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THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF POLITICAL CONSUMERISM

edited by Magnus Bostrom, Michele Micheletti, and Peter Oosterveer [Oxford Handbooks, Oxford University Press, 9780190629038]

The global phenomenon of political consumerism is known through such diverse manifestations as corporate boycotts, increased preferences for organic and fairtrade products, and lifestyle choices such as veganism. It has also become an area of increasing research across a variety of disciplines. Political consumerism uses consumer power to change institutional or market practices that are found ethically, environmentally, or politically objectionable. Through such actions, the goods offered on the consumer market are problematized and politicized. Distinctions between consumers and citizens and between the economy and politics collapse. **THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF POLITICAL CONSUMERISM** offers the first comprehensive theoretical and comparative overview of the ways in which the market becomes a political arena. It maps the four major forms of political consumerism: boycotting, buycotting (spending to show support), lifestyle politics, and discursive actions, such as culture jamming. Chapters by leading scholars examine political consumerism in different locations and industry sectors, and in consideration of environmental and human rights problems, political events, and the ethics of production and manufacturing practices. This volume offers a thorough exploration of the phenomenon and its myriad dilemmas, involving religion, race, nationalism, gender relations, animals, and our common future. Moreover, the Handbook takes stock of political consumerism's effectiveness in solving complex global problems and its use to both promote and impede democracy.

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Studying Political Consumerism

Excerpt: Globalized trade opens up numerous opportunities for corporations to produce and market goods in ways inconceivable in the past. Today there are more affordable goods for sale and more different kinds of goods on the marketplace than imaginable in the past. Consumer society has become an integral part of most citizens' lives globally. Consumption now plays a crucial role in constructing personal identities. While these developments have created economic growth and offered consumers more opportunities to enjoy various freedoms, they have also come at great societal costs. Clearly it is no longer possible to avoid thinking about how production and consumption affect broader societal affairs at home and abroad.

The examples are numerous. Smart phones offer opportunities to connect with others close by and across the globe. This is a positive development. But, as discussed in this Handbook (see Chapter 18), the metals necessary for most electronics—coltan, tantalum, tin, tungsten, gold, and others—are often mined using forced labour in conflict areas in sub-Saharan Africa, and they are often illegally traded before ending up in our mobile phones. The negative developments do not stop there. Illegal mining for these metals has caused a considerable fall in the gorilla population in these areas. There is even a negative side to other forms of common consumer practices. Eating meat contributes to climate change, while cultivating soy to feed livestock is a major driver of deforestation in the Amazon basin. Savoring a chocolate might well be connected to child labour and slavery in the harvesting of cocoa for the global chocolate market in Western Africa. Problems with child labour, bad working conditions, and environmental problems associated with textile production are a daily part of the fast fashion industry (see Chapter 14). When consumers buy a smart phone, eat certain kinds of food, or decide to lift their spirits with new attire, they connect to serious societal issues at a distance. There are alarming reports on these matters. Civil society and governments are reacting, and attempts have been made to raise consumer awareness about the societal problems linked with production and consumption.

Political consumerism can be defined as market-oriented engagements emerging from societal concerns associated with production and consumption. Acts of production and consumption are, therefore, considered as more than purely private matters about business profit-making and individual consumer preference based on a cost-benefit analysis when buying goods. Most prominent therein is the relationships among goods offered on the consumer market and political events and developments, environmental and human rights problems and worries, and the ethics of production and manufacturing practices. Political consumerism also involves various moral challenges concerning religion, race, ethnicity, family, gender relations, animals, and our common future (Stolle & Micheletti, 2013). In political consumerism, the strict separation between consumers and citizens and between economy and politics collapses. This crossing of the boundaries among these different spheres and the hybridization of social roles require extensive reflection and research on the phenomenon of political consumerism (Warde, 2015).

An important assumption in political consumerism is that consumers potentially can and in certain circumstances do collectively influence societal developments through what they decide to purchase, what they decide not to purchase, and how they relate to consumption in general through discourses and lifestyle projects. Starting from social movements' concerns and expanding into lifestyle politics and issues of ethical and sustainable procurement within public and private organizations, political consumerism has grown into a significant force for handling complex and tough problems in different domains of production and consumption and in transnational and multilevel settings.

This Handbook includes six thematically divided parts. This introductory chapter introduces the study of political consumerism, the thematic parts, and summarizes the chapters within each part. The thematic parts focus on (1) historical routes of political consumerism, (2) theory and designing research on political consumerism, (3) industry sectors of political consumerism, (4) the geographic spread and practice of political consumerism, (5) democratic paradoxes and challenges in political consumerism, and (6) the problem-solving potential of political consumerism. The concluding chapter highlights important thematic issues within the chapters in each part and across parts, discussing research challenges and the future directions of political consumer scholarship. Before introducing the Handbook parts, the discussion briefly elaborates how the study of political consumerism has developed and introduces the four basic action forms.

Political Consumerism and its Study

Recent scholarship views political consumerism as a complex multilevel phenomenon. It involves numerous societal actors and structural conditions associated with consumption-related acts taking place within a wide variety of societal institutions on different levels of society. This scholarship acknowledges the interdependencies and interactions among actors and institutions in different contexts. It also points at the significance of similar practices even before the full development of contemporary and globalized mass-consumer society, as discussed in the first part on political consumerism's historical routes. However, unlike the past, contemporary political consumer actors and institutions engage increasingly with the complexities of globalized production and consumption. The current understanding of the phenomenon leads, therefore, to an expansion of the original definition of political consumerism focusing primarily on individual consumers' economic transactions. This more nuanced understanding concerns its action forms, levels of activity and institutional and structural prerequisites (Micheletti, 2010; Stolle & Micheletti, 2013). Researchers now systematically study four basic action forms: (1) boycotts (refusing to purchase a good based on societal concerns about production and consumption), (2) buycotts (purchasing a good for such reasons), (3) discursive political

consumerism (communicative actions), and (4) lifestyle political consumerism (more profound changes in lifestyle practices) (Micheletti, 2010; Stolle & Micheletti, 2013).

These four forms demonstrate how the study of political consumerism has developed over time. They also illustrate that the orientations towards market-based practices range from confrontational to cooperative. Boycotts, also termed "negative political consumer action" (cf. Friedman, 1999), often involve a confrontational approach and rhetoric. The civil groups behind them tend to use strong critical arguments to mobilize individuals to boycott a particular good produced not only by a corporation but also, at times, even from a country. They put strong demands on their boycott targets and threaten to start or continue their boycott campaigns if their demands are not met. The decades-long Nestle boycott is a good example (Bromberg Bar Yam, 1995; Johnson, 1986). Buycotts rely more on cooperative strategies; they are also termed "positive political consumer action" (cf. Andersen & Tobiasen, 2004; Friedman, 1999). Buycott campaigners ask consumers to purchase a particular good in the same category, for instance organic rather than conventional coffee. Over the years, buycotting activities have developed into stakeholder partnerships in which civil society organizations collaborate with corporations, and at times governments, thus demonstrating the structural ramifications of politicizing production and consumption with labelling schemes as the clearest example. Discursive political consumerism, the third form, is well known as confrontational culture jamming of iconic corporations and their clever logos and slogans. This can be humorous, confrontational antibranding communication that targets a transnational corporation for lacking a sense of societal responsibility for labour and environmental practices in its outsourced manufacturing in the developing world, as illustrated by the culture jamming attacks on Nike's slogans and brand name (Stolle & Micheletti, 2013, chap. 6). In this form of political consumerism, corporate brands are not only the target of activism but also its source, medium, and message board. Discursive tactics can help consumers reflect on their consumption practices and mobilize them into lifestyle political consumerism. This fourth form involves overhauling one's lifestyle practices in the consumption field. Thus, this form tends to include the other three action forms. It can develop into a deep general commitment that changes how a person lives her life. Good examples discussed in this Handbook are veganism, voluntary simplicity, and slow food (see also Pentina & Amos,).

An important contribution from this recent conceptualization is the recognition that political consumerism is a multilevel phenomenon, which involves more than an individual's behaviour and practices. There is a greater focus on the phenomenon's social-movement networking, institution building, international character, and the facilitating role played by the state. This trend signifies scholarly interest in political consumerism as a part of transnational governance relationships. Another important aspect is the organizational setting for political consumerism.

Scholars map and analyse the civic groups and networks that communicate and mobilize for political consumer causes. They focus on how these groups raise awareness about the politics of various products and nudge individuals into using the marketplace as an arena for politics. Labour unions, environmental groups, human rights networks, and specialized groups emerging for specific causes are examples of civil society organizations involved in political consumerism. New institutional arrangements, such as labelling and product certification, form another significant part of contemporary political consumerism. Even government actors increasingly act as collective or institutional political consumers, although they are constrained by trade regulations, procurement legislation, and the obligation to use taxpayers' money effectively. The ethics and sustainability of procurement activities is a

growing field of concern within families, civil society, businesses, and governmental institutions. At times governments help facilitate political consumerism, as shown in several Handbook chapters.

Noteworthy is the growth in the "self-interest" and "feel-good" framing of political consumerism, such as in the slow food movement and the marketing of organic and fairtrade products. There are different views on this development. Some scholars and societal observers consider this development as positive because it encourages a greater number of consumers to buy "better" goods; others consider it as negative because it encourages more consumption and "ethical fetishism" (Guthman, 2009), which is a kind of ethical whitewashing of the ideological causes historically behind political consumer campaigns. Nevertheless, political consumerism has given rise to new initiatives in organizing consumers and developing new governance arrangements. Particularly buycotting, which relies more or less on innovative rule-making initiatives, often begins outside governmental arenas (Bartley, 2007; Bostrom & Klintman, 2008; Busch, 2000, Cashore et al., 2004; Pattberg, 2007; Ponte et al., 2011).

Additionally, there are important temporal and spatial components in political consumerism. They change through history and do not develop in the same way everywhere. Neither the category of politics nor the category of consumption remains constant over time, and both have different meanings around the world, as shown clearly in the Handbook chapters. Core macro-level processes, identified by terms like "globalization" (with economic, technological, cultural, and political variants), "individualization," "postmodernization," "reflexive modernization," and "social acceleration" (Rosa, 2013), capture the major shifts affecting societal affairs at multiple levels. They also shed important light on political consumerism's background conditions. One core macrotrend is the diminishing regulatory capacity of government, which assumes both structural and cultural dimensions. Structurally, it involves the shrinkage of governmental (state) authority and action capacity; this development is compensated with more plural, transnational, and networking types of politics. The term for this development is "governance," which implies a more complex and fluid political setting. Culturally, the change involves the emergence of more focused concerns for the global environment and global human rights, broad processes of individualization, that is, the personalization of politics associated with so-called postmaterialistic values. Importantly, the Handbook's chapters also demonstrate an increased relevance of studying the impact of religious traditions and movements in political consumerism both historically and contemporarily (see Stolle & Micheletti, 2013, chap. 4, for an initial discussion).

Historical Routes of Political Consumerism

The chapters in the first part explore two important historical examples that have inspired latter-day political consumer activities across the world. In their chapter "The Development of Political Consumerism in India: A Historical Perspective," Hari Sreekumar and Rohit Varman analyse trends in political consumerism in India between the fifteenth and twenty-first centuries, a period coinciding with the country's colonial era and independence period. Particularly in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, political consumerism was a form of resistance against colonial rule, with Mahatma Gandhi's campaigns as well-known illustrations. Noteworthy is that the same ideology, swadeshi, is now used to support a neoliberal, conservative, and nationalist political agenda. For instance, not eating beef was used to show Hindu superiority to counter colonial oppression, but nowadays this is used to suppress Dalits, Muslims, and other marginalized groups in modern India. The authors argue that, in the context of rapid economic developments in India, there is room for developing forms of political consumerism that fit this contemporary context instead of relying on the anticolonialist and nationalist forms of the past. Johan Nicolaas Wilhelm de Jager presents an extensive overview of South African political consumer activities during the apartheid era in his chapter "Political Consumerism in the South African and British

Anti-Apartheid Movements: The Historical Role of Consumer Boycott Campaigns." As conventional democratic instruments to create political change became increasingly inaccessible and ineffective, the anti-apartheid movement developed market-based strategies to mobilize consumers in the struggle. When these activities were brutally suppressed in South Africa, international consumer boycott campaigns became a potential alternative. These consumer boycott campaigns did not create significant economic pressure on the apartheid state. However, they did unite people, groups, and communities within South Africa and in the rest of the world in the struggle against a violent and discriminatory political system.

Theory and Designing Research on Political Consumerism

Since political consumerism is an increasingly multifaceted phenomenon, its analysis requires a plurality of theoretical perspectives, methodological approaches, and empirical materials. There is not only one correct way to study the phenomenon, though some approaches have dominated over others. This part of the Handbook offers diverse theoretical and methodological approaches to studying political consumerism and insights into the role of major societal changes that have changed and moulded the phenomenon. The chapters—both individually and collectively—discuss the design of political consumerism research and ideas about research topics, including methodological advice and tips on appropriate empirical case material. The authors also openly discuss the strengths and weaknesses of their theoretical approaches. Some chapters encourage scholars to dare to be innovative; others challenge conventional theorizing of political consumerism. In sum, this part offers comparative insights into common themes while also identifying theoretical debates on best approaches for studying the phenomenon.

Political scientists working on political consumerism have traditionally viewed the phenomenon as a form of political participation, focusing on the motivations of individuals to engage in market-based activities and comparing them with other forms of participation (e.g., voting and joining political organizations). An important finding has been that political consumers are generally highly politically active and that political consumerism complements rather than replaces ("crowds out") conventional forms of participation. Surveys help these scholars gather data on the "who, how, and why" of individual political consumers' participation (particularly in the easily measured forms of boycotts and buycotts) and analyse the importance of such common research factors as gender, socioeconomic status, political interest, knowledge, ideology, and worries. This research began in the northern hemisphere, but scholars have applied its design, survey questions, and even theoretical assumptions to studies of the Global South. Several Handbook chapters critically discuss how well this theorizing travels when studying other parts of the world.

Protest and social movement scholarship represents another classical way of studying political consumerism. The focus of this part of the Handbook begins with a fresh look at this theoretical approach. In her chapter "Protest, Social Movements, and Spaces for Politically Oriented Consumerist Actions-Nationally, Transnationally, and Locally" Francesca Forno discusses how the relationship between social movements and political consumerism has evolved. She shows how globalization and individualization processes, which are two major societal changes, have altered the way social movements engage with political consumerism, illustrating this with research on how social movement organizations and networks, after the short-lived Global Justice movement of the early 2000S, used political consumerism to reposition themselves. In certain countries, governmental austerity policies and degrowth spurred the building of new alliances for alternative production and consumption. Here political consumerism became a vehicle for creating and reinforcing solidarity ties, which helped

implement collective action around distinctive political projects of local, sustainable community movements. Forno views this as a new social imaginary supported by a generalized value-based, alternative political lifestyle opposed to consumerism as a fundament of the dominant economic and political order. This illustrates how social movements use alter-and-anticonsumerism to create new dimensions in politics. Can we speak of an emerging political consumer movement? Mario Diani's chapter "Modes of Coordination in Political Consumerism" helps with an answer by analysing whether a social movement can develop from forms of action primarily consisting of personal individual-oriented market-based actions. He defines social movements as having a collective identity reliant on relational processes involving a series of decisions, including resource allocation, collective representation, identification of opponents, solidarity feeling, and mutual obligatory bonds. Do these factors characterize political consumer groups? His analysis and empirical overview of different political consumer mobilizations (e.g., slow food, the Nestle boycott, etc.) show that the political consumer repertoire of actions (the four forms) has organizational, community-building, and collaborative potential but generally tends to lack a strong source of collective identity persisting over time. Thus, as also underscored in Forno's chapter, political consumerism is presently more a tool or method for organizing and mobilizing people than a political project in itself. Therefore, it should not be characterized as a full social movement.

Behavioural economics is possibly the latest discipline to show interest in political consumerism. This research perspective combines economic logic with psychological, social, cognitive, and emotional factors to understand how we make economic decisions. Sebastian Berger's chapter "A Behavioural Economic Perspective on Political Consumerism" views boycotting and buycotting as the exercise of prosocial preferences transcending the standard economic assumption about self-interested individuals. He stresses that altruistic motivations do not immediately trigger action because individuals need information on the role of consumption in societal developments (a kind of literacy), events and actions that remind them of this (issue saliency), and a sense of the importance of individual behaviour in problem solving (pivotality). Investment market experiments illustrate this. Berger discusses "nudging" (the designing of choice situations to steer individuals toward prosocial consumer choices). He maintains that more innovation in collective thinking is necessary to design choice situations that nudge more people to act in politically, ethically, and environmentally responsible ways in the marketplace.

However, Peter Oosterveer, Gert Spaargaren, and Sanneke Kloppenburg disagree with Berger's conclusion. Their chapter "Political Consumerism and the Social-Practice Perspective" considers nudging as an outside trigger that simply attempts to push around consumers rather than to change their general relation to consumption. The social-practice approach poses an interesting theoretical contrast to Berger's and other approaches by taking a strong theoretical stance against the Attitude, Behaviour, Choice (ABC) paradigm used in much consumer policymaking globally, including nudging. The authors assume instead that consumers can be assigned a more (pro) active or reflexive role in affecting social change "from the inside." This sociologically inspired approach focuses on consumer-oriented everyday practices and how they can change for the betterment of society. They discuss the complexities and challenges involved in, for instance, encouraging people to ride a bike rather than drive a car, to use less energy, and to eat more sustainably. These choices involve many skills, more reflexivity, and a more complex series of decisions than is assumed in simple ABC policymaking and nudging.

Illustrations of the difficulties in switching to a new, more sustainable, and political consumer-oriented-practice are offered in "Veganism and Plant-Based Eating: Analysis of Interplay Between Discursive Strategies and Lifestyle Political Consumerism" by Piia Jallinoja, Markus Vinnari, and Mari Niva. This

chapter gives additional arguments for how and why scholars should not classify political consumerism as an emerging social movement. While there has been increased mobilization around vegan and plant-based diets, the discursive and lifestyle modes of coordination lack a developed collective identity. Some plant-based-diet supporters are clearly opposed to eating animals for other-oriented values (e.g., animal rights). But flexitarians choose less meat-eating for other social reasons and/or self-oriented reasons (e.g., healthism, habitus). Savvy mobilization through social media and celebrities, and the aesthetic presentation of vegan and plant-based food as cool and healthy, explain its boost and popularity. Therefore, the authors view this new food practice as an assemblage of interacting actors engaging in political consumer actions as a way of living in neoliberal consumer society but without adhering to any coherent and common goal.

Many Handbook contributions mention the significant role of the media and mediated relations in political consumerism. Mundo Yang and Sigrid Baringhorst's chapter "Studying Media Within Political Consumerism: Past and Present" is, therefore, a particularly welcome contribution. Their topic is challenging. Scholarship on the media's role in political consumerism is scarce. Along with the growing complexity and globalization of the phenomenon, the media have also evolved as have the theories for studying it further. The authors stress the media's importance in helping actors and institutions overcome collective action problems or disconnections within political consumerism brought on by the more individualized and scattered nature of the phenomenon. A key finding is that scholars should not assume that political consumerism takes place only in the world of mass media (the old media situation). Today's reality involves new alternative media and a rising importance of individual media consumers as coproducers (so-called produsers) of media content. They critically discuss exciting examples of "old" and "new" media school studies of political consumerism and identify important research gaps.

Readers might get the impression that political consumer scholarship only involves researchers curious about individuals, families, and communities engaging with societal concerns. This is not the case. More scholars focus now on other aspects of the phenomenon, including the role of corporate brands and globalized supply chains. In his chapter "Rejecting and Embracing Brands in Political Consumerism," Magnus Bostrom discusses the importance of high-profile brands in political consumerism. Indirectly, he also engages with Berger's discussion on issue saliency: consumer knowledge of big brands explains why attacking them leads to media publicity that furthers the political consumer struggle. Culture jamming, identified as the most spectacular kind of discursive political consumerism, is an excellent illustration here. Bostrom argues that scholars should also consider how and why brands are important for understanding contemporary society and politics. He views them as a cultural resource for consumers (e.g., brand communities), a symbolic resource for corporations (symbolic capital), and a means of corporate cultivation (the branding process). Bostrom finds the concepts of frontstage (brands' public face) and backstage (corporate reasoning on their reputation and legitimacy) useful for understanding business reactions to political consumer criticism and protests. He encourages more research on brand rejection to investigate lifestyle variants of political consumerism.

Political consumerism also interests scholars of institutions and governance, particularly in relation to the effects of globalization processes. Two chapters directly address this topic. "Globalization, Governance Gaps, and the Emergence of New Institutions for Political Consumerism" by Lars H. Gulbrandsen discusses the critical importance of globalization processes in explaining political consumerism's rise from the 198os onward. He focuses on nonstate regulation and governance initiatives within sustainability certification. Important chapter themes are trade liberalization and neoliberal ideology, the growth of transnational advocacy networks involving (nongovernmental

organizations [NGOs]), and the rise of global supply chains, all of which are key factors in the emergence of sustainability certification schemes in the forest, fishery, and labour sectors. Gulbrandsen argues for researching "governance gaps" (i.e., the distance between steps taken to address a collective action problem and a collectively optimal governance solution) when examining their rise and performance. He shows how nongovernmental and intergovernmental processes as well as organizations in complex systems of governance play instrumental roles in institutionalizing certification. Additionally, transnational corporations embrace sustainability certification to position themselves in competitive consumer markets and to give them maneuverability to put forth industry-friendly certification standards. Since tensions easily develop within certification schemes, it is important to study how involved actors understand and respond to them.

Gavin Fridell's chapter "Conceptualizing Political Consumerism as Part of the Global Value Chain" stresses the importance of carefully studying the role of values in global supply chains as an integral part of political consumer. The global value chain approach examines globalized networks and sites of labour and production processes and more directly integrates a southern and gendered-economy perspective into the analysis. Fridell argues for looking beyond the relationship between northern-based individual consumers and consumer commodities (an exchange relation approach) to a much wider social relations approach. Examples from the global jeans and coffee industries illustrate how this approach enriches research on political consumerism's impact (or effectiveness) as a mechanism for change. This theoretical perspective directs scholarly attention to the regulatory, cultural, and institutional environments that embed political consumerism, in particular power relations. This approach expands political consumer study. Fridell also gives some cautionary advice about the weaknesses of this approach, including the tendency to focus on lead firms, to neglect some industries, and to focus on market-driven projects like fair trade that reflect powerful northern fantasies about the exaggerated power of political consumers.

In sum, the second part offers different scientific approaches that theoretically innovate the research field. The two chapters on behavioural economics and social practices offer conflicting advice to policymakers. Other chapters call for a more nuanced view of the drivers behind political consumerism and political consumerism's significance for social bonding and connectivity. Scholars are encouraged to view certification as experimental governance and to develop research strategies to study governance efforts for coordination. The chapters also call for methodological innovations, including longitudinal and comparative studies (even across geographically stretched supply chains) and more fieldwork in order to gain a richer understanding of the different contexts involved in political consumerism.

Industry Sectors and Political Consumerism

Political consumerism has developed differently in different industry sectors and for different types of goods and services. In some sectors there are prevalent boycott activities (e.g., fashion; see Chapter 14); in others there are more discursive political consumer actions (e.g., toys; see Chapter 15). In other sectors, there are many buycott arrangements, including ecolabels, fairtrade labels, and certification schemes (e.g., on food, see Chapter 13; on seafood, see Chapter 16). For political consumer research, it is important to learn more about what supply-and demand-side factors facilitate and inhibit political consumer activities and arrangements. Typically, these include technological, economic, cultural, political, and geographical factors. The third part of the Handbook is devoted to industry sector analyses.

Even if industry comparison is an understudied topic in political consumer research, various scholars have engaged in these questions; often, however, they focus on one sector at a time. This scholarship,

and the Handbook chapters in this part, apply some of the broad theoretical perspectives reviewed in the preceding part. First, the study and theorizing of new institutions, including a growing field that focuses on standards, certifications, multistakeholders, and public-private partnerships, provides new governance and regulatory frameworks for political consumerism in some sectors (see Chapter ii). This scholarship focuses primarily on buycott arrangements. For example, earlier research has documented the vast amount of organizing and legitimacy-seeking efforts required to build and institutionalize trustworthy buycotting arrangements in sectors such as food, forestry, and fisheries (Bartley, 2007; Bush et al., 2013; Cashore et al., 2004; Mol & Oosterveer, 2015; Spaargaren & Oosterveer, 2010; Tamm Hallstrom & Bostrom, 2010). Second, global value chain literature (see Chapter 12) emphasizes how economic globalization; increased offshore production; complex supply chains; and increased geographical, political, and cultural distance between production and consumption sites in many sectors create governance challenges and make it harder for consumers to perceive and address the social and environmental impacts of production (Bostrom et al., 2015; Bush et al., 2015; Locke, 2013). Political consumer arrangements are set up to cope with these challenges, which scholarship discusses in terms of responsible and/or sustainable supply chain management (De Bakker & Nijhof, 2002; Seuring & Mueller, 2008). A third research stream focuses more on the consumer demand side and on how political consumer action, or the lack thereof, relates to the provision of different types of goods and services. Social practice theory is growing as an analytical lens (see Chapter 7). The chapters in this part use the accumulated theorizing to study how different goods, services, and devices are embedded and interconnected in everyday life. For example, food should be understood as more than just something to eat. Only a larger contextual understanding of it helps in explaining if, how, and to what extent food can be an issue for political consumer consideration. A fourth topic of study, also seen in the chapters in this part, is how global/local social-movement mobilization and activism engage in boycotting and culture jamming that targets the reputation of large corporate brands (see chapters 9 and 10).

Chapters in this part identify the opportunities and barriers of political consumerism as related to a variety of consumer products, services, and devices and study both supply- and demand-side factors and how they interact. They discuss how supply-side factors relate to sociopolitical factors, new technologies, public regulation, availability of credible information arrangements, and the extent and character of the public campaigns and framings connected to particular consumer products and services. The chapters in this part also evaluate how demand-side factors relate to societal values and norms; the dynamics of consumer culture; and new lifestyle experiments, movements, and practices. This part provides some answers as to why certain consumer products and services are more associated with politics, ethics, and morality than others and what types of problems are easier or more difficult to express through the politicization of consumer goods and the different forms of political consumerism. The concluding chapter gets back to this general comparison.

Scholars generally consider food a successful example of mobilizing consumers, framed through a number of societal issues such as sustainability, public health, animal rights, and global justice. Bente Halkier's chapter "Political Food Consumerism between Mundane Routines and Organizational Alliance-Building" focuses on political food consumerism and highlights not just famous boycott campaigns (e.g., the Nestle boycott) but also the dominant role of buycotting and lifestyle political consumerism in this sector. She also discusses how food consumption as a mundane and embodied type of consumption shapes political consumerism in this industry sector.

Compared to food, the textile sector has less developed political consumerism. In the chapter "Utilizing Political Consumerism to Challenge the 21st Century Fast Fashion Industry," Kim Y. Hiller Connell

examines political consumerism in the context of the (fundamentally unsustainable) global fashion industry. The chapter provides a brief history of the movements against the socially, environmentally, and economically objectionable and politicized practices within the industry. The author then shows how the strategy of boycotts (and to a considerable extent discursive tactics) has been and still is the dominant form of political consumerism in the sector. Although buycotting and interesting new lifestyle experiments increase in importance, these forms face considerable barriers in becoming mainstream, and consumer engagement is still relatively low.

The toy industry has historically been subject to a broad array of political consumer reactions. As Mikael Klintman argues in his chapter "Toy Consumption as Political: Challenges for Making Dreams Come True this is due to the fact that children constitute a particular consumer/user group. Concerns relate to certain values promoted via toys and games (e.g., violence, gender stereotypes), chemicals and other health hazards related to toys, environmental problems caused by toy production and disposal, and norms of mass consumption and aggressive marketing to children. So far, the concerns have mostly been channelled into discursive political consumerism and governmental regulation but not much on political consumer labelling. The chapter discusses reasons behind this pattern, as well as a number of facilitating factors (e.g., strong dependence on reputation in this sector) and constraining influences (e.g., long supply chains) that affect political consumerism in the toy industry.

The seafood sector has seen a range of NGO-led boycott and buycott initiatives in the 2000S. In "The Shifting Politics of Sustainable Seafood Consumerism," Simon R. Bush and Cathy A. Roheim show that many of the buycott initiatives have been formalized into political consumer institutions and tools, such as certification and ecolabels, recommendation lists, improvement projects and benchmarks, and systems for traceability. A network of actors, including producers, retailers, celebrity chefs, and a broad sustainability seafood movement consisting of various NGOs and philanthropic family foundations, are involved in developing and shaping political consumerism in this sector.

The above chapters focus mainly on tangible items—that is, goods. An intangible and complex social phenomenon such as tourism can also be commodified and hence become a field for political consumer actions. In "Political Consumerism for Sustainable Tourism: A Review," Machiel Lamers, Jeroen Nawijn, and Eke Eijgelaar analyse the constraints and opportunities of political consumerism for sustainable tourism, a sector with significant social and environmental impacts, including climate change problems. But the role of tourist consumers in driving sustainable tourism has remained weak and inconsistent. There are initiatives such as boycotts, slow travel, conservation tourism, "voluntourism," and a fragmented field of buycotting arrangements. Nevertheless, the authors present the sector as generally lagging behind with respect to sustainable consumption and political consumerism. They discuss, for example, explanations connected to the "home and away gap," which is the willingness among consumers to participate in environmental pro action in and around the home while the transference of these practices to tourism contexts is often problematic (see also Barr et al., 2010). Difficulties include considerations of mobility and the complex organization of tourism services.

Natural resource extraction industries is the topic of the next chapter, "Political Consumerism in the Oil and Mining Extractive Industries: Possibilities for Sustainability and Social Justice." Mark C. J. Stoddart, Max Chewinski, B. Quinn Burt, and Megan Stewart focus on political consumer mobilization targeting oil and mineral extraction. They show that these actions are present where there are particularly dramatic examples of violations of social or environmental well-being, as well as clear corporate or government wrongdoers who can be targeted with, for example, culture jamming tactics.

The term "blood diamonds" has become a powerful emotional metaphor. The chapter demonstrates the difficulties in achieving effective political consumerism in this sector because of the diffuse and pervasive nature of oil and minerals in contemporary consumer societies. However, the recent fossil fuel divestment movement is portrayed as innovative.

One sector with perhaps even lower levels of political consumerism activity is household appliances and electronics, despite the massive social and environmental implications caused by their production, consumption, disposal, and rapid replacement. Various initiatives are described in the chapter "Household Appliances and Electronics: Discussing the Relative Absence of Political Consumerism" by Toke Haunstrup Christensen, Kirsten Gram-Hanssen, and Mette Hove Jacobsen. Political consumer efforts such as the Fairphone, sharing economies, or repairing movements occupy extremely limited niche markets. The chapter documents the relative absence of political consumerism in this field and discusses how it can be understood in relation to various social drivers (e.g., peer pressure) behind (increased) consumption (see also Chapter 40).

Some of the chapters discussed so far have paid attention to the role of new technologies, particularly ICT, in providing new means for political consumerism. This part's final chapter, "Energy Devices and Political Consumerism in Reconfigured Energy Systems," focuses more systematically on this topic. Can political consumerism play a role in the transformation towards a low-carbon electricity system? By analysing the energy sector, Sanneke Kloppenburg and Bas van Vliet demonstrate how new technologies, deregulation, and privatization have opened up market spaces for western or northern consumers to influence the greening of energy provision and consumption. Electricity system reconfiguration creates a growing diversity of homebased energy devices that engage consumers in using energy in new and altered ways. Through smart meters, solar panels, and home batteries, passive energy users change into "prosumers." Energy devices thus produce new action possibilities for consumers to contribute to decarbonization of the electricity system as (collective) consumers and producers at the same time (prosumers). The two last chapters presented offer good illustrations of the relevance of a social-practice perspective for studying political consumerism.

Seen together, this part's chapters demonstrate the relevance of paying particular attention to political consumerism in different industry sectors and offer important insights into why opportunities and barriers of political consumerism differ. They show that these differences relate to both supply-and demand-side factors and to issues of culture, mass media, economy, technology, politics, regulation, and geography.

The Geographic Spread and Practice Of Political Consumerism

Scholarship on political consumerism must be sensitive to different structural and cultural characteristics. Political consumerism is often associated with the social-liberal welfare state and market-based capitalism in the northwestern part of the world. To better understand the phenomenon generally, it is important to also ask about its presence and character in other geographical areas. Are there inhibiting and/or facilitating factors in other political contexts that play a role in its emergence elsewhere? Such differences may affect its significance in specific regional or national contexts. By comparing the forms and spread of political consumerism in different countries and regions, we can further enhance our knowledge about the conditions under which it thrives or fails.

Political consumerism flourishes primarily in the northern hemisphere where concerns about the negative effects or consequences of continued technological and industrial development and of growing

international trade became increasingly apparent in the 1980s. At the same time, governmental institutions came under pressure because they did not prove to be effective enough in dealing with environmental and social problems. There were governance gaps. Moreover, these countries generally had well-educated populations, at a certain level of well-being, with free access to various means of communication. Against this background, political consumerism burgeoned in Northwestern Europe and the United States as an innovation in solving complex problems concerning human rights and environmental degradation (Micheletti, 2010; Micheletti et al., 2003).

In other geographical areas, political consumerism, as shown in this part, takes different shapes and forms. In some emerging economies, like South Africa, the growing middle class has become an important target for various ethical consumption initiatives (Harrison et al., 2005; Hughes et al., 2015). Making connections between transnational networks with global concerns and their local expressions is essential for successful transformations in production and manufacturing practices. In some countries, political consumerism seems less steered by recognized altruistic ethical or political concerns and more by individualistic worries about personal and family health and safety (Hoi et al., 2009; Oosterveer et al., 2007). Nevertheless, these self-oriented concerns may be expressed in political consumer initiatives seeking to transform production practices. A rather different development in market-oriented consumer activism is forthcoming in countries that have undergone recent economic and financial crisis (Lekakis, 2015).

The chapters in this part contribute to a comparison of the global spread and practice of political consumerism's four forms. They offer data on its presence and practice in different regional and national settings and include empirical material as well as some methodological advice for studying the phenomenon in specific geographic areas. The chapters address the regions that have dominated the debate and scholarship (e.g., Northwestern Europe and North America) and include regions where political consumerism is a more recent phenomenon (e.g., Central and Eastern Europe) and where it takes different forms (e.g., the Middle East, Africa, and Asia). The regions that have received less attention are particularly interesting because they include countries with booming economies (China and Thailand) or developing ones (Middle East and Africa), with different political histories (Central and Eastern Europe and Latin America), and with different political consumer strategies (Southern Europe and Latin America).

Northwestern Europe is the first geographical area reviewed. Joost de Moor and Philip Balsiger, in their chapter "Political Consumerism in Northwestern Europe: Leading by Example?," illustrate political consumerism's spread and diversity in this region, which has been extensively studied. They use the wealth of available empirical data (in particular, of a quantitative character) to illustrate the depth and spread of the different forms of political consumerism. Still, they find it difficult to assess the phenomenon's political impact and to evaluate whether political consumerism is a valuable and effective strategy for solving societal problems. Southern Europe has witnessed a different kind of political consumerism. Eleftheria J. Lekakis and Francesca Forno start their chapter, "Political Consumerism in Southern Europe," with the observation that surveys generally show a lower rate of political consumerism in Southern European countries. However, a closer examination shows that consumers here may focus less on boycotts and buycotts and instead invest more in communitarian and local collective actions not easily measured in surveys. Therefore, political consumerism should not be considered as individualistic but to include collective organization of food production, distribution and consumption. This "social turn" broadens the concept of political consumerism and has great potential to encourage new forms of empirical research. Lena Pellandini-Simanyi and Emese Gulyas's chapter,

"Political Consumerism in Central and Eastern Europe," questions whether political consumerism in Eastern Europe can simply be understood as lagging behind Western Europe and shows this is not the case. When mapping political consumerism in these countries, they observe some important consumer-oriented activities embedded in everyday life. Consumers make choices requiring little or no additional costs, such as energy-saving options. Several conditions, including consumer willingness to engage in political consumerism and to further expand such forms of political consumerism, are present in Central and Eastern Europe.

North America is another region with a long history of market-based political activism. Meredith A. Katz shows in her chapter "Boycotting and Buycotting in Consumer Cultures: Political Consumerism in North America" how early consumer boycotting and buycotting campaigns were organized in the United States by women's organizations to protect workers' rights. Her historical overview leads to a discussion on contemporary forms of political consumerism using social media and a plea for more research on these innovative instruments for political consumerism. Fatima Portilho and Michele Micheletti, in their chapter "Politicizing Consumption in Latin America: stress not only that political consumerism in Latin America relates to the production of labelled goods for the northern market but also that the region has a unique tradition of politicizing consumption. In particular, the social movements opposing the neoliberal capitalist system incorporate political consumerism in their repertoire but focus their actions rather on the parliamentary arena than on the market. Africa and the Middle East constitutes the region reviewed by Peter Oosterveer, Laurent Glin, and Michele Micheletti in "Tracing Political Consumerism in Africa and the Middle East:' They describe different initiatives that illustrate how (forms of modern) consumption in Africa are discussed in moral terms, often related to excessive (western) lifestyles and corruption. Africa is at the same time, as a producing continent, also linked to global supply chains that make political consumer behaviour possible in richer countries through fairtrade and organically labelled products. In the Middle East and North Africa, religious controversies are very prominent. To understand this region's political consumerism, it appears necessary to study the connections with economic, religious, and political dynamics around the world.

Two chapters on Asia conclude this part. First, Zhang Lei, Wenling Liu, and Peter Oosterveer show in "Institutional Changes and Changing Political Consumerism in China" how the communist political system with its limited economic freedom has made way for rapid economic development and a rise of the middle classes. The unique Chinese institutional context gives political consumerism a particular framing, especially with respect to state-market dynamics as the government is still leading while private initiatives are less prominent. Still, it remains an open question whether or not consumers will, in the future, be politically motivated in their everyday consumer choices and opt for more environmentally friendly products. In the chapter on Thailand, "Facilitating Political Consumerism in an Emerging Economy: The Case of Political Consumerism in Thailand," Kanang Kantamaturapoj, Natapol Thongplew, and Suwit Wibulpolprasert review several recent cases of political consumerism, which illustrate its diversity in Thailand in terms of actors involved, forms used, and agendas set. In doing so, they portray the importance of social media in Thailand for mobilizing consumers. These chapters underline the importance of keeping an open view on the multiple ways in which political consumerism may acquire its particular form in the Global South where political systems and cultures differ.

Seen together, this part's chapters offer interesting insights into the significant geographical, economic, and political diversity involved in political consumerism globally. @There are differences in the dynamics and relationships in the field of political consumerism and in how and why it is being regionalized.

Democratic Paradoxes and Challenges in Political Consumerism

Political consumerism scholars typically study the phenomenon as a new form of globalized democratic governance and democratic responsibility-taking on the part of consumers individually and collectively. Often they equate political consumerism with ethical or sustainable consumption. Whereas this research tradition has studied many challenging issues around the realization of ethical/sustainable consumption, it can be criticized for not seriously addressing examples that do not include a democratic spirit or promote democratic societal development. This part thus focuses on how political consumerism can hinder the pursuit of democracy by threatening political and social equality and supporting undemocratic ideologies and values. The chapters discuss how political consumerism can promote and even institutionalize discrimination and undemocratic practices as well as how it may marginalize ethnic and racial groups economically and socially. It is of utmost importance to consider how and why political consumerism is currently also being used as an excluding mechanism in the globalized world.

The part's chapters show several historical and contemporary examples of public and civil society campaigns that pit societal, ethnic, or religious groups against each other. Some campaigns promoting nationalism, nationalistic movements, and national or regional protectionism occur at a time of crisis (Lekakis, 2015) or during a nation-building process (see Chapter 3o). In both cases, movements promote the buying of domestically produced goods instead of imported ones. While such boycotts and buycotts might seem appropriate in certain circumstances, in others they lead to nationalist protectionism (e.g., "Buy American") and even discrimination of certain societal groups, as witnessed by historical anti-Jewish boycotts (see Chapter 29).

This part also explores ambiguous or sensitive cases of political consumerism. There is a broad variety of such kinds of political consumerism. Some sensitive cases of political consumerism campaigns may aim at promoting social justice while indirectly mobilizing support for discrimination. An important example discussed in the Handbook is the global "boycott, divest and sanction" (BDS) movement to pressure Israel to change its policy on Palestine and the Golan Heights (see Chapter 33). Other ambiguous cases concern the balance between environmental and social concerns (see Chapter 34). Policies, movements, and actions, including consumption for "the environment," may neglect issues of social justice and democracy or even be associated with antidemocratic framings (see Fischer, 2018, on the ambiguous nature of environmental democracy). Within political consumerism, it is not uncommon, for instance, that buycott arrangements promoting ecological values fundamentally neglect or even reject issues around poverty, social conflicts, and justice. Simply assuming that "eco" is good may be extremely illusory.

The first chapter of this part, "Undemocratic Political Consumerism" by Dietlind Stolle and Lucas Huissoud, elaborates on some novel concepts for this area of study, including consumer ethnocentrism, consumer animosity, and consumer racism. It furthermore discusses general problems in conducting research on more problematic contemporary political consumerism. Reasons connect to conceptual factors, for instance that terms such as "ethical" and "moral" consumption make researchers bias their attention towards only democratic forms. Other related reasons concern research design and political consumerism's operationalization and measurement, such as in the construction of survey questionnaires as well as difficulties in finding information and conducting systematic analysis of undemocratic cases. These difficulties relate to the fact that undemocratic usage is often less visible and, therefore, challenging or even unsafe to study with conventional methodological strategies and empirical materials. Because of such conceptual and methodological limitations, scholarship so far has presented an image of political consumerism that fails to include all relevant facets and variants. This and other

chapters in this part offer reflections on the ability of conventional ways of theorizing and measuring political consumerism to distinguish between its democratic/ undemocratic or problematic/unproblematic cases.

The part continues with a historical chapter. Political consumerism has been involved in various ways in colonial relationships. As Stefanie Affeldt shows in "Buy White—Stay Fair': Racist Political Consumerism in Australian History" colonial products enabled a race-based demarcation (i.e., a white supremacy), but this took shape in different ways between different colonial powers. She focuses on how racist political consumerism was applied in a particular way in early-2oth-century Australia in the sugar industry by scrutinizing the White Sugar campaign and the Buy Australian-Made campaign. Both show how Australian consumers were asked to express national identity, pride, and loyalty by consuming locally manufactured products. These campaigns fused everyday culture with the political programme of the time and contributed to the emergence of an imagined racist community of consumers.

Moving to contemporary times, Eleftheria J. Lekakis in "Poltical Consumerism and Nationalist Struggles in Europe" explores the intersection between political consumerism and nationalism through three cases of nationalist struggles in Europe: a British boycott-halal campaign, a Catalan cava boycott in Spain, and a German product boycott in Greece. Located at different societal levels of struggle (local, regional, and national), these cases illustrate contradictions and tensions at the intersection between political consumerism and nationalism as well as the ideological ambiguity inherent in nationalism. This chapter elaborates on various concepts for understanding the ambiguities involved, including consumer nationalism, economic nationalism, banal nationalism, and everyday nationhood as well as how universalistic and particularistic aspects of nationalism can interact.

The U.S. context is strikingly different from the European one. In American history, both political consumerism and racial conflicts, with the important heritage of the slave economy, have been substantial. Thus, the intersection of these two phenomena is worth much more theoretical and empirical scholarly attention. Bo Yun Park in "Racialized Political Consumerism in the United States" notes the lack of research around this intersection and suggests conceptual and empirical avenues for more research. Studies of such political consumerism approaches, she argues, should include theorizing symbolic and social boundaries, considering struggles among both ethnoracial minorities and majorities; direct and indirect consequences of racial issues; and, finally, how the racial dimension intersects with age, education, income, and gender. She moreover shows that both white supremacist groups and various ethnoracial minority groups in the United States have used different forms of racialized political consumerism, including boycotts, buycotts, discursive actions, and selective investments.

In the chapter "Problematic Political Consumerism: Confusions and Moral Dilemmas in Boycott Activism," Michele Micheletti and Didem Oral discuss why political consumerism, particularly boycotts, can be confusing and problematic through a discussion on the Disney Company boycott in different historical times and the contemporary movement against Israeli settlements in the Palestine territories (BDS). These cases are seen as more problematic than other well-known boycotts against, for instance, Nestle, Nike, and the apartheid regime in South Africa. They theorize how political consumerism can involve moral dilemmas and explain why such dilemmas are particularly salient in boycotts rather than in buycotts and discursive actions. Reasons include the tendency for various boycott campaigns to express unclear or inconsistent demands and messages directed to the identified targets (wrongdoers) and thus to create confusing messages to consumers as well as easily attract unintended and unwelcome supporters.

Even if buycotts generally imply fewer moral dilemmas, they may nevertheless involve several problematic aspects. This is exemplified in the chapter "Some Dilemmas of Political Consumerism: Class and Ecotourism Practices in the Philippines"? by Sarah Webb and Anna Cristina Pertierra, which focuses on ecotourism at a UNESCO World Heritage site on the island of Palawan in the Philippines. This is a good example of how environmental and social dimensions do not always cling together. The chapter demonstrates the relevance of taking into account factors such as social class, social cleavages, and the marginalization of certain groups (e.g., indigenous peoples or local populations facing poverty) when conducting research on the problematic aspects of political consumerism. The authors show how several dilemmas related to these factors are involved in ecotourism in this country.

Finally, this part includes a case on how the dynamics of political consumerism shift in relation to a particular good: cannabis (marijuana) in the North American context (Canada and the United States). Elizabeth A. Bennett in "Prohibition, Legalization, and Political Consumerism: Insights From the U.S. and Canadian Cannabis Markets" focuses on how a good's legal status and public discourses interact with demand- and supply-side dynamics in political consumerism. These dynamics shift through processes of prohibition, semilegalization, and new legalization. Political consumerism here involves issues of normalization and alternative lifestyle consumerism. She shows how a controversial topic like cannabis involves challenges for producers, consumers, and social movement organizations to engage in political consumerism.

By exploring the role of racism and other types of undemocratic stereotyping and intolerance, as well as nationalism, religion, class struggles, and politically/culturally sensitive practices in the broader aspects of political consumerism, this part provides many new conceptual, methodological, and empirical insights for further researching more problematic aspects of the phenomenon.

The Problem-Solving Potential of Political Consumerism

Increasingly, the problem-solving potential of political consumerism is discussed among social scientists and in public debates. These discussions demonstrate the need for more firm analytical perspectives for systematically studying the power of consumers and political consumer activities. This part's five chapters focus on this large topic and contribute ideas about the stringent assessment of political consumerism's effectiveness through different analytical and disciplinary perspectives. They evaluate whether, how, and why political consumerism is or can be a driver of societal change. For instance, what role do civil society campaigns, governmental efforts, and corporate initiatives play in creating broad public awareness about the role of consumers, consumer behaviour, and consumer-oriented mechanisms to solve societal problems? This part also addresses the important topic of political consumerism's limitations in filling the governance gap (i.e., solving complex globalized societal problems). Through examples and general discussions, it develops scholarship on measuring the impact/effectiveness and limitations of political consumer action and institutions.

The part begins with a chapter by Lara Monticelli and Donatella della Porta, "The Successes of Political Consumerism as a Social Movement." Unlike studies focusing on individuals' engagements in market-based political activities, they focus on political consumerism as "collectivized individual action." Here, factors such as political opportunity structure, social movement organizations, and framing processes play a central role. An important contribution is their interpretative compass with six main features (type, domain, nature, target, timing, and duration) that systematizes the complex, multilayered process of political consumer activism from its mobilization to its outcome and effects. The compass helps evaluate some standard examples (fairtrade and antisweatshop activism), others that relate to the 2008-

2009 financial crisis (solidarity purchasing groups and time banks), and the degrowth movement (transition towns and ecovillages). For political consumerism to be effective, the authors find that interaction between political consumer—oriented social movements and their political, cultural, and institutional environment is critical. For example, an important effect is that emerging alternative and grassroots practices explicitly criticize the foundational paradigms of the market and overcome the classic dualism between producers and consumers.

Two chapters in this part address the question of how political consumerism affects the corporate world. Luc Fransen's "Political Consumerism and Corporate Strategy Towards Sustainability Standard-Setting: In or Out of Sync?" surveys political consumerism's role in ongoing corporate activities to promote private sustainability standards organizations (PSOs). He discusses how political consumers are not the only factor driving corporations into more social and environmental responsibility-taking in the form of sustainability standard-setting in industry sectors. Other important considerations having little to do with political consumer pressure are the government's role and corporations' own business strategies. Fransen shows that many PSOs dominating some industrial sectors are developed and run by businesses only. Several PSOs do not offer a consumer label on their products as evidence of their compliance with a sustainability standard. Two factors explain the unimportance of political consumer action: first, the increased engagement of governments and intergovernmental organizations with PSOs; and, second, the self-interest of firms.

Sophie Dubuisson-Quellier also addresses the corporate world in her chapter "From Moral Concerns to Market Values: How Political Consumerism Shapes Markets." Unlike Fransen, whose focus is business strategy, her economic sociological approach considers political consumerism's impacts on more basic market structures and practices. Her focus is on contentious forms of valuation and how and why they modify the structure of opportunities for market actors, lead some companies to change their practices or products, and influence market competition. She argues that individuals' engagements in boycotting and buycotting have limited direct effects on fostering corporate or societal change. Instead, such activism can have an indirect effect by producing and circulating symbolic, normative, and material resources for valuation. For her and other authors in this volume, markets can be locations for the emergence of moral economies that challenge existing economic practices.

Several Handbook chapters mention the role of government. Erik Hysing's "Government Engagement With Political Consumerism" reconsiders the conventional theorization of political consumerism as filling governance gaps. Through industry sector examples, he shows how governments help structure, incentivize, facilitate, and legitimize labelling schemes and even sometimes favour one scheme over another (e.g., fishing and forestry). Governments also promote buycotting by integrating labelling schemes into their public procurement policies and practices. This might imply that governments are finding innovative ways of taking more proactive responsibility for globalized production and domestic consumption. However, Hysing emphasizes how governmental involvement in political consumerism can have negative (side-) effects by promoting national protectionism and making it more difficult for small southern farmers who cannot afford to certify their products with voluntary labelling schemes. In sum, governments are intimately intertwined with political consumerism both intentionally and unintentionally.

The final chapter by Magnus Bostrom and Mikael Klintman, "Mass Consumption and Political Consumerism," tackles the part's topic differently by addressing the problematic relationship between political consumerism and mass consumption. Here the term "citizen-consumers" and the difference

between alterconsumption and anticonsumption are discussed. They relate six factors tied to mass consumption and political consumerism's effectiveness. Interesting findings include how anticonsumption practices (freegans, dumpster divers, and secondhand shopping) are highly dependent on the mass consumption of others. Even successful political consumerism is dependent on people buying political consumer goods at a large, stable rate. Thus, the mass-consumption context and forces both obstruct and facilitate political consumer practices.

In sum, the chapters in this part provide nuances for understanding the effectiveness of political consumerism as a force for societal change. Governments and corporations are crucial in the phenomenon, and political consumer efforts can have intended and unintended, direct and indirect, short- and long-term, as well as unexpected and negative side-effects.

Conclusion

Political consumerism has developed in many different directions: geographically, conceptually, methodologically, in multiple sectors, at multiple levels, and involving multiple disciplines. Political consumerism's diversity and spread may encourage many consumers and activists to use the market as an arena for politics and societal affairs. But its varieties also create challenges for scholars to make sense of the phenomenon. Critical questions arise about its appropriate conceptual framing. The Handbook also offers methodological reflections in studying political consumerism in different countries and sectors, measures to evaluate its effectiveness, and scholarly problems in studying the antidemocratic use of political consumerism. These key topics and others are taken up again in the concluding chapter. <>

THE SPIRITUAL DANGER OF DONALD TRUMP: 30 EVANGELICAL CHRISTIANS ON JUSTICE, TRUTH, AND MORAL INTEGRITY edited by Ronald J Sider [Cascade Books, 9781725271791]

What should Christians think about Donald Trump? His policies, his style, his personal life? Thirty evangelical Christians wrestle with these tough questions. They are Republicans, Democrats, and Independents. They don't all agree, but they seek to let Christ be the Lord of their political views. They seek to apply biblical standards to difficult debates about our current political situation. Vast numbers of white evangelicals enthusiastically support Donald Trump. Do biblical standards on truth, justice, life, freedom, and personal integrity warrant or challenge that support? How does that support of President Trump affect the image of Christianity in the larger culture? Around the world? Many younger evangelicals today are rejecting evangelical Christianity, even Christianity itself. To what extent is that because of widespread evangelical support for Donald Trump? Don't read this book to find support for your views. Read it to be challenged--with facts, reason, and biblical principles.

Reviews

“Well done good and faithful servant! Ron Sider’s steadfast voice is welcome during this trying time. He continues to be a beacon for followers of Jesus who care about justice and morality and being told the truth. I commend this book to anyone struggling to align their faith with their choices at the ballot box. I am grateful for his ongoing witness to God who loves us all with a passion for justice and a heart full of

mercy." —**Tony Hall, Ambassador and former U.S. Representative (1979–2002); author of Changing the Face of Hunger**

"The dominant narrative in the public square is that the evangelical Protestant church provides unwavering support for Donald J. Trump. While this may be true, I am thankful for the witness of the editors and contributors of The Spiritual Danger of Donald Trump that this claim is far from universally true of all evangelicals and also for their crucial warning that continued support will lead to the deepening erosion of the church's witness to the world. My hope and prayer is that all Christians, whatever their present political leanings, will be open to the case made in this book." —**Tremper Longman III, Author of The Bible and the Ballot: Using Scripture in Political Decisions**

"People who care about this country (and the whole world) need to use every medium to urge the public to restore sanity in the highest echelon of our government. Yes, including a full-length book. A sharp contrast to curt, snarky remarks through social media, The Spiritual Danger of Donald Trump is a thoughtful, interdisciplinary multi-voiced, Christ-centered, prophetic exposé of danger—social, political, and spiritual—that every person of faith must read." —**Al Tizon, Executive Minister of Serve Globally, Evangelical Covenant Church**

"The Spiritual Danger of Donald Trump is a compilation of timely essays that document the perilous seismic and public shift from evangelicals endorsing the policies of a presidential candidate to evangelicals ordaining that same candidate. Today may be a great day for evangelicals politically but this day may ultimately lead to believers having less and less real spiritual influence on their neighbors around them. Judged by our own actions, good news will be seen as fake news and Jesus will soon be relegated to the alternative way, the alternative truth, and the alternative life. That's the spiritual danger of Donald Trump. —**Eric Swanson, Director, Leadership Network; co-author of The Externally Focused Church**

"Ron Sider is one of the most faithful followers of the person and teachings of Jesus Christ that I have ever known. I wholeheartedly believe that in this Trump era or any other, the silence of many white evangelicals to outright evil who seek to occupy the quiet political center is instead an insidious form of complicity that affirms the morally indefensible status quo. I pray that The Spiritual Danger of Donald Trump will help spark conversations across the country that will finally end that silence for good. It's time to move from caution to courage in the most important election of our lifetimes. —**Jim Wallis, Founder and President, Sojourners**

"This book is an appropriate lament that faithfully records a dark chapter in American evangelicalism. Its warning notes to the blind guides who have anointed Donald Trump as God's instrument are firm, urgent, and offered out of loving concern for the integrity of Christian witness. The contributors consistently plead for the embrace of the foundational Christian virtues of humility, truth-telling, and justice. They remind us that Jesus alone is King, that his politics were decidedly not based on fear and hate, and that he is the only person to whom unqualified allegiance is due. —**Amy L. Sherman, Author of Kingdom Calling: Vocational Stewardship for the Common Good**

"The support of American evangelicals for the presidency of Donald Trump will likely be recorded as one of the most consequential acts of any religious group in world history. It cannot be overrated. That is why this carefully compiled collection of essays is so timely and important. Whether you agree with their opinions or not, Ron Sider, his fellow editors, and their contributors treat this subject with the seriousness it deserves. If Trump supporters believe it is worth risking the very reputation of the gospel

to re-elect their candidate, they should at least explore what these dissenting voices have to say. If Trump detractors believe evangelical support for his presidency is, indeed, dangerous, this book will equip them to defend their positions and persuade others to join them in opposition. Regardless of where one stands on Christians and Donald Trump, this compilation explains significant political differences within evangelicalism and sets out reasons why evangelicals across the theological and social spectrums will continue to play a critically important role in the political life of our nation, for good or for bad. Evangelicals and those who want to understand them better cannot afford to ignore this book!" **—Rob Schenck, President, The Dietrich Bonhoeffer Institute; author of Costly Grace: An Evangelical Minister's Rediscovery of Faith, Hope and Love**

"Whether you agree or disagree with these voices, I believe their perspectives and arguments are urgently in need of being heard. Listening should always be the first act of a leader, and even more, for a leader seeking to live as a follower of Jesus. What I so appreciate about this collection of essays is the careful way these authors have tried to listen carefully—to Donald Trump, to his supporters and detractors, and to the national and international climate of our day. Beyond that, however, they are all people trying to listen as deeply and wisely to God in Jesus Christ as they can. This is what I believe leads them to conclude that the United States, including especially the church in this nation, faces in Donald Trump not just a political leader with a political vision that some like and some don't, but a personal and spiritual force-field of a far more dangerous and destructive kind. Whether or not you accept these voices, I hear in their perspectives and arguments many things that are urgently in need of being heard. What is at stake is far too important to do otherwise and risks multi-generational damage. Lord, may it not be so." —**Mark Labberton, President, Fuller Theological Seminary**

"This timely and careful critique of the evangelical movement's surprisingly fervent embrace of Donald Trump draws on biblical, theological, sociological, and historical sources to argue persuasively against his leadership and re-election to a second term of office. Humble and sacrificial loyalty to Jesus Christ should reign above all other loyalties including seeking political, personal, or cultural power. In light of Trump's documented 'badly damaged soul,' the authors warn of the spiritual damage to the soul and witness of evangelicalism in America. Issues of character, speech, and behavior as well as policy choices on racial justice, immigration, treatment of women, and the needs of the poor and marginalized should be shaped by the teaching and example of Jesus and the Scriptures. Christian witness and faithfulness to the gospel are all at stake. I recommend this book." —**Roberta Hestenes, Presbyterian minister; former President, Eastern University; theology faculty member, Fuller Seminary; International Minister-at-Large, World Vision**

"If you are looking for deep religious wisdom about the 2020 presidential election, here it is. For those wanting their faith to inform their vote, there is no more important book to read before November 3. Ron Sider has always helped the evangelical community see truth—carefully, biblically, fairly, and courageously. In bringing forth The Spiritual Danger of Donald Trump, he has done so again. The title says it all. These thirty outstanding evangelical voices are not talking mere politics. They explore the roots and reasons underlying the spiritual crisis created by Donald Trump's presidency. Their well-reasoned, well-researched, theologically grounded voices, from the US and the world, are compelling. Listen. Share. And then you'll be better equipped to answer: how does being a disciple of Jesus Christ shape the choice I am asked to make about the next president of the United States?"

—Wesley Granberg-Michaelson, General Secretary Emeritus, Reformed Church in America; author of Without Oars: Casting Off into a Life of Pilgrimage

"Ron Sider curated essays that integrate biblical insights, with deep reflection to challenge Christians to think about what their faith should look like, lived out in the public sphere. The voices from the global evangelical community provide helpful nuance to short-hand versions of evangelicalism. A thoughtful collection of essays, grounded in biblical reflection, that helps Christians ground their conclusions on the heart of Jesus' teachings. A timely, thought-provoking book!" —**Nikki Toyama-Szeto, Executive Director, Evangelicals for Social Action**

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When We Respond to God's Calling by Bandy X. Lee

> Sacrifice and offering you did not desire—but my ears you have opened—
> burnt offerings and sin offerings you did not require. Then I said, "Here I am,
> I have come—it is written about me in the scroll. I desire to do your will, my
> God; your law is within my heart."
> (Psalm 40:6–8)

This book is the product of a series of responses to a calling— that still, small voice that beckons and, when we drop everything to answer, reveals a larger plan.

Three of us were involved. Dr. Chris Thurman started it with great boldness and no hesitation. As a psychologist, he knew of the book I edited, The Dangerous Case of Donald Trump, a collection of essays by mental health professionals who felt a duty to warn the public about the new president's psychological dangers. Despite being a multi-authored book of specialized knowledge, it became a runaway best seller that even one of the biggest publishers in the country had not prepared for (it took five weeks for them to replenish the stocks in a way that would not deplete within hours). Chris noticed "MDiv" at the end of my name and saw the possibility of doing something similar for Christians.

I did not know Chris at the time, but he recognized something important: while I made use of my training and knowledge, the book I edited was not mine. There was divine work behind the timing, the preparation, and the way the circumstances came together. I simply happened to be available. With the passing of my mother, a devout Christian, I had nothing more of true value to lose in this world. I had rid myself of most of my possessions, and all that I was seeking in my remaining days was to gaze on the beauty of the Lord and to seek him in his temple (Psalm 27). Thus, when the Lord called, I had but one response: Here I am— "I am the Lord's servant" (Luke 1:38). This is when he plunged me straight into the center of the political world, and all my credentials, university affiliation, medical degree, background in violence prevention, and work with prisoners were put to use.

I witnessed something similar happening with Chris: he answered a call and was obedient all the way, regardless of the personal or professional cost. Early in the quest, however, Chris encountered a difficult challenge: he came to the painful realization that because of his lack of formal theological training he was to do all the work but not be listed as an editor. The editor of any book knows of all the work that goes into selecting and recruiting authors, bringing them together, and getting them to contribute on time. With a sensitive topic like this one and the tight timeline we were proposing, it was a monumental task. Yet Chris took it all on without a complaint, and now without the prospect even of recognition. I gave no small protest, but Chris would not waver and remained steadfast. Gracious and generous in all his dealings, he emulates Christ like few I have seen. His attitude is what has become the backbone of this book and will be its nourishment when the work is ready to take flight. Christians know the power of the humility he exemplifies: The Lord calls, we respond, and things happen.

Third among us is Dr. Ron Sider. He is the theologian we recruited when it was clear that neither of us could speak authoritatively from a Christian point of view. Ron was gracious and bold in responding, coming fully on board with two strangers who had no standing in the Christian world but our personal faith. I was overjoyed to have a fellow Yale Divinity School graduate on board, with his theological and intellectual rigor, not to mention the clear Christian values he brought, having dedicated a lifetime to compassion, generosity, and work for justice. We agreed on most things, and, because of Ron's willingness to come on to the project and to give it the weight of a respected theologian, it seemed for a while we had all that we could hope for—until I came to the reluctant recognition in prayer that I was

not to be listed as editor, either. It should have been quite the shake-up, little more than a week before the manuscript was due, but Ron gracefully and magnanimously accepted the situation as God's will, and for this I will be eternally grateful.

My reasons for wishing to be on the project were personal. Reaching out to Christians was dear to my heart, as I consider it one step closer to reaching out to Christ, whom my mother has recently joined. I also considered spiritual healing for the land to be the next stage of progression from psychological healing. I wished to reach out to as much of the nation as I was able to with my earlier, secular one. Finally, I felt compassion for all the Christian Trump supporters I connected with, who are among the most good-hearted people I have met, making great sacrifices to do the right thing. They were strangers reaching out to me, defending their president, exasperated that I would dare criticize him—then, each time I responded, they were amazed that I would even bother to do so.

In truth, I feel humbled before them, for the greatness of their humility and often childlike faith, which I cannot claim to have. We know that, in the Lord's eyes, many who are first in the world will be last, and many who are last will be first (Matthew 19:30); people look at outward appearances, but the Lord looks at the heart (1 Samuel 16:7). I count myself as being beneath them. I do not presume to be better because I happen to have the education and know how to navigate the complex informational systems to have access to the facts. Rather, it is the meek who will inherit God's land (Psalm 37:11). I tried nothing more than to demonstrate to them that my goals, too, were humanitarian, that I cared for the president as a human being, and merely wished for him to get the right care and for the nation to be safe. The more convincing I was, the harder it seemed for them to continue engaging with me, as I shook their firmly held, cherished beliefs. Yet it would be enough if I planted a seed—if, in their moment of disappointment, they would remember there was another place where Christians could be, and that, if they chose to abandon their president, we would welcome them as brothers and sisters.

It is for these people that I initially agreed to this project, knowing that their simplicity has made them vulnerable to exploitation and oppression, now by a Christian establishment that has chosen to ally with worldly power. Chris and Ron were impassioned to do something about it, and we would be partners in this mission—as were all the authors of this book. Hence, it was sad for me to leave it, but the Lord has called me elsewhere, and the readiness and powerful examples that these two have set helped me to accept this situation. Our work will still be complementary—and I know that, with Chris and Ron, both men of God, the book is in excellent hands.

This is an extraordinarily important work. While I embarked on The Dangerous Case of Donald Trump because I found our nation and humankind at existential risk, in truth, the spiritual danger is greater. We can lose our lives, but we should not lose our souls. And this book deals with just that matter. With all the disagreements it is sure to raise, in the end, as Christians, we know that we will have passed from death to life because we love one another (1 John 3:14).

Christians are selfless and ready for sacrifice. With all our hearts we seek the Lord and delight in the Lord's commandments (Psalm 119:10). But the Lord did not desire sacrifice and offering—only that we open our ears (Psalm 40:6). Burnt offerings and sin offerings, and all the twisting of what we hear and think to prop up a false prophet who demands idolatry, he did not condone. Rather, we know that the Lord's yoke is easy and his burden is light (Matthew 11:30). The true God awaits us as a father who calls on his sons and daughters (2 Corinthians 6:18). We need only reply, "Here I am, I have come"—and, because he has made us for himself, our hearts will no longer be restless when they find rest in him (Augustine, Confessions, 1.1.1).

Our Common Commitment to Christ by Ronald J. Sider

We publish this book with deep sadness and persistent hope. Sadness, indeed grief, that current politics is so divisive and dysfunctional. And hope that biblical values and constitutional standards will prevail.

We write frankly about current politics and presidential leadership, but we do not do that as people committed to one political party. We are Republicans, Democrats, and Independents. We do not all agree on how faithful Christians should vote on November 3, 2020.

We do, however, share a common commitment to Jesus Christ our Lord. We all want to let Christ be Lord of every part of our lives, including our politics. We all want to live out our conviction that unity in the body of Christ is far more important than any political disagreement, however deep. We all seek to speak the truth in love, even when we sharply disagree with other Christians. We are evangelical Christians, pleading with other Christians, especially evangelicals, to allow biblical principles to shape all our political activity.

We are deeply worried: first about the good name of Christianity and second about the future of our beloved nation.

Growing evidence shows that more and more Americans are rejecting Christian faith. That is especially true of young people, including youth who grew up in evangelical churches. And many attribute their turning away from Christianity to what they consider immoral, fundamentally wrong, political engagement by Christians, especially evangelical Christians.

Everyone knows that our national politics is so fundamentally dysfunctional that our future as a thriving democracy is in danger. A commitment to truth, respect for opponents, and willingness to negotiate reasonable bipartisan compromise is in dreadfully short supply. Serious observers wonder whether the great American experiment in freedom and democracy can survive.

We believe it can!

We believe that Christians can make a huge contribution to preserving a good future for our children and grandchildren by praying for God's guidance, submitting unconditionally to biblical principles about truth, justice, and moral integrity, and faithfully applying these biblical principles in all our political decisions in this election year.

In that faith and hope, we share these essays with all Americans, especially our sisters and brothers in Christ. <>

THE MORAL NEXUS by R. Jay Wallace [Carl G. Hempel Lecture Series, Princeton University Press, 9780691172170]

THE MORAL NEXUS develops and defends a new interpretation of morality—namely, as a set of requirements that connect agents normatively to other persons in a nexus of moral relations. According to this relational interpretation, moral demands are directed to other individuals, who have claims that the agent comply with these demands. Interpersonal morality, so conceived, is the domain of what we owe to each other, insofar as we are each persons with equal moral standing.

The book offers an interpretative argument for the relational approach. Specifically, it highlights

neglected advantages of this way of understanding the moral domain; explores important theoretical and practical presuppositions of relational moral duties; and considers the normative implications of understanding morality in relational terms.

The book features a novel defense of the relational approach to morality, which emphasizes the special significance that moral requirements have, both for agents who are deliberating about what to do and for those who stand to be affected by their actions. The book argues that relational moral requirements can be understood to link us to all individuals whose interests render them vulnerable to our agency, regardless of whether they stand in any prior relationship to us. It also offers fresh accounts of some of the moral phenomena that have seemed to resist treatment in relational terms, showing that the relational interpretation is a viable framework for understanding our specific moral obligations to other people.

Review

"Wonderfully clear, absorbingly written, and ambitious, **THE MORAL NEXUS** is an excellent book on a subject of the first importance in moral philosophy. Although it is unlikely that this book will put an end to arguments and debates about relational morality, it takes every aspect of those debates to a new, higher level. It will be a must-read for people working in moral, legal, and political philosophy."**—Arthur Ripstein, University of Toronto**

"**THE MORAL NEXUS** impressively develops and defends a distinctive view of the essential nature of moral obligation. This ambitious and sophisticated book makes a novel and significant contribution."**—Sarah Stroud, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill**

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People mean many different things when they talk about morality. In a familiar modern sense, however, morality may be thought of as a set of normative constraints on attitudes and actions that stem from the fact that we inhabit a common world together with other agents. More specifically, and more controversially, it may be thought of as a normative nexus that links us individually with each of the persons who might potentially be affected by what we do. According to what I will call the relational interpretation of it, morality involves a set of requirements on action that are constitutively connected to claims that others have against us, just insofar as they are persons. Requirements that are connected to claims in this way have a built-in directionality, specifying things that we owe it to others to do. So on the relational interpretation, morality could be said to be fundamentally a matter of what we owe to each other.

This book offers a statement and defense of the idea that morality collects a set of fundamentally relational requirements. A leading idea of the discussion is that moral standards have some significant normative features that can be made sense of only if we interpret them in relational terms. They function to define practical requirements, which regulate the deliberations of agents in the distinctive manner of obligations; and they also have interpersonal significance, providing a normative basis for relations of moral accountability. I argue that the relational approach is better able than the alternatives to illuminate these significant aspects of the moral. In addition, I shall highlight and defend the major philosophical commitments and presuppositions of the relational interpretation, which have not been subjected to sustained critical investigation. I shall also discuss some of the first-order implications of the relational approach, for questions about what, specifically, we owe it to each other to do, and about the nature of the reasoning that goes into deciding issues of this kind.

The idea of relational requirements in the most general sense is implicit in talk of moral and legal rights. More specifically, it is familiar from discussions of claim rights, in the sense made familiar by Wesley Newcombe Hohfeld. These rights are commonly understood to be complexes of claims, privileges, and powers that are invested in agents, and that correspond to duties on the part of other agents.' My right to a piece of property that has legitimately come into my possession, for instance, involves a claim against other people that they should not use it without my permission, where that claim defines a duty that others are under; it involves, furthermore, a permission to do with the piece of property as I wish, as well as a power to transfer my claims in it to others as I see fit. According to this way of thinking, those who make off with my property without my authorization will violate a claim I have against them, thereby transforming their relationships to me in a way they will not change their relationships to other parties. They will have not only have acted wrongly; they will also have wronged me in particular, providing me with what we might think of as a privileged ground for objecting to what they have done.

Hohfeldian rights of this general kind are a familiar part of our normative repertoire, deeply embedded in our thinking about (for instance) the structures of private law. Contracts, for instance, seem to

generate a complex of directed duties and corresponding claims, and a similar structure of claim rights is arguably implicit in the law of torts. Whether there are similar claim rights at the most fundamental level of moral thought is a more controversial suggestion, one that has been questioned, in different ways, by consequentialists and proponents of certain virtue-theoretic views. Even those who are open to the idea that there are basic moral claim rights, however, naturally tend to think of them as constituting just a part of morality; the "realm of rights" that Judith Jarvis Thomson has written about, for instance, is seen by her as a subregion within a larger moral territory. Thus, there are many moral duties that people seem to be under that do not correspond to any Hohfeldian claim rights in the familiar sense, including imperfect obligations of mutual aid, duties of gratitude, environmental imperatives, and sundry requirements of moral virtue.

I agree that morality cannot be understood exclusively in terms of moral rights in the narrow, Hohfeldian sense. But it nevertheless strikes me as promising to interpret morality in relational terms, as a set of requirements on agents that are like the obligations of the Hohfeldian domain in being constitutively connected to claims that other individuals have against us. Relational elements are pervasive in many significant features of modern, secular morality, and it is my belief that these elements can be brought together into a comprehensive interpretation of the moral realm. The account I defend is not a theory of moral rights, as these are conventionally understood; rather it extracts a relational core from ordinary talk about rights and directed duties, and proposes that this relational structure can be extended, in an illuminating way, into a general framework for understanding the nature and normative significance of moral requirements.

The extension of the relational model that I shall defend, however, is not meant to capture everything that might intuitively be understood to be a reason or requirement of morality. There is a broad conception of the moral according to which it collects all standards of deliberate human conduct, whatever their source. In this broad sense, it is a moral defect if someone acts with disregard for the beauty of the natural world, or attaches importance to an activity that is out of proportion to its significance and value, regardless of whether the behavior in question otherwise affects the interests or welfare of persons or other sentient individuals. Moral failings, in this very capacious usage, are to be contrasted with deficiencies that do not directly involve the will, such as chronic bodily illnesses or infirmities that interfere with an individual's biological good functioning.' It is no part of my brief in this book to maintain that all moral standards, in this maximally capacious sense, are defined by relational requirements that are owed to individual claimholders. The relational account I shall develop is meant to capture a moral domain that is broader than the realm of moral rights, but narrower than the set of all standards that are applicable to the rational will. This is the intermediate domain, roughly speaking, that T. M. Scanlon has referred to as "the morality of right and wrong." I shall call it interpersonal morality, to emphasize the fact that the standards that are in question derive directly from the effects of an individual's actions on the interests and well-being of persons (where personhood is understood in a manner, still to be defined, that potentially diverges from membership in our biological species'). Interpersonal morality, in this intermediate sense, might be thought of as a set of requirements that reflect the fundamental insight that we share a world with other individuals whose interests are in some sense neither more nor less important than our own.

Not everyone who accepts this way of dividing up normative standards needs to agree about the desiderata to which an account of interpersonal morality is answerable. Some philosophers favor pluralist interpretations of interpersonal morality, tracing its requirements to fundamentally distinct values rather than imputing to them any underlying substantive unity. There is room for disagreement,

as well, about the precise boundaries of this intermediate domain (disagreements, that is, about some particular requirements on human agency, and whether they are to be included within the domain). The approach I favor starts from the observation that interpersonal morality intuitively exhibits more specific normative features that have been neglected in recent treatments, and that a relational conception of obligation captures the underlying unity of the interpersonal domain that exhibits these important features. A consequence of this approach is that there might be some standards of rational agency that derive from the effects of action on other persons, but that are not standards of interpersonal morality as I understand it. Standards of this kind are not obligations in the sense in which the core requirements of interpersonal morality can be understood to be, nor do they function to structure accountability relations with other persons. They define forms of what I shall call extramoral concern for moral persons—taking "morality," as I shall do in what follows, to refer to the intermediate domain of interpersonal morality, rather than to the broad set of all standards that might apply to the rational will.

My discussion will at many points raise more questions than can be answered in the compass of a single volume; as will become plain in what follows, the relational interpretation touches on many large issues of both theory and practice that are worthy of extended treatment in their own right. But I write in the conviction that it is important to have a sense of the big picture before we get too bogged down in matters of fine detail and nuance. Writers on moral philosophy frequently fall into a relational idiom when they talk about particular normative and philosophical issues. They assume, for instance, that individuals are typically wronged by behavior that is morally impermissible, and proceed to reflect on the implications of being treated in this way for the attitudes and behavior of the person who is wronged. But the relational interpretation, even when it comes naturally to us, is also philosophically distinctive; it is fundamentally opposed by some of the most influential traditions of reflection about morality, which treat moral requirements in individualistic rather than relational terms. There is need for an overview of the relational approach to the moral that highlights its distinctive features, so that we may better appreciate both the philosophical and normative advantages of understanding morality in these terms and the obstacles that stand in the way of such an interpretation. My hope is that the discussion in the present volume will go some way toward addressing this need.

Elements of Relational Normativity

In the present section, I would like to flesh out my initial sketch of the relational conception of morality by saying a bit more about what I take to be its basic elements.' For purposes of exposition, it will be helpful to take as an example a case of a moral requirement that it is natural to understand as having a relational structure: that of promissory obligation. There are three important features that appear distinctive of cases of this kind, which I shall call directed obligation, claim, and normative injury; let us consider these in turn.

Directed Obligation

Relational norms, on an intuitive understanding of them, serve to ground obligations, specifying things that an individual agent must do. Thus, someone who makes a promise has undertaken an obligation, one that would not obtain in the absence of the promissory exchange. If the promise was to do X, then it seems, at a minimum, that the fact of the promise gives rise to a new reason for the agent to do X. That is, there is a consideration that speaks in favor of doing X that was not in place before the promise was made. But this understates the change in the normative situation that is effected by the promise. We normally think that promisors, in offering someone else promissory assurance about what they will do, are now under a duty to fulfill the promise they have made. Promisors exercise a normative power

that is available to agents to create obligations where such were not antecedently in place, binding themselves to do what they have promised. Promises are indeed among the most salient and familiar examples of the phenomenon of moral obligation, even if they differ from many alleged obligations in being created through voluntary acts.

In saying this, I do not mean to suggest that it is always morally impermissible for promisors to fail to do the very thing that they have promised. Our understanding of the morality of promissory obligation implicitly acknowledges circumstances in which promisors do not have to follow the letter of their promises. Emergencies sometimes come up, for instance, that could not have been anticipated, even by a conscientious agent, at the time when the promise was made. Under these conditions, I think it would be natural to say that it is not wrong for the promisor to fail to perform the promised action. There may be some residual obligation that the promisor is under to provide compensation for losses that the promisee might have suffered in virtue of having relied on the promisor to do the thing that was promised; strictly speaking, however, the original promissory obligation (to do X, for example, if that is what was promised) no longer obtains under such circumstances. We might put this by saying that promissory obligation is not reasonably understood to be unconditional!' It is, however, defeasible: so long as exceptional circumstances do not obtain, the promisor is under a moral obligation to do the thing that was promised, an obligation that was entered into through the promissory act.

It is further characteristic of these obligations that they have a built-in directionality!' The promissory exchange brings into existence a normative nexus between the promisor and the promisee, whereby the former owes it to the latter to do the thing that was promised. Other people, who were not themselves parties to the promissory exchange, might well take an interest in whether the promisor fulfills the obligation. But this is not something that the promisor owes it specifically to them to do. The promise creates a special relationship between the promisor and the promisee, making it the case that the new obligation that obtains is directed specifically to the promisee. Indeed, as I shall argue more extensively in chapter 2,, our sense that the promise creates an obligation is connected to the fact that it links the promisor and the promisee in a new normative nexus of this kind. A requirement that is owed to another individual in particular is not the exclusive property of the agent whose actions it governs; rather it is held in common by the two people whom it links. We are "bound" when we stand in a normative relationship of this kind, in the specific sense that the requirement that we are under, as agents, binds us to another party.

Claim

A directed obligation corresponds, on the side of the person to whom it is directed, to the notion of a claim. 'The party to whom the agent owes compliance with the obligation is someone who has a claim to such compliant behavior. Indeed, the claim in question has a built-in directionality that mirrors that of the obligation to which it corresponds; it is a claim that the party has against the agent to the latter's compliance with the directed requirement. In the promising case, for example, it is the promisees who have a moral claim of this kind. We might understand this as an entitlement, held against the promisors, to their seeing to it that the promises are kept.

Like the directed obligation with which it is linked, the claim that is held by the other party is not necessarily unconditional. As we saw above, the promise to do X does not generate an obligation on the promisor to do X under any and all possible circumstances that might eventually come to obtain. The claim on the part of the promisee, insofar as it corresponds neatly to the promisor's obligation, is therefore likewise defeasible in character. It is a claim that the promisor should do X, barring

unforeseeable conditions of the kind that would generally be understood to defeat the promisor's obligation so to act. Just as the promisor might well have various secondary obligations under such circumstances, for example to provide compensation for losses suffered, so too would the promisee have claims against the promisor to those secondary performances.

A claim, in the sense that dovetails with a directed obligation, should be distinguished carefully from the notion of an interest. To have a claim against another party or parties that they should do X is not the same as having an interest in whether they will so act. Suppose that A has promised B to do X, and that there is another person, C, whose professional projects will be furthered if A in fact does X. Under these circumstances, C has an interest in A's doing X (making C what is sometimes called a "third-party beneficiary" of As X-ing); but it does not follow from this that C has a specific claim against A that A should do X. The directed claim, insofar as there is one in this case, resides in B, the promisee. Having an interest in someone else's doing something is thus not sufficient for having a claim against that individual, in the sense that is here at issue.

It is perhaps more plausible to suppose that interests are at least necessary conditions for normative claims, but even here caution is required. When people have claims against other parties that they do X, it seems that there must be something in their situation and outlook, as individual agents, that provides a basis for their claims, and enables us to understand the claims as residing in them in particular. In some cases, this will be the fact that the claimholders' interests would be affected negatively if the other parties were to fail to do X; consider in this connection our claims against people not to be physically assaulted by them, which presumably have something to do with the effects of assault on our basic interests in bodily integrity, self-determination, and freedom from pain and suffering.

But the general relationship between interests and normative claims is more complicated than this example might suggest. Returning to the phenomenon of promising, take the case that Philippa Foot introduced into recent discussions: a Malay servant extracts from the anthropologist Milduko-Maklay a promise that the latter will not photograph him, believing that having his picture taken would cause harm to his spirit!' It seems plausible that the promise gives the servant a claim against Maklay not to be photographed by the anthropologist; and yet it seems that the servant would not really be harmed if Maklay were to break the promise surreptitiously (for example, by snapping some pictures of the servant while he is asleep).

Some have suggested that we have in this case a bare normative claim, one that is not grounded in any genuine nonnormative interests that are held by the promisee!' But this seems to me a questionable inference. Even if the servant would not by hypothesis be harmed if Maklay were to photograph him, he has a legitimate interest in his own autonomy—in determining for himself, and in accordance with his own convictions, how others will make use of his body and person. He also has an interest in achieving assurance from others that they will respect his wishes about such matters of personal self-determination. There are thus important interests of the servant's, in the sense of things that he takes a legitimate interest in concerning the character of his own life, that provide a basis for his claim that Maklay should keep the promise that was made in this case.

Generalizing boldly from this single example, it is tempting to conjecture that normative claims have to be anchored somehow in the interests of the claimholder, even if interests are not on their own sufficient to ground claims of the relevant kind. But is there anything in the relational interpretation of morality that would support this way of thinking about the bearing of interests on moral claims? What, more specifically, is the nature of the interests that are relevant to our specifically moral claims? And

how exactly do we get from such interests to the determinate assignment of moral claims to individual claimholders, given that the bare possession of an interest does not on its own suffice to ground a normative claim? These are important questions for the relational interpretation of morality, to which I shall return in chapter 5 of this book.

In the meantime, I would caution against equating moral claims with the notion of moral rights. As I noted above, it is commonplace in the philosophical literature on rights to assume that at least some moral rights involve directed claims that are structurally like the claims that I have been discussing, insofar as they are held against other agents, correspond to directed duties on the part of those agents that are owed to the claimholder, and so on. If we are going to interpret the entire moral domain in relational terms, however, then we should not assume from the start that all moral claims involve what we would intuitively recognize as assignable individual rights. There are duties of gratitude, for instance, but it would be strange to say that these correspond to moral rights on the part of the potential beneficiaries of the duty; and we have duties to aid those who are in severe distress, without it being the case that specific rights are held by each of the potential millions of beneficiaries that each in particular should be assisted by us. We also have moral obligations to uphold and support valuable practices or conventions that we may have participated in, and yet these, too, do not seem to correspond to assignable individual rights against us.

Rights, I believe, represent a subclass of the normative claims that morality invests in individuals, but their distinguishing features are not present in all cases in which we have claims against others that they should comply with moral requirements. This will become a prominent theme in chapter 6 of this book, which addresses, inter alia, moral duties that have not seemed to be relational in character, precisely because they do not correspond to what we conventionally think of as individual moral rights.

(c) Normative Injury

The third element in the kind of relational conception that interests me is that of a normative injury. This concept is in place in situations in which agents have flouted the requirements that they stand under. Insofar as the requirement is genuine, specifying what people have to do, those who have violated it will have done something wrong. But if the requirement is a directed one, owed specifically to another party who has a claim against the agent to compliance, something further will be the case as well. The action that flouts the requirement will not merely be wrong; it will change the agent's normative relationship to another individual, wronging the person to whom compliance with the requirement was owed. This is, as it were, the ex post facto residue of the individual's claim against the agent to performance of the required action, in the case in which the claim has not been honored.

Just as normative claims are not to be equated with interests, normative injury is not the same as harm. Wrongful actions can have harmful effects on other persons without wronging them in particular, and those who are wronged by an action need not specifically be harmed by it, taking everything into account. Consider a case in which A promises B to stay away from a reception that B will be attending, but A ends up going to the reception all the same. A's wrongful presence at the reception might end up being disadvantageous to the professional interests of a third person in attendance, C, but it wouldn't necessarily follow that A had thereby wronged C. (Perhaps A ends up in a lengthy and mutually absorbing conversation with a potential client whom C had been hoping to cultivate at the reception, without it being the case that the promise was originally made by A to B out of consideration for C's professional interest in having unimpeded access to any potential clients who might be in attendance.) By the same token, A's action might wrong B, even if it leaves B better off on balance than B would

otherwise have been. (Maybe B extracted the promise from A out of a concern for B's own access to potential clients at the reception, but A's presence and easy banter about fly fishing ends up facilitating B's plan to cultivate new business relationships.) If, as I suggested above, moral claims can always be traced to some interest or other on the part of the claimholder, then disregard of moral claims will involve a slight of some kind to the claimholder's interests. But it needn't be the case that claimholders are harmed, on balance, by the actions that wrong them.

These points, or analogues of them, are familiar from the literature on rights, claims, and directed obligations. But there is a further aspect of moral injury that has seldom been remarked on, namely its dependence on the attitudes of the agent. Directed obligations, and the claims that correspond to them, do not in general involve demands on the attitudes of the agents who are bound by them. In the case we have just been discussing, where A promised B to stay away from the reception, A will count as complying with the obligation, and satisfying B's literal claims, so long as A does not appear at the location of the event during the time when it is taking place; the motives out of which A satisfies this condition make no difference to the question of whether the claims and obligations have been satisfied. By the same token, A will have broken the promise if A shows up at the reception, regardless of A's reasons for so acting (assuming that no unanticipated emergencies have arisen in the meantime, of the kind that are capable of modifying the original promissory commitment).

When it comes to moral injury, by contrast, things are otherwise. It matters to the question of whether A has wronged B with what attitudes A acted. When I introduced the notion of normative injury above, I associated it with cases in which agents have flouted a directed obligation that they stand under. But to flout a requirement is to act with a distinctive attitude toward it, one of knowing and even open disregard. Furthermore, given the constitutive connection between the directed obligation and the claim of another party, this attitude of disregard for the obligation is eo ipso an attitude of disregard for the specific claimholder. But to be treated with this kind of disregard is crucial, I submit, to the relevant notion of a normative injury; the wrong that has been visited on one who suffers such an injury consists, at least in part, in the attitude of indifference to or contempt for one's specific claims.

If this is right, however, then there can be cases in which agents fail to fulfill the letter of the directed obligations that they stand under, without their having thereby wronged the individuals who had claims against them to performance. Having promised not to show up at the reception, A might end up putting in an appearance inadvertently, arriving at the gallery where it is taking place out of ignorance that it was relocated there by the organizers at the last minute. The promisee, B, would not have been wronged by A's action under this scenario, precisely insofar as A's action does not reflect an attitude of disregard toward B's specific claims (though this might change if A does not leave the gallery as soon as it becomes clear that the reception is taking place there).

An attitude of disregard for another person's claims seems in this way to be a necessary element in the analysis of moral injury. Whether such an attitude is also sufficient to give rise to a moral injury is a further question, which does not need to be resolved here. To think that it is would be to suppose that people might suffer moral injuries through actions that are not morally wrong. Thus, suppose A goes to the gallery, believing that that is where the reception will be happening, and not caring about the fact that she promised B not to attend, but it turns out that the reception was all along scheduled to take place in a different venue on the other side of town. Here B would naturally feel unnerved about A's performance, if not outright resentful, despite the fact that A complied in the end with the obligation that was owed to B. But it is not clear that we would want to say that B was actually wronged by A's

behavior, strictly speaking. Perhaps people suffer moral injuries, in the relevant sense, only through actions that in fact violate duties that are owed to them; or perhaps we can allow that there are cases of moral injury that do not violate any duties that are owed to the person who suffers the injury.

Whichever way we come down on this question, however, it is important to note that there will be something unsettling to claimholders about agents who comply objectively with their claims, but without acknowledging them as important constraints on their behavior. The agent's attitude of indifference to other peoples' claims is something significant that these cases have in common with the central examples of moral injury, and there will be continuities in our responses to the different cases, however we decide to classify them in the end. This is an issue to which I shall return in chapter 4 of the present volume.

Overview of the Argument

In the remainder of this book, I shall develop an interpretation of interpersonal morality as a domain of normative requirements that exhibit the three relational elements just sketched. Understanding morality in these terms, I shall argue, enables us to make sense of central features of the moral realm that are otherwise mysterious, while also shedding light on the character and content of the reasoning we engage in about particular moral issues.

The argument of the book begins, in chapter z, with a discussion of the deliberative significance of moral considerations. The focus here is on the character of such considerations as obligations. Conclusions about what it is morally right or permissible to do enter the field of deliberation in a distinctive way, as presumptive constraints on the agent's activities. It is an important desideratum for moral theory to make sense of this aspect of morality, which involves (as I contend) a sui generis form of normative relation. I show that a relational interpretation of morality can illuminate the force of moral considerations as obligations of this kind, ones that derive from the basic fact that we inhabit a common world together with other individuals. Duties that are owed to another party are paradigmatically suited to the distinctive deliberative role of presumptive constraints on a person's agency. So if there are things that we owe to other persons just in virtue of their standing as persons, the ingredients will be in place for an account of interpersonal morality as a set of obligations or practical requirements on the will. In the course of developing this idea, I argue, further, that the resulting account is superior to the alternative theories of moral obligation bequeathed to us by the philosophical tradition.

In chapter 3, I turn to a different but equally important aspect of morality, which involves its social significance. Moral norms, I suggest, characteristically ground relations of accountability between individuals. Thus, we understand a group's morality, in part, by identifying the norms whose violation attracts blame and opprobrium within their community; these are norms that members of the community hold each other accountable for complying with. I argue that the features that explain the standing of moral considerations as obligations should equally shed light on their suitability to structure interpersonal accountability relations of this kind. That is, the moral qualities that function normatively in deliberation as presumptive constraints on agency should equally provide other parties with reasons to adjust their attitudes and behavior toward the agent when the constraints are flouted.

I contend that the relational interpretation is uniquely equipped to render intelligible this interpersonal dimension of the moral. If moral obligations have their basis in the things that we owe it to other individuals to do, then to act with disregard for such considerations is to display disregard for other individuals, as persons who have claims against us. To flout moral obligations, so understood, is not

merely to do the wrong thing, but to wrong someone else, causing that individual what I referred to above as a moral injury. But this is the sort of thing that gives the person who is wronged reason to resent the agent, in the way that is characteristic of relations of accountability. I show, further, that our accountability practices themselves have a relational deep structure. Reactive and other forms of blame, as well as the subsequent responses they set in motion, seem to presuppose a relational interpretation of moral requirements. Thus, wrongdoers are expected to apologize to those who have been wronged by what they did, and people in this position have a power to forgive wrongdoers that does not extend to other parties. We can make sense of these features of our interpersonal practices of accountability only if the moral norms that structure them are relational in character.

Chapters 2 and 3 together make a positive case for interpreting morality as a domain of directed obligations. The argument turns on the importance of elucidating the characteristic role of morality, both within individual deliberation and as a basis for a social practice of interpersonal accountability. Both aspects of this challenge have been somewhat neglected in recent discussions.' To be sure, the general problem of normativity looms large in contemporary moral philosophy. But contributors to debates about this issue often ignore the distinctive role of moral considerations in practical reflection about what to do. Considerations of this kind are not merely reasons, in the now familiar sense of things that count for or against candidate actions that the agent might perform, but obligations, which structure reflection in a very different and more peremptory fashion. Similarly, the role of morality as a basis for relations of interpersonal accountability is crucial to human life, but it is often completely neglected in treatments of the nature of morality; whole treatises are written on this subject in which the topic of interpersonal accountability hardly comes up at all.' The lived experience of morality is as a domain of considerations that make demands on us as agents, and that also have a special kind of importance for the attitudes of other parties toward us. My contention is that the relational approach is uniquely able to shed light on these neglected aspects of interpersonal morality, and that this constitutes a powerful presumptive case for understanding the moral domain in relational terms.

In the not too distant past, philosophical accounts of morality were expected to establish in some way or other the authority of moral norms to govern the activities of the individual agents to whom they apply; at least that was the expectation if they were vindicatory rather than revisionist in tenor. The background was a climate of mild skepticism about independent normative notions, and a corresponding feeling that moral requirements required some special justification if they were to succeed in prescribing what the agent is to do.

More recently, the intellectual climate has evolved somewhat. Many contemporary moral philosophers are willing to take for granted some form of nonreductive realism about the normative in their philosophical investigations. Those who are not tend to focus on the metaethics of normativity in general, not the credentials of moral reasons and requirements in particular. The idea that there might be a special problem that is posed by the normativity of the moral starts to seem peculiar against the background of these assumptions. But I think there is a special problem here, one that it is important for a philosophical account of morality to address.' In particular, the challenge is to make sense of the fact that considerations of moral right and wrong have two very distinctive kinds of normative significance: they represent obligations or practical requirements in the first-person perspective of deliberation, and they also structure our interpersonal relations of accountability. My initial case for the relational approach is based on its success at meeting this important challenge to moral theory.

Every philosophical investigation takes some things for granted. In developing my argument for the relational approach, I shall not attempt to vindicate normative commitments in general in the face of skeptical or naturalistic worries about them. Rather, I shall assume that we can safely operate with normative notions of various kinds, and address the more specific questions sketched above, about how moral theory can make sense of the distinctive normative bearing that morality has both on individual deliberation and on our social relations. These issues, like many others in philosophy, come into sharp relief only when we focus on them at the right level of resolution. Zoom out too far—for instance, by taking up the metaethical project of placing normativity in general within the larger landscape of natural objects and processes—and the specific normative features that distinguish interpersonal morality become indistinct. These features also disappear when we zoom in very closely on the fine structure of moral requirements, as happens with many investigations in so-called normative ethics, where fantastic variants on hypothetical cases are constructed in order to elicit intuitions about the morality of right and wrong.' Ethical theory, as I shall be pursuing it here, cannot ignore questions in metaethics or normative ethics; but it equally cannot allow the pursuit of these questions to pull us out of the intermediate range within which the distinctive normative features of interpersonal morality become both visible and puzzling.

The background framework that I shall adopt for purposes of this intermediate investigation does not merely countenance normative commitments in general; it allows that there can be irreducibly distinct forms of normative relation.' Philosophers sometimes assume that normativity is exclusively a matter of reasons, where reasons are in turn considerations that count for and against attitudes and actions. But as noted earlier, this idea does not seem to fit very well with the idea that there are obligations. Considerations that practically require an agent to do something seem to figure very differently within deliberation from the kind of reasons that merely count in favor of doing the same thing. Similarly, reasons for the reactive attitudes, such as resentment or indignation, seem different in kind from the considerations that count in favor of actions we might perform; the former are considerations that render the attitudes fitting or intelligible, whereas the latter have to do with the various ways in which actions might be valuable or worthy of pursuit. My suggestion will be that the relational account is well suited to elucidate the different kinds of sui generis normative significance we attribute to morality: its standing as a source of practical requirements on the individual will, as well as its role in making it fitting or appropriate for others to respond to infractions with reactive and other forms of blame.

Directed obligations and the claims that are connected with them might be understood to constitute a normative nexus, and this is how I shall speak of the relational elements in the theory of morality that are my main target in this book. They represent a normative nexus, just in the sense that their elements have the different kinds of normative significance for agents and for claimholders that were distinguished in the preceding paragraph. But idea of a relational nexus itself—of a complex of directed obligations and claims that are linked to them—is a further element in the larger theory that I shall largely take for granted in what follows. I assume there is a range of familiar cases that we all intuitively understand to have this kind of relational structure, including the example of promissory obligations that recurs throughout the book, as well as numerous other examples from private law, institutional practice, and even games of various kinds. My aim will be to draw out some of the significant features of a normative nexus of this familiar kind, and to defend and develop the suggestion that a nexus of the same kind can be understood to constitute the deep structure of the realm of impartial morality. But I shall not endeavor to provide a reductive account of relational structures of this general type (one that might, for

instance, attempt to identify nonrelational elements that together constitute necessary and sufficient conditions for the obtaining of such a structure).

To summarize this catalogue of defensive stipulations, I shall develop a normative argument for the relational interpretation of the moral, but one that differs from approaches familiar in the philosophical tradition. I shall not attempt to demonstrate that all agents have reason to comply with relational moral requirements, nor do I have a transcendental argument to offer, to the effect that a commitment to relational obligations is implicit in the structure of rational agency (for instance, as a constitutive condition of its possibility). Rather, taking basic normative concepts largely as given, I shall focus on some of the things that set moral norms apart from normative notions of other kinds, including their standing in deliberation as practical requirements and their significance to our practices of interpersonal accountability. The gist of the argument is that we will best be able to understand these aspects of the moral domain if we think of it as a set of relational obligations that link us with other individuals in a pairwise normative nexus.

The normative argument of chapters 2 and 3 has a conditional structure. The general suggestion is that, if the relational model can be applied to the entire moral domain, the result will be an interpretation of it that renders fully intelligible its distinctive normative features. But it still needs to be shown that the relational model can be extended in this way. This is the task of the remaining chapters of the book. In chapter 4, I discuss some general issues that are raised by the ambition to interpret all moral obligations in relational terms. The most salient and familiar examples of directed duties arise from transactions and other forms of causal interaction between the parties that they link. A promise comes into existence through some kind of exchange between the parties to it, and duties of gratitude are created when a kindness is bestowed by one person on another; similar patterns of nonnormative interaction are found in relationships between family members and friends, which characteristically give rise to networks of claims and directed obligations.

Against this background, it is natural to wonder whether directed obligations presuppose antecedent personal relationships. If so, this would prevent the application of the model to the entire moral domain, as interpersonal morality, on the modern conception of it, is meant to define obligations that govern our conduct toward people with whom we have never before interacted. A complementary line of thought is suggested by reflection about the evolutionary history of morality, which plausibly first emerged as a set of tendencies that encourage cooperation in contexts involving close and sustained social interaction. The relational model that seems well suited to contexts of this kind might not provide a plausible framework for thinking about our duties in cases that do not involve face-to-face interaction or tribal identity.

I argue, in response to these questions, that some reflective extension of more elementary moral resources is required in any case, if we are to devise principles that are adequate to regulate our conduct in the full range of situations that must be covered by a comprehensive moral scheme. A scheme of this kind is one that acknowledges the basic modern insight that morality is a cosmopolitan phenomenon, regulating our relations to a maximally inclusive notional community of individuals whose interests are considered equally important. I suggest that there is a strong presumptive case for extending the relational model into a comprehensive framework that applies to this extensive notional community, given the ability of the model to illuminate the normative features that are distinctive of the moral realm. Doing this requires that we think of morality as a set of self-standing directed obligations, which are not grounded in any antecedent relationship that the parties to them have with each other. I

consider and reject some general arguments that have been advanced for thinking that there could not be a self-standing normative nexus of this kind. I also explore some of the metaethical presuppositions of the moral nexus, construed in this way, which include an anti-individualist conception of normativity. Individualists might not be able to accept that there are self-standing relational obligations that link agents and claimholders in a common normative structure; but I show that they will equally be skeptical about ideas that are basic to any cosmopolitan conception of morality, including ideas that the relational approach is especially well equipped to illuminate.

The chapter concludes with some further reflections about the agentrelativity of moral obligations and about the values enabled by relational morality. It might initially seem that obligations are agent-relative in character in virtue of the fact that they are grounded in patterns of historical interaction between individuals, which serve to distinguish the people to whom agents specifically owe compliance with moral obligations from others who merely stand to be affected by what the agent does (perhaps in ways that also involve the agency of third parties). But this is not correct. The deeper feature that explains the agent-relativity of many standard moral requirements is simply their directed character, which connects them constitutively to the claims of other individuals. 'This same feature of relational morality sheds light on the values that are enabled through compliance with moral requirements, which I suggest should be understood in terms of an ideal of interpersonal recognition. We understand it to be a valuable thing to relate to others in a way that serves to realize this ideal in our own conduct, and this can help us appreciate the contribution that morality can make to the goodness of the agent's own life.

In chapter 5, I take up some questions about the structure and scope of relational morality. If the moral nexus is construed as a domain of self-standing relational obligations, the question arises as to the manifold of individuals who are potentially linked under such obligations. Prior relationships or ties are not preconditions for linkage under the relational duties and claims of morality, so what other principles might enable us to decide the issue of inclusion in the set of moral persons? I suggest that we begin by thinking of this class as including those individuals who are capable of entertaining relational moral thoughts. This group includes all normal adult members of our species, but it might conceivably include other individuals as well. I then consider various ways in which the cosmopolitan manifold of persons might be extended outward from this core, including possible extensions that result in asymmetries among the members of the manifold (where, for instance, claims are assigned to individuals who do not themselves stand under corresponding directed obligations).

It is implausible to think, however, that there are concrete duties that we owe to all of the members of the maximally extensive class of moral persons. Some individuals, for instance, lie outside our temporal or spatial reach. In thinking about the specific conditions that have to be satisfied before a concrete nexus of moral duties and claims can be in place, I suggest that we focus on the effects that our agency can potentially have on the personal interests of other individuals. Personal interests in the relevant sense are interests people have in how their own lives go. I go on to propose that interests of this kind will play a prominent role in justifications for the assignment of concrete moral claims to an individual, and that moral reasoning can be understood, in general terms, as a movement of thought that takes us from personal interests to the identification of claims. The resulting picture differs from some conventional conceptions of moral rights and duties, which conceive of these things as inputs into reflection about what it is morally permissible to do, rather than outputs of specifically moral thought.

Chapter s ends with a discussion of the prospects for a theoretical account of relational morality. I note that the relational approach might be advanced in an intuitionistic variant, which would hold that the

movement from personal interests to claims is effected through an exercise of particularistic judgment that cannot be subsumed under any general procedures or principles. While acknowledging this possibility, however, I also think that there is a promising moral theory that can be interpreted as offering an account of morality's implicitly relational structure. That theory is moral contractualism, in the form familiar from the work of T. M. Scanlon. Contractualism offers an account of moral reasoning, describing what we might think of as a general template for extracting assignable moral claims from the personal interests of those who might be affected by an agent's actions. It can also be understood as a substantive conception of morality that specifies, in illuminating terms, what it is for a nexus of moral directed duties and claims to be in place between two individuals. Its relational character is, in my view, essential to the power and plausibility of contractualism as a substantive moral theory, something that has been lost sight of in recent debates about the role of personal interests within contractualist reasoning.'

The final chapter addresses some first-order practical implications of the relational interpretation. As noted above, there are some important moral duties that do not intuitively seem to be grounded in the claims of individuals. Examples include duties to future generations, where the identity of the people who will exist in the future depends on what we now decide to do; imperfect duties of mutual aid, where our actions benefit people who do not have specific claims to the goods that we provide; and situations in which the numbers count for moral reflection, which have seemed difficult to make sense of in terms of moral requirements that are owed to other individuals. I show that the relational approach can plausibly be extended to challenging cases of these kinds, though only by modifying the familiar idea of a moral claim.

The chapter begins with a discussion of some of the most familiar examples of relational obligation, which I show to be very diverse in character. Some, but by no means all of them, involve transactions through which we understand ourselves to have incurred a literal or figurative debt that stands to be repaid. But they all involve situations in which our actions have potential effects on individuals who are foreseeable at the time when we act. I go on to consider a recent suggestion to the effect that foreseeability of this kind is not a necessary condition for an action to count as one that wrongs another party. Though the suggestion seems implausible to me, I note that it could be accommodated by postulating secondary moral claims not to be harmed by the wrongful agency of another. Claims of this kind would be unlike paradigm moral rights; but on any account of relational morality, there will be numerous claims of this sort. These include the considerations involved in cases of socalled imperfect moral duty, which leave agents with considerable discretion as to how they are to be fulfilled. I discuss the cases of gratitude and mutual aid, suggesting that claims are in place even here, though they are not necessarily claims whose satisfaction would redound to the benefit of the claimholder in particular.

The remaining sections of the chapter offer an extended discussion of some of the moral situations that have traditionally been thought especially difficult to accommodate within a basically relational framework. A particular crux is the significance of numbers and aggregation for moral thought. I recommend a form of relational morality that gives prominence to the ex ante objections that individuals might have to principles for the general regulation of behavior, and observe that it provides resources for incorporating aggregative considerations within the framework of what we owe to each other as individuals. There remain, however, some cases that cannot be understood in these terms, where philosophers have maintained that aggregate well-being has independent importance for practical thought. I note that intuitions about this matter may trade in part on a failure to distinguish between contexts of individual agency and of collective decision-making about matters of democratic public

policy. I also argue that the independent importance of well-being for individual agency, to the extent it persists, should be understood to involve requirements that conflict (at best) with those of relational morality, rather than undermining or outweighing them, as some have alleged that they do.

It is not my aim in chapter 6 to resolve the thorny practical questions that are there discussed. The objective is instead to explore the resources of the relational approach for understanding the moral dimension of these important questions. As noted earlier, many contemporary discussions in normative ethics proceed through constructing elaborate hypothetical cases, which are meant to test our intuitions about what it is right or permissible to do, but in a way that is independent of theoretical debates about the nature of moral rightness or permissibility.' One implication of the earlier chapters of this book is that this is a questionable strategy. It is not at all clear that there is a stable and convincing conception of moral rightness, one that is suited to the deliberative and interpersonal roles that a conception of this kind may reasonably be expected to satisfy. Until a plausible such conception is articulated and developed, reflection on elaborate hypothetical cases threatens to become undisciplined, appealing to elusive ideas about morality that we do not fully understand. It is unpromising, for instance, to argue about what we have "moral reason" to do, or about which of various hypothetical outcomes would be "better (from the moral point of view)," until we know what conceptions of moral reasons and moral value might be in play.' So one objective of chapter 6 is to situate some of the controversies in normative ethics within the context of an independently compelling conception of what morality is about in the first place.

Interpersonal morality, according to the relational interpretation of it, collects a set of requirements that derive from the inherent challenges of our social life. These requirements constitute a coherent domain of interpersonal obligations and claims, specifying what we owe to each other insofar as we are moral persons who stand to be affected by exertions of each other's agency. Chapter 6 argues that this way of thinking about interpersonal morality provides a fruitful framework for understanding what is at stake in some of the challenging practical questions that are discussed. Seen in this light, the argument of chapter 6 dovetails with the earlier chapters of the book, which identify important normative features of our moral practices that are fully intelligible only on the relational interpretation of them, and which show how the relational framework can be extended to encompass our relations to anyone whose interests might conceivably be affected by what we do.

The book as a whole might thus be thought of as making an interpretative case for the relational account." It sketches a distinctive approach to understanding the unity of the moral realm, highlighting normative and practical features of morality that best make sense when morality is understood in these terms. The burden of the argument is not to counter the kind of skepticism about morality that questions whether we can have reason to do things that do not directly promote our own welfare and interests; nor do I aim to establish that rational agents have to think of themselves as subject to relational moral requirements, on pain of inconsistency or some other form of rational instability. My discussion is targeted at those who are prepared to accept the basic idea, already mentioned several times, that no individual is either more or less important than any other.' This is a characteristically modern idea, as it seems to me, one that may not have been fully acknowledged at all times and places, even by agents who were otherwise thoughtful and conscientious. But for most of us today, it is an idea that seems extremely difficult to deny. Even those who are willing to take on board this substantive commitment, however, might reasonably wonder how the postulate of equal standing could give rise to something recognizable as interpersonal morality: a set of obligations on agents that are also suited to structure accountability relations with other persons, and that provide an illuminating framework for

negotiating first-order questions about the ways in which it is permissible for them to conduct their lives.

Thus, consequentialism in some form strikes us as an exceptionally natural way of thinking about morality, once we take seriously the idea that the circle of moral concern must expand beyond the boundaries of parochial attachment, so that we grant the interests of each individual to be equally important." As T. M. Scanlon has written, consequentialism is for a wide range of people "the view towards which they find themselves pressed when they try to give a theoretical account of their moral beliefs."' If the interests of all persons matter equally, then it is very tempting to suppose that morality will enjoin us to maximize the impartial good, taking the good of each to be no more or less important than the good of any other. But the resulting interpretation of morality is also deeply problematic. It notoriously delivers verdicts about many questions of normative ethics that are wildly at variance with our considered convictions, failing (among other things) to acknowledge the significance for moral thought of the differences between persons and the relation between their agency and their own projects and attachments.' It also, as I argue in chapters 2 and 3 below, leaves us without resources to understand the character of morality as a set of obligations on agents that at the same time structure relations of accountability with others.

Some have tried to make of such apparent deficiencies a kind of theoretical virtue, arguing that secular moral philosophy is a subject in its infancy, and that it is only to be expected that the comparatively recent insights it attempts to accommodate might lead to radical revisions in received ideas about its nature and first-order consequences. It can be thrilling to think of oneself as embarked on an inquiry that is in this way untethered from conventional wisdom. A different and no less plausible response is that the project of modern moral philosophy would be a failure if consequentialism (or something similar) is what becomes of it when we try to take seriously the postulate of the equal standing of everyone.' Both of these attitudes—the heroically optimistic as well as the pessimistic and gloomy—take for granted that central features of our interpersonal moral practices will not survive the attempt to adapt them to the cosmopolitan insight that the interests of all persons matter equally. But perhaps this common assumption is unwarranted.

I hope to show that the relational approach offers a promising paradigm for thinking about the significance of people's interests for our agency. It distills those interests into a universal normative system whose features align with our reflective understanding of interpersonal morality, construed as a unified set of obligations that equally function to structure relations of accountability. To adopt this interpretation is to see ourselves as standing in a distinctive relation to the other members of a notional domain of equal moral beings, acknowledging that we are linked to each of them through a moral nexus of directed obligations and corresponding claims. We become intelligible to ourselves, as agents who are subject to genuine moral requirements, and who rightly hold each other accountable for living up to them, when we think of the realm of interpersonal morality along these lines; we also gain insight into the first-order structure of this realm when we understand it as a collection of duties that are owed to others, just insofar as they are persons with equal standing. That, in essence, will be my argument for the relational approach. <>

Biased: Uncovering the Hidden Prejudice That Shapes What We See, Think, and Do by Jennifer L. Eberhardt, PhD [Viking, 9780735224933]

"Poignant....important and illuminating."—*The New York Times Book Review*

"Groundbreaking."—Bryan Stevenson, *New York Times* bestselling author of *Just Mercy*

From one of the world's leading experts on unconscious racial bias come stories, science, and strategies to address one of the central controversies of our time

How do we talk about bias? How do we address racial disparities and inequities? What role do our institutions play in creating, maintaining, and magnifying those inequities? What role do we play? With a perspective that is at once scientific, investigative, and informed by personal experience, Dr. Jennifer Eberhardt offers us the language and courage we need to face one of the biggest and most troubling issues of our time. She exposes racial bias at all levels of society—in our neighborhoods, schools, workplaces, and criminal justice system. Yet she also offers us tools to address it. Eberhardt shows us how we can be vulnerable to bias but not doomed to live under its grip. Racial bias is a problem that we all have a role to play in solving.

Review

"A fascinating new book... [Dr. Jennifer Eberhardt is] a genius."**—Trevor Noah, The Daily Show with Trevor Noah**

"Groundbreaking."**—Bryan Stevenson, *New York Times* bestselling author of *Just Mercy***

"Powerful…useful for those new to the topic as well as those well-versed in the topic...Eberhardt abandons the jargon-speak of academic research and speaks to the reader's head, heart, and soul...[and] will make you think about the news, your neighborhood, your work place and yourself with fresh eyes."**—*Forbes***

"An immensely informative and insightful analysis of race-based stereotypes. [Eberhardt] also offers practical suggestions for managing mechanisms of prejudice that 'are rooted in the structures of our brains.'"**—*Psychology Today***

"Explores the reasons for bias of all kinds — racial, religious, gender and more — and lays out research-based strategies that can short-circuit our initial prejudices."**—*New York Post***

"[A] timely, exhaustive investigation of how bias infiltrates every sector of public and private life... Eberhardt offers tips for reforming business practices, police departments, and day-to-day interactions in pursuit of a fairer world for everyone."**—Esquire.com**

"Combining storytelling with a deep dive into the science of implicit bias, Eberhardt explains how bias and prejudice form—and she describes their pernicious effects on all of us. But she doesn't stop at the problem: Her book shines a spotlight on what we can do to fight bias at a personal and institutional

level."**—*Greater Good Magazine***

"Compelling and provocative, this is a game-changing book about how unconscious racial bias impacts our society and what each of us can do about it."**—*Kirkus Reviews* (starred review)**

"Jennifer Eberhardt's work is essential to helping us understand racial inequalities in our country and around the world."**—Michelle Alexander, author of *New York Times* bestseller *The New Jim Crow***

"In accessible language and compelling examples, Dr. Eberhardt draws on copious empirical research to challenge the idea of human objectivity and the tragic outcomes of this false belief. ...This book should be required reading for everyone."**—Robin DiAngelo, author of *White Fragility***

"This book helps us to scientifically view how racial bias works in our own minds and throughout society. We could not ask for a better guide to understand this reality than Jennifer Eberhardt. Her research reveals critical information that can help leaders better understand how biases can impact our judgment and how we are perceived by the communities we are sworn to serve."**—Kamala D. Harris, United States Senator from California**

"Jennifer is one of the great thinkers and one of the great voices of our time…I believe her book will change the conversation on race in our society–and perhaps our society itself."**—Carol Dweck, author of *New York Times* bestseller *Mindset: The New Psychology of Success***

"Drawing on her pioneering research, Jennifer Eberhardt's new book offers a powerful exploration of how racial bias seeps into our classrooms, college campuses, police departments, and businesses."**—Bruce Western, author of *Punishment and Inequality in America* and Professor of Sociology, Columbia University**

"*Biased* is deeply relevant to education and other fields of work, within the U.S. and globally. Dr. Eberhardt's work offers a touchstone for educators, leaders, lawmakers, and all those who want a society that serves everyone equally."**—Linda Darling-Hammond, author of *The Flat World* and *Education: How America's Commitment to Equity will Determine our Future***

"This is not someone who is just doing work in the ivory tower of a university. This is someone who is really out in the trenches working with police departments and the criminal justice system."**—Chris Magnus, Chief of Police, Tucson, Arizona**

"She is saying things that make people uncomfortable, but she has the evidence to back up the reality of what's she's describing… [her work is]…original, provocative, and rigorous. I think she has changed the way we all think about the American dilemma of race."**—Susan Fiske, Psychologist, Princeton University**

"The hope for progress is greatly increased by Jennifer Eberhardt's groundbreaking new book on implicit bias. Biased presents the science of bias with rare insight and accessibility, but it is also a work with the

power and craft to make us see why overcoming racial bias is so critical."**—Bryan Stevenson, *New York Times* bestselling author of *Just Mercy***

I walked in through a sea of navy-blue uniforms. The auditorium was filled to capacity, with 132 sworn members of the Oakland Police Department sitting motionless with perfect posture: erect, arms crossed. As I walked down the aisle to take the stage, I could not see their faces, but I already knew what they were thinking.

The road to this particular presentation was a long one. The police force was still recovering from a major scandal that had left a legacy of distrust in the community. I was just wrapping up a two-year report that was about to be released to the public—one of the final steps required by the federal oversight team brought in to investigate extensive civil rights violations by members of this department—and I didn't want the police to be blindsided by our findings. Many in the community were calling for an end to racial profiling. They wanted fair treatment. They were demanding justice. Many in the police department felt they were delivering that justice every day—sometimes at great sacrifice. I wanted to help the officers to understand the insidious ways in which implicit bias could act on human decision making, despite the officers' noble intentions and deliberate efforts.

Reporters were pressuring me to discuss our findings before the report was released, but I couldn't; there was too much at stake. I first wanted the department to be prepared and to be willing to work with our team as they crafted solutions to any problems the report would reveal.

I was tired—exhausted, really—from working on the report around the clock for months, to the neglect of my teaching, my husband, and our three sons. As I marched up the aisle, I could feel a chill in the room.

I made it to the stage. Although not exactly as modern or as high-tech as the classrooms at Stanford where I normally taught, the auditorium—with its wood-paneled walls and rows of cushioned red metal chairs—seemed familiar enough. I looked out at the faces in the crowd, searching for a connection. I

found every face expressionless, their eyes distant. Each officer wore a crisp, clean uniform over a bulletproof vest. At the waist was a duty belt holding the essential tools of their trade: handcuffs, Taser, OC pepper spray, and Glock 17 9 mm firearm. The officers looked ready for duty, but no one seemed ready to engage with me.

For the first time in my career, I was facing a hostile crowd. There was no booing or yelling. There were no verbal complaints of any kind—just a steely silence that was more eloquent than any words. I tried to make a few jokes. Nothing landed. I led them through an interactive "shoot—don't shoot" simulation, which was always a crowdpleaser. The exercise fell flat. I showed a few movie clips that in other places triggered bursts of laughter. Still nothing.

Finally, I caught the eye of LeRonne Armstrong, a captain whom I'd worked with before on trainings designed to improve police-community relations. I knew he understood the importance of delivering this message to law enforcement. I was relieved to see his face,

until I realized that his expression was one of concern for me. He was looking around the crowd with the same worry I was trying not to let show onstage. I saw him shifting uncomfortably in his seat. How, I wondered, can I possibly deliver this training ten more times to units across the department when I'm not really sure whether I can make it through this first session?

Eventually, I stopped with the lessons, and the data graphs, and the images, and the jokes, and the movie clips. I decided to veer off my usual script and share a personal story.

I explained that some years ago my son Everett and I were on a plane. He was five years old, wide-eyed, and trying to take it all in. He looked around and saw a black passenger. He said, "Hey, that guy looks like Daddy." I looked at the man, and truth be told, he did not look anything like Daddy—not in any way. I looked around for anyone else Everett might be referring to. But there was only one black man on the plane.

I couldn't help but be struck by the irony: the race researcher having to explain to her own black child that not all black people look alike. But then I paused and thought about the fact that kids see the world differently from adults. Maybe Everett was seeing something that I missed. I decided to take another look.

I checked the guy's height. No resemblance there. He was several inches shorter than my husband. I studied his face. There was nothing in his features that looked familiar. I looked at his skin color. No similarity there either. Then I took a look at his hair. This man had dreadlocks flowing down his back. Everett's father is bald.

I gathered my thoughts and turned to my son, prepared to lecture him in the way that I might inform an unobservant student in my class. But before I could begin, he looked up at me and said, "I hope that man doesn't rob the plane."

Maybe I didn't get that right. "What did you say?" I asked him, wishing I had not heard what I heard. And he said it again, as innocently and as sweetly as you can imagine from a bright-eyed boy trying to understand the world: "I hope he doesn't rob the plane."

I was on the brink of being upset. "Why would you say that?" I asked as gently as I could. "You know Daddy wouldn't rob a plane."

"Yes," he said. "I know."

"Well, why did you say that?" This time my voice dropped an octave and turned sharp.

Everett looked up at me with a really sad face and said very solemnly, "I don't know why I said that. I don't know why I was thinking that."

Just telling that story reminded me of how much that moment hurt. I took a deep breath, and when I looked back out at the crowd in the auditorium, I saw that the expressions had changed. Their eyes had softened. They were no longer uniformed police officers, and I was no longer a university researcher. We were parents, unable to protect our children from a world that is often bewildering and frightening, a world that influences them so profoundly, so insidiously, and so unconsciously that they—and we—don't know why we think the way we do.

With a heavy heart, I continued with my point: "We are living with such severe racial stratification that even a five-year-old can tell us what's supposed to happen next. Even with no malice—even with no hatred—the black-crime association made its way into the mind of my five-year-old son, into all of our children, into all of us."

I finished the training and invited the audience to come up to ask questions or share their stories. I had been warned that no one would, but one officer did stay behind in the emptying auditorium. As he approached the stage, I stepped down to meet him. "Your story about your son on the plane reminded me of an experience I had on the street. It's something I haven't thought about in a long time," the officer told me.

"I was out one day, working undercover," the officer said, "and I saw a guy, at a distance, who didn't look right. This guy looked similar to me—you know, black, same build, same height. But this guy had a scruffy beard, unkempt hair, ripped clothes, and he looked like he was up to no good. The guy began approaching me, and as he was getting closer, I had a feeling that he had a gun on him. Something's off with this guy, I thought. This dude ain't right.

"So the guy is coming down a hill, near the front of a nice office building—one of those big office towers with glass walls. And as the guy is approaching, I couldn't shake the feeling that he was armed and dangerous.

"As I got closer to the building, I lost him for a second and I began to feel panicked. Suddenly I see the guy again, but this time he is inside the office building. I could see the guy clearly through the glass wall. He was walking inside the building—in the same direction and at the same pace as I was walking.

"Something was wrong. When I quickened my pace, I could see him quicken his pace. And finally, I decided to stop abruptly, turn, and confront the guy.

"He stops too, and I look at him face-to-face," the officer said to me. "And when I look in his eyes, a shock went through me. I realized that I was staring at myself. I was the person I feared. I was staring at my own reflection through the mirrored wall. That entire time, I was tailing myself; I was profiling myself."

The stories kept coming. At every single session, someone came up and told me a story—stories that enriched my understanding not only of police-community relations but also of our human predicament.

This book is an examination of implicit bias—what it is, where it comes from, how it affects us, and how we can address it. Implicit bias is not a new way of calling someone a racist. In fact, you don't have to be a racist at all to be influenced by it. Implicit bias is a kind of distorting lens that's a product of both the architecture of our brain and the disparities in our society.

We all have ideas about race, even the most open-minded among us. Those ideas have the power to bias our perception, our attention, our memory, and our actions—all despite our conscious awareness or deliberate intentions. Our ideas about race are shaped by the stereotypes to which we are exposed on a daily basis. And one of the strongest stereotypes in American society associates blacks with criminality.

This stereotypic association is so powerful that the mere presence of a black face, even one that appears so fleetingly we are unaware of it, can cause us to see weapons more quickly—or to imagine weapons that are not there. The mere thought of violent crime can lead us to shift our eyes away from a white face and toward a black face. And although looking black is not a crime, jurors are more likely to deliver a death sentence to black felons who have stereotypically black facial features than to those who do not, at least when their victims are white.

Bias can lead to racial disparities in everything from preschool suspensions to corporate leadership. And the disparities themselves then bolster our biases. For example, knowing that a disproportionate amount of violent crime is committed by young black men can bias judgments about black people more generally. That affects how blacks are seen in all manner of situations—whether sitting in a classroom or a coffee shop, whether leading a Fortune 500 company or fighting a California wildfire. The stereotypes shadow them.

In this book, I'll show you the many surprising places and ways that racial bias affects all sorts of decisions we make during the normal course of our lives—the homes we buy, the people we hire, the way we treat our neighbors. Bias is not limited to one domain of life. It is not limited to one profession, one race, or one country. It is also not limited to one stereotypic association. This book grew from my research on the black-crime association, yet it is not the only association that matters and blacks are not the only group affected. Probing the role of implicit bias in the criminal justice arena can teach us broader lessons about who we are, where we've been, and what we can become, regardless of our social group or the groups toward which we may be biased.

People can hold biases based on all sorts of characteristics—skin color, age, weight, ethnic origin, accent, disability, height, gender. I talk a lot about race, specifically about blacks and whites, because those two groups have been studied the most by researchers investigating bias. And because the racial dynamics between blacks and whites are dramatic, consequential, and enduring. In the United States, those tensions over centuries have even set the tone for how other social groups are regarded.

Confronting implicit bias requires us to look in the mirror. To understand the influence of implicit racial bias requires us to stare into our own eyes—much as the undercover police officer who found that he had been tailing himself had done—to face how readily stereotypes and unconscious associations can shape our reality. By acknowledging the distorting lens of fear and bias, we move one step closer to clearly seeing each other. And we move one step closer to clearly seeing the social harms—the devastation—that bias can leave in its wake.

Neither our evolutionary path nor our present culture dooms us to be held hostage by bias. Change requires a kind of open-minded attention that is well within our reach. There are successful approaches we can learn from and new ways of thinking that we can build upon, whether we are trying to change ourselves or the settings where we live, work, and learn.

This book is a representation of the journey I have taken—the unexpected findings I have uncovered, the stories I have heard, the struggles I have encountered, and the triumphs I have been buttressed by. I invite you to join me. < >

SEARCHING PAUL: CONVERSATIONS WITH THE JEWISH APOSTLE TO THE NATIONS. COLLECTED ESSAYS

by Kathy Ehrensperger [Wissenschaftliche Untersuchungen Zum Neuen Testament, Mohr Siebeck, 9783161555015]

Firmly rooted in his ancestral Jewish traditions, Paul interacted with, and was involved in vivid communication primarily with non-Jews, who through Christ were associated with the one God of Israel. In the highly diverse cultural, linguistic, social, and political world of the Roman Empire, Paul's activities are seen as those of a cultural translator embedded in his own social and symbolic world and simultaneously conversant with the diverse, mainly Greek and Roman world, of the non-Jewish nations. In this role he negotiates the Jewish message of the Christ event into the particular everyday life of his addressees. Informed by socio-historical research, cultural studies, and gender studies Kathy Ehrensperger explores in her collection of essays aspects of this process based on the hermeneutical presupposition that the Pauline texts are rooted in the social particularities of everyday life of the people involved in the Christ-movement, and that his theologizing has to be understood from within this context.

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The essays in this volume are trajectories of an exploratory journey with and through the literary traces Paul the Jewish apostle to the nations has left in the letters available to us. In as much as his letters are fragmentary evidence of conversations in the early Christ-movement which spanned over a longer period of time, over geographically distant places, and including people from various contexts and backgrounds, these essays are themselves fragmentary evidence of conversations in the scholarly community, which encompassed more than what has made it into the written form presented here. They are snapshots of my conversations with Paul and his interpreters over a number of years and as such they do not represent a system of interpretation but are rather nods in a multidirectional network of trajectories I explored. There are many traces that have not (yet) been explored, pathways that I am not even aware of, and others I might wish to come back to so I can deepen my understanding. So this collection is a patchwork of explorations in progress — part of an exploratory journey which continues.

The topics of the essays are diverse but they came to conglomerate under certain main headings. So they are presented here in a topic related rather than in the chronological order in which they were originally published. This indicates that I came upon some trajectories of Paul from different directions, at different periods, namely "Gender and Traditions," "Among Greeks and Romans," "The Language of Belonging," "Romans," and "The Early Reception —the Emergence of Pauline Traditions." All of these essays in different ways represent aspects of parameters which guide my approach to New Testament Studies and Paul in particular. Rather than summarizing the essays here, I will sketch the concerns and parameters which guide my reading of Paul with different aspects being in the foreground in different essays.

Hermeneutical Presuppositions — Contemporary Concerns

My conversations with Paul are guided and shaped by my presuppositions, that is by my interests, concerns and values. I hear his letters say certain things because of the place from where I listen into his conversations, I see certain aspects because of the perspective from which I read his conversations. There is no point from nowhere. And although it is vital in academic research to take a step back from personal interests and try to do justice to the research "material" by getting as much historical, political, social, cultural, and linguistic information as possible on events, circumstances, and situations of the past, a stance of pure objectivity is not possible. Hermeneutical presuppositions shape and color academic understanding and interpretation. I still think Sheyla Benhabib has summarized this in an excellent way:

> Understanding always means understanding within a framework that makes sense for us, from where we stand today. In this sense, learning the questions of the past involves posing questions to the past in light of our present preoccupations. [...] Every interpretation is a conversation, with all the joys and dangers that conversations usually involve: misunderstandings as well as ellipses, innuendos as well as surfeits of meaning.

I thus consider it vital in the business of interpretation of ancient texts and traditions to reflect on, and as far as possible lay open such presuppositions. They are rooted in, and emerge from contemporary issues rather than those in the past. This distances the approach of the interpreter from the material in question, and similarities and commonalities should not easily be assumed, nor direct conclusions be drawn between past and present. Although I am interested in understanding events and documents of antiquity, namely of Jewish traditions in the Mediterranean of the first century CE, this interest is related to my concern for Christian self-understanding in the pluralistic, interreligious world of today. The texts of the New Testament eventually were recognized as the authoritative texts of Christian traditions and as such their interpretation triggered an enormously influential world-wide reception history. Many aspects of this reception history have been, are, and will be in the focus of scholarly research. My particular concern is the fact that Christian self-understanding has been formulated over centuries in opposition to Jewish traditions and Jewish people and thereby contributed significantly to racist and "völkisch" antisemitism in the 19th and 20th century (this aspect is explicitly addressed in the essays "Paul, his People, and Racial Terminology" and "What's in a name? Ideologies of Volk, Rasse, and Reich in German New Testament Interpretation: Past and Present").

An implicit question which guides all my New Testament research thus is whether there are ways to Christian self-understanding that do not use Jewish traditions and Jewish people as negative foils. Of course this concern is influenced by the horrors of the Shoah, and of course it is influenced by the concern for Jewish-Christian relations. It would be rather strange if events as those of the Shoah would not affect also academic research! Moreover, there is no way to engage meaningfully in interreligious conversations if the partners in the conversation are not treated with the highest of respect for the value of their own, different tradition. In addition, there are in my view internal reasons which render it necessary to reconsider Christian self-understanding in relation to Jewish traditions.

The recognition that there is an intrinsic relation between Christian self-understanding and Jewish traditions has not been triggered by recent events but has been part of Christian tradition from the very beginning. The question is not whether, but how this relation has been and is being conceived by Christians. Christian self-understanding has emerged decisively in negative differentiation from Jewish traditions. In the course of the centuries clarification about who one was, and what the essence of one's own perception and relation to the divine was, has been defined via opposition to anything Jewish. To be Christian implied an attitude of contempt and rejection to anything Jewish, and to the people who lived according to Jewish tradition, that is, the Jewish people.' Formulations in the Pauline letters were read as supporting such perceptions. Thus Jewish traditions and Jews were part of Christian self-understanding all along. Christians seemed to be unable to say who they were without denigrating the others who read (almost) the same scriptures, also related to the one God, and continued to do so, although in different ways. The question is: Is this denigration of Jews and Jewish tradition an inherent necessity for Christian self-understanding? Is the differentiation into the two religious traditions of Rabbinic Judaism and Christianity necessarily antagonistic and is antagonism against Jews and anything Jewish as such an essential part of Christianity? It is a crucial question for Jewish-Christian relations today, and Christianity has to find ways to address it for her own sake. If a denigrating negative foil is inherently necessary for Christian identity a meaningful interreligious conversation is basically impossible.

I consider this a vital question in that, to base one's self-understanding on the contempt and denigration of others who are and remain different seriously questions the very core of values claimed as Christian. The Pauline letters have been a main source and provided building blocks for Christian self-understanding at different periods of Church history often at decisive junctions, such as the Reformation or after World War I. They are necessarily part of this search for a Christian self-understanding without anti-Judaism. My journey in conversation with Paul is thus not interest- and value-free but guided by this main concern.

Biblical Interpretation: An Open Conversation — with Limitations

The Pauline letters eventually became authoritative scripture as part of the Christian canon. But like the other New Testament writings, they were not written as such. They emerged as part of the divergence of Jewish traditions, with the Pauline letters being written even before the destruction of Jerusalem and the Temple in 70 CE. As such these letters are historical documents of the late Second Temple period, documents of Jewish history and tradition. My journey is guided by the presupposition that they should be read as such, informed of course by most recent research into the socio-historical, cultural, political, and linguistic conditions of the period and through critical evaluation of the letters in relation to these. Paul refers to himself as someone who is and remains part of Jewish tradition, who is educated in this tradition, who understands his task as part of this tradition, who tries to understand the implications of the Christ-event relying entirely on this tradition, and who considers the traditions of the fathers and the scriptures as the authoritative guidance for his own life and that of the Christ-following groups from the non-Jewish nations. I share this perspective on Paul with others, and my own research is indebted to many who have been involved in this endeavor for a much longer time than I have. I have learned from others, I build on the research and insights of others, who were before me and are with me on this journey. Biblical Interpretation is a collective endeavor, a conversation of scholars, past and present, that will hopefully inspire scholars in the future. In as much as it is a conversation, that is, a critical interaction between colleagues, there are always new questions emerging, different perspectives opening up which challenge but also illuminate each other. As such I consider the task of interpretation not as something static, aimed at generating answers which stand the test of time forever, but as a journey in search of meaningful answers within particular contexts. As a continuous journey there is always another perspective from which to perceive and interpret, perspectives of which I had not been aware, or blind spots I could not see from where I was standing.

This is not an argument for "anything goes," but as mentioned, any interpretation has to be grounded in solid scholarly research, based on information available and relevant in support of understanding texts from the past, and argued with the scrutiny of critical reasoning as required in any academic discipline in conversation with colleagues.' This means that where new information demonstrates that earlier interpretations were based on misinformation and wrong assumptions these of course need to be revised. In the field of New Testament Studies such an insight was triggered by the publication of E.P. Sanders' Paul and Palestinian Judaism in 1977. Although already at the end of the I 8th century Reimarus had located Jesus within Judaism, this had nothing to do with an accurate perception of Judaism but rather with an internal critical stance over against Christian doctrinal traditions.' In the 19th century attention was drawn to the Jewishness of New Testament writings, mainly by Jewish scholars who demonstrated the closeness of the traditions of the New Testament with Jewish traditions,' but since Jewish academics were not taken seriously as scholars on equal par with Christian academics, their evidence and arguments were widely ignored.' Leo Baeck's book on the gospels as part of Jewish tradition and history (Das Evangelium als Urkunde der jüdischen Glaubensgeschichte, Berlin: Schocken)

was published in 1938 (sic!) without triggering any response from Christian scholars. From a Christian perspective, already in 1921 George F. Moore had demonstrated that the "Judaism" of New Testament scholarship presented a highly distorted image of Jewish traditions.' And Albert Schweitzer had argued that Paul had to be understood from within Jewish apocalyptic traditions." Paul's Jewishness was acknowledged by others in the 19' century but for entirely opposite reasons. He was charged with having transformed and falsified Christianity. Paul LaGarde saw in him the reason the church had adhered to the writings of the Old Testament and thus to a Jewish understanding of history under which in his view the true gospel perished.' With the publication of W.D. Davies' Paul and Rabbinic Judaism the trajectory of taking Jewish tradition seriously in New Testament interpretation re-emerged after World War II." And Krister Stendahl challenged the dominating strand of Pauline Studies in his lecture on "Paul and the Introspective Conscience of the West" in 1963.14 In the case of Stendahl a major controversy between him and Ernst Kasemann evolved, however, without major changes in the image of Judaism in New Testament scholarship following from this." Such a change only slowly began to emerge with Sanders' 1977 publication. Building on colleagues' research before him, Sanders conclusively demonstrated that the image of Jewish traditions used in traditional Christian New Testament interpretation was a caricature rather than an adequate representation of Jewish traditions of the Second Temple period. Even if some aspects of Sanders' work may in detail be questioned due to new or more precise information, the assessment that the image of Jewish tradition in New Testament scholarship was a misrepresentation cannot be refuted, and there is no going back to such distortions whatever one's stance on the so-called partings of the ways may be.

The World of Antiquity and Contemporary Concepts

Since we are dealing with traditions of the past, from contexts not our own and not directly accessible to us, the methods and concepts through which access to, and understanding of the past is sought, need to be as critically scrutinized as possible. They are contemporary methods and concepts — not the concepts, possibly not even the terminology of those people of the past we are trying to understand.' It means trying to understand writings of the past as far as possible within their own frameworks, and critically reflect on the concepts and frameworks we apply and through which we interpret. Since Christianity as a separate entity did not exist in the first century, it is anachronistic to apply the concept of such an entity to the texts in question. This is why I do not use the term Christian for those who are part of groups of people, Jews and non-Jews, who were convinced that with the Christ-event the age to come was in the process of beginning.

Since a concept of religion as a realm of life which consisted predominantly in a belief system as separated from other dimensions of life, also did not exist in antiquity, I also try as far as possible to avoid to refer to the traditions which in modern categorizations are referred to as religions, in this terminology." These dimensions were intrinsic parts of everyday life of all people at the time. They were permeating all aspects of "how one did things" among particular people, Thracians, Macedonians, Egyptians or Jews, that is, they were part of what in contemporary terminology is referred to as something similar to "culture." As Barton and Boyarin clarify this does not mean that "people did not make gods or build temples, praise and pray and sacrifice, that they did not ask metaphysical questions or try to understand the world in which they lived, conceive of invisible beings (gods, spirits, demons, ghosts), organize forms of worship and festivals, invent cosmologies and mythologies, support beliefs, defend morals and ideals, or imagine other worlds." But they did not organize these "experiences and practices into a separate realm." The realm of belonging and the way of living were a package which included the relationship of those who belonged to the same group with the divine realm. As Paula

Fredriksen pointedly formulated "Divine ethnicity might seem like a strange idea; but in Greco-Roman antiquity, gods often shared the ethnicity of the peoples who worshiped them. In this regard, the Jewish god was no exception." This was so for Jews, including Paul, this was also so for those to whom Paul refers.

I thereby do not imply that these different cultures were entirely separate and untouched by other traditions and cultures.' But they were, in their self-perception and in the perception of others, identifiable as Egyptian, Roman, Greek, Phrygian, or Jewish, thus their sense of belonging including the relation to the divine was perceived to be different.

Paul, the Jew

To see Paul as firmly rooted in Jewish tradition has a number of implications. It is an assertion which by now is quite widely shared in the scholarly realm. It is a move similar to the acknowledgement that Jesus was and remained a Jew. Although the latter insight had already been formulated in the late 18th and early 19th century, most significantly by Jewish scholars,' it really only became widely accepted in the wake of the so-called third quest for the historical Jesus.' This insight led to the question in what sense Jesus was a Jew, was he a marginal Jew, a middle-ground Jew, etc. The question of what kind of Jew Jesus was and where he should be located within Judaism indicates that precisely this aspect still presents an unprecedented challenge because of its theological implications. The attempts to specify in what sense or to what degree Jesus was a Jew seem to assume that there is a way in which Jewish traditions of antiquity can be evaluated in terms of quality, intensity, center or periphery according to some objective, quantifiable criteria. A similar phenomenon can now be observed concerning Paul. While in earlier interpretations he was considered to be the first Christian theologian, that is the one who broke away from Jewish tradition, and did overcome its perceived particularity as the founder of universalist Christianity, it is now widely acknowledged that he was and remained a Jew. But as with regard to Jesus the question often debated is, what kind of Jew Paul was: an apostate, a marginal, a radical or an anomalous Jew; as if there was a normative Jewish tradition over against which Paul's Jewishness could be measured. In variation of a phrase by E.P. Sanders it can certainly be asserted that "There is no evidence that Paul was an anti-Jewish Jew."

Aside from the acknowledgement that Paul was a Jew, this often does not have any further implications for the interpretation of his letters. However, if Paul was and remained a Jew, he also considered the message he was called to proclaim among the non-Jewish nations to be a Jewish message. The content of the proclamation as well as the implications Paul elaborates in his letters are Jewish. The authoritative reference where interpretive guidance is being sought, are the Jewish scriptures and their interpretation within contemporary Jewish interpretive practice.' The notions and perceptions Paul conveys to his non-Jewish addressees are Jewish. Inherent to the insight that Paul was a Jew is the presupposition that the content of Paul's letters is also part of Jewish tradition of the first century. It is not sufficient to assert that Paul was and remained a Jew throughout his life, but his message too is part of Jewish tradition of the time, and needs to be understood from within this tradition in the first place. When looking for analogies and comparisons, those of Jewish traditions should be primarily considered (as in the essay "The Pauline 'Enckricriat and Images of Community in Enoch Traditions"), also where the meaning of the Christ-event is concerned. The notion of messiahs and a messianic age as far as the Pauline discourse is concerned are part of Jewish traditions of the time. That they resonate with other traditions and notions is thereby not denied. But the initial point of reference nevertheless remains Jewish.

Aspects of Cultural Translation

The peculiarity of Paul's activities and writings lies in the fact that he transmits this content to non-Jews, that is to people who are not socialized and do not live within the context of Jewish traditions. They most likely had some familiarity with Jewish traditions and Jewish people in their neighborhood, were possibly sympathizers or godfearers but they were not part of Jewish social life. They had been part of their Greek, Roman, Galatian etc. social contexts and were socialized in respective traditions and practices. Thus Paul's task involved a cultural translation process. He was a Jew, who was also familiar with the traditions and languages prevalent in the Greek and Roman contexts of the Western Diaspora. He was someone who was most likely bilingual in a linguistic as well as in a cultural sense. He was not exceptional in that probably many if not most Jews who lived outside the land of Israel were familiar with the traditions and to some extent also the languages of the areas in which they lived, and as such were bicultural and possibly bilingual. The scene that is envisaged in the Book of Acts (2:1-13), with Jews assembling in Jerusalem for Shavuot from diverse areas of the Roman empire and beyond, depicts a rather realistic image of the diversity among Jews at the time. Paul's Jewish education (Gal 1:14) and his familiarity with the cultural context of the Greek speaking Diaspora rendered him an ideal candidate to serve as a cultural mediator or go-between for the non-Jews to whom he considered himself called to proclaim the message of the Christ-event (Gal 1 :1 6; Rom 1:5). In order for an intelligible conversation between Paul and those non-Jews in Christ to take place, the language and images used must have made sense to the addressees, they must have translated into the symbolic and social world of non-Jews. I assume that Paul must have had sufficient knowledge to be able to judge fairly well, how to best communicate with people who were socialized in pagan cultural contexts. However, he transmitted a message which was steeped in Jewish tradition. In order to understand what was being communicated one needed not only to speak the same language linguistically but also needed some awareness of the difference in the cultural encyclopedias and codes which evoked in the use of the same words possibly very different associations, memories and experiences. Particular terms and notions of Jewish traditions were part of an entire network of narratives, practices, experiences. This was of course also the case with Jewish traditions expressed in Greek. This discourse, even though conducted in Greek could only be fully understood if one was familiar with this network. Hence words could carry different connotations and resonated sometimes significantly, sometimes only to a slight degree, differently with codes and cultural encyclopedias when compared with their use in the majority society.' Thus rather than assuming that Greek culture provided the main framework of Paul's ways of arguing (rhetoric) and of the content he tried to transmit due to him writing in Greek, the language itself does not allow for such a direct conclusion. Research into bilingualism and the use of a language as a lingua franca in modem times demonstrate that the cultures using a lingua franca imprint their cultural codes and encyclopedias on the language rather than the other way round." A specific use of the language thereby emerges which cannot be subsumed under the use of the initial culture of this particular language.

Daniel Boyarin has drawn attention to the use of terms by Josephus which clearly demonstrates the accuracy of this pattern also for antiquity. Research into the language of the LXX comes to similar conclusions. Since Paul is part of Jewish culture and tradition of the first century CE these insights also apply to his writing and use of Greek. This is where analogies should be looked for in the first place. The Jewish traditions in their entirety provide the context from within which Paul's discourse should be considered.

That his words also resonate with cultural codes and encyclopedias of his addressees is of course not excluded but necessarily assumed. However, these are also not a homogenous group, they are of a label

which refers to diverse peoples under the domination of Rome. There can be Greek educated people among these but this may not be a majority among them. There most likely were Thracians in Philippi, Galatians in Galatia, Aquila was from Pontus — this indicates that the members of the movement were a pluralistic mix, ethnically, in terms of social status, gender, as well as education. The factor that united them all (apart from their choice of joining the Christ-movement) is that they all lived in the realm of the dominating power of the time, Rome. Most of them were members of peoples who had been conquered, subjugated or pacified by this imperial power, which means that they, as much as Paul, were not part of the dominating elite that ruled and administered the privileged and privileging network of imperial power. But it was the all-permeating context which impacted on the lives of those living in this realm. The visual presence of the imperial power in statues, inscriptions and building programs in provincial cities and colonies could hardly be overlooked, the infrastructure and the overarching legal systems were Roman and the dominating narratives were there to legitimize the right of imperial Rome to rule over the wide range of its provinces. Of course some aspects of everyday life continued for the provincial population as before their encounter with Rome, but with tax systems imposed and tributes required there can hardly have been many aspects of everyday life which were not in some ways touched by the presence of the imperial power. In the perspective of the dominating ideology Paul was part of a subjugated people, despite speaking and writing in Greek, part of a "barbaric" people with its respective barbaric tradition." Paul, like other Jewish writers of the time did not directly refer to Rome or the implications of Roman domination, however, it is hardly conceivable that this did not have any impact on the message Paul conveyed. As I mentioned elsewhere, the fact that the Jewish tradition told a story which was fundamentally different as far as the rulership of the world was concerned, rendered this tradition implicitly subversive although not explicitly counter-cultural. But by claiming that the Lord of the world was the God of Israel, rather than Caesar and the respective divine powers, an opposition to those who claimed otherwise was established. Terms and titles used by Paul, in the vein of Jewish tradition, applied to Jesus as the Christ, implicitly challenge the claims of the imperial power (see the essay "Speaking Greek under Rome: Paul, the Power of Language and the Language of Power"). The non-participation in cult activities by non-Jews who were now part of the Christ-movement could well be seen as an act of defiance, certainly as an act of distancing oneself from what was considered vital for the maintenance of social peace (see the essays "Called to be but without ? Peculiarities of Cultural Translation in Paul" and "Between Polis, Oikos and Ekklesia: The Challenge of Negotiating the Spirit World"). Hence taken together with the diversity of his non-Jewish addressees, their socialization in pagan contexts, and the impact of Roman domination, the translation process Paul was involved in was rather complex. Apart from the difficulties of long-distance communication via letters and the fact that we only read part of this communication, there certainly were issues of loss and gain in translation, that is understanding and misunderstanding, different understandings, and all the nuances between these options of understanding in communication processes.

Embodiment, Gender, and Everyday Life

This is no different than in any other area of communication, since understanding is not a given but has to be sought again and again. Paul is involved in such processes not only via writing letters, rather the letters complement communication and interaction which took place in face to face encounters through mutual personal visits (1 Cor 1:11; Rom 16:1-2), and via messengers, letter carriers and co-workers (Titus in 2 Cor 8:7). The communication and interaction took place between particular people, that is, the letters participate in these real-life communications between those particular people involved. They are not abstract treatises but address and respond to particular needs and questions arising within these communication and interaction processes. Since people of diverse contexts and social

embeddedness are involved, it should not come as a surprise that issues of everyday life, and questions concerning the everyday life as Christ-followers emerged, and required practical answers. The understanding of the conviction of the messianic dimension of the Christ-event did not happen in an abstract vacuum but in everyday life situations in particular places. The implications of the Christ-event required that they be translated not merely at the intellectual level but also and decisively it had to be embodied in everyday life. Learning to be "in Christ" for non-Jews required significant changes in their lives (much more so than for Jews), and Paul acted as a teacher for them in support of this process, including not only words, but as he indicates, he was teaching them in relation to mind, emotions and practical aspects by admonishing them to "keep on doing the things that you have learned and received and heard and seen in me" (Phil 4:9). His imitation language serves precisely the purpose to support his addressees from the nations in their learning to embody the message (see the essays "Embodying the Ways in Christ: Paul's Teaching of the Nations" and — Pauline Trajectories according to 1 Timothy"). Embodiment happens not in a generic form identical for all human beings but in particularity — in terms of ethnicity, gender and social status.35 Thus my interpretations are guided by attentiveness to the diversity this embodiment inherently presupposes not merely as a transitory stage in the process of learning Christ, but rather as the way in which the Christ message was, and continued to be, transmitted. In addition to the lasting distinction between Israel and the nations that is, between Jews and non-Jews, the dimension of gender is of particular relevance. As texts of a patriarchal context, attention to the gendered implications is vital in order to note implicit and explicit problematic passages. Not in order to "save" Paul for feminism — but to try to do justice to his way of arguing in his context, and set this in relation to what could be expected as possible attitudes and indications to actual practical dimensions of his activities beyond the stereotypical perceptions of gender that are found in his letters (see the essays "Paul and the Authority of Scripture: A Feminist Perception," "The Question(s) of Gender: Relocating Paul within Judaism," and "Paul, Emasculated Apostle or Manly Man? Gendered Aspects of Cultural Translation").The focus on the particularity of the communication processes as directed to addressees in their concrete everyday life situations and the embodiment of implications of the Christ-event by those addressees is relevant not only as the social aspect of the transmission of the message, but is inherent to its theological dimension. The aspect of implications of everyday life for non-Jews who joined the Christ-movement has been underestimated in my view by the predominant focus on comparing Paul's letters.

The message is the message of God who is trusted as the God of Israel and the nations, the God of creation. The message of Christ is claimed to be part of the narrative of this God with his creation and with his people Israel. In the narrative of creation it is asserted that the diversity so created through God's word was good. Nowhere is there any hint in the narrative of the scriptures that diversity is the problem of creation or of the breach which ruptures God's good creation, sometimes referred to as sin. If there are problems emerging in God's creation, they are not attributed to diversity, but to other factors such as how people deal with diversity. In the Pauline letters there also is no indication that the Christ-event was a remedy against diversity. If diversity is not a problem, the overcoming of diversity cannot be the solution for a problem which does not exist — when considered according to the narrative of the scriptures. Paul is convinced that the Christ-event is an event of cosmic dimensions. As noted above, this leads to the necessity to embody the message of this event in order for it to become real, it cannot be a mere issue of seeing the world differently. It has to be embodied by people in their diversity. And Paul relentlessly asserts that this diversity is also theologically crucial. If these are the events inaugurating the beginning of the world to come, then the fact that people from the nations now also recognize the God of Israel as their God is a sure consequence and sign of precisely that, the

inauguration of the world to come. It means that it is evident that God is God not of the Jews only but also of the (non-Jewish) nations. Maintaining this difference is of decisive theological relevance. In their difference those called should embody the message of Christ. This relates well to the notion of creation as an interconnected network of embodied life. If it is still God's creation that is in view in the message of Christ then there surely must be an analogy with the narratives of Genesis 1 and 2. The cosmological dimension of the Christ-event is inherently linked to the notion of creation as God's good creation which in itself refers to an overflow of diversity, a celebration of diversity (see the essays "Reading Romans in the Face of the Other: Levinas, the Jewish Philosopher, meets Paul, the Jewish Apostle" and elitist philosophical discourses of the time. Of course it is valuable to also consider this latter aspect, but the everyday practical dimensions of the loyalty swap for non-Jews joining the Christ-movement deserves far more attention than so far devoted to (see the essays "Called to be saints — the Identity Shaping Dimension of Paul's Priestly Discourse in Romans" and "The Ministry to Jerusalem (Rom 15:13): Paul's Hopes and Fears"). The relevance of everyday life has been researched in empirical cultural studies now for a quite a few decades and much can be learned from these also for the field of New Testament studies.

"The Mystery of Paul's Mysterion in Rom 11:25-36"). The particularity of the letters, the addressees, the issues raised and responded to in relation to concrete aspects of everyday lives of the people involved are all vital aspects in my interpretative journey with Paul.

Continuing the Conversation with Paul

Everyday life approaches" powerfully remind us, that this is the context of even the greatest thinkers, hence socio-historical research into these dimensions of life in antiquity is of foremost relevance not only to understand the socio-political aspects of Paul's letters, but also for understanding his theologizing. It is a way of doing theology as a dynamic process, it is doing theology by way of conversation. Embedded in his own narrative of belonging, in the Jewish social and symbolic universe of the first century CE, Paul entrusts the groups he had initiated to use their own wits to work out the implications of being part of the Christ-movement which this has for their lives in the here and now ([...] test everything, hold fast to what is good, 1 Thess 5:21; [...] you yourselves are full of goodness, filled with all knowledge, and able to instruct one another, Rom 15:14). He intervenes only if they have questions (1 Cor 7:1) or if he considers it necessary due to particular circumstances. His letters witness to a question-response form of theologizing, which has some resemblance to later Jewish Responsa traditions.' It is a form of theologizing which also has similarities with theologizing as developed and practiced in contemporary gender-critical theological approaches (see the essay "Paul and the Authority of Scriptures: A Feminist Perspective"). This form of theologizing invites Paul's readers still to enter into conversation with him. He may have tried to convey helpful, maybe in his view the best, even right, answers to the questions of the day. These may not always be answers for us today, as the context and the questions may be fundamentally different. Nevertheless, his way of theologizing en route — on the way, may still be a template for theologizing today, in open conversations, with respect for the dignity of difference, concerned with what affects us all in the diversity of our societies: the common good of peace and reconciliation among those who are and remain different, so that life can flourish. In that sense the journey in search of, and also with Paul does not end with the explorations presented here, certainly not for me. I hope that they also can serve as invitations to further conversations and explorations. <>

Hysteria, Perversion, and Paranoia in The Canterbury Tales: "Wild" Analysis and the Symptomatic Storyteller by Becky Renee McLaughlin [Research in Medieval and Early Modern Culture, Western Michigan University Press 9781501518416]

Beginning with the spectacle of hysteria, moving through the perversions of fetishism, masochism, and sadism, and ending with paranoia and psychosis, this book explores the ways that conflicts with the Oedipal law erupt on the body and in language in Chaucer's *Canterbury Tales*, for Chaucer's tales are rife with issues of mastery and control that emerge as conflicts not only between authority and experience but also between power and knowledge, word and flesh, rule books and reason, man and woman, same and other - conflicts that erupt in a macabre sprawl of broken bones, dismembered bodies, cut throats, and decapitations.

Like the macabre sprawl of conflict in the *Canterbury Tales*, this book brings together a number of conflicting modes of thinking and writing through the surprising and perhaps disconcerting use of "shadow" chapters that speak to or against the four "central" chapters, creating both dialogue and interruption.

A Long Preamble to a Tale

I am a pilgrim and a stranger
Traveling through this wearisome land ... —Folksong, origin unknown

Oscillations

Excerpts: Writing as damnation: what I call the "primal pedagogical scene" occurred in 1966 when I was in the second grade. My family was living in the Belgian Congo, where my father was a bush pilot, and I was attending a school for "mish kids." Those were the days when the frustration that attends sounding out words was beginning to abate. Those were the days when I was falling in love with the voluptuous curves of my newly learned cursive hand. And then my English teacher—a woman who wore severe, black glasses, pursed lips, and a tweed suit in spite of the hot climate—assigned a book report. I read the book, wrote the report, and made what turned out to be a costly mistake. Looking at the words and sentences on the pages of lined paper, I imagined them as live creatures imprisoned behind fences of barbed wire, and it occurred to me that I could free them by cutting out each of the sentences with a pair of scissors. I carefully cut around the upward and downward loops of letters such as "h" or "y," thoughtfully considering how to approach the dot of the "i." When I had finished cutting out all of the sentences in my book report, I stacked them in the proper order and tied a ribbon around them. This tidy packet was what I handed in to my teacher, whose name was Mrs. Gorham but which I shall always hear in my mind's ear as "Mrs. Gore-'em," for her response to this decoupage style essay was immediate and brutal: "You ought to be ashamed of yourself! Go stand in the corner." For the rest of the period, I

stood with my eyes traveling up and down the seam where two walls came together. Did I feel ashamed, as I had been told that I should? Yes, for I connected shame with sexual misconduct, and thus this reprimand served to link pedagogical transgression with sexual.

Like the primal scene, the primal pedagogical scene played a fundamental role in the constitution of my episteme and life in general, and the way I reacted to it determined my relations to teachers, my pedagogical preferences, and my capacity for epistemological satisfaction. Perhaps not surprisingly, what followed in its wake was a struggle with two warring impulses: to please and to provoke. Initiated by standing in the corner, itself a liminal space, I began in later years to shuttle back and forth between two responses to authority, one of which was to gratify it and the other of which was to rebel against it. In order to please or provoke the subject-supposed-to-know according to my whim, I vowed never again to neglect to ask the question of "Che Vuoi?" or "What does the Other desire?" Although the receipt of Mrs. Gorham's angry reproach was painful, it became one of the anchoring points of my identity, a dyspeptic blend of the dutiful and disruptive, for I was in some respects shapeless and ill-defined until Mrs. Gorham "cut" into me with her words. For better or worse, puncture led to punctuation: I became an English teacher.

Reading as salvation: during one of my oscillations toward the deferential and dutiful, I found myself attending a Christian coffeehouse whose Friday night meetings involved musical entertainment by rock groups such as God's Power and Light Company followed by a sermon with a big emotional windup, the grand finale of which was an altar call. At the close of one such meeting, I was moved to raise my hand in response to the preacher's inevitable question, "Do ya wanna be saved?" Oh, yes, I thought, for I was sure that my twelve-year-old soul was as black as the hell I envisioned every night as I tried desperately and generally unsuccessfully to escape into sleep. And so as timid as I was, I found myself making the trek to the altar and joining hands with the proselytizer. After we had "prayed together" (which really amounted to his praying and my listening in a kind of cloyed awe), I was asked to commit to reading the Bible every day. I kept my promise to the proselytizer for the next several years, dutifully beginning on page one and proceeding through the text without skipping a word. But I must confess that, at some point, what I called "reading" degenerated into merely allowing my eyes to pass over the black marks on the page, and the number of black marks grew fewer and fewer as the years passed. At this point, I found myself in a dilemma. Although I had begun to doubt that reading the Bible in this mechanical way was the key to salvation, I was afraid that breaking my promise to the proselytizer would only make slimmer my already slim chances of avoiding hell. And thus I was bound to the book, a most pathetic of readers, clinging to the letter of the law.

It was during this time, when I was concerned with my salvation and the part writing and reading played in it, that I had on the shelf above my bed two books that sat cheek by jowl with the Bible. One was The Autobiography of Maxim Gorky, and the other was The Canterbury Tales, both of which had been given to me by my father. (In fact, I still recall with pleasure hearing laughter erupt from his study and being called in to listen to him read a passage of Chaucer.) Because I had made no promise to read either book, and because neither was offered as a means of salvation, I treated them with less seriousness, certainly with less discipline, than the Bible. Nevertheless, I did wish to please my father, and so I read enough of Maxim Gorky to know that Gorky received some rather rough treatment as a child, once being hurled against the stove during one of his grandfather's drunken rages. Fortunately, neither my grandfather nor my father was given to drunkenness or to violent rages, but, like many a child reared in the "Bible Belt" and saturated with its Calvinist concepts of total depravity and limited atonement, I believed that I was in the hands of an angry god who held me over "a wide and bottomless pit, full of the

fire of wrath" and that in due time my foot would slide and the slender thread from which I dangled would be severed.

Was it simply by dint of sitting in close proximity to the Bible and an autobiography that The Canterbury Tales became for me a personal text of bliss, one that arises out of my history "like a scandal (an irregularity)" or "the trace of a cut"? And what of it did I read in those days? Not much. Just enough, in fact, to be able to say that, technically speaking, I was reading it. Like a good little fetishist, I allowed two tales to stand in for the whole, a phenomenon that frequently occurs in the American classroom and that is made to sound respectable through the nomenclature of the "excerpt." Perhaps it has something to do with notions of the American spirit that the two most regularly assigned tales are those told by the brash Miller and the equally brash Wife of Bath. While the Miller is a kind of medieval Rambo, a man who takes things by force and who wins by a show of manly strength, the Wife of Bath speaks to the entrepreneurial spirit so revered in the U.S., acting the part of the good businesswoman by exchanging sex for money and/or moments of personal freedom. By the time I actually encountered these tales in a formal classroom setting, I had already discovered that men act like battering rams, knocking doors off their hinges, and that women get their ears boxed unless they learn how to subtly manipulate

the men who hold them enthrall. If you were a girl, was to appear dutifut hut to be disruptive on the sly. This was, I suppose, the same lesson I learned as a reader: appear interested in so-called "high art" but get your real kicks from something etse, namely that incipient (and insipid) pornography so many young girls of my generation glutted themselves on, the Harlequin romance. The fact that all of these books were located in the bedroom and initially read in bed (not only the "locus of irresponsibility," as Roland Barthes refers to the bed,' but also the locus of sexual fantasy, and, later in life, the locus of carnal activity) is certainly not without significance. In fact, I have often thought that if my students understood the practice of reading as Barthes does—that is, as an erotic activity—they would seek out a much closer relationship with books.

Although I had determined early in life never to marry, a determination I failed to follow through upon, the Wife of Bath appears to have remained a model for me well into college, arising like a ghostly specter on the oddest of occasions. For example, while I was an undergraduate, I was taking a modern novel course that had as its central text Man and His Fictions: An Introduction to Fiction-Making, Its Forms and Uses. The book is still on my shelf, having, like a precious relic or memento, escaped a number of garage sales, and although I have searched the contents and index for mention of Chaucer, there is none. And so it is with some bemusement that I recall an argument that arose, during the course of this class, on the Wife of Bath. My memory tells me that I said the gap-toothed, spurred Wife of Bath was correct in her answer to the question that lies at the heart of psychoanalysis, Was will das Weib? "Yes," I asserted, "women do want mastery. Better women than men." To which a more politically correct female classmate of mine retorted, "No, they want equality." (It is interesting that we both spoke of women in the third person as if we were not speaking of ourselves.) The drama or "theatricks" of the discussion that followed can easily be imagined, for it continues to play itself out in every bedroom and classroom across the country.

My next encounter with Chaucer came at the end of my college career when, with B.A. in hand and no clear notion of what to do with it, I made a pilgrimage across the Atlantic. Like the Kerouacian beat generation who did not know where they were going but wanted to get there fast, I believed that if I traveled far enough and long enough, I would figure out where I was supposed to go. And so in the fall of 1981, I was standing on the outskirts of London, knapsack on my back, hoping to hitchhike to

Canterbury but feeling dismayed to find myself wait the company of a pack of Druids on their way kick limn Stonehenge.

"Who's going to pick up such a motley crew of pilgrims?", soon enough, a young fellow driving a ramshackle while van stopped for us. Ile was either on speed or in a race with the devil, for almost before the back doors had swung closed and we had arranged ourselves on the van's seatless floor, we were hurtling down the highway at a truly ungodly velocity. I do not know what the Druids were saying to themselves, but I was remarking to God that I would from this moment forward try to be a better Christian if he would let me make it to Canterbury alive. Maybe God, or Thomas a Becket, or Chaucer himself heard my prayer because, before long, the van came to an abrupt halt, and we were dumped back onto the safety of our feet just a few miles away from the city limits. A van, with its four wheels, may be more akin to a horse than I am, but for obvious reasons, I thought it appropriate to walk into Canterbury, heavy laden, as if I were a fourteenth-century peasant on her way to the site of an important martyrdom. As Helene Cixous says in Three Steps on the Ladder of Writing, "The true poet is a traveler. Poetry is about traveling on foot and all its substitutes, all forms of transportation."' Was The Canterbury Tales being (re)written on my body, tattooed onto the soles of my feet as I trudged, still bristling and trembling—nay, horripilating—into Canterbury?

When I met up with Chaucer again, I was far from Canterbury, living the sedentary life of a graduate student working toward an M.A. If I had been sidling up to Chaucer all those years, approaching him from aslant, now I was taking him frontally. Or so it seemed. The course was a Chaucer course, and the text to which I became cathected was Troilus and Criseyde. I was a diligent student, dutifully reading the assignments, not mechanically but with concentrated attention, and enthusiastically participating in classroom discussions. When it came time to write the final paper, however, I found myself doing the Jekyll-and-Hyde dance again, under the sway of that old oscillation. Against my professor's better judgment, I wrote a paper on obsession, giving Chaucer's Troilus and Criseyde and Proust's Swann's Way equal play. "Proust?" my professor asked with raised eyebrows and furrowed brow. "What's Proust doing in a Chaucer class?" He may have been right to discourage me because, in some respects, I was still avoiding direct treatment of Chaucer, still not owning up to the magnificent pull he had on me.

Although my professor later admitted that the paper was better than he thought it would be and that I had successfully avoided a number of pitfalls into which he had anticipated my falling, he did not give me the grade for which I had been hoping. This was, perhaps, another puncturing moment that led to punctuation, for rather than leaving Chaucer's medieval world behind, I enrolled in a class on the "Scottish Chaucerians," taught by the same professor who had just knocked me out of the saddle with his lance-like pen of red ink. In this class, I fixed on Robert Henryson's Orpheus and Eurydice perhaps because, like Orpheus, I find it impossible not to look back. (In fact, when we read Chaucer, are we not always looking back?) There was in Henryson's treatment of the myth an odd contradiction or curious disjunction between the narrative and its accompanying moralitas. And so in the hope of explaining this curiosity, I traveled to Scotland to do research on Henryson's old stomping grounds. After many months of immersion in medieval philosophy, theology, and philology, I produced an M.A. thesis that surely must have made me a contender for the title of most-knowledgeable-about-a-slightly-obscure-medieval-Scottish-poet's-least-admired-work. If all this sounds rather academic, there was something else—another project upon which I was hard at work—that was less so. I had gotten married just a few short months before making plans to put an entire ocean between my new spouse and me. While one aim was certainly scholarly (can I be true to Henryson's text?), the other was purely personal (can I be true to my husband?). The trip to Scotland, then, was a test: could I come home with completed thesis in hand

and marital fidelity intact? Because of Mrs. Gore-'em, the textual and the sexual are never far apart. Indeed, they are hopelessly enmeshed, coupled, wedded. Sometimes blissfully, sometimes not.

My dalliance with Chaucer finally came to a head when after four years of doctoral work on subjects decidedly modern, I fell headlong into the medieval by auditing a course on The Canterbury Tales. The audit itself suggests a kind of surplus or return of the repressed, for there was nothing to be gained, officially speaking, by taking the class. I had already completed my course work and passed the comprehensive exams, and so this audit stands as a moment of excess that is hard to account for but in which I (re)found Chaucer. This time, however, there was no ducking or dodging. I had to look what is called Chaucer's masterpiece in the eye. Was I running away from something or hurrying toward it when I decided—against all advice otherwise—to write my dissertation on this very text? "You're not a medievalist; you can't write on Chaucer," said one. "It's academic suicide," said another. "You'll never be marketable." All I could offer in defense of what must have looked like insanity was something akin to "Me and Mr. Chaucer / we got a thing going on." Admittedly, our relationship was a scandal, which is to say, I had fallen in love with the wrong text, but there was no helping it. Or, if I were to attempt to shirk the blame, I might argue as Barthes does that it was Chaucer's fault, not mine: "The text chooses me, by a whole disposition of invisible screens, selective baffles: vocabulary, references, readability, etc.; and, lost in the midst of a text (not behind it, like a dens ex machina) there is always the other, the author."' Did Chaucer seek me out ("cruise" me) without knowing where or who I am? As I sit here writing, I want to answer, yes, that he came looking for me, that I was both his "whit wal" and his Canterbury Cathedral, the beginning and the end of his pilgrimage—and he mine. But whoever fell in love with whom does not really matter, for the bottom line is this: the very thing that had been under my nose all of those years, the thing that I had not really bothered to look closely at, was suddenly the most important, the thing most worth looking at. The Canterbury Tales had been just "a prattling text" that was going nowhere "until desire, until neurosis form[ed] in it."' But why, one might ask, did desire come to settle itself so securely in this particular text, and how did the neurosis form? I do not know how to answer these questions explicitly, but perhaps in telling stories, exposing my symptoms, answers will emerge. Like Montaigne, "Could my mind find a firm footing, I should not be making essays, but coming to conclusions; it is, however, always in its apprenticeship and on trial."

It could be argued—and maybe I would want to make the argument myself—that choosing to write about The Canterbury Tales was just another swing of the pendulum, another moment in which oscillation had taken me to the outer reaches of the disruptive, to a confrontation with the law, to the self-destructive. (It could even be argued that this oscillation is precisely what brings the subject itself into view, for the subject is nothing more than a pulsation, something that appears and fades, appears and fades.) If so, perhaps that is as it should be, for Chaucer himself betrays a similar oscillation when he begins The Canterbury Tales with the "dutiful"—a tale told in poetic lines by a devout knight, loyal to church and monarch—and ends it with the "disruptive"—a sermon in prose, delivered by a parson who smells like a Lollard. While it may be open to debate whether Chaucer was fully sympathetic to the Lollard movement, which had been set in motion by anti-clerical feeling and by John Wyclif's theory of dominion, we do know that Chaucer's good friend and patron, John of Gaunt, supported Wyclif until he attacked the doctrine of transubstantiation and that he retained in his household men who were known to favor Lollardy despite Richard II's suppression of a Lollard petition. Less debatable, however, is the fact that Chaucer was writing during a time when a series of upheavals—demographic, economic, natural, and political—was bringing an end to the medieval ecclesiastical system. In 1348, for example, came the arrival of the bubonic plague. In 1378, the Great Schism created two rival popes. And in 1381,

the Peasant's Revolt erupted, a mob uprising during which, among other atrocities, John of Gaunt's palace was burned and the Archbishop of Canterbury beheaded. This was, then, a time in which old masks were falling and new ones had not yet been made, a time in which gaps and puckers were beginning to appear in the fabric of medieval society. The time was ripe for critique but still too early for reformation.

The father (pope and king alike) may have been dying, his mask slipping, but he had not yet drawn his last breath, and maybe this is why we find Chaucer telling tales at the end of his life. "If there is no longer a father, why tell stories?" asks Barthes, answering his question with yet another: "Isn't story-telling always a way of searching for one's origin, speaking one's conflicts with the Law, entering into the dialectic of tenderness and hatred?"' If, as Barthes seems to suggest, storytelling is a way of speaking our ambivalence toward a father who holds us over the bottomless pit of hell, then each of Chaucer's pilgrims is, to one degree or another, an outlaw, risking his or her relation to or position in the symbolic order. The pilgrims are playing for very high stakes, not just a free supper upon return to the Tabard Inn. And thus The Canterbury Tales makes manifest the "deep play" of an often fierce struggle with the father in all of his many guises, and clearly Chaucer, along with a number of his pilgrims, believes as Barthes does that the "text is (should be) that uninhibited person who shows his behind to the Political Father."

Chimney-Sweeping

Many metaphors have been used to suggest the kind of work entailed by psychoanalysis, the theatrical and the surgical two of the most prominent. But the one I find most appealing because of its humorous and humble metaphorical value is "chimney-sweeping," Anna O.'s word for the storytelling she engaged in during her treatment by Joseph Breuer. As Rachel Bowlby points out in her introduction to Studies in Hysteria, the analogy of chimney-sweeping "associates the talking cure with routine, daily life, necessary household work. Like all domestic tasks, chimney-sweeping is never finally done."' What Bowlby's comment implies is that the work of analysis, whether clinical or pedagogical, is never finally done, nor does the need for storytelling—again, whether on the couch or in the classroom—disappear, never to return. And thus it is with the metaphor of psychoanalysis as ongoing housework and/or homework that this book constructs Chaucer's fictional pilgrimage to Canterbury as a journey into the symptom and, further, into the unconscious itself. Beginning with the spectacle of hysteria, traveling through the perversions of fetishism, masochism, and sadism, and pulling into the terminus with paranoia and psychosis, the chapters that follow explore the ways in which conflicts with the (Oedipal) law play themselves out on the body and in language." For Chaucer's Canterbury Tales is rife with issues of mastery and control that emerge as conflicts not only between authority and experience but also between power and knowledge, the word and the flesh, rule books and reason, man and woman, same and other—conflicts that erupt in a macabre sprawl of broken bones, dismembered bodies, cut throats, and decapitations. Although contracts are generally supposed to forestall violence, in any contract violence is both an origin and an outcome as Derrida has noted, and thus when the pilgrims assembled at the Tabard Inn agree to participate in the storytelling contest, which Harry Bailly articulates in terms of contract, violence is destined to break out."

The reader hostile to psychoanalysis might argue that my analysis of Chaucer's storytelling pilgrims is "wild," and perhaps it is, not because of ignorance or omnipotence but because of the sort of contradiction with which Barthes introduces The Pleasure of the Text:

> Imagine someone [...] who abolishes within himself all barriers, all classes, all exclusions, not by syncretism but by simple discard of that old specter: logical contradiction; who mixes every language, even those said to be incompatible [...]. Such a man would be the mockery of our society: court, school, asylum, polite conversation would cast him out: who endures contradiction without shame?'

It may be the case that, like Hesiod's two Strife-broods, there is good contradiction, which makes us human rather than mere automatons, and bad. Barthes invites us to imagine someone who discards the fear of logical contradiction. Imagine, then, the hysteric with her "incompatible syntheses,' her multiple identifications, her conversion symptoms, her self-repudiating discourse, and, in the case of Anna 0., her mixing of English, French, and Italian. Imagine moi. Attempting to endure this contradiction while keeping shame at bay, I function as the anti-hero of whom Barthes speaks, for in taking my pleasure with The Canterbury Tales, I bring together a number of what are sometimes thought to be incompatible modes of thinking and writing: the autobiographical, the clinical, the pedagogical, and the scholarly. At times, I take up the "proper" distance from the reader by adopting a traditional scholarly approach to The Canterbury Tales, while at other times, I draw uncomfortably close through autobiographical "shadow" chapters that deal specifically with self-analysis and its potential pedagogical uses. This is my attempt to recreate, in some tangible form, the subject as split between the ego and the unconscious. If I appear to privilege one type of chapter over another by referring to one as "central" and the other as "shadow," that is merely because we tend to privilege conscious thought over unconscious. But, in fact, conscious or ego discourse is associated with the false self, while unconscious "discourse" is associated with the (psyche's) truth. Because the unconscious is a reservoir of noxious desires, beliefs, and prejudices, however, the truth of the psyche is not always pretty. In fact, it sometimes stinks to high heaven as you will soon see.

Although I believe this book will add new insight to the existing scholarship on Chaucer, I also believe that simply to add more is not enough. One must add differently. Thus, what I am attempting is an exploration and exposition of the underbelly or "secret history" of academic activity, which call attention to the fact that scholarship and pedagogy are always ruled by the same ambivalences, misprisions, misrecognitions, and prejudices that govern subjectivity. As Rebecca Bullard argues in her introduction to The Secret History in Literature, 1660 —1820, the genre of the secret history requires a "transverse" reading practice that directs us "to read across boundaries: between texts, literary traditions, cultures, and geographical territories.' My approach, like that of the secret history, embraces the "both/and" of generic representation rather than the "either/or," and thus the shadow chapters speak to or against the central chapters, creating both a dialogue and an interruption not unlike that between conscious and unconscious chains of discourse, not unlike that between one Canterbury pilgrim and another."

One of the benefits of this approach, as suggested by its form, is that it works on a number of levels more or less simultaneously, addressing concerns that fall under the various rubrics of the pedagogical, the political, and the theoretical. For I attempt not only to make new inroads into the treatment of Chaucer's most contradictory and symptomatic pilgrims—the Prioress, the Pardoner, and the Physician, for example—but also to render less obscure psychoanalytic concepts that students often find difficult to grasp. (If Lacan is the instrument of Chaucer, so, too, is Chaucer the instrument of Lacan. By this, I mean that if I engage in psychoanalyzing Chaucer's pilgrims, as some may describe what I do, I do so not merely to shed new light on Chaucer's fictional characters but to illusitrate and illuminate psychoanalytic concepts. And so, like any good analysis, it has an educational aim.) To achieve these ends, I circulate around and through Three pedagogical questions:

1) How are we to teach a medieval text to students of the twenty-first century?
2) How are we to teach theoretical discourses such as feminism(s), psychoanalysis, and queer theory when each is radically opposed to the existing power structures so often implied by the intersection of teacher and student?
3) what role should autobiography and/or personal anecdote Islay in the classroom? Clearly, these pedagogical questions point to political questions, one of which is who is authorized to speak about Chaucer and how. In juxtaposing the scholarly (an impersonal discourse) with the autobiographical (a personal discourse), my hope is that the shadow chapters will act as moments of disruption, unsettling or, at least, jostling the authority of the scholarly voice that makes itself heard in the central chapters. Put slightly differently, the shifts between central and shadow chapters might be said to represent the shifts between pseudo-analyst and pseudo-analysand. Rather than suppressing one voice or the other, both will be allowed to speak.

This multi-vocality is, in some respects, an attempt to resist closure and thus to mirror the principle embodied by The Canterbury Tales, for as Rosemarie McGerr argues in Chaucer's Open Books, "[w]hat The Canterbury Tales does is to illustrate, in the debates among the pilgrims and in the juxtaposition of the tales [...], the limitations on any single, mortal, temporal point of view or monologic discourse. At any point in the process of the poem, our temptation to come to a final decision about any issue discussed is undercut by the introduction of another voice." As I have read article after article on Chaucer and his poetry, I have come to realize that the scene of the critical debate is a repetition or mimicry of the mise-en-scène dramatized in The Canterbury Tales. Chaucer's poem itself has become the scholar's Canterbury, and everyone who writes about The Canterbury Tales is a pilgrim of sorts—some on better mounts than others, some with spurs, some with false relics but each one jockeying for position, each one with a "tale" to tell, each one hoping to win the storytelling contest by asserting the final authority. What I am attempting to work against, then, is the aggressive, defensive, protective voice that many scholars adopt when confronted with an object of criticism. What I am also attempting to work against is, as Michael Warner identified it in 2004, "a widely felt disenchantment with the idea of literature, which students in a technologically changing climate increasingly encounter as archaic."" Sixteen years later, the disenchantment of which Warner speaks has only become more obvious—or so it seems to me—hence the need for a pedagogy that will make the study of literature seem less archaic to our technologically savvy, texting students.

One way to create this kind of pedagogy is to give students a psychoanalytic vocabulary big enough to grapple with both the fictional world of literature and the factual world of its readers and the socio-historical culture they inhabit. Many of the students I teach are in the process of discovering who they are as sexual beings, and thus they respond positively to a discourse such as psychoanalysis, which does not shy away from matters of sexuality and which has the capacity to question orthodoxies concerning sexual identity rather than simply reproducing them. It was, in fact, my sexual hang-ups that led me to psychoanalysis, which may be only one framework among many, but, given the particular set of questions and problems that I was confronted with when I first became acquainted with it, it, like The Canterbury Tales, ceased to be a prattling discourse and became the one in which desire formed.

Another and interrelated way to create this kind of pedagogy is to introduce into the classroom what I call "auto-theory" and/or what Jane Gallop refers to as "anecdotal theory." Arguing along the same lines that I am attempting to, Gallop states that anecdote and theory "carry diametrically opposed connotations: humorous vs. serious, short vs. grand, trivial vs. overarching, specific vs. general. Anecdotal theory would cut through these oppositions in order to produce theory with a better sense

of humor, theorizing which honors the uncanny detail of lived experience.' Although Gallop admits that the personal remains a vexed question despite feminist pedagogy's embracing of it, she also argues that it was feminist epistemology chat taught her the value of revealing the personal experience behind the professional product. It has done the same for me, as has Richard Miller's concept of "institutional autobiography." In Writing at the End of the World, Miller argues that only by acknowledging the personal dimension and recognizing the role it plays in our scholarly work will academic writing remain meaningful. Although I could not agree more, I would go further and argue that writing institutional autobiography is important not only for our scholarly but also for our pedagogical work. If we are to "address the student as a whole person" as Michael Roth and countless others including John Dewey have encouraged us to do, we have to be whole persons." And introducing the personal into an institutional venue such as the classroom or a literary monograph allows us to be teachers, scholars, and persons all rolled into one. Scholars in the humanities are not alone in having recognized the value of the personal, however. Having arisen among the ranks of the social sciences, "evocative autoethnography" trains its gaze "inward" onto the "self" while at the same time training its gaze outward onto the larger social context in which the self is embedded.' Using their personal experiences as primary data, autoethnographers "research themselves in relation to others.' In fact, the autoethnographic methodology as described by Carolyn Ellis closely resembles the psychoanalytic methodology as described by Lacan, for both acknowledge and accommodate "subjectivity, emotionality, and the researcher's influence on research, rather than hiding from these matters or assuming they don't exist."

Arguing that it is not only fruitful but necessary to address emotions in the classroom, Megan Boler voices the hope in Feeling Power: Emotions and Education that teachers will begin to become aware of how their pedagogy is dictated by their emotions and of how "curricula that neglect emotion (for example, teaching students never to use the word 'I' in writing as it is 'too personal'—a phobia in part reflecting the fear of emotion in higher education) deny students possibilities of passionate engagement."' It is interesting to ponder how my book report might have been received if Mrs. Gorham had been aware that her unjust pedagogical act was informed by her own emotions (and psychological baggage). Did she ever consider the impact that the unstated subtext of her emotions would or did have on me? It seems unlikely given that affective response has traditionally been downplayed in the classroom and that emotions are notoriously difficult to define—disgust, for example. Although many confuse disgust with a purely physical sensation such as nausea, William Ian Miller convincingly argues that it is an emotion and that, like all emotions, it "is a feeling about something and in response to something, not just raw unattached feeling." While emotions may be discounted in the classroom, however, they are not discounted but acknowledged and talked about in psychoanalysis, and this, along with its storytelling and interpretive practices, is one of the reasons that I am drawn to psychoanalysis as a unique pedagogical tool.

Cutting Up

This book could go by many names: Postmodernizing Chaucer, or Tracing Chaucer's Cuts with Jacques the Knife, or even I Read Him My Way, but whether a more appropriate title might have been chosen can be decided later, when all is said and done. We can, in the fashion of Wallace Stevens, "Met be be finale of seem." Given the subject matter of this book, how we cut and are cut by acts of signification, perhaps it is not shameful to admit that other titles are possible and that, like Rodrigo S. M., the narrator of Clarice Lispector's The Hour of the Star, I am afraid of starting. Writing is not easy, he says: "It is as hard as breaking rocks. Sparks and splinters fly like shattered steel."' Not only does the act of writing require a tremendous amount of exertion, but also it is a dangerous act, producing sparks that

might jump into flame and burn us or flying splinters that pierce like arrows, bury themselves in our flesh, and fester. Our very bodies are at stake when we write, especially when we are writing what might be called the "secret history" of the anecdote.' And that is why this book, at its most fundamental level, is about bodies and the stories their symptoms tell. If Chaucer and his storytellers are symptomatic, so, too, am I—hence my reference to myself as the moi. But if writing is such a frightening prospect—hard work that puts us and those around us in danger—why do it? Jean-Paul Sartre has already provided us with one good answer: we write in order to bring the world and human relations into existence, for as storytellers we are one of the avenues by which things are made manifest. Relations multiply because of our presence in the world. And just as we create a connection between one object and another (the Wife of Bath and the horse upon which she rides, for example), we also set in motion a dialectic between writer and reader: "the operation of writing," Sartre argues, "implies that of reading as its dialectical correlative and these two connected acts necessitate two distinct agents. It is the conjoint effort of author and reader which brings upon the scene that concrete and imaginary object which is the work of the mind. There is no art except for and by others." Writing creates relations, and so, too, does reading.

Writing is hard work, but reading is equally so as Lacan points out when he says to those who have been attending his seminar on Antigone,

> It may have seemed demanding to some of you. [...] I might almost say that on this occasion I have put you to the test of eating raw rabbits. It is on account of this procedure I have adopted—and it's no doubt quite a demanding one obviously, quite a tough one—of requiring you to accompany me in breaking the stones along the road of the text [so] that it will enter your body.

If writing puts the body at stake, so, too, does reading. Both acts require a body and, of necessity, both acts transform the body. In fact, as Anthony Bale points out in Feeling Persecuted, "[m]edieval people did not see books and pictures as something separate from themselves—either from their minds or bodies—but as recreational objects which could touch, impress, hurt or wound the reader or viewer.'" Because of the book's performative quality, medieval people described books as "quicke bookis," that is, as "living books—the word made flesh."' Even more so than ours does, the medieval world saw a physical engagement between body and book. When Chaucer wrote, then, he was stretching his hand out into the centuries ahead like a lover groping for his beloved in the dark of some unknown and unknowable future. In writing, he was disclosing his world and offering it, as Sartre would say, "as a task to the generosity of the reader." If we are to be generous, we must take his hand and allow ourselves to be pulled backward into his world but also pull him forward into ours. We must, as Lacan urges, break the stones along the road of the text that will allow The Canterbury Tales to enter our bodies.

But why take Lacan's hand and pull him along for the ride? For me, there are personal reasons that will be revealed in the shadow chapters, and for this I make no apology since I think it absolutely crucial to have a personal stake in what we say, write, and tell stories about, especially in the classroom. For now, however, let me go on record as stating that, unlike some feminists, I do not believe that psychoanalysis as practiced by Lacanians is either an inherently essentializing or patriarchal discourse, but it certainly has the ability to ruffle feathers, for at its heart lies the concept of the unconscious and the phenomenon of transference. Despite accusations to the contrary, one of the most laudable characteristics of Lacanian psychoanalysis is its resistance to moralizing and normalizing treatment of the analysand, for as Lacan states in "The Direction of the Treatment," while the analyst directs the treatment, she does not direct the patient, nor does she, like many an American therapist, give the analysand advice, telling him

what he should or should not do: "The first principle of this treatment, the one that is spelt out to [her] before all else [...], is that [she] must not direct the patient. The direction of conscience, in the sense of the moral guidance that a Catholic might find in it, is radically excluded here."

Lacan's principles of treatment are not the only reason to take him along for the ride, however. A second and more important reason is that it makes good pedagogical sense because of his quest for a radical new pedagogy that would allow the one called "master" to adopt and speak from the position of "other," which necessarily entails the non-mastery suggested by the unconscious." A pedagogy based on otherness and that assumes a position of non-mastery would, it seems to me, stand a good chance of upsetting what Paulo Freire refers to as the "banking" concept of education whereby the teacher deposits information into the students' empty educational accounts. When Lacan advocates a style of teaching that would "break with the mirror game of 'the subject presumed to know,' as well as with that false, narcissistic understanding inherent in all dual relationships,"' he, too, is challenging the "banking" concept of education by undermining the teacher's absolute authority and breaking with a dual relationship that pits teacher against student in a hostile end oppositional dance. Lacan's radical pedagogy finds its counterpart in Chaucer's fictional pilgrimage, for it is a gain of)1 fort/da gone awry. 'I' The pilgrims leave the Tabards Inn—the cotton reel gels tossed away and the word "fort" uttered—but the pilgrims never ret urn, and thus the "da" dies in the throat. Mastery of anxiety is not achieved, nor is control of the situation. Departing from the security and comfort of mastery and control is a frightening but also an exciting prospect because it means letting go of the reins, allowing the horse to lead us to a place where mastery does not exist, a place where the "mirror game" of the subtract-supposed-to-know shatters into a million whispering shards.

"How are we to teach what psychoanalysis teaches us?" asks Lacan, to which he answers that we are to put obstacles rather than transparency to use: "[to] teach about and through misprision, about and through interpretive stumbling blocks and textual distortions." When Lacan advocates obstacles rather than transparency, he does not mean assimilation, or locating one complex of signifiers within another, but the establishment of a new order or permutation in the signifying chain. As Bruce Fink says of Lacan, he is

> [...] adamant about refusing to understand, about striving to defer understanding, because in the process of understanding, everything is brought back to the level of the status quo, to the level of what is already known. Lacan's writing itself overflows with extravagant, preposterous, and mixed metaphors, precisely to jolt one out of the easy reductionism inherent in the very process of understanding.

If we believe as Lacan does that deferring understanding eliminates reductionism and promotes frayage, which is a breach in or break from the usual path, then we can certainly argue that one of the most useful aspects of Chaucer's Canterbury Tales is that it is written in Middle English, the language itself representing the margin between what is familiar to most contemporary speakers of English (Modern English) and what is utterly unfamiliar (Old English). Although no language is transparent, we often make the mistake of thinking that our own language is or our own words are, that somehow there is a simple and complete correspondence between what we say (the words that we speak) and what we mean (the intended message sent to the listener). Reading a text in Middle English, however, mobilizes the obstacles inherent in language. In fact, part of the reason that Chaucer and Lacan are such compelling bedfellows, or fellow pilgrims, is precisely because of language. What better place than in The Canterbury Tales to recognize Chaucer's Middle English as a pedagogical touchstone for the "otherness" of language, or language as the big Other? Because Chaucer's Middle English is the uncanny double of

Modern English, it seems at once heimlich and unheimlich to students of the twenty-first century. Many Middle English words look like and even mean the same thing as words we use today, while others appear to belong to the vocabulary of a foreign language. What is useful in this description of Middle English as an example of the uncanny is the potential pedagogical gain: while a certain amount of familiarity with an object of study such as a language or a text can put us at ease, a concomitant lack of familiarity can eliminate or undermine the faulty assumptions and hasty conclusions that often accompany the familiar. In fact, Wendell Berry convincingly argues in Standing by Words that "one of the great practical uses of literary disciplines, of course, is to resist glibness—to slow language down and make it thoughtful." As he says in prose that seems akin to poetry, "[V]erse checks the merely impulsive flow of speech, subjects it to another pulse, to measure, to extra-linguistic considerations; by inducing the hesitations of difficulty, it admits into language the influence of the Muse and of musing." In other words, we resist the glib and the impulsive in order, first, to be able to thoughtfully grapple with what we read and, second, to be able to stand by what we say in response to it.

And thus one answer to Lacan's question is to teach about and through the interpretive stumbling blocks and textual distortions of an uncanny text such as The Canterbury Tales. Part of my pedagogical strategy involves an oscillation between Lacan's question and mine, "How are we to teach what psychoanalysis teaches us?" and "How are we to teach The Canterbury Tales?" The purpose of this back-and-forth movement is to create a stage upon which to work out the "play"—or, perhaps more accurately, to play out the "work"—between the medieval and the postmodern, literature and theory, the scholarly and the autobiographical. On this stage, however, we occupy the gap, a marginal space from which we can look in two directions but never comfortably situate ourselves in either. Like the split subject, who must acknowledge its castration (its asymptotic relation to and/or its non-coincidence with its mirror image), Chaucer's text is split: there is a temporal gap between Chaucer and his twenty-first-century readers. Psychoanalysis views this split or gap as the unavoidable condition of the subject—or, in this case, the text—for it was precisely the incompatible syntheses of the hysteric that allowed Freud to found psychoanalysis and thus completely alter our way of viewing the world." Because the hysteric made strange the normative concept of what a woman should be, or want, Freud was led to recognize that the very nature of sexuality is aberrant. Like sexuality, textuality, too, is aberrant. Any normative concept of what a text and thus a pedagogy should be, or do, occludes the possibility of breaking new ground.

It has been our tendency, at least since the Enlightenment, to divide the world of experience into knowable pieces, categories, and periods, but psychoanalysis has challenged the way we organize this world. It has played a central role in undermining the confidence we have placed in these "knowables," thereby helping redefine what it means to "know." Because Freud proposed that neurosis had its roots in repressed memories, the subject could no longer be thought to be the master of its domain. Following in Freud's footsteps, Lacan rejected the agency and authority of the empirical "I," which believes in the transpicuity and objectivity of its own perceptions as well as in the cohesiveness of transpicuous consciousness and reality. Instead of trusting in reason and empirical testing, Lacan surmised that we are characterized by implicit subjectivity, ambivalence, and misrecognition. What psychoanalysis calls into question, then, is the confidence Western thought places in the "cogito" as the origin of all knowledge. It is not surprising, therefore, to find someone such as Cixous, who puts a feminist twist on psychoanalysis, arguing that the repression of the unconscious is the foundation of Western ideology and that a thoroughly political female text would be one that is informed by an unconscious freed of certain cultural strictures. Sounding very much like the Wife of Bath, who

announces that her "joly body schal a tale telle," Cixous argues in The Newly Born Woman that "[w]oman must write her body,"" but this kind of writing is, as she says, "not done without danger, without pain, without loss—of moments of self, of consciousness, of persons one has been, goes beyond, leaves." Upon reading my autobiographical shadow chapters, perhaps the reader will admit that what Cixous says is true, for I have been forced to wade hip deep into my psyche's quagmire in order to write my body's anekdota, and this has entailed the danger of betrayal, the pain of confronting my many shortcomings and offenses, and the loss of the illusions that make up my imaginary self. When one writes one's body, one never knows what one will discover, for, as Paul Ricoeur has pointed out, one comes to be through storytelling. Nothing would be learned if the self were a given, that is, already known at the beginning of the narrative: "In place of an ego enchanted by itself, a self is born" through stories,' and thus creating a narrative identity for oneself is an important pedagogical act.

Unfortunately, the traditional academic institution has been a place where one seldom gets to do this, for it has been and continues to be a place where the cultural strictures of which Cixous speaks are created, taught, and maintained, a place where discourse is tightly controlled or policed through organs such as the five-paragraph essay, the research paper, Turnitin.com, and what Barthes refers to as "the very oppressive, not to say repressive, constraints brought to bear upon students by the myth of the outline and syllogistic Aristotelian development." However, the conjunction of psychoanalysis and feminism has created a space in which to give up control, a space in which not knowing and/or knowing differently is not only acceptable but also necessary. There is no use for pre-packaged knowledge in analysis, whether we are on the couch or in the classroom. The nicely-decorated package of our neuroses must be unwrapped, its contents allowed to spill out if, like Cixous, we are to employ writing (and thinking and speaking) as a means of transformation and if, like Freire, we are to cure the particular type of "narration sickness" from which the classroom suffers, wherein the teacher alienates the student by expounding upon texts and topics that have little or nothing to do with the lived experience of the student." The shadow chapters, in which I use myself and my body's experiences as a pedagogical tool along the lines of Augustine's Confessions, are an attempt to enact the feminine writing Cixous describes but also to move into what J. Allan Mitchell would call "a place for safe stumbling," his definition of what the humanities should be. Just what the reader will learn from these shadow chapters is impossible to say ahead of time, but then is it not more fruitful to discover what one will than what one is told to? Will Stockton, for one, would say so, for he suggests in Burn After Reading that we "delete all course objectives from our syllabi—all things that seek in advance to tell the student what he or she will learn."' Like Stockton, Kim Paffenroth argues in her discussion of Augustine and modern pedagogy that teachers "must constantly remind themselves that their role is to assist their students in realizing their own truth[,]" and she emphasizes the fact that "the students' act of learning is their own."' The same thing can be said of the analysands' act of analysis: it is their own, for no one knows ahead of time what will be learned from an encounter with the unconscious.

Those of us who study and teach literature, who read and write about it, have chosen to do so because of a powerful relation to language, that gift—or perhaps exigency would be a better word—offered to us as a substitute for the loss of the mother's breast. If the unconscious is about the "yes" or the non-binary, then language is about the "no" or the Name-of-the-Father, the function that denies the child access to that originary dyadic bond with the mother. Is this denial a problem? Not at all, for most of us recognize the undesirability of living our lives in the sheltering confines of the maternal bosom, and thus we accept the necessity of acquiring language as that which sutures us into I he social fabric. But what we may fail to grasp is the enjoyment afforded by allowing space for the appearance of the unconscious

when it spills through or into language, disrupting the comfortable rhythms and patterns of our speech and utter(ance)ly unsettling us. Making room for the unconscious, for jouissance, is what Cixous is talking about when she argues that a feminine discourse "even when 'theoretical' or political, is never simple or linear or `objectivized,' universalized [...]." In fact, the discourse of the personal, particularly the discourse of the hysteric, offers a challenge to the notion of the universal subject and functions as a form of resistance to its normative status. Although the concept of he hysteric has wide-ranging misogynistic currency, I view the hysteric as a heroic figure, using her body to reject an oppressive cultural situation and/or tdentity when her voice cannot be heard. In fact, many feminists (including me) view hysteria as an incipient form of feminism, for hysterics such as Anna 0. became feminists once they found their voices. Not only was Anna 0. responsible, at least in part, for the birth of psychoanalysis, but also, in the aftermath of tier treatment, she became the leading figure in Germany's Jewish women's movement. Later, Lacan found in his clinical work that the analysand must be hystericized before any fruitful analysis could take place. And thus in our pedagogical work, perhaps we shall find that the classroom must be feminized before fruitful learning can take place. If we (teacher and student alike) write ourselves, make our bodies heard, perhaps "the huge resources of the unconscious will burst out." Perhaps we shall begin to learn and to know differently.

Objection!

Before I give the reader a glimpse of what lies ahead, I would like to address one of the difficulties I have had to wrestle with in writing this book and several objections to my approach that a discerning reader might rightfully make. In attempting to use psychoanalysis to understand Chaucer's pilgrims and, conversely, Chaucer's pilgrims to understand psychoanalysis, I am forced to straddle two intellectual communities that have not always been in accord and that can sometimes be actively hostile toward each other: the literary and the theoretical or, in this case, the Chaucerian and the psychoanalytic. I am sure to annoy Chaucerians when I supply plot summaries that they do not require but that non-Chaucerians do; and I am sure to annoy Lacanians, for example, when I explain terminology that they already understand and use but that non-Lacanians do not. There is no good way around this dilemma, except to ask for the reader's good will and to quote Richard Rorty on Hegel and Heidegger:

> To get through their books, you must temporarily suspend disbelief, get into the swing of the story that is being told, pick up the jargon as you go along, and then decide, after having given the entire book the most sympathetic reading you can, whether to move out into unchartered space. If you lay down those books feeling no temptation to make any such move, you may conclude that Hegel and Heidegger are, at best, failed poets and, at worst, self-infatuated obscurantists.

Of course, I am not comparing myself to Hegel or Heidegger, merely making a plea for the most sympathetic reading a generous and patient reader can give.

The first objection to my approach that might arise for the discerning reader can be put in the form of the following question: is it an anachronistic gesture to make use of a discourse conceived in the nineteenth century to discuss a medieval text? The way I would address this question is by making a distinction between existence and what Heidegger refers to as "ex-sistence." Even before something is given identity by naming—masochism, for example—it can "exsist" in the register of the real, a register that Fink defines as "that which has not yet been symbolized, remains to be symbolized, or even resists symbolization.' Once named, this something (whatever it may be) takes up existence in language or the symbolic register, which is identified with "social reality." Fink explains the shift from "ex-sistence" to existence in this way: "insofar as we name and talk about the real and weave it into a theoretical

discourse on language and the 'time before the word,' we draw it into language and thereby give a kind of existence to that which, in its very concept, has only ex-sistence In other words, meaning now begins to congeal in a way that was impossible before this shift into existence occurred. This does not mean that the object moves out of one register and into another. Instead, it means that the object occupies two overlapping registers, and because of the complexity created by the overlap of real and symbolic, a residue of opacity will always cling to the name, which is simply to say that we can never experience the object named in an unmediated, fully present, fully revealed form. Even a more historicized lexicon such as that of complexion theory, medical astrology, and/or alchemy runs up against the residual opacity of language. If Chaucer's texts were simply the sum of these outmoded theories, we would no longer need or want to read them, but there will always be something irrecoverable—and thus something that creates hermeneutic desire—when we turn our gaze toward the medieval world whether we do so from a historicist, a psychoanalytic, or any other contemporary viewpoint.

Closely related to the issue of anachronism is that of psychoanalyzing fictional characters, about whom, some would argue, we have insufficient information to do so. First, the word "information" is antithetical to analysis, for it names the factual, the non-disputable, the dead matters of knowledge. And, second, no analysis (whether of a fictional character, a person, or a text) has sufficient particulars, and it is precisely this lack that drives the quest for interpretation. The gaps in one's memory and/or in a story are what set the text-reader relationship in motion. In fact, argues Wolfgang Iser, "it is only through inevitable omissions that a story gains its dynamism," for it is these omissions that draw the reader's imagination into engagement, thus allowing the reader "to 'climb aboard' the text." Like the sentences that were imprisoned upon the pages of my second-grade book report and needed freeing, the pilgrims of The Canterbury Tales did not really come alive or take on definition for me until I began to "cut up" with them. What gives an object in a story density, argues Sartre, is the complexity of its connections to the story's characters: "The more often the characters handle it, take it up, and put it down, in short, go beyond it toward their own ends, the more real will it appear." Is this not true of a reader's interaction with Chaucer's pilgrims? The more we handle them, take them up, put them down, in short, go beyond them toward our own ends, the more real will they appear.

A third objection to my approach that might arise can also be put in the form of a question: is it possible to write autobiography if one is a Lacanian? The answer to this is complicated. The way Lacan has conceived of the subject, traditionally understood as the "self" or the "individual," can be brought to bear quite fruitfully on how we think, talk, and write about the "failure" of autobiography, that is, its inability to tell all and/or to tell the truth. For what happens when we begin to write about ourselves is that we are immediately guilty of what Lacan would call "ego discourse," which is based on the false image one has of oneself, and thus we are immediately in the realm of fiction rather than that of fact. This makes the writing of autobiography impossible, but it is also what makes those who attempt to write autobiography continue to attempt to write it—over and over and over again—as I have done. Perhaps one way to skirt the problem of impossibility, then, is to define autobiography not as a genre but as a practice: it is not a thing that is but a thing that one does. Perhaps another way is to admit that although the being who speaks—that is, the subject —can never be entirely represented in language, this does not mean that the "I" is or should be disregarded. What it does mean is that the "I" occupies a fragile relationship to language and thus to constructed reality. In light of this, one must acknowledge the fragility of any autobiographical enterprise.

A final objection concerns the politics of confession, for women's autobiographical writing is often read as personal confession, and, as Irene Gammel points out in Confessional Politics, the "term confession is

a problematic one for women, as it brings to mind its patriarchal history." While I agree with Gammel, I also believe, as Gammel does, that it is possible to employ the conventions of the confessional self-consciously in order to reclaim one's agency and voice. In fact, if my shadow chapters do read like confessions, that is as it should be, for those four chapters are meant to be read, like the first nine books of Augustine's Confessions, as a conversion story embedded in a larger polemical work." There is also a social dimension to the confession, for as Foucault argues, self-writing "offsets the dangers of solitude" by exposing us to the other's gaze: "Confession then is both a communicative and an expressive act, a narrative in which we (re)create ourselves by creating our own narrative, reworking the past, in public, or at least in dialogue with another."

Having, I hope, engaged the reader's sympathy and attenuated possible concerns about my approach, I turn now to brief summaries of each chapter.

In Chapter 1, "The Prick of the Prioress, or Hysteria and Its Humors," I examine the many contradictions in which the Prioress is mired, the most important of which is that between the ladylike way she presents herself to her fellow pilgrims as described in the General Prologue and the unladylike spectacle she stages in her tale. Using hysteria as a touchstone, I flesh out (and flush out) the difference between the Wife of Bath's response to authority and the Prioress's, arguing that the Wife of Bath represents the "normal" woman who understands the patriarchal economy of exchange and, because she is a good businesswoman, makes the system work to her advantage. Ultimately, however, she does not subvert the existing order; she simply inverts it by asserting that women want mastery. But if the Wife of Bath directly addresses the question that Freud placed at the center of psychoanalysis—"What does woman want?"—the Prioress has the much more challenging role of acting it out, amplifying and staging the question in the theater of her body. And for the Prioress, as for Freud's hysterics, there is no easy answer.

Chapter 2, "Portrait of the Hysteric as a Young Girl," is a shadow chapter devoted to loss: of body, of mother, and of voice. Perhaps it will come as no surprise to learn that it was my own oscillations between the dutiful (being disgusted) and the disruptive (being disgusting), my own hysterical symptoms, that led to my initial interest in the Prioress and finally to my attempt to write about her. Behind an analysis of the Prioress, then, lies a shadowy analysis of myself. Like Charlotte Perkins Gilman, I have found it cathartic, even curative, to write about my experience of aphasia a typical hysterical symptom which began when I heard my mother speak in tongues."

In Chapter 3, "Masochist as Miscreant Minister: The Parable of the Pardoner's Perverse Performance," I argue that Chaucer is making use of the morally and sexually ambiguous Pardoner to agitate for religious and sexual tolerance during a time of political crisis. My argument is composed of three sections. The first argues that the Pardoner's puzzling performance can best be understood through the perverse structure of masochism. The second functions as a pivot point between the first and the third sections, its aim being to show how tightly imbricated the "normal" and the perverse are and thus how much in sympathy they should be. The third relies on the story of Matthew the publican and the Parable of the Tares to argue that the Pardoner's masochism both conceals and reveals a criticism and a provocation of religious and sexual law, a religious and sexual law about which Chaucer may have had his doubts.

Chapter 4, "Confessing Animals," is a shadow chapter focusing on the theme of confession, a carry-over from the previous chapter in which I ask why audiences respond indulgently to the Wife of Bath's confession but not to the Pardoner's. In this chapter, I narrate a scene in which my Mennonite boyfriend and I confessed our sexual misdeeds to each other with disastrous consequences following in the

aftermath. I also draw a connection between the trauma of the confessional and the panic attacks that I began experiencing during a two-year teaching stint in the People's Republic of China. Like the central chapter before it, this shadow chapter invites the reader to think about the function of confession and its effect on a reader.

In Chapter 5, "Before There Was Sade, There Was Chaucer: Sadistic Sensibility in the Tales of the Man of Law, the Clerk, and the Physician," I lay out a series of questions that I found difficult to answer until I began using sadism as the lens through which to view them. For example, what is each teller's relationship to law, knowledge, and power? For whom are these tales told and to what end? And although there is a great deal of cruelty in the tales told by the Man of Law, the Clerk, and the Physician, does that mean these pilgrims are sadists? Given the challenges of writing about sadism, the argument I make in this chapter is somewhat different from the one I make in the chapter on the Pardoner in which I argue that he is a masochist. In this chapter, I am less interested in ongoing that the Man of Law, the Clerk, or the Physician is a sadist than I am in arguing that a sadistic sensibility informs each of their tales, thus accounting for the general bemusement that has suffused their reception. Taken all together, thew three tales flesh out the portrait of the sadist, each tale giving us a slightly different perspective from which to view him.

Chapter 6, "Sadomasochism for (Neurotic) Dummies," begins with a scene in which my hysterical symptoms have become so severe that they have crippled my sexual relationship with my husband. After narrating this scene, I attempt to explain why we remained together for as long as we did and how I began to recover from my hysterical symptoms after we divorced, namely through the study of psychoanalysis and with the help a fellow graduate student who made use of psychoanalysis in his everyday life.

In Chapter 7, "The Reeve's Paranoid Eye, or the Dramatics of 'Bleared' Sight," I turn from neurosis and perversion to psychosis, focusing on the Reeve's and the Miller's tales and/of doublings. I argue that the Reeve views the world through the lens of paranoia and that the fat, bag-piping Miller is the frightening rival who makes itself known as the Reeve's terrible enjoyment or jouissance. I argue further that the tale told by the Miller is a recounting of the Reeve's primal scene, made traumatic by the father's (in this case, Nicholas's and the community's) refusal to validate, through language, the carpenter's understanding of events. I also contend that the Reeve's lengthy prologue is a moment in which the Reeve bemoans the split between his mirror image, an image that appears whole or "together," and his experience of the awkward, uncoordinated limbs that fragment his body. Because the father does not operate for the Reeve, he will always be in search of this figure, constructing him not as the agent that allows for meaningful exchange within the community but as a hostile force that threatens his tenuous connection to the community.

Chapter 8, "Farting and Its (Dis)contents, or Call Me Absalom," is a shadow chapter that focuses on the fart's social status as well as on my own attitude toward and history of farting. Comparing myself to what has been termed the "fart repressed," I explain how I first became "flatuphobic" and how I then overcame my phobia so thoroughly as to be able to make pedagogical use of the concept of the fart to explain Lacan's registers of the real, the imaginary, and the symbolic.

Chapter 9, "Retractor," is my concluding chapter. Playing on Chaucer's "Retraction" at the end of The Canterbury Tales, I make use of the concept in terms of the surgical retractor, an instrument used to hold open the edges of a wound. My concluding point is that Chaucer's cut—that is, his work—is a wound that cannot be sutured or closed. Despite scholars' attempts to master the text or have the last

word, it stubbornly remains open to further interpretation and speculation, for Chaucer's "Retraction" functions precisely as a retractor. <>

A History of Solitude by David Vincent [Polity, 9781509536580]

Solitude has always had an ambivalent status: the capacity to enjoy being alone can make sociability bearable, but those predisposed to solitude are often viewed with suspicion or pity.

Drawing on a wide array of literary and historical sources, David Vincent explores how people have conducted themselves in the absence of company over the last three centuries. He argues that the ambivalent nature of solitude became a prominent concern in the modern era. For intellectuals in the romantic age, solitude gave respite to citizens living in ever more complex modern societies. But while the search for solitude was seen as a symptom of modern life, it was also viewed as a dangerous pathology: a perceived renunciation of the world, which could lead to psychological disorder and anti-social behaviour.

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The first full-length account of its subject, **A History of Solitude** will appeal to a wide general readership.

Review

"Superb ... a remarkably versatile study."
Terry Eagleton, *The Guardian*

"[A] beautifully written, nuanced and now topical history."
The Spectator

"Totally absorbing."
Sydney Morning Herald

"[B]ursts with fascinating information and chewy ideas."
The Telegraph

"[An] elegantly written and acute history ... It is characteristic of Vincent's insight that he detects mirrors everywhere."
Yorkshire Times

"In this well-judged history of a currently pressing preoccupation ... Vincent performs a useful public service: he recognises the uniqueness of our contemporary problems, but gives them the calming and edifying perspective of context."
Times Higher Education

"Are we living in a lonely age and, if so, when did it begin? In this riveting history, David Vincent tackles this timely question by bringing to light everyday experiences of solitude and loneliness from the late eighteenth century to the present. Here we meet solitary walkers, spiritual recluses, sailors on long solo voyages, but also men and women locked up in asylums or prisons where unremitting isolation broke minds and spirits. Solitude could be nourishing but it could also madden or even kill. Vincent gives us the stories in rich detail, in a pathbreaking book that will fascinate anyone interested in solitariness, past or present."
Barbara Taylor, *Queen Mary University of London*

"This is a superb book. David Vincent has mobilized texts that he has mastered over fifty years of scholarship and supplemented these – poetry, novels, memoirs, and autobiography – with a dazzling range of sources on everything from stamp-collecting to dog-walking to prison reform. He manages the intractable distinction between solitude and loneliness over a large domain. This will become the standard work on a topic of both academic and general interest."
Thomas Laqueur, University of California at Berkeley

"This is a deeply researched book that sheds light on many aspects of modern history, from leisure to penology. While exploring rich historical cases, the book also provides an explicit backdrop for contemporary concerns about loneliness but also about modern barriers to achieving solitude. A real gem."
Peter Stearns, George Mason University

"Original, bang up-to-date, and impressive in its scholarship. This is a fine piece of work from an experienced historian."
Colin Heywood, University of Nottingham

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The Modern History of Solitude

The long debate over solitude was given new urgency by the Enlightenment commitment to sociability. Personal exchange drove innovation but left insufficient space for intellectual exploration and self-discovery. Social interaction promoted creativity but might also distract and trivialize if there was no opportunity for retreat and reflection. A new balance had to be struck between engagement and seclusion in the pursuit of progress. At the same time, historical forms of withdrawal retrained a dangerous attraction amidst the noise and materialism of an urbanizing society. The walled cloister or unpeopled nature had long been a cleansing alternative to the corrupting pressures of the contemporary world. Both threatened an irreversible rejection of vital structures of discourse and debate. Amidst these pressures there were evident casualties of social living. There was a growing apprehension, driven by the emerging medical profession, that the mental resilience of those charged with achieving change could not withstand the maelstrom of personal interactions. The more intense the demands of society, the lager the number of participants, the greater the risk of a descent into a potentially lethal melancholy.

The question of how to be alone has remained a lightning conductor in the response to modernity." As European populations expanded and relocated from the country to the city after 1800, so new questions were asked in a host of contexts about the appropriate role of solitude. What James Vernon has characterized as 'a new society of strangers'86 was faced with the task of redefining and remaking practices which could variously be seen as compounding the dangers or exploiting the strengths of more fragmented interpersonal relations. Over time, three distinct functions of solitude emerged, each of them a response to the opportunities and threats of increasingly crowded populations.

The first of these had a lineage stretching back to the Romantic Movement and thence to oppositional practices with which Zimmermann was concerned. In this discourse, solitude was a recurring, endlessly remodelled critique of whatever was conceived as modernity. The locus of unwelcome change was the expanding urban centres which corrupted human relations and threatened physical health. The principal arena of spiritual and bodily recovery was nature in as unspoilt a form as the British Isles could supply. With the growth of international transport systems from the mid-nineteenth century onwards, it became possible to engage in person or through travel literature with truly wild landscapes. What was required above all was an unmediated relationship not between one individual and another, but between the lone walker or explorer and some manifestation of God's original creation. This withdrawal from urban sociability is considered in Chapter 2, which is principally concerned with walking in the nineteenth century, Chapter 5, which discusses recreational encounters with the countryside in the twentieth century, and Chapter 6, which examines the increasingly exhausted practice of battling with extreme nature.

The second function of solitary behaviour was as a pathology of modernity. The licentious pursuit of material pleasure and individual satisfaction increasingly threatened healthy forms of sociability. Severe

forms of physical or psychological morbidity were a direct, quantifiable measure of unmanageable contradictions in interpersonal relations. Over the period covered by this study, concerns coalesced around the emerging notion of loneliness. Before the modern era, the term was rarely deployed in isolation from emotional solitude more generally. Milton's 1643 tract on divorce argued that marriage was primarily 'a remedy against loneliness', and existed to provide 'the apt and cheerful conversation of man with woman, to comfort and refresh him against the evil of a solitary life'." In the eighteenth century, lonely meant a state or more often a place of solitude. It began to appear more widely as a distinct negative emotion in the writings of the Romantic poets." The disaffected wandering of Byron's Childe Harold takes him to the Alps, 'The palaces of Nature, whose vast walls, / Have pinnacled in clouds their snowy scalps, /And throned Eternity in icy halls / of cold sublimity.' There was, however, 'too much of man' in Lac Leman and he renewed his quest for a form of bitter solitude: 'soon in me shall Loneliness renew / Thoughts hid, but not less cherish'd than of old.'

The term 'loneliness' entered popular discourse during the nineteenth century, although initially the concept was subsumed within the pathologies of solitude discussed by successive medical authorities and other writers. In Charles Dickens's 1840 Christmas story, a deaf, elderly man is befriended on the festive day by the narrator, who seeks to draw him out of his melancholic isolation, described in the story not a loneliness but as a state of 'solitude'. Gradually it became a separate condition, carrying with it a specific set of symptoms. Writing in 1930, N., Chesterton satirized the emergence of what appeared to be a particularly local phenomenon:

> One of the finer manifestations of an indefatigable patriotism has taken the form of an appeal to the nation on the subject of Loneliness. This complains that the individual is isolated in England, in a sense unknown in most other countries, and demands that something should be done to link up all these lonely individuals in a chain of sociability.

Aloneness was embraced by the emerging discipline of psychology." At the most intense it could cause outbreaks of psychotic illness. The difficult concept of melancholy was reborn as a condition with interacting mental and physical symptoms. Chapter 7 will examine the post-1945 emergence of a public crisis of loneliness, culminating in the appointment of the world's first government minister for the phenomenon, and the publication of an official strategy to combat it.

The third change was the most pervasive yet the least recognized by contemporary commentators. The replacement of literary doctors by professional social scientists from the late Victorian period onwards did l tile to alter the marginal status of solitary behaviours. The first major study to place solitude as a normal and necessary aspect of living was written by the psychologist Anthony Storr as late as 1989. He mounted 'se against the prevailing orthodoxy. 'It is widely believed,' he wrote his Preface, 'that interpersonal relationships of an intimate kind c the chief, if not the only, source of human happiness.' His book mutated greater interest in the topic amongst social scientists, but as recently as 2016, Ira Cohen could still observe that 'while my fellow sociologists have made extraordinary progress in the study of how individulals engage in social interaction, they have seldom acknowledged that there is an entire realm of behaviors in which people engage when they are not involved in interpersonal encounters'." Such activities, it will be argued in this history, were more than residual pastimes that have been obscured by the noise and energy of commercial progress. t her, they were at once a product of modernity and a necessary condition of its success. From the early nineteenth century onwards, multiform improvements in material prosperity, consumer markets and communication networks made possible a wider range of solitary practices across the population. Solitude in its basic form as a site of fleeting leisure amidst hard-pressed lives became more available, especially for women and the labouring

poor. It will be argued, particularly in Chapters 3 and 5, that at all stages of the life-course, and for all but the most dispossessed of society, these forms of solitary endeavour made a sustainable sociability possible.

The dynamics of change across these three functions have been obscured by a static conception of solitude as an activity. In Zimmermann's treatise, as more widely in his own time and subsequently, solitude was seen as a simple antonym of physical company. He insisted, as we have seen, that the motives for withdrawal were critical, but nonetheless assumed that in all circumstances he was dealing with the absence of another in a particular space. The modern debate about loneliness is still largely predicated on a binary opposition between face-to-face contact and non-communicative isolation. Whether in an unpeopled landscape or an empty room, the withdrawn figure is a key component of the experience and understanding of solitude throughout our period. Two further forms of solitude have, however, become increasingly significant. The first may be termed networked solitude, the engagement with others through print, correspondence or other media whilst otherwise alone.

In the late eighteenth century, particularly at the level of education and society that a medical practitioner occupied, there was already an intervening structure of virtual representation, whereby an individual could be both by himself or herself and in communication with another. In Britain, men and women of the gentry class had been using letters to conduct their affairs with distant relatives and business partners since the later middle ages. By 1800, what Susan Whyman terms 'epistolary literacy' had reached as far down as the many literate members of the artisan community." For a manual worker, the composition or receipt of a letter was a rare event, but leading scientists had long been accustomed to maintaining a network of correspondents across Europe and latterly with the New World. Zimmermann conducted not only his research on this basis but also his literary endeavours. 'His work upon Solitude,' recorded Tissot, 'was received with great éclat, not only in Germany, wherever German is read, and procured him a correspondence which gratified him greatly.' The subsequent expansion of European postal networks, founded on the flat-rate, pre-paid model. Asn's 1840 Penny Post, was designed to maintain connections to members dispersed by the economic and demographic rivals of the period. The later inventions of the telephone and the I net, which will be discussed in the final chapter, supplied further ins of managing physical isolation. Networked solitude both reduced stress and enriched the experience of being alone. Through credence and the proliferating forms of printed media, it enabled individuals to enjoy their own company and at the same time that they were in some sense part of a wider community.

The second alternative form has only lately become the subject of scholarly discussion. Abstracted solitude was the capacity to be alone amidst company. It was the means by which individuals withdrew their silence and thoughts from those in close physical proximity. Aiding concern with finding mental space within the press of people needs a new urgency in the rapidly expanding metropolitan civilization of the eighteenth century. In 1720, Daniel Defoe wrote a second sequel epochal novel of solitude. Robinson Crusoe was now back in London, and anxious to draw a distinction between absolute physical Isolation, whether chosen or enforced, and a temporary withdrawal from surrounding company. The returned castaway had no nostalgia for his former life. The solitude he had enjoyed was necessary to the wellbeing of his moral self, but artificial and unsafe when disconnected from the moral structures and constraining perspectives of educated society. The most profound forms of spiritual reflection were better undertaken in the midst of everyday activity. 'Divine Contemplations,' Crusoe insists, 'require a Composure of Soul, uninterrupted by any extraordinary Motions or Disorders of the Passions; and this, I say, is much easier to be obtained and enjoy'd in the ordinary Course of Life, in Monkish Cells and

forcible Retreats.' The crowd, specifically that of the nation's capital, was a condition of disciplined, productive nation, not its negation:

> It is evident then, that as I see nothing but what is far from being retied, in the forced Retreat of an Island, the Thoughts being in no Composure suitable to a retired Condition, no not for a great While; so I can affirm, that I enjoy much more Solitude in the Middle of the greatest Collection of Mankind in the World, I mean at London, while I am writing this, than ever I could say I enjoy'd in eight and twenty Years Confinement to a desolate Island.

It was an argument about what was necessary and also what was feasible. Crusoe's creator had no doubt that abstracting himself at will from the complex networks in which he lived and worked was an entirely practical proposition. His hero insists that 'all the Parts of a compleat Solitude are to be as effectually enjoy'd, if we please, and sufficient Grace assisting, even in the most populous Cities, among the Hurries of Conversation, and Gallantry of a Court, or the Noise and Business of a Camp, as in the Desarts of Arabia and Lybia, or in the desolate Life of an uninhabited Island'.

By its nature, abstracted solitude has left little record, but it may be argued that in the overcrowded domestic interiors in which most people lived for much of the time covered by this study, it was the principal means of achieving the benefits traditionally claimed for physical isolation. It required a degree of practiced concentration and could vary in time from a few snatched minutes of contemplation or day-dreaming to a prolonged immersion in a personal task or distraction. There was a frequent association with types of networked solitude, most obviously getting lost in a book whilst the noisy life of the household went on around the reader. In middle-class interiors it was visible in the ability of employing householders to consider themselves entirely alone whilst in the presence of toiling servants. Throughout the period it was influenced by technical change, and as Chapter 8 will argue, it reached its apotheosis with the arrival of the texting smartphone.

Common to the differing responses to modernity and the varying categories of solitude were questions of class and gender. Late eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century writers on the subject, as on melancholy more generally, were in no doubt that their principal concern was with well-educated men. 'Close, and unremitted thinking', as Thomas Arnold argued, was a leading cause of insanity. Only those with a mature, balanced mind were capable of withstanding the perils of isolation and returning to productive intercourse with society. Conversely, those spending excessive hours in their studies were espcially vulnerable to the pathologies of solitude, whereas the bulk of the population were shielded from them by their intellectual limitations. As William Buchan's Domestic Medicine of 1769 put it, The perpetual thinker seldom enjoys either health or spirits; while the person who can hardly be said to think at all, seldom fails to enjoy both." Men who worked with their hands were unlikely to suffer from disorders of the mind. Thomas Trotter's View of the Nervous Temperament of 1812 noted that 'I do not find that the pitmen in the coal-mines in this district are liable to any particular diseases; when temperate in drinking, they commonly live to a great age.

In most of the contemporary commentary, women were excluded from the benefits of the solitary state. The early eighteenth-century poet Mary Chudleigh regarded it as a 'masculine pleasure' for which Cason 'Solitude ought never to be our Choice, an active Life including Hist much greater Perfection.' There was a possibility of withdrawal our Studies, in our Gardens, and in the silent lonely Retirement to a shady Grove', but 'none can be thus happy in Solitude, unless we have an inward Purity of Mind, their Desires contracted, and Passions absolutely under the Government of their Reason'. This Zimmermann thought displays of virtues highly unlikely amongst men. Either they were simply too busy managing the

affairs of the wily ever to have the opportunity to enjoy their own company, or their particular exposure to the imaginative faculty rendered them incapable of withstanding its destructive effects. 'Solitude is still more prolific of visionary insanity in the minds of women,' he observed, 'than In those of men; since the imaginations of the latter are in general less governed by an irritable sensibility and more restrained by stability of Judgment."

People with time to spare were held to require a certain level of education to make use of their leisure. The seventeenth-century poet Abraham Cowley observed in his essay 'Of Solitude' that he 'cannot much recommend Solitude to a man totally illiterate'. Those encountering what he termed 'the little intervals of accidental Solitude, which frequently occur in almost all conditions (except the very meanest of the people, who have business enough in the necessary provisions of We, needed access to hooks or some form of 'Ingenious Art' to fill the empty hours." It is possible to argue, however, that solitude has both an upper-case and a lower-case existence. There is an intertextual literary tradition, reviewed in Zimmermann's treatise and revisited in prose and poetry throughout the modern period. And there is a tradition of commonplace practices which have been and remain of critical importance to men and women of every level of society and education as they seek to balance their lives and find space for themselves amidst the demands of company.

Cowley's 'little intervals of accidental Solitude' were not the exclusive preserve of the privileged, whether male or female. For most of the population at the turn of the nineteenth century, even in urbanizing England, many of such opportunities as existed were to be found in the rural economy. In 1800, the labourer poet Robert Bloomfield wrote in The Farmer's Boy of the young lad tending a field of growing wheat and in the course of his daily labour enjoying 'his frequent intervals of lonely ease. . . . Whence solitude derives peculiar charms'.' As Chapters 3 and 5 will explore, there were times in the working day when the demands of labour could be suspended, the more so before the imposition of factory-based time discipline. In the home there were again moments of escape, their incidence varying according to the numbers and ages of children. The density of company varied over the course of the day as men went out to labour and increasingly children left for school. And always, particularly but not only in rural areas, there were the gardens, lanes, and fields beyond the front door where it was possible for fleeting periods to be alone with yourself.'

Upper- and lower-case categories of solitude have to be seen in relation to each other. There needs to be a focus on the exchange between the literary discourse and everyday attitudes and practices. In his classic study of the related subject of the pastoral ideal in American life, Leo Marx argues that 'to appreciate the significance and power of our American fables it is necessary to understand the interplay between the literary imagination and what happens outside literature, in the general culture'. Over the period from 1800, there were a series of fierce debates on topics, for instance, such as solitary confinement, which will be examined in Chapter 4, where there was complex movement between high-level theoretical arguments, some of which went back to the monastic tradition with which Zimmermann was so preoccupied, the actual and perceived experiences of common criminals. By the measure, as Chapter 7 argues, it is impossible to understand the emergence of the pathology of loneliness in a range of sociological, and medical studies unless a clear view is kept of the basic demography, household structure and standards of living the nineteenth century onwards. More generally, successive information revolutions, from the Penny Post to the internet, profoundly the sense of what solitude was and might be as a communicative the same time, lower-case solitude remains a neglected topic in right. From Robert Bloomfield to our own era, opportunities withdrawal from company have been sought and enjoyed. In Solitude: A Philosophical Encounter, Philip Koch writes that,

'One of most fervently celebrated virtues of solitude is its ability to provide place of refuge from the beleaguered toils of social life.' These may the form of extended leaves of absence from daily rituals, but more they are borrowed moments from pressured lives. For most of most of the time, solitude has been a snatched experience in contexts where company and its absence are equal and open to possibilities. This will be the central concern of Chapter 3 nineteenth century, and Chapter 5 on the twentieth and early centuries. Whilst the latter-day advocates of monasticism term retreats who will be discussed in Chapter 6 sometimes the practices as a form of spiritual base-jumping, risking sanity in high-risk encounter with prolonged silence and self-examination, A general pattern has been to embrace solitude simply as a form relxation from work and family. In the words of Diana Senechal's 'It's public of Noise, 'Solitude contains great leisure. To be in solitude is to even momentarily, from meeting the demands of others." I 'here is a need for what might be termed a quiet history of British society. Too little attention has been paid to the intermittently organized, often silent, re-creative practices that have been and remain a vital pounce in the lives of most men and women in the modern world. Ira Cohen's Solitary Action: Acting on Our Own in Everyday Life catalogues the 'numerous . . . public sites where we find people engaged in solitary negativities', together with 'our homes, where at various times of the day individuals find themselves alone or claim zones of solitude in order to do some housework or homework or recreate by themselves', and observes that 'this hitherto half-hidden realm of human behaviour' is 'a suitable subject for sociological enquiry'."° What is true of the present applies also to the past. Social historians, like social scientists more generally, have tended to focus on communal, noisy forms of activity. This is partly from a desire to emphasize the complexity of interactions at all levels of society and not just amongst the educated and privileged. It is partly from a sense that collective practices have been the locus of historical change. And it is also a matter of evidence. Bloomfield's farm boy enjoying his 'frequent intervals of lonely ease' left no mark on the public record, neither did the weary housewife stepping outside the house for a few moments of private peace. Even where historians have stooped to consider the pastimes of the common people, the tendency has been to concentrate on rough sports and commercialized mass entertainment which one way or another generated a trail of commentary and paperwork.'

There are, however, a number of historical sources which between them permit the creation of at least a patchwork quiet history. A fertile archive was generated by the continual expansion of networked solitude. As we shall see in the next two chapters, from the beginning of the period covered by this study, solitary pastimes called forth a literature of periodicals and monographs which serviced isolated practices. A year after Zimmermann's treatise first appeared in English, The Sporting Magazine began publication, carrying, amongst much else, information on long-distance solo walking against the clock, a popular constituent of the vibrant gambling culture of the era.'" From the late eighteenth century through to the present day, the energetic and responsive publishing industry produced material on a proliferating range of private pastimes. Alongside these there were monographs on the most salient quiet recreations, such as fishing and gardening, although these infrequently addressed the breadth of popular participation. From the last quarter of the nineteenth century, practitioners of all kinds of unseen hobbies, from embroidery to stamp collecting, began to form themselves into associations which created their own archives and publications. During the more recent past, oral histories and social surveys have extended their scope to examine the quotidian lives of the mass of the population. Finally there are the commentators from within the everyday world in the form of memoirs and imaginative literature. A champion of Robert Bloomfield was John Clare, one of the very few writers of his own or any subsequent period capable of engaging with both upper- and lower-case solitude, and his poetry and prose will form the point of departure for the next chapter.

In Zimmermann's critical universe, solitude, for good or ill, was piously practised by only a small minority of the population.

The Tally Ho Stakes

the posthumous life of Solitude Considered travelled far from its origin, 'Zimmerman on Solitude' became a cultural object in its own right, largely independent of the full text. During the course of the nineteenth century, it was treated as a shorthand for an uncritical indorsement of the subject. A young man or woman seeking to be considered serious and soulful would like to be seen with a copy as I they walked in the countryside or found space for quiet reading at with wine. As with other literary successes, it enjoyed an existence in diverse recreational forms, including, in this case, horse racing. In March 1845, Mr. Wesley's three-year-old 'Solitude by Zimmerman' was entered for the Tally-Ho Stakes at the Northampton and Pytchley Hunt. It set off at a great pace, but at the first turn the horse bolted, leaving its rival, D'Egville', to build up a lead of three hundred yards. Eventually the rider regained control of his steed. The newspaper report concluded: `Solitude, however, made up for lost time on coming up the flat, and was only beaten by about three lengths.' <>

THE JOURNEYS OF A TAYMIYYAN SUFI: SUFISM THROUGH THE EYES OF ʿIMĀD AL-DĪN AḤMAD AL-WĀSIṬĪ (D. 711/1311) by Arjan Post [Studies on Sufism, Brill, 9789004431294] Digital Open Source

THE JOURNEYS OF A TAYMIYYAN SUFI: SUFISM THROUGH THE EYES OF ʿIMĀD AL-DĪN AḤMAD AL-WĀSIṬĪ (D. 711/1311) explores the life and teachings of ʿImād al-Dīn Aḥmad al-Wāsiṭī (d. 711/1311), a little-known Ḥanbalī Sufi master from the circle of Ibn Taymiyya (d. 728/1328). The first part of this book follows al-Wāsiṭī's physical journey in search of spiritual guidance through a critical study of his autobiographical writings. This provides unique insights into the Rifāʿiyya, the Shādhiliyya, and the school of Ibn ʿArabī, several manifestations of Sufism that he encountered as he travelled from Wāsiṭ to Baghdad, Alexandria, and Cairo. Part I closes with his final destination, Damascus, where his membership of Ibn Taymiyya's circle and his role as a Sufi teacher is closely examined.

The second part focuses on al-Wāsiṭī's spiritual journey through a study of his Sufi writings, which convey the distinct type of traditionalist Sufism that he taught in early eighth/fourteenth-century Damascus. Besides providing an overview of the spiritual path unto God from beginning to end as he formulated it, this reveals an exceptional interplay between Sufi theory and traditionalist theology.

Excerpt: In the summer of 2014 I visited the Universitätsbibliothek Basel to view the Nachlass of Fritz Meier, a collection of personal unpublished papers and notes the late Swiss scholar of Sufism bequeathed to the university. At that time, I still aspired to devote my PhD project to the much-debated Ḥanbalī shaykh al-Islām Taqī al-Dīn Aḥmad Ibn Taymiyya (d. 728/1328) and his supposedly fraught relationship with *taṣawwuf*, commonly known in the West as Sufism. I was aware that Meier's Nachlass contains some material that deals with this very topic and was hence curious to see what I would find. As I went through the many pages of the Nachlass, I came across a note concerning ʿImād al-Dīn Abū al-ʿAbbās Aḥmad al-Wāsiṭī, who was known to me as a companion of Ibn Taymiyya. I had found out long before that al-Wāsiṭī was in fact recognized by his contemporaries as a *ṣūfī*, a notion that intrigued me given his membership of Ibn Taymiyya's circle. In that regard, Meier made an observation that caught my attention. Referring to al-Wāsiṭī as 'al-Ḥizāmī,' he wrote:

This is a case of connection between Sufism and orthodox Ḥanbalism, at the same time a convergence of the Šādiliyya and Ibn Taymiyya. In the person of Ibn Taymiyya and in the person of Ibn ʿAṭāʾ Allāh al-Sikandarī the two positions clash with each other. They merge in Ḥizāmī. Šādilism is a return to classical Sufism, or at least a recollection thereof, [it is a form of] classicism. Ibn Taymiyya represents a reform of Sunna, an attempt to brush off the contaminated traditionalism and reconnect with the ancient foundations of orthodoxy. Both of these seem to have converged here in Ḥizāmī. Ḥizāmī sought to link the acceptable and good of Šādilī mysticism with the oldest form of Islam. Ḥizāmī recognized Ibn Taymiyya as a great reformer and leader, and was on his part recognized by Ibn Taymiyya as a great Sufi. It is appealing that Ḥizāmī did not abandon Sufism, but simply put it on a Ḥanbalī basis.

By coincidence, just a few months earlier in March, I discovered that a large number of al-Wāsiṭī's works had quite recently been edited and published. Since Meier did not disclose the source on which he based the above-quoted observation, I was curious as to whether I could find proof for it in al-Wāsiṭī's own books. Meier thus gave me the final nudge I needed to start reading the material that was to become the main source for the research I would conduct for the next three years – though at that point I still simply wanted to see whether al-Wāsiṭī would be of any use to our understanding of Ibn Taymiyya's relationship with Sufism. As I skimmed through several of the titles at my disposal, I was fascinated by the richness of al-Wāsiṭī's thought on Sufism and realized that we have here a scholar who deserves to be studied in his own right. And this is exactly what the present book sets out to do. But before I turn to discuss the relevance of studying al-Wāsiṭī and the approach of this volume, some preliminary remarks must be made concerning Sufism, traditionalism, and Ibn Taymiyya, for it is within the scholarly discussions on these topics that we must attempt to situate al-Wāsiṭī.

A Contextual Approach to Studying Sufism(s)

What is *taṣawwuf*? In truth, it is hard to come up with an umbrella definition that includes its many differing, and sometimes seemingly contradictory, manifestations. *Taṣawwuf* is far from monolithic. While for long the tendency has been to view it as Islam's 'mysticism' and the *ṣūfiyya* as its 'mystics,' this basically leaves us with an equally thorny problem: What is mysticism? Who are mystics? The common use among scholars of the latter terms seems to be inherited from our Orientalist predecessors, who had the anachronistic tendency to understand Islam through the lens of Christianity. Apart from the Western-centrism implicitly present when using the terms mysticism and mystic, there is also the problem that they are difficult to define in a way that includes all groups and individuals historically

associated with the terms *taṣawwuf* and *ṣūfī*. Sara Sviri has looked at the formative period of *taṣawwuf* and observed that, according to her definition of mysticism and mystic, some figures she identifies as mystics were not called *ṣūfī*s, and some figures who were called *ṣūfī*s cannot be identified as mystics. For such reasons, there have been several scholars who have rightly problematized the use of mysticism and mystic. A recent critique comes from Nathan Hofer, who has opted to simply use the modern terms 'Sufism' and 'Sufi' instead, because they "bear some resemblance to local medieval usage," that is, to '*taṣawwuf*' and '*ṣūfī*' respectively. In the present study we will likewise avoid mysticism and mystic and instead use Sufism and Sufi. And rather than attempting to provide a definition for them, my aim will be to let the objects of our inquiry explain to us in their own terms how they gave substance to 'Sufism' and 'being Sufi' in the period that stretches from roughly the middle of the seventh/thirteenth century up to the early eighth/fourteenth century.

In this epoch Sufism in its many manifestations had become an integral part of the Sunni world, that is, the regions dominated by Muslims who identified themselves as belonging to the *Ahl al-Sunna wa-al-Jamāʿa*. Antinomian and controversial Sufi currents certainly existed, but it was not uncommon that these would be criticized and censured by the very scholars who were themselves Sufis. It is a historical reality that *taṣawwuf* was widely acknowledged as one of the legitimate religious sciences ('*ʿulūm*' in Arabic), on par with other fields of knowledge such as specialist theology (*kalām* or *uṣūl al-dīn*) and jurisprudence (*fiqh*). The class of jurists was in most cases not a category separated from the specialized theologians or the Sufis. One could be jurist, theologian, and Sufi at the same time – and indeed, in the realm of the Mamluks and the Ilkhanids, this increasingly became the rule rather than the exception. The milieu of the professional scholars, the *ʿulamāʾ*, thus comprised different layers of identity between which there was cross-pollination and mobility. And with the rise of the phenomenon of the Sufi order – still called '*ṭāʾifa*' (pl. *ṭawāʾif*) rather than '*ṭarīqa*' (pl. *ṭuruq*), the common designation in later centuries – affiliation with a Sufi genealogy (*silsila*) traced back to a renowned shaykh became widespread in all layers of medieval Muslim society.

It has been argued that, at least from the ninth to tenth century onwards, the classical Sufis may be considered perfectly "orthodox" (Sunni) Muslims. While I agree with what is intended by this claim, there is again a problem of terminology here that we must address – one that will in part help us better understand the diversity within Sufism. Unlike Christianity, Islam never knew a fixed orthodoxy that enforced a specific doctrine to regulate what is correct belief and what is incorrect (and hence heterodox). What was considered normative and mainstream in terms of dogma differed over time and space. Like the term mysticism, the value of 'orthodoxy' for our field of study has therefore been questioned. Josef van Ess has noted this problem and suggested that the term may only be useful when understood as the "dominant opinion" and "mainstream position" as it existed within a particular spatial-temporal context. In that sense it could be said – as van Ess does – that Islam knows not one orthodoxy, but multiple local *orthodoxies*. This is a very valid point that I believe also bears relevance for the way one could approach the different manifestations of Sufism. For if the Sufi is indeed "orthodox" and there existed multiple "orthodoxies," then it will be useful to question which trend of Sufism was associated with which "orthodoxy."

Now, while this study will henceforth avoid the latter term due to its historical incompatibility with Islam, it is to some degree possible to identify a more widely understood category of normative religiosity. However, I would argue that this category should not only be understood in terms of dogmas of a certain school of thought claiming monopoly over Sunni theology. What was considered normative in a certain locality at a certain time was also shaped by embodied forms of religion, and by broader ideas about the sociopolitical, economic, and cultural expressions of Islam. And even in a specific locality, it may be possible to recognize different categories of people with very differing notions of normativity. So clearly, if we attempt to distinguish normativity in Islam, this must always be done against a specific context with an open mind to the different forces that may have helped shape it.

Like all manifestations of religiosity, Sufism was never disconnected from the context in which it existed. For instance, it has been observed that Sufism in the Turco-Persian cultural context was markedly different from that of the Arab cultural context. What was considered normative when it came to Sufism evidently had to do with the cultural dimension in which it was practiced. Furthermore, around the period that concerns us, historical circumstances such as wars and economic growth or decline led to streams of migrants resettling in other parts of the Muslim world, where they subsequently reshaped the local religious landscape. What was considered normative when it came to Sufism was, of course, affected by historical context as well. By taking such factors into consideration, we may investigate the relationship between various trends of Sufism and the contexts in which they were practiced. We may thereby attempt to understand better why, for instance, a certain manifestation of the Sufi path was accepted as perfectly normative by one group of people and not by another.

To be clear, I am not attempting to make any essentialist claims when describing what is normative to a particular group of people in a particular context. For as intended by van Ess when he speaks of Islamic orthodoxies, what we identify as mainstream is not static but rather evolves, and is renegotiated and adapted according to circumstances. It cannot therefore be defined along strict lines. To exemplify how a contextualized approach to normativity could nevertheless be useful and at the same time take into consideration the fluidity of this category, let us look at a case that will be central to this book: the place of Sufism in the traditionalist community of early Mamluk Damascus and, more specifically, in the circle of Ibn Taymiyya.

Situating Ibn Taymiyya's Circle in Its Context

Ibn Taymiyya's circle consisted mostly of Ḥanbalīs and Shāfiʿīs who belonged to the *Ahl al-Ḥadīth*, the 'partisans of tradition,' or 'traditionalists.' This intellectual current, which has historically been represented most vividly by the Ḥanbalī school, strove to base religious knowledge (almost) exclusively on the Qur'an, the Sunna, and the presumed consensus of the Muslim community. Although there certainly are exceptions, the traditionalists have generally displayed a suspicious, at times even highly critical, attitude towards the interference of reason with these sources, especially in their formulation of theology (which they term '*uṣūl al-dīn*'). This approach put them at odds with the rationalist *Ahl al-Kalām* (or *mutakallimūn*), the scholars of speculative theology. The latter group allowed much more space for reason in determining how to interpret the divine sources to extract therefrom the articles of faith (sing. *al-ʿaqīda*, pl. *al-ʿaqāʿid*). The Ashʿarī school – named after its eponymous founder, Abū al-Ḥasan al-Ashʿarī (d. 324/936) – gradually became the dominant trend of *kalām* in the Sunni world and was adopted in particular by jurists of the Shāfiʿī and Mālikī schools of law. Because both the traditionalists and the Ashʿarīs put themselves forward as the true representatives of normative Sunni theology, they frequently clashed with each other.

If we look at the spatial-temporal context of early Mamluk Damascus, we could say that the city itself contained at least two theological groups: a community of Ḥanbalī/Shāfiʿī traditionalists and a community of Ḥanafī/Mālikī/Shāfiʿī *mutakallimūn* (mostly Ashʿarīs). If we home in on the city's traditionalist fraction, we find that the religiosity that existed among them was influenced by several other factors, such as the presence of Ḥanbalī families that had emigrated from Iraq and Palestine due to the Mongol invasion and the Crusades respectively. The *Ahl al-Ḥadīth* here was thus not a monolithic group per se, including both Ḥanbalīs and Shāfiʿīs of different cultural backgrounds, at times differing in the way they positioned themselves vis-à-vis their theological outlook. A good example of this is Ibn Taymiyya himself, who sought to defend the traditionalist creed through a very rational argumentation, an approach not all his traditionalist colleagues appreciated – among whom the shaykh's own pupil, Shams al-Dīn al-Dhahabī (d. 748/1348). Furthermore, it would be a gross simplification to assert that traditionalists and Ashʿarīs were two perpetually segregated groups, since they had to coexist in the same professional stratum. Interaction would occur, for instance, through their shared interest in collecting and studying tradition among the city's *ḥadīth*-scholars. Traditionalist Shāfiʿīs would especially have had to maneuver between

their Ḥanbalī colleagues and their fellow Ashʿarī Shāfiʿīs. Thus, although I have chosen to view the traditionalists of early Mamluk Damascus as a specific community with its own notions of normativity, its boundaries were clearly not always sharply delineated.

In spite of this observation, for the sake of analysis there is still value in identifying the traditionalists as a distinct group in the context we just described, and to delineate certain elements of normativity that were particular to them. Ultimately, the difficulties of defining boundaries here have to do with the dynamic character of (group) identity. I understand identity as per Gerd Baumann and Andre Gingrich as that which "designates social subjectivities as persons and groups of persons." These subjectivities are "multidimensional and fluid; they include power-related ascriptions by selves as well as by others; and they simultaneously combine sameness, or belonging, with alterity, or otherness." Very simply put, identity is construed through 'selfing' and 'othering.' As we have just seen with regard to the traditionalists, there is a fluidity to this process of identity-making that works differently on different levels. Baumann has explained this through what he calls 'the grammar of segmentation,' which he based on the anthropological theory of Evans-Pritchard. If we apply this model to the above-discussed case, then we could say that on a lower level of segmentation the traditionalists may reject the Ashʿarīs as the 'other' due to conflicting notions of normativity; for instance, when it comes to the way they understand God's divine attributes. On the other hand, on a higher level of segmentation they may share notions of normativity; for instance, when attending an audition of *ḥadīth* under a renowned shaykh, or in opposition to a common theological foe. Baumann has therefore argued that "[f]usion and fission, identity and difference are not matters of absolute criteria in this grammar, but functions of recognizing the appropriate segmentary level." The traditionalists of early Mamluk Damascus can thus be studied as a delineated group with its own notions of normativity particular to their identity, as long as we are conscious of the segmentary level on which we operate.

It is within this group in this context that I want to situate Ibn Taymiyya and his circle of companions and followers in order to better understand the place of Sufism among them. For if we look at the kind of Sufism that al-Wāsiṭī taught amidst the Damascene traditionalist community, we will find that the very process of selfing and othering resulted in a Sufi doctrine that was particular to this context – a 'traditionalist Sufism' that in certain respects distinguished itself from other trends of Sufism that simultaneously existed elsewhere and among other groups. Having said that, it should be noted that a specific traditionalist affinity with Sufism has been recognized before. It is therefore necessary to have a closer look at the previous scholarship on the relationship between Sufism and traditionalism, especially with respect to Ibn Taymiyya and his circle.

Sufism, Traditionalists, and the Circle of Ibn Taymiyya

In the introductory paragraph I quoted Meier stating that al-Wāsiṭī had put Sufism "on a Ḥanbalī basis." Whether intended or not, this remark hints at the prevalent notion that the Ḥanbalīs had something of a troubled relationship with *taṣawwuf*. It is as if prior to al-Wāsiṭī Sufism had never been adapted to Ḥanbalism. Now, in the context of the early third/ninth century, Christopher Melchert has indeed made notice of an overall "traditionalist suspicion of Sufism" and concluded that the piety of the traditionalists was "at odds" with that of the Sufis. Elsewhere, Melchert argued in the same vein that Aḥmad Ibn Ḥanbal (d. 241/855) himself was clearly "hostile to crucially important precursors of the Classical Sufis" and would likely have had little sympathy for Sufism as it developed after him. However, Melchert also noted that, about a century later, the Ḥanbalī and Sufi traditions did "surprisingly" seem to meet in the person of al-Barbahārī (d. 329/941). This is perhaps not as surprising as one may think.

Even if there was some concrete opposition to proto-Sufism among early traditionalists, this attitude did not survive for long. Scholars such as George Makdisi, Ahmet Karamustafa, and Laury Silvers have observed that the early Sufis from around the fourth/tenth century were generally aligned with the traditionalist movement through their shared interest in *ḥadīth*. That medieval sources nevertheless present us with examples of Ḥanbalī scholars from subsequent generations who displayed animosity

towards certain Sufis or Sufi practices was not a shift away from this alignment, but rather had to do with the shift Sufism made away from traditionalism; or to put it differently, the shift Sufism made away from the traditionalist understanding of what normative Sunni Islam embodies. It has been shown, for instance, that Ibn ʿAqīl (d. 513/119) and Ibn al-Jawzī (d. 597/1201), though generally known as critics of the Sufis, had in all likelihood both been positively involved with Sufism as well. Addressing the objectives of the traditionalists in that regard, Makdisi has gone as far as to allege that "[t]he Hanbali School preserves Sufism in the spirit of the early Sufis who … belonged to the Ahl al-Ḥadīth." While this is admittedly a rather bold statement, he was not alone in noticing a trend he referred to as 'traditionalist Sufism' that could occasionally be hostile towards ecstatic and rationalist *kalām*-aligned trends of Sufism.

Unfortunately, there are but few examples of traditionalist Sufi shaykhs who left behind teachings in writing, which makes it difficult to study how they may have distinguished themselves from other trends of Sufism. Some of the noteworthy authorities who have been studied are Abū al-ʿAbbās Ibn ʿAṭā' (d. 309/922), Abū Manṣūr Maʿmar al-Iṣfahānī (d. 418/1027), ʿAbd Allāh al-Anṣārī al-Harawī (d. 481/1089), and ʿAbd al-Qādir al-Jīlānī (or al-Jīlī) (d. 561/1166). We must note, however, that these shaykhs all have in common that they never became prolific authors. It is perhaps partly for that reason that the influence that traditionalists in particular have historically had on the development of Sufism has received little notice.

A widely known exception is Ibn Taymiyya, though this is for the most part due to the considerable list of writings he composed wherein he criticizes the Sufis. Both in and outside of academia he is therefore still frequently perceived as *the* archenemy of Sufism. And because he is often negatively portrayed as the intellectual forefather of today's extremist Salafis, who are well-known for their opposition to Sufism, his anti-Sufi image seems more prevalent than ever. This reputation has since long been contested, however, starting with Henri Laoust, who already noticed in 1939 that Ibn Taymiyya had a "frank intellectual affinity with the ethico-mystical tendencies of a moderate *taṣawwuf*." He argued that, rather than attacking Sufism as a whole, the Ḥanbalī shaykh aimed his pen at specific deviant trends he recognized, such as monistic Sufism. Since Laoust, an increasing number of scholars have described Ibn Taymiyya's position vis-à-vis Sufism in similar terms, such as Joseph Bell, Fritz Meier, Thomas Michel, Emil Homerin, and Alexander Knysh to name a few. Broadly speaking, the general consensus seems to be that the shaykh's polemical effort in the field of Sufism was aimed at purifying it of those elements he considered alien to Islam, so as to keep it strictly in accordance with the Qur'an and the Sunna as he understood it from the framework of traditionalism. Because he accepted the vast majority of the early Sufis as traditionalists, he argued that his vision of pure Sufism was actually in perfect accordance with the kind they had practiced and preached. This is, of course, very much in line with what Makdisi saw as the general attitude towards Sufism among the Ḥanbalīs as noted above.

But does this mean that Ibn Taymiyya himself also consciously practiced Sufism? Did he teach or preach Sufism? Was he a Sufi? These questions have not yet received definitive answers. In that respect an important contribution that must not be left unmentioned is George Makdisi's article from 1974, which set out to prove that Ibn Taymiyya was not only sympathetic towards classical Sufism, but was in fact himself a Sufi of the Qādiriyya, the order traced back to the aforementioned Ḥanbalī Sufi ʿAbd al-Qādir al-Jīlānī. Some scholars such as Éric Geoffroy, Yahya Michot, and Josef van Ess have accepted Makdisi's evidence for this theory, whereas others such as Meier and Michel found it unconvincing and remained skeptical. We can thus conclude that while the prejudice that Ibn Taymiyya had a strict anti-Sufi agenda has been debunked for good, his exact personal relationship with Sufism remains somewhat shrouded in mystery.

More recently scholars have also taken an interest in the circle of people around Ibn Taymiyya, most notably his pupil Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya (d. 751/1350). Among the academic research done on the latter figure we again find special attention for Sufism. In their respective articles on the life and works of Ibn

al-Qayyim, Birgit Krawietz and Livnat Holtzman have both regarded him as a Sufi, in part due to his numerous writings that appear to fall under the category of Sufism. However, it could be argued against this that even if his writings seem "Sufic" to us as modern readers, this does not mean that they were intended as such. The question of his affinity with Sufism has been dealt with in more detail by Ovamir Anjum and the late Belgian scholar Gino Schallenbergh in their respective work on the *Madārij al-sālikīn*. Anjum considered the latter book Ibn al-Qayyim's "most developed spiritual discourse … and arguably an authentic development of Ibn Taymiyyah's ideas as well," and hence an ideal source to "explore the vexed question of their relationship to Sufism." He concluded that even though both master and pupil never identified themselves as Sufis, they "endorsed Sufism devoid of mysticism, and wished to recover the earliest tradition of Sufism when mystical knowledge had not challenged the primacy of scriptural knowledge." Schallenbergh arrived at a somewhat similar conclusion in his earlier study of the Sufi terminology used in the *Madārij*, where he hypothesized that Ibn al-Qayyim and Ibn Taymiyya "professed possibly a Sufism that … aimed foremost at a spiritualization of the *šarīʿa*." In a later article, however, he adjusted this conclusion, stating instead that Ibn al-Qayyim in all likelihood "saw it as his task to offer an alternative spirituality to Sufism." Thus, while Ibn al-Qayyim is clearly a vital source for our understanding of Taymiyyan thought on Sufism, the work done on him has not yet unequivocally answered whether *taṣawwuf* as an Islamic science was really consciously taught, studied, and practiced in the circle of Ibn Taymiyya.

This finally bring us back to al-Wāsiṭī, the companion of Ibn Taymiyya who had supposedly put Sufism on a Ḥanbalī basis. As such, he is potentially an important source for our knowledge of the kind of Sufism that was practiced among the traditionalists of early Mamluk Damascus, and specifically in the circle of Ibn Taymiyya. Although he has certainly not been overlooked by academics, still very little work has been done on him. Henri Laoust was perhaps the first scholar to notice him in an article that paraphrased his entry from Ibn Rajab's (d. 795/1397) biographical dictionary of Ḥanbalīs. After that, he has sporadically been mentioned in several publications that in some way deal with Sufism and/or members of Ibn Taymiyya's circle. Joseph Bell and Livnat Holtzman have both stated that al-Wāsiṭī was an important teacher of Ibn al-Qayyim and may have greatly influenced his early acquaintance with the discipline of Sufism, as well as inspired his later composition of the *Madārij*. Al-Wāsiṭī was also named several times in Alexander Knysh's study on the medieval polemics against Muḥyī al-Dīn Ibn ʿArabī as one of the latter's Sufi critics. Knysh remarked in a footnote that al-Wāsiṭī had written at least three works to refute Ibn ʿArabī, all of which were unfortunately left unstudied as he did not have access to them. Caterina Bori has written an article on the group dynamics of Ibn Taymiyya's circle wherein she summarized and analyzed a letter al-Wāsiṭī had written to seven of its members, imploring them to hold fast to their shaykh. By far the most relevant publication on our list is, to my knowledge, the only one dedicated solely to the Ḥanbalī Sufi. In 1995, Éric Geoffroy published a nineteen-page article that discussed what he believed to be a unique manuscript of a Sufi work by al-Wāsiṭī preserved in the Ẓāhiriyya Library of Damascus. His aim was to summarize several of the characteristic elements of the Sufi doctrine he recognized therein and make suggestions concerning al-Wāsiṭī's influences. In line with Meier's notes on al-Wāsiṭī, he found several instances of clear Shādhilī-inspired teachings. Naturally, he also considered how the manuscript is of relevance to our knowledge of Ibn Taymiyya's relationship with Sufism, and concluded that al-Wāsiṭī's testimony "proves that the shaykh al-Islām has indeed been the spiritual director of Sufis." Moreover, taking Ibn Taymiyya's Qādirī affiliation for granted, he hypothesized that al-Wāsiṭī must have been instructed by his Ḥanbalī master in the teachings of the Qādiriyya, even though, he admits, no mention of the Sufi order is made in the manuscript.

Apart from the above publications, there has been no research into al-Wāsiṭī, and the theory that Ibn Taymiyya was his (or anyone else's) teacher in *taṣawwuf* as put forth by Geoffroy has not been further explored. The reason for that is quite simple, I believe: until recently, practically all of al-Wāsiṭī's writings have only been available in manuscript form. However, now that we actually have the majority

of them at our disposal in printed editions, including many titles that were not studied by Geoffroy, it is high time that we give this Sufi from Ibn Taymiyya's circle his due.

Book Outline: al-Wāsiṭī's Two Journeys

In order to systematically study al-Wāsiṭī this book is split into two parts. This division is based on two journeys that are described in his writings: The first part will be concerned with al-Wāsiṭī's *riḥla*, the physical journey he made to find a teacher who could guide him to the level of religious perfection to which he aspired. The second part will be concerned with his *sulūk*, the inward spiritual journey he put down in writing in Damascus and taught to his students as a teacher of Sufism there. Like most Sufis, he believed that the very purpose of *taṣawwuf* was to take the latter journey and traverse a sequence of spiritual stations in order to reach the ultimate goal of friendship with God (*wilāya*, or *walāya*). As we will see throughout the coming chapters, his formulation of *sulūk* was the direct product of all he had accumulated during his *riḥla* through the Muslim world. One of the purposes of distinguishing between these two journeys is therefore to evaluate how al-Wāsiṭī's physical movement in search of guidance influenced the way he eventually systematically formulated his spiritual movement on the Sufi path.

We will follow both journeys through a detailed analysis of all his writings that have been available to me. Apart from three titles in manuscript form, we will rely on published editions. It must be noted that none of these have been critically edited, as they were all exclusively based on a single manuscript. The majority of them have been made available thanks to Muḥammad Abū al-Faḍl al-Qūnawī, who first published a lengthy collective volume of treatises by al-Wāsiṭī in 2010, and another one of equal length in 2014. In addition, the late Walīd b. Muḥammad al-ʿAlī has likewise been working on a series of shorter volumes with editions of al-Wāsiṭī's writings. Coincidentally, some of the titles found therein are also present in either of the two volumes published by al-Qūnawī. This is probably in part due to the fact that both scholars have based their editions on the same manuscript, a collective volume of works by al-Wāsiṭī held in the Hacı Selim Ağa Library in Istanbul (under shelf number 404). The manuscript's scribe, one Muḥammad b. ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Dimashqī, finished copying it in 805/1402, which is less than a century after al-Wāsiṭī's passing in 711/1311. According to al-Qūnawī there is good reason to believe that this al-Dimashqī relied on copies that were based on the original manuscripts, since his grandfather, Ibn Ṭūlūbghā (d. 749/1348), is known to have copied directly from al-Wāsiṭī's own handwritten work. So although most titles at our disposal are based on this one manuscript, it seems to be relatively reliable considering its transmission history. Rather than merely describing what al-Wāsiṭī's writings tell us, we will aim at contextualizing and historicizing them.

In order to prepare the reader for what is to come in the next chapters, it will be helpful to briefly explain how part one of the current book applies this approach differently from part two by presenting a chapter overview:

The first part consists of three chapters. Chapter 1 follows al-Wāsiṭī's account of his years in Iraq. We begin in Wāsiṭ, where he grows up among Sufis of the Rifāʿī order and starts his training in jurisprudence among Shāfiʿī jurists. Then we follow his migration from his hometown to Baghdad, where he accompanies another group of Sufis whose affiliation is not clearly specified. Chapter 2 focuses solely on his time among the Shādhilīs of Alexandria, whose teachings will later greatly influence his own formulation of Sufism as both Meier and Geoffroy have noted. In chapter 3 we begin with his stay in several Cairene Sufi convents, where he is confronted for the first time with Sufis who follow Ibn ʿArabī's school of thought. Then we turn to his final destination, Damascus, where, awed by the city's traditionalist fraction, he adopts the Ḥanbalī school and becomes a member of Ibn Taymiyya's circle. Here he spends the final years of his life teaching his own traditionalist version of Sufism.

By thus following the stages of his journey through his personal account we are provided with a unique emic view of the religious groups he accompanied. For each of these we will critically assess his descriptions of them on the basis of primary and secondary literature. Whenever works produced by

members of these groups are relevant in relation to al-Wāsiṭī's account these will be consulted. In addition, a plethora of chronicles that deal with the period in question will also be consulted. These sources allow us to reconstruct the main doctrines of the groups under consideration, and in some instances their respective network of people. They also allow us to sketch an image of the sociopolitical, cultural, historical, and spatial context in which al-Wāsiṭī encountered them.

The purpose of this endeavor is to historicize al-Wāsiṭī's *riḥla* and at the same time situate each group he accompanied in its own context. It will thereby be argued that the extent to which these groups were able to successfully establish themselves in their respective spatial context can to some degree be connected to the notions of normativity that were prevalent there. At the same time this part of the book means to capitalize on al-Wāsiṭī's *riḥla* in order to provide new historical insights into the practices, beliefs, and group structure of the early Rifāʿiyya, the early Shādhiliyya, and the Damascene circle of Ibn Taymiyya.

The second part of this book consists of two chapters. In chapter 4 we will distinguish the foundations of the Sufi path as described in al-Wāsiṭī's writings. The first of these is his doctrine on intimate knowledge (*maʿrifa*) of the Prophet Muḥammad, which is centered around what he calls 'the Muḥammadan way' (*al-ṭarīqa al-Muḥammadiyya*); the second is his doctrine on intimate knowledge of God, which he very much defines in traditionalist terms; the third is his polemics against what he saw as the deviations of the Sufi path. In chapter 5 we will analyze his doctrine of the degrees of witnessing God, which brings us to the conclusion of the Sufi path as he formulated it.

Throughout these two chapters we will use our study of al-Wāsiṭī's physical journey as the context against which we may understand the contents of his spiritual journey. We will thereby attempt to recognize where certain episodes described and analyzed in part I may have shaped his views on Sufism, where and how he appears to have appropriated material from the different religious groups and scholars he accompanied, and how he was an original thinker in his own right. Particular focus will be put on the manner in which his Sufi teachings were formulated within the framework of traditionalism. It will be argued that while some of his ideas and concepts in the field of Sufism can be traced back to either Ibn Taymiyya or the Shādhiliyya, others may be understood as a counter-reaction to some of the Sufi practices he had observed and disapproved of, while yet others appear to have been the product of his own creative thought. Such observations will showcase how 'selfing' and 'othering' was an important force behind the way he construed his Sufi doctrine, and that the common thread guiding this creative process was his understanding of traditionalist Islam.

It is hoped that this study will be of value in at least three different ways. First, for the general field of Sufi studies, it provides a window into numerous trends of Sufism that existed in some of the most prominent centers of Muslim learning in al-Wāsiṭī's epoch. This allows us to see how diversely 'Sufism' and 'being Sufi' was given substance in various contexts of roughly the same period, and consider how this diversity may be related to differing notions of normativity. Second, by studying al-Wāsiṭī's writings we are offered an exceptional glimpse into the kind of Sufism that was accepted and practiced in the traditionalist community of Damascus at the beginning of the eighth/fourteenth century, a subject that has hitherto hardly been studied. Third, for the specific field of Taymiyyan studies, this book provides new information concerning the role allotted to Sufism in the circle of Ibn Taymiyya and how this circle operated. In addition, it aims to answer whether Ibn Taymiyya functioned as something of a Sufi shaykh for the people around him and whether he actually was himself a Sufi.

Editorial Appraisal:

Post provides a close and generous account of various Sufi schools al-Wāsiṭī encountered as he sought divine wisdom, settling upon the circle of Ibn Taymiyya where al-Wāsiṭī's talents were developed and utilized. An exciting introduction to until now too little studied aspects of degrees of mysticism and Sunni orthodoxies. <>

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Bibliography

The Oxford Handbook of Political Consumerism edited by Magnus Bostrom, Michele Micheletti, and Peter Oosterveer [Oxford Handbooks, Oxford University Press, 9780190629038]

The global phenomenon of political consumerism is known through such diverse manifestations as corporate boycotts, increased preferences for organic and fairtrade products, and lifestyle choices such as veganism. It has also become an area of increasing research across a variety of disciplines. Political consumerism uses consumer power to change institutional or market practices that are found ethically, environmentally, or politically objectionable. Through such actions, the goods offered on the consumer market are problematized and politicized. Distinctions between consumers and citizens and between the economy and politics collapse. **The Oxford Handbook of Political Consumerism** offers the first comprehensive theoretical and comparative overview of the ways in which the market becomes a political arena. It maps the four major forms of political consumerism: boycotting, buycotting (spending to show support), lifestyle politics, and discursive actions, such as culture jamming. Chapters by leading scholars examine political consumerism in different locations and industry sectors, and in consideration of environmental and human rights problems, political events, and the ethics of production and manufacturing practices. This volume offers a thorough exploration of the phenomenon and its myriad dilemmas, involving religion, race, nationalism, gender relations, animals, and our common future. Moreover, the Handbook takes stock of political consumerism's effectiveness in solving complex global problems and its use to both promote and impede democracy. <>

The Spiritual Danger of Donald Trump: 30 Evangelical Christians on Justice, Truth, and Moral Integrity edited by Ronald J Sider [Cascade Books, 97817252717911]

What should Christians think about Donald Trump? His policies, his style, his personal life? Thirty evangelical Christians wrestle with these tough questions. They are Republicans, Democrats, and Independents. They don't all agree, but they seek to let Christ be the Lord of their political views. They seek to apply biblical standards to difficult debates about our current political situation. Vast numbers of white evangelicals enthusiastically support Donald Trump. Do biblical standards on truth, justice, life, freedom, and personal integrity warrant or challenge that support? How does that support of President Trump affect the image of Christianity in the larger culture? Around the world? Many younger evangelicals today are rejecting evangelical Christianity, even Christianity itself. To what extent is that because of widespread evangelical support for Donald Trump? Don't read this book to find support for your views. Read it to be challenged--with facts, reason, and biblical principles. <>

The Moral Nexus by R. Jay Wallace [Carl G. Hempel Lecture Series, Princeton University Press, 9780691172170]

The Moral Nexus develops and defends a new interpretation of morality—namely, as a set of requirements that connect agents normatively to other persons in a nexus of moral relations. According to this relational interpretation, moral demands are directed to other individuals, who have claims that the agent comply with these demands. Interpersonal morality, so conceived, is the domain of what we owe to each other, insofar as we are each persons with equal moral standing.

The book offers an interpretative argument for the relational approach. Specifically, it highlights neglected advantages of this way of understanding the moral domain; explores important theoretical and practical presuppositions of relational moral duties; and considers the normative implications of understanding morality in relational terms.

The book features a novel defense of the relational approach to morality, which emphasizes the special significance that moral requirements have, both for agents who are deliberating about what to do and for those who stand to be affected by their actions. The book argues that relational moral requirements can be understood to link us to all individuals whose interests render them vulnerable to our agency, regardless of whether they stand in any prior relationship to us. It also offers fresh accounts of some of the moral phenomena that have seemed to resist treatment in relational terms, showing that the relational interpretation is a viable framework for understanding our specific moral obligations to other people. <>

Biased: Uncovering the Hidden Prejudice That Shapes What We See, Think, and Do by Jennifer L. Eberhardt, PhD [Viking, 9780735224933]

"Poignant....important and illuminating."—*The New York Times Book Review*

"Groundbreaking."—Bryan Stevenson, *New York Times* bestselling author of *Just Mercy*

From one of the world's leading experts on unconscious racial bias come stories, science, and strategies to address one of the central controversies of our time

How do we talk about bias? How do we address racial disparities and inequities? What role do our institutions play in creating, maintaining, and magnifying those inequities? What role do we play? With a perspective that is at once scientific, investigative, and informed by personal experience, Dr. Jennifer Eberhardt offers us the language and courage we need to face one of the biggest and most troubling issues of our time. She exposes racial bias at all levels of society—in our neighborhoods, schools, workplaces, and criminal justice system. Yet she also offers us tools to address it. Eberhardt shows us how we can be vulnerable to bias but not doomed to live under its grip. Racial bias is a problem that we all have a role to play in solving. <>

Searching Paul: Conversations With the Jewish Apostle to the Nations. Collected Essays by Kathy Ehrensperger [Wissenschaftliche Untersuchungen Zum Neuen Testament, Mohr Siebeck, 9783161555015]

Firmly rooted in his ancestral Jewish traditions, Paul interacted with, and was involved in vivid communication primarily with non-Jews, who through Christ were associated with the one God of Israel. In the highly diverse cultural, linguistic, social, and political world of the Roman Empire, Paul's activities are seen as those of a cultural translator embedded in his own social and symbolic world and simultaneously conversant with the diverse, mainly Greek and Roman world, of the non-Jewish nations. In this role he negotiates the Jewish message of the Christ event into the particular everyday life of his addressees. Informed by socio-historical research, cultural studies, and gender studies Kathy Ehrensperger explores in her collection of essays aspects of this process based on the hermeneutical presupposition that the Pauline texts are rooted in the social particularities of everyday life of the

people involved in the Christ-movement, and that his theologizing has to be understood from within this context. <>

Hysteria, Perversion, and Paranoia in The Canterbury Tales: "Wild" Analysis and the Symptomatic Storyteller by Becky Renee McLaughlin [Research in Medieval and Early Modern Culture, Western Michigan University Press 9781501518416]

Beginning with the spectacle of hysteria, moving through the perversions of fetishism, masochism, and sadism, and ending with paranoia and psychosis, this book explores the ways that conflicts with the Oedipal law erupt on the body and in language in Chaucer's *Canterbury Tales*, for Chaucer's tales are rife with issues of mastery and control that emerge as conflicts not only between authority and experience but also between power and knowledge, word and flesh, rule books and reason, man and woman, same and other - conflicts that erupt in a macabre sprawl of broken bones, dismembered bodies, cut throats, and decapitations.

Like the macabre sprawl of conflict in the *Canterbury Tales*, this book brings together a number of conflicting modes of thinking and writing through the surprising and perhaps disconcerting use of "shadow" chapters that speak to or against the four "central" chapters, creating both dialogue and interruption. <>

A History of Solitude by David Vincent [Polity, 9781509536580]

Solitude has always had an ambivalent status: the capacity to enjoy being alone can make sociability bearable, but those predisposed to solitude are often viewed with suspicion or pity.

Drawing on a wide array of literary and historical sources, David Vincent explores how people have conducted themselves in the absence of company over the last three centuries. He argues that the ambivalent nature of solitude became a prominent concern in the modern era. For intellectuals in the romantic age, solitude gave respite to citizens living in ever more complex modern societies. But while the search for solitude was seen as a symptom of modern life, it was also viewed as a dangerous pathology: a perceived renunciation of the world, which could lead to psychological disorder and anti-social behaviour.

Vincent explores the successive attempts of religious authorities and political institutions to manage solitude, taking readers from the monastery to the prisoner's cell, and explains how western society's increasing secularism, urbanization and prosperity led to the development of new solitary pastimes at the same time as it made traditional forms of solitary communion, with God and with a pristine nature, impossible. At the dawn of the digital age, solitude has taken on new meanings, as physical isolation and intense sociability have become possible as never before. With the advent of a so-called loneliness epidemic, a proper historical understanding of the natural human desire to disengage from the world is more important than ever. <>

The Journeys of a Taymiyyan Sufi: Sufism through the Eyes of ʿImād al-Dīn Aḥmad al-Wāsiṭī (d. 711/1311) by Arjan Post [Studies on Sufism, Brill, 9789004431294] Digital Open Source

The Journeys of a Taymiyyan Sufi: Sufism through the Eyes of ʿImād al-Dīn Aḥmad al-Wāsiṭī (d. 711/1311) explores the life and teachings of ʿImād al-Dīn Aḥmad al-Wāsiṭī (d. 711/1311), a little-known Ḥanbalī Sufi master from the circle of Ibn Taymiyya (d. 728/1328). The first part of this book

follows al-Wāsiṭī's physical journey in search of spiritual guidance through a critical study of his autobiographical writings. This provides unique insights into the Rifāʿiyya, the Shādhiliyya, and the school of Ibn ʿArabī, several manifestations of Sufism that he encountered as he travelled from Wāsiṭ to Baghdad, Alexandria, and Cairo. Part I closes with his final destination, Damascus, where his membership of Ibn Taymiyya's circle and his role as a Sufi teacher is closely examined.
The second part focuses on al-Wāsiṭī's spiritual journey through a study of his Sufi writings, which convey the distinct type of traditionalist Sufism that he taught in early eighth/fourteenth-century Damascus. Besides providing an overview of the spiritual path unto God from beginning to end as he formulated it, this reveals an exceptional interplay between Sufi theory and traditionalist theology. <>