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Wordtrade Reviews: Searching for Gender

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THE SEARCH FOR MEANING IN PSYCHOTHERAPY: SPIRITUAL PRACTICE, THE APOPHATIC WAY AND BION by Judith Pickering [Routledge, 9781138193062]

If, when a patient enters therapy, there is an underlying yearning to discover a deeper sense of meaning or purpose, how might a therapist rise to such a challenge? As both Carl Jung and Wilfred Bion observed, the patient may be seeking something that has a spiritual as well as psychotherapeutic dimension. Presented in two parts, **THE SEARCH FOR MEANING IN PSYCHOTHERAPY: SPIRITUAL PRACTICE, THE APOPHATIC WAY AND BION** is a profound inquiry into the contemplative, mystical and apophatic dimensions of psychoanalysis.

What are some of the qualities that may inspire processes of growth, healing and transformation in a patient? Part One, The Listening Cure: Psychotherapy as Spiritual Practice, considers the confluence between psychotherapy, spirituality, mysticism, meditation and contemplation. The book explores qualities such as presence, awareness, attention, mindfulness, calm abiding, reverie, patience, compassion, insight and wisdom, as well as showing how they may be enhanced by meditative and spiritual practice.

Part Two, A Ray of Divine Darkness: Psychotherapy and the Apophatic Way, explores the relevance of apophatic mysticism to psychoanalysis, particularly showing its inspiration through the work of Wilfred Bion. Paradoxically using language to unsay itself, the apophatic points towards absolute reality as ineffable and unnameable. So too, Bion observed, psychoanalysis requires the ability to dwell in mystery

awaiting intimations of ultimate truth, O, which cannot be known, only realised. Pickering reflects on the works of key apophatic mystics including Dionysius, Meister Eckhart and St John of the Cross; Buddhist teachings on meditation; Śūnyatā and Dzogchen; and Lévinas' ethics of alterity.

THE SEARCH FOR MEANING IN PSYCHOTHERAPY: SPIRITUAL PRACTICE, THE APOPHATIC WAY AND BION will be of great interest to both trainees and accomplished practitioners in psychoanalysis, analytical psychology, psychotherapy and counselling, as well as scholars of religious studies, those in religious orders, spiritual directors, priests and meditation teachers.

Review

"Early in her book Judith writes of her own experience of singing: *Ultimately, inspired by the spirit of the music, all elements of attention converge and unify, the singer enters a state of ecstasy transcending awareness of time, space and individuality, such that the music and singers become all one instrument, one soaring, flowing body of sound.* In this scholarly book Judith brings us, her patients and herself on a deeply personal journey in the search for meaning in psychotherapy. Her exploration of Dzogchen, Buddhism and apophatic mysticism from a range of traditions culminates in an original re-interpretation of Bion's "O". Her writing sings to the "ray of divine darkness": the transcendence of not knowing over knowledge in psychotherapy."-**Penelope Jools**, Senior Editor, *Working with Developmental Anxieties in Couple and Family Psychotherapy: The Family Within* (Routledge, 2018)

"Dr Judith Pickering offers invaluable insights and guidelines into a richer understanding of the human spirit, showing a path to unity out of false divisions and bringing much needed compassion and gentleness of spirit into a fast-paced, acquisitive and often aggressive world. She does so by drawing on the wisdom of many apophatic mystics from different spiritual traditions as well as her own vast experience in contemplation, meditation, and psychotherapy."-**Bishop Patrick Power**, author of *Joy and Hope, Pilgrim Priest and Bishop*

"In this immensely evocative, provocative and scholarly book, Judith Pickering challenges the reader to consider the daunting role of the psychoanalyst, psychotherapist and couple psychotherapist in relating to their patients – mind and soul – in discovering the truth of who they are. In her engaging writing style, which conveys her aliveness and *analytic hospitality*, she emphasises the spiritual dimension of psychoanalysis, noting the importance of a particular state of mind in the analyst in this enterprise and how this can be cultivated. In noting the importance of un-knowing ourselves in the processes of self-realisation, she also highlights the value of approaches to psychoanalysis such as those advocated by Jung and Bion which incorporate an apophatic approach. I think this book, which is of great contemporary relevance, makes an important contribution to the field and is essential reading for psychoanalysts, psychotherapists, couple therapists, students and those with an interest in spirituality and psychotherapy."-**Timothy Keogh**, Vice-President, International Association of Couple and Family Psychoanalysis and Australian Confederation of Psychoanalytic Psychotherapies, Co-author of *Psychoanalytic Approaches to Loss: Mourning, Melancholia and Couples*

"At the heart of psychotherapy lies the yearning for meaning and spiritual fulfillment. To venture into this inner landscape as a therapist and offer support to another is to enter sacred ground. While mindful of history, Judith Pickering makes accessible all the best of current psychotherapy, mysticism, contemplation and meditation techniques. Engaging, powerful, insightful and above all relevant to these

troubled times, this book is a must read; it provides the know-how and the inspiration to take the plunge!"-**Ian Gawler**, author of *Blue Sky Mind*

The Search for Meaning in Psychotherapy

If, when a patient enters therapy, there is an underlying yearning to discover a deeper sense of meaning, how might a therapist rise to such a challenge? As both Carl Jung and Wilfred Bion observed, the patient may be seeking something that has a spiritual as well as psychotherapeutic dimension. Presented in two parts, The Search for Meaning in Psychotherapy is a profound inquiry into the contemplative, mystical and apophatic dimensions of psychoanalysis.

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I am singing in a concert entitled Songs of Farewell. The music circles around themes of remembrance, paying homage to all who have lived on our common earth, those close to us and those far away; those who died in war and those who died in peace; those who have died of cancer, accident or old age; and all those who have departed life unknown and unsung.

We begin with a minute's silence. A minute is a long time in our hurried world. Silence, like rising mist, gradually envelops us in a sense of communion, audience and choir partaking in the same memorial rite. In honouring those who have died, we confront the ephemerality and mutability of life. Yet there is hope in the possibility of some form of continuity beyond the grave.

What is a life? When a person dies, what continues? The uniqueness of a human being can never be replaced, but they continue to inspire and so accompany us. Who that person was continues, and so still is, in our hearts, our minds and our memory.

We sing of 'countries far beyond the stars', 'above noise and danger', of the `flower of peace', the 'Rose that cannot wither', and of 'One who never changes'.' There are hauntingly poignant themes, soaring melodic lines, changes in mood from terrible desolation, grief and mourning to a realm of peace beyond understanding.

We sing a setting by Charles Parry (1848-1918) of a poem by John Gibson Lockhart (1794-1854):

> There is an old belief, that on some solemn shore, beyond the sphere of grief dear friends shall meet once more, beyond the sphere of time and sin and fate's control, serene in changeless prime of body and of soul . . . Eternal be the sleep, if not to waken so. (in Quiller-Couch, 1968, p. 25)

I remember my grandfather who, when he went to war, wore a gold medallion with a picture of his beloved wife and a lock of her hair in a locket. She gave it to him as a keepsake to keep him alive, praying that awareness of her love would sustain him through ghastly horror. He was shot in the leg and taken to an army hospital in England. My grandmother set sail on the S.S. Arabia to be at his bedside, but

the ship was torpedoed off the shore of Gibraltar. She survived to tell the tale, writing of her war experiences under a pseudonym, Max Arthur. You can read her war correspondence in the National Library Archives.

We sing the setting by William Harris (1883-1973) of a prayer by John Donne (1572-1631) in the spirit of apophatic mystery:

> Bring us O Lord God, at our last awakening
> into the house and gate of heav'n
> to enter into that gate and dwell in that house
> where there shall be no noise, nor silence, but one equal music
> no fears nor hopes
> but one equal possession
> no ends nor beginnings, but one equal eternity
> in the habitation of thy glory and dominion
> world without end. (in Counsell, 1999, p. 237)

Our singing makes one instrument of so many diverse voices, and diverse personalities, beliefs and different motivations for singing. I am reminded of John Donne's Sermon CIX:

> Man is but a voice, but a sound, but a noise, he begins the noise himself, when he comes crying into the world, and when he goes out; perchance friends celebrate, perchance enemies calumniate him, with a diverse voice, a diverse noise.

We sing but for fleeting moments, then the sound dies away and the rest is silence. For two hours, everyone puts aside worldly concerns. We are together in the same atmosphere of deep contemplation, remembering those who have died — audience, conductor, each singer, all part of a greater whole.

Although we are singing religious music, the majority of those singing are not religious per se. Some members of the choir are 'believers', whether Jewish, Christian, Buddhist, Hindu or Muslim, but most, as with the audience, would probably describe themselves as agnostic, atheist or areligious, part of the post-faith, secular twenty-first-century society. Nevertheless, there is a sense of being inspired by some unnamed source, taking us into a subliminal realm of transcendence.

As singers, despite our best intentions, despite hours of crafting the formation and rhythmic placement of each vowel, diphthong and consonant, expressing every sentiment with both precision and passion, we make mistakes.

One small passage terrifies me: it is so poignant, so exposed, so sublime, so pure that I am afraid I will not be able to sing it without my voice cracking. Who can dare sing:

> And you whose eyes shall behold God
> And never taste death's woe.

My mother did taste death's woe. Her dying was woefully unendurable. Right now I have to sing as if my life depends upon it, as if to God herself. As I sing the first note, fear and trembling passes away as my voice is carried across the divide between life and death on a gentle breath of sound, like a feather on the breath of God, as Saint Hildegard would say. Entering a timeless yet totally present realm I am freed from black despair concerning my mother's final agony. In this utterly ephemeral, mutable moment there

is a presentiment of immutability. Like a mother reassuring her infant with the most primordial sound, a mother's voice, I sing to God and through God to her, beholding God and so never tasting death's woe.

This is why people come to sit and listen to music in a disused church on a Saturday afternoon, taking time out from the hurry and worry, the greed and grasp of the modern, urban world. They come to be transported beyond immediate quotidian concerns. Even in a post-religious age, we still face the big questions: death, old age, sickness, loss, war, loneliness, alienation, the search for the reason we are alive.

This is why composers compose music, poets write poetry, conductors conduct, artists paint. This is why we sing this concert, and this is why I wrote this book. It matters not whether we are religious or simply have a spiritual bone left in our body, for all of us in our finitude are touched by that which is infinite, yet also infinitely full of pathos and gentleness of spirit. This indefinable sense of mystery beyond comprehension is what inspires this book. I will not label it or seek to define it, but only hope to allow it to course its way through what I write, and try not to get in its way. It is an offering, full of mistakes, imperfect, repetitive and incomplete, but hopefully conveying something of meaning.

The meaning of life

`Jenny' says, 'I am sorry, it's a tall order, but what I'm really asking you is, what is the meaning of my life?' I answer gently, 'Perhaps this is something we may discover, slowly, together'.

A voice wells up within 'James' as he leaves the consulting room after his first session. 'There is only one place that this will lead, and that is to God'. This is highly disturbing, as, reacting against his 'bible-bashing, fundamentalist upbringing', James is an avowed atheist. He firmly dismisses the voice, yet it gnaws away at him at a subliminal level, emerging from time to time in dream imagery. Two years later he sheepishly says to me, 'Look, I have been thinking. Perhaps I just need to give in to this voice and see where it will lead me'. James begins to explore the spiritual dimension of his personality, but on his terms, not those of his parents. Three years later, he does a short retreat at a contemplative monastery. Four years later he ends therapy to enter a Trappist monastery.

`Arvind' and `Damayanti' are a Hindu couple who ask me to teach them 'anger management strategies'. As well as analysing the explosive interlocking conflicts threatening their marriage, I wonder how they 'manage' their anger at home. Damayanti says that 'when it's really bad, I go into my bedroom and pray before a statue of Vishnu that my mother gave me as a child'. Surprised, Arvind responds, `I love the slokas of Vishnu; my grandfather taught me how to recite them when I was a child! Maybe we could chant them together?' Arvind and Damayanti begin each day in a new way, chanting the slokas of Vishnu. Gradually they notice a lessening of conflict.

`Sally' describes herself as a 'self-confessed arch-atheist, rationalist and materialist. If it cannot be proved scientifically, it doesn't exist'. Engaged as an international medical aid worker, she wants to help others, yet a restless uneasiness pervades her life. just want to do all I can to help those most in need. But why is that not enough? I feel so discontent. What am I really meant to be doing with my life?' Sally is adamant that she will find no answers in religion. Although trained In mindfulness meditation, she is highly suspicious lest hidden religious elements lurk behind meditation techniques. Yet the quest to fmd the meaning of her life eats away at her. Sally is in good company:

> The meaning of my existence is that life has addressed a question to me. Or, conversely, I myself am a question which is addressed to the world, and I must communicate my answer. (Jung, 1963, p. 350)

This book takes this question as a starting point. The question has no ready-made answers. Here question and quest are linked, the quest for truth, meaning, purpose, truth, being. Jung believed that `psychoneurosis must be understood, ultimately, as the suffering of a soul which has not discovered its meaning' (1932, para. 497).

Underneath the presenting problems propelling a person into therapy — longing for love, a failed relationship, depression, anxiety, family feuds, a work crisis, grief and loss — some also experience an inchoate sense of emptiness and futility. They suffer existential loneliness and feel disconnected from the core of themselves, from others, from life itself. All the usual avenues to fill the void — affluence, possessions, ambition — have somehow failed to deliver. The Buddhists call such dissatisfaction duhkha. The original Sanskrit for duhkha referred to an axle hole that was off-centre, leading to a bumpy ride. Dissatisfaction is a condition of life that is unbalanced, stuck in ceaseless spirals of repetition compulsion and destructive behaviour: a life that has not found its true meaning.

Among his patients aged over 35, Jung observed that

> there has not been one whose problem in the last resort was not that of finding a religious outlook on life. It is safe to say that every one of them fell ill because he had lost that which the living religions of every age have given to their followers, and none of them has been really healed who did not regain his religious outlook. (Jung, 1933, p. 229)

The psychoanalyst Wilfred Bion also held that an individual is born with an instinct predisposed to experience 'reverence and awe' (Bion, 1992, p. 285). Quoting John of the Cross, Bion argues that the goal of analysis is cure of the soul: 'The soul is now, as it were, undergoing a cure in order that it may regain its health — its health being God himself' (1968/2014, CWXV, p. 64). He felt that `psychoanalysts have been peculiarly blind to the topic of religion'. Such a glaring omission was like saying a human being had 'no alimentary canal' (1990, p. 6). Bion lamented the tendency among psychoanalysts to reduce belief in God to no more than a glorified father figure.

Yet for atheists such as Sally, it would be as disrespectful to say that their discontent is a displaced religious issue as it would be to say that a religious person is merely suffering a disowned psychological complex.

The search for meaning manifests in myriad ways: as simple joie de vivre, a passionate engagement with the world, or wanting to do good, be engaged in humanitarian or political concerns, or lead the ethical life. It may be a love of nature or pursuit of physical prowess. One's raison d'etre may take creative, philosophical or metaphysical forms. It might appear as a concern for being well, living well, wholeness, integration, balance or self-realisation. The quest for meaning may take a different direction, through a narrow gate, along a path less travelled, towards realisation, an intimation of ultimate truth, the path of the mystics.

Psychotherapy and spiritual direction: a human relationship

If, when a person enters psychotherapy, underneath the ostensible presenting problems, there is an underlying yearning for a deeper dimension to life, how might the therapist rise to the occasion? The

person coming to see the therapist may be asking something of the therapist that is intrinsically spiritual. The contemporary psychotherapist could be seen to inherit the role of the traditional healer: the medicine man or woman, shaman, staretz, priest, rabbi or spiritual guide. Jung found that patients often 'force the psychotherapist into the role of a priest, and expect and demand of him that he shall free them from their distress. That is why we psychotherapists must occupy ourselves with problems which, strictly speaking, belong to the theologian' (Jung, 1933, p. 278). Conversely, spiritual directors often need to attend to the psychological as well as spiritual disposition of the person seeking their help, being 'actively concerned in aspects of the soul in a "therapeutic" sense' (Bion, 1968/2014, CWXV, p. 68). Psychotherapy may help a practitioner gain insight into and so resolve, dissolve and heal old wounds and so remove psychological obstacles to their spiritual path.

Meditation and psychotherapy

It is said that Buddha observed there were over 84,000 forms of emotional and psychological disease; consequently, he taught over 84,000 forms of meditation as psychological medicine, to be applied judiciously according to need. Although the application of mindfulness to psychotherapy has recently become popular, numerous techniques of meditation, as well as methods of prayer and practices of contemplation are to be found in a variety of forms in all religious traditions. Just as good doctors know their patients well and so can prescribe the right treatment for a given condition, the teacher-student relationship is a critical factor. The teacher has to know the disposition, condition and capacity of the student in order to know which methods will be suitable. Certain practices are contraindicated for certain mental conditions. Cultural and religious background needs consideration. With Arvand and Damayanti it was more appropriate to encourage them to apply their own Hindu-inspired practices they had already discovered for themselves than suggest mindfulness meditation or Western psychological anger management strategies.

Under what conditions might meditation have a place in the consulting room? Is it ever appropriate to include meditation as part of therapy? In specific situations I may suggest a particular meditation practice that is appropriate for those who come to see me, given that I am trained to do so and knowing full well that some people find it too daunting to attend meditation courses. This enables the careful selection of meditations to fit the world view, culture and disposition of the person in question: finding authentic Christian practices for the Christian, Buddhist practices for those open to Buddhism, non-religious meditations for those seeking to be free of anxiety but not wanting anything ostensibly spiritual. There are many other important considerations, such as whether the person suffers anxiety, depression, ADHD, psychosis, PTSD or autism, as well as typology and predilection. Meditation should not ever be 'one-size fits all' any more than medicine or psychotherapy is.

Psychotherapy as spiritual practice: the therapist

`Physician heal thyself'. Nietzsche's Zarathustra, thus quoting from Luke's Gospel, adds, 'Then wilt thou also heal thy patient. Let it be his best cure to see with his eyes him who maketh himself whole' (Nietzsche, 1908, p. 102). Central to this book is the issue of the spiritual practice of the psychotherapist, its form and degree, or perhaps its absence. As well as intensive vocational training and ongoing professional development, might some form of meditative or contemplative practice help a therapist? Could psychotherapy be considered as a form of spiritual practice? There are many parallels. The therapy session is a demarcated time and space, just as a meditation session is time put aside for

meditation. The therapist undertakes the disciplined practice of paying free-floating as well- as undivided attention, cultivating analytic reverie, empathic attunement, equanimity and patience in the face of turbulence, frustration, doubt and uncertainty, listening out for promptings of a still quiet voice of intuition.

What are the particular transformational qualities that, in the sanctuary of therapy, aid processes of psychological healing? First of all the therapist should not get in the way of a given person's innate capacity for self-healing. But the therapist's own state of being is vital as well. The patient comes to understand, work through and heal developmental lacks, losses, relational traumas and other psychological obstacles to their well-being, through a deeply personal, committed therapeutic relationship. This relationship is imbued with certain 'psychotherapeutic virtues'. Among these are free-floating attention, pure presence, reverie, contemplation, attunement, resonance, equanimity, calm, reflective capacity, compassion, loving kindness, patience, understanding, open-mindedness, generosity and gentleness of spirit, discernment, intuition, courage, and truthfulness. There are qualities related to the therapist's training and technique such as an analytic attitude, a capacity to work symbolically and interpretively in and with transference and countertransference. There is the importance of what the therapist should avoid: being overly advice-giving or directive, let alone exploitative, seductive, revengeful, violent or retaliatory. The therapist needs to be constantly on the lookout for hidden agendas and mixed motives. There needs to be finely attuned, yet rigorous ethical awareness, honest self-reflection and examination of conscience. Such psychotherapeutic virtues are some of the most powerful factors in the healing process, inspiring the patient to enhance their own nascent capacity for transformation. But even if any such virtues are vital aspects of the therapeutic relationship, they are not givens. How might a therapist actively cultivate them? There is a range of meditation and contemplative practices that are aimed at increasing awareness, concentration and the capacity to be fully present, to listen deeply, as well as to develop loving kindness, altruism, compassion, equanimity, generosity of spirit, ethical discipline, patience, diligence, and wisdom. A therapist could do well to consider what spiritual or meditative practices may benefit their own work, to which we might add a life creatively lived and other sources of inspiration according to the unique interests of the therapist, such as artistic pursuits, love of nature, physical activities, dancing, singing, music, poetry, reading, friendships, close relationships, time for stillness and deep reflection.

Care of the soul: psychological, spiritual, and mystical dimensions

What is the relationship between psychotherapy and spirituality? They are etymologically related since both derive from words meaning to breathe. To breathe is to be alive; breath is the basis of communication and mediates inner and outer. Among the many meanings of `psyche', from the Greek psyxö, meaning to breathe and to blow, is the breath of life which animates the body, the life principle, life itself. This life principle has also come to be related, equated or conflated in different ways with soul, spirit, intellect, mind, self and consciousness.

`Spiritual' derives from the Latin noun Spiritus meaning 'breath', spiriare meaning to breathe and to blow and the adjectives spiritalis or spiritualis. The spirit is the principle that inspires us, stirs things, moves matter and perhaps is the movement of matter. For some, it is matter that moves spirit into action. 'A wind from God (ruah elohim) swept over the face of the waters' (Genesis 1:2). God breathes into Adam's nostrils the breath of life (Hebrew n'shama, Greek psyche, Latin anima) and so Adam becomes animate, a living soul (Genesis 2:7).

In the history of Western thought, the word 'spirit' has been used to refer to the spirit of life, the human spirit, the Spirit of God, the Holy Spirit and spirits in the sense of disembodied souls or ghosts. Spirit is sometimes equated with the soul and sometimes seen as in between, mediating between body and soul. For many, including Descartes, spirit was seen as the breath of life which was a fine vapour that animates living beings.

A distinction is often made between soul and spirit. In Greek thought this is reflected in the two words psyche and pneuma, in Latin between anima and Spiritus, in Hebrew between ruah and nephesh, in German between Seele and Geist. To distinguish is not necessarily to separate: sometimes psyche was seen to consist of pneuma or spirit. This distinction lead to a tripartite view of the human being. For the Stoics the person consists of body, soul and mind. For many Christian theologians it was body, soul and spirit, as propounded by St Paul and taken up by Justin Martyr, Clement of Alexandria, Origen, Irenaeus and Eusebius. In the earlier Greek context, further distinctions between related terms abound: such as between psyche as life and autos (the 'person'), nous (mind or intellect) and phrenes (thought), and their respective relationships to the body or söma. Psyche as 'life' also has a combination of many other aspects such as mind, thought, emotions and virtues such as courage and justice.

For the German psychologist Von Schubert (1780-1860) the three-fold division of human nature consisted of living body (Lieb), soul and spirit. This trio is in a constant process of self-becoming (Selbst bewusstein) or self-consciousness. An original state of harmony with nature is severed due to self-love (Ich-Sucht). The purpose of life is to regain this original state in a perfected form (Ellenberger, 1970, p. 205).

Troxler (1780-1866) added a fourth to comprise the Tetraktys: Körper, Leib, soul and spirit. He distinguished two 'bodies'. Körper is the anatomical body and Leib is the soma or body as meaning. He also posited two polarities within the Letraktys: soma-soul and spirit-body. All are held together by the Gemsüt which is `the true individuality of man by means of which he is himself most authentically, the hearth of his self-hood, the most alive central point of his existence' (Ellenberger, 1970, p. 206).

William James (1842-1910) linked breath with consciousness and the stream of thinking:

> The stream of thinking . . . is only a careless name for what, when scrutinized, reveals itself to consist chiefly of the stream of my breathing. The 'I think' . . . is the 'I breathe' . . . breath, which was ever the original of 'spirit' . . . is, I am persuaded, the essence out of which philosophers have constructed the entity known to them as consciousness. (James, 1904, p. 491)

What is the difference between spirit and soul? 'Soul' is the word most often chosen to translate either psyche or anima into English. The word 'soul' is derived from Old Gothic. Wulfila (311-382 CE), a Cappadocian who evangelised the Goths, devised a Gothic alphabet primarily out of Greek, and to a lesser extent Latin. In coining Gothic Christian terminology, he drew on existing Gothic words but gave them new meanings, such as ahma 'spirit'. He used the word saiwala to translate the Greek psyche. However, *saiwala was originally used to denote the spirit of a dead person, whereas *ferh denoted 'the spark of life, the animating spirit in a living being' (Green, 1995, p. 148). When translating anima/psyche the difficulty was to extend the meaning to refer to both the immortality of the soul after death and the essence of a person during life (Falluomini, 2015). The Gothic version of the Magnificat differentiates soul (saiwala) and spirit (ahma):

> Mikileid saiwala meina fraujan, jah swegneid ahma meins du guda nasjand meinamma .My soul magnifies the Lord, and my spirit rejoices in God my saviour. (Luke 1:4, 46-47 in Mendez, 2013, p. 99)

Soul was used by Tyndale in the first Bible in English to translate the Hebrew nephesh. The KJB translated nephesh variously depending on the context, attributing a range of meanings: soul, life, person, mind, heart, creature, body, himself, yourselves, dead, will, desire, man, themselves, any, appetite.

The common etymology of psyche and spirit underlies the common tasks of both psychotherapy and spirituality: care of psyche, healing of the soul, freeing it from entanglement in neurotic, defensive and destructive constraints. Many spiritual traditions hold that ultimate reality is something that we discover and realise, not create or develop. In such traditions, one's true self, the spark of divinity, godliness, primordial purity, enlightenment, is always there behind all that occludes, entraps and contaminates it. The Greek word alétheia, unconcealment, has this sense. The implication is that at the ultimate level, the myriad forms of psychological disease are accidental, not substantial or inherent. The pursuit of truth is a process of removing all that is false to reveal the primordial purity and spontaneous presence of one's true nature. Dionysius suggests that we should be 'sculptors who set out to carve a statue. They remove every obstacle to the pure view of the hidden image, and simply by this act of clearing away (aphaeresis) they show up the beauty which is hidden' (MT 2 1025B).

This raises a question debated in many religious traditions concerning primordial godliness or original sin. Are we made in the image of God (imago dei) or inherently flawed from conception? Is enlightenment a potential or a latency? Is Buddhahood like a seed, that may be realised, or is our fundamental nature already one of primordial purity, although covered over by the obscuring grime of ignorance?

Not only are spiritual traditions divided on this point, so is psychotherapy. For example, Klein saw the infant as innately destructive whereas Jung emphasised a teleological dimension, suggesting that we have an inbuilt impetus towards individuation, becoming who we truly are. Myriad psychological disorders may thwart and distort our lives, yet they are also opportune, for without them we would never be called forth to work things through and thus flower into the fullness of whom we might be.

A 'teleological stance' is clinically helpful. No matter how ferociously and destructively a patient may behave and despite tendencies to revert back to the neurotic gains of familiar defence systems, it may help to be reminded of the possibility of an underlying fundamental ground of being which, like sky behind clouds, is always present. This is not to sentimentally avoid confronting the reality of human destructiveness, greed, envy, hate, apathy and selfishness. A borderline patient's envy, resentment, angry frustration and self-harm can be seen as a defence against (and so covering over) a developmental lack, a basic wound, desperate loneliness, depressive defeat and primitive anxiety or fear. To remember this in the heat of borderline attacks, one needs reason, clinical understanding and heteropathic empathy.

Psychotherapy is the handmaiden of spiritual practice, in that psychotherapy may uncover the specificity of one's habitual destructive tendencies, traumatic complexes and defence mechanisms which impede one from realising psychological and spiritual health and well-being. The Greek word eudemonia has the sense of flourishing and well-being, for to live in accordance with ultimate truth naturally brings a sense of contentment, serenity and grace as well as compassion for others, harmony with one's environment, a sense of aliveness.

Therapy, from the Greek therapeia, relates to care of the psyche. It is based on the root dher, to 'carry, support, hold'. This is the same root dhr for Dharma in Sanskrit, which has a wealth of meanings, but one of them is 'that which upholds, supports, or sustains'. Dharma is a word that is almost impossible to translate, meaning many different things in different schools of Hindu and Buddhist thought. On the absolute level dharma refers to absolute truth itself (dharmata).

Therapeia derives from therapön and has etymological meanings related to servant, attendant, ritual substitute and curing. It also relates to Indo-European words meaning 'dwelling' or 'house'. Therapy has spatial, temporal and relational dimensions. The therapeutic space provides a 'dwelling' to safely house, contain and thereby ameliorate psychological disorder, fragmentation, rage, grief, yearning, terror, shame, mourning, doubt, confusion, bewilderment and perplexity. Therapy is a path that patient and therapist take together, unfolding over time. The therapist serves, cares for and supports the patient on this journey of deconstruction, reconstruction and discovery. Therapy is an intrinsically relational process. Following Jung, not only does each patient make of the therapy a different theory; patient and therapist are both transformed by the process.

Gregory Nagy argues that therapön derives from a Hittite word tarpalli meaning 'ritual substitute' or scapegoat where pollution is transferred from the one being purified into another who serves as a ritual substitute and who is 'identified as another self, un autre soi-même' (Nagy, 2013, p. 149). There are parallels here with Jung's descriptions of psychic contagion, Freud and Jung's unconscious-to-unconscious communication, and Bion's observation that the therapist takes in the analysand's confusion, psychically metabolising and then returning it as detoxified 'food for thought'.

In The Contemplative Life, Philo of Alexandria described contemplative ascetics, philosophers and hermits as therapeutae and therapeutrides because they

> heal souls which are under the mastery of terrible and almost incurable diseases, which pleasures and appetites, fears and griefs, and covetousness, and follies, and injustice, and all the rest of the innumerable multitude of other passions and vices, have inflicted upon them. (1981, p. 42)

They had a two-fold task of healing souls and serving God, thus combining the spiritual and psychotherapeutic dimensions together. Could a psychotherapist be considered as a form of modern-day therapeutae? Hillman suggests that the 'psychotherapist is literally the attendant of the soul' and 'by carrying, by paying careful attention to and devotedly caring for the psyche, the analyst translates into life, the meaning of the word psychotherapy' (1989, p. 73).

In order to retain the ancient Greek idea of therapeia as care or cure of psyche, this book uses 'psychotherapy' as an inclusive term, encompassing psychoanalysis, analytical psychology, psychotherapy, psychology and spiritual care.

Psychotherapy, spirituality, religion and mysticism

What are the relationships between psychotherapy, spirituality, mysticism and religion? In contemporary society spirituality is often differentiated from religion, with its attendant belief systems, moral codes and formalised rituals and practices. Spirituality can denote a deep inwardness and a search for transcendence that may not involve adherence to any formal belief system.

What is the relationship between psychotherapy and mysticism? The adjective 'mystical' derives from the Greek mysterion (mystery) and mystikos (mystical). From the second century CE mustiness referred to the mysteriousness of God. Mystical theology for Pseudo-Dionysius, Thomas Aquinas, St John of the Cross and other Christian mystics referred to experiential realisation of the hiddenness and mysteriousness of God, infused into the soul through mystical contemplation.

In the psychoanalytic context, according to Bion, mystical experience involves

direct encounters with ultimate reality. For Bion, it is more than an encounter with the absolute or seeing ultimate truth. It is about being ultimate reality, absolute truth. The paradox is that, for apophatic mystics and Bion, such 'being' is not realised through knowing but through unknowing. Studstill's definition is inclusive of monotheistic, polytheistic and non-theistic traditions:

> In all of the world's major religions certain individuals experience — directly and vividly — what they believe is ultimate reality. Depending on the religion, they seem to perceive/know (in some cases, merge with) God, Visnu, sunyata, gzhi, the Tao, the (Neoplatonic) One, Brahman, etc. These individuals are referred to as 'mystics,' and their apparent encounters with ultimate reality are 'mystical experiences.' The term 'mysticism' encompasses the experiences, traditions, practices, rituals, doctrines, etc. comprising and associated with their various religious paths. (2005, p. 1)

The apophatic way

The project of psychoanalysis is related to the epistemological aim 'know thyself'. Through analysis one seeks greater self-knowledge, self-awareness and self-realisation, to bring consciousness to what was unconscious. Yet for the followers of the apophatic way, ultimate reality cannot be realised through ordinary ways of knowing.

Apophatic comes from the Greek apophasis, where phasis comes from phemi meaning to 'assert' or 'say', and apo means 'away' (from). Apophatic could be translated as 'unsaying', 'non-assertion' or 'negation' but also 'revelation'.

The apophatic is related to 'negative theology' or the via negativa, based on the recognition that through negating concepts, names, formulations and ideas about ultimate reality, we clear space for direct realisation of the utter mystery of the Godhead or absolute.

The apophatic is contrasted with affirmative strands of mysticism known as the kataphatic. The apophatic and kataphatic are interdependent: one cannot 'unsay' except by saying. Affirmation followed by negation is a process of clearing away attributes to uncover and reveal the hidden mystery of the One.

The apophatic can be discovered in Plato and in Neoplatonic writers such as Plotinus (205-270 CE), the Alexandrian Jewish philosopher Philo (15/10 BCE-45/50 CE) and the Neoplatonist Proclus (412-485 CE). In the early Christian tradition it is associated with Clement of Alexandria (150-211/215 CE), Basil of Caesarea (329-379 CE), Gregory of Nyssa (335-394 CE) and the sixth-century Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite.3 Later Christian apophatic mystics include Meister Eckhart (1260-1327/1328), Marguerite Porete (d. 1310), John Tauler (1300-1361), John Ruysbroeck (1293-1381) and Julian of Norwich (1342—after 1416). There is also the fourteenth-century anonymous author of The Cloud of Unknowing and John of the Cross (1542-1591). Judaism, permeated with the recognition that God is ineffable and

unnameable, also has the Ein Sof, or 'infinite beyond description' in the Kabbalah. Maimonides (1138-1204) was a major Jewish proponent of apophatic philosophy. In Islam, we not only find negative theology in Sufism but also in the Kalam schools. In Arabic two terms for the apophatic are lahoot salbi or nizaam al lahoot. In Hinduism there is the apophatic non-dualism of Advaita Vedanta.

In the Western philosophical tradition, the apophatic is found in Lévinas, Deleuze, Derrida, Merleau-Ponty and Wittgenstein. In psychoanalysis Jung, Lacan and Bion are important exponents.

In the Buddhist context, we find it in the Zen, Chan and Dzogchen traditions as well as the Prãsangika Madhyamika of Nagarjuna (150-250 CE). Prãsangika Mãdhyamika uses a reductio ad absurdum technique through which all ideological conceptualisation of reality are dissolved in order to open the mind to a numinous realm of absolute truth beyond concepts.

Dzogchen has both apophatic and kataphatic elements. Although associated with Tibetan Buddhism, Dzogchen is seen to both predate and transcend any school. Dzogchen means total (chen) perfection (dzog). Dzogchen relates to the discovery and 'awareness (rig pa)4 of the true nature of reality in its ultimate purity and perfection' (Samuel, 1993, p. 550) that, underneath all obscuration and defilement, is self-perfected, primordially pure, empty and free of limitations. The 'path' towards realising such perfection is the state of contemplation in which there is a 'simplicity of immediate awareness, unconditioned by any concept, symbol, practice' (Studstill, 2005, p. 126).

A core element of this book involves the application of the apophatic way to psychotherapy. The apophatic dimension has much to offer psychotherapy because in seeking to avoid false certitudes and stale presumptions of knowledge, the apophatic also avoids dogmatism, essentialism and reification. Apophatic approaches to the question 'what is the meaning of life' may also transcend dualistic divisions between schools of thought, even within psychotherapy. This is not to create false dichotomies where apophatic approaches are posited as superior to the `kataphatic' richness of archetypal images, symbols, personal and universal myths. As we shall see, the kataphatic and apophatic condition each other.

This book celebrates both the richness of diversity and the fundamental unity behind all spiritual paths. Like spokes on a hub, different formulations of truth may be based on different cultural world-views, historical epochs and typological differences. The apophatic way has the potential to transcend limitations of a particular cultural or ideological viewpoint, without collapsing into a spurious syncretism. Alterity, diversity, transcendence, mystery and ineffability are ornaments of the apophatic. As psychotherapists sitting with patients of different backgrounds and beliefs, the apophatic approach aids us in the search for truth, a truth which is utterly unique for each patient. An apophatic approach enables us to embrace the quest for the meaning of life of our patients beyond any denomination or even psychoanalytic school of thought. The apophatic lends itself to ecumenism, both religious and psychoanalytic. As Bion observed:

> Verbal expressions intended to represent the ultimate object often appear to be contradictory within themselves, but there is a surprising degree of agreement, despite differences of background, time and space, in the descriptions offered by mystics who feel they have experienced the ultimate reality. (Bion, 1965, p. 151)

Bion, mysticism, ultimate reality and O

The apophatic mystics were a major inspiration for Bion. Bion sought to find language capable of gesturing towards the indescribable nature of absolute truth, language that undid itself, opening one out to a domain beyond thought and beyond understanding. He used the sign O to refer to absolute reality, ultimate truth, the Godhead. O as a symbol is unsaturated with preconceptions, ideas or theories which obscure rather than reveal ultimate reality. O, like a thing-in-itself, cannot be known but O can be realised through processes of transformation in O.

Tracing Bion's original sources for O in the apophatic mystical tradition leads to a radical implication. Psychoanalysts, if they are seekers of truth, are invited to enter through the narrow gate to follow the path taken by the apophatic mystics who seek union with the unknowable Godhead, realisation of their inner divinity, or enlightenment. According to Bion, becoming O is the same fundamental goal for the patient, although the patient may well resist this aim. For Bion, 'Resistance operates because it is feared that the reality [of O] is imminent' (Bion, 1965, p. 147).

Know thyself and un-know thyself: apophatic epistemology and anthropology

The apophatic tradition is radical in seeing the meaning of life to be found, not in the search for self-knowledge, but through unknowing, in agnosia. Related to such apophatic epistemology is what Stang and others call apophatic anthropology. The search for one's true self is a via negativa, clearing away all that is false, distorted or contorted. For Dionysius, the goal of all self-development is apopha-sis of the self. To un-know the unknown God, one must un-know oneself.

As it is for apophatic mystics, a central theme for Bion is that of unknowing as an analytic discipline: 'What we are concerned with is not only what we know and understand, but what we do not know and do not understand' (Bion, 1991, p. 264). Absolute reality cannot be known, only realised. In psychoanalysis 'there is more at stake than an exhortation to "know thyself, accept thyself, be thyself". . . The point at issue is how to pass from "knowing" "phenomena" to "being" that which is "real"' (Bion, 1965, p. 148).

Inspired by The Ascent of Mount Carmel, Bion advises therapists to cultivate a state of mind involving the suspension of memory, desire, understanding and sense impressions. This is the state of mind that is necessary if there is to be `restoration of god (the Mother) and the evolution of god (the formless, infinite, ineffable, non-existent)' (Bion, 1970, p. 129).

Bion also quotes Freud who, in a letter to Lou Andreas-Salome on 25 May 1916, describes a meditative discipline in which one blinds oneself artificially 'in order to focus all the light on one dark spot'. Freud writes:

> I have to blind myself artificially in order to focus all the light on one dark spot, renouncing cohesion, harmony, rhetoric and everything which you call symbolic. (in E. L. Freud, 1961)

Although Freud did not apply such a principle to a spiritual end, this statement places Freud in the tradition of Dionysius who describes plunging into a 'truly mysterious darkness of unknowing' in order to be 'borne up to the ray of divine darkness that surpasseth all being' (Dionysius, MT I, 1, in Johnston, 1967, p. 33).

This book will draw out the apophatic strain in the psychoanalytic tradition, particularly Bion's writings on O as ultimate reality beyond knowledge and understanding. I explicate Bion's apophatic epistemology. I seek out Bion's sources in the apophatic mysticism of Dionysius, John of the Cross, the author of The Cloud of Unknowing and Meister Eckhart. Bion suggested that while all are at some level religious, 'the expression of religious forces in the individual is coloured by each person's character and mental quality' (1991, p. 286) as well as by culture and history. As psychotherapists sitting with patients of different backgrounds and beliefs, Bion's apophatic approach may aid us in the search for truth: even if it is also indescribable and incomprehensible (although not for Bion, inconceivable).

Qualifications

This book is full of questions, contradictions and paradoxes. I shall not attempt to either answer or reconcile them. A simple example is the rather ambitious title of this book: The Search for Meaning in Psychotherapy. This book has been written by way of a response to the implicit question posed by many patients, 'What is the meaning of my life?' However, when confronting a terrible crisis, we may defensively manufacture false or sentimental meaning. Indeed, sometimes courage is needed to accept the pain of not finding true meaning. A given 'meaning' may be merely provisional, needing to be led go so that a deeper meaning might emerge.

Many patients are not concerned with spiritual questions. They may be seeking financial and physical security, a good job, good home, good relationship, good family and good health. They may be motivated by a passion for art, music, literature, film, poetry, drama, nature, physical culture, bushwalking or sport. I do not wish to suggest that spiritual concerns are 'better', 'deeper' or loftier. There are potentially spiritual dimensions to all life's passions. It is vital to remain deeply respectful of the myriad different motivations inspiring a life.

Patients who do not ordinarily talk about the meaning of life, might, in a crisis, wonder 'What's it all about really?' The inspiration may be something joyful, an intimation of some mysterious presence or beauty that moves and inspires.

A patient described feeling this when swimming in the ocean, of being one with the water and the powerful surging currents. Another felt a sense of the sublime listening to a Bach cello concerto. For some a sense of unease has been gnawing away at them, life has not worked out according to plan, something vital is missing. In other words, perhaps questions concerning the meaning of life impact more people than may meet the eye.

Structure of the book

The book falls into two major sections. The first part considers the relationships between the practice of psychotherapy, spirituality, meditation, contemplation and reverie. The second part explores the relevance of apophatic mysticism in the work of Bion and psychoanalysis.

Part One: the listening cure: psychotherapy as spiritual practice

Chapter 1 concerns the relationships between spirituality, religion, mysticism and Psychotherapy. Chapter 2 elaborates on an ethic of analytic hospitality. Chapter 3 argues for the benefits of a regular practice of meditation reflection and contemplation, as well as cultivating presence, awareness and attention in general. The focus of Chapter 4 is the healing potential of the analyst's state of mind,

including the role of contemplation, reverie and Freud's free-floating attention. It outlines Bion's theory of thinking, container/contained and thoughts without a thinker. Chapter 5 considers the relevance of Buddhist teachings on meditation to psychotherapy. Chapter 6 presents an outline of the teachings of Dzogchen. Using a clinical vignette, Chapter 7 warns of the dangers when Western meditators suffering depersonalisation and derealisation draw on misunderstandings of Buddhist teachings on non-self or anãtman and emptiness or sunyata. Chapter 8 explores the role of analytic reverie, containment and compassionate witness in situations involving intergenerational transmission of trauma.

Part Two: a ray of divine darkness: psychotherapy and the apophatic way

Part Two considers the clinical relevance of the apophatic way. Chapter 9 represents the ethics of alterity of Emmanuel Lévinas. It is followed by four chapters on the history and core elements of the apophatic way: Chapter 10 provides a brief history of early apophatic writers; Chapter 11 outlines key themes in the works of Dionysius; Chapter 12 refers to the contributions of John the Scot Erigena, Moses Maimonides, Thomas Gallus, Nicholas of Cusa and Meister Eckhart; and Chapter 13 is devoted to John of the Cross.

Chapter 14 recounts the practice of apophatic contemplation in the tradition of Christian contemplative prayer. Chapter 15 engages with negative epistemology in Bion including his writings on the K link, faith (F), Keats' concept of negative capability, Henri Poincaré's selected fact and the Language of Achievement. Chapter 16 locates the original source for Bion's admonition that analyst should eschew memory, desire and understanding in John of the Cross, who taught that annihilation of the understanding, the memory and the will was necessary for those seeking union with God. Chapter 17 takes the reader into the depths of Bion's writings on O as a numinous, ineffable realm of pure being, absolute truth and ultimate reality.

A common thread woven throughout the book is the apophatic way of unknowing. The search for meaning is found through uncovering our true nature, a primordially pure ground of being in Dzogchen; through divinisation and union of the unknown self in the unknowable Godhead for Christian apophatic mystics; and through realising our true nature in at-one-ment in O for Bion. In all three traditions such realisation takes place through a cloud of unknowing beyond all understanding.

There is a sense of a mystical core through which one partakes in that which is incomprehensible and transcendent. There is a goalless goal of becoming who we already are, but cannot fully know, in communion with all beings. There is a presentiment of an immanent eternity, in every moment, in every meeting, if we can but be open to that which is:

> Beyond words, beyond thought, beyond description,
> Unborn, unceasing, the very essence of space
> Yet it can be experienced as the wisdom of our own awareness:
> Homage to the mother of the Buddhas of past, present and future!
> —Prajnaparamita <>

THE BLOOMSBURY RESEARCH HANDBOOK OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY AND GENDER edited by Veena R. Howard [Bloomsbury Research Handbooks in Asian Philosophy, Bloomsbury Academic, 9781474269582]

'How do gender constructions transform religious experiences?' 'What is the role of bodily materiality in ethics and epistemology?' 'How does rethinking gender and sexuality force us to reconceptualise settled ontological frameworks?' This collection provides the first research resource to Indian philosophical gender issues, exploring a variety of texts and traditions from Indian philosophy where the treatment of gender is dynamic and diverse.

Organised around three central themes - the gender dynamics of enlightenment in the Hindu and Buddhist traditions; the simple binary opposition of genders in Indian traditions; the ways in which symbolic representations of gender differ from social realities in Hindu and Buddhist practice – a team of respected scholars discuss feminist readings, examinations of femininity and masculinity, as well as queer and trans identities, representations, and theories.

Beginning with the Vedic tradition and ending with sections on Sri Ramakrishna and Gandhi, this wide-ranging handbook encourages fresh inquiry into classic philosophical questions. Offering critical analyses relevant to literary, cultural and religious studies, **THE BLOOMSBURY RESEARCH HANDBOOK OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY AND GENDER** opens up new ways of understanding gender and South Asian philosophy.

Review

"This important collection provides a guide to how gender and sexuality appear sometimes as mere binaries, other times as fluid mysteries and rich multiplicities, in Indian thought. Drawing on a wide range of ancient and modern texts, the essays offer an exciting lens for exploring the classic questions of how to live, what is the self, and where transcendence might be found." —*Cynthia Willett, Samuel Candler Dobbs Professor of Philosophy, Emory University, USA*

Contents

Gender Conceptions in Indian Thought: Identity, Hybridity, Fluidity, Androgyny, and Transcendence by Veena R. Howard

Excerpt: Throughout human history, stories have shaped our reality as gendered beings, which is expressed through rituals, symbolism, and philosophical arguments. Not surprisingly, feminist thinkers seek to create a new understanding of the self through dialogue with oral narratives, religious rituals, metaphors, and religious and philosophical texts. This volume develops that dialogue by considering selected texts from the philosophical traditions originated on the Indian subcontinent to widen the scope of stories to further deepen our knowledge of nuanced expressions of gender.' As scholars have noted, "gender" in much South Asian scholarship is largely restricted to a study of women. With the richly textured lives and stories in Indian philosophical texts and traditions, this volume provides a broader exploration of gender in terms of femininity, masculinity, androgyny, and other forms of gendered living.

Significantly, the Sanskrit term dariana, derived from the root verb drn meaning "to see" or a "way of seeing:' is used for "philosophy." Indian philosophical thoughts, including Jain and Buddhist, are multifarious. Any one of several orthodox and heterodox positions in the classical texts of Indian philosophy and its living traditions we consider to be a dariana. Each philosophy represents a worldview and way of evaluating questions of metaphysics, ontology, cosmology, epistemology, ethics, embodiment, and social order, including questions of gender.' In the present context, we use the philosophical signifier, dargana, in the sense of illuminating the multiple constructions of gender articulated in Indic texts—ancient and modern—which themselves are composed in both classical languages and local vernaculars.

A consideration of gender in any philosophical texts or schools of dar§ana entails drawing on multiple sources and approaches. R. K. Narayan comments on how in India's context, philosophical truths and questions are considered by taking into account different disciplines and genres:

> Everything is interrelated. Stories, scriptures, ethics, philosophy, grammar, astrology, astronomy, semantics, mysticism, and moral codes—each forms part and parcel of total life and is indispensable for a four-square understanding of existence. (Narayan 1964:4)

For evaluating questions about gender, this volume highlights the value of utilizing different literary genres that convey philosophical insights. This study reveals that no one essential approach, although certain orthodox conventions dominate, conceptualizes either gender or sexual identity within India's astonishingly vast array of philosophical and religious views.

Various classical and vernacular theological and philosophical viewpoints problematize any single construction of gender and sexual identity despite heteronormative cultural conventions. Thus, any attempts to retrieve any one prevailing philosophical analysis or essentialized approach prove fruitless. However, a close attention to language compositions, narrative structures, and multiple voices gives rise to a richer understanding of the complexity of gender constructions in Indian thought. Additionally, with such a prolific availability of narratives and perspectives, the authors of this volume also broaden theories—for example, gender as biological, social or linguistic construct—expressed in the works of eminent Western thinkers including Judith Butler, Julia Kristeva, Donna Haraway, Luce Irigaray, and so forth.

As the issue of gender intersects with questions about equality, justice, disability, race, ethnicity, and social class, there exists no one way to answer the compound question: What is gender, and how does it determine us as human beings? Such questions have been addressed in various ways in Indian thought and articulated in many philosophical views, each of which has nuanced interpretations of what is meant by the term "human being"—an embodied being that is simultaneously an entity beyond flesh and blood. Often in the Indian context, the question has been reversed from the outset, not beginning from the bodily reality but from the reality of the self (constructed both in universal and individual terms), which precedes the present physical body. Various texts have posed a more basic question long before any discussions resembling those of contemporary gender debates and it remains: Can gender be self-determine the gender of our being beyond the constraints of one body, one life, or one practice?

The largely pan-Indian notion that an individual might have experienced numerous genders, or can experience them across lifetimes, is informed by key presuppositions (depending on the school of philosophy): samsara (or rebirth); the relation between Divine Reality, the self, and the cosmos (this includes the affirmation or denial of God and the self/non-self); the empirical self and the body; and the individual's relationship with society. These factors implicitly intertwine with gender, creating a context for conventional truth claims. Therefore, any inquiry into issues regarding gender must always be contextualized. Hence, we must begin with philosophical texts, narratives, and traditions that have guided the conduct of a people over two millennia, along with a recognition of the historicized bias of the contemporary context, which propels our current inquiry into gender.

The scholarly project of analyzing gender constructs using contemporary gender theories can potentially create new practical insights, but it simultaneously may challenge established positions, prompting inevitable counterexamples. Therefore, we must be attentive to the perspectives set out in these texts (which are living corpora that guide their practitioners), whether they are from the point of view of an individual or social norms and expectations. The authors widen the discussion about the relationship between sex and gender, considering masculinities and femininities as plural and fluid. They variously

analyze dynamics of both gender and sex by exploring whether biological sex is alterable by way of a kind of practice (ritual or meditation), the extent to which ambiguity is recognized, and whether gender can be rejected, altered, or amended by the individual themselves and on what basis. These questions arise out of essential concern for the subject of experience and gender autonomy. Both of these are impacted by the initial socially determined gender of an individual as well as social class and status, religious piety, allegiance to a tradition, or the personal power of an individual to deviate from the culture itself. Questions about gender are not absolute; they always require qualification.

Expanding Concepts of Gender from a Set of Interrelated Philosophies

While Western discourse has highly conceptualized the use of the term "gender" Scholars of Indian thought have only recently begun mining the the various schools and systems of philosophy define the nature of reality in different ways—with theistic, nontheistic, or materialistic language. All theistic understandings include a female principle in the framework of creation, but not all include male and female gods. We convey this point through briefly explaining the idea of Brahman (bearing in mind that this is only as an example and certainly not the dominant view in Indian philosophical traditions). Brahman becomes central to the philosophical discourse of the Upanisads and Vedantic thought. The unity of the Self and the Universe is codified in the following Great Sayings (mahavakyas): tat team asi (You are That) and sarvam khalvidam Brahman (All this indeed is Brahman). These statements do away with all hierarchal ordering, both human and natural. Brahman, as mentioned earlier, is grammatically referred to in the neuter, with the neuter pronoun tad, underscoring that it is neither masculine nor feminine. According to Heinrich Zimmer, Brahman is "beyond the differentiating qualifications of sex, beyond all limiting, individualizing characteristics whatsoever" (Zimmer 1972: 123). Brahman can only be indirectly pointed at by way of negative expressions that allude to what it is not, as for instance, demonstrated through the provocative passage from the Brhadaravyaka Upanisad (3.8.8):

> It is neither gross nor atomic, neither short nor long, neither red nor oily, neither shadow nor dark, neither air nor space, it is unattached, neither taste nor odor, it is without eyes or ears, without the speech or mind, not-luminous, devoid of the vital force of pram and without mouth, it is not a unit of measure, and is without both interior or exterior. It does not consume anything, nor is it consumed by anybody. (Madhavananda 1950: 517)

Defining Brahman via negativa—without any human characteristics that have often been a source of human divisions and oppression—leads to an epistemic shift in our understanding of God and the universe. According to this apophatic line of reasoning, Brahman must also be without markers of sex insofar as such constructions are only provisional rather than ultimate truths of reality. The famous phrase neti neti—literally meaning, "not this, not this"—has been used to (indirectly) describe Brahman. The meaning behind this expression is that Brahman is never "this or that"—that is, never an empirical, describable, classifiable, propertied thing, much as the Christian apophatic theologians such as Dionysius and Meister Eckhart often referred to the Highest God only by using the so-called via negativa.

The idea of an unqualified Being extends beyond the astika (orthodox) schools of Indian philosophy. Divine Reality in the Sikh worldview is genderless and formless. In the Sikh tradition, "reality" Is described as Ikk Onkar—it is "the One" (the term for Supreme Being)—and it is also described through negatives. In general, Jain and Buddhist heterodox philosophical schools reject the idea of a creator God, or even God simpliciter, perhaps due to their contention that any conceptions of Ultimate Reality have the potential to create misinterpretations. Such nastika (heterodox) and nuanced views of Ultimate

Reality can be construed as hermeneutics employed to circumvent any power structures arising out of more traditional conceptions of reality, which are typically informed by polarized dyads such as feminine/masculine and emotion/reason.

However, other darsanas counterbalance the genderless reality of the Sikh and Upanisadic philosophies by including masculine and feminine divine principles and deities in their worldviews. In the Satpichya system, Prakrti (feminine) is the source the material world, and Maya (also a feminine principle) is the force of creation in most of the theistic schools. Sakti (the Feminine Divine power) is the Primordial Principle in the Devi Mahatmya and the Agama literature.

In general, in many Indic traditions, the term Sakti can be used for any of the goddesses—Durga, Kali, Laksmi, or any local female deity. The goddess holds supreme status in the Tantric traditions of Hindus, Jains, and Buddhists.

But the dual-gendered figure Ardhanarigvara provides the most intricate and ingenious conception of reality. One of the most profound alternatives to the male/female dyad is the figure of Siva as both male and female, the form of Ardhanarigvara—"the lord who is half woman:' The androgynous Ardhanarigvara, worshipped in this particular form, represents a fusion or perfect integration of the gender characteristics of Siva and Parvati in "perfect symmetry" (Goldberg 2012: 3).

These unique attempts to understand reality through either genderless, female, male, or bi-gendered lenses collectively result in a particular language and symbolism that can be employed to both approach issues of gender bias and confront other oppressive structures that feminist and gender studies critique. In all these instances, the category of gender is unstable and experienced dynamically.

Overview of the Volume

The following section provides an overview of gender taxonomies, gender constructions, and creative interpretations that emerge from the thirteen chapters in this volume. As we discussed earlier, feminist scholars and gender theorists have confronted gender essentialism and stability by deconstructing inherently volatile conceptions of gender, and they envision alternative identities that challenge the binaries of male/female, emotional/rational, and self/divine. The analyses in this volume cultivate an idea of the self—a self that can be identified as male or female, neither male nor female, or both female and male—which is always in relation with the Other, both human and natural. By deconstructing traditional philosophical assumptions and constructing new paradigms through textual analyses of Indian materials, the authors reveal an intricate view of gender that may not neatly fit in the Western gender theoretical framework, but their analyses hold the promise to advance theoretical and lived understanding of gender.

The authors engage with the question of gender stability—and also the larger subject of subjectivity—through exploring various philosophical systems, gendered rules, narrative models, and modern examples. The chapters are organized in five broad categories: (1) Gender Essentialism, (2) Gender Negotiation, (3) Androgyny, Gender Hybridity, and Fluidity, (4) Gender and the Divine Feminine, and (5) Gender Transcendence. These chapters include pedagogical approaches and textual material that are seldom included in the field of gender studies, narrowly confined as generally it is to Western academies. Because the chapters deal with the issues that concern our human condition and engage (explicitly or implicitly) with the same questions that feminist and gender studies scholars have been

asking, we frame each section with the introductory remarks from the modern feminist/gender studies scholars. A brief analysis of each of these gender subclassifications and how the chapters engage with them will help orient the reader in navigating through the book.

Gender Essentialism

Many feminist scholars have observed a conspicuous lack of connection between the divine representation of female deities (in Hindu, Jain, and Buddhist texts) and the real lives of ordinary women. "The fact:' writes Morny Joy, "that they [women] are regarded not just as representations of the divine, but as embodiments of it, has not been of benefit to women" (2003: 59). However, such analysis overlooks the many instances in which such representations are used to assert agency and power. In Tantra and devotional sects, the principle of the Divine feminine has been used to subvert gender essentialized roles. Tantric traditions subscribe to the Goddess as supreme and consider both female and male equally participate in the rituals.

As we saw earlier, each of the philosophical traditions under discussion hold inclusive views of ontological reality and of the human being, and both-gendered or gender-neutral theological representations. However, the philosophical texts and religious traditions simultaneously lay out a litany of essentialized rules and regulations—whether these are commands prescribed for a wife in epics or the rules for monks and nuns in Buddhist and Jain texts. Scholars draw attention to these perplexing contradictions in texts that, on the one hand, maintain a subject position for women on the basis of inclusive theologies and, on the other hand, deprive them of their subjectivity and individual/independent self on the basis of subjugating gender rules and customs. According to Naomi Appleton, in the "Majjhima Nikaya, the Buddha is recorded as saying that it is impossible for a woman to be a fully awakened one—a sammasambuddha" (Appleton 2010: 95). This is problematic because the Buddha seemingly was egalitarian and taught the path to both men and women.

Joy identifies stridharma (the duties for women) in the Manusmrti as methods to deny selfhood of the woman: "whatever realisation of self is allowed to a woman comes to her only as a reflection of the spiritual stature of her husband" (Joy 2003: 60). Some scholars construe the ideal of the devoted wife (pativrata) as a ploy for oppressive behavior, while others interpret the wife's du ties as a form of karma yoga (the path of selfless action) and a way to attain mosksa (spiritual liberation). A devoted wife attains high spiritual achievement by dedicating herself to her husband as a deity deserving complete devotion. While elaborating pativrata. dharma (duties of a wife) as a form of karma yoga Arti Dhand writes, "The dedication to dharma is then both empowering and liberating" (Dhand 2008: 178). The narratives of devoted wives, such as Savitri, Sita., and Draupadi, have been considered, by some scholars, as examples of oppressive gendered patriarchal norms but, by others, they have been presented as the tales of self-determining powerful women who (female divinity) co-create the world with their husbands (lords). Intriguingly, Irigaray presents the Hindu notions of theology and women's roles in a positive light. In particular, Joy draws attention to Irigaray's attraction toward the notion of relationship between gods and goddesses: "In India, men and women are gods together, and together they create the world, including its cosmic dimension" (In Joy 2003: 54).

However, an idealistic interpretation of the Indian myths and principles of classical philosophical system can potentially prove dangerous for real women, subjecting them to difficult challenges. Idealistic interpretations have also been responsible for essentialized gender norms. Notably, the texts and

related traditions are simultaneously self-aware of the pitfalls of such essentialist systems, and authors in this volume highlight this through close readings of select texts. The three essays in this section by Ana Funes, Veena Howard, and Gopal Gupta provide a fresh look at the select texts of Sanikhya philosophy, Jain thought, and the Puranas, and they problematize the obvious gender essentialist interpretations as a way of creating more constructive views on gender. These chapters also point to examples and provide creative readings that seek to subvert gender essentialism regarding female representations.

In her chapter, "The Unbearability of the Male Gaze: A Phenomenological Exposition of Samkhyan Philosophy of the Body through Feminine Eyes:' Ana Funes challenges Samkhyan philosophy's metaphysical dualism expressed in the polarity between a pure conscious principle (Purusa, male) and an unconscious material one (Prakrti, female). The relation between Purusa and Prakrti in Sanil, chya is often expressed as the interactions between a male and a female, purtqa representing the male and prakrti the female. Funes argues against any justification for essentializing the binary of the masculine cosmic principle and the feminine material principle since both principles are present in all humans and all aspects of creation. Nevertheless, gendered metaphors are often used in the Sanikhya tradition to express the metaphysical functions of the two principles. Conceptualizations of the masculine and the feminine have traditionally had—and still have—an impact on the composition of female and male subjectivities. Using Merleau-Ponty's phenomenological notion of "flesh" and Irigaray's notion of the "maternal feminine she creatively recovers the notion of body in Sarpkhya philosophy and highlights the interrelation between puri,qa (consciousness) and prakrti (materiality) as it is played out in the realm of the body.

Veena Howard's chapter, "Women's Liberation in Jainism: Understanding Philosophical Debates and Cultural Dialectics:' focuses on the issue of women's spiritual liberation (stri-moka or stri-mukti), which has been a source of contention between the two major sects of Jainism, the Digambaras (Sky-clad) and the Bvetambaras (White-clad). She examines the controversies that have arisen between these two sects, especially the counter-debates. The issue of gender becomes complicated in Jainism because the Digambara sect historically emphasized the impossibility of attaining the ultimate spiritual goal of liberation (moskya) in the female body, while other sects persuasively defend women's right to take up a spiritual life.

Howard's analysis of Jain traditions that take women's liberation through sex show arguments and counterarguments. Through close reading of the Jain texts, Howard identifies the sources of the distinctive views of gender and sexuality and debates surrounding these issues. By drawing on the historical narratives and current lives of Jain nuns and laywomen, she argues that the persistent and robust female monastic movement and sustained laywomen's religiosity can be understood as resistance modes to misogynist tendencies.

In his essay "Woman as Maya: Gendered Narrative in the Bhagavata Puraya," Gopal offers a new, innovative reading of the prominent Vaisnava text's characterization of women as maya, which is commonly understood to mean illusive power, illusion, or deception. He argues that the Bhagavata portrays women and traditional feminine nature (of gentleness, beauty, sensuality, sensitivity, caring, sweetness, devotion, tolerance, and nurturance) in ways similar to maya (with its two functions of obscuring and revealing). In the worldly realm, female nature entangles the soul—it makes the soul more attached to the persons, places, and things of this world. But in the context of the divine, the feminine

nature reveals the divine—it becomes a channel through which the divine can be accessed. Women are described in the Dharmagastras and the Mahabharata as a "dangerous sorceress," but in the Bhagavata they are most exalted devotees of Krsna, who are far more advanced than their husbands. In fact, the Bhagavata Puratia affirms that simply hearing about the divine play of the gopis (the cowherd maidens) with Krgia cures humans' worldly lust. Gupta concludes that the Bhagavata's views on maya and female spirituality are radical, given the time period and cultural context in which it was composed.

Gender Negotiation

If we understand gender, along with Joan Scott, to be "a constitutive element of social relationships based on perceived differences between the sexes, and gender is a primary way of signifying relationship of power" (In Castelli 2001: 3), as has been generally accepted by the scholarly community, then gender can be negotiated. Elizabeth Castelli further draws attention to the fact that feminists focus on the "troubling category" of "women" and "gender" and battle with religious traditions, institutions, and "over-zealous identifications" (Castelli 2001: 3). Indian philosophical texts and traditions provide examples of how women and men have been negotiating and crossing over categories of "men," "women," "body," and "soul" in gendered bodies offerin various devotional styles and ways of behavior.

A long history of men identifying with female exemplars" (Frazier 2010: 199). In the poetry of many bhakti saints, gender binaries are subverted, and gendered social norms are shattered, when male poets express their love for the male god in erotic and passionate language. Furthermore, in the Vaisnava traditions, male devotees often deliberately adopt the so-called female bhava (emotion) to bring themselves closer to the male Vigil or Kona. There is a glaring paradox of condemning women as temptresses while glorifying femaleness as the highest ideal on the path of devotion. Maleness is negotiated for femaleness, assuring expeditious success on the path of devotion.

The three essays by Nancy Martin, Ram-Prasad, and Jeffery Long explore how essentialized gender norms have been negotiated and subverted, highlighting select historical Indian saints' unique ways of disrupting gendered identities, either through a male using female voices or through males centralizing the female divinity. In her chapter, "The Gendering of Voice in the Medieval Hindu Literature," Martin examines the nuanced understandings of gender in medieval Hindu devotional literature and theology. She argues that the stories of saints and songs in their voices, particularly those of female saints, serve to expose, challenge, and subvert patriarchal norms and offer rich resources for dismantling gender oppression and for crafting a much wider and more fluid array of gendered identities and relations. These voices offer a vehicle to publicly articulate and reject patriarchal norms (especially in the voices of female saints) and to explore alternatives. They open up an intersubjective space to experiment with gendered identities and cultivate empathy (particularly as male saints and singers speak in female voices), thereby fostering spiritual and/or psychological wholeness and transformation, and even potentially, though not necessarily, inspiring positive social change.

In his essay, "Given, Taken, Performed: Gender in a Tamil Theopoetics," C. Ram-Prasad engages with feminist and gender scholarship on the question of sex and gender, and he focuses especially on the works of the Tamil poets Nammalvar and Antal in order to retrieve a richer understanding of gender. Nammalvar writes in the voice of "the young woman" and Antal keeps her female voice. The argument of the chapter is centered on the question how performativity affects both what one expresses as one's gender and what one expresses as the meaning of that gender. Ram-Prasad shows, through the contours

of some of Nammalvar's poetry, that the conventional givenness of the man-woman binary is shown to be labile in the performance of emotion, while Antal enables exploration of new limits to the givenness of being a woman.

He concludes that to make us think about how gender may be acknowledged only to be crossed, and how norms can be symbolically deployed only to reconfigure their meaning. Through teasing apart the contrasting intuitions we may have about Nammalvar's and Antes literary expression of womanhood, he provides theoretical insights into the relationship between the self-expression and reception of gender identities in light of assumptions about what we take to already know about men and women, adding the cautionary remark that we should try to neither conflate sex and gender nor ontologize a difference.

In his chapter, "Gender in the Tradition of Sri Ramakrishna," Long focuses on how the Ramakrishna tradition's understanding of gender is shaped by its approach to transcendence as available equally to women and to men, its orientation toward the Mother Goddess, and the prominent roles played by women early in its history. He presents the Ramakrishna tradition, originated in the nineteenth century with the leadership of Sri Ramakrishna, as a case of an Indic tradition in which, according to its own ideals, femininity is something to be affirmed, while at the same time, institutionally male domination tends to be the norm. Long draws attention to the abundant resources available for affirming female equality within the tradition but contends that they represent a potential that has yet to be fully realized.

The icon of Goddess Kali standing on the body of Siva is enshrined at Dakshineshwar, where Ramakrishna practiced his sadhanas. This powerful icon symbolizes Ramakrishna's views on gender: the divine feminine, embodied devotion, and his emphasis on a personal realization of nonduality (beyond gender) cuts through the patriarchal structures of his time and reveals his feminine sensibilities. This becomes even more evident in his relationship with his wife, Mother Sarada Devi. Long chronicles the importance women had in Sri Ramakrishna's life and the formation of his tradition, arguing that the egalitarian potential posed by the gynocentric view of its founder should find its way into current practices of the tradition, which is still male dominated.

Androgyny, Gender Hybridity, and Fluidity

"The dyads male-female and their mapping to masculine-feminine are made of constitutive exclusions that feminist philosophy of religion can no longer be presume," writes Nancy Frankenberry, foreboding the end of not so stable categories and opening a space for creative practice (Frankenberry 2004: 22). The binary of the two-sex model has long been put into performance of gender is rather complicated in the early periods of Pali Buddhism. In Pali Buddhism, Anderson identifies two different explanations for the relationship between the faculties (indriya Ili) that are present in womb-born beings from the moment of conception and biological sex and gender. The first explanation says that the faculties are displayed and manifested in one's biological sex and gender, as evidenced in such ways as one's deportment, occupation, fashion, and so on. The second explanation, however, argues that the male and female faculties are ultimately the cause of one's biological sex and also the basis for the gender that one performs. The intricacy of these analyses demonstrates that Pali Buddhism is more complex than an essentialist, sexually dimorphic system.

One example of gender hybridity is found in the Mahabharata's narrative of Amba. In her essay, "Narrative of Amba in the Mahabharata: Female Body, Gender, and the Namesake of the Divine

Feminine Veena Howard carefully analyzes the text to show an extraordinary example of a woman defying conventional gender norms and roles. When Amba is abducted by the patriarch Bhisma and consequently rejected by her lover 8alva, she emerges as a fierce independent woman and, with her words and actions, exposes oppressive patriarchal marriage laws.

The chapter provides a fresh reading of Amba's tale and draws attention to her defiance of conventional gender and sexual norms, which have been overlooked by scholars. Amba argues her case with powerful men and ascetics; she rejects the comfortable life of a princess and undertakes fierce austerities to kill her wrongdoer, the mighty Bhisma; and she resorts to unconventional means to change her sex to confront Bhisma in battle. Howard concludes that Amba's character is strikingly different from that typifying the women of the Indian epics, women who are traditionally bound by normative patriarchal laws. Last, she shows how Amba negotiates her female sex to face Bhisma in battle. Although she changes sex from a female to a male, she is perceived as having hybrid sexual identity—that is, both male and female. Amba's story is not simply a tale of the victimization of a woman trapped by patriarchal customs nor a tale of scintillating sexual themes, but, rather, it is an attempt to shed light on the Mahabharata's theme of dharma—restoring justice to those who are on the side of right. The tale reveals oppressions arising out of patriarchal dharma laws and normative gender roles. Howard argues that such misogyny must be confronted by an equally powerful feminine force, which is not constrained by Amba's biological sex. A close literary and feminist reading of the text offers new insights into Ambles choice to sacrifice her Initially female body—the body that was violated, rejected, and humiliated—for a hybrid identity to challenge patriarchal structures.

Gender and the Divine Feminine

As noted, feminist scholars have critiqued androcentric language and masculine representations of God and seek to recover the divine feminine models. Irigaray sees the value of feminine religious symbols and representations in disrupting structures of oppression and providing positive images for women. She appreciates the goddess traditions and symbolism that celebrate female body and power. Merlin Stone, in her seminal book, When God Was a Woman (1976), traces historically prevalent representations of the Divine as feminine in various cultures and connects the decline of the Divine Feminine models with the current subjugated status of women. In their groundbreaking scholarship, Alf Hiltebeitel and Kathleen Erndl (2000) ask the pertinent question, "Is the Goddess a feminist?" and, by tracing various goddess traditions, explore the issue of the impact of goddess traditions on the social and psychological lives of women in South Asia. The models of the Divine Feminine are being explored beyond India's traditions. For example, Rabbi Rami Shapiro's collection (2005) of biblical literature creatively traces the tradition of "Wisdom" (known as Chochma in Hebrew and Sophia in Greek), the Divine Feminine, the Mother of Life. Such scholarship demonstrates the significance of female divinities to empower women.

Two chapters by Rita D. Sherma and Raj Balkaran focus on two essential issues concerning the feminine and Divine, respectively: (1) philosophical principles embedded in the Divine Feminine articulation and representation of the Devi Mahatmya, which have been overlooked by scholars, and (2) the uniqueness of the Divine Feminine who engenders, supports, and governs phenomenal reality, compelled through compassion toward cosmic preservation.

In her essay, "God the Mother and Her Sacred Text: A Hindu Vision of Divine Immanence," Sherma shows that the conceptualization of feminine deity in the Hindu traditions of the Mahadevi/Sakti offers

Her ultimate divine status as God, the Mother. She argues that Hindu texts offer arguably the only extant, widely accepted, systematic theological vision of God the Mother as the Divine Feminine—transcendent and immanent, the efficient and material cause, and destination of all existence. By focusing on the Devi Mahatmya, Sherma argues that most scholars of Hinduism, have shown the Divine Feminine have focused on rituals pilgrimage. Sherma notes that some scholars also analyze the impact of the strong presence of the Divine Feminine in the India's traditions on the lives and liberties of actual women. Sherma, however, draws attention to what is an overlooked problematic: how foundational philosophical categories play an important part in the vision and definition of the theology of the Mahadevi (the Great Goddess), a fact that is evident in the conceptualization of divine nature presented by the Devi Mahatmya. She argues that the modern (eighteenth century onward) conventional disjunctive bipolarity of philosophy and theology has not been the traditional norm for Hindu thought in which the two categories often interpenetrate and inform each other. In this vein, she shows how philosophical principles such as prakrti (matter/components of the physical world); the gunas (the three foundational characteristics/tendencies of matter); mulapradhcina (the root material cause of creation); maya (the cosmological power of veiling the Ultimate Reality); and conceptual paradigms such as satkaryava da (postulating the presence of the cause within the effect) and paritiamavada (positing transformation of the cause into the effect), are deeply imbued in the structure of the Bhakta theology advanced by this seminal essay.

Balkaran's essay, "The Story of Sarpjfia., Mother of Manu: Shadow and Light in the Markandeya Purcina," revisits the famous story of Samjfia., wife of the sun. Balkaran critiques the dominant interpretation of this myth, expounded by Wendy Doniger, as one harkening to the "wicked stepmother" motif prevalent in Western religious and mythlogical traditions. Balkaran addresses some significant overarching issues—such as dichotomies of good and evil, male and female—through a close analysis of the story. He argues that rather than presenting us with a flawed feminine figure, the Samjna story presents us with a resilient feminine figure who succeeds in softening overbearing masculinity. This chapter sheds light not only on the inner workings of the myth cycle but also why it is dovetailed with the Devi Mahatmya (the Glory of the Goddess), anchored in the Markancfeya Purana.

From the perspective of the Devi Mahatmya, which glorifies the Hindu Great Goddess whose might surpasses even the creator's and whose grace is responsible for installing the next Manu, the story of Samjiia ornaments and echoes the Goddess' grandeur. Through a careful analysis of Indian thought, Balkaran shows that in the Puranic discourse, lines between good and evil are incredibly (and intentionally) blurred. In various narratives, gods behave nefariously (typically for a greater good) and demons may exhibit extraordinary piety (particularly in devotional milieu.) for the devotee of acquiring power. Only opposing directions, obstinately pressed together. From a grander perspective, one sees that they are pressed together in anjali mudra, stemming from the same ground of being, producing a unified gesture. Balkaran concludes that the Devi Mahatmya, bolstered by its Puranic context, affirms that the diversity of this phenomenal world, along with the myriad of life forms finding homes there, is as supreme as that dynamic feminine mystery. The Divine Feminine engenders, supports, and governs the phenomenal reality, compelled through compassion toward colossal acts of cosmic preservation.

Gender Transcendence

As we saw earlier, Daly argues that "the women's revolution ... is an ontological, spiritual revolution, pointing beyond the idolatries of sexist society and sparking creative action in and toward

transcendence" (1973: 6). The move to realize gender transcendence requires cultivating symbols and metaphors that are inclusive and relational. All language is symbolic when describing Reality, God/ Goddess, or Self. To Clifford Geertz, religious symbols are "historically created vehicles of reasoning, perception, feeling, and understanding". Geertz's idea can be interpreted in the context of gender as a socially created vehicle that creates a relational self through which feelings and understanding are processed. 1he goal of attaining gender transcendence—along with its soteriological telos (realization of the unity of the self and the divine)—can also mean freedom li o m gender-based social and religious rules. In Indic philosophy and theology, gender transcendence also implies rising above constraints of race, caste, gender, and so forth.

'The chapters authored by Ruth Vanita and Nikky-G. Kaur Singh highlight the philosophical and theological emphasis on gender transcendence on the basis of the philosophical conceptions of the Self/Divine as one (ek; ikk) or none (neti, void). They simultaneously emphasize the positive engagement with the world as real not illusory. Further, through a close textual analysis of the Hindu epic narratives and the Sikh scripture, the authors show how feminist hermeneutics can help to highlight the philosophical principles that challenge the prevailing gender-based inequality.

Vanita's essay, "Male-Female Dialogues on Gender, Sexuality and Dharma in the Hindu Epics,' examines the paradoxes that arise in two dialogues between male and female sages incept of nondifference with regard to both gender and age. From different perspectives, both dialogues demonstrate the invalidity of the dictum that a woman must always be under a father's, husband's, or son's protection. In both dialogues, the woman interlocutor ends up instructing the man. Through a comparative analysis, Vanita explores the complex ways in which Hindu texts frame and interrogate gender difference, likeness, and equality in relation to dharma.

In her essay, "The Vision of the Transcendent One: Feminist Hermeneutics and Feminine Symbolism in the Sikh Scripture Nikky-G. Kaur Singh seeks to challenge the hold of masculine assumptions in the perception of the Divine that have been shaped by exegetes, scholars, and translators of the Guru Granth Sahib (GGS)." The fundamental Sikh theological expression is Ikk Onkar—stated at the very outset of the volume and reiterated throughout its 1,430 portfolio pages. This unique and all-embracing configuration by the first Guru spells out the infinity of the singular Divine beyond any dyads. Although this expression does not leave room for any gender specification, Kaur Singh laments that it has been structured and shaped into a male god—its vastness reduced to an exclusionary concept and an intimidating male symbol. She contends that the colonial machine reinforced an omnipotent lordly "God" that ruptured the intimate relationship between humans and the divine at the heart of the Sikh scripture. Since male subjectivity produced Sikh scriptural hermeneutics, it has resulted in male-dominated identity formations, social relations, and power structures. Because of this one-sided approach, the transcendent, egalitarian, and liberating theological, ethical, and aesthetic currents of the sacred text have neither been fully understood nor are they put in practice.

Kaur Singh argues that a change of lens—from androcentric to the feminist approach—engages the Sikh theological construct with the potential for the radical "metapatriarchal journey" proposed by the feminist philosopher Mary Daly, exorcizing an internalized father—for example, God in his various manifestations and incarnations. As the inclusive numeral "One" shatters the dominance of male imagery, it creates a space for the Divine to be experienced in other new and important ways. Logically, the One

is totally transcendent and beyond all categories. But in the poetry of the Gurus, both female and male dimensions run parallel. The Divine is identified in both genders: "Itself male, Itself is female" (GGS, 1020). She concludes that It is essential to retrieve both the transcendent model of the Divine and the feminine imagery that is embedded in the text in order to create a balanced perspective that is crucial for mental and spiritual health.

Concluding Insights

The wide-ranging chapters in this volume encourage fresh inquiry into classic questions by offering critical analyses that have relevance to the disciplines of gender, literary, cultural, theological, Asian, and religious studies as well as philosophy. Within the general topic of gender, the contributors have worked within their areas of expertise providing close and constructive readings of various texts. We remain cognizant of the multiplicity of texts and traditions; to ensure plurality of viewpoints (dargana), selected texts encompass a broad range of traditions: ancient and modern, orthodox and heterodox, classical languages, and local vernaculars. The subcategories and taxonomies outlined a hove emerged organically, creating a complex mosaic of gender constructions in Indian thought and beyond. As is evident, these chapters focus only on select texts and traditions, and therefore many have been left out. Thus, there is a great need and scope to expand this project that will include a broad range of texts and traditions, including Islam. There are many texts that could be of service in broadening the scope of the above-outlined theoretical approaches to explore the ever-changing landscape of gender more broadly—for example, the issues of the genderless Self and women sages in the Upanishads, the implication of female Bodhisattvas in Mahayana Buddhism, gender transcendence in the Jain Siddha. Its implication for gendered female subjects, understanding the deep meaning of the feminine symbolism in Vajrayana, and the gendered mandates for women in the Dharmashastra. Any new insights offered through analyzing the cultural past will also prove helpful in dealing with questions regarding self, nature, and society. <>

MEDIEVAL PHILOSOPHY: CRITICAL CONCEPTS IN PHILOSOPHY Edited by Christina Van Dyke and Andrew W. Arlig [Routledge, 9780415829816]

The Middle Ages saw a great flourishing of philosophy. Now, to help students and researchers make sense of the gargantuan—and, often, dauntingly complex—body of literature on the main traditions of thinking that stem from the Greek heritage of late antiquity, this new four-volume collection is the latest addition to Routledge's acclaimed Critical Concepts in Philosophy series. Christina Van Dyke of Calvin College, USA, and an editor of the **CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF MEDIEVAL PHILOSOPHY**, has carefully assembled classic contributions, as well as more recent work, to create a one-stop 'mini library' of the best and most influential scholarship.

With a comprehensive index and a useful synoptic introduction newly written by the editor, *Medieval Philosophy* will be welcomed as an indispensable resource for reference and research.

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The state of scholarship on medieval philosophy (1920-2020)

Compiling a collection of the 'best' secondary literature on any period in history would be daunting, but doing so for the Middle Ages presents particular challenges. As the name 'Middle Ages' suggests, it's a period defined largely in terms of `betweens': between Aristotle and Descartes; between the high point of ancient Greco-Roman philosophy and its 'recovery' in the Renaissance. Potted histories of philosophy and classes designated as introductions to the field often pass over the thousand years between the death of Boethius (c. 525 CE) and the birth of Descartes (1596) with nothing more than a sentence or two describing medieval thought as the 'baptizing' of Plato and Aristotle — a time Copleston memorably caricatures in terms of the imprisoning of free thought, 'when ecclesiastical authority reigned supreme and human reason, chained by heavy fetters, was compelled to confine itself to the useless and fanciful study of theology, until a thinker like Descartes at length broke the chains and gave reason its freedom'.' Medieval scholars are often assumed to contribute nothing original or important to the history of philosophy; their value is, at best, as commentators of Plato and Aristotle.

Even a quick glance at the articles in these volumes overturns that assumption. In the past seventy years, a virtual explosion of work has demonstrated the originality and importance of medieval philosophy — both within the Christian Latin West and beyond. Giants of Roman Catholic scholarship such as John Haldane, Armand Maurer, Joseph Owens, Anton Pegis, James Weisheipl, and John Wippel prove conclusively that Thomas Aquinas (d. 1274) was much more than just the Christian-izer' of Aristotle. At the same time, Jan Aertsen, Elizabeth Ashworth, Desmond Paul Henry, Simo Knuuttila, Norman Kretzmann, Christopher Martin, Calvin Normore, Arthur Prior, and Stephen Read establish the importance and interest of medieval philosophy of language and logic (including its relation to central issues in metaphysics and epistemology), bringing medieval insights to a broader audience by publishing ground-breaking articles in non-specialist and widely read venues such as the Journal of Philosophy, Mind, and the Philosophical Review.

In the 1980s and 1990s, contemporary interest in the philosophy of mind leads to a boom in scholarship on medieval theories of mind, characterized by Claude Panaccio's work on mental language and continuing in the work of Susan BrowerToland, Dominik Perler, Giorgio Pini, José Filipe Silva, and Juhana Toivanen. This interest in mental representation and language particularly engages the thought of later medieval scholars such as John Buridan (d. 1358), Walter Burley (d. 1344), Walter Chatton (d. 1343), and William of Ockham (d. 1347).

Medieval theories of moral psychology and ethics become a focus of attention around the same time, as with Marilyn McCord Adams's treatment of William of Ockham's moral theory. Debates over the nature of the will and free choice continue to generate heated discussion to the present day. Thomas Aquinas's theories receive the lion's share of the attention, as the articles included here by David Gallagher, Jeffrey Hause, Bonnie Kent, and Scott MacDonald show, but Duns Scotus's (d. 1308) theory of the will is now also the subject of extensive debate, as articles by Thomas Williams and Allan Wolter

bear witness. This in turn generates interest in what less well-known, but immensely influential and interesting medieval figures like Henry or Ghent (d. 1293) and, as in Tobias Hoffmann's discussion, Peter Auriol (d. 1322), have to say about moral responsibility and the will.

Perhaps the most significant development of the past thirty years in Anglophone scholarship is its increasing recognition of the importance of the Islamic and Jewish medieval traditions. Harry Wolfson publishes his ground-breaking article on the internal senses in Latin, Arabic, and Hebrew texts in 1935, and Michael Marmura begins to work on the Islamic tradition in the 1960s, but serious and widespread engagement with medieval Islamic and Jewish texts really takes off only in the late 20th/early 21st century with the work of Deborah Black, Frank Griffel, Dimitri Gutas, and Josef Stern, who inspire work by a new generation of scholars such as Therese Cory and A. M. Khalidi.

As should already be clear, the collection of articles in these four volumes belie the 'Great Man' myth of the Middle Ages — that is, that every now and again a great mind arose and produced arguments worth considering (e.g., Anselm of Canterbury's (d. 1109) Ontological Argument and Aquinas's Five Ways), but that these were the surprising and noteworthy exceptions that prove the general rule that nothing of philosophical importance happened between 525 and the 1600s. The articles in these volumes encompass a wide range of medieval figures, who address an even wider range of topics, many of which — in one way, shape, or form — are still of interest to professional philosophers working today.

For example, one theme that emerges is an interest in the philosophy of time, as with Eleonore Stump and Norman Kretzmann on eternity and Brian Leftow's response, Neil Lewis on the plurality of eternal beings in Robert Grosseteste (d. 1253), and Cecilia Trifogli on Giles of Rome (d. 1316) on the last instant of change. Another theme is form, matter, and substance and the closely related question of individuation — particularly as it relates to the human soul. See, for instance, Bernardo-Carlos Bazan on whether the human soul is form or substance, Richard Cross on Duns Scotus's account of material substance, and Peter King and Eileen Sweeney on the problem of individuation.

In the Middle Ages, issues of embodiment include not just human beings in this present life, but also the status of human beings in the afterlife (see Marilyn McCord Adams's piece on the bodily resurrection in Aquinas, Scotus, and Ockham), the Incarnation of Christ (see Alfred Freddoso on human nature and the incarnation), and the nature of being itself (see Brian Davies on God and being). As Christina Van Dyke notes in her article on mysticism, conceptions of the body play a key role in both the final end of human beings and the possibility of unmediated contact with the divine in this life. As Caroline Walker Bynum has famously argued, physical differences between men and women also affect perceptions of the religious life and religious practice in important ways.

One way in which gender impacts religious life in the Middle Ages plays out in the debate over Franciscan poverty, as the Poor Clares are forbidden to follow their brothers in renouncing all rights to property. The Franciscan controversy about property and poverty goes far beyond gender, though — the nature of religious orders, natural rights, and the concept of ownership all come into play, as Janet Coleman and Roberto Lambertini discuss. The idea of natural rights and property also gain significance in the increasingly sophisticated iterations of just war theory, as Frederick Russell notes.

Organization of these volumes

This collection of articles spans four volumes, each divided into two parts. These parts in turn are organized around one broad topic or set of closely related topics. Volume I includes articles on Mind, logic and language. Volume II covers Metaphysics and epistemology. Volume III collects some major works on topics of Natural science and philosophical theology. Finally, Volume IV covers Ethics and moral psychology, and social and political philosophy.

This collection in no way aims to give a comprehensive history of the history of medieval philosophy. Indeed, there is no way that we can cover in this limited space all the important figures, developments, and discoveries of philosophy as it was practiced in the span of over a thousand years and across three Abrahamic faiths. For this reason, we include some suggestions for further reading at the end of this introduction. Since there are no simple narratives that we can provide that will tie all these articles together, we present the articles in alphabetical order with respect to their authors. However, we wish to point our readers to the Chronological Table at the beginning of this volume, as this will provide them with a rough impression of who was flourishing when and what aspects of medieval thought were occupying some of the best and most influential scholars in the field. This impression, however, can only be rough.

It should be stressed that all of these topical divisions are to some extent arbitrary and, in many cases, porous as well. We have divided up the terrain for a contemporary audience by following how philosophers currently partition the field, which does not necessarily mirror the way that medieval thinkers themselves would have divided things up. In the Arts curriculum of the medieval Western university, for instance, there was no course on Philosophy of Language or Philosophy of Mind, and there was often no clear distinction drawn between a problem about mental language or representation as opposed to a problem about logic or epistemology. In 14th-century thought in particular, 'concepts' are commonly considered to be items belonging to a universal mental language common to all human beings. Thus, in a very real sense logic (and even metaphysics') both informs and is informed by prior commitments about the inner workings of the mind in relation to the world.

It is also important to observe that while medieval philosophers have concerns about, say, our capacity to acquire true beliefs and knowledge, the specific concerns dominant in their discussions are not always those shared by philosophers in later periods. To give one example, medieval philosophers working in Western universities are not too troubled by the problem of global skepticism, which is something on which later generations of philosophers famously fixate.' Rather, on the one hand, medieval scholars are confident that human minds are by their very nature structured in such a way that they accurately glean information about the world. This does not mean that we cannot make mistakes; it is just that the cause of these mistakes is not due to some intrinsic lack of fit at the point of initial contact with the extramental world, or at least some parts of it. On the other hand, medieval philosophers universally concede that we are by our very natures incapable of knowing everything that is knowable.' No finite mind is capable of perfect knowledge. Incidentally, this is not a point merely about our incapacity to know God's essence. Many philosophers in this period also hold that the essences (that is, the substantial forms and prime matter) of mutable, mundane things are in a very important sense inaccessible to us.' Thus epistemology is a 'close enough' enterprise for most medieval philosophers: we're capable of gaining the knowledge that we need to live the best sort of human life, but we're incapable of intellectual perfection.

Such observations might lead the reader to wonder whether contemporary scholars of medieval philosophy (or, at least, we the editors) are presenting a distorted picture of medieval philosophy as it was actually practiced, specifically, a picture that represents our interests and values more than those of the people whom we study. This is a serious concern, and it is a topic of intense debate among scholars working in any period of the history of philosophy.

There are several things to say in response, the first of which is to concede that what contemporary scholars focus on is shaped by their interests. This seems to be an inescapable fact about scholarship of historical figures. The question is, thus, not whether we can somehow completely bracket our contemporary interests and concerns and read medieval thinkers solely on medieval terms — that is to ask for the impossible — but rather, whether we can to some measure allow medieval thinkers to speak to us without obscuring all of the characteristics that make them distinct from us. To borrow a metaphor from John Marenbon (one of the contemporary scholars who has written extensively and informatively on this topic), we can choose to think of medieval philosophy as a ruined city which we plunder for stray pieces of treasure that directly and readily speak to our interests, or we can try to enter into a conversation with medieval thinkers, where we treat them as autonomous interlocutors, ones whose thoughts need to be put in their proper historical and intellectual context before we can be in a position to listen to what they have to tell us.

Piggybacking on this first point is a second. Once we treat medieval philosophers as interlocutors, we might find that our own projects are enriched by the perspectives they offer. This does not necessarily mean that Aquinas or Ockham, for instance, has an immediately applicable solution to some problem that we are concerned about.' Rather, the idea is that honest and open engagement with historical figures can help us to view our problems and tools in a new light. We might discover that there is an aspect of a topic that was not been noticed before, or that we have been blind to some thing or phenomenon that is worthy of examination. We might see that there are other important questions that we could ask. Moreover, changes in our interests and concerns might lead us to seek out interesting and intelligent perspectives that have hitherto been unexplored or underappreciated. A case in point are the contemplative or 'mystical' traditions in Christianity, Judaism, and Islam, which for many years were considered to be of limited interest to 'serious' philosophers. Studying these traditions as philosophy helps to undermine, for instance, the misguided notion that women did not 'do philosophy' in the Middle Ages at the same time that it helps us enrich contemporary notions of what philosophy can be. In short, the history of philosophy helps us be better philosophers.

Finally, there is not just one legitimate approach to doing the history of philosophy. If asked, the authors included in these volumes would undoubtedly provide a plethora of different answers to the question of how they approach the subject. Even the aforementioned 'plunder' model can yield important insights or send philosophy off in new and interesting directions. Indeed, one of the many factors that we considered as we made the final determination of what articles to include was what influence an article had on other subfields in contemporary professional philosophy. Although this was not the principal factor, in some cases it helped to us choose one article over another, and it allows us to present a fuller picture of the secondary English scholarship in medieval philosophy over the past century.

Breakdown of the contents of each volume

Volume I: Mind, logic and language

As we noted above, the boundaries between logic (in our present-day sense), philosophical reflections on language, and philosophical reflections on the nature and architecture of the mind were quite fluid to the medieval mind. The connection between mind, language, and world is made already in Aristotle (see, e.g., De Interpretatione (16a4-6): 'What is in spoken words are symbols of affections in the soul, and what is written down are symbols of what is in spoken words') and becomes commonplace in later centuries. (In particular, this quote from De Interpretatione, translated and commented on by Boethius, provides the foundation for the medieval belief that written words are signs for spoken words, spoken words primarily signify concepts in the mind, and these concepts in turn are representations of the world more or less as it is.)

`Logic' itself, for a medieval thinker, covers a wider range of linguistic phenomena than is now covered in the standard informal or formal logic course at university. For medieval readers, the Aristotelian logical corpus is sometimes understood to include not only the Analytics (as well as the Categories and On Interpretation), but also the Rhetoric and Poetics.9 And as our selection of articles demonstrates, logicians are concerned not only with literal language, but also with figurative language — especially analogy and metaphor. The interest in figurative language is understandable, since logic often is considered a helpful tool for interpreting Scripture, albeit with results that at times proved alarming to what we might call 'traditionalist' scholars across all three Abrahamic traditions.

Medieval thinkers are rarely if ever interested in language merely as formal structures: the languages they study are always, as modern logicians would put it, `interpreted' languages which contain both a syntax and a semantics. We might even go so far as to say that the primary concern of logicians in the Middle Ages is semantics, understood as the referential relations (which included both the denotation and connotation) of terms in a language to a domain of objects.

Semantics is the bridge between the first part of Volume I and the second, since as we noted above, written terms generally are thought to stand in for spoken terms, and spoken terms in turn are thought to be signs for something in the head of the speaker, or what they would call the 'mental word' and what we nowadays think of as a 'concept'. Thus, semantics and mental representation more generally were studied in so far as they are ways that the mind connects up with the world. Indeed, these topics represent a rich vein of sophisticated medieval thought that our selections can only begin to gesture at — thought developed especially but not exclusively in English and Continental European universities.

The Aristotelian theory of concept formation that many medieval scholars adopted must include a pathway from the world to the mind through the five senses. Indeed, Thomas Aquinas famously holds that human thought, even highly abstract theoretical speculations, cannot occur without the aid of imaginative representations (the 'phantasms') that are derived from sense perceptions and stored in the soul. Several of the articles in the second half of this volume explore details of these complex mental systems.

Finally, medieval figures share with both 'early modern' and present-day philosophers of mind an interest in the phenomenon of self-awareness or consciousness. This interest at times blurs the boundaries between periods, as Dominik Perler discusses in his piece on Francisco Suarez (d. 1617), an individual

who considered merely in terms of when he lived ought to count as an early modern philosopher, but when examined in terms of whom he reads and to whom and what he responds is clearly one of the last, great medieval thinkers."

Volume II: Metaphysics and epistemology

In our second volume, we pick up additional medieval themes pertaining to the mind and its capacities, now with an emphasis on these two questions: What is the structure of reality, created and untreated? And what conditions must obtain — both with respect to the world itself and the mind that is turned toward it — for a subject's glimpses of that reality to be accurate and certain?

Let us start with the latter concern. As contemporary scholars are beginning to show, the Arabic philosophical tradition is especially rich in considerations that we would now include in the category of epistemology. In particular, philosophers in this tradition have interesting things to say about what must happen in the human intellect for actual understanding to occur, and what conditions must hold for thoughts and beliefs to be certain or indubitable. The Arab followers of Plato and Aristotle (the falasifah) take suggestions from Aristotle's On the Soul and the Greek commentaries on that book and develop sophisticated and controversial theories of human intellection.' (These theories of intellectual thought later become extremely influential and hotly contested in the Latin West.)

The falasifah as well as their critics devote considerable attention to the question of in what certainty consists." And, indeed, we find Arab critics of Greek philosophy (falsafa) using the notion of certainty that is developed in this tradition to entertain some startlingly 'modern' skeptical reflections. Perhaps the most wellknown of these moments can be found in Abu Hamid al-Ghazali' s (d. 1111 CE) Deliverance from Error. At the beginning of this remarkable work, al-Ghazali entertains a radical and global form of skepticism that in its structure and resolution is comparable in many ways to the famous skeptical argument at the beginning of Descartes' Meditations.

What we can know with certainty is determined in no small part by what there is and what knowledge of 'what is' is like. Theories of knowledge thus overlap extensively with theories of truth and with ontology (the science of what there is). Theories of truth address questions such as 'Is truth a particular relation between thinkers and objects?' Is truth "in" either the mind or in the object?' How would we know, and why would it matter?' Closely related to these questions in many ways, ontological queries also become increasingly sophisticated over the Middle Ages, including sophisticated debates about the nature of substance and accidents, the problem of individuation (in short, what distinguishes one substance from another, or one accident from another), and relative independence and dependence of what exists. Often seemingly abstruse questions, such as whether the form of a material substance can exist in separation from matter and whether an accident can in any sense exist independently of its subject, were sparked by theological concerns — e.g. about the afterlife, the Eucharist, or the relation of creation to the Creator. The same concerns also drive medieval thinkers to delve deeply into the notions of necessity, possibility, and contingency.

Finally, in addition to these epistemological and metaphysical questions, medieval thinkers puzzle over numerous meta-philosophical questions, particular concerning the structure of related objects and fields of knowledge. So, for example, metaphysical speculation seems by its nature to range over everything that exists, and thus it seems to have as part of its subject matter things that also pertain to Natural

Philosophy and to the Divine Science (Theology). Standard formulations of the sciences at this time, however, typically maintain that for each science there is a unique primary object of study. If the same thing is studied in distinct sciences, it must be studied in different ways.

This leads to the generation of complicated scientific frameworks and methods of inquiry. Take, for instance, a horse. As an existing material substance, a horse may be studied by (among other fields) Metaphysics, Natural Philosophy, and Theology. In Metaphysics, it is studied in abstraction from its material embodiment and taken as an object of interest insofar as it has existence and essence. Within Natural Philosophy, a horse may be studied by both Physics and Psychology. In Physics, it is studied insofar as it is a thing that undergoes changes; in Psychology, a horse is studied insofar as it is a living thing (with a soul, or psyche). In Theology, a horse may be studied as a demonstration of God's providence or created order.

Volume III: Natural science and philosophical theology

The complications that medieval thinkers encountered in defining the proper subjects of various fields of study becomes all the more pronounced if one surveys what medieval philosophers actually investigate in their courses on Natural Philosophy and lectures in Theology.

In the Middle Ages, traditional courses on Physics were as much about the principles of motion and the general conditions of motion and its derivative — time — as they were about particular natural beings and their characteristics. Thus, it is in Physics that a student would begin to seriously investigate form and matter, and the nature of change, motion, and time. Western Scholasticism also followed Aristotle's dictum that the souls of plants and animals are the substantial forms of material substances, and so in the medieval curriculum, psychology (the science of the soul) is also at least partially a physical or natural science. Given, however, that contemporary philosophers tend to parcel out the science of the soul understood in this way into several subfields (metaphysics, philosophy of mind, and moral psychology, for instance), we have followed suit in including in other volumes much of what would have fallen under a medieval lecture on psychology in natural science. Our selections for Part I of this volume focus primarily on medieval philosophical investigations of change.

Medieval discussions of change are tremendously involved. There are several puzzles that spring merely from the fact that natural things are fundamentally things that change. There is the general problem, for instance, of 'coming-to-be' and 'passing-away'. This phenomenon tends to be analyzed in terms of a subject, a thing taken on, and a lack (cf. Aristotle Physics 1.7). In Aristotle's case of Socrates learning to play a musical instrument, this framework is relatively simple: Socrates (the subject) goes from 'not musical' (a lack) to 'musical' (a thing taken on).

In the case of substantial change, however, this framework encounters serious problems. The subject in substantial change is usually considered to be 'prime matter' and the thing taken on is the substantial form (while the lack is the absence of the substantial form). But prime matter is typically defined as pure potentiality, completely unactualized possibility. What could it mean for prime matter to 'take on' a substantial form, and thus, for a substance to come into being? Some, such as Ockham, assert that all one needs is the existence of the matter and the existence of the form in close enough proximity. Others, like Scotus, argue that some additional thing must exist or some additional fact must obtain over and above the form and matter being in proximity to one another."

The relation of time to change presents another puzzle. According to Aristotle, time is the measure of motion (Physics 4.11, 219b1-2). But this leaves a number of questions about the moment, or instant, of a change. Consider some water that changes from not being 100 °C to being 100 °C. According to the Aristotelian template of change, this means that at one time, t_1, the water was not 100 °C and thus lacking the being 100 °C, and at a later time, t_{1+n}, that same water now is 100 °C. Surely, then, there must be some moment between t_1 and t_{1+n} (call it t_{ch}), where the water ceases being 100 °C and becomes being 100 °C. But what state is the water in at t_{ch}? The water cannot not be 100 °C at t_{ch}, Since then it is not taking on being 100 °C at t_{ch}. The instant of change would have been a moment that is not t_{ch}. For similar reasons, it cannot already be 100 °C. But it seems that the water must either be 100 °C or not: one or the other of these states must hold true whenever this water exists.

Medieval natural philosophy moreover includes not only Aristotelian natural philosophy (grounded in a hylomorphic form/matter analysis of the material world), but also rival theories and systems. Many of the mutakallimun (those who practiced the science of kalam), for instance, are atomists and occasionalists rather than hylomorphists. Islamic debates between partisans of kalam physics and the falasifah (partisans of the Arabic hybridization of Platonic and Aristotelian philosophies) present a particularly sharp lens through which to critically examine the fundamental assumptions of and motivations for these rival pictures of the natural world.

A topic common to both the study of natural philosophy and theology in the Middle Ages is time — not just questions about its fundamental nature, but also questions of persistence (particularly the persistence of persons) and God's relation to it. God is typically thought to be a being who is eternal, rather than temporal — time is characterized as the measure of change, but one of the classical attributes of God is immutability. What does this mean, though, both in itself and for the possibility of our acquiring knowledge of God? For all three Abrahamic faiths, angels also pose an interesting conundrum with respect to time: God is eternal, and material creatures are temporal, but 'immaterial intelligences', or angels are often described as falling between the two, existing in aeveternity' or sempiternity'. Such ontological and epistemological issues are central in medieval theological discussions in reflections about God and angels, and about human beings — both in this life and in the next.

Encompassing as it does not just everything God is and everything God does, but also everything God causes to be (i.e., the cosmos), philosophical theology is a particularly rich field of inquiry in the medieval period. Christian scholars are motivated to provide rational explanations for various articles of faith (e.g., the Trinity, the Incarnation, and the Eucharist — a sacrament in which bread and wine are transubstantiated into the substance of Christ's body and blood, while retaining the accidents of the bread and the wine), but individuals from all three Abrahamic traditions worry about questions such as whether God's nature can be grasped by the human intellect, whether God's existence can be demonstrated by natural reasoning, and whether resurrection is rationally defensible. Thinkers of all three faiths are also keenly interested in the phenomenon of prophecy and related extraordinary or transcendent ways of coming to know God's nature and will, including so-called 'mystical' states and experiences.

Volume IV: Ethics and moral psychology, and social and political philosophy

The fourth volume focuses on topics in ethics and the psychological underpinnings of acting and living well, and on social and political theory.

In general, medieval philosophers take their ethical starting point from Plato and Aristotle and would be described in contemporary terms as eudaimonists and virtue ethicists. Their primary focus is happiness (eudaimonia, understood as a robustly flourishing life) and developing the virtues that lead to and support that state. This by no means implies that medieval ethicists are uninterested in the moral status of individual actions or how to choose the right path and avoid the bad; after all, salvation depends on one's actions, or at least on one's intentions when acting. (Medieval philosophers are well aware of all the things that can go wrong even if one wants to do the right thing.) Nevertheless, when it comes to explaining good and bad acts, and especially when it comes to setting moral goals (or ends), the focus is on whether the powers and capacities of our souls are optimally disposed, or virtuous. In short, medieval scholars follow the Greco-Roman predecessors in their emphasis on cultivating the virtues of the soul, both the practical virtues related to its embodied capacities and the intellectual virtues related to its immaterial capacities.

One significant way in which medieval thinkers move beyond their ancient forerunners is with respect to the will and its freedom. It is widely acknowledged that there is no clear notion of the will, considered as a distinctive part or power of the soul, in Plato or Aristotle. And while there is still robust debate over precisely when the will is 'discovered', by the 13th century the will is both universally agreed to be a part of a rational soul and a principal locus of discussion when it comes to moral theory. In particular, in Western universities there is intense concern over the interactions that take place between the will and the intellect. If one understands what the right course of action is — that is, really knows it in the way that the intellect knows things — does the will still have the freedom to move in the opposite direction? Those who incline toward the view that the will is absolutely free, even when the intellect firmly and clearly presents the good to it, have been called voluntarists by contemporary commentators. Those who think that the activity of the will is in some significant sense hemmed in by the intellect are now called the intellectualists.

The specific debate between intellectualists and voluntarists does not appear to arise in the Islamic and Jewish traditions. But this is not to say that philosophers in these traditions are indifferent to problems pertaining to the will. As in the Christian tradition, the will's freedom is generally thought to be necessary for Divine Justice: otherwise, why would one person be deserving of damnation and another of salvation? But the freedom of the will, especially in the Arabic philosophical and theological traditions, is seen to be in tension with God's absolute power. Indeed, this is one of the major fault lines between the various schools of kalam.

Gaining a full and proper understanding of medieval ethics requires taking into account not only the theories of scholars in the Western universities and their Arabic- and Hebrew-speaking counterparts (the so-called falasifah), but also the ethical theories developed in both traditionalist and contemplative literatures, that is, the vast body of thought generated by theologians and others who are not usually counted among the philosophers. This includes Scriptural commentators and legal scholars as well as mystics, Sufis, and Kabbalists. This is a project that, at least in Anglophone scholarship, is in its infancy.'

Both Plato and Aristotle emphasize that ethics is preparation for being a citizen of the polis, or state, and indeed, both say things that might suggest that the individual is merely a role player in what is the primary moral project, the completion of the best possible state. This emphasis on the priority of the State over the individual is picked up and developed by Abu Nasr al-Farabi (d. 950 CE), who is one of

the greatest political philosophers in the medieval Islamic world." Western university students, as well, encountered and were forced to reckon with Aristotle's claim that 'the polis is prior in nature to the household and to each one of us' (Politics 1, 1253a19).

In Christian monastic settings, political life in practice often centered first around an individual's convent or abbey, and then higher levels within his or her religious order. Ultimately, however, these smaller units all had to interact with the higher authority of the Pope. In the Middle Ages, this leads to a number of tensions, particularly between the Franciscan order, which was committed to radical poverty and renounced ownership of property, and the papacy, which at the time owned more property than any other single entity in the Western world. Christian medieval scholars also addressed the relationship of the papacy to secular kingdoms. A central theme in these discussions is the notion of natural law: the moral order God infuses into creation. This natural law was, in turn, taken as the common grounding for both religious and secular rules." Theories of jurisprudence in this period increasingly discuss the notion of rights, motivated in part by the debate that the Franciscans have with the Church over poverty and property ownership."

Both Christian and Islamic intellectuals also wondered whether and when war is sanctioned by God and His natural law. Quite often, it is thought that war is sometimes justified." In the West, Augustine is the primary source for subsequent theorization about the conditions under which war is justified, with Aquinas providing an influential formulation in the 13th century.27 In the Islamic world, the sanction and broad outline of rules governing war are given by God (the Qur'an), which is supplemented by the examples of the Prophet Muhammad and the first Caliphs (the Sunna). These sources are then interpreted and elaborated into full-blown theories not only by the falasifah but also by practitioners of the science of fiqh (`jurisprudence'). In both traditions, there are serious constraints associated both with conditions under which a state can justly go to war (jus ad bellum) and on rules of conduct governing how such a war can be conducted (jus in bello). Contemporary debates about military combat often draw extensively on these medieval discussions. <>

A Companion to William of Saint-Thierry *edited by* F. Tyler Sergent [Brill's Companions to the Christian Tradition, Brill 9789004313552]

A Companion to William of Saint-Thierry provides eight new studies on this noted twelfth-century Cistercian writer by some of the most prolific English-language William scholars from North America and Europe and is structured around William's life, thought, and influence.
A Benedictine abbot who became a Cistercian monk, William of Saint-Thierry (c. 1085-1148) lived through the first half of the twelfth century, a time of significant reform within western Christian monasticism. Although William was directly involved in these reforming efforts while at the Benedictine abbey of Saint-Thierry, his lasting legacy in Christian tradition comes through his written works, many as a Cistercian monk, that showcase his keen intellect, creative thinking, and at times profound insight for spiritual life and its fulfilment.
Contributors: David N. Bell, Thomas X. Davis, E. Rozanne Elder, Brian Patrick McGuire, Glenn E. Myers, Nathaniel Peters, Aage Rydstrøm-Poulsen, and F. Tyler Sergent.

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About William of Saint-Thierry

Excerpt: William of Saint-Thierry's biography proves elusive, yet as scholarship on William has shown, including the contents of this volume, his contribution to western intellectual history—and specifically Christian monastic tradition—rests on his insightful thought as explicated in his twenty-one extant writings. This is not to say that his life did not in itself have impact in his own day. As Adriaan Bredero asserted in his presentation at the Abbey of Saint-Thierry colloquium in 1976, William stood "at the crossroads of the monastic currents of his time". Yet William was no bystander. From the source material we have, he was actively involved and deeply participatory in monastic reform movements both Benedictine and Cistercian; in controversies of theological dogma, including Christological and Eucharistic debates; and in staunch reaffirmation of historical monastic practices, the tropes of desert

monastic devotion, and rigorous observation of the Rule of Benedict. Most significantly, William stands out for his own place within this inherited monastic tradition, particularly through his progressive assertion of original monastic thought in the context of his own contemporary spirituality from the stages of spiritual progress to the ultimate deification of the soul.

This present volume attempts to provide an overview and introduction to the life, works, thought, and influence of William of Saint-Thierry (c. 1080–1148). As such, we have gathered an international group of current Cistercian and William scholars to explore, elucidate, and address anew each of these areas while at the same time engaging previous established scholarship that remains relevant, accessible, and insightful.

An Overview of William of Saint-Thierry

Come, let us go up to the mountain of the Lord, and to the house of the God of Jacob, and he will teach us his ways William begins perhaps his earliest work, *De contemplando Deo* (*On Contemplating God*) with these words. In a meaningful way, this quotation summarizes the overall content of William's writings and monastic life: his constant effort to meet God, not just in the here and now, but where God is, "the mountain of the Lord". For William, to ascend this mountain and to encounter God in profound, albeit fleeting, ways this side of eternity is indeed possible. William's commitment to monastic life, combined with his near lifelong writing career, demonstrate as well his commitment to seeking, finding, and enjoying God. For William, this journey follows a particular path along distinct stages of progress that were defined by various degrees of intellectual as well as spiritual perception and understanding. From his earliest work through to his last, *Vita prima Bernardi* (*First Life of Saint Bernard*, Book 1), William's conceptual depiction of this journey remains constant through his own lifelong experience on this path, although as we shall see his depth of understanding and his descriptive nuance continuously sharpen and focus the image of that journey for the reader and ultimately also the image of the triune God William sought to know, to love, and with whom to be unified. This is the William the reader will be acquainted with through this volume.

William also was pulled—and, it must be noted, sometimes willingly inserted himself—into controversies regarding monastic life and practice as well as contemporary controversies of theological doctrine. Although he lamented the vicissitudes his abbatial office had thrust upon him, he still actively stood at the crossroads that these controversies illuminated during the first half of the 12th century. Although himself a Benedictine or "black monk" at the time, William did not approve of what he saw as the Cluniac attack on the Cistercian "white monk" reforms, and so he pleaded with his Cistercian friend, Bernard, abbot of Clairvaux, to respond and refute the Cluniac accusations. After a time, in 1125—no doubt taking longer than William would have liked—Bernard did so in a letter addressed to Abbot William of Saint-Thierry but aimed at Abbot Peter [the Venerable] of Cluny.

Related to his resonance with the Cistercian reform—vis-à-vis his admiration of Bernard and the monastic life at Clairvaux—William was himself involved in reform efforts within the Benedictine order. In 1131, he successfully introduced a General Chapter of Benedictine abbots in the diocese of Reims in imitation of the Cistercian practice. This particular innovation met with resistance, both from within the order and from the ecclesial hierarch, Cardinal Matthew of Albano, the papal legate of the region, who wrote in opposition to the practice, and to whom William in turn wrote the *Responsio abbatum* in

perhaps 1132. William's direct action and intervention were successful and managed to garner support for the reform work within the Benedictine houses, at least in his own diocese.

Among the theological and doctrinal controversies William addressed— there are at least three interventions we know of—the condemnation of Peter Abelard stands out most for its historical significance for 12th century theological paradigms and for the way in which William orchestrated it from behind the scenes, once again through his friend Bernard of Clairvaux. William's concern over Abelard's Trinitarian theology and its implications for redemption fueled Bernard's attack on Abelard, which culminated in Abelard's public condemnation at the Council of Sens in 1141. In this case, William beforehand had also written a *Disputation against Abelard* addressed to Bernard, in which he considered and rejected Abelard's views point by point. The tide against Abelard did not recede until after the condemnation and Abelard's death at Cluny that same year. Even so, William still saw fit to write *Speculum fidei* (*The Mirror of Faith*) to assist monastic minds to avoid the errors, as he saw them, of Abelard and to develop a proper faith that would illuminate the path to God.

The first of the other two interventions into theological discourse came earlier in William's career during his abbacy at Saint-Thierry (1119/20–1135). It involved Rupert of Deutz and his treatise on the Eucharist which William found lacking, if not heretical, in its distinction between the substance and the species of the sacrament. At first William wrote a letter to Rupert voicing his concerns to him directly, abbot to abbot. Perhaps not satisfied with that alone, William proceeded to write his own treatise, *De sacramento altaris* (*On the Sacrament of the Altar*), the first work on Eucharistic theology among Cistercian writers.

The final theological controversy William addressed came at the same time as the issue with Peter Abelard, after William had left Saint-Thierry and joined the Cistercian house at Signy (1135). William now concerned himself with the Trinitarian theology of William of Conches, which he found misleading and dangerous, even accusing William of Manichaeism, that is, of embracing a dualism of good and evil in the psychosomatic person and thereby reflecting an unacceptable dualism in creation. He intervened not with a letter to William of Conches himself but to his longtime friend, Bernard of Clairvaux.

The recurring theme in each of these incidents is William's relationship with Bernard of Clairvaux, beginning with his first encounter—by William's own account a profound and life-changing event—all the way until his final effort, near the end of his own life to write the hagiography of Bernard, whom William clearly viewed as a living saint. Bernard not only inspired William's monastic reform efforts but also William's desire to leave his Benedictine community and join the New Order himself, something Bernard did not approve. As influential as Bernard was on William, we are curiously pressed to find direct influence of Bernard on William's thought and writings. In the shadow of his famous friend, William retained his own identity and originality that he articulated so well in his own writings.

What might we conclude about William the man, the monk, and the writer from these vignettes of his life? William was indeed in the middle of the crossroads of 12th-century monastic life, both in his public role as abbot and in his private, interior life as a monk. From his spiritual and theological writings— the bulk of his works—we can see that, in spite of his public and polemical activities, he always desired above all else to seek and find God, to "go up to the mountain of the Lord" and be united with God and God alone:

> When the will mounts on high, like fire going up to its place, that is to say, when it unites with truth and tends toward higher things, it is *amor*. When it is fed with the milk of grace in order to make progress, it is *delectio*. When it lays hold of its object and keeps it in its grasp and has enjoyment of it, it is *caritas*, it is unity of spirit, it is God...

These words from William's most widely dispersed treatise, the *Letter to the Brothers of Mont Dieu* (*The Golden Epistle*), provide a summary of William's spiritual and intellectual desire to encounter God, to become united with God, and to "become not God but what God is". Not only does this accurately describe the heart of William, it also represents the central theme (now come full circle) that we see throughout William's three decades of spiritual writings, from his first *On Contemplating God* to his last *The Golden Epistle*.

William of Saint-Thierry Scholarship Overview

Scholarship on William has for the most part come in the form of numerous articles, translations, editions, conference papers, but only a few monographs and collected essays. For more than a century now, William scholarship has successfully identified William's authentic works, produced Latin editions of all of his works, published translations (primarily French and English) of most of his works, explicated William's thought, investigated his sources, and provided historical analysis and context for understanding William in his own time and place while also fitting William into the broader Christian history and more specifically Cistercian monastic tradition, past and present.

William scholarship might properly be categorized into two periods: early and recent. If we arbitrarily define the early period up through the 1950s, prominent scholars include Jean-Marie Déchanet, Marie-Madeleine Davy, Jacques Hourlier, and André Wilmart. Up to the 1950s, access to William's writings was limited primarily to the *Patrologia Cursus Completus* (Patrologia Latina) of J.-P. Migne. Although all of William's works were available in this monumental collection of Latin texts, they were not all correctly attributed. Thus, the responsibility for identifying William's complete corpus fell to scholars of this early era. André Wilmart's seminal article in 1924 helped to accomplish this essential task. More accurate and useful Latin editions of William's works began to be published especially in the 1950s through the painstaking work of M.-M. Davy and Jacques Hourlier.

Jean-Marie Déchanet stands out as the first major scholar to analyze William's writings and thought—and to speculate, sometimes erroneously, on William's sources—in a way that set the course for future William studies, so much so that one cannot seriously study William today without engaging and demonstrating familiarity with Déchanet's work. In addition to numerous articles spanning from the 1930s to the 1960s, Déchanet published the first major influential monograph on William in 1942. Although many of Déchanet's conclusions about William's thought, and especially his sources and influences, have been rejected by subsequent scholarship, Déchanet's place within William scholarship still remains formative and notable.

The recent era from the 1960s to the present has seen an eruption of scholarly articles, some monographs and collected essays along with critical editions of all of William's works, most of which have also been translated into English, French, and a few other languages. There are too many scholars devoted to William studies in the recent era to name, and many have been prolific for producing editions of William's works and especially analyzing William's thought.

Among particular recent accomplishments furthering William scholarship is the publication of William's works in critical editions from 1989 to 2011 in six volumes in the *Corpus Christianorum Continuatio Mediaevalis* series from Brepols Publishers. Although earlier editions remain useful—and according to some scholars, superior—having all of William's works available in this one series increases accessibility for scholars and students of William alike. The bulk of these new editions has been produced by Paul Verdeyen, SJ, of the University of Antwerp. This present volume relies on these critical editions (except where noted otherwise).

In the last three decades or so of scholarship, only two original English language books have been published on William. The first, David N. Bell's monograph on the Augustinian nature of William's spirituality from 1984, remains essential scholarship for anyone investigating William's intellectual framework. The second and more recent publication, a collection of essays in honor of E. Rozanne Elder published in 2015, provides new perspectives on William's writings and thought, although only five of the nine chapters focus exclusively on William, while the other four emphasize William as compared to Bernard of Clairvaux's thought or the portrait of Bernard in William's *Vita prima Bernardi*. As a result of this paucity of English language scholarly books, this *Companion to William of Saint-Thierry* fulfills the need for more book-length scholarly publications on William and provides an overview with in-depth research that will be useful for both scholars and students, while it also benefits from the existing scholarship, including the now available critical editions of William's corpus of writings.

Companion to William of Saint-Thierry

The chapters in this book represent scholarship that spans the last fifty years of William studies and include both established and new scholars among the international contributors. Each chapter offers new, original research, informed by up-to-date scholarship, and addresses one or more categories typically incorporated into each volume of this Brill series: life, works, thought, and influence of the historical figure. In the first chapter, Brian Patrick McGuire introduces us to William of Saint-Thierry's life and works by sketching a biography, based on careful analysis of the *Vita antiqua* (*Life of William of Saint-Thierry*), and setting forth a chronology of his life as a monk and writer. Through this chronology of William's life and works, we are also provided the historical and intellectual context for each work in William's corpus. McGuire astutely emphasizes William's relationship with Bernard of Clairvaux and its importance in William's life from their first meeting until William's death, as well as William's essential role in our understanding of Bernard through the *Vita prima Bernardi*.

In my own chapter, I provide a brief overview of the scholarly questions and debates over the sources that influenced William's written works and his thought. The assertions made in the early period of William scholarship, particularly by Jean-Marie Déchanet, that William could access and relied directly on Greek Christian sources went unchallenged until the recent period of scholarship, most notably in the work of David N. Bell. His careful and critical analysis of William's Augustinian and overall western intellectual framework—along with direct source material in quotations from, allusions to, and clear influence by Augustine's writings—demonstrated definitively that William did not rely on eastern Greek sources for his intellectual and spiritual views. The debate has not ended here: there still remains the need to determine in specific detail what other western sources apart from Augustine that we might identify as influential on William. Using two examples of key terms in William's writings, *ratio fidei* ("reason of faith") and *fruitio* ("enjoyment"), I show that western medieval authors from the intervening

centuries between Augustine and William also provided source material for him, including Hilary of Poitiers, John Scotus Eriugena, Gregory the Great, Paschasius Radbertus, and Rabanus Maurus.

David N. Bell's chapter explicates in depth the central contribution of William's thought and works: mystical theology and theological mysticism. He provides historically grounded and practical definitions for both terms in order to situate William within his fundamental context: the Christian monk in search of God in prayer and life. The spirituality that comes from William's theological mysticism is neither Marian nor Christocentric; rather, it is Augustinian and built on the foundations of the human being having been created in the image and likeness of God (Gen 1:26), the doctrine of the Trinity, and the power of love ("a vehement, well-ordered will") for accessing God, for experiencing God, and ultimately for being united with God.

Aage Rydstrøm-Poulsen provides much needed scholarly attention to William's work *De natura animae* (*On the Nature of the Soul*) and the concept of the human soul found there. William's understanding of the soul, once again, begins with the scriptural precept that human beings were created in the image and likeness of God (Gen 1:26); in medieval anthropology, the image resides in the human soul, which is rational. Reason in itself can lead one to the good or the bad, and so the rational soul, influenced by the Holy Spirit, is key to guiding human reason. In addition, the human soul is a kind of trinity with memory, deliberation, and will. The desired result is that the soul and God become "one in love, one in beatitude, one in immortality and incorruption, one even in some way the divinity itself".

E. Rozanne Elder addresses William's view of the renewal of the human person—the process of redemption and salvation—along the spiritual path toward God. She explains this central aspect of William's thought within the context of his *Disputatio adversus PetrumAbaelardum* (*Disputation agains tPeter Abelard*) and the Trinitarian issues regarding faith and salvation that Abelard's views aroused in William. While analyzing William's point by point arguments against Abelard and the questions he raised, Elder demonstrates that William's writings, and thus his thought, after this encounter were directly influenced by these questions as William determined to provide adequate answers that Abelard, in William's estimation, had failed to do. Of particular concern was the question of how Christ's death as a sacrifice to God was redemptive for humankind. William's last three theological (and spiritual) treatises were *Speculum Fidei* (*The Mirror of Faith*), *Aenigma Fidei* (*The Enigma of Faith*), and *The Golden Epistle*. All responded to this very question and articulated most fully William's theory of redemption, carefully integrated with his view of the soul's ascent to God. Although William and Abelard held several ideas in common, a key difference between the two writers lay in their goal: Abelard sought *scientia* ("knowledge") and William sought *sapientia* ("wisdom").

Thomas X. Davis, ocso, provides what few can, a perspective on William's relevance to contemporary spirituality formed from a lifetime study of William from within the communal life and ascesis of the Order of Cistercians of the Strict Observance. He articulates the theological and spiritual legacy that William offers, especially in his concept of participation in the Trinitarian life through human *concientia*, defined as both conscience and consciousness. Davis begins with the critical question that Jesus posed to his disciples: "Who do you say that I am?" For believers within the Christian community, this remains always a central, contemporary, and essential question to be answered so that one's faith in Jesus as the Christ—whether a 12th-century monk or a 21st-century student—has a concrete foundation on which to be built. To put this into William's intellectual and faith-based framework, Davis focuses on William's

teaching about how Christ dwells within a person by faith and grace and how the effects of this indwelling restore and transfigure the person's life based on the image and likeness to God with which human beings were created (Gen 1:26)—by now a familiar touchstone for William's readers. For William, faith and the work of Christ further manifest in experiential participation in the Trinity. Thomas X. Davis's chapter provides the first thorough analysis of *conscientia* in William's thought. Davis crafts this chapter by masterfully and comprehensively pulling from William's writings to show William's own analytical, developing— yet consistent—understanding of *conscientia* and its significance in William's conceptualization of spiritual progress and union with God.

Nathaniel Peters offers a welcome investigation into Eucharistic theology, a part of William's thought rarely addressed within the scholarship. Peters's analysis naturally begins with William's Eucharistic text, *De sacramento altaris* (*On the Sacrament of the Altar*), but it also takes into consideration William's other works up through and including the *Golden Epistle*. In this way, we have the first English language holistic treatment of William as a sacramental theologian. Central themes addressed by Peters include the presence of Christ in the Eucharist and how it is received both physically and spiritually; the Eucharist as church (body of Christ); how the sacramental participation in the Trinity is a provisional foretaste of eternal participation and union with God; and the image of the kiss from the *Song of Songs* that William employs to describe the union and participation found in the sacrament. Putting William's sacramental theology into the larger context of his overall mystical theology helps to elucidate both and to illuminate the significance of the Eucharist throughout William's *corpus*.

The final chapter investigates William's influence in the later Middle Ages as Glenn E. Myers explores in detail how William's teachings on spiritual progress, participation in the Trinity, and ultimate mystical union with God can be found in the sermons of the 14th-century German Dominican Johannes Tauler, a concrete example of William's *Golden Epistle* as a source and direct influence on a later medieval writer. To accomplish this, Myers guides the reader steadily through the process by which Tauler would have read William's text in manuscripts readily available, then shows precisely—in spite of the language transition from William's Latin to Tauler's Middle High German—where Tauler's sermons rely directly on passages from the *Golden Epistle*. Myers's contribution affords us a thorough accounting of how William's concept of spiritual union informed and helped to form Tauler's own understanding of this culmination of the spiritual journey.

The reader will undoubtedly recognize that within the different categories by which this volume looks at William of Saint-Thierry—his life, works, thought, and influence—there are certain recurring and overlapping themes. This is quite appropriate. For the historical person of William provides us with an intellectual world and spiritual insights that permeate each facet of his life and career as a 12th-century monk and writer. Indeed, the elements of his intellect and spirituality transcend his own time and place. <>

THE RISE OF CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY AND THE END OF ANCIENT METAPHYSICS: PATRISTIC PHILOSOPHY FROM THE CAPPADOCIAN FATHERS TO JOHN OF DAMASCUS

by Johannes Zachhuber [Oxford University Press, 9780198859956]

It has rarely been recognized that the Christian writers of the first millennium pursued an ambitious and exciting philosophical project alongside their engagement in the doctrinal controversies of their age. **THE RISE OF CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY AND THE END OF ANCIENT METAPHYSICS: PATRISTIC PHILOSOPHY FROM THE CAPPADOCIAN FATHERS TO JOHN OF DAMASCUS** offers, for the first time, a full analysis of this Patristic philosophy. It shows how it took its distinctive shape in the late fourth century and gives an account of its subsequent development until the time of John of Damascus.

The book falls into three main parts. The first starts with an analysis of the philosophical project underlying the teaching of the Cappadocian fathers, Basil of Caesarea, Gregory of Nyssa and Gregory of Nazianzus. This philosophy, arguably the first distinctively Christian theory of being, soon became near-universally shared in Eastern Christianity. Just a few decades after the Cappadocians, all sides in the early Christological controversy took its fundamental tenets for granted. Its application to the Christological problem thus appeared inevitable. Yet it created substantial conceptual problems.

Parts two and three describe in detail how these problems led to a series of increasingly radical modifications of the Cappadocian philosophy. In part two, Zachhuber explores the miaphysite opponents of the Council of Chalcedon, while in part three he discusses the defenders of the Council from the early sixth to the eighth century. Through this overview, the book reveals this period as one of remarkable philosophical creativity, fecundity, and innovation.

Excerpt: The Christian writers of late antiquity are famous for their foundational and decisive contribution to the formation of the Church's teaching. Rarely has it been recognized, however, that they also pursued an ambitious and exciting philosophical project alongside their engagement in the doctrinal controversies of their age. In this book, I will for the first time offer a full analysis of this Patristic philosophy. I will show how it took its distinctive shape in the late fourth century and give an account of its subsequent development until the time of John of Damascus. In this Introduction, I will outline the approach taken, explain the selection of authors that will be examined, and give a précis of my overall argument.

Patristic Thought as Christian Philosophy

For a long time, early Christian thought has been connected with ancient philosophy mainly in order to explore its sources and to show how the Fathers depended on the insights of pagan thinkers from Plato and Aristotle in the classical period, to Plotinus and Proclus in late antiquity.' Scholars who disagreed with this assessment would do so by emphasizing the incompatibility between Christian faith and Greek philosophy whether with a view to censure Christianity for its lack of rationality or to insist on its genuinely religious character.

More recently, scholars of both historical theology and ancient philosophy have rightly challenged the stark dichotomy of Patristic thought and ancient philosophy that underlay either of these traditional approaches. Instead, Christian authors have increasingly been treated as part of the late antique intellectual world and as philosophers in their own right. In this vein, Patristic accounts of creation, for example, have successfully been reconstructed in the context of late ancient philosophical cosmologies rather than an entirely separate undertaking.'

Christian views of the soul, of time, or of the will have similarly been treated alongside those held by their non-Christian philosophical peers.

The account I will give in this study follows this trajectory yet extends it to the very heart of Christian theology. The philosophy whose history will here be recounted is found directly in texts engaging with the central doctrines of the Christian Church, namely, the Trinity and Christology. This raises wide-ranging and fundamental questions of terminology, method, and the disciplinary cast of the present study. How can doctrinal questions yield philosophical insights given that they are based on authoritative decisions taken at the institutional level, usually by synods and councils? Conversely, if philosophical categories are used to analyse doctrinal debates in late antiquity, what room does this leave for their claim that they reflect divine revelation?

Part of my answer to questions of this kind is contained in the very language of Patristic or Christian philosophy which will be employed throughout this study. Its main purpose is to stem the dualistic tendency inherent in the conventional use of theology and philosophy as quasi-disciplinary designators. It is important to recall that this distinction has its origin in the medieval university with separate faculties of philosophy and theology.' Since then, it has become seemingly self-evident and is, therefore, applied to historical research on earlier periods as well. It is, however, an ill fit for the first millennium. While pagan intellectuals often did not think highly of Christianity, they found it natural to classify it as a philosophy, albeit an inferior one, rather than as religion.' The new faith was simply too different from traditional Greek or Roman cults. Christian writers, too, often referred to their own activity as philosophy, usually qualified as true philosophy, true wisdom, or true knowledge!

It is therefore arguable that the emerging intellectual culture of late ancient Christianity can be conceptualized as a kind of philosophy within the late ancient context of a plurality of philosophical schools.' Its relationship to the philosophies of Platonism or Stoicism will then appear analogous to the one those schools had amongst each other. Dependence and critique, polemical rejection and the acceptance of shared principles will no longer appear mutually exclusive or even contradictory. More importantly perhaps, none of those observations will in itself feed ideological narratives of Christianity as an anti-philosophical force or, indeed, of 'hellenization' as a betrayal of the purity of the gospel.

This notion of Patristic theology as a philosophical school becomes even more plausible when the specific character of ancient philosophy is taken into account: its acceptance of authoritative texts and its practice of commenting on them; its institutionalization in schools whose heads derived their authority by direct descent (diadoche) from the school's founder; its embeddedness in a specific form of ethical existence, as influentially emphasized by Pierre Hadot." In other words, while it may seem counterintuitive today to consider Christian thought as a philosophy, late ancient philosophy, as pointed out by Arthur Darby Nock many years ago, would strike a modern observer as rather similar to the kind of religion that has dominated the West for the past 1500 years.

In this sense, Patristic thought as a whole can be identified as Christian philosophy. In the present book, however, the term Christian or Patristic philosophy will generally be taken in a more restricted sense signifying a set of logical and ontological concepts underlying the articulation of doctrinal statements. Such a philosophical system can be found in the Eastern Fathers from the end of the fourth century. These theories, then, are not themselves doctrinal; they can be appreciated or indeed critiqued independently of the affirmation of the doctrine they are meant to support. Thus far, they can be understood as properly philosophical. And yet, the argumentative purpose for which they were developed clearly influenced their shape. As philosophies, they were from the outset inscribed into the intellectual attempt to give a reasoned account of the Christian faith as expressed through a number of credal and doctrinal formulae. In this sense, these intellectual systems can be understood as Christian philosophies. As will become apparent, a considerable number of Patristic authors took seriously the need to underpin their doctrinal standpoint by such a system of terms and concepts. It is the story of their work that will be told in this book.

How can the rise of this philosophy be explained and understood? One major factor, undoubtedly, was the decision of the Council Fathers of the fourth and fifth centuries to adopt for the formulation of the most central doctrines of Christianity terms that could not be found in the Bible or, at least, were not used in it in any technical sense. As soon as central tenets of the Christian faith were defined through words such as ousia, physis, and hypostasis, the exposition, justification, and defence of these doctrines had to resort to definitions and arguments of an teasingly technical nature.

Important though these institutional decisions were, it is arguable that another or was equally influential in ensuring the emergence of Patristic philosophy as described above. Doctrines are often considered as static affirmations of certain truths; traditional theology considered them as divinely revealed, whereas historians tend to think of them as imposed by institutional authority. The very words 'doctrine' or 'dogma' to us suggest rigidity and inflexibility. Such a perception overlooks, however, that the doctrines of late ancient Christianity were not simply promulgated and accepted but fiercely debated, rejected, and defended. A major space, therefore, in which philosophical development occurred was in the debates and controversies about doctrine that were such a central part of Christian literature throughout the period covered in this book.

In other words, Christian authors could not avoid embedding their doctrinal confessions about the Trinity and of the Person of Jesus Christ into a terminological and conceptual system whose validity did not directly depend on the acceptance of these doctrines, because they were faced by opponents unwilling to accept their own dogmatic formula. The trinitarian controversy of the fourth century was therefore the incubator for the first and most influential version of this Patristic philosophy.

Subsequently, it was largely the debate about Christology, which stubbornly continued for centuries, that stimulated conceptual clarifications and modifications of the original fourth-century theory.

Recognizing the importance of doctrinal polemics for the development of Patristic philosophy inevitably highlights the extent to which its history was one of unintended consequences. Wide-reaching philosophical decisions concerning, for example, the status of universals or the constitution of the individual being, were often caused by the need to find rationalizations for a doctrinal position an author simply had to defend. As we shall see, this was particularly the case for sixth-century Chalcedonians who struggled to justify the unpopular formula of the Council of Chalcedon against a barrage of well-articulated criticisms and in doing so became rather innovative and inventive in their philosophical ideas.

In line with the often-haphazard character of philosophical developments among Patristic authors is the observation of the plurality of forms it assumed. Those scholars who have treated Patristic thought as part of the history of philosophy have usually seen it as one or, at least, as converging towards one unified vision in line with the supposed unity of Christian doctrine emerging during this historical epoch. In reality, its plurality rapidly increased as the centuries went on, and there is no indication that by the time the present account comes to its close this tendency had come to a halt. The primary reason for this increasing pluralization was the fragmentation of Eastern Christianity during this epoch, as the attempt to settle the Christological controversy through doctrinal formulae led to the permanent establishment of rival ecclesiastical communities across the Eastern Mediterranean. Yet even Chalcedonian attempts to develop a philosophical vision in line with the language mandated by the Council of 451 did not result in unanimity but in several, rather different but equally fascinating philosophies.

Despite this plurality, some major patterns will emerge from the analysis of these developments. There is a venerable tradition in philosophical historiography, most prominently represented by G. W. F. Hegel, that has assigned philosophical significance to the doctrinal development of late antiquity on the grounds that doctrine itself was philosophical.' More recently, it has been the claim of Eastern Orthodox thinkers such as Vladimir Lossky and John Zizioulas that Patristic thinkers brought about an ontological revolution while articulating the doctrine of the Trinity in particular."

While the approach in this study will be rather different from these, the overall result will partly converge with such earlier assessments. I will show that by the end of the Patristic period philosophical ideas had been generated that were far Away from consensus views that prevailed among most pagan philosophers. The term 'ontological revolution', thus far, is not far-fetched. Yet the revolutionary philosophy is not the fourth-century system established by Basil of Caesarea and Gregory of Nyssa, as Lossky and Zizioulas opined; rather, it was the Christological controversy that led Christian thinkers to the adoption of increasingly innovative intellectual assumptions.

From the Cappadocians to John of Damascus

The particular approach to Patristic philosophy taken in this book determines its chronological scope. There is no doubt that Christian writers prior to the fourth centuries can legitimately be classed as philosophers; in fact, thinkers such as Justin Martyr and Origen who operated as independent teachers, may more plausibly be compared to contemporaneous philosophers than their later descendants in the fourth or sixth centuries!' Histories of Patristic philosophy therefore rightly begin with these thinkers or,

even earlier, with the Gnostic of the second century.' Important works have even restricted their scope of enquiry to the first three centuries on the grounds that Christian thought during this period was less impacted by external, political pressures than during the ensuing age of state—church alliance."

Yet however philosophical earlier Fathers may have been, it is arguable that as a distinctive and recognizable entity Christian philosophy only emerged in the East at the end of the fourth century. As such, it owes its existence to the so-called Cappadocian theologians, Basil of Caesarea, Gregory of Nazianzus, and Gregory of Nyssa." These three, and especially Basil and Gregory of Nyssa, integrated their proposed settlement to the trinitarian controversy into an innovative and clearly defined set of terms and concepts. On this basis, they spoke of the Trinity as a single substance or ousia in three consubstantial hypostases thus coining the formula that was to become recognized orthodoxy from the Council of Constantinople in 381 onwards. Moreover, Gregory of Nyssa applied the same conceptual language also to a range of other doctrinal topics including creation, salvation, and the eschatological resurrection and restoration of humankind." In this way, Cappadocian philosophy permitted for the first time the systematic integration of many doctrinal topics into one systematic whole. Christology, however, was not one of them: a fact that was to have grave consequences.

Within a surprisingly short time, this philosophy became widely shared across the East. In this book, I will therefore refer to it as the 'classical theory'. By this I mean that its acceptance was from the beginning not a sign of school affiliation but became a sort of intellectual koine. From all the evidence we have, it seems clear that the Cappadocian heritage was never tied to a distinctive part of the Eastern Church. Cappadocian thought was neither concentrated in certain areas, as Antiochene and Alexandrian theologies were, nor was it connected with particular intellectual milieus as was the case with the inheritance of Origen and Evagrius of Pontus. Instead, Cappadocian patterns of thought and argument took a foundational place in the writing of all major theologians of the East only a few decades after Gregory of Nyssa codified this novel philosophy around the year 380.

The near-total absence of reliable texts from the decades following the Theodosian settlement of the 380s makes it impossible, for the time being, to trace this remarkable success-story in any detail, but it is a matter of historical record that, at the outbreak of the Christological controversy in the late 420s, all sides already took for granted the use of Cappadocian philosophy to articulate and rationalize their various doctrinal positions." While never again losing this status, the Cappadocian theory subsequently came under strain when individuals employed it—or sought to employ it—to justify the particular positions they took in the increasingly entrenched debate about the doctrine of the Person of Jesus Christ.

This tendency became pronounced from the early sixth century. In many ways, the main object of this book's narrative is the dramatic intellectual realignment that ensued from this decision. Different groups emerging during this period sought to capitalize on the authoritative status the Cappadocian theory had gained by explaining their Christologies on its basis. This, however, was never possible without modifications which turned out to be far-reaching and increasingly radical. The result was a fascinating dynamic in which the tensions between the intellectual tradition inherited from the Cappadocians on the one hand, and the conceptual needs of the advanced Christological debate on the other, brought about the rise of new and unexpected, often intellectually ambitious, philosophical theories.

In the current book, I will show the intellectual sophistication and the sheer adventurousness of this development. With this end in mind, texts and authors have been selected for inclusion. Completeness has not been intended; in each case my choice was based on the genuinely philosophical quality in evidence in Individual texts while aiming to represent the breadth and diversity of the debate. It therefore goes without saying that the account could not be limited to Chalcedonian writers. In many ways, the miaphysite opponents of the Council were in the ascendency for much of the century that followed the divisive synod of 451. This holds for their philosophical prowess as much as for almost any other aspect of their activity. It is hardly coincidence that the most important Christian philosopher of the sixth century, John Philoponus, considered miaphysitism the Christological default position.

Yet the necessity of including the non-Chalcedonian traditions in the present account is not only or even primarily due to the intellectual rigour with which any of its individual representatives argued their case. In a more general sense, the deepening doctrinal divisions about Christology were pivotal for the particular way in which the evolution of Patristic philosophy played out from the late fifth century. Different accounts of the doctrine of the Person of Jesus Christ became the faultline along which Patristic philosophies took different paths, as much as they divided ecdesial communities. Only an account that takes seriously this plurality can therefore hope to convey a true picture of this intellectual development."

On the Chalcedonian side, the sixth century will turn out to be a period of unrecognized philosophical acumen." The individuals who wrote this story are largely unknown; they have not merely been neglected by modern scholarship but were marginal in their own time and their immediate posteriority to such an extent that we often hardly know their names. The only partial exception is Leontius of Byzantium, but even his personality is barely recognizable from the historical sources we possess. As for the rest, John the Grammarian, Pamphilus the Theologian, Theodore of Raithu, and Leontius of Jerusalem have all been mostly forgotten. Their writings are preserved by pure luck in a tiny number of manuscripts, and no personal information about them is recorded in the accounts of Church Historians or by their theological successors.

And yet they are a remarkable group of individuals, as will become apparent in due course. Admittedly, none of them was a Philoponus or a Maximus. There are important theological and religious questions on which they never pronounce and which, most probably, lay outside their scope of interest. For the story of this book, however, they are a major unrecognized resource, evidence for the philosophical fecundity of Patristic thought and for the creative tension between the inherited Cappadocian philosophy and the conceptual needs of Chalcedonian Christology.

These authors were also among the earliest theologians to make use of the Dionysian Corpus. As is well known, this collection of texts is first attested in the early sixth century and, despite some early objections to its authenticity, was soon universally recognized as authored by St Paul's Athenian convert. Overall, the impact of ps.-Dionysius on the developments at the centre of the present book was rather limited and a full discussion of the corpus and its place in Patristic philosophy, therefore, did not fall within the purview of this study. Nevertheless, some key insights from his writings became recurrent in Patristic authors of various associations and convictions from the latter half of the sixth century. By highlighting the consistent presence of those ideas as well as their function within Patristic philosophy,

the present account will shed some light on the stunning career of this mysterious author within Christian thought.

Established convention has it that the Patristic period of Christian theology ended in the East with John of Damascus. The present account too will conclude with a chapter describing the Damascene's philosophy together with that of Maximus the Confessor, the major Chalcedonian thinker of the seventh century. Both produced highly systematic, philosophically astute, and historically influential versions of Patristic philosophy drawing creatively on the work of earlier generations of Christian thinkers. These philosophies, moreover, differ starkly, thus further defying the notion of a unified Patristic philosophy at the end of late antiquity.

Yet while there is no doubt that the political and cultural changes of the seventh and eighth centuries profoundly transformed Christian intellectual culture in the Eastern Mediterranean, the history of Patristic philosophy does not simply come to its end in the major syntheses that mark this period of crisis. At the end of this book, I shall therefore point to its continuation and reception indicating that its novel reflections and insights were passed on to posterity through a variety of often unexplored channels which future research will need to trace.

The Rise of Christian Theology and the End of Ancient Metaphysics

Students of Christian thought in late antiquity have long been divided over its relationship to the earlier tradition of Hellenistic philosophy. While some have found startlingly novel tendencies in Patristic attempts to give a rational account of their religious faith,' others have emphasized the intellectual continuity between the mainstream of the Platonic-Aristotelian tradition and nascent Christian theology." For this latter group, affirming this continuity was often Important insofar as it allowed for a contrast with later transformations in the Western Middle Ages that ushered in the more radically different philosophies of European modernity.

The present account will offer a nuanced adjudication of these views. As far as the classical theory of Cappadocian philosophy is concerned, it will appear that the advocates of broad philosophical continuity between Hellenistic and Christian philosophy are essentially right. Claims to the contrary have mostly been based on the notion that the Cappadocians initiated a philosophical turn to the individual or even to the personal. Yet this interpretation is unsustainable." On the contrary, it will appear from my subsequent analysis that at heart, the Cappadocians developed an ontology of being as one; thus far, they did not diverge from the long-standing emphasis on ontological unity in Greek philosophical thought. They did not replace this principle of a single first principle or arche with an unbridled affirmation of a plurality of persons whose unity merely consists in their mutual communion, even though they affirmed that the single *ousia* necessarily exists or subsists in a plurality of individual hypostases.

It is admittedly easy to be mistaken about this point. This is because the Cappadocian theory is presented in the writings of these thinkers in two versions, which will here be called abstract and concrete. The former of them was initially advanced by Basil of Caesarea and later accepted by Gregory of Nazianzus and Gregory of Nyssa. The concrete account, by contrast, seems to have been the genuine contribution of the Bishop of Nyssa. Focussing on the abstract account, as has often happened, can indeed make it appear as if the Cappadocians were content to give ontological priority to individuals which they called hypostases, whereas they merely accorded conceptual unity to genera and species. Yet

it is arguable, as will become apparent in more detail later, that this aspect of the Cappadocian philosophy was restricted to the grammatical and logical level, whereas for their understanding of physical and ontological reality the rather different concrete account in Gregory of Nyssa is indispensable.

Paying attention to the latter dimension of Cappadocian philosophy makes it immediately clear how much it is geared towards the unity or oneness of being. While ousia, or being, only and exclusively exists in individual instantiations, the role of these instantiations is little more than to provide concrete realizations for the universal. They are, we might say, only hypostases of the single ousia or nature. In particular, their individuality is in no way important for this theory.

This should not come as a surprise: after all, the doctrinal paradigm on which the Cappadocian philosophy was based is the Trinity whose ousia is absolutely simple, although it only subsists in three hypostases. Yet, as the Eastern Fathers are at pains to emphasize, the affirmation of three hypostases does not impinge on the tenets of monotheism as the distinction between the three can be reduced to the fact that their mode of subsistence is different. In other words, their difference is ultimately reduced to the factuality of their separate subsistence or existence.

The picture is confirmed from the other doctrines to which the Cappadocian theory was initially applied." The creation of the world by God always created the conceptual difficulty of how the oneness and simplicity of God could be reconciled with the plurality and diversity of created reality. Yet there could be no doubt which of these two poles predominates. While the Christian thinker could not advocate a monism in which the evolution of plurality from the single source of all being was only a semblance or an unfortunate accident, the origin and goal of all movement was and remained the unity and simplicity of the divine. In this sense, the unity of human nature as originally created by God has priority over the multiplicity of being which unfolds over time, even though the latter is a necessary process without which the original creation would not be complete.

As far as the Cappadocian account of being is concerned, then, plurality remains an afterthought, and the individuality of particulars is not emphasized.

Individual hypostases are necessary in the plural, not in the singular: the world consists of individual existents, but their distinctiveness and uniqueness is as unimportant as it had been in the previous Hellenistic tradition. Is the same, however, true for the Patristic tradition in its entirety? It is intriguing to note how much the advocates of the continuity between earlier Hellenistic philosophy and Patristic thought have focussed their attention on late fourth- and early-fifth century figures for whose philosophy the Trinity was the main conceptual paradigm. Their case, as we shall see, becomes much weaker once we move beyond this early period in Patristic thought and observe the conceptual impact of what was, perhaps, the most distinctive doctrine of Christianity: Christology.

While for the conceptualization of orthodox trinitarianism oneness and unity was pivotal despite a plurality of hypostases, Christology heavily depended on a viable theory of the individual in order to explain the unique case of Jesus Christ. By adopting the term hypostasis for the saviour's personal individuality and by stipulating that his human nature stood in the same relation of consubstantiality to the rest of humankind as his divine nature stood with the other Trinitarian Persons," fifth-century Christianity set up Christology as a conceptual challenge almost exactly contrary to that of

Trinitarianism. It was the Christological controversy, therefore, which for the first time truly directed intellectual energies towards the task of conceptualizing the individual as individual.

As a result, the inherited Cappadocian philosophy had to be adapted and modified. Little has been written about this process, and it will therefore be the main task of the present book to offer a detailed account of its unfolding. Without anticipating its outcome, it can be said that claims about the adoption of novel and unprecedented philosophical views by early Christian thinkers become much more plausible on this basis. Overall, philosophical attention from the late fifth century turned to the role of the individual, its ontological constitution, its internal cohesion, and its relationship to universal natures. The positions adopted by the various Christian thinkers during this period vary greatly: some authors asserted the ontological primacy of the individual in a way anticipating medieval forms of nominalism; others detached existence from essence treating the former more or less as a qualitative property. Once under the influence of Christological debate, Patristic philosophy thus became an incubator, a laboratory for a variety of views that, much later, would be associated with the decisive intellectual breaks that separate modernity from classical thought forms.

Few of these philosophies are fully worked out at this stage. The most radical ideas, rather, seem to exist as seeds waiting to be developed by later thinkers into fuller intellectual systems. Yet their origin in the Christological controversy is nonetheless crucial, as it indicates that the reflection on the Christian faith in its most peculiar and most idiosyncratic element—the postulation that a historical human person was at the same time God—led to profound changes to the intellectual fabric of Western civilization with far-reaching consequences over the centuries and, arguably, into our own time. <>

The First Scottish Enlightenment: Rebels, Priests, and History by Kelsey Jackson Williams [Oxford University Press, 9780198809692]

Traditional accounts of the Scottish Enlightenment present the half-century or so before 1750 as, at best, a not-yet fully realised precursor to the era of Hume and Smith, at worst, a period of superstition and religious bigotry. This is the first book-length study to systematically challenge that notion. Instead, it argues that the era between approximately 1680 and 1745 was a 'First' Scottish Enlightenment, part of the continent-wide phenomenon of early Enlightenment and led by the Jacobites, Episcopalians, and Catholics of north-eastern Scotland. It makes this argument through an intensive study of the dramatic changes in historiographical practice which took place in Scotland during this era, showing how the documentary scholarship of Jean Mabillon and the Maurists was eagerly received and rapidly developed in Scottish historical circles, resulting in the wholesale demolition of the older, Humanist myths of Scottish origins and their replacement with the foundations of our modern understanding of early Scottish history.

This volume accordingly challenges many of the truisms surrounding seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Scottish history, pushing back against notions of pre-Enlightenment Scotland as backward, insular, and intellectually impoverished and mapping a richly polymathic, erudite, and transnational web of scholars, readers, and polemicists. It highlights the enduring cultural links with France and argues for

the central importance of Scotland's two principal religious minorities--Episcopalians and Catholics--in the growth of Enlightenment thinking. As such, it makes a major intervention in the intellectual and cultural histories of Scotland, early modern Europe, and the Enlightenment itself.

Review

"**FIRST SCOTTISH ENLIGHTENMENT** has many virtues...Overall, this a tremendous contribution to the history of Scottish scholarship and Scottish intellectual history generally." -- R.J.W. Mills, Queen Mary University of London, *The Seventeenth Century*

Scotland and Enlightenment

In the summer of 1699 James Stevenson received an unexpected visitor. Stevenson had been keeper of the Advocates Library, late seventeenth-century Edinburgh's centre for legal and historical scholarship, since 1693 but now he found himself in the role of novice instead of master. Over two June afternoons his guest, one 'Mr. Fleming', taught Stevenson how to date medieval handwriting and even examined many of the library's manuscripts himself, determining their ages and correcting the descriptions made by Stevenson and his predecessor James Nasmyth. A few days later the stranger had vanished from Edinburgh, leaving Stevenson with only a baffled recollection of an unusually erudite 'foraign travelled man'.

The mysterious 'Mr. Fleming' was none other than Thomas Innes, a Catholic priest travelling in disguise and under continual threat of judicial apprehension and exile. Unlike the well-meaning but largely clueless Stevenson, Innes was one of Europe's leading experts in the study of medieval manuscripts, their styles, and dating: the new science of 'diplomatic' championed by the Maurist scholar Jean Mabillon. He was also representative of something greater than himself: a distinctive change in Scottish intellectual culture stretching from the 1680s through the 1740s. In short, an Early Enlightenment.

This Enlightenment was concerned with many forms of scholarship, from botany to numismatics, and from agricultural improvement to mechanics, but its most notable contribution was in the field of history and that is what will be explored in the present work. Its practitioners used the critical methodologies of the European Early Enlightenment to understand the Scottish past in new ways, exploring how the Scottish state and Scottish culture had developed over the centuries and how that

had led to the unsettled state of affairs existing in the wake of the Revolution of 1688. The questions it asked were 'how did we get here?' and 'will understanding the past help us to change the present?'

When we think of the Scottish Enlightenment, we think of moderate Presbyterians sitting in Edinburgh drawing rooms, but the men and women of this earlier moment were very different. The Scottish Early Enlightenment was made up overwhelmingly of Episcopalians, Catholics, and Jacobites: outsiders who found themselves arrayed against the establishment politically, theologically, culturally, and intellectually. Nor did they, as a rule, hail from Edinburgh. These rebels came from the east and north-east of Scotland, the coastlands lapped by the North Sea which already had a long history of producing scholars, soldiers, and administrators at home and abroad.

This generation was decisively rejected by the better-known Scottish Enlightenment of the later eighteenth century, an unsurprising move given its radical opposition to the politics and theology of its successors. After 1745 a moment of cultural forgetting occurred and within a generation the names of writers such as Thomas Innes were nearly erased. But their scholarship remained and exerted a profound effect upon Scottish culture in everything from understandings of ancient history to the make-up of the literary canon. The project of this book is to recover the scholarship which produced those effects, to restore it to its contemporary contexts, and to reveal the full importance of the once powerful, now forgotten, Scottish Early Enlightenment.

Such a project entails a degree of gentle disagreement with long-standing narratives in Scottish history. For most of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, this period of Scotland's past was viewed as, at best, a preparatory moment for the Enlightenment of Hume and Smith, at worst, a final hiccough of bigotry and superstition, famously characterized by the execution of Thomas Aikenhead for blasphemy in 1697. Accordingly, the figures discussed in the present work tended to be presented either as minor supporting players—the 'city guard' and 'crowd of citizens' to the leading dramatis personae of the next generation—or as retrogade stalwarts from the bad old days, ripe to be swept away in the tides of human progress.

More recently, such concepts have been problematized, but the era of Scottish history after the revolution of 1688—which is, at least, no longer universally 'Glorious'—and before the publication of canonical texts such as Hume's Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding (1748) or Smith's Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759), remains contested and uncertain ground. In Scottish studies, Jacobitism takes centre stage, but while the political, military, and ideological aspects of the movement have received extensive study in recent decades, the place of Jacobitism within larger patterns of European thought has attracted comparatively less attention. Even after scholars such as Allan Macinnes made the case for the possibility of progressive—even Enlightened—Jacobitism, there is still too often a tendency to see it as an essentially atavistic and backwards-looking movement which, by its very nature, could hardly bear any close kinship to the Enlightenment of the following generation.

These crotchets in Scottish studies are reinforced by understandings of Enlightenment as a whole. Leaving aside the longue durée of Enlightenment studies, stretching back to Peter Gay and beyond, modern interpretations of Enlightenment have largely been conditioned as either agreements with or reactions to the seminal three volumes of Jonathan Israel.8 Israel's argument that the 'business of Enlightenment' was over by 1750 and his distinction between moderate and radical Enlightenments have proved enduring bones for subsequent scholars to chew over. One possible answer is the retrenchment

of John Robertson. In The Case for the Enlightenment, Robertson responded to Israel by pulling back the borders of 'Enlightenment' to the mid- to late eighteenth-century 'science of man' and tracing the parallels and intertwinings of that school of philosophical enquiry in Scotland and Naples. This avoided the problems, widely expressed, of a plurality of Enlightenments, but did so at the cost of sacrificing much of the eighteenth century to a strange intellectual purgatory.

Alternatively, J. G. A. Pocock disputed the fundamental premise of Israel's argument that Enlightenment was 'a single or unifiable phenomenon'. Pocock's critique of those Enlightenment scholars who see in the movement 'a cause or programme—typically a secular liberalism—with which they identify themselves and which they desire to defend against its enemies' was both a necessary riposte to the teleology inherent in Israel's work and also a more general warning against the presentist language sitting just below the surface of so much Enlightenment historiography.

Where does this leave us? Israel warned that '[i]f one is not talking 'Radical Enlightenment' one fails to grasp what the intellectual wars of the late seventeenth, eighteenth, and early nineteenth century were really about', but is this a tenable thesis? If it is then C. D. A. Leighton is perhaps correct in seeing the scholarly movement described in this book not as Enlightenment but 'as a Counter-Enlightenment response to the age's assault on a theocratic order'. Such an interpretation is not inevitable, however, and we can see another way through to conceptualizing this movement in recent work on conservative, religious, and particularly Catholic Enlightenments. Ulrich Lehner's argument for restoring Catholic scholars such as the Benedictines of St. Maur to Israel's 'moderate or mainstream Enlightenment' offers an avenue into reconceiving the role of traditionally marginalized figures, as is his crucial observation that 'Catholic Enlighteners understood themselves not as inventors but as reformers, as their work had been an adaptation or a development of what the Church originally believed'. In Lehner's view, these projects could also usefully be understood as Enlightenment.

If a plurality of Enlightenments may be admitted—a contentious but by no means marginal viewpoint in current scholarship—we must ask, first, what value is there in retaining the term 'Enlightenment' at all? And, second, how does this force us to rethink our received understanding of eighteenth-century Scottish intellectual history? The first question is, to a point, insoluble. Even if we take Pocock's most basic definition of Enlightenment as 'the conversion of theology into its history as a human endeavour', this still seems to simultaneously exclude much of what we have been discussing from the umbrella of 'Enlightenment' while failing to provide an intellectually useful or coherent category in which to fit that which remains. Is Enlightenment, then, simply too baggy and meaningless a term? For some, the answer will surely be 'yes'. In the case of the present work, however, there is an argument to be made for preserving, albeit cautiously, this outworn definition. To define the historical moment discussed here as 'Enlightenment' is to recognize its novelty, its participation in continent-wide changes in the way historical evidence was perceived and assessed, and its reaction to the decay of previously paradigmatic truths over the course of the eighteenth century. But it is also a move which gives it cultural capital in the modern day and allows us to recognize its equal importance in Scottish history with the better-known Enlightenment of Robertson and Hume. One of the goals of this book is to challenge the monolithic Scottish Enlightenment present in much of the historiography, arguing instead that Scotland had multiple moments, chronologically and ideologically separate, of Enlightenment, of which the present is only one.

This argument was partially anticipated by Hugh Trevor-Roper, who, in his infamous 1967 essay, 'The Scottish Enlightenment', slyly suggested that the intellectual origins of that movement might lie not solely with continental radicals but with the 'Jacobite, Episcopalian society' in the north-east, 'the cultural bastion of Scotland'. His insights were only patchily followed to their conclusion in his own work but proved influential on the subsequent generation. When they were reiterated by Colin Kidd in his 2005 appraisal of Trevor-Roper's scholarship, the outraged response to that article by William Ferguson only confirmed the extent to which Trevor-Roper had shifted the goalposts: the essential issue had become the origins of the Enlightened thought which first manifested itself in late seventeenth- and early eighteenth-century Episcopalian circles, not its presence, which was assumed.

Yet both Trevor-Roper and Kidd saw this Episcopal moment as essentially a prelude, an 'Episcopalian and Erastian pre-Enlightenment' leading to a 'Presbyterian Enlightenment' in the latter's words. In the present work, no such secondary status will be applied to this movement, which will instead be treated as an independent scholarly moment in its own right. Why has this not been done before? As hinted at in Ferguson's reaction to Kidd, to do so challenges traditional narratives of the Scottish Enlightenment and its beneficent, progressive, moderate nature. In particular, it challenges the still often implicit Whig narratives about Scotland, Great Britain, and progress during the eighteenth century. If Jacobites were Enlightened, where does that leave us? If Enlightened Scotland was a persecuting society with Episcopalians and Catholics acting as its Huguenots, how does that force us to reassess the century? Such questions strike close to the heart of many too easily made assumptions about the nature of Enlightenment in Scotland.

Accordingly, the present work is predicated on the assumption that dichotomies such as reactionary vs. progressive, moderate vs. radical, Whig vs. Jacobite, while they appeal to the human desire for binaries, conceal more than they reveal and distort the nature of eighteenth-century 'Enlightened' thought. Rather than beginning with the heroes and villains already named, this project endeavours to approach Scotland's Early Enlightenment non-judgmentally, asking the basic questions: 'what changed? and why?' It does this from an intellectual historian's perspective, closely reading key texts while also keeping both texts and authors grounded in their respective cultures. This is balanced with a cultural historical approach towards the spheres within which they moved, reading the minority groups of eighteenth-century Scotland—both religious and political—as a series of overlapping communities whose interactions, friendly or antagonistic, with each other and the establishment fundamentally shaped their beliefs and ideas.

What, we might ask, is the intellectual pay-off of navigating these poorly mapped shoals of Enlightenment? What can we learn from this scholarly movement? First, there is the intrinsic value of recovery. This work explores an intellectual world which was essential to its time, but which was rapidly discarded in the wake of the 1745 rebellion and subsequently elided over in mainstream historiography. But its value lies in more than that. It challenges the nature of Enlightenment in Scotland, as discussed above, arguing for multiple Enlightenments and multiple scholarly achievements, not all of which are either so straightforward or so triumphalist as the traditional narrative would suggest. It also challenges canards concerning Scottish culture which, though frequently debunked, enjoy a fruitful afterlife in the twenty-first century. Scotland was not inherently demotic, Presbyterian, or radical as famously argued by scholars such as Kurt Wittig. There was a side—a vibrant, rich, and complex side—of Scottish culture which was aristocratic, erudite, and absolutist: altogether closer to Louis XIV's France than George II's

England. Recovering that culture not only transforms our understanding of eighteenth-century Scotland, it substantially reshapes and adds to our understanding of the European Enlightenment as a whole.

This volume is divided into ten chapters which collectively address the principle manifestations of the Scottish Early Enlightenment. The first two locate it in culture, space, and time. Chapter 1 argues that its catalyst was the intellectually febrile environment of 1680s Edinburgh, combined with James VII and II's attempts at its reconstruction as a Royalist and Catholic environment. The seeds sown there bore fruit in the wake of the Revolution of 1688 when the ousted establishment found itself urgently trying to justify its very existence.

Chapter 2, however, argues that the changes which took place in Scottish intellectual culture during the 1680s were not in themselves sufficient to produce this cultural moment. Instead, they interacted with and built upon the rich, long-standing cultural traditions of the north-east, 'Scotland beyond the mountains', which are here traced to the foundation of King's College, Aberdeen, by Bishop William Elphinstone and the early development of a distinctively north-eastern humanist tradition. The scholars and scholarship discussed in the remainder of this book owed their intellectual and cultural world to this heady blend of Early Enlightenment intellectual ferment, revolution, and north-eastern humanism.

Chapters 3 and 4 explore the single most important scholarly debate of the Scottish Early Enlightenment: the decades-long dispute which ultimately saw trad ition al humanist histories of Scotland stripped of their cultural capital and revealed as late, partial, and entirely inaccurate accounts of the country's past. Chapter 3 recovers the first major assault on Scotland's humanist history, its myth of an ancient monarchy, in the 1680s and the subsequent, increasingly probing challenges which were directed against it in the wake of revolution. The authority of historians such as Hector Boece and George Buchanan was no longer sufficient to protect them from challenges based upon new and more sophisticated interpretations of medieval texts.

These challenges culminated in Thomas Innes's 1729 Critical Essay on the Ancient Inhabitants of the Northern Parts of Britain, or Scotland, the subject of Chapter 4. Innes's paradigm-shifting reconstruction of early medieval Scottish history, together with the final rejection of humanist history which it required, still underpins modern understandings of the period. Innes's own methods and goals, however, were more complex than mere seeking after truth and this chapter interrogates his Jacobite and Catholic, but surprisingly ecumenical, agenda as well as tracing the immediate and longer-term fortunes of his theories.

The scholarship which demolished the ancient monarchy mythos was founded on methodologically innovative approaches both to artefacts and to texts. Chapter 5 turns away from texts and towards artefacts, tracing the sudden rise in interest in prehistoric sites and monuments across Scotland during this period. It shows that cutting-edge approaches to the study of material as diverse as Roman forts and ancient megaliths could interact with older syncretist theories of know ledge and human origins to produce surprising, sometimes radical, reinterpretations of the distant past. Archaeologists and writers as diverse as the opera singer-turned-antiquary Alexander Gordon and the free-thinker John Toland used these ancient monuments as telescopes through which to glimpse an almost unimaginable antiquity, one which could exert a dramatically destabilizing effect on present-day hierarchies of culture and geography. Chapter 6, by contrast, highlights the foundational role of the French textual scholar Jean Mabillon in setting the agenda for the study of medieval Scotland in the archive during the same period.

From the first adoption of Mabillon's methods by Scottish scholars to the triumphant 1739 publication of James Anderson's Thesaurus—a Scottish response to Mabillon's De re diplomatica—these methodologies went from being peripheral to axiomatic in Scottish historical studies, fundamentally transforming scholars' engagement with the archive and its documents.

These general and methodological chapters are followed by three case studies, each exploring in depth a field of Scottish scholarship which was transformed during the Early Enlightenment. Chapter 7 turns to national and local geographies, challenging older views of this period as a geographically impoverished caesura between the monumental achievements of the 1662 Atlas Maior and the 1791 First Statistical Account. Instead, it argues, geographical scholarship was very much alive during the Early Enlightenment, but was undergoing rapid and unpredictable change as scholars brought new methodologies and new mental ties to bear on a traditional, humanist discipline.

Chapter 8 interrogates the methods and motivations of a discipline often dismissed as the driest of dry and antiquarian pursuits: genealogy. It reveals that, far from being intellectually vapid, genealogical scholarship was intimately connected to the development of the Stuart state and the transmission of French text ual scholarship to Scotland. It offered a proving ground for the new practices of archival research and could practically demonstrate the value of the new scholarship in a field of study whose application was widely seen to be both immediate and essential in a kin-based society.

The Early Enlightenment was, in many ways, a time of reckoning and wrestling with Scotland's humanist past and this was no different for those Scots attempting to build, rebuild, or deconstruct their nation's literary heritage. Chapter 9 explores

a series of canon-building efforts during this period, all growing out of the much older dispute between Scottish and Irish scholars over their shared Gaelic heri tage, but all also partaking of new, Enlightened forms of literary scholarship and textual editing to create a distinctive canon of Scottish writers.

Chapter 10 turns outwards to assess the cultural impact of the works of scholarship discussed here. Were they read and, if so, by whom? Using subscription lists, it argues that not only were these texts widely received throughout and furth of Scotland but that their reception allows us to trace the culture of the north-east exporting its own traditions to Scotland at large in a crucial, but subsequently forgotten, moment of cultural and intellectual upheaval. This in turn is placed within the wider context of Early Enlightenment reading, within and beyond the nation. Finally, the conclusion reiterates the arguments of the book as a whole and looks towards the end of the eighteenth century and the fate of Early Enlightenment thought.

By its very nature, as a single book-length study of sixty years of intellectual endeavour, this book is limited and selective in its scope. It focuses almost solely on the historical scholarship of the Early Enlightenment; had it addressed medicine or botany or art it would tell a different story. It is also inevitably confined to a restricted cast of characters, all of whom are discussed in far too brief a space, but each of whom is richly deserving of further study. And it is only tangentially engaged with the vast literature on the better-known high Scottish Enlightenment, an unavoidable but hardly desirable necessity. In each case, a different approach would have resulted in a very different book.

The largest omission in the present work, however, is the decision not to explore the connections between the Early Enlightenment and its famous successor, nor to follow the threads of its scholarship forward into the later eighteenth century and beyond. Such an investigation is a great desideratum, but far out with what can be achieved here. Instead, I hope that this volume will perform the more modest function of serving as a preliminary map—a chart of exploration—for this forgotten world and will lead to further scholarship which can begin to address these questions in the detail they deserve.

Let us then return to the end of the seventeenth century. But before we can reach Thomas Innes in the comfortable confines of the Advocates Library in 1699, we must go back to a moment some years before, when the project of Scottish scholarship seemed to be in itself a risible concept.

A Bright Constellation

On 14 November 1780, David Steuart Erskine, 11th Earl of Buchan, the radical antiquary and natural historian, invited a group of 'noblemen and gentlemen' to his house to discuss the formation of what was to become the Society of Antiquaries of Scotland. The list is a long and scintillating one, including Lord Kames, Lord Hailes, James Boswell, Gilbert Stuart, and a host of other worthies. Of the thirty-seven invited, however, only fourteen attended. Amongst those absent was the 'Hon. Mr Baron Maule', younger son of Harry Maule and half-brother of James Maule, both of whom have appeared numerous times in the preceding pages. Had he attended, we can only imagine what he would have made of the competing interpretations of Scottish scholarship amongst the Society's founders.

In his speech on that day in November 1780, Buchan told the assembled crowd that he was well aware of the Early Enlightenment scholarship which had preceded him, exhorting his auditors to 'allow me to recall to your recollection a bright constellation of Caledonian Naturalists and Antiquaries, which adorned the end of the last century, and continued to illuminate the beginning of this'. By 1782, however, William Smellie, also present at the initial meeting and subsequently to become the Society's first chronicler, could happily report that historic al scholarship had had no foothold in Scottish culture 'till we were happily united to England, not in government only, but in loyalty and affection to a common Sovereign'; a culturally and politically independent Scotland was a nation without history.

Smellie's attitude was symptomatic of the larger post-1745 rejection of the scholarly tradition which has been discussed here. Once the mainstream Scottish intelligentsia had reinvented themselves as loyal subjects of a British Empire, the culture of pre-1745 scholarship came to seem increasingly alien, subversive, and unusable, as much a relic of another age as the Episcopal Bishop James Brown, who continued to pray for King Henry I and IX until his death in 1791. We may recall, in this context, Boswell's letter to Samuel Johnson in which he described drinking 'coffee and old port' with the nonjuring Bishop William Falconer. Falconer toasted Dr. Johnson and the Jacobite heroine Flora MacDonald before relating stories of the non-jurors and his long-dead friend, the scholar-printer Thomas Ruddiman. 'It was really,' Boswell wrote, 'as if I had been living in the last century.' Men such as Bishops Brown and Falconer who did not follow the post-1745 winds of change rapidly became antiquities in their own lifetimes, the detritus of a way of life so different, but also so uncomfortably close, that in Boswell's anecdote it became transposed to the safety of a previous century, even though it had, in reality, been a living force only a generation before.

We should ask ourselves, then, what this meant for the longer tradition of Scottish scholarship? Were the ideas of this movement rejected along with its culture? The answer, of course, is 'no'. The discoveries of the Early Enlightenment and their conception of historical scholarship was carried forward well into the nineteenth century and beyond, even when they themselves had been forgotten, and it is worth recalling their foundational position to so much of modern Scottish historical research.

The collapse of the Ancient Monarchy mythos was the single greatest shift in Scottish historical thought, in the eighteenth century or at any other time. Within a few decades, the entire panorama of ancient Scottish history had been reshaped beyond recognition. As a result of the pioneering archival research and analysis of Thomas Innes and the scholars who went before him, the study of early medieval Scotland as it was pursued in the nineteenth century by scholars such as William Forbes Skene and in the twentieth century by A. O. Anderson, had already assumed its modern shape.

Alexander Gordon's attempts to wrestle with the mysterious symbols on Pictish stones were a first step towards John Stuart's Sculptured Stones of Scotland (1856) and the modern study of these remnants of Pictish culture. Meanwhile, the Society of Antiquaries of Scotland served as a home for scholars such as James Young Simpson, whose Archaic Sculpturings of Cups, Circles, &c. upon Stones and Rocks (1867) represented one of the most important advances in the study of Scottish prehistoric monuments since the early eighteenth century, and Joseph Anderson, the long-time keeper of the National Museum of Antiquities of Scotland.

The archival explorations of Innes, Patrick Abercromby, Robert Keith, Walter Macfarlan, and their compatriots laid the foundations for Scotland's great renaissance as a site of manuscript study and editing in the early nineteenth century. They set an example and, in the case of Macfarlan amongst others, provided the raw materials for the vast endeavour of the publication clubs, beginning with the Bannatyne Club in 1823 and continuing with the Maitland, the Abbotsford, the Spalding, the Spottiswoode, and other lesser lights. The Spalding Club, in particular (established in Aberdeen in 1839), built upon the foundations of its north-eastern predecessors and was responsible for first publishing many of the manuscript treatises discussed here, most notably Thomas Innes's Civil and Ecclesiastical History in 1853. The publication societies, in turn, have fundamentally shaped the contours of modern Scottish historiography, to the extent that as late as 2006 Alasdair Ross was able to comment on our reliance—over-reliance, indeed— on editions of chartularies which can be traced back to the transcriptions made by and for Walter Macfarlan in the middle of the eighteenth century.

In the era of the Statistical Accounts, earlier Scottish chorography and local history was rediscovered, with Sibbald's county histories being republished in 1803 (Fife) and 1892 (Stirling) while Alexander Keith's work formed one part of the Spalding Club's massive Collections for a History of the Shires of Aberdeen and Banff . As late as the early twentieth century, a confused mass of geographical and chorographical writing from this period could be published as Macfarlane's Geographical Collections, edited by Sir Arthur Mitchell and James Toschach Clark, and this larger corpus has played an important role in numerous subsequent studies of local antiquities and traditions, especially in relation to the Pont and Blaeu maps.

Genealogies have not fared as well as most products of the Scottish Early Enlightenment, with the majority of modern scholars being inclined to agree with John Ramsay of Ochtertyre's opinion that 'such performances . . . are often masses of dulness and vainglory, oddly huddled together'. In the nineteenth

century, however, they found a large and appreciative audience, with the works of Hay, Rose, and their contemporaries being edited and published in lavish limited editions for the benefit of the present-day members of the families commemorated. The tradition of collective genealogy and biography inaugurated by Crawfurd continued into the twentieth century with publications such as the Scots Peerage (1904–1914) and Complete Peerage (1910–1959), still familiar sights on reference library shelves.

The Scottish canon established in the era of Freebairn and Ruddiman has been one of the most enduring contributions of the Early Enlightenment. That Buchanan and Johnston, Florence Wilson, and Gavin Douglas, continue to be key figures in the history of Scottish letters is due in no small part to the editions and historiae literariae of that generation, even if the reasons for our interest are no longer so obvious. As with the contemporary canonization and editing of Shakespeare and Milton, the first generation of the eighteenth century exerted a profound influence in shaping subsequent understandings of what constituted great literature in Scotland.

We may conclude, then, that while the culture of the Early Enlightenment was ostensibly ignored or denied, its scholarly impact remained. Indeed, it did more than remain, it defined the cultural history of eighteenth-century Scotland and, to a great extent, continues to do so in the present day. Recovering the context in which these paradigmatic texts were written, then, becomes a project of signal importance. To understand modern Scottish scholarship, we must understand the scholarship of the Early Enlightenment.

The Scottish Early Enlightenment challenges us to reassess how we think about Scotland and its past. A small group of outsiders—religious minorities, political outcasts, and rural lairds—collectively transformed their country's intellectual landscape and disseminated that transformation through a far wider public sphere than that to which they themselves belonged. Their polemical scholarship with its determination to understand the present through the past and, ultimately, to transform that present based upon their new understandings of its history, laid the foundations not for the Jacobite Restoration or Episcopal toleration for which they had hoped but rather for a new era in Scotland's understanding of itself and its origins. In giving their country a new history, founded upon the scholarly analysis of textual and material sources, they were participating in the mainstream of Europe's Early Enlightenment. <>

THE SECULAR ENLIGHTENMENT Margaret C. Jacob [Princeton University Press, 978-0691161327]

A major new history of how the Enlightenment transformed people's everyday lives

THE SECULAR ENLIGHTENMENT is a panoramic account of the radical ways that life began to change for ordinary people in the age of Locke, Voltaire, and Rousseau. In this landmark book, familiar Enlightenment figures share places with voices that have remained largely unheard until now, from freethinkers and freemasons to French materialists, anticlerical Catholics, pantheists, pornographers, readers, and travelers.

Margaret Jacob, one of our most esteemed historians of the Enlightenment, reveals how this newly secular outlook was not a wholesale rejection of Christianity but rather a new mental space in which to

encounter the world on its own terms. She takes readers from London and Amsterdam to Berlin, Vienna, Turin, and Naples, drawing on rare archival materials to show how ideas central to the emergence of secular democracy touched all facets of daily life. Human frailties once attributed to sin were now viewed through the lens of the newly conceived social sciences. People entered churches not to pray but to admire the architecture, and spent their Sunday mornings reading a newspaper or even a risqué book. The secular-minded pursued their own temporal and commercial well-being without concern for the life hereafter, regarding their successes as the rewards for their actions, their failures as the result of blind economic forces.

A majestic work of intellectual and cultural history, **THE SECULAR ENLIGHTENMENT** demonstrates how secular values and pursuits took hold of eighteenth-century Europe, spilled into the American colonies, and left their lasting imprint on the Western world for generations to come.

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The Enlightenment was an eighteenth-century movement of ideas and practices that made the secular world its point of departure. It did not necessarily deny the meaning or emotional hold of religion, but it gradually shifted attention away from religious questions toward secular ones. By seeking answers in secular terms—even to many religious questions—it vastly expanded the sphere of the secular, making it, for increasing numbers of educated people, a primary frame of reference. In the Western world, art, music, science, politics, and even the categories of space and time had undergone a gradual process of secularization in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries; the Enlightenment built on this process and made it into an international intellectual cause. By asserting this expansion of secularity, I do not mean to downplay the many religious manifestations found in the age. This book does not claim that religion was enroute to being cast aside like bad bacteria waiting to be knocked out by an antibiotic of deism or atheism.

The chapters ahead do claim that attachment to the world—the here and the now—to a life lived without constant reference to God, became increasingly commonplace and the source of an explosion of innovative thinking about society, government, and the economy, to mention but a few areas of inquiry. In attaching to the world, many people lost interest, or belief, in hell. Its proprietor, the devil, still haunted popular beliefs but was no longer invoked on a daily basis by the literate and educated.

Areas of human behavior once explained by concepts like miracles or original sin now received explanations inspired by physical science or the emerging studies of social and economic relations. Space

and time were cleared of their Christian meaning, and people became more concerned with reorganizing the present and planning for the future than in their fate after death. They could enter churches not to pray but to admire the architecture, spend Sunday mornings reading a newspaper, cast a cold eye on clergy of every persuasion, and read risque books to their heart's content.' The secular-minded and literate could pursue their economic or commercial success, become innovative in science or technology, take up the liberal professions, work long hours in business or household, and imagine their successes or failures as the reward for their actions or the result of blind economic or social forces.

In a secular setting, the purpose of human life takes shape without necessary reference to a transcendent order; temporal well-being is the end being sought, now more readily managed by the increasing use of pocket watches. Where once the deeply religious monitored time to identify their shortcomings and assess their chances at salvation, the secular man lived a punctual life that found pleasure in work or social life. The secular woman, when not caring for home and domestic life, read novels, entertained in gatherings with an agenda—the abolition of the slave trade, the news from France or America—and died without fear of what might come next. Fathers and mothers sought to educate children so that they might find temporal happiness.

It is one thing to say that increasingly secular values and pursuits can be observed in the course of the eighteenth century; it is another to assert that a teleological process took hold particularly in the Western world and it is here to stay. Most recently, such an assertion allows its believers to look down upon Islam, for example. It also assumes that nation-states making it first to the finish line of secularization would be immune to the dark forces of totalitarianism or fascism.

In this book, readers will hear a cacophony of rich voices new to the age. We will be introduced to freethinkers, low and high Anglican churchmen, Hobbes, Spinoza, Locke, Newton, moderate Scots Presbyterians, French materialists, Rousseauian idealists, pornographers, Lutheran pantheists, and deeply anticlerical Catholics. As a result of their writings about politics, society, or religion, after 1750 a new generation of Europeans and American colonists could imagine entirely human creations such as republics and democracies. So much of this creative energy occurred in cities—hence the focus in many chapters on major urban settings. They did not cause the Enlightenment, but they facilitated its birthing.

Sometimes the signs of secularity, of living in the here and now, were subtle. Around the middle of the seventeenth century, Dutch professors of astronomy stopped teaching astrology. It was still widely practiced, yet, ever so gradually, in most annual Dutch almanacs its importance dwindled. About the same time, in the lifetime of Spinoza (d. 1677), few of his contemporaries could understand, let alone accept, his identification of God with Nature. Fast-forward to the 178os in both England and Germany, where thinkers with obviously religious sentiments like the Lutheran Johann Herder, or the poet of Dissenting (non-Anglican, Protestant) background, Samuel Taylor Coleridge, could imagine a universe infused with the divine. In three generations, one of the foundations of Christian metaphysics, the absolute separation of Creator from Creation, of spirit from matter, had disaggregated.

The disaggregation could also be symbolic. A French masonic ceremony of the late 1770s occurred in its "Sanctuary?' There we find the throne of the master of the lodge and next to it on the altar three silver candlesticks, the book of statutes and rules of the lodge, the "book of the gospel, a compass, a mallet," and in pride of place "reposes, displayed, the new Constitutions from the Grand Orient of France?'

Were these masonic brothers in Strasbourg mocking the accoutrements of the Catholic Church? Or using them to signal the importance they attached to their legal status within the fraternity? The setting was adorned with sky-blue serge, braids and ribbons of gold, silver and jewels. It belonged to a lodge of merchants who lost little love for their aristocratic brothers largely found in other lodges. The orator of the occasion noted the bravery of the French soldiers fighting in the American Revolution. He also said that brothers meet under "the living image of the Grand Architect of the Universe?' Somewhere, in this mélange of symbols and talk about the Grand Architect, lurks the residue of the Christian heritage common to all the brothers, but did one of them actually have to believe in it? Readers can make up their own minds.

Last, what to make of the Christian heritage? As early as the 1720s, an entirely new approach to religion emerged among a circle of exiled French Huguenot writers, German publishers, and engravers resident in the Dutch Republic. Overwhelmingly, the literature about Christianity and all the other religions had praised and privileged the first, even mocked the alternatives. Time out of mind, Jews and Christians waged polemical warfare in multiple texts, while Catholics and Protestants had been at one another's throats since the 1520s. None of them liked Muslims. Then a set of large, engraved French volumes, Picart and Bernard's Religious Ceremonies of the World, began to appear from 1723 onward, and it sought to treat all the religions of the world evenhandedly.' The volumes would remain in print in multiple editions, in the major languages, well into the nineteenth century. The impulse to develop such a treatment can best be described as secular; it focused on people's religious customs and ceremonies, not on the truth or falsity of their beliefs. By comparing in this way, the volumes helped establish the category of "religion," itself an offshoot of secular thinking. Religion was now a cultural practice that varied across time and space; it could be explained in secular terms.

This book tries to understand the major intellectual currents of the century that gave birth to the label "secular?' In the writing of history, in many European languages, the number of Enlightenments has now proliferated: the Radical Enlightenment, the Moderate Enlightenment, the Religious Enlightenment, even the Catholic Enlightenment. I too am guilty. The Radical Enlightenment: Pantheists, Freemasons and Republicans (1981) was my creation. It is surely blatantly presumptuous in the area of title making to bring forward yet another one, the Secular Enlightenment. At least this title possesses a historical lineage that goes back to the writings of Ernst Cassirer in the 193os and includes, in our own time, Peter Gay, Franco Venturi, Daniel Roche, and John Marshall. Here, I seek to add a contribution to their legacy.

Malebranche: Theological Figure, Being 2 by Alain Badiou translated by Jason E. Smith with Susan Spitzer, Introduction by Jason E. Smith [The Seminars of Alain Badiou, Columbia University Press, 9780231174787]

Alain Badiou is perhaps the world's most significant living philosopher. In his annual seminars on major topics and pivotal figures, Badiou developed vital aspects of his thinking on a range of subjects that he would go on to explore in his influential works. In this seminar, Badiou offers a tour de force encounter with a lesser-known seventeenth-century philosopher and theologian, Nicolas Malebranche, a contemporary and peer of Spinoza and Leibniz.

The seminar is at once a record of Badiou's thought at a key moment in the years before the publication of his most important work, Being and Event, and a lively interrogation of Malebranche's key text, the Treatise on Nature and Grace. Badiou develops a rigorous yet novel analysis of Malebranche's theory of grace, retracing his claims regarding the nature of creation and the relation between God and world and between God and Jesus. Through Malebranche, Badiou develops a radical concept of truth and the subject. This book renders a seemingly obscure post-Cartesian philosopher fascinating and alive, restoring him to the philosophical canon. It occupies a pivotal place in Badiou's reflections on the nature of being that demonstrates the crucial role of theology in his thinking.

Review

I devoured this magnificent work in an evening. It blends Badiou's usual systematic approach with a nuanced account of seventeenth- and early eighteenth-century philosophy that draws skillful contrasts between Malebranche's system and those of Arnauld, Bossuet, Leibniz, Pascal, and the Jesuits. Hovering over the scene is the unlikely but finally compelling specter of Jacques Lacan. -- Graham Harman, author of *Object-Oriented Ontology: A New Theory of Everything*

Malebranche emerges from this seminar as an author divided between an asphyxiating theological doctrine and an exhilarating theory of the subject, which anticipates many ideas about desire, fantasy, finitude, and grace that will appear much later, from Hegel to Lacan. Even though Badiou claims that nothing productive came from his effort, we can appreciate in this new installment of his seminar a crucial stepping stone between *Theory of the Subject* and *Being and Event.* -- Bruno Bosteels, author of *Badiou and Politics*

This book tackles Malebranche through Alain Badiou's unique perspective. Badiou nicely translates questions of theology into questions of politics, bringing Malebranche a contemporary resonance that he doesn't have in any other account. -- Todd McGowan, author of *Emancipation After Hegel: Achieving a Contradictory Revolution*

The book reads very well, and the translation is as excellent as one would expect from this team. . . . Anyone curious about Malebranche, or wishing to recall things they used to know about him, should enjoy Badiou's presentation; and anyone who appreciates solid philosophical exegeses and a bit of intellectual flair should be very entertained and provoked by this seminar as well. -- Ed Pluth, *Notre Dame Philosophical Review*

Malebranche is a must-read for Marxists, Philosophers, Theologians, and anyone interested in the Philosophy of Alain Badiou. —Dalton Winfree, *Marx and Philosophy Review of Books*

A fascinating interrogation of a thinker much ignored in the English-speaking world by a leading contemporary philosopher. *Choice*

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Editors' Introduction to the English Edition of the Seminars of Alain Badiou

With the publication in English of Alain Badiou's seminar, we believe that a new phase of his reception in the Anglophone world will open up, one that bridges the often formidable gap between the two main forms in which his published work has so far appeared. On the one hand, there is the tetralogy of his difficult and lengthy major works of systematic philosophy, beginning with a sort of prelude, Theory of the Subject, and continuing with the three parts of Being and Event-, Logics of Worlds, and the forthcoming Immanence of Truths. On the other hand, there are his numerous shorter and occasional pieces on topics such as ethics, contemporary politics, film, literature, and art. Badiou's "big books" are often built on rather daunting mathematical ideas and formulations: Being and Event relies primarily on set theory and the innovations introduced by Paul Cohen; Logics of Worlds adds category, topos, and sheaf theory; and The Immanence of Truths expands into the mathematics of large cardinals. Each of these great works is written in its own distinctive, and often rather dense, style: Theory of the Subject echoes the dramatic tone and form of a Lacanian seminar; Being and Event presents a fundamental ontology in the form of a series of Cartesian "meditations"; Logics of Worlds is organized in formal theories and "Greater Logics," and expressed in richly developed concrete examples, phenomenological descriptions, and scholia; and for reading the Immanence of Truths, Badiou suggests two distinct paths: one short and "absolutely necessary," the other long and "more elaborate or illustrative, more free-ranging." Because of the difficulty of these longer books, and their highly compact formulations, Badiou's shorter writings—such as the books on ethics and Saint Paul—often serve as a reader's first point of entry into his ideas. But this less steep path of induction brings its own problems, insofar as these more topical and occasional works often take for granted their relationship to the fundamental architecture of Badiou's thinking and thus may appear to have a greater (or smaller) role in it than they actually do. Hence the publication of Badiou's seminar from 1983 through (at least) 2012 makes available a middle path, one in which the major lines of Badiou's thinking—as well as its many extraordinary detours—are displayed with the remarkable clarity and the generous explications and exemplifications that always characterize his oral presentations.' It is extraordinarily exciting to see the genesis of Badiou's ideas in the experimental and performative context of his seminar, and there is a great deal in the seminars that doesn't appear at all in his existing published writings.

The first volume of the seminar to be published in English, on Lacan, constitutes part of a four-year sequence on "anti-philosophy" which also includes volumes on Nietzsche, Wittgenstein, and Saint Paul.

The second volume, on Malebranche, is part of a similar cluster on being, which also involves years dedicated to Parmenides and Heidegger. And the later volumes, beginning in 1996, gather material from multiple years of the seminar, as in the case of Axiomatic Theory of the Subject (which is based on the sessions from the years 1996-97 and 1997-98), and Images of the Present Time (which was delivered in sessions over three years, from 2001 to 2004).

Isabelle Vodoz and Veronique Pineau are establishing the French text of the seminar on the basis of audio recordings and notes, with the intention of remaining as close as possible to Badiou's delivery while eliminating unnecessary repetitions and other minor artifacts. In reviewing and approving the texts of the seminar (sometimes as long as thirty years after having delivered them), Badiou decided not to revise or reformulate them, but to let them speak for themselves, without the benefit of self-critical hindsight. Given this decision, it is remarkable to see how consistent his thinking has been over the years. Moreover, each volume of the seminar includes a preface by Badiou that offers an extremely valuable account of the political and intellectual context of the seminar, as well as a sort of retrospective reflection on the process of his thought's emergence. In our translations of the seminar into English, we have tried to preserve the oral quality of the French edition in order to give the reader the impression of listening to the original recordings. We hope that the publication of Badiou's seminar will allow more readers to encounter the full scope of his ideas, and will allow those readers who are already familiar with his work to discover a new sense of its depths, its range, and its implications—perhaps almost as if reading Badiou for the first time.

About the 1986 Seminar on Malebranche by Alain Badiou

As far as my own philosophical efforts are concerned, the years between 1982, when my Theory of the Subject was published, and 1988 were entirely dominated by the elaboration of what is often considered my most important book, *Being and Event*.

The most fundamental thesis of this book is that being qua being is pure multiplicity (the multiple without One, or, to be more literary, the multiple without qualities) and that, since the rational knowledge of the multiple is mathematics, it can be said that ontology is quite simply the science of mathematics itself.

As a result, the preliminary work on Being and Event took two different directions.

First, I reexamined an entire branch of contemporary mathematics that deals with sets and placed at the heart of my philosophical system Paul Cohen's remarkable conception of "generic" sets, that is, those multiplicities that have "almost" no identity of their own and are therefore particularly well-suited to supporting universal truths with their being. This work was the focus of my so-called "Saturday" seminar, which sought to develop a philosophical didactics of these difficult mathematical matters.

Next, I turned back to philosophy—ancient, classical, and modern—so as to figure out the history of the thinking of being, the history of ontology, in my own way. I took what I considered to be the principal concepts that "surround" from above and below, so to speak, the central concept of multiplicity—the One and the Infinite—and I attempted to understand the relationship that these concepts entertain with the concept of being in the different historically established approaches to ontology.

This led to a sort of rapid survey of almost the entire history of philosophy. With regard to the One, in terms of its ontological function, I studied it in the work of Plato, Descartes, and Kant.' The Infinite resulted in close analyses of a number of texts by Aristotle, Spinoza, and Hegel. As for being itself, I divided up its history into three parts. As far as its beginnings were concerned, I probed its properly ontological figure, grasped via Parmenides; as regards its modernity, its figure of withdrawal and forgetting as Heidegger explored it; and there obviously remained the theological figure of being, which was especially important since being, when conceived of as God, effects a synthesis of the One and the Infinite.

Initially, I thought that the most significant thinker on this subject was Leibniz. Then, under the influence of Martial Gueroult's enormous book devoted to Malebranche, a book I'd once read with passionate interest, I went back to the Treatise on Nature and Grace, and I was in fact touched by something like grace. Whence the seminar you are about to read.

Malebranche is an incredible thinker, especially because, in a way, for anyone who's not a Christian, and a committed Christian at that, he seems unusable. And yet, reading him, you move from one wonder to another, as if you were visiting a beautiful church filled with little paintings, each more amazing than the next.

When it comes to the intelligibility of being, Malebranche shows unflinching courage: since God is the ultimate name of being, since the true God is that of the Christian Church, and since Cartesian rationality requires us to be able to think all of this clearly and distinctly, the fundamental categories of religion, namely, Christ and the Church, have to be categories of being itself, and we have to be able to prove that this is the case. And since the two orders of nature and grace condition men's lives in every way, in this world as in the next, their relationship has to be explained in its entirety without our ever conceding anything to the artifice of the mysterious or of the incomprehensible, which is nothing but a spiritual abdication.

Armed with a single principle, namely that God can act only in the simplest ways—otherwise he would be a capricious and frivolous creator—Malebranche sets about to deduce, yes, deduce, both Christ and the Church, as well as the action of grace, and many other things besides.

To that end, as you'll see, his method is to go straight to the heart of a problem, to resolve it, as a rule, by raising an even more difficult problem, to counterbalance this problem with an unexpectedly simple solution, which will in turn lead to consequences of a rare complexity, which will have to be dealt with by a new notion, and so on.

The result is that we've got an intellectual masterpiece of Baroque art, far more honest and pure than Leibniz's propositions. To be sure, Malebranche lacked the deep understanding of differential calculus that assured Leibniz's glory and superiority. But when it came to sincerity, to the light in which the whole enterprise was bathed, to the fluid, elegant style, to the bold conviction that was constantly engaged in his amazing proofs, Malebranche was second to none.

This seminar is without a doubt the only one in my entire career that, in terms of the construction of my own system, has been of no use to me. But it was a time of true delight, when I was able to

experience, to use one of the master's terms, "the grace of feeling." I hope that you readers will be touched by it too. <>

ANECDOTES OF ENLIGHTENMENT: HUMAN NATURE FROM LOCKE TO WORDSWORTH by James Robert Wood [University of Virginia Press, 9780813942209]

ANECDOTES OF ENLIGHTENMENT is the first literary history of the anecdote in English. In this wide-ranging account, James Robert Wood explores the animating effects anecdotes had on intellectual and literary cultures over the long eighteenth century. Drawing on extensive archival research and emphasizing the anecdote as a way of thinking, he shows that an intimate relationship developed between the anecdote and the Enlightenment concept of human nature. Anecdotes drew attention to odd phenomena on the peripheries of human life and human history. Enlightenment writers developed new and often contentious ideas of human nature through their efforts to explain these anomalies. They challenged each other's ideas by reinterpreting each other's anecdotes and by telling new anecdotes in turn.

ANECDOTES OF ENLIGHTENMENT features careful readings of the philosophy of John Locke and David Hume; the periodical essays of Joseph Addison, Richard Steele, and Eliza Haywood; the travel narratives of Joseph Banks, James Cook, and James Boswell; the poetry of Samuel Taylor Coleridge and William Wordsworth; and Laurence Sterne's *Tristram Shandy*. Written in an engaging style and spotlighting the eccentric aspects of Enlightenment thought, this fascinating book will appeal to historians, philosophers, and literary critics interested in the intellectual culture of the long eighteenth century.

Review

"An ambitious exploration of the generic status, purpose, and consumption of the anecdote in the Enlightenment, covering five major fields of inquiry: philosophy, scientific experiment, journals of voyagers, periodical literature, and the poetry of the *Lyrical Ballads*. Although the anecdote is a topic that has preoccupied scholars since the onset of New Historicism, James Wood has refreshed the discussion in a manner that will appeal to younger academics intrigued by the fluidities of Epicurean materialism. Wood's argument is as extensive as it is polished." (Jonathan Lamb, Vanderbilt University, author of *Scurvy: The Disease of Discovery*)

Absolutely wonderful. **ANECDOTES OF ENLIGHTENMENT** is a very valuable contribution to eighteenth-century British literary studies. (Jenny Davidson, Columbia University, author of *Reading Jane Austen*)

ANECDOTES OF ENLIGHTENMENT centers on the British Enlightenment, tracing a tradition of thinking with anecdotes from the late seventeenth century up to the early nineteenth century. The Enlightenment culture of the anecdote was not, of course, unique to Britain. Other books could easily be written exploring anecdotes in other national contexts. I have chosen to focus on the British Enlightenment simply because it is the one that I know best. But even to concentrate on the British Enlightenment is to encounter many peripatetic stories that traversed linguistic and national boundaries and helped connect the British Enlightenment to the Enlightenment as a whole. Whether they came from near or afar, anecdotes prompted philosophers, essayists, travel writers, and poets to rethink what they believed they knew about human nature. Writers were drawn to anecdotes of people (and occasionally animals) who seemed to differ markedly from themselves: tales of hunchbacks and housekeepers, polytheists and parrots, savages and slaves. Anecdotes opened paths leading out to the perceived peripheries of the human world. But anecdotes also tended to unsettle conventional notions of what was central and what was peripheral in human life, frequently pointing thinkers toward the conclusion that both the norm and the exception obey the very same set of laws.

The Polly Baker story illustrates how anecdotes in general could allow the abstract laws of human nature to acquire narrative form. Indeed, the story's true protagonist might be said to be what Baker calls "the first and great Command of Nature, and of Nature's God, Encrease and Multiply"—a phrase that equates God's injunction to Adam and Eve (and later to Noah) in Genesis to fill the world with people with the law of nature directing all living things to propagate themselves. In the anecdote, the "first and great Command of Nature, and of Nature's God" ends up triumphing over the New England law forbidding sex out of marriage. One reason that writers kept coming back to the anecdote of Polly Baker was that her singular story lent itself to thinking about the nature of sexual desire in general. The anecdotes that entered into Enlightenment writings on the human similarly identified and dramatized larger problems for the study of human nature. They told of isolated instances of human (or human-like) behavior that deviated from tacit norms. For many Enlightenment writers, the process of reconciling anecdotal anomalies promised to illuminate much more fundamental laws than those on the law books: the laws of human nature itself.

In practice, however, anecdotes signally failed to establish clear and uncontestable laws behind the diversity of human experience, for the tendency of anecdotes was to provoke debate on the nature of human nature rather than to close it down. Commentators on the Polly Baker anecdote, for example, did not agree on exactly what it was that the anecdote implied about the nature of sexual desire and its relation to existing social arrangements. Annet used the story to argue that many of the legal restrictions placed on sexual behavior on both sides of the Atlantic were unjust. But the anonymous writer of the "Interesting Reflections on the Life of Miss Polly Baker" (1794), while conceding that "To

instruct mankind in the art of extirpating those passions planted in us for the wisest and most benevolent purposes, would be like teaching them to arrest the circulation of the blood," nevertheless recommended that "proper channels, and legal gratification" ought to be provided to contain and direct the "torrent, to which we owe the most the blissful moments of our life." These interpreters of the Polly Baker anecdote made Baker, the harlot who claims the right to judge her own case, subject once again to judgment. Annet uses the Polly Baker story to argue that many laws and conventions governing the expression of human sexuality are unjustified impositions on natural desires. But the anonymous author of "Interesting Reflections on the Life of Miss Polly Baker" gives the same laws a necessary part to play in channeling these desires. Where Annet sees the Polly Baker anecdote as a clarion call to rethink conventional morality, the writer of the "Interesting Reflections" sees it as a comic fable showing up the absurdity of allowing women to pursue their desires without regard for law or convention. Neither writer can have the final word. What Andre Jolles says in Simple Forms (1929) about the genre of the "case"—a narrative that poses a problem for deciding how some law or other is to be applied—could also be said of the anecdote's function in Enlightenment writing on the human. In these writings, the anecdote "asks the question, but cannot give the answer." In the anecdote, as in the "case," it is the "swaying and swinging of the mental disposition of weighing and judging" that "becomes manifest in the form" and not the law itself. This is why different commentators could discover very different principles of human nature at work in the same anecdote. Anecdotes like the story of Polly Baker did not serve to establish universal laws of human nature. To borrow a phrase from Jacques Derrida, the anecdote obeys "a law of singularity which must come into contact with the general or universal essence of the law without ever being able to do so." Instead of fixing laws of human nature for once and for all, anecdotes provided Enlightenment writers points of departure from which to embark on the quest to discover these laws. They did so by posing the problem of how singular occurrences might be accounted for in universal terms.

Anecdotes are characterized by singleness and singularity. The Oxford English Dictionary captures these two essential features of the anecdote in its definition of the genre as "The narrative of a detached incident, or of a single event, told as being in itself interesting or striking." Anecdotes are short narratives of events singled out as worthy to be told because they are singular, swerving in one way or another from the usual order of things." As Novalis wrote in one of his notebooks in the final years of the eighteenth century, "A large class of anecdotes are those which show a human trait in a strange, striking way, for example, cunning, magnanimity, bravery, inconstancy, bizarrerie, cruelty, wit, imagination, benevolence, morality, love, friendship, wisdom, narrow-mindedness etc." Anecdotes furnish what Novalis describes as "a gallery of many kinds of human actions, an anatomy of humanity," which supplies "the study of man" with cases on which to work: As he was writing down these thoughts on the anecdote as a genre, Novalis could look back on the eighteenth century as an age in which anecdotes had served as indispensable aids to the study of humankind.

Anecdotes served as touchstones in Enlightenment writing on human nature despite their known unreliability as accounts of actual happenings. The anecdote's tenuous and yet tenacious claim to historical reference is one quality that distinguishes it from the novel, which began to display a more manifest and open fictionality as its generic outlines became more defined over the eighteenth century. Indeed, the emergence of the anecdote as a distinct and identifiable genre closely tracks that of the novel—at least in the English language, in which the novel came to be distinguished from the romance."

The anecdote and the novel may even be regarded as mirror genres, for where the novel appears to make fiction conform to the rules of reality, the anecdote seems to make reality conform to the rules of fiction. Unlike the novel, however, the anecdote was a small narrative of human life that could be incorporated into longer works that aimed to identify the general laws governing human thought and behavior.

Far from than treating anecdotes as readily intelligible stories that pointed to clear conclusions about human nature, Enlightenment writers valued anecdotes precisely for their unassimilable oddness: a quality that seemed essential to their ability to jolt the mind into reflecting on the well-springs of human nature. In his short remarks on the anecdote, Novalis draws attention to this ability of the anecdote to "produce an effect" and "engage our imagination in a pleasing way"—although he also attempts to distinguish anecdotes that generate this elusive "effect" from the kind that illustrate specific human traits and are of clear value to "the study of man." I would argue, however, that all anecdotes (or at least all successful ones) create an "effect" that is inextricable from their singularity of content and shortness of form. Anecdotes are more than mere representations of preceding events. They are also textual, social, and cognitive events in themselves. Beyond the initial "effect" they produce, anecdotes can engender endless versions and variants of themselves, multiplying in mouths and minds. And more than simply illustrating what is already known, anecdotes can galvanize the work of thought.

A few qualifications should be added here to this definition of the anecdote as the story of a single and singular event. Firstly, some anecdotes might better be described as narrating circumstances rather than events, for the happenings that anecdotes narrate are not always presented as occurring within clear temporal or spatial limits. Secondly, the happening narrated in an anecdote can be represented as happening once or many times over. The latter kind of anecdote is, to use Gerard Genette's term, "iterative," in the sense that in it "a single narrative utterance takes upon itself several occurrences together of the same event." An anecdote that is "iterative" in this sense might tell of a repeated habit or compulsion characteristic of a particular person, as when the fictional character Tristram Shandy divulges a "small anecdote known only in our own family" that his father "had made it a rule for many years of his life,—on the first Sunday night of every month throughout the whole year,—as certain as ever the Sunday night came,—to wind up a large house-clock which we had standing upon the back-stairs head, with his own hands" (LS i:6), adding that the day of the month that Walter allocated to winding the clock was also the one on which he fulfilled his marital duties to his wife. However, even "singular" anecdotes (anecdotes of happenstances presented as happening only once) are potentially "iterative" in the sense that they invite themselves to be told again and again. In fact, a tendency to transform singularity into repetition is characteristic of anecdotes in general, whether the happenings of which they tell are represented as happening once or many times over.

Anecdotes can be told in a variety of ways. The original anecdote of Polly Baker was, for example, mostly taken up with a transcription of the speech that Baker had purportedly given in the Connecticut courthouse, with the speech's framing context supplied in a short headnote. Anecdotes can also be told in verse, as in William Wordsworth's poem "Anecdote for Fathers." Within the indistinct limits that distinguish anecdotes from more extended historical or fictional narratives, anecdotes can vary in length. At one extreme, there are anecdotes that are told within the confines of a single sentence, as when Carl Linnaeus records in Nemesis Divina, the manuscript of theological case studies that he compiled between 1750 and 1765, "On the day when my mother died in Smâland and I was in Uppsala, I was

more melancholy than I have ever been, although I knew nothing of her death." Anecdotes can, of course, be longer than this. Even anecdotes that are relatively short in some versions may be longer in others. The version of the Polly Baker anecdote that was printed in the Edinburgh Magazine, for example, gave Baker a detailed backstory that she had lacked in the version that appeared in the General Advertiser, expanding her tale to nearly double its original length. Too much elaboration, however, and an anecdote ceases to be an anecdote and begins to be something else—potentially, a novel.' The anecdote's protean adaptability—its ability to be told in different ways, to signify differently in different contexts, and even to be transformed into other genres—was key to the catalyzing function the genre served in the intellectual culture of the Enlightenment. The anecdote's mutual entwinement with the Enlightenment is the subject to which I now turn.

Overview

I have organized each of the chapters in this book on a different principle. Successive chapters use a literary genre (the essay), a single writer (Hume), a historical event (the voyage of the Endeavour), and a literary project (Lyrical Ballads) as nets for catching anecdotes. My book is not intended as a general account of the eighteenth-century anecdote, but rather as a more focused study of the anecdote's role in what Hume called "the science of human nature" (EHU 5). This is one reason why, for example, I have not given a more prominent role to Samuel Johnson in this book. I am primarily concerned not with individual persons like Johnson but rather the universal category of the human. The decision to deemphasize Johnson also freed me from having to retread ground already well covered by Helen Deutsch in Loving Dr. Johnson, a book that has nevertheless shaped my thinking on the eighteenth-century anecdote in ways not easily specifiable in the notes, although I acknowledge the influence here.

The first chapter of this book is concerned with the anecdote's ability to make human nature newly available for exploration. I show how the anecdote emerges in the essayistic writings of John Locke, Joseph Addison, Richard Steele, and Eliza Haywood as a genre positioned between the scientific experiment and the thought experiment. Much like the premeditated events that were detailed in experimental reports, anecdotes were narratives of spontaneous events that seemed to point toward the existence of general principles behind the diversity of the human world. I emphasize throughout this chapter the capacity of anecdotes to stage experiments of thought. They had the effect of making human nature seem newly strange, encouraging writers to try to explain this strangeness. These explanations remained provisional, for anecdotes in the Lockean tradition of essayistic writing also invited further interpretation and reinterpretation. I show, for example, how one of Locke's anecdotes was directly answered by another anecdote of Hume's that served to unsettle the conclusions that Locke had reached on the basis of the original anecdote. I also examine how the antifeminist classical anecdote of the Ephesian matron was answered by Steele's anecdote of Inkle and Yarico, as well as how Haywood, in turn, tells an anecdote in order to trump one of the many anecdotes of female nature that appear in Addison's and Steele's Spectator.

My second chapter on Hume's literary career centers on the capacity of the anecdote to enable philosophers to take speculative flights from common life but also to pull them back down to earth again. I examine anecdotes of Hume's own odd behavior in public, anecdotes that seemed to imply a relationship between Hume's personal eccentricity and the eccentricity of his philosophical thought. Many of the anecdotes about Hume—anecdotes told by others and by Hume himself—frame Hume's philosophy as founded on Hume's self-alienation from common life. At the same time, however, the

anecdotes present this self-alienation as a process that itself happens within common life. I argue that these anecdotes of Hume's oddness are continuous with Hume's own use of anecdotes throughout his literary career, in which anecdotes work as narrative islands that expose the constructed nature of the narratives human beings tell about themselves, as well as the narratives fashioned to explain the progress of England as a nation and the advance of religious belief from polytheism to monotheism. Finally, in my discussion of Hume's essay "On the Standard of Taste" (1757), I show the centrality of the anecdote Hume quotes from Don Quixote (1605-15) to Hume's attempt to explain the nature of aesthetic taste, a phenomenon that escapes easy definition but can nevertheless be exemplified through the je-ne-sais-quoi that the well-told anecdote is capable of producing.

While my first two chapters establish how anecdotes could function within the study of human nature, my third chapter looks at how the use of anecdotes as a tool for understanding the human could itself become a point of controversy in the Enlightenment. I focus on the divergences and disagreements about the use of anecdotes. that surfaced in the wake of the first of James Cook's three voyages to the South Seas on the Endeavour. In their respective journals, Joseph Banks and Cook pursue different approaches to recording anecdotes, Banks seeking to fit anecdotal narratives into allencompassing descriptions of the societies he encountered and Cook enacting a modest reticence to explain the larger meaning of the singular events he records in his journal. John Hawkesworth, the compiler of the official narrative of the voyage, would subsequently seek to mine the anecdotes he found in Banks's and Cook's journals for useful information for the study of human nature as a whole. His reliance on the anecdote as a form, however, opened him up to the scorn of many of his reviewers, who denied the relevance of the anecdotes on which he speculated for the science of man. Much as Hawkesworth was brought low by his association with the anecdote, Banks's association with the genre also worked to undermine his scientific authority as the president of the Royal Society Finally, I contrast the Scottish conjectural historians' speculative use of anecdotes concerning the Endeavour voyage with Samuel Johnson's stubbornly commonsense reactions to the same material, which deny the need for any systematic framework at all in order to understand the anecdotes that the Endeavour brought in its wake.

In my final chapter on William Wordsworth and Samuel Taylor Coleridge's Lyrical Ballads, with a Few Other Poems (1798) I argue that Wordsworth reframes the anecdote as a distinctively poetic form of knowledge. As a genre embedded in the "real language of men," the anecdote helps Wordsworth bridge the gap between informal conversation and the language of poetry. In my reading of "Goody Blake and Harry Gill" in relation to the physiological writings of Thomas Beddoes and Erasmus Darwin, I show how the anecdote becomes a common ground on which men of science, poets, and the wider public can meet. The link between anecdotes and poetry thus underpins Wordsworth's claims that poetry can and should be written in ordinary language, that poetry is a "science of human feelings," and that the poet possesses a special claim to reveal the nature of human beings, a claim founded on the poet's special ability to transmute the anecdote into poetry. A brief coda juxtaposes Montesquieu's Spirit of the Laws (1748) with Laurence Sterne's Tristram Shandy (1759-1767), considering how both texts illustrate an animating illogicality that characterized the use of anecdotes to think systematically about the structuring principles of human nature.

This book was finished at a time of widespread anxiety over "fake news," falsehoods posing as actual news stories and disseminated rapidly through electronic social networks. These stories were, at the time of writing, often treated as if they had become malign agents in themselves, with powers to derange

the whole public sphere. In the current climate, then, a book arguing for the enlightening potential of parafactual stories might appear a bit perverse. But I would reply that the fact that Enlightenment writers did embrace anecdotes enjoins us to rethink what we mean by "enlightenment." For while anecdotes often led thinkers toward startling conclusions about the nature of human nature, they also brought the same thinkers perilously close to credulity, lunacy, and enthusiasm. This book takes notice of the darker side to Enlightenment anecdotes, which can depict cruel as well as whimsical incidents—and often themselves perform an intellectual comity toward the human beings they depict. Enlightenment anecdotes were, moreover, closely intertwined with transatlantic slavery, imperial expansion, and colonial prospecting, traveling along the routes these historical processes scored around the globe. Even as I have sought to acknowledge these entanglements, I have also tried to register the pleasures of reading and thinking with Enlightenment anecdotes—in our own time as well as in the long eighteenth century. For Enlightenment writers, this pleasure was no simple self-indulgence but a shared experience that served to bind them to their fellow human beings, even as their own efforts to expose the inner workings of human nature led them to depart from ordinary habits of thought. Anecdotes helped foster a certain self-consciousness about the embeddedness of intellectual work within the wider social world, as well as promoting an awareness on the oddness of studying the nature of human beings while at the same time being one. To trace the workings of anecdotes in the Enlightenment science of human nature may help us, in turn, become more conscious about the ways we think about the human now. <>

Emancipation After Hegel: Achieving a Contradictory Revolution by Todd McGowan [Columbia University Press, 9780231192705]

Hegel is making a comeback. After the decline of the Marxist Hegelianism that dominated the twentieth century, leading thinkers are rediscovering Hegel's thought as a resource for contemporary politics. What does a notoriously difficult nineteenth-century German philosopher have to offer the present? How should we understand Hegel, and what does understanding Hegel teach us about confronting our most urgent challenges?

In this book, Todd McGowan offers us a Hegel for the twenty-first century. Simultaneously an introduction to Hegel and a fundamental reimagining of Hegel's project, **Emancipation After Hegel** presents a radical Hegel who speaks to a world overwhelmed by right-wing populism, authoritarianism, neoliberalism, and economic inequalities. McGowan argues that the revolutionary core of Hegel's thought is contradiction. He reveals that contradiction is inexorable and that we must attempt to sustain it rather than overcoming it or dismissing it as a logical failure. McGowan contends that Hegel's notion of contradiction, when applied to contemporary problems, challenges any assertion of unitary identity as every identity is in tension with itself and dependent on others. An accessible and compelling reinterpretation of an often-misunderstood thinker, this book shows us a way forward to a new politics of emancipation as we reconcile ourselves to the inevitability of contradiction and find solidarity in not belonging.

Review

This is the book we were waiting for after long years of being bombarded by Hegel as a closet liberal whose last word is recognition. With Todd McGowan, the revolutionary Hegel is back—however, it is not the old Marxist Hegel but the Hegel AFTER Marx, the Hegel who makes us aware that revolution is an open and risked process which necessarily entails catastrophic failures. Hegel's problem—how to save the legacy of the French revolution after its breakdown—is our problem today: how to save the project of radical emancipation after the catastrophe of Stalinism. In a truly democratic country, **EMANCIPATION AFTER HEGEL** would be reprinted in hundreds of thousands of copies and distributed for free to all students. Read this book… or ignore it at your own risk! -- Slavoj Žižek, author of *Less Than Nothing* and *Absolute Recoil*

Todd McGowan's **EMANCIPATION AFTER HEGEL** could not come at a more appropriate time: the time when we truly need to carefully (re)think and reestablish the idea of emancipation. The book does this in a brilliant and compelling way, taking contradiction—as understood by Hegel—as the key to the understanding of emancipation and its relationship to freedom. -- Alenka Zupančič, author of *What Is Sex?*

In **EMANCIPATION AFTER HEGEL**, Todd McGowan forges an unprecedented type of left Hegelianism. From Marx and Engels onward, leftist defenders of Hegel either downplay or repudiate Hegel's accounts of Christianity and the state. McGowan's distinctive achievement is to prove that Hegelian freedom would not exist without both the Christian legacy and the modern state. McGowan opens up new horizons precisely by venturing where traditional left Hegelianisms have feared to go. -- Adrian Johnston, author of *A New German Idealism: Hegel, Žižek, and Dialectical Materialism*

The ten chapters canvass a wide range of topics—logic, reason, history, love, freedom, politics, experience, universality. In each case, McGowan shows with devastating clarity how the received view of Hegel has been founded on serious misreadings, then unfolds a fresh interpretation as deeply insightful as it is far-reaching. The result is an absolute *tour de force.* In McGowan's book, Hegel rises from the dead and assumes the status of an indispensable resource for the next chapter of Western intellectual history. -- Richard Boothby, author of *Freud as Philosopher: Metapsychology After Lacan*

Sparklingly articulate., *Marx and Philosophy Review of Books*

The split into Left Hegelians and Right Hegelians obscures what I argue in **EMANCIPATION AFTER HEGEL,** is the central contention of Hegel's philosophy—that being itself is contradictory and that we have the capacity to apprehend this contradiction by thinking. Rather than trying to eliminate contradiction, subjects attempt to sustain and further it. Contradiction is not anathema to thought but what animates both thought and being. Hegel's primary philosophical contribution is to reverse the historical judgment on contradiction. It is the driving force of his philosophy.

The role of contradiction in Hegel's philosophy calls into question two pillars of traditional logic—the law of identity and the principle of noncontradiction. Though many attribute both of these laws to Aristotle (along with the law of the excluded middle), it isn't entirely clear that he formulates the law of identity. Or at least he never explicitly says "each thing is what it is" or "A is A" as Gottfried Leibniz does in the New Essays on Human Understanding. Leibniz takes self-identity as banally true, as one of the primary truths of reason. It is so obvious that it is not informative, but one cannot dispute this law while remaining on the terrain of reason.

Though Aristotle is reticent about the law of identity, he is much more forthcoming about the principle of noncontradiction. In the Metaphysics, he provides the canonical definition of this principle. He states, "obviously it is impossible for the same man at the same time to believe the same thing to be and not to be; for if a man were mistaken in this point he would have contrary opinions at the same time. It is for this reason that all who are carrying out a demonstration refer it to this as an ultimate belief; for this is naturally the starting-point even for all the other axioms." Aristotle sees the problem with the rejection of the principle: one would be able to say anything and thus would say nothing of significance. Sense seems to require adhere to the principle of noncontradiction, which is just the negative version of the law of identity. If one violates the law of identity by saying an apple is not an apple, one falls into contradiction.

Hegel's position on the law of identity is straightforward. The propositional form in which the law of identity is articulated reveals this law's self-refutation. The attempt to formulate an identity through a proposition inadvertently reveals how the identity is not purely itself. In the Science of Logic, Hegel states, "Such talk of identity . . . contradicts itself." It does so because the propositional form entails a "movement of reflection in the course of which there emerges the other." The redoubling of the entity being identified in the proposition shows that it is not purely self-identical. Even if otherness is not acknowledged, it is nonetheless involved as a vanishing moment in the constitution of identity. Otherness emerges through the very articulation of the law. Identity depends on what negates it. In this sense, Hegel's challenge to the law of identity is inseparable from his questioning of the principle of noncontradiction.

Commentators on Hegel are divided about his relationship to the principle of noncontradiction. On one side, Beatrice Longuenesse insists that the role of contradiction in Hegel's thought in no way threatens the principle of noncontradiction nor suggests that being itself might be contradictory. This position has a wide following especially among those who see Hegel as primarily an epistemologist. Slavoj Zizek, from the other side, insists that the whole point of Hegel's philosophy is that one "accepts contradiction as an internal condition of every identity." The extreme opposition between Longuenesse and Zizek on this question reflects the extent to which it divides Hegel's commentators. How we answer this question about the principle of noncontradiction determines how we understand Hegel's project. Zizek puts us on the right track, but even he doesn't go far enough in the direction of contradiction. The point is not just accepting contradiction but seeing how it drives our thinking and our actions. We don't retreat from contradiction but seek it out.

That said, Hegel doesn't not simply reject the principle of noncontradiction. One cannot construct manifestly contradictory propositions like "Paris, the city in France, is in Texas." If one allows oneself to say anything, then one can say nothing. Instead, Hegel shows that the principle of noncontradiction actually refutes itself. When one follows the principle of noncontradiction through an analysis of a series of philosophical positions, one ultimately discovers that insisting on noncontradiction leads to contradiction. This is the trajectory that each of Hegel's major works follows. Utilizing the principle of noncontradiction, Hegel illustrates how a position is at odds with itself. This leads Hegel to a subsequent position that avoids the contradiction that undid the previous one but that inaugurates a new contradiction. For instance, after discovering the contradiction that unravels sense certainty at the beginning of the Phenomenology of Spirit, he moves on to perception, which avoids this contradiction while inadvertently creating a new one through its solution to the prior one. Hegel advances in this way until he reaches the absolute—the point at which contradiction reveals itself as intractable. It is only here, at the absolute, that Hegel rejects the principle of noncontradiction. Getting to this point enables Hegel to recognize the central role that contradiction plays in everything.

According to Hegel, if I begin with a clear opposition like the difference between being and nothing, I soon discover that the opposition is not as clear as it appears. Without its relationship to nothing that is evident in becoming, pure being is indistinguishable from pure nothing. Being requires nothing in order to be. Contradiction is the name for the necessary impurity of every identity—its inability to just be itself.

Identity is incapable of being identity without introducing some form of otherness that reveals the lack of perfect self-identity. The failure of what Hegel calls formal thinking lies in its inability to account for the necessity of contradiction. As Hegel puts it in the Science of Logic, "The firm principle that formal thinking lays down for itself . . . is that contradiction cannot be thought. But in fact the thought of contradiction is the essential moment of the concept. Formal thought does in fact think it, only it at once looks away from it." Even formal thinking that believes itself to be free of contradiction must go through contradiction in order to perform its operations. Its formulations of identity necessarily involve the negation of this same identity, but formal thinking holds this negation as external and separate from the identity. As a result, contradiction remains repressed within formal thinking. Hegel's philosophy is the return of this repressed.

Hegel does not just confine contradiction to logic. In one of his most controversial moves, he also sees contradiction in the natural world as well. When we examine what he means by this, however, it becomes less outlandish than it initially appears. For Hegel, entities in the natural world never simply are what they are. Organic entities constantly become other than what they are by eating, growing, and eventually dying. Even the inorganic world cannot simply be what it is: ice caps melt, and stars go nova. Hegel links these changes to contradiction because he sees the same disruption at work in both logic and the world. But subjects have a much different relationship to contradiction than that of the natural world.

What Hegel calls spirit (Geist) is just this capacity of thought to apprehend contradiction rather than merely succumbing to it as the natural world does. Recognizing contradiction as intractable enables Hegel to reimagine the task of philosophy. Philosophy becomes the drive to uncover the intractability of contradiction through the insistence on the principle of non-contradiction. The result is not a paraconsistent logic but a logic that reveals its own moment of incapacity.

As Hegel sees it, to refuse to accept that contradiction is not only thinkable but also possible would leave us unable to account for the act of thinking itself, which requires the involvement of nonidentity within every assertion of identity. An identity free of negation would be completely immobile, isolated, and finally unable to be identified. It is through the negation that contradicts identity that identity becomes what it is. Ironically, for Hegel, rejecting the possibility of contradiction is self-contradictory. In the act of thinking anything at all, we think some form of contradiction, some movement of identity into difference.

Contradiction does not function as a transcendental a priori truth for Hegel but rather emerges out of the attempt to think through each position that Hegel confronts. Rather than trying to eliminate contradictions in the way that other thinkers do, Hegel aims at uncovering them in order to discover the constitutive status of contradiction for the subject. He sees in contradiction the site where thought comes to ruin and, paradoxically, the site of thought's fecundity. If we fail to recognize the necessity of contradiction in the last instance, we lose thinking altogether.

At every turn, contradiction manifests itself, even when one attempts to articulate the simplest proposition. If contradiction isn't just an error of thought but a prerequisite of being, then it becomes impossible to avoid. Rather than being a license to say anything, recognizing the inevitability of contradiction forces one to pay more attention to what is said. One must integrate the ultimate inevitability of contradiction into the fabric of one's thought in order to avoid betraying its constitutive

role. The philosopher of contradiction need not guard against straightforwardness and strive for obscurity. Instead, this philosopher has to take the effect of contradiction into account with the formulation of each proposition.

Contradictions seem like problems to overcome, which is why both the traditional interpretation of Hegel's dialectic and Marx's materialist version are so attractive. But Hegel's significance as a thinker derives from his ability to defy common sense, as his claim in the preface to the Phenomenology of Spirit that "what is well known as such, because it is well known, is not cognitively known" makes clear. By recognizing the structuring role that contradiction plays not just in our subjectivity but even in the nature of being itself, Hegel enacts a philosophical revolution that provides an ontological basis for freedom, equality, and solidarity. But Hegel's philosophy loses its revolutionary status when the Left Hegelians take away its most theoretically radical features in the name of progress.

One can never return to Hegel's philosophy before the split. The damage has already been done. But this damage is at once a possibility for encountering Hegel again, for seeing the possibilities that neither his followers nor Hegel himself could properly see. The years since Hegel's death have witnessed the spectacular failure of Left Hegelianism and the quiet disappearance of Right Hegelianism. The missteps of both camps have cleared the path for a new radical Hegel. Hegel is a radical not because he eschews the traditions passed down to him but because he takes them seriously. The philosophy of contradiction has its origin in the revolutionary act of God dying on the cross. Hegel is the first thinker to see the profundity of the transformation that Christianity inaugurates. When the infinite reveals itself as ignominious, we know that nothing is free of contradiction. <>

The Minds of the Moderns: Rationalism, Empiricism and Philosophy of Mind by Janice Thomas [McGill-Queen's University Press, 9780773536371]

This is a comprehensive examination of the ideas of the early modern philosophers on the nature of mind. Taking Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, Locke, Berkeley, and Hume in turn, Janice Thomas presents an authoritative and critical assessment of each of these canonical thinkers' views of the notion of mind. The book examines each philosopher's position on five key topics: the metaphysical character of minds and mental states; the nature and scope of introspection and self-knowledge; the nature of consciousness; the problem of mental causation and the nature of representation and intentionality. The exposition and examination of their positions is informed by present-day debates in the philosophy of mind and the philosophy of psychology so that students get a clear sense of the importance of these philosophers' ideas, many of which continue to define our current notions of the mental. Again and again, philosophers and students alike come back to the great early modern rationalist and empiricist philosophers for instruction and inspiration. Their views on the philosophy of mind are no exception and as Janice Thomas shows they have much to offer contemporary debates. The book is suitable for undergraduate courses in the philosophy of mind and the many new courses in philosophy of psychology.

The roll call of great early modern Western philosophers trips readily off any undergraduate's tongue: Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, Locke, Berkeley and Hume - the rationalists and the empiricists. Again and again, professional philosophers and students alike come back to these figures for instruction and inspiration. The main objective of this book is to set out clearly views on the philosophy of mind held by each of these six figures. Each thinker has a distinct stance on the nature of mind that can be found in his

central text or texts. So I shall be mainly looking at Descartes's Meditations and Discourse on Method, Spinoza's Ethics, Leibniz's Monadology and Discourse on Metaphysics, Locke's Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Berkeley's A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge and Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous and Hume's A Treatise of Human Nature (especially Book I).

Students of the history of philosophy will be well aware that most commentaries give some attention to the views on mind held by their subject. However, this discussion is usually restricted to a thinker's position on the metaphysics of mind. My intention here is to go beyond this and try to discover what each of the six philosophers has to say that is relevant to four topics that have been of strong interest to philosophers of mind in recent years. So, in each of the six parts to come, the discussion follows the same pattern. I look first at what each thinker takes to be the metaphysical character of mind (in some cases also mentioning personal identity). But then in the second and third chapters, respectively, I turn to the scope and nature of self-knowledge followed by the nature of consciousness. Finally, the fourth and fifth chapters of each part are devoted to the problem of mental causation and then the nature of representation or intentionality. In the remainder of this introduction I shall give a brief outline of the general concerns and problems to be examined under each of these five topic headings.

The metaphysical character of mind: are minds substances and if so what kind?

The word "substance" in non-philosophical parlance usually signifies a kind of stuff like chalk or cheese, treacle or tea. In philosophical writing, however, the term "substance" has a tradition in Western thought, which goes back at least to Aristotle, in which the word is reserved as a technical term for whatever a particular thinker regards as most fundamental in reality. There are two central Aristotelian criteria of substancehood. First of all, substances are those things that have ontological primacy, which is to say they are things that do not depend for their existence on the existence of anything else. Substances are "the fundamental entities in the universe, the ultimate objects of natural science". They are the things on which other things depend for their existence. Secondly, substances for Aristotle have logical priority in the sense that items in other categories — qualities, quantities and so forth — are predicable of ("said of") them whereas substances are always subjects. They are never predicated of (or "said of") anything else.

According to Aristotle, substances are also genuine individuals or unities not just collections, even collections of parts. They are what might be called "free-standing" things capable of existing and persisting independently in a way that neither their properties nor their parts could do. They can survive change, retaining their identity intact through many kinds of alteration, just so long as they retain those features essential to being the kinds of things they are. For Aristotle two paradigmatic examples of substances — things for which, in each case, it seems to him that all the characteristics mentioned so far are true — are the individual man and the individual horse.

By the time Berkeley came to mount his notorious attack on the hypothesis of material substance the Aristotelian criteria for applying the term "substance" had come apart to some extent. Or, rather, some writers highlighted one aspect, while others concentrated on another. For a number of Locke's immediate predecessors "substance" carries much less of a concern for individuality and unity, at least where material substance is concerned. Instead, the term occurs in debates about how many sorts of fundamental kinds of stuff reality consists in. This change of emphasis is due, of course, to Descartes, whose very influential view that there are two (but only two) sorts of created substance — material

substance and rational souls or minds — was at the centre of his metaphysics. Each type of substance has its essential attribute. Material substance, or res extensa, has extension in length, breadth and height. The rational soul, or res cogitans, is essentially the unextended subject of thought.

Once Cartesian substance dualism has been propounded, the attempt to decide what in reality deserves the honorific title "substance" becomes largely the question whether it is dualism, materialistic monism or idealistic monism that best represents the fundamental character of reality. This is to emphasize, almost to the exclusion of the others, the first of Aristotle's criteria of substancehood, according to which substance is what is independent in existence. For Descartes, matter and minds each depend for their existence on nothing other than God, who could, if he wished, create either in the total absence of the other. For Spinoza the interdependence that exists between each thing and the next and that unites each thing with its neighbours and its surroundings is so thoroughgoing that nothing short of the whole of reality qualifies as an independent substance although that one substance is both extended (material) and ideal (mental). On the other hand, for Leibniz, individuality is paramount in deciding which things are substances: only his immaterial monads have the simplicity, indivisibility and persistence to count as genuine individuals and thus, for him, substances.

When we come to Locke a different facet of the character of the independence that bestows substancehood comes to the forefront; or at least many of Locke's readers, including Berkeley, found this aspect or emphasis in what Locke says of substance. While Locke explicitly endorsed a dualist metaphysical position recognizing both material and immaterial substance (as well as the one divine substance) he also made the following, and other similar, remarks about "substance in general", describing it as "something ... though we know not what it is" (Essay II.xxiii.3, 297), and "the supposed, but unknown support of those qualities we find existing" (II.xxiii.2, 296).

Many readers (including Leibniz) took these "something, we know not what" remarks as evidence that substance, whether material or immaterial, was or should have been for Locke, an in-principle-unknowable thing, a kind of "prime matter", necessary because properties cannot exist unsupported, but itself featureless, an impenetrable mystery at the heart of reality.

To Berkeley it seemed that Locke's view was: (i) that the only things whose existence we are certain of, and about which we have knowledge, are the ideas that come to us in sense experience; but (ii) that we are nonetheless constrained also to accept that there is an additional unknown realm or world of mind-independent things that act as the unknown causes of those sensible ideas. We can have no contact with that additional realm of material substance (since it is beyond the reach of sense) and can thus know nothing about it: not even how it accomplishes its supposed task of subtending or causing our ideas of sense. Berkeley thinks philosophers are left to fruitless puzzlement about what could possibly be the nature of the relationship of "inherence" that sensible qualities presumably have to the unknown substance that supports them and the equally mysterious relation of "supporting" or "having" that substances bear to the qualities that inhere in them.

Now it may well be that Locke did not in fact believe material substance in particular to be the in-principle-unknowable, explanatorily impotent thing Berkeley and others took him to subscribe to. I shall look at this question in more detail in Part IV as a preliminary to looking at the relationship Locke recognizes between minds or selves and immaterial substance. For now, it only remains to round off this

survey of attitudes to substance throughout this period by noting that Hume joined Berkeley in rejecting the idea of material substance and then went him one better by rejecting immaterial substance as well.

In the chapters that follow I shall be asking, about each philosopher in turn, why he gives the answer he does to the question whether individual created minds are or are not substances and looking at the case that each thinker makes for his position. I want to trace the impact of the early modern period's growing scepticism about substance on its evolving theories about the nature of mind.

Self-knowledge and the transparency of the mental

The term "self-knowledge" covers at least two areas. On the one hand, it is often used to mean knowledge of the existence and fundamental or metaphysical nature of an individual mind or self by that self; on the other, it can be used to cover knowledge of what is going on in a particular mind, that is, what that mind is doing, its mental states, activities and contents, its ideas, sensations, thoughts, capacities, beliefs, wishes, fears, hopes, desires - in fact, its whole history of current and past experiences.

In recent philosophy of mind there has been considerable debate about the latter sort of self-knowledge: what is sometimes called "first-person authority" about conscious mental contents. This is the supposedly unchallengeable and non-evidence-based knowledge each of us has of what he or she believes, intends, wants and so forth. It seems that our self-knowledge of at least the conscious contents of our own minds has three significant features - salience, immediacy and authority:

- If I believe dinosaurs once roamed the earth or if I intend to have a pork chop for dinner I do not need to be told that I believe and intend these things. My belief and intention are salient for me.
- I know that these are my present belief and intention without considering any evidence from my behaviour, without having to figure them out from the context or do anything to discover them. My belief and intention are immediate.
- And, as already said, I am authoritative with respect to that belief and that intention. I not only know without evidence that this is what I believe and that is what I intend, but I know in a way that cannot be challenged. No one can tell me that I do not have the conscious mental contents (beliefs, intentions, hopes, fears or whatever) that I sincerely claim to have.

These three features can seem to pose a puzzle: how can any sort of knowledge be correctly so characterized? How can there be knowledge that is in this way salient and immediate for its subject, that does not require evidence and that need not be supported by any justification?

We can ask, of each of our philosophers in turn, whether he thinks we possess either kind of self-knowledge: either self-knowledge of our own nature and existence or the sort of self-knowledge of our own mental contents described above. We can also ask how each philosopher thinks that the sort of self-knowledge he ascribes to human minds is obtained and what justifies our claim to have it. Is it a product of introspection? Or is it gained from some other source, for example, some kind of inference?

Descartes would say that we have both sorts of self-knowledge. For him, certainty of his own existence as a thinker who is essentially an immaterial substance or rational soul comes before all other

certainties. He also takes himself to have, if not complete and infallible knowledge of, at least access to, everything going on in his mind. For Descartes, there are no such things as unconscious thoughts.

As we have just seen, Hume stands in sharp contrast to Descartes in that he rejects the very idea of substance. For him, there could not be self-knowledge in the sense of knowledge of the existence of a substantial self. Hume is persuaded of this on empirical grounds: he says that he can find no such thing as a self in introspection. But he does not consider himself as lacking full awareness of what is going on in his mind: "since all actions and sensations of the mind are known to us by consciousness, they must necessarily appear in every particular what they are, and be what they appear."

So, however great the distance between Descartes's and Hume's verdicts on the existence of a substantial self they are agreed in subscribing to the view that has been dubbed "the transparency of the mind" or "the transparency of the mental". This is the view that there are no hidden corners in the mind, no ideas or thoughts, sensations or feelings, or any other mental functions happening there that are unavailable to the mind in which they occur. In fact, all the philosophers examined here, except Leibniz, subscribe to some part (or version) of the doctrine of the transparency of the mental. All five would reject scepticism about our capacity to know at least a good portion of what goes on in our own minds. However, we should look closely at each thinker's views on mental transparency. Some (both Leibniz and Locke come to mind in different ways) look with sympathy on the common-sense view that there are times when deep sleep or anaesthetic robs us of conscious thought.

For Spinoza, individual human minds or selves, like everything else in nature, are through and through knowable since each mind consists in ideas of its body and ideas are nothing if not knowable. Knowability, however, does not guarantee knowledge. Spinoza is persuaded that considerable effort is required to gain the self-knowledge that a contented and indeed moral life requires. Leibniz, too, believes that we have access to our minds and thus self-knowledge. We have a kind of (self-)consciousness (which Leibniz calls "apperception") that informs us of both the nature of the individual self or spirit and the perceptions and thoughts that it is having.

Like the three rationalists, Locke thinks that we have self-knowledge both in the sense of knowledge of the existence-of the self and in the sense of knowledge of the nature and contents of the mind. This knowledge, which we shall look at in detail in Chapter 17, is not knowledge of a substance, whether material or immaterial. Self-knowledge for Locke comes from "that consciousness, which is inseparable from thinking" and it is knowledge of a "person" or "thinking intelligent Being, that has reason and reflection, and can consider it self as it self, the same thinking thing in different times and places."

Commentators disagree about the amount and type of self-knowledge of which Berkeley thinks we are capable. He certainly says that he has a notion of the self, soul, mind or spirit (these are interchangeable terms for Berkeley) and that that notion is gained in reflection or "by a reflex act" (D III, 232). In Chapter 22, I shall examine some of the differing interpretations and arguments and try to reach a decision about whether or not Berkeley is really committed to knowledge, not just of the existence, but also of the individual nature and mental contents, of the self.

Finally, to return to Hume, it should be noted that despite his rejection of the notion of the self he never says - nor could he coherently do so - that there is no such thing as a mind. And, as I began this section by saying, nor does he deny that we are able to know what is going on in our minds, what

perceptions we are experiencing, whether we are sensing or remembering, thinking about real things or entertaining ideas of a fictional or fanciful kind. There is much to explore in Hume's philosophy of mind notwithstanding his dismissal of the idea of a self and his notorious scepticism about personal identity over time. Self-knowledge is ruled out for him only in that he rejects the term "self" and the notion of an immaterial substance as the principle of identity of that individual bundle of impressions and ideas each of us calls "myself".

Consciousness

The puzzle about consciousness that has so perplexed and fascinated philosophers of mind over the past two or three decades is the puzzle of how to account for the difference between those physical things that are uncontroversially lacking in any kind of consciousness, such as rocks, and those that are beyond dispute conscious, such as human beings. What is consciousness and what philosophical analysis can we give of it? Is it a single sort of thing or are there different types of consciousness? Does it consist in some form of internal monitoring, higher-order thought or special kind of inner sense or self-consciousness? Does it depend on the body for any or all of its features?

For Descartes, Leibniz and Berkeley - each in his own highly distinctive way - it is the existence of a rational soul or mind (and, for Descartes, the rational soul's relationship to its physical body) that accounts for the consciousness enjoyed by individual human beings.

For Spinoza, Locke and Hume - again, each for very different reasons and in different ways - consciousness cannot or should not be accounted for by designating it as the activity of a particular substance. Spinoza recognizes individual human minds or consciousnesses but for him they are not substances. On the other hand, we must look at the question whether Spinoza's one substance has, as its mental aspect, what could be regarded as a single "world-mind" or a "collective consciousness" or, alternatively, a "divine mind".

For neither Locke nor Hume is consciousness to be identified with, or explained as the activity of, an individual substance. Locke thinks it is in principle possible that a single consciousness could be associated successively with more than one mental (or physical) substance. And Hume, as has been pointed out several times already, does not recognize the existence of any substances at all, whether mental or physical.

The problem of mental causation

We automatically look to an individual's feelings, desires, wishes, fears and hopes, reasons, thoughts and beliefs for an explanation of that individual's actions and behaviour. But do mental items of the sorts just listed literally cause actions? Does my thirst cause me to pour a glass of water and drink? Does my fear of the approaching Alsatian literally cause me to cross the road out of its path? Is it the murderer's decision to kill (is it that very state of his mind) that causes him to pull the trigger? It seems to be common sense that feelings cause the behaviour designed to alleviate them; that wishes literally prompt actions thought likely to fulfil them; that decisions produce actions in line with those decisions.

However, this common-sense view about the mind's role in our actions has encountered a strong challenge that present-day philosophers of mind have tried to address in a number of different ways. This challenge is the so-called "problem of mental causation", one version of which goes as follows:

(i) When I pour myself a drink of water "because I am thirsty" (as I would say), there is a whole state of my body, brain and nervous system that is responsible for initiating and carrying out the muscle movements that move my left hand to pick up the glass and my right to pick up the pitcher and pour.

(ii) But this whole, entirely physical, set-up, if it were preceded by the same causal history of neural and other physical events, would produce the water-pouring activity even without the mental state (i.e. even if I did not feel thirsty).

(iii) And, also, without this brain and body state and physical causal history, the pouring would not take place no matter how thirsty I was.

(iv) So it seems that the physical causes and conditions on their own are sufficient (and some such physical causes and conditions are necessary) to produce my action while my mental state, my thirst, has no causal role in the event that is my pouring the water. The would-be mental cause - my thirst - is actually impotent.

This argument is also sometimes called "the physical exclusion problem" because it maintains that the causal sufficiency of physical properties excludes the causal efficacy or potency of mental properties.

Our six philosophers all believe that human minds and their thoughts, feelings, choices and decisions have a genuinely causal role in human actions. But for each of them there are specific obstacles in the way of justifying this belief. Descartes, notoriously, has great difficulty accounting for any sort of mind-body interaction, including, therefore, causation of physical actions by (wholly mental) beliefs or desires. For both Spinoza and Leibniz there are difficulties explaining how an individual human agent could intervene causally in the rigorously determined or pre-ordained course of history: how a wish or belief or decision by an individual could literally be (part of) the cause of an event that already has a complete explanation in terms of prior circumstances or divine creative will.

Locke clearly believes that individuals merit moral praise or blame for their actions and this can only be fair if the choices and decisions of the individuals in question have some genuine causal role in the motivation of the actions judged. But how is such causal power to be accounted for? Berkeley is convinced that minds are the only causes there are but he has been widely thought to be unable to explain how created minds can even initiate movement in their own bodies let alone make changes in their external environment. Hume, too, seems both convinced of our ability to make moral choices and act on our beliefs and decisions and, yet, to lack a substantial response to the question how exactly mental items are able to affect physical realities. We need to explore whether any of our six philosophers has a substantial answer to the problem of mental causation, one that could defend itself successfully against its critics.

Representation and intentionality

A state of affairs that has seemed to many modern day philosophers of mind and psychology to cry out for philosophical explanation is the way thoughts or ideas, items that ordinary speech would describe as "in the head", can stand

for or represent things in the world. It is not as if I decide that one of my ideas will stand for something, in the way I can decide to let the pepper shaker stand for the referee's assistant when trying to explain the offside rule at the dinner table. The pepper shaker can be made to stand for or represent something

for present purposes and it will thus acquire what philosophers' jargon calls "intentionality" or "aboutness", albeit temporarily. I can create something whose whole purpose is to represent or stand for something simply by drawing a symbol on a map and announcing that that symbol is to stand for, say, a hospital. But these two examples are both examples of what has been called "derived intentionality". The pepper shaker and the symbol on the map have their intentionality, their aboutness, bestowed on them by a mind. It is not an intrinsic feature of either to represent what it represents. It seems, however, that ideas or thoughts in a subject's head do not need to be made the representatives of what they are thoughts or ideas about. Without being made representatives by any action of their possessors, they just do represent the things they stand for or represent. They have "intrinsic" or "original" intentionality. But how?

What is intrinsic intentionality or "representativeness"? Descartes, like Locke, sees ideas as kinds of "natural" representatives of the things and features in the world that they stand for in thought. Spinoza sees ideas as intrinsic aspects of the portions of the one substance that they represent in our minds. For Leibniz, every monad or basic substance, whether or not endowed with conscious perception, has innumerable representations of everything else in the universe whose representational character is given by God in the pre-established harmony.

Berkeley sees sensory ideas as themselves parts of the external world rather than representatives of things outside the mind, although ideas that are copied from sensory ideas can, in a way, represent what they are copied from. Hume thinks ideas are copies of impressions that they represent although they do not represent anything extra-mental.

This is the final puzzle from recent philosophy of mind that I wish to examine in the context of the views of each of the six major early modern philosophers in turn. Here, as with the previous topics, I hope it will not be thought that I am approaching the subject like a prospector revisiting an old seam and hoping to find golden nuggets missed by previous miners. No one should expect to find, simply lying about in Leibniz's Monadology or Berkeley's Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge, novel, fully worked-out answers to modern philosophical questions expressed in a modern idiom or directed explicitly at modern concerns. It is always wise to be careful not to read modern answers to modern problems back into classic works whose authors were addressing quite different problems in quite different terms.

On the other hand, the topics and questions I have chosen all have timeless elements at their core; it would be surprising if they found no echo in the writings of six classic philosophers all of whom were deeply concerned with the nature of minds, knowledge, thought, causation and ideas. It certainly seems worth taking the trouble to try to discover what light each thinker might have to shed on any of the puzzles, even if what we unearth is more likely to be a number of interesting hints and exploratory ideas rather than any full-blown (let alone incontrovertible) solutions.

Personal identity

One topic that I have had to leave almost completely untouched in this book is the question what each of our philosophers would say accounts for personal identity or persistence of the self over time. Here is the briefest of catalogues of the answers I believe would be given. Criteria of personal identity are often said to fall into broadly two types: a criterion that stresses physical persistence of the body or one

where psychological continuity is crucial. It could be said that each of our six thinkers (with the possible exception of Spinoza) adopts his own, highly distinctive psychological criterion.

Descartes

Descartes appears to have been very little interested in the subject of personal identity but if pressed to designate a principle of identity for the self he would say that personal survival for him is a matter of the persistence of the mind or rational soul. Since on Descartes's view the immaterial soul could exist even if there were no bodies of any kind, survival of human bodily death by the self is for him a genuine possibility. However, as far as I am aware he never says anything from which we could deduce whether or not he thinks it would be me surviving if at some future time my rational soul, although conscious, retained no memories or consciousness of any of my life or personal details. My guess would be that he would deny that this could occur, but that if per impossibile it did, the person would still be (a maximally amnesiac) me.

Spinoza

For Spinoza the self's survival during the life of the human being in question parallels the survival and stability of the complex bodily organism with its simpler organisms collaborating to make ever more complex higher-level organic systems. It is the ideas of these nested organic systems that go together to make the complex idea which is my mind or self. But he insists that mind and body do not interact in any way so we cannot read him as saying that the mind depends causally on the body for its survival. Although Spinoza thinks that, for those who attain what he calls "blessedness", a kind of immortality is possible, most readers find it very mysterious how this might happen. At any rate it appears that such immortality would not, for him, be survival of the individual mind and moral subject as such.

Leibniz

Leibniz equates the person with the dominant monad or soul, which governs the human body. Souls are created ex nihilo and are eternal even though, at the death of the body, they become dormant in a sort of utter waning of vitality and self-awareness that robs them of any presence detectable by themselves or others. However, this dormant state will not last forever, on Leibniz's view. For him the person is his or her whole "detail of changes" (collection of perceptions or mental contents) as specified by the pre-established harmony. The same person survives where there is the same detail of monadic changes or perceptions playing itself out, whatever different monads make up that person's body at any given period.

Locke

As we have seen, Locke equates personhood and personal identity with persisting individual consciousness rather than any substance either material or immaterial. He certainly leaves open the possibility of survival of bodily death: for any individual this would only require that some future person have exactly that consciousness and access to memories of his or her past self which that person now possesses.

Berkeley

Like Descartes, Berkeley would make personal identity depend on the survival of the mind, soul or spirit. Spirits alone, for Berkeley, are persistent substances as opposed to phenomenal things — such as stars, flowers, apples, trees in the quad and, of course, human bodies — which consist of ideas.

Hume

Finally, although Hume is famously sceptical about identity over time in general and the existence of a (lasting or even instantaneous) self in particular he never writes as if he, his readers and his philosophical opponents are anything other than lasting persons. And his notorious bundle-self notion gives him a Humean psychological criterion for personal identity: I survive from moment to moment throughout my history as the subject of experience and bundle of present perceptions, which inherits all my past self's impressions, ideas, memories and imaginings and imagines itself to be a lasting particular mind.

The evolution of a modern approach to mind?

A student might guess at the outset of a course on the early modern period that there is a progressive line of development - an evolution of thought as well as approach - from Descartes to Hume, with each successive later thinker responding to and building on his predecessor's ideas, until a Humean modern empiricism or even early positivism about the mind is achieved. What follows is a brief summary of the main answers given to the five questions posed to our six philosophers about their views on mind, which I have assembled in hopes of showing that such a "linear evolution of thought" picture is largely inaccurate. Far more helpful is the view that there is a highly reticulated complex of influences crisscrossing the period and providing a fertile ground in which both the Kantian idealism of the nineteenth century and the markedly different monistic materialism about the mind that has flourished in recent years are deeply rooted.

Is the mind a substance?

What can be learned about the development of views on the character of the human mind in the early modern period from the fact that only three philosophers of the six would affirm that the human mind is a substance? It is not as if (as might have been vaguely expected) it is the line dividing the earlier three (Descartes, Spinoza, Locke) from the later trio (Leibniz, Berkeley, Hume) that divides those who think the mind is a substance from those who do not. Nor is this a difference between those traditionally labelled rationalists and those labelled empiricists: of the rationalists, two regard the mind as an immaterial substance but one does not; of the empiricists, one denies that the human mind is a substance, one is agnostic and one does see the mind as a substance.

The last point might lend weight to the suggestion now supported by most commentators that the rationalist-empiricist dichotomy is not a hugely useful one.' To take just one illustration, it is certainly the case that Descartes is always eager to see how far unaided reason can take him in addressing any question (so far so rationalist). But equally certainly he labours to acquire knowledge about the scope and limits of the mind - in particular, the nature of sense perception and the springs of behaviour - from hands-on animal dissections and painstaking physiological research (in line with empiricist principles).

Of course Spinoza remains committed to a substance ontology so that for him the individual mind, while not a substance in itself, is nonetheless a part of the one divine substance. And Berkeley's empiricist label has often been questioned just because of his staunch defence of mind as a Cartesian immaterial substance and his rejection of material substance. But even though Locke and Hume are both sceptical about the existence of substance and its role in individual human minds we cannot conclude that there is a simple trend here, let alone a pendulum swing, from an early unqualified (rationalist) belief in the mind as immaterial substance to a later more enlightened (empiricist) outright rejection of such mind-matter dualism. Things are far more complicated than that.

What knowledge can we have of what goes on in our own minds?

We have seen that all six figures, in certain ways and in certain contexts, express allegiance to some sort of doctrine of mental transparency. Under the surface, however, there are pronounced differences between the views of the six on the question of self-knowledge. Descartes's position is far from the simple-minded and contradictory "Cartesian introspective model" often attributed to him: he makes clear that he thinks there are many ideas in the mind that lie ready to be discovered for the first time as well as memories that are out of sight until consciously adverted to. And it seems defensible to attribute to him the belief that a number of different types of advertence or consciousness characterize those various ideas or thoughts that he thinks appear ceaselessly before the mind.

For both Spinoza and Leibniz the mind of every individual holds ideas that can elude full consciousness for much or all of the subject's life. But, sad to say, Locke firmly rejects this revolutionary suggestion that there might be thoughts in my mind (for example, in dreamless sleep) of which I am unaware. Instead he declares that he can see no role that unconscious thought could occupy or mental work that such unconscious ideas could do. And although he certainly accepts that there are memories that remain in my mind without being conscious, his account of how these memories are retained and/or revived is so thin and sketchy that, to a modern eye, his unqualified allegiance to strong mental transparency seems highly retrograde: far less plausible and more naive than the earlier Cartesian view.

Berkeley believes that our ideas when made the focus of our discriminative attention are transparent to reflection but he also believes that ideas can lurk in the mind - in the shadows so to speak - awaiting that attention which will reveal their nature. Compared to Berkeley, Hume appears much less aware of the need for caution in declaring not only his immediate and privileged access to all his ideas, but his conviction that his ideas are all exactly as he takes them to be.

So, with the question of mental transparency, even more than with the question whether the mind is or is not a substance, there seems little trend or smooth line of development or refinement from Descartes's position to that adopted by Hume. If anything, Hume seems less aware than Descartes of the real possibility that a human mind might harbour thoughts and ideas that stubbornly resist awareness of them by their subject.

What account can be given of the nature of consciousness and subjectivity?

All six authors show a subtle understanding of numerous facets or aspects of conscious experience. Arguably, Descartes and Leibniz both recognize a number of different sorts of consciousness even if they do not explicitly distinguish them one from another. And they would agree that what are now called "access consciousness" and "perceptual consciousness" come to human beings as a result of their being animals.

There are also hints that Descartes, Berkeley and Hume would recognize phenomenal consciousness as a further distinct type of conscious experience (experienced by men and animals alike). Locke's subtle distinctions between different types and degrees of attention are also noteworthy, even though they do not in the end offer him a way of escaping the criticism that his all-or-nothing view of consciousness (an idea is either fully conscious or not there at all) contradicts everyone's everyday experience and indeed one strand in his own account of memory.

I have argued that Descartes and Leibniz have the beginnings of theories about consciousness that could stand as very early precursors of a higher-order-thought or "inner scanning" theory while Locke's and Berkeley's views do not admit of such a higher-order-thought reading.

Spinoza, disappointingly, says all too little about the source of consciousness beyond saying that each particular mind is part of the one great divine mind. We are left to wonder how he thinks individual subjectivity and consciousness are achieved, although he has a great deal to say about the nature of subjective experience itself that subtly enriches our understanding of that phenomenon.

And Hume, although he makes considerable use of introspection in his search for understanding of the mind never says anything to suggest he thinks that any sort of inner scanning explains the conscious character of his impressions or ideas. Like Locke he believes that consciousness, being in the mind and the having of ideas are all simply equivalent.

Have human mental states the power to initiate human movement?

All of our six figures but Spinoza credit human minds with the power to move their own bodies. Each has some response he can make to earlier and later problems of mental causation if only by attempting to shift the burden of proof to his opponent.

We have seen that Descartes thinks that a human mind can move its body by force of will, just as God - although wholly immaterial - moves matter by the power of his thought alone. Spinoza disagrees, denying the possibility of causal interaction between individual minds and their bodies and, in general, between the mental realm and the physical realm. Leibniz's complex position on mental causation is perhaps ultimately unsustainable: he wishes to agree with Descartes that human beings are free to choose and will, that their actions are guided by their thoughts and ideas, but it is difficult to see how he can square human freedom with his pre-established harmony.

Like Descartes, Locke believes that he has the evidence of everyday experience that mental states, in particular acts of will, cause our actions. But, as Spinoza observed, no matter how strongly I feel that I am making my body move by willing it to do so this is no proof that it is my will that does the moving. No matter how sure I am that what I do is caused by my mental states it is always possible that I am mistaken or under an illusion.

Berkeley has been accused of extinguishing all chance of mental causation for human beings by maintaining that all real ideas (such as the idea of any bodily movement), and thus all real movements, are caused not by their would-be human subjects, but by God. I have argued on the contrary that Berkeley believes God gives us (admittedly limited) powers to move ourselves, notwithstanding that God's unbroken will to sustain appearances as if there were an objective nature governed by natural law means that he is ultimately responsible for creating for every observer each appearance of every bodily change.

Hume believes firmly that human minds are efficacious. Granted, for him our choices, decisions and acts of will are governed by natural law, just as the motions of all bodies are governed. Human nature is a part of nature. However, he nonetheless holds that it is right to say that we are free and responsible with respect to those actions we perform when not constrained or coerced. Our mental states make a difference: they govern what we do when we are not compelled by conditions beyond our control.

How do our ideas represent what they are ideas of?

Whatever their other differences, all our thinkers up to Hume are agreed that the "aboutness" or intentionality of our ideas is derived rather than original intentionality. They are all persuaded that it is (either immediately or ultimately) God who bestows aboutness or meaning on our mental states. Either they think we are furnished from birth with innate ideas that are already about their objects (Descartes's innate ideas, Leibniz's monadic concepts and Berkeley's divine archetypes), or we are endowed with the physiological mechanisms for acquiring — and things are created with the powers to cause in us — just those ideas that are best fitted to represent what we naturally take them to be ideas of (Descartes's adventitious and invented ideas, Spinoza's ideas of changes in his sense organs, Locke's ideas of sensation and reflection and Berkeley's ideas copied from sensations). Either way, our ideas ultimately owe their "aboutness" to God, who appoints them to represent what they come to stand for in our thinking. In no case is it thought that ideas represent what they are ideas of simply as a result of their resembling those things although there will of course be some sort of resemblance, in some respect or other, between any idea and the thing it stands for.

Hume, however, says nothing that would indicate that he regards himself as heir to this tradition. His view has much in common with Locke's and Berkeley's view that ideas represent their experiential causes, but he does not mention God's role, if any. Our ideas for Hume represent and are copied from our impressions. Their (original) intentionality is in large part a function of their causal origin and to a lesser degree a result of such resemblance as exists between idea and impression.

So, as far as theory of mind is concerned, there is certainly no smooth line of development from Cartesian dualism to Humean rejection of all substances, material or immaterial. It is true that each thinker after Descartes is substantially influenced by him, some accepting and developing his ideas, some rejecting one or another or all of them. But it is worth noticing that there is here no battle between rationalists who refuse to leave their armchairs and empiricists who reject any a priori propositions and restrict themselves exclusively to arguing from the results of experiments.

And it would certainly be a travesty to picture each later philosopher as devoting his career to taking his immediate predecessor's ideas and developing them before handing them on to the next generation. Each of these six great philosophers responds to and is influenced by a personal selection of past and contemporary thinkers while ignoring or even disparaging others. Those philosophers who came after Spinoza were almost uniformly highly censorious of him and found little if anything in his thought to respond (let alone warm) to. And sometimes individuals failed to recognize any sort of kinship of outlook where later readers would detect it: Leibniz wrote, referring to his fellow idealist the young Berkeley, "the man in Ireland who impugns the reality of bodies seems neither to give adequate reasons nor to explain sufficiently". He then said that he suspected Berkeley of being "one of those people who seek to become famous by their paradoxes".

Of course, it is true that Spinoza wrote a commentary on Descartes; that Leibniz wrote a commentary on Locke; that Leibniz and Berkeley evidently looked back to Descartes's view that the mind is the rational soul; and that Hume responded again and again to Locke, often disagreeing with him but sometimes echoing the Essay uncannily as he makes his own distinctive points in the Treatise.' To all this must be added the fact that each of the six is influenced to some extent by writers outside the circle, a

list that includes Bacon, Arnauld, Mersenne, Hobbes, More, Malebranche, Boyle, Hutcheson and numerous others.

But if this book makes anything clear I hope it is that each of these six great philosophers is first and foremost an original thinker who merits our attention in his own right. Whether he is considering problems about the nature of knowledge or existence, substance or causation, God or the capacities and character of the human mind, each is a thinker whose unique views and voice it is worth making every effort to hear and to understand. <>

THINKING THE EVENT by Francois Raffoul [Studies in Continental Thought, Indiana University Press, 9780253045133]

What happens when something happens? In **THINKING THE EVENT,** senior continental philosophy scholar François Raffoul undertakes a philosophical inquiry into what constitutes an event as event, its very eventfulness: not what happens or why it happens, but that it happens, and what "happening" means. If, as Leibniz posited, it is true that nothing happens without a reason, does this principle of reason have a reason? For Raffoul, the event always breaks the demands of rational thought. Bringing together philosophical insights from Heidegger, Derrida, Nancy, and Marion, Raffoul shows how the event, in its disruptive unpredictability, always exceeds causality, subjectivity, and reason. It is that "pure event," each time happening outside or without reason, which remains to be thought, and which is the focus of this work. In the final movement of the book, Raffoul takes on questions about the inappropriability of the event and the implications this carries for ethical and political considerations when thinking the event. In the wake of the exhaustion of traditional metaphysics, the notion of the event comes to the fore in an unprecedented way, with key implications for philosophy, ontology, ethics, and theories of selfhood.

Review

This is a major contribution to philosophical scholarship on a topic that has become increasingly important in recent decades. It caps the existing scholarship on events – both drawing on it extensively while criticizing it effectively – by offering a book that is at once cognizant of all the most important descriptions and theories of the very idea of the event, while offering its own unique take on it. — Edward S. Casey, author of *The World on Edge*

Engaging in the project of "thinking the event" consists in undertaking a philosophical inquiry into what constitutes an event as an event, its very eventfulness: not what happens, not why it happens, but that it happens, and what does "happening" mean. Not the eventum, what has happened, but the evenire, the sheer happening of what happens. However, at the outset of such a work, one is immediately confronted with the following obstacle: the event has traditionally been understood and neutralized within a philosophy of substance or essence, a metaphysics of causality, subjectivity, and reason--in a word, subjected to the demands of rational thought. An event is interpreted either as the accident of a substrate or substance, as the effect or deed of a subject or an agent, or else it is ordered and organized according to causality, if it is not included within fate or a rational order. In all instances, it answers to the demands of the principle of sufficient reason, which states that no event happens without a cause or a reason. In the words of Leibniz, the "great" principle of natural philosophy and key metaphysical principle of truth is "the principle of sufficient reason, namely, that nothing happens without a reason why it should be so rather than otherwise." Leibniz posits that events must conform to the principle of sufficient reason and that no event can occur without a reason or a ground: in fact, every event must he as it were prepared in advance to be the event that it is, conditioned by a determinant reason: "For the nature of things requires that every event should have Beforehand its proper conditions, requirements and dispositions, the existence of which makes the sufficient reason of such an event.' Such reason can be a cause, as the principle of sufficient reason merges with a "principle of causality," which states that every event is caused to be the event that it is. Indeed, Leibniz includes in the principle of reason a principle of causality: "Nothing is without reason, or no effect is without a cause.." Although not every reason is a cause, every cause is a reason.

Ultimately, as Heidegger demonstrates in his 1955-1956 lecture course, The Principle of Reason, the principle of reason self-deconstructs because it cannot apply to itself its own requirements without undermining itself: if the principle of reason states that everything that happens must have a reason, then what is the reason for the principle of reason? Does the principle of reason have a reason?

"Indeed the principle of reason is, as a principle, not nothing. The principle is itself something. Therefore, according to what the principle itself tells us, it is the sort of thing that must have a reason. What is the reason for the principle of reason?" (GA 10, 17/PR, 11). Does the principle of reason have a reason? Nothing could be less certain. "Nihil est sine ratione. Nothing is without reason, says the principle of reason. Nothing—which means not even this principle of reason, certainly it least of all. It may then be that the principle of reason, that whereof it speaks, and this speaking itself do not belong within the jurisdiction of the principle of reason. To think this remains a grave burden. In short it means that the principle of reason is without reason. Said still more clearly: 'Nothing without reason'—this, which is something, is without reason" (GA 10, 27/PR, 17, emphasis mine). One divines here how the principle of reason is caught in a circle (What is the reason of the principle of reason? What is the foundation of a foundation?) that will throw it into a self-deconstruction, that is, into the abyss of its own impossible foundation.

Indeed, in order to be a ground, the ground must itself be without foundation and therefore groundless. This led Gilles Deleuze to speak of the paradoxical nature of the logic of grounding, of the "comical ungrounding" of the principle of reason: "But who still speaks of a foundation, when the logic of grounding or the principle of reason leads precisely to its own `ungrounding,' comical and disappointing."' The principle of reason does collapse ("run aground") at the very place of its impossible foundation, "there where," as Derrida puts it in Rogues, "the Grund opens up onto the Abgrund, where giving reasons [rendre-raison] and giving an account [rendre-compte]—logon didonai or principium reddendae rationis—are threatened by or drawn into the abyss." Heidegger revealed this self-deconstructive aspect of the principle of reason by following the logic of the question "why?": "Whenever we pursue the ground/ reason of a being, we ask: why? Cognition stalks this interrogative word from one reason to another. The 'why' allows no rest, offers no stop, gives no support" (GA 10, 185/PR, 126, my emphasis). The question "why?" seeking a foundation, in fact reveals an abyss, betraying that reason itself may lack a rational basis. Kant spoke of reason as a drive, a Trieb, of an "interest" of reason (Interesse der Vernunft), thereby pointing to a certain nonrational basis of reason, which led Derrida to ask: "The honor of reason—is that reason? Is honor reasonable or rational through and through? The very form of this question can be applied analogically to everything that evaluates, affirms, or prescribes reason: to prefer reason, is that rational or, and this is something else, reasonable? The value of reason, the desire for reason, the dignity of reason—are these rational? Do these have to do wholly with reason?" (R, 120). Is reason rational? Is the principle of reason rational? Does reason have a reason? These questions reveal the aporia harbored in the principle of reason.

In fact, each time unpredictable and incalculable, an event always exceeds or "suspends"' the demands of the principle of sufficient reason. As Jacques Derrida states, an event can only challenge the principle of sufficient reason "insofar as reason is limited to 'giving an account' (reddere rationem, logon didonai)." It is not a matter of complying with the demands of such reason rendering, but instead of not "denying or ignoring this unforeseeable and incalculable coming of the other."' No longer placed under the authority of the principle of sufficient reason, the event must be rethought as the incalculable and unpredictable arrival of what will always remain other—and thus inappropriable—for the one to whom it happens. In that sense, the event also comes as an excess in relation to the subject and can only "naturally take by surprise not only the addressee but also the subject to whom and by whom it is supposed to happen."' It would then be a matter, in order to give thought to the event in its eventfulness, of freeing the event from the demands of the principle of sufficient reason.

A clarification is necessary at the outset: by the project of "thinking the event," I do not mean the appropriation by thought of the event, under the authority of the principle of reason. Thinking here is not appropriative, not "in-scription," but rather, as Jean-Luc Nancy calls it, "ex-scription." The event remains outside of thought, "exscribed" in it. "Thinking the event" means to give thought to its very eventfulness, its sheer happening, which necessarily exceeds both reason and subjectivity. Indeed, one could say that the event, in its disruptive and unpredictable happening, exceeds both the concept and the anticipation of a subject. This is why a further obstacle in the attempt to think the event is the predominance of transcendental modes of thought, which claim to provide prior conditions of possibility for experience and for the occurrence of events. Indeed, it may well be the case that events are precisely eventful when not preorganized or prepared by some transcendental conditions, or anticipated by a transcendental subject, when they break or "pierce" the horizon provided by transcendental

conditions. Not being made possible by a prior condition, the event, as Jean-Luc Nancy points out, "must not be the object of a programmatic and certain calculation. . . . It must be the possibility of the impossible (according to a logic used often by Derrida), it must know itself as such, that is to say, know that it happens also in the incalculable and the unassignable.." An event cannot be reduced to what can happen: it does not happen because it can happen, but rather happens without being made possible in advance and to that extent can be called "impossible," Jean-Luc Marion going so far as to state that the event can only be impossible, the impossible itself: "Moreover, [the event] always appears to us at bottom as impossible, or even as the impossible, since it does not belong to the domain of the possible, of that of which we are able."' The impossible, in this context, does not mean what cannot be or happen. Rather, the impossible, or the impossible, as Derrida writes it, means: that which happens outside the conditions of possibility offered in advance by a subject of representation, outside the transcendental conditions of possibility. Thinking the event will require to break with a certain transcendental mode of thinking, as the event deconstructs the transcendental as such.

In the philosophical tradition, the notion of event has been neutralized under the authority of reason and causality. With Kant, the event is conceived in terms of and on the basis of causality, its independence reduced to a causal order. As one knows, Kant assumes the universal determinism of nature, a universal causal determinism for everything that happens and according to which "everything in the world happens solely in accordance with laws of nature." Such universal natural causality is taken by Kant as a given and not in dispute. This is not surprising, if it is the case, as Heidegger argues in The Essence of Human Freedom, that "Causality, in the traditional sense of the being of beings, in common understanding as in traditional metaphysics, is the fundamental category of being as being-present-at-hand [Vorhandensein]." The causality of nature is traditionally the paradigm to think the being of beings, the very meaning of being. One cannot stress enough the importance of the motif of causality in traditional metaphysics. As Jean-Luc Marion puts it, "Metaphysics knows nothing but the cause." It "knows nothing except through the cause, either as cause or as effect" (NC, 181). This is why causality is not one category among others but "the universal category for all beings" (BG, 161).

Kant posits this paradigm in the "Analogies of Experience" (second analogy) in The Critique of Pure Reason, which state that all events happen according to causality. "All alterations [Veranderungen] occur in accordance with the law of the connection of cause and effect" (CPR, A 189/B 232, 304). Every event occurs following a causal rule since "everything that happens presupposes a previous state, upon which it follows without exception according to a rule" (CPR, A 444/B 472, 484). The succession of events follows the order of causality, and an event becomes the effect of a prior cause. The event is not something new, an original phenomenon disrupting and breaking the course of time, indeed generating time, but the product or result of a prior process. For Jean-Luc Marion, this proves that the kind of events mobilized by Kant in the second analogy are not properly events but rather what he terms impoverished events, that is, events reduced to what reason demands of them: predictability, repeatability, and foundation in causality: "the analogies of experience concern only a fringe of phenomenality—phenomena of the type of objects constituted by the sciences, poor in intuition, foreseeable, exhaustively knowable, reproducible—while other levels (and first of all historical phenomena) would make an exception" (BG, 207). The events of the analogies of experience are not properly events but intraworldly facts that are subject to causality. "Eventful" events, as will be noted, are not subject to causal determinations; rather, in their original happening, they indeed

do not follow but constitute new causal networks and thereby reconfigure if not create a new world. An event "worthy of the name," as Derrida would say, represents the surge of the new through which precisely it does not "follow" from a previous cause. By introducing the new in the world, indeed by bringing forth a new world, does an event not disqualify prior causal contexts and networks? To that extent, an event could not be "explained" by prior causes because its occurrence has transformed the context on the basis of which it could be explained. To that extent, an event has no cause. Jean-Luc Marion writes: "Inasmuch as it is a given phenomenon, the event does not have an adequate cause and cannot have one. Only in this way can it advance on the wings of a dove: unforeseen, unusual, unexpected, unheard of, and unseen" (BG, 167). Kant, however, thinks in the perspective of the demands of the principle of sufficient reason. This is why he reduces events to the law of causality and then attempts to establish a perfect symmetry, or reversibility, between event and causality: "If, therefore, we experience that something happens, then we always presuppose that something else precedes it, which it follows in accordance with a rule" (CPR, A 195/B 24o, 3o8). Conversely, as soon as I perceive in a sequence "a relation to the preceding state, from which the representation follows in accordance with a rule, I represent something as an occurrence, or as something that happens" (CPR, A 198/B 243, 309-310). This structuring accomplishes what Leibniz had posited, namely that events must conform to the principle of sufficient reason.

In addition to this rational enframing, one also notes an egological reduction of the event in the philosophical tradition, as one finds for instance in a hyperbolic or paroxistic form in the work of Jean-Paul Sartre. On the basis of the view that we are responsible for what happens to us, Sartre claims that whatever happens happens to us, and what happens to us happens through us. Ultimately for him, I choose the meaning of events. Sartre attempts to reduce the alterity and surprise of the event, as it is immediately appropriated by the self in its responsible engagement. Any event becomes a call to my responsibility: I am engaged by the event. Even a war declared by others becomes mine. For Sartre "everything takes place as if I bore the entire responsibility for this war." Everything that happens is mine, and nothing human is foreign to me, which means there is no radical alterity in the world, and thus no events I have not chosen. I can decide on the nonhuman, but "this decision is human, and I shall carry the entire responsibility for it" (BN, 708). Sartre posits here a subjectivity as appropriation of all that happens, as appropriation of the event. Any event is immediately taken over by my freedom, and there are no events without my appropriating them and making them my own. "Thus there are no accidents in life," and "any way you look at it, it is a matter of a choice" (BN, 708). This hyperbolic inflation of appropriating subjectivity implies the reduction, appropriation, and overcoming of the alterity of events.

In chapter 1, I attempt to reconstitute the twisting free of the event from the demands of rational thought. I have indicated how the event has traditionally been understood within a philosophy of causality, subjectivity, and reason and how its eventfulness was neutralized by the postulate that events happen accordMg to causality. In contrast with this tradition, which ultimately places the event under the requirements of the principle of sufficient reason, I follow the emergence of a thinking of the event after Kant (but in a sense already with Kant), drawing from Hannah Arendt's 1946 essay "What Is Existential Philosophy?" Hannah Arendt argues that in the tradition the event of existence was neutralized by and reduced to the power of the concept, a project that culminates in Hegel's work. Even in Husserlian phenomenology, the notion of an intentional consciousness establishes the reduction of the happening phenomenon to what a consciousness can transcendentally constitute: the event is not

allowed to escape the constitutive powers of subjectivity. To think the event in its eventfulness will require a break with that reduction of being to thought, that is, with the postulated identity of being with thought in which the event is made to conform to the power of the concept and of consciousness.

Arendt evokes the "philosophical shock," the very shock or wonder (thaumazein) that is at the origin of thinking and philosophy. The event happens outside of thought and remains inappropriable for it. This is, for instance, the shock of the resistance of singularity to conceptual generality. An event is each time singular, a singularity that interrupts the mastery of thought and the form of conceptuality. Derrida speaks of the event as "what comes to pass only once, only one time, a single time, a first and last time, in an always singular, unique, exceptional, irreplaceable, unforeseeable, and incalculable fashion" (R, 135). It is the shock of an event that does not occur within a pregiven structural whole, such as "the orld," but "pierces" its horizon. It is the shock of facticity in the face of thought, the "that" before the "what." It is the shock of sheer existence before meaning. In each case, the event exceeds the form of the concept. I follow this freeing of the event from the power of the concept in Arendt's reading of Kant, in particular in: (a) his account of synthetic judgments; (b) his refutation of the ontological proof of God's existence; and (c) his notion of transcendental freedom.

I pursue in chapter 2 this emergence of the event outside of the dominance of causality and subjectivity by showing how for both Nietzsche and Heidegger, the event escapes the schemes of causality, subject or substrate, and reason. Two fundamental errors stand in the way of letting the event come forth in its eventfulness: the reliance on causality and the belief in the subject. With respect to causality, instead of the event following the cause, I suggest that the event is the original phenomenon. Events do not simply follow predetermined sequences. An event "worthy of the name" represents the surge of the new through which precisely it does not "follow" from a previous cause. A new understanding of temporality is here required: not a ruled sequence coming from the past to the present, but an eventful temporality, coming from the future, disrupting the causal networks, and transforming the entire complex of temporality, indeed transforming the past itself. Another conception of the event is called for, no longer anchored in a cause-substrate, but happening without ground.

This groundlessness of the event is revealed by Heidegger in his course, The Principle of Reason, in which he reflects on a principle that is precisely supposed to ground events: the principle of reason (der Satz vom Grund). As noted, it is paradoxically the very claim of the principle of reason, that is, that all events must be founded in reason, that turns out to be itself without reason and thus groundless. An abyss is here formed, which is the abyss (Ab-grund) of the ground that, in order to be the ground, must itself be without a ground. To the question of "why," which asks for reasons and foundations, Heidegger opposes the "answer" of the because through his citing of the sixteenth-century poet and mystic Angelus Silesius:

> The rose is without why: it blooms because it blooms,
> It pays no attention to itself, asks not whether it is seen

The rose is without why, but blooms because it blooms. For Heidegger, that tautology, far from saying nothing, says everything, that is, the entire eventful facticity of the being: it happens as it happens. The event becomes the highest reason. The reason given is harbored entirely within the fact of the being, that is, within the being itself, "the fact of its being a rose or its rose-being Roseseini" (GA 10, 84/PR, 57, trans. slightly modified). We are asked to leave the why (the cause) for the because (the event).

Heidegger cites Goethe, who wrote in his Collected Sayings from 1815: "How? When? and Where?—The gods remain mute! You stick to the because and ask not why?" (GA185/PR, 126). The because (well) is, as ground, groundless. In contrast with the why, always in quest of foundations, the because remains groundless. "What does 'because' mean? It guards against investigating the 'why,' therefore, against investigating foundations. It balks at founding and getting to the bottom of something. For the 'because' is without `why,' it has no ground, it is ground itself" (GA 10, 186/PR, 127). The event of being is groundless, without reason, without a why.

In chapter 3, I investigate the phenomenological senses of the event revealed by this dismantling—deconstruction—of the metaphysical categories of causality, subjectivity, and reason/ground. Once the event is no longer referred to the demands of the principle of reason, no longer anchored in a subject-cause, it becomes possible to let it give itself in its eventfulness, in the way it happens each time. "Thinking the event" would here mean not subjecting it to reason, but letting it be (especially if thinking itself is approached as a kind of letting, letting-be or Gelassenheit"), and indeed grasping phenomenality itself as an event. Following Heidegger in paragraph 7 of Being and Time, phenomenology is a bringing to light of the phenomenality of phenomena, that is, the event of their givenness. Phenomenology is concerned, not with the ontical given, but with phenomenality itself, with the event of givenness. The phenomenon is here taken in its verbal sense, as a self-showing. This suggests that phenomena themselves must be taken as events. This is why I argue that phenomenology, in its most authentic sense, ought to be reconsidered in terms of the event and recast as a phenomenology of the event.

Certain commentators have claimed that there is an antinomy, an incompatibility of sorts, between phenomenology and event on the account that phenomenology would always be directed at the present phenomenon while the event exceeds the present, and even the horizon of presence. To the extent that the event is not a present being or object, that is, is "not 'presentable,'" it would "exceed" the resources of any phenomenology." I argue, however, that phenomenology is about that very excess. Drawing from Jean-Luc Marion's description of the "saturated" phenomenon, I approach the event as excess. Unconditional eventful phenomenality exceeds any encompassing horizon and reverses the subject into the recipient (indeed, as we saw, the "witness") of the impersonal passing of the event. As such, the event becomes unpredictable (for Derrida, "it's an event insofar as what's happening was not predicted," CIP, 456), outside the domain or sphere of the subject and happening to it from without. An event is that which happens in excess of our subjective anticipations. Phenomenology is transformed by such eventful phenomenality, and thinking the event means here how thinking is affected and traumatized by the event.

In light of this phenomenology of the event, I investigate in chapter 4 the extent to which "things" themselves should be taken as events. Once things are referred back to the event of their givenness, they in turn become affected by such presence and find themselves participating in the proper mobility and happening of being so that they are precisely not simply "mere" things but events themselves. For Heidegger being is never without beings and does not subsist in some separate sphere: there is no being without beings. This is why beings participate in the event of being, an event that cannot happen without things "sheltering" it. With respect to thing and world, one can state that things become events by participating in a world that is never given but exists only as happening. "The world worlds," Heidegger writes in "The Origin of the Work of Art." This verbality of the world reveals that the world is not given but is an event that happens, each time, by way of things. This is shown in Being and Time, where

Heidegger describes things, not as discrete, separate, individual entities, but as constitutive and formative of a world. Things that appear within the world are not first simply "present-at-hand" (vorhanden), as Heidegger calls them, but must be taken instead as "ready-to-hand" (zuhanden), that is, as participating in the event of the world. Further, Heidegger presents in Being and Time what could be called a "thingly self," that is, a self that comes to itself from things, revealing that the event of selfhood is inscribed in things.

Things are thus events. I analyze Heidegger's rethinking of the thing in later texts, where it is precisely taken in its eventful and verbal sense. Heidegger seems to recognize that a thing is indeed properly an event, and to that extent, he offers a verbal form for the term, dingen, Das Dingen, at the risk of stretching the limits of language: the "thing things," Das Ding dingt, the thing is a thing insofar as it "things." As he puts it in the essay "The Thing": "The jug presences [west] as a thing. The jug is the jug as a thing. But how does the thing presence? The thing things [Das Ding dingt]."32 The thing as noun becomes the thing as a verb: to thing, the "thinging" of the thing. The thing is neither the Roman res, nor the medieval ens, nor an object, and nor a present-at-hand entity. Rather, the thing is a thing insofar as it happens, that is, insofar as "it things": "The presence of something present such as the jug comes into its own, appropriatively manifests and determines itself, only from the thinging of the thing" (GA 7, 179/PLT, 175). The being of the thing lies in its eventfulness, not in objective presence. This presencing of things is the way in which the thing harbors, shelters, the event of presence. There are no things prior to such thinging; rather, there is a thing insofar as there is "thinging." Things are properly events, and this reveals in turn that events are "thingly."

In chapters 5 and 6, I explore the thematic of an "event of being" and how the event comes forth as the main feature of being. In the wake of the deconstruction of the categories of reason and causality that have in the tradition enframed and neutralized the event in its eventfulness, I noted how it became possible to do justice to the phenomenon of the event, indeed to grasp phenomenology itself as a phenomenology of the event. Now, according to Heidegger, the original phenomenon of phenomenology is being itself. Unlike his former mentor, Husserl, Heidegger does not define phenomenology in relation to consciousness but to the event of being. "With regard to its subject-matter, phenomenology is the science of the being of entities— ontology."" Phenomenology is approached as the very method of ontology, and the phenomena are to be referred not to a constituting consciousness, but to the event of being as such. Now, if on the one hand phenomenology is to be recognized as a phenomenology of the event, and if on the other hand the distinctive original phenomenon of phenomenology is being as such, then it becomes possible to finally grasp being itself as event, as opposed to some substantial ground. Indeed, Heidegger develops a powerful thought of the event, seizing being itself as eventfulness and temporal happening, as presence and presencing. By approaching being in distinction from beings, and in particular in distinction from any reference to a supreme being, substrate, or substance (which in the ontotheological tradition had determined the meaning of being), Heidegger makes it possible to approach being as an event, away from the tradition of substantiality and the metaphysical categories of atemporal permanent presence. Levinas rightly underlined this fundamental contribution of Heidegger's thought: namely, to have grasped being no longer as a noun, but as a verb. In one of his last classes taught at the Sorbonne, on November 17, 1975, he explained: "The most extraordinary thing that Heidegger brings us is a new sonority of the verb 'to be': precisely its verbal sonority. To be: not what is, but the verb, the 'act' of being."" Heidegger

understands being as event: being, as such, happens. In this way, it becomes clear that it is not necessary to go beyond being, beyond ontology, to think the event (as some allege), for being itself happens as an event.

In chapter 5, I follow Heidegger's critique of substantiality so as to reveal the eventfulness of being, which he approached in his early works as the proper motion or "unrest" (Unruhe) of "factical life." Understanding being itself as event was made possible, first, by deconstructing the inadequate mode of substantiality, and further, by revealing the motion and eventfulness of historical life. I trace the retrieval of the eventfulness of life in Heidegger's early work on history and in his thematization of "hermeneutical life," which displays a motion or motility (Bewegtheit) that always involves a radical expropriation, which Heidegger names "ruinance." I identify several features: (a) Being (which Heidegger approaches in these early texts terminologically as "life" and "factical life") is not some substantial presence, but an event and a happening. (b) This event is irreducible and the ultimate phenomenon: it is not anchored in any other reality that itself would not be happening. (c) This event is marked by an expropriation or negativity, an expropriation or "ruinance" already identified in the thematic of the event occurring "outside" of thought. (d) To such event is assigned thought as the counter-event or response to its coming.

In chapter 6, I pursue this thinking of the event of being by first developing its temporal dimension. In Heidegger's early work, "factical life" (later renamed "Dasein") is described in terms of a temporal singularity as each time its own (Jeweiligkeit). Dasein is each time the being it has to be. I elaborate this logic of the each, revealing key features of the event: singularity, discontinuity, and difference. In Being Singular Plural, Nancy insists on the singularity of being, understood in terms of the temporal givenness of an "each time," suggesting that being itself happens "au coup par coup," blow by blow, going so far as to claim that :he essence of being is the stroke or the shock of the instant (le coup). Each time, "being" is always a stroke or blow (un coup) of being. This could also be said in this way: the essence of being is the event. Being happens each time as a "stroke of being": "a lash, blow, beating, shock, knock, an encounter, an access" (BSP, 33). The event of existence is and can only be singular: there is no "general" or continuous existence. Indeed, "each time" does not mean "always" and in fact indicates the interruption of any continuity. Any "constancy" is derived from the interruption of the event, from the succession of an "each time" that is not unlike what Merleau-Ponty wrote of time, which he compared it to a fountain whose renewed thrust can give the appearance of permanence: "We say that there is time as we say that there is a fountain: the water changes and the fountain remains, because the form is preserved; the form is preserved because each successive burst takes up the functions of the previous one."

I further explore how the event can be articulated in terms of possibility. Derrida stresses that any event must be structured around the possibility of a perhaps. "There is no event, to be sure, that is not preceded and followed by its own perhaps," he writes. The perhaps or the maybe of the event is the primary and irreducible form of experience, the primary tense of being. This perhaps represents the most authentic sense of the event: "the thought of the 'perhaps' perhaps engages the only possible thought of the event" (PF, 29). This is indeed what Heidegger showed when he explained that Dasein's being is its own possibility. "As a being, Dasein always defines itself in terms of a possibility which it is" (SZ, 43). Dasein is a being that never "is" what it is (as a present-at-hand being), but is instead

approached in terms of an event that is in the process of happening. The event is tied to the possible, to the event of an existence that is each time "to be."

Nonetheless, I will in chapter 8 radicalize this thinking of the possible by showing how possibility needs to be located in an exposure to the "im-possible," as if the possible was "possibilized" by the impossible. Indeed, a possibility that would be merely possible can only be a neutralization of the irruptive nature of the event. "For a possible that would only be possible (non-impossible), a possible surely and certainly possible, accessible in advance, would be a poor possible, a futureless possible, a possible already set aside, so to speak, life-assured" (PF, 29). Such a possible would not be eventful, but the predetermined realization of a prior plan or program. If the event must be approached first on the side of the possible, it must be recognized that the impossible proves to be the secret resource of the possible. "If all that arises is what is already possible, and so capable of being anticipated and expected, that is not an event. The event is possible only coming from the impossible" (PM, 74).

I pursue this thinking of the event of being in terms of a reflection on presence. As noted, Heidegger approaches being as an event, as the event of presence. Instead of supposing an underlying permanent substance and foundation, it is a matter of understanding being as the event of givenness (and withdrawal), as well as a letting. Indeed, "letting" is for Heidegger the "deepest meaning of being." For an event happens of itself so that an event is never prepared, produced, or made, but precisely let be. To the letting of being corresponds the fundamental disposition of thinking as Gelassenheit, as letting-be. "Thinking the event" would mean here: letting . . . the letting, letting the letting be. Through a close reading of the 1962 lecture "On Time and Being" and other texts of that late period, such as Four Seminars, I engage Heidegger's approach to being as event of presence (Anwesenheit) or presencing (Anwesen). What then appears is how the proper of time and the proper of being involve the event (Ereignis) of the givenness of the es gibt, that is to say, the event of being and time and the human being as recipient of such event. This is why in a last section, I show how the self happens in and though the event of being, a self that is no longer the substantial subject of the tradition, but the one who is the recipient of the event of being, happening through the happening of being. The thinking of being approached from the giving of Ereignis leads to a pure thinking of the event, that is, to the eventfulness of the event, an eventfulness that nonetheless always entails an irreducible expropriation.

In chapter 7, I explore such expropriation in the happening of the event in terms of what Jean-Luc Nancy calls a withdrawal of essence. This withdrawal is apparent in the fact that nothing preexists the event of being, no principle, arche, or prior substance. "Being absolutely does not preexist; nothing preexists; only what exists exists" (BSP, 29). To that extent, being is nothing but the event of itself and does not refer to any other instance than its own happening. The event is no longer anchored in a principle that itself would not be happening. Preceded by nothing and grounded in no essence, the event can only come as a surprise. Indeed, for Nancy, the surprise is not the mere accompanying aspect of an event, but its defining characteristic ("What makes the event an event is not only that it happens, but that it surprises," BSP, 159), going so far as to write that "the event surprises or else it is not an event" (BSP, 167). The event cannot unfold predictably, following an essence, a direction, or some principle, but can only happen "by way of surprise" (BSP, 159). Thinking the event here would mean thinking the surprise, which immediately reverses into: thinking is surprised by the event; surprised, or, to follow literally the French, surprise: "over-taken." Nancy writes that "philosophy is surprised thought" (BSP, 165).

I unfold this essencelessness of the event in terms of what Nancy calls the "creation of the world." In spite of its theological provenance, the motif of "creation," certainly used provocatively by Nancy,' is to be taken in a radically nontheological way as a creation "without a creator."" In fact, creation is even characterized as the nodal point in a deconstruction of Christianity to the extent that it is a creation ex nihilo, a nothing in which God as author disappears. Nancy suggests that the God of ontotheology, in a peculiar kenosis or self-emptying, was "progressively stripped of the divine attributes of an independent existence and only retained those of the existence of the world considered in its immanence" (CW, 44). Creation, understood is a nontheological sense, is the mark of the event of the world: the world is not given, not resting on some prior principle of arche, but exists rigorously as the event of itself, as creation of itself. This is why Nancy clarifies that "the world is not given" and that, in fact, "the world is its own creation" (CW, 109).

In a third section, I explore this thinking of the event in terms of abandonment, which designates the unsubstantial character of an event as deprived of principles, ground and arche, a condition or rather "incondition" in which we find ourselves in the wake of the exhaustion of metaphysical principles and from which we are called to think. Nancy characterizes existence as abandonment and sheer exposure, a "leaving" or "abandonment" of any prior essence. It is "from an abandonment that being comes forth: we can say no more. There is no going back prior; being conveys nothing older than its abandonment."" The only ontology that remains, according to Nancy, is precisely no longer an ontotheology, but an ontology characterized by the feature of abandonment, that is, abandonment as the sole predicate of being. Abandonment must not only be understood as an abandonment by but also an abandonment to a law, Nancy clarifies. One finds here the motif of law and obligation intertwined with that of "abandoned being." The event of being amounts to a being-obligated: to be is having to be, obligated and called to be. One can speak of a categorical imperative of the event of being: one must be! A certain dignity, or ethicality, is hence conferred to the event of being, which is always a call that one must answer.

Finally, I explore the extent to which this event of being is always—each time—the event of a coexistence, as for Nancy being rigorously means: being-with. Nancy approaches such being-with as an event in his rethinking of democracy, of what one may call the event of democracy. Nancy's claim is that it is a matter of understanding democracy "metaphysically," and not in its traditional exhausted sense as a political regime. "Democracy is first of all a metaphysics and only afterwards a politics.' What Nancy gestures toward here is to approach democracy not as a political form or regime, but as an event. Indeed, democracy is characterized as a power of imagining, of invention, without subject or mastery and in excess of identity of any given form. Democracy is not only in excess of the political, it is also in excess of itself, that is, of its own idea, form, or concept, precisely to the extent that it is first of all an event, which, as seen with Arendt, always exceeds its own concept. Therein lies what Nancy calls the "inadequacy" of democracy, an inadequacy with respect to itself that Nancy refers to Derrida's "democracy to come" in a perspective that combines the eventful character of democracy with its incompleteness and perfectibility. I argue that such incompletion or inadequation—indeed differance—must be also thought from the eventful character of democracy.

In chapter 8, I focus on the inappropriability of the event, a motif that has been a constant thread in the course of this work. As I have hoped to show, the event permeates every instance of being and existence to such an extent that to be means: to happen. And yet, it remains inappropriable, frustrating any attempt to reduce it to a present being or an identity. It only happens, in the flash of a disjointed,

discontinuous, and anachronic temporality preventing any gathering in a present. The event has, as it were, the structure of the trace as Derrida describes it: "The trace is not a substance, a present existing thing, but a process that is changing all the time. It can only reinterpret itself and always, finally, it is carried away" (PM, 159). The event remains inappropriable, resistant to anticipation and even to comprehension, irreducible to reason. It "belongs to an atemporal temporality, to a duration that cannot be grasped: something one can neither stabilize, establish, grasp [prendre], apprehend, or comprehend. Understanding, common sense, and reason cannot seize [begreifen], conceive, understand, or mediate it As such, the event constitutes a challenge to reason and understanding: "The event is what comes and, in coming, comes to surprise me, to surprise and to suspend comprehension: the event is first of all that which I do not first of all comprehend. Better, the event is first of all that I do not comprehend. The fact that I do not comprehend: my incomprehension."" For Derrida, an event is always inappropriable. I discuss the presence of this inappropriable in terms of what Derrida calls the "secret" (note that the French secret translates in Derrida's text Heidegger's Geheimnis). Through the leitmotif repetition of the expression "il y a la un secret" or "il y a la du secret," "there is something secret" (literally, there is there something secret), Derrida seeks to emphasize that it is first a matter of recalling, not what the secret would be, but rather that there is a secret at all; as if, through this shift from the "what" to the "that" of the secret, it was a matter of remembering, or removing from its necessary oblivion, the presence of a secret in the experience of the event.

I then engage Derrida's thinking of the "im-possible" as it pertains to the event. Indeed, for Derrida, "only the impossible happens" (PM, 87). In what was to be his last appearance on television, in June 2004 with France 3, answering the question of the journalist who had asked him what deconstruction is, Derrida replied: "deconstruction is what happens [la deconstruction, c'est ce qui arrive]," and then he added: "that is to say, the impossible." The impossible, he concluded, is "the only thing that happens [la seule chose qui arrive]"! This is no hyperbole, but a rigorous understanding of the intertwining between the possible and the impossible as it pertains to the event. ""The impossible is what takes place.' Madness. I am tempted to say of this utterance, itself impossible, that it touches on the very condition of thinking the event. There where the possible is all that happens, nothing happens, nothing that is not the impoverished unfurling or the predictable predicate of what finds itself already there, potentially, and thus produces nothing new, not even accidents worthy of the name 'event' (OT, 57). As I alluded to prior, the impossible becomes the secret resource of the possible and the condition of any event "worthy of the name."

Finally, in a concluding chapter, I sketch the contours of an "ethics of the event" and how the happening of the event opens onto a welcome to what comes in the event, a saying yes to being overtaken and taken away by its secret. Here appear the thematics of a hospitality to the event. Throughout this work, it has been an issue of freeing the pure eventfulness of the event from the traditional attempts to neutralize it, whether through the demands of a principle of reason or through the position of a willful ego, of letting the event give itself. The happening of the event is the coming of the arrivant, an arrival that is welcomed by an original hospitality. Indeed, the ethics of the event, as I approach it here, is to be taken as an ethics of hospitality, a welcome of the event in its irruptive coming. I am, before the event, caught by surprise, and without resources, an absolute weakness before its happening. In fact, an event exposes the utter vulnerability of the one who is exposed to it, the powerlessness and radical passivity of the one to whom it happens. Derrida writes that the event "is there, before us, without us—there is

someone, something, that happens, that happens to us, and that has no need of us to happen (to us). And this relation to the event or alterity, as well as to chance or the occasion, leaves us completely disarmed; and one has to be disarmed. The las to' says yes to the event: it is stronger than I am."" The ethics of the event would designate this vulnerability, this unconditional openness to the other. From such exposure to the otherness of the event, always happening from without, one understands better in what sense the event weighs on thought from the outside (how it exscribes it) and how thought is nothing but the thinking of this shock, in wonder before it, even if it means never being able to comprehend or appropriate it. <>

HUSSERL, KANT AND TRANSCENDENTAL PHENOMENOLOGY edited by Iulian Apostolescu and Claudia Serban [DE GRUYTER, 9783110562927]

The transcendental turn of Husserl's phenomenology has challenged philosophers and scholars from the beginning. This volume inquires into the profound meaning of this turn by contrasting its Kantian and its phenomenological versions. Examining controversies surrounding subjectivity, idealism, aesthetics, logic, the foundation of sciences, and practical philosophy, the chapters provide a helpful guide for facing current debates.

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Husserl, Kant, and Transcendental Phenomenology

From Kantian criticism to Husserlian phenomenology, transcendental philosophy has proven to be undeniably resilient and, at the same time, has seen a controversial reception. The aim of this volume is to inquire into the profound meaning of this motif by contrasting the Kantian and phenomenological versions of transcendental philosophy on several crucial points.

Far from being unanimously accepted by his students and contemporary philosophers of different orientations, the transcendental turn in Husserl's phenomenology has always been a source of divided interpretations among scholars. Thus, the deep significance and necessity of this turn have been continually interrogated: what is the precise content and nature of the transcendental, and what does it mean vis-a-vis Husserl's relationship to Kant? To what extent does phenomenology square with idealism, insofar as it redefines transcendental subjectivity and uncovers the realm of intersubjectivity? How does it reshape the project of a transcendental aesthetic or logic, as well as the foundation of the sciences or ethics? In short, what is it that distinguishes the "baroque" (Moran 2002, p. 51) form of transcendental philosophy advocated by Husserl from the Kantian one?

The contributions gathered here approach these issues both historically and systematically by means of a thorough engagement with the available literature in Kant and Husserl studies, while also taking into account some indispensable recent publications (such as that of Husserliana, volume XLII: Die Grenzprobleme der Phanomenologie, 2014). Following the latest research trends in the field of transcendental phenomenology (Mohanty 1997; Crowell 2001 and 2013; Luft 2011; Fabbianelli and Luft 2014; Luft 2018; Heinämaa, Hartimo, Miettinen, 2014; Staiti 2014; Gardner, Grist 2015; Honenberger 2016; Kim, Hoeltzel 2016; Engelland 2017; Zahavi 2017), the present volume offers a range of in-depth analyses that aim at elucidating and evaluating some of the essential features of transcendental philosophy, as well as some of the important debates that its reception has generated in German Idealism, Neo-Kantianism, and in the subsequent phenomenological tradition. Without pretending to accomplish the task of a systematic confrontation between Husserl's phenomenology and the main lines

of Kant's transcendental strategy (which might be impossible, if we follow Luft 2018, p. 47), this collection of works authored by both junior and senior researchers provides a complex and nuanced picture of the challenges and possibilities opened up by the transcendental problematic.

The Transcendental and the A Priori

This volume brings together twenty-three contributions arranged into four sections. The first section deals primarily with the significance and scope of the transcendental from a perspective that presents itself from the outset as both historical and systematic.

In "The Meaning of the Transcendental in the Philosophies of Kant and Husserl," Veronica Cibotaru highlights the discrepancy between the two uses of the transcendental: while Kant introduces and develops the notion in an attempt to ensure the possibility of metaphysics, Husserl mobilizes it within his endeavor to provide a deeper understanding of the relationship between the subject and the world. Nevertheless, these uses display one common feature: both of these appeals to the transcendental manifest the imperative of the infinite as a fundamental structure of subjectivity. Following this path, Cibotaru engages several key questions: for instance, she refutes the perspective according to which the meaning of the transcendental in Kant's philosophy is primarily defined as reflecting knowledge or self-knowledge of human reason and subjectivity, and argues that transcendental philosophy is more specifically preoccupied with the grounding of the concepts of pure reason, with their possibility and legitimacy. Thus, it is the foundation of the sciences - and eventually, of metaphysics itself - that is at stake in transcendental philosophy: it is for this reason that its elaboration by Kant takes the shape of a critical project. In contrast, for Husserl, the meaning and scope of the transcendental is quite obviously no longer determined by the concern for the possibility of a metaphysics. Yet this does not imply any relinquishing of interest in the general problem of foundation, insofar as for Husserl the grounding of knowledge in general, and of a pure logic or of sciences in particular, is a major and constant active preoccupation. From this perspective, phenomenology itself has a critical significance, in the Kantian sense of the term: with its development marking the turn to transcendental idealism, Husserl aims at a radical foundation of knowledge in general and of science in particular, a foundation that simultaneously disclaims the epistemological pretensions of psychology and the unchallenged hegemony of the natural sciences. This radical foundation finds its privileged methodological tool in phenomenological reduction, whose reshaping and new interpretation as transcendental only accentuates this constant concern for a grounding.

In "The Ethics of the Transcendental," Susi Ferrarello points out the distinctive characteristics of a thought which aims at elucidating the link between Being and meaning, while also investigating its ethical implications and the kind of meaning-giving activity it involves. The author initially retraces the historical path that leads to Kant's philosophical use of the transcendental through Calov and Baumgarten and states that it is only with Kant that we truly face a shift from an ontological to an epistemological way of explaining the transcendental, and a new orientation towards subjectivity in the determination of the object. Importantly, if Husserl attempts to overcome the anthropological limitation of Kant's account of the transcendental, he also joins Kant in considering time to be that which ultimately explains the interconnection between Being and meaning. Nevertheless, if the productive function of time bridges Being and meaning for Husserl as well, the anthropological and psychological dimension of time is bracketed through phenomenological reduction, thus reaching into a deeper realm of subjectivity. Where, then, might the ethical quality of transcendental philosophy come from? This ethical dimension

comes into view precisely in connection with the search for meaning experienced as a crisis of meaning demanding a subjective commitment to truth and to moral imperatives. For this reason, Husserl is ultimately able to speak of a "transcendental humanity" (Husserl 1973, Hua XV, p. 24) as a concrete intersubjective community which decides to assume an ethical stance within its common lifeworld through a radical epoché that separates it from the point of view of the natural attitude.

In "The Phenomenological A Priori as the Husserlian Solution to the Problem of Kant's 'Transcendental Psychologism,'" John Rogove turns our attention to and analyzes Husserl's critique of the Kantian doctrine of the faculties, frequently accused of harboring naturalistic and empiricist metaphysical presuppositions. Furthermore, the author highlights the affinity between Husserl's denunciation of Kant's "transcendental psychologism" and the critique of Foucault, formulated in terms of a "doublet empirico-transcendantal," which claims that critical philosophy inevitably results in anthropology. The phenomenological attempt to ensure the de-anthropologization of the a priori leads Husserl to the discovery of a new kind of necessity, neither solely empirical nor merely formal, namely, the material a priori. This radical divergence in the interpretation of the a priori appears to lie at the very heart of the difference between Kant's and Husserl's versions of transcendental philosophy. The latter's corollary is the assertion of the intuitive givenness of the a priori - whether subjective or objective - whereas Kant had maintained that everything pertaining to the transcendental ego cannot be given in intuition or in any experience whatsoever.The critical gap between form and content, or between epistemology and ontology, is thus considerably narrowed. In a nutshell, Rogove proposes an interpretation of Husserl's phenomenology which revolves around a joint de-subjectivation of the transcendental and of the a priori, entailing an inevitable distanciation from psychology and anthropology

In her contribution, "On the Naturalization of the Transcendental," Elena Partene reevaluates Husserl's criticism of Kant's conception of transcendental structures, wondering whether one might be justified in interpreting Kant's transcendental theory as a form of naturalism. By means of a minute analysis of this approach, she attempts to formulate an answer to the phenomenologist's accusations from a Kantian point of view. Drawing upon the consequences of the idea of an epigenesis of pure reason, she additionally proposes a defense of the Kantian account of human or subjective finitude. In his joint disapproval of Kant's psychologism and anthropologism, Husserl equally reproaches the author of the Critiques for his conception of the faculties of the Gemut, for the resulting account of the a priori, and for the epistemological limitations that come with the standpoint of the finite rational human being, which cannot therefore be conceived of as an exemplary intellect. Confronting this criticism, Partene stresses the fact that Kant introduces the idea of an "epigenesis of pure reason" precisely in order to avoid any naturalization of the transcendental and to prevent the temptation to consider it as a nature, as a psychological datum, or as something innate to the human mind. From a transcendental point of view, everything is acquired, and the transcendental structures of experience and knowledge are acquired in an original sense. This also means, as the author states, following Grandjean (2009), that everything that pertains to the transcendental is characterized by a certain facticity: a non-innate, non-psychological facticity. However, it is with respect to "the central thesis of finitude" that Partene identifies "the real point of contention between Kant and Husserl:" Kant's philosophy asserts an irreducible finitude which expresses the posteriority of the subject with respect to being; thus, being finite means being confronted with something radically exterior or with an irreducible form of otherness.

With "Kant, Husserl, and the Aim of a 'Transcendental Anthropology,'" Claudia Serban reconsiders the question of the facticity specific to the transcendental. She examines the manner in which both Kant and Husserl have conceived of and developed an anthropological counterpart to transcendental philosophy, going so far as to propose the aporetic and presumably oxymoronic idea of a "transcendental anthropology." Serban argues that it is the necessity of developing a transcendental egology for the purpose of incorporating certain fundamental aspects of the empirical (psychological and worldly) dimension of subjective life that expresses itself in these anthropological projects. In following this path, transcendental philosophy is no longer obligated to choose between subscribing to an "anthropological prohibition" (denounced in Blumenberg 2006, pp. 60, 61, 91, etc.) or accepting the "anthropologization" of the transcendental that was vigorously disavowed by Husserl. It is not only the core of philosophical anthropology and of its concept of humanity that might be reshaped in this way, but also the sense and the contents of the transcendental itself. Following Foucault's diagnosis of the "anthropologico-critical repetition" (Foucault 2008a, p. 52; Foucault 2008b, p. 83), Serban shows that it is precisely the firm rejection of any form of scientific psychology and the new articulation of the relationship between internal and external experience that leads Kant to develop his pragmatic anthropology as a genuine means of replacing psychology (whether rational or empirical). Thus, Kant's anthropological inquiry responds to a postcritical necessity and proves that instead of adhering to an anthropological prohibition, the Critique issues a call for an anthropology. The same can be argued for Husserl himself, given that while the famous 1931 conference on "Phenomenology and Anthropology" stresses the separation of the two disciplines, the research manuscripts from the same period thoroughly explore and develop that which the conference had already designated as their "intrinsic affinity (innere Affinitat)" (Husserl 1989, Hua XXVII, p. 181; Husserl 1997, p. 500): in this way, it becomes possible to envision a legitimate phenomenological, and thus properly transcendental, anthropology.

The Ego and the Sphere of Otherness

Complementing the results of these inaugural analyses, the second section of the volume approaches the crucial problem of the ego: how has the view of subjectivity evolved between critical philosophy and transcendental phenomenology? Do Kant and Husserl speak of a transcendental "I" in the same sense, and does their adherence to transcendental idealism carry the same significance? Moreover, how do they conceive of the sphere of otherness — whether intersubjective or worldly?

In "Transcendental Apperception and Temporalization: Husserl on Kant," Inga Romer examines Husserl's reappropriation of Kant's idea of transcendental apperception and his interpretation of the transcendental deduction of the categories. In view of the contrasting accounts of these crucial topics in critical philosophy offered by Hegel, Cohen, and Heidegger, Romer insists upon the reasons for which, in Husserl's eyes, Kant's deductions have an anthropological and, thus, ultimately skeptical character that needs to be overcome by a more rigorously scientific transcendental philosophy, which would benefit from the fruitful methodological tool of phenomenological reduction. Drawing upon the unpublished manuscript A VI 30 (most likely written in 1926) and the late C-Manuscripts, Milner extends the classical analyses of Iso Kern (1964), Klaus Held (1966), and Eduard Marbach (1974) in order to show that Husserl's final answer to the problem of a phenomenological transcendental apperception (which leaves behind what he denounces as "the mythology of the transcendental apperception" in Kant) lies in his conception of the ultimate, most fundamental layer of time-constitution. Yet the temporalization characterized by anonymity and drive-intentionality is not so much the "highest point" of transcendental

phenomenology (as transcendental apperception was for Kant), but rather the "lowest," or the deepest, pre-personal dimension of subjective life.

With “The Ego beside Itself': On Birth, Sleep, and Death from Kant's Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View to Husserl's Late Manuscripts on Time-Constitution," by Vincent Gérard, the volume embarks upon an exploration of the C-Manuscripts from a different perspective in order to contrast Kant's account of subjectivity with that of Husserl. The frame of reference for this comparison is no longer that of the "Transcendental Analytic," but rather that of the 1798 Anthropology, which is simply pragmatic or empirical without explicitly assuming a transcendental significance. It is in this context that the author of the Critiques analyzes the empirical processes that affect self-consciousness and discusses the traditional analogy between sleep and death. Gérard's claim is that in the analysis of sleep, birth, and death found in the C-Manuscripts (mainly in the C8 Manuscript from 1929 that the Freiburg phenomenologist considered to be "the best elucidation of the idea of limit," Husserl 2006, Hua Mat. VIII, p. 159), Husserl makes transcendental use of Kant's non-transcendental anthropology. The transcendental reconsideration of the borderline empirical phenomena of subjective life is accomplished by considering and deepening the structure of the living present: from this perspective, birth designates a past present which does not send us back to any anterior genesis, or the limit-case of the impoverishment of the living present, while death appears as the borderline case of the dreamless sleep, or as a "final sleep" where waking up is impossible. This undertaking can be regarded as an illustration of the way in which anthropological concepts or descriptions call for their own transcendental transposition or interpretation in late Husserl.

In "Kant and Husserl on Overcoming Skeptical Idealism through Transcendental Idealism," Corijn van Mazijk examines the compatibility between transcendental idealism and a form of realism that we find both in critical philosophy and in Husserl's phenomenology. This subtle position, which overcomes a simplistic contradiction between idealism and realism, goes hand-in-hand with a redefinition of the norm for the real, which is now to be found within the scope of possible experience and not in the ideal of absolute mind-independence. In (other words, as the author pills it, "for an object lw real does not mean, as with transcendental realism, that it exists radically independently from us." From the standpoint of transcendental idealism, objects are to be considered as transcendentally inseparable from us: as a transcendental condition of objectivity, subjectivity is required in order for objects to exist at all. Thus, at this level, it is their common rejection of transcendental realism that serves as a ground for an essential proximity between Kant and Husserl. This reading is tested and reinforced by taking into account the polemical relationship of both philosophers to Descartes, their common aim of overcoming skepticism, and their subtle treatment of the hypothesis of a thing existing beyond our cognition or of a world beyond ours. In this way, Van Mazijk's analysis substantially clarifies the realism-idealism debate, which still animates the reception of both Kant and Husserl, and establishes a proximity between the two, which might counterbalance their well-known and no less radical divergences.

But what is the nature and content of the ego from which objects might ultimately derive their sense of reality? Does Husserl's view on subjectivity join Kant's analysis of the "I think" or of internal experience? In —Pure Ego and Nothing More,'" focusing on the Ideas I, Antoine Grandjean examines the phenome-nologist's conception of an ego which is nothing beyond its own acts. Proceeding from the natural life of the ego towards the transcendental, Husserl progressively unveils the egoity of consciousness as the other side of its intentionality, as the irreducible identity of conscious intentional life. The purity of this

ego, which differs from all forms of the psychic ego — as it is characterized as the mere identity of conscious life —, contributes specifically to our understanding of the transcendental meaning of egoity. As the pole of identity of all flowing, temporal, lived experiences, the "I" itself is no lived experience; and yet, it is more than nothing, since it is that which is omnipresent and permanent where everything else is in flux. Therefore, as Grandjean insists, "its qualitative emptiness is the other side of a never-ending description." He also convincingly argues (against Marbach 1974) that one should not too hastily assign the function of unifying the stream of lived experiences to the ego: as already granted by the Logical Investigations, the temporal flow of consciousness has no need of an external principle in order to synthesize its unity. In turn, the ego indicates an identity, discovered through reflection, inscribed within all of the acts belonging to a life of consciousness unitary in itself. Thus, with respect to individual lived experiences, the ego is characterized as a form of transcendence-in-immanence. Consequently, Grandjean can claim that it is the discovery of the intentional sense of immanence that led phenomenology to both idealism and transcendental egology.

The pure ego of the personal ego characterized by its radical poverty and emptiness. It is well known that this vacuity has been challenged and revised by Husserl, as early as in the analyses of the personal, habitual ego provided in Ideas II, as well as in the genetic and monadological developments of his phenomenology. In "Towards a Phenomenological Metaphysics: The Contingent Core of the Ego and of All Eidetic Forms," Irene Breuer retraces the significant transformations of both eidetic and transcendental phenomenology which have resulted from these evolutions of Husserlian egology and highlights the remarkable emergence of a renewed, phenomenological metaphysics to which they ultimately lead. But how is it that transcendental philosophy and metaphysics have managed to cross paths again? At the time of the composition of Ideas I, transcendental phenomenology subscribes to an eidetic method which assigns it the rank of "first philosophy" concerned with the invariant structure inherent to all possible factual realities. In contrast, metaphysics understood as a rational investigation of factual actuality acquires the status of a "second philosophy" that presupposes eidetic phenomenology as the primordial science of possibilities. However, the specific facticity of the ego requires particular treatment not only on methodological grounds (in order to account for the task of eidetic variation), but also insofar as it opens up a new dimension of analysis, that of originary primal facts taken up by a renewed metaphysics. Hence, at the end of the path leading from transcendental philosophy, understood as an eidetic science, to phenomenological metaphysics based on originally given primal facts, the order of foundation is revised: phenomenological metaphysics —a metaphysics of apodictically given primal facts that cannot be subject to modalization (cf. Tengelyi 2014), substantially different from the Kantian figure of metaphysics — does indeed underlie transcendental phenomenology.

The connection between the factual "I" and the eidos ego obtained through self-variation appears to be an exception to the law that commonly governs the relationship between matter and essence. In "The Transcendental Grounding of the Experience of the Other in Husserl's Phenomenology," Raymond Kassis revisits this question while examining the manner in which transcendental phenomenology manages to chase away the specter of solipsism. How can the transcendental reduced ego, deprived of any natural commerce with transcendent beings, encounter the specific otherness of the alter ego? The response to this difficulty, which engages the intersubjectively objective unity of the world, entails significant implications for transcendental egology. In his critical reading of the available accounts of the experience of otherness.

Husserl considers that both analogical reasoning (Erdmann) and recourse to empathy (Lipps) presuppose a more original manner in which the other is given in reference to the specific structure of self-experience. Indeed, the possibility of imaginative self-variation discloses the path of access to the otherness of the alter ego, insofar as it manifests an eidos ego or a realm of egological possibilities prior to any factual, existing "I." Consequently, the structure of the intersubjective community is that of a mutual implication (Ineinander), which is a primal fact (Urfaktum) as much as egological facticity is. It is on this basis that the objective unity of the world, threatened by the menace of solipsism, is eventually grounded: the ultimate subject of constitution being understood as an egological community, the world possesses an intersubjective unity for every real and possible ego.

Aesthetic, Logic, Science, Ethics

The third section of this volume further explores the confrontation between the Kantian and Husserlian versions of transcendental philosophy by approaching certain key issues, such as the scope of a transcendental aesthetic and transcendental logic, the breadth of a transcendental foundation of the empirical sciences, and the phenomenological elaboration of ethics.

In "Aesthetic, Intuition, Experience: Husserl's Redefinition of the Transcendental Constitution" shows the scientific world by highlighting the acts of idealization that underlie it. Consequently, the Kantian tripartition of sensibility, understanding, and reason not only finds itself reduced to the duality of the intuitive and the discursive, of the given and the constructed, or to that of experience and thought, but the phenomenological task is also reformulated as the disclosure of the genetic continuity that exists between the two realms. Furthermore, Farges shows that this reorganization of Kant's topology is strikingly akin to the objections that Schopenhauer had raised against the author of the Critiques a century earlier.

In "Synthesis and Identity: Husserl on Kant's Contribution to the History of Philosophy," Daniele De Santis takes us back to Husserl's reading and use of the Kantian articulation of the relationship between synthesis and identity. This inquiry shows that the phenomenologist repeatedly insists on the great importance of Kant's notion of synthesis, while also stressing its particular fruitfulness for an accurate understanding and definition of intentionality. Furthermore, an examination of Husserl's lectures on the history of philosophy confirms that he had fully grasped the significance of the perennial problem of determining the identity of being as it had first manifested itself in Greek thought. From this standpoint, Kant's contribution to the history of philosophy consists in his transcendental development of the notion of synthesis in order to address properly the perennial problem of identity and to oppose its Humean dissolution. While praising Kant's "profound doctrine of synthesis [tiefsinnige Lehre von der Synthesis]" (Husserl 1956, Hua VII, p. 237), Husserl also criticizes Brentano's shortcomings, and subsequently stresses the necessity of placing the Kantian insight at the very heart of the idea of an "intentional relation," for without synthesis there is no intentionality, and without the identity ensured through synthesis there is no intentional object (Husserl 1962, Hua IX, pp. 420-427). However, this also means that it is only when it is interpreted specifically as intentional synthesis that the Kantian outcome can be properly appreciated and used within the realm of phenomenology.

With "Questions of Genesis as Questions of Validity: Husserl's New Approach to an Old Kantian Problem," Bernardo Ainbinder extends the confrontation whose native ground is to be found in Kant's "Transcendental Analytic." Why did Husserl contest and refuse the Kantian exclusion of that which

pertains to genesis (the subjective deduction of the categories, for instance) from the domain of transcendental inquiry? Can genetic analysis be transcendentally motivated, given that it leads to the unveiling of prepersonal cognitive mechanisms (like instincts, drives, or passive associations)? Ainbinder shows that it is Husserl's appeal to a concrete form of subjectivity that grounds a transcendental perspective in which questions of genesis and questions of validity are legitimately and intricately connected. He also opposes the interpretation according to which the phenomenologist's genetic investigations are motivated by a naturalistic assumption and are independent from the transcendental question concerning validity. Far from orchestrating a relapse into a kind of naturalism incompatible with the transcendental inquiry, Husserl retraces the genesis of intentional rational behavior in cognitive subjects and shows, with his recourse to teleology, that cognition is rooted in a tendency towards self-coherence and self-preservation that pervades living beings. Thus, the contingent factual conditions of organisms capable of cognition may gain a form of transcendental necessity, insofar as they contribute to the determination of the norms of knowledge. In this way, phenomenology integrates the outcome of Kant's "Analytic of Teleological Judgment" into transcendental philosophy and manages to overcome successfully the separation between the formal "I think" and the bodily concrete and mundane "I." However, this does not imply a naturalization of the realm of rationality, but rather a disclosure of the roots of rational normativity within the contingent concrete mechanisms of embodied biological life, which significantly reshapes the very way in which we account for the transcendental.

In "Philosophical Scientists and Scientific Philosophers: Kant and Husserl on the Philosophical Foundations of the Natural Sciences," Dale Allen Hobbs explores and contrasts the conceptions of the relationship between science and transcendental philosophy elaborated by the author of the Critiques and by the author of the Crisis. If the two converge in assigning a foundational role to transcendental philosophy, they disagree about the precise nature of this role and therefore about the nature and scope of science itself. For Kant, transcendental philosophy is the foundation of all genuine science, insofar as it alone is capable of attaining the synthetic a priori truths that are necessary for the application of apodictic knowledge to the natural world. Nevertheless, this philosophical rigor is responsible for certain limitations in Kant's view of science, namely, for the denial of the status of science proper to several disciplines (such as chemistry, geology, biology — not to speak of psychology or the social sciences), given that they lack the type of rigid adherence to the truly apodictic truths of transcendental philosophy that characterizes physics. While Husserl similarly claims that any genuine science must be rooted in transcendental philosophy and endorses Kant's criteria for scientificity (systematicity, the presence of grounding relations, and apodictic certainty), his conception of the natural sciences is nevertheless a less restrictive one. Especially in Husserl's later work, the phenomenological focus on the lifeworld — the world of our everyday interests and experiences — requires and ultimately makes possible a closer connection between science and the concerns of our prescientific lives. Thus, the phenomenologist does not limit the scope of science to the purely mathematical elements of physics, but rather broadens the category of natural sciences and admits the possibility of scientific investigation into several regions of our ordinary experience. The validity of a science does not come from the mathematization of the real that it accomplishes, but rather from the fact of its having its roots firmly planted within the soil of the lifeworld.

In "A Phenomenological Critique of Kantian Ethics," Dominique Pradelle extends his previous work on the "anti-Copernican revolution" specific to Hume) by asking whether the anti-Copernican principle

might also be applicable to the ethical realm, and if so, to what extent. While Kant and Husserl share the goal of refuting ethical skepticism In Its various forms and agree that moral laws cannot be reduced to any kind of factual legality (whether psychological, sociological, ethnological, historical, etc.), their understanding of the practical a priori diverges significantly. First of all, in contrast to Kant, the phenomenologist expresses a Platonic preference for the primacy of theoretical reason and therefore tolerates or even requires recourse to reason within the practical sphere in the form of an intuition or insight (Einsicht) into practical norms: thus, ethics becomes "a matter of discernment or perceptiveness." Furthermore, ethics must be built — and this is a particular illustration of the relationship of grounding or Fundierung — "from the bottom up," as an Ethik von unten, in reference to the moral being's capacity for feeling and desiring. Thus, what is true in the perceptual and theoretical order is confirmed within the practical realm: the moral sense is grounded in a practical sensibility that must necessarily belong to any ethical subject, even God. This illustrates both the "essential neutralization of the distinction between God and the finite subject, infinity and finitude" (in Pradelle's wording) and the universal validity of the Fundierung relation within Husserl's phenomenology, whose anti-Copernican revolution, accordingly, suffers no exception in the practical field.

Transcendental Philosophy in Debate

The fourth and final section of the volume, which groups together a significant number of papers, presents and examines a few of the many debates in which transcendental philosophy has been engaged since its Kantian elaboration. The first inevitable quaestio disputata, raised by the contribution of Alexander Schnell, "Is There a 'Copernican' or an 'Anti-Copernican' Revolution in Phenomenology?," consists in discussing and challenging the very thesis that guides the understanding of the relationship between Kantian critical philosophy and Husserlian transcendental phenomenology found in Pradelle's contribution and previous work (see Pradelle 2012): namely, the view that opposes Kant's "Copernican revolution" to the "anti-Copernican revolution" accomplished by Husserl himself. Schnell attempts to deconstruct this apparent antinomy that separates the two transcendental projects by arguing for the necessity of going "beyond" or rather "beneath" the Copernican revolution, that is, below the subject and the object as given poles or terms of a constitutive relation. From this perspective, Husserl's endeavor appears to be a radicalization of the Copernican revolution. Indeed, if the anti-Copernican move seeks to avoid the perils of an anthropologization of the subject, it nevertheless risks ultimately depriving the subject of its constitutive power by condemning it to being a "transcendental mirror of its transcendent correlatives". On the other hand, going "beyond" the Copernican revolution, as envisioned by Pradelle himself, implies the disclosure of the anonymous or a-subjective structures of experience that equally precede and determine the subject and the object. It is this very task which, in Schnell's account, is taken up by his own project of a "constructive" or "generative" phenomenology that exhibits the transcendental field at work beneath the immanent field of consciousness (Schnell 2015), thus arguing for a constructive circularity between transcendental constitution and ontological grounding.

With Garrett Zantow Bredeson's contribution, "Back to Fichte? Natorp's Doubts about Husserl's Transcendental Phenomenology," we move to the field of certain remarkable historical debates inspired by the reception of transcendental philosophy. As Bredeson maintains, it is in the light of their contrasted appropriations of Kant's legacy that the divergences between Neo-Kantians (Natorp or Cassirer, in the lineage of Cohen) and phenomenologists (Husserl or Heidegger) have to be examined. Natorp does indeed share Cohen's insurmountable reticence to follow Fichte in asserting the absolute

primacy of a subjective grounding of cognition, and considers, accordingly, that the approach to that which pertains to subjectivity can only be reconstructive. This position is far from being without influence on the methodological development of early phenomenology, that of Husserl as well as that of Reinach. It is well known that Husserl's Logical Investigations resonate with Natorp in rejecting the psychological talk about "activities" of consciousness (Husserl 1984, Hua XIX/1, p. 393) and in stating that there is no room for the pure "I" within the stream of lived experience. However, in Natorp's eyes, Husserl's insistence upon subjective operations and accomplishments (reflected, for instance, in his preference for Kant's 1781 version of the transcendental deduction) was forceful enough to suggest a perilous proximity to Fichte. This suspicion was rightfully amplified after the publication of Ideas I, where the commitment to the given and to intuitive givenness could only broaden the gap between Husserl's phenomenology and Natorp's reconstructive psychology. Nevertheless, to some extent, Natorp had always considered that phenomenology's program of research was a genuinely Kantian project. What is more, as Bredeson points out, Reinach had emphasized the distance that separated the Neo-Kantian refutation of the given from the phenomenological bottom-up approach inaugurated by Husserl in an even more radical manner.

Another major player in the confrontation between phenomenology and Neo-Kantianism was Eugen Fink, Mussed's brilliant assistant. The following two contributions attempt more precisely to situate Fink within the landscape of the reception of transcendental philosophy be it Kantian or Husserlian. In "'An Explosive Thought': Kant, link, mid the Cosmic Concept of the World," Ovidiu Stanciu stresses the major importance of Fink's engagement with Kantian philosophy and shows that it is under the aegis of Kant that Fink accomplished the transformation of the phenomenological inquiry into a cosmological philosophy and his breakthrough towards the question of the world as the ultimate level of analysis of the constitution of meaning. In his profound reading of the "Transcendental Dialectic," Fink held Kant to be the "true discoverer of the problem of the world" (Fink 1985, p. 112) while also considering that the treatment of this problem within critical philosophy had remained insufficient. If Kant's indisputable merit consisted in dismissing the traditional vision of totality and, accordingly, the cumulative concept of the world, the subjectivistic principle of the critical solution was inacceptable in Fink's view: unveiling the "a-ontic nature of the world" and its irreducibility to an aggregate of beings does not automatically transform it into a subjective Idea. This consequence must, in fact, be referred to its hidden ontological presuppositions: namely, to the tacit hegemony of an ontology of the thing and to the secret complicity between the reification of mundane totality and its theologization — shortcomings that the phenomenological approach to the world will have had to overcome.

With "Eugen Fink's Transcendental Phenomenology of the World: Its Proximity and Distance in relation to Kant and to the Late Husserl," Yusuke Ikeda provides us with the hallmarks of Fink's phenomenological approach to the world, while also arguing that this endeavor legitimately belongs to the field of transcendental phenomenology. In contrast with researchers who claim that Fink's philosophy is neither transcendental nor strictly phenomenological and who emphasize its proximity to Hegelian speculative dialectics, Ikeda proposes reading it as a radicalization of the late Husserl's phenomenological inquiry into the problem of the "pregiven world." Indeed, while praising Kant for the discovery of the "cosmological difference" between innerwordly beings and the world itself, Fink can only deplore a certain loss or even oblivion of the genuine cosmological problem in Hegel. This problem is phenomenologically handled by Fink as one of "world-consciousness," leading to an interrogation of

the pregivenness of the world. Although Fink considers that the modalities of worldconsciousness are not reducible to intentionality, this does not imply a dismissal of phenomenological description and a relapse into speculation. Instead, it is upon the trail of Heidegger that Fink attempts to be "more phenomenological" than Husserl himself, by deepening rather than abandoning the transcendental orientation of inquiry into the pregivenness of the world.

In "Amphibian Dreams: Karsten Harries and the Phenomenology of 'Human' Reason," the discussion of the work of Karsten Harries gives Steven Crowell the opportunity to revisit the meaning of the transcendental profile which was adopted by phenomenology quite early in its history. In denouncing the "antinomies" of transcendental philosophy, Harries considers that phenomenology cannot efficiently dissolve or prevent these aporetic results, but is rather condemned to reproduce them: in Husserl, in the form of the "paradox of human subjectivity" which brings the medieval doctrine of the "double truth" up to date, and in Heidegger, as an inescapable "antinomy of Being" (Harries 2012, p. 10). Crowell's goal, then, is to defend phenomenology against such accusations. In order to do so, he interprets phenomenology as a "transcendental empiricism" whose purpose is to remain true to the meaning found in experience, leaving aside the traditional motivations that animated the Kantian transcendental endeavor and adopting an entirely different method: while critical philosophy employs transcendental arguments (like that of the transcendental deduction) in order to establish the conditions of possibility of experience a priori, phenomenology employs a transcendental reduction, or a peculiar reflection that unveils the meaning of the entities given in our experience. Thus, phenomenologically, and quite apart from any antinomy, Being and meaning depend on subjectivity, as the latter alone defines the normative space of true significations; and from this perspective, "reason is originally reason-giving," or norm-responsive. In this defense of transcendental phenomenology, Crowell will moreover insist upon the distance that separates phenomenological empiricism from traditional foundationalism.

It is this very profile of phenomenology as a transcendental empiricism that is adopted by Natalie Depraz in "Husserlian Phenomenology in the Light of Microphenomenology." She stresses anew the fact that, from Kantian philosophy to transcendental phenomenology, while subjectivity does indeed remain the provider of meaning for the object, we move from the formal conditions of the possibility of experience, which themselves cannot be experienced, to a transcendental experience in which the subject constitutes the intentional meaning of given objects. If the task of transcendental phenomenology itself is to uncover the subjective operations responsible for the objectivation process, the recent project of a microphenomenology (inaugurated by Pierre Vermersch and taken up by Depraz herself), far from representing a naturalization attempt, can be regarded as a radicalization of the transcendental orientation of Husserlian phenomenology insofar as it performs a significant shift of its descriptive focus towards the irreplaceable singularity of embodied and situated lived experiences that a mere generic or structural description cannot grasp. But the philosophical interest of microphenomenology is also directed towards the manner in which it enforces the claim of a mutual renewal of psychology by phenomenology, and vice versa. As Depraz demonstrates in her discussion of telling cases of introspection and attention, Husserl himself was largely open to the salutary and constructive influence of contemporary debates in psychology, whose major actors were Wundt,lpe, Titchener, and Lipps. While asserting its capacity to be informed by the richness of psychological analysis, the phenomenological legacy of Husserl reaffirms the vital connection between transcendental and empirical analysis, which justifies interpreting it as a transcendental empiricism.

Over the course of these in-depth analyses, some constant features that can be regarded as decisive emerge. Thus, the specific way of defining the boundaries of experience, of intuition, or of the a priori, engages the vital yet problematic connection between transcendental elucidation and empirical description. The account of the living body and the status conferred upon the givenness of the world determine access to otherness and the functional role of the alter ego. The oscillation between a formal and ultimately vacuous figure of subjectivity and a concrete, bodily, and historically situated subject deeply affects the configurations that might be formed at the nexus of transcendental philosophy, psychology, and anthropology; and so does one's stance towards finitude (leading either to its exacerbation or to its neutralization) and towards anthropologism (regarded either as fatal or as susceptible to a transcendental repetition or conversion). For any transcendental endeavor, the resistance to naturalism and the refusal of a naturalization of philosophy is the correlate of its refutation of skepticism and of its concern for a foundation — whether epistemological ontological. Finally, its relationship to metaphysics appears inevitable, even as we move towards a phenomenological metaphysics substantially different from that of Kant.

The thematic organization of the contributions does not exhaust their multiple affinities and mutual resonances; the present volume is likely to offer several different reading paths. For instance, Romer's contribution can be paired with those of De Santis and Schnell; Grandjean's or Schnell's with that of Bredeson; and Depraz's with that of Kassis or Hobbs. By providing accounts and interpretations that are not always convergent and which occasionally contrast with each other, this collection has the virtue of identifying a range of problems as well as of reshaping and sometimes even softening a number of false or apparent alternatives. The goal of such thorough discussions is not only to demonstrate once again the interrogative force of the transcendental problematic, but also to show that Kant's and Husserl's legacies are inseparable when it comes to an evaluation of the significance and contemporary relevance of transcendental phenomenology. <>

PATHS IN HEIDEGGER'S LATER THOUGHT edited by Gunter Figal, Diego D'Angelo, Tobias Keiling, and Guang Yang [Studies in Continental Thought, Indiana University Press, 9780253047199]

If one takes Heidegger at his word then his philosophy is about pursuing different "paths" of thought rather than defining a single set of truths. This volume gathers the work of an international group of scholars to present a range of ways in which Heidegger can be read and a diversity of styles in which his thought can be continued. Despite their many approaches to Heidegger, their hermeneutic orientation brings these scholars together. The essays span themes from the ontic to the ontological, from the specific to the speculative. While the volume does not aim to present a comprehensive interpretation of Heidegger's later thought, it covers much of the terrain of his later thinking and presents new directions for how Heidegger should and should not be read today. Scholars of Heidegger's later thought will find rich and original readings that expand considerations of Heidegger's entire oeuvre.

Contents
Introduction

Wege, nicht werke ("Ways, not works"). According to the report of Heidegger's personal assistant, Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann, published in the first volume of the Gesamtausgabe, this is the motto Heidegger intended for his collected works. If one takes Heidegger at his word, then, his own philosophy is about pursuing different "paths" of thought rather than defining a single set of truths. Philosophy is a process rather than a result, a process evolving along more than one intellectual direction. How Heidegger's "works" have been received testifies to this idea. There is, indeed, scholarly discussion on specific questions in the interpretation of Heidegger, yet the different ways in which his philosophy is interpreted and transformed may well be more important for understanding, even in its transgression, what is genuine to Heidegger's thinking.

This proves to be the case as the publication of additional material from the Nachlass and a growing number of studies on Heidegger's thought successively engage the breadth and complexity of his oeuvre. The recent publication of the "Black Notebooks" makes Heidegger an all-the-more difficult case. If the "Black Notebooks" show how closely Heidegger's philosophy of history is intertwined with his personal and ideological prejudices, this defines, however, an additional task for Heidegger studies—namely, to understand the interaction between his philosophy and these individual prejudices. But Heidegger's philosophy of history, and the history of Being (Seinsgeschichte) specifically, does not absorb the entirety of his philosophical work, nor do Heidegger's commitments as a person undercut the possibility of studying his works philosophically. That Heidegger is one of the most important, and surely the most

controversial of, figures of twentieth-century continental philosophy is only confirmed by the publication of the "Black Notebooks."

It greatly contributes to the import of Heidegger's philosophy that it is read, translated, interpreted, and continued around the globe, interacting with local intellectual traditions and different academic cultures. As an international group of scholars educated at European universities, we intend, in gathering these essays, to present a range of ways in which Heidegger can be read and a diversity of styles in which his thought can be continued. To any one particular audience, some of these styles of thinking will appear foreign and strange. But restricting the tone and voice of thinking takes away the philosophical richness that Heidegger's thought has achieved and continues to achieve. To explore this richness, however, there is no other starting point than Heidegger's texts; it is a hermeneutical endeavor, beginning with an interpretation of his writings.

Despite the chapters' diversity in approaching Heidegger, this hermeneutic orientation constitutes one of the leitmotifs in this volume: the authors contributing to it are greatly indebted to the European tradition of Heidegger studies and its hermeneutic approach to the history of philosophy. Each author attempts careful and often close readings that avoid the alternative of either blindly imitating Heidegger's style of writing or forcing his thinking into categories alien to it. Over the last decades, research in the later period of Heidegger's thought has been a prominent interest in the European (French, German, and also Italian), Continental tradition of Heidegger scholarship, while Anglo-American research on Heidegger has often focused on Being and Time and surrounding texts. This defines the specific aim of our collection: to bring to a broader, international public voices in Heidegger studies that have addressed Heidegger's later philosophy but that are not always prominently represented in the Anglo-American discourse. Rounding up the collection are also a few noted philosophers from the Anglophone tradition who, for different reasons, stand particularly close to the aforementioned hermeneutic reading of Heidegger.

Embracing the diversity of Heidegger studies in the hermeneutic tradition, we decided to concentrate on four topics, defining the arrangement of chapters in the volume: First, an inquiry into language, not so much into the human capacity to speak or to use signs but into language as a manifestation of Being itself. Second, the notion of emerging prominently in Heidegger's reception of the pre-Socratics. Third, the question of Heidegger's relation to phenomenology in his later thought, a question for which "the thing" (das Ding) and its manifestation in what Heidegger calls "the fourfold" (das Geviert) is central. Fourth, the discussion of "ground" and "non-ground" (Grund, Ungrund), representing a core moment in Heidegger's readings of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century authors such as Leibniz and Schelling. This is hardly an exhaustive account of the different philosophical topics Heidegger addresses, yet these fields cover much of the terrain of Heidegger's later thinking.

Setting up this collection in such a way does not only allow moving away from the question of how many Heideggers succeeded each other in the course of his writing, a question more of historical than of philosophical interest. It also has an implication for how we think Heidegger should and should not be read: Heidegger's ontological discourse, the changing ways of asking the question of Being (asking for "Being," the "meaning of Being," the "truth of Being," or the "place of Being") pervades all of his work. Yet, rather than structuring it in its entirety, we believe it bears witness not only to chronological shifts but also, and more importantly, at least for his later writing, to thematic variations. One finds recurring

arguments and descriptions that define different regions within the landscape of his thought and give one possible direction in which an engagement with the later Heidegger can be pursued. As the motto to the Gesamtausgabe indicates, Heidegger eventually came to embrace the idea that even the question of Being, rather than giving his philosophy a center, can only be pursued in an irreducible plurality of ways. We propose to consider and explore the topical variations of this questioning rather than to search for a single set of ideas defining the later Heidegger.

Nonetheless, there are some general features that, while not necessarily setting the later Heidegger apart from the early, appear in various forms in each of the four areas of Heidegger's work we identify. One fundamental concern, no matter in which direction Heidegger's thought is developed, is to span the ontic and the ontological, the specific and the speculative. Even when Heidegger aims to explore the meaning of Being itself, he orients philosophy toward very specific phenomena: the meaning of home; a poem by Georg Trakl; what we communicate by greeting one another; the manifestation of an earthen jug; the beautiful shining of things; a rare and enigmatic German word. The attempt to bring specific phenomena such as these to bear on abstract philosophical questioning annd on Heidegger's ontological project represents the concrete, descriptive, and interpretive side of Heidegger's thinking. If there is an overarching problem that Heidegger may be said to be concerned with, it may be pursuing his ontological or speculative ambitions without losing sight of the ontic and manifest, modifying the understanding of phenomenology in such a way as to allow his method to serve these ambitions. If there needs to be an answer to the question of what propels Heidegger's philosophical work, this is at least one: if Being and Time shows one way in which phenomenology and ontology can be joined, Heidegger's later works assume that this jointure was problematic or has proven insufficient. The fact that Heidegger's work after Being and Time responds to what he has been led to see as a philosophical failure gives a good reason why Heidegger addresses such diffuse themes and writes in such different styles without forging his ideas a new systematic unity.

Despite the wish, in the spirit if not the letter of phenomenology, to do justice to the concrete, it is typical for Heidegger's language to also draw from a very different register from that of nuanced description, scholarly comment, or careful interpretation. The register of the enigmatic, speculative, and mystical defines the second feature typical of the later Heidegger, making for the often-recognized difficulty approaching this period of his writing. Heidegger's magnum opus integrates the discussion of specific phenomena into a systematic framework which, taken as a whole, presents an attempt to understand the meaning of Being.

In his later works, by contrast, the descriptive and the speculative ambition of his texts do not so effortlessly converge in a single philosophical project. While some writings such as the Bremen Lectures, show a rhetorical force, argumentative rigor, and conceptual precision similar to that for which Heidegger's early lectures and Being and Time are famous, other writings, particularly the numerous manuscripts Heidegger never published, cannot but be called vague or obscure. Often enough, one finds bold statements that, taken out of context, can hardly be said to present a philosophical claim.

Consider, for instance, the famous adage from the "Letter on 'Humanism': "Language is the house of Being." There is no doubt that this sentence is meant to grasp and relate the function of language to the whole of Being—but how? Or take the notion that a thing should be understood as a "gathering" (Versammeln)—gathering what? And why should we adopt this notion? Or consider the idea that a basic

ancient Greek word such as articulates an understanding of Being that defines the epoch of pre-Socratic philosophy and, at the same time, is to be retrieved (and translated) for the future philosophy Heidegger envisages. Only to the extent that Heidegger's language, in these speculative turns, makes manifest the philosophical ideas behind these statements can it be said to succeed. To do justice to Heidegger's writing, the essays of this volume follow Heidegger as he attempts to bridge the speculative and the phenomenological.

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The essays of the first section, "Language, Logos, and Rhythm," take their point of departure from ideas in Heidegger's philosophy of language. Although language can arguably be considered a central topic of Heidegger's interest since the earliest writings and seminars, the only explicit reference to language in a seminar title is from the summer 1934 seminar, Logic as the Question concerning the Essence of Language. This title announces a deep connection between language and logic that, while crucial for the early Heidegger, will be rejected in later years: if the task of Heidegger's discussion of language in the1930s lies in referring logic back to language, his later thought will be concerned with the relation of spoken and written language to the very possibility and elemental structure of intelligibility. The essays of the collection On the Way to Language in particular, gathering texts written between 1950 and 1959, attempt to address this elemental structure without reducing it to logic. The chapters of the first section discuss how Heidegger describes this elemental structure outside the traditional discourse of logic.

In his contribution, Jeff Malpas links Heidegger's renewed attention to language after the Second World War with a shift from time (obviously crucial for Being and Time, among other writings) to space or, more precisely, to tonoc, or "place" (Ort or Ortschaft). If language is, according to the "Letter on 'Humanism," the house of Being and therefore the home in which human being dwells, then clearly—according to Malpas—the relation between dwelling in a certain place and language is crucial to understanding not only language but also Being itself. Against the background of Heidegger's reading of Holderlin, Malpas shows that Heidegger's reflections on language are inseparably tied to poetry.

In a similar vein, Markus Wild analyzes the relation between language and poetry. His main reference is to the work of Trakl rather than Holderlin, following a different path in Heidegger's encounter with poetic language. Wild's central aim is to address some problems he sees in the literature on Heidegger's understanding of language. Particularly, Wild accuses current scholarly literature of having been too keen on linking the later to the early Heidegger in order to avoid confrontation with other debates. Secondly, Trakl is often referred to as one poet among others with whom Heidegger confronts his philosophy in the later years. According to Wild, however, Heidegger's reading of Trakl is of pivotal importance. Missing this point has hindered an accurate understanding of Heidegger's texts on Trakl. Thirdly, Heidegger is often seen as just "opposing the tradition," as if he wanted to show the tradition to be simply wrong. But he actually often states the correctness of traditional views, only aiming to show the "deeper significance" of the phenomenon in question—for example, language. Only "clearing the path" of these assumptions will make it possible to reach a comprehensive account of Heidegger's understanding of language and the importance of Trakl's poetry.

The kinship of language and experience emerges with peculiar clarity in engaging with Heidegger's interpretation of Holderlin in the way Diego D'Angelo proposes. By analyzing the conceptual constellation surrounding the destiny of Being (Seinsgeschick) and the thinking of the holy (das Heilige),

D'Angelo highlights the importance of greeting (Griifien). By characterizing the language of the poet as greeting, Heidegger proposes to understand the different epochs of the history of Being as opened up by the greeting of the gods and transposed into language by the poets. As D'Angelo shows, the centrality of greeting for Heidegger emerges from the idea that greeting describes the joining of the ideal and the real, of past and future in the destiny of Being. Greeting can thus be said to constitute the structural unity of this destiny, defining one of the ways in which Heidegger attempts to grasp the experience of Being.

Yet if even the idea of a greeting of Being yields to a phenompretation, this may serve as an example overcoming the accusation that Heidegger's later thought is incomprehensible, mysterious, or mystical in this sense. There is no doubt that it needs a certain form of translation, but it is nonetheless susceptible to such a hermeneutic effort. Tristan Moyle lays bare the methodological roots of such an approach, aiming at "naturalizing" Heidegger, not by reducing his philosophy to the language of natural sciences, but by translating his philosophy into a vocabulary rooted in everyday experiences. Moyle does this by introducing concepts, such as the idea of a rhythm of experience, that are alien to Heidegger's own philosophy, prima facie at least. In Moyle's reading, what Heidegger essentially describes is a specifically aesthetic faith.

* * *

The essays in the second section focus on Heidegger's analysis of the notion. This notion is central to Heidegger's encounter with early Greek thinking and his attempt at retrieving an originary Greek beginning of thinking. Situated within his general critique of Western metaphysics, the notion is to serve as a key to understanding pre-Socratic and classical Greek philosophy and, at the same time, open a new way of thinking. Thus, for Heidegger, the entire history of Western philosophy is gathered in the history and future understanding of the word.

In her essay, Claudia Baracchi undertakes to analyze this project and Heidegger's attempt to define the historical experience accessible at the end of philosophy by referring back to the beginning of philosophy in pre-Socratic thinking. At this limit, primordial truth is experienced as unconcealment, a position Heidegger exposes in "The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking," one of the central lectures in which Heidegger defines his philosophical legacy. Drawing from Greek philosophy and referring to such notions as vac and cacenatc, Baracchi argues that such inceptional experience, understood as being open to the self-concealing clearing (Lichtung) and accessible by renewing the Greek understanding, takes place prior to logical determination and truth in metaphysical sense. The term experience here mutates into a kind of attentiveness to the matter (Sache) of thinking, which transgresses the dichotomy of theoretical activity and practical engagement.

But what exactly is implied in Heidegger's account of a fundamental experience? In addressing this question, Damir Barbark points to the tension expressed by this notion. in the ontological sense Heidegger wishes to give to that notion, entails both emergence, a coming forth, and the simultaneous self-withholding, a form of rest Heidegger calls standing (Stehen). This tension is indicative of the verbal or processual character of Being; Being is not presence (Anwesen) but presencing (Anwesung). In Barbaries reading, refers to an elusive dimension of depth irreducible to any form of directed movement. Even further, is the name the Greeks gave to a momentary exposure to Being itself. The fact that entities exist manifests itself in abundance and excess, which Heidegger sees as defining Being's

character. It is in the face of such experience that the Greeks expressed wonder, which Heidegger marks as the fundamental attunement of early Greek philosophy. However, in the history of Greek thought Heidegger sketches, the originary manifestation of cpiimc did not persist; its phenomenal traits were covered over by the idea of substance as metaphysics took the place of the pre-Socratics' inceptional thinking.

In line with Barbaries inquiry into the tensional structure defining, (Wang Yang in his essay focuses on the phenomenology of rest or repose in its intimate relation to movement. Yang argues that Heidegger's nuanced analysis the primordial Greek experience cannot be reduced to an ontological movement, to an emerging event of Being that was successively lost in the story of philosophy. Rather, the unique intertwining of movement and rest is ii often-overlooked moment in the phenomenology of movement. It is in the I henomenology of movement that Heidegger's ontological and historical specification gains footing in the manifestation of things. Through an in-depth interpolation of "On the Essence and Concept of Physis" and other relevant texts, I it ng shows that rest is not to be understood as negation of movement. Instead, rest gathers movement in its highest form, and it is their belonging together that characterizes Heidegger's "Greek".

Thomas Buchheim's essay delineates the itinerary of Heidegger's engagement with gykytc. In "On the Essence and Concept of Physis" Heidegger idenli lies a late echo of early Greek in Aristotle's treatise, the Physics. Even th hough Heidegger's interpretation has often been criticized after publication, lie did indeed think much ahead of his time. According to Buchheim, many of Heidegger's interpretative insights are consistent with today's state of the art in Idiolatry research on Aristotle. Buchheim also points to an important continuity in IIcidegger's writing: already in texts from the 1920s, Heidegger conceives the dpacity of Dasein to project a world as a response to the primordial withdrawal.

* * *

I n its historical and phenomenological dimensions, Heidegger's discussion, aims to give a description of the world, the whole of experience, or Being. Heidegger's work is not solely centered on the history of what he takes to be the fundamental concepts of philosophy. There is, along the speculative side of it is thinking, evident in the engagement with the pre-Socratics, a parallel con, et n for a renewal of a descriptive, phenomenological form of philosophy. One of the very late examples of this concern is a recently published set of notes, around1973-75, to which Gunter Figal draws attention in the first essay of the third section. These notes present an astonishing merger of Heidegger's interpretation pre-Socratic philosophy, specifically Parmenides, and his wish to bet-t understand the manifestation, the showing (Zeigen), and the self-showing (eigen) of things. Figal discusses the different ways in which Heidegger interprets the Parmenidean statement that Being and perceiving are the same. Among Heidegger's different readings of this went, perhaps the most challenging is the one put forth in the later notes. Heidegger's interpretations have always taken the notion of "the same" as key to this statement, the notes situate this idea in the context of phenomenology. If showing is central to the notion of the phenomenon, as Heidegger argued in Being and Time (§ 7), the sameness of Being and perceiving expressed the self-showing of this same, or, with the Greek terminology Heidegger invents, phenomenophasis is tautophasis. Yet as Figal points out, the form of quasi-phenomenological philosophy Heidegger envisages, what he calls "tautological thinking" (tautologisches Denken) in the Zahringen seminar, is threatened to become aporetic, for it is unclear how an articulation of "the same" can do

justice to the differences of the appearing world and specific, perhaps even singular, events of manifestation.

This leads to a problem addressed by Jussi Backman in his essay. Heidegger's adherence to both the phenomenological orientation toward the particular and the ontological ambition to articulate a unifying meaning in all there is force him to revisit the relation of identity and difference, Taking his departure from a reading of Heidegger's entire philosophical project as a deepening form of contextualism, Backman describes Heidegger's ontological project as moving from the inherent temporal structure of Being to the thought that the uniqueness (Einzigkeit) or singularity (Einmaligkeit) of each event represents the hallmark of ontological meaning. Alongside Reiner Schiirmann, Backman sees Heidegger as endorsing the contextual singularity of Being. An expression of this thought is Heidegger's discussion of the so-called fourfold (Geviert), which Backman takes as the attempt not to define a fixed set of ontological categories but to offer a dynamic matrix for understanding the manifestation of entities, or, as Heidegger prefers to call them, things (binge).

Andrew Mitchell approaches this notion of a "thing" from another direction. While Heidegger considered his postwar lecture "The Thing" (das Ding) the most immediate articulation of his later thinking, he also emphasizes that the notion of das Ding is meant to correct the problematic "objectification" of things he takes to be endemic to the history of philosophy. Mitchell reconstructs the history of the "thing" Heidegger sketches, through Aristotle's natural philosophy and Eckhart's account of dine, from which Heidegger takes the idea that things are a gathering (Versammeln). Mitchell adds to Heidegger's "history of things" by considering Husserl's lecture course Thing and Space as well as Being and Time. For Mitchell, Heidegger's discovery of "the thing" marks the very initiation of the later period of Heidegger's later thought, while his magnum opus still participates in and reinforces the neglect of things.

Rather than looking back on the history of thought from Heidegger's writing, Nikola Mirkovies essay explores Heidegger's own influence, taking as an example All Things Shining by Hubert Dreyfus and Sean Kelly. While Dreytus and Kelly show themselves as deeply influenced by Heidegger's later philosophy, taking their departure from the idea that the present, secular age is threatened by nihilism, the way in which they conceive of "shining" is, incomplete in relation to Heidegger's understanding. Turning to Heidegger's engagement with Nietzsche in the 193os and his correspondence with the literary scholar Emil Staiger in the 1950s, Mirkovies argues that the most relevant context for understanding Heidegger's notion of shining is his philosophy of art. Similar to Plato's understanding of beauty as expavtmarov, "shining" (Scheinen) and "shining-forth" (Hervorscheinen) are the hallmark of the manifestation of the beautiful. As the discussion with Staiger reveals, however, Heidegger did not conceive the beauty of art to be lost in the present age. On the contrary, only the continuous shining of artworks, such as the poem by Eduard Morike that initiated the Staiger correspondence, makes possible the renewal of meaning Dreyfus and Kelly envisage.

* *

The three essays of the fourth section have their common theme in the notion and philosophical image of a "ground" (Grund), one of the central themes in Heidegger's later engagement with ontology. While the first two essays discuss Heidegger's interpretations of Leibniz and Schelling, the most important philosophical interlocutors with respect to the notion of ground, the third essay questions Heidegger's

use of ground as a philosophical metaphor. In his contribution, Hans Ruin traces the trajectory of Heidegger's engagement with Leibniz from an early stage, culminating in "On the Essence of Ground," to Heidegger's last lecture course in 1955. Central to this engagement is Leibniz's formulation of the principle of sufficient reason, der Satz vom Grund. But what does it mean to say that everything has a reason/ground, and how does the correlation between reason and grounding shape our understanding of rationality and of thinking itself? And why should the principle of sufficient reason hold at all? In the first stage of his reading of Leibniz, Heidegger asks these questions with regard to his own fundamental ontology, answering that the principle of reason and the commitment to the form of rationality it embodies must in turn be "grounded" in the freedom of human Dasein. While that position overcomes the transcendent grounding for the principle of reason Leibniz upheld, it also reiterates the commitment to grounding as ontological relation and the giving of reasons as eminent logical form. By the time of the late lecture course, however, Heidegger came to see the principle of reason as the pinnacle of a problematic form of rationality. Rather than aiming to renew it within fundamental ontology, Heidegger's understanding of Leibniz now takes the subversive form of hearing the principle of reason in a new key: if it is to transgress the alternative between rational and irrational thought, meditative thinking progresses "without why," thereby relinquishing the Leibnizian principle.

Complementing Heidegger's dissatisfaction with the Satz vom Grund is his consideration of the non-ground (Ungrund) and the abyss (Abgrund). As Sylvaine Gourdain shows in her essay, the way in which Heidegger molds these terms into philosophical concepts cannot be understood without considering the influence of Schelling's philosophy. It is Schelling who allows Heidegger to redefine, rather than abandon, the very concept of ground by emphasizing its inherent negativity. From his engagement with Schelling, Heidegger draws the idea that the reason/ ground of an entity is not its positive ontological basis but the withdrawing of manifest being, or in Schelling's terminology, the ground is not a condition of the existence of entities (Existenz) but that which renders impossible any prior condition, because it refuses and eludes incessantly. Whereas Schelling emphasizes the negativity of the ground, Heidegger integrates this meaning into his discussion of Ungrund and Abgrund. Gourdain shows that the duality between an existing entity and its ground not only lies at the center of Heidegger's reading of Schelling's freedom essay but comes to influence a much larger share of Heidegger's writings. Both the idea of a strife of earth and world in Heidegger's artwork essay and the notion of a "grounding" (Griindung) in Contributions to Philosophy display a close structural affinity to the dualism first exposed in Schelling's freedom essay. If it is from Leibniz that Heidegger learned to be skeptical regarding the metaphysical suppositions and the implications of a notion of positive grounding, of ratio, it is from Schelling that Heidegger draws his account of ground as manifest negativity.

This negative meaning of ground is also at play in the third essay of the section. Tobias Keiling, however, strikes a critical note regarding Heidegger's discussion of ground. Taking his departure from the discussion of projection (Entwerfen) in Being and Time, Keiling points to the fusion of the image of ground and of projection Heidegger sees in the word Erkliiftung (typically translated as sundering), used in key passages from Contributions to Philosophy. While the notion of projection determines the form in which the temporal constitution of human Dasein and Being is revealed, Heidegger also holds that Dasein can be said to be grounding in its own right. But how, in the logic of philosophical images, can something be both a secluding ground and the process in which a specific endeavor is projected into an open future? Does the latter not presuppose an open space, which the former denies? Heidegger's

answer refers to the process of Erkliiftung, sundering, attempting to turn into a philosophical notion an extremely rare and enigmatic German word. For Keiling, the fact that Heidegger quickly discards the notion is indicative of its inherent metaphorological contradiction. <>

Cosmopolitan Responsibility: Global Injustice, Relational Equality, and Individual Agency by Jan-Christoph Heilinger [De Gruyter, 9783110600780] Open Source

The world we live in is unjust. Preventable deprivation and suffering shape the lives of many people, while others enjoy advantages and privileges aplenty.

Cosmopolitan responsibility addresses the moral responsibilities of privileged individuals to take action in the face of global structural injustice. Individuals are called upon to complement institutional efforts to respond to global challenges, such as climate change, unfair global trade, or world poverty.

Committed to an ideal of relational equality among all human beings, the book discusses the impact of individual action, the challenge of special obligations, and the possibility of moral overdemandingness in order to lay the ground for an action-guiding ethos of cosmopolitan responsibility.

This thought-provoking book will be of interest to any reflective reader concerned about justice and responsibilities in a globalised world.

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- one of the most urgent topics of our time
- lays the ground for a global political ethics

Contents

The challenge:

Global injustice and the individual agent

The world we live in is unjust. A just world would not feature a distribution of resources wherein a few of the richest people control massive, even increasing amounts of wealth—while large numbers of people live in dire poverty. Nor would a just world feature thousands of people dying every day from unsanitary living conditions, or easily preventable diseases. Nor would so many people suffer oppression,

exploitation, and exclusion from the decision-making processes that have a significant impact on their lives. A just world would not be one in which nearly all of the women who die as a result of childbirth are from low and middle-income countries; nor one in which excessive consumption of natural resources in the Global North has led to negative environmental outcomes such as a changing climate severely affecting those living elsewhere, not to mention future generations; nor one in which people seeking to flee war, persecution, deprivation or disaster are often denied access to security, are sent back, or knowingly kept in places where their basic rights are violated. And a just world would clearly not be one in which many of these forms of inequality and injustice, despite of some significant improvement and progress, appear to be on the increase due to such diverse reasons as ongoing unfair trade regulations, rising nationalism and supremacism, ongoing environmental pollution, and so on. This list of injustices reigning in today's globalised world—with its unprecedented international connections and interactions, and movements of people, knowledge, capacities, goods and capital across national borders—could, alas, be further extended.

Obviously, existing political and institutional structures on the national and international level have, so far, failed to address these injustices in an adequate way. The persistence and severity of such inequities in the face of institutional shortcomings thus raise the vexing yet unavoidable question of whether other agents, such as individual people, must step in and do something about them. From the combined perspective of political and moral philosophy, one would then have to ask, what is demanded of individual moral agents given the current unjust conditions of our globalised world? With a narrower focus ona specific group of individuals, the question would be: What should the rather well-off, conscientious citizens of the prosperous countries do about current injustices?

Given the urgency of the challenge and the insufficient responses of institutional agents this question may appear obvious: of course, someone, including individual people, has to do something about these massive injustices. Yet, this answer suggests a perplexing connection between extremely large and complex global challenges on the one hand, and the smallest unit of agency, single individuals, on the other. It will be the task of this bookto explore the complicated and problematic link between the possibilities of individual agency and urgent need to address global, structural injustices. In it, I reconsider and reassess pertinent normative values, rules and principles that can be deployed to determine the content of individual responsibility in the global context. And I contend that the moral demands for advantaged and privileged individuals like ordinary citizens living in relative security and affluence in the countries of the Global North are more stringent than the prevailing, rather lenient views suggest.

This exploration thus has both practical and theoretical facets. Practically, the question is: What should advantaged individual agents do in the face of massively unjust global structures that clearly favour their material interests and secure their privilege? This practical question, however, turns on a prior, more theoretical one: how should one reason about individual moral responsibility for globally unjust circumstances? The focus of this book on cosmopolitan responsibility will be primarily on the theoretical side and explore and defend from the perspective of moral and political philosophy a possible theory of cosmopolitan responsibility and discuss several challenges for such a theory. Yet, this is done with the conviction that a better understanding can also inform and inspire adequate action and reform.

The distinctive focal point of this book is thus the individual person, seen simultaneously as a needy human being and a bearer of rights on the one hand, and as an active moral agent who is subject to moral demands on the other. As agents, humans are capable of acting with reference to normative concepts, concepts that can also be employed to evaluate the moral quality ofa person's actions. Making progress in addressing injustices and promoting justice will, on the side of individual agents, inevitably also require self-scrutiny and a critical examination of one's own life in the social and global context.

The idea of moral cosmopolitanism—i.e. the egalitarian and universalist assumption that each human being is equally morally relevant and that all human beings form a morally relevant community—provides the normative starting point for my exploration of the role and responsibilities of individual agents in the contemporary global context. I will pay particular attention to the attitudes moral agents should develop in response to global injustices if they accept the basic assumption that all human lives are of equal moral importance. This is a normative and pragmatic inquiry into a cosmopolitan, egalitarian ethos, understood as a set of values, norms and concepts that shapes how individuals feel, think, talk and act about global issues in an interconnected world. Such an analysis of the moral and political roles and responsibilities of individual agents in an unjust world contributes to an account of global political ethics, understood as a 'bottom up' complement to the 'top down' accounts of global institutional justice. Offering the analysis of individual responsibility as a complement, not a replacement, thus does not curtail the importance of institutional responsibility. Often, only structural, top-down reform—through laws, regulations, financial incentives and penalties and so forth—can bring lasting change. Nevertheless, structural change will not occur unless a sufficient number of committed individuals credibly demand such reform.

Three central ideas that I will explore and defend in this book inform and guide my thinking. First, the extensive degree of interconnection, interaction and interdependency among countries, institutions, and people around the world make it impossible to focus only on the immediate environment of any individual moral agent when assessing the moral quality of any act. While it is uncontroversial to state that the reality of globalisation and the factual 'circumstances of cosmopolitanism 'fundamentally shape the contemporary global order, I will argue that cosmopolitanism should feature in our normative understanding of how we as moral agents ought to conduct ourselves within that order, as well. This is particularly important since the advantage of some is frequently connected with the disadvantage of others through the dynamics of structural injustice. Acknowledging not only the reality of the circumstances of cosmopolitanism but also the ideal of moral cosmopolitanism precludes focussing on narrow frames; instead it entails expanding the circle of moral concern to all members of the global order, connected in one way or another—a move that may carry with it dramatic implications for the sphere and content of our responsibilities.

The second idea is that discomfort, indignation, and outrage are appropriate responses towards what appears to count as the "normal," "inevitable," even "acceptable" background conditions of the lives of the well-off citizens in the industrialised, democratic, high-income countries of the Global North. Often enough, the privileged turn a blind eye to unjustified inequalities and structural injustices, consider them to be remote or perhaps regrettable facts of our world, but essentially unconnected to their lives.1 Instead of indifference and complacency, a significant, uncomfortable but "healthy dissatisfaction with the familiar" (Nagel 1991, 8) is urgently needed. The presumably normal but dramatically unjust "background conditions" (Young 2006b, 120) of the radically unequal world we inhabit provide a morally repugnant context for all of our actions.

This background must be acknowledged to have a bearing on any moral assessment of what we do, as well as of what we fail or refuse to do Third, I am persuaded that individual agents and their actions do matter on a global scale, even if global problems and challenges appear overwhelmingly large, complex and numerous. But—as I will argue—individuals have more options than engaging in isolated single acts: they can also become politically active, inform and coordinate with others; they can inspire, call for, and work to bring about collective and institutional change, reform and action that are consistent with cosmopolitan values. This is done best, I argue, by fostering and developing an egalitarian and cosmopolitan ethos to guide one's thought, action and commitment to others in one's potentially global social environment. Ultimately, I do not call for selected transactional contributions to addressing injustice, but for transformational change in how agents think, feel, and respond to it. Indeed, a crucial weakness of the current debate about global justice may well be its failure to sufficiently address the role of individual agents necessary to counterbalance and complement institution-based accounts. After all, the commitments and actions of numerous individuals—ordinary citizens, political activists and official leaders alike—inform and shape existing institutions and the creation of new ones; and, under conditions of institutional shortcomings, ineffectivity or even outright failure, individuals are called upon and become primary subjects of moral demands. These considerations raise rather than diminish the importance and fundamental role of individual agents. Thus, besides political philosophy, moral philosophy has to play a central role in the global context as well. In combining these two dimensions of practical philosophy, my proposed theory of cosmopolitan responsibility should be read as a contribution to a global political ethics.

Three main theoretical influences shape my proposal: an analysis of structural injustice and its implications for determining the role and responsibilities of individuals in this context in the tradition of Young (2011);relational theories of equality (Scheffler 1993, Anderson 1999, Scheffler2015), deployed ina modified form to explore the nature of moral obligations that extend beyond the domestic frame to the global scale; and pragmatic accounts of ethics and their assumptions about normative pluralism, the importance of habits and social dynamics, and the possibility of moral and social progress.

The 'circumstances of cosmopolitanism'

In the past, most human beings lived without detailed knowledge about (or even an awareness of) different cultures in far away regions.Today,by contrast, only few human beings remain detached from the forces of global communication, trade and politics. Indeed, the contemporary world, more than ever before, is characterised by a dense set of individuals and institutions very nearly everywhere (Widdows 2011; 5, 271). Moreover, even those very few with little or no direct exposure to the modern technological world are now nonetheless affected by it, notably through diffuse phenomena such as environmental pollution and climate change. Even isolated, non-industrial societies living deep in uncharted areas of the Brazilian rainforest, for example, cannot escape the consequences of changing weather patterns. The consequences of global trade, furthermore, affect local markets even in the most remote areas of the world, as the aggregate effect of global consumerism leaves virtually no producer or consumer untouched ;global trade and ruthless economic competition have resulted in the creation of "special export zones," in which workers manufacture often trivial consumer products under inhumane conditions; intellectual property regimes prevent access to essential medicines; famines are aggravated by financial sector speculation on staple foods; illicit financial flows and off-shore business encourages tax evasion which prevents poorer and richer countries alike from providing essential services to their

citizens. There are also global events like the soccer world cup that do not only bring people together by providing sports-centered entertainment to a truly global audience. They also create a sphere of global publicity that triggers political discussions ranging from the management of the tournament by its organising institutions, over the diversity of the teams mirroring the history of the country, to the political situation in host countries and the often fraught political relationships between countries.

Global interconnectedness and interdependence has reached historically unprecedented levels; it has brought about institutionalised forms of interaction of states and international bodies that cover communication and media, the rules and practices of both local and global business, and people's leisure activities, travelling, consumer preferences and choices. Such connections, relations and interactions have such a massive and pervasive impact on the lives of people— both positive (advantageous) and negative (limiting)—that they have effectively become unavoidable, as it is neither possible to escape them, nor to be unaffected by them. They are also in an important sense non-voluntary, since no one was asked or able to give prior consent to being subject to such global dynamics. The extensive connections between states, institutions and individuals are thus an inescapable fact, which I call the de facto circumstances of cosmopolitanism or the existing global order (even though I do not mean to insinuate that it is particularly well-ordered). The circumstances of cosmopolitanism are constituted by the multiple, inevitable and highly significant connections between people around the globe.

However, the last decades have also brought abutment is immune to challenges and potential failure. Supranational structures like the United Nations and the European Union continue to evolve to better defend universal rights and basic standards for the treatment of all people (albeit not without an abundance of conflict and new challenges) via the proclamation and progressive realisation of the goals of various instruments such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Sustainable Development Goals. As a result of such developments, for example, a smaller percentage of the world's population lives under conditions fore. Strides are also being made in cooperation to combat climate change, with there sults of the COP21 meeting in Paris in late2015 being something of a breakthrough for being at least partially legally binding—even though the current global political climate at the time of writing these lines poses signifying new threats to the achieved agreements.

In fact, despite some progress, existing institutions and patterns of interaction have yet to achieve substantial and enduring improvements for the billions of people who continue to live in extreme deprivation and/or continue to be unjustly dominated by others. This type of injustice, as Iris M. Young characterises it, and the morally alarming persistence of the unequal distribution of new benefits and costs, qualifies as an instance of structural injustice (Young 2011). It takes a very particular form:

> Structural injustice exists when social processes put large categories of persons under a systematic threat of domination or deprivation of the means to develop and exercise their capacities, at the same time as these processes enable others to dominate or have a wide range of opportunities for developing and exercising their capacities. Structural injustice is a kind of moral wrong distinct from the wrongful action of an individual agent or the willfully repressive policies of a state. Structural injustice occurs as a consequence of many individuals and institutions acting in pursuit of their particular goals and interests, within given institutional rules and accepted norms. (Young 2006b, 114)

Itis important to emphasise that this disadvantaging of a sizeable proportion of humanity is the collateral result of many agents acting in ways that have been and continue to be widely considered "normal,"

"legal," and even morally unproblematic, such as the powerful pursuit of national interests by political lead ers and the pursuit of personal interests by already advantaged individuals. Alas, this does not alter the fact that repeated patterns of presumably unproblematic and permissible behaviour within established structures not only secure privilege and advantage but ultimately lead to and perpetuate negative outcomes for vast swathes of humanity. A massive proportion of human disadvantage is not the result of unavoidable causes (like natural disasters), but is anthropogenic, in the sense that it is socially and politically constituted, or could—through coordinated effort—be avoided. Hence, human beings and the social structures they bring about are at the origin of the ongoing disaster of structural injustice in the world.

Acknowledging these 'circumstances of cosmopolitanism'—including the disastrous global outcomes of structural injustice, created and maintained by normal practices widely regarded as acceptable—is not easy for those enjoying the advantages of security, political stability, and economic prosperity. Such acknowledgement would compare and link—partly through a factual, causal connection through interactions; partly through a conceptual connection through the ideal of the equal moral standing of all—the advantages of some with the disadvantages of others. But then, as Nagel has formulated pointedly: "The magnitude of the world's problems and the inequality in a ccess to its resources produce a weight of potential guilt that may, depending on one's temperament, require considerable ingenuity to keep roped down" (Nagel 1986, 190).Yet, most of the rather well-off citizens of affluent countries seem to muster that ingenuity with ease, so that they live their comfortable lives more or less unaffected by feelings of complicity with or responsibility for the unjust structures to enable or perpetuate their privilege. The core challenge put forward in this book is to make some progress in understanding the role and responsibilities of individuals in light of the disastrous background conditions just described.

The idea of cosmopolitanism

A guiding normative idea of this book is to understand human beings as "cosmopolitans", as citizens of the world. The fact that all human beings today live in a highly interconnected world makes them, nolens volens, members of a jointly shared system of interaction: everyone is a member of the global order (even if, once again, its dysfunctions and inherent structural injustices make the use of the term "order" here rather less thana literal one). First developed in early Greek philosophy, the idea of "world citizenship" designated the very idea that all human beings are bound together as equals in spite of the differences between groups and individuals and jointly form a morally relevant community. Initially largely idealistic, the increasing interconnections across the globe today have made it more obvious than ever before that there is indeed some form of a factual global sphere of mutual influence and community of which all human beings are members. A moral account of cosmopolitanism is hence based on two assumptions: that each human being is of equal moral standing; and that the morally relevant community includes all humans. This ideal can be used to assess states of affairs from a normative perspective, and to morally demand particular acts and institutional arrangements: It first states the interconnected global reality (circumstances of cosmopolitanism); it then diagnoses several moral flaws in the current global order, based on the moral view that, even in the absence of an actual world-state, every member of the human community is entitled to being respected and treated as a moral equal; and it then assigns cosmopolitan responsibilities to individual and institutional agents.

Unlike other contributions based on the cosmopolitan commitment to equality and universality, my focus here is not so much on giving detailed advice about concrete practices and actions of individuals (e.g. Singer2009), nor on an analysis of the political dimension of cosmopolitanism (e.g. Hahn 2017) or specific recommendations for institutional reform (e.g. Wenar 2016, Neuhäuser 2018, Cabrera 2018). Instead, I will take a step back and approach cosmopolitanism as a distinctive big-picture moral outlook with implications for the morally demanded underlying ethos that should inform an individual agent's feelings,

thoughts, and actions. This approach is based on the idea that it is possible to promote and implement the cosmopolitan ideal not only from top down but also from the bottom up: cosmopolitanism can then start being realised within borders, such as in an agent's direct, local sphere of influence or in one country or a federation of countries that are willing to take a lead. Individual agents can integrate global thinking into their local action; and institutional agents can already respect their global responsibility in their confined sphere of influence.

Towards a global political ethics

The ongoing scholarly debates about global justice are rich and manifold. They include normative discussions about the existing global institutional order, about the establishment and regulation of fair trade relationships between nations, about corporate social responsibility of multinational companies, about what constitutes a just distribution of benefits and burdens between different global players, about the conditions for just war, and about possible limits of state sovereignty, particularly with regard to the control of borders, but also with regard to the right or duty of states to intervene to assist citizens in other countries, regardless of sovereign prerogative or cost to the intervening countries (cf. e.g. Brock and Moellendorf 2005, Brock2013). These are very important debates. Most of the participants in these debates, however, adopt Rawls's lead8 in largely ignoring the role of the individual when it comes to matters of justice, which he initially proposed could only be an emergent feature of the political and social institutions of a liberal society. According to Rawls, justice is "the first virtue of institutions" (Rawls 1999b, 3), and the individual is, as a result, accorded only a minor role in his theory of justice. A similar marginalisation of the role and responsibility of the individual has dominated the debates about global justice.

Itis not that I object toa focus on institutions or states in the debate about (global) justice.Itis clearly appropriate and necessary to elaborate on institutions, interstate interaction and global structures, especially when these are causally implicated in the generation and maintenance of structural injustice and where institutional reform constitutes the most effective, maybe even the only way to eventually overcome structural injustices. But Rawls notwithstanding, it must not be ignored that, ultimately, institutions are not "natural kinds" existing independently of human beings. Instead, they are created by people, frequently with the intention to better fulfill what they deem to be important tasks. Ultimately, individuals shape institutions and social structures, and continue to fill them with life and spirit—for better or for worse. This, in turn, implies that the ethos of people—i.e. their normative commitments and ambitions that shape their dispositions and habits of feeling and thinking, talking and acting —has a significant impact on the existence and functioning of institutions. Individuals also exercise influence on the social norms that govern behaviour and on the (politically and morally relevant) ideas that exist in a group.

Thus, I suggest to direct, in questions about global justice, particular attention to the potential role of individual moral agents, and both the direct and the indirect effects of their behaviour. This will, I contend, open potentially fruitful avenues for analysing their responsibilities and guiding their attitudes and actions. My inquiry into the role and responsibilities of individual moral agents in an interconnected, unjust world is not meant to replace, but to complement debates over global institutional justice. It brings into consideration this neglected level of global political ethics, the level of individual agency. It requires individuals to accept responsibility, acknowledges and discusses challenges, but concludes with empowering arguments for the importance of individual engagement under current conditions of injustice.

Even though the focus of this work is clearly on the individual's role in the face of global injustice, I do not mean to imply that comprehensive solutions to global injustice are likely to flow from isolated instances of individual action alone. Cooperative and collective actor, ultimately involving institutional agency in the right way, are still necessary. However, all agents are also individually subject to moral demands, and bear personal responsibility to promote the changes necessary to fight existing injustice and advance egalitarian justice globally. In the absence of adequate institutions and in the absence of an ethos of cosmopolitan responsibility, the chances for genuine egalitarian progress appear limited, even grim. But individuals can start and continue making a credible case for change and reform to promote justice; they can, through their acts, also inform and influence others, and this is the best possible way forward for individuals to contribute to addressing and possibly eventually overcoming the massive wrongs that dominate our world.

Such individual dispositions matter particularly in time of crisis where suddenly the established order and patterns of conduct are questioned and become fragile. The ideas that are in the air at a time of crisis can then be taken into account, guide action, inspire and inform reforms and thus shape the future. Itis the important task of individuals to keep the right ideas alive and available, especially under adverse conditions, so that they are at hand when the opportunity arises to deploy and implement them ona larger scale.

The pragmatic impulse

The ideas expressed in this book take up several impulses from the tradition of US-American pragmatism, found notably in the writings of Dewey. Most importantly, a pragmatist perspective on ethics emphasizes a moral outlook characterised by three elements that I take to be central to my task: an emphasis on the individual agent (and his or her habits) in social contexts as the core concern of morality; preference fora pluralist method of moral inquiry over the defense of any narrow set of criteria, principles or conclusions; and a resolute optimism that moral and social progress is possible.

Many current global issues—such as inequality and world poverty, climate change and the unjust dynamics in the global economy—are also distinctively moral challenges resulting from and influencing the actions and experiences of persons. It is the habitual actions of individual agents, the things we do day after day (including seemingly trivial consumer decisions or travel preferences), that are at the root of many global problems related to structural injustice. Morality, in the pragmatist tradition, stresses the importance of constantly evaluating, re-evaluating, and intentionally shaping our habits, based on moral insight drawn from the full spectrum of sources, rather than from any single normative theory, which, for Dewey at least, would be too limited to be of much practical service. Moral decision-making is

complex and multi-faceted, both for individual agents considering their obligations, and for answering the questions of what better political and institutional arrangements would look like, and which actions are likely to help bring about such arrangements. My approach is focussed on the careful cultivation of appropriate habits as a method for ongoing practical reasoning, moral decision making, and action about the current global challenges.

Following Kitcher (2011), I regard reflections about all forms of individual ethical conduct to be inherently embedded in the larger "ethical project" of living together in an ever larger, now truly global community of human beings on this planet. Icontend that the ideals of cosmopolitan responsibility must ultimately translate into "a personal way of individual life" in light of the reality and nature of globalised human relations. Such a "personalisation" includes:

> the possession and continual use of certain attitudes, formitermining desire and purpose in all the relations of life. Instead of thinking of our own dispositions and habits as accommodated to certain institutionswe have to learnto think of the latter as expressions, projections and extensions of habitually dominant personal attitudes. (Dewey 1939, 226)

Such an account invites a politisation and "ethicisation" of daily life, a change from the assumed innocence and amorality of ordinary behaviour. While it does not require us to be always and exclusively concerned with moral considerations, it charges all our actions with an ethically relevant dimension. Yet, pragmatic ethics does not stop with such a focus on individual agency: It points to the need to structure the political and social environment in a way that it both reflects the considered normative commitments of people and facilitates individual behavior that aligns with these commitments. Individual behaviour thus has a public and political dimension; and democratic structures inform and shape individual behaviour. Making intelligent use of these dynamics thus can facilitate moral and social progress in the form of structural change.

Overview

This book confronts the pressing questionabout the role and responsibility of individual agents in an unjust world. I consider this to be among the defining moral, political and philosophical challenges of our time. It would be folly to suggest thata single book, let alone this one, could once and for all settle such an issue. Instead, I only hope to offer some routes for morally reflective individuals to consider as they attempt to navigate the difficult terrain surrounding the question of how to act in the face of global structural injustice.

With this aim, the book proposes a theory of cosmopolitan responsibility to analyse and determine the role and the responsibility of individual agents in the context of global structural injustice. This theory lies at the intersection of moral and political philosophy and can be called a global political ethics. Concretely, it consists of an account of a cosmopolitan ethos, i.e. a set of ideas, values and commitments that can shape how individuals feel, think, talk and act about global issues in the local context they find themselves in. This cosmopolitan ethos, with its three central elements—the idea of world citizenship; a commitment to global relational egalitarianism; and a pragmatic understanding of ethics, action and habit—is presented in part I. The ethos is elaborated further in part II with the help of three important challenges that can appear once one starts weighing options for action out of the cosmopolitan ethos: the problem that individual acts may be too small to generate any relevant impact on global issues; the tension between universal obligations towards all and special obligations towards some particularly near

and dear to us; and the danger of inevitable failure because cosmopolitan obligations exceed what is humanely possible.

Chapter one offers a historical and conceptual overview about the idea of cosmopolitanism in its different diagnostic and normative forms in Western philosophy from antiquity to the 20th century. While the first half of chapter one is more historical, the second half introduces important contemporary concepts and discussions, such as about the scope of justice, the universalist and particularist poles of the debate, different metrics and patterns of justice, and the notion of structural injustice. It concludes with an outlook on global political ethics with reflections on the relationship of individuals and institutions, the division of labour in society, and the possibility of fostering an egalitarian ethos.

Chapter two considers the basic notion of equality that lies at the heart of the present analysis. I compare and contrast distributive and relational accounts of egalitarianism, both on the domestic and the global level. Ultimately, I argue for global relational egalitarianism as the best account to capture the fundamental commitments of cosmopolitan responsibility. This view understands equality as a lived practice, something we do, not as a static state of affairs or pattern of distribution. It demands, negatively, that oppression, domination, exploitation, marginalisation, exclusion, etc. have to end; and it demands, positively, that equality must reign in all possible and actual interactions and relationships. This understanding of the ideal of equality also has normative implications for individual behaviour and will thus inform my further arguments about the way how individual agents should respond to issues of global inequality and injustice.

Chapter three brings into relief some impulses from the philosophical tradition of American pragmatism which underlie and in spire my account of cosmopolitan responsibility, such as the possibility to integrate normative values into the individual and collective "way of life", the importance of habits over single acts, and an optimistic belief in the possibility of social and moral progress. Pragmatism also assigns philosophy a modest but constructive role in addressing problems and identifying solutions to facilitate and improve the living together of all.

In advancing the moral ideal of cosmopolitanism, the theory of global relational egalitarianism and the pragmatic perspective, part I will provide the normative groundwork for my theory of cosmopolitan responsibility that can be integrated in the personal ethos of individual agents.

Part II moves on to weighing action. Its three chapters discuss three pressing challenges that arise once agents endorse and attempt to act out of the cosmopolitan ethos, presented in part I. How does individual action matter? Does cosmopolitan responsibility leave room for any preferential treatment of those particularly near and dear to us? And: Can we ever hope to live up to the apparently excessive demands of cosmopolitan responsibility?

Chapter four addresses the tension between the large size of problems of global injustice and the inevitably very small impact of individual agency: Given this discrepancy, any agent weighing different reasons for action will wonder whether her actions will matter at all; and whether they will be able to generate any meaningful impact. The chapter discusses several ways in which even single acts of individual agents matter morally: as small contributionsto large harm; as small triggers that can set of a cascade of events; or as contributions that (even if they make only a negligible difference to addressing a

complex global problem) make a very big difference for some who are affected by a complex global problem. To conclude, the chapter introduces Young's social connection model to explain how not only single acts, but particularly repeated patterns of individual action matter in contexts of structural injustice. It identifies several criteria that can help determine the content of individual responsibility. The results reached in this chapter will be taken up and expanded further in the concluding chapter of the book.

In chapter five, I address the puzzle of partiality, an important and practically relevant objection against an account of cosmopolitan responsibility. This puzzle is based on the tension between universal, impartial demands on the one hand, and partial, more immediate demands on the other. This challenging tension becomes palpable once individuals consider everyone as a being of equal moral standing, while still feeling a special commitment or obligation towards some that are particularly near and dear. This tension is difficult to solve: even if impartiality always matters morally, it clearly is not all that matters morally. The chapter discusses the grounds for special obligations and preferential treatment for oneself, for one's intimates, and also for one's compatriots. I argue that relationship-dependent reasons for preferential treatment, as they result from personal connections, have some genuine moral weight that can render some degree of preferential treatment morally permissible. Membership-dependent reasons for preferential treatment, however, as they result for example from shared nationality, cannot claim to have similar moral force: if not all have equal access to the relevant communities, that are not shaped by close interpersonal relations, preferential treatment of the in-groups comes at the morally unjustifiable expense of those who are excluded.

However, even in the case of well-justified and permissible forms of preferential treatment within special relations, the universal and impartial reasons can never be fully eliminated. Thus, a tension between the two incommensurable standpoints of partiality and impartiality will inevitably persist, at least under conditions of massive inequality. Consequently, morality as such does not appear as an integrated and comprehensive whole but as a fragmented set of competing perspectives and values, that renders the possibility of successfully navigating through mutually exclusive demands dubious.

Chapter six pursues this insight further by addressing the moral over demandingness objection cosmopolitan responsibility might generate impossible moral requirements if, under current conditions, weighty and non-negotiable moral requirements (that are able to pass an interpersonal justification test) bind agents, no matter whether they are actually capable of acting upon them. The chapter critically reviews different possible strategies to ease the moral burden that results from a cosmopolitan extension of moral concern. But arguments for reducing the moral burden of individual agents to what they consider not excessively demanding and/or feasible is not the only option. Alternatively, one could accept that it is impossible, under current conditions of extreme inequality and injustice, to live a fully moral live. In the second half of the chapter I explore and defend this second option, however much more controversial and much less appealing it may be. Yet, taking the needs and unmet basic rights of the disadvantaged seriously deserves priority over worrying about the moral innocence of the advantaged. Thus, I propose a qualified account of impossible moral imperfection, even failure, that distinguishes its objective, diagnostic dimension from its subjective and intersubjective dimensions. Generally, it should not count as a flaw of any (sufficiently demanding) moral theory if it places apparently excessive moral burdens on those who could, in principle, act. Instead, such over demandingness rather indicates a flaw of the world that needs to be corrected.

The critical reflections of part II—on the limits of individual agency in a global context, on the puzzle of partiality and on moral over demandingness— elaborate my understanding of the role and responsibility of individual agents in the face of global structural injustice: As morally equal citizens of the world, agents aspire to contribute to realising global relational equality. Committed, from a pragmatic persepective, to normative pluralism, and equipped with a firm belief in the possibility of progress, they understand that their direct impact will inevitably be limited. But even apparently tiny contributions might matter, particularly if they are repeated over long periods of time and if they start to spread, influence behaviour of others, shape ideas and consolidate themselves in institutions. Clearly, the social and epistemic networks that today connect people across the globe will not only impose limits to unconstrained preferential treatment for oneself and for those particularly near and dear; it will also make moral perfection unavailable under current conditions. But acknowledging these unpleasant realities can motivate responsible cosmopolitan agents to take pride in contributing—through concrete and often local action out of global thinking—to realising a world in which the circumstances are such that global structural injustice ceases to exist; in which everyone's basic needs and interests are fully met; and in which, consequently, preferential treatment for some becomes less problematic and moral failure, in the sense analysed, can be avoided.

In this spirit, the book concludes with a chapter on the throes of cosmopolitan responsibility. The adequate response of individual agents to global injustice consists in developing an egalitarian, cosmopolitan ethos that informs and influences one's way of feeling, thinking, talking, and acting about injustice. Given the pervasive nature of global structural injustice, promoting an egalitarian ethos— in individuals and groups—would be, I contend, a suitable contribution to addressing the distinctive wrong of pervasive structural injustice from the side of individuals. An ethos links the cognitive-rational, the socio-emotional and the dispositional-behavioural dimensions of a person and thus does not only trigger small direct ('vertical') action to address injustice; it also generates indirect ('horizontal') effects by communicating one's moral and political commitments to other agents in one's community. No individual in isolation can have a meaningful impact upon the massive and complex challenge of global injustice; but joint normative commitments, shared aims, and coordinated political and systemic action, of which individuals can be part, can generate impact and bring reform.

As I argue throughout the book, a major shift in perceiving the wrong of injustice is necessary: global problems have to be moved from the periphery of our attention more to the centre; and they have to be conceptualised as challenges that must not be left to ineffective or inexistent institutions: they require responses from individual moral agents, too. Fostering an ethos of cosmopolitan responsibility with its pervasive impact on how agents feel, think, talk and act does just this.

Of course, for those seeking specific guidance about what to do, my account of cosmopolitan responsibility will most likely appear insufficiently concrete. And obviously a great number of questions remain unaddressed and unanswered in the following pages. But the goal of my philosophical analysis is—in spite of its ambitious scope and its firm conviction that promoting a cosmopolitan ethos is urgently needed—quite modest: to engage in a conceptual inquiry into the values, norms and principles that can determine and help guide individual responsible action in the global context. Thinking through the issues presented in this book will hopefully provide readers with some thought provoking material to form their own judgements about what to do and then to take responsible action, once that the

importance of individual contributions to respecting the equal moral importance of all and to addressing global wrongs has been firmly established. <>

Blasphemous Modernism: The 20th-Century Word Made Flesh by Steve Pinkerton [Modernist Literature and Culture, Oxford University Press, 9780190627560]

Scholars have long described modernism as "heretical" or "iconoclastic" in its assaults on secular traditions of form, genre, and decorum. Yet critics have paid surprisingly little attention to the related category of blasphemy -- the rhetoric of religious offense -- and to the specific ways this rhetoric operates in, and as, literary modernism. United by a shared commitment to "the word made flesh," writers such as James Joyce, Mina Loy, Richard Bruce Nugent, and Djuna Barnes made blasphemy a key component of their modernist practice, profaning the very scriptures and sacraments that fueled their art. In doing so they belied T. S. Eliot's verdict that the forces of secularization had rendered blasphemy obsolete in an increasingly godless century ("a world in which blasphemy is impossible"); their determined irreverence reveals, ironically, the extent to which religion endured as a cultural force after the Death of God. More, their transgressions spotlight a *politics* of religion that has seldom engaged the attention of modernist studies. Blasphemy respects no division of church and state, and neither do the writers who wield it to profane all manner of coercive dogmas -- including ecclesiastical as well as more worldly ideologies of race, class, nation, empire, gender, and sexuality. The late-century example of Salman Rushdie's *The Satanic Verses* affords, finally, a demonstration of how modernism persists in postwar anglophone literature and of the critical role blasphemy plays in that persistence. **Blasphemous Modernism: The 20th-Century Word Made Flesh** thus resonates with the broader cultural and ideological concerns that in recent years have enriched the scope of modernist scholarship.

Review

"Lively and readable. . . . An important contribution to rethinking the engagement of modernist writers with religion. . . . Makes a persuasive case for the importance of blasphemy as a category of study in its own right." (***Los Angeles Review of Books***)

"Provocative. . . . Pinkerton realizes the extremes of the 'religious turn' by entering the conversation through the back door. He convincingly eviscerates the secular caricature of modernism by drawing attention to the various ways in which modernist writers deployed religious belief against itself via acts of often self-reflexive, playful, 'jocoserious' blasphemy. All of this is done in an enviably pithy, lucid prose style." (***Modernism/modernity***)

"Steve Pinkerton's compellingly readable new study is a welcome addition to those literary histories that complicate and nuance readings of a modernist period supposedly marked by a fatal spread of doubt in all religious issues. . . . What is distinctive about Pinkerton's critical approach is his resolve to show that this era's intense interest in religion (and speaking out against it) was a formidable, even vitalizing

potency behind aesthetic modernism." (***Literature and History***)

"In the current political and cultural climate it is good to see that people are still willing to take on controversial topics in a thoughtful way. . . . Pinkerton has done a great service to Modernist studies by reminding us of literature's transgressive power." (***English: Journal of the English Association***)

"Fascinating. . . . An important and persuasive contribution to the study of modernist writing. . . . This is a compelling study of its topic, one which deserves to be widely read and which will do doubt reframe all future explorations of modernism and religion." (***James Joyce Broadsheet***)

"Steve Pinkerton's **BLASPHEMOUS MODERNISM: THE 20TH-CENTURY WORD MADE FLESH** is an important study of modernist writers' continuing engagement with religion in the early twentieth century -- an era that is sometimes anachronistically treated as totally secularized. Pinkerton shows how writers from the mainstream and the margins of the modernist movement attacked religion because they took it so seriously. This impressive work has significant implications for our current cultural scene, in which accusations of blasphemy continue to have real-world consequences." (**Pericles Lewis, Yale University**)

"At last! An intuitive and probing analysis of blasphemy and modernist writers, skillfully accomplished by exploring the real-world context of their works. This penetrating and lucid book pries apart the fundamental paradox of blasphemy within the modernist epoch -- that the most forthright blasphemy effectively reinforces the power of the sacred over the imagination in a supposedly godless age." (**David Nash, Oxford Brookes University**)

"First-Rate Blasphemy"

God exists, in language if nowhere else. "Whether or not there is a realm of the 'supernatural,' " Kenneth Burke reminds us, "there are words for it."1 The Bible rather strikingly encourages this discursive emphasis: the Creator creates through language, then redeems that creation, for Christians, through language embodied. "And God said, Let there be light: and there was light"; "And the Word was made flesh, and dwelt among us" (Gen. 1:3, John 1:14). In a further testament to Christianity's special concern for the linguistic, "blasphemy against the Holy Ghost" stands as the one unforgivable sin— for blasphemy, too, is inherently textual (Matt. 12:31).2 It is the word we use to denote religious

offenses or desecrations that are verbal in nature; we have other words (heresy, apostasy) for other categories of offense. That's why the traditional European punishment for blasphemy was to bore through the offender's tongue. It's also why, in the present day, blasphemy tends to arise with urgency as an issue of free speech: the religious believer pits the texts that he or she holds sacred against the "human right" of unhindered expression that others hold sacred. One sacred discourse— a discourse about discourse— combats another. It would be wrong to see such combat as exclusively rhetorical; too much blood has been spilled, through the ages and in very recent memory. At bottom, however, it is a conflict of words, of texts, and of the affective and political power that attaches to them.

We are concerned here with how these discourses, the sacred and the blasphemous, intersect with a third: literary modernism. For blasphemy is a signal modernist idiom, and while hardly the exclusive property of modernist writers, it does acquire in their works an exceptional resonance and force. That blasphemy "demands fine- grained literary analysis," as Joss Marsh has argued, is never so evident as in the case of modernism and its characteristic stake in the materiality of language. But as worldly blasphemies inevitably carry implications that exceed the linguistic, so too do the literary works we will encounter here. Among other things, Blasphemous Modernism attends to the complex relationship in modernist texts between words, the Word, and the flesh— a relationship that illumines the interrelations of form and content, textuality and the body— and to the ideological contests that blasphemers wage against each other and against both sacred and secular power.

Such an undertaking demands that we pay close attention to the abiding authority of religious language in an epoch that has traditionally been viewed as post-religious, as though the ascendance of various other realms of human experience (reason, science, art) had succeeded unconditionally in taking God's nolonger requisite place in the order of things. The standard assumption has been, in Charles Taylor's paraphrase, that "modern civilization cannot but bring about a 'death of God,' " and that modernism reflects that death in its literary texts. As James Joyce's own Buck Mulligan states the case, "Jehovah, collector of prepuces, is no more"— a judgment shared by Ezra Pound, who insisted that the "Christian era" had come "definitely to an END" in October 1921, on the night Joyce finished the final two chapters of Ulysses.6 Yet modernist writers, Joyce included, continued to seek in scripture and theology the particular sources of meaning, affect, and literary force that only religion seemed fully capable of providing. With redoubled vigor, they wove the themes and rhetorics of religious tradition into the fabrics of their often highly irreverent poems and fictions, where God endures as a potent object of imaginative appropriation and profanation. For the works of blasphemous modernism, that is, God remains very much alive.

Modernist literature thus complicates the popular narrative of religion's inexorable decline in the modern world. "In this process there is no stopping," Freud wrote; "the greater the number of men to whom the treasures of knowledge become accessible, the more widespread is the falling- away from religious belief." Freud's striking confidence that the religious neurosis could not possibly survive the accumulating pressures of modernity is typical of his contemporaries' prevailing assumption in these matters, even if many contemplated God's death with far less satisfaction. Yet Freud's prophecy of a wholly secular future left, ironically, no room for a return of the repressed. Like many other social observers, he was unable to foresee God's comeback in a twenty- first century where religion remains a powerful cultural force, even (with some exceptions) in the world's most "developed," "modernized" nations— a century in which perfectly sane thinkers have declared a "death of the death of God."

In scholarship across the humanities, such reconsiderations of modernity and secularization have accompanied a renewed interest in religion generally. Nonetheless, as Pericles Lewis has observed, most scholarship on modernist writers continues "anachronistically to read back into them a blithely secular point of view." Important exceptions include recent work by Lewis, Erik Tonning, and other scholars whose efforts generally accord with my own sense of modernism's religious underpinnings. Together, these studies make a compelling case for the fundamental importance of religious discourses to literary modernism, and I join their effort to contest what Suzanne Hobson calls the "strong reading of modernism's disenchantment." I take, however, a via negativa, arguing that literary blasphemies of the period— writers' self- conscious formal and thematic deployments of religious irreverence— are in a perverse way the surest proof of religion's abiding importance among the moderns.

Blasphemy is double- edged, as we'll have many occasions to consider. Even as it profanes religious traditions and institutions, it also tacitly affirms their status as objects worthy of such profanation. Here my argument follows the logic, if not the diagnosis, of T. S. Eliot's theorization of blasphemy in a series of lectures published under the title After Strange Gods (1934). Now best remembered for a particularly ugly sentence about "free- thinking Jews," these lectures identify blasphemy as a useful index of religious sensibility while also claiming that modernity provides infertile soil for that sensibility, and thus for blasphemy of any genuine form, to take root. The current reappraisals of modern secularization noted above give us ample reason to take seriously the first of these claims— and to put some much-needed critical pressure on the second.

Blasphemy, Faith, and Modernity

We can begin with Ezra Pound's negative review of After Strange Gods, in which Pound concisely articulates the conventional view of religion's status in the twentieth century: "The fact is that 'religion' long since resigned. Religion in the person of its greatest organized European institution resigned. The average man now thinks of religion either as a left- over or an irrelevance." Pound's remarks

imply that Eliot hasn't sufficiently recognized this, but the author of After Strange Gods is if anything hyperaware of what he perceives to be religion's diminished importance: a state of affairs Eliot mourns, somewhat counterintuitively, as "the obsolescence of Blasphemy" (After Strange Gods, 10). Because "no one can possibly blaspheme in any sense except that in which a parrot may be said to curse, unless he profoundly believes in that which he profanes," for Eliot the moderns have mostly "ceased to be capable of exercising that activity or of recognizing it" (55– 56). As G. K. Chesterton had proclaimed some years before, "Blasphemy depends upon belief, and is fading with it. If anyone doubts this, let him sit down seriously and try to think blasphemous thoughts about Thor." On views such as these, blasphemy's extinction follows logically from God's. So it is that any remaining trace of "genuine blasphemy" is for Eliot "a way of affirming belief," "a symptom that the soul is still alive"— and that "first- rate blasphemy," in particular, deserves to be treasured as "one of the rarest things in literature."

This idea— that an irreverent work must earn its blasphemy or else fail as literature— brings us to a suggestive distinction between blasphemy and the proximate category of the obscene. For if blasphemy is understood to stand in positive relation with aesthetic value, obscenity stands in neutral or negative relation to such value. Obscenity has widely been understood as either incompatible with artistic merit or, at best, immaterial to it. In British and US jurisprudence, the latter view was for many decades implied by the "Hicklin test" of obscenity, which disregarded literary value altogether. The former

view— that an "obscene" book cannot at the same time be a successfully "literary" one— was voiced memorably by John M. Woolsey, who declared Joyce's Ulysses not obscene, in part, because its author had pursued his artistic aims with such "astonishing success." (Conceding that the book contained "dirty words," Judge Woolsey could nonetheless discern no "dirt for dirt's sake" in Joyce's "amazing tour de force" [xvi].) These commonly held views of obscenity and blasphemy speak directly to the argument of this book, because while I take obscenity to be generally incidental to modernist literature— its writers often used "dirty words" but rarely just "for dirt's sake"— blasphemy was very often integral to that literature, constitutive of it, and in ways that index both the aesthetic and the political stakes of modernism itself.

Here I differ from Eliot, not only with regard to the capacity or incapacity for "first- rate blasphemy" among modernist writers but also as regards the political potential of such irreverence. For Eliot, blasphemy matters primarily for what it signals about the well- being of "therapeutic" religion, in Slavoj Žižek's terms: a faith that "helps individuals to function better in the existing order." For me, the import of blasphemous expression lies instead in its service to what Žižek calls a "critical" faith, one that "tries to assert itself as a critical agency articulating what is wrong with this order as such, a space for the voices of discontent" (3). My own sense of blasphemy's worth has less to do with what it says about the blasphemer's own soul than with its intrinsically "disruptive power ... to undermine, transform, and constructively engage cultural forms and institutions that have grown rigid with time": the sorts of institutions that Eliot would likely, for the most part, have wished to shore up. His thoughts on blasphemy are nonetheless crucial; as Raymond Williams once observed, "If Eliot is read with attention, he is seen to have raised questions which those who differ from him politically must answer, or else retire from the field." Eliot is right to insist that for blasphemy to matter at all, it must be grounded in and even motivated by an acknowledgment of religious authority and of the affective and rhetorical force of spiritual feeling and traditions. He's also right to suggest that this acknowledgment not only can but must be accompanied by a profound skepticism and a willingness to face equally religion's goods and ills, a condition the Anglo- Catholic Eliot defines as "spiritual sickness": one of his three criteria for "first-rate" blaspheming, the others being "literary genius and profound faith" (After Strange Gods, 56).

Worth recuperating among Eliot's delineations of the first- rate is his insistence that faith and blasphemy cannot be sundered completely— though surely we can do without his recourse to pathology. What blasphemy requires is not "spiritual sickness" but rather a commitment to playful and critical reworkings of orthodoxy, coupled with a respect and even reverence, not for God, or scripture, or the church, but for religious faith itself and its enduring cultural sway. As Eliot said of his favorite blasphemer, Baudelaire, "His business was not to practise Christianity, but— what was much more important for his time— to assert its necessity." Likewise, when Eliot judges James Joyce to be "the most ethically orthodox of the more eminent writers of my time," he means not that the Irish author succeeds at achieving a fully "orthodox sensibility"— scarcely possible by Eliot's standards— but that his works, like Baudelaire's, "recognize" the "necessity" of Christianity as the proper soil in which a philosophically and artistically meaningful blasphemy can take root (After Strange Gods, 41).

Or as Salman Rushdie wrote, many years later, in the novel that earned him the blasphemer's highest sentence: "Where there is no belief, there is no blasphemy." That The Satanic Verses (1988) is in many respects a "sincerely religious book" is precisely what makes its blasphemies so potent. It is in fact a crucial component not only of that novel's blasphemies but also of its modernism that it stands in such

richly ambivalent relation "to the cultural system that it must both desecrate and renew"— that its profanations contain "a gesture of recuperative devotion." Indeed on some level they must, for, as Georges Bataille memorably put it, irreverence would be doomed to irrelevance "if the blasphemer denied the sacred nature of the Good that Blasphemy was intended to despoil."

One of Bataille's own contributions to blasphemous modernism, his pornographic Story of the Eye (1928), is exemplary here. Having exhausted just about every secular form of transgression, this novella reserves its most powerful desecrations for its final pages, where an orgy inside a cathedral develops into a Eucharistic travesty of extreme proportions. Its climax is marked by a Catholic priest being choked to death, in his own church, while enjoying and suffering la petite mort at the hands of the other celebrants. As the priest's subsequently uprooted eyeball undergoes an alarming series of defilements, we may be tempted to ask: Is nothing sacred? But that is the wrong question altogether. What makes this text so troubling (and, perhaps, titillating) is its insistence that the church, and the various objects defiled under its roof, are sacred— and, for this reason, are worthy of the blasphemer's "despoiling." Like Eliot, Bataille maintains that blasphemy requires not a secularist dismissal of religion but rather a recognition of the sanctity that still adheres to its institutions, sacraments, and scriptures.

In Finnegans Wake (1939), Joyce provides a useful term for such simultaneous reverence and transgression— "sacreligion"— that deserves a place among the more familiar list of modernism's proverbial heresies and iconoclasms, its breaks with cultural orthodoxies of various kinds.28 Scholars have long described and even defined modernism in such terms, of course, but almost always in service to worldly notions of assault on secular authority and tradition: notions largely divorced from spiritual contexts and divested of religious signification. In claiming blasphemy as a defining mode of modernist literary production, I want to insist on the full religious valence of that term in order to respect modernism's imaginative investments in, and often subversive reworkings of, theology and scripture. Heresy, for example, recognizes certain of the moderns' idiosyncratic forays into heterodox visions of the sacred— Lawrence and Yeats come readily to mind— but it elides the majority's manifest interest in both assimilating and profaning orthodox religious traditions.

So, too, does the tendency of recent modernist scholarship to emphasize authors' transpositions of religious experience into formal or aesthetic principles— so that what emerges as "sacred" in modernist texts (for example, Virginia Woolf's "moments of being") is generally unrecognizable as sacred in any Christian or other doctrinal sense.31 This kind of criticism often emphasizes the ways literature creates its own versions of religion and even can become, as Arthur Symons suggested, "a kind of religion, with all the duties and responsibilities of the sacred ritual."

(T. E. Hulme supplies a less favorable description of this dynamic: "spilt religion.") Rather than stress writers' sublimations and personalized secularizations of the religious, I attend primarily to the ways that modernists assimilate scripture and exploit orthodox constructions of the sacred. To be sure, there is much to be said about how they transform these constructions. It's worth considering, though, how the resultant depictions of sacred and profane continue to function in recognizably doctrinal ways, drawing on the cultural durability of scripture and sacrament.

In the chapters that follow, I pursue these considerations across a fairly diverse range of writers and texts. Where recent studies of modernism and religion have concentrated almost exclusively on "the mainstream of high modernism" (James, Conrad, Proust, Kafka, Woolf, Pound), I will instead be dealing

mostly with the canon's outliers: the Others, to borrow the title of Alfred Kreymborg's important little magazine. Joyce is an exception here, but, as Enda Duffy notes, Ulysses "has always been seen in some sense as an exception among the masterpieces of patriarchal modernism," staging as it does "a different kind of intervention within the realities of nation, race, class, even gender." In chapter 1, I show how Joyce marshals the language of blasphemy to challenge prevailing assumptions about these matrices of identity— "even gender." (And sexuality, too.) Joyce's oeuvre is crucial to the story of blasphemous modernism, Ulysses in particular providing a template for the literary profanations to be found in works that have been alternately overlooked and underappreciated for the better part of a century, and which remain largely neglected by studies of modernism and religion.

As he did for these writers, Joyce will serve in these pages as a kind of patron saint, his works affording a primer of the full spectrum of modernist blasphemy— from the irreverent disarticulations of gender and sexuality we find in Mina Loy and Djuna Barnes to the artistic rebellion undertaken by a coterie of young Harlem artists of the 1920s and 1930s (including Wallace Thurman and Richard Bruce Nugent), whose insistently iconoclastic works often telegraph their debt to the Joycean precedent. In keeping with the principle of a "sacreligious" art, blasphemy and modernism do more than coexist in these writers' works. They are in fact mutually constitutive, as can be seen most readily in texts such as Loy's 1914 poem "Parturition," or Nugent's 1926 story "Smoke, Lilies and Jade": two works as blasphemous as they are unprecedented in their formal and thematic experimentations. In such cases, modernism and blasphemy prove as difficult to separate as form and content. Thus do these authors discharge the duties of what a young James Joyce had in 1904 declared the modern artist's "Holy Office": the imperative to transgress orthodoxies both literary and religious, or, let us say, to be at once both blasphemous and modernist.

The Politics of Blasphemy

That imperative carries political as well as aesthetic implications. For blasphemy is a barometer and a mechanism of power, a discourse governed by the powerful but also occasionally usurped by the marginalized in politically significant ways. Blasphemy respects no division of church and state; alongside its religious subversions, it inevitably transgresses secular authority. Accordingly, as modernist writers critique and reinscribe religious orthodoxy, they also expose the ideological complicities of ecclesiastical and more worldly institutions of power. Further, they evolve blasphemous ways of addressing such inevitably ideological issues as race, gender, class, sexuality, and religious orientation— and use blasphemy as a means to articulate novel and potentially liberating ways to conceive these very categories, giving voice to the subaltern, the unrecognized, the "unnatural."

Here we encounter one way to resolve the supposed incommensurability of a literary criticism that attends to such overtly political issues with a criticism that engages the topic of religion. Such an opposition is implied, for instance, by a much- remarked 2005 article in which Stanley Fish cited religion as the topic most likely to supplant "the triumvirate of race, gender, and class as the center of intellectual energy." This must have been welcome news to J. Hillis Miller, who had earlier lamented literary critics' inattention to "the religious or ontological dimension of writers' and cultures' ideologies in favor of a more or less exclusive infatuation with the three mythological graces of contemporary humanistic study: Race, Class, and Gender." One of the present study's foundational questions is: why must we choose between one approach and the other? Why not discuss these mythological graces, with all their pressing political import, in the context of the religious? In particular, why not discuss the ways

that often transgressive religious discourses enable confrontations with the taboos of Race, Class, and Gender? And why not the fourth grace, Sexuality? That category, I know, would have spoiled Miller's neat trinity— but sexuality is crucial to understanding spiritual ecstasy, and blasphemy has always offended most when it has had to do with religion's putative corruption at the hands of profane Eros.

Accordingly, the chapters that follow propose readings of blasphemy as both an artistic and a political mode of expression. When I speak of blasphemy's political aims and consequences, however, I mean something quite different than Giorgio Aga mben's utopic vision of a politically liberative "profanation"— a term he defines, idiosyncratically, as an effort "to abolish and erase separations" between sacred and profane, "to return to common use that which has been removed to

the sphere of the sacred." I am concerned not with this idealized practice of neutralizing all distinction, but rather with the subversive, blasphemous uses to which literary representations of the sacred and profane are put. To that end a sense of distinction must remain— albeit in decidedly transformed ways— so that the blasphemer can partake of the authority inherent in notions of the sacred, even as she upends those notions and illumines their repressive political uses. This is a perhaps necessary and certainly transgressive move on the part of modernists who need to point up, in order to critique, the functionally sacral nature of modernity's new gods, and by writers— especially women writers, queer writers, and writers of color— who seek ways to make their voices heard.

Exemplum: The Good News in Langston Hughes

Consider Langston Hughes's 1932 poem "Goodbye Christ." Repudiating "Christ Jesus Lord God Jehovah" in favor of "A real guy named / Marx Communist Lenin Peasant Stalin Worker ME," the poem aroused thunderous protest both from evangelicals, angered at its blasphemy, and from American nationalists who objected to its blatantly pro- Communist message. (To say nothing of the Saturday Evening Post, which the poem derides, and which mischievously reprinted "Goodbye Christ" without permission in 1940.) Of course— and this is the point— one cannot dissociate the poem's religious transgressions from its political ones. The political cause of "godless Communism" was inseparable, in the minds of many detractors, from its rejection of religious faith. According to an anti- Hughes flyer from the time, distributed by a group dedicated to the cause of "Christian Nationalism": "'HATE CHRIST' Is the Slogan of the Communists." For such readers, Hughes's poem was both treasonous and blasphemous; the writer of "Goodbye Christ" knew well the potency of such an irreverent mixture. Or perhaps it's more correct to say that Hughes recognized that treason and blasphemy are at some level inextricable offenses. What made "Goodbye Christ" so dangerous was the explosive directness with which it framed its indictments of both the political and the religious.

In some "Draft ideas" he jotted down in December 1964, Hughes nonetheless warns his fellow poets against the snares of the political: "Politics can be the graveyard of the poet. And only poetry can be his resurrection." Yet later in the same draft he writes,

> Concerning politics, nothing I have said is true. A poet is a human being. Each human being must live within his time, with and for his people, and within the boundaries of his country. Therefore, how can a poet keep out of politics?
> Hang yourself, poet, in your own words. Otherwise, you are dead.

Notable is the way that the figure of poetic "resurrection" remains even in Hughes's volte- face at the end of this passage, indeed becomes much more forceful. The poet must hang herself in order to live,

must lose her life to find it. And for Hughes, despite his initial (rhetorical) hesitation, that resurrection is ultimately as politically charged as it is inherently religious.

As a poet, at any rate, Hughes's evocations of religion are invariably political, often in the least subtle of ways. His "Christ in Alabama" (1931) declares, for example, that "Christ is a Nigger": a "holy bastard" born not of Virgin Birth but of unholy rape (by the "White Master above") and now left to die on "the cross of the South." The poem provoked a scandal when it was first published in Contempo, making this Hughes's most controversial work behind "Goodbye Christ." Politicians and newspaper editors denounced "the insulting and blasphemous" Hughes in ways that prove the success of the poet's calculation to provoke: "It's bad enough to call Christ a bastard ... but to call Him a nigger— that's too much!" Above all, blasphemy serves Hughes as a means to articulate his outrage at economic inequality. In poems such as "Hungry Child"— published in the March 1925 issue of Workers Monthly— Hughes links religious notions of divine Providence, whose mysteries are impenetrable, with the similarly mysterious and often unjust dispensations of capitalism. Regardless what the scriptures say, this poem suggests, God continues to be a god for the rich and the white: "Where are your shares in standard oil? / I made the world for the rich / And the will-be-rich / And the have-always-been-rich." As I demonstrate further in chapter 3, blasphemy is for Hughes— and for other Harlem Renaissance writers— the preferred idiom in which to express resistance to this white God and to the worldly injustices perpetuated in his name.

Transgressive Typology and the Aesthetics of Sacrilege

In attending to the literary strategies that Hughes and others use to articulate such resistance, Blasphemous Modernism is concerned always with what Rachel Blau DuPlessis calls "the intersection of two 'news'— the rhetorical/ stylistic (modernism) and the ideological/ political (modernity)." The language of blasphemous modernism irrupts at that intersection, and it takes, I argue, two predominant channels of expression: channels that follow the two predominant forms of blasphemy as it's understood in Christian tradition. One of these, of course, is the act of defiling or desecrating the sacred. The other entails arrogating divinity to oneself: an act of willful appropriation that typically involves declaring oneself the fulfillment of a prophetic typology. In modernist literature, for reasons I explain below, the former mode of blasphemy tends to constitute an "aesthetics of sacrilege." The latter let us call "transgressive typology," and let us appreciate that for Christians this is blasphemy's most pertinent meaning. For without this form of blasphemy, the New Testament suggests, there would be no Christ and no religion in his name.

In the gospels of Matthew and Mark, the Jewish high priest Caiaphas asks Jesus directly "whether thou be the Christ, the Son of God." Both Caiaphas and the gathered crowd declare the prisoner guilty of "blasphemy" when he responds, "I am: and ye shall see the Son of man sitting on the right hand of power, and coming in the clouds of heaven." Historically, Jesus's promise has not yet come to pass, though believers might take some consolation from its parodic fulfillment in Joyce's Ulysses. At the close of that novel's "Cyclops" episode, finding himself charged, like Jesus, with blasphemy, Leopold Bloom eludes his violent accuser by ascending to the clouds on a biblical chariot— where he sits, fittingly, at the right hand of Power. Jack Power, that is: Bloom's fellow Dubliner. Such playful typology is one of the most notable narrative components of Ulysses, which Joyce structures as much by biblical parallels as by the novel's more famous Homeric correspondences. Ulysses thus exemplifies blasphemous modernism's

interest in transgressive typology: in the unorthodox, unauthorized, and often subversive exploitation of scripture and its tropes.

Typology for Christians involves a hermeneutic appropriation of the Hebrew Bible. More broadly, typology is a matter of linguistic appropriation and reappropriation. It's a matter of colonization, even, though with the word transgressive I mean to signal a reverse colonization, as when a marginalized artist imaginatively stakes his or her claim to a hegemonic religious discourse. Observe the female Jehovahs and Christs that populate Mina Loy's poetry; the black Christs and other biblical figures strewn throughout African American modernism; and Djuna Barnes's sly parody, in Nightwood (1936), of the Virgin Birth: an irreverent rewriting that typifies the modernist approach to scriptural typology. In this novel, the character Robin Vote produces a son for her husband, Felix Volkbein, who holds decidedly messianic expectations for his new heir. (The son's name, Guido, derives from the Latin Vito, or "life.") Felix, though, seems to have little to do with conceiving him, and Robin herself disavows any penetration by man, as Nightwood hints that Guido may be the product of a miraculous conception. With the stoic faith of Christ's mother obeying the Annunciation, Robin "conceiv[es] herself pregnant." When her labor pains arrive, the nativity she has fostered with "monstrous" prayers and inspired with "the memoirs of the Marquis de Sade" soon becomes a travesty of the biblical precedent: "She rose up on her elbow in her bloody gown, looking about her in the bed as if she had lost something. 'Oh, for Christ's sake, for Christ's sake!' she kept crying like a child who had walked into the commencement of a horror" (47– 48). Like the birth scene in Loy's 1914 poem "Parturition," whose speaker hears "the gurgling of a crucified wild beast" as a baby emerges from her womb, Guido's virgin birth replays in baroque fashion the birth that truly was "for Christ's sake." Not for nothing will Guido later fondle the Virgin that hangs from his neck and call it "mother" (162).

The circumstances of Christ's conception likewise served W. B. Yeats as a fit subject for transgressive typology when, in 1924— incensed by Ireland's largely uncontested policies "giving Catholic moral standards the backing of the State"— Yeats contributed to the pages of a radical Irish magazine a poem expressly designed "to arouse controversy and flout censorship." The poem, "Leda and the Swan," did indeed prove controversial— and not only for its seeming prurience or obscenity but also, and especially, for its irreverent troping on Christian theology and iconography. "Annunciation" had in fact been the poem's working title, and its readers were only too familiar with the sort of blasphemy that dwelt on the Virgin Mother's unsolicited fertilization by the holy dove or, at least, by some avian equivalent. "C'est le pigeon, Joseph," thinks Stephen Dedalus as he walks along Sandymount Strand; Yeats himself would title Book II of A Vision (1925) "Dove or Swan," making clear his imaginative typological equation of the Greek and the Christian annunciations.

Yeats's poem invites political readings, too, wherein Leda personifies an Ireland figuratively "raped" by its colonial oppressors, or perhaps by an oppressive Catholic Church: by either its "conqueror" or its "gay betrayer," as Joyce had put the matter in Ulysses (1.405). "Leda and the Swan" thus echoes Joyce's systematic use of blasphemy to frame his novelistic critiques of both church and empire— a topic I take up in chapter 1— and also resonates with the telltale ambivalence, equal parts appropriation and profanation, that attends Joyce's "sacreligious" trafficking in transgressive typology throughout Ulysses and Finnegans Wake. Mina Loy's 1923 poem "Joyce's Ulysses" captures this ambivalence in evocative terms, characterizing that novel's modernist aesthetic as "The word made flesh / and feeding upon itself / with erudite fangs." Here Loy aptly praises the nimble ironic modes with which Joyce succeeds in

having his religion and eating it too— in simultaneously channeling and profaning, or "feeding upon," a scriptural poetics of Word- made- flesh. For in addition to demonstrating the allure for modernist writers of transgressive typology, Ulysses also showcases the other mode of blasphemy, distinct but related: the rhetorical desecration of the sacred.

Modernist strategies of this kind aspire, often, to the condition of actual physical or embodied profanation— in accordance with a literary aesthetics of sacrilege whose ideal, it seems, would be somehow to literalize or reify the conventional Christian figuration of blasphemy as words that "injure and rend the body of Christ." Here some brief definitions are in order. While for most practical purposes the terms "blasphemy" and "sacrilege" are interchangeable, there is nonetheless a semantic distinction that proves fruitful for theorizing literary irreverence. Both blasphemy and sacrilege are profanatory, which is to say that both offend against the sacred. What distinguishes them is that blasphemy, as I began by saying, is textual— a matter of rhetoric, form, and expression— while sacrilege denotes physical desecration. If the realm of the former is discourse or text, the realm of the latter is physicality, embodiment. Blasphemy thus lends itself as the more obvious term for religious irreverence that exists in or as literature, but modernist writers are rarely content with this distinction; their provocations inevitably test the boundaries between sacrilege and blasphemy, body and text, content and form. Literature's most memorable profanations, after all, are those that forcefully usher forth the profane and profaning body within a context of the sacred, pressing blasphemy's essential discursiveness as near as possible to the immanent materiality of sacrilege.

For a modernist paradigm of this operation, consider the Reverend Hightower in Faulkner's Light in August (1932), "up there in the pulpit with his hands flying around him and the dogma he was supposed to preach all full of galloping cavalry and defeat and glory just as when he tried to tell them on the street about the galloping horses, it in turn would get all mixed up with absolution and choirs of martial seraphim." Such rhetorical mixing- up of profane and sacred is the stuff of blasphemy. But it is Hightower's unique ability to evoke these profane bodies and ghosts, to render them virtually present in the house of God— to conjure, incarnate, resurrect them— that invites a slightly more dangerous suspicion in the minds of his parishioners, namely "that what he preached in God's own house on God's own day verged on actual sacrilege" (63). This "actual sacrilege," of which Hightower's oratory seems ever on the brink, is the unachievable but nonetheless persistent goal of the blasphemous writer.

Like Hightower's sermons, the corporeal excesses of blasphemous modernism seem to exceed the "merely" textual— often, as it happens, by asserting the sexual. Mina Loy, for instance, puts the highly eroticized speaker of Songs to Joannes (1917) through her own Passion and Crucifixion as the poem itself begins to come apart at the seams, undergoing an analogous textual immolation. Structurally and formally, this and other of Loy's poems mirror the somatic textuality of what Joyce called his "epic of the human body," Ulysses.57n both Loy and Joyce, body and text are conflated— Molly Bloom's "soliloquy" is only the best- known example— and with them sacrilege and blasphemy. Especially in the influential works they produced between 1914 (Loy's print debut, Joyce's "annus mirabilis") and 1922/ 23 (Ulysses, Lunar Baedeker), these two authors provide the touchstones or urtexts of modernism's sacrilegious aesthetics, one performing in poetry what the other does in prose.58 But the vision they share also has special resonance for writers such as Djuna Barnes (see chapter 4), whose novels so often entwine the thematics of religion and of erotic embodiment, and D. H. Lawrence, whose reimagining of the Christ myth in The Escaped Cock (1929) replaces the Resurrection with, I suppose,

the Erection: "He crouched to her, and he felt the blaze of his manhood and his power rise up in his loins, magnificent. 'I am risen!'" A sacrilegious aesthetic also attends the work of Harlem's self-styled "Niggeratti" (chapter 3), whose fictions bring the body very much to the fore— notably in their contributions to the single but explosive issue of Wallace Thurman's little magazine Fire!! (1926).

Given these writers' investments in the profane Word made flesh, it's far from incidental that the figure of the tongue— mortal nexus of flesh and word— should recur with such tenacity in their works, from "the tattle of tongue play" that resounds throughout Loy's poetry to the "livid tongues" of the Niggeratti, "burning wooden opposition with a cackling chuckle of contempt" (as Fire!! advertised on its opening page). See also the richly profane tongue of Joyce's Shem the Penman, unleashing the "blasphematory spits" of Finnegans Wake (183.24), and the erotic revision, in Barnes's Ladies Almanack, of the Pentecost and its "tongues like as of fire" (Acts 2:3). Such invocations comport well enough with the juridical logic of medieval and early modern Europe, where blasphemers could expect to have their tongues mutilated in punishment— or even, in the case of recidivists, forcibly removed.61 That blasphemy is "primarily a sin of the tongue," as The Catholic Encyclopedia informs us, underscores its status as both inherently discursive and also inevitably rooted in the body. The resultant comic potential would be exploited memorably, a half- century after Finnegans Wake, by Salman Rushdie's satire of "American religiosity" in his own determinedly modernist

novel (a text much indebted to the blasphemous modernisms both of Joyce and of Mikhail Bulgakov): The Satanic Verses. Here a comical purveyor of the Word— Protestant creationist Eugene Dumsday (dumb + doomsday)—suffers the poetic justice of having his incessantly flapping tongue first severed and then reconstituted "with flesh taken from his posterior" (432). Putting his "new, buttocky tongue" to work as a radio evangelist, Dumsday reminds us of the tongue's profane corporeality as well as its capacity for rhetorical virtuosity, blasphemous and otherwise (432).

It is, in fact, in The Satanic Verses that the aesthetics of sacrilege would eventually find its most extreme manifestation. In this case, the sacrilege had less to do with any profane corporeality of the text itself than with its notorious reception, if "reception" is indeed the word for an international firestorm that consumed dozens of human lives. Curiously, this hostile response managed both to affirm and to confute the novel's own implicit arguments about blasphemy and writing. For while The Satanic Verses clearly endorses the critical agency of the written word, it also forcefully dramatizes the tragically unequal struggle between blasphemy and the seductive powers of militant orthodoxy. "How hard that struggle," thinks one character in the novel, a poet seeking to "repossess" the "poisoned wells" of orthodox discourse; "how inevitable the defeat" (290). More generally, The Satanic Verses posits as "a great lie" the ostensibly quaint notion that "the pen is mightier than the sword" (100). When the novel's other resident poet, the blasphemer Baal, imagines "rivers of blood" flowing "from the cuts his verses inflict," he is not speaking literally (105). Yet while the ensuing Rushdie Affair validated one crucial aspect of the Verses' project— affirming the written word's preeminence as the medium of blasphemy— it also disproved, in spectacular fashion, the notion that the violence caused by such writings is inevitably merely figurative. Real blood flowed from the "cuts" Rushdie's Verses inflicted, in addition to the deeply personal wounding that scholars such as Saba Mahmood have identified as a defining consequence of blasphemy in Muslim contexts.

This logic of religious trauma had underwritten the official judgment of the All India Shia Conference, in 1933, that a book called Angaaray ("Burning Coals")— a frequently blasphemous volume of modernist fiction and drama composed, in Urdu, by a coterie of north Indian writers— was not just "filthy" but "heartrending," that it had "wounded the feelings of the entire Muslim community." (Along with The Satanic Verses, Angaaray reminds us that Christianity— which provides the most pressing religious contexts for the predominantly British, Irish, and American authors discussed in this book— nonetheless holds no monopoly over blasphemy's range of formal and ideological uses for modernist writers.)

Now Muslim scholars were writing editorials urging Rushdie to stanch "the rage of entire nations" caused by his hurtful novel: "Mr. Rushdie, you have cut them and they are bleeding: Do something quickly to heal the wound." In a fateful iteration of the aesthetics of sacrilege, then, The Satanic Verses converted the verbal offense of blasphemy into a trauma felt as unbearably physical, into an offense that carried all the violence of sacrilege and spawned further violence in turn. Rushdie's novel thus stands as a powerful demonstration not only of how religion persists in modernism, but also of how modernism itself persists in postwar anglophone literature— and of the critical role blasphemy plays in that persistence.

Blasphemy as Dialectic

Although this book generally emphasizes a complementary relation in modernist texts between transgressive typologies and sacrilegious aesthetics, chapter 3 locates a crucial tension between the two— one that illuminates the competing politics and poetics of the Harlem Renaissance. In that chapter I consider, first, the large- scale exercise in imaginative modernist typology that is Alain Locke's 1925 New Negro anthology. As if to supersede the traditional association of African Americans with the "chosen people" of the Hebrew Bible, The New Negro offers itself, I argue, as a kind of New Testament— and it duly seeks to present its titular figure as a messianic black Christ fit to redeem an as- yet artistically and politically undeveloped black culture. It's against this typological project that Harlem's younger, more radical writers— the "Niggeratti" coterie of Langston Hughes, Wallace Thurman, Richard Bruce Nugent, Zora Neale Hurston, and others— aim their own sacrilegious aesthetics. This dialectic can be read profitably as one of those politically inflected, blasphemous contests that are "staged, often ritually, for control of a shared discourse." Here the contest is staged as a kind of "signifyin(g)," in Henry Louis Gates Jr.'s formulation: an irreverent dialogue with, troping on, and transformation of The New Negro's own blasphemous strategies.

Which brings us to another cultural exchange from the period, one similarly characterized by biblical appropriation and the discourse of blasphemy. Like The New Negro, Radclyffe Hall's controversial novel The Well of Loneliness (1928) exploits Christian typology in a bid for cultural recognition and acceptance— of the "sexual invert," in this case, rather than "the Negro." The "stigmata" of the invert, Hall writes, are "verily the wounds of One nailed to a cross," and she accordingly casts her protagonist, Stephen Gordon, as an elaborate and unsubtle Christ figure. Echoing, meanwhile, the satiric or "signifying" role of the Niggeratti is The Sink of Solitude (1928), a satiric pamphlet— comprising a polemical preface by P. R. Stephensen, drawings by Beresford Egan, and an anonymous "verse lampoon" in heroic couplets— that not only skewers Hall herself and her "silly novel" but also calls "upon the Home Secretary as a christian to enforce the blasphemy laws" against Hall's most vocal critic, James Douglas.

These successive rhetorical postures bear remarking. First, The Well of Loneliness makes "brazen, blasphemous" use of biblical typology in its moral defense of homosexuality, which some of its readers nonetheless decry as blasphemous for its perceived immorality. Then The Sink of Solitude calls for blasphemy charges to be brought against the novel's detractors for having profaned one of modernity's secular gods, Freedom of Speech. Finally, Hall herself was considerably upset by what she considered the "blasphemy" of The Sink's frontispiece, which depicts the author's body nailed to a cross; no doubt Hall's moralizing critics would have concurred in characterizing the image as blasphemous. The similarity of this dialectic— a blasphemous response to blasphemy, which itself elicits charges of blasphemy— to the New Negro / Niggeratti agon demonstrates that divergent minority constituencies in the modernist period experienced similar kinds of infighting over how best to deploy religious and blasphemous tropes. In writing back to Hall's novel, moreover, The Sink of Solitude is joined by the works of Djuna Barnes, especially Ladies Almanack (1928), which caricatures Hall as a tiresome advocate for lesbian monogamy. For Barnes, as I demonstrate in chapter 4, blasphemy provides a way to unsettle and critique the then-regnant notion of homosexuality as congenital "inversion": a concept promulgated most widely by sexologists such as Richard von Krafft-Ebing and Havelock Ellis.

Ellis, incidentally, subscribed as confidently as anyone to the death- of- God thesis, writing in 1897 that since "the problem of religion has practically been settled," "the question of sex ... stands before the coming generations as the chief problem for solution." It is important to recognize that writers such as Joyce, Loy, Nugent, and Barnes keep both of these "problems" open, the former just as much as the latter. Their works acknowledge the aesthetic and political power of the religious structures they profane, in order more meaningfully to assimilate and exploit them. The very profanability of scripture and sacrament implies, after all, their enduring sanctity; the seemingly total irreverence of a novel such as Ulysses, or Nightwood, or The Satanic Verses is in fact circumscribed by this tacit concession of religion's power and symbolic necessity. The modernists' literary profanations derive their force in large part from this necessity and from the transgressive possibilities its limitations make possible— reminding us that to blaspheme an institution without respect for its authority, its sanctity, would be not to blaspheme at all. In this and other ways, the writers I discuss belie Eliot's declaration that blasphemy had become obsolete in a faithless century. Their poems and fictions insist that both religion and its artistic subversions continue to matter, that by drawing fully on religion's cultural authority blasphemy can achieve real literary and political significance. The pages that follow explore the various but always radical ends to which these writers put this shared understanding. <>

UNION: THE STRUGGLE TO FORGE THE STORY OF UNITED STATES NATIONHOOD by Colin Woodard [VIKING, 9780525560159]

The author of *American Nations* returns to the historical study of a fractured America by examining how a myth of national unity was created and fought over in the nineteenth century--a myth that continues to affect us today

UNION: THE STRUGGLE TO FORGE THE STORY OF UNITED STATES NATIONHOOD tells the story of the struggle to create a national myth for the United States, one that could hold its rival

regional cultures together and forge, for the first time, an American nationhood. It tells the dramatic tale of how the story of our national origins, identity, and purpose was intentionally created and fought over in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. On one hand, a small group of individuals--historians, political leaders, and novelists--fashioned and promoted a history that attempted to transcend and erase the fundamental differences and profound tensions between the nation's regional cultures. America had a God-given mission to lead humanity toward freedom, equality, and self-government and was held together by fealty to these ideals.

This emerging nationalist story was immediately and powerfully contested by another set of intellectuals and firebrands who argued that the United States was instead an ethno-state, the homeland of the allegedly superior "Anglo-Saxon" race, upon whom Divine and Darwinian favor shined. Their vision helped create a new federation--the Confederacy--prompting the bloody Civil War. While defeated on the battlefield, their vision later managed to win the war of ideas, capturing the White House in the early twentieth century, and achieving the first consensus, pan-regional vision of U.S. nationhood in the years before the outbreak of the first World War. This narrower, more exclusive vision of America would be overthrown in mid-century, but it was never fully vanquished. Woodard tells the story of the genesis and epic confrontations between these visions of our nation's path and purpose through the lives of the key figures who created them, a cast of characters whose personal quirks and virtues, gifts and demons shaped the destiny of millions.

I have long wondered how and by whom the story of the United States nationhood was created. Nearly a decade ago I wrote a book, American Nations: A History of the Eleven Rival Regional Cultures of North America, that argued there was never one America but several, with distinctions dating back to the differences between the various North American colonial projects and the swaths of the continent each settled in the decades and centuries that followed. I knew t hat these regional cultures—Greater New En gland, Greater Appalachia, the Tidewater, the Deep South, and so on— had their own ethnographic, religious, political, and philosophical characteristics and that most had rallied together in response to an external threat: Britain’s attempt to systemize, homogenize, and consolidate its empire. At its birth, no body seemed quite sure what the United States was. A treaty organization? A federation of sovereign nations? A nation- state in waiting? I was also aware that these questions persisted as late as the 1830s, and that the lack of answers threatened the survival of this new entity, whatever it was.

In **UNION: THE STRUGGLE TO FORGE THE STORY OF UNITED STATES NATIONHOOD** I set out to write a book that would reveal how the story of a shared nationhood was devised, disseminated, and ultimately upheld. What I discovered in the course of my research was an intellectual battle of the highest possible stakes that spanned a century and ultimately helped explain a great deal about the age in which we now live. I have told this story through the lives of five people who made themselves standard- bearers as well as lightning rods in this struggle for the hearts and minds of millions.

The battle was initially fought between two vainglorious men who had been professional acquaintances and partisan allies— one a Harvard- educated New England preacher's son, the other a mostly self-educated South Carolinian torn in his loyalties between aristocratic Charleston and the crude and dangerous Deep Southern frontier. One believed we were a nation founded upon shared, God- given ideals, the other that we were an alliance of sovereign nations defined by blood and built on inequity. They were both unexpectedly challenged by a fugitive slave from the Maryland Tidewater, who denounced their arguments from the greatest stages in the land and from the pages of his immensely popular books. The conflict would not be settled until the 1910s, after terrorist campaigns and a war that killed hundreds of thousands, when a Deep Southern president vanquished his ideological opponents and united the federation under an ethnonationalist vision of the American identity. Even then, one of his closest friends, perhaps the most famous American scholar of his age, was laying the groundwork for a later revolution. This book tells their story.

At this writing our Republic faces existential dangers not unlike those of the 1820s, when the federation was sharply divided along regional lines and its members uncertain of what, if anything, held it together. The paths Union's principal characters fought over remain before us, and the survival of the United States is at stake in the choices we make about which one to follow.

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The enemy's forces were surrounded, artillery raining down on them from three sides, their backs to the river, huddled in fortifications from which there was no escape. All through the night and into the morning, French and rebel cannonballs blasted the town's hewn log defenses, propelling wooden shrapnel through flesh and bone. Shells tore through buildings, buried men in their trenches, and scattered severed limbs across muddy streets. Within the collapsing walls, food was scarce, even though the commander had already expelled all the fugitive slaves who had sought shelter beneath his flag, the Union Jack.

Then a red-coated drummer appeared at the top of the parapet. His arms began moving rapidly as he beat on his instrument. The soldiers of the besieging armies couldn't hear the drumroll over the din of artillery, but when a British officer appeared beside him, holding a white handkerchief above his head, the meaning was clear enough. The cannon stopped firing, the last clouds of smoke slowly rose into the sky, and the beat of the drum could be heard, signaling a desire to parley. The British officer and the drummer— the latter still broadcasting the request for a truce— stepped down from the defenses and walked slowly toward the American lines. A Continental officer ran up to greet his British counterpart and fastened a handkerchief over his eyes. He sent the drummer back over the parapet to Yorktown and led the blindfolded officer to meet General George Washington.

After a solemn night beneath a clear sky "decorated with ten thousand stars," Lord Cornwallis negotiated his surrender. The day after that, October 19, 1781, his seven- thousand- man army marched out of the shattered Virginia port between rows of French and Continental troops, their regimental flags furled, the drummers playing "Welcome Brother Debtor," a tune associated with imprisonment. They laid their rifles in heaps at the rebels' feet.

The war for American independence was at an end. But what now?

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Thirteen of Britain's seventeen mainland North American colonies had won independence, having banded together to face a common threat to their respective political institutions, traditions, and liberties. They had created a joint military command, the Cont inental Army, and a sort- of treaty organization, "The United States of America," under the Articles of Confederation. Each of these American states was sovereign and independent, having agreed only to deleg ate defense, foreign trade, and foreign policy duties to their shared body, the Congress, which had fled from place to place during the conflict. Nob ody really knew what this United States was or what it should b ecome or even if it should continue to exist at all.

These new states' cize it ns didn't think of themselves as "Americans," except in the sense that French, German, and Spanish people might have considered themselves "Europeans." If asked what country they were from, the soldiers who now occupied Yorktown would have said "Massachusetts" or "Virginia," "Pennsylvania" or "South Carolina." For years to come, newspaper editors across the former colonies would refer to the new collective not as a nation but as a "league" or as the "American states" or "Confederated America," unsure of what it was or how long it might last.

The ethno-cultural landscape— with all its implications for nationhood— was even more complex. The descendants of English Puritans dominated most of New England and upstate New York; those of Southern English gentry and their indentured servants and slaves populated the Chesapeake country; those of the English slave planters of Barbados controlled life in the Deep Southern lowlands. The legacy of the Dutch colony of New Netherland had shaped the development of the area around New York City, while that of William Penn's Quakers had begat an ethnic and religious mosaic (with a German plurality) up and down the Delaware Valley. The backcountry was overwhelmingly Scots-Irish, in constant friction with the coastal societies that usually governed it. If a nation can be described as a people with a sense of common culture, history, and belonging, there were, in effect, a half dozen of them within these "United States," and outside New England there wasn't a single state that wasn't divided between two or, in the case of Maryland and Pennsylvania, three of them.

In the run- up to the war, one of the biggest arguments against leaving the Empire had been that a shared British identity was one of the few things keeping the colonies at peace with one another. In 1764 one anonymous letter to the editor of the New York Mercury warned that if the colonies achieved independence, "the dis putes amongst ourselves would throw us into all the confusion, and bring on us all the calamities usually attendant on civil wars."5 In Maryland Reverend Jonathan Boucher warned New Englanders would become "the Goths and Vandals of America," conquering their neighbors.6 The Founding Father John Dickinson of Pennsylvania predicted that an independent British North America would collapse into "a multitude of Commonwealths, Crimes, and Calamities — centuries of mutual Jealousies, Hatreds, Wars and Devastations, until at last the exhausted Provinces shall sink into Slavery under the yoke of some fortunate conqueror." Leaving Britain, he added, was tantamount to "destroying a house before we have got another, in winter, with a small family."

Wartime regional divisions were so profound that, in 1778, the British secret agent Paul Wentworth reported there would be not one American Republic, but three: an "eastern republic of Independents in church and state," a "middle republic of toleration in church and state," and a " southern . . . mixed government copied nearly from Great Britain." The differences between them, Wentworth argued,

were greater than those between the nations of Europe. Even after the war the London papers reported that "the States consider themselves thirteen independent provinces, subject to no other control than their own assemblies. The authority of Congress, to which they submitted but from necessity during the war they have now almost generally thrown off." Edward Bancroft, a postwar British spy, predicted the American confederation would surely splinter, leaving only the "question whether we shall have thirteen separate states in alliance or whether New England, the middle, and the southern states will form three new Confederations."

One thing was clear to the confederation's elites in the aftermath of the war: Unless a more formidable union could be negotiated, the United States would soon fall apart. "I . . . predict the worst consequences from a half-starved, limping government, that appears to be always moving upon crutches and tottering at every step," Washington wrote in 1784, and added in 1786: "I do not conceive we can lo ng exist as a nation without having lodged somewhere a power which will pervade the whole union in as energetic a manner as the authority of the different state governments extends over the several states." Everyone realized, Jefferson would later recall, that "these separate independencies, like the petty States of Greece, would be eternally at war with each other."

The Constitutional Convention of 1787 was called in response to this growing crisis and yielded a legalistic remedy: a stronger federal government constrained by elaborate checks and balances between its monarchical, aristocratic, democratic, and priestly components— the presidency, Senate, House, and Supreme Court— and vis- à- vis the states themselves, which arguably remained sovereign little nations. The whole point was to ensure no one block of colonies— no one regional culture— would be able to force its will on the others. The word "nation" was conspicuously absent from the constitution that was drafted.

The United States of America came into being as a contractual agreement, a means to an end for the parties involved. No one thought they had created a nation- state of the sort that Holland or Prussia or post-Revolutionary France was, and that central Europe's Romantic thinkers hoped the states of the German Confederation might one day become. Its people lacked a shared history, religion, or ethnicity. They didn't speak a unique language all their own. They hadn't occupied the continent long enough to imagine it as a mythic homeland, a place their people had dwelled in since time immemorial, and they'd killed or supplanted those people who did have the right to make such a claim. They lacked a common political heritage apart from the imperial ties against which they had just revolted, and they had no shared story of who they were and what their purpose was. In short, they had none of the practical or ideological foundations of a nation-state.

The United States was a state in search of nationhood, a country in search of a story of its origins, identity, and purpose. It needed to find these things if it was to survive.

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For a time the ad hoc remedy to this problem was to define American identity in terms of participation in the shared struggle of the American Revolution. Washington, commander in chief and founding president, was venerated almost as a monarch until his death in 1799, then promptly promoted to demigod: the father of the nation, the mythic lawgiver, a man of perfect virtue, wisdom, and morals whom "Americans" might strive to emulate. Parson Mason Weems, a hustler- cum- historian, invented

stories to buttress this image and disseminated them at considerable profit in pamphlets and, later, his book- length Life of George Washington. Washington's birthday was made a public holiday. His remains were treated as sacred relics, their resting place fought over between Virginia (which held them) and the U.S. Congress, which had appropriated money to house them in a purpose- built D.C. shrine. Virginia won.

But the beatification of Washington and his wartime supporting cast— Henry Knox, Nathan Hale, Ethan Allen, the Marquis de Lafayette— only worked as a placeholder for a national narrative for as long as 1776 remained in living memory. By the 1810s the Revolutionary soldiers and Founding Fathers began dying off, leaving a growing void where the country's sense of national identity should have been. Backcountry settlers in the Appalachian uplands had rebelled against the authority of the governments of Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, and the United States in the early 1790s. New Englanders considered seceding from the federation during the War of 1812, and the governor of Massachusetts had conspired with British officials to frustrate the federal war effort.

The federation's leaders began panicking. Senators slapped a tariff on the British books they feared were brainwashing Americans in their own schools and libraries. Noah Webster toiled away at compiling an "American" dictionary with distinctive words and spelling conventions in an effort to create a "national" language because, as he put it, "America should have her own, distinct from all the world." The intellectuals who wrote for the leading journal of the era, The North American Review, lamented that the United States couldn't produce a hi story of its own— a story of itself and its origins—because its component states couldn't agree on what it should say. "It will be at best but a combination of distinct histories," one lamented, "which subsequent events only show the propriety of uniting in a single narrative." If new adhesives weren't developed, if someone didn't fashion a compelling story of what America was, the young Union was expected to fall apart.

This is the story of the struggle to create that national story and, with it, an American nationhood. It is told through the eyes of the primary combatants themselves: three men born in very different circumstances at the dawn of the nineteenth century who would develop three competing answers to the United States' existential questions; and two who came of age in the aftermath of the Civil War and witnessed the triumph of one vision over the other in the second decade of a new century. It's the story of how the peoples of the United States answered those great existential questions of nationhood: Where did we come from? Who are we? Where are we going?

I end the story at the point when a broad consensus on how to answer these questions was finally achieved. It's a struggle that takes the better part of a century, a period in which we see the federation radically transformed— geographically, technologically, economically, and philosophically—into an industrial empire capable of dominating the world. This consensus was by no means final, but its contours make this a sobering and cautionary tale for readers today. <>

LIFT EVERY VOICE AND SWING: BLACK MUSICIANS AND RELIGIOUS CULTURE IN THE JAZZ CENTURY by Vaughn A. Booker [New York University Press, 9781479892327]

Explores the role of jazz celebrities like Ella Fitzgerald, Cab Calloway, Duke Ellington, and Mary Lou Williams as representatives of African American religion in the twentieth century

Beginning in the 1920s, the Jazz Age propelled Black swing artists into national celebrity. Many took on the role of race representatives, and were able to leverage their popularity toward achieving social progress for other African Americans.

In **LIFT EVERY VOICE AND SWING: BLACK MUSICIANS AND RELIGIOUS CULTURE IN THE JAZZ CENTURY**, Vaughn A. Booker argues that with the emergence of these popular jazz figures, who came from a culture shaped by Black Protestantism, religious authority for African Americans found a place and spokespeople outside of traditional Afro-Protestant institutions and religious life. Popular Black jazz professionals—such as Ella Fitzgerald, Cab Calloway, Duke Ellington, and Mary Lou Williams—inherited religious authority though they were not official religious leaders. Some of these artists put forward a religious culture in the mid-twentieth century by releasing religious recordings and putting on religious concerts, and their work came to be seen as integral to the Black religious ethos. Booker documents this transformative era in religious expression, in which jazz musicians embodied religious beliefs and practices that echoed and diverged from the predominant African American religious culture. He draws on the heretofore unexamined private religious writings of Duke Ellington and Mary Lou Williams, and showcases the careers of female jazz artists alongside those of men, expanding our understanding of African American religious expression and decentering the Black church as the sole concept for understanding Black Protestant religiosity.

Featuring gorgeous prose and insightful research, **LIFT EVERY VOICE AND SWING: BLACK MUSICIANS AND RELIGIOUS CULTURE IN THE JAZZ CENTURY** will change the way we understand the connections between jazz music and faith.

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> Nobody would think of swingin' "Ave Maria" or "Silent Night," yet I often hear bands rip into our spirituals and turn them every which way but loose. To me that's sacrilege, and I'll argue anybody, anytime about it.
> I walked off a Paramount [Pictures] lot once because some wise guys insisted on burlesquing "Deep River." As I told a group of young Y[MCA] fellows in Frisco, if we don't work up our own race pride, who, pray tell me, is going to do it for us? — Lionel Hampton, "Swing by Lionel Hampton"

Excerpt: Lionel Hampton was an African American multi- instrumentalist and composer who entered the jazz profession in the late 1920s as a teenager. By 1940, he had attained his own big band and enough prominence to speak regularly on the "state" and trajectory of jazz music. Granted a regular column, "Swing," in the Baltimore Afro-American newspaper, the thirty-two-year-old vibraphonist and percussionist used the December 28, 1940, edition to voice his opposition to a recent trend among big bands to "swing" spirituals— to arrange up- tempo, syncopated versions of African American religious songs for popular consumption. Hampton made his artistic integrity clear by forgoing a paying performance at Paramount Studios, which likely would have been lucrative for him and the musicians in his employ. Sacred African American music was a cultural possession of Hampton and other African Americans, and, in his view, to transform it into a festive or entertaining commodity was to commit sacrilege and a racial offense. No one should swing it, as no one would think to vulgarize sacred Euro-American Christian music. Hampton conveyed his religious opposition to artists and producers of any race who sought to profit by popularizing African American religious music. In voicing his discontent, he signaled his position as a race representative: an authoritative role model for younger black men, particularly black Christian men, whom he charged with taking seriously their responsibility to safeguard African American artistic and entertainment output.

As a jazz artist, black print press columnist, and by 1944 a convert to Christian Science from Roman Catholicism, Hampton represented his religion, his race, and his profession to various audiences. To encourage different communities to take jazz seriously, Hampton and others worked to secure the music's reputation as a constructive, creative art form and to convince a fretful, critical religious leadership and cultural elite among African American middle- class Protestants that its composers and performers had their moral bearings. The sense that African American religion was vulnerable to improper commodification for popular consumption, evident by the 1940s in criticisms of jazz for "swinging" spirituals, arose from existing concerns throughout the early twentieth century that popular culture and urban living had impeded African American pursuits of uplift and damaged the race's unassailable moral standing.

In the twentieth century, the emergence of jazz music propelled black artists into fame on a national scale. Many, like Hampton, took on the roles of race representatives and leveraged their popularity

toward social progress for their racial communities. These jazz professionals also played an important part in shaping the religious landscape of twentieth-century African American Protestantism, wielding the power to both define their religious communities and craft novel religious voices and performances. Jazz figures such as Duke Ellington and Mary Lou Williams stood outside of black Protestant churches, but they put forward a religious culture that was shaped by Afro- Protestantism. At the same time, their artistic expressions conveyed personal religious movement beyond, and challenges to, this tradition. These figures, though they did not hold religious positions, were celebrities. By releasing religious recordings and staging religious concerts, they became integral to the artistry of African American religious expression.

From the late 1920s through the 1950s and 1960s, jazz artists worked to change public opinion about their music's appropriateness in society. Meanwhile, nothing was static about their musical genre. Young jazz musicians grew up and matured as artists, and jazz as a competitive profession produced constant innovations in rhythms, instruments, ways of playing instruments, vocal techniques, and sensibilities about the cultural significance of a music that came to constitute an art form and a tradition. They faced claims voiced in religious and nonreligious language that jazz music represented the opposite of proper culture, namely, that not only was it bad- sounding music, but it also encouraged indulgence in the immoral or uncivilized pleasures of the urban nightlife. Over time, several musicians emerged who treated their profession as a tradition to be defined, refined, defended, and challenged. Given the realities of a segregated America and the desire to challenge this segregation, jazz artists strove to claim their profession as an appropriate musical outlet for positive racial representations of African American men and women. Part of their social project was to convince the broader white public in America that what they believed were the musical gifts or talents of African Americans stemmed from both a proud racial history and a providential story of a faithful race.

This book argues that with the emergence of new representatives, religious authority for African Americans found a place and spokespeople in popular culture beyond traditional Afro- Protestant institutions and religious life. It examines jazz musicians' expressions of belief, practice, and unconventional positions of religious authority. It demonstrates that, through their recorded music, public words, private writings, and live performances, these jazz professionals enacted theological beliefs and religious practices that echoed, contested with, and diverged from the predominant African American religious culture. The lives and work of Cab Calloway, Duke Ellington, Ella Fitzgerald, and Mary Lou Williams— prominent jazz artists in this novel culture of religious expression and authority— anchor this book's narrative of racial and religious representations as well as of religious beliefs and practices in the middle decades of the twentieth century.

In the history of civil rights legal activism, race representation is a concept that identifies "those who claimed to speak for, stand in for, and advocate for the interests of the larger group." Since the nineteenth century, for African Americans to call for a "representative colored man" or "representative Negro" has involved a tension between an atypical member of the race in terms of her or his accomplishments and an "authentic" member of the race who was "as much like the masses of black people as possible." The representative colored men, "the lucky few who had attained enough education and training to become doctors, dentists, schoolteachers, ministers, and lawyers," were to serve as the best cases for full and equal African American citizenship.2 Popular black jazz professionals became de facto race representatives because of their coverage in the black and white press, their travel and

publicity nationally and abroad, and the emergence of music criticism as a form of discourse that brought major intellectual attention to African American cultural creativity.

Representation is a concept that spotlights black religious expressions in twentieth- century African American history and popular culture, regardless of the degree to which a jazz professional affiliated with Afro- Protestant denominations or churches. Representation centers the images, scenes, roles, discourses, and music of African American religious practice. Religious representations in popular culture were often presented as authentic reproductions of African American religious thought, expression, and practice. They became content not simply for popular consumption and criticism, but also for religious reflection by the faithful and even for potential religious innovation. As prominent African Americans in an emerging jazz profession, Calloway, Ellington, Fitzgerald, and Williams bore representative racial authority and the ability to represent African American religious belief and practice through live performances, recording sessions, films, prose, press interviews, and private reflections.

This book offers a novel rethinking of African American religious history. Its focus on jazz musicians, and their representations of African American religious life, illuminates the significant Afro- Protestant cultural presence that informed, surrounded, and opposed their professional and personal lives while also contributing significantly to their artistry. As a study of religion that makes African American jazz women and men central actors, this book expands the portrait of Afro- Protestantism as a mode of professional, middle- class black cultural production with distinctive features relative to other emergent African American religions and their popular cultural production in the first half of the twentieth century. This set of jazz artists expands the concept of Afro- Protestantism beyond its traditional understanding as a collective of black religious institutions by bringing into focus its significant artistic religious dimensions that impacted black popular culture in the twentieth century.

The Consumer Challenge to Cultivating Christian Race Representatives

A "new" African American middle class arose in the early twentieth century. This socioeconomic class maintained the "subjective markers of ancestry, culture, and education" that defined nineteenth- century black elites. However, "occupation, wealth, and skill" also defined this new black middle class. In the 1910s and 1920s, "a new elite composed of entrepreneurs, professionals, and skilled workers, and whose existence was tied to the segregated world of consumer capitalism, vied with the traditional black aristocracy for the economic, political, and moral leadership of the race." In part, the concept of a black middle class was an "ideological self- invention." The older elite black middle- class "positions of journalists, ministers, educators, and entrepreneurs who catered to a white clientele" faced the emergence of new black middle- class professions, which consisted of "social workers, lawyers, doctors, and dentists; small entrepreneurs who increasingly serviced segregated communities, such as grocers, retailers, beauticians, restaurateurs, hoteliers, real estate agents, and undertakers; and individuals engaged in larger financial ventures such as banks, building and loan associations, and insurance companies." Urbanization in the early twentieth century fostered this new and substantial African American middle class. At the same time, urbanization produced a new consumer culture that challenged existing Victorian ideals of stability, thrift, and refinement that had characterized late nineteenth- century black elites' strategies of racial uplift.

This new crop of middle- class race leaders encountered the freewheeling spontaneity of the urban landscape's leisure culture. African Americans enjoying such spontaneity jeopardized race leaders'

attempts to depict their people as progressing rapidly toward "civilization." The construction of urban arenas like the dance hall and the nickelodeon "afforded blacks the space and anonymity to experiment with new identities beyond that dictated within the stiff rubric of Victorianism, which remained a central component of race uplift ideology." Black middleclass leaders' principal concerns centered on the behavior of rural black migrants who had come to the cities, a population that they deemed susceptible to gambling parlors and saloons. Along with courting, these illicit private activities took place in new spaces that resulted from "the freedom to mingle in an unregulated environment with men and women of varying classes and ages." For race leaders in positions of religious leadership in the 1920s and 1930s, new forms of leisure continued to present a social dilemma in both the American South and North. They encountered, debated, and at times accommodated an evolving leisure culture beyond their professional regulation, a culture that black working- class migrants and middle- class city inhabitants alike found alluring.

At the turn of the century, W. E. B. Du Bois claimed that the rise of black commercial entertainment would become a chief challenge for urban churches to address in the new century. Historians of African American religions have noted that popular entertainments in the early twentieth century challenged the authority and centrality of African American churches in directing black social, educational, economic, and political activity. Noted historian Judith Weisenfeld has shown that these churches "were in the midst of a cultural shift that involved the separation of many of these activities from their purview, and their leaders felt the potential for churches' cultural influence to decrease." The rise of black popular entertainment culture took the forms of "film, theater, nightclubs, professional sports, and radio as well as consumer items like beauty products, records, literature, newspapers, magazines, and toys marketed specifically to their communities." Historian Clarence Taylor notes that the responses of leading clergy included "offering their own brand of popular entertainment, remaining moral leaders of the community as they attempted to adopt mass forms within the boundaries of Christian principles." Furthermore, as historian Lerone Martin has shown, black ministers of largely rural black Baptist congregations who viewed popular entertainments as a moral problem responded to popular recreation by overhauling these churches' missions for the new black urban reality. In the 1920s, African American leaders advocated and worked toward providing migrant churchgoers with alternative, bourgeois forms of commercial entertainment, such as creating alternative amusement spaces, hosting annual festivals for concert and opera performances, and church sponsorship of musicals, operas, race films, and dances.

These black middle-class Protestants, deeply critical of jazz, dance, and popular entertainment, went beyond theologically conservative moral opposition in their expressions of disdain. Their protestations reflected their middle- class, interracial, ecumenical, and integrationist pursuits of racial progress. Claiming that race progress depended on cultivating and maintaining a professional class of African Americans, they became voices in the press, pulpit, and academy who made no room for jazz as an emerging popular art form to serve as a meaningful alternative for moral representation of African American culture and society. Jazz historians have focused on black religious opposition to blues and jazz music and the ministers who targeted urban migrants with alternative, "wholesome" forms of recreation to keep them from patronizing the dens of urban vice. This book complements this history of working-class black migrants by considering the religious leaders who focused on middle- class black youth and black professionals, instead of black migrants, because they charged these populations with forging the race's progress in the present and future.

Despite concerns about the cultural and moral worth of jazz lingering for black Christian clergy over the next few decades, by the Cold War era jazz music came to represent an idealized set of democratic and expressive possibilities. This evolution in jazz's perceived worth accompanied innovations and developments in music and performance, with jazz enjoying a smaller audience no longer interested in big band dance music and more invested in the music as a listening, intellectual artistic experience that small instrumental combos created. Fans and professional critics exalted jazz musicians as artistic virtuosos, America's international cultural ambassadors, and representatives of an elite African American culture capable of capturing, through music, the sounds, moods, and political desires of a people.9 Jazz musicians who were religious even consecrated the music for spiritual purposes— Lionel Hampton eventually composed works like the "King David Suite" to express his adoration of the nation of Israel. This jazz music that was eventually deemed appropriate for race representation and religious expression had precursors in the early twentieth century among other forms of African American artistic production.

Popular Black Religious Representation in Entertainment

Before and during the rise of popular jazz musicians like Duke Ellington and Cab Calloway, major African American musical artists, composers, and film impresarios who were intimately familiar with African American Protestant religious expressions were producing representations of African American religiosity in classical compositions, operas, modern spiritual compositions, theatrical productions, race records, short films, radio programs, and major motion pictures. Among these artists, black musicians participated in projects of racial uplift that stemmed from romantic schools of musical composition and performance, inspired in part by European musical nationalist composers like Antonin Dvořák (1841–1904). According to music historian Lawrence Schenbeck, Dvořák's "advocacy of African American and American Indian music as the ideal basis of high art had the effect of pushing these folk sources from the margins toward the broad, safe center of American musical life." Dvořák had two prominent African American students: composer and baritone singer Harry T. Burleigh (1866– 1949) and composer and violinist Will Marion Cook (1869– 1944). In 1916 Burleigh produced Jubilee Songs of the United States of America, and "widespread use of Burleigh's spiritual arrangements in the recitals of ranking American singers of the day contributed further to the acceptance of the spiritual as authentic American music worthy of cultivation by serious musicians."

Following Burleigh in the classical tradition of African American cultural production at the beginning of the twentieth century was R. Nathaniel Dett (1882–1943), a Canadian- born composer, choir director, and writer. Dett presented defensive portraits of African American Protestantism through his music from the 1900s until the end of his life in the 1940s, striving "to create an atmosphere of piety and solemnity in his choral concert performances" of spirituals and other forms of sacred music. Schenbeck notes that Dett found in spirituals "the absolute antithesis of the degrading blackface minstrel ditties that remained a commonplace of American popular theater in the early twentieth century." Dett's central project was "that of battling racism by eliminating the secular— and especially the erotic— in Negro music." Elements of nonreligious African American life permitted modern artists to construct "primitivist" representations of African Americans as essential racial markers, and "one had to avoid, at all costs, association with negative stereotypes that migrated so easily from black popular styles and white imitations of them. Otherwise the degree of distinction (read class distinction) inherent in 'the best class of Negro music' would never be recognized, and its efficacy in uplift would be lost."

Many white Americans were eager to consume African American musical culture in the 1920s, but "the relatively widespread adoption of arranged spirituals by white and black classical artists alike, combined with their genteel sentiment, unstintingly earnest tone, and obligatory lack of wit, rendered them less attractive to a white avant- garde seeking cultural work that mirrored its own alienation from mainstream American culture after World War I." For these white consumers, jazz and blues became the preferred African American music, with jazz representing "youthful vitality, rebellion, sophistication, and sensitivity toward the racial Other in a way that radically reinscribed white definitions of blackness and reconfigured white elites' usages of black music." However, the popular rise of jazz and blues did not signal the end of African American musicians' efforts to proffer the spirituals. Beyond African American classical artists and composers, choral singing of the spirituals carried the sounds and images of African American Protestant culture further into mainstream American entertainment with advancements in the industries of film, radio, music, and theater. The works of Will Marion Cook, another Dvořák student who produced popular African American music for Broadway musicals in the early twentieth century, establish an alternative lineage for the "uplifting" promotion of African American Protestant cultural production with his use of African American folk cultural elements. Cook was one of Duke Ellington's songwriting instructors, and according to Harlem Renaissance scholar Paul Anderson, Alain Locke considered Cook "the real father of symphonic jazz," a genre of which many Ellington compositions became exemplary. Ellington showcased one of his earliest symphonic jazz compositions, "Black and Tan Fantasy," in the 1929 short film Black and Tan, which also featured the spiritual sights and sounds of the Hall Johnson Choir.

Another African American cultural producer in the alternative lineage of Cook was the prominent spiritual arranger, composer, and choral director Eva Jessye (1895– 1992). Jessye first met Cook while she attended Kansas's Quindaro State Normal School, affiliated with the African Methodist Episcopal (AME) Church. Cook provided Jessye with professional and publishing connections in her early career. Jessye's collection of her spiritual arrangements in 1927, titled My Spirituals, with its "music- drama" style, became popular with African American concert performers like Paul Robeson. According to Weisenfeld, "Jessye used the arts to assert her authority regardless of gender, to act as an interpreter of scripture and as a Christian evangelist within and outside church institutions and before racially diverse audiences." Jessye's repertoire of spirituals established a performance style of African American religious music that was intentionally dramatic— she crafted performances of "authentic" religious emotionality through her selection of vocal performers and in her arranging and composing instructions for them to act out certain verses, constructing an atmosphere of "spontaneity within an overall unity."

During the mid- 1920s to 1930s, Jessye created and directed large choirs, including the Dixie Jubilee Singers, the Eva Jessye Choir, and a male quartet called the Four Dusty Travelers, who performed on radio programs, for phonograph records, in MGM feature films such as King Vidor's Hallelujah (1929), in Virgil Thomson and Gertrude Stein's opera Four Saints in Three Acts, and in George Gershwin and DuBose Heyward's Broadway play Porgy and Bess (1935). King Vidor claimed to the black and white press that the African American actors' performances in Hallelujah were "natural" expressions of "the negro race," evidencing for him, in Weisenfeld's assessment, "a racially compromised moral sensibility, sexualized religious expression, and emotional musical display devoid of deeper theological content." However, Jessye "countered Vidor's claim of the set as dominated by the true religious frenzy of the black cast members," asserting that religious scenes resulted from the black cast members' intentional

and artistic performances emerging from their "professionalism and preparation." Ultimately, Jessye's presentation of spirituals in nonreligious, commercial arenas inevitably garnered her critical ire, resulting in her decision to stop performing in stage shows and in films.

In addition to Jessye, Francis Hall Johnson (1888–1970) commanded a reputation for representing black Protestantism within Hollywood, arranging music for more than thirty feature films, shorts, and cartoons from the 1920s through the 1940s with a choir that became a fixture on film and for many film soundtracks. Johnson's productions and performances of spirituals served as a counterbalance to white playwrights who depended on their commodification for white audiences. As Weisenfeld illuminates through a study of his Bible reading habits, Johnson went further with his own compositions to engage in religious explorations beyond the conventions of the era's black Protestantism. Beyond directing the Hall Johnson Choir, Johnson also employed vernacular African American religious elements with his music, critiquing "the conservative tendencies and restrictive parochialism of some black church members and leaders and insist[ing] on the ability of the individual religious self to range freely across a variety of spiritual possibilities."

Musical representations of black Protestant culture existed within the "race film" industry of motion pictures directed and produced by African Americans. African American religious life became a frequent subject of representation and criticism through the race film industry. With all- black casts, these films in the interwar period depicted various "uneducated, corrupt, scheming, or ineffectual" fictional black ministers in an era when African Americans increasingly moved beyond sole reliance on black religious institutions by looking to social and political leadership. Oscar Micheaux (1884– 1951), the African American filmmaker, writer, director, and producer known for his "scathing criticism of black clergy," produced more than thirty race films between 1919 and 1948. His 1925 silent film Body and Soul portrayed a con man preacher (played by Paul Robeson) in addition to an extended church scene showcasing his theatrical sermon and the congregation's emotional responses to it. For Micheaux, according to Weisenfeld, "the overly emotional approach to worship in some black churches makes black congregations more susceptible to manipulation by unscrupulous clergy. He proposes, instead, a sedate, rational religiosity grounded in knowledge of the Bible as a key to the uplift of African American communities." Micheaux's depictions of ministers offered a critical and dramatic portrait without the levity of comedic parody.

On a variety of popular fronts, Dett, Jessye, and Johnson served as cultural guardians of African American spirituals throughout the 1920s and 1930s, refuting assertions that Hollywood productions featuring depictions of African American Protestantism through music or acting represented or captured authentic religious expression. Micheaux's works, starting in the silent film era and produced for black audiences, set a template for African American self- depictions that were of upstanding religious figures or cautionary presentations of nefarious and unlettered preachers and their naïve, unwitting church members.

The world of the arts and entertainment of the 1920s and 1930s saw the commodification of black Protestant sights, sounds, and bodily performances for modern, racially uplifting purposes. Black jazz entertainers were able to participate in this racial and religious project. As we will see, some musicians tilled this fertile religious soil to produce modern forms of intimate humor. This humor was principally for black audiences to enjoy, distinct in performance from the racial and religious representations of

white minstrels in blackface, and seemingly lacking the long- standing black religious concerns that such musical comedy was counterproductive to social and political progress. Other musicians viewed jazz as popular music whose cultural ownership African Americans must defend for the sake of their fans and also for their detractors. Part of their defense strategy was to root the new, modern music in a tradition of African American musics, tracing jazz through the blues, ragtime, the spirituals, and ultimately through the sounds of gospel and West African music. Black musicians who were committed to constructing noble narratives of African American history in the lineage of historians such as Carter G. Woodson engaged in the parallel constructions of musical versions of proud racial histories. These stories told through music unavoidably reflected themes of deeply devout black Christian women and men from the antebellum slave period into the twentieth century.

Chapter Structure

Part 1, "Representations of Religion and Race," reveals that black jazz musicians emerged as popular, professional race leaders because of the artistic, intellectual work of African American middle- class Protestants in the first half of the twentieth century, who modeled religious and racial representations of African Americans as professional duties. Accompanying the development of jazz as part of a leisure culture that religious African American middle- class professional men and women decried was the emergence of middle- class youth as professional jazz musicians, aficionados, and advocates in the black press. Together, this new generation shaped the music into an art form that they believed to be an appropriate, alternative vehicle for race representation. In intended and unintended forms, various expressions of early twentieth- century African American religious belief and practices accompanied jazz professionals' race representations, which this book explores through three major themes:

(1) jazz musicians' irreverent performances of African American religious leadership and expressive acts of worship
(2) jazz musicians' commitment to black Protestants' social and political activism against Jim Crow
(3) jazz musicians' sacralization of "Africa" in narratives of African American history

The first chapter introduces one group of "religious race professionals"— educated black middle- class Protestant clergy, academics, and writers in the religious and nonreligious black press in the 1920s and 1930s. It establishes the concept of religious race professionalism to capture the variety of religiously invested black middle- class race leaders beyond only ordained male clergy who led prominent black Protestant denominations and churches. The chapter focuses on these men and women's professional work as cultural critics, who employed strong and dramatic language to criticize "jazz" along with a perceived "jazz culture" and its effects on the morality of youth. Because of their commitment to race representation, these men and women generated and participated in commentary on the religious image and moral standing of black middle- class youth. They maintained that the black middle class's duty was to act as the race's brokers to white America on behalf of working- and middle- class blacks in order to ensure African American economic, social, and political advancement. Importantly, they argued that middle- class black youth must emerge as the next generation of committed, irreproachable leaders. In this capacity as public intellectuals, these professionals extended the complicated racial reformist work of producing both a "counter- discourse to the politics of prejudice" and a "bridge discourse" with white Americans through perceived black social propriety, as Evelyn Brooks Higginbotham established in her foundational study of the "politics of respectability" among turn-of-the-century black Baptist women.

In depicting the professional objectives of the African American Protestant mainline in the 1920s and 1930s, the first chapter relies primarily on the denominational writings that circulated throughout their religious networks. The Star of Zion, the weekly paper of the African Methodist Episcopal Zion Church (AMEZ), has been relatively unexamined by historians of African American religions but is a valuable and critical resource. Its position as the print outlet of a black Protestant mainline denomination with a comprehensive primary focus on domestic African American affairs stands in contrast to the more internationalist missionary focuses of the black Baptist and AME print publications. These religious periodicals circulated throughout the nation according to the landscape of each denomination's churches and schools. They reflected middle- class black Protestant efforts to produce a national religious identity for black America and to claim the position as its professional racial and religious representatives. By focusing on religious race professionals, the first chapter highlights black professional figures with religious commitments and critical religious investments as their print discourses generated rhetorical artistry about the modern business of black religious institutions and leaders.

The second chapter centers on the early jazz career of Cab Calloway. In his 1976 autobiography, Of Minnie the Moocher and Me, Calloway conveys a tone of irreverence and humor about his black middle-class youth and adulthood. Though he used humor to depict his church life, such irreverence never took the form of full- throated maliciousness. Rather, Calloway attempted to convey through music and prose the humor he found with religiosity without denouncing religious persons or institutions. Nevertheless, the music Calloway performed and recorded reflected his decision to withdraw from regular participation in the institutional life of black Protestantism. His music resonated with many other African Americans who preferred Saturday leisure to Sunday service.

Calloway's autobiography serves as an important resource because the authorship of jazz autobiographies parallels the musical genre. Jazz scholar Christopher Harlos writes that "like jazz itself, where the completely solo performance is atypical, jazz autobiography also easily lends itself to being produced on a collective basis." To compose his autobiography, Calloway collaborated with Bryant Rollins, the African American author, columnist, playwright, and editor for the New York Sunday Times and New York Amsterdam News. Such collaborative efforts represent jazz musicians' intentions to offer their own historical narratives, collectively forging a "musician- as- historian" ethos in popular culture as a response to what they perceived as the inauthenticity of jazz histories produced by non-musicians. Racial representation is evident in the production of more than forty jazz autobiographies between 1936 and 1996. For instance, Duke Ellington's 1973 autobiography, Music Is My Mistress, revealed that the musician was "always on stage" when performing, and "his racial identity forced him to become a representative, linking public perception of African Americans irretrievably to the individual achievement of celebrities and artists such as himself."

The autobiography, as a document, cannot be considered to reliably convey the absolute and authentic truth about every moment in an individual's life. In Calloway's case, however, it can reveal the author's own attempt to arrange the details of his life to make meaning of who he was and what experiences he recalled as formative, instructive, or pivotal. Calloway's autobiography was a humorous and irreverent portrait of himself, a reliable indicator that he sought to identify these qualities in many aspects of his life.

The third chapter situates Ella Fitzgerald, who produced no extensive written discourse about her profession, as nevertheless central to debates over genre, gender, and racial performance within the jazz world and as the producer of racial and religious representations through her vocal performances. To center Fitzgerald's vocal jazz career represents a departure from the standard narrative of jazz virtuosity that centers black male musicians. This chapter analyzes the artistic self- fashioning practices of male and female performers in the big band/swing era of the 1930s, in the "bebop revolution" of the 1940s, and in the emergence of solo jazz artists throughout these eras and beyond. As music historian Eden E. Kainer notes, Amiri Baraka's omission of Fitzgerald when discussing the bebop scene in Black Music, relying instead on Billie Holiday as a representative for all jazz women, "reflects Fitzgerald's stance on the periphery of the academic jazz community, and the role of female jazz vocalist as a blanket category," despite Fitzgerald's long career as a scat singer who toured with bebop pioneer John Birks "Dizzy" Gillespie in the late 1940s and 1950s.30 This chapter's focus on Fitzgerald displaces a bop/post- bop jazz virtuoso- driven narrative— which focuses regularly on black men— to add complexity to the portrait of the jazz profession and to reveal how some African American jazz women participated in the production of religious and racial sensibilities alongside their male colleagues in the profession.

Moving from explicit racial and religious irreverence to reverence, the fourth chapter places Duke Ellington's musical compositions into the early twentieth- century black Protestant narrative of an African American history emerging from, and connected to, a sacred African past that included both biblical scriptures and ancient African civilizations. Academic literature, black Protestant race record sermons, public intellectual engagement in the religious and nonreligious black press, and popular music represented collective African American Protestant efforts to make sacred both the ancient civilizations of the African continent and dark- skinned biblical peoples. These collective efforts also extended to rendering the enslaved African experience in the United States— with its eventual black Protestant institutions— as an extension of that sacred African history. Late nineteenth- century Pan- African engagement with West Africa, recent discoveries in archeology and Egyptology, and the cultural production of the Harlem Renaissance influenced popular black Protestant expressions of reverence for African American history and a reading of ancient biblical (and extra-biblical) civilizations as the record of African contributions to civilization. In this chapter, a discussion of Ellington's music, poetry, and prose accompanies an examination of other early twentieth- century black cultural producers who contributed to this sacralizing, reverential view of Africa and its ancient religious women and men.

Part 2, "Missions and Legacies," moves from thematic discussions of jazz as an artistic profession for racial and religious representation to more specific focuses on the religious thought and practice of two African American pianists and composers in the jazz tradition, Duke Ellington and Mary Lou Williams. Ellington and Williams fashioned public personae as race representatives and had significant religious statements to express in the late 1950s, 1960s, and into the 1970s. These musicians operated within a jazz profession that underwent a decades- long transition in social status, starting with its association with a vicious urban nightlife that corrupted black youth and ending with its treatment as a virtuosic art form conducive to progressive race representation. Key to these famous musicians' self-awareness as race representatives is the preservation of their documents in national and university archives, with Ellington's materials at the Smithsonian Institution's National Museum of American History and Williams's records at Rutgers University's Institute of Jazz Studies. Both Ellington and Williams produced sacred jazz music through album recordings and religious concerts, and their archives often reflected

detailed thought processes and business organization required to manage and produce these professional endeavors. The chapters in part 2 rely on these musicians' archives to locate their religious practices and articulations of belief.

Two of the chapters in part 2 focus on Duke Ellington. Chapter 5 situates Ellington as a prominent African American race representative who served this role in white religious spaces, although the religious literature and influential conversation partners he enjoyed did not emerge from African American Christian denominations or thinkers. Ellington did not situate his sacred music in the mainline African American Protestantism of Washington, DC, in which his parents raised him. Rather, as we will see, he engaged an explicitly ecumenical religious project that brought him into the world of white mainline liberal Protestantism in the United States and Western Europe.

Moreover, while Ellington implicitly bore the task of representing African American Christianity in his new music, his primary familiarity with African American religious life stemmed from his childhood, when he spent Sundays between his father's AMEZ church and his mother's National Baptist Convention, USA (NBC) church. Engagement with the evolving expressions and theologies of institutional African American Protestantism in the first half of the twentieth century was absent in Ellington's adulthood, and he gravitated more toward white mainline Protestant leaders, thinkers, and religious spaces. His sister, Ruth Ellington Boatwright, a significant champion of Ellington's religious legacy and a congregant at St. Peter's Lutheran Church in Manhattan, was similarly situated between white mainline and white evangelical religious worlds.

Gospel developed as a popular African American music form and industry in the years between Ellington's religious youth and his Sacred Concerts in the mid- 1960s, spreading throughout African American Christianity (from Holiness- Pentecostal churches to the Baptist and Methodist mainline). Consequently, a significant temporal and theological gulf existed between Ellington's religious life and that of many African American Christians, despite Ellington's de facto task of serving as an African American racial and religious representative to predominantly white mainline Protestant audiences. In this light, the posthumous popularity of Ellington's sacred music in white American mainline and European Protestant churches is not an ironic outcome, and these are the congregations that continue to perform his compositions annually.

The sixth chapter interprets Ellington's theology through his recorded private thoughts about believing in God in relation to the religious practice of constructing and performing sacred music publicly. The theological reflections Ellington produced with his sacred musical compositions reveal not only his manner of wrestling with appropriate language to address and characterize the nature of God but also his noteworthy omission of language about Jesus Christ and the Holy Spirit. The chapter focuses squarely on Ellington's affirmation of religiosity while revealing that such a stance did not necessarily mean the total acceptance of any denomination's teachings about Christianity, even as he mostly navigated Christian religious spaces. However, we may qualify the "individuality" of Ellington's religious belief and expression not only by interrogating the religious literature with which he engaged but also by incorporating the people responsible for shaping (and responding to) his religious pronouncements. With this chapter, the notes that Ellington wrote on hotel stationery during his tours emerge as a unique form of literature for interpreting individual theological statements and commitments. Such literature allows for a portrait of "lay" engagement with and production of theology as a process of

"working out" individual commitments. Ellington's particular linguistic concerns in voicing his theology represented his responses to the issues and discourses of liberal Christianity as a composer of sacred music who moved primarily throughout white mainline Christian religious spaces.

Mary Lou Williams was born with a "veil" and claimed that she had religious visions as a child. She likely had religious family members who encouraged the notion that she wielded spiritual gifts. But Williams did not explore "conventional" religious traditions until after the death of her friend, jazz saxophonist Charlie Parker, from years of hard substance abuse. The seventh chapter explores Williams's religious thought as she sought her personal calling following her embrace of Roman Catholicism. Before conversion, Williams had engaged in prayer and "ascetic" practices like fasting, meditation, and abstaining from purchasing luxuries. These habits followed an intense period of continued visions and accompanied close friendships with jazz trumpeter Dizzy Gillespie and his wife, Lorraine, a Catholic convert. Lorraine encouraged Williams's exploration of Catholicism, while Dizzy encouraged her to return to performing music. She viewed her music, and the music industry itself, as antithetical to her religious mission before meeting a black Catholic friar, Mario Hancock, who encouraged her to compose religious reflections as part of her calling.

The eighth chapter mines the business archive of Mary Lou Williams to reveal her religious commitments and labor. She envisioned and worked to establish the Bel Canto Foundation, a professional institution to care for jazz men and women. The pursuit of a Bel Canto Foundation was Williams's work to create a structure and facility to care for musicians struggling with substance abuse, as she had personally cared for many in her apartment. Biographies of Williams have examined her productive sacred jazz period and career revival extensively, but the absence of sufficient attention to her business pursuits in this period results in the dismissal of an arena of her personal and professional labor that exemplifies a novel form of intense religious work.

Williams's embrace of Roman Catholicism and production of sacred jazz did not constitute a conscious affiliation with an emerging "Black Catholic" identity in the late 1960s that reflected the Black Power era's performance of race consciousness, as religious historian Matthew Cressler has detailed. However, the 1960s and 1970s saw Williams composing many religious works that revealed her shared cultural interests with Black Catholics who "embraced what they took to be an essential Black Spirituality and learned how to incorporate the traditions of the Black Church (which they took to be singular) into the liturgy." The Roman Catholic reforms of Vatican II afforded her a vehicle to promote the concept of "sacred jazz" by providing music "for the disturbed soul."

Her music for Catholic liturgy contained gospel influences, and Williams, as a champion of jazz education, sought to make clear to others the roots of authentic American music in spirituals and the blues. Black Christ of the Andes celebrated the seventeenth- century Afro- Peruvian Catholic saint Martin de Porres. "Dirge Blues" was a memorial to President John F. Kennedy (the first Catholic US president). And her concerts Praise the Lord in Many Voices, Mass for Lenten Season, and Mass for Peace saw Williams and her music circulating throughout Catholic churches in an attempt to get a male-dominated and formerly segregated religious institution to take seriously her musical talents, religious sincerity, and the general presence of Catholics who shared her roots. When Black Catholics acquired formal institutional presence, such as the National Office for Black Catholics and its Department of Culture and Worship, they called upon Williams and other prominent Black Catholic liturgists to offer

"direct liturgical consultation for parishes across the country" in the 1970s. Early in this decade, Williams articulated the sacred origins of jazz through a particular African American heritage: "Through our suffering God took pity on us and created the world's greatest true art: the 'Negro Spirituals' and from the Spirituals: Jazz was born in all its creative and progressive forms. . . . Jazz is also a healer of the mind and soul. God reaches others through it to bring peace and happiness to those who know how to listen to it." Williams reiterated her belief about jazz music's divine origins in a 1978 interview, adding the notion that performing and listening to the music had spiritually therapeutic benefits: "God did blacks a favor by creating jazz especially for them. God helps people through jazz; people have been healed through it. It has happened to me."

Lastly, the ninth chapter weighs the meaningfulness of African American jazz professionals' authority as religious and racial representatives by examining their posthumous legacies and celebrations. This chapter examines the "afterlives" of Ellington, Fitzgerald, and Williams by revealing practices of reverence for them in the late twentieth and early twenty- first centuries. Because of the United States' cultural purchase on jazz as a distinctive national art form, the professional music industry, academia, and those who celebrate African Americans in the arts have bolstered the effort to safeguard jazz as both America's classical music and a living art form. Musicians and fans worldwide have celebrated these jazz professionals since their passing, creating musical works, artistic testaments, research institutions, and landscapes both physical and virtual that mark practices of venerating prominent African Americans with spiritual and religious significance. This chapter also brings into focus African American celebrations of these jazz virtuosos, and black women's religious engagements, more specifically.

This book is a work of jazz history and African American religious history that adopts an expansive concept of sources and sites constituting the archive of race representation and religious expression. From this interdisciplinary effort emerge portraits of racial identity, humor, profession, and religion in middle- class black cultural production in the twentieth century. This book takes seriously the careers of jazz women and men, instrumentalists and vocalists, as artistic professionals with the authority to voice religious belonging, perform religious belief, and demonstrate religious practice for their vast audiences. <>

TSARINA: A NOVEL by Ellen Alpsten [St. Martin's Press, 9781250214430]

CATHERINE I, EMPRESS OF RUSSIA, 1684–1727 TOLD IN AN AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL VOICE. AS HISTORICAL FICTION.

"Makes Game of Thrones look like a nursery rhyme." —Daisy Goodwin, New York Times bestselling author of The Fortune Hunter

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Before there was Catherine the Great, there was Catherine Alexeyevna: the first woman to rule Russia in her own right. Ellen Alpsten's rich, sweeping debut novel is the story of her rise

to power.

St. Petersburg, 1725. Peter the Great lies dying in his magnificent Winter Palace. The weakness and treachery of his only son has driven his father to an appalling act of cruelty and left the empire without an heir. Russia risks falling into chaos. Into the void steps the woman who has been by his side for decades: his second wife, Catherine Alexeyevna, as ambitious, ruthless and passionate as Peter himself.

Born into devastating poverty, Catherine used her extraordinary beauty and shrewd intelligence to ingratiate herself with Peter's powerful generals, finally seducing the Tsar himself. But even amongst the splendor and opulence of her new life—the lavish feasts, glittering jewels, and candle-lit hours in Peter's bedchamber—she knows the peril of her position. Peter's attentions are fickle and his rages powerful; his first wife is condemned to a prison cell, her lover impaled alive in Red Square. And now Catherine faces the ultimate test: can she keep the Tsar's death a secret as she plays a lethal game to destroy her enemies and take the Crown for herself?

From the sensuous pleasures of a decadent aristocracy, to the incense-filled rites of the Orthodox Church and the terror of Peter's torture chambers, the intoxicating and dangerous world of Imperial Russia is brought to vivid life. **TSARINA: A NOVEL** is the story of one remarkable woman whose bid for power would transform the Russian Empire.

I first discovered Marta/Catherine when I was aged thirteen, reading Leo Sievers's fabulous book Germans and Russians, which charted the millennial history of these two countries and its people. That was it for me: writing about Marta's incredible destiny was an all- encompassing endeavor. I was never able to thank Lindsey Hughes, professor of Russian history at the School of Slavonic and East European Studies, UCL, for her outstanding oeuvre Russia in the Age of Peter the Great—it was my bible while writing Tsarina.

Review

Praise for **TSARINA: A NOVEL**:

"Astonishing...the ultimate Cinderella story [that] makes *Game of Thrones* look like a nursery rhyme." —**Daisy Goodwin, bestselling author of *The Fortune Hunter***

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"The extraordinary life and career of Catherine I of Russia is brought to life in Alpsten's colourful novel." --***Sunday Times,*** **Summer Reading Picks 2020 (UK)**

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"[Alpsten] recounts this remarkable woman's colourful life and times." —**Count Nikolai Tolstoy, historian and author**

"Luscious…Alpsten has clearly done some brilliant research. It reads like *Game of Thrones* without the dragons." —**Natasha Pulley, author of the international bestseller *The Watchmaker of Filigree Street***

"*Tsarina* should come with a health warning—once you start reading, it's impossible to stop."
—**Hannah Rothschild, bestselling author of *House of Trelawney***

Excerpt: A brief word for the sake of historical accuracy: the beginnings of Marta's life are shrouded in mystery. She emerges from the mist of time when she took a position as a maid with Ernst Glück. While Field Marshall Sheremetev captured her at the siege of Marienburg, I blended his persona with Peter's crony Fedor Matveev Apraxin later in the manuscript. It was Apraxin who took the Baltic girl Alice Kramer in. Likewise, Alice Kramer was called Anna, as were Rasia Menshikova and Alexandra Tolstoya. Other than that, I took very few liberties with happenings and timelines: the Petrine era is incredibly well documented. Also, Marta's tale could only have been invented by life itself.

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PROLOGUE

IN THE WINTER PALACE, 1725

He is dead. My beloved husband, the mighty tsar of all the Russias, has died— and just in time.

Moments before death came for him, Peter called for a quill and paper to be brought to him in his bedchamber in the Winter Palace. My heart almost stalled. He had not forgotten, but was going to drag me down with him. When he lost consciousness for the last time and the darkness drew him closer to its heart, the quill slipped from his fingers. Black ink spattered the soiled sheets; time held its breath. What had the tsar wanted to settle with that last effort of his tremendous spirit?

I knew the answer.

The candles in the tall candelabra filled the room with a heavy scent and an unsteady light; their glow made shadows reel in corners and brought the woven figurines on the Flemish tapestries to life, their coarse faces showing pain and disbelief. Outside the door, the voices of the people who'd stood there all night were drowned out by the February wind rattling furiously at the shutters. Time spread slowly, like oil on water. Peter had pressed himself into our souls like his signet ring in hot wax. It seemed impossible that the world hadn't careened to a halt at his passing. My husband, the greatest will ever to impose itself on Russia, had been more than our ruler. He had been our fate. He was still mine.

The doctors— Blumentrost, Paulsen, and Horn— stood silently around Peter's bed, staring at him, browbeaten. Five kopecks' worth of medicine, given early enough, could have saved him. Thank God for the quacks' lack of good sense.

Without looking, I could feel Feofan Prokopovich, the archbishop of Novgorod, watching me, along with Alexander Menshikov. Prokopovich had made the tsar's will eternal and Peter had much to thank him for. Menshikov, on the other hand, owed his fortune and influence to Peter. What was it Peter had said when someone tried to blacken Alexander Danilovich's name to him by referring to his murky business dealings? "Menshikov is always Menshikov, in all that he does!" That had put an end to that.

Dr. Paulsen had closed the tsar's eyes and crossed his hands on his breast, but he hadn't removed the scroll, Peter's last will and testament, from his grasp. Those hands, which were always too dainty for the tall, powerful body, had grown still, helpless. Just two weeks earlier he had plunged those very hands into my hair, winding it round his fingers, inhaling the scent of rosewater and sandalwood.

"My Catherine," he'd said, calling me by the name he himself had given me, and he'd smiled at me. "You're still a beauty. But what will you look like in a convent, shorn, and bald? The cold there will break you, your spirit, even though you're strong as a horse. Do you know that Evdokia still writes to me begging for a second fur, poor thing! What a good job you can't write!" he'd said, laughing.

It had been thirty years since Evdokia had been banished to the convent. I'd met her once. Her eyes shone with madness, her shaven head was covered in boils and scabs from the cold and the filth, and her only company was a hunchbacked dwarf to serve her in her cell. Peter had ordered the poor creature have her tongue cut out, so in response to Evdokia's moaning and laments, all she was able to do was burble. He'd been right to believe that seeing Evdokia would fill me with lifelong dread.

I knelt at Peter's bedside and the three doctors retreated to the twilight at the edge of the room, like crows driven from a field: the birds Peter had been so terrified of in the last years of his life. The tsar had called open season on the hapless birds all over his empire. Farmers caught, killed, plucked, and roasted them for reward. None of this helped Peter: silently, at night, the bird would slip through the padded walls and locked doors of his bedchamber. Its ebony wings blotted the light and in their cool shadow, the blood on the tsar's hands never dried. His fingers were not yet those of a corpse, but soft, and still warm. For a moment, the fear and anger of these past few months slipped from my heart like a thief in the night. I kissed his hands and breathed in his familiar scent of tobacco, ink, leather, and the perfume tincture that was blended for his sole use in Grasse.

I took the scroll from his hand— it was easy enough to slide it out, although my blood thickened with fear and my veins were coated with frost and rime like branches in our Baltic winter. It was important

to show everyone that I alone was entitled to do this— I, his wife, and the mother of his children. Twelve times I had given birth.

The paper rustled as I unrolled it. Not for the first time, I was ashamed of my inability to read, and I handed his last will to Feofan Prokopovich. At least Menshikov was as ignorant as I. Ever since the days when Peter first drew us into his orbit and cast his spell upon us, we had been like two children squabbling over their father's love and attention. Batjushka tsar, his people called him. Our little father tsar.

Prokopovich must have known what Peter had in mind for me. He was an old fox with a sharp wit, as comfortable in heavenly and earthly realms. Daria had once sworn that he had three thousand books in his library. What, if you please, can one man do with three thousand books? The scroll sat lightly in his liver- spotted hands now. After all, he himself had helped Peter draft the decree that shocked us all. The tsar had set aside every custom, every law: he wanted to appoint his own successor and would rather leave his empire to a worthy stranger than his own, unworthy child.

How timid Alexey had been when we first met, the spitting image of his mother, Evdokia, with his veiled gaze and high, domed forehead. He couldn't sit up straight, because Menshikov had thrashed his back and buttocks bloody and sore. Only when it was too late did Alexey grasp his fate: in his quest for a new Russia, the tsar would spare no one, neither himself, nor his only son. You were no blood of my blood, Alexey, no flesh of my flesh, and so I was able to sleep soundly. Peter, though, had been haunted by nightmares from that day on.

My heart pounded against my lightly laced bodice— I was surprised it didn't echo from the walls— but I met Prokopovich's gaze as calmly as I could. I wriggled my toes in my slippers, as I could not afford to faint.

Prokopovich's smile was as thin as one of the wafers he would offer in church. He knew the secrets of the human heart; especially mine. "Read, Feofan," I said quietly.

"Give everything to . . ." He paused, looked up, and repeated: "To . . ."

Menshikov's temper flared; he reared as if someone had struck him with a whip, like in the good old days. "To whom?" he snarled at Prokopovich. "Pray tell, Feofan, to whom?"

I could hardly breathe. The fur was suddenly much too hot against my skin.

Feofan shrugged. "That's all. The tsar didn't finish writing the sentence." The shadow of a smile flitted across his wrinkled face. Peter had liked nothing better than to turn the world on its head, and, oh yes, he still had hold of us from beyond the grave. Feofan lowered his gaze. I snapped back to life. Nothing was decided. Peter was dead; his successor unnamed. But that didn't mean I was safe. It meant quite the opposite.

"What— that's it?" Menshikov snatched the paper out of Feofan's hands. "I don't believe it!" He stared at the scrawl, but Prokopovich took the scroll from him again. "Oh, Alexander Danilovich. That's what comes of always having had something better to do than learn to read and write."

Menshikov was about to give a stinging reply, but I cut him off. Men! Was this the moment for rivalry? I had to act fast if I didn't want to live out my days in a nunnery, or be forced aboard a sled to Siberia, or end up facedown in the Neva, drifting between the thick floes of ice, my body being crushed and shredded by their sheer force.

"Feofan— has the tsar died without naming his heir?" I had to be sure.

He nodded, his eyes bloodshot from the long hours of keeping vigil at his lord's bedside. In the manner of Russian Orthodox priests, he wore his dark hair plain— it fell straight to his shoulders, streaked with gray— and his simple, dark tunic was that of an ordinary priest. Nothing about him betrayed the honors and offices with which Peter had rewarded him; nothing apart from the heavy, jewel- studded cross on his breast—the panagia. Feofan was old, but he was one of those men who could easily serve many more tsars. He bowed and handed me the scroll. I thrust it into the sleeve of my dress. Feofan straightened up.

"Tsarina. I place the future of Russia in your hands." My heart skipped a beat when he called me by this title. Menshikov, too, raised his head, alert, like a bloodhound taking scent. His eyes narrowed.

"Go home, Feofan, and get some rest. I'll send for you when I need you. Until then, do not forget that the tsar's last words are known only to the three of us," I said. "I hope you will serve me for many years, Feofan," I added as he rose. "I bestow upon you the Order of Saint Andrew and an estate outside Kiev with ten— no, twenty thousand souls." He bowed, looking content, and I thought quickly about whom to send into exile, whose property I would have to appropriate. On a day like today, fortunes were made and lost. I gestured to the servant standing guard next to the door. Had he understood our whispers? I hoped not.

"Order Feofan Prokopovich's carriage. Help him downstairs. No one is to speak to him, do you hear?" I added in a whisper.

He nodded, his long lashes fluttering on his rosy cheeks. A handsome young boy this one was. His face suddenly recalled that of another. One I'd thought the most beautiful I'd ever known. Peter had put a brutal end to that. And after, he'd ordered that the head, that same sweet head, be set at my bedside, in a heavy glass jar of strong spirit, the way apples are preserved in vodka in winter. The gaping eyes stared sadly out at me; in the throes of death the lips, once so soft to kiss, now shriveled and drained of blood, had pulled back from the teeth and gums. When I first saw it and, horrified, asked the maid to remove it, Peter threatened me with the convent and the whip. And so there it lived on.

Feofan laughed softly, his face splitting in so many wrinkles that his skin looked like the parched earth after summer. "Don't worry, Tsarina. Come, boy, lend an old man your arm."

The two of them stepped out into the corridor. The footman's pale, narrow- legged silk trousers clearly showed his muscular legs and buttocks. Was there any truth in the rumor that Prokopovich liked young men? Well— each to his own. I blocked the view of the tsar's bed with my body. Pale, frightened faces turned to me: both noblemen and servants sat there like rabbits in a snare. Madame de la Tour, the scrawny French governess who watched over my youngest daughter, Natalya, was hugging the little girl close. I frowned, as it was much too cold in the corridor for her and she'd been coughing since

yesterday afternoon. Her elder sisters, Elizabeth and Anna, were there beside her, but I avoided their eyes. They were too young; how could they understand?

Nobody knew yet whether I was the one they had to fear. I searched the crowd for young Petrushka, Peter's grandson, and the princes Dolgoruki, his followers, but they were nowhere to be seen. I bit my lip. Where were they— busy hatching plans to seize the throne? I had to lay hands on them as soon as possible. I snapped my fingers and the closest guard leaped to attention.

"Send for the privy council— Count Tolstoy, Baron Ostermann, and Pavel Jagushinsky. Look sharp, the tsar wants to see them," I ordered, making sure that my last words were heard the entire length of the corridor.

Menshikov pulled me back into the room and closed the door.

"Come," I said curtly. "We'll go next door, to the little library." Menshikov picked up his embroidered coat of green brocade from the chair in which he had kept watch at Peter's bedside for the last days and weeks. A peasant household could easily have lived for two whole years on just one of the silver threads woven in its cloth. His ivory-handled walking stick he clamped underneath his armpit. At the hidden door that led to Peter's small library I turned to the doctors. "Blumentrost. You are not allowed to leave this room and you are to summon no one."

"But . . ." he began.

I raised my hand. "It cannot become known that the tsar has passed away. Not yet."

Peter would have approved of the tone.

"As you command." Blumentrost bowed.

"Good. You shall be paid later today. The same goes for your colleagues."

Menshikov swayed a little. Was it tiredness that made him unsteady on his feet, or fear?

I walked ahead of him into the cozy little library. Menshikov followed, but only after seizing the tall carafe of Burgundy he had been drinking from, as well as two Venetian goblets. "This is not a moment to be either sober or stingy," he said with a lopsided smile before kicking the door shut like a common innkeeper. The fire had burned down in the grate, but the wood- paneled walls retained its heat. The colorful silk rugs we had brought from our Persian campaign— easily adding a dozen carts to our train— brimmed with all the flowers and birds of God's creation in their full splendor. The plain chairs standing by the desk, the fireplace, and near the shelves had been made by Peter himself. Sometimes I would hear him lathing and hammering far beyond midnight. Carpentry drove out his demons and gave him his best ideas, he used to say. His ministers feared nothing so much as a night Peter spent doing carpentry. He would fall asleep, exhausted, across his workbench. Only Menshikov was strong enough to hoist the tsar onto his shoulders and carry him to bed. If I was not there waiting for him, Peter would use the belly of a young chamberlain as his pillow. He always needed skin against his skin to keep his memories at bay.

The high windows were draped with lined curtains that he had bought as a young man on his visit to Holland, long before the Great Northern War, those two decades of struggle for survival and supremacy against the Swedes. The shelves sagged beneath the weight of the books, which I was told were travelogues, seafaring tales, war histories, biographies of rulers and books on how to rule, and religious works. He had leafed through each and every one of them time and time again. It was a world where I could never follow him. Scrolls still lay open on his desk or were piled up in heaps in corners. Some books were printed and bound in thick pigskin; others were written by hand in monasteries. On the mantelpiece stood a model of the Natalya, Peter's proud frigate, and above it hung a painting of my son, Peter Petrovich. It was painted months before the death that broke our hearts. I had avoided this room for years because of it; the painting was too real, as if at any moment my son would throw me the red leather ball he held in his hands. His blond curls tumbled onto a white lace shirt; his smile hinted at a row of little teeth. I would have given my life to have him here, now, and declare him tsar of all the Russias. Still a child, certainly. But a son of our blood, Peter, mine and yours. A dynasty. Isn't that what every ruler wants? Now there are only daughters left, and a dreaded grandson, little Petrushka.

The thought of Petrushka took my breath away. At his birth Peter had cradled him in his arms and turned his back on the unhappy mother. Poor Sophie Charlotte. She had been like a nervous thoroughbred, and like a horse her father had sold her to Russia. Where was her young

son now? In the Dolgoruki Palace? In the barracks? Outside the door? Petrushka was only twelve years old and Peter hadn't even granted him the title of tsarevich, but I feared him more than the Devil.

In the library, Menshikov said: "You did well, calling for the council and getting rid of Feofan, the old fool."

I turned to look at him. "We're the fools. I hope he keeps his word." "What word did he give you?" he asked, astonished.

"You see! You only hear what is spoken, but so much more than that is said." I seized him by the shirt collar and hissed: "We're both in the same boat. God have mercy on you for every second you waste right now. I saw neither Petrushka nor his charming friends in the corridor, did you? And why is the rightful heir of the Russian empire not here at his grandfather's deathbed, where he belongs?"

Beads of sweat appeared on Menshikov's forehead.

"Because he's with the troops at the imperial barracks, where soon they'll hoist him on their shoulders and give him three cheers as soon as they find out the tsar is dead. What will happen to us then? Will Petrushka remember the people who signed Alexey's judgment, albeit just with a cross next to their name, as they couldn't write?"

I let go of him. Menshikov filled his goblet and took a large slug of wine, his hands trembling, his strong fingers weighted with several heavy rings. His natural wiliness was blunted by the fatigue of the wake in Peter's chamber, but I was not finished with him. "Siberia will be too good for us in their eyes. The Dolgorukis will feed the four winds with our ashes. No one but us knows that the tsar is dead," I whispered. "Our secret buys us time." Time that might save us. We couldn't keep the tsar's death secret for too long; it would be out by morning, when a leaden dawn broke over Peter's city.

Menshikov, the man who had turned so many battles in his favor, whose neck had slipped so many times from even the most perilous of nooses, seemed dazed. My dread was contagious. He sat heavily in one of the cozier armchairs, which Peter had brought from Versailles, and stretched out his still- shapely legs. A marvel that the dainty piece of furniture was able to bear his weight! He took a few sips and then turned the colored glass this way and that in front of the fire. The flames warmed the goblet's smooth, tinted surface; it looked as if it were filled with blood. I sat down opposite him. Tonight was no time for drinking games.

Menshikov raised his goblet to me in jest. "To you, Catherine Alexeyevna. It was well worth gifting you to the tsar, my lady. To you, my greatest loss. To you, my greatest gain." Suddenly he laughed, laughed so much that his wig slipped down over his eyes, his laugh like the sound of wolves in winter: high and scornful. He pulled the wig off and flung it away. I calmly took his insolence, while Peter would have had him flogged for it. Menshikov was suffering like a dog: it was his lord and love, too, who had died. What was in store for him now? His suffering made him unpredictable. I needed him now; desperately. Him, the privy council, and the troops. The tsar's last will and testament was wedged up my sleeve. Menshikov's face was red and bloated under the shaggy, still dark blond mop of hair. He stopped laughing and looked at me uncertainly over the rim of his glass.

"Here we are. What an extraordinary life you've lived, my lady. Divine will is the only explanation."

I nodded. That's what they say about me at the courts of Europe. My background is the joke that always puts envoys in a good mood. But for Peter, whatever he willed at any given time was normal and so nothing was extraordinary any longer.

Suddenly, Menshikov's glass slipped from his fingers, his chin dropped onto his chest, and the wine spilled, leaving a large red stain on his white lace shirt and blue waistcoat. The last weeks, days, and hours caught up with him and a moment later, he was snoring and hung as limp as a rag doll in the chair. I could grant him some rest before Tolstoy and the privy council arrived. Then he would be carried back to his palace to sleep off his stupor. Menshikov already held the Order of Saint Andrew, as well as far more serfs and titles than I could grant him. There was nothing left to promise him. He had to stay of his own accord: nothing binds people more powerfully than the fear for survival, Catherine, I could hear Peter say.

I walked over to the window, which looked over the inner courtyard. The golden icons sewn to the hem of my dress tinkled with each step. When little Princess Wilhelmine of Prussia back in Berlin saw the way I dressed, she had laughed out loud: "The empress of Russia looks like a minstrel's wife!"

I pushed aside the heavy curtain that kept the inky chill of a Saint Petersburg winter night— our city, Peter, our dream!— at bay. Alexander Nevsky Prospect and the Neva were shrouded in a darkness that now held you forever in its arms, a darkness that hid the breathtaking beauty of what you created: the icy green shade of the river's waves blending to perfection with the rainbow hues of the flat façades of both palaces and houses, which were such a novelty twenty years ago. This city that you conjured out of the swampy ground, by force of your sheer, incredible will and the suffering of hundreds of thousands of your people, nobles and serfs alike. The bones of the forced laborers lie buried in the marshy earth as its foundations. Men, women, children, nameless, faceless; who remembers them in the light of such magnificence? If there was a surfeit of anything in Russia, it was human life. The morning would break

wan and cool; then, later, the palace's bright, even façade would reflect the day's pale fire. You lured the light here, Peter, and gave it a home. What happens now? Help me.

Candlelight moved behind the windows of the fine, tall houses, gliding through rooms and corridors, as if borne on ghostly hands. In the courtyard a sentry stood hunched over his bayonet, when with a clatter of hooves— embers flying off the hard cobblestones— a rider dashed out through the gate. My fingers clenched around the catch of the window. Had Blumentrost obeyed my order? Or had the rider left to confirm the unthinkable? What would happen now? Volya— great, unimaginable freedom— or exile and death?

My mouth was dry with fear: a feeling that knots the stomach, turns sweat cold and bitter, and opens the bowels. I hadn't felt it since— stop! I mustn't think about these things now. I could only focus on one thing at a time, whereas Peter, like an acrobat, would juggle ten ideas and plans.

Menshikov was mumbling in his sleep. If only Tolstoy and the privy council would come. The whole city seemed to be lying in wait. I bit my fingernails until I tasted blood.

I sat down again close to the fire and took off my slippers, stiff with embroidery and jewels. The warmth of the fire made my skin prickle. February was one of the coldest months in Saint Petersburg. Perhaps I should order some mulled wine and pretzels instead of the Burgundy; that always gave me a swift boost. Was Peter warm enough in the room next door? He couldn't stand the cold and we were always freezing on the battlefield. Nothing is frostier than the morning after a battle. I could

only keep him warm at night, when he struck camp in the folds of my flesh.

People asleep look either ridiculous or touching. Menshikov, snoring open- mouthed, was the latter. I drew Peter's last will from my sleeve and the scroll lay in my lap, so close to the flames. Its letters blurred as my tears came: real, heartfelt tears, despite the sense of relief. I still had a long day and longer weeks ahead of me and I would need many tears. The people, and the court, would want to see a grief-stricken widow with tousled hair, scratched cheeks, a broken voice, and swollen eyes. Only my show of love and grief could make the unthinkable acceptable, render my tears more powerful than any bloodline. So I may as well start weeping now. The tears weren't hard to summon: in a few hours I might be either dead, or wishing I was dead, or I'd be the most powerful woman in all the Russias. <>

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