

January 2021

Wordtrade Reviews: The Long Game of the Black Books

Editorial Appraisals:

Some qualified reviewers offer their own brief evaluation of the book. Otherwise most of our content represents the authors'-editors' own words as a preview to their approach to the subject, their style and point-of-view. <>

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LOSING THE LONG GAME: THE FALSE PROMISE OF REGIME CHANGE IN THE MIDDLE EAST by Philip H. Gordon [St. Martin's Press, 9781250217035]

The definitive account of how regime change in the Middle East has proven so tempting to American policymakers for decades—and why it always seems to go wrong.

"Must reading—by someone who saw it first-hand—for all interested in America's foreign policy and its place in the world."—**Robin Wright**

Since the end of World War II, the United States has set out to oust governments in the Middle East on an average of once per decade—in places as diverse as Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan (twice), Egypt, Libya, and Syria. The reasons for these interventions have also been extremely diverse, and the methods by which the United States pursued regime change have likewise been highly varied, ranging from diplomatic pressure alone to outright military invasion and occupation. What is common to all the operations, however, is that they failed to achieve their ultimate goals, produced a range of unintended and even catastrophic consequences, carried heavy financial and human costs, and in many cases left the countries in question worse off than they were before.

Philip H. Gordon's **LOSING THE LONG GAME** is a thorough and riveting look at the U.S. experience with regime change over the past seventy years, and an insider's view on U.S. policymaking in the region at the highest levels. It is the story of repeated U.S. interventions in the region that always started out with high hopes and often the best of intentions, but never turned out well. No future discussion of U.S. policy in the Middle East will be complete without taking into account the lessons of the past, especially at a time of intense domestic polarization and reckoning with America's standing in world.

Review

"**LOSING THE LONG GAME** is an engaging and provocative examination of US regime change efforts in the Middle East. Gordon shows the indispensability of bringing humility and historical awareness in US foreign policy, as well as the urgent need for the United States to cease its over reliance on military force and invest far more in economic development, people to people engagement, and diplomacy."
—**Ambassador Samantha Power, former US representative to the UN and author of *The Education of an Idealist***

"Phil Gordon has written a compelling, sweeping narrative of how American good intentions consistently and predictably go awry in the Middle East. As a scholar and practitioner of American foreign policy, Phil is in a unique position to be able to connect the dots - from Iran in 1953 to Syria in 2020 - to demonstrate how both Republican and Democratic presidents fall into the same traps when trying to force political change on Middle Eastern societies. Each chapter is a page-turning insider's view into American interventions gone wrong, and the masterful conclusion, showing the common thread of hubris linking all our mistakes in the Middle East - should be required reading for any diplomat or military leader in training." —**Senator Chris Murphy**

"Philip Gordon has written what will surely become the definitive analysis of how U.S. efforts at regime change in the greater Middle East over the past seven decades have largely backfired or had dismal second-order effects. *Losing the Long Game* is also refreshingly concise and bracingly well-argued."
—**Peter Bergen, author of *Trump and His Generals: The Cost of Chaos***

"Gordon has written a devastating account of repeated U.S. attempts to remove leaders and transform political systems from North Africa to South Asia over the past seventy years. Whatever the intentions, regime change simply hasn't worked. Most attempts have come at horrific costs with unintended long-term consequences that have further undermined the original U.S. goals. *Losing the Long Game* is must reading—by someone who saw it first-hand—for all interested in America's foreign policy and its place in the world." —**Robin Wright, author of *Rock the Casbah: Rage and Rebellion Across the Islamic World***

"An essential reflection on an enduring temptation of American foreign policy. Phil Gordon deconstructs past mistakes and gives clues for a better approach. A must read for US policy makers but also readers in the Middle East puzzled by American failures." —**Kim Ghattas, author of *Black Wave***

"With sharp insight and refreshing candor, Phil Gordon lays bare the magical thinking which has so often led American policymakers to assume too much about our powers of transformation in the Middle East,

and too little about the limits of our agency. Gordon offers a compelling argument for more pragmatism and less hubris, and for greater reliance on diplomacy in shifting the terms of America's engagement in the original land of unintended consequences." —**Ambassador William J. Burns, President, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and former U.S. Deputy Secretary of State**

"An important and timely book on how the pursuit of regime change in the Middle East since 1953 has been a disaster—with unanticipated consequences. Written by an insider with a masterful understanding of how American foreign policy is made, this is an urgent wake up call to get out of the habit of believing that there are cheap and easy ways to fix the complicated issues that the region poses." —**Bruce Riedel, senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, former senior CIA and National Security Council official, and author of *Beirut 1958: How America's Wars in the Middle East Began***

"Phil Gordon has written an important history of America's pursuit of maximalist goals in the Middle East, often with little understanding of local conditions and hubristic assumptions about American power to reshape foreign governments and societies. The result is a fast-paced and timeless journey through a land of unintended consequences. This is a book for future presidents, policymakers, and the citizens to whom they are accountable." —**Brett McGurk, former Special Presidential Envoy for the Global Coalition to Counter ISIS and Special Assistant to the President for Iraq and Afghanistan**

"Any advocate of replacing an irritating foreign government with one that is more congenial should read Philip Gordon's incisive and salutary account of those cases where it has been tried in the past and invariably gone badly wrong" —**Lawrence Freedman, Emeritus Professor of War Studies, King's College London, and author of *A Choice of Enemies: America Confronts the Middle East***

"*Losing the Long Game* recounts American efforts over the past seven decades to get rid of annoying regimes in the greater Middle East and to install in their place something more to Washington's liking...his criticisms are devastating." —**Andrew Bacevich, *The New York Times Book Review***

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Excerpt: This book is the story of how regime change in the Middle East has proven so tempting to American policy makers for decades and of why it always seems to go wrong. I've called the book *Losing*

the Long Game because regime change often seems to work out in the short term—leading to premature declarations of victory by its proponents—but then ends up failing badly as costs mount, unintended consequences arise, and instability spreads in the wake of the apparent initial success. In fact, the long-term results of regime change in the region are so consistently disappointing—regardless of the reasons why it was tried or the manner in which plans were executed that it is surprising so many policy makers and analysts keep coming back to it as a viable policy option, hoping that somehow it will work out better next time. The track record also shows that the reason for the recurring failure is not just a matter of poor implementation or lack of sustained follow-up—the most common excuses of regime change proponents. Instead, it shows that there are inherently high costs, unexpected consequences, and insurmountable obstacles that make it exceedingly difficult for the United States to replace objectionable Middle Eastern regimes and leaders without creating new, different, and often bigger problems.

With few exceptions, the history of U.S. regime change efforts in the region reveals remarkably familiar patterns. Once U.S. policy makers become determined to remove a given regime, they overstate the threat, underestimate the costs and risks, overpromise what they can accomplish, and prematurely claim success if and when the targeted regime falls. Invariably, however, stability quickly proves elusive, a security vacuum develops, insecure and suspicious neighbors interfere, allied contributions fall short, and long-standing ethnic, sectarian, geopolitical, and personal rivalries emerge that the United States is unable to control. As unexpected challenges emerge and costs mount, those who conceived of and oversold the policy blame the results on implementation, and an "if only" phase begins—"if only" we had sent more troops, or fewer oops, or different troops, or more money, or better diplomats, or "if only" we had followed up on any one of a number of other policy options that were not pursued. Books and articles are written by key protagonists, explaining that victory could have been achieved if only U.S. leaders had been wiser, more determined, and willing to commit adequate resources to the task. Over time, the American public sours on the results of the intervention and tires of the costs of trying to make it a success, and the policy is shelved, usually after a new president enters office and blames the problem on the ill-conceived or poorly implemented strategy of his predecessor. This rejection of the policy then lasts until the next time leaders consider trying it again—sometimes in the very same country where it failed the first time.

Not every case of Middle East regime change conforms exactly to this pattern, of course. In some cases, certain U.S. goals are met initially before problems emerge later; in others, some objectives are achieved while new, different, and unexpected problems are created; in many cases, the United States derives strategic benefits from its intervention while the citizens of the target countries pay the price; and in some cases the result is a disaster for almost all concerned. In other words, to paraphrase Tolstoy, every unsuccessful attempt at regime change is unsuccessful in its own way. But the patterns and outcomes are consistent enough across a wide range of countries, circumstances, and administrations—that future U.S. leaders would be wise to take them into careful account before concluding, yet again, that U.S. efforts to oust existing regimes will prove worth the high costs and risks...

Debates about the pros and cons of regime change in the Middle East and elsewhere have gone on for many decades, and as both an analyst and a policy maker I've been involved in them for nearly thirty years. The issue took on renewed practical relevance in 2018, however, when President Donald Trump withdrew the United States from the 2015 nuclear deal with Iran—apparently pinning his hopes on a

strategy of regime change there. To be sure, the Trump administration didn't officially embrace that goal and insisted it just wanted to change Iranian behavior. But it was hard to avoid the conclusion that regime change was the actual policy. Trump alleged in 2017 that the nuclear deal had come "just before what would have been the total collapse of the Iranian regime" and that it had impeded the Iranian people's ability "to reclaim their country's proud history, its culture, [and] civilization." While the administration said it only wanted to negotiate a "better deal," Secretary of State Mike Pompeo used his first speech in May 2018 to spell out demands on Iran—including completely and indefinitely ending all uranium enrichment, abandoning ballistic missile development, providing international nuclear inspectors unqualified access anywhere and everywhere, and abandoning all its regional allies—that seemed designed to be rejected.² Trump surrounded himself with prominent proponents of regime change (including Pompeo, National Security Adviser John Bolton, and Trump's personal attorney Rudolph Giuliani), lent strong rhetorical support to Iranian protesters ("TIME FOR CHANGE!" he tweeted in January 2018), and set up the special Iran Action Group at the State Department to coordinate a "maximum pressure" campaign.¹ Encouraged by outside supporters in think tanks and Congress—many of whom had been strong proponents of regime change in Iraq fifteen years previously and in Syria more recently—the administration seemed to see the solution to the Iran problem as a sanctions campaign that would cripple the regime and lead to a popular uprising to overthrow it. As the scholar and former Bush administration official Eliot Cohen observed, Trump's "real theory of victory" in Iran was not that the Iranian regime would negotiate a new and better deal but "that American sanctions, rather, will bring down a regime whose economy is already collapsing."

Facing skepticism that the administration sought only to influence Iranian policy, Pompeo acknowledged to an interviewer in May 2019 that he didn't actually expect Tehran's behavior to change, but "what can change is the people can change the government. What we're trying to do is create space for the Iranian people." In Trump's more simplistic formulation, a fight with the United States would mean the "official end of Iran." "Never threaten the United States again!" he warned in a May 2019 tweet. As Trump's Iran policy unfolded—demonizing the Iranian regime, exaggerating intelligence about weapons of mass destruction and Iranian links to al-Qaeda, associating with unsavory opposition groups, and overselling the likely benefits of confrontation—it was hard to avoid having flashbacks to 2002 and the run-up to the Iraq War.

A U.S. policy of promoting regime change in Iran would certainly be in America's interest if it led to a new government that treated its people better, abandoned its nuclear program, stopped supporting terrorism and meddling in its neighbors' affairs, and was ready to cooperate politically, militarily, and diplomatically with the United States. Far less clear was whether that goal could be achieved by the United States through the imposition of economic sanctions, diplomatic isolation, covert action, or military force; whether the results would be the intended ones if it somehow were accomplished; and what the costs and side effects—for Americans, Iranians, and the region—would be of trying and failing to do so.

Trying to think through those questions led me to think even more about the track record of previous U.S. regime change efforts, which turns out to be replete with cautionary tales of hubris, overreach, and magical thinking. A look back at previous efforts since World War II—ironically, the first of which was a 1953 intervention in Iran that contributed to some of the very problems later generations of Americans would seek to solve with regime change again—shows no case of clear success, some catastrophic

failures, and universally high costs and unintended consequences. In every case it has proven far more costly and difficult than expected, and in no case has it led to anything even close to stable democracy, despite the promises of some of its proponents. If the U.S. experience in the region over the past seventy years is any guide, the prospect that external pressure—whether through economic isolation or covert or overt military intervention—can bring about the replacement of adversarial regimes in the region with more stable, friendly, and democratic ones is poor. If past is prologue, any administration that pursues such an approach should do so with its eyes wide open, and the American public should be very skeptical about its claims and promises. <>

A SOUND MIND: HOW I FELL IN LOVE WITH CLASSICAL MUSIC (AND DECIDED TO REWRITE ITS ENTIRE HISTORY) by Paul Morley [Bloomsbury Publishing, 9781635570267]

For readers of *Mozart in the Jungle* and *Year of Wonder*, a new history of and guide to classical music.

Paul Morley made his name as a journalist covering the rock and pop of the 1970s and 1980s. But as his career progressed, he found himself drawn toward developing technologies, streaming platforms, and, increasingly, the music from the past that streaming services now made available. Suddenly able to access every piece Mozart or Bach had ever written and to curate playlists that worked with these musicians' themes across different performers, composers, and eras, he began to understand classical music in a whole new way and to believe that it was music at its most dramatic and revealing.

In **A SOUND MIND: HOW I FELL IN LOVE WITH CLASSICAL MUSIC (AND DECIDED TO REWRITE ITS ENTIRE HISTORY)**, Morley takes readers along on his journey into the history and future of classical music. His descriptions, explanations, and guidance make this seemingly arcane genre more friendly to listeners and show the music's power, depth, and timeless beauty. In Morley's capable hands, the history of the classical genre is shown to be the history of all music, with these long-ago pieces influencing everyone from jazz greats to punk rockers and the pop musicians of today.

Review

“A thoughtful work full of fresh observations and strong opinions. . . [Morley's] writing strikes just the right note: erudite but edgy, entertaining but enlightening. An excellent guide for anyone interested in expanding their musical horizons.” —*Library Journal*

“Morley delivers many perceptive, tunefully written passages” —*Publishers Weekly*

“An intoxicating journey into classical music. . . [Morley] expertly probes classical composers' agitated minds and collective oeuvres. Adeptly framing observations of pop, rock, and classical music within the context of the industry, Morley also underscores extraordinary changes in our time, highlighting the rapid growth of technology and its impact on music. . . A rich resource for music lovers.” —*Booklist*

“Morley's expansive present-tense prose flows from the loosening of the superego, his id let out to play

in a style that's at times neo-gonzo, at others like an inspired hybrid of Mik Cohn and the Julian Cope of Krautrock sampler. I hold him to be one of the great pop writers. You might even call him the Bowie of rock journalism.” —*Barney Hoskyns, The Guardian on THE AGE OF BOWIE*

“Morley remains a brilliant conductor – of music, of ideas, of inexplicable flashes of lightning. He knows the score.” —*The Sunday Times*

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Excerpt: Between the ages of fifty and sixty, I was increasingly listening to music that spanned centuries. I wasn't less committed or less caring faced with all this music; I was more so. I couldn't help it. The 'more music' didn't disconcert me, because, as a long-time professional writer about music, I could make some sense of it all, and work out where a lot of it had come from and how it was part of history, make decisions about what had become of it; what did challenge me perhaps was where it was all going and what it meant to the making of music. What was music becoming?

The 'more — and more — music', the onslaught, simply gave me more to think about, and this became the kind of thinking that I began putting into large playlists — 'sonic sculptures', I called them, consciously made as artworks, some of which contained so much assembled music that they could last for days, and which I imagined being released from inside their virtual storage centre and floating off into space, spectacular evidence of life on earth.

I imagined them as artworks in the way I had imagined music writing to be an art. When I started, there didn't seem any other way of approaching it. Once writing about music became more polite or prosaic, and part of a social-media invasion and interruption of traditional rational thinking, it could seem that generating these playlists was the new form of writing about music. How you put together the playlists — even if just for yourself — expressed and explained your feelings about music. More than that, they were a musical act: you told stories, expressed emotions and created worlds through these playlists.

Previously, before music streaming, where all music was gathered in the one place because now it could be — if possibly on borrowed time, but then we all are — my music listening tended to be concentrated on music made, recorded and performed, coincidentally, or quite naturally enough, between the year I was born, 1957, and the beginning of the twenty-first century, as long as my life so far, the borrowed time, had lasted.

Before streaming, this music was limited to records and compact discs that I owned as objects, certain radio stations I listened to that had the time and inclination to feature my kind of music, and increasingly what repeats of Top of the Pops BBC Four showed, once they had edited out the actually evil presence of certain disc jockeys. (Pop music turned out to be a great cover not only for the occasional genius but also for the occasional psychopath.) The music I heard was heavily biased to that second half of the twentieth century, post-Presley, post-multitrack recording, post-seven-inch singles and post-albums-as-art. For a while, this was where my final piece was going to come from: music more or less made and released during my lifetime.

A love of jazz and the mental motoring and sensual seriousness of improvised music pushed me back deeper into the almighty tangle of the twentieth century, and an anti-herd fascination with the dismantled and dismantling sounds, risks and challenges of avant-garde music pushed me even further back to the beginning of the twentieth century, and the early murmurs, and anxieties, of modernism. In turn, that took me back to what I decided were definite sources of jazz and the conceptual avant-garde, in particular the artfully temporal and sacred secular French music written by Erik Satie, Claude Debussy and Maurice Ravel at the end of the nineteenth century and beginning of the twentieth century.

I hesitantly dipped back further in time, to Beethoven, Brahms and Mozart. There were definitely a few candidates among this music, at the heart of many of my structured playlists, that were high up on the list of a last, personal musical ceremony. I found myself playing this French music, and what came immediately after from Germany and Russia, from Stravinsky, Webern, Hindemith and Shostakovich, as I sat on planes that were taking off, or landing. Just in case...

The internet was the end for anyone fancying writing about music in the way it had been written about after the method had been invented in the 1960s and consolidated in the 1970s, as something more ambitious and provocative than a convenient, practical consumer guide. It helped ensure that popular culture, once at the messy, furtive edge of things, became the mainstream. Everyone had an opinion, and even though it could be claimed there is nothing wrong with that, the disappointing thing was, the majority of those opinions were all the same and not particularly exceptional. Bestsellers' charts had once been the place where the voice of the majority was seen and heard; critics were responsible for ensuring there was more to art and entertainment than the simply popular. Increasingly, populist opinions were broadcast as though they were interesting, revealing and insightful, as if they showed intrinsic, constructive critical merit, not merely a dreary display of likes and dislikes.

Once everyone had the opportunity to distribute their opinions and attitudes, and could endlessly record their taste and draw attention to their favourite music, movies or TV, through endless blogs, vlogs, podcasts and online music forums, they picked up the same conditions and neuroses that the great rock writers had, without the ideological energy and literary ambition — the addiction to telling people about your loves and hates, the excitement of telling people all about yourself when previously no one really wanted to know, the snobbish elevated high you can feel when you are first to spot a secret new trend, a hot new movement. The internet meant that there were now millions of rock writers covering, celebrating and hyping, and explaining popular culture in ways that were unimaginable when there were just a few. Millions of music critics, and five great ones, and one or two of those are the same as they were in the 1970s.

Nostalgic against my better instincts, I could never bring myself to accept that the most important thing in a music review after about 1995 was the number of stars you handed out or marks out of ten. The discriminating, provocative, disruptive moods of the critic were replaced by the bland four and five stars, or the merely angry and mostly staged one or two stars. I had always believed it was about finding the language and structure to explain how and what the music made you felt. Also, because of the new sharing world, whatever I could write about the things I liked to write about, there were hundreds of people lined up fully prepared to do the same or similar, quite reasonably considering they could do it better than me and quite happy to grade what they were writing about as if it was a product, a hotel room, a train journey or an exam.

For those born during and after the 1980s there was no other way; sightings of the other way must have seemed a little Edwardian, even though all generations were now more or less interested in the proliferating trends and currents of popular culture as it more or less redirected reality itself. Everyone could find what they wanted now, quickly and efficiently, guided by genial, anonymous calculations, by ever-increasing playlists, by a proliferation of genres that almost bureaucratically processed and filed music for driving, sleeping, motivating, studying, eating, chilling, isolation, concentrating, shopping, swapping, dancing, night-time, Thursday. It became a world that was looking for user-friendly tips and advice, not manifestos, essays and rants, a world of irregular uniformity and conglomerated mediocrity, where the idea of quality and meaning was quickly replaced by convenience.

You can find information and guidance within seconds without coming into contact with a 1970s-style mostly white, mostly male rock writer, their peculiar personal habits, the narcissistic certainty that they are right, their dubious, far-fetched claims, their insane, illogical prejudices, their arcane, mystifying theories, a deep fear of losing control of their precious canon, and their insatiable desire to use too many words. Note how the first two or three waves of rock writers between the early 1960s and the early 1980s acted as though they were changing the world and, to some extent, ruling it, even though they had little experience of life and other cultures outside of their bedroom, their favourite gig venues and their record collection. The breed of eager, inbred, self-obsessed, self-important, naive, unsophisticated, holier-than-thou, mock-disruptive white male entrepreneurs who founded Apple, Google, Amazon, Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, Spotify, etc. shared many of the same introverted, defensively arrogant and immature, insular qualities of the early rock writers, their nerdy self-involvement, missionary zeal and self-righteous rebel gestures. They also thought they were agents of free expression and protest who were going to change the world, even run it. The big difference between them and the rock writers was that, scarily, they actually did.

The covering of music is all for the consumer now, the well-regulated customers, less for the nature and momentum, the wonderful warp and weave, of the culture, which ultimately has greater worth for the consumer and introduces them to better things and a wider, more varied selection. There is all the choice in the world, but less actual selective choosing than there used to be. At least, that's what I tell myself, still with this need to write about music because, on and off, it's something I have done since I was, well, a child. I had also become fascinated with how to write about music, and there was still plenty for me to find out about the practice and function.

I wasn't going to stop just because so many others were now doing it and the wider point of it was far less specific, less unprecedented than it was when I started. I needed to find new routes, new material

and see if there could still be a purpose in the way I understood it, something other than being part of the promotions industry or one faceless component in a collective flowing in one forced direction.

This book, then, is not just the story of a search to find out what might be the final piece of music I would ever listen to, or to analyse the effects of streaming on the form and content of music, but it is also a book about what it is, and how it is, to write about music, what the motivation is, and what the satisfactions are, after doing it for forty years. And how I found the material to continue writing about music in a different, non-rock field, where there are perhaps still only a few hundred practitioners — and only five great ones.

I love and crave music of all sorts enough to be seduced by streamed music and all its information and take out subscriptions to all the streaming services, even as I am aware of its new, disorientating, overwhelming, even synthetic oddness, which one day will seem very natural, or be replaced as something old-fashioned, by something else even newer, odder and apparently, at least from a late twentieth-century point of view, less human. I realise that somehow music has become data, rather than knowledge, experience, emotion — but what data! As long as you can keep your wits about you and begin sifting all this data with prior knowledge of at least some music history.

When people ask me what I am listening to, expecting to hear from an alleged rock expert some new band or compelling discovery, the elusive latest happening, like the old days when such things mattered, or were made to matter, I now reply — I'm listening to Tidal, to Spotify and Apple, to YouTube Music, as though that is the one act, taking all music by whoever and whatever into its corporate body, its deadpan creative presence.

This made me think: what is all this music actually for, now that we appear to own it all, even if just virtually, in our own personal cloud, which fast becomes our own personal Jesus? Simply pleasure, nostalgia, consolation, relaxation, collection, sharing, completing the turning of the millions of songs into playlists that show off your signalled taste, hipness and discrimination, the sentimentally paraded trajectory of your life. Is all this gathering of musical material the creation of a vast library that might eventually sink under its own weight, or, really, its weightlessness — or something more, something that might be threatened by the very thing that is actually making music so easily accessible?

It's all so easy to find, but it is harder to pay attention to, at least as a collective — individual attention perhaps, if you have the will and need, but collectively the latest new thing is now destined to remain inside its own world, however popular and rated never likely to make an impact beyond its place. Even the most popular of pop music seems essentially a niche activity, a segment of pop culture, a portion of distraction, rather than the top of the bill. The idea of a teenage audience, which originally was the momentum behind pop music, the way out of a dreary environment, a tense domestic situation, the weirdness of the mind, has evolved, and teenagers, which becomes an age span stretching between, say, ten and forty or fifty, maybe a few years beyond, have different ways of fighting free of immediate restrictions, of generating personal space and possible independence.

Do we lose that sense of the greater purpose of music — once it is set inside the flat, if relentless and very helpful, music services — as this other language, this alien presence taking on the unknown, defending us against all kinds of threats, danger and tension? Will this near-monstrous availability of music, the over-engineered tethering of everything into one place, lead to stronger, more innovative

music, and more awareness of its deeper powers, or weaken and break it up into mere patterns of fun, a bland, near-perfunctory amenity increasingly adrift from any rooted, evolving artistic, cultural or social context, except when the idea of 'rebellion', or resistance — the transmission of cool — is merely part of an inherited game plan, an established formula?

As much as there is now all music ready for us to quickly find, there is also the fact that it can easily go missing — the power can be turned off, the machines lost or broken, the playlists become narrower and narrower, inevitably marginalising the loftier, higher thinking, the bolder music, instead favouring music that is more ingenious product design, more zesty, zoned soundtrack to celebrity, to TikTok doodling, than challenging, visionary, reality-changing, life-altering sonic poetry.

Does it now become cut off from creative regeneration and new developments — no more indisputable masterpieces, no more real shocks to the system, or ruptures to the history — and simply reside inside a permanently open, well-lit store, a zoo, a static museum, a series of relics, anniversaries and greatest hits targeting shrinking communities stuck inside ever-multiplying and narrower aesthetic alcoves? Rather than being released by the streaming services, does music lose its freedom, and its freedom to be obscure and outlying, and become caged? Some parts of the zoo are visited a lot more than others, which start to become a little unlooked-after, a little overgrown, even sad.

The great music, the great songs, the bright, persuasive togetherness achieved by musicians and composers finding new ways to turn old =sic into new music has always, like the best art, helped us adapt to new ideas, to fundamental change, encouraged us to keep our wits about prepare for love and death, supplying clues about how to defend ourselves from the damaging consequences of those environmental, emotional and existential changes that result from often unregulated technological and economic advancements.

Art is ultimately what helps us deal with the turbulent, sometimes toxic force of change; it explains it, predicts it, contains it, is a necessary antidote to the rampaging forces of those claiming power, dictating morals, reducing freedom, setting us apart and shredding truth and beauty. It is the most vital corrective alternative to the self-generating entrepreneurial energy that generally exploits technological change and natural disaster, mostly to make money and take control of our interests. It is a mysterious, at best uncontrollable form of opposition to those who use the developments in technology to herd us into obedient, pacified communities whose sole function is ultimately to consume and download and disappear into a kind of censored, gated territory of lifestyle ease, merciless entertainment and moral indifference, until there's nothing left of what once seemed inviolably human.

At this point, in the middle of the sort of changes that will either end us or profoundly transform us, even replace us, there is an extraordinary, fast-evolving need for music, as an unclassifiable symbol of otherness and artistic endeavour, as a method of communicating thought about the vastness of the cosmos, the glory of love, the wonder of existence, the nature of our minds, the dreams of humans, which music is a mirror of, a maker of, beyond words and logic, and temporary, distracting societal pressure and overstimulating fashionable trends. As someone trained in the elastic, eccentric arts of rock criticism, where Roland Barthes and Susan Sontag, even J. G. Ballard and Philip K. Dick were as much an influence as Nik Cohn, Joan Didion, Richard Meltzer, Patti Smith and Lester Bangs, I still have these kind of thoughts, and they still seem important — but with the knowledge that they now are

drowning in a world of instant ratings, Amazon reviews (no offence), perky spirit raising and scrappy, aggrieved, populist shouting. <>

RULES OF ORIGIN FOR SERVICES: FROM THE EARLY DAYS OF GATS TO THE ERA OF SERVICIFICATION by Duy Dinh [Edward Elgar, 9781789908084] the eBook version is available from [Google Play](#), [ebooks.com](#) and other eBook vendors, while in print the book can be ordered from the [Edward Elgar Publishing website](#).

In an era where services play an increasingly vital role in servicified global value chains, this insightful book provides a comprehensive study of legal aspects of rules of origin for services and their importance in international trade.

The author identifies and examines the defects in the current approach to rules of origin for services through an astute analysis of these rules in the General Agreement on Trade in Services and in preferential trade agreements. In addition, by asserting that trade in goods and trade in services cannot be separated, the author provides a comparative analysis of rules of origin in these two fields, offering a better understanding of their boundaries and connections. Paving the way for further development, the author concludes that certain aspects of rules of origin for goods, such as the product-based approach, may be repurposed for services.

Addressing an area of rulemaking insufficiently explored to date, this book will prove important reading for students and scholars of international trade, economics, and governance. The focus on new patterns of international trade will also benefit trade experts, policy makers and businesses.

Review

'The book not only provides insights into rules of origin for services, but also makes a comparative analysis with rules of origin for goods. Considering the crucial role of services in global value chains and emerging trends in international trade and production, understanding rules of origin for services will become important to understand rules of origin for goods.' —Giorgio Sacerdoti, Emeritus Professor of International and European Law, Bocconi University, Italy and former Member and Chairman of the WTO Appellate Body

'This thoroughly-researched and forward-looking publication fills in a major research gap and will provide an extremely useful resource for scholars, negotiators and trade practitioners interested in defining rules of origin for services. Considering the growing and central role of services in global value chains, the origin of service providers will undoubtedly become a major focus of attention in the negotiation of international preferential trade agreements and international trade disputes.' —Darlan Marti, Secretary, WTO Committee on Rules of Origin

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1 Services in global value chains and new patterns in global services trade

2 The concept and aspects of rules of origin for services

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4 Rules of origin for goods and services — a comparative analysis

5 The way forward: the prospect of a 'product-based' approach

6 Conclusion

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Why a Book on Rules of Origin for Services?

Rules of origin (ROO) are an important area of rule making in international trade. The legal and economic aspects of ROO have been discussed for the last few decades from different perspectives. It should be noted, however, that by default they are ROO in the field of merchandise trade. There is much less attention paid to the question relating to origin determination in the field of services trade. Indeed, the existence of ROO for services is not common knowledge even to many trade scholars and practitioners.

Anyone starting the quest into this topic may be influenced by the remark of previous authors that ROO for services differ from those for goods in many aspects, particularly they are of far less importance. In effect, such prejudice makes an impression that the topic is not worth digging deeper into due to its negligible significance. However, there are certain reasons to remain skeptical. Firstly, in principle when it comes to defining the scope of coverage of the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) or any other preferential trade agreement (PTA) covering services, it is necessary to identify those services or service suppliers entitled to benefits granted by those agreements, which is synonymous with determining their origin. Secondly, in a number of disputes brought before the World Trade Organization (WTO), matters relating to origin of services and service suppliers have been raised and addressed. In addition, for the purpose of legal studies, it is crucial to explore this under-researched area at least to understand why it is not attracting scholarly attention.

Another reason that necessitates this research stems from the intention to consider the subject from new perspectives. Trade in services has evolved remarkably over the past decades. In global value chains (GVCs), services may be used as inputs for production of other goods and services, and may also be outputs in pure services GVCs. Advances in information and communications technologies (ICT) have vastly transformed trade and production. These changes are likely to have some implications for the discussion on ROO for services. In the meantime, the most influential works on this subject were written more than a decade ago, which means they have not taken into account

new patterns of trade in services. It is not to mention ROO for services, at least ROO in the GATS, were negotiated even longer ago in a world very different from ours today. This calls for a study to assess whether ROO for services can keep pace with the evolvement of international trade.

In addition, since services trade is growing rapidly not only in the multilateral trading system but also in PTAs, it is important to reach beyond the GATS to explore the origin rules in PTAs. This analysis will elucidate how services ROO in the GATS and in PTAs are similar to or different from each other. Moreover, if ROO for services in the GATS are not important, it is useful to assess whether they are not important in PTAs, either. To this end, any link between ROO for services in PTAs and the GATS also needs to be identified and analyzed. It means there is a need for research which examines at the same time non-preferential and preferential ROO for services.

To date, trade in goods and trade in services have widely been considered as separate spheres. In the multilateral trading system, trade in goods is governed by the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), and trade in services is covered by the GATS. In PTAs, trade in goods and trade in services are covered in separate chapters as well. However, the line between them is becoming thinner as trade statistics indicate that services account for a growing share in the manufacturing of goods, either as inputs or as accompanying services. That merchandise trade and services trade are intertwined implies that ROO for goods and services are also connected. Therefore, it prompts the author to look at ROO for services through the lens of ROO for goods.

In short, this book on ROO for services is written to discuss an under-researched topic from new perspectives.

What We Know and What We Do Not Know?

Since this area of rule making is relatively under-researched, there are not many prior works that thoroughly discuss ROO for services. A humble range of book chapters and articles briefly mention ROO for services as part of the general analysis on ROO, which mostly focuses on ROO for goods, for instance, Hoekman (1993) and Kingston (1994). In addition, ROO for services is mentioned scatteredly in a larger number of works on services trade in which the theme of ROO is generally not emphasized. Recently, there are more substantive works discussing ROO for services by Zampetti and Sauve (2006), Wang (2010), Munin (2010), Fink and Nikomboririak (2008), Khumon (2015), and Dinh (2016). Although it seems the subject has started to attract scholars' attention, it is not comparable to the countless number of works discussing ROO for goods.

Among the works that have discussed ROO for services, there are some that contribute substantially to shaping the book's analytical framework. Hoekman (1993) pointed at the difference between ROO for goods and services, and concluded that services ROO must be based on another approach from those for goods. Abu-Akeel (1999) analyzed the difficulties in defining the origin of services, and discussed the distinction between the nationality of suppliers and the origin of services themselves. Zampetti and Sauvé (2006) were the first to compare ROO for services in the GATS, PTAs and investment treaties, and to rank the stringency of origin criteria. Wang (2010) authored one of the most influential works on the topic, which illustrated the flaws of services ROO in the GATS and suggested that a 'substantial input test' would be the way out. However, his paper does not touch upon ROO in PTAs at all. Munin (2010) spent one chapter in her comprehensive book scrutinizing ROO in the GATS. This is by far the most elaborated legal guide to interpreting definitions relating to origin of services stipulated in Article XXVIII of the GATS. Finally, Dinh (2016), the author of this book, made a contribution by proposing to import some concepts from ROO for goods to ROO for services.

Apart from these works, there are others focusing more on describing the state of the art. Fink and Nikomborirak (2008) discussed in depth services ROO in a case study of five ASEAN countries. They mainly looked at factors defining the restrictiveness of the rules and their impacts on trade. A comprehensive paper by Khumon (2015) provided a thorough analysis services ROO in 47 PTAs concerning Asia Pacific countries, and found that the rules are generally liberal.

However, most existing works on this theme focus on ROO in the GATS, and have not sufficiently investigated ROO in PTAs. The link between ROO in the GATS and ROO in PTAs as well as the link between ROO for services and ROO for goods are not handled. Besides, these works have not taken into account recent trends in international trade, which may either elucidate or complicate the current discussion.

Given the gap in literature, this book will be one of the most comprehensive works to discuss ROO for services. It aims to systematize scattered and unelaborated thoughts on ROO for services, refine and reinforce them with more arguments and evidences. The book is also one of the first works to simultaneously discuss ROO in the GATS and in PTAs, and to put ROO for services in a comparative analysis with ROO for goods. The whole discussion will take into account the implications of new patterns of production and trade. Hopefully, the discussion in the book will encourage trade scholars to think out of the box about the future of ROO in international trade. Above all, it is expected that the book will become a guide to readers interested in this area of rule making.

Research Questions and Structure of the Book

The book includes six chapters, which aim to answer the following questions:

1. Why is it necessary to rethink ROO for services?
2. How are ROO for services in the GATS and PTAs formulated?
3. What are the advantages and disadvantages of current ROO for services?
4. How are ROO for services related to ROO for goods, and its implications?
5. How can ROO for services be improved, and what is a potential new approach?

Chapter 1 describes the landscape of GVCs and servicification, and the proliferation of PTAs covering services. Since the new context has resulted in fundamental changes in world trade and production, it becomes the ground for the book to reconsider ROO for services from new perspectives.

Chapter 2 focuses on ROO for services in the GATS and PTAs. It explains in depth the rationale of ROO for services in trade agreements, and scrutinizes origin criteria in the GATS and PTAs, focusing on selected agreements. The connection between GATS and PTAs in terms of ROO will also be discussed, and the question as to GATS-consistency of preferential ROO for services will be addressed.

Chapter 3 furthers the analysis by weighing the pros and cons of the 'GATS approach' to ROO for services, particularly in the light of new patterns of trade.

Chapter 4 opens up the discussion by looking at ROO for goods and their relationship with ROO for services. It illustrates why the defects of ROO for services may adversely affect the origin determination of goods.

Chapter 5 revisits the fundamental concept of 'substantial transformation' in ROO for goods, and suggests that a 'product-based' approach may be a direction for the future development of ROO for services. <>

JUSTICE AND VULNERABILITY IN EUROPE AN INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACH edited by Trudie Knijn, and Dorota Lepianka, [Edward Elgar Publishing, 978183910 8471]

The eBook version is available from [Google Play](#), [ebooks.com](#) and other eBook vendors, while in print the book can be ordered from the [Edward Elgar Publishing website](#).

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JUSTICE AND VULNERABILITY IN EUROPE AN INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACH contributes to the understanding of justice in Europe from both a theoretical and empirical perspective. It shows that Europe is falling short of its ideals and justice-related ambitions by repeatedly failing its most vulnerable populations.

Interdisciplinary and expert contributors search for the explanations behind these failing ambitions through analysis of institutional discourse, legal debate and practice and the daily experiences of vulnerable populations, such as those dependent on social care and welfare. By setting tentative criteria for justice as 'participatory parity', in line with the insights of the political philosopher Nancy Fraser, the book challenges European policy makers to re-define redistributive, recognitive and representative justice.

Original and incisive, **JUSTICE AND VULNERABILITY IN EUROPE** is an invaluable resource for policy makers at European, national and local levels. It is also highly relevant to scholars and students of public and social policy, social justice, politics and law.

Reviews

Justice is often thought of as a theoretical concern of philosophers and social theorists. This book vitalizes discussions about justice and makes them accessible to a broader audience in a truly inspiring way. Impressive and convincing, it brings philosophers together with legal scholars and sociologists to discuss the realities and injustices in a Europe and EU formed by different welfare regimes and austerity policies. It invites us to reflect on whether we can think of a European theory of justice taking into account its historical, cultural and institutional legacy – and its diversity. It's a fantastic book, a "must

read” for scholars – and students – interested in justice, Europe and the EU, marginalization, discrimination, care and recognition.’ – Hanne Marlene Dahl, Roskilde University, Denmark

‘Here is a highly anticipated book. Among its innumerable qualities, let’s stress three of them: it’s the result of a very robust research project (ETHOS), which articulates theoretical reflections and results of in-depth empirical studies; it formulates an analytical framework in Europe and for Europe; last but not least, it suggests a non-ideal, contextual and critical approach to social justice. An approach that is reachable for social actors, especially the most vulnerable. What a breath of intellectual fresh air! This book should circulate in all hands: those of researchers as well as those of citizens, those of activists and those of political leaders. The EU is in crisis? Nothing but an additional reason to dive into this fundamental and highly stimulating book. More than a book: a cornerstone. To read and study ... urgently.’ – Matthieu de Nanteuil, UCLouvain, Belgium

‘This very substantial book – both in size and content – takes us on a critical path. Based on a largely European context, examining the “entities and activities” of groups and institutions, the authors ask how a theory of justice links to the messy reality on the ground: for example, how in practice, as opposed to theory, do we recognize others as equals; a particularly pertinent question at a time of the global Black Lives Matter movement. This is a deeply researched, thoughtful and compelling book which should be of value to both philosophers and those who, in everyday practice, attempt to promote a practice, however complex and messy, which meets the needs of the most vulnerable in our society.’ – Gary Craig, Newcastle Law School, UK

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Timeliness of the Questions of Justice

Over the last decades Europe, as a continent and as a political project, has stumbled over a number of crises and has been faced with challenges that put into question the validity of justice ideals deemed constitutive of European values, the European Social Model (ESM) and European democracy. These challenges include: social and economic solidarity in and between nation states in reaction to the financial, economic and social crises lasting from 2008 to 2015; the growing socio-economic inequalities within and between European societies; the accelerating trends of economic and financial globalization, coupled with the flexibilization of the labour market and shrinking social protection, which pressure and ultimately alter European welfare states; the crisis of liberal democracy, marked by a rise in populism, a drift towards authoritarianism and attempts to dismantle the rule of law; rising nationalisms with their antifoignner rhetoric and strong resistance to accommodating the soaring number of refugees; and – last but not least – a mounting global health crisis (sparked by the outbreak of the Corona pandemic at the outset of 2020) that suddenly exposes the fragility of individuals, societies and the nation-state institutional order.

In his recent 'Introduction' to the Handbook on Global Social Justice, Gary Craig (2020) reflects on the meaning of social justice in times of increasing inequality in multi-cultural and multi-religious nations by assuming that notions of justice change as political conditions change. This volume raises a similar question though from a different perspective; it takes a wider scope by not only analysing social (redistributive) justice but also recognitive and representative justice. At the same time, its focus is narrower due to its orientation on Europe instead of the globe. A central question posed in this volume revolves around the issue of how the various economic, social and political challenges may lead (or might have already led) to a reformulation of the ideals of justice as we knew it – its normative

foundations, premises, scope and boundaries. Some of the pressing questions we ask include: What is just and what is unjust? Where does (in)justice start? Who is entitled to (what kind of) justice? On what grounds? Who should secure justice and how? And – last but not least – what barriers to the realization of justice are there and what are their sources?

These questions are of great significance for the 22 per cent (or over 109 million) of Europeans living at the risk of poverty and social exclusion (Eurostat 2019), whose precarity – enhanced by the neoliberal spirit of ‘responsibilization’ – cannot be prevented or remedied by decimated public budgets and institutions (Shamir 2008; Schulze-Cleven 2018). They are also very relevant to the 38 per cent of the inhabitants of Europe who feel discriminated against because of their minority status and/or otherness associated with race, ethnicity, different cultural and religious belief systems, gender or disability (FRA 2017). And to the hundreds of thousands of refugees camping in Europe (Turkey, Greece, France and Italy).

At the same time, the questions of justice are of high pertinence to the European Union as an integration project founded not only on common economic interests and legal frameworks but essentially also on the assumption of a common history, common cultural heritage and above all common values (Treaty of Lisbon 2009). In this time of crisis and trial, Europe as an integration project has yet to prove its merit. The challenge lies not only in responding to its critics and addressing the strikingly contradictory reactions to the processes of Europeanization, but also in coming to terms with Europe’s ‘original sin’ of being founded on contradictions, where respect and adherence to justice and human rights co-exist, and often blend, with their violations. Paraphrasing Habermas (2007), Europe could be in fact seen – just like modernity – as an ‘incomplete’ or ‘unfinished’ project, whereby justice is the result of ongoing struggles over rights (economic, social and political) as well as over the boundaries of inclusion and scope of participation. In the face of the recent crises, this project seems to be desperately in need of revisiting and strengthening (or rebuilding) its (normative) foundation.

This volume constitutes an attempt to answer, at least partially, some of the above questions in relation to justice in Europe. It is an outcome of a collaborative Horizon 2020 project ‘Towards a European Theory Of juStice and fairness’ (ETHOS).² In its essence, the project aimed to construct a, possibly specifically European, theory which is in tune with European values and reflects the achievements and shortcomings of the European integration process. Such a theory, according to Kochenov et al. (2015), has so far remained unarticulated. The main goal of ETHOS was thus to develop an empirically informed European theory of justice by: (1) refining and deepening the knowledge of the European foundations of justice – both historically based and contemporarily envisaged; (2) enhancing awareness of the mechanisms that impede the realization of the justice ideals that live in contemporary Europe; (3) advancing the understanding of the process of drawing and re-drawing of the boundaries, or fault lines, of justice; and (4) providing guidance to politicians, policy makers, advocacies and other stakeholders on how to design and implement policies to reverse inequalities and prevent injustice.

The guiding premise of the contributions collected in this volume is that justice is not merely an abstracted moral ideal of universal reach, deduced from abstract (philosophical) paradigms or foundational legal frameworks, such as the European Convention on Human Rights (1950), the Treaty of the European Union (2007) and the Lisbon Treaty (2009), deemed binding for all (for example, as a deontological or teleological concept). Rather, it is a continuously re-enacted and reconstructed ‘lived’

experience, embedded in firm legal, political, moral, social, economic and cultural institutions, and reflected in public attitudes, discourses and individual experiences. Although a theory of justice and fairness may have roots in abstract moral principles of what is socially desirable and appropriate, in order to resonate with the 'here and now' and to form a realistic (and binding) reference for social and political praxis, it needs to take into account people's actual views of and attitudes towards what 'ought to be' as well as their experiences of what actually 'is'. Important here is the realization that (justice) principles are always historical constructs, embedded in particular conjunctures, as well as the fact that even the most concrete formulation of justice principles (for example, as codified 'rights') tells us very little about the 'practicalities of justice', that is, whether 'justice' is actually being done. Therefore, we take a conflict-based approach, whereby perceptions of injustice play a key role in the formulation of (collective) claims to justice as well as in the search for practical justice-seeking solutions. In analysing justice, contributions in this volume are led by the non-ideal theoretical approach to justice that starts from a diagnosis (what 'is', usually an injustice that can be identified³) and then unravels the structural and cultural problems underlying these injustices, the conflicting claims behind them and the various perspectives on how to overcome injustices. Therefore, we focus not so much on the articulation of an 'end-state' of perfect justice, but highlight instead the importance of incremental, 'transitional' improvements towards more justice in the real world (Sen 2010; see also Van den Brink et al. 2018; Chapters 3 and 12 in this volume).

Complexity of In/Justice: Beyond Fraser's Model of Participatory Parity

In order to cover – and simplify – the wide range of justice principles present in political philosophical traditions, such as equality, liberty and democracy, and the goals of the European Union (EU) – peace, well-being of citizens, freedom and security, combatting social exclusion and discrimination, promoting solidarity among EU countries, and respecting Europe's rich cultural and linguistic diversity, we make use of Nancy Fraser's tripartite distinction between justice as redistribution, justice as recognition, and justice as representation (1995, 1998, 2005, 2007, 2009) as a starting point of our theoretical and empirical investigations, complementing it with the capability approach (Sen 1999, 2010; Nussbaum 2000). Fraser conceives justice as parity of participation, which she defines as 'the condition of being a peer, of being on a par with others, of standing on an equal, and argues for a multi-dimensional approach that treats redistribution, recognition and representation as three primary, irreducible facets of justice that have broad independent application to addressing real-world injustices (Fraser 2009). While redistribution taps into (in)justices rooted in the economic structure of society, resulting in poverty, exploitation, inequality and class differentials, justice understood in recognitive terms is about social status and the relative standing of a person vis-à-vis others regardless of their gender, race, ethnicity, sexuality, religion and nationality, or any other axes of social differentiation (Fraser 2007, 2009). Recognitive justice implies absence of cultural domination, marginalization in the public space, cultural and social invisibility, and disrespect and disparagement in everyday life. Finally, representative justice taps into being put on an equal footing in political participation, which involves being included in a political community as well as being granted an equal democratic voice (Fraser 2009). Importantly, as noticed by Fraser herself, while analytically distinct, the various facets of justice are in real life interwoven in a complex and often tensioned way. They may mutually reinforce one another, that is, 'just' representation might be contingent on 'just' recognition and/or 'just' redistribution of resources that enable participation. However, in other cases the realization of some justice claims, such as identity claims, is likely to impinge on other claims and/or claims of other members of the community. Useful in

analysing such conflicts is also the capability approach, originating in the work of Amartya Sen, which views justice through the lens of a wide range of means that are necessary for people to function in ways that make their lives valuable; and which recognizes how individual opportunities and choices are historically and culturally determined, and contingent on the choices of others. Rooted in European social and political theory and developed in the spirit of the ‘non-ideal’, the ‘context-sensitive’ approach in critical social theory of the Frankfurt School, Fraser’s framework offers an outstanding social-theoretical tool for understanding real-world experiences of in/justice, as many chapters of this volume will testify. Yet, while useful as a lens in exploring the complexity of in/justice claims, Fraser’s ideal of justice as participatory parity leaves room for additional normative and empirical approaches to (in)justice. Chapters in this volume demonstrate that while some forms or facets of justice fit well into Fraser’s tripartite categorization and/or Sen’s capability approach (Chapters 8 to 10), there are also justice dimensions that go beyond Fraser’s or Sen’s conceptualizations, such as restorative justice, historical justice, epistemic justice or procedural justice (see Chapters 4 and 12). Moreover, the chapters on legal theory and the institutionalization of justice in legal frameworks (Chapters 5 to 7) demonstrate that Fraser’s model seems unable to capture law as an important site and medium of in/justice. This might be due to the fact that her theory mainly focuses on the public domain, thus excluding private law; on participatory parity, thus not making personal liberty central (see also Scheurman 2017); and on substantive and ‘real’ justice, while law and legal theory mainly deal with procedural justice and ‘law in books’ (Chapters 5, 6, 7 and 12).

Justice as Law, Rights as Means to Secure Justice?

Although law and justice are often bundled together, among legal scholars there is no agreement whether law should be informed by moral justice considerations or separated from those questions (Salát 2018; see also Chapter 6). Relevant here are also doubts whether it is at all possible to achieve justice through law, and if so, how and by whom, that is, through which processes and institutions (Herlin-Karnell and Kjaer 2017).

As discussed in Chapters 5 to 7, ‘rights’ constitute the legal vehicle for formulating and pursuing claims to justice in Europe (Douglas-Scott 2017) and beyond (Pogge 2013). Indeed, commitment to the protection of rights, which informed early European integration (see Chapter 5), found its expression in 1950 in the adoption of the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) that is legally binding on all Council of Europe Member States. It was further confirmed in the Treaty on the European Union (TEU) in 2007, in which ‘respect for human rights’ was declared a European value (Article 2) and ‘fundamental rights’ were acknowledged to constitute a ‘general principle of the Union’s law’ rooted in the constitutional traditions of the Member States (Article 6). Also a number of other treaties and legal instruments – the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD), Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), to name just a few – testify to the fundamental importance of human rights in the European normative and legal space.

Still, the relation between justice and (human) rights is not necessarily straightforward and/or unquestioned. Zygmunt Bauman, for example, dismissed the usefulness of the ‘human rights’ principle for the realization of social justice for its contribution to ‘boundary wars’ and the perpetuation of differentiation and divisiveness’ (2001, p. 141). Similarly, Sen criticized the ‘human rights’ framework for being ‘intellectually frail – lacking in foundation and perhaps even in coherence and cogency’ (Sen 2005,

p. 151). Moreover, framing justice in terms of rights better serves some groups than others, depending on the status of the groups in question, the legal recognition and protection this status entails, and the moral grounds (such as needs, deservingness or vulnerability) upon which the protection is granted. Furthermore, enforceable legal rights seem better equipped to secure recognitive justice than to ensure representative or redistributive justice (Chapters 6 and 7). This disconnection of recognitive, redistributive and representative justice in the application of the human rights framework appears to be the major obstacle to achieving justice understood as Fraserian participatory parity. Blind spots regarding human rights seem particularly pertinent in the European multi-level legal order, where international law, EU law, national law and regional law overlap, and sometimes clash.

Justice Among Whom?

One of the basic questions addressed in *ETHOS* and several contributions to this volume relates to the question of the boundaries of justice, or what philosophers call the ‘scope of justice’. Most theories of justice (implicitly) deal with justice relations among people belonging to a single political community – usually a nation state. ‘Membership [in a political community]’, claims Michael Walzer, ‘is important because of what [its] members ... owe to one another and to no one else, or to no one else in the same degree’ However, with enhanced globalization of markets and finance, war refugees at Europe’s borders, internal European mobility and shifting sources of belonging, the distinction of who is ‘in’ and who is ‘out’, while vital for (non-)realization of justice, is increasingly difficult to draw. The growing incidence of double and multiple citizenships co-exists with rising statelessness, and the category of (non-)citizen – embedded in various sub-state, cross-state and supra-state political communities – becomes increasingly multi-layered (Anderson et al. 2014; Yuval-Davis 2011). As a result, access to primary social goods such as rights, opportunities and the social basis of self-respect differs substantially not only per country but also according to the status of individuals as national citizens, European citizens, citizens of an associated country or citizens of a (particular) third country (Anderson et al. 2014). Crucial as well is the emergence of alternative identity-based sources of belonging (for example, as a member of a specific cultural collectivity or unbounded cosmopolitan), which further complicates the traditional ‘in-or-out’ division based on formal membership (Yuval-Davis 2011), especially as neither the inclusion of all of the formal community members nor the exclusion of all of the non-members is absolutely identical.

In this volume, questions about the nature and normative basis of the boundary drawing that defines the ‘ins’ and the ‘outs’ of justice are tackled in Chapter 8 by Bridget Anderson, which zooms into the experiences of the Roma to problematize the legal status of citizenship as institutionalized in European nation states, and in the integrative Chapter 14 by Trudie Knijn, Jelena Belic and Miklós Zala, which synthesizes findings of various *ETHOS* studies on boundary drawing across various spheres of social life.

Vulnerability and Justice

While vulnerability is considered one of the crucial justice concerns, its meaning and consequences for the realization of justice is frequently contested. On the one hand, vulnerability is understood as ‘a universal, inevitable, enduring aspect of the human condition’ (Fineman 2008, p. 8). Within this approach, everybody is vulnerable, if not actually then potentially. On the other hand, as noted by Butler, ‘precarity is not simply an existential truth’; it is ‘lived differently’ (2015, p. 20) by different social groups, co-determined by their social location and/or position vis-à-vis other social actors. Thus, while constituting

a fundamental feature of human existence, it is also connected to personal, economic, social and cultural circumstances within which individuals find themselves at different points in their lives. Certain social categories – frail older citizens, persons with disability, migrants and members of ethnic minorities, youth and women – are thus often (classified as) more vulnerable than others; and their vulnerability is frequently exacerbated by intersectionality (Chapter 13).

Since the concept of vulnerability carries a particular moral weight, it implies both a need and a moral obligation to take action (Goodin 1985). People or groups defined or seen as ‘vulnerable’ are often prioritized in the allocation of redistributed resources and/or protection (Brown et al. 2017; see also Chapter 6). However, linking vulnerability with specific social categories and/or situations (like phases in the life-course or adverse circumstances) may have detrimental effects for social justice. First, it may lead to ‘naturalization’ of vulnerability, for example, when some people are considered ‘naturally’ more vulnerable than others (Brown et al. 2017), or when vulnerability is considered pathogenic, as in the case of ‘morally dysfunctional or abusive interpersonal and social relationships and socio-political oppression or injustice’, or in special cases when attempts to alleviate someone’s vulnerability result in ‘the paradoxical effect of exacerbating existing vulnerabilities or generating new ones’ (Mackenzie et al. 2014, p. 9). Undeniably, as noted by Butler (2015):

no one person suffers a lack of shelter without there being a social failure to organise shelter in such a way that it is accessible to each and every person. And no one person suffers unemployment without there being a system or a political economy that fails to safeguard against that possibility ... in some of our most vulnerable experiences of social and economic deprivation, what is revealed is not only our precariousness as individual persons ... but also the failures and inequalities of socioeconomic and political institutions. (Butler 2015, p. 21)

Second, considering ‘vulnerability’ in ‘situational’ terms may lead to the ‘stigmatization’ of vulnerable ‘populations’, which are then ‘associated with victimhood, deprivation, dependency, or pathology’ (Fineman 2008, p. 8), evaluated along the criteria of deservingness and/or risk, denied agency and voice, and subjected to social control. In such a case, ‘vulnerability’ may in fact become a mechanism for impeding injustice, as analysed in Chapter 13 by Trudie Knijn and Başak Akkan.

In this volume, the concept of vulnerability is explored in Chapter 3, which examines the significance of the concept of vulnerability for theorizing justice in the real world. Further, in some of the empirical contributions (Chapters 8 to 11), the specific theoretically fed ideals of justice and ways of understanding justice are scrutinized from the perspective of vulnerable populations. This explicit focus on the experiences of ‘the vulnerable’ constitutes a conscious attempt to escape the danger of overemphasizing the already dominant claims while neglecting the less obvious sources of harm and less visible claims to justice. It also allows us to position vulnerable groups as ethical and political subjects, and a source of justice norms. The various contributions explore the perspectives of ethnic and religious minorities, but also other marginalized populations, such as women, the young and the old, poor people and people with disabilities. Since claims to justice may be determined not only by the characteristics of the individual or the group formulating the claim (members versus non-members of a collectivity), but differ as well per sphere or domain of justice (for example, political freedom, freedom of speech and participation, security and welfare, care and work), our investigations touch upon distinct realms of social life: education (Chapter 9), care (Chapter 10) and labour market (Chapter 11) as well as the questions of mobility and citizenship (Chapter 8).

In their unique ways, each of the empirical studies presented in Chapters 8 to 11 problematizes the notion of vulnerability and exposes the working of the cross-cutting, often mutually reinforcing, vulnerabilities. By emphasizing differences between the various sub-categories of ‘the vulnerable’, each with their unique needs, identities and preferences, the authors of those studies draw attention to the constructed nature of the notion of ‘vulnerability’ and the injustice inherent in the (implicit) treatment of the various ‘vulnerable groups’ as a generic social category. They also show how categorization into specific (allegedly vulnerable) groups enhances vulnerability (and injustice as mis-recognition) through stigma. At the same time, all of the contributions testify to the universality of vulnerability as the human condition in the face of which certain classifications and distinctions, such as between ‘citizen’ and ‘migrant’ or ‘dependent’ and ‘independent’ prove essentially irrelevant: under specific circumstances all of us are vulnerable regardless of our (formal) status. Next, they demonstrate how the category of ‘vulnerability’ presupposes the existence of a normatively preferred *modus vivendi*, governed by neoliberal ideals of self-sufficiency, responsibility and in- rather than interdependence (see Chapter 10). Those results resonate with the observations by other scholars. Finally, all of the empirically based chapters demonstrate how socio-economic and political institutions, through policy failures, negligence and inadequate institutional practices, create or enhance ‘vulnerability’ of various social categories – mobile citizens, minority children, frail older citizens, persons with a disability, (female) carers and young workers. In Chapter 13 that classification is further explored as a mechanism that impedes injustice. Indeed, as observed by Butler, ‘none of us acts without the conditions to act’ (2015, p. 16). At the same time, however, the numerous examples of resistance and coping and attempts to redefine the dominant discourse prove that a conceptualization that reduces ‘the vulnerable’ to mere ‘victims’ of circumstance and state (in)action constitutes a harmful simplification and is in itself an act of misrecognition.

Current Volume

All of the chapters in this volume reflect ETHOS research efforts. The book starts with a number of theoretical contributions that discuss how justice is approached and conceptualized in the academic disciplines included in the project: philosophy, legal studies, social and political science and economy (Chapters 2 to 4), followed by empirical studies of the European legal framework that sets the foundation for the realization of justice (Chapters 5 to 7) and studies of how justice and injustice take form ‘on the ground’, within the realm of experience of those deemed ‘vulnerable’ (Chapters 8 to 11). The volume ends with three integrative chapters reflecting on the applicability of Fraser’s tripartite approach to justice in contemporary Europe (Chapter 12), mechanisms that impede justice (Chapter 13) and boundaries of justice (Chapter 14). Set in the tradition of non-ideal theorizing, all of the chapters in this volume take a critical stance. They problematize not only the issue of justice but also the notion of vulnerability, questions of the relationship between justice and law, and Europe, the EU and its Member States as sites and agents of justice. Moreover, as seen especially in Chapter 4 and Chapters 12 to 14, the bridging of the empirical ‘is’ with the normative ‘ought’ is informed (and complicated) by different academic disciplines: political philosophy, sociology, law, economics and political science, each of which approaches and conceptualizes justice in a distinct, sometimes contrasting, manner. Such interdisciplinary approaches to studying justice are scarce. Most academic studies on justice rely either on normative philosophical theories or psychological theories, while most sociological, economic and legal studies assume but do not problematize the concept of justice. The interdisciplinary approach of this volume can be therefore seen as rather innovative, just like the approach to studying justice in its interde-

pendence between the ideal and the real, the normative and the practical, the formal and the informal – all set in the highly complex institutions of modern European societies. <>

THE TYRANNY OF VIRTUE, IDENTITY, THE ACADEMY, AND THE HUNT FOR POLITICAL HERESIES by Robert Boyers [Scribner, 9781982127183]

From public intellectual and professor Robert Boyers, “a powerfully persuasive, insightful, and provocative prose that mixes erudition and first-hand reportage” (Joyce Carol Oates) addressing recent developments in American culture and arguing for the tolerance of difference that is at the heart of the liberal tradition.

Written from the perspective of a liberal intellectual who has spent a lifetime as a writer, editor, and college professor, **THE TYRANNY OF VIRTUE, IDENTITY, THE ACADEMY, AND THE HUNT FOR POLITICAL HERESIES** is a “courageous, unsparing, and nuanced to a rare degree” (Mary Gaitskill) insider’s look at shifts in American culture—most especially in the American academy—that so many people find alarming.

Part memoir and part polemic, Boyers’s collection of essays laments the erosion of standard liberal values, and covers such subjects as tolerance, identity, privilege, appropriation, diversity, and ableism that have turned academic life into a minefield. Why, Robert Boyers asks, are a great many liberals, people who should know better, invested in the drawing up of enemies lists and driven by the conviction that on critical issues no dispute may be tolerated? In stories, anecdotes, and character profiles, a public intellectual and longtime professor takes on those in his own progressive cohort who labor in the grip of a poisonous and illiberal fundamentalism. The end result is a finely tuned work of cultural intervention from the front lines.

Review

“An intellectually stimulating series of essays about the decline of civility and academic freedom.” — ***Albany Times Union***

“Boyers has given us a crucial lesson in the sweeping anti-liberalism of present-day leftists.” —***Tablet***

“A rousing call for speech on college campuses that is truly free, addressing uncomfortable issues while allowing room for dissent...Coming from a clearly liberal point of view, Boyers nonetheless courts controversy—and is bound to get it—with some of his tenets, such as the thought that identity politics as such evinces ‘a fear of the uncertainties and hard choices that come with modernity and the need to think.’ A nuanced argument of interest to those who worry that nuanced arguments are no longer possible in quad or classroom.” —***Kirkus Reviews***

“Robert Boyers writes in the great tradition of Saul Bellow, Irving Howe and Susan Sontag: a powerfully persuasive, insightful and provocative prose that mixes erudition and first-hand reportage,

combativeness and sympathy, moral vehemence and humor. From his vantage point as longtime editor of the preeminent journal *Salmagundi*, Boyers has been in close contact with every seismic shift in literary, intellectual, artistic and academic quarters in recent decades, and for those of us who may require guidance, here is our guide.” —**Joyce Carol Oates**

“Robert Boyers’s voice is a bracing one: courageous, unsparing, and nuanced to a rare degree. In this book, he patiently and wittily speaks sanity to the towering forces of cultural craziness, and he actually respects everyone—well, nearly everyone—whom he subjects to his rigorous critique. For anyone wondering how a person should be, **THE TYRANNY OF VIRTUE, IDENTITY, THE ACADEMY, AND THE HUNT FOR POLITICAL HERESIES** is an excellent example.” —**Mary Gaitskill**

“This is a moment in which many robust voices claim attention for groups and causes that have been undervalued historically—a splendid moment for a culture that, at its best, places great value on reform that tends toward justice. In our universities, the debates it encourages have sometimes become vitriolic and judgmental. Robert Boyers has given us a reminder of the complexity of the issues at stake and the urgency of preventing a humane impulse from being overwhelmed by passions unworthy of it.” —**Marilynne Robinson**

“Robert Boyers has written a probing meditation on his experiences within the left-liberal cultural bubble, including his own college, where he has been a formidable presence for decades. He trenchantly challenges assumptions, slogans and nostrums of those excessively certain and proud of their ‘wokeness.’ I found **THE TYRANNY OF VIRTUE, IDENTITY, THE ACADEMY, AND THE HUNT FOR POLITICAL HERESIES** to be instructive and inspiring.” —**Randall Kennedy, Michael Klein Professor of Law, Harvard University**

“This book offers a sustained argument against the virtue-signaling and apologetics that have become a major force in the arts and academic life. Boyers’s assessment is all the more persuasive for the way it draws on his own long experience as a teacher, critic, and commentator on American culture.” —**David Bromwich, Yale University**

“*The Tyranny of Virtue*: think of virtue as an ideal, and yet also as a tyranny, and all that does not belong to that realm must cower and disappear. We live in a time when true virtue seems to have disappeared, and everything that is not virtuous has taken to wearing virtue as a cloak. Of course I might have begun by saying that I know of almost no one but Robert Boyers who can succinctly penetrate and dispose of this masquerade of a period we are living in. So much that is wrong and dark he reveals in extraordinarily limpid prose, showing us that what is out there will not be made right and clear without the courage to name the human mess we have made. The life of the academy should remain sacred, and this book makes a splendid case for it, for the proposition that virtue is permanently hinged to the ideal of truth—that many-hued and illusive reality. The admirable and triumphant accomplishment of this

work is that it adds to the ongoingness of our common enterprise. **THE TYRANNY OF VIRTUE, IDENTITY, THE ACADEMY, AND THE HUNT FOR POLITICAL HERESIES** is a wonderful book, and I shall always have it nearby.” —**Jamaica Kincaid**

“For decades Robert Boyers has been a bracing voice of sanity amid the ideological fashions of left and right. **THE TYRANNY OF VIRTUE, IDENTITY, THE ACADEMY, AND THE HUNT FOR POLITICAL HERESIES** is vintage Boyers—a brave and timely challenge to the suffocating moral orthodoxy that has come to envelop academic life and much of our broader public discourse as well. No one who cares about the future of independent thought can afford to ignore this book.” —**Jackson Lears, Board of Governors Distinguished Professor of History, Rutgers University**

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Acknowledgments

Bitter struggles deform their participants in subtle, complicated ways. The idea that one should speak one's cultural allegiance first and the truth second (and that this is a sign of authenticity) is precisely such a deformation. —**Zadie Smith**

A student at a graduation party tells you she thinks you're "woke," and you say thank you and you're not sure you know what that means. "It's no small thing," she continues, "for an old white guy like you." And so you think further about it the next day. Try to process the idea. Obvious that you can talk the talk. Invoke the system and the market, inequality and abuse, neoliberalism and privilege. That you don't offend. After three classes with you the student probably means mainly that. You don't offend. Willing to talk politics when teaching your courses. Not averse to assigning books sure to provoke unrest. Michel Houellebecq and Claudia Rankine. Susan Sontag and Slavoj Zizek. Zadie Smith and Philip Roth. And yet no prospect, you think, that you'll spontaneously utter something that will lead decent people to walk out or turn their backs. Decent people. The kinds who sign up for your classes, attend your lectures, read your articles, and occasionally send you email letters to express their encouragement or disappointment. Even your kids, who are given to noting your deficiencies, assure you that you've

written nothing to embarrass them—not yet, though they are wary of your insistence on coming out with things uncomfortable or contrarian. Your habit of criticism. Your tendency to quarrel with people in your own left-liberal cohort. The pleasure you take in saying no to things many of your friends embrace. Maybe too reluctant to let people know you're with them. Pissed off about always needing to show your papers and confirm you're on board. Wanting to have it both ways. Wanting to be "woke" and yet disdainful of the rituals and empty posturing that signify your determination never to offend. In truth, if truth be told, not always on board even with what passes for the higher wisdom in your own herd of independent minds. Your friendly demeanor no longer sufficient to cover over the fact that you're unwilling to sit quietly, hands nicely folded, in the total cultural environment many of your friends and colleagues want to inhabit. Total, in that all are expected to speak with one voice about the right and the true. No misgivings permitted. An environment in which naysayers and dissidents are routinely asked to leave the room. Not always "asked," you say, wondering, not for the first time, how you can have avoided that fate yourself.

The resolve not to be swept off your feet, to avoid fanaticism and ideology, often ends in ambivalence. Nothing new in that. The standard caricature of liberals has it that they are unable to make judgments at all, that they are weak and irresolute. Boring.* That the best they can aim for is coexistence. Getting along with opponents. Keeping open the channels of communication. Don't you ever feel sick and tired of pushing tolerance? A question put to you late one night by venerable provocateur Stanley Fish at a New Year's Eve party in Miami Beach. Fish notorious for promoting the caricature of liberals as people who want the mind to be empty of commitments, who are paralyzed by principles. You tell him you're amazed he still promotes this nonsense, that he's been peddling this caricature for so many years that he actually believes it. He says, amiably, that if you're willing to stand and fight, you should just stop calling yourself a liberal. Admit there are things you won't negotiate. You laugh. Tell him you're always willing to talk. And fight. In the university, you tell him, to refuse to talk is to give up the game. A liberal who's willing to fight is a contradiction in terms, he says.

In fact, you've been a partisan in the ongoing culture wars for about thirty years. Troubled by the turn in liberal culture toward what Fish calls "structures of exclusion." Trying to square your liberal principles with your sense that people who are with you on most things—on the obligation to move the world as it is closer to the world as it should be—are increasingly suspicious of dissent. Bizarre, of course, that of all places the liberal university should now be the one where strenuous efforts are most emphatically made to ensure consensus. Your own efforts in recent years having mainly to do with attempting to understand how people who are as adept as you are at arguing ideas and reading books can have managed to sign on to protocols that are often intolerant and illiberal. Always you wonder that these people—many of them amiable and well-read—no longer incline to think about the fact, noted by political theorist Stephen Holmes and many others, that "public disagreement [as] a creative force may have been the most novel and radical principle of liberal politics." Little question, is there, that there is not much appetite for serious debate when the opposition is unintimidated. You see it on their faces when someone comes out with something even mildly provocative. The rare, playful, contradictory utterance like a bad smell the mildest among them prefer not to acknowledge, while others, a bit more honest, are increasingly adept at wielding the familiar arsenal of dismissive epithets, invoking the not yet exhausted vocabulary of surefire conversation stoppers. Privilege, power, hostile environment. The really fierce apparatchiks poised to promote and finish the essential ideological cleansing.

Like others you've by now had it with the so-called free-speech controversies, which have been talked to death especially by partisans of the right, who pretend that the well-publicized eruptions of violence at Yale and Middlebury and other such places confirm their own reactionary prejudices and proclivities. But occasional efforts to disinvite controversial lecturers or disrupt classes are but a small token of more important problems, which include not only the demands for "safe spaces" but the widespread insistence on rituals designed to affirm that teachers are okay with the formulas favored by the most vocal cadres on campus, not to mention the prescriptions sent down by university officials and human resources professionals. Especially galling are the mandated sessions with lawyers and bureaucrats designed to generate an atmosphere of unanimity, the sense that everyone, from the newly arrived freshman student to the department chair and provost, will be eager, when asked, to provide the correct answers to every question and thereby to avoid dispute, controversy, or legal challenge.

Of course now and then, in spite of the strenuous efforts to create a total culture, some incident will upend the order of things for a day or a month, and you think that maybe this time the dueling factions will actually attempt to engage in serious talk and renounce the slogans. Will they perhaps become disgusted with their inclination to call out others who've failed to "check their privilege" and instead think about privilege as something other than a lethal put-down? Will there be, at least temporarily, a halt to the protocols designed to shame or bully susceptible students or colleagues? Any chance, you wonder, that those given to condemning and harassing people who've said "the wrong thing" or dared to teach an offensive book or film will stop performing their vulnerability and abandon the studied censoriousness now so pervasive in precincts of the contemporary liberal university?

You remember that you're by no means alone in lamenting what makes the criticism of your own cohort so painful and difficult. In part, you suppose, the situation in the academy has something to do with larger problems in liberal culture. The political thinker Michael Walzer contends that "no one on the left has succeeded in telling a story that brings together the different values to which we are committed and connects them to some general picture of what the modern world is like and what our country should be like." You take that in and you think that you would like to tell the story Walzer wants. And yet the trouble is that the values you embrace are not always compatible with one another. That the instinct to be charitable and forgiving is contradicted by the instinct to be critical and to call things by their rightful names. That the respect you accord to opponents can seem irresponsible when those opponents are themselves intolerant and are bent on shutting up people like you.

More troubling still, many of those in your cohort refuse to acknowledge that contradiction is an elementary fact of our common life, and are in denial about all the things their own avowals fail to take into account. Hard not to feel disappointed when brilliant law students at Harvard mobilize to forbid the use of the word "violate," or when students and teachers at Brandeis deploy the term "microaggression" to attack an installation designed to expose racial stereotypes.

Are there in fact microaggressions? No doubt. Are some people uncomfortable when we use ordinary terms like "violate" and thereby trigger in them unwanted thoughts? To be sure. But it is—it must be—legitimate to ask what is lost and what is gained when we capitulate to demands that have as their objective the cleansing of the common language and the creation of a surveillance culture.

When a lawyer at your own New York State Summer Writers Institute, working on a memoir about her own personal tribulations, mounts a public campaign against the screening of a "disturbing" 1960s

Italian comedy that may trigger, in a person with her background, traumatic memories, you are courteous and sympathetic, and yet find that what counts for her is the opportunity to invoke a principle and to put others—yourself very much included—on the defensive. When you tell her that the principle she invokes—it's never a good idea to screen films that portray desire, abuse, or subordination—is not a principle you share, and that other students in the program clearly have an entirely different view of such matters, she tells you that as a man you'll never understand the problem. You wonder what such encounters reveal about the culture and about your own resistance to the kinds of complaint articulated by a person who is deeply invested in her convictions. A friend tells you that you must learn to relax. Avoid unnecessary agitation. Let small things be small things and move on. And if they're not small things? They're always smaller than you make them out to be, he says. That lawyer is symptomatic of nothing.

The attempt to create a total cultural environment and to silence or intimidate opponents is part of a campaign that had once seemed promising, even to those—yourself included—alarmed at the irrationality and anti-intellectuality unleashed by many of the most vocal proponents of the new fundamentalism. But concepts with some genuine merit—like "privilege," "appropriation," and even "microaggression" were very rapidly weaponized, and well-intentioned discussions of "identity," "inequality," and "disability" became the leading edge of new efforts to label and separate the saved and the damned, the "woke" and the benighted, the victim and the oppressor. Concepts useful in careful and nuanced discussions proved strikingly "amenable to over-extension," as the cultural historian Rochelle Gurstein put it, and ideas suitable for addressing "psychological distress" were forced into the service of efforts to "[redress] the subordination of one people by another," yielding not significant redress but a new wave of puritanism and a culture of suspicion.

It's tempting to fall back on the notion that cultural battles are predictable and recurrent and that those who wage them are always apt to lose sight of what is truly important. Your middle son, a CEO and social justice activist in St. Louis, reminds you that speech codes and academic protocols distract you from what you know to be the major issues out there in the real world, and you argue, not always successfully, that "privilege," "toleration," "identity," and "appropriation" are in fact real-world issues. Different, to be sure, from equality or sexual violence or racism, but important. Even good ideas, you say, when they are misused and misunderstood, can create a toxic environment. And the university is, in many ways, an increasingly toxic environment. Toxic in what sense? your son asks. You'll read my book, you tell him, and you'll hear my stories, and follow out the arc of my thinking, for what it's worth. And you'll see that, as always, I'm mainly trying to identify and wrestle with my own uncertainties, while demanding that others do no less. And if they're not as doubt-filled as you are? Well, they should be, shouldn't they? you reply. Does it ever occur to you, he asks, that you put too high a value on doubt and contradiction? Let me get back to you about that, you say. <>

OUR SHADOWED WORLD: REFLECTIONS ON CIVILIZATION, CONFLICT, AND BELIEF by Dominic Kirkham [Westar Studies, Cascade Books, 9781532661747]

Civilization is often equated with the story of human advancement and progress. Yet it is also the story of human oppression, exploitation, war, and empire. In our own time, modern global civilization has brought us to the brink of planetary destruction. By offering an understanding of our past, this book aims to provide a stimulus to considering a different future. **OUR SHADOWED WORLD: REFLECTIONS ON CIVILIZATION, CONFLICT, AND BELIEF** considers how we have been brought to this point. It describes how the fragmented and conflicted state of humanity has "progressed" from the earliest city-states to the devastation of world war and holocaust--how civilization has brought its own form of savagery.

What beliefs have underlain and motivated human action? How have humans tried to understand their world? Driven by the relentless quest for power, by greed, and by extreme beliefs, the human enterprise today has placed the very idea of civilization under threat, the subject of radical questioning. Despite a new ecological awareness dedicated to saving the planet from civilization's carelessness, and a preoccupation with the nature of apocalyptic thinking, a question mark looms over the very survival of humanity in its present state--a question mark that now overshadows the world.

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A Personal Encounter with the Savagery of Civilization

“It is with civilization that human ‘savagery’ becomes an agonizing part of the human condition.”

A. B. Schmookler

Many people can recall an event that changed them forever—a completely unexpected incident that altered the whole course of their lives. It need not have been dramatic or traumatic in itself, perhaps it was no more than a chance encounter or an unexpected visitor, but it was an event whose powerful effects they only later began to recognize.

My chance visit to Poland in 1982 was such an event. At that time Europe was entering into a critical period of change with a sclerotic Soviet Union hovering on the point of collapse and increasingly restive satellite nations struggling to survive under its oppressive yoke. None was more disgruntled than Poland, where a fractious electrician from Gdańsk named Lech Walesa had taken the lead of the protest movement *Solidarnosc*. Solidarity threatened to topple the Communist hierarchy and was determined to settle for nothing less. In the face of an imminent Soviet invasion, Prime Minister Jaruzelski choose the least disreputable option, declared martial law, and put Walesa under house arrest.

It was in this volatile context that a Polish friend then living in Warsaw asked if I would like to visit for the Easter holidays. I readily accepted, and my life was never the same again. Though I had previously visited Poland and Russia, and was quite familiar with their history and cultures from college studies under a tutor who was an East European refugee, nothing prepared me for a whole nation on the edge of a precipice. The atmosphere was not simply electric but volcanic, charged with what can be described only as an apocalyptic expectancy.

This sense was heightened by the Easter season itself, with its many dramatic church displays highlighting the theme of the conflict of good and evil with the possibility of a triumphal resurrection. But this was not just a theological or religious message, with which as a priest I was quite familiar, but a none-too-subtle theopolitical statement of resolution and revolution in the face of an overbearing atheistic tyranny (Soviet communism). It was all very much in tune with the traditional Polish messianic self-identity stretching back to Michiewicz and the early Romantics. The vibrancy of this tradition was something quite new to me and was made more intense by the fact that beyond anyone’s wildest dreams a Polish pope had just been elected in Rome. Surely not only Poland’s but all of Europe’s destiny was about to be transformed—and they were definitely up for the fight.

I returned to England almost in a daze. The experience had quite disorientated me, and curiously the thing that seemed most difficult to come to terms with was the sheer ordinariness of life here in England: people strolled down the street without a care in the world, perhaps into a shop to buy something or for a game in the park—just doing as they pleased. It seemed impossible to imagine this was part of the same world as the one I had just left—a place of riots, revolution, and religious intoxication. When I spoke about this sense of disorientation to a Polish acquaintance, he fully understood; he told of a relative who had recently been for a visit to England and had to be carried out of a supermarket in a state of collapse, so overwhelmed was he not only by the abundance of goods, but by being free to buy whatever he wanted. Poland was a land of empty store shelves, rationed goods, and

endemic scarcity—a place where one had to wait in line for everything, and even a delivery of toilet paper to a store could become a major event.

An even more immediate and powerful experience, indeed among the most significant of my life, was a visit to Auschwitz. Nothing could prepare one for the visual impact of that horrific place as an indelible testimonial to human cruelty. Even more difficult to accept was that what happened there was the product of an advanced, modern society of which I was a part. For Jews it was a *churban*, an event of utter destructiveness that defies comprehension; for those who survived the death camps it meant that life could never be the same. As is the consequence for torture victims in general, they experienced a loss of faith in humanity, felt radically detached from society, and lived with a question mark hanging over the very meaning and purpose of life. One of the first and most famous reflections on life in Auschwitz was Viktor Frankl's tellingly titled *Man's Search for Meaning*. The title of Primo Levi's *If This Is a Man*, was equally indicative and perhaps ominous, for in the end the memory proved unbearable, and he committed suicide.

For me, even more significant than the horrific historical facts of Auschwitz was their wider context—the question of how such events could have happened. What tragic flaw in the society and perhaps even the broader civilization had made it possible? In many ways Auschwitz seemed to symbolize the death of the civilization that made it possible. The consequences were seismic, and the implications have preoccupied me ever since.

One consequence was to question the very nature of evil. Both as a Catholic and a priest I was familiar with the notion of evil and its hypostatization (from the Greek hypostasis: foundation) in the figure of the devil—he whose satanic presence figured largely in those Easter posters in Polish churches, inferring implying that his current incarnation was the Soviet Union, famously described by Ronald Regan as “the evil empire.” Surely in the case of Auschwitz the immediate agency of Hitler as a monster of satanic force could be blamed for all that had happened. Such an explanation left the rest of us as much in the clear as it did the many ordinary Germans who at the time denied any knowledge of what had happened in the death camps.

But I found this whole narrative—along with its assumption of an underlying evil as an external influence on humanity—not only unconvincing but so delusional as to amount to a state of denial. I began to see that the cause lay in the nature of humanity itself and the sort of society that we humans create. Events like the Holocaust were neither exceptional nor inexplicable, but the result of an aspect of humanity about which many were unwilling to inquire too deeply or too willing to dismiss as the work of evil monsters. As Holocaust theologian Richard Rubenstein commented, by our neglecting to recognize the nature of the human desire for destructiveness, an outpouring of evil had been unleashed upon millions of innocent victims.

Introduction

Far more disturbing, and even threatening, is the recognition that people like Hitler and Himmler, the chief executive of the Holocaust, were not exceptional people, but ordinary human beings like you and me. Himmler was a loving father and family man who frequently wrote home regretting that his “duties” kept him away for so long. The same was true of the Auschwitz camp commandant, Rudolf Hoess, who was dedicated to his work and liked nothing better than listening to Mozart in the company of his family

after a tiring day's work. It just so happened that his "work" was mass murder. Among recent historical studies, Thomas Weber's *Hitler's First War* documents Hitler's transformation from an unexceptional, conscientious soldier to a madman—a change driven by personal frustration and enabled by the society in which he lived: a society that provided many eager collaborators. Equally notorious purveyors of evil were Stalin, Mao, and Franco, who remain national icons. And one of the most shocking things about the social psychologist Stanley Milgram's research experiments was the ease with which ordinary people could be turned into killers, especially if they were conscientious. At the Nuremberg trials a Rorschach psychological test was given to all the accused Nazis, and all registered as normal!

Granted the individual flaws of the actors in this drama, it seems clear to me that contemporary history and society had created a matrix that made such events possible. Deeply implicated in this worldwide tragedy are the nature of European culture and the role of the church in the long and shameful history of anti-Semitism (though some dissemble even at this description, preferring to call it anti-Judaism, as if this were somehow more acceptable!). In fact, it was through the explicit and deliberate policies of the Catholic Church that twelfth-century Europe became what the medievalist Robert I. Moore termed in the title of a book a *Persecuting Society*, and has remained so down to the present day. As a Catholic priest, I found this increasingly difficult for me to cope with. Not only was the hierarchical church complicit, but the very nature of Christian religious belief and practice is tainted with anti-Semitism that is firmly rooted in the gospels and in other documents foundational to the faith.

And thus it was that just as I had come to reject the traditional understanding of evil, so I now began to reject traditional theism and much of the religious tradition in which I had grown up. For the death camp survivor Elie Wiesel there could be no belief in God after Auschwitz. For writers like Richard Rubenstein, in *After Auschwitz*, God cannot be exempted from what happened in history, and neo-Orthodox attempts at explaining this unspeakable evil as some sort of punishment or retribution must be rejected as utterly contemptible. Having arrived at these conclusions, after nearly thirty years as a religious and a priest I left the church and ministry.

This book, then is the outcome of a long personal journey and years of reflection. Though it may lack a compelling narrative, it does have the overall coherence of theme and purpose adumbrated above: the historical evaluation of our human predicament and what we call civilization. Many of the individual chapters have resulted from years of reflection and have grown old with me! They may have begun as reflections on particular topics—the nature of tyranny and ideology, of civilization and society, of ways of thinking and the nature of belief, of militarism and misogyny—but have widened out into meditations on humanity and where civilization has led us in its present predicament as it faces not only the threat of genocide but that of ecocide—the destruction of the planet. In a way the story of this book is how we created a civilization but devastated the earth.

I have been led to put these reflections in written form not primarily to see them published, nor to persuade others of a particular view. Rather, they have arisen as a consequence of my own search for understanding; I see them as explorations rather than conclusions. Others will have their own views, and mine are no more than pinpricks on a vast canvas; but perhaps they will serve as a prompt to the hopeful reflection that as a species we are able to do better, that humanity can become more humane.

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QUEER PROPHETS: THE BIBLE'S SURPRISE ENDING TO THE STORY OF SEXUALITY AND GENDER by Greg Paul [Wipf and Stock, 9781725266568]

This is the story of a spiritual journey, a theological quest to find better biblical answers (ones that work in real life) to the challenging questions that plague many of us surrounding gender and sexual identity. If God is love, why does he seemingly reject LGBTQ+ people? How can Christians truly embrace them without abandoning their biblical convictions? How are queer Christians supposed to live? No story ends where it began. If we follow the story instead of treating the Bible as a document recording a set of precepts, we find that the angst, division, and abuse set in motion by the fall in the garden are reconciled and resolved in the city of the new Jerusalem. And just possibly, we may also find that “queer” people have a prophetic function for our age.

Review

"In this hermeneutic of the street Greg Paul invites us to join him on the twisted, confusing, and conflicted path that has led him to a place of LGBTQ+ affirmation. This is a path taken with deep integrity, courage, and humility. Whether or not you can walk with Paul to the same destination, you will find him to be a good companion and guide along the way." --Brian Walsh, co-author of *Romans Disarmed and Beyond Homelessness*

"Regardless of what you think of Greg Paul's book *Queer Prophets*, he's done us and the church a massive service by writing it. Where Christians have too often bogged down in fruitless, bitter debates about an issue, he sees this man, this woman. He knows their names, has listened well to their stories, and now tells those stories with humility, compassion, and wisdom. No one is more qualified to do so. Greg can navigate Scripture with depth and deftness, but he is no armchair theologian. He has walked with queer folk for more than three decades, and here brings us the fruit of that journey. Many will read this book and disagree with some or all of it. But it is impossible to read this book and not be deeply moved, profoundly convicted, and left with a longing for a more excellent way." --Mark Buchanan, author of *God Walk: Moving at the Speed of Your Soul*

"If you would prefer to avoid linking lived experience with the biblical narrative, this book will be irritating. It seeks to weave together personal story with God's story. If you prefer strident arguments, this book will be frustrating. It is invitational, and welcoming. If you like books that provide linear and definitive conclusions on controversial matters, this book will be disorienting. It is humble and winsome. If your perspective on the LGBT community is issue-, topic-, and debate-oriented, this book will be disappointing. It is filled with faces, names, and stories. Put your irritation, frustration, disorientation, and disappointment on hold for a short time and listen to this master storyteller." --Rod Wilson, author of *Exploring Your Anger and How Do I Help a Hurting Friend?*

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This Is a Story, Friend

This is a story, friend, so pour yourself something to sip on and pull up a chair.

You might say it’s the story of a theological quest, but that seems a little bloodless, although it’s true enough in a limited way. Really, it’s the tale of one straight, pretty conservative Christian guy who kept looking for better answers because so many of his friends were LGBTQ2+. In the process he—I—realized that the narrative twist at the conclusion of the Bible story clarified much that had been obscure or downright problematic before. I had never heard anyone else reference this perspective before (still haven’t), so after about six years of ruminating on it and testing the ideas out on friends, some of whom are in fact actual theologians, I thought I should put it out there.

I might just be bold enough to describe myself as a student of the Bible—I’ve been reading it almost daily for close to fifty years, since I was a child, and studying and preaching from it almost weekly in my own quirky way for more than forty—but I’m certainly no scholar. You should know that right out of the gate. I have zero formal academic theological training. On the other hand, I’ve spent decades trying to live the gospel on the streets of Toronto, the largest city in Canada. The specific area that I’ve worked in houses what was identified, in the early nineties when I began, as one of the three largest queer communities in the world. Amsterdam and San Francisco were the others. I’ve learned a thing or two; I’d say I’ve probably unlearned even more.

When I started working on this book, I thought I’d offer an anecdote or two, then slide straight into a clear, concise presentation of the theological “argument” that’s at its core. The more I wrote the more I realized it needed to be rooted in a story. My own story. Since it involves what is often identified as *the* hot-button issue of our time for the church, some readers will no doubt delight in picking that argument apart, getting up in arms about it, and in time-honored tradition, slugging the author. It won’t be hard to do. I fully expect that sort of response to come from both “sides” and frankly I don’t care much. (And really, racism, greed, addiction to power, and many other evidences of the church’s abandonment of the gospel of the just kingdom of God should probably be closer to the top of the hot-button list.)

I do care about the other kinds of readers. I hope there will be queer folk who read this and will find in it both comfort and challenge. I hope some readers will be straight folk who, like me, are deeply convinced that the Bible is God’s word, and as such can’t just dismiss or ignore any part of it. Those readers want to really love, the way Jesus said we should; specifically, they want to really love queer people they’ve come to know and care about—and yet they find, sometimes, that their convictions about what the Bible teaches makes it hard to do so truly and fully. They sense that if ordinary people can seemingly be more accepting and more inclusive than God, we have a theological problem. I hope those good folk will find a way forward herein. Some other readers, I suspect, will be ones who have at some point decided that the Bible is just goofy or out of date about some issues, and can’t really be taken seriously. They’ve simply ditched the passages that bother them and focus on the stuff that they think makes good sense. My hope for them is that this story will recover their confidence that the Holy Spirit breathes throughout the entire Bible and even reveal that the God depicted within it is good beyond what they’ve been able to imagine. Because he is, you know.

A word about the term “queer,” which I use as a convenience throughout: there are lots of people within the LGBTQ2+ spectrum who don’t like it. I don’t blame them. (A few don’t even like LGBTQ2+.) However, I’ve been unable to find a better simple catch-all word to encompass people who identify as gay, lesbian, bisexual, transgender, asexual, two-spirited, nonbinary, or one of a slew of other terms that seem to keep proliferating. If the word bothers you, I apologize, and hope you might be able to receive it in the spirit of the King James Version phrase “a peculiar people.” It’s used in Deuteronomy (twice), Titus, and I Peter to describe people God has chosen as his own. I should note too that, for the sake of simplicity, my story only directly references gay, lesbian, and trans people, although the ideas presented certainly cover the entire spectrum of sexual and gender identity.

You may realize that I frequently and inaccurately conflate transgender and same-gender attracted (gay, lesbian, and bi) people, at least by implication. I freely acknowledge that they are, quite evidently, not the same. The one group is identified by gender, the other by sexuality. It’s worth noting that the sexual orientation of transgender people doesn’t change after they’ve transitioned. I’ve conflated them (along with people who identify in a myriad of other ways along the LGBTQ2+ continuum) because gender and sexual identity are connected closely enough that the same general theological questions tend to arise about both, and it seems to me that many of the same biblical principles apply.

Since this is the story of an individual spiritual journey, not a theological treatise, I’ve not footnoted anything. I’m not trying to definitively “prove” anything. If it’s really necessary, I’ve noted my source in the text. If you encounter a paragraph that makes you wonder, “Where on earth did he get that?” I’m sure the good folks at Google will make it plain. As I said, this is no scholarly work. I should also make it absolutely clear that I am not offering anything in this book as Sanctuary’s “position” on any matter. (Sanctuary is the community and church I work and hang out in.)

The Story Isn’t Finished Yet

Early in 2017, not long after I’d begun writing this book, I hit an emotional wall. It was a slow-motion crash, like those automotive safety clips where you see a close-up of the test dummies as the car rams into the barricade. In fact, when I looked back on it later, I realized it had been coming for years.

It got worse as summer approached and, along with it, a big celebration of Sanctuary's twenty-fifth anniversary we had been planning. I had been there at the beginning, the first full-time worker, and I had been active in one form or another of street-level outreach in Toronto's downtown core for a good fifteen years before that. Throughout Sanctuary's history, I had been the primary pastoral figure, which among other things meant that, almost invariably, I was the one who facilitated the funerals and memorials.

Our community is made up mostly of people who are poor and street-involved. Many are homeless, lots are addicted and/or struggling with mental illness. I would guess that most, to a greater or lesser degree, are afflicted with post-trauma issues. These people were not and are not clients—that's almost a dirty word in our context; they are community members, friends, and even "family" members. One indigenous man calls me "uncle," a term of respect and affection I greatly prize; some others call me "brother" and a few even refer to me as "Dad." Which can be a little strange when coming from someone only a few years younger than oneself, but it's still very sweet.

Because of the poverty and affliction my people experience, the rate of death is absurdly and tragically high. Because of the closeness of relationship, because of the preciousness of these brothers and sisters and the routinely horrid, often violent circumstances in which they pass, their deaths are more than usually traumatic to the community and to me personally. Having had to hold it together so I could properly facilitate the grieving of others, and having had to do that month after month, year after year for a quarter of a century while awash in sorrow myself had, it became clear, done some damage.

I'd wake up in the night assaulted by lurid images of the deaths I'd either witnessed personally or imagined from what I knew about the circumstances of my friends' passing. Lying in my bed in the darkness, they would clip through my mind one after the other like a macabre highlight reel I couldn't shut off. This had happened now and then through the years, but as the anniversary approached, it became a nightly occurrence. I'd come to in the morning exhausted and stunned, feeling as if I had been emotionally pummeled.

At the anniversary celebration itself, I experienced what I would later recognize as my first truly waking dissociative episode. It was triggered by standing with my step-daughter Gillian before the event got underway, watching a montage of photos of members of our community scroll through on a video monitor. I kept saying to her, "He's gone . . . she's dead . . . those two on the left are gone . . ." I had to turn away. I managed to fulfill all my necessary functions that night but felt as though I was watching myself from somewhere up in the rafters, metaphysically and emotionally disengaged. To this day, I can't really remember what happened throughout the rest of that evening.

After a couple of more funerals, and more dissociative episodes that were worse than the first, I knew I needed some help. My wife, Maggie, and my dear friend Alan, Sanctuary's executive director, gave me some good advice about some things I needed to do myself—things I had long been afraid to face—and with their support, I began. But I also thought I needed some good counsel or therapy.

But where to find it? Grief counsellors, I suspected, would be familiar with the struggles of people who had lost a loved one, or maybe even two or three over a short period of time. Trauma therapists generally focused on people who had experienced cataclysmic events in their own lives. What I was experiencing was by no means worse—my dissociative episodes were mild compared to those of some

of my friends—but it seemed different: the regular deaths of people I loved, sometimes a few in the course of a single week, dozens upon dozens of them by overdose, suicide, insane accidents, murder; often dying alone in dismal squalid rooms or alleys or parking garage stairwells or cardboard and plastic squats. I didn't know anyone who had been as close to these particular “front lines” for as long as me.

In time I realized that my answer was to be found in the opening chapters of this book: John. John could help me. He had embalmed and buried more than a hundred friends in a short few years at the height of the AIDS crisis, frequently officiating at their funerals. He knew what it was to lose and lose and lose, and in the middle of the loss and the grieving to shepherd others through their own sorrow. I knew he and his husband, Paul, had moved out of the city long since for this very reason—all their friends had died.

Just a few months earlier, I had once again met him over lunch after years of not seeing or communicating with him. John's hair was whiter and he wore a few more lines on his face, but he seemed otherwise little changed. His eyes sparkled with the same good humor. He was generous and gentle and tender without being the least bit maudlin. I'd sent him the chapter that relates some of his story and the effect he had on my own journey, asking for permission to use it in this book and for any editorial comment he might care to offer. That lunch was much like the one we'd shared so long ago: the veil of years and divergent experience dropped away, and it felt like two hearts communed with hardly a filter between.

I called him, told him what was going on, and he answered my request with an enthusiastic, “Of course!” So I began to meet with him regularly, going for a while to their farm for the day, before he and Paul moved to Nova Scotia. Now we see each other through the magic of the internet, although they have a standing invitation from Maggie and me to stay at our place in Toronto whenever they're in town.

It feels, in some ways, as if this quest has come full circle—although not back to the beginning, if that makes any sense. Too far along the story's arc for that now. We're not going back to the Garden. John was a prophet to me, but now he's a pastor, as well. Whatever else that unusual transparency that I experience with him is, I suspect it's also an echo of the unity that will subsume and fulfill us all when we arrive in the City.

May I say a final word to you? If, as a person who seeks better answers, this book hasn't given you a satisfying place to land regarding the place of queer folk in the kingdom of God, I congratulate you on sticking with it all the way through and apologize for not having anything more convincing to offer. I suspect you've hung in there because you really care, and really want better answers than you have yet encountered. May I then encourage you to keep on seeking, asking questions? Remember that the sum total of human understanding is as miniscule within the greater knowledge—and wisdom, grace, mercy, and love—of God as is our own earth within the universe. He is the Great Mystery—and a mystery does not forbid knowledge, but invites us to explore, to venture deep into new territory. Hold what you think you know lightly, knowing that some of it at least will change in time. By all means live according to such knowledge as you believe you have in the moment, as far as you can do so submitting it to the rule of love. For the great, overarching law of the God who is love is that we must love.

If, on the other hand, this book has been helpful to you—well, hurray. I'm glad. Get out there and live, speak, love. Do remember that there are others who want to love as God does, and want to be faithful

to him, yet may be stuck as we all are to some degree within the limits of their understanding. Be gracious to them, as you need grace yourself.

If you're queer, I hope this will help increase your confidence in who you are and who your God is and encourage you to live faithfully and joyfully the gospel that proclaims that we are all one in Christ. If you're straight, I guess, really, I hope it does the same for you.

Whoever you are, and whatever your opinion of this book, just remember: the story isn't finished yet.
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HUMAN FREEDOM, DIVINE KNOWLEDGE, AND MERE MOLINISM; A BIBLICAL, HISTORICAL, THEOLOGICAL, AND PHILOSOPHICAL ANALYSIS by Timothy A. Stratton *foreword by Kirk R. MacGregor* [Wipf and Stock, 9781725276116]

Does humanity possess the freedom to think and act, or are we always caused and determined to think and act—exactly how we think and act—by things outside of our control? If we are always causally determined to think and act by things outside of our control, then how can humans be genuinely responsible for any of our thoughts or following actions? However, if humanity is genuinely free and responsible for at least *some* of our thoughts and actions, then how can the Christian rationally affirm the doctrine that God is totally sovereign and predestines *all* things?

In **HUMAN FREEDOM, DIVINE KNOWLEDGE, AND MERE MOLINISM**, Timothy A. Stratton surveys the history of theological thought from Augustine to Edwards and reaches surprising historical conclusions supporting what he refers to as “limited libertarian freedom.” Stratton goes further to offer multiple arguments appealing to Scripture, theology, and philosophy that each conclude humanity does, in fact, possess libertarian freedom. He then appeals to the work of Luis de Molina and offers unique arguments concluding that God possesses middle knowledge. If this is the case, then God can be completely sovereign and predestine all things without violating human freedom and responsibility.

Review

"For years I've hoped to see someone take my work, expand upon it, make it their own, and run with it. This is exactly what Dr. Stratton has done in *Human Freedom, Divine Knowledge, and Mere Molinism*. Stratton makes a systematic case for 'mere Molinism' by examining Scripture and history while appealing to metaphysics and perfect being theology. The final chapter connecting Molinism to the cumulative case of apologetic arguments and addressing the problem of evil is worth the price of admission alone." — William Lane Craig, author of *The Only Wise God: The Compatibility of Divine Foreknowledge & Human Freedom*

"For more than five hundred years, questions related to the extent God has predetermined one's salvation and life events have been vigorously debated. Dr. Stratton's book builds a needed bridge between Calvinists and Molinists, showing quite convincingly that, although a divide remains pertaining to the role of God in one's coming to faith in Christ, there are important points where Calvinists and

Molinists can cross the theological chasm and agree. Thus, Dr. Stratton is a most welcome player in this age-old discussion!" —Michael R. Licona, Associate Professor of Theology, Houston Baptist University

"Dr. Tim Stratton has the rare and precious gift of taking highly complex issues in philosophical theology and making them easily understandable to laypeople at the same time as he shows their tremendous importance for scholars in the disciplines of philosophy and religion. This book will be profitably and enjoyably read by laypeople and scholars interested in various themes, including biblical exegesis, the history of Christian thought, metaphysics, epistemology, systematic theology, and practical Christian living." —Kirk R. MacGregor, from the foreword

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Introduction, definitions, and methodology

The question of the relationship between the terms “determinism” and “human freedom” has occupied the thinking of human beings for centuries. Though it is often suggested that Homer, Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, and their writings are the seminal sources of the debate, recent research suggests that the modern use of “free will” has its roots in Stoicism.¹ But the debate must not be merely relegated to the

ivory towers of philosophers in academia. It has been and remains a debate in theological and religious venues. Even in philosophical discussions terms are utilized—especially to define or describe what “determinism” means—that are more commonly used in religious contexts. And though those using such terms may not be religious or arguing from a religious perspective, the terms themselves many times have theological and religious connotations: “fate,” “karma,” “destiny,” “predestination,” “decree,” “election,” “fortune,” and “the force,” for instance. Sometimes these terms are used in an ominous sense of humanity being *controlled* (causally determined) by a force—heredity (genetics), parentage (culture), nature, or even the gods—and the choice of term often identifies the source of the control, whether supernatural (good or evil), the forces of natural law, or some other cause.

Perhaps an illustration of this interplay of philosophy and theology can be seen in what might be labeled a determinism of two sorts: “scientific” determinism and “theological” determinism, both of which stand in contrast to a third variable: libertarian free will.

SCIENTIFIC DETERMINISM.

Scientific determinism arises from the belief that all that exists is nature. It stands to reason that, if nature is all that exists, then everything about humanity would be caused and determined by the laws or forces of nature. However, if everything about a human being is caused or determined by external factors, then this would imply that human beings do not possess the freedom to think or act in a manner opposed to what physics and chemistry dictate. Consequently, it would seem that human beings do not have genuine responsibility for their thoughts, beliefs, behaviors, or actions. Sam Harris, the well-known atheist and naturalist, arrives at the same conclusion about scientific determinism: “Free will is an illusion. Our wills are simply not of our own making. Thoughts and intentions emerge from background causes of which we are unaware and over which we exert no conscious control. We do not have the freedom we think we have. Free will is actually more than an illusion (or less), in that it cannot be made conceptually coherent. Either our wills are determined by prior causes and we are not responsible for them, or they are the product of chance and we are not responsible for them.”

Many scholars are not as honest and forthright as Harris about the implications of determinism. Nevertheless, this is the view of scientific determinism: all events are determined by natural causes.

THEOLOGICAL DETERMINISM.

The primary concern of this study is to critically evaluate, not only scientific determinism, but also the issue as to how Scripture and theologians relate their understanding to the issue of human freedom. In contrast to scientific determinism, then, is what might be called theological or divine determinism. The latter has its origins, not only in certain interpretations of select biblical passages, but also in the Bible’s implications on the behavior of Christians. Although seminal sources extend back to St. Augustine and the Pelagians, the issue broke out more recently in the Reformation and, especially, with the spirited debate between the humanist Desiderius Erasmus and the reformer Martin Luther. Erasmus wrote a short treatise called *Discourses on the Freedom of the Will* to which Luther wrote an extensive refutation called *On the Bondage of the Will*. In short, Erasmus argued that God created humanity with genuine human freedom and, although infected with sin, humanity nevertheless maintains that freedom and, therefore, is responsible for both good and evil choices. Luther, however, argued otherwise: humanity does *not* possess free will (at least in soteriological matters) and, as a result, humanity is completely dependent on God to free them from the bondage of their fallenness and their bondage to Satan.

John Calvin's comment, though similar to Luther's, is more well-known and quoted: "But those who, while they profess to be the disciples of Christ, still seek for free-will in man, notwithstanding of his being lost and drowned in spiritual destruction, labor under manifold delusion, making a heterogeneous mixture of inspired doctrine and philosophical opinions, and so erring as to both." Later Calvin added, "Creatures are so governed by the secret counsel of God, that nothing happens but what he has knowingly and willingly decreed."

Lest one conclude that this is a centuries-old debate and shed from current thinking, one need only to consult the writings of more modern Calvinists¹⁰ who, often basing their arguments on certain biblical passages (such as Romans 9), presuppose that God causally determines all things and, thus, humans are not free. Moreover, since these contemporary Calvinists also affirm that they offer their objections as knowledge claims, they unintentionally join forces with naturalists. Indeed, some Calvinists deny human freedom with as much vigor as does Harris and his atheistic colleagues. Consider, for example, these words from R. C. Sproul: "We cannot soft-pedal this dilemma by calling it a mystery; we must face up to the full import of the concept. If free will means autonomy, then God cannot be sovereign. If man is utterly and completely free to do as he pleases, there can be no sovereign God. However, if God is utterly sovereign to do as He pleases, no creature can be autonomous."

This, then, is the view of theological determinism or what this author refers to as exhaustive divine determinism (EDD): all events are causally determined by God.

LIBERTARIAN FREE WILL.

In light of the previous descriptions of determinism (both scientific and theological) it is vital clearly to define what stands in contrast to it: libertarian free will (LFW) or simply *libertarian freedom*. Aquinas defines human freedom as the absence of any outside force that would prevent a person from weighing alternatives and making his own choices. Importantly, Aquinas is not suggesting that there are no external influences (such as persuaders or persuasions) that put pressure on a person to think, weigh, and decide on a certain action. Such influences abound, both from natural and supernatural sources. However, as Aquinas notes, libertarian freedom implies that, despite the strength of the external influences, they do not necessarily causally determine the choices a person makes.

Libertarian freedom may be defined, essentially, as the conjunction of a rejection of compatibilism (which will be defined in chapter 12) along with the claim that humans (at least occasionally) possess free will. That is to say, the advocate of libertarian freedom affirms that people possess "freedom of moral and rational responsibility" and "that the freedom necessary for responsible action is not compatible with determinism." Thus, in simple terms, libertarian freedom *sometimes* refers to a categorical ability to act or think otherwise, and it *always* refers to source agency without any ultimate external deterministic causes. The former is sufficient for libertarian freedom, while the latter is necessary. With that said, one of the main aims of this study is to argue for a stronger model description or definitional model of libertarian freedom.

Consequently, the primary use of the term "libertarian freedom" in this study will usually refer to the idea corresponding to what most people seem to think of when they use the term "free will," namely, the categorical ability to choose among a range of alternative options, each of which is consistent or compatible with one's nature. This concept of libertarian freedom can be more clearly articulated with

the following common illustration [author’s adaptations]: Imagine a man whose brain has been secretly implanted with electrodes by a mad scientist. The scientist, being a . . . supporter [of politician X], decides that he will activate the electrodes to make the man vote for . . . [politician X] if the man goes into the polling booth to vote for . . . [politician Y]. On the other hand, if the man chooses to vote for . . . [politician X], then the scientist will not activate the electrodes. Suppose, then, the man goes into the polling booth and presses the button to vote for . . . [politician X]. In such a case it seems that the man freely votes for . . . [politician X] (he is responsible for his vote). Yet it was not within his power to do anything different!

This thought-experiment suggests that, in order for a person’s will to be free, his choices, actions, and some of his beliefs must really be “up to” him and not due only to external factors. This is known as “agent causation” and implies *libertarian* freedom. An agent, although unable to physically act otherwise in this case, is free to think otherwise and make his or her own decisions (at least some of the time) according to reason and without being completely controlled by deterministic laws of nature or some other external cause. Moreover, if humans are free to make their own choices through reasoning and freely weighing alternatives, then they may be held responsible and accountable for their choices and free actions. This, then, is the essence of libertarian freedom.

More specifically, J. P. Moreland suggests that the following are four essential ingredients of libertarian freedom: For any person *P* and some event or action *e*, *P* freely brings about *e* if:

P is a substance that has the active power to bring about *e*.

P exerts his/her active power as a first unmoved mover (an “originator”) to bring about *e* [in thought or action].

P has the categorical ability to refrain from exerting his/her power to bring about *e* [nothing causally determines *P* to not do otherwise].

P acts for the sake of reasons [thoughts], which serve as the final cause or teleological goal for which *P* acted.¹⁶

It follows from this that if *P* has this ability, then *P* also possesses responsibility.

THE CENTRAL RESEARCH QUESTION.

The central research question which is the subject of this study is: “Does humanity possess libertarian freedom, and if so, are human freedom and genuine responsibility logically compatible with God’s complete sovereignty and predestination”?

The alleged dilemma.

While such deterministic language—as noted above—is used in some theological and philosophical circles, there is inherent in the human psyche a rebellion against any sense that individuals do not control their own destinies, that is, that all of a person’s thoughts and actions are at the mercy of and are being controlled by someone or something else. People intuitively sense that they are—and must be—free in their thinking, decisions, and at least in some of their actions.¹⁸ Perhaps it is this inner intuition that has moved many Christians to argue against determinism, arguments which will be explored in later chapters.

These apparent polar opposites—namely, determinism and freedom—have engaged the minds of many Christians, especially Christian philosophers and theologians, as they have sought to understand, define, and reconcile what seems irreconcilable. Of course, between these two ends of the spectrum, there are

those who describe their position in terms other than determinism or freedom (though one's view usually tends toward one end or the other of the spectrum). There are also others who believe that there can be harmony between determinism and freedom. An example of the latter is Francis Turretin, who remarks with unusual frankness and candor: "God on the one hand by his providence not only decreed but most certainly secures the event of all things, whether free or contingent; on the other hand, however, man is always free in acting and many effects are contingent. Although I cannot understand how these can be mutually connected together, yet (on account of ignorance of the mode) the thing itself is (which is certain from another source, i.e., from the word) not either to be called in question or wholly denied."

It is with this latter position—one seeking to affirm both freedom and determinism or divine providence, despite the tension that would incline one to either extreme—that prompted this writer to explore the issue as to how the two might be harmonized. It seems clear that the Bible teaches two important propositions, namely, that (1) God is sovereign, provident, and in control of *all* things all the time, and that (2) humans possess libertarian freedom and are genuinely responsible for at least *some* things at some times, such as their thoughts, and actions. Chapter 2 examines the biblical passages in support of these two propositions. However, to conclude, as does Turretin, that neither (1) nor (2) can be denied—and both accepted—even though they seem irreconcilable, leads to what William Lane Craig has called an interpretative "*cul de sac*" and, therefore, demands that the person "reassess whether [he] has, indeed, rightly interpreted Scripture."

An important question, then, is: "Can one, to the satisfaction of both sides of the debate, show theologically and philosophically that predestination and election can be affirmed together with genuine human libertarian freedom"? The argument here is that this can be done responsibly while neither denying divine providence or human freedom nor appealing to mystery and *merely* acknowledging, as does Turretin, that both are taught in Scripture.

Basic research questions.

The above problem may be addressed by answering the following research questions:

1. How is one to understand divine sovereignty/providence from a philosophical, a theological and a biblical perspective?
2. How is one to understand human freedom and responsibility from a philosophical, a theological, and a biblical perspective?
3. How did some of the prominent historical Christian thinkers contribute to the debate about predestination, sovereignty/providence, and freedom; and how can their work help in addressing the central research question?
4. How do the writings of Luis de Molina offer insights and a possible solution to the central research question?
5. How do some of the prominent contemporary Christian thinkers contribute to the issue at hand, and how can their work help in addressing the central research question?

6. How does the discussion of human freedom and predestination contribute to the field of apologetics and practical Christian living?

The central hypothesis.

This study concludes that humans do possess libertarian freedom. Moreover, by building on the work of Luis de Molina—one of the great historical figures that contributed to the debate surrounding the central research question—divine providence and libertarian freedom can be reconciled without neglecting, diminishing, delimiting, or destroying either concept as taught in the Scriptures. Though others have made such an attempt—and with some of their reasoning, this writer would agree—the hypothesis staked out here is unique to his own research. Unique arguments are offered supporting the key “ingredients” of Molina’s hypothesis.

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The research methodology taken in this study involves a literature study, review, and critical analysis of the discussions, surrounding divine predestination, human libertarian freedom, and related topics, that appear in some of the leading academic journals and in relevant books. Importantly, this study was conducted in line with the ethical rules and guidelines as formulated by the North-West University—from which the author received his PhD—and in particular its Institutional Research Ethics Regulatory Committee.

The Protestant-Reformed tradition.

The discussion above might suggest that this approach completely departs from the Reformed tradition, or that arguments are being raised against essential Reformed positions. It is important, therefore, to note that this study unabashedly approaches the investigation from a Protestant-Reformed perspective. The author of this book has been a Protestant pastor in the Evangelical Free Church of America and, furthermore, considers himself Reformed.

What does it mean to be “Reformed”? The term is being used here in the sense that North-West University (South Africa) defines it:

The Faculty of Theology of the North-West University practises the science of Theology on a Reformational foundation. In this way it recognises its historical links with the Reformation of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, [and] implies recognition that the Word of God, the Bible, originated through the inspiration of the Holy Spirit and that the Bible is therefore inspired and authoritative. In our practice of Theology as a science, we recognise and respect the Reformed view of God and the written Word of God as the particular revelation of God. This is the basis on which all paradigms (including our own) are subjected to constant critical and reformative study.”

The study which follows, then, is an attempt to practice theology on a Reformational foundation, which entails a constant, critical examination and scrutinizing of even this writer’s own Reformed beliefs. As this study will show, some of the beliefs and teachings of many Reformed colleagues—in particular, the view that humanity lacks libertarian freedom or, in other words, the view that God causally determines all things—will be questioned. However, in the end, the crucial tenet of Reformed theology, namely, that God predestines and is sovereign over all things, will be affirmed and defended together with the view that humans possess libertarian freedom.

Truth

What is truth? People have been asking this question for centuries. In fact, Pilate asked Jesus this same question over two thousand years ago (John 18:38). Pilate may have been expressing his own skeptical philosophy, but there is such a category of “truth.” In this study “truth” is defined as a statement or a proposition that corresponds to ontological reality. “Reality” simply refers to the way things are (apart from human opinion). In Col 1:16 it appears that the Apostle Paul believed that ultimate reality is grounded in the nature of God. Accordingly, the view here is that God is necessary, and all other actual things—*visible and invisible*—are contingent upon God, who is the ultimate reality. Although people may have different views of—or opinions about—reality, they cannot all be correct in their assessment of reality. Therefore, those who utter propositions corresponding to ultimate reality (or God) make truth claims.

It is important to distinguish between ontological reality and epistemology. Ontological or objective truth refers to the way things are regardless of whether human beings possess knowledge of reality. There is, therefore, no such thing as “my truth,” or “your truth,” “his truth,” or “her truth.” Objective truth is independent of a person’s opinion; indeed, it is the judge, the standard or benchmark of all statements or beliefs. Epistemology, in contrast, refers to how people come to know, or gain knowledge of reality. While truth is to be found in many disciplines, this author affirms that the Bible is the inspired, authoritative, and inerrant source of truth. This requires, therefore, that there be careful and the accurate interpretation of it.

Grammatico-historical method for biblical interpretation.

The discipline of how to interpret the Bible is called “hermeneutics.” Often the discipline is associated in Christian circles as only related to a way of understanding and interpreting the Bible, but the word and the discipline have a wider context. It was an ancient response against the allegorical interpretation of philosophical treatises and other writings. By “allegorical” is meant an interpretive explanation—often some hidden meaning—versus what is the plain meaning of the words as the author intended them to communicate. Philo would be an example of this in biblical interpretation.

The hermeneutic followed in this study is based on several ingredients:

1. The interpreter must seek to understand the meaning of the words in the sense intended by the author(s) for his contemporary readers.

The pursuit of the interpreter is not to determine what a text means to him or her but particularly what it meant to the writer and then how it would be understood by the original readers. This means that one must understand how an author uses terms, which may be different than they are used in other books of the Bible, elsewhere, or today. This is sometimes denoted as “context” study: the immediate context (chapter), book, author, the great corpus of Scripture, other contemporary writings of the same time period and location, etc. This also means that the reader must distinguish what the text actually states (“exegesis”) from application (how this might relate to a person’s life today).

2. The interpreter recognizes the importance of the original languages in the Bible: Hebrew, Aramaic, and Greek.

Every translation reflects a person's understanding of the foreign language and his/her ability in that particular language. Some terms, tenses, pronouns are difficult to put into a translation without it becoming cumbersome for the reader. Rarely will the translation result in any difficulty for the reader to understand the original writer's meaning, but knowing the original language often enhances nuances not easily translatable. Howe's challenge of language study is well-balanced and helpful: "It's not necessary for everyone who wants to study the Bible to be a scholar in the original languages of the Bible . . . [But] serious Bible study requires some study in the original languages . . . Learning the basics of language, how to do word studies, and how to consider the way a word functions in a sentence, helps you to understand what the Bible is saying."

3. The interpreter seeks to *determine* the meaning of the words in the *historical/ cultural settings in which the material was written*.

Today, it is easy for people whose worldview or culture is different from those in biblical times to read the Bible from their own perspective, but that often leads to misunderstandings. Howe illustrates this principle from Genesis 11 and the account of building the tower of Babel. Some interpreters have said that the tower was built to protect against a huge flood. But the question must be asked: "Why did these people begin to build a tower"? . . . By investigating ancient religious practices and beliefs, we discover that it was generally held to be true that a person's god dwelled on a mountain . . . Since there were no mountains in the *plains of Shinar* . . . the people decided to construct a mountain in which their god(s) could dwell.

4. The word "*grammatico*" does not necessarily mean literal, but takes into consideration the kinds of literature: the genres and compositional devices commonly employed in the time period the original author lived.

This means that one must consider the many different genres of Scripture and interpret them accordingly. Such genres would include poetry, parables, "types," and apocalyptic writings. A fine discussion of these different genres is found in Osborne. Michael R. Licona is clear: "For our purposes, we only need to recognize that the New Testament Gospels bear a strong affinity to Greco-Roman biography. Accordingly, we should not be surprised when the evangelists employ compositional devices similar to those used by ancient biographers. In fact, we should be surprised if they did not."

Licona's words imply the importance of understanding not only the correct genre in which an author wrote, but also the compositional devices employed within the particular genre. If one errs on the proper understanding of genre or compositional device by the original author, one is apt to also err regarding the correct interpretation of the original author's ancient writing. Licona adds:

God's Word is rich and beautiful. We can learn new things from it our entire lives. The deeper I study it, the more impressed with it I become. And there will still be much, much more for us to see. I, for one, love God's Word and I'm by no means trying to lessen its value or cast doubt on its reliability. However, I think we can misread it when we do so through modern lenses, as though the Gospels were written using modern literary conventions. Why would we demand that they be? Realizing that the Gospel authors felt free to report with some elasticity makes some uncomfortable. It made me uncomfortable at first. But a principle I have come to live by is this: I must accept the Gospels as God has given them to us rather than forcing them into a mold of how I think He should have. If I fail to do this, I may believe I have a high view of

Scripture when, in reality, I merely have a high view of *my* view of Scripture. That would constitute misguided piety.

In other words, if one reads ancient writings through modern lenses, mistakes are likely to follow. It is necessary to view ancient writings through ancient lenses to reach correct interpretations. This is best accomplished by possessing a proper understanding of genre, compositional devices, and other literary conventions in which the original author of a particular book of the Bible and/or any other ancient writing employed.

One important footnote to the above discussion is that the interpreter should ask the questions: “Does this interpretation square with other passages of Scripture? Does it square with the nature of God (as illustrated by John 1; Col 1 and 2; Heb 1; Rev 1; and John 14:8–9)?”

Rational principles and logic.

Luther referred to philosophy as the work of the devil³⁴ and the “devil’s whore.” Yet, it was speculative philosophy from which he turned away.³⁶ Indeed, he was nicknamed “the philosopher”³⁷ because of his reasoned arguments, which are notably evident in his response to Erasmus: *The Bondage of the Will*. Logic is bedrock in that it underlies all use of language and communication. Therefore, all philosophical speculation, theological conversation, hermeneutical interpretations, scientific hypotheses, mathematics, and conclusions based on the historical method entail the reality of logical laws. Osborne says that:

The theologian must truly be a renaissance person, for it is necessary to exegete the Scriptures, collate the theological threads via biblical theology, be aware of the development of dogma throughout church history, then contextualize all this for the modern situation; and at each stage philosophical reasoning plays a critical role. In a very real sense, the theologian is asked to be an expert exegete, historian, and philosopher . . . Philosophy helps the theologian to avoid subjective reasoning and to ground theological formulations in critical reasoning, coherence, and rationality . . . [It] is a supplement to theology in helping the latter reformulate biblical truths rationally and coherently in order to address the current situation. They are not equal partners, for theology contains the ultimate truth, but philosophy forces the theologian to be both logical and open to new expressions/clarifications of the timeless truths . . . Most theologians today argue that inductive and deductive methods must be integrated in constructing theological systems.

It would be impossible to engage in any of the above disciplines if there were no logical absolutes providing parameters to help a person reach conclusions that follow from given premises. Even interpreting Scripture correctly presupposes and depends on the laws of logic.

There are three fundamental Laws of Logic that are always required in rational interaction:

- *The Law of Identity*: Something is what it is: “A” is “A.” Things that exist have specific properties that identify them.
- *The Law of Non-Contradiction*: “A” cannot be both “A” and “Non-A” at the same time, in the same way and in the same sense. “When two claims contradict one another, one . . . must be false.”

Wayne Grudem states it well: “Contradictions aren’t acceptable in the study of systematic theology, since there aren’t any contradictions in the Bible.”⁴⁰ This presupposition is supported by Scripture itself. For example, Psa 119:160 states that *the sum of your words is truth* and this implies, in turn, that God’s

Word, which Christians believe is true in all that it teaches, will be logical when studied in the context as a whole. This is obvious because truth and logic are inextricably linked; one cannot be without the other since truth assumes logic and vice versa. As Grudem put it: “There are many times we need to acknowledge mystery, paradox, and things we can’t fully understand. But that’s different from saying there’s a [logical] contradiction. God never asks us to believe a contradiction.”

- *The Law of Excluded Middle*: A well-defined proposition is either true or false. There is no middle position. For example, the proposition that “A proposition is either true or false” is either true or false.

These laws are just as necessary to keep a person grounded in rationality as the law of gravity is necessary to keep them grounded on the earth. The laws of logic are tools which help a person to objectively determine true or false propositions, inferences, and deductions. For example, if a scientific conclusion is logically incoherent, then the conclusion must be mistaken. Rosenblum and Kuttner’s maxim cannot be stated too emphatically: “A [scientific] theory leading to a logical contradiction is necessarily an incorrect theory.”⁴² Logical laws apply to everyone regardless of when or where he lives, that is to say, the laws of logic transcend humanity and are objectively true. In fact, truth and logic are inextricably linked; one cannot have one without the other. Thus, if Christians claim that Christianity is true, then the affirmations of Christianity must be logical (even if people cannot fully understand all the affirmations). Therefore, heavy emphasis is placed on truth and logic throughout this study.

Original languages.

In a study that is the scope of the current study, many of the primary sources are in languages other than English. These sources are identified in the bibliography, both for the original language and the translation, where possible. When biblical studies are used, the most current Hebrew (Aramaic) and Greek critical texts have been consulted. When sources are in other languages, the most recent translations have been consulted (e.g., Luther) or where there are different translations of the primary source (e.g., Calvin who wrote in both Latin and French), a comparison of the primary languages is helpful for determining the meaning. Some sources (e.g., Luis de Molina’s writings) have not been translated into English and, therefore, secondary sources or translations have been consulted.

CHAPTER OUTLINES.

Chapter 2: A survey of biblical data on God’s sovereignty and human freedom.

The objective of the second chapter is to set the scene for why this study’s central research question involves reflection from both theological and philosophical perspectives. Chapter 2 argues that Scripture, or God’s revelation of the truth, affirms both that God has a plan for history and that the actors on the stage of life do their own thinking and make their own decisions (at least on occasion) and, for this reason, experience the consequences of their actions. It would be irresponsible, of course, for a person to defend his view of divine providence by simply appealing to cherry-picked, biblical passages. Therefore, in this chapter, biblical passages are offered which support both sides of the debate. No attempt is made to argue in favor of a certain position. This will serve as the foundation for setting forth premises and drawing conclusions that take into consideration the whole of Scripture.

Chapters 3–11: A survey of human freedom during the Pre-Reformation, Reformation, and Post-Reformation periods.

No discussion of this subject can or should be understood, constructed, or defended without interacting with the great Christian thinkers of the past. They have also struggled with attempts to harmonize divine providence with human freedom and responsibility. By answering the questions and arguments posed by others (including secular, orthodox, and heretic thinkers), Christians of the past have proposed unique solutions to the issue at hand. The fruit of their study and interaction with opposing points of view prove to be of great help to theologians and philosophers today. It is evident that contemporary debates about divine providence have been largely influenced by this rich past. Therefore, in chapters 3–11 a broad historical picture of the nature of the debate with an intentional emphasis on the issue of human freedom and determinism is offered. Other matters of theology and soteriology may be interesting, but the purpose of these chapters is to draw out, from the writings of past thinkers, their views on the subject at hand. These chapters, then, describe the historical background of the central research question of this book by surveying the theology of great past thinkers over a number of centuries.

Chapters 12–13: Arguments in favor of libertarian freedom.

These chapters take a philosophical turn and provide pivotal arguments to help a person discern which theologians of the past were correct or on the right path. In it, reasoned (and sometimes unique) arguments against exhaustive divine determinism or theological determinism are offered as well as arguments in favor of human libertarian freedom. An important part of these arguments is to have a careful definition of the term “libertarian freedom” or “libertarian free will.” The chapters, therefore, include a meticulous analysis of libertarian freedom. Furthermore, in the chapters, a critical engagement with relevant, contemporary scholars is offered in order to arrive at some conclusions regarding determinism and free will. The objective of these chapters, then, is to highlight, and provide initial grounds for, the (somewhat unique) position that is argued for in subsequent chapters.

Chapter 14: God’s sovereignty and human freedom: A Spanish theologian solves the mystery.

This chapter is an introduction to Luis de Molina, the Spanish Jesuit, who has been relatively unknown in Protestant circles, though in recent years has gained prominence in theological and philosophical circles. Molina broke fresh ground in the debate concerning divine providence in his attempt to reconcile human freedom and God’s sovereignty. He appeals to God’s omniscience or, more specifically, what he terms God’s “middle knowledge” as a particularly convincing argument for harmonizing the two seeming “opposites.” As impressive as Molina’s ideas were, his ideas were criticized by the Dominicans of his day, who felt that he was out of step with Catholic doctrine, especially that of the great theologian Thomas Aquinas. This chapter provides a historical survey of Molina and his contribution to the debate.

Chapter 15: A defense of divine middle knowledge and Molinism.

Chapter 15 takes another philosophical turn. It critically examines the theology of Luis de Molina which was explored in the previous chapter and also provides arguments concluding that aspects of his theological view probably correspond to reality. Most Christian theologians, with the notable exception of open theists, believe that God knows everything related to the world of God’s creation, including the complete future, and God has had this knowledge from at least the moment of creation. Of course, this belief suggests that nothing that God knows will fail to happen. However, this creates a difficult problem for determinists, whether scientific determinists or divine determinists: “Can human beings be in any

sense ‘free’ if God foreknows all their actions”? It is here that Molina’s “middle knowledge” proposal sheds light on, and provides a coherent solution to, the issue of divine providence and human freedom and responsibility. At the same time, the chapter will attempt to show that Molina’s proposal is compatible with Reformed theology.

Chapter 16: The apologetic significance of Molinism.

This chapter seeks to integrate all the above chapters and demonstrate the practical applications of these matters. It also seeks to illustrate that, although the topic at hand is rather academic in nature, it is extremely relevant to the kingdom of God in the “real” world of everyday life. Understanding history (especially the history of Christianity), theology, and philosophy significantly enhances one’s ability to support evangelistic efforts through apologetic argumentation, whether in academic settings, the neighborhood, and/or the workplace. Christians, whether they be academics, pastors, or lay people—if they study the contributions of others and those discussed here—will gain the ability to answer more of the tough questions that often arise over the course of ministry and life.

CONCLUSION.

In many ways this research project reveals the writer’s own journey to understanding divine providence and human freedom, through an exploration of Scripture, history, theology, and philosophy. Each of these disciplines should be integrated in order to discern the true meaning of Scripture. Scripture is the foundation, but interpreting it correctly is often a process of reflecting on and evaluating the thinking of great leaders, theologians, and philosophers of both the past and the present.

EXISTENTIAL THEOLOGY: AN INTRODUCTION edited by Hue Woodson [Wipf & Stock Publishers, 9781532668418]

EXISTENTIAL THEOLOGY: AN INTRODUCTION offers a formalized and comprehensive examination of the field of existential theology, in order to distinguish it as a unique field of study and view it as a measured synthesis of the concerns of Christian existentialism, Christian humanism, and Christian philosophy with the preoccupations of proper existentialism and a series of unfolding themes from Augustine to Kierkegaard. To do this, *Existential Theology* attends to the field through the exploration of genres: the European traditions in French, Russian, and German schools of thought, counter-traditions in liberation, feminist, and womanist approaches, and postmodern traditions located in anthropological, political, and ethical approaches. While the cultural contexts inform how each of the selected philosopher-theologians present genres of “existential theology,” other unique genres are examined in theoretical and philosophical contexts, particularly through a selected set of theologians, philosophers, thinkers, and theorists that are not generally categorized theologically. By assessing existential theology through how it manifests itself in “genres,” this book brings together lesser-known figures, well-known thinkers, and figures that are not generally viewed as “existential theologians” to

form a focused understanding of the question of the meaning of ""existential theology"" and what ""existential theology"" looks like in its varying forms.

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The Question of the Meaning of Existential Theology

The question of the meaning of existential theology seems simple, straightforward, and fairly transparent, particularly when attending to the two words that unavoidably make up its orientation, task, and method: “existential” and “theology proper.” It should be clear that, on the surface, the business of “existential theology” traverses the respective businesses of existential philosophy and theology proper, such that, in the relationship between the two, “existential theology” becomes concerned with a connection between issues that are fundamental to the two fields of studies. In that way, we may be able to conclude that “existential theology” is a synthesis of the tasks and methods of existential philosophy and those of theology proper—that synthesis, as such, seems to suggest that existential philosophy informs and speaks to something in theology and theology, likewise, informs and speaks to something in existential philosophy.

What do the two fields inform the other about? How do they speak to one another? Perhaps, what these questions ask is: do “existential philosophy” and “theology proper” have anything meaningful to say to one another within a plane of understanding emanating between the two? And, if there is, indeed, something in the former’s secularism and the latter’s sacredness, *the question of the meaning of existential theology* may, in fact, be much more opaque than it initially seems.

If we remain steadfast to the extent that there is more than just a synthesis at work between “existential philosophy” and “theology proper,” we still must not overlook that a mere synthesis, as I make explicit in *Heideggerian Theologies* (2018), is “an important place to begin, [even if] it is certainly only a superficial understanding of what existential theology is and does.”¹ In recognizing this first, it becomes all the more possible to conceptualize “existential theology” as not only being unique to what traditional theologizing intends to do, but also unique to what existential philosophizing espouses. We can say, then, that, if “existential theology is concerned with expressing theology by way of existential errands,” those errands must be enumerated and outlined as taking hold to a kind of philosophizing and theologizing that goes un-philosophized by “existential philosophy” and goes un-theologized by “theology proper.” If these errands are intent on “meaning-making,” we might ask: what is the meaning that is being made? How does “meaning-making” bring us closer to *the question of the meaning of existential theology*? In one sense, given that “meaning” is respectively presented in “existential philosophy” and “theology proper,” and some sort of “making” takes place in both within the framework for the secular and the sacred, it behooves us to ask: what is existential theology fashioning through its philosophizing and theologizing that is not fully fashioned by “existential philosophy” or “theology proper”?

We need not ask that question to suggest that either “existential philosophy” or “theology proper” purposefully overlook certain phenomena and entities within their different frameworks of inquiry, investigation, and explication—on the contrary, clearly “existential philosophy” and “theology proper” both have something significant to say about our world of both the infinite and the finite, and the temporal and the atemporal, if I may use Kierkegaard’s categorization in *Sickness unto Death* (1849). In

fact, when working within a purely existential-philosophical framework, we can easily arrive at important insights about the world and our standing in it, just as much as the meaning of human being and our worldhood can be aptly translated through a properly-theological framework. However, what is missed—what falls outside of the purview of “the existential-philosophical” and “the properly-theological” is what “the existential-theological” has to say, when comporting ourselves to what is required of us as *a task* and what we require as *a method* from an “existential-theological dialogue.”

In *Heideggerian Theologies*, I align “the existential-theological” to Martin Heidegger, and distribute the issues of scripture, tradition, reason, and experience to four theologians with four kinds of theologizing that are largely-openly influenced by and make use of Heidegger’s philosophizing—the fact that John Macquarrie, Rudolf Bultmann, Paul Tillich, and Karl Rahner are “existential theologians” has as much to do with how they handle and are handled by their “Heideggerian” influences as it has to do how each calibrates the dialogue between “the existential” and “the theological.” These influences serve different roles in the theologizing of each. What any one of them does theologically with Heidegger is not necessarily out of the scope of the other three—each individual Heideggerian influence does not place each of their respective theologizing within an exclusivity. Rather, because the Macquarrie, Bultmann, Tillich, and Rahner “speak” to one another from where they are each grounded theologically, through how they make use of Heidegger, and about what the “existential-theological” is. The extent to which the *question of the meaning of existential theology* is expressed differently from Macquarrie to Bultmann to Tillich to Rahner is grounded on how each purposefully aligns themselves with Heidegger—for each, Heidegger becomes a means to an end, but not the very end of the *question of the meaning of existential theology*.

In whatever way—in terms of qualifications, aims, or intentions—we can call a “Heideggerian theology” a kind of existential theology, I do not think too fine a point can be made on the fact that making use of Heidegger is not the only way to handle the *question of the meaning of existential theology*. As largely as Heidegger looms philosophically within however he may be problematically aligned with the concerns of existentialism (i.e., to Sartre’s, more generally and problematically than anyone else), and as crucial as Heidegger becomes theologically—which is the central, guiding claim made in my *A Theologian’s Guide to Heidegger* (2019)—“existential theology” is much larger than any single philosopher or any individual theologian. The *question of the meaning of existential theology* unfolds itself, as itself, through a community of voices, all of which negotiate the secular and the sacred, ground a voice firmly between “the existential” and “the theological,” and embark on a quest that inextricably philosophizes and theologizes.

The *question of the meaning of existential theology* is posed in the attunement of “the existential” and “the theological,” and the meaningful manner with which the former attunes itself to the latter, and the latter meaningfully attunes itself to the former. What is offered in *Heideggerian Theologies* is just one representation of “existential theology”—it is one that attunes and is attuned by what I have called a “Heideggerian pathmark,” and, to be sure, “express[es] only a specific kind of existential theology.” Here, as a way to further explicate the question of the meaning of existential theology beyond a “Heideggerian pathmark,” this book, *Existential Theology: An Introduction*, wishes to explore what it means to do existential theology more comprehensively as far as the pathmarks of “the existential” and “the theological” go. <>

APPREHENDING LOVE: THEOLOGICAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL INQUIRIES edited by Pekka Kärkkäinen and Olli-Pekka Vainio [Schriften der Luther-Agricola-Gesellschaft, Wipf & Stock Publishers, 9781725282797]

This volume collects together articles which engage a variety of themes related to human and divine love. The title of this book “apprehending love” employs the notion of *apprehensio* and especially its medieval background. For example, Martin Luther built his understanding of justification around this concept, which, on the one hand, refers to intellectual comprehension but, on the other hand, means becoming one with the object itself. In faith, Christ becomes not only the outward object of our faith, but its proper subject. In a similar way, when we love someone or something, we are transformed according to the object of our love.

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This volume collects together Professor Risto Saarinen’s friends, students and colleagues, who in their articles engage a variety of themes related to love, broadly understood. The title of this book “apprehending love” employs the notion of *apprehensio* and especially its medieval background. For example, Martin Luther built his understanding of justification around this concept, which, on the one hand, refers to intellectual comprehension but on the other hand means becoming one with the object

itself. In faith, Christ becomes not only the outward object of our faith, but its proper subject. In a similar way, when we love someone or something, we are transformed according to the object of our love. Our hope is that these articles are not only intellectually insightful but also transformative to readers.

The outlines of the following fifteen articles are as follows.

Theo Dieter offers an analysis of a text by Luther where he addresses a question how to relate the effectivity of justification, which seeks to direct our loves rightly towards God and one's neighbour, with our state as sinful beings who are never wholly purified in this life. He claims that while the forensic side of justification has a certain primacy for Luther, this is realized in effective *promissio Christi*, so that while the believer's love for God is always fragmentary, in faith the believer apprehends Christ entirely.

Werner Jeanrond investigates the notions of love and hope and explores what it would mean to approach hope from within a horizon of love. He encourages a reconsideration of the virtues of love and hope outside subordination to preconceived or dogmatic notions of faith so that challenging the traditional hierarchy among the three theological virtues might allow us to gain new insights into the dynamics of faith.

Veli-Matti Kärkkäinen highlights the nature and significance of divine revelation through the lens of God's love. He argues that whatever else we might be saying theologically about God's self-revelation and however we define its mode and motif, behind God's voluntary and effectual self-revelation is God's infinitely abundant love. In fact, divine self-revelation is a profound gift of God to humanity.

In his article on Dietrich Bonhoeffer's theology of love, Michael Welker shows how love has both individual and communal effects. Love forms a community that it then keeps active through its own living character, which is shaped by the salvific activity of Christ. Love is a transformative force: God's love overcomes all manifestations of hostility and hate. In gratitude, humility, patience, and in the power of hope, we struggle to be formed according to his divine image of love.

Sami Pihlström and Sari Kivistö examine possible ways of redrawing the boundaries between rationality and irrationality, meaningfulness and meaninglessness, and contingency and necessity in our understanding of love. In dialogue with various literary sources, they argue that we may through love re-examine and re-evaluate everything in our lives, including the meaning morality has for us. This is what it means to speak of love as a "transcendental limit phenomenon".

Olli-Pekka Vainio examines the use of the word hate in the Bible and evaluates the discussion in contemporary moral and cognitive psychology concerning the possible benefits of hate. He offers a systematic and constructive account of hate as a theological category and argues that in some cases hate can be viewed as a moral virtue, and thereby as an act of love.

Jaana Hallamaa assesses and furthers the debate concerning fake news and hate speech with a reference to some recent legal and political cases in Finland. She argues that while there is no easy and simple means to curb hate speech, sound argumentation is the only sustainable alternative to it. However, the problem is that sound argumentation often seems rather powerless in the face of hate speech, which relies on primal psychological and social mechanisms.

Kenneth Appold tackles the ecumenical problem to do with the assumption according to which there are 'fundamental' differences between Lutheran ecclesiology and Roman Catholic, Anglican or Reformed ecclesiologies. Basing his analysis on the Augsburg Confession and its immediate reception and use in early Lutheran communities, he argues that Lutheran ecclesiological theorization were not fully thought through during the Reformation era and contemporary difficulties reflect this origin.

In her article on the relationship between Luther and Schleiermacher, Friederike Nüssel argues that even if Schleiermacher gives up the traditional terminology of incarnational Christology, his theology offers a way to explain the adoption of believers in terms of recognition of their faith. If, however, one takes into account faith as caused by way of communication of the Gospel of Jesus Christ that allows one to recognize Christ as the Redeemer, and if this redemption is granted to recognize Christ's personhood through his ministry in his life, then recognition in justification is a gift mediated through Christ himself.

In her contribution Minna Hietamäki uses the idea of recognition to discuss the movement towards church unity in ecumenism. She focuses especially on love as an attitude which motivates recognition at its very core, namely in the recognition as a person. After the clarification of the concept of recognition in general terms and in theological discourse, Hietamäki analyses different aspects of recognition in ecumenical discussions, culminating with a discussion on the role of love.

In his essay, Peter De Mey continues the discussion on the ecumenical import of the concept of love. His specific topic is the virtue of love (*caritas*) as it is presented in the documents of the Second Vatican Council and later by Popes Benedict XVI and Francis. Already from the discussion of the conciliar documents it becomes evident that the virtue of love is firmly grounded in God's love. Similar ideas are reflected and developed further by the two popes in respect to several theological themes.

Michael Root takes up the discussion on the Catholic theology of love, but at the same time reflects on the modern classic of Protestant theology, Karl Barth. Specifically, Root analyses recent Catholic engagement with Barth's theology of love, which provides critical but constructive insights into the Catholic position. This provides the author a platform for discussing questions about Protestant-Catholic relations on a more general level.

Simo Knuuttila's contribution leads us to another emotion and to another time. Compassion, which is hardly unrelated to love, is examined in the writings of medieval Latin authors. The story begins with Augustine and the Stoics, proceeds with medieval accounts on the conceptual structure of compassion, and ends in discussions on theological formulations of God's mercy.

Antti Raunio in his article again introduces the ecumenical question of Christian unity, providing additional insights from Martin Luther's theology. The key question about unanimity and diversity in the Christian community was not unknown to Luther. Raunio shows how the Reformer discusses the problem with the help of the core concepts of his theology, namely faith and love.

Luther is also discussed in Bo Holm's contribution, this time with regard to Luther's and Melanchthon's reception of Seneca's ideas on benefices. Holm examines Senecan influence in the reformers' theology of creation and in the notions of the benevolence of the creator and the ideal of the benevolent prince.

The Lutheran idea of God's free gift in the justification by faith offers the starting point for Ted Peters's essay. Peters argues that the problem of the pure gift, as it is often described, is misplaced at the outset. He proves this by an analysis of the related concepts of grace, favour, mercy, agape and the gift.

The topic of Jason Lepojärvi's article is J. R. R. Tolkien and women. Lepojärvi discusses Tolkien's views on friendship love between the sexes, but also examines whether Tolkien's relationships with the women in his life actually rose to the level of intimate friendship. In order to answer this question, Lepojärvi provides an overview of Tolkien's interaction with women among his family, his female fandom and in his academic career. <>

JEANNE GUYON'S MYSTICAL PERFECTION THROUGH EUCHARISTIC SUFFERING: HER BIBLICAL COMMENTARY ON SAINT JOHN'S GOSPEL by Jeanne de la Mothe Guyon, edited and Translated by *Nancy Carol James*, Foreword by *William Bradley Roberts* [Pickwick Publications, 9781532684234]

Madame Jeanne Guyon (1648-1717), a woman of great wisdom and worship, was filled with the richness of God's grace as she endured hardships and abuse in her married life. Blessed with children and great earthly wealth, she suffered physically, mentally, emotionally, and spiritually at the hands of her spiritual leaders, imprisoned unjustly for her simple yet solid faith in Christ, her Divine Confidant. Trusting in her Lord, she expressed her insights in commentaries concerning the Scriptures, seeing in them the mysteries of the holy Eucharist, the sacrificial presence of her merciful Savior. Through her intercession, we are inspired to adore the Lord, uniting our suffering to his as she did.

Review

"Madame Guyon provides a living example of a simple yet profound message, that anyone can establish a close relationship with God through contemplative meditation." — Peter C. Phan, Georgetown University

"This translation of Jeanne Guyon's commentary on John is key to Guyon studies. Was this seventeenth-century mystic really a closet Protestant? We now have the answer. She was not; her deep sacramental theology comes shining through this commentary. Nancy James has done remarkable work: she locates, understands, and interprets this remarkable mystic. This is not just an important text for the academy but it is important for every faithful Christian. Madam Guyon is a person to admire and learn from. This is a vitally important text that every person serious about the mystical tradition should have in their library." — Ian S. Markham, Virginia Theological Seminary "

"I warmly and heartily commend Rev. Professor Nancy James' latest work, her translation and commentary on Jeanne Guyon's *Mystical Perfection through Eucharistic Suffering*. James' scholarly yet accessible approach to Guyon's eucharistic spirituality should be enriching for all who seek to follow a profound Christian pathway in these complex times. Nancy James has become the key and leading expert on Guyon and her invitation to understand the Guyon spirituality better is to be greatly

welcomed and appreciated." — Paul Haffner, Duquesne University Italian Campus, Seton Hall University, and Pontifical Gregorian University

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Foreword by The Rev. William Bradley Roberts, D.M.A.

'Tis folly all—let me no more be told
 Of Parian¹ porticos, and roofs of gold;
 Delightful views of nature, dressed by art,
 Enchant no longer this indifferent heart;
 The Lord of all things, in his humble birth,
 Makes mean the proud magnificence of earth;
 The straw, the manger, and the mouldering wall,
 Eclipse its lustre; and I scorn it all.

(Madame Jeanne Guyon, trans. William Cowper, English, 1731–1800)

Above is the first verse of the English translation of an extended poem by Guyon. The translator William Cowper (pronounced “Cooper”) was the foremost English poet of the generation between Alexander Pope and William Wordsworth.² With precision and yet with tender care, he translates Guyon’s poem into English verse that has its own integrity, while still reflecting the mystical piety and devotion of the original.

Such personal piety is emblematic of the writings of Madame Jeanne Guyon. She portrays a humble Jesus, whom she greatly prefers to the opulence of either natural beauty or beauty created by humans. In this poem, as well as in her commentary on the book of John, she places a relationship with Jesus above everything else. (“I scorn it all.”)

Though Guyon didn’t greatly concern herself with issues of authorship, provenance, or textual analysis, it is interesting to discover what modern scholarship uncovers in the fourth Gospel, which stands in contradistinction to the Synoptic (“seeing with the same eye”) Gospels of Matthew, Mark, and Luke, which are similar in content, form, and statement. Despite Guyon’s apparent lack of interest in such scholarly investigation, she would surely not have disapproved of those scholars and contemporary readers who are drawn to scholarly analysis.

Scholars disagree about the authorship of the Gospel of John, arguing persuasively for this theory or that. Perhaps Bruce Vawter CM (1921–86), writing in *The Jerome Biblical Commentary*, is most certain of his position. He holds out the alluring possibility that the earliest witness to authorship is Irenaeus, Bishop of Lyons, (A.D. 120/124–200/203), who studied with Polycarp of Smyrna (A.D. 69–155), who knew John personally! Both these bishops were persuaded that John was the anonymous “disciple whom Jesus loved,” who “reclined on his breast at the Last Supper” and the author of the fourth Gospel.

Fr. Vawter goes on to support Johannine authorship by pointing out that John was a Jew who was familiar with Palestinian culture and geography. The fourth Gospel mentions places that don't appear in the Synoptic Gospels (Matthew, Mark, and Luke), such as the Pool of Bethesda and Lithostrotos (*Gabbatha* in Aramaic). He further states that the language in John is that of a Palestinian Jew. Additionally, the persistence of detail in the text strongly suggests a firsthand witness. Though the Gospel writer's Greek is not the best in the New Testament, it correctly reproduces the common language of the time. Fr. Vawter finds evidence that John employed a disciple-scribe whose Greek was superior to his own. He goes on to say that the Gospel of John presupposes the Synoptic Gospels, and that John, in some respects, would be difficult to understand, were we not already familiar with the story as found in the Synoptic Gospels.

Jerome H. Neyrey SJ cites contemporary scholarship that distinguishes between a "writer" of this Gospel and an "author." A writer might merely take dictation, but an author imagines and organizes the project and establishes an editorial point of view. Unlike Vawter, Neyrey believes that we are still uncertain who the author is or where and when the document was written and revised. (Its provenance is debated, but traditionally assumed to be Ephesus.) Neyrey takes the position that we may learn a lot about the author by asking "what does he know."

Neyrey finds, for example, like Vawter, that the author of the Gospel has intimate knowledge of the geography attested in the writing. In fact, this Gospel writer displays a unique knowledge, superior to that of the Synoptic writers. Likewise, he has keen insight into practices of Temple Feasts and Sabbath. The Synoptics know, for instance, of only one Passover in the career of Jesus, whereas this author knows of three.

As Neyrey continues to investigate the relationship between John and Synoptics, he posits that, even though no proof exists that John drew upon the Synoptics, most scholars believe that the author frequently draws on traditions shared with the Synoptics. Setting aside the question of dependency on the Synoptics, perhaps it is more important that the author knows a great deal about the Jesus tradition.

Scholar Johannes Beutler SJ says that when readers read John they enter a new world, hear a new language. The Divine Logos (Word) brings "light" (mentioned in sixteen verses) and "life" (in thirty-eight verses). Even when standing before Pilate, Jesus claims to be the king who came to "bear witness to the truth." The tone of this Gospel is not heard in the Synoptics.

Whereas in the Synoptics dualistic language is temporal, in John it is spatial. Jesus comes "from above," his opponents "from below." While they are "of this world," he is "not of this world." Interestingly, the sequence of events in Jesus' life do not always correspond to that of the Synoptics. The Gospel of Mark is selective in the miracles included, and so is John. In the fourth Gospel there is no exorcism or healing of a leper, and the number of Jesus' miracles is considerably smaller. On the other hand, the account of the miracle at the wedding in Cana, changing water into wine, appears only in John. The Parables of the Kingdom, characteristic of the Synoptics, are missing from John. A striking feature of the fourth Gospel is its language about Jesus' identity, the so-called "I Am Sayings:" "I am the bread of life." (6:35) "I am the light of the world." (8:12), as well as extended metaphors of his identity: the Good Shepherd (10:1-5) and the True Vine (15:1-8).

Strikingly, John has no account of the birth and infancy of Jesus, but begins instead with Jesus' identity as the eternally existent Divine Logos (WWord). John's Gospel intends to lead to faith in Jesus, the Messiah and Son of God, and to strengthen the faith of those who already believe. Some scholars (especially German ones) find this to be its *only* aim. John is concerned with *following* Jesus.

Small wonder, then, that Madame Guyon, the deeply devoted mystic, was drawn to write a commentary on John. She would have naturally been attracted to the message of faith, belief, and, above all, the call to follow Jesus.

Unlike scholarly theological works, Guyon's commentary is intentionally devotional. Theologian Katherine Sonderegger in her recent book *The Doctrine of God*, speaks with a similar devotion that one of her students describes as, "a love letter to God." Guyon possessed a love for Jesus that, from our vantage, seems a consuming passion, redolent of modern-day evangelicals. In fact, however, she was a committed Roman Catholic (see Preface), one who unashamedly spoke of her "Master Jesus Christ" in language that at times sounded unapologetically romantic.

As insightful as Guyon's commentary is in some respects, what we may gain from it is not so much a scholarly understanding as a portrait of Jesus, drawn tenderly by someone who loved him with her whole heart. Elsewhere among Nancy Carol James' prolific writings on Guyon, we may discover this mystic's struggles with the Church, despite her love for it. Nevertheless, she persisted and declared her commitment to the Roman Catholic Church throughout her life.

Nancy Carol James, PhD, has devoted years of study to Guyon. Prior to this translation of Guyon's commentary on the Gospel of John, James had published fourteen books about the Catholic mystic. Her rich history of research into Guyon's life and work allows James to speak with wise and eloquent insight. James is able to give voice to Guyon's inner-most thoughts and prayers. Indeed she can describe the very faith of Guyon.

What we may say with a certainty about Madame Guyon is that her deep faith was authentic. When she shared her faith with others in her writing, she showed marks of a true Catholic, allowing the Holy Spirit to bring people to faith in Jesus. The witness of her life and her writing are compelling—so compelling in fact that the reader's interest is piqued, a new curiosity aroused, and one is motivated to learn more about the faith she professed. Her unwavering faith in Jesus, her deep desire to follow him, are everywhere in evidence in this volume. Encountering her, the reader is strengthened in the faith.

Preface by Nancy Carol James

Throughout history, the writings of Jeanne Guyon have attracted some of the greatest thinkers and faithful ministers of the Christian gospel. Among those who admire her Christian testimony include Archbishop Fénelon, William Cowper, Sir Isaac Newton, John Wesley, and John Newton, author of the hymn "Amazing Grace." The list continues to grow, revealing how her quiet but powerful voice continues to influence the Christian faith.

After years of research and translating Jeanne Guyon, I have found her commentary on the Gospel of John to be her most powerful document declaring her profound Christian beliefs. In this commentary, Jeanne Guyon reveals her deepest devotion and thought about the Christian faith. She describes her love and commitment to the Roman Catholic Church, her lifelong church. We read of her devotion to

Mary. Guyon writes, “Although there is one mediator between God and human beings, Mary is a mediator between sinners and her son. O Mary, full of pain and love! Who is the sinner who will not hope from your protection given by your Son?” Guyon describes her fervent belief in Transubstantiation; in the Eucharist, she says, the believer receives the very Body and Blood of Jesus Christ. She affirms that we receive mystical perfection, called theosis, as we participate in the holy sacrament of the Eucharist.

Jeanne Guyon’s faith and testimony, filled with joy and praise, continue to help guide human souls to the one she knew as Master Lord Jesus Christ. Her commentary on St. John’s Gospel, so filled with joy and ecstasy, offers wisdom and heart-felt love to all those seeking to imitate the life and faith of Jesus Christ.

Introduction by Nancy Carol James, Ph.D.

Since the seventeenth century, the writing of Jeanne Guyon (1648–1717) has spread throughout the globe, encouraging those in spiritual need and providing enthusiastic nourishment for those living the Christian faith. Because Madame Guyon was accused of heresy by the Inquisition of the Roman Catholic Church instigated by Bishop Bossuet, a powerful archbishop well connected with the King of France and the Vatican Hierarchy, she bears heroic witness to her Catholic Faith. Guyon spoke continually words of love for her church despite her incarceration for nearly ten years, including nearly five years in the Bastille. In her heroic witness, she lived spiritually free for she knew in her mystical relationship with Jesus Christ, that he, and he alone, sets us free. The paradox of Jeanne Guyon’s life is that she had every right to condemn and even hate her Catholic faith and those clergy representing clerical abuse, yet her kind voice of love and mercy spoke words telling others of a living, loving, and forgiving Christian way. In the image of Jesus Christ, she portrayed a true Christian witness praying for and instructing her persecutors. Jeanne Guyon testifies to the way, the truth, and the life of Jesus Christ in her suffering and in her prayers and so her testimony continues to be received and revered as a Christian martyr to the scandals and abuses we constantly experience throughout history, either from within the church in her case, or from outside the church in other cases.

A brief summary of Jeanne Guyon’s life shows the dramatic and still debated arrest, incarceration and release of Jeanne Guyon. (For a more detailed account of her life, please read my introduction in **THE COMPLETE MADAME GUYON.**)

From an early age, Jeanne Guyon lived a life of suffering. Born into an aristocratic family in 1648, when she was fifteen, her parents forced her into an arranged marriage with a man she had not met, the thirty-eight-year-old Philippe Guyon. This unhappy marriage led to the nineteen-year-old Jeanne’s serious crisis about how to endure such desolation and following this, her profound spiritual conversion. She committed herself to Jesus Christ, saying she loved him as Mary Magdalen had loved him. Soon Jeanne became actively and passionately involved with caring for the peasants, founding hospitals, and raising her five children, two of whom died of smallpox. In her late twenties, her husband also died, leaving Jeanne as a young, attractive, wealthy widow who was widely sought after.

With the recognition of her spiritual gifts, Jeanne was welcomed at King Louis XIV’s royal court at Versailles. She joined a prayer group with Madame de Maintenon, the third wife of Louis XIV, and Archbishop Francois Fénelon, the royal tutor to the son expected to become king. Sadly, later Madame de Maintenon withdrew her support of Jeanne, which led to the Roman Catholic Inquisition led by

Bishop Bossuet arresting Jeanne and keeping her incarcerated for a total of nearly ten years, while the church hierarchy searched for ways to remove her influence over Archbishop Fénelon. Guyon was imprisoned, suffered psychological and physical abuse, and threatened with death by burning, as the French hierarchy had done with St Joan of Arc.

Throughout this time, however, Archbishop Fénelon defended Jeanne continually and passionately, which led to King Louis XIV banishing him from Versailles and sending him to the front-lines in the War of Spanish Succession. Years of debate ensued at the Vatican by the cardinals and the pope, leading to a papal censure of some points of Fénelon's book, *The Maxims of the Saints*, which he wrote to defend Guyon. Eventually Guyon was exonerated and lived in a cottage near her daughter. Fénelon and Guyon remained in close correspondence for the rest of their lives, including personal visits with one another. Jeanne Guyon's works are still revered by Christians internationally.

In this controversy over Jeanne Guyon's life and works, she was considered a semi-quietist: a heresy that denied the need for the development of personal virtues and relied solely on God's grace being annihilated by divine love. Her works, though, are still revered by Christians and non-Christians internationally. She is considered by many as a mystic who influenced others with her charm and charisma being a warm and enthusiastic woman who brought joy to others with her vibrant spirit.

One of the great joys of being a Jeanne Guyon scholar is talking with others who share my respect and passion for her mystical theology. A natural and profound intimacy exists between those who desire mystical perfection and those who have read and benefitted from her ideas and interpretation of the Christian faith. Guyon's thought creates a heart-felt commitment to our relationship with our Master Jesus Christ, as she called him. We share the belief that abandonment to Jesus Christ and imitating him with our very lives begins the beautiful process of being transformed by grace and being united with God through divine love. This transformation is known as theosis, an early Christian teaching of the Eastern Patristic Fathers. We love Jesus Christ, who in his great mercy to us, offers us his perfection and carries us into the heart of God the Father.

Lost in the infinite beauty of God, we praise God, Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, in expressible words of adoration and love that echo the beauty, majesty, and glory of his transforming love dwelling in our souls. We devotees of mysticism not only share Guyon's insights with others, but, in reality we share Christ with others who is the source of these insights.

This book, the first English translation of Guyon's Commentary on the Gospel of John, came out of a conversation I had with another who also treasures Jeanne Guyon. I still remember when he said to me, "We need a translation of Jeanne Guyon's Commentary on the Gospel of John." I had recently finished translations of Guyon's commentaries on Ephesians, Colossians, Galatians, Luke, and Revelation, but still I knew I had missed something valuable. His words poured in my heart and within a week, I began translating the Guyon commentary on John.

I have found in Guyon's Commentary of John a pearl of great price and the resolution of many problems still existing in Guyon scholarship. One of the great debates about Guyon has been and still is whether she was an orthodox, faithful Catholic believer or whether she secretly harbored Protestant ideas and sensibilities. From the historical perspective, Guyon as a secret Protestant might appear a reasonable

conclusion because of the strong support she early on received from Anglicans and Protestants in Europe, the United Kingdom, and the New World.

Yet, her greatest supporter and advocate was the powerful and mysterious Roman Catholic Archbishop Francois Fénelon, who wrote a book about her theology called *The Maxims of the Saints*. He saw her as a faithful Catholic woman, in love with Jesus Christ, and defended her even though his support of her and her writing led to the destruction of his powerful ministry both in France and at the Vatican.

Was Jeanne Guyon a faithful Catholic? I can say definitively after translating her commentary on John's Gospel that indeed she sought to be a good Catholic, spending her very life-force to purify and expand the Catholic faith. She speaks words of wonder and love about her faith, but also ones of challenge and correction. She remained committed to the Roman Catholic Church, which had incarcerated her—its reasons for doing so are many and the decision may have been influenced by her wealth, beauty, and charisma rather than any actual unorthodoxy.

In her writings, Madame Guyon describes her intense and brutal sufferings not in terms of the physical and emotional anguish that anyone feels being locked up in prison. We know her sufferings were real, but she describes her greatest suffering in terms of the spiritual loss. She could not participate in the Roman Catholic Church's most sacred Liturgy, commonly called today the Mass, and receive the Eucharist daily.

Even after her exoneration and return to life on the Loire River, she wrote no angry or critical words to or about the Roman Catholic hierarchy who had interrogated and incarcerated her. Instead, continually and frequently, Jeanne Guyon professed the Christian faith as believed and practiced by the Roman Catholic Church. In her commentary on John, Guyon's love for the Roman Catholic Church shines clearly.

Jeanne Guyon's Roman Catholic Beliefs

Jeanne Guyon testified to the truth of the Roman Catholic Church in this commentary on John. She explains and defends the real presence of Jesus Christ in the Eucharist, the most sublime of the seven sacraments of the Catholic Faith and defends the other six sacraments of the church.

Not only did she believe in the sacramental life of the church, she also believe in the Catholic Church's ecclesiology, which upholds and promotes the communion of the saints. The Catholic Church believes that the saints are in heaven and are examples of holiness and intercessors for us, still seeking that transforming grace to become perfect as our heavenly Father is perfect. She developed a deep and profound devotion to two saints, Francis de Sales and Teresa of Avila, who were influential in her life, for both of them suffered much in their earthly lives.

Through many pages in this commentary, Jeanne Guyon makes a passionate defense of transubstantiation: the real presence of the body and blood (soul and divinity) of Jesus Christ in the Eucharist as a living and everlasting offering. She writes, "St. John testifies to the truth of the Eucharist, regarding Jesus Christ being immolated not only on the cross, but again on the altar until the end of the centuries. O divine Lamb, you take away the sins of the world!" (19–20) Guyon states that Jesus Christ will be present in the world through his presence on Roman Catholic altars, writing, "Jesus Christ also

dwells on the earth until the consummation of the centuries through means of the Holy Eucharist. He cannot remain in another way. His glory will never end and never be consummated.” (178)

Guyon describes her Roman Catholic belief in the Eucharist through which Jesus Christ joins himself with the faithful. She writes the following.

The institution of the Sacrament . . . perpetuates his glorious sacrifice to his Father and his ministry to human beings. As he was made man to give himself entirely to human beings and God, so he finds a way of giving himself in the most particular way possible. No union equals that of food, which becomes the substance and sustenance of the person who takes it. And what better way to make human beings God than to have them live as God? All human beings could not have hypostatic union, so he married human nature by his same union. To do this he made a real and sacramental union, so that each human being may be united with him in a way which closely approaches hypostatic union. (197)

Guyon gives strong warnings to those who did not believe in his real presence in the Eucharist. She writes,

Jesus Christ tells us, *My flesh will be given for you*. He clearly promised this without any intention to deceive. To say that he could not do this is clearly blasphemy since he is God and all-powerful. To doubt his power is to doubt his divinity. Does he not say that all power on heaven and earth has been given to him? If all power has been given to him, he is able. Not willing to deceive us, he acts in good faith and did this for us. If he gives his own flesh to death, I must conclude that he gives his own flesh to eat. When he says he gives his flesh to eat, this is not a figure of speech. (99–100)

Guyon also emphasizes the need for the confession of sins in the Sacrament of Reconciliation. Catholics believe that Jesus gave power not only to the apostles in the upper room when he reveals to them his resurrected body, but also empowers them with the Holy Spirit to forgive sins. Catholics believe that this power was not given solely to the apostles, but was given to their office, that is the priesthood itself and the successors to the apostles (apostolic succession) receive this grace to forgive sins, as did the eleven in the upper room. Guyon quotes John 20:23, “If you forgive the sins of any, they are forgiven them; if you retain the sins of any, they are retained.” Guyon interprets this, writing, “Jesus Christ gives them the Holy Spirit and the apostolic mission with the power to deliver *from sins*. This passage supports the priest hearing confession.” (263)

Guyon supports the Roman Catholic Church’s teaching on sacraments throughout her commentary on the Gospel of John, the Evangelist.

John’s Gospel uses seven signs as a format (paradigm) for his Gospel that some modern authors, such as John Bergsma, would claim are the teachings concerning the seven sacraments. For example, Jesus’ first miracle, The Wedding Feast of Cana, is obviously about the sacrament of marriage. Guyon fervently supports these sacraments throughout this commentary.

She does all of this in her most passionate way of writing with cries of love and even ecstasy. In other documents, Guyon at times has defended Catholic theology in prosaic terms in awkward sentences, as if written for the inquisitors, or even by the inquisitors, who were interrogating her. Her terminology and almost tormented writing style raised questions about the authenticity of her words. Yet, when Guyon speaks of words of truth, her sentences flow with joy and she uses more and more exclamation points

and cries of “Oh!” That is one reason Guyon fans adore her intimate and mystical insights and ideas. We do not need to interpret and suck meaning out of her theology through a narrow straw of thinking. Instead, she pours her meaning into us with ecstatic joy. In this commentary on John, Guyon articulates her impassioned and beautiful love for her Roman Catholic Church and her mystical love for Jesus in a way not present in other writings.

Jeanne Guyon’s Christian Mysticism

So why did Bishop Bossuet and others in the Roman Catholic hierarchy raise doubts about Jeanne Guyon’s faithfulness and orthodoxy? Jeanne Guyon was a Christian mystic who believed that Jesus Christ still desires intimacy and seeks to join spiritually with those who follow him. Her written words are not detailed and deliberate, as a scholar and theologian’s words, but ones of passionate love and intimacy, describing her growing union with Jesus Christ. As she says repeatedly, she had no theological training but felt that the Holy Spirit inspired her reflections on the scriptures. Ironically, in some of her responses to her inquisitors, she shows more theological understanding and insight than they did.

In this commentary, Jeanne Guyon discusses the intimacy present between Jesus Christ and Mary. She says that Mary had knit together Jesus Christ’s body in her womb and shared complete intimacy with him in her life. Yet at the wedding in Cana, there seemed to be a change between them.

Guyon writes about the wedding described in John 2:3–4.

The words of Jesus Christ to his holy mother appear to be rebukes but they are very mysterious. First, if we look at the natural miracle, Jesus Christ says, *Woman, what concern is that to you and to me?* The union between us is so close, do not you have all you want? You can do everything through me. (25)

Guyon continues,

In the mystical sense, Jesus Christ says to his mother, I have made a union with you so close that I cannot do the same with any other. *What concern is that to you and to me?* Is not my body formed in your blood? In you I was married with human nature in a hypostatic union that will never happen in any other creature. (26)

Guyon emphasizes the holy and exalted role of Mary, a core belief that continues to be held strong still in the Roman Catholic Church though it is also a point of great discussion. As another French saint, St Louis Marie de Montfort, would later write, Jesus came to us through Mary, we go to Jesus through Mary. In the context of intimacy and a wondrous closeness between Jesus and Mary, Guyon invites us, the faithful, to share in the great wedding feast of Jesus Christ intimate and present with his church, in a way similar to that of Jesus Christ and Mary. Guyon calls this the mystical incarnation.

In this commentary, Guyon describes clearly how Jesus Christ himself unites with the follower in a mystical incarnation. Guyon describes this in the following way. When a person through the actions of the Holy Spirit repents and accepts the motion of grace, the believer lives the faith imitating the life of Jesus Christ. In this imitation of his life, the believer also experiences within his or her interior life the same or similar heart-felt feelings, ideas, and convictions that Jesus Christ experienced in his suffering and sacrifice, his joy and faith. Guyon called this bearing the states of being of Jesus Christ. Guyon reveals that mystical perfection comes from suffering as Jesus did when he instituted the sacrament of the Eucharist in three parts: Holy Thursday, the institution of the Eucharistic ritual; Good Friday, his

suffering and death on the cross; and Easter Sunday, his risen presence revealed to his disciples. Out of this imitation, the believer will also have some form of spiritual, emotional, social, or physical crucifixion. Through this, Jesus Christ enters the believer's heart and becomes formed within the heart. When this formation is strong, Jesus Christ gently leads the follower out of the human heart and guides the soul into the very heart and bosom of God the Father. There the soul lives intimately with Jesus Christ lost in the infinite beauty and majesty of God the Father.

Guyon's clearest exposition of this comes in the following passage, based on John 14:3. Jesus said, "And if I go and prepare a place for you, I will come again and will take you to myself, so that where I am, there you may be also." Guyon writes the following about John 14:3.

I am leaving, Jesus Christ said, to prepare the place and to open the entrance to my Father's bosom. Then *I will come again and take you to myself*. Oh, what admirable words! Will Jesus Christ be incarnated once again and have we seen him come to seek his apostles? However, these words are true! It is true that Jesus Christ goes first as an example and model to prepare the place. We need to follow Jesus Christ and bear his states until we are crucified with him. O then he truly becomes incarnate in the soul in a mystical way. Then he takes the soul into himself. After hiding the soul within him, he is formed within her, born there, and believes until to the perfect day of eternal glory. Then he then leads her to himself and she remains with him eternally where he is himself and not in another place. (200–201)

According to her understanding of the Bread of Life discourse in John's famous passage (John 6), she along with all believing Christians see Jesus Christ's unconditional love displayed perfectly, though mystically upon the cross. In Guyon's commentary, we see she believed in transubstantiation, that is the bread and wine become the body and blood of Jesus and when she received this Eucharist, she is in him and he is in her: the mystical perfection that so many seek.

In her sufferings, which echoed Jesus Christ's sufferings, she sensed his real presence and her need for his divine provision. She expressed our human yearning for a real union with the physical Jesus providing us with a transformative union in his divine love. This unconditional love is solidified by his promise to give us the Advocate, who becomes ours through our adoration and reception of the Eucharist. Jesus Christ promised the Holy Spirit later in the Passover Discourse, and if we hold fast to our crucifixion, we too receive Jesus Christ's pure Spirit through his sacrificial love as did his followers and anyone who still seeks him.

I offer this first English translation of Jeanne Guyon's commentary on John in a spirit of thanksgiving that her voice was not successfully silenced by the powers of the Inquisition. The aggressive and antagonistic tactics of the Inquisition were more humanistic rather Christocentric, which led to many abuses and scandals. Guyon in her response to the Inquisition reveals a spiritual maturity that, despite her lack of theological training, reveals a deep spiritual theology, even a mystical love and understanding of her Lord Jesus. Her meditation on John displays a mystical perfection through her Eucharistic sufferings, though obviously too exuberant for the Catholic hierarchy at that time.

As the Inquisition tried to squash her more exuberant and emotional expression of the Catholic faith, due to their more objective and orthodox/stoic demands to keep Catholicism free from theological error, a Catholic proverb of the twentieth century may shed light on silenced the French mindset of the seventeenth century: *Charity without orthodoxy is heterodox; Orthodoxy without charity is heterodox too.*

The greatest lesson we learn from Guyon may not be her exuberant and even ecstatic expressions of her mystical love for Jesus, but her virtuous embrace of her sufferings caused by those whose sole focus was orthodoxy without true charity. As her divine Master did the will of the Father in silence, like a lamb led to the slaughter, so too Guyon was silent about her sufferings despite her many poems, commentaries, and letters.

The accusations riled against her by the inquisitors for being interiorly passive and seeking annihilation of the self and not demanding an active and positive response through virtue and moral integrity to the demands of the Christian life, may be false, for perhaps, she just lived a virtuous and moral life inspired by her deep love of Jesus: the work of her spiritual writings displayed her interior faith.

In this light, recalling the other great French mystic of the thirteenth century, St Joan of Arc, who also was condemned as a false prophet, history may ultimately reveal that Guyon was a true mystic, whereas, heaven already knows.

And so to those who read Jeanne Guyon's commentaries, I say thank you. This is one of her crucial documents for by her words, she intimately, passionately, and mystically shares with us her love of Jesus Christ. Once again, in Jeanne Guyon's words on the Gospel of John, we experience the anointing of the Holy Spirit and intimacy with the one Jeanne Guyon called Master, the Lord Jesus Christ. <>

THE BLACK BOOKS 1913-1932: NOTEBOOKS OF TRANSFORMATION Seven-Volume Set Slip-Cased Boxed, 1648 pages by C G Jung, edited and introduced by Sonu Shamdasani, translated by Martin Liebscher, John Peck and Sonu Shamdasani [Philemon Series: W. W. Norton & Company, 9780393088649]

Until now, the single most important unpublished work by C.G. Jung—**The Black Books**.

In 1913, C.G. Jung started a unique self-experiment that he called his “confrontation with the unconscious”: an engagement with his fantasies in a waking state, which he charted in a series of notebooks referred to as **THE BLACK BOOKS**. These intimate writings shed light on the further elaboration of Jung's personal cosmology and his attempts to embody insights from his self-investigation into his life and personal relationships. **THE RED BOOK** drew on material recorded from 1913 to 1916, but Jung actively kept the notebooks for many more decades.

Presented in a magnificent, seven-volume boxed collection featuring a revelatory essay by noted Jung scholar Sonu Shamdasani—illuminated by a selection of Jung's vibrant visual works—and both translated and facsimile versions of each notebook, **THE BLACK BOOKS** offer a unique portal into Jung's mind and the origins of analytical psychology.

Facsimile reproductions throughout.

The publication in 2009 of *Liber Novus*, C. G. Jung's **THE RED BOOK**, has justly been regarded as a cultural event of historical significance. The publication enabled a new reading of Jung that is just beginning, based for the first time on primary documentation of the most critical creative phase in Jung's life. To continue this, the Philemon Foundation is pleased to announce the editing for publication of C. G. Jung's **THE BLACK BOOKS**, from 1913 to 1932, in a facsimile edition, accompanied by translation, introduction and notes, in collaboration with the Foundation of the Works of C. G. Jung. The edition is edited by Sonu Shamdasani, translated by Martin Liebscher, John Peck and Sonu Shamdasani and will be published by W. W. Norton.

The text of **THE RED BOOK** draws on material from **THE BLACK BOOKS** between 1913 and 1916. Approximately fifty percent of the text of **THE RED BOOK** derives directly from **THE BLACK BOOKS**, with very light editing and reworking. **THE BLACK BOOKS** are not personal diaries but the records of the unique self-experimentation that Jung called his 'confrontation with the unconscious.' He did not record day-to-day happenings or outer events but his active imaginations and depictions of his mental states together with his reflections on these.

The material that Jung did not include in **THE RED BOOK** is of equal interest to the material that he did include. **THE BLACK BOOKS** shed light on Jung's 'confrontation with the unconscious,' for which they are the prime documentation, as well as the genesis of **THE RED BOOK**, the further elaboration of Jung's personal cosmology, and the making of analytical psychology.

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
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Toward a Visionary Science: Jung's Notebooks of Transformation by Sonu Shamdasani

Prelude

In 1935, Jung said: "A point exists at about the thirty-fifth year when things begin to change, it is the first moment of the shadow side of life, of the going down to death. It is clear that Dante found this point and those who have read *Zarathustra* will know that Nietzsche also discovered it. When this turning point comes people meet it in several ways: some turn away from it; others plunge into it; and something important happens to yet others from the outside. If we do not see a thing Fate does it to us." By 1913, he had established himself as one of the leading lights in European psychiatry and was president of the burgeoning International Psychoanalytical Association. As he recounted in *Liber Novus*, "I had achieved everything that I had wished for myself. I had achieved honor, power, wealth, knowledge, and every human happiness. Then my desire for the increase of these trappings ceased, the desire ebbed from me and horror came over me." He had reached a turning point that was to transform his life and work: through this, Jung *became* Jung, and analytical psychology emerged as a general psychology and as a school of psychotherapy.

This transformation took place through the exploration of the visionary imagination, charted in **THE BLACK BOOKS**, from 1913 to 1932. These are not personal diaries but the records of a unique self-experimentation that Jung called his "confrontation with his soul" and his "confrontation with the unconscious." He didn't record day-to-day happenings or outer events in them but rather his active imaginations, depictions of his mental states, and reflections on these. From the fantasies therein, between 1913 and 1916 he composed the *Draft of Liber Novus*, **THE RED BOOK**, which he then transcribed in a calligraphic volume, illustrated with paintings. The paintings from 1916 onward in the *Red Book* relate to Jung's continued explorations in the later **THE BLACK BOOKS**. *Liber Novus* and the *Black Books* are thus closely intertwined. **THE BLACK BOOKS**, cover the period before, during, and after *Liber Novus*.

Liber Novus was born from **THE BLACK BOOKS**. It includes Jung's meditation on his fantasies between 1913 and 1916, and his understanding of the significance of his experiences up to that point. In Jung's view, his undertaking pertained not just to himself but to others as well; he had come to view his fantasies as stemming from a general mythopoeic layer of the psyche, which he named the collective unconscious. From the notebooks of a self-experimentation, a psychological work in a literary and theogonic form was created. Jung's continued explorations of the visionary imagination in the *Black Books* from 1916 chart his evolving understanding and demonstrate how he sought to develop and extend the insights he had gained and embody them in life. At the same time, they enable his paintings from 1916 onward to be understood in the context of the evolution of the iconography of his personal cosmology.

Given the intersection of **THE BLACK BOOKS**, and *Liber Novus*, particularly between 1913 and 1916, this introduction of necessity reprises in a reworked and expanded form sections from the introduction to *Liber Novus*, now taken up from a different angle, as both works arise from one context and shared chronology. The introduction at hand focuses more on the unfolding of Jung's visionary self-experimentation, and provides a fuller contextualization of the later period, 1916 to 1932. Similarly, a share of the notes from the 2009 Norton edition of *Liber Novus* have been carried over in the first part of this edition. In the early twentieth century, it was not uncommon for a work to be expanded and recast through several editions. A number of Jung's pivotal publications, such as *The Psychology of the Unconscious Processes*, are prime examples of this. This introduction is part of that genre.

The Intoxication of Mythology

Vocatus atque vocatus, dens aderit: Called or not, God will be present. In 1908, Jung had this proverb carved on the portal of the house he had built in Küsnacht, on the upper shore of Lake Zurich. The statement was from the Delphic oracle, reproduced in the Dutch Renaissance humanist Erasmus's *Collectanea adagiorum*, proverbs from classical authors. Jung closely worked on the plans for the house. The following year, he resigned his post as senior physician at Burgholzli hospital to devote himself to his growing practice and his research interests. He kept his position as a lecturer in the medical school, where he continued to give courses on the psychology of the unconscious and psychoanalysis.'

His retreat from the Burgholzli coincided with a shift in his research interests to the study of mythology, folklore, and religion, and he assembled a vast private library of scholarly works. These researches culminated in *Transformations and Symbols of the Libido*, published in two installments in 1911 and 1912. It marked a return to Jung's intellectual roots and to his cultural and religious preoccupations. He found the mythological work exciting and intoxicating. "It seemed to me I was living in an insane asylum of my own making," he recalled in 1925. "I went about with all these fantastic figures: centaurs, nymphs, satyrs, gods and goddesses, as though they were patients and I was analyzing them. I read a Greek or a Negro myth as if a lunatic were telling me his anamnesis." The end of the nineteenth century saw an explosion of scholarship in the newly founded disciplines of comparative religion and ethnopsychology. Primary texts were collected and translated for the first time and subjected to historical scholarship in collections such as Max Müller's *Sacred Books of the East*.' For many, these works represented an important relativization of the Christian worldview.

In *Transformations and Symbols of the Libido*, Jung differentiated two kinds of thinking. Taking his cue from William James, among others, he contrasted directed thinking and fantasy thinking. The former was verbal and logical. The latter was passive, associative, and imagistic. The former was exemplified by science and the latter by mythology. Jung claimed that the ancients lacked a capacity for directed thinking, which was a modern acquisition. Fantasy thinking took place when directed thinking ceased. *Transformations and Symbols of the Libido* was an extended study of fantasy thinking, and of the continued presence of mythological themes in the dreams and fantasies of contemporary individuals. Jung reiterated the anthropological equation between the prehistoric, the primitive, and the child. He held that the elucidation of current-day fantasy thinking in adults would concurrently shed light on the thought of children, savages, and prehistoric peoples.

In this work, Jung synthesized nineteenth-century theories of memory, heredity, and the unconscious and posited a phylogenetic layer to the unconscious, still present in everyone, and consisting of

mythological images. For Jung, myths were symbols of the libido and they depicted its typical movements. He used the comparative method of anthropology to draw together a vast panoply of myths, and then subjected them to analytic interpretation. He later termed his use of the comparative method "amplification." He claimed that there had to be typical myths, which corresponded to the ethnopsychological development of complexes. Following Jacob Burckhardt, he termed such typical myths "primordial images" (*Urbilder*). One particular myth was given a central role: that of the hero. For Jung, this represented the life of the individual, attempting to become independent and to free himself from the mother. He interpreted the incest motif as an attempt to return to the mother to be reborn. He was later to herald this work as marking the discovery of the collective unconscious, though the term itself was of a later date.

In his preface to the 1952 revision of *Transformations and Symbols of the Libido*, Jung noted that the work was written in 1911, his thirty-sixth year: "The time is a critical one, for it marks the beginning of the second half of life, when a metanoia, a mental transformation, not infrequently occurs' He was conscious of the loss of his collaboration with Freud and was indebted to his wife for her support. After completing the work, he realized the significance of what it meant to live without a myth. One without a myth "is like one uprooted, having no true link either with the past, or with the ancestral life which continues within him, or yet with contemporary human society.

I was driven to ask myself in all seriousness: "what is the myth you are living?" I found no answer to this question, and had to admit that I was not living with a myth, or even in a myth, but rather in an uncertain cloud of theoretical possibilities which I was beginning to regard with increasing distrust. . . . So in the most natural way, I took it upon myself to get to know "my" myth, and I regarded this as the task of tasks, for—so I told myself—how could I, when treating my patients, make due allowance for the personal factor, for my personal equation, which is yet so necessary for a knowledge of the other person, if I was unconscious of it?

The study of myth had revealed to Jung his mythlessness. He then undertook to get to know his myth, his "personal equation." Thus we see that the self-experimentation that he undertook through exploring his own fantasy thinking was in part a direct response to theoretical questions raised by research that culminated in *Transformations and Symbols of the Libido*.

In conclusion, **THE BLACK BOOKS**, provide a unique window into the creative process of a major psychologist. At a textual level, they enable one to follow how Jung's scholarly reading provided resources that inspired his fantasy, moving him to imagine in a mythic way. By reflecting on these resources, he attempted to divine broad insights from them, first cast in a lyrical form in *Liber Novus* and subsequently in conceptual and theoretical forms in his scholarly writings. As a *document humain* and psychological record, **THE BLACK BOOKS**, chart Jung's attempt to resolve the twentieth-century crisis of meaning in his own person, and distill from this a means through psychotherapy for others to do likewise. In short, **THE BLACK BOOKS**, and *Liber Novus* together form the core of analytical psychology, and enable its historical genesis to be studied from its inception. Jung's work may now be seen in the round, and the intimate connections between the esoteric visionary cycles and the exoteric psychology may be grasped. Jung later recalled that his "entire life consisted in elaborating what had burst forth from the unconscious like an enigmatic stream and threatened to break me. . . . Everything

later was merely the outer classification, the scientific elaboration, the integration into life. But the numinous beginning, which contained everything, was then." Thus **THE BLACK BOOKS**, enable one to enter the private laboratory of analytical psychology and follow the genesis of a visionary science: that is, how a psychology was born of the visionary imagination, which in turn could form a *science* of visions.
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THE HOLY SPIRIT AND THE REFORMATION LEGACY edited by Mark J. Cartledge and Mark A. Jumper [Pickwick Publications, 9781532695438]

This collection of essays explores the legacy of the Reformation with regard to the person and work of the Holy Spirit. Following the five-hundredth anniversary of Luther's posting of his ninety-five theses, these essays consider this legacy with particular reference to the work of Martin Luther and John Calvin, as well as broader Reformation themes as they are related to pneumatology and the life of the church today. The contribution of this collection is to tease out and reflect on pneumatology historically but also to relate these findings to contemporary discussions, especially among scholars of pentecostal and charismatic Christianity. Together these essays invite readers to appreciate the contribution that the Protestant Reformation makes to life in the Holy Spirit today, as well as offering critical and constructive reflection on this theme. It is a timely and significant contribution to the discussions of the person and work of the Holy Spirit and the church.

Review

"A compelling and creative pentecostal contribution to the celebration and recovery of the Protestant Reformation. It investigates Luther's and Calvin's legacy in select areas of theology, hermeneutics, spirituality, worship, and women in ministry. It brings Protestant Reformation theology into conversation with key areas of contemporary charismatic theology--gifts and renewal, justification and the transformation of life, and participation in social change. A pneumatological and pentecostal perspective grounds its historical and contemporary dialogue with Luther, Calvin, and Reformation theology." --Steven M. Studebaker, Professor of Systematic and Historical Theology, Howard and Shirley Bentall Chair in Evangelical Thought, McMaster Divinity College

"Those who view the Reformation as word rather than Spirit dominated will find this intriguing collection of essays edited by Mark Cartledge and Mark Jumper to be especially enlightening. Offered in celebration of the five-hundredth anniversary of Luther's ninety-five theses, these essays show us the varied contributions of the Reformation to pneumatology and trace their influence into the modern era. Tremendously informative and creative." --Frank D. Macchia, Professor of Systematic Theology, Vanguard University

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The Protestant Reformation represented a revolution in the religious affairs of the West that reverberates to the present. The East–West Schism in Christendom (1054) between Roman Catholic and Orthodox had reflected formal actions of the bodies, Rome and Constantinople, that had long been recognized as definitive leaders of the Church. The Protestant Reformation (1517), in contrast, sprang from the soil, as it were: if not *ex nihilo* (progenitors included such as Huss and Wycliff, among other persons and movements), certainly not *ex cathedra*. The formation of two leading movements, Lutheran and Reformed, as well as Anglicans, Anabaptists, and others proceeded unplanned and piecemeal with many diversions and dispersions in the process. In the meantime, the Roman Catholic Church experienced many reformations of its own, including the forming of the innovatively modern Society of Jesus. Years of struggle and battle followed theological, ecclesial, political, and military- that remade not just the face of Europe, but its religious configuration, by the time of Westfalia's peace of 1648.

We note that the European discovery, exploration, and expropriation of the New World predated the Reformation by only twenty-five years, reaching its floodtide even as Reformation conflicts tore the explorers' homelands. The New World's melee of new boundaries and rulers reflected much of Europe's conflicts, eventuating in North America generally aligning Protestant and South America, Roman Catholic. The dynamics occurring in both Europe and the New World were thus not isolated, but mutually interactive in myriads of unpredictable and sometimes unrecognized ways.

Technical, economic, and social change also claimed roles in the times' convulsions. New technology, most notably the movable type printing press, had a primary role. The Gutenberg Bible was completed by 1455, when the future Pope Pius II spoke of it sixty-two years before Luther's handwritten 95 Theses were posted. However, it was Luther and the Protestants who made mass pamphlet printing and distribution their trademark method of propagation and teaching. That teaching implicitly depended

upon the Holy Spirit's illumination of those lesser-trained individuals who read it in private and public. New social developments included travel, trade, infusions of New World gold, spice, and crops, and new uses of capital. These brought significant changes to a continent not so far removed from feudalism. To generalize, Protestant places tended to be more open to these changes, embracing them with enthusiasm in some contexts. Max Weber later named *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* as the mutually reinforcing winners of that war.

We also remember that Europe, after centuries of loss to Muslim conquerors from the south, had only recently put a definite close to Christendom's near-death threat at Islam's hands. Spain's 700-year self-deliverance from Islamic rule, the Reconquista, was only completed in 1492, with the victorious Ferdinand and Isabella promptly sending Columbus on his momentous voyage (as well as exiling Jews who took their prosperous practices elsewhere).³ The gates of Vienna only survived the climactic Ottoman assault in 1529, finally leaving central and western Europe to stew in their internecine conflicts rather than have their weakened pieces consumed by Islam's cumulative victories. Islam's retreat from high tide, Spain in 1492 and Vienna in 1529, thus overlapped the Reformation's early years, along with the New World dynamics.

Finally, we note the Renaissance as another of the Reformation's overlays, starting as it did in the 1300s and continuing through the 1700s. This movement of academic and cultural recovery of ancient literature and philosophy combined with an energetic flowering of art and new philosophies, and the rise of humanism and science, to undermine many of the assumptions and underpinnings of Christendom's ancien regime.

It may thus be seen that the Reformation does not stand alone in its revolutionary role. If the Renaissance weakened the ancien regime, perhaps the Reformation administered a coup de grace of sorts. However, the conjunctions of the New World's opening horizon, Islam's ebbside, and paradigmatic changes in technological, social, scientific, and economic developments were certainly of momentous import. These factors, each in itself of defining consequence, joined to birth a new world that is yet with us as our formative heritage: "No Westerner can ever hope to know him or herself, or the world he or she lives in, without first understanding this crucial turning point in history. And the same goes for any non-Westerner who wants to understand Western civilization."

The question then arises: as Christians who affirm the providence and sovereignty of God, do we dare to discern the role of the Holy Spirit amid such momentous events? This question lay at the root of the conference from which these chapters sprang. We should remember that while the above-mentioned movements and influences provided the context for the several reformations that occurred, the center stage of the era was religious. We dare to suggest that church, theology, and faith with its experience were the prime drivers of the era's events. In other words, the living out of belief in God lay at the core of it all. It is this claimed nexus of this definitive era that gives us pause to ask how God's Spirit, who hovered over the earth's waters in Genesis 1:1, was active amid the Reformation's human striving and strife.

Martin Luther linked his revolution, recognizing faith as primary over works, to the Holy Spirit:

Faith is God's work in us, that changes us and gives new birth from God. (John 1:13). It kills the Old Adam and makes us completely different people. It changes our hearts, our spirits, our

thoughts and all our powers. It brings the Holy Spirit with it. Yes, it is a living, creative, active and powerful thing, this faith. Faith is a living, bold trust in God's grace, so certain of God's favor that it would risk death a thousand times trusting in it. Such confidence and knowledge of God's grace makes you happy, joyful and bold in your relationship to God and all creatures. The Holy Spirit makes this happen through faith. Because of it, you freely, willingly and joyfully do good to everyone, serve everyone, suffer all kinds of things, love and praise the God who has shown you such grace.

It is significant, too, that Luther emphasized this infusion of the Spirit's presence and illumination in personal terms, rather than primarily in corporate (ecclesial) or communitarian (sacramental) terms. This emphasis on the private person's relationship to God through the Holy Spirit became central, for good and ill, in individualized Western society, even if, in our context, we are now recovering the importance of communal approaches to theological reflection.

Calvin, too, attributed high of place to the Holy Spirit. He was even given the sobriquet, "Theologian of the Holy Spirit," by various theologians including B. B. Warfield:

In the same sense in which we may say that the doctrine of sin and grace dates from Augustine, the doctrine of satisfaction from Anselm, the doctrine of justification by faith from Luther—we must say that the doctrine of the work of the Holy Spirit is a gift from Calvin to the church. [And] above everything else, it is the sense of the sovereign working of salvation by the almighty power of the Holy Spirit which characterizes all Calvin's thought of God.

Calvin went to great lengths in his Institutes to expand upon the Holy Spirit's significant role, in both personal and theological terms:

The Scriptures obtain full authority among believers only when men regard them as having sprung from heaven, as if there the living words of God were heard . . . The testimony of the Spirit is more excellent than all reason. For as God alone is a fit witness of himself in his Word, so also the Word will not find acceptance in men's hearts before it is sealed by the inward testimony of the Spirit . . . Those whom the Holy Spirit has inwardly taught truly rest upon Scripture, and that Scripture indeed is self-authenticated . . . Let us, then, know that the only true faith is that which the Spirit of God seals in our hearts.

It is thus safe to say, of Calvin as well as Luther, that the Reformation represented recovery and reemphasis of the person and work of the Holy Spirit. Indeed neither would have maintained his path apart from "popery," as Calvin called it, were he not convinced that such a drastic move was not only justified but required as a faithful act in response to the move and leading of the Holy Spirit of God.

G. W. F. Hegel later sought to explain history in terms of a (capitalized but impersonal) World Spirit that "consists in what is produced by man":

The realm of Spirit is all-comprehensive; it includes everything that ever has interested or ever will interest man. Man is active in it; whatever he does, he is the creature within which the Spirit works. Hence it is of interest, in the course of history, to learn to know spiritual nature in its existence, that is, the point where Spirit and Nature unite, namely, human nature.

We Christians, while resonating with Hegel's wish to learn the spiritual nature of history, take a different tack that seeks to discern the winds of the person of God's Spirit moving through time, space, place, and people's lives. We believe that God's divine, personal, providential plan and presence, mediated by his Spirit's activity through all time, ultimately achieve his will to bring about his Kingdom, ruled by Christ.

Exploring the degree to which the Reformation represented and reflected that rule is one aim of the conference that we convened on the Reformation's 500th anniversary. We took our specific task from the conference's title, "The Holy Spirit and the Reformation Legacy." This title entailed three emphases that were required of each presentation as we examined but a few of the Reformation's facets: first, the presence and role of the Holy Spirit in a given area of interest; second, awareness and placement of the Spirit's role in the historical locus of the Reformation; and third, ways in which those Reformation beliefs and actions, regarding the Holy Spirit, left lasting legacies that still live today.

Regent University, the host of the conference through its School of Divinity's Center for Renewal Studies, has, from its start, been part of the Holy Spirit renewal movement that swept the world from the twentieth century on. This movement includes Pentecostal, Charismatic, and Third Wave streams, as well as a vigorous stream in the Roman Catholic Church. Our Reformation 500 conference thus sought to take its distinction from other Reformation celebrations and explorations by giving primary attention to the Holy Spirit. We pray that this conference may thus make a unique contribution to the scholarship of those Reformation events that continue to echo through time.

As you consider each conference paper chapter, we also pray that you will find fresh insight, not only into what happened and what has come about but into the activity of the Holy Spirit in this earthly veil—including in your life.

It now remains to offer a brief outline of the chapters in this book. We have divided the book into three parts. The first part clusters chapters that consider the influence of Martin Luther and includes chapters 1–6. Chapter 1 by Michael M.C. Reardon discusses Luther and his influence on Melancthon's pneumatology in relation to the doctrines of the Trinity and justification. This legacy is then brought into conversation with the idealism of Hegel and its traces in Rahner, suggesting that Luther's legacy has impacted a wide variety of thought beyond the confessionalism of the Lutheran tradition. Chapter 2 by Samuel W. Muindi takes a hermeneutical turn. It considers the legacy of Luther concerning biblical hermeneutics and in particular canonical criticism. It does this by analyzing Luther's hermeneutical approach before attending to the post-Reformation trajectories from the Enlightenment. He continues by discussing the similarities of Luther's hermeneutics with the canonical criticism of Brevard Childs before concluding with a discussion of pneumatic hermeneutics. Chapter 3 by Donald W. Kammer takes an entirely different approach as it reviews the early Pentecostal devotional literature in America and Britain from 1907 and how these early Pentecostals conceived of themselves as inheritors of the Lutheran legacy through their devotional practices. In particular, they regarded Martin Luther as a spiritual exemplar and incorporated him into their view of church history, thus adding an interesting ecumenical perspective.

Chapter 4 by Mara Lief Crabtree brings the legacy of Martin Luther into conversation with the issue of spirituality and, in particular, the nature of spiritual formation. Crabtree first discusses key elements in Luther's spirituality before tracing his influence via the printing press, visio divina and lectio divina, and

diverse theologies of the Eucharist. Then follows a description of Luther's understanding of suffering in the Christian life, including his view on purgatory, before a brief discussion of joy and priestly formation. The chapter concludes by identifying aspects of the Reformation legacy that can be seen in spiritual "reformation" today. Lance Bacon writes chapter 5. In this chapter, the author investigates the influence of Luther on the Pentecostal appreciation of the cross and Pentecostals' appropriation of John Wesley's approach to Christian perfection. Having identified the plurality of Pentecostalism, Bacon then considers Luther's theology of the cross in some detail before bringing it into conversation with Wesley's theology. The discussion is then brought back to how American Wesleyan Pentecostalism has appropriated both justification and sanctification in its theology. He then concludes with a discussion of pneumatology and ethics in the light of the legacy of Luther and Wesley. Chapter 6, written by Barbara Elkjer, concludes the section investigating the legacy of Luther. She takes a look at Luther's theology of marriage and in particular, his marriage to his wife Katharina von Bora. She places this discussion within an historical context, both ancient and medieval, before considering ideas of virginity and marriage that Katharina developed during her marriage to Luther. Thus, this chapter brings an essential perspective on Luther's legacy, often missed, which relates to the Pentecostal empowerment of women through a pneumatic spirituality.

The second part brings together chapters that discuss the legacy of John Calvin and includes chapters 7–10. Chapter 7 by Andrew Snyder investigates Calvin's pneumatology in relation to soteriology and in particular, the believer's union with Christ by means of the Holy Spirit. He traces the influence of Augustine on Calvin's theology more generally before focusing on Calvin's pneumatology and soteriology. He then considers implications of this discussion in relation to sacramental theology, especially Calvin's eucharistic pneumatology. Chapter 8 by David M. Barbee explores the influence of Calvin's pneumatology on Karl Barth. He begins by noting Calvin's pneumatology and its reception by Schleiermacher and via Schleiermacher to Barth. Given this pneumatological trajectory, the author then discusses the theme of revelation in Barth before noting some similarities between Calvin and Barth and the impact of Calvin's pneumatology on Barth. Chapter 9, by Fitzroy John Willis, is a review of Calvin's criteria for the use of the charismata and their possible use within contemporary worship. The author begins by elucidating Calvin's understanding of the proper employment of prophecy within a worship service before considering how contemporary theology has considered the application of these criteria to today's worshipping communities. He discusses the relationship between prophecy and preaching and the nature and use of speaking in tongues and interpretation, as well as the issue of the cessation of the charismata. Finally, there is a discussion of charismata, gender, and the *mulier taceat*. Chapter 10, written by Daniel B. Gilbert, provides a second study of John Calvin and the charismata, with a particular emphasis on the gift of prophecy. He begins with a general description of Calvin's view of the charismata before a discussion of soteriological gifts, the charismata, and the gift of prophecy. He discusses the nature of the temporary-permanent distinction before applying this understanding to its use in the church today.

Part three gathers three papers that reflect on several Reformation themes and are not as focused on a discussion of either Luther or Calvin. It contains chapters 11–13. Chapter 11 picks up the theme of cessationism and addresses it in relation to the Reformation and renewal of the Holy Spirit. It is written by Christopher J. Wilson. It begins with a short historical sketch of cessationism in the Patristic era before considering the Reformation period. He then discusses anti-supernaturalism and the rise of

historical criticism. Finally, he addresses the position of David Hume in relation to the Pentecostal and Charismatic Renewal movements from the twentieth century. Chapter 12, by James M. Henderson, investigates the relationship of justification to the idea of the theōsis. He begins with an analysis of justification as theōsis in recent Pentecostal theology and literature before considering whether theōsis could be understood as part of the process of justification. He then develops a discussion engaging the work of Finnish Lutheran theology in particular before considering the critique of this school of thought by German theologian, Eberhard Jüngel. Carl R. Trueman is also brought into the conversation as another critical dialogue partner with regard to the Finnish Lutheran school of thought, before a discussion of justification and transformation in the Reformed theology of Jonathan Edwards. Finally, the essay concludes by addressing the issue of how justification with transformation may be regarded as a better model than theōsis. Chapter 13 is the final chapter of the book, and it is written by Jan B. Drayer. It reviews the impact of the Reformation heritage in dialogue with the cultural change theory of James Davidson Hunter. On this account, the social change initiated by the Reformation is seen as still significant for our understanding of the contemporary religious landscape. He notes Hunter's critique of the common understanding of culture in American society, his alternative suggestions for understanding culture, and in particular, his analysis of the Reformation, before providing an overall analysis of the Reformation, social change, and the Holy Spirit. Finally, he observes the limited role that Pentecostals have played in the field of social change, being more concerned with evangelism rather than social transformation. <>

POST-HELLENISTIC PHILOSOPHY: A STUDY OF ITS DEVELOPMENT FROM THE STOICS TO ORIGEN by G. R. Boys-Stones [Oxford University Press, 978-0198152644]

This book traces, for the first time, a revolution in philosophy which took place during the early centuries of our era. It reconstructs the philosophical basis of the Stoics' theory that fragments of an ancient and divine wisdom could be reconstructed from mythological traditions, and shows that Platonism was founded on an argument that Plato had himself achieved a full reconstruction of this wisdom, and that subsequent philosophies had only regressed once again in their attempts to "improve" on his achievement.

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The centuries immediately following the end of the Hellenistic age remain a murky area in the history of philosophy. While a great deal of work has been done in recent years to rehabilitate Hellenistic thought itself from the generally negative assessment of the nineteenth century, the thesis that later philosophy traces a decline into 'eclecticism' (cf. not least Zeller 1892: vol. iv/1) retains a programmatic hold over studies of the period. Three centuries of intellectual activity are held to mark out a kind of philosophical no man's land between the earlier systems from which they are taken to derive their material, and the glories of 'Neoplatonism' to which they look forward. Even John Dillon, who has done so much to map out the territory (esp. Dillon 1996) and to question the term 'eclecticism' itself (Dillon 1988), found the period interesting 'chiefly as a prologue to Plotinus' (Dillon 1996: p. xiv). However, if scholarship has managed to bring the post-Aristotelian schools within the pale, the possibility must exist that post-Hellenistic philosophy can be brought inside as well—perhaps, ultimately, that the no man's land it marks out at the doorstep of Plotinus can be reclaimed and the pale brought down altogether. It is the aim of the present study to explore that possibility. It looks at post-Hellenistic philosophy, in particular at the one distinctive and influential movement it produced, namely Platonism, and argues that, in this movement, philosophy changed for ever, and changed in a manner perhaps less visible for its very depth. For this change, I shall argue, was not one marked as such—in the first place, at least—by a radical departure from engagement with the doctrines of the Hellenistic schools; it was rather marked by a shift in the theoretical understanding of how philosophy itself should be done. The distinction between 'Neo-' and 'Middle' Platonism is based on superficialities: the real philosophical revolution had taken place by the end of the second century ad, and it is this revolution that the study traces.

Platonism, it hardly needs arguing, was about a return to the philosophy of Plato. But this return was the consequence, not the basis, of a theory: the consequence, as I argue, of a theory de-

veloped from work originally done in the Hellenistic Stoa on the nature of mythological and theological traditions. In Part I of the study I examine the Stoics' suggestion that these traditions might preserve fragments of the philosophical outlook which obtained among the very first generations of mankind, an outlook whose truth could be independently established. In Chapters 1–2 I examine the basis for this belief in the early Stoa, and in Chapter 3, the increasingly sophisticated methods developed by the later Stoics for isolating 'original' philosophical material from the traditions which preserved it. One of the most important of these methods was the cross-cultural comparison of theological traditions—an approach which called for further investigation into the purity and antiquity of the traditions with which it worked. As evidence for the development of interest in these questions, I look in Chapters 4 and 5 at the way it is reflected in the Hellenistic debate between Greek and Jewish intellectuals over the age and status of Jewish culture, and argue that the issue of Jewish antiquity arose as a theme in the polemic it involves only in the light of the work of the later Stoics.

In Part II I turn to the Platonists themselves. They, I argue in Chapter 6, adopted the Stoics' beliefs concerning the survival of ancient, privileged wisdom, and their methods for extracting it as well. But what made the Platonists Platonists was their additional belief that Plato had already made use of just this kind of approach himself. Plato's philosophy represented, they believed, a full and successful

reconstruction and articulation of the primitive, privileged wisdom of early man—and that is why Plato came to stand as an authority for them. But if Plato’s authority is explained on the basis of his sources and method, the truth of his philosophy is also made plausible by the Platonists through an account of postPlatonic history. In Chapter 7 I show that, working from the explosion of philosophical disagreement and debate after Plato’s death, institutionalized in the foundation of a number of different philosophical schools, the Platonists argued that we should not (with the Sceptics) suspend judgement over where the truth lay at all, but rather conclude that a return to the study of Plato might provide the most promising route to discovering it. The difficulties and disagreements among schools which had diverged from the teaching of Plato only made it more plausible that Plato had been right in the first place.

Finally, I argue that the models which defined the Platonist ap-

proach to philosophy were adopted by Christian thinkers of the later first and early second centuries ad, and shaped the emergence of Christianity as a force in Western philosophy. Needing to respond to Platonist claims that the dissension within Christianity could be explained by their own divergence from the ancient tradition inherited through Plato, the Christians used the Platonists’ own tools to develop the notions of ‘orthodoxy’ and ‘heresy’ by which a ‘true’ and unified Christian tradition could be distinguished from the dissension it later attracted. Furthermore, by arguing that Christianity was in philosophical continuity with Hebrew thought (as the apologists of the second century started to do), ‘orthodox’ Christians were able to lay claim to a Hebraeo-Christian tradition which was older in its turn than any pagan tradition. Indeed, they argued that the traditional theologies of the pagans themselves must now be viewed as later and decadent offshoots of their own. But all of this leaves the Christians one further question, explored in Chapter 9: if traditional pagan theology is to be explained as a corrupt divergence from Hebraeo-Christian thought, how did it come to give rise to the more positive tradition of Classical Greek philosophy? Since it was axiomatic to the argument used by the Christians that divergent traditions could only tend to the worse, the improvements apparent in the work of the philosophers were in need of explanation. The answer offered by the Christians was that, one way or another, pagan philosophy also depended for its existence on the prior existence and superior truth of the Christian tradition: that it was, for example, sparked into being by contact during the Classical period with Hebrew Scripture. This explains the muchmaligned ‘dependency theme’ (as one commentator has called it); but, crucially, it explains why one should not allow the positive developments within pagan philosophy to blind one to the essential weakness of its approach. The same traits which had led the pagans to diverge from the original tradition led their philosophers to dispute all over again the insights they had gained from the Hebrews, and to fall once again into a disagreement which showed that, if the truth was discernible at all, it must lie within orthodox Christianity.

Having described what is contained in this study, I should say a word about what is omitted. I do not, on the whole, discuss evidence later than the late third century ad—or, more specifically, later than the Platonist Porphyry, or Origen in the chapters on Christianity. These two thinkers seem to me convenient resting-points in their respective traditions; and the theory I discuss has been sufficiently established by this point for it to be neither necessary nor profitable to extend the investigation further. But a word is needed on the scope of my discussion of earlier Platonism as well, from which several familiar names will be found to be absent. It is part of my argument that Platonism should not be defined primarily by its doctrines, but rather by its methodology (in the context of which its doctrinal

development can then be understood). For this reason, I concentrate away from Platonists who are only known to us through doxographical fragments or works: this is the excuse I offer for the absence here of figures such as Albinus, Alcinous, Gaius, and Apuleius. I am encouraged in focusing my attention elsewhere (in particular on Celsus, Plutarch, Atticus, and Numenius, as well as, to a lesser extent, on Plotinus and Porphyry) not just by this theoretical consideration, but also by the failure of doxographical approaches to Platonism which have deployed these thinkers on the front line of their evidence—one thinks in particular of the now discredited theory which traced Platonism from Antiochus of Ascalon, through Arius Didymus, to Gaius and the school attributed to him (cf. Chapter 6 below, esp. n. 2). Quite generally, in fact, this study does not aim to be comprehensive; but it does aim to start uncovering the kinds of structure in terms of which a comprehensive investigation might operate. <>

GOD'S JUDGMENT THROUGH THE DAVIDIC MESSIAH: THE ROLE OF THE DAVIDIC MESSIAH IN ROMANS 1:18-- 4:25 by Myongil Kim [Wipf and Stock, 9781725280892]

This dissertation examines the role of the Davidic Messiah, who is the agent of God's judgment in Romans 1:18—4:25. It may be summarized in two theses: First of all, the Davidic Messiah was expected in the Old Testament and the Second Temple Jewish writings, which establish the foundation for Paul's Davidic Messiah Christology in Romans. Second, the language in the role of the agent of God's judgment cannot be identified with the term faithfulness.

Review

""Myongil Kim navigates intersecting, swirling, controversial streams in Paul's Letter to the Romans: the Davidic Messiah, covenant faithfulness, and faith/faithfulness in/of the Messiah. He navigates these waters with bold strokes. The key is to understand the expectations in the Scriptures and Second Temple Judaism of a Davidic Messiah who would be an agent of God's judgment, not covenantal fulfillment. We are indebted to Professor Kim for advancing our understanding in new and fresh directions."" --A. Andrew Das, Professor of Religious Studies and Assistant Dean of the Faculty, Elmhurst University

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Paul writes, "but now the righteousness of God has been manifested apart from the Law, although the Law and the Prophets bear witness to it— the righteousness of God through faith in Jesus Christ for all who believe" (Rom 3:21–22). In these verses, Paul highlights a key theme in Romans— the righteousness of God, which is linked to faith in Jesus, the Messiah. Paul introduces the Messiah as one born from the

seed of David, and utilizes quotations about the Messiah from the Old Testament to emphasize the significance of his arguments (Rom 11:26–27; 15:12).

The relationship between the Messiah of Romans and the tradition of the Davidic Messiah is an ongoing source of controversy in New Testament scholarship. The conventional Jewish messianism identified by some

God's Judgment through the Davidic Messiah

in Paul's letters has been denied or modified by others. The debate about the Davidic Messiah is not merely a debate about the Messiah Christology itself in Romans because it is intertwined with the key themes in Romans. If the righteousness of God has been revealed through faith in the Messiah, Jesus, for all believers (Rom 3:22), what then is the connection between the righteousness of God and the Davidic Messiah in Romans? How does Paul's conception of the Messiah in Romans inform his understanding of the righteousness of God, a key theme in this book, as the faithfulness of God in the role of the faithful Messiah, the deliverance of God through the redeemer, or justifying righteousness through the agent of God's judgment? If Paul specifically references justification as being through the Messiah, Jesus (Rom 5:1), is justification based on union with the Messianic king, on incorporation into the messianic community, or on the forensic feature of Christ's role in Romans? With such possibilities, it is clear that Paul centers his argument on the Davidic Messiah in his gospel for the believers in Rome since the role of the Davidic Messiah influences the key themes in Romans.

Thesis

This book investigates the Davidic messianic elements of Romans. The characteristics of the Davidic Messiah in Romans provide evidence for a coherent and distinct role of the Davidic Messiah in relation to the primary themes in Romans. For Paul, the Davidic Messiah is the agent of God's judgment, demarcated by his kingly and priestly features. The Davidic Messiah features in Romans are influential for justification and the righteousness of God, both of which are closely related to the judgment of God. In Romans 1:18–4:25, Paul argues that believers can be justified through faith in the Messiah, who is the agent of God's judgment. Paul depicts Jesus as the Davidic Messiah (1:3–4; 15:12), especially referencing his enthronement as such (4:25; 8:34–35). Jesus Christ is the agent of God's judgment (2:16; 8:34; 15:1–12), and all who believe are justified through faith in the Messiah Jesus (3:22). This divine judicial activity pertains directly to the Davidic Messiah, and is accomplished in light of his tandem roles as king and high priest. Acting as God's judgment is the role of the Davidic Messiah, which is accomplished in his kingship and high priesthood. Romans quotes and alludes to other Old Testament messianic texts that are based on God's judgment through the Messiah, and propagate the messianic expectation for the Davidic Messiah. The Davidic Messiah acts to save and govern as both redeemer and ruler (11:26; 15:12), through the justification enacted by that same Messiah.

The thesis of this book is that in his arguments about justification and the righteousness of God in Romans 1:18–4:25, Paul depicts the Davidic Messiah exclusively as the agent of God's judgment without reference to the Messiah's fulfillment of the covenant. In Romans, the Davidic Messiah—Jesus—is affirmed as the agent of God's judgment, rather than as the faithful Messiah through and in whom God has fulfilled his covenant. In other words, although the Davidic Messiah has fulfilled the covenant of God, the focus on the Davidic Messiah in Romans is not the faithfulness of the Davidic Messiah, but the agency of the Davidic Messiah in executing God's judgment on sinners (Rom 2:16).

The majority of this work will be conducted through careful exegesis of selected passages concerning the Davidic Messiah in Romans, and by an investigation of relevant background material related to the Old Testament and the Second Temple Jewish writings. The exegetical approach is mainly performed following arguments regarding the Davidic messianic Christology in Romans 1:18–4:25 to examine the function of the Davidic Messiah and the Messiah's faithfulness in Paul's discourse in Romans. This study investigates Paul's understanding of the Davidic Messiah in Romans by analyzing the allusions and citations to it in other parts of Romans, as well.

This chapter introduces the thesis and a history of research within the literature related to the thesis. I will survey the major works about Messiah Christology in Paul and the faithfulness of the Messiah in Romans. In addition, I will briefly evaluate the present state of research and present my thesis as a contribution to Davidic Messiah Christology and the Messiah's faithfulness.

In chapter 2, I observe the characteristics of the Davidic Messiah in the Old Testament as the foundation for discussing the Davidic Messiah in Romans. The judgment function of the Davidic Messiah, who is the agent of the judgment of God, will be examined. I then cross-examine the judgment and atonement of the Suffering Servant in Isaiah 53, which is closely related to the faithfulness of Jesus Christ in Romans.

In chapter 3, I observe the characteristics of the Davidic Messiah, particularly the judgment function of the Davidic Messiah in the Second Temple Literature. In the course of this observation, I evaluate whether the Messiah's faithfulness is unfamiliar in God's judgment through the Davidic Messiah.

In chapter 4, I study the evidence for the gospel concerning the Davidic Messiah, which is the context for God's judgment, asking in what sense Paul announces the gospel and the Sonship of the Davidic Messiah in Romans 1:3–4. Additionally, with an exegetical study of the messianic oracle and Romans 15:12 related to 1:3–4, I offer an analysis of the immediate context in light of the discussion about the Davidic Messiah's role as the agent of God's judgment. The relationship between the saving and ruling of the Davidic Messiah, which is based on God's judgment, is displayed in the exegesis of the Davidic Messiah in the Isaiah oracle and Romans 15:12. Paul's treatment of the Davidic Messiah in Romans 15:12 clearly shows that the role of the Davidic Messiah is the execution of God's judgment and that the Davidic Messiah's faithfulness is not a significant theme in Paul's discussion.

In chapter 5, I concentrate on the judgment function of the Davidic Messiah described in the judgment theme in Romans 1:18–4:25 to support faith in the Messiah, rather than the Messiah's faithfulness in terms of the judgment function of the Davidic Messiah. This chapter's main emphasis is the solution for God's wrath. The function of the agent of God's judgment is resolving this problem through the Davidic Messiah's atonement. My analysis focuses on the question of the function of the Davidic Messiah's atonement in terms of God's judgment. I then identify elements of the exalted Messiah that seem to be related to the justification of believers in Romans 4:25. The present study concentrates particularly on the justification and enthronement of the Davidic Messiah, with a background in the Old Testament and Jewish tradition that demonstrates the authority of the Davidic Messiah for sinners' judgment. The atonement for God's judgment is the basis for faith in the Messiah. The exaltation of the suffering Messiah, alluded to in 4:25, is the basis of the faith (4:24). Finally, chapter 6 will include a summary of my conclusion.

History of Research

A history of research on the Davidic Messiah in Romans must begin with the History of Religions School, with its focus on kyrios Christology in Paul's letters because New Testament scholarship has vacillated between Messiah Christology and kyrios Christology ever since then. Some scholars who have stressed kyrios Christology have denied the Davidic Messiahship in Paul's Christology. The vacillation originated from the division presupposed between Hellenistic Christians and Palestinian Christians according to the thought of the History of Religions School. The Jewish messiahship in Paul's ministry to Hellenistic Christians has been denied, based on the differences between the religious thoughts of the two groups—Jewish and Gentile Christians. However, it is impossible to determine the Messiah Christology in early Christianity based on a distinction between Jewish and Hellenistic Christians and to insist that there was no Jewish messianism in the Hellenistic Christians' belief concerning Jesus. Later, the kyrios Christology and Messiah Christology have been understood as intertwined in Paul's letter because there is no evidence of a sharp division between them in his time. Several scholars assert that Paul clearly holds to a kyrios Christology, which is merged with Jesus' Jewish messianism. Here I present briefly a few key figures who provide interpretations of a significant section of Paul's letter, especially concerning the kyrios Christology and the Messiah Christology.

Wilhelm Bousset

Wilhelm Bousset, who represents the History of Religions School, approaches early Christianity through the lens of liturgy and Christology in his book, *Kyrios Christos*. According to Bousset, the earliest Palestinian Christian movement is sharply separated from Hellenistic Christians, and he locates Paul in Hellenistic Christianity. Bousset explains that the Kyrios cult had been developed from Hellenistic churches, saying, "What the κύριος signified for the first Hellenistic Christian congregation thus stands before us in bright and living colors. It is the Lord who holds sway over the Christian life of fellowship, in particular as it is unfolded in the community's worship, thus in the cultus." The Palestinian Christians prohibited application of the title kyrios to Jesus because of Jewish monotheism. The Palestinian community understood the resurrected and exalted Jesus as "the Son of Man."

In Romans 1:3–4, the Son of God is synonymous with the kyrios idea for Paul. Bousset observes, "It is always this exalted son of God upon whom Paul focuses."⁶ And, he argues,

We have already given reason for our doubting whether the title "Son of God" at all stems from Jewish messianology and accordingly from Palestinian primitive Christianity. If the doubts are valid, then the possibility must be reckoned with that here we have to do with an independent creation of Paul.

While Paul focuses on the Son of God in his writing to the Hellenistic group, he does suggest the title "Son of David," but it is less important in Paul's kyrios Christology. Although Paul emphasizes "Jesus' descent from David's tribe," he is simply "following the community's tradition which had come down to him." In Bousset's thought, the title "Christ" was understood as a proper name in Paul's era because Paul did not hold to the Jewish messianic expectation. Instead, he followed the Hellenistic piety of the mysticism of Christ.

Albert Schweitzer

Critics from among Bousset's contemporaries criticized his explanation. Albert Schweitzer contends that Paul's thought "cannot be reconstructed out of a patchwork of Hellenistic ideas but only becomes

intelligible in the light of eschatology.” Schweitzer supports the idea that Paul’s Davidic Messianism was based on Jewish eschatology, and did not represent the belief of the Hellenistic community. Schweitzer maintains that the *kyrios* Christology Bousset emphasized has no evidence in the earliest church. Schweitzer relates Paul’s conception of Christ-mysticism to the mystical concept of “being in Christ” in the late Second Temple apocalypses, rather than to Hellenism. He writes, “The problems of Pauline eschatology all go back to the two circumstances that it is, in the first place, like the Apocalypses of Baruch and Ezra, a synthesis of the eschatology of Daniel; and, in the second place, that it has to reckon with the facts, wholly unforeseen to Jewish eschatology, that the Messiah has already appeared as a man, has died, and is risen again.” In the Second Temple apocalypses, the Davidic Sonship was applied to the “Son-of-Man Messiah,” and this concept of the Messiah of the Messianic Kingdom was applied to Jesus in Paul’s writings.

Rudolf Bultmann

Rudolf Bultmann, who stands in the History of Religions School, attests that the title, the Son of David, is not important to Paul.¹⁵ The Davidic Messiah, the Son of David, did not have great significance to Paul. This term—the Son of David in Romans 1:3—is just a handed-down, pre-Pauline formula, and cannot reflect Pauline theology.¹⁶ Bultmann explains, “For though the title is of no importance to him, he refers to it in Rom 1:3, a sentence which is evidently due to a handed-down formula.” The narrow concept of the Messiah had been changed to the apocalyptic heavenly salvation-bringer, which Paul applied to Christ. He goes on to say, “The ancient title ‘Messiah,’ once expressing Israelitic national hope, was no longer confined to this narrower meaning but could just as well be transferred to the heavenly salvation-bringer awaited by the apocalyptists.” Bultmann argues with the division placed between Hellenistic thought and Palestinian Jewish thought, based on Bousset’s thesis. He is skeptical of the messianic understanding in Paul because he denies the possibility of confirming an understanding about the historical Jesus.

Oscar Cullmann

Oscar Cullman criticizes Bousset’s scheme in his book, *The Christology of the New Testament*, opposing the “Christ cult” in Hellenistic Christianity. He opposes Bousset’s thesis that the *kyrios* for Jesus originated from the cultic setting of the Hellenistic community in Syria. The Maranatha passage (1 Cor 16:22) of Aramaic-speaking Palestinian Christians was used in a liturgical context, and “[in] his Greek letters Paul preserves in the Aramaic precisely the oldest characteristic prayers of the first Church.” He additionally mentions that the Jewish communities in Palestine also used *kyrios* to designate Christ because *kyrios* was the word the Septuagint utilized to translate the divine name Adonai.

Cullmann insists that there was no question of Jesus’ Davidic descent. In Cullmann’s understanding, though, the early church did not accept “the terminology relative to the Messiah,” and Christ will execute his Messiah-ship over the whole world “at the end.” He writes, “The kingship of the Son of David was now primarily a kingship over the church. . . . The early church believed that the kingship of Jesus would become visible only in the future. . . . Paul does expect a final event in which Christ will visibly appear, but he never allows Christ’s eschatological work to take a political form.” Cullmann notes that “Christ” is a proper name in early Christianity,²⁵ which signifies the receding of Jewish messianic ideas.

W. D. Davies

In *Paul and Rabbinic Judaism: Some Rabbinic Elements in Pauline Theology*, W. D. Davies suggests that there is not any difference in the Palestinian Judaism and Diaspora Judaism because of the strong Hellenizing influences in Palestine. Within this view, Paul's main ideas were derived from early rabbinic Judaism. He comments, "In the present work we shall not seek to deny all Hellenistic influence on him; we shall merely attempt to prove that Paul belonged to the main stream of first-century Judaism, and that elements in his thought, which are often labeled as Hellenistic, might well be derived from Judaism." Palestinian Judaism had been influenced "with all parts of the Hellenistic world."

The Jewish Messiahship of Jesus is apparent in Paul because he was plainly a Jew. According to Davies,

Both in his life and thought, therefore, Paul's close relation to Rabbinic Judaism has become clear, and we cannot too strongly insist again that for him the acceptance of the Gospel was not so much the rejection of the old Judaism and the discovery of a new religion wholly antithetical to it, as his polemics might sometimes pardonably lead us to assume, but the recognition of the advent of the Messianic Age of Jewish expectation. . . . It was at this one point that Paul parted company with Judaism, at

the valuation of Jesus of Nazareth as the Messiah with all that this implied.

He points out that the suffering Messiah and the resurrection of the Messiah are connected to Rabbinic literature. Paul placed the emphasis on Jesus as the Messiah of Jewish expectation.

Ernst Käsemann

Similar to Bultmann, Ernst Käsemann focuses on kyrios Christology in his *Romans* commentary. He sides with those who understand Paul's use of *Christos* as a proper name. In *Romans* 1:3, Paul does not concentrate on the messianic significance and "allows it to be overshadowed by the *Kyrios* title." The Jewish expectation of the Messiah is denied in *Romans*. In *Romans* 11:26, the returning of the Redeemer is not a reference to "the historical Jesus, nor to the christological event as a whole, nor indeed to the parousia in Jerusalem, but to the return of the exalted Christ from the heavenly Jerusalem of *Gal* 4:26." The quotation of *Isaiah* 11:1 in *Romans* 15:12 is also applied by Paul "to him who has been raised again and exalted."³³ He declares, "Christ has not just come to win the Gentiles for the community. He intends to rule over the cosmos and for this reason, as in *8:20*, he is an object of hope for all creation, which is represented by the peoples." Käse-mann stresses the universal lordship of Christ.³⁵ He comprehends that Paul proclaims the eschatological fulfillment through Christ's rule (15:12). He focuses on the kyrios Christology, rather than on the Jewish Messiah, based on the sovereign eschatological rule of Christ in Paul.

Martin Hengel

In *Judaism and Hellenism*, Martin Hengel shows that Hellenistic culture had affected Palestine. By the third century BC, the upper classes of Palestine had already been influenced by Hellenization, and the lower classes

were affected in the next two centuries.³⁷ Therefore, Hengel challenges the History of Religions School with his historical analysis that contrasts with the thought of the History of Religions School. He states that "the putative pre-Pauline, Christologically productive 'Gentile-Christian community,' is a fiction."³⁸ The Christian communities in Syria were "at best 'mixed communities,' and the element of Jewish

Christianity was predominant for years.” The missionaries of the earliest Christians were Jewish Christians. Hengel, supporting the *kyrios* Christology from a Jewish background, remarks,

The conception of the sending of the Son does not come from a pre-Christian gnostic myth—which in fact never existed—but has its roots in Jewish wisdom speculation; the confession *κύριος Ἰησοῦς* is not borrowed from the cult of Attis, Serapis, or Isis, but is a necessary consequence of the exaltation Christology in which Ps 110:1 in particular played a part; the Jerusalem Maranatha formula represented a preliminary stage in which the exalted Christ was called upon to return soon.

Additionally, Hengel understands Paul to fully acknowledge the conceptions of the *Χριστός* within the Old Testament, and he employed this title for Jesus in Romans 1:3–4. He says,

That Paul was perfectly acquainted with the Old Testament Jewish conceptions bound up with the messianic name *Ἰησοῦς Χριστός*, can be seen from any number of texts. Thus the reference to Jesus’ descent *ἐκ σπέρματος Δαυὶδ κατὰ σάρκα* (Rom 1:3f). The appointment to “Son of God in power . . . by his resurrection from the dead” which follows, means nothing other than the effective, powerful installation of the resurrected Jesus in the fullness of his messianic power. . . . The Davidic descent of Jesus—which Paul, in an ancient formula, presupposes to be well known as a matter of course even by the Roman Christians—probably derives from a tradition in the family of Jesus attested by Hegesippus and Julius Africanus.

The salvific work of Christ, who is the promised Messiah, has universal significance. Hengel insists on “the ‘Gentiles’ access to salvation in Christ,” who is the Messiah promised to Israel.

Hengel and Davies contest Bousset’s thought that there was a difference between the confessions concerning the Messiah in Palestinian and Hellenistic Diaspora communities. The dominance of Hellenism influenced Palestinian Judaism. The dichotomy in early Christians’ Christology between Messiah Christology and *kyrios* Christology needs to be abandoned because there is no evidence of a separation between Palestinian Judaism and Diaspora Judaism. Hengel emphasizes that historical analysis, based strictly on chronological development of early Christianity, does not provide evidence for such boundaries.

Larry W. Hurtado

Larry W. Hurtado understands early Christianity to have the characteristic of “high” Christology, which stresses the divinity of Christ. He demonstrates that Jewish monotheism was applied to Jesus-devotion. The exclusive Jewish monotheism could not allow cultic worship for “revered agents of God (whether angelic or human).” The devotion granted to Jesus in early Christianity has historical significance because Jesus represents a unique agent of God “the Father.” In addition, it is still more important to note that the Jews resisted worshiping any figure. This means that Jewish monotheism was taken over in early Christianity as “the Christian mutation.” He writes, “The accommodation of Jesus as recipient of cultic worship with God is unparalleled and signals a major development in monotheistic cultic practice and belief.” Moreover, like Bousset, Hurtado realizes that the earliest Christians had the sense and experience of the presence of the exalted Jesus and worshiped him. Hurtado proposes that the divinity of Jesus as the object of worship was recognized in early Christianity. Pauline letters illustrate that early Christians “took over and perpetuated from previous circles of Christians a devotional pattern in which

Jesus functioned with God as subject matter and recipient of worship.” Hurtado’s understanding is vital for understanding N. T. Wright’s “divine identity” of Christ in relation to worship and cultic devotion of Christ.

Richard Bauckham

In Jewish monotheism, the God of Israel had been identified as YHWH in the covenant relationship. God’s identity is additionally characterized by the reference to “God’s relationship to the whole of reality.” The only true God, YHWH, is “sole Creator of all things and sole Ruler of all things.” The exclusive worship of YHWH is a clear signal of the division “between God and all other realities.” Richard Bauckham shows three characteristics of the divine identity in Jewish monotheism: creational, eschatological, and cultic. These features are applied to Christ in Paul’s Christology: “They include Jesus in the unique divine sovereignty over all things, they include him in the unique divine creation of all things, they identify him by the divine name which names the unique divine identity, and they portray him as accorded the worship which, for Jewish monotheists, is recognition of the unique divine identity.” In Bauckham’s understanding, Christ has a unique divine identity because Christ is sovereign ruler over the world, and he participated in God’s creation. The whole New Testament is identified as having the highest Christology—one that espouses Christ’s divine identity.

James D. G. Dunn

James D. G. Dunn describes his view of Christology as a “high” or moderately “high” Christology,⁵⁸ but his Christology starts from a low Christology. He proposes that Paul begins with the particular form of monotheism that he received from his Jewish upbringing. This is manifested in the idea of the subordination of Christ to God (1 Cor 15:27–28). In opposition to Hurtado’s idea, the worship of Jesus, Dunn explains that the worship language

and words for praise and thanksgiving were never offered to Christ. Although Christ has significance in Christian worship, worship was offered to God through Christ, as well, because “Christ is both sacrificing High Priest and sacrificial victim.” He writes, “Christ was never understood as the one to whom sacrifice was offered.” Furthermore, against the term of divine identity, Dunn warns his readers of “the danger of confusing.” He emphasizes, “An identification of Jesus with and as Yahweh was an early attempt to resolve the tensions indicated above; it was labelled as ‘Modalism,’ a form of ‘Monarchianism’ (the one God operating first as Father and then as Son), and accounted a heresy.” In his view, Paul’s interpretation is that of an interaction between his Jewish monotheism and his beliefs about Jesus within God’s purpose. The influx of Gentiles influenced Paul’s developing Christology, resulting in Pauline Christology being elevated higher to the “highest” moment.

Dunn insinuates that to understand Davidic Messiahship, the particularity of situations within the Hellenistic communities and the Palestinian church must be considered. He notes,

Why the identification of Jesus as Son of David was so treated in the Hellenistic church is not entirely clear—most probably because it was too peculiarly Jewish to permit its easy translation into the wider world. The Jewish hope of a messianic son of David was expressed in strongly political and so nationalistic terms: the son of David was expected to introduce a political kingdom and effect a this-worldly salvation. However amenable this was to the gospel of the Palestinian church it cannot but have been an embarrassment outside Palestine. . . . Paul does

not affirm the Davidic sonship of Jesus without qualification. He does not deny it either, but he makes it clear that to describe Jesus as “born of the seed of David” is a dangerously defective and misleading half-truth.

The Davidic Messiahship in Romans 1:3–4 reflects the embarrassment of the Hellenistic communities “over Jesus’ Davidic sonship.” In Dunn’s view, while Jewish messianic expectations are political and nationalistic,

Paul uses the formula in 1:3–4 to present a balanced portrayal of the Davidic Messiah for the Hellenistic Christians that does not emphasize the nationalistic kingship of the Messiah.⁶⁶ In addition, Dunn observes in terms of Romans 15:12, “The final scripture, from Paul’s favorite prophet (Isa 11:10), fittingly ties together again the thought of the Jewishness of Jesus (the Davidic Messiah) and of the risen Christ, hope of the nations—an effective recall of the themes of the letter’s paragraph (1:2–5).” Paul elaborates on “the messianic promise” as the vindication of Israel that includes “the destruction of the Gentiles.” However, it “has been reversed in the outreach of the gentile mission.” Paul doubtlessly would not want to endanger the acceptance of his letter in Rome “by imposing a different sense” of nationalistic and political messiahship held by the Jews. In Dunn’s understanding, the Davidic Messiah, as such, has been enlarged to embrace a gospel message, which includes the Jewish Messiah’s becoming the Son of God.

New Testament scholars question the chronological schemes of the development of kyrios Christology in the History of Religions School, and the School’s denial of the Messiah Christology. An accurate definition of the boundary between Jewish and Gentile Christianity was not given. Additionally, scholars still debate Jewish monotheists’ worship of Christ.⁷² Some scholars have questioned the “exclusive” Jewish monotheism in the Messiah Christology. They insist that the characteristics of Jewish monotheism in Second Temple Judaism are “inclusive,” although some scholars assert

that the conventional messianism of Judaism was denied by or changed in Pauline high Christology, and that the entrance of Gentile Christians in early Christianity resulted in outstanding christological developments.

The Messiah’s Faithfulness in the Messiah Christology

In his letters, especially in Romans, Paul focuses on the Messiah Christology, which is clearly presented in several verses: 1:3–4; 3:21–25; 4:25; 15:12. Several scholars maintain that these verses in Romans emphasize the Messiah’s faithfulness. This is the most controversial issue in New Testament scholarship.

Richard B. Hays

Richard B. Hays opposes the claim that there was a radical division between Jewish and Gentile factions within early Christian communities. There is commonality of faith among Christians groups. Some German scholars assume that Paul uses Jewish-Christian confessional traditions (e.g., Rom 3:24–26) and that he does rebut or correct them for his Gentile communities. However, Hays emphasizes that Paul quotes narrative kerygmatic traditions and argues from them to make the conclusions that he wishes to draw.

Hays suggests the Messiah's faithfulness as the meaning of πίστις Χριστοῦ in the narrative structure in Paul's letter. Hays contends, Paul's theology must be understood as the explication and defense of a story. The narrative structure of the gospel story depicts Jesus as the divinely commissioned protagonist who gives himself up to death on a cross in order to liberate humanity from bondage (Gal 1:4; 2:20; 3:13–14; 4:4–7). His death, in obedience to the will of God is simultaneously a loving act of faithfulness (πίστις) to God and the decisive manifestation of God's faithfulness to his covenant promise to Abraham.

Faithfulness in the messianic interpretation is applied in Romans, too. The allusion of Habakkuk 2:4 in Romans 1:17 supports the Messiah's faithfulness. God's righteousness is revealed through the πίστις of the Righteous One, who is the Messiah Jesus as in Habakkuk 2:4. In Romans 3:22, Hays additionally attests that διὰ πίστεως Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ does not mean "through believing in Jesus Christ." Rather, Paul's intention in this phrase is that "through the faithfulness of Jesus Christ," God's righteousness is manifested. The obedience of the Messiah in the cross is Paul's point with πίστις Χριστοῦ. As some scholars support the subjective genitive with the perfect tense of "manifested (πεφανερωται)," Hays proposes the meaning of Romans 3:22 is that the righteousness of God has been manifested "in the faith/obedience of the crucified one." This corresponds with Paul's fundamental concern in Romans 3. He continues,

In the early part of the chapter, God's faithfulness (πίστις τοῦ θεοῦ, 3:3) and righteousness/justice (θεοῦ δικαιοσύνην, 3:5) are called into question, at least for rhetorical purposes. After a crushing indictment of humanity's injustice (vv. 9–20), Paul sets forth his positive affirmation of the faithfulness and righteousness of God; God, he asserts, has now revealed his righteousness in a new way, overcoming human unfaithfulness by his own power and proving himself faithful and just. We discover, furthermore, that this demonstration of God's righteousness (ἔνδειξις τῆς δικαιοσύνης αὐτοῦ, 3:25) has something to do with Jesus, that this righteousness is manifested διὰ πίστεως Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ (3:22). . . . Through the faithfulness of Jesus Christ, the one who "became a servant of circumcision for the sake of the truthfulness of God (ὑπὲρ ἀληθείας θεοῦ) in order to confirm the promises given to the fathers. . . ." (Rom 15:8).

Jesus' faithful endurance and obedience to death on the cross are a "righteous act" (δικαίωμα) of "obedience" (ὑπακοή; Rom 5:18–19). The representative faithfulness of Christ overcomes the unfaithfulness of human beings.

Douglas Campbell

Douglas Campbell suggests that the kingship discourse in Romans is linked to Christ in Romans in a significant interplay. Because he espouses high Christology related to the messiahship of Christ, he says, "Christ's messiahship and lordship are here affirmed by his resurrection from the dead, which functions, furthermore, as a heavenly enthronement." He additionally asserts, "We seem to be in touch here, then with an explanation of the resurrection—as the heavenly enthronement and glorification of Jesus, and his consequent affirmation as Messiah and the Lord, who will rule the cosmos on behalf of his divine

father.” In Douglas Campbell’s view, his messiah-ship is portrayed as divine kingship in the divine sonship. According to him, “He is the Son of God because, as for any divinely appointed king, God has now become his Father.” So he is the Davidic king not only by descent, but by royal enthronement.

This kingship discourse governs Paul’s arguments in Romans. He adds, “We can see in each of these other places a narrative of Jesus’ heavenly enthronement informing Paul’s argument—a narrative that describes Jesus as Son, Christ, ‘firstborn,’ and Lord, because of the enthronement by the resurrection.” Campbell holds that God’s deliverance is one that God “has just undertaken on behalf of his messianic agent, Christ—the act of resurrection, empowerment, and heavenly enthronement.” Campbell thinks the ancient discourse of kingship “seems to be traditional theology that the Roman Christians share with both Paul and the Jerusalem church—an integrated, Jewish, and perhaps surprisingly ‘high’ christological narrative that smoothly links Jesus’ messiahship, sonship, resurrection, and exalted heavenly lordship.” The particularity of his point regarding Jesus’ messiahship is that God’s deliverance first occurs on behalf of Christ by using ‘righteousness’ language from the Old Testament.

Campbell stresses God’s deliverance, which is a liberating and eschatological act of God that has taken place in Christ, “in particular Christ’s heavenly enthronement by God after his faithful death.” God “delivers” Christ and “vindicates” him. He describes, “They are merely meant to understand what he is talking about in more general terms, and they should be able to do so insofar as they inhabit this Jewish Christian discourse concerning Jesus’ resurrection and kingship. Paul is merely using the words of Psalm :2–3 to say here what he wants to say (and presumably in a way that other Christians have already formulated and so can recognize)—that God the King has acted to save his messianic Son.” Paul implements a christological reading of Habakkuk 2:4 in Romans 1:17 and 3:22 to reveal God’s deliverance. In Romans, Paul presents God’s delivering based on the faithful Messiah, and this comes to focus in Paul’s christological reading of Habakkuk 2:4 in Romans 1:17.¹⁰⁰ The righteous one is Christ. Because of his “faithfulness to the point of death he will live in the sense of being vindicated and resurrected.” Habakkuk 2:4 predicts the passion of the Messiah, to which Paul’s gospel attests. He continues,

A messianic reading of Habakkuk 2:4 directly fulfills the expectations that Paul set in motion in Romans 1:2–4. There he broke into his address—amounting to a breach of ancient epistolary etiquette—to affirm that his gospel concerned God’s Son who was descended from David and declared the Son of God by his resurrection in fulfillment of God’s prophets in the Scriptures. Paul’s explicit indications, then, would dispose the letter’s auditors to read prophetic texts from the Scriptures in Romans as witnesses to the Son of God, Christ, and in particular to either his Davidic lineage or, probably more importantly, his resurrection.

Romans 3:21–22 presents God’s deliverance through the faithful Christ for those who are faithful (leaving the precise nuance of this expression for discussion later), a set of claims that establishes the argument of 3:27–4:22. He argues,

So a single motif can denote the presence of the narrative—or of one of its broad trajectories—within the apostle’s developing arguments: “obedience,” “blood,” “death,” “cross/crucifixion,” and so on. . . . So the claim that the phrase “the fidelity of Christ” could denote Jesus’ entire passion more broadly is quite consistent with Paul’s usual practice as that is attested elsewhere.

In addition, the faithfulness of the Messiah fits a martyrological trajectory. He says,

Indeed, the notion of fidelity fits smoothly into the downward martyrological trajectory in the story of Jesus' passion. It is largely self-evident that fidelity is an ingredient within any essentially martyrological story. Martyrs faithfully endure suffering and death (if not a horrible execution); the story of martyrdom thus encodes its heroes with the quality of fidelity, even if only implicitly in view of their endurance and steadfastness within those unfolding stories. But numerous martyrologies mention fidelity explicitly as well (see 2 Macc 7:40; 4 Macc 7:21–22; 15:24; 16:22; 17:2; see also 2 Macc 6:30; 4 Macc 17:10). So it seems entirely appropriate in terms of Paul's background to suggest that his account of Jesus' death—an essentially martyrological story—could include the element of faithfulness.

Paul explicates Christ's faithfulness in a particular connection to the story of the Messiah's death, which fits the martyrology in 2 and 4 Maccabees. The faithfulness of the Messiah functions to reveal or disclose God's righteousness to vindicate his Son (3:21–22).¹⁰⁶ God delivers those who are faithful through the faithful Messiah, which continues in the argument of Romans 3:27–4:22. Campbell delineates that *pistis* is basically identified as “fidelity,” and the fidelity of Christians is closely related to Christ's own fidelity. A Christian's fidelity functions as a mark of belonging to Christ. So because *pistis* does mean fidelity, rather than faith, Christ is not the object of faith in Romans. God's deliverance is accomplished through Christ's *pistis*, which is the Messiah's faithfulness.

N. T. Wright

N. T. Wright applies exclusive Jewish monotheism to Jesus in his treatment of the Messianism of Jesus in the Pauline letters.¹⁰⁸ Paul followed the Jewish monotheism of the Second Temple period with the worldview of a zealous Pharisee.¹⁰⁹ The main idea implied in Jewish monotheism is that Israel's God is the Creator over all the creation; God will eventually judge all the people who worship other gods; and, finally, God will rescue his people of Israel from continued exile. Wright reads Paul's Christology through the lens of Jewish monotheism because early Christians understood the divine identity of Jesus to be incontrovertible already before the New Testament (1 Cor 8:6). Jewish monotheism is revised to conceive of Jesus as God over all (Rom 9:5). Following Richard Bauckham and Larry Hurtado, Wright insists on applying the divine identity to the Messiah Jesus, who faithfully fulfilled promises in the Old Testament. Wright links the concept of Jesus' divine identity to the returning of YHWH to Zion through Jesus death and resurrection, which fulfills the Old Testament promises of YHWH's return to Zion.

The meaning of “God's gospel” is God's announcement of “the royal enthronement of the Messiah, Israel's anointed king.” The anointing of the Messiahship is closely connected to the resurrection of the Messiah in Lord Christology in Wright's understanding. Romans 1:3–4 echoes Psalm 2:7 and 2 Samuel 7:12–14, which manifests the Davidic “Son of God.” The Davidic Son is declared “through his resurrection from the dead, echoing the Septuagint, in particular 2 Samuel 7:12.”¹¹³ Additionally, he posits,

The Gentiles will come to hope in the Davidic Messiah, the “root of Jesse” (for ‘root of Jesse’ as a title for the Messiah, see Rev 5:5; 22:16); he is the one who “rises to rule the nations.” The echo of 1:4 should leave us in no doubt that Paul intends a reference to Jesus' resurrection. This is what constituted him as Messiah and Lord of the whole world.

In other words, the Davidic Messiah in Romans incorporates the notion of monotheism. He comments,

Paul speaks of the Davidic Messiah who “rises to rule the nations, and in [whom] the nations shall hope” (15:12). Again it is the resurrection that unveils the messianic identity, and with it the summons to worship, to “hope in him.” This is deeply monotheistic language, of the second-temple creational, covenantal, cultic and especially eschatological variety.

Wright’s “divine identity” originates from the Davidic Messianism in Romans.

In his book, *Paul and the Faithfulness of God*, Wright discusses God’s righteousness and the Messiah Jesus in Romans 3:21 ff.: “In ‘the gospel,’ that is, the message about Jesus the Messiah and his death and resurrection as the fulfillment of God’s scriptural promises, ‘God’s righteousness’ is revealed.” He indicates that God’s righteousness, which is closely connected with the Messiah Christology, is the faithfulness of the Messiah to God’s covenant with the people of God within the “big picture” of God’s covenant in the history of Israel. In this “big picture,” God has been faithful to his covenant with his people through the Messiah Jesus in these significant ways. One, God’s righteousness is revealed through the faithfulness of the Messiah who has fulfilled the covenant and rescued his people from their “exile.” Two, God has accomplished his covenantal faithfulness, which is his righteousness through the Messiah; those who are the true Israel are incorporated into Jesus the Messiah, the crucified and risen Lord, and Israel has been justified in this Messiah.

Wright’s Messiah Christology manifests the incorporated Christology and the faithfulness of the Messiah linked with significant arguments of Paul in Romans. God is faithful to covenant promises in terms of Jesus’ faithfulness. According to Wright,

Working from the beginning (3.21–23) and the end (3.26) of this short paragraph into the dense statement in 3.24–25, we discover that the faithful death of Jesus (which Paul sees in 5.6–10 as an act of divine agape and in 5.15–19 as the act of the Messiah’s hypakoe, ‘obedience’) is more specifically an act of Exodus.

The Messiah is “faithful” to God’s covenant plan, which is that “Abraham’s seed would bless the world.” The Messiah’s faithfulness is presented by “obedience” in his death on the cross. Wright connects the faithful Messiah to the “righteous one” and the opening of Romans. He continues,

And of course, for Paul, what this means in concrete terms is his death on the cross. The Messiah himself, in some versions of this narrative, is referred to as *ho dikaios*, “the righteous one.” Whether or not we press that point, we see here the main thrust of Romans 1.3–4, and we understand more fully why Paul has used that opening precisely for that letter.

Moreover, he relates the Messiah’s death on the cross to martyrology. He states, “The answer seems to lie in Paul’s retrieval of certain themes available at the time in which the sacrificial overtones already there in the fourth servant song were being reused in connection with martyrs whose deaths were thought to be in some sense redemptive.” The redemption of the world, which is God’s saving plan, was Israel’s vocation. The saving was that “Israel’s vocation would always involve Israel (or righteous martyrs within Israel) becoming a kind of sacrifice through which not only Israel itself but also the whole world would be rescued from its sinful, rebellious state.” It is fulfilled through the sacrifice offered by Israel’s

representative Messiah, Jesus. The Messiah is faithful to God's gracious plan, which is expressed in God's promises to Abraham.

In Romans, several scholars stress the faithfulness of Christ based on God's righteousness, which is his covenantal faithfulness, rather than faith in Christ. In God's covenantal relationship with his people, God's righteousness is fulfilled in the faithful Messiah. The suffering and death of the faithful

Christ, who is the Suffering Servant in Isaiah 53, fits a martyrological trajectory and is applied to Paul's Messiah Christology in Romans 1:18–4:25.

However, the Messiah Christology should be understood in the concept of the role of the Davidic Messiah, who is presented in the Old Testament and the Second Temple Jewish writings. The faithfulness of the Davidic Messiah does not suit his role in God's judgment. He is the agent of God's judgment, in which the covenantal faithfulness is unfamiliar. In Romans, Paul cannot emphasize the faithfulness of Christ for the faith of Christ because of discontinuity with the Old Testament and the Second Temple Jewish writings. Instead, faith in Christ, who is the Davidic Messiah and the executor of righteous judgment, is consonant with Paul's Messiah Christology in Romans 1:18–4:25. The faith of Christ does not have a meaning of the faithfulness of Christ, investigating Davidic Messiah, who is the agent of God's judgment.

CONCLUSION

The emphasis of the History of Religions School, which focused on high Christology, was the *kyrios* Christology of the Hellenistic group in early Christianity and the influence it had on Paul's Christology. New Testament scholarship has both continued and criticized the sharp division between messianic Christology and *kyrios* Christology. The Jewish and Hellenistic background in early Christianity had no strict distinction between them because Hellenism greatly influenced Palestine during Paul's era. Some have argued against the Davidic Messiahship in Paul's Christology because Paul would have known that anti-Semitic Gentile readers of his letters would have reacted against this Jewish portrayal of the Messiah. However, the recipients of Romans, with a recognizable Jewish background, clearly were able to accept the Jewish background inherent in the Davidic Messiah in Paul's letter. Rather, messianic Christology was axiomatically reconstructed in Paul's Christology, and this messianic Christology was not differentiated from the *kyrios* Christology.

In addition, some scholars have emphasized the Messiah's faithfulness in their argument for the key themes in Romans, usually when they focus on the Messiah Christology. The Messiah's faithfulness accomplishes God's covenant promises, in which God's faithfulness—which is his righteousness—is clearly presented in Paul's discourse. The faithful Messiah's endurance, obedience, and death on the cross play a key role in the deliverance of God. The Messiah's endurance, obedience, and death of the Messiah seem to correspond to the martyrology in 2 and 4 Maccabees. This is the flow of

Paul's thought in his argument in Romans, which is that God's covenantal faithfulness is revealed through the Messiah's faithfulness.

The Davidic Messiahship cannot be denied in Romans, even though some scholars support the *kyrios* Christology, instead of the Messiah Christology. The History of Religions School and some scholars have denied the Davidic Messiahship in Paul's Christology, especially in Romans. Yet, in the Old

Testament and the Second Temple Jewish writings, the Davidic Messiah—an eschatological figure who executes God’s judgment—clearly appears. Paul continuously employs the concept of the eschatological Davidic Messiah in the flow of his argument in Romans. The Davidic Messiah is main content of the gospel of God in Romans 1:3–4. Paul definitely maintains that, “according to my gospel, God judges the secrets of men through the Messiah Jesus” (2:16). God’s judgment is accomplished in the death of the Davidic Messiah (3:25) and, through the death and resurrection of the Davidic Messiah, the sinners are justified (4:25).

Lastly, in his argument concerning the Davidic Messiah’s role, the agent of God’s judgment, the focus of Paul is not the Messiah’s faithfulness. Paul points to faith in the Messiah, rather than to the faithfulness of the Messiah. Contrary to the interpretation of “πίστις Χριστοῦ” as “the Messiah’s faith/faithfulness,” Paul’s statements concerning the Davidic Messiah in Romans (1:3–4; 2:16; 3:21–25; 4:25; 15:12) clearly involve the Messiah’s role as the executor of God’s judgment and faith in the Messiah. In this role, the Messiah’s faithfulness is unfamiliar. God’s salvation is accomplished through faith in the Messiah, whose role is that of executor of God’s judgment. The theme of the covenantal faithfulness of the Messiah does not fit in this discourse of Paul in Romans. <>

AMERICAN COSMIC: UFOs, RELIGION, TECHNOLOGY by D.W. Pasulka [Oxford University Press, 9780190692889]

More than half of American adults and more than seventy-five percent of young Americans believe in intelligent extraterrestrial life. This level of belief rivals that of belief in God. *American Cosmic* examines the mechanisms at work behind the thriving belief system in extraterrestrial life, a system that is changing and even supplanting traditional religions.

Over the course of a six-year ethnographic study, D.W. Pasulka interviewed successful and influential scientists, professionals, and Silicon Valley entrepreneurs who believe in extraterrestrial intelligence, thereby disproving the common misconception that only fringe members of society believe in UFOs. She argues that widespread belief in aliens is due to a number of factors including their ubiquity in modern media like *The X-Files*, which can influence memory, and the believability lent to that media by the search for planets that might support life. *American Cosmic* explores the intriguing question of how people interpret unexplainable experiences, and argues that the media is replacing religion as a cultural authority that offers believers answers about non-human intelligent life.

Review

"Pasulka's book is nothing short of spectacular and intriguing—a mind-blowing read with fascinating insight. Her research and knowledge present a whole new truth, some of which is very scary, and we don't scare easily." -- Chad and Carey Hayes, writers of *The Conjuring* and *The Conjuring II*

"From a solid base of scholarship Dr. Pasulka introduces us to the players at the frontier of biological and physical research. Her sharp insight is drawn from her research into spiritual phenomena, updated by her travels from the purported UFO crash sites of New Mexico to the archives of the Vatican. The result is a timely introduction to the revelations in our collective future." -- Jacques F. Vallee, author

of *Wonders in the Sky*

"UFOs are a remarkable phenomenon that both believers and skeptics initially have a hard time connecting to religion. *American Cosmic* is a vivid and even moving account of the way this strange world works as a kind of sacred mystery for those within it." -- T.M. Luhrmann, author of *When God Talks Back*

"[Pasulka] approaches UFO believers with an open mind in her irresistible debut . . . lively character sketches bring the story to life . . . Pasulka gives wonderful, entertaining insight into the curious study of UFOs." -- *Publishers Weekly*

"Pasulka makes a reasonable case that the spirits, angels, divine messengers, manifestations of God, aliens or their spaceships that humans have been reporting since the dawn of history are too numerous to be entirely delusional, so they deserve serious investigation." -- *Kirkus Reviews*

"A thought-provoking book about religion today." -- *Booklist*

"*American Cosmic* is a superb investigation into the birth and rise of a new religion." -- *Foreword Reviews*

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A Tour of Silicon Valley with Jacques Vallee

"These are the hills of Silicon Valley. There are many secrets in this valley."

Jacques Vallee maneuvers his car expertly through the daunting San Francisco Bay Area traffic, darting this way and that. Large trucks and small cars barrel toward us on the winding roads, and crashes are narrowly evaded. Every twenty minutes I lift my shoulders, which are stuck to the back of the car seat, and try to shake out the tension.

Jacques, father of the modern study of UFOs and an early visionary of the Internet, is giving me and my colleague, Robbie Graham, a personal tour of his favorite geolocation, Silicon Valley. We drive by places that loom large in the history of "the Valley." He recalls the early days of the technology revolution: "They were on fire and purely democratic. Pure scientists, fueled by discovery." Jacques's credentials are intimidating. As an astronomer, he helped NASA create the first detailed map of Mars. As a computer scientist with a PhD from Northwestern University, he was one of the early engineers of ARPANET, the Advanced Research Projects Agency, a precursor of the internet. He is also a successful venture capitalist, funding startups of innovative technologies that have changed the daily lives of millions of people. He is a prolific author. He is probably most famous for being a consultant to Steven Spielberg on the movie *Close Encounters of the Third Kind* (1977). The scientist character in the movie, played by French actor Francois Truffaut, is based on Jacques. Jacques has perhaps done more for the field of ufology than anyone else in its short history, and yet he calls the study of UFOs his hobby.

This is the orthodox history of Jacques's life and work. His unorthodox history is equally interesting. He worked with scientists affiliated with the Stanford Research Institute, now SRI International, an independent, nonprofit research institute in Menlo Park. The group's activities are largely unknown to the public, but declassified documents from the 1970s and 1980s indicate that it was a research site for the extraordinary. Jacques did his early work on the internet under a program that, as Jeffrey Kripal writes, was probably called "Augmentation of the Human Intellect."

This research was happening at the same time and in the same place as studies of remote viewing, precognition, and extrasensory perception. These esoteric skills were studied under a classified program called The Stargate Project, funded by the US military in partnership with the SRI. The hope was that the skills and talents of people who were naturally psychic could be developed and harnessed for the purposes of gathering intelligence. In the course of this research, the psychic viewers reportedly uncovered unintended and surprising targets, like UFOs. The participants in the program also reported that they could travel through space, to the moon, and to other planets, like Mars. In other words, the program allegedly developed, intentionally or not, psychic cosmonauts.

Perhaps unknown to Jacques and the researchers of the SRI, psychic travel had long been reported. Psychic cosmonauts like the eighteenth-century philosopher/theologian Emanuel Swedenborg crop up throughout the history of religions. Swedenborg claimed that, with the assistance of an angel, he had visited Mercury, Mars, Venus, and the moon. He claimed to have spoken to beings on those planets and he published his experiences in a book, *Life on Other Planets* (1758). The activities of the cosmonauts of the SRI may have resembled the interstellar adventures of Swedenborg, but their goals could not have been more different. They hoped to operationalize the knowledge they acquired about terrestrial targets; remote viewing was one of many methods of attempted data collection. These efforts to create human portals to other planets were taking place under the same auspices and at the same time as technologies of connectivity like the internet.

As we spun down the highway, I recognized the neighborhoods of my childhood, but I saw them now through Jacques's eyes. The streets, the smell of the eucalyptus trees, parks, schools, cafes—all looked new to me, shining with the allure of mystery. As much as I wanted to, I never got up the nerve to ask Jacques exactly what he meant by the secrets of Silicon Valley. But on that drive I caught a glimpse into the exciting ideology and philosophy behind the revolution—its zeitgeist.

If Jacques were an essay, he would be "The Question Concerning Technology" by the philosopher Martin Heidegger. This essay, dubbed impenetrable by many readers, nevertheless offers several intriguing observations about the relationship between humans and technology. As Heidegger saw it, humans do not understand the essence of technology. Instead, they are blinded by it and view it simply as an instrument. The interpretation of technology as pure instrumentality was wrong, he said. The Greek temple, for the Greeks, housed the gods, and as such it was a sacred "frame." Similarly, the medieval cathedral embodied and housed the presence of God for medieval Europeans. Heidegger suggested that the human relationship with technology is religiouslike, that it is possible for us to have a noninstrumental relationship with technology and engage fully with what it really is: a saving power. Jacques Vallee is fully aware of the revolution that is technology. Although he most likely never read Heidegger's essay, Jacques's depiction of Silicon Valley as the home of the new resonates with Heidegger's vision of technology as bringing to birth a new era of human experience, a new epoch.

The symbol for this new epoch is the UFO. Carl Jung called the UFO a technological angel. This is a book about UFOs and technology, but also about a group of people who believe anomalous technology functions as creative inspiration. I found these people. In the 1970s, when Jacques consulted on *Close Encounters*, he encouraged Spielberg to portray the more complex version of the story, that is, that the phenomenon is complex and might not be extraterrestrial at all. But Spielberg went with the simple story, the one everybody would understand. He said, "This is Hollywood." This book does not tell the simple story, but I believe it is a story anyone can understand.

When you gaze long into the abyss, the abyss gazes also into you. -FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE

As I finish writing this introduction, the television series *60 Minutes* has just aired an interview with billionaire Robert Bigelow, of Bigelow Aerospace. Bigelow founded his company, which specializes in manufactured space equipment, mostly with his own funding in 1998. Due to the reliability and safety of Bigelow Aerospace's equipment, NASA and other space companies use Bigelow's space habitats and other equipment in their explorations and experiments in space. In the interview, Bigelow boldly claimed that aliens, or nonhuman intelligences, are interacting with humans, and have been for a long time.

"Is it risky for you to say in public that you believe in UFOs and aliens?" asked interviewer Lara Logan. "You don't worry that some people will say, 'Did you hear that guy? He sounds like he's crazy?'"

"I don't give a damn. I don't care" Bigelow replied. "It's not going to make a difference. It's not going to change the reality of what I know."

I was not surprised by Bigelow's statements. They are typical of the many scientist-believers I have met since I began my research in 2012. Since that time, I have come to know millionaires and billionaires and successful innovative scientists who believe in and study the phenomenon. This was the first of several surprising revelations about the UFO phenomenon. People like Stephen Hawking are wrong when they state, as Hawking did in his 2008 TED Talk, "I am discounting reports of UFOs. Why would they appear to only cranks and weirdos?" The lie has been that belief in UFOs is associated with those on the "fringe"—"cranks and weirdos," in Hawking's words. The truth is just the opposite.

This book is about contemporary religion, using as a case study the phenomenon known as the UFO. It is also about technology. These may seem like completely unrelated topics, but they are intimately connected. They are connected because social and economic infrastructures shape the ways in which people practice religions. A historical and uncontroversial example is the impact of the printing press on the Christian tradition. The mass production of Bibles in the common languages of the people soon gave rise to the doctrine of Sola Scriptura, or Scripture Alone, according to which scripture is the only reliable and necessary guide for Christian faith and practice—a foundational principle of the Protestant Reformation. As technologies shift infrastructures, religious practices and habits are changed.

Beyond documenting how technological infrastructure shapes religious practices and beliefs, the UFO is considered by believers to be advanced technology. Like the Spiritualists of the nineteenth century, believers see technology as a portal or a frequency shift that allows humans to connect to other minds, human or extraterrestrial, as well as to places outside of the current understanding of space-time.' Therefore, not only is the technological infrastructure the basis for widespread belief in UFOs, through media technologies and

other mechanisms, but also technology itself is a sacred medium, as well as the sacred object, of this new religiosity. Conversely, within certain theological circles, technology, especially the internet, has been characterized as "the Beast," the anti-Christ. Technology in these contexts is not secular but infused with theological meaning.

A Unique Experience for an Academic

This book is about how technology informs a widespread and growing religiosity focused on UFOs, but it is also a story. It is partly the story of my own participation in a group of scientists and academics who study the phenomenon anonymously (except for me, of course). The participants are anonymous because of the stigma that is often associated with UFOs and belief in them, but also because there were classified government programs in which the phenomenon was studied, necessitating secrecy among the participants. To offset any conspiratorial interpretations of this book, I will clarify that I am not "read in" to any government program to study the phenomenon, I was never privy to any classified information of which I am aware, nor am I part of an official or nonofficial disclosure of UFOs to the American public.

I began my study of UFO cultures in January 2012. I proceeded in the conventional way in that I conducted an ethnography of a variety of believers and delved into research into UFOs and ufology, a branch of research devoted to the topic. I was lucky to inherit an extensive library of resources about UFOs and reports of contactees/experiencers from Dr. Brenda Denzler, whose own book, *The Lure of the Edge*, informed my study. The library included her own research, as well as the research of ufologists and organizations like MUFON (the Mutual UFO Network) and CUFOS (Center for UFO Studies) and the works of other academics and researchers studying the phenomenon. I read the works of Allen Hynek, Jacques Vallee, John Keel, Budd Hopkins, and John Mack, as well as those of people who theorize the phenomenon academically, such as Jeffrey Kripal, Whitley Strieber, Debora Battaglia, Greg Eghigian, Carole Cusack, Susan Lepsetter, and David Halperin.

Not long after I began, I quickly surmised that there is a parallel research tradition within the field of the study of the phenomenon, and that there always has been. There are public ufologists who are known for their work, there are a few academics who write about the topic, and then there is an "Invisible

College," as Allen Hynek called it and of which Jacques Vallee wrote—a group of scientists, academics, and others who will never make their work public, or at least not for a long time, although the results of their investigations impact society in many ways. Halfway through my research I made the decision to write about this group, for a couple of reasons. First, they receive no recognition or press, yet rumors about them spawn folklore and traditions that constitute the UFO narrative. Second, frankly, this was the group whose work and members I became best acquainted with, and whose stories I found most fascinating. I had to muster courage to write about this group because its members are anonymous, and what I observed of their work places me in the odd position of almost confirming a myth. This is not the preferred position of the academic author of books about religion. It is usually the place occupied by authors of theology. In the end, however, I chose the path of writing a book that conveys what I consider the most interesting, and challenging, aspects about the topic.

The parallel tradition of ufology is not known to the uninitiated, but it is well known within the culture of ufologists. Some scientists, such as astronomer Massimo Teodorani and physicist Eric Davis, have confirmed its existence. Teodorani writes:

I have been quite heavily involved in the so called "ufo" stuff for at least 25 years, in research that is parallel to more canonic studies of physics and astronomy. I know that some anomalies do exist and I stress the importance of studying this problem scientifically, especially when measurement instruments are used. For many years I have been studying the problem behind totally closed doors.'

Davis has also noted this aspect of the study of UFOs. "UFOs are real phenomena," he writes. "They are artificial objects under intelligent control. They're definitely craft of a supremely advanced technology." He goes on to say that most of what academics and scientists know about the phenomenon is secret, and will probably remain so. "There are scientists who are aware of evidence and observational data that is not refutable. It is absolutely corroborated, using forensic techniques and methodology. But they won't come out and publicize that because they fear it. Not the subject—they fear the backlash from their professional colleagues." He notes that one tradition of study requires secrecy, as it is related to the military: "It's the domain of military science. The fact that [unknown] craft are flying around Earth is not a subject for science—it is a subject for intelligence gathering collection and analysis."

There are a number of players in this story. For the most part, they fall into one of two categories: there are those who engage with and interact with what they believe are nonhuman intelligences, perhaps extraterrestrial or even interdimensional. The people in this category who are featured in this book are the scientists to whom Davis refers. They agreed to be included on condition that they remain anonymous. The second category consists of those who interpret, spin, produce, and market the story of UFO events to the general public. Members of the first category are silent about their research, while members of the second category are very vocal about information they have received second-, third-, or even fourth-hand. Often they even make up stories or derive their information from hoaxes.

The second of the surprising revelations is that even as some respected scientists believe in the phenomenon associated with UFOs and make discoveries about it, what is ultimately marketed to the public about the phenomenon barely resembles these scientists' findings. Belief in the phenomenon is at an all-time high—even among successful, high-profile people like Bigelow. Among those who report sightings are former US president Jimmy Carter and legions of other credible witnesses, including the

trained observers of the US Air Force, pilots, commercial pilots, police officers, US Army personnel, and millions of civilians who were certainly not out looking for UFOs. Different polls record varying levels of belief in UFOs, but all indicate that it is pervasive. A 2008 Scripps poll showed that more than 50 percent of Americans believe in extraterrestrial life. Seventy-four percent of people between the ages of eighteen and twenty-four are believers.' In 2012, in connection with marketing their UFO-themed programming, National Geographic conducted an informal poll of Americans about their belief in UFOs. They randomly sampled 1,114 individuals over the age of eighteen and found that 36 percent believed UFOs exist and, more significantly, 77 percent believed that there are signs suggesting that aliens have been to Earth in the past. Although not a formal poll, the results concur with professional polls such as the Harris Poll conducted in 2009, which found that 32 percent of Americans believe in UFOs.

I began my own research into aerial phenomena after I finished a book on the Catholic doctrine of purgatory. The project was a multiyear study in which I examined many primary sources of European Catholic history, found mostly in obscure archives, of anecdotes about souls from purgatory. These sources dated from 1300 to 1880. In them I found a lot of other unexpected things, such as reports of orbs of light, flames that penetrated walls, luminous beings, forms of conscious light, spinning suns, and dislike aerial objects. I wasn't sure how to theorize these reports, and I left them out of my book. Yet I wondered about them. I wondered aloud one morning while drinking coffee with a friend.

"These reports remind me of a Steven Spielberg film. You know, lots of shining aerial phenomena, luminous beings, transformed lives," he said.

I summarily dismissed his comparison. The next day, he found an ad for a local conference about UFOs and extraterrestrials taking place the following weekend. He suggested that I attend.

The conference featured speakers who were experiencers, people who have sighted UFOs or believe they have seen extraterrestrials. They described some of the same things I had observed in my research in Catholic history—shining aerial discs, flames, and orbs—and especially how these experiences

transformed their lives. The experiencers interpreted these as spiritual or religious events. They either fractured their traditional religious belief systems or, more commonly, caused them to reinterpret their traditions through a biblical-UFO framework in which they viewed biblical and historical religious events as UFO events. Ezekiel's wheel is the prime example of how scripture is used in this context. Many religious practitioners view the strange spinning aerial contraption witnessed by the biblical prophet Ezekiel as a UFO. The television show *Ancient Aliens* offers a similar interpretive slant. This way of looking at anomalous ancient aerial phenomena is not restricted to experiencers but is common, especially among youth such as my students.

Could the orbs of the past, once interpreted as souls from purgatory, still be around? Are they currently being interpreted as UFOs? This question was not so mindbending. I could still fit this data into my academic training, interpreting orbs as social constructions based on an externally generated unknown event, or some type of perennial mystical experience interpreted through each era's reigning cultural framework.

The challenge began when I met the meta-experiencers, the scientists who studied the experiencers and the phenomenon. It confounded the academic categories I had been using thus far in my work. The new

research compelled me to think in novel ways to understand this group and their research. Additionally, the charisma and conviction of the scientist-believers were difficult to discount—at least for me. As a scholar of religion I am trained not to weigh in, one way or the other, on the truth or falseness of believers' claims. When looking at the documentation of the proliferation of a belief, there is no need to consider whether the belief is justified or not if one is just analyzing its social effects and influence. My association with the scientists brought about something that Harvard UFO researcher John Mack called an "epistemological shock," that is, a shock to my fundamental understanding of the world and the universe.

The shock to my epistemological frameworks, or to what I believed to be true, occurred on two levels. The first is obvious. Several of the most well-regarded scientists in the world believe in nonhuman intelligence that originated in space. The second level of epistemological shock was galling. Rumors of the findings of these scientists inspired hoaxes, disinformation, media, and documentaries based on bogus information that purported to inform the public about UFO events and created UFO narratives and mythologies. I watched several of these unfold in real time. It was hard to remain aloof when confronted by what I knew to be misinformation, some created as disinformation, some created for the sole reason that it sells. I was so embedded in the research, on the one level of observing the scientists and on another level of being involved with the producers of media content, that it was impossible to be neutral. It was at this point that I felt myself fall headlong into Nietzsche's abyss, stare into it, and see it grin mockingly back at me.

Method

In one sense, I feel as if I have been studying this phenomenon my whole life, but I didn't call it UFO research; I called it religious studies. Scholars of religion are well suited to study this topic because religious studies is not a religion, but a set of methods for studying religious phenomena. With a few exceptions, scholars of religion do not assess the truth claims of religious practitioners. The metaphysical truth and the objective truth of the phenomena are bracketed so that one can focus on the social effects, which are incontestably very real. This strategy is helpful in the study of the phenomenon of UFOs and was advocated by Jacques Vallee in a 1979 address to the special political committee of the United Nations organization. He told the committee that "the belief in space visitors is independent of the physical reality of the UFO phenomenon." Significantly, Vallee himself believes in the reality of the UFO phenomenon but understands that the formation of mass belief in it does not depend on its objective reality.

A New Religious Form

It is an understatement to say that in 2012, as soon as my research focus shifted, so did my life. When I began to focus on modern reports of UFO sightings and events, I was immediately immersed in a world where the religious impulse was alive and the formation of a new, unique form of religion was in process. I was observing it as it happened. Carl Jung put it well. Referring to the modern phenomenon of flying saucers, he wrote, "We have here a golden opportunity of seeing how a legend is formed.

The cast of characters who showed up, unannounced and unexpected, surprised me. They included television producers, experiencers and their entourages of agents affiliated with the government, and even actors whose names are known in every household. After my initial shock, I began to understand these individuals from the perspective of the

history of religions. In a sense, they were the same cast of characters who appear at the birth of every major religious tradition, although today they have different names and job descriptions. In the first century CE they would be called scribes and redactors, but today they are agents of information, like screenwriters, television producers, and authors. I observed the dynamic genesis of a global belief system. I began to record the mechanisms by which people believe and practice, and how they believe and practice. The producers, actors, government agents, and even myself were all part of the process of the formation of belief, and perhaps even pawns in this process.

How Is It Religious? The Contact Event

One of the scientists with whom I worked, whose methodology is primarily "nuts and bolts" in that he uses scientific analysis on what he believes to be artifacts or physical parts of potential "crafts," asked me why UFO events are often linked to religion. This is a fair question. One answer lies in the fact that the history of religion is, among other things, a record of perceived contact with supernatural beings, many of which descend from the skies as beings of light, or on light, or amid light. This is one of the reasons scholars of religion are comfortable examining modern reports of UFO events. Jeffrey Kripal, working with author Whitely Strieber, articulates this well. In his work he has sought to reveal "how the modern experience of the alien coming down from the sky can be compared to the ancient experience of the god descending from the heavens."

These "contact events," the perceived interface between the human and the intelligent nonhuman being from the sky, spawn beliefs and interpretations. These beliefs and interpretations develop into communities of belief, or faith communities. Kripal notes, "Some of the remembered effects of these fantastic states of mind have been taken up by extremely elaborate social, political, and artistic processes and have been fashioned by communities into mythical, ritual, and institutional complexes that have fundamentally changed human history. We call these 'religions. "

Similar to religions, institutions appropriate, cultivate, and sometimes intervene in the interpretations of a UFO event. These institutions vary and range from religious institutions to governments to clubs or groups, and, today, to social media groups.

The Formation of Belief Communities

In the history of religions, a contact event is followed by a series of interpretations, and these are usually followed by the creation of institutions. Such interpretive communities are often called religions or religious denominations. Institutions have a stake in how the original contact event is interpreted. A familiar example is the communities of interpretation that surround the religion of Christianity, of which there are thousands.

A recent example of how a contact event spawns a community of belief, and how institutions monitor belief, is the American-based religion of the Nation of Islam. One of the Nation's early leaders was Elijah Robert Poole, who adopted the name Elijah Muhammad. Poole believed that UFOs would come to Earth and bring salvation to his community of believers and punish others who were not believers. The US government was interested in Poole and his followers, and the FBI established a file on him and his community. Within the history of many traditional religions, institutions, including governments, have been involved in monitoring and often forming and shaping the interpretations of the contact event. This fact is becoming less controversial and suggestive of conspiracy to UFO believers, and the focus is

shifting now to how institutions monitor, and sometimes actively shape, the interpretations of contact events. Perceived contacts with nonhuman intelligences are powerful events with unpredictable social effects.

The Creation of Belief and Practices: A Tenuous Relationship to the Contact Event

In analyzing the contact event and the subsequent interpretations of it, one needs to keep a few things in mind. First, a contact event is not automatically a religious event, and the spotting of an unidentified aerial object is not automatically a UFO event. These experiences become religious events, or UFO events, through an interpretive process. The interpretative process goes through stages of shaping and sometimes active intervention before it is solidified as a religious event, a UFO event, or both. The various types of belief in UFOs can be traced as cultural processes that develop both spontaneously and intentionally within layers of popular culture and through purposive institutional involvement.

Technology and New Forms of Religious Belief

Scholars of religion were not the first to suggest that the flying saucer was the symbol of a new, global belief system. Carl Jung announced it in his little book, published in the 1950s, *Flying Saucers: A Modern Myth of Things Seen in the Skies*. Writing in the late 1960s, Jacques Vallee argued, in *Passport to Magonia*, that similar patterns could be observed in folklore, religious traditions, and modern UFO events. Scholars of the history of the flying saucer usually date its emergence to the beginning of the Cold War and pilot Kenneth Arnold's sighting of nine, flat, saucerlike discs over Mount Rainier in 1947. Vallee argues, however, that the phenomenon has been around for thousands of years, perhaps more. He is right. Yet the ubiquitous cultural framework for understanding them as the modern UFO did indeed begin around 1947.

Since the 1960s, scholars of religion have made significant progress in identifying the mechanisms of religious belief, including how social infrastructures inspire new religious movements. Interpretation of UFOs as connected to religion or religious traditions constitutes a significant cultural development. New religious movements such as the Nation of Islam, Scientology, and Jediism incorporate the UFO narrative into older religious traditions and scriptures." Popular television programs like *Ancient Aliens* provide viewers with interpretive strategies that encourage them to view religious visions of the past through the lens of the modern UFO narrative, turning medieval angels into aliens, for example. What was once a belief localized within small pockets or groups of believers under the umbrella term "UFO religions" is now a widespread worldview that is supercharged by the digital infrastructure that spreads messages and beliefs "virally" The infrastructure of technology has spawned new forms of religion and religiosity, and belief in UFOs has emerged as one such new form of religious belief.

Real or Imaginary?

The media's representation of the phenomenon often adds some violence to the original event that motivated the belief. Some may understandably ask, "Is it real, or is it imaginary?" It is important to remember that the events themselves pale in comparison to the reality of the social effects. This is a shame. The closer one gets to those engaged in the study of the phenomenon, the more one begins to fathom the complex nature of these events that come to be interpreted as religious, mystical, sacred, or pertaining to UFOs, and the deep commitments of the people who experience them. Each of the

scientists with whom I engaged was passionately obsessed with his research, but none of them would ever offer conclusions as to what the phenomenon was or where it came from. The suggestion that the phenomenon is the basis for a new form of religion elicited sneers and disgust. To them, the phenomenon was too sacred to become religious dogma.

It was also, in their opinion, too sacred to be entrusted to the media. Because of my dual research focus, on occasion I became a reluctant bridge between the scientists and media professionals. On one occasion a videographer, working for a well-known production company, contacted one of the scientists and asked him for a two-sentence quote. At first the scientist was confused, wondering how the videographer had acquired his contact information. He then correctly traced it back to me. In a phone call to me he registered his disgust.

"There is a lot of arrogance in the assumption that I am supposed to condense twenty years of research into the most profound topic in human history into a two-sentence sound bite to be broadcast out to the public so they can consume it with their TV dinner. No thanks," he said.

Interchanges like this, which I witnessed often, reveal the chasm between those engaged in studying the phenomenon and the media representations of it. Ironically, however, it is precisely media representations that create and sustain UFO belief. Is it real, or is it imaginary? What follows suggests that it is both. <>

MANI AND AUGUSTINE: COLLECTED ESSAYS ON MANI, MANICHAISM AND AUGUSTINE by Johannes van Oort [Nag Hammadi and Manichaean Studies, Brill, 9789004416956]

MANI AND AUGUSTINE: COLLECTED ESSAYS ON MANI, MANICHAISM AND AUGUSTINE gathers in one volume contributions on Manichaean scholarship made by the internationally renowned scholar Johannes van Oort. The first part of the book focuses on the Babylonian prophet Mani (216-277) who styled himself an 'apostle of Jesus Christ', on Jewish elements in Manichaeism and on 'human semen eucharist', eschatology and imagery of Christ as 'God's Right Hand'. The second part of the book concentrates on the question to what extent the former 'auditor' Augustine became acquainted with Mani's gnostic world religion and his canonical writings, and explores to what extent Manichaeism had a lasting impact on the most influential church father of the West.

Review

Johannes van Oort zählt seit Jahrzehnten zu den weltweit bedeutendsten Erforschern der Gnosis und speziell des Manichäismus. Einen zweiten wissenschaftlichen Schwerpunkt legte der in den Niederlanden und in Südafrika Lehrende auf die Erschließung von Person und Werk des Augustinus von Hippo, des wohl namhaftesten christlichen Anhängers, schließlich aber vor allem Bekämpfers Manis, des Manichäismus und seiner Schriften. Neben einigen gewichtigen Monographien zu diesen beiden großen Themenfeldern und ihrer Schnittmenge publizierte van Oort eine beachtliche Anzahl an kleineren Beiträgen, verstreut in Periodika aus den Bereichen Religionswissenschaft, Theologie, Geschichtswissenschaft oder Altphilologie. Insofern diese Einzelveröffentlichungen bisweilen schwerer zugänglich sind, stellt die nun erschienene Sammlung ein wertvolles Instrument für die einschlägige

Forschung bereit. Zu den wiederabgedruckten „Essays“, die durch zwei bislang noch nicht publizierte Aufsätze ergänzt werden, gesellt sich die Wiedergabe etlicher Rezensionen aus der Feder van Oorts – auch hier wieder gruppiert zu den zwei Bereichen „Manichaeism“ und „Augustine and Manichaeism“. Der renommierte Verfasser und der nicht minder renommierte Verlag Brill haben dafür gesorgt, dass der neue Sammelband sorgfältig verfasst, lektoriert und erschlossen – wir finden ausführliche Verzeichnisse und Register – sowie hochwertig produziert und gebunden wurde: zu Freude und Gewinn für jeden Lesenden und zu Nutzen und Zierde einer jeden geisteswissenschaftlichen Bibliothek. — Christof Müller, Würzburg

[Translation: For decades, Johannes van Oort has been one of the world's most important researchers of Gnosis and especially Manichaeism. The lecturer in the Netherlands and South Africa placed a second academic focus on the development of the person and work of Augustine of Hippo, probably the most well-known Christian devotee, but above all the fighter of Mani, Manichaeism and his writings. In addition to some weighty monographs on these two major subject areas and their overlap, van Oort published a considerable number of smaller contributions, scattered in periodicals from the fields of religious studies, theology, historical studies or classical philology. Insofar as these individual publications are sometimes difficult to access, the collection that has now been published provides a valuable tool for relevant research. The reprinted “essays”, which are supplemented by two as yet unpublished articles, are joined by the reproduction of a number of reviews from van Oort's pen - again grouped into the two areas “Manichaeism” and “Augustine and Manichaeism”. The renowned author and the no less renowned publishing house Brill have ensured that the new anthology was carefully written, edited and cataloged - we can find detailed directories and registers - as well as produced and bound to a high quality: for the joy and profit of every reader and for the benefit of and an ornament of every humanities library.— Christof Müller, Würzburg]

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Indices

Excerpt: This book collects most of my essays on Mani, Manichaeism and Augustine as they appeared during the past years in various scientific journals and congress collections. Supplemented by a number of relevant review articles and more or less extensive reviews, all studies have been divided into three parts. Part One 'Mani and Manichaeism' gives an overview of the origins of Mani's gnostic church and discusses a number of characteristic features of his world religion. Part Two 'Augustine and Manichaeism' comprises eighteen studies examining the significance Mani and his gnostic Christianity may have had for the church father Augustine. Since the ultimate purpose of my researches was and still is to find out to what extent the most important thinker of (Western) Christianity has been influenced by Mani and his followers, the main emphasis of this book is on these studies. They are based on my endeavours to understand the fascinating worldview of Mani and his many disciples. Over the years I have become increasingly convinced that Augustine was very well aware of Mani's teachings; it has also become increasingly my conviction that the lasting impact of Manichaeism on Augustine was considerable. I hope that the studies collected here provide convincing evidence of this, especially with regard to Augustine's distinctive Christian spirituality, his negative attitude to sexuality (and the role of sex in the transmission of original sin) and, for instance, his theories about memory, all being so very influential in our intellectual and cultural history. Part Three assembles topical reviews and review articles on the themes of 'Mani and Manichaeism' and 'Augustine and Manichaeism' respectively. Extensive indices have been added which, I assume, may help not only readers seeking for quick reference but also those researchers who aim at further study of so many an intriguing feature of both Mani's and Augustine's worldviews.

The essays collected here (I also enclosed two previously unpublished ones) have been written over the course of a good number of years. I have not removed all traces of the different times and places of origin, but supplemented new information where this seemed desirable. All essays have in principle retained their original 'complete' character and can therefore be read as independent studies. I hereby meet an increasingly common form of publication in which individual chapters of a book are also made available electronically to the interested student for download. The benevolent reader will understand that in this way repetition of essential information sometimes turned out to be inevitable.

Mani and Manichaeism

The Discovery of Manichaeism

It was a long time before Manichaeism, the world religion that is named after Mani (216–276/7), became the object of serious historical and theological research. During the Middle Ages, the term 'Manichaeism' was in use in the West, but mainly as a false and horrifying designation of dissenting opinion. Both in the Church and the State the label 'Manichaeism' was rather lavishly attached, even if opinions had nothing in common with the religion in question. Thus dissenters from established social and theological opinions were silenced, as was particularly the case with the Cathars in Southern France and some regions of Northern Italy. As late as the sixteenth century the protestant Luther was accused of Manichaeism, and in this respect even an irenic scholar such as Erasmus could not restrain himself.

It was also for this reason that, first of all in protestant circles, Mani and his religion became the objects of study. An initial but still insecure attempt was made by the notorious dissident Gottfried Arnold in his *Unparteyische Kirchen- und Ketzerhistorie* (1699/1700). Against all current opinions, this German Pietist tried to understand and even to justify the Manichaeans; and he particularly stressed the cruelties perpetrated by the Catholics against them. A more solid scientific foundation for all future research of Manichaeism was laid down by the Huguenot Isaac de Beausobre. His monumental and still consulted *Histoire critique de Manichée et du Manichéisme* was published in two substantial folio volumes in Amsterdam in 1734 and 1739. Although apologetics was also an important underlying motive in this case (De Beausobre tried to vindicate the Protestant Reformation, and in his efforts he sometimes even depicted Manichaeism as Protestantism *avant la lettre!*), subsequent studies could build upon several of his profound insights. The originality of De Beausobre's analyses can be detected in, for instance, his observations about the importance of the Gospel of Thomas to the Manichaeans and about their use of Jewish Enochic lore. Not until the discoveries at Nag Hammadi (1945) and Qumran (1946) could his remarkably prescient insights be properly evaluated.

In the long interval after De Beausobre, virtually no progress was made. Studies usually became entrenched in ordinary anti-Manichaean polemics. A fresh treatment of the subject had to wait until the theologian Ferdinand Christian Baur from Tübingen, who in 1831 published his *Das manichäische Religionssystem nach den Quellen neu untersucht und entwickelt*. Although Baur attached too much importance to Buddhism as a formative element in Mani's religion, his study is of lasting value because of its meticulous analysis of traditions preserved by the Church Fathers, Augustine in particular. After the groundbreaking work of Baur, the nineteenth century also saw the publication of new Oriental source material by scholars like G. Flügel (1862, 1871), E. Sachau (1878), K. Kessler (1889), and H. Pognon (1898). This new information, together with the material already known from Greek and Latin sources, provided a solid basis for subsequent studies.

Yet still material which had been collected from the Christian and Muslim opponents of Manichaeism was concerned. Genuine Manichaean texts were first discovered from the beginning of the twentieth century. During the years 1902–1914, Prussian archaeological expeditions, first led by A. Grünwedel and then by the more successful A. von Le Coq, brought back to Berlin several thousand fragments of Manichaean texts mainly originating from the sites of Turfan in Sinkiang (China) along the famous Silk Road. These texts were written in some seventeen (then partly unknown) languages and dialects such as Tokharian, Middle Persian, Parthian, Sogdian, Uighur (a kind of Old Turkish), 'Bactrian', New Persian and also in Chinese. The year 1905 brought the news of Sir Aurel Stein's discovery of a large hoard of Buddhist and Manichaean manuscripts in Tun-huang in Chinese Central Asia. Here, shortly afterwards, the French scholar Paul Pelliot was also successful, as were some Chinese expeditions which followed him. Among the documents discovered at Turfan were a Manichaean Confessional for the Hearers in Uighur (usually termed the *Xuastvanift*); among the documents from Tun-huang were a lengthy doctrinal tractate in Chinese (usually known as the *Traité*), the *Compendium of the Doctrines and Styles of the Teaching of Mani, the Buddha of Light* (conserved in London; a supplementary part, known as the *Fragment Pelliot*, is in Paris), and the Chinese Hymnscroll. Subsequently, an important series of discoveries followed in the West. As early as 1918, a Manichaean manuscript in Latin was found near Tébessa in Algeria. In November 1929 a large collection of Coptic

Manichaean texts, the importance of which cannot easily be overestimated, was first made known to the Danish Egyptologist H.O. Lange and then, in 1930, to the Berlin scholar Carl Schmidt during a visit in Cairo. Eventually the greater part of these manuscripts went to Berlin; the other part was acquired by Sir Chester Beatty for his famous collection of classical and biblical manuscripts in London (now housed in Dublin). As is generally assumed, all these Coptic texts, although they were found in Medinet Madi in the Egyptian Fayoum, did not originate there but probably in the region of Assiut (Lycopolis) in Upper Egypt. Now accessible in (facsimile) edition are the lion's share of the Kephalaia, the Psalm-Book, and the Homilies. Unfortunately, the bulk of three codices (among them a historical work that gave reports on Mani's death and the early history of his Church, and a collection of Letters of Mani) seem to have been mainly lost. An extraordinary surprise was the publication in 1970 of another document from Egypt, namely the now famous Greek Cologne Mani-Codex. The Codex Manichaicus Coloniensis (CMC) contains a unique biography of Mani's youth and first missionary journeys edited on the basis of the eyewitness accounts of his closest disciples. Since 1991, other new Manichaean texts have been discovered in Ismant el-Kharab (ancient Kellis) in the Egyptian Dakhleh-Oasis.

Mani's Origin, Life, and Mission

In his compendium of heresies, the Church Father Augustine begins his description of Manichaeism as follows:

The Manichaeans sprang from a certain Persian called Manes, but when his mad doctrine began to be preached in Greece, his disciples chose to call him Manichaeus to avoid the word for 'madness'. For the same reason some of them, somewhat more learned and therefore more deceitful, called him Mannichaeus, doubling the letter 'n', as if he were one who pours out manna. —De haer. 46,1

In this passage, it is actually not so much Augustine's derision of Mani's name by suggesting a connection with madness (Greek: Manía) that is conspicuous. Such a pun was obvious and used by many. It is more characteristic that Augustine, previously an auditor of the sect for some ten years, as regards the person of Mani, confines himself to the statement: he was a Persian (Persa quidem). This profile matches the current view and even applies to Mani's electi: the words and doctrines of the master had to be considered important, but about his descent one was usually badly informed. Besides, in this passage the simple—and in fact misleading—designation of Mani as a Persian had a fatal effect to Roman ears because Persia was Rome's hereditary enemy. But highly noteworthy and very accurate is Augustine's record that Mani's name designates the one who pours out manna (Gr. Mánna + chéō, pour out). In the Cologne Mani-Codex we read that Mani styled himself the new Johannine Christ 'to scatter the bread on my people' (CMC 107,18–20). It is thanks to this Codex and several other authentic sources (particularly those from Turfan and Medinet Madi, apart from some remarkably accurate Arabic writers) that we have precise information about Mani's life and work.

Mani was born on 14 April 216 near the southern Mesopotamian town of Seleucia-Ctesiphon on the Tigris. His father's name was Pattig or Patteg (Greek: Pattikios; Latin: Patticius; Arabic: Futtuq); the name of his mother was probably Maryam or Miryam. It may be questioned whether the mother had close ties with the then still ruling house of the Arsacids: more likely these and other claims of a noble birth are but pious legends. A now re-established fact, however, is the narrative already handed down by the tenth century Muslim writer Ibn al-Nadim that from his early youth onwards Mani grew up in a community of Baptists. The CMC (e.g. 94–97) demonstrates that the members of this sect were (a

group within the) Elchasaites. These Jewish Christians practised daily ablutions of their bodies and food; referred to their religion as the Law; emphasized the keeping of the Sabbath; referred repeatedly to ancestral traditions; but also acknowledged Jesus as the Saviour. The bare fact of this descent from the Jewish-Christian milieu of the El/Alchasaites (those who were named by An-Nadim as the Mughtasilah, 'the ones who wash themselves') may explain Mani's connections with gnostic Christianity. Here, one can also find the initial sources for his strict asceticism and his eschatology that, to a far-reaching extent, was determined by Jewish-Christian and Encratite ideas. The concept attributed to Elchasaïos of the earth being 'the flesh and blood of my Lord' (CMC 97,9–10) can be treated as the basis of the Manichaeic doctrine of Jesus as the one who suffers in the whole cosmos (Jesus patibilis). Evidently, it was also the Jewish-Christian concept of the true prophet revealing himself anew in various periods of history that was accepted by Mani and his early disciples (cf. CMC 47,1–72,7). Besides, it seems to be most likely that already in this sect Mani had become acquainted with astrological speculations such as are particularly present in his cosmology.

Thanks to the Cologne Mani-Codex, we understand that Mani not only grew up among the Elchasaites, but also that, initially, he tried to be their prophetic reformer. From his earliest youth he received revelations. A special revelation by his Syzygos or heavenly Twin, was imparted to him at the beginning of his 25th year (CMC 17,8ff.; 73,5f.). Because of the fragmentary status of its first quires, it remains unclear whether or not the CMC mentions a major revelation at the completion of Mani's twelfth year. Both the Kephalaia (14,31) and the Arabic writer al-Biruni (†1048) explicitly mention such an event; it may remind one of Jewish bar mitzwa as well as Christian (cf. the twelve-year-old Jesus in the temple) legacy. The traditions about such a revelation seem to reach back to accounts given by Mani himself in his Shabuhrgan. It is also elsewhere than in the new Mani-Codex that a more plain identification of the Syzygos or Twin with the promised Paraclete can be found (see e.g. Kephalaia 14,32 ff. & 15,22f.). Such an identification may well have been derived from traditions in the Aramaic Christian Church of Mesopotamia that equated the Holy Spirit (which is given at baptism) with a person's guardian angel. By adopting the title of Paraclete for himself, Mani indicated that he would follow in Jesus' footsteps. As Augustine said: 'That is why in his letters he [Mani] styles himself the apostle of Jesus Christ, because Jesus Christ had promised that He would send him [the Paraclete] and had sent the Holy Spirit in him' (De haer. 46,16). Yet the Manichaeans not only identified Mani with the Paraclete, but also considered him to be the new Jesus (e.g. Psalm-Book 9,3–7; 12,28–32; etc.). Thus Mani would be, at the final judgment, both the Judge and the peace giving Paraclete (e.g. Psalm-Book 20,19 ff.). Apart from these and other appropriations of genuine Jewish and Jewish-Christian heritage, the CMC and several other sources testify to Mani's conscious imitation of the apostle Paul. The recurrent designation of Mani as 'apostle of Jesus Christ' is a clear manifestation of this imitatio Pauli (e.g. CMC 66,4–5), as is the emphatic mention of Paul in the series of those who received the true revelation (CMC 60–62). This concentration on a gnostic tailored Paul, a process in which Marcion and Bardesanes seem to have played their role, eventually led to Mani's break with the sect of his youth. In the CMC this parting of the ways is described in detail and with some dramatic effect. The trial that led up to Mani's rejection and departure reveals striking parallels with the legal procedures of the Jewish community at Qumran.

The Codex relates that, after his departure, Mani was followed by two members of the sect. They first travelled to Ctesiphon where Pattikios joined their company. Soon afterwards the first missionary journeys will have begun, probably along the Tigris in a northerly direction. The fragmentary status of

the last portion of the CMC does not allow one to speak with certainty about these first itineraries, but the mention of the Medes and Gonzak (CMC 121) combined with some other data seems to provide trustworthy evidence. The sources do not record that in the city of Gonzak or Ganzak, one of the summer residences of the Sassanian kings, Mani would have tried to convert the then ruling Shahanshah Ardashir. During the last years of the reign of Ardashir, who was noted for being a devotee of Zoroastrianism, Mani went to India via the harbour of Pharat in southern Babylonia (cf. e.g. Keph. 15,24–27; 184,23–185,15, and CMC 140 ff.). A striking feature of these early missionary accounts is that nearly everywhere—and even in India—Mani could start his work in congregations of Jewish-Christian Baptists. Soon after the accession of Shapur I as the sole King of Kings, Mani returned. He probably delivered his only Middle Persian writing, the Shabuhrgan, to the new Shahanshah on 9 April 243. His admittance into Shapur's entourage (*comitatus*) and the permission to propagate his new syncretistic religion accorded him unique opportunities. After Shapur's death, Mani also found a willing ear with Shapur's son and successor Hormizd (272–273). However, after Bahram I had received the royal diadem, this benevolent attitude soon disappeared. At the beginning of the second year of his reign, Karder, the Chief Mobed of the Zoroastrians, began to persuade him to take action against the prophet from Babylon. Mani was summoned before Bahram, duly accused, put in chains, and tortured. After 26 days in prison he died on 26.2.277. In several Manichaean sources his death is described as a crucifixion.

During his lifetime, Mani dispatched several missions headed by his chief disciples: as far as Egypt came Adda(i) and others; as far as Chorasán and the Sogdiana came Mar Ammo. Even before 276, a widespread Church had grown up within and even outside the Persian Empire. In Graeco-Roman antiquity the Manichaean Church expanded into Syria, Palestine, Arabia, Asia Minor, the Balkans (in 1906 a unique tombstone of a Manichaean electa named Bassa was discovered at Salona, near modern Split, in Dalmatia), Roman Africa, Spain, Italy and Gaul. In the East, Manichaeism was made the State religion among the Uighurs of Turkestan by Bögü Khaghan in A.D. 762–763; in the centuries which followed, this highly syncretistic but in essence still gnostic religion spread as far as the Indian Ocean and the China Sea.

Mani's Church and Canon

Mani failed to make his revelation the official religion of Iran; he succeeded, however, in what he really intended: the establishment of a new world religion. Due to the Manichaeans' missionary zeal, their new Church soon became a feared competitor of the official Christian Church both in the Roman Empire and elsewhere. Its firm organization guaranteed a strong unity. Thanks to its organization and a system of teachings that could easily be accommodated, Manichaeism was already within Graeco-Roman antiquity a success.

The interior organization of Mani's religion was a pyramidal one, headed by Mani's deputy (*archegos*) with his residence in Babylon until the beginning of the tenth century, when it was moved to Samarkand. The worldwide unity of the Church can be exemplified by the fact that, even in the eighth century, a North-African is said to have been its leader. Immediately following the *archegos* or *princeps* there were, in the order of three subsequent ranks, the 12 apostles or teachers, the 72 bishops, and the 360 presbyters. The fourth rank was constituted by the general electi, both men and women. Particularly amongst these elect, the many scribes, preachers and, for instance, Church musicians will have to be sought. An official fifth rank was constituted by the many male and female auditors (*auditores*, a term which in Syriac Christianity denoted the catechumens).

The numbers 12 and 72 seem to be rooted in the tradition of the Christian Church; the number 360 will stem from astrological lore which, as a rule, was highly valued in gnostic circles. Not only the number 12 reminds us of the example of Jesus who chose 12 apostles, but perhaps this also goes for the number 72. In a typically Jewish-Christian writing such as the Pseudo-Clementines, in the Acts of Thomas which were well known among the Manichaeans and also transmitted archaic Jewish-Christian traditions, and particularly in Tatian's Diatessaron it is said that Jesus sent out 72 (and not 70) missionaries. Mani knew the Diatessaron and this Gospel text seems to have suggested the election of 72 bishops.

Mani laid down his teaching in various books that were to gain canonical status throughout his Church. He himself took great pains to ensure that his teachings would be handed down in writing. This would prevent what had already happened to other founders of religions such as the Buddha, Zarathustra and Jesus: i.e. many disputes arose because they did not record their doctrines in writing. Apart from the Shabuhrgan (which seems not to have been an official part of his sevenfold Canon, although it was a widely read classic among the Manichaeans in Persia and Central Asia), Mani composed all his writings in his East Aramaic (Syriac) mother tongue and used a variant of the Palmyrene script. The names of these writings are usually given as follows: 1. The Living (or Great) Gospel; 2. The Treasure of Life; 3. The Pragmateia (or Treatise or Essay); 4. The Book of Mysteries (Secrets); 5. The Book of the Giants; 6. The Letters; 7. The Psalms and Prayers. All of them survive only in fragmentary form. The non-canonical literature included the Kephalaia (e.g. in Coptic), the Homilies (Coptic) as well as several hymn collections (e.g. the Coptic Psalter) and the Image (Greek: Eikon; Persian/Parthian: Ardahang), a painted picture-book illustrating the more important aspects of the doctrine, probably as an appendix to, but different from the most important Living Gospel.

The Manichaean Myth

Manichaeism should be considered a form of Gnosticism. The heart of this religion was Mani's own speculative version of the gnostic myth of cosmic exile and salvation. As a religious system, Manichaeism offered the promise of an a-cosmic salvation through the revealed knowledge (gnosis) of transcendent realities, including the divine nature of the soul, and what needs to be known about the way to eternal life.

All this is expressed in a detailed and very complicated myth. Any account of this myth inevitably tends towards an artificial synthesis. In several Manichaean and other sources we find important elements of Mani's doctrinal tenets, which turn out to be carefully adapted and tailored to the needs of those addressed. This is particularly the case in works like the Coptic Kephalaia, the Middle Persian Shabuhrgan, and in the Chinese *Traité*, *Compendium* and *Hymnscroll*. However, in documents such as the Cologne Mani-Codex, the Tebessa Codex and the substantial Coptic Manichaean Psalter, the mythical elements can only be detected as a kind of substratum underlying the present text. The same turns out to be case with the new Kellis finds. Thus more than once there appears to be little knowledge of or interest in the many gods and demons among the Manichaeans. Nor do we always find much interest in the intricacies of cosmogony and cosmology.

Mani and his followers taught a cosmogony of a definitely dualistic kind: evil is an eternal cosmic force, not the result of a fall. Two realms or kingdoms, the realm of light and the realm of darkness, good and evil, God and matter, oppose each other implacably. It should be noted that this is not the Hellenistic

dualism of spirit and matter, but one of two substances: the divine light is a visible, spatial and quantifiable element, as is the evil substance of darkness, the active principle of lust, the 'thought of death'. In the kingdom of light the Father of Greatness rules, and this kingdom is in fact an extension of himself. It has four divine attributes (purity, light, power, and wisdom) and the Father resides in his five intellectual powers or limbs (reason, mind, intelligence, thought, and understanding, which are otherwise substantially detailed as the five elements of living air, light, wind, water, and fire). Surrounding the Father are the twelve aeons, equally distributed towards the four directions of heaven, and refracted also into myriads of 'aeons of the aeons'.

Opposed to this kingdom of light is the realm of the King of Darkness, a kingdom that is essentially the domain of evil matter. It is disorderly dominated by the 'Prince of Darkness', who is the product of (and even identified with) evil matter. This dark realm also consists of five areas or worlds (dark reason, dark mind, and so on), which are also referred to as the five dark elements of smoke, fire, wind, water(s), and darkness. In this area countless demons are actively present; they fight and devour each other. Because there was an accidental shift of these disorganized and senseless movements, the Prince of Darkness (in fact a collective personification of the five evil archons 'ruling' the five worlds of darkness), having once reached the upper limit of his territory, glimpses the radiance of light, desires to possess its life, and therefore attacks the kingdom of light.

In the ensuing struggle, the Father of Light brings forth the Mother of Life, who in turn evokes the First Man. This is the first series of emanations or creations. It may be remarked in passing that, with regard to the emergence of new gods and godly powers, the Manichaeans strictly avoid any suggestion of generation and thus of evil sexuality. Instead, they speak of 'calling out' or 'calling forth'. Accordingly the First Man, the 'first born' Son of God, is also 'called forth' and, being equipped with the five light powers that appear personified either as his 'sons' or as his 'arms', goes out into battle. But Primal Man is defeated, and his fivefold armour that constitutes the Living Soul or Living Self is devoured by the powers of evil. To say it in Mani's own words as cited by the eighth century Nestorian bishop Theodore bar Koni:

Then the Primal Man gave himself and his five sons to be consumed by the five sons of darkness, like a man who has an enemy and mixes a deadly poison into a cake and gives it. —Lib. Schol. I I

This being the case, the divine Soul (also termed the Living Self that is suspended on the Cross of Light and particularly in the West personified as the suffering Jesus, *Jesus patibilis*) is mixed with the dark elements of matter and thus is in need of redemption. The First Man, being vanquished, lays unconscious in the depths. In order to redeem him, the Father of Light calls forth a second series of emanations: a new divine trinity. First, the Father sends forth the Beloved of the Lights; from him comes the Great Builder; and he in turn produces the Living Spirit who, like Primal Man, has five sons: the King of Splendour; the King of Honour; the Adamas of Light; the King of Glory; and Atlas. The Living Spirit (also termed the Father of Life) sends his Call from the lowest boundary of the world of light to the First Man lying in the depths. By this Call, the First Man is aroused from his unconscious state and he responds by an Answer. Then the Living Spirit, together with its five sons and the Mother of Life, descends to the First Man and leads him up to the world of light. To rescue the light still captured through the compound of the divine Soul with evil matter, the Living Spirit constructs with the help of its sons ten heavens and eight earths. It is noteworthy that this act of creation is performed by a light god: and not by an evil demiurge. Thus, in the gnosis of Manichaeism, the structure of the universe is divinely devised.

In order to create the cosmos, however, use must be made of material of a mixed substance (light and darkness). The sun and the moon are vessels of pure light, being made from the particles of light completely unaffected by darkness. The planets and stars, however, are evil rulers; because they are created from material contaminated with darkness.

The world thus being constructed as a prison for the forces of Darkness as well as a place where the divine Soul is captured, the process of salvation can begin. To this end a third evocation of deities occurs. The Father of Greatness calls forth the Third Messenger (or Ambassador) who is charged to extract and purify the light still retained by the powers of darkness and contained in their bodies. By taking advantage of the innate lust of the male and female archons which are chained in the heavens, this Tertius Legatus and his female doublet the Virgin of Light (also represented as the Twelve Maidens, each corresponding to a sign of the Zodiac) make them relinquish the light they have devoured. It is concentrated, in particular, in their semen and in their wombs. The 'sins' of the male archons fall upon the earth when they see the beautiful Maiden(s); out of that part of their semen that dropped into water a monster arises; but this fearful beast is subjugated by the Adamas of Light. From the semen that has fallen on the dry ground, five trees spring up, and from them all other forms of plant-life originate. When the female archons—made pregnant by their own evil nature—see the naked form of the Third Messenger, they are agitated and their foetuses fall down upon the earth. These abortions not only survive their premature birth, but also devour the fruits of the trees that have grown out of the semen of the male archons. Driven by sexual lust, they unite with each other and give birth to the innumerable species of animals as we know them. The light that is not yet saved is thus transferred to the earth, where it is scattered and bound in plants and—to a lesser degree—in the bodies of animals.

This well-known episode in the Manichaeic myth, since François Cumont called 'the seduction of the archons', is a pivotal one. Through later research (e.g. by John C. Reeves) it has become increasingly clear that, apart from its origins in a variety of earlier traditions, several details in this multifarious account are drawn from Jewish lore.

The next episodes of the Manichaeic myth may be summarized as succinctly as possible. In order to continue the liberation of the light, the Third Messenger calls forth the Column of Glory (who is also referred to as the New or Perfect Man; cf. Ephesians 4:12–13) and sets in motion the work of 'the ships of light' (i.e. sun and moon) in order to transport the light to the New Paradise which has been built by the Great Builder. This process frightens the powers of darkness and, in a desperate attempt to preserve some of the captive particles of light, they create the first human couple: Adam and Eve. Hence man is fabricated by the demons. He has been created, however, after the image of the Third Messenger (and so ultimately after the image of God!) which the demons had seen on high. Man is thus rooted in two worlds, but at first he is unconscious of his high descent: because the necessary gnosis is still missing. This explains why the work of light redemption must be concentrated on man. So Jesus the Luminous descends to Adam to bring him the saving knowledge. In Manichaeism, this revelation by Jesus the Luminous to Adam is the archetype of all future human redemption. Gradually this liberation will be achieved. In order to bring about the redemption of the light, Jesus evokes the Light Mind or Nous (Intelligence): this Nous, in turn, summons forth the Apostle of Light who becomes incarnate in the great religious leaders throughout world history such as the Buddha, Zoroaster, and Jesus the Messiah.

The final stage of world history is introduced by the Great War between the forces of good and evil. Through the practice of the laws of the true religion, light is liberated. When the Church of the righteous ones triumphs, all the souls will be judged, and those of the chosen will rise to heaven. After that, the world will be destroyed and purified by a fire lasting 1,468 years. All, or most, of the light particles will be saved; evil matter, in all its manifestations and with its victims (the damned), will be forever imprisoned in a globe (Greek and Coptic: *bolos*; Latin: *globus*) inside a gigantic pit covered with a huge stone. Then the separation of light and darkness will be accomplished for all eternity.

This is a necessarily brief and—inevitably—eclectic account of the very complicated myth. The most coherent description of Manichaean cosmogony can be found in Theodore bar Koni's already cited Book of Scholia, but his account ends with the creation of Adam and Eve. Many other cosmological and cosmogonic tenets have been preserved in the surviving works of the Manichaeans and in the writings of opponents such as Augustine. The latter also includes very interesting passages from Mani's Treasure of Life in Latin translation (cf. *Contra Felicem* 2,5 and *De natura boni* 44; this Thesaurus appears to have circulated in Gaul and Spain as well).

However complex and arcane the various ramifications of the Manichaean myth became in the course of its distribution through many countries and centuries, its essential elements remained the same from the Atlantic to the Pacific. It is Mani's doctrine that there are two principles (or roots, kingdoms, realms, cities) and three 'moments': the time before the commingling and the struggle, when the two kingdoms of light and darkness were still separated; the time of the commingling, being the present world time; and future time in which the two kingdoms will again be (but now definitively) separated. In essence this message of salvation is typically gnostic: the *Nous* (the heavenly revelation) rescues the *Psyche* (the divine spark of light in man) from *Hyle* (evil matter).

The Manichaean Ethic and Cult

It would be difficult on the basis of its complicated myth to understand the success of Mani's religion. In fact, the elaborate myth was only of minor importance and sometimes even played down. What really interested both the hearers and the elect was the microcosmic significance of the macrocosmic drama. And indeed the long-term imprisonment of light by matter in the physical universe had important practical consequences for those who had been illuminated by the *Nous*. Their duty was to be instruments for the liberation of the divine light.

To carry out this liberation required both a conscious effort for virtue by the individual and the avoidance of any action which might harm the light or prolong its captivity. The Manichaean elect were expected to observe 'the five commandments' which were e.g. prescribed as 1. truthfulness, 2. non-injury, 3. chastity, 4. purity of the mouth, and 5. poverty. From Augustine and from Iranian and Turkish sources as well, it is known that the Manichaean ethic which was binding upon the elect was more generally summarized as the 'three seals' (*tria signacula*): the seal of the mouth; the seal of the hands; and the seal of the bosom. For the auditors, there were ten commandments which have not been preserved uniformly, but which encompassed in any case the prohibition of killing; lying; false accusations; an unchaste life; stealing; and black magic.

From this it can be inferred that the catechumens were allowed to marry and to carry out normal daily activities. Their main obligation, however, was what is termed in Middle Persian *ruwanagan*, 'soul-

service'. This service, by providing food, shelter and any other required sustenance for the elect, is the condition for the auditor's own redemption: he will be rescued and purified according to his works. Although in very exceptional cases the catechumen (like the elect) may be directly saved by his conduct, as a rule this will take place through a series of reincarnations in e.g. luminous fruits and, finally, in an elect. In the *Fragmenta Tebestina*, fragments of a Latin Manichaean text found in presentday Algeria, the vital place of the hearer in the Manichaean Church is illustrated by the New Testament story of Martha and Maria (Luke 10:38–42): like these two sisters, the two classes of elect and hearers both perform indispensable and complementary tasks in order to ensure the liberation of light.

The elect received the hearer's daily offerings of—in particular—fruit and bread at 'the table'. This sacred meal, in fact the only real sacrament in Manichaeism, was opened by the elect with 'an apology to the bread'. Of special importance was the yearly Bema festival to commemorate Mani's martyrdom. A judgement seat (Bema, tribunal, etc.) was raised in the middle of the worshipping congregation upon which stood an icon of Mani to celebrate his continuing presence in the community of the elect: and to symbolize his role as Jesus' representative until the last judgment. This feast of the Bema was preceded by a month of fasting. Other fast days were Sunday (for the hearers and the elect) and Monday (for the elect). Apart from these days, fasting was also practised at other times and periods, e.g. during the five nocturnal festivals (*pannychismoí*) each of which encompassed one day and night. Ritual prayer had its place within these fasts as well as in the daily services: together with hymns, scripture readings and, for instance, sermons and catechetical lessons.

The ritual greetings and blessings that Mani had initiated in his Church were seen as reenactments of divine archetypes: the 'peace' (the first greeting), the giving of the right hand, the kiss, the 'salutation' (*proskynesis*), and the laying on of hands (cf. e.g. *Kephalaia* 37–42).

The Place of Manichaeism in the History of Religions

The origins of Manichaeism are still open to question. For centuries the religion was thought to be a Christian heresy. Augustine called Mani a 'Persian', and until recently it has been common in the history of religions to treat Manichaeism primarily as part of the religious history of Iran. This view seemed to be corroborated by the finds at Turfan and Tun-huang of the first original Manichaean texts. However, with the discovery of original Manichaean texts in Coptic, the scholarly consensus concerning the general character of Manichaeism has changed. Manichaeism seemed to have firm roots in a Gnostic type of Christendom. This view has been magnificently substantiated by the *Cologne Mani-Codex*. According to this *Codex*, some of the Jewish-Christian Elchasaites among whom the young Mani lived regarded him as a prophet, and some even said that the Living Word spoke through him (cf. *CMC* 86). There is reason for the assumption that at that time Mani shared their Jewish-Christian convictions and believed that he was the new incarnation of the true prophet.

In recent research, several other tenets of Manichaeism have been freshly interpreted against this Jewish and Jewish-Christian background. Indeed, any unprejudiced reader of the *CMC* will be struck by its Jewish and (Jewish-) Christian elements. This does not, however, exclude that Iranian or other religious and philosophical components may well have influenced both the origin and (certainly) subsequent developments of Mani's religious system. Iranian and perhaps even Zoroastrian elements may be identified in its concept of history as the Three Times; in some particular traits of its mythology; in a term like 'the Great War'; in the *Daena*-concept; or in the designation of the highest God as

tetraprosopos (the One with four faces). As regards the last two concepts, however, reference can be made to Christian and Jewish parallels as well. That Mani's concept of the Nous ought to be derived from the Iranian Vohu manah (so Geo Widengren) seems unlikely in view of its many essential equivalents in Hellenistic thinking. From Buddhism, Mani may have received impulses to the radical division of his Church into elect and auditors and to his doctrine of metempsychosis. Besides these possible 'sources', great influence has doubtlessly been exerted by the radical gnostic Marcion. Major formative elements of Mani's system, particularly of his cosmology, may well have been inspired by Bardesanes. If the latter is to be treated not so much as a gnostic, but in particular as a typical representative of pluralistic Syriac Christianity (so H.J.W. Drijvers), then this again indicates certain backgrounds of Mani in Edessene Christendom. Apart from these and other possible 'sources', however, Mani has to be evaluated first and foremost as the founder of an independent and unique world religion.

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ARISTOTLE AND HIS COMMENTATORS: STUDIES IN MEMORY OF PARASKEVI KOTZIA edited by Pantelis Golitsis and Katerina Ierodiakonou [Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca Et Byzantina, De Gruyter, 9783110601831]

This volume includes twelve studies by international specialists on Aristotle and his commentators. Among the topics treated are Aristotle's political philosophy and metaphysics, the ancient and Byzantine commentators' scholia on Aristotle's logic, philosophy of language and psychology as well as studies of broader scope on developmentalism in ancient philosophy and the importance of studying Late Antiquity.

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The explanatory value of developmental hypotheses as exemplified by the interpretation of Aristotle

Introduction

That a philosopher who has been active as an author for several decades should continue to develop his viewpoint or sometimes even change his stance on key philosophical issues is hardly surprising. To the contrary, it would be remarkable if this were not the case. One is rather inclined to view it as evidence of an author's philosophical potential when he advocates more than one approach or applies it to more than one field in his lifetime. Of course, the extent of these changes may vary greatly. At times one speaks only of a continuous development, while at other times of a fundamental change of course, as in the transition from the "pre-critical" to the "critical" works of Immanuel Kant or in the turn that Ludwig Wittgenstein seems to have taken between writing his *Tractatus* and working on the *Philosophical Investigations*. Consequently, philosophy deals quite often with the phenomenon of development, and the question remains what value should be accorded to this phenomenon and what approach should be taken with regard to it.

Developmental hypotheses and the notion of development in philosophy

In general one might wonder to what extent the notion of development can legitimately be taken into consideration in philosophy. For, when assessing a philosophical argument, it is hardly relevant at what stage in the life of a philosopher the argument was developed. For example, as a philosopher one would like to know whether Kant's categorical imperative actually constitutes the basis of all morality, whereas the question of how old Kant was and in what circumstances he found himself when he began to view the categorical imperative as an important moral principle is of secondary importance. A distinction drawn by Gottlob Frege regarding the relevance of the origin and development of philosophical propositions is well worth citing here: if we follow Frege in consistently distinguishing between laws of being-true and laws of taking-to-be-true, then the latter, which concern how someone came to take something to be true, can hardly play a decisive role in the former, in assessing the truth or validity of a conception. For, it is just as possible in principle to arrive at a correct notion via random or irrational factors as it is to come to false or even absurd

conclusions by taking a systematic approach. However, if our primary concern is to determine whether or not other philosophers' conceptions are tenable, then philosophy can only take a secondary interest in the question how and under what circumstances a given philosopher came to hold a thesis as true. On this view, it would be easy to quickly dismiss questions regarding philosophical development. But the matter is not quite so simple - in part, for the following reasons:

- (1) Not all philosophical theses reveal themselves readily and - so to speak - "of their own accord." The main theses of the Hegelian philosophy, for example, can hardly be understood without at least basic knowledge of the philosophical debates that took place prior to Hegel, including those involving Kant and Fichte. And it is precisely here that the history of philosophy comes into play. In order to clarify the sense or significance of a philosophical thesis alone, the historian of philosophy often has to examine how an idea came about, which in turn frequently requires exploring larger coherences that are relevant to the emergence of an idea; this may include the political sphere, along with general, social or personal circumstances, but it applies in particular to school memberships, discussion contexts and critical references to the thinker's own philosophical premises. It is therefore only natural that this effort should include an inquiry into an author's development, insofar as this is important for the understanding of a philosophical thesis. For, it may be the case that earlier assumptions and earlier theories are just as much a part of the background of a thesis as the views of contemporaries, teachers or critics.
- (2) The object of philosophy is to penetrate through to those assumptions that we presuppose when we make a particular assertion or make use of a particular term. What do we assume, for example, when we speak of "things" or when we allege that there exist "things that remain identical"? In order to answer these types of questions, a philosopher often has to begin by clarifying his own assumptions, so as to be able to subject them to critical scrutiny. Consequently, progress in philosophy often takes the form of disengagement from premises that a given philosopher may himself have shared up to a certain point in time - regardless of whether he learned to accept these assumptions as part of a specific tradition or by virtue of belonging to a certain school, or whether he explicitly defended them himself. When a development from one philosophical position to another occurs by means of a well-founded critique of the premises underlying the former position, then the reasons for this development partially coincide with the reasons that can be cited in favor of the new position. For example, the arguments that Wittgenstein ultimately began to invoke against the "ideal language" premises of the *Tractatus* are an important part of the justification for his later "ordinary language" position. When development is understood in this sense, in other words, as the result of a critical examination of one's own theoretical assumptions, then the philosophical relevance of the notion of development should remain beyond dispute. However, it is also possible to imagine developments that are motivated in a different manner; we cannot rule out the possibility that, for example, an unsuccessful journey to Sicily, frustration over being held in low esteem by one's colleagues, or a novel sexual experience could influence the tenor of one's philosophical thought. But because such factors can hardly serve to justify a philosophical thesis, they should be distinguished from the previously mentioned type of reasons for development.¹ In keeping with the terminology introduced above, the latter are solely psychological factors relevant to taking-to-be-true and have nothing to do with the being-true or the justification of a philosophical thesis.

- (3) An old maxim, commonly referred to as the 'hermeneutic circle', states that individual parts can only be understood if the whole is grasped, while the whole can only be understood in reference to many individual parts. Assuming it were our task to comment on an unedited collection of notes by Wittgenstein, we would no doubt often be reminded of the first part of this maxim. For, if we didn't know whether an individual note belongs in the context of Wittgenstein's early, middle or late period, it would be difficult if not impossible to determine its meaning. Let us further assume we knew nothing of Wittgenstein's philosophical development, had none of his edited works at our disposal, and were constantly confronted with notes that seemed to contradict each other. How then could we draw conclusions about the whole from the individual parts? We would be prevented again and again from arriving at a consistent whole by individual statements that do not fit within the whole or require an entirely different whole. We would probably be forced to sort the notes into different stacks and postulate distinct theoretical backgrounds for different stacks. However, if the juxtaposition of different theoretical backgrounds were to prove confusing due to the appearance of inconsistency, we could ask ourselves whether this troublesome juxtaposition of incompatible theories might not be resolved into a more favorable succession (step 1). But in this case we would not yet be dealing with a developmental hypothesis, because we only speak of a "development" when something has developed out of something else. In order to demonstrate this, we would also have to supplement the claim of temporal succession by postulating a development motive (step 2) capable of showing not only that the theories in question are different, but that one of them could actually have developed out of the other (step 3).
- (4) Consequently, the notion of development is not philosophically significant as such, but it does appear that there are at least three respects in which possible developments should not be dismissed when examining past authors. The thought experiment outlined above has further shown that developmental hypotheses may be introduced as an explanation for the phenomenon of inconsistency; this entails not only assigning the mutually incompatible theory fragments to different theoretical frameworks, but also establishing relationships between these frameworks through the assumption of a development motive.

That's the theory. In point of fact, however, the history of the developmental paradigm - at least in the case of Aristotle interpretation - has taken a somewhat different course.

Werner Jaeger's developmental interpretation of Aristotle

In 1923 Werner Jaeger (1888 —1961) published a study entitled *Aristoteles. Grundlegung einer Geschichte seiner Entwicklung*,² in which he sought to supersede the hitherto predominant scholastic conception of the Aristotelian philosophy as "a static system of conceptions". According to Jaeger, the scholastic interpretation neglects the forces that drive Aristotle's approach to research; it does not take into account "his characteristic interplay of keen and abstract apodictic with a vivid and organic sense of form". In the jargon of his time, which was heavily influenced by the so-called philosophy of life, Jaeger contrasts the "purely conceptual" scholasticism with a "living understanding of Aristotle", which views Aristotle's philosophy as "the product of his special genius working on the problems set him by his age." He carried out this program by representing Aristotle's philosophy as a development-tinuous debate with his teacher. Jaeger tied the stages in question to familiar biographical events (Aristotle's stay at Plato's Academy, his years of travel, his second stay in Athens, i. e. his years as a master) and postulated that

Aristotle underwent a development from being a Platonist to being a metaphysician critical of Plato, only to end up an empiricist. Jaeger then applied philological methods in attempting to assign various works to these three phases and in seeking to identify various strata of development in several works. In the first, Platonic phase Aristotle is alleged to have composed the (mostly lost) exoteric writings, such as the *Protrepticus*, which were intended for a wider audience; in so doing, he is supposed to have largely appropriated the philosophical standpoint of Plato's Academy. The middle phase, which corresponds to his years of travel, is characterized by a disengagement from Plato. This is expressed, among other things, in his criticism of Plato's theory of forms. By distinguishing what he called "several strata of composition", Jaeger ascertains the emergence of an original *Metaphysics* (*Metaph. A, a, E 1, K, A, M 9 — N*), an original *Politics* (*Pol. II, III, VII, VIII*) and an original *Ethics* (*EE*) together with the foundation for a speculative physics and cosmology (*Phys. I-II, Cael.*). In his last phase, his "master period", he not only expanded the *Metaphysics* by writing the presumably empirically oriented Books *Z, H, O* and *A 8*, but also composed works such as *Parva Naturalia* and *De Anima*.

Jaeger's development-oriented approach played a major role in the interpretation of Aristotle in the twentieth century.⁷ Several authors have attempted to apply these ideas concerning Aristotle's biographical development to subsections of his works.

Jaeger's student Friedrich Solmsen (1904-1989) reconstructed the development of Aristotelian logic based on the *Analytics*, the *Topics* and the *Rhetoric*.⁸ Franciscus Nuyens (1908 —1982) distinguished three phases of Aristotelian psychology, in the course of which Aristotle is supposed to have distanced himself step by step from the theses of his teacher.⁹ Other authors, for example Hans von Arnim (1859 —1931), adopted Jaeger's approach on the one hand, while on the other hand becoming embroiled in controversies with him over the ordering of individual writings and purported levels. Then there were authors who explicitly sought to refute Jaeger's history of development, for example Franz Dirlmeier (1904-1977), who attempted to show on the basis of the ethical writings that in a certain sense Aristotle remained a Platonist at all times.¹⁰ Finally, there were interpreters who rejected or consciously dismissed Jaeger's biographical scenario, while nonetheless speaking of a development in which Plato remained the most important reference point.

The extraordinary success of Jaeger's developmental Aristotle interpretation can no doubt be attributed to more than one cause. For example, Jaeger himself points out that the idea of development had already been applied successfully to the interpretation of Plato. Furthermore, Jaeger understood how to give development a philosophical dimension, and his insistence on taking Aristotle's personality into consideration — thus imbuing the interpretation with life — was very much in the style of his era. It may also be that many researchers in this period viewed the paradigm of systematic interpretation, which Jaeger termed "scholastic", as obsolete. At the same time, it should also be emphasized that Jaeger's approach didn't simply fall from the sky but was already being prepared in a certain sense by the historicist style of philology in 19th-century Germany; it can be shown that different compositional and editorial measures were already being implemented in relation to certain aspects of Aristotle's works.¹¹ Therefore, a better understanding of Jaeger's success can perhaps be achieved by viewing his works as the provisional climax of an already existing tendency.

Criticism of Jaeger's developmental approach

In Plato scholarship, the treatment of questions of chronology and development has led to a relatively uncontroversial, rough classification of the works into early, middle and late dialogues. With Aristotle, however, the kind of developmental research pursued by Jaeger has not managed to produce a verified chronology of works; hardly any of Jaeger's attempts to assign particular parts of works to certain developmental stages have avoided (justified) opposition. The end result of this has been to considerably weaken faith in the effectiveness of the developmental approach. This outcome, which is rather disappointing when compared to the state of Plato scholarship, is no doubt partially a product of the editorial status of the Aristotelian corpus. After all, Aristotle left several manuscripts in an editorially unfinished condition; in a few cases, it is clear that the texts were not compiled into works until after his death," while other cases involve an editorial process consisting of several steps and subsequent additions. This often makes it difficult to determine whether, for example, one is dealing with an earlier text with later additions, or an altogether later text." Furthermore, given the difficulty of the initial situation, the assumption of several strata of composition led to a strange increase in the number of strata. Whereas, for example, the pioneers of this procedure were able to manage with only two strata, later interpreters discovered four or more strata, which obviously could no longer be brought in line with the three phases assumed by Jaeger.

In general, the three-phase model seems to be the decisive weak point in Jaeger's theory. On the one hand, it has the advantage of being the only way to link Aristotle's presumed philosophical development (Platonist - metaphysician critical of Plato empiricist) to his external living conditions (Academy period - years of travel - second stay in Athens), while on the other hand it contains several problematic assumptions. In principle, the practice of deriving philosophical development from biographical factors is questionable." Even without dramatic events occurring in his external life, a philosopher can arrive at the conclusion that the assumptions he made in the past are in need of correction or differentiation. For, even assuming that a philosophical development took place, this need not be interpreted as a psychological reaction to specific living conditions; sometimes such a development can simply and plainly be attributed to the fact that certain theoretical accomplishments take time. Thus, in the case of Aristotle one can hardly expect that the main features of syllogistic logic simply occurred to him overnight.

Even if one were to concede that biographical factors played such a prominent role, why should the relationship with Plato be the only factor worth mentioning? Might not other material circumstances - his flight from Athens, his relationship with Alexander, his natural-scientific observations on Lesbos, etc. - be just as important? One begins to suspect that the preferential treatment of the biographically conditioned teacher-pupil relationship is already accompanied by a preliminary decision in favor of a specific model of philosophical development, namely that of a progressive distancing from the viewpoint of the teacher.

And even if one wanted to view the teacher-pupil relationship as the decisive developmental motif, why should one then assume that it has necessarily taken the form of a progressive distancing? Isn't there also the phenomenon of the rebellious pupil, who throughout his youth revolts against everything that comes from his teacher,' and only later recognizes that the differences were not nearly as large as he had supposed? Finally, even if one were to admit that Aristotle was a Platonist in his youth," why should his further development necessarily proceed along the romantic course of "years of travel/master

years?" Why shouldn't it follow any number of other models, for example, that of the young genius and his subsequent decline?

All of these objections have to be considered as well, if one fundamentally shares Jaeger's conviction that Aristotle's development is important to an understanding of his works. However, many critics do not share even this premise; either they deny that anything like a significant development occurred, or they object that questions of development have no bearing on questions of interpretation, or that an excessive interest in development pushes the really interesting philosophical questions into the background. This is why every kind of developmental hypothesis has met with increasingly strong objections, especially among schools that are primarily interested in an objective analysis of Aristotle.¹ The fact that for Aristotle in general, as well as for individual works, the developmental approach had yielded few uncontroversial results was pointed to with increasing frequency as evidence of the impracticality of the method as a whole. The result was that the heyday of the developmental interpretation was followed by diverse projects that emphatically defended the unity of individual works, general areas of his thought, or even the Aristotelian oeuvre as a whole.

Developmental approaches in the post-Jaeger era Was the application of the developmental method in Aristotle scholarship therefore only a temporary, fashionable phenomenon? In point of fact it would be questionable — in light of the critique outlined above — for someone today to attempt to reintroduce a history of development in the style of Jaeger. However, it would be rash to bid farewell to the use of developmental hypotheses along with Jaeger's project. We have seen that there are sometimes good philosophical reasons for considering an author's development and formulating developmental hypotheses. The question is therefore not whether developmental hypotheses should be ruled out in general; the question is rather what we can learn from criticism of Jaeger's developmental method and what form a more suitable treatment of such hypotheses would have to take.

Developmental hypotheses without biographism

In Jaeger's theory proved to be his three-phase model. His commitment to this model was clearly connected with the desire that the philosophically relevant stages of development should find parallels in biographical events; and since the first stage was characterized by spatial proximity to Plato, while subsequent stages involved an increasing temporal distance, the thesis of a progressive philosophical distancing is therefore assumed.

Fixating on the biography in this way leads us to forget what is really at issue when we attempt to investigate a philosopher's development: we are searching for the arguments that led a philosopher to change his position on an issue and that could be used as a justification for the modified position. While biographical findings can suggest such arguments or make the assumption of a development generally plausible," they cannot replace what we are actually searching for: the philosophical grounds for development. In addition, one has to decide whether such biographical factors are known and generally recognized as relevant to a subject's philosophical development,' or whether they first have to be postulated in attempting to explain a philosophical problem. Only in the first case do they have any sort of explanatory value. In the second case we are dealing rather with tales that could potentially help us imagine that the development in question took place; hence, they should be classified primarily as a rhetorical device. Moreover, since very few substantial details are verified in Aristotle's case apart from the familiar three phases, and since the three-phase model is far too crude to help explain nuances," the

biographical interpreter more often finds himself in the situation corresponding to the second case: he must interpret biographical events as relevant that are known to us only accidentally or deduce unknown events; because this process primarily taxes the imagination of the interpreter, it has a marked tendency to spiral out of control" and cannot under any circumstances serve as a serious basis for a developmental hypothesis.

Developmental hypotheses that wish to avoid losing themselves in the abyss of biographism, by contrast, understand themselves as proposed solutions for specific problems of consistency,' and these types of problems initially require a much more regulated treatment than references to biographical turning points can provide. In Aristotle's case, they typically arise in connection with the following phenomena:

- (1) Aristotle wrote on various subjects more than once, and his findings differed to some extent. For example, there are two works on ethics, the Nicomachean and the Eudemian Ethics,' and two treatises on pleasure that make no reference to one another."
- (2) In some cases, the same terms are used quite differently or defined differently in various works,' and at times they even seem to necessitate a completely different background theory."
- (3) Terms that appear frequently in some works are entirely absent in others, as if they had only been discovered later.
- (4) Some of Aristotle's works contain additions that thematically fit the context in one way or another, yet their background theory seems to differ from that of the main text.

These phenomena require some kind of explanation, if the philosophical theses in question are to be adequately understood. When other approaches fail, developmental hypotheses come into consideration as possible explanations. However, these hypotheses can remain entirely neutral with respect to biographical conjectures; it seems unlikely that biographical factors could help explain the terminological variations mentioned above.

Internal and external developmental factors

Thus far we have distinguished between biographical and philosophical development factors; the latter can now be further subdivided into external and internal factors. One can speak of purely internal development factors when a problem that has existed for a philosopher up to a certain point in time can be overcome at a later time by a newly developed method or approach. By contrast, external factors come into play when a development is initiated from without by encounters with colleagues and rivals, by becoming acquainted with a new theory, or due to other intellectual influences. If we are interested in making transparent use of developmental hypotheses, then in light of this differentiation the following points seem to be of importance:

- (1) The four problems posed in Section 4.1 above can often be explained only in terms of internal development factors. An explanation based on internal factors has the undeniable advantage of not being dependent on any non-philosophical assumptions.
- (2) External factors, such as the influence of a specific doctrine or thesis, are typically connected with biographical events, but should not be confused with the biographical event itself or with its psychological effect. We can assume such an external factor without possessing knowledge of the corresponding biographical details; a connection exists only insofar as the biographical facts can prove that a specific influence is possible or probable.

- (3) External factors seem to have a particularly close connection to personal circumstances, as has already been shown in the previous point. However, individual facts from the life of a philosopher do not yet justify assuming a particular external development factor if the facts are not demonstrably reflected in the works in question. For example, the fact that Aristotle's father was a physician has been used and exploited in various ways; but proving that Aristotle was influenced by the medicine of his day is a much more difficult project that cannot be managed through biographical evidence alone.

Sectoral rather than global developmental hypotheses

In advancing a global thesis on Aristotle's philosophical development, Werner Jaeger wanted to supply a schema that could be applied to different groups of work and disciplines. This is why his development schema had to operate with very general concepts, such as "metaphysician" and "empiricist." These categories are most likely justified for the disciplines of metaphysics, physics, political philosophy and ethics; however, if one takes into account that the aspect of development also comes into play for other subdisciplines represented in Aristotle's works, then it is clear from the outset that these categories at any rate are no longer helpful. Assuming that a development took place in the field of logic, it would hardly be helpful, for example, to pit a metaphysical phase against an empirical one. By the same token, the schema of nearness-to-Plato vs. distance-from-Plato can hardly contribute to research areas for which there is not any Platonic precedent. It therefore appears that in principle there are difficulties for which the comprehensive character of Jaeger's development schema was to blame. To put it another way: if one wishes to follow Jaeger in relying on a global developmental hypothesis, then one has to take into account at the very least that the explanatory value of this hypothesis is not equally high for all subareas.

The fact that global assessments of this kind meet with resistance today is also primarily a result of the general development that Aristotle scholarship has undergone; in many areas, the degree of specialization has increased sharply, and focused analysis of individual arguments is generally treated more seriously than speculations about the works as a whole. Nonetheless, if one wishes to apply the developmental hypotheses primarily in connection with the types of inconsistencies outlined above, it is only reasonable to point out that different sub-areas such as logic, ethics, and natural philosophy face different problems, and that in order to solve these

problems, different types of development processes have to be taken into consideration. Consequently, if any progress is to be expected regarding questions of development in Aristotle's philosophy, then it is surely to be made only for those developmental hypotheses that are based on thematic sectors of Aristotle's work. And in point of fact, the discussion that followed the publication of Jaeger's book on Aristotle quickly applied itself to just such a sectoral developmental account. Even the most important early attempt to formulate a comprehensive history of development takes the form of multiple sectoral approaches.

From the outset, the sectoral approach is clearly demarcated from the approach based on global development history. Areas such as ethics/politics, metaphysics, logic/dialectic, philosophy of science, physics, astronomy, biology, and psychology, at the very least, receive differentiated treatment. This does not rule out the possibility of parallel developments being attested on the conceptual level in different sectors. For example, the term *energeia* appears in very different sectors, and may be among

the terms that are assigned entirely different definitions in the course of Aristotle's creative activity; however, corresponding observations concerning the use of concepts of a transsectoral character should still clearly be distinguished from claims in favor of a global developmental hypothesis.

Because in Aristotle's case fundamental philosophical disciplines such as metaphysics or ethics are composed of completely different subprojects in which relatively independent developments can occur, it may be sensible to apply the sectoral developmental approach not only to fundamental disciplines, but also to these subprojects; thus, when discussing metaphysics one has good reason to ask, for example, whether Aristotle's concept of an unmoved mover changed, or, when discussing ethics, whether the conception of pleasure underwent development. Even if one disregards the general distrust associated with broad theories, this fine-grained developmental approach still seems to have the advantage of dealing with consistency problems "on the spot", as it were, without drawing speculative conclusions regarding larger units of meaning. However, this tendency towards finer-grained developmental hypotheses has its limits too. In the first place, developmental postulates for particular problems also have to be assessed in terms of their respective theoretical framework; conformity with the theoretical development of the thematic framework is possibly the most important verification criterion for a specific development hypothesis. However, if the developmental hypotheses are so highly specialized that factual correlation to the respective thematic area is no longer possible, then this ultimately boils down to immunization of the hypothesis. Secondly, the use of developmental hypotheses for smaller units of meaning carries the risk that the number of supposed "developments" might increase drastically; and the higher the number of developmental hypotheses, the lower their individual explanatory value.

Chronological uncertainty

A chronology of works can be based on purely philological indications or on the content of philosophical discussions. But the methodologically sounder chronology is no doubt one capable of remaining neutral in philosophical controversies over interpretation. This kind of philological dating makes use of dateable sources (if available) from other authors that refer to the work to be dated, references to historical events or personalities in the work in question, cross-references to other works, and analysis of stylistic changes (stylometry). Because Aristotle's writings were not fully edited in some cases and were clearly reworked again and again, these philological methods are not truly effective. References to historicized to the political writings, and even there they are not reliable. The Rhetoric contains numerous examples from the period of Aristotle's second stay in Athens, yet researchers agree that the book could not have been written in this period. Nor are cross-references to other works a reliable guideline; oftentimes they are even misleading. Cross-references like this may have been added later by editors or by Aristotle himself; and a reference to, for example, the Politics need not necessarily mean the work that has come down to us, and certainly not the entire work known to us. Finally, stylometry too has not yielded any uncontroversial results.

Let us assume that we know of two treatments of the same subject, one an early work and the other a later work. This already places considerable limits on the options for interpretation. For, if the treatises exhibit differences that are to be explained by a development, then it is no doubt already clear which one must be the point of departure and which the endpoint of the development; the interpreter would then still have to name developmental factors that could explain the transition from the former position to the latter. However, if the background knowledge assumed above concerning the relative chronology of the two treatises were lacking, we would find ourselves in a completely different initial situation. We

would not know, for example, whether the time that elapsed between the writing of the first and second treatise played a role in the differences we observed, much less whether the first treatise was actually written before the second. In this situation, we could only arrive at a conclusion regarding which came first by examining the texts in question; in other words, the postulated development would have to be such that one of the cor

Alternatives to developmental hypotheses

Developmental hypotheses can help deal with inconsistencies that arise; but not every inconsistency has to be explained in terms of a development. When Aristotle comes to different conclusions on the same question or uses the same term in different ways in two different treatises, his reasons for doing so may often have nothing to do with a development. Upon closer examination it may turn out that he stated the problem in a slightly different matter in different places, that he chose a different methodological approach to answering the question, that the different answers are aimed at different target groups or are adapted for different opponents; individual concepts may sometimes be used in a terminological sense other times in an unterminological sense and still other times in a terminological sense with an alternative definition. Finally, Aristotle refers time and again to a didactic order in which the knowledge contained in his works should be presented; obvious inconsistencies can therefore be attributed at times to this didactic arrangement. For example, one treatise may present the solution to a problem, while the other may only formulate the problem or work out premises for solving it. A critical review of various prominent developmental hypotheses in the light of these alternative types of explanations is able to show that (a) it is possible to avoid resorting to a developmental hypothesis in many cases, and (b) even when two treatises were written at different periods, the aspect of development has no additional explanatory value. This can be illustrated by three concluding examples:

- (1) A familiar, if controversial, example of how supposedly incompatible positions can be "reconciled" through evidence relating to different issues is provided related viewpoints could be shown to have necessarily preceded the other. In the absence of a clear chronology of works, the developmental hypothesis would therefore have to help bear the burden of proof for the relative chronology.

The problem described above is characteristic of the situation that Aristotle scholars face when debating about development. Because hopes of arriving at a chronology of works by purely philological means have largely been disappointed, the dating process has to be supported by textual comparisons; this results in developmental hypotheses that are twice as hazardous and can easily become circular. The risk of circularity is especially high when a purported development assumes a specific chronology and this chronology was originally established by means of the selfsame development thesis. Consequently, the initial situation that one faces when employing developmental hypotheses is admittedly difficult; much has already been achieved, however, if this problem is recognized and questionable ad-hoc datings are abandoned.

He explains that one of the treatises describes the objects of pleasure, while the other delineates the pleasure-sensation process.

- (2) In Politics III, Aristotle distinguishes three good and three bad types of constitutions and adds that no other constitutions are possible. In Book IV of the Politics, however, he

speaks of other constitutions that were not mentioned in Book III. One common explanation of this difference is to claim that Book IV was written later. The decisive factor, however, is that Book IV pursues a different project: it seeks to define the elements of the polis based on different duties so that various subspecies of constitutions can be delineated in terms of the characteristics of different functionally defined groups. In Book III, by contrast, the only relevant point is whether the government is in the hands of one person, a few people, or the masses. Book IV may well have been written later, but the actual explanation does not hinge upon this fact.

- (3) Aristotle's concept of substance (ousia) is a classic dispute. In the *Categories* Aristotle says that the "first ousia" is the individual things, while the "second ousia" is the eidos, the type or species. In book Z of the *Metaphysics*, by contrast, he says that the eidos is the "first ousia", and no mention is made of a "second ousia". The contradiction seems obvious; this has even led some interpreters to conclude that the *Categories* is a spurious work. A much more common view, however, is that the *Categories* is an early work, while *Metaphysics Z* represents a later Aristotelian treatise. That the latter treatise, which seems far more difficult and complex, represents Aristotle's "mature position" is one of the most commonly cited stereotypes concerning Aristotle's philosophical development. But even here the claim that they were written at different periods does not explain the differences. The following observations are more helpful: firstly, the eidos that is referred to in *Metaphysics Z* as "first ousia" signifies not the type or species but the form; secondly, in recent years various interpreters have emphasized that concrete, individual things are indeed defined as "ousia" in the *Metaphysics* as well, and that Book Z in no way attempts to call this into question, but rather asks what the ousia of ordinary substances (taken in the sense of the *Categories*' first ousia) is.' It is therefore entirely unnecessary to assume a development; and even if one does assume a development, the contradiction is nonetheless resolved not by the development, but by differences in the question being posed. <>

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Bibliography

[**Losing the Long Game: The False Promise of Regime Change in the Middle East**](#) by Philip H. Gordon [St. Martin's Press, 9781250217035]

The definitive account of how regime change in the Middle East has proven so tempting to American policymakers for decades—and why it always seems to go wrong.

"Must reading—by someone who saw it first-hand—for all interested in America's foreign policy and its place in the world."—**Robin Wright**

Since the end of World War II, the United States has set out to oust governments in the Middle East on an average of once per decade—in places as diverse as Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan (twice), Egypt, Libya, and

Syria. The reasons for these interventions have also been extremely diverse, and the methods by which the United States pursued regime change have likewise been highly varied, ranging from diplomatic pressure alone to outright military invasion and occupation. What is common to all the operations, however, is that they failed to achieve their ultimate goals, produced a range of unintended and even catastrophic consequences, carried heavy financial and human costs, and in many cases left the countries in question worse off than they were before. <>

[A Sound Mind: How I Fell in Love With Classical Music \(and Decided to Rewrite its Entire History\)](#)

by Paul Morley [Bloomsbury Publishing, 9781635570267]

For readers of *Mozart in the Jungle* and *Year of Wonder*, a new history of and guide to classical music.

Paul Morley made his name as a journalist covering the rock and pop of the 1970s and 1980s. But as his career progressed, he found himself drawn toward developing technologies, streaming platforms, and, increasingly, the music from the past that streaming services now made available. Suddenly able to access every piece Mozart or Bach had ever written and to curate playlists that worked with these musicians' themes across different performers, composers, and eras, he began to understand classical music in a whole new way and to believe that it was music at its most dramatic and revealing.

In **[A Sound Mind: How I Fell in Love With Classical Music \(and Decided to Rewrite its Entire History\)](#)**, Morley takes readers along on his journey into the history and future of classical music. His descriptions, explanations, and guidance make this seemingly arcane genre more friendly to listeners and show the music's power, depth, and timeless beauty. In Morley's capable hands, the history of the classical genre is shown to be the history of all music, with these long-ago pieces influencing everyone from jazz greats to punk rockers and the pop musicians of today. <>

[Rules of Origin for Services: From the Early Days of GATS to the Era of Servicification](#) by Duy Dinh [Edward Elgar, 9781789908084] the eBook version is available from [Google Play](#), [ebooks.com](#) and other eBook vendors, while in print the book can be ordered from the [Edward Elgar Publishing website](#).

In an era where services play an increasingly vital role in servicified global value chains, this insightful book provides a comprehensive study of legal aspects of rules of origin for services and their importance in international trade.

The author identifies and examines the defects in the current approach to rules of origin for services through an astute analysis of these rules in the General Agreement on Trade in Services and in preferential trade agreements. In addition, by asserting that trade in goods and trade in services cannot be separated, the author provides a comparative analysis of rules of origin in these two fields, offering a better understanding of their boundaries and connections. Paving the way for further development, the author concludes that certain aspects of rules of origin for goods, such as the product-based approach, may be repurposed for services. <>

[Justice and Vulnerability in Europe An Interdisciplinary Approach](#) edited by Trudie Knijn, and Dorota Lepianka, [Edward Elgar Publishing, 9781839108471] The eBook version is available from [Google Play](#), [ebooks.com](#) and other eBook vendors, while in print the book can be ordered from the [Edward Elgar Publishing website](#).

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[Justice and Vulnerability in Europe An Interdisciplinary Approach](#) contributes to the understanding of justice in Europe from both a theoretical and empirical perspective. It shows that Europe is falling short of its ideals and justice-related ambitions by repeatedly failing its most vulnerable populations.

Interdisciplinary and expert contributors search for the explanations behind these failing ambitions through analysis of institutional discourse, legal debate and practice and the daily experiences of vulnerable populations, such as those dependent on social care and welfare. By setting tentative criteria for justice as ‘participatory parity’, in line with the insights of the political philosopher Nancy Fraser, the book challenges European policy makers to re-define redistributive, recognitive and representative justice. <>

[The Tyranny of Virtue, Identity, The Academy, and the Hunt for Political Heresies](#) by Robert Boyers [Scribner, 9781982127183]

From public intellectual and professor Robert Boyers, “a powerfully persuasive, insightful, and provocative prose that mixes erudition and first-hand reportage” (Joyce Carol Oates) addressing recent developments in American culture and arguing for the tolerance of difference that is at the heart of the liberal tradition.

Written from the perspective of a liberal intellectual who has spent a lifetime as a writer, editor, and college professor, **[The Tyranny of Virtue, Identity, The Academy, and the Hunt for Political Heresies](#)** is a “courageous, unsparing, and nuanced to a rare degree” (Mary Gaitskill) insider’s look at shifts in American culture—most especially in the American academy—that so many people find alarming. <>

[Our Shadowed World: Reflections on Civilization, Conflict, and Belief](#) by Dominic Kirkham [Westar Studies, Cascade Books, 9781532661747]

Civilization is often equated with the story of human advancement and progress. Yet it is also the story of human oppression, exploitation, war, and empire. In our own time, modern global civilization has brought us to the brink of planetary destruction. By offering an understanding of our past, this book aims to provide a stimulus to considering a different future. **[Our Shadowed World: Reflections on Civilization, Conflict, and Belief](#)** considers how we have been brought to this point. It describes how the fragmented and conflicted state of humanity has “progressed” from the earliest city-states to the devastation of world war and holocaust--how civilization has brought its own form of savagery. <>

[Queer Prophets: The Bible’s Surprise Ending to the Story of Sexuality and Gender](#) by Greg Paul [Wipf and Stock, 9781725266568]

This is the story of a spiritual journey, a theological quest to find better biblical answers (ones that work in real life) to the challenging questions that plague many of us surrounding gender and sexual identity. If God is love, why does he seemingly reject LGBTQ2+ people? How can Christians truly embrace them without abandoning their biblical convictions? How are queer Christians supposed to live? No story ends where it began. If we follow the story instead of treating the Bible as a document recording a set of precepts, we find that the angst, division, and abuse set in motion by the fall in the garden are reconciled and resolved in the city of the new Jerusalem. And just possibly, we may also find that “queer” people have a prophetic function for our age. <>

[Human Freedom, Divine Knowledge, and Mere Molinism; A Biblical, Historical, Theological, and Philosophical Analysis](#) by Timothy A. Stratton *foreword by Kirk R. MacGregor* [Wipf and Stock, 9781725276116]

Does humanity possess the freedom to think and act, or are we always caused and determined to think and act—exactly how we think and act—by things outside of our control? If we are always causally determined to think and act by things outside of our control, then how can humans be genuinely responsible for any of our thoughts or following actions? However, if humanity is genuinely free and responsible for at least *some* of our thoughts and actions, then how can the Christian rationally affirm the doctrine that God is totally sovereign and predestines *all* things?

In **[Human Freedom, Divine Knowledge, and Mere Molinism](#)**, Timothy A. Stratton surveys the history of theological thought from Augustine to Edwards and reaches surprising historical conclusions supporting what he refers to as “limited libertarian freedom.” Stratton goes further to offer multiple arguments appealing to Scripture,

theology, and philosophy that each conclude humanity does, in fact, possess libertarian freedom. He then appeals to the work of Luis de Molina and offers unique arguments concluding that God possesses middle knowledge. If this is the case, then God can be completely sovereign and predestine all things without violating human freedom and responsibility. <>

[Existential Theology: An Introduction](#) edited by Hue Woodson [Wipf & Stock Publishers, 9781532668418]

[Existential Theology: An Introduction](#) offers a formalized and comprehensive examination of the field of existential theology, in order to distinguish it as a unique field of study and view it as a measured synthesis of the concerns of Christian existentialism, Christian humanism, and Christian philosophy with the preoccupations of proper existentialism and a series of unfolding themes from Augustine to Kierkegaard. To do this, Existential Theology attends to the field through the exploration of genres: the European traditions in French, Russian, and German schools of thought, counter-traditions in liberation, feminist, and womanist approaches, and postmodern traditions located in anthropological, political, and ethical approaches. While the cultural contexts inform how each of the selected philosopher-theologians present genres of "existential theology," other unique genres are examined in theoretical and philosophical contexts, particularly through a selected set of theologians, philosophers, thinkers, and theorists that are not generally categorized theologically. By assessing existential theology through how it manifests itself in "genres," this book brings together lesser-known figures, well-known thinkers, and figures that are not generally viewed as "existential theologians" to form a focused understanding of the question of the meaning of "existential theology" and what "existential theology" looks like in its varying forms. <>

[Apprehending Love: Theological and Philosophical Inquiries](#) edited by Pekka Kärkkäinen and Olli-Pekka Vainio [Schriften der Luther-Agricola-Gesellschaft, Wipf & Stock Publishers, 9781725282797]

This volume collects together articles which engage a variety of themes related to human and divine love. The title of this book "apprehending love" employs the notion of *apprehensio* and especially its medieval background. For example, Martin Luther built his understanding of justification around this concept, which, on the one hand, refers to intellectual comprehension but, on the other hand, means becoming one with the object itself. In faith, Christ becomes not only the outward object of our faith, but its proper subject. In a similar way, when we love someone or something, we are transformed according to the object of our love. <>

[Jeanne Guyon's Mystical Perfection through Eucharistic Suffering: Her Biblical Commentary on Saint John's Gospel](#) by Jeanne de la Mothe Guyon, edited and Translated by Nancy Carol James, Foreword by William Bradley Roberts [Pickwick Publications, 9781532684234]

Madame Jeanne Guyon (1648-1717), a woman of great wisdom and worship, was filled with the richness of God's grace as she endured hardships and abuse in her married life. Blessed with children and great earthly wealth, she suffered physically, mentally, emotionally, and spiritually at the hands of her spiritual leaders, imprisoned unjustly for her simple yet solid faith in Christ, her Divine Confidant. Trusting in her Lord, she expressed her insights in commentaries concerning the Scriptures, seeing in them the mysteries of the holy Eucharist, the sacrificial presence of her merciful Savior. Through her intercession, we are inspired to adore the Lord, uniting our suffering to his as she did. <>

[The Black Books 1913-1932: Notebooks of Transformation](#) Seven-Volume Set Slip-Cased Boxed, 1648 pages by C G Jung, edited and introduced by Sonu Shamdasani, translated by Martin Liebscher, John Peck and Sonu Shamdasani [Philemon Series: W. W. Norton & Company, 9780393088649]

Until now, the single most important unpublished work by C.G. Jung—The Black Books.

In 1913, C.G. Jung started a unique self- experiment that he called his "confrontation with the unconscious": an engagement with his fantasies in a waking state, which he charted in a series of notebooks referred to as **[The Black Books](#)**. These intimate writings shed light on the further elaboration of Jung's personal cosmology and his

attempts to embody insights from his self- investigation into his life and personal relationships. **The Red Book** drew on material recorded from 1913 to 1916, but Jung actively kept the notebooks for many more decades.

Presented in a magnificent, seven-volume boxed collection featuring a revelatory essay by noted Jung scholar Sonu Shamdasani—illuminated by a selection of Jung’s vibrant visual works—and both translated and facsimile versions of each notebook, **The Black Books** offer a unique portal into Jung’s mind and the origins of analytical psychology.

Facsimile reproductions throughout. <>

The Holy Spirit and the Reformation Legacy edited by Mark J. Cartledge and Mark A. Jumper [Pickwick Publications, 9781532695438]

This collection of essays explores the legacy of the Reformation with regard to the person and work of the Holy Spirit. Following the five-hundredth anniversary of Luther’s posting of his ninety-five theses, these essays consider this legacy with particular reference to the work of Martin Luther and John Calvin, as well as broader Reformation themes as they are related to pneumatology and the life of the church today. The contribution of this collection is to tease out and reflect on pneumatology historically but also to relate these findings to contemporary discussions, especially among scholars of pentecostal and charismatic Christianity. Together these essays invite readers to appreciate the contribution that the Protestant Reformation makes to life in the Holy Spirit today, as well as offering critical and constructive reflection on this theme. It is a timely and significant contribution to the discussions of the person and work of the Holy Spirit and the church. <>

Post-Hellenistic Philosophy: A Study of its Development from the Stoics to Origen by G. R. Boys-Stones [Oxford University Press, 978-0198152644]

This book traces, for the first time, a revolution in philosophy which took place during the early centuries of our era. It reconstructs the philosophical basis of the Stoics' theory that fragments of an ancient and divine wisdom could be reconstructed from mythological traditions, and shows that Platonism was founded on an argument that Plato had himself achieved a full reconstruction of this wisdom, and that subsequent philosophies had only regressed once again in their attempts to "improve" on his achievement. <>

God's Judgment through the Davidic Messiah: The Role of the Davidic Messiah in Romans 1:18--4:25 by Myongil Kim [Wipf and Stock, 9781725280892]

This dissertation examines the role of the Davidic Messiah, who is the agent of God’s judgment in Romans 1:18—4:25. It may be summarized in two theses: First of all, the Davidic Messiah was expected in the Old Testament and the Second Temple Jewish writings, which establish the foundation for Paul’s Davidic Messiah Christology in Romans. Second, the language in the role of the agent of God’s judgment cannot be identified with the term faithfulness. <>

Mani and Augustine: Collected Essays on Mani, Manichaeism and Augustine by Johannes van Oort [Nag Hammadi and Manichaean Studies, Brill, 9789004416956]

Mani and Augustine: Collected Essays on Mani, Manichaeism and Augustine gathers in one volume contributions on Manichaean scholarship made by the internationally renowned scholar Johannes van Oort. The first part of the book focuses on the Babylonian prophet Mani (216-277) who styled himself an ‘apostle of Jesus Christ’, on Jewish elements in Manichaeism and on ‘human semen eucharist’, eschatology and imagery of Christ as ‘God’s Right Hand’. The second part of the book concentrates on the question to what extent the former ‘auditor’ Augustine became acquainted with Mani’s gnostic world religion and his canonical writings, and explores to what extent Manichaeism had a lasting impact on the most influential church father of the West. <>

Aristotle and His Commentators: Studies in Memory of Paraskevi Kotzia edited by Pantelis Golitsis and Katerina Ierodiakonou [Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca Et Byzantina, De Gruyter, 9783110601831]

This volume includes twelve studies by international specialists on Aristotle and his commentators. Among the topics treated are Aristotle's political philosophy and metaphysics, the ancient and Byzantine commentators' scholia on Aristotle's logic, philosophy of language and psychology as well as studies of broader scope on developmentalism in ancient philosophy and the importance of studying Late Antiquity. <>

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