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Wordtrade Reviews: Island of White Freedom

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Some qualified reviewers offer their own brief evaluation of the book. Otherwise most of our content represents the authors'-editors' own words as a preview to their approach to the subject, their style and point-of-view. <>

THE ISLAND OF HAPPINESS: TALES OF MADAME D'AULNOY, drawings by Natalie Frank, edited, translated, and introduced by Jack Zipes [Princeton University Press, 9780691180243]

Marie-Catherine Le Jumel de Barneville (1650–1705), also known as Madame d'Aulnoy, was a pioneer of the French literary fairy tale. Though d'Aulnoy's work now rarely appears outside of anthologies, her books were notably popular during her lifetime, and she was in fact the author who coined the term "fairy tales" (*contes des fées*). Presenting eight of d'Aulnoy's magical stories, **THE ISLAND OF HAPPINESS** juxtaposes poetic English translations with a wealth of original, contemporary drawings by Natalie Frank, one of today's most outstanding visual artists. In this beautiful volume, classic narratives are interpreted and made anew through Frank's feminist and surreal images.

This feast of words and visuals presents worlds where women exercise their independence and push against rigid social rules. Fidelity and sincerity are valued over jealousy and greed, though not everything ends seamlessly. Selected tales include "Belle-Belle," where an incompetent king has his kingdom restored to him through an androgynous heroine's constancy. In "The Green Serpent," a heroine falls in love with the eponymous snake, is punished by a wicked fairy, and endures trials to prove her worthiness. And in "The White Cat," a young prince is dazzled by the astonishing powers of a feline. Jack Zipes's informative introduction offers historical context, and Natalie Frank's opening essay delves into her aesthetic approaches to d'Aulnoy's characters.

An inspired integration of art and text, **THE ISLAND OF HAPPINESS** is filled with seductive stories of transformation and enchantment.

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The Hopeful Hyperbolic Countess d'Aulnoy

Who was this exceptional woman, Marie-Catherine Le Jumel de Barneville, Comtesse d'Aulnoy, pioneer of the literary fairy tale in France? Why is much of her life a mystery, even though she was a major writer and socialite in Paris during the 1690s and the beginning of the eighteenth century? What brought her to write what she allegedly considered trifling tales, "bagatelles," which nevertheless drew the admiration of aristocratic and bourgeois readers and were turned later into popular chapbooks and books for children? Why did she coin the term conte de feés and more or less initiate a fairy-tale vogue during the absolutist years of Louis XIV?

Born in 1652 into a wealthy aristocratic family in Barneville-La Bertrand, Normandy, Marie-Catherine had a close relationship with her mother and her maternal aunt, who educated her and told her numerous folk tales. More than likely, she also heard stories from her nannies and servants. In addition, she became proficient in English and Spanish and demonstrated a broad knowledge of medieval French and Spanish literature. Her mother married her off at age thirteen to Francois de la Motte, Baron d'Aulnoy, thirty years her senior and a notorious gambler and libertine. By the time Marie-Catherine turned eighteen, she had given birth to three children.

In 1669, due to the baron's financial difficulties and dissolute character, his relationship with Marie-Catherine and her mother, Madame Gudanne (who had remarried after her first husband's death and changed her name), deteriorated to the point that mother and daughter implicated Baron d'Aulnoy in a crime of high treason (lêse majesté), punishable by death. They recruited two accomplices, Jacques-Antoine de Courboyer and Charles de la Mozière, and the baron was arrested. The plot backfired, however, when the baron proved his innocence: Courboyer and Mozière were charged with calumny and executed. Mme Gudanne escaped charges by fleeing France, while her daughter, young Mme d'Aulnoy, was briefly imprisoned with a newborn daughter—her two other children had died in infancy. By 1670, Mme d'Aulnoy was pardoned because her role in the conspiracy could not be proved. After she was released from prison, she separated from her husband and temporarily entered a convent for refuge, which she left by 1672. During the next thirteen years, she traveled a great deal and allegedly spent time in England, Flanders, and Spain, where her mother lived and worked as a double agent for the French and Spanish governments. Otherwise, Mme d'Aulnoy would occasionally return to Paris, but there are no records or clear evidence about what she did during this period of her life. It remains a mystery.

What we do know is that around 1685, she bought a house on the rue Saint-Benoit, and was gradually accepted into Parisian high society. By 1690, she published her first important novel, Histoire d'Hypolite, comte de Duglas (The Story of Hypolitus, Count of Douglas), which was a great success and contained her first major fairy tale, "L'ile de la félicité" ("The Island of Happiness"). She followed this book the same year with a pseudo-memoir, Mémoires de la cour d'Espagne (Memoirs of the Spanish Court), and in 1691 with her traveVepistolary narrative, Relation du voyage d'Espagne (An Account of a Journey to Spain), which included another fairy tale, "L'Histoire de Mira" ("The Story of Mira").



Once fully settled in Paris, d'Aulnoy became one of the most popular and notable authors of her time. She was invited to various literary salons and established her own salon on the rue Saint-Benoit, where she often read her fairy tales aloud before they were published. It became customary at d'Aulnoy's salon to recite fairy tales and, on festive occasions, to dress up like characters from fairy tales. She was regarded as a talented storyteller and published her fairy tales in several volumes: Les Contes des feés, I—III (1696-97); Les Contes des fees, IV (1698); and Contes nouveaux ou les fées a la mode, I—IV (1698). Altogether, she published twenty-five fairy tales during her lifetime. She was the first to establish the literary fairy tale as a genre. Indeed, she was more responsible even than Charles Perrault for the extraordinary vogue of French literary fairy tales that swept Parisian cultural circles from 1690 through 1705.

On the basis of her writing in addition to fairy tales, d'Aulnoy published historical romances, novels, devotional books, and memoirs—she was elected a member of the Academia dei Ricovrati in Padova, and she continued to be active in the literary field by publishing such works as Sentiments d'une ame pénitente (Sentiments of a Penitent Soul ,1698) and Le Comte de Warwick (The Count Warwick ,17 03). In addition, d'Aulnoy managed to make time for intrigues. In 1699, she is said to have assisted her friend Mme Ticquet, who attempted to assassinate her husband, a member of Parliament, because he allegedly had abused her. He survived the attempt, and Mme Ticquet was beheaded. D'Aulnoy was not charged with any wrongdoing.

In 1700, d'Aulnoy's husband, the notorious baron, died. Although he had never divorced her, he had disinherited her before his death. Nevertheless, she continued to maintain her salon and participate in the cultural life of Paris until her death in 1705.

Many mysteries about her life remain unsolved. She published nothing until 1690, at age thirty-nine, and there are no reliable records about what she did during her years of travel, from 1672 to 1685. In fact, it is unclear how she supported herself or who fathered two of her daughters, born in 1676 and 1677. It is possible, since she was an only child, that she inherited a good deal of money and received support from her mother from 167o to 1685, when she bought her house in Paris, and that she later earned money through her writing. What seems clear is that she was an independent young woman of thirty-five when she left Paris, and that she began writing her first three works toward the end of the 168os. Moreover, these works, The Story of Hypolitus (1690), Memories of the Spanish Court (1690), and An Account of Travels in Spain (1691), were highly diverse. Her first fairy tales, "The Island of Happiness" and "The Story of Mira," are very different from her later ones and yet foreshadow many of the themes and concerns found in the later stories. Both are surprisingly dystopian narratives and stem from oral traditions, so the style and language are not as hyperbolical or euphemistic as in the later tales.

By 1690, d'Aulnoy had become an idealist and moralist. She was exclusively interested in the aristocratic classes and how they suffered from the decline of the nobility—that is, she believed that the upper classes were declining because of the corruption of civil manners. What interested her most of all was the status of women, the power of love, ethical behavior, and the tender relations between lovers. Without love and the cultivation ?of love, she believed, an ideal and just society could not exist. In even her earliest fairy tales, d'Aulnoy was a severe judge. King Adolph dies in "The Island of Happiness" because he chooses pride and glory over his love for Princess Felicity; the princess dies in "The Story of Mira" because she is too proud and narcissistic and must be punished by the gods. In these tales, d'Aulnoy's privileged king and princess could have lived ideal lives if it had not been for their character flaws.

It is evident from "The Island of Happiness" and "The Tale of Mira" that d'Aulnoy had not yet conceived a plan to write a series of fairy tales or to experiment with the genre. In fact, it was not until 16g7 and 1698 that she was to make a name for herself as the writer of contes des fées when she published Les Contes des fees, fifteen tales within two frame narratives, Don Gabriel Ponce de Leon and Don Fernand de Tolêde, followed by Contes nouveaux ou les fées a la mode, nine tales within the narrative frame of Le Gentilhomme bourgeois. If she had particular reasons and causes for writing these tales, it is likely that they were prompted by her disillusionment with the court and politics of Louis XIV, as well as by her experiences in the literary salons of Paris.

France endured a major crisis around i688, and conditions began to deteriorate at all levels of society. Indeed, even the aristocracy and haute bourgeoisie were not exempt. As Louis XIV waged costly wars and sought to annex more land for France, taxes for all classes became exorbitant. At various times during the latter part of his reign, terrible weather led to years of bad harvests, and the continued wars added to the devastation. The steady increase of debt, taxation, and poor living conditions resulted in extreme misery for the peasantry and austerity for the bourgeoisie and aristocracy. Moreover, as Louis XIV became more orthodox in his devotion to Catholicism, he became more rigid in his cultural taste, and more arbitrary and willful as absolutist king. His reign, which had begun during an "Age of Reason," turned reason against itself to justify his desires, tastes, and ambition for glory, and this solipsism led to irrational, destructive policies that were soundly criticized by the highly respected Fénelon, the archbishop of Cambrai, who became the moral conscience of the ancien régime during its decline. Given these dark times, and the censorship that prohibited writers from criticizing Louis XIV directly, the fairy tale became a means to vent criticism and at the same time to project hope for a better world. D'Aulnoy clearly was drawn to imaginative literary works by educated writers as well as to magical folk tales from the common people, and adapted them for members of her social class.

From the late Middle Ages up through the Renaissance, peasants told a variety of folk tales, legends, and fables among themselves at the hearth, in spinning rooms, and in the fields. Priests also used vernacular tales in their sermons to reach the peasantry. Literate merchants and travelers transmitted these tales to people of all classes in inns and taverns. Storytelling was popular at royal courts. All kinds of tales were told to children of the upper class by servants and governesses. They were remembered and passed on in different forms and versions by all members of society and told to suit particular occasions—as talk. Gradually, however, this talk became elevated, cultivated, and, by the seventeenth

century, considered acceptable in Italian and French salons. By 1696, printed fairy tales were in vogue: the literary fairy tale had come into its own.

Though it is impossible to fix a date for the rise of the literary fairy tale in France and the exact reasons d'Aulnoy was attracted to this genre, it originated in the conversation and games developed by highly educated aristocratic women in the salons of Paris, beginning around 1610 and remaining popular through the beginning of the eighteenth century. Deprived of access to schools and universities, French aristocratic women organized gatherings in their homes to which they invited other women and men to discuss art, literature, and other topics important to them, such as love, marriage, and freedom. These women, called précieuses, tried to develop a manner of thinking, speaking, and writing to reveal and celebrate their innate talents and to distinguish them from the vulgar elements of society. Most important was their emphasis on wit and invention in conversation. The women who frequented the salons constantly sought innovative ways to express their needs and to embellish the forms and style of speech and communication they shared. The folk tales they had heard as children became a source of amusement and served as models for the occasional lyric and the serial novel. Speakers in the salons endeavored to portray ideal situations in the most effective oratory style, which set the standards for the conte de fées, or what we now call the literary fairy tale.

By the 1690s, the "salon" fairy tale became so acceptable that women and men began writing down their tales for publication. Most of the notable writers of the fairy tale learned to develop this literary genre by going to the salons or homes of women who wanted to foster intellectual conversation. D'Aulnoy based her stories on the oral tales she had heard as a young girl or read in Giovan Francesco Straparola's Italian collection, The Pleasant Nights (1550-53). She might also have known Giambattista Basile's The Tale of Tales (1634-36) and other French and Spanish literary works that circulated in the salons.

The transformation of the oral folk tale into a literary fairy tale was not superficial or decorative, however. The aesthetics that the aristocratic women developed in their conversational games and in their written tales varied in style and content, but these tales were all anti-classical and written in opposition to the literary establishment that championed Greek and Roman literature as models for

contemporary French writers to follow. Instead, early French fairy-tale writers used models from French folklore and the medieval courtly tradition. In addition, since the majority of the writers and tellers of fairy tales were women, these tales displayed a certain resistance toward male rational precepts and patriarchal realms by conceiving pagan worlds in which extraordinarily majestic and powerful female fairies had the final say.

Until the publication of Les Contes des fees, no French author had used the term conte de fees, which is key for understanding the unique quality and appeal of d'Aulnoy's tales. Translated literally into English, the term means "tale about fairies" or "tale of the fairies." In other words, the fairies were to become the central figures or protagonists of magical tales, replacing the gods and goddesses of Greco-Roman myths. Moreover, d'Aulnoy never refers to religious principles of the Judeo-Christian tradition. Her tales are entirely secular, and the destinies of aristocratic heroes and heroines are determined by the fairies, who uphold the moral principles of the French civilizing process. These somewhat arbitrary principles of the civilizing process are generally summarized in quaint moral poems at the end of each tale. They are the laws of the fairies, and woe to anyone who defies them, even though d'Aulnoy and her friends could not enforce them in reality.

D'Aulnoy and many other gifted women authors of fairy tales, such as Marie Jeanne L'Héritier de Villandon, Catherine Bernard, Charlotte Rose de Caumont de la Force, Henriette-Julie de Castelnau, Comtesse de Murat, and Mlle de Lubert, developed fairy tales that pronounced their social views of civility. The aristocratic writers often used the term fée among themselves and created an atmosphere in the salons in which they could freely exchange ideas that challenged the hypocrisy and immorality of Louis XIV's court. Of course, they did not direct all their criticisms at the court, but it was clear that their strange metaphorical language and codes, filled with hyperbole and euphemisms, were intended to create utopian narratives in opposition to the status quo.

Of all the women writers, d'Aulnoy was the most critical and judgmental. For example, "Finette Cendron" and "Belle-Belle, or the Chevalier Fortuné" reveal how conspiracies and corruption ran rampant at royal courts, and how courageous young women with integrity could withstand abuse and betrayal to become queens in their own right. D'Aulnoy was fond of transforming traditional folk tales into long, sophisticated literary tales intended for upper-class readers. In "Finette Cendron," for example, which could be translated as "Clever Cinderella," she begins by alluding to the abandonment motif of "Hansel and Gretel" and then also includes her own version of "Cinderella." The dissolute villains are Finette's parents, who lose their kingdom because of their decadent characters. Concerned only about their own fate, they abandon Finette and her sisters in the woods. In addition, her malicious sisters constantly betray her, and ogres threaten to kill the three princesses. All are greedy and treacherous, but they are not punished in the end, because Finette, encouraged by her fairy godmother, believes that a magnanimous soul gains more vengeance through generosity than through punishment.

***

Note on the Translation

With the exception of "The Tale of Mira," all the translations of Mme d'Aulnoy's tales originally appeared in my book Beauties, Beasts, and Enchantment: Classic French Fairy Tales (1989), in which I used James Planché's somewhat anachronistic translation, Countess D'Aulnoy's Fairy Tales (1885), as the basis for

my work. Though I believed Planché's work to be dated, his renditions contained a certain idiomatic style that captured the highly mannered style of Mme d'Aulnoy. Moreover, as an expert in clothes, customs, and architecture, Planché provided accurate descriptions of the garments, buildings, and manners of late seventeenth-century France.

Consequently, his translations provided an excellent reference point for my work as I honed and tightened the tales. One of my major challenges involved translating the verse morals that appear at the end of d'Aulnoy's tales. In most cases, I sacrificed meter and style to meaning and tempered the lavish tone. In this book, I have carefully revised all the tales and corrected minor errors.

Since I first translated d'Aulnoy's tales, Professor Volker Schroder of Princeton University has uncovered important documents about Mme d'Aulnoy's life inAnecdota, an online source for rare texts and images. I have used his invaluable work to correct certain facts about d'Aulnoy's life. In addition, I wish to thank the two anonymous reviewers of my text for their suggestions and corrections in both the introduction and translations.

Drawing Mme d'Aulnoy

I came to the world of Madame d'Aulnoy because I wanted to draw tales that I read as unequivocally feminist. The wily heroines of d'Aulnoy's stories test the limits of acceptable behavior for women and appropriate roles for female characters in fairy tales.

Women in d'Aulnoy's tales are smarter and more vibrant than in those of her contemporaries and more active and unusual than those of her antecedents. They flirt with boundaries and power dynamics between men and women, frequently connected to the relationship between animals/ gods and humans. Love and power, intertwined, enable women to seduce, triumph, change form, and tell their own stories. They undertake active pursuits: saving kingdoms, embarking on journeys, speaking their minds. They also fall prey to human complexities: hubris, jealousy, disgust, and vengeance. They test physical and emotional frontiers in their journeys and conflicts. A suitor's arrogance destroys happiness; kindness and cunning, combined with perseverance, triumphs; jealousy poisons families and separates lovers. Frequently, women activate their lovers' metamorphoses from animals to humans, and humans to animals. Women's virtue often is rewarded, and conversely, men's vice often is punished. In traversing class lines and in interspecies love, d'Aulnoy uses the humor of cross-dressing and animal-smitten women to overturn then-conventional ideas of femininity. D'Aulnoy engages her female characters in many types of performance: they perform as animals, as women, as men, as fairies, as nature, and as stepsisters, lovers, wives, daughters, and mothers. They possess self-knowledge, and this ownership is tantamount to power.



Depicting the stories of d'Aulnoy, in drawing and painting with gouache and chalk pastel, is the culmination of my exploration of fairy tales with my mentor and collaborator, Jack Zipes. I first worked with fairy tales in Tales of the Brothers Grimm. Drawings by Natalie Frank (Damiani, 2015). Though these tales are the original versions prior to their twentieth-century sanitizing, they are avowedly not feminist. Instead, they are firmly rooted in a nineteenth-century mindset favoring princesses waiting to be wed and little girls punished for veering from the forest path. My drawings for this series imbued a feminist perspective that reimagined these tales. I recast the heroines with more agency and, at times, more threat. Amplifying their attributes made them bolder and more in control of their own stories. My work with Zipes on The Sorcerer's Apprentice (Princeton University Press, 2017) deepened my fascination with fairy tales, the role of women in them, and the tales' evolution as memes. Drawing d'Aulnoy's stories was a departure from my previous work. The tales have boldly imagined heroines and a brightened palette that allow my role as artist to be more personal. In d'Aulnoy's work, I see connections with my own twenty-first-century ideas about femininity, sexuality, and power: her themes are timeless and her heroines, daring.

Performance and role-playing are pivotal to the ways in which women challenge power dynamics, engage with transformations that straddle human and magical worlds, and provoke revelations that spur character development. D'Aulnoy creates female characters that play out a full range of women's actions and reactions, striking in their depth and complexity, especially among traditional and current conceptions of what a fairy tale is. Just as d'Aulnoy's female characters develop from pivotal moments transfiguration, falling in love, despair, shots of courage—my female figures are defined at fulcrums, under physical and emotional duress. Just as her heroines cross between the banal and the spectacular, I also am drawn to times when unexpected change collides with everyday life. In these images, I can capture a figure in motion. I am also captivated by the complex ways that violence and sexuality are performed by and on women's bodies, an undercurrent of these stories.

As author, d'Aulnoy inhabits other bodies, simultaneously acting as voyeur and participant in her characters' stories. I undertake a similar and sensual pursuit: drawing itself is a performance. I bring forth life by squeezing, rubbing, creating, and destroying bodies; casting characters; constructing images; and building scenes. When I draw, I begin with the form, a sketch in a single color, that delineates the movement of the figures, the interplay between them, and the composition as a whole. I enhance the figures and their space, again and again, until a scene emerges, akin to d'Aulnoy's verbal aggregation. My drawings, like her stories, arise out of the layering of drawn and painted passages both representational and surreal. An abundance of animals, magical transformations, fairies, and jewels are her paint; the layering of chalk and gouache are mine. D'Aulnoy's stories read as combinations of painterly scenarios in sequence. As I read them, vivid images come; color sensually floods over me.

I first became aware of my synesthesia, a neurological interconnectedness of words and colors, when I began to read the Grimms' tales. Literature always had elicited images and colors for me, but the Grimms' brought forth complete compositions: drawing became a direct record of images in my head. When I drew d'Aulnoy's tales, which are lengthy, developed narratives with baroque flourishes of writing, her florid prose manifested in evocative color. Her sentences are melodic and bursting with description.

D'Aulnoy's stories are lush with objects that emit movement of pigment and light: jewels, ribbons, sunsets, flowering meadows, dew and rainbows. My associations with words and language are hyper-colored daydreams—ones that I am able to manifest immediately through my own hands. I create movement, bright, sumptuous, and nonsensical juxtapositions of color, teasing the eye with a visual hum. Much of my pleasure in reading comes from this translation of d'Aulnoy's and her characters' performances into my drawing, which feels like the retelling of a secret.

Performance and play, in the magical and natural worlds, unmask larger themes of self-reliance and human vulnerability; these manifest in distinctive ways in my thirty-three drawings. In "Finette Cendron," "Belle-Belle," and "The Blue Bird," I am interested in the heroine's strong sense of self and comfort with vulnerability, which ensure success; conversely, in "The Island of Happiness" and "The Ram," Adolph and Merveilleuse's human weaknesses are their undoing. In drawings with assertive heroines, I focus on scenes in which these women demonstrate their individuality. My Belle-Belle is dressed as a man; her clashing feather vest, vivid cowboy boots, riding pants, and tied-back hair mark her as the antithesis of blasé femininity. In the second drawing, she dances with a male version of herself. Her lower body, bare and feminine, embraces her upper body, clothed and masculine. I focus on the fluidity of her gender and identity. Whatever might belie her gender, I erase or negate. In the subsequent drawing, various superheroes become actual parts of her body, and in the next drawing, she transforms into a new hybrid of king and queen. Last, I draw Belle tied to a stake, her torn-open shirt exposing her breast; her confrontational stare defies both the king and queen. Her image is far from that of a typical fairy-tale heroine. With her pose, I evoke the image of Saint Sebastian, martyr and symbol of steadfast courage and justice. Belle's most potent characteristic is her own vulnerability.

Finette Cendron's success revolves around her constant state of active wakefulness. In the first drawing, she rides, and in the second she lies awake, while one unpleasant sister sleeps and the others stares upward, light in hand, unable to see. I picture Finette looking at the viewer, aware, even in repose. Next, Finette conjures the magic of the acorn tree, leading her stepsisters to the ogre and ogress's kingdom.

Her head and patterned dress dominate the space; her less compelling sisters pictorially recede. In the fourth drawing, Finette dangles her foot on the threshold of the page's border, stepping into the viewer's space, testing the boundary of the image. Like the savvy one-eyed ogress who continually outsmarts her husband, Finette outwits her stepsisters. It is Finette who plants the decisive ax blow in the ogress's neck; she becomes even bolder as the story continues. In the final image, Finette assumes the crown of a leopard with a border of spots, royal purple because she is queen. An underdrawing of black gouache reveals her jagged grin. One snaggletooth juts out against her rouged lips; she is both a lady and a stealth huntress, regal in her patience and fidelity to herself.

"The Island of Happiness" juxtaposes the natural and eternal with the human and ephemeral. To begin, I present Felicity with a soft, floral palette. She is at one with the natural world. Her rose-colored dress, garland-laden hair, and pink skin unite her with the beds of flowers among which she stands. I put forward Adolph, a mere mortal, naked, ashamed, and covering his genitals. Uncloaked, he reveals his human frailty. In the joint portrait of Felicity and Adolph, her head transforms from pink and alive to blue and cold: there is an air of death in her eternal life. He is a caricature. I focus on her face and body throughout: I am interested in the devastating effect that mortality and human weakness, despite her eternal youth and beauty, will have on her body and spirit. In the final drawing, she lies on a yellow ground with black staccato lines. The ground is barren, despite its lushness, and the hand of time, purple and greedy, reaches over her. A black entryway into a mausoleum beckons the viewer. Her fate of eternal confinement after experiencing flawed, human love, represented by harsh vertical and horizontal lines, is the true prison.

In drawing "The Green Serpent" and "The White Cat," which show the fatal cost of curiosity and greed, even if love and fealty triumph in the end, I explore the violence that often accompanies a fairy-tale ending. I picture the cat with her retinue in the court hall and also as a huntress with her suitor diminutive on his hobby horse. The cat's final transformation is captivating in its goriness. I replicate the fragmentation of her body through a mélange of body parts, human and feline, with mismatched features of size and exaggeration. In the final drawing, she springs out of her own body with a cat's ferocity, heightened by the black space and her frenetic, chalk outline. In these drawings I try to capture what it looks and feels like to be trapped in a body, human or animal. I appreciate the ways that d'Aulnoy's characters exhibit gender and physical fluidity and the way they embrace the grotesquerie and beauty in physical and emotional transformations. I use a lurid palette, bodily fragmentation, and collaged images to present multiple versions of an individual at once.

My favorite tale, "The Tale of Mira," is the most unequivocally feminist of all of the tales of d'Aulnoy. Mira is a beautiful woman who murders men with her eyes a feminist ghost story for the ages. She is, in turn, killed by her own unrequited desire of the strapping shepherd. Laced with dark comicality, the story engages clichéd depictions of conventional femininity in the fairy-tale genre. Mira's striking beauty is lethal because it is not passive. Absurdist humor also defines the treatment of the objectified shepherd, who becomes a heroine of sorts. Men rarely are trivialized as mere love objects, but unlike Mira, the shepherd seems to have no qualms about his objectification. Mira is tortured by her toxic effect on men; her male equivalent does not possess this depth of feeling. A traditional fairy tale warns of the dangers of unrequited love; this one warns of the violence that occurs out of unreciprocated lust, poking fun at the seriousness of a tragic fairy-tale story.

I render Mira's full lips and clownish nose to accentuate the macabre: her feminine beauty is weaponized. Her eyes glow pale cerulean, the color of the splitting sky, which she controls. She is possessed, and her giant arms block the landscape, an armature for the cascading men who disintegrate into fractured eyes and limbs, murdered by her beauty. Her body is swollen and her stomach, elbows, and hands push against the edges of the drawing.

She asserts her powerful presence through her towering form. All of the characters in this tale are undone by either the physical allure or disdain for the body. In death, Mira is fortunate to exist, formless, as a ghost.

D'Aulnoy turns this short tale into a farce. The narrator steps outside the fairy-tale narrative gone awry and breaks the fourth wall with an ode to her own hunger. The fairy tale is thus thwarted twice: once by Mira's dangerous beauty, and again by the narrator, abandoning the romanticism of the tale to attend to her own needs. I repeat Mira's image, once in light and again in darkness, to echo this break in narrative continuity. As much as the soft pinks, blues, and cascading blond hair frame Mira as a fairy-tale heroine, her corporality, rendered twice, in fleshy strokes of pastel and modeled gouache, exaggerate what it feels like to be human, cursed to experience the indignities of a physical body.

The fairy tale also turns a sharp lens onto itself. As much as d'Aulnoy personifies animals and nature in her tales, here she endows the form of the tale itself with self-awareness—the most notable characteristic of her fiercest heroines. This is a story of femininity with which I identify. Natalie Frank
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Information: A Historical Companion edited by Ann Blair, Paul Duguid, Anja-Silvia Goeing, and Anthony Grafton [Princeton University Press, 9780691179544]

A landmark history that traces the creation, management, and sharing of information through six centuries

Thanks to modern technological advances, we now enjoy seemingly unlimited access to information. Yet how did information become so central to our everyday lives, and how did its processing and storage make our data-driven era possible? This volume is the first to consider these questions in comprehensive detail, tracing the global emergence of information practices, technologies, and more, from the premodern era to the present. With entries spanning archivists to algorithms and scribes to surveilling, this is the ultimate reference on how information has shaped and been shaped by societies.

Written by an international team of experts, the book's inspired and original long- and short-form contributions reconstruct the rise of human approaches to creating, managing, and sharing facts and knowledge. Thirteen full-length chapters discuss the role of information in pivotal epochs and regions, with chief emphasis on Europe and North America, but also substantive treatment of other parts of the world as well as current global interconnections. More than 100 alphabetical entries follow, focusing on specific tools, methods, and concepts—from ancient coins to the office memo, and censorship to plagiarism. The result is a wide-ranging, deeply immersive collection that will appeal to anyone drawn to the story behind our modern mania for an informed existence.

- Tells the story of information's rise from 1450 through to today
- Covers a range of eras and regions, including the medieval Islamic world, late imperial East Asia, early modern and modern Europe, and modern North America

Includes 100 concise articles on wide-ranging topics:

- Concepts: data, intellectual property, privacy
- Formats and genres: books, databases, maps, newspapers, scrolls and rolls, social media
- People: archivists, diplomats and spies, readers, secretaries, teachers
- Practices: censorship, forecasting, learning, political reporting, translating
- Processes: digitization, quantification, storage and search
- Systems: bureaucracy, platforms, telecommunications
- Technologies: cameras, computers, lithography
- Provides an informative glossary, suggested further reading (a short bibliography accompanies each entry), and a detailed index

Written by an international team of notable contributors, including Jeremy Adelman, Lorraine Daston, Devin Fitzgerald, John-Paul Ghobrial, Lisa Gitelman, Earle Havens, Randolph C. Head, Niv Horesh, Sarah Igo, Richard R. John, Lauren Kassell, Pamela Long, Erin McGuirl, David McKitterick, Elias Muhanna, Thomas S. Mullaney, Carla Nappi, Craig Robertson, Daniel Rosenberg, Neil Safier, Haun Saussy, Will Slauter, Jacob Soll, Heidi Tworek, Siva Vaidhyanathan, Alexandra Walsham, and many more.

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How to Use **INFORMATION: A HISTORICAL COMPANION**

Part 1 contains thirteen long articles that together provide a chronological narrative of the history of information from the early modern period to the present. Part 2 contains 101 short entries, focused on particular issues central to that history.

The short entries are arranged alphabetically. Each concludes with cross-references (labelled "see also") pointing to other entries in the volume that explore related topics.

For readers interested in further research, each entry concludes with a "further reading" list of books and articles important to the topic under discussion. In a few cases, such as quotations drawn from secondary sources, brief parenthetical references within the entry point to their source.

Words marked with an asterisk (*) on first mention within an entry can be found in the glossary, which defines terms used in specific ways within this book. Foreign words appear in italics on their first mention within each entry. Foreign terms and titles of books, newspapers, and the like have generally been translated if they are not explained. Translations often appear in parentheses after the original name--for example, *Tiangong Kaiwu* (The exploitation of the works of nature) or *Frankfurter Postzeitung* (Frankfurt postal newspaper).

A general index aids navigation across the multiple topics and issues that make up the volume as a whole.

Finally, an expanded bibliography offered by our contributors on their several topics can be found through the book's website, which will be linked from the Princeton University Press website and updated periodically.

Ann Blair, Paul Duguid, Anja-Silvia Goeing, and Anthony Grafton

Excerpt:

INFORMATION: A HISTORICAL COMPANION explores how information has shaped and been shaped by human society across ages past and present. It offers readers views of history through the lens of information and views of information through the lens of history.

Such a project might seem paradoxical. In 1964, the media scholar Marshall McLuhan declared his the "age of information." The idea was widely taken up, so that in the following decade an IBM advertisement could announce, "Information: there's growing agreement that it's the name of the age we live in." Both announcements thrust information to the fore but in the process suggested that it and related information technologies of the sort IBM made had created a fundamental break from the past. History, by these and similar accounts, can seem retrograde, irrelevant to forward-looking information. This book is built on the belief that, contrary to IBM's assertion, "growing agreement" might reasonably be claimed to point another way. Since the 1970s, books, conferences, and university courses have shown increasing interest in information in prior ages. In the process, a growing body of information-focused research has thrown new light on both the past and the present, drawing the two together rather than separating them. Indeed, as this book goes to press, two other significant collections, *Information Keywords* and *Literary Information in China: A History,* are also coming into print. Together

those volumes and this one reveal the remarkable range of approaches to and topics in information history that are raising interest and enthusiasm within academia and beyond.

For its part, this book assembles researchers who have engaged directly with information in historical context to illustrate for scholars and general readers alike the breadth and the depth of these developing perspectives. The contributors look at the emergence across history of new information practices, technologies, and institutions as these developed to address informational challenges of their day. In particular, they look at moments of confrontation and transition—beginning, for example, with Columbus's legendary encounter with Caribbean societies in 1492—to reveal how approaching these as part of a history of information provides fresh insight into how they unfolded at the time and how they might be better understood today. From this starting point, the thirteen long articles in part 1 of the book present a cumulative narrative bringing this exploration of information in history to the present. The 101 short entries in part 2 examine in depth particular topics that are critical to such an exploration. Together, contributors to **INFORMATION: A HISTORICAL COMPANION** show how information and information technology were crucial to earlier ages, as they are to our age today.

Information, of course, is an expansive term. Consequently, any starting point for an investigation can seem arbitrary, and convincing arguments can always be made for starting elsewhere. But given inevitable constraints of space and time in a publishing venture such as this, the editors have chosen to focus principally on the *early modern and modern periods, from circa 1450 to the present. Nonetheless the early articles and many of the entries look back well before this to allow the overall collection to develop a continuous, information-focused narrative across many historical contexts down to the present in the scope of a single volume and with sufficient depth to reveal emergent and enduring themes. Within this constraint of continuity, the editors sought entries that engaged diverse issues and places and took distinct approaches to the topic of information. The attempt to achieve both continuity and diversity makes no claim to comprehensiveness. While it is hoped that this selection will appear judicious, all contributors, as well as the editors, are aware of inevitable gaps. They hope that the collection as a whole can indicate how topics omitted might nonetheless be illuminated by the overall information perspectives of the collection. Together, the articles reveal recurring responses to social change, thereby making evident over time and across cultures the resilience of attitudes familiar today, such as information optimism and information anxiety or faith in information "solutions" and surprise at their unintended consequences.

The opening account of Columbus and the Silk Road introduces globalization as one of the volume's major themes, represented by emerging networks of travel and communication across Asia, the Islamic world, and Europe. Informational connections inevitably shaped this "road" as not only silk and spices but also word of supply and demand and technologies such as paper and forms of writing and mathematics passed back and forth, opening new worlds, both literally and metaphorically, to recipients. These exchanges also fostered spiritual and scientific engagements, as intrepid Buddhists, Muslims, and Christians traveled in opposite directions along these interconnecting pathways, appearing in new environments and before new audiences, then sending back reports of such encounters. Supporting this circulation, the Silk Road and similar communication channels emerge as complex sets of social, institutional, and geographical networks, continuously circumscribed by short- and long-distance demands of and for information. In response to these demands, practices from printing to record

keeping developed to formalize and reify information in different ways, and new communication channels able to carry such reifications arose, including crucially important forms of postal networks.

These developing interconnections played a significant role in shaping what we now think of as information technologies. Printing, which appeared first in the Sinosphere and centuries later in Europe, was crucially transformed and transforming in interactions with state, market, and culture. Analyses of these different settings and the information practices they favored add complexity to the simple determinism that accounts of information technology otherwise often assume. New information techniques also accompanied the formation of commercial relations, including the emergence of accounting devices for making and recording market exchanges, such as the financial "ledger" (a historical, transnational technology whose enduring contribution is evident today in the ledgers of Bitcoin and other digital currencies). On the one hand the articles track an increasing use of information to control and stabilize markets, as well as attempts by markets to control information in order to commodify and commercialize it. On the other hand the articles also explore the drive to resist control by removing restrictions and liberating the circulation of information. This resistance to control is particularly noticeable in the accounts of scientific groups and educational institutions that sought autonomy for members and also for their information so both could circulate across national, political, and religious boundaries. In particular the development and spread of new forms of scholarly information included natural histories, encyclopedias, and other kinds of reference works (all in different ways, of course, forerunners of this book).

One of the most influential developments explored across this volume is the rise of the "information state" and its informational apparatus—chanceries, secretaries, surveillance, archives, and the like—designed to help assert political control over populations. Among the most pervasive state-driven contributions revealed in these accounts are the standardization of information, through such things as forms and questionnaires, and the quantification such standardization allowed as populations were counted in different ways for different reasons. The passport, as one article shows, offers an unexpected and insightful view of the state's attempts to standardize both information and population and of their normative impact. Conversely, as the state sought to control people through information, others sought to use information to help control the state, and inevitably states pushed back. Thus articles in part I move from the rise of "public information" in Japan to the periodical and the press in the West and the emergence of the information media of the "public sphere" along with state initiatives to control the press and public opinion directly or indirectly.

The cluster of articles focused on the nineteenth century and early twentieth century track the development of electromagnetic and then electric technologies, including the telegraph, telephone, phonograph, radio, and television, showing how these technologies transformed prior assumptions about the relation between information, nation-states, and the public. Nonetheless, despite these apparently transformative technologies, themes of unequal distribution, problematic standardization, commodification, normativity, and state control return, along with new bouts of anxiety about increasing quantities of information and contrasting optimism about its potential to create efficient and effective markets and democracies. The final articles in part I take the collection from telephone and telegraph into IBM's "information age" with discussions of new communication and search technologies, exploring ways in which, despite claims of "revolution," recent developments and enthusiasms often parallel those discussed in earlier chapters. Throughout, these discussions repeatedly raise important questions of

information politics and ethics that run from Magellan's (and Columbus's) willingness to lie to their crews to the development of propaganda to support state interests and the appropriation of personal information to improve search and surveillance technologies.

While part 1 builds a chronological narrative from the early modern period to the present, each of the entries in part 2 focuses on a particular topic critical to understanding information in history, from accounting, algorithms, and archivists to secretaries, social media, surveilling, and much more. The 101 short entries, which appear alphabetically, are also grouped together under a series of thematic categories (the category "objects," for instance, includes essays on coins, government documents, and inscriptions) and are linked to one another by cross-references. The book also contains a glossary, collecting and elaborating terms that may be unfamiliar to readers or that are used in distinctive ways in this volume. The cross-references and the glossary seek to support both the autonomy and the focus of particular pieces as well as the cumulative interdependence of the collection as a whole.

Information's complex character presents challenges to anyone trying to undertake this sort of historical enquiry. As noted, influenced by arguments like those of McLuhan and IBM about the "information age," many assume that information is a critical feature for the present age alone. Conversely, other scholars have followed the linguist and computer scientist Anthony Oettinger, who in 1980 argued that "every society is an information society." Information: A Historical Companion, while recognizing changes over time, clearly takes the latter view. But in so doing, it faces questions about whose notion of information is at stake. Is it the historian's notion or that of the subjects of historical study? The latter perspective is exemplified in the words of the historian Peter Burke, whose *Social History of Knowledge* (2000-2012) seeks to trace "what early modern people—rather than the present author or his readers—considered to be knowledge." This is an important distinction; hence this book highlights people becoming aware of information as a critical aspect of their lives. But the alternative view, allowing examination of historical actors who did not have the term or the concept but whose behavior can nonetheless be illuminated with insight from current perspectives of information, is equally important here. Contributors have taken what they have seen as the appropriate approach for each topic.

Using the term information itself presents further challenges. Not only does the word favor particular (i.e., Latinate) languages, but even within those languages, information has been used in quite different ways in different times and contexts. Given these complexities, it might seem plausible to define information as a technical term to be shared among this book's contributors, thus putting to one side both historical and contemporary variations. Unfortunately, such definitions are as likely to generate as to resolve difficulties. For instance, it seems unexceptional to take "information" as a carrier of meaningful ideas between people. Such views, however, must confront the pioneering information theorist Claude Shannon, whose work, discussed in several of the pieces that follow, probably did more than any other to promote ideas of an "information age." Shannon's theory held meaning as irrelevant to information. Many also assume that information is an objective entity. Yet Geoffrey Bateson's famous definition of information as "a difference that makes a difference" (which is, deservedly, one of the most cited definitions in this book) portrays information as personally subjective: the ability to make a difference depends not only on the communication, but also on what the recipient knew before. Similarly, some take information as an autonomous entity that can be removed from one context and unproblematically presented in another. McLuhan, however, famously argued that in the age of information "the medium is the message," suggesting that context is inescapable.

Overall, the problems of definition are perhaps best exposed in a study in 2007 by the information scientist Chaim Zins that compiled definitions of information (and data and knowledge) offered by forty-five information scholars from sixteen countries. The compilation revealed 130 distinct notions, with different degrees of compatibility with one another, but no one capable of encompassing all the different variations. Contributors to this collection proceeded using their own understandings rather than subordinating themselves to a single definition. Their contributions reveal both common and distinctive threads across the volume's different historical and thematic explorations. Nonetheless, one aim of the book is, where possible, to encourage contributors and readers to weave these threads together.

While following the development of current scholarship, another goal of this book is to engage readers outside the academy. Consequently, the book eschews scholarly footnotes and long bibliographies, offering instead short "further reading" lists. (For those seeking more depth, the editors are maintaining a fuller bibliography of works explicitly and implicitly invoked in articles. This can be reached through the Princeton University Press website for this book. Overall, both long and short pieces work individually and together to illustrate key facets of information's *longue durée* and wide reach from multiple perspectives. Again, this collection makes no claim to be comprehensive but rather aspires to be illustrative. Its editors hope that it will provide a range of audiences with useful and reliable insights, but also that it will prompt readers in the developing field of information history to pursue new questions and fill gaps made evident by this attempt. Paul Duguid

Thematic List of Entries

Concepts
Formats
Genres
Objects
People
Practices
Processes
Systems
Technologies

Concepts

cybernetics/feedback
data
documentary authority
error
governance
information, disinformation,
misinformation
information policy
intellectual property
knowledge
media
networks
privacy

public sphere
publicity/publication

Formats

books
databases
diagrams
files
horoscopes
journals
khipus
layout and script in letters
newsletters
newspapers
notebooks
scrolls and rolls

Genres

albums
bibliography
book sales catalogs
cases
inventories
letters
lists
manuals
maps
memos
petitions
reference books
registers
sales catalogs
sermons
social media

Objects

bells
cards
coins
government documents
inscriptions
money

People

archivists
diplomats/spies
merchants
postal customers
professors
proofreaders
readers
scribes
secretaries

Practices

- accounting
- appraising
- archaeological decipherment
- art of memory
- censorship
- ethnography
- excerpting/commonplacing
- forecasting
- forgery
- indexing
- intelligence testing
- learning
- observing
- office practices
- plagiarizing
- political reporting
- programming
- reading against the grain
- recording
- surveilling
- teaching
- translating
- travel

Processes

- commodification
- digitization
- globalization
- quantification
- storage and search

Systems

- bureaucracy
- landscapes and cities
- libraries and catalogs
- platforms
- telecommunications

Technologies

- algorithms
- cameras
- computers
- encrypting/decrypting
- letterpress lithography
- photocopiers
- printed visuals
- stereotype printing
- surveys and censuses
- xylography

Example entries

Forecasting

Prediction is a basic human activity that has persisted from antiquity to the present day, with myriad terms for methods of producing information about the future, including augury, foretelling, presaging, prognosticating, prophecy, and soothsaying. With roots in biblical tradition and classical antiquity, prophetic arts of divination hinged on predictive observation of a range of natural and otherworldly phenomena. Augury relied on recognizing omens in the behavior of birds and other animals, for example, as signals of auspicious or foreboding events. Astrology, a widespread practice spanning classical antiquity to medieval and *Renaissance Europe to the present day, involved reading the stars to foretell an individual's fortune, and early astronomers accurately projected the position of celestial bodies and the return of comets (most famously English astronomer Edmund Halley, who issued his predictive calculations of comet orbits in 1705). The historical record is replete with famous oracles, Cassandras, and prophets, from Pythia, the oracle at Delphi in ancient Greece, to the sixteenth-century French physician Nostradamus, whose ambiguous prophecies are still in print today.

The word forecast entered the English *lexicon by the fifteenth century, with an early usage being "contrive or plan beforehand; foreordain, predestine." Yet this obsolete definition of forecasting as a mode of determining the future would echo through the subsequent centuries' history of attempts—often futile—to understand and thus control future conditions. Forecasting reflects the ideologies, political priorities, and cultural ideals of its historical context, and so the history of forecasting reveals more about a particular time and place in the past than it does about the future itself.

Forecasting, as both cultural keyword and routinized practice, became more commonplace in the nineteenth century as it was intertwined with broader historical processes of commercialization, quantification, and professionalization. Forecasting was both an economic and an epistemic practice: a mechanism for risk management in the uncertain world of commercial and capitalist exchange, as well as a new form of knowledge production. Forecasters often claimed scientific authority for their methods of prediction, but, given the shifting definition of "science" throughout the nineteenth century, we cannot use present-day standards to retrospectively assess forecasts as "scientific" information or not. Forecasters' claims to scientific objectivity and rationality have been an important rhetorical strategy for constructing professional authority, both historically and in the present, yet forecasting is best understood as a combination of predictive calculation and predictive judgment.

If not strictly scientific, forecasting did become newly systematic in the nineteenth century. Government bureaucracies, paperwork, and what Ian Hacking has termed "the avalanche of printed numbers" were key elements of new predictive knowledge infrastructures. Postal, telegraph, and then telephone networks accelerated the circulation of information and so enabled the production of short-term forecasts that coexisted and competed with existing long-range predictions from the traditions of astrology, almanacs, and prophecy. Alongside forecasts as a form of information were imagined cultural and technoscientific futures. Beginning in the mid-nineteenth century, celebrations of industrial progress at world's fairs, proto—science fiction utopian and dystopian novels, and literary forecasts like Edward Bellamy's Looking Backward (1888) and H. G. Wells's Anticipations (1901) offered more speculative and spectacular visions of a distant future.

The late nineteenth century witnessed the proliferation of routinized forecasts in daily economic life, from weather to harvest to market. As they circulated outside the scientific and government institutions that often produced them, forecasts generated controversies over their accuracy, value, and legitimacy. In the United States, such controversies generated a shift away from a late nineteenth-century belief in predictive certainty toward an early twentieth-century acceptance of uncertainty as a feature rather than a failure of forecasting, an epistemic shift that parallels the nineteenth-century "erosion of determinism" and the "space . . . cleared for chance" identified by Ian Hacking.

The organization of national weather services in the United States and Europe enabled the production of daily weather forecasts, a form of information used for risk management for weather-dependent businesses and activities, from shipping companies to agricultural producers to outdoor excursionists. Although short-lived networks of weather observation stations existed in Europe and North America in the late seventeenth and late eighteenth centuries, they could not aggregate and analyze their data quickly enough to produce forecasts. In the mid- to late nineteenth century, the United States, France, Belgium, Britain, Italy, the German states, Scotland, and Russia established meteorological infrastructures—combining telegraph networks; decentralized networks of observers who conducted standardized synchronous observations of surface conditions including temperature, precipitation, and barometric pressure; and a centralized bureaucracy—that produced and circulated short-term predictions of the next day's weather. Robert Fitzroy (1805-65), the first head of the British Meteorological Department, began using the term forecast in 1861 according to this definition: "Prophecies or predictions they are not. The term forecast is strictly applicable to such an opinion as is the result of a scientific combination and calculation." In the United States the daily government forecast, first issued in 1871, was originally called "The Synopsis and Probabilities," but short-term weather forecasting was not probabilistic. The US Army Signal Service's official definition of the daily "probabilities" was "announcements of the changes, considered from the study of the charts . . . as probably to happen within the twenty-four hours then next ensuing." Probability of precipitation forecasts (e.g., 30 percent chance of rain) were not widespread until the 1960s and 1970s and are used to varying extents in countries around the world today as a way to communicate uncertainty about the future to the public.

The advent of short-term government weather forecasts as a public good created direct competition with long-range commercial forecasts long sold by "weather prophets" and almanac *publishers. Although there was no bright line between weather "prophecy" and "forecasting" in the nineteenth century, British and US government officials engaged in "boundary-work" in an attempt to distinguish professional scientific weather forecasting from superstition and fraud. The "war on the weather prophets" was not only a battle over professional authority and respectability but also a political and epistemic conflict over the commercialization of scientific knowledge, the temporalities of shortterm versus long-range forecasting, and the nature of foreknowledge itself.

Weather forecasting and crop forecasting are important but often overlooked aspects of the nineteenth-century expansion of state administrative capacity. Beginning in the early nineteenth century, local and then federal agricultural statistics bureaus in Europe and the United States produced volumes of crop estimates that were easily converted into yield forecasts for crops including wheat, barley, corn, oats, tobacco, and cotton. Agricultural statistics bureaus relied on networks of decentralized crop reporters who could be trusted to submit "disinterested" figures on crop acreage and condition. The premise that

objective government crop statistics would rationalize agricultural commodity markets—and thwart speculators who profited on commodity futures exchanges by predicting the price of "wind wheat" that they had not grown—did not always come to fruition. Crop forecasts, whether produced by government agricultural statistics bureaus or commercial forecasters, regularly influenced commodity markets, and bear-market forecasters could manipulate cotton prices, for example, with an inflated or fraudulent prediction of the season's yield. Predictive climate and crop statistics were also crucial to imperial expansion, and weather forecasting was the central component of imperial meteorological infrastructures around the globe in the nineteenth century, as *Jesuit observatories, nation-states, and local experts contributed to systems for tracking and predicting cyclones, typhoons, and hurricanes.

Economic forecasting had its origins in late nineteenth-century theories of cycles that, if not widely accepted in academic circles, had enough popular influence to be considered the antecedent of the professional business forecasting industry that emerged in the early twentieth century. In the 1870s and early 1880s, the English economist William Stanley Jevons (1835-82) posited predictive theories of correlation between sunspots and business cycles, declaring, "it becomes almost certain that the two series of phenomena, credit cycles and solar variations, are connected as effect and cause." In the United States, an Ohio farmer, Samuel Benner (1832-1913), became a household name after the 1876 publication of Benner's Prophecies of Future Ups and Downs in Prices (subsequently reprinted in over fifteen updated editions), which equipped readers with longterm predictions of the directionality of commodity markets in pig iron, hogs, corn, cotton, and provisions. Benner's price forecasts hinged on his claim that ups and downs in prices recurred in a symmetrical and predictable pattern that could be calculated as precisely as the return of a comet. Benner's method, based on a theory of electromagnetic meteorological cycles set forth in a weather almanac by John Tice, illustrates what Peter Eisenstadt has identified as the "meteorologizing" of the business cycle. The "business barometers" of the early twentieth century were predicated on the metaphorical assumption that both atmospheric and economic pressure could be measured and used to anticipate future conditions.

Although professional economic forecasters like Roger Babson, Irving Fisher, John Moody, and Warren Persons rose to prominence in the United States in the wake of the Panic of 1907, the business forecasting industry overall did not predict the US stock market crash of 1929 (with the exception of Roger Babson). And perhaps this is not surprising, given the performativity of markets and economic models: business forecasts can easily become self-fulfilling prophecies, as gloomy outlooks issued for any economic indicator can influence the behavior of corporations, investors, and consumers so as to cause a downturn. As business and government leaders increasingly studied business cycles and predictive economic indicators during the first half of the twentieth century, so too did advertising professionals on both sides of the Atlantic develop new strategies for using market research and consumer surveys in a predictive capacity (the forerunners of late twentieth-century trend forecasting).

In the context of late nineteenth-century professionalization, forecasters often claimed the imprimatur of science to establish authority and credibility with a consuming public, and the question of whether predicting the future was a legitimate practice bedeviled the worlds of meteorology and fortune-telling alike. The late nineteenth and early twentieth century witnessed the intensified policing and prosecution of fortune-tellers—primarily women—in France, the United States, and Australia, for example. Antidivination laws based in Elizabethan legal tradition and the Napoleonic *Code were applied arbitrarily throughout the nineteenth century and used to enforce nativist and white supremacist moral

reform agendas in urban spaces well into the twentieth century. For example, the wealthy white astrologer Evangeline Adams (1868-1932)—known as the "Society Palmist"—was acquitted of "pretending to tell fortunes" in New York City, while the successful Black businesswoman and character reader Adena Minott (1879—?) was targeted by a white supremacist home owners' protective association who sought to drive her Clio School of Mental Sciences out of its original Harlem neighborhood. The resurgence of Spiritualism on both sides of the Atlantic during and after World War I generated new debates over the legal status of occult foreknowledge, and a more liberal jurisprudence emerged to accommodate both the indeterminacy of fortune-telling and the religious freedoms of Spiritualist investigations of "the future life." The American law professor Blewett Lee, who wrote extensively about occult foreknowledge, posited in 1923 a ubiquitous future orientation: "All of us predict the future more or less, from the astronomer with his nautical almanac to the lawyer who foretells the outcome of a lawsuit, or the physician the result of an operation. The weather man makes a calling of predicting, and all who sit down and count the cost of a proposed undertaking are trying to unravel the future." By the end of the World War I era, forecasting had become an *epistemology of the everyday.

World War II marked a key turning point in the history of forecasting. The scope of forecasting became increasingly global from the mid- to late twentieth century, as catastrophic geopolitical and ecological futures were predicted by a range of institutions and individuals across the public and private sectors. The future of the world itself became at once a newly urgent moral category as well as a new terrain to be observed, calculated, and manipulated. The possibilities of nuclear annihilation were anticipated through Cold War geopolitical scenarios, nuclear evacuation drills, and cultural expressions of the atomic age. Dire forecasts—perhaps self-negating—of a nuclear World War III that would obliterate major cities and cripple entire societies never came to fruition. Malthusian warnings of disastrous demographic futures were part of the postwar emergence of global environmental prediction that hinged on a new concept of "the environment" as a totalizing ecological and planetary entity as well as on new interdisciplinary modes of expertise required to imagine and protect the environmental future. The apocalyptic famines of Paul Ehrlich's "population bomb" never happened in the 1970s and 1980s, but his 1968 book was representative of a postwar genre of future crises including Rachel Carson's 1962 Silent Spring and Alvin and Heidi Toffler's 1970 Future Shock.

The new postwar study of the future coalesced in a constellation of self-proclaimed futurists and practitioners of futures studies who combined quantitative and qualitative methods into a new form of social-scientific knowledge applied to problems of planetary, national, and local scope. Beginning in the mid-1960s, new organizations like the World Future Society, the Institute for the Future, and the World Futures Studies Federation held conferences and published academic journals (like Futures and the Futurist) alongside the work of dozens of less well-known futurist think tanks. Alongside Cold War attempts to strategically anticipate and ultimately control a shared global future, contests over long-term political and social futures emerged in myriad contexts, such as Pan-Africanist socialist development planning in Ghana in the 1950s and 1960s, USAID-funded simulations of the Nigerian agricultural economy in the 1960s and 1970s, and forecasts of a Czechoslovakian postsocialist future and a communist Romanian future in the 1970s and 1980s.

Although the postwar era was not the first instance of predictive calculation, the use of *digital computing technology for simulation and modeling brought the long-term future into sharper focus in a

range of contexts, from successful numerical weather prediction in the 1950s to RAND's Delphi method in the 1960s to the production of global climate data that powered the first climate modeling in the 1970s. The twenty-first-century rise of *big data and predictive analytics has created new methods of prediction as well as new digital marketplaces for buying and selling information about the future. Weather futures, options, and derivatives trading began at the turn of the twenty-first century and use government weather data (a public good) to profit from the practice of betting on future weather. Predictive analytics, which employs algorithmic modeling of big data to forecast human behavior, is widely used in the retail, health-care, and social media industries, among others. But as scholars and critics of algorithmic bias have recently noted, predictive analytics' promise of objectivity is unfulfilled, as its application to the US criminal justice system reveals. Big-data techniques of "predictive policing" (which law enforcement uses to target neighborhoods where they expect crimes to happen) and "crime forecasting" (which state prisons use to predict recidivism rates of incarcerated people) perpetuate the centuries-old structural racial discrimination that is the foundation of the prison-industrial complex in the twenty-first-century United States.

Temporalities of forecasting have shifted once again at the turn of the twenty-first century with the advent of nowcasting (a term that migrated from meteorology to economics), which compresses the time horizon of short-term forecasting even further to an assessment of the present and immediate future. Meteorological nowcasting predicts the weather within six hours within a square kilometer, and central banks in Europe, North America, and South America use macroeconomic nowcasting for GDP and inflation. Yet even with the increasing speed, precision, and hyperlocal scope of routinized forecasting in the twenty-first century, unforeseen "Black Swan" events like the Great Recession, Brexit, and the 2016 US presidential election defy both probabilistic forecasting and the art of predictive judgment, reminding us that certain futures always remain unpredictable.

Jamie L. Pietruska

Art of Memory

In 1968, Alexander Lurija, a Russian neuropsychologist, published The Mind of a Mnemonist: A Little Book about a Vast Memory, which recounted—with scientific rigor and considerable narrative skill—a clinical case that he had studied. He discussed a man, Seresevskij, who from childhood was burdened by an excessive memory that prevented him from forgetting anything. When, in the 1930s, Seresevskij performed as a mnemonist, he put in place a series of techniques to discipline his memory. These techniques—associations, images giving visual form to words, the construction of a spatial route, that is, a succession of places in which images were gathered—are identical to those practiced by an age-old tradition that neither Lurija nor Seresevskij knew: the art of memory, also known as artificial or spatial memory. From ancient Greece until the *Renaissance, this tradition played an important role in European culture, transforming itself gradually through contact with diverse philosophical and scientific cultures, changes in the modes of communication, and the different needs to which it responded. At the same time—as Lurija's case shows us—the principles on which it rested seem to have some basis in how the brain works. After all, more recently anthropologists have shown that these techniques also exist in non-European cultures, although they manifest differently.

In this entry I trace not so much the different theories of memory and the treatises that taught how to develop it, but rather how mnemonics were used between the Middle Ages and the end of the sixteenth

century as a means to make information that might otherwise be forgotten memorable. We must begin with the classical texts that were the foundations of the tradition. These were rhetorical texts, since the orator had to rely on a well-trained memory both in the phase of inventio—the creation of the discourse—and in that of actio—the recitation in public. Cicero's De oratore (On the orator) (11.8688), the pseudo-Ciceronian Rhetorica ad Herennium (Rhetoric to Herennius) (111.16-24), and Quintilian's De institution oratoria (On the training of the orator) (XI.2) (which also expresses doubts and reservations about traditional mnemonic practices) transmit the basic components of a technique that was developed in Greece and has its roots deep in oral society. The Aristotelian texts are also essential, especially De anima (On the soul) (III.3.427b-432a) and De memoria et reminiscentia (On memory and recollection) (451b-452a), which highlight the link between memory and imagination and describe the procedures underlying the associations that facilitate recollection: similarity, opposition, and contiguity. From the classical world onward, then, the art of memory taught not how to record memories, but how to transform them. Memory's riches thus became an extensive treasury for discovering more: from which to create new words, concepts, and images.

In addition to the rhetorical texts, we find medical ones. Avicenna in particular harmonized diverse traditions regarding the location of the soul's functions. In general, the function of memory was located in the lower part of the brain. These texts gave instructions about diet and therapies that could improve the physical conditions that sustain memory.

In the Christian world, the classical tradition was revived and transformed. The great Dominican writers Albertus Magnus and Thomas Aquinas commented on Aristotelian psychology and on the precepts of Cicero and of the Rhetorica ad Herennium. But the meaning of mnemonic techniques changed. They assumed a strong religious connotation: remembering the passion of Christ, one's own sins, the pains and joys of the afterlife, the articles of faith, and the most important prayers became an essential task that concerned the salvation or damnation of the soul. At the same time, the ancient techniques were combined with the practices of monastic meditation, which taught how to construct in the mind an ordered path that gradually produces an interior transformation and lifts one up to God. An extraordinary example of this is the Divina Commedia (Divine Comedy). Dante the pilgrim crosses Hell, Purgatory, and Paradise, meeting historical characters that are also exempla of all the sins and all the virtues. As he progresses, he purifies himself morally and grows in his knowledge of the order that governs the world. When he reaches the end of his journey through Paradise, he experiences the vision of the mystery of the Trinity, and at this point "memory yields to such excess" (cede la memoria a tanto oltraggio) (Paradiso, XXXIII, 57).

Before and after Dante, Dominican and Franciscan preachers used mnemonic techniques both to construct and recall their sermons, and to imprint them in the memory of a largely illiterate public. To this end, they employed the logical and rhetorical divisions of the subject in question, but also images from civic iconography. For example, St. Bernardino of Siena (1380-1444), a Franciscan preacher who enjoyed enormous success thanks also to his unconventional theatrical performances, connected the contents of his sermons in Siena to famous local images like the Annunciation by Simone Martini in the Duomo, or the frescos of Good and Bad Government by Ambrogio Lorenzetti in the Palazzo Pubblico. He gradually directed the gaze of his listeners and gave instructions for the use of images, in the sense that painters' images should be transformed into imagines agentes (acting images), images capable of recalling the moral teachings that the preacher associated with them (in the case of the Annunciation,

how women should behave, in the case of Lorenzetti's frescos, how governors should secure peace). In this way, every time a member of the public saw these images, she or he would recall the teachings of St. Bernardino.

Many categories of people in addition to preachers practiced the art of memory in the fifteenth century: men of letters, doctors, ambassadors, students and professors engaged in university disputations, and, above all, jurists. There were also other reasons to employ the techniques of memory: contemporary treatises taught how to remember the cards already played in a card game, credits, debts, dates, and the names of creditors and debtors, and also how to remember the merchandise loaded on ships. Moreover, we also find these techniques in didactic practices, especially at the intersection between pedagogy and play that was so prominent in European culture between the fifteenth and seventeenth centuries. For example, in 1507, Thomas Murner, a Franciscan from Strasbourg, published the Chartiludium logice seu logica poetica vel memorativa (Logical card game or poetic and mnemonic logic) in which a game of cards teaches students to recall the Summulae logicales (Brief summaries of logic) of Peter of Spain, a thirteenth-century text still present in university curricula despite its outdated contents and its difficult and barbarous Latin. In 1518, Murner's Chartiludium institute summarie (Card game in brief) proposed the same method, though with different images, to facilitate the memorization of complex case law. This mnemonic use of playing cards was very durable: at the end of the seventeenth century, a great scholar, Francesco Bianchini, constructed illustrated books and playing cards in parallel to outline, condense, and make memorable universal history.

In the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, mnemonic techniques were the object of criticism and satire on the part of men of letters and philosophers like Erasmus, Melanchthon, Agrippa, and Rabelais. The masters of memory were criticized for the useless tasks they inflicted on their pupils, for the purely passive and repetitive nature of their practices, and for their pretensions to transmit with great speed a knowledge that was based on words instead of matter. The diffusion of printing, moreover, helped to create a situation in which the art of memory seemed to lose its importance: the book, the dictionary, and the catalog provided modern readers with the basic tools to cultivate their own learning and to write new works. And yet, even in this moment of crisis and polemic, the art of memory found new life and enjoyed great prominence in European universities, courts, and printing presses.

Various components led to this apparently paradoxical state of affairs. On the one hand, printing was very well suited to interact with those currents of thought—as in the case of Petrus Ramus (1515-72)—that made memory a part of logic, linking memory to the problem of the method to be followed in research and in the transmission of knowledge. It became typical of Ramism to use diagrams and large tree structures in which the logical path taken could be visualized and its memorization and presentation were both made easier. The page of the printed book offered an ordered and reproducible space in which diagrams and large synoptic tables based on taxonomic division could be inserted. In this way, it was possible to render "knowledge visible," as the editorial project of the Accademia Veneziana della Fama (1558-61) proposed—a project entrusted to Paulus Manutius, heir and descendant of the famous printer Aldus Manutius.

There were also other important elements of the new sixteenth-century culture that worked well with the art of memory. The rebirth of arts and letters was often connected to the imitation of the ancients, in an effort to revive in new forms a world that was perceived to be the guardian of the secrets of

beauty. In this context, imitating classical models became crucial. To imitate them (and to emulate and surpass them, perhaps) it was necessary to have them present in one's memory. Here the techniques of memory integrated traditional modes of reading and of memorizing texts and interacted with the new tools offered by the printed book, such as rhyming dictionaries, lists of sources, *commonplaces, and illustrations that translated the text into a gallery of images.

The art of memory also drew new strength from different philosophical and religious currents—such as Neoplatonism, hermeticism, and kabbalah—that exalted the powers of imagination and of the human mind. The techniques of memory were not only an aid to make up for the weaknesses of man, but a symbol of his almost divine potential. The memory theater of Giulio Camillo (ca. 1480-1544) is exemplary in this sense; it presents itself both as a kind of machine for literary memory, in that it offers the tools to remember and imitate model texts, and as a guide to attain the highest powers and knowledge of which the mind was capable. Camillo's theater in fact aims to reproduce the divine order that expresses itself on the different levels of reality. Camillo believed that the order uncovered was not arbitrary, but one that reproduced and made visible the very order of the cosmos. The structure is a type of grid, based on seven. At the base there are seven columns that represent the seven planets and the divinities that Greek mythology associated with them, the days of the creation, and also the sefirot, the divine attributes in Hebrew mystical tradition, as well as the first principles of Pythagorean and hermetic philosophy. The seven columns of the theater thus became the images of memory in a syncretistic attempt that had its celebrated model in the approach of Pico della Mirandola. The theater is presented as the synthesis of the truths that form part of various philosophical and religious traditions.

The columns constitute the vertical order of the theater; seven steps mark its horizontal order. One begins from divine ideas, first principles, to ascend through man and nature to the arts and sciences. The model is the classical theater, but the structure is reversed: at the center, on the stage, stands the spectator, who sees around him, in the places and images of the theater, all reality as his mind perceives it. We know that Camillo had a wooden model of his theater constructed and that he had the images painted by great artists, like his friend Titian. This project embodied in itself the myths of the Renaissance. The theater must of course provide the tools to master rapidly the secrets that made ancient texts so beautiful. It must at the same time guarantee access to the *encyclopedia—but not only that. For anyone who knew how to attain the wisdom kept hidden in the theater, it opened the paths to the fulfillment of the alchemical opus and to deification. Indeed, in its creator's intentions, the theater gave men divine powers, because it offered them the keys to the three arts of transformation: eloquence (the metamorphosis of words), alchemy (the metamorphosis of things), and deification (the metamorphosis of the soul).

Precisely these characteristics of Camillo's theater help us understand the fascination that the art of memory exercised in the sixteenth century, and the reasons behind its crisis. Both its allure and its crisis were related to the encyclopedic character that the art assumed, and to its magical and esoteric components. The expectations that the art created could be dangerous, as one famous case demonstrates. Giordano Bruno (1548-1600), philosopher and great master of the art of memory, was in exile in various European countries because he was considered a dangerous heretic. He returned to Italy in 1591 because the Venetian patrician Giovanni Mocenigo wanted him to teach him the secrets of the art, and he died burnt at the stake in the Campo de' Fiori in Rome on February 17, 1600.

Between the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries the production of texts about the art of memory continued, but the preconditions for a crisis materialized. The mistrust toward occultism, the rejection of magic, the growth and specialization of knowledge, the decline of a unitary conception of the world and of knowledge, all contributed to a radical crisis in the tradition of the art of memory.

At the same time, however, in the last decades of the sixteenth century, its techniques were used by missionaries as valuable tools to make distant, different worlds communicate with each other. In 1579, the Franciscan Diego Valadés published in Perugia his Rhetorica christiana (Christian rhetoric) in which the use of the art of memory builds a bridge between the world of conquistadors and that of Indigenous peoples. Against those who denied local populations human dignity, reducing them to the state of beasts, Valadés pointed out that even if they do not use alphabetical writing, they nevertheless use images to communicate and to remember, exactly as the ancient Egyptians once did and Europeans do still. To defend Indigenous populations, Valadés carried out a reverse cultural translation. The mysterious and unsettling images of pre-Columbian civilization are framed in a way that renders them accessible to the Western eye, in that it reveals their resemblance either to a remote antiquity that the West views with reverent awe (the hieroglyphs of ancient Egypt) or to a practice diffused throughout Western culture, namely that of the art of memory. This maneuver was similar in some ways to that which the Jesuit Matteo Ricci attempted in China in the last decades of the sixteenth century, when he committed the fundamental truths of Christianity to a *"memory palace" and created a parallel between Chinese ideograms and European mnemonic images.

The capacity of images to communicate beyond linguistic differences meant that in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the art of memory, with its imagines agentes (acting images), was intertwined with utopia. For example, in the City of the Sun by Tommaso Campanella (1568-1639), all the sciences and arts were depicted in images painted on seven walls that encircle the city, reproducing the cosmic order. The children of the city of the sun could thus learn the encyclopedia of knowledge just by looking at the painted images while they played. The Orbis sensualium pictus (World of the senses in pictures, 1658) of Jan Amos Komensky (or Comenius) was a great success, with its promise to communicate knowledge in an efficient and pleasing manner, using all the traditional resources of mnemonics, especially images. For Comenius, as for Campanella, the renewal of knowledge had a strong utopian charge: in his view, pansophism, or universal knowledge, would bring peace. The images make possible the rediscovery of a common ground beyond divisions and, at the same time, the ascent from the orbis sensualis (sensual world) to the orbis intellectualis (intellectual world)—to a united and peaceful vision of reality.

Lina Bolzoni

Structures of Epic Poetry: Vol. I: Foundations. Vol. II.1/II.2: Configuration. Vol. III: Continuity

edited by: Christiane Reitz and Simone Finkmann [De Gruyter, Hardcover: ISBN: 9783110492002; Electronic: ISBN: 9783110492590]

This compendium (4 vols.) studies the continuity, flexibility, and variation of structural elements in epic narratives. It provides an overview of the structural patterns of epic poetry by means of a standardized, stringent terminology. Both diachronic developments and changes within individual epics are scrutinized in order to provide a comprehensive structural approach and a key to intra- and intertextual characteristics of ancient epic poetry.

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Volume I offers a survey of the fundamental issues concerning the history, theory, genre, and subject matter of ancient epic, and analyses its core structures, such as similes, catalogues, and ekphraseis.

Volumes II.1 and II.2 tackle the most prominent structural elements used to describe battle narratives, epic journeys, movement in time and space, as well as the communication between different groups of epic characters.

Volume III is devoted to the post-classical history of epic poetry, with chapters on late antique, Byzantine, and Neo-Latin epic poetry, as well as the cento. It includes an overview of ancient narrative poems commonly classified as epyllia and epics in addition to a core bibliography comprising the main editions and commentaries from Homer to Silius Italicus.

All volumes moreover contain extensive indices (locorum, nominum, rerum) and up-to-date bibliographies.

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This set offers more rigor and clarity to the study of classical Greek and Roman epic from Homer to Silius. It proposes a homogeneous classification of genre in ancient and modern theories of epic in historical intergeneric influences and interactions of principles of communication in the origin, tradition, and reinvention of epic structures including a catalog themes, settings, patterns in space and time, epic journeys and related scenes. As well wrought as these essays confront the structures ancient epics systematically there is still much left unsaid and elsewhere studies such as the orality and repetition, social settings, and cultural norms the stories entertain the listeners to internalize. A useful reference work that helps anyone who wishes to see the complex sweep of epics in the ancient world.

Contents of the 4 volumes: **Structures of Epic Poetry: Vol. I: Foundations. Vol. II.1/II.2: Configuration. Vol. III: Continuity. Pages 2758. Sold as set.**

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STRUCTURES OF EPIC POETRY: VOL. III: CONTINUITY

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Excerpts: The aim of the present compendium is to identify and to trace those epic scenes and structures diachronically whose set forms, sequences, and recognisable features mark them as a lasting and integral part of the ancient epic tradition. Our notion of the bauform or 'epic structure' as design is more capacious than that of the established concept of the 'type-scene' and goes far beyond the conceptual scope of epic formulae. Our underlying theoretical considerations are reflected by a deliberate variety of concepts.

Firstly, we build on the ideas of structuralist thinkers and, in particular, the tradition of Russian Formalism. The terminology of the Geneva School of Linguistics (Ferdinand de Saussure), a differentiated and productive engagement both with synchronic and with diachronic observations, and the acceptance of the systemic structural nature of language and literature form the basis of the studies collected in this compendium. Yet, we have to take into account that already at an early stage, Formalism opted against a too 'scholastic formalism'. To name one example, Tynjanov and Jakobson explicitly argued for a view on literary products that includes both a historical approach and a structural analysis? We aim at achieving a mode of speaking that is both theoretically grounded and practicable, and that requires us as scholars to engage with the material in its structural form and to attend to the dynamic processes of its reception and imitation. Through a conscious synthesis of established methods, we strive to build a theory and terminology based on the texts themselves.

We acknowledge that in recent years the terminology of narratology and the analytic apparatus of intertextuality have fundamentally influenced how scholars interpret ancient texts. The study of ancient epic, in particular, has always been concerned with the processes of reception and imitation. A few stages of scholarly preoccupation with the phenomenon of literary imitatio deserve a brief outline. Within the broader humanities but also among classical philologists an increased interest in literary theory and a need for a consistent terminology for describing how texts interact and mutually influence one another9 have led scholars to engage thoroughly with the intellectual processes underlying the practice of literary reference. The theories of intertextuality and narratology are established research paradigms available to readers and researchers for describing these complex processes.

Within this growing body of scholarship a number of approaches are distinguishable. Works of literary criticism range from studies of particular authors and poems to extended treatments of whole epochs. New scholarly attention to issues of gender has put the questions it entails at the forefront of many

research projects and programmes. Another fruitful approach investigates the relationship between politics and poetry, especially as it pertains to the conditions of literary production under dictatorial regimes. The perspective of cultural history increasingly informs single-author studies and multi-author collections on epic. Works of this kind, e.g. Galinsky (1996) on the Augustan period and the volumes by Boyle/ Dominik (2003) and Kramer/Reitz (2010) on the Flavian period, illuminate the contexts and historical processes that bear on the various modes and media of expression within a given epoch. Furthermore, today the afterlives of texts and authors in the Middle Ages and in Neo-Latin epic receive treatment not only in individual studies, but also in more general overviews.

With our compendium we aim to put forward a systematic overview of the most important structural elements in ancient epic. The frequent interplay and juxtaposition of individual narrative elements makes it clear that epic poems are neither limited nor constrained by tradition. To the contrary, they can also be influenced by other genres.36 Epic poetry develops its power for innovation precisely out of the recognisability of its fixed structures. In reference to Statius, Henderson described the great variety of epic structures as total chaos:

> Olympian inserts, twin catalogues and teichoscopy, necromancy and underworld scenography, funeral games and aristeiai, prayer-sequences and prophecy, tragic included narrative and aetiological hymn, developed formal similes, battle-Sturm and Drang, mountain vastness ... in extenso — the whole works!

We are more optimistic to be able to find a systematic approach. Set forms and familiar contents, on the one hand, enable recipients to orient themselves within the vast texture of an epic narrative and form a shared set of expectations, which allows the epic poet either to fulfil them or to be innovative by deviating from them. They can be reversed, compressed, or simply alluded to as, for example, in 'almost-episodes'. Epic structures, by their very consistency, facilitate variation.

The first volume Foundations') contains theoretical considerations on the architecture of ancient epic that lay the foundation for our study: contributions on genre and genre theory, on formularity in epic narration, on classification, i.e. the

distinctions between didactic and narrative epic, and the use of mythological and historical material. Every scholar and reader of epic literature is confronted with the problem that in many respects Ovid's Metamorphoses occupies an exceptional place in the epic tradition. Consequently, we have left it up to the contributors whether to include the Metamorphoses in their essays or whether to exclude the work from their purview. To address potential gaps in coverage arising from our editorial guidelines, a separate contribution examines Ovid's engagement with traditional epic structures using the poet's battle, storm, and hospitality scenes as representative examples.

The question of book divisions as early attempts to identify structures, and the role of the authorial voice in the initial proem, the internal proem, and the sphragis are handled in individual contributions. As we encouraged a plurality of narratological approaches, we included the aforementioned chapter on narratology and epic poetry in this volume to unburden the single contributions from repetitive methodological introductions. Volume I also broaches the topic of those structural elements whose function may denote those structural elements that pause or accompany the main action. They are, in a sense, situated alongside the plot, not disconnected to it but capable of coming loose. In addition to forming narratological digressions, they can contain inset narratives of parallel stories or offer retrospect

and proleptic narration. In this respect, structural elements, like catalogues, aetiological and genealogical digressions, ekphraseis, or similes, are also open to metapoetic interpretations. The comparably rare but important occurrence of 'almost-episodes' is also treated separately in this volume.

Whereas the essays designated for each individual bauform keep their focus within the genre of epic, a separate contribution discusses the intergeneric aspects of structural elements, especially in connection to tragedy. Similarly, special manifestations of epic forms, like parody, are not treated in the essays on individual structural elements. Rather, the topic is taken up in the contributions on Greek and Roman epyllia. Another problem is raised by texts transmitted only in fragments, which may nonetheless have formed an important influence on later poems. Therefore, a separate contribution is devoted to examining the traces of epic structures in fragmentary epic poems.

In volumes II.1 and II.2 (`Configuration') we aim to provide a comprehensive approach to the discussion of the most important epic structures that are tied to epic plots. Volume II.1 is devoted to representations of battle scenes, proceeding sequentially through war preparations (arming), observation (teichoscopy), the individual stages and modes (single combat, mass combat, chain-reaction fights, naval and river battles), and extraordinary feats (aristeiai) of epic combat, as well as its aftermath (deaths, burial rites, and funeral games). The first section of volume II.2 is dedicated to epic journeys and their related scenes, most importantly arrivals,

banquet scenes, departures, and storm scenes, which are at the core of nostos and ktisis epics. The recognition that epic action takes place in time and space (both on the horizontal and vertical axis) informs the second and the third section of volume II.2. A set of contributions explores how epic poetry understands and makes use of time (and, by extension, weather and the challenges or blessings it provides) in its varying structural functions and of space, especially with regard to the portrayal of landscapes, cities, mythical places, as well as the abodes of the dead and of the gods. The fourth and final section of volume II.2 encompasses the broad domain of communication. The scope includes not only communication as it transpires between the characters of a given poem (e.g. in messenger and council scenes), but it also extends to communication with the past and the future in the context of underworld scenes, prophecies, epiphanies, and dreams.

In volume III our authors address the question of epic structures on a timeline from Akkadian epic to the Neo-Latin texts of the 19th century. The final paper discusses one of the many possibilities provided by digital research tools and methods for the study of structural elements and narrative patterns in the epic tradition.

By including extensive bibliographies and indices of sources, names, and subjects, we have endeavoured to make the compendium as accessible as possible not only for classical philologists, but for any literary scholar or reader interested in narrative genres. We are convinced that the contributions in these volumes furnish the concept of the bauform with the needed structural rigor, new analysis, and fresh presentation. The sophisticated toolkit available to today's philologists and recent theoretical insights into epic imitation have together enabled this project, in all its intended plurality, to plumb the utility of existing methodologies and to leverage a clear structure and comprehensible organisation into attaining the following goal: to give an overview of ancient epic structures that describes their diachronic development, analyses their varied instantiations, and ultimately provides a key to the intertextual character of ancient epic narrative and its tradition.

A Look Inside Some of the Chapters

Ancient and modern theories of epic by Philip Hardie

This chapter will analyse the range of ancient statements and debates about the nature and goals of epic poetry, both as formulated explicitly in surviving discussions in the ancient literary critics, chief among whom Plato, Aristotle, Horace, and the fragmented theory of epic to be excavated from the scholia; and as formulated implicitly in `werkintern' or `werkimmanent' representations within the epic texts: performances by fictional epic bards and the response thereto by internal audiences, ekphrasis, figures of fama, etc. Questions of authority and tradition in this most authoritative and traditional of genres prompt ancient theorisation of the status and exemplarity of the two 'gods' of ancient epic, Homer and Vergil: topics will include the idea of the universality of Homer as source, and of Vergil, the Roman Homer; and the importance of allegorisation as a means of defending the authority of epic, and of asserting the profundity of its doctrine.

The universalist view of Homer sees him as the source of all genres; ancient theory of epic is much concerned with the relationship of epic to other genres, both to other kinds of poetry within the broader category of hexameter epos (bucolic, didactic), and to other genres (tragedy, lyric, elegy, etc.). Within the genre of epic there is discussion and negotiation of subgenres, in their relationship to the 'gold standard' of Homer and Vergil: cyclical epic, historical epic, panegyrical epic, epyllion.

The chapter will also look forward to Renaissance and modern theories of epic, in terms of their reception both of ancient epic and of ancient theories of epic. For example, the protracted Renaissance debate over epic and romance picks up on Ovid's testing of the limits of Vergilian epic in his Metamorphoses. Bakhtin's contrastive characterisation of epic and the novel gives a negative cast to ancient epic's claim to authority.

The narrative forms and mythological materials of classical epic by Joseph Farrell

The most characteristic themes of Greek and Roman epic are warfare and voyaging. Most epics therefore develop or examine the proposition that 'life is a battle' or that 'life is a journey'. Epic treatments of both themes regard them as consummately heroic undertakings, but may present them either as unproblematically compatible with one another, or else as antithetical or complementary themes. Hercules, for instance, travels the world in what is a series of battles. For Achilles, on the other hand, a journey home stands in sharp contrast to the glorious but short life that he has chosen. But Odysseus' long-delayed homecoming is the defining achievement of his heroic career. For Homer and most of his critics, Achilles and Odysseus are mutually incompatible, even antagonistic types of hero; yet, Vergil seems to suggest that Aeneas' Odyssean' wandering is a necessary prelude to his `Iliadic' victory.

These story patterns inform not only mythic but historical epic as well, and once again in various ways. The pattern of voyage followed by war may have been intrinsic to the subgenre of ktisis (foundation) epic, particularly in the case of Greek cities that traced their origins to the colonisation movement of the archaic period. Such poems seem also to have followed the practice of local historians and mythographers by tracing the origins of the cities and peoples that they celebrated back to the heroic period (as is most clearly visible in Ennius' Annales, despite its fragmentary condition); alternatively, they correlated historical events with mythic antecedents in a typological way (as can be seen variously in the remains of Rhianus' Messeniaca or Naevius' Bellum Poenicum and with great clarity in Vergil's Aeneid).

Sophisticated responses to these tendencies are to be found in Apollonius' Argonautica, Ovid's Metamorphoses, Lucan's Bellum Ciuile, and in Flavian epic.

Learning the epic formula by Egbert Bakker

This chapter offers a broad overview of oral-formulaic theory. It argues that the conditions for formulaic composition of epic poetry in hexametric verse are not confined to the historical context envisaged by oral-formulaic theory: the production of epic song in the complete absence of writing and texts. Reading and writing in their earliest stages do not end a poet's reliance on the interplay between formulas and the verse. Nor are formulas as such a phenomenon that is confined to oral-formulaic poetry: ordinary language is full of ready-made phrases and word combinations, and the way in which an apprentice poet learns the epic language is not fundamentally different from the way in which children learn their native language. The chapter ends with a brief analysis of some lines of the late antique epic poet Quintus of Smyrna as an illustration that even under conditions of full literacy poets can acquire and interiorise the epic language.

Narratology and classical epic by Robert Kirstein, Andreas Abele, and Hans-Peter Nill

Narrative theory or narratology, to use the term coined by Tzvetan Todorov in the late 1960s, has in recent decades evolved into a key concept of literary theory. Its subject, the oral and written, literary and non-literary narrative has become almost a principal paradigm of Cultural Studies. In this view, narrative appears as an anthropologically given (culturally and socially variable) fact, as a ubiquitous means both of individual and collective interpretation of the world and of the making of cultural meaning. No other literary genre of modern literature is so closely linked to the aspect of the search for meaning in an increasingly fragmented and uncertain world as the novel.

This gives rise to two aspects that are relevant for the narratological interpretation of ancient Greek and Latin texts: first, a significant portion of current narratological theorizing takes place around the (modern) novel. Second, the special role of the ancient epic as an object of narratological analysis within the study of Classical Philology is given by the fact that epic poetry has been viewed as the literary precursor of the novel since the 18th century. The occasional objection that narratology, with a certain arbitrariness, imposes unfitting, modern theories upon ancient texts proves problematic since the earlier research of the 20th century - in a time when the term `narratology' was still unfamiliar - was partially based upon the same theoretical approaches that, together with (French) structuralism, led to today's concept of narratology.

The first part of this article deals with the history, methodology, and terminology of narratological research from the late 1960s until now both in the general field of Literary Studies and in Classics. The second part responds to the 'clash of cultures' between traditional hermeneutics and modern theory. The third and final section discusses themes and trends in the area of narratology and Classics.

Epic and rhetoric by Christiane Reitz

Speech and discourse are stock components of the narrative from the beginning of the epic tradition. The speakers' rhetorical skills become part of the narrative discourse, as can be seen from Iliad 3: Helen in the teichoscopy characterises Odysseus by his rhetorical skills. Statistically speaking, 45% of the Iliad and67% of the Odyssey are made up of direct speech. Epic speeches, both Greek and Latin, have been

subjected to rhetorical analysis and theoretical discussion by the ancient critics, and epic poets have been evaluated - or denigrated, as in the case of Ovid and Lucan - by their use of rhetoric. In this survey, I concentrate on the interaction between theory and rhetorical(e)0.7 practice, as evident from its use in epic poetry.

Alexandrian book division and its reception in Greek and Roman epic by Gregor Bitto

It remains a matter of debate when the two Homeric poems were divided into 24 books each. A wide range of suggestions has been offered: from a division that ul(e)0.7timately goes back to the poet himself to an attribution solely to the Alexandrian edi(e)0.7tors. Apollonius' Argonautica, the first ancient epic after Homer's Iliad and Odyssey to survive in its entirety, exhibits clear characteris(e)0.7tics of a book divis(e)0.7ion very consciously made and one that refers back to the aforementioned predecessors. Its substantial reduction of book numbers, from 24 to 4, adds special weight to each book in terms of uni(e)0.7ty and separation. Additional proems to Books 3 and 4 underl(e)0.7ine the segmentation and its role to create narrative meaning.

Composing an epic poem w(e)0.7ith special attention to book division becomes fashionable for Roman epicists, at least since Ennius: Livius Andronicus is likely to have adopted the book division of his Greek original; there is evidence for a posthumous, post-Ennian book division in Naevius' Bellum Poenicum (Suet. gramm. 2). Enni(e)0.7us' 18 books of the Annales show a division into triads. Fragments of the proems to Books 7 and 10 display metapoetic statements that emphasise the book division and make use of the special attention readers give to beginnings.

The prime importance of book division for the macrostructure of an epic poem is most prominent in the 12 books of Vergil's Aeneid, without being employed schematically or pedantically: for example, the double structure of an Odyssean and an Iliadic half is suggested, but the proem in the middle in Book 7 is not situated directly at the beginni(e)0.7ng but a little later, thus undermini(e)0.7ng division. The reception of Vergil transformed his Aeneid into the model Roman epic. Just to mention two examples: playing with book divisions is characteristic for Ovid's Metamorphoses and the 12-book structure serves as a benchmark for Statius' Thebaid.

Accordingly, this paper focuses on the reception of the (Alexandrian-)Homeric book division in subsequent epics, including, of course, the reception of such receptions, in order to highlight how this structuring device, totally disconnected from its originally mostly pragmatic function, is employed by later epicists to add layers of meaning to their narrative.

Ovid's Metamorphoses: the naughty boy of the Graeco-Roman epic tradition by Allison Sharrock

Where and how does Ovid's extraordinary 15-book hexameter poem on stories of metamorphosis fit into the history of classical epic? At the turn of the eras, Latin epic had just found its definitive form in the shape of Vergil's Aeneid, leaving an extraordinary challenge for anyone who might seek to pile Pelion on Ossa thereafter (to use, along with the Roman poets, the metaphor of Gigantomachy for writing of epic). Ovid's response to the Vergilian perfection is so outrageous that it risks stretching the generic boundaries beyond breaking point, and yet for every accusation of epic impropriety that could be made against the Metamorphoses, it would be possible also to find precedent in the epic tradition, including in

the Aeneid itself. The argument of this chapter is that Ovid's poem makes use of the traditional building blocks of epic in a way that is both conventional and daringly innovative. It is conventional in that all the parts are, in some way, present in the poem, but innovative in that those parts are tested near to or sometimes beyond the point of destruction. The overall effect is that all the elements of a proper epic poem can be identified within the Metamorphoses, but that the balance of parts, together with the Siren-like attraction of individual stories, constantly threatens to undermine the reader's perception of the epic whole. After briefly considering the extensive cross-generic fertilisation of the poem (itself an epic feature with pedigree back to Homer, the source of all the genres) together with the problems of teleology and wholeness, my discussion concentrates on three major genre-defining building blocks of epic: battles, journeys, and hospitality. In each case, I argue that the poem consciously situates itself within epic convention, while constantly straining on the leash as if to undermine its epic status in the very act of claiming it — and equally to claim it in the act of undermining.

Battle scenes in ancient epic — a short introduction by Christiane Reitz and Simone Finkmann

Battle narratives are an integral, even constituent part of epic poetry, which is why an entire volume of this compendium is dedicated to the study of this central structure. Already the programmatic proems of Greek and Roman epic leave no doubt as to the androcentric worldview of the epic genre, which, in contrast to the *epyllion,* focuses on male heroes and their explorative missions and military conflicts on behalf of a patriarchal society. Battle scenes are at the core of the epic plot and generally form the climax of the action with the confrontation of the two opposing armies or a decisive duel between their respective leaders, the protagonist and antagonist of the narrative. The length of the depicted battles varies from a single day (with sunset as the starting and nightfall as the end point) to several years. Some epic poems also include *analepseis* which reference battles that occur prior to the main narrative and *prolepseis* which anticipate historical battles that take place long after the conclusion of the epic plot, sometimes even in the poet's lifetime. Similarly, the narrative scope of the embedded fighting scenes ranges from shorter episodes to book-length depictions. It can even be the pervasive subject of an entire epic,[3] which is therefore referred to as a heroic or martial epic, as in the case of Homer's *Iliad,* Statius' *Thebaid,* Quintus of Smyrna's *Posthomerica,* or Triphiodorus' *Sack of Troy,* or as a historical epic, like Lucan's *Bellum Ciuile* and Silius Italicus' *Punica.* It has long been established that the structure of individual battle scenes can be important for the epic *equilibrium* in general. Tipping has, for example, supported this observation for the *Punica* where the structure of Book 12 with its frequent changes in the power dynamics between the Roman and Carthaginian armies is representative of the macrostructure of the entire epic.

Whereas the aforementioned epics focus on one main war - the Trojan War, the Battle of the Seven against Thebes, the Roman Civil War between Caesar and Pompey (49-45 BC), and the Second Punic War (218-201 BC) - *nostos, ktisis,* and travel epics also contain a great variety of battle scenes, both in retrospective and as part of the heroes' adventures during their sea voyages. Battle scenes can be extensive but concentrated in one half of the epic, as in the second, 'Iliadic' half of the *Aeneid,* or they can be spread out more or less evenly over the entire narrative, as in the 'episodic' epics: e.g. Homer's *Odyssey,* Ovid's *Metamorphoses,* and Apollonius' and Valerius' *Argonautica.* With the exception of the Trojan War, the settings of martial epics do not focus on one city but can frequently shift between two cities, e.g. Thebes and Argos in the *Thebaid,* or they can even take on a global scale, as in Lucan's *Bellum*

Ciuile. Ovid's *Metamorphoses,* of course, stands out from the rest of the epic poems under discussion in this volume as it combines a multitude of different narrative strands that are related by a shared topic, transformation, or the characters involved.[6] The poem nonetheless contains a variety of smaller, clearly structured fighting sequences, such as the fight between Perseus and Phineus for Andromeda (Ov. met. 5.30-235) or the battle between the Lapiths and the Centaurs (12.210-535), as well as a detailed account of the most famous battle of Ovid's epic predecessors, the Trojan War (12.1-13.622). A comparison of the battle scenes in Apollonius' and Valerius' *Argonautica* is moreover particularly interesting given their shared cast of characters, subject matter, and macrostructure. By adding two full-scale battle scenes (the Cyzicus nyktomachy in Book 3 and the Colchian-Scythian civil war in Book 6) to his account, the Flavian poet incorporates the popular civil war *topos* into his mythical epic while at the same time `Romanising' the portrayal of the epic protagonist, the Greek hero Jason, who is no longer merely the democratic leader of Apollonius' version but also excels as a military general on the battlefield with traditional Roman qualities. This tendency of Romanisation, which is decisively influenced by Vergil's national epic on the foundation of Rome, is evident in all Flavian epics. It is especially manifest in the poets' portrayal of and attitude towards disguise and concealed manoeuvres as a deliberate military strategy, generally as a last resort. These rarely employed operations are utilised by the Flavian authors to address the generals' morally ambivalent decision to gain a tactical advantage with a hidden manoeuvre instead of heroically facing the enemy in open battle.

Battle scenes in general are one of the main contexts in which epic heroes are characterised. They are defined by their loyalty and *fides* towards their respective families and *patriae,* as well as by their leadership qualities in battle, their treatment of fallen soldiers, especially if the victims are of the same nationality, and by whether or not they show their opponents mercy or treat their corpses and mourning family members with respect and piety. Whereas Homer and Vergil firmly focus on their respective protagonists, it has been argued that in later heroic epic, poets lose interest in focussing primarily "on the commander and the decisions he made". In Statius' *Thebaid,* for instance, "battle scenes, unlike those of Vergil, show no sign of generalship or strategy: infantry, cavalry, and war chariots are committed pell-mell; the fighting is neither Homeric, nor anything else." This is, however, no general tendency for Flavian epic, as Valerius Flaccus and Silius Italicus both draw attention to the military strategies the respective leaders are employing. Valerius, in particular, juxtaposes Jason's and Hercules' *aristeiai* and, by extension, Jason's leadership qualities with Hercules' devastating physical power in Book 3 of the *Argonautica,* while Silius contrasts the opposing generals' military strategies and their attempts to manipulate their opponent's manoeuvres in the very tactical warfare between Fabius and Hannibal in Book 7 of the *Punica.*

Strategic alterations in the style of fighting are also reflected in the change of the rhythm and pace of the respective battle narratives. Other important structural elements that can have a great impact on the narrative pace are catalogues, similes, and especially direct speeches." They render the narration more vivid, regulate its pace, and help structure the battle scene — with easily recognisable pre-battle speeches (e.g. war councils and war cries), mid-battle speeches (e.g. challenges, taunts, and exhortations), and post-battle speeches (most notably, the laments and the *oratio funebris).* The resulting recognisability of the different stages of an epic battle scene and of the various types of fighting are used by the poets as a rich and flexible tool for variegating their only seemingly rigid and highly formalised songs of war. In addition to a variation and modification of the different structural elements and

narrative patterns employed in the individual battle sequences, a shift in the narrative speed and intensity is important to avoid monotony and keep the reader's interest. The same applies for narrative techniques like zooming in on individual fighting scenes to focus on heroic, gruesome, pathetic, surprising, or sentimental details of the described single combat, and zooming out to display the greater strategic movements within a mass combat. Post-Homeric and especially post-Vergilian epicists go to great lengths to create suspense and offer an innovative take on the well-known wars whose outcome are clear from the very beginning. This difficulty has been firmly established for ancient epic in general, but particularly for Flavian epicists, who use a variety of narrative techniques to solve the problem: Gibson, for instance, concludes in his seminal paper on Statius' *Thebaid* that "Statius foreshortens battle narratives in his poem, sometimes to an extraordinary degree. In part we may see this as Statius' response to the problem of how to sustain the narrative and the interest of the readers. This is an issue that is arguably germane to martial epic in general."

The complexity of battle scenes is also explicitly addressed in the epics themselves, not only in their programmatic proems, but also in authorial comments by the epic narrators who raise this concern at the start of longer battle descriptions. Especially the Homeric and Vergilian narrators emphasise their difficulty in accurately describing the unfolding events. They invoke the Muses to ask them for their support for this task. In addition to the well-known appeals to the Muses, Gibson draws attention to the "often forgotten moment in Hom. Il. 12.175-6 where the poet acknowledges the practical problem of narrating the complexities of battle: 'The others fought the battle at different gates: it is difficult for me to narrate all this as if I were a god'." Similarly, at the beginning of the 'Iliadic *Aeneid',* Vergil states the following: Verg. Aen. 7.44b-5a *maior rerum mihi nascitur ordo maius opus moueo,* "a greater order of things is created by me, I set in motion a greater work." At times, the narrators not only invoke the Muses for inspiration and support but they also ask them to give them insights into the reasons for the apparently senseless war. This is especially the case in civil war epics, such as Lucan's *Bellum Ciuile,* and in scenes depicting a civil war or a battle violating the bond of *xenia,* such as Valerius Flaccus' Cyzicus episode where the narrator very harshly criticises Cybele, Pan, and Bellona for having actively provoked the war, and Jupiter for doing nothing to prevent it (Val. Fl. 3.14-18a and 3.46-7). It is also this horrific civil war(-like) context which inspires narrators to switch from subsequent to simultaneous narration and to address the involved fighters, in particular imminent victims, in order to warn them of their inevitable death, to express their sympathy for brave young warriors with great potential whose life has been cut short, or to curse the abhorrent war.

The topic of warfare in ancient epic is so vast and complex that it is not surprising that a comprehensive diachronic study that unites the analyses of the different individual structural elements of war narratives in ancient epic from Homer to Triphiodorus has not yet been undertaken. The most helpful study to date is still Miniconi's *Etude des themes `guerriers' de la poésie épique gréco-romaine* from 1951, which provides a very useful overview of the different types of battle scenes but remains rather succinct in its qualitative and quantitative analysis of the individual epic structures. Modern scholarship has instead focused on the synchronic analysis of warfare and its related topics in one or a small selection of individual authors, or on the diachronic study of one or more structural and thematic patterns of battle narratives in ancient epic. The overwhelming influence of the formulaic Homeric composition, which is perhaps nowhere more pervasive than in the representation of battle scenes in his epic successors,[18] is also reflected in the greater focus on Homer's structural elements and narrative patterns, which is best

exemplified by Fenik's indispensible monograph from 1968. Vergil, by comparison, "has not yet found his Fenik". This is also true for Homer's other epic successors, perhaps with the exception of Lucan's and Silius' historical epics which have received more attention, especially in the form of studies examining the historical accuracy of their presentation of the Roman Civil War and the Second Punic War, and comparing the epic narratives with their respective historical sources.

With the following chapters we attempt to fill this double vacancy. The selected contributions analyse and trace the development of the constituent structural elements of battle narratives in the epic tradition, from arming scenes and other war preparations to the outbreak of hostilities in single, mass, or chain-combat with related set-pieces such as *aristeiai* and *teichoscopies,* and pauses or turning points that result from unexpected ceasefires or breaches of contract, to the final stages of the battle which can end in (continued) flight and pursuit, or with funeral rites and ceremonies. The volume also reflects on a selection of highly specialised battle scenes which digress from the traditional narrative patterns: nyktomachies, theomachies, as well as naval and river battles. To limit the scope of our compendium we made the decision not to include unorganised fighting sequences and individual actions such as *impromptu* combat, brawls, duels, plundering, spoiling, the fight against nature and monsters, the retrieval of the corpses of fellow combatants, or tactical manceuvres such as scouting expeditions, military marches, and encampments. Other interesting topics could have been personalised battle sequences that focus on one particular group of characters, like Titanomachies, Gigantomachies, or Amazonian warfare, and the role of women in battle more generally, professional groups such as helmsmen, bards, priests, and seers who tend to abstain from fighting for different reasons, as well as anonymous warriors and named fighters who only appear in the context of the battle and die shortly after they are first introduced. It would also not have been fruitful to treat the complex topic of battle speeches in one single chapter. The different types of speech acts are not only very numerous, but they also range from assemblies, war cries, exhortations, taunts, threats, challenges, deliberations, prayers, and appeals for mercy, to victory speeches, laments, and many more. These different sub-types deserve individual assessments and will be the topic of another volume on speech representation in ancient epic.

Epic journeys and related scenes — a short introduction by Christiane Reitz and Simone Finkmann

The action of all epic plots unfolds both on the horizontal and the vertical axis of its narrative canvas. While only a small, but diverse group of characters is able to move along the vertical axis, travelling along the horizontal axis is generally restricted to mortal characters and two types of journeys:

1. pedestrian journeys in the form of diplomatic missions carried out by messengers or small envoys (e.g. Ilioneus in Aeneid 7 or Tydeus in Thebaid 2), exploratory missions of new and unfamiliar territory (e.g. Jason and his men exploring Colchis after their arrival in Book 5 of Valerius' Argonautica), or scouting missions to gain information about the enemy camp (e.g. Odysseus' and Diomedes' nightly expedition in Iliad 10), military marches (e.g. Cato's march through the Libyan desert in Bellum Ciuile 9 or Hannibal's crossing of the Pyrenees and the Alps in Book 3 of Silius Italicus' Punica), and 'sightseeing' walks in which the newly arrived heroes go on a (guided) tour of the foreign land (e.g. Caesar visiting the ruins of Troy in Bellum Ciuile 9 or Jason being guided to Vulcan's cave by Hypsipyle in Book 2 of Valerius' Argonautica) in the build-up to or following an audience with the respective rulers.

2. sea voyages, which are either also part of a military operation (e.g. Caesar's pursuit of Pompey from Rome to Alexandria in Lucan's Bellum Ciuile 3-8) or dangerous heroic missions (e.g. the Argonauts' mission to retrieve the Golden Fleece from Colchis in Apollonius' and Valerius' Argonautica, and Aeneas' mission to found a new city for the Trojan refugees in Vergil's Aeneid).

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Another interesting feature that is (almost) exclusive to the context of epic journeys is the incorporation of lengthy travelogues in secondary focalisation. Unlike battle scenes which are generally related by the heterodiegetic primary narrator, epic journeys provide ample opportunities for secondary narration by the travelling protagonists who recount their past adventures from their own perspective or by a bard who sings about 'parallel' adventures from the mythical past. These travel stories serve as entertainment for a generous foreign ruler in the context of a banquet scene or as encouragement and distraction for the army during their long and exhausting journey. The most extensive and influential accounts are Odysseus' Apologoi at the court of the Phaeacians, which comprise four books (Odyssey 9-12), Aeneas' report of the reasons that have led to the capture of Troy and the first stage of his wanderings from Troy to his arrival at Carthage (Aeneid 2-3), and the songs of Demodocus in Odyssey 8 and the bard of the Argonauts, Orpheus, prior to and during their journey from Thessaly to Colchis in Books 1 and 4 of Valerius' and Book 1 of Apollonius' Argonautica. These narratives thus take the reader on a journey back in time, either as part of the epic plot as in the case of the protagonists or to past events not covered in the epic narrative and even to events of the mythical past as in the case of the bards.

In the context of travel epics new characters emerge at the forefront of the narrative, especially maritime deities, who form the second largest group of divine agents, next to the Olympian gods, and epic helmsmen, most of whom do not survive the voyage and reappear to demand a proper burial during the protagonist's underworld visit. Just as in battle scenes, the protagonists of epic journeys, i.e. the majority of travellers, are also male. Women only take on a small number of roles in sea voyages: they occur as mothers and wives who have been left behind at home (e.g. Penelope in the Odyssey or Alcimede in the Argonautic epics) as "blockers" and "helpers", to use Foley's terms,21 who delay and/or facilitate the continuation of the journey, most frequently in the form of seductive foreign princesses and sorceresses, or as travel companions who voluntarily embark on the journey together with the male protagonists (e.g. Cornelia in Lucan's Bellum Ciuile or Medea in the Argonautic epics), and as a result directly influence the development of the battle (Pompey risks making a detour during his flight to be reunited with Cornelia and in the Argonautic epics the Colchians pursue the Argonauts to take back Medea).

Epic journeys also offer a greater variety of settings, including domestic settings such as palaces or even the privacy of a bedroom as the place of important decision-making among couples (e.g. Homer's Arete and Alcinous) or by foreign princesses who are fearful of their partner's departure (e.g. Vergil's Dido or Apollonius' and Valerius' Medea), or as the setting for emotional farewell (e.g. Lucan's Pompey and Cornelia) and reunion scenes (e.g. Homer's Penelope and Odysseus). Sea voyages similarly provide the background for a greater variety of typical scenes, most of which are highly formalised, ranging from arrivals and greetings, banquets, farewell, departure, reunion, and recognition scenes, sea-storms, and battle scenes (including single and mass combat as well as funeral games), and their associated structural

elements, most importantly aetiological and geographical digressions, de- and embarkation sacrifices, farewell gifts, the epic gaze, and catalogues of the involved crew members and foreign warriors. The four overarching categories of time and space, battle scenes, and communication (esp. with the inhabitants of the visited nations, the gods in apparition scenes, and the dead in the underworld) are all of particular importance for sea voyages in ancient epic. The following chapters will focus on the constituent elements of hospitality scenes as well as on sea-storms, which are at the core of all epic journeys. These scenes which are inextricably intertwined with one another are analysed in this volume in the chronological order of their appearance in the hospitality scene with the exception of sea-storms which can occur at different positions during the epic journey.

The origin, tradition, and reinvention of epic structures — a short introduction by Christiane Reitz and Simone Finkmann

Two questions remain and need to be addressed in the final volume of our compendium: Are the structural elements scrutinised in volumes I and II characteristic of classical epic specifically? Or are they consistently used throughout the entire tradition of Graeco-Roman epic from early Greek to Neo-Latin epic?

Any conscientious diachronic study of the development of a literary genre, but especially of such a long, dense, complex, and experimental tradition as epic poetry has to start with several caveats. The fact that the design and structural approach of this study as well as the normative structural theories of classical epic that form the basis of our analysis nearly exclusively focus on the epic form is not to be understood as a renunciation of the significance of the poems' content and language for the epic tradition. As Johannes Haubold convincingly shows in the first contribution of this volume, the dialogue between form and content plays an important part from the very start of the tradition, which is universally accepted to have begun with Homer for the Western tradition in the form of oral poetry. Johannes Haubold is not challenging this view, but he expands the analysis to ancient Mesopotamia, especially Akkadian epic, to explore and gain new insights into the conditions, shared cultural background, and the understanding of the divine and human history that influenced Homer's composition, and thus the early stages of the epic tradition.

Another persistent challenge for diachronic approaches is, of course, that of periodisation. These problems of chronology and direct and indirect borrowing and (inter)dependency of the individual poems only multiply when the analysis is expanded from the structures of classical epic to the entire tradition of Graeco-Roman epic from its beginning to the early 20th century. While we divide the important periods of the structural development of the epic genre into different eras for the purpose of our analysis, we do not postulate that the individual time periods and developmental stages are self-contained units and independent from one another. All contributions in this volume work on the assumption of a fluent, albeit not strictly linear transition, and, more importantly, parallel development of multiple strands of the epic genre. It seems reasonable therefore to exclude the problem of periodisation as well as questions about the transmission of the individual epics from our discussion.

No theoretical model could accurately unify the versatile and ever-evolving architecture of epic poetry, for which the only constant is the shared knowledge of a clearly recognisable set of building blocks between the poet as the builder and creator of a complex epic construction and the recipient (both contemporary and of future generations) as admirer or critic of this epic architecture. It therefore

cannot be the aim of this study to develop a comprehensive theoretical model that can truly encompass the complex development and transformation of epic structures throughout the entire tradition. The architecture of an epic poem can be individually modified to fit the desired layout and the specific purpose of the intended construction. It can easily be expanded horizontally and vertically to the point where only individual structures resemble the blueprint of the classical model, but it will always be held together and defined by its core structures, irrespective of the time of its creation, the skillset of its creator, the material from which it is built, the different paint jobs it receives over the years, or the degree of change or de(con)struction it undergoes over the course of time.

Similarly, this study will not examine the historical, cultural, and socio-political background of the individual epics under discussion in detail, but presupposes that the authors' and the readers' biographies inform the practice of literary composition and reception, and as such have a significant impact on the reception and the transformation of epic structures and the perception of epic poetry as a reflection of the poets' (and by extension their contemporary readers') cultural and political values as well as aesthetic and religious views. These important external factors are explicitly addressed in this volume only when they are the main factor for the modification of an established epic structure or for the creation of a new one.

For the purposes of our study, a strict classification system is neither necessary nor beneficial, as it is not relevant whether the different products of epic experimentation are subtypes in their own rights. It is more important which structures are studied, copied, varied, enhanced, or omitted, and to what effect. Acknowledging the experimental nature and openness of the epic genre to expansion and variation, and the occurrence of many mixed types of epic poetry, as well as a predilection for the shorter form of the epyllion in Late Antiquity, we adopt a broad definition for epic poetry in this compendium. This allows for the inclusion of a great range of epic designs and subtypes, such as didactic poetry, verse panegyrics, hagiographic poems, animal epics, romance epics, and mock epics, some of which even came to surpass the production of classical historical and mythological epics.

This evolving process of composition, literary taste, and perception of the form and content of epic poetry is particularly evident in the Christianisation and rhetorisation of epic poetry in Late Antiquity and the Middle Ages, which gave rise to the creation of new epic conventions, while leading to the disappearance of other well-established structures.

The rhetorisation of epic poetry, under the influence of declamation schools and a more pervasive formal education of the target audience, is perhaps best exemplified by four developments: 1) the stricter application of already existing formal regulations and microstructures, e.g. in the greater precision of parallelisms between the objects of comparisons in epic similes; 2) the enhancement of (declamatory) speeches and rhetorical devices, esp. ethopoiia, and the embellishment of ekphraseis; 3) the authors' purposeful combination of complex and subtle borrowings from multiple predecessors and literary traditions, which appealed to and challenged a learned reader and created a new style of epic poetry; 4) individual authors, such as the late antique poet Claudian, showed their versatility by composing different subtypes of epic poetry.

Other transformations within this process were the result of general changes in the use of the respective language itself. Nonnus' stricter regulation of the hexameter, for instance, is the result of the transition of the Greek language to a stress accent. The heroic verse is, however, a good example for

the general pervasiveness of the changes an epic poem could undergo throughout this long literary tradition. Once the undisputed stock meter of the epic genre and a symbol for its high style, the hexameter was rivalled, and at times replaced, for instance, by elegiac couplets and even prose in the Middle Ages and Neo-Latin epic. This change is also indicative of the evolution of aesthetic views, which gradually led to a dilution of the grandeur of epic poetry with the incorporation of more `undignified' elements such as humour or the burlesque, which became important elements of vernacular epic.

As a result of the rhetorisation of epic poetry and the formal education of the poet and his audience, there is also a growing awareness and explicit discussion of epic composition, and by extension, of classical narrative patterns and structural elements, and the authors' place in the literary tradition. This heightened (self-) reflection generated new programmatic microstructures, most importantly, the epic preface or prologue. In addition to praising and legitimising individual rulers and conquerors, as well as the development of new political or religious institutions, these paratexts explicitly address both the process of composition and of recitation, and thus provide helpful insights into the understanding and strategic use of structural elements as generic markers and normative criteria for literary assessment in Late Antiquity and beyond: postclassical epicists expected to be judged by their audience based on their own successful and innovative adaptation of traditional epic structures and the creation of interesting new forms.

The emergence of Christian epic and cento poetry brought with it new structural challenges for the authors in so far as they had to decide whether to follow the narrative sequence of their biblical sources, such as the four Gospels of the New Testament, in their adaptation and combination of Christian and pagan pretexts, or whether to adopt the chronology more loosely instead. The poets were also aware of the difficulties of incorporating mythical pagan structures, such as theomachies, divine council scenes, the epic hero's descent to and return from the underworld, or his sexual dalliances during epic voyages, and, most notably, the invocation of the Muses, into their Christian narratives. They successfully navigated this problem by recasting and repurposing these structures, or by embedding them in similes, dream visions, and ekphraseis.

In addition to the omission or Christianisation of typically 'pagan' structures, other 'Christian' structures, e.g. the depiction of the Eucharist, became new stock elements in late antique biblical epics and paraphrases as well as in medieval and Neo-Latin epics, whose authors were frequently priests or members of ecclesiastical institutions.

As patchworks of epic structures and the purest form of structural adaptation, biblical cento poetry even created additional challenges to both their authors and readers. Since cento poetry is the result of the deconstruction and recombination of a selection of already existing epic structures, which may not be modified except for minor alterations, this associative form of composition draws attention to the authors' decision-making process and their structural concept for the selection and reorganisation of epic models. Several redactions of both Homeric and Vergilian centones have been transmitted, which are an important source of information for the authors' structural reasoning and selection process.

As the individual contributions of this volume cover long periods of time and/or a large number of epic poems, they cannot possibly be comprehensive in their discussion of the building blocks of epic poetry. Instead of attempting to discuss the reception and appropriation of all epic structures analysed in detail in volume II.1 and II.2, they focus on core structures, which have been identified to carry special

importance as generic markers of epic poetry and metapoetic structures in volume I: these are direct speeches, ekphraseis, similes, and aetiological and genealogical catalogues. They transcend the epic plot by allowing the authors to incorporate contemporary or past historical and socio-political events and characters that lie outside the time frame of the epic narrative, as well as new technological developments or contemporary scientific knowledge into their poems.

Papers in this volume that do include a more detailed analysis of a plotconstricted narrative pattern select the same set-pieces to trace the development of this particular structural element from late antique epic to Neo-Latin epic — as, for instance, in the case of epic sea-storms, which are discussed in more detail in all of the individual time periods covered in this compendium, while also being examined in a synchronic analysis juxtaposing the use of maritime storms in mythological epic, Christian epic, and cento poetry in Late Antiquity. This comparative, synchronic approach is also employed by Martin Bail who uses the building block `epic games', and more specifically, the funeral games for Anchises in Aeneid 5, as a shared point of reference for his analysis of the reception of this particular Vergilian structure in epic and non-epic cento poems and late antique epyllia.

In addition to examining the continuity of firmly established 'classical' structures, the contributions focus on new structures that are developed in the course of the epic tradition, which can be considered as characteristic for the concept of epic(ity) in the respective time period.

The individual studies have - as far as that is possible with traditions spanning from c. 330 to 1453 as in the case of the Byzantine Empire and the combination of diachronic and synchronic analyses - been arranged chronologically. While we have allowed for necessary temporal, thematic, and motivic overlap between the different contributions to highlight the important intersections between the individual subtypes and transitional stages, we have opted for a division of the discussion of post-classical epic into Greek epic and Latin epic from antiquity onwards to acknowledge the split of the literary tradition into an independent Greek and Latin epic tradition and its substrands.

In accordance with the tripartite development of both Greek and Roman epic in Late Antiquity, the three variants of the epic production are discussed in separate contributions: 1) 'classical' historical and (archaising and Hellenistic) mythological epic (Simon Zuenelli), 2) biblical epic and paraphrase (Berenice Verhelst and Christoph Schubert), and 3) Homeric and Vergilian cento poetry (Berenice Verhelst and Martin Bazil).

The two time periods in the production of epic poetry which are often ignored in diachronic studies and handbooks of Graeco-Roman epic as a result of the small number of extant traditional epic narratives, 'Byzantine epic' and medieval Latin `epicity', are scrutinised, explained, and opened up for a new discussion of the many problems and questions these stages of the epic tradition pose by Kristoffel Demoen, Berenice Verhelst, and Wim Verbaal.

The long and very productive period of Neo-Latin epic composition from the 15th to the 19th century is examined in two individual contributions by Christian Peters and Florian Schaffenrath that combine in-depth analyses of a selection of the most influential epics from 1440 to 1500 with a more concise comparative analysis of the adaptation and transformation of a wide range of epic structures, e.g. book divisions, invocations, middle proems, digressions, battle scenes, ekphraseis, and funeral games. While the first study provides us with a representative overview of the use of the micro- and macrostructures

of classical epic in the early stages of Neo-Latin epic, the second assesses the continuity of the traditional core structures in epic poetry from the 16th to the 19th century.

During our research for this volume we benefited greatly from the interdisciplinary dialogue with experts in the field of English, French, German, Italian, and Portuguese epic, as well as classical reception during the rise of vernacular epic from the 16th century onwards and its impact on the production of Neo-Latin epic. This took place at a workshop we hosted at the University of Rostock in December 2016. We are very grateful for the opportunity to compare our research findings for the adaptation and transformation of 'classical' structures and narrative patterns in Graeco-Roman 'post-classical' epic with our colleagues' analyses of the most influential European vernacular epics such as Dante's Commedia and Petrarch's Trionfi (Bernard Huß), the German Nibelungenlied (Franz-Josef Holznagel and Julia Frick), Luis de Camões' Os Lusíadas (Rafael Arnold), Milton's Paradise Lost (Philip Hardie), as well as epic structures and narrative conventions in French and Italian literature of the 19th and early 20th century (Stephanie Wodianka). This inspiring exchange taught us two things: 1) vernacular epic continues the practice of structural imitation, transformation, and (in)novation of epic structures from (a small number of the most influential) Greek and Roman classical epic models, and it shares many of the programmatic and strategic usages of post-classical Graeco-Roman epic; 2) a fruitful analysis of the reception of classical epic structures in the individual vernacular epic traditions is such a fascinating, vast, and complex endeavour that it deserves its own independent study.

While we decided against the inclusion of individual contributions on the development of narrative patterns in vernacular epic, the final paper of this volume addresses the chances and challenges modern scholars face when studying epic structures. Matteo Romanello examines the various possibilities new digital research tools and the combination of qualitative and quantitative analysis open up for the analysis of large data sets, such as the one collated to create a searchable digital appendix (http://epibau.ub.uni-rostock.de/app) for this study of the narrative patterns and structural elements in Graeco-Roman epic from early Greek epic to Neo-Latin epic. <>

Greek Rhetoric of the 4th Century BC: The Elixir of Democracy and Individuality by Evangelos Alexiou, translated by: Daniel Webber [De Gruyter, 9783110559798]

The interaction between orator and audience, the passions and distrust held by many concerning the predominance of one individual, but also the individual's struggle as an advisor and political leader, these are the quintessential elements of 4th century rhetoric. As an individual personality, the orator draws strength from his audience, while the rhetorical texts mirror his own thoughts and those of his audience as part of a two-way relationship, in which individuality meets, opposes, and identifies with the masses. For the first time, this volume systematically compares minor orators with the major figures of rhetoric, Demosthenes and Isocrates, taking into account other findings as well, such as extracts of Hyperides from the Archimedes Palimpsest. Moreover, this book provides insight into the controversy surrounding the art of discourse in the rhetorical texts of Anaximenes, Aristotle, and especially of Isocrates who took up a clear stance against the philosophy of the 4th century.

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Excerpt: I. While information on the origins of rhetoric is mainly drawn from its opponents, such as Plato, it is noteworthy that the origins, nature and role of rhetoric were at the focus of theoretical discussions in the 4th century BC. They bear indisputable witness to the importance intellectuals — both sophists and philosophers — placed on rhetorical theory and practice. The 4th century BC cannot be considered the *protos heuretes* of rhetoric, but does serve as its main field of action: it contributed so decisively to its growth that the art of speaking achieved a remarkable triumph, especially during this period and despite philosophical criticism.

For democracy, rhetoric served as an "elixir of life" since its inception. Democratic Athens placed the power of speech at the centre of all political and judicial decisions: the desire of politically active citizens to be convincing before the Athenian Assembly and the courts signals the key role played by rhetoric in democratic Athenian procedures. The teaching of rhetoric was vital for preparing Athenian citizens to become active participants in public affairs. Besides democracy, which remained the key constitution of Athens, new political forces, visions of statehood and monarchs on the periphery of the Greek world were instrumental for the ambiguity of the 4th century BC in terms of internal and foreign policy. Isocrates' political-deliberative speeches *Panegyricus* (4; 380 BC) and *To Philip* (5; 346 BC) focus on the political ideal that the orator tenaciously pursued for over 50 years: concord amongst Greeks and war against the Persians. At the same time, Demosthenes unleashed his rhetorical genius in the opposite direction, envisioning the revival of the Athenian past of the 5th century BC, with patriotic engagement against the superpower of Macedon. Although political parties, in the modern meaning of the term, did not exist in antiquity, a form of political or ideological collaboration is recorded among the top politiciansorators of the era, e.g. among the anti-Macedonians Demosthenes, Lycurgus and Hyperides, and was reflected in their orations.

Rhetorical texts take on a "mirror effect" of Athenian society. This means that rhetoric, as a psychagogic art, i.e. the art of "leading the souls through speech", has a tremendous effect on listeners and also redefines itself, reflecting and reverberating the "soul" of the public, to the point where it is often difficult to tell apart the orator and the audience. Stirring passions dominates judicial and deliberative speeches; the judgments of judges and listeners are decisively impacted by shifting passions (Aristotle *Rhetoric* 1354b 8-13; 1356a 14-16). From this perspective, a close connection between rhetorical texts and everyday morality is vital. Research into popular morality, such as that of K. Dover, has helped us

better perceive the limits of this non-theoretical, practical morality. A number of passions, such as *orge, eleos, hybris, phthonos,* etc., permeate rhetorical texts that focus on political reality. Further semantic fields are those of *polypragmosyne* and *pleonexia,* or, on the contrary, those of *sophrosyne* and apragmosyne. Following the various oligarchic conspiracies of the late 5th century BC, the frequent use of adjectives such as misopolis, misodemos, philopolis or philodemos and the positive connotation ascribed to competitive values such as philotimia support the view that the rise of the individual with its competitive values coincided with the endeavour to include it in the cooperative values of the city.

Judicial rhetoric, either in private or in public political life, is a defining aspect of the rhetorical art of the 4th century BC, from its inception until the final orator of the canon of the ten Attic orators, Dinarchus. The answer to whether legal proceedings were dominated by competitive values, such as those of desire for success and excellence (D. Cohen; M.R. Christ) or by cooperative values of clemency and prudence (G. Herman) has similar elements to the classic distinction made by A.W.H. Adkins between cooperative and competitive values, as regards the stratification of Hellenic values over time from Homer until the classical era. Such overly formal distinctions cannot define a society as a whole; they are always present to a lesser or greater extent, but serve as a broad field of reference allowing one to understand the synthesis between a moral subject and external influences in ancient Greek thought. Certain speeches, such as Demosthenes' Against Conon (54), appear to support both possibilities. On the other hand, judicial disputes that concerned public cases served as an important weapon in the struggle for political advancement. Procedures initiated against unlawful decrees (graphai paranomon) enabled the revision of decisions and the neutralisation of political opponents.

The ideals of the city were exceptionally powerful in the late 5th century and early 4th century BC, but at the same time individuality was continuously growing. The decisive step was taken by Isocrates, who emerged as a reformer of epideictic oratory during the 4th century BC. The encomium Evagoras (9) is recognised as a watershed moment, because the position of the mythical lauded figure was now held by a contemporary historical figure, namely Evagoras I, a Cypriot king. Isocrates does not limit himself to praising an individual act but extols all the virtues of Evagoras that emerge through his actions.

The epitaphios logos functioned as a political institution and exponent of the city-state. The funeral speech is permeated by collective, impersonal presentation and preserves a traditional, formal arsenal of common topoi and motifs from which the orator draws. Nevertheless, new ideas directly related to the promotion of individuality could not but have affected funeral speeches. Hyperides' Funeral Speech, dated at a later time (322 BC), praises not only the unnamed fallen, but mainly the general Leosthenes both specifically and comprehensively — a decisive innovation.

II. The dispute between philosophy and rhetoric became established during the 4th century BC. The key figures are Plato and Isocrates; the former, as the pupil of Socrates, juxtaposes philosophy, the supreme science, and knowledge originating from the dialectical search for an absolute, timeless truth (episteme) against rhetoric, which is based on what is reasonable and likely (eikos). The latter, as the pupil of Gorgias and advocate of a renewed sophistical movement, places rhetoric at the very centre of education, which is based on opinion (doxa) and integrally linked to the social and political presence of citizens.

In Plato's Gorgias, rhetoric is subjected to extreme criticism: for Plato, rhetoric is not based on a true foundation, but is merely a producer of persuasion (peithous demiourgos), without taking right and

wrong into consideration (454e). Through an impressive formal parallelism, Plato mocks the new art and ranks it among the four parts of kolakeia (464b-465e). Rhetoric deceives and flatters the soul, as cookery does to the body; it is directed wholly against the moral improvement of the audience. It provides the means to deceive one's fellow man and manipulate the audience. The criticism of rhetoric is in line with the general discussion of pleonexia at the time, as expounded on by Thrasymachus in Plato's Republic, Callicles in Gorgias or Eteocles in Euripides' Phoenissae. Menexenus, as a model funeral speech, is also subject to the debate concerning rhetoric. The introductory dialogue between Socrates and Menexenus, a young, wealthy Athenian, as a derisive context, has many characteristics that would allow for Menexenus to be interpreted as a parody, following Plato's critique of rhetoric in Gorgias. In Phaedrus, a new role is ascribed to rhetoric: in contrast to the technical form of his contemporary rhetoric, Plato turns towards a psychological direction of rhetoric on a philosophical-dialectical basis. The definition of rhetoric as peithous demiourgos (Gorg. 454e) is now replaced by psychagogia dia logon, i.e. the art of "leading the soul through speeches" (Phaedr. 261a; 271c). Orators must know the souls of their listeners, which parts of their soul are touched by each speech (271c-272a).

Isocrates' opposition to Plato begins from the limits he himself set in his autobiographical speech Antidosis (15.84-85): Isocrates stands out as an early theoretician of common sense and public opinion. Through the concept of homologoumene arete ("popular morality"), he propounds the moral dimension of his rhetoric, juxtaposing it against Platonic philosophy. His worldview is based on predominant traditional values and represents popular morality. For Isocrates, adherence to homologoumene arete is not an expression of incapacity for deeper moral thought, but an established principle of the rhetorical logon paideia. For Isocrates, what is useful and politically profitable is true. Through his rhetoric, he exhorts the entirety of his city towards a form of politics that will result in prosperity for Athenians and will deliver the rest of the Greeks from their tribulations.

In the proem to his exhortative speech Nicocles (3.2-5), Isocrates refutes Plato's beliefs concerning rhetoric, i.e. that it grants the means for pleonexia in order to deceive one's fellow man. The chief tenet is clear: it is not logos that is harmful; its use by man is exclusively responsible for any adverse consequences it might entail. The sophistic principle of man as the measure of all things (Protagoras 80 B1) is transformed into a moral expression of individual personality, which is ultimately and exclusively responsible for its actions.

Isocrates extols logos, both speech and thought, as the key distinguishing feature between animals and men and as a touchstone for all human achievements, even in the moral dimension (3.6-7). Discourse is the finest symbol of proper thought and discourse which is true, lawful and just is the outward image of a good and faithful soul.

This single conception of morality and rhetoric indicates considerable progress over the formalistic rhetoric of the sophists and Gorgias in particular. Gorgias placed the power of speech at the very centre of his teachings: speech is a "a powerful lord" (82 B11.8 D.-K.: Suvacrrric geyac). The "dynastic" conception of the sophists' logos is supplanted by the "hegemonic" logos of Isocrates. Logos is the hegemein of the thoughts and actions of men and it predominantly characterises those with the greatest intellectual skills (Isocr. 3.9). The Isocratean speech is dynamis, but it is not violent. Therefore, logos is transformed into a cultural symbol from which all goods spring forth. With logos at the heart of the Panegyricus (4.45-50), Athens is depicted as a vibrant cultural centre in the ancient world. Isocrates

establishes a direct link between the cultural influence of Athens and his humanistic educational ideal which is defined as philosophia in Isocreatean terminology and is, ultimately, a terminus technicus for Isocratean rhetoric.

During the 4th century BC, competition and disputes concerning rhetoric between sophists and orators were increasing in number. The conflict between Alcidamas and Isocrates is fundamental, based on the deep opposition between a traditionally oral culture and the emergent contender for primacy, the written word. Both were pupils of Gorgias and were active in Athens during the 4th century BC, holding different beliefs in regard to the ideal rhetorical art. Through his criticism of the written word and his exhortation in favour of eloquent improvisation, Alcidamas stands in contrast to Isocrates. In his declamation On Sophists, Alcidamas juxtaposes meticulous, rhythmic written speeches, which he censures as immobile and inflexible, against vibrant extemporaneous speeches. Alcidamas employs autoschediazein ("to improvise") as a terminus technicus for rhetoric. Alcidamas scorns written epideictic speeches and praises the contribution of improvisation to deliberative and judicial speeches.

In contrast to Alcidamas, Isocrates is an advocate for the diligence and systematic care of an epideictic speech, as defined through the stylistic terminus technicus akribeia and synonymous terms. The concept of akribeia ("precision") concerns —apart from harmonious, rhythmic structure — the aesthetic integrity of epideictic speeches, the precise selection of words, the finish and the purity of the style (5.4). Isocrates rejects autoschediazein (13.9) and highlights the superiority of written epideictic speeches (4.11-14)...

XII. Rhetoric, as a literary genre, underlines more than any other the vibrant relationship between the author and his audience or readers. The bipolar relationship "orator - audience" leads to the vivacious applause or disapproval by the audience, and makes the individual directly and permanently subject to the judgment of the political community.

The historian Thucydides insistently raises the issue of the relationship between the one and the many in democracy, extolling Pericles as a true leader of a regime that was nominally a democracy but, in actuality, government in the hands of one individual (2.65.9-10). The various dimensions of this relationship in the 4th century BC are recorded both in the professional and political sectors served by orators themselves as individuals and in the ideas of Attic society reflected in their texts. Concepts, values, behaviours and attitudes before the court or the Assembly paint the picture of a diverse Athenian society with intense fluctuations, polarising views, political collaborations and complaints, with rhetorical texts serving as its living mirror. On the one hand, individuality in private and public life, and, on the other, the democratic framework of the city-state in civic life or foreign policy seem to have been twin forces, at times in harmony and at times in conflict, but always aware that the existence of either required the existence of the other. The interaction between orator and audience, the emotions and distrust of the many faced with the excellence of the one, and the drive and passion of the one, as an advisor and political leader, is the quintessence of rhetoric in the 4th century BC.

Towards the end of the 4th century BC, rhetoric began following different paths, adapting to the new historical requirements of the Hellenistic era. As the art of persuasion, it naturally continued to exist in every aspect of literary endeavour, and there were no extreme rifts in politics. However, classical rhetoric, which was the elixir of democracy, lost its significance and grandeur, precisely because the vital space of its political momentum no longer existed. It was this very space that gave the opportunity to

the individual, regardless of his origins and financial power, to convince the many as their equal, and to expect that he could determine the course of the political community through the power of his discourse. <>

TREASURES OF KNOWLEDGE: AN INVENTORY OF THE OTTOMAN PALACE LIBRARY (1502/3-1503/4) (2 VOL SET) edited by Gülru Necipoğlu, Cemal Kafadar, and Cornell H. Fleischer [Open Access]

Volume I: Essays [9789004386983] / Volume II: Transliteration and Facsimile "Register of Books" (*Kitāb al-kutub*), MS Török F. 59; Magyar Tudományos Akadémia Könyvtára Keleti Gyűjtemény (Oriental Collection of the Library of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences) [9789004402454] [Series: Muqarnas, Supplements, Brill, 9789004402485, 2vol set]

The subject of this two-volume publication is an inventory of manuscripts in the book treasury of the Topkapı Palace in Istanbul, commissioned by the Ottoman sultan Bayezid II from his royal librarian ʿAtufi in the year 908 (1502–3) and transcribed in a clean copy in 909 (1503–4). This unicum inventory preserved in the Oriental Collection of the Library of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences (Magyar Tudományos Akadémia Könyvtára Keleti Gyűjtemény, MS Török F. 59) records over 5,000 volumes, and more than 7,000 titles, on virtually every branch of human erudition at the time. The Ottoman palace library housed an unmatched encyclopedic collection of learning and literature; hence, the publication of this unique inventory opens a larger conversation about Ottoman and Islamic intellectual/cultural history. The very creation of such a systematically ordered inventory of books raises broad questions about knowledge production and practices of collecting, readership, librarianship, and the arts of the book at the dawn of the sixteenth century.

The first volume contains twenty-eight interpretative essays on this fascinating document, authored by a team of scholars from diverse disciplines, including Islamic and Ottoman history, history of science, arts of the book and codicology, agriculture, medicine, astrology, astronomy, occultism, mathematics, philosophy, theology, law, mysticism, political thought, ethics, literature (Arabic, Persian, Turkish/Turkic), philology, and epistolary. Following the first three essays by the editors on implications of the library inventory as a whole, the other essays focus on particular fields of knowledge under which books are catalogued in MS Török F. 59, each accompanied by annotated lists of entries. The second volume presents a transliteration of the Arabic manuscript, which also features an Ottoman Turkish preface on method, together with a reduced-scale facsimile.

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"REGISTER OF BOOKS" (*KITĀB AL-KUTUB*), MS TÖRÖK F. 59
Magyar Tudományos Akadémia Könyvtára Keleti Gyűjtemény
(Oriental Collection of the Library of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences)
Principles Observed in Transliterating MS Török F. 59 1
Transliterated Text of MS Török F. 59, prepared by Himmet Taşkömür and Hesna Ergun Taşkömür
Facsimile of MS Török F. 59

Excerpt:The subject of this double-volume publication is an inventory of the holdings of the Topkapı Palace book treasury in Istanbul, commissioned by the Ottoman sultan Bayezid II from his royal librarian ʿAtufi in the year 908 (1502–3) and transcribed in a clean copy in 909 (1503–4). Preserved in the Oriental Collection of the Library of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences (Magyar Tudományos Akadémia Könyvtára Keleti Gyűjtemény, MS Török F. 59), it was introduced to scholarship by İsmail Erünsal in articles that announced his auspicious discovery of this invaluable primary source. Erünsal focused only on the prefatory folios of the inventory, which precede its catalogue of book titles, and on the librarian's entries on Turkish literature. He expressed the hope that future studies would take up the task of scrutinizing this unique manuscript in greater detail:

> [A]s a list of Sultan Bayezid II's Palace library it can offer us much useful information not only on literary and scientific tastes of the Ottoman rulers but also on the subsequent movement of books which were relocated from the Palace library to other libraries. It will also allow us to confirm the existence of certain books which are no longer extant. It is hoped that further articles will deal with these aspects of this important catalogue.

Our collective study seeks to fulfill his hope, while at the same time inspiring further research.

Without reference to Erünsal's previous articles, another preliminary study on MS Török F. 59 was published in 2003 by Miklós Maróth, who discussed only its "history books and related historical topics." We would like to express regret that neither of these pioneering scholars accepted our invitation to participate in this collaborative publication. In 2004, with the precious help of András Riedlmayer, a microfilm of the 365-page manuscript of MS Török F. 59 was obtained from Hungary to be consulted by Gülru Necipoğlu while preparing her keynote lecture for an exhibition-related conference on "Bellini and the East." Published, with a delay, in 2012, her study briefly analyzed some books in Bayezid II's palace library inventory that were collected by his father Mehmed II.

FIGURES. 1A–B. THE TOPKAPI PALACE IN ISTANBUL. [1A] VIEW FROM THE MARMARA SEA, WITH THE INNER TREASURY (TREASURY-BATH COMPLEX). (PHOTO: GÜLRU NECIPOĞLU) [1B] CLOSE-UP VIEW OF THE INNER TREASURY (TREASURY-BATH COMPLEX). (PHOTO: DOĞAN KUBAN, OTTOMAN ARCHITECT

Realizing that MS Török F. 59 deserved a detailed study of its own, Gülru Necipoğlu and Cemal Kafadar decided to co-edit it as part of an interdisciplinary group project that would be published under the auspices of the Harvard University Aga Khan Program for Islamic Architecture. In 2010 permission was obtained to publish this primary source in *Supplements to Muqarnas,* a series largely dedicated to

sourcebooks on the cultural and artistic history of the Islamic lands. Simultaneously and independently, Cornell Fleischer had begun an informal project to work through the same document with students and colleagues. Hence, it was decided to join forces and pursue this undertaking as a Harvard University and University of Chicago collaborative project, carried out mostly by contributors affiliated with these two institutions or closely associated with the same academic circles.

The important task of transliterating and preparing an edition of the Arabic manuscript, which also features an Ottoman Turkish preface, was undertaken by another Harvard University colleague, Himmet Ta§skömür, in cooperation with Hesna Ergun Ta§skömür. Their transliteration of the document is published in the second volume, together with a reduced-scale facsimile; these are accompanied in the first volume by essays and a critical apparatus consisting of annotated lists of entries, authored by a team of scholars from diverse

Despite limitations possibly due to the relative speed with which it was completed, the inventory-cum-catalogue titled "Register of Books" (*defter-i kütüb, kitāb al-kutub*, hereafter the "inventory") is a document of considerable historical interest, being the only surviving example of its kind from the Ottoman period. It seems to be the sole comprehensive catalogue of the imperial library that was ever attempted, assuming there were no updated later versions of it that are lost. Further, it is the single known catalogue of an Islamic library that spells out in two prefaces the principles adopted in its own idiosyncratic classificatory system, partly colored by practical concerns. Two surviving pre-1500 public library catalogues from the Arab Middle East that have been identified thus far lack preambles explicating how and why they were prepared. Moreover, no original inventory of books has come to light from the palatine libraries of other early modern Islamic dynasties, or from earlier palaces for that matter.

Besides testifying to a previously unknown attempt at the classification of knowledge, the "Register of Books" prepared for Bayezid II by his librarian was tailored to suit the circumstances of a specific architectural space, containing not only the palace library but also the private treasury collection of the Ottoman sultans. With the exception of sporadic references to some manuscripts in chests and cupboards, contemporaneous registers (*defter*) of this "Imperial Inner Treasury" (*ḫizāne-i ʿāmire-i enderūnī*) exclude the vast collection of Islamic books that were kept in the same building as an autonomous collection. The library holdings were placed alongside prized artifacts inherited, collected, and commissioned by the sultans, or seized as booty and presented as gifts. Therefore, the inventory of the palace library complements surviving early examples of registers comprising lists of objects stored at the Inner Treasury, the subject of an ongoing book project of mine.

While the co-editors of this volume have contributed multiple essays, I preferred combining several lines of inquiry in a longer essay with three parts. The first part focuses on the palace library, the second part turns to the inventory itself, and the third part considers some outstanding volumes of the book collection. Starting with the architecture and diverse contents of the Inner Treasury, accompanied by a comparison to contemporary palatine libraries elsewhere, I then turn to the mobility of books in the palace's reading spaces and readership practices. This is followed by a reconstruction of the inventory's "classification of the sciences" (*taṣnīf al-ʿulūm*) and an analysis of cataloguing methods adopted by the librarian, in conjunction with the codicological examination of some extant volumes. The concluding part highlights selected inventory entries along with their surviving manuscript copies that can be associated with Mehmed II, Bayezid II, and the contexts of their court cultures (see my Appendix III at the end of

this volume). It thus complements lists of entries provided in other essays that assess the strengths and weaknesses of the library collection in specific disciplines.

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Part II: The Palace Library Inventory

The Classification of Knowledge and Categorization of Books

That some book titles on the opening pages of extant manuscripts are believed to have been written in Bayezid II's own hand points to his personal involvement in the cataloguing project of the palace library that he delegated to his librarian. In one such manuscript the title written in a single line above the opening page, which is stamped with Bayezid's almond-shaped seal at the lower left corner, has been authenticated by a diagonal note: "This is the noble handwriting of Sultan Bayezid, one line, it is true" (*Sulṭān Bāyezīdüñ ḫaṭṭ-i şerīfidür, bir saṭır, ṣaḥḥ*) (fig. 11). Nine copies of that manuscript are listed in `Atufi's inventory with exactly the same title (75 {15–19}, 76 {1–3}), making it impossible to distinguish these volumes from one another. The title line includes the assigned name of the book and its author, followed by the science or discipline (category of knowledge) to which it belongs: *Kitābu sharḥi al-Mukhtaṣari li-ʿAḍūd al-Dīn fī uṣūli al-fiqhi* (Book of the Abridged Commentary by Adud al-Din [al-Iji], on the Principles of Jurisprudence).

This is precisely the format that Bayezid II instructed his palace librarian to follow when cataloguing the imperial book collection, as indicated by the Arabic preface of the inventory, according to which `Atufi was ordered to designate the titles and affiliated disciplines of each volume. The librarian explains that when his illustrious patron "resolved to attend to the books of the religious sciences" (*bi-riʿāyati kutubi ʿulūmi al-dīni*), he ordered this slave of his to determine the titles of the books in his imperial treasury (*bi-taʿayyuni asmāʾi kutubi khizānatihi al-ʿāmirati*) and to classify every book according to its particular discipline (*bi-khuṣūṣiyyati fannihi*), writing [this information] on the front pages and the bindings, and [he commanded me] to write these in the [present] register in a way that corresponds to the titles and descriptions (*al-asmāʾi wa-al-awṣāfi*) that are [written] on the front pages and the bindings—without altering [these] in any way [marginal note:] that is to say, any semantic way, not any literal way. For on rare occasions the text in one differs from the text in the other without changing the understood meaning. As for such differences, they concern either substitution, or addition and subtraction, or pre-position and post-position (12 {5–10}, translated in Appendix V).

This passage is somewhat ambiguous concerning `Atufi's duties. It suggests that he had to first determine the title and discipline of a book, then to write this information on both the opening page (*al-ẓuhūr*) and the binding (*al-julūd*) of the book, *and finally* to copy the assigned identification in the inventory. However, many books must have already featured preexisting titles written by former librarians on their opening pages and/or bindings. In such cases `Atufi would have simply checked to ascertain their correctness, revising or rewriting this information on the book's opening page and binding, thereafter recording it exactly in the inventory. Other volumes whose titles were waiting to be identified and classified would have involved greater scrutiny on his part.

Such a scenario appears to be confirmed by my physical examination of books stamped with Bayezid II's seal. In several volumes, older titles on the opening pages have been crossed out or left in place but

modified with interlinear insertions or accompanied by titles assigned by `Atufi, which differ in that they systematically include field classifications at the end. Occasionally the previous title inscribed above the opening page was altered by crossing out some words and adding others. Additions to the end of book titles identified the affiliated discipline of a work as being either "on" (*fī*) or "pertaining to" (*min qibali*) a specified field of knowledge (see Appendix III: Pl. 5 [1], 10, 22 [1]). Such designations, which were assigned to each book by the librarian, were recorded above the opening page (fol. 1a) or flyleaf, and on the sticky label of the binding flap. Remarkably, the designations written on the books themselves match exactly (or nearly so) those that appear in the entries of the inventory, which were recorded subsequently.

A telling example that sheds light on the cataloguing procedure is a famous Timurid calligraphy album compiled during Shahrukh's reign (r. 1405–47) in Herat (Appendix III: 40, Pl. 17 [1]). The title written above fol. 1a, which also bears Bayezid II's seal impression, perfectly matches the corresponding entry in `Atufi's inventory (the binding's sticky label is lost): *Safīnatun fīhā khuṭūṭun nafīsatun wa-Rasā'ilu fī mujalladin a`ẓama* (A Compendium Containing Exquisite Calligraphy and Epistles within a Large Bound Volume, 257 {9}). A slanted note in Turkish, also attributable to `Atufi and written along the left edge of that page, reads: "let it be recorded under divans" (*devāvīnde derc oluna*). Clearly, this note was necessitated by the complex task of assigning one specific field of knowledge to the diverse texts collected within this monumental album, which is listed in the inventory under Persian divans and versified books. The note confirms that the librarian first wrote the title on the book itself, before the same information was recorded in the relevant section of the inventory, perhaps with the help of one or more assistants.

`Atufi, or an assistant of his, wrote in each book and in the inventory itself the title given by the author, sometimes abbreviating it, or citing the popular title by which it was widely known. Not always indicating the names of authors, the librarian also occasionally assigned generic titles to books based on their subject matter, or simply listed a keyword followed by a disciplinary affiliation. The fact that various titles are given to different copies of the same work in `Atufi's inventory reflects the notorious flexibility of premodern titles. `Atufi avoided systematizing headings or naming books in a more consistent manner, perhaps to accommodate preexisting labels or to distinguish different copies of the same work. The recognizable hand in *naskh* script, with some variations, that transcribed the titles and disciplines of many manuscripts stamped with Bayezid II's seal can be attributed to `Atufi and/or his assistant(s), who copied and modified previous headings, as well as created new ones.

`Atufi's task involved a combination of procedures. Even though the affiliated disciplines of books were often missing from their previously assigned titles, the volumes must have been loosely grouped according to discipline in the library spaces and chests. After all, Mehmed II's librarian Molla Lutfi wrote a well-known treatise in Arabic on the classification of religious and linguistic sciences, titled *al-Ma ṭālib al-ilāhiyya fī mawḍū`āt al-`ulūm al-lughawiyya* (The Divine Questions in the Subjects of the Philological Sciences), and his teacher `Ali Qushji reportedly composed an encyclopedia of knowledge called *Mawḍū`āt al-`ulūm* (Subjects of the Sciences) that has not yet come to light. The relevance of such encyclopedic classifications of the sciences to the cataloguing of libraries has long been recognized. It may well be that the classificatory system devised by `Atufi was partly rooted in an earlier encyclopedic conception envisioned by Molla Lutfi and his royal patron, Mehmed II, who was the true founder of the

palace library. Whether or not this was the case, it is rather improbable that `Atufi organized *ex novo* the entire library, whose formation was a cumulative process initiated by his predecessors. Interestingly, `Atufi's inventory lists four copies of medieval classifications of the sciences by the Sunni Ash`arite scholars Abu Hamid al-Ghazali (d. 1111) and Fakhr al-Din al-Razi (d. 1210). It has been observed that al-Razi's classification, which integrated the religious and rational sciences, was widely imitated by sixteenth-century authors in Iran. I would argue that a similar integration characterizes ʿAtufi's individualized classification of knowledge… <>

THE LOGIC OF NARRATIVES by EunHee Lee [Utrecht Studies in Language and Communication, Brill, Rodopi, 97890044222124]

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THE LOGIC OF NARRATIVES is a linguistic study of narrative discourse that contextualizes the 'logical' rather than the 'stylistic' aspect of narratives within the range of current issues in the interdisciplinary study of narratives being conducted in linguistics, philosophy, literature, cognitive science, and Artificial Intelligence. The book quantitatively analyzes naturally occurring narratives randomly selected from the British National Corpus (BNC) as well as James Joyce's (1882-1941) *The Dead* (1914) and Fredrik Backman's (1981-) *A Man Called Ove* (2012). Discourse Representation Theory (DRT) formalization (Kamp and Reyle, 1993) is employed and enriched with the representations and interpretations of perspective/point of view, genre differences, coherence relations, and episodes, which are called in the book Perspectival DRT (PDRT).

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Summary

The Logic of Narratives consisted of three parts dealing with the three fundamental subjects of narratives: theoretical concepts and tools, events, and characters. Events and characters were considered as the two pillars of the narrative, which involves a story of people situated in time and place experiencing events. Part I presented the foundational concepts and theories that provided the basis for understanding events and characters in narratives as analyzed in the subsequent chapters. Chapter 1 explained the book's basic orientation/perspective on narrative, listed its distinctive features and unique contributions, and provided a brief outline and synopsis of the book. In short, the book is a linguistic study of narrative discourse that develops the idea that narratives are compositional and logical. It addresses the relative paucity of linguistic and formal semantic analyses of narrative structure in comparison with the copious publications on narratives from a literary perspective. It expands the empirical coverage of the existing linguistic work on discourse, which mostly rely on constructed examples and the authors' intuitions of them, by examining naturally occurring narrative examples from a large corpus and highly regarded literary works. It provides a formal method of encoding information about the point of view or subjectivity, discourse relations, the reader's attentional state and perspective prominence, and episode in narratives, all of which are currently less explored or non-existent in the field.

Chapter 2 provided basic concepts in the study of narratives, starting with an operational definition of narratives. Narratives were defined as a representation of a series of connected events in which a verbal sequence of clauses matches the order in which those events take place. After distinguishing narrative and non-narrative discourse types, I explored the architecture of narratives by introducing the foreground vs. background distinction and defining episodes that make up the nucleus of a complete narrative. In section 2, I discussed aspectual classes that help make the foreground and background distinction possible, together with operational tests to determine aspectual classes seminal work, many researchers working on the phenomenon of aspect and temporal interpreta- tion in discourse have shown that events, especially telic event descriptions (accomplishment and achievement), perfective, and inceptive clauses, form foreground, moving the narrative time forward, whereas state, imperfective, and modal clauses belong to background, maintaining the given time in the narrative. Based on this, I argued that the fundamental structure of narratives may be grammatically and formally determined. In section 3, rhetorical or coherence relations such as Narration, Explanation, and Elaboration were discussed in detail. Despite the fact that they are rarely explicitly marked, we nonetheless effortlessly perceive the coherence relations, organizing discourse into a systematic hierarchical structure and establishing the most natural inter-clausal anaphoric dependences. How is this possible? Where does the knowledge come from? I compared Hobbs's abduction and Mann and Thompson's Rhetorical Structure Theory with Asher and Lascarides' theory for nonmonotonic validity and commonsense reasoning to answer these questions, arguing that the inferences that we draw for coherence are conventional. I also inquired into anaphora resolution that is significantly affected by the hierarchical discourse s.

Chapter 3 outlined a novel theoretical tool in dynamic semantics, Perspectival Discourse Representation Theory (PDRT), to deal with problems unique to narratives that previous discourse-level semantic analyses were unable to satisfactorily unravel, such as genre differences, character perspectives, and

episode structure. Section 1 explained why dynamic semantics is necessary for natural language semantics by pointing out the inadequacies of traditional static truth-conditional semantics in dealing with nominal and temporal anaphora in discourse. Section 2 discussed classic DRT and its varieties, such as Segmented DRT and structured/Layered DRT. The classic DRT only encodes temporal relations and lacks a means to specify rhetorical relations. Asher and Lascarides propose Segmented DRT to incorporate them. Maier and Hunter utilize structured DRS, where the topmost DRS K0 encodes the utterance (extralinguistic) context. Unlike Hunter, I maintained the difference between context and world because they have different properties, behaving independently from each other. Context is the source from which the information comes, taking priority over worlds, the latter of which do something different, namely, representing different attitudes toward the given information. Whereas Hunter maintains that K0 is always the actual world containing the utterance event/context, I equated it with the most prominent context or perspective, which happens to be the utterance context in a typical communicative exchange of everyday face-to-face conversation. What is lacking in classic DRT and its varieties like S D RT and structured DRT is a means to systematically encode character perspective vs. non-narrative), and episode structure, which affect the interpretations of numerous natural language expressions such as tense, pronoun, indexicals, and expressives, to name a few. DRT is not specifically designed for narratives and thus does not recognize the fundamental processing differences between conversational and narrative discourse types. Even though rhetorical relations are represented in SDRT, it treats them as deriving from defeasible pragmatic inferences, whereas I view them as conventional discourse rules. Moreover, a stack of prominent entities customarily used in computer science, which is useful in modeling the resolution of pronouns (Stojnic et al., 2017), has not been a systematic part of a model-theoretic dynamic semantic framework such as DRT. I added these features to previous DRT frameworks, referring to the new version as Perspectival DRT (PDRT).

The construction of an imaginary narrative timeline, arguably the most distinctive feature of narratives, and the use of various temporal and aspectual expressions to locate events and states on it constituted the main themes of Part 2. The most important point that I wanted to drive home in this part of the book was that narratives are more or less constructed independently of the coordinates of their actual production and reception, and thus the normal deictic function of tense in everyday use of language is lost in this genre, forcing tense to take on an anaphoric role. As a result, temporal relations between events and states on the narrative timeline became the source of a successful understanding of the narrative. This intuition is in fact not new, and theoretical notions such as reference time (Reichenbach, 1947) and temporal perspective point (Kamp and Reyle, 1993) have been employed to capture this phenomenon. However, these notions have limited applications as their utility has been explored only with respect to individual temporal or aspectual constructions, such as the pluperfect. The fact that the entire temporal perspective shifts to the narrative context, making the utterance context secondary, and the fact that this is a universal property of narratives themselves, rather than fixed lexical meaning of particular temporal or aspectual markers, have so far gone unexplored (cf. Lee, 2018). As a result, a more systematic comprehension of the narrative structure has been hard to attain. To remedy this, I proposed to replace the traditional utterance context C with the point of view POV and argued that C is only one of many POVs that becomes promi- nent in typical everyday face-to-face conversation, which linguists use for the sake of simplicity and convenience. In this framework, interpretation becomes a (input-output) function from POV (not C) to content (function from possible worlds to extensions). Chapter 4 section 2 empirically supported the claim that lexical and grammatical aspect plays a major

role in determining the foreground and background distinction in narratives by examining The Dead and A Man Called Ove. The result of the quantitative analysis is followed by a PDRT representation of event and state sentences in narratives in section 3. From chapters 5 to 7, various tense and aspect markers were analyzed with respect to their functions in narratives as illustrated through case studies.

Contrary to traditional Reichenbachian (1947) analysis of tense and aspect, a mere temporal precedence relation does not license a simple past-pluperfect sequence in discourse, which is subject to further discourse constraints. In Chapter 5, I discussed the discourse semantic constraints imposed on the use of the pluperfect form in narrative discourse based on a quantitative analysis of corpus examples drawn from the British National Corpus. I proposed a unified analysis of the pluperfect by arguing that its alleged ambiguity between aspectual and temporal interpretations hinges on the aspectual class of the main predicate. Furthermore, the relationship between the pluperfect sentence, which forms background and builds a side-structure of ancillary timeline (Hopper, 1979; Reinhart, 1983), and its preceding simple past event sentence, which forms foreground and serves as an antecedent perspectival event, could be best characterized by normative-modal background relation. The unified analysis of the pluperfect was formally implemented in PDRT where the semantics of the pluperfect derives from the interplay between the anaphoric presupposition of the pluperfect and the discourse coherence principles.

Chapter 6 focused on the progressive, whose semantic composition raises some puzzling questions that have vexed semanticists for a long time; the progressive does not entail that the completed event in its scope will actually occur. Most scholars argue that the progressive must make a reference to the truth of its non-progressive counterpart in some possible worlds or futures, resulting in numerous proposals to pinpoint the relevant possible worlds. Whether the eventual culmination is reached in some possible worlds, however, depends on the perspective from which the event is viewed (Landman, 1992; Portner, 1998; Varasdi, 2014, inter alia). I argued that the modal base for a progressive sentence is perspective-dependent, as it shifts the point of view from the speaker to the character by taking an internal viewpoint of the unfolding events in the character's experiential field. Moreover, the progressive becomes coherent without cohesion in discourse because it is an anaphoric expression that is temporal- and perspectival-bound by its antecedent clause in the previous discourse. A corpus study was presented to support these claims. PDRT was shown to be better suited to capture the semantics of the progressive than previous dynamic semantic tools because it is equipped with a logical means to represent perspective binding in discourse. As was the case with the pluperfect, we observed an interaction between lexical and discursive meanings manifested in the use of the progressive in context.

In Chapter 7, I examined the shifted now, whose distribution is much broader than other indexical expressions. Unlike previous analyses that have tried to derive this property from the lexical meaning of now, thus treating it as a special case, I argued that the temporal perspective shift and temporal relations are functions of narrative discourse itself rather than the lexical semantics of now. The only lexical meaning of now is that its denotation is flexible, referring to a contextually salient time, whether it derives from the actual utterance context or a discourse context. In addition, now invariably indicates a change of state, denoting the turning point dividing the past and the future seen from this contextually salient temporal vantage point. I supported these claims by a quantitative study of corpus examples drawn from BNC and provided a PD RT analysis of now with the past tense in narratives. Now denotes the time of POV in the topmost PDRS K0 that gets updated when a new event is introduced.

Part 3, Character, investigated how the characters are introduced and referred back to within the narrative, and the way in which the characters' speech and thoughts are conveyed by the narrator using Free Indirect Discourse (FID). The events occurring in narratives are described from a certain point of view due to our physical orientation, psychological and mental dispositions, as well as the inherent situatedness of events. In everyday discourse that linguists typically examine, the perspective is indistinguishable from the utterance context (Doron, 1991; Eckardt, 2014). In narratives, by contrast, the utterance (the narrator's production) context and the character's speech/thought context (i.e., perspective) are clearly distinguished, the latter of which is marked linguistically using FID. The opening chapter of Part 3 discussed commonly mentioned linguistic devices for FID, such as speech/ thought parenthetical without a complementizer, shifted temporal, spatial, or demonstrative indexical (now, here, etc.), reflexives that are logophoric, e.g., those without antecedents in the local domain, de dicto reading of possessives, definite descriptions, and pronouns, and expressives (e.g., really, yes, pause). I then critically examined the previous semantic analyses of FID in order to assess our current understanding of this distinctive style (Doron, 1991; Eckardt, 2014; Schlenker, 2004; Sharvit, 2008; Maier, 2017). Common to the previous studies of FID is the assumption of dual contexts (the actual speech context and a separate "inner" or "thought" context) and individual lexical specifications on context-dependent items (pronouns, tenses, and indexicals) regarding the context upon which their meaning depends. Naturally, these studies explicitly or implicitly advocate the dual-voice hypothesis, which argues that the voice of the objective narrator is mixed with that of the subjective character in FID (Baxtin, 1929/1984; Pascal, 1977). In typical FID passages in narratives, however, we seem to only hear the quoted character's voice, while the narrator's contribution is only seen in shifted tense and person. In fact, the narrator's complete empathetic identification with the character was taken for granted in the early discussions of FID, which was endorsed by scholars like Bally and Lips. This position was revived by Banfield (1982), who claims that FID entirely lacks a narrator, so it could hardly be dual-voiced. Unlike the previous studies, I argued that pronouns and tenses may be purely anaphoric in FID rather than being indexical to the speaker/narrator, obviating the need to postulate the dual contexts and thus supporting the original no-narrator hypothesis (Banfield, 1982). I further argued that FID is a third kind of speech and thought representation, occupying its own legitimate place in the logical typology of speech/thought reports, rather than a hybrid of the most 'mimetic' Direct Discourse (DD) and the most 'diegetic' Indirect Discourse (ID). After providing evidence for this claim based on features of DD and ID observed in standard analyses (Hintikka, 1969; Maier, 2017; Potts, 2007, inter alia), I addressed the question as to whether there is a correlation between the use of ID, DD, or FID and the narrator alignment and empathy through a quantitative study of The Dead and A Man Called Ove. I tested the hypothesis that major characters' speech would be typically in FID, indicating the narrator's relegation of the narrative voice to these important characters, whereas a newly introduced or minor character's speech or unapproved content would take the form of DD or I D, signaling the lack of empathy. Such different degrees of narrator empathy are difficult to analyze using classic DRT as it lacks a method for encoding perspective shifts. A PDRT analysis of FID showcased the usefulness of this updated framework. From chapters 9 to 11, I examined various linguistic markings for subjective spectives.

A very salient characteristic of FID is that indexical or deictic expressions, which are traditionally assumed to be unaffected by attitude operators (Kaplan, 1978), are anchored to the subject of consciousness and not to the narrator. Shifted indexicals include locative deictic such as here, there,

verbs with deictic elements such as approach, come, go, demonstratives such as this, that, these, those, and temporal indexical expressions such as now, yesterday, ten years ago. Hence, we see the surprising effect of present and future time deictic co- occurring with the past tense in narratives. Indexical shift in attitude reports is also common cross-linguistically. In Chapter 9, after reviewing previous studies, I proposed a uniform semantic analysis of indexicals as denoting coordinates of the most prominent point of view (POV), based on the results of the quantitative study of shifted indexicals in The Dead and A Man Called Ove. In other words, the invariant linguistic meaning, 'the prominent/salient agent, world, and time,' governs the behavior of all pronouns, including the indexical ones, and which coordinates become prominent depends on separate but equally conventional discourse semantics, obviating the need to stipulate special lexical meaning to the indexical (Stojnic et al. 2017). In PDRT, the fact that indexicals denote the coordinates of the story context is expected because the most prominent context (the topmost PDRS K0) is not the utterance context but the one that contains the subject of consciousness, perspective time, and the story world, which get constantly updated as the story unfolds. Another important discovery regarding flexible indexicals was that they do not invariably signal FID.

The topic of Chapter 10 was how the use of different nominal forms, such as definite descriptions, possessives, and logophoric pronouns, signals subjective character perspectives. This chapter began with a general discussion of semantic problems involved in the interpretation of proper names (Elbourne, 2006; Geurts, 1997; Kaplan, 1978; Kripke, 1972; Maier 2009), definite descriptions (Russell, 1905; Strawson, 1950; Donnellan, 1966; Heim, 1982; Jenks, 2015), and logophors/de se pronouns (Culy, 1994; Oshima, 2007; Sells, 1987; Sterling, 2005; Zribi-Hertz, 1989). It then investigated whether pronouns are anaphoric to the most prominent character and encode his or her de se belief, and whether reflexives in narratives display characteristics of logophoric pronouns via a quantitative study of definites in The Dead and A Man Called Ove. It also examined various NP forms used to refer to the characters regarding register to test the hypothesis that the main characters are referred to with informal reference such as first name, whereas minor characters or characters that the narrator does not empathize with are referred to with a formal register with title and surname to signal distance. In PDRT, definites, which are invariably de dicto in FID, are never introduced into the most prominent DRS K0 but in sub-PD RS embedded under the character's perspective.

Chapter 11 dealt with expressives, such as epithets the idiot and adverbials bloody. Potts' (2005) claim that expressives, together with appositives, are invariably speaker-oriented regardless of their syntactic position, was questioned by Amaral et al. (2007), who observed that these expressions can be anchored to an agent other than the speaker. Harris and Potts (2009) investigated this issue and conceded that appositives and expressives indeed can be anchored to the subject of consciousness, proposing an account based in pragmaticallydriven perspective shifting rather than a semantic binding analysis by attitude predicates. My approach to FID, in which expressives reflect the focal character's feelings and evaluations, is in line with this new analysis. The empirical study of expressives in The Dead and A Man Called Ove showed that they are, like indexicals, anchored to the subject of consciousness, which was given a natural analysis in PDRT.

Linguistic Study of Narratives and Its Implications

This book proposed a linguistic study of narrative discourse that advanced the thesis that narratives are compositional and logical. That is, the meaning of a narrative is the function of the meaning of every sentence occurring in it and the way they are put together (so, compositional), and the conclusions and

inferences drawn from the events happening in narratives are considered valid (hence, logical). The assumption explained our abilities to readily recognize the various rhetorical relations among sentences; to draw episode boundaries with ease; to follow the constantly moving story line with little difficulty by keeping track of characters and events; or to intuitively distinguish between the narrator's and the characters' thoughts and perspectives, across a possibly infinite number of different stories. This book contextual-ized the 'logical' rather than the 'stylistic' aspect of narratives within the range of current issues in the interdisciplinary study of narratives being conducted in linguistics, philosophy, literature, cognitive science, and Artificial Intelligence.

The timely and unique contribution of the book was twofold. On the empirical side, in order to delineate the discourse properties and relations of narrative discourses, I quantitatively analyzed naturally occurring narratives randomly selected from the British National Corpus (BNC). These disconnected corpus examples from different stories by different authors were supplemented by an examination of the full text of a short story from the twentieth century, James Joyce's (1882–1941) The Dead (1914), and chapters of a novel from the twenty-first century, Fredrik Backman's (1981–) A Man Called Ove (2012). The combined results of studying both the corpus and literary works provided a wealth of naturalistic data and new empirical discoveries to help better understand the semantics of nominal and temporal anaphora and the pragmatics of rhetorical relations and commonsense inferences. My hope was that they would also inspire new perspectives for literary studies and deliver practical applications for modeling machine discourse processing in computer science and Artificial Intelligence. On the theoretical side, to make the semantic and pragmatic properties of narratives clearer and more precise, I employed Discourse Representation Theory (DRT) formalization (Kamp and Reyle, 1993) that I enriched with the representations and interpretations of perspective/point of view, genre differences, coherence relations, and episodes, which I called Perspectival DRT (PDRT). The theoretical improvements on dynamic semantics in the framework of PDRT hopefully provided a new perspective to our current thinking in discourse semantics and pragmatics, resulting in a sharpened theoretical tool to analyze a wider range of natural discourse data.

The book addressed the relative paucity of linguistic and formal semantic analyses of narrative structure in comparison with the copious publications on narratives from a literary perspective. Discourse and literary studies on narratives are focused on pragmatic and stylistic factors, such as genre expectations and character analyses, and pay relatively little attention to the exact linguistic forms that are used and how their formal meanings expand to express the author's and the characters' viewpoints and intentions. On the other hand, because the field of linguistics is mostly concerned with sentence-level structure and meaning, few studies have been devoted to describing the nature of narratives. This book aimed to bridge that divide. It also expanded the empirical coverage of the existing linguistic work on discourse, which tend to rely on constructed examples and the authors' intuitions of them, by examining naturally occurring narrative examples from a large corpus and highly regarded literary works. The value of corpus and natural discourse data lies in their ability to reveal unexpected features of words, sentences, and discourses that are often inaccessible from introspection alone. The presentation of the quantitative studies in the book showed that we can gain new insight even into extensively studied topics, such as the progressive and speech reports, by looking at their actual use in natural context, while at the same time contributing to the development of rigorous methodology of data collection and analysis. The book provided a formal method of encoding information about the point of view or

subjectivity, discourse relations, the reader's attentional state, and episode in narratives, which are currently less explored or even non-existent in the field. As I explained in detail in Chapter 3, current dynamic semantic frameworks, although vastly improved over more traditional static truth-conditional semantics, are still not flexible enough to correctly encapsulate the perspective dependency, shifts, and binding pervasive in natural language. The encoding of the genre differences is important but often glossed over in the current dynamic semantic frameworks. They lack the capacity to move beyond consecutive sentences and their local relations to the larger structure of episodes, which affect anaphoric dependencies. The book offered a more flexible logical tool that can accurately describe and satisfactorily analyze natural discourse data.

While focused on a formal linguistic analysis of narratives, the book has larger implications and applications for related fields, particularly for literary studies and cognitive science. In this book, I have raised questions that have been actively debated in literary studies, such as 'Who is the narrator?' 'Where is she/he located?' 'Are narratives dual-voiced?' and offered my own answers to them based on linguistic evidence. I have shown that the use of various linguistic forms and constructions, such as the pluperfect, the progressives, indexicals, tenses, and pronouns, engender the logical inferences, e.g., linear temporal progression and perspective shift. Formal linguistic tools can be fruitfully applied to other inferences and conclusions that we draw in the narrative interpretation about characters and events. For example, subjectivity and affective aspect of language have been at the center of semantics and pragmatics research recently, and the theories for them can be used to better explain character perspective and narrator alignment/distance in narratives. I did not discuss modality extensively in this book, but modal expressions often give rise to subjective perspective in narratives, which can be effectively studied using elaborate theories about modality that have been developed in semantics. A lot of research has accumulated on information structure and packaging, which has the potential to shed light on how discourse highlights certain aspect of reality and draws our attention, while leaving out other details. The vast literature on coherence and inter-sentential dependency in both computer science and linguistics can inform literary studies regarding the assumptions we make to fill the gaps in the story based on world knowledge and discourse connectivity. Likewise, detailed analyses about the voice, character, genre expectations, ways of interpreting, and adaptations in literary studies can benefit discourse analysis in cognitive and language sciences, invigorating them with refreshing energy to an otherwise technical and dry enterprise. I hope that this book will contribute to generating interdisciplinary dialogue, providing a more holistic study of narratives and story-telling, which are so fundamental in our everyday lives. <>

Niccolò di Lorenzo della Magna and the Social World of Florentine Printing, ca. 1470–1493 by Lorenz Böninger [I Tatti Studies in Italian Renaissance History, Harvard University Press, 9780674251137]

A new history of one of the foremost printers of the Renaissance explores how the Age of Print came to Italy.

Lorenz Böninger offers a fresh history of the birth of print in Italy through the story of one of its most important figures, Niccolò di Lorenzo della Magna. After having worked for several years for a judicial court in Florence, Niccolò established his business there and published a number of influential books. Among these were Marsilio Ficino's *De christiana religione*, Leon Battista Alberti's *De re aedificatoria*, Cristoforo Landino's commentaries on Dante's *Commedia*, and Francesco Berlinghieri's *Septe giornate della geographia*. Many of these books were printed in vernacular Italian.

Despite his prominence, Niccolò has remained an enigma. A meticulous historical detective, Böninger pieces together the thorough portrait that scholars have been missing. In doing so, he illuminates not only Niccolò's life but also the Italian printing revolution generally. Combining Renaissance studies' traditional attention to bibliographic and textual concerns with a broader social and economic history of printing in Renaissance Italy, Böninger provides an unparalleled view of the business of printing in its earliest years. The story of Niccolò di Lorenzo furnishes a host of new insights into the legal issues that printers confronted, the working conditions in printshops, and the political forces that both encouraged and constrained the publication and dissemination of texts.

Reviews

"An ambitious and successful effort to shed light on the social conditions, human networks, and labor practices that underpinned the earliest book production in one of the fifteenth century's most dynamic—but also mercurial—centers. Building upon his numerous excellent essays and books on artisan culture and immigrant communities in Renaissance Florence, Böninger fills an extremely important lacuna in our knowledge of early Italian printing."—Sean Roberts, author of *Printing a Mediterranean World*

"A *tour de force* of scholarship. Böninger has done a brilliant job of combining known and unknown documents with the literature on the pertinent literary, economic, social, and religious history to create the best and fullest history of Niccolò di Lorenzo della Magna and his world to date."—John Monfasani, author of *Greeks and Latins in Renaissance Italy*

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In Italy, the printing revolution arrived step by step. Attention for the unknown art grew slowly in the 1460s, when increasing numbers of books produced in Western and Southern Germany arrived on the peninsula. Simultaneously, a young generation of printers spread out from there in search of new opportunities. Some of them settled in Subiaco and thereafter in Rome, where their presses began working in the middle of the decade. Elsewhere one had to wait until 1470-1472, when a sudden frenzy overcame important centers like Bologna, Florence, Milan, or Venice. In the dynamic and geographically mobile society of the time, now even more individuals from different backgrounds sought to learn this promising craft from experienced printers. As must be stressed, the complex typographical process could not be improvised or reinvented without the expertise of these "masters." Such miraculous "reinventions" were nevertheless more than once propagated, for instance, by the mysterious priest Clemente da Padova, who twice—in 1470 and 1472—offered himself to introduce printing in the town of Lucca.

From the very beginning, printing was "a meeting point of economic forces," as Brian Richardson formulated, and Renaissance Florence was no exception to this. Regarding these forces, Richard Goldthwaite added that the Florentine printing industry "was the one business that, unlike any other in Florence outside the textile industry, was oriented to production for foreign markets." Not very much is known about the functioning of these markets. With respect to serial manuscript production, the example of the famous bookseller and writer Vespasiano da Bisticci demonstrates how easily the whole of the Italian Peninsula could be reached with his handwritten products. The mechanisms of the early printed book trade have, on the other hand, only in the last decades become a matter of historiographical interest. If thus, as Goldthwaite put it, "for the most part the history of [Florentine] printers is that of ventures that hobbled along, from one contract to another, until the Giunti appeared on the scene at the end of the [fifteenth] century," this requires further explanation.

Already in the fourteenth century, Florentine citizens prided themselves on one of the highest rates of literacy in Europe and propagated their ethical and cultural values derived—as they claimed—from ancient and modern literature. Reading was a fundamental element of this culture. Florence's internal market for printed books was therefore potentially richer than that of other civic centers. The natural question arises as to why, then, printing turned out to be so difficult and risky in Florence, if on the other hand one of the traditional characteristics of its economic culture was its vocation to long-distance trade and if its merchants were omnipresent on the principal fairs and markets of the time. Could it really be that at a certain point the Florentine printers realized that they were "not able to produce for export" and that they thus limited their efforts on the—however rich—local markets, publishing their books predominantly for the nearby towns of Siena, Pisa or Bologna, as Paolo Trovato maintained?

Comparing the Florentine output of incunabula with that of the three most dynamic printing centers in Italy (i.e., Milan, Rome, and Venice), Brian Richardson found that on the Arno River fewer legal or theological volumes in Latin were produced because of the relatively modest size of the Florentine university, the Studium Generale, which in 1473 had been transferred to Pisa.? Florentine vernacular editions suffered, on the other hand, from an "inward-looking and insular" attitude. Another reason for the rather modest local production lay in the Florentines' reticence to invest in the new industry: whereas in Venice printing "had the support of many leading statesmen, academics and clerics," in Florence "the works printed were often more ephemeral and printing itself did not attract the sort of patronage which helped to launch Jenson's career." This last point has also been stressed by other scholars, such as Neil Harris and Martin Lowry, who recorded the mental "predisposition" of Venetian publishers to economic risks and their eagerness to invest risk capital.

Although one of the most important scholars in this field, Roberto Ridolfi, went so far as to define the study of the economical factors of printing as the "philosophy of the history of the book," these problems have never been dealt with in a more than impressionistic manner. Of course, many other factors contributed to the growth of the new business as well—for example, social and cultural aspects and, more generally, the legal, political, and economical conditions. For this study the considerations of all these aspects must be considered as fundamental.

The richness of Florence's libraries and archives has always stimulated scholarly research on its civic, literary, and artistic culture, as well as on a multitude of other, sometimes even neglected, aspects. With the help of hitherto unknown archival material, these pages will reflect on the life and work of the most prolific Florentine printer in the 1470s and early 1480s, Niccolô di Lorenzo della Magna, and on printing in Renaissance Florence in general. Before doing so, this introduction will present the institutional framework in which local typographers operated, the problems regarding the distribution of their works, and the wider economic context. This will be followed by a brief presentation of how this text is organized and the archival sources on which it is based.

A striking aspect of early printing in Renaissance Florence seems to be the fact that the publishers only exceptionally indicated their investments as part of their professional activities. As will be shown, many of them were quite young, in their twenties, and were described in their tax returns to the Catasto as without any profession ("senza exercizio," "non fa nulla"). Sometimes investments in printing seem to have been made by the wealthier scions of Florentine society shortly after their weddings, and in these

cases one might suspect that parts of the dowry funds were used for them, turning even their spouses into possibly unaware but certainly legitimate owners of the finished volumes. The printers, booksellers, and stationers (cartolai), just like the painters and haberdashers or mercers (merciai), were, unlike the publishers, subject to the guild of doctors of medicine and apothecaries commonly known as the Arte dei medici e speziali (or aromatai). The reason for this was that the main substance used by the stationers, paper, was originally listed among the merchandise traded exclusively by the apothecaries. Although doctors, apothecaries, and sometimes even stationers played an important role in Florentine political and social life, their guild was dominated by a handful of patrician families, as the rather repetitive lists of names in the lists of its "consuls" prove. As it seems, apothecaries were only represented in the larger, general council meetings. No painters, stationers, or printers seem to have reached high positions in the guild.

Unlike the local painters who regularly met in their religious confraternity of Saint Luke or the stationers in other towns like Milan or Genoa, Florentine stationers and printers had no such confraternity of their own in the fifteenth century. They were subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the guild of doctors and apothecaries and could not pursue their debtors from the guild in a secular or ecclesiastical court. Unfortunately, the loss of all of the guild's internal records does not allow any further considerations. Neither is there a list of the members of the guild (matricola) for the crucial years of our interest. Many Florentine and foreign printers, whose presence or activity before 1490 can only be guessed at, remain therefore nameless. In compensation there is a member list of the surrounding territory (contado) and four matriculation lists regarding the city of Florence for the period after 1490 which have been studied by Gustavo Bertoli.

The guild of doctors and apothecaries occasionally sold both manuscripts and printed books. Although this was probably no organized trade, one might consider the hypothesis that these books had been confiscated from its members in order to balance their debts. This corporation was furthermore, as has been seen, the first judicial instance in disputes between stationers or printers and their business partners. Naturally, the guild also decided all questions between fabric merchants and local paper producers (cartai).19 Again, no documents regarding these cases have survived. Sometimes, however, we can gain a glimpse on how the corporation worked. The partially known history of a dispute between the notary, publisher, and book dealer Piero Pacini and the typographer Francesco di Dino in the 1480s on the printing of three different books shows, for example, that the guild tribunal arrived at a first sentence in 1484, but that in order to conclude his plea successfully, Pacini had to turn to the court of the Mercanzia and finally to that of the Podestà, who eventually forced the printer to give in by imprisoning him.

Albinia de la Mare has described how the Florentine stationers and scribes adapted to the new situation created by the printing industry. The expansion of the increasingly dynamic book market caused a stronger competition and, as an unwelcome "by-product," a rising number of conflicts between different professional categories working in printing and selling which—as elsewhere—sometimes turned even violent. One of the most obvious changes the printing press brought to Florence was the considerable increase not only of local stationers but also of ambulant booksellers. These worked in two different ways, as salaried salesmen for other printers or on their own, on a more modest level as peddlers, cerretani or circulatores, as they were called in Genoa.

Few sources have fueled the interest in this professional category more than the so-called diary of the Florentine convent of San Iacopo di Ripoli (1476-1484), in which many of these middlemen appear with their qualifications and names. As one of the most important sources for the study of early printing, this account book has been studied from various points of view ever since it was discovered in the eighteenth century. One of the lessons to be learned from it is that "the printer's ability to locate suitable distributors for his products—energetic and shrewd judges of an audience's actual and potential tastes—and his ability to create and maintain stable relations with them, may have been as important to his success as his choice of text or type." As various examples show, this counted also for the local stationers.

In Venice and not in Florence, the merchants Girolamo Strozzi and Giambattista Ridolfi organized in 1476 for the printing of three important volumes, the Florentine histories of Leonardo Bruni and Poggio Bracciolini, and Cristoforo Landino's volgare translation of Pliny's Historia naturale. The finished volumes were then sent to Florence to be sold by a group of competing stationers. The reasons given for this procedure were quite interesting. Strozzi knew "by experience that it is unwise to allow the booksellers to have more than two or three copies at a time and that it is very difficult to get them to reimburse him for the copies sold." He therefore advised his Florentine agent "not to furnish any more copies until those already disposed of have been paid for and further advises him to make a tour of all the shops every fortnight, checking to see that unsold copies are still in evidence because of the tendency of the booksellers to lend them to those who would probably purchase copies if unable to borrow them."

The role of both "stationary" and ambulant booksellers was considered so crucial that at times it was mentioned as an integral part of a new printing enterprise—as, for example, in Pavia (1474). A recent three-volume dictionary on the Italian book market between the fifteenth and seventeenth centuries has justly given much space to this professional category.27 And even the following discussion of Niccolà di Lorenzo della Magna's career will include short biographical portraits of those individuals—Antonio di Mariano speziale, Domenico di Benedetto Doni—who were presumably involved with the distribution of his works.

This matter has to be considered in the more general economic context. A recent survey on the production of a typographer in the Swiss town of Basel, Michel Wenssler, has stressed that his activity was "capital-intensive and marked by a very long return on investment. Indeed, a considerable amount of time would pass between the initial investments in infrastructure, raw material and labour force, and the moment the first books were sold. Finally, for early publishers it was almost impossible to make predictions about market expectations. Local markets normally were quite restricted, whereas trans-regional markets were hard to read; moreover, it was necessary to travel to fairs in order to promote the product." The question of whether these aspects can already be discussed in a "protocapitalistic" perspective today seems to have lost much of its appeal. It leads, however, to another crucial point: that of debt capital in joint ventures between publishers and printers. From the court acts in Basel it has been demonstrated that printers like Wenssler ran their business from the very beginning on debt capital. This was, for example, needed for assembling the press, the purchase of paper, or other services: "With all due respect towards quantitative analysis, there is strong evidence that debts shaped both the late medieval urban economy as well as everyday life. In this sense, Michel Wenssler and his steady presence in court are representative of the late medieval urban economy and particularly telling for how the debt economy is essential in understanding how he ran his printing workshop." As has convincingly

been concluded, debt economy was in this sense the "underlying financial structure for the [printing] industry as a whole."

The present study is organized into three parts, covering roughly (and mostly chronologically) two decades—that is, from around 1470 / 1471 until 1493, when Niccolô di Lorenzo della Magna's name was mentioned for the last time. Beginning rather conventionally with the presumed "inventor" of typography in Florence, Bernardo Cennini, it will become clear that there was at least one other professional colleague, Giovanni di Piero da Magonza, and presumably a third one, the as yet nameless "Printer of Terentius, Pr. 6748," who all gave proof of their skills in the years around 1471. Part I will end with the hitherto overlooked relationship between wool merchants and printers, which is a perfect example of the debt economy as described above. For wool merchants the investment in printing was considered a natural, if not instinctive way of selling cloth, especially the so-called panni di garbo, in an "alternative" way and in a saturated home market that was characterized by overproduction of exactly this sort of wool. On a larger scale, these transactions confirm the results of Paul McLean and Neha Gondal's research on the "credit network" in Renaissance Florence.

Niccolô di Lorenzo della Magna's career, his typographical production and his frequent legal struggles between 1475 and 1486, stand at the center of Parts II and III. Leaving a modest position in the court of the Mercanzia, Niccolô received his professional formation after 1474, probably from his "master," Giovanni di Piero da Magonza, before entering into a partnership with the Florentine citizen Cappone di Bartolomeo Capponi. This company secured him economic stability for five years, during which, according to the partnership rules, single commissions for works could be accepted from other citizens or institutions like religious convents. Whenever such a direct commission could be reasonably argued, the text will investigate the circumstances and biographies of the single publishers involved with them.

Niccolô di Lorenzo had no permanent business partner after 1480/ 1481, when he ventured to become an independent printer. Many of his best-known books date from these years, like Cristoforo Landino's commented and partly illustrated edition of Dante Alighieri's Divina Commedia, Francesco Berlinghieri's Geographia, and Leon Battista Alberti's De re aedificatoria. All of these works derived from single commissions, just like his last—disastrous—enterprise of Saint Gregory's Morali (14831486). As in Part I, biographical data will help to illustrate the lives of the individuals known to have been involved with either Niccolô's printing press or the distribution of its works. Unfortunately, most of the craftsmen in his workshop—in which after 1480 up to four presses were simultaneously used, employing probably no less than ten craftsmen—remain for now anonymous, despite all the research. Probably Niccolà di Lorenzo was employing itinerant and therefore "nameless" printers from central Europe, but the historical sources on this matter remain disappointingly silent. As will be demonstrated, he still relied on the direct or indirect support of other citizens, foremost the humanist Cristoforo Landino. Especially from this side, he continued to receive his necessary share of "vertical solidarity," as this characteristic feature of late medieval society has been called by Francis William Kent.

Following the long and complicated legal battle over the printing of Saint Gregory's Morali, the epilogue will finally address a central matter in all early book printing—that is, the question of paper supply. Although no final conclusions can be reached on the specific role that paper prices and paper trade played in early Tuscan book production, their crucial importance for printing, not only in Florence, will become evident. Another fundamental question, that of the selling prices of books, will only be touched

upon in a nonsystematic and "impressionistic" way, i.e., supplying information on prices every time the sources permit this.

These pages concentrate therefore on the typographer's professional career and not so much on the bibliographical analysis of his products. A detailed and satisfying account in this sense could only be offered by book historians and bibliographers with a special interest in early printing. The complex analytical methods derived from the study of Johannes Gutenberg's products or Shakespeare's First Folio have set standards that cannot be met here. Certainly this study would have greatly benefited from a collaboration regarding the physical aspects, the printing practices, print or state variants, and similar problems in Niccolô di Lorenzo's books. Albeit, such an undertaking would imply viewing the highest possible numbers of extant copies; as these are spread around the globe, at times in large numbers and at others in just a few or single copies, the project would have become very demanding. For all bibliographical aspects this text will therefore mostly rely on Victor Scholderer's 1930 catalog of books from the fifteenth century in the British Library and Dennis Rhodes's Annali from 1988, just as much as on the online repertories of the Incunabula Short Title Catalogue at the British Library (ISTC), and the Gesamtkatalog der Wiegendrucke (GW), usually with the reference number of the single editions.

In a few exceptional cases, however, bibliographical questions will be addressed from a historical point of view. The German writer and philosopher Walter Benjamin once quoted Anatole France: "The only exact knowledge there is is the knowledge of the date of publication and the format of books." Alas, this knowledge remains often incomplete if not contradictory, and especially in Florence, where many of the earliest prints appeared without any indication regarding these crucial matters, sine notis.35 In more fortunate cases printers presented themselves with their signatures (colophons), but even this information at times raises doubts.36 This counts also for Niccolô di Lorenzo's books. For instance, not always can the dates derived from his colophons be harmonized with the historical documents at hand, as the example of his edition of Fra Cherubino da Spoleto's Della vita spirituale will show.

A last instruction on the archival sources used and the methodology followed here must be given. In general, historical sources on early typography in Florence are very scarce and often difficult to interpret. This is due to the fact that here, as in the rest of the Italian Peninsula, the foreign printers normally arrived with little more than their technical knowledge and very little or no capital. Typically they belonged to the lower strata of society and only exceptionally married, set up households, and became fiscal subjects, depending on their personal economic situation or outlook. As a direct consequence, modern historical research has to focus on sources other than those traditionally studied by Florentine historians and art historians, such as notarial and fiscal records (the Catasto), private and public account books and ricordanze (recollections), letters, and the like.

For the study of early printing, the more than twenty thousand registers of the Florentine notarial archive, the Notarile antecosimiano, have traditionally presented the richest grounds. For Niccolô di Lorenzo's biography, they have mostly been exploited. As a consequence, few if any relevant new documents can still be unearthed in them. As must be remembered, however, interpreting notarial acts in a "complete" way often requires additional archival research, especially if they are related to economic or legal conflicts. Compromises as results of private arbitrations were often recorded by notaries and sometimes arrived after earlier, fruitless legal action taken in court; often the court officials themselves ordered such arbitrations (lodi). In the opposite scenario, one of the two parties went to court after a

private arbitration had failed. In both cases, however, the pertinent court documents need to be unearthed. Special attention has furthermore to be paid to the legal witnesses named in these documents. Generally, it has to be borne in mind that the testimonies listed in notarial acts often indicate the formal or informal "guarantees" of a contract or the members of a network who in this particular moment were all defending their own financial interests. Whenever possible, some light will be thrown on these "bystanders." It is hoped that the resulting, sometimes very detailed studies on individuals who have so far eluded historical interest will not bore the reader, result in a "flat narrative," or become, even worse, an example of the "tunnel vision, (to) an unwillingness to look beyond the immediate object of study to search for contexts and connections," so typical for much of the research on late medieval and Renaissance Florence.

As a direct consequence of this approach, the following pages draw heavily on the documentation of the judicial court reserved for the resolution of financial and economic disputes, the so-called Mercanzia. For the more than two decades in question, the acts of this court have been studied systematically, not only in their three main series ("Atti ordinari," "Atti straordinari," and "Sentenze"), but also in the other, less numerous and thus more "accessible" ones. To a minor degree, other legal records—for instance, those from the tribunal of the Podestà—have been studied as well, despite their incompleteness. Due to their formal character, the information to be gathered from court acts is usually limited to the names of the two or more disputants and the amount(s) of sum(s) requested by the supposed creditor(s). Only in very rare cases is the nature or origin of the debt stated other than in general terms.

In at least one important case, the immense files of the court of the Podestà have contributed to our knowledge on Niccolô di Lorenzo's activity as well. From these registers came, for instance, the copy of the printing contract regarding the publication of Landino's commentary on Dante's Divina Commedia (24 December 1480). The first informal exchanges on the correct interpretation of this document grew into the project of a conference, jointly organized in November 2014 in Florence by the Società Dantesca Italiana and Villa I Tatti, the Harvard University Center for Italian Renaissance Studies.'" Some of the problems raised on this occasion regarded both Niccolô di Lorenzo's printing practices and the financial aspects of his business. Concentrating only on the latter, I realized that they had to be reconsidered. The result of these reflections is the present study. <>

Brill's Companion to the Reception of Presocratic Natural Philosophy in Later Classical Thought edited by Chelsea C. Harry and Justin Habash [Brill's Companions to Philosophy: Ancient Philosophy, Brill, 9789004318175]

In **Brill's Companion to the Reception of Presocratic Natural Philosophy in Later Classical Thought,** contributions by Gottfried Heinemann, Andrew Gregory, Justin Habash, Daniel W. Graham, Oliver Primavesi, Owen Goldin, Omar D. Álvarez Salas, Christopher Kurfess, Dirk L. Couprie, Tiberiu Popa, Timothy J. Crowley, Liliana Carolina Sánchez Castro, Iakovos

Vasiliou, Barbara Sattler, Rosemary Wright, and a foreword by Patricia Curd explore the influences of early Greek science (6-4th c. BCE) on the philosophical works of Plato, Aristotle, and the Hippocratics.

Rather than presenting an unified narrative, the volume supports various ways to understand the development of the concept of nature, the emergence of science, and the historical context of topics such as elements, principles, soul, organization, causation, purpose, and cosmos in ancient Greek philosophy.

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Excerpt: Plato and Aristotle, together with the Hippocratic thinkers, are the most celebrated and prolific contributors to a period of ancient Greek thought that we will refer to here as "later classical." This name and designation is partially bounded by time, ca. 5th-4th centuries BCE. But, more importantly, it means thinkers that form a sort of "second wave" in ancient Greek thought. This is to suggest that in Plato, Aristotle, and the Hippocratics, we see not only new ideas and novel arguments, but also dialectical arguments, responses to previous positions, and even syntheses of previous ideas. These

syntheses, in turn, create new ideas, and even paradigms in early philosophy and science. Those whom we will consider here as a more or less "first wave" of thinkers, given their status as interlocutors to the later classical thinkers, are more commonly known as the "Presocratics," or as Aristotle called them, the *(physiologoi)*. This "first wave" of thinkers spans a longer time in history, ca. 6th-4th century BCE, as well as a far more diverse geography, from modern day western Turkey to modern day southern Italy. What is more, they represent different philosophical schools. Nevertheless, we group them together because we have the sense that they made a collective, if not directly related, effort that effectually began ancient Greek philosophy and science with various enquiries into nature.

This volume takes for granted that both Plato and Aristotle were profoundly influenced by these "first wave" philosophical forebears. For, despite Plato's Socrates's well-known account of his own turning away from natural philosophy in the *Phaedo,* ideas about the concept of nature inform Platonic philosophy across Plato's corpus. Thus we see discussions of "nature" not only in Plato's *Timaeus,* his singular work on cosmogony and cosmology, but also in works like the *Republic,* a foundational text of political theory, which also takes up the nature of *human* being. Aristotle, often considered the first scientist in the West because of his profound contributions to the foundations of biology and zoology, was also the first philosopher to develop a method by which to undertake and proliferate a complete *phuseós epistémés,* or science of nature. While Aristotle's negative accounts almost alway reply to commonly held theories of his time *(endoxa),* these theories are often treated anonymously and not considered in their own right. The *endoxa* to which Aristotle replies nevertheless come from a rich historical tradition of investigation into the greatest mysteries of nature and being, which though perhaps not methodological in compilation and scope, certainly aimed at the same target as Aristotle: truth. As John Burnet put it, curiosity was the common denominator, and Jonathan Barnes famously argued that it was reason.

Despite centuries of excellent philological and philosophical scholarship produced on these early Greek thinkers, they remain lesser known to most than the later classical thinkers. This may be due in part to a lack of extant literature we have from them today. Whereas a figure like Empedocles might present an anomaly to this generalization because we have more extant from him than most, in other cases, e.g., Thales, we have only a few lines of testimony on which to rely. So, even when Plato or Aristotle allude to these first wave thinkers, we face the challenge of sometimes having no other real source to cross-reference, and thus needing to rely on these allusions in order to know the Presocratic thinkers at all. Of course, the fact that we have the allusions indicates for us the relative importance they had for the later classical thinkers; and, yet, the lack of extant material whence we could examine, confirm, or deny certain attributions can make any effort to know these early Greek thinkers better seem speculative at best.

This leads us to a question of reception. While to scholars familiar with both of these waves of thinkers, it is undisputed that the later classical thinkers "received" many ideas *(endoxa),* formulations, and arguments from the early Greek thinkers, the details and force of the reception is still not widely understood. Consequently, what exactly served as theoretical catalysts for the second wave of ancient Greek thought, in what capacity, and to what end, is a topic for ongoing examination. The purview of the present volume is to address, as reasonably as possible, the reception of first wave natural philosophy by the second wave thinkers. By 'natural philosophy,' we mean discussions of what some today might consider early or proto-scientific concepts of elements, motion and activity, materiality,

form or soul, causation, medicine, dreams and wakefulness, and existence itself. Inquiries into these concepts assume, whether it is explicitly articulated or not, a theory of nature itself. Thus, the art of understanding some of the complexity of even investigating this reception is to consider that the term or concept, "nature" meant different things over the course of the time period of interest to us in this volume.

What is the meaning of "nature" in Presocratic and in later classical inquiries? In the early Greek literary tradition, talking of something's nature *(phusis)* is generally a way to describe the outward characteristics of a thing.' But, notably, it has been suggested that there was a unity in the long inquiry known to us today as Presocratic natural philosophy, namely, that when taken as a cohesive body of inquiry and work, the Presocratics used *phusis* as a term to mean something intrinsic about a thing—that which things really are. Likewise, it has been argued that *phusis* means "origin" only occasionally and that there is no unifying interpretation of the use of the term across extant texts and authors.

Part of the question in this debate is whether nature means the nature of all things, or whether it means the nature of a particular thing. For example, according to Beardslee's early twentieth century study of the development of the term and concept over time, the Milesians, or earliest of the first wave thinkers, "... focused their attention not on a particular example of the phenomenon, but on earthquakes or lightning-flashes in general. Their inquiries were directed towards classes of natural phenomena, and they exhibit this feature of science, that it investigates the universal and the essential, not the particular and the accidental." Beardslee then provides a history of the term's use in early Greek thought: "particular" in the Hippocratic thinkers, "character of things in general" in the Pythagoreans, "universal nature" in Plato's Lysis, "particular nature" in fourth century colloquial usage. Beardslee concludes that: "Until the close of the fifth century there is no direct proof that *phusis* was used for Nature in general.

Even in what we consider later classical thought, the meaning of "nature" continues to lack consistency. When authors were indeed thinking about similar problems to those of one or more Presocratic philosopher, a shift in method and focus means that these comparisons are not always easily drawn. A key example of this is found in Aristotle, who redefined "nature" as an *arché,* an inner principle, of motion *(kinesis)* and rest *(stasis)* in his most general work on nature philosophy, the *Physics* (192b13-22) Despite the fact that he is in dialogue with the Presocratic Ionian thinkers, the Pythagoreans, Parmenides, and Plato, his complex and self-contained treatment of nature might seem a world apart from the first wave thinkers' styles of inquiry and conclusions. Yet, Aristotle's interest in natural objects is part of his interest in explaining change, and the idea that nature comes from and exists as a single underlying material element, or principle of change and rest, recalls rather than supplants the Presocratic inquiries.

Plato's philosophy of nature, on the other hand, is less certain, told in the *Timaeus* as only a likely tale (38c). For Plato, the notion of material change, as opposed to the steadfast form or Idea *(eidos)* inherent in nature, called into question the possibility for veracity at all in an account of nature. Thus, at the heart of Plato's physics is something rather immaterial. Instead of studying the nature of natural beings, it provides an hypothesis about the entire picture. His theory of nature, then, is not a study of individual bodies subject to change; rather, it gives an account of the whole. As aforementioned, Plato talks about nature in other ways outside of his philosophy of nature. In these instances, we see nature means the *nature of* x, or a particular kind of thing. This approach to thinking of nature is employed throughout

Plato's Socratic dialogues, as interlocutors seek truth about the essence of ideas. So too, Nato and Plato's Socrates's interest in *human nature* marks a turn from talking about the natural world to talking specifically about human psychology and community. But, just as we recognize the mark of Presocratic natural philosophy in Aristotle's philosophy of nature, we see here too an echo of a turn in Presocratic philosophy—from the inquiry into the nature of phenomena in the Ionian thinkers to the interest in humanity and community in Heraclitus and others.

In the spirit that fits well with the plurality of views on nature proffered by Plato, Aristotle, the Hippocratics, and indeed the Presocratics themselves, the contributors to the present volume have each brought their individual understanding of the nature and challenges of the idea of reception to bear. The resulting work highlights a familiar disparity of views regarding the major interpretive issues in Presocratic studies but also in conceptions of this idea of reception itself. This is to say that this volume does not purport to offer an interpretive or methodological solution to understanding the reception of Presocratic natural philosophy. The editors aim, rather, to highlight the complexity, relative opacity, and yet the obvious importance, of scrupulous scholarship on the reception of Presocratic natural philosophy in Plato and Aristotle. To this end, this volume brings together a global array of voices in Presocratic studies that include the perspectives of rising scholars in the field along with those of established voices.

The contributions have been organized according to a division among thematic, topical, and methodological lines. While some chapters address broad methodology and continue the conversation about aforementioned concepts present both in Presocratic and later classical authors, other chapters address either misinterpretations and misattributions of specific Presocratic ideas in later classical authors, or work to uncover an overlooked or "hidden" influence of the former in the latter.

Reception: Methodology and Grounding Concepts

The first four chapters each take up in depth and overarching discussions regarding the meanings of the concepts, *nature, reception, principles/causes/ elements,* and the *beginning of science,* for studies on the reception of Presocratic natural philosophy. These chapters likewise each consider multiple Presocratic figures in their approach to saying something about the reception of Presocratic natural philosophy in Plato and Aristotle. Because of their relatively global approach, these chapters are intended to scaffold, as much as possible, the studies undertaken in the subsequent eleven chapters. Readers will also find cross-references among the first three of these chapters.

Gottfried Heinemann's chapter continues the discussion about the ancient Greek concept of nature introduced here. Specifically, he establishes this foundation on the philosophical project of the Presocratics as he explores the root of the study of nature in ancient Greek thought, beginning with the Presocratic nature philosophers before turning to Plato, and then to Aristotle. In the end, Heinemann shows Aristotle's own work on nature to be a sophisticated result of a complex conversation both with the earliest Greek philosophers and with Plato. Aristotle's works mark a return to a philosophical focus on the natural, but they likewise entail a new way to define nature, in terms of regularity and necessity.

Andrew Gregory takes up the question of Plato's reception of Presocratic natural philosophy generally, ultimately arguing for a nuanced reading of certain passages in the Platonic corpus, including the famous

Phaedo passage (96a ff), where Socrates details his original interest in and then subsequent disenchantment with Presocratic natural philosophy.

Justin Habash proposes that we reconceive our understanding of the chain of conceptions of nature that runs from the Presocratics through the so-called Sophists to later classical thinkers like Plato and Aristotle. Habash argues that despite their variations, conceptions of nature among the *physiologoi* almost invariably contain purposive strains that serve as precursors to Aristotle's more fully developed conception of a teleological nature.

Daniel Graham discusses the beginning of science in Presocratic philosophy, arguing that Parmenides and Anaxagoras are the authors of the "revolution that launched scientific astronomy," specifically through theories of the source of lunar light and the explanation of eclipses. Their new scientific conceptions replaced all other accounts of these phenomena and have held sway through the present time. Other scholars point to the problems of specific barriers within the reception of certain ideas.

Hidden Reception: Exploring Sources and Developing Themes

Misinterpretations, unacknowledged influences, and misattributions of Presocratic ideas in later classical thought frequently occurred because of a hidden or obscured intermediary, or due to unrecognized sources. Scholars writing on what we here call "hidden reception," identify and examine unrecognized links in the chains of specific ideas and concepts as they develop through ancient Greek thought. These chapters provide new ways to understand not only individual thinkers, but also the broader tapestry of ancient Greek philosophy itself.

Oliver Primavesi presents a special case of reception, in that his very project calls into question the meanings of categories like "Presocratic" and "later classical thinkers." Namely, he investigates a case of Presocratic influence in later classical thought within the Presocratic period. Using relatively recent evidence and deft philological analysis, he offers a convincing argument for the influence of the Pythagorean numerical ratios in the Empedoclean cosmic cycle.

In his chapter engaging the Pythagoreans, Owen Goldin points to specific forms of methodological influence of Presocratic protologic on later classical thought when he argues that Aristotle's theory of demonstration integrates Platonic ideas of definition with later Pythagorean distinctions between causally basic realities and their derivatives.

Omar Alvarez Salas traces references to Pythagoras in Aristotle's extant and lost works, arguing that despite never naming Pythagoras in his texts, Aristotle nevertheless implicitly refers to him as often as he does other relevant early Greek thinkers, in the context of the other "so-called" Pythagoreans. This conclusion provides an alternative position to the more standard reading by scholars that Aristotle was not as engaged with Pythagoras' doctrines as he was with other previous thinkers or that Aristotle was hesitant to include Pythagoras as a member of the Pythagoreans.

Christopher Kurfess provides compelling support from Simplicius's commentary on Aristotle's *Physics* to suggest that views on Eleatic *archai* presented by Aristotle in the opening books of the *Physics, Metaphysics,* and *De Anima* were first articulated by Theophrastus in a work Simplicius called, *Natural History.* Kurfess's research and analysis makes possible a reconsideration not only of the relationship

between Theophrastus and Aristotle, but also of the reception of certain Eleatic formulations, as we have come to know them by way of Aristotle.

Dirk Couprie illuminates the spherical earth bias present in Presocratic reception after Aristotle, occasioned, as he argues, by Aristotle's polemical treatment of the flat earth cosmology. The spherical earth bias, which Couprie finds not only in the doxography but also in modern interpreters, has led to a general lack of understanding about the characteristics and distinctive features of the flat earth cosmology. His article provides a careful treatment of these features.

Tiberiu Popa and Timothy Crowley investigate the so-called elements of nature. Popa shows us the role elemental varieties, including quasi-elementary simple bodies, play as explanatory devices both in cosmological and ontological accounts among Diogenes of Apollonia, Anaximenes, early Hippocratic works, Plato, Aristotle, and Theophrastus. While Popa is cautious in discussing the specific reception of such a role, he provides convincing evidence that simple stuffs helped early cosmological and ontological theory move from basic Ionian material monism to material dualism, as Popa calls the Hippocratic prescriptive emphasis on fire and water, to the more complex theories of simple bodies, elements, and their properties found in later classical thinkers. With a focus on Empedocles and Aristotle, Crowley examines the reception of Empedocles' four element hypothesis. Taking as a starting point Aristotle's remark at *Metaphysics* Alpha, that Empedocles was the first to talk of four material elements, Crowley discloses part of the historically significant and long-standing reception of a theory that was still being discussed in 17th century science. Crowley finds a fundamental difference between Empedocles' four element hypothesis and a four element hypothesis otherwise.

Iakovos Vasiliou and Lilliana Carolina Sanchez Castro focus on reception as it relates to questions of the soul. Vasiliou argues that Plato relies heavily on Anaxagorean concepts of *nous,* separation, and mixture in establishing a teleological framework that explains the relationship of body and soul in the *Phaedo,* focusing on the role of the philosopher's way of life on Plato's theory of body-soul separation. Sanchez Castro tackles Aristotle's engagement with the Heraclitean notion of the soul in *De Anima,* arguing that despite barely a passing mention of the Ephesian's views on *psuche,* Aristotle deliberately includes Heraclitus' view as a way to illustrate the soul as a cognitive principle.

Both Barbara Sattler and Rosemary Wright focus on Plato's careful adaptation of the ideas of earlier thinkers. Sattler first sketches different forms of philosophical reception in the Presocratics, Plato, and Aristotle before turning to a specific focus on the way Plato receives and modifies atomistic theory. Sattler argues that Plato's conscientious construction of atomist thought in the *Timaeus* is a deliberate attempt to be explicit about key points of disagreement while incorporating the ways in which Plato agrees with atomic theory Ultimately, Sattler offers a new way to understand why, despite atomic influence on his work, Plato does not name or directly refer to the atomists in his corpus. Wright, on the other hand, offers an analysis of the intersection between Presocratic cosmogonical and cosmological conclusions and Plato's use of myths in the *Gorgias, Phaedo, Republic,* and *Phaedrus.* Delivering an expert summary of a wide swath of Presocratic views, Wright argues that despite that Plato takes Presocratic cosmology as subjects of myth, or likely stories, they serve as a basis for his views about immortality. In an appendix to her chapter she lays out the evidence for understanding the *Timaeus* to follow closely on the conversation in the *Republic,* thus connecting the ideas of nature in these two key dialogues.

On Reading This Volume

Due to the indirect, complicated, and sometimes wily nature of addressing Presocratic reception—especially given that "Presocratic" is such a broad and deep category of thinkers and topics itself—the volume allows for multiple ways of entry to read, compare, contrast, and digest the rich contributions contained within.

The first way of entry is linear and straightforward. It takes the first four chapters as a unit constituting a theoretical propaedeutic to the subsequent eleven chapters. Readers can study them first, and use them as a guide to beginning more specific studies on the figures and themes discussed in later chapters.

These first four chapters reveal themselves to be a less straightforward trailhead, however, when one realizes that the aforementioned concepts weave into each other, and that the unit is at times inconsistent: overlapping, converging, but also diverging in complementary, at times challenging, ways. Nevertheless, the muddiness they reveal helps to put the subsequent eleven studies into their proper context and alerts readers to the real interpretive issues with which any study of Presocratic reception must contend.

The next points of entry take just one of the four initial chapters and then looks to between one and four more specific studies in subsequent chapters, which can be identified as thematically and/or stylistically resonant. On this approach, some possible pathways include: "nature, principles, and elements": read chapter one, followed by chapters five, eight, ten, and eleven; "reception, nature, and soul": read chapter two, followed by chapters twelve, thirteen, and fifteen; "purpose, nature, Plato, and Aristotle": chapter three, followed by chapters thirteen, fourteen, and fifteen; "scientific inquiry, nature, cosmos, and reception": read chapter four, followed by chapters six, seven, and nine. This list, however, is far from exhaustive; the engaged reader will discover many more such theme-based adventures in the pages of this volume.

A final suggestion for beginning an exploration of the pages that follow eschews the scaffolding provided by the first four chapters and uses the following topical guide to begin reading more narrowly about one or more Presocratic thinker(s), theme(s) in nature philosophy, passage(s), or later classical thinker(s): Aristotle: ch. 1, ch. 3, ch. 6, ch. 7, ch. 8, ch. 9, ch. 12, ch. 12; Plato: ch. 13, ch. 14, ch. 15, ch. 2, ch. 3; Empedocles: ch. 1, ch. 5, ch. 10, ch. ii, ch. 15; Cosmology: ch. 4, ch. 5, ch. 9, ch. 13, ch. 14, ch. 15; Heraclitus: ch. 3, ch. 12, ch. i5; Eleatic: ch. 7, ch. 1, ch. 3, ch. io; Pythagorean: ch. 7, ch. 5, ch. 6, ch. 15; Milesians: ch. 1, ch. 3, ch. 8, ch. 10, ch. 15; Atomism: ch. 2, ch. 3, ch. 13, ch. 14, ch. 15; Phaedo 96a if: ch. 1, ch. 2, Soul: ch. 2, ch. 12, ch. i3; Timaeus: ch. 1, ch. 2, ch. 3, ch.13, ch. 14, ch. 15, ch. 1; Theophrastus: ch. 8, ch. 10.

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How did the most famous classical philosophers benefit from the inquiries and findings of these Presocratics? How exactly was Presocratic natural philosophy received in early Greek philosophy and in later classical times? To what extent does the history of science owe a debt to the explorations and conclusions of the earliest Greek philosophers? With this volume, we strive to address these questions.

Chelsea C. Harry <>

Greek Rhetoric of the 4th Century BC: The Elixir of Democracy and Individuality by Evangelos Alexiou, translated by Daniel Webber [De Gruyter, 9783110559798]

The interaction between orator and audience, the passions and distrust held by many concerning the predominance of one individual, but also the individual's struggle as an advisor and political leader, these are the quintessential elements of 4th century rhetoric. As an individual personality, the orator draws strength from his audience, while the rhetorical texts mirror his own thoughts and those of his audience as part of a two-way relationship, in which individuality meets, opposes, and identifies with the masses. For the first time, this volume systematically compares minor orators with the major figures of rhetoric, Demosthenes and Isocrates, taking into account other findings as well, such as extracts of Hyperides from the Archimedes Palimpsest. Moreover, this book provides insight into the controversy surrounding the art of discourse in the rhetorical texts of Anaximenes, Aristotle, and especially of Isocrates who took up a clear stance against the philosophy of the 4th century.

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Excerpt: When one considers the literary conceptions, the genres of literature or the history of ideas of the Greeks, which not only left a decisive and catalytic mark on European thinking and literature but had an influence well beyond the borders of Europe, on global civilisation and literature, one cannot but bring to mind the epic (and its successor, the novel), tragedy and comedy, history and philosophy. On the other hand, there is a wealth of texts by Attic orators and on the Greek theory of rhetoric, works which, almost subconsciously, have left an indelible mark on language and expression and, by extension, our way of thinking even to this day. However, this may only be perceived after careful examination and thinking. The limited (at first glance) interest in practical and theoretical rhetoric could be attributed to the modern poetics of genius (*Geniekult*) which used the term "rhetorical" in a dismissive sense, connoting "sterile", "uninspired", "cold" and "soulless". In the past and even to this day, scientific

discourse often distinguishes (to the detriment of the field itself) between practical oratory – the extant speeches of the Attic orators – and theoretical rhetoric – conceptions and treatises on the art of discourse – leading to the loss of the direct correlation between practical speaking and theoretical debate over language and rhetoric. This work aims to bridge this gap in research into Greek antiquity in a diverse manner. It is not only a comprehensive contribution to the study of the Attic orators on the basis of diligent examination of secondary sources and the context of the society and political life of the 4th century BC, but takes a broader approach to the contacts between orations and other contemporary literary genres, raising questions as regards the juxtaposition between the written word and improvisation or the relationship between individuality and the political community – questions that are exceptionally interesting as regards other genres of literature and literary practices beyond rhetoric. In this book, the so-called minor Attic orators are evaluated systematically for the first time alongside the major representatives of the art of oration: Demosthenes and Isocrates. In fact, recent findings, such as fragments of Hyperides' speeches in the Archimedes Palimpsest, are taken into account. The inclusion of theoretical disputes on the art of discourse in the rhetorical handbooks of Anaximenes and Aristotle, and (more importantly) the underlining of the major role played by Isocrates, whose position during the dispute with philosophy in the 4th century BC is framed in a clear context, are major contributions of this study. The educational benefits are increased manifold if one considers that important passages of rhetorical speeches are repeatedly commented upon and central concepts are explored. Evangelos Alexiou, Professor of Ancient Greek Literature at Aristotle University of Thessaloniki, is an acclaimed expert in ancient Rhetoric. His works on Isocrates were released to international acclaim, while his contribution to the *Handbuch der riechischen Literatur der Antike. II: Die Literatur der klassischen und hellenistischen Zeit* (Munich 2014, pp. 734–859) on the Attic orators and the rhetorical art, from which this book sprang, is a unique, comprehensive analysis of the material.

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This book is a revised and slightly abbreviated form of my monograph on the rhetoric of the 4th century BC, which was published in modern Greek in 2016 (Η ρητορική του 4ου αι. π.Χ. Το ελιξίριο της δημοκρατίας και η ατομικότητα, ed. Gutenberg, Athens). New bibliographic sources for this English edition were used only in isolated cases. According to a chreia attributed to the philosopher Antisthenes, when a father asked him what, in his view, he ought to teach his son, Antisthenes responded: "If he is to live with the gods, philosophy; if he is to live with men, rhetoric" (Stob. Anth. 2.31.76 = Antisth. VA 173 Giann.: Ἀντισθένης ἐρωτηθεὶς ὑπό τινος, τί διδάξει τὸν υἱόν, εἶπεν, "εἰ μὲν θεοῖς μέλλει συμβιοῦν, φιλόσοφον, εἰ δὲ ἀνθρώποις, ῥήτορα"). This response may provide a simple but apt dividing line between the idealised (if not utopian) philosophical discourse and a more practical rhetoric as the component of a realistic but often contradictory human world. The central belief is that rhetoric, the art of persuasion, is integrally linked to the human community and constitutes an exceptional means of human communication. The gift of speaking well, natural eloquence, was considered a virtue already by Homer's era, but the tremendous power of speaking was most successfully framed by Gorgias, the formidable orator and sophist of the 5th century BC: "Speech is a powerful lord" (82 B11.8 D.-K.: λόγος δυνάστης μέγας ἐστίν). Since antiquity, rhetoric has dominated almost every field of human activity: the political, the professional, the interpersonal, the literary, the scientific, the educational. For example, the need of politicians in modern parliamentary democracy to convince, to move, to enthuse, to stir anger in their audience is reflected in their handling of speaking

and the acting accompanying the words. Major statesmen were deemed charismatic due to their rhetorical skills – and it is noteworthy that our contemporary diverse and liberal culture searches in the rhetoric of classical antiquity for communication models.1 The broader the freedom of speech, the more determining a factor the presence of rhetoric in public life: in this frame of mind, rhetoric and democracy are almost synonymous concepts, constituting a hendiadys. This concerns the first part of the subtitle of this work. Rhetoric is the elixir of democracy; parrhēsia and isēgoria, the famous concept of "who wishes to speak" (τίς ἀγορεύειν βούλεται), are integral components of the Athenian democracy of classical antiquity. Public speaking drives and revitalises democratic ideology. It is not that the rhetorical art ceased to play an important role during the Hellenistic or the Imperial period – far from it; since its first appearance, rhetoric has never been divorced from human activity, neither written nor verbal communication. However, its vital political space was the democracy of city-states, and the arrival of Hellenistic monarchy set limits and restrictions on the art. It is precisely this dimension that the second part of the subtitle refers to, the role of individuality in the 4th century BC, defined by A. Dihle as the "emancipation of the individual" (Emanzipation des Individuums). In the twilight of the classical period, the value system of the city-state was called upon to address individuality in a multi-factorial relationship, whether in order to curb the ambitions of high-profile individuals – both within and beyond the city walls – or in order to include them in the ideology of the city – or surmount them. At this point, rhetoric plays a vital role as a psychagogic art, i.e. the art of "leading the souls through speech", or, as it is defined herein, "a mirror of everyday ethics": at times the orator identifies with the audience and at others distances himself from them – but what remains constant is the bipolar relationship between orator and audience, which is always vibrant and present. In no other ancient literary text is contact between the author and the audience as direct as it is in rhetorical speeches. The orator, as an individual personality, is driven by the audience, and rhetorical texts reflect the thoughts of both the orator and the audience in a two-way relationship where individuality is conversant, juxtaposed or identified with the many. Therefore, rhetorical texts serve as our best source for what K. Dover, in particular, established as "popular morality"; this is a practical ethical way of thinking, a non-theoretical ethical code, whether it concerns politicians, orators or everyday individuals, such as heirs and courtesans. A number of topics touched upon herein refer to the rhetorical texts: the dispute between rhetoric and philosophy and the central role played by Isocrates and Plato, the argument between Isocrates and Alcidamas over the primacy of the written or the spoken word, the rhetorical handbooks of Anaximenes of Lampsacus and Aristotle, the competitive ambitions of the individual and the cooperative values of the city-state, according to the classic distinction by A.W.H Adkins, the judicial rhetoric of Isaeus, Demosthenes, Apollodorus, Hyperides, Dinarchus and its connotations, the prosecutions of Lycurgus and the values he defends, the innovations of Isocrates and his contribution to the development of the rhetorical art, the monarchic ideology and the emergence of new states – particularly Macedon and its kings – as opposed to the "hard line" of anti-Macedonian figures such as Demosthenes, Hegesippus and Hyperides or the conciliatory and, at times, novel political directions adopted by Isocrates, Aeschines and Demades.

This book is based on my contribution on rhetoric in the 4th century BC to the 2nd volume of Handbuch der griechischen Literatur der Antike, edited by B. Zimmermann and A. Rengakos for the series Handbuch der Altertumswissenschaft (VII,2, ed. C.H. Beck, Munich 2014). With such a starting point, I was faced with a dilemma: should this monograph include the rhetoric of the 5th century, particularly Andocides, Antiphon and Lysias, the three orators listed in the canon of the ten Attic

orators who, based on the distinction made in the German handbook, were included in the previous period? Although there are no impermeable, strictly demarcated time limits in literature or intellectual and social phenomena, in general, I finally decided not to overreach, but to focus on the rhetoric of the 4th century BC, providing merely an introductory summary of the development of this important genre until that time, making specific note of the logographer Lysias. By following this convention, I believe I was able to further illuminate the subsequent time period, the 4th century BC, which is often overshadowed by the 5th century BC and has been far less explored. Following the recent rare (in terms of classical philology) discovery of fragments of the "New Hyperides" through the Archimedes Palimpsest, I was presented with the proposition and challenge of dedicating myself more than usual to the "minor" Attic orators of the 4th century BC, whose reception in antiquity was pitted against the masters of rhetoric, Isocrates and Demosthenes. For this purpose, various rhetorical passages were added, translated and interpreted, while I increased my focus on the interpretation of values, terms and concepts, a research area that has not benefited from systematic attention in scholarship. An effort was made to bring Isocrates, that last great sophist of the Classical era, a "rival" of Plato and a major theoretician of 4th-century rhetoric, to the forefront of the theoretical discussion of rhetoric.

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I would like to end this preface with the hope that my study might contribute to what I call "dialectical humanism" in classical philology – that is, to the modern understanding of classics and the need to better comprehend the present through the past, far removed as such from sterile philological historicism as idealisation of antiquity. I find Nietzsche's eloquent turn of phrase in his heretical essay *Wir Philologen* inspiring and appropriate (transl. J.M. Kennedy):

> Philology as the science of antiquity does not, of course, endure forever; its elements are not inexhaustible. What cannot be exhausted, however, is the ever-new adaptation of one's age to antiquity; the comparison of the two. If we make it our task to understand our own age better by means of antiquity, then our task will be an everlasting one. <>

Atomism in the Aeneid: Physics, Politics, and Cosmological Disorder by Matthew M. Gorey [Oxford University Press, 9780197518748]

Scholars have long recognized Lucretius's *De Rerum Natura* as an important allusive source for the *Aeneid*, but significant disagreement persists regarding the scope and purpose of Virgil's engagement with Epicurean philosophy. In *Atomism in the* Aeneid, Matthew M. Gorey investigates that engagement and argues that atomic imagery functions as a metaphor for cosmic and political disorder in Virgil's epic, associating the enemies of Aeneas and of Rome's imperial destiny with the haphazard, purposeless chaos of Epicurean atoms in the void. While nearly all of Virgil's allusions to atomism are constructed from Lucretian intertextual material, Gorey shows how the poet's negative reception of atomism draws upon a long and popular tradition of anti-atomist discourse in Greek philosophy that metaphorically likened the non-teleological cosmology of atomism to civic disorder and mob rule. By situating Virgil's atomic allusions within the tradition of philosophical opposition to Epicurean physics, **Atomism in the**

AENEID: PHYSICS, POLITICS, AND COSMOLOGICAL DISORDER illustrates the deeply ideological nature of his engagement with Lucretius.

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Lucretian Allusion, Virgilian Allegory

> *Non verba autem sola, sed versus prope totos et locos quoque Lucreti plurimos sectatum esse Vergilium videmus.* —Aulus Gellius, *Noctes Atticae* 1.21.6–7
> Moreover, we see that Virgil has imitated not only individual words of Lucretius, but also almost entire verses and a great many passages. —Aulus Gellius

What is the overarching purpose and nature of intertextual references to Lucretius's *de Rerum Natura* in Virgil's *Aeneid*? Does there exist a "program" of Lucretian allusion in Virgil's epic? And if so, what are the common characteristics of these varied intertextual moments, which are woven into the fabric of so many important scenes throughout the poem? Although legions of scholars since Aulus Gellius have remarked upon Virgil's profound literary debt to Lucretius— a debt second only, perhaps, to the debt to Homer when measured by the sheer volume of identifiable verbal parallels— there have been surprisingly few accounts of Lucretian allusion in the *Aeneid* that are both comprehensive and compelling. Of course, many insightful studies already exist that shed light on particular aspects of Lucretian intertextuality in Virgil's poetry, but in the gaps between these works lie a significant number of overlooked passages that engage with Lucretius' Epicurean philosophy, and with atomism especially. Broadly speaking, therefore, this book is concerned with providing a global framework for understanding many of the Lucretian words and verses found in the *Aeneid*— one that synthesizes much of the existing scholarship while filling in a crucial gap in our understanding of Virgilian allusions pertaining to Epicurean physics and cosmology.

My objective in pursuing this global account of Lucretian intertextuality in the *Aeneid* is twofold. First, I wish to identify and analyze allusions in the *Aeneid* that evoke the philosophy of Epicurean atomism, and in doing so, to illustrate the great extent to which Virgil engages with Lucretius' poem *as a philosophical text*. Second, from this diverse collection of philosophical allusions, which are scattered throughout the poem, I will endeavor to draw some general conclusions about the dominant political and cosmological worldview of the *Aeneid*. I believe that careful attention to atomic details in the *Aeneid*, however minor, may help us to form a better understanding of the poem's overall orientation toward teleology and order, as illustrated by the negative example of atomic *disorder*. In particular, I am concerned with demonstrating the interdependence of the poem's mythological, political, and cosmological narratives, all of which share a common teleological understanding of order and progress that is starkly opposed to the worldview of Epicurean atomism. Furthermore, by investigating how and why Virgil employs atomic imagery and ideas in the poem, I hope to avoid creating a false dichotomy between philosophical reference and literary allusion, and to show instead that many intertextual references to Lucretius in the *Aeneid* participate in an allegorical conflict between order and disorder that is neither exclusively literary nor philosophical, but simultaneously and inextricably both.

I devote the rest of this Introduction, as a prelude to this task, to the consideration of two important subjects: (1) a review of the main threads of scholarship that deal with Virgil's Lucretian intertexts, and (2) the use of philosophical allegory (both ancient and modern) as a method of interpreting the *Aeneid*. Chapter 1"(Characterizations of Epicurean Atomism") assesses pre- Virgilian attitudes toward atomism, arguing that Virgil adopts his tendentious portrayal of atomism in the *Aeneid* as a system of disorder from the hostile critiques of earlier non- atomist philosophers. Chapter 2 ("Trojans under the Influence of Atomism") examines scenes in which the poem's Trojan protagonists are faced with obstacles that

are associated with atomic disorder, while Chapter 3 ("Non- Trojans under the Influence of Atomism") analyzes the atomic characterization of prominent non- Trojan antagonists. Chapter 4 ("Turnus and the End of the Epicurean World," investigates the dense cluster of Lucretian intertexts present in the duel at the end of Book 12 between Aeneas and Turnus, whose defeat in combat represents a defeat for the non- hierarchical worldview of atomism and a victory for teleological order— albeit one that is tempered in the final moments of the poem. Last, Chapter 5 ("Atomism and the Worldview of the Aeneid") summarizes the ideological significance of Virgil's negative attitude toward atomism in the *Aeneid*, and how this view fits into the available ancient evidence concerning the poet's personal and literary ties to Epicurean philosophy. I conclude by suggesting some directions for further study, with respect both to literary receptions of atomism and to Lucretian allusion more generally in Augustan poetry.

PHILOSOPHICAL ALLEGORY IN THE *AENEID*

The fundamental argument of this book is that Virgil uses images of atomic motion in the *Aeneid* as a metaphor for disorder, part of a larger allegorical narrative that assimilates Aeneas' personal struggles against various enemies into a cosmic conflict between order and disorder. Within this allegorical conflict, atomism functions as a sort of philosophical antagonist, an anarchic vision of natural philosophy over which Aeneas, who is generally aligned with natural, theological, and political forces of order, must ultimately triumph.

Why Epicureanism?

Although the idea that the world follows a divine teleology claims adherents in many philosophical schools, atomism is one of the few ancient cosmologies that is systematic and system building, but embraces a non- purposive vision of nature. Thus, the triumph of Aeneas and Rome's future *imperium* may be interpreted through the lenses of any number of teleological philosophies, whereas disorder is typically cast as a specifically Epicurean phenomenon (philosophically speaking). To paraphrase John F. Kennedy, one might say that Cosmic Order in the *Aeneid* has a hundred fathers, while Cosmic Disorder is an Epicurean orphan. Granted, there are isolated moments of destruction in the poem that tap into other apocalyptic eschatologies, such as the Stoic *ekpyrosis*.[25] But even these details are typically harnessed to Epicureanism through a layer of intervening Lucretian intertexts, with the effect that virtually every philosophical vision of disorder and turmoil in the *Aeneid* becomes "Epicureanized" at some level.

The notion of interpreting parts of the *Aeneid* or the poem as a whole in terms of philosophical allegory goes back to its earliest commentators.

As Hardie notes, natural philosophy and cosmology figured prominently in the early readings of Classical and Hellenistic critics, with whom Virgil was acquainted by virtue of his familiarity with Alexandrian and Pergamene scholarship. By Virgil's own time, educated readers had access to a variety of allegorical interpretations of epic poetry, and even readers lacking expertise in the Greek tradition could find discussions of philosophical allegory in the more recent works of Roman authors such as Cicero (*N.D.*) and Varro (*Antiquitates Rerum Humanarum et Divinarum*). In the centuries following the publication of the *Aeneid*, ancient commentators repeatedly affirmed the importance of philosophical allegory in both the composition and early reception of ancient epic poems, including the *Aeneid*.

While Virgilian scholars interested in systematic studies of allegory have in the past tended to focus their attention on Book 6, where Stoic, Pythagorean, and Platonic models dominate, commentators since Servius have acknowledged the possibility of latent Epicurean meanings throughout the poem, either in isolated local details or underlying the work as a whole. In the realm of natural philosophy, much has been written on Virgil's allegorizing of Epicurean cosmology and physics, with Hardie (1986) providing the most comprehensive study of such material in the *Aeneid*. Much of Hardie's work on "remythologizing" allusions is essentially allegorical, inasmuch as it demonstrates Virgil's interest in refuting Epicurean cosmology through veiled allusions and through metaphorical language that is suggestive of natural philosophy. Yet while Hardie advances an allegorical interpretation of the *Aeneid*'s narrative as a triumph of order over cosmic and political chaos, he deals only with those instances in which Lucretian details have been recruited to the cause of hierarchical order in a way that directly contradicts their original intent and meaning. While acknowledging the strength and validity of Hardie's analysis of intertextual moments that invert or displace Epicurean philosophy, I want to supplement that understanding of polemical allusion by also considering allusions to Lucretius in which that philosophical content remains intact and serves as the central focus of the allusive reference.

Static versus Dynamic Allegory

I believe that the methodology of "polemical allusion" is fundamentally correct, and that Virgil's *Aeneid* consistently rejects Epicurean philosophy, both as a model of the universe and as a way of conducting one's life. To the extent that the narrative of the *Aeneid* can be interpreted as an allegory for competing cosmologies, that allegory is utterly opposed to Epicurean atomism. Yet one can think of this allegorical agenda as having two levels, one static and one dynamic, each of which employs Lucretian intertexts in different ways. The remythologizing allusions investigated by Hardie and others are essentially static, in that they presuppose a world of divine intention and order that gives no space to the possibility of a literal Epicurean atomic cosmos. Through the tactics of inversion and remythologizing, atomism as a physical reality is defeated, in a sense, before the poem even begins.

Yet what is missing from these studies is attention to the philosophical allegory as a dynamic process—a story. Against a backdrop of polemical allusions, which firmly establish the world of the *Aeneid* as one in which divine mythological figures direct nature and influence human affairs, Virgil also depicts an ongoing struggle throughout the poem's narrative, in which the stable cosmology of divine teleology and national purpose must face and overcome various forces of disorder. This struggle can be mapped onto Aeneas' journey from the ruins of Troy to the settlement of the Trojans in Latium, during which the possibility of cosmic and political anarchy is treated as a real threat, despite oracular assurances of Rome's eventual triumph. I am interested in bridging the gap between Virgil's static polemical allusions, already well documented, and the more dynamic allegorical narrative just described.

My purpose, therefore, is not to refute Hardie's thesis of remythologization, but to supplement it by showing how allusive inversion works in concert with other often- overlooked allusions that import the imagery of atomism into the poem, using the atomic cosmology as a metaphor for disorder rather than displacing it entirely from the text. While advocates of polemical allusion tend to identify most Lucretian allusions as instances of inversion or remythologizing, the picture is more complicated. For instance, there are certain details in the *Aeneid* that seem to demand a didactic or philosophical understanding of the source text (e.g., when Virgil uses the Lucretian didactic tagline *quippe* ("of course") to conclude a description of stormy weather; see pp. 57– 58), and in such cases one should consider the philosophical

background when assessing how the allusion works in the *Aeneid*. Yet often the choice of how much or how little of Epicurean philosophy to read into Virgil's Lucretian intertexts cannot be dictated by anything within the poem itself, but falls to our own subjective considerations of what makes for a stronger, more consistent reading of the poem. In the chapters that follow, I argue that we can achieve a better understanding of philosophical and political allegory in the *Aeneid* by allowing atomism into certain passages of the poem as a metaphor where it has previously been excluded by the scholarly consensus.

Ultimately, this approach will allow readers to synthesize elements of all three interpretive approaches to Lucretian intertextuality in the *Aeneid* as previously outlined. One way of thinking about this coordination of different intertextual methodologies is through the analogy of a theatrical performance. At the level of style and tone, Lucretian language performs an essential function simply by identifying the genre of the performance. In the same way that playbills, marquees, and the presence of actors on a stage tell you that "this is theater," the ubiquitous presence of Lucretian language in the *Aeneid* indicates in a very basic way that "this is an epic poem on a cosmic scale." Within this genre, remythologizing allusions of the static Hardian variety construct a sort of backdrop or stage decoration that indicates what kind of world the characters of the drama inhabit— specifically, a relatively stable mythological world in which, contrary to Lucretian teaching, the gods ultimately control the universe, regularly directing the affairs of individuals and peoples alike. However, the allegorical drama that takes place on that stage— the narrative of the poem— conveys a dynamic conflict between Order and Disorder. By consistently associating atomic imagery with doubt, hesitation, violence, and disorder, Virgil casts Epicurean physics in the role of an allegorical antagonist, opposed to numerous symbols of Roman order and progress, which include Aeneas, Augustus, Roman *imperium*, and the Homeric gods, along with various teleological philosophies and Roman religious cults.

In a literal sense, I will not be arguing that Epicurean atoms really "exist" at any moment within the physical world of the poem. Instead, atomism serves as a symbol of the disorder that arises in the absence of hierarchy and purpose, not just in the physical world, but in political, cosmic, and religious contexts as well. Therefore, atomic imagery functions primarily as a metaphor within the fiction of the poem— one that illustrates both the undesirability and the inherent danger or instability of a non-teleological universe, if it were actually to exist. Nevertheless, Virgil's well- documented tendency to allusively (and allegorically) conflate the realms of physics, politics, and theology tends to problematize any search for a "real" or "true" physical world that can be neatly separated from its metaphorical portrayal. In the final analysis, I believe that Virgil's epic is concerned more with ideology than with ontology, and thus my interpretive focus remains on the allegorical implications of atomism's negative portrayal: namely that the repeated association of atomism with hesitation and failure signals a rejection of non- teleological models of order both in cosmology *and* politics.

In advancing this argument, I also hope to blur some of the sharp lines that separate philosophical and poetic interpretations in contemporary literary criticism of the *Aeneid*, and to push back against the idea that philosophy in Virgil is always (or even mostly) subordinated to poetic concerns. By showing the interdependency between philosophical doctrines and poetic context in many of Virgil's Lucretian borrowings, this study advances an understanding of philosophy and poetry in the *Aeneid* as being deeply complementary, rather than dichotomous. As Don Fowler has argued in the context of the *de Rerum Natura*, this dichotomy is an artificial one that reflects the purposes and biases of scholars more than poets, and never more so than in the ancient world:

> The celebrated opposition between philosophy and poetry in the *De rerum natura* can to an extent be rephrased in terms of an opposition between the differing reading practices of two interpretative communities. The frontier between the "philosophical" and "literary" traditions is not itself, of course, timeless, and how close or distant they are from each other will depend on the nature of the philosophical or literary- critical positions adopted by readers as well as on the general intellectual climate. (Fowler 2000: 138)

If we attend to the moments in the *Aeneid* that engage with philosophy *as philosophy*, then we will discover that the text advances a vision of cosmology and society that thoroughly rejects the worldview of Epicurean physics in favor of top- down models of order and authority. In the chapter that follows, I begin by tracing the history of atomic phics, in order to better understand the cultural and philosophical sources for Virgil's tendentious portrayal of atomism. For in light of ancient evidence that Virgil studied under the guidance of Epicurean philosophers in the Bay of Naples, we must first ask from what sources this anti- atomist orientation stems, since it is conspicuously not that of the Epicureans themselves.

Characterizations of Epicurean Atomism

It is clear, I hope, from the preceding discussion that Virgil, when formulating his reception of atomism in the *Aeneid*, had access not only to Lucretius' imaginative descripions of growth and decay in *de Rerum Natura*, but also to a long and prominent tradition of opposing texts that presented atomic physics as random, violent, and fundamentally unstable. While it is impossible to prove beyond a shadow of a doubt Virgil's familiarity with many of the individual philosophical texts previously discussed, or to prove direct lines of transmission between various anti- atomist philosophers, the ubiquity of images and arguments equating atomic physics with disorder indicates that Virgil could have encountered this negative characterization in any number of philosophical sources. As I demonstrate in the following chapters, although all of the allusions to atomism in the *Aeneid* are crafted from Lucretian intertexts, Virgil filters them through the conceptual framework of the anti- atomists, whose characterization of atomism as disorderly he adopts throughout his epic.

One important consequence of this move is reflected in Virgil's choice of Lucretian intertexts, which gravitate toward moments in the poem that emphasize the destructive aspect of atoms. While the early atomists and Epicureans presented their account of cosmology as rational and ordered according to clear mechanical principles of material motion, Aristotle and Cicero (and likely his Hellenistic Greek sources as well) advanced characterizations of atomism as profoundly disordered and irrational, often by using contentious metaphors to support their arguments. However, when Lucretius opened atomism to the social metaphors and martial analogies of epic poetry and Roman culture, he subordinated these images of natural violence and dissolution to a vision of the cosmos as balanced, eternally alternating between cycles of growth and dissolution at both the micro and macro levels. What ultimately makes the reception of atomism in the *Aeneid* so "polemical" is that, when presenting images that evoke atomic motion without any sort of philosophical inversion or Hardian remythologizing, Virgil exclusively recalls the destructive aspect of the Lucretian worldview, without acknowledging the corresponding component of growth and order. In this way, Virgil follows Aristotle and Cicero (and likely the Stoics and Academic Skeptics of the Hellenistic period more generally) in making atomic physics a stand- in for, or symbol of, disorder.

Last, I believe it is essential to recognize that this move is not just a literary ploy meant to assert Virgil's supersession of Lucretius in the poetic tradition, but that it has undeniable philosophical implications for the worldview of the *Aeneid*. By applying a consistently anti- atomist framework to Lucretian atomic allusions, the poem advances a partisan view of Epicurean physics that coheres with its overall orientation toward the trajectory of Roman imperial conquest, the rule of Augustus, and the proper attitude of humanity toward nature and the gods. Instead of seeking to separate these threads or subordinate one to another, we will gain a richer understanding of philosophical and political allegory in the *Aeneid* by asking how these different areas contribute to a unified concept of the relationship between hierarchical order and authority in the poem. In the next chapter I begin by examining the political and historical dimension of this picture, focusing on scenes in which Aeneas and other epic "winners" confront atomic obstacles on their path to progress.

Non-Trojans under the Influence of Atomism

As I previously suggested in my discussion of Dido's death and Turnus' humiliating removal from the battlefield and his subsequent suicide attempts, I believe that Mezentius' defeat conforms to a broader pattern in the *Aeneid* of associating noteworthy enemies of Trojan destiny with atomic physics. Whether one chooses to interpret the dying souls of Dido and Mezentius as literally atomic (if only for a brief moment before the poem's dominant teleological cosmology reasserts itself) or as being allegorically connected to atomic psychology, the portrayal of non- Trojan failures in atomic terms further solidifies the status of Epicurean atomism as an enemy of Roman power. A prominent critique of atomism since the time of Aristotle was to assert that non- teleological cosmologies are doomed to eventual self-destruction and disorder, and the atomic characterization of these non- Trojan deaths and setbacks imbues Aeneas' enemies with a similar sense of futility and unsustainability. It is as if personal and political challenges to Trojan (and Roman) power had inevitably collapsed into oblivion in the same manner as an atomic *mundus* must eventually dissipate back into the chaotic void of inter-cosmic space.[56]

Furthermore, in addition to the allegorical conflict between teleological cosmologies and non-teleological atomism, Aeneas' personal antagonisms can be mapped onto major historical conflicts in Rome's past. Each of the three non- Trojan characters examined in this chapter represents an ethnic group that posed significant historical challenges to the expansion of Roman power: Turnus is from Ardea, an early member of the Latin League that successfully resisted attempts at conquest by Tarquinius Superbus; Mezentius hails from Etruria, a perennial and dangerous enemy of Rome throughout the regal and early- Republican periods; and Dido founded Carthage, arguably the greatest foreign threat to Rome's existence during its initial period of expansion beyond central Italy.[57] Thus, by depicting the deaths (or near- death, in Turnus' case) of these characters with the language of atomic phenomena, Virgil aligns the enemies of Rome's historical and imperial teleology with an Epicurean cosmology that is similarly opposed to narratives of fate and fixed authority, both national and divine. As we will see in the next chapter, which looks at the role of atomism in the conclusion of the poem, these lesser episodes of allegorical defeat for atomic cosmology and its human representatives foreshadow a more permanent rejection of atomism, embodied in Turnus' defeat at the hands of Aeneas.

Turnus and the End of the Epicurean World

Compared to more prominent Homeric parallels, such as the duels between Aeneas and Diomedes in *Iliad* 5, or between Achilles and Hector in *Iliad* 22, the death of Eumedes is admittedly a secondary

model for the final scene of the *Aeneid*. However, the ideologically charged parallels between the deaths of Eumedes and Turnus discussed previously, which touch on essential issues of cosmology, colonization, and political violence, are surely more than inci-dental. In closing, I would argue that, to the extent that Turnus' death marks an inversion of his earlier killing of Eumedes, the implied rejection of Italian political power (and of the Epicurean cosmology with which Turnus is al-lusively associated) in this act remains somewhat unsettled. Teleology and Trojan power emerge victorious by the end of the poem, but in a manner that uncomfortably likens Aeneas' actions to those of Turnus.

Discussing the role of doubt and dissent in Augustan literature, Duncan Kennedy argues, "Power is successful in so far as it manages not so much to silence or suppress as to *determine the consumption* of the oppositional voice within its discourse" and within an individual text. By linking the deaths of Turnus and Eumedes in the ways that I have described, I would argue that the text of the *Aeneid* resists determining the consumption of its closing scene in a strictly binary fashion, even while clearly conceding overall victory to Aeneas and to the teleological worldview of Augustan Rome. Of course, one may easily find faults in the behavior of either combatant, but the allusive comparisons between Aeneas' actions at the end of the poem and Turnus' killing of Eumedes earlier in Book 12 complicate any zero-sum, partisan analysis. Instead, the ironic fulfillment of Turnus' anti- colonial threat, "thus do they found their walls" (*sic moenia condunt*, 12.361), serves to undermine certain key distinctions between the two characters, suggesting that the violence of the victor in his moment of triumph is potentially not so different from that of his defeated challenger.

David Quint, writing about the fate of antagonists in epic poetry, observes that such challengers, typically portrayed as culturally "other" in some sense, inevitably fail: "They and their stories can . . . be finally assimilated with the forces of nature that the victorious builders of empire and history strive to overcome". In the case of Turnus and the Italians, their defeat on the battlefield marks the allegorical taming (for now) of atomic forces of purposeless chaos that threatened the foundation of an orderly, teleological universe of Roman imperial power. Although echoes of atomic language in the final scene may signify uneasiness about the violent *manner* of Aeneas' victory, the systematic conflation of atomic imagery with anti- Trojan disorder and violence throughout the poem, culminating in Turnus' tragic failure, evinces an unambiguous preference for teleology, both in its cosmology and politics. One need not take at face value the poem's most optimistic prophecies of eternal rule and "empire without end" (*imperium sine fine*, *Aen*. 1.279) to recognize that, by the time of the poem's violent and sobering conclusion, a vision of hierarchical order has won out that is starkly at odds with the non-teleological framework of atomic physics.

Atomism and the Worldview of the *Aeneid*

> *Dumtaxat rerum magnarum parva potest res exemplare dare et vestigia notitiai.* —Lucretius 2.123–24
> As far as this matter is concerned, something small can offer a model of greater things and trace the outlines of an idea. —Lucretius

With Turnus' death at the hands of Aeneas, the *Aeneid* ends in polemical inversion and remythologization in the fullest sense of these terms: through a nexus of allusive details linking Turnus' final failed attack to the chaotic motion of Epicurean atoms, the philosophy of Lucretius is firmly rejected, but in terms distinctly Lucretian. The putative disorder of atomism yields, on the whole, to Roman rule and a divinely organized cosmos. Yet it is important to remember that this conclusion comes only after a long struggle between order and chaos over the course of the poem, during which

key obstacles to the Trojan mission— including storms at sea, armed resistance by foreign antagonists, and Aeneas' own private moments of indecision and doubt— are portrayed in atomistic terms. While Hardie rightly characterizes many of the Lucretian allusions in the *Aeneid* as instances of remythologization, there are many allusions that preserve the original atomic, philosophical spirit of the Lucretian source text for polemical purposes, which work alongside the remythologizing variety in the *Aeneid*. To focus exclusively on instances of inverted or rejected Epicurean philosophy, or to interpret virtually every use of Lucretian imagery by Virgil as an inversion of Lucretian philosophy, would be to miss the fact that the specter of atomism persists in many scenes of the *Aeneid*, uninverted and independent, as a metaphor for disorder right up to the final scene of Book 12. On an allegorical level, moreover, this metaphor adds a powerful cosmological component to the basic narrative in which Rome's ancestors overcome adversity and disorder to build a more harmonious universe at the level of physics, culture, politics, and religion (even if that positive teleological vision remains incomplete in some respects by the end of the poem).

In the process of providing this account of poetic allusions to Lucretian atomism, I have also attempted to pursue a number of parallel threads concerning the ideological nature of Virgil's allusive engagement with Lucretius; the permeability of mythological, political, and philosophical narratives in Greco- Roman epic; and the place of the *Aeneid* within the intellectual history of Greco- Roman literature and philosophy in the 1st century BCE. I now conclude by returning to these broader issues, which were initially raised in the Introduction and in Chapter 1, in order to assess how the study of atomic imagery in the *Aeneid* can inform our understanding of the poem as a whole. In the first section, I explore the surprising extent to which political and cosmological ideologies overlap in the world of the *Aeneid*, and what this overlap reveals about the philosophical coherence of the poem's worldview. In the following section, I consider how the tendentious deployment of Lucretian atomic imagery as a symbol of disorder fits into existing evidence concerning Virgil's personal and philosophical associations with Epicureanism. Finally, I offer some remarks about the place of Epicurean atomic physics within the intellectual landscape of the early Roman Empire, while suggesting promising directions for further study.

VIRGIL ON THE NATURE OF THINGS (AGAIN)

In her book *Virgil on the Nature of Things*, which investigates Lucretian intertextuality and literary influence in the *Georgics*, Monica Gale argues that Virgil's didactic poetry is, at its core, philosophically agnostic. That is, it aims to provide exposure to varied schools of thought without endorsing any specific set of doctrines or thinkers. As I have argued in the preceding chapters of the present book, Virgil is also interested in the *Aeneid* in grappling with philosophical questions concerning the "nature of things" and the ordering of the universe, but with the crucial difference that his polemical use of Lucretian imagery reveals an unambiguously partisan rejection of Epicurean atomic physics, along with its non-teleological ideology. While previous works of scholarship have detected moments (however brief) in the *Aeneid* in which Virgil engages sympathetically or constructively with Epicurean teachings on ethics, kingship theory, and psychology, virtually every allusion to Lucretian physics in the poem associates atomic imagery with confusion and disarray.

An important consequence of Virgil's negative attitude toward the decentralized, non- teleological worldview of atomism, as revealed through his tendentious use of atomic imagery in scenes of political disorder and personal doubt, is that it reveals a fairly consistent set of philosophical principles at work in the world of the poem. On the one hand, Aeneas' defeat of Turnus, by evoking key verbal and thematic

details from Turnus' earlier "atomistic" killing of Eumedes, muddies the distinction between how these characters use violence for political ends. Despite the partial erosion of moral distinctions between Aeneas and Turnus in the closing lines of the *Aeneid*, however, the allusive function of atomic imagery remains fundamentally the same throughout the poem: to imbue various characters and events with connotations of cosmic disorder and chaos. In every instance in which Aeneas (or any other character) is associated with Lucretian atomism, the effect is not to create sympathy for atomic physics, but rather to cast aspersions on some aspect of that character's behavior that stands in the way of Rome's preordained future. For all of the ideological contradictions and doubts that exist within the poem, the many instances of allusion to Lucretian atomism discussed in this book situate Virgil's epic squarely within the anti- atomist tradition of philosophy discussed in Chapter 1, exemplified in the writings of Aristotle and Cicero.

In turn, this pattern of consistently adopting the framing of anti- atomist philosophers in allusions to Lucretian atomism has the effect of anchoring the worldview of the *Aeneid* within an ideological framework that thoroughly conflated the realms of politics and cosmology, and that was profoundly suspicious of, if not outright hostile to, non- hierarchical modes of social and political organization. While the metaphorical politics of atomism in Lucretius are enthusiastically republican and egalitarian, in Cicero and the other non- atomists they are anarchic and violent, stemming from decidedly aristocratic or monarchic perspectives that are deeply skeptical about popular politics and spontaneous order. By embracing this particular framing of atomic physics as a model for disorganization and chaotic violence, and then repeatedly associating atomic imagery with obstacles to Roman power, the *Aeneid* reveals itself to be fundamentally opposed to non- hierarchical understandings of both cosmology and politics. Scholars have rightly cautioned against attempting to claim the *Aeneid* for any one philosophical school, but the poem does embrace a coherent set of philosophical and political assumptions about the relationship between hierarchy and order that were shared by all anti- atomist writers between the 4th and 1st centuries BCE. To the extent that the worldview of the poem aligns with Platonists, Peripatetics, Stoics, and Academic Skeptics on the impossibility of structural order without purposeful hierarchies, this aspect of the *Aeneid* reflects a popular intellectual position that was found across many different philosophical schools and that persisted for centuries in mainstream philosophical discourse.

Last, as I hope I have adequately demonstrated, the preference for teleology and hierarchy evident in Virgil's allusions to Lucretian atomism is never exclusively literary or philosophical— or exclusively political, religious, or mythological— but always multivalent and subject to coordinated interpretations on multiple levels. In choosing to analyze and parse allusion to Lucretian physics in the *Aeneid*, to take seriously the philosophical implications of each borrowing, and to consider in depth the intellectual background against which such borrowings took place, spanning centuries of natural- philosophical debate from Democritus to Cicero, I have treated Virgil's epic as a philosophically serious text with a coherent orientation toward basic issues of teleology, order, and purpose. While it is perhaps much more difficult to provide a positive answer to the question of what the philosophical worldview of the *Aeneid* is, one can follow the *via negativa* (i.e., clarifying what the poem's worldview is *not*) to find an approximate answer, or a helpful start, in the poem's overall rejection of Epicurean atomism, along with its apolitical, non- teleological ideology.

BIOGRAPHICAL CONSIDERATIONS

In light of ancient evidence that Virgil had strong ties to, and even studied under, prominent Epicurean philosophers in the Bay of Naples, it is perhaps surprising that the *Aeneid* embraces such an anti- atomist perspective. Indeed, various scholars throughout the 20th century have argued that Virgil's connections to the Greek Epicureans Philodemus and Siro, combined with his painstaking allusive engagement with Lucretian poetry and the biographical testimony of the late- antique Virgilian *Vitae*, constitute proof of the poet's personal adherence to Epicurean thought, although opinions on the depth and duration of that commitment have varied considerably. While more recent work has largely refrained from attempting to claim Virgil as an ideologically consistent follower of any particular philosophical sect, the evidence that the poet remained sympathetic to various aspects of Epicureanism over the course of his career is strong. What, then, are we to make of the apparent inconsistency between Virgil's well-attested social and educational links to Epicurean philosophy and the thoroughly negative role assigned to Lucretian atomic imagery in the *Aeneid*? Is it possible— or even worthwhile— to reconcile the anti-atomist worldview of the *Aeneid* with the limited biographical information we have about its author?

To begin, it is important to exercise caution when attempting to assess the personal or political attitudes of an ancient author through the lens of a fictional work, and it is for this reason that I have preferred to analyze allusions to Lucretian atomism in terms of the worldview of the *Aeneid*, rather than of Virgil himself. Nevertheless, this analysis can, within certain limits, shed useful light on the question of Virgil's biography and his relationship to philosophy. First and foremost, the negative deployment of atomic imagery in contexts of doubt and disorder renders the notion of Virgil as a committed Epicurean in his later years extremely unlikely. It is not just that Virgil alludes tendentiously to Lucretius, a connection that could easily be interpreted as the product of a literary rivalry with a talented predecessor. Rather, the repeated filtering of Lucretian atomic imagery in the *Aeneid* through the anti-atomist perspective of authors like Cicero points at a rejection of core tenets of Epicurean cosmology, a rejection that is fundamentally at odds with the *Aeneid* being pro- Epicurean in any meaningful sense.

Second, the fact that Virgil's epic engages carefully not just with the language of Lucretian atomism, but also with the differing perspectives of non- Epicurean philosophers, indicates a level of intellectual seriousness to his philosophical allusions beyond what is often supposed for the *Aeneid*. While Virgil's education at Naples would have exposed him to the works of Epicurean philosophers, it is likely that his studies (whether as a young man under Siro, or later in life) brought him into contact with many other authors from opposing schools of thought. The diversity of philosophical texts attested in the ruins of the Villa dei Papiri in Herculaneum certainly supports this supposition, as does the frequency with which Philodemus' own works quote non- Epicurean philosophers at length, even if only for the purpose of refuting their arguments. That Virgil's allusions to Lucretian physics should not only acknowledge the difference of opinions concerning atomism, but also participate in common tropes of anti- atomist discourse, suggests broad familiarity with the anti- materialist tradition of philosophy that I outlined in Chapter 1, a tradition that originated with Aristotle and found its most vivid expression in Cicero's dialogues. Thus, Virgil's allusive relationship to Lucretius is best conceived of not just as a poetic rivalry with a distinguished predecessor in the genre of hexameter epic, but also as part of a broader intellectual engagement with the language and ideas of natural philosophy. <>

Porphyry's On the Cave of the Nymphs in its Intellectual Context by K. Nilüfer Akçay [Studies in Platonism, Neoplatonism, and the Platonic Tradition, Brill, 9789004407596] Open Access

Neoplatonic allegorical interpretation expounds how literary texts present philosophical ideas in an enigmatic and coded form, offering an alternative path to the divine truths. The Neoplatonist Porphyry's *On the Cave of the Nymphs* is one of the most significant allegorical interpretation handed down to us from Antiquity. This monograph, exclusively dedicated to the analysis of *On the Cave of Nymphs*, demonstrates that Porphyry interprets Homer's verse from Odyssey 13.102-112 to convey his philosophical thoughts, particularly on the material world, relationship between soul and body and the salvation of the soul through the doctrines of Plato and Plotinus. The Homeric cave of the nymphs with two gates is a station where the souls descend into genesis and ascend to the intelligible realm. Porphyry associates Odysseus' long wanderings with the journey of the soul and its salvation from the irrational to rational through escape from all toils of the material world.

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Bibliography

Excerpts: The Neoplatonic philosopher, Porphyry, was born in Tyre in Phoenicia, probably in 234 CE. According to Porphyry's own Life of Plotinus and Eunapius' report, he had distinguished ancestors, and his original name (in Phoenician) was Malchus, meaning 'king.' He studied rhetoric and grammar with Longinus in Athens before joining the circle of Plotinus (204/5–270 c.e.) in Rome in 262–268 C.E. Porphyry collected and edited the works of his teacher Plotinus under the title, Enneads, and divided them into six books, consisting of nine treatises each, prefaced by his own Life of Plotinus. He himself is believed to have written sixty works, but, unfortunately, most are lost or survive only in fragmentary form. Fully or substantially extant works include, apart from On the Cave of the Nymphs and Life of Plotinus (Vita Plotini), also a large excerpt of a Life of Pythagoras (Vita Pythagorae), Homeric Questions, Letter to Marcella (written to his wife, Marcella, Ad Marcellam), On Abstinence from Killing Animals (De Abstinentia), Starting-points Leading to the Intelligibles (Sententiae ad Intelligibilia Ducentes, Sententiae in short), Isagoge (Introduction) to Aristotle's Organon, Introduction to Ptolemy's Tetrabiblos and a Commentary on Aristotle's Categories. In addition, Porphyry is often credited with the authorship of an anonymously transmitted Commentary on Plato's Parmenides and he almost certainly wrote a likewise anonymously transmitted work on embryology, attributed in the manuscripts to Galen, and entitled To Gaurus on How Embryos Are Ensouled (Ad Gaurum). There are also fragments of many lost works such as a history of philosophy, a Commentary on Plato's Timaeus, Letter to Anebo (Epistula ad Anebonem), several treatises, such as On Images, On the Styx, Philosophy from Oracles (De Philosophia ex Oraculis), On the Return of the Soul (De Regressu Animae), On What Is in Our Power (or On Free-will), and a large work Against the Christians (Contra Christianos).

As this corpus suggests, Porphyry had very broad interests, covering fields as diverse as grammar, rhetoric, arithmetic, geometry, logic, music, religion and literary criticism, and his work had a deep impact on his contemporaries and successors. The fourth-century historian and sophist, Eunapius, praises Porphyry as a polymath (VS 4.2.2-3), and, in his City of God, Augustine (354–430 c.e.) calls him 'the most learned of the philosophers' (doctissimus philosophorum, Civ. Dei 19.22). In the translation of Boethius, Porphyry's Isagoge was used as a standard textbook on logic until the end of the Middle Ages. Because so much of his output does not survive, it is difficult to establish to what extent Porphyry generated original philosophical ideas, particularly ideas independent of his teacher Plotinus. There is a common tendency in modern scholarship to see him primarily as a follower on the path set out by Plotinus. Hadot argued nearly forty years ago that Porphyry is a much more original thinker than has been thought, despite earlier claims that his thought lacked originality, and there has been a growing consensus that this assessment is correct. One of my aims will be to show that, at least in his approach to poetry, myths, religion and rituals, Porphyry went well beyond Plotinus, developing original ideas that are on a par with those of his contemporary, Iamblichus (c. 250–330 CE.), a pupil of Porphyry.

As for existing scholarship on the Porphyrian treatise to which this book is dedicated, On the Cave of the Nymphs in the Odyssey, *De Antro Nympharum*; hereafter *De Antro*), Laura Simonini's L'antro delle Ninfe, in 1986, is an extensive annotated edition, with an Italian translation, whose text and apparatus are taken over from the Arethusa Monograph edition in 1969. Simonini situates De Antro within a wide range of disciplines and offers a commentary of the treatise at large and makes references to various ancient sources. Simonini's references related to Porphyry's other works are compatible with those in this book, e.g., her reference to Sententia 20 for the definition of Matter, to Sententia 29, Ad Gaurum 11.3 and De Regressu Animae for the theory of pneuma-ochema, to Sententia 32 for the connection of the cathartic virtues with the image of the goddess Athena (phronesis) and Odysseus sitting under the olive tree. In her article 'Homers Nymphengrotte in der Deutung des Porphyrios,' Karin Alt does not present a detailed interpretation of the treatise, but rather provides the outline of each section; she argues that, although Porphyry's interpretation is based on a plan, it lacks consistency – a claim which is at odds with what I here attempt to show. This book considers the treatise as a coherent and consistent literary project with its thematic subjects indicated below, its aim, Porphyry's other works, and his intellectual style. The treatise indeed looks like a reflection of the material world that contains dichotomies, such as dark vs beautiful; Platonic cave vs Mithraic cave; southern region vs northern region; the gate for mortals vs the gate for immortals; summer solstices vs winter solstices; genesis vs apogenesis, etc., where Porphyry brings together different allegorical interpretations that project his overall aim.

A significant recent paper on De Antro is Mark Edwards' 'Porphyry's 'Cave of the Nymphs' and the Gnostic Controversy.' Edwards, here, compares certain features of De Antro, particularly Porphyry's employment of Zoroaster, Mithras as the Maker and Father of all and the Mithraic cave, with Plotinus' Ennead 2.9, a treatise written against a group of Gnostics, Christian Heretics, while Porphyry was a member of Plotinus' school. He concludes that Porphyry intended to write the treatise, not only as a work of interpretation, but as a manual for interpreters, directed in particular against the Gnostics, showing that the truth is reached, not immediately, but gradually. Edwards also discusses Homer's influence on the writings of Plotinus and Porphyry in his paper 'Scenes from the Later Wanderings of Odysseus,' in which he connects the Delphic Oracle in Porphyry's Life of Plotinus (VPlot. 22) with De Antro and shows that the oracle, which reveals the fate of Plotinus' soul after his death, bears resemblance to the description of Odysseus' arrival in Phaeacia. In contrast to Plotinus, who is never deceived by tricks of the material world, as Edwards points out, Porphyry's Odysseus in De Antro achieves his ultimate goal only when he gets rid of his earthly life.

De Antro has also regularly been discussed by scholars interested in the field of ancient allegorical interpretation, most prominently by Peter T. Struck, in Birth of the Symbol: Ancient Readers at the Limits of Their Texts, and Robert Lamberton, in Homer the Theologian: Neoplatonist Allegorical Reading and the Growth of the Epic Tradition, and other works. Struck offers a wide-ranging assessment of allegorical interpretation from the Presocratics to the Neoplatonists, along with the development of the concept of the 'symbol' as an authentic token or divine sign, from passwords used by the Pythagoreans and initiates of the Orphic, Dionysian and Eleusinian mysteries, via an ontological concept in Stoic language theory, to a sign of divinity itself in Iamblichus and Proclus (412–485 CE.). Lamberton's Homer the Theologian, meanwhile, focuses on how the Neoplatonists read Homer in line with their own philosophy, and particularly how they interpreted Odysseus as a symbol of the descended soul

trying to return to the intelligible realm. The most recent monographs that touch upon De Antro in the context of a discussion of allegory are Crystal Addey's Divination and Theurgy in Neoplatonism: Oracles of the Gods, in which she explores Porphyry's method of allegorical exegesis in De Antro while examining the common features of allegory and oracles; and Aaron P. Johnson's Religion and Identity in Porphyry of Tyre: The Limits of Hellenism in Late Antiquity, in which he compares De Antro with another Homeric study by Porphyry, On the Styx, pointing out their structural and methodological similarities. All of these works throw important light on Porphyry's allegorical method and the place of De Antro in the history of allegorical interpretation.

Scholars of Mithraism have likewise shown a great interest in De Antro, because it offers the only reliable cosmological discussion of a mithraeum, the 'cave' where the followers of Mithras worship, to which Porphyry refers in De Antro 6 and 24. De Antro 6 provides significant information about the function of the cave in the mysteries of Mithras and De Antro 24 mentions the seat of Mithras at the equinoxes in relation to the solstitial gates of the soul. The state of the question and what can, and cannot, be safely inferred from De Antro regarding Mithraism is most clearly laid out in Roger Beck's most recent work, **THE RELIGION OF THE MITHRAS CULT IN THE ROMAN EMPIRE,** in which he builds on ideas expounded in many earlier publications. Beck posits that in a mithraeum, the place of cult worship that represented the Mithraic cosmos, the initiates acquired information about the process of 'soul journeying,' the descent of one's soul at birth and its ascent at death, through a ritualised execution of the soul's heavenly journey. Beck convincingly argues for close analogies between Mithraic doctrine and the Neoplatonic ideas of Porphyry while avoiding speculative reconstructions of the precise relationship between the two paradigms. Such constructions were attempted most prominently by Robert Turcan in his Mithras Platonicus, in which he posits influence of the cult of Mithras on the Platonic tradition from the first century BCE. onward and uses the references to Mithraism in De Antro to argue that Mithraism and Neoplatonism are, in essence, the same. My analysis of De Antro here is compatible with Beck's argument and puts it on more solid ground by situating De Antro more comprehensively within Porphyry's wider philosophical thought.

There are two modern English translations of De Antro, whose dates are indicative of the lack of scholarly attention for the treatise in his own right: one was produced by a postgraduate seminar class in 1969, conducted by the distinguished Neoplatonic scholar, L.G. Westerink,17 the other by Robert Lamberton in 1983. These and earlier versions (such as the one published by Thomas Taylor in 1823) include little or no annotation and there is no comprehensive analysis of the entire treatise. Throughout the book, I will use the Greek text produced by the 1969 Postgraduate Seminar, which is based on a comprehensive consideration of the manuscript tradition. Earlier Greek editions of the treatise were published, in many cases with Latin translations, by J. Lascaris (1518), Lucas Holstenius (1630), J. Barnes (1711), R.M. Van Goens (1765), R. Hercher (1858), and A. Nauck (1887).

De Antro has been generally given little attention in discussions of Neoplatonic philosophy, as it is deemed to be of little importance for establishing Porphyrian doctrine. Scholarship on this doctrine, however, has thrived over the last decade or so. A number of important studies18 have centered on the religious philosophy of Porphyry and Porphyrian soteriology, as expounded, for example, in his On the Return of the Soul (De Regressu Animae) and in his Philosophy from Oracles (De Philosophia ex Oraculis), both works which also enlighten his stance on traditional religious practices. The philosophical analysis of De Antro in this work builds on this recent scholarship, as it aims to place the treatise within

the context of Porphyry's other works and proposes that it contains significant philosophical ideas, particularly on the relationship between the soul and body, embodiment, demonology and the concept of salvation of the soul. Apart from these, there are a number of major studies addressing the question on Porphyry's reconciliation of Aristotle with Platonism.

Porphyry starts his allegorical exegesis of Homer's description of the cave of the nymphs in which Odysseus places the gifts he has received from the Phaeacians at Odyssey 13.102-112, a passage cited in full at the beginning of the treatise after the briefest possible indication of the project on which Porphyry is embarking:

> (1.1-13) One wonders what the cave in Ithaca symbolises for Homer,
> the one which he describes in the following verses:
> At the head of harbour there is an olive tree with acuminate leaves,
> and near it, a lovely and dark cave,
> consecrated to the nymphs called Naiads.
> In the cave are mixing bowls and amphoras,
> made of stone. There, bees store up honey.
> In the cave, there are very high stone looms, where the nymphs
> weave garments of sea-purple, a wonder to be seen,
> and in it there are ever-flowing waters. It has two entrances:
> one is northerly, for humans to descend,
> the other, southerly, is more divine; through that entrance
> men do not enter, but it is the way of immortals.

In his exegesis of Homer's cave 'at the head of the harbour' and its elements and attributes – that is, the olive tree, the Naiad nymphs weaving sea-purple garments on stone looms, ever-flowing waters, stone mixing bowls and amphoras, bees storing up honey, and the two entrances, one oriented towards the South for the immortals to ascend and the other towards the North for the mortals to descend – Porphyry touches on a remarkable number of philosophical concepts. These include, for example, Anaximander's apeiron, Heraclitus' flux theory, the Pythagoreans' orderly arrangement of the cosmos, and Plato's doctrine of participation in the Forms. Porphyry uses these concepts to define the characteristics of the material realm, which is the inferior principle in the process of the creation of the cosmos, symbolised by the cave of the nymphs. Interpretations of this kind are in line with Plotinus' view that the doctrine of Plato should be explained and clarified through the teachings of other philosophical schools, including the Stoics. Furthermore, the treatise is also a clear manifestation of Porphyry's great interest in the association and dissociation of the soul and body. In his Life of Plotinus (VPlot. 13), Porphyry tells how he interrogated Plotinus for three days about the precise association of the soul with the body. In De Antro, he provides a wide range of philosophical and astrological explanations of these processes through the concepts of pneuma, genesis, apogenesis, and the gates of heaven, including the gates of the Sun, the gates of the Sun and the Moon, and the solstitial gates.

In comparison with his Homeric Questions, a more philological interpretation of passages in Homer's poems, Porphyry's Homeric interpretation in De Antro shows his transformation from a literary critic into a Neoplatonic philosopher. In this regard, De Antro can be deemed to be part of a corpus of Porphyrian philosophical writings on the salvation of the soul, aimed partly at the Neoplatonic philosophers, partly at a more general audience. Porphyry seems to have been engaged in enquiries to

find the way(s) for salvation of the soul during his life, and to develop this topic in different ways throughout his works.

In Sententia 32 (Lamberz), on the other hand, we find that Porphyry provides guidance for the purification of the soul through his classification of the Neoplatonic virtues, that is, the political, the cathartic, the theoretical, and the paradigmatic virtues. All these virtues are related to the purification of the intelligent part of the soul. The political virtues, for example, teach us to live up to the laws of human nature by moderating passions, whereas the aim of the cathartic virtues is the complete removal of passions from the soul. As Rappe observes, in Sententia 32, 'these virtues are defined in terms of the soul's ability to direct its attention inwardly, to abide in a state of contemplation, and to become one with the object of contemplation.'

As we have seen, Edwards has argued that Porphyry 'meant to write, not only a work of interpretation, but a manual for interpreters.' I would take this in a somewhat different direction and think that Porphyry uses De Antro to educate his disciples. Porphyry's scattered quotations, e.g. his quotation of Plato's Republic 7 in De Antro 8, brief statements such as his definition of matter in De Antro 5, and the plurality of subjects, give the impression that he wrote the treatise for presentation to and discussion in lectures. Of course, symbolism also enables Porphyry to convey his religious and philosophical ideas to his disciples by elaborate explanations. There is already a general consensus among scholars that there is a close connection between De Antro and the myth of Er in Republic 10, and that De Antro is to be read as an ethical text, as will be seen later. In addition to this, I shall seek to demonstrate that De Antro is closely connected with Porphyry's philosophical works, particularly passages of his Commentary on Plato's Timaeus, Sententiae and De Abstinentia. It is primarily in its readings of individual sections of De Antro against these philosophical works that the original contribution of this work resides. I will, for example, consider the perception of the darkness of the material realm in De Antro in light of the noetic triad in Porphyry's commentary on the Parmenides; read his assignments of the different regions to the gods, daimones, mortals and more divine beings against his commentary on the story of Atlantis in the Timaeus; situate Porphyry's description of Homer's Naiad Nymphs weaving a sea-purple garment vis-à-vis Ad Gaurum; interpret the 'divinities' shedding of powers' in the context of Sententia 37 and De Abstinentia; place the gates of the Sun and the Moon in the context of Porphyry's commentary on Timaeus 36d2-7 (F 72 Sodano) and 38c9-d6 (F 79 Sodano); relate his identification of the goddess Athena to the doctrine of virtues in Sententia 32.

De Antro as the product of a highly intelligent thinker (not an undisciplined or chaotic mind, as might appear on first reading), proves that symbols and images are a key language and tool for the Neoplatonists to reveal their doctrines, similar to the Pythagoreans' use of dual discourses, direct and symbolic. According to reports by Porphyry (VP 37) and Iamblichus (VP 18.81), the Pythagoreans divided their disciples into Learners and Hearers, the former being given elaborate explanations and the latter assumed to be capable of studying philosophy from mere maxims without arguments. In his Life of Plotinus (VPlot. 7.1-2) , Porphyry's division of Plotinus' disciples into two groups as ^^^o^-r^^, 'hearers,' and ^^^^-r^^, 'zealous students,' seems to imply that the Pythagorean tradition was maintained in Plotinus' school in Rome. Porphyry interprets the literary symbols in De Antro both as transcendent being and as natural realities. Following, apparently, the Pythagoreans' mode of examination, Porphyry calls them 'images' (^^^^^^^) when he explains principles perceived by the senses, and 'symbols' (^^^^^^^), when his intention is to explain abstract principles. Thus, symbols function as contemplative

objects for the students, and their meanings allow them to develop philosophical awareness and consciousness through the use of sensual and mental powers.

Starting from the assumption that Porphyry uses De Antro to explain his philosophical ideas, and to educate his disciples through allegorical interpretation, my overarching aim is to offer an exegesis of Porphyry's De Antro against the backdrop of his wider philosophical oeuvre. Inspired most likely by Numenius, Porphyry's allegorical method attempts to unfold the deeper meaning of Homer's text by asking meticulous questions about the literary symbols of his verses and elaborately examining them in light of these questions. In this book, I have chosen and organised my topics of discussion in accordance with Porphyry's questions as they emerge from De Antro. These are the nature, method and purpose of allegorical interpretation, the features of the material realm symbolised by Homer's cave of the nymphs, the association of the soul with the body, and the ways of descent and ascent of the soul.

In accordance with, on the one hand, my aim to situate De Antro within the context of Porphyry's works and, on the other hand, the reading of the treatise's central interests as the association and dissociation of the soul and the body, and, above all, the salvation of the soul, the discussions focus on a specific set of Porphyry's philosophical works, namely relevant passages of De Abstinentia and Sententiae, surviving fragments of Porphyry's commentaries on the Timaeus, the Parmenides and the Republic, Ad Gaurum, and other fragmentary works that are related to sections of De Antro. I hope that this first detailed and thematic study of De Antro in English will contribute to a recognition of Porphyry as a complex, original and interesting thinker and will demonstrate that, for Porphyry, allegorical interpretation is an important tool to teach Platonic 'philosophy,' and the 'philosophical way of life,' at the meeting point of muthos and logos.

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As generally agreed, Porphyry's purpose in explaining the doctrines of Plato and Plotinus is mainly to develop parameters for the salvation of the soul, and throughout his various works, this purpose manifests itself in his ethical concern for the soul. The concept of the salvation of the soul is associated with the purification of the soul, and this purification is dependent on what part of the soul is targeted. For example, according to Porphyry, theurgy and rituals play significant roles in the purification of the lower (spiritual) part of the soul. On the other hand, a life dedicated to philosophy and its ethical practice, allows the soul to attain the intelligible realm and permanently escape from the cycle of genesis.

Beginning from the assumption that Porphyry uses his allegorical interpretations in On the Cave of the Nymphs to convey his own thoughts and to educate his disciples, most likely prospective philosophers, in important philosophical ideas, throughout this book I have offered an exegesis of De Antro in the context of his wider philosophical oeuvre. More precisely, I have endeavoured to show how the treatise fits in with his other more straightforward philosophical works, particularly with respect to his interests in the salvation of the soul and the relationship between the soul and body. Like Cornutus, Porphyry might have used De Antro for didactic purposes. The treatise is a perfect example of Porphyry's approach to the allegorical interpretation of the Homeric verses, in which he questions all the inconsistencies and paradoxes of his verses and provides various allegorical interpretation for them.

Reading De Antro as part of Porphyry's corpus of works relating to the salvation of the soul, I have systematically compared it to his other works that mainly deal with this issue and are complementary to

De Antro. In particular, I have proposed that relevant sections of De Antro should be read alongside, not only Porphyry's commentary on the myth of Er, but also his commentary on the Timaeus, De Abstinentia and Sententiae.

Chapter 1 has examined the textual structure and composition of the treatise. As an introductory section, rather than summarising a long and rich tradition of allegorical exegesis and allegorical thinking, followed by many eminent literary critics, grammarians, and philosophers, my intention here has been to highlight those who were influence on Porphyry's exegetical approach and methodology in treatise. Most important among them – and therefore discussed in a separate section – were the Stoics, including Cornutus and Crates of Mallos, and the Neopythagoreans, Numenius and Cronius, who are Porphyry's main sources in De Antro and highly influential figures in Neoplatonism.

In agreement with Dillon and Edwards, I have suggested that De Antro is a complementary text to Porphyry's commentary on the myth of Er in Republic 10, based upon the idea that De Antro and the Republic share two common key symbols, the cave and Odysseus. This affinity is reflected in the basic theme of the treatise and Porphyry's overarching aim: the ultimate goal of the treatise is to show the way of salvation for the individual soul, which is to lead a philosophical life. This implies that Porphyry's aim in De Antro is ethical – his common attitude in other commentaries, as I have here shown at various places – and is compatible with Plato's aim in the myth of Er.

I have then analysed the two key concepts of Neoplatonic allegory, image and symbol, which Porphyry also uses for the cave and Odysseus. These two concepts are in fact used by the Pythagoreans for educational purposes: the natural reality perceived by the senses is introduced through images, the abstract principles perceived by mind through symbols. I have argued that the cave bears both of these aspects: on the one hand, it is a natural reality, but on the other hand, with its mystical elements, it is an abstract principle grasped by the mind. The discussion has included Porphyry's methodology, particularly how he justifies interpreting Homer's verses by raising issues which are thought to be contradictory. I have also discussed an important point of De Antro: Porphyry's identification of Homer as a theologian, an idea being rooted in the view that texts are written by 'divinely inspired' poets whom Porphyry considers as theological authorities, thus turning Homer's verses into divine oracles.

In De Antro 5 to 9, Porphyry explores the philosophical and religious precedents of viewing the cosmos or material world as a cave, the identification that lies at the basis of his allegorical interpretation of Homer's lines. The image is a common one, which is found, for example, in the Pythagoreans, the Orphics, Plato, Empedocles and in the cult of Mithras; and Porphyry elaborately argues its appropriateness (whence its popularity). In the first part of Chapter 2, under the title 'The Cave as Symbol and Image of Cosmos,' I have examined key relevant philosophical concepts relating to the material world in the Presocratic tradition such as Anaximander's apeiron, the flux theory of Heraclitus, and Plato's treatment of caves and caverns as hollows in the Phaedrus.

I have then analysed Porphyry's discussion of two ostensibly contradictory features of the cave in Homer's description: its loveliness and its darkness. I have examined the loveliness of the cave with reference to the material realm's 'participation in the Forms' in De Antro 6.5, starting from Plato's idea that the cosmos is generated from the Form of Good in Timaeus, alongside the relevant parts of Porphyry's and Proclus' commentaries on the Timaeus. I have sought to show a connection between the material world and the second One at the level of Life in Porphyry's commentary on the Parmenides, an

issue that could be developed further in future research. I have made a connection between the darkness of the cave, resulting from the fact that it is perceived by Intellect, and Plotinus' and Porphyry's conceptualisation of Matter and its participation in the Forms, and I have concluded that the cave's darkness reflects the ontological relation, immediate or mediated, between substrata of the cosmos from top to bottom, that is, from the intelligible realm to Matter.

The second part of Chapter 2 opened with an exploration of Porphyry's references to the Mithraic cave in the context of his De Abstinentia and Origen's Contra Celsum. The main concern of this part was to examine Porphyry's identification of Mithras as the Maker and Father of the cosmos with the Platonic Demiurge in the Timaeus in comparison with Numenius' ontological principles. Taking into account how the epithet 'Maker and Father' operates in the Neoplatonic metaphysical and cosmological scheme in accordance with Por-phyry's commentary on the Timaeus, I have concluded that Porphyry's Mithras is a demiurgic god whose creative aspect is predominant. Lastly, I have ventured to argue that Mithras, as Master of genesis, as he is portrayed in De Antro 24.13, may be considered to have a cosmological aspect at the lower ontological level.

In the final section of Chapter 2, I have discussed Porphyry's references to the cave in Empedocles and the cave of Plato's Republic in De Antro 8. Porphyry's quotation from the Republic ensures that the cave in question is the material world as a prison-like cave, filled with shadows, from which one must escape in order to access the intelligible realm that lies beyond it. I discussed the fact that Porphyry's implication of analogies of the divided line and the Sun is an allusion to the movement of the state of minds from the visible realm to the intelligible realm, which we may associated with his doctrine of virtues, the political, the cathartic, the theoretical and the paradigmatic virtues in Sententia 32. This association is also deemed to be the beginning stage of enlightenment, that is, the realisation of the darkness of the cave or the material realm through intellect in De Antro 6.5-6.3

Chapter 3 has investigated the sections of De Antro which deal with the body-soul relationship against the background of Porphyry's metaphysics but also of common Greek symbolic thinking, which underlies Porphyry's associations and identifications of genesis with wetness and pleasures. Porphyry identifies the Naiad nymphs as daimones who preside over genesis (^^^^^^^^^^ ^^^^^^^^, De Antro 12.5), and similarly, he speaks of a certain 'daimon of genesis' (^^^ ^^^^^^^^^ ^^^^^^, De Antro 35.7) – whom Odysseus must appease due to his blinding of Polyphemus, namely Thoosa.

Those brief statements, along with Porphyry's multifaceted identification of the Naiad nymphs as souls in the process of falling into generation, and dunameis that preside over genesis (De Antro 10.8-9), give an impression of Porphyry's demonology, but a rather inadequate one. In order to elucidate this, I have discussed the dual aspects of daimones in De Antro, based on the assumption that Porphyry's interpretive practice should be read from both a macrocosmic and a microcosmic perspective. True in essence to Plato's description of daimones in Timaeus 40d6-9 as the invisible gods, daimones, figuratively as Naiad nymphs, are closely related to entities which cause the descent of souls in Porphyry's commentary on the story of Atlantis in Timaeus 20d8-9 (F 10 Sodano), which is preserved in Proclus' Commentary on Plato's Timaeus (In Tim. 1.77.624 Diehl). I have related Porphyry's tripartite division of daimones and souls, some of which are in the process of genesis, others in the process of ascending to the higher realm, to the celestial regions distinguished in De Antro 29.1-3. Another key issue discussed in the section of De Antro is the distinction between the guiding spirit and the idea of humans' souls as

their daimones, the former having its source in Timaeus 90a, the latter in Timaeus 90c. Thus, I have suggested that Odysseus might be deemed one of the heroic or divine souls allocated to the South in De Antro 29.2, whereas Athena is his guiding spirit allocated to the East, ruling the rational part of Odysseus' soul and leading him to the divine. Based on the idea that 'the individual souls have received a daimonic lot' in F 10.8 of Porphyry's commentary on the Timaeus, Athena might operate as Odysseus' rational principle, since he has not, as yet, completed his self-improvement. This aspect of Athena is compatible with Ennead 3.4.3, in which Plotinus deems to be the guiding spirit an entity superior to us. The assignment of the goddess Athena to Odysseus' rational principle is also in accordance with her identification with phronesis, as discussed in Chapter 4.

According to Porphyry's treatment of the female mythological divinities, Amphitrite and the Naiad nymphs – as generative powers in On Images, as well as in De Antro, I have analysed the possible function of the Naiad nymphs as dunameis in the process of body-creation, De Antro 14.3), based on the fact that the formation of flesh proceeds 'through blood and from blood' (De Antro 14.10-11). The statement 'blood and moist seed are dear to [the souls]' (De Antro 10.20-11.1), has prompted me to examine the formation of flesh with reference to Porphyry's conception of the development of embryos in Ad Gaurum. Because in Ad Gaurum the formation of flesh belongs to the first stage of the formation of the embryo in the womb before limbs and organs are articulated, I have come to the conclusion that Porphyry's interpretation of the Homeric image of the Naiad nymphs weaving a sea-purple garment reflects the creation of the embryo and the physiological phase.

Another philosophical concept in the context of embodiment in De Antro is the pneumatic body, an intermediary link between the soul and the body. To complement and explain De Antro 11.8-12.1, I have used Sententia 29, in which Porphyry classifies the four major phases of the pneumatic body, as the soul obtains different substances. According to Sententia 29, the aethereal body is generated from the substances of the first five planets, and the solar and lunar bodies are obtained from the Sun and Moon. The earthly body consists of heavy and moist pneuma generated from exhalation (^^^^^^^^^^, De Antro 11.3-6) in the sublunary region, reflecting the process of embodiment of the soul, as presented in De Antro. Lastly, in this Chapter, I have discussed the Orphic poem preserved in De Antro 16 in order to analyse how Porphyry evaluates the deception of the divine principle through honey as a symbol of pleasure. Porphyry's analogy between Poros in Plato's Symposium and Kronos, who become inebriated by nectar and honey, respectively, indicates the dominance of irrationality in the soul.

In the first part of Chapter 4, I have discussed the various exegeses of Homer's double gates provided by Porphyry, which is relevant to the journey of the soul through the sensible world. They are variously called the gates of Cancer and Capricorn or solstitial gates in the Mithraic cosmological model, the gates of the Sun by Homer, and the gates of the Sun and the Moon by the theologians. I have mainly examined the gates of the Sun and the Moon in De Antro, which have received less scholarly attention. Regarding their astrological aspect, as presented in De Antro 22.2-6, I have argued that the gates of the Sun and the Moon are related to the diurnal and nocturnal rotations of the seven planets according to the planetary order. I have compared the ascending path of the soul towards the Sun to the escape of the liberated prisoner from the Platonic cave, which can be interpreted as the soul's union with the intelligible realm. At the microcosmic level the path towards the Sun refers to the soul guided by rationality, whereas the path towards the Moon refers to the soul under the guidance of its irrational part. Taking a further step, the discussion brought Porphyry's comments on the gates of the Sun and the

Moon within the scope of his division of the triad Being-Intellect-Life at the celestial level in his commentary on the Timaeus (F 79 Sodano), in which Porphyry mentions the dominant principles and goals of the Sun and the Moon.

In the second part of Chapter 4, I have examined the significant philosophical concepts in Porphyry's allegorical interpretation of Homer's image of Odysseus and Athena sitting under the olive tree and Odysseus' being stripped of his garments. I have argued that the core message of the treatise reflects Porphyry's identification of the goddess Athena with phronesis, along with the olive tree, which Homer puts near the cave, symbolising nous, the intellect that generates the cosmos and permeates it. At the microcosmic level phronesis, by which the rational part of the soul is guided, inspires the soul to incline towards the level of Intellect that is, away from damaging influences of the body to which the soul is enslaved and which confuses it with desires, passions, fears and illusory impressions, and prevents it from attaining the intelligible realm. The body and its desires lead us to conflict and unjust behaviour in order to gain wealth, status, power, and pleasure. Following Numenius, Porphyry with Plotinus reads the Odyssey as a whole in which Odysseus' laborious journey back to Ithaca and his escape from dangers, pleasures and other distractions along the way, symbolise the successful journey of the human soul to return to the 'fatherland' that is the realm of the intelligible. Homer's elaborate description of Odysseus' meeting with Athena, and of the cave of the nymphs and its surroundings, comes at an especially significant point in the poem. Having completed his long and laborious journey with the help of Athena/phronesis, Odysseus has returned to the place from which he started and in which he was born, and at Athena's suggestion he leaves all his material wealth and clothes in the cave. The Homeric hero, a soul who has stripped off his garments, is enlightened and liberated by wisdom, the ultimate goal of Neoplatonic philosophy.

I have suggested that Porphyry's identification of the goddess Athena with phronesis is best seen against the backdrop of the doctrine the levels of virtue of Sententia 32, in which Porphyry discusses the four stages of the Neoplatonic system of virtues. These stages gradually lead the soul to achieve human excellence through distinct mental endeavours. According to this doctrine, the cathartic virtues guide the soul away from bodily concerns. At this stage, phronesis directs the soul towards suppressing bodily thoughts and weaknesses, and operating in an introverted manner.

I have also examined two significant phrases in De Antro in connection with the purification of the soul or the ascent of the soul through the intelligible. The first phrase 'stripped of garments' (De Antro 35.13) is a metaphor also used in De Abstinentia, meaning the soul's freedom from corporeal things. I have demonstrated that this phrase is closely connected with the soul's 'self-detachment' from the body, while still living its corporeal life, which Smith calls 'spiritual death,' as being in the state of impassivity in this life. The second phrase, 'the inexperienced or ignorant souls in the deeds of the sea and matter' (De Antro 35.15-16), hints at a conditional situation which Porphyry interprets as Odysseus or the soul being no more subjected to embodiment only when he has got rid of sea and matter. In this context, I have investigated to what extent one should detach oneself from the earthly life according to Porphyry, who endorses a simple and self-sufficient life, and the minimum involvement with material things. Lastly, I have discussed Porphyry's doctrine of free-will according to Porphyry's fragmentary treatise (F268 Smith), On What Is In Our Power, in which although only human souls have the power to choose the self-determined life, this life is not fully under our control because of the influences of inherited and acquired features in this world.

Having followed the journey of the soul from the realm of Matter to the intelligible realm, I have demonstrated the philosophical aspect of De Antro and Porphyry's ultimate aim of showing that 'philosophy is a way of life.' Whoever our guiding spirit be, whether Athena, Homer, or Porphyry, philosophy will make us better persons if we learn to perceive truths beyond what is said. <>

THE RELIGION OF THE MITHRAS CULT IN THE ROMAN EMPIRE MYSTERIES OF THE UNCONQUERED SUN by Roger Beck [Oxford University Press, 9780198140894]

This book provides a new description of Mithraism, one of the mystery cults of the Roman Empire, from the perspective of its initiates. Mithraism, which was centred on the sun god Mithras, is described as a complex of symbolic representations created, apprehended, and transmitted not only in the medium of an extraordinarily rich and detailed iconography, but also in ritual action and language, in cult life and hierarchy, and in the design of its sacred space, the mithraeum.

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Introduction to Interpreting the Mysteries: Old Ways, New Ways

This introductory chapter provides an introduction to interpreting Mithraism as a mystery cult. The sense in which 'religion' is used is defined. Old methods are contrasted with a new method that focuses on cognition, on how the initiate gets to know his religion through apprehending 'images, suppositions, and representations'. A summary description of the cult's religion is given in terms of 'axioms', instantiated in 'motifs' (e.g. descent and ascent), operating in 'domains' (e.g. the sublunary world), on

'structured sites' (e.g. the mithraeum), in 'symbolic modes' (e.g. ritual action), by means of a 'symbolic idiom' (i.e. 'star-talk'). The axioms postulated for Mithraism are (1) deus sol invictus Mithras (the cult title of the god), and (2) 'harmony of tension in opposition'.

An Agenda

A study of the 'religion' of an ancient cult may seem to entail an artificial, even perverse, distinction between the cult's religion and the cult itself, as if 'religion' were somehow the cream to be skimmed from the surface of the institutional milk. Such an undertaking would indeed be strange, especially these days when students of religion in the Roman empire are with good reason more interested in social formation than in theologoumena.

Please then be assured that in advancing a new interpretation of the 'mysteries' of Mithras I am not proposing to treat Mithraism as a self-contained and free-standing system separable in principle from actual Mithraists. We need not—indeed should not—think of the 'religion' of the Mithras cult as a sort of pre-existent package deal which a person bought into, as it were. Rather, we should see it as an aspect of a collaborative human enterprise of a particular time, place, and culture, constantly re-created and sustained by those initiated into it.

Its contemporaries spoke of 'the Mysteries of Mithras', not of 'Mithraism'. The latter, like all such '-isms', is but a modern label devised for comparison and taxonomy (cf. Stoicism, maenadism, and so on). Contemporaries of course made no distinction between the 'Mysteries' as an institution in the socio-cultural scene and the 'mysteries' as the peculiar sacred business or 'religion' of that institution. The conventions of modern English orthography (initial capital versus initial lower-case) allow me to draw this distinction. I stress that the distinction is for hermeneutic purposes only. The 'mysteries' (lower-case 'm') are inseparable from the 'Mysteries' (capital 'M'), and it is senseless to look for a point where the one starts and the other leaves off.

'What do you mean by "religion"?' is a fair question, to which I shall return three rather different answers. First, by 'religion' I mean what the theologian Gerd Theissen means by 'religion' in his book The Religion of the Earliest Churches (1999). Let me set this out formally:

> The Mithraic religion (i.e. the 'mysteries' of Mithras) : the institution of the Mithras cult (i.e. the 'Mysteries' of Mithras) (Beck) :: 'The religion of the earliest churches' : 'earliest churches' (Theissen).

This is a relational definition. I am also in sympathy with Theissen's own working definition of religion as 'a cultural sign language which promises a gain in life by corresponding to an ultimate reality', with the important proviso that the 'ultimate reality' is subjective: 'the statement … merely takes up the way in which the religions understand themselves; it does not expect anyone to adopt this understanding' (1999: 2).

My second answer is to say what I do not mean by 'religion'. As will become clear soon enough, I do not mean a 'faith' or a 'belief system'. That is the old 'package deal' approach. It never was appropriate to ancient paganisms, even to the mystery cults. Few now accept its applicability to very early forms of Christianity. As a model it is a retrojection from later times of creed and dogma.

For my third answer I turn to an ancient expert on religion, Plutarch of Chaeronea, writing at the turn of the first and second centuries CE. In his essay on Isis, her cult (mostly in Egypt), and her theological meaning, Plutarch describes the 'mysteries' of Isis as the gift of the goddess (On Isis and Osiris 27, trans. Gwyn Griffith):

> Nor did she allow the contests and struggles which she had undertaken, and her many deeds of wisdom and bravery, to be engulfed in oblivion and silence, but into the most sacred rites she infused images, suggestions and representations of her experiences at that time (alla tais hagiōtatais anamixasa teletais eikonas kai hyponoias kai mimēmata tōn tote pathēmatōn), and so she consecrated at once a pattern (didagma) of piety and an encouragement (paramythion) to men and women overtaken by similar misfortunes.

Eikonas kai hyponoias kai mimēmata.

I propose to treat the 'religion' or 'mysteries' of the Mithras cult as a system of (literally) 'likenesses and underthoughts and imitations' apprehended and realized by the initiate as the gift of Mithras. Just as 'likenesses' include but are not limited to material icons, so 'imitations' include but are not limited to mimetic rituals. As for the 'underthoughts', 'mental representations' best approximates the sense in which I take the term. My study of the 'religion' of the Mithras cult is thus a study in cognition, a study of how the initiate gets to know his mysteries in the context of the life and physical environment of the mithraeum, the 'cave' in which he and his cult brothers assembled.

The scholarly consensus is that the Mithraic mysteries were coterminous with the cult of Mithras; in other words, that wherever Mithraists met in a mithraeum, there too Mithraic mysteries were celebrated. To some this may seem self-evident, true only as part of a definition and hence trivial: Mithraism was a mystery cult; obviously, then, it had its mysteries and was nothing without them.

The ubiquity of its mysteries, however, is precisely what distinguishes Mith-raism from the other 'mystery cults'. The mysteries of Isis were not coterminous with Isism, which was a much broader, more multiform phenomenon altogether. Initiation into a mystery, such as we read about in the eleventh book of the Metamorphoses of Apuleius, was but an option—and an option which we cannot assume was on offer in all or even most Isiac communities. The same is true of the other so-called 'mystery cults'.

Mithraism's distinctiveness in this regard is stated forcefully and without qualification by Giulia Sfameni Gasparro in an important study of the cult of Cybele and Attis, where it is all the more telling because the Mithraic mysteries are not there her primary concern (1985: p. xiv):1 'it [Roman Mithraism] constitutes an organic and autonomous religious context which had so entirely assumed a mystery "shape" that, of all the cults with an initiatory-esoteric structure in Antiquity, this alone deserves to be defined as a "mystery religion".'

I shall begin, in Chapter 2, with a critical look at twentieth-century approaches to the interpretation of the Mithraic mysteries. For the most part, these follow in, or react against, a tradition set by Franz Cumont in his magisterial two-volume study of the cult at the close of the nineteenth century (Cumont 1896, 1899). For all the gains in our understanding of the Mithraic mysteries effected in—or in opposition to—the Cumontian tradition, we sense that hermeneutics has now reached something of a dead end. This is as true of the relatively recent astronomical/astrological interpretations (Beck 2004c: 235–49) as of the more conservative approaches. As a consequence of this hermeneutic failure, a narrow positivism has in some quarters replaced interpretation. Hard facts about the cult, its

membership, and its physical remains are valued above the interpretation of its mysteries, a venture which is deemed at best 'speculative' (Clauss 1990a, 2000) and at worst mere invention, the misattribution of high theology to unsophisticated folk manifestly incapable of sustaining it (Swerdlow 1991). In Chapters 2 to 4, then, we shall explore the shortcomings of the traditional hermeneutics, especially in its heuristic procedure and in the classic approach to deciphering doctrine by way of the cult myth and the iconography of the monuments which carry the myth.

In particular, I shall identify five problems with the traditional approach. In ascending order of seriousness these are: first, an undervaluing of the admittedly very small body of literary testimony to the mysteries in favour of an almost exclusive concentration on the monumental, that is, iconographic, testimony; secondly, an undervaluing of the design of the mithraeum, in comparison to the iconography of the 'figured monuments' (monuments figurés), as a store and expression of ideological meaning; thirdly, an assumption—albeit a waning one—that doctrine is the primary object of the heuristic quest; fourthly, as a complement to the third problem, the positivist assumption that, absent doctrine, the mysteries cannot have been a serious and sophisticated cognitive enterprise; fifthly, the total disregard of semantics and semiotics, a failure to ask not merely what the iconography means but also how it means. And not just the iconography; the design of the mithraeum too, and of the rituals enacted there.

In fairness, one cannot fault an interpretation for failing to take into account methods which lay beyond its time horizon. So rather than speak of a sixth deficiency, I shall list as 'an opportunity' the availability of new methods pioneered by cognitive science, especially in anthropology and psychology, during the last decade or so. More on this later.

From Chapter 5 onwards I shall propose a new hermeneutics based on a new heuristic procedure. In place of the hermeneutics of doctrine, I shall offer an interpretation of the mysteries as a system of symbols, both complex and orderly, apprehended by the initiates in cult life and especially in ritual. Indeed, to experience the mysteries, I shall argue, was precisely to apprehend the symbols. At least, that is the most fruitful way I now see of describing the mysteries.

As a banner text for this enterprise we might take a phrase from a passage of Origen, Contra Celsum 1.12. Origen claims that a distinction which he drew within Egyptian religion between the approaches of the wise (sophōn) and the vulgar (idioton) is valid also for the 'Persians' (by whom he means the Mithraists). The 'mysteries' (teletai) of the Persians, he says, 'are cultivated rationally by the erudite but realized symbolically by common, rather superficial persons (par' hois eisi teletai, presbeuomenai men logikōs hypo tōn par' autois logiōn, symbolikōs de ginomenai hypo tōn par' autois pollōn kai epipolaioterōn)' (trans. Chadwick). My aim is not to show that the rank and file got it right while their betters got it wrong—for that would be to accept the distinction between the two types of initiate at face value—but rather that mysteries 'come into being via their symbols' and are apprehended in that form by their initiates, both high and low.

Interpreting the mysteries of Mithras as a system of symbols inevitably places me in a particular anthropological camp, the symbolist camp, and from my perspective the most important proponent of the interpretation of cultures and their religions as systems of symbols is Clifford Geertz (1973). My new hermeneutics will be unashamedly Geertzian—which reveals that it is 'new' only in its application to Classics. To an anthropologist it will be very old news indeed.

Before attempting to apply the new hermeneutics to the mysteries in any detail, I shall postulate some fundamental principles of the Mithraic mysteries to direct and control our analysis of the symbol system. Obviously, I shall not backtrack and propose these principles as Mithraic 'doctrines'. Rather, they are what the anthropologist Roy Rappaport, in an important study which was the culmination of his life's work (1999), called the 'ultimate sacred postulates' of a religion, and Gerd Theissen, in his work of the same year (1999), called a religion's 'axioms'. Since 'axiom' is the simpler term, I shall use it, remarking that in this context it loses, at least for the secular scholar, its implications of 'logical deduction from'.

Although they are known to their religion's members and are usually explicit, axioms are not generally understood by them as a limited set. As such, they are strictly a scholar's hermeneutic device. 'Axioms' are the overarching truths of a religion which ultimately sanctify, and so sanction, the thoughts, the words, the deeds, of its members thinking, speaking, and acting within the context of that religion. They are obvious, simple, and often tautologous or merely definitional. Generally, they are neither verifiable nor falsifiable, and they are invalidated not by argument but only by the death of the religion in question. In this sense, all Mithraic axioms are now invalid because there are no Mithraists left to live by them. An example, often cited by Rappaport, of a religious axiom is the Jewish Shema ('Hear, O Israel, the Lord our God, the Lord is One'), words which are ideally the first a child learns and the last the dying hope to utter. Theissen (1999: 271–307, esp. 273) finds just two axioms for the early Christian churches, covenantal monotheism (inherited of course from Judaism) and acceptance of Jesus as the effective redeemer, the latter encapsulated in the saying 'Christ is Lord'.

For the Mithraic mysteries I shall propose, likewise, just two axioms (ultimate sacred postulates):

1. DEUS SOL INVICTUS MITHRAS. As every ancient Mithraist once knew (presumably it was explained to the illiterate), and as every modern student of Mithraism now knows, this is the god's cult title and the normal formula for dedications; it establishes that the religion's effective power is a god, is the sun, is UNCONQUERED, is MITHRAS.
2. 'HARMONY OF TENSION IN OPPOSITION'. This axiom is presented here as it appears in Porphyry *De antro nympharum 29*, at the conclusion of a list of fundamental oppositions (e.g. night and day): palintonos he harmonie kai toxeuei dia tōn enantion. It was originally a saying of Heraclitus (Fr. 51 DK). Elsewhere (Beck 2000: 167–71) I have argued that it was the Mithraists who adapted it and integrated it with the list of opposed pairs. However, the principal expression of this axiom of 'harmony of tension in opposition' in the Mithraic mysteries is the pair of images of the torchbearing divinities: Cautes with his raised torch and Cautopates with his lowered torch.

    [It may be objected that with the second axiom I am crudely mistaking the medium for the message. Many would argue (Lévi-Straussian structuralists, for example) that eliciting and reconciling oppositions is simply the way in which religions and other socio-cultural systems work. True enough, but my point will be that in the Mithraic mysteries, untypically, the oppositions are displayed on the surface—literally so in the iconography—and are so omnipresent and explicitly structured that 'harmony of tension in opposition' may reasonably be claimed as an axiom.]

These two axioms find expression in an indeterminate number of motifs (the term, the concept, and the relation of 'motifs' to 'axioms' are Theissen's—1999: 271–82, 290–1). Examples of an important motif in the Mithraic mysteries would be descent and ascent.

I further propose that axioms and motifs operate in various domains. Four domains are particularly germane to the Mithraic mysteries: (1) the sacred story, the deeds of Mithras; (2) the cosmos; (3) the sublunary world; (4) the destiny of human souls, and in particular the souls of the initiates of Mithras.

These four domains are not mutually exclusive. Obviously, the sublunary world is a part of the cosmos. Thus domain 2 contains domain 3; and, in accordance with ancient cosmology, domain 3 is at rest at the centre of domain 2, which moves in a complex dance around it.

Furthermore, 'domain' is not intended solely in the literal sense of an area—or, since we are dealing with a three-dimensional universe, a volume of space in which activities take place and power is exercised. The cosmos and the sublunary world (domains 2 and 3) are clearly domains of that sort, but the Mithras story and the destiny of human souls (domains 1 and 4) are clearly not. Rather, the latter are, as it were, envelopes for divine and human actions, actions which take place in cosmic or earthly space. They have a temporal dimension, but not one that is reducible to dating on any earthly continuum of linear time. As to the relating of domains, much of the narrative of the first and fourth domains has to do with bridging the second and third domains, the terrestrial with the celestial or cosmic.

The symbol system conveying the axioms and motifs of Mithraism in their several domains are manifested concretely in three distinctive structures: (1) the physical structure of the icon of the tauroctony (with its occasional reverse, the banquet scene, and other peripheral scenes); (2) the physical structure of the mithraeum; (3) the organizational structure of the seven grades. I shall pay particular attention to the first and second of these structures because, unlike the third, they are attested ubiquitously in the Mysteries.

What you will not find in these chapters is a comprehensive reconstruction of Mithraic theology and other beliefs; or of the myth cycle in all its episodes. Those goals, which dominated much of twentieth-century Mithraic scholarship, I no longer consider either achievable or, for that matter, worth pursuing.

I shall distinguish four modes in which, singly or concurrently, the symbol system of the Mithraic mysteries could be apprehended by its initiates: (1) ritual action; (2) the perception of meaningful iconography; (3) the giving and receiving of words (logia, explications, teaching, esoteric epigraphic phrases, etc.); (4) ethical behaviour consonant with the mysteries (e.g. Mithraic Lions behave in an esoterically appropriate leonine way). The first three modes are esoteric; they characterize types of internal behaviour within the cult and (literally) inside the mithraeum. The last is more public; presumably, one is expected to behave in an ethically appropriate fashion not just to one's cult brethren but also in one's wider social relations.

Further, I shall argue throughout, but specifically in Chapters 8 and 9, that the Mithraic mysteries, across their axioms, motifs, domains, structures, and modes, communicated symbolically in a peculiar idiom. This idiom is a form or jargon of one of Graeco-Roman culture's most pervasive languages, the language of astronomy and astrology. Partly to avoid the clumsy repetition of those two constituents, and partly

because a new or at any rate radically different concept requires a new term, I shall call this idiom 'star-talk'.

By 'star-talk' I do not intend merely talk in words or symbols about the stars. I intend also, following the ancients' own conception of the stars as language signs and the heavens as text, the talk of the stars. From the ancient point of view, this is the primary celestial language of which the discourses of astronomy, astrology, and astral symbolism such as we find in the Mithraic mysteries are earthly replications. Primary star-talk is thus a highly peculiar language, in that the celestial bodies which are its signs and signifiers are themselves also its speakers, holding discourse in and by their rotations and revolutions. And if not they, then the power or powers who move them.

From the modern scientific perspective, of course, primary star-talk does not exist: the stars are without mind or meaning, and so do not and cannot communicate. Here, however, what science tells us can and cannot transpire in the physical heavens is of less relevance than the construction placed upon the physical heavens by the human mind in the particular cultural context of (p.8) Graeco-Roman antiquity. The ancients' supposition that the stars communicate is of far more interest to us than the scientific fact that they don't.

However, even if for analytical purposes we entertain the ancients' conception of an astral language, a more cogent objection remains. 'Star-talk', in my definition of the ancients' conception of it, is a language of symbols; and a language of symbols, it has been argued by the anthropologist Dan Sperber (1975), is an oxymoron: symbols are not language signs. Consequently, before I can deploy 'star-talk' in my description of the Mithraic mysteries, I have to clear what one might call 'Sperber's bar'. I must show not only that star-talk was deemed a language by the ancients, but also that as a (to us) imaginary language it does indeed function as a language on criteria that Sperber set as the necessary conditions for language status. Specifically, I must show that astral symbols, as deployed in the Mithraic mysteries, can and do function as language signs.

From my past interest in interpreting certain aspects of the mysteries by reference to Graeco-Roman astronomy and astrology, a sceptical reader might suspect that I am ushering back in through the back door as astral 'language' the same disreputable creature whom I have expelled through the front door as astral 'doctrine'. In a sense, that is indeed what I am doing. Nevertheless, I plead that the creature has undergone a reformation. No longer is it the 'astral truths of the mysteries'; rather, it is the 'truths of the mysteries astrally expressed'. It is now medium, not message.

Of the five problems of traditional Mithraic hermeneutics, I identified as the most serious 'the total disregard of semantics and semiotics, a failure to ask not merely what the iconography means but also how it means. And not just the iconography; the design of the mithraeum too, and of the rituals enacted there.' The concept of star-talk as a language and as the proper idiom of the Mithraic mysteries is intended to remedy that deficiency. It will enable us to translate traditional substantive ('what') questions into modal ('how') questions of communication, of the giving and apprehending of signs and symbols, and ultimately of cognition itself. In posing and answering the old questions in this novel way, we shall actually be traversing much the same traditional terrain of cult theology, cosmology, and salvation.

A Word on Ontology

Some of our categories are obviously anchored in the actual world: their matter or, rather, propositions about their matter are susceptible, at least in principle, to empirical verification. This is mainly so of matter which falls within the categories of 'structure' and 'mode'. The categories themselves are no more than heuristic and hermeneutic organizing principles. Accordingly, my statement that the mysteries were conveyed and given expression in three structures and four modes is actually just a claim (non-factual, hence neither verifiable nor falsifiable) that the (mysteries can be re-described most effectively in terms of those categories so delimited. However, what you find brigaded under the banners of the three structures and four modes are facts; or at least the propositions which assert them can be empirically verified or falsified. It is a fact, verifiable from the extant exemplars, that there were Mithraic icons and mithraea designed so and not otherwise. It is a fact that there was a (probably non-ubiquitous) hierarchy of grades ordered so and not otherwise. It is a fact that the initiates performed certain actions, and not others, of a sort which we call 'ritual'.

In the preceding sentence I have deliberately problematized 'ritual'. It would have been all too easy to say simply, 'it is a fact that the initiates performed certain rituals rather than others'. That, however, would beg an enormous ontological question. What makes a particular action a ritual? Or more precisely, how does one verify/ falsify empirically the proposition that such-and-such a piece of business is a 'ritual', for example a 'sacrifice' rather than routine butchery? Of course we all 'know the difference'—or think we do—but how can we confirm it empirically on real-world criteria and without appeal either to our own modern scholarly taxonomies (as above) or, more dangerously, to a meta-realm of 'the sacred'?

The problem is well posed by Dan Sperber (1996: 24), whose solution we shall follow. It is the representations of sacrifice in the minds of those who perform and witness the deed, not the sacrifice qua sacrifice, that belong in our common world where empirically verifiable/falsifiable propositions can be made about them. Whether or not one wants to reduce these representations to states or changes in the neural circuitry of the brain, the fact remains that for every representation there must necessarily be a corresponding neural event. These events, whether mental or neural or both, occur in the course of nature in the empirically accessible world. [Sperber's explicit materialism points him that way, but there is no need to follow. His theory of representations, as I employ it here, is compatible with a dualist position, provided one accepts that every mental representation is physically anchored in a corresponding neural state or event and is hence part of an individual's physical history; hence an event in the material history of the world; hence accessible in principle to verification/falsification: either it did happen or it did not happen.]

Ontologically, according to Sperber (1996), cultural phenomena, of which religions constitute a set, are clusters of representations of two types, 'mental' and 'public'. Mental representations are obviously those discussed in the preceding paragraph. Public representations are the expression of mental representations in the common world: the observable ritual, the visible icon, the legible text. Of all these representations, mental as well as public, one can state that they are/were so and not otherwise. Those propositions, in principle if not in practice, are subject to empirical verification/falsification. [Of course, we have records of only a few of the public versions and none of the mental ones, but

complementing observations with hypotheses about unobserved—and even unobservable—entities is plain normal science' (Sperber 1996: 27)].

Consequently, under 'modes' I speak not of Mithraic 'ritual' and so on per se, but of the 'apprehension' of the Mithraic 'symbol system' in and by 'ritual action', in and by 'the perception of meaningful iconography', in and by 'the giving and receiving of words', in and by esoterically appropriate 'ethical behaviour'. What I seek to describe and to analyse is the interplay of those mental and public representations the sum of which constituted the mysteries.

Like 'structures' and 'modes', my categories of 'axioms', 'motifs', and 'domains' are in and of themselves just scholars' heuristic and hermeneutic devices for ordering representations. But they too are grounded in the actual world. Our postulated 'axiom' DEUS SOL INVICTUS MITHRAS is also a dedicatory formula, hence a public representation in Sperber's sense, existing openly in the actual world. Moreover, it was a public representation only because it was a (complex) mental representation in the minds/brains of the initiates. Precisely because we suppose it a definitive representation of Mithras we identify it as an 'axiom'.

In sum, we may say that ontologically all axioms, motifs, domains, structures, and modes, are, or are reducible to, mental and/or public representations or clusters of representations (as defined by Sperber 1996).

Template for a Re-Description of the Mithraic Mysteries

In this section I lay out in summary form the re-description of the Mithraic mysteries developed over the preceding sections.

The description comprises six propositions, A–F. Each proposition except the last (F) has alternative openings (A1 and A2, B1 and B2, etc.). This is to reflect different perspectives: the first line represents the mysteries as an autonomous system acting on the initiate; the second line represents the mysteries from the initiate's point of view as something apprehended and accepted. Obviously, my preference is for the latter, for it captures the interplay of mental and public representations of which the mysteries, as a matter of fact, consisted.

Elsewhere, I have presented a third alternative which better reflects the ancient way of looking at things: it represents the mysteries from the divine perspective as the gift of the god, mediated in part by a 'prophet' or 'lawgiver' ('Zoroaster' for the Mithraists) and received by the initiate.12 Unsurpassed as a paradigm for this third way is Plutarch's account of the transmission of her mysteries by Isis in the form of 'likenesses and underthoughts and imitations' (On Isis and Osiris 27), a passage we examined at the beginning of this chapter.

A description of the Mithraic mysteries

A1. The mysteries give symbolic expression to …
A2. In the mysteries, the initiate apprehends symbolically…
two axioms or ultimate sacred postulates:

3. Deus sol invictus mithras
4. 'Harmony of tension in opposition.'

B1. These axioms are conveyed …
B2. The initiate experiences these axioms …
in an indeterminate number of motifs:

e.g. the motif of descent and ascent.

C1. Axioms and themes operate …
C2. The initiate apprehends the axioms and themes …
in one or more of four domains:

5. the sacred story, the deeds of Mithras
6. the cosmos
7. the sublunary world
8. the destiny of human (especially initiates') souls.

D1. The complexes of symbols conveying the axioms and motifs of the mysteries in their various domains are manifested concretely…
D2. The initiate apprehends the symbol complexes conveying the axioms and motifs of the mysteries in their various domains …
on structured sites; in the mysteries there are three principal and distinctive structures:

9. the physical structure of the icon of the tauroctony (with its reverse = the banquet scene, plus peripheral scenes)
10. the physical structure of the mithraeum
11. the organizational structure of the seven grades

(note: only the first two structures are attested ubiquitously).

E1. The symbols are activated …
E2. The initiate apprehends the symbols …
in one or more of four modes:

12. ritual action
13. the perception of meaningful iconography
14. the giving and receiving of words (logia, explications, teaching, esoteric epigraphic formulae)
15. ethical behaviour consonant with the mysteries (e.g. Mithraic Lions behave in an esoterically appropriate leonine way).

F. The mysteries' common symbolic idiom across axioms, motifs, domains, structures, and modes is the language of astronomy/astrology or star-talk.

On Comparisons

I am confident that this new heuristic/hermeneutic approach and template for a re-description of the Mithraic mysteries, developed as they are from recent initiatives in anthropology (Rappaport, Sperber) and Christian origins (Theissen), will allow us to make more interesting, deeper, and better-nuanced comparisons than heretofore. The making of interesting comparisons, I agree with the distinguished scholar of ancient religions, Jonathan Z. Smith (1990), is at the heart of the enterprise of the study of religion. The importance of Smith's comparative project has been endorsed and its centrality emphasized in the recent work of a senior New Testament and Christian origins scholar, Burton Mack.

Accordingly, you will encounter here comparisons not only with the systems of Christianity in its early forms, but also with those of cultures closer to us in time and as distant as the indigenous Chamula of southern Mexico (Gossen 1979); also with those of certain contemporary Western 'cults' (in the modern sense), in particular the celestially oriented cults of the Solar Temple and Heaven's Gate, groups which achieved notoriety in the 1990s for the bizarre murder-suicides of their initiates.

Wide comparisons over space, time, and levels of economic and scientific sophistication help us both to familiarize the exotic and—no less important—to exoticize the familiar. We aim to create, as it were, a level playing-field for all mysteries, in particular one on which those of Mithras are not set at a disadvantage with those of Christ. Though no longer in the spirit of Christian triumphalism, we classicists still tend to overprivilege the latter, especially on the intellectual plane. We may (or may not) concede some intellectual value to the ancient philosophical allegorizations of the pagan mysteries. But by and large we treat the real-life initiates as an intellectually scruffy lot, reserving our respect, if not our liking, for the minds of their Christian rivals. 'Jerusalem' might have wanted little to do with 'Athens', but we extend it honorary Athenian citizenship nonetheless. Not so the pagan mysteries.

On Cognition

As one of the shortcomings of the traditional interpretations of the Mithraic and other ancient mysteries, we have identified the lack of adequate semiotics and semantics, specifically of a paradigm of how symbols in the mysteries convey meaning. To that semantic deficiency we added the absence of any cognitive theory, that is, a paradigm of how the initiates apprehended the symbol systems of their mysteries. Classical scholarship here tends to take a commonsensical approach (as it does all too often), supposing it sufficient that the initiates believed their beliefs, that they thought their thoughts (if the mystery is allowed intelligent and intelligible content), and that the rest was affect or more-or-less edifying emotion.

Since we postulate that Mithraism was a serious cognitive enterprise, it is incumbent on us to have at least a working paradigm of cognition in the context of religion. Fortunately, the new cognitive science of religion (CSR) provides just such a paradigm. As an approach to a particular subset of mental and cultural phenomena, CSR is part of a more general cognitivist methodology which I shall describe at the start of Chapter 6 when I begin to employ it in my hermeneutics. Suffce it to say here that Dan Sperber's theory of representations, which I adopted above, exemplifies this method.

A precursor of the cognitivist approach is a theory known (not very informatively) as biogenetic structuralism. Biogenetic structuralism proposes a model of the operation of the human brain and the autonomous nervous system functioning as an integrated whole, especially in certain non-everyday situations, notably meditation, ecstasy, and participation in ritual. It is, of course, the theory's focus on religious states of mind and their corresponding physiological states that attracted my attention. This approach too I shall describe in more detail when I come to make use of it towards the end of Chapter 7

Synchronic Versus Diachronic; Structure And Meaning Versus Historic Cause And Effect; Interpretation Versus Explanation

If one were to ask why, for example, the tauroctony is composed of a certain set of symbols in a certain arrangement, one of two different sorts of answer may be returned: first a synchronic answer, that the

tauroctony is so and not otherwise because it gives expression, via an apparent narrative episode, to the axioms and certain key motifs of the Mithraic religion; secondly a diachronic answer, that the tauroctony is so and not otherwise because it is the end product of a historical evolution, whether of an underlying set of ideas or of the iconography itself (or both). These two broad types of answer are not of course mutually exclusive, but they should be kept distinct, at least conceptually. One should differentiate clearly between an explication in terms of meaning and an explication in terms of antecedents.

My study takes a synchronic approach. I shall attempt to explicate the mysteries as a symbolic system in terms of the system's meaning(s) and structure. To some extent, this is inevitable. There is simply not enough evidence to reconstruct the development of the tauroctony (to retain that example) in the way in which historians of Christian origins can reconstruct, through the methods of source-, redaction-, and form-criticism, not only the development of early Christianity's pre-canonical texts but also the earliest forms, social and ideological, of the religion itself. In part, however, my choice of approach is deliberate. In these chapters I am more concerned with interpreting the mysteries than with explaining them historically in terms of cause and effect.

There are of course diachronic stories to be told, not only about the social formation of the Roman Mysteries of Mithras but also about the development of the cult's mysteries. Indeed, the whole Cumontian narrative of the transmission of Mithra-worship from Persia to Mesopotamia to Anatolia to Rome was as much (if not more) about the creation and modification of a set of beliefs as about the institution and transformations of a social group.

Paradoxically, to validate my synchronic account, I found that towards the end of this study, specifically from section 11 of Chapter 9 and in Chapter 10, I had to tell an elaborate diachronic story. This, you will find, is not even about the mysteries of Mithras, or at least not primarily so. Rather, it is the reconstructed history of a set of astronomical and astrological—that is, 'star-talk'—concepts and representations in which, I claim, the prehistory and origins of the mysteries of Mithras are embedded. Large though that claim is, there is fortunately no need to say more about it here at the outset.

Conclusion

Such, then, is our hermeneutic agenda. In the next chapter we shall look at the traditional interpretations of twentieth-century Mithraic scholarship and their fons et origo in the great two-volume work of Franz Cumont, which appeared in the closing years of the century before. Concurrently, we shall start to lay the foundations of our new approach.

Theissen, as the subtitle of his book ('creating a symbolic world') makes explicit, also aligns himself with the symbolist tradition. Mithraism, however, was demonstrably the more literal 'symbol system'; for while early Christianity may by metaphor be called 'a marvellous cathedral of signs' (Theissen 1999: 306), the mithraeum was designed and constructed, literally and physically, as a symbol-equipped 'image of the universe' (Porphyry, *De antro nympharum* 6).

A New Basis for Interpreting the Mysteries

Revisiting the summary description of the religion of the Mithras cult proposed initially proposed.

I set out what I called a 'template' for the redescription of the Mithraic mysteries in the form of six propositions. To these six propositions I now return to see what sense they make at the end of our explorations. Remember that they are in no sense Articles of Religion. You may want to review their status, as I see it, in the first two sections of Chapter 1.

The propositions were advanced in two versions, the first in neutral language (e.g. 'The mysteries give symbolic expression to … '), the second in language reflecting the point of view of the initiate (e.g. 'In the mysteries, the initiate apprehends symbolically…'). Clearly the second version is prior; the first is merely a scholar's construct which feigns objectivity. So I shall recapitulate our six propositions from the initiate's perspective.

A. In the mysteries, the initiate apprehends symbolically two axioms or ultimate sacred postulates:
(1) deus sol invictus mithras,
(2) 'Harmony of tension in opposition'.
B. The initiate apprehends these axioms in an indeterminate number of themes or motifs, e.g. the theme of descent and ascent.
C. The initiate apprehends the axioms and themes in one or more of four domains:
(1) the sacred story, the deeds of Mithras,
(2) the cosmos,
(3) the sublunary world,
(4) the destiny of human (especially initiates') souls.
D. The initiate apprehends the symbol complexes conveying the axioms and motifs of the mysteries in their various domains on structured sites. In the mysteries there are three principal and distinctive structures:
(1) the physical structure of the icon of the tauroctony (with its reverse = the banquet scene, plus peripheral scenes),
(2) the physical structure of the mithraeum,
(3) the organizational structure of the seven grades.
E. The initiate apprehends the symbols in one or more of four modes:
(1) ritual action,
(2) the perception of meaningful iconography,
(3) the giving and receiving of words (logia, explications, teaching, esoteric epigraphic formulae),
(4) ethical behaviour consonant with the mysteries (e.g. Mithraic Lions behave in an esoterically appropriate leonine way).
F. The mysteries' common symbolic idiom across axioms, motifs, domains, structures, and modes is the language of astronomy/astrology or star-talk.

On reviewing the six propositions it strikes me that more needs to be said on only one of them, Proposition B on themes or motifs. Chapter 9 was entirely devoted to star-talk as the idiom of the mysteries (F), and Chapter 8 to establishing that a symbol system can in certain circumstances function as a language and that the ancients themselves treated the heavens as text and the stars as intelligent communicators. As regards Proposition D on the initiate's apprehension of symbols in complexes on

three principal structured sites, we have explored at some length how this was evicted in the tauroctony in Chapter 9 and in the mithraeum in Chapter 8.2 The 'modes' of apprehending and engaging with symbols (in ritual action, perception of iconography, explications, appropriate ethical behaviour, and so on—Proposition E) do not need systematic treatment either, once the chimaera of a coherent Mithraic doctrine and belief system has been exorcised, as it was in Chapters 2–4. The 'domains' (C) are likewise self-explanatory. In Chapter 9 (end of sect. 6, start of sect. 7) we saw how a change of domain sometimes entails a change of meaning for a star-talk sign. This was important, for it shows how apparent paradox can sometimes be explained—but not explained away!—as an instance of the lexical and semantic Xexibility of language.

To say nothing further about Mithraism's two axioms or ultimate sacred postulates (Proposition A) might seem bizarre in a Conclusion. But is it really? If it still needs to be established that the two axioms, (1) deus sol invictus mithras and (2) 'Harmony of tension in opposition', are the golden threads running through and holding together the Mithraic mysteries, then I have failed in my task. One does not prove these things, one shows them by demonstration and iteration.

If anything further needs to be said about the axioms it can be said in the context of some brief remarks about the 'motifs' or 'themes' in and through which the initiate apprehends them (Proposition B). In principle at least there was no limit to the number of themes, unlike the axioms (A), domains (C), structured sites (D), and modes (E). In their explications Mithraic Fathers could and no doubt did develop many themes which have disappeared from the record. Some of these were probably quite idiosyncratic. But all save the most evanescent would have instantiated one or both of the axioms. More successfully or less successfully, each would have said something explicitly or implicitly about the solar invincibility of the god Mithras and the tensed harmony of opposites. If we think of the mysteries as an evolving stream of mental and public representations, we might think of effective instantiation of the axioms as the main factor in the selection of successful representations. Those which effectively instantiated the axioms survived; those which did not did not survive. The principal themes which we can still discern are the 'fit' survivors of a process of selection at work at a level well below the conscious choice of initiates.

In the summary above I cited 'descent and ascent' as an example of a theme, and we saw in Chapter 9 how that theme operated in different domains: in the cosmic domain in the elevation and subordination of the journeying Sun and Moon; in the domain of the sublunary world in the growth and dying down of vegetation; in the domain of human destinies in the descent and return of souls. Our first conclusion must therefore be that themes of consequence both span domains and integrate them. Secondly, nowhere was our theme simple or unparadoxical. Indeed, part of its function appears to have been precisely to generate paradox. Thirdly, complexity and paradox were never pointless; meaning was always present and discernible in star-talk utterances. Fourthly, the theme, while complex in its applications, was reducible to a straightforward polarity: descent versus ascent.

Here we face the problem of circularity. Having proclaimed 'harmony of tension in opposition' the second 'ultimate sacred postulate' of the Mithraic mysteries, themes of opposition are the rabbits I am going to pull out of the top hat. The question then becomes, how authentic is that second postulate? In answer, I can point to the most explicit symbol of opposition in the mysteries, the pair of torchbearers, the 'twins' who are identical in appearance yet also polar opposites in that one carries his torch raised,

the other lowered; and I can demonstrate, as I did in Chapter 9, how they function as star-talk signs conveying paired oppositional meanings. I can also argue, as I did in Chapter 5 (sect. 8) that Porphyry, *De antro 29* is based on a Mithraic list of star-talk oppositions. Yet of course it was I who chose to privilege the torchbearers and Porphyry's *De antro nympharum* in my explications and I who imported the concept of 'star-talk'. In the end, formal circularity just has to be accepted.

The identification of themes is a large part of interpretation—scholarly interpretation, that is, not the esoteric explications of Mithraic Fathers. Identifying themes, however, is not an analytical task. One is not breaking something down into its components. Rather it is a matter of seeing what principles emerge as one explores symbolic structures and star-talk narratives. Baldly listing themes is not an appropriate hermeneutic strategy.

In this study, now at its conclusion, I have begun the task of reinterpreting the Mithraic mysteries on what I hope are sounder heuristic and hermeneutic principles and a sounder theoretical base. Begun, but not completed; for the project of interpretation is open-ended, and I hope not only to go further myself but also that others will venture along this road. <>

THE BYZANTINE SINBAD by Michael Andreopoulos, translated by Jeffrey Beneker, Craig A. Gibson [Dumbarton Oaks Medieval Library, 9780674251472]

The Byzantine Sinbad collects *The Book of Syntipas the Philosopher* and *The Fables of Syntipas*, both translated from Syriac in the late eleventh century by the scholar Michael Andreopoulos. Originally written in Persian and part of a multilingual and multicultural medieval storytelling tradition, *The Book of Syntipas* recounts how the Persian king Cyrus's unnamed son—a student of the fictional philosopher Sinbad, who is known in Greek as Syntipas—is falsely accused of rape by a royal concubine. While the young man awaits execution, seven philosophers and the concubine attempt to influence Cyrus's judgment. After seven days of storytelling, the son is exonerated and demonstrates the wisdom he learned from Syntipas.

The sixty-two moral tales in *The Fables of Syntipas* are inspired mainly by the tradition of Aesop but include fifteen that are uniquely attributed to the philosopher.

This volume is the first English translation to bring together Andreopoulos's Byzantine Greek texts.

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The figure of the philosopher Sinbad, rendered in Greek as *Syntipas,* was introduced into the Byzantine literary tradition in the late eleventh century through two works translated from Syriac into Greek by Michael Andreopoulos. Both of these works, *The Book of Syntipas the Philosopher* and a collection of sixty- two fables (Fables), are contained in this volume. Taken together, *The Book of Syntipas the Philosopher* and Fables represent the character and the wisdom of Syntipas as they would become known to Byzantine readers. Although Andreopoulos translated both texts in the Middle Ages, they are distantly related to earlier Greek traditions as old as the fourth century BCE and, more immediately, to a complex development of medieval wisdom literature written in Persian, Arabic, and Syriac. *The Book of Syntipas the Philosopher* and the Fables made their way into Greek by different paths, but once united by Andreopoulos's translations, they were probably assumed to belong together. Of the three oldest manuscripts that form the basis of our Greek texts, two transmit both the story of Syntipas and the fables that were at tributed to him.

The framework story in which Syntipas plays a leading part accompanies the immensely popular cluster of tales, reminiscent of the *1001 Nights*, known generally in Europe as the History of the Seven Wise Masters (*Historia Septem Sapientium*) or Dolopathos. It is conjectured to have been of Persian origin and was eventually transmitted into many Oriental and Western languages. A Syriac version was translated into Greek by the Byzantine author Michael Andreopoulos at the end of the 11th century under the title of *The Book of the Philosopher Syntipas*. In his introduction, Andreopoulos describes it as a story which "derides evildoers and, towards its end, praises righteous deeds," thus excusing a work otherwise characterised by "exoticism and eroticism".[1] Another version was translated from Arabic into Spanish in the thirteenth century as The Book of the Wiles of Women (Spanish: *El Libro de los Enganos* e *los Asayamientos de las Mugeres*).

In the Greek version, *Syntipas* is counsellor to King Cyrus and tutor to his son who, having taken a vow of silence for seven days, is accused by his stepmother of trying to seduce her. Over successive days there follows a competition of stories and counter-stories told by the king's advisory philosophers and the stepmother whose advances he has rejected, thus putting off the prince's execution until he is at liberty to tell the truth. This denouement is followed by a few other tales illustrative of the situation.

Although a few of the 27 stories that appear there concern animals, the main protagonists of the majority are humans. This proportion was reversed in *The Fables of Syntipas*, a Syriac fable collection also translated by Andreopoulos which accompanied the Syntipas romance in some manuscripts. A Latin version of these was published in 1781 by Christian Frederick Matthaei, drawing the attention of scholars interested in the transmission of Aesop's Fables. Eventually it was demonstrated that most had been translated into Syriac from an old Greek source as recently as the 9th century or later. Nearly a

quarter of the 62 appearing there are not Aesopic, but otherwise it includes such well known examples as The Ant and the Grasshopper, The North Wind and the Sun and The Farmer and the Viper.

The Translator and His Patron

A dedicatory poem attached as an epigram to t *The Book of Syntipas the Philosopher* identifies the translator and the circumstances of his work. Michael Andreopoulos, speaking in the first person, claims that he translated *The Book of Syntipas the Philosopher* as a commission from Gabriel, whom he identifies as the "revered governor of the city named for honey (meli)," that is, Melitene (modern Malatya in Turkey), a city in eastern Asia Minor located near the upper Euphrates River.2 Gabriel was ruler (doux) of Melitene from the 1080s until 1101, a period when Turkish peoples were challenging By zan tium for control of the eastern territories. While remaining loyal to the Byzantine emperor, Gabriel also appears to have had good relations with the Seljuk Turks.3 He had im por tant local connections, as well. One of his daughters was married to the doux of neighboring Edessa in Syria, who ruled until he was overthrown in a coup led by the crusader Baldwin of Boulogne. In 1100, when Baldwin became king of Jerusalem (as Baldwin I), he turned control of the city over to his cousin Baldwin of Bourcq (the future Baldwin II of Jerusalem). Gabriel then married another daughter, Morfia, to the second Baldwin, but he did not live long enough to profit from the alliance. Melitene was sacked in 1101 by Danishmendids, a Turkish group that was contending with the Seljuks, and Gabriel was executed. Morfia, however, became queen of Jerusalem when Baldwin ascended the throne, and her progeny held powerful positions in the crusader states and the Byzantine empire.

We know very little about Andreopoulos's life. In the same dedicatory poem, he identifies himself as a Christian and humbly calls himself "the least of the grammarians." A grammarian (grammatikos) was a literary scholar who often ran a secondary school. Andreopoulos, therefore, would have been an educated man, but one of relatively low social standing and perhaps financially de pen dent on Gabriel or another member of the local nobility. If he was in fact a teacher, his school would have served an important purpose. After students learned basic skills in reading and writing, the grammarian taught them more advanced topics, including grammar, literature, and prose composition. Some students would go on to pursue further studies in rhetoric or philosophy. One obstacle to advancement seems to have been that Greek higher education was typically available only in Constantinople in the Middle Ages. In many places outside the capital, however, a school run by a dedicated teacher, sometimes assisted by advanced students, could and did fill that need. Andreopoulos's translations, like his presumed teaching, were probably intended for his local audience: the earliest manuscripts come from Trebilos in any sort of epigram or preface, but like the THE BOOK OF SYNTIPAS THE PHILOSOPHER, they were translated into Greek in eastern Asia Minor in the late eleventh century, and they are included with the THE BOOK OF SYNTIPAS THE PHILOSOPHER in two of the earliest manuscripts. Ben Edwin Perry originally suggested that they were written in Greek and then ascribed to Syntipas. However, he later modified his position, arguing from characteristics of language that they were based on the Aesopic tradition, but that they had been written first in Syriac and then translated by Andreopoulos into Greek. Andreopoulos appears to have believed that the Fables represented the teachings of Syntipas, much in the way that the Aesopic fables were thought to represent the teachings of Aesop and were frequently transmitted in books along with his life. Indeed, in *The Book of Syntipas the Philosopher*'s dedicatory epigram, Andreopoulos identifies Syntipas as the "fable writer" (mythographos), assigning him to the same category of wise man as Aesop.

The Book of Syntipas the Philosopher

The Book of Syntipas the Philosopher, in its various forms, was, according to Ida Toth, "one of the most successful and most widely transmitted pieces of popular literature, and a true bestseller of medieval and early modern times." Written in Persian in the sixth or seventh century, it was translated into Arabic in the eighth or ninth century, including a version by "Mousos the Persian," who has been iden ti fied as Müsã b. ʻÏsã al-Kisrawï, a ninth- century Arabic scholar and translator of Persian literature. An Arabic version was translated into Syriac sometime between the ninth and the eleventh centuries, and a Syriac version created during this period was most likely the exemplar used by Andreopoulos in approximately 1090 to create the first Greek version. Translations from Syriac into Greek were relatively rare, but Andreopoulos made his translation at a time when the Byzantine Greeks were very interested in eastern art, architecture, and secular literature, and when patrons (such as Andreopoulos's own Gabriel) were sponsoring translations of eastern scientific texts and narrative fiction.

The plot of *The Book of Syntipas the Philosopher* involves a frame tale in which the Persian king Cyrus turns his son over to the famous philosopher Syntipas to be educated (on the structure, see below). Syntipas does indeed instruct the king's son, making him in turn the wisest of his peers, but before the son can demonstrate his wisdom, he is involved in a scandal. One of the king's concubines falsely accuses him of rape, and he, sworn to silence for seven days because of an astrological warning, cannot defend himself. Cyrus believes his concubine's accusation and intends to execute his son. To delay this punishment, seven philosophers tell a series of stories over the seven days, and the concubine responds on most days with a story of her own. These interior tales are all aimed at influencing the king's judgment: the philosophers' stories are cautionary tales about the dishonesty of women, while the concubine warns of untrustworthy advisors. Once the son can finally speak, he clears his name and the concubine is punished. With the scandal resolved, t *The Book of Syntipas the Philosopher* concludes with a demonstration of the great wisdom that the son has acquired through the teaching of Syntipas.

Since the Persian, Arabic, and Syriac versions that lie behind the Greek *The Book of Syntipas the Philosopher* are not extant, Toth argues that "the 11th-century translation by Michael Andreopoulos most prob ably represents the oldest surviving witness of the earliest known eastern tradition." Andreopoulos's version was later retranslated by an unknown author into the so-called *Retractatio*, a new Greek version whose grammar, syntax, style, and vocabulary were simplified in order to appeal to a wider contemporary readership. Other simplified Greek translations were made from the fourteenth through the seventeenth centuries, and Greek versions were translated into Romanian, Bulgarian, and Serbian versions in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.

Andreopoulos's eleventh- century Greek translation of *The Book of Syntipas the Philosopher* is part of a family of so- called eastern versions of the Syntipas story, of which nine other versions are extant: one Syriac (which is later than the lost Syriac version translated by Andreopoulos, and breaks off at the beginning of the story of the old man, section 118 in this edition); three Persian (including two that appear, respectively, in One Thousand and One Nights and One Hundred and One Nights); three Arabic; one Old Spanish (El libro des los engaños e los asayamientos de las mujeres); and one Hebrew (Mishle Sendabar). The Old Spanish and Hebrew versions were each translated from Arabic. The frame tale remains more consistent than the interior tales, which vary in number, order, and content across the eastern versions.

While Andreopoulos's version belongs to this eastern medieval tradition, the tradition of seven wise men (or sages) as represented by the seven philosophers who tell the interior tales also has an ancient Greek analogue. In his discussions of the origins of t *The Book of Syntipas the Philosopher*, Perry connects the seven philosophers to the "Seven Wise Men of Greece," a legend as old as the fourth century BCE, and perhaps older. Perry also notes that three of the stories told in *The Book of Syntipas the Philosopher* "can be traced to Graeco- Roman antiquity." In his edition of the Greek life of Secundus the Silent Philosopher, Perry traces the translation of that second- century CE text into Arabic and argues that it in flu enced the development of *The Book of Syntipas the Philosopher* and related works.28 Likewise, the frame tale's theme of the young man falsely accused of rape has ancient antecedents, such as the Greek story of Hippolytus and Phaedra, and the biblical story of Joseph and Potiphar's wife. Though Andreopoulos rightly claims in his epigram that *The Book of Syntipas the Philosopher* "did not exist among the Romans' books" before his translation, he nonetheless made himself part of a pro cess of literary exchange that was much older than he likely knew.

The so-called western family of this tradition differs greatly from the eastern family and therefore from Andreopoulos's Greek *The Book of Syntipas the Philosopher*. The location of the story is usually transferred from Persia to Rome; two versions place it in Constantinople, and the twelfth- century Latin version known as Dolopathos places it in Sicily during the reign of Augustus. The concubine from the king's harem in *The Book of Syntipas the Philosopher* is transformed into the son's stepmother, and the central Syntipas fig ure is removed (except in Dolopathos, which substitutes the Roman poet Virgil), leaving the seven sages to act alone. As for the structure, on each of seven days the stepmother tells a story and one of the seven sages responds with a story, and at the end the son tells a final story, for a total of fif teen stories, only four to six of which are arguably also found in eastern versions. This medieval tradition of The Story of the Seven Sages seems to begin in the mid- twelfth century in France, and French versions in both poetry and prose are known. French versions were later translated into Ital ian and into different Latin versions: the widely known Historia septem sapientium, and the apparently unique Dolopathos. The origin and early transmission his tor y of the western family of the Syntipas story is still not well understood.

The only named characters in *The Book of Syntipas the Philosopher* are *Syntipas* the philosopher and Cyrus the king. The king's son, concubine, and royal philosophers are unnamed. Nor are the seven philosophers distinguished from one another except by ordinal number. Likewise, none of the characters in the interior tales is named. Cyrus is to be identified with Cyrus II, or the Great (r. ca. 557–530 BCE), but despite sharing a name and a title, he bears little resemblance to the historical Cyrus. The setting of the frame tale is Cyrus's palace in Persia; the settings of the interior tales are nonspecific. This lack of specificity, yet with a tinge of the exotic, probably con tributed to the international, multilingual, and long- term appeal of the work.

The frame tale itself is a genre with ancient roots that was quite popular in the medieval period. It creates a narrative context for telling a series of interior tales. In the case of *The Book of Syntipas the Philosopher*, the education of the king's son and the concubine's accusation against him provide the context for the seven philosophers, the concubine, and eventually the son himself to tell their stories. This type of tale, according to Bonnie Irwin, "is not simply an anthology of stories. Rather, it is a fictional narrative . . . composed primarily for the purpose of presenting other narratives. A frame tale depicts a series of oral storytelling events in which one or more characters in the frame tale are also narrators of

the interpolated tales." These interpolated tales (also called interior, embedded, and nested stories or narratives) are told within the surrounding frame, which "provides a context for reading, listening, and, of course, interpreting the interior tales." Thus the surrounding frame depends on the interior tales to advance its plot, but the individual interior tales are essentially in de pen dent; they may be removed from any one particular frame to "stand alone or appear in a different frame, albeit with a different connotation." As a frame tale is adapted or translated, its interior tales can be reordered, creatively reworked, or even replaced with other tales. In t *The Book of Syntipas the Philosopher* the interior tales are used, first (on days 1–7), to hasten or delay the king's decision to execute his son and, second (on day 8), as an opportunity for the king's son and syntipas to demonstrate their wisdom and learning.

The following summary demonstrates the overall structure of *The Book of Syntipas the Philosopher*. The numbers in parentheses correspond to the sections of the text and translation published in this edition.

Dedicatory poem of Michael Andreopoulos (1).

A brief prologue (2).

The frame tale begins: syntipas educates the king's son and swears him to silence for seven days. One of the king's concubines falsely accuses the son of rape, and the king sentences him to death (3–11).

On days 1 to 7, the seven philosophers take turns telling the king two stories each that persuade him to call off the execution. On the following mornings of days 2 to 6, the concubine warns the king not to listen to the philosophers.

Day 1: The first philosopher tells the story of the lustful king, the resistant woman, and her suspicious husband (12–15), and the story of the adulterous woman, her suspicious husband, and a spying parrot (16–18).

Day 2: The concubine tells the story of the drowning of a fuller and his son (19–21). The second philosopher tells the story of the merchant, the girl, and the pure loaves of bread (22–25), and the story of the adulterous woman, her lover, his slave, and her husband (26–28).

Day 3: The concubine tells the story of the king's son and the female demon (lamia) (29–33). The third philosopher tells the story of the honeycomb that leads to a war (34–36), and the story of the woman, the lustful merchant, and the duped husband (37–39).

Day 4: The concubine tells the story of a prince who was transformed into a woman (40–45). The fourth philosopher tells the story of the greedy bath manager, his humiliated wife, and the son of a king (46–49), and the story of the lustful man, the cle ver old woman, and the couple who break their mutual oaths of fidelity (50–55).

Day 5: The concubine tells the story of the pig, the monkey, and the figs (56–58). The fifth philosopher tells the story of the soldier and his faithful dog (59–62), and the story of the raped woman, her suspicious husband, and the burned cloak (63–69).

Day 6: The concubine tells the story of the thief, the lion, and the monkey (70–73). The sixth philosopher tells the story of the pigeons and the disappearing grain (74–77), and the story of the raped woman and the elephant- shaped honey cake (78–80).

Day 7: The concubine threatens to throw herself into a bonfire but does not tell a story (81–83). The seventh philosopher tells the story of three phallic wishes (84–89), and the story of the man who tried to compile all the vices of women in a book (90–95).

The eighth day dawns, and the son can speak again. He explains why he remained silent and why the concubine falsely accused him, and syntipas accounts for his absence (96–99). Four of the philosophers debate who would have been responsible for the son's execution, and syntipas explains why the woman is blameless (100–102). The son tells the story of the milkmaid who accidentally poisons her master's dinner guests, and he, four philosophers, and syntipas debate who is to blame (103–7).

The son tells three stories of unexpectedly intelligent people: the three- year- old boy (108–10), the five- year- old boy (111–17), and the old man (118–26). He then explains to the king how syntipas taught him (127–28).

The king asks his court how the concubine should be punished (129–30). She tells the story of the mutilated fox (131–33). The son suggests that she be punished with the parade of infamy (134).

Syntipas tells the story of the philosopher's son who grew up to become a criminal (135–40).

The king's son repeats the earlier de scrip tion of his education (see 128) and explains the ten ethical lessons that Syntipas also taught him (141–42). The king then asks his son twenty questions about fate, kings, philosophers, morality, and human relations (143–53).

A brief epilogue summarizes the subject matter and tallies up the twenty- seven stories of *The Book of Syntipas the Philosopher* (154).

The Fables of Syntipas

The collection of sixty- two fables or "exemplary stories" attributed to Syntipas are descended from the Greek tradtion. They began to appear in Syriac versions in the ninth century, and also found their way into Arabic. Andreopoulos translated them from Syriac into Greek at the end of the eleventh century, possibly at the same time that he translated *The Book of Syntipas the Philosopher*. They are generally considered to be part of the Aesopic corpus, and similar fables can be found in a variety of other sources. Perry identifies fifteen fables, however, that are unique to the collection. Thus, the collection ascribed to Syntipas is a significant contribution to the study of Greek fables because it expands the Aesopic corpus.

How this collection came to be attributed to Syntipas is unknown. Perry hypothesized that the Syriac collection may have lost the page attributing the fables to Iosepos (Syriac for "Aesop"), the author to whom they are at tributed in all the Syriac manuscripts. Then, the proximity of t *The Book of Syntipas the Philosopher* to the Fables in the Syriac manuscripts may have led to the collection being attributed to Syntipas. What seems clear is that, even in Syriac versions, the story of Syntipas was being collected

together with Aesop's fables. Andreopoulos, moreover, appears to have accepted the attribution and, as mentioned above, considered Syntipas to be a "fable writer" along the lines of Aesop.

About These Texts and Translations

Our text and translation of *The Book of Syntipas the Philosopher* are based on the edition of Viktor Jernstedt and Petr Nikitin (1912). Our text and translation of the Fables are based on the edition of Ben Edwin Perry (1952), with occasional preference given to the edition of August Hausrath and Herbert Hunger (1959). We have made few changes to these texts, which are documented in the Notes to the Texts. Biblical references are to Septuagint with Apocrypha, ed. l. C. Brenton (Peabody, Mass., 1986), and **THE MAJORITY TEXT GREEK NEW TESTAMENT INTERLINEAR**, ed. A. l. Farstad and others (Nashville, 2007). The Notes to the Translations do not constitute a full commentary, but are intended to clarify details and explain unusual features of the text. The Concordance lists the Fables and their corresponding numbers in Perry's catalog.

In rendering *The Book of Syntipas the Philosopher* and Fables in English, we have attempted to preserve the sense of Andreopoulos's style and vocabulary. We have occasionally and very cautiously made use of the *Retractatio*, which Jernstedt–Nikitin print in parallel with *The Book of Syntipas the Philosopher*, to interpret Andreopoulos's meaning, recognizing that the *Retractatio* is not merely a crib to *The Book of Syntipas the Philosopher*. <>

MEDITATIONS: THE ANNOTATED EDITION by Marcus Aurelius, edited, translated and commentary by Robin Waterfield [Basic Books, 9781541673854]

This definitive annotated translation of Marcus Aurelius's **MEDITATIONS** is an insightful look into the mind of Ancient Rome's sixteenth emperor.

Marcus Aurelius Antoninus (121-180 CE) was the sixteenth emperor of Rome—and by far the most powerful man in the world. Yet he was also an intensely private person, with a rich interior life and one of the wisest minds of his generation. He collected his thoughts in notebooks, gems that have come to be called his *Meditations*. Never intended for publication, the work has proved an inexhaustible source of wisdom and one of the most important Stoic texts of all time. In often passionate language, the entries range from one-line aphorisms to essays, from profundity to bitterness.

This annotated edition offers the definitive translation of this classic and much beloved text, with copious notes from world-renowned classics expert Robin Waterfield. It illuminates one of the greatest works of popular philosophy for new readers and enriches the understanding of even the most devoted Stoic.

Review

"Robin Waterfield has given us a splendid translation of Marcus: accurate and idiomatic, it captures the personal tone of the **MEDITATIONS** wonderfully. The notes and introduction are detailed but clear, authoritative both historically and philosophically, telling modern readers what they need to know. This is the best translation of the **MEDITATIONS** available today." —**Brad Inwood**, ***William Lampson***

Professor of Philosophy and Classics, Yale University

"This is a valuable addition to our stock of modern translations of the **MEDITATIONS**. The translation is accurate but also accessible and powerful. The full and informative introduction and the notes, helpfully placed at the foot of each page, make this a book that offers much to a wide variety of readers." —**Christopher Gill**, ***emeritus professor of ancient Thought, University of Exeter, and author of Greek Thought***

"Do we need another translation of Marcus Aurelius's **MEDITATIONS**? Yes, especially when it is so thoroughly and informatively annotated as Waterfield's. The introduction alone is worth the price of admission."—**Massimo Pigliucci**, ***author of How to Be A Stoic***

"Robin Waterfield, a leading classical scholar and translator, has given us a dazzling new translation of Marcus Aurelius' *Meditations*. Readers: Do not skip the introduction. In hard-hitting and eloquent prose, Waterfield explains the personal and private meditations of an emperor who turns to Stoicism for exercises in becoming a better person and a better world leader. The tension in juggling those worlds is part of Marcus's enduring legacy. This modernized scholarly edition of the **MEDITATIONS** will quickly find its home on the modern Stoic's bookshelf as well as on the reading lists of those of us who teach ancient Stoicism. It's a most welcome addition to ancient Stoic scholarship."—**Nancy Sherman**, ***professor of philosophy, Georgetown University***

"The best of both worlds: a lively, readable, and engaging translation, supplemented by extensive notes drawn from up-to-date scholarship. This edition can be studied in a graduate seminar or presented to an interested amateur for their casual enjoyment. Waterfield's wide experience as a translator of Plato, Xenophon, and Plutarch has equipped him to tackle Marcus' idiosyncratic musings, and he has improved the text with numerous corrections. Marcus emerges from the mists of time with a clear voice and a compelling vision."—**Tad Brennan**, ***professor of philosophy and classics, Cornell University***

Excerpt:

Marcus Aurelius's **MEDITATIONS** is high on the list of the most famous and widely read works of philosophy in the world. It has often been translated into English, but the Greek in which Marcus wrote is frequently so difficult that there is always room for another version. The justification of this book, however, is not just an improved translation but an increased degree of annotation. The intention of the Introduction and the notes is that they should deepen anyone's understanding of Marcus's work while falling short of hardcore philosophical commentary. The Introduction covers general issues that illuminate the book as a whole, and I wrote notes wherever I felt that Marcus's meaning would not be immediately clear to at least some readers. So the notes serve, as it were, the short-term function of explaining passages as they are read, whereas the Introduction has a more general purpose.

Stoicism, an ancient philosophical system, has been rediscovered in recent years, and many thousands of people around the world consider themselves Stoics and try to put it into practice. My acquaintance with this Modern Stoicism is minimal, and I have deliberately kept it so because I want to try to understand Marcus on his own terms and in his own day. But Meditations is a core text for Modern Stoics, and in a sense they are exactly the kind of reader for whom the book is intended.

How **MEDITATIONS** Reached Us and Got Its Name

A number of factors indicate that the notebooks were written in the last decade of Marcus's life—above all, the epigraphs that head the second and third notebooks, and Marcus's frequent anticipation of his death. Greater precision is impossible. The scholarly consensus is that the notebooks as a whole were written between 172 and 180, when Marcus died; that Notebook i was written between 176 and 180; and that Notebooks 2 and 3 were written between 170 and 175. At any rate, when Marcus died in 180, while out on campaign in central Europe, the notebooks were there with him.

Given the personal and private nature of the work, it is a considerable mystery how and when it became accessible to others. It might well not have survived. [Ironically, the book's survival has confounded one of Marcus's recurrent expectations. At 7.2.1, for instance, he says: "Soon you'll have forgotten everything; soon everyone will have forgotten you. Fortunately, the second clause was wrong.] I think we have the complete set of these notebooks (though notebooks of other kinds have been lost: 3.14), because the last entry of the final book is such a perfect ending, set down by one who knows he is about to die. The entries were probably written on parchment or vellum and sewn together into book form. Someone close to Marcus—someone who was out on campaign with him—must have preserved the notebooks on his death, by accident or design, but we have no idea what happened to them over the following centuries. References to the book by authors over subsequent centuries are few and uncertain. It was being read and transcribed—for instance, someone added the reference to the Christians at 11.3—but we cannot track its fortunes. The first absolutely certain reference is when Arethas of Caesarea, a Christian bishop of the late ninth—early tenth century, discussed the book in a letter and mentioned that he had arranged for the transcribing of the old copy he had in his possession. This transcription seems to have given the book a new lease on life.

None of the earliest references to the book give it a proper title; after all, it was just a bundle of notebooks Marcus had written for himself, and he had no need to call it anything. Arethas called it "an ethical work written to and for himself," and To Himself is still preferred by some as a title, because that is exactly what happens: Marcus writes to and for himself. But the title Meditations has become canonized in the English-speaking world since its invention by Meric Casaubon when he published the first English translation in 1634.

The Style Of **MEDITATIONS**

Some thoughts are developed as mini-essays, but the writing is often concise, occasionally even to the point of being no more than notes and jottings, which may be ungrammatical, carelessly phrased, or compressed to the point of obscurity. Marcus knew what he meant, but it is not always easy for us to decipher his meaning. [One important consequence of the occasional difficulty in detecting Marcus's train of thought is that it is not always easy to be sure how exactly to divide the entries. If two or more consecutive entries cover much the same ground, should we really be reading them as a single entry? A few entries contain disconnected thoughts: should they perhaps be separate entries? Look at 7.51, for instance, or 9.28. The early editors who divided up the entries cannot always have been true to Marcus's intentions. For the purposes of this translation, however, I have been conservative in that I have not attempted to reorganize or renumber any of the entries, but have followed the divisions found in the standard editions of Marcus's Greek, which are essentially those of Thomas Gataker in his edition of 1652.] Some entries are no more than quotations or aphorisms that Marcus appreciated. Nevertheless,

the writing is frequently vivid. Metaphor and imagery abound: life, for instance, is variously likened to a play, a battlefield, a journey, a torrent; the rational faculty is a refuge, a citadel, a headland standing against waves, a light that illuminates what it surveys, and even a perfect sphere; praise is "the clapping of tongues" (6.16). But humor is largely lacking; life was a serious business for Marcus. The overall tone can be melancholy, on the border between profundity and sadness, and sometimes Marcus can be jaundiced and downright caustic about the world and its inhabitants, though he reaches at times for a lofty irony (e.g., 11.14) [One feature of Marcus's writing that has been lost in translation is his use of diminutives. Quite often, when he refers to his body or his soul, for instance, he employs words that mean "little body" and "little soul," as a way of disparaging them and seeing them as unimportant when viewed against a universal background. This rarely works in English.]

A certain degree of repetition and even inconsistency is inevitable in such a work, as ideas were jotted down in no particular order. It is not necessarily the kind of book that one reads from start to finish; some prefer to dip into it, and then put it down and ponder. [This has led to a certain degree of repetition in the notes I have written. A reader who chooses to start by dipping into Notebook 5, say, will have missed the earlier notes, but still needs guidance.] It raises issues that strike chords with all readers—the inevitability of death, the purpose and meaning of one's existence on earth. It communicates with considerable effectiveness what it means to try to live a life based sincerely on Stoic principles. In his postface to The Kreutzer Sonata, Tolstoy described ideals as a light at the end of a long pole carried by oneself—never reachable, but always leading one on. Marcus's Meditations shows us a man striving in just such a way.

In the text as we have it, then, there are many rapid changes of topic from one entry to another, and sometimes within single entries. There is some clustering of ideas, when Marcus was preoccupied with particular issues, but the overall impression is one of randomness. Extended development of ideas is rare, since, to repeat, Marcus was writing for himself alone and had no need to convince himself of what he already believed. But these features, puzzling as they occasionally may be to the reader, are precisely those that can reassure us that we are reading the notebooks more or less as Marcus left them. An editor would no doubt have imposed more order on it. [The attempt has been made, more than once, to reorganize the text according to topic.]

The repetitiousness of the text—the way that Marcus comes back again and again to the same core topics—is not just a result of Marcus's jotting ideas down as they occurred to him over the course of many years. It is also an essential feature of this kind of writing. Writing things down is always a good way to fix them in your mind, and that is what Marcus was doing. Writing them down again and again, a practice encouraged within Stoicism, fixes them even better.[In fact, at Discourses 2.1.32-33, Epictetus projects the practice back onto Socrates. Marcus's self-admonishment is truly Stoic because one of the most famous Stoic paradoxes was that one was either a sage, whose every action was virtuous, or as imperfect as the worst criminal. Although an aspirant to sagehood could make progress, until actually achieving enlightenment that person was not virtuous. The Roman Stoics of the imperial era were less severe on themselves than this and allowed degrees of goodness and badness in people, but they still felt, as Seneca memorably put it: "I am far from being even a tolerable human being, let alone a perfect one" (Letters 57.3). So Marcus urges himself to make progress toward sagehood, to stop being one of the phauloi, as the Stoics called them, the "base" or "iniquitous" people.] In an exercise he learned from Epictetus, Marcus frequently urges himself to have his core precepts readily available for consultation,

and to keep them pithy and memorable, so that they can strike his mind with their original force. The single-sentence entries in Meditations, such as 6.54, 7.2.9, 9.7, and 9.20, are good examples.

This is what really explains the stylistic details of Meditations: the great majority of entries, especially the brief ones, are, above all, Marcus's way of "dyeing his mind" (5.16) with the ideas and teachings that could help him be a better person and a better emperor. The entries are fragments of a kind of dialogue between teacher and pupil, where Marcus simultaneously plays both parts. For Marcus, the notebooks and their entries had a therapeutic aim: to reinforce and revive, if necessary, the moral precepts he had come to accept as true, as a way of helping him put them into practice. Each entry is, as it were, a dose of therapeutic medicine.

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Marcus was trying to encapsulate the magnificent vision of human life and its cosmic setting that Stoicism afforded and to see how it applied to his personal quest for happiness and his desire to be a good emperor. Of course, there would be setbacks, but there is no point in making things worse for yourself by worrying about things that are not within your control. You have to make the best of the lot the gods have assigned you. You must depend on yourself as much as you can and avoid treating indifferents as important or being ruled by your feelings. Your rational faculty can help you select a path through life that will lead you to happiness. Meditations shows us a man who was engaged against the odds in an ongoing quest for self-perfection, and although it was written entirely for himself, it encourages others to do the same, shows them a path, and casts a little light on the way ahead. <>

JULIAN AND CHRISTIANITY: REVISITING THE CONSTANTINIAN REVOLUTION by David Neal Greenwood [Cornell University Press, 9781501755477]

The Roman emperor Julian is a figure of ongoing interest and the subject of David Neal Greenwood's **JULIAN AND CHRISTIANITY**.

This unique examination of Julian as the last pagan emperor and anti-Christian polemicist revolves around his drive and status as a ruler. Greenwood adeptly outlines the dramatic impact of Julian's short-lived regime on the course of history, with a particular emphasis on his relationship with Christianity.

Julian has experienced a wide-ranging reception throughout history, shaped by both adulation and vitriol, along with controversies and rumors that question his sanity and passive ruling. His connections to Christianity, however, are rooted in his regime's open hostility, which Greenwood shows is outlined explicitly in Oration 7: To the Cynic Heracleios. Greenwood's close reading of *Oration 7* highlights not only Julian's extensive anti-Christian religious program and decided rejection of Christianity but also his brilliant, calculated use of that same religion. As Greenwood emphasizes in **JULIAN AND CHRISTIANITY,** these attributes were inextricably tied to Julian's relationship with Christianity—and how he appropriated certain theological elements from the religion for his own religious framework, from texts to deities.

Through his nuanced, detailed readings of Julian's writings, Greenwood brings together ancient history, Neoplatonist philosophy, and patristic theology to create an exceptional and thoughtful biography of the great Roman leader. As a result, **JULIAN AND CHRISTIANITY** is a deeply immersive look at Julian's life, one that considers his multifaceted rule and the deliberate maneuvers he made on behalf of political ascendancy.

Reviews

"Saying something new about Roman emperor Julian is a difficult thing to do. Yet, David Neal Greenwood manages to do so in a well-researched, soundly argued, and compelling book" — Elizabeth DePalma Digeser, University of California, Santa Barbara, author of *A Threat to Public Piety*

"**JULIAN AND CHRISTIANITY** offers a new and very refreshing approach to Julian as philosopher, practitioner of religion, devotee of the pagan gods, emperor, and tragic figure in the period immediately following Constantine's Christianization program." — Michael Bland Simmons, Auburn University at Montgomery, author of *Universal Salvation in Late Antiquity*

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Excerpt: Julian is a fascinating subject for historians: a man of ability and drive, who was placed in a position with the potential to affect the course of history. Unfortunately, scholarship on Julian has too often suffered from an excess of either adulation or vitriol. In addition, modern analysis of his less than two-year reign is beset by controversies that range from questions about his sanity to speculations regarding the motives for some of his admittedly more opaque actions. The present inquiry works from the assumption that Julian was both intelligent and rational, and that there was coherent method to his actions. This was tied to his intellectual relationship to the Christianity he rejected; specifically, his appropriating a Christian theological framework and employing within it numerous Christian texts to recraft pagan deities.' There are any number of facets that conceivably could be construed as related to Julian's interactions with Christianity: his revisiting of existing laws on a broad scale, the trials at the beginning of his reign of those opposed to him and responsible for past misdeeds, and so on. This work will focus on Julian's recapitulatory overwriting of Constantine, in terms of both a religious metanarrative and a religious monumental construction, allowing us to see the shape of a deliberate plan unobscured by opportunistic maneuvers or actions of debatable intent. Although the development of the argument in this book happens roughly to follow the chronology of Julian's reign, readers should note that it was clearer to organize the material thematically, and therefore the section on "materiality"

by necessity doubles back somewhat, chronologically. Julian returned to an earlier theme or tactic in his second Antiochene phase, so following a strict chronology would actually obscure Julian's actions. I hope this approach will contribute to a new perspective on Julian and offer a foundation for future close analysis of his writings in light of his response to Christianization.

Julian would proceed with his campaign in depth, producing both literary and material narratives of resurgent paganism. He made statements of purpose that indicate deliberation and forethought. He pursued his agenda aggressively, drawing on previous anti-Christian polemicists and tacking with the wind to move his agenda forward, flexibly adapting to changing circumstances. The emperor drew much more heavily from Christianity than has been appreciated, appropriating both Biblical texts and theological concepts. Any improvements in our understanding of Julian must include a review of his formative experiences, so let us begin with the central event of his childhood.

A New Perspective

Taking into account what consensus exists still allows much room to maneuver, room within which I intend to improve on the understanding of Julian's life and career. The narrative of Julian as a historical figure is a divided one, framed for modern researchers by the very different portraits drawn by Bidez and Bowersock. Bidez viewed Julian as a reluctant persecutor whose relationship with the Christian church declined in reaction to setbacks. Bowersock viewed Julian very negatively, and highlighted Julian's duplicity in his rise to power and consistent aggression toward Christianity. The focus of modern scholarship on Julian's response to the Constantinian dynasty has lessened significantly. This is not to suggest that the matter has been ignored by scholars, as future chapters include citations related to this area, but the trend has been toward other areas of Julian's thought and action. As the issue of what one might call dynastic response has not been invalidated by the efforts of scholars, this is an area of unrecognized opportunity.

The majority of modern scholars view Julian's campaign against Christianity as something proactive stemming from his philosophical and religious commitment to paganism. In my view this is an error, an easy one to commit, but one whose profound implications are corrected by a close examination of the text of Or. 7. Although the reactivity of Julian's campaign could be emphasized more, some scholars have recognized that Julian's response to Christianity was tied up with his visceral reaction to his cousin and uncle, whom he blamed for the murders of his family and the perceived woes of the empire in general.

The majority of Julianic scholars agree that the emperor was a Neoplatonic monotheist, although Polymnia Athanassiadi and Rowland Smith are notable exceptions. This is borne out by experts on Neoplatonism whose research touches on Julian, such as John Dillon and Andrew Smith.'" This incidental similarity to Christianity was exploited by Julian, who crafted several Christ parallels, which I treat in the coming chapters. Modern scholars have tended to emphasize Julian's Hellenic religion and philosophy in their assessment of his thought and action, and have viewed his dramatic reversal of imperial policy regarding religion through the lens of his new Hellenic religion and philosophy. In essence, they cast Julian as a proactive figure who proceeded from his new Hellenic commitment to engage Christianity, which he found lacking in comparison. This deemphasizes the elements in his policies reacting against Christianity Attempting to classify Julian's thought using religious and philosophical categories creates inconsistencies which prove difficult to resolve. As an example of this issue in Julianic research, Wright

assesses Julian's treatment of two Greek gods and concludes that it is no challenge to find inconsistencies in Julian's religious statements. With different scholars defending one of three categories (Neoplatonic monotheism, Mithraism, and polytheism) as holding claim to Julian's primary religious commitment, it appears both that Julian was not entirely consistent with regard to philosophical and religious categories and that those categories may not be exclusive. If the categorical thought of these scholars seems forced, perhaps it is because they are seeking consistency in the wrong place. This lack of a convincing narrative unifying the evidence suggests that there may be a gap in existing scholarship, which I believe can be filled by the story of Julian's recapitulation and revenge as the consistent and dominant motivating forces. Indeed, both threads of pagan thought found a methodological place in Julian's campaign against Christianity. The blood sacrifices associated with traditional pagan religion served to offend and undermine Christian triumphalism, while Neoplatonism assisted in the overwriting of Christian theology, as it provided a monotheistic or henotheistic framework allowing Julian to write of parallel father-son relationships like those of Helios and Heracles.

My book develops and brings together the work of previous scholars, focusing on the theme of recapitulation. Numerous scholars have noticed Julian's manipulation of the gods Heracles and Asclepius into Christ figures, although usually in brief. I expand on this and show the extent to which Julian borrowed from Christian theology for these parallels, something that has been insufficiently appreciated. Julian's efforts to restore the Jewish Temple in Jerusalem are widely understood to be a response to Constantine. This is a consensus I attempt to build on and expand to Julian's wider building program. In a related matter, modern scholars concur as to Julian's efforts to co-opt the church by patterning his reinvigorated paganism after it. In short, I argue that the theme tying together these topics is that of recapitulation: Julian's desire to undo Constantine's Christianization using the Christian rhetoric of a divinely chosen representative who would revisit and overwrite the wrongs of the past, restoring the divine intentions for the Roman Empire.

Epilogue and Analysis

Julian's anticipated restoration never came to fruition, ending instead with his death in Persia. While Constantine has clearly influenced our world and institutions through his actions, Julian left no such tangible legacy, but his hold on the collective imagination of the West has proven tenacious. At Julian's death, both pagans and Christians immediately attempted to explain or make use of his reign, policies, and death for their own narratives, and their arguments have obscured his intentions and actions ever since. Christian writers found that the nature of his sudden death in Persia allowed the claim that God had spoken, settling matters without having to address Julian's specific arguments against Christianity. Some of his unique policies and influences were therefore never addressed, and it was not until many decades later that his Against the Galilaeans was responded to, and even then arguably with the intent of establishing the credentials of the responder. Julian's attempt to turn back the dock for the empire in both a structural and a religious sense seems to have had wider support than is sometimes asserted by modern scholars, as displayed by inscriptions in various locations and from various groups." Had he survived to continue his efforts, or at least died gloriously in victory in Persia, it is possible that his pagan recapitulation of the Constantinian revolution might have had a profound impact on Western history.

What light has this investigation shed upon Julian's pagan restoration? Julian's restoration campaign was comprehensive, with several facets operating simultaneously as he crafted a religious narrative and incorporated that in a material narrative of monumental and religious construction. There was also a

conscious plan to his restoration, as suggested by both statements of purpose and the way that, under stress from difficult circumstances in Antioch, Julian returned to the exact pattern that had worked previously. It was aggressive in its intent, as shown both by the use of Porphyry as a source, suggesting not philosophical versatility but the furtherance of Porphyry's aggressive anti-Christian agenda and by his later persecution in Edessa and Bostra. There are a number of indications that Julian moved quickly against Christianity, an assessment that is enhanced if it is correct to date the Symposium to December 361, but still not refuted if that work originated in late 362. This is also demonstrated by the summoning of Artemius to Antioch where he was executed, prior to the outbreak of conflict between Julian and Antiochene Christians. Most significantly, Julian's restoration was more heavily Christianized than has been appreciated. The significant appropriation of Christian source material demonstrates premeditation and refutes the possibility of coincidence in the emperor's choice of language. His framework also matches that of the Christian theology of recapitulation, which was not coincidental over-writing, shown by Julian's portrayal of himself as a Christ figure even as he assimilated himself to Heracles and Asclepius, whom he had recrafted into Christ figures. Just as Christ the new Adam overwrote the actions of the old failed Adam, Julian the faithful pagan attempted to overwrite the failures of the apostate Constantine. These claims will no doubt prompt discussion of the prevalence of syncretism in this period and the possibility of accidental cross-pollination. If the appropriation of theological characteristics were going the other direction—if, say, Athanasius had claimed that in Christ's descent to Hell he borrowed and returned Cerberus—would one require statements of intent and verbal parallels before recognizing a conscious appropriation of classical literary material? The likelihood that Julian, intelligent and trained both classically and in Christian theology, would make such statements by accident must be considered as remote indeed. <>

History in Games: Contingencies of an Authentic Past edited by Martin Lorber, Felix Zimmermann [transcript Verlag, 9783837654202]

Where do we end up when we enter the time machine that is the digital game? One axiomatic truth of historical research is that the past is the time-space that eludes human intervention. Every account made of the past is therefore only an approximation. But how is it that strolling through ancient Alexandria can feel so real in the virtual world? Claims of authenticity are prominent in discussions surrounding the digital games of our time. What is historical authenticity and does it even matter? When does authenticity or the lack thereof become political? By answering these questions, the book illuminates the ubiquitous category of authenticity from the perspective of historical game studies.

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Approaching the Authenticities of Late Modernity by Felix Zimmermann

Where do we end up when we enter the time machine that is the digital game? In this introduction, I want to explain how to arrive at such a question and give some preliminary answers. I will first offer a short and cursory history of authenticity which leads to our present age, the world of late modernity. I will elaborate that authenticity has reached its status as an almost ubiquitous term because it signifies a condition of the individual of late modernity who appears to be in constant search for the authentic to satisfy a seemingly insatiable desire. In will continue in concluding that it is the digital game in particular that offers an authentic experienceespecially when it appears to paradoxically give unmediated access to the past. We will have to (re)consider the relationship of the digital game to history, the past and consequently the kinds of authenticity we are dealing with. The papers in this book aim to do just that, as I will show at the end of this chapter.

A Short History of Authenticity

As a term of the historical sciences, `authentic' can be traced back to the *interpretatio authentica* of juridical and religious texts in the 16th century. This approved interpretation of a given document was delivered by persons of authority.

`Authentic' was therefore used to identify an object as `approved' or `legitimate'.1 Two still potent semantic contents of `authentic' originate from this earliest use of the term: Firstly, regarding something that can be called `object authenticity', `authentic' can still refer to an object which has been approved as correct or valid by a person of authority. Secondly and building on this, `authentic' is still to this day linked to questions of authority and power and therefore raises the question of who is in a position to declare something as authentic.

In the 18th century, the noun `authenticity' came into popular use. The historical sciences began to use the term to describe historical sources of verified origin.

Simultaneously, the term was infused with another semantic level, one of an aesthetic kind. Consequently, the complexity of the term increased significantly in the 18th and 19th century. Thinkers of the Enlightenment and early Romanticism began to use `authenticity' to describe untouched nature and the genuine, unaltered mannerisms of every human being. Susanne Knaller describes this as a merging of terms from philosophical and aesthetical theories of the 18th and 19th century, "sincerite, naivite, vrai etc." with the terms `authentic' and `authenticity'. From this point onward, authenticity no longer solely refers to the authenticity of an object but also of a person, a subject, hence the dichotomy of object and subject authenticity was established.

However, authenticity only turned into a "catchword" in the second half of the 20th century, still carrying this semantic burden, making it impossible to define authenticity without acknowledging that at least two and not always compatible levels of meaning are embedded in the term. To add another layer of complexity, the term is also cited by different actors with different intentions at different times. By now, `authenticity' is ever-present and has therefore been called a "key term of modernity" or a "myth of modernity." I, however, prefer a different denomination.

Authenticity as Ailment and Cure

Authenticity is a "term of crisis". In this, it is as much indicative of a contemporary longing for the real and unmediated as it points towards practices which aim to satisfy this longing. In his theory on "aesthetic capitalism", Gernot Bohme differentiates between "Bediirfnis" and "Begehrnis" which may be translated into "need" and "desire". While the former-elemental needs like food or water-can indeed be satisfied, the latter is perpetually intensified in the attempt to satisfy it. In these terms, authenticity can be understood as a desire, pointing to the next, even more authentic experience, to the ever more real, i.e. the seemingly unfiltered contact with the world. It is an ailment turned cure turned ailment, always promising to be an endpoint of the search for the individual of late modernity which so eagerly wants to repress "feelings of lack"-but is only able to do so for a short moment. Jean Baudrillard's emphatic pessimism outlines what is meant when I relate authenticity to these "feelings of lack". Baudrillard claims that we have entered a "hyperreal nebula" which is characterized by an „implosion of the medium and of the real." Following this train of thought I want to assume that the individual of late modernity is surrounded by medial representations of unclear origin and truth value. In this, these representations are hyperreal, meaning „a real without origin or reality."

I am by no means claiming here that there is no such thing as truth anymore or that everyday life has left the realms of reality. This chapter is not aimed at engaging with the philosophical discourse that such a claim would demand. Rather, I am claiming that our day and age is a time of an acutely felt uncertainty. It is my opinion that this uncertainty can be in part traced back to the role of medial representations as being one of the most important ways for the individual to connect to the world. This `window to the world' is today tainted by fake news and social bots, to just name two of the most prominent examples. What we see, what we hear and even who we talk to often needs to be taken with a grain of salt. As Ian Bogost astutely notes:

> "The crowd isn't made up of people anymore, but of pictures that might be people, of corporate brands impersonating them, of young people dancing politically in TikToks, of tweets about youths in TikToks, of disputes absent referents, of bots shouting into the void."

I would argue, then, that it is one of the most natural courses of action to dream of a time of certainty, a time of the real and unmediated and therefore, finally, the authentic.

This time might be gone, but it might not be lost. As Zygmunt Bauman has argued, "Retrotopia" appears to be in reach. And in her famous discussion of nostalgia, Svetlana Boym unearths a notion of the past as being a "perfect snapshot", just waiting to be reconstructed. Thinking of the past as an idealized space-time and some trying to bring back what has never even existed entails a plethora of messy implications which I will not discuss here in detail. Following Eva Illouz, I want to employ a "post-normative critique"18 as I see this turning to the past in search of the authentic as a practice which warrants research and cannot be dismissed as being a delusion of people idealizing the past. This leads me to the conclusion that authenticity is indicative for a crisis of certainty and that the search for authenticity can consequently be seen as a search for a cure-the real, the unmediated-for a contemporary ailment-the hyperreal, the mediated, in short: the unauthentic. As a practice, authenticity is linked to the time-space in which the authentic is hoped to be found: The Past-with a capital P as suggested by Sharon Macdonald to signify the transformation of "something that is simply there, or has merely happened, into an arena from which selections can be made and values derived".

I am intentionally not talking about history but about the Past. I want to stress that history, as a scientific but also pop-cultural or societal narration about past time-spaces, has a complicated relationship to authenticity. People turn to the Past to find what they think they are lacking in their everyday lives. But does that mean they also turn to history? Or are they creating their own histories in their search for authenticity? Of what kind are these histories?

Historical Game Studies and Authenticity

It is the aim of this collection of essays to untangle this complicated relationship between history and authenticity. The object of study for all the chapters in this collection is the digital game, an object which I would claim is a product of a "global authenticity industry" which aims to deliver authentic experiences to their consumers. In this, digital games are also part of "the emerging experience economy" identified by Joseph Pine and James Gilmore as early as 1998.

There are numerous ways to offer authentic experiences but referring to the Past appears to be one of the most successful if the rise of heritage experiences like living history museums, heritage tourism or historical reenactment is any indication. As Adam Chapman has argued, digital games can also be understood as affording heritage experiences. What all of these practices offer or claim to be offering are authentic experiences of the Past. Again, the question remains: As the Past is the time-space forever lost to human intervention, what are people really interacting with when they make use of the offers of the authenticity industry? If it is history, is this history revealed as being history-a mere approximation of what is past-or is the illusion of a direct access to the Past maintained?

Especially digital games appear to allow for unhindered travel into this enchanted time-space where authenticity should be waiting-they feel like time-travel machines. It does not come as a surprise, then, that authenticity is a term so common in popular as well as scientific discussions surrounding historical digital games. It is a marketing buzzword deployed by developers and publishers who try to position

their games as being close to the reality of the Past. It is demanded by consumers who expect the historical games they play to be authentic and by this mI would argue-to offer authentic experiences. And, finally, it is a controversial subject for scholars who are tasked with untangling the semantic contents of the term. Interestingly enough, researcher in the field of "historical game studies"

only recently started to consider `authenticity' in its full breadth as a term with at least two, possibly conflicting semantic levels (object and subject authenticity)-granted, historical game studies is still an emerging field in and of itself. As James Sweeting puts it: "[T]he videogames medium increasingly considers authenticity and accuracy to be separate designations rather than two sides of the same coin", although the generalization of video games as a whole should be regarded carefully. Misconceptions about accuracy and authenticity are still seen far and wide in the industry and in discussions by players. This is only changing selectively and primarily in academic contexts. A clear distinction between authenticity and accuracy has only been formulated in recent years and what this means for how we, as researchers, should assess historical digital games and what they offer to players is still not clear. For me, it becomes more and more evident that we are dealing with a clash of object and subject authenticity here. Heavily discussed concepts like realism, historicity and accuracy lie more on the side of object authenticity. They point towards verification-of dates, of historical agents, of semi-automatic rifles-but also make abundantly clear that the digital game and its virtual worlds cannot be verified in the same way a historical source could be. Digital game worlds are not real, and they never will be, but that does not mean that they cannot be authentic, or rather afford authentic experiences. This is the paradoxical quality of authenticity in media settings, signifying immediacy and a direct contact-for example to the Past-while being evidently mediated. The emphasis on accuracy by developers, publishers as well as players (and sometimes scholars) can be seen as an overcompensation for what the medium lacks in terms of its reality status. But rather than following these parties down the rabbit hole of accurate depiction and engaging in the ensuing, endless discussion about the `realness' of a weapon's sound or of a knight's helmet, I see the future of authenticity research in historical game studies in the realm of subject or rather subjective authenticity.

Recent publications point in this direction. To my knowledge, the first full-blown authenticity theory on digital games has been brought forth by Andrew J. Salvati and Jonathan M. Bullinger with their idea of "selective authenticity" and a "BrandWW2". However, as Michal Mochoki has recently pointed out, with their identified elements "technology fetishism, cinematic conventions, and documentary authority" they still remain somewhat grounded in the realm of object authenticity and its kindred concepts, namely accuracy and realism. Groundbreaking but only barely adopted by researchers is Tobias Winnerling's work on "affective historicity" which he defines "as the attempt to create representations that convey the feeling of (representations of) the past." He was the first to point towards authenticity as a feeling in the context of digital games and urges us to think about the processes that allow for these feelings to arise. Also, he makes the important distinction between history and affective historicity by claiming that "[h]istory works towards the rational, utilizing reasons, while affective historicity tends towards the emotional, utilizing feelings." As I said, the relationship between authenticity and history is complicated. I would argue that future research can heavily benefit from rethinking what it is that these historical digital games offer and if and to what degree they are even historical. Authenticity and especially authentic experiences might be a different beast, more prone to the Past rather than history-as for example Andrew Elliott and Matthew Wilhelm Kapell have implied in their pioneering collection "Playing with the

Past." I for one see great value in turning to fields like tourism studies that have developed highly productive theories on authenticity in terms of a subjective, felt authenticity and to phenomenology which allows for an understanding of authenticity as the result of convincing atmospheres-not of history but of the Past.38 In this, we might even be dealing with three semantic levels of the term authenticity: authenticity of verification (object authenticity), authenticity of the self (subject authenticity) and felt authenticity (subjective authenticity).

About This Book

As I have presented, authenticity is a highly complex term, the potential of which we are merely beginning to grasp in historical game studies. Understanding it as a process, as an endless struggle between object authenticity, subject authenticity and even subjective authenticity, as an arena in which questions of power, staging, relationality and processuality are being debated, in which arguments and intentions of different social groups need to be considered, makes it a valuable ally when trying to find out what makes historical digital games so successful and fascinating for so many players. It would be wise to look at how other fields are dealing with this volatile composition and to thereby realize that authenticity is a phenomenon much broader than what is often called a historical authenticity. Consequently, the authors in this collection approach authenticity from numerous different angles and thereby contribute to the vibrant field sketched above.

The first section of this volume, "History as told by the Game" is concerned with how history and the past are appropriated in and through digital games. The essays grouped in this section make far-reaching arguments about the relationship between games and history/the past. Angela Schwarz offers a broad system to categorize historical digital games in terms of their integration of gameplay and historical information. The spectrum ranges from "Quarry" to "Brand" with the "Playground" in between. Additionally, she proposes 12 categories in which historical digital games might be sorted, ranging from "the first games with historical settings" to "the renaissance of well-known game brands with historical setting" and thereby contributes a short chronology of historical digital games to this volume. Eugen Pfister questions the ongoing demand for historical content. He argues that history in digital games is a place where identities are reaffirmed, ideologies discussed, and myths are naturalized. He aims to make these processes visible and therefore subject them to critical scrutiny. Nico Nolden argues for an understanding of games in terms of historical possibility spaces, especially when considering multiplayer online role-playing games. Possibility spaces like THE SECRET WORLD (2012) are presented as a technical form of collective historical memory which is performatively created in activities inside the game and surrounding the game. These activities are connected to notions of history with what Nolden calls authenticity anchors. Rüdiger Brandis deploys the concept of "procedural rhetoric" introduced by Ian Bogost and thereby identifies historism as the driving force behind many historical digital games. Consequently, he argues to assess digital games less in terms of the authenticity of their depictions but of the authenticity of the procedures they deploy and invite players to engage with.

The second section of this volume, "Authenticity in and of History", engages with the numerous manifestations of authenticity in the context of (not only) historical games. It presents theoretical concepts and category systems as well as engaging case studies in an attempt to trace the Janus-faced term. Angela Schwarz proposes a systematic approach to techniques of authentication deployed in historical digital games. These techniques comprise "authentication through images and/or sounds", "through facts and data", "through players' contemporaries" and "through fictitious characters." Andrew

B. R. Elliot and Mike Horswell deal with the depiction of the crusades in digital games based on the notion that understanding authenticity in this context means building on memory studies and its methods. They identify "crusading icons" which can be traced through different popular formats and frequently re-appear in digital games. Andra Ivanescu turns to METAL GEAR SOLID V: THE PHANTOM PAIN (2015) to offer a ludomusicologist take on authenticity in digital games. She connects auteur and nostalgia theory to authenticity and explains how the game and its creator Hideo Kojima create different kinds of authenticity, for example an authentic feeling of the 1980s created by means of audio mixtapes. Finally, Lara Keilbart contributes to a history of queer representation by presenting examples of queerness in games from the 1980s till today. She aims to define queer authenticity and thus to encourage new perspectives on existing game material.

The third section of this volume, "The Politics of Authenticity", illustrates the oftentimes heated discussion surrounding the concept, and its implications for broader societal processes and debates. Aurelia Brandenburg engages with the highly successful THE WITCHER 3: WILD HUNT (2015) and thereby enters the realm of medievalism and neomedievalism where history and fantasy collide. She identifies overlapping arguments in debates of advocates and adversaries of historical authenticity surrounding this game and concludes that both parties adhere to a distinct notion of the Middle Ages as being the `dark ages'. Tobias Winnerling analyses debates surrounding one of the most prominent strategy games from Austria and Germany: the ANNO series (since 1998). He focuses on how colonialism has been depicted in the series and identifies a systematic blanking of the colonialist implications of the games' settings and mechanics. Angus Mol outlines processes of playful interaction with authenticity. He demonstrates that the young participants of the `RoMeincraft' project counterplayed the past and thereby interacted with expert authorities organizing and supervising the project. By doing this, Mol unearths the oftentimes implicit relationship of authenticity with questions of power and authority. Jörg Friedrich gives insight in the development of the critically acclaimed THROUGH THE DARKEST OF TIMES (2020), which thematizes the resistance in Germany under Nazi rule. He claims that to authentically and responsibly engage with problematic pasts, developers have to rethink what is deemed authentic and find their own access to the respective Past by not reproducing the aesthetic of the perpetrators but of those who stood against them. <>

Games and Rules: Game Mechanics for the "Magic Circle" edited by Beat Suter, Mela Kocher, René Bauer [Media Studies, Transcript-Verlag 9783837643046]

Why do we play games and why do we play them on computers? The contributors of *Games and Rules* take a closer look at the core of each game and the motivational system that is the game mechanics. Games are control circuits that organize the game world with their (joint) players and establish motivations in a dedicated space, a "Magic Circle," whereas game mechanics are constructs of rules designed for interactions that provide gameplay. Those rules form the base for all the excitement and frustration we experience in games. This anthology contains individual essays by authors with backgrounds in game design and game studies, who lead the discourse to get to the bottom of game mechanics in video games and the real world.

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What would the world be without rules? Would it be totally chaotic and anarchic or simply free and unbound or even boring and uninteresting? The question is rather pointless, because there is no world without rules. For the purpose of play, there are worlds that have rules and create their own rules. Subjects who enter these worlds are immediately confronted with these rules or laws (of physics). It starts with gravitation and motion – the gravitational force on the moon, for example, differs from that on earth and therefore offers different types of motion. In a fictitious world the designer defines these (basic) forces according to the needs of the world that is being developed. It continues with the topography of the landscape, its obstacles, its textures and objects, the different possibilities of movement and transportation, nutrition, shelter and so on – the rules of nature. And then, within a set of laws of physics, there are worlds whose complex rules have been created and recorded by many generations of living beings, and all who live in the catchment area of these rules (e.g. a country) sign a social contract (Rousseau 1762) and must abide by its rules – the artificial rules (of law). Of course, small parts of these rules can be changed again, but only through institutionalized processes that usually take some time. Life according to these rules seems like a playful simulation. The frame is fixed. The course of life is foreseen. However, the world of rules can always be interpreted – to a certain degree. As an (inter-) active agent in this system we can explore how far we will go to gain benefits, or we can

use the rules to cooperate better with others or support them in their goals. It may also happen that we become exasperated with the rules and their strict interpretation and struggle to maintain our life simulation. Or perhaps we do not like the rules and fight them in all possible (and impossible) ways.

Once we have sounded out how to gain advantages, we can easily bend the rules. We may use the loopholes in the control system and dismiss difficult employees, or even add an additional system such as bribery and favoritism, in order to gain greater economic success and more power. The mechanics of the control system include numerous small gears, and usually work excellently for those who control the machinery. As long as we stay within the parameters of the system and use its weaknesses and, to use the above example, dismiss employees (in accordance with existing labor laws), nothing can happen to us. But as soon as we introduce an additional system such as bribery, it becomes a little trickier. This may necessitate further game mechanics: namely that of hiding and (not) being discovered. And when we are discovered, there may be the need for yet another game mechanism: that of denial and distraction. From here on, that is where things starts getting interesting for any fictitious or not so fictitious world, as we are confronted with the decisive question: who is really in control of the control system?

Games are such control systems, developed by game designers by means of motivation design. They come with virtual physical rules and artificial laws and (in-game) rules – a framework for play. The system itself is especially motivating for the player. The players may even "sign" a social contract when they commit to playing the game and to its quests. As a simple control system it represents a challenge that offers opportunities for action and events, and it also evaluates them. Assessing and evaluating means matching the rules and allocating rewards or punishment. Punishment may be harsh and could mean death of the avatar. Reward may be small and encourage more action. Each game is a unique construction that is integrated into its own structure by execution, acceptance of the rules and (if digital) processing on a computer. It becomes the actual game by enclosing the player in its "Magic Circle", a symbolic space of play (Huizinga 1938). This space of play is a world of its own, in which different rules apply to those in the real world. And this new "fictitious" world uses different motivational structures that are genre- and addressee-dependent.

Why Do We Play Games?

Why do we play games and why do we play them with computers? This book takes a closer look at the core of each game, the motivational system that is the game mechanics. Generally, games are control circuits that organize the game world (according to a special social contract) with their (joint) players and establish motivations in an own space, a "Magic Circle" or a (new) game world. In this self-sufficient circle, arena or playground, players interact with each other, with NPCs and with (rigid and dynamic) objects according to the action, outcome and consequence principle. And "Game Mechanics" are constructs of sets of rules designed for these interactions of players, NPCs and different mobile and immobile objects that provide gameplay. Those rules are the basis for all the excitement and frustration we experience in games.

Game Mechanics

In a videogame, game mechanics mean: jump, climb, dodge, reach, collect, fly or shoot. This is what you do as a player or let your avatar do. These "actions of play" are the core of any game: analog game, augmented game or video game. As a player you have a set of actions – special rules with conditions depending on the player – available at any time to progress through the game space. This might be a

limited field like the pitch of a ball game, a linear A to B level of a platformer or an extended fictitious world like a GTA map. Your activities are crucial; they let you discover this new space, its possibilities and restrictions. You hit the ball and see where it goes; you jump and land, fall down somewhere and find out how far your jump can get you. You drive like a berserker and find out that this has consequences. You make use of the actions that you have available and get to know the rules and mechanics of the game, the laws of physics (of this particular game), the restraints and the dominant social behavior. And this gives you a better feeling for your gameplay.

This is the player's perspective. For the player, the basic gameplay defines the game. (The player's activities are central to the game.) The developer knows that a structured gameplay is necessary for the player. Thus, when the developer chooses and implements the mechanics in terms of actions like jump, shoot a ball or drive, they become structured with parameters and with rule sets. A whole system is developed in this way: the ball is not allowed to get out of bounds. The player avatar can only reach the other side of the gap with a supporting object like a spring. And the driver is not allowed to injure pedestrians or run several red lights; should that happen, police cars will start a chase. In the fictitious game world, you can easily try this out. There are also always limits to the game space you can explore at any one time. The playing field has lines, the platform works from A to B, and even the open world environment has clear boundaries, temporary and permanent ones like road blocks on bridges, an ocean or a range of mountains that cannot be surmounted.

Franz Kafka was already aware that he needed to introduce precise rules and parameters in order for his stories to function like a game. He cleverly put the reader into the story, assigned them an avatar role, played with their expectations and took more and more freedom away from them. In the tale “The Metamorphosis” Kafka creates a recognizable but not quite real world that is detailed and yet dreamlike. The avatar, formerly a human being, wakes up, discovers that he has six legs and struggles to crawl out of bed. In this new setting the rules are clearly set. The avatar is confined to his room (narrow boundary). His body morphs into a bug, his physical movements become increasingly difficult, he has to hide from his family, but he has to communicate and eat, if he wants to survive and sit out the horrific, unexplainable difficulty he is in. As the morphing progresses his troubles and the horror increase. Kafka designed the mechanics of his tale so thoroughly that they have to be “played” by his readers.

It appears that what is good for literature is good for many other areas too. In politics, game mechanics are implemented to advocate decisions and choices, elect people and express rights and wrongs. This can be illustrated by the phenomenon of fake news in politics. It does not matter whose fake news we are talking about because they are all developed with a deliberate strategy to conduct a successful game or, we might say, “to game the system”. The tactics of play as rhetoric of power (cf. Sutton-Smith 1997) may be deviation, stealth approach, ploy, bluff, disguise, charade, destroying someone’s reputation, eroding ethical concepts, avoiding inconvenient truths, hushing up research results or policies and so on. Game mechanics run and occupy the world in almost all imaginable areas. And “playing games” may have negative connotations in many ways.

The Core of a Game

The subject of this book is the game mechanics of games, a somewhat neglected, but constitutive element of game design in the field of game studies. We are convinced that the heart of a game is not artistic expression, aesthetics and beautiful assets or clever programming, but mechanics as the basic

mechanical system of a game that creates the possibility of a (good and challenging) gameplay for the player and provides motivation. To discuss this assumption we organized a series of conferences on game mechanics and invited international guests who had been dealing with game mechanics in theory and practice for some time. The name of the conference "GameZ & RuleZ" was deliberately programmatic. The "Z" stands for the culture of games and game designers and suggests other ways of analyzing games and rules or cracking their codes (of perception). The first part of our conference series focused on game mechanics and rules, the second part was dedicated to game mechanics and motivational design, and the third and final conference put the spotlight on motivational design for non-human play.

The outcome was a good understanding of different perspectives and methods and a continued discussion that will be fueled by further events in the future. To make the results available to the public, the participants presented their thoughts in individual essays and tried to get to the bottom of game mechanics in video games and their integration into the real world. They offered different perspectives on the topic: as player, game designer or researcher. It was essential for the conference to bring game developers and game studies scholars together in order to illuminate the core subject of game mechanics from all possible sides.

In other words, we do not only ask why we play games, we also raise the question of why we make games. In the light of the recent popularity of games, we need to ask: Why do we integrate and intertwine our games more and more with our world? And what are the consequences of gamifying our world? Is it not enough to interact playfully? Do we really need more badges, leaderboards, virtual currencies and awards for all sorts of activities? There are so many awards that each of us receives one, and so many badges that we do not notice anymore how little sense it makes to distribute badges, for example in job recruitment when badges are given to all applicants – even those who do not get the job!

"GameZ and RuleZ"

It all started with a Game Mechanics Manifesto (2013) for the first "GameZ & RuleZ" conference at the "GameZfestival" in Zurich, Switzerland. The manifesto was a short pamphlet on how game mechanics function as the core of any game. It was short yet provocative, and served its purpose by starting the discourse on game mechanics from the perspective of game designers. The participants of the conference were intrigued and brought their own views and angles to the table, illuminating important aspects of the puzzle of game mechanics. However, not all of the participants were able to contribute to this volume; they include the scholars Jesper Juul, Staffan Björk, Margarete Jahrmann, Annika Waern, Floyd Müller, Michael Cook, and other invited game designers from different studios.

The manifesto itself had to be revised thoroughly and expanded into an essay for this book, and it now provides an insight into motivational systems and the development of core elements for games. In our book's first section on "Play Motivation", René Bauer identifies the "Magic Circle" as the "Special Zone of Play" that makes different rules and laws culturally possible. From challenge to reward and punishment, motivation design is able to use all the rules in a game system to keep players busy. Bauer states that a game system consists of different game mechanics as elements of motivation and he takes us on a tour from analog games with humans assuming the role of processing units to electronic games as highly integrated control systems, and finally into rule-based reality that works with similar motivational concepts. In "Rules of Play as a Framework for the 'Magic Circle'" Beat Suter outlines a

framework for playing games in which he sees play as communication between player and game. Playful action in a game world must be similarly meaningful for the subject as actions and events are in real life. The game and its rules build a dynamic system that creates not only sense, but also commitment. Furthermore he divides game mechanics into the heuristic motivation sets of macro and micro mechanics where macro mechanics establish the framework for decisions and interactions in a game and micro mechanics network with each other to establish playful experiences for the player.

Also part of the first section is Miguel Sicart's "Playing Computers". The essay steps back from the mechanics discourse and gains a better view of play culture. In letters to the reader, Sicart starts an inquiry into similarities of computation and play. Using a post-phenomenological approach he delineates their shared capacity to create worlds. This process of world-creation may be seen as re-ontologizing worlds and thus shaping human experience. For Sicart, play is a way of interfacing; it "allows us to understand how to live, and how to experience the computational world" (Sicart, in this volume).

In the second section, on "Game Mechanics", we address established theories of game mechanics. Imre Hofmann gets to the bottom of three main theories taking a philosophical perspective with a meta-theoretical approach. He evaluates the state of the art of the theories and defines the attributes of a general game mechanics theory. Furthermore, he makes the case for a clearer distinction of the following three crucial terms: game experience, gameplay and game mechanics.

Carlo Fabricatore on the other hand goes "Underneath and Beyond Mechanics" and offers a new view on meaning-making in gameplay. He focuses on an activity-theoretical perspective and points out that meaning-making is a key driver for the player experience. It is crucial for the player's comprehension and decision-making – his agency – and a primary source for motivation. Fabricatore therefore suggests exploring games as systems of meaning-making. This involves analyzing which meanings are relevant for a definition of gameplay entities, causal relationships and significance, and how exactly they are conveyed to the player.

The third section, on "Guidance Systems", offers different insights and studies on the topic of player guidance: How exactly are games built to lead, and mislead, the players on their adventures inside the "Magic Circle"? In "Design and Reception of Orientation Cues in Game Space", Hiloko Kato and René Bauer take a closer look at orientation cues in games from both the perspective of reception and game design. By analyzing player behavior and communication in Let's Plays on YouTube, Kato and Bauer focus on the central player question: "What are we actually supposed to do here?" They describe how games, by means of guiding principles, achieve the satisfactory balance between the challenge and the player's reward.

To take their interdisciplinary and Let's Play-oriented study of guiding principles a step further, Bauer and Kato also define the "The Spectacular Space" in computer games as hyperreal. By examining some early games and introducing different approaches (comparisons between the analog world and the digital game world, trial-and-error method, space appropriation model), this essay helps to understand how players learn to inhabit the hyperreal, impossible, irrational spaces in video games.

Open-world games seem to offer players complete freedom in terms of their actions and decisions. By presenting six different "Nonverbal Guidance Systems", Francine Rotzetter shows that, in contrast to that assumption, the open-world player constantly faces complex sets of signs and cues, among them

some more intuitive and obtrusive ones. By analyzing different games with her "100-steps method", Rotzetter suggests combinations of guidance systems for the designer to create a more balanced game experience, thus offering an academically based, but at the same time development-oriented approach to guidance systems.

The fourth section of this book concerns itself with "Ethics". How can game designers use ethics as a means of game motivation? This is the leading question that Wolfgang Walk tries to answer in his essay on the subject of "Ethics as a Game Mechanism". He has been studying the topic over the course of several years from the perspective of a game designer and producer. After making a clear distinction between ethics and morals, and defining what an ethical game is (and isn't), Walk reveals how ethical dilemmas and the complexity of ethical decision-making can create outstanding, lasting game experiences, in order to enable other game designers to implement ethical game mechanics in a skillful way.

The following essay by Hiloko Kato and René Bauer likewise deals with meaningful decision-making and proposes the notion of "The Player as Puppet". In comparison to the reception of literary texts, the role of the player of a game surely exceeds the position of the powerless spectator – or does it? How influential and consequential are, in fact, the decisions of the player of a computer game? After addressing the notion of games as decision machines and providing examples of visualized decisions, the essay analyzes the challenge of implementing moral decisions as a significant game mechanic.

In the following collaborative essay, Wolfgang Walk and Mark L. Barrett propose a set of game design tools which they call "The Ethical Avatar". They consider the deep impact that ethical decisions can have on gameplay, but for their research, they chose a practical, applied point of view. The authors argue that their Ethical Avatar enhances the player's participation in the game world, revolutionizes storytelling for video games with better feedback loops and, in fact, impacts the game production workflow as a whole.

The fifth section "Game Spaces" deals with the interdependence of space, rules and game mechanics. In his essay on how "Rules Shape Spaces" and how "Spaces Shape Rules", Ulrich Götz draws analogies from the real world for digital game design. He describes how rules form the typologies of spaces and points out that it is essential to create controllable situations in game worlds in order to observe consequences and gradually enhance spaces, connections and motions within these spaces. Götz further explains how the extended possibility space of environmental design in games has not reached its full potential yet, but still leaves plenty of room for more innovative visual and functional designs.

Sharing post-mortem insights from intercultural games for the "ludic city" (Zurich/Hong Kong), Mela Kocher analyzes the development conditions for "Game Mechanics of Serious Urban Games". Comparing the design process of video games (mainly for entertainment purposes) with that of urban games (mainly for "serious" purposes), and drawing insights from the MDA model, Kocher defines a set of design rules and constraints that the designers (and, in fact, also the players) are faced with when they create for, or play games in, the ludic space.

The sixth and last section of this book, "NPC and Non-human Game Design", looks into recent game design trends and asks the following questions: How do design and research conditions change when the players are not human, and what effect does this trend have in general on the shaping of a game culture, which has traditionally been geared towards the human actor? Furthermore, how does the motivation

design have to be re-designed in order to meet the changing demands of the new users? And last but not least: What happens if we apply game rules to society and start rediscovering ourselves as elements of a game?

In "NPC and me", Günter Hack provocatively discusses "How to become a Non-Player Character" in times when "everyday life and game mechanics converge in ever new digital media remixes" (Hack, in this volume). Drawing from the mechanics of early NPCs and their relationship to the fiction world i.e. the system, Hack ponders on the quantification and gamification of everyday life (with examples such as the Chinese "social credit system"). He debates the resulting status of people with concepts derived from cybernetics and political science: "In this all-encompassing totalitarian context, everybody has become a Pac-Man ghost or a Tamagotchi, even the President of the United States!" (Hack, in this volume).

Though the notion of non-human game elements such as NPCs is employed rather metaphorically in the preceding contribution, it surely is meant very literally in Michelle Westerlaken's article on what happens "When Game Mechanics Come Crawling out of Ant Colonies". Taking Miguel Sicart's approach to game mechanics (Sicart 2008) a step further and understanding "agents" not only as humans or artificial intelligences, but also as animals, Westerlaken investigates the design of playful artifacts and games that involve animals (specifically ants), both as players and as co-designers, thus sharing her insights from her experiments in non-speciesist game studies.

To Be in The Game or (Not) To Be

Game designers open worlds in the design process by enriching, varying and experimenting with avatars, figures, objects, motions, actions, events, mechanics, feedbacks, sounds, visuals and environments. And then they close them by reducing, optimizing and adapting elements so that the game becomes more coherent. It is an iterative optimization process that we are increasingly losing sight of. Today's games manage to cover up as perfectly as they perform. They manage to hide their complexity behind playful surfaces and, at the same time, offer a wide variety of motivational designs. Games no longer have a direct influence but rule over the abundance of decision-making possibilities and their consequences. They have become so successful in society that their power mechanisms are no longer just used in games. In fact, they are applied as much in the real world.

In an increasingly self-designed world, game mechanics have become a kind of operating system for society, its design process and ubiquitous designs. Since 2010 more than 50% of the human population live in self-designed cities. Concepts such as gamification, serious game and games for change are widespread today, and continuously implemented in society. This clearly illustrates that game mechanics have become a kind of operating system for society – if they have not always been one. We live in a time in which we have to look ever so closely at when and where game mechanics emerge or are strategically implemented and applied in a more or less creative mode, be it in the economy, architecture, healthcare, private and public transport, education, refrigerator design or cultural and social processes. There seems to be no stopping the amazing and frightening spread of game mechanics.

This book is a first step in exploring our role as people and players in this "new" overarching game world. Electronic games are the forerunners and mirrors, the playgrounds for all kind of experiments and combat zones for society. And at the same time they are leading the way for current and future

technological and cultural progress. We may be able to learn from games how to design the future. But first there has to be the realization: We do exist, when we play, but we don't solely live in the game.

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PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AS AN INTEGRAL PART OF PHILOSOPHY: ESSAYS ON THE JURISPRUDENCE OF GERALD J POSTEMA edited by Thomas Bustamante and Thiago Lopes Decat [HART, 9781509933884]

This edited collection considers the work of one of the most important legal philosophers of our time, Professor Gerald J Postema. It includes contributions from expert philosophers of law.

The chapters dig deep into important camps of Postema's rich theoretical project including:

- the value of the rule of law;
- the ideal of integrity in adjudication;
- his works on analogical reasoning;
- the methodology of jurisprudence;
- dialogues with Ronald Dworkin, Joseph Raz, Frederick Schauer and HLA Hart.

The collection includes an original article by Professor Postema, in which he develops his conception of the rule of law and replies to some objections to previous works, and an interview in which he provides a fascinating and unique insight into his philosophy of law.

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The Pursuit of a Sociable Jurisprudence

I have always regarded philosophy of law as an integral part of philosophy I believe that one can do philosophy of law well only if one can do philosophy well, and I believe that one can do philosophy well only if one is immersed in the history of philosophy' This fragment from the Interview with Professor Gerald Postema that you will find in the final chapter of this book tells an important lesson about his jurisprudence and how he conceives the nature of law and legal inquiry Contemporary jurisprudence has been dominated, ever since the publication of John Austin's The Province of Jurisprudence Determined, about halfway through the nineteenth century, by an analytical methodology, which seeks above any other goal to isolate the law and its theoretical discourse from other disciplines such as sociology, history political theory and moral philosophy

Jurisprudence has been concerned with borders, limits, separations, distinctions. It has been dominated by a metaphysical talk of essences, nature, causes, necessary and sufficient properties and the like, and by an endeavour to describe the law from a disengaged and external point of view. The proper job of jurisprudence was to reveal the grounds of law that is, to explain what makes it a distinctive system of rules with its proper and unique normativity, which cannot be confused with the motivating capacity of moral and ethical values. In describing the law, one should argue in value-neutral terms instead of making judgments, evaluations, interpretations. Much of jurisprudence was meant to make sense of 'intuitions' and 'truisms' that one already knows, according to a methodology of conceptual analysis.

The most plausible candidate to explain the nature of law under this theoretical framework is legal positivism, with its insistence on a reductive explanation of legal validity that holds that social facts are the ultimate or, for some, exclusive determinants of the content of the law. Yet the claim that the law emerges from authoritative pronouncements of certain persons or institutions is independent from the theoretical framework adduced in the previous paragraph, as Professor Postema has shown in several writings in his prolific career.

One need not accept the methodology that predominates in analytical jurisprudence to uphold the claim that the law is man-made, or that it is posited by an authority, or that it has a conventional or social source. Most medieval legal philosophers, including those that are now uncontroversially associated with the natural law tradition, which is meant to oppose the central tenets of legal positivism, advocated a `thetic' (`taking the term from the Greek tithenai meaning to put, as in laid down or posited') conception of law that distinguishes the law established by nature (arts) from the law that is 'instituted by agreement or mutual consent' (ins positiva), normally expressed in a public way in the form of 'rules or measures prescribing right order' (lex).

Perhaps the anxiety to classify natural law and legal positivism as competing conceptions of legal validity, as if these two traditions emerged together and were concerned with precisely the same questions, stems from the kind of philosophical temperament that Professor Postema challenged in the quote at the beginning of this introduction.

Postema's jurisprudence is, first and foremost, historically conscious. It aims to understand the law from the perspective of human experience, as a 'sociable science' in the sense of common lawyers like Edward Coke and Matthew Hale. Jurisprudence is 'sociable' for Coke, 'in that it agreeth with the principles and rules of other excellent Sciences, divine and human'. Perhaps the central idea of Professor Postema's intent to rehabilitate the idea of jurisprudence as a sociable science lies in the Renaissance effort to locate jurisprudence 'in concrete human life and experience': jurisprudence was understood according to Accursio's idea of `vera philosophia', which was 'neither speculation nor pure prudence, but the point at which the theoretical and the practical intersected'. It attempted neither to subordinate 'practice to theory nor theory to practice' but to integrate them instead.

Another crucial contribution of Professor Postema to our understanding of the nature of law is the thesis, of which he claims to find some traces in Oliver Wendell Holmes, that time 'is intrinsic to law's ordinary mode of operating, to its distinctive mode of normative guidance'. The point applies not only to law but to all kinds of intentional action. Intentional action has a temporal texture: `intended action is an undertaking, governed by a project. To form an intention is to organize a portion of one's time, to give movement or direction to one's involvement in that span of time.'6 Professor Postema seeks for a model to explain the normativity of law that is based neither on the idea of nomos (that roots the normativity of law in a 'supposed rational ordering of reality') nor on the idea of thermos (which 'models law as a system of commands' or authoritative reasons for action). It appeals to a different metaphor, constructed around the idea of melody (melos), which 'highlights the temporal dimensions' of the normativity of law:

> Music takes time, but not just in the way that healing or sleeping take time; music exists in time, but not in the way paintings and sculpture exist in time. Music, melody in particular, is an ordering of time. While Michelangelo's Pieta exists in time, and it takes time to appreciate it, space is intrinsic to the sculpture; sculpture is a meaningful ordering of space. A performance of Bach's Erbarme dick must be located in time and in space (as must every act of human beings), but time is intrinsic to it; music is a meaningful ordering of time?

The right point for us to start our deliberative processes and our philosophical endeavours to interpret or understand the law is in media res, rather than ex ante. We cannot be satisfied with a priori

conditions for emergence of norms or with a static account of legal validity. On Bratman's theory of intentional action, to which Professor Postema resorts in order to provide a framework for his analysis of time-dependence in practical deliberation, 'the agent in mid-course typically faces new problems for deliberation', since the deliberation in which she participates 'is framed by three parameters: the intention-plan, current circumstances, and the initial instalments in the execution of the plan.... Rational execution of one's intention depends on integrating these three parameters into deliberation.

Legal reasoning is thus a reasoning in which one works in media res with materials stemming from past political decisions, but also with the present responsibility to direct the future of our community in certain matters. The practice of following judicial precedents, for instance, is a reasoning that 'is always, like Janus, on the threshold of past and future, seeking to integrate them into a normatively meaningful whole'. Melody, for Professor Postema, `models this kind of integration'?

Law is time-dependent just as much as it is dependent on politics, and jurisprudence must be integrated into political philosophy for similar reasons. The point is not only that the legal system is part of the political system, or that we need to import some concepts from jurisprudence to make sense of our political theories. It is, instead, that the arguments and submissions of legal philosophers can be 'taken seriously', or play a 'role ... in the life of the law and in determining the place that the law occupies in a society', only by 'paying attention to matters that are in the domain of political science (how law is in fact regarded) or political philosophy (how the law ought to be regarded) . The arguments for or against legal positivism, for instance, 'can be grasped and illuminated only on the basis of certain normative commitments' that have traditionally concerned moral and political philosophy"

Jurisprudence must be regarded as a branch of political philosophy because of its intrinsically critical nature. As Professor Postema explains, summarising Oakeshott's contribution to philosophical jurisprudence, it seeks for `comprehensive explanations', and 'its bounden duty is to maintain a resolutely critical stance, especially to its own presuppositions and modes of thought; Fortunately Professor Postema is not alone in this understanding of the character of jurisprudence, understood broadly as legal philosophy. John Finnis, for instance, is also critical of the methodological claim of descriptiveness in analytical philosophers like Kelsen, Hart and Raz. 'It is obvious,' he argues, `that the differences in description [of the nature of law] derive from differences of opinion, amongst the descriptive theorists, about what is important and significant in the field of data and experience with which they are all equally and thoroughly familiar.' A good theory of law must be part of a theory of practical reasonableness, must be a theory in which the 'theoretical work' is 'controlled by the adoption ... of some practical viewpoint of the standard of relevance and significance in the construction of [a] descriptive analysis'. And Ronald Dworkin, by the same token, regards jurisprudence itself as a constructive interpretation of the legal practice, which tries to 'show legal practice as a whole in its best light, to achieve equilibrium between legal practice as they find it and the best justification of that practice'

We should not, however, lose sight of the fact that the purpose of jurisprudence is not purely practical. It is theoretical while integrated with the law as a practice: 'The aim of philosophical jurisprudence is not to change the world, but to understand it '16 One can find in Professor Postema's philosophy of law an underlying Hegelian mood that invites us to build our theories by focusing on a concrete practice jurisprudential arguments are 'anchored in the concrete experience and practice of law taken in all its

richness'." Like Dworkin, Professor Postema advocates that we should look at the practice's history to figure out its point, which is given by the practice itself, and that this point should be a moral point that is a source of critical power for jurisprudence itself. Jurisprudence must be 'truly illuminating while remaining responsibly critical'. Part of our theoretical responsibilities, as philosophers, is to take up this critical attitude, which despite not being meant for purely pragmatic purposes, such as deciding concrete cases, can lead to an improvement in the practice." In a nutshell, jurisprudence, for Professor Postema, is constitutionally critical: `it takes as part of its remit to destabilize stabilities due to ignorance, indolence, insufficient self-awareness, the powerful dynamics of communal thinking, or past victories in the polity or the academy'; it must, moreover, be 'always prepared to be critical of its own performance and the presuppositions on which it rests'.

Another aspect of the idea of sociable science is Professor Postema's defence of a synechist rather than analytic mentality in jurisprudence. While analytic jurisprudence typically seeks 'explanations built on sharp distinctions and deep differences of a kind', a synechist methodology 'is a methodological inclination favouring explanations that focus on continuities rather than those that insist on sharp distinctions'. He borrows this thought from Peirce's synechism, which was employed as a 'principle of explanation':

> The analytic mentality seeks sharp boundaries for the concept of law, essentially distinguishing properties of law that define its nature, and criteria that enable us to know with some confidence when we have law 'properly-so-called` in our observer-analyst field of vision. When it encounters an as-yet unclassified phenomenon, or phenomena about the nature of which we might be genuinely punted, among its first inquiry-structuring question is: Is it or is it not proper law? (And, typically, when the answer is not unambiguously 'yes', further inquiry regarding the phenomena is assigned to the large file marked 'for others to explore'). By contrast, the synechist, no less interested in probing the nature of law, looks for continuities and illuminating similarities (and differences that build continuities). The synechist asks, 'What is law like?' and '(How) is this like law?', rather than declaring, 'This isn't like law, so it's not law (properly speaking)'. It seeks understanding by locating, relating, and integrating.

For much of the last couple of centuries, jurisprudence has been segregated into a safe haven of problems that are resolvable with the conceptual armoury of analytical jurisprudence. It claimed `modesty' for philosophical inquiry and confined itself to a metaphysical realm in which philosophers can make second-order, detached statements about the nature of law and leave it untouched by any critical or evaluative aims. According to a recent and influential work in jurisprudence, 'the key to conceptual analysis is the gathering of truisms about a given entity'. To determine the nature of a thing, we should stick to 'those properties that it necessarily has'. But this kind of inquiry, for Professor Postema, misses an important aspect of the point of philosophy itself, and should no longer be pursued. Instead of being satisfied with a neutral description of the 'prevailing views' in a professional practice and a set of intuitions about its nature, philosophers should ask for more: they should make their discipline more 'sociable' in the sense that we explained above, on pain of losing a big part of its point. We beg your pardon for another extended quote:

> Philosophy that proceeds primarily by plumbing and pumping intuitions is inevitably and uncritically in thrall to the present. Philosophical jurisprudence needs critical distance and resources for critical assessment of current understanding of familiar practice, but such distance and resources rarely come from abstraction alone. A grasp of the forces that have shaped the

> practice and the presuppositions shaping it is more likely to provide the distance and resources needed for the task. It can help us break the tyranny of present intuitions shaped by preconceptions at or behind the horizons of our ordinary vision, and it can help us excavate, identify, articulate, and critically explore them. Locating familiar notions in initially unfamiliar conceptual and historical neighborhoods often sheds new light on those notions, revealing aspects or links to other notions and problems that we otherwise overlook.

Professor Postema has successfully shown us, in this fragment, an important aspect of the failure that seems to affect the largest part of contemporary jurisprudence, a failure that doomed even some of the most talented jurisprudence scholars in the twentieth century Legal philosophers' claim to modesty comes at the price of renouncing the most interesting questions a curious student or lawyer might ask about the nature of her enterprise. It seems that jurisprudence has built a prison in which one is confined to a very specific set of questions that often limit, rather than expand, our knowledge of the object of our inquiry But there is no reason to confine ourselves to this mindset. If you cannot discuss the point, or the value, or the moral, political and social significance, or the efficacy, or the legitimacy or the history of a legal system because the methodology you chose aprioristically remits you to a different discipline, then probably the problem lies in your method rather than in the questions that you asked but that could not be answered by it. Philosophers of law are advised, therefore, not to encapsulate themselves in a disciplinary realm in which they can only confirm their intuitions and repeat what they believe are truisms or necessary truths. They should make their own science more sociable and try to understand it by critically evaluating the concrete practices in which they participate.

The analytical framework that promises us reliable and conceptually correct descriptions is the same one that gives us only incomplete and fragmented answers that sometimes leave us ignorant about the subject matter of our inquiry. We should thus get rid of the analytical framework, rather than our intellectual curiosity This point applies to much of the predominant tradition in jurisprudence, including its most prominent participant, HLA Hart:

> Hart brought philosophical investigation to analytic jurisprudence, but his insistence on methodological positivism revealed and amplified analytic jurisprudence's `unsociable' tendency. Indeed, Hart and his descendants were often careful to identify questions not within the domain of legal philosophy and hand them off to other disciplines, never to be entertained again. At the same time, as debates in the latter decades of the century among positivists proceeded down their complex, winding paths, the core of the dominant positivist jurisprudence narrowed dramatically. This trend had reached such a point that by the turn of the century, the current incumbent in Hart's chair of jurisprudence at Oxford, could boldly declare that 'Legal positivism is not a whole theory of law's nature. It is a thesis about legal validity only'. We noted in Chapter 10, that the fundamental debate between the two major camps of contemporary positivists — the exclusive positivists and the inclusive positivists — rested solely on contested claims about what is conceptually possible. Both camps were willing to consign a very large number of what we might regard as salient and perhaps very important features of law to the category of the non-conceptual and merely empirical — and thus not matters proper for jurisprudential attention.

Professor Postema's jurisprudence can be regarded as an attempt to revisit and reinterpret some of our thoughts about law without the conceptual method that analytical jurisprudence has imposed upon the students of philosophy of law We will try to show in the next two sections whether Professor Postema has been successful in this task.

The Contents of the Book

The point of this introduction was not only to provide an overview of part of Professor Postema's comprehensive works on law, philosophy, practical reasoning, common law and so on. It was also to provide some context for the reader to assess the following chapters of the book, which attempt to develop some thoughts based on Professor Postema's contributions to jurisprudence. The book is divided into five Parts and 14 chapters, which will be introduced below

Part I is dedicated to Professor Postema's contribution to the study of the value of the rule of law and is composed of two chapters. In recent scholarship, Professor Postema stressed that the central aspect of the rule of law is that it is about `law's ruling'. For the law to rule, it must provide protection and recourse against arbitrary exercise of power. But for this protection to be effective, it must be the case that the members of the political community, whether they are officials or lay members, take responsibility for holding each other accountable under law. The rule of law, on Professor Postema's view, is based on an ethos of fidelity, which is of fundamental importance for it to arise. In chapter 1 of the book, Professor Postema deals with a possible objection to this approach. According to the objection, the structures of accountability in a political community tend to undermine an important aspect of this ethos, which is the value of trust: the fact that each member of the community is responsible for holding the others accountable might provide incentives for disintegration and distrust. So the objection is stated thus: if accountability is at the heart of the rule of law, and distrust a consequence of accountability, the rule of law fails in its claim to provide a robust programme of controlling the exercise of power. In response to this objection, which was named as the 'trust challenge', Professor Postema proposes an integrated account of accountability and trust. He argues that it is not necessarily the case that accountability depends on distrust. On the contrary, accountability is a key component of trust-supporting moral and social relationships, such that fidelity and trust are not only compatible but also mutually supporting.

In chapter 2, Franklin Marques Dutra further discusses Professor Postema's account of the rule of law. He intends to bring to the surface in the chapter the fundamental value underlying Professor Postema's account of the rule of law. After a short introduction to Professor Postema's conception of the rule of law, he proposes to characterise Professor Postema's conception as a monist theory according to Liam Murphy's definition, inasmuch as it claims that the duties of officials and individual citizens stem from the same source and are guided by the same principle. He argues, once this interpretation is settled, that Professor Postema's conception of the rule of law rests more properly on the demand of equal concern and respect, as stated in Ronald Dworkin's writings, than on Philip Pettit's neo-republican value of freedom as non-domination.

Part II, which is the longest Part in the book, is dedicated to Professor Postema's reflections on interpretation and integrity, particularly in his exchange with Ronald Dworkin. Chapter 3, by Barbara Baum Levenbook, analyses and evaluates Professor Postema's account of integrity, which, like Dworkin, assumes that integrity is a virtue of political communities that is distinct from other values like justice and fairness. Like Dworkin's, his account is premised on a requirement of fidelity to the past political decisions of the community, including the conception of justice that 'fits and unifies these past decisions'. There is, however, according to Levenbook, a distinctive aspect of Professor Postema's idea of integrity, which is the thought that integrity incorporates not only 'respect for the past' but also the idea of 'regret', which entails a need for reaching compromises to accommodate principles that sometimes do

not cohere with the best reconstruction of a community's overarching values: 'Regret is consistent with preserving some currency for a morally incorrect decision, but limiting its force.' For this argument to work, the justification of regret would still have to be a moral justification. Integrity must be based both on justice and on fidelity, understood as a distinctly legal virtue and an important aspect of the rule of law. Levenbook is sceptical, however, about the possibility of an internal justification for the value of fidelity and the idea of regret. Although Levenbook acknowledges the wealth and sophistication of Professor Postema's account, she is not persuaded that his idea of regret is part of the practice of common law legal systems, and neither is she convinced that justice itself can establish some spheres of local incoherence in a system of moral values.

The remaining chapters of Part II are dedicated to the exchange between Postema and Dworkin on the idea of protestant interpretation. Chapter 4, by Thomas Bustamante, offers an optimistic view about the possibilities of the value of political integrity Bustamante insists that Dworkin's idea of protestant interpretation is a plausible view. The point of the chapter is not only to offer a response to Professor Postema, but also to reconcile his thoughts with Dworkinian jurisprudence, that is, to show that Professor Postema himself can accept it to provide a justification for some of his recent views about the character of law and interpretation. In an early review of Dworkin's Law's Empire, Professor Postema argued that Dworkin's conception of interpretation is problematic because it allows the interpreter to impose her own view upon the practice, without the need to engage with other citizens' interpretations about the point of law. Even if what we interpret is a common practice, Dworkinian interpretations are private judgments. Given that the point of law is logically independent from legal practice, Dworkin's advocacy of protestant interpretation is insufficiently inter-subjective and insufficiently political. To respond to this objection, Bustamante argues that it is possible to read Dworkin in a more charitable way, so that the point of law is given by legal practice itself. Once we consider the role played by history in Dworkin's interpretivism, we can realise that it is similar to Postema's recent views about the principle of the Rule of Law, which provide a successful conception of legality.

In chapter 5, Dennis Patterson responds to this attempt to reconcile Dworkin and Professor Postema. He claims that Dworkin's account of interpretation implies a commitment to a hermeneutical account of meaning found in Continental scholars like Heidegger and Gadamer, which should be replaced by an account of language, meaning and social practices erected on the basis of Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations. On Patterson's view, there is no room for an intermediate position between these two, and Professor Postema successfully showed that only the latter offers a promising theory of law.

In chapter 6, Brian Bix also defends Professor Postema's views against Dworkinian interpretation. Contra Dworkin, his suggestion is that the structure of law, at least in some legal systems like that of the United States, is comparable to a catholic, rather than protestant, division of interpretive competences. No interpreter can rely, if this is correct, on his own judgment about the point and purpose of a legal practice, to use it as a tool to interpret the law. Legal construction is a social and public process, either because of some institutional constraints imposed by the structure of the judicial system, as Robert Cover suggested, or because of the need for authoritative settlement by higher courts.

Part III of the book is focused on Professor Postema's contribution to analogical thinking in legal reasoning. In chapter 7, Thiago Decat engages with Professor Postema's argument on analogical

reasoning in common law legal systems. The chapter highlights the unarticulated and implicit theoretical framework behind Professor Postema's formulation and defence of his version of the classical common law conception of analogy in opposition to particularism and rule rationalism. Decat takes Postema's solution to the problems of relevance and of the infinite regress of rules—raised respectively by the first and the second of these conceptions of analogy — to be made possible by an understanding of reasoning that is broadly inferentialist. Combining what Brandom calls 'fundamental pragmatism' with the Kantian/inferentialist idea that making a judgement involves assuming the justificatory responsibility of integrating the (analogical) judgment to other judgments already inferentially articulated, provides the basis for Postema's conception of analogical reasoning's ability to synthesise a sound conception that profits from the insights of the two examined conceptions while eschewing their flaws. In the end, Decat argues that, had Postema made full and explicit use of inferentialist theoretical resources such as the concepts of material inference and of the expressive function of deontological vocabulary,

his conception could still retain the possibility of bringing analogies to critical assessment in a public forum without the need to posit the division of analytical reasoning in law into a two-stage process. Had Professor Postema dug deeper into the critical question of how the implicit conceptual norms defining the normative conditions for integrating the analogical judgment in an inferential net historically emerge, he would probably arrive at a monist model of analogical reasoning whose historical expressive rationality is able to account for the rational pressure exerted by both particulars and universals in reaching analogies as different aspects of the same one-stage process.

Chapter 8, by Fábio Shecaira, takes a different direction. In response to Professor Postema, Shecaira attempts to rescue the idea of an 'argument from analogy' from the claim that 'strictly speaking, there is no such a thing as an argument from analogy, but only reasoning with analogy, or rather analogical reasoning. After distinguishing the concepts of 'thinking', 'argument' and `justification', Shecaira presents two objections to Professor Postema's charge against rule-rationalist interpretations of legal analogy, of the kind that one can find in the arguments of Professor Postema's opponents, like Posner and Dworkin. On the first objection, Postema's interlocutors are not interested in reconstructing how one thinks about the law but rather the argument or justification that they can offer, that is, the cogency of the claims lawyers and judges offer in support of their view when they resort to a legal analogy On the second objection, in turn, Shecaira argues that Professor Postema's criticism against argumentation scholars fails because it cannot be generalised, for if it were to work against analogical reasoning it would have to work also against any kind of argumentation analysis and informal logic. According to Shecaira, these objections imply that Professor Postema's criticisms do not hit their target.

Part IV of the book discusses, in more depth than this introduction, some further aspects of Professor Postema's methodological claims about the nature of jurisprudence, understood as a sociable science. In chapter 9, by Margaret Martin, Professor Postema's idea that jurisprudence must be understood as practical philosophy is revisited to provide a reinterpretation of Hartian jurisprudence and rescue it from the assumption of value neutrality. For Martin, as for Postema, Hart failed to establish that legal theory can provide a sociological description of law from an external and uncommitted point of view One of the reasons of Hart's failure to provide an explanation of the normativity of law is the absence of a distinction between different approaches or points of view that can equally be regarded as 'internal' or 'external', in Hart's sense. One of these distinctions is between two agents who might adopt what Hart would describe as an 'external' point of view with regard to the law: the Holmesian 'bad man', who only

acts on the basis of a prudential assessment of the consequences that he believes will arise if he follows a law, and the victim of an extremely unjust legal system. Hart assumes in The Concept of Law that the bad man's failure to internalise the law is problematic because there are sound moral reasons to comply with it, so he does not respond to the law appropriately; and he (Hart) resorts to a similar argument, in chapter 9 of his seminal book, when he discusses the law's impact on the victims. The victim cannot have reasons to follow the law because `[t]he law reaches [her], as Postema perceptively notes, in the form of arbitrary power'. According to Martin, Hart's argument seems to be based on a series of moral judgements. Jurisprudence is a practical philosophy, rather than a purely descriptive or conceptual project.

In chapter 10, Dan Priel produces an insightful discussion of the details of Professor Postema's contribution to the intrinsic relevance of time in jurisprudence. For Professor Postema, law, like practical reason in general, has constitutive temporal aspects; it is part of its nature that it not only exists in time, but also exists as an ordering of time. We should avoid, therefore, the idea that jurisprudence can provide an account of the 'nature' of law beyond time and place, as has been fashionable in analytical legal theory. Priel analyses the relevance of time in jurisprudence on three levels: first, law and jurisprudence exist in time, and have a history; second, at least in common law systems, precedent ties present law to its past; and, third, at the most general level, law's authority cannot be understood independently from time. Priel takes a step beyond what Professor Postema has argued in his account of sociable jurisprudence, however, when he submits that these views should fit within a naturalistic approach to jurisprudence, to which he subscribes.

Chapter 11, by Saulo de Matos, comes back to the debate between Dworkin and Professor Postema, to discuss their jurisprudential methodologies. Matos believes that Professor Postema's 'sociable jurisprudence' is in the same neighbourhood as Dworkin's 'law as integrity', since they both present plausible objections to analytic jurisprudence. Both can fit easily into the description of a synechist approach to legal theory, for neither subscribes to an essentialist methodology and both are more interested in explaining how the law works or directs our action than excavating necessary properties. Dworkin's well-known comparison between law and literature, for instance, would be a typical application of the Peirce-inspired synechist methodology that Professor Postema defends. The difference that remains between Postema and Dworkin, for the author, is that the former is primarily focused on a sociological or empirical analysis of the concept of law, whereas the latter is primarily concerned with an account of correct or justified assertions about the content of the law.

Part V of the book considers the dialogues between Professor Postema and other contemporary perspectives on jurisprudence. Chapter 12, by Andrea Faggion, presents a response to Professor Postema's objections to HLA Hart's explanation of the normativity of law. She chooses, however, a path that is different from that adopted in this introduction. After describing Professor Postema's early works on social conventions and the foundations of law, on the one hand, and Postema's later works that criticise Hart's views on normativity and advocate a moralised account of practical reasoning and the normativity of law, Faggion argues that the former provide a more robust account of law and legal reasoning, which should not have been abandoned by Professor Postema. She claims, in a nutshell, that law gives reasons for official action but not necessarily for the ordinary citizens and people in general. A narrow account or legal normativity is considered preferable and more likely to provide a plausible jurisprudence.

In chapter 13, finally, Noel Struchiner and Guilherme Almeida revisit the debate between Professor Postema and Frederick Schauer, as well as the objection that the latter fails to establish, in his seminal work Playing by the Rules, a stable criterion to differentiate between a 'particularism sensitive to rules' and a mitigated formalism (or 'presumptive positivism'). In his comments on Schauer, Professor Postema claimed that these two positions are 'extensionally equivalent' and lack a psychological difference. To respond to this challenge, the authors revisit recent developments in psychological theory to attack both claims.

The final chapter of the book, chapter 14, contains an interview with Professor Postema conducted by Thomas Bustamante, César Serbena and Natalina Stamile, which offers not only a bird's eye view of the developments of his philosophy of law, but also an account of the most important influences in his career, his views on law, history, professional practice and philosophy, his general assessment of the state of art and a prospect for the future of jurisprudence.

As editors of the book, we are very much indebted to Professor Postema for his generous engagement with the authors and his willingness to listen and to respond to the chapters, and especially the editors' doubts and considerations about his work. We hope that this book will generate even more interest in Professor Postema's brilliant contribution to philosophy and law. <>

Kripkes Metaphysik möglicher Welten (Kripke's Metaphysics of Possible Worlds) by Sebastian Krebs [Philosophical Analysis, De Gruyter, ISBN: 9783110651188] Principal language: German

In this study, Sebastian Krebs elaborates a metaphysical deflationism in response to the question of the ontological status of possibility and necessity. In doing so, he not only offers the first German-language introduction to Kripke's metaphysics; he also clarifies the much misunderstood yet crucial concept of possible worlds in formal modal logic.

Der ontologische Status von Möglichkeit und Notwendigkeit ist eines der zentralen Probleme sowohl der klassischen als auch der modernen Metaphysik. In der analytischen Philosophie wird dieses Problem zumeist als Frage der Interpretation von möglichen Welten aufgefasst: ein Konzept, das (unter anderem) auf den amerikanischen Logiker und Sprachphilosophen Saul Kripke zurückgeht. Zur Interpretation dieses Konzepts leistet das vorliegende Buch einen entscheidenen Beitrag, in dem es aus Kripkes vage Andeutungen eine deflationäre Metaphysik möglicher Welten entwickelt und in den Zusammenhang von sprachphilosophischer Referenztheorie, formaler Logik und metaphysischem Essentialismus einbettet. Dabei leistet Sebastian Krebs nicht nur die erste deutschsprachige Einführung in Kripkes Metaphysik, sondern bietet eine ausführliche Auseinandersetzung mit David Lewis' modalem Realismus und anderen wichtigen Positionen der analytischen Metaphysik. Sein modalmetaphysischer Deflationismus klärt schließlich nicht nur das Konzept der möglichen Welten, sondern entwirrt die metaphysisch "aufgeblasene" Debatte um den ontologischen Status von Möglichkeit und Notwendigkeit durch eine konsequente Rückbindung an den gesunden Menschenverstand.

(The ontological status of possibility and necessity is one of the central problems of both classical and modern metaphysics. In analytic philosophy, this problem is mostly understood as a question of the interpretation of possible worlds: a concept that goes back (among other things) to the American logician and language philosopher Saul Kripke. The present book makes a decisive contribution to the interpretation of this concept, in that it develops a deflationary metaphysics of possible worlds from Kripke's vague hints and embeds it in the context of linguistic-philosophical reference theory, formal logic and metaphysical essentialism. Sebastian Krebs not only provides the first German-language introduction to Kripke's metaphysics, but also offers a detailed examination of David Lewis' modal realism and other important positions in analytical metaphysics. His modal metaphysical deflationism ultimately not only clarifies the concept of possible worlds, but also unravels the metaphysically "inflated" debate about the ontological status of possibility and necessity through a consequent connection to common sense.)

The series, Philosophical Analysis, offers a publication forum for innovative works on all topics of analytic philosophy. The focus is on the disciplines of theoretical philosophy: metaphysics, ontology, epistemology, philosophy of language, logic. and additionally, includes contributions to the history of philosophy.

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Purpose of this Study

This book develops and defends modal metaphysical deflationism. This is a position that the American linguistic philosopher and logician Saul Kripke suggests with regard to the question of the ontological status of possibility and necessity, but which is not developed in a systematic form. The historical background of this position is the debate in the analytical philosophy urn, which has been going on since the 1970s and continues to the present day, the concept of possible worlds, which is shaped in connection with the development of formal modal logic, to which this book contributes.

Kripke writes in the retrospectively inserted foreword of his lecture series *Naming and Necessity,* which is published in book form and is now considered a classic of analytical philosophy:

> I will say something briefly about possible worlds. (I hope to elaborate elsewhere.) (Kripke 1980, S. 15)

To date, Kripke has not presented a systematic elaboration of his concept of possible worlds. Moreover, it is not expected that he will make such a work in the coming years and decades, unless published. This has several Grandes directly related to his very own philosophical way of working, which is surely the greatest challenge of a systematization of Kripke's philosophy, as sought in this book, and which is therefore discussed in detail in section 1.2.

First of all, it is important to stress that this book pursues a systematic and not an exegetical objective. This means that Kripke's work of beer serves above all as a template dear to develop and defend a position that, in the debate conducted in the present analytical philosophy urn, proposes the ontological status of possibility and necessity a new direction. Strictly speaking, therefore, this book does not present Kripke's metaphysics of possible worlds, as its title promises, but my own metaphysics of possible worlds, whereby writing on the title would not only have been far too presumptuous, but also wrong in that I am not even sure whether my deflationary position can be called metaphysics at all.

However, I find Kripke's metaphysics of possible worlds appropriate for this book, as it is about Saul Kripke, the philosophical discipline of metaphysics and possible worlds. I would also argue that scientific book titles are also proper names and therefore rigid *lyrists.* To whom this linguistic concept is still unknown, there is only so much to reveal at this point that it occupies a central place not only in *Kripke's metaphysics of possible worlds,* but also in Kripke's metaphysics of possible worlds, and thus I will meet some expectations of my research goal that only Burch awakened the title at the end.

Since there is no German-language and hardly english-language monographic literature, which puts the background of the debate in a historical context and gives a systematic overview of what individual positions in the field of modal metaphysics differ in the first place, or - to put it bluntly - what exactly is being debated, it is another important research goal to provide clarity on these questions.

Urn to achieve this clarity, are in cape. 2 First laid some important formal-logical and conceptual foundations, which are indispensable for an understanding of the central concept of the possible world. Building on this, I am developing in Cape. 3.1 a systematic map on the basis of which I draw up the essential aspects of the current debate and classify all the important modal-metaphysical positions. This applies in particular to the modal realism developed by David Lewis in On *the Plurality of Worlds* (1986) and other works, which for many authors offers the most important historical reference point and represents the most powerful counter-position for Kripke- and thus also for the modalmetaphysical deflationism represented here.

In my examination and rejection of Lewis's modal realism, I develop a yardstick by which every convincing modal-metaphysical position must be measured. While I apply this standard to some other influential positions of the more recent debate, in the fourth chapter my aim is to show why modalmetaphysical deflationism satisfies the standard-based demands of common sense and thus presents a convincing position in the debate urn the ontological status of possible worlds. Before this happens, I first explain what is meant by modal metaphysical deflationism and how it can be located on the modal metaphysical map.

Finally, it becomes clear why Saul Kripke's extensive attention to the comments and hints of possibility and necessity is worthwhile. The position on the ontological status of possible worlds, based on his philosophy and to be developed in the course of this book, exposes some sham problems of the present analytical metaphysics, and therefore represents an important contribution to the current debate. However, why the approach I call modalmetaphysical deflationism does not exactly correspond to what Kripke himself contributes to the subject is mainly due to the fact that Kripke is fundamentally opposed to theories and systematizations. To understand this, it is important to take a closer look at how it works below.

The Relationship of Modal Logic, Reference, and Essentialities

The fact that modal logic, reference and essentialism are interrelated has already been hinted at in this chapter. In this final summary, these three aspects of the debate in modal metaphysics are once again summarized as a coherent network that makes the background of the modal metaphysical map of the Britten chapter comprehensible and serves as a starting point for the modal metaphysical deflationism presented and defended in the fourth chapter.

The view of *rigid designation,* which Kripke advocates in the linguistic philosophical debate on the reference, inevitably leads to reflections in the field of formal modal logic and to metaphysical questions about an Aristotelian essentialism: if one assumes that a proper name in alien possible worlds refers to the same object or person, this already presupposes that the talk of possible worlds and thus quantified modal logic results. From a formal-logical perspective, *rigid designation* corresponds exactly to an extensional reference to an object within the skopus of a modal operator. As a result of these, the following two sentences are to be considered synonymous:

(18) It is necessary for Angela Merkel to be a woman.

(19) It is necessary that Angela Kasner is a woman.

Formally-logically, both (18) and (19) can be expressed as follows, wherein *a* stands for the person designated by the respective proper name "Angela Merkel" or "Angela Kasner" and the predicate *F* for their property to be a woman:

(20) ❑ *Fa*

It is obvious to take into account the need in (20) *de re,* that is to say, as a necessity expressed about that person, which exists irrespective of which of his proper names is referred to him. The fact that Angela Merkel is a woman has nothing to do with the fact that she now bears the surname of her first husband and is therefore no longer called Angela Kasner. Furthermore, Angela Merkel does not have the status of being a woman, because she is the German chancellor in 2017. Even if one doubts Baran whether Angela Merkel's being a woman is really necessary", one will easily realize that there is a fundamental difference between (18) and (19) and the following statement:

(21) It is necessary for the German Chancellor to be a woman in 2017.

The label "German Chancellor in 2017" used in (21) is not a *rigid designator:* it is quite possible that Martin Schulz (or even a completely different person) would have won the 2017 election and would thus be Chancellor. The label does not therefore refer to the same person in every possible world. (21) is wrong because it is usually interpreted de *dicto,* that is to say, as a necessity over the whole statement and not only about the person to which the label 'German Chancellor in 2017' actually applies.

The discussion on necessity *de dicto* and *de re* underlines that modality (and thus quantified modal logic) is closely related to the thesis of Aristotelian essentialism, that is, the view that objects and persons, but also natural species and substances, possess some of their properties necessary. This does not mean, of course, that every modal logician must be a representative of a strong metaphysical essentialism at the same time. It underlines, however, that linguistic reference, essentialism and quantified modal logic are closely intertwined and that anyone who seriously wants to deal with one of these three issues cannot help but take a position on the other issues. Exactly how this opinion of the representatives of the recent debate looks is made clear in the following third chapter of this book, the aim of which is to draw a modalmetaphysical map, in particular critically reflecting the genuine modal realism of David Lewis. In the fourth chapter, I come back in detail to Kripke's views on linguistic reference and essentialism, when I use the modalmetaphysical deflationism to outline Kripke's answer to the question of the ontological status of possible worlds. The overview of historical and systematic backgrounds of the Alethian modal logic provided in this second chapter forms the conceptual foundation for the further progress of my argumentation.

In other words, without understanding what the concept of possible worlds in the formal-logical understanding of Kripke's model structures means, it makes no sense to ask about their ontological status. The conceptual foundation laid down in this second chapter is therefore essential for a systematic analysis of the various modal metaphysical positions in the following third chapter, as well as the development of modal metaphysical deflationism on the model of Kripke in the fourth chapter of this book.

What do possible worlds mean for the metaphysics?

Overview

Before Saul Kripke's modalmetaphysical deflationism is presented and defended in the final fourth chapter, a brief glimpse of the systematization of the more recent debate on the question of the ontological status of possible worlds in analytical philosophy takes place here.

This chapter dealt with four essential points which are essential for an understanding of modal metaphysical deflationism. First, a map was drawn which can be used to clarify the distinctions of individual positions on modality. Later, David Lewis's GMR outlined the most important counter-position to Kripke's approach and then criticized. In particular, in the context of the criticism outside theory, three fundamental claims were identified, which are directed at each modalmetaphysical position and by which modal metaphysical deflationism must also be measured. The subsequent cursory passage through other important positions of the more recent debate took place along the orientation points of the previously developed map and evaluated them according to the previously elaborated demands on a modal metaphysics.

With realism in relation to impossible worlds, Meinongian, heuristic modal realism and substitutes, positions were sketched above all that play an important role in an understanding of modal-metaphysical deflationism. This chapter was always written in the knowledge that a cursory passage through different positions in philosophy never fully does justice to its respective representatives. Even if, therefore, the main authors of the debate have been briefly addressed, it is not the claim of my book to offer a complete overview of which positions and styles of positions have been represented in the entire analytical philosophy of the 20th and 21st centuries in relation to modal metaphysics. It is therefore important to stress once again that other positions were always carried out with the concrete aim of being able to develop Kripke's modal-metaphysical deflationism later in demarcation - in particular the Meinongianism and the Jules-Verne-o-skop by David Kaplan, which is relevant in heuristic realism.

In contrast, the modalmetaphysical map may well be the claim of systematic completeness, since there can be no position regarding the ontological status of possible worlds, which cannot be located on the basis of their orientation points. These four landmarks, with the help of which in Cape. 4.3 Kripke's deflationary approach can also be briefly described with the following questions. First: is modality a basic concept of reality or can modality be reduced to et-what else (e.g. worlds) (primitivism vs. reductionism)? Second, do possible worlds exist (Realism vs. Anti-Realism? Thirdly, which objects belong to the ontological inventory of these worlds (Actualism vs. Possibilism)? Finally, fourthly, how does the corresponding position deal with the modal metaphysical problem of *transworld identity,* i.e. the question of the identification of an individual across possible worlds?

Precisely dealing with the central problem of *transworld identity* is one of the main reasons why David Lewis's modal realism is rejected. Accordingly, the third, developed, to be able to formulate a modalmetaphysical position, an intuitive answer for *transworld identity.* The other two claims, namely, firstly to be as ideologically unbiased as possible and secondly to meet the peculiarity of the real laid out in everyday language, could also be worked out on the basis of the criticism of modal realism - whereby in particular the principle of ideological impartiality PIU or docking ability PIA should embody a fundamental scientific-theoretical virtue.

The above-mentioned orientation points of the modal metaphysical map Bowie the three demands on a modal metaphysics of common sense represent the foundation on which modal metaphysical deflationism is built.

With Kripke's modalmetaphysical deflationism, a position was preceded in this chapter, the alien three in meets the demands expressed for a modal metaphysics of common sense. Moreover, this position is of convincing coherence. This means that their main premises are diverging and interdependent.

The summary made can be characterized by modalmetaphysical deflationism in a sentence as follows: it is a primitive, up-to-date (but as-obpossiarian), eliminative anti-realism with respect to the ontological status of possible worlds, which *transworld identity* rejects as a sham probtolic due to its close connection with the question of reference in the language philosophy and at the same time can integrate an Aristotetic essentialism.

The term "modalmetaphysical deflationism" is used back to the position of deflationism from semantic truth theory, according to which it is the same to claim that a statement is true, and simply to assert that statement. Much like Ayer claims for deflationism that the "problem of truth as it is ordinarily conceived", the modalmetaphysical deflationism represented here assumes that the question of the ontological status of possible worlds offers less cause for confusion than is usually assumed. To claim that *P* is true in a possible world is nothing more than to claim that *P* could be the case — which is closely related to the linguistic primitiveism inherent in this position, according to which possibility and necessity are a fundamental component of any linguistic description of reality.

On the other hand, superfluous assumptions and speculations about possible worlds reminiscent of science fiction literature in Lewis's modal realism or David Kaplan's Jules-Verne-o-shop, as in the case of parallel universe metaphysics, must be rejected for these reasons. In the recent past, it was precisely such speculations that led to the fact that the analytical philosophy of modality has become increasingly lost in sham discourses (e.g. *transworld identity),* which lead to the core of any modal metaphysics, namely the question of what is possibility and necessity.

Although Kripke himself has so far failed to formulate his approach systematically, the contouring and positioning of his philosophy carried out in this chapter underlines that the modalmetaphysical deflationism developed from this point **out** is a convincing position **in** the current de-batte on the ontological status **and** the concept of possible worlds. Unlike all the other approaches considered in this book (which correspond to the systematic range of what is possible at all) modalmetaphysical deflationism satisfies all the demands of a modal metaphysics of common sense by taking seriously both **natural** language and everyday intuitions about possibilities and necessities. The presentation and defence of modal metaphysical deflationism in this chapter can therefore be seen as a response to an increasingly "bloated debate" in recent years, to which this book has made an important contribution to its return to common sense - as I will point out in the following final summary.

As has just been pointed out, modalmetaphysical deflationism developed in this book is not only an important step towards dissolving the current debate urn the ontological status of possible worlds. In fact, it is also a signpost to the question of the ontological status of worlds in non-alethic modal logic, which has hardly been debated so far, and which can shape the direction of future debates. In the future

there is the potential to create clarity and structure to the philosophy of duty and permission as well as to the philosophy of time and to answer fundamental questions about the ontological status of worlds.

Although this potential could only be hinted at in this research, I am optimistic that there is not only a possible but also a future research project that profitably analyses and evaluates modal-metaphysical deflationism also with regard to non-alethehic modal logic, building on the research results that have become real with the publication of this book. <>

WHITE FREEDOM: THE RACIAL HISTORY OF AN IDEA
by Tyler Stovall [Princeton University Press, 9780691179469]

The racist legacy behind the Western idea of freedom

The era of the Enlightenment, which gave rise to our modern conceptions of freedom and democracy, was also the height of the trans-Atlantic slave trade. America, a nation founded on the principle of liberty, is also a nation built on African slavery, Native American genocide, and systematic racial discrimination. **WHITE FREEDOM: THE RACIAL HISTORY OF AN IDEA** traces the complex relationship between freedom and race from the eighteenth century to today, revealing how being free has meant being white.

Review

"**WHITE FREEDOM** is clear and engaging. It offers fresh insight to the idea of liberty — an idea that is increasingly at the fore of societal concern. Stovall doesn't preach; he doesn't try to convince anyone to come to his side. He offers important context to the history of the development of freedom, and engaging analysis supported by carefully researched evidence. Stovall, a professor of history and dean of the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences at Fordham University, gives us all the information we need, and then challenges us to look deeper."**---Brock Kingsley, *Chicago Review of Books***

"This cogent study of ideas of race and freedom has added relevance and crossover potential in today's political landscape." — *Kirkus Reviews*

"Extremely convincing."**---Ilana Masad, *NPR***

"Ambitious in scope, **WHITE FREEDOM** traces the racially selective course of the historic expansion of individual freedom. This is an impressive work of scholarship on an issue of enduring moral and political relevance."**—Thomas C. Holt, author of *Children of Fire: A History of African Americans***

"**WHITE FREEDOM** is a well-researched and well-written book that is certain to exert significant influence on historical scholarship and critical racial studies."**—George Lipsitz, author of *The Possessive Investment in Whiteness: How White People Profit from Identity Politics***

"Beautifully written and lucidly argued, Tyler Stovall's **WHITE FREEDOM** effectively disentangles the idea of freedom from the grip of racialized thinking. Ranging widely across history and geography, Stovall takes the 'white Goddess' of liberty down from her pedestal, with force, erudition, and elegance."**—Christopher L. Miller, Yale University**

"Powerful and convincing. In this sweeping history of the idea he calls 'white freedom,' Stovall traces the interdependence of these two key terms since the Enlightenment, arguing that Western conceptions of freedom have been enduringly racialized as white."**—Jennifer E. Sessions, author of *By Sword and Plow: France and the Conquest of Algeria***

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The relationship between freedom and race has been one of the key themes of modern society and politics in the Western world. Scholars and social commentators have long noted that the era of the Enlightenment, which emphasized the importance of freedom and in many ways codified our modern understandings of the idea, also witnessed the height of the transatlantic slave trade. The enduring presence of racism in the history of America, a nation built simultaneously upon ideas of liberty and upon African slavery, Indian genocide, and systematic racial discrimination, has provided one of the most dramatic (but certainly not the only) example of this complex relationship.' To take one specific example, historians of the American Revolution have struggled for generations to conceptualize a war for liberty that preserved and reinforced slavery, and the debate has by no means come to an end.

Commentators have often portrayed the relationship between freedom and race in paradoxical terms, as the quotation from the 2000s Congressional report cited above makes clear. If liberty represents the acme of Western civilization, racism—embodied above all by horrible histories like the slave trade and the Holocaust—is its nadir. The two classic statements of freedom that open this introduction illustrate this contradiction: the first was written by a man, Thomas Jefferson, who owned slaves; the second was written by representatives of a nation that owned one of the greatest slave colonies, Saint-Domingue, the world had ever seen.' Some argue that one represents the essence of modern societies while the other is more peripheral; [9] others (for example, Black nationalist Malcolm X) contend the reverse, that racism is the true inescapable reality of Western culture and society.' In general, however, perspectives on freedom and race tend to posit them as opposites, and the relationship between them as paradoxical and ironic, one due more to human inconsistencies and frailties than to any underlying logics.

White Freedom takes issue with this consensus, suggesting instead that the relationship between liberty and racism is not necessarily contradictory but rather has its own internal consistency. In short, I reject the idea of a paradoxical relationship between the two; to my mind there is no contradiction. The central theme of this study is that to an important extent, although certainly not always, ideas of freedom in the modern world have been racialized. In particular, many have considered whiteness and white racial identity intrinsic to modern liberty. Models of autonomy and self-empowerment have often come with a racial dimension, as reflected in the popular saying, "free, white, and twenty-one." To be free is to be white, and to be white is to be free. In this reading, therefore, freedom and race are not just enemies but also allies, *frères ennemis* whose histories cannot be understood separately. Put baldly, at its most extreme freedom can be and historically has been a racist ideology.

WHITE FREEDOM thus challenges the idea that freedom and race are necessarily opposites, arguing instead that both historically and in the present day they have worked together to construct white identity. The pages that follow will show the many different ways in which freedom has functioned as an essential part of white identity, and by contrast the ways lack of freedom and the lack of white racial identity have gone together. Rather than see this relationship as paradoxical, it argues that in many cases it has been absolutely essential to what it means to be white (and therefore to be nonwhite). The book will therefore consider not just different examples of white freedom but more generally its evolution as concept and practice over the two hundred-plus years from the Enlightenment to the present day.

One can easily anticipate objections that many might make to such a thesis. Two in particular stand out in my mind. First, how can one condemn as racist, or even racialized, a broad human goal that has stood for the best in mankind, that has motivated millions and millions of people throughout history to fight and die for the rights of all? Let me state from the outset that this study does not aim to condemn the desire for freedom, to sully it by labeling it racist. Rather, I wish to consider the ways in which the ideal of freedom, like many other aspects of modern human politics and society, has had a racial dimension. Notably, the notion that whites in particular should be (and have been) free, and that freedom foregrounded the interests and goals of white populations, is one this study will explore.

The second objection also bears a lot of weight. Given that so many movements *against* racism have embraced an identity as freedom struggles (decolonization and the civil rights movement are perhaps the most prominent examples of these), how can one refer to freedom as a racist ideology? How can one characterize as white an ideal that inspired so many people of color to sacrifice everything for it? My answer to that is that freedom has never just been white; there are many political variants of human liberty. In particular many great popular struggles have been waged in the modern era to bring freedom to all men and women. But in many ways that is my point: peoples of color have had to fight for inclusion into the idea of freedom, in fact not just struggling to be part of white freedom but to overthrow it as a concept and as a social and political reality. Those struggles have had their victories but also their defeats, and have never succeeded in completely destroying the relationship between freedom and race in the modern world.

To a certain extent both these objections rest upon a foundational belief that freedom is a positive human value, whereas racism is its evil antithesis. I certainly believe in human liberty and reject racial discrimination, as do probably most people in the contemporary world. But also, as an historian I understand that such convictions are not only not universal, but have also changed over time. As I will

discuss more extensively in chapter 1, people have not always viewed freedom as a positive value, and there are important ways in which that is still true. One need only substitute *anarchy* for freedom, for instance, to understand that the idea of liberty can have serious negative connotations. Similarly, the idea of the *libertine* represents a person whose freedom is immoral, destructive, and ultimately self-destructive. The contrast between ideas of a political activist understood as *a freedom fighter* versus a *terrorist* shows how warriors for liberty can be seen in both positive and negative terms.' A central theme of the history of freedom, one which this book will consider, is how as a social and political value it was in effect domesticated, embedded in governmental systems that limited the autonomy of the individual for the effective functionality of the collectivity.

If freedom has not always been good, equally race and racial discrimination have not always been seen as bad. Obviously, this was true in fu[n]damentally racist societies like Nazi Germany and the antebellum American South, but the idea of racial differentiation as a positive value—one that emphasized the biological differences between peoples—also existed in cultures that did not embrace overt racism. A belief in racial difference did not have to necessitate racial oppression, for example, but could be seen instead as a way of maximizing the inherent and distinct qualities of each race. Ideas of race were intimately intertwined with the rise of nationalism in nineteenth-century Europe, for example, to the extent that the modern nation was seen as a political formation that could affirm and advance the racial interests of a people. Romantic literature also embraced a frequently positive vision of race, as one can see in novels like Sir Walter Scott's *Ivanhoe* or James Fenimore Cooper's *The Last of the Mohicans.*' Finally, the rise of racial pride movements such as Black nationalism often served to mobilize and empower members of ethnic minority groups." The response to racial discrimination has been as much racial pride as antiracism, and the two have at times gone together.

Very few people willingly embrace what they perceive to be evil. The construction of white freedom rested on the idea that both liberty and white racial identity were not only positive values but also in many ways inseparable. This history will explore the rise of this phenomenon across the modern period, considering how a belief in freedom developed in the context of increasing racial differentiation. This study will explore, for example, how the first represented a reaction to the second, and also how the two phenomena interacted and even mutually reinforced each other.

The chronological scope of this study is the modern era, from roughly the eighteenth century to the end of the twentieth, in particular the two hundred years from 1789 to 1989. Although freedom and racial difference have existed for a long time, they came together in the modern era, and together they have played a major role in shaping the world we know today.

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A central paradox of the historiography of race is the fact that while racial thinking, especially scientific racism, was overwhelmingly repudiated after the Holocaust, the scholarly study of race has become more prominent than ever. From the heated battles over affirmative action in the United States" to questions of universalism versus difference in France" and controversies over race relations in Britain,' politicians, public intellectuals, and activists have wrestled with how to deal with a phenomenon that almost all agree has no objective or scientific reality.' As we shall see below, the histories of both race and freedom are replete with paradoxes.

* * *

I have organized **WHITE FREEDOM** in three sections, of two chapters each. Part 1 deals with both broad theories and specific practices of white freedom, organized thematically rather than chronologically. Chapter considers alternate ideas of freedom, notably those related to piracy and childhood, and how they were increasingly suppressed and relegated to the margins of modern bourgeois society in Europe and America. Both children and pirates represented a kind of racialized "savage" freedom, attractive and easily romanticized yet nonetheless at odds with white freedom in the modern era. Chapter 2 takes as its subject a specific case study, the Statue of Liberty. Probably the most famous symbolic image of freedom in the world, the Statue of Liberty also represents ideas of freedom in both France and the United States. This chapter explores the racial history of the great statue, from its forgotten and suppressed links to antislavery to its changing relationship to immigration. Together, the two chapters give an overview of the main outlines of the book.

Parts 2 and 3 proceed chronologically. Part 2, looks at the relationship between freedom and race in the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, from the Enlightenment to the outbreak of the Great War. Chapter 3 considers the Age of Democratic Revolution and how it brought together liberty and whiteness. It examines the Enlightenment, the American Revolution, the French Revolution, and the Saint-Domingue Revolution, to show the many ways in which struggles around both white freedom and Black slavery intersected. This chapter concludes by arguing that the crusade for freedom at the beginning of the modern era ended up by emphasizing the links between liberty and race. Chapter 4 deals with the rise of modern industrial and bourgeois society and the rIse of liberal democracy in Europe and America. In Europe it explores the link between the rise of mass democracy at home and the growth of massive empires in Africa and Asia, producing polities organized around white citizenship and nonwhite subjecthood. In America the chapter considers the rise of mass democracy, the Civil War, and Reconstruction, showing how the struggle against Black slavery ended up reaffirming white freedom. It also investigates the history of immigration and whiteness at the turn of the century.

Part 3 of *White Freedom* focuses on the twentieth century. Chapter 5 discusses the history of the two world wars and the interwar years. It explores the ways in which World War I brought the planet together into one global social and political unit, and how that unit was segmented along racial lines. The chapter considers the history of fascism and how it interacted with racialized ideas of freedom, and then analyzes the great antifascist crusade for freedom and the racial dimensions of that crusade. It ends by looking at how the struggle against fascist racism undermined the idea of white freedom. This leads into Chapter 6, which considers the fall and rise of white freedom in the latter half of the twentieth century. Beginning with decolonization and the civil rights movement in America, it notes the triumph of struggles against white freedom up to 1965, then the return of that ideological practice in the 1970s and 1980s. It concludes with the fall of European communism in 1989, a date justly celebrated as a banner year for freedom but one that and its own racial implications.

Such is the story of *White Freedom.* It intends not to condemn the Idea of liberty but rather to explore a rarely considered dimension of that ideology, its relationship to ideas of race and racial difference in the modern world. I hope this book will inspire other studies on the complex nature of liberty in our history and ultimately help us to understand how we can make all the world's peoples more free. If it

can do that, or even if it simply inspires and provokes debates about race and freedom in our time, I feel it will have served its purpose.

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The recent growth of the National Front in France highlights one of the most remarkable global political developments of the twenty-first century, the rise of authoritarian populism. This is in many ways a global phenomenon, as the electoral victories of Narendra Modi in India, Benjamin Netanyahu in Israel, and Jair Bolsonaro in Brazil in one twelve-month span, 2018-19, illustrate. But it has had a particular impact in Europe and America. Since 2000 a number of charismatic right-wing leaders, for example, Viktor Orban in Hungary, Silvio Berlusconi in Italy, and Vladimir Putin in Russia, have taken power. The populist Right has overwhelmed the Far Left and is increasingly drawing support from the Center Right. In 2016 a small right-wing British political party pushed the country into the Brexit referendum, in which a popular majority approved the secession of the United Kingdom from the European Union. A few months later Donald Trump overpowered both the establishment in his own Republican Party and the Democratic opposition to win election as president of the United States.

The new authoritarian populism is a complex affair, blending hostility to global elites, resentment at cultural change, and anger at working-class economic stagnation. But there can be no doubt that covert and overt appeals to racism and anti-immigrant hostility form a major part of its appeal. Trump himself has been especially outrageous in this regard, from characterizing Mexicans as "drug dealers, criminals, and rapists" to saying that there were fine people on both sides of a battle in Charlottesville, Virginia, between neo-Nazis and their opponents, but he is not alone in this regard. As a report noted in 2018, "Both Donald Trump's campaign and right-wing authoritarian populists in Europe have tended to exploit anxieties related to such demographic change. Trump's electoral base—as well as the base of the Republican Party—is overwhelmingly white. The Trump campaign took advantage of anxieties around immigration, race, and Islam, leaning into white identity politics with explicitly racist appeals."' Hostility to immigrants, foreigners, Muslims, and racially defined Others in general has thus been a key driver of contemporary authoritarian populism.

At the same time, many populists see themselves as engaged in a movement for freedom, in particular a movement to defend their nations against oppression by an alliance of global elites and the racial minorities and immigrants they exploit for their own ends. In a London pro-Brexit protest a demonstrator costumed as a hoplite of ancient Greece claimed, "I am here fighting for freedom. . . . The Brexit vote is a mass rebellion by the working class of this country, and I don't frigging blame them, because they have not been listened to by any of the parties for years."' As noted earlier in this study, freedom in the modern era has been closely identified with the defense of the nation-state; today's authoritarian populists see national cultures as threatened by globalizaltion. In June 2015 representatives of several Far Right parties, including the French National Front, formed a rightist bloc in the European Parliament with the name of Europe of Nations and Freedom. Geert Wilders, head of the Dutch Freedom party, hailed it as an historic occasion, saying "Today is the beginning of our liberation, our D-Day," and arguing that the new bloc would defend national sovereignty against the European Union and the threat of Islamization.

The dynamism of authoritarian populism in today's world shows that white freedom remains alive and well in the twenty-first century. As with the New Right in the late twentieth century, the movement

blends a rejection of liberal democratic orthodoxies with appeals to white identity. I will conclude this study by considering what this portends for the times ahead.

White Freedom Yet to Come

As I noted earlier in this chapter, historians are not seers, and I certainly have neither the obligation nor the ability to predict the future. Rather, in this final section I would like to speculate on possible implications of **WHITE FREEDOM** for the world we live in today and tomorrow. This book has addressed and explored a major question in the modern world, the relationship between liberty and race, and I wish to conclude with some thoughts about how people might continue to approach (or not) this relationship. The fact that this question has come up time and time again over the last two hundred years suggests, to me at least, that it will continue to do so for some time to come.

We inhabit a world that is, at least formally, committed to racial equality as part of the democratic ideal. One should immediately note that modern societies frequently betray or fail to meet this standard, and the continued existence of white freedom as a social and political reality is an important part of that failure. Nonetheless, the idea that freedom is a universal value transcending race is now the default standard in modern societies, and it is hard to imagine that changing anytime soon. The powerful movements described in chapter 6 against white freedom did not succeed completely, and they provoked a powerful counterreaction that is still in evidence today. They did, however, permanently shift the goalposts of the game, a great accomplishment that we must never forget. Thanks to them, and to many others over the years who have struggled for racial equality, the primary question surrounding the relationship between race and freedom today is not so much how to challenge white freedom as how to make the reality of universal liberty live up to the ideal.

I would also observe that, except perhaps for some believers in libertarianism and anarchism, freedom has generally not been an end in and of itself. Rather, freedom enables us to do and enjoy things that all peoples value: live in security and peace, have adequate food and shelter, enjoy our friends and families, raise our children with confidence for their futures. I say this to make the point that the politics of white freedom has never been just about race, but it advocates racial distinction and white privilege as a way of achieving those ends. The rise of the New Right in the late twentieth century and of authoritarian populism today certainly has a major racial dimension, but is not just about race: many supporters of Trump and Brexit (including many nonwhite supporters) did not cast their votes in favor of bigotry. Today the push for white freedom is in many ways a response to the inability of modern societies to provide those achievements listed above that freedom was supposed to ensure, and as long as that remains the case, racialized visions of liberty will retain their ability to inspire and motivate those searching for a better life.

For me, therefore, the ultimate question is not so much whether racism will disappear and the universal vision of freedom triumph. Rather, it is whether future societies will overcome the need for white freedom by assuring a good life for all their members. Will the conditions that drive many to embrace a racialized vision of liberty melt away as a result? In a world that embraces racial equality in theory, whiteness is ultimately untenable, a burden as well as a privilege. In the last analysis, will we find a way to free our societies from the need for whiteness? A utopian vision, perhaps, but so much that has been considered utopian in the present has become reality in the future. The clarion call of the French

Revolution for liberty, equality, and fraternity still rings true, especially if we consider not just these values in general but the relationship between them in particular.

I hope that historians of the future will be able to answer these questions, but it won't be until long after we are gone. At that point, they will then doubtless come up with new questions that we can't imagine. In the present, we must therefore content ourselves with posing them, with measuring how far we have come and considering the possible shapes of the road ahead. The history of white freedom considers the best and the worst of the human experience, its highs and lows, and the relationship between them. It is both a sobering tale and one full of hope, and if the past is a guide I consider myself justified in believing that hope will prevail in the future. <>

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Bibliography

The Island of Happiness: tales of Madame d'Aulnoy, drawings by Natalie Frank, edited, translated, and introduced by Jack Zipes [Princeton University Press, 9780691180243]

Marie-Catherine Le Jumel de Barneville (1650–1705), also known as Madame d'Aulnoy, was a pioneer of the French literary fairy tale. Though d'Aulnoy's work now rarely appears outside of anthologies, her books were notably popular during her lifetime, and she was in fact the author who coined the term "fairy tales" (*contes des fées*). Presenting eight of d'Aulnoy's magical stories, **The Island of Happiness** juxtaposes poetic English translations with a wealth of original, contemporary drawings by Natalie Frank, one of today's most outstanding visual artists. In this beautiful volume, classic narratives are interpreted and made anew through Frank's feminist and surreal images. <>

Information: A Historical Companion edited by Ann Blair, Paul Duguid, Anja-Silvia Goeing, and Anthony Grafton [Princeton University Press, 9780691179544]

A landmark history that traces the creation, management, and sharing of information through six centuries

Thanks to modern technological advances, we now enjoy seemingly unlimited access to information. Yet how did information become so central to our everyday lives, and how did its processing and storage make our data-driven era possible? This volume is the first to consider these questions in comprehensive detail, tracing the global emergence of information practices, technologies, and more, from the premodern era to the present. With entries spanning archivists to algorithms and scribes to surveilling, this is the ultimate reference on how information has shaped and been shaped by societies.

Written by an international team of experts, the book's inspired and original long- and short-form contributions reconstruct the rise of human approaches to creating, managing, and sharing facts and knowledge. Thirteen full-length chapters discuss the role of information in pivotal epochs and regions, with chief emphasis on Europe and North America, but also substantive treatment of other parts of the world as well as current global interconnections. More than 100 alphabetical entries follow, focusing on specific tools, methods, and concepts—from ancient coins to the office memo, and censorship to plagiarism. The result is a wide-ranging, deeply immersive collection that will appeal to anyone drawn to the story behind our modern mania for an informed existence.

- Tells the story of information's rise from 1450 through to today
- Covers a range of eras and regions, including the medieval Islamic world, late imperial East Asia, early modern and modern Europe, and modern North America

Includes 100 concise articles on wide-ranging topics:

- Concepts: data, intellectual property, privacy
- Formats and genres: books, databases, maps, newspapers, scrolls and rolls, social media
- People: archivists, diplomats and spies, readers, secretaries, teachers
- Practices: censorship, forecasting, learning, political reporting, translating
- Processes: digitization, quantification, storage and search
- Systems: bureaucracy, platforms, telecommunications
- Technologies: cameras, computers, lithography
- Provides an informative glossary, suggested further reading (a short bibliography accompanies each entry), and a detailed index

TREASURES OF KNOWLEDGE: AN INVENTORY OF THE OTTOMAN PALACE LIBRARY (1502/3-1503/4) (2 VOL SET) edited by Gülru Necipoğlu, Cemal Kafadar, and Cornell H. Fleischer [Open Access]

Volume I: Essays [9789004386983] / Volume II: Transliteration and Facsimile "Register of Books" (*Kitāb al-kutub*), MS Török F. 59; Magyar Tudományos Akadémia Könyvtára Keleti Gyűjtemény (Oriental Collection of the Library of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences) [9789004402454] [Series: Muqarnas, Supplements, Brill, 9789004402485, 2vol set]

The subject of this two-volume publication is an inventory of manuscripts in the book treasury of the Topkapı Palace in Istanbul, commissioned by the Ottoman sultan Bayezid II from his royal librarian ʿAtufi in the year 908 (1502–3) and transcribed in a clean copy in 909 (1503–4). This unicum inventory preserved in the Oriental Collection of the Library of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences (Magyar Tudományos Akadémia Könyvtára Keleti Gyűjtemény, MS Török F. 59) records over 5,000 volumes, and more than 7,000 titles, on virtually every branch of human erudition at the time. The Ottoman palace library housed an unmatched encyclopedic collection of learning and literature; hence, the publication of this unique inventory opens a larger conversation about Ottoman and Islamic intellectual/cultural history. The very creation of such a systematically ordered inventory of books raises broad questions about knowledge production and practices of collecting, readership, librarianship, and the arts of the book at the dawn of the sixteenth century.

The first volume contains twenty-eight interpretative essays on this fascinating document, authored by a team of scholars from diverse disciplines, including Islamic and Ottoman history, history of science, arts of the book and codicology, agriculture, medicine, astrology, astronomy, occultism, mathematics, philosophy, theology, law, mysticism, political thought, ethics, literature (Arabic, Persian, Turkish/Turkic), philology, and epistolary. Following the first three essays by the editors on implications of the library inventory as a whole, the other essays focus on particular fields of knowledge under which

books are catalogued in MS Török F. 59, each accompanied by annotated lists of entries. The second volume presents a transliteration of the Arabic manuscript, which also features an Ottoman Turkish preface on method, together with a reduced-scale facsimile. <>

Structures of Epic Poetry: Vol. I: Foundations. Vol. II.1/II.2: Configuration. Vol. III: Continuity edited by: Christiane Reitz and Simone Finkmann [De Gruyter, Hardcover: ISBN: 9783110492002; Electronic: ISBN: 9783110492590]

This compendium (4 vols.) studies the continuity, flexibility, and variation of structural elements in epic narratives. It provides an overview of the structural patterns of epic poetry by means of a standardized, stringent terminology. Both diachronic developments and changes within individual epics are scrutinized in order to provide a comprehensive structural approach and a key to intra- and intertextual characteristics of ancient epic poetry.

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Volume I offers a survey of the fundamental issues concerning the history, theory, genre, and subject matter of ancient epic, and analyses its core structures, such as similes, catalogues, and ekphraseis.

Volumes II.1 and II.2 tackle the most prominent structural elements used to describe battle narratives, epic journeys, movement in time and space, as well as the communication between different groups of epic characters.

Volume III is devoted to the post-classical history of epic poetry, with chapters on late antique, Byzantine, and Neo-Latin epic poetry, as well as the cento. It includes an overview of ancient narrative poems commonly classified as epyllia and epics in addition to a core bibliography comprising the main editions and commentaries from Homer to Silius Italicus.

All volumes moreover contain extensive indices (locorum, nominum, rerum) and up-to-date bibliographies. <>

Treasures of Knowledge: An Inventory of the Ottoman Palace Library (1502/3-1503/4) (2 vol set) edited by Gülru Necipoğlu, Cemal Kafadar, and Cornell H. Fleischer [Open Access]

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The Logic of Narratives by EunHee Lee [Utrecht Studies in Language and Communication, Brill, Rodopi, 9789004422124]

The Logic of Narratives is a linguistic study of narrative discourse that contextualizes the 'logical' rather than the 'stylistic' aspect of narratives within the range of current issues in the interdisciplinary study of narratives being conducted in linguistics, philosophy, literature, cognitive science, and Artificial Intelligence. The book quantitatively analyzes naturally occurring narratives randomly selected from the British National Corpus (BNC) as well as James Joyce's (1882-1941) *The Dead* (1914) and Fredrik Backman's (1981-) *A Man Called Ove* (2012). Discourse Representation Theory (DRT) formalization (Kamp and Reyle, 1993) is employed and enriched with the representations and interpretations of perspective/point of view, genre differences, coherence relations, and episodes, which are called in the book Perspectival DRT (PDRT). <>

Niccolò di Lorenzo della Magna and the Social World of Florentine Printing, ca. 1470–1493 by Lorenz Böninger [I Tatti Studies in Italian Renaissance History, Harvard University Press, 9780674251137]

A new history of one of the foremost printers of the Renaissance explores how the Age of Print came to Italy.

Lorenz Böninger offers a fresh history of the birth of print in Italy through the story of one of its most important figures, Niccolò di Lorenzo della Magna. After having worked for several years for a judicial court in Florence, Niccolò established his business there and published a number of influential books. Among these were Marsilio Ficino's *De christiana religione*, Leon Battista Alberti's *De re aedificatoria*, Cristoforo Landino's commentaries on Dante's *Commedia*, and Francesco Berlinghieri's *Septe giornate della geographia*. Many of these books were printed in vernacular Italian.

Despite his prominence, Niccolò has remained an enigma. A meticulous historical detective, Böninger pieces together the thorough portrait that scholars have been missing. In doing so, he illuminates not only Niccolò's life but also the Italian printing revolution generally. Combining Renaissance studies' traditional attention to bibliographic and textual concerns with a broader social and economic history of printing in Renaissance Italy, Böninger provides an unparalleled view of the business of printing in its earliest years. The story of Niccolò di Lorenzo furnishes a host of new insights into the legal issues that printers confronted, the working conditions in printshops, and the political forces that both encouraged and constrained the publication and dissemination of texts. <>

Brill's Companion to the Reception of Presocratic Natural Philosophy in Later Classical Thought edited by Chelsea C. Harry and Justin Habash [Brill's Companions to Philosophy: Ancient Philosophy, Brill, 9789004318175]

In **Brill's Companion to the Reception of Presocratic Natural Philosophy in Later Classical Thought,** contributions by Gottfried Heinemann, Andrew Gregory, Justin Habash, Daniel W. Graham, Oliver Primavesi, Owen Goldin, Omar D. Álvarez Salas, Christopher Kurfess, Dirk L. Couprie, Tiberiu Popa, Timothy J. Crowley, Liliana Carolina Sánchez Castro, Iakovos Vasiliou, Barbara Sattler, Rosemary Wright, and a foreword by Patricia Curd explore the influences of early Greek science (6-4th c. BCE) on the philosophical works of Plato, Aristotle, and the Hippocratics.

Rather than presenting an unified narrative, the volume supports various ways to understand the development of the concept of nature, the emergence of science, and the historical context of topics such as elements, principles, soul, organization, causation, purpose, and cosmos in ancient Greek philosophy. <>

Greek Rhetoric of the 4th Century BC: The Elixir of Democracy and Individuality by Evangelos Alexiou, translated by Daniel Webber [De Gruyter, 9783110559798]

The interaction between orator and audience, the passions and distrust held by many concerning the predominance of one individual, but also the individual's struggle as an advisor and political leader, these are the quintessential elements of 4th century rhetoric. As an individual personality, the orator draws strength from his audience, while the rhetorical texts mirror his own thoughts and those of his audience as part of a two-way relationship, in which individuality meets, opposes, and identifies with the masses. For the first time, this volume systematically compares minor orators with the major figures of rhetoric, Demosthenes and Isocrates, taking into account other findings as well, such as extracts of Hyperides from the Archimedes Palimpsest. Moreover, this book provides insight into the controversy surrounding the art of discourse in the rhetorical texts of Anaximenes, Aristotle, and especially of Isocrates who took up a clear stance against the philosophy of the 4th century. <>

Atomism in the Aeneid: Physics, Politics, and Cosmological Disorder by Matthew M. Gorey [Oxford University Press, 9780197518748]

Scholars have long recognized Lucretius's *De Rerum Natura* as an important allusive source for the *Aeneid*, but significant disagreement persists regarding the scope and purpose of Virgil's engagement with Epicurean philosophy. In *Atomism in the* Aeneid, Matthew M. Gorey investigates that engagement and argues that atomic imagery functions as a metaphor for cosmic and political disorder in Virgil's epic, associating the enemies of Aeneas and of Rome's imperial destiny with the haphazard, purposeless chaos of Epicurean atoms in the void. While nearly all of Virgil's allusions to atomism are constructed from Lucretian intertextual material, Gorey shows how the poet's negative reception of atomism draws upon a long and popular tradition of anti-atomist discourse in Greek philosophy that metaphorically likened the non-teleological cosmology of atomism to civic disorder and mob rule. By situating Virgil's atomic allusions within the tradition of philosophical opposition to Epicurean physics, **Atomism in the Aeneid: Physics, Politics, and Cosmological Disorder** illustrates the deeply ideological nature of his engagement with Lucretius. <>

Porphyry's On the Cave of the Nymphs in its Intellectual Context by K. Nilüfer Akçay [Studies in Platonism, Neoplatonism, and the Platonic Tradition, Brill, 9789004407596] Open Access

Neoplatonic allegorical interpretation expounds how literary texts present philosophical ideas in an enigmatic and coded form, offering an alternative path to the divine truths. The Neoplatonist Porphyry's *On the Cave of the Nymphs* is one of the most significant allegorical interpretation handed down to us from Antiquity. This monograph, exclusively dedicated to the analysis of *On the Cave of Nymphs*, demonstrates that Porphyry interprets Homer's verse from Odyssey 13.102-112 to convey his philosophical thoughts, particularly on the material world, relationship between soul and body and the salvation of the soul through the doctrines of Plato and Plotinus. The Homeric cave of the nymphs with two gates is a station where the souls descend into genesis and ascend to the intelligible realm. Porphyry associates Odysseus' long wanderings with the journey of the soul and its salvation from the irrational to rational through escape from all toils of the material world. <>

The Religion of the Mithras Cult in the Roman Empire Mysteries of the Unconquered Sun by Roger Beck [Oxford University Press, 9780198140894]

This book provides a new description of Mithraism, one of the mystery cults of the Roman Empire, from the perspective of its initiates. Mithraism, which was centred on the sun god Mithras, is described as a complex of symbolic representations created, apprehended, and transmitted not only in the medium of an extraordinarily rich

and detailed iconography, but also in ritual action and language, in cult life and hierarchy, and in the design of its sacred space, the mithraeum. <>

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The Byzantine Sinbad by Michael Andreopoulos, translated by Jeffrey Beneker, Craig A. Gibson [Dumbarton Oaks Medieval Library, 9780674251472]

The Byzantine Sinbad collects *The Book of Syntipas the Philosopher* and *The Fables of Syntipas*, both translated from Syriac in the late eleventh century by the scholar Michael Andreopoulos.

Originally written in Persian and part of a multilingual and multicultural medieval storytelling tradition, *The Book of Syntipas* recounts how the Persian king Cyrus's unnamed son—a student of the fictional philosopher Sinbad, who is known in Greek as Syntipas—is falsely accused of rape by a royal concubine. While the young man awaits execution, seven philosophers and the concubine attempt to influence Cyrus's judgment. After seven days of storytelling, the son is exonerated and demonstrates the wisdom he learned from Syntipas.

The sixty-two moral tales in *The Fables of Syntipas* are inspired mainly by the tradition of Aesop but include fifteen that are uniquely attributed to the philosopher.

This volume is the first English translation to bring together Andreopoulos's Byzantine Greek texts. <>

Meditations: The Annotated Edition by Marcus Aurelius, edited, translated and commentary by Robin Waterfield [Basic Books, 9781541673854]

This definitive annotated translation of Marcus Aurelius's **Meditations** is an insightful look into the mind of Ancient Rome's sixteenth emperor.

Marcus Aurelius Antoninus (121-180 CE) was the sixteenth emperor of Rome—and by far the most powerful man in the world. Yet he was also an intensely private person, with a rich interior life and one of the wisest minds of his generation. He collected his thoughts in notebooks, gems that have come to be called his *Meditations*. Never intended for publication, the work has proved an inexhaustible source of wisdom and one of the most important Stoic texts of all time. In often passionate language, the entries range from one-line aphorisms to essays, from profundity to bitterness.

This annotated edition offers the definitive translation of this classic and much beloved text, with copious notes from world-renowned classics expert Robin Waterfield. It illuminates one of the greatest works of popular philosophy for new readers and enriches the understanding of even the most devoted Stoic. <>

Julian and Christianity: Revisiting the Constantinian Revolution by David Neal Greenwood [Cornell University Press, 9781501755477]

The Roman emperor Julian is a figure of ongoing interest and the subject of David Neal Greenwood's **Julian and Christianity**.

This unique examination of Julian as the last pagan emperor and anti-Christian polemicist revolves around his drive and status as a ruler. Greenwood adeptly outlines the dramatic impact of Julian's short-lived regime on the course of history, with a particular emphasis on his relationship with Christianity.

Julian has experienced a wide-ranging reception throughout history, shaped by both adulation and vitriol, along with controversies and rumors that question his sanity and passive ruling. His connections to Christianity, however, are rooted in his regime's open hostility, which Greenwood shows is outlined explicitly in Oration 7: To the Cynic Heracleios. Greenwood's close reading of *Oration* 7 highlights not only Julian's extensive anti-Christian religious program and decided rejection of Christianity but also his brilliant, calculated use of that same religion. As Greenwood emphasizes in **Julian and Christianity,** these attributes were inextricably tied to Julian's relationship with Christianity—and how he appropriated certain theological elements from the religion for his own religious framework, from texts to deities. <>

History in Games: Contingencies of an Authentic Past edited by Martin Lorber, Felix Zimmermann [transcript Verlag, 9783837654202]

Where do we end up when we enter the time machine that is the digital game? One axiomatic truth of historical research is that the past is the time-space that eludes human intervention. Every account made of the past is therefore only an approximation. But how is it that strolling through ancient Alexandria can feel so real in the virtual world? Claims of authenticity are prominent in discussions surrounding the digital games of our time. What is historical authenticity and does it even matter? When does authenticity or the lack thereof become political? By answering these questions, the book illuminates the ubiquitous category of authenticity from the perspective of historical game studies. <>

Games and Rules: Game Mechanics for the "Magic Circle" edited by Beat Suter, Mela Kocher, René Bauer [Media Studies, Transcript-Verlag 9783837643046]

Why do we play games and why do we play them on computers? The contributors of *Games and Rules* take a closer look at the core of each game and the motivational system that is the game mechanics. Games are control circuits that organize the game world with their (joint) players and establish motivations in a dedicated space, a "Magic Circle," whereas game mechanics are constructs of rules designed for interactions that provide gameplay. Those rules form the base for all the excitement and frustration we experience in games. This anthology contains individual essays by authors with backgrounds in game design and game studies, who lead the discourse to get to the bottom of game mechanics in video games and the real world.

Philosophy of Law as an Integral Part of Philosophy: Essays on the Jurisprudence of Gerald J Postema edited by Thomas Bustamante and Thiago Lopes Decat [HART, 9781509933884]

This edited collection considers the work of one of the most important legal philosophers of our time, Professor Gerald J Postema. It includes contributions from expert philosophers of law.

The chapters dig deep into important camps of Postema's rich theoretical project including:

- the value of the rule of law;
- the ideal of integrity in adjudication;
- his works on analogical reasoning;
- the methodology of jurisprudence;
- dialogues with Ronald Dworkin, Joseph Raz, Frederick Schauer and HLA Hart.

The collection includes an original article by Professor Postema, in which he develops his conception of the rule of law and replies to some objections to previous works, and an interview in which he provides a fascinating and unique insight into his philosophy of law. <>

Kripkes Metaphysik möglicher Welten (Kripke's Metaphysics of Possible Worlds) by Sebastian Krebs [Philosophical Analysis, De Gruyter, ISBN: 9783110651188] Principal language: German

In this study, Sebastian Krebs elaborates a metaphysical deflationism in response to the question of the ontological status of possibility and necessity. In doing so, he not only offers the first German-language introduction to Kripke's metaphysics; he also clarifies the much misunderstood yet crucial concept of possible worlds in formal modal logic.

Der ontologische Status von Möglichkeit und Notwendigkeit ist eines der zentralen Probleme sowohl der klassischen als auch der modernen Metaphysik. In der analytischen Philosophie wird dieses Problem zumeist als Frage der Interpretation von möglichen Welten aufgefasst: ein Konzept, das (unter anderem) auf den amerikanischen Logiker und Sprachphilosophen Saul Kripke zurückgeht. Zur Interpretation dieses Konzepts leistet das vorliegende Buch einen entscheidenen Beitrag, in dem es aus Kripkes vage Andeutungen eine deflationäre Metaphysik möglicher Welten entwickelt und in den Zusammenhang von sprachphilosophischer Referenztheorie, formaler Logik und metaphysischem Essentialismus einbettet. Dabei leistet Sebastian Krebs nicht nur die erste deutschsprachige Einführung in Kripkes Metaphysik, sondern bietet eine ausführliche Auseinandersetzung mit David Lewis' modalem Realismus und anderen wichtigen Positionen der analytischen Metaphysik. Sein modalmetaphysischer Deflationismus klärt schließlich nicht nur das Konzept der möglichen Welten, sondern entwirrt die metaphysisch "aufgeblasene" Debatte um den ontologischen Status von Möglichkeit und Notwendigkeit durch eine konsequente Rückbindung an den gesunden Menschenverstand. <>

White Freedom: The Racial History of an Idea by Tyler Stovall [Princeton University Press, 9780691179469]

The racist legacy behind the Western idea of freedom

The era of the Enlightenment, which gave rise to our modern conceptions of freedom and democracy, was also the height of the trans-Atlantic slave trade. America, a nation founded on the principle of liberty, is also a nation built on African slavery, Native American genocide, and systematic racial discrimination. **White Freedom: The Racial History of an Idea** traces the complex relationship between freedom and race from the eighteenth century to today, revealing how being free has meant being white. <>