SPOTLIGHT
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Wordtrade Reviews: Sky Life, Riddle Likeness

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Editorial Appraisals:

Some qualified reviewers offer their own brief evaluation of the book. Otherwise most of our content represents the authors'-editors' own words as a preview to their approach to the subject, their style and point-of-view. <>

TREES OF LIFE by Max Adams [Princeton University Press, 9780691212739]

An informative, richly illustrated book about eighty of the world's most important and remarkable trees

Our planet is home to some three trillion trees—roughly four hundred for every person on Earth. In TREES OF LIFE, Max Adams selects, from sixty thousand extant species, eighty remarkable trees through which to celebrate the richness of humanity's relationship with trees, woods, and forests.

In a sequence of informative and beautifully illustrated portraits, divided between six thematic sections, Adams investigates the trees that human cultures have found most useful across the world and ages: trees that yield timber and other materials of immense practical value, trees that bear edible fruits and nuts, trees that deliver special culinary ingredients and traditions, and trees that give us dyes, essences, and medicines. In a section titled "Supertrees," Adams considers trees that have played a pivotal role in maintaining natural and social communities, while a final section, "Trees for the Planet," looks at a group of trees so valuable to humanity that they must be protected at all costs from loss.

From the apple to the oak, the logwood to the breadfruit, and the paper mulberry to the Dahurian larch, these are trees that offer not merely shelter, timber, and fuel but also drugs, foods, and fibers. TREES OF LIFE presents a plethora of fascinating stories about them.

Reviews

"[A] richly illustrated tome. It has the classic look of a coffee table book, but it will arouse your curiosity when you open it at random — to the point where you will want to read it cover to cover for its lively descriptions of 80 trees."—Joshua Siskin, *The Orange County Register*

"TREES OF LIFE can turn any reader into a tree expert."—Nicole Noechel, *Washington Gardener*

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The trees in your Life

What is a tree of life? What makes a tree useful? The short answer is that all trees are life-giving; all are useful. Trees, like the oceans, drive the earth's climate and its incomparable biodiversity, absorbing carbon dioxide, pollutants and the energy of sunlight and giving out oxygen. Trees cycle water and gaseous nitrogen, act as air conditioners and provide habitats for millions of species of other plants, insects, birds, mammals and amphibians. They stabilize and enrich soils, slow down floods.

A single veteran tree standing in a field may host more than 300 species of birds and insects. Exploiting it for food, they also use it as a place to nest and reproduce, take refuge from predators in the cracks and fissures of its bark, or as a perch from which to advertise their wares to potential mates. Trees forming a continuous canopy — as woods or forests — create biomes on a grander scale, sometimes spanning nations and continents as a huge living organism of almost infinite interlocking and interdependent biological and behavioural relationships. When trees die their materials are recycled or act as carbon sinks.

For early humans, an intelligent species foraging in the savannah forests of East Africa and highly dependent on trees, they have been partners in a great cultural adventure. Trees provide shelter and shade as well as materials for constructing the most elemental and elegant tools and building shelters. We eat their fruit, use their leaves, bark and roots for medicines; their wood fuelled the fires that liberated us as a thinking, creative species. Trees have colonized every continent that supports permanent human communities; they, like us, are adaptable and resourceful. At least 60,000 species have evolved during the last 300 million years, brilliantly responding to every opportunity and threat that nature offers.

Trees' beauty, adaptability and resilience, their longevity and apparent stoicism have also inspired humans. The role of trees in connecting the heavens and the earth, life and death in ever-renewing cycles can seem almost magical. Mythology makes much of their supposed wisdom, their supernatural abilities and their propensity to host living spirits. Artists and writers have eulogized, anthropomorphized, satirized and observed trees over millennia. As botanists and biologists study the miraculous workings of trees they seem to become more, not less, marvellous and complex. We know that trees can communicate with each other above and below ground; that they can draw up water from the soil to improbable heights; that they effortlessly and routinely create solid matter from light, gas and water; that they have found all manner of means to reproduce at a distance with immovable potential partners.

Humans are restless, curious, empirical experimenters with nature. From the first use of a sharp tool to split a log or peel bark, communities have explored and exploited trees over the best part of a million years. In every habitable region of the planet intimate practical knowledge of their uses, materials, propagation and behaviour has been accumulated and passed on to new generations. In the Caribbean young children and visitors are warned not to shelter from rain beneath the poisonous manchineel tree (Hippomane mancinella) for fear of horrible blisters, and never to eat its promising-looking fruit. The herders of the Altai mountains in Kazakhstan long since learned to trust their pigs and horses to find the sweetest varieties of wild apples. In Southeast Asia the knowledge that certain trees, when damaged,

exude a mouldable and waterproof milky-white substance was acquired thousands of years ago. The memory of the genius who first dried and roasted the bean of the cacao tree of the Andes to taste the food of the gods is lost in the mists of time.

In this book I celebrate the richness of our relationship with trees, woods and forests in a series of portraits of those trees that have spawned particularly interesting relations with human communities. In many cases these are stories of deep local knowledge followed by global discovery, exploitation, environmental fallout and social oppression. In others, obscure and unprepossessing trees have turned out to hold potential solutions to the challenges of modern life through their medicinal properties or their status as keystones in subsistence strategies for some of the world's poorest communities. Where possible, I have illustrated the stories with fine photography or with paintings by great artists or botanical illustrators.

Individual species have, quite naturally, found themselves fitting into a number of themes. In the first chapter I look at those trees that have yielded materials of great practical value — from timber with a huge range of handy characteristics to bark for paper and rope, nuts for lighting and seed cases for percussion instruments. I devote a chapter to the edible fruits and nuts, some better known than others; another to trees that have given us special culinary ingredients and traditions. Dyes, essences and medicines are the focus of a dozen or so tree profiles, while a whole section is devoted to what I call trees for the planet — species so valuable to all humanity that they must be protected from loss by neglect or ignorance. I have also chosen a select few species for a chapter called `Supertrees' — a baker's dozen of arboreal A-listers that punch far above their weight. Some trees might have sat comfortably in other chapters but I hope that, as a whole, my choices — a very small selection out of thousands of `useful' species — will encourage readers to learn more about these givers of life on which we rely so much and about the communities who value and protect these natural riches under our care.

In a world of plastics, concrete, steel, creeping deserts and dwindling mineral resources, it is worth reminding ourselves of these ever-giving biological, chemical and engineering marvels that can and will sustain so many of our material and aesthetic needs, if only we allow them space, and time.

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The Earth supports about sixty thousand tree species. I wonder, how many of them would you come across in an average day? If you live in the countryside, or walk regularly through a public park on your way to or from work, you might recognise twenty or thirty: species native to your local climate, or exotic ornamentals collected by botanists or enthusiasts. And then, you could look around your home and wonder if there is any sign at all of the trees that keep the planet breathing and sustain local communities globally. You might be surprised.

And then there's your diet—starting with breakfast: coffee, juice, cereal? If you drink coffee, the beans used to grind it came from one of two species of this small, red-berried drought-resistant tree: *Coffea arabica* and *Coffea robusta*—both native to the Horn of Africa and SW Asia. Why those two specifically? It's hard to say. There are more than 120 species of coffee tree, some of them dangerously vulnerable to extinction. A few are naturally low in caffeine; others have distinctly interesting genes. Many coffee growers use the trees both as a source of valuable income and as interplanted shade to protect other food crops.

A RIPE COFFEE ARABICA CHERRY

As for your juice, it's probably one of the citrus fruits, all cultigens—species modified and selected by humans so long ago that their wild ancestors have disappeared. They supply much of our winter vitamin C—essential for life. Like many others I like to eat muesli. I especially value the vitamins and minerals I get from a favourite mix of nut-bearing trees: hazelnuts (*Corylus avellana*), walnuts (*Juglans regia*), Brazil nuts (*Bertholetia excelsa*) and almonds (*Prunus dulcis*).

HAZELNUTS

At the weekend, why not indulge in pancakes with syrup (*Acer saccharum*) or even chocolate sauce (*Cacao theobroma*). You might be resting your cereal bowl on a mat made of cork (*Quercus suber*)—the remarkably self-replenishing bark of an evergreen Mediterranean oak.

CORK OAKS FROM NORTHERN SPAIN

Over-indulgence might have you reaching for your medicine cupboard: for aspirin (originally synthesised from the bark of the white willow, *Salix alba*). Many, much more complex medicines also derive from trees: anti-cancer drugs from the Pacific yew (*Taxus brevifolia*), quinine (*Cinchona officinalis*) for reducing malarial fever. If you've had root canal work, the chances are you have an implant of gutta percha (*Palaquium gutta*), a latex that first revolutionised transatlantic telegraph communication in the 29th century.

CACAO (THEOBROMA CACAO)

Trees are everywhere in our lives: in food, medicine, construction, play; in arts; in industrial materials; in the newsprint and books you read. Many rural communities around the world have special relations with trees that offer them all sorts of resources: spices, treatments for ailments; wood for fuel, building, carving, tools and weapons; with writing materials and fencing; with leaves for shade, fodder and roofing; twigs for basketry and small devices or tools. Others, like the marvellous Gao tree (*Faidherbia albida*) of Africa, are legumes, fixing nitrogen in the soil to improve fertility for other crops. Many trees that we take for granted have been overexploited, with devastating consequences for both indigenous communities who are sustained by their life-giving materials. The widespread destruction of a very precious coastal biome called mangal, consisting primarily of mangrove (*Rhizophora* spp.) exacerbated the devastating effects of the December 2005 tsunami. Where did all those mangrove trees go? Primarily to make charcoal for your garden barbecue; and to allow for fish farms. Deforestation, climate change and indigenous cultures are umbilically linked.

PICHAVARAM MANGROVE FORESTS IN INDIA

But trees are not just essential for life; they underpin civilisation in all its richness. They do not just form flood-preventing, timber rich forests, but are keystones in both natural and human ecologies. Much that is removed in processing precious foods, medicines and materials destined for the markets of the Developed World provides vital resources for the communities, sometimes living on the margins of subsistence, who nurture and harvest those trees. We depend on their knowledge and skills to sustain them and enrich our lives.

In **TREES OF LIFE** I have collected together stories and profiles of some 80 of the world's most useful trees—a very small sample. The book is illustrated with both sumptuous photographs and with some of the fine art that trees have inspired. It is both a celebration of their richness and a warning not to take them, and their human partners in survival, for granted.

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HOW TO WRITE A MYSTERY: A HANDBOOK FROM MYSTERY WRITERS OF AMERICA edited by Lee Child with Laurie R. King [Scribner, 9781982149437]

From the most successful mystery writers in the business, an invaluable guide to crafting mysteries—from character development and plot to procedurals and thrillers—a must-have for every aspiring mystery writer.

Mystery Writers of America (MWA) is known for providing unparalleled resources on the craft, art, and business of storytelling, helping writers of all levels improve their skills for nearly a century. Now, this new handbook helps authors navigate the ever-shifting publishing landscape—from pacing, plotting, the business side of publishing, to the current demand for diversity and inclusivity across all genres, and more.

Featuring essays by a new generation of bestselling experts on various elements of the craft and shorter pieces of crowd-sourced wisdom from the MWA membership as a whole, the topics covered can be categorized as follows:

➔ Before Writing (rules; genres; setting; character; research; etc.)
➔ While Writing (outlining; the plot; dialogue; mood; etc.)
➔ After Writing (agents; editors; self-pub; etc.)
➔ Other than Novels (short stories; true crime; etc.)
➔ Other Considerations (diverse characters; legal questions; criticism)

Also included is a collection of essays from MWA published authors—including Jeffery Deaver, Tess Gerritsen, and Charlaine Harris—selected by bestselling authors Lee Child and Laurie King and arranged thematically answering, "What piece of writing advice do you wish you'd had at the beginning of your career?"

Highly anticipated and incredibly useful, this new and trusted guide from MWA's experts provides practical, current, easily digestible advice for new and established authors alike.

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Excerpt: Let's get the jokes out of the way first: "Every successful mystery novel must have two specific attributes. Unfortunately, no one knows what they are." "What's the difference between a thriller and a mystery? An extra zero on the advance." And so on, and so forth.

In fact, the attributes a successful mystery must have are many and various, and the successful mystery writers in this book explore them in depth. The question of definition is equally complex. What actually is a mystery? The word means different things to different people. Publishers, editors, reviewers, and genre buffs tend to infer an exact specification, narrow enough to be precise yet broad enough to include several even more precise subcategories. By contrast, I have known several older folks, all very well educated, who call anything south of, say, Haruki Murakami a "mystery."

Publishers, editors, and reviewers need to be precise, and genre buffs like to be, but writers don't have to join them. I write without a plan or an outline. The way I picture my process is this: The novel is a movie stuntman, about to get pushed off a sixty-story building. The prop guys have a square fire-department airbag ready on the sidewalk below. One corner is marked Mystery, one Thriller, one Crime Fiction, and one Suspense. The stuntman is going to land on the bag. (I hope.) But probably not dead-on. Probably somewhat off center. But biased toward which corner? I don't know yet. And I really don't mind. I'm excited to find out.

I think most writers are like that. And they should be, because most readers are. Or, nowadays, most consumers. Mystery Writers of America was founded around the slogan "Crime doesn't pay. Enough." We acknowledge commercial realities, because we're all subject to them. The demand for story is still huge. But the supply is growing. In the old days, movies and TV competed with books for leisure time, but they didn't really scratch the same itch. Now, quality long-form narrative television gets dangerously close.

Therefore we need to write better than ever. And we should feel free to use the whole airbag. "Mystery writers" is a noble and evocative term, but we shouldn't think it limits us. Far from it. From day one, MWA was all over the map. We need to keep it that way, fluid and flexible—and better than ever.

You can make a start on figuring out how by reading this book. It's all here. I'm deeply grateful to all the contributors—and I think you will be, too, eventually—and to those who worked hard behind the scenes. A lot of people gave up a lot of time. Why? Because they want you to be them, twenty years from now. Hopefully even better. They're telling you how. Weird, I know. Maybe that's one of the attributes. A successful mystery novel must be written by a good human being. Plus one other thing. Unfortunately, no one knows what it is. <>

HEGEL ON TRAGEDY AND COMEDY: NEW ESSAYS edited by Mark Alznauer [SUNY, 9781438483375]

Explores the full extent of Hegel's interest in tragedy and comedy throughout his works and extends from more literary and dramatic issues to questions about the role these genres play in the history of society and religion.

No philosopher has treated the subject of tragedy and comedy in as original and searching a manner as G. W. F. Hegel. His concern with these genres runs throughout both his early and late works and extends from aesthetic issues to questions in the history of society and religion. **HEGEL ON TRAGEDY AND COMEDY** is the first book to explore the full extent of Hegel's interest in tragedy and comedy. The contributors analyze his treatment of both ancient and modern drama, including major essays on Sophocles, Aristophanes, Shakespeare, Goethe, and the German comedic tradition, and examine the relation of these genres to political, religious, and philosophical issues. In addition, the volume includes several essays on the role tragedy and comedy play in Hegel's philosophy of history. This book will not only be valuable to those who wish for a general overview of Hegel's treatment of tragedy and comedy but also to those who want to understand how his treatment of these genres is connected to the rest of his thought.

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Excerpt: The famous English literary critic A. C. Bradley once remarked that, in the time since Aristotle first delineated the main features of the subject of tragedy in Ancient Greece, no philosopher had treated the subject in as original and searching a manner as Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831). Similar praise could be given of Hegel's treatment of comedy—though here Hegel worked without as much guidance from Aristotle, whose own discussion of comedy is incomplete in the text of the Poetics that has come down to us. Certainly, Hegel's concern with the genres of tragedy and comedy was no passing one; it is evident in his early theological writings, it plays an important role in his Jena masterwork, the Phenomenology of Spirit, and it recurs throughout the writings and lectures of his mature period, most prominently in his lectures on aesthetics, which were given repeatedly in the last decade of his life. The scholarly literature on tragedy and comedy has grown exponentially since Bradley's comments, but the sheer extensiveness of Hegel's treatment of these genres still stands unsurpassed among philosophical treatments.

In one important respect, however, the comparison of Hegel with Aristotle is misleading, for it underestimates the striking differences between their different ways of understanding drama. Prior to the period in which Hegel wrote, most studies of tragedy and comedy followed Aristotle in restricting themselves to discussions of poetic form, that is, to the description of the formal properties of successful drama: its constituent parts and structure. But although Hegel provides his own account of the elements of poetic form, his interest extends well beyond narrowly aesthetic issues. For Hegel, drama plays an essential role in the historical transformation of political society and the deepening of human subjectivity; it embodies religious worldviews and experience, sometimes leading to their dissolution and reformulation; and it serves as a way of unveiling fundamental metaphysical truths. By allowing drama to raise these political, religious, and metaphysical issues, Hegel treats tragedy and comedy as full participants in the human conversation about what we are and what our place in the world is and ought to be. Although he did not think drama was ultimately equal to philosophy as a medium for such self-reflection, he saw it as sharing the same end or purpose, which is to express the deepest truths of human life.

Hegel was not the first thinker to see the potential for this kind of philosophical engagement with drama, and his influence would help ensure that he was not the last. His specific interest in the philosophical significance of tragedy was anticipated by several of the leading figures of German romanticism, like the poet Friedrich Holderlin and the philosopher Karl Solger, and he was undoubtedly

influenced by pioneering work on the subject by his initially more illustrious friend, F. W. J. von Schelling. His analysis of comedy follows in the wake of philosophical treatments of comedy by August Schlegel and the by comic novelist Jean Paul Richter (whom Hegel nominated for an honorary doctorate after a night of carousing in 1817). But although Hegel might have been comparatively late to try his hand at this, he had unequaled follow-through; he was the only one among his contemporaries who developed this new intuition about the philosophical significance of art into a truly comprehensive theory of tragedy and comedy. His philosophy not only places tragedy and comedy within a systematic hierarchy of the arts, it also includes a comprehensive treatment of their most influential historical forms and integrates them into a philosophy of human activity as a whole. Although theories of this kind of art would continue to attract powerful proponents throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries— one thinks of Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, Heidegger, and Adorno as among the most notable figures in this tradition—none of Hegel's major philosophical successors would treat both tragedy and comedy with as much systematic thoroughness or historical detail.

Despite the prominence of these genres in Hegel's thought, this is the first volume to explore the full extent of Hegel's interest in tragedy and comedy. The thirteen new essays included here range from Hegel's early works on theology and politics to his later philosophy of fine art. They cover his treatments of both ancient and modern writers and pursue his reflections of these genres beyond his aesthetics into his political, religious, and historical writings. Although there are still omissions to make up for in the future, this volume provides the reader with a better idea of the scope and breadth of Hegel's reflections on these genres than any other existing book or collection of essays.

Hegel's lectures on aesthetics offer a useful vantage point from which we can see why tragedy and comedy are so important to his philosophy in general and why it is useful to consider them together.' In those lectures, Hegel argues that poetry is the most perfect of the fine arts and that drama is the highest form of poetry. These claims entail that tragedy and comedy—the two primary forms of drama on his account—are to be placed at the very pinnacle of the fine arts.' Given Hegel's long history of engaging with these genres throughout his writings, it is perhaps unsurprising that they end up in this exalted position. But it is worth asking why they occupy this important place in his final thoughts on art.

Hegel's argument for the supremacy of drama over other forms of art and poetry is impossible to fully extricate from the rest of his system, but it is easy to state the basic standard he uses to arrive at his judgment, for he is very explicit that every artwork and every genre is to be evaluated in terms of its capacity to reveal the deepest and most comprehensive truths. "Art has no other mission [keinen anderen Beruf]," he says, "but to bring before sensuous contemplation the truth as it in the spirit."' So when he claims that tragedy and comedy are the highest forms of art this is because he thinks they are forms that best realize this end, forms that are most capable of revealing the deepest truths of spirit.

We can get some idea of the kind of truth he is concerned with through an understanding of why he thinks drama is so well suited to convey it. The feature of drama that he singles out in this context is its capacity to render the inner lives of human beings, particularly their aims and passions, fully visible in external actions and events. For Hegel, nonlinguistic arts inevitably fail to express the full depths of human spiritual life, and other literary genres fail because they overemphasize either the internal and subjective side of life (as in lyric poetry) or the external and objective side (as in epic poetry). The fine balance between the inner and outer experience that is characteristic of drama is crucial for Hegel

whether we should accept Hegel's way of understanding it. Does one of these genres better explain the ultimate truth of human life than the other, or (as one might expect with Hegel) are they both aspects of some higher truth? Since reconciliation is arguably the central aim of Hegel's philosophy, this is a question that goes to the heart of Hegel's project. To answer it, we need to deepen our understanding of the philosophical significance of tragedy and comedy. The following essays will address this issue.

This volume is grouped into three major sections: one on tragedy, one on comedy, and one on history.

The first two essays in the first section address the complicated relationship between Hegel and the greatest living writer of his time, Johann Wolfgang von Goethe. Goethe was more than a decade older than Hegel and had already established himself as a literary celebrity while Hegel was still in gymnasium, but they would come to know each other as Hegel's star rose in the academy. These essays approach the relationship between these great figures of the Goethezeit from opposite directions: Douglas Finn from the point of view of Hegel's early reception of Goethean tragedy and Eric v. d. Luft from the point of view of Goethe's late reception of Hegel's mature theory of tragedy.

Douglas Finn's essay examines the influence of Goethe's drama on Hegel's early theological writings. He carefully considers Walter Kaufmann's provocative claim that Goethe's Iphigenie auf Tauris (a reworking of the famous Euripidean play) first alerted Hegel to the possibility that Greek ethical life might show us how to overcome divisions and dichotomies in modern life. For Kaufman. Goethe's Iphignie was the hidden model of Hegel's Jesus in The Spirit of Christianity and Its Fate and thus the original source of Hegel's critique of Kantian morality. Finn shows, however, that although both figures share many features—most importantly, they are both what would have been called at the time "beautiful souls"—they respond very differently to the impasses of the circumstances in which they find themselves. Jesus withdraws from society into inwardness, whereas Iphigenia offers forgiveness and the promise of political reconciliation. Over the course of Hegel's philosophical development, the insufficiencies of the former model of the "beautiful soul" become increasingly prominent, and the ideal of forgiveness comes to take on a more central role in his thinking. Finn thus argues that although Goethe's great drama certainly influenced Hegel's early writings, as Kaufmann suggested, it also anticipates insights into the danger of spiritual withdrawal that Hegel himself would not fully understand or express until his later period.

Eric v. d. Luft looks at this same relationship from the other direction: from the point of view of Goethe. Luft shows that Goethe's understanding of Hegel's theory of tragedy was not firsthand but was mediated through the work of Hermann Friedrich Wilhelm Hinrichs, who studied with Hegel at Heidelberg and who might count as Hegel's first major convert. Hinrichs wrote a deeply Hegelian treatise on Sophoclean tragedy, one that Goethe and Johann Peter Eckermann discussed extensively in 1827 (as recounted in Eckermann's famous Gesprache mit Goethe). Luft offers an extensive comparison of Hinrichs's interpretation of tragedy and Goethe's own conception. He explores the grounds of Goethe's summary judgment that the Hegelian interpretation of tragedy reduces the conflicts of Greek drama to a mere expression of ideas and is guilty of excessive moralizing. But Luft also shows that Hegel's theory (as interpreted by Hinrichs) offers something that Goethe's own more purely dramaturgical approach lacks: an attention to the subtle philosophical issues raised by Greek tragedy.

The next three essays show exactly what kind of philosophical themes Hegel found in Greek tragedies of the classical age.

For Wes Furlotte, Hegel's reading of Eumenides by Aeschylus in his "Natural Law" essay is best understood as inaugurating a kind of critical social theory that Hegel was never able to follow through on. His analysis of the "tragedy of the ethical" enables an innovative dialectical approach to critical social theory that pays attention to the contradictions of modern European social life, but it also ends up short-circuiting the potential of such a theory by heralding the availability of a kind of suprapolitical reconciliation that would obviate the need for political reform or revolution. Furlotte carefully identifies where Hegel's attempt to use tragedy as a means for analyzing historical contradictions is diverted into an attempt to provide a spuriously philosophical or metaphysical resolution of these contradictions, ultimately aestheticizing the political. Furlotte's essay thus attempts to rescue the critical kernel from the reactionary metaphysical shell of Hegel's revolutionary new manner of reading drama.

For Anton Barba-Kay, it is Hegel's famous reading of Sophocles's Antigone that is at issue, and the philosophical theme that is raised concerns the significance of sexual difference—the division of humans into men and women. Barba-Kay points out that a striking feature of the Antigone (as opposed to, say, Oedipus Rex) is that the central conflict of the play is sexualized—the contradiction between the city and the home is made concrete as a difference between men and women. He argues that this feature is essential to Hegel's interest in the play, which Hegel considered the single greatest work of tragedy. This was not because Hegel regarded the conflict between the sexes as of eternal metaphysical significance (as it was sometimes treated by his contemporaries like Schelling and Holderlin) but because he thought that it is only when sexual difference takes on ethical significance that the question of the role of nature in ethical life can be properly raised. Antigone is especially interesting, then, because it documents the very moment in history where human nature became a problem for human culture, something that helps to explain why Hegel's treatment of Antigone occurs at the very beginning of his history of spirit in the Jena Phenomenology.

Allegra de Laurentiis offers a more general account of why Hegel took ancient tragedy as the exemplary form of tragedy itself, one that does not focus on any particular tragedian. She agrees with Furlotte and Barba-Kay that the importance of Greek tragedy for Hegel stems from the insight it gives us into the history of spirit, and like Barba-Kay, she thinks the crucial insight it gives us is into an early and unrepeatable moment in that history, one that she thinks involved for Hegel a transformation of human nature. For de Laurentiis's Hegel, Greek tragedy reenacts the moment that humanity entered into political life; that is, the historical moment when the irreconcilable but seemingly equally justified claims of conflicting individuals in the state of nature were first made commensurable and adjudicable by being subsumed under the rule of law. The perennial importance of these tragedies is that they serve as a reminder of this transformation, which forestalls a relapse into pre-political forms of life and their correspondingly inadequate forms of self-consciousness.

In the final essay in this section, Rachel Falkenstern offers a complementary account of Hegel's theory of modern tragedy—particularly Shakespearean tragedy—one that emphasizes the distinct gains in self-consciousness that modern tragic heroes display but that also points to the limits of their self-consciousness. The puzzle she sets out to resolve has to do with the problem of reconciling Hegel's claim that all tragic heroes must be one-sidedly fixed on their aims and his claim that modern life is

characterized precisely by a greater degree of subjective depth and freedom, which seems flatly incompatible with such one-sidedness. What she shows is that Shakespearean heroes are one-sided in a different way than ancient heroes, a way that is compatible with Hegel's account of the deepening of subjectivity. For example, though we might think of Hamlet as the epitome of vacillation and thus a counterexample to Hegel's claims about the importance of one-sidedness, Hegel emphasized that Hamlet was never doubtful about what he was to do—only how he was to do it. Although figures like Hamlet show a clear advance over the self-consciousness of the ancient tragic hero, this advance is not the end of the story. It is only another stage on the road to true or complete freedom for Hegel (the sort of freedom that is only on display in later tragedies, like those of Schiller).

The next group of essays concerns the comparatively neglected topic of Hegel's theory of comedy. Comedy plays a particularly prominent role in Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit; in the penultimate chapter of that book, comedy (particularly Aristophanic comedy) is cast as the final form of "art religion," the form that follows tragedy and prepares the way for the transition to revealed religion. The first two essays on Hegel's theory of comedy, by Peter Wake and Paul Wilford, respectively, offer contrasting views on what comedy is doing in these sections of the Phenomenology.

For Wake, Greek tragedy and comedy offer different means for contemplating the diminution and flight of the gods at the end of the classical period. Tragedy represents the beginning of this process, for in tragedy the gods show themselves to be subject to fate, an eternal justice that asserts itself through the downfall of any individual who oversteps his or her bounds. But comedy completes the secularization of Greek consciousness: for the laughter and ridicule of comedy liberate us from all authority, even that of fate, thus providing us with an experience of the individual self as the negative power through which the gods themselves vanish. According to Wake, comedy represents the complete triumph and elevation of the human subject over all external limits, thus amounting to a kind of secular self-transcendence. He concludes with a suggestion that comedy's primary defect is that the liberation it offers us is both fleeting and ultimately empty—leaving us with nothing but grief at the death of the God.

Wilford's essay picks up at this very point. According to Wilford, Hegel's presentation of Aristophanic comedy in the Phenomenology of Spirit teaches that Aristophanic comedy is not just irreverent and iconoclastic but ultimately nihilistic. It reveals a form of self-consciousness that exalts itself above any determinate norms, over any sense of something higher than self-dissolving subjectivity. Its propensity to lightness thus leads ultimately to despair, an unhappy consciousness, and a sense that there is nothing worth taking seriously. Wilford argues that the transition from comedy to revealed religion is supposed to show that overcoming the nihilistic effects of Aristophanic comedy requires the advent of a form of religion in which the divine is not incompatible with such subjective inwardness but in fact incarnated in a single, self-conscious individual. This is a sense of the divine that is finally adequate to the new depths of subjectivity that comedy has revealed, a "divinity equal to the power of self-consciousness." This, of course, is Christianity.

In the next essay, Martin Donougho offers a general history of Hegel's reflections on comedy, one that returns to the question of the nature of the experience of comedy and provides a new answer as to the kind of truth of spirit that it is supposed to reveal. On Donougho's reading, the experience of the comic is not one of simple negation—the death of God, or nihilism in Wilford's sense—but negation balanced with sympathetic identification with the characters in the comedy. Donougho shows that Hegel's later

lectures on aesthetics continue to view Aristophanes both as the very paradigm of comedy and as the end of the classical ideal of art, but he offers a more complex picture of his accomplishment than we get in the Phenomenology—one where Aristophanes's critical, satirical edge is counterbalanced with seriousness and true patriotism. And even though Hegel never retracted his admiration for Aristophanes, Donougho points to moments in his lectures where Hegel entertained a more positive view of modern comedy, one alive to its own specific virtues. For example, Hegel showed an unusual and surprising enthusiasm for Lustspiel, a form of contemporary light comedy, writing a long review of a now obscure comedy by Ernst Raupach. And he showed great admiration for the stories of T. G. H Appel. These examples, Donoguho argues, suggest that Hegel appreciated the capacity of modern comic art, alongside other seemingly minor artistic genres, to spiritualize the ordinary and quotidian and that he considered these virtues to be specific to modern comedy.

Jeffrey Church shows that Hegel's remarks on comedy are not limited to his aesthetic and religious contexts. Church's essay offers a provocative and original meditation on Hegel's theory of public opinion as involving important comic elements. It is well known that Hegel had deeply ambivalent feelings about the prominence of public opinion in modern societies, claiming that public opinion deserves to both be respected (as to its being the public's opinion) and despised (as to its content). Hegel hoped that the poor judgment of the public would be improved to some degree by the public's exposure to the arguments offered in the Estates Assembly. Church shows how the relationship between these bodies can be usefully modeled on the relationship between an audience and a performed drama. One might imagine that the drama in question is a tragedy in the Hegelian sense—a conflict between two equally justified but one-sided arguments—but he argues that Hegel himself treats it as comedic in nature, as a collision that comes to nothing. By seeing how poorly the public's own complaints fare against the educated insights expressed in the Assembly, the people learn that their own objections to the government are self-dissolving and self-undermining. They are not so much educated to better opinions as they are brought to take their own opinions less seriously. Church concludes with some interesting reflections on the role of comic cheerfulness in our own more democratic political condition.

Although all of the previous essays touch on the historical dimension of Hegel's theory of tragedy and comedy, the third and final section of the volume looks at the tragic and comic dimensions of Hegel's theory of history.

Fiacha Heneghan's essay considers whether Hegel's philosophy of world history can be defended against the common accusation that it is too optimistic by emphasizing its tragic aspects. Heneghan argues that Hegel's treatment of history explicitly incorporates two features from his treatment of tragedy. The first of these is Hegel's claim that the tragic hero's one-sided dedication to her ethical principle leads her into an experience of conflict with something that appears alien to her but that is in reality a part of the hero, a fact that she is able to recognize only in her self-destruction (if then). The second feature is the structural logic of tragic situations, which involves not the conflict between right and wrong but conflict between two ethical spheres that, in history, takes the form of the conflict between states embodying lower and higher principles of freedom. Though both of these elements go some distance in addressing worries that Hegel's philosophy of history is excessively optimistic or theodicean, Heneghan concludes that they do not go far enough; Hegel's theory of history is, despite these elements, still indefensibly optimistic.

Jason M. Yonover's essay focuses on the tragedy of the world-historical individual. We have already seen that Hegel claims that tragedy in the world involves not a conflict between right and wrong but between two rights. Since, as Yonover emphasizes, world-historical individuals take part in just such tragic conflicts, it is natural to ask whether such individuals—individuals who collide with existing ethical orders and who represent new and higher principles—are ultimately justified in contravening what their contemporaries take as right and just. Yonover argues that Hegel's view on this is quite complex—Hegel does not think such individuals are simply in the wrong, nor are they simply in the right. Yonover argues that, on Hegel's account, world-historical individuals have an absolute right that in the final analysis outdoes any wrong they may do, though this is only properly understood after the fact. Yonover holds that Hegel's retrospective justification of such figures is crucial to his vindication of the legitimacy of revolutionary action and so of great importance to any contemporary appropriation of Hegel's ethical thought.

In the final essay in this volume, Allen Speight turns to comic dimensions of history. He draws attention to a striking claim in Hegel's Lectures on Fine Art, a claim that the same principle that gives us the basis of our distinction between tragedy and comedy also provides the basis for the distinction between the ancient and the modern. This suggests the somewhat paradoxical claim that Hegel's treatment of Aristophanes (Hegel's paradigm of the comic art form) might offer us a key to understanding his theory of modernity. Speight points to three possible ways in which this might be so. First, Aristophanes anticipates the theatricality of modern life. Second, Aristophanic comedy represents the very endpoint of all artistic practice: the triumph of the subjective. And, finally, his comedies show us how art can reflect on its own role in life, dissolving not into nihilism or an unambiguous affirmation of life but into a genuinely philosophic meditation on the conditions of human existence. <>

REMEDIOS VARO: THE MEXICAN YEARS by Remedios Varo, edited Masayo Nonaka [RM, 9788415118220]

A definitive survey of the life and work of a singularly appealing and mysterious surrealist painter

REMEDIOS VARO: THE MEXICAN YEARS offers a definitive survey of the life and work of a singularly appealing and mysterious Surrealist painter. Born and raised in Spain, Remedios Varo received her earliest training in Madrid before fleeing the Spanish Civil War in 1937 to join Surrealist circles in Paris. The outbreak of World War II forced her to take refuge in Mexico, where she remained until her untimely death in 1963, and where she created her most enduring work. Known as one of the three "brujas" (witches) active in the Mexico City art milieu, Varo shared an interest in esotericism with fellow painter Leonora Carrington and a range of interests in science, philosophy and the literature of German Romanticism with the photographer Kati Horna. For some ten years, from the mid–1950s until her death in 1963, Varo devoted herself to creating an extraordinary dreamlike oeuvre, on the threshold between mysticism and modernity. Her beautifully crafted images of medieval interiors, occult workshops and androgynous figures engaged in alchemical pursuits evoke the eerie allegories of Hieronymus Bosch, esoteric engravings and the charm and lure of fairytales. This catalogue includes a complete illustrated chronology with never before published images and describes Varo's role in the Mexican Surrealist movement and her relations with Luis Buñuel, Octavio Paz, Benjamin Péret, Alice Rahon, Wolfgang Paalen and many others.

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Remedios Varo (1908–1963) fled the Spanish Civil War and then World War II to settle in Mexico where she helped establish a Mexican Surrealist movement and painted visions that combined modernism with mysticism. She was married to the leading French Surrealist Benjamin Péret.

This book deals with the life and works of one of the most interesting and mysterious surrealist painters of the twentieth century. The first monograph on the artist to circulate worldwide, it includes an introductory study by Masayo Nonaka, curator of the exhibition *Women Surrealists in Mexico* and author of several books on Mexican surrealism. Masayo's essay provide a singular perspective on the pictorial universe of Remedios Varo and is accompanied by magnificent reproductions of her most important paintings.

The group of works included in this book was part of the exhibition *In Wonderland: The Surrealist Adventures of Women Artists in Mexico and the United States*, which visited various venues in the Unites States and Canada in 2012.

Excerpt: Varo sought for harmony and tried to synthesize, or to create a bridge between mysticism or ancient wisdom and the modern mind. In her imaginary world, esotericism touches on certain aspects of the most advanced science, as in her last completed painting, *Still Life Reviving* (1963). This work is no less intriguingly evasive than her other best paintings. It evokes an orthodox religious atmosphere, with the table set for the Last Supper and the burning candle symbolizing the dwindling flame of life, while a gust of wind makes eight plates float into space and flutters the table cloth, as if a poltergeist were at work. A microcosmic track appears on the table as an image of the macrocosm. The fruits collide and explode, spilling their seeds over the earth, and the seeds germinate and sprout with new life, as if symbolizing metempsychosis.

In addition to these mystical and allegorical readings, the painting might also contain a different aspect. Pauwels and Bergier note in **THE MORNING OF THE MAGICIANS: SECRET SOCIETIES, CONSPIRACIES, AND VANISHED CIVILIZATIONS**, a book to which Varo was devoted: "Modern science has shown that behind the visible there exists an extremely complicated invisible. A table, a chair, a starry sky are in fact radically different from our ideas of them: they are systems in motion, suspended energy." Varo might have been rendering the mystery of the universe that contemporary astronomers, physicists, and natural philosophers have been working on. In the imaginary world of Remedios Varo the frontier between mysticism and modern science dissolves, exactly where her surrealism and poetic dreams begin.

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THE GREAT GUIDE: WHAT DAVID HUME CAN TEACH US ABOUT BEING HUMAN AND LIVING WELL by Julian Baggini [Princeton University Press, 9780691205434]

Invaluable wisdom on living a good life from one of the Enlightenment's greatest philosophers

David Hume (1711–1776) is perhaps best known for his ideas about cause and effect and his criticisms of religion, but he is rarely thought of as a philosopher with practical wisdom to offer. Yet Hume's philosophy is grounded in an honest assessment of nature—human nature in particular. THE GREAT GUIDE is an engaging and eye-opening account of how Hume's thought should serve as the basis for a complete approach to life.

In this enthralling book, Julian Baggini masterfully interweaves biography with intellectual history and philosophy to give us a complete vision of Hume's guide to life. He follows Hume on his life's journey, literally walking in the great philosopher's footsteps as Baggini takes readers to the places that inspired Hume the most, from his family estate near the Scottish border to Paris, where, as an older man, he was warmly embraced by French society. Baggini shows how Hume put his philosophy into practice in a life

that blended reason and passion, study and leisure, and relaxation and enjoyment.

THE GREAT GUIDE includes 145 Humean maxims for living well, on topics ranging from the meaning of success and the value of travel to friendship, facing death, identity, and the importance of leisure. This book shows how life is far richer with Hume as your guide.

Reviews

"Marvelous. This enlightening account of Hume's life and thought shows how philosophy's true worth is measured not on the strength of the argument but on the strength of the life that it inspires. Hume once said, 'A wise man proportions his belief to the evidence.' In the case of **THE GREAT GUIDE**, the evidence is clear: Julian Baggini is one of the most delightful writers of philosophy today."—John Kaag, author of *Sick Souls, Healthy Minds: How William James Can Save Your Life*

"A fascinating mix of biography, travelogue, and ideas. This book will enhance Baggini's reputation as one of the most elegant writers in the world of philosophy."—David Edmonds, author of *The Murder of Professor Schlick: The Rise and Fall of the Vienna Circle*

"This unique book is filled with useful maxims for everyday life, illuminating Hume's world while also adding a contemporary touch. Baggini's intermingling of life and philosophy, both past and present, makes for an engaging read."—Angela M. Coventry, author of *Hume: A Guide for the Perplexed*

"In this well-written and accessible book, Baggini shows how Hume's life illustrates and accords with his philosophical standpoints, deftly navigating a good many of the central themes of Hume's work."—Simon Blackburn, author of *What Do We Really Know? The Big Questions of Philosophy*

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Scotland's Hidden Gem

Standing at the top of Calton Hill, close to the center of Edinburgh, is Scotland's National Monument, built to commemorate the Scottish soldiers and sailors who died in the Napoleonic Wars. Modeled on the Parthenon in Athens, it ended up resembling its inspiration more than its designers intended.' While the Parthenon is half destroyed, the National Monument is only half constructed, after work was abandoned in 1829 due to lack of funds.

The monument's evocation of classical Greece in modern Scotland might at first seem incongruous. When Plato and Aristotle were laying down the foundations of Western philosophy, Scotland, like the rest of Britain, was still a preliterate society. However, by the early eighteenth century, it could proudly claim to be the successor of Athens as the philosophical capital of the world. Edinburgh was leading the European Enlightenment, rivaled only by Paris as an intellectual center. In 1757, David Hume, the greatest philosopher the city, Britain, and arguably even the world had ever known, said with some justification that the Scottish "shou'd really be the People most distinguish'd for literature in Europe."

The city produced two of the greatest thinkers of the modern era. One, the economist Adam Smith, is widely known and esteemed. The other, Hume, remains relatively obscure outside academia. Among philosophers, however, he is often celebrated as the greatest among their ranks of all-time. When thousands of academic philosophers were recently asked which non-living predecessor they most identified with, Hume came a clear first, ahead of Aristotle, Kant, and Wittgenstein.' Hume has become the postmortem victim of a phenomenon he himself described: "Learning has been as great a Loser by being shut up in Colleges and Cells, and secluded from the World and good Company." Hume is as adored in academe as he is unknown in the wider world.

Many scientists—not usually great fans of philosophy—also cite Hume as an influence. In a letter to Moritz Schlick, Einstein reports that he read Hume's Treatise "with eagerness and admiration shortly before finding relativity theory?' He goes so far as to say that "it is very well possible that without these philosophical studies I would not have arrived at the solution." Charles Darwin's notebooks also show he read several of Hume's works. Even the biologist Lewis Wolpert, who says philosophers are "very clever but have nothing useful to say whatsoever," makes an exception for Hume, admitting that at one stage he "fell in love" with him.

Not even his academic fans, however, sufficiently appreciate Hume as a practical philosopher. He is most known for his ideas about cause and effect, perception, and his criticisms of religion. People don't tend to pick up Hume because they want to know how to live. This is a great loss. Hume did spend a lot of time writing and thinking about often arcane metaphysical questions, but only because they were important for understanding human nature and our place in the world. "The most abstract speculations concerning human nature, however cold and unentertaining, become subservient to practical morality; and may render this latter science more correct in its precepts, and more persuasive in its exhortations."' For instance, cause and effect was not an abstract metaphysical issue for him but something that touched every moment of our daily experience. He never allowed himself to take intellectual flights of fancy, always grounding his ideas in experience, which he called the "great guide of human life." Hume thus thought about everyday issues in the same way as he did about ultimate ones.

To see how Hume offers us a model of how to live, we need to look not only at his work but at his life. Everyone who knew Hume, with the exception of the paranoid and narcissistic Jean-Jacques Rousseau, spoke highly of him. When he spent three years in Paris in later life he was known as "le bon David," his company sought out by all the salonistes. Baron d'Holbach described him as "a great man, whose friendship, at least, I know to value as it deserves." Adam Smith described him as "approaching as nearly to the idea of a perfectly wise and virtuous man, as perhaps the nature of human frailty will permit."

Hume didn't just write about how to live—he modeled the good life. He was modest in his philosophical pretensions, advocating human sympathy as much as, if not more than, human rationality. He avoided

hysterical condemnations of religion and superstition as well as overly optimistic praise for the power of science and rationality. Most of all, he never allowed his pursuit of learning and knowledge to get in the way of the softening pleasures of food, drink, company, and play. Hume exemplified a way of life that is gentle, reasonable, amiable: all the things public life now so rarely is.

What Hume said and did form equal parts of a harmonious whole, a life of the mind and body that stands as an inspiration to us all. I want to approach David Hume as a synoptic whole, a person whose philosophy touches every aspect of how he lived and who he was. To do that, I need to approach his life and work together. I have followed in Hume's biographical and sometimes geographical footsteps to show why we would be wise to follow in his philosophical ones too.

When we look at his life and person, we also understand better why Hume has not "crossed over" from academic preeminence to public acclaim. In short, he lacks the usual characteristics that give an intellectual mystique and appeal. He is not a tragic, romantic figure who died young, misunderstood, and unknown or unpopular. He was a genial, cheerful man who died loved and renowned. His ideas are far too sensible to shock or not obviously radical enough to capture our attention. His distaste for "enthusiasts"—by which he meant fanatics of any kind—made him too moderate to inspire zealotry in his admirers. These same qualities that made him a rounded, wise figure prevented him from becoming a cult one.

If ever there were a time in recent history to turn to Hume, now is surely it. The enthusiasts are on the rise, in the form of strongman political populists who assert the will of the people as though it were absolute and absolutely infallible. In more settled times, we could perhaps use a Nietzsche to shake us out of our bourgeois complacency, or entertain Platonic dreams of perfect, immortal forms. Now such philosophical excesses are harmful indulgences. Good, uncommon sense is needed more than ever.

I'm going to use a lot of Hume's own words, simply because I find them so elegantly crafted that I can't see how paraphrasing improves them. I know that many people find Hume difficult to read, largely because of his eighteenth-century style, with its long sentences and archaic vocabulary. But within these seemingly meandering and long-winded texts there are so many gems. In particular, Hume knew the importance of beginnings and endings. Take the first paragraph of *An Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals:*

> Disputes with men, pertinaciously obstinate in their principles, are, of all others, the most irksome; except, perhaps, those with persons, entirely disingenuous, who really do not believe the opinions they defend, but engage in the controversy, from affectation, from a spirit of opposition, or from a desire of showing wit and ingenuity, superior to the rest of mankind. The same blind adherence to their own arguments is to be expected in both; the same contempt of their antagonists; and the same passionate vehemence, in inforcing sophistry and falsehood. And as reasoning is not the source, whence either disputant derives his tenets; it is in vain to expect, that any logic, which speaks not to the affections, will ever engage him to embrace sounder principles.

If you can get beyond the use of words like "pertinaciously" (holding firmly to an opinion or a course of action), "whence," and "inforcing," you'll find a paragraph that is almost a miniessay, capturing so much that is true of the nature of obstinacy and why it is objectionable. It also tells you that Hume intends to

avoid the vice. Hume's inquiries are sincere, not attempts to justify his own preexisting beliefs. The reader should approach his work in the same spirit of openness.

I've extracted the essence of the lessons we can learn from him as Humean maxims and aphorisms. From the above passage, for instance, we can distill the principle: When reason has nothing to do with why people hold their beliefs, reason is powerless to change them. Usually these are in my words, sometimes they are in Hume's. They are gathered together in the book's appendix. On some occasions they are negative lessons: things we can learn from Hume's mistakes and failings. The self-detracting and humble Hume would surely have approved of this. He once wrote that one of the things that makes a human superior to other animals is that he "corrects his mistakes; and makes his very errors profitable."'

After giving his verdict on the character of Sir Robert Walpole, he even noted that "the impartial Reader, if any such there be; or Posterity, if such a Trifle can reach them, will best be able to correct my Mistakes."

All the maxims can be identified in the text by my use of a different font. A good one to start us on our guided journey comes directly from the pen of the man himself: "There are great Advantages, in travelling, & nothing serves more to remove Prejudices.' Hume traveled a great deal during his lifetime. Two of the most significant trips were both to France. They came at opposite ends of his career and had very different characters. As a young man, he went to sleepy La Flèche in the Loire valley to work in virtual solitude on his first major philosophical work, A Treatise of Human Nature. As an older man, his oeuvre complete, he spent a little over two years in bustling Paris, feted by the intelligentsia. These bookends, both symmetric and asymmetric at the same time, frame his life and work in a way that helps us to better understand both. They show that Hume speaks to us all, at every time of life, whether solitary or sociable, well-known or obscure, successful or struggling, young or old. Hume and his philosophy are companions for life.

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How Hume anticipated Darwin

It's a great irony that many still believe Darwin's theory of evolution was a sudden, startling revelation rather than itself being the fruit of the evolution of ideas. Darwin found some key missing pieces and put the jigsaw together, but many other pieces had been discovered years before.

Most of these piece-finders were nineteenth century scientists, such as Charles Lyell, William Herbert, William Charles Wells and, of course, Alfred Russel Wallace, who came up with his own theory of evolution through natural selection independently of Darwin. But one had a very different

background. The eighteenth century Scottish enlightenment philosopher David Hume had ideas that dovetailed so perfectly with evolutionary theory that reading him now, it seems remarkable he had no idea of evolution at all.

This is most evident in Hume's writings about what we now call evolutionary psychology, before there was even a theory of evolution. Without the specific insights of Darwin, Hume had a sense that certain principles of thought had developed over the course of human history in response to certain needs that emerged purely out of our biological and social situation.

For instance, in one striking passage he suggests that our ideals of beauty are linked to what we would now call, in evolutionary terms, fitness for survival. "'Tis certain, that a considerable part of the beauty of men, as well as of other animals, consists in such a conformation of members, as we find by experience to be attended with strength and agility, and to capacitate the creature for any action or exercise. Broad shoulders, a lank belly, firm joints, taper legs; all these are beautiful in our species, because they are signs of force and vigour, which being advantages we naturally sympathize with, they convey to the beholder a share of that satisfaction they produce in the possessor."

Our natural history even explains the emergence of moral norms, another idea which has become popular in recent years. Perhaps the clearest example of this is his answer to the question of why sexual promiscuity has been condemned more in women than men. Hume offered a version of an argument that many evolutionary psychologists use today. It starts with the observation that "Men are induc'd to labour for the maintenance and education of their children, by the persuasion that they are really their own; and therefore 'tis reasonable, and even necessary, to give them some security in this particular." As Hume delicately explains, "if we examine the structure of the human body, we shall find, that this security is very difficult to be attain'd on our part." The most efficient means that evolved to ensure this was for women themselves to internalise society's condemnation of infidelity. "In order, therefore, to impose a due restraint on the female sex, we must attach a peculiar degree of shame to their infidelity, above what arises merely from its injustice, and must bestow proportionable praises on their chastity."

Hume believed that the usefulness of norms of chastity for married women of childbearing age generates a general rule which "carries us beyond the original principle, and makes us extend the notions of modesty over the whole sex, from their earliest infancy to their extremest old-age and infirmity."

Another respect in which Hume anticipated Darwin was in his denial of a sharp distinction between humans and other animals. Quite remarkably for his time, he claimed that "no truth appears to me more evident, than that beasts are endow'd with thought and reason as well as men."

If it seems much less than obvious, that is probably because we are pretty sure that animals don't construct logical arguments. This misses the point. By saying animals reason, Hume is not so much raising them to the level of the highest philosophy but lowering the level of most human reasoning. Animals are more intelligent than we tend to think because humans are not as intelligent as we would like to think.

For Hume, we have to remember that most of our "reasoning" is little more than making assumptions based on past experience without any logical inference at all. Animals do the same. "Animals, as well as men learn many things from experience, and infer, that the same events will always follow from the

same causes." Hume full accepts that animals "are not guided in these inferences by reasoning" but "Neither are children: Neither are the generality of mankind, in their ordinary actions and conclusions: Neither are philosophers themselves, who, in all the active parts of life, are, in the main, the same with the vulgar, and are governed by the same maxims."

Although it is commonly believed that animals act on pure "instinct" whereas humans do not, for Hume even reason itself "is nothing but a wonderful and unintelligible instinct in our souls, which carries us along a certain train of ideas, and endows them with particular qualities, according to their particular situations and relations."

Hume also attributes emotions to animals, saying "love and hatred are common to the whole sensitive creation." Darwin himself wrote extensively on the same theme his *The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals*. As with humans, these are transmitted from animal to animal. "Fear, anger, courage and other affections are frequently communicated from one animal to another, without their knowledge of that cause, which produc'd the original passion." Given that Hume believed such sympathy is the basis of morality in humankind, Hume suggested that this ability to sense the emotions of others gives animals some kind of primitive moral sense too.

Charles Darwin's notebooks also show he read several of Hume's works. We do not know whether they helped him to form his ideas. But even if they did not, he would have agreed with many of Hume's observations and arguments. Darwin took many of Hume's ideas further than the great Scot could have done, and vindicated them. <>

ILLUMINATIONS BY PHILO OF ALEXANDRIA: SELECTED STUDIES ON INTERPRETATION IN PHILO, PAUL AND THE REVELATION OF JOHN by Peder Borgen, edited by Torrey Seland [Studies in Philo of Alexandria, Brill, 9789004452763]

This volume contains a collection of 17 essays on Philo written by Peder Borgen between 1987 and 2018.

The first six studies deal with important issues in Philo's religious thought and social world, such as his views on Flaccus, prayers, and his eschatology. The next five essays illustrate how an understanding of Philo can contribute to the interpretation of Paul, especially his Letter to the Galatians. The final six studies deal with the importance of Philo's writings for the interpretation of the Revelation of John, a subject too rarely touched upon in recent scholarship.

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About Peder Borgen by Torrey Seland

Peder Borgen was born (1928) in Lillestrøm, a small town a few miles north of Oslo, Norway, where he still lives. In a Norwegian context, he is known for his roles in several settings; he has been a high profile Methodist, a preacher, a church-politician, and an ecumenist. Moreover, he was a university teacher and scholar in religious studies at the University of Bergen 1967-73, and the University of Trondheim 1973-93.1 In biblical research, he is especially known and respected as a prominent scholar of the Gospel of John and the learned Jewish theologian, politician, and philosopher Philo of Alexandria. He has also worked and published within the field of Lukan and Pauline studies.

His dissertation from 1966 (published in 1965) made him internationally known among New Testament scholars. In this study, he set out to investigate the concept of Manna in both the Gospel of John and the writings of Philo. He summarized the results thus: "In their expositions, both Philo ... and John ... paraphrased words from the Old Testament quotations and interwove them with fragments from the Haggadah about manna." He also argued that the expositions were presented according to a common homiletic pattern, a pattern used by Philo several times in his writings and in some Palestinian

midrashim. The volume received immediate praise from many scholars, and the publication of a third edition in 2017 demonstrates the lasting value of this work. In the years to come, Borgen continued working on the Gospel of John, developing some issues from his dissertation but also expanding his focus and themes.

While working as an associate professor in Bergen, he initiated and directed a larger research project in Philo, this time applying the growing use of computer technology in the humanities, setting out to digitalize the works of Philo. The purpose of the project, in fact, was threefold: to produce a machine-readable text of Philo's works, to produce an Index Verborum, and to carry out an analysis of exegetical terminology and exegetical patterns of style in Philo's work. The project turned out to be too ambitious to be finalized at that time, but the two first parts of it were completed some years later, after Borgen took up a full professorship in Trondheim in 1973. In the meantime, computer technology had also been developed far beyond the horizon of the 1970-ies. However, a lasting result of the Bergen/Trondheim project is that Philo's texts are now digitally available in a grammatically tagged (marked) form to anyone interested in reading his works on their computers, whether that be on a smartphone or a PC.

From the mid 1960-ies, Borgen continued to publish several studies on the Gospel of John,4 as well as on the works of Philo. Moreover, he expanded his field of interest to cover the Synoptic gospels, Paul, and the Revelation of John. He published several studies on Paul's letter to the Galatians and its inherent debate on circumcision, a debate he tried to illuminate by investigating similar issues in the works of Philo. Concerning Philo, three significant studies should be mentioned here; his introductory articles, issued in CRINT and ANRW in the mid-1980-ies, and his major book on Philo, published in 1997.

A couple of social issues and interests influenced his life but may also be said to have influenced his focus of research. First, as a Methodist, Borgenbelonged to a church minority group in Norway; as a member of a 'free church, he was a 'dissenter.' The Church of Norway, the majority church, was at this time a state-church, enjoying a relation to the state that represented several social and economic prerogatives. These issues came to affect him in many ways: he became a tireless advocate for the rights and demands of the free churches in a state-ecclesiastical environment, and in that context, he became an advocate for religious freedom in its broadest sense. It can be argued that this has also made him especially sensitive to the minority situations of both Philo of Alexandria and the early Christians.

Second, throughout his theological research, Borgen was interested in patterns; in 'patterns' found in the various texts, as well as in the social currents and life expressions he explored. This interest was at work whether he dealt with exegetical patterns in the texts of Philo of Alexandria, in the Gospel of John, or in other New Testament texts. He could of course, investigate the Gospel of John or the works of Philo in their own right. But more often Borgen was interested in exploring if there were patterns in Philo's use of Scriptures that could illuminate similar issues in the New Testament.

This interest in patterns is also evident in, and has inspired the selection of several of the essays chosen for the present volume, which—on the initiative of Borgen himself—carries the pertinent title Illuminations by Philo. Published between 1987 and 2018, Borgen himself has now made many of his articles, scattered among Festschriften, conference volumes and journals, more accessible to other scholars by gathering them in collected volumes.

This collection likewise brings together a selection of Borgen's previously published essays. They address themes not yet covered in previous collections, touching upon the hermeneutical value of Philo for studying the New Testament in particular. Some essays were also included because they represent essential studies in and by itself, e.g., the study of "'There Shall Come Forth a Man.' Reflections on Messianic Ideas in Philo."

It is the hope that these studies will introduce more readers to the work of Peder Borgen on both the New Testament and the value of drawing on the works of Philo in trying to understand early Christianity.

Introduction by David E. Aune

It is with distinct pleasure that I write this introduction to a collection of essays on aspects of Philo and the New Testament written by my mentor, colleague, and friend, Peder Borgen. I first met Peder and his wife Inger when my family and I arrived in Trondheim, Norway, for the academic year 1982-83 as a Fulbright Professor at the Religionsvitenskapelig Institutt (Department of Religious Studies) of the University of Trondheim. At that time Peder was professor of New Testament at the University of Trondheim.

ILLUMINATIONS BY PHILO OF ALEXANDRIA: SELECTED STUDIES ON INTERPRETATION IN PHILO, PAUL AND THE REVELATION OF JOHN contains a collection of seventeen essays, written by Peder Borgen between 1987 and 2018. The first section of six essays focuses on various important themes found in the writings of Philo of Alexandria (ca. 20 BCE to ca. 40 CE), and is entitled "Interpreted History, Application of a Biblical Event and an Eschatological Hope." The second section contains five essays on "Philo and Paul," while the third section contains six essays on "Philo and the Revelation of John."

The first section of six essays on aspects of the religious thought of Philo reveals that the author is not only interested in Philo's writings as a quarry for exploring aspects of the Hellenistic Jewish thought world that can be used to illuminate aspects of New Testament literature (as valid as that is), but equally interested in understanding the thought of Philo in and for itself. The author's long-standing interest in Philo of Alexandria is revealed in the doctoral dissertation that he wrote for the doctor theologiae at the University of Oslo, published as Bread from Heaven: An Exegetical Study of the Concept of Manna in the Gospel of John and the Writings of Philo. More than thirty years later, Borgen published a monograph focusing exclusively on Philo, entitled Philo of Alexandria, An Exegete for His Time. A few years later, with the assistance of two students, he published a Greek word index to the writings of Philo. Each of the six articles on aspects of Philo's thought exhibits a deep familiarity of the author with the writings of Philo as well as with the enormous range of secondary scholarship on Philo.

Interpreted History, Application of a Biblical Event and an Eschatological Hope

In the first of the six essays focusing on Philo, "Philo's Against Flaccus as Interpreted History;" Borgen investigates how Philo interprets historical events. Some scholars, like M.A. Kraus, have interpreted Against Flaccus as philosophical history, arguing that Philo's philosophical world view governs his interpretation of current historical events. Kraus, according to Borgen, correctly holds that the true knowledge of God is the highest goal in Philo's philosophy, though more emphasis should have been placed on God's close relationship and concern for the Jewish people. Others, like M. Meiser, have

characterized Against Flaccus as a work of mimetic history, i.e., a historical work, similar to Hellenistic and Roman historical writings in which the author uses mimetic historiography, i.e., he claims to know the inner thoughts of his or her characters and attempts to influence the readers to think and act in particular ways. One weakness of Meiser's study is that he assumes that the addressees of Against Flaccus were non-Jews and therefore the terminology and ideas he uses are pagan. However, this is probably not true, since the supposed non-Jewish terminology permeates all Philo's writings. Nevertheless, Philo also wrote with non-Jews in mind. The author argues that the similarities between Against Flaccus and Philo's other writings supports the view that Philo has used Pentateuchal principles to interpret historical events.

In the second article in this section, "Application of and Commitment to the Laws of Moses: Observations on Philo's Treatise On the Embassy to Gaias," Borgen argues that there is a close relationship between the two Philonic treatises Against Flaccus and On the Embassy to Gaius on the one hand, and Philo's expository writings on the other. In this essay, the author seeks to provide a further analysis of On the Embassy to Gaius in order to demonstrate in more detail that in that document the Laws of Moses are interpreted in relation to the practices of Jewish communal life. To do so, Borgen follows the interpretive model formulated by B. Gerhardsson, consisting of the following elements: (a) inner tradition. The Jewish tradition had a vital inner life: the Torah-centric relationship to "the only true God" with its different elements: faith, love, obedience, loyalty in emotions, thought, word, action towards God and a corresponding attitude to fellow human beings. (b) outer tradition: (1) verbal tradition, (2) behavioral tradition, (3) institutional tradition, (4) material tradition (sacred localities, etc.). Against this background the thesis of this essay is that Philo's treatise On the Embassy to Gaius should be classified with Philo's exegetical writings. The utilization of Gerhardsson's model reveals the variety of ways in which the Law of Moses and ancestral Jewish traditions find expression in the incorrectly entitled essay On the Embassy to Gaius. The expository application of the Laws of Moses to the conflict between the Jews of Alexandria and the emperor Gaius indicates that the treatise was directed toward both the Jewish communities and the non-Jewish circles which had links to the Jews and their various ways of interpreting the Law of Moses.

In the third essay on Philo, "Some Crime-and-Punishment Reports," Borgen examines the historical reports about four ancient rulers whose crimes and punishments are narrated in four texts, Flaccus in Philo Against Flaccus, Antioches Epiphanes in 2 Maccabees 4-9, Herod Agrippa in Acts 12:1-24, and Catullus in Josephus, Jewish War 7.437-54. All these texts reflect a religious world view in which divine justice is at work in historical events. Toward the beginning, Borgen asks whether these reports in which a series of crimes followed by divine punishment should be considered a genre. In Flaccus 1-96, the evil deeds of Flaccus against the Jews of Alexandria are narrated, while in the second half, 97-191 the punishment and execution of Flaccus are narrated. For Philo, divine justice preserved a mathematical counterbalance between crimes and punishments. Catullus, the governor of the Libyan region of Cyrene, killed groups of Jews and individual members of the Jewish community and was punished by an incurable disease. As in the case of Flaccus, the death of Catullus was proof that God in his providence inflicts justice. While Philo had focused on the conflict between Jews and non-Jews, Josephus draws a more complex picture by emphasizing conflicts within the Jewish community. While both Philo and Josephus wrote about historical events that they had actually experienced, both wrote historiography laced with interpretative elaborations and stereotypical traditions. The author of 2 Maccabees, like Philo

and Josephus, used the basic structure of crime reports in a narrative form that led to the just punishment of Antiochus, who contracted a fatal illness. Antiochus, however, exhibited the extreme arrogance of a person who goes beyond the limit set for humans. Like the story of Catullus, the story of Antiochus Epiphanes links various conflicts between members of the Jewish community. The story of Antiochus contains interpreted historiography; in historical events, God is at work in his people punishing crimes and offering the faithful hope and blessing. Herod Agrippa in Acts 12:1-24 is another example of a king who committed evil acts against God's people, including the killing of James the brother of John, the arrest and imprisonment Peter and who allowed himself to take the place of God when the people shouted "The voice of a god not of a man" (Acts 12:22). He was immediately struck down by the angel of the Lord because he did not give God the glory (Acts 12:23). At the end of the essay, the author proposes that the Gospels of John and Mark should be examined to see if their structure has been influenced by these crime-and-punishment reports.

The fourth essay on Philo is entitled "Two Philonic Prayers and Their Contexts," an analysis of Who is the Heir of Divine Things (Her.) 24-29 and Against Flaccus (Flacc.) 170-75. This essay focuses on the neglected subject of prayer in Philo. The prayer of Abraham In Her. 24-29 formulated from the perspective of an outcast and exile, is an exposition of Gen 15:2 and is a paraphrase of biblical phrases. In form, the prayer exhibits many similarities to prayers in the Qumran Hodayot, indicating that both prayers share a common type of prayer which contains confessions of knowledge. Flaccus' prayer (Flacc.170-75) is the prayer of an excommunicated exile, a person who had tried to destroy the civil rights of the Jewish community. The setting of Abraham's prayer is that of a person standing before God, who addresses God as despotes (Lord) and the main theme is fear. The phrase "my own nothingness" in the prayer is the proper attitude of a person meeting God. Abraham's prayer reflects a Niedrigkeitsdoxologie, a contrast between the lowliness of human beings and the greatness and sovereignty of God. Abraham presents himself as an outcast who possesses a homeland in the Lord, reflecting the precarious situation of the Jewish people in diaspora situations. The basic idea in the prayer of Flaccus is that the persecutor of God's people is punished. Flaccus' prayer, which resembles farewell prayers and speeches, contains a list of his crimes with their corresponding penalties. In both prayers the praying person is seen as in exile or banishment and both are based on the interpretation of Scripture.

In the fifth of the six essays on Philo in this section, "The Crossing of the Red Sea as Interpreted by Philo," subtitled Biblical Event—Liturgical Model—Cultural Application, Borgen begins by formulating a hermeneutical key for reading Philo: particular ordinances in the Jewish law coincide with universal cosmic principles. This means that Philo can interpret a given biblical text in as having as many as three different levels: (i) the concrete and specific level, (z) the level of cosmic and general principles, and (3) the level of the divine realm and beyond. The present study illustrates aspects of Philo's multilevel exegesis in his treatment of the crossing of the Red Sea in Exod 3:17-15:21, paraphrased three times in Philo's writings as an event in biblical history:

(1) Mos. 1:63-80 (where Moses is portrayed as a divinely authorized king), (2) Mos. 2:246-56 (where Moses' role as a prophetic is illustrated), (3) Vita (83), 85-89 (where the past event of the crossing of the sea is used as a model for a typological and liturgical reenactment when the Therapeutae during their sacred vigil form a choir of men and women and sing in harmony). In Ebr. he presents a deeper interpretation of the crossing of the sea, and the phrase "the king of Egypt" is spiritualized to mean "the

boastful mind," the phrase retains a specific reference to the pagan impiety of the Egyptians. The crossing of the Red Sea then is interpreted by Philo on three levels: (1) as a concrete event of the past, (2) a typological event of the past used as a liturgical reenactment of the present, and (3) on a higher level as an event which indicates the conflict of principles and an ethical struggle in a pagan and Egyptian context.

The sixth and final essay in this section is "'There Shall Come Forth a Man: Reflections on Messianic Ideas in Philo." The first part of this study emphasizes particularism, universalism and eschatology in On the Life of Moses I and II and Exposition of the Law (consisting of seven individual treatises: (On the Creation [Op.] , On Abraham [Abr.], On Joseph [Jos.], On the Decalogue [Dec.], On the Special Laws [Spec.], On the Virtues [Virt.] and Rewards and Punishments [Praem]). "Eschatology" will be specifically defined as the realization of the universal aspect of Moses kingship and the universal role of the Hebrew nation. Against this background, in the second part of this study, the main Philonic messianic passages will be examined (Mos 2:89-91, Praem 91-97, and 163-72). The foundation of Jewish existence is based on universal God-given cosmic principles. Since these principles are made known in the specific laws of the Jewish nation, this nation is the center and head of all nations. All nations will hopefully recognize God's universal laws are revealed in the Laws of Moses and will therefore recognize the leading role of the Jewish nation. Philo's eschatology means that this universal claim for the Laws of Moses are effectuated in what Borgen calls "particularistic universalism." When Philo quotes Num 24:7 in Mos. 1:290 ("There shall come forth from you one day a man and he shall rule many nations"), Philo speaks of a Jewish emperor who will bring to full realization the universal call of Moses and the Jewish nation. Similarly, in a variety of passages in Philo's writings, we learn that he understands Moses' roles as legislator, high priest, and prophet, he understands that the specific laws of the Jewish nation are simultaneously the eternal principles of the universe. Focusing specifically on Mos. 1:289-90 where Philo summarizes Num 24:1-9, the universal aspect of Moses' kingship and the universal role of the Jewish people did not take place in Moses' lifetime. Rather, these things will be accomplished in the future by "a man," i.e., the Messiah, a term Philo never used, who will be the ruler of many nations.

Philo and Paul

The first of the five essays on aspects of thought in Philo and Paul is entitled "Perspectives for Mission: Galatians 3:1-14 in Context." Paul, like other Jews, believed in one God the creator who has a special relationship with the Jewish nation and their sacred writings. In Galatians, written to Christians to whom Paul earlier preached the Gospel, the Apostle deals with the problem of how Gentiles can be included in the worship and service of this one God. The problem faced by Paul was the extent to which inner-Jewish traditions and observances be applied to the non-Jewish Christians of Galatia. The theme of the one God who is also the God of the Gentiles plays a central role in Gal 3:1-14, which speaks of the blessings of Abraham coming upon the Gentiles as well as the reception of the Spirit by faith. In Gal 3:2, Paul asks the Galatians if they have received the Spirit "through the works of the law" or "by the hearing of faith." The two themes of "faith" and "works of the law" are further elaborated in Gal 3:5-13. In v.13, the meaning of Christ is characterized as a "curse": "Christ has redeemed us from the curse of the law, having become a curse for us, for it is written 'cursed is everyone who hangs on a tree'." When Paul was a persecutor of Christians before his conversion, he must have thought that Jesus had been crucified for his own crimes; later Paul came to believe that Christ died, not for his own sins, but for those of believers. For Paul there were two contrary jurisdictions in view, a Sinai jurisdiction with "works of the

law" as a key phrase and an Abrahamic jurisdiction with "faith" as a key word. Paul argues that Christ is the eschatological fulfilment of the promises made to Abraham and his offspring (v. 16). Using a philological argument, Paul maintains that here "offspring" is a singular noun, understanding Christ as a collective person. While the blessing of Abraham and the reception of the Spirit are mentioned in Gal 3:14, several scholars have noted that in the OT, the promise of Abraham has no connection with the Spirit. Borgen asks whether the connection of the promise to Abraham and the giving of the Spirit is to be found in other Jewish writings. Turning to Philo, a near contemporary of Paul, Borgen examines Virt. 212-219, where Abraham, through divine inspiration left his native country in search of the untreated and Father of all things, thus connecting Abraham as a prophet with the Spirit.

In the second essay in this section, entitled "Openly Portrayed as Crucified: Some Observations on Gal 3:1-14," Borgen focuses on the theme of crucifixion. In Gal 3:1-14, the death of Christ seen in light of Sinaitic law, is a central feature. In Gal 3:13, Deut 21:22-23 is quoted, "cursed is everyone who has been hanged on a tree," i.e., crucifixion, a specific way of executing the death penalty, could be understood to mean that Jesus was a criminal who was cursed and executed for his own sins. However, Paul turns this interpretation around in three ways: (1) Christ became a curse for us, not for his own sins. (2) Rather than understanding Christ as a cursed person, it is us, not Christ, who are under the curse of the law. (3) As a curse for us, Christ redeemed us from the curse of the law. Paul argues that the fact that Christ was crucified as a cursed criminal made it evident that those who relied upon the Sinaitic law were themselves under a curse. Christ's death then marked the end of the Sinaitic law and the beginning of a new era when the blessing of Abraham would come to the Gentiles who could receive the promise of the Spirit (Gal 3:14). While it is common to understand "works of the law" as human self-achievement over against God's of grace, Recently, however, some scholars have rightly argued that "works of the law" refers to whether or not Paul's Gentile converts must accept the Jewish law in order to be truly called members of the people of God. The message that Jesus Christ had been executed as a criminal and law breaker meant to Paul that those who relied on the works of the law were under a curse (Gal 3:10) and Christ's death meant the end of the era of the Sinaitic law. The hearing with faith thus took place outside of the jurisdiction of the law and works done on that basis.

The third essay on Philo and Paul is entitled "Crucified for His Own Sins—Crucified for Our Sins: Observations on a Pauline Perspective." In his letters, Paul made it clear that Jesus was crucified, that is, executed as a criminal. When Paul says that "Christ died for our sins in accordance with the Scriptures" (1 Cor 15:3), the opposite view is presupposed, namely that he, in accordance with the law, died for his own sins or crimes, a view that Paul must have held before his conversion. That Christ was crucified for his own crimes is reflected in Gal 3:13: "Cursed is everyone who hangs on a tree." Though Paul does not specify which crimes Jesus was thought to have committed, early Christian and rabbinic literature suggests that Christ was considered a magician whose healings and exorcisms were carried out on demons and evil spirits and he was also a false prophet who deceived his people. He even claimed the authority to forgive sins (Mark 2:2). The Christian Paul held the view that although Jesus was crucified as a criminal, he was actually innocent. In some of Paul's letters (e.g., Rom 1:18-32 and 7:7-8:4), he argues that though Christ was executed as a criminal by crucifixion, he was actually innocent, i.e., he did not die for his own crimes but rather for ours. Often in Paul and other ancient writers such as Philo, the authors use a "crime and punishment" structure to (e.g., Rom 1:22-31; Philo In Flaccum 170-75; Rev 18:4-8), serving to document the kind of divine punishment that was meted out by listing various types

and crimes and punishments. This pattern is also reflected in Rom 1:18-32 and 7:7-8:4. Rom 1:18-32 contains a list of crimes and punishments, characterizing the crimes committed and the basis for the punishments. Rom 7:7-8:4 uses the conventional form of an autobiographical crime and punishment story with the "I" as a contrite wrongdoer who received a verdict.

The fourth essay is entitled "Some Hebrew and Pagan Features in Philo's and Paul's Interpretation of Hagar and Ishmael." A central problem in Paul's letter to the Galatians is whether Gentiles who confess Christ must become Jewish proselytes, undergo circumcision, and join the Jewish community under the law of Moses. In this situation how could Paul use the stories of Abraham, Hagar/Ishmael, and Sarah/Isaac in Gal 4:21-5:1 as a relevant argument? Apparently as an afterthought, Paul includes an allegorical interpretation of Abraham's two sons, Ishmael, and Isaac, one born in the course of nature, the other in fulfillment of a divine promise. A main issue in this study is: how can Paul's exegesis serve as a forceful argument against the Judaizers? Why was it important for Paul to include this section in his letter? In answering these and other questions, Borgen proposes exploring the Jewish expository traditions on Abraham, his wives and sons in Philo, who deals with the relevant biblical texts in the commentary series called "Allegory of the Laws" consisting of nine treatises. Throughout Philo's writings, he emphasizes that Hagar (whose name etymologically means "sojourning," i.e., on the borderline between foreigners and citizens) was a pagan Egyptian by birth, though her close relationship with Abraham and Sarah connects her closely with the Hebrew nation. The Judaizers in Galatia who argue that the Galatian converts must become Jewish proselytes and follow the Laws of Moses copy the pattern of Hagar. By identifying Hagar with Mt. Sinai in Gal 4:24-25, and by identifying Hagar as a slave and Sarah as a free woman, Paul makes two important arguments against the Judaizers: (1) They are making slave proselytes out of Gentile converts to Christianity, and (2) these slave proselytes were the result of the Law of Sinai. In Gal 4:21-31, Ishmael, like his mother Hagar, is associated with Jewish proselytes, so that in Paul's view, the Judaizers follow the model of Hagar and Ishmael. When the Judaizers claimed that Christian Gentiles had to be circumcised and become Jewish proselytes, then these proselytes became members of the Jewish nation who had Jerusalem as its religious and political center. Yet Paul rebuts the views of the Judaizers by sharply distinguishing between the Judaizers present Jerusalem, which is in slavery with her children, from the heavenly Jerusalem, which is free.

The fifth and final essay in this section is entitled "The Cross-National Church for Jews and Greeks." Paul took traditions and events out of their Jewish context and put them in various ethnic contexts, transforming Christianity from just part of a national religion into a religion with a cross-national structure. The tension between national Judaism and cross-national Christianity was exhibited in many places in the Mediterranean world, including Galatia, and is reflected in several passages in Galatians including Gal 5:11: "If I am still preaching circumcision, why am I despite this fact still persecuted?" Paul's opponents claimed that circumcision involved the removal of passions and desires, a view frequently expressed in Philo. The idea that circumcision should follow and complete ethical circumcision is supported by Gal 3:3: "Having begun with the Spirit, are you now complete with the flesh?" and Gal 5:24: "They who belong to Christ have crucified the flesh together with the passions and desires." Crucifixion with Christ and not bodily crucifixion has removed the passions and desires. Philo supports this interpretation, cf. Migr. Abr. 92: receiving circumcision portrays the excision of pleasure and all passions. The role of circumcision, understood as removing pleasures and passions, has thus been transferred by Paul to the believer's crucifixion with Christ, excluding bodily circumcision itself. Paul's Judaizing

opponents in Galatia claimed that Paul continued to preach and practice circumcision after he received his call to be an apostle. In their view, Paul wanted to be accepted by the Jewish community and to please men by continuing to advocate circumcision. However, his preaching did not imply that bodily circumcision ought to follow and thus his service to Christ meant conflict with the Jewish communities. Philo supports this view, since in his view, circumcision plays the role of removing the passions and desires (De migratione 92), a role which Paul interprets as crucifixion with Christ (Gal 5:24). Philo does criticize anti-circumcision Jews who understood circumcision having an ethical meaning (De migratione 86-93). Unlike them, Paul transferred the role of circumcision to another event, crucifixion with Christ. Paul's Judaizing opponents tried to persuade the Galatians to make bodily circumcision follow ethical circumcision.

The problem Paul faced in Jerusalem (Gal 2:1-10) was that in preaching the gospel of Christ, he drew on Jewish teaching about proselytes in which physical circumcision was an integral part. Paul's opponents, the Judaizers, claimed that Paul continued to preach circumcision after his call to be an apostle. In their view, Paul wanted to be accepted by the Jewish community and to please men. Paul objected to this misunderstanding. Christianity was not a nationally bound religious movement—it was cross-national. His preaching did not imply that bodily circumcision was required and thus his service to Christ meant conflict with the Jewish communities.

Philo and the Revelation of John

The first essay in this third and final section is "Heavenly Ascent in Philo." Borgen begins by asking the question, Should Philo's heavenly ascension texts be classified as Jewish or non-Jewish? If Jewish, can they be categorized as apocalyptic, rabbinic and hekhalot texts? Philo's views on heavenly ascension is a subject rarely discussed. Borgen begins by asking a methodological question: what is the proper approach to analyzing the theme of heavenly ascent in Philo's writings? Borgen's thesis is that both Jewish and non-Jewish elements are woven together in Philo's texts in varying degrees. In dependence on Jewish tradition, Philo comments on traditions about the assumptions of Enoch, Moses, and Elijah, meaning that they entered the heavenly realm without experiencing death. Both Jewish and non-Jewish elements could be woven together by Philo, an example of which is found in On the Creation 69-71, in which the concepts of "man," "the image of God" and "His likeness" are found together in an interpretation of Gen 1:26. Sometimes Philo presupposes a dichotomous anthropology in which the soul is connected with heaven and the body with earth, a view found in rabbinic and apocalyptic sources as well as in Platonic and Stoic traditions. The heavenly ascent of the soul is a natural development of such an anthropology. Philo can speak of his own inspired ascent to the heavenly region from where he views earthly matters making it possible for him to have special insight into the Law of Moses. According to Virt. 74, when Moses sings, he is critically examined by angels, who doubt that anyone in a corruptible body could, like the angels and heavenly bodies, sing in cosmic harmony. Celestial songs sung by angels appear prominently in apocalypses and other Jewish writings. In heavenly ascents in Jewish writings, angels commonly serve as heavenly guides. In Judaism and in Philo, heavenly ascents can be viewed either positively or negatively, the latter conceptualized as an illegitimate invasion (Migr. Abr. 168-75). The story of the tower of Babel is interpreted by Philo as an invasion of heaven by means of false doctrines (Sown. 2:283-99). Philo also understands ascent to mean the right way of life for those who are wealthy and hold offices (Migr. Abr. 171-72). Philo also regards Moses' ascent as divine confirmation of his

appointment as king. (Vit. Mos. 1.163). The theme of heavenly ascent in Philo provides an illuminating background for the New Testament, especially the Revelation of John.

The second essay in this section is entitled "Illegitimate Invasion and Proper Ascent: A Study of Passages in Philo's Writings and the Revelation of John." DJ. Halperin posits a dualistic contrast between two ways of approaching the divine realm, illegitimate invasion and proper ascent. Borgen, who has discussed this issue in Philo in the last essay, asks about the relationship between spiritual ascent by reason and the soul and the ascent by people and political leaders. The author also asks if there are enough similarities between Philo and the Book of Revelation to make fruitful comparisons between the two. When Philo says that souls ascend, what is the relationship between such spiritual or allegorical ascent and the particular people said to ascend in biblical stories and in history? While "souls" (i.e., the Jewish people) can ascend (Legat. 3-5), reason, i.e., the unaided human intellect, such as practiced by Sceptics and Epicureans, cannot ascend to God (Legat. 6). The invasion of heaven by the building of the tower of Babel is discussed by Philo (Conf. 111-14). The emperor Gaius Caligula, who regarded himself as a god (Legat. 116), was an illegitimate ruler who went beyond the normal limitations of human beings and illegitimately invaded the divine realm (Legat. 75). Philo's description of Gaius has many similarities to his discussion of the tower of Babel. In contrast to Gaius, Moses, Abraham, and other Israelite leaders legitimately ascended to the divine realm. Moses in particular is understood as a legitimate emperor unlike the counterfeit Gaius. Borgen then surveys relevant aspects of legitimate and illegitimate ascensions in Philo and the Book of Revelation, arguing that such comparisons are valid. In Revelation, the beast from the sea ascends to the divine realm as indicated by the blasphemous names it had on its heads (Rev 13a). For both Philo and John the seer, acts of prostration were part of the worship of the emperor and for both ascent took the form of conquest and victory. Similarly, there are striking instances of contrasting parallelism between Jesus, the Lamb, and the beasts. The large number of similarities and contrasts shows the relevance of comparing further points from John's Revelation and the writings of Philo.

The third essay in this section is entitled "Autobiographical Ascent Reports: Philo and John the Seer." Some scholars, like Samuel Sandmel, have emphasized the differences between Philo and Jewish apocalypses. Recently scholars have turned from the eschatological elements in apocalypses and emphasized aspects of heavenly ascents and other-worldly journeys found in apocalyptic texts. Philo not only discusses the ascents of biblical figures, but also reports his own ascents (cf. Spec. 3:1-6), which might illuminate John the Seers autobiographical visions and ascents. Borgen then presents a detailed examination of this report of Philo's own ascent to the heavenly bodies and his descent because of envies and cares connected with the Jewish politeia, experiences which gave him insight into the meaning of the Laws of Moses. Philo experienced these ascents in two different situations: one in which he felt himself at a distance from earthly troubles (Spec. 3:1-2), and another in which he felt himself deeply involved in the cares and troubles of the Jewish politeia (Spec. 3:3-6a). Borgen then focuses on discussing the nature of these civil cares and their historical context and discussed some of the historical troubles experienced by Jews inflicted on them by the Roman emperor Gaius from AD 38-41 as they struggled for civil rights. The problem of a troublesome historical situation and impending persecution also applies to the historical situation of the Book of Revelation. Borgen then turns to a discussion of the historical similarities and dissimilarities between Philo and John the Seer. Both Philo and John ascend to heaven through divine inspiration, though they picture their ascents differently: Philo thinks of the

experienced as being carried and as getting wings, while John sees an open door and is invited to come up. For both Philo and John, ascent serves a hermeneutical function: Philo receives a deeper insight into the Law of Moses, while John draws extensively on a wide variety of biblical texts which now apply to the Christian church. While John sharply critiques the practice of emperor worship, Philo similarly has a critique of the emperor Gaius and his claim to divinity.

The fourth essay in this section is entitled "Polemic in the Book of Revelation." Jews are referred to just twice in Revelation in two polemical statements that refer to a "synagogue of Satan" (2:9; 3:9), though there is disagreement among scholars whether the "Jews" referred to are Jews or Christians (if Christians, this reflects an inner Christian conflict). The Jewish character of Revelation is widely recognized, and Jerusalem plays an important part in the thoughtworld of the book, and the author uses Jewish traditions and perspectives in its geographical and political outlook. The same is true for the religious outlook of the book, since the polemic against pagan polytheistic cults follows Jewish traditions (e.g., 2:14, 20). The death of Jesus is fundamental for the outlook of Revelation that Christians constitute the true Judaism (no distinction is made in the book between Jewish Christians and Gentile Christians). John has interpreted the Church as the inclusive eschatological Israel in which both Jews and Gentiles constitute the one people of God. A common characteristic of both the Synagogue and the Church is that both were organized groups that rejected the pagan polytheistic gods and their worship. John understood the Church to be cross-national, i.e., comprised of both Jewish Christians and Gentile Christians, yet the strong Jewish character of the book indicates that John and the communities he addressed had their base in Jewish milieus and had Jews as members. Why then was there a tension between the Synagogue and the Church? The reason is simply that both groups made exclusive claims to be the exclusive owner of Jewish traditions.

The fifth essay in this final section is entitled "Moses, Jesus and the Roman Emperor: Observations in Philo's Writings and the Revelation of John." Since recent scholarship has moved away from a one-sided emphasis on eschatology in apocalyptic literature in favor of a focus of other-worldly ascents and journeys, apocalyptic and mystical texts can be seen as overlapping, passages dealing with heavenly ascents in Philo's writings can be drawn into the discussion of apocalyptic texts. Philo, in Mos. 1.149--62, reports on Moses becoming a divine king. Philo's description of the area under the sovereignty of Moses partly overlaps with the area under the control of the Roman emperor. While the Roman emperor had control of the whole earth and the sea, Moses received the whole cosmos as his portion. In further defining God's partnership with Moses, according to Philo, Moses was called both god and king of the whole nation of Israel. Designating Moses as "god" probably means that Moses was thought to function as the vice-regent of God. The similarities between Moses' ascent and the claim to be divine of the Roman emperor Gaius suggests that giving the title of "god" to Moses implies that his status transcends that of a human king. To Philo, Gaius was a counterfeit god who sought to invade heaven in an illegitimate way. Just as God gave the whole cosmos to Moses (according to Philo), so God gave Jesus as the Lamb cosmic authority (Rev 5:13). Both Philo and John the Seer place Moses and Jesus next to God (Mos. 1.158; Rev 5:14). Both Moses (Mos. 1.158) and Jesus (Rev 5:6) are given certain charges; Moses is a paradigm and personification of the Law, while Jesus is enabled to open the seals of the scroll. Men paid homage to Gaius through prostration, just as in Revelation speaks of prostration before both God and the Lamb. In imperial court ceremonial, hymns were sung to the emperor, in Revelation hymns were sung to the beast from the sea (Rev 13:4).

The sixth and final essay in this section is entitled "Emperor Worship and Persecution in Philo's In Flaccum and De Legatione ad Gaium and the Revelation of John." In this essay, the author proposes four theses which he substantiates throughout the essay: (1) Both Philo and John the Seer present the Roman emperor's claim to divinity as an illegitimate ascent to the heavenly sphere of the gods. (2) According to both Philo and John, the image of the emperor, the offering of sacrifices and the act of proskynesis are the main elements in worshipping the emperor. Everyone took part in emperor worship, except Jews and Christians whom the emperor punished with persecution and warfare. (3) According to both Philo and John, those who worship the emperor will suffer punishment and destruction. (4) While Philo does not reject the Roman empire, he does not share its positive view of that empire. Both Philo and John use parody in their critique of the Roman emperor. Philo argues that the Roman emperor's actions are completely contrary to the qualities and virtues of the gods and demi-gods with whom he identified himself. John used a different kind of parody, comparing the emperor with various animals such as snakes, dragons, and beasts. While the emperor Gaius authorized images and statues of himself which were used in sacrificial worship, before which worshippers sacrificed, prostrated themselves, and sang hymns. There is a dualism between those written in the book of life and the beasts which corresponds to the Jews and Alexandrians as interpreted by Philo. According to both Philo and John, the emperor's action against them was considered warfare. In Against Flaccus, Philo describes the fate of Flaccus as the evil actor responsible for the pogrom against Jews in Alexandria. Flaccus is punished with divine justice in a manner corresponding to his misdeeds. In Revelation, the idea of reversal is applied to the fate of Babylon whose punishment corresponds to her misdeeds (Rev 18:6-8). There is an important difference in the principle of justice and reversal between Philo and John the Seer. For Philo, the reversal take place in the life of Flaccus, an individual, while for John it applies to Babylon, which stands for Rome as the center of the empire. <>

THEODICY AND SPIRITUALITY IN THE FOURTH GOSPEL: A GIRARDIAN PERSPECTIVE by Daniel Deforest London [Lexington Books / Fortress Academic, 9781978702400]

Daniel DeForest London argues that the Fourth Gospel offers a potentially transformative response to the question of suffering and the human compulsion to blame. Based on his reading of John 9 (the man born blind), London argues that the Gospel does not offer a theodicy, but rather a theodical spirituality, an experience of praying the question of suffering and remaining open to a divine response. London shows how the Johannine Jesus's response poses three sets of symbols in dichotomy (day/night, vision/blindness, sheep/wolf), each subverted by another, core symbol (light, judge, shepherd). By interpreting these symbols in light of mimetic theory, he argues that Jesus's response reveals the scapegoat mechanism in which an innocent victim is blamed by violent victimizers. However, rather than blaming the victimizers, Jesus continues to engage with the characters who appear to be villains: the light of the world transforms night and day into one continuous day; the Good Shepherd welcomes sheep and wolf into his beloved flock. In this way, readers are invited to bring to the Johannine Jesus their own violence, resentment, and wolfish rage regarding the question of suffering and to experience the theodical spirituality of the Fourth Gospel.

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About the Author

In this book, I focus primarily on how the question of suffering can reveal humanity's compulsion to blame someone for the anguish that we see all around us. Acknowledging humanity's addiction to blame, I ask who can be held accountable for the suffering in the world without perpetuating more suffering through scapegoating and blame. Just as I reflected on my encounter with the Jewish man while rafting down the Jordan River, I will delve into two chapters (9:1-10:21) of the Fourth Gospel's narrative, which has been described as a body of water "in which a child may wade and an elephant can swim." Just as my Messianic Jewish raft mate served as a helpful conversation partner on the Jordan River, I will enlist the help of anthropologist Rene Girard and Girardians as conversation partners, especially as I encounter the rich symbols of the Gospel. I trust that the Fourth Gospel will offer some helpful and potentially transformative insight on my question.

Synopsis of Themes

Before stepping into the river, I will clarify my question of suffering in chapter 1 and acknowledge that I am not seeking to construct a Johannine theodicy but rather to experience a theodical spirituality as I bring my question and the compulsion to blame to the Gospel narrative. In this chapter, I will offer a definition of theodical spirituality within the larger context of Christian spirituality and a brief survey within the Christian tradition. I will then turn my attention to the Fourth Gospel, initially highlighting the theodical spirituality of Johannine scholar Robert Kysar who has brought his own "theodical" concerns to his readings of the Gospel narrative that he has referred to as "voyages with John." Finally, I will set the parameters and frames for the focus of my argument: the Johannine pericope (John 9:1-10:21).

In chapter 2, I will introduce my conversation partner in navigating the Gospel narrative. Just as a rafter can drown in a river's rapids, a reader may feel overwhelmed by the Gospel's dizzying symbols and metaphors. Girard's insights—collectively called "mimetic theory"—will help serve as an interpretive key for experiencing and understanding the symbols and metaphors employed by Jesus in the pericope. Mimetic theory will assist me in understanding the prevalence of the human compulsion to blame as well as observing the anthropological aspects of the spiritual realities that the Johannine symbols present. My main guides for reading John in light of mimetic theory will be those who have previously used Girard's insights to interpret John and John's symbols, in particular James Alison, Gil Bailie, and Rene Girard himself.

In chapter 3, I will analyze John 9:1-7 where the disciples ask the question of suffering and Jesus offers his initial response as well as his first set of symbols: day, night, and the light. I will demonstrate how the disciples' question invites me to enter into the narrative with my own question of suffering. In identifying with the disciples and their question, I will consider the victim of suffering as a potential object of blame. I will interpret Jesus's initial response where he clearly rejects the disciples' theology. I will then interpret the symbols of day, night, and light through the lens of mimetic theory.

In chapter 4, I will analyze John 9:6-41 where the man born blind undergoes the interrogation of the Pharisees, who eventually expel him from the synagogue. I will consider the option of unleashing the compulsion to blame onto the interrogators who victimize the man through expulsion. I will interpret Jesus's second set of symbols (vision, blindness, and the judge) and how he remains fully committed to the transformation of those who are blinded by theologies of blame, thus challenging our temptation to blame the victimizers. I will then highlight the ways in which the narrative itself invites us to identify with the interrogators and thus recognize how we ourselves remain complicit in the very violence that we seek to blame in others.

In chapter 5, I will analyze John 10:1-21 in which Jesus launches into the "Good Shepherd" discourse by employing the symbols of sheep, wolf, and shepherd. By using this metaphor, Jesus offers himself as a victim to theodicies of blame—essentially as the object of blame itself—in response to the question of suffering. As the Good Shepherd who takes up his life again, Jesus points toward his resurrection which embodies divine forgiveness that has the power to disarm and liberate those bound by the compulsion to blame. Jesus responds to the question of suffering by inviting us to recognize our compulsion to scapegoat and to undergo transformation through the forgiveness of the one who bears the brunt of our blame.

In each of these chapters, Jesus offers a dichotomous pair (day and night / vision and blindness / sheep and wolf) followed by a symbol that refers to Jesus himself (Light, Judge, Shepherd). In each case, the metaphor that Jesus uses for himself subverts the dichotomy of the other two symbols. He transforms both day and night into one continuous day as the Light. He receives and fully engages with blindness and vision as the Judge; and he protects the sheep and receives the wolf to the extent of laying down his life as the shepherd. In this way, the Jesus of John can receive and heal our own victimhood as well as our participation in violent victimizing. Jesus seeks to transform both the victims and victimizers of blame. The Fourth Gospel can thus function as an invitation for our own inner wolves of violent victimization and our lambs of victimhood to lie peacefully together (Isaiah 11:6).

In chapter 6, I will consider how our reading of John 9 and 10 invites us to reclaim the tradition of lament and protest against God as a resource for overcoming our propensity to blame. In this tradition, we can hold God accountable for the suffering in the world and even blame God, not because we have concluded that God is, in fact, to blame, but rather because we are addicted to blame and God offers himself as a victim in order to liberate us from our addiction through his forgiveness. My reading will invite us to see God's transforming forgiveness gush forth in response to our prayerful protest just as life-giving waters gushed forth from Christ's pierced side.

Ultimately, this reading of the Fourth Gospel will beckon us into a life unbound by blame: one that requires no victims and which the Gospel calls "abundant" and "eternal" (John 10:10; 3:16). However, we will likely not break our habits of blaming instantly. My reading will demonstrate how the Johannine

Jesus' remains committed to showing the ways in which we remain blinded and bound by blame. Some might begin to let go of scapegoating tendencies upon first realizations of the violent world perpetuated through victimization. Others might require an outlet for violence during the weaning process. We will be invited to acknowledge the ways in which we ourselves behave as the wolf who unleashes violence upon the Good Shepherd. Although the Johannine Jesus seeks to move us beyond blame, he is willing to take the blame in order to get us there. The Fourth Gospel's response to the question of suffering and the compulsion to blame is broad enough to receive and transform those who remain addicted to blame even after being shown its violent implications. Thus we will see that the Fourth Gospel is not only a river in which our lambs may wade but also one in which our wolves can swim. <>

THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO THE COUNCIL OF NICAEA edited by Young Richard Kim [Cambridge Companions to Religion, Cambridge University Press, 9781108427746]

Every Sunday, Christians all over the world recite the Nicene Creed as a confession of faith. While most do not know the details of the controversy that led to its composition, they are aware that the Council of Nicaea was a critical moment in the history of Christianity. For scholars, the Council has long been a subject of multi-disciplinary interest and continues to fascinate and inspire research. As we approach the 1700th anniversary of the Council, **THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO THE COUNCIL OF NICAEA** provides an opportunity to revisit and reflect on old discussions, propose new approaches and interpretative frameworks, and ultimately revitalize a conversation that remains as important now as it was in the fourth century. The volume offers fifteen original studies by scholars who each examine an aspect of the Council. Informed by interdisciplinary approaches, the essays demonstrate its profound legacy with fresh, sometimes provocative, but always intellectually rich ideas.

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What This Volume Is ... and Is Not

First, let me begin by reflecting on what this Cambridge Companion is not. It is not designed or intended to provide the reader with a comprehensive, diachronic narrative of the time before, during, and after the council, and all of its associated events, people, places, and dates. Nor will it dive into the intricacies of ongoing debates about the sources, their dates of composition and authorship, their authenticity, :heir transmission, and their reliability. Such can be found in already published works, especially the massive study by Richard Hanson, and studies by Lewis Ayres, John Behr, and Khaled Anatolios. For the related documents, the classic collection by Opitz and recent updates by Brennecke, von Stockhausen, and others, are excellent resources." Rather, the essays collected here offer several possibilities. Some revisit old debates and discussions, others ask new questions, and still more provide different viewpoints on the people, context, and consequences linked to the Council of Nicaea. My hope is that there is something for everyone interested in the Council of Nicaea, from the public to the professional, from the student to the senior scholar, and that the sum total of the chapters provides perspectives that will enhance the reader's thinking about the monumental event, the lead-up to it, and its long afterlife. As is true of any edited volume focused on a particular topic, there will be some overlap among the various contributions, and, I am pleased to say, there are instances of different and even conflicting interpretations of particular historical or theological problems. But these only enhance the critical value of the volume, as the chapters function dialectically as conversation and debate partners with each other, as they also do with the reader. There will also be noticeable gaps or subjects not covered. There simply are not enough pages or acceptable word counts that would make this possible. In some sense, the bibliography itself of this volume mirrors this potential criticism. While on the one hand it is lengthy and contains many (and in some cases) "canon" entries, it is not comprehensive. My ultimate goal is that the contributions of all of the expert writers in this volume will stimulate thought, provoke unexpected reactions, and ultimately inspire renewed interested in one of the most important — albeit often misunderstood — moments in the history of Christianity.

The Contributions

Part I of this Cambridge Companion will explore the "contexts" leading up to the Council of Nicaea, with examinations of the political, social, ecclesiastical, and theological developments that informed and

influenced the gathering and its deliberations. Raymond Van Dam offers a "prelude," which investigates a series of questions related to the political and social context in the lead-up to Nicaea. Eschewing a teleological perspective that assumes the inevitability of the theology of Nicaea, he explores how the symbols and language of religion are reflections of social and cultural concerns. Van Dam pays special attention to the Tetrarchic framework that in turn led to the rise of Constantine, and how the ambiguities inherent in his complex rise to power and conversion were very much reflected in the theological debates that emerged about the Son's relationship to the Father. Rebecca Lyman studies the uncertain and contested origins of the theological dispute between Alexander of Alexandria and Arius, in particular the social, cultural, and political developments of the years 312-24, which set the stage for the escalation of the conflict and the convocation of the council. After surveying previous scholarly interpretations, which are varied and debated rigorously, she argues that the political, social, and religious tensions resulting from the empire of Constantine and Licinius and the development of ascetic ideals and practices in the post-Diocletianic, post-persecution dispensation set the context in which the theological dispute between Arius and Alexander unfolded.

In Part II, Ine Jacobs uses her expertise in late antique and Byzantine archaeology to analyze the material considerations of the council. She first reflects on the change in locale, from Ancyra to Nicaea, and what may have motivated it, and then she examines the available remains of Nicaea (modern Iznik) to ascertain the suitability of the city to host such a gathering, including practical concerns such as where the imperial court and officials were housed, where the meeting space was in the overall landscape of the city, and how and where the delegates were hosted. Finally, she discusses the broader Constantinian building program reflected in other locales and how developments in Christian architecture resulted from changing liturgical and conciliar needs. David Gwynn explores the council and what we know about its convocation, participants, and proceedings from a broad perspective. His discussion includes reflections on the difficulties presented by the conflicting sources, and in his reconstruction of the events he draws on later, more secure conciliar documents to tease out insights into what may have transpired at Nicaea. In addition, he tries as much as possible to recover the voices and perspectives of the "humble individuals." Hal Drake reflects on the "elephant in the room," namely, the emperor Constantine, whose presence at the council was an unprecedented development. Drake explores what motivated Constantine to be so intimately involved with the council, shifting attention away from the usual theological interpretations and back to the political motivations of the emperor. He considers the significance of Constantine's earlier dealings with the Donatists, which gave him a framework for how to approach the Arian controversy. While Constantine sought unity and harmony in his empire, the internal dynamics of Christianity itself ultimately made this an impossibility.

In Part III, on the outcomes of the council, Mark Edwards offers a detailed study of the creed itself. His assessment begins with the evidence for earlier creeds and creed-making and then analyzes the one produced at Nicaea, its language, biblical foundations, and theological implications, including a close look at the history and origin of the term homoousios. He also examines the anathemas and their allegations. Finally, Edwards discusses the promulgation and reception of the creed in the immediate aftermath of the council. Andreas Weckwerth studies the canons by first considering their textual transmission and their translation into several languages, and second discussing their purpose and content. He then shifts to an analysis of their reception and function in later tradition, in particular how other councils and churchmen understood, adapted, and applied the Nicene canons in subsequent centuries. Daniel Mc

Carthy investigates the debate at the council regarding the calculation for when to celebrate the Pasch, that is, Easter. He provides an overview of the Paschal Controversy before and after the fourth century, and he discusses if and how the issue was resolved at the council and received by later traditions. Aaron Johnson writes on the council specifically from the perspective of Eusebius of Caesarea, examining the theological, ecclesiastical, and political vision of arguably the most important eyewitness to the council and its aftermath. Eusebius has left us with several immeasurably important texts, and this chapter surveys the scholarly debates resulting from various interpretative issues. Finally, Johnson challenges traditional and perhaps uncritical arguments about the famous ecclesiastical historian, that he was a dishonest Arian sympathizer who signed the creed out of cowardice or that he did so because he was awestruck in the presence of the emperor. Eusebius was, in fact, an original thinker with a coherent vision that was deeply influential for later writers.

Part IV examines the aftermath of the council, up to the end of the fourth century, with careful attention on the theological trajectories initiated by Nicaea. Sara Parvis argues against recent scholarly assessments that eschew the development of discrete parties, for or against Arius, and correspondingly for or against the Council of Nicaea and its creed. With close analysis of the evidence, she traces the extent to which politics, theology, friendships and enmities, and the talent, ambitions, and charisma of prominent individuals all influenced the decades-long dispute until the Council of Constantinople in 381. In particular, she identifies Athanasius as the key player. Mark Del Cogliano discusses the various theological strands in the aftermath that eventually culminated in the so-called pro-Nicene position, championed at first by Athanasius and refined by the Cappadocian fathers: Basil of Caesarea, Gregory of Nazianzus, and Gregory of Nyssa. He argues that this pro-Nicene alliance was ultimately a consensus-building movement that borrowed from tactics employed by earlier theologians, but that it espoused a particular interpretation of the Nicene Creed that positioned their theology as a middle ground between the extremes of the theology of Arius and Marcellus of Ancyra. Kelley Spoerl studies the term homoousios and its implications for Christology, viewed primarily through the teaching attributed to Apollinarius of Laodicea, but also in anticipation of the Christological disputes that unfolded at the end of the fourth century and through the fifth century. The Council of Nicaea, and the fourth century in general, are often (mistakenly) described as only trinitarian in focus, so this chapter offers a valuable corrective to the overly simplistic binary between the trinitarian fourth and Christological fifth centuries. Dan Williams examines the fourth-century developments in the western half of the Roman empire, tracing the pro-Nicene theological trajectory initiated among others by Hilary of Poitiers and Marius Victorinus and gradually solidified by prominent western bishops like Ambrose and Augustine. He demonstrates how the eventual affirmation of a "neo-Nicene" trinitarian doctrine was achieved sometime in the 380s, after a protracted struggle against the Homoian doctrine, which rejected any "substance"-related terminologies.

Finally, in Part V, the contributions investigate the "long" reception of the council and creed by two Christian traditions. Paul Gavrilyuk considers Nicaea from the perspective of the Orthodox tradition and traces the importance of the council and creed first in the work of Cyril of Alexandria and then in Byzantine liturgy in the sixth century. He introduces the idea of the "hermeneutic of conciliar authority" as evident in later councils, all of which made Nicaea a crucial reference point, and his chapter concludes with reflections on the council in light of the pan-Orthodox council, held in Crete, June 2016. Geoffrey Dunn begins with an examination of the reception of the council in the churches of the West up to

1054 and then specifically by the Roman Catholic Church in the centuries following. He explores broadly the reception of the creed, including the controversy of the Filioque, and the Canons and their function in church discipline. Dunn also pays special attention to the modern Catholic reception of Nicaea.

Together, these chapters together provide a picture of the immediate, the middle, and the long-term impact of the Council of Nicaea, and they will inspire new questions and research trajectories, provoke debate and disagreement, and ultimately contribute to an ongoing conversation that in reality began as soon as the gathering ended. Seventeen hundred years is a long time in which to discuss anything, but for the nature of the Godhead, ecclesiastical leadership and organization, orthodoxy and heresy, among other related subjects, perhaps such a span of time is only the beginning. THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO THE COUNCIL OF NICAEA pays respect to its forebears but also looks ahead to continued dialogue, discussion, and debate about the people and their actions, the events and their outcomes, and the ideas and their lasting legacy in the history of Christianity.

Note to the Reader

The chapters in this volume are each followed by a "Select References" list, rather than a complete bibliography. These lists include fifteen scholarly works chosen by each author, which are relevant to the individual chapter's contents. All works cited in the contributions can be found in the Bibliography at the end of the volume. <>

LIVING I WAS YOUR PLAGUE: MARTIN LUTHER'S WORLD AND LEGACY by Lyndal Roper [The Lawrence Stone Lectures, Princeton University Press, 9780691205304]

From the author of the acclaimed biography MARTIN LUTHER: RENEGADE AND PROPHET, new perspectives on how Luther and others crafted his larger-than-life image

Martin Luther was a controversial figure during his lifetime, eliciting strong emotions in friends and enemies alike, and his outsized persona has left an indelible mark on the world today. *Living I Was Your Plague* explores how Luther carefully crafted his own image and how he has been portrayed in his own times and ours, painting a unique portrait of the man who set in motion a revolution that sundered Western Christendom.

Renowned Luther biographer Lyndal Roper examines how the painter Lucas Cranach produced images that made the reformer an instantly recognizable character whose biography became part of Lutheran devotional culture. She reveals what Luther's dreams have to say about his relationships and discusses how his masculinity was on the line in his devastatingly crude and often funny polemical attacks. Roper shows how Luther's hostility to the papacy was unshaken to the day he died, how his deep-rooted anti-Semitism infused his theology, and how his memorialization has given rise to a remarkable flood of kitsch, from "Here I Stand" socks to Playmobil Luther.

Lavishly illustrated, LIVING I WAS YOUR PLAGUE is a splendid work of cultural history that sheds new light on the complex and enduring legacy of Luther and his image.

Reviews

"Roper's book proves that a rigorously scholarly work can also be a pleasure to read."—Dan Hitchens, *The Times*

"[*Living I Was Your Plague*] may unsettle in ways that open diligent readers to new vision. The book accomplishes something that few of the books about Luther occasioned by the 2017 anniversary accomplished: it sees Luther with fresh eyes and shows us why we need to wrestle with his legacy."—Vincent Evener, *Christian Century*

"Intelligent and absorbing"—Sean Sheehan, *The Prisma*

"After an outpouring of books about Luther at the time of the quicentenary, one could have been forgiven for thinking. . . that there wasn't much of interest left to be said. In her ambition to tackle together the life and the legend, and her avowed determination to appraise Luther in a thoroughly Lutheran spirit of anti-authoritarianism, Lyndal Roper has triumphantly demonstrated the contrary."—Peter Marshall, *The Tablet*

"Lively and engaging. Roper's scholarship is of the very highest caliber, and her writing is crisp and eloquent. *Living I Was Your Plague* is full of brilliant insights."—Joel F. Harrington, author of *Dangerous Mystic: Meister Eckhart's Path to the God Within*

"Lyndal Roper focuses on topics that have been neglected until now, from Luther's masculinity and dreams to his binary thinking and the role of images in Lutheranism. The work of an eminent and creative historian, *Living I Was Your Plague* demonstrates that Luther is anything but boring."—Thomas Kaufmann, University of Göttingen

"Another book on Luther? The analytic exuberance of this stunning, inspiring, and deeply engaging cultural history will inevitably both inform and delight the reader."—Helmut Puff, author of *Sodomy in Reformation Germany and Switzerland, 1400–1600*

"With trenchant analysis of words and images, Roper tackles disturbing aspects of Luther's legacy, from his vicious hatred of the pope and of Jews to his strutting, bullying masculinity. She skillfully interweaves these with explorations of the artists, followers, fans, and critics who have shaped his long shadow, from the mythmakers of his own day to the purveyors of Luther-themed socks and snow globes today."—Merry E. Wiesner-Hanks, author of *A Concise History of the World*

"Roper's absorbing book takes us deep into Luther's psyche and across German history to engage with our own questions about overbearing leaders, religious strife, and cultures of masculinity. Her brilliance shines through on every page as she demonstrates the connections between Luther's emotional and intellectual preoccupations and our struggles with how to confront his legacy today. This is a book of breathtaking insight."—Ulinka Rublack, author of *The Astronomer and the Witch*

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The World of Martin Luther

The nineteenth century commemorated the Protestant hero Martin Luther with giant statues on a host of town squares across Germany. When after 1871 the new German Reich built its massive new cathedral in the heart of Berlin, it placed a huge Luther statue in its line of national heroes. But for the 500th anniversary of the beginning of the Reformation, the twenty-first century produced the cute plastic Playmobil Luther that you see above. You can assemble (and disassemble) him yourself and he fits neatly in your pocket. No longer staking a claim to public space, the Luther colossus has now shrunk to kitsch.

If you want to understand Germany and its culture, you have to understand Luther—and particularly because since Brexit, Germany is now the dominant force in the European Union. Martin Luther grew up in the former East Germany and spent almost his entire life there. Luther is anchored deep in the German psyche. You can hear Luther's speech cadences in today's German Bible, based on Luther's original translation, and they echo in the rhythms of even so secular a writer as Bertolt Brecht. Luther's embarrassingly earthy humour is quintessentially German—and he shaped early German literature with its fondness for the crude. With his deep-set eyes, wayward curl and heavy jowls, Luther remains instantly recognizable—his face is on chocolates, pasta and billboards. The man who loved pork and beer is one of a line of German heroes with gargantuan appetites, through Bismarck to Helmut Kohl who presided over the unification of East and West Germany in 1990. But he isn't a figure who unites. If it was hoped that celebrating Luther would bring East and West together, in fact the continuing chasm between the two was exposed, a generation after the fall of the Wall. The former East Germany is a resolutely secular society and Protestant church membership is low; it is not as rich as the former West and its politics are different too.

I had published a biography of Luther, **MARTIN LUTHER, RENEGADE AND PROPHET.** It took me twelve years to write because I needed to return to the sources—Luther's biography had become so well-known and so formulaic that if I wanted to say something new I simply had to start again. To my surprise the book became a German bestseller.

LIVING I WAS YOUR PLAGUE was written as I travelled around Germany to speak about Luther to a series of very different audiences. Academic authors rarely get to meet their readers: it was an exhilarating and exhausting experience. I was surprised by how much Germans knew about Luther and how deeply concerned they were about his anti-Semitism. I had started the book with a sneaking liking for Luther's robust male posturing—but it looked much less benign in the era of Trump. I had tackled the anti-Semitism in the biography, but when I preached from Luther's pulpit in the church with its statue of a Jewish sow suckling Jews whilst a rabbi looks in the pig's backside, I knew that I had not got its measure. Luther's anti-papalism too turned out to be deeper and nastier than I knew. He even wanted his curse of the papacy to be his testament: '*Living I was your plague, dead I will be your death O Pope!*'—and he meant it. These words are to be found on many portraits of the reformer, even including

those of him on his deathbed. I hadn't seen them because they are often painted out. And even when they weren't, I could not see them because I simply did not expect them to be there.

As I began to realise, Luther's ghost is everywhere in German culture. And that matters outside Germany too: after all, until recent times Germans were the second largest migrant group in the USA. Luther is far more than a religious figure, and he offers a way into understanding what German-ness means and what its legacies are. This nexus of German identity and the figure of Luther is the reason why Luther could not be celebrated in any straightforward fashion: he is inseparable from Bach and the German love of music, he permeates German literature. Yet his monumentality can fit neatly into a pattern of German political leaders, and he has been instrumentalised to celebrate Saxon patriotism, Reich nationalism and East German pride. His virulent anti-Semitism comes too close for comfort.

Luther remains a deeply divisive and flawed human being. But he was also remarkably courageous and a brilliantly creative theologian. He had the determination and bravery not to recant his views when interrogated in front of the Emperor and the representatives of the whole Empire. That example, perhaps even more than his theology, remains inspirational—'here I stand, I can do no other'.

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The anniversary of Luther in 2017 was not just an event of local Wittenberg history or even primarily of the Lutheran church. Because Luther has so long been linked with German-ness itself; the event was a secular commemoration as well, an occasion to ask about what being German means today. Even though the country was formally reunited in 1989, the difference between the former East and the former West is still unmistakeable. The East remains noticeably poorer, and thirty years on, its idealism is different too, with an abiding commitment to equality and communitarian values, and an ingrained suspicion of the power of the state. If the anniversary were meant to do anything politically, it was intended to bring East and West together. Yet those formed in the education system of the East approached Luther very differently. They wanted to know about the economic side of the indulgences trade, and the wealth and status of those who supported him, topics which were not really considered during the centenary celebrations. They asked different questions too; scholars from the former East who worked in monument conservation, for instance, undertook the archaeology on Luther's house and transformed our view of the family's wealth. But far from uniting East and West, it felt as though the questions and outlook of the former East was often silenced during the anniversary year in favour of a more anodyne commemoration of the reformer as the translator of the Bible and inventor of the German language.

Celebrating Luther has often been politically fraught, and linked to questions of German identity. The first centenary of the 95 Theses was celebrated on the eve of the Thirty Years' War, the catastrophic conflict that unleashed a generation-long religious and political military struggle and left much of Germany devastated. In 1917, the posting of the 95 Theses was commemorated in the midst of war and on the brink of revolution and defeat. Now, in a reunited Germany, with the commemoration happening on the territory that had once been that of the former East Germany, celebrating Luther was also an attempt to escape defining Germany's history solely in terms of Nazism and the holocaust—to find, that is, a 'usable past'.

How Luther was commemorated was therefore a question of national significance.' This difficult hero, with his stodgy determination, his love of beer and pork, his relentless hatreds, his penchant for misogynist quips, and his four-square masculinist stance, has always been a divisive figure. Embracing him would not be easy. It could only be done with self-mockery, and could succeed only if religious divisions proved to be distant enough for denominational identity to be surpassed by a more indulgent attitude towards the colourful characters of the sixteenth century But the fact that the Gottingen professor of church history Thomas Kaufmann published a book on Luther's Jews that acknowledged Luther's anti-Semitism once and for all, and which did not excuse it as a product of his times, meant that this issue in particular became a subject of national debate, the first time it had been confronted head on since the Second World War.

Luther, it seemed, always raises issues of cultural and national identity that reach far beyond his theological legacy. A colossus of the stature of Bismarck, every age seems to appropriate him as its own—erasing him as a historical figure. People either love him or hate him, and even today, he elicits strong emotional reactions. How this anniversary unfolded, and what rituals of remembrance took place, revealed a lot about German culture and politics: here, surely, cultural history had much to say. It could help us examine Luther's cussed character, his lumpy masculinity, the depth of his appeal, and it could explain the pervasive legacy he has left in German culture, musical, linguistic, material, and visual.

As the commemorative year wore on, I pondered how the biography I had written of Luther had itself become part of the memorial cult, and I often felt uncomfortable. Partly because of my own experience when I spoke from the pulpit in Luther's church, I realized that I had not done enough to interrogate Luther's anti-Semitism or to ask how far it extended into Lutheran theology. And I sensed that I needed to confront the less comfortable sides of his legacy. Most of all, I needed to look more critically at one of the aspects I loved most about Luther: his rambunctious masculine posturing. Here studies of masculinity didn't really seem to offer the tools I needed. Years before, I had felt impatient with historians who divided masculinity into 'good', responsible house-father masculinity and rough, disruptive male behaviour. Surely you could not have one without the other; the upstanding patriarchs of today were yesterday's tearaways. Indeed, because state power so evidently relied in the end upon force in the early-modern period, authorities needed their young men to have mastered the use of weapons (towns were defended by citizen militias); and while law-makers might inveigh against drinking to excess, male bonding rituals—then as now—usually involve collective consumption of alcohol.' I felt irritated with histories that adopted the authorities' moralising tones towards the young rowdies of the past, and impatient with those who claimed to be shocked by Luther's crudeness, or who air-brushed out his aggressive polemics against those he disagreed with. This, to me, was part of Luther's anarchic attractiveness, his refusal to be a plaster saint. And yet, the commemoration year led me to re-consider my tendency to integrate Luther's obstreperous qualities into a relatively positive assessment of his personality, and to draw out more the dangers of his habitual aggression.

Thinking about masculinity—one of the major growth areas of gender history over the last thirty years—can help us think differently about Luther. You could, for example, write a history of the Reformation through Luther's facial hair: the tonsured, shaven monk gave way to the shaggy, bearded, mustachioed Luther once he was in hiding in the Wartburg, disguised as a nobleman. The mature Luther adopted a clean-shaven look but the stubble on his jutting jaw is usually visible. The Cranach workshop was at pains to show Luther as a virile, potent man, a figure very different from a diffident monk. Indeed,

it could be argued that the Reformation marked a genuine moment of transformation in the history of masculinity, as it rejected the ideal of celibacy, mocked the pope as effeminate, and abolished monks and priests as different models of manhood. Protestant pastors were meant to be patriarchs like the city fathers and stately bureaucrats who employed them. Instead of a multiplicity of different kinds of masculinity, Lutherans valued only one.

Cultural history of this kind has its seductions, but our story must be more complex, because masculinity is never uniform and individuals craft their sexual identities, albeit in dialogue with social forms. After all, from early on, Luther was paired in portraits with the much less potent-looking Melanchthon. Unlike Luther, the younger man wore a wispy beard; and as Melanchthon never was a monk, he did not have to repudiate celibate masculinity; but both men knew Melanchthon was the better scholar. The reformer's masculine strutting was of a piece with his bullying antagonism to the Jews. In his final years he ordered German rulers, including his own elector, to take measures against the Jews and he castigated the Brandenburg electors for being too tolerant, using the same polemical, prophetic mode he had developed early on to enable him to speak the truth (as he saw it) to power.

Luther revelled in his masculinity and liked to see himself as the hero of the Reformation. It was part of the way he established his dominance over his younger followers. It had playful aspects—one of Luther's greatest gifts was his sense of humour—but it also had much less pleasant sides. So, in 1530, when Melanchthon had to conduct the negotiations over the recognition of the Confession of Augsburg, Luther twitted him for his lack of masculine bravery and for weeping too much, cutting remarks that seemed to reveal less about sixteenth century masculinity than they did about Luther's penchant for bullying.' Or when, as the Table Talk (the notes Luther's students took on his dinner conversations) reveals, Luther mocked his wife Katharina von Bora for her failure to understand what 'rhetoric' was or pronounced that cleverness was the garment that suited women least, Luther's jolliness was also a way of shutting women up.' Luther's masculinist polemical mode, in fact, may have been part of the way he cemented his own position and made it less possible for others to speak. It also contributed to making compromise—with the Catholics or with the Sacramentarians—impossible. In this sense, the history of masculinity has much to offer, because this kind of rough-hewn, bullying manhood may mesmerise even those it grinds down. Why were Luther's followers, including women, willing to fall into line, at least for much of the time? And what did Luther's manly displays enable him to do, crossing the lines of what was acceptable, getting away with rudeness, and directing aggression at his greatest enemy, the pope? Luther's masculinity, it seemed, had its noxious streak.

Luther thought in binaries, and repeatedly split people into friends and foes. His ability to turn the world into an epic moral struggle—to see the Devil at work everywhere, to simplify, and to give names to things—was one of his greatest strengths, but also the source of his greatest weaknesses. This pattern is evident in his theological works as well: his ability to put a 'name' on something was key to his devastating polemic, but it was also one of his greatest gifts as a theologian. Looking for repetitive behaviour across all areas of Luther's activity helps us to understand his theology differently: the Luther who devised brilliant nicknames for his friends, calling the Wittenberg pastor Johannes Bugenhagen 'Dr Pommer' (he came from Pomerania and so spoke Low German, and his sermons were too long) and his enemy Johannes Cochlaeus 'the snail' (he was always several steps behind Luther), also had the knack of summarising complex theology in a word.' Naming is after all about the relationship of language to reality, a fundamental issue for Luther philosophically as well as theologically. These essays are an

attempt to do theological history in a different way. Instead of treating ideas as independent agents, with their own lineages, this book tries to understand them in relation to the person who produced them, and not to distinguish them from their unconscious and semi-conscious usages. It looks for patterns and habits of mind as much as for explicit statements.

Binaries structured much of Lutheran rhetoric and a good deal of the Reformation's propaganda too. Central to this was its apposition of the pope and Christ, and the movement developed an unrelenting anti-papalism in which Luther was the hero who revealed the Papacy for what it truly was: the Antichrist. Even as Luther died, he repeated the anti-papal prophecy which is also a curse: 'Living I was your plague, 0 Pope, dead I will be your death'. This bitter aphorism was surprisingly pervasive in Lutheran memorial culture from the sixteenth century on. Nowadays the offensive words have frequently been erased, but even when they are not, it can be easy to overlook their presence in some of the most familiar images of the Reformation. For example, Luther's binary thinking was mirrored in the image-making which the Cranach workshop invented for the new movement, with clear vertical divisions into good and evil and anti-papal caricatures which at times bordered on being images of hatred. The movement's obsession with the pope is revealed in the insults his opponents flung at him, both radicals and Catholics. Müntzer dubbed him the Wittenberg Pope, accusing him of 'play[ing] the hypocrite with the princes' and `set[ting] himself up in place of the pope'.' He is 'Pope of the Elbe', complained another former supporter.

And yet the Cranach workshop did far more than manufacture images of hate. It also created novel Reformation iconographies, in particular, Law and Gospel, which—though they use binary forms—do more than contrast opposites. Both Law and Gospel are needed, for the Christian needs the Law to recognize their sin. The image-form the workshop devised required the viewer to meditate on different sections of the image, to incorporate it into their own devotion, and to follow words and sign so as to `get' the key theological ideas.

There was more, too, to Luther than just the bullying patriarch. Dreams are not normally part of the field of investigation for ecclesiastical historians. But one cannot fail to be haunted by reading Luther's account in a letter to his confessor, Staupitz, of a dream he had when he was feeling abandoned by him, in which he wrote that he felt like a child 'weaned from its mother'. Weaning is a foundational human physical experience, for the mother as for the child, and yet we rarely talk about it. When a child is weaned, he or she gradually separates from the mother and the interdependence of their two digestive systems, which begins at conception, finally comes to an end. For mother and child alike, it means the loss of a deep source of physical connection and pleasure. Both have to find comfort without that oral link, and the child must learn to comfort himself or herself. Yet while this is a universal human experience, what is revealing is how Luther chose to invoke it, and what this might tell us about a specific historical time. As Luther wrote in the letter, the words were taken from Psalm 131, a psalm which Luther later translated, using words that conveyed more of the child's experience of being weaned, and that left the agency of the child in the process unclear. And yet in translations by others, the child is content, having reached its own separation from its mother. Mistakes and imprecisions are usually revealing, often more so than we readily realize, as Freud pointed out long ago: Luther 'remembered' the psalm as conveying a feeling of abandonment and not the child's arrival at its own contentment. This profound ambiguity in how Luther recalled what was a very important biblical quotation for him helps us to understand the depth of his attachment to Staupitz. It also suggests that he

was groping his way towards independence as he set off on his own theological path, revealing some of the pain and abandonment that parting from the Catholic church entailed.

A conventional psychoanalytic interpretation might attempt to divine Luther's relationship with his mother through this dream, but that might be a reductive path, narrowing a complex character to problems in weaning and development, about which we know nothing in Luther's case. So also, a psychoanalytic analysis which derived Luther's theology from his relationship with his parents would be unsatisfying—though his complicated relationship to his father, against whom he rebelled by becoming an Augustinian friar, gave him unusual insight into the paternal aspect of the Christian's relation to God, and how that can lead to struggle with God. Psychoanalytic ideas are not much use to historians if they lead them to pathologise an individual. They serve then merely to cheapen complex inner lives and they do not help us understand their thought over time, organically revealed in all their habits, patterns of mind, conscious and unconscious inclinations, and in their actual relationships with others. As we start to tease these out, we can see how dreams—which raise issues about the nature of divine inspiration and prophecy as opposed to the letter of scripture—were connected to central dilemmas of Luther's Reformation. By approaching questions at a tangent, by looking at issues that are on the periphery of our scholarly vision, new and unexpected connections often emerge. So, for example, one of the central theological divisions of the Reformation was linked to the status of dreams. The revolutionary firebrand Thomas Müntzer was scathing about Luther's support of the rich and powerful, and derived his own authority in part from dreams and visions. For his part, Luther was always sceptical about them, preferring to rely on scripture alone—but of course, scripture too features prophetic dreams and visions. Luther could never entirely disavow dreams, and his apparent scepticism masked a fascination with them.

Dreams communicated hopes and fears for people in Luther's circle, allowing them to talk indirectly about them by arguing over possible interpretations of their dreams. They wondered, for example, if the eagle, who became a cat in one of Melanchthon's dreams, stood for the emperor. He was the focus of much of their anxieties at this time as they waited to present their confession of faith to him at the Imperial Diet of 1530 at Augsburg, the document that founded their new church. They worried about this while being unable to talk to Luther, who could come no further than the castle of Coburg. Psychoanalytic ideas could therefore help illuminate not just the psychological dilemmas of individuals, but might disclose the richness of relationships between groups of people—and it was these collective dynamics which were crucial to the Reformation's implementation. They were not just harmonious relationships of co-operation, but often of rivalry for Luther's attention, and they could on occasion include attacks on each other's manhood, as in every movement with a charismatic leader. To look at these undersides of the nascent church is not, of course, to belittle what the Wittenbergers accomplished together; it reminds us how important that Wittenberg collective was to the movement's self-perception: one of the abiding iconographies of the Reformation, not just within Lutheranism, but copied even within iconophobic Calvinism, was that of the reformers sitting together around a table. Images were central to Lutheranism and museum exhibitions featured prominently in the celebrations of 2017. Perhaps the most inspiring was 'Luther and die Avantgarde', held in the nineteenth-century former jail in Wittenberg, with each artist given a prison cell as a canvas on which to develop their ideas about Luther. Containing a ramshackle series of installations, videos, mixed media artworks, and sculptures, the crumbling building was as much a part of the show as the exhibits, for it juxtaposed the architectural

legacies of state institutions with Western cutting-edge art (having been a prison in the Third Reich and in the DDR, the building had lately become a depot for storing official records). Not all of it worked. Some artists seemed to think that Luther was an iconoclast who wanted to destroy all religious images—he was no such thing—while others thought he stood for the freedom of the individual. But some of the displays conveyed aspects of Luther that scholarship had been unable to deal with. In particular I was struck by Erwin Wurm's orange fist that greeted the visitor on arrival at the exhibition, which conveyed that masculine aggression so much part of Luther's style. Another was a dizzying prison of clear plastic tubes in a cage-like structure by the Chinese artist Song Dong, filled with sweets and placed on top of a mirror that filled the floor space—it somehow managed to recreate the self-referential quality of Luther's thought, conveying how such a liberating theology could yet turn inwards on itself, repeating its key concepts to infinity.' Above all, the sheer creativity and inventiveness of this exhibition showed that Lutheranism is far from being confined to museums, and can inspire extraordinary art.

As it did from its inception. There is no other Protestant sect which could have hosted such an amazing number of exhibitions, because none fostered such a rich material and visual legacy. Most other protestant sects shared iconoclastic instincts, mistrusting sumptuous altarpieces that might seduce the senses, and favouring white-washed walls or simple words from scripture. Not so Luther: from the outset, he remained closer to the Catholicism he had left, and though Lutherans remodelled their churches to include didactic art, with paintings of Christ blessing the children that underlined the importance of infant baptism, or of Law and Gospel, they decorated their places of worship with appealing and fashionable mannerist designs. They also furnished their churches with images of the reformer himself. The artist Lucas Cranach was one of Luther's oldest friends and earliest supporters, and as the Lutherjabr demonstrated, he did more than any other artist to shape the remarkable churches of Saxony and Thuringia, to make Luther's face well known, and to stamp the 'look' of early modern Lutheran print." Lutheranism was as much a visual and material culture as it was a musical one. And if we think that we can 'know' Luther as an individual, that is largely because we are so familiar with the Luther the Cranach workshop made, the man with the deep-set, farseeing eyes, the confident four-square stance, and the wayward curl, poking out irreverently from underneath the doctor's hat. If this book can occasionally seem critical of Luther, or point to less comfortable features of Lutheranism's legacy, I hope that this will be taken in the spirit of Lutheranism I so admire: its profound anti-authoritarianism, its political engagement, and its insistence on argument, discussion, and critical appraisal of its own history.   <>

GREEK POEMS TO THE GODS: HYMNS FROM HOMER TO PROCLUS translated by Barry B. Powell [University of California Press, 9780520302877]

The ancient Greek hymnic tradition translated beautifully and accessibly.

The hymn—as poetry, as craft, as a tool for worship and philosophy—was a vital art form throughout antiquity. Although the *Homeric Hymns* have long been popular, other equally important collections have not been readily accessible to students eager to learn about ancient poetry. In reading hymns, we also gain valuable insight into life in the classical world. In this collection, early *Homeric Hymns* of uncertain authorship appear along with the carefully wrought hymns of the great Hellenistic poet and courtier Callimachus; the mystical writings attributed to the legendary poet Orpheus, written as Christianity was taking over the ancient world; and finally, the hymns of Proclus, the last great pagan philosopher of antiquity, from the fifth century AD, whose intellectual influence throughout western culture has been profound.

GREEK POEMS TO THE GODS distills over a thousand years of the ancient Greek hymnic tradition into a single volume. Acclaimed translator Barry B. Powell brings these fabulous texts to life in English, hewing closely to the poetic beauty of the original Greek. His superb introductions and notes give readers essential context, making the hymns as accessible to a beginner approaching them for the first time as to an advanced student continuing to explore their secrets. Brilliant illustrations from ancient art enliven and enrich the experience of reading these poems.

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Excerpt: A hymn is a song to a god, originally sung, usually to a lyre. The meaning of hymn is unclear and it may have a foreign origin. The word occurs only once in Homer (Odyssey 8.429), and Hesiod speaks of winning a prize for a hymnos (Works and Days 651), but it is unclear what he meant by hymnos. Early hymns seem to have been composed in hexameters (see below), but later poems appear in other meters. The standard form was to list the god's names, thus invoking his or her presence, then to continue with some event from the god's career, often the god's birth, and to conclude with a prayer, a reference to the god, or a declaration that the hymnist would now proceed to another song. Hymns to the gods must have been widely circulated in antiquity but, puzzlingly, they are not often referred to by other ancient writers.

A remarkable collection of Greek hymns, by a range of authors, survives in twenty-nine manuscripts, none older than the fifteenth century AD. They are among our most important sources for our knowledge of Greek myth. The collection was evidently made in the early Middle Ages and included, in this order: the anonymous Orphic Hymns (c. AD second/third century?); the Hymns of Proclus, an important Neoplatonist philosopher of late antiquity (AD 412-485); the anonymous Homeric Hymns (eighth/seventh centuries BC-fifth century BC, with one exception), our earliest surviving hymns; and

the Hymns of Callimachus (c. 310—c. 240 BC), from the Hellenistic Age (323-c. 30 BC); Callimachus was a poet, critic, and scholar at the Library of Alexandria, one of the most influential intellectuals of his day. The collection also includes an anonymous Orphic Argonautica from the fifth or sixth centuries AD that tells the story of Jason with an emphasis on the role of Orpheus, but it is not a hymn and is not translated here.

One of these manuscripts, discovered in Moscow in 1777 and now in Leiden, is unique in containing a portion of a "Homeric Hymn to Dionysos" and the long "Homeric Hymn to Demeter," poems not included in other versions of the collection. Several papyrus fragments also preserve portions of the Homeric Hymns. The manuscripts of the collection are not nearly so well preserved as texts of the Iliad and the Odyssey and there are many corruptions, some incurable, and occasionally misplaced lines. The collection (missing only the hymns to Dionysos and Demeter) was printed in the editio princeps of Homer's Iliad and Odyssey, published in Florence in 1488 by Demetrios Chalkokondyles, one of the most eminent Greek scholars working in the West, tutor to the sons of Lorenzo de Medici.

This book will contain translations of most of these hymns, arranged not as they are in the collection, but according to each individual deity. In this way the reader can see how Greek poets, during a period of over one thousand years, conceived and celebrated their gods, allowing the reader to form an impression of how notions of each god evolved over nearly a millennium. All the hymns of Callimachus and Proclus are included, together with twenty-eight of the thirty-four Homeric Hymns, and thirty-two of the seventy-eight Orphic Hymns; hymns to minor gods, such as the Orphic Hymns to Justice, Misê, the Seasons, Leukothea, and the like, are omitted. The hymns will be cited in rough chronological order: first the Homeric Hymns; then the Hymns of Callimachus; then the Orphic Hymns; then the Hymns of Proclus.

Proclus Hymn 4: To All the Gods

Proclus invokes the gods as a body to provide protection and guidance for the soul's ascent to the intelligible realm of the Demiurge.

Listen, O gods, who sit at the helm of wisdom, who kindle
the fire of the spirit in the souls of mortal men, drawing
them up to the deathless ones, out of the shadowy hole,
purified by the secret rites of hymns.
                         Hear, mighty saviors!
5 Scatter the mist and grant me your holy light that comes
from sacred books, that I might know well the difference
between a man and an immortal god. And do not allow
a spirit, doing evil things, to hold me down in the streams
far from the blessed ones. And let not cold Punishment
10 bind me in the bonds of life, fallen in the waves of cold
becoming, unwilling to wander long.
                         But gods, masters of bright
shining wisdom, hear! Reveal to me, as I ascend the path
that leads upwards, the rites and initiations of sacred words!
   <>

ATHENIAN AND ALEXANDRIAN NEOPLATONISM AND THE HARMONIZATION OF ARISTOTLE AND PLATO by Ilsetraut Hadot [Studies in Platonism, Neoplatonism, and the Platonic Tradition, Brill, 9789004280076]

ATHENIAN AND ALEXANDRIAN NEOPLATONISM AND THE HARMONIZATION OF ARISTOTLE AND PLATO by I. Hadot deals with the Neoplatonist tendency to harmonize the philosophies of Plato and Aristotle. It shows that this harmonizing tendency, born in Middle Platonism, prevailed in Neoplatonism from Porphyry and Iamblichus, where it persisted until the end of this philosophy. Hadot aims to illustrate that it is not the different schools themselves, for instance those of Athens and Alexandria, that differ from one another by the intensity of the will to harmonization, but groups of philosophers within these schools.

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Excerpt: The research I am presenting on the tendency to harmonize the philosophies of Aristotle and Plato in Neoplatonism follows chronologically upon the excellent book by G.K. Karamanolis, entitled Plato and Aristotle in agreement? Platonists on Aristotle from Antiochus to Porphyry. For my part, I would like to show that this harmonizing tendency, born in Middle Platonism, as G. Karamanolis and also M. Zambon have proved, prevailed in Neoplatonism from Porphyry and Iamblichus, and that it persisted in this philosophy until its end without any known exception, but with some nuances, which are due both to the proper personality of each of the Neoplatonists and to the stage of development of their doctrines. I therefore protest against an opinion that is still widespread, based ultimately on a paper by K. Verrycken, according to which it was the late Neoplatonist Ammonius of Alexandria who introduced "an instrinsic simplfication" into the Neoplatonism of Alexandria. From the period of Middle Platonism, we will mention, very briefly and in an introductory way, only a few characteristic elements of the harmonizing tendency that emerged in this interval, particularly those that lasted down the end of Neoplatonism. As far as Neoplatonism, the final period of Platonism, is concerned, I propose to give a significant, but by no means exhaustive, overview of the manifestations of this harmonizing tendency in its various representatives (including Themistius), beginning with Porphyry. It is true that the latter's position on this question has been studied in great detail by G.K. Karamanolis in his aforementioned book, but (on a rather important point) I will set forth a divergent opinion.

The present study thus has as its subject the extent and the limits of the Neoplatonist tendency to harmonize the philosophies of Plato and Aristotle, and it leaves aside the question of whether or not this tendency can be objectively justified: an important theme, for which I refer the reader to L.P. Gerson's book entitled Aristotle and other Platonists.

Closely linked to the problematic of the harmonizing tendency is the question of whether there exists a general, striking difference between the theologies and religious practices of the Neoplatonists teaching at Alexandria and those who were professors at Athens. I will answer this question in the negative, although emphasizing that the very meager documentary material available to us for the three centuries of Neoplatonism taught at Alexandria and Athens allows us to perceive only a tiny fraction of its history.

Some Characteristic and Permanent Features of the Tendency toward Harmonization of the Philosophies of Plato and Aristotle in Middle-and Neoplatonism

In fact, the tendency toward harmonization was already born in Middle Platonism, and emerged victorious beginning with Porphyry. The title of a lost treatise by the Middle Platonist Atticus, Against those who claim to interpret Plato by means of Aristotle, is enough to attest the existence of such a trend among the Middle Platonists. M. Zambon's book **PORPHYRE ET LE MOYEN-PLATONISME** provides ample documentation on the beginnings of this tendency in the Middle Platonists Plutarch of Chaeronea and Alcinous, among others, and on its completion by Porphyry. There can be no question here of repeating all that Zambon has excellently written on this subject, which researchers who wish to study the commentaries of the late Neoplatonists should begin by reading, along with the book by G.K. Karamanolis, which has already been mentioned.

I shall note only three typical features of this nascent procedure of harmonization, features that we shall encounter once again later on in the introductions to the Alexandrian commentaires on Aristotle's Organon. As Zambon points out: "in the face of the objections raised by Aristotle's detractors, the strategy of Platonists who favored his integration into Platonic doctrine often consisted in 'backdating' Aristotelian innovations. If the ten categories are already identifiable in the Platonic dialogues, they are not an anti-Platonic innovation, but are an integral, original part of the Master's doctrine.'" A flagrant example of the tendency to backdate Aristotelian doctrines is provided to us by the treatise you attributed to Archytas, a pseudo-Pythagorean treatise of the 1st century B.C., in which the Aristotelian doctrine of the categories is 'ennobled' by its attribution to an illustrious contemporary of Plato. The author of this treatise clearly wished to set forth a doctrine of the categories that answered the objections raised by the critics of Aristotle". The first known use of this treatise in the sense indicated is by Iamblichus in his lost commentary on Aristotle's Categories. This is attested by Simplicius, who, according to the affirmations in his own commentary on the Categories, followed Iamblichus' commentary very closely. Olympiodorus and David (Elias) also refer to this pseudonymous Archytas in their commentaries on the Categories, as does Simplicius in his commentary on the Physics.

The other recurrent feature in late Neoplatonism is the affirmation of the superiority of Plato over Aristotle in everything having to do with questions of metaphysics and theology, an affirmation that is implicit in Plutarch and broadly developed by the anti-Aristotelian Atticus: Aristotle privileged the senses as compared to reason, and he "relies on sight" (Atticus, fr. 3.94 des Places). He possesses an intelligence that is "capable of penetrating earthly phenomena and perceiving their reality, but incapable of contemplating the authentic 'plain of truth'" (Atticus, fr. 9,10-13 des Places). Zambon remarks quite rightly that Atticus, "in a caricatural and excessive way, nevertheless proposes an image of Aristotle that was widespread at the time", and that "it was precisely by invoking its presumably propadeutic and complimentary nature that Aristotelian philosophy was to be integrated within Platonism". And it was for the same reasons, we might add, that, in an attenuated form, the same arguments over Plato's superiority over Aristotle reappear once again, as we shall see, in the commentaries by Philoponus, Olympiodorus, Elias and David from the school of Ammonius, and in Simplicius, the student of Ammonius and Damascius. This belief in Plato's superiority does not, moreover, rule out that occasionally, especially in questions connected with the sensible world, Aristotle was vindicated against Plato.

Another constant feature in the Middle- and Neoplatonic interpretation of Aristotle derived its origin in Pythagoreanizing Platonism, which saw a divine revelation in the philosophy of Pythagoras, which could be transmitted only to those who were worthy. Rightly or wrongly, it was thought that the famous Pythagorean symbola or ainigmata (enigmas) had been deliberately uttered in a language with double meanings. Let us cite Iamblichus in this regard:

> And if someone, after making a choice among the symbols in question, did not interpret them and did not (include) them by means of an interpretation that is not open to sarcasm, what they say would appear to the common man ridiculous and worthy of old wives' tales, full of foolishness and idle chatter. In contrast, when they are decrypted as symbols must be, instead of remaining obscure, as is the case for most people, they become transparent and luminous, comparable to prophesies or the oracles of the Pythian Apollo. They reveal an astonishing thought, and produce a demonic inspiration in those lovers of study who have taken the trouble to understand them.

Plato being viewed as the distant successor of Pythagoras, his myths, and in a certain sense his 'oral teachings'. had been taken as equivalent to the `symbola', and as far as Aristotle was concerned, it was declared, from the same perspective, that in his treatises that were not intended for the broad public, the "esoteric writings", he had intentionally practiced an obscure style to dismiss undesirable readers. <>

PORPHYRY'S ON THE CAVE OF THE NYMPHS IN ITS INTELLECTUAL CONTEXT by K. Nilüfer Akçay [Studies in Platonism, Neoplatonism, and the Platonic Tradition, Brill, 9789004407596] Open Access

Neoplatonic allegorical interpretation expounds how literary texts present philosophical ideas in an enigmatic and coded form, offering an alternative path to the divine truths. The Neoplatonist Porphyry's *On the Cave of the Nymphs* is one of the most significant allegorical interpretation handed down to us from Antiquity. This monograph, exclusively dedicated to the analysis of *On the Cave of Nymphs*, demonstrates that Porphyry interprets Homer's verse from Odyssey 13.102-112 to convey his philosophical thoughts, particularly on the material world, relationship between soul and body and the salvation of the soul through the doctrines of Plato and Plotinus. The Homeric cave of the nymphs with two gates is a station where the souls descend into genesis and ascend to the intelligible realm. Porphyry associates Odysseus' long wanderings with the journey of the soul and its salvation from the irrational to rational through escape from all toils of the material world.

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Introduction

Excerpts: The Neoplatonic philosopher, Porphyry, was born in Tyre in Phoenicia, probably in 234 CE. According to Porphyry's own Life of Plotinus and Eunapius' report, he had distinguished ancestors, and his original name (in Phoenician) was Malchus, meaning 'king.' He studied rhetoric and grammar with Longinus in Athens before joining the circle of Plotinus (204/5–270 c.e.) in Rome in 262–268 C.E. Porphyry collected and edited the works of his teacher Plotinus under the title, Enneads, and divided them into six books, consisting of nine treatises each, prefaced by his own Life of Plotinus. He himself is believed to have written sixty works, but, unfortunately, most are lost or survive only in fragmentary form. Fully or substantially extant works include, apart from On the Cave of the Nymphs and Life of Plotinus (Vita Plotini), also a large excerpt of a Life of Pythagoras (Vita Pythagorae), Homeric Questions, Letter to Marcella (written to his wife, Marcella, Ad Marcellam), On Abstinence from Killing Animals (De Abstinentia), Starting-points Leading to the Intelligibles (Sententiae ad Intelligibilia Ducentes, Sententiae in short), Isagoge (Introduction) to Aristotle's Organon, Introduction to Ptolemy's Tetrabiblos and a Commentary on Aristotle's Categories. In addition, Porphyry is often credited with the authorship of an anonymously transmitted Commentary on Plato's Parmenides and he almost certainly wrote a likewise anonymously transmitted work on embryology, attributed in the manuscripts to Galen, and entitled To Gaurus on How Embryos Are Ensouled (Ad Gaurum). There are also

fragments of many lost works such as a history of philosophy, a Commentary on Plato's Timaeus, Letter to Anebo (Epistula ad Anebonem), several treatises, such as On Images, On the Styx, Philosophy from Oracles (De Philosophia ex Oraculis), On the Return of the Soul (De Regressu Animae), On What Is in Our Power (or On Free-will), and a large work Against the Christians (Contra Christianos).

As this corpus suggests, Porphyry had very broad interests, covering fields as diverse as grammar, rhetoric, arithmetic, geometry, logic, music, religion and literary criticism, and his work had a deep impact on his contemporaries and successors. The fourth-century historian and sophist, Eunapius, praises Porphyry as a polymath (VS 4.2.2-3), and, in his City of God, Augustine (354–430 c.e.) calls him 'the most learned of the philosophers' (doctissimus philosophorum, Civ. Dei 19.22). In the translation of Boethius, Porphyry's Isagoge was used as a standard textbook on logic until the end of the Middle Ages. Because so much of his output does not survive, it is difficult to establish to what extent Porphyry generated original philosophical ideas, particularly ideas independent of his teacher Plotinus. There is a common tendency in modern scholarship to see him primarily as a follower on the path set out by Plotinus. Hadot argued nearly forty years ago that Porphyry is a much more original thinker than has been thought, despite earlier claims that his thought lacked originality, and there has been a growing consensus that this assessment is correct. One of my aims will be to show that, at least in his approach to poetry, myths, religion and rituals, Porphyry went well beyond Plotinus, developing original ideas that are on a par with those of his contemporary, Iamblichus (c. 250–330 CE.), a pupil of Porphyry.

As for existing scholarship on the Porphyrian treatise to which this book is dedicated, On the Cave of the Nymphs in the Odyssey, *De Antro Nympharum*; hereafter *De Antro*), Laura Simonini's L'antro delle Ninfe, in 1986, is an extensive annotated edition, with an Italian translation, whose text and apparatus are taken over from the Arethusa Monograph edition in 1969. Simonini situates De Antro within a wide range of disciplines and offers a commentary of the treatise at large and makes references to various ancient sources. Simonini's references related to Porphyry's other works are compatible with those in this book, e.g., her reference to Sententia 20 for the definition of Matter, to Sententia 29, Ad Gaurum 11.3 and De Regressu Animae for the theory of pneuma-ochema, to Sententia 32 for the connection of the cathartic virtues with the image of the goddess Athena (phronesis) and Odysseus sitting under the olive tree. In her article 'Homers Nymphengrotte in der Deutung des Porphyrios,' Karin Alt does not present a detailed interpretation of the treatise, but rather provides the outline of each section; she argues that, although Porphyry's interpretation is based on a plan, it lacks consistency – a claim which is at odds with what I here attempt to show. This book considers the treatise as a coherent and consistent literary project with its thematic subjects indicated below, its aim, Porphyry's other works, and his intellectual style. The treatise indeed looks like a reflection of the material world that contains dichotomies, such as dark vs beautiful; Platonic cave vs Mithraic cave; southern region vs northern region; the gate for mortals vs the gate for immortals; summer solstices vs winter solstices; genesis vs apogenesis, etc., where Porphyry brings together different allegorical interpretations that project his overall aim.

A significant recent paper on De Antro is Mark Edwards' 'Porphyry's 'Cave of the Nymphs' and the Gnostic Controversy.' Edwards, here, compares certain features of De Antro, particularly Porphyry's employment of Zoroaster, Mithras as the Maker and Father of all and the Mithraic cave, with Plotinus' Ennead 2.9, a treatise written against a group of Gnostics, Christian Heretics, while Porphyry was a member of Plotinus' school. He concludes that Porphyry intended to write the treatise, not only as a

work of interpretation, but as a manual for interpreters, directed in particular against the Gnostics, showing that the truth is reached, not immediately, but gradually. Edwards also discusses Homer's influence on the writings of Plotinus and Porphyry in his paper 'Scenes from the Later Wanderings of Odysseus,' in which he connects the Delphic Oracle in Porphyry's Life of Plotinus (VPlot. 22) with De Antro and shows that the oracle, which reveals the fate of Plotinus' soul after his death, bears resemblance to the description of Odysseus' arrival in Phaeacia. In contrast to Plotinus, who is never deceived by tricks of the material world, as Edwards points out, Porphyry's Odysseus in De Antro achieves his ultimate goal only when he gets rid of his earthly life.

De Antro has also regularly been discussed by scholars interested in the field of ancient allegorical interpretation, most prominently by Peter T. Struck, in Birth of the Symbol: Ancient Readers at the Limits of Their Texts, and Robert Lamberton, in Homer the Theologian: Neoplatonist Allegorical Reading and the Growth of the Epic Tradition, and other works. Struck offers a wide-ranging assessment of allegorical interpretation from the Presocratics to the Neoplatonists, along with the development of the concept of the 'symbol' as an authentic token or divine sign, from passwords used by the Pythagoreans and initiates of the Orphic, Dionysian and Eleusinian mysteries, via an ontological concept in Stoic language theory, to a sign of divinity itself in Iamblichus and Proclus (412–485 CE.). Lamberton's Homer the Theologian, meanwhile, focuses on how the Neoplatonists read Homer in line with their own philosophy, and particularly how they interpreted Odysseus as a symbol of the descended soul trying to return to the intelligible realm. The most recent monographs that touch upon De Antro in the context of a discussion of allegory are Crystal Addey's Divination and Theurgy in Neoplatonism: Oracles of the Gods, in which she explores Porphyry's method of allegorical exegesis in De Antro while examining the common features of allegory and oracles; and Aaron P. Johnson's Religion and Identity in Porphyry of Tyre: The Limits of Hellenism in Late Antiquity, in which he compares De Antro with another Homeric study by Porphyry, On the Styx, pointing out their structural and methodological similarities. All of these works throw important light on Porphyry's allegorical method and the place of De Antro in the history of allegorical interpretation.

Scholars of Mithraism have likewise shown a great interest in De Antro, because it offers the only reliable cosmological discussion of a mithraeum, the 'cave' where the followers of Mithras worship, to which Porphyry refers in De Antro 6 and 24. De Antro 6 provides significant information about the function of the cave in the mysteries of Mithras and De Antro 24 mentions the seat of Mithras at the equinoxes in relation to the solstitial gates of the soul. The state of the question and what can, and cannot, be safely inferred from De Antro regarding Mithraism is most clearly laid out in Roger Beck's most recent work, **THE RELIGION OF THE MITHRAS CULT IN THE ROMAN EMPIRE,** in which he builds on ideas expounded in many earlier publications. Beck posits that in a mithraeum, the place of cult worship that represented the Mithraic cosmos, the initiates acquired information about the process of 'soul journeying,' the descent of one's soul at birth and its ascent at death, through a ritualised execution of the soul's heavenly journey. Beck convincingly argues for close analogies between Mithraic doctrine and the Neoplatonic ideas of Porphyry while avoiding speculative reconstructions of the precise relationship between the two paradigms. Such constructions were attempted most prominently by Robert Turcan in his Mithras Platonicus, in which he posits influence of the cult of Mithras on the Platonic tradition from the first century BCE. onward and uses the references to Mithraism in De Antro to argue that Mithraism and Neoplatonism are, in essence, the same. My analysis of De Antro here is

compatible with Beck's argument and puts it on more solid ground by situating De Antro more comprehensively within Porphyry's wider philosophical thought.

There are two modern English translations of De Antro, whose dates are indicative of the lack of scholarly attention for the treatise in his own right: one was produced by a postgraduate seminar class in 1969, conducted by the distinguished Neoplatonic scholar, L.G. Westerink,[17] the other by Robert Lamberton in 1983. These and earlier versions (such as the one published by Thomas Taylor in 1823) include little or no annotation and there is no comprehensive analysis of the entire treatise. Throughout the book, I will use the Greek text produced by the 1969 Postgraduate Seminar, which is based on a comprehensive consideration of the manuscript tradition. Earlier Greek editions of the treatise were published, in many cases with Latin translations, by J. Lascaris (1518), Lucas Holstenius (1630), J. Barnes (1711), R.M. Van Goens (1765), R. Hercher (1858), and A. Nauck (1887).

De Antro has been generally given little attention in discussions of Neoplatonic philosophy, as it is deemed to be of little importance for establishing Porphyrian doctrine. Scholarship on this doctrine, however, has thrived over the last decade or so. A number of important studies[18] have centered on the religious philosophy of Porphyry and Porphyrian soteriology, as expounded, for example, in his On the Return of the Soul (De Regressu Animae) and in his Philosophy from Oracles (De Philosophia ex Oraculis), both works which also enlighten his stance on traditional religious practices. The philosophical analysis of De Antro in this work builds on this recent scholarship, as it aims to place the treatise within the context of Porphyry's other works and proposes that it contains significant philosophical ideas, particularly on the relationship between the soul and body, embodiment, demonology and the concept of salvation of the soul. Apart from these, there are a number of major studies addressing the question on Porphyry's reconciliation of Aristotle with Platonism.

Porphyry starts his allegorical exegesis of Homer's description of the cave of the nymphs in which Odysseus places the gifts he has received from the Phaeacians at Odyssey 13.102-112, a passage cited in full at the beginning of the treatise after the briefest possible indication of the project on which Porphyry is embarking:

> (1.1-13) One wonders what the cave in Ithaca symbolises for Homer,
> the one which he describes in the following verses:
> At the head of harbour there is an olive tree with acuminate leaves,
> and near it, a lovely and dark cave,
> consecrated to the nymphs called Naiads.
> In the cave are mixing bowls and amphoras,
> made of stone. There, bees store up honey.
> In the cave, there are very high stone looms, where the nymphs
> weave garments of sea-purple, a wonder to be seen,
> and in it there are ever-flowing waters. It has two entrances:
> one is northerly, for humans to descend,
> the other, southerly, is more divine; through that entrance
> men do not enter, but it is the way of immortals.

In his exegesis of Homer's cave 'at the head of the harbour' and its elements and attributes – that is, the olive tree, the Naiad nymphs weaving sea-purple garments on stone looms, ever-flowing waters, stone mixing bowls and amphoras, bees storing up honey, and the two entrances, one oriented towards the

South for the immortals to ascend and the other towards the North for the mortals to descend – Porphyry touches on a remarkable number of philosophical concepts. These include, for example, Anaximander's apeiron, Heraclitus' flux theory, the Pythagoreans' orderly arrangement of the cosmos, and Plato's doctrine of participation in the Forms. Porphyry uses these concepts to define the characteristics of the material realm, which is the inferior principle in the process of the creation of the cosmos, symbolised by the cave of the nymphs. Interpretations of this kind are in line with Plotinus' view that the doctrine of Plato should be explained and clarified through the teachings of other philosophical schools, including the Stoics. Furthermore, the treatise is also a clear manifestation of Porphyry's great interest in the association and dissociation of the soul and body. In his Life of Plotinus (VPlot. 13), Porphyry tells how he interrogated Plotinus for three days about the precise association of the soul with the body. In De Antro, he provides a wide range of philosophical and astrological explanations of these processes through the concepts of pneuma, genesis, apogenesis, and the gates of heaven, including the gates of the Sun, the gates of the Sun and the Moon, and the solstitial gates.

In comparison with his Homeric Questions, a more philological interpretation of passages in Homer's poems, Porphyry's Homeric interpretation in De Antro shows his transformation from a literary critic into a Neoplatonic philosopher. In this regard, De Antro can be deemed to be part of a corpus of Porphyrian philosophical writings on the salvation of the soul, aimed partly at the Neoplatonic philosophers, partly at a more general audience. Porphyry seems to have been engaged in enquiries to find the way(s) for salvation of the soul during his life, and to develop this topic in different ways throughout his works.

In Sententia 32 (Lamberz), on the other hand, we find that Porphyry provides guidance for the purification of the soul through his classification of the Neoplatonic virtues, that is, the political, the cathartic, the theoretical, and the paradigmatic virtues. All these virtues are related to the purification of the intelligent part of the soul. The political virtues, for example, teach us to live up to the laws of human nature by moderating passions, whereas the aim of the cathartic virtues is the complete removal of passions from the soul. As Rappe observes, in Sententia 32, 'these virtues are defined in terms of the soul's ability to direct its attention inwardly, to abide in a state of contemplation, and to become one with the object of contemplation.'

As we have seen, Edwards has argued that Porphyry 'meant to write, not only a work of interpretation, but a manual for interpreters.' I would take this in a somewhat different direction and think that Porphyry uses De Antro to educate his disciples. Porphyry's scattered quotations, e.g. his quotation of Plato's Republic 7 in De Antro 8, brief statements such as his definition of matter in De Antro 5, and the plurality of subjects, give the impression that he wrote the treatise for presentation to and discussion in lectures. Of course, symbolism also enables Porphyry to convey his religious and philosophical ideas to his disciples by elaborate explanations. There is already a general consensus among scholars that there is a close connection between De Antro and the myth of Er in Republic 10, and that De Antro is to be read as an ethical text, as will be seen later. In addition to this, I shall seek to demonstrate that De Antro is closely connected with Porphyry's philosophical works, particularly passages of his Commentary on Plato's Timaeus, Sententiae and De Abstinentia. It is primarily in its readings of individual sections of De Antro against these philosophical works that the original contribution of this work resides. I will, for example, consider the perception of the darkness of the material realm in De Antro in light of the noetic triad in Porphyry's commentary on the Parmenides; read his assignments of

the different regions to the gods, daimones, mortals and more divine beings against his commentary on the story of Atlantis in the Timaeus; situate Porphyry's description of Homer's Naiad Nymphs weaving a sea-purple garment vis-à-vis Ad Gaurum; interpret the 'divinities' shedding of powers' in the context of Sententia 37 and De Abstinentia; place the gates of the Sun and the Moon in the context of Porphyry's commentary on Timaeus 36d2-7 (F 72 Sodano) and 38c9-d6 (F 79 Sodano); relate his identification of the goddess Athena to the doctrine of virtues in Sententia 32.

De Antro as the product of a highly intelligent thinker (not an undisciplined or chaotic mind, as might appear on first reading), proves that symbols and images are a key language and tool for the Neoplatonists to reveal their doctrines, similar to the Pythagoreans' use of dual discourses, direct and symbolic. According to reports by Porphyry (VP 37) and Iamblichus (VP 18.81), the Pythagoreans divided their disciples into Learners and Hearers, the former being given elaborate explanations and the latter assumed to be capable of studying philosophy from mere maxims without arguments. In his Life of Plotinus (VPlot. 7.1-2) , Porphyry's division of Plotinus' disciples into two groups as 'hearers,' and 'zealous students,' seems to imply that the Pythagorean tradition was maintained in Plotinus' school in Rome. Porphyry interprets the literary symbols in De Antro both as transcendent being and as natural realities. Following, apparently, the Pythagoreans' mode of examination, Porphyry calls them 'images' (^^^^^^^) when he explains principles perceived by the senses, and 'symbols' (^^^^^^^), when his intention is to explain abstract principles. Thus, symbols function as contemplative objects for the students, and their meanings allow them to develop philosophical awareness and consciousness through the use of sensual and mental powers.

Starting from the assumption that Porphyry uses De Antro to explain his philosophical ideas, and to educate his disciples through allegorical interpretation, my overarching aim is to offer an exegesis of Porphyry's De Antro against the backdrop of his wider philosophical oeuvre. Inspired most likely by Numenius, Porphyry's allegorical method attempts to unfold the deeper meaning of Homer's text by asking meticulous questions about the literary symbols of his verses and elaborately examining them in light of these questions. In this book, I have chosen and organised my topics of discussion in accordance with Porphyry's questions as they emerge from De Antro. These are the nature, method and purpose of allegorical interpretation, the features of the material realm symbolised by Homer's cave of the nymphs, the association of the soul with the body, and the ways of descent and ascent of the soul.

In accordance with, on the one hand, my aim to situate De Antro within the context of Porphyry's works and, on the other hand, the reading of the treatise's central interests as the association and dissociation of the soul and the body, and, above all, the salvation of the soul, the discussions focus on a specific set of Porphyry's philosophical works, namely relevant passages of De Abstinentia and Sententiae, surviving fragments of Porphyry's commentaries on the Timaeus, the Parmenides and the Republic, Ad Gaurum, and other fragmentary works that are related to sections of De Antro. I hope that this first detailed and thematic study of De Antro in English will contribute to a recognition of Porphyry as a complex, original and interesting thinker and will demonstrate that, for Porphyry, allegorical interpretation is an important tool to teach Platonic 'philosophy,' and the 'philosophical way of life,' at the meeting point of muthos and logos.

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As generally agreed, Porphyry's purpose in explaining the doctrines of Plato and Plotinus is mainly to develop parameters for the salvation of the soul, and throughout his various works, this purpose manifests itself in his ethical concern for the soul. The concept of the salvation of the soul is associated with the purification of the soul, and this purification is dependent on what part of the soul is targeted. For example, according to Porphyry, theurgy and rituals play significant roles in the purification of the lower (spiritual) part of the soul. On the other hand, a life dedicated to philosophy and its ethical practice, allows the soul to attain the intelligible realm and permanently escape from the cycle of genesis.

Beginning from the assumption that Porphyry uses his allegorical interpretations in On the Cave of the Nymphs to convey his own thoughts and to educate his disciples, most likely prospective philosophers, in important philosophical ideas, throughout this book I have offered an exegesis of De Antro in the context of his wider philosophical oeuvre. More precisely, I have endeavoured to show how the treatise fits in with his other more straightforward philosophical works, particularly with respect to his interests in the salvation of the soul and the relationship between the soul and body. Like Cornutus, Porphyry might have used De Antro for didactic purposes. The treatise is a perfect example of Porphyry's approach to the allegorical interpretation of the Homeric verses, in which he questions all the inconsistencies and paradoxes of his verses and provides various allegorical interpretation for them.

Reading De Antro as part of Porphyry's corpus of works relating to the salvation of the soul, I have systematically compared it to his other works that mainly deal with this issue and are complementary to De Antro. In particular, I have proposed that relevant sections of De Antro should be read alongside, not only Porphyry's commentary on the myth of Er, but also his commentary on the Timaeus, De Abstinentia and Sententiae.

Chapter 1 has examined the textual structure and composition of the treatise. As an introductory section, rather than summarising a long and rich tradition of allegorical exegesis and allegorical thinking, followed by many eminent literary critics, grammarians, and philosophers, my intention here has been to highlight those who were influence on Porphyry's exegetical approach and methodology in treatise. Most important among them – and therefore discussed in a separate section – were the Stoics, including Cornutus and Crates of Mallos, and the Neopythagor7(o)-2.ans, Numenius and Cronius, who are Porphyry's main sources in De Antro and highly influential figures in Neoplatonism.

In agreement with Dillon and Edwards, I have suggested that De Antro is a complementary text to Porphyry's commentary on the myth of Er in Republic 10, based upon the idea that De Antro and the Republic share two common key symbols, the cave and Odysseus. This affinity is reflected in the basic theme of the treatise and Porphyry's overarching aim: the ultimate goal of the treatise is to show the way of salvation for the individual soul, which is to lead a philosophical life. This implies that Porphyry's aim in De Antro is ethical – his common attitude in other commentaries, as I have here shown at various places – and is compatible with Plato's aim in the myth of Er.

I have then analysed the two key concepts of Neoplatonic allegory, image and symbol, which Porphyry also uses for the cave and Odysseus. These two concepts are in fact used by the Pythagoreans for educational purposes: the natural reality perceived by the senses is introduced through images, the abstract principles perceived by mind through symbols. I have argued that the cave bears both of these aspects: on the one hand, it is a natural reality, but on the other hand, with its mystical elements, it is an abstract principle grasped by the mind. The discussion has included Porphyry's methodology, particularly

how he justifies interpreting Homer's verses by raising issues which are thought to be contradictory. I have also discussed an important point of De Antro: Porphyry's identification of Homer as a theologian, an idea being rooted in the view that texts are written by 'divinely inspired' poets whom Porphyry considers as theological authorities, thus turning Homer's verses into divine oracles.

In De Antro 5 to 9, Porphyry explores the philosophical and religious precedents of viewing the cosmos or material world as a cave, the identification that lies at the basis of his allegorical interpretation of Homer's lines. The image is a common one, which is found, for example, in the Pythagoreans, the Orphics, Plato, Empedocles and in the cult of Mithras; and Porphyry elaborately argues its appropriateness (whence its popularity). In the first part of Chapter 2, under the title 'The Cave as Symbol and Image of Cosmos,' I have examined key relevant philosophical concepts relating to the material world in the Presocratic tradition such as Anaximander's apeiron, the flux theory of Heraclitus, and Plato's treatment of caves and caverns as hollows in the Phaedrus.

I have then analysed Porphyry's discussion of two ostensibly contradictory features of the cave in Homer's description: its loveliness and its darkness. I have examined the loveliness of the cave with reference to the material realm's 'participation in the Forms' in De Antro 6.5, starting from Plato's idea that the cosmos is generated from the Form of Good in Timaeus, alongside the relevant parts of Porphyry's and Proclus' commentaries on the Timaeus. I have sought to show a connection between the material world and the second One at the level of Life in Porphyry's commentary on the Parmenides, an issue that could be developed further in future research. I have made a connection between the darkness of the cave, resulting from the fact that it is perceived by Intellect, and Plotinus' and Porphyry's conceptualisation of Matter and its participation in the Forms, and I have concluded that the cave's darkness reflects the ontological relation, immediate or mediated, between substrata of the cosmos from top to bottom, that is, from the intelligible realm to Matter.

The second part of Chapter 2 opened with an exploration of Porphyry's references to the Mithraic cave in the context of his De Abstinentia and Origen's Contra Celsum. The main concern of this part was to examine Porphyry's identification of Mithras as the Maker and Father of the cosmos with the Platonic Demiurge in the Timaeus in comparison with Numenius' ontological principles. Taking into account how the epithet 'Maker and Father' operates in the Neoplatonic metaphysical and cosmological scheme in accordance with Por-phyry's commentary on the Timaeus, I have concluded that Porphyry's Mithras is a demiurgic god whose creative aspect is predominant. Lastly, I have ventured to argue that Mithras, as Master of genesis, as he is portrayed in De Antro 24.13, may be considered to have a cosmological aspect at the lower ontological level.

In the final section of Chapter 2, I have discussed Porphyry's references to the cave in Empedocles and the cave of Plato's Republic in De Antro 8. Porphyry's quotation from the Republic ensures that the cave in question is the material world as a prison-like cave, filled with shadows, from which one must escape in order to access the intelligible realm that lies beyond it. I discussed the fact that Porphyry's implication of analogies of the divided line and the Sun is an allusion to the movement of the state of minds from the visible realm to the intelligible realm, which we may associated with his doctrine of virtues, the political, the cathartic, the theoretical and the paradigmatic virtues in Sententia 32. This association is also deemed to be the beginning stage of enlightenment, that is, the realisation of the darkness of the cave or the material realm through intellect in De Antro 6.5-6.3

Chapter 3 has investigated the sections of De Antro which deal with the body-soul relationship against the background of Porphyry's metaphysics but also of common Greek symbolic thinking, which underlies Porphyry's associations and identifications of genesis with wetness and pleasures. Porphyry identifies the Naiad nymphs as daimones who preside over genesis, De Antro 12.5), and similarly, he speaks of a certain 'daimon of genesis' (De Antro 35.7) – whom Odysseus must appease due to his blinding of Polyphemus, namely Thoosa.

Those brief statements, along with Porphyry's multifaceted identification of the Naiad nymphs as souls in the process of falling into generation, and dunameis that preside over genesis (De Antro 10.8-9), give an impression of Porphyry's demonology, but a rather inadequate one. In order to elucidate this, I have discussed the dual aspects of daimones in De Antro, based on the assumption that Porphyry's interpretive practice should be read from both a macrocosmic and a microcosmic perspective. True in essence to Plato's description of daimones in Timaeus 40d6-9 as the invisible gods, daimones, figuratively as Naiad nymphs, are closely related to entities which cause the descent of souls in Porphyry's commentary on the story of Atlantis in Timaeus 20d8-9 (F 10 Sodano), which is preserved in Proclus' Commentary on Plato's Timaeus (In Tim. 1.77.624 Diehl). I have related Porphyry's tripartite division of daimones and souls, some of which are in the process of genesis, others in the process of ascending to the higher realm, to the celestial regions distinguished in De Antro 29.1-3. Another key issue discussed in the section of De Antro is the distinction between the guiding spirit and the idea of humans' souls as their daimones, the former having its source in Timaeus 90a, the latter in Timaeus 90c. Thus, I have suggested that Odysseus might be deemed one of the heroic or divine souls allocated to the South in De Antro 29.2, whereas Athena is his guiding spirit allocated to the East, ruling the rational part of Odysseus' soul and leading him to the divine. Based on the idea that 'the individual souls have received a daimonic lot' in F 10.8 of Porphyry's commentary on the Timaeus, Athena might operate as Odysseus' rational principle, since he has not, as yet, completed his self-improvement. This aspect of Athena is compatible with Ennead 3.4.3, in which Plotinus deems to be the guiding spirit an entity superior to us. The assignment of the goddess Athena to Odysseus' rational principle is also in accordance with her identification with phronesis, as discussed in Chapter 4.

According to Porphyry's treatment of the female mythological divinities, Amphitrite and the Naiad nymphs – as generative powers in On Images, as well as in De Antro, I have analysed the possible function of the Naiad nymphs as dunameis in the process of body-creation, De Antro 14.3), based on the fact that the formation of flesh proceeds 'through blood and from blood' (De Antro 14.10-11). The statement 'blood and moist seed are dear to [the souls]' (De Antro 10.20-11.1), has prompted me to examine the formation of flesh with reference to Porphyry's conception of the development of embryos in Ad Gaurum. Because in Ad Gaurum the formation of flesh belongs to the first stage of the formation of the embryo in the womb before limbs and organs are articulated, I have come to the conclusion that Porphyry's interpretation of the Homeric image of the Naiad nymphs weaving a sea-purple garment reflects the creation of the embryo and the physiological phase.

Another philosophical concept in the context of embodiment in De Antro is the pneumatic body, an intermediary link between the soul and the body. To complement and explain De Antro 11.8-12.1, I have used Sententia 29, in which Porphyry classifies the four major phases of the pneumatic body, as the soul obtains different substances. According to Sententia 29, the aethereal body is generated from the substances of the first five planets, and the solar and lunar bodies are obtained from the Sun and Moon.

The earthly body consists of heavy and moist pneuma generated from exhalation (^^^^^^^^^^, De Antro 11.3-6) in the sublunary region, reflecting the process of embodiment of the soul, as presented in De Antro. Lastly, in this Chapter, I have discussed the Orphic poem preserved in De Antro 16 in order to analyse how Porphyry evaluates the deception of the divine principle through honey as a symbol of pleasure. Porphyry's analogy between Poros in Plato's Symposium and Kronos, who become inebriated by nectar and honey, respectively, indicates the dominance of irrationality in the soul.

In the first part of Chapter 4, I have discussed the various exegeses of Homer's double gates provided by Porphyry, which is relevant to the journey of the soul through the sensible world. They are variously called the gates of Cancer and Capricorn or solstitial gates in the Mithraic cosmological model, the gates of the Sun by Homer, and the gates of the Sun and the Moon by the theologians. I have mainly examined the gates of the Sun and the Moon in De Antro, which have received less scholarly attention. Regarding their astrological aspect, as presented in De Antro 22.2-6, I have argued that the gates of the Sun and the Moon are related to the diurnal and nocturnal rotations of the seven planets according to the planetary order. I have compared the ascending path of the soul towards the Sun to the escape of the liberated prisoner from the Platonic cave, which can be interpreted as the soul's union with the intelligible realm. At the microcosmic level the path towards the Sun refers to the soul guided by rationality, whereas the path towards the Moon refers to the soul under the guidance of its irrational part. Taking a further step, the discussion brought Porphyry's comments on the gates of the Sun and the Moon within the scope of his division of the triad Being-Intellect-Life at the celestial level in his commentary on the Timaeus (F 79 Sodano), in which Porphyry mentions the dominant principles and goals of the Sun and the Moon.

In the second part of Chapter 4, I have examined the significant philosophical concepts in Porphyry's allegorical interpretation of Homer's image of Odysseus and Athena sitting under the olive tree and Odysseus' being stripped of his garments. I have argued that the core message of the treatise reflects Porphyry's identification of the goddess Athena with phronesis, along with the olive tree, which Homer puts near the cave, symbolising nous, the intellect that generates the cosmos and permeates it. At the microcosmic level phronesis, by which the rational part of the soul is guided, inspires the soul to incline towards the level of Intellect that is, away from damaging influences of the body to which the soul is enslaved and which confuses it with desires, passions, fears and illusory impressions, and prevents it from attaining the intelligible realm. The body and its desires lead us to conflict and unjust behaviour in order to gain wealth, status, power, and pleasure. Following Numenius, Porphyry with Plotinus reads the Odyssey as a whole in which Odysseus' laborious journey back to Ithaca and his escape from dangers, pleasures and other distractions along the way, symbolise the successful journey of the human soul to return to the 'fatherland' that is the realm of the intelligible. Homer's elaborate description of Odysseus' meeting with Athena, and of the cave of the nymphs and its surroundings, comes at an especially significant point in the poem. Having completed his long and laborious journey with the help of Athena/phronesis, Odysseus has returned to the place from which he started and in which he was born, and at Athena's suggestion he leaves all his material wealth and clothes in the cave. The Homeric hero, a soul who has stripped off his garments, is enlightened and liberated by wisdom, the ultimate goal of Neoplatonic philosophy.

I have suggested that Porphyry's identification of the goddess Athena with phronesis is best seen against the backdrop of the doctrine the levels of virtue of Sententia 32, in which Porphyry discusses the four

stages of the Neoplatonic system of virtues. These stages gradually lead the soul to achieve human excellence through distinct mental endeavours. According to this doctrine, the cathartic virtues guide the soul away from bodily concerns. At this stage, phronesis directs the soul towards suppressing bodily thoughts and weaknesses, and operating in an introverted manner.

I have also examined two significant phrases in De Antro in connection with the purification of the soul or the ascent of the soul through the intelligible. The first phrase 'stripped of garments' (De Antro 35.13) is a metaphor also used in De Abstinentia, meaning the soul's freedom from corporeal things. I have demonstrated that this phrase is closely connected with the soul's 'self-detachment' from the body, while still living its corporeal life, which Smith calls 'spiritual death,' as being in the state of impassivity in this life. The second phrase, 'the inexperienced or ignorant souls in the deeds of the sea and matter' (De Antro 35.15-16), hints at a conditional situation which Porphyry interprets as Odysseus or the soul being no more subjected to embodiment only when he has got rid of sea and matter. In this context, I have investigated to what extent one should detach oneself from the earthly life according to Porphyry, who endorses a simple and self-sufficient life, and the minimum involvement with material things. Lastly, I have discussed Porphyry's doctrine of free-will according to Porphyry's fragmentary treatise (F268 Smith), On What Is In Our Power, in which although only human souls have the power to choose the self-determined life, this life is not fully under our control because of the influences of inherited and acquired features in this world.

Having followed the journey of the soul from the realm of Matter to the intelligible realm, I have demonstrated the philosophical aspect of De Antro and Porphyry's ultimate aim of showing that 'philosophy is a way of life.' Whoever our guiding spirit be, whether Athena, Homer, or Porphyry, philosophy will make us better persons if we learn to perceive truths beyond what is said.   <>

GUIDE TO THE STUDY OF ANCIENT MAGIC edited by David Frankfurter [Religions in the Graeco-Roman World, Brill, 9789004171572]

In the midst of academic debates about the utility of the term "magic" and the cultural meaning of ancient words like mageia or khesheph, this GUIDE TO THE STUDY OF ANCIENT MAGIC seeks to advance the discussion by separating out three topics essential to the very idea of magic. The three major sections of this volume address (1) indigenous terminologies for ambiguous or illicit ritual in antiquity; (2) the ancient texts, manuals, and artifacts commonly designated "magical" or used to represent ancient magic; and (3) a series of contexts, from the written word to materiality itself, to which the term "magic" might usefully pertain.

The individual essays in this volume cover most of Mediterranean and Near Eastern antiquity, with essays by both established and emergent scholars of ancient religions.

In a burgeoning field of "magic studies" trying both to preserve and to justify critically the category itself, this volume brings new clarity and provocative insights. This will be an indispensable resource to all

interested in magic in the Bible and the Ancient Near East, ancient Greece and Rome, Early Christianity and Judaism, Egypt through the Christian period, and also comparative and critical theory.

Contributors are: Magali Bailliot, Gideon Bohak, Véronique Dasen, Albert de Jong, Jacco Dieleman, Esther Eidinow, David Frankfurter, Fritz Graf, Yuval Harari, Naomi Janowitz, Sarah Iles Johnston, Roy D. Kotansky, Arpad M. Nagy, Daniel Schwemer, Joseph E. Sanzo, Jacques van der Vliet, Andrew Wilburn.

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This project began with a series of conversations between Henk Versnel and myself about what should constitute a "Guide to Ancient Magic" in a world full of Companions, Handbooks, and Guides that rarely do more than replicate their fields' traditional nomenclature and assumptions. How—we thought—might such a Guide rearrange the way this subject has been studied over the past century? While one of us (Versnel) had written extensively about a real sense of "magic" versus "religion" in ancient Greece and the other (Frankfurter) alternately shunned and reclaimed "magic" on a five-year cycle, we agreed that a Guide that moved beyond the standard overview of what magic seemed to mean in one or another culture had to be an improvement, since the very category had become highly contested.

What we envisioned was a new starting point for future investigations, essays, and dissertations in "magic," where authors could no longer get away with "using magic the way the ancient authors did," since ancient authors never used (our term) magic anyway. If the terms that magic has traditionally covered in ancient languages tended to *evaluate* ritual acts (or experts) as either ambiguous or illegitimate, then why not look at the terms and the evaluations as indigenous strategies to evaluate, censure, render exotic—that is, as *emic* discourses in various ancient cultures? And then the *texts* that we label magic and from which we build our concepts of magic—what are these texts on their own terms? Consequently does the term magic have any real utility? Many scholars have come to reject it as inevitably deviant and exoticizing; but there may be some specific areas where the term may be less harmful or alien as description—may even hold up aspects of language or materiality for critical attention. It is, after all, up to scholars, not their sources, to decide on the value and meaning of a modern category.

From the beginning the particular challenge for the authors we signed onto this project was to internalize the mandate we laid on them: to eliminate entirely the use of the English term "magic" in Part 2, and to avoid it as a predetermined category in Part 3. As the reader will see, some authors embraced the challenge; others tried to meet us half-way; others were able, over a couple of drafts, to streamline their vocabularies; and a few could not escape the seductive convenience of the term magic to designate something under discussion.

In the almost fifteen years since this project began, a number of authors had to abandon their assignments while most others hung on, dutifully adjusting their manuscripts when called upon. I convey my deep gratitude to all the authors in this volume for their extraordinary patience and commitment to the project. Gaps in coverage will be inevitable—the neglect of Arabic, Syriac, and Ethiopic sources being most glaring—but what we have produced is a start in sharpening the study of ancient magic.

This project would not have seen the light of day without the initial encouragement of E.J. Brill's Loes Schouten and the final, indefatigable copyediting and indexing of Scott Possiel. I am also grateful to John Chase's excellent translation of one article from the French; and, in the final year, regular consultations with Jacco Dieleman. Of course, the inspiration and commitment of Henk Versnel, who helped guide

authors for several years, shine over this volume in every way, and I still think of GSAM as a collaborative work.

I have dedicated this **GUIDE** to Marvin Meyer, whose enthusiasm for this subject first inspired many of us and whose Coptic Magical Texts Project produced one of the most important publications in the field for its "de-exoticizing" of magical texts and the activities they guided: **ANCIENT CHRISTIAN MAGIC: COPTIC TEXTS OF RITUAL POWER** (San Francisco, 1994). Marvin was taken much too early from this life—indeed, in the midst of revisions of his article for this volume—and he is still mourned by everyone in this field.

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"Magic" as a Flexible and Heuristic Category

So what about "magic"? Can we, in the end, use this term in any meaningful way to describe some type of data? If the use of "magic" to describe what the ancient Greeks or Christians meant by *mageia* results in the inevitable channelling of Frazerian worldviews, Durkheimian dichotomies, theological prejudices, and tenuous data, must we conclude that the term's utility is exhausted? Must we abandon the term wholesale? In an important article Henk Versnel argued that we maintain an implicit sense of what counts as magic when we are selecting our data even when we try to excise the term from our vocabulary—that our unconscious definitions determine what we choose as worthy of discussion as "magic": amulets and poppets, but not spoons and hats (or processional crucifixes and Mithraic stelae). Thus we may as well keep the term in play, at least to characterize how ancient peoples discriminated areas of ritual action. On the other hand, Jonathan Z. Smith, in his address to the Lawrence magic conference in 1992, declared that "magic" as a second-order—descriptive—category involves an intrinsic *alterity*. It exoticizes whatever it covers and juxtaposes it to some other category of culture—whether religion, science, or reason. And Smith did have a point, not only for Keith Thomas's brilliantly told but unfortunately conceptualized *Religion and the Decline of Magic* (1971) but even in the most recent historical scholarship. Michael Swartz's insightful study of late antique rituals to invoke the *Sar Ha-Torah* angel (in a kind of Jewish scholastic mysticism) classified these rituals as "magic" as part of an argument to *distinguish* their authors from the rabbinic elite. In a more obvious case of magic's intrinsic alterity, the archaeologist Ron Stroud classified various devotional practices and prayers in Roman Corinth as "magic" to reflect their extra-temple provenance and to juxtapose them to ... the teachings of Paul.

This argument of Smith's was powerful stuff when it was published, arid it convinced many of us, who consequently raised the banner of the abandonment of "magic" (even while attending conference sessions and publishing in books with "magic" in their titles). The problem with Smith's argument, however, is that *all* of our principal second-order categories carry some degree of Otherness or exoticism, from "religion" (as Talal Asad notably pointed out) and "ritual" (as historians of the Reformation remind us) to "sacrifice," which mystifies and overloads the most prosaic animal-slaughter or homicide. If we want all our descriptive categories to carry neutral pedigrees we won't have anything left. The more realistic goal should be to ask ourselves what is gained or lost by describing data with one etic term or another: magic or ritual, religion or tradition, book or Bible, pilgrimage or travel, and so on. If "sacrifice" seems to imply the violent death of an animal or person while for most ancient folks the term *thusia* meant cakes and the occasional pig-roast, then maybe the term gives the wrong sense to

private and civic ritual. If "conversion" implies a modern Protestant type of psychological transformation, then to use it for antiquity will probably distort shifts in religious adherence or allegiance. But if we use "ritual" to gather together certain traditional patterns of gesture or speech, maybe it can help make sense of important data.

So back to magic—what can it describe, moving forward? To describe as magic some unspecified component of the culture in which the New Testament came about, of course, reinscribes precisely the errors and biases of which J.Z. Smith warned and in which Morton Smith revelled. It creates an image of a crude and superstitious heathen Other against which the apostles tried valiantly to define a pure gospel—a perfect retrojection of Protestant ideology. On the other hand, borrowing social definitions of magic from Durkheim, Mauss, and Malinowski that depend on a juxtaposition to "religion" doesn't carry us much further, since—as countless historians and anthropologists have shown us—the phenomenology of magical acts flows equally through so-called "religious" rites: rabbis curse, priests write amulets, monks invoke demons, sheikhs offer binding spells, and so on. Overall, any time one seeks to articulate a "non-magic," ideological bias follows, and then one is back in post-Reformation dichotomies.

One classic attempt to distinguish a sphere of magic from a sphere of religion in the ancient world was Henk Versnel's. In an important series of articles he analyzed the language of supplication and command in ritual tablets deposited at various ancient shrines to resolve various crises. To Versnel, the differing uses of language justified a distinction between a more mechanistic "magic" and a more supplicatory "religion" that involved gods. "Magic" was supposed to work by the intrinsic power of commands and words; "religion" covered appeals that, at least ostensibly, depended on the mediation and agency of gods. These were tendencies Versnel saw in the data of Greek curse tablets and votive inscriptions, and they were tendencies that, he argued, bore out how ancient Greek authors themselves envisioned two different categories of ritual speech and the cosmic dynamics each involved—long before Frazer made these dynamics fundamental to his own magic/religion distinction.

The argument is compelling, and yet it accepts perhaps too readily as a starting point the implications of written words for intentionality, belief, consistency, and the very function of spoken and written language. We must be extraordinarily careful not to get hung up on the language of ritual texts, whether in the original languages or how it sounds in translation. Where we think there is awe, humility, and a sense of ethics—or, conversely, amoral and mechanistic assumptions about selfish manipulation and command—there may simply be scribal idioms, local conventions, and a fundamental, overarching concern with efficacy on the part of a scribe. Even in oral performance 'prayer" can veer between supplication and illocutionary act, especially in the realm of the curse. To extrapolate an intentionality and a theological perspective on the part of the ancient client or ritual specialist, whether for prayer or magical incantation, comes down in the end to one's own imagination (and, frankly, for the world of biblical and New Testament studies, the projection of normative values). Indeed, such extrapolation—here, from the wording of inscriptions, binding tablets, magical papyri, and the such—is really not so different from how Frazer imagined how primitive folk negotiated causality in the world. Evans-Pritchard labelled this kind of speculation the "If I were a horse" fallacy: imagining sentiments and thoughts you really have no access to.

So what can we do with the word "magic"? If we accept (with Versnel) that "magic does not exist, nor does religion. What do exist are our definitions of these concepts," then it is an empty category to do with what we will. Does the category require an opposite—a "non-magic"—at all? This book instead proposes—in Part 4—that "magic" or "magical" can serve as a *quality* of certain practices and materials that highlights for our scholarly scrutiny features of materiality, potency, or verbal or ritual performance we might not otherwise appreciate as part of a culture's religious world, or aspects of the social location of ritual practices we might not otherwise appreciate. "Magic"—the category—becomes thus a heuristic tool rather than a second-order (etic) classification.

We might, for example, speak of the magical use of language to highlight the diverse functions that Austin and Searle outlined in speech-acts theory, or the multiple dimensions of ritual speech that Malinowski described in *Coral Gardens.* Given that a so-called prayer can easily function as a curse, the application of the quality "magical" here does not establish hard and fast distinctions, just tendencies that are inevitable in language and culture: that songs, spoken charms, speech acts, and certain uses of narrative actually work on the world.

A more obvious situation in which we find magical characteristics is writing, a technology that lends itself almost intrinsically to ritual expressions. The magical use of writing is akin to what Sam Gill has called the "performative" use of text—in amulet and gesture—in contrast to the "informative"—for cognitive appreciation. Given that in most nonliterate and semi-literate cultures texts have almost exclusively performative value, the extension to amulet, to drinking erased letters, to inscribing pseudo-hieroglyphs, represents no shift in religious domain whatsoever.

Magic in this material sense also pertains to, and highlights, the indigenization or localization of a Great Tradition. If Great Traditions like Christianity or Buddhism frame the administration and mythology of power, it is through a range of local practices, materials, and images that that power comes to be directed: the stone cross in the town as a source of sand for fecundity, the Bible as a device of divination, the altar-cloth or bell-rope as a healing substance. Magic again does not signify an erroneous (or uncatechized) understanding but rather a *shift in political and spatial dimension* of materials, formulas, and ceremonial elements and the particular charisma borne in the local domain by the symbols of broad religious institutions.

"Magic" can also highlight shifts in individuals'—ritual specialists'—social location. The Greco-Roman world was awash in stereotypes of ambiguous ritual expertise and in images of the exotic powers of foreigners—like those three Babylonian *magoi* who see Jesus's birth in the stars. At the same time, **we** must remember that there were real priestly traditions in these cultures as **well** as ritual experts both local and regional: diviners, mediums, seers. What happens when, say, the traditional lector priest of some Egyptian temple or the local diviner migrates from the local culture, in which his role and practices make traditional sense, to the cosmopolitan culture? An identity and sphere of authority that was understood in intimate social terms in the local culture, or native priestly styles in the temple culture, *shift* into an exotic frame of reference in the cosmopolitan culture—a magnet for awe, fear, ridicule, and the whole Orientalist charisma of the foreign Other. The great Chicago anthropologist Robert Redfield observed this shift almost a century ago in the Yucatan, as rural shamans assumed the character of wizards when they came to the cities. But, as I have argued, the native or priestly ritual expert often has a hand in this shift too, *appropriating* the stereotypes projected upon him for authority and financial gain.

So we might call magical the exoticized appearance of a ritual expert outside his indigenous milieu. Traditional, familiar remedies, charms, and gestures come off as magical to the cosmopolitan outsider: "This I shall do," says the speaker in an early Christian novel, "I shall proceed to Egypt, and there I shall cultivate the friendship of the hierophants or prophets, who preside at the shrines. Then I shall win over a *magus* by money, and entreat him, by what they call their necromantic art, to bring me a soul from the infernal regions," in order to find out "whether the soul be immortal." For the outsider Clement, all the priests are just wizards at his disposal.

Such shifts in performative, social, and political context often take place in new cultural or economic regimes: Hellenism, Roman or Sassanian rule, and so also, anthropologists have found, developments in the modern world. New regimes, these anthropologists have found, foster a kind of magic in the new material or sensory forms of the regime—say, for antiquity, statuary, jurisprudence, and coinage; and in the modern world, televisions, magazines, currency, and clothing styles—but also in the suspicions that new regimes breed (and seek to control) in cities and countryside. At the same time, new regimes and their commodities, governments, and idioms of power tend to hide their own magical forces while at the same time promoting discourses of illegitimate ritual forces—sorcery; witchcraft—as the antithesis of the "modern" and the foil to central authority.

In a likewise sociological vein we might consider the way magic can point to particular situations of social tension or struggle in which both protection and aggression are called for (and sometimes public accusation and trial). For some scholars the term magic can stimulate inquiry into the way certain ritual acts and material assemblages are produced or commissioned out of social desperation or rivalry: the curse that augments legal proceedings or follows the breakdown in some village relationships; the erotic spell that a spurned wife uses to keep her husband and thus the honor and financial security he represents, or the kind of spell a man might use to project his frustrated desires onto the woman he desires: "Let [her] not be able to sleep for the entire night, but compel her until she comes to [my] feet, loving [me] with frenzied love, with affection and with sex ... do not allow her to eat, drink, sleep, or laugh but make her rush out of every place, ... abandon [her family], until she comes to me, ... loving me, wanting me (with a) divine, unceasing, and wild love." As Jack Winkler suggested, these unquenchable feelings he seems to want *her* to suffer are, in fact, those that *he suffers.*

Is there a productive way to describe such ritual materials, given that their use of language and symbols lies on a continuum with other efforts at potent writing or speech in the culture, and given that they clearly *supplement* quite elaborate face-to-face efforts to gain honor, security, or gratification? To denote them as the magical aspects of the resolution of crisis is not the end of the story but the *beginning* of an inquiry into the types of ritual materials used to negotiate social tensions and frustrations—or (in the famous case of the sorcery accusation against Apuleius of Madaura) the way particular things can become marked as sorcery in the context of social tension. Is this really a question of private as opposed to public practices? Probably not, given the fact that most binding and curse spells had an inevitably public nature. Does social tension intrinsically demand a different, perhaps more ambivalent range of names, spirits, or stories to be efficacious-daimones, underworld powers, black cats? Are we really talking about ways of situating or performing *liminality,* according to cultural norms? How might a prevailing *culture of liminal symbolism—all* those hideous ingredients attributed to witches in Lucan and Apuleius—feed back into these kinds of rituals for negotiating social tension, in the way a contemporary adolescent who wants to curse a bullying classmate might know to include a pentagram, a skull or dead

animal, and something to do with Satan? Here again we may use magic as a quality or character of a type of data—curses and erotic spells—that demands dynamic redescription in social context.

The new turn to materiality in the study of religion, picking up a theme developed in the field of archaeology, should steer us away from the intentions and ideologies that have governed the discussion of magic and towards the very substances that mediate powers and agency in the world. Materiality of Religion (as opposed to "materials of religion"—a more traditional and limited archaeological approach) highlights the concrete forms through which religious ideas, supernatural beings, and local traditions are felt and sensed in this world: from books to shrines, from ecclesiastical furniture to festival decorations, from figurines to costumes. This approach to religion stresses the *agency* of images and crafts, the *efficacy* of objects, the active *presence* in images, the *vitality* of repurposed things — say, baby shoes used as votive symbols — and the physical practicality of written amulets. It regards the body itself not as a passive thing to be transcended or healed but as a symbolic pallette for communication with spirits and saints—through illness and inspiration, through dance and through pain. In steering us back to the things that constitute religious and social experience Materiality of Religion represents the ultimate repudiation of the Protestant legacy in Religious Studies, which had always held up the spiritual, intellectual, and transcendent as theologically superior to the idolatry of heathens, primitives, and Catholics. Putting the concrete, the object, the carnal, as well as ritual "play" and bricolage at the center of religion, the material approach represents an enormous step forward in the understanding of religion in culture and human life; and in many ways it is the next step also in the appreciation of magic as more than some heathen counterpoint to apostolic Christianity. Magic, that is, becomes the element of agency and presence in objects sought out, combined, crafted, invested with mediation, deposited, worn, or placed publicly—the curse-tablet "sent" to Hekate as much as the female figurine left in a saint's shrine, the apotropaic icon of St. Simeon or the cloak of a deceased prophet as much as the plaque with the "suffering eye" outside one's door, and certainly the amulet containing scripture phrases as much as the bright red gem displaying the Anguipede symbol. In all such cases it is the agency in the material object that is felt to protect, communicate, heal, or curse.

Finally, the term magic can aid us in describing or redescribing certain verbal or material *aspects* of rituals that are otherwise defined as immaterial or transcendent in orientation: what we usually classify as mysticism or theurgy. Ancient mystical programs typically involved the recitation of sacred names, sounds, repetitive verses and images, and an illocutionary force to declarations and descriptions. That is to say, the declaration establishes the situation. Permeating apocalyptic literature, Gnostic literature, and many other esoteric liturgical traditions, these linguistic features and functions should not be called magical in and of themselves. We gain nothing by using the term magic simply for the language of mysticism. But magical might refer helpfully to the particular uses to which certain types of language and gesture were put in mystical programs. And it might also refer to the *materials* that serve or are created through these rituals: the liquids and substances and sounds that serve the acquisition of visions, or mediate between the heavenly and human worlds. In this area of mysticism one might think of the *lynx* wheel that the theurgist would whirl to create supernatural sounds; or the names and symbols affixed on the body for heavenly ascent in apocalyptic and Gnostic texts; or (on the other hand) the amulets and the ritual knowledge that one is said to gain *through* rituals of ascent to heaven (like the "white stone" with the secret name on it, promised by the prophet in the Book of Revelation, 2:17)." *Sefer Ha-Razim* is the paramount example of these verbal or material results of visionary ritual. It is not "magical"

because it recommends specific formulas and spells for practical purposes but rather because it derives material applications and ritual powers from apocalyptic ascent.

In all these ways the category magic might have some utility as long as we justify it for particular types of data not as a loose or lazy generalization for whatever seems weird, manipulative, or selfish in orientation (and especially not as a foil to Jesus or Paul). As a heuristic term it can highlight—for further analysis—material aspects of ritual, local applications of official ritual, and shifting evaluations of traditional religious figures or rites. We can use it as a quality or aspect of ritual or a domain in which rituals might be directed. In these contexts the word carries a helpful qualitative sense—sometimes akin to ·numinousness" or "charisma," "agency" or "presence," "potency" or "liminality," in all the ways these words have been loaded in the humanities; and sometimes characterizing shifts in status or the materiality of social crises. In these different ways, the self-conscious use of magic and magical can also encourage intellectual responsibility for the history of ideological misuses of these terms—misuses that tend to be replicated by scholars who imagine themselves pure by eliminating the term magic. As the anthropologists Charles Stewart and Rosalind Shaw observed with the contested term *syncretism,* "embracing a term which has acquired—in some quarters—pejorative meanings can lead to a more challenging critique of the assumptions on which those meanings are based than can its mere avoidance."

Yet invariably, and appropriately, scholars will leave the category magic behind as, in the end, unnecessary to the description or classification of some phenomenon: the use of mysterious words and sounds to drive an incantation, for example. While helpful initially to highlight aspects of phenomena, the term "magic" remains too vague to rely on as a genuine second-order category of description for magic as described here essentially permeates human language, material lives, and social interactions. Ultimately the term should point us to something more fundamental in all the religions of antiquity (and beyond): that what we call religion inevitably revolves around the image and the amulet, the assemblage and the inscribed letters, the shrine and the body. Still, the term helped us to get there—to raise the questions.

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This **GUIDE** is meant to flesh out a vision for the study of magic encapsulated in due preceding essay. It is a "Guide to the Study of Ancient Magic" rather than 'A New Approach to Ancient Magic" because its conceivers and authors would like this volume to standardize presuppositions in such a way that future work m this area will begin from the same place. It is our hope that future scholars in this area will not feel the need to define magic "as the Romans imagined it" or as part of or different from "religion" but to move on to the material or social dynamics suggested as magical in Part 4 or to focus on discourses of ambiguous/illegitimate ritual (without use of magic as a translation) as described in Part 2, or conversely to examine texts and artifacts with ritual or apotropaic implications as described in Part 3—again, independently of a category magic.

Thus this **GUIDE** does *not* provide articles on "Magic in Ancient Judaism" or `Magic in the New Testament." The time has passed when such articles contributed anything but fuzzy amalgamations of negative stereotypes of the Other with uncritical efforts to define something essential about magic as separate from religion. Even when books are published with magic in the title there often follow extended apologies for using a loaded and exoticizing term that bears little resemblance to the indigenous categories discussed or to the phenomena that might pertain to such a category.' (It is

notable that the scholar most associated with the field of "magic in early Christianity" ultimately repudiated the use of the term in print.)

Nor will the **GUIDE** offer a review of the last two centuries of etic, or secondorder, thinking about magic as a category in anthropology, religious studies, comparative literature, theology, and so on, for the contribution we hope to make is to phenomena in Mediterranean and Near Eastern antiquity. A larger, more comprehensive field of "magic studies" has blossomed across the humanities in recent years, with a prestigious book series and journals like *Preternature* and *Magic, Ritual and Witchcraft,* all encouraging the interdisciplinary study of phenomena across historical periods and literatures. At the same time, a number of historians have placed the legacy of the category magic in broad critical perspective: a legacy from antiquity that evolved through the Reformation to become an essential, if deceptive, part of modern thinking. That is to say, the critical analysis of the modern history of the word "magic" is well under way, and it need not be addressed in this book. Our attention is instead directed towards the problems and interests in ancient materials and the theoretical challenges that they occasion. I readily acknowledge that critical historians of magic through history—who invariably conclude that the term is irredeemable for descriptive purposes—may not agree with this *Guide*'s offer of "flexible" uses of magic as a quality or dynamic. Yet this strategy seems more productive with the texts and artifacts of antiquity than the elimination of the term entirely—a tactic that, as Henk Versnel has observed, ends up creating magics by other names.[5] Overall, adjusting the parameters and nomenclature of academic fields is a complex process, and a focus on antiquity is both defensible and realistic in that regard.

The three parts of the *Guide* that follow this Introduction are thus conceived both to move the larger field loosely focused on ancient magic beyond its preoccupations with the legitimacy and historical uses of magic and to adhere more closely to the principles of emic (indigenous, insiders') and etic (secondorder, outsiders') description than prior studies have followed. Part 2 looks at cultural constructions of ambiguous or unsanctioned ritual as a field of ethnoclassification, conceptualized differently in different cultures and periods according to institutional or legal predilection, local/institutional interactions, and historical circumstances. Those "different cultures and periods" represented in Part 2 are, to be sure, not exhaustive—nor, some will argue, are they representative, since they maintain essentialist parameters ("Jewish", "Early Christian", "Greek") even if the authors themselves are more nuanced, and they leave out discourses from Syriac, Ethiopic, Armenian, and Arabic/Muslim sources (for reasons of expediency, not purpose). Be that as it may, authors in section were asked to cleave closely to indigenous nomenclature *(magia, teka. khesheph,* etc.) and to eschew the term "magic" as much as possible—as a translation, a generalization, or even as a misleading modern concept. Their mandates were to expose the reader as much as possible to indigenous vocabulary for illegitimate and ambiguous ritual acts and the discourses and fears that organized this vocabulary. Whereas some scholars have argued for a disjunction between popular and "learned" notions of illegitimate or ambiguous ritual—that is, putting authors like Plato, Theocritus, Plutarch, and Augustine on a separate discursive level from folk conceptions—in this volume such authors are treated as fully members of the field of emic perspectives.

Now, as I admit in "Ancient Magic in a New Key," above, to conceptualize the topic in this way "cultural constructions of ambiguous or unsanctioned ritual" is to impose an "etic" (outsider's) framework on cultures: to put it crudely, we decided what material would count as an emic approach to magic. But it is

defensible as a way of thinking about where in cultures the terms and ideas often gathered or translated as "magic" arose. To be sure, it is an etic assertion that these cultures maintained such notions—these verbal, folkloric, and even legal alternations between fantasy and fear, exoticism and condemnation—but that very etic assertion sets in motion an effective type of discussion of emic perspectives.

Of course, the broad scopes of these chapters may be criticized as too broad to reflect anything like an indigenous perspective. Fritz Graf's epigraphical work has uncovered highly localized situations in the Mediterranean world in which a plague or an untimely death triggers inquiries into *maleficium* or the use of *pharmakeia:* the kinds of small-scale social crises in which such words and fears usually live. And yet those who framed crises in these local cases relied on generally recognized terms for illegitimate ritual acts: they drew on traditions and discourses of ambiguous or unsanctioned ritual. Or else they did not draw on such discourses or vocabulary, and misfortune and social tension were resolved in other ways. For example, when Pliny investigates "the contagion of that *superstitio*" (i.e., Christians) in early II CE Bithynia (Asia Minor), despite some concerns about their ceremonies, a vocabulary associated with illegitimate ritual acts never arises.' And when Gemellus Horion complains formally to the Roman strategos in late II CE Karanis (Egypt) that his neighbor sought to "hem him around with malice" by throwing a stillborn fetus at him, he does not accuse his neighbor with *mageia, pharmakeia,* or like words for unsanctioned and antisocial ritual acts, even though he is trying to appeal to Roman jurisprudence. These cases suggest the ultimately idiosyncratic application of the words and ideas discussed in this first section, even while the discourse was available, recognizable, and could be explosive if deployed in the right circumstances.

Part 3 addresses the texts and artifacts historically called magical—and for some scholars actually serving as the basis of definitions of magic. But what *are* these materials? Do their authors or craftsmen present them as in any way exotic, subversive, or antithetical to religion or civil society? If they consist of ritual instructions, like the so-called Greek Magical Papyri, how do they differ from ritual instructions in other religions of the ancient world? This section is not meant so much to critique the history of interpretive scholarship on these texts and artifacts as to help readers understand what these materials actually were and how we—historians of religion, biblical scholars, classicists—might actually make use of them.

And while the authors here were not, as in Part 1, enjoined from using "magic" as a term of convenience, most left it behind as they focused on the nature of the artifacts or documents. Instead of magic there are amulets (including gems) for healing and protection, figurines for ritual focus and gestures, inscribed bowls for protection from demons, and of course, ritual manuals. These manuals may have been used as libretti for performance, but they may also have been composed or translated in a nostalgic literary vein unrelated to practice or performance, or to substantiate a codex or scroll with interesting contents, or to collect and edit popular charms and remedies from local culture. Inasmuch as their practical or editorial use required literacy, sometimes an arcane priestly literacy, any assumptions we might make about what they were for or what they signify historically should require a full account of what kinds of people might have held that kind of literacy: priestly (or rabbinic, or monastic) experts? General literati? As I explain in the Introductory Essay above, we must avoid taking published collections like Betz's *Greek Magical Papyri in Translation,* or Kropp's *Ausegewahlte koptische Zaubertexte,* or Naveh and Shaked's *Magical Spells and Formulae* as veritable Bibles of Magic—as canons that offer uniform pictures of a subcurrent of antiquity. Each individual papyrus, or codex, or bowl, or amulet, or bunch of leather strips is its own product, with discrete, authors, interests, and contexts.

Part 4 returns to magic as an etic, second-order category, but not to offer a definition, scope, or theory of magic. Instead, these essays are experiments in using magic as a quality or dynamic of words, texts, artifacts, persons, ritual procedures, or social situations. In these essays magic is not characterized against some "non-magic" (like "religion" or rational instrumentality) but—in the spirit of such classic terms as charisma or numinosity—as a term that might be used on its own to enlarge our understanding of how things might have been regarded and treated in antiquity. It is etic in the sense that it is our term to apply tentatively and critically to indigenous uses of things or indigenous attitudes toward situations, regardless of indigenous nomenclature. Indeed, one might go further in justifying magic as an etic category, even despite its long legacy of exoticizing its subjects, for to embrace a critically suspect category makes one responsible to its legacy of misuses. Simply to replace **or** avoid "magic," by this reasoning, allows the unwitting perpetuation of the old errors in new guise, whereas keeping the term in play for select purposes requires conscientiousness.

The essays on "Dimensions of a Category Magic" are indeed experiments in select cultural and textual domains, and the reader will have to weigh for herself how much in each case the category enlarges on a type of artifact or situation. Many scholars have simply dispensed with magic completely, preferring to discuss situations of binding or cursing, or apotropaia, or the distribution of charisma, or folk-healing. Magic is often unnecessary outside the thematic or comparative modes in which these essays operate. In the incident to which I referred earlier, in which Gemellus Horion complains that his neighbor has twice thrown a fetus in his direction to "hem him around with malice," the term magic could capture the notion of the agentive fetus (part of an assemblage, no doubt), the verbal/gestural context of "hemming around with malice," or—as Eidinow would imply in her essay—the larger social context in which village tensions devolved into sorcery and sorcery-accusations.

In the end, this volume endeavors to clarify the study of ancient magic by dispensing with general studies of "magic in early Christianity" or "magic in ancient Egypt" and dividing the subject into more profitable areas: the discourse of illegitimate or exotic ritual in a culture; the materials from which we draw our impressions of a magic; and broader areas of culture or language or social status that might be illuminated by reference to something called magic. This division should encourage scholars to be both more rigorously philological—avoiding facile translations for culturally-loaded words—and, in a way, more anthropological, in imagining areas of culture and practice that suggest magic as a second-order term or, on the other hand, that impelled people in history to react with their own loaded categories. It is to be hoped that these fields, interests, and materials continue to grow, gain in sophistication and authority, lose their occasional academic stigma, and establish interconnections across fields once undisposed towards "magic." It is my hope that this *Guide* offers a way for this kind of responsible interdisciplinarity. <>

NEW APPROACHES TO THE STUDY OF ESOTERICISM
edited by Egil Asprem and Julian Strube [Supplements to Method & Theory in the Study of Religion, Brill, 9789004446441] Open Access

This volume offers new approaches to some of the biggest persistent challenges in the study of esotericism and beyond. Commonly understood as a particularly "Western" undertaking consisting of religious, philosophical, and ritual traditions that go back to Mediterranean antiquity, this book argues for a global approach that significantly expands the scope of esotericism and highlights its relevance for broader theoretical and methodological debates in the humanities and social sciences.

The contributors offer critical interventions on aspects related to colonialism, race, gender and sexuality, economy, and marginality. Equipped with a substantial introduction and conclusion, the book offers textbook-style discussions of the state of research and makes concrete proposals for how esotericism can be rethought through broader engagement with neighboring fields.

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Afterword: Outlines of a New Roadmap *Egil Asprem and Julian Strube*
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We opened this volume by observing that esotericism scholars' scope is undergoing a phase of geographical, cultural, and demographic expansion. With these developments comes the need for theoretical and methodological reflection. As scholars are now once again inquiring about esotericism in a global context—not as part of a phenomenological comparative program, but as a critical historical undertaking—it has become clear that some of the field's core assumptions and key terminology must be rethought. The chapters of this book have demonstrated this need in a number of different ways, and put theoretical tools and existing scholarly literatures on the table that would help the field succeed at the task.

If there is one central assumption that rises above all others, due to its centrality to the field and the way its consequences make themselves felt on a number of different issues, it is the Eurocentrism embedded in the notion that esotericism is specifically "Western." Chapters in this book have drawn on a number of scholarly literatures that critique this issue in different but compatible ways, notably postcolonial studies and global history, decolonial approaches, and critical race and whiteness studies. The chapters demonstrate that, contrary to some polemical framing that has now become fashionable even in the field of esotericism, these approaches are not out on an iconoclastic mission to demolish Western civilization and denigrate its values: they are about doing historical and social-scientific work in a theoretically and methodologically more substantiated way. This means taking into account the complexities and contingencies, the ambiguities and contradictions, and the ruptures and continuities of the historical developments that have shaped not only understandings of "Western civilization," but of "esotericism" as well. Decades of scholarship have demonstrated how diffusionist assumptions about the unilateral spread of Western knowledge have obstructed our understanding of such complexities and still play a crucial part in present-day scholarly and political polemics.

What we have called the "diffusionist reaction" to global approaches in the study of esotericism is exemplary not only of the neglect but also of the outright misrepresentation of such insights, and also illustrate a lack of (self-)reflection on the positionality of those who, today, carry out historical or social-scientific research on esotericism. In this sense, we hold that the structural analysis of biases and power inequalities that is of major concern for postcolonial, (global) historical, or critical-theoretical approaches are tools that will ultimately equip us to uncover sources, voices, historical relationships, and entanglements that we had ignored—not because they weren't there, but because we were systematically looking the other way. The consequences of engaging these frameworks seriously and thereby challenging the field's Eurocentrism when we start studying esotericism around the world are that the "Western" moniker should be dropped, along with the diffusionist representations that come with it and that have so far dominated attempts to study esotericism outside its imagined occidental homeland.

Why is this important? The key reason, discussed in several chapters of this book, has to do with a basic concept of historical analysis and interpretation: *agency*. This notion signifies the capabilities of historical actors to shape history, which is conditioned and structured by their individual embedment in complex historical contexts. The diffusionist frameworks have, as we think is now well demonstrated, led to a selective and distortive attribution of agency to historical actors. It has essentially meant following the

activities of the Western, often European, usually white and mostly male actors already well-known to esotericism scholars, and prioritizing their creative activities and contributions even when these contributions are clearly negotiated in non-European contexts—to the occlusion of non-white, non-Western actors. The effect is a self-sustaining and circular line of scholarship, which cannot fail to reproduce its own assumptions because it only selects sources capable of confirming them. Put differently, the critical approaches introduced in this book are a remedy against the field's persistent confirmation or "myside" bias.

The paradigmatic example, as discussed by Strube and Cantú, is the activities of occultists in India, such as the Theosophical Society and various occultist engagements with yoga, but we have seen the same logic applied to South America, the entire Islamic world, and the descendants of the Atlantic slave triangle's displaced bodies. Reclaiming and making space for subaltern voices, then, must be a major project for a global study of esotericism. While most chapters have focused on the theoretical prerequisites for this project, it bears emphasizing that the realization of the project must above all be a revision in *methodology*: giving space for subaltern voices requires selecting different sorts of material, reading different languages, and perhaps even embracing alternative modes of scholarly representation, as was argued and effectively illustrated by Finley and Page's flash non-fiction exercise as part of their recovery of *Africana* esoteric discourse through the lyrics and material culture of soul and blues music.

The issues of agency, subaltern voices, selection of sources, and scholarly representations of the same are not only relevant for the discussion of esotericism globally; they also bear on the question of an *historical* expansion of the field, and its relationship with other fields and disciplines. The study of esotericism holds enormous potential for entering dialogue with, significantly enrich, and even transform the perspectives of other fields of study. It is able to demonstrate the outstanding but notoriously neglected importance of currents such as Theosophy or occultism, not only in terms of historical relevance but also in light of theoretical and methodological approaches and concepts. Esoteric contexts often function like a burning glass for controversially debated issues such as agency, colonialism, racism, gender, or "appropriation" and "authenticity." This is not least because of esotericism's constant tendency to defy modern categorizations (e.g. the religion-science-magic triad; high and low culture; the political right-left spectrum), a fact which indeed has been a major contribution of the field as a whole. The concentrated study of how esotericism is entangled with debates of colonialism, gender, racism, etc. offers instructive insights into the often ambivalent *negotiations and performances of identities*, not only in light of broader political or cultural trends, but also, as Hedenborg White has demonstrated in her chapter (2021), of gender, sex, and sexuality.

The scholarship that formed the basis of the various chapters of this volume is concerned with unraveling such intricacies. That does not mean "eagerly deconstructing Western culture," but explaining how "it" was subject to constant renegotiations and transformations, in which esotericism played a crucial and still under-studied part. In this sense, the study of esotericism should also complicate both the ideas of a unilateral spread of some knowledge from the West to the East and the unilateral "appropriation" of other knowledge from the East by the West. These ideas do not only mark predominant approaches within the study of esotericism, but also more extreme postcolonial views on the colonial context as exclusively determined by oppression, exploitation, and cultural incommensurability. From both angles, the agency of "non-hegemonic" actors is historiographically obscured. At a time when such issues are the subject of prominent academic and socio-political debates,

the study of esotericism could make a significant and valuable contribution on the basis of a revised and substantiated toolkit that would break the self-referential circle, complicate ongoing polemics, and attract the attention of other scholars and institutions.

To this end, it is imperative to rethink the categories at work within the study of esotericism, including its conceptualization as a dustbin of rejected knowledge. As Burns has demonstrated, esotericism scholars often operate with categories that are ahistorically projected on earlier source material, without sufficiently engaging with the expertise of the fields of study dedicated to them. Not only does this contribute to the self-isolation and self-marginalization of the field because of a lack of interdisciplinary dialogue and scholarly rigor; it also perpetuates the historiographical marginalization of its *subjects*, which, as Asprem points out, often enough were anything but marginal or rejected. One crucial step to counter these perceptions is a methodological focus on the *reception history* of historical subjects, the fruitfulness of which becomes evident in Burns' treatment of "gnosis." Such an approach harmonizes well with the *genealogy* proposed by Strube, in demonstrating how historical narratives and polemics have shaped and often distorted the perception of historical sources and their contexts up to the present day. While a call for "strictly historical" approaches and an awareness of the polemical and/or retrospective construction of esotericism *as* rejected knowledge are by no means absent from earlier scholarship, Burns' chapter further underlines that such calls have not always been consistently and thoroughly carried out. These shortcomings also reveal themselves in the neglect of Islamicate contexts examined by Saif, which ironically shaped much of the historical material—such as Hermetism—that is often considered an integral part of "Western" esotericism. When we further consider that there are more texts dedicated to Hermes in Arabic than in any other language (van Bladel, 2009), it becomes all the more reasonable to decenter the particularly European and Christian reception that has been given pride of place so far, and present it instead as just one among many receptions of Hermetic writings.

The study of esotericism as rejected knowledge also carries great potential for contributing to broader discussions in the humanities if it is done right. As Asprem argued in his chapter, doing it right would mean scrapping the inflated version of the thesis, which risks amounting to hyperbolic statements about the field as the ultimate victim of hegemonic knowledge systems, while at the same time contradicting the likely results of in-depth analyses of rejection processes, marginalization, and distributions of power—or worse, making such analyses impossible. By contrast, the strict version of the rejected knowledge model has a lot to offer to broader understandings of modernity, and especially the impact of the Reformation and the Enlightenment on the formation of a modern "historical *a priori*" or tacit knowledge of what counts as acceptable claims. In particular, this aspect of esotericism has much to gain from integrating with a broader sociology of knowledge and related perspectives, whether in the history of religion, science, or medicine. To begin with, this is, as Asprem noted, because the stigmatization of knowledge systems or particular knowledge claims can happen in many different ways and for different reasons—from explicit rejection by specific authorities, to shifts in orientation by knowledge users and producers resulting in forgetfulness and replacement, to the ignoring of low-prestige knowledge not considered worthy of attention in the first place.

Moreover, the study of modern and contemporary esotericism offers excellent opportunities to study the complex *effects* and diverging *motivations behind* the production of esoteric ideas and practices as being somehow marginal or even subversive. As Asprem also highlighted, such status seems in fact to be

an integral component of what makes esotericism attractive as an "alternative" to "official" positions, whether in the domains of religion, arts, politics, medicine, worldviews, or "lifestyles." Crockford's chapter further illustrated how this aspect troubles the view of esoteric rejected knowledge as the essential "underdog," divested of "Establishment" power, by showing how the rhetoric of being rejected, marginal, oppositional and, moreover, *secret*, is used successfully in marketing purposes by the wellness industry. The thrust of Asprem's and Crockford's arguments is that a critical reappraisal of how rejected knowledge narratives are constructed leads us to consider the agency of those who are either "rejected" by others, claim such status for themselves, or gravitate towards that which has already been construed as marginal. Further studies along these lines can contribute a lot to our understanding of more general processes of exclusion and opposition, which seems crucial at a time when anti-Establishment rhetoric is a potent political force in the world.

Conceptualizing "Esotericism" for a New Generation

The focus of this book has been on how we can responsibly and fruitfully expand the perimeters of the study of esotericism. The responses to this question—and the particular recommendations to drop the Western demarcation, avoid diffusionist models, readjust our foci on (historical) actors, and rethink the rejected knowledge thesis—inevitably brings us back to the question of how esotericism ought to be defined. We can hear the worries of some readers that there will be nothing left of the field once the reflection is done, or that a global approach on non-diffusionist terms leaves us with a concept so diluted that it signifies anything and nothing, anywhere and nowhere. Let us in conclusion address this worry by showing that, to the contrary, we have a lot left to work with, and clear directions for a plurality of different research projects where esotericism can be operationalized on lucid and sound foundations.

As Okropiridze argued in his philosophy-inflected contribution on the definitional progression in the field, there is currently an unresolved tension between definitions that claim to be grounded in the way things are (what he calls the onto-epistemological directionality) and approaches that hold esotericism to be a human (scholarly or otherwise) projection onto reality (historical, social, psychological or otherwise; what he calls the epistemo-ontological directionality). In the first camp he singles out Faivre's definition as the gold standard, while elements of it are also found in Hanegraaff's empiricist project of letting sources speak for themselves and in Asprem's cognitivist project of studying the mental and evolutionary building blocks of practices deemed esoteric. In the second camp he singles out Bergunder's approach to esotericism as an "empty signifier" that temporarily fixes contentious power discourses in concrete historical contexts as the clearest example, while again also finding elements of it in Hanegraaff's insistence that esotericism emerged as a narrative construct shaped in polemical discourses, and Asprem's insistence that the cognitive building blocks are not building blocks *of* esotericism (constituting and defining it), but rather of individual practices that are *labelled* such in various discursive formations (and yet differently in other formations).

Okropiridze's conclusion is worth noting, for it offers consolation to those who worry that scholars will have nothing left to work with following theoretical interventions of the type offered in this book, or that the field will be dominated by "deconstructions." To the contrary, Okropiridze argues that *neither* the "deconstructionist" *nor* the "inductivist-realist" side of the spectrum can succeed on their own, because the nature of interpretation requires both that there is some*thing* revealing itself to be interpreted (the onto-epistemic, or realist presupposition) and that *some*thing is singled out for

interpretation by the scholar (the epistemo-ontological, or "deconstructionist" presupposition). Since Okropiridze thinks this conundrum *cannot* be solved, his prescription is that we must allow for differing approaches and, indeed, definitions, to work side by side in the field—on the condition that each research program self-reflectively acknowledges their limitation, restrains any ambition for dominance, and listens attentively to what other projects built on different assumptions are achieving.

In that spirit, let us now return to the definition question as it looks in light of the chapters of this book. While the definition debate has not been at the forefront, we have seen several strategies deployed throughout the book, notably a consistent genealogical approach based on Bergunder (Strube), and stipulative, heuristic definitions singling out specific understudied subfields, such as "ancient (Mediterranean) esoteric traditions" (Burns) and "Africana esoteric studies". These approaches work in opposing directionalities, to use Okropiridze's terminology, but can, as we will show, still fruitfully speak to one another.

The first thing to make clear is what is and is not entailed by the genealogical approach that Strube suggests as the basis for a global history of esotericism. First of all, while it is true that it dismisses the possibility of simply uncovering a set of sources out there that can be made to speak for "esotericism," it does not follow that we thereby lose access to our sources, that esotericism doesn't "really exist," or that *anything* could be made into esotericism on the scholar's whim. What the approach leaves us with in terms of defining a field of study is in fact very precise and empirically accessible: starting with the existence of the term itself, it points us to the discourses in which it is articulated, by real flesh-and-blood people, along with the contexts in which they live and act, and asks us to pay attention to the meaning-making processes and negotiations over the term's significance *in those contexts* and *to those people*. Working our way backwards, we land in the nineteenth century as the crucial period in which meanings of esotericism are enunciated, connected with ancient wisdom traditions, initiations, secrecy, magical power, tantra, mesmeric trance and somnambulism, hidden Tibetan masters, yoga, gnosis, perennial truth, astral travel, and all the rest. As Strube demonstrates, this genealogical foundation then requires us to decenter the particular voices we have been used to prioritize and analyse the entire discourse on the esoteric/esotericism where, e.g., South Asian individuals and organizations, as well as rank-and-file Indian members of the Theosophical Society are given equal attention, and their own local motivations, background knowledge, and pre-Theosophical horizon of meaning are explored for how they actively shaped the negotiations that ensued. A crucial insight resulting from this perspective is that the meanings of notions such as esotericism, occultism, or Theosophy were anything but fixed and subject to constant controversial negotiations—they were *not* ready-made "Western concepts" that could be exported into the rest of the world. Quite the contrary, they were shaped within global exchanges. As Cantú demonstrated with regards to the study of yoga, this tracking of existing local traditions, practices, and meanings has already turned up lots of empirical evidence that causes significant problems for the narrative of Western occultists simply "appropriating" an authentic yoga and adapting it to comply with "essentially Western" ideas. Instead we see genuine entanglements of pre-existing Indian and European traditions that mutually influence each other.

Some might object that a genealogical approach will run into problems if it wants to push further back in history to times before there was a discourse on "esotericism" (because the term was not yet coined). For such an expansion to succeed, it will usually be necessary to invent analytic concepts for heuristic purposes, or to follow other "empty signifiers" (such as "gnosis," "kabbalah," or "magic") that made it

into the temporary fixing of "esotericism." In fact, the genealogical approach does already provide us with crucial insights that must be taken into account if we are to stipulate definitions to be deployed backwards in history. It is also well equipped to conceptualize responsible comparative projects, as it consistently works through the contextualization of historical sources (Bergunder, 2016). For example, it is already clear that, while "esotericism" as such is empty, the connections that the term fixed in nineteenth-century discourses tended to draw on a number of rather specific ideas, particularly when narratives of tradition were invented. As is well known, Jacques Matter was first to define the term in French as denoting the elitist secrecy that he associated with Gnosis and ancient Gnosticism—significantly influenced when doing so by existing Illuminist currents in France that combined initiatory societies with magical and theurgic practice, divination, and oracles. In the German context, the noun *Esoterismus* was first used in discussions about Pythagoreanism and their apparent secret societies, while it soon also came to be used in the context of Freemasonry, across the continent as well as in English. It bears emphasizing that the earliest authors who used such vocabulary did so in the context of orientalist studies and, like Matter, linked Gnostic doctrines to common civilizational roots in "India" and "the East" from the very beginning. Among the occultists, invocations of esotericism or "esoteric tradition" would seldom fail to reference the Gnostics, kabbalists, mystery cults, Hermes Trismegistus, Pythagoras, Plato, the Neoplatonists, the Knights Templars, the Cathars, the Rosicrucians, the alchemists, and so forth. It did not take occultists long, then, to embark on journeys to "the East" on their quests for the origins of the ancient wisdom supposedly handed down by these traditions. A genealogical perspective offers explanations of this circumstance on the basis of historical source material and investigates how and why historical actors identified and compared "esoteric traditions" across the globe.

Such a perspective also helps to understand the emergence of such (invented) traditions. Esoteric narratives and ideas emerged and were shaped in all sorts of different contexts and for different reasons: as Strube has shown elsewhere, the first occultists did it in the very specific contexts of French pre-Marxist "utopian socialism" and neo-Catholicism—and emphatically not in the context of an actually existing tradition where these systems were passed down in an unbroken chain that can simply be studied historically. Yet, the meanings and connections that such enunciations assembled provide us with a framework for further, necessarily more fragmented, historical studies along the lines of reception history. It is precisely through such a lens that the study of esotericism could demonstrate the relevance of its subjects, and thus its own relevance: orientalist studies, historical-critical Bible studies, socialism, and the most influential Catholic movements at a given time were anything but rejected or marginal. A consistent pursuit of such a research program could thus not only yield crucial insights into historical and social-scientific material; it also could help other scholars understand the history of their subjects, for instance by demonstrating the relevance of esotericism within the history of socialism. It could also help them understand the history of their disciplines: even a cursory look at Indological scholarship or studies focusing on late antiquity, for instance, will reveal an abundance of "esoteric" vocabulary.

This is also where we can see how Burns' suggestions complement the genealogical approach, which starts by stipulating "ancient (Mediterranean) esoteric traditions," which is to cover religious and philosophical traditions in the ancient world centrally concerned with an "esoteric" dynamic of hiding and revealing higher truths usually held to be ineffable, whether we find these in Neoplatonic theurgic traditions, Gnostic apocalyptic texts, or the Enochic literature of Jewish apocalypses. Having defined this

area of interest, Burns suggests we can fruitfully build our way through history, not by tracing "surviving traditions" from antiquity, but through a reception-historical approach in which the memory of and references to such texts, whether in existing manuscripts or fragmentary reconstructions, have constantly been reinterpreted and reimagined over the first millennium, into the European Renaissance and down to our own days. Eventually, then, these two approaches meet in the fixing of discourses on "esotericism"—the crucial point is that while these discourses retroactively point out the direction for us of what's relevant to study, the critical reflection on how those connections were fixed should enable us to resist simply reproducing, for instance, nineteenth century historical narratives. Any ancient sources we end up studying, then, are not sources "of" esotericism (strictly speaking invented in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries), even though their *reception history* and their later entanglements eventually contributed to the formation of "esotericism" as an empirically available historical subject matter in the modern colonial period.

Along the way, scholars get plenty of opportunities to study the social roles of secrecy and initiation, the construction of tradition, the production and contestation of knowledge, and rejection and exclusion practices—as well as the shifting ways in which this material is connected with political, economic, and religious power. Not least due to the oppositional and non-hegemonic status that is often ascribed to esotericism by practitioners, their critics and opponents, or scholars studying them, this material holds huge potential for analyses of social practices and socio-political issues. Several chapters in this volume have highlighted this potential with regard to sexuality, gender, and race. It is in light of such examples that the study of esotericism can make significant contributions, not only to research on historical subjects but also on how they inform and shape present-day developments.

All of this should suffice to illustrate that there is a vast continent of material left to study with such conceptualizations of "esotericism." While it does not lead to an "anything goes" attitude, it does open up the field in very significant ways. For example, Burns' reception-historical approach could equally validly be applied in the South Indian context, as indeed Cantú does in his chapter, or in the context of South and Latin America, as indicated by Villalba, and obviously too in the Islamic world, as Saif argues. Rather than escalating into a diffuse or even neo-perennialist historiography, or attempting to write a "universal" or "planetary" history of esotericism, the decentered and global approaches suggested in this volume form solid foundations for strictly historical, consistent, and theoretically substantiated research. Equipped with such a roadmap, we invite scholars of esotericism as well as outside observers to explore the expanding horizon of our field and secure not only its internal solidification, but also its establishment within academia at large. <>

EASTERN AND WESTERN SYNERGIES AND IMAGINATIONS: TEXTS AND HISTORIES edited by Katrine Wong [East and West, Brill, 9789004437401

EASTERN AND WESTERN SYNERGIES AND IMAGINATIONS: TEXTS AND HISTORIES is a product of east-west studies crossed with adaptation studies: it goes beyond evaluation of cultural interactions and discussion of forms and manners of adaptation. This volume brings together critical discourses from various cultural locales which have developed from and thrived on the notion of "East

meets West" or "West meets East". The 10 chapters trace and investigate cross-, trans- or multi-cultural interpretations of fictional and non-fictional narratives that feature people and events in cities and regions which thrive, or have thrived, as East-West hubs, thereby expounding multiple layers of relationship between source texts and new texts. An allegorical play, The Three Ladies of Macao, premièred in December 2016, is now published as appendix in this volume.

CONTENTS

Excerpt: The age of globalization — or digital globalization, to be exact — has witnessed, and is witnessing, increasing activities across borders and interactions between nations, typically and especially between the East and the West. Such movement is heavily punctuated with events of expedition, trade, colonialization, and colonialism, as well as religious transmission. Just as tangible entities, such as spices, foods, products, and inventions, can be brought across oceans and continents, so can ideas and practices flow in and out of regions. Since the fifteenth century, typically known as the beginning of the Age of Discovery, the accelerated movement of people, commodities, and ideological notions from one place to another has fed an active dialogical exchange between Eastern and Western cultures. The word "discovery" encapsulates a concept present in the European mind: the West discovered the East, and in the process of such discovery, "by appropriating the exotic, by extracting and consuming certain elements of it, one could claim emblematic power over the other" (Jackson and Jaffer 9), which results in a formation of a dichotomy of superiority and inferiority.

A dichotomy exists in the terminology itself — East and West — in that it suggests the East and the West are, and have always been, perceived as separate and different entities. One of the most studied discussions is found in Edward Said's now polemic Orientalism:

The Orient is not only adjacent to Europe; it is also the place of Europe's greatest and richest and oldest colonies, the source of its civilizations and languages, its cultural contestant, and one of its deepest and most recurring images of the "other." In addition, the Orient has helped to define Europe (or the West) as its contrasting image, idea, personality, experience.

SAID 1–2

The "Orient," in Said's account, lived in the European imagination, which condensed non- European peoples into a common colonial entity and concocted fictional stereotypes of subordination, primitivism, and exoticism. This is, however, a rather simplistic, if not archaic, view of the development of civilization, especially when viewed from the current day and age, in which borders are porous and boundaries are penetrated and eradicated by instant digital communication. Richard Bernstein calls Said's binarism a false essentialism that "distorts the sheer complexity of overlapping traditions that cut across [the] artificially simplistic global notions" (Bernstein 93). Also, as John M. Hobson observes in The Eastern Origins of Western Civilisation, the East and the West have been "fundamentally and consistently interlinked through globalization ever since 500 CE" (Hobson 2). He demonstrates how the East, which was more advanced than the West between 500 and 1800, "enabled the rise of the West through two main processes: diffusion/ assimilation and appropriationism" (ibid. 2). While Hobson's study debunks the preconceived cultural prejudice, the underlying geographical, cultural, and ideological binarism still exists, at least prior to the moment when East and West mingle and merge. The pretext of such two-pronged identification of the East and the West is, to borrow Sylvia Chong's explanation of Orientalism, "a racial ideology imposed from the outside" (Chong 182), wherein the one looking in from the "outside" can be either an Easterner or a Westerner, depending on perspective and subject matter. Evidently, the outside, the foreign, and the Other are all units of relativity. Acts of mutual outsidering, mutual foreignizing, and mutual Othering between individuals and collectivities result in networks of homogeneity and heterogeneity.

The fact that the current era of digitization prompts us to embrace slogans upholding cultural diversity signifies a plurality of cultural identities. On the one hand, cybercitizens roam about without having to present their passports; on the other hand, we do not yet all share and identify with one single meta — or mega- culture. The truth is that cultural distinction and differentiation exist in and permeate the apparently borderless world country where we move osmotically; we live in a universe that has inherited a fundamental dichotomy, with which humanity develops and from which humanity strives to steer in order to realize a certain shared ideal in a neoliberal consumerist landscape.

In the process of living and constructing cultural diversity, intentionally or not, one cannot help but exercise imagination of and about the "Other," a conscious effort of diversification which can nonetheless sometimes lead us back into homogenization and even stereotyping. When we work with disparate cultures, we inadvertently become agents of cross- fertilization of these cultures and the identities, meanings, experience, and aesthetics thereof. At the centre of it all we find cultural dialogues made up of entering and exiting, borrowing and lending. To literature scholars, such discourse indicates intertextuality, in which texts, like cultures, are read and utilized to work through intersection, interaction, interchange, and interpretation. As theorized by Barthes, any one narrative is "international, transhistorical, transcultural: it is simply there, like life itself" (Barthes 79); any one text is the "text-between of another text" (ibid. 160). The connotation of lateral movement and relationship in Barthes's descriptions lies inherent in Linda Hutcheon's study of adaptation — "adaptation is a subset of

intertextuality," quips Thomas Leitch (Leitch 89) — which places the "original text" (authentic source) and subsequent endeavours of adaptation (creative products) as entities in a non- hierarchical process of creation and creativity: "multiple versions exist laterally, not vertically" (Hutcheon xiii). Hutcheon's view is an attempt to decry the "constant critical denigration of the general phenomenon of adaptation" that sees the creative products (adapted versions) as "minor and subsidiary and certainly never as good as the 'original' " (ibid. xii). As is the case in modern cultural transmissions and interactions where the local and the incoming meet and fuel each other without either one claiming purported superiority or inferiority, in works of adaptation there are no conquerors, no dictators — all borrowing from each other, all developing from each other, all flourishing henceforth.

Multidimensional communication and collaboration between the East and the West from the Age of Sail to the modern era are often narrated and recreated in print and on stage. One such feat is Monkey King, recently staged at the 1,700- seat Sands Cotai Theatre in Macao. The classic narrative Journey to the West, written during the Ming Dynasty, is about the India- bound adventures of the Tang Dynasty monk Xuanzang and his four disciples, one of them being the wily and adroit Monkey King. The story of this agile trickster, arguably the most adored character of the novel, has been told and retold in numerous forms, including opera, dance, cinema, television, video games, cartoons, and now Monkey King. The seventy- minute production, mounted by Beijing Hua Yan Group under the artistic directorship of Li Qiankuan (honorary president of the China Film Association), combines modern stage design and performance with multimedia technology. The multigeneric presentation brings together acrobats, ballet dancers, operatic singers, and martial arts masters from around the world. Showcasing hundreds of kaleidoscopically colourful costumes, a fifteen- metre tall Buddha hand that weighs seven tonnes, 3- D projections of flowers, birds, and fish, and two massive talons that extend from either side of the theatre, this show goes well beyond singing and dancing. It is an exemplar of how "traditional culture can be demonstrated with modern vitality," according to Zhang Huijun, president of the Beijing Film Academy. When working with Journey, a text Li Qiankuan has referred to as an "inexhaustible mine" of precious cultural goods, Li and Beijing Hua Yan Group demonstrate their interpretation of the spirit of traditional Chinese culture and the wisdom of Chinese civilization. What he and his team have done — interpreting a text and then creating a new narrative — is an illustration of Hutcheon's seminal definition of adaptation as "an extended, deliberate, announced revisitation of a particular work of art" (Hutcheon 170). Li and his team are adaptors or, to use John Bryant's term, " 'revising readers' who enact their interpretations" (Bryant 50); their enactment of their collective interpretation of the novel Journey to the West prompted several of this author's fellow theatregoers to venture and concur: "this visual feast has brought alive and substantiated the many imageries present in the novel, yet the verbal ring in the text has become something else." Seeing Monkey King and reading Journey to the West are, at least to the author's colleagues of various ethnicities, complementary activities of literary criticism, with neither of them being "better."

EASTERN AND WESTERN SYNERGIES AND IMAGINATIONS: TEXTS AND HISTORIES is a volume that brings together experts from a variety of cultural locales which have developed from and thrived on the notion of "East meets West" (or "West meets East," for the sake of pedantic inclusivity). The chapters trace and investigate cross- , trans- , or multicultural interpretation of fictional and non-fictional narratives that feature people and events in cities and regions which thrive, or have at different historical points thrived, as East- West hubs. Original texts and new texts (for economy of argument, all

derived, adapted, re- created, remodelled, revamped, parodied texts stemming from corresponding original texts are referred to as "new " text) are linked by interpretation and creativity interrogated through comparative readings of the original version and subsequent version(s). One central question is: what texts are involved in the creation of any one text? The "text," as is relevant to the scope and context of this volume, refers to a literary work, a historical event, a prolonged period of time, and an expression of sentiments. There is a guaranteed plurality of meanings in each individual discussion in ensuing chapters in that multiple, interdependent acts of reading are presented: the context and meaning of the source text, the context of creation of the new text, the subsequent meaning (be it authors' or readers') of the new text, the synthesized meaning resulting from a dialogic study of both texts ("intertextual dialogism," as proposed by Mia Mask).

Before penning this introduction, the author asked herself what constituted the identity of this volume. The domain words that surfaced were wildly diverse: comparative literature, adaptation studies, multiculturalism, translation, world literature. Given the range of chapters in the collection — some of them examine how historical discourse and archival material are incorporated into creation of new texts, some tackle cross- cultural and/ or cross- temporal rewrites, some query the significance of ethno- biographical input in (semi-) fictional work, this current East- West volume is an attempt at East- West studies crossed with adaptation studies. It goes beyond description and evaluation of cultural movements and interactions, beyond discussion and debate of forms and manners of adaptation. It hopes to introduce a new product of fusion that will complicate two existing vibrant scenes of East- West studies and adaptation studies, both of which are populated with carefully researched publications. Recent book- length ventures into East- West enquiry include East-West Exchange and Late Modernism: Williams, Moore, Pound (Qian 2017), The Orient and the Young Romantics (Warren 2014), Macao: Cultural Interaction and Literary Representations (Wong and Wei 2014), The English Renaissance, Orientalism, and the Idea of Asia (Johanyak and Lim 2009), and Allegoresis: Reading Canonical Literature East and West (Zhang 2005). These volumes have either focused on major writers and canonical works or conducted analytical reading of specific literary periods or cultures, and in doing so have positioned themselves as authoritative studies pertaining to respective periods, styles, or cultures. Owing to the frame and scope of texts under examination, these evaluations of cross- cultural imagination and conversation sometimes interrogate and subvert, but more often reinforce, pre- existing perceptions and well- established theories. While these scholars acknowledge the unequivocally distinct differences between the East and the West set against inherently profound similarities shared by these binary entities, one cannot help but ask if there is ever really any distinction between East and West save those created by humanity out of our own minds, out of our collective identities and beliefs. This question is in itself a philosophical colloquy. The present collection of essays departs from the scheme of canonical literature and language traditions and showcases lesser- known and yet significant narratives. At the risk of rendering inane the title of the series East and West, this volume builds its premise upon an equitable observation that "there is neither East nor West, Border, nor Breed, nor Birth" in "The Ballad of East and West" (1889) by Rudyard Kipling (who, until recently, was often regarded as a mouthpiece of British imperialism or even decried as a racist), and, more crucially, upon the fact that culturally neither the East nor the West is a stable entity, that both of them are constantly mutating, constantly undergoing hybridization, especially in this day and age.

Such a scene of perpetual cultural hybridization, transference, and transformation is substantiated and further complicated by creative works of adaptation, which are simultaneously agents and products of cultural evolution. Adaptation studies is a field that has attracted myriad forms and threads of scholarship; examples include Adaptation and Appropriation (Sanders 2015), Teaching Adaptations (Cartmell and Whelehan 2014), The Adaptation of History: Essays on Ways of Telling the Past (Raw and Ersin Tutan 2013), Adaptation Studies: New Challenges, New Directions (Bruhn et al. 2013), A Companion to Literature, Film, and Adaptation (Cartmell 2012), Beyond Adaptation: Essays on Radical Transformations of Original Works (Frus and Williams 2010), Rewriting/ Reprising in Literature: The Paradoxes of Intertextuality (Maisonnat et al. 2009), Film Adaptation (Naremore 2000), and Adaptations: From Text to Screen, Screen to Text (Cartmell and Whelehan 1999). Key ideas linking these studies include the question of fidelity, the expansion of forms and media of adaptation (such as paintings and video games) beyond the usual fiction-to-film reproduction, the phenomenon of dialogic negotiation between source text and resultant text rather than "one- way transport" from one to another, and, perhaps most significantly, a perennial investigation of what adaptation means and entails. An array of words that come under the umbrella term of "adaptation," words designating different modes and degrees of creative and re- creative endeavours, have arisen from three questions that are asked, respectively, by creators, audiences, and critics. First, what makes a work an adaptation? Second, how can one identify a work as an adaptation? And finally what qualifies a work as an adaptation? Regarding the immense "reproductive capacity" of adaptation and appropriation, Sanders states that "Texts feed off each other and create other texts, and other critical studies; literature creates other literature" (14), which, if I may, can be conveniently borrowed for cultural contexts in East- West discourse: "Cultures feed off each other and create other cultures, and other critical and creative readings of cultures; culture creates other culture."

The ten chapters in this volume don't lay emphasis on source texts (meaning examples of any form of narrative, such as classic masterpieces, historical documents, politico- diplomatic struggles and issues, legal and administrative infrastructure, one's life story, and certain art forms) or on new texts and the transformation and creation these give rise to. Instead the authors highlight textual relationships between the texts. The approach allows us to work towards a possibility of multiple interpretations of the source texts, the new texts, and the text pairs. Contributors to this present volume have developed distinctive approaches in their exploration of cross- and intercultural phenomena across time. Thriving on the tension and connection between source texts and new texts, they write from a diverse range of perspectives on an equally diverse set of sociocultural contexts and literary genres. While some chapters conceptualize the dynamics between cultures and the process of adaptation using new texts that are responses to existing poems, documents, stories, or plays (such as chapters 3, 4, 7, and 9), some tackle the subject matter with less conventional but equally exciting new texts which arise from the amalgamation of material reality (existing literary works and archival material) and artistic imagination (such as chapters 2, 5, 8, and 10). No common methodology is adopted, so there is no attempt to configure any theoretical structure into which the chapters of multicultural and multigeneric discussion fit. The ensuing chapters are arranged in such a manner that readers may imagine that they are going on a virtual voyage, departing from Macao, stopping over in India, journeying onward to the Black Sea and then the Mediterranean, crossing over to Europe and the British Isles, and finally, after a short sojourn in North America, returning to Macao.

The editor decided to bookend the contents of this collection with the port city of Macao essentially because Macao is the gateway through which Western people and ideas, including Jesuit missionaries, entered China back in the sixteenth century, long before Hong Kong also became a trade port in the nineteenth century. As a major transit port in the East for international exploration and merchant vessels, Macao has seen centuries of cultural, economic, religious, and political commotion. Its ecology is so hybrid, as discussed in the introduction to Macao: Cultural Interaction and Literary Representations (Wong and Wei 2014), that it is also "so unique, so inimitable" (xxvi). This entrepôt has accumulated multicultural history of more than four centuries, which has begotten "a gamut of cultures that feed on and grow from each other" (ibid.). The resulting cultural ecology is an epitome of East- meets- West: "Culturally there has never been anything like Macao, where so much of China and so much of Europe are enshrined in one small place" (Coates 138).

The collection opens with Patricia P. Chu's exciting " 'A Being ... from a Different World': Yung Wing and the Making of a Global Subjectivity." Macaoeducated Yung Wing (1828– 1912), the first Chinese graduated from an American college, founded the Chinese Educational Mission (1872– 1881). His My Life in China and America (1909) is the first full Asian American autobiography and narrative of return. Reframing slave narratives and missionary travel narratives, Yung's autobiography symbolically manages his racial melancholia and his inability to become a global subject. Historically, Asians and Africans have been linked in the global economy and the Western imagination. Like slave narrators facing threats of re- enslavement, Yung shares in his self- narrative the global vulnerability of all Chinese due to the Qing Dynasty's weakness. Chu examines how Yung, like slave narrators, demonstrates his masculinity physically, dramatizes his own ascent, presents himself as a desexualized being, emphasizes his personal industry and economic competence, expresses respect for motherhood and white women but also ambivalence toward Christianity, and finds learning bittersweet while resolving to share it. As she elucidates how Yung's text manages many contradictions as he fails to attain full acceptance in China or the United States, or global subjectivity, and registers racial melancholia, Chu also argues that, while reticent about US racism, Yung exercises an active and, at times, selectively imaginative yet critical mind and speaks against the coolie trade in Peru and the Qing Dynasty's corruption.

The thread of literary representation of the coolie trade continues in Shilpa Daithota Bhat's illuminating contribution, "Maritime Links, Imperialism, and Diaspora in the Ibis Trilogy." Bhat's essay examines the Ibis trilogy, comprising Sea of Poppies, River of Smoke, and Flood of Fire; the three books are grand ethnographic narratives by the Indo- Burmese writer Amitav Ghosh, who has painstakingly incorporated into his works the archival material collected and preserved by Neel Rattan and his son Raju. This trilogy is set against British colonialism of the nineteenth century and the accelerated migratory patterns caused by Britain's empire- building. The propagation of the imperial ideology in Asia led to interactions and contestations between the East and the West, resulting in increased use of maritime trade routes and creation of diasporas. In this chapter, whose primary concern is how authorial imagination negotiates with archival and historic material in producing stories with an undercurrent of realism, Bhat argues that Amitav Ghosh captures the interfaces between the Orient and the Occident through strategic negotiations between real historical circumstances and invented archival records — the Ibis Chrestomathy that Ghosh refers to in the Ibis trilogy. The symbol of the ship is critical in representing maritime routes during the times for transporting commodities for trade and for forced displacement of people from their original homeland. Forced by the British to cultivate poppy, Indians found their health

and finances broken. Forced by the British to allow the sale of opium, China fought back in the futile Opium Wars, which brought destruction and couldn't save Chinese lives from being devastated by the drug. The episode marks a historical connection with the Qing Dynasty corruption discussed in Chu's chapter. Bhat also focuses on how these East- West interactions intensified the colonial apparatus utilized in perpetuating hegemony and creating many of the diasporas that characterize the demographics of the contemporary world.

From perilous voyages to quasi- or counter- utopian voyages, Helena Carvalhão Buescu's "Utopia and History: Os Lusíadas (Camões) and Uma viagem à Índia (G. M. Tavares)" looks at the ambiguous counter- epic published by Gonçalo M. Tavares in 2010, Voyage to India, as a rewriting of the canonical epic written by Camões in the sixteenth century. Both epics evolve around a voyage that makes East and West connect more directly. However, Buescu argues that Tavares's counter- epic responds in a particular way to the hopes and glimpses of the future included in The Lusiads, by making it a dialogue with different authors of the epic tradition (especially Vyasa, Homer, Joyce, and Camões), and subsequently by questioning the utopian principle that The Lusiads implicates. Focusing on the core episode of this epic, the "Ilha do Amor" ("Isle of Love"), Buescu examines Tavares's counterpart in an attempt to analyse how an "enchantment" of humanist Renaissance is perceived in the twenty- first century as an essential "disenchantment" of the world at large and of humans in particular. The chapter proposes that Tavares is talking to and with Camões, and that readers must understand this if they are to have a complete overview of how Voyage to India compares to The Lusiads, both thematically and structurally. The episode treated in this chapter combines the paradoxes contained in the utopian drive, as underlined, among others, by Ernst Bloch (the principle of hope) and Fredric Jameson. A dense and potentially contradictory description of modernity emerges from this comparison between the sixteenth- century epic and the twenty- first- century counter- epic, showing just how far- reaching and paradoxical "modernity" and its waves maybe.

Still set against the backdrop of India, " 'Orientalism from Within' in Goa: Local Textual Production in Light of the Legal and Administrative Framework of the Overseas Populations" by Everton V. Machado begins by establishing that much of what has been written in Portuguese about Goa — where the Portuguese remained for four and a half centuries as an imperial presence (1510– 1961) — within the context of literature and the social sciences confirms the connection between knowledge and power put forward by Said's Orientalism. It is by duly positioning the various discourses resulting from such imperial presence that one can re- evaluate what has been generally claimed concerning Portuguese Orientalism. When considering Orientalism according to the patterns indicated by Said, Machado holds the view that for many specialists, Portuguese Orientalism practically did not exist. Taking a holistic approach, Machado ventures to prove the contrary through what has been conventionally called "Orientalism from within," supported by analyses of selected texts written in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries by Goans who received Portuguese cultural and religious education. These texts repeat the topoi of Western culture about India and the Indians, as well as of the Portuguese Empire's action in Asia, two synergic forces that are never independent of each other. This chapter argues that one should be aware of the fact that the premodern idea of Respublica Christiana has conditioned the orientalization of Goa during the period of rationalism and scientificism.

A similar societal restructuring in Machado's study finds a coherent continuation in a reading of the connection between knowledge and power in Onoriu Colăcel's analysis, "Present Absences: The East in

the Story of a Port Town on the Western Coast of the Black Sea," which takes us to what used to be the porto franco called Selinas and is now Sulina, a Romanian backwater that's the easternmost settlement found within the European Union. Colăcel presents Sulina as a case in point of Eastern and Western synergies at the mouth of the Danube, where "a paranoid narrative" lives. The Danube delta, a thriving free-trade area, has historically been much sought after for its commercial values and opportunities by the Habsburgs, the United Kingdom, France, and Germany, alongside Tsarist Russia and Ottoman Turkey. One of the most important trading posts of southeastern Europe from the late 1860s to World War ii, Sulina is an intriguing place to study. Working with a Romanian novel Europolis (1933) by Jean Bart (Eugeniu Botez) and an English travel book The Danube: A Journey Upriver from the Black Sea to the Black Forest (2014) by Nick Thorpe, Colăcel discusses the rise and fall of a port city. He writes that despite the drive to remove the Ottoman legacy of the place, the cultural memory of Sulina, a place of robust multiculturalism, has an affinity with the Eastern part of the world. "In with the new, out with the old" has been the area's imperative for the past century and a half, with the new being the West, the old being the East. Somehow "Greater Asia" keeps emerging from within the story of Sulina: the East is something feared, to be replaced from above by Western civilization for the greater good of the people. The literature of Sulina proves that the vertical, top- down agency of Western- educated elites aimed to wipe out the horizontal, bottom- up dimension of the East in the Romanian province of Dobrogea.

In "Pragmatism and Politics Intertwined: The West, the East, the Suez Crisis, and Inter/ national Hegemony in James Graham's Eden's Empire," Önder Çakírtas moves our focus to the Mediterranean and introduces the first work of drama in this volume. Beginning with an observation that new theatrical forms complementing new ideological and/ or political philosophies have emerged in the twenty- first century, Çakírtaşs puts forward that, within these novel ideologies, clashes between the West and the East have been tools of their being, and that they have fed literary productions ever since their discernible interactions with each other. While theatrical productions, new or revived or adapted, have led to critics and reviewers inundating the theatre scene with words such as "Orientalism" and "Occidentalism," new philosophies continue to emerge through new literary genres. James Graham, for instance, has introduced a theatrical treatment of realpolitik (commonly defined as an approach to politics that leaves out ideology and morality) with Eden's Empire. Çakírtas explicates how Graham intertwines history, politics, and theatre, and how his play revolves around the political thirsts of Egypt, Israel, Britain, France, the United States, and the Soviet Union — nations representing varied geographies. Though the play narrates and explores the catastrophic hamartia of Anthony Eden, the British prime minister who blundered into the Suez Crisis, Graham aspires to represent the negative connotations of politics worldwide. Thus, it is realpolitik that is foregrounded in the play, through which Graham discloses a never- ending war between the East and the West. This chapter places an emphasis on the supremacy of realpolitik and correlates realpolitik with the fictional humour of Graham's drama. Çakírtas's study employs the historical backdrop of the Suez Crisis in evaluating the international hegemony of a few differing geographies of the East and the West.

With Etienne Boumans's enjoyable "A Dog of Flanders: Of Triumphant Heroes and Heroic Losers," we travel to Europe and encounter this book's one and only discussion of film. Providing a crucial example of East- West imagination and consumption, Boumans examines what American and Japanese filmmakers have made of the short novel A Dog of Flanders (1872) by the British writer Ouida (Maria Louise de la

Ramée). The book is a sentimental, tear- jerking story of a boy and his dog in the Flemish port of Antwerp. Unlike Jane Austen, who has been perceived as an author who succeeded in bridging high and low cultures, Ouida was a Victorian marvel whose work fell out of favour with literary tastemakers when a masculinist recoil led to the excision of many women writers from the canon during the fin de siècle. Yet there have been numerous film adaptations and reinterpretations of her Dog of Flanders, even until now. Boumans asks: what's the secret of this story? He first looks at how American adaptations depart from the book by having the boy live instead of die at story's end, thereby underscoring that textual fidelity within the filmic re- creation process is subject to cultural conventions. Then he charts how Ouida's story found its way to Japan in 1908, and how, decades later, the US censor in Japan advised that it be the first novel to be reprinted there after World War ii, the aim being to launch a message of hope among the defeated population, a message that still fit in with the Japanese people's traditional predilection for sad endings. A 1975 anime series had a huge impact, with the characters becoming part of collective memory. The display of samurai- like virtues by a Western child in an unusual locale further enhances the Aha-Erlebnis (aha-experience) with Japanese audiences. Bouman's chapter shows that cinematic adaptations of A Dog of Flanders by both American and Asian filmmakers have portrayed the Flemish national identity (including landscapes) as if identical to Dutch stereotypes: the inaccurate representation of locales has hindered the adherence of Flanders's population to Ouida's story (which was not translated into Dutch until 1985). Moreover, such ill-positioned imaginations have rendered Japanese and Korean visitors to Antwerp incapable of recognizing what they see as vital elements in the storyline, thereby ignoring that fiction leaves few traces in the "real" world.

From American and Asian treatments of a Flemish narrative, we move on to Irish/ British treatment and utilization of Noh theatre. Matthew Gibson's rich discussion in "Yeats, Noh Theatre, and the Traditions of Asia" seeks to show the development of Yeats's use of Noh in relation to the poet's growing interest in Buddhism and how the two interests fostered and supported each other. Above all it shows not only how Noh contributed to his understanding of spiritualism, but also how Buddhist notions of Ultimate Reality contributed to the cyclical presentation of history in plays like Purgatory and The Resurrection. Gibson elucidates how Yeats's experimentation with Noh creates further use of drama as a metaphor for history and the changes of influx over cycles, which the poet- dramatist uses Chinese iconography to illustrate. This chapter is an exploration of how Asian traditions have influenced Yeats's dramatic practice and shaped his understanding of the theory of history, and how such traditions have been used to present as drama the concept of the Great Year, his macroscopic historical cycle.

Keith Appler's "David Henry Hwang's Yellow Face in Postracial Times" transports us (back) to an Asian-American context by showcasing yet another playwright. In David Henry Hwang's semi- autobiographical 2007 play Yellow Face — where cultural, racial, theatrical, and performative identities, combined with autobiographical narratives, knit a web of dialogic textual material — a white character named Marcus succeeds as an "Asian" actor in various Asian roles, much to the chagrin of a character called d h h, an Asian American playwright who is David Henry Hwang's surrogate in the play. This scenario recalls Hwang's own experience of protesting the yellow- face casting of Jonathan Pryce in the Broadway musical Miss Saigon, as well as the writing of Face Value, Hwang's first Broadway flop. Both activities were aimed at upholding the ethnic authenticity and economic claims of actors with Asian bodies, and both gave rise to Yellow Face. But in this highly complex play, Hwang — who has always regarded

ethnicity, gender, and sexuality as performances — acknowledges the possibility that a white man like Marcus may be as "authentic" in investing in an Asian persona as Hwang/ dhh himself. Appler contends that Hwang's changing attitude toward white yellow- face performance corresponds to the emergence of a hegemonic neoliberal multiculturalism. Under this regime, the white yellow- face performer appropriates the racial Other's identity in a new way, precisely because the authenticity being sought has become detached from ethnic bodies. The yellow- face performer, explains Appler, continues to invest in the cross- racial desire involved in nineteenth- century minstrelsy (which managed the whites' love and theft of African American identity), and in the post- war "white negro." Yet under neoliberalism, there is, according to Viet Thuyn Nguyen, the rise of "panethnic entrepreneurs" of those of a marginal ethnicity who exploit their ethnicity to accumulate cultural and economic capital. The complication lies in the "reality" that, in a context of universal commodification, the white yellow- face performer is doubly rewarded: first for his imaginary racist appropriation of a utopian alternative to his white life, and second for his co-optation, with marginalized identity, of its exchange value in the multicultural marketplace.

As outlined earlier in this introduction, we return to where we first started — the unique Asian hub of Macao — in Katrine K. Wong's "Imagining Robert Wilson's The Three Ladies of London in Macao." In exercising her imagination when reading an Elizabethan allegorical play from the 1580s, Wong has situated the source text in a 1960s Portuguese Macao and re- created a new text, an original English play The Three Ladies of Macao (3LM). This was premiered in December 2016 at the Black Box Theatre of the University of Macau, and restaged by invitation at the Macau Literary Festival in March 2017. 3LM, too, is an allegorical play that is formulated around anthropomorphic representation of abstract ideas and qualities. The endeavour of creating 3LM has been built upon a dramaturgical inspiration derived from the universality of Wilson's allegorical characters, who embody ideas that are translatable to the evermutating transience of Macao. Wong's chapter, the fourth and last discussion dealing with the genre of drama in this volume, is primarily concerned with the philosophy behind and the process of creation; through an annotated synopsis of Wilson's play in which thematic observations relevant to a potential recontextualization in Macao can be made, it also evaluates how 3LM responds to and builds upon the dramaturgical elements in 3LL from the perspective of cultural studies and adaptation studies. Wong specifically indicates that her intention is not to review 3LM, but to explore the viability of re- creating an Elizabethan city play by setting it in a unique sociohistorical context of Macao, as well as to document and explain how the allegorical framework of an Elizabethan play becomes applicable and relevant to a twenty- first- century Macao audience. In her pursuit of structuring a brand- new narrative with Wilson's framework of allegory, Wong tackles several key issues as both a creator and a reflective practitioner, examining ways of re- creating the soundscape of the city, ways of recontextualizing societal problems such as pandering, nepotism, eviction, loan sharking, and murder. It should be noted that the script of 3LM is included as an appendix in this volume.

The firm support from Brill and from the series editor George C. X. Wei is a much- needed and -valued endorsement of academia's effort to read and decipher East- West dynamics and interconnectedness in this tumultuous time. This volume treats text types such as autobiographical and return narratives, historical epic, utopic epic, political drama, allegory, and Noh theatre, which have been viewed and consumed as carriers and transmitters of cultures as well as, at times, indicators of power configuration. While the chapters are exciting and representative in their own right, this collection certainly does not

claim to present a comprehensive account of East-West imagination and synergies; the very nature of the topic prevents such a thing. The editor is fully aware that this current volume is neither historical nor exhaustive, and that the scope of examination that it has set out to conduct can and will be advanced and expanded. It is our hope that the critical transference and complexities inherent in this cross-fertilization of cultural- historical strand of adaptation may attract further cross-cultural cases of study. <>

THE OLD ENGLISH AND ANGLO-LATIN RIDDLE TRADITION edited and translated by Andy Orchard [Dumbarton Oaks Medieval Library, Harvard University Press, 9780674055339]

What offers over seven hundred witty enigmas in several languages? Answer: **THE OLD ENGLISH AND ANGLO-LATIN RIDDLE TRADITION.** Riddles, wordplay, and inscrutable utterances have been at the heart of Western literature for many centuries. Often brief and always delightful, medieval riddles provide insights into the extraordinary and the everyday, connecting the learned and the ribald, the lay and the devout, and the familiar and the imported. Many solutions involve domestic life, including "butter churn" and "chickens." Others like "the harrowing of hell" or "the Pleiades" appeal to an educated elite. Still others, like "the one-eyed seller of garlic," are too absurd to solve: that is part of the game. Riddles are not simply lighthearted amusement. They invite philosophical questions about language and knowledge.

Most riddles in this volume are translated from Old English and Latin, but it also includes some from Old Norse–Icelandic. **THE OLD ENGLISH AND ANGLO-LATIN RIDDLE TRADITION** assembles, for the first time ever, an astonishing array of riddles composed before 1200 CE that continue to entertain and puzzle.

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Riddles, wordplay, and enigmatic utterance have been at the heart of English literature for many centuries: if the crossword as a form is only a hundred years old, the principles that underlie its successful solution go back more than a millennium, when anagrams, acrostics, and a variety of word and sound games both within and beyond Old English and Latin, the two literary languages of Anglo-Saxon England, are attested both widely and well.

At first glance, the Old English and Anglo-Latin riddle tradition might seem a frivolous, obscure, and irrelevant subject for serious discussion in learned circles, a quaint coda to a sober field. But in fact not so: close study of the intellectual and material aspects of the riddles, composed for the most part by some of the most literate Anglo-Saxons whose names we know, and in both Latin and Old English, reveals a good deal of what we can ever hope to recover of the Anglo-Saxon world, its interests and opinions and, perhaps most important, its ties to those other worlds (the deep and beguiling seas of the classical, Continental, and Christian spheres) that it sought variously both to supplement and to supplant. The intimate connections between the learned and the lewd, the lay and the devout, the Latin and the vernacular, the inherited and the imported, and the oral and the literary provide contrasting perspectives. Such alternative insights into both the extraordinary and the everyday offer additionally a useful lens through which to perceive the past and the perceptions of others, as well as an appreciation of how wondrous the world can seem, and how marvelous the mundane.

In that sense, the Old English and Anglo-Latin riddle tradition can only aid us in solving the riddle of the Anglo-Saxons themselves, and how they chose to understand a wider world to which they perhaps inevitably felt peripheral, and not just geographically. Literate (which in the context of the surviving written record mostly meant Latinate) and therefore learned Anglo-Saxons would have known that the Mediterranean was quite literally the center of the world, but they did not simply surrender thereby their own space. However much the inherited and alien traditions of Latin and even Byzantine Greek impinged on their world view, not to mention analogues from the culturally closer Norse and Celtic regions, Anglo-Saxon riddlers seem to have sought from the start to make the genre their own.

There are, of course, riddles in the Bible, notably those posed by Samson (Judges 14:14) and the Queen of Sheba (1 Kings 10.1). In the classical world it was the Greeks who made most use of the form. Oedipus answers the famous riddle of the Sphinx: "What walks on four feet in the morning, two in the afternoon, and three in the evening?" The answer is "man," with a clue potentially enshrined in his very name, if we focus on the last syllable, which means "foot." The encyclopedic and highly bookish Deipnosophistae (the title might be translated as Dons at Dinner, Fellows Feasting or Learned Banqueters, as in Olson's edition)

of Athenaeus, who flourished in the first quarter of the third century, demonstrates in Book io that riddles and problems were bandied about during banquets and drinking parties by the learned. Likewise, Book 14 of the sprawling collection of Greek poems from across several centuries now known as the Palatine Anthology comprises around 150 riddles, problems, and oracles. It is surely noteworthy that Latin speakers simply took over into their own tongue the two main Greek words for "riddle," namely (Latin aenigma) and (Latin griphus). Certainly, there seems no great indigenous Latin tradition of verse riddles (the native term scirpus, literally, "bullrush," but designating a riddle as complex as basketry, seems to have been used only in very specialized settings), although in an echo of the practice of the Deipnosophistae, we are told by Aulus Gellius in his Noctes Atticae of how well-educated Romans in Athens in the second century spent the feast of the Saturnalia, which took place in December each year. The chapter heading says it all (18.2):

> *Cuiusmodi quaestionum certationibus Saturnalicia ludicra Athenis agitare soliti simus; atque inibi expressa quaedam sophismata et aenigmata oblectatoria.*
>
> What kind of questions we used to ask in competition as Saturnalian amusements in Athens; and some entertaining puzzles and riddles that were produced there.

Latin riddlers evidently identified primarily with Greek contexts and Greek contests of learned emulation too, and it is no surprise to find that the esteemed rhetorician and poet Ausonius, who died around the year 395, should imitate the studied frivolity so evident here. Indeed, he even uses the term frivola (trifles) to describe his own enigmatic composition in the introduction to his *Griphus ternarii numeri* (Riddle on the Number Three), just before going on to emphasize the association of riddling and drink:

> *Acne me gloriosum neges, coeptos inter prandendum versiculos ante cenae tempus absolvi, hoc est dum bibo et paulo ante quam biberem. Sit ergo examen pro materia et tempore. Sed to quoque hoc ipsum Paulo hilarior et dilutior lege; namque iniurium est de poeta male sobrio lectorem abstemium iudicare.*
>
> And just so that you don't deny that I am boastful: I began these little verses over lunch and finished before suppertime; that is to say, I began while drinking and then a bit before I was drinking again. Let that be your scale for the theme and the timing. Read them too while a bit merrier and more drenched; for it is unfair for a sober reader to pass judgment on a poet in his cups.

It is against this background that we should turn to the aenigmata of Symphosius, the verse preface of which explicitly states that his own frivola were composed, perhaps even extemporaneously, at a drinking party as entertainment during the Saturnalia; it concludes with a chirpy request for indulgence from a readership less drunk than the poet himself. The author's own name (which does not seem to be attested before the fourth century), indeed, with its clear parallels to the common noun symposium

(drinking party), connects this collection of one hundred riddles back directly to those of his Greek predecessors. Symphosius laments the fact that he has brought nothing with him, presumably in the way of the kind of mechanical and memorized words that stud the sayings of the Deipnosophistae, and claims that his aenigmata either came to him quite spontaneously or were worked up on the basis of then-cited tropes. The preface to Symphosius's Aenigmata (here SYM PR) is itself of course a carefully contrived conceit: an opening pair of lines that does not appear in all manuscripts addresses an unknown teacher and points the way to the later use of these and other aenigmata in classroom contexts, while the final line addresses an anonymous "reader" (lector; another term that appears to be deliberately echoed by the Anglo-Saxon Aldhelm), perhaps pointing to a conscious literary collection. Certainly, the framing tale offered by Symphosius provides a secular echo of the reported inspiration of the pious cowherd Cædmon in late seventh-century Northumbria at a drinking party: Bede calls the gathering Cædmon attended a convivium (party); the Old English Bede adds the interesting extra detail that it was a gebeorscipe (beer-drinking party).

Suggested dates for Symphosius's texts range from the fourth to the sixth centuries, in the same milieu as, for example, Ausonius, Macrobius, and Martianus Capella, with tradition placing his origins in North Africa. Such a suggestion is all the more tantalizing given Symphosius's demonstrable and explicitly acknowledged influence on Aldhelm (who died 709/10the first Anglo-Saxon author to have composed extensively in Latin verse, and who chose the genre of aenigmata for his earliest compositions (ALD). Aldhelm was educated at the celebrated Canterbury school of Theodore and Hadrian, where among the subjects he tells us he studied was Latin metrics. Theodore, a Greek-speaking monk from Tarsus, may have introduced Aldhelm to the Greek tradition of riddling, but it was most likely the Latin scholar Hadrian, coming from North Africa, who introduced Aldhelm to the Symphosian style of riddling in a classroom context. It is striking that in the prose preface to his own collection of one hundred aenigmata Aldhelm is silent about any vernacular riddle traditions, but instead points very carefully to three major influences, namely Symphosius, Aristotle, and the Bible. This gesture may indicate his wider knowledge (presumably via Theodore, and certainly in translation) of the kind of Greek and Byzantine riddles preserved in the Palatine Anthology, and certainly downplays Symphosius as his only influence. Indeed, Aldhelm goes out of his way to surpass Symphosius, both in explicitly using Christian themes and language, and in composing lengthier riddles of between four and eighty-three lines (all of Symphosius's are strictly three lines long).

While Symphosius was certainly a major influence on the Anglo-Saxon riddle tradition well beyond Aldhelm, and in both Latin and Old English, it is harder to assess the impact (not to mention the provenance) of another anonymous collection of aenigmata variously called the Bern Riddles, Aenigmata Hexasticha, or the Enigmata Tullii (BER). These sixty-two aenigmata are uniformly composed in six lines of rhythmical rather than metrical hexameters and have a clear link to Symphosius (consistently doubling in scale the scope of his three-line aenigmata); their connection to the Anglo-Latin riddle tradition is less clear cut. The earliest

manuscript (Bern, Burgerbibliothek 6ii, dating to the early eighth century), which does not contain solutions, derives from an Irish monastic foundation on the Continent; hence the much-disputed attribution of the whole collection to a seventh-century Irishman, although conjectures concerning the collection's age range from the fourth century on. A closing acrostic spelling out PAULUS (ps-BER I) may, allowing for scribal error in transmission, underlie the attribution to "Tullius," presumably saddling

Cicero, via his full name of Marcus Tullius Cicero, with material he would more likely disclaim than willingly declaim. Since the collection is given the title Qaestiones (questions, challenges) in some manuscripts, it is tempting to identify the author or compiler with the otherwise unknown "Paulus Quaestor" (another form of *quaesitor*, "seeker," "questioner"?) named and quoted by Aldhelm in the two metrical treatises (*De metris* and *De pedum regulis)* that accompany his aenigmata. If so, the metrical verses attributed to Paulus may have been appended to the existing collection of rhythmical verses: the aenigmata themselves are purely rhythmical, except for the final acrostic. Whatever one's views on the literary merit and influence of BER, the judgment of their first editor, Riese, that these are "six-line rhythmical poems, horrid in their roughness" (*hexasticha rhythmica barbarie horrida*) seems a tad harsh.

This Text and Translation

With such a necessarily wide-ranging purview, it is perhaps inevitable that much of the material here will have been derived from secondary sources. Nonetheless, the texts and translations here are based wherever possible on firsthand analysis of the manuscripts, especially those written or owned in England before 1100 (as noted in G-L), and I have tried to consult as broad a range as possible of existing translations. For details with regard to individual texts and collections, see the relevant headnotes below. The solutions to the riddles are provided, along with other basic commentary, in the Notes to the Translations. The prefatory note there explains in more detail the conventions that I have adopted for distinguishing, where necessary, solutions provided in the manuscripts by the medieval authors or scribes from those proposed, with varying degrees of confidence, by modern readers; where these differ, I have explained the choice of preferred solution in the Notes to the Translations, and often more fully in the companion commentary, COEALRT. One other convention employed widely in the texts and notes should be noted here, namely the practice of printing what I consider interpolations or added material (often in the form of formulaic additions or embedded solutions) in italics. I have also used italics for letters that contribute to acrostics or *telestics* and for runic transcriptions, but I trust that context will always make clear the distinction in usage. In a few cases, I have used underlining to emphasize wordplay or other kinds of correspondence in the original languages.

Anglo-Saxons evidently wanted to understand the world, to explain it, and perhaps above all, to marvel at its myriad ways. The Anglo-Saxon riddle tradition poses many questions and seems to be comfortable with the fact that for each and all of those questions there is not necessarily a single or simple and unanswerable solution. Sometimes just asking is apparently enough, and in picking a path through the question at hand the respondent seems encouraged to wander. In the spirit of the multilingual Anglo-Saxon riddle tradition, this book aims not only to ask more questions than it can possibly answer but also to keep an eye on the benefits of wandering in wonder, as well as the grave dangers of error.

A Commentary on the Old English and Anglo-Latin Riddle Tradition by Andy Orchard [Supplements to the Dumbarton Oaks Medieval Library, Harvard University Press, 9780884024774]

This volume is a companion to **The Old English and Anglo-Latin Riddle Tradition**. Its extensive notes and commentary on hundreds of Latin, Old English, and Old Norse-Icelandic riddles illuminate and clarify the multifaceted and interconnected nature of a broad, international tradition. Within this commentary, readers will encounter a deep reservoir of knowledge about riddles produced in both Latin and Old English during the Anglo-Saxon period, and the literatures with which they were in dialogue.

Riddles range from those by prominent authors like Aldhelm, Bede, Alcuin, and Boniface to those presented anonymously in collections such as the Exeter Book. All are fully discussed, with particular attention paid to manuscript traditions, subject matter, solutions, style, sources, parallels, and recommendations for further reading. Consideration is given to running themes throughout the collection, comparisons to other riddles and to other literature more broadly, and important linguistic observations and manuscript readings. The commentary also lists the manuscripts and earlier editions for each riddle, extensive catalogues of proposed solutions, and additional bibliographic references. Following the general discussion of each riddle there is detailed line-by-line annotation.

This authoritative commentary is the most comprehensive examination to date of the bilingual riddle tradition of Anglo-Saxon England and its links to the wider world.

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Frige mec frodum wordum. Ne lætþinne ferth onhælne degol þæti þudeopost cunne. Nelle icþe min dyrne gesecgan, gifþu me þinne hyge-cræft hylest. and þine heortan geþohtas. Gleawe men sceolon gieddum wrixlan. Maxims I 1-4a

Question me with wise words. Don't keep your soul concealed, the deepest secret that you know. I don't want to tell you my mysteries,
if you hide from me the power of your mind and the thoughts of your heart.
The smart should swap riddles.

It is in the nature of riddles to highlight unlikely or unusual combinations and contrasts, and in that spirit, I can only apologize for the combination and contrast of this volume of notes and commentary with the somewhat leaner, slimmer lines of the DOML volume of **The Old English and Anglo-Latin Riddle Tradition (OEALRT)** from which it grew, and with which it is necessarily paired. I have endeavored to keep the inevitable overlap to a minimum, while intending each volume to stand alone, with this one in particular potentially useful alongside all earlier editions of the relevant texts and translations.

Whether there was indeed such a thing as an Anglo-Saxon riddle tradition at all, as I argue here, I leave to others to judge.' But if this book and its companion serve any useful purpose, it may be again to underline the benefits of considering Anglo-Saxon culture in the widest possible context, and to highlight the dangers of simply speaking of Anglo-Saxon riddles (or indeed Anglo-Saxon literature as a whole) in the monoglot manner that the current study of the subject, overwhelmingly within university Departments of English, has inevitably, if inadvertently, encouraged. I have deliberately cast my net wider, and, mindful of the delightful manner in which riddles can level playing fields and eclipse both academic qualifications and book-learning in general, have also attempted to consult and incorporate as many relevant unpublished dissertations, comparative discussions, and other often web-based material as I have been able to identify. Here, I should particularly highlight the tools available through my own ongoing project, "A Consolidated Library of Anglo-Saxon Poetry," funded by the European Research Council (www.clasp.eu), several of which were employed and tested here.

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A Note on This Commentary

The multifaceted, complex, and interconnected nature of the Anglo-Saxon riddle tradition can seem bewildering, and in devising a set of abbreviations and manuscript sigla I have striven for simplicity and transparency, always in order to emphasize the many different kinds of links that can be traced between the texts and collections presented here. The principles of abbreviation are as follows:

1. The major texts and collections are abbreviated in upper case, using three letters where possible, with pseudonymous material prefaced by ps-, where relevant.
2. Earlier texts, translations, and commentaries are abbreviated by suitable combinations of upper- and lowercase letters, restricted where feasible to two-letter forms, necessarily augmented to avoid ambiguity.
3. Manuscripts are represented by sigla consisting of a single uppercase letter, augmented where necessary by a superscript number. I have tried to retain the same sigla used in earlier editions, though this has not always been possible.

Apart from these abbreviations, I have indicated preferred and suggested solutions in uppercase italics, and also used the sign "—>" to indicate where logographs (those riddles that rely on changes in spelling to offer more than one solution) are involved. While the various texts and collections differ significantly, often from manuscript to manuscript, as well as from text to text, about whether or not solutions are given at all, or circulate separately or in alternative forms, here I have deferred all suggested solutions (or indeed titles, as they are sometimes presented) to the relevant notes and headnotes, and leveled their forms to the nominative, rather than preferring the versions with Latin DE + ablative which I believe to be a secondary development aligning the Latin aenigmata with other didactic and encyclopedic texts, alongside which they often circulate. In presenting the texts, I have followed the usual conventions: acrostics and *telestichs* are signaled in capitals, and interpolations, especially interpolated solutions, whether right or wrong, in italics; runes are generally transliterated in lowercase. In general, in presenting a text I have followed existing editions more slavishly and silently in Sources and Analogues of the Tradition than in the Anglo-Latin Tradition and the Old English Tradition, where I have (occasionally) attempted originality, and the notes and markup reflect this accordingly.

I have translated the poems line by line, where reasonable, and in as neutral a manner as I could, in order to preserve the inherent ambiguity and developing revelation of these tricky, enigmatic texts. In introducing the relevant texts and collections, I have used the same basic template, again to facilitate direct comparison, considering in turn: authorship and date; manuscript context; subject matter and solutions; style; sources and parallels; idiosyncrasies of this text and translation; and further reading. For individual texts, including those within larger collections, I have adopted a similar basic structure, reporting individual manuscripts, earlier editions and translations, and solutions both accepted and suggested. For brevity and focus, in cases where there are multiple manuscript witnesses, I have deliberately favored the reporting of manuscripts written or owned in Anglo-Saxon England, and though I am well aware that this gives a highly skewed picture, it is at least a bias accurately reflected in the title. In a more inclusive manner, I report previous editions and translations so that their readings and renderings can be checked against mine, and have tried to include the whole range of suggested solutions, both modern and medieval, even those that remain baffling, unlikely, impossible, or overly

imaginative. Within the notes, I have taken particular care to highlight comparisons, both verbal and conceptual, that link the various texts and collections, the better to emphasize what binds this material together. In the same vein, and to the extent that much of what makes the Anglo-Saxon riddle tradition appears to be a developing set of mutually reflexive texts with many shared themes and strategies, I have endeavored to offer exhaustive listings in the various introductions and headnotes, with cross-references where appropriate. By contrast, verbal parallels from outside the particular texts and collections showcased here are not intended to be comprehensive, but rather again to reflect the milieu within which the literate Anglo-Saxons who composed the vast majority of texts considered here taught and worked. <>

BIZARRE-PRIVILEGED ITEMS IN THE UNIVERSE: THE LOGIC OF LIKENESS by Paul North [Zone Books, 9781942130468]

An imaginative new theory of likeness that ranges widely across history and subjects, from physics and evolution to psychology, language, and art

A butterfly is like another butterfly. A butterfly is also like a leaf and at the same time like a paper airplane, an owl's face, a scholar flying from book to book. The most disparate things approach one another in a butterfly, the sort of dense nodule of likeness that Roger Caillois once proposed calling a "bizarre-privileged item." In response, critical theorist Paul North proposes a spiritual exercise: imagine a universe made up solely of likenesses. There are no things, only traits acting according to the law of series, here and there a thick overlap that appears "bizarre."

Centuries of thought have fixated on the concept of difference. This book offers a theory that begins from likeness, where, at any instant, a vast array of series proliferates and remote regions come into contact. **BIZARRE-PRIVILEGED ITEMS IN THE UNIVERSE** follows likenesses as they traverse physics and the physical universe; evolution and evolutionary theory; psychology and the psyche; sociality, language, and art. Divergent sources from an eccentric history help give shape to a new trans-science, "homeotics."

Review

"Likeness looks like a relation that is both too obvious and too 'bizarre,' likely because it has been used and abused by a few lyric and surrealist poets. As a result, dogmatists and suspicious minds have held it in oow esteem. Paul North overturns all these prejudices in a sort of *tractatus poetico-philosophicus*—at once free and rigorous, impertinent and lucid. Here, Darwin finally meets Caillois; Plotinus finally illuminates Arcimboldo; Peirce and Wittgenstein finally converse with Bergson, Reverdy, and Benjamin. The book gives us luminously to understand how likenesses arise, act, and proliferate. How they aren't what we once thought; how they are a matter of noncoincidence, of multiplicity, of happenings; how they allow for the possibility of a morphology, a semiotics, a history, and a theory of social linkages. A 'grammatology' of difference and of repetition, **BIZARRE-PRIVILEGED ITEMS IN THE UNIVERSE** is a philosophical tour de force."**—Georges Didi-Huberman, professor at the École des hautes études en sciences sociales and author of more than fifty works on the theory and history**

of images

"Paul North's exploration of the logic of likeness is unlike anything I have read, with its admirable mode of moving between so many unexpected regions and objects. It performs or enacts (perhaps we should say, borrowing a verb coined in these dazzling pages, that it enlikens) what it analyzes: the book connects domains that we thought were as far away from one another as Darwin's notebooks and Surrealism; the Plotinian universe and Wittgenstein's duckrabbit; Arcimboldo's composite vegetable portraits and Gabriel Tarde's sociology."**—Peter Szendy, David Herlihy Professor of Comparative Literature and Humanities at Brown University**

"It is very rare that one comes across a book like Paul North's **Bizarre-Privileged Items in the Universe**. I'm tempted to say that it constitutes itself a 'bizarre-privileged item in the universe,' in the best possible meaning of this formulation. It is an extraordinary, and extraordinarily well-written treatise that takes the reader through numerous different facets of likeness, following its complex yet airy texture, its multiple refractions, arrows and overlaps, by engaging in a smooth, tender, almost comforting flow of ongoing reflection. Big, extremely significant, and very far reaching claims are being made all along the way, in a manner that in no way imposes itself upon the reader, but rather gently takes her hand and proposes a joint and fascinating journey through the strange wonderland of likeness. I have no hesitation in saying that this is one of the most original and important books written in the past decades."**—Alenka Zupančič, author of *The Shortest Shadow: Nietzsche's Philosophy of the Two* and *What IS Sex?***

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Preamble

The sentences that follow move through seven major premises that lay out something like a logic of likeness. Through their stepwise progression and in their accumulated intentions, the premises reflect two separate aspirations. First, they are meant to bring a reader from a naive and defensive position toward likeness to a discerning and receptive position toward it. At least, that is the wish. A receptive position is approached through a modification of the initial naïve premise, "Everything is like everything in some respect," a mainstay of empiricism since Hume. Further premises travel away from the initial naive premise. Each subsequent premise follows from the previous, as premises are supposed to do, but also modifies it. As they are modified, the premises converge on a topic, homeosis, homeosis being a

name for the happening of likeness. A "subsequent" is a better premise, that is to say a more homeotic premise, than an "antecedent" premise. Second, while departing from a naive position and transiting toward a reflective position, the premises also conjure up a complex cosmos in which homeosis is the basic element. For example, Premise 4 says "World is an asymmetrical array."

To move from a naive view of a trivial phenomenon toward a reflective encounter with a new whole that acts by and large according to likeness's eccentric habits—this is the book's wager. The stakes are high. If likeness is the basic element of this cosmos, then there are no beings and no being. Instead, there is an arraying display of inertial pairs with overlapping traits. In place of individual objects in motion, this cosmos displays pairs in inertia with respect to one another. In place of independent entities, this cosmos arrays nodes or points of qualitative overlap. These pairs with overlaps were best described by Roger Caillois when he proposed "to establish the existence of bizarre-privileged items [elements insolites-privilegies in the universe" ("The Natural Fantastic," in **THE EDGE OF SURREALISM;** "Le fantastique naturel," in *Cases d'un echiquier*, Caillois's most provocative example of a bizarre-privileged item is the praying mantis. As he sees it, the mantis overlaps with a human fear and a human desire, the fear of death and the desire for sex, turning the figure that results into a "bizarre" amalgam of human and animal, nature and psyche and culture, will and being, an eccentric conjunction among the most disparate regions. The mantis is one example of such an item. As it turns out, a community of bizarre-privileged items exists, cosmic points at which likenesses, which cut across modes of existence, overlap. Overlapping is homeosis's mode of existence. The presentation that follows collects a menagerie of bizarre overlaps. Along the way, the presentation also collects a vocabulary for talking about a likeness cosmos. As the premises proceed, terms are gathered from historical sources that depended on likeness, even if those sources only ever partially theorized it.

"Likeness" or figures like it have played decisive roles in a variety of discourses over the history of Europe and its satellites. Aristotle makes homeosis, at one point in the Poetics, the operative force within mimesis. Plotinus makes homeosis the glue holding the ladder of emanations together and to the One. Much later in chronological history, Darwin, following a long lineage of taxonomists, makes "resemblance" the highest principle in nature, while at the same time altering the meaning and scope of the term. Before him, Hume makes it the highest principle of mind. None of these thinkers, except for Plotinus, and then only in a roundabout way, tells you where exactly likeness fits among the other basic principles. Here, the individual sources for a likeness lexicon have been chosen for their conceptual daring and terminological precision, and they are arranged by their best placement in a theory of likeness under construction, rather than according to their chronological place in a history.

"History," in the European sense, has never got past likeness. When it comes to likeness, modernity and antiquity are not really distinct. Foucault's version of things simply cannot be right. The argument in The Order of Things hinges in part on the presupposition that likeness was once a basic principle, and "modernity" abandoned it or relegated it to a trivial position. Modernity is on the whole and in its essence anhomeotic, or so goes the thesis. From the perspective of likeness, the modern world never happened. This is not all that tragic, since the classical world never ended, either, or to use a more apt term, the archaic—the archaic does not release its grip on mind and nature, then and now. A scene that repeats across this swampy nonhistory is one in which a thinker compares likeness unfavorably with being and then surreptitiously explains being by means of likeness. In the garden of ontology, the alien seed likeness sprouts everywhere, and discourses committed to a cosmos full of entities struggle to

contain its weedy growth. The philosophical purpose of this book is to challenge ontology with an alternative discipline that can be called homeotics. Homeotics would make the third in a triptych of fundamental explanatory schemata whose inner relations still need to be understood: ontology — semiotics —homeotics. <>

Apocalypse of Truth: Heideggerian Meditations by Jean Vioulac, translated by Matthew J. Peterson, with a Foreword by Jean-Luc Marion [University of Chicago Press,

We inhabit a time of crisis—totalitarianism, environmental collapse, and the unquestioned rule of neoliberal capitalism. Philosopher Jean Vioulac is invested in and worried by all of this, but his main concern lies with how these phenomena all represent a crisis within—and a threat to—thinking itself.

In his first book to be translated into English, Vioulac radicalizes Heidegger's understanding of truth as disclosure through the notion of truth as apocalypse. This "apocalypse of truth" works as an unveiling that reveals both the finitude and mystery of truth, allowing a full confrontation with truth-as-absence. Engaging with Heidegger, Marx, and St. Paul, as well as contemporary figures including Giorgio Agamben, Alain Badiou, and Slavoj Žižek, Vioulac's book presents a subtle, masterful exposition of his analysis before culminating in a powerful vision of "the abyss of the deity." Here, Vioulac articulates a portrait of Christianity as a religion of mourning, waiting for a god who has already passed by, a form of ever-present eschatology whose end has always already taken place. With a preface by Jean-Luc Marion, Apocalypse of Truth presents a major contemporary French thinker to English-speaking audiences for the first time.

Reviews
Hent de Vries, New York University:

"In this magisterial study, Vioulac proposes a radical reversal of thought, employing Biblical inspiration and philosophical rigor. *Apocalypse of Truth* dares to tap into a counter-archive that reaches deeper and further back than Heidegger's rethinking of truth as unconcealment, reviving the long-ignored idea of apocalypticism. What results is not only a stunning rereading of St. Paul, Meister Eckhart, Hölderlin, Hegel, and others, but also a subtle loosening of the mythological grip that Western ontology has too long imposed on its subjects. A tour de force in its own right, Vioulac's book builds on the recent breakthroughs in phenomenological and post-phenomenological thought, bringing a fresh realignment with Christianity and the 'incarnation of truth' it invites us to wager anew."

Thomas A. Carlson, University of California, Santa Barbara:

"In and through a learned, historically far-reaching, and textually rigorous meditation on Heidegger's diagnosis of our modern nihilism, Vioulac turns to the apocalyptic revelation of Saint Paul for truth that would undermine modernity's subjection of all beings to the logic of production and management by means of rational calculation and technological power. In sharp contrast to such machination, wherein humans become—like everything else—interchangeable, Vioulac advances a thinking of the frailty and vulnerability of finite, embodied, and mortal existence, and of the love and mourning essential to such existence. Thanks to an admirably graceful and faithful translation by Matthew J. Peterson, English readers will encounter a challenging and original thinker who sheds light on the disasters of our capitalistic and technological age."

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To think apocalyptically is to think from the point of view of the ultimate (*Eaxatov*): not teleologically, from the point of view of the end (rang), but eschatologically, from the point of view of after the end. Such a point of view is forced upon every finite existant, whose essance unfolds temporally until its death: only a recapitulatory point of view is capable of circumscribing it in its being; a man can only be de-fined after his end, "changed to Himself at last by eternity" and eschatological thinking then consists in everyone asking himself what he will have been, what he will have made of his life, and in adopting on himself this final judgment that speaks from the ultimate, the *Eaxatov*. But our epoch demands transferring this eschatological perspective to history, humanity, life, and the universe, whose finitude is

now manifested from all sides. History had a beginning [debut], it was preceded by hundreds of millennia of prehistory: it will have an end; the human species had a beginning, which only occurred after millions of years of animal evolution: it will have an end; life emerged on planet earth after billions of years of minerality, it had a beginning: it will have an end; and one major scientific revolution of the twentieth century was the thesis—still unthinkable for Einstein—of a universe in becoming, whose beginning it is possible to date, and also to foresee its end. It is thus a trait proper to our epoch to place all things within the horizon of the end, and to demand of the end itself the eschatological perspective. For millennia, the cosmos gave itself as an eternal Whole, albeit under the cyclical form of its own return; the eschatological perspective was then heterogeneous, offered by messengers of God who, like Philippulus the Prophet,' could always be considered crazy: but now it is the world itself, from its immanent rationality, that unfolds only in anticipation of its own end. Therefore, the horizon of the possible is now the horizon of the end, and to the thought of this possibility, our epoch furthermore demands taking into account its imminence. Indeed, contemporary technology possesses the means to annihilate all life on earth—through its chemical and nuclear potential—and climatology, in some of its predictive models, raises the possibility of an imminent collapse of the biosphere threatening terrestrial life in the short term.' And, even more disturbing if possible, all of humanity seems only to desire this end, and is only motivated by the will to get it over with. Man never knew what he was, but he always knew how to preserve a mystery and a promise in this enigma: but now he no longer believes in it, and consents wholeheartedly and unqualifiedly to his reduction to the rank of a herd animal. Man is tired, with an ancient tiredness, and now seeks only to forget himself and run away from himself, in any pharmacopoeia, even the most narcotic, and any entertainment, even the most grotesque, to the point of seeking to leave the earth in order to lose himself in the interplanetary void, to the point of planning his own genetic mutation, to the point of putting his whole heritage up for sale in sales' that organize its total liquidation, where everything must go. Humans have long understood themselves as intermediaries between animal and divine, but now they consent to have been only intermediaries between nature and machine, and it is to their own disappearance that they are resigned today. Is a "genuine revolution of the whole of Being and knowledge"' going to occur to ward off these threats, are we "in the very twilight of the most monstrous transformation of the whole earth and of the time of the historical space in which it is suspended?"'—this is what thought is not in a position to know, and what it is not intended to organize.

It is only a matter of thinking, but precisely from this eschatological point of view, which tries to think Logos from the silence that succeeds it—from the epilogue, therefore—and thus to think in the future anterior: what will have been the event of speech and thought, what will have been human history within the universe once planet earth becomes sterile and deserted again and still slides around its orbit for millions of years before being evaporated in the expansion of the sun? Humanity certainly emerges from nature, but the fact remains that within nature it is the advent of something that is not natural at all, that in it springs forth a light that illuminates nature in its totality and (in the sciences) lights up its smallest corners, but also a power that (in technology) dominates it, turns against it, and can destroy it: in the eternal silence of infinite space humanity is a blaze that we must try to think as such. Humanity makes non-being emerge within beings, that is, Being and nothing, it makes meaning [sens] emerge in the whole panic of primordial senselessness [insense], and that is why we must conceive the human being "not as one among the other things on the Earth that creep and fly, but as the meaning of the Earth, in the sense that with and through the existant each and every being first arises as such a being, closes itself off

(comes under command), succeeds and fails, and returns again to the origin."' And it is precisely because the event of human history is the advent of meaning that one can hardly come to terms with its absurdity: or at least, highlighting the emptiness of all signification, that is, of meaning as "vanity of vanities" (Eccl 1:2) is precisely what reveals the unfathomable abyss from which it proceeds, and reveals meaning itself as lack, and as empty.

According to the word of Hegel often recalled by Heidegger, *Wesen ist was gewesen ist*, "essance is the gathering of what has been," and it is the very content of the thinking of our epoch to be recapitulatory. But the whole question is then to know what is the principle of recapitulation, or what is its prince, its leader or its head, since recapitulatio, built on caput, as well as, on, literally means gathering on a single head, a single leader. To this question Hegel, which is to say metaphysics, answers: it is the Idea, which recapitulates itself encyclopedically, and this speculative logic was verified in contemporary totalization, the effective gathering of all that is into the planetary totality of technology, and the dissolution in the spectrality of cyberspace. Our epoch is, in fact, the systematic and automatic recapitulation of all the scattered nations, of all languages and all the generations of men in the same abstract and universal space-time that reduces everything to a quantity of ideal value: that is, in Capital, a word equally derived from caput, "the head." The contemporary re-capit-ulation is capit-alization.

Our epoch is that of the triumph of Capital and the onto-logical totalization that submits the entire planet to technical rationality and finally integrates it into Machinery: it is thereby the triumph of calculative thinking and its functionaries, it recapitulates knowledge and thought themselves, which have become a vast reserve fund for "research," in an apparatus in which "the scholar disappears and is replaced by the researcher engaged in research programs. [...] From an inner compulsion, the researcher presses forward into the sphere occupied by the figure of, in the essential sense, the technologist."' The destiny of philosophy, knowledge, art, and religion then becomes "culture," that is, the available stock of "cultural products," and fundamentally cultural capital. In this way our epoch is the domination of "specialists" to whom it recklessly grants the power to state the very meaning of history, and to give the impression that the conquering rationality that has conquered everything is recapitulation in-and-for-itself: that it is the Universal. Yet the eschatological question is to know who has the keys to define the very meaning of humanity's irruption within nature, who is right [qui a raison] in the recapitulation of meaning: who is the head, and the prince. Apocalyptic thinking then allows the elitist sufficiency of specialists to be sent back into the insignificance of its inanity, and it is in this sense that Hans Urs von Balthasar interprets the verse from the Apocalypse of John (5:2) that asks: "Who is worthy to open the scroll and break its seals?

> Who can decipher the meaning of the universe, its nature, its history? What philosophy can explain the beginning, the middle, and the end, and break its seven seals? To this question a terrifying silence responds: "But no one on earth or under the earth was able to open the scroll or to read it." In the middle of this distraught silence burst the cries of the visionary: "And I began to weep bitterly because no one was found worthy," because no one has the strength, even if he has the courage, to solve the enigma of the world. These cries reveal more to us and are more precious than all the dry eyes of the philosophers or other sages of this world, who manipulate the seals however they see fit, who recommend to us a solution, a "way" to slip through the seals or to simply deny their existence.

In the eternal silence of infinite space, humanity is an essential interruption, which opens a fault in the continuum of immanence where transcendence occurs from a word that through this fissuring introduces meaning. It is the abyss of this fault that reveals lucidity regarding meaning itself, which sees that "all is vanity and a chasing after wind. [...] For in much wisdom is much vexation, and those who increase knowledge increase sorrow" (Eccl 1:14-18): the Qoheleth thus grasped in the vanity of history as such, in the vanity of all labor and every work, the emptiness of an absence and the experience of a haunting lack of the essantial that could only be filled by an infinite love. The ultimate key to the fissuring of this fault in the field of immanence is then divine keno-sis as faultiness, in the singular person of the poorest, who endures, takes on, and recapitulates this infinite by an acquiescence, itself infinite, to the mystery, whose abyss he thus unveils.

But the destiny of the West is the panicked flight before the abyss of this infinite, the impossibility of enduring it and taking it on, its history is the continuous transfer of this infinite into thingness and objectivity, a transfer completed today in globalized techno-capitalist Machinery. In this way, it is annihilation of the infinite, in the sense that it denies it and takes it for nothingness, but also in the sense that it transfers it into non-Being, and makes it into a pure annihilating power: Machinery is extroverted infinitude, it is the attribution of the infinite to beings. "Man," continued Balthasar, "has had enough of being mortal, and he always invents new atomic bombs to blow up his finitude and acquire the infinite by any means necessary," and in this way he risks "lighting the match that, one day, by the explosion of all creation, would send the finite into the infinite. The search for the infinite that characterizes Euro pean modernity and that is unleashed in the possibilities, themselves infinite, of technology is in truth only the refusal of the originary infinite and the idolatry of an objectified infinite that only promises annihilation, and that at the same time covers and veils the abyss: the blinding clarity that contemporary rationality makes prevail throughout the whole universe and the immensity of space thus exhibited, because they are enough to strike thought with terror, dissimulate the very possibility of the originary infinite; and thus the universe veils the One. Contemporary existence, that of the functionary of technology, is then entirely dedicated to fleeing melancholy, avoiding solitude, eradicating silence, despising the sacred, renouncing the past, denying death, tracking down and anesthetizing all phenomena of faultiness: it is the distraught denial of the abyss of its own distress. But as Heidegger said: "In the face of this abyss one can try to shut one's eyes. One can erect one illusion after another. The abyss does not retreat."

Apocalyptic thinking can only give the key to the abyss. "That key is charity." Today it must be content with rejecting "the wisdom of the princes of this epoch, who are doomed to perish" (1 Cor 2:6), it reveals to one and all: "For you say, 'I am rich, I have prospered, and I need nothing: You do not realize that you are wretched, pitiable, poor, blind, and naked" (Apoc. 3:17). It leaves nothing to be done apart from standing resolutely in eschatological imminence, and our epoch thus demands from itself the eschatological community that defined early Christianity: a new people who leave history because they gather in the end time; not the end of time, but a time that "has grown short" or "contracted" (1 Cor 7:29) by the knowledge that "the end of all things is near" (1 Pt 4:7), that is, a time that expects nothing more from time, which has always already rejected all historiological progress in order to place itself in the parvis of eternity. Such a community is always difficult to establish and maintain, and in principle since an eschatological community is essentially aporetic and exodic; it can in no way be identified with any politics whatsoever and could only be underground; moreover, it always remains exposed to the apparatus's atomizing power, and to the effective violence of real nihilism; it especially does not

constitute any "solution" to the technological danger. But the tension of eschatological imminence nevertheless gives all its weight to the crucial phenomena of death and love, it thus gives a setting and a provisional morality that Ernst Junger defined perfectly in a text where he addressed the surge of contemporary nihilism under the monstrous figure of totalitarianism:

> In our deserts there are also oases where wilderness flourishes. Isaiah had recognized this at the time of an analogous upheaval. These are the gardens to which Leviathan has no access, around which he prowls with fury. In the first place, there is death. Today, as always, those who do not fear death are infinitely superior to the greatest of temporal powers. [...] The second power of the depths is Eros. Wherever two beings love each other, they gain ground on Leviathan, they create a space that he does not control. Eros will always win the day, as the true messenger of the gods, over all the fictions of the Titans.

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THINK LEAST OF DEATH: SPINOZA ON HOW TO LIVE AND HOW TO DIE by Steven Nadler [Princeton University Press, 9780691183848]

From Pulitzer Prize-finalist Steven Nadler, an engaging guide to what Spinoza can teach us about life's big questions

In 1656, after being excommunicated from Amsterdam's Portuguese-Jewish community for "abominable heresies" and "monstrous deeds," the young Baruch Spinoza abandoned his family's import business to dedicate his life to philosophy. He quickly became notorious across Europe for his views on God, the Bible, and miracles, as well as for his uncompromising defense of free thought. Yet the radicalism of Spinoza's views has long obscured that his primary reason for turning to philosophy was to answer one of humanity's most urgent questions: How can we lead a good life and enjoy happiness in a world without a providential God? In **THINK LEAST OF DEATH**, Pulitzer Prize–finalist Steven Nadler connects Spinoza's ideas with his life and times to offer a compelling account of how the philosopher can provide a guide to living one's best life.

In the *Ethics*, Spinoza presents his vision of the ideal human being, the "free person" who, motivated by reason, lives a life of joy devoted to what is most important—improving oneself and others. Untroubled by passions such as hate, greed, and envy, free people treat others with benevolence, justice, and charity. Focusing on the rewards of goodness, they enjoy the pleasures of this world, but in moderation. "The free person thinks least of all of death," Spinoza writes, "and his wisdom is a meditation not on death but on life."

An unmatched introduction to Spinoza's moral philosophy, **THINK LEAST OF DEATH** shows how his ideas still provide valuable insights about how to live today.

Reviews
"Aiming to extract life lessons from the philosophy of Spinoza, this vibrant study focusses on the concept of 'homo liber,' or the free person, a supremely rational figure continually striving for power

and virtue. . . . Spinoza's work serves as a hopeful, timely statement of what the truth-seeking individual can accomplish."—*New Yorker*

"As an accessible introduction to the complex thought of Spinoza, it is a success."—Jeffrey Collins, *Wall Street Journal*

"If you want to become a better person, you ought to study the philosophy of Baruch Spinoza. That at least is the message of Steven Nadler's delightful new book."—Jonathan Rée, *Literary Review*

"A helpful explication of [Spinoza's] ideas about ethics, the afterlife, and human nature."—*Kirkus Reviews*

"If you want the clearest and most sympathetic introduction as exists to Spinoza's ideas . . . then Nadler's your man. This, his latest book, is a must-read for our present, troubled times."—David Conway, *Jewish Chronicle*

"Spinoza always has more to teach us, and Steven Nadler is among the best in laying out the riches of Spinoza's thought in ways both accessible and inspiring."—Rebecca Newberger Goldstein, author of *Plato at the Googleplex: Why Philosophy Won't Go Away*

"*Think Least of Death* is a lively, engaging, and enjoyable introduction to Spinoza's moral philosophy. Steven Nadler, a gifted writer, has produced a stimulating account of Spinoza's answer to the question of what makes a good human life."—Clare Carlisle, author of *Philosopher of the Heart: The Restless Life of Søren Kierkegaard*

"Steven Nadler sheds new light on Spinoza by taking him seriously as a moral philosopher. Particularly impressive is the way Nadler highlights Spinoza's surprising and often overlooked contributions to traditional ethical subjects, such as death and suicide."—Matthew J. Kisner, author of *Spinoza on Human Freedom*

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Spinoza's guide to life and death

How should we face our mortality? Whether death is—as we all hope—a far off eventuality or, through age or illness, imminent, what is the proper attitude to take? Should we fear death? The ancient Epicureans felt that this was something of a category mistake: you should fear only those things that can harm you, and if you are dead then nothing can harm you. As Epicurus so elegantly put it, "Death, the most awful of evils, is nothing to us, seeing that, when we are, death is not come, and when death is come, we are not."

But if not fear, then should the prospect of one's own demise at least be a source of anxiety? dread? regret? Or, as some religiously minded people might insist, should the end of this life be looked upon with hope, in the expectation that something better awaits in a world-to-come?

Spinoza's views in moral philosophy—what he has to say about virtue, the good life, and happiness— were clearly influenced by the wisdom of the ancient Stoics. He was well read in Seneca, Epictetus and others. However, on the topic of death, Spinoza goes his own separate way; in fact, he heads in the completely opposite direction.

The Stoic sage meditates upon death constantly. Epictetus advised, as part of his therapeutic strategy for peace of mind, that one should "keep before your eyes day by day death and exile, and everything that seems terrible, but most of all death." Seneca, too, recommends thinking often about one's own mortality as essential to overcoming both fear of one's own death and grief at the death of others. "Rehearse this thought [about death, that it is the evil that puts an end to all evils] every day, that you may be able to depart from life contentedly. For many men clutch and cling to life, even as those who are carried down a rushing stream clutch and cling to briars and sharp rocks."

By contrast, Spinoza's "free person"—the ideal individual all of whose thoughts and actions are under the guidance of reason, not passion—rarely, if ever, thinks about death. In one of the more striking propositions of his philosophical masterpiece, the *Ethics*, Spinoza notes that "the free person thinks least of all of death." This is because the free person knows that there is nothing to think about. They understand that there is no afterlife, no post-mortem realm of reward and punishment, no world-to-come. When a person dies, there is, for that person, nothing. In this respect, Spinoza's view is closer to that of Epicurus.

For Spinoza, there is no immortal soul or self that persists beyond this life. When you are dead, you are dead. The denial of immortality seems, in fact, to have been a constant in Spinoza's thinking, going back even to around the time of his *herem* or excommunication from the Amsterdam Portuguese-Jewish community at the age of 23, when he was reportedly telling people that among the reasons for his expulsion from the Sephardic community was his proclaiming that "the soul dies with the body." But if there is no such thing as immortality, then there is nothing to be afraid of after death—nor, for that matter, anything to hope for. This ancient lesson is something that the free person understands well.

What the free person *does* think about, constantly, is the joy of living. This does not mean that s/he is obsessed with carnal pleasures and the hedonistic delights that come through sense experience. While Spinoza's "sage" does not go to the other extreme and lead an austere life of deprivation, s/he does know that the mundane pleasures of food, companionship and art that make life interesting and pleasant are to be pursued only in moderation. The true joy of living, however, comes from the increase in the

human "power of striving" that accompanies the acquisition of knowledge, especially knowledge of oneself and of one's place in nature. This self-understanding is a kind of wisdom, and it fills the free person with self-esteem—not, however, the self-esteem or pride that depends on the opinion of others, but the true estimation of one's achievement and self-worth. It also liberates the free person from such harmful emotions as hate, envy, and jealousy, and moves him/her to improve the lives of others and treat them with benevolence. In all of this, the free person sees how such attitudes and behaviors are in their own best interest.

I am often asked why, of all the great, dead philosophers, I spend so much time studying and writing about Spinoza. It is because, as I see it, Spinoza basically got it right: about human nature, religion, reason, politics and a good life. He, more than any of the other philosophers I enjoy working on, really is still relevant in the twenty-first century—especially in this era in which science is all too often denigrated and the life of the mind undervalued. For lessons on how to live well, how to lead an examined life, a life that reaches our highest potential as rational being—and, just as important, lessons on how to die— there can be no better guide. <>

WILLIAM OF OCKHAM: QUESTIONS ON VIRTUE, GOODNESS, AND THE WILL edited and translated by Eric W. Hagedorn[Cambridge University Press, 9781108498388]

Sheds light on a large number of Ockham's longest and most involved discussions of ethical issues

William of Ockham (d. 1347) was among the most influential and the most notorious thinkers of the late Middle Ages. In the twenty-seven questions translated in this volume, most never before published in English, he considers a host of theological and philosophical issues, including the nature of virtue and vice, the relationship between the intellect and the will, the scope of human freedom, the possibility of God's creating a better world, the role of love and hatred in practical reasoning, whether God could command someone to do wrong, and more. In answering these questions, Ockham critically engages with the ethical thought of such predecessors as Aristotle, Augustine, Thomas Aquinas, and John Duns Scotus. Students and scholars of both philosophy and historical theology will appreciate the accessible translations and ample explanatory notes on the text.

- Provides clear translations that largely avoid scholarly jargon or undefined technical terms
- Includes a textual apparatus of notes and cross-references, as well as an analytical table of contents for several of the longer questions

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Ockham's Place in the History of Thought

William of Ockham is widely considered to be among the greatest of the Christian philosophers of the late Middle Ages; his thought at the very least foreshadowed, and to some degree actually shaped, much of the course of European thought for several centuries after his death. In Ockham's writing we see the first stages of the transition from ancient and medieval ways of thinking to more characteristically modern ones such as a greater emphasis on individual rights, the primacy of experience, explanatory modesty, and human freedom. His most characteristic philosophical views are his nominalist metaphysics, voluntarist ethics, and liberal political theory.

Among philosophers of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries Ockham is best known for being the progenitor of a particular variety of ontological reductionism. Though not the first thinker in the history

of philosophy to be a nominalist in the contemporary sense denying any kind of universal entities (that honor likely goes to the twelfth-century thinker Peter Abelard and his immediate predecessor Roscelin of Compiegne), Ockham is probably the historical figure most readily associated with that doctrine. He shrank the standard medieval Aristotelian ontology considerably through the use of his eponymous Razor along with an array of other metaphysical principles: he argued against the existence of any kind of universals and he also pruned away many of the branches of the Aristotelian categorical tree by arguing that there is no philosophical need to posit any entities at all within the categories of Quantity, Relation, Time, Place, Action, etc. Ockham's world is one that contains only individual substances and individual qualities inhering in those substances; in this way, he prefigures and sets the stage for early modern substance/mode ontologies as found in authors such as Descartes and Locke. (The reader will see some faint traces of this ontological program in this volume, e.g., in texts where Ockham argues against more ontologically expansive theories that suppose moral goodness and original sin must be some sort of property or relation inhering in morally good acts and in unbaptized humans, respectively.)

The content and influence of Ockham's ethical views are less well known today than are his ontological doctrines, but they were no less impactful in the history of thought. Ockham, along with his predecessor John Duns Scotus, helped initiate a momentous shift in th history of ethics. In the century immediately prior to their work many of the dominant ethical theories were eudaimonist; according to such views, what is right for an agent is importantly grounded in what is good for that agent. Further, many of these views were also in some sense naturalist; they taught that what is good for an agent is a matter of natural fact, at least to some degree discernible through unaided human reason alone. Thus, according to a thirteenth-century thinker like Thomas Aquinas, one can discover most, if not all, ethical truths simply through the natural study of human nature and the human good. Furthermore, Aquinas and many of his contemporaries held that one's conception of the good in some way necessitates the activity of one's will: the very idea of choosing contrary to one's considered judgment was seen as paradoxical at best, outright impossible at worst.

Scotus begins to sever this theoretical link between the right and the good, arguing that it is at least possible for God to bring about a world in which an agent's ethical duties conflict with that agent's own flourishing, and that it is at least possible that one's ethical duties might not be deducible from the facts of human nature. He also laid an elaborate doctrine of the will's two inclinations (an idea previously suggested by Anselm of Canterbury in the eleventh century); for Scotus, the will is always simultaneously tugged toward one's moral duty and toward one's own self-interest, and the will's freedom lies in its ability to indeterministically select which of these inclinations to

Ockham extends Scotus's ideas, arguing that the concept of right action is entirely based on relations of duty and obligation, that such obligation holds irrespective of the agent's flourishing, and that the will is empowered to select absolutely anything the intellect can represent. An agent willing what is straightforwardly morally bad while conceiving that very thing as bad is not treated as a paradoxical situation by Ockham; if anything, he seems to take it to be a not uncommon occurrence of human experience, one we should be able to recognize in our own lives. He is firmly committed to the view that an agent is only morally praiseworthy or blameworthy when their actions are both deliberate and unnecessitated; someone acting from drunken rage or from outside compulsion cannot be held morally responsible for those acts, and is in fact blameless in the sight of God (although, of course, the drunk individual might be responsible for deliberately and freely getting drunk). 9 Further, he holds that God

has no moral obligations — this seems to be a conclusion he reaches from the premise that the only possible source of moral obligation is the command of a superior authority, together with the belief there is no authority to whom God owes deference — and therefore there is nothing that God could ever do that could count as being morally wrong or unjust in any sense. Rather, God's activity is, in an important sense, simply not subject to moral appraisal. Views such as these would serve to form a basis for the moral and theological reflections of later thinkers such as the early Protestant reformers.

Connotation

Perhaps the single most utilized implement in Ockham's philosophical toolbox is his notion of connotative terms; since connotation theory is used a number of times in this volume without actually being explained in any of these texts, a short summary may be useful.

Ockham regularly accuses his predecessors (justly or not) of trying to derive ontological structure from linguistic structure, believing that they assume, for example, that some entities in reality must be common to many because some terms generally apply to many, or that some entities in reality are relational items because there are true sentences containing relational predicates. The theory of connotation is intended to forestall and help clear up such metaphysical confusion.

On Ockham's account, some linguistic terms and concepts are what he calls "absolute"; they signify only individual substances and/or individual qualities that do exist in reality, they are truly predicated of everything that they signify, and the semantic role of these terms just is this signification. (In contemporary terms, we might say their meaning is equivalent to their reference.) Most linguistic terms and concepts, however, are "connotative" and so have multiple semantic roles; they have what Ockham calls both a primary signification and a secondary signification, by which he means that such terms are truly predicated of one real entity (or entities) while conveying or bringing some other entity (or entities) as well, but without being truly of the latter entity (or entities).

Examples may help. On Ockham's view, absolute terms like Thomas Aquinas,' Lucifer,' 'the redness of that ball,' 'dog,' 'human being,' and 'heat' all play a similar semantic role. They differ in that the first three signify unique individuals (an individual human, an individual angel, and an individual quality entity) while the latter three signify all the members of a collection (all the individual dogs, and heat qualities, respectively), but all these terms are similar insofar as they have the same kind of semantic role: each term is predicated of all the entities in question, and this, Ockham thinks, is the entirety of its meaning.

The paradigmatic case of a connotative term, on the other hand, is something like 'parent.' On Ockham's view, the word 'parent' primarily signifies all the parents, but secondarily signifies (i.e., connotes) all the children of those parents; the semantic role of 'parent' is that it is truly predicable of all the parents by means of its implicit gesturing to the children, since 'parent' is not truly predicated of someone unless there's a child around somewhere. What Ockham thinks he gains from of this theory is he doesn't need to appeal to a relational property of parenthood floating around in the external world to explain why it's true that some people are parents and others aren't; rather, it's just a lingudtic fact about the term 'parent' that it only applies when both the appropriate primary significate and secondary significate exist. Similarly, albeit in a more complicated way, Ockham argues in the texts collected here that there is no distinct property of moral goodness that actions possess when they are good and lack when they are not good; rather, the term 'morally good' is just a connotative term that primarily

signifies the good action while connoting (among other things) that the agent committing that act is under an obligation to perform that act. Likewise, he also claims in this volume that 'intellect' and 'will' are connotative terms with exactly the same primary significate: 'intellect' signifies a rational soul while connoting that soul's thinking, while 'will' signifies the very same rational soul while connoting that soul's desiring. Thus, on his view, the intellect and the will are entirely undifferentiated in reality; the division between intellect and will is, on his view, merely a difference in how we conceptualize and speak about the human mind and the various kinds of operations it can perform.

On the Texts

As the culmination of his graduate studies at Oxford, William of Ockham was required to spend two years lecturing and commenting upon the Sentences of Peter Lombard, a twelfth-century theological compendium of Catholic doctrine organized into four books (on God, Creation, the Incarnation, and the Sacraments, respectively). By Ockham's day, it was no longer typical practice to comment on the Sentences line by line; rather, the custom was to use the text of the Sentences as an occasion to discuss whichever philosophical and theological questions related to the text the degree candidate found most interesting, and so, especially in his commentary on Books II—IV, Ockham pays little attention to the actual text of Lombard other than as a source of themes to discuss. Given standard practice, Ockham probably spent one academic year lecturing on Books I and II and lectured on Books III and IV the following year; one likely guess is that these lectures took place during the years 1317-19.

A student would have been tasked with keeping a transcript of these lectures; for Books II—IV of Ockham's commentary, this unedited student transcript (known as a reportatio) was the only text ever produced. For Book I, however, Ockham personally corrected, emended, and expanded upon the student transcript to produce a more polished version of the text (an ordinatio); the completed Ordinatio on Book I is significantly longer than the Reportatio on Books II, III, and IV combined. Ockham seems to have completed at least an initial version of the Ordinatio of Book I before he finished the last of his lectures on the Sentences; in the final question of Reportatio IV he directs his students to consult "Ockham's Ordinatio" by that name. Ockham also made a significant number of later emendations to the text of the Ordinatio, though it is unknown exactly when these revisions occurred.

Most of the texts translated in this volume come from the Ordinatio and the Reportatio. Those that do not come from two other collections of theological and philosophical questions, the Quaestiones variae and the Quodlibeta septem. The Quodlibeta septem is a unified work, comprising seven sets of short questions that may be the result of classroom exercises during Ockham's years of teaching in London (perhaps revised and completed while at Avignon); at the least, their content indicates that they are among the very latest of Ockham's academic writings. A complete translation of the Quodlibeta already exists in English,' but I have included translations of two short questions for reasons discussed below.

Unlike the Quodlibeta, the Quaestiones variae is not a single unified whole, but a grab bag of short essays, longer disputed questions, and marginal notes collected under that title in the mid-twentieth century by the editors of the critical edition of Ockham's academic writings. It is unclear when or for what purpose any of these texts was produced; many of them are clearly later than the Sentences commentary, though at least one question appears to be the original student transcript of part of the lectures on Book 1.2 I have included five texts from this collection in this volume.

One of those texts — Var. Ques., q. 4, on the nature of final causality —provides little to no internal evidence as to its time of composition or purpose. Though much of the question contains material relevant to the topics of this volume, it is exceedingly long, nearly twice as long as any other chapter in this book, and includes long digressions on the metaphysics of causation that are at best tangential to my purposes here. Given this, I have only included a few excerpts from it, largely confined to matters of moral psychology concerning how ends that are loved function differently in the causal process leading to action than do ends that are hated.

The other four texts from Quaestiones variae from which I have taken material are worthy of special note by one interested in Ockham's ethics.3 There is significant internal evidence that what the edition calls articles 9—10 of question 6 were composed together along with questions 7 and 8 in the same manuscript: q. 8 includes explicit references to q. 7 and to q. 6, a. 9; and q. 7 includes such references to q. 6, a. 10, with each of these references stating that the discussion in question can be found on "an earlier page [quaternus]." Given both the connection and the content of these texts — on the nature of the passions, the role of self-control and temperance with respect to those persons, the connections of the virtues to each other and to prudence, and whether virtuous action is possible when reason is mistaken — I think it a distinct possibility that these four questions were an attempt or composing a commentary on Nicomachean Ethics VI—VII; but when they were written and whether they were intended to be part of some larger project is entirely unclear.

In producing this volume, my aim has been to present as much of broadly ethical material as possible from Ockham's academic works. (I have not included any selections from the political writing from the second half of Ockham's life; but many of these texts are already available in English.) The most notable absence is the longest part of this hypothesized commentary on the Ethics, namely the lengthy question on the connection of the virtues (Vars. Ques., q. 7); that text would be twice as long as the next longest chapter in this volume, and besides, a complete English translation of it is already in print, so I would direct the reader to look there. The ethical questions in Quodlibeta septem largely tend to be either echoes or elucidations of what Ockham says in the questions translated here, and are already available in English elsewhere, but I have included translations of two short questions that have been widely discussed in the secondary literature and that may differ in subtle points of doctrine from the views Ockham expresses in his Sentences commentary: namely, Quod. III, q. 14, on whether any acts are necessarily virtuous, and Quod. II, q. 14, on the possibility of moral knowledge. I have also included one very short excerpt from Var. Ques., q. 7 that closely parallels Quod. III, q. 14 but that seems to have been largely overlooked in the secondary literature. The resulting volume is not an exhaustive collection of Ockham's ethical writings by any means, but it is, I think, as close to complete as could be produced, especially if it is supplemented with the existing translation of Var. Ques., q. 7.

In organizing this material, I have decided to compile it thematically and in such a way that Ockham's doctrines are presented largely in a logical order, rather than following the original order of presentation according to the arrangement of Lombard's Sentences. First, I include a number of questions on the nature of the created will and its internal states and abilities, followed by questions about the divine will, then questions about the morality of individual acts and virtuous habits, and I close with a series of questions about charity and grace. <>

HELLENISTIC ASTRONOMY: THE SCIENCE IN ITS CONTEXTS edited by Alan C. Bowen and Francesca Rochberg [Brill's Companions to Classical Studies, Brill, 9789004243361]

In **HELLENISTIC ASTRONOMY: THE SCIENCE IN ITS CONTEXTS**, new essays by renowned scholars address questions about what the ancient science of the heavens was in the ancient Near East and Mediterranean worlds, and the numerous contexts in which it was pursued. Together, these essays will enable readers not only to understand the technical accomplishments of this ancient science but also to appreciate their historical significance by locating the questions, challenges, and issues inspiring them in their political, medical, philosophical, literary, and religious contexts.

Reviews

"This is an absolutely wonderful book, well-written and a pleasure to read. It is generally based on the most recent research and very informative without being inaccessible to the layman. That the field of ancient astronomy is under rapid development is evident from the bibliography alone. [...] It is generously supplied with interesting and relevant illustrations and its structure and composition take the reader by the hand so that it can be read easily from cover to cover. The individual chapters can also be read on their own, and the "Historical Glossary" and indices make it an excellent handbook as well. It provides a status question is in a way which is at the same time accessible to the interested layman and contains a brilliant survey and much new to be learnt for the specialist in any parts of the vast topic covered as well." Ulla Koch, BMCR 2021.04.23

Winner of the 2020 Choice Outstanding Academic Title Award

Subjects: Ancient Science & Medicine Naturwissenschaften und Medizin der Antike, Classical Studies Klassische Altertumswissenschaften, Philosophy, Science & Medicine Philosophie, Wissenschaft & Medizin, Ancient Near East and Egypt Alter Orient und Ägypten, History of Science Wissenschaftsgeschichte, History Geschichte, Gnosticism & Manichaeism Gnosis & Manichäismus, Biblical Studies Bibelauslegung

Readership

This volume will appeal to all interested in the history of ancient astronomy as found in Mediterranean and Near Eastern sources, its technical requirements, its fundamental questions, and its diverse contexts.

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Excerpt: The Hellenistic science of astronomy was one aspect of a distinctive intellectual culture arising in the Near East and Western Mediterranean—indeed, in all three of the Antigonid, Seleucid, and Ptolemaic Empires in the geographical area briefly unified by the conquests of Alexander the Great—during a period roughly extending from the late fourth century bce to the rise of Arabic astronomy. As a result of cultural contacts, some of longstanding and even more ancient roots, the development of astronomy in this period came to bear the impress particularly of Babylonian knowledge and practices. The significance of Babylonian influence is a key feature of the development of astronomy in the Hellenistic Period; whereas, at the same time, the development of Babylonian astronomy itself reached its apex in Babylonia under Seleucid rule. The characteristic features of Hellenistic astronomy as manifested in the various parts of the Near Eastern and Mediterranean worlds during this period and the contexts within which it functioned and was further developed are the remit of this volume.

Of all the sciences created in Antiquity, astronomy is second in importance only to medicine in its impact on human lives. And, for this reason, like medicine, it achieved remarkable sophistication. The development of astronomy in Greco-Roman culture from a qualitative science in the late fourth century BCE to a fully quantitative and predictive science in the second century CE that was the paradigm of human knowledge and a rival to philosophy is truly astounding. So there is no denying the historical importance of astronomy as a basis for insight into the Greek and Roman worlds of that time. But ancient astronomy also developed in other geo-cultural domains and their understandings of the heavens are also important and merit close attention because they influenced, and were influenced by, the Greco-Roman science. In effect, each of these cultures played a role in defining ancient astronomy as a set of historically interacting bodies of knowledge that lasted in various forms to the beginnings of Arabic astronomy in the latter half of the eighth century CE.

One of the fascinations of astronomy in the period from roughly 300 BCE to 750 CE, which we call Hellenistic, is surely that its geographical range was vast, spanning regions that were, prior to

Alexander's unification, culturally distinct. Even before Alexander the Great briefly formed a single inhabited world (*oikoumene*), the layers of culture and language, especially in the eastern part of that conquered area, were many and already integrated with one another in various ways. Thus, for example, in Mesopotamia, the region of the Seleucid Empire, the ancient Sumerian and Akkadian traditions of the third millennium fused into a Babylonian tradition that was followed by an Assyro-Babylonian form in the first millennium that was replaced yet again by a Late Babylonian form (after *ca* 500 BCE), within which mathematical astronomy first made its appearance.

The Persian Empire had its own impact on the cultures of its political domain, accounting for the rise of Aramaic as a learned language in many parts of the Near East in the sixth to fourth centuries BCE. The Hellenistic Near East, however, ushered in an unprecedented culture of intellectual transmission and circulation of knowledge. The component of Hellenistic astronomy that we see in Judea [chs 13.1–2] is an important instance of the influence of the Babylonian astronomical tradition within the new Hellenistic world and its adaptation for local interests in the Eastern Mediterranean.

Pre-Hellenistic Egyptian knowledge of the heavens was also absorbed within new forms of Hellenistic Egyptian astronomy [chs 4.8 and 11.1]. The capital city of the Ptolemies, Alexandria, became a center for scientific activity and served under the Ptolemaic dynasts to foster intellectual culture and, with it, the combined astral sciences of astronomy and astrology. Some of the most significant Greek treatises, such as the *Almagest* and *Tetrabiblos* by Claudius Ptolemy, came from Alexandria during the second century of our era.

Needless to say, therefore, any historical analysis that does not account for the impact of the cultures of the eastern regions of the *oikoumene* will be inadequate for understanding the Hellenistic sciences, particularly astronomy and astrology, since the East is where these sciences originated. In much the same way, the Hellenistic traditions of medicine and magic and, indeed, the combinations of these with astronomy to produce new ideas and practices (such as astral medicine [ch. 9.3] or astral magic) were equally products of the circulation of knowledge and the remarkable intellectual transmission of ideas from the East that characterizes the Hellenistic world.

Just as the geographical domain for the study of astronomy in the Hellenistic Period is extensive, so too is the range of the sources to be considered. The textual evidence for Hellenistic astronomy stems from tablets and papyri (or artifacts and inscriptions) from Seleucid Babylonia, Ptolemaic Egypt, and Macedonian Greece, as well as from the Roman Near East, where it may be found, for example, in the astronomical texts of the Qumran community in the first century BCE [chs 13.1–2]. In tracing the continuation of Hellenistic astronomy in even later periods, it is clear that the Late Antique heirs in both East and West carried on certain elements of Hellenistic astronomical culture. These late manifestations of the tradition, such as in Christianity [ch. 13.3], Stoic and Neoplatonic philosophy [chs 14.1–2], and Hermeticism [ch. 13.5], have a place in the history of Hellenistic astronomy, and consequently a place in the present volume.

In order to accommodate the different languages, cultures, religions, and intellectual traditions that supported astronomy and astrology, we have adopted what is perhaps an ultra-long Hellenistic Period for our chronological framework (*ca* 300 BCE to 750 CE). Our chronological limits are determined not by singular political turning points but rather by developments within the science considered as a transcultural phenomenon of shared knowledge. We have not found the standard date-limits given for

the 'Hellenistic Period' (323–31 Bce), the 'Greco-Roman Period' (332–395 CE), the 'Byzantine Period' (330–1453 ce), or 'Late Antiquity' (third to eighth centuries ce in the West and third to mid-eighth CE in the East) to be appropriate or useful in delimiting chronologically the long period within which astronomy appeared and then persisted until the major shift that occurred in the development of the science as it entered the Islamicate world of the eighth century. Such transculturally shared and interactively created systems of knowledge demonstrate yet again greater staying power than kingdoms and empires. Astrology, after all, was one of the longest lasting sciences of all from Antiquity.

Apart from delimiting the geographical and chronological framework for studying Hellenistic astronomy, what is called for is a history that is ever mindful of the fact that its great success was due to the development of an impressive mathematical apparatus, yet aware as well that this very success entailed addressing needs and requirements deriving from the diverse contexts in which this science was pursued. Our goal, then, is to provide critical analyses that lay out the great success that astronomy enjoyed by addressing the complex interplay between these needs or requirements and the mathematical apparatus developed to meet them.

But there is a caveat. The present volume is only a first step toward the larger project of understanding astronomy as a scientific and social phenomenon of the Hellenistic world. Given that the ambit of Hellenistic astronomy as we conceive it is extremely wide, it should not come as a surprise that this volume is incomplete in both its temporal and geo-cultural coverage. Practical constraints have necessitated that our focus be on the Mediterranean and Near East and mainly in the interval from 300 BCE to 300 CE . And so much remains to be said and much more to be done. But completeness can only be a goal in a project that proposes to set Hellenistic astronomy in its diverse cultural contexts in order to understand both why and how its ideas and practices developed.

We are mindful, of course, that the very features that made Hellenistic astronomy such a success in its time, its technical apparatus, can prove an impediment to readers today, even to the few who have some knowledge of the heavens. And so, astronomy, that magnificent science which afforded its results, insights, and authority to so many aspects of Hellenistic culture [e.g., ch. 10.2] is often not given its due in studies of the cultures to which it was once such an integral part. Thus, this volume strives to overcome our modern preference for compartmentalizing knowledge, particularly scientific knowledge, in order to understand the more complex processes by which Hellenistic astronomy came to be the paradigmatic science that it was, and came to represent, as against a number of alternative cosmological pictures, a basic geocentric, spherical construction of the universe that lasted until the Early Modern Period.

Accordingly, we have divided the volume into three parts:

a. Technical Requirements;
b. Observations, Instruments, and Issues; and
c. Contexts

A Technical Requirements

The opening Part of our volume presents Hellenistic astronomy as a mathematical science with an ever evolving vocabulary and budget of techniques and results. Our aim here is to provide readers with enough of the theory to facilitate their understanding of Hellenistic documents bearing on astronomy

and to supplement this with a scholarly apparatus that directs them to further reading. This means that Part A is not the complete and comprehensive handbook to Hellenistic astronomy that is ultimately needed: the list of topics covered is not complete and there is often more to say in covering them. There is, for example, no full-blown study of the great changes in theorizing that the work of Claudius Ptolemy embodies. The reasons for this are practical. Ptolemy's writings are technically demanding. Furthermore, the great challenge, once one has mastered the technical aspect of his work, is to locate it in the context of his own times, a daunting task that still lies ahead.

For those interested in Hellenistic Greco-Roman astronomy and who wish to learn more about what was known at the time, we recommend Geminus' *Introductio astronomiae*[Evans and Berggren 2006] or Cleomedes, *Caelestia* [Bowen and Todd 2004] and then Ptolemy's *Syntaxis* or, as it was later known, *Almagest* [Toomer 1998]. Macrobius' *In somnium Scipionis* and Martianus Capella's *De nuptiis* c. 8 [Stahl, Johnson, and Burge 1977] will also reward attention. For Babylonian astronomy, one may consult the texts collected in Neugebauer 1955, Hunger 2001–2012, and Rochberg 1998, and turn to Hunger and Pingree 1999 for an overview. For Egyptian astronomy, there are Neugebauer and Parker 1960–1969, Ross 2006a, and Clagett 1989–1999, vol. 2.

B Observations, Instruments, and Issues

In Part B, we turn to astronomy understood as a system or complex of knowledge and practice. The first task here is to characterize Hellenistic astronomy by considering the ways in which theory was grounded in observation and the various instruments developed as tools of astronomical practice. The second is to provide a critic's overview of the problems defining astronomy during the Hellenistic Period. Accordingly, we offer chapters on the role of observation [chs 5.1–2] and on instruments and their use [chs 6.1–4] that are followed by chapters dealing with the basic problems and subjects of astronomy in Egyptian, Babylonian, and Greco-Latin sources [chs 7.1–3].

C Contexts

To counteract any tendency to reduce the history of Hellenistic astronomy to its technical results, be they parameters, techniques for observation and calculation, or hypotheses, Part C is devoted to an exploration of the uses of astronomy in a variety of contexts, from practical to theological. By this means, we aim to contextualize the science itself, that is, to understand astronomy in its various intellectual and social contexts, and to do this from the diverse standpoints of those who drew on astronomy in their own enterprises. In this Part, the focus is on the numerous ways in which Hellenistic astronomy affected, and was affected by, the culturally diverse communities in which it was practiced. Accordingly, we offer chapters on the professional astronomer/astrologer [ch. 8], astronomy in public service [chs 9.1–10.2], astronomy as priestly knowledge [chs 11.1–2], and the use of astronomy in medicine, in divination and natal astrology [chs 12.1–4], as well as in theological and philosophical contexts [chs 13.1–5, 14.1–2].

Astronomy and Astrology

Our culturally oriented approach to ancient astronomy necessarily gives due weight to the centrally important aspect of astrology, whether in the form of celestial divination or astral omens, nativities, or horoscopes. This too was an integral part of the science of astronomy, which, accordingly, had predictive as well as prognosticatory dimensions. We have not found it necessary to discuss the modern philosophical issue of the demarcation between science and non-science since it in no way applies to

ancient astronomy and astrology. This is not to say, however, that practitioners did not make their own demarcations and separated those varying dimensions of the science of the stars, only that their demarcations are not the same as the ones made today. On examining the evidence, we have found the inclusion of the astrological aspect of many of the sources produced throughout the regions of the period to be a necessary component of any study of the science of Hellenistic astronomy in its contexts.

Conclusion

In accordance with the foregoing description of this volume, we reiterate in conclusion that the primary aim has been the contextualization of the ancient science of Hellenistic astronomy in as wide a framework as we could defend. Therefore, together with the description and analysis of Hellenistic astronomy as an exact, or mathematical, science, we wish to emphasize as well its cultural reach and, in particular, the central role played by astrology in the astronomy of the Hellenistic cultures of the Near East (Egypt and Mesopotamia) and of the Eastern and Western Mediterranean regions.

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Introduction

If it is prudent at any time to reflect on the assumptions underlying a question, it is surely prudent at the outset of this volume to set forth our presuppositions in asking the question What is Hellenistic astronomy? The aim of such preliminary reflection is not, of course, to answer the question but to clarify the terms on which we expect it to be answered. So, let us start with a definition and an observation.

The definition is a lexical stipulation: in what follows, the term "astronomy" will cover knowledge of the heavens no matter whether it is used for describing the heavens, for predicting celestial and meteorological phenomena or, astrologically, for understanding and prognosticating human lives and events in them. In making this stipulation, we step aside from modern concerns about science and pseudo-science. Our justification is that, while the ancients did indeed ponder how astronomy differed from astrology, they regarded both as real sciences and even as aspects of the same science in spite of their different epistemic reach.

The observation is that no idea is born or lives in the abstract, that ideas are conceived in specific contexts by people living in given places at given times in determinate communities in diverse cultures, and that they are preserved in media that are ultimately material using the languages and scripts of those communities and cultures. For us, this observation gains particular interest when the ideas concern the world about us and the question becomes Under what circumstances do groups unified by some project or shared understanding change their ideas when confronted with new ones arising either from within the group as consequences of what was held before or from without?

To bring this last question to the history of astronomy, we elaborate the observation as follows:

1. Science as a body of knowledge and practices is entirely embedded within the historical and cultural framework of those who know and practice it. It is in no way separable from such frameworks. Thus, while we continue to learn from the work of Otto Neugebauer and his students—without it, we would not have our current understanding of Ptolemy's debt to the Babylonians or of the ways in which he either transformed and made it Greek or was prominent

in this process—we will not limit our study of ancient astronomy in any culture to considering its mathematical methods and parameters, an approach exemplified in Neugebauer's monumental *A History of Ancient Mathematical Astronomy* [1975].

2. Understanding a culture's science and appropriating or interpreting it in one's own framework is made possible to the extent that science is about, or concerns, a shared world and that the cultures involved and individuals within them share some commonalities.

3. Change in science does not arise only in response to the solution of technical problems within the science; it may also be brought about proximately by ideas that come from outside the boundaries of the science as conceived and practiced at the time.

4. Since any such change in ideas is, however, mediated by the individuals and groups that have them, the acceptance of new ideas may ultimately depend on interests and concerns that are far from scientific themselves.

5. Accordingly, such acceptance can bring about radical change not only in the scientific ideas that a community or culture has, it may also bring about new scientific practices and even professions as well as broad challenges to previous norms of belief and behavior.

6. Finally, when communities and cultures interact and share knowledge in part, it makes sense not only to speak of the science of one group in distinction from that of another but also to view the science embedded in both together as a single transcultural phenomenon, that is, as a locus where questions of what is and is not admitted in each gain real meaning.

It is true, we admit, that adopting premises of this sort is self-fulfilling: to look at the history of a particular science under these terms is pretty much to guarantee that they will be found to be the case. Yet, this is not a fault but a feature of most inquiries: in intellectual history especially, the findings tend to confirm the terms under which they were found. Indeed, the real test for such an inquiry once completed is whether it encompasses all and only what should be encompassed. With this in mind, then, let us spell out what we take to be the guiding principles of the kind of answer that we expect in asking the question What is Hellenistic astronomy?

Since Hellenistic astronomy has been an object of modern scholarship for close to 300 years, we begin with the adjective "Hellenistic" because its use in classical scholarship bears the weight of established tradition.

Why "Hellenistic"?

There are many ways in which historians divide their subject into periods. It is important to keep in mind that, when such periodization is done properly, it is with an eye to the subject itself and its internal structure. Like Plato's butcher [cf. *Phaedrus* 265e1–3], one must carve the animal at its joints. To introduce periods that belong to another subject or class of questions is a misstep that will separate what ought to be grasped at once and keep together what should be separated. Thus, for example, periodizing the history of ancient Greek mathematics by reference to the Archons of Athens would not be a particularly good idea. So let us turn to the history of ancient astronomy by itself.

When one considers ancient astronomy in the Near East and Mediterranean as a transcultural phenomenon, that is, as a set of diverse but interacting astronomies, it becomes readily evident, nowadays at least, that Babylonian mathematical astronomy and astrology were the original instigators of a great change in other cultures that demarcates one period of astronomical theorizing in the history of Western thought from the next. (This is not to deny that older forms of theorizing persisted.) Scholars will, of course, set the timing of this change differently in different cultures. For the Greeks and Romans, it started in the late fourth century BCE. This is important because the Greco-Roman transformation of the earlier native science, a process involving the appropriation of Babylonian astronomy that was effectively completed in the works of Claudius Ptolemy, became itself an instigator of change in other cultures, primarily as recorded in Greek. Moreover, it persisted even with the emergence of Christianity as a political power and it is not until the mid-eighth century CE, when the Arabs took Greco-Roman science in new directions, that we see the end of the era that began roughly a millennium earlier. For this reason, then, we maintain that the period from the late fourth century BCE to the mid-eighth century CE is a discrete era in the history of Western astronomy and that it is rightly called Hellenistic.

Hellenistic Astronomy as a Subject

For students of astronomy in Greco-Roman intellectual culture, what makes this view of Hellenistic astronomy especially interesting is that astronomy in this period was actually contested, that Greek and Latin writers urged divergent views of what astronomy is and should be without there being clear winners, Ptolemy's great synthesis notwithstanding. Indeed, one defining question for authors writing in Greek and Latin was whether to include Babylonian astronomy in the traditional astronomy that went back to Plato and Aristotle, and, if so, how much of it, all or some.

Such concern about what to appropriate from Babylonian astronomy is not limited to Greco-Roman culture; it is reflected in other cultures too and points to the more basic fact that the process of appropriation is a complicated one of interpretation, rejection, and transformative acceptance.[3] Moreover, this process was often bi-directional: while Babylonian astronomy left its mark on other cultures (and not always by the mediation of work in Greek and Latin) without signs of changing much itself, there are indications that these other cultures, Egyptian for example, likewise impacted astronomy in Greco-Roman culture even as they were in turn influenced by it. The upshot for inquiry into Hellenistic astronomy as we propose is two-fold:

- First is that to understand how and why the various Hellenistic astronomies took the form that they did will require exploring the intellectual and social contexts of each in its culture. This entails that we must reject any personification or essentializing of culture or civilization—Greco-Roman or whatever—as though it were an agent and had impermeable boundaries. To the contrary, the history of Hellenistic astronomy shows exactly how permeable these supposed boundaries of language and culture can really be.

- But second is that this will make sense only if we distinguish Hellenistic astronomy from Hellenistic astronomies without reifying the former as a body of knowledge and making it anything more than a meta-historical category. In other words, on our terms, while it is useful and necessary to speak of Hellenistic astronomy, it was not a body of knowledge held by any one community or culture in Antiquity. Further, there was no single, authoritative way of

understanding the heavens that merited the title "astronomy" before all others or was universally valued as such.

Consequently, in asking What is Hellenistic astronomy?, we rule out any assertion that Hellenistic Greco-Roman astronomy was the authoritative paradigm for knowledge of the heavens, since this would impede our understanding the very processes by which this particular astronomy or any of the others was formed and transformed. As we see it, then, Greco-Roman astronomy has nothing to do with any modern hierarchy of value attached to ancient sources for science and will have no more centrality or epistemic authority than Babylonian or Egyptian astronomy, for example, in our discussions.

The Geo-cultural Reach of Hellenistic Astronomy

Once Hellenistic astronomy is viewed as a corpus of interacting astronomies, the question becomes Whose astronomies does it include? In our view, it should include the astronomical science of each of the geo-cultural regions that was engulfed by the Alexandrian conquest in the late fourth century BCE. Well, almost all. In this volume, however, we do not address Indian astronomy because it makes better sense to us to present it as a subject while considering astronomy in the Arab world as it impacted the Latin West and Byzantine East.

The Challenge of Contextualization

Such contextualization of Hellenistic astronomy as we propose raises a problem that may be cast as a dilemma: while ignoring the contexts of a science by abstracting its ideas is to miss the *history* of that science, to focus on these contexts and to ignore the ideas and their role in bodies of knowledge is to miss the history of the *science*. The challenge to be faced in our asking What is Hellenistic astronomy? is to pass between the horns of this dilemma which is at once historiographic and philosophical.

So far as the two opposed schools in the historiography of science in evidence today are concerned, this is easy enough. To internalists who restrict their study of astronomy to its technical content, that is, to its observations, the use of these observations to quantify models, and the parameters of these models, we propose by virtue of our concern with context an answer to the Why?-questions that they broach only on the most restricted terms, if at all. That is, we propose a course that will allow much fuller explanations of changes in the technical theorizing of Hellenistic astronomy. To those historians who focus on scientists and scientific institutions, we are proposing here a case study of astronomy that connects the socio-cultural environment of a body of scientific learning to its technical apparatus and structures.

As for those in either school who advocate histories of *longue durée*, we here set out a theme by which to study more than a millennium of thought. Granted, this theme comes with no hope for a narrative— and this not just because the evidentiary materials for such are lacking but because in focusing on Hellenistic astronomy understood as a number of interacting astronomies each with its own cultural context, we embrace the adventitious character of human history and, thus, its resistance to overarching storylines and narratives of continuous progress.

Conclusion

Thus, our understanding of what is involved in asking What is Hellenistic astronomy? is that, while it is a body of knowledge to be acquired by historians, it has no historical standing, no meaning in Antiquity.

To ask about and study Hellenistic astronomy is, in our view, to ask about and study a set of numerous, interacting astronomies held in the interval from 300 BCE to 750 CE, say, by the cultures of the various regions brought into contact by Alexander the Great in the late fourth century BCE. <>

PLUTARCH'S RELIGIOUS LANDSCAPES edited by Rainer Hirsch-Luipold and Lautaro Roig Lanzillotta [Brill's Plutarch Studies, Brill, 9789004443525]

A Platonist philosopher and priest of Apollo at Delphi, Plutarch (ca. 45-120 CE) covers in his vast oeuvre of miscellaneous writings and biographies of great men virtually every aspect of ancient religion, Greek, Roman, Jewish, Egyptian, Persian. This collection of essays takes the reader on a hike through Plutarch's Religious Landscapes offering as a compass the philosopher's considerations on issues of philosophical theology, cult, ethics, politics, natural sciences, hermeneutics, atheism, and life after death. Plutarch provides a unique vantage point to reconstruct and understand many of the interesting developments that were taking in the philosophical and religious world of the first centuries CE.

CONTENTS

The border between philosophy and religion was never clear-cut in ancient Greece. In the first centuries CE, however, the religious becomes an integral part of philosophical reasoning to the extent that philosophy is even presented in the categories of a mystery-like initiation. At the end of this initiation the neophyte achieves the desired reunion with the divine. Plutarch is the prime exponent of this development in the Greek "pagan" sphere (complementing Jewish authors like Philo and Christians like Clement, Justin, and Origen). His Moralia and Lives provide ample witness of both philosophical approaches to religious issues and religious approaches to philosophical matters. As a Platonic philosopher and priest of Apollo at Delphi, he knew and viewed the ancient religious world both as a scientific observer and as an actor. In this sense, Plutarch provides a wide overview of what has been called the religious philosophy or philosophical religion so characteristic of the time.

Plutarch's writings, however, do not only provide an outstanding testimony regarding the religious landscape of the time. The material presented in both Moralia and Lives are shaped by Plutarch's own religious and philosophical agenda and convictions as well. Plutarch offers, on the one hand, first rate testimony of the theological discussions that were taking place within and without Platonism, as well as his own view of religion(s), theology, and his conception of the Divine.

This rich testimony regarding the "ancient religious Landscape" was the focus of two consecutive conferences bearing the title "Plutarch and the Ancient Religious Landscape" at the Universities of Groningen (27-29 September 2017) and Bern (28-30 June 2018), respectively. In order to enrich the discussion and exchange, as well as the quality of the presentations, the papers were first presented in Groningen, then reworked and improved before being presented again in Bern. During the presentation of the papers at the Bern conference, the author's short exposition was followed by a critical response and a plenary discussion.

The nineteen papers cover a wide range of issues related to Plutarch's testimony and have been organized into three parts following an introductory "survey" by Rainer Hirsch-Luipold ("Religions, Religion and Theology in Plutarch"), presenting both Plutarch's broad phenomenology of lived religion (including views on mythology, rituals, cultic images, symbols, iconography, architecture) and his theoretical reasoning regarding religion, god(s) and theology. The three parts are devoted to Plutarch's theology, notion of religion, and ethics (2), Plutarch's testimony of ancient religion (3), and some glimpses of the reception of Plutarch's religious thought.

Inger N.I. Kuin's "Deaf to the Gods: Atheism in Plutarch's De superstitione," opens part 2 ("Plutarch's Theology, Notion of Religion, and Ethics") by exploring Plutarch's understanding of atheism. In De superstitione, Plutarch compares deisidaimonia to atheotes, traditionally translated as `superstition' and `atheism, respectively, even if both words in Plutarch's works represent complex phenomena that do not map well onto modern categories. Kuin focuses on the comparative element of the treatise in order

to investigate how Plutarch characterizes atheism and how he represents atheists. Why do some people stop believing in the existence of the gods? Or, why do some individuals—`born atheists' perhaps—never start believing in the existence of the gods in the first place? This chapter investigates in detail how Plutarch characterizes atheotes and its alleged representatives (atheoi) in De superstitione with particular attention to his understanding of atheotes as an affliction of the senses.

Michiel Meeusen's contribution, "Plutarch on the Platonic Synthesis: A Synthesis," analyses how Plutarch presents Plato as a turning point in the history of ancient Greek philosophy who developed the rivalling theological and naturalist worldviews of earlier thinkers into a harmonious synthesis. This chapter substantiates how this Platonic synthesis serves as a recurrent theme in Plut-arch's writings and usefully contributes to our better understanding of the pagan landscape against which his world should be read and interpreted.

Peter Lotscher's paper, "Plutarch's Monotheism and the God of Mathematics," deals with Plutarch as a central figure in recent discussions regarding the emergence of both a pagan monotheism and a religious branch of Platonism. Mainly based on an analysis of De E apud Delphos, especially its fourth and fifth speeches, Lötscher intends to show how, following Platonic-Pythagorean tradition, Plutarch associated belief in the existence of the one and only God, the "one being" in the true sense of the word, with the traditional religion of different peoples. The analysis of some relevant passages from De Iside et Osiride, on the other hand, serves to counter the objection made by some scholars who believe that Plutarch is a dualist who ultimately believes in two supreme beings.

The following two papers place Plutarch's ideas of homoiosis theo in the context of Early Christianity and the Gnostic traditions, respectively. The final goal of Plutarch's ethics is the traditional ideal of "assimilation to the divine (as far as possible)," the well-known Platonic telos of homoiosis theo kata to dynaton. Geert Roskam's study "Plutarch's Theonomous Ethics and Christianity: A Few Thoughts on a Much-Discussed Problem," scrutinizes how the ethical doctrine of an assimilation to God according to Plutarch presupposes some knowledge and insight about the Divine. In a second part, the author compares Plutarch's position to that of early Christianity, particularly the Gospel of John. Similarities are to be found in the theonomous aspect of their ethics, for both indeed take their conception of God as the starting point for further moral reflections. Yet there also exist some basic differences between the two, both regarding their understanding of God and regarding the general orientation and concrete elaboration of their ethical thinking. In John, God is not just being, but love, with important consequences for his relation to the world and human beings. This also leads to a new conception of the idea of homoiosis theo. In conclusion, Roskam stresses the fundamental differences that would have led Plutarch to reject John's fundamental beliefs concerning God, Christ, and the need of salvation.

Lautaro Roig Lanzillotta's "An End in Itself, or a Means to an End? The Role of Ethics in the Second Century: Plutarch's Moralia and the Nag Hammadi Writings," focusses on the preparatory role of ethics in the individual's search for assimilation to the divine. Roig Lanzillotta contends that while some Middle Platonists and Nag Hammadi writings hesitated as to the moral or purely intellectual understanding of Plato's homoiosis theo (`likeness to God'), one finds in Plutarch an interesting combination of both aspects, since ethics provides the individual with the preparatory steps towards the higher visionary experience of the divine. Interestingly enough, this combination appears in several Nag Hammadi writings as well. By comparing the role of ethics in Plutarch and in the Nag Hammadi corpus, the

chapter highlights their conspicuous parallelisms in the conception of the ethical path as being initiatory for achieving epoptic culmination. These similarities, Roig Lanzillotta observes, do not result from influences in either or both directions, however, but rather are simply expressions of the same cultural context Plutarch and the Nag Hammadi writers were part of, of the religious-philosophical continuum they shared.

The following two contributions deal with ethics and eschatology The importance of the former in Plutarch's eschatological views is assessed by Luisa Lesage Garriga ("Reincarnation and Other Experiences of the Soul in Plutarch's De facie: Two Case Studies"). Plutarch discerns several stages within the life of the soul. In each of them the ethical value of the soul is primordial and allows the discrimination of good and bad souls. Only those souls that show a constant control of the irrational part will be able to move forward to salvation, while the others that do not do so will go through a process of punishment and purification before being allowed to progress to the final desintegration into the moon's essence. Lesage explores the different groups and types of soul-intellects Plutarch envisages in De facie's myth in order to argue that the different locations allotted to them in the sublunary realm all emphasize the utmost importance of ethical values in the soul's life.

Plutarch's view of the human final encounter with the divine is dealt with by Israel Munoz Gallarte ("The Conception of the Last Steps towards Salvation Revisited: the Telos of the Soul in Plutarch and Its Context"). The chapter focusses on two difficult passages of Plutarch's Moralia describing the last steps before the reunion of human being with the divinity, namely Amatorius (766B) and De Iside et Osiride (374F-375A). While Plutarch regularly presents the achievement of the highest human goal in terms of the separation of soul and intellect, Amatorius and De Iside present it instead as a hieros gamos. With a view to explaining this alleged inconsistency Munoz Gallarte places both treatises in the wider cultural context in which Plutarch lived.

With Delfim F. Leäo's chapter, "Gods, Impiety and Pollution in the Life and Death of Phocion," we turn to the Lives. In the analysis of the Life of Phocion, Ledo shows how Plutarch insistently interprets human deeds and historical developments with references to the divine. Besides the operative interactions of such concepts as ('fortune'), ('proper time') and ('time') in the outline of the biography, as well as omens and other signs, the Mysteries of Eleusis are particularly mentioned in articulation with important events that mark both the emergence and the decline of Phocion's military and political career. The most striking example, however, is given in the description of Phocion's death, whose execution is depicted as an ('impious crime'; Phoc. 37.2) and is explicitly compared to the trial and execution of Socrates.

In the same vein as the previous chapter, Serena Citro's contribution, "The Religiosity of Greek and Roman," examines some characters in Plutarch's works with a view to highlighting and understanding his view of the problematic relationship between human will and divine sanction. Does the favorable outcome of an action in the political or military sphere result from a weighted and thoughtful examination of the circumstances through the exercise of ? Or is it rather determined by a higher entity or a combination of both factors? While some characters show gratitude to different divinities, considering their contribution fundamental for the subsequent actions, others attribute the merit of important deeds exclusively to themselves. With a view to answering these questions, the present chapter compares Plutarch's presentation of Timotheos, the Athenian strategos, and Sulla, the Roman general.

Joaquim Pinheiro's, "La valeur de la tolma dans les Moralia de Plutarque," analyzes the concept of tolma in Plutarch, a concept that is closely related to questions concerning the soul, fate, the problem of evil, the Stoic acceptance of misfortune, and the (lack of) courage of human nature. Indeed, tolma not only expresses an ethical value but also reveals the voluntary or involuntary relationship of the human being both with the divine and the human world. In Plutarch, tolma might have a positive meaning when it reveals the virtue or heroism of human nature. But it also has a negative side, namely when it is associated with unsavory characters or actions. This chapter surveys the use of tolma in Plutarch's Parallel Lives and mainly focuses on contexts of action represented by the dynamism of courage, but takes also into consideration cases in which tolma involves attitudes marked by risk and irrationality.

Part 3 "Plutarch's Testimony of Ancient Religion" includes eight chapters charting various aspects of Plutarch's landscape of ancient religions in terms of individual religious traditions.

Fabio Tanga surveys "The Religious Landscape of Plutarch's Quaestiones Graecae". Of Plutarch's Quaestiones graecae 25 out of a total of 59 deal with religious issues. Tanga focuses on Plutarch's references to religious aspects in his description of the customs of cities, regions and islands: descriptions of gods, quotations of oracles, presentations of priests and priestesses, sacrifices made by gods' ministers or by entire cities, sacred cults and festivals, local customs or prohibitions, and sacred foods. Many of the episodes are situated in temples, sanctuaries, and sacred places. Thereby, the Quaestiones Graecae intermingle topics of knowledge, mysticism and revelation with historical, aetiological, literary and religious perspectives.

Human sacrifices are an especially problematic aspect of religious lore in Plutach's religious universe. Carlos Alcalde-Martin, "Human Sacrifices: Can They Be Justified?," analyzes several cases of human sacrifices as presented by Plutarch's Parallel Lives. The chapter focuses on Plutarch's views on this phenomenon and discusses his presentation of some human sacrifices that occur in life-and-death situations, or before imminent and decisive battles, in which such sacrifices aim to instill courage in the army or the people. This chapter pays attention both to the literary function of these episodes in structuring the biography and in characterizing the main protagonists, and to Plutarch's ethical and religious reflections.

The following four chapters are devoted to the portrait of individual deities in Plutarch: Hekate and Dionysos. Nerea Lopez Carrasco's contribution, "The Conception of the Goddess Hecate in Plutarch," provides an overview of all references to the goddess Hecate in Plutarch's time and works. In order to do so, Lopez Carrasco organizes the materials in two different groups: references to Hekate included in ritual contexts and references to the goddess in astral conceptions (in which Hecate is presented as chtonian and ouranian). Her study shows that, building on tradition, Plutarch innovates considerably in the presentation of the goddess. In fact, Plutarch can be considered a turning point in the development of Hecate's cult in Greco-Roman literature. He marks the beginning of Hecate's vertiginous and expansive development after the first century CE, especially in its Neoplatonic conception, something that explains its appearance in the Chaldean Oracles, where Hecate becomes the World-Soul.

The first chapter on the god Dionysus is Paola Volpe's "Plutarch and the Ambiguity of the God Dionysus". It approaches the god from the perspective of myth and assesses the numerous names given to him. He is the god "of the orgiastic cry, exciter of women, Dionysus, glorified with mad honours" (Quaestiones convivales 671A).

Approaching the god Dionysus from a different angle, Soraya Planchas Gallarte's chapter, "Interpretations of Dionysus in an Orphic Ritual (Plutarch, De E apud Delphos 389A)", applies Plutarch's testimony to parse the meaning of a particular epithet of the god. She does so by means of an analysis of Plutarch's De E apud Delphos (389A), the only passage that interestingly links the use of the epithet to an orphic ritual. On the basis of a survey of all references to in Greek literature, Planchas Gallarte attempts to overcome the lack of interpretive consensus in the search for a new interpretation of the Dionysian epithet that suits this context.

Ana Isabel Jimenez San Cristobal's "The Epiphany of Dionysus in Elis and the Miracle of the Wine (Plutarch, Quaestiones graecae 299 B)," in turn, focuses on Plutarch's testimony of one particular Dionysian festival in which the women of Elis sung a hymn to Dionysus, invoking him to come to them "with the foot of an ox" (Chapter 16). The hymn in question was probably sung in a Dionysiac celebration called Thyia that took place in Elis, and during which—according to Pausanias (6.26.1)—the three empty cauldrons placed in a sealed room were miraculously filled with wine in a single night. This chapter discusses the relation between this festival and other Dionysiac festivities celebrated at Andros, Elis, Teos and Pellene where other wine-related miracles also took place.

The last chapter of the second part, Elsa Giovanna Simonetti's contribution, "Divination in Plutarch's Life of Cicero," focuses on Plutarch's presentation of Roman religion by means of analyzing Plutarch's Life of Cicero, a text that is rich in prophetic episodes. Cicero's birth is welcomed by positive presages (cf. Cicero 2.2), which he confirms in the best possible ways throughout his life and career, also thanks to his own natural talents. In the midst of his biography (5.1), the Delphic oracle intervenes to hinder his political ambitions. Divine agents save Cicero's life when it is threatened (14.4); his exile (32.4) is also marked by ominous signs, while nefarious omens accompany his death (47.8-1o). Simonetti inquires why and to what philosophical end Plutarch inserts all these divinatory episodes and references in the Life of Cicero—who, like Plutarch, was an expert on divination, and a follower of the Platonic Academy. Simonetti intends to understand the wider logic behind Plutarch's insertion of supernatural elements in his Lives. She does so by paying attention to Plutarch's strategic approach to Roman religious, cultural and divinatory customs; and to the specific ethical notions (e.g., those of virtue, nature, ambition) that help make sense of characters and circumstances utterly extraneous to Hellenic standards.

Part 4, "Some Glimpses of the Reception of Plutarch's Religion," consists of two studies devoted to the Early modern reception of Plutarch's religious ideas. Christina Harker's "The Reception of Plutarch's Universe" focusses on the reception of Plutarch's astronomical writing De facie in orbe lunae in astronomers like Copernicus, Galileo, and Kepler. Plutarch functioned for these three astronomers as inspiration, source, and literary model for their own work on a variety of subjects, including discussions of the heliocentric model of the solar system. This chapter explores in what ways these thinkers benefited from Plutarch's astronomical works and to what extent Plutarch influenced the course of scientific discovery some 140 years after his death, both as a scientific and literary forerunner.

S. Desmoulin's and O. Guerrier's contribution, "Les daimons de Plutarque et leur reception dans la Renaissance francaise," is devoted to one of the most difficult aspects of Plutarch's works midway between philosophical cosmology and religious mythology. Eusebius' Evangelical Preparation, which provides Plutarch's treatises dealing with demons a prominent place, was widely read in the first half of the 16th century. Due to Eusebius' impact, the notoriously problematic place and function of bad

demons in Plutarch's oeuvre was interpreted by his translators of the 16th century in line with Christian apologists. According to Desmoulins and Guerrier, the tendency of these translators to Christianize Plutarch means that the translations tend to read Christian notions of the devil into Plutarch's demonology. <>

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