Wordtrade Reviews: By Other Means an Art of Listening

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Editorial Appraisals:

Some qualified reviewers offer their own brief evaluation of the book. Otherwise most of our content represents the authors'-editors' own words as a preview to their approach to the subject, their style and point-of-view. <>

PHILOSOPHY BY OTHER MEANS: THE ARTS IN PHILOSOPHY AND PHILOSOPHY IN THE ARTS by Robert B. Pippin [University of Chicago Press, 9780226770772]

Throughout his career, Robert B. Pippin has examined the relationship between philosophy and the arts. With his writings on film, literature, and visual modernism, he has shown that there are aesthetic objects that cannot be properly understood unless we acknowledge and reflect on the philosophical concerns that are integral to their meaning. His latest book, **PHILOSOPHY BY OTHER MEANS**, extends this

trajectory, offering a collection of essays that present profound considerations of philosophical issues in aesthetics alongside close readings of novels by Henry James, Marcel Proust, and J. M. Coetzee.

The arts hold a range of values and ambitions, offering beauty, playfulness, and craftsmanship while deepening our mythologies and enriching the human experience. Some works take on philosophical ambitions, contributing to philosophy in ways that transcend the discipline's traditional analytic and discursive forms. Pippin's claim is twofold: criticism properly understood often requires a form of philosophical reflection, and philosophy is impoverished if it is not informed by critical attention to aesthetic objects. In the first part of the book, he examines how philosophers like Kant, Hegel, and Adorno have considered the relationship between art and philosophy. The second part of the book offers an exploration of how individual artworks might be considered forms of philosophical reflection. Pippin demonstrates the importance of practicing philosophical criticism and shows how the arts can provide key insights that are out of reach for philosophy, at least as traditionally understood.

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Reviews

Derek Attridge, University of York: "This collection of essays addresses the perennial question of the relation between philosophy and aesthetic criticism with cogency and originality. It's hard to think of anyone better qualified to explore this question, as Pippin has made major contributions both to the study of modern German philosophy and to philosophical approaches to aesthetic objects, notably painting, literary fiction, and film."

Michael Wood, Princeton University: "When seeking to bring together two distinct practices or disciplines it is all too easy to confuse them or lose sight of what is most interesting about each. Pippin avoids this fate with remarkable grace and precision. His philosophical questions illuminate literature and

art, and his interpretations of particular works invite a philosophical connection without depending on it. A wonderful, infinitely interesting project."

David Bromwich, Yale University: "These essays display the enormous range of Pippin's intelligence as a commentator on philosophy and literature. Whether as an expounder of Hegel's aesthetics or an interpreter of self-knowledge in *What Maisie Knew*, he offers discoveries that always reward the attention he demands."

Excerpt: A Continuation

What follows is an attempt to develop an approach to understanding aesthetic objects. The approach is a form of criticism that I want to call philosophical, a contribution to philosophy, even if not in the analytic and discursive form traditionally characteristic of academic philosophy. The claim is twofold: that criticism properly understood often requires a form of philosophic reflection, and that philosophy is impoverished if it is not informed by critical attention to aesthetic objects. Misunderstandings are inevitable in this context. A philosophical illumination of artworks and a philosophy illuminated by attention to artworks are not offered as a delimitation of the only or main value of the arts. The arts are valuable for all sorts of reasons: enjoyment, play, beauty, or simply as an enrichment of the human experience of the human. Different works have different ambitions, some closer to the ambition of craftsmanship, some closer to the ambitions of mythology. This notion of philosophical illumination applies where it does and doesn't apply where it doesn't.' I'll begin by trying to contextualize the project.

This volume is a continuation of attempts made in other work, in four books on film—**HOLLYWOOD WESTERNS AND AMERICAN MYTH** (2010), **FATALISM IN AMERICAN FILM NOIR** (2012), **THE PHILOSOPHICAL HITCHCOCK** (2017), and **FILMED THOUGHT** (2019)—in an earlier work on literature, **HENRY JAMES AND MODERN MORAL LIFE** (2000), and in a volume on the philosophical dimensions of visual modernism, **AFTER THE BEAUTIFUL** (2013). In the discussion of various aesthetic objects in these books, whether of filmed or fictional narratives, or visual objects suffused with intelligence and purpose, the claim was that we could not fully understand the works, or understand them at all, without somehow dealing with the fact that integral to their meaning was some clearly philosophical issue, raised in a way that invites and guides reflection.

In the case of Henry James, the attempt was to show what moral experience in later modernity had become: an emerging form of life in which conventional reliance on an assumed hierarchy of values, role-defined obligations, religion, or a shared sense of moral rules had collapsed, but in which some sense of the inappropriateness of mere self-seeking had survived. The value of James's phenomenology of this new moral experience is that he does not suggest through his characters' reflections and actions that some new moral consensus and general principle has emerged. It is the absence of any such consensus that allows James to portray contingent forms of social interaction and dependence that force characters with some good faith to find their way to what we can now be said to owe each other in various cases difficult to compare with each other and so difficult to generalize from. I can imagine that economic or social research and analysis could also help with this sort of exploration, but I find it hard to imagine how either empirical research or a philosophic insistence on some new principle or law could illuminate such an unprecedented situation, our situation. That situation seems to me much more accessible to philosophically minded literary critics like Lionel Trilling: "Now and then it is possible to observe the moral life in process of revising itself, perhaps by reducing the emphasis it formerly placed

upon one or another of its elements, perhaps by inventing and adding to itself a new element, some mode of conduct or of feeling which hitherto it had not regarded as essential to virtue. This ready recognition of change in the moral life is implicitin our modern way of thinking about literature" (Trilling 1982,1).

In the case of Hollywood westerns, in following the stories of the transition from a prelegal to a bourgeois rule of law, no intelligent viewer could avoid reflecting on the nature of the political allegiance necessary for that transition, on how there could arise the bond that unites subjects to one another in a collective submission to political order and the rule of law. It is highly unlikely that this acceptance has much to do with an appreciation of the quality of the argument strategies for exiting the state of nature or counterfactual state of original contracting. Some appreciation of the psychological dynamics of political life is necessary, especially American political life in the aftermath of the Civil War (the shadow of which still looms over our political life today). This political psychology is not well captured by the unavoidable abstractions and conceptual distinctions in traditional philosophical terms and is not accessible by any empirical research program.

In the case of the best film noir, the problem was whether we adequately understand common assumptions about intentional action, an issue that requires an exploration of the nature of self-knowledge and its relation to knowledge of others. Those assumptions are that ex ante reflection leads to the formation of intentions to act, which intentions explain and possibly justify the action (in some accounts, cause the action). If some narrative could show credible cases where characters have no idea what they are doing or why, and where their ability to understand the possible implications of what they do is undermined by an ever more corrupt and chaotic social and political world, the sources of whose corruption are maddeningly hidden and unaccountable, then a number of these common assumptions cannot hold. Not only do these films pose as problems issues like "what it is like" to live in a world like this, and how that illumination might bear on any reflection about agency, responsibility, and individuality, as if such issues were just provocations for reflection, but the narrative itself offers us a distinct form of reflection. (The "results" of such reflection are not comforting.)

With Hitchcock, the interpretive question is why his films, especially the most ambitious ones, concentrate so often on how bad we are at understanding each other, why the wrong person is often so confidently blamed for something he or she is innocent of. The general default position in Hitchcock is "unknowingness," not complete ignorance as in a thoroughgoing other minds skepticism, but a depiction of our fragile (if also ultimately correctable) grasp of what others mean to do or say and why; who they are, who I am. This all reaches a kind of cinematic and philosophical culmination in Vertigo, the subject of a scene-by-scene analysis in **The Philosophical Hitchcock**. The important contribution made by his films about this condition of unknowingness is showing us not merely that it exists, at a far deeper and more frequent and consequential level than we appreciate, but also how we might begin to think about how to live with this condition, honestly, without self-deceit or wishful thinking. It is not that he reaches any "conclusion" about this; it is not as if there is any reachable conclusion (as is so often the case and sometimes confidently denied in philosophy). The experiences involved are too variegated, not suitable for any generalization. But any reflection on the issue can certainly be informed, both negatively and positively, by what those films show us.

The collection **FILMED THOUGHT** attempts to show that such an approach does not require the contrast and choice between "immanentist" and "contextualist" approaches to aesthetic objects. Many of the films discussed in the volume can easily be shown to have a bearing on both sorts of questions. One of the main arguments in After the Beautiful is not only that there is no tension between these approaches, but that they are complementary and indeed mutually required. The main continuous task in the book is to show how the films at issue involve a demand for philosophical reflection as part of the attempt to understand them, that we could not understand the point of showing us what they do, as they do, without such reflection. Films and aesthetic objects generally are said to embody implicitly a self-reflective sense of their own form, and so a conatus toward the realization of that form, the point or purpose of making the object. Often this sense of purpose is minimal and unambitious, but in the cases under consideration, that is not so, and this more ambitious purpose cannot be described as anything other than philosophical. And the attempt was to show that this is true not only of films that might be identified as art films, like those by the Dardenne brothers or Malick or Almodovar, but also in commercial Hollywood cinema: Hitchcock, Nicholas Ray, Polanski, and Douglas Sirk.

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Philosophy and Interpretation

What we now call criticism in the arts descended from so-called high or source criticism of the Bible. In the modern age, roughly from the end of the eighteenth and beginning of the nineteenth century, the tasks of aesthetic criticism—literary, art, and music—came to be primarily interpretive and evaluative. Critics, both academic and journalistic, are supposed to help us understand a work and appreciate its quality and value. The object of attempts at understanding is said to be "meaning": why the work has the appearance and texture it has, how the parts fit into a whole, what the purpose of the work is, how some otherwise obscure element in the work makes the sense it does, how the symbolic and allegorical dimensions should be understood, as well as biographical and contextual details about its place in the author's oeuvre, its relation to her personal history, the work's historical period and audience, and so forth, all on the assumption that this should help us in that task of understanding the art. This list is only the beginning of several more characterizations of "meaning," and that already indicates that the term is so polysemous that it might not get us very far in any general account of criticism. But we can say that criticism, understood in this general way, should not be taken to be the exclusive domain of specialists, trained in a distinct "science' In this very general sense criticism is simply an extension and deepening of any intelligent encounter between a work and a reader, viewer, or listener, an extension and deepening because some readers and viewers are presumed to have had more experience in these attempts and a broader range of objects to call to mind in pursuing a critical understanding. But any responder to a work has to "follow" the plot, say, its events and characters, understand the intentions and reactions of characters, how the past might bear on a present, whether a claim is self-deceived or hypocritical, whether a character is lying and if so why, why a line in a poem follows another line with which it seems to have no connection, what relation to the beholder a painting seems to assume, whether a revelation is credible or misleading, and any reader or viewer might also be moved to ask about formal characteristics of the work, the point of a narrative or prose style, or an author's intentions in,

say, quoting something from a foreign language in a poem. Each of these interpretive questions implicitly appeals to some philosophical understanding of the questions themselves, and any philosophical position is, or can be with the right attentiveness, distinctively informed by the imagined presentation: What is it

to understand another's intentions? Can we? How does a person's past bear on the present? Is there such a thing as self-deceit? Can there be? How is it distinguished from hypocrisy? What is the nature of the wrong done another by lying? What is a poem that its sequence of lines can be difficult to follow, or that allusions can be made to other languages? How can a painting be said to assume or construct a relation to a beholder?' Are there different assumptions in different periods? Why? How are they to be discovered? "Interpretation" in this sense is always implicitly philosophical, and many philosophical claims always already assume that a case under consideration is a case relevant to, potentially clarifying for, the philosophical problem.

This does not mean that any serious critic must constantly be working out these philosophical problems as she attempts to understand the work, at least not in the language of traditional philosophy. The issues can be engaged with, clarified, misleading directions excluded, all in the language of criticism itself, as the examples of Frye, Girard, Trilling, and Cavell cited in this chapter, and the two chapters on Fried in what follows, demonstrate. Moreover, critics who have written on the issue of whether literature can be a form of knowledge often cite the difference between "understanding" a text and possessing "knowledge." But if this claim about the inevitable role of philosophical reflection (in its own critical modality) is correct, that difference cannot be right. This raises the question of the nature of philosophical knowledge, and that is a weighty topic in itself, but we might do well to remember that long ago when Aristotle distinguished understanding and knowledge, the former was a superior form of knowledge, metaphysics.

In this sense, interpretation is simply identical to fully experiencing a work as a work of art; everybody does it, must do it. It has nothing to do with merely "translating" the work into another version of content or finding something hidden. If there is something to understand, something that raises a question, demands something of us beyond what a first experience reveals, it is "right there." It simply needs to be understood. A second or third or fourth reading or viewing is not boring deeper until something hidden is found; it is appreciating better and better what is simply "present." The fact that we feel the need for rereading or re-viewing is interesting in itself. It means that we sense that the novel, say, "knows something," and that by having read the novel, we now know something we did not, but we cannot yet say what it is and we know that another look or viewing or reading is necessary. That deeply felt and often deeply gratifying moment of insight when it becomes clear what it is we know but could not say is not something we can offer to another simply by formulating and saying it. We have to help another see it, feel that moment as well in the experience of the work. This insight is not subject to the kind of proof one could marshal for a scientific claim; it is not a philosophical argument so that denying it would be contradictory; but it has its own kind of standing. Denying its possibility would come at the cost of denying an enormous amount in human life, from seeing that someone is lying to realizing that an expression of love is sincere but self-deceived. Such interpretation is the most important task of teaching, although it can also provoke defensiveness and a kind of sullen resistance by some students, resentful that they are being told there was something important they "missed." But the injunction that we should "stop interpreting" a work and just "experience" it is like demanding that we just look at the words on a page and not ask what they mean.

The object of the second task of criticism is the work's quality, an assessment of its aesthetic merits in comparison with other works and in itself. Traditionally, an enterprise like this was thought to rely on a critic's taste, and the assumption was that wide exposure to a variety of works could sharpen

sensibilities and produce authoritative arbiters of taste. This notion of assessment has fallen out of favor, subject to understandable skepticism about cultural, class, and gender biases. But a different sort of assessment of a work's significance or importance is still understood as a task of criticism. Nonaesthetic factors are also sometimes invoked: whether the work exposes an injustice or corruption or gives voice to voiceless people. A work's importance could be tied to what it tells us about the audience that appreciates or consumes it, or even whether it is a good thing that the work exists at all, whether its inevitable effects on readers are morally suspect.

In some accounts, a work's value or significance is assessed in a very different way. Value is said to reside in whether the work can be said to reveal a kind of truth, for example, a way for a historical community to come to know itself otherwise inaccessible and perhaps inconsistent with its avowed view of its own values and principles, or whether the work can reveal some aspect of the human psychological, social, or even ontological world. This is the task of "philosophical criticism," and it has emerged in various ways since Hegel and the German romantic movement introduced its possibility. One prominent school of thought developed out of Hegel's social theory and his approach to works like Sophocles's **ANTIGONE**, Diderot's **RAMEAU'S NEPHEW**, and his account of the historicity of art in his Lectures. This approach—the arts as a form of historical self-knowledge—extended through the Marxist tradition, Lukács, Adorno, Lowenthal, Raymond Williams, and in a different way, Walter Benjamin.' The idea was not what is sometimes casually assumed, that the task of criticism is to show how the arts support and perpetuate a class ideology, or to show that the arts were produced to do this, but that the arts could help us understand what was happening to us in a historical period, could reveal the tensions and even "contradictions," in general the irrationality or the unbearable pressures created in the way a society organized and regulated itself. One especially interesting aspect of this approach has been a claim to demonstrate the inseparability of various historically distinctive moral psychological issues in an individual from the social dynamics of a time.' And should it not be a function of philosophy to be able to say that some notion or norm is no longer available to us, has gone dead, that only a very different way of thinking is available to us, and all of that because of what we can be taught by the arts? Consider Trilling again, and his account of Rameau's Nephew and Hegel's view of the text: "In refusing its obedient service to the state power and to wealth it [Hegelian "spirit"] has lost its wholeness; its selfhood is disintegrated'; the self is 'alienated' from itself. But because it has detached itself from imposed conditions, Hegel says that it has made a step in progress. He puts it that the existence of the self on its own account is, strictly speaking, the loss of itself. The statement can also be made the other way round: 'Alienation of self is really self-preservation" (Trilling 1982, 38).

Or consider the more radical claim put by Hugo von Hofmannsthal in the words of "Lord Chandos" in his famous Letter:

> But all that is ended. The word-mirror is broken, irreparably, it seems . . . The words on the page will no longer stand up and be counted, each proclaiming, "I mean what I mean!" . . . There used to be a time, we believe, when we could say who we were. Now we are just performers speaking our parts. The bottom has dropped out. We could think of this as a tragic turn of events were it not that it is hard to have respect for whatever was the bottom that dropped out—it looks to us like an illusion now. (Hofmannsthal 2005, 19)

The only philosophers attempting to give this thought philosophical expression at around the same time were Nietzsche and Heidegger. It is the same thought in this literary case, but it is indispensable for philosophy that Chandos is seen "living it out," that we see how he might have come to this thought and what it does to him to think it. Otherwise, we would not have understood the thought.

Another approach, associated with Schelling, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, and Heidegger, saw the arts as aiming at a "disclosure" of the real, of being as such, not empirical or social reality, but "what there truly is," beyond the appearances, the traditional task of metaphysics in philosophy. (There is an unusual confluence here with Lionel Trilling's quite philosophical Sincerity and Authenticity, in which he makes use of literature to show not only that there has been a sea change in the availability of concepts but also that that we now seem to need literature and the arts to be able to have any genuine or even vicarious sense of our own being.) All of this involves treating the arts as forms of reflective thought, sometimes historically and socially indexed in various ways, sometimes not, aiming at a kind of truth. This view is of course not the same as various philosophies ("theories") of the arts, or the impossibility of the arts, and in some ways at odds with such approaches, but I don't take up that issue in what follows. (The more radical view here, which is sometimes suggested by the philosophers just cited, is that philosophy is no longer possible except as art and aesthetic criticism, perhaps one art in particular, as in Girard's (1965) claim: "If the novel is the source of the greatest existential and social truth in the nineteenth century, it is because only the novel has turned its attention to the regions of existence where spiritual energy has taken refuge" [111]. Schelling's early lectures on all the arts make this point even more insistently.)

But even if we don't go that far, still, why "indispensable"? An aspect of Hegel's answer emerges in something he says about poetry: "The subject matter of poetry is not the universal as it is abstracted in philosophy. What it has to represent is reason individualized" (Hegel 1975, 977). This says at once that there is a "universal" dimension to a lyric poet's expression, so that a poem is not merely a psychological record of some reaction or inspiration. It should be regarded as "reason individualized:' This is to be contrasted with the level of abstraction necessary for discursive philosophy to do its work, which can certainly be valuable for lots of reasons, but which also can lose touch with the life of the concept as used. The aspiration here for the arts is linked to the claim for an explanatory role for the "ideal types" of Weberians, the "perspicuous representations" of the Wittgensteinians, the "concrete universal" of Hegelians in other contexts, and the unique moments of disclosure in what Heideggerians describe as a "happening" or "event" of truth. Hegel puts it another way in this passage: "In this [beautiful] object the self becomes concrete in itself since it makes explicit the unity of Concept and reality, the unification, in their concreteness, of the aspects hitherto separated, and therefore abstract, in the self and its object" (Hegel 1975, 114). A certain sort of philosophical attentiveness is necessary in interpretation so that both criticism and philosophy avoid "the abstract," and so that any work's "concept" of itself is appreciated in its concreteness, in its "unity" with reality. That must mean: in its distinct mode of truth. But this does not mean that having exercised such attentiveness, one can carry away from the reading some bundle of bits of knowledge, a set of propositions, a "moral" That would be the land of abstraction. For the interpreter not to be able to say what he carries away, even as he carries something substantive away that has something to do with knowledge, is the achievement of the work of the most important art and great criticism together. (There are rough analogies. Someone who asked a man who had been through a war what he had learned from the war, and expected some general moral truth,

would have grossly misunderstood what that question could mean about such an experience; likewise, if he were bewildered if the soldier simply recounted an anecdote. The role of parables in the Christian Bible would be another analogy.)

This all must also mean that not only can a reader or a viewer get a text or painting "wrong," can miss ambiguities, ironies, formal patterns, or simply misunderstand the plot, but a text that purports to have some purchase on truth can be "wrong" as well. There were certainly persons who behaved as depicted in Griffith's The Birth of a Nation, but something goes wrong, is disturbingly "off," about the way they are represented. More often, the work can have nothing to do with the human world as it actually is; it deals instead with caricatures, stereotypes, adolescent fantasies, and so is simply irrelevant. The films of Quentin Tarantino seem to me like this, or Marvel comic superhero movies.

Organization

The chapters that follow are divided into two parts. Since Hegel's views on the significance of the arts are at issue in much of the work done above and lie behind the essays that follow, there is an opening section on the pre-Hegelian appearance of the problem of the relation between the arts and philosophy, aspects of Hegel's own understanding of the issue, and the three essays on approaches to modernism in the arts that I want to say are downstream from Hegel's influence.

The discussion in chapter 2 of Kant's skepticism about the philosophical importance or even the moral worth of the tragedies, ancient and modern, is a reminder of what sort of shift in sensibilities was necessary in Hegel and romanticism for a response to Kant and reformulation of the issue to be possible. More important, Kant's hostility to the idea that we might learn something from an experience of tragic poetry, or at least anything positive, opens a door to a much larger issue specific to tragedy: whether there is a deep incompatibility between the "tragic point of view" (somewhat paradoxically already a kind of philosophical claim) and philosophy itself, at least any philosophy that understands itself as a rational, sense-making enterprise. It might be that the most famous attempts to account for and integrate into some rational order what is implied about the human condition in tragedy are much more attempts to domesticate the challenge raised by tragic drama, and so constitute a strategy of cooption, rather than genuine understanding. The arts, or some of them, might be said to contribute to philosophy by being a challenge to its ambitions. Just so with tragedy; when we encounter what we badly need to know but cannot, know that we cannot, we thereby confront another form of knowledge and must begin exploring another: how, therefore, to live.

The three chapters on Hegel attempt to account for various dimensions of his understanding of the relation between philosophy and the arts, evaluate the status of his use of literature in the philosophical project of the Phenomenology of Spirit, show in what way, and why, Hegel transformed philosophical "aesthetics" into a theory of art, and describe his understanding of the relation between painting and a philosophical understanding of "subjectivity."

There then follow two chapters on the art historian and art critic Michael Fried. I include Fried's understanding of painting, photography and video in that Hegelian downstream I mentioned earlier for several reasons. For one, as the chapter on Hegel on painting already indicates, a major issue in Hegel's understanding of painting is the expression of mindedness, modalities of subjectivity that are not simply represented, as if thematically, but are corporeally present, "enlivened" in a way that arrests the

beholder. To do this, the expression must be credible; it must not be experienced as merely offered for the beholder's pleasure, or "theatrically;' but arrest the beholder and hold his or her attention and thereby demand something of such attentiveness. This involves Fried's account of "absorption" (which has a thematic connection to Kant's and Hegel's notion of "enlivening" [*beleben*] as central to the experience of art), the depiction of subjects immersed in their activities, in effect canceling or preventing any acknowledgment of the presence of the beholder, as a strategy in painting in roughly the seventeenth through two-thirds of the nineteenth century, basically beginning, for Fried, with Caravaggio. Fried's account is so rich because, as he notes, this aesthetic exploration of what it is to have a point of view, of "what it is like to be an individual subject" as a possible object of artistic attention, emerges along with the work of Descartes, Shakespeare, Cervantes, and soon thereafter romantic lyric poetry and the novels of individual consciousness. This involves another deep connection between Fried's narrative and two aspects of Hegel's position: for Fried, what accounts for how masterpieces "work," what defines them as substantive achievements in painting (credible, authentic, arresting) must be essentially historically inflected. So, for example, in the course of the nineteenth century, the absorptive strategies begin to fail and new approaches, most dramatically in Manet, turn out to be necessary. Second, and in a deeply related way, the meaning of the painting, if that term can be helpful at all, cannot be said to simply "reside" in the painting, but must lie in the dynamic relation to the beholder. This intersects with Hegel's account of the fine arts in general as modes of communal self-knowledge over time, inseparable from other such development in the other arts, in religion, philosophy, and political life (this goes beyond Fried's aesthetic concerns, but I think it is essential to note the dimension because it undermines the supposed distinction between immanentist and contextualist, or sociopolitical approaches to such meaning). I think the same Hegelian traces are quite visible in Fried's account of the role of intention in photography and video and connect with Hegel's frequent appeal to his theory of agency to account for the role of intentions in artistic meaning.

Finally, I conclude this section with a well-known and explicit anti-Hegelian approach to the same sort of issues, Adorno's in his Aesthetic Theory. The commonality is of course that Adorno also believes that advanced modern art is a major vehicle for understanding late bourgeois social reality, as well as a distinctive and powerful "negation" of that society. I take issue with some aspects of his account, especially that notion of negation and his understanding of idealism, as a way of showing the value of the Hegelian approach that I don't believe Adorno has appreciated.

Then I turn to five case studies of what I am calling philosophical criticism. I am aware that there is a certain built-in appropriateness for the choice of James, Proust, and Coetzee as such instances. Their works are all intensely and quite consciously philosophically reflective. This might seem to restrict the possible application of philosophical criticism to these sorts of novelists alone, or only to artists in the Western canon. That is certainly not the intention, and if any restriction is implied, it is only to works that make certain demands on the reader or viewer, something just as possible in commercial Hollywood cinema (or Japanese novels or Hindu mythology, etc.) as in high art philosophical novels.

James's risky experimental ambition in *What Maisie Knew* is not only to try to express the often bewildered and pained point of view of a child but also to explore how someone might be said to come to have a "mind of her own" Part of what James shows us in his narrative is how someone can come to regard herself as speaking for herself, convinced that she is "in touch with herself" and is speaking authentically, even while from our point of view, we can see she is at the outset avowing what others

who have an interest in her making such avowals desire and have brought about. Genuinely to have a mind of one's own means being able to deal with and in effect fight through such possible skepticism, something very difficult for a girl between the ages of six and twelve. The difficulties of self-knowledge in a situation of even more extreme dependence than usual in modern society (that of a child) requires of any interpreter reflection on how there could be self-knowledge at all in such a situation, what such an achievement would look like; and seeing Maisie heroically achieve it is deeply instructive about all this even if it is not formulable in a "philosophical theory," even if it emerges for us only in the act of "criticism"

The magisterial novel of Marcel Proust poses unique challenges to any philosophical criticism. It should be the easiest case of all: there are philosophical reflections all over the place, offered both by Marcel, the subject of the narration, as he thinks about his experiences of society, art, love, and many other things, and by the narrator, who often interrupts the narration for reflections that appear to be his own. And neither of these voices can be identified as the real author's, Proust's. To make matters even more difficult, it would also be simplistic to deny that any of these views, especially the narrator's, could be Proust's. It some cases, particularly in the later novels, many clearly are. This is itself a philosophical conundrum, a "Nietzschean" one we could call it: how to understand the appeal of various philosophical thoughts to various psychological types, and how or whether one might transcend such psychological dependence. (If we cannot, then all philosophy ought also to be considered the "confessions of the author," as if voiced by a character in a novel, and the task would be to understand why the philosopher needs to believe what she does.) And the case is paradigmatic for literature itself, certainly for any instance of what might appear to be authorial reflections, whether voiced by characters or implicit in what happens. Such reflective content can never be said to be the author's. That is what it means for the work to present a fictional world, even if it is also true (as in the case of Proust) that some of the reflections are the author's. Active, close reading has as its task coming to terms with this complexity, everywhere and at all times. (The problem is quite prominent and complicated in the two Coetzee chapters as well.)

The two issues discussed, subjectivity (what it is like for Marcel to be Marcel; what it is like for us to understand what it is like) and jealousy (why it is so often shown and asserted that love is inseparable from jealousy, why they are two sides of the same coin), are both elements central to the events of the novel themselves and frequent subjects of reflection in the novel, subject to the conundrum just noted.

The subjectivity issue has three dimensions for Marcel: a skeptical dimension, or how he can know whether anyone else experiences the world as he does; a connected skeptical dimension, or whether some other's subjective life, what it is like to be him, can ever be known, or whether our view of anyone is always a projection connected to what we need to believe; and a final skeptical dimension, whether his own view of his own subjectivity, apparently the most intimate and even incorrigible sense of what it is like to be him, is that, whether the role a fantasy about himself plays in his actual experience is far greater than he suspects. There is no thematic resolution of doubts like these, no answers. But there is a narrative and reflective presentation of what it is like to live with such unavoidable questions and how one might at least be said to come to terms with them, and all of this while the social world of the characters is coming apart on the eve of and then after the First World War.

Jealousy in Proust's novel has an unusual dimension that offers a clue to what we are shown about its nature. Why does it arise? What is the nature of the anxiety at its heart? Is being possessed by it always a sign of some failure of character? Although it is the issue that for Swann and Marcel overwhelmingly dominates their love for, respectively, Odette and Albertine, the experiences narrated seem weirdly epistemological rather than passionate. Lovers are typically enraged by jealousy; they murder because of it. In contrast, in the novel what the characters are obsessed with is the issue of certainty in knowledge. Such certainty is impossible, of course, but that dimension of their anxiety allows Proust to explore not only the reasons for such an obsession and why it has the form it takes in the novel, but also how it is connected to the nature of our knowledge of ourselves and others (such as it is).

In the concluding two chapters on J. M. Coetzee, the philosophic dimension of the imagined characters, scenes, and events, and what those literary elements show us about that dimension, are both quite prominent. The theme identified in his first three novels, **DUSKLANDS**, **IN THE HEART OF THE COUNTRY**, and **WAITING FOR THE BARBARIANS**, amounts to an exploration of "the paradoxes of power" This returns us to recognizable Hegelian ideas, especially the notion prominent in the famous staging of the Master-Slave dialectic in his Phenomenology of Spirit that the exercise of power by the Master, while materially beneficial, is psychologically futile. Some subject demands recognition from another whom he does not recognize, and so the "recognition," status, standing that a subject might achieve is worthless, as worthless as paying someone to be your friend or to tell you how wonderful you are. Hegel's account is linked to a general theory of the relation between independence and dependence in social life, and the experiential depth of what it means to demand recognition from one whom one does not recognize, and for the victim to require recognition from one who does not even recognize him as a potential recognizer—a formulation that already indicates the abstraction of Hegel's treatment—is all transformed in Coetzee's accounts into a fictional treatment that not merely illustrates the issue but contributes to what should count as the fine-grained content of the concepts themselves.

The eight "lessons" Coetzee collected in Elizabeth Costello (which are essentially readings Coetzee began giving instead of lectures) purport to be lectures given by an Australian novelist on a variety of literary and philosophical topics. So the question of the relation between a distinct, individual psychological "voice" and the philosophical commitments of such a person is raised again. There is a kind of back-shadowing orientation at the end of the book for all the lectures that I take as important in understanding the whole project. It is a four-page "Postscript," the last thing we read in the book, a fictional letter from Lord Chandos's wife, he of the famous Hugo von Hofmannsthal fictional letter cited above. Lady Chandos pleads with Bacon to help; she says that her husband is being destroyed by the burden of his insight ("the wordmirror is broken") and that she is being destroyed by his suffering: "Drowning, we write out of our separate fates. Save us" In the world-historical context set by this orientation, these lessons, I suggest, have to do with how, in such a world, someone could be understood to "justify herself," primarily to herself, but also to others. (Let us say, in the "Lutheran" and not in the "force of the better argument" sense of justification.) Why she refuses to eat animals, why she writes fiction, why she defends the inheritance of Western humanism, why she has lived the life she has. In a Kafkaesque closing lesson, a parable, "At the Gate," Elizabeth addresses and responds to such a demand, both questioning whether she needs to respond and offering the kind of justification anyone should expect from a writer. It is something I would hope is a fitting conclusion to an exploration like this one: not a model to be imitated, not a general thesis to be argued for, but the only kind of response

she could give to such a question, of serious philosophical value, even if not expressible in the language of traditional or academic philosophy. <>

THE ENIGMA OF ART: ON THE PROVENANCE OF ARTISTIC CREATION by Gino Zaccaria [Series: Studies on the Interaction of Art, Thought and Power, Brill, 9789004448704]

In this book, Gino Zaccaria offers a philosophical meditation on the issue of art in light of its originary sense. He shows how this sense can be fully understood provided that our thinking, on the one hand, returns to the ancient Greek world where it must heed the voice and hints of the goddess Athena, and, on the other hand, listens to "artist-thinkers" close to our current epoch, such as Cézanne, van Gogh and Boccioni. Indeed, the path of this meditation has as its guide the well-known sentence by the painter from Aix-en-Provence, which reads: "*Je vous dois la vérité en peinture, et je vous la dirai !*". What will finally appear in this way will not be an abstract or historical notion of art, but its enigma; that is to say, the promise of "another initiation" of art itself.

CONTENTS

Excerpt: Φύσις as Assurgency

Φύσις, as we know, is usually translated as "nature", and is normally understood in light of the traits of productivity and production; in particular, one might reckon that φύσις means "autonomous production of forms" (or even "productive principle of the universe").

By following this consuetude, one also simultaneously thinks of τέχνη in reference to the Aristotelian *dictum*:

> ἡ τέχνη μιμεῖται τὴν φύσιν
>
> —unanimously translated as:
>
> art imitates nature
>
> or even
>
> τέχνη is an imitation of φύσις.

According to the "logic" of this interpretation, one is also careful to specify (and in a manner not completely incorrect) that the Stagirite does not, in fact, intend to claim that art resides in a "representation" of "reality", but rather in the imitation of nature itself, that is, in the replication of its "substance" as a productive principle, of its "essence" as a production of forms. Thus, art—according to the Aristotelian sentence, interpreted and translated in this manner—would be, in turn, a (principle of the) production of forms. Nature: *autonomous* principial formative force. Art: *human* principial formative force. [Note, "princi-pia-l" (with an "i" inserted between the "p" and the "a") means that which has the character of a principle; constituting a source or origin.] Therefore, it stands that nature and art would be united by the original trait of *principial formativity* in the following sense: with regard to φύσις, this trait would lie in the incessant producing of its own forms: stars and light, wind and clouds, rain and storms, oceans and mountains, lakes, rivers and plains, plants and animals (of the sky, land and sea), gods and men, and so forth; in relation to τέχνη, the aforesaid trait would reside in the bringing its specific formations to light: tools of every shape and kind, and works of art of every sort and for every purpose and taste (from dance and theatre performances to architecture, from paintings to sculptures, from musical compositions to poetry, and so on).

However: are we certain that Aristotle's *dictum* means all of this? That it is sufficient to produce a form so that a work of art may appear? In reality, what we are certain of is the opposite: the philosopher cannot speak this "language", and for us to sustain this thesis it is sufficient to recall that φύσις does not mean "autonomous (principial) production of forms" at all. Indeed, φύσις has nothing to do with production and formativeness, or with an *entia*-creating force, or with a "universal productive principle". *This is the problem!*

The "explanation" of *physis* that has just been presented is simply an abstract conceptual format that appears so convincing because it leans heavily—unknowingly—on one of the "cheap versions" of Nietzsche's metaphysics (to which we are now accustomed). Only when the scope of being, or rather the *being*-beënt, is pre-comprehended as the will to potency and power—and, as a consequence, thought through values is imposed—will one hear within the Greek word φύσις the ancient denomination of nature as a "field of forces", and nature itself as a force or principle, to wit, as principial per-*formative* energy.

Φύσις—what does this word mean, however, when thought of *in Greek*? "To think of φύσις in Greek" means, primarily, to hear it independently of the metaphysics of the will to potency-power (we hinted at this issue in note 356, XX). Indeed, in the Greek pre-understoodness of the scope of being, potency

only bides *germinally*(to wit, according to that "germ of potency" or "gene of power" that will go on to render Nietzsche's philosophy geniturally conceivable and trustworthy)—and this is simply and solely due to the fact that being is experienced and perceived primarily as φύσις. If, therefore, we interpret φύσις by (implicitly or explicitly) assuming Nietzschean metaphysics as our guide, we bring about an undue conceptual retro-projection because we attribute traits and tones to Greek thought that are extraneous to it (because it cannot geniturally know them). Nothing but a single way remains for us: to elucidate the *initial*-Greek sense of φύσις. (I will now reformulate it in a different manner to how I clarified in §§ 17.2–18.1.)

What sooth do the Greek philosophers envisage within the word φύσις? With this word, they denominate a percept of the beënts *in (the dimension of) their being*, and not a perception of an *ens*—as the force of principial performative energy would, in fact, be: indeed, a force—above all, when it is (reckoned to be) invisible or not directly perceptible, or only conjectured or hypothesised—already bides as something "forced" to contingentment; that is, as something intrinsically contingentable, and, therefore, as a contingent "by nature". So, the word φύσις—as a name of the scope of being—cannot be discovered or noticed in a certain beënt or thing, like a river or a plant. The circumstance that a certain river appears in its own determined and circumscribed form, or that a certain plant appears in one manner or another, well, all of this (the appearance of appeared things according to what each thing is) is due to the fact that man—*and herein lies the sense of the conception of φύσις* qua *being*—has already pre-comprehended, as a "flagrance" of the *ingeny* of being, the sense of φύσις, thus adopting it *ab origine* not as the autonomous production of forms but rather as the originary discontingent dimension, thanks to which every *thing* comes to assume its own while-biding configuration. If we remain on the plane of the scope of being (and a-being)—as is necessary here to avoid all forms of confusion and misunderstanding—we are called to translate the title φύσις with a word capable of clearing its schismatic tone. In a certain sense, we have to take the occasion of translating to save φύσις—as a word of being—from its formatisation.

Above, I stated that we had but a single way. Here is one of its plausible beginnings: we must remember that in the word φύσις the verb φύω speaks, and φύω means "to give birth" and "to let provene to light", "to disclose oneself", "to (let) originate", "to let emerge and appear", "to let surge". Let us first look at the verb and not the noun form and understand φύσις *in light of* φύειν, since the verb has the intrinsic capability to maintain thinking within the schism, whereas the noun remains ambiguous in that respect because it evokes a "substance", a determinate "reality", to wit, a certain *ens*. In the word φύσις, heard in the Greek manner, we can perceive the sense of surging, that peculiar and salient surging—which is, at the same time, a "pervening-against-towards" and an involving, a referring to and a being pertinent to; in short, a regarding and concerning the mortal's biding in a world. Indeed, is human biding not that being which is regarded from that which surges, like a certain appeared river (which runs broad and quiet) or an appeared plant (which provides shade and gives fruit), but also like a certain appeared sudden impulse of fear or consternation, or as an appeared gesture of friendliness or affection or hatred, and so forth, for every thing and for every likely sense which reveals itself while-bidingly? Does the surging of every "surgent" not perhaps concern man's *biding (ingeny of being, a-being)*? Thus, since φύειν, which is implicit in φύσις, is simultaneously a letting surge *and* a coming and pervening-towards in the sense of concerning, and since concerning (let us say: the concerning towardness) can be

indicated through the Latin prefix *ad-*, I shall translate the verb φύειν with the form "to let *ad*surge", and the noun φύσις with the form "*ad*surgency" (Latin *assurgĕre* < *as-* *[= ad-]* + *surgĕre*).

Φύσις: *to assurge and to let assurge into assurgency*—this is the meaning of the primary and originary pre-understoodness of the scope of being, or *human* ingeny of being, that characterised the Greek inition of thought. *To assurge and to let assurge within assurgency*—this is the crucial grounding-trait of that genitural perception and apperception of the scope of being that *subsisted in* and *suited* ancient Greekness.

To the Greeks (that is, to the Greek *thinkers*, not "the ancient Greeks" in general), the fact that mortals could understand a tree as such—that is, a tree in its rising from the earth, where it is rooted, towards the sky, where it flowers and bears fruit—is due to the originary condition that they have always-already understood the scope of being as assurgency. It is the scope of being as assurgency that guides the understanding (in one instant) of the tree as assurged in its own manner, and (in another) the river that assurges along the assurged valley, and (in another still) the stars that assurge in the sky, which, in turn, assurges thanks to them, and (now) the plants and animals, and (finally) man, who also assurges—and lives and exists—in different manners from those in which other living beings come to light and "are".

The circumstance that φύσις is a name of the scope of being, and, therefore, that its *sense* (assurgency) and its *biding* (i.e. the concern in relation to man's being) cannot be obtained through the production of "ontic" proofs (i.e. observations of *entia*, their measurements or descriptions), because they (sense and biding) are necessarily presumed in every understanding of the beënt, and are, therefore, simply *flagrant*. Nothing else but this irrefragable circumstance is unequivocally recalled by Aristotle in Book B of *Physics* (193 a 3–7):

> ὡς δ' ἔστιν ἡ φύσις, πειρᾶσθαι δεικνύναι γελοῖον· φανερὸν γὰρ ὅτι τοιαῦτα τῶν ὄντων ἐστὶν πολλά. τὸ δὲ δεικνύναι τὰ φανερὰ διὰ τῶν ἀφανῶν οὐ δυναμένου κρίνειν ἐστὶ τὸ δι' αὐτὸ καὶ μὴ δι' αὐτὸ γνώριμον (ὅτι δ' ἐνδέχεται τοῦτο πάσχειν, οὐκ ἄδηλον· …).

I shall translate in the following explicating manner:

> But the circumstance that φύσις *is*, to wit, that *it bides*—the will to produce a proof of this event (and advent) is ridiculous [this (i.e. the scope of being as φύσις) is "something" which shows itself by itself, which comes to light (dis-conceals itself) by its own sooth, i.e. it is something flagrant]; in truth, a multiplicity of beënts is indigenous to it [to φύσις]. Now, to produce proof of something flagrant and to produce this proof even by means of that which did not show itself [that is, through that which is non-flagrant] constitutes the behaviour of a man incapable of conceiving the scissure between that which is knowable by its sooth and that which is not (and in observing this, we do not exclude that this incapacity may occur).

We are now able to grasp *the essential point, or the gist,* of the elucidation of φύσις. Let me attempt to put it into focus.

When the scope of being lets itself be perceived as assurgency, thinking becomes accustomed to the idea that the assurging of every assurged beënt—assurging as a mountain or star, animal or plant, man or god—is already, in itself, a self-entruing, a self-averring, a self-clearing: in assurgency, every assurgent disconceals itself as already constituted in itself and for itself. Without fully conceiving it (and, therefore,

unknowingly), man notices φύσις, assurgency, as *already* being clearance, *already* being (the) truth. In the dimension of φύσις, there is no "space", so to speak, for the abeyance of and hope for being. A tree is not a hoping-abeyant thing, just as the river is not, nor is man, nor a god: nothing abeyant hopes to be since everything is always-already something assurged-cleared by itself, through its own intrinsic concreteness, "thinghood" (see above § 2.3 and § 3.2). Certainly, assurgency is *a scope of being*, and the scope of being (the Greek thinkers have taught us this) needs man in order to bide as such. Nevertheless, the scope of being's "need for man", when φύσις reigns, is that for which mortals are uniquely called to *recognise* something assurged as something that is "already autonomously cleared", and since mortals are called in this manner, they are finally capable of understanding what is assurged *as such* (τὸ ὂν ᾗ ὄν, as Aristotle states). *Every assurgent is spontaneously self-clearing. Φύσις means assurgency as spontaneous clearance.* Here, as we have already seen in §§ 17.3–18.1, the trait of spontaneity emerges. Everything assurges and, in assuring in spontaneous self-clearing, calls the mortals to recognise the "self-clearing" trait of all that is assurged and of every assurgent.

The discerning perception of the spontaneity of clearance is the primary or fundamental stance, which φύσις imposes on the thinking that aspires to found a knowledge capable of constructing a human habitation on earth (α πολιτεία). This is why Aristotle defines τέχνη as the μίμησις of φύσις. In the word μίμησις, we must not hear "imitation", "representation", or "reproduction", but rather the traits of *con*vening (convenance), *con*forming (conformity) and adapting (adaptation, adaptability): assuming a measure and becoming commensurate. Τέχνη (which, as we know, is not "technique", in the hodiernal meaning of the word, but, first and foremost, a form of knowledge) primarily consists in *con-formity* to assurgency, in *commensuration* to the spontaneity of clearance; and all this implies that *art* (in every sense) can only be generated when man has already understood—before every productive act and every manipulative, designing or "ideational" or "ideative" ability—the trait of *self-con-forming to assuring as spontaneous self-clearing*. This means, for example, that the fabrication of a tool, or the creation of a work of art—the "letting surge" a vase, a chair, or even a temple or a poem or a tragedy—must unfold in modalities that conform to and commeasure themselves with the assuring of seas and rivers, mountains and valleys, lands and islands, animals and plants, as well as the assuring of man and of the assurgent traits of his or her biding.

*Art—in the sense of φύσις experienced and thought of in the Greek onset—*is *measured conformity to assurgency as the spontaneity of clearance.* This is the fundament of the creating actions of artisans and of the artistic creatorship of painters and sculptors, of poets and architects, of musicians and dancers. In φύσις, art finds its unique and sure guide. So, Aristotle, with his *dictum*, brings to light and interprets that which the Greek experience of the scope of being implicitly indicates.

Art and Art

The preceding clarification permits us to become aware of: 1. the unconceivability of the current explanation for φύσις (an *autonomous* principial formative force or energy that would find its *human* imitation in τέχνη); and 2. the "import" of the essential point thus brought to light, that is, the circumstance that φύσις is a name for the scope of being in the sense of assurgency as *the spontaneity of clearance*—a name that betrays the oblivion of the trait of the abeyance of and hope for being.

The word "import" does not simply suggest that this point is significant or relevant. The word should be taken to the letter: the above-clarified essential point has an *import* in the sense that it "ports"— conducts—thought to that dimension where it can recognise a *constitutive scissure*, by which geniture, to which the Hesperidean progeny is indigenous, is scinded into two constitutive epochs, into two worlds—the Alpha and the Omega.

Alpha: *over here*, on the "versant" of—and towards—the Greek onset, the epoch of the scope of being as assurgency (and, therefore, of its thought and its foundation) bides; it is that world in which the acceptability and conceivability of the abeyance of and hope for being—as a "habitual state", or as the "first concreteness" of every beënt, every selving thing, every instressed inscape—remains ineluctably absconded, nay-said and denied, and in which, as a consequence, art is designed, instituted and "practiced" as *conformity to truth qua φύσις, to φύσις-already-clearance* (here, art is, in the end, recruited and conscripted from and within the regime of factuation [See Heidegger, Besinnung, 30–42.]); Omega: *over there*, on the "versant" of—and towards—another genitural onset, another inition, that is only just presaged, the epoch of the schism of the scope of being (and, therefore, of its foundations and apperceptive acceptions) bides; it is that world in which the conceivableness and trustworthiness of the abeyance of and hope for being breaks forth amongst the beënts as their nullibiquitous invisible fulcrum, and in which art is configured as the (disquieting) *quieting* of the call to the scope of being that resonates and fulgurates from the (latent) hoping abeyants—a quieting that consists, as we know, in setting-to-work (into a work of art) the truth of being *qua* clearance (scinded from φύσις). [See § 2.2, where I recall Heidegger's "definition" of art as the setting-itself-to-work of truth or the setting-of-verity-into-the-work.] Hence, art becomes: the letting an abeyant thing bide in the clearing of (its) sooth: the art of (carency towards) chastity, the art of errantry—according to the more antique and ever more advening wink of the schismatic goddess Athena.

We now have before our eyes the constitutive genitural scissure of Hesperidean art (the Alpha and the Omega):

> φύσις: art *qua* close-fitting conformity
> *versus*
> schism: art *qua* clearing quieting (in its dis-quietude)
> ─────────
> (meta-)physical art
> *versus*
> schismatic art

Groundlessness

To conclude, I propose a last observation on the aforementioned Aristotelian *dictum*

> ἡ τέχνη μιμεῖται τὴν φύσιν.

One of its likely translations is as follows:

> Art bides in the conformity to assurgency as the spontaneity of clearance.

The *dictum* indicates the state of need in which art finds itself when the scope of being is perceived as self-cleared-clearing assurgency: if the scope of being "is" assurgency, then art must necessarily envisage

and project itself as an act conforming to and with self-assuring: all that is *artistically* adducible cannot but conform to φύσις, otherwise it would collapse into non-truth.

The hand of man, to be capable of truth, must, in its creating act, assume the measure from all that comes to light without its intervention. This is the law of being that reigns within the progenies that are indigenous to the epoch of φύσις.

This law has already been widely expressed and prescribed in various manners, from the Greek onset onward. It is a law, so to speak, of long and great geniture, whose signs are patent throughout our world. However, in the sphere of this law, the schism is never perceivable because it remains retracted and absconded; nor is it, therefore, perceptively acceptable. It can be sensed, experienced in some manner, hinted at or sketched out, but it can never be explicitly admitted; that is, it can never self-clear "to" thought by convoking it to a suitable and devoted *acting and operating*. It bides as the unthinkable and the unnameable.

This implies that truth can never be fully disclosed as clearance and clearage; instead, it remains "snagged" and "entangled" in contingency, and thus compromised in itself. And this, in turn, cannot but leave art in a state of dismay—a dismay that can never let itself be perceived or recognised as such.

(Meta-)physical art is geniturally destined to persist concealedly without foundation—to wit, groundless. <>

SCIENTISTS AND POETS #RESIST edited by Sandra L. Faulkner and Andrea England [Series: Personal/Public Scholarship, Brill Sense, 9789004418806]

SCIENTISTS AND POETS #RESIST is a collection of creative nonfiction, personal narrative, and poetry. This volume is a conversation between poets and scientists and a dialogue between art and science. The authors are poets, scientists, and poet-scientists who use the seven words—"vulnerable," "entitlement," "diversity," "transgender," "fetus," "evidence-based" and "science-based"—banned by the Trump administration in official Health and Human Service documents in December 2017 in their contributions. The contributors use the seven words to discuss their work, reactions to their work, and the creative environment in which they work. The resulting collection is an act of resistance, a political commentary, a conversation between scientists and poets, and a dialogue of collective voices using banned words as a rallying cry— SCIENTISTS AND POETS #RESIST—a warning that censorship is an issue connecting us all, an issue requiring a collective aesthetic response. This book can be read for pleasure, is a great choice for book clubs, and can be used as a springboard for reflection and discussion in a range of courses in the social sciences, education, and creative writing.

Reviews Advance Praise for SCIENTISTS AND POETS #RESIST

"This collection of high quality creative nonfiction, poetry, and personal narrative is not only an act of resistance, but an act of hope. Reading the dialogue between scientists and poets centered on seven words banned by the Trump administration in official Health and Human Service documents gave me a deeper understanding of the effect of censorship and tyranny on the work, personal lives, and identities of scientists, poets, and scientist-poets and how they are engaged in resistance. The book made me feel

more empowered in my own resistance through engagement in social scientific – Pamela J. Lannutti, PhD, author of Experiencing Same-Sex Marriage: Individuals, Couples, Social Networks

"**SCIENTISTS AND POETS #RESIST** is an act of emboldened literary and intellectual rebellion against the overt censorship and banning of seven words by the dystopian dictator in chief in the reality TV show of our current America— vulnerable, entitlement, diversity, transgender, fetus, evidence-based, and science-based. This anthology is an impassioned cry against this censorship, a defensive strike for the protection of language, rallying together is an amalgamation of written resistance with the seven words scattered in boldface defiance throughout, like embers of separate flames joining together into one fire. With sparks that provoke self-and societal-reflection resistance poets and thinkers thought when someone attempted to ban our **SCIENTISTS AND POETS #RESIST**, editors Sandra L. Faulkner and Andrea England, have created a text that is by turns lament, manifesto and blueprint for how to live a life of compassion and integrity. say them, not only write them, but use them—to theorize, hypothesize, narrate and imagine expertise and understanding. The richly textured work in these pages, written by poets and scientists, sometimes collaboratively, evokes a painful moment in our national story, but creates within that moment a space of possibility. They remind us that we need to start somewhere in order to get anywhere will you start, and what will you – Sheila Squillante, Director, MFA Program in Creative Writing and assistant professor of English at Chatham University

"When the Trump administration banned the use of seven words in documents—words pointedly related to gender, abortion access, and science—they went beyond merely trying to frame a public discussion according to their own agenda: it is one thing to identify preferred language, this anthology demonstrate, openly and often painfully, the day-to-day necessity of the words this administration seeks to suppress. This is a crucial text. – Philip Memmer, author of Pantheon

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Expressive Writing Paradigm: An Experiment in Righting by Jessica Moore

Thank you for participating in this writing study. Please follow the instructions written below over the next four days. Your writing is confidential and will not be re(a)d by anyone but you.

"Over the next four days, take 15 minutes each day to write about your deepest thoughts and emotions. Find a place where you will not be disturbed. Write continuously without interruption. Write only for yourself and don't worry about spelling or grammar. Really let go and explore. You might link your writing to the past, present, or future, or who you have been, who you are now, or who you would like to be. The only rule is that once you begin writing, continue to do so until time is up."

Day 1: Denial [#fakenews]

Take 15 minutes today to avoid all of your thoughts and emotions. If you have informed thoughts or heightened emotions, keep them to yourself because no one cares. Overburden yourself so that you will not be disturbed; stay busy. Clean and organize your disgusting home, improve the deficiencies of your body, purchase new and improved feelings. Right continuously without interruption with no consideration for your own desires. Never let go and explore. Doing so might prompt you to become aware and disrupt your psychosocial internment. Once you shut out all thoughts and emotions, continue to do so even when time is up.

Day 2: Anger [8 U.S. Code § 1531 § 18.5.19.9.19.20]

Take 15 minutes to right your deepest thoughts and emotions. Find a place where you will not be disturbed by diversity, solidarity, or the nationless. Right continuously without interruption. Right and don't worry about science or evidence. Let go of your desire for healthcare; you are not worthy. You might link your righting to the past, present, or future, or the fetus you once were, the living soul you are now, or who you would like to become as long as you are not transgender. Once you begin righting, continue to do so until you arrive at a wall.

Day 3: Bargaining [Writes]

Take back 15 vulnerable minutes to right your deepest thoughts and emotions. Find places you will disturb the status quo. Write continuously without interruption from those attempting to shut you up.

Right for diversity and the vulnerable, and leverage the power of language to speak your truth. Let art and science be companions of comfort. You might link your writing to the past, present, or future, or who people wanted you to be, who you are now, or who you aspire to become. Once you begin resisting, the writing will become increasingly effortless as you let the rules fade away.

Day 4: Depression [ICD-10 F32.5 Full Remission]

Take as little or as much time as you want to write about your deepest thoughts and emotions. Discover places to write where you can just allow yourself to be. Write in spite of the inevitable interruption(s). Write first and foremost for yourself, but recognize the power of your words when you set them free. Let your words fly from the page into shared spaces. You might link your writing to the past, present, or future, or who we have been, who we are now, or who we are becoming. Once you begin writing, continue to do so. Time is never up. Thank you for accepting this self-study. Take a few days off and then come back to reflect on your acts of resistance.

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To Beat the Banned by Scott Wiggerman

A gob of gel, a glob of goo,
too young to yet be a fetus.
I may always stay an embryo,
content with being a nucleus.
Too speculative, too vulnerable,
a bit of squiggle, a snick of squirm,
like many lives, I'm accidental,
the hook-up of an egg and sperm.
Not male, not female, a touch
of both, which shouldn't be a crime.
I might be transgender in a clutch
and create my own paradigm.
A clot, a curd of diversity,
I add to myself each day.
I will be what I want to be,
not what conservatives say.
A spit of this, a spot of that,
afloat in this environment.
This hydroponic habitat
exists as my entitlement.
Facts are always evidence-based
or else they wouldn't be facts,
as science is always science-based—
or are these just means to distract?

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JUSTIFICATION AS IGNORANCE: AN ESSAY IN EPISTEMOLOGY by Sven Rosenkranz [Oxford University Press, 9780198865636]

Offers a novel account of epistemic justification that vindicates much of internalist ideology without defending the position that justification is an internal condition and Informs contemporary debates in epistemology

JUSTIFICATION AS IGNORANCE offers an original account of epistemic justification as both non-factive and luminous, vindicating core internalist intuitions without construing justification as an internal condition knowable by reflection alone. Sven Rosenkranz conceives of justification, in its doxastic and propositional varieties, as a kind of epistemic possibility of knowing and of being in a position to know. His account contrasts with recent alternative views that characterize justification in terms of the metaphysical possibility of knowing. Instead, he develops a suitable non-normal multi-modal epistemic logic for knowledge and being in a position to know that respects the finding that these notions create hyperintensional contexts. He also defends his conception of justification against well-known anti-luminosity arguments, shows that the account allows for fruitful applications and principled solutions to the lottery and preface paradoxes, and provides a metaphysics of justification and its varying degrees of strength that is compatible with core assumptions of the knowledge-first approach and disjunctivist conceptions of mental states.

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Those who endorse the knowledge-first approach to epistemic justification can adopt this account and heed internalist intuitions, while those who support prominent anti-luminosity arguments may find reasons to reconsider their position.

Excerpts: Prologue to an Outline of a theory of justification

Core theses of the novel account of justification to be developed are first stated: one has propositional justification for p just in case one is in no position to know that one is in no position to know p; and one

has doxastic justification for p just in case one is in no position to know that one does not know p. Unlike other theories that conceive of justification in terms of the metaphysical possibility of knowing, the present account thus construes it as a distinctive kind of epistemic possibility. It treats propositional justification as non-factive, both its presence and its absence as luminous conditions, and by assuming a weak non-normal modal logic for knowledge and being in a position to know, validates principles of positive and negative introspection for it. The account thereby attributes features to justification that internalists care about. But it does so without construing justification as an internal condition. The account allows one to systematically distinguish between the condition of being justified and the metaphysical grounds for its obtaining, thereby heeding externalist insights into the difference between the good cases and the bad cases envisaged by radical scepticism. Lines of argument that show the account's potential, e.g. in dealing with the preface and lottery paradoxes, are previewed, and so are lines of defence against challenges and objections, including prominent anti-luminosity arguments.

Epistemic justification is a type of ignorance. This is the key claim of the account to be developed in what follows. It is an initially puzzling claim to make. How can justification, as a condition of positive epistemic appraisal, ever arise out of sheer ignorance, however resilient such ignorance may be, and whatever in particular it may be ignorance of? And so, the account needs careful exposition and defence, which will be provided in the chapters to follow. But already here, we can take first steps in order to dispel the air of puzzlement.

You are alone indoors with the curtains drawn, listening to music, while wondering whether it rains. For dramatic effect, let us suppose that you are immobilized and so cannot get up and check. In that situation, we may suppose, you are in a position to know that you are in no position to know whether it rains. Your epistemic situation is perfectly symmetrical with respect to the proposition that it rains and its negation. Then something about your epistemic situation changes, and the symmetry is lost. Now, let us assume, you are no longer in a position to rule out that you are in a position to know that it rains, while you remain in a position to rule out that you are in a position to know that it doesn't rain. Something blocks your path to ruling out the former that does not block your path to ruling out the latter. For all you can tell, you are in a position to know that it rains, while the same cannot be said about your being in a position to know that it doesn't rain.

What might have happened to break the symmetry? For instance, your situation might have changed in such a way that, if only you pricked up your ears in between tracks, you could now hear the plashing patter of rain, or that you've regained your mobility to get up and open the curtains to reveal a windowpane on which droplets form in rapid ways. Under these new circumstances, were you to do what you are in a position to do to decide whether you have to remain ignorant, you would prick up your ears, or get up and open the curtains, and then the patter you'd hear, or the droplets you'd see, would, for all you can tell, put you in a position to know that it rains. But at the same time, the patter you'd hear, or the droplets you'd see, would clearly spoil the opportunity to know that it doesn't rain.

The suggestion then is that, once your situation has changed in these ways, you have justification available for believing that it rains, which you did not have available before. The account to be developed in what follows exploits this train of thought in systematic ways and generalizes it to other cases. To get the gist of the account it helps to conceive of it as departing, in each case, from an original, or default, state that is inherently Socratic, i.e. a state of appreciable ignorance. Changes to that default state may

put one in a position to know what one previously was in no position to know, but they may also accomplish less and merely deprive one of the opportunity to appreciate one's ignorance. Since coming into a position to know is one, but only one, way in which one may be so deprived, lacking the opportunity to know that one is in no position to know is the common denominator of changes of either kind. Justification is a type of ignorance of a type of ignorance.

One of the upshots of the account to be proposed is that we should be internalists about justification without conceiving of justification as an internal condition. In slogan form, we should endorse internalism without the internal. This recommendation, too, must sound puzzling at first: what can internalism about justification possibly be, if it isn't the view that justification is an internal condition?

In one pertinent sense of the term, a condition is internal if and only if facts internal to a subject's mind already fully determine its obtaining. In another pertinent sense, a condition is internal if and only if in order to ascertain that it obtains whenever it does, subjects do not need to direct their gaze outwards: introspection, intuition, a priori reasoning, and the recall of a priori principles and past mental episodes are all it takes. According to extant views that go by the label of `internalism', justification is a condition that is internal in at least one of these two senses.

If the conception of justification as internal were to be taken to define internalism, externalism could be defined in terms of its rejection. But externalists profess much more than that justification is not an internal condition, in either of the two senses identified. Externalists offer positive accounts of justification that prove to be at odds with a patchwork of intuitive claims which extant internalists think they can vindicate only by construing justification as internal. Chief amongst these intuitive claims are two. First, that victims of the systematic deception envisaged by radical scepticism—though deprived of the opportunity to form true and reliable beliefs about their environment—nonetheless have justification for believing what they do. Secondly, that it is ascertainable that one has justification for believing p, whenever one has such justification. The tempting thought then is that either of these claims can be vindicated only on condition that justification is internal in at least one of the aforementioned two senses. If justification isn't already determined by factors internal to the subjects' minds, or so the thought goes, suitable manipulations of their environment—like those envisaged by radical scepticism—may make those subjects unwittingly lose their justification. And if one needs to direct one's gaze outwards in order to ascertain that one has the justification that one in fact has, any such outward gaze may be corrupted without corrupting the condition that it was meant to disclose.

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From Concluding Remarks

Justification is a kind of ignorance—a kind of resilient ignorance that, even by exploiting all the opportunities that our present situation affords, we are in no position to overcome. What it is that we are said to be ignorant of in this way varies according to whether the justification in question is thought to be propositional or doxastic. If we have doxastic justification for p, we are in no position to know that we fail to know p. For all we can currently tell, we do know p. Knowing p is an epistemic possibility for us. If we believe p under such circumstances, then from our point of view, that belief might well be knowledge. If we have merely propositional justification for p, we are in no position to know that we are in no position to know p. For all we can currently tell, we are in a position to know p. Being in a

position to know p is an epistemic possibility for us. If we do the best we are currently in a position to do to decide whether we are in a position to know p, we will find that we might.

On the present account, this is all that justification amounts to. Doxastic justification is a special case of propositional justification. Knowing p is a way of having doxastic justification for p; and being in a position to know p is a way of having propositional justification for p. But to have either type of justification, it is neither necessary to know p nor necessary to be in a position to know p. In fact, p need not even be true. Justification is non-factive.

Justification is also luminous. If one is in no position to know that one is in no position to know p, and one comes to believe that this is so as a result of doing the best that one is in a position to do to find out whether this is so, one could not easily have believed falsely. For, doing the best that one is in a position to do to find out whether one is in no position to know that one is in no position to know p implies doing the best that one is in a position to do to find out whether one is in a position to know p. Accordingly, in a case in which one is after all in a position to know that one is in no position to know p, and does one's best to decide whether this is so, one will come to responsively believe that one is in no position to know p as a result; and one cannot responsively do so all the while believing that one is in no position to tell that one is in no position to know p. Since believing that one is in no position to know that one is in no position to know p is easy, when one is indeed in no such position, propositional justification is luminous. Given a suitable multimodal epistemic logic, the luminosity of doxastic justification follows. The argument respects the safety requirement on knowledge. Prominent anti-luminosity arguments, based on the safety requirement, do not subvert these conclusions since they proceed from further assumptions that fail to apply.

Subjects in the bad cases, like envatted brains, can have justification for p, even if p concerns features of their physical environment from which they remain cognitively detached. They are even in a position to know that they have such justification, whenever they do. By contrast, they are in no position to tell that they are in the bad cases, and a fortiori in no position to tell that the factors determining that they have justification are distinct from those only available in the good cases. Our more fortunate selves are likewise in a position to know that they have such justification, whenever they do. But, unlike envatted brains, they may furthermore be in a position to tell that they are in one of the good cases by being in a position to tell that their justification is owing to factors only available in the good cases. Whether they are in the latter position will depend on further conditions whose obtaining is not yet guaranteed by the fact that they have the justification that they do.

Even if justification is luminous, while its metaphysical determinants are not, this is not to say that whenever one is in a position to know that one has justification, one is in a position to know that one does by mere reflection. More often than not, we need to investigate our physical environment in order to find out what we are, and what we are not, in a position to know. Envatted brains do not know that they do not direct their gaze outwards when they try to find out what epistemic opportunities they have. But phenomenologically, it certainly seems to them as if they directed their gaze outwards. They would reject the suggestion that they merely look inwards, and reason from what that inward look reveals, or that they do not look anywhere at all, as hugely inappropriate. <>

Jus Post Bellum: The Rediscovery, Foundations, and Future of the Law of Transforming War into Peace by Jens Iverson Series: Leiden Studies on the Frontiers of International Law, Brill | Nijhoff, 9789004331020]

In **Jus Post Bellum,** Jens Iverson provides the Just War foundations of the concept, reveals the function of *jus post bellum*, and integrates the law that governs the transition from armed conflict to peace. This volume traces the history of *jus post bellum avant la lettre*, tracing important writings on the transition to peace from Augustine, Aquinas, and Kant to more modern jurists and scholars. It explores definitional aspects of *jus post bellum*, including current its relationship to sister terms and related fields. It also critically evaluates the current state and possibilities for future development of the law and normative principles that apply to the transition to peace. Peacebuilders, scholars, and diplomats will find this book a crucial resource.

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Introducing the Theme of *Jus Post Bellum*

Sir Hirsch Lauterpacht once asserted that "if international law is, in some ways, at the vanishing point of law, the law of war is, perhaps, even more conspicuously, at the vanishing point of international law." Lauterpacht was not arguing that there was no law to apply—something antithetical to his approach. Rather, he was suggesting that there was work to do. He makes this observation after a stunning list of problems that require clarification, suggesting that the lawyer must "do his duty regardless of dialectical doubts—though with a feeling of humility[.] What is that duty? To "expound the various aspects of the law of war."

One might continue the observation—if the laws regulating war are at the vanishing point of international law, the laws regulating the transition from war to peace are at the vanishing point of laws regulating war. The transition to peace is at the frontier of efforts to govern human conduct, both at the global and local level. As an armed conflict concludes, the victor's comparative strength is often at its apogee, and the opposing side may be at its most desperate. How can either side be constrained by law under these challenging circumstances?

Characterizing the transition to peace as a phenomenon at the frontier of law only hints at the rich, complex nature of this difficult area. The transition to peace is often a period of intense instability and complex legal interplay and flux. New states, constitutions, inter-state agreements and peacekeeping agreements may come into existence, crimes may or may not be amnestied, old institutions may lose their legal existence and lawgivers of the *ancien régime* may lose their role as a source of law. The causes of the conflict, the conflict itself, and actions taken within the conflict may be the subject of legal action as the transition to peace moves forward.

Summary

This study focuses on legal and normative principles of the transition from armed conflict to peace, often called *jus post bellum*. *Jus post bellum* is self-consciously named in relation to its sister terms, *jus ad bellum* and *jus in bello*, terms that have been exhaustively developed and theorized. *Jus post bellum*, in contrast, is comparatively under-developed. It is a phrase frequently used without definition, or with little understanding that others may use the term to mean something else. It is almost never used with anything approaching a full exposition of the intellectual history upon which it is built. Before the scholarship in recent years, the laws and principles that constitute the *jus post bellum* were rarely expounded. This study helps to consolidate a firmer theoretical grounding for the term, as well as a clearer intellectual history and analysis of its content. *Jus post bellum*, like *jus gentium* or *jus civile*, is best understood as *by definition* primarily a system or body of law and related principles.

In addition to the positive objectives identified above, it may be helpful to identify what this work argues against. Throughout the volume, explicitly or implicitly, the suggestion that *jus post bellum* does not exist is rebuffed, as is the idea that it has no content. In the introduction and conclusion to Chapter 1 (Past – The Deep Roots of *Jus Post Bellum*) the claim that the just war tradition is devoid of discussion of the subject matter of *jus post bellum* or that discussing the just war tradition is meritless is specifically rejected. Chapter 2 situates *jus post bellum* with its sister terms, *jus in bello* and *jus ad bellum*. The particular content and contours of *jus post bellum* are explored in Chapter 3 (Three theories of *Jus Post Bellum*) and Chapter 4 (Present – An Exploration of Contemporary Usage). Chapter 4 also specifically rejects the idea that transitional justice, post-conflict international criminal law and *jus post bellum* are

interchangeable ideas. Chapter 5 provides an empirical analysis of the trends in the literature on *jus post bellum*. Chapter 6 provides a closer examination of *jus post bellum* in international and non-international armed conflict. Chapter 7 examines the contemporary legal content of *jus post bellum*. Chapter 8 provides an analysis of *jus post bellum* and counterinsurgency. Chapter 9 concludes with an overall analysis of the current state and future of *jus post bellum*.

Problematization

This study focuses on legal and normative principles of the transition from armed conflict to peace, often called *jus post bellum*. *Jus post bellum* is named in relation to its sister terms, *jus ad bellum* and *jus in bello*, terms that have been exhaustively developed and theorized since they were coined in the early-1900s, a subject that will be discussed in detail below. *Jus post bellum*, in contrast, is comparatively under-developed. For *jus post bellum*, there is no foundational treaty text equivalent to the Hague Regulations of 1899 or 1907 or the Geneva Conventions of 1949 for *jus in bello* or Articles 2 and 51 of the United Nations Charter for *jus ad bellum*.

While this is primarily a work of legal analysis, given the deep roots of *jus post bellum* analysed in Chapter 1, normative aspects will also be considered. Larry May's work on the normative principles of *jus post bellum* is noteworthy. May advocates that six normative principles of *jus post bellum* be recognized: rebuilding, retribution, reconciliation, restitution, reparation, and proportionality. Given the normative content of his work, he rightly suggests that the addressee of these principles are not only political leaders but average citizens. The goal of May's conception of *jus post bellum* is the same as the hybrid functional approach outlined in this work, namely, one that emphasizes the *functional* aspects of *jus post bellum* (establishing a just and lasting peace) while nonetheless rooting it in a general timeline of transition from armed conflict to peace. As May and Elizabeth Edenberg put it:

> It is not merely peace that is at issue, but a just peace, where mutual respect and the rule of law are key considerations. […] The *jus post bellum* literature focuses, as one might expect, on the achieving of peace. […] While *jus post bellum* theorists want a just peace, not merely any peaceful settlement of hostilities, they focus on the stopping of hostilities. *Jus post bellum* principles all are aimed at securing a just and lasting peace at the end of war or armed conflict. Discussion of these principles has been standard fare in the Just War Tradition for several thousand years, even if *jus post bellum*,principles are not usually given the status afford to *jus ad bellum* and *jus in bello* principles.

This work principally reflects on the historic meaning of normative principles that inform contemporary law and practice in Chapter 1, *Past —The Deep Roots of* Jus Post Bellum. Recognition that the application of law in this area has, as May and Edenberg state, the *aim* of a just and lasting peace (and is not neutral with the application to these normative goals) is necessary for understanding and development of *jus post bellum*.

Another way to frame the normative emphasis on a "just and sustainable peace" so often referenced in the literature of *jus post bellum* is to tie it to concepts form peace studies such as Johan Galtung's "positive peace" being differentiated from a mere "negative" peace, without a just resolution of the causes of the war and conduct within the war. The specific nature of what constitutes a "just" peace depends in large part on what the causes of the war and conduct of the war were. The fundamental

aspect of what is "just" with respect to a "just and sustainable" peace is that *jus post bellum* is not simply focused on peace at any price with respect to justice; it rejects, for example, the goal of a sustainable peace founded on annexation, the denial of self-determination, rewarding aggression, denying the responsibility of trusteeship, violation of laws of occupation or human rights, or complete impunity for international criminal law violations. Attention should be paid not only to the justice demanded under international law but the particular priorities of those who will live in the constructed peace. Legal scholars interested in *jus post bellum* cannot shy away from principles, including normative principles, that inevitably arise in discussions of *jus post bellum*.

For international lawyers, the transition to peace may be at the frontier, or the vanishing point. For those surviving armed conflict and that must live in the society created by the peace, the possibilities and risks inherent in creating a potentially novel social structure with new rules and power relations are not at the edge but at the centre of their reality. There is a chance of creating a new moment that is in a sense "pre-constitutional"—indeed peace agreements and similar documents often serve a constitutional function. One might argue that this period when the new core of a future society or relationship between states can be formed is, perhaps, controlled purely by non-legal forces, that it is the outcome solely of the use of force. But upon reflection, most jurists will reject that notion, adopting instead the notion espoused by Lauterpacht, that where there are questions, there is work to do in determining the international law that applies to the transition to peace.

Without answering the type of questions described above, there is an increasing gap between the references to *jus post bellum* and providing a coherent, well thought out theoretical and historical basis for the concept. By exploring definitional aspects of *jus post bellum*, including its relationship to *jus ad bellum*, *jus in bello*, and related concepts such as transitional justice and international criminal law, this work will seek to provide a coherent view of how scholars consider the term, closing the gap between the varied definitions scholars use for the term (when a definition is supplied at all). There is an unfortunate tendency by some scholars to treat *jus post bellum*, transitional justice, and post-conflict justice as interchangeable—this idea or assumption of interchangeability is a tendency this work argues against. By exploring the historical roots of *jus post bellum* within the just war tradition, it will address the gap between scholars such as Grégory Lewkowicz who insist that there are no such roots and the many authors who think such roots exist. With these foundations laid, this volume will address the gap implicit in the uncertain question of the potential of *jus post bellum*.

Research Aims

This volume has three overarching objectives. First, it will evaluate the history of *jus post bellum avant la lettre*, tracing important writings on the transition to peace from Augustine, Aquinas, and Kant to more modern jurists and scholars. Second, it explores definitional aspects of *jus post bellum*, including current its relationship to sister terms and related fields. Third, it will explore the current state and possibilities for the future development of the law and normative principles that apply to the transition to peace. *Jus post bellum* has received an increasing amount of attention in recent years, but remains comparatively under-theorized, and frequently referenced without realizing that many authors be talking past each other, meaning different things while using the same term. The author's hope for the volume is not only to help clarify the debate over the term, but also to move the consensus towards a hybrid functional (rather than temporal) approach to *jus post bellum*, that is, to define an approach to this area

of law that focuses on the goal of achieving a just and sustainable peace (with an awareness of temporal context) rather than a mere discussion of law that applies during early peace.

Research Questions

It is not enough to simply invoke the existence of *jus post bellum*, as many scholars and practitioners do. Rather, it is helpful to, first, test the existence and meaning of *jus post bellum* and second, examine the added value of *jus post bellum*. The overarching research question is to identify the function and content of *jus post bellum*. More specifically, the primary research questions discussed in this work are:

1. 1) What are the historical roots of *jus post bellum* and how does this impact present-day conceptualizations of *jus post bellum*?

2. 2) To what extent do sister terms shape the contours of *jus post bellum*?

3. 3) What is the present-day function of *jus post bellum*?

4. 4) To what extent do competitive notions such as transitional justice shape the contours of *jus post bellum*?

5. 5) How does *jus post bellum* operate in international and non-international armed conflict?

6. 6) What is the contemporary legal content of *jus post bellum*?

7. 7) How should *jus post bellum* evolve as a concept?

For maximum clarity, each research question is paired with a chapter. Research question 1 (historical roots) is addressed in Chapter 1 (*Past — The Deep Roots of Jus Post Bellum*). Research question 2 (Sister terms) is addressed in Chapter 2 (*Exploration of Sister Terms*). Research question 3 (function) is addressed in Chapter 3 (*Three theories of jus post bellum*). Research question 4 (competitive notions) is addressed in Chapter 4 (*Present — An Exploration of Contemporary Usage*) and Chapter 5. Research question 5 is addressed in Chapter 6 (*Jus Post Bellum in the context of International and Non-International Armed Conflict*). Research questions 6 and 7 are addressed in Chapters 7 (*Contemporary Legal Content of Jus Post Bellum*), 8, and 9.

Propositions

The following propositions are presented as a numbered list, not strictly orthogonal with the structure of this work, but bringing forth certain major points that are referenced throughout.

1. 1. "*Jus post bellum*" is a useful and meaningful term, best used to examine and structure the laws and principles applicable to the effort to transition from an armed conflict to a just and sustainable peace. While meaningful, the phrase "*jus post bellum*" is not always used consistently by various authors. This plurality in intended meaning comes from the newness of the term, the complexity of the problem, and the relative under-theorization of the concept. Despite the newness of the term, the concept has deep roots.[21]

2. 2. The function of *jus post bellum* is the successful transition from armed conflict to a just and sustainable peace. A hybrid functional approach to *jus post bellum* is superior to a primarily temporal approach to *jus post bellum* in terms of coherence, efficacy and scholarly depth.[22]

    1. a. The simplest but least useful theorization of the *jus ad bellum/jus in bello/jus post bellum* tripartite division is that these areas cover the beginning, middle, and end of armed conflict. This might be called a "temporal" tripartite division. It might be thought of as a "horizontal" approach, where *jus ad bellum* covers the moment of entry into armed conflict, the *jus in bello* covers the period during armed conflict, and *jus post bellum* covers the period after armed conflict.

    2. b. With a hybrid functional conception, *jus ad bellum*, *jus in bello*, and *jus post bellum* can overlap temporally, but differ in terms of function. While the emphasis of application may change over time, with *jus ad bellum* taking the lead during peace, *jus in bello* taking the leading during periods of armed conflict, and *jus post bellum* playing a role during the transition to peace, their definition is rooted more in their function than in their sequence.

3. 3. The concerns and laws of *jus post bellum*, like those of *jus ad bellum* and *jus in bello*, predate the terms themselves. A review of the works of Augustine and his peers, the Institutes of Justinian, the Decretals of Gregory ix, Thomas Aquinas, Baldus de Ubaldis, Francisco de Vitoria, Francisco Suarez, Alberico Gentili, Petrus Gudelinus, Hugo Grotius, Christian Wolff, Emer de Vattel, and Immanuel Kant demonstrate that the issue of the transition from armed conflict to peace is of enduring importance.

    1. a. The writings of international jurists regarding the successful transition from armed conflict to a just and sustainable peace are deeply rooted in the same just war tradition that informs contemporary *jus ad bellum* and *jus in bello*.

    2. b. The legal and normative tradition regarding the transition to peace has been under-examined in part due to the retrospective application of the terms of the twentieth century (*jus ad bellum* and *jus in bello*) to encompass the entirety of thinking about armed conflict. This reductive pattern of thinking poorly serves contemporary understanding of these important works.

    3. c. It is a fair criticism to note that there are limits to the import of a tradition primarily based in Europe. A truly comprehensive, encyclopaedic approach to the history of legal and normative thinking regarding the transition from armed conflict to peace would be of great value, but is beyond the scope of this work. While not universal, there remains a good deal of value in analyzing a discrete tradition that has been largely historically rooted in Europe, given its impact on contemporary law and practice.

    4. d. It is far from useless to discuss the ancient traditions of normative and legal thinking on the justice of war and peace, and indeed failure to reevaluate and consider the traditions that gave rise to contemporary international law is to doom oneself to a curious form of self-imposed blindness—not only to the beneficial analysis of past

authors, but also to their errors (such as using *jus post bellum* as a general license to violate other norms).

4. 4. While *jus post bellum*'s function in aiming to establish a just and sustainable peace is in many ways more complex than the function of *jus ad bellum* or *jus in bello*, it is no less coherent in its basic aims.

    1. a. The transition to peace is often a period of intense instability and complex legal interplay and flux. New states, constitutions, inter-state agreements and peacekeeping agreements may come into existence, crimes may or may not be amnestied, old institutions may lose their legal existence and lawgivers of the *ancien régime* may lose their role as a source of law. The causes of the conflict, the conflict itself, and actions taken within the conflict may be the subject of legal action as the transition to peace moves forward.

    2. b. One benefit of including *jus post bellum* as part of a trichotomy rather than limiting analysis of armed conflict and peace to the *jus ad bellum/jus in bello* trichotomy is it encourages a reevaluation of the coherence and purpose of *jus ad bellum* and *jus in bello* as well.

5. 5. *Jus post bellum*'s sister terms *jus ad bellum* and *jus in bello* extensively shape the contours of *jus post bellum*, helping jurists take a comprehensive view of the challenges of armed conflict and the transition to peace.

6. 6. Transitional justice is clearly distinguishable from *jus post bellum*. Transitional justice, properly understood, is a conception of justice associated with periods of political change, characterized by legal responses to confront the wrongdoings of repressive predecessor regimes.[26] *Jus post bellum* is rooted in transition from armed conflict to a just and sustainable peace.[27]

    1. a. While *jus post bellum* is substantively broader than Transitional Justice in many respects, *jus post bellum* is also clearly inapplicable in certain scenarios where Transitional Justice is applicable. Similarly, one can imagine a change in regime in which no significant human rights violations were perpetrated by the previous regime, deposed by armed conflict. Armed conflicts can happen without massive human rights violations. Additionally, armed conflicts occur without regime change. In these instances, Transitional Justice would tend not to apply, but *jus post bellum* would.

    2. b. Similarly, Transitional Justice and *jus post bellum* are both distinguishable from post-conflict justice. Transitional Justice does not require armed conflict, while post-conflict justice obviously does. *Jus post bellum* is broader than post-conflict justice, although clearly can include it.

7. 7.A review of the contemporary legal content of *jus post bellum* provides a clear indication of the need for *jus post bellum*. Procedural fairness is generally necessary for peace to succeed. Territorial disputes must be resolved, and aggression condemned. No longer is it acceptable and commonplace to exterminate or enslave the defeated population. The prohibition on the

annexation of territory is central not only in determining the legality of particular post-conflict settlement, but also in underpinning the entire order of stable and pacific interstate relations. The possibility of holding individuals to account must be available, and the possibility of freeing a post-conflict state from odious debt must be considered.

8. 8. *Jus post bellum* should push back against the prohibition on transformative occupation in certain situations.

9. 9. *Jus post bellum* addresses an issue of vital concern for the international community and for post-conflict societies. Relapse into armed conflict is too frequent in modern history, with devastating results. *Jus post bellum* should be developed to help all participants manage the complex process of ending armed conflict and developing early peace as successful as possible.

The promise of peace lies not only in the cessation of the suffering of war but also in the wide variety of forms that peace can take. Navigating the path to a just and sustainable peace is notoriously difficult. There is work to be done on this frontier. Before looking at the laws and norms that apply and could apply to the transition to peace, it may help to take a step back and think generally about how to approach law and norms with respect to armed conflict in general.

Conceptual Framework

How should the law and principles regarding armed conflict be approached? At least since the terms *jus ad bellum* and *jus in bello* were invented in the early 20th century, there has been a strenuous emphasis on the distinction between two sets of legal and normative questions regarding armed conflict. The law applicable to armed conflict is typically divided into two parts, the first governing resort to force (*jus ad bellum*), and the second the conduct within the conflict (*jus in bello*). While imperfect, the laws restricting aggressive war (*jus ad bellum*) and codifying war crimes and other international humanitarian law violations (*jus in bello*) have matured considerably since the Second World War. In contrast, transitions out of armed conflict are less regulated and frequently fail. The post-conflict pause in violence often collapses into renewed armed conflict, or persists as a mere "negative" peace, without a just resolution of the causes of the war and conduct within the war. From 1945–2009, 57 percent of all countries that suffered from one civil war experienced at least one subsequent conflict.

There has been a push in recent years to approach the law that governs the use of force not as a dichotomy, but as a trichotomy. But adding *jus post bellum* to *jus in bello* and *jus ad bellum* has proven difficult, much as rebuilding a viable post-conflict society is more complicated than a general prohibition on armed conflict. To find the legal core of *jus post bellum*, one cannot simply reference a single document such as the prohibition on aggressive war in the Charter of the United Nations or a set of treaties governing conduct in war such as the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and their additional protocols. Rather, the law that governs the transition to peace is contingent and cross-cutting. Different laws may apply to each transition, and the applicable laws in any particular transition will be drawn from legal areas often considered separately. For example, transitions to peace occur in the context of conflict exclusively between states and also in conflicts involving non-state actors, with the involvement of the United Nations Security Council or without its involvement, with the dissolution of states or the creation of them, with a military victory for those with criminal culpability or without that difficulty.

Why make the distinction between two or three different areas of regulation and norms relating to armed conflict? Why not one unified theory of the justice of war? Why not a highly atomized field with each sub-element of the current two or three areas treated as one of scores of separate areas (e.g. why think of *jus in bello* protections for those *hors de combat*, civilians, prisoners of war, and weapons law under one umbrella term)? The terms *jus ad bellum* and *jus in bello* were coined in large part to protect one set of concerns (governed by *jus in bello*) from another (governed by *jus ad bellum*). Again, *jus ad bellum* regulates recourse to the use of force. *Jus in bello* regulates the conduct of the armed conflict, seeking to limit the damage caused by war without resort to adjudicating the justice of the conflict as a whole.

There are extremely good reasons to make this distinction between *jus ad bellum* and *jus in bello*, beyond any qualitative difference that allows for the creation of a convenient typology. Chief amongst these reasons is to protect *jus in bello* from *jus ad bellum*—that is, to prevent the asserted justice of one's cause in war from being an excuse for one's conduct. Without a strict distinction between questions of *jus in bello* and *jus ad bellum*, the regulations of *jus in bello* tend to crumble under the emotional force of *jus ad bellum* claims, leaving the humanitarian concerns at the heart of *jus in bello* wholly unprotected.

Since the terms *jus in bello* and *jus ad bellum* became commonplace, this distinction has been the starting point for answering the question of how the law and principles regarding armed conflict should be approached. First, one determined if a particular question related to the laws and norms of entering into armed conflict. If that was not the concern but it still related to armed conflict, the question was generally determined to be one within the body of laws and norms known as *jus in bello*. Thus, *jus in bello* grew to cover many diverse wartime and peacetime concerns, as long as they were not reducible to *jus ad bellum*.

Addressees of Jus Post Bellum

Additional information regarding the addressees of *jus post bellum* will become clearer throughout this work, particularly in Chapter 2 (Exploration of Sister Terms) and Chapter 6 (on the contemporary legal content of *jus post bellum*). Introducing the range of addressees at the outset, however, may help to clarify the concept somewhat.

Discussing addressees can be unexpectedly complicated. Even in the simple case of domestic law, there can be debate as to whether the addressee is the nationals of that state or the government officials and agencies. Classical commandments such as "do not murder" directly address all persons, but typical modern domestic legislation often more directly regulates the state apparatus that may arrest, try, and punish (alleged) murderers.

To take an example closer to the subject of this work, consider the question of the addressees of *jus ad bellum*. The standard response as to the addressees of *jus ad bellum*, is simple: states are the addressees, because *jus ad bellum* involves international armed conflicts, which are between states. On further reflection, scholars and practitioners might consider that the United Nations is also regulated and in a sense a source of specific regulation of *jus ad bellum*, in the form of one its organs, the United Nations Security Council. The issue of which organ or subsidiary organ of the United Nations is addressed by *jus ad bellum* is further complicated by the trend towards more "robust" peacekeeping mandates, historic examples such as the Uniting for Peace Resolution, or the role of the Secretary General; and if the term

"addressee" is not limited to restrictive regulation but also the possibility of license or facilitation. Addressees of *jus ad bellum*arguably also go beyond states when one looks at the role of collective self-defence organizations such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization or for example organized armed groups that play a role in internationalized armed conflicts. While some may argue that *jus ad bellum* only regulates the act of aggression and not the crime of aggression, given that the act is a constituent part of the crime, those "in a position effectively to exercise control over or to direct the political or military action of a State" who may be liable to be convicted of the crime of aggression may consider themselves at least indirectly addressed by *jus ad bellum*. To ask "who are the addressees of *jus ad bellum*" is thus an imprecise question, allowing a general answer such as "generally states" but requiring a specific legal question applied to a precise fact pattern to provide an answer as to who is addressed by which specific legal provision. Noting the need for precision when amplifying a question such as "who are the addressees of *jus ad bellum*" in no way suggests that *jus ad bellum* has no meaning in terms of legal responsibility, it merely suggests the need for clarity.

Jus in bello is a more complex body of law than *jus ad bellum* in many respects, regulating a great diversity of conduct within armed conflict and occupation as opposed to largely prohibiting conduct (albeit with notable exceptions). The potential addressees of *jus in bello* grow as one includes non-international armed conflict in the phenomena addressed. Nonetheless, a general answer to the question "who are the addressees of *jus in bello*" can be ventured: generally belligerent states, and also in non-international armed conflict organized armed groups, although properly conceived a wider array of actors from the International Committee of the Red Cross to local humanitarian groups to intergovernmental organizations are also regulated. A more precise question is needed for a more specific answer, but that in no way lessens the importance, coherence, or validity of *jus in bello*.

Jus post bellum is more complicated still, involving what is in many respects a more complex set of challenges (ending conflict and building a positive peace, not restricting force and protecting the vulnerable). Most importantly with respect to the question of "who are the addressees of *jus post bellum*," many questions of *jus post bellum* properly conceived involve a greater diversity of potential actors. That said, it is worth describing at the outset some general answers to the question of the addressees of *jus post bellum*. The general summation might be "usually states, sometimes other parties to peace agreements and international organizations," but of course specifying the particular law applied and factual scenario clarifies the answer.

With respect to *jus post bellum* and the regulation of the procedural fairness of peace treaties between states emerging from international armed conflict, the addressees are primarily states, although for example depositories may also be involved. More generally peace processes (including the crafting of peace agreements) may have a distinctive self-determination role bound to questions of state legitimacy and human rights protections that may involve both governments and organized armed groups.[47] Peace agreements often have a hybrid international/domestic legal status and may create obligations that may need to be interpreted from both a treaty or contract law framework and a constitutional law framework; and distinctive types of third-party delegation, but primarily can be said to address those entities who are party to the agreements.

Jus post bellum is informed by The Responsibility to Protect doctrine, particularly the Responsibility to Prevent and the Responsibility to Rebuild as part of this doctrine. These responsibilities lie primarily on the territorial state, but secondarily to the international community as a whole.

Certain specific legal restrictions that are part of *jus post bellum* apply to governments due to their state-based nature. The prohibition of annexation as a forbidden conclusion to an armed conflict is addressed to states. The prohibition of the threat of the use of force as guaranteed by the Article 52 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties with respect to fairness in peace treaties applies to states, as do other areas of treaty law. Similarly, the duty to extradite or refer for prosecution (*aut dedere aut judicare*) certain criminal violations bind states or state actors, limiting their ability to grant amnesties or to simply refrain from acting. This is in tension with the duty of states in non-international armed conflicts a duty to "endeavour to grant the broadest possible amnesty to persons who have participated in the armed conflict, or those deprived of their liberty for reasons related to the armed conflict, whether they are interned or detained," arguably limiting this type of amnesty to conduct other than, for example, genocide, torture, destruction of cultural property, and terrorism. When a question of law in the transition from armed conflict to peace relies on the law of state succession or occupation, these laws are also primarily addressed to states.

The addressee of a question of *jus post bellum* with respect to the right to self-determination is more complex. Self-determination has historically been the goal of many armed groups, and may be a necessary part of a just and sustainable peace. The right to self-determination is a peremptory norm. Under Additional Protocol ii it is made clear that an "International Armed Conflict" "include[s] armed conflicts in which peoples are fighting against colonial domination and alien occupation and against racist régimes in the exercise of their right of self-determination[.]" The primary addressee of these norms are states, but other groups such as international organizations may also be regulated. Similarly, human rights law, when applied in the context of the transition from armed conflict to peace with an aim towards establishing a just and sustainable peace, is primarily addressed to states but is increasingly applied to international organizations and non-state actors as well. The law of International Territorial Administration, as indicated by the term, historically is addressed to international organizations, albeit with impacts on other entities.

While the obligation to extradite or refer for prosecution may apply only to states, the scope of international criminal responsibility and its impact on the transition from armed conflict to peace regulates more than states. A central theory behind international criminal responsibility (thus saving most prosecutions from challenges regarding legality) is that conduct can be criminalized regardless of domestic law. This addresses states by limiting the effectiveness of state decriminalization, amnesty, or inaction. The application of international criminal law, regardless of whether this occurs in international, hybrid, or domestic fora, can play an important role in building a just and sustainable peace. It is addressed primarily to individuals, but also to others subject to the authority of court or tribunal, as well as the court or tribunal itself.

If state debt can be discharged during the transition from armed conflict to peace due to its "odious" nature, the law regulating the discharge or validity of such debt is addressable both to the state debtor and the creditor, whether that creditor is a governmental, intergovernmental, or non-governmental entity.

Explanation of Structure

This work is structured in nine chapters. The first five chapters form Part i, the theoretical foundation for the work. Chapter 1 establishes the existence and use of *jus post bellum* within the just war tradition, ranging from Augustine of Hippo to Immanuel Kant. Chapter 2, *Exploration of Sister Terms* roots the discussion of *jus in bello* in the "sister terms" *jus ad bellum* and *jus in bello*. One of the main concepts this work seeks to introduce and reinforce is outlined in Chapter 3, *Three Theories of Jus Post Bellum*. Chapter 4, *Present – An Exploration of Contemporary Usage*, has two major sections. The first section reviews contemporary scholarship, evaluating the functional/temporal definitional dichotomy. The second section contrasts *jus post bellum* and transitional justice. Chapter 5 provides an empirical analysis of the trends in the literature on *jus pos bellum*.

Part ii builds upon the foundation of Part i, covering in four chapters the substance and future of *jus post bellum*. The question of why *jus post bellum* is useful for both International Armed Conflict and Non-International Armed Conflict and how it applies in each is explored in Chapter 6, *Jus Post Bellum in the context of International and Non-International Armed Conflict*. Chapter 7 surveys the contemporary legal content of *jus post bellum* with an eye towards some areas (such as the Responsibility to Protect) that are more *lex ferenda* than *lex lata*. Chapter 8 provides an analysis of *jus post bellum* and counterinsurgency. The work concludes in Chapter 9 with an overall analysis of the current state and future of *jus post bellum*. <>

THEODICY AND SPIRITUALITY IN THE FOURTH GOSPEL: A GIRARDIAN PERSPECTIVE by Daniel Deforest London [Lexington Books / Fortress Academic, 9781978702400]

Daniel DeForest London argues that the Fourth Gospel offers a potentially transformative response to the question of suffering and the human compulsion to blame. Based on his reading of John 9 (the man born blind), London argues that the Gospel does not offer a theodicy, but rather a theodical spirituality, an experience of praying the question of suffering and remaining open to a divine response. London shows how the Johannine Jesus's response poses three sets of symbols in dichotomy (day/night, vision/blindness, sheep/wolf), each subverted by another, core symbol (light, judge, shepherd). By interpreting these symbols in light of mimetic theory, he argues that Jesus's response reveals the scapegoat mechanism in which an innocent victim is blamed by violent victimizers. However, rather than blaming the victimizers, Jesus continues to engage with the characters who appear to be villains: the light of the world transforms night and day into one continuous day; the Good Shepherd welcomes sheep and wolf into his beloved flock. In this way, readers are invited to bring to the Johannine Jesus their own violence, resentment, and wolfish rage regarding the question of suffering and to experience the theodical spirituality of the Fourth Gospel.

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Introduction: Contemplating Protest Prayer on the Jordan River

In this book, I focus primarily on how the question of suffering can reveal humanity's compulsion to blame someone for the anguish that we see all around us. Acknowledging humanity's addiction to blame, I ask who can be held accountable for the suffering in the world without perpetuating more suffering through scapegoating and blame. Just as I reflected on my encounter with the Jewish man while rafting down the Jordan River, I will delve into two chapters (9:1-10:21) of the Fourth Gospel's narrative, which has been described as a body of water "in which a child may wade and an elephant can swim." Just as my Messianic Jewish raft mate served as a helpful conversation partner on the Jordan River, I will enlist the help of anthropologist Rene Girard and Girardians as conversation partners, especially as I encounter the rich symbols of the Gospel. I trust that the Fourth Gospel will offer some helpful and potentially transformative insight on my question.

Synopsis of Themes

Before stepping into the river, I will clarify my question of suffering in chapter 1 and acknowledge that I am not seeking to construct a Johannine theodicy but rather to experience a theodical spirituality as I bring my question and the compulsion to blame to the Gospel narrative. In this chapter, I will offer a definition of theodical spirituality within the larger context of Christian spirituality and a brief survey within the Christian tradition. I will then turn my attention to the Fourth Gospel, initially highlighting the theodical spirituality of Johannine scholar Robert Kysar who has brought his own "theodical" concerns to his readings of the Gospel narrative that he has referred to as "voyages with John." Finally, I will set the parameters and frames for the focus of my argument: the Johannine pericope (John 9:1-10:21).

In chapter 2, I will introduce my conversation partner in navigating the Gospel narrative. Just as a rafter can drown in a river's rapids, a reader may feel overwhelmed by the Gospel's dizzying symbols and metaphors. Girard's insights—collectively called "mimetic theory"—will help serve as an interpretive key for experiencing and understanding the symbols and metaphors employed by Jesus in the pericope. Mimetic theory will assist me in understanding the prevalence of the human compulsion to blame as well as observing the anthropological aspects of the spiritual realities that the Johannine symbols present. My main guides for reading John in light of mimetic theory will be those who have previously used Girard's insights to interpret John and John's symbols, in particular James Alison, Gil Bailie, and Rene Girard himself.

In chapter 3, I will analyze John 9:1-7 where the disciples ask the question of suffering and Jesus offers his initial response as well as his first set of symbols: day, night, and the light. I will demonstrate how the disciples' question invites me to enter into the narrative with my own question of suffering. In identifying with the disciples and their question, I will consider the victim of suffering as a potential object of blame. I will interpret Jesus's initial response where he clearly rejects the disciples' theology. I will then interpret the symbols of day, night, and light through the lens of mimetic theory.

In chapter 4, I will analyze John 9:6-41 where the man born blind undergoes the interrogation of the Pharisees, who eventually expel him from the synagogue. I will consider the option of unleashing the compulsion to blame onto the interrogators who victimize the man through expulsion. I will interpret Jesus's second set of symbols (vision, blindness, and the judge) and how he remains fully committed to the transformation of those who are blinded by theologies of blame, thus challenging our temptation to blame the victimizers. I will then highlight the ways in which the narrative itself invites us to identify with the interrogators and thus recognize how we ourselves remain complicit in the very violence that we seek to blame in others.

In chapter 5, I will analyze John 10:1-21 in which Jesus launches into the "Good Shepherd" discourse by employing the symbols of sheep, wolf, and shepherd. By using this metaphor, Jesus offers himself as a victim to theodicies of blame—essentially as the object of blame itself—in response to the question of suffering. As the Good Shepherd who takes up his life again, Jesus points toward his resurrection which embodies divine forgiveness that has the power to disarm and liberate those bound by the compulsion to blame. Jesus responds to the question of suffering by inviting us to recognize our compulsion to scapegoat and to undergo transformation through the forgiveness of the one who bears the brunt of our blame.

In each of these chapters, Jesus offers a dichotomous pair (day and night / vision and blindness / sheep and wolf) followed by a symbol that refers to Jesus himself (Light, Judge, Shepherd). In each case, the metaphor that Jesus uses for himself subverts the dichotomy of the other two symbols. He transforms both day and night into one continuous day as the Light. He receives and fully engages with blindness and vision as the Judge; and he protects the sheep and receives the wolf to the extent of laying down his life as the shepherd. In this way, the Jesus of John can receive and heal our own victimhood as well as our participation in violent victimizing. Jesus seeks to transform both the victims and victimizers of blame. The Fourth Gospel can thus function as an invitation for our own inner wolves of violent victimization and our lambs of victimhood to lie peacefully together (Isaiah 11:6).

In chapter 6, I will consider how our reading of John 9 and 10 invites us to reclaim the tradition of lament and protest against God as a resource for overcoming our propensity to blame. In this tradition, we can hold God accountable for the suffering in the world and even blame God, not because we have concluded that God is, in fact, to blame, but rather because we are addicted to blame and God offers himself as a victim in order to liberate us from our addiction through his forgiveness. My reading will invite us to see God's transforming forgiveness gush forth in response to our prayerful protest just as life-giving waters gushed forth from Christ's pierced side.

Ultimately, this reading of the Fourth Gospel will beckon us into a life unbound by blame: one that requires no victims and which the Gospel calls "abundant" and "eternal" (John 10:10; 3:16). However, we will likely not break our habits of blaming instantly. My reading will demonstrate how the Johannine

Jesus' remains committed to showing the ways in which we remain blinded and bound by blame. Some might begin to let go of scapegoating tendencies upon first realizations of the violent world perpetuated through victimization. Others might require an outlet for violence during the weaning process. We will be invited to acknowledge the ways in which we ourselves behave as the wolf who unleashes violence upon the Good Shepherd. Although the Johannine Jesus seeks to move us beyond blame, he is willing to take the blame in order to get us there. The Fourth Gospel's response to the question of suffering and the compulsion to blame is broad enough to receive and transform those who remain addicted to blame even after being shown its violent implications. Thus we will see that the Fourth Gospel is not only a river in which our lambs may wade but also one in which our wolves can swim. <>

THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO THE COUNCIL OF NICAEA edited by Young Richard Kim [Cambridge Companions to Religion, Cambridge University Press, 9781108427746]

Every Sunday, Christians all over the world recite the Nicene Creed as a confession of faith. While most do not know the details of the controversy that led to its composition, they are aware that the Council of Nicaea was a critical moment in the history of Christianity. For scholars, the Council has long been a subject of multi-disciplinary interest and continues to fascinate and inspire research. As we approach the 1700th anniversary of the Council, **THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO THE COUNCIL OF NICAEA** provides an opportunity to revisit and reflect on old discussions, propose new approaches and interpretative frameworks, and ultimately revitalize a conversation that remains as important now as it was in the fourth century. The volume offers fifteen original studies by scholars who each examine an aspect of the Council. Informed by interdisciplinary approaches, the essays demonstrate its profound legacy with fresh, sometimes provocative, but always intellectually rich ideas.

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What This Volume Is ... and Is Not

First, let me begin by reflecting on what this Cambridge Companion is not. It is not designed or intended to provide the reader with a comprehensive, diachronic narrative of the time before, during, and after the council, and all of its associated events, people, places, and dates. Nor will it dive into the intricacies of ongoing debates about the sources, their dates of composition and authorship, their authenticity, :heir transmission, and their reliability. Such can be found in already published works, especially the massive study by Richard Hanson, and studies by Lewis Ayres, John Behr, and Khaled Anatolios. For the related documents, the classic collection by Opitz and recent updates by Brennecke, von Stockhausen, and others, are excellent resources." Rather, the essays collected here offer several possibilities. Some revisit old debates and discussions, others ask new questions, and still more provide different viewpoints on the people, context, and consequences linked to the Council of Nicaea. My hope is that there is

something for everyone interested in the Council of Nicaea, from the public to the professional, from the student to the senior scholar, and that the sum total of the chapters provides perspectives that will enhance the reader's thinking about the monumental event, the lead-up to it, and its long afterlife. As is true of any edited volume focused on a particular topic, there will be some overlap among the various contributions, and, I am pleased to say, there are instances of different and even conflicting interpretations of particular historical or theological problems. But these only enhance the critical value of the volume, as the chapters function dialectically as conversation and debate partners with each other, as they also do with the reader. There will also be noticeable gaps or subjects not covered. There simply are not enough pages or acceptable word counts that would make this possible. In some sense, the bibliography itself of this volume mirrors this potential criticism. While on the one hand it is lengthy and contains many (and in some cases) "canon" entries, it is not comprehensive. My ultimate goal is that the contributions of all of the expert writers in this volume will stimulate thought, provoke unexpected reactions, and ultimately inspire renewed interested in one of the most important — albeit often misunderstood — moments in the history of Christianity.

The Contributions

Part I of this **Cambridge Companion** will explore the "contexts" leading up to the Council of Nicaea, with examinations of the political, social, ecclesiastical, and theological developments that informed and influenced the gathering and its deliberations. Raymond Van Dam offers a "prelude," which investigates a series of questions related to the political and social context in the lead-up to Nicaea. Eschewing a teleological perspective that assumes the inevitability of the theology of Nicaea, he explores how the symbols and language of religion are reflections of social and cultural concerns. Van Dam pays special attention to the Tetrarchic framework that in turn led to the rise of Constantine, and how the ambiguities inherent in his complex rise to power and conversion were very much reflected in the theological debates that emerged about the Son's relationship to the Father. Rebecca Lyman studies the uncertain and contested origins of the theological dispute between Alexander of Alexandria and Arius, in particular the social, cultural, and political developments of the years 312-24, which set the stage for the escalation of the conflict and the convocation of the council. After surveying previous scholarly interpretations, which are varied and debated rigorously, she argues that the political, social, and religious tensions resulting from the empire of Constantine and Licinius and the development of ascetic ideals and practices in the post-Diocletianic, post-persecution dispensation set the context in which the theological dispute between Arius and Alexander unfolded.

In Part II, Ine Jacobs uses her expertise in late antique and Byzantine archaeology to analyze the material considerations of the council. She first reflects on the change in locale, from Ancyra to Nicaea, and what may have motivated it, and then she examines the available remains of Nicaea (modern Iznik) to ascertain the suitability of the city to host such a gathering, including practical concerns such as where the imperial court and officials were housed, where the meeting space was in the overall landscape of the city, and how and where the delegates were hosted. Finally, she discusses the broader Constantinian building program reflected in other locales and how developments in Christian architecture resulted from changing liturgical and conciliar needs. David Gwynn explores the council and what we know about its convocation, participants, and proceedings from a broad perspective. His discussion includes reflections on the difficulties presented by the conflicting sources, and in his reconstruction of the events he draws on later, more secure conciliar documents to tease out insights into what may have

transpired at Nicaea. In addition, he tries as much as possible to recover the voices and perspectives of the "humble individuals." Hal Drake reflects on the "elephant in the room," namely, the emperor Constantine, whose presence at the council was an unprecedented development. Drake explores what motivated Constantine to be so intimately involved with the council, shifting attention away from the usual theological interpretations and back to the political motivations of the emperor. He considers the significance of Constantine's earlier dealings with the Donatists, which gave him a framework for how to approach the Arian controversy. While Constantine sought unity and harmony in his empire, the internal dynamics of Christianity itself ultimately made this an impossibility.

In Part III, on the outcomes of the council, Mark Edwards offers a detailed study of the creed itself. His assessment begins with the evidence for earlier creeds and creed-making and then analyzes the one produced at Nicaea, its language, biblical foundations, and theological implications, including a close look at the history and origin of the term homoousios. He also examines the anathemas and their allegations. Finally, Edwards discusses the promulgation and reception of the creed in the immediate aftermath of the council. Andreas Weckwerth studies the canons by first considering their textual transmission and their translation into several languages, and second discussing their purpose and content. He then shifts to an analysis of their reception and function in later tradition, in particular how other councils and churchmen understood, adapted, and applied the Nicene canons in subsequent centuries. Daniel Mc Carthy investigates the debate at the council regarding the calculation for when to celebrate the Pasch, that is, Easter. He provides an overview of the Paschal Controversy before and after the fourth century, and he discusses if and how the issue was resolved at the council and received by later traditions. Aaron Johnson writes on the council specifically from the perspective of Eusebius of Caesarea, examining the theological, ecclesiastical, and political vision of arguably the most important eyewitness to the council and its aftermath. Eusebius has left us with several immeasurably important texts, and this chapter surveys the scholarly debates resulting from various interpretative issues. Finally, Johnson challenges traditional and perhaps uncritical arguments about the famous ecclesiastical historian, that he was a dishonest Arian sympathizer who signed the creed out of cowardice or that he did so because he was awestruck in the presence of the emperor. Eusebius was, in fact, an original thinker with a coherent vision that was deeply influential for later writers.

Part IV examines the aftermath of the council, up to the end of the fourth century, with careful attention on the theological trajectories initiated by Nicaea. Sara Parvis argues against recent scholarly assessments that eschew the development of discrete parties, for or against Arius, and correspondingly for or against the Council of Nicaea and its creed. With close analysis of the evidence, she traces the extent to which politics, theology, friendships and enmities, and the talent, ambitions, and charisma of prominent individuals all influenced the decades-long dispute until the Council of Constantinople in 381. In particular, she identifies Athanasius as the key player. Mark Del Cogliano discusses the various theological strands in the aftermath that eventually culminated in the so-called pro-Nicene position, championed at first by Athanasius and refined by the Cappadocian fathers: Basil of Caesarea, Gregory of Nazianzus, and Gregory of Nyssa. He argues that this pro-Nicene alliance was ultimately a consensus-building movement that borrowed from tactics employed by earlier theologians, but that it espoused a particular interpretation of the Nicene Creed that positioned their theology as a middle ground between the extremes of the theology of Arius and Marcellus of Ancyra. Kelley Spoerl studies the term homoousios and its implications for Christology, viewed primarily through the teaching attributed to

Apollinarius of Laodicea, but also in anticipation of the Christological disputes that unfolded at the end of the fourth century and through the fifth century. The Council of Nicaea, and the fourth century in general, are often (mistakenly) described as only trinitarian in focus, so this chapter offers a valuable corrective to the overly simplistic binary between the trinitarian fourth and Christological fifth centuries. Dan Williams examines the fourth-century developments in the western half of the Roman empire, tracing the pro-Nicene theological trajectory initiated among others by Hilary of Poitiers and Marius Victorinus and gradually solidified by prominent western bishops like Ambrose and Augustine. He demonstrates how the eventual affirmation of a "neo-Nicene" trinitarian doctrine was achieved sometime in the 380s, after a protracted struggle against the Homoian doctrine, which rejected any "substance"-related terminologies.

Finally, in Part V, the contributions investigate the "long" reception of the council and creed by two Christian traditions. Paul Gavrilyuk considers Nicaea from the perspective of the Orthodox tradition and traces the importance of the council and creed first in the work of Cyril of Alexandria and then in Byzantine liturgy in the sixth century. He introduces the idea of the "hermeneutic of conciliar authority" as evident in later councils, all of which made Nicaea a crucial reference point, and his chapter concludes with reflections on the council in light of the pan-Orthodox council, held in Crete, June 2016. Geoffrey Dunn begins with an examination of the reception of the council in the churches of the West up to 1054 and then specifically by the Roman Catholic Church in the centuries following. He explores broadly the reception of the creed, including the controversy of the Filioque, and the Canons and their function in church discipline. Dunn also pays special attention to the modern Catholic reception of Nicaea.

Together, these chapters together provide a picture of the immediate, the middle, and the long-term impact of the Council of Nicaea, and they will inspire new questions and research trajectories, provoke debate and disagreement, and ultimately contribute to an ongoing conversation that in reality began as soon as the gathering ended. Seventeen hundred years is a long time in which to discuss anything, but for the nature of the Godhead, ecclesiastical leadership and organization, orthodoxy and heresy, among other related subjects, perhaps such a span of time is only the beginning. **THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO THE COUNCIL OF NICAEA** pays respect to its forebears but also looks ahead to continued dialogue, discussion, and debate about the people and their actions, the events and their outcomes, and the ideas and their lasting legacy in the history of Christianity.

Note to the Reader

The chapters in this volume are each followed by a "Select References" list, rather than a complete bibliography. These lists include fifteen scholarly works chosen by each author, which are relevant to the individual chapter's contents. All works cited in the contributions can be found in the Bibliography at the end of the volume. <>

THOMAS AQUINAS

Thomas Aquinas and Contemplation by Rik Van Nieuwenhove

- Provides an authoritative introduction to key aspects of Aquinas's thought
- *Offers an interdisciplinary approach engaging with his philosophy, theology, and spirituality*

Contemplation, according to Thomas Aquinas, is the central goal of our life. This study considers the epistemological and metaphysical foundations of the contemplative act; the nature of the active and contemplative lives in light of Aquinas's Dominican calling; the role of faith, charity, and the gifts of the Holy Spirit in contemplation; and contemplation and the beatific vision. Rik Van Nieuwenhove argues that Aquinas espouses a profoundly intellective notion of contemplation in the strictly speculative sense, which culminates in a non-discursive moment of insight (*intuitus simplex*). In marked contrast to his contemporaries Aquinas therefore rejects a sapiential or affective brand of theology. He also employs a broader notion of contemplation, which can be enjoyed by all Christians, in which the gifts of the Holy Spirit are of central importance. *Thomas Aquinas and Contemplation* will appeal to readers interested in this key aspect of Aquinas's thought. Van Nieuwenhove provides a lucid account of central aspects of Aquinas's metaphysics, epistemology, theology, and spirituality. He also offers new insights into the nature of the theological discipline as Aquinas sees it, and how theology relates to philosophy.

Contains new insights in relation to the nature of contemplation, charity, the relation between theology and philosophy

Raises the following important questions: What is truth? How do we come to know anything in this world? Given our reliance on the senses can we know God? What is theology (as the science of God) and how does it relate to philosophical ways of knowing? What is the role of faith and love in our knowledge of God?

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Excerpt: In his excellent book **ALBERT AND THOMAS** Simon Tugwell writes that Aquinas's interest was 'not engaged by the treatise on the two lives' (i.e. the active and contemplative). He further alleges that Aquinas 'tried to do justice to the complex and not very coherent inheritance he had received from

the Christian tradition, but his heart does not seem to have been in it'. I hope this book has demonstrated that these claims are less than convincing. As a Dominican friar faced with fierce opposition (from secular Parisian Masters such as William of Saint Amour and Gerard of Abbeville) Aquinas developed a rich theology of contemplation from the very beginning of his career and pondered carefully how it related to the active life.

Aquinas differentiates between the active and contemplative lives by appealing to the distinction between the practical and theoretical intellect. As these are not two separate faculties, Aquinas does not propose a dichotomous view of the contemplative and active lives either. He also distinguishes between the contemplative and active lives in another way, inspired by St Gregory the Great, namely by associating them with love of God and neighbour, respectively. Again, this does not imply a dichotomy: love of God generates and finds expression in love of neighbour, the way, ideally, the contemplative life shapes and informs the active life, and in particular those activities, such as teaching and preaching, which find their origin and nourishment in contemplation.

Contemplation is intrinsically more meaningful than action for a number of reasons. Firstly, contemplation is pursued for its own sake, while practical engagements are ultimately for the sake of contemplation in which they find their telos and fulfilment. Secondly, in contemplation we exercise our highest faculty, namely the theoretical intellect. Thirdly, there is an eschatological consideration: in the beatific vision we will contemplate the divine essence while the active life will go into abeyance. The affirmation of the ultimate superiority of contemplation (in terms of intrinsic meaningfulness) does not imply that we should invariably give it preference over practices associated with the active life. On the contrary, given the needs of our fellow human beings, greater love of God is demonstrated when we occasionally relinquish the delights of contemplation for those activities that assist others in attaining their salvation (which consists, ultimately, in contemplation of God in the beatific vision). This was Aquinas's teaching from the very beginning of his career.

Throughout this book I have drawn attention to the wide semantic range of Aquinas's concept of contemplation. There is, of course, speculative contemplation in the strict sense (i.e. philosophical and theological contemplation). He also uses contemplation in a more general sense (*modus communiter*) as denoting an openness or receptivity to the divine truth that should characterize the life of the ordinary Christian (cf. 'Be still and see that I am God'), and which Aquinas associates with the commandment to keep the Sabbath. Whether it is used in the broad or in a more restricted sense, either way Christian contemplation on earth constitutes part of the 'imperfect happiness' which Aquinas contrasts throughout his works with the perfect happiness of the contemplation of God in the afterlife.

It is imperative to be attentive to the distinction between contemplation in the strictly speculative sense and 'broadly conceived'. If not, we may end up with a reading of Aquinas's account of contemplation that is incoherent. Prayer, for instance, is part of the contemplative life (in the broad sense) but not of speculative contemplation, if only because prayer is an exercise of practical reason while speculative contemplation relies on the theoretical intellect. Similarly, we should not assume that Aquinas's discussion of the (cognitive) gifts of the Holy Spirit covers without qualification both contemplation in the broad sense and speculative contemplation.

All our knowledge originates in the senses; the sensory impressions become internalized as *phantasmata* from which the agent intellect extracts intelligible species, which provide the potential intellect with its

contents for thinking to occur. Aquinas distinguishes between three fundamental acts of our intellect: apprehension of indivisibles, judgement (i.e. affirmation and negation), and discursive reasoning. Reasoning occurs through *inventio* (discovery) and *iudicium* (judgement) or resolution. These are cognitive processes that rely (either synthetically or analytically) on insight into first principles. Discursive reasoning, therefore, both presupposes and culminates in a simple, intellective (or non-discursive) insight into truth, *intuitus simplex*. Now I ponder whether Aquinas considers the acme of the contemplative operation an act distinct from, and irreducible to, the other three mental operations. More importantly, I also argued that Aquinas supports his argument for the intellective or non-discursive nature of *intuitus simplex* by drawing on Christian Neoplatonist authors, namely Pseudo-Dionysius and Boethius, rather than on Aristotle (who is also familiar with the distinction between *noein* and *dianoeisthai*, intellective understanding and discursive reasoning). I suggested that Aristotle's notions of understanding, knowledge, and wisdom might have been too apodeictic for Aquinas's liking. More particularly, I argued that Aquinas espouses notions of understanding, knowledge, and wisdom that are non-discursive or intellective, when understood as gifts of the Holy Spirit. The non-discursive nature of *intuitus simplex* allowed Aquinas to account for the contemplation 'broadly conceived' of the non-learned Christian, as well as the intellective insight in which the speculative contemplation of scholars culminates.

Contemplation is concerned with the consideration of 'truth'. Together with the other transcendentals. Aquinas defines 'truth' as the convergence of intellect and reality. He argues that natural things are ultimately true insofar as they conform to the divine mind. Truth's ontological foundation in the divine intellect does not, however, commit Aquinas to an illuminist epistemology. Things have their inherent intelligibility, which we grasp through ordinary operations of perception, abstraction, and reasoning. Aquinas's views are therefore in marked contrast to those of some of his contemporaries, such as the authors of the *Summa Halensis* and Bonaventure, according to whom the Word is the condition of possibility of our attainment of truth. Similarly, Bonaventure, and the *Summa Halensis* before him, argued that an explicitly trinitarian foundation grounds the transcendentals of being, truth, and goodness, with efficient, formal, and final causality being associated with the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit respectively. Hence, metaphysical speculation without participation in the mystery of the Trinity is necessarily inadequate. Aquinas does not share this view and is disinclined to draw trinitarian considerations into his exposition of the transcendentals.

Given his empiricist stance (all knowledge is derived through the senses), Aquinas's theological outlook is deeply apophatic: in this life we cannot know what God is but only that he is. Our dependence on *phantasmata* explains the need for another discipline, namely sacra doctrina, which does not rely solely on abstraction and reason (as philosophical sciences do) but is informed by faith in divine revelation itself. Aquinas nonetheless refuses to evacuate philosophy of its integrity and significance. This is not to say that philosophy is somehow 'autonomous'. Aquinas would have been deeply uncomfortable with a notion of philosophy as autonomous and separate from theology (a view which, perhaps, he may have sensed to have been incipiently present in the writings of his teacher, Albert the Great). All sciences are part of a hierarchy. Within the realm of sciences that operate by the natural light of reason, metaphysics is the science which subalternates inferior sciences. Metaphysics, in turn, is characterized by an inherent dynamic towards theological engagement: the study of *ens commune* (being in general) evokes speculation about its Cause, subsistent being, even though the two understandings of 'being' remain

analogically distinct. For theological reasons (i.e. out of respect for the integrity of things as created) Aquinas adopts the view that metaphysics is both distinct from, and yet inherently oriented towards, theological contemplation. Christian theology can, in turn, draw on philosophical arguments to clarify and strengthen (not: 'to prove') its own positions.

Later we had occasion to discuss how Aquinas distinguishes between the theoretical sciences, and between *sacra doctrina* and metaphysics in particular. In terms of their subject matter, the natural sciences deal with forms of things that are material and in motion. Mathematics treats of forms that, while existing in matter, can be considered without reference to their material existence. Theology or divine science examines either entities that always exist without matter or motion (such as God or angels)—and these are the subject of *sacra doctrina*—or things that may exist without matter or motion (but not necessarily)—and these are studied by metaphysics. Similarly, Christian theology immediately considers God, whereas metaphysics examines primarily being as such (ens commune) and God only insofar as he is the principle of its subject matter. More frequently he also employs another way of distinguishing between metaphysics and revealed theology, namely their reliance on the natural light of reason or revelation respectively. We have noted another difference, namely: metaphysics offers fundamental principles and categories to lower theoretical sciences but Christian theology does not sub-alternate any other science.

The different objects of the theoretical sciences require different noetic modes. The natural sciences operate *rationabiliter* (through the mode of reason). Mathematics primarily uses the mode of learning (*disciplinabiliter*), while metaphysics and Christian theology share an intellective mode (*intellectualiter*). Given the differences we have mentioned (especially distinct subject matters and different formal sources of knowledge), how then does Aquinas conceive of the connections between Christian theology, on the one hand, and metaphysics and the other theoretical sciences, on the other? Sacra doctrina is the ultimate architectonic science in a teleological and hierarchical ordering of the sciences. Christian theology considers the First Cause (God) in its own right, whereas philosophy works the other way around (i.e. from studying created effects it comes to consider the divine Cause). This implies an ascending dynamic of the theoretical sciences. All sciences point to and display a(n implicit) dynamic towards God as Cause of everything. The ultimate End of all things, namely God, is the immediate concern of Christian theology, in which the other sciences find their fulfilment: 'divine knowledge is the ultimate end of every act of human knowledge and every operation'. The architectonic status of *sacra doctrina* does not imply that it pursues the activities that pertain to natural or philosophical sciences, just as the *sensus communis* does not perform any of the operations of the exterior senses. It can, however, judge and order them. *Sacra doctrina* can also use the perspectives and reasonings of the other sciences to clarify and strengthen its own arguments.

Again, sacra doctrina sees the diverse knowledge of other sciences from the formal aspect of revelation (*revelabilia*), with a view to God as their beginning and end. The very transcendence this implies means that it relates to other sciences not by usurping their subject matter but by considering it from a higher, unified vantage point. Aquinas is therefore very happy to affirm the meaningfulness and integrity of philosophical pursuits: 'The study of philosophy is in itself lawful and commendable (*studium philosophiae secundum se est licitum et laudabile)*. He is also happy to use rational arguments throughout his theological writings; I explained that his notion that things cannot be both believed and known at the same time does not undermine the status of theology as a science; and rather than setting up a separation of

theology from philosophy it softens the exact boundary lines between arguments that rely on revelation and those that rely exclusively on natural reason.

Throughout this book I have questioned a charismatic reading of Aquinas's account of speculative contemplation. It is no coincidence that he resists an affective interpretation of the virtue of faith. His intellectualist stance also finds expression in the way he conceives of the theological discipline, which in marked contrast to his contemporaries he considers to be primarily theoretical rather than practical. Again, the mature Aquinas does not appeal to the gifts of the Holy Spirit to legitimize the scientific status of the theology. Instead he adopts the theme of sub-alternation of theology to divine scientia. Through faith in revelation the theologian shares, no matter how inadequately, in the divine self-knowledge. This reliance on revelation does not compromise the scientific status of theology, for all scientific disciplines (with the exception of those that rely on self-evident principles, such as logic) borrow their principles from higher sciences. Theology is not unique amongst the sciences in operating with a rationality that is fiduciary. On the other hand, *sacra doctrina* retains a unique status amongst the sciences insofar as its principles cannot be known through the light of natural reason but derive from revelation.

Securing the scientific credentials of a discipline by appealing to its sub-alternated status does not require that the first principles of the science are self-evident. Before he hit upon the notion of sub-alternation, Aquinas tentatively considered the view that the articles of faith are per se noti. In such a view, the gifts of the Holy Spirit may prove indispensable in coming to understand these foundational principles. The theory of sub-alternation considerably weakens, or even dissolves, the dependency on cognitive gifts to render epistemic cogency to our theological pursuits. A musician does not need to understand fully the principles of mathematics that support musical theory; similarly, it is not required that the theologian enjoy a comprehensive understanding of the articles of faith. Thus, the theory of sub-alternation that Aquinas comes to espouse assists him in adopting a concept of theology that does not rely on the gifts of the Holy Spirit.

While Aquinas does not espouse an affective brand of theology, he is perfectly aware that theology can have a transformative dimension in which we become gradually assimilated into divine truth through the theological virtue of faith. Here Aquinas's distinction between God as the material object and the formal object [ive] of faith is relevant. We come to know God through God. In varying degrees (mainly depending on whether or not it is informed by charity) faith prepares the mind for a convergence or assimilation to the divine truth that will come to ultimate fruition in the afterlife. Sacra doctrina is a participation in holy learning or teaching that assists us in growing in likeness to, and assenting to, the authority of divine truth.

We explore the role of charity in contemplation. Undoubtedly, the contemplative act consists essentially in the operation of the intellect. Nonetheless, the will and charity are involved in the contemplative act insofar as delight naturally accompanies it. In order to explain this, I first discussed the nature of love in general before dealing with charity or love for God, which, so Aquinas argues, moves us towards contemplation. In this context I argued that an early text in which Aquinas associates philosophical and theological contemplation with love of self and God, respectively, does not support an interpretation that Aquinas drives a wedge between philosophy and theology. On the contrary, given that love of

others presupposes love of self, Aquinas might actually be hinting at a harmonious relation between philosophy and theology.

The discussion of charity strengthened and hopefully clarified the argument developed on the relation between the active and contemplative lives. Charity is friendship with God for his own sake, from which love of neighbour ensues. In a similar way, engagement with certain practices of the active life (such as teaching and preaching) flow from the contemplation of God. Charity is also deeply gratuitous: we love God for his own sake. As charity bestows a theocentric focus upon everything we do, it nourishes the non-utilitarian character of contemplation as a leisurely pursuit, fostering the receptivity and stillness required for a free contemplation of all things.

Insofar as love moves us towards contemplation, which then ensues in delight when the intellect apprehends truth, a trinitarian dimension is implied in contemplation (both in the strictly speculative and in the more general senses of the word). In his mature writings Aquinas argues that we actualize our image character (Gen. 1:26) when we come to know and love God, i.e. when we share, no matter how inadequately, in the generation of the Word and the procession of the Holy Spirit as Love. This image character will of course be fully actualized when we meet the trinitarian God face to face in the beatific vision.

In order to underscore once more the non-affective brand of Aquinas's theology it may be useful to contrast his approach with that of Bonaventure. 'The passing over from knowledge (*scientia*) to wisdom is not secure; therefore, it is necessary to propose a medium, namely holiness,' thus wrote St Bonaventure. According to the Franciscan theologian, theology involves a loving disposition (habitus affectivus), requiring prayerful devotion and the assistance of the gifts of the Holy Spirit. The object of faith is above ordinary reason but not above reason elevated by the gifts of knowledge and understanding, which assist us in understanding what has been believed. The gift of wisdom, then, is an experiential knowledge of God, which originates in knowledge but is consummated in affection insofar as 'the taste or savouring is an experiential knowledge of what is good and sweet'. In contrast to the mature Aquinas, Bonaventure is of the view that this sort of affective disposition shaped by the gifts is necessary for speculative contemplation. Contemplation of the Trinity requires the gift of fear, assisting us in acknowledging the divine majesty; the gift of understanding, to perceive its truth; and the gift of wisdom, to savour or taste its goodness. Aquinas's theological temperament is rather different: less affective and charismatic, and less sceptical of the claims of (philosophical) reason.

In his early Commentary on the Sentences Aquinas still struggled to secure the scientific credentials of theology. In the relevant question at the beginning of the work he does not refer to the gifts of the Holy Spirit, which probably reveals his implicit reservations concerning this approach. Admittedly, there are some early passages that can be interpreted as a remnant of the view that the gifts assist us in the theological task by enabling us to understand better the articles of faith. Aquinas discusses the gifts in *III Sent. d. 34–5* in light of the distinction between the contemplative and active lives, as his predecessors had done (from Peter Lombard and William of Auxerre to Bonaventure). In the *Commentary on the Sentences* the gifts of understanding and wisdom assist the ways of discovery (*via inventionis*) and judgement (*via iudicii*) respectively. This intimate connection between the basic processes of reasoning and the (cognitive) gifts seems to imply that theological discourse cannot proceed without reliance on the gifts.

Once Aquinas adopted the theme of subalternation he could reconceptualize the connection between the gifts and our contemplative act. In the *Prima Secundae* of the *Summa Theologiae* Aquinas abandons the framework of the two lives to distinguish between the different gifts. They are now differentiated on the basis of the functions of the faculties (the speculative and practical intellect, and the appetitive powers). True, the distinction between the speculative and practical intellect is closely related to that between the contemplative and active lives. Still, an important shift has nonetheless occurred. The gifts of understanding and wisdom now perfect speculative apprehension and judgement respectively. These are simple, non-discursive operations of the intellect. In other words, the connection between the cognitive gifts and the reasoning processes (which are obviously central in theological discourse and argumentation) has become considerably weakened. This allows Aquinas to do justice to a more broad-ranging notion of contemplation, namely one that could include the contemplation of the ordinary, unlearned Christian, nourished by the gifts of the Holy Spirit.

In the *Secunda Secundae*, then, appending the gifts to the theological and cardinal virtues further positions the central role the gifts occupy in the Christian life, while their connection with speculative contemplation has become further loosened. In this context it is revealing that the gifts of wisdom and understanding, previously exclusively theoretical, have now also acquired a practical dimension. In short, the gifts remain of central importance for the Christian life; but the initial link between the cognitive gifts and speculative contemplation becomes increasingly weaker throughout Aquinas's career.

As indicated earlier, Aquinas's treatment of prayer further illustrates that he resisted an affective notion of theology. Aquinas conceives of prayer primarily in petitionary terms; it is therefore an act of the practical intellect and cannot be immediately associated with the act of contemplation. It can prepare us for contemplation—and we know from hagiographical sources that Aquinas often prayed before study or when faced with a difficult theological problem—but it is not an essential part of contemplation as such. This explains why he hardly mentions prayer when discussing contemplation in the strict sense, or vice versa.

Again, Aquinas's theology should not be characterized as 'sapiential' if one takes this term in an affective, savouring sense. Aquinas insists that theology is wisdom (sapientia) in the Aristotelean sense because as an architectonic science it orders all other sciences, concerned as it is with the ultimate Cause and End of all things. He proves himself, however, decidedly less than enthusiastically disposed towards a 'savoury' or affective notion of theological wisdom, pointing out drily that the etymological connection between sapientia and sapere only applies in Latin, and not in other languages. Insofar as he entertains a savoury notion of wisdom he reserves it very much for wisdom as a gift of the Holy Spirit. The gifts of the Holy Spirit are, undoubtedly, of major significance for the Christian life. We should, however, refrain from confusing what Aquinas says about the gift of wisdom with wisdom as a cognitive virtue, or theological wisdom. In marked contrast to Bonaventure, Aquinas points out that only the cognitive virtue of wisdom, and not wisdom as a gift of the Holy Spirit, is necessary to engage with the theological discipline.

Aquinas's discussion of the beatific vision appears to be in tension with his overall epistemological account as to how we acquire knowledge, and to some extent it undoubtedly is. On earth we acquire knowledge by relying on the senses and the abstraction of the intelligible species from *phantasmata*, enabling us to apprehend, make affirmations and negations, and reason. In the beatific vision an illuminist

account is adopted: the soul will be flooded with the light of glory, enabling us to know God in an immediate, non-discursive manner. There is, however, a significant element of continuity, namely, the intellective, non-discursive nature of the insight that characterizes the acme of the contemplative act here on earth, what Aquinas calls *intuitus simplex*. This is the main reason why Aquinas can call speculative contemplation (in theology and philosophy) an inchoatio beatitudinis, a foretaste of heavenly beatitude. Thus, the *intuitus simplex* on earth anticipates and points towards the non-discursive union with God in the beatific vision.

The beatific vision is the telos of our entire life, in terms of both intellect and will. The theoretical nature of the beatific vision constitutes one of the main reasons why Aquinas gives preference to the contemplative over the active life in terms of intrinsic meaningfulness, although, in this life we occasionally must pursue activities of the practical life for the sake of our fellow humans, especially those activities that are nourished by contemplation of God.

Unlike his teacher Albert the Great, Aquinas has not engaged with the sciences of his day (e.g. biology). He was first and foremost a theologian and was, in contrast to his mentor, unwilling to characterize the non-theological sciences as autonomous. While Aquinas acknowledges their distinctive nature, they are nonetheless ordered towards the architectonic science, i.e. theology. Nor does Aquinas suggest that philosophical happiness is possible on earth. Undoubtedly, an imperfect happiness is attainable, of which earthly contemplation is an integral part, but it will always fall short of our ultimate goal or finis, the complete and lasting happiness we will enjoy when we encounter God in the beatific vision. <>

SUMMISTAE: THE COMMENTARY TRADITION ON THOMAS AQUINAS' SUMMA THEOLOGIAE FROM THE 15TH TO THE 17TH CENTURIES edited by Lidia Lanza and Marco Toste [Ancient and Medieval Philosophy, Leuven University Press, 9789462702622]

The importance of the *Summa theologiae* on late scholasticism

Thomas Aquinas' *Summa theologiae* is one of the classics in the history of theology and philosophy. Beyond its influence in the Middle Ages, its importance is also borne out by the fact that it became the subject of commentary. During the sixteenth century it was gradually adopted as the official text for the teaching of scholastic theology in most European Catholic universities. As a result, university professors throughout Europe and the colonial Americas started lecturing and producing commentaries on the *Summa* and using it as a starting point for many theological and philosophical discussions. Some of the works of major authors such as Vitoria, Soto, Molina, Suárez and Arriaga are for all intents and purposes commentaries on the *Summa*. This book is the first scholarly endeavour to investigate this commentary tradition. As it examines late scholasticism against its institutional backdrop and contains studies of unpublished manuscripts and texts, it will remain an authoritative source for the research of late scholasticism.

Contributors: Igor Agostini (University of Salento), Monica Brînzei (CNRS–IRHT, Paris), William Duba (University of Fribourg), Matthew Gaetano (Hillsdale College), Helen Hattab (University of Houston), Lidia Lanza (University of Lisbon), Mauro Mantovani (Salesian Pontifical University), Daniel D. Novotný and Tomáš Machula (University of South Bohemia in České Budějovice), Chris Schabel (University of Cyprus), Jean-Luc Solère (Boston College), Marco Toste (University of Fribourg), Andreas Wagner (Goethe University of Frankfurt), Ueli Zahnd (University of Geneva)

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Excerpt: The Commentary Tradition on The Summa Theologiae by Lidia Lanza (Centre of Philosophy University of Lisbon) – Marco Toste (Université de Fribourg)

Why a Volume on the Commentary Tradition on the Summa Theologiae?

A great part of the history of philosophy is comprised of commentaries and commentary traditions. Indeed, a number of the major works from late antiquity up to the early modern period are commentaries. And while commentaries were abundant, only a handful of philosophical and theological works became objects of a commentary tradition spanning more than two centuries. This is above all visible in the Middle Ages, the quintessential period of the commentary traditions. During this heyday, there were a great number of commentaries, for instance, on the Bible, on the works of the corpus Aristotelicum, on medical texts, on Cicero, on Ovid and so on. However, very few later medieval texts were commented on and gave rise to a commentary tradition. Among the few that were deemed significant, we may list Peter Lombard's Sentences, Gratian's Decretum, Peter of Spain's Summulae, Dante's Divina commedia, and Thomas Aquinas' Summa Theologiae. This fact alone demonstrates the importance of the Summa Theologiae. Yet the Summa Theologiae is unique in this respect: its commentary tradition started quite a bit later (compared with the commentaries on the Sentences, the Decretum, and the Divina commedia) and is in some sense more closely connected with the late Renaissance than with the Middle Ages. The commentary tradition on the Summa Theologiae owes its existence primarily to the replacement of Peter Lombard's Sentences with the Summa Theologiae, which effectively meant that the Summa Theologiae became the standard text for teaching scholastic theology at universities in Catholic areas in Europe. Since the lectures were based on the Summa Theologiae, and produced by means of the medieval practice of dictation, reportationes of those lectures began to circulate within the universities. At the same time, commentaries on the Summa Theologiae started to be published. All this activity gave birth to a commentary tradition that lasted over two hundred years.

As with all such cases, the commentary tradition on the Summa Theologiae is not to be confounded with or subsumed into the text commented on. The act of commenting always begets something that was not in the original text or uncovers something understood as hidden in the source and in need of both expression and evaluation. The commentator is situated in a context other than the original work, engages in debates with other commentators that can go far beyond the source text, and draws on other works that appeared at a later date and that may have expanded the original issue. In the case of the Summa Theologiae, its history and influence over the centuries is not exactly the same as the history of its commentary tradition. The present volume is therefore neither a collection of articles on the reception of the Summa Theologiae nor a history of Thomism and Neo-Thomism, though it might very well contribute to it. These caveats serve to advance another: this commentary tradition should not be regarded a priori as a Thomistic and homogeneous tradition, for as the chapters in this volume will show, non-Thomistic ideas were also conveyed throughout the commentary tradition.

The aim of this volume is twofold: first, to show how the Summa Theologiae advanced to become a crucial authoritative text, how its commentary tradition emerged, and how this tradition related to medieval scholastic thought. Second, to illustrate with some case-studies how the commentaries contributed to the philosophical and theological discourse of early modern thought; more specifically, this volume explores how specific topics contained in the Summa Theologiae were interpreted by different authors over time and thereby views formulated there were deepened or transformed.

The Summa Theologiae is undoubtedly a crucial work in the Western tradition. The tremendous influence it exerted shortly after Aquinas' death in 1274 is well known and extended both to works of philosophy—the II-II became the basis for the late 13th-century Parisian commentaries on the Nicomachean Ethics—and theology, as attested to by the late 13th-century Correctoria controversy. The Summa Theologiae was even used as the main source in texts intended for broader audiences, such as the Summa confessorum by John of Freiburg and the Tractatus de virtutibus et vitiis by Jordan of Quedlinburg. The influence of the Summa Theologiae was so pervasive that it was translated into Greek and (partially) into Hebrew during the Middle Ages. Moreover, Reformed theologians in the 16th century still considered it a significant work and made extensive use of it. Nevertheless, it is evident that its status throughout the centuries cannot solely be attributed to its intrinsic philosophical value; its canonization as an authoritative text owes a great deal to other factors: its promotion within the Dominican Order in the Middle Ages and within other orders (chiefly the Jesuits) in the late Renaissance; the weight that Thomism gained as a school of thought; the declaration of Aquinas as 'Doctor of the Church' in 1567 by Pope Pius V; and the institutionalization of the Summa Theologiae as one of the texts to be read in university classes in the 16th century. The commentary tradition on the Summa Theologiae is a product of all these factors. For this reason, this introduction gives a brief account of the history and context of the commentary tradition.

Recent decades have seen a growing interest in late Scholasticism. This is attested to by the publication of numerous collective volumes on major authors, such as Molina and Suárez,5 and on specific themes, principally related to metaphysics, ethics, political thought, and the so-called 'School of Salamanca'. Moreover, volumes penned by individual authors have produced comprehensive studies taking into account both numerous and less well-known authors.6 Such an interest in late Scholasticism has led to the creation of dedicated research websites, the most significant of which is Scholasticon, in no small part due to its indispensable section Nomenclator.7 This scholarly undertaking, of which this volume is

just a part, has been changing the landscape of the research field. Nonetheless, it suffers from one problem: many of the texts produced by late scholastic authors have almost never been regarded for what they first and foremost were, that is, commentaries.

Numerous works produced during the 16th and 17th centuries were indeed nothing more than commentaries on the Summa Theologiae, even if they bear titles such as De legibus and De iustitia et iure. Jacob Schmutz has labeled the process whereby sections of the Summa Theologiae, such as De legibus or De fide, were separated from the whole and treated as if they constituted an autonomous block the 'dismantling of the Summa Theologiae'. This dismantling of texts partly had to do with the slow pace of the university lectures on the Summa Theologiae. For example, by the end of the 16th century in Salamanca, the study of the entire Summa Theologiae took sixteen years. This meant that a professor read only one section of the Summa Theologiae per academic year, and in Coimbra the sixteen questions that constitute the De fide were read by the holder of the Prime chair over the course of two academic years. More importantly, however, such a dismantling does not obliterate the fact that the commentaries were intended by their authors as commentaries on a specific part of the Summa Theologiae, thus implicitly belonging to a commentary tradition. Being part of a tradition means that these works adopted a specific approach and drew (whether explicitly or implicitly) arguments, lines of thought, and even sources from previous commentaries of that same tradition. In other words, if we approach these texts as commentaries, our assessment of any supposed originality on the part of a given author will be far more cautious, and we will be in a better position to grasp both the point and the backdrop of the discussions.

The studies contained in this volume take up this approach. By examining one specific question or article of the Summa Theologiae, and how it evolved within (or sometimes beyond) the commentary tradition, these articles provide new insights about the transmission of ideas, shed light on specific problems of early modern thought, and highlight how authors outside this tradition might have made use of the works produced within it (see the chapters by Solère and Hattab). At the same time, as the works studied here are commentaries on a medieval text and address the views of other medieval authors who opposed Aquinas, they prolong discussions that emerged in medieval Scholasticism. Thus, this volume also contributes to the understanding of how late Scholasticism related to and rested on medieval Scholasticism (see the chapters by Agostini, Mantovani, Duba, Toste, and Lanza).

By studying how a question was interpreted diachronically through more than one commentary, the approach used in this volume enables us to gain a feel for the commentary tradition, that is, how an argument passed from one commentary to another and how a given debate evolved. This approach also enables us to draw attention to some less studied authors and to grasp the importance that different commentaries might have played in the development of a discussion. The recent historiographical attention paid to some major scholastic authors, such as Molina and Suárez, has been at the expense of other key commentators, the most notable section of the Summa Theologiae, his audience was perhaps more interested in his metaphysical thought, given the number of manuscripts of his lectures on the I. As is well known, the Jesuits were even more focused on morals and politics, but we should not lose sight of the fact the three major Jesuits of the late 16th century were famous for their metaphysical thought and commentaries on the I, namely Molina, Vázquez, and Suárez.

All this suggests that we should not overplay the significance of 'practical philosophy' (or 'speculative moral theology') and moral topics for Salamanca, for late Scholasticism, and for the commentary tradition on the Summa Theologiae. As some of the chapters of this volume show, authors continued to deal with traditional topics—God's existence, angels, and substance (see the chapters by Agostini, Novotný and Machu la, and Hattab)—and many studies have long since established that metaphysical topics were fiercely debated by late scholastics and within this commentary tradition. In the 17th century, it is very likely that metaphysical questions were more debated within this tradition than moral and political topics.

The commentary tradition on the Summa Theologiae can be divided into four main periods. The first occurred in the 15th century when (German and Italian) Dominicans started to produce paraphrases, abridgements, and even literal interpretations of the Summa Theologiae (which explained the text in the form of propositions and syllogisms). Because Ueli Zahnd treats the works of this period in great detail in his chapter, we will limit ourselves here to only a few brief remarks. The earliest works on the Summa Theologiae were clearly produced for teaching purposes, although according to the available evidence the Summa Theologiae was never used in the classroom in the late 15th century (the sole exception being the work of Johannes Tinctoris). As Zahnd shows, the Summa Theologiae did not replace the Sentences in the 15th century as the textbook at the university, and the continual Dominican inclination toward the production of works that might help students to better understand the Summa Theologiae was part of a trend to produce the same kind of works on other scholastic authors, such as Scotus and Bonaventure. Almost none of the earliest works on the Summa Theologiae were printed and therefore their impact was at best negligible. The works by Laurentius Gervasii and Gerhard of Elten thus never advanced past manuscript form. The first printed works related to the Summa Theologiae were the ones by Henry of Gorkum, Clemens de Terra Salsa, and Konrad Köllin.

By the late 15th and early 16th century, a growing interest in the Summa Theologiae developed at the University of Paris38 and in Spain and Italy as well. Consequently, universities started to establish chairs dedicated to the teaching of Aquinas' doctrine—though the teaching undertaken in those chairs focused on his Sentences commentary and not on the Summa Theologiae.

Despite the reduction in the number of commentaries, it is during this initial period that Cajetan's commentary on the entire Summa Theologiae appeared (issued in Venice between 1508 and 1523), and it played a pivotal role until the end of the 16th century. The fact that no Salamancan master printed a commentary until the end of the 1570s surely helped Cajetan's work assume such a prominent position, along with the fact that, unlike the commentaries by other Dominicans, his covered the entire Summa Theologiae. This also explains why his commentary was chosen to accompany the text of the Summa Theologiae in the Piana Edition in 1569-70.

We can further understand the success of Cajetan's commentary if we compare it with one of the few commentaries printed during this period, namely the commentary by Konrad Köllin (1512). Köllin's work is a true literal commentary in that it divides the text of each article of the Summa Theologiae into lemmata and thus separately explains the solution and each argument against the solution. By contrast, Cajetan comments on each article of the Summa Theologiae, thus treating the text as one whole. In this regard, the latter commentary is considered more a text in its own right. All successive commentators followed Cajetan's approach, though over time the commentaries did increasingly gravitate toward a

scholastic arrangement of the questions, i.e. with arguments pros and cons. This, of course, does not correspond to Cajetan's characteristic explanations of the articles, which are often quite short.

Given the structure of Köllin's commentary, its impact was rather limited—it is rarely quoted by Vitoria, much less by successive Salamancan commentators. In contrast, because Cajetan did not comment on the text of each article step by step, but just focused on its critical points, he was able to give a direction to the discussion. In fact, the issues Cajetan emphasized in his explanation of an article usually went on to become the focus of successive commentators' treatments. His approach explains why he enjoyed a high degree of influence in Salamanca, though many of his positions were also the target of criticism there.

Cajetan's commentary on the Summa Theologiae belongs to the Thomistic trend of the early 16th century and has to be seen alongside other works, for example, Francesco Silvestri of Ferrara's commentary on the ScG (Venice, 1534). And within Cajetan's output, the commentary on the Summa Theologiae was just one among many commentaries he produced, whether on other texts by Aquinas, such as De ente et essentia, or works by Aristotle. This changed with Vitoria, as the Summa Theologiae became the only scholastic text theologians commented on. And another significant difference between Cajetan and Vitoria is that, while Cajetan's work is not related to his teaching, Vitoria's commentaries on the Summa Theologiae stemmed from his university lectures.

The second period of the commentary tradition begins with Francisco de Vitoria's teachings based on the Summa Theologiae in his capacity as the Prime chair of the Faculty of Theology of Salamanca (starting with the academic year 1527-28). A scholarly commonplace tells that Vitoria was merely one among many masters at various universities who introduced the Summa Theologiae as the text to be used in the classroom. This portrayal owes much to Ricardo Villoslada's work on the University of Paris. It neglects, however, a major factor: Vitoria did not adopt the Summa Theologiae while holding a university chair created specifically for the teaching of Aquinas' doctrine—the via Thomae—and which was just one chair among others dedicated to various scholastic authors, such as Duns Scotus. This was in fact the case in some universities: for instance, in Alcalá—prior to the arrival of Vitoria in Salamanca—Pedro Sánchez de Ciruelo lectured on the Summa Theologiae in a chair devoted to Aquinas. On the contrary, Vitoria started using the Summa Theologiae in the Prime chair, that is, the most prestigious chair in any faculty of theology. Vitoria is thus part of a wider movement—essentially a Dominican one—that from the late 15th century onward started paying more attention to the Summa Theologiae, and for this reason it is clear that Vitoria was not the prime initiator of any movement or trend. Having said that, Vitoria was indeed the first professor in Europe to make use of the Summa Theologiae in his capacity as Prime chair, and this is why he had such a tremendous impact. He started lecturing on the Summa Theologiae in his second academic year as professor in Salamanca, followed later by Soto in the Vespers chair, who started reading the Summa Theologiae in 1532-33. From that moment onward, the two major chairs effectively turned into chairs based on the Summa Theologiae, and no holder of these chairs after Vitoria ever read the Sentences. In this respect, Vitoria can certainly be regarded as someone who introduced an innovation. The novelty he triggered was so strongly felt that Vitoria and his successors in the Prime chair, Melchor Cano and Domingo de Soto, took care to justify the benefits of the Summa Theologiae over the Sentences.

This second period of the commentary tradition extends to the 1580s and revolves essentially around Salamanca and the Dominican order. It was from Salamanca that Vitoria's revolution spread to other places, first to Iberian universities and later to other countries. A change, however, is already noticeable in previous decades. The Jesuits started to become involved in theological higher education in the 1550s: while for much of the 1560s they tended to focus on the Sentences, by the end of the decade the Summa Theologiae had become the basis of their scholastic theological teachings. Shortly thereafter, the first Jesuit commentaries on the Summa Theologiae appeared, and although none of them was ever printed, they nevertheless circulated among Jesuit colleges. We will see later in this introduction the motifs behind the Jesuits' adoption of the Summa Theologiae, but here it is more important to underline that they were part of a movement of transmission of knowledge whose center of influence was Salamanca.

If we analyze how the Summa Theologiae was first introduced and used at universities, it immediately becomes apparent that it is often tied to former students of Salamanca—who had studied under Vitoria and Soto—that went on to teach at other universities. Since it was by no means unusual to bring along manuscripts containing lectures, they drew on and thereby disseminated the work of their former Salamancan professors. A few examples are perhaps useful in this regard. For instance, the Dominican Mart ín de Ledesma, who graduated from Salamanca and was appointed to the Vespers chair in Coimbra in 1541, took with him to Coimbra texts by Vitoria and Soto, which he based his lectures on. Later, in 1557, when Mart ín started teaching in the Prime chair in Coimbra, he adopted the same approach as Domingo de Soto in his commentary on Book IV of the Sentences: while Mart ín maintained the order of distinctiones found in the Sentences, within each distinctio he actually commented on the corresponding question of the Summa Theologiae, which means that he was actually reading the Summa Theologiae in the classroom. Once his tenure was over, when he was replaced by the Dominican António de São Domingos in 1576, the Summa Theologiae was permanently established as the textbook to be used by the Prime chair. Another such case is that of Fernando Vellosillo: he studied in Alcalá and taught in Salamanca (1544-50) and Sig üenza, where he became rector in 1541 and later held the Vespers chair (1551-66); in 1541 he copied a manuscript containing Soto's lectures on the I-II, which suggests that he did so to use Soto's ideas in his own teaching. This peregrinatio academica was quite pronounced throughout the Iberian Peninsula, and professors taught at more than one university over the course of their careers. It was precisely this heightened mobility that initially made the fast spread of the Summa Theologiae possible. And although the Dominicans played a major role, members from other religious orders also took part in this process. Two early examples of this are the secular Bartolomé de Torres and the Jesuit Francisco de Toledo. A pupil of Vitoria, Torres taught in Salamanca (1542-47) and later became a professor in Sig üenza (1547-66); his commentaries on the Summa Theologiae are clearly marked by Vitoria's influence.48 After studying under Soto in Salamanca, Francisco de Toledo taught at the Roman College. In his lectures on the Summa Theologiae, offered between 1562 and 1569, he quotes Soto and—quite remarkably—the unpublished lectures given in Salamanca by the Dominican Juan de la Peña.

Within just a few decades, the innovation introduced by Vitoria had transformed theology in Spain, and the Iberian universities started to change their statutes accordingly and to establish the Summa Theologiae as the textbook for scholastic theology. Even in Alcalá, the Dominicans were able to secure the two chairs of St. Thomas and to lecture on the Summa Theologiae in these chairs during the decisive

decades of 1540 and 1550. But not all such cases of use of the Summa Theologiae were connected to Salamanca. A notable outlier, analyzed by Matthew Gaetano in this volume, is the University of Padua, where from 1545 to 1568 Dominicans lectured on the Summa Theologiae. Moreover, as early as the 1540s, the University of Valencia was already using the Summa Theologiae in one chair and concurrently the Sentences in another.52 And it is evident that the teaching carried out there owes nothing to Salamanca—the commentary by the professor of Valencia, the Mercedarian Jerónimo Pérez, on Summa Theologiae I (published in 1547) takes an approach quite different than the one used by Vitoria and Soto in that he divides the text into dubia and notanda and refers more often to Aquinas' other works and less to other medieval scholastic authors.

In the 1550s and 1560s, not only did other universities start to adopt the Summa Theologiae but the Jesuits began to play a more significant role. In this sense, these two decades can be seen as the beginning of a development that truly came to fruition in the 1590s: the shift away from a Salamanca-centered commentary tradition to commentaries produced elsewhere, mostly at Jesuit universities, where the most significant commentaries were produced.

Starting at the end of the 1570s, another significant transformation occurred: the Dominicans of Salamanca engaged in the publication of commentaries on the Summa Theologiae. This Dominican enterprise, however, did not go unchallenged; other religious orders in Salamanca, i.e. the Augustinians and the Mercedarians, immediately set about publishing their own commentaries. Over the course of 16 years, four Salamanca n theologians were assigned the task by their respective religious order to compose commentaries on parts of the Summa Theologiae in order to be published: the Dominican Bartolomé de Medina (and later Domingo Báñez), the Augustinian Pedro de Aragón, and the Mercedarian Francisco Zumel. Their commentaries were printed in the following order: Bartolomé de Medina's commentary on the I-II (1578); Medina's commentary on the III (1584); Domingo Báñez's commentary on the II-II, qq. 1-46 (1584); Pedro de Aragón's commentary on II-II, qq. 1-46 (1584); Báñez's commentary on I, qq. 1-64 (1585); Zumel's commentary on the I (1585-87, 2 vols.); Pedro de Aragón's commentary on II-II, qq. 57-100 (1590); Báñez's commentary on II-II, qq. 57-88 (1594); Zumel's commentary on I-II, qq. 71-89 (1594). As this list clearly shows, the Dominicans were the only order whose printed commentaries covered all the parts of the Summa Theologiae and their commentaries proved to be more influential; in fact, Medina's and Báñez' commentaries were the only ones of this list to be reissued in other countries.

These were, however, not the first commentaries to be printed in Spain: Soto in Salamanca (1558-60), Mart ín de Ledesma (1555-60), and Francisco de Cristo (1579) in Coimbra all published Sentences commentaries whose structure was indebted to the Summa Theologiae . And, as noted above, the Mercedarian Jerónimo Pérez, in Valencia, and Bartolomé de Torres, in Sig üenza, published partial commentaries on Summa Theologiae I in 1548 and 1567, respectively.

But the publication of commentaries on the Summa Theologiae associated with the University of Salamanca had a greater impact, since Salamanca was the most important uni versity on the Iberian Peninsula and not merely a regional university like Sigüenza, Valencia, or even Coimbra. Moreover, by the late 1570s, numerous universities had already adopted the Summa Theologiae as their primary theological textbook. This meant that there was a market for the printed commentaries by Medina, Báñez, and Aragón on different parts of the Summa Theologiae.

This editorial enterprise on the part of the Dominicans can be understood as an endeavour to compete with other religious orders that were gaining prominence in Salamanca, principally the Augustinians and the Jesuits. It can also be seen as a response to the role assigned to Cajetan's commentary, which had been printed along with the Summa Theologiae in the Piana edition and therefore had gained a kind of 'official status'. But whatever the reason, such an enterprise had a major impact. From that moment onward, the Salamancan commentaries started to be read throughout Europe. We should bear in mind that almost all the manuscripts containing Salamancan commentaries are preserved in Iberian libraries and in the Vatican Library (in a group of manuscripts that nonetheless arrived there at a later period from Spain). This means that the Salamancan commentaries did not cross the Pyrenees and that the situation changed only in the 1580s, that is, when commentaries on the Summa Theologiae produced in Salamanca started to be published. Prior to the 1580s, the Salamancan theologians were known and read in Europe only thanks to their printed texts, none of which was (nominally) a commentary on the Summa Theologiae.

This second period of the commentary tradition comprises four characteristics. First, the commentaries tend, over time, to be arranged in the scholastic question-form, that is, with arguments pro and con plus a solution. This format eventually helped liberate authors from the text commented on, a development clearly evident in the third period of the commentary tradition. Second, the commentaries take the Summa Theologiae as a starting point and significantly broaden the discussion of some articles—notable examples are II-II, q. 1 (on the object of faith) and II-II, q. 62 (on restitution), whose lengthy discussions resemble independent treatises on these subjects. Third, the commentaries still discuss medieval scholastic authors—obviously only those authors whose works were available in print.60 Fourth, with very few exceptions, they do not feel the need to address the views of Franciscan authors (Scotus is probably the most quoted Franciscan author). The motif lies in the very limited presence of Franciscans in Iberian universities and in the dearth of works of scholastic theology produced by Spanish Franciscans. This all started to change in 1560, when the general congregation of the Franciscans established the reading of Scotus in their studia. In the decades that followed, the number of theological works published by Spanish Franciscans began to increase. And within this context, it should thus come as no surprise that in Báñez's commentary on the II-II (1584), more specifically in his interpretation of q. 33, on fraternal correction, he feels compelled to spend several pages discussing in detail the view of the Franciscan Bernardino de Arévalo, who had argued in 1557 for the illegitimacy of fraternal correction.

The third period of the commentary tradition begins in the 1590s. The number of printed commentaries skyrocketed—significantly broadening their readership and thus fostering the exchange of ideas and criticism among commentators—and the debates increased in their sophistication. All this arguably makes this period the most important of the commentary tradition on the Summa Theologiae. This is also the period in which a Dominican-centered commentary tradition gives way to a scene dominated by the Jesuits.

This period began when, in the wake of the Salamancan Dominicans, Jesuits started publishing commentaries: Molina's Concordia (1588), which is somewhat a commentary on some questions of the I; Francisco Suárez's commentary on III, qq. 1-26 (1590); Luis de Molina's commentary on the I (1592); Gregory of Valencia's commentaries on the I and I-II (1592), II-II (1596), and III (1597); and Gabriel Vázquez's commentaries on the I (1598), I-II (1598-1605), and III (1609-1615). One could also mention Francisco Suárez's main works, published mostly in the 1600s; nevertheless, the greater part of his

output is to be understood as commentaries on the Summa Theologiae, broadly understood. It is worth noting that although three of the four aforementioned Jesuit authors are somehow connected with Salamanca—Molina studied law there for a while; Gregory of Valencia earned his bachelor degree there; and he and Suárez studied at the Salamancan Jesuit College—their commentaries are related to the teaching carried out in other institutions: Molina in Evora, Vázquez at the Roman College and principally in Alcalá; Gregory of Valencia in Dillingen and later in Ingolstadt; and Suárez in several places, but mainly at the Roman College, Alcalá, and Coimbra.

This third period definitely widens the commentary tradition's scope: it is no longer confined to Iberian universities and Jesuit colleges. Salamanca, nevertheless, continued to be a source of important commentaries, such as those by Francisco Araújo, Agustín Antolínez, Pedro de Godoy, and the Cursus theologicus of the Salmanticenses. But by the beginning of the 17th century, Salamanca underwent another crucial change. The Dominicans held the Prime chair from 1526 to 1604, i.e. from Vitoria to Báñez, and the Vespers chair from 1532 to 1565, i.e. from Soto to Juan de la Peña. They also held the minor chairs of St. Thomas and Durand—the latter from 1575 to 1596. However, the Augustinians slowly started to secure the two major chairs and even some minor chairs, ending the dominance of the Dominicans. A few dates should suffice to illustrate this: the Vespers chair was held by the Augustinians Juan Guevara (1565-1600), Juan Márquez (1607-21), and Francisco Cornejo (1621-30); and the Prime chair was held by Antolínez (1609-26), Basilio Ponce de León (1626-29), and Francisco Cornejo (1630-38). Already in the second half of the 16th century, other Augustinians such as Pedro de Aragón, Luis de León, and Alfonso de Mendoza had already held the chairs of St. Thomas, Durand, and Scotus. And while the Dominicans were still influential and one of the major commentaries of the period was authored by the Dominican John of St. Thomas (João Poinsot), professor in Alcalá, in this third period, the role of the Dominicans was definitely inferior to that of the Jesuits. By the turn of the century, Alcalá had also become a renowned center of commentary production, as the cases of Gabriel Vázquez, the Cistercian Pedro de Lorca, and the secular Luis Montesinos illustrate. Spain remained a key region for the commentary tradition, though at this point it had more to do with the Spanish Jesuits, who produced some of the most influential commentaries (read outside Iberia) of this period: Pedro Hurtado de Mendoza, Agustín de Herrera, Diego Granado, Diego Ruiz de Montoya, Juan de Lugo, and Antonio Pérez (the last two also active at the Roman College). The importance of Spain in this period also relates to another factor: as the degree of academic mobility remained high, many scholars started off teaching in Spain and went on to pursue their careers abroad, in this way contributing to the transmission of ideas. The cases of the Jesuits who went from Spain and Portugal to lecture at the Roman College, and of Gregory of Valencia, who went to Dillingen and Ingolstadt, and Arriaga, who taught in Prague, are perhaps the most well-known cases. But many others scholars are also worthy of note, and exiled Catholic Irishmen and Britons played a definite part in this transmission of ideas, either because they studied in Spain and went on to teach in other parts of Europe or because they taught in the numerous Irish, Scot, and English colleges across continental Europe, from Lisbon to Rome, from Salamanca to Paris and Louvain.65 Moreover, apart from the Roman College, other colleges attracted foreign scholars, the Dominican convent of Santa Maria sopra Minerva being an exemplary case.

As the publication of commentaries on the Summa Theologiae increased in the 1580s (in Salamanca) and in 1590s (thanks to the Jesuits), the circulation of manuscripts containing commentaries started to dwindle. On the Iberian Peninsula, but also in France and among the German Jesuit Colleges,

commentaries produced between the 1580s and the 1610s still circulated in manuscript form, but this almost came to a complete halt around 1615. The University of Coimbra is a case in point, for its library still conserves manuscripts of Salamancan commentaries produced at the turn of the century that never made it to print or were printed at a later date. Commentaries transmitted only in manuscript form continued to be read, on occasion quoted, and sometimes even discussed, but as time went on, especially after the first two decades of the 17th century, this became a residual practice.

In this period, numerous commentaries were produced all over Europe: from France to Central Europe, and from Italy to Germany. Thanks principally to the Jesuits, the Summa Theologiae was by then the text used in the chairs of scholastic theology, and, beyond the Dominicans and the Jesuits, other religious orders embraced the teaching of theology based on the Summa Theologiae (see later in this introduction). The success enjoyed by the Summa Theologiae was overwhelming, albeit not equally everywhere. Despite its extensive use in teaching, important late scholastic authors did not produce commentaries and preferred instead other literary forms for their works—this is evident in German Catholic universities, where only a minority composed commentaries on the Summa Theologiae. At a time when Catholic theologians sought to intervene in their political and social realities and publicly dispute with Protestants, a commentary on the Summa Theologiae was probably perceived as a straitjacket. This might explain why Bellarmine never published his Louvain lectures on the Summa Theologiae and opted instead to work on his Disputationes de controversiis christianae fidei adversus huius temporis haereticos (1586-89).

This third period somewhat represents a break with the second period. Because the greater part of commentaries produced in the University of Salamanca, in the first Jesuit universities, and in some other universities during the second period remained unpublished, the commentators of this third period hardly ever quote commentaries from the second period of the commentary tradition. This is not to suggest that there is no continuity whatsoever. Bartolomé de Medina's commentaries on the I-II and III are telling in this regard: they were published in 1578 and 1584 and therefore were available to later authors. However, as Medina himself avows in the prologue to his commentary on Summa Theologiae I-II, he made use of manuscripts containing lectures of Salamancan professors who preceded him, and indeed many of Medina's lines of reasoning are taken from previous commentators. What is more, at the beginning of their discussion of articles of the Summa Theologiae, commentators such as Suárez and Vázquez often mention a set of scholastic authors (sometimes more than ten) that constitute the opinio communis about the topic at hand; however, the greater part of those authors were already quoted in the same form, i.e. as a group, by the Salamancan commentators.

While previous commentators are almost never quoted—Cajetan being the main exception—the commentators of the third period engaged much more than their predecessors in arguments with their contemporary commentators. In the second period, given the reduced number of places where the Summa Theologiae was used, authors did not explicitly disagree with other commentators, or if they did, it usually involved Cajetan. For instance, very rarely did a Salamancan commentator criticize other commentators, since it implied a criticism of a fellow professor within the same faculty. By contrast, the third period is marked by harsh criticism of other commentators, even within members of the same religious order—the Jesuits being the most salient example.

The sheer number of universities using the Summa Theologiae in the third period meant that there was a greater variety of approaches to the texts commented on; this also increased the likelihood of encountering specific local readings of the Summa Theologiae. Sven Knebel highlighted the role of two commentators in the Jesuit College of Seville— Diego Ruiz de Montoya and Diego Granado—in the development of the idea of 'the best of all possible worlds'. And we can also mention the distinctive approach of the commentaries produced in Louvain: scholastic theology there had been down-played during the 16th century in favor of Augustine's works. This is reflected in the commentaries by Jan van Malderen, Johannes Wiggers, and Guillaume Merchier, in which Augustine and the Fathers of the Church are extensively mentioned and the scholastic commentators ignored. And in another work related to Louvain, namely Lessius' De iustitia et iure, the references to scholastic authors are much less frequent than in Molina's De iustitia et iure.74 A further relevant case might be the College of Sorbonne, since there the three professors lecturing on the Summa Theologiae in the early 17th century were seculars, which stands in stark contrast to all the other places it was used, for at the Sorbonne the lectures were undertaken by seculars and not by Jesuits or Dominicans.

Finally, this period is marked by great controversies, the most significant being the De auxiliis controversy. Although this controversy originated outside the commentary tradition, it was eventually integrated into it. As the commentaries more and more emancipated themselves from the Summa Theologiae, it is not surprising that the discussion of topics eventually exceeds its confines. An example suffices to give us an idea of the evolution of the commentaries and their emancipation from the Summa Theologiae: while Soto's De iustitia et iure—though not presented as a commentary—followed by and large the order of questions and articles of the Summa Theologiae, Molina's De iustitia et iure, published nearly half a century later, bears little resemblance to the Summa Theologiae. It is worth noting that Molina, by the end of the 16th century, was complaining about the inadequacy of Aquinas' De iustitia et iure because of the lack of topics treated. In this third period, the commentaries also became quite lengthy—sometimes a commentary covers just one section of the Summa Theologiae, like De fide, or De legibus, and so on.

The fourth and final period of the commentary tradition begins in the mid-17th century and extends to the end of the 18th century—it coincides thus with the end of Scholasticism.77 Commentaries, whose relation to the text of the Summa Theologiae was rather nominal, continued to be produced, sometimes in multi-volume editions and tended to treat the entire Summa Theologiae. Rodrigo de Arriaga's Disputationes theologicae (1643-55; 8 vols.) initiated just such a trend. He was followed by among others Thomas Compton Carleton (1659-62; 2 vols.); Augustine Gibbon Burke (1669-79, 7 vols.);78 Pedro de Godoy (1686; 3 vols.); Augustin Reding von Biberegg (1687; 13 vols.); Bonifacio Maria Grandi (1692-97; 3 vols.); Giovanni Claudio Pozzobonelli (1703-8; 4 vols.); Vincenzo Ludovico Gotti (1727-35; 16 vols.); and Charles René Billuart (1746-51; 6 vols.). While the former four were still used by later authors, the latter two are just archaic products that owe more to previous times—Gott i earned his doctorate in Salamanca, and Billuart still makes abundant use of Cajetan, Soto, Báñez, and Spanish Jesuit authors. In this period the number and impact of the commentaries completely diminished beyond the strict field of convents and faculties of theology. In many cases, instead of a genuine commentary, the works produced in this period bear the words iuxta ordinem Thomae in their titles and are rather a presentation of Aquinas' doctrine. The reference to the Summa Theologiae occasionally appears in titles of works, but such works are rather Disputationes and Cursus theologici, which hold only a loose

connection to the Summa Theologiae, e.g. the Cursus theologicus of the Jesuit Mart ín de Esparza y Artieda. The Cursus are often collective initiatives and related to a local university or convent, the Collegium Salmanticense being the most famous.80 However, many lectures on the Summa Theologiae stemming from classes in seminaries and faculties of theology have survived, though only in manuscript form, as they were not intended to be published and read outside the classroom. This was primarily the case in Southern Europe and in the colonial Spanish Empire. <>

THE LIGHT THAT BINDS: A STUDY IN THOMAS AQUINAS'S METAPHYSICS OF NATURAL LAW by Stephen L. Brock [Pickwick Publications, 9781532647291]

If there is any one author in the history of moral thought who has come to be associated with the idea of natural law, it is Saint Thomas Aquinas. Many things have been written about Aquinas's natural law teaching, and from many different perspectives. The aim of this book is to help see it from his own perspective. That is why the focus is metaphysical. Aquinas's whole moral doctrine is laden with metaphysics, and his natural law teaching especially so, because it is all about first principles. The book centers on how Aquinas thinks the first principles of practical reason, which for him are what make up natural law, function as laws. It is a controversial question, and the book engages a variety of readers of Aquinas, including Francisco Suárez, Jacques Maritain, prominent analytical philosophers, Straussians, and the initiators of the New Natural Law theory. Among the issues addressed are the relation between natural law and natural inclination, how far natural law depends on knowledge of human nature, what its obligatory force consists in, and, above all, how it is related to what for Aquinas is the first principle of all being, the divine will.

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Excerpt: "The law of nature," declares Saint Thomas, "is nothing other than the light of the intellect instilled in us by God, through which we know what is to be done and what is to be avoided." Of course, it is not a physical light. "As it pertains to intellect, light is nothing other than a certain manifestation of truth." In his more technical moments, Thomas will distinguish a little between the mind's light and natural law, the law being a set of truths, and the light being what manifests them and lets us understand them. But once lit up, the truths are also a light, showing us a path to follow. In some sense they even oblige us, bind us, to that path. Natural law is a light that binds.

The question running through the following pages is how exactly it is, for Aquinas, that the truths of natural law constitute a genuine law and carry real binding force. I shall motivate the question and survey various answers that it has received in chapter 1. There I shall also explain the plan of the rest. Here I would like to say something about my subtitle.

By far the bulk of Thomas's writing on natural law is found in his masterpiece, the Summa theologiae. So situated, it is obviously a theological teaching. I hope that I have kept its theological character sufficiently in view. Nevertheless, as with many of the topics presented in the Summa, its treatment of natural law involves very heavy use of philosophical sources and arguments. This is hardly surprising, if indeed natural law itself is a work of the human mind's natural light. For that is also philosophy's proper light. I see no need to apologize for wanting to concentrate on Thomas's philosophy of natural law.

Philosophy, though, has many parts. The truths of natural law, Thomas tells us, constitute the first principles of practical reason. The practical part of philosophy is moral philosophy or ethics. Metaphysics, by contrast, is speculative or theoretical, not practical. What has metaphysics got to do with natural law?

The truths of natural law are certainly not, for Thomas, the first principles of metaphysics itself. The field of metaphysics is all of reality, being itself, and its own principles are more far-reaching, and even more basic, than those that bear only on human conduct. Of course human conduct is a being too—it exists— and so its principles do somehow fall within the metaphysical purview. The metaphysician can speculate about anything. But the study of human conduct in light of the truths of natural law, both in its matter and in its purpose, is surely a practical undertaking. By that very fact, natural law pertains to moral philosophy.

It is one thing, however, to study a field in light of its principles. It is another thing to study the principles themselves. In Thomas's conception of philosophy, studying the principles of any field whatever is a metaphysical task. Every other part of philosophy takes the principles of its field for granted and seeks only to draw out the implications from them that make for full mastery of that field. Moral philosophy draws practical conclusions from the principles of natural law. But the fundamental treatment of all first principles, both those of metaphysics itself and those of the other parts of philosophy, whether speculative or practical, belongs to metaphysics. The mere fact that the principles are really principles and not conclusions—the fact that they do not need to be demonstrated, in light of other principles— does not preclude such treatment. For instance, the principles still need to be identified. The terms

comprising them need to be clarified so as to achieve and to judge the precise formulations of them. And doubts or difficulties about them can arise and need to be resolved. These are metaphysical exercises.

Moreover, if metaphysics has one primary task, it is to trace all the fields of philosophy and all of their principles back to the very first explanations or causes of all reality and all truth. This is metaphysics in its character as wisdom. And among the various kinds of cause that Thomas recognizes, the dominant one—the one that explains the others—is the final cause, the end, that for the sake of which the others function as they do. Every final cause or end is some sort of good. Indeed the notion of the good is itself something metaphysical, "among the firsts." And the absolutely ultimate end is the supreme good, which is God. Every other end and good is for the sake of His good. All of this gives metaphysics an obvious affinity with theology, and also a special bearing on natural law. For natural law rests entirely on the notion of the good, and the whole point of natural law is to provide us with our first guidance toward our own ultimate end. Within philosophy, the final word on man's end belongs to metaphysics, not ethics. This is why Thomas can even say that metaphysics regulates all human activities, all of them being ordered to that end. Practical thinking does not determine the end itself, but only assumes it and disposes the things that are for its sake.

But perhaps most importantly, at least as far as this book is concerned, the very question of how Thomas thinks natural law constitutes a law is closely tied to the question of his view of its relation to God. In a sense, the whole book is an attempt to determine the meaning and drift of his famous description of natural law as "nothing other than a participation of the eternal law in the rational creature." The eternal law is God's law. If only for this reason, the perspective cannot but be heavily metaphysical.

Let me stress, however, that this is only a study "in" Aquinas's metaphysics of natural law. I make no pretense of exhausting the matter. Much more could be said, for example, about his metaphysics of the good and the bad.

Some features of the book may make more sense to the reader if something is said about its rather protracted gestation. Three decades ago I defended a dissertation in Medieval Studies at the University of Toronto on "The Legal Character of Natural Law according to St Thomas Aquinas," under the direction of the late James P. Reilly. Wisely—he was a very practical man—Dr. Reilly advised me to follow the fairly common practice of Toronto medievalists and not to try at once to turn the dissertation into a book. Luckily I took the advice. Over the years the thing did spawn a few articles, and those, together with the degree, seemed to constitute a satisfactory yield. Lately, however, I have been encouraged to publish it after all. I dusted it off, and (for better or worse) I found myself still in substantial agreement with it. Having recently worked with Wipf and Stock and been very happy with both the process and the result, I proposed it to them, and they kindly accepted.

Originally I thought that, beyond putting the material in book form, little more would be needed. The more I got back into it, however, the more I realized that my understanding of Aquinas's natural law teaching had actually evolved somewhat. An overhaul was called for. This showed the wisdom of Dr. Reilly's advice, and I regret that it is now too late to thank him.

The result has not been a complete transformation. The overall structure, the position that I take on the study's fundamental question, and most of the lines of argument, are the same. The changes are least in the first two chapters. Readers may notice that most of the scholarly literature surveyed in chapter 1 already existed when I wrote the dissertation. I think that the older literature is still interesting and that it does cover the main positions that can be taken on my question. At least, no significantly new position has come to my attention, and the chief purpose of the survey is simply to present the issues that I think need to be addressed. There are more references to subsequent publications in the later chapters. But this is not, after all, another dissertation, and it is quite long enough as it is.

Just in case anyone actually did see the dissertation, the main philosophical developments (if that is what they are) appear in what are now the third, sixth, and last chapters. Those in the third mostly regard the way in which the precepts of natural law can be seen as effects of the divine will and the divine command ordering all things toward the divine common good. This may be the book's philosophically most important moment, and I return to it in the last chapter. The last chapter also calls attention to what Thomas calls natural law "absolutely considered," which is a notion that had not previously struck me, and the chapter ends with a thought that came to me only recently about the relation between natural law and Thomas's definition of law in general. The chief development in the sixth chapter, vis-à-vis the dissertation, is a substantially different account of the general nature of obligation. As for the fourth and fifth chapters, they were originally one, of fewer pages; the division into two represents not so much a change in the views advanced as a desire to bolster the arguments, these being perhaps, in the current scholarly scene, the book's most contentious ones.

I hope it is clear that this is a historical study. I wish only to offer a tolerably accurate reading of Thomas on natural law. I am not proposing a natural law theory of my own, even a "Thomistic" one. There are several such theories out there that are quite worthy of study. Some of them I have engaged elsewhere. But here I try not to stray too far from Aquinas's texts. Perhaps this will account for at least some of the omissions, or near omissions, that some readers may otherwise find glaring.

As for Aquinas's texts themselves, for the most part I have not included the Latin originals. This is mainly in consideration of space and of their being so easily accessible nowadays, thanks especially to Enrique Alarcón's marvelous "Corpus Thomisticum" website. Unless otherwise indicated, translations in the book are mine. <>

THEOLOGICAL ETHICS THROUGH A MULTISPECIES LENS: THE EVOLUTION OF WISDOM, VOLUME I by Celia E. Deane-Drummond [Oxford University Press, 9780198843344]

Engages with new evolutionary hypotheses, recent discussions in evolutionary anthropology and new multispecies approaches to ethnography and provides a constructive approach to the biosocial evolution of key virtues of compassion, justice and wisdom

There are two driving questions informing this book. The first is where does our moral life come from? The presupposition is that considering morality broadly is inadequate. Instead, different aspects need to

be teased apart. It is not sufficient to assume that different virtues are bolted onto a vicious animality, red in tooth and claw. Nature and culture have interlaced histories. By weaving in evolutionary theories and debates on the evolution of compassion, justice, and wisdom, the book shows a richer account of who we are as moral agents. The second driving question concerns our relationships with animals. There is dissatisfaction with animal rights frameworks and an argument instead for a more complex community-based multispecies approach. Hence, rather than extending rights, a more radical approach is a holistic multispecies framework for moral action. This need not weaken individual responsibility. The intention is not to develop a manual of practice, but rather to build towards an alternative philosophically informed approach to theological ethics, including animal ethics. The theological thread weaving through this account is wisdom. Wisdom has many different levels, and in the broadest sense is connected with the flow of life understood in its interconnectedness and sociality. It is profoundly theological and practical. In naming the project the evolution of wisdom a statement is being made about where wisdom may have come from and its future orientation. But justice, compassion, and conscience are not far behind, especially in so far as they are relevant to both individual decision-making and institutions.

Develops a theology of wisdom that includes attention to both individuals and institutions.

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Excerpt:

I intend to make clear precisely what I am arguing for in this book, how this will be connected to the larger project as a whole (which includes two more volumes), and how this is connected with previous work that I have begun to sketch out in The Wisdom of the Liminal: Evolution and Other Animals in Human Becoming, published in 2014.

My aim in The Wisdom of the Liminal was to write a new theological anthropology, one that took into account both the depth of Christian traditions and the extent of research in evolutionary anthropology and the related topic of animal studies. While I argued for a different way of framing what it is to be human that challenged the human/animal binary often lodged uncritically within theological discourse, I also demonstrated on numerous occasions how the Christian tradition provided rich resoAurces for a very different understanding of humanity's relationships with animals. I also showed how that theological

research could engage in helpful conversations with evolutionary anthropology and, even though the basic assumptions of that research are different, there are some common questions related to human meaning and origins. Reason, freedom, language, and morality were the main ingredients that I teased out in the book since these very characteristics have habitually been offered as a way of asserting human supremacy over animals, and also used in the Christian tradition to define the meaning of human uniqueness as made in the image of God, imago Dei. I began to press for a different way of understanding what it means to be human in terms of relationships with animals in a common multispecies community. I touched on Marc Bekoff's understanding of wild justice as play and the theoretical framework for social justice that Martha Nussbaum presents in her capabilities approach. Theologically, the liminal intellectual space also included our relationship with the divine that reflects the divine image in us, grounded in Christology, with divine likeness understood as characteristic of all animals and creaturely kinds. That divine likeness should not be seen as demeaning for such creatures, but a way of affirming their goodness before God.

However, as I came to the end of that work I became acutely aware of areas requiring much more development, not least about the evolution of morality and virtues in particular. Rather than crafting morality as a single basket into which all our different capacities or dispositions might be placed, I consider that it is far more fruitful to tease out what that morality might look like in terms of specific tendencies for empathy, compassion, justice, and practical wisdom that in evolutionary terms becomes translated into other regard, inequity aversion, and symbolic thinking. Furthermore, rather than thinking of a valuer and what is valued in a single encounter, what has become clear to me in writing the present volume is that human valuation is part of a meshwork in a dynamic system, one that includes other animals (and indeed, other organisms including plants) in so far as what is valued from their perspective connects or conflicts with our own. This interspecies or, perhaps better, multispecies approach presents a very different theoretical and philosophical basis for ethical practice, especially that in relation to animals, which has been dominated by the rhetoric of animal rights. I have also in this book made a self-conscious effort to spell out as clearly as I can philosophical questions and issues compared with the Wisdom of the Liminal, finding inspiration for a different philosophy of life in the work of anthropologist Tim Ingold, philosopher Cynthia Willett, as well as drawing on the work of French phenomenologist Paul Ricoeur, whose understanding of self as another and justice can, I suggest, be stretched to provide a more nuanced basis for interspecies/multispecies ethics, even though he did not move in this direction himself.

In Weaving of Wisdom, the introduction opening this book, I lay out the reasons for my particular theological and philosophical starting points and the evolutionary premises in relation to alternatives. Part of this material connects with aspects of the evolution of cooperation covered in The Wisdom of the Liminal. I am deliberately naming all three volumes the evolution of wisdom rather than the evolution of morality, because wisdom is itself about making connections, and is sufficiently fluid as a term to be flexible in what it can encompass, while not being quite as vague as morality. I deal with the more specific discussion of wisdom in a number of chapters, while cross-referencing to wisdom throughout the work, so wisdom also becomes a way of linking all the different chapters together.

In Chapter 1, I dive into a discussion of animal rights in order to set this volume within the intellectual framework of alternative approaches to animal ethics, even though I do not dwell on issues of practical animal ethics. The ethics agenda from a more theoretical perspective is the basic question at the back of

my mind in this volume, while for the Wisdom of the Liminal to face up to the tendency for ill and evil, what Christians have called sin. Volume 2 is therefore more explicitly theological in its framing, and I start with a discussion of Augustine's original sin, not least because it has had and continues to have such a profound cultural impact. I also draw on Sergii Bulgakov's understanding of evil as shadow Sophia, but take it up in a new way. But what are the deeper roots of these tendencies for ill, and how might that play out in multispecies relationships? French philosopher Paul Ricoeur comes to my aid again here because he was not only a profound and careful phenomenologist, but also, unlike Augustine, his understanding of evil and finitude tried to take into account its natural roots. I do not follow all his suggestions, but I do think that it helps frame discussions that follow where I explore the evolutionary, psychological, and theological interpretations of specific dispositions named vices. This is a new approach to what has sometimes been termed natural evil, and I hope to show that the split between natural and moral evil is not as sharp as it might seem, even though the self-consciousness of human beings puts their acts into a different ethical category.

Volume 3 moves from tendencies to sin in Volume 2 to a discussion of the evolution of morality in context of an evolution of religion and Thomas Aquinas's understanding of specific virtues infused by the grace of God. Ricoeur's discussion of narratives is also helpful. This volume faces more difficult questions of dissonance between theology and evolutionary anthropology, even though explanatory accounts of dispositions for justice, compassion, and practical wisdom in the first two volumes began such questioning. I interrogate contemporary debates on transhumanism that provide new approaches to transcendence, bearing in mind the length of humanity's relationships with tools. Over the three volumes I am not attempting a neo-Hegelian approach to this debate, or even necessarily suggesting that infused virtues can be separated from the acquired virtues grounded in our evolutionary and biological becoming. However, Volume 3 does open up further questions about the role of the Holy Spirit in the life of the world.

By breaking up this material into manageable pieces, my hope is that readers will appreciate both the enormity of this task, but also its contribution to theological ethics, as well as the dynamism of the conversation possible between science and theology more broadly. I recognize that there are still plenty of gaps to fill in here, and if I have done anything to inspire the reader to start working on those gaps, then I will have achieved my aim. One gap that I know is important and needs further discussion is that of symbiosis, both in the varieties of mutualism and parasitism.' However, as this discussion is more about the fundamental biological incorporation of different agents within each other either for good or ill, I see that discussion as a background to multispecies approaches. There are fewer ethical issues associated with symbiosis, though its prevalence in the biological world is perhaps one more reason why a multispecies approach is coherent with basic biological thinking. It is another example of an area that is sorely neglected in public understanding of biology compared with competitive models of interspecies association.

The search for wisdom is an ongoing and never-ending task, and this work is just one contribution towards that search. I believe wisdom to be the right framing for this whole project, not least because of its diversity in terms of virtue (as practical wisdom and wisdom proper), but also because it is necessary, in my view, in order to understand all other dispositions, including that supreme theological virtue, charity. Science, too, brings its own form of wisdom, and I remain grateful and in debt to all those who have been patient enough to share their insights with me along the way. But science as technology also

has a darker side that is capable of fostering ambiguous desires towards transcendence and transhumanism that encourage disincarnation. The question—requiring a considerable exercise of wisdom—as to whether these are idolatrous or true expressions of human creativity will be left to Volume 3.

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Towards Wisdom Practices

Drawing the various threads together that have made up this book is a challenging task, not least because every topic of exploration has opened up new questions, new challenges in interpretation, and sometimes unresolved puzzles. In the first instance I will highlight what I understand as the key concepts that have emerged in working through these threads. This will provide the background through which to consider in a limited way some examples of practical ethics.

First, one overriding thread that I have consistently sought to demonstrate is that consideration of different facets of human morality as if they were purely the product of a disembodied reasoning mind is no longer convincing. This does not mean that Kantian ethics is totally redundant, but that there needs to be far more awareness of its limitations. Looking back into deep time and speculation on the evolution of morality offers an evolutionary naturalism that, left unmodified, opposes Kantian theories. However, there are tensions and philosophical difficulties here as well, not least because arguments seem to be circular, for what is explained as arising through evolutionary selection pressures relies on empirical forms of reasoning that can then equally be scrutinized through evolutionary explanations. The standard Neo-Darwinian paradigm of evolution by natural selection that most theologians and philosophers adopt as a reference point does not take sufficient account of alternative hypotheses on biological and cultural evolution. These alternatives are more promising for the present project, as they open up more complex ways of considering how humanity came to be a moral agent, in so far as they stress the ecological niches in which humans and all other creatures have been and still are to a large extent situated, even if city dwelling has shielded many of us from that reality. Further, there is an important difference between seeking to explain how different and particular human capacities have evolved, including capacities for moral agency, and assuming that the content of that morality is thereby adequately understood simply through evolutionary explanations. Cultural evolutionary biologists edge towards such claims, though at their best their arguments are, in the most serious studies, suitably qualified in terms of the conclusions that can be reached. Similar tensions exist in evolutionary explanations of religion.

Second, widening the moral sphere to include animals in the manner that animal rights discourse has attempted to do, repeats the same mistakes of (a) beginning with humans and then extending that domain, and (b) focusing on a rational appraisal of (i) who are or who are not subjects of a life, (ii) who are or who are not capable of sentience, or, in the liberationist approach of Singer, (iii) what overall process leads to the maximum levels of flourishing, according to a utilitarian calculus. While Singer has accused the Catholic church of speciesism, the animal rights movement that he helped initiate relies on species-specific use of rights language that is a term grounded in humanism. Given that, it is hardly surprising that many who support human rights object to the term being used in the case of other animals, as it can seem to weaken the value of those who are claiming that right by such a comparative rhetoric with animals. Comparative rhetoric, historically at least, were often disguised forms of abuse.

So, there is an equal risk of humanity, or even worse of different supposedly less 'developed' cultures within humanity, being degraded, rather than the opposite intention to elevate other animals to the human plane. The rhetoric against hierarchical schema on the basis of shared sentience sits uneasily alongside the use of rights language, that in some cases applies only to mammalian species like our own.

I have proposed an alternative multispecies approach in this book that focuses on the deep roots of core virtues of justice, love, and wisdom, and by doing so generally avoids foregrounding rights language. Further, wisdom puts stress on an interlaced, relational approach, while including rather than rejecting reason. It is the narrowly proscribed and disembodied reasoning that fails to gain traction. The evolution of wisdom is therefore holistic, inclusive, and open to the transcendent. I believe such a wisdom-informed multispecies approach is more likely to encourage a deeper appreciation for the special importance of other animal lives in their rich diversity. I am not suggesting that animal rights has been completely unsuccessful in the practical sphere of animal ethics; certainly its campaigns for what are sometimes known as the three Rs of replacement, reduction, and refinement have led to important improvements in animal welfare. But it has not so far been all that successful in providing a solid basis for why animals are also so important for human identity, not so much in terms of their instrumental usefulness, but as part of, and integral to, our shared evolutionary history and present multispecies reality.

Third, the term morality is itself too broad to be really useful, and a kaleidoscope of different aspects of what morality entails helps to deepen analysis of the complex origins of different human tendencies to do good or ill, virtue or vice. I have focused in this book on just some of the important virtues of the moral life. I have referred to justice on numerous occasions, as this characteristic is particularly interesting in that it joins up individual moral virtue with more collective and structural dimensions of what it means to live in a just society. I think the jury is still out on how far and to what extent other social animals can display 'wild justice'. It is certainly fully functional, however, within their communities, most often in the form of fairness expressed as inequity aversion or in some cases play behaviour. Care needs to be taken not to assume that the tendencies towards this behaviour in different social animals, especially primates, are necessarily a template for the way justice needs to be understood in human communities. The fact that there is some resonance, however, is interesting and important to consider. Justice as virtue also overlaps with the notion of natural right and natural law, both of which have been dominant in discussions of moral theology.

Multispecies communities were the norm in evolutionary terms and this way of living still impacts our own social world, even though it is sometimes difficult to recognize. Love is sometimes thought of as a theological virtue, though prior to a full-blown transcendent version the capacity for other regard shows up in many other social species. I have concentrated in this volume on the virtue of compassion, which can be thought of as in some but not in all respects related to more developed and sacrificial forms of other regard. Cooperation is complicated by being both a tool for the greater good of a specific group of social animals, but also potentially greater violence towards outsiders. Bonds of affection between members of different species are, however, quite common, and show up in an important way in patterns of domestication in human communities prior to the subsequent treatment of animals in more mechanistic terms. Wisdom, too, goes back deep into time and human origins—in so far as it has a specifically human quality—though it does not seem to be in evidence as far back in the evolutionary account of hominins in comparison with compassion. There are, however, behaviours of other life forms

that look from our own perspective rather like practical wisdom, just as there are behaviours that look rather like expressions of compassion or perhaps wild justice. But it is the specific way that humans can remember and their specific capacity to make long-term judgements in foresight that marks a distinctive human capacity for being practically wise.

Fourth, wisdom has a place not just as one ingredient among many in the evolution of morality, but is, as I have attempted to demonstrate in this volume, relevant for decision-making at individual, structural, and political levels. At the individual level, wisdom works alongside other virtues in order to make clear what it means to act justly, or what it means to love with true compassion. It is also part and parcel of what acting according to conscience looks like, and so in that case, is like the compass needle in the moral life, pointing in the direction that is going to lead to the common good as well as helping to shape what that common good might entail in different communities. To put this succinctly, wisdom, as practical wisdom, helps get judgements right. There is a rich theological background to wisdom thinking in a theology of creation,' and in the Hebrew Bible wisdom is capable of both being taught and learned through the experience of living in families. If the arguments of this book are correct, then human wisdom is also developed through the way our lives have been and are interlaced with those of other life forms in general and other animals in particular. Many of those living in indigenous communities could be said to be exemplars of wisdom in the way that nothing is wasted, there is appropriate reverence for other animals and their agency, and ecological dynamics of human activity are taken into account.

Fifth, finding ways of appropriating the insights of indigenous communities into forms that make sense to the Western world can be challenging. I have suggested the work of anthropologist Tim Ingold points the way in this respect, in that he offers an alternative approach to the philosophy of life that both takes account of Darwinian forms of evolutionary biology and yet holds lightly to its implications. For him, evolution is also caught up with a dynamic interlacing process that is like a minor key in an overall musical score that makes up the evolutionary history of human life. The insights of Paul Ricoeur are also useful for a multispecies ethics, especially in so far as he provides, from a philosophical perspective, (a) ways of considering institutional aspects of the moral life that can sometimes be missed out in a virtue approach, and (b) a theoretical basis for the importance of considering the other in relationship as integral to the moral life. Both of these ingredients are useful when considering what justice and compassion might look like in multispecies relationships.

Sixth, by promoting a multispecies approach to ethics I am not collapsing ethical distinctions between humans and other creatures, but situating our moral life in a broader multispecies framework. Drawing particularly on the work of Ricoeur, I have tried to show how a multispecies framework might impinge on justice understood through individual decision-making and within human institutions as well. While it is obvious that no animal other than humans develops collective institutions, that should not be a sufficient reason for the exclusion of animals from moral considerability within those human institutions. I have argued, in particular, that recognizing personhood that is already in evidence in many different animals can be supported theologically through a particular interpretation of Trinitarian theology as well as through ethnographic observations. I have not specified which animals could be considered personal, as that would depend on the specific cultural frameworks in each multispecies community. In Western societies we are more likely to be open to considering our companion animals or domesticated animals personal, but this category will vary from one culture to the next.

Given the enormous variety of different ethical issues that arise in humanity's relationship with other beings, especially other animals, I will focus for the remainder of this conclusion on a very brief commentary on a couple of specific examples as a way of illustrating how a multispecies ethic that takes account of justice, compassion, and wisdom elements might be played out in practice in the specific context of Western, industrialized societies.' What I do not do here is work out more precisely the ways in which this might converge or diverge from alternative animal rights positions, for example. My own sense is that some will find a multispecies framework more convincing compared with animal rights, and if both ethical frameworks converge in their policy recommendations, then that should be welcomed, rather than resisted.

Agricultural Practice and Vegetarianism

The habit of forgetting humanity's dense multispecies relationship with other animals is nowhere more obvious than in the practice of farm animals reared in concentrated feeding lots. Such practices immediately raise the issue of animal suffering and the presence of human toleration of cruelty. A multispecies approach, in recognizing the shared space between human beings and domesticated animals, actively resists cruel forms of animal farming and so would support campaigns both to stop this practice and to introduce alternative methods. Second, such farming methods impinge on those migrant workers who are exploited and often at high risk of contracting disease, given the extent of excrement in the air in such conditions. Third, consideration of wider ecological questions demonstrates the extent to which methane production is elevated under these conditions, as well as environmentally destructive nitrogen levels in the run-off water that also impacts negatively on the quality of drinking water.' On all fronts, justice, compassion, and wisdom are violated: for those working in unhealthy conditions, for the animals themselves, and in the wider impact on other living forms. More broadly still, the impact on climate change then has the potential to damage the livelihoods of predominantly the poorest communities of the world, though eventually that impact will be felt by everyone in future generations.' Tackling this issue, however, is also related to the need for structural and political reform and for just institutions as well as individual actions, such as limiting the quantity of meat eating, positively choosing to consume only those animals who have been reared in cruelty free conditions, and avoiding all factory farmed food.

A rather more ambiguous and difficult question is the extent to which a multispecies approach obliges a firm commitment to vegetarianism or veganism. I remain unconvinced by arguments that use the biblical text of Genesis as a direct reference point for such an ethic, not least because the Bible is ambiguous in this regard, and in the New Testament the practice of eating meat was not challenged. Recognition of the interlaced societies that make up multispecies communities certainly gives pause for thought on the extent to which human societies have become reliant on animal protein for their nourishment when there are viable alternatives available. The multiple effects of over-consumption on habitats, on climate change, and on those living in poverty all need to be taken into account. If there is an acknowledgement that all animals are in a shared community, including humans, then those in richer nations of the world who already consume to excess have a clear obligation to drastically cut their meat consumption and to avoid any practices that are indifferent to animal cruelty. My own view is that veganism is a desired goal towards asceticism more generally, rather than a strictly obligatory practice in

Conservation Ethics and Biodiversity

Even those most committed to animal welfare still admit that some kind of value scale needs to be introduced when there are conflicts of interest. Conservation ethics generally takes two approaches: one that is preservationist or conservationist. Nature preservationists aim to protect 'natural' areas of wildlife from any interference, at least as far as it is ever possible to achieve such a goal. Social conservationists argue for greater management of wildlife, wilderness, and other natural assets for the sake of human benefit. Arguments for the former believe that biodiversity loss (including genes, populations, and landscapes) requires strictly protecting areas from human interference, especially as that loss due to human influences is a thousand fold higher in comparison with estimates of 'background' loss." However, the vision of protected areas as a fortress against the ravages of human interference is much more difficult to sustain in practice due to complex social and political challenges in these areas.

More integrated approaches that seek to combine human development projects with conservation have largely failed to deliver benefits in tandem: for example, in the Ranomafana National Park in Madagascar, forest clearing has continued and revenue from tourism has not yet reached the local population. The split between those who view conservation goals as a means to address social ends, such as the alleviation of poverty, economic development, and political participation, and those who view those goals as distracting from the central mission of protecting areas for the sake of biodiversity conservation and human induced species extinctions is still very much in evidence. For nature preservationists, sustainable development is not just rejected, but a threat to the aim of biodiversity preservation. Indigenous arguments suggest that sustainable development projects are a politically imposed (and some would say colonial) agenda.

This opens up an important question of how best to act when specific vulnerable species are under threat of extinction. Holmes Rolston notoriously argued in favour of endangered and threatened species in his discussion of Nepal's Chitwan National Park (CNP), a UNESCO world heritage site that protects one-horned rhinos (Rhinocereos unicronis) and Panthera tigris. A malaria eradication programme resulted in a higher population density, pushing the threatened species to near extinction in less than a decade. Those writing from an indigenous perspective strongly objected to Rolston's position." A multispecies approach will try to resolve such conflicts by taking account of the needs of the local indigenous communities as well as those of the various threatened species in the health of a whole system, rather than pitching one against the other. Many anthropological research papers have shown how disease crosses species boundaries, so that investigating the spread of disease by confining attention to human subjects simply will not work." So, in difficult situations where human communities and the health of species are under threat, much greater efforts need to go into trying to understand the interaction between the transfer of disease between different species and what makes the whole system resilient."

Envisaging a multispecies community as integral to human wellbeing means not just taking account of the health of an ecosystem, but also the particular paths to flourishing for each species within that system, especially other sentient animals with whom humanity is capable of entering into intimate relationships. As humanity dawned, so did consciousness of the divine, and this book has, to a large extent, deliberately refrained from detailed theological work except where it is particularly helpful for the arguments I am making. In the introductory chapter to this volume I presented a brief theology of wisdom, which is inclusive of knowledge from other sources, especially the natural and social sciences.

As I move through the two volumes that follow, that theological articulation will gradually become stronger and more explicit. I hope that theologians will be patient in tolerating this strategy, and that others will sense that regardless of one's religious starting point there is something to gain through multidisciplinary frameworks of thinking.

I am acutely aware of the gaps in my argument in this first volume, and I can only hope to tackle some of these gaps in future work. One of the major ones is the difficult and troubling issue of natural suffering, disease, and death in the evolutionary record and in current ecological frameworks. How is that suffering also related to specific tendencies in human societies that work against moral goods? Where does human cruelty come from? Where do dispositions for different aspects of what was traditionally known as vice arise from? Is the doctrine of original sin still compatible with evolutionary accounts or not? Is there a distorted form of wisdom that connects the different vices together, just as wisdom informs all the virtues? Does a focus on vice help to enlarge an understanding of what virtues mean, as some writers in the early church supposed? How might vice come to be expressed in structural ways institutionally as well as individually? These and other related questions are left unanswered in this volume, but it is my intention to develop them in more detail in Volume 2. <>

SHADOW SOPHIA: EVOLUTION OF WISDOM, VOLUME 2
by Celia E. Deane-Drummond [Oxford University Press, 9780198843467]

Engages with evolutionary and psychological theories in mapping the origin of tendencies to act in ways that correspond to traditional theological teaching on vice, especially the seven deadly sins and develops a theology of wisdom (shadow sophia) that explores the origin of sin and a deeper understanding of the virtues in the light of a Thomistic understanding of moral agency
Why do humans who seem to be exemplars of virtue also have the capacity to act in atrocious ways? What are the roots of tendencies for sin and evil? A popular assumption is that it is our animalistic natures that are responsible for human immorality and sin, while our moral nature curtails and contains such tendencies through human powers of freedom and higher reason. This book challenges such assumptions as being far too simplistic. Through a careful engagement with evolutionary and psychological literature, Celia Deane-Drummond argues that tendencies towards vice are, more often than not, distortions of the very virtues that are capable of making us good. After beginning with Augustine's classic theory of original sin, the book probes the philosophical implications of sin's origins in dialogue with the philosophy of Paul Ricoeur. Different vices are treated in both individual and collective settings in keeping with a multispecies approach. Areas covered include selfishness, pride, violence, anger, injustice, greed, envy, gluttony, deception, lying, lust, despair, anxiety, and sloth. The work of Thomas Aquinas helps to illuminate and clarify much of this discussion on vice, including those vices which are more distinctive for human persons in community with other beings. Such an approach amounts to a search for the shadow side of human nature, shadow *sophia*. Facing that shadow is part of a fuller understanding of what makes us human and thus this book is a contribution to both theological anthropology and theological ethics.

Provides a constructive approach to biosocial moral evolution through engagement with the philosophy of Paul Ricoeur

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This is the second part of a three-part trilogy on wisdom's evolution, which itself draws on an earlier monograph, The Wisdom of the Liminal. The first volume presents the case for a multispecies approach to animal ethics in preference to animal rights, drawing on evolutionary aspects of the human capacity for wisdom that I argue exists in close relationship with a growing capacity for compassion, love, and justice. This second volume tackles what could be called the shadow side of morality in deep time, which I am naming shadow sophia—evil, guilt, and the propensity to sin. I will argue that this shadow side, although difficult in some respects to ponder, reveals more clearly the meaning of different virtues by identifying their associated vices. The third volume will track what this evolving morality looks like through a theological lens by focusing on the distinctive ability of Homo to reach for the transcendent and by considering the theologically resonant virtues of faith, hope, and charity, as well as gratitude, humility, and grace. The third volume will also explore humanity's relationship with technology, including the secular reach to the transcendent that is becoming popular in transhumanist philosophies and often understood as the next trajectory in human evolution.

Here, in Volume II, I consider the key virtue of wisdom discussed in the first volume, but now with an explicit reference to the distortion of practical wisdom and its repercussions. I am fully aware of the distinction that Thomas Aquinas makes between the virtues of prudence (practical wisdom) and wisdom. In some respects, this book is about how the distortion or lack of both virtues, especially prudence, opens the door to the development of different vices. I am also aware that there are many

different interpretative traditions in Thomistic thought and I am not attempting to contribute to the largely internal Thomistic debates about his significance for the moral life.' Rather, I draw on his methodological insights on prudence and wisdom, in particular, as integral to a more constructive task of engaging with theology, philosophy, and the human sciences when facing bigger questions about the human tendencies to sin. Augustine of Hippo's influential notion of original sin, Paul Ricoeur's discussion of the symbolism of evil, and Ignatius of Loyola's account of the negative aspects of desolation as opposed to consolation are significant in this discussion. I critique an approach to vice that portrays animality as the primary source of the human propensity for sin, while avoiding an overly romantic approach to the social lives of animals. As in the first volume, I argue for the importance of a multispecies approach to ethics, though to some extent this aspect fades into the background.

The dominant interpretation of modernity, as discussed in the work of Charles Taylor,' is that modernity is, to an extent, a movement of scientific reasoning that has attempted to liberate humanity from the natural world in order to create its own history. Paradoxically, this view is now challenged by the narrative of the Anthropocene which has its conceptual roots in geological science. Even if that narrative is regarded as both a construction and a reference to geological data, envisaging humanity as dis-embedded becomes rather more difficult to justify. Humans are now no longer free from the ties of the natural world, but their collective activities of what is sometimes termed slow violence are leading to a major disruption of the Earth System and the extinction of numerous species. Ironically, perhaps, just at the time when it would be important to take our incarnation in the world seriously, at least some transhumanist philosophies press for a gnostic separation of mind in a mechanistic rather than organic posthuman future. Such confusing cultural currents require, I suggest, a much closer look at where our deepest desires stem from and what might lead humanity to act negatively or positively. Both (a) the so-called climate emergency, with its associated mass extinction of thousands of species, human migration, and cultural disruptions, and (b) the prospect of artificial intelligence and silicon posthuman futures present immense challenges. Both will inevitably need to face the risks associated with human weakness, failure, and sin. Both entail a significant impact on the earth on which we live, thus confounding the traditional categories of natural and moral evil and necessitating a closer examination of the role of collective, structural evil.

This blurring between human and natural evil in its individual and collective expression is complex, but shows in an important way why an adequate understanding of sin that takes account of humanity's relationships with the natural world is so critical. This book is an attempt to identify the origins of the drive for human sin by exploring philosophical, theological, and scientific explanations. It is, of course, my own interpretation of what this kind of synthesis might look like. However, my argument deliberately weaves back and forth, with some chapters focusing more on the theological or philosophical aspects and others more on psychology or evolutionary theories. My hope is that readers will have looked at the first volume as a prelude to this one, even though this book invites readers to enter into the darker side of human nature, which was mostly unexplored in the IL first volume. Looking at this darker side forces philosophical and theological aspects to the surface in a way that was not quite so prominent in the first volume. Such an elaboration opens up, for example, broader questions about the darker side of creation as such, tenebrae creationis, which comes to the surface in theological discussions about the meaning of Christology and deep incarnation.

Trying to understand this dark side is also, I believe, ultimately illuminating for the human condition. Such illumination about ways forward, including tendencies to act positively through religious belief and through secular alternatives discussed by transhumanists, will form the topic of Volume III.

I open this book with an introduction that presents a discussion of awareness of shame in hunter-gatherer communities, as discussed in the work of Christopher Boehm, and how such experiences are interpreted within that community. In so far as shame suggests some manner of moral awareness regarding good and evil, I next consider attempts within the Western intellectual tradition to explain the existence of evil. Theodicy, in particular, is one such attempt to reconcile the existence of a good God with the presence of evil in the world; moreover, theodicy raises questions about how shame and conscience might reflect awareness of a divine presence. After this, I introduce the traditional idea, which many virtue ethicists seem to have forgotten, that one can only understand how to act rightly in the context of what it means to act wrongly. Exploring the difficult topic of vice, as Saint Climacus did in the seventh century, is therefore a crucial endeavour in order to truly grasp the meaning of virtue.

Given the influence of Augustine not only on Western Christendom, but on wider Western culture more broadly, the first chapter explores his particular interpretation of sin as original sin. His work is interesting because he tries to explain the origin of sin in relation to biologically significant events, that is, through sex. It is also interesting because his insistence on the historicity of Adam and Eve has hamstrung discussion between theologians and evolutionary biologists. My own interpretation of the Fall of humanity will reject aspects of Augustine's view in the interests of consonance, but argue for a retention of what could be termed the intent behind his understanding of the origin of evil.

Working out the significance of evil and its roots cannot be done adequately without proper attention to philosophy, and for that task I turn in Chapter 2 to the work of Paul Ricoeur. His work is appealing because he rejects too sharp a separation between humanity and the rest of the natural world, while at the same time recognizing the distinctive contribution of humanity. His analysis of evil helps to crystallize the ways in which humans are distinct in their capacity to sin, most specifically in his discussion of free will, and he also tracks the important cultural milieu of the discussion on the capacity to sin through explicit practical notions such as defilement. Yet, while his interpretation makes Augustine's work relevant for contemporary culture, it is not beyond critique from a theological perspective.

Given that I have opened this book with a discussion of Augustine's understanding of sin, in Chapter 3 I deal with the tendency towards selfishness and pride. It is of interest that this disposition has also been taken up among biologists who, although they frame a discussion of selfishness in terms of conservation of genes, regularly seem to assume that self-interest is the default position of individuals in a population. I explore Mary Midgley's critique of Richard Dawkins' theory of the selfish gene, which, while somewhat outdated in scientific terms, still influences public debate. I also explore the relationship between sin, pride, and free will as laid out in Augustine's work. I argue against his view that virtuous behaviour among unbelievers cannot be named virtue at all, but amounts to forms of pride (superbia). I compare theological interpretations of pride with those laid out in contemporary psychology in order to arrive at some tentative conclusions.

Debates about how far and to what extent humanity, in its basic sense, is characterized by peacemaking or warmongering goes back to the early seventeenth century, particularly the discussions between Thomas Hobbes and Jean-Jacques Rousseau about the basic state of human nature. At stake is the

question about whether humanity is fundamentally good or bad. What is interesting is that such discussions influenced anthropological interpretations that, in turn, had wider cultural impacts. While violence is endemic to animal societies in general, warfare is distinctly human, but neither are as prevalent as sometimes supposed. In Chapter 4, I take up these discussions in the light of more recent evolutionary anthropological research that explores archaeological evidence for the origins of organized violence in human societies. Tracing the deeper origins of such tendencies is challenging, but one piece of the puzzle includes a closer look at primate forms of aggression and violence, while recognizing divergence from a common ancestor with humans was between seven and eight million years ago.

This discussion on violence raises the important issue of where the motivation for such violent and cruel acts originates in the human mind, while recognizing evolutionary or other pressures that might encourage such tendencies. In as much as anger arises from situations that are considered unjust or unfair it can readily spill over into a desire to retaliate, thus escalating violence. Aggression in social psychology is not necessarily understood as negative, while anger in the realm of moral psychology is understood in such terms. I try and work out in Chapter 5 ways in which anger and aggression can be understood as not just pathological in psychological terms, but also sinful from a theological perspective. My main interlocutor for this theological analysis is Thomas Aquinas, whose moral psychology spans many volumes. While his work continues to be influential in Protestant as well as Roman Catholic theological traditions, detailed treatment of his analysis of the different vices is often neglected. I also discuss ways in which God can be described as being full of anger and wrath and how theologians have tried to come to terms with such assertions.

In Chapter 6, I move from anger as a sin to other tendencies which can motivate harm to self or others, specifically greed, envy, and gluttony. Greed is one of the more interesting vices in so far as it has often been described in evolutionary psychology as an asset rather than a detriment to the individual. In contrast, the Christian tradition has viewed greed (often translated as avaritia) as a particularly pernicious vice. One of the reasons for this pernicious view is the idea that such desire—for wealth, for example—distracts the believer from desire for God, and so amounts to idolatry. How are such conflicting accounts to be reconciled or understood? Envy focuses on the goods of others that are desired for the self, while gluttony is more about self-indulgence, which in earlier traditions included drunkenness. Gluttony is rarely considered a vice in contemporary Western culture, given politically correct notions about the need to affirm different body shapes. But given the disparities in global wealth along with prevenient tendencies towards luxury of all kind, the need for ascetism becomes relevant once more. This is particularly the case when considering the global challenges arising from overaccumulation such as an elevated carbon footprint and its associated anthropogenic climate change, species devastation due to habitat loss, and extreme poverty.

The temptation to deceive is also intriguing as its basic ingredients seem to be common to the natural world. What is specifically distinctive about human deception and how might it be understood? Deceiving in human societies becomes explicit in the capacity to lie. This tendency is relevant not just for individuals, but also in socio-political terms. In Chapter 7, I explore the evolutionary psychology of deception and discuss some of the philosophical and theological dimensions of lying. I will argue for a biocultural explanation for the emergence of lying in human societies, while recognizing that the extent to which human communities engage in complex forms of deception is unique. Theologians have debated about whether it is ever morally permissible to lie in situations where it would protect the life

of another or in self-defence. I assess the merits of these and other arguments, drawing the chapter to a close with a discussion of where deception has been used to gain sexual goods. That drive to deceive for sexual aims is related to the theological tradition of lust. I elaborate further on what lust might mean for contemporary theology and how this relates back to an Augustinian association of sexuality and sin.

My final main chapter deals with the shadow side of human nature related to despair, anxiety, and sloth. Like many other human emotions, it is possible to recognize something like despondency or anxiety in other social animals. However, despair implies a greater consciousness of transcendence than is possible for other species and is one reason why theologians and philosophers such as Soren Kierkegaard consider anxiety and despair integral to the human condition. In fact, Kierkegaard frames anxiety as the driving force behind the first sin rather than selfishness, pride, greed, or lust. Ignatius of Loyola was among one of a number of mystics who sought to explore the experience of desolation, though he urged against his followers succumbing to despair. In addition, the monastic communities warned against the vice of sloth or acedia, which they named the `demon', so convinced were they of its negative impact on the spiritual life. This theological understanding of acedia is far richer than its secular interpretation as mere laziness.

In the concluding remarks, I come back to the notion of distorted forms of wisdom through an exploration of folly as well as vices opposed to prudence. Given that many of the vices tackled in this book also have transcendent as well as transactional importance, folly is the correct term to use as, following Aquinas, this implies that something more than just practical incompetence or distorted prudence is at stake. I suggest that Aquinas is hinting here at evil more generally, which relates to wisdom understood as competency in our relationship with God. This shadow side of human nature has come to the surface in each of the different vices explored, be it in their individual or collective form. It is, therefore, with some justification that we can say that the world in which humanity is born is, as Sergii Bulgakov would claim, a mixture of experiences of both creaturely sophia and shadow sophia.

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This book is a continuation of the broad quest set forth in the first volume in this series, namely, a search for wisdom and its significance for the moral life through a multidimensional approach to human tendencies for good or ill set in the broadest context of a multispecies framework. Wisdom is an extremely difficult concept to grasp, not least because it eludes clear definition; or rather, through attempting such definition something of its complexity is lost. However, wisdom in the most fundamental sense is concerned with skills relevant to sociality, to relationships. When applied to practical tasks relating to the world, wisdom takes shape as the virtue of practical wisdom; in theological interpretations, when directed to knowledge of the divine, the virtue is wisdom as such. I argued in the first volume that human wisdom, as a relational term, is not just concerned with human relationships among kin. What I tried to demonstrate was that the different elements in the evolution of wisdom are best thought of in interlaced ways through a complex and dynamic multispecies understanding of wisdom's emergence. Further, human compassion and justice, which are also important relational characteristics relevant for the moral life, share at least some baseline characteristics with our nearest primate relatives. Knowing what justice and compassion mean in different human cultural communities requires attention to culturally attuned wisdom. More importantly, perhaps, the potential for inequity aversion and other regard in other primates and socially advanced animals shows the possibility, at least,

of their interaction with those human communities. In other words, those human communities develop forms of compassion, justice, and wisdom in accordance with their specific and culturally attuned norms. These norms, in turn, are shaped through dynamic interactions with each other and other beings and lead to the eventual establishment of social institutions. The discussion of more specific theological aspects was left somewhat in the background in the first volume. In the quest for understanding practical wisdom I also attempted to map out the different elements of morality that are relevant to the way practical wisdom is best conceived. The task had practical implications as well since it showed forth a different way of considering theological ethics as well as animal ethics.

Rather than focus on via positiva the present volume tackles instead via negativa, that is, trying to discover more about wisdom through consideration of what it is not. Given the complexity of wisdom, the possible vices associated with its lack are legion, but in the course of this discussion there are important theological and theoretical issues to consider as prolegomena to more detailed attention to specific vices. This introduction provides such prolegomena. In the background to this discussion is the way theodicies have relied too heavily on a reasoned and abstract account of why sin is present in the world, such as a free will philosophical defence.

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The first important theoretical issue in addressing questions about the roots of moral and natural evil relates to theodicy in discussions that have occupied religious believers for many centuries. If God as Creator is divine Goodness and Wisdom, then how can there be suffering, pain, death, evil, and sin in the created world? From a logical point of view raising this question presupposes belief in God's goodness or, at minimum, God's justice. This raises another question of how religions and religious rituals are most likely to have arisen and what those religions promoted in terms of normative social behaviour. I can only touch briefly on this question in the present context.

Robert Bellah traces the origin of religion to rituals which arise out of what he calls 'serious play', where play behaviour is characteristic of social animals more broadly.' The way social animals play, however, seems to represent at least a liminal expression of a sense of fairness,' though Bellah does not comment specifically on this aspect of the connection between religious ritual and animal play. Justice, in so far as it is about right relationships, is also, in the broadest possible sense, about addressing evil, pain, and suffering in the world. The earliest form of interpreting suffering in many religious traditions was through an understanding that suffering was justified because God or the gods were simply paying back humanity for sins committed by the individual concerned or by earlier generations. <>

Prognostication in the Medieval World: A Handbook edited by Matthias Heiduk, Klaus Herbers and Hans-Christian Lehner [De Gruyter Reference, De Gruyter, 9783110501209]

Two opposing views of the future in the Middle Ages dominate recent historical scholarship. According to one opinion, medieval societies were expecting the near end of the world and therefore had no concept of the future. According to the other opinion, the expectation of the near end created a drive to change the world for the better and thus for innovation. Close inspection of the history of prognostication reveals the continuous attempts and multifold methods to recognize and interpret God's will, the prodigies of nature, and the patterns of time. That proves, on the one hand, the constant human uncertainty facing the contingencies of the future. On the other hand, it demonstrates the firm

believe during the Middle Ages in a future which could be shaped and even manipulated. The handbook provides the first overview of current historical research on medieval prognostication. It considers the entangled influences and transmissions between Christian, Jewish, Islamic, and non-monotheistic societies during the period from a wide range of perspectives. An international team of 63 renowned authors from about a dozen different academic disciplines contributed to this comprehensive overview.

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The Development of a Handbook-Project

The Tanakh, the Bible, and the Quran are rich in prognostics: From Late Antiquity onward, the three major monotheistic religions, including their internal variations (especially Sephardic and Ashkenazi Judaism, Latin and Byzantine Christianity, and Shiite and Sunni Islam), established their own emphases and characteristics of prognostication. However, these did not arise independently of one another. Their development resulted, in fact, from the lively exchanges and relationships between them. Whether directly or through reputation, the members of these religious cultures knew each other, despised or feared each other and regarded their colleagues as ideological opponents or allies. Knowing the teachings of another religion often led to an opposing position or to reflection on one's own position.

Some areas of anticipating the future, like apocalyptic thinking or political prophecy, belong to traditional topics of research in the field of Medieval Studies, besides that prognostication remained a marginal field until now. This handbook on prognostication in the Middle Ages now brings the different facets of prognostication together comprehensively for the first time. It emerged from a series of workshops held between 2016 and 2018, each dealing with prognostic elements within the Christian, Jewish and Muslim traditions.

This project was, in turn, prompted by in-depth research carried out at the International Consortium for Research in the Humanities (ICRH) "Fate, Freedom and Prognostication. Strategies for Coping with the Future in East Asia and Europe" in Erlangen, established in 2009 by the Federal Ministry of Education and Research. The way in which people deal with issues of the future is analyzed across epochs and cultures under the leadership of the core disciplines of Sinology and Medieval Studies. As one of the largest interdisciplinary research projects on prognostication worldwide, studies in multiple disciplines were funded. A large number of international visiting fellows presented relevant work on the theme. At numerous events – workshops, conferences, seminars, and lecture series – individual aspects were deepened and their results published. The spectrum of this research ranged from astronomy and astrology to apocalypticism, from the history of science and philosophy to questions of divination and manticism in secular and canonical law, from hermetic tracts to personal preventive medicine, prophecy or observing favorable and unfavorable days, to name but a few areas. An annotated list of the most important relevant publications can be found in the publication by ICRH deputy director Klaus Herbers (Herbers 2019).

After the mutual exchange between Sinology, Medieval Studies and other disciplines was consistently sought and implemented, it seemed obvious to bring the results together. This endeavor was carried out

separately by the two leading disciplines, but approached in close exchange with one another, not least in order to discuss and decide on the various theoretical, methodological and structural issues within the dialogue.

The respective volume is now available for the field of Medieval Studies in its religious and cultural diversity. In this introduction, the three editors wish to outline the approach, reflect on the central terms "Prognostication, the Middle Ages, and the Medieval World," and explain the compilation, structure and usage of this volume.

The Varied Forms of Prognostication in Different Societies – Uniform Western Traditions in the Middle Ages?

In 2013, Léon Vandermeersch argued (Vandermeersch 2013), with regard to Chinese history, that the Chinese pictographic scripture of the thirteenth century BCE was not invented in order to state the facts, but rather to record "divination."

This language, he wrote, had developed from manticology. By relying on the examination of divinatory equations, the author concludes, among other things, that there was something like a divinatory rationalism, characterized rather by a "raison manticologique" than by a theological rationality (as in the European West).

Confronting this thesis with the Christian-Latin development, one aspect is striking: although, in the Christian world, the prophet was highly appreciated, fewer calculations were made to fathom the future. This more personal approach has been common in Christianity since the prophet figure was introduced in the Old Testament. Max Weber was so impressed by this concept that he even spoke of a "prophetic charism" (Weber 1922, III, 4 § 10). He was referring to persons who possessed supernatural gifts that others lacked. The charism of the prophet was different from that of the magician or priest. In the Latin West, however, prophecy gained importance above all when, in contact with Byzantium, the ancient Sibylline traditions became relevant. This resulted in the dichotomy between prophets and false prophets.

But what was typical for future visions? For a long time, it was claimed that utopian ideas were barely projected in the Latin Middle Ages (Cf. Hartmann and Röcke 2013, 3–9). Nevertheless, there were also scattered phenomena, directing hope toward the arrival of an earthly realm of peace. Especially the messianic chiliasm aimed at a real reform "in this life." The word "chiliasm" is derived from the Greek term chilia for "thousand" (years), and can be traced back to the twentieth chapter of the Revelation to John, which deals with a "millennial"/thousand year realm of peace, preceding the end of all things. Probably the most impressive example of Christian chiliasm is provided by Joachim of Fiore. His ideas provoked a sustained impact. The philosopher Ernst Bloch (Bloch 1959, 590) called Joachim's reflections the "most effective social utopia of the Middle Ages" ("die folgenreichste Sozialutopie des Mittelalters"). Joachim built an ideal by making use of biblical symbolism; his most essential source of knowledge remained the Bible. He illustrated this in his Book of Figures, the Liber Figurarum.

Conceptually, a third aspect should be emphasized: it is related to the structuring of earthly time. The historical ideas dominant in the Latin Middle Ages followed the doctrine of successive realms, which were finally, at the end of days and in certain forms, raised to another level. Classically, Karl Löwith

(Löwith 1953) spoke of "world history and salvation" ("Weltgeschichte und Heilsgeschehen") and thus of the "theological foundations in the philosophy of history" ("Die theologischen Voraussetzungen der Geschichtsphilosophie"). Apocalyptical thinking, ideas concerning the Antichrist, but even the calendrical determination of the Christian salvation and far more belong, therefore, to the great prognostic designs of the Christian-Latin tradition.

Apart from these aspects – prophecy, utopia, the world ages and apocalypticism –, here were also traditions, that recalled mythical knowledge, developed further practical methods such as the use of lots or resulted from various practices (partially clinging to tradition). These include the position of the stars and their interpretation in astrology, the existing horoscopes, the reading of entrails in the ancient tradition, games and numbers, and many other procedures regarding medical and meteorological prognoses – some of which reached the West as part of cultural exchange.

However, time and space need to be defined more precisely for the large-scale overview intended in this handbook. To date, mainly the Christian-Latin traditions have been the focus but an increasing amount of medieval research is underlining the influence of the Arab-Muslim, Jewish, but also the Greek-Byzantine influences in Medieval History.

Focusing solely on "Occidental" conceptions that only concern the Latin-Christian area not only risk absolutization, but they also ignore the crucial exchange between the different worlds (cf. above all Borgolte et al. 2011; Herbers and Jaspert 2007).

Many works on medieval prognostics have already pointed out that Antiquity had a huge influence on medieval practices (e. g. Tuczay 2012). In the Greek-Byzantine East, prophetic traditions strongly evolved. One has only to recall the prophecy of Pseudo-Methodius, or the Sibylline writings which, in their later Latin versions as well, reveal strong references to the Eastern Mediterranean. After all, both the Jewish and Arab-Muslim traditions are of special significance, for they intermediated Ancient and Eastern knowledge to the Latin Middle Ages (primarily in the Late Middle Ages). In the present handbook, as stressed at the beginning, these different traditions are taken into account.

In the face of the new discussions arising about the Middle Ages (recently Bauer 2018; cf. also the review article by Lehner 2020), it is indeed challenging to define larger areas with uniform temporal boundaries for these varying geographical regions. The Islamic World for instance included large parts of Spain in the Middle Ages, but in very different ways and intensities during different periods.

For this reason, the difficult decisions in this context were allocated to the in volved experts. We wish to express our sincere thanks for their manifold support! We operated with linguistic and religious criteria equally, because these overlap to some extent, too. The differentiation in the Western World is based not only on systematic considerations, but also on the evidence that the "Large Areas," the Western Roman Empire, Eastern Roman Empire as well as the Islamic and Jewish worlds, emerged from Antiquity (cf. for example Pitz 2001).

The structure we have proposed does not suggest homogeneous cultural areas or periods; but without these "soft" geographical boundaries, this handbook would hardly have been achieved. The respective deviations from a scheme familiar to many at the same time reflect the state of research and the research opportunities within the corresponding disciplines.

Prognostication, the Middle Ages, and the Medieval World – the Evidently Non-self-evident

Why prognostication?

This handbook explores the views of the future in the Middle Ages. The emphasis is placed on the term "prognostication," whereas other publications highlight "prophecy" or "divination." This requires an explanation. The future can be anticipated in many different ways, as reflected in the vocabulary of the European languages and its abundance of terms, with all of their semantic ambiguities and overlaps. Many of these terms are loan words derived from ancient Greek and Latin (see also the etymologies in 7I Demaitre, Medical Prognostication Western Christian World). The future can be foretold and predicted (predicere), foreseen (providere), forethought (prognoscere), and known beforehand (precognoscere). Prognosis, fore-knowledge, has proven to be the central term in this semantic field. When the processes required to gain that fore-knowledge are taken into account, the semantic field widens to include related terms such as prophecy (propheteia), the gift to communicate the knowledge revealed. Inspired by divinity, the prophet or prophetess interprets this knowledge, which may or may not be related to the future. Divination (divinatio) is the ability to recognize and interpret the signs sent by divine powers. It encompasses the past, present and future. In Hebrew and Arabic, the historical terms used for looking into the future are more or less the equivalents of prophecy and divination (7I Bar Levav, Prognostication Jewish Culture; 7I Schmidl, Medieval Traditions Islamic World). In European cultural history, however, the term "divination," originally neutral, acquired a different connotation. The Christian doctrine associated divination with magic, which consequently became a negative term, smacking of superstition (7I Heiduk, Prognostication Western Christian World). Unlike the other terms, prognostication is a neutral expression, that clearly relates to the future and also points to both observation and calculation (see also Grünbart, Prognostication Eastern Christian World). In this handbook, prognostication is, therefore, used as the standard term for anticipating the future, free of all connotations. It includes the future-oriented forms of prophecy and divination, but also purely mathematical-calculative methods, without any metaphysical or cosmological framework.

If prognostication indicates gaining foreknowledge, the handbook places the focus on how people looked into the future, with which expectations and using which methods. That implicates the fears, hopes, desires, and daily problems that made them want to know the future. People wanted to know what would happen to them and their loved ones – who was the best person to marry, what were the chances of their children surviving, what could be done to stay healthy, when was the best moment to make a journey, and which business transaction would yield a profit. People also wanted to know what was in store for their community, country, and the whole of humankind: good fortune or hardship – would the harvest be good, the political situation stable? Was disaster looming, war, or even the end of time? Which conclusions the knowledge-seekers might have drawn from the wide range of possible answers in order to be prepared for what was to come, is, however, not covered by the subject of prognostication. There are merely a few references in this handbook to whether a prediction was, supposedly, right or wrong; for instance when the narratives of medieval commentators are cited.

This handbook pays equal attention to all forms of prognostication: prophesies inspired by a divinity, interpretations of dreams and visions, calculations of opportune or less opportune days or the influence of stars and constellations, the drawing of oracle lots, the summoning of spirits, or the calculations of assurance risks and the odds of gambling.

To this end, the expertise of many different research disciplines was collected and summarized. Until now, the access to prognostication in each discipline is defined by the specific characteristics of the historical evidence, so most publications on the subject are limited either to a "history of prophecy," a "history of astrology," or, under the heading of a "history of magic," the history of divination, while this handbook presents the sum of what is known about the history of all forms of prognostication in the Middle Ages. The equal treatment of those different forms also breaks with a still widespread, traditional point of view which ranks, openly or implicitly, the subject on the basis of hierarchies of rationality, so the various methods of knowing the future are evaluated according to their degree of progressiveness or backwardness, dull superstition or enlightened spirit, scientific value or irrelevance, religious probity or insubordination, sophistication or primitiveness, or, quite simply, their degree of supposed truth or falsehood. Neither narratives of teleological progress nor accounts of the history of development based on such dichotomies form part of this handbook.

On the contrary – its content and conception may serve as an antidote to certain current forms of prophecy, such as economic forecasts, trend research or future technologies. Still, in spite of the editors' best efforts to present prognostication in all its diversity as a form of cultural achievement, they must admit that, on occasion, the reader may catch a glimpse of a certain rationality-based hierarchy in some of the articles. This is due to the academic diversity and different scientific cultures of the scholars involved in this project, which the editors did not wish to limit by imposing a compulsory vocabulary.

The Concepts, Practices, and Contexts of Prognostication

The purpose of this handbook is to provide a comprehensive view of prognostication, to shed light on its functions and structures in the social fabric, its significance for customs and the social order, but also to examine the concepts of prognostication prevalent in the medieval world and their practical application. Special attention is paid to the circumstances under which prognostication was practiced in daily life, the habitus of the people involved and their milieu. The particular emphasis which this handbook places on the practical aspects of prognostication is the result of an interdisciplinary dialogue at the IKGF. It became apparent that, more than any other aspects, practical applications allow hands-on comparisons between different cultural environments over the course of history, whereas the comparability of concepts quickly reaches its limits due to their enormous diversity. The focus on practices leaves sufficient room for relatively unconventional approaches to prognostication such as the study of images and artefacts. It also places the normative and classifying text genres in perspective. They represent the largest part of the historical legacy available for research and have, therefore, long been its main focus of attention. The conventional approach to research into prophecy and divination often builds upon the academic classifications of the Middle Ages – such as Thomas Aquinas' Summa Theologiae – and the definitions they provide. Often, however, these works are examined out of context, without regard to the associated academic and theological discourse, and interpreted as a universal mirror of the medieval worldview. Comparable misconceptions are usually based on the assumption that daily life faithfully reflected the standards set in the legal texts. The genres of normative and classifying texts undoubtedly provide important historical sources, due to the classification schemes they offer and also their sheer abundance, but they usually describe things according to specific discourses or even from an outsider perspective. They rarely contain information about the daily practices of prognostication or the practitioners' perspective. Ideally, research should focus on the different settings in which prognostication was practiced – from the ruler's court, the places of learning

and monasteries to the households of ordinary people – to convey an overall impression of its role within medieval life.

The editors are keenly aware of how difficult it is to carry out this type of research. The material available is scarce to begin with: the historical tradition offers little evidence in terms of a material legacy, and the written sources are usually limited to the aforementioned standards and classifications. The research is also influenced by the traditions and priorities of the various disciplines, so the degree of accessibility of the historical material varies considerably. An expert in astrological treatise literature, for instance, would not necessarily know what else the archives of a sovereign's court or a city state contained, and so might find it difficult to piece together instructions on the practice of prognostication and the accounts of the services related to it to create a coherent picture of daily astrological practice in the Middle Ages. The focus which this handbook places on the practical application of prognostication is, nevertheless, important, as it brings out surprising facets of what seemed familiar and points to the gaps in our knowledge and the research.

Which Time Period is Covered by the Term "the Middle Ages"?

In academic and everyday language, the Middle Ages traditionally denote a period in the history of Europe which spans the millennium between 500 and 1500 CE. This handbook, too, follows this convention and aims to provide an overview across this millennium. The editors understand – as mentioned above – that this timeframe is by no means self-explanatory. In the millennium between 500 and 1500, there was no such thing as a culturally coherent European continent, nor were there any common characteristics which would have clearly delimitated this millennium from its preceding and ensuring periods. In terms of the history of development, Europe in the seventh century is closely linked to Europe in the fourth century, and Europe in the fourteenth century to Europe in the seventeenth century, whereas the seventh and fourteenth centuries have very little in common. If, therefore, as in this handbook, the term the "Middle Ages" is used in the conventional sense and applied to the whole European continent over the millennium between 500 and 1500, this is done for the purpose of spatial and chronological delimitation and is not to be understood as a political statement, claiming that a homogeneous occidental Europe existed at the time. By exploring the historical roots of "medieval" prognostication in Antiquity and pointing at further developments in the Early Modern Age, characterized by both changes and continuities, two detailed surveys in this handbook illustrate the flexibility of those period boundaries.

The editors chose to adopt a very broad approach to provide a better understanding of prognostication in "Europe in the Middle Ages." As explained in the following section, the history of prognostication in Europe as such emerges only in its transcultural context, i. e. only when the history of Christian-Western Europe, Christian-Eastern Europe and non-Christian Europe as well as the history of Europe's neighbors, who were part of the Byzantine Empire and the Islamic empires, are taken into account. It is important to emphasize once more that the term "Middle Ages" is used as a means of chronological delimitation, and is not to be understood as a period in Jewish, Islamic or Byzantine history. The use of both the term "Middle Ages" and the dates indicated according to the "common era" notation system in this handbook have been agreed upon by all participating research disciplines for the purpose of practicability. The fact that this handbook presents different cultural regions with different calendar systems and, consequently, different historical periodizations under the heading the "medieval world,"

does not mean that these differences are being ignored. The articles about calendars, for instance, address this subject.

What Exactly is the "Medieval World"?

In view of the above, it has already become quite clear that the medieval world, as the focus of this handbook, is neither limited to a specific – however defined – cultural region such as "Latin Europe," nor to the geographical continent of Europe (which was defined differently in Antiquity and the Middle Ages and ended at the banks of the Don in the East). With regard to the subject of prognostication, the editors consider it necessary to highlight the transcultural relations between the different regions. These relations result from the shared cultural heritage of Antiquity, which was transmitted, transformed or received again in a variety of philosophical concepts, scientific methods and the practice of prognostication in daily life in a Christian, Jewish or Islamic environment. Part of this common heritage found its expression in the prophetical revelations of the monotheistic religions. The fact that the medieval world did not end at the boundaries of the European continent is reflected in the history of prognostication, which has always been characterized by knowledge transfer between the Jewish, Greek-Byzantine, Latin-Western traditions and those of the Islamic world. The West profited most from the flow of this knowledge transfer. In many areas –- including prognostication –, the foundation for many fields of knowledge was laid, starting with mathematical observation and calculation methods to empirical nature observation and cosmological interpretation methods, such as astrology. Knowledge transfer in the Middle Ages was more than simply the rediscovery of ancient wisdom, although this misconception is postulated repeatedly, even in academic publications. The knowledge which the West received above all from translations from Arabic was not a linguistically deformed version of the wealth of knowledge from the ancient Hellenistic world, but an amalgamation, further processing and enrichment of different concepts and traditions, being a post-antique cultural achievement in its own right. Catchphrases, such as statements about the presumably pure Aristotelianism of scholastic philosophy or a medieval renaissance of Antiquity, oversimplify and distort these historical facts.

But how can this complex and culturally interconnected medieval world be best described? The editors decided to divide the individual thematic blocks on prognostication into four parts, dedicated, respectively, to the Western-Christian, Eastern-Christian, Jewish and Islamic traditions, and to present them as equal to provide the reader with a tool for drawing direct comparisons. This "quadrinity" appeared to be the most pragmatic way of including the academic disciplines of Medieval Studies, Byzantine Studies, Jewish Studies and Islamic Studies in the project, each in their own right. Even this subdivision of the medieval world, however, is simply a means to providing a transparent outline of the subject which follows the cultural dominants Latin-Christian, Greek-Christian, Hebrew-Jewish and Arab-Muslim. It is by no means to be understood as a postulate claiming that there were four homogeneous cultural areas in the Middle Ages, because each of these areas is in itself highly heterogeneous. Many parts of Europe, for example, were only Christianized late in the Middle Ages, and Christianization has always been a lengthy process, sometimes stretching over the whole medieval millennium. This handbook attempts to do justice to "pre-Christian" Europe as well. Three overviews address the Celtic, Nordic and Slavic traditions of prognostication. They illustrate a recurring problem: these civilizations did not leave behind any first hand testimony in written form. What little is known about them is based on the outside perception of Roman writers or Christian missionaries and chroniclers, or on testimonies such as the Nordic sagas, which were either written by Christian authors or carry the

distinctive marks of contact with Christianity. These historical sources do transmit a rather deformed image of "indigenous" worldviews and cultural practices. Pagan civilizations, like those of the Avars or Sami, whose testimonies related to prognostication are almost entirely either archeological artifacts that are difficult to interpret or post-medieval references, could not be included in the handbook because of the immensely difficult research situation related to these.

The differentiation between pagan and non-pagan is just one aspect of the cultural heterogeneity of the medieval world that all of the articles contained in this handbook are committed to represent. In the Christian West, there are not only sources in Latin but also in vernacular languages; the Christian East covers not only Byzantium, but also the Eastern European Slavic world; while the Jewish traditions come from the Mizrahi, the Sephardi, the Ashkenazy, the orthodox mainstream and the mythical branches. The authors of the articles on the Islamic world will have found it particularly difficult to develop an overview of the cultural and religious heterogeneity of the area between Andalusia and South-East Asia. The extremely difficult question of how to define and delimit this Islamic world and relate it to Europe could only be answered by putting the focus on points of orientation in or near the Mediterranean region or concentrating on particularly influential traditions. In the end, the desiderata in many fields of research assisted the actual selection which allowed the authors to refer mainly to their own subjects.

This handbook does not present the medieval world within clearly demarcated borders, but this vagueness has its own appeal, as it offers the advantage of facilitating the investigation of a large number of historical phenomena and the equally large number of traditions in the humanities devoted to their studies, free from any arbitrary restrictions.

How to Use this Handbook

This handbook is divided into three major sections. In the first part, as already mentioned, the legacy of antiquity, the developments in the pagan world, as well as an overview of the continuities and innovations of the early modern period are examined in separate survey articles. There is also an overview of the prognostics in the Latin-Christian, Greek-Christian, Hebrew-Jewish and Arabic-Muslim traditions. The findings from the individual studies in the following two sections are brought together here and supplemented at certain points. In addition, the functions of prognostication are analyzed, such as their social contexts, the role of experts and clients, or their occasions.

The second section forms the core of the handbook. Nine areas were identified in which medieval prognostication manifested itself. These are illuminated from the perspective of the four mentioned traditions. This includes the area "Eschatology and Millenarism," already mentioned above, with the various eschatological scenarios. In the second subchapter "Prophecy and Visions," the division into four traditions was abandoned, since this topic could not be separated from the eschatology in the Byzantine context. Explanations of special forecasting techniques follow. First of all, there is "Dream Interpretation," which can be seen as an anthropological constant up to the present day. The distinction made here between visions and dreams has nothing to do with the transcendent status (of the dreamer/visionary), but rather refers to literary genres: while visionary reports emerged in the Middle Ages, particularly in monastic contexts, tracts on dreams look back to a tradition dating back to ancient times. Various techniques, which differed in the different traditions, are the subject of the "Mantic Arts" chapter. The other sub-chapters refer to "Astral Sciences," "Calendrical Calculations," and "Weather

Forecasting." It concludes with a contribution on "Quantifying and Managing Risks," the forecasting of risks, now the basis of modern insurance. This is presented exclusively from a Latin-Christian perspective, since the research situation in the other areas has so far failed to illustrate this phenomenon clearly.

Each of these contributions follows an internal structure. A five-part system was developed and proposed to the respective authors. This envisaged the individual areas as: (I.) "Definitions and Terminology," (II.) "Written Sources and Artifacts," (III.) "Techniques and Manifestations," (IV.) "Developments, Historical and Social Contexts," and (V.) "Medieval Classifications and Discussions." The authors adapted this proposal to the respective circumstances for largely understandable reasons. This is due to the research situation and research tradition: the individual traditions can access diversely detailed arrangements of the respective topic. This also means that some contributions are shorter than others. Aside from that, of course, not every topic can be optimally represented by the intended internal structure. This applies in particular to the "Mantic Arts." Cross-references between the individual chapters (represented by: ^ author, chapter) refer to similar developments or to the fact that individual considerations in the different traditions were of comparable importance. In most cases, source citations are reproduced in English, and transliterations from Arabic and Hebrew were conducted in accordance with the respective standard transliteration systems. Names should be given in a standard form but, given the sheer number of cases, errors should be pardoned. The articles are intended to reflect the current state of research and offer further literature in short references in the text as well as in an attached "bibliography." Editions of classical works (such as Thomas Aquinas or Cicero) were not included, as these passages are standardized in every edition.

The third section offers a "Repertoire of Written Sources and Artifacts." This consists of detailed representations of text genres, text corpora, individual works or descriptions of certain objects as concrete manifestations of prognostication. The articles, which are concise in comparison to the chapters of the previous sections, are equipped with a bibliography which is divided into "Primary Sources" and "Secondary Literature." In this section, the division into the different traditions has largely been abandoned. Therefore, space was created to undertake a closer examination of the special phenomena of individual traditions. Wherever necessary, this is indicated by cross-references both in the chapters of part II and in the repertoire itself. The repertoire benefited particularly from the research environment at the ICRH. Most of the visiting fellows of the past few years contributed a short entry here. On the one hand, this leads to a certain focus due to the competences of the contributors while, on the other, it is the reason why the Christian West is most present in the repertoire. The handbook concludes with an extensive register of names and places. <>

Fate and Fortune in European Thought, ca. 1400–1650 edited by Ovanes Akopyan [Series: Brill's Studies in Intellectual History, Brill, 9789004359727]

If the universe were conceived to fulfill a certain divine plan or to manifest God's will and glory, what would the place of an individual be within this plan? What is more, if, from the very beginning of its existence and through divine providence, it were predestined to be driven toward a certain end, how could people adjust their individual lives to the incognizable universal design and react to the obscure future fraught with both luck and failure?

These questions, which have occupied humanity for centuries, formed a remarkable element of early modern European thought. This collection of essays presents new insights into what shaped and constituted reflections on fate and fortune between, roughly, 1400 and 1650, both in word and image. This volume argues that these ideas were emblematic of a more fundamental argument about the self, society, and the universe and shows that their influence was more widespread, geographically and thematically, than hitherto assumed.

Contributors: Damiano Acciarino, Ovanes Akopyan, Elisabeth Blum, Paul Richard Blum, Jo Coture, Guido Giglioni, Dalia Judovitz, Sophie Raux, Orlando Reade, and John Sellars.

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Excerpt: Starting, roughly, from the late fourteenth century, first in Italy and later across Europe, Renaissance scholarship became particularly concerned with an issue that received a second wind in the wake of the reception of the classical tradition. The question of whether free will and predestination are in fundamental conflict with each other was indeed posed in ancient and medieval thought. However, it significantly intensified as a consequence of the revival of an avalanche of forgotten sources, mostly of ancient origin. These texts appear to have provided a fresh intellectual perspective on what might determine the vicissitudes of fate and how alleged determinism of human life could be reconciled with divine providence. On a more profound and theoretical level, Renaissance and early modern philosophical, theological, and ethical reflections on fate inevitably touched upon the problem of whether the universe had been divinely designed. If it were conceived to fulfill a certain divine plan or to manifest God's will and glory, what would the place of an individual be within this plan? What is more, if, from the very beginning of its existence and through divine providence, it were predestined to be driven toward a certain end, how could people adjust their individual lives to the incognizable universal design and react to the obscure future fraught with both luck and failure?

These questions, which have bothered humanity for centuries, from ancient philosophy to Martin Heidegger's *Dasein* and Albert Camus's absurdism in *The Myth of Sisyphus*, formed a remarkable element of early modern European thought. Alongside a renewed interest in classical antiquity, two factors similarly contributed to a growing number of accounts centered on the notion of fate. First, fifteenth- and sixteenth-century political thought devoted a great deal of attention to the ways in which the concepts of "virtue politics" and the ruler's fortune could be put in relation to statecraft.[2] These socio-political discussions reached their climax in the work of Niccolò Machiavelli, which heavily influenced the early modern political discourse on the whole. Second, lotteries and gambling that began flourishing from the sixteenth century were clearly indicative of the early developments of capitalism, bringing the problem of one's fortune down to practice in place of pure theory. Given the breadth of the subjects they discussed, it comes as no surprise that fate narratives spread across a variety of disciplines and geographical locations. Thus, the ideas, most of which were initially put forth in the intellectual environment of early Renaissance Italy, eventually found their way beyond the Alps, and new approaches to fate and fortune followed. Largely drawing upon a conference held at the University of Warwick in May 2016, this interdisciplinary volume, placed at the intersection of intellectual history, philosophy, literary studies, and art history, sheds new light on early modern engagement with determinism. It investigates how contemporary scholars and artists across Europe thought on the issue in seeking to establish to what extent human life depends on the contingent.

The *fatum* dilemma was widely debated in antiquity. Suffice it to recall Sophocles' *Oedipus Rex* or Seneca's *Letters to Lucilius*, which, despite having been written in completely different contexts and periods, stress the deterministic character of human life and insist on one's full acceptance of the fruits of fate, either malign or benevolent. The Greek discourse of fate was additionally reinforced as a result of the transmission of occult knowledge from the Middle East, mainly of astrology. By the third century BC, this knowledge had spread throughout Greece and become part of philosophical discussions on *heimarméne* (destiny, fate). Along with the diffusion of Stoic thought, with its famous idea of the

casual chain, first in Greece and later in the Roman Empire, the occult understanding of the universal design contributed to the formation of a framework in which the concepts of fate, fortune, and predestination were explored as a whole. However, despite the remarkable impact Stoicism had on contemporary thinking, some of the prominent ancient philosophers refused to accept the fatalistic interpretation of human destiny uncritically. Among those who proposed alternative approaches to fate, Plotinus and Alexander of Aphrodisias are to be mentioned *in primo loco*.

As some studies have clearly shown, Plotinus polemicized with the Stoic tradition rather than with particular Stoic philosophers of the time. While demonstrating a refined expertise in Stoicism, which he considered to be the most dangerous form of "anti-Platonism," and sometimes borrowing from the opponents, Plotinus firmly rejected Stoic materialism and epistemology. This consequently brought him to the Stoic notion of universal causality to which he opposed the providential governance of the universe combined with God's goodness. According to Plotinus, it left room for a human being to reject the fruits of evil passions and turn the soul toward to the Good, allowing them to take personal, seen as primarily moral, responsibility for their actions. Plotinus went on to say that external elements occasionally interpreted as the causes of events, such as the position of the stars and planets, are to be regarded exclusively as signs of providence's involvement in the terrestrial world. Plotinus's position on fate and fatalistic astrology was rediscovered in the Renaissance and influenced, among others, Marsilio Ficino.

Apart from its attack on Neoplatonism, Stoic teaching on the causal chain was subjected to criticism by the Peripatetic school personified above all in the figure of Alexander of Aphrodisias. As is well known, the fascination for astrology and other deterministic theories in Rome, at the court of the emperor Septimius Severus and his heirs, led Alexander of Aphrodisias to write his famous treatise *De fato*. There, Alexander opposed the Stoic idea of determinism, claiming that there were no pre-determined causes for terrestrial events. He insisted that human beings were responsible for their own decisions, and that chance was a source for human freedom since it allowed the breaking of a casual chain. It is also worth noting that Alexander's *De fato* was known in the Middle Ages. William of Moerbeke, a prolific expert in, and translator of, Greek philosophical and scientific texts, used extensively by Thomas Aquinas, translated it from Greek into Latin. Alexander's legacy received its second life in the sixteenth century at the University of Padua, the most renowned center of Aristotelian philosophy in the Renaissance. Alexander's approach, including his discourse on fate, was seen as a revived ancient Greek alternative to the still-dominant pro-Averroistic branch within the Aristotelian commentary tradition. This shift affected the spirit of early sixteenth-century Paduan production and resulted, *inter alia*, in the texts concerned with fate and predestination, such as Pietro Pomponazzi's *De fato, de libero arbitrio et de predestinatione*.

Of the array of ancient responses to fate, Christian teaching adapted some elements of Stoicism while, at the same time, firmly rejecting determinism. What Christians were inclined to admit was acceptance, to a certain extent, of the fruits of fate, considered to be manifestations of the divine will. God might direct someone toward salvation through ordeals that tested and verified their faith. This became a widespread *topos* in Christian hagiography, starting from the very first saint's life, Saint Anthony of Egypt. However, unlike Stoics, for whom *apatheia* is a sage's highest and most noble state, Christian teaching presupposed that humans were eligible not to accept the ordeals and, moreover, to oppose them. Thus, in a significantly modified and Christianized version, elements of the Stoic view of fate appeared in later

theological writings. Another explanation for how the Stoic elements were integrated into the Christian worldview is that several ancient thinkers' deeds and texts were later reinterpreted from a Christian position. The most famous example of such a conversion is Virgil, whose *Eclogue IV* was believed to have predicted the birth of Christ. Seneca went through the same transformation. Jerome and Augustine, as well as later scholars and theologians, such as Jacobus da Voragine, praised him as one of the foremost Christian writers. This image of Seneca as a pre-Christian saint was reinforced in the early Renaissance.

The way in which Christian theology reshaped bits of Stoic teaching on fate is evident in Boethius's *De consolatione philosophiae*. Although containing no direct reference to Christianity, this influential treatise extensively touched upon the questions of *fortuna* and predestination. Written in the form of a dialogue between Boethius himself, jailed and awaiting trial, and "Philosophy," the *De consolatione* stressed the central notions of Christian teaching of man's and woman's free will and substantive goodness. At the same time, Boethius admitted that there was no implicit correlation between one's prosperity and wealth and virtue. Through the vicissitudes of fortune, good people could fall into ruin or favor evil. This does not, however, negate the centrality of virtue since that is what determines one's life. To illustrate the unstable character of fortune, Boethius introduced the image of the wheel – something that penetrated the discourse on fate, both in literature and art, in the following centuries. Widely read and translated into the major European languages in the Middle Ages, *The Consolation of Philosophy* did not lose its importance in the Renaissance and continued to play a crucial role in later debates on the nature of fate.

The other substantial problem to which Christian theology had to respond was the relationship between divine providence and free will. Evolved in the heated controversy with the followers of Pelagius, the Church's position was coined by Augustine. According to the Church Father, and in contrast to Pelagius's teaching, the free will that provided humans with an ability to choose good over evil was insufficient to obtain salvation. To turn them to the right path, God, as the Supreme Being that controlled and governed the universe, might intervene in the life of people and grant them the gift of divine grace. The latter, which implied divine providence, did not deny free will but, by its importance, undoubtedly exceeded all other divine gifts and led people to salvation. Later advanced in medieval scholasticism, receiving its full justification in Thomas Aquinas's *Summa theologiae*, the Augustinian theory presented a famous dilemma: although the soul kept control of its actions, God was aware of what choice it was inclined to make and, therefore, might act to direct it, without, again, compromising free choice. As is well known, in the sixteenth century, John Calvin adopted Augustine's account to develop his doctrine of double predestination and predestined salvation.

On the one hand, these features formed the grounds for what early modern scholars and artists viewed of fate and fortune. On the other, as mentioned above, a good deal of newly recovered primary literary and philosophical sources, as well as a deep interest in the imagery of fate, significantly intensified these reflections. Over the period between the fifteenth and early eighteenth centuries, *fatum*, under numerous faces, pervaded all layers of early modern intellectual culture. The Reformation that had eroded the religious unity across Europe; the dramatic socio-political developments of the time; and the proliferation of texts that challenged the notion of universal design, from both philosophical and scientific perspectives, all made the contingent, in general, and one's personal fate, in particular, matters of notable anxiety. It might seem that at the turn of the eighteenth century, things went through substantial changes. Mathematization of natural knowledge, rationalization of the economic life and

public sphere, and the development of the scientific method are believed to have put the realm of the probable under control. However, the satisfaction with the rationalized probability (to use Lorraine Daston's words), which exceeded the boundaries of mathematics and science, and permeated into philosophy, did not last long; late-nineteenth- and twentieth-century thinkers kept constantly returning to what their predecessors had contemplated for generations. Thus, in reconstructing the history of human interaction with, and understanding of, *fatum*, the early modern era particularly concerned with the notion in question on both the divine and human levels deserves closer examination.

This volume evidences the multifaceted character of early modern reflections on fate and fortune. It does not pretend to cover the subject in its entirety, therefore making some lacunae inevitable. What this collection does aspire to do, however, is to instance the main fields of knowledge in which thinking on *fatum* became central at the time, as well as to illustrate the approaches contemporary scholars applied in dealing with it. This determines the volume's focus on philosophical, political and societal, and art historical topics.

As will be shown below, Renaissance and early modern philosophical treatments of fate and fortune texts witnessed multidirectional trends. On the one hand, the early Italian Renaissance adaptation of Stoicism for the benefit of Christian teachings proved highly successful. The Stoic idea of a person's humility in the presence of the uncertain and predestined dressed up in Christian wording received wide support beyond the Apennine peninsula and, subsequently, culminated in Justus Lipsius's *De constantia*, a "manifesto" of early modern Christian Neo-Stoicism. On the other hand, not only did the newly revived philosophical currents, such as Platonism and atomism, shake the dominance of Aristotelianism across the whole spectrum of knowledge; they, particularly atomism that postulated the constant random motion of atoms, cast doubt on the principal conception of the universal design. This, by extension, affected an understanding of providence and personal destiny. There were three ways to react to these challenges: to adjust the new theories to keep an existing framework; to substitute what was thought to have become outdated with new concepts; or to admit that the universe may not have been designed as previously suggested by tradition and that the degree of divine involvement in human affairs and the limits of human cognition of this design, including that of an individual's *fatum*, could be different than had been presumed before. In the long run, this paved the way for the rise of modern science, on the one side, and further discussions on causality in the age of Enlightenment and Enlightenment deism, on the other.

As regards the socio-political and artistic observations of fate, they were similarly grounded in a long-standing tradition but gained fresh impetus in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. As the contributions in this volume demonstrate, apart from benefiting from the classical and medieval traditions, these reflections were specifically responsive to structural changes, political, economic, and gender, which formed the core of early modern intellectual culture on the whole. Thus, what this book aims to provide is a broad and manifold picture of early modern speculation on fate and fortune spreading through all fields of knowledge and through all of Europe, from England to Russia.

The volume's goal explains its structure. The division of the parts remains symbolic: in delving into a variety of subjects, the contributions thematically and intellectually interact with and complement each other. However, to give some order to the collection, it is divided into three main clusters. The first four essays center on the concept of fate in Renaissance and early modern philosophy. John Sellars gives

a detailed analysis of the Christianized use of Stoic and Platonic teachings among early Renaissance scholars, from Petrarch to Marsilio Ficino. Paul Richard Blum examines Coluccio Salutati's *De fato and fortuna* and puts the humanist's argument into a larger framework of the Christian understanding of divine providence and fortune. Elisabeth Blum scrutinizes Giordano Bruno's *Spaccio de la bestia trionfante*. Through reconstructing Bruno's use of the three terms, providence, fortune, and fate, she uncovers Bruno's multifarious interpretation, metaphysical and moral, of the various forms of causation. Jo Coture's essay exposes the threats that the revival of atomism posed to Christian teaching on free will and providence. Together with an inquiry into the intellectual context of late-sixteenth- and seventeenth-century discussions on fate, his meticulous reading of Pierre Gassendi's *Syntagma philosophicum* informs of the ways in which early modern philosophy sought to remove the points of contradiction between atomism and Christian theology.

The second cluster zooms in on the political and societal factors that defined the discourse on fate and fortune in the early modern period. Exploring the relationship between the body of nature and the body politic, on the one hand, and that of the notion of *antiperistasis* and fortune, on the other, Guido Giglioni thereby sheds new light on how Niccolò Machiavelli made use of natural philosophy and anatomy to explain the political meaning of fortune. On the basis of a good deal of textual evidence that attests to the transformations of the image of Fortuna in English Renaissance poetry, Orlando Reade masterfully interprets the literary tendencies from a methodological perspective of gender and race studies. Sophie Raux's contribution shifts the reader's attention to another, more practical form of engagement with fate. Although undoubtedly echoing the intellectual trends of the day, the increasing popularity of lotteries and gambling was at the same time symptomatic of the rise of early capitalism in the Low Countries in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. This, as Raux has perfectly shown, laid the groundwork for fate or fortune (depending on one's success) to become an issue of curiosity, attraction, and concern to a wider audience, which, in turn, manifested in a rich selection of imagery.

Raux's essay connects the second part to the third, which focuses essentially on the artistic representations of fate. It begins with Damiano Acciarino's erudite study of the iconology of fate in Italian Renaissance art. In the footsteps of Aby Warburg, Erwin Panofsky, and their followers, Acciarino reveals how literature and philosophy intersected with visual arts in developing an impressive and diverse collection of iconographical models of fate. Dalia Judovitz convincingly situates the oeuvre of the leading seventeenth-century French painter Georges de La Tour in the intellectual and socio-economic context of contemporary Europe and discloses the multi-layered background behind his paintings featuring the theme of the contingent. Finally, Ovanes Akopyan scrupulously investigates the origin, significance, and political message of two enigmatic early eighteenth-century Russian icon paintings that deliberately accentuated the problem of the ruler's personal *fortuna* in relation to one's desire to foresee the future. Demonstrating that the works' iconographical scheme was grounded in medieval astrological sources, Akopyan's article traces the transmission of Western European texts and imagery to Russia. It also suggests that starting from the sixteenth century, astrology, a discipline that interfered in the domain of the unknown and endangered the purity of Christian teaching on divine providence and free will, obtained a distinct political meaning in early modern Russia.

Therefore, this volume presents new insights into what shaped and constituted the Renaissance and early modern views of fate and fortune. It argues that these ideas were emblematic of a more

fundamental argument about the self, society, and the universe and shows that their influence was more widespread, both geographically and thematically, than hitherto assumed. <>

Coincidences: Synchronicity, Verisimilitude, and Storytelling by Michael Jackson [University of California Press, 9780520379961]

Most people have a story to tell about a remarkable coincidence that in some instances changed the course of their lives. These uncanny occurrences have been variously interpreted as evidence of divine influence, fate, or the collective unconscious. Less common are explanations that explore the social situations and personal preoccupations of the individuals who place the most weight on coincidences. Drawing on a variety of coincidence stories, renowned anthropologist Michael Jackson builds a case for seeing them as allegories of separation and loss—revealing the hope of repairing sundered lives, reconnecting estranged friends, reuniting distant kin, closing the gap between people and their gods, and achieving a sense of emotional and social connectedness with others in a fragmented world.

Reviews

"In Coincidences, Michael Jackson has produced an impassioned and wonderfully written essay that weaves strands of narrative and philosophical reflection into a powerful and seamless tapestry that underscores a central theme of human being—its irrepressible ambiguity." —Paul Stoller, author of Yaya's Story: The Quest for Well-Being in the World

"Michael Jackson elegantly combines analysis, memoir, and literary sensibilities to create a vibrant and exciting book about coincidence and its ramifications in human life. An extraordinary achievement that displays the full range of Jackson's flair as a thinker and a writer."—Hans Lucht, Senior Researcher, Danish Institute for International Studies

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Excerpt:

Our lives are, for the most part, made up of unremarkable events. Inevitably, however, the course of every life is punctuated by events that disturb and astonish in equal measure, and when we recount our lives as stories we often single out such events as turning points or moments of truth. This book is about such events. Its particular focus is on coincidences, the "remarkable concurrences of events or circumstances that have no discernible causal connection," and the notions of luck, fate, and providence to which these events give rise. Whether coincidences are construed as fortunate or unfortunate, tragic or transformative, they always evoke wonder and, as the saying goes, "make us think."

As I am writing, my faculty assistant, Andrea Davies, appears in the doorway of my office, and we fall into conversation. At one point, Andrea mentions that she wrote her MFA thesis on James Baldwin's nonfiction and his use of coincidence.1 When I mention that I happen to be writing a book about coincidence and ask Andrea which of Baldwin's works I might refer to, she suggests I read the opening lines of Notes of a Native Son.

On the 29th of July, in 1943, my father died. On the same day, a few hours later, his last child was born. Over a month before this, while all our energies were concentrated in waiting for these events, there had been, in Detroit, one of the bloodiest race riots of the century. A few hours after my father's funeral, while he lay in state in the undertaker's chapel, a race riot broke out in Harlem. In the morning of the 3rd of August, we drove my father to the graveyard through a wilderness of smashed plate glass.

As we drove him to the graveyard, the spoils of injustice, anarchy, discontent, and hatred were all around us. It seemed to me that God himself had devised, to mark my father's end, the most sustained

and brutally dissonant of codas. And it seemed to me, too, that the violence which rose all about us as my father left the world had been devised as a corrective for the pride of his eldest son.

This coincidence of a personal tragedy and a social calamity prompted Baldwin, "the eldest son," to ponder the connection between his father's generation and his own as well as the connection between the race riots in America and the biblical apocalypse.

Coincidences typically occasion quite different interpretations, and my ethnographic research in Aboriginal Australia and West Africa has taught me that while Western intellectuals tend to refer coincidences to that landscape of shadow that has been termed, directly or indirectly, "the unconscious," preliterate peoples tend to invoke unknown forces like witchcraft and sorcery, lying at the periphery of their social fields. As Michel Foucault observes, the unthought may be construed as deep within "like a shrivelled-up nature or a stratified history" or as something exterior to us, in the penumbra as it were, an "Other that is not only a brother but a twin, born, not of man, nor in man, but beside him and at the same time, in an identical newness, in an unavoidable duality." Although Foucault draws a distinction between the unconscious and the unknown, the former being "an abysmal region in man's nature" and the latter "an obscure space" inhabited by unknown others, he refuses to accord greater weight to either perspective. It could be argued, however, that the dominant episteme since the late nineteenth century has centered on the intrapsychic, not the intersubjective. For Sigmund Freud, as for Claude Lévi-Strauss, delving into the depths of the unconscious mind was the royal road to understanding human thought and action, while Carl Jung interpreted synchronicity as the irruption of archetypal figures and mythological motifs into our conscious life.4 Although these thinkers evince an intellectual habit that Henri Ellenberger characterizes as

"unmasking," it is practically impossible to sustain any hard and fast distinction between a mode of thought that focuses on the unconscious mind and a mode of thought that focuses on the dilemmas and difficulties of social relations. As Baldwin's compelling account of the coincidence of his father's death and the 1943 Detroit race riots indicates, theological, sociological, and psychological interpretations may all be inspired by the same event. Aboriginal people speak of the Dreaming as an ancestral yet timeless field of being that is occasionally and partially glimpsed by the living in their dreams. For many African people, the mysteries of the invisible can be penetrated by diviners gifted with second sight or assisted by spirit allies. In religions throughout the world, the invisible is a numinous realm to which one rarely gains direct access, though it can be reached by means of prayer, ordeal, and ritual. For scientists, the invisible consists in hidden laws of cause and effect that rational inquiry and sophisticated instruments can bring to light. For many anthropologists, the field of intersubjective life is the subject of their concern: the social matrices in which we are embedded and the dynamic forces that govern our interactions—love and hate, reciprocity and exchange, attachment and separation, certainty and uncertainty, power and powerlessness, war and peace.

What is common to all these interpretive traditions is the mysterious relationship between the visible and invisible dimensions of human existence, the "landscape of shadow" that lies between the known and the unknown and is at once exterior and interior to us. Whether one approaches the phenomenon of coincidence from an intrapsychic or intersubjective point of view, the same assumption is made—that the "obscure space" between the known and the unknown, or between thought and the unthought, can be illuminated, and that the world without and the world within can thereby be seen as one.

Methodologically, one therefore needs a bifocal perspective that, in the words of D. W. Winnicott, does justice to the "intermediate area of experiencing to which inner reality and external life both contribute." This dialectical approach is also suggested by Carl Jung's comment that synchronicity involves a "peculiar interdependence of objective events among themselves as well as with subjective (psychic) states of the observer or observers."8 But Jung's fascination with the collective unconscious leads him to downplay the dynamics of intersubjectivity—the passions that unite and divide us, coming together and moving apart in the course of our journeys through life. Historical and even prehistorical events shape our consciousness, to be sure, but we reshape those events in the multiple ways we respond to them after the fact, and any interpretation of a coincidence is inadequate unless it considers the lived experiences and immediate circumstances of those to whom the coincidence happens. Although I do not uncritically embrace either Jung's metaphysical interpretations of coincidence" or the Freudian view that our tendency to see meaning in coincidences is an expression of an infantile fantasy of omnipotence (a defense against our anxiety of not being in control of our world), psychoanalysis remains one of the most compelling approaches to understanding "clusters of unexplained facts," not by glib reiterations of the view that facts speak for themselves but by acknowledging that our evolutionary, genealogical, historical, mythological, and biographical pasts bequeath to us a constellation of elements that emerge in different permutations and combinations at different moments in life, and that our perception of reality reflects these ever-changing assemblages that are never the same for everyone, or for any one person in any given situation. This is why one cannot entirely explain a person in terms of any one variable, be it class, culture, gender, ethnic or religious affiliation, or even personality. This is also why it is imperative to deploy a double perspective that encompasses both the object of experience and the experiencing subject, allowing that human beings are shaped by external forces and conspire in their own fates, seeing the world through the lens of their own preoccupations and interests and creating gods in their own image. One is led, therefore, to broach the philosophical problem of verisimilitude: of speaking truth-to-life, of questioning every truth claim not in order to finally arrive at the truth for once and for all but in order to more deeply appreciate the complexity of what is at play for any person, in any moment of time, or in any one place.

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Synchronicity and Suffering

When I ask myself why people should assign deep significance to a coincidence rather than brush it aside as inconsequential, I am struck by the degree to which suffering and anxiety increase not only our awareness of patterns but also our compulsion to find them.' In a recent report in Science, two psychologists at the University of Texas at Austin describe six experiments they conducted in order to test the hypothesis that lack of control increases a person's "illusory pattern perception"—which they defined as "the identification of a coherent and meaningful interrelationship among a set of random or unrelated stimuli: They found that participants who lacked control were more likely to perceive a variety of illusory patterns, including hearing voices in the wind, discerning coherent images in chaotic or scrambled lines, perceiving conspiracies, imagining illusory correlations in stock market information, and developing superstitions.

Speaking of how lives do not end but assume alternate forms, Jung suggests that coincidences often reveal moments in our prehistories, psychic echoes as it were of previous incarnations. "What I found;'

he writes, "were `coincidences' which were connected so meaningfully that their 'chance' concurrence would represent a degree of improbability that would have to be expressed by an astronomical figure."

Among the many examples, Jung adduces, is one from Wilhelm von Scholz concerning a young mother who took a photograph of her small son in the Black Forest on the eve of World War I. After leaving the film in Strasbourg to be processed, the woman was distracted by the political turmoil engulfing Europe and was unable to retrieve the film. Two years later, in Frankfurt, she purchased another roll of film, intending to take photographs of her infant daughter. When the film was processed it was found to have been double exposed. To her astonishment the ghostly image beneath the image of her daughter was of her son. For some reason, the film she had deposited in Strasbourg had not been developed but left in its canister and gone back into circulation. For von Scholz, the story confirmed the "mutual attraction of related objects" or an "elective affinity" that unites things or people that belong to each other but have been accidentally separated, like the two halves of Aristophanes's sorb apples.'

If there are not only two sides to every story, but two sides to every human being, it is reasonable to ask why von Scholz shows so little interest in the woman who took a photograph of her son on the outbreak of war and two years later recovered the photograph with the ghostly figure of her son underlying the picture of her daughter. This graphic image of one sibling displacing another is compelling enough. But is it not also notable, given the traumatic events that overwhelmed this young mother, that she should crave evidence of continuity in the midst of chaos and find it in this double-exposed photograph? That a coincidence should involve not simply the concurrence of two events, separated in time and space, but also an intersubjective union of two separate lives is not without significance, as the following story, related by my Polish friend Wojcieck Dabrowski, also suggests.

The Dabrowskis had lived in Warsaw for ten generations, and their apartment had been in the family for almost one hundred years. Wojcieck, his father, and grandfather were all born in the same bed, in the same bedroom.

The family's next-door neighbor was a Mr. Zajac—Mr. Hare.

Mr. Hare received a lot of anonymous telephone calls. The phone would ring, Mr. Hare would pick up, and the caller would ask, "Is that Mr. Hare?" "Yes," Mr. Hare would say, "Hare speaking."

"Pif! Paf!" the caller would exclaim, mimicking a shotgun going off. Then he would hang up.

This went on for several years.

In September 1939, Warsaw was besieged by German panzers and infantry. The city was bombed day and night. Heaps of rubble in the streets, paving stones torn up, gutted streetcars, the stench of burning asphalt and the dead. As fire and panic swept the city, Mr. Hare carried homemade petrol bombs to soldiers engaged in rearguard actions.

For as long as the battle lasted, Warsaw Radio repeatedly broadcast a Chopin polonaise. When the music stopped, the fighting ended. SS units entered the city, arresting and shooting teachers, aristocrats, Jews, clergymen, doctors ...

Mr. Hare was taken prisoner only to escape a few days later and make his way to England, where he joined the Resistance. Of his circle of friends, he alone survived the war.

In 1945, he returned to Warsaw. Incredibly, his apartment building was still standing, though for miles around there was nothing but rubble and ruins.

Mr. Hare climbed the stairs to his apartment. The windows were gaping holes. Splinters of glass and chunks of plaster littered the floors.

Over the next few days, Mr. Hare scavenged for food, kitchenware, sticks of furniture. When he discovered that the telephone wires were still intact, he had the phone reconnected.

A week passed, and the telephone rang. Mr. Hare picked up the receiver. "Is that Mr. Hare?"

"Speaking."

"Pif! Paf!"

Mr. Hare could not believe that this bagatelle, this puerile pun, had somehow survived the years of death and destruction. He implored the caller not to hang up. Mr. Hare was choking with the effort to establish contact. He begged the ghostly caller to reveal his identity, his name, to continue the conversation. But the phone went dead, and the caller never called again. <>

NIETZSCHE, THE ARISTOCRATIC REBEL: INTELLECTUAL BIOGRAPHY AND CRITICAL BALANCE-SHEET by Domenico Losurdo, translated by Gregor Benton. with an introduction by Harrison Fluss [Series: Historical Materialism Book Series, Brill, 9789004270947]

The most comprehensive historical accounting of Nietzsche's life and thought to appear in decades

Perhaps no philosopher is more of a conundrum than Nietzsche, the solitary rebel, poet, wayfarer, anti-revolutionary *Aufklärer* and theorist of aristocratic radicalism. His accusers identify in his 'superman' the origins of Nazism, and thus issue an irrevocable condemnation; his defenders pursue a hermeneutics of innocence founded ultimately in allegory. In a work that constitutes the most important contribution to Nietzschean studies in recent decades, Domenico Losurdo instead pursues a less reductive strategy. Taking literally the ruthless implications of Nietzsche's anti-democratic thinking – his celebration of slavery, of war and colonial expansion, and eugenics – he nevertheless refuses to treat these from the perspective of the mid-twentieth century. In doing so, he restores Nietzsche's works to their complex nineteenth-century context, and presents a more compelling account of the importance of Nietzsche as philosopher than can be expected from his many contemporary apologists.

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EXCERPT: HOW ONE CONSTRUCTS NIETZSCHE'S INNOCENCE: PUBLISHERS, TRANSLATORS, INTERPRETERS

These comments give us some idea of the spiritual climate in which today's dominant Nietzsche interpretation has arisen and become established. An extreme case is that of Giorgio Colli, who says we should read the philosopher while simply abandoning ourselves to the musical charm of his magnificent prose. At the time, Montinari tries to resist. But we should not be deceived by the severe and mordant manner in which he expresses himself: we are on the eve of a capitulation. Colli's 'musical' interpretation, or a 'theoretical' interpretation that – as in Foucault's case – considers historical-philological reconstruction to be irrelevant or – as in Vattimo's case – seeks to correct Nietzsche's 'self-misunderstandings', has prevailed.

This spiritual climate has above all influenced the translations. But it is not the inaccuracies, oversights and errors that are the problem: no translation is flawless, and, of course, this also goes for the translations I have proposed in the Italian edition of my book. The problem is the 'method' that underlies the inaccuracies, oversights and errors in the Italian Colli-Montinari edition. This edition evinces a constant tendency to suppress the historical and political world as an alien and disruptive factor. This preoccupation is so pronounced that it has, at least in one instance, strongly influenced the editing.

The Young Nietzsche's Judeophobia

It is here we should start out, also because we have here a text that marks the beginning of Nietzsche's philosophical (and political) path. On 1 February 1870 he held a lecture in Basel titled 'Socrates and Tragedy' that concluded:

> *In conclusion, a single question. Is music drama really dead, dead for good? Should the German really not be allowed to put anything alongside that vanished work of art of the past other than 'great opera',* much in the same way as the ape used to appear next to Hercules? This is the most serious question of our art, and who, as a German, does not understand the seriousness of this question* has fallen victim to the Socratism of our days, which undoubtedly cannot produce martyrs nor speak the language of the 'wisest among the Greeks' and which certainly blusters [like the historical

Socrates] about not knowing anything, but really knows nothing. This Socratism is the Jewish press: I say nothing more. (ST, I, 549 and XIV, 101)

I have already dwelt at length on the reactions this text evoked in the Wagner household, as well as on Nietzsche's response (*supra*, 3 § 1). It is worth quickly reviewing the incident, so the reader has to hand the elements essential for evaluating the editors' decisions. Invited by Cosima Wagner to avoid prematurely and recklessly provoking the Jewish community, Nietzsche replaced the term 'Jewish [*jüdische*]' with 'today's [*heutige*]' and, probably later, crossed out the first part of the paragraph (which I have italicised). The second part is on a page of the manuscript that has been torn out (by the philosopher or his sister Elisabeth, no one knows which). But so much is clear: the whole paragraph, as quoted here (with the explicit reference to the 'Jewish press') corresponds to the preparatory draft of the text, was delivered in the Basel lecture, was sent to Richard and Cosima Wagner and reflects without a doubt the original and young philosopher's true intention.

All this is clearly explained by Colli and Montinari (even though they have placed these clarificatory lines in such a way that they escape the reader's eyes). But let us see how they proceed in the edition prepared by them. The German edition gives only the first (italicised) part of the paragraph: to read the conclusion and the details of the matter, the reader must go to the trouble of checking in the volume devoted to variants and the critical apparatus. This procedure alone is highly questionable. Following Cosima's request, Nietzsche did not amend the written and spoken text because he had changed his mind but merely to carry out the temporary self-censorship urged on him by his correspondent. It is not clear why today's editors should follow Cosima's advice.

But things get even worse in the Italian version. Here the paragraph is quoted in full, save that the original 'Jewish press' has become 'today's press', while in the 'chronology' and 'notes' that accompany the text there is no reference to the original version. The 'chronology' (*Opere*, vol. III, II, 394–6) cites excerpts from Cosima's and Richard Wagner's letters in which they speak of the 'horror' and unease they had experienced on reading the text of the lecture; besides that, passages from Nietzsche's letter to Rohde are quoted, in which the philosopher explains that in future he wants to overcome the caution of the moment to express himself 'as seriously and frankly as possible'. But all this is made incomprehensible by the disappearance of the reference to the 'Jewish press' and Cosima's recommendations for caution on this point. The composer writes: 'You will receive absolution only if no one from *that side* understands anything. […] I hope with all my heart you do not break your neck.' And Cosima: 'We were so upset that we no longer read anything that evening.' One can easily imagine the reader's questions. What 'side' is being referred to? And why should it be so threatening? Wagner continues: 'You could free me of a great part, even an entire half, of my mission.' Reader: what 'mission'? But the reader is left in the dark about the essential issue: the intellectual alliance the musician, after reading *Socrates and Tragedy*, offered the philologist in the common struggle against Judaism, a struggle to be conducted with the tactical skill the enemy's power and malice necessitated. In conclusion, the self-censorship recommended by Cosima and inexplicably included in the German version of the critical edition becomes real censorship in the Italian version (and in the widely available paperback edition published by the Piccola Biblioteca Adelphi).

But that is not the only example of censorship. The 'chronology' cites in relation to *The Birth of Tragedy* (*Opere*, vol. III, I, 468) passages from Nietzsche's letter to Wagner in which he attributes to him

the merit of having, together with Schopenhauer, given voice to the 'Germanic seriousness of life', a 'more serious and soulful worldview', threatened by 'clamant Judaism' (B, II, 1, 9). The quotation starts at an opportune moment: it reproduces the tribute paid to the 'Germanic seriousness of life', but the reader once again learns nothing about the opposition of Judaism and Germanism that so profoundly characterised Nietzsche before the start of the 'Enlightenment' phase, and nothing about the denunciation of Judaism that immediately preceded it.

Now we come to the translation. I will confine myself to examples easy for non-Italian readers to understand. *The Greek State* polemicised against 'a self-seeking, stateless money aristocracy' (CV, 3, I, 774 [171]). The allusion to Jewish finance, a constant target of the anti-Jewish and anti-Semitic polemic, is transparent. But, in the Italian version, the aristocracy changes from *apolide* [stateless] to *apolitika* [apolitical] (*Opere*, vol. III, II, 234)! Taking up one of Wagner's favourite themes, the young Nietzsche reproached Auerbach and authors of Jewish descent for using a form of German, 'due to national reasons', characterised by 'natural foreignness' and therefore 'deplorable' (VII, 598 [168]). In the Italian translation, *estraneità* [foreignness] becomes *inesperienza* [inexperience] (*Opere*, III, III, II, 196), and so the young Nietzsche's Judeophobia once again vanishes without trace.

The Suppression of Politics and History

The Germany celebrated by the Germanomaniacs, who would include the young Nietzsche, was synonymous with true 'culture', set against the banal 'civilization' of other peoples, above all the Romans. The culture/civilisation dichotomy is wholly absent from the Colli-Montinari Italian edition. Yet Nietzsche expressly emphasised the 'abysmal antagonism' between 'culture' and 'civilization' (*supra*, 11 §7).

Given the methodological assumptions represented especially by Giorgio Colli, little attention is paid to history. Although the Puritan sect had sprung from an intrinsically plebeian Reformation, it succeeded in overcoming its origins and, thanks to the inducements to self-overcoming contained within its religion, becoming a master-race: 'Asceticism and Puritanism are almost indispensable means of educating and ennobling a race that wants to gain control over its origins among the rabble' (JGB, 61 [55]), Nietzsche concluded. Not so, however, the Italian translation, which renders *Puritanismus* as *castità* [chastity]! Even if one ignores the risk of transforming the immoralist philosopher into a eulogiser of purity and sexual abstinence, the fact remains that the specific historical event to which he referred has vanished. Similarly, the 'visionary [*schwärmerisch*][4] spirit of the eighteenth century' becomes in the Italian translation a *spirito stravagante*[extravagant spirit] (FW, 362 [227]). Once again, the reference to the dreams of social regeneration that characterised the ideological preparation of the French Revolution tends to be obfuscated. The *Genealogy of Morals* (I, 5) criticised 'Europe's socialists' for their 'inclination towards the "Commune", the most primitive form of society': the Italian version has 'commune' in lowercase: will readers realise Nietzsche's target was the Paris Commune?

Luther, this plebeian, observed *The Gay Science*, 'lacked any inheritance from a ruling caste [*Kaste*] and instinct for power' (FW, 358 [222]). Caste becomes 'class' in the Italian translation (*Opere*, V, II, 272). The same happens in other even more significant contexts. It is 'is characteristic of every strong age', says *Twilight of the Idols*, to maintain 'the rift between people, between classes [*Stand*]' (GD, Skirmishes of an untimely man, 37 [212]). In the Italian translation too, 'class' again replaces *ceto* [caste] (*Opere*, VI, III, 136). As a result, we end up with the oxymoron of a chasm between class and class. One

can speak of social class only when there is relative social mobility; but it is precisely this mobility Nietzsche aimed to eliminate. This is a trait that accompanied the philosopher in the entire course of his development, including the period of 'Enlightenment'.

Breeding, Physiology and Degeneration

A similar process occurs around the theme of 'breeding [*Züchtung*]'. As we know, Vattimo recommends its allegorical interpretation, with the help of an arbitrary abstraction from a historical context in which eugenic views were widespread, and an even more arbitrary abstraction from the interest, not to say enthusiasm, Nietzsche displayed for this new 'science'. It is interesting to observe how Vattimo immerses even the philosopher's most disquieting pages in a purifying bath. Zarathustra enounced the maxim 'Die at the right time' and then continued:

> To be sure, how could the person that never lives at the right time ever die at the right time? [Would that he were never born! – Thus I advise the superfluous. But even the superfluous boast about their dying [*thun noch wichtig mit ihrem Sterben*], and even the hollowest nut still wants to be cracked.] Everyone regards dying as important; but death is not yet a festival. As of yet people have not learned how to consecrate the most beautiful festivals. (Za, I, On Free Death [53])

I have put square brackets around the passage Vattimo omits, indicated in his book in the traditional way, by means of an ellipsis in square brackets. In this way, it is not clear to the reader that, for Nietzsche, the importance of the death of the 'superfluous' was purely subjective and imaginary. They weighed unbearably on society and life; in one way or another, one was to urge them to end a worthless existence. Zarathustra insisted strongly on this in the excerpt, which – not for nothing – has been called the 'suicide chapter' (*supra*, 19 § 4). But there is no trace of this in Vattimo's commentary. Thus, he miraculously transforms a brutal eugenicist discourse that celebrates the suicide of the malformed as a festival of culture into purely moral reflection.

The process of volatilisation and sublimation concludes with the proposal to translate *Übermensch* as *oltreuomo* (*oltre*, 'above, beyond', *uomo*, 'man') rather than as *superuomo*, on the grounds that Nietzsche cared only about 'transcending the man of tradition'.[6] But when Zarathustra, in the speech that immediately follows, denounced 'the selfishness of the sick', who clung to a worthless life and thereby compound the 'degeneration [*Entartung*]', he continued: 'Upward goes our way, over from genus [*Art*] to super-genus [*Über-Art*]' (Za, I, On the Bestowing Virtue, 1 [56]). An essential aspect of Zarathustra's speech was his setting of the 'overman' and 'super-genus' against rampant 'degeneration'. Again, we find ourselves returning to a theme that, together and inextricably intertwined with the themes of the hereditary transmission of crime and eugenics, dominated European and Western culture in the second half of the nineteenth century and also played a central role in the circle of Nietzsche's treasured authors and friends. This is shown, for example, by the fact that the names of writers like Galton, Lombroso and Gobineau frequently cropped up in their correspondence (*supra*, 19 § 1). In Zarathustra to seek to separate the great fascinating moralist from the brutal theorist of aristocratic radicalism is an untenable enterprise.

The *oltreuomo* becomes the starting point for a dizzying process of transfiguration and sublimation. Vattimo refers to § 868 of the *Will to Power*, of which I here quote the central passage: 'A dominant race can grow only from terrible and violent beginnings. Problem: where are the barbarians of the twentieth

century? Obviously, they will show and consolidate themselves only after enormous socialist crises.' This is one of Nietzsche's most brutally significant pages. Confronted with the challenge of what Nietzsche elsewhere called 'socialist wars' (*supra*, 11 § 7), with the 'choice' of 'either perish or win through', as he wrote in the last months of his conscious existence, a new caste or master race would form from those in a position, after putting aside democratic and humanitarian inhibitions, to apply barbaric means as the situation requires, and to demonstrate a 'will to terrible things' (this is also an allusion to the annihilation of the malformed, the basis of the slave revolt). Only then would the new 'dominant race' be able to dispose of the mass of human beings as the 'most intelligent slave animal'. '[T]errible and violent beginnings', the 'will to terrible things': these repeated expressions set the tone for this text (XIII, 17–18). But Vattimo refers to it only in order to read from it the evocation of 'a sort of 'new barbarians', whose barbarism consists essentially in the fact that they 'come from outside', they are abstracted from the logic of the system': this new species 'already anticipates the characteristics of the freedom achieved by the *oltreuomo*'.[7] As if by magic, the 'terrible and violent beginnings', the 'will to terrible things', the 'enormous socialist crises', and, of course, the reaffirmation of the necessity of slavery dissolve into thin air.

Sometimes the hermeneutics of innocence are so pronounced they end up provoking an actual reversal of meaning. *Ecce Homo* invites us to pay attention to 'all the things about life that deserve to be taken very seriously – questions of nutrition, residence, spiritual diet, treatment of the sick [*Krankenbehandlung*], cleanliness, weather!' Unfortunately, 'in the concept of the good person, [one has taken the side] of everything weak, sick, badly formed, suffering from itself, everything *that should be destroyed* [*zu Grunde gehen soll*], – defiance of the law of *selection*' (EH, Why I am a destiny, 8 [150–1]). In the Italian translation, *Krankenbehandlung*, which had a clearly eugenetic meaning, becomes '*cura dei malati* [healing of the sick]', despite Nietzsche's highlighting with italics the assertion that one was not artificially to keep alive in the world anything that ran counter to the 'law of *selection*' and that consequently 'should *perish*' (*Opere*, VI, III, 384–5).

Beyond the 'Nietzschean' Catechism

While some of the editorial choices are questionable and there are no few cases of political blocking in the translation, the 'chronology', and the 'notes' to the Italian version, the commentary in the *Opere* and the paperback editions published by Adelphi adopts an occasionally uplifting tone. Where *Twilight of the Idols*('Improving' humanity, 4) points to the Manu Code and the Hindu world as an expression of an 'Aryan humanity', Colli and Montinari's commentary takes care to point out that the conceptual pair Aryan/anti-Aryan has an 'objective, descriptive character', void of 'value criteria.' While Nietzsche defines Christianity as 'the anti-Aryan religion *par excellence*', according to Colli and Montinari he had emphasised Jesus's Jewish origins merely in order to confront Christian anti-Semites trying to demonstrate that the founder of their religion was at least half-Roman and half-Aryan (*Opere*, VI, III, 502). In fact, in the text at issue it is crystal-clear that the opposition was between 'Chandala values' and 'Aryan values': while the former found their consecration in Christianity, the latter referred to an 'Aryan humanity, absolutely pure, absolutely original', which rejected with horror 'the mishmash human beings', 'the fruit of adultery, incest, crime' (*supra*, 12 § 8). According to Colli and Montinari, a master of prose used such emphatic language to express an innocuously 'descriptive' concept! It is admittedly difficult to read in a non-judgemental way a philosopher who, with his concept of perspectivism, tirelessly emphasised that any theory involved the moment of decision, of choice, of the explicit or implicit

utterance of a value judgement. However, it is incomprehensible how one can apply such an interpretation to a paragraph that even in the language it uses, in every line and every word, exudes value judgements.

The hermeneutics of innocence treats history as an intruder that must immediately be shown the door. At a time when the Aryan myth was running rampant, Nietzsche was supposedly not only immune to it but did not even know about it. In the last phase of his development, Nietzsche emphatically praised the Hindu world of castes, but was supposedly unaware of the fact that the term *varna*, 'caste', also indicated colour, and referred to the difference between the blond conquerors belonging to the higher races and the subjugated coloured peoples of the lower castes. So a trained philologist and passionate devotee of Hindu culture supposedly had no idea of what was perfectly clear to both Treitschke and the circles of Christian missionaries Nietzsche hated and despised. In fact, Aryan mythology, which had already made an appearance in *The Birth of Tragedy*, played a growing role in Nietzsche's subsequent development.

As often happens in such cases, the outcome is a paradox. On the one hand, the apologetic zeal completely misses its target, for consistent anti-Semites have no problem in acknowledging Jesus's Jewish descent, and at most take it as an occasion to denounce Christianity along with Judaism, as, for example, Dühring did (*supra*, 18 § 6). On the other hand, the apologetic zeal ends up achieving a result opposite to that pursued. In their interpretation of the aphorism just quoted, Colli and Montinari seem to assume that, for Nietzsche, 'Jewish' and 'Aryan' were opposites. In this case, the unavoidable acknowledgement of a positive or negative value judgement of the two terms would push in the direction of the most vehemently anti-Semitic circles the philosopher so staunchly defended. And yet the antagonistic pole of the master-'race' was not the Jews but the 'dark-haired native inhabitants' (GM, I, 5 [14]) who provided the mass of the servants or sudra.

The same apologetic zeal inspires the abandon with which the text *Socrates and Tragedy* is presented and 'adjusted' and with which the traces of Judeophobia in the young Nietzsche are erased. These are not the only cases of concealment and suppression with which the Piccola Biblioteca Adelphi can be reproached. One seeks in vain in the more available volumes for the most disquieting or downright repulsive fragments, which provide a theoretical basis for annihilations on a massive scale. In this case, pedagogical and catechetical concern takes precedence over philological and historical rigour. That illustrious interpreters also resort to similar procedures is no reason for indulging in a method scientifically and ethically unacceptable.

As I have already explained several times, it is not at all a question of viewing Nietzsche as dated or uninteresting. On the contrary, his powerful demystifying potential can only be understood from the angle of the reactionary radicalism of his political programme. Moreover, his most repugnant sides refer to the most repugnant pages of the history the West wrote even before the start of the Third Reich. As in the history of the West as a whole, so too in the thought of this great philosopher, greatness and horror are two sides of the same coin: they point to the rigorous and unrelenting delimitation of the sacred space within which the right to the free unfolding of individuality is confined.

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Nietzsche's Spectacles and Umbrella: An Answer to My Critics

Colli and Montinari's editorial work is highly valuable, but it is not the hermeneutics of a fullness of time [*plenitudo temporum*] solemnly announced by the interpreters, eager to put an end to disquieting questions about reading Nietzsche. Gadamer's warning dates from 1986, and for a long time such questions were frowned upon in the name of political correctness and *bon ton*. And yet, even the Colli-Montinari edition confirms dimensions of the philosopher, however extraordinarily acute and stimulating he may have been, that today cannot but awaken the darkest memories: the glorification of eugenics and the 'super-species', the theorising on the one hand of slavery, on the other of the 'breeding' of the 'higher species of dominant Caesaric spirits', the demand for the 'annihilation of decadent races' and of 'millions of malformed', the assertion of the need for 'a hammer with which to smash degenerating and dying races, to remove them in order to make way for a new order of life'.

Gadamer's Discomfiture

How to explain that Nietzsche's lost 'umbrella' arouses more attention than the themes just mentioned? Here the second part of Gadamer's warning, which I italicised, comes into play. So, should we view sceptically the fact that all the philosopher's notes are published in the same way and accorded the same weight, so that the most disquieting passages end up being overwhelmed by a mass of details regarding the most banal episodes in Nietzsche's life? Perhaps Gadamer goes too far here with his application of a hermeneutics of suspicion. Moreover, it is untrue that the Colli-Montinari edition publishes everything in the same way and without distinctions. In the third edition of Nietzsche's works, the so-called Grossoktav-Ausgabe (vol. XIII, 43), we can read this passage:

> He that as a knowing person has acknowledged that in us, alongside growth of all kinds, the law of perishing is at the same time in force, and that annihilation and decay inexorably impose themselves at the end of every creation and generation: he must learn to experience a kind of joy at such a sight, in order to *bear* it, or he is no longer good for knowing. That is, he must be capable of a refined cruelty and get used to it with a resolute heart. If his force is even higher in the rank-ordering of forces, he himself is one of the creators and not just a spectator: so it is not enough that he is capable of cruelty only in *seeing* so much suffering, so much extinction, so much destruction; such a human being must be able to create pain with pleasure, to be cruel with hand and deed (and not just with the eyes of the spirit).

This fragment, reproduced in a well-regarded edition, was included by Baeumler in his Nietzsche anthology, devoted to illustrating or celebrating the 'innocence of becoming'. Later it was taken up again by Nolte, who used it to support his own interpretation: while Nietzsche reacted to Marx's demand for the 'destruction' of the bourgeoisie with a programme of 'counter-destruction', he 'provided the political radical anti-Marxism of fascism, […] decades in advance, with the spiritual model even Hitler himself was never quite up to'. This is a provocative thesis that would perhaps have deserved a wider discussion. But what happens with this fragment in the Colli-Montinari edition? As a preparatory draft of § 229 of *Beyond Good and Evil*, it is reproduced in the 'notices and notes' of the Adelphi edition of *Beyond Good and Evil* and in the volumes of the critical apparatus of the *Kritische Gesamtausgabe* and the *Kritische Studienausgabe*, while it disappears completely from the digital version of the *Kritische Studienausgabe*, because this has not, up to now (March 2009), reproduced the critical apparatus. For the same reason, it disappears from the digital version of the original conclusion of the lecture *Socrates and Tragedy*, with its polemic against the 'Jewish press'.

Thus, there emerges an even greater danger than that against which Gadamer warns. It is not the case that 'such a comprehensive edition' leads ultimately to 'hiding essential things behind inessential things'. What actually happens is rather that completely trivial notes (not just 'I have forgotten my umbrella' IX, 587] but also 'don't wear glasses in public!' [XIII, 579], 'warm clothes in the evening!' [XIII, 580], etc) tend to marginalise and even cause to disappear the hymn of the joy to destruction and to the unmasking of the Jewish press.

'Persistence' and 'Improvement'

That these are serious problems is recognised by voices beyond suspicion. For example, Sossio Giametta, after a very critical reading of my Nietzsche study, notes:

> However, the book has one great merit: it puts an end, by applying the most historical, philological and critical tools, to the hermeneutics of innocence, which tear Nietzsche from his historical context and from his actual roots; this is a hermeneutic 'tendency' that 'has taken hold of even the best minds, including the two editors [Colli and Montinari]', and has led them to commit various errors that Losurdo persistently pursues.

What should one say of this analysis? In the first place, one cannot but value the intellectual honesty of a researcher who, having made a first-rate contribution to the Italian version of the new critical edition, does not confine himself to recognising the (understandable and even inevitable) presence of errors of translation and other sorts. More important is the acknowledgement that these errors correspond to a certain extent to a logic, a precise interpretative 'tendency'. As for my supposed 'obstinacy', I would like to point out that, while I simply highlight the influence of the hermeneutics of innocence on the otherwise meritorious Colli-Montinari edition, Giametta is carried away to the point where he notes that this hermeneutics has 'taken hold' of the two editors.

On another occasion, Giametta formulates an even more drastic judgement on Montinari, in this case focusing more on his interpretation than on his editing:

> In politics too he argues the need to take account of Nietzsche, his critique, his dimension. Not his blinding and lacerating truths. And not his errors and horrors, like the 'cannibal morality to be imposed dictatorially', as Rohde says, which bursts forth unmistakeably in *Beyond Good and Evil*. […] All the things Montinari preaches about Nietzsche have the appearance of being important. But they are, sorry to say, insignificant if not false.

I do not know if 'all' Montinari's observations are 'insignificant' or 'false', but it is certainly the case that his tendency to suppress 'errors and horrors' also shows up in his work as an editor, at least in the notes and commentary that accompany the Italian edition. My remarks are intended as a contribution to 'improving' the new critical edition. Here, I mention only the problems easiest to solve. Has the reader of the Italian edition the right to be informed of the fact that the lecture of 1 February 1870 ends with an indictment of the Jewish press? And is it acceptable that the reader is made aware of the agitation the lecture causes Cosima and Richard Wagner, but not of its cause (the public denunciation of Judaism as a synonym for Socratism)? Is it philologically accurate to quote only the glorification of the 'Germanic seriousness of life' from Nietzsche's letter to Wagner of 22 May 1869 but to remain silent about the contrasting of this worldview with 'clamant Judaism'? And, to return briefly to the problem of translation, would it not be right to put an end to the cheerful confusion of 'culture' and 'civilization', two terms to which Nietzsche ascribes quite different and even antithetical meanings? It is a good sign that some of my 'clarifications' regarding the translation 'can be accepted'. It goes without saying I am

not questioning Colli's and Montinari's 'good faith' and 'intellectual probity'. But I fail to see why Lukács should be stripped of these characteristics, as the daily *La Repubblica* does in an anonymous article (a nice touch of elegance!) in which the adjective 'Lukácsian' is used practically synonymously with 'policing'. To expose one's opponents to vile suspicion but to reject it with disdain for oneself or one's own side is the very nub of dogmatism!

Emerson and Nietzsche

Among those open to discussion that have reacted to the challenging of the hermeneutics of innocence is an interpreter whom I have criticised as a leading exponent of this hermeneutic. Gianni Vattimo recognises that, in spite of his admiration for Emerson, Nietzsche 'certainly did not share the latter's commitment to the abolition of slavery': so the celebration of slavery as an indispensable foundation of culture is not merely a metaphor! Moreover, Vattimo draws attention to 'certain contradictions of individualism with which we must still grapple even today'. Can a worldview like that of Nietzsche and the liberal tradition behind him, which admittedly praised select individuals but labels the vast majority of humanity as instruments of labour and two-legged machines, truly be seen as individualistic? The emancipation of which the classical liberal tradition and – in a decidedly more radical and fascinating way – Nietzsche spoke never concerned the individual in his generality. That is precisely why the German philosopher, displaying a much greater critical awareness than his predecessor liberals, was careful not to profess individualism. On the contrary, he insisted that, just like 'collectivist morality', the 'individualistic' form had the disadvantage of asserting egalitarian measures, given that it demands the 'same freedom' and the same open-mindedness for all. The basic flaw of Christianity and socialism was, according to Nietzsche, to assume or invent souls and individuals where there were only instruments of labour. Vattimo is rightly concerned to valorise Nietzsche's 'less Nazistic traits of thought'. Yet the fact remains that we are not dealing with an unpolitical author; it is time to leave the hermeneutics of innocence behind us!

And yet there is no lack of shilly-shallying and vacillation. When Vattimo puts Nietzsche together with Emerson, he believes he can at least partially rescue the unpolitical interpretation: after all, who would want to assert against the American writer the suspicions and accusations levelled at the German philosopher? In reality, the hermeneutics of innocence prove unsustainable even with reference to Emerson. True, he had not experienced the trauma of the Paris Commune and an endlessly long revolutionary cycle that had devastated France in order to find its elective homeland in Germany in the late nineteenth century, where Social Democracy, a party celebrated or damned by the entire culture of the time as the spearhead of the revolution, was waxing menacingly. And yet disquieting themes are not absent from the American writer, above all when he praised great men (only they find sense in a world infested by 'pygmies' and therefore have the right to sacrifice 'millions of people' 'without sparing blood and without mercy'), insisted on the role of race ('we know what weight race has in history') and the fatal character of the expansion of the 'instinctive and heroic races', and praised the wars that 'rid the world of the corrupt races and the seats of disease'.

Also significant is the history of Emerson's reception. Certain aspects of his thinking were recalled later by Chamberlain and, with particular enthusiasm, by Henry Ford, the great scourge of the Jewish-Bolshevik conspiracy threatening the world, who for that very reason was highly successful in the Third Reich. It is well known that Emerson had excellent relations with Carlyle, who along with Chamberlain was celebrated by the Nazi press in 1935 as the inspiration behind the new German regime: the two

'Britons' were jointly praised for having asserted the 'idea of the Führer and racial thought [*Führertum und Rassengedanke*]; thanks to this aristocratic worldview, they have tightened even further the links between the Germans and the English, the two peoples destined for leadership'. This acknowledgement could also be extended to the American author, who for his part emphasised and celebrated the common racial origins and common imperial mission of Germans, English and Americans. So, the attempt to rescue at least Emerson on the grounds of pure culture hardly succeeds. The fact is that Vattimo, despite polemicising against Lukács, shares a basic premise with him: both argue as if the process of the formation of the most disquieting themes of the ideology of the late nineteenth century, later inherited, radicalised and transformed by the Nazis, were confined to Germany!

The history of Emerson's reception includes a chapter of surprising actuality. Immediately after the declaration of war on Spain, he was raised by excited chauvinists into the pantheon of 'imperial intellects of his race', that superb 'conquering race', champion of the unstoppable expansion of the United States. Against that, he was later mercilessly reinterpreted by critics of the Vietnam War: it was Emerson who removed from our politics and our politicians 'any sense of restriction'.

The Public Prosecutor and the Defendant: A Strange Convergence

And yet, despite my persisting differences with Vattimo, the fact remains that his contribution is symptomatic: the hermeneutics of innocence regarding Nietzsche is no longer taboo. Perhaps the tendency to get rid of the 'preoccupations' Gadamer mentions by finding two scapegoats for them has begun to falter. The first is, of course, Elisabeth, accused of having adapted Nietzsche's philosophy to the needs of Nazism. Even today, few dare question this thesis. What does it matter if her biography of the philosopher appeared at the turn of the century, and if *The Will to Power* was published in 1901 or, in its second edition, in 1906, in the Europe of the *belle époque*, when no one was yet able to predict the outbreak of the First World War, let alone the rise of Hitler? To avoid troubling their conscience, the hermeneuts of innocence readily attribute extraordinary powers of divination to the despised Elisabeth. The result is to expose her as a sort of female Nostradamus, who, far from merely predicting a distant future, worked actively and successfully for its fateful realisation.

The interesting thing is that, despite the harshness of the indictment, the prosecutor ends up displaying some unexpected resemblances to the unfortunate accused. Vattimo, in his attempt to rescue the hermeneutics of innocence though in a weaker version, links Nietzsche to Emerson, but Elisabeth, in her biography, had already said the philosopher 'particularly loved' the American writer. Do not Colli and Montinari insist that Nietzsche had nothing to do with anti-Semitism and Judeophobia? This was exactly Elisabeth's standpoint. If the two editors, in their rendition of *Socrates and Tragedy*, confine the conclusion ('this Socratism is the Jewish press') to the critical apparatus or delete it altogether, the philosopher's scorned sister proceeded similarly. In her biography, she reported in detail on the lecture, but said nothing about its conclusion; she said Cosima and Richard Wagner reacted with both admiration and concern, but without specifying that this reaction was brought about by the explicit identification of Socratism and Judaism. Moreover, it is precisely Colli and Montinari that suggest, in the critical apparatus to the German edition, that it might not have been the author who tore out the final page, with its already familiar conclusion, from *Socrates and Tragedy*. And how could one explain by Elisabeth's intervention, if not by a desire to shield the philosopher from the accusation of anti-Semitism?

Elisabeth was the recipient of the letters in which the young Nietzsche gave free rein to his Judeophobia: he was glad 'finally' to have found an inn where one could enjoy a meal without having to endure the sight of 'Jewish ugly mugs', or, again with reference to the Jews, of 'disgusting soulless apes and other merchants'; he expressed his disgust at seeing 'Jews and cronies of Jews wherever one looks' at a performance of the *Afrikanerin* by Meyerbeer (the musician of Jewish origin mocked by Wagner). He even wrote to ask his sister: 'How can you expect from me that I order a book from a scandalous Jewish antiquarian?' Elisabeth took care not to trumpet these letters abroad, but rather extended a veil of silence over them: but does not the Colli-Montinari edition do the same? There is another interesting detail. After Wilamowitz had torn into the *Birth of Tragedy* in a review, Nietzsche denounced him as a 'youngster suffering from Jewish arrogance', while he mocked the coldness of his teacher or ex-teacher Ritschl, blaming it on his Alexandrian or 'Jewish-Roman' culture. The philologist-philosopher's circle of friends reacted similarly. Elisabeth responded more coolly in her biography, where she merely criticised the philologist's limited horizons. That the young Nietzsche's violent Judeophobia has remained so long in shadow is, ultimately, thanks to the curtain his loving sister drew over it.

Far from adapting her brothers thinking to the ideological demands of Nazism (and moreover decades in advance of it!), Elisabeth tended rather to soften or remove the most repugnant declarations. On the other hand, Nietzsche's esteemed disciple Brandes provided an interpretation that made Nietzsche a champion of the most radical and repugnant forms of eugenics (later adopted by the Nazis): 'The hygiene that keeps alive millions of weak and useless beings that should rather die is, for him, not true progress.' In reality, 'one must measure the greatness of a movement by the sacrifices it requires'. In the end, the same preoccupation inspires today's apologists as inspired Nietzsche's sister: one should erect a monument to him, although it goes without saying that a postmodern monument would have to look very different from one designed to suit the Wilhelmine age.

The sole toehold for the idea of a plot by Elisabeth is the homage paid her by Hitler 1934, while she was still alive, and a year later, after her death. But this evidence carries little weight. Clearly, Hitler's tribute was meant not for the widow of Bernhard Förster but for Nietzsche's sister. And not entirely without reason, at least according to Heidegger, who in 1936 observed: 'Mussolini and Hitler, the two men that brought in a counter-movement against nihilism, both learned from Nietzsche, though in essentially different ways.' It is true Elisabeth seems to like the obeisances: at last her brother had become a national monument! And yet there was no lack of reservations and even of a certain irony: after Hitler's visit to Weimar, Elisabeth noted he had given 'the impression of a person more significant religiously than politically'. Heidegger was far less reserved in his enthusiasm: he was so fascinated by the Führer that he silenced Jaspers's doubts and timid objections by exclaiming: 'But look at his wonderful hands.' So why blame a poor woman rather than one of the great interpreters for shattering the magic of the unpolitical interpretation of Nietzsche? The hermeneuts of innocence do not allow themselves to be impressed by such an objection and withdraw from the affair, while effortlessly dipping Heidegger too into a purifying bath that washes away all political debris.

The Conflict of the Faculties: Philosophers and Historians

To realise how unsustainable is the second myth (the one that makes not Elisabeth but Lukács the scapegoat), it is enough to carry out a simple intellectual experiment. Let us imagine a student who wants to study Nietzsche, and starts by visiting a department of philosophy. There, Kaufmann, Deleuze, Foucault, Bataille, Vattimo and Cacciari practically rule the roost, all working in different ways to unmask

Elisabeth's conspiracy and Lukács's ideological delirium. But should the student happen to cross over into a history classroom, he would encounter a completely different line of interpretation: eminent historians like Ritter, Hobsbawm, Elias, Mayer and Nolte all agree, though from quite different positions, on placing Nietzsche in the ranks of the anti-democratic reaction of the late nineteenth century, from which stems the movement that later led to fascism. In the philosophy classrooms, the hermeneutics of innocence are obligatory. On the other hand, Mayer says the following about Nietzsche's philosophy: 'In this sense the new *Weltanschauung* was anything but innocent.' And if you think the historian quoted here is too leftwing (his book is dedicated to Marcuse), you can turn to Nolte: as we have seen, for the representative of historical revisionism, Hitler was a sort of shy and awkward follower of Nietzsche!

Instead of getting exercised about Lukács, the hermeneuts of innocence would do better to choose the targets of their criticism with greater care. George Lichtheim also displayed the highest contempt for the Hungarian Marxist philosopher, but then declared that '[i]t is not too much to say that but for Nietzsche the SS – Hitler's shock troops and the core of the whole movement – would have lacked the inspiration to carry out their programmes of mass murder in Eastern Europe'. The thesis is mistaken. Nietzsche was certainly not thinking of the Slavs when he elaborated his theory of the 'annihilation of the decadent races', for at the end of the nineteenth century the Slavs were still considered an integral part of the 'civilised' world (this view was also Chamberlain's). On the other hand, establishing an immediate and exclusive relationship between this 'annihilation' and the Third Reich helps to embellish the colonial tradition and the liberal West, as if the extermination of the Native Americans or the aborigines of Australia and South Africa had not already taken place by the end of the nineteenth century!

Even so, a problem arises: why do the hermeneuts of innocence attack only Lukács and not the historians mentioned above or more recent and authoritative scholars of the Third Reich (e.g., Kershaw), who stress Nietzsche's strong influence on Hitler's ideological formation? Earlier, there was much debate and widespread unease about the big gap between the natural sciences and the humanities, and people criticised the lack of communication between them. Now, however, there seems to be a lack of communication even within the humanities, between philosophical and historical research, whereby the latter signifies in the eyes of the philosopher-priests of the Nietzsche cult the desecration of a sacred ritual.

The Suppressions of the 'New Right' and of the Postmodern Left

Thus, the traditional criticism of Lukács, that he repeated, albeit with a reversed value judgement, Baeumler's picture of Nietzsche, turns out to be completely unsustainable. The charge ignores Heidegger of the 1930s on the one hand, and a whole range of contemporary historians on the other.

Nowadays, not only the postmodern left tends to suppress Nietzsche's most repugnant statements. So do the new rightists, whose efforts to gain a new respectability are seriously hampered by the demand for the 'annihilation of decadent races' and of 'millions of deformed'. This emerges with particular clarity from the recently published Italian translation of the book Alfred Baeumler, who two years later joined the Nazi party, dedicated to the philosopher in 1931. Here Nietzsche's *Zucht* and *Züchtung* are rendered as *addestramento*, '[military] training'. The term has military and warlike connotations and is thereby distinguished from the banal and philistine *educazione* ('education'), which the postmodern translators and interpreters like to use. However, neither *addestramento* nor *educazione* convey the eugenics

programme of Nietzsche's 'new party of life', which aimed at encouraging the fertility of healthy couples while seeking to stop the malformed from getting married and even to 'castrate' or 'annihilate' them. This is why the 'new party of life', with an explicit reference to Galton, did not stop at recommending the 'education' or 'training' of the master race and the race of servants, but called for their 'breeding'. But Nietzsche's eugenicist ideas are a burden not only for the postmodern left, which would dearly love to see the back of them, but also for the new right, which seeks to define its anti-egalitarian programme in cultural rather than in naturalistic and biological terms, as in the past.

Similarly, *Übermensch* is no longer rendered in the recent Italian translation of Baeumler by the traditional *superuomo* but by *sovrauomo*. In this case too, the similarity with Vattimo's *oltreuomo*, meant to convey the transcendence of the human being of tradition, is striking. In Zarathustra's speech, 'overman' refers to the 'super-species': and again, the shadow of eugenics looms into view. But in the background lurks an even more disturbing shadow, that projected by a central and particularly sinister category of Nazi ideological discourse, namely, the category of *Untermensch*, which can be separated from *Übermensch* only with great difficulty: the two terms constitute a single conceptual dichotomy. A journalist who had read Nietzsche or was at least superficially acquainted with his writings pointed to the great danger posed to culture by such an *Untermensch* (the mass of 'savages and barbarians', 'essentially incapable of culture and obstinately hostile to culture'). Referring to Nietzsche (also in terms of his language and sources), he polemicised against the 'fetish' or 'idol' of 'democracy', evoked a 'new aristocracy' or 'new nobility', and expressed his admiration for Theognis and his battle against mixed marriages between the nobility and the common people. Here not just eugenics but the *oltreuomo* of the postmodern left or the *sovrauomo* of the new right was invoked to perform a miracle and above all eliminate the *Untermensch*!

Surprising in this linguistic-ideological story is the fact that the author in question was not a German but a North American who had studied in Germany: Lothrop Stoddard was the first to coin the term 'Under Man' in 1922, in a book subtitled *The Menace of the Under-Man*. The book was immediately translated into German, and Under Man became *Untermensch*. Rosenberg passionately embraced the category and admitted taking it over from Stoddard, upon whom two American presidents, Harding and Hoover, also lavished praise. Evidently, the alternative to the hermeneutics of innocence does not take the form of drawing a straight line of continuity from Nietzsche to Hitler. The *Untermensch* of the North American ideologue referred, well before its application to the oriental and Asiatic Bolsheviks, to blacks and Native Americans, who in the years following the Civil War were the object of terrorist violence and genocide. Similar considerations apply to the other term in the conceptual dichotomy. At the beginning of the twentieth century an English poet, John Davidson, referred positively to the theory of the overman, but criticised it on account of its cosmopolitan character. According to Davidson, Nietzsche missed a fundamental truth: 'The Englishman is the overman and the history of England is the history of his development.' A different opinion was represented by the Italian writer Angelo Mosso, another eulogiser of imperialism, who was fascinated above all by the epic of the Far West: 'The Yankee is the *superuomo*.'

So, to understand the repugnant aspects of Nietzsche's philosophy (the reverse side of his radical and fascinating project of emancipation, designated for a very small elite of the aristocratic caste and overmen), one must not only start from the end of the nineteenth century (rather than 1933), but one must also take into account the fact that this grim ideology of the turn of the century had spread not

only across Germany but across the West as a whole, before being inherited and radicalided by the Nazis.

We thus return to the 'preoccupations' and the disquieting questions to which Gadamer had pointed: would it not make sense to take them up once again and discuss them from a new perspective, rather than give in to the compulsion to suppress them? Or will Nietzsche's spectacles and umbrella continue to make the running? <>

DIVINATION IN EXILE: INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACHES TO RITUAL PROGNOSTICATION IN THE TIBETAN BON TRADITION by Alexander Kingsbury Smith [Series: Brill's Tibetan Studies Library, Brill, 9789004438194]

In **DIVINATION IN EXILE**, Alexander K. Smith offers the first comprehensive scholarly introduction to the performance of divination in Tibetan speaking communities, both past and present. While Smith surveys a variety of ritual practices, the volume focuses on divination and its associated rites in the contemporary Tibetan Bon tradition. Drawing from multi-site ethnographic fieldwork conducted in Himachal Pradesh and the translation of previously unpublished Tibetan language materials, *Divination in Exile* offers a valuable, social scientific contribution to our understanding of the perception and usage of ritual manuscripts in contemporary Tibetan cultural milieus.

CONTENTS

Excerpt: On a balmy day in August 1904, shortly after the arrival of the Younghusband expeditionary force in Lhasa, Lieutenant Colonel L. Austin Waddell organized a visit to the Karmashar Oracle. As recounted in his memoir of the 1903–1904 British invasion of Tibet, *Lhasa and Its Mysteries*, Waddell was at first struck by the small building's interiors. Like other temples he had seen in Gyantse, which

Waddell romantically recounted as "satanic Aladdin's cave[s] in the dark," the inner-oracular chamber was richly decorated and illuminated with flickering candles (Waddell 1906: 228). Through the smoke and gloom, the oracle leaned forward, jewels clattering against his circular breastplate, and beckoned the Englishman to enter. As with many of the diviners that he had met during his tenure as the Younghusband Expedition's chief medical offer, Waddell was not impressed with the man's prognostications, which he felt embodied nothing more than "pithy and shrewd common-sense" (Waddell 1906: 385). As the story goes, however, just as he turned to leave the chamber, the oracle stared at the Englishman piercingly and asked him his age. Waddell, inadvertently forgetting that his birthday had passed several months earlier, replied incorrectly, saying, "forty-nine years old". With great dramatic poise, the oracle responded, "no, you are one year more. You are fifty!" He then promptly dismissed the British delegation before leaning back and vanishing into the shadows. Not knowing how the Tibetan could have guessed his true age, Waddell left the temple overcome with curiosity.

If this episode reads like historical fiction, it is because it may well be exactly that. It is sometimes difficult to parse out fact from fiction in Waddell's *Lhasa and Its Mysteries*, the prose of which are saturated with both romantic mystique and the ethos of British colonial conquest. At times, he moves seamlessly between nostalgia and disgust in his exploration of Tibetan Buddhism, seeing Tibet as both a degenerate oriental despotism and a mystic cache of ancient wisdom, the inheritor and guardian of 'pure' Indian Buddhism, the rediscovery of which would vivify Western civilization. In this respect, Waddell is very much a man of his times—but also uncannily familiar.

To adapt Lopez (1995, 1998) to my purposes, Waddell's observations stem from two kinds of orientalism. The first, *à la* Edward Said, transforms Tibet into an object of European fantasy, in one moment debased to suit the hierarchies inherent to colonial rule and, in the next, exulted to accommodate narratives of the 'mystical' Orient. The second orientalism would be the eponymousism underlying the field of oriental studies itself, which, in the case of Buddhism, emerged primarily through the textual study of South and East Asian Buddhist traditions. As a consequence, the Western academic study of Tibet tended (and I would argue still tends) to eschew cultural history and ethnography in favor of the collection, editing, and translation of Tibetan Buddhist texts, which are then exhaustively compared to South and East Asian witnesses. In many respects, these orientalisms, which frame the content of L. Austin Waddell's understanding of Tibet, comprise two major themes in the crucible that shaped early Tibetan studies and, in a fashion, continues to inform the outlook of the field today.

Not unlike *Lhasa and Its Mysteries*, the contemporary study of Tibetan divination exists at the center of a kind of ideological web, in this case suspended between the entrenched philological approach of oriental studies and the qualitative methods central to the anthropology of religion. While a considerable amount of ink has been shed on the importance of exploring the ritual/textual interface in Tibetan cultures, very few authors have adopted an interdisciplinary tack in their consideration of Tibetan divination systems. One significant casualty of this is that we lack a general, scholarly introduction to the forms of divination encountered in Tibetan cultures, both historical and contemporary. Also, not insignificantly, no attention has been paid to the ways in which divination manuals are used by diviners. The variable reading techniques deployed in the usage of texts forms the basis of the discourse analysis central to the reading techniques of social and cultural anthropology. As such, this is a significant lacuna, which cannot be overcome without getting off the verandah, as Malinowski was fond of saying, and studying the performance of divination in the field. In many respects, the present volume was imagined

as a preliminary effort to overcome this research gap by consolidating philological and ethnographic methods so as to explore the perception, usage, and interpretation of divination manuals by both diviners and their clientele.

Before broaching the subject in any depth, it is important to note that both of these disciplinary approaches bear distinctive hallmarks of our two orientalisms, which, until very recently, have dictated the intellectual historical development of the Western study of Tibetan divination. Perhaps the most evident of these is that, with a few notable exceptions, Western scholars researching the subject have worked exclusively with monastic informants. There are a number of good reasons for this, not the least of which are the importance of classical literacy and familiarity with canonical literature, as well as the accessibility of refugee lamas in the diaspora community; however, the monastic representation of divination and its associated apotropaic rituals is neither value free, nor is it apolitical. It is my experience that, when speaking with Western audiences, Tibetan monastics are often acutely aware of the value of promoting relatively saccharine, intellectualist depictions of Tibetan Buddhism, which are shorn of many ritualistic aspects of Buddhist praxis. In much of the literature, this informant-bias has combined with the philological orientation of Tibetan studies in such a way as to privilege forms of 'high' Buddhism at the expense of a considerable number of practices that inform the day-to-day lives of lay practitioners (and many monastics themselves). The present volume's emphasis on divination in the Tibetan Bon tradition was conceived as effort to circumvent this gap in the extant literature.

The term Bon has been used historically to indicate a plurality of concepts, the disambiguation of which would require a thorough and lengthy explanation. To speak very generally, however, Bon may be provisionally described as a heterodox branch of Tibetan Buddhism that, according to emic narratives, lays claim to a legacy that long predates the origins of Indian Buddhism. For a number of reasons, Bon has historically been treated with dismissiveness by the followers of other Tibetan sects, who have frequently decried the Bonpos (the followers of Bon) as "outsiders" (*phyi pa*), "heretics" (*mu stegs pa*), or things considerably worse. One advantage, however, of working in Bonpo communities is that, according to Bon sacred histories, long before the birth of Siddhārtha Gautama, an earlier Buddha, known as sTon pa gshen rab, travelled extensively throughout Central and East Asia offering a variety of teachings, including divination practices and apotropaic rites. Consequently, divination in the Bon tradition demonstrates a canonical charter that is lacking in the case of other Tibetan sects. The resultant openness with which Bonpos discuss otherwise esoteric aspects of divination and its quotidian performance is invaluable to advancing the study of divination in Tibetan speaking communities.

While this publication will survey a significant number of divination practices, my primary focus in the third and fourth chapters is a single form of pebble divination performed by Tibetan Bonpos. This practice, which is known interchangeably as "manifestation of knowledge" (*lde'u 'phrul*) or "the pebble divination of the Masang" (*ma sang rdel mo*), possesses a nearly unstudied textual tradition that, according to Bon histories, originates in the eleventh century. In addition to fieldwork conducted in various locations in Himachal Pradesh, India, my discussion of Bon pebble divination is supplemented by the translation of a number of previously unstudied lithomantic manuscripts. Chiefly, I focus on the *sMra seng rdel mo gsal ba'i me long*, written by the 18th century ecumenicist and historian Kun grol grags pa. Certain aspects of this work will be read against two later commentaries on the subject of lithomancy: (1) the *Ma sangs 'phrul gyi rdel mo mngon shes rno gsal gyi sgron me*, written by Slob dpon mkhas grub lung rtogs rgya mtsho, the first preceptor of Yung drung gling Monastery in Central Tibet (founded 1834);

and (2) the *sMra seng 'phrul gyi rdel mo mngon shes gsal ba'i sgron po*, a 19th century witness of an alleged 11th century *gter ma* discovery attributed to the Bon "treasure revealer" (*gter ston*) Khro tshang 'brug lha.

The translation and study of these types of divination manuals often raises an important question which, though not central to Tibetological research, emerges as a pressing point in both popular Western and emic discourses. In short, does divination 'work' as a prognostic technique and, if so, how? Travelling back to August 1904, we might imagine Lieutenant Colonel L. Austin Waddell leaving the Karmashar Oracle and, in hushed tones, asking his contemporaries the same question. This issue of efficacy—or of the perceived efficacy of divination—is one around which much of our discourse orbits and to which we will frequently return. As a social scientist, however, I leave questions pertaining to the veracity of ritual practices open-ended by methodological necessity.

As a general rule, the goal of research in the anthropology of religion is neither to propound the factual, objective validity of religious beliefs, nor to disprove any aspect of religious belief or practice. To quote Bader, Mencken, and Baker's groundbreaking work on paranormal subcultures in the United States, "when studying religion, it is relevant to ask how religious beliefs affect the lives of believers. Do these beliefs affect other attitudes and motivate specific patterns of action? What types of groups organize around specific beliefs, and how do these groups operate? How are beliefs maintained and reinforced?" (2017: 11). As sub-disciplines, the anthropology and sociology of religion are built around these lines of inquiry and their qualitative methods have evolved to answer these kinds of questions specifically. In short, no interview will ever prove or disprove religious epistemologies, nor will any textual critique provide evidence that divination practices offer extra-sensory foresight. Leaving these goals aside, one of this volume's main aims is to address what the effects of the belief in divination are upon believers. In particular, how this belief is expressed in terms of the engagement with and interpretation of textual materials.

Before moving on to the structure of the volume, it may first be useful to articulate my usage and understanding of the term 'divination' and its Tibetan language equivalents. To begin with, the Tibetan nouns *mo, phyag mo*, and *mo rtsis*, along with common verbal forms such as *mo rgyab* and *mo bkyon*, may be understood as referring to a heterogenous body of divination practices, largely (though not entirely) cleromantic in nature, which are widely practiced in Tibetan cultures. In many cases, these divinations are textually oriented (e.g. involve the use of an interpretive textual catalogue), though it is not uncommon to encounter illiterate diviners. The syllable *mo* has a number of other linguistic functions; however, limiting ourselves to its relationship to divination, it also appears in a variety of noun phrases indicating specific forms of divination. For example: *sho mo* (dice divination), *'phreng mo* (rosary divination), *rdo mo* (rock divination), and *pra mo* (mirror divination). Speaking of the individuals who perform divination, over the course of my fieldwork in Himachal Pradesh, diviners were consistently referred to as either *mo pa, mo ma* (f.), *mo mkhan, mo rgyab mkhan*, or *mo rtsis pa*.

Returning to the English language, in proposing a working definition of divination I can do little better that to cite Wim van Binsbergen's excellent remarks on the subject: "within any cultural domain more or less demarcated in time and space, and endowed with meaning within that domain, divination might be defined as the entire set of procedures intended to acquire knowledge which is of a supernatural

nature or which is otherwise not available through everyday means such as are based upon direct sensory perception" (1995: 114).

The variable classifications of the types of divination practiced globally are extremely diverse and the value of meta-taxonomies to ethnographic inquiry could easily be called into question. As such, I do not intend to commit to a discussion of etic classifications in any depth. Nevertheless, in the pages that follow, I do advocate a distinction between what I term 'mechanical' and 'inspirational' forms of divination (adapted from Zeitlyn 1990, 1995), which I see as reflected, in a relatively roughshod fashion, in the ways in which the terms *mo* and *mo rtsis* are differentiated from spirit-mediumship in Tibetan cultures.

Inspirational divination here refers to divination practices that depend wholly upon a relationship expressed between the diviner and some form of supernatural or divine agency, typically involving a form of possession as the medium through which revelation is expressed. Within the Tibetan cultural sphere, for example, the prognostics offered by spirit mediums (the *lha pa* of upper Tibet, for instance) and the prophecies given by semi-divine or divine beings in quasi-historical narratives would both represent inspirational forms of divination. Conversely, mechanical divination refers to forms of divination that utilize mechanistic apparatuses external to the operator that, if correctly interpreted, serve as a medium through which truths may be articulated or supernatural agency may be divined.

It is worth noting that similar binary classifications have been proposed by a number of authors writing on the subject of divination (Beattie 1964; Devisch 1985; Vernant 1974; and Zeitlyn 1987, for example). In fact, Nissinen (2010) goes as far as to trace the distinction between mechanical and inspirational, or 'technical' and 'nontechnical' divination to Plato's *Phaedrus* (244a–245a) and the Socratic discussion of μαντική and τέχνη (cf. Barton 1994; North 1990). Jacobs (2010), furthermore, argues that this distinction is popularized by Cicero, who argues for the delineation of 'artificial' and 'natural' forms of divination in his treatise *De Divinatione* (*De Div.* 1.1.1–13, 1.1.12). It has also been suggested that a comparable dichotomy privileging prophetic over mechanical divination can be found in the Hebrew Bible, where prophecy is characterized as a legitimate means of divine revelation while other forms of divination are forbidden (Leviticus 20: 6; Deuteronomy 18: 9–14; Isaiah 8: 19).

It may have been noted that Tibetan systems of astrology are conspicuously absent from this binary taxonomy. In Tibetan cultures, divination and astrology are often treated as separate, though closely related, phenomena. Broadly speaking, the Tibetan astrological sciences are divided into two systems: (1) *nag rtsis* or *'byung rtsis*, which is related to the Chinese *Yijing*; and (2) *dkar rtsis*, which is considered to have entered into Tibet from India via the proliferation of the *Kālacakratantra* (Schuh 1973; Te-min Tseng 05; Gerke 2011: 93–98). It also should be remembered that Bon narratives cast both *nag rtsis* and *dkar rtsis* as derivations of the Kālacakra, the Bon equivalent of which is found in the fourth volume of the *gZi brjid* (cf. Ramble 2013). Broadly speaking, however, *dkar rtsis* refers to a body of calendrical calculations and astronomy, while *nag rtsis*, as Gerke writes, is "not astrology *per se*, but a set of divination techniques based on temporal intervals and their determinants, which [form] the base of calendrical calculations" (Gerke 2011: 94) (cf. Schuh 1972, 1973a). By way of contrast, divination practices which rely expressly upon the mediation of aleatoric devices belong to a slightly different taxonomic order and are generally classified as *mo rtsis* or, more succinctly, as *mo*. Nevertheless, divination and astrology are closely interrelated; so much so, for example, that sDe srid Sangs rgyas rgya

mtsho, the Regent of the Fifth Dalai Lama, treats *mo* and *rtsis* as a single body of knowledge in his penultimate astrological treatise, the *Vaiḍūrya dkar po* (17 c.). Nevertheless, for my purposes, as the majority of my remarks will focus on forms of cleromancy, the astrological and elemental calculatory systems typified by *dkar rtsis* and *nag rtsis* will be treated as separate from—though closely related to— the cleromantic techniques referred to as *mo* or *mo rtsis.*

Turning now to the volume's structure, the first chapter provides a critical genealogy of the representation and study of Tibetan divination in European and American scholarship, ranging from the first appearance of the word *mo* in a Western language publication through to the present day. Having sketched the contours of the field, I move on to discuss some of the roles played by the study of divination in parallel academic disciplines. In this section, I attempt nothing as ambitious as an intellectual history, but instead focus on several theoretical leitmotifs in the anthropology of divination as it has been advanced, generally speaking, in the study of witchcraft and sorcery in African societies.

The second chapter is divided into two parts, the first section of which provides a general introduction to Tibetan divination. This includes a survey of the majority of the cleromantic practices known to ethnographic literature, as well as a discussion of the origins of various divinatory traditions in Tibetan Buddhist mytho-history. In the second section I provide a general introduction to Bon. This focuses, in particular, on Bon historiography and the origins of divination as they are represented in the Bon tradition. As Bon provides us with the only extant pre-modern taxonomy of divination practices in Tibet, aspects of this chapter may be of particular value for the advancement of historical research on *mo rtsis*.

In Chapters 3 and 4, I then offer a detailed analysis of the pebble divination known as *lde'u 'phrul*. Though I discuss the origins, performance, and symbolism of *lde'u 'phrul* in Chapter 3, I pay particular attention to the structure of the divination's prognostications, which are supplemented, in Chapter 4, by the translation of a complete *lde'u 'phrul* manuscript, along with a commentary on a wide variety of related ritual practices. In addition to articulating the practice's more salient features, my hope is that my remarks will help to demonstrate that Tibetan divination practices sit at a critical juncture, mediating multiple ritual systems, as well as a number of social and economic structures. Additionally, I aim to show that divination is associated with the articulation (and, perhaps, validation) of traditional epistemologies which, in some cases, are called into question by the mediating forces of globalization and its effects upon the performance of rites and the usage of ritual texts in contemporary exile communities. <>

THE ART OF LISTENING: A GUIDE TO THE EARLY TEACHINGS OF BUDDHISM by Sarah Shaw [Shambhala Publications, 9781611808858]

The *Dīghanikāya* or *Long Discourses of the Buddha* is one of the four major collections of teachings from the early period of Buddhism. Its thirty-four suttas (in Sanskrit, sutras) demonstrate remarkable breadth in both content and style, forming a comprehensive collection. **THE ART OF LISTENING** gives an introduction to the *Dīghanikāya* and demonstrates the historical, cultural, and spiritual insights that

emerge when we view the Buddhist suttas as oral literature.

Each sutta of the *Dīghanikāya* is a paced, rhythmic composition that evolved and passed intergenerationally through chanting. For hundreds of years, these timeless teachings were never written down. Examining twelve suttas of the *Dīghanikāya*, scholar Sarah Shaw combines a literary approach and a personal one, based on her experiences carefully studying, hearing, and chanting the texts. At once sophisticated and companionable, **THE ART OF LISTENING** will introduce you to the diversity and beauty of the early Buddhist suttas.

Reviews

"For many years I regarded the *Dīgha Nikāya*, the Buddha's Long Discourses, as of little personal relevance, seeing it as primarily aimed at enhancing the status of Buddhism in the social and cultural milieu of ancient India. Sarah Shaw's book has radically transformed my assessment of this collection. Beautifully written and rich in observations, her inspired work shows the Digha to be perhaps the boldest and most majestic of the four Nikāyas. In Shaw's treatment of the text, the Digha merges two contrasting perspectives in a tense but happy harmony: a panoramic vision of the vast cosmic significance of the Buddha and his teaching, and an earthy view of the Buddha's concrete physical presence in this world. This contrast, she argues, is seen most poignantly in the Mahaparinibbana Sutta, the long narrative on the Buddha's final journey and passage into nirvana, where he himself exemplifies his teaching of universal impermanence. I believe that for others, too, this book will have a lasting impact on their appreciation of the Digha, offering many new ways of looking at this fascinating collection of early Buddhist texts." —Ven. Bhikkhu Bodhi, author of *Reading the Buddha's Discourses in Pāli*

"In this quietly revolutionary book, Sarah Shaw shows us that Buddhist sutras are also Buddhist practices, and that listening can be a form of meditation. She shows that our modern habits of skim reading and skipping ahead in texts are very different from the way the sutras have been appreciated in the past, and that if we can better understand the way the dharma has been recited and listened to over so many generations, it will allow us to engage with it more fully. Cultivating a quiet and attentive practice of listening seems more necessary than ever and this is a book that shows us how it can be done." —Sam van Schaik, author of *Buddhist Magic* and *Tibetan Zen*

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PART TWO: Exploring the Suttas of the Dighanikaya

Excerpt: Most of us liked hearing stories in the evening as children. At my boarding school, during sewing in the evening after dinner, our teacher used to read us long novels over a number of evenings. We complained, of course, but I used to like just hearing someone's voice telling me a story. Something in my mind relaxed, and events of the day fell into perspective. Such reading aloud, particularly in the evenings, was widespread in Western cultures until recently. For every Victorian novel bought, nine people "heard" it: families used to read to one another as everyone relaxed after the day.

While writing this book during the COVID-19 pandemic, I was struck by how people again find listening at home so helpful and soothing in times of fear and, for many, solitude. Our genetic code must be hardwired to this method of letting go, and we have refound the pleasure of listening. Before the virus confined us all to our homes, we could sit on a train, plane, or bus during the evening rush hour and see others, having finished a hard day's work, shut their eyes and visibly unwind with earbuds in place: they would be just listening, transported, to music, a story, or perhaps a talk on a podcast. And this has continued. We are at home in our various states of quarantine or social distancing, and many of us are listening to apps, the radio, music, or, if we're lucky, birdsong in surprisingly unpolluted skies.

I do not suppose human nature changes very much. When the Buddha composed the talks discussed in this book, people would have had hard days, done a bit too much work, had a great deal to think about,

and would have wanted something to help them unwind. The texts would have been chanted then; people would have gone to temples to hear them; and they would have liked just hearing something for a long, sometimes very long, time.

Doing something while listening also helps. At school, we used to sew; in Benedictine monasteries, monks used to eat while scriptures were read aloud. In this book, I argue that those who heard the suttas at the time they were first recited may well have been "doing" something. Some would have been snoozing, some figuring out a work problem, and some hoping the recitation finished soon. But some could well have been genuinely listening perhaps practicing mindfulness,

perhaps watching their own responses in body and mind as they listened. Some anthropologists have been bemused by the Asian love of listening to texts even when the meaning is not fully understood.' But there is a spectrum of attention and a way in which words are semi-understood, even if they are in another language, whereby you somehow get a feel for the shape, rhythms, and pace of the chant if you hear it often enough. Buddhist chanted texts have a rise and fall, sometimes stressed by pitch changes. Those of the Dighanikaya, which we are looking at in this book, deal primarily with the way things arise, exist, fall away, and repeat: these elements lie at the core of Buddhist teaching. The repetitions of a heard text, whether in its original or a vernacular language, communicate these movements in all sorts of ways. The attention span of listeners was probably as varied and capricious as it is now, but this and other texts would have been received as a kind of enactment of Buddhist teaching.

The Dighanikaya (The Long Discourses of the Buddha) is a collection of early Buddhist texts. It is one of the four major nikayas, or collections, of teachings from the early period of Buddhism. (These are the Dighanikaya, the Majjhimanikaya, the Samyuttanikaya, and the Anguttaranikaya. When referencing individual suttas or specific passages from them throughout this book, the collections are abbreviated as D or DN, M or MN, SN, and AN, respectively—see Abbreviations and Bibliography, in the back matter, for more information on sources.) The Dighanikaya is usually listed first of the four, all composed sometime after the Buddha's death. While some of its suttas employ archaic language, it is not thought to have been written earlier than the others; all four are usually treated as a whole for historical purposes. We do not know if the Pali canon is the earliest canon; it is certainly the only complete one. This book is intended to give an introduction to the Dighanikva in particular and, more generally, to Buddhist suttas from this time, around the fourth century B.C.E. Such texts were heard at the outset by people who certainly did understand their meaning. Full of debate, imaginative scope, and the evocation of sometimes breathtaking vistas of time and space, it is the body of texts where we see early Buddhist practice and thinking in its most expanded and expansive form. The Dighanikaya embeds understanding in debate, interchange, and sometimes mythical landscapes, thus offering some of the most emotionally rewarding and satisfying texts in the Pali canon. Among modern Buddhist practitioners, it is perhaps the best loved of the early Buddhist collections of suttas.

Many people who come to be interested in Buddhism would like an introduction to how suttas work: they want to find out more about sutta style. This book is intended as a guide to exploring the style and form of the suttas in the Dighanikdya. Its primary contention is that approaching the suttas from the vantage point of their original context, wherein they were encountered not as printed texts but as chanted enactments—what we now call "oral literature"—opens up possibilities of understanding and insight one otherwise misses. But it takes time to get used to different types of text and their

terminologies. So how does one begin? I don't suggest that you immediately try to read them straight through. I have found taking one at a time, letting it sink in without rushing it, is the best way to become familiar with them. If you can arrange to have them read aloud to you, you are lucky! Reading them out loud to yourself is also a helpful way of letting them have their effect. It is worth remembering that for centuries—and indeed now—they have been recited, as group performances, to perhaps a large number of listeners. So there would be no skipping to the end to find out what happens or skimming over repetitions. You would be listening to them in "real" time. A modern reader might not want to read each repetition, but bearing the oral context in mind is helpful and means the process is more leisurely. Just becoming familiar with one text at a time, at your own pace, is really the best way of getting a feel for what it is doing.

This book is not a historical survey of the Dighanikiya, but it is worth knowing that for hundreds of years, these texts were intended to be heard, not read. They were passed on through groups of monks, who trained others in sustaining the tradition, and the students in turn trained others. The Mahavamsa, a fifth-century C.E. epic poem on the history of the region we now call Sri Lanka, says that the full canon was inscribed there around 29 B.C.E. Heat, insect infestation, humidity, war, and other factors mean that nothing has survived. We do not know the extent to which, in what manner, or even if written texts really supplanted oral transmission in Sri Lanka.' In China, where writing had developed in the second millennium B.C.E., extant Chinese versions of Buddhist texts emerged from the second century C.E. From the centuries after this Sanskrit, Tocharian, Uighur, and Khotanese texts have been found in central Asia. Some texts from the Gandharan region date from the first century B.C.E. Orality may have operated somewhat less frequently in China and central Asia. Chronological dating of various phases of the transmission of Buddhism to different regions is ongoing work. While writing may well have come in earlier than is usually supposed, it is clear that for centuries, in many Pali Buddhist regions, the delivery of the suttas was primarily oral. The question of the Pali canon's duration as oral literature is complex, but some orality appears to have continued well into the twentieth century.

The texts of the Dighanikaya comprise a literary tour de force, demonstrating Buddhist philosophy as a lived tradition expressed in often highly distinct ways. The collection has been part of the imaginative world of many forms of Buddhism and contains some of the key Buddhist texts. But as a literature that evolved before the use of writing, it must also have been regarded as something more interactive: you would listen, perhaps investigate the content (and yourself), and then allow your mind to move on to the next stage of the text. Each text is a paced, rhythmic composition, a choreographed movement in time, that works in a different way from something you read alone with book or iPad in hand. So, with these texts, you start to feel the Buddhist principles of rising, sustaining, and falling—with circling rhythms repeating in "real" time—in the very structure of the words. If you hear the texts as recitals in a temple, you look, listen, and attend; you are conscious of those around you, how you are sitting, and the environment. You are open to the text in a different way. Much of Buddhist meditation and ethical teaching is based on this underlying delivery of the text itself by living people to those who have met, perhaps, just to listen.

Nowadays, the texts are recited at events all the time, such as on temple days; however, the language is no longer clear to those listening, as it once was. But the rhythms, repetitions, and styles; the sense of ebb and flow; and the way that inflected languages, with so many words that all end in the same cases, have internal resonance even in prose—these remain familiar. For anyone who has grown up with such

texts, they are a bit like ancient paths and landmarks cutting across the countryside: they have just always been there. We cannot replicate that familiarity or contact, but it is useful to bear this in mind as we read them.

Despite the fact it contains many of the major texts of the Buddhist tradition, often studied individually, it is curious that the Dighanikaya as a complete collection tends to be quietly pushed aside. Recent trends in scholarship have rightly pointed out that Pali suttas are less taught or understood in some Southeast Asian Buddhist regions than they used to be, that they might for long periods have been the domain of monastics, and that they are probably not the first versions of Buddhist texts. This is not the place to comment on such issues. The Pali suttas are certainly still used in many regions, as I myself have seen. In some places where their presence is less evident, vernacular versions of the Dighanikaya, as well as its stories, similes, and anecdotes, have seeped into the popular understanding of Buddhism or its manuals, teaching devices, and chanting books. Many of the suttas are still chanted frequently and with passion; they live on as performative oral texts, as they were intended. Practitioners who read them, West and East, love them. The Pali Text Society still finds the Dighanikaya to be the most popular of all the Buddhist collections. The Art of Listening is an assessment of these suttas as a whole, as a synchronic collection. Such a collection must have been known well in various historical periods, as it still is in many regions now, by both monastics and laity.'

Buddhist studies as a subject is, necessarily, often for specialists in the many languages that are involved and in philology, manuscript work, and historical dating. These kinds of research are essential. But there is little or no examination of the literary content of texts or any appreciation that style may be a reflection of meaning. The internal cohesion of any body of texts, and a sense that this may be the result of deliberate care, is one helpful way of understanding them. Such an approach is not yet taken seriously as a field of study for Buddhist texts.' In Western literary culture, one would not dismiss whole collections of early texts on the grounds that they are a little later than the earliest strata of teachings, not mainstream, only monastic, or just propaganda for laypeople. Narratives from an Anglo-Saxon monk or an early Arabic historiographer would not be overlooked because they are full of myths, legends, and "literary embellishments." They are explored and examined for what they are: they tell us about the people who composed them and the world in which they lived. I have heard all of the previously mentioned charges made against the Pali Dighanikaya some at the same time! Given the need for so much specialization in this subject, all of this is understandable. In time, perhaps, the historical reception of texts and their literary content will become a part of Buddhist studies and given the sympathetic attention they deserve.

Underneath all of the surface objections, we can safely assume that at one time, and probably in many Buddhist periods, texts in the Dighanikaya were both heard and understood by a great many people, both lay and monastic. As part of my argument in this book, the distinction between lay and monastic audiences is not really one we need to make for the Dighanikaya. Both audiences are actively addressed individually and collectively, and within the texts themselves, both are clearly demarcated and celebrated. This comprehensive, encompassing corpus of texts presents a Buddhism that embraces the great and living symbiotic relationship that developed between the two poles of the lay and the monastic life.

Before we look at the texts, it will be helpful to explore some of the skills and expectations of an oral society. Oral cultures clearly vary, but they share some features that can help us understand how the Dighanikaya works. These cultures have their own idiosyncrasies that allow the mind to build up associations and connections over time and make its own patterns, with different kinds of engagement at different times.

These are not just charmingly arcane ways of working. We possess many of the same skills, which still tend to operate in our culture, as if we search for them unconsciously: the way Internet links branch into one another; the way information is listed, organized, and accessed through portals opening onto other portals that open onto yet others; the way we like repetitive games or respond to and remember a striking image to distill a large amount of information. And sometimes it's just a good story, often told along highly formulaic patterns, that satisfies our deepest instincts. We do not now have the capacity of oral societies to build and structure knowledge in the mind over a long period of time, but repetition, rhythm, and a good sustained yarn still let us relax and free up parts of the mind that may have been sleeping while we've been going about our lives.

If we link these tendencies to a sense of engaging with the texts as a means of bringing ourselves to the path, and that this happens alongside mindfulness, we tend to wake up. For what is a meditation other than engaging with a repetitive series of events, familiar yet fresh, with a sense of alertness? What does our breath do but move in and out again and again? The use of such rhythms, and finding how to steer through their tidal paths, is the essence of meditation practice.

The varied texts in the Dighanikaya use such techniques in abundance, far more than the other nikayas. The way they do so shows that these devices make some, though not all, of the texts work as full meditations and appears to give us explicit instructions. The intention here is not to analyze each one in detail or to suggest that we can replicate their original setting, but rather to explore some of the suttas in this light. Where they are not meditations in the sense of formal exercises, they are like guided meditative journeys through aspects of the teaching. Philosophical and psychological discourse is expressed through pattern, number, fable, and parable; the text itself becomes a way of arousing a sense of the path simply by its structure and through how it is heard.

This book is called **THE ART OF LISTENING**. There is a way of listening to Buddhist texts that is light but attentive, sympathetic without having to "believe." It can be there when you are reading to yourself and you feel you "hear" the text. This kind of attention is quite simple. It occurs sometimes while you are hearing about something that has happened to a friend, listening to a good story on the radio or a podcast, or just going for a walk and hearing trees murmur like water: the listening can be quiet and receptive, yet active and awake at the same time. In my experience, it is just this kind of mindfulness that can be there when hearing a Buddhist text.

The first part of this book deals with the background to oral literature, some features of Buddhist texts in general, and those of the Dighanikaya in particular. The second part looks at a sample of twelve texts from that collection and, although not exhaustive, demonstrates the diversity in the Dighanikaya. At the outset, I should also say that these interpretations are based on two strands: a literary approach, as this is my academic background, and personal observation after hearing the texts, both in Pali and English, at meditation meetings; visiting Southeast Asia; and being involved in chanting groups in Asia and the United Kingdom. The discussions are based on reflections arising from these experiences. I try to

present known historical facts accurately but have made no attempt to isolate the earliest levels of the text; I am taking the Dighanikaya as the synchronic, discrete collection it has been for so long. <>

ÉDOUARD GLISSANT, PHILOSOPHER: HERACLITUS AND HEGEL IN THE WHOLE-WORLD by Alexandre Leupin, translated by Andrew Brown [SUNY series in Contemporary French Thought, SUNY, 9781438483269]

Translation of Alexandre Leupin's award-winning study of Édouard Glissant's entire work in relation to philosophy.

One of the greatest writers of the late twentieth century, Édouard Glissant's body of work covers multiple genres and addresses many cogent contemporary problems, such as borders, multiculturalism, postcolonial and decolonial studies, and global humanities. *Édouard Glissant, Philosopher* is the first study that maps out this writer's entire work in relation to philosophy. Glissant is reputed to be a "difficult writer;" however, Alexandre Leupin demonstrates the clarity and coherence of his thinking. Glissant's rereading of Western philosophy entirely remaps its age-old questions and offers answers that have never been proposed. In doing so, Glissant offers a new way to think about questions that are at the forefront of Global Humanities today: identity, race, communities, diasporas, slavery, nation-states and nationalism, aesthetics, ethics, and the place and function of poetry and art in a globalized world. This book will elucidate Glissant's theoretical writings, not only in England and in America but also in the anglophone Caribbean, Africa, and India.

Alexandre Leupin is Professor Emeritus in French Studies at Louisiana State University. He is the Founder and Codirector (with Charles Forsdick) of the Glissant Translation Project, which has already published three translations, among them *The Baton Rouge Interviews*, coauthored by Glissant and Leupin. **Andrew Brown** previously taught French at the University of Cambridge and is currently a freelance translator of French philosophy and social thought, including works on or by Sartre, Barthes, and Derrida. His books include *A Brief History of Biographies: From Plutarch to Celebs*.

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Abbreviations
Acknowledgments
Translator's Note
Chapter 1 "The immense foliage of a Louisiana oak, like a flattened palaver tree"
Chapter 2 "Repetition is not an unnecessary duplication"
Chapter 3 "I do not reject, I establish correlation"
Chapter 4 "This need to go beyond one's own subjectivity"
Chapter 5 "Everything is in everything"
Chapter 6 "Universality has no language"
Chapter 7 "Bounds, breaks and sudden leaps"
Chapter 8 "Only the poets"
Chapter 9 "The beauty of beauty"
Chapter 10 "The dispute, one of the safest and oldest reinforcements of thought"

Epigraphs

When a poet dies, his most beautiful images,
his most influential works,
as well as his most everyday words,
are immediately safeguarded
in imperceptible fissures of the improbable,
and in the mysterious cracks of time,
where those bold enough can consult them.
—Glissant, *Philosophie de la Relation*

All philosophy is an art.
—Glissant, *Une nouvelle region du monde*

It is not the system that needs to be challenged.
What needs to be challenged
is any system that seeks to be systematic.
—Glissant, *L'Imaginaire des langues*

A living poetry must be part of life itself.
—Hegel, *Esthétique IV*

The death of poets also has a certain allure
which much more overwhelming
or terrifying sorrows do not possess. It is because we
feel that a great poet,
here among us, enters into a solitude
that we cannot conquer.
And once he has gone, we know
that if we were to follow him that minute into the endless shadows,
never could we see him or touch him.
—Glissant, *Philosophie de la Relation*

Embraces

Wholes and not-Wholes
An accordance, a discordance
Consonant and dissonant
And of all things one
And of the One all things
—Heraclitus, *Fragment X*

Excerpt: The Relation to come presupposes more than a will, more than a belief in its advent: it requires a true faith, one that runs across the whole of Glissant's thought. A path to subjective knowledge [connaissance] that passes through faith immediately raises the question of the sacred. The sacred is at first separation: in Latin, sacer means, on the one hand, the separate space dedicated to the divinity and, on the other hand, the propitiatory victim who is destined for it. Thus, sacer also refers to the abject person, the one cast out of the community to be offered as a sacrifice. Rene Girard has repeatedly alerted us, throughout his work, to the violence that is the backbone of the scapegoating process, a resolution that connects individuals succumbing to the process of atomization so as to bind them together in community. Glissant takes care to demarcate his notion of the sacred from the bloody, immemorial heritage still alive in the contemporary world: "In such a mesh, the ancient sacred force of filiation would no longer play its game of exclusion, the resolution of the dissolute would be relayed by the aggregation of those who have been scattered. [. . .] There would be no more need for the sacrifice of a propitiatory or victimized hero: for we can unravel this plot, meditate on it together, recognize ourselves in it at each other's side" (PR 68). Glissant's sacred is entirely purified of all transcendence, anthropomorphized through and through; it unfolds in this world, also distinguished from the chorus of Greek tragedy, which was the voice of the gods themselves—it is the very order of Chaos, fixing the nodal points of Relation without, however, determining its future: "We will fix the sacred, the order pre-supposed in the disorder of Relation, without being stupefied. We will discuss it without being imbued by the solemn melopoeia of the Greek chorus alone. We will imagine it without perforce becoming the hand of a god. To imagine the transparency of Relation is also to found the opacity of what animates it. The sacred comes from us, from this plot, from our wandering" (PR 68). The sacred comes not only from the past, but from the future, as an "unsuspected appetite for the unforeseeable" (TM 510). The writer (the unspeaker [déparleur]), is the one with the task of identifying those points where disorder hangs suspended, without any tremolos drenched in religiosity: "Any unspeaker [déparleur] is more gifted than anyone else for the search of the Sacred precisely because he unspeaks—in other words he is kidding, he is transported into exaggerations. Miseries confide in him without his seeing this as a priesthood. The unspeaker is the layman of the sacred" (TM 345).6

Therefore, the sacred is not a cause, but a consequence of Relation: "The sacred proceeds perhaps, for us, from this Relation, and no longer from a Revelation or a Law" (TTM 113). Relation puts Re(ve)lation in brackets. But it is mainly the opening of the Philosophie de la Relation that has attracted the attention of commentators' to this "secular sacred" (still an oxymoron and indeed a joke) that Glissant proposes: "There was that which arose, a sacred word. And the poem, then the poem, of itself begotten, started to be recognized" (PhR 11). Let us emphasize that this genesis is indeed a hypothesis, "this myth, or this legend or this dream" (PhR 12). "Thus should have been pronounced, in the prehistories of all the literatures of the world, this same beginning" (PhR 11), an original integration, one genesis that opposes and is appended to any digenesis, "the very sign of the fusion of the whole with the whole" (PhR 12). The primordial poem has no speaker—it arises from itself, it holds no commerce with anything else (sex, God the Creator): "It was before all else humanity" (PhR 11), a "sacred word, born already from all

things in the world" (PhR 12): before the Enumah Elish, before Gilgamesh, before The Odyssey and Heraclitus. The poem is therefore without words, inarticulate, and inarticulable, a "song of the world" (as Bernadette Gainer puts it) that precedes the divisions and distinctions necessarily implied in any act of speaking, right from the very earliest times:

What did this word of the sacred seek (it is the entirety of the world I am talking about), if not to confirm so many unavoidable obscurities? It had supposed, first and foremost, that it could forestall (or struggle against) the partitioning of differences, a partitioning which seemed inevitable, and then, when the paths and inspirations of the world were indeed divided, this word took care to gather these differences together again, panting in the same, ever-same way, so that the divergent sound emerging from it and echoing to the horizons would appear calm and reassuring. (PhR 14)

The sacred word is therefore an oxymoron, since it is outside of language: in this sense it is literally inconceivable, inextricable, unavoidable. Believing in its existence is a matter of faith: the primordial poem is the "*credo quia absurdum*" that Glissant takes from Tertullian, applied to a completely different object than the glorious Body, albeit with some striking analogies. The sacred word has been buried, lost, repressed, like Christ: "Let us remember well: the poem was buried in a collapse of the earth" (PhR 15). The primordial poem is the obscure object that poets seek, their original horizon: "and this poem comes back each time to what was an episode or a need of the prescience of the humanities, and it renews, with the most unexpected poets, in their need for speech, this journey that led from the original obscurity of the song to its trembling appearance" (PhR 12-13). The sacred word (of which Lascaux provides the buried image; PhR 12) is the horizon of all literature: "I think that in the history of all arts and all cultures there is a nostalgia for that primordial—and not primitive—moment when the same was related to the other. The same who was the cave dweller had, as his other, not another person; his other was the animal and his surroundings [. . .]. And I think that we have tried by dint of regulating the beautiful to forget this moment" (IL 93-94).

But the analogy with Christ does not stop there: the sacred word says that we must also resurrect, to build the future: "We can then understand that what distracts us from the 'essence' of a sacred, from the reading of the primordial poem, is not the banalization or the unstoppable technicization or the legislated secularism of our forms of objective knowledge [savoirs] and our current mode of life, but this fact: the poetics of Relation has projected before us this poem in extent that we deem to have been born from primordial lavas" (PhR 148). The sacred word is origin and goal; a circular fusion of everything, it is the One, even though Glissant rejects elsewhere the philosophers' obsession with it. For two reasons, the sacred word is Faith, past and future, a dual "credo quia absurdum" clearly opposed to the rationalization of the "credo ut intelligam" ("I believe in order to understand") of Saint Anselm, which is completed by Saint Albert the Great and Saint Thomas Aquinas in the systematization of the Summae. This "believe in order to understand" aims to block the "temptations of the thought of the Infinite and the Cosmos, a thought which will at the same time follow more obscure paths, byways that are usually prohibited" (TTM 95).

The new gods, recomposed from the old, are therefore secular, and the sacred word is a path to subjective knowledge (connaissance) that goes beyond the paths of rationality. Art is not reduced to the mere accumulation of the facts of its history and its achievements, true (subjective) knowledge

(connaissance) is reducible neither to the aggregate of forms of (objective) knowledge (saviors) or to subjective and impressionistic evaluation.

The language we speak has always been used to anchor identity and connection to a community (tribe, ethnic group, nation, empire); for the Hellenes, the one who speaks Greek badly is a barbaros, an allogeneic element that cannot be assimilated to the city. For the Romans, latinitas is what defines being part of the Republic, then the Empire. Among the Jews at the time of Jesus Christ, Biblical Hebrew, the sacred language entrusted to the custody of the Levites and the Kohanim, defines the very purity of belonging to the nation.

But here again, there is digenesis or multigenesis. Indeed, the Hebrew of the Torah is doubled by a vehicular Hebrew called Mishnaic (from the Mishna, "repetition," a compilation of rabbinical laws),9 and Ancient Palestine used another lingua franca, Aramaic, the language in which Jesus preached. Jesus himself was certainly bilingual, probably multilingual: he spoke Aramaic, knew the sacred Hebrew of the Torah (evidenced by his frequent quotations from the Old Testament in the Gospels and his polemics with rabbinical doctors), probably understood and could speak Mishnaic Hebrew, and may have conversed in Greek with Pontius Pilate. What a scumble of languages at the origins of Christianity! And this cultural exchange will become the rule with the second book of the Acts of the Apostles and Pentecost. If any speaker can understand preaching in any language, then there is no sacred language. The glossolalia of the book of Acts is "the sign that every tongue [or language, langue] will confess" (Rupert de Deutz, Les OEuvres du Saint-Esprit). At the same time, what a hubbub in the development of the New Testament! In the second century, Greek-speaking Jews living in the diaspora, in Alexandria, translated Aramaic and Hebrew and produced the first version of the New Testament together with the Old Testament, translated into Greek from Biblical Hebrew This was the Septuagint: it was then translated into Latin by Saint Jerome, and triggered a boundless dynamic process: Testaments exist today in three hundred languages; one thousand eight hundred and forty-eight languages include the translation of at least one book of the Bible." This spirit of Pentecost is summed up by Saint Augustine in a pithy phrase: "The truth is neither Hebrew, nor Greek, nor Latin, nor barbaric" (Confessions XI, III, 5). It does not need to be articulated in a specific language: all the idioms of the world revolve around a truth without language: "[The truth] would say to me, without needing a mouth or a language, without making any syllables sound out: `Moses speaks the truth!' " (Ibid.). <>