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Wordtrade Reviews: Questioning Transforms

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DU FU TRANSFORMS: TRADITION AND ETHICS AMID SOCIETAL COLLAPSE by Lucas Rambo Bender [Harvard-Yenching Institute Monograph Series, Harvard University Asia Center, Harvard Ubiversity Press, 9780674260177]

Often considered China's greatest poet, Du Fu (712–770) came of age at the height of the Tang dynasty, in an era marked by confidence that the accumulated wisdom of the precedent cultural tradition would guarantee civilization's continued stability and prosperity. When his society collapsed into civil war in 755, however, he began to question contemporary assumptions about the role that tradition should play in making sense of experience and defining human flourishing.

In this book, Lucas Bender argues that Du Fu's reconsideration of the nature and importance of tradition has played a pivotal role in the transformation of Chinese poetic understanding over the last

millennium. In reimagining his relationship to tradition, Du Fu anticipated important philosophical transitions from the late-medieval into the early-modern period and laid the template for a new and perduring paradigm of poetry's relationship to ethics. He also looked forward to the transformations his own poetry would undergo as it was elevated to the pinnacle of the Chinese poetic pantheon.

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Tradition and Transformation

Among the many lures of literature, perhaps the most addictive is its promise to make sense. Though the point is almost too obvious to merit comment, this promise goes down to its simplest linguistic elements, whose basic function is to mean. As readers and writers, we arrange these promising elements into significant patterns, weave those patterns into intelligible ideas and satisfying stories, and translate those ideas and those stories into visions of our lives and of what matters in them. And we do not do so alone: we are always reading what others have written, reading in community, responding in our own writings. As a shared practice by which we involve each other in these projects, literature thus gives voice to a communal hope, against much evidence, that at least some sense can be made in and of this world.

Literature's entanglement with our passion for sense does not, however, guarantee that the "best" literature will most satisfy it. Quite the contrary, readers often demand of those works that would stand the test of time that they retain a certain reticence when it comes to the sense we can make of them. A number of explanations might be offered for this somewhat unintuitive phenomenon. Optimistically, for instance, dissatisfaction with what comes easy might represent a recognition that easy sorts of sense are flimsy things, that what will survive the Sequent phases of our interests and capacities will necessarily refuse to be comprehended entire on a first pass. Or, more pessimistically, we might intuit that any sense we can grasp will shortly sour, that culture has an inherent tendency to reduce its achievements

to ruins. Whatever explanation we give, however, it seems clear enough that it is not always the particular sense we will ultimately make of a text that defines our attachment to it, but sometimes more the hint, the pursuit, even the frustration that precedes any final articulation, as if it were the promise rather than the promised that we cared most about.

This dynamic generates revealing paradoxes, nowhere more obvious than in literary canons. Though classic works must always remain partly elusive if they are to repay rereading throughout readers' lives and across generations, they come, over time, to constitute the shared reference points by which sense is made elsewhere. As the literary cultures they initially addressed pass away and new cultures form themselves around them, moreover, they become obscure not only in themselves but also through time, forcing readers invested in the stability they supposedly offer to invent new ways of interpreting them. For these reasons, canonical texts always exist at a point of crisis. They prove a culture's most cherished visions of sense while also undermining them, and offer to preserve civilization while simultaneously driving it inexorably to what partisans of any one stage in its progress would recognize as collapse. They are evidence of our need for shared sense and also that we will, collectively, never find it—at least if finding it would mean ceasing to seek further.

These paradoxes are particularly clear in the case of Chinese poetry, where critics of subsequent ages largely remade the art in the image of one medieval poet whose work, written at a moment of quite literal societal collapse, presented an enduring crisis of understanding. This poet is Du Fu (712-70), generally recognized throughout the last millennium as the greatest poet in the tradition, but also as one whose poetry was unusually difficult for his latter-born readers. To reveal what they took to be its secrets, devotees of Du Fu's poetry over a thousand years have engaged in unprecedented feats of historical and biographical research, supplementing his collection with new genres of criticism and inventing new sorts of scholarly apparatus to transform it into the art's most powerful demonstration that sense was always there to be made. In time, these new genres and new apparatus have come to define what it means to make sense of Chinese poetry and have been applied to nearly every important poet in Chinese history, including many who were previously read quite comfortably without them. In this way, the obscurity that has so troubled readers of Du Fu's verse has stimulated the development of new regimes of sense-making for the tradition as a whole.

The obscurity of Du Fu's verse was not merely adventitious, however; nor has it been simply resolved by the work of so many generations of commentators. Instead, his was a poetry originally difficult to make sense of, a fact attested by the limited enthusiasm with which it was received in his lifetime and for the first 250 years after his death. Though this opacity has often been heightened by the passage of time, it derives ultimately from the work's consistent focus on difficult questions about sense-making itself, both in literature and in our lives. For Du Fu, these questions were urgent, sharpened by the sudden violence of the An Lushan Rebellion in 755, which fractured one of the greatest empires the world had ever known. In the wake of this cataclysmic conflict, Du Fu found himself unable to live out the models of the good life provided by "This Culture of Ours" (siwen), the great literary, philosophical, historiographical, and ritual tradition that he and his contemporaries had believed contained the wisdom necessary to guarantee social and personal flourishing. During the fifteen years that remained to him after An Lushan's initial assault on the Tang capitals, therefore, he searched for new ways to make sense of his experience, unmoored from the certainties that had guided him in his youth.

What he found, I will suggest, was less an answer to his questions than a new perspective on them. In the collapse of his civilization's models of sense-making, Du Fu came to recognize that cultural traditions are ineluctably insufficient to changing circumstances; that the understandings of any given cultural moment are, as such, inherently fragile; and that cultural change is thus inevitable. Yet rather than discarding his age's deep investment in the idea of tradition, he came to see value in its inability to offer irrefragable meanings. After the trauma of the Rebellion, he began to discern a richness in his experience's divergence from established paradigms and, in his last years, even began to hope that his apparently failed life might bear a different significance for future readers who derived their models of sense-making from different moral cultures. With increasing self-consciousness, therefore, he came to write a poetry designed to speak to a future he could not predict, as part of a tradition more commensurate with the inevitability of, and more capable of surviving, collapses like that he witnessed in his lifetime.

Over the last thousand years, Du Fu's success in this project has been nothing short of remarkable. Not only has he survived successive waves of cultural change, retaining his position at the apex of the canon in literary cultures organized around values as disparate as loyalty to the emperor and revolutionary solidarity with the masses. Through those changes, moreover, he has also been recognized as a crucial exemplar of virtues he could not have imagined, transfiguring him from a failure in his own age to an epitome of the ethical life. Yet by virtue of this very success, Du Fu's critics have also been blinded to his own evolving interest in the problems of sense-making itself, the interest that rendered his poetry so open to interpretation in the first place. That interest is the focus of this book.

Modes of Sense-Making

This book thus offers two central arguments. The first concerns Du Fu's poetry and how it changed as he thought through the consequences of his society's collapse; the second, a shift in the modes of sense-making that have prevailed in China in the thousand years since he was elevated to the pinnacle of its poetic pantheon. Though different in scope, these two arguments are interrelated. On the one hand, the millennial shift in sense-making described here is written into the very text of Du Fu's collection, which in all its existing forms has been molded by his commentators. On the other hand, Du Fu's collection, thus constituted, has served as a principal justification for the shift these critics have wrought, retrojecting its origin into the deeper past and thus disguising their innovations. When we unearth, therefore, the contemporary assumptions against which Du Fu was writing, we begin to recognize how different he was. from either his inheritance or his inheritors. And when we identify the eccentricity of his mature verse to the literary culture of his time, we start to appreciate how radical were the changes wrought upon literary sense-making by the later critics who placed him at its center.

It is this historical intertwining of poetic and critical innovation that makes the concept of "sense-making" useful to me here, highlighting as it does the connections between what we do when we write literature, read literature, and integrate literature into larger visions of significance. The concept is also helpful in explaining why the transformations in literary understanding I will describe have not previously been recognized as such. The sense that we make in and of any given poem, that is, we make beyond the text itself, in the connections we draw between the fragmentary markings on the page and the various conceptual and affective domains that underwrite our sense of poeticity. In this way, both reading and writing poetry involve intuitions about the kind of thing poetry is and should be, intuitions that depend upon larger, generally implicit understandings of human psychology, the nature of reality, and the role of

art in a good life—to name just a few of the issues at play. And not only do the intellectual networks that underwrite our intuitions thus guarantee that there is at least a rough alignment between our instincts as to what makes sense as a poem, how a successful poem should make sense of the realities and imaginaries it concerns, and how it is that reading and writing poetry make sense as activities people might want to pursue. Just as important, the inchoate extent of these intellectual networks all but guarantees that we only rarely articulate our sense of the poetic in explicit forms. Readers operating on different models of sense-making can therefore appreciate the same literature in vastly different ways, without recognizing that they are doing so.

The salience of these points is particularly marked when it comes to premodern Chinese verse. This poetry is, for the most part, written in an idiom far removed from everyday speech, omitting the particles and grammatical markers even of literary prose. In its language, then, no less than in its imagery, classical Chinese poetry often provides readers only the barest building blocks of scenes, sentences, and thoughts, as if it were a fragment from a lost fullness inviting their active reconstruction. This participatory quality, not incidentally, is one of the main reasons that the tradition of philological and explanatory commentary on Du Fu is so robust that, by the year 1250, publishers of critical editions of his work could claim to have collected exegesis from "a thousand scholars," When we read classical Chinese poetry, that is, we are quite obviously "making" sense, producing it out of some combination of the fragmentary markings on the page and the assumptions we bring with us about what it would make sense for the poet to be saying. And when these assumptions change, everything down to the basic grammatical construal of a poem can change with them.

We do not, unfortunately, have records of the construals, grammatical or otherwise, of Du Fu's poetry from his own time (or, for that matter, from the three centuries that followed his death). What we do have are statements about poetry and its entailments within other domains of significance, statements that can be usefully compared with the ideas that are articulated in later criticism of Du Fu's work. Among the many contrasts that could be drawn from these materials, I will focus throughout this book on the ways in which Du Fu's contemporaries and his critics discussed the relationship between poetry and what can roughly be termed "ethics"—that is, attitudes towards what is good or praiseworthy in a life. Ethics was central to the literary discourse of Du Fu's time, when poetry was more commonly integrated into visions of the good life than it has been since. Indeed, given that poetry figured almost omnipresently in social rituals among the elite, was discussed in mainstream intellectual circles as central to civilization's flourishing, and served as one of the most prestigious paths of access to real political power, Tang China might represent the world-historical apogee of poetry's assumed ethical significance. After the Tang, the art would never again attain the same general approbation as a moral medium—though Du Fu proved that it still could be one in exceptional cases. He has been, for the critics of the last thousand years, the tradition's "Poet Sage," the most moral of all its post-Classical writers. The entanglement of poetry and ethics was thus salient to Du Fu's context and has been important to his reception, albeit in revealingly different ways.

The question of poetry's ethical significance is also central to the narrative of poetic change that I want Ito trace in Du Fu's own work. The early eighth century was a golden age of culture and the arts, a flourishing believed to have been matched only in the legendary epochs of early Chinese history. According to contemporary ideology, this cultural flourishing both reflected and contributed to the surging economic and political might of an empire that by the 750s was closing in on a century and a half

of almost continuous political stability, military strength, and economic growth. When the empire suddenly crumbled before An Lushan's armies at the apparent height of its cultural achievements, therefore, Du Fu's confidence in poetry's ethical significance crumbled with it—not to mention his hopes that poetry would earn him entry into the halls of power, where he could accomplish the moral goals he cherished most. Unlike most of his contemporaries—who generally wrote in the period immediately following the war in styles that signaled a retrenchment of the visions of poetry's significance that had underwritten the art for Du Fu in his youth10—Du Fu's acute sense of being cut off from the promised political and moral ends of his early immersion in literature led him to a thorough-going reconsideration of the nature and purpose of the art.

This reconsideration, I suggest, has allowed Du Fu to serve as a pivot between the optimistic assumptions of his time and those of the later ages for which he served as proof, against an ambient doubt, that poetry could at least sometimes be ethically significant. This is partly because his mature work pioneered new ways of understanding poetry's relationship to ethics that would become influential among his critics. His role in catalyzing this shift, however, is even more dependent on the ways in which he did not foreshadow their critical innovations: the ways his reconsideration of the poetic art often presented readers with verse that did not make immediate sense to them. In response to these obscurities, critics from the eleventh century onward have worked diligently to figure out how everything that Du Fu says might, in fact, be what a paradigmatically ethical poet should say, and they have written their conclusions into the text of his collection in the ways they have ordered it, in the paratexts they have provided for it, and in the annotations they have written to accompany it. In these respects, Du Fu's poetry as it exists today is indelibly marked by his postmedieval critics' vision of poetry's ethical significance. What I hope to suggest in this book, however, is that it is possible to read these interventions against the grain as well, as evidence of critical difficulty occasioned by his struggles with the failing ethical paradigms of a cultural world that, by his critics' time, had long since passed.
Poetry as a Moral Medium

Some indication of poetry's capacity as this sort of moral medium is suggested by the structure of the thousand-year commentary tradition that has formed around Du Fu's collection. Works within this tradition predominantly endeavor to translate his verse into more straightforward, more elaborated, and more coherent propositions—much as I have done in this book. Yet the interest of those propositions always reposes implicitly on their insufficiency to the poetry itself, since were its riches to be exhausted by them, it would hardly merit commentary in the first place. In this sense, the generic expectation that poetry may require elucidation, while nonetheless remaining both more evocative and more precise than any elucidation could be, inherently predisposes the art to transcending any one articulated moral perspective.

A generic expectation of poetry's greater power as a moral medium, in comparison to more propositional forms of discourse, was a feature of Du Fu's own literary context as well, though contemporary thought turned it to different ends. According to the late medieval model, that is, it was the literary patterning of verse that made it particularly apt for conveying ethical orientations, its rhythms and intensities embodying the writer's emotions and involving the reader's body in the process of re-creating them. This literary patterning, moreover, was commensurate to the patterning that poetry was supposed to promote in the body politic, wen as literature translating into wen as culture to ensure the iteration of normative values throughout society and across time. These moral imperatives were

reflected in the short, occasional form of the art, which allowed its allusions to bring the weight of tradition to bear upon the present moments it characteristically discussed, thus modeling for readers the essential moral process they were subsequently expected to perform in bringing the poem's own values to bear upon their own experiences. Poetry was thus formally commensurate to the structure of morality as it was understood in the late medieval period: a system of propagating analogies that formed readers into the sort of moral adepts who would know before reading what the next good poem could say, who would "match tallies with it in their minds."

This account of the art's moral capacities underwrote Du Fu's early verse, and it was by inverting crucial features of this paradigm that he would turn his later poetry from a technology for propagating analogies into an exploration of disanalogies. Like his contemporaries, he continued to write mostly in short, highly allusive forms that allowed him to apply the resources of the past to his ongoing experience. But from the outbreak of the Rebellion onwards, his allusions are often problematic. Instead of invoking the tradition in such a way as to conform the present to it, he makes use of its resources to reflect on the obscurity, the idiosyncrasy, and the ambiguity of his experience. In this respect, his poetry rearranges the iterative chain characteristic of the late medieval model. If the ideal reader in his time was one who already embodied the values a good poem would express, Du Fu's focus on failures of precedent and interruptions in analogy ensures that his readers, no matter how steeped they might be in the cultural tradition, will not know in advance what he is trying to say. His poems become puzzles for his readers, much as the experiences they describe were puzzles to him.

Whereas the late medieval model figured poetry as a chain of normative repetitions encoding civilizational stability across time, then, Du Fu reconfigures it as a chain of bewilderment propelling a search for new ideas. Just as the collapse of his culture's moral certainties drove him to experiment with novel solutions to the puzzles of his life, that is, so too do the puzzles of his poems encourage his readers to seek out innovative interpretations to dispel their obscurities. And in both cases, the difficulty of these enigmas is crucial to their continuing interest. Not only does the problematic applicability of the tradition leave underdetermined both the moral interpretation of Du Fu's experience and the text of his poems that attempt it. When he seeks to ameliorate this underdetermination by treating individual experiences as part of a broader narrative of his life, moreover, he winds up massively overdetermining them, rendering his solutions provisional to an unknown future and his readers', likewise, dependent on convergent solutions to the rest of his verse. For these reasons, Du Fu never arrived at a final interpretation of his life's moral meaning, and his critics have always found more work to be done.

Yet although their endeavors are thus always incomplete, it is nonetheless in the ongoing attempts of such readers that we fulfill the hopes he articulates in his late works: that his problematic life should be revealed in time to have been a good one. In those rare moments when we break through bewilderment to a satisfying interpretation of a given poem, we discover the sense in what initially appeared not to make it, both to us and, in a different way, to Du Fu himself. Crucially, the over- and unclerdetermination of the verse ensure that the criteria by which we recognize such a discovery are rarely linguistic or historical only. Instead, just as the late medieval model required an adept reader who already knows what a good poet will say, so too can we not be fully satisfied we have understood what Du Fu is saying until it makes sense that he would have been saying it. And as our own ethical and aesthetic predilections inform our solutions to the ethical and aesthetic puzzles of his verse, a striking reorientation occurs. Suddenly, the moral divergences between individuals, eras, and ethical worlds that

previously drove the obscurity of Du Fu's life and work prove, on the contrary, synergic, his disjunctive use of past precedents coming to describe the details of his present situation in a way that, from our future vantage point, seems apt and even ethically laudable. In such breakthrough moments, we thread together a tradition very different from that of the late medieval model.

Although recordizing criticism has not generally perceived itself as bringing to bear on Du Fu's work moral ideas that would have been foreign to him, it nonetheless can demonstrate the point. Not only does the millennium-spanning length of the commentary tradition testify both to the enduring obscurity of his collection and its alluring promise to someday make sense. More specifically, the assiduous historical research that animates recordizing reading attests his poetry's undercietermination; the fact that critics still generally ignore large portions of his oeuvre, after a thousand years of such research, suggests the difficulties created by its overdetermination; and the prominent role very different moral theories, from Neo-Confucianism to Maoism, have played in guiding the results of this research indicates how this combination of over- and underdetermination involves readers' ethical intuitions in its interpretation. And yet, despite these difficulties, there has hardly been a commentator who has not claimed his commentary unlocks the previously unappreciated moral significance of Du Fu's life and work. In this way, recordizing reading has been a tradition in two different senses. On the one hand, it has been remarkably consistent in its adherence to the basic idea that poetry should be a transparent record of moral truths immanent in historical experience itself. On the other, its insistence that this paradigm of poetic meaning, in fact radically new, articulates the moral significance of Du Fu's verse and the normative form of Chinese poetry since the Shijing—especially as both keep changing to match the evolving exigencies of different eras—reveals recordizing criticism as creatively maintaining a larger tradition whose unity, ultimately, lies in transformation.

What I have tried to suggest in this book is that it is no coincidence that this tradition, in the limited sense of the word, should also have been secretly committed to the maintenance of tradition in the larger sense as well. Instead, it has in this respect responded both to the articulated hope of Du Fu's mature work and to the poetic mechanisms he found to enact it. It is, finally, this homology between the form of his verse, its moral vision, and the tradition it has created that renders his poetry more compelling than any propositional account of that vision could be—very much including my own. Indeed, if my reading of his work is onto something, it cannot, by its own lights, be complete. It is, rather, merely a means of participating in a tradition that, if we are to remain faithful to Du Fu, must always find new ways of continuing on.

A Shared Moral Project

At a certain point in this research, I thought my contribution to the tradition of Du Fu criticism might involve bringing to bear on his work the insights of recent discussions, in both literary criticism and Anglo-American philosophy, of literature's potential as a moral medium. Over the last century and particularly since the1980s, a number of scholars have explored how homologies between literary form and content create spaces for ethical reflection that cannot be replicated in more theoretical genres, and many of their conclusions seem relevant, mutatis mutandis, to thinking about the role Du Fu's poetry has played in the moral economy of China over the last millennium. Recordizing critics, in fact, have located the ethical import of his verse along each of the four main branches Joshua Landy has outlined in a recent typology of such theoretical accounts: the exemplary, the affective, the cognitive, and the formative. They have, that is, taken Du Fu as exemplifying virtue in an age of disorder, as modeling the

emotions that are constitutive of a rich inner life, as providing valuable information about the processes of history, and as teaching us ways of properly appreciating their significance as they play out in our own lives.

Beyond Land's typology, the close adherence of Du Fu's poetry to the contours of his life also dovetails nicely with recent work suggesting that literature's ethical promise lies in its capacities to challenge the abstract thinking that has often dominated moral theory, to complexify the problems such theory works to solve, to ground ethical thought in the dense realities of real human lives, or to encourage us to accept the limitations incumbent upon the sort of moral beings that we are. Given that most of these ideas have been developed exclusively in connection with novels from the modern West, moreover, their application to the work of a premodern Chinese poet seemed likely to be fruitful both in broadening and in specifying their claims.

Yet though Du Fu may in fact have shaped his readers' moral perspectives in all these ways, the difficulty of studying this effect began to warn me away from doing so—not to mention my growing suspicion that he probably shaped different individuals and different eras differently. More important, it gradually dawned on me that the most obvious role he has played in his readers' lives did not fit along any of these lines. Rather, in building on the work of their predecessors and contributing to the cumulative edifice of historical research that supports recordizing reading, his critics have consistently attested, despite the changing details of their particular ethical and political paradigms, to the access his work has provided them to a shared moral project stretching across centuries. That Du Fu should have written in such a way as to make this possible is, I have come to think, an achievement that is ethical in character and conducive, moreover, to his readers' living better lives.

Most concretely, the participatory quality of Du Fu's poetry may render it particularly well suited to encouraging its disparate readers to see themselves as potential collaborators in a community of moral interpretation. Although, as discussed, Du Fu has often been invoked at moments of crisis to distinguish the "Chinese" from "foreign" invaders, his work nonetheless remained canonical in so-called conquest dynasties and may eventually have played some small role in shoring up their mixed communal identities. Despite his importance to Ming loyalists, for instance, the Manchu rulers of the Qing also promoted his poetry and the patriotic values it purportedly encouraged. And despite simmering tensions between China and Japan, his verse has in recent years created opportunities for scholarly exchange between them, with both sides viewing it as, to greater or lesser degrees, part of their own tradition. Going forward, it is to be hoped that similar exchanges will continue between East Asia and the rest of the world.

As Du Fu recognized particularly in his Kuizhou era work, moreover, effective synchronic communities are, to a significant degree, functions of imagined diachronic solidarity. Even more than horizontal linkages, therefore, his poetry encourages his readers to imagine themselves members of a shared vertical community, across time. Such transtemporal communities were always important to Du Fu, but they became even more so in his exile—a development that partially explains why, as he wrote towards a future he could not predict, his poetry became even more densely studded with allusions to the past. In his late work, these allusions no longer stake a claim to timeless wisdom, but rather suggest the commonality of the moral obscurities he thinks define our lives. As we read Du Fu, therefore, we are invited to consider the possibility that the distant past of his allusions, the middle past of his life, and the

proximate past of the commentary tradition are not, ultimately, foreign to us; that instead they may contain crucial elements for our own moral futures.

In this sense, Du Fu's poetry militates against what Samuel Schemer has called "temporal parochialism." According to Schemer, there is a danger that, as "our sense of the connections among different human generations [becomes] increasingly impoverished," we may disregard the good reasons we have to participate in, preserve, and transmit inherited traditions, and may fail to recognize our moral dependence on the future, that "what is necessary to sustain our confidence in our values [ultimately,] is that we should die and that others should live." Schemer identifies this temporal parochialism as a particular danger of our current moment, in which environmental and political crises threaten to leave to future generations neither the moral resources they will need to make sense of their lives nor the material resources necessary for living them well. But it is no coincidence that Du Fu too was responding to what seemed to him the imminent collapse of a great, if flawed, culture. Although the An Lushan Rebellion did not quite endanger the existence of future generations, he likewise had reason to worry that his lifetime would coincide with a decisive break between the past and the future, after which the values he learned in his youth and the tradition that informed them might be forgotten as obsolete. After all, these values and this tradition no longer worked well even for him. With the past threatening to be swallowed up into an oblivion of failed moral and political ideas and the future to become unrecognizable, human history seemed on the brink of transforming from the proving ground for the unbroken thread of This Culture of Ours to a discontinuous series in which no life could remain significant for long.

It was in response to this threat, ultimately, that Du Fu abandoned the comforting communities of late medieval poetry and late medieval ethics for a more speculative solidarity he could live only as an exile. In writing not for his contemporaries but rather for readers whose moral proclivities he could not predict, he seems to have recognized that the exigencies of enacting a particular set of settled values will always conflict with those of bridging the discontinuities between such sets. The rigor, purity, and clarity that motivate the like-minded may come to seem brittle to communities otherwise constituted, and no matter how frustrating it may be to work alongside anyone who cultivates a moral style involving irony, enigma, and plenitude, these equivocal virtues in the here-and-now can play significant roles in the long-term success of endeavors whose fruits lie in the future. For this reason, although any given ethical perspective may allot some narrow space within which poetry can be moral, within the larger scope of human history, any perduring ethical accomplishment will have to be poetry, and will, as such, have to dally with incomprehension, isolation, and failure. And it is precisely as this sort of venture into the unknown that Du Fu's work is both an ethical achievement and an enduring paradox: that precisely in living a failed life according to the standards of the tradition as it was understood in his time, he ended up living well according to the transforming tradition Chinese moral poetics has actually proven to be.
<>

THE POETRY OF DU FU translated by Stephen Owen, edited by: Ding Xiang Warner and Paul W. Kroll 6 volumes [Series Library of Chinese Humanities, De Gruyer, 9781614517122] Open Source Funded by The Andrew W. Mellon Foundation, Chinese, English

THE COMPLETE POETRY OF DU FU presents a complete scholarly translation of Chinese literature alongside the original text in a critical edition. The English translation is more scholarly than vernacular Chinese translations, and it is compelled to address problems that even the best traditional commentaries overlook.

The main body of the text is a facing page translation and critical edition of the earliest Song editions and other sources. For convenience the translations are arranged following the sequence in Qiu Zhao'an's Du shi xiangzhu (although Qiu's text is not followed). Basic footnotes are included when the translation needs clarification or supplement. Endnotes provide sources, textual notes, and a limited discussion of problem passages. A supplement references commonly used allusions, their sources, and where they can be found in the translation.

Scholars know that there is scarcely a Du Fu poem whose interpretation is uncontested. The scholar may use this as a baseline to agree or disagree. Other readers can feel confident that this is a credible reading of the text within the tradition. A reader with a basic understanding of the language of Chinese poetry can use this to facilitate reading Du Fu, which can present problems for even the most learned reader.

Reviews

"To call Du Fu China's greatest poet grossly underestimates his importance. [...] Thus the first full translation of Du Fu's poems into English is a major event, and everyone involved in the study of Chinese literature owes Stephen Owen a great debt. That his edition of Du Fu's poems includes helpful annotation, such as explanatory footnotes, scholarly endnotes pointing out variants and justifying interpretations, and a guide to major allusions, makes it an invaluable scholarly tool. Moreover, the online version is open access, making it even more convenient for students and poetry lovers alike."
Nicholas Morrow Witliams in: China Review International: Vol. 21, Nos. 3 & 4, 2014

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Excerpt: Du Fu (712–770) came to be referred to as the "poet-historian," shishi t.t, primarily because he bore testimony to the momentous events surrounding the great An Lushan Rebellion of 755–763, which humbled the Tang dynasty (618–907) and from which the dynasty never entirely recovered. Such a version of the "historian," whose attention was always on the center of the polity and on the whole only through the political center, has been supplemented in recent times by a more capacious sense of "history," which includes the local details of contemporary life that were previously considered marginal. In this larger sense of history Du Fu remains the "poet-historian."

In the eleventh century Du Fu was canonized, not simply as the preeminent figure in Tang poetry, but also as the very embodiment of Confucian values, as they were coming to be understood in the Song. He was the epitome of loyalty, unrecognized and unrewarded by the dynasty. Though unheeded, he spoke to and for the polity, praising the worthy, criticizing the unworthy, pointing out the social consequences of policy, and sympathizing with the sufferings of the common people. The selection of his poetry gathered around these values.

All these values are true and amply attested in his poetry (even if we might now be inclined to note his gross political misjudgments). It is, however, time for a broader understanding of his work. No poet in the Tang passed through so many social positions and roles in his poetry — the grown man of good family going about with the fashionable elite of Chang'an, the husband and father trying to get his family out of harm's way, the court officer in close attendance on the emperor, the minor local official complaining about too much paperwork, the itinerant with his family looking for food and lodging, the sycophantic dependent of local power-holders, the neighbor of peasants, all within the crumbling structure of the Tang empire. He often lamented that he was thwarted from gaining office in Xuanzong's (r. 712–756) reign, but during the An Lushan Rebellion that failure perhaps spared him the danger of an enforced office in the rebel regime and the treason trials that followed the reconquest of the capitals by loyalist forces. Just before the Rebellion he declined a post that he considered unworthy of his capabilities, but he received a good post after escaping through rebel lines and making his way to loyalist headquarters. Following the recovery of Chang'an, he lost favor through maintaining political loyalties that were as wrong-headed in political actuality as they were admirable in principle; he was assigned a provincial post that involved too much dreary, bureaucratic work, and resigned. When he finally was named to a purely honorary post in the Board of Works, he proudly carried his insignia of office for the rest of his life.

He had a strong sense of right, and his sense of right was matched by his interest in food. After his youthful years, food became a central concern in his poetry. Upon taking the family to the countryside just before the Rebellion, one of his children died of hunger. He begged for food, celebrated it, foraged, and complained when a promised allotment of vegetables was not up to his standard. He celebrated sashimi, pestered a relative for good Chinese chives, thanked a friend profusely for a pot of bean sauce, and in hard times was grateful for what is called "famine food." He writes about medicines almost as much as he talks about food. Throughout most of his life as a poet he was sick — he never lets us forget it. He suffered from diabetes, lung inflammation, asthma, fevers, aches, and pains. We ourselves are "at pains" to diagnose his illnesses — though we may suspect that he was a bit of a hypochondriac. We first see him in his late thirties and he already claims to be old or "getting old." He remained "old" for most of his poetic career.

We are never sure how to read his complaints. He complained of poverty; and indeed, in parts of his life he seems to have been truly destitute. Poverty is, however, relative. When he was leaving Kuizhou, we learn that his orchard was forty mu in extent (almost six acres), which did not include his gardens and share in the rice fields. When the rice harvest was coming in, he set up house by the fields to supervise. We know the size of his fruit acreage because, unlike any of his contemporaries or almost any later poet, he tells us in his poetry. We want to tease him for his incessant complaints; but we see him telling a relative, who is temporarily moving into his main domicile in Kuizhou, not to build any fence so that the widow next door will not feel unwelcome or too intimidated to take the fruit from his date tree, which he has always permitted. This could, of course, have been communicated orally. If Du Fu does this in poetry, it is not, I believe, simply to demonstrate to contemporaries and posterity that he is a good person; rather, he seems to write in poetry absolutely everything he thinks is important. He is not like any other Tang poet — and, indeed, he often seems to have entirely forgotten what normally lay outside poetry's sphere of discourse. Later writers wanted to recapture Du Fu's weird engagement with lived experience, but even at their best they could not quite attain that.

Du Fu was, without a doubt, the most imitated poet in the later Chinese tradition, but it was the Du Fu as he was seen in the Song dynasty (960–1279) who was imitated, rather than the full range of our Tang Du Fu. At different times he had three or four servants; but, like no one else in his day, we know his servants by name because he wrote poems for them and named them in his poems. What is usually socially invisible in Tang poetic discourse often becomes visible in Du Fu's poetry — and perhaps for this, more than anything else, he deserves to be called "poet-historian."

In his poetry we see, in passing, those moments we know must have occurred, but which are not to be found in the poems or even the prose of his contemporaries. After the emperor Xuanzong fled Chang'an, leaving the members of the extensive imperial family to fend for themselves in the city soon occupied by An Lushan's forces, we meet a prince of the blood hiding from An Lushan's occupation force. We see divisions of the grand army of Central Asia, which had fought their way as far as Afghanistan, then withdrawn from the frontier and sent to the east to attack the rebel generals; later, under inept generals and a divided command, those soldiers were wasted in the fiasco of the siege of Ye. We see empty villages and hear Du Fu urging his peasant neighbors, driven to desperation by continuous tax-gouging, not to flee their land. We see the dark synecdoche of a riderless horse with arrows in its saddle. In his last years we see Du Fu fleeing Changsha with his family by night, as the local garrison killed its commander and ran amok. Nevertheless, in the midst of the fearful contingency of his life and

his poetry, he has moments of consummate vision of the order of the world, the nature of the people that inhabit it, and the way we apprehend it.

Many of his best poems connect the mundane with larger ethical values and a vision of how the world works. He never begins as a moralist; he discovers moral issues in the world he encounters; sometimes the issues he finds are far too grand for the experience, and he laughs at himself. His pervasive irony and humor — in conjunction with his very human crankiness — make him a better model for the "Confucian" than the generations of sanctimonious readers who idolized him. One of his most famous poems is on a storm that blew the thatch from his roof, which was carried off by local children, then a rainstorm that soaked him and his family by night, concluding with his wish to shelter all the poor gentlemen of the world. The noble wish is inseparable from the self-representation as a ridiculous, helpless older man yelling at children behaving badly. If there is a justification for translating all of the poems, it may be deepening our sense of his engagement with the mundane and not allowing it to resolve into simply a way to talk about "big things." It is the persistence of his vision of large significance in the everyday — sometimes ironically — that makes a whole Du Fu more satisfying than a selected Du Fu.

After the An Lushan Rebellion Du Fu took his family on a large loop, from the region around the capitals to the bleak northwest, then down through the mountains in a harrowing journey to Chengdu, and, later, on down the Yangzi to Kuizhou, Jiangling, and across Lake Dongting down to Changsha in Hu'nan. In some of these places the family stayed for years. During all that time, Du Fu was transporting the scrolls of his growing poetry collection, surviving as more than fourteen hundred extant poems. It is worth thinking of this in the context of the family's escape from the uprising in Changsha (Tanzhou), 23.37:

> My soul melted, escaping the flying arrows,
> I crept fearfully through those wolves and jackals.
> I made myself endure the prick of thornbushes,
> I kept on going with wounds from blisters.
> My son, coming from afar, attended us closely,
> a girl, still nursing, was next to us.

In this dramatic scene of flight, we have to imagine someone bringing along at least fourteen hundred poems, not in the compact codex form, but as early tradition tells us, in sixty scrolls, each with a wrapper. Leizu translated as "crept fearfully," is literally "one foot standing on another," a sign of intense fear. Even allowing for poetic license, a space must be made somewhere in the scene for those sixty scrolls, along with some of Du Fu's favorite household goods, such as his black leather armrest and, no doubt, the rest of his library.

If we credit his claim made in the early 750s that he had been writing poetry since age seven and had composed more than a thousand poems, most of his early work has been lost, which is hardly surprising in the desperate situation surrounding the fall of Chang'an to rebel forces. What we have of his earlier poetry was probably put down later, from memory. Those sixty cumbersome scrolls come from a poet who was already fully mature.

When those poems first appear to us in the Song dynasty, they are divided into two parts, "regulated poems" and "non-regulated poems." Within each of those two divisions the poems are arranged

chronologically. In all but a few cases we do not know the original form of Tang poetry collections; we have evidence to guess about others. However, from circumstantial evidence this may have been one of the earliest poetry collections that was originally arranged chronologically, though perhaps with the elementary generic division between "old style" and "recent style." This is another way of saying that Du Fu chronicled his life in poetry. This fact and the unprecedented volume of his poetry became itself an essential part of the image of Du Fu and the way he has been read. While Du Fu's poetry often seems to respond to the contingency of the moment, we also know that he frequently revised his poems — and we never can be sure, in a given poem, how much is immediate response, how much is response from recent memory, and how much is added in retrospect. We find ourselves in between diary and autobiography, the historical person responding to the contingency of the moment and the artist constructing his life, saying the things he should have said. He wrote until he died.

The autobiographical form of the collection, more than anything else, made Du Fu's biography the essential ground from which to consider his poems. While this has become the standard way to approach a poet in China, it was not so in the Tang. The biographies of some poets are credible; others are based on serial conjecture. Du Fu's biography, however, has a level of detail that is approached only by the poet who sought to write even more poetry than Du Fu — Bai Juyi (772–846). Even in Bai Juyi, there is a specific year — at a time when he was closely engaged with Du Fu's poetry of social protest — when his poems begin to be organized chronologically. We do know that the scholarly chronology of "life and writings," the nianpu, had its origins in the second half of the eleventh century, in chronologies of Du Fu and his other devoted admirer, Han Yu (768–824).

Du Fu's biography can be done in a few paragraphs, in a chapter, or in the three volumes of Chen Yixin's Du Fu pingzhuan (Critical Biography of Du Fu). When we reach that final stage, in Chen Yixin's three volumes, we realize how deeply Du Fu's poems are embedded in history, which we know from substantiating bits and pieces from other sources. It is important, however, to recognize that Du Fu's canonical status in the Chinese poetic tradition is based on an intuition of how his poems are embedded in history rather than the substantiation we find in Chen Yixin's great work. An "intuition" is different from certain knowledge, but it makes readers yearn for certain knowledge, even when it is as impossible to have as it is necessary for the nuance of the poem.

The lesson we learn from this is not that we can ever fully know the context of certain poems — anyone who has read the scholarship knows how often we have two or more competing and equally plausible interpretations for the same lines. The lesson is rather that the poetry called for and engendered a passion for philology grounded in empirical history, the larger meaning appearing only through what those lines meant in that particular historical context. Du Fu has many universal lines — and those are often quoted — but there are other beguiling lines that made readers want to know what the words meant in that context at that time. Perhaps only Du Fu will ever know; perhaps even Du Fu did not know — they just seemed the right words at the moment.

The long tradition of biographical contextualization of Du Fu's poetry is perhaps why William Hung presented his prose translations of Du Fu's poetry in a biographical narrative. The purposes of a complete translation and a critical biography are very different, but in the case of Du Fu some supplementary information is often useful in understanding a poem. Many poems contain "original notes," often assumed to be by Du Fu's own hand. Indeed some such notes — such as one that identifies a person referred to in a poem as a "drinking buddy" — involve either personal knowledge or

historical knowledge that is not in extant sources and unlikely to ever have been included in any historical sources. This presumes that in preparing his poetry collection Du Fu already anticipated readers who would not know what he himself realized was necessary context. That means, in turn, that Du Fu was thinking seriously about future readership, which was not the norm in Tang poetry.

The readers of the current translation are farther from the context of Du Fu's poems than the poet himself could have ever anticipated or imagined; his own inclusion of notes invites the current translator to briefly supplement the translations so that the contemporary reader will be able to make sense of a poem. Sometimes such supplementary context will be given in a few lines after the poem; sometimes, when involving particular lines, it will be provided in footnotes. The general principle for footnotes in the text is to provide necessary information for understanding the text and the current translation. When there are problems of interpretation that might invite other translations, these are addressed in "Additional Notes" in the Supplement.

The Business of Poetry

My great-grandfather's sister
was your great-grandfather's mother.
Before your ancestor became eminent
she [my great-grandfather's sister] became the
wife of the [future] minister [your great-great-grandfather]. (23.22)

No other Du Fu poem begins with a banality as memorable as this, yet this is part of the social "business" of poetry, establishing a relationship with the recipient — in this case, a family relationship going back to the founding of the Tang — through which the poem happens.

In reading Du Fu's complete collection we see much of the business of poetry in the Tang. The reader who retains that lofty sense of "Poetry" from the Romantic tradition may be horrified. But there is much to enjoy here. When a friend is appointed to an official position, he is congratulated; when a friend is demoted or exiled, Du Fu commiserates. He writes obsequiously to men in power asking for help — but like no other Tang poet he also writes: "I force myself to be amusing when serving my patrons" and tells of the client's life in the dust of the patron's carriage and dining on "dregs of goblets and cold roasts." He says goodbye to departing friends. This is the usual business of Tang poetry, but there is more everyday "business" than has survived in other contemporary poetry collections; and we do not know if Du Fu simply preserved verses that others discarded or if he had an expanded sense of poetry in the everyday. No one else, setting up a household, has poems begging for fruit trees and crockery. No one else writes irritated poems when promised grain does not arrive on time or the usual vegetable delivery is substandard. No one else celebrates a bamboo piping system that brings water from a mountain spring into his kitchen or the construction of a chicken coop. Chinese critics wax ecstatic about Du Fu's "realism," but they do not mention these poems that are just too realistic, the persuasively "realistic" voice of a very cranky old man making his complaint about bad vegetables into poetry.

The presence of a significant number of such poems in Du Fu's collected works makes us wonder what Du Fu was doing. A poetry collection — whether edited by a friend, a family member, or the poet himself — was a way of presenting oneself to society and to posterity. Some later Tang poetry collections seem to try to foreground all the famous people the poet knew and with whom he exchanged poems. Du Fu was on very good terms with several Tang princes and prominent political and

cultural figures, and we have those poems. But then we have "Meng of the Granaries Section Comes on Foot to Give This Old Man Full Pots of New Ale and Bean Sauce". Meng was a minor functionary in the local bureaucratic establishment of Kuizhou and a friend. Du Fu's role in Kuizhou was the resident cultural figure, writing documents for the court-sanctioned loyalist warlord in charge of the local army and attending parties for passing dignitaries. Perhaps Meng thought that he might get a poem for a gift of a pot of bean sauce and a pot of ale — and he did. It is not surprising that Du Fu wrote such a poem; what is surprising is that he kept it among his poems so that it miraculously survived to the present day, with nine centuries of erudite commentary. Perhaps Du Fu had come to think of his poetry differently from other poets.

This is in no way a critical commitment to "literary realism," either in the nineteenth century mode or in the socialist variety. European "realism" invents the "real" through representation and idealization. Du Fu is much closer to diary and attention to what happens. When that enters the reflective regime of poetry, it is sometimes versified diary, sometimes merely "doing social business," and sometimes the greatest poetry in the Chinese tradition — allowing that all three can occur simultaneously. If, returning to his cottage near Chengdu after an extended period, Du Fu finds that his boat had sunk under the water and rotted, it leads to thoughts about what the boat had meant to him, whether the enabling means of future travel down the Vangzi to the idyllic Southland or simply the means by which to sail around nearby Chengdu and poetically speculate on such a journey. This is diary, which, through Du Fu's singularly ironic self-reflection, becomes great poetry.

Du Fu praises patrons in the common way: their ancestry, their superior nature, the certainty that a high court appointment is inevitable and soon to appear. Perhaps the most remarkable thing is that he finds new ways to praise. Du Fu's praise of his patron Van Wu in Chengdu is displaced into a peasant neighbor expressing his gratitude that his son, in military service, has been released to help with seasonal farm work.

> Turning his head, he pointed to his oldest boy: "He is a master with the crossbow.
> His name is on the light cavalry registers, his term is long in permanent service.
> A few days ago they released him for farm work saving my decrepit body from bitter hardship.
> I'll do corvee labor and pay my tax until I die, and I swear that I won't run away with the family." (11.2)

This is praise in a very different key from the usual themes, and praise that a devoted senior servant of the empire would surely appreciate. Du Fu touches on perhaps the most pressing issue for the dynasty that other poets rarely mention. Under constant pressures of taxation to support the bloated military, peasant families were fleeing their land and diminishing the tax base, which put an increasingly unbearable burden on the peasants who remained. Du Fu knows that there is no greater praise for the regional military commissioner than an old peasant's promise not to flee his land in return for the grace of temporarily releasing his son to help him bring in the harvest.

It is the quotidian that makes the sublime possible in Du Fu's poetry. Later poets sought the sublime or the quotidian without understanding how much they need each other.

> From old friends with fat salaries letters have ceased coming,
> my children, constantly hungry, have forlorn complexions. (9.28)

These lines are from one of Du Fu's Chengdu poems before Van Wu arrived to take military and political control of the province, providing Du Fu with a stable income by putting him on his military staff. The Chinese poetic couplet always asks us to see the relation between lines. There is little subtlety here: the letters from friends represent potential patronage, which will feed him and his family. Characterizing those "old friends" as having "fat salaries" deserves some consideration. Sentiment is clearly subordinated to utility here; friendship is not simply a natural feeling — though it is always represented as such — but also utility. Du Fu had many friends who were no use at all, and he sustained those friendships. He saw friends who could support him differently.

Du Fu was not much use for anything but writing poetry — but since he was, arguably, China's greatest poet, that is enough. On other levels his sympathy for the suffering of common folk redeems him to some degree, but his political judgments were often misguided, naïve, and biased in favor of his friends. The times needed men with political acumen or the capacity to take action. Du Fu had neither. He had no comprehension of the political balances necessary to preserve the tottering empire. The secretarial post he briefly held in Huazhou seems to have been the appropriate level for his bureaucratic abilities, and he resented the work deeply.

He expected to be supported by others, "old friends with fat salaries." He frequently admitted that he was lazy and not good at managing his affairs — which was true. He seems to have risen to the status of a competent small "gentleman farmer" in Kuizhou, but he gave that up to go chasing friendship and the illusory prospects of better patronage farther down the Vangzi in Jingzhou.

Like other poets, Du Fu used poetry to maintain his social network, and to keep in touch with friends found in Chang'an and later in his life scattered throughout the empire. He received great practical benefit from some of these connections, most notably Van Wu, whose military position permitted him to appoint his own staff. In Chengdu Du Fu was appointed to that staff, and returning to Chang'an for court business, Van Wu acquired for Du Fu his honorary appointment in the Board of Works that served him well for the rest of his life. Du Fu writes to each of his social contacts in kind, drawing on his impressive repertoire of voices: a light-hearted quatrain to ask for pottery, fulsome congratulations to friends for promotions (reminding them that he supported them when he was in court and they were not), answering poems to Wang Wei's (701–761) close friend Pei Di in the then dated style that Pei Di shared with Wang Wei, praising military men for their bravado. There was a range of registers from which to address different individuals in different situations. But nowhere does Du Fu present more problems for the reader of translation than in his long regulated poems (pailü) in the "high style." Most of these — with some famous exceptions — are addressed to people in his network. They can often be recognized by the number of footnotes required to make sense of them and by the designation in the title of how many couplets they contain. In some cases he sends these to two recipients, "A" and "B," filled with couplets whose lines implicitly refer to "A" then "B," or "B" then "A." Even the minimalist annotator has to explain to whom Du Fu was referring.

As with any discourse in social relationship, style adapts to the particular relationship. An easy intimacy is sometimes appropriate, even for those who hold great power over your fortunes. Du Fu often wrote with (deferential) intimacy to his patron Van Wu, when he was alive. When he died, Van Wu was treated in the "high style." Though hard to read now, the "high style" was much loved in the Tang, with a dignity that cultural change largely erased in Chinese poetry in the Song dynasty; the appeal oof that

style is even harder to recover in the present. It is good, at least, to remember what it meant: it was public honor.

Du Fu's Fate

Not only was Du Fu not considered a major poet in his lifetime, he was not a major poet by the standards of his own time. During the last dozen years of his life, when the vast majority of his poems were written, he was out of the social network within which the poetry then most admired was being written. Even if his poetry had been widely known, such neglect would be no surprise: he was writing poems of a kind that no one could then quite knew what to make of. He could sometimes play the game of social poetry with supreme confidence, but his was a talent that also often spilled over and transgressed the decorum of the occasion or the group. One of his most famous poems is "Climbing the Pagoda of Ci'en Temple with Various Gentlemen" (2.9); three other poems from the same occasion have been preserved. Those three other poems are finely polished and, despite some fine flourishes in Cen Shen's poem, utterly predictable. Du Fu's poem is brilliant, but totally out of tune with others.

Through the period of his service in the court of Suzong (r. 756–762), he was part of a court community, and much of his work was stabilized and contained by the community; that community diminished later, and he was often writing largely in isolation. He was in the provinces, but not among the literary circles of Jiangnan, where so many poets had taken refuge. The young poets of three or four decades later were weary of polish; they wanted someone who stood out with genius, and they found that in Du Fu. Eventually his poetry became a standard in relation to which other poets were judged; and when that same standard was turned on Du Fu's own poetry, it was self-evident that he was the greatest of all poets.

The earliest testimony to his posthumous reception is the preface to Fan Huang's "Anthology," written in the decade after Du Fu's death. Here Fan Huang tells us that Du Fu's collection was circulating in the Hubei and Hu'nan region, but the full collection was not yet known by "Easterners," i.e., the literary communities in eastern Jiangnan, primarily modern Jiangsu and Zhejiang. According to Fan Huang, the "Easterners" know only Du Fu's "playful topics and amusing discussions," but "do not know that he had compositions in the manner of the 'Great Odes' [of the Shijing], which made him unique in contemporary times." We have no evidence of Du Fu being read in the capital until 794, when young Yuan Zhen (779–831) got hold of a collection of "several hundred poems" and read them with great admiration.5 In the two following decades Du Fu was elevated to preeminent status by the major Mid-Tang writers Bai Juyi, Yuan Zhen, and Han Yu.

Esteem is one thing, and popularity is another. While Du Fu was referred to with admiration and sometimes imitated throughout the ninth century, he was far from the most popular contemporary or earlier poet. The esteem in which he was held is confirmed by his first appearance in an extant Tang anthology, at the head of Wei Zhuang's (836?–910) Youxuan ji from around 900. A small selection of his poems is followed by a selection from his older contemporary Li Bai (701– 762?), with whom his name had been paired since the early in the ninth century. Wang Wei, whose work had headed an earlier anthology, was relegated to the third position.

In the first part of the Song dynasty, from 960 through the first half of the eleventh century, the dominant literary period of the Tang was not the "High Tang," but the Mid- and LateTang. Bai Juyi retained a lasting popularity among some groups and was, arguably, the foundation of the emergent Song

poetic style. Han Yu's prestige as a master of prose and a culture hero was steadily on the rise. The admiration of Du Fu by these two great Mid-Tang masters was the foundation of Song interest in Du Fu, combined with the new literary scholarship that was trying to piece together the Tang literary legacy from surviving manuscripts.

The subsequent canonization of Du Fu in the eleventh century went far beyond anything that happened earlier. In the context of emergent ethical concerns, associated with but not limited to the rise of Neo-Confucianism, Du Fu became the great "Confucian poet," the "sage of poetry," the "poet historian," and the very embodiment of loyalty to the dynasty and moral engagement. He was also the learned poet, for whom "every word has a source," and became the model for writing regulated verse. By the end of the eleventh century he began to attract imitators, who modeled their own poetry on his example, and at least by the twelfth century he began to attract commentaries on an unprecedented scale. In the vastly expanded print culture of the twelfth and thirteenth century, there were a large number of editions, of which only a few survive. There were certainly more editions of Du Fu in the Song than there were anthologies of Tang poetry.

Du Fu's canonical status has remained largely unchallenged to the present day. In part this was inertia; in part this was due to the variety of his collected poems, which could be selected to serve very different interests. Poetry manuals of the late thirteenth and fourteenth century used Du Fu poems as the model by which to teach regulated verse, a tradition continuing in later critical editions that selected only his regulated verse. His poems were the model for socially engaged poems; in dynastic crisis his poems were the model of how to bear poetic witness. By the eighteenth century we begin to see some critics growing weary of Du Fu's iconic status, but Du Fu has retained his preeminence in the tradition to this day. At least one famous mid-twentieth intellectual championed Li Bai; but however much Li Bai was always loved, Du Fu always remained Du Fu. His iconic modern image on an anthology cover has provided recent Chinese adolescents the possibility of a vast repertoire of visual parody.

It wasn't Du Fu's fault that he was turned into this. As Yuan Zhen observed already in the early ninth century, Du Fu's genius was his inclusiveness, his variety. The advantage of having the complete works is discovering how many, very different images of Du Fu there are.

The Tang

It is not possible here to give a full account of the political and social institutions of the world in which Du Fu lived, but these can confuse, even bewilder the most devoted non-specialist reader. Even the reader who has a good understanding of modern and late imperial China will find certain aspects of the Tang strange. The watershed is the great An Lushan Rebellion that began in late 755, though changes in the huge Tang military establishment laid the groundwork for the rebellion, and the consequences continued to unfold even after the rebellion was nominally put down. The earlier and basic political order of the civil bureaucracy had worked with a pool of qualified candidates to make civil appointments throughout the empire. This pool of candidates came from various sources, including the "literary" civil service examination (jinshi) and hereditary qualification, given to the eldest children of high-level civil servants, the "Yin" or "shade" privilege. After qualification, appointments were made by the complicated and highly politicized "Selection" (xuan) process. These were appointments either in the central government bureaucracy, or on the prefectural (zhou) or county (xian) level in the provinces. The

imperial center was constantly promoting, demoting, and "exiling" (i.e. appointments to unpleasant prefectures and counties), with the result that officials had to be continually moved around.

From its beginning of the dynasty the Tang had military threats from the Turkic confederations to the northwest. The rise of Tibet and the Nanzhao kingdom to the south, combined with border wars with the peoples of the northeast required a strong military. By the time of Du Fu's earliest extant poems, the Tang had already expanded deep into Central Asia.

Whether the armies in Central Asia and fighting in the northeast were the product of mad military adventurism or a legitimate need to protect the empire's borders against continuing foreign threat is a matter of debate. The consequence, however, was a hard military shell to the north of a largely demilitarized center. In the decades preceding the rebellion, these armies had become increasingly professionalized, often with the appointment of non-Han generals and large contingents of non-Han, "permanent service" troops. The regular reassignment of generals was replaced by more or less permanent appointments. The result was almost inevitable: when the long-term, non-Han general in command of all the northeastern armies revolted, the center fell with shocking ease.

Tang authority, badly damaged, was eventually reasserted. In the process, however, much of the core of the empire was militarized, which resulted in a two-tier administration. Each of the regional armies constituted a "Circuit" (dao ^), which included many prefectures. The circuit was roughly the equivalent of later provinces in size. The army was commanded by a military commissioner (jiedushi), formally appointed by the emperor. The military commissioner had the power to make appointments to his "staff," bypassing the usual recruitment procedures of the civil administration. After the An Lushan Rebellion the degree of loyalty to the emperor varied, as did the ability to win the allegiance of the regional armies. In the most uncontrollable regions the armies themselves might insist on appointing their general, sometimes hereditary. In the more "loyal" provinces the emperor appointed the military commissioner, the commanding general. Far more important than the commander, the armies themselves became local; even when officers and troops came originally from the outside, their interests were iden tified with the region. These armies were often restive.

Take the case of Du Fu's patron Van Wu, who commanded the two circuits into which modern Sichuan was divided. In early autumn of 762 he was recalled to court for the installation of the new emperor Daizong ^^ (r. 762–779). Summoning military commissioners to court was one way the imperial government tested the loyalty of its military commissioners — and many did not go. Van Wu, however, was a loyal servant of the empire and followed orders. No sooner did Van Wu go to Chang'an than one of his generals rebelled in Chengdu, the capital of western Sichuan. Although the rebellious general was soon killed, the troops continued to wreak havoc. At this point we find Du Fu departing Chengdu for an extended tour of then peaceful eastern Sichuan. Since troops had blocked the difficult passes over the mountains to Chang'an, it took a long time for Van Wu to return to Chengdu and restore order. Only then did Du Fu decide to return to Chengdu.

Although the center was supposed to be in charge of appointing prefects, in this new world of instability and local armies overseeing many prefectures, the old system of central control was complicated and compromised. A military commissioner could have a large say in who was to be the prefect of one of the prefectures under his command. A loyal local strongman with a small army could be confirmed as prefect by the central government.

The fiscal consequences for the empire should be obvious. There was now a very expensive military layer in between the central government and its tax base in the prefectures. The central government had to essentially give up hope of ever getting taxes from the northeast, once its richest source of income. Funds were constantly needed for military operations and for the bloated bureaucracy; largesse was needed to keep the regional armies loyal; the tax base was in many places squeezed to the point of breaking; peasants would leave their land in search of greener pastures, placing an even greater burden on those that stayed. And we should not forget that Du Fu was, from his Chengdu years on, was feeding off that system, largely idle except for writing poetry.

Text and Editions

The scholar of Tang literature ignores the textual sources at his or her peril. With perhaps the unique exception of a part of Xu Hun's (c.788–c.854) collection initially preserved in autograph in the Southern Song for the poet's calligraphy, none of our current literary texts can be traced to an authorial "original." Bai Juyi's extraordinary efforts to leave depository copies of his works is the case next closest to authorial "intention," and our current version of his collected works seems to basically follow the one he made, even if variants were introduced in the transmission process. Quite apart from the textual variants that inevitably arise in serial recopying, very many Tang poetry collections seem to have been copied selectively in the Tang, Five Dynasties, and early Northern Song. Song editors, seeking "complete" editions, were commonly faced with different versions of a Tang poetry collection, with varying degrees of overlap, but with many poems that were unique to each particular version. The "complete" collections that were recompiled in the Song drew from one or more of such partial collections and pieces included in anthologies. Du Fu's collected poetry, as it took shape in the Song, was based on various partial collections in circulation.

The text of Du Fu's poetry is a unique variation on the usual issues that arise in the transmission of Tang literature through manuscripts into the Song, to scholarly editing and appearance in print, and on how those editions have been transmitted into the versions we now possess. Du Fu differs from less famous Tang poets in the remarkable degree of editorial attention he received beginning in the 1030s. Such attention led to the recovery of more manuscripts, more editions, and more editorial work. All in all the works of Du Fu probably have benefitted more from such attention than they have suffered from it; however, Song and many later editors uncritically preferred the "easier reading"; and deeply held convictions about Du Fu both as a person and as a craftsman seem to have deeply influenced textual decisions and spurred emendation. Behind those decisions among variants, the Song practice of speculatively correcting the text to reflect what Du Fu "must have written" was common, as some Song editors knew and deplored. Once Du Fu entered the hands of the booksellers in the Southern Song, there was an immense marketing advantage of numerous "new and improved" editions. Moreover, Song printers were not always careful proofreaders. What remains is a handful of those Song editions, some complete and some partial, some Song imprints and some recut or recopied, some scholarly and some popular.

In contrast to Bai Juyi's literary collection, the original version of Du Fu's collected works had been lost by the Song. The oldest edition still in circulation in the Song was Fan Huang's Du Fu xiaoji (Anthology of Du Fu) in six scrolls, with 290 poems, completed in the decade after Du Fu's death. In the Song a very brief encomium (zan ^) by Di Zundu is attested as having been attached to Fan Huang's anthology. Fan's preface is, however, attested for the first time only in the 17th century, in Qian Qianyi's (1582–1664)

Jianzhu Du gongbu ji, presumably through the Wu Ruo edition. A number of variants represented by readings in the Fan Huang "Anthology" are mentioned in the earliest Song editions. While these should be taken seriously as indications of what was included in the "Anthology," we should always keep in mind that this collection was no less vulnerable to manuscript variation than other editions of Du Fu. There are many variants from the Fan Huang anthology given in the older sections of the "Songben". (Song edition) and the Guo Zhida edition (more on these two editions later). Because of the uncertainties in the transmission of the Fan Huang anthology itself, these have only the authority of early variants; these variants, do, however allow us to know which poems were included in the anthology.

Apart from the handful of poems in Wei Zhuang's Youxuan ji and those mentioned as having been included in Tangshi leixuan li (probably mid-ninth century), the earliest extant corpus of Du Fu's poems of considerable size is in the poems included in Wenyuan yinghua (987), and to a much smaller degree, in Tangwen (completed 1101). The texts of Du Fu's poems in Wenyuan yinghua, a huge, imperially sponsored "anthology" of the literary collections in the imperial library, often differ from the texts in the various Song editions of Du Fu's poems; and while that massive manuscript also suffered the vagaries of copying, its readings are earlier, sometimes clearly superior, and must always be taken seriously.

The state of the manuscript legacy of Du Fu's poetry in the early eleventh century is best represented by a bibliographical note by Su Shunqin from 1036. Su saw three manuscripts, let us call them "A," "B," and "C": B had three hundred poems that were not in A, which was probably a larger manuscript; C had eighty poems contained in neither A nor B. It is not surprising that two large manuscripts would have so many poems in one that were not in the other (and Su does not tell us how many poems in A were not in B). What is surprising is that C, a smaller manuscript, had eighty poems in neither A nor B. We can only conjecture the situation if Su Shunqin had found ten manuscripts.

For all the Song scholarly dissatisfaction with printed editions, imprints had a level of relatively consistent dissemination that left even the best old manuscripts in oblivion. All Song editions are ultimately traced to the manuscript edition made by Wang Zhu (997–1057), with a postface (houji) dated to 1039. This contained 1405 poems in eighteen fascicles (juan), with two fascicles of other writing. A note in the postface to his edition lists Wang's sources:

> An old edition in two fascicles; the Shu edition in twenty fascicles; an "abbreviated collection" in fifteen fascicles; the "Anthology" with Fan Huang's preface in six fascicles; twenty fascicles with Sun Guangxian's preface; the "Shaoling Collection" with Zheng Wenbao's preface in twenty fascicles; another "Anthology" in two fascicles; Sun Jin's single fascicle; three fascicles of various pieces.

The first two printings of the Wang Zhu edition were by his son Wang Qi in 1059, reportedly in a print run of ten thousand (impossible with a single set of blocks). Here we must mention the Wu Ruo edition of 1133. This was the edition that Qian Qianyi claimed to have owned (in some version) and used as the basis of his commentary on Du Fu. It unfortunately was burned up with the rest of Qian Qianyi's library. In the preface to his Dushi yinde, William Hung argued strenuously that this edition was a fraud. Most modern scholars, on better evidence, credit both Wu Ruo and Qian Qianyi's edition — Zhou Caiquan suggests that Qian may have had a later reprint of the Wu Ruo edition. Qian Qianyi's edition held great prestige in the Qing, and many of the editorial choices reflect Qian's choices — which may or may not represent the Wu Ruo edition.

This comes to what does survive and its relation to Wang Zhu's edition. We have a composite edition from the early Qing, now known as the "Song edition." This is a seventeenth-century Jiguge construction, primarily based on two related early Southern Song editions, with some lost pages filled in from other editions. The small number of supplementary pages have been stripped of commentary, but the two predominant sources are without commentary, which is unique among extant Song editions, suggesting scholarly interest in the text per se and gesturing back to the Wang Zhu edition. One of these two editions cites variants from the manuscripts Wang Zhu used in preparing his edition; since it cites other, later sources for variants as well, it is clearly a later version. The other primary component does not cite the sources for its variants. There is scholarly debate regarding what these editions are — perhaps Wang Zhu with additional variants, perhaps Wu Ruo — but they are both probably among the earliest editions and closest to Wang Zhu.

Next we must consider Guo Zhidás Jiujia jizhu Dushi). The original 1181 edition has been lost, but the 1225 edition (perhaps changed) survived into the Qing. We currently have it most commonly through the manuscript copy in Siku quanshu (which is not always reliable). This was based on a now-lost Song edition in the palace collection; another Song edition, missing some juan and pages, was preserved in the library of the great bibliographer Huang Pilie and was reprinted in 1981. This also sometimes indicates the sources of variants, though less comprehensively than the few fascicles of the "Song edition" that give the manuscript variants. Guo's preface, moreover, addresses the issue of enthusiasts altering Du Fu's text without evidence; and while Guo himself says he fixes "errors," he is clearly interested in preserving what he considers the best text. Collating the poems shows that, while there are differences, the Guo Zhida readings generally are in accord with the two texts that comprise the "Song edition," while there are some striking differences from later Song commercial editions. The relative textual agreement between the two components of the "Song edition" and the Guo Zhida edition suggests that they all come from the same textual lineage.

Some mention should be made of the best Song commentary, the Xinding Du gongbu gushi jintishi xianhou bingjie by Zhao Cigong completed sometime between 1134 and 1151. Twenty-six of the original fifty-nine fascicles survive. As important as the commentary is, Zhao Cigong's edition was based on an earlier edition with frequent Song conjectural readings, to which Zhao added his own conjectural readings. The differences can be seen not only in the surviving fascicles, but also in the readings implicit in Zhao's commentary, which was extensively quoted by Guo and other, later Song commentaries.

I have based my text primarily on "Song edition" and the Guo Zhida edition, with consideration of earlier texts such as Wenyuan yinghua and Tang wencui. I note variants in these texts in my final notes, sometimes adding interesting variants from other early editions and Qiu Zhao'ao's Du shi xiangzhu (1703). Here we need to stress the obvious: the fact that Wenyuan yinghua, the Guo Zhida edition, and the two components of the "Song edition" may agree on a reading is no guarantee whatsoever that this is what Du Fu wrote. It is simply as close as we can come to the manuscript tradition and to a time before scholars were willfully changing Du Fu's texts. We have enough occasions when they are obviously correct — using a term otherwise appearing only in Tang texts rather than a term used in both Tang and Song texts — that we can have confidence that they are sometimes right.

Sometimes the variants give us an insight into a Du Fu rather different from the conventional image. In Du Fu has been brought a gift of bunches for fresh Chinese chives (jiucai). Du Fu praises the chives and at the end concludes:

In my waning years, my viscera are cold,
they taste warm, and I have no more worries at all. (8.18)

This seems bland enough, but the variants are interesting: the "Song edition" offers a variant fu ^, "stomach" or more vulgarly "belly" for bing; Guo gives the variant fu "also". The reading bing ("all together," translated as "at all") is odd. Taken together, the two variants, however, give us a clue to what possibly happened.

First we note a technical term of Chinese medicine, guanli "viscera." Tang poets very rarely use the technical vocabulary of Chinese medicine, and the term guanli is used nowhere else in extant Tang poetry. This tells us that the term would have stood out as an oddity to Tang readers. This goes in conjunction with the "cold" and "warm," then as now, standard terms in Chinese medicine. In this context let me suggest that the "Song edition" variant reading of fu (biuk) is correct. This is a play on registers, moving from the technically medical to the everyday:

In my waning years my viscera are cold,
they taste warm, my belly has no more worries.

It is easy to conjecture what happened. Radicals of characters were often omitted or exchanged, so a text might read A copyist could easily miss the joke and take the more common reading fu Fu has two readings: bhiuk meaning "return," and bhiòu meaning "also." By the period of copying (10th–11th century) the initials of bhiuk and biuk were collapsing, so it may have been a misunderstanding of sounds. The problem is that fu in the sense of "return" would be very awkward ("return to no worries"), and anyone reading the text would naturally take it as: "and again (bhiòu) I have no worries." The problem then is that in Middle Chinese this would be the painfully cacophonous bhiòu mio qiou. If it were biuk mio qiou ("belly without worries"), it would be perfect, since an entering tone in the third position of the eighth line of a five-syllable regulated verse was very common. Such cacophony begged repair, and a rough synonym for fu (bhiòu), "also," was bing (bieng).

This may not be what happened, but the conjecture brings to the fore many of the issues at work in the production of variants: texts that either do not use radicals or the proper radicals for characters, homophones and near homophones in the period of copying, the avoidance of cacophony, and semantic variation. In the process a witty line becomes a bland line. I do not know if this was the case in the lines cited — we can never know for certain — but it vividly illustrates what "could have happened." <>

THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF EARLY CHINA by Elizabeth Childs-Johnson [Oxford Handbooks, Oxford University Press, 9780199328369]

THE OXFORD HANDBOOK ON EARLY CHINA brings together 34 scholars to provide a comprehensive and up-to-date survey of archaeological, textual, palaeographic, metallurgical, philosophical, religious, and art historical research on China from the Neolithic through Iron Age periods, ca. 7/6000 BCE to ca. 300 BCE. To date, there has been no systematic or comprehensive study of ancient Chinese archaeology and art, in contrast with the extensive literature on "imperial China," which began with the Qin and Han dynasty, ca. 250 BCE and thereafter. Early China experienced momentous phases of development—heretofore unknown or inadequately described—including, for

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Review

"In focusing on early Chinese civilization, this handbook is unique ... **THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF EARLY CHINA** fills a niche for those needing a detailed focus on early Chinese civilization." -- R. Withers, *CHOICE*

"This handbook is unique.... [It] fills a niche for those needing a detailed focus on early Chinese civilization." -- *CHOICE*

"Authoritative and multidisciplinary in scope, this landmark volume offers a comprehensive overview of the latest research trends, paradigms, and approaches in the study of early China, from the Neolithic era to the Warring States period." -- International Convention of Asia Scholars Book Prize, 2021, Accolades in the Humanities

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I am glad to have the opportunity to bring 34 authors together for a joint project to put early China on the map of ancient world cultures from an interdisciplinary perspective. Too often, surveys of early China have been narrowly focused on anthropological/ archaeological, historical, or literary/paleographical subjects, without the benefit of a broader cultural perspective. Many recent books on early China in English have tended to take a strictly anthropological/archaeological point of view; examples include Campbell 2014 (appeared 2016), Shelach-Lavi 2015, Underhill 2013, and Liu and Chen 2012. Others take a specialized approach to regional studies (e.g., Flad 2011; Flad and Chen 2013; Liu 2004; Liu and Chen 2003; Shelach-Lavy 1999, 2009; Underhill 2002). There have been fewer general histories (including social and cultural history) of the whole time span of early China; see Major and Cook 2017 and Feng Li 2013. Others are comprehensive in outlook but more restricted in time, such as Feng Li on the Western Zhou (2006, 2008) and Xiaolong Wu on the Warring States—period site of Zhongshan (2017).

Anthropological and archaeological studies usually are limited to questions concerning the beginning and rise of civilization, or hierarchies of settlements with a particular culture. Historical studies often concern specific events at the expense of broader context. What has been lacking, to date, is a coordinated, multidisciplinary approach focused on the period before the establishment of imperial rule, encompassing the whole span of time from the Neolithic through Eastern Zhou eras, ca. 5000-250 BCE. This long era was the nursery of Sinitic culture, laying the groundwork for practices, beliefs, and traditions that extended into later periods. Thus, to fill this void in publications about early China we have gathered together various specialists from different disciplines to produce both introductory essays and essays that focus on specific issues in each one of the six chronologically successive eras covered (Neolithic, Xia/Erlitou, Shang, Western Zhou, Springs and Autumns, and Warring States). Thus, for example, introductions to the Neolithic include one covering the north and one covering the south. One author takes a chronological approach (Early, Middle, and Late phases of the Northern Neolithic) and another analyzes the Southern Neolithic from the point of view of advances in the arts, agriculture, and settlement patterns.

Our goal is to present up-to-date material in a multivarious universe that casts new light on our understanding of early China. Due to archaeological discoveries of the past 30 to 40 years, increasingly rich data in terms of new texts and new material finds from tombs and settlement sites have profoundly enhanced our picture of early China and its cultural achievements in multiple directions. We need to emphasize that this early theater is mainstream China, the major pacesetter for modern China and its belief systems and cultural markers.

Our approach is multidisciplinary in covering fields of archaeology, anthropology, art history, architecture, metallurgy, literature, religion, paleography, cosmology, prehistory, and history. The material covered is analyzed chronologically, beginning with the Neolithic and ending with the Warring States era of the Eastern Zhou period. The northern Neolithic in chapter 1 by Andrew Womack is analyzed in terms of Early, Middle, and Late phases, whereas the southern Neolithic from the same time period (7/6000-2000 BCE) is analyzed according to new and major cultural issues, such as the appearance of rice agriculture and plows, patterns of increasingly formalized settlements, and advanced handicrafts. This approach is exemplified in chapter 2 by Xianming Fang, who describes the artistic style of Songze as "open and liberated" due to the evident humor of, for example, wild boar sculptures that are both naturalistic and symbolic.

What is completely new to the late phase of the Neolithic is what I, in earlier publications, have termed the Jade Age, a period from ca. 3500-2000 BCE during which jade was exploited as a material possessing particular religious and socio-political power. Reinforcing this concept of the Jade Age in the present volume are three analytical essays. Chung Tang and colleagues focus on the earliest (5000 BCE) production of slit Jade earrings in the Xinglongwa culture in the northeast (chapter 3). The creation of jade earrings gave rise to a cultural trait that was to characterize China both past and present—a reverence not only for the beauty and quality of jade but a belief in jade's intrinsic spiritual power and related properties. In chapter 4, I continue the focus on jade by analyzing why three major overlapping cultures exploiting jade (Hongshan, Liangzhu, and Longshan/Erlitou) are responsible for catalyzing civilization in the East Asian Heartland. Two regional studies follow, the first by Bin Liu in chapter 5 on the site of Mojiaoshan in Yuhang, Zhejiang—the richest culture in the evolution of the Jade Age; and the second by Nu He in chapter 6 on the site of Taosi in Shanxi, on the outskirts of the Sinitic world in this era but pivotal to novel advances within the Jade Age time frame. Bin Liu explains why Mojiaoshan may be a "capital" of the Liangzhu civilization—a concept with which many scholars may not agree—but also why the same site may be described as a "water city." Bin Liu, the leader of excavations at the site, describes the most advanced early system of water control in its time and a feat of hydraulic engineering, designed with 51 inner and outer city rivers and streams, most of them man-made but others natural, either tunneled or dammed, surrounding a palatial enclosure encompassing some 3 million square meters.

The Neolithic site of Taosi in Linfen, Shanxi, is equally dramatic due to what has been excavated and examined in detail as an outdoor center for astronomical observations. Nu He, the primary archaeologist directing excavations at Taosi, conjures up a cosmological system of Taiji dualism at Taosi as revealed by excavations of the rammed-earth solar observatory along with later textual data. He illuminates a solar-lunar calendar and Four Directions cosmology based on other unique discoveries, including a lacquered gnomon shadow template and a copper disk with 29 teeth he identifies as a small "moon wheel."

The Erlitou culture or Xia dynasty remains a historical enigma. The site of Erlitou was discovered as early as 1959 but, as of today, there has still been no resolution about the culture's historicity other than abundant archaeological data without any discovery of writing. The debate about whether or not the site is the Xia-dynasty capital of Yu the Great or a late Xia king cannot be resolved by presently available information in the complete absence of inscriptional evidence citing Xia or its alleged rulers. These matters are reviewed in the introduction to the historiography of "Xia" in chapter 7 by Hong Xu. Yet innovative advances in archaeology, as amplified by Xu, show that by the end of the Longshan period, independent walled cities began to lose their turbulent independence in favor of what Xu calls "breaking away" in forming stable settlement complexes, incorporating and integrating other surrounding settlements, as represented at the site of Xinzhai, transitional between Longshan and Erlitou. Erlitou emerged as the most stable city-state, bringing a full stop to warring factions and developing a core government and culture ca. 1750 BCE that is equivalent to "Earliest China" and the first state and civilization.

The other chapters in the Erlitou/Xia section focus on finds identifying new and stunning cultural achievements. Hong Xu and Xiang Li clarify in chapter 8 why Erlitou is the earliest territorial state and capital settlement in Chinese history by describing major archaeologically revealed features and the reach of the Erlitou culture. The metallurgist Yu Liu analyzes the bronze-casting revolution together with Hong Xu in chapter 9, which led to the beginning of the Bronze Age in China. He also presents documentation of the variations in chemical composition of bronze and how the singular technology of piece-mold casting worked during the Erlitou period. The chapter on the Erlitou yazhang [zhangj jade blade with dentated handle, although first published in 2015 in Chinese by Chung Tang and Fang Wang, is considerably updated and revised in chapter ^^. Citing the extensive presence of zhang not only throughout the East Asian Heartland but also beyond its frontiers, Tang and Wang show why the Erlitou yazhang was a material symbol of political order and why this jade blade may be used to define primary states such as Erlitou and Erlitou's influence on competitive states in south China.

The fourth section is devoted to Shang-period topics and new data that help to characterize the period culturally. Jonathan Smith with Yuzhou Fan introduce the culture and history of Shang and oracle bone inscriptions in chapter ii, commenting on their origin and historical significance and offering new interpretations for their periodization, an issue that has plagued the field for years. Guoding Song provides in chapter 12 the latest archaeological data for identifying early Shang finds at the Shang cities of Zhengzhou and Yanshi, in addition to neighboring early Shang city sites, such as Dongxiafeng, Fucheng, and Wangjinglou, and middle Shang cities at Huanbei, Xiaoshuangqiao, and Xingtai in Hebei. Changping Zhang introduces in chapter 14 new data for understanding bronze-casting technology during the late Erligang through Yinxu periods (ca. 1600-1056 BCE), which during the Erligang period were mainly adjustments in balancing bronze vessel attachments and positioning blind cores. The growing complexity of mold divisions by the Late Shang period leads to new casting in the form of a composite mold set and the introduction of casting-on and precasting techniques. One of the most important sources of archaeological and inscriptional data of the Late Shang period came with the discovery of the intact tomb of Fu Zi (Fu Hao). Dingyun Cao presents in chapter 16 a detailed analysis of inscriptions on burial objects found in her tomb, M5 at Xiaotun, and her divinatory texts mentioning her and her relations. She was the first queen of King Wu Ding and produced his first heir, Small King Fu Ji. In my own chapter 131 provide new interpretations for certain architectural structures, such as she altars and pyramidal mounds, leading to a new periodization of those structures at the late Shang capital, Yinxu at Anyang in

Henan. Separately, in Chapter 15, I expound on new data for Shang belief systems, characterized by a common belief in spirit metamorphosis, exorcism, and royal ancestor worship. "Yi" is the Shang oracle bone term for this system of belief. Metamorphosis is a concept directly reflecting the ritual image of the metamorphic power mask—an ancestral spirit power characterized by human and wild animal attributes and standardized conventions of representation.

Strides in ironing out the grooves and ridges in Western Zhou historiography are presented in the introductory chapter of this next phase in Chinas Bronze Age. In chapter 17 Maria Khayutina introduces primary sources; legendary origins; surnames and marital relations; proto-Zhou ceramic chronologies; relations with Shang before, during, and after the conquest; and various accounts defining "Western" Zhou history, the chronology of kings, and political doctrine. She is careful to point out what is known and what is not known about the Western Zhou historical period of ca. 1046-771 BCE. She also makes a point of differentiating Chinese titles and kinship terms from names by italicizing the former throughout her chapters (e.g., Zhou Bo: Zhou is a name and bo is a title/ kinship term).

Nicholas Vogt follows this historical introduction in chapter 18 by analyzing the major characteristics of government and social organization of the Western Zhou period. In developing his analysis, he employs representative transcriptions and translations of inscriptions on ritual bronze vessels. Among these complex and difficult-to-translate inscriptions (e.g., He zun, Mai fangzun, Xiao Yu ding) several noteworthy trends in ritual and political control are identified: rites as concepts of "ritual assemblies;' "nexus ancestors;' "persuasive royal strategies;' and the "relaying of royal rites through bronze [inscriptions]." Although scholars may not agree entirely with his conclusions that early Zhou ritual contrasts with the character of Shang ritual, that hypothesis may only be justified by a close comparison of the two. In turn, Constance A. Cook addresses rites and mortuary practices in chapter 19 by considering data from both archaeological excavations and texts and bronze vessel inscriptions. She observes the gradually increasing emphasis in Zhou vessel inscriptions on de ft (translated as "virtue" or "morality" when referring to Confucian texts of the late Warring States and subsequent imperial times) as something originating from Shangdi and Tian bestowed on the first Zhou king as a form of lineage authority and cosmological power. De may be understood as a "source of life energy and political authority," complemented by ostentatious rites and coercive displays that recognized Zhou power.

Yan Sun's chapter, 20, is devoted to another aspect of ritual bronze evolution, focused less on inscriptional data and more on stylistic change and changes in ritual bronze assemblages during the Western Zhou period. Although she employs mainland Chinese views of inscriptions as historic documentation for a chronological sequence—an approach that many scholars outside of China find unhelpful—she incorporates the latest archaeological data to bring this field of art up to date. Scott Cook presents a superb survey of the many aspects of music and instruments present during the Western and Eastern Zhou eras in chapter 21. He introduces not only archaeological data, instrumental types, and assemblages (various types of bells, chime stones, drums, winds, and strings) but also musical theory, musical practice, musical philosophy, and musical institutions.

Scholars contributing articles to the next phase of Zhou history, the Springs and Autumns period, include Yuri Pines covering not only history but historiography and intellectual developments as well and Wu writing on art and its achievements in chapter 24. Pines in chapter 22 assesses the very convoluted and complex history of the multistate system during the Springs and Autumns period, ca. 770-453. He presents a nuanced and accurate portrayal of what he describes as one of Chinas "deepest systemic

crises;' covering the rise and fall of a multistate order, an account of ethnocultural identities (e.g., peoples known as Chu, Rong, or Di), the rise of hereditary ministerial lineages, capital dwellers as political activists, and finally "cultural unity at the age of fragmentation." In a following chapter 25 Pines treats the study of history as represented by two primary Springs and Autumns texts, the Springs and Autumns Annals (of the Lu state) and one of its commentaries, the Zuozhuan. Although Pines states that the former "may well compete for the designation as the most boring and the least inspiring of Chinese classics;' he explicates why the two historical texts are so different: one is based on flavorless, ritually correct "Zhou-based hierarchal rankings" and the other is "the fountainhead of traditional Chinese historiography." A distinctly aristocratic outlook and a multistate order with a ministerial-lord rulership replaces monarchic rule. Xiaolong Wu tackles the overwhelming excavated data for the numerous states of the Springs and Autumns era in chapter 24, producing in some cases exquisite works of art and in others more mundane works. He divides his study into five geographical sections, describing and tabulating the five areas and their chronologies.

A team of ^^ distinguished scholars address Warring States issues (ca. 453-221 BCE) with fresh and invigorating approaches. Topics range from historical background, reform, and individual philosophers (e.g., Mozi and Confucius) to the rise of iron-working, novel architecture and art, and military arts; and from the position of "shi ±," urbanization, capitals, and population records to Chu religion. Wencheong Lam introduces this era in chapter 26 by sorting out what we know and do not know about how iron-working (iron technology, bloomery iron, and iron-casting) flourished during the Warring States period. His major points revolve around the three most powerful states of Jin (Han, Wei, Chao), Qin, and Chu and their differing contributions based primarily on archaeological evidence along with textual evidence about iron technology during this revolutionary era of change and reform. He is able to reach a preliminary conclusion that iron-working was probably more advanced in the Chu state despite the lack of discovery of any iron foundry in capital areas of Chu. Yuri Pines follows this introduction in chapter 25 by highlighting the historical and related events of competing "her^-states,' providing textual and paleographic sources (or lack thereof) and employing the year 453 BCE as the starting point of Warring States history, since it was then that the state of Jin dissolved into Wei, Han, and Zhao. As background to the history of the multi-state system he analyzes, for example, the decline of the Wei state and the "ephemeral alliances" between Qin and other rival states. His account of peripatetic persuaders (youshui) who could find themselves "serving Qin in the morning and Chu in the evening" helps document the unprecedented geographic and social mobility of the era. His second contribution to this section of the book, chapter 27, relates to institutional reform and reformers, especially as seen in the career of the Warring States Qin diplomat, Shang Yang. Pines takes Qin as exemplary of the new socially mobile yet heavily bureaucratic direction the state and later imperial Qin would take. Aided by the reforms of his adviser Shang Yang, Pines outlines how the lord—later king—of Qin eliminated the hereditary aristocracy, created military conscription for all, and created an "agro-managerial state:'

In addition, other scholars document new aspects of political, military, and economic reforms of the Warring States period. Charles Sanft presents archaeological evidence in chapter 28 for the multiplicity of many state capitals and their need for double, fortified walls. He follows this with new data from written texts about population registries—something that appears unique to this era; he provides concrete examples of new administrative controls, translations of Chu governmental "ledgers" (dian), and registries of households (hu) from Liye, Hunan. Next he documents ritual oaths (shi V); the swearing of covenants (meng); and tallies (fujie), "a class of objects that served as official symbols of

authority and authorization over a long period in premodern China, typically in contexts of military command, diplomacy, resource control, and movement through passes and gates." Albert Galvany analyzes a different aspect of Warring States history in chapter 29—the army, military arts, treatises on military affairs (including of course the most famous military text in Asia, Sunzi's Art of War), and warfare itself. Galvany outlines major features of innovative change expressed by: (i) "the rise of instrumental rationality" and a "new total warfare"; (2) "the decline of the warrior and emergence of the commander (the demise of the aristocratic warrior and his traditional values coincides with the emergence of the figure of the strategist or commander)"; (3) "the essential of discipline;' explaining that "[w]ith the introduction of armies consisting of peasant masses, the art of warfare confronted one of its most delicate and decisive tasks: transforming a shapeless and anarchic mass of peasants lacking any trace of a military tradition into an orderly and compliant organism ready to execute"; (4) "the art of deception," metaphorically represented by water; and (5) "from economic awareness to the idea of deterrence: the art of non-war."

The next part of the Warring States section features "[sjocial, intellectual and religious transformations." Andrew Meyer opens this section on "the shi class, diplomats, and urban expansion" in chapter 30. With engaging anecdotal description, Meyer documents the rollercoaster ride of the so-called shi class of "knights;' the rise of diplomats, and the rapidity of commercialism and urbanization that took place during this disruptive but peripatetic age. Particularly insightful is his contextualization of the literary shi figure, Su Qin, "who is said to have brokered his own rise to the prime ministerial seat of six states simultaneously... and stopped the advance of Qin and brought down the throne of Qi in the third century BCE:' Moss Roberts, a senior scholar of classical Chinese literature, profiles and reviews six thinkers of this age in chapter 31: Confucius along with his later disciple Mencius, Mozi, Laozi, Zhuangzi, and Han Feizi. Casting Confucius as one who organized a graduate school of political management focusing on the junzi (ideal man) who espouses virtue and intellect, Roberts contrasts this with his disciple Mencius, who re-envisions his ideals in emphasizing the significance of human nature (xing), the seedbed of renyi (benevolence and righteousness). Xunzi was "an institutionalist and a structuralist" hovering between Confucianism and Legalism. Han Feizi was Mencius's opposite, an anti-Confucianist in favor of Legalism and the concept that "Dao is what gave birth to Law" As Roberts points out, the Dao for Laozi negates ancestral authority in subjecting it to the authority often thousand things (wanwu), which embodies a "law" that the Dao must follow. Zhuangzi totally rebels in favoring a oneness with nature, negating the hierarchical social identity so critical to Confucius.

Vincent Leung (chapter 32) and Carinne Defoort (chapter 33) both address the philosopher Mozi or Master Mo, famous in his day but relatively little-known today. Defoort identifies three historic steps (Warring States, imperial periods, and twentieth century) for understanding Mozi and his association with jian ai variously translated as "universal love" or "impartial caring." The idea of "inclusive care" gradually evolved with the writing of the book Mozi. In the second phase, Han classicists used the works of Mencius to support Confucius's values of humaneness and righteousness and relegate Moism to the status of a heterodox theory. That view lasted through the early imperial period until the Tang dynasty, as reflected in "Reading Mozi" by Han Yu (768-824). The rise of jian ai in the post-imperial era is primarily tied to Sun Yirang's magnum opus on Mozi in 1893, along with translations by James Legge, and to the developing modern ideology of Sun Yatsen (1966-1925), a Christian Democrat who elevated Mozi to one of the sages of the world. Vincent Leung, on the other hand, introduces us to new values of Mozi, hidden in what Leung describes as his "etiological method" of writing—his toolbox for analysis of

the "etiology of disorder." Mozi says there are "three criteria' to test truth—a forerunner of inductive and deductive reasoning involving invocation of past leaders and sages (good doctors who knew what needed to be done and did it). Yet for Mozi moral principles were not human constructs but a fact of the cosmos: the source of all moral principles is Tian (Heaven). Mozi, as pacifist and antiwar hero and promoter of meritocracy, impartiality, and universal love, perhaps provides instruction for today's world in such matters as universal healthcare, preservation of the natural world, and the cessation of war.

Two chapters, one by John Major and myself (chapter 34), the other by Jie Shi (chapter 35), round out this section on the Warring States with an analysis of Chu religion and art, and of the revolution that characterized all arts of this period, respectively. Major and Childs-Johnson categorize Chu religion as one probably based on a Sinified version of shamanism, probably linked with Shang belief and practice. Jie Shi divides his chapter according to artistic, macro, and micro categories, beginning with cities, palaces, funerary parks, and tombs, followed by the arts of bronze, jade, lacquer, and textiles, and ultimately an analysis of figurative and pictorial art. Everything created seemed to be new and huge, such as the palatial complex of Fangying Terrace No. 1 (Fangying tai R), which featured a multi-terraced structure, surrounded by endless courtyards and galleries, rising to 23 meters; another example is the palatial palace at Xianyang (Palace Complex No. 1) where another new type of building called guan (literally "building for overlooking") is preserved alongside a novel suspended bridge that once connected two large-scale terraces. The micro arts are equally novel and revolutionary, exploiting new secular interests and new artistic techniques as represented by the lost-wax and welded bronze set of zun and pan shapes from the tomb of Marquis Yi of Zeng, splendid and sculpturally exquisite in their decor of numerous tiny S-shaped dragons densely packed into an intricate composition of openwork on vessel rims.

It is with great pleasure that I offer this rich collection of cutting-edge research on pre-imperial China in one volume, the Oxford Handbook on Early China.

Elizabeth Childs-Johnson, July 20, 2017 <>

Origins of Moral-Political Philosophy in Early China: Contestation of Humaneness, Justice, and Personal Freedom by Tao Jiang [Oxford University Press, 9780197603475]

- Tells a dramatic and often unexpected story about early Chinese moral-political philosophy through a new interpretative framework that brings to light a new arc and dialectic of its development
- Explores tensions in the works attributed to Confucius, Mozi, Mencius, Laozi, Shang Yang, Shen Dao, Zhuangzi, Xunzi, Han Feizi and others, to understand what motivated early Chinese thinkers
- Brings together Sinological and philosophical research of the last several decades
- Structured in such a way that readers can choose to engage the part of the book that interests them most

This book rewrites the story of classical Chinese philosophy, which has always been considered the single most creative and vibrant chapter in the history of Chinese philosophy. Works attributed to Confucius, Mozi, Mencius, Laozi, Zhuangzi, Xunzi, Han Feizi and many others represent the very origins of moral and political thinking in China. As testimony to their enduring stature, in recent decades many Chinese intellectuals, and even leading politicians, have turned to those classics, especially Confucian texts, for alternative or complementary sources of moral authority and political legitimacy. Therefore, philosophical inquiries into core normative values embedded in those classical texts are crucial to the ongoing scholarly discussion about China as China turns more culturally inward. It can also contribute to the spirited contemporary debate about the nature of philosophical reasoning, especially in the non-Western traditions.

This book offers a new narrative and interpretative framework about the origins of moral-political philosophy that tracks how the three normative values, humaneness, justice, and personal freedom, were formulated, reformulated, and contested by early Chinese philosophers in their effort to negotiate the relationship among three distinct domains, the personal, the familial, and the political. Such efforts took place as those thinkers were reimagining a new moral-political order, debating its guiding norms, and exploring possible sources within the context of an evolving understanding of Heaven and its relationship with the humans. Tao Jiang argues that the competing visions in that debate can be characterized as a contestation between partialist humaneness and impartialist justice as the guiding norm for the newly imagined moral-political order, with the Confucians, the Mohists, the Laoists, and the so-called fajia thinkers being the major participants, constituting the mainstream philosophical project during this period. Thinkers lined up differently along the justice-humaneness spectrum with earlier ones maintaining some continuity between the two normative values (or at least trying to accommodate both to some extent) while later ones leaning more toward their exclusivity in the political/public domain. Zhuangzi and the Zhuangists were the outliers of the mainstream moral-political debate who rejected the very parameter of humaneness versus justice in that discourse. They were a lone voice advocating personal freedom, but the Zhuangist expressions of freedom were self-restricted to the margins of the political world and the interiority of one's heartmind. Such a take can shed new

light on how the Zhuangist approach to personal freedom would profoundly impact the development of this idea in pre-modern Chinese political and intellectual history.

Reviews

"Tao Jiang has provided a coherent and sweeping narrative of the development of moral and political philosophy in the classical period of Chinese philosophy. He integrates many plausible insights gleaned from sinology and philosophy to argue provocatively that the classical period can be understood in terms of a struggle to deal with conflicts between the values of humaneness (pertaining to the personal and familial realms) and of justice (pertaining to the political realm). This book is highly recommended both to specialists and to those with a more general interest in Chinese moral and political philosophy." -- David Wong, Duke University

"Tao Jiang in this hugely intelligent monograph provides his readers with an interpretive context twice. First, his project of rehearsing the story of the origins of Chinese moral-political philosophy is located within a state-of-the-art account of the politics of the Western academy and the best efforts of its Sinologists and philosophers to make sense of the complex textual narrative of pre-Qin China in all of its parts. Again, appealing to a cluster of seminal themes—humaneness, justice, and personal freedom—he recounts the way in which different philosophical voices advocated for their own disparate and competing models of structuring and construing personal, familial, and political relations within the overarching context of what are fundamentally different valorizations of the notion of Heaven." -- Roger T. Ames, Peking University

"Jiang ranges over the entire foundational period of Chinese philosophy with effortless erudition, unfailing intellectual sympathy, and, above all, a brilliantly economical conception that shines a uniquely revealing and integrating light on all the major figures and schools of thought. The result is that rare kind of book which has the potential to change the way Chinese philosophy is viewed and practiced, and has all the scholarly and philosophical attributes that should make it a classic in due course." -- Jiwei Ci, The University of Hong Kong, and author of *Democracy in China: The Coming Crisis*

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Excerpt: Contestation of Humaneness, Justice, and Personal Freedom

In this book I use the categories of humaneness, justice, and personal freedom to remap the intellectual landscape of classical Chinese philosophy and to recast the narrative of its origins. For the purpose of this book, I will employ thin or baseline definitions of humaneness, justice, and personal freedom in order to, on the one hand, schematize what I see as competing normative values operative in the moral-political project during the classical period while, on the other hand, leaving room for variations on these broad underlying values among different inherited texts and the thinkers they are attributed to.

Accordingly, humaneness is understood in this book as the moral norm that is agent/recipient relative, namely our natural inclination to be partial toward those who are close to us, especially our family/ kin members; justice is defined here as the moral norm that is agent/ recipient neutral, namely our exercise of impartial judgment on the merits of persons and states of affairs, especially in lieu of articulated and publicized standards and codes, irrespective of their relations to us. In other words, humaneness is partialist in nature, whereas justice is impartialist. Humaneness is understood in relational terms, whereas justice is non- relational by contrast. More importantly, precisely because of the relational nature of humaneness, agent and recipient cannot be switched or substituted, whereas in justice agent and recipient are switchable and substitutable. Personal freedom is understood as the appreciation and cultivation of personal space wherein one can be left alone and enjoy the company of like- minded friends without being entangled in the sociopolitical world.

The terms of humaneness, justice, and personal freedom are used in this book more as organizing frameworks to bring these ideas into the contemporary discussions of Chinese philosophy, rather than terms "with one-to-one correspondence in Chinese" (Ing 2017, 10). Therefore, these terms play an interpretative role in this book, working to "not only accurately describe the texts but also to render them intelligible within contemporary discourses" of Chinese thought. Needless to say, I am writing about early Chinese philosophy, but for a contemporary audience in a way that produces new understandings and opens up new possibilities for contemporary philosophical engagement without misconstruing the native terms and the conceptual apparatuses in those texts.

I make three key points in retelling the story about classical Chinese philosophy. First, the central intellectual challenge during the Chinese classical period was how to negotiate the relationships between the personal, the familial, and the political domains (sometimes also characterized as the relationship between the private and the public) when philosophers were reimagining and reconceptualizing a new sociopolitical order, due to the collapse of the old order. Consequently, philosophers offered a dazzling array of competing visions for that newly envisioned order.

Second, the competing visions can be characterized as a contestation between partialist humaneness and impartialist justice as the guiding norm for the newly imagined moral-political order, with the Confucians, the Mohists, the Laoists, and the so-called fajia thinkers being the major participants, constituting the mainstream intellectual project during this foundational period of Chinese philosophy. In this connection, it is especially important to see the fajia (often translated as Legalist) thinkers, often marginalized in the standard narrative about classical Chinese philosophy, as central players instead of as an embarrassing anomaly, as they have often been portrayed. That is, those fajia thinkers were grappling with the same tension between partialist humaneness and impartialist justice in their effort to negotiate

the intractable relationship between the familial and the political, similar to other mainstream thinkers during the classical period.

Third, I argue that Zhuangzi and the Zhuangists were the outliers of the mainstream moral- political debate who rejected the very parameter of humaneness versus justice in the mainstream discourse. Zhuangzi and the Zhuangists were a lone voice advocating personal freedom. For them, the mainstream debate about humaneness and justice was intellectually banal, morally misguided, and politically dangerous.

Humaneness and Justice

The clearest expression of the partialist humaneness in the classical context was the famous Confucian moral-political paradigm, known as the cultivation-regulation-governance-pacification (xiu qi zhi ping, hereafter XQZP) model, most succinctly articulated in the Great Learning (daxue). The XQZP model integrates the personal, the familial, and the political domains through cultivating one's personal virtues (xiushen), regulating the family/ kin (qijia), governing a (feudal) state (zhiguo), and bringing peace to all under the Heaven (ping tianxia). In fact, the classical moral-political debate can well be seen as a series of efforts to defend, modify, critique, or repudiate this XQZP ideal, even among the Confucians themselves, with thinkers lining up differently in their efforts to engage various aspects of this moral-political model.

The XQZP ideal is based on two premises, both of which were challenged during the classical period. First, politics is grounded in or derived from moral virtues of political actors. Second, XQZP is extensionist in nature, operating on the assumption of a seamless continuum between the personal, the familial, and the political domains. In many ways, this book is a study of the classical moral- political debate wherein ancient Chinese philosophers examined all of the constitutive parts and their relationships in the XQZP ideal. I will argue that the operating moral principle in this Confucian moral-political model, in its attempts to accommodate the familial/ private and the political/ public domains, is humaneness that is partialist in its orientation. Furthermore, in the norm of humaneness, framed primarily in relational terms, agent and recipient are not switchable or substitutable due to the particularity of relations involved.

Against the XQZP model and its operating norm of partialist humaneness was the ideal of impartialist justice, most forcefully represented by the Mohists, the Laoists, and the fajia thinkers under different, but sometimes overlapping, conceptual and ideological registers. In the classical Chinese philosophical context, justice was heavily tilted toward impartiality, understood as the non-discriminatory treatment of people and the state of affairs by applying the same standard and code, irrespective of their status or relationship with the moral, political, or legal authority. Justice is framed in non- relational terms in the classical Chinese philosophical context, which means that within the framework of justice the agent and the recipient are switchable and substitutable, pointing to the impersonal and impartial nature of justice.

The concept of justice has had an overwhelming importance in the history of Western philosophy, with philosophers from Socrates to John Rawls deliberating its meaning, nature, scope, and relationship with other values. I will not be able to engage the infinitely rich and complex Western discourse on justice in this book, as it is not meant to be explicitly and thematically comparative. Instead, I will limit the use of the term "justice" to a relatively "thin" content so that it can be more easily adapted to the classical Chinese context. More specifically, I will highlight the aspects of impartiality, objective standards, and

agent/ recipientneutrality, especially in the engineering of an elaborate state bureaucracy, when articulating the operative principle of justice in the classical Chinese context that includes a cluster of concepts like impartiality (jian), impartial care (jian ai), public or fairness (gong ^), and standards or legal codes (fa), etc.

It is important to note that both humaneness and justice are universalist values. The distinction between them, in the classical Chinese debate, had to do with whether or not differential treatments accorded to a family/ kin member and someone unrelated could be justified and on what ground, especially when the two treatments were in conflict. What was the proper way to treat our family/ kin members when they were at fault was at the heart of the contestation between humaneness and justice in early Chinese philosophical discourse. From the perspective of humaneness, impartialist justice can be inhumane since it flattens all our relationships and disregards the critical differentiations among those relationships that are constitutive of who we are as humans; however, from the perspective of justice, partialist humaneness can be unfair since it favors those recipients who are close to the adjudicating agents of the state and it breeds nepotism in politics under the pretense of humaneness.

Tensions between the Familial/ Private and the Political/Public

The contestation between partialist humaneness and impartialist justice can be seen in terms of the clash of norms that govern the familial/ private and the political/ public domains. That is, if we take humaneness as the default governing norm in the familial domain and justice in the political, the key issue in the disputation among classical philosophers was this: should there be an overarching norm that governs both the familial and the political domains? Classical Confucians, with important variations and tension among them notwithstanding, leaned toward exploring humaneness as the unifying norm to encompass both the familial and the political domains; on the other hand, we see a powerful development in the justice wing of Chinese moral- political philosophy that questions the value or relevance of humaneness in political governance, with the Mohists separating the familial and the political domains and focusing heavily, though not exclusively, on the political, and the fajia thinkers privileging the political while denigrating the familial as often antithetical to or even subversive of the interest of the state.

In this respect, two famous anecdotes would help to put into sharp focus the wide gap in moral sensibility between classical Confucians and Mohists. The first anecdote is from the Analects (Lunyu ^^), a record of sayings and teachings traditionally attributed to the historical Confucius and some of his disciples:

> The Duke of She said to Confucius, "Among my people there is one we call 'Upright Gong' (Zhi Gong). When his father stole a sheep, he reported him to the authorities."
> Confucius replied, "Among my people, those who we consider 'upright' are different from this: fathers cover up for their sons, and sons cover up for their fathers. 'Uprightness' is to be found in this." (Analects 13.18, Slingerland's trans.)

The second one is recounted in The Annals of Lü Buwei (Lüshi chunqiu), a large collection of texts that was composed and compiled toward the end of the Warring States period under the patronage and supervision of Lü Buwei (d. 235 BCE), a prime minister under the young Yingzheng, the king of Qin who would unify China in 221 BCE and become the first emperor:

> The Mohist leader Fu Tun resided in Qin. His son murdered a man. King Hui of Qin said, "You, sir, are too old to have another son, so I have already ordered that the officials not execute him. I hope, sir, that you will abide by my judgment in this matter."
> Fu Tun replied, "The law of the Mohist order says: 'He who kills another person shall die; he who injures another shall be punished.' The purpose of this is to prevent the injuring and killing of other people. To prevent the injuring and killing of other people is the most important moral principle in the world. Though your majesty out of kindness has ordered that the officials not execute my son, I cannot but implement the law of the Mohist order." He would not assent to King Hui's request and proceeded to kill his own son.
> A son is what a man is most partial to. Yet Fu Tun endured the loss of what he was most partial to in order to observe his most important moral principle. The Mohist leader may properly be called impartial. (Knoblock and Riegel 2000 trans.,75, with slight modification)

These two narratives, to the extent they represent typical Confucian and Mohist moral instincts, vividly capture two drastically different moral sentiments and the underlying principles of humaneness and justice, respectively.

However, before we hasten to characterize the moral norms embraced by the Confucians and the Mohists based on the preceding two anecdotes, as illuminating as they might be, let us take a look at yet another famous passage that is also attributed to Confucius and has been enshrined by the Confucian tradition, exhibiting a rather different moral sentiment from the Upright Gong passage in the Analects:

> When the Great Dao prevailed, the world was just. People were selected for their virtues and talents, and people were trustworthy and good- neighborly. Therefore, people did not only treat their own parents as parents, not only treat their own children as children. The elderly received proper care toward the end of their lives, the physically strong were properly employed, the young were brought up properly, widowers, widows, the parentless, the childless, the sick, and the disabled were all properly provided for. Men had their professions while women had their families. People loathed to leave wealth wasted and unused, and yet did not have to store them in private; people loathed to leave their strength unused, and yet did not have to exert it to serve themselves. Therefore, scheming was thwarted before it could develop; theft, robbery, rebellion, and betrayal did not arise, therefore one left home without closing the door. This was Grand Unity. Nowadays the Great Dao has fallen into obscurity, the world is treated as a matter of family inheritance. People respect only their own parents, caring for only their own children, horde wealth and exert strength for their own benefit.

This is from the famous Liyun Chapter of the Book of Rites (Liji), the Confucian classic of rituals whose canonical status was evident in its inclusion as part of the Five Classics (wu jing) in the Confucian tradition— or, more appropriately, the state- sponsored official learning— during the Western Han dynasty in late second century bce. Liji was likely compiled, from independently extant ritual texts, and redacted in the Han dynasty, even though much of its content dates back to the Warring States period or even earlier. The authorship and dating of Liyun, one of the most famous chapters of the Liji, has long been a topic of intense debate among scholars. The contemporary consensus is that it was an evolving text through the hands of generations of Confucians from mid- Warring States period to Western Han. What interests me is how Confucius is portrayed, regardless of its accuracy in representing the historical Confucius.

In the passage, Confucius is seen as offering a rather detailed description of a lost golden age, a utopian Grand Unity (datong), when the Great Dao (dadao) prevailed in the world and lamenting its decline in

his own days. In the passage, gong, which literally means public, is used as the opposite of family (jia). The contrast is clearly drawn between what is impartial and what is partial, hence my translation of gong as "just." It is striking that the ideal(ized) world described here does not give priority to one's own family at all, in sharp contrast with the Upright Gong story in the Analects. Rather, the idea of justice is front and center in this Liyun passage.

The contrast in the moral sentiments expressed in the Analects and Liyun passages is rather striking. In the Analects passage, Confucius is adamant about the priority of family relationship over other considerations, and he defends the family relations and interest even at the expense of other people adversely affected by the actions of one's own family members. However, in the Liyun passage, we find another Confucius, who laments that very prioritization of family interest over the broader sociopolitical order expressed in the Analects passage. Instead, the Confucius in the Liyun passage recalls (or more likely imagines) a world wherein the young and the old were properly taken care of, irrespective of the relationships involved. In such a world, family relationship did not enjoy a privileged status. This implies that what constituted an ideal world for the Confucians evolved from the fifth century, the time of the Analects, to the third century bce, the time Liyun was compiled.

An obvious question is this: what happened during the years that separated the Analects passage from the Liyun passage? The Mohists, who represented the most serious challenge to the Confucian moral-political project during the classical period, could have come up with a similar depiction of the ideal society touted in the Liyun chapter. We will see that during the intervening period the Confucians engaged in heated and often fierce debates among themselves, as well as with their intellectual peers, most notably the Mohists and other less organized thinkers, especially the Laoists and the so- called fajia thinkers. It is highly possible, even likely, that the Mohist (as well as the Laoist and the fajia) challenges contributed to the evolution of the Confucian imaginaire of an ideal society as a result of the vigorous intellectual cross- pollination during the classical period.

Changing Conceptions of Heaven and Its Relations with Humans

One fascinating component of this story about the origins of Chinese moral-political philosophy is the fact that changing conceptions of Heaven and the evolving relationships between Heaven and humans were at the heart of much of the philosophical disputation. In this connection, there were roughly speaking two different understandings of Heaven during the classical period: caring/ anthropocentric and indifferent/ naturalist. Confucius's and Mozi's thoughts were operating under a Heaven that cared about and was involved in human affairs. In the excavated bamboo- slip texts that have given us some rare glimpses into the world between Confucius and Mencius, we find a Heaven that, while still in charge of the world, was increasingly naturalized in terms of both its constancy and its capriciousness. In Mencius's thought we can see an intense struggle to hold on to the idea of a caring Heaven, but the hold was rather tenuous, as Mencius was rather critical of Heaven for its failure to bring forth a sage who could save the chaotic world. This tenuous hold and the increasing naturalization of Heaven would eventually give way to a radically new idea of Heaven that was indifferent to human affairs, and the paradigmatic figure here was Laozi. In Laozi's thought we can see a Heaven that is completely detached from care for human well- being. Most of the best- known thinkers from the mid- to late Warring States period, such as Shen Dao, Zhuangzi, Xunzi, and Han Feizi, shared the Laoist view of Heaven.

However, we also witness some rather drastically different proposals about how humans should respond to the Laoist conception of Heaven among the last group of thinkers. Laozi still advocated sagely emulation of Heaven, similar to Confucius and Mozi, even though the Laoist Heaven was indifferent to human affairs, unlike the Heaven of Confucius, Mozi, and Mencius. By contrast, Xunzi elevated the ancient sage- kings to be the partners of Heaven (and Earth), instead of simply being its followers or emulators, and made sage- kings the new foundation of the ritual system, almost in defiance of the naturalized Laoist Heaven that did not particularly care about human well- being. In the hands of fajia thinkers like Shen Dao and Han Feizi, Heaven would be further transformed from a supernatural agent to a naturalist system, and they advocated modeling a political system after such a new model of Heaven, with fixed standards and impartial enforcement of standards, laws, and regulations, so that the political system could operate like the naturalized Heaven. In so doing, they sought to reduce the role of any single person in governance, including even the ruler, who is partial to, and hence can be easily manipulated by, those in their proximity.

Personal Freedom

Against the backdrop of the mainstream moral-political discourse in early China we find a remarkable text, the Zhuangzi. One of the major challenges in the scholarship on classical Chinese philosophical discourse is how to deal with the Zhuangzi. This text is arguably the single most fascinating and unusual one in the entire Chinese intellectual history, certainly during the classical period, in terms of its unrivaled literary quality, its playful wit and humor, as well as its penetrating philosophical analysis. The Zhuangzi is simply unlike any other text, and its difference from other texts far exceeds the differences among Confucian, Mohist, and fajia texts. Although it has some resonance with the Laozi and shares the Laoist view on Heaven and Dao, the Zhuangist vision about personhood, nature, and politics is strikingly different from the Laoist one.

Such an interpretative difficulty or cognitive dissonance when dealing with the Zhuangzi has to do with our implicit but problematic assumption, seldom articulated, that Zhuangzi was engaged in the same philosophical project as everybody else during the period. However, in this book I will make the case that in order to better appreciate the singularity of the Zhuangzi, it is better to see it as engaging in the kind of intellectual project that is radically different from the mainstream philosophical debate dominated by the Confucians and Mohists and participated by many others, including the Laoists and the fajia thinkers. The mainstream moral- political project is characterized in this book as a contestation between partialist humaneness and impartialist justice as the governing norm of the sociopolitical world. Zhuangzi was skeptical and critical of such a project, deeming it as arrogant, baseless, and even harmful.

I argue in this book that the primary intellectual pulse in the Zhuangzi is its musing of personal freedom. Therefore, I interpret the Zhuangist philosophical project as that of personal freedom, unlike any of his peers during the classical period. Zhuangzi just wanted to be left alone, enjoying the company of friends and natural wonders. The Zhuangist personal freedom is framed in terms of cautiousness, or even anxiety, toward human entanglement mediated by the concern for humaneness and justice. Being wary of any political entanglement, Zhuangists are portrayed as those living at the margin of the political world or in the interiority of their heartminds, even though we also find cases wherein certain Zhuangist paragons lived in the midst of the political world, aided by their extraordinary discernment and skills. As such, the Zhuangist personal freedom is ultimately outside the parameters of humaneness and justice that characterize the mainstream moral-political discourse in early China. This approach to Zhuangzi's

philosophy can offer a fresh perspective on the Zhuangist critique of knowledge, especially its alleged skepticism and relativism. It can also have profound implications in making sense of the project of personal freedom in premodern Chinese political and intellectual history, which I will explore briefly in the Conclusion of this book.

A Note about Translating Xin as "Heartmind"

Throughout this book, I will translate the Chinese word xin in the classical texts as "heartmind," instead of heart, mind, heart-and-mind, or heart-mind, as adopted by other translators. "Heartmind" is obviously not an English word, but a neologism coined to capture the widely shared scholarly consensus that the ancient Chinese language did not differentiate between heart and mind the way contemporary English does. Since this book deals with classical Chinese texts that are translated into contemporary English for contemporary Western readership, it makes sense to highlight the way the word xin is translated. For me, the attraction of "heartmind" as a single term is precisely its ambiguity, much like xin in different texts and contexts. Since it is not yet an extant English word, we get to define "heartmind" in such a way that runs the gamut of the emotive, cognitive, evaluative, calculative, voluntary, and whatever other functions xin performs in classical Chinese texts, with different texts leaning toward different aspects. In other words, the fact that pre-modern Chinese thinkers allowed xin to perform such a wide range of roles without feeling the need to clarify which one suggests the underlying assumption of its unity. The term "heartmind" has the added advantage of being both familiar and strange, not unlike xin in all its complexity and ambiguity in various Chinese texts through the ages.

Summary of Chapters

The central theme in the new narrative offered in this book is that the origins of Chinese moral- political philosophy can be fruitfully understood as the contestation of humaneness, justice, and personal freedom in the early Chinese effort to negotiate the relationships among the personal, the familial, and the political domains, under drastically different conceptions of Heaven and its evolving relationship with the humans. This new narrative provides an alternative paradigm on the peculiar configuration of classical Chinese philosophical landscape and helps to chart a new course in systematically presenting the motivating issues underlying much of the Chinese moral- political debate at its very inception.

The book is divided into three parts. Part I, "Humaneness-cum-Justice: Negotiating Humans' Relationship with Heaven," containing Chapter 1, is devoted to the discussion of Confucius and his teachings in the fifth century BCE. We will see that Confucius struggled with the tension between humaneness and justice in his effort to deal with the relationship between Heaven and humans, setting the stage for the subsequent development of Chinese intellectual discourse. Part II, "Humaneness versus Justice: Grappling with the Familial*Political Relationship under a Naturalizing Heaven," including Chapters 2, 3, and 4, takes on Mozi, Mencius, Laozi, and the early fajia thinkers. In all these philosophical projects, the concerns for humaneness and justice diverged, accompanied by shifting evaluations of the norms operative in the private and the public domains, as well as the increasing bureaucratization of the state. We will see that the rich and nuanced philosophical deliberations during this period unfolded under an understanding of Heaven that was naturalizing, with profound implications on the Heaven-human relationship. Part III, "Personal Freedom, Humaneness, and Justice: Coming to Terms with the State under a Naturalized Heaven," consisting of Chapters 5, 6, and 7, highlights three thinkers toward the end of the Warring States period, i.e., Zhuangzi, Xunzi, and Han Feizi. They are portrayed as representing three distinct voices, i.e., personal freedom, humane justice, and statist impartiality, as the

classical period drew to a close with the eventual unification of China under the powerful but short-lived universal state of Qin. This development in the classical moral- political philosophy was accompanied by new models of Heaven–human relationship and human agency under a completely naturalized Heaven.

In Chapter 1, I start with Confucius (551– 479 BCE), who has long been regarded as the baseline of the Chinese moral- political deliberations to which all subsequent philosophers had to respond, one way or another. Confucius endeavored to salvage the once powerful normative ritual system, whose regulative power encompassed the personal, the familial, and the political realms, by grounding it on the newly formulated idea of ren humaneness-cum-justice, the consummate moral virtue for Confucius. In so doing, Confucius laid the groundwork for the XQZP model that connects sages' moral virtues with familial regulation and political governance, even though the model itself does not appear in the Analects.

However, Confucius clearly struggled with the tension between humaneness and justice in his articulation of ren, reflected in his appropriation of familial virtues as the foundation for ren on the one hand, and his appeal to the Golden Rule in some of his iterations of ren on the other. Confucius's solution was to invoke the moral judgment of a cultivated gentleman or sage who alone could weigh the particularities of a complex situation when making decisions. Confucius's project set up the intellectual agenda for the subsequent philosophical debate about humaneness and justice, while his faith in a moral virtuoso's ability to negotiate the tension between the two normative values heightened the stake of self- cultivation in the ensuing Confucian moral- political project. In fact, self-cultivation remained a powerful premise and commitment, seldom challenged among most early texts, with interesting but also problematic consequences that I will explore in the Conclusion of this book.

The first chapter concludes with an examination of some excavated bambooslip texts with a focus on the Guodian Confucian manuscripts in order to study the state of the Confucian discourse between the time of Confucius and that of Mencius. I look into the idea of Heaven, its mandate, and their relationship with the concept of human nature, which would become central to Mencius's and Xunzi's moral-political philosophy. We will also see that the excavated texts promote the unity and integration of core Confucian virtues as a way to cultivate one's heavenly endowed nature while also signaling tensions among those virtues, indicative of the effort by thinkers to negotiate different contexts wherein distinct virtues were required.

The fermentation stage of classical Chinese philosophy would witness a full-blown exploration of the more latent tension between humaneness and justice in Confucius's moral- political project. In Chapter 2 we see the tension between humaneness and justice dramatically heightened in the hands of Mozi (and the Mohists) and Mencius, so much so that it would result in what I call "the Great Divergence" between the two values in the post- Confucius moral universe. Mozi (c. 470– c. 391 BCE) was a radical moral thinker during the classical period in his advocacy of impartial care, promotion of uniform moral standard, and rejection of differential treatment. Mozi and the Mohists were the pioneers of universal justice in Chinese intellectual history. They were the main rival of the Confucians in early China.

By contrast, I argue that Mencius (c. 372– c. 289 BCE) was more on the humaneness end of this humaneness- justice spectrum, even though the real picture is much more complex. He appealed to human nature, or incipient moral inclinations (xing), to construct a world that was more conducive to

human flourishing and advocated the ideal of benevolent governance that appealed to the humane inclinations of a ruler to be compassionate toward his subjects. Meanwhile, Mencius downplayed the role of the institution of ritual (he internalized ritual into the virtue of propriety), with the result that his project was based more on moral intuitions and sentiments than on articulated rules.

Importantly, however, we will see that although family plays an important role in Mencius's moral philosophy, its place in his political philosophy and the relationship between the familial and the political are much more complicated and ambiguous than commonly assumed. In this connection, I examine two related assumptions about Mencius's philosophy, one concerning the role of family and the other the unity of virtues. I argue that, despite his assertion to the contrary, there are indeed two roots in Mencius's philosophy, the family root and the general sympathy root. These two are sometimes in conflict within his framework, exposing a deep tension therein. To make the case, I distinguish two distinct strands in Mencius's thought, the "extensionist," which has been regarded as normative, and the "sacrificialist," which is more radical and less appreciated. While the extensionist Mencius operates on the assumption of congruity between the personal, the familial, and the political domains, the sacrificialist Mencius recognizes the conflict between the norms of humaneness and justice that govern familial and the political domains that is sometimes irreconcilable under certain circumstances, and he embraces the necessity for self- sacrifice in order to protect the familial.

Chapter 3 covers an enigmatic figure in this period, Laozi, who was the alleged author of the Daodejing (fourth century BCE). We will see that the significance of the Daodejing in classical Chinese philosophy was its radical transformation of Heaven from one that cared about and was deeply involved in human affairs to one that was fundamentally indifferent. The Daodejing signaled a dramatic shift in the philosophical discourse during the fourth century bce, what I call the "naturalist turn," supported by several excavated texts from the similar period. The corollary development of this naturalist turn was the realignment of values within a cosmos wherein the primacy of the Heaven was eclipsed by the Dao as the ultimate cosmic source. This resulted in the naturalization of justice and the rejection of humaneness within the political domain in the Daodejing. In so doing, Laozi naturalized the idea of justice/ impartiality in early Chinese moral political philosophy and completely abandoned the central ideal of ren which was promoted by both the Confucians and the Mohists, albeit under different moral and ideological registers. As a result, justice and impartiality become the Heavenly attribute, beyond the reach of human effort. In so doing, Laozi rejected the universalist projects of both the Confucians and the Mohists. We will see that later classical thinkers all had to grapple with this naturalist cosmology in their own projects, often with unexpected developments.

Chapter 4 discusses the writings of what came to be known as the early fajia (often translated as Legalist) thinkers against the background of the increasing concentration of power in the monarchy and the accelerating bureaucratization of the state in the mid- Warring States period. We look at three prominent political theorists in the fourth to early third centuries bce, Shen Buhai, Shang Yang, and Shen Dao, in this chapter. I argue that in the hands of these early fajia thinkers, classical Chinese political philosophy took a decidedly bureaucratic turn that saw the institution of the state as a domain that had its own operating principle, irreducible to other domains. They embraced the value of impartiality, first formulated and defended by the Mohists and reformulated by the Laoists, as the most important institutional virtue, and ruthlessly instituted it in the state bureaucracy, meticulously mapping the state apparatus onto the Heavenly processes such that the state apparatus could function by itself without

constant intervention from the ruler, as if it were the operation of Heaven. Such an approach to the state would bring the problem of the state to the forefront of the classical moral-political discourse.

In the culmination stage of classical Chinese philosophy, all thinkers had to confront the question of how to deal with the increasingly powerful state, conceptualized and engineered by the early fajia thinkers and politicians.

Chapter 5 deals with the first thinker in this culmination period, Zhuangzi (late fourth century– early third century bce). Zhuangzi was simply an extraordinary figure in Chinese intellectual history. His fierce advocacy for personal freedom made him the singular outlier in the moral- political projects of the classical period dominated by the contestations between humaneness and justice. He ridiculed the misguided character of such projects and warned against their potential for inhumanity and injustice, the very opposite of what was intended by the participants of the mainstream discourse. However, the Zhuangist attempt to offer an alternative framework that foregrounded personal freedom and valued pluralism was severely compromised by their aversion to a more active engagement with the state. As we will see, the Zhuangist musing about personal freedom would have a lasting impact on the subsequent development of this ideal in Chinese intellectual and political history, i.e., its marginalization and internalization, as well as its lack of institutional impact in the imagination and construction of an ideal Chinese state.

Chapter 6 deals with the last major Confucian thinker in the classical period, Xunzi (active 298– 238 BCE), whose philosophy operated on the premise of a Laoist or naturalist cosmos that did not particularly care about human affairs. Xunzi's philosophy exhibited a spirit of defiance against the naturalist and indifferent Heaven by valorizing human effort in the formation of a flourishing

human society. His philosophical project focused on revitalizing the inherited, but increasingly discredited, ritual system. For him the traditional ritual system that regulated the personal, the familial, and the political domains was the result of the cumulative efforts of generations of sage- kings in response to Heavenly patterns and conditions on the ground. Xunzi used ritual as a way to reconcile the tension between humaneness and justice by making sage- kings the cocreator of order in the human world in collaboration with Heaven and Earth. The cult of sage- kings provided critical components of humaneness in the human world under an otherwise impartial and indifferent Laoist cosmos, resulting in the norm of humane justice that is mediated by ritual in Xunzi's political thought.

Chapter 7 focuses on the last fajia thinker, Han Feizi (c. 280– 233 BCE), who was a grand synthesizer of many aspects of all classical Chinese moral- political discourse in his effort to perfect the operation of the impartialist state. We will see that his political project explicitly rejected the XQZP model by problematizing its every aspect. In sharp contrast to Xunzi's cult of sage- kings, Han Feizi sought to minimize the role of any individual person, including even the monarch. Like the earlier fajia thinkers, Han Feizi sought a model that provided the intellectual foundation for a system of impersonal and uniform bureaucratic machinery capable of dispensing reward and punishment automatically with as little interference from the ruler as possible. Even though Han Feizi's project might have been motivated by a desire to stabilize and strengthen the state so that it could survive the precarious domestic and international environment, its goal of instituting a set of impartial, transparent, and uniform administrative and legal codes and standards in governing the state, often in defiance of the interests of powerful aristocratic families, points to the principle of justice operative in his statist project.

Unfortunately, Han Feizi was not able to solve the core tension between the monarch and the monarchy, dooming his fajia project of building a lasting and impartial political order.

The book concludes by a reflection on the tragic fate of the Zhuangist idea of personal freedom in Chinese intellectual and political history. More specifically, I will scrutinize the widely shared premise of self- cultivation, what I call the "regime of self- cultivation," among most classical thinkers including Zhuangzi, and will explore its constraint on the development of personal freedom in the mainstream moral- political discourse, as well as in the building of political institutions. Interestingly, in this respect, it was the fajia thinkers who built their theories on the givenness of ordinary human dispositions, instead of on the promissory note of moral transformation. I will reflect on a path that was not taken in Chinese history, i.e., the integration of the Zhuangist idea of personal freedom into the mainstream moral-political project in conceptualizing a polity that can accommodate the ideal of personal freedom institutionally. <>

THE METAPHYSICS OF CHINESE MORAL PRINCIPLES by Mingjun Lu [Series: Modern Chinese Philosophy, Brill, 9789004503496]

In **THE METAPHYSICS OF CHINESE MORAL PRINCIPLES**, author Mingjun Lu seeks to construct and establish the metaphysics of Chinese morals as a formal and independent branch of learning by abstracting and systemizing the universal principles presupposed by the primal virtues and key imperatives in Daoist and Confucian ethics. Lu proposes that the metaphysical foundation of Chinese moral principles, as reinstated in this book, brings to light not only the universality of its core values and ideals but also a pivotal though hitherto neglected key to the enduring vibrancy of a civilization that has lasted several millennia.

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To justify his theory that moral virtues are innate in one's xin 心 (heart or mind) rather than imposed from without, Mencius 孟子 (372–289bc) cites Confucius's 孔子 (551–479bc) commentary on a poem from the Shijing 诗经, The Book of Odes:

> The Shijing says: "Heaven breeds the myriad things, / Things must follow certain principles. /Adhering to these principles, / People are fond of fine virtues." Confucius says: "The poet here really knows what the Dao is! Hence the poetic lines that 'things must follow certain principles' and people are 'adhering to these principles.' This is why they are fond of fine virtues."
> 《诗》曰: '天生蒸民, 有物有则. 民之秉彝, 好是懿德.' 孔子曰: '为此诗者, 其知道乎! 故有物必有则, 民之秉彝也. 故好是懿德.' Mencius 11.61

The word ze 则 in the second poetic line refers to the principles of things endowed by Heaven at their very inception; and the Dao 道 is the Chinese term for the law of Nature. Ze 则 thus indicates the expression of the universal law of Nature in phenomenal beings. As Confucius interprets, it is apprehension of, and adherence to, the natural principles inherent in things that leads to love of fine virtues. Endorsing Confucius's reading, Mencius holds the same view regarding the relation of virtue and the knowledge of natural principles, a view crystalized in his celebrated thesis of siduan 四端, "four moral beginnings."

The relation of moral virtue and the law of Nature as intuited by the poetic mind and philosophized by the two founding masters of Confucian ethics will be the key topic of this project. In engaging with the moral or ethical consequences of the metaphysical assumption of the first principle, this project is a necessary sequel to my book, Chinese-Western Comparative Metaphysics and Epistemology: A Topical Approach (Lu 2020), that deals with the epistemological implications of the primary cause.

The title of this book recalls Immanuel Kant's (1724–1804) Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (1785) and The Metaphysics of Morals (1797).2 Despite its revolutionary significance in Western moral philosophy, Kant's metaphysics of morals premised upon the primacy of human reason fails to address the first principles informing Chinese morals. A primary objective of this project is to reinstate the metaphysical foundation of the Chinese moral system by rereading the notions and concepts fundamental to Daoist and Confucian ethics as well as their theorization in Neo-Confucian philosophy. While Kant constructs a metaphysics of "pure reason" to serve as the foundation for morals, I seek to extract and systematize the metaphysical principles presupposed by the Chinese moral system at its very institution.

Given their shared concern with the moral claims of right and wrong, or good and evil, ethical and moral studies are intrinsically connected, though with different emphases. Where ethics refers chiefly to specific virtues and rules of conduct, moral theory is concerned with the principles underlying these virtues or rules. Since this book means to tease out the metaphysical or universal principles

presupposed by the moral maxims and injunctions informing virtuous character or conduct, I entitle it "The Metaphysics of Chinese Moral Principles." By "Chinese moral principles," I mean the fundamental principles constituting the moral system that builds out of Confucian, Neo-Confucian, and Daoist ethics. In these three different but closely related ethical traditions, moral principles take the form of either maxims, injunctions, or imperatives.

This project adopts Aristotle's (384–322bc) definition of "metaphysics" as the study of the first principle or primary cause, though I distinguish between the metaphysical and the moral first principle. Mou Zongsan 牟宗三 (1909–1995) famously proposed a Confucian "moral metaphysics" in reference to Kant's philosophy of pure reason. According to Mou (2015, 83), "metaphysics addresses the issue of existence," while "moral metaphysics addresses the issue of existence on the grounds of morality." In fact, a more precise way to put the distinction is that where "moral metaphysics" concerns the first principle in ethics, the metaphysics of moral philosophy deals with the first principle presupposed by the overall moral system and its core concepts or categories. For instance, in his Metaphysics, Aristotle calls the first principle "God" or "being qua being" (1003a33), but in his Nicomachean Ethics, he regards "happiness" as "a first principle" (1102a1). In like manner, ren 仁, or benevolence, is the moral first principle in Confucian ethics, while the law of Nature or the instantiation of this law in the xing 性, "innate nature," of phenomenal beings, is the metaphysical first principle sustaining not only ren but also its whole moral system. Given that the moral is premised upon the metaphysical first principle, I will use moral metaphysics and the metaphysics or metaphysical foundation of morals as interchangeable terms.

The Chinese moral system has evolved out of three different but closely related ethical traditions. The first refers to the ethics propounded by Confucius and further developed by Mencius and Xunzi 荀子 (ca. 310–237bc). The moral teachings of the classical Confucian masters draw on Liujing 六经, the "Six Classics" edited by Confucius, and become the basis of Sishu 四书, the "Four Books" compiled and annotated by the reputed Neo-Confucian philosopher Zhu Xi 朱熹 (1130–1200). Since the Yuejing 乐经, "The book of music," is no longer extant, the Liujing is also called Wujing 五经, the "Five Classics."7 Despite divergences over some specific issues, the core tenets in Mencius's moral philosophy, especially his hypothesis of an originally good nature, build largely on Confucius's ethics, so the two moral systems can be collectively called Confucian ethics. The Confucian-Mencian tradition is only one of zhuzi baijia 诸子百家, the "one hundred philosophical schools" that flourished in the Spring and Autumn and Warring States periods in the Zhou dynasty (1046–249bc). After it was instituted by Emperor Wu 汉武帝 in the Western Han dynasty (206–8bc) as the state orthodoxy, this tradition gained predominance and served as the moral center for Chinese until the present day, though with short periods of interruption.

In positing an evil nature, Xunzi's moral theory tends to depart from Confucian ethics, though most of his ethical views are still conceived within the Confucian framework. Given that Xunzi is the alleged teacher of such well-known Legalists as Han Fei 韩非 (280–233bc) and Li Si 李斯 (284–208bc), and considering the Daoist association of the Legalists, Xunzi is the founder of a synthetic philosophical school that integrates at once the teachings of the Confucians, Daoists, and Legalists. Though touching on Xunzi, however, the focus of this book is the Confucian-Mencian ethical tradition.

Second, the canonical status of the Confucian-Mencian tradition is inherited and reinforced by the Neo-Confucian philosophy that rose to prominence in the Song (960–1279) and Ming dynasties (1368–1644).

Neo-Confucianism boasts of two schools. One refers to lixue 理学, "the metaphysics of li or principle" championed by Cheng Hao 程颢 (1032–1085) and his brother Cheng Yi 程颐 (1033–1107) but synthesized by the philosophical guru Zhu Xi. The other, headed by Lu Jiuyuan 陆九渊 (1139–1193), is called xinxue 心学, "the metaphysics of the mind," and given a systematic representation in the philosophy of Wang Yangming 王阳明 (1472–1529).

A third key component of the Chinese moral system consists in the Daoist ethics as expounded by both Laozi 老子 (ca. 600–531bc), founder of the Daoist philosophy, and his most notable follower Zhuangzi 庄子 (370–287bc). The title of Laozi's treatise Daode jing 道德经, literally "the Dao and its Virtue," declares unequivocally the joining of morals and metaphysics. Zhuangzi, on the other hand, seeks to illuminate the Daoist principles and virtues set out in Laozi's treatise through such heightened means of representation as legendary tales, fables, or allegories. It is my contention that the ethical views expressed by both Laozi and Zhuangzi share the same metaphysical assumption of the first principle with Confucian ethics.

When East and West first came into contact in the sixteenth century, Chinese culture, especially its moral system, struck great awe and wonder into the hearts of Western observers (Lu 2016b). At the initial stage of the East-West encounter, the West knew but little of Confucian ethics, not to say its connection with Daoism. What amazed them was that this moral system sustained a civilization once contemporaneous with ancient Greece and Rome and that continued to exist alongside Western Europe with unabated vitality. How could a civilization raised up and sustained by such a moral system outlive Greece and Rome, the classical idols of Renaissance Europe? What was the secret force of the Eastern values and ideals that allowed them to rival the theological virtues propagated by Christianity?

This wonder emerged again with the miraculous renaissance of China in the modern, globalized world after about three centuries' dormancy. Within only a short span of four decades, China successfully eradicated poverty and enabled the prosperity of a large middle class. For a country without religion and not based on Western liberal or neoliberal principles, what spiritual force has the power to integrate more than 1.4 billion people in a concerted effort to regenerate, progress, and prosper? Apart from its cultural and political systems, Confucian ethics has played a vital part in ensuring the spiritual integration and social coherence indispensable to the modern renaissance of the country. Then what is the key to the longevity of China?

The vibrancy of Confucian ethics in new historical circumstances has given rise to a host of insightful studies in recent years. The burgeoning of this new interest renders it necessary to examine the metaphysical or universal principles presupposed by this moral system. In regard to the topical urgency and significance of studying Chinese metaphysics in the new historical context, Chenyang Li and Franklin Perkins well observe that:

> In the Chinese tradition, the metaphysical and the moral are always intertwined, as the status of values, the nature of the self, and conceptions of order all have metaphysical implications, if not foundations … and studying Chinese ethical theories without examining their metaphysical presuppositions risks misrepresenting moral perspectives. With the advancement of the study of, and deepening research on, Chinese philosophy in our age, confining our study to Chinese political, social, and ethical theories is no longer acceptable. (2015a, 7)

By metaphysics, Li and Perkins mean "theories regarding the nature, components, and operating principles of reality." Based on this definition, the essays in Li and Perkins's collection "focus on the metaphysical aspect of the philosophical continuum while showing how metaphysical conceptions connect to other areas of concern" (7–8).

My study shares Li and Perkins's insight that without knowledge of the "metaphysical presuppositions" of Chinese ethics one cannot get a full picture of its "moral perspectives." My approach, however, differs from that of Li and Perkins in adopting a different definition of metaphysics. While Li and Perkins conceive metaphysics as "theories regarding the nature, components, and operating principles of reality," I use Aristotle's definition of metaphysics as the study of the first principle or primary cause. It is its foundation in the first principle embodied by the law of Nature, or the instantiation of this law in the xing 性 (innate nature) of phenomenal beings, I argue, that lies at the root of the abiding vitality and relevance of a moral system that has sustained a civilization for several millennia. This metaphysical foundation also accounts for the celebrated notion of tianren heyi 天人合一, "the unity of man and Heaven," registered in Laozi's concept of xuantong 玄同, "metaphysical unity" (ch.4), and Zhuangzi's qiwulun 齐物论, "thesis of universal equality" (ch.2, 31), both of which are different ways of putting the first principle.

In claiming the relevance of Aristotelian metaphysics to Chinese moral philosophy, however, I am not evoking a Western framework to study Chinese culture. Aristotle's definition of metaphysics is adopted because it corresponds closely to the metaphysical system expounded by Daoist and Confucian philosophers. That Aristotle's metaphysics happens to find a close parallel in the metaphysical system conceived by Chinese philosophers bespeaks at once a shared concern with the first principle or primary cause and the universality of this topic. As will be shown in chapter 3, however, the shared metaphysical assumption does not necessarily lead to similar views regarding such topical ethical issues as the moral end and standard.

The Necessity of Joining Morals to Metaphysics

In his Metaphysics, Aristotle calls metaphysics philosophia prima, the "first science" or "first philosophy" that concerns wisdom or truth (1026a28–30). By "wisdom," he means "knowledge about certain causes and principles" (982a1). Since great wisdom "must belong to him who has in the highest degree universal knowledge," Aristotle observes, "wisdom is a science of first principles" (982a20–21; 1059a18). Unlike practical knowledge that concerns action, inquiry into the metaphysical first principle aims at "knowledge of the truth" (993b20–21). Metaphysical inquiry is necessary because, Aristotle explains, "we do not think that we know a thing until we are acquainted with its primary causes or first principles" (Physics 184a12–13).

As philosophia prima or the "first philosophy," metaphysics naturally becomes the root of individual sciences. It is precisely by resorting to the root-branch metaphor that Francis Bacon (1561–1626) and René Descartes (1596–1650), two famous early modern European philosophers, describe the relation of metaphysics and the branches of learning derived from it. For Bacon (2001, 83), individual sciences are "branches" that sprout from the philosophia prima. Likewise, Descartes (2006,14) compares metaphysics to "a tree whose roots are metaphysics, whose trunk is physics, and whose branches, which issue from this trunk, are all the other sciences."

As a science that deals with moral virtues or injunctions, ethics is necessarily rooted in metaphysics. Accordingly, moral truth relies on metaphysical truth, and moral certainty is premised upon metaphysical certainty. Regarding the knowledge dictated by wisdom of the first principle, Aristotle states in his Nicomachean Ethics:

> Wisdom must plainly be the most finished of the forms of knowledge. It follows that the wise man must not only know what follows from the first principles, but must also possess truth about the first principles. Therefore wisdom must be comprehension combined with knowledge—knowledge of the highest objects which has received as it were its proper completion. (1141a16–20)

Wisdom of what "follows from the first principles" could be moral, aesthetic, or methodological. Ethics is a branch of learning that engages with the moral consequences of wisdom of the metaphysical first principle. Put differently, ethical views or positions are inseparable from the metaphysical principles they presuppose, whether explicitly or implicitly.

The root-branch metaphor thus dictates the necessity of investigating the metaphysical principles of morals. As the Roman philosopher Cicero (106–43bc) expressly states in his On Moral Ends:

> The starting-point for anyone who is to live in accordance with nature is the universe as a whole and its governance. Moreover one cannot make correct judgments about good and evil unless one understands the whole system of nature, and even of the life of the gods, as well as the question of whether or not human nature is in harmony with that of the universe … This one science alone can reveal the power of nature to foster justice and preserve friendship and other bonds of affection. (2001, 88)

By "this one science" Cicero refers to nothing else but the metaphysics underlying "the whole system of nature and its governance." In Cicero's view, one could only "make correct judgments about good and evil" by comprehending the universal principles governing the natural system. In other words, metaphysical principles provide a yardstick for the moral sense of "good and evil" and thereby constitute the foundation of ethical virtues like justice and friendship. Similarly, in "An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals" (1751), the English Enlightenment philosopher David Hume (1711–1776) asserts that only by reaching "the foundation of ethics" and finding the "universal principles" governing it could we learn about the primary source "from which all censure or approbation is ultimately derived" (2006, 190).

It is a key argument of this book that the supreme wisdom of Chinese philosophy consists in its metaphysics as well, and wisdom of the metaphysical first principle is what underlies its moral system. The law of Nature or its instantiation in the xing 性 (innate nature) of phenomenal beings, as demonstrated in chapter 1, constitutes the very first principle or primary cause of Chinese metaphysics. The Chinese metaphysical first principle expresses itself in two major forms. As a cosmogonic or cosmological principle, it is called the Dao, tian 天 (Heaven), li 理 (principle), or tianli 天理 (the principle of Heaven). As the substantial principle of unity, the prime mover is called xing (innate nature) by the Confucians and you 有 (being) versus wu 无 (nonbeing) by Laozi. The necessary union of morals and metaphysics is expressly asserted in the Zhongyong 中庸, one of the "Four Books" widely known to English readers as The Doctrine of the Mean:

> Without zhide 至德 [the supreme Virtue], zhidao 至道 [the supreme Dao] cannot be fully manifested.
> 苟不至德, 至道不凝焉. Zhongyong 2014 ch.27, 119

Put differently, only "the supreme virtue" could fully manifest "the supreme Dao." The necessary joining of zhide to zhidao proves a foundational hypothesis of Confucian moral philosophy. Also, this union is unambiguously declared in the very title of Laozi's Daode jing 道德经. While Dao 道 refers to the law of Nature, de 德 means literally "Virtue" and connotes the life-nourishing and preserving attribute of the universal principle.

Now the question at issue is What is the agent by virtue of which the "supreme Virtue" is joined to "the supreme Dao"? The answer resides in none other than xing 性 (innate nature). Innate nature constitutes the cornerstone concept in Chinese moral metaphysics because it provides a conceptual bridge to at once connect the cosmic with the substantial principle and join morals to metaphysics. In his commentaries on the Yijing 易经, The Book of Changes, Confucius remarks

> One yin 阴 [female] and one yang 阳 [male] show the working of the Dao. Observance of the Dao leads to the good, and the actualization of the Dao gives rise to xing 性 [innate nature].
> 一阴一阳之谓道, 继之者善也, 成之者性也. Zhouyi 2015, 36214

What is significant about Confucius's metaphysical account is both his conception of the temporal instantiation of the Dao as innate nature and his association of the universal principle with moral virtues. While Laozi defines the substantial principle as being versus nonbeing (Laozi ch.1), Confucius conceives it in terms of both innate nature and the Dao. In addition to encoding the law of Nature, the Chinese concept of innate nature also distinguishes by its original goodness. Though ancient China produced different accounts regarding the morality of human nature, Mencius's hypothesis of xingshan 性善, "an originally good nature" (Mencius 5.1), prevails as the ruling framework to understand its ethics.

That moral certainty relies on metaphysical certainty proves a fundamental hypothesis of Chinese ethics. Confucius explicitly states that

> What a man of virtue is concerned with is ben 本 [the primary root or foundation], and once ben 本 is established, the Dao naturally follows. Isn't filial piety toward one's parents and brothers the ben 本 of ren [benevolence]!
> 君子务本, 本立而道生. 孝弟也者, 其为仁之本与! Analects 1.2

Junzi 君子 refers to a gentleman or a man of virtue noted for his deliberate and conscientious cultivation of the moral self, and as such it becomes a conventional name for virtuous character in Confucian ethics. The word ben 本 means literally "root or foundation" but connotes the primary cause or first principle of things. According to the Great Learning, zhiben 知本, or "knowledge of the first principles," marks zhi zhizhi 知之至, "the highest point of learning" (ch.6, 17). Once the first principles informing moral virtues are identified and reinstated, the Dao or universal law entailed by these virtues comes naturally to light, which explains why

> The Dao of a virtuous man begins with the relation of husband and wife, but once reaching a supreme state, this Dao [of man] mirrors the law of Heaven and Earth.
> 君子之道, 造端乎夫妇, 及其至也, 察乎天地. Zhongyong ch.12, 70

What is highlighted here is the relationship between the universal law of Nature and the ethical degrees structuring human society. The implicit message is that the moral principles governing the ethical distinctions are but the temporal manifestations of the law of Heaven and Earth in human relations.

In fact, all three great Confucian masters in classical antiquity, Confucius, Mencius, and Xunzi, expressly address the metaphysical principles presupposed by their ethics. As Mencius quotes, Confucius declares that

> the Dao has two expressions: ren [benevolence] and buren [non- benevolence].
> 道二，仁与不仁而已矣. Mencius 7.2

By Daoer 道二, Confucius does not mean two first principles; instead, he means that the Dao has two different but interrelated expressions. As he openly asserts, "my Dao is a single general principle" (Analects 4.15). Likewise, Mencius himself claims that,

> Heaven's production of the myriad things betokens the existence of yiben 一本 [one and the same root], but Yizi [the Mohist] takes it as erben 二本 [two roots].
> 且天之生物也, 使之一本, 而夷子二本故也. Mencius 5.5

The phrase "one and the same root" here signifies the very first principle embodied by Heaven or the Dao. Refuting Yizi's hypothesis of two first principles, Mencius asserts that "The Dao of all is just one and the same" 道一而已矣" (5.1). Likewise, Xunzi writes,

> The mind naturally knows, and knowledge naturally differs. What is called difference is but the simultaneous knowledge of diverse things. To know diverse things simultaneously is called liang 两 [the dyad]. Though knowledge tends to be dualistic, there is still the yi 一 [the One]. Not to let "that One" harm "this One" is called yi 壹 [single-mindedness].
> 心生而有知, 知而有异, 异也者, 同时兼知之. 同时兼知之, 两也, 然而有所谓一, 不以夫一害此一谓之壹. Xunzi ch.21, 344

Here liang 两 (the dyad) signifies the myriad things produced by the "One," which proves none other than the first principle or primary cause. Xunzi's One-dyad thesis addresses the ontological relation of the One first principle and the "dyad" it produces, as well as the epistemological order to know the One and its temporal manifestations.

In reality, back in the eighteenth century Western philosophers like Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716) had already begun to notice the long tradition of joining morals to metaphysics in Chinese philosophy.15 In his Discourse on the Natural Theology of the Chinese (1716), Leibniz writes,

> There is in China a public morality admirable in certain regards, conjoined to a philosophical doctrine, or rather a natural theology, venerable by its antiquity, established and authorized for about 3,000 years, long before the philosophy of the Greeks whose works nevertheless are the earliest which the rest of the world possess, except for of course our sacred writings. Cook and Rosemont 1994, 3

As Leibniz recognizes, it had been a "venerable" tradition for the Chinese to join "public morality" to "a philosophical doctrine" since ancient times. One could actually see this union of morality and metaphysics, Leibniz observes, from Father Nicolo Longobardi's 1623 "Religion Treatise":

> The first principle of the Chinese is called Li (2:13), that is reason, or the foundation of all nature (5:32), the most universal reason and substance (11:50) … From the Li qua Li emanate five

> virtues: piety, justice, religion, prudence, and faith (11:49). Cook and Rosemont 1994, 4; numbering in the original

This quote shows, as Leibniz comments, that the Chinese first principle li 理 is what sustains the five virtues of "piety, justice, religion, prudence, and faith," though by li 理 he refers chiefly to that propounded by Zhu Xi. So, Leibniz concludes, the Neo-Confucian li 理 is "not only the principle of the physical basis of Heaven and Earth and other material things, but also the principle of the moral basis of virtues, customs, and other spiritual things" (5).

The Consequences of Joining Morals to Metaphysics

For Aristotle, the necessary consequence of joining morals to metaphysics is that "a wise man must not only know what follows from the first principles, but must also possess truth about the first principles." In Chinese metaphysics, this consequence expresses as the two injunctions of zun dexing 尊德性 and dao xuewen 道学问. The verb zun 尊 means literally showing respect for but connotes the act of going along with the innate nature of things, and the word dao 道 here is a verb that indicates to investigate the epistemological implications of the Dao 道 as the universal law of Nature. Laozi openly declares that we should "respect the Dao and honor Virtue" (Laozi ch.51). The Daoist imperative finds an elaborate account in the Zhongyong,

> Great is the Dao of the sages! How plentiful [the sagely virtue] is! It nourishes and propagates the myriad things, with a sublimity as exalted as Heaven. How ample and grand it is! There are three hundred general principles of li or ritual rites, and three thousand rules governing the application of li, both of which await a man of virtue to implement. So without zhide 至德 [the supreme Virtue], zhidao 至道 [the supreme Dao] cannot be fully manifested. A virtuous man would at once zun dexing 尊德性 [respect the moral nature] and dao xuewen 道学问 [pursue knowledge of the Dao], inquire after the general principle and its subtle working, and grasp the high moral end and its manifestation in zhongyong [the natural Mean]. [The joining of zhide and zhidao] allows him both to infer new knowledge by reflecting upon the old and honor ritual courtesy with honesty.
> 大哉圣人之道! 洋洋乎! 发育万物, 峻极于天. 优优大哉! 礼仪三百, 威仪三千,待其后人而行. 故曰苟不至德, 至道不凝焉. 故君子尊德性而道学问, 致广大而尽精微, 极高明而道中庸, 温故而知新, 敦厚以崇礼. Zhongyong ch.27, 119

What is featured here is the intrinsic connection between "the supreme Dao" and "the supreme Virtue" exemplified by the sages, as well as the moral and epistemological implications of this connection. According to the quoted passage, the Dao relies on perfect Virtue to fully manifest itself, and the union of the Dao and Virtue dictates the necessity to at once "respect the moral nature" and "pursue knowledge of the Dao."

The two injunctions of zun dexing and dao xuewen point to the very principle that moral certainty is premised upon metaphysical certainty. Both injunctions become the central concern of Daoist and Confucian ethics. The unity of zun dexing and dao xuewen is explicitly declared in the title of Laozi's The Dao and Its Virtue (the Daode jing). In this founding text of Daoism, Laozi not only philosophizes the relation of the Dao and its Virtue but also names this Virtue xuande 玄德, "metaphysical virtue" (Laozi ch.51), which is represented as the root from which temporal virtues spring forth. As will be shown in

chapter 4, the distinction between metaphysical and temporal virtue figures prominently in the Confucian commentaries on the Yijing as well.

The injunctions of zun dexing and dao xuewen could be well illustrated by Kant's theory regarding moral laws or imperatives. According to Kant, "moral laws are imperatives (commands or prohibitions) and indeed categorical (unconditional) imperatives," as opposed to "technical imperatives (precepts of art), which always command only conditionally" (6:221). This is because, Kant explains, moral laws "hold as laws only insofar as they can be seen to have an a priori basis and to be necessary" (6:215). In his view, there is only "a single categorical imperative" of morality, that is, act only according to that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it become a universal law. (4:421)

Accordingly, "the canon" of judging whether an action is morally right is to see if we are "able to will that a maxim of our action become a universal law" (4:424). So by moral laws or imperatives Kant means "commands or prohibitions" whose governing principles or maxims accord with "a universal law."

Based on the supreme Dao and supreme Virtue, zun dexing and dao xuewen are two moral laws or imperatives whose governing principles naturally accord with the universal law of Nature. In fact, Daoist and Confucian ethics are full of such moral laws or imperatives, which, together with their core virtues, constitute the founding stones of the Chinese moral system. For instance, the moral end of zhishan 至善 (supreme or highest good) dictated by the law of Nature; the moral standard of zhongyong 中庸 that reflects the law of zhonghe 中和 (universal equilibrium and harmony); the cluster of moral maxims centered on cheng 诚, a concept that indicates the truthfulness of both man and Heaven; as well as the two injunctions of fanqiu zhuji 反求诸己 (returning to reflect upon the self for the cause of error or failure) and fanshen ercheng 反身而诚 (returning to reflect upon the truthfulness of one's own self) dictated by the law of fan 反 or fanfu 反复 (return), all of which are moral imperatives on account of the universal law entailed in their very conception. Here lies a key divergence between Kantian and Chinese moral metaphysics. Where Kant's moral agent needs to have the ability to "will" that "a maxim" of his action "become a universal law," the Chinese moral standard, virtues, and imperatives, founded upon the law of Nature and original goodness, entail in themselves the universal principles. This divergence will be further explored in chapter 2.

It is in Mencius's thesis of siduan 四端, "four moral beginnings," that the metaphysical foundation of Confucian ethics finds a most focused and coherent articulation. Siduan refers to the four senses of pity, shame, humility, and morality of innate nature. These instinctive senses, Mencius argues, constitute the "beginnings" or origins of the four primal virtues of ren 仁 (benevolence), yi 义 (justice), li 礼 (ritual etiquette/courtesy), and zhi 智 (wisdom) (Mencius 3.6). These virtues are primal not only because they are the primary expressions of the morality of innate nature but also because they themselves become the seedbed from which other virtues sprout forth. As organic sprouts of an originally good nature, the four primal virtues presuppose the metaphysical first principle in their very inception.

Among all Confucian concepts and categories, Mencian siduan proves both an apt starting point and a meaningful site to explore the metaphysics of Chinese morals, on three major accounts. First, siduan affords a compelling framework for Mencius to organize the various virtues in the Analects into four broad categories, integrating them within a coherent framework by conceptualizing their metaphysical

foundation. Second, siduan also allows Mencius to at once identify four primal virtues and ground them in an originally good nature. Third, as Zhu Xi (1986, 1:285) points out, philosophical inquiry should begin with qiejichu 切己处, or "what concerns one's own self most," and Mencius's siduan proves such an apt locus.

The metaphysically charged concept of siduan naturally renders it a fertile site of metaphysical investigations, which explains why studies of the metaphysics of Chinese morals focus mostly on this concept.16 There are two typical approaches to Mencian siduan. One deals with the motivation or specific principles informing morally right actions. For instance, the so-called "internalist thesis" conceives the relation of moral motivation and judgment in terms of emotion and reason. The second refers to the critical tendency to evoke Western moral theory to analyze Mencius's thesis. Shirong Luo (2015) turns to modern "moral foundations theory" proposed by Jonathan Hardt and Craig Joseph to interpret Mencius's virtue ethics. Xiusheng Liu (2002b, 2002c), on the other hand, resorts to Hume's "sensibility theory" to explain the "foundations" of Mencian ethics.

What is neglected in scholarship on Mencius's siduan is its metaphysical assumption of the first principle or primary cause. Rather than motivations as asserted in the "internalist thesis," the research question asked by a moral metaphysics approach should be What is the first principle assumed by the diverse conceptions of morals, be it eudaimonic, deontological, utilitarian, or naturalistic? Put differently, a metaphysical investigation of ethics already presupposes a morally right motivation, and what it seeks to know is the primary cause of such a motivation. The problem with the approaches based on Western moral theory is their neglect of the fact that Mencius's fourfold ethical scheme itself already entails and thereby addresses its metaphysical foundation.

The Argument, Methodology, and Objective of the Project

Despite Leibniz's insight on Chinese metaphysics and morals in the eighteenth century, it has been a prevalent practice in modern Western scholarship to deny a metaphysical discourse in Chinese philosophy and ethics. In his Disputers of the Dao, Angus Graham (1989, 222) famously asserts that "no Chinese thinkers conceive the One and the constant as Being or reality behind that veil of appearance," and while Western philosophers undertake to search for "being, reality, [and] truth," the central question asked by Chinese philosophers "was always 'where is the Way?'"18 Graham's two claims set the stage for the hypothesis of incommensurability prevailing in East-West comparative studies. Following the line set out by Graham, David L. Hall and Roger T. Ames (1998, 247) argue that Chinese philosophy distinguishes by "the absence of ontological assertion," which means that "for the Chinese there is no 'being' behind the myriad beings … no One behind the Many, no Reality behind Appearance." Hypothesis of metaphysical incommensurability is necessarily reflected in scholarship on Chinese ethics. Alasdair MacIntyre (1991) explicitly asserts "incommensurability" in his comparison of Confucian and Aristotelian moral virtues. Referring to MacIntyre, May Sim (2007, 35–36) claims that Aristotle's ethics is supported by metaphysics, but since China lacks metaphysical categories, Confucian ethics has "the support of tradition."

The claim that China lacks a metaphysical discourse, however, has been increasingly challenged by a rising trend to identify a Chinese metaphysics. In addition to Li and Perkins's collection, Alexus McLeod and Joshua R. Brown's attempt (2020) to identify the key concepts and notions of "transcendence and non-naturalism" in early Chinese texts marks another milestone in this new trend. Meanwhile, in my

recent book (Lu 2020), I have demonstrated that Chinese philosophy boasts of not only a well-developed metaphysical and epistemological system that corresponds closely to that in the West but also abundant metaphysical concepts and categories that directly address "being, reality, [and] truth."

Drawing on the two opposing trends of scholarship, this project argues for both commensurability and incommensurability in Chinese-Western comparative moral metaphysics. On one hand, since metaphysics concerns the first principle common to all, the subject itself provides a commensurable ground of comparison. But as a discursive study, moral theory is contingent upon cultural, religious, or national differences. Both Chinese and Aristotelian morals are premised upon the law of Nature or the physical world and both conceive a kind of teleological virtue ethics that regards virtue as a key means to achieve the moral end. But as will be shown in chapter 3, the shared metaphysical assumption does not necessarily lead to similar views regarding particular moral issues or problems due to the cultural disparity between ancient China and Greece. On the other hand, with regard to Confucian and Kantian moral metaphysics, the problem of incommensurability does exist. As will be argued in chapter 2, Kantian moral metaphysics based on the primacy of human reason could not serve as a commensurable standard or measure to gauge Confucian moral metaphysics grounded on the law of Nature. This metaphysical divergence leads naturally to striking differences in Confucian and Kantian moral philosophy.

In reality, in addition to a systematic metaphysics and epistemology, I propose, Chinese philosophy boasts of a coherent metaphysics of morals as well. As with their Western counterparts, Chinese philosophers take upon themselves to at once "possess truth about the first principles" and "know what follows from the first principles." Put differently, they not only respect the moral nature (zun dexing) but also pursue knowledge of the Dao (dao xuewen). Both the Daoists and Confucians openly assert the metaphysical assumption of their morals, and this metaphysical inquiry is continued by the Neo-Confucians who make it a core mission to philosophize and systematize classical ethics. A primary objective of this book is, therefore, to reinstate the metaphysical foundation of Chinese morals by abstracting the law of Nature entailed in its foundational concepts and categories.

Methodologically speaking, the three chapters in part I adopt a comparative approach. The growing attention to Chinese-Western comparative metaphysics necessarily spills into Chinese-Western comparative ethics. So far, however, most comparative studies of Chinese moral metaphysics tend to follow the Kantian line headed by Mou Zongsan. As will be argued in chapter 2, compared with Kant's metaphysics based on the subjective category of pure reason, Aristotelian metaphysics that takes the law of Nature or the physical world as the first principle bears more closely on the metaphysics of the Chinese moral system.

In negating the relevance of Kantian philosophy to investigating Chinese moral metaphysics, however, I do not deny the usefulness of Kant's concepts or notions in helping illuminate some specific issues or problems. Apart from his theory of moral laws or imperatives, Kant's distinction between "analytic judgment" and "synthetic judgment" affords a useful tool to understand the divergence between his and Aristotelian or Confucian metaphysics. According to Kant, the "predicate" in an analytic judgment is contained in "the concept of the subject" (1929, A7); but in a synthetic judgment the predicate is something added to the concept of the subject rather than contained in it (B11). Put differently, instead of the intrinsic qualities of things, synthetic logic concerns extra or external attributes imposed upon a subject. By contrast, the conventional Aristotelian analytic logic deals with what is contained in the

nature of things under investigation. Likewise, with its emphasis on the xing or innate nature of things, Confucian ethics, as well as its reformulation by the Neo-Confucians, evokes the analytic rather than synthetic judgment.

Though adopting a comparative approach in Part I and referring constantly to Western philosophers, however, this is not strictly a comparative study. The key methodology adopted in this project is the inductive approach that seeks to infer and extract the metaphysical or universal principles from the core virtues and imperatives in Daoist and Confucian ethics through a close reading of the primary texts. This inductive methodology requires a more meaningful and productive reconstruction of the metaphysics of Chinese morals rather than reliance on an external framework.

To abstract universal principles from moral virtues and imperatives is to tease out the "maxims" governing them. A maxim means literally a short and pithy statement that expresses a general truth. As Kant points out, for a personal maxim to express a general truth, it must "hold as a universal law" (6:226). What distinguishes the maxims governing the foundational concepts and categories in Chinese morals is that they entail "a universal law" in their very definition.

Though detachable at the analytical and methodological levels, however, the moral virtues, maxims, and imperatives discussed in each chapter remain united on the metaphysical terrain within a single and uniform framework. As Zhu Xi (1986, 1:107) points out, "all the four primal virtues are metaphysical categories" that cannot be separated from each other, though to be apprehended by human intellect, these categories should be instantiated and discursively marked out. For instance, without being manifested in temporal beings or events, the virtue of ren or benevolence cannot be recognized or understood as such (1:116). Likewise, universal justice cannot be well grasped without being differentiated into various forms of justness. So it is with the wisdom of universality. To provide insights into ordinary affairs, knowledge of universality should be actualized in phenomenal beings or events. The virtues, maxims, and imperatives involved in this project are, therefore, organic components of an overarching moral system founded on the universal law of Nature.

Significance of the Project—Metaphysical vs. Other Readings of the Chinese Moral System

The uncovering of the metaphysical foundation of the Chinese moral system has four important consequences or implications. First of all, the metaphysical approach not only provides an alternative framework to conceive and systematize the core virtues and imperatives in Chinese ethics but also helps reveal the secret key to its abiding relevance and vitality. The metaphysical root in innate nature and the law of Nature indicates that rather than randomly posited or arbitrarily imposed, the primal virtues and key imperatives in Daoist and Confucian ethics accord with universal principles in their very conception. And it is precisely on account of this metaphysical root that the Chinese moral system could last from antiquity to the present time.

Second, aside from the divergence between Kantian and Aristotelian or Confucian metaphysics, Kant's distinction between analytic and synthetic judgment also helps bring to light a fundamental difference in the virtues and ideals esteemed by China and the West. The extra addition to the subject in Kantian synthetic judgment proves revolutionary because it not only affords a new perspective into the subject but also serves as a catalyst for scientific discovery by imposing some external attributes upon the subject. Despite its landmark contribution, however, Kant's postulate of synthetic judgment also

unleashes an unprecedented enthusiasm for inventing, adding, and exploring features of things beyond their original nature. Conceived on the model of synthetic judgment, concepts such as "freedom" and "autonomy," Kant himself remarks, are human constructs that cannot be corroborated by the law of Nature or empirical evidence (4:459). By contrast, rooted in the law of nature or the innate nature of things and humans, the moral virtues and injunctions in Daoist and Confucian ethics prove organic sprouts that automatically accord with universal principles.

A third significance of this project consists in the potential educational value it promises. The moral end and standard, the four primal virtues, as well as the related moral imperatives of being truthful and returning to reflect upon the self for the cause of error or failure, are core components of the Chinese value system that has lasted for about five thousand years. Man-made values or ideals can be helpful, but their fundamentally discursive nature and the limitations this nature entails is exposed when severely challenged. By contrast, organic virtues or values inherent in the very nature of things and dictated by the universal law of Nature are supposed to survive and preserve like plants that bud, fade, and resprout with seasonal changes. For morally minded educators, knowledge of the basic principles sustaining conventional ideals and values would provide a surer guide for moral education.

Fourth, a metaphysical reading of Chinese moral theory is only one of multiple approaches to Daoist and Confucian ethics, the most prominent of which include Kantian deontology, consequentialist ethics, "virtue ethics," and "role ethics." Given that metaphysics concerns the first principle or primary cause, a metaphysical reading can reveal the fundamental hypothesis implicit in these various approaches and thereby throws a fresh light on them.

The revelation of the metaphysics of Chinese morals provides new insights into, above all, Kantian deontology and consequentialist ethics. Kant is noted for his deontological conception of morals, according to which an action must be performed from deon (duty) to have moral worth (4:398). Based on the utilitarian philosophy of Jeremy Bentham (1747–1782), consequentialist ethics claims that "it is the greatest happiness of the greatest number that is the measure of right and wrong" (1977, 393). Founded on the universal the law of Nature and an originally good nature, Confucian ethics that prizes moral virtues seems to fit uneasily within the deontological and consequentialist frameworks that take "duty" or "utility" as the measure of morality. Indeed, rather than utilitarian considerations preached in consequentialist ethics, moral virtues in Confucian ethics are motivated by the instinctive moral impulses of an originally good nature. But Kantian deontology presents a more complex case. On one hand, as will be shown in chapters 2 and 7, li 礼, the third pillar in Mencius's ethical edifice that evokes the whole liyue zhidu 礼乐制度, "the ritual and musical system" that was established in the Zhou dynasty, does show strong deontological implications with its emphasis on the duties or obligations to observe the ethical degrees and rules prescribed by this system. But on the other hand, as is argued in chapter 2, Chinese ethics does differ fundamentally from Kantian deontology in locating the primary ground of virtues or duties in the law of Nature rather than human reason.

"Virtue ethics" and "role ethics" are two popular methodologies avowedly put foward to counteract Kantian deontology and consequentialist ethics. While deontology prizes duty and consequentialism privileges utility, "an ethics of virtue is an ethical position that makes virtues prominent by using virtue expressions often" (White 2015, 3). Given that virtues feature prominently in Chinese morals, "virtue ethics" is indeed a relevant framework.22 But as I will argue in chapter 2, rather than mere virtue ethics,

the Confucian moral system points to a kind of teleological virtue ethics that at once posits an ultimate moral end and takes virtue as a key means of achieving this end. Given the civic dimension of moral virtues, "role ethics" makes sense as well, especially considering the deontological capacity of the liyue system to prescribe duties or obligations in accordance with different social roles and positions.

When viewed in light of moral metaphysics, however, "virtue ethics" and "role ethics" are not as dissimilar or distinct as alleged; instead, the two methodological approaches are not only intrinsically connected but also share the same metaphysical foundation. To elucidate this relation, I differentiate between moral and civic virtues. Moral virtues concern mainly the "morality" of personal character or behavior. As Cicero (2001,139, 140) puts it, morality "inheres in" and "arises from" virtues; accordingly, morality is what is "either actually virtue or is virtuous behavior." Civic virtues, on the other hand, refer chiefly to virtues that bear on one's duties or obligations to tianxia guojia 天下国家, "the world, country, and family" (Mencius 7.5), and as such they are closely related to one's ethical or sociopolitical roles and positions. Cultivation of moral virtues is thus both the basis of, and precondition for, discharging one's civic duties or obligations.

In current scholarship on Chinese ethics, moral virtues usually go under the category of "virtue ethics," while civic virtues are addressed within the framework of "role ethics." In fact, rooted in the universal law of Nature, moral and civic virtues refer to one and the same thing, and they are differentiated only in practical applications. Virtues are moral with respect to personal character or behavior, and they become civic virtues or duties once realized in wulun 五伦, "five cardinal relations." Wulun refers to the relationships between a king and his ministers, father and son, husband and wife, brothers, and friends—five cardinal relations that structure the basic fabric of human community. Thus, while moral virtues are epitomized in Mencius's siduan, civic virtues are expressed by means of wulun. Mencius gives a vivid account of how moral virtues transform into civic virtues:

> The realization of ren [benevolence] consists in serving one's parents; the realization of yi [justice] consists in obeying one's brother; the realization of zhi [wisdom] consists in knowing that filial piety and brotherly duty are essential to cultivating ren and yi; the realization of li [ritual rites] consists in prescribing the proper boundary for ren and yi; and the realization of yue [music] consists in taking delight in being a just and benevolent person.
> 仁之实, 事亲是也; 义之实, 从兄是也; 智之实, 知斯二者弗去是也; 礼之实, 节文斯二者是也; 乐之实, 乐斯二者, 乐则生矣. Mencius 7.27

By ren zhishi 仁之实 and yi zhishi 义之实, Mencius means the realization or manifestation of the Dao of renyi (benevolence and justice) in temporal affairs, which refers here specifically to the two basic duties within the household—filial piety and brotherly duty. The rationale governing the realization of renyi applies to the actualization of the two other primal virtues (ritual courtesy and wisdom) as well. So, once realized in social relations, moral virtues become civic virtues that bespeak one's sociopolitical roles and the related duties or obligations. Whether expressed as moral or civic duties, virtues in Chinese ethics are rooted in the universal law of Nature. Just as siduan is the expression of original goodness and the Dao, wulun is the temporal manifestation of dadao 达道 or "the universal Dao" (Zhongyong ch.20, 96).

Rather than being confined to the "five cardinal relations," civic virtues extend beyond the household to the broader society, the state, and the world. Hence the use of such conventional terms as renyi 人义

(principles of sociopolitical roles), jiujing 九经 (nine political principles), and liuyi 六义 (six civic duties), all of which point to the affinity of moral and civic virtues. In the Liji 礼记, The Book of Rites, civic virtues are represented as renyi 人义, ten principles that govern ten basic sociopolitical roles:

> Loving fathers, filial sons, good-natured elder brothers, respectful younger brothers, upright husbands, obedient wives, affectionate elders, dutiful youngsters, benevolent rulers, and loyal ministers.
> 父慈、子孝、兄良、弟弟、夫义、妇听、长惠、幼顺、君仁、臣忠.
> Liji ch.9, 43224

What is highlighted here is none other than the inextricable connection between moral and civic virtues and one's sociopolitical roles: where the adjective in each term addresses moral and civic virtue or duty, the noun signals the related sociopolitical role. The bonding of moral and civic virtues informs regulations not only for the household and society but also for rulers of the state. Thus we find the concept of jiujing 九经 in the Zhongyong, which includes:

> Cultivating the self, esteeming the worthy, loving one's parents, respecting the prime minister, showing compassion for all ministers, treating subjects as one's own children, attracting all manner of craftsmen, appeasing distant peoples, and showing concern for the manor states.
> 修身也, 尊贤也, 亲亲也, 敬大臣也, 体群臣也, 子庶民也, 来百工也, 柔远人也, 怀诸侯也.
> Zhongyong ch.20, 97

Represented in this passage are the moral virtues and civic duties required by, or prescribed for, those in sovereign or governing positions. In the Great Learning (Daxue), civic virtues are directly cast as the "six civic duties" of ming mingde 明明德 (making illustrious the bright virtue), qijia 齐家 (putting one's family in order), zhiguo 治国 (engaging in good governance of the state), ping tianxia 平天下 (bringing peace to all under Heaven), xiushen 修身 (cultivating oneself), and zhengxin 正心 (rectifying one's mind) (ch.1, 4). In Confucian ethics, these six civic duties and the moral virtues they entail are what bind and obligate a junzi 君子, a man of virtue who exemplifies social conscience and political accomplishment.

In addition to their shared foundation in the law of Nature and association with sociopolitical roles, moral and civic virtues are inseparably tied also because both are premised upon the primacy of the self. In other words, individual self is the nexus that joins moral to civic virtues. Xiushen 修身, the moral cultivation of the self, lies at the root of the civic virtues that bind one to one's family, country, and the world. As is stated in the Great Learning:

> All, from the king to ordinary people, should take xiushen 修身 [self-cultivation] as ben 本, the root or fundamental principle. For the root to be disrupted while the branches remain in order is impossible.
> 自天子至庶人, 壹是皆宜修身为本. 其本乱而末治者, 否矣. ch.1, 5

The root-branch metaphor regarding the relation of metaphysics and the sciences derived from it applies as well to Confucian ethics in which the moral virtue of the self is deemed as the root that sustains one's civic duties or obligations to one's family, country, and the world.

Plan of Study

This book consists of three parts comprising ten chapters. Part 1 investigates, through a comparative lens, the metaphysical foundation of Chinese morals in general, the methodological approaches to this foundation, as well as the moral end and standard dictated by this foundation. Chapter 1 sets out the first principle in Chinese metaphysics, and chapter 2 examines the relevance of Aristotelian and Kantian metaphysics to studying Confucian ethics. Chapter 3 deals with the moral end and standard dictated by a metaphysics that takes the law of Nature or the physical world as the first principle. The five chapters in part 2 examine the metaphysical foundation of the core virtues of Daoist and Confucian ethics. Chapter 4 considers the Dao of Heaven and Earth and the metaphysical virtues it dictates. Chapters 5, 6, 7, and 8 undertake to explore the metaphysics of the four primal virtues in Mencius's fourfold ethical scheme. Chapters 9 and 10 engage with the metaphysical ground of two moral imperatives deemed most conducive to realizing the core virtues, upholding the moral standard, and achieving the highest good.

Zhipan's Account of the History of Buddhism in China: Volume 1: Fozu tongji, juan 34-38: From the Times of the Buddha to the Nanbeichao Era

by Thomas Jülch [Brill, 9789004396203]

The Fozu tongji by Zhipan (ca. 1220-1275) is a key text of Chinese Buddhist historiography. In the present volume Thomas Jülch presents his translation of the first five juan of the massive annalistic part. Rich annotations clarify the backgrounds to the historiographic contents, presented by Zhipan in a highly essentialized style. For the historical traditions the sources Zhipan refers to are meticulously identified. In those cases where the accounts presented are inaccurate or imprecise, Jülch points out how the relevant matter is depicted in the sources Zhipan relies on. With this carefully annotated translation of Fozu tongji, juan 34-38, Thomas Jülch enables an indepth understanding of a key text of Chinese Buddhist historiography.

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Fayun tongsai zhi, juan 2
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Glossary of Sanskrit and Pāli Terms
Bibliography

The Fozu tongji (T 2035, Comprehensive History of the Buddhist Patriarchs) is a massive work of Buddhist historiography composed by the Southern Song monk Zhipan (ca. 1220–1275). The present translation project, which is intended to have three volumes, refers to a part of the Fozu tong /e entitled "Fayun tongsai zhi" (Monograph on Success and Obstructions in the Spread of the Dharma). The "Fayun tongsai zhi," covering Fozu tong/e, juan 34–48, is an annalistic chronicle of Buddhism in China. It goes through Chinese history dynasty by dynasty, ruler by ruler, and year by year, listing events following the chronological order. With the present project I intend to offer a complete translation of the "Fayun tongsai zhi." In the present volume, I translate the first five juan (i.e. Fozu tong/e, juan 34–38), which contain the annals referring to the history of Buddhism in China from the time of the birth of the Buddha in the 26th year of King Zhao of Zhou ^^^to the end of the Nanbeichao period. In the second volume I will translate the next four juan of the "Fayun tongsai zhi" (i.e. Fozu tong/e, juan 39–42), which have previously been translated by Jan Yün-hua,1 and refer to the history of Buddhism from the Sui dynasty to the end of the Wudai period. In the third volume I will translate the remaining six juan of the "Fayun tongsai zhi" (i.e. Fozu tong/e, juan 43–48), which refer to the history of Buddhism in the Song dynasty up to the year 1236, the third year of the duanping era of the Southern Song emperor Lizong.

With regard to the overall textual structure of the "Fayun tongsai zhi," it needs to be explained that apart from the main text, the work contains supplements, commentary passages, and annotations. Supplements are enhancements added to the main text in the end of some of the juan: In the end of juan 35 we find the supplements for juan 34 and 35. In the end of juan 36 there are supplements again. In the end of juan 37 there are no supplements. In the end of juan 38 there is a supplement, which is however excluded from the translation, as it repeats things that have previously already been said. Shi Daofa has published a modern edition of the Fozu tong/e, which integrates the supplements into the annalistic display fitting them in wherever they chronologically belong. In the present translation project I do however not follow this approach. Instead I translate the text of the "Fayun tongsai zhi" as it appears in the Taishō. Commentary passages are designed to provide further information on a subject of an entry in the main text or also on a subject of an entry in a supplement. They therefore appear subsequent to the entry they refer to, and are in the present translation project presented as indented to the text of this entry. Annotations appear within the main text, within supplements and within commentary passages. They are of very different content. Those that carry important information are in the present translation project translated in footnotes to the relevant passage. It is however also seen that annotations run to great length pointing out the Chinese equivalents of certain Sanskrit terms and explaining their original meaning. Since today this sort of information is easily accessible, such annotations are excluded from the translation presented in the current translation project.

The main intention of the "Fayun tongsai zhi" is to present a positive image of Buddhism in China, and to demonstrate that the presence of Buddhism at all times brought blessings, created miracles, and was of advantage to the country. This intention was common to Chinese Buddhist historiography since its beginnings in Nanbeichao times. To the Chinese sangha, Buddhist historiographic writing was a means of making Buddhism prevail in the face of anti-Buddhist agitation. The charges brought up against Buddhism were manifold. Rather than listing them exhaustively, I would like to point to one essential charge, which in particular was predestined for counters from Buddhist historiography. Confucian scholars claimed that in the Chinese antiquity the Confucian sages (shengren) established the ideal state of "great peace"

(taiping), which was regarded as the source of all teachings worth being studied. To Confucian scholars Buddhism, as a teaching from the lands of the "barbarians," was not based on this ancient Chinese wisdom treasury and was therefore seen as an unwelcome defilement of the Chinese high culture. Reacting to this Confucian understanding, Chinese Buddhist historiographic literature seeks to introduce a counter-concept, allowing the presence of Buddhism in China to appear in a more favorable light. Part of the strategy Chinese Buddhist historiography employed in this context was to implant Buddhism into the Chinese antiquity, which made Buddhism appear as part of the wisdom treasury associated with that age. As an expression of this strategy, the history of Buddhism in China presented in the "Fayun tongsai zhi" begins right with the Buddha. According to a tradition deeply rooted in Chinese Buddhist historiography, birth and parinirvãna of the Buddha caused natural phenomena, which alarmed the contemporary kings of the Chinese antiquity. In this way, the birth of the Buddha alarmed King Zhao of Zhou, while the parinirvãna of the Buddha alarmed King Mu of Zhou. This tradition, which goes back to the Chinese Buddhist apocryphal scripture Zhoushu yiji,allows to integrate birth and parinirvãna of the Buddha into the annalistic display shown in the "Fayun tongsai zhi." As far as the case of King Mu is concerned, a reinterpretation of the Mu tianzi zhuan implied. The Mu tianzi zhuan, a legendary account from ancient China, says that King Mu travelled to the West to see the Xiwangmu. The Buddhist historiographic tradition based on the Zhoushu yiji takes up the tradition of King Mu travelling to the West but depicts the journey as motivated by the natural phenomena pointing to the parinirvã^a of the Buddha in India. As the legend of King Mu's journey to the West was publically perceived as an important event of the Chinese antiquity, being able to ascribe a Buddhist causation to King Mu's journey meant to establish a prominent presence of Buddhism within the golden age of the sages.

The references to the birth and to the parinirvãna of the Buddha are part of a full biography of the Buddha, which is placed in the beginning of the "Fayun tongsai zhi" as a means of portraying the superior sanctity of Buddhism. This biography begins with parts referring to matters prior to the birth of the Buddha. They cannot be integrated into the annalistic display, which otherwise characterizes the "Fayun tongsai zhi," as they cannot be contextualized with corresponding events in Chinese history (such as natural phenomena). The first chapter of the biography of the Buddha in the beginning of the "Fayun tongsai zhi" is entitled "Understanding the origin and manifestation [of the Buddha]" and explains that on an ultimate level the life of the Buddha is not confined to the Buddha's historical life span as Šãkyamuni, since the Buddha's emanation as Šãkyamuni was merely a worldly semblance of his true supernatural existence. Borrowing a term from Christian theology, Michael Radich has described this understanding as "docetistic" (derived from Greek "dokesis," meaning semblance, appearance). In the second chapter, "The descent from the Tusita-heaven", we are told how Šãkyamuni descended from the heavenly realm where—as part of the docetistic display—he was prepared for his manifestation as the Buddha. The third chapter, "Entering the mother's womb", reveals how Šãkyamuni having descended from the Tusita-heaven entered the womb of his mother Mãyã. Only with the third chapter, "Manifestation in incarnation", which explains how the Buddha was born from Mãyã's womb, the annals of the "Fayun tongsai zhi" begin.

Apart from demonstrating the sanctity of the Buddha by means of presenting his biography, Buddhist historiography still has further means of opposing the Confucian understanding that the Buddha, as a barbarian deity, had to be inferior to the sages of the Chinese antiquity. One tradition frequently employed in this respect is represented in the "Fayun tongsai zhi" rather briefly, but enjoys great popularity throughout Chinese Buddhist historiography. It goes back to Liezi, juan 4. According to Erik

Zürcher, the original text of the Liezi was lost early, while the present text of the Liezi "is at least partly a forgery of the third or early fourth century AD," which appears to include components articulating Buddhist ideological positions. The famous passage seen in Liezi juan 4, presents a conversation in which Confucius says that he would not know whether the Confucian sages are real sages, while the people of the West (i.e. the people of India) would however have a real sage. Tang Yongtong has argued that, owing to the Daoist background ascribed to the Liezi, this reference to the sage of the West might also be a statement of Daoist religiosity, thinking of the Buddha as Laozi having reincarnated in India as claimed in the "huahu" legend. However Zürcher does not think so. He argues that, since in the Liezi statements of Buddhist ideology are also seen in other places, we should assume that also this famous passage was meant to be a statement in favor of Buddhism. Be that as it may, the intention with which the passage is employed in Buddhist historiography and in the "Fayun tongsai zhi" is clear. The passage is quoted to demonstrate that Buddhism, not Confucianism, is based on the teachings of a true sage.

Again as part of the attempt to anchor Buddhism in the Chinese antiquity, Chinese Buddhist historiography also depicts the history of the spread of Buddhism in China as reaching back to the earliest times. The general conception of the early history of Buddhism in China follows a key pattern which Chinese Buddhist historiographic sources largely agree upon. I here need to confine myself to introducing this conception in a thoroughly succinct fashion: First Buddhism had been spread in the Chinese antiquity through various incidents, the most famous among which may be the spreading of the relics of the Buddha through messengers sent by the Indian King Ašoka (ayu wang). With the burning of books under Qin Shihuang Buddhism however became extinct in China. Yet, even while Buddhism was extinct, there were certain incidents suggesting that it had not completely slipped into oblivion. E.g. Huo Qubing Vim', a general of Han Wudi, on one of his campaigns got hold of a "golden man" (i.e. a Buddha statue), which Han Wudi knew to worship as a deity. The period of Buddhism being extinct in China lasted until Han Mingdi , the second emperor of the Eastern Han dynasty, under whom Buddhism was officially reintroduced. According to a tradition originating from the Chinese Buddhist apocryphal scripture Han faben neizhuan (Inner Transmission of the Root of the Dharma in the Han Dynasty), Han Mingdi, having had a dream of a "golden man" (i.e. of the Buddha), sent messengers to India to find out about this appearance. The messengers came back with the two monk missionaries Kãšyapa Mãta^ga (shemoteng,) and Zhu Falan, who on a white horse brought Buddhist sütras, based on which the first Buddhist monastery in China was named White Horse Monastery (baima si). While this is the general pattern which the conception of the early history of Buddhism in China as seen in the "Fayun tongsai zhi" and in the diverse other texts of Chinese Buddhist historiography is based upon, traditions which are employed for enhancement and illustration vary from account to account.

In the further course the "Fayun tongsai zhi" continues to depict Buddhism as a teaching bringing blessings and positive influence to China by referring to exemplary monks and nuns. Zhipan widely quotes from biographies in the Gaoseng zhuan (T 2059) by Huijiao (497–554), from biographies in the Xu gaoseng zhuan (T 2060) by Daoxuan (596–667), and also from biographies in the Biqiuni zhuan (T 2063) by Baochang E.g. seeking to depict Buddhism as a teaching benefitting both the state and the ruler, Zhipan quotes the biographies of Kang Senghui (Gaoseng zhuan, juan 1), Gu^avarman (Gaoseng zhuan, juan 3), and Fotudeng (Gaoseng zhuan, juan 9), all of whom succeeded in changing rulers for the better by converting them to Buddhism. The conversion talks these monk missionaries held with the relevant rulers are reminiscent of the counselling activity of Confucius, who in the Spring- and Autumn-Period moved from court to court hoping to guide rulers to better policies. So the biographies quoted in this

context do not only demonstrate that Buddhism helped to ease political turmoil in medieval China, but also imply that this was done in a way consistent with the Chinese tradition. Other monastics are commended for their engagement in translating the Buddhist scriptures into Chinese, or for their outstanding virtue.

Also accounts of Buddhist laypeople are included in the "Fayun tongsai zhi." We find a broad coverage of the White Lotus Society (Bailian she), a circle of Buddhist monks and laymen founded by Huiyuan (334–416). Many of the traditions the "Fayun tongsai zhi" quotes in this context can be traced back to Huiyuan's biography in Gaoseng zhuan, juan 6. Other traditions, however, only originate from the Lushan ji (T 2095), a late work authored in the Song dynasty by Chen Shunyu (d. 1074). The "Fayun tongsai zhi" also includes references to Buddhist laypeople, who through their piety brought about all sorts of miracles. Such miracle accounts are frequently adopted from early medieval zhiguai collections, such as the Youming lu, and the Mingxiang ji. Other traditions simply pointing to remarkable acts of Buddhist laypeople are frequently adopted from the official historiography (zhengshi). Based on the official historiography, too, the realm of politics of religion is covered. Rulers supporting the dharma, such as Liang Wudi, are portrayed as shining examples. Rulers responsible for persecutions of Buddhism, such as Beiwei Taiwu di, are depicted as tragically misled.

While the tales quoted from the sources named above primarily refer to sacred people, the "Fayuan tongsai zhi" also quotes miracle tales rather associated with sacred places. A rich source for such traditions is the Luoyang qielan ji (Record of Buddhist Monasteries in Luoyang) by Yang Xuanzhi.

While Luoyang was capital of the Tuoba-Wei dynasty a multitude of Buddhist monasteries adorned the city. As after the end of the Tuoba-Wei dynasty Luoyang was in ruins, Yang Xuanzhi, a low-ranking official, in 547 sojourned in Luoyang, and on this basis composed the Luoyang qielan ji to remind of the city's former Buddhist culture. Since the Luoyang qielan ji mainly presents historical traditions referring to Tuoba-Wei times, the "Fayun tongsai zhi" preferably makes use of the work in the part concerning the Tuoba-Wei period, which is seen in Fozu tongji, juan 38. Here the "Fayun tongsai zhi" quotes the Luoyang qielan ji presenting accounts of miraculous events associated with particular monasteries.

Many of the traditions the "Fayun tongsai zhi" adopts from the above mentioned sources were widely employed also in the Buddhist apologetic treatises written up to the times of Wu Zetian. In those days a rich production of Buddhist apologetic literature was triggered by the following circumstances: (1) As a teaching coming from abroad, Buddhism had to demonstrate how it was relevant to the China society and how it could harmonize with Confucianism. (2) Asa religious system, Buddhism in China stood in fierce rivalry with Daoism, and thus sought to demonstrate that Daoist thought was invalid, subversive, and based on debauchery and plagiarism. The list of Buddhist apologetic treatises arguing along those lines is long. Of particular importance are the Mouzi lihuo lun (Treatise of Master Mou Removing Doubts), which is one of the earliest Chinese Buddhist apologetic treatises, the Erjiao lun (Treatise of the Two Teachings) and the Xiaodao lun (Treatise of Laughing at the Dao) from the Northern Zhou dynasty, the Poxie lun (T 2109, Treatise Destroying Evils) and the Bianzheng lun (T 2110, Treatise Discussing what is Correct) written by Falin (572–640) in the early Tang dynasty, and the Zhenzheng lun (T 2112, Treatise Revealing the Correct) written by Xuanyi under Wu Zetian. On the one hand these apologetic works adopt content from monk biographies, miracle tales and so forth, while on the other hand in the "Fayun tongsai zhi" we find content also seen in previous apologetic writing. So it is clear that contents were exchanged between formats of apologetic and historiographic writing and vice versa.

The presentation style in apologetic writing and historiographic writing is however different. While in an apologetic context content is employed in argumentative style serving the relevant apologetic objective, in a historiographic context the same content would simply be presented as an account of history, even though apologetic intent may also be involved. To make the difference understandable I will offer an example: The Poxie lun is the earliest known work to present the text of the Han faben neizhuan, the original of which is lost. The text tells a story of Daoist priests seeking to demonstrate the superiority of Daoism to Buddhism, when Buddhism was officially introduced to China under Han Mingdi. As we are told, the Daoist demonstration fails, which in fact demonstrates the inferiority of Daoism to Buddhism. In the Poxie lun this story is quoted as part of an apologetic reply to an anti-Buddhist statement presented by the Daoist priest Fu Yi (555–639). The "Fayun tongsai zhi" quotes the Han faben neizhuan at remarkable length (T 2035, p. 329, b17–p. 330, a9), simply presenting the story as part of the historical events under Han Mingdi. Certainly, if a text as polemic as the Han faben neizhuan is quoted this elaborately, apologetic interest is involved. But the presentation style in apologetic and historiographic treatises can still be differentiated clearly.

To fully understand the intention with which the "Fayun tongsai zhi" was written, we do however also need to appreciate the particular context of Buddhist historiography in the Song dynasty. While the history of Chinese Buddhist historiographic writing reaches back to Nanbeichao times, the Song dynasty saw an enormous increase in the production of Buddhist historiographic works. This increase is owed to the competition between the two dominant Buddhist schools of the Song dynasty: the Tiantai school and the Chan school. In the context of this competition, historical treatises were written to depict the history of Buddhism either in favor of the Tiantai school or in favor of the Chan school. In particular, both schools attempted to demonstrate that the own lineage of patriarchs went back right to the Buddha, while the patriarchal lineage of the competing school did not. Already in the Tang dynasty, Shenqing (fl. 779–806) in his Beshan (T 2113, North Mountain Record) attacked the Chan genealogy. Later on the Tiantai historiographers praised and employed him, while the Chan scholars, and among them especially Qisong (1007–1072), criticized him severely. As a Tiantai scholar, Zhipan with the Fozu tong/* composed the most complex among the works authored in the context of the competition between the Tiantai and the Chan schools. The Fozu tong/* in no way confines itself to arguing in terms of this controversy only. Rather than that it also refers to controversies within the Tiantai school, and supports the orthodox tradition of the "shanjia" (mountain house) against the dissenters referred to as "shanwai" (off the mountain). Furthermore, the Fozu tong also contains accounts of other Buddhist schools, such as especially the Jingtu (Pure Land) school. Matching this wider approach, the "Fayun tongsai zhi" is, as we have seen, designed to be a general history of Buddhism in China. Yet, despite this broad thematic setting, Zhipan's main intention still was to state the case for the Tiantai school in its competition with Chan Buddhism. The Fozu tong begins by presenting the Tiantai lineage as going back to the Buddha: juan 1–4 present the biography of the Buddha, juan 5 presents the biographies of the Indian patriarchs, and juan 6–8 present the biographies of the Chinese patriarchs. In the "Fayun tongsai zhi" the succession of the patriarchs from the Buddha on is again included into the general annalistic display. Even though the references to the patriarchs are kept brief here, their succession in favor of the Tiantai lineage is again shown.

Yet there are further aspects which give the "Fayun tongsai zhi" a particular Tiantai flavor. Firstly, in the biography of the Buddha, which stands at the beginning of the "Fayun tongsai zhi," the sütras preached by the Buddha are classified according to the Tiantai classification system, which depicts the Saddharma

pundarïka sütra (Miaofa lianhua jing) and the Mahãparinirvã^a sütra (Da ban niepan jing) as the highest sutras. Secondly, the "Fayun tongsai zhi" contains many accounts of miracles resulting from recitations of the Saddharma pundarïka sütra. Thirdly, Zhiyi (538–597), the founder of the Tiantai school, is covered particularly extensively. Even though the actual foundation of the Tiantai order in the Sui dynasty does not fall into the scope of what is translated from the "Fayun tongsai zhi" in the present first volume of the translation project, we observe the eye-catching generosity with which Zhiyi is covered already with regard to his actions in the preceding Chen dynasty. In connection with the broad coverage of Zhiyi, the historiographic works of Zhiyi's main student, Guanding (561–632), i.e. the Guoqing bailu (T 1934) and the Sui Tiantai Zhizhe dashi biezhuan(T 2050), are employed. Fourthly, the "Fayun tongsai zhi" occasionally also includes explicit rejoinders to particular traditions of Chan historiography. In Fozu tongji, juan 37 (T 2035, p. 352, c15–21), we find an attack on a tradition seen in the Jingde chuandeng lu (T 2076), an important historiographic work of the Chan school compiled in 1004. In Fozu tongji, juan 38 (T 2035, p. 356, a22–29), we find a counter to the claim that Bodhidharma, the alleged founder of the Chan school, was after his death seen walking in a realized fashion by the Chinese traveler Song Yun.

It is important to note that, apart from the Buddhist main content, the "Fayun tongsai zhi" also comprises passages referring to non-Buddhist matters. In the main text we observe that space is given to important political developments as well. In particular acts of misled policy, such as the burning of books under Qin Shihuang, attacks on the public order, such as the Yellow Turban uprising, or the persecutions of Buddhism under Beiwei Taiwudi and Zhou Wudi are covered and commented in thoroughly critical style. Apart from that, as the two most important native Chinese traditions of thought, also Confucianism and Daoism are covered. While they already play their role within the coverage of the political situation, Confucianism and Daoism are introduced in their own right in the supplements, which the author designed as the place for matters that do not fit into the main text. Even though, as we have seen, the "Fayun tongsai zhi" in its Buddhist content also opposes Confucian attempts of belittling Buddhism, those passages which introduce Confucianism and Daoism in their own right do so in friendly and respectful style. Written in the age of Neoconfucianism, the Fozu tongji does not have an interest in a confrontation between Buddhism and the native Chinese teachings, but rather seeks to offer a general perspective which does refute anti-Buddhist polemicism but otherwise seeks to present a view conducive to reconciliation.

The coverage of the political situation and the inclusion of Confucian and Daoist content makes the "Fayun tongsai zhi" a precursor to the Buddhist historiography of the Yuan dynasty, in which we find the history of Buddhism embedded in a broad perspective on Chinese history. As far as the competition between the Tiantai and the Chan schools is concerned, the Chan school was able to take the lead, and the dispute between the two schools of Chinese Buddhism gradually dissipated. With the Fozu lidai tongzai (T 2036, A Comprehensive Registry of the Successive Ages of the Buddha and the Patriarchs), completed in 1333 or 1334, the Chan monk Nianchang composed a history of Buddhism which formally still has the character of sectarian historiography, but gives less priority to the sectarian dispute and more priority to the new approach of integrating the history of Buddhism into a more general history of thought in China.

To conclude with, I would like to refer to several studies that can help the reader to gain a broader background to the text translated here. A general study of the Fozu tong/i has been presented by Jan Yün-hua. Koichi Shinohara has published an article discussing the importance of the Fozu tong/i to the

construction of the Tiantai lineage of patriarchs. General studies of Song dynasty Buddhist historiography have been presented by Jan Yün-hua and Cao Ganghua. For studies of the life of Zhiyi, see the monographs by Leon Hurvitz and Pan Guiming. <>

Zhipan's Account of the History of Buddhism in China: Volume 2: Fozu tongji, juan 39-42: From the Sui Dynasty to the Wudai Era by Thomas Jülch [Brill, 9789004445918]

The Fozu tongji by Zhipan (ca. 1220-1275) is a key text of Chinese Buddhist historiography. The core of the work is formed by the "Fayun tongsai zhi," an annalistic history of Buddhism in China, which extends through Fozu tongji, juan 34-48. Thomas Jülch now presents a translation of the "Fayun tongsai zhi" in three volumes. This second volume covers the annalistic display from the Sui dynasty to the end of the Wudai period. Offering elaborate annotations, Jülch succeeds in clarifying the backgrounds to the historiographic contents, which Zhipan presents in highly essentialized style. Jülch identifies the sources for the historical traditions Zhipan refers to, and when accounts presented by Zhipan are inaccurate or imprecise, he points out how the relevant matter is depicted in the sources Zhipan relies on. Consistently employing these means in reliable style Jülch defines a new standard for translations of medieval Chinese historiographic texts.

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HISTORICAL DICTIONARY OF DAOISM by Ronnie L. Littlejohn [Historical Dictionaries of Religions, Philosophies, and Movements Series, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 978538122730]

Daoism is the oldest indigenous philosophic-spiritual tradition of China and one of the most ancient of the world's spiritual structures. The name *Daoism* comes from the term *dao*, which means a "way" or a "road" through the field or woods to one's village. It is also means the "way" to do something, such as how a master craftsman carves wood, makes a bell, or even butchers an ox. But *dao* is also a nominative in the history of Daoism, referring to the energizing process that permeates and animates all of reality and moves it along. However, both text and practice in this tradition insist that *dao* itself cannot be described in words; it is not God in the sense of Western philosophy or religion. Daoism has no supreme being, even if there is an extensive grammar about nominally self-conscious entities and powers for which the Chinese use the word "spirit" (*shen*). For example, the highest powers of Daoism are variously called *Taishang Laojun* (the deified Laozi), the Celestial Worthy of Primordial Beginning (*Yuanshi tianzun*), the Jade Emperor (*Yuhuang Shangdi*), or the Perfected Warrior (*Zhenwu*). But these are expressions of *dao* in specific *shen*; they are not identical to *Dao*, except in the most unique case—when Laozi, the putative founder of Daoism and author of its major work, *Daodejing*, is said to be one with the *dao*.

HISTORICAL DICTIONARY OF DAOISM contains a chronology, an introduction, appendixes, an extensive bibliography, and more than 400 cross-referenced entries related to the Chinese belief and worldview known as Daoism, including dozens of Daoist terms, names, and practices. This book is an excellent resource for students, researchers, and anyone wanting to know more about Daoism.

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Excerpt: Daoism is the oldest indigenous philosophic-spiritual tradition of China and one of the most ancient of the world's spiritual structures. The name "Daoism" comes from the term dao, which is often used for a "way" or a "road" through the field or woods to one's village. It is also used for the "way" to do something, for example, the way a master craftsman carves a candlestick, makes a bell, or even butchers an ox. But dao is also used as a nominative in the history of Daoism. It is used for the

energising process that permeates and animates all of reality and moves it along simply as the -Dao"; however, both text and practice in this tradition insist that dao itself cannot be described in words. Dao is not God in the sense of Western philosophy or religion. Daoism has no supreme being, even if there is an extensive grammar about numinal self-conscious entities and powers, for which the Chinese use the word "spirit" (shen). For example, the highest numinal powers of Daoism are variously called Taishang Laojun (the deified Laozi), the Celestial Worthy of Primordial Beginning (Yuanshi tianzun), the Jade Emperor (Yuhuang Shangdi), or the Perfected Warrior (Zhenwu). But these are expressions of dao in specific shen. They are not identical with the Dao, except in the most unique case, when Laozi, the putative founder of Daoism and author of its major work, Daodejing, is said to be one with the Dao.

Daoism is the spiritual tradition at the roots of Chinese civilisation, but it defies any single typological characterisation as either a philosophy or a religion. In fact, while these terms have been used by Western and Chinese scholars alike to understand Daoism, such categorisation distorts the historicity of the tradition itself by forcing it into modern conceptual categories that do not exhaust the richness of practice and belief found within it.

Admittedly, until recently it was common to speak of "philosophical Daoism" (daojia) and "religious Daoism" (daojiao), suggesting that the former was transformed into the latter or replaced by it. Western scholars did not create this distinction. The name daojia, later used for philosophical Daoism, was a creation of historian Sima Tan (d. 110 BCE) in his Shiji (Records of the Historian), begun in the 2nd century BCE and later completed by his son, Sima Qian (145-86 BCE). Sima Qian's use of this term is more like "school" than "philosophy." Daojia is listed as one of the Six Schools known to him: Yin-Yang, Confucian, Mohist, Legalist, School of Names, and Daoism.

Sima Qian probably did not have in mind what Western intellectuals of the post-Enlightenment period mean by "philosophy" as opposed to "religion." Moreover, scholars today kn^w things about Daoism and its origin that even the great Chinese thinkers of the past, for instance, Sima Qian, did not know: For example, there is a critical appreciation for how the classical texts of the tradition, the Daodejing and Zhuangzi, are more like anthologies than singleauthored works. Additionally, within the Zhuangzi there are records of people and practices that are recognisable as what may assuredly be called religious or spiritual in any modern definition of religion. So, we cannot think that there was some original, pure "philosophical Daoism" that later morphed into "religious Daoism."

The strange desire to bleach out Daoism's religious identity shows up rather early in Chinese history. For example, Gu^ Xiang (?232-312), editor of what we now call the "received" Zhuangzi, tells us that he removed large blocks of material, reducing the text from the 52 chapters delivered to him to its present 33. We do not kn^w why this was done, and Gu^ does not tell us. Livia Kohn has suggested it was because he felt the excised materials contained "superstitious" ideas and practices to which he and other educated intellectuals, like his Confucian literati colleagues, objected (Knaul 1982). While this claim is still speculative, Ronnie Littlejohn (2011) has argued that the 4th-century text Liezi may contain passages from the "lost" Zhuangzi in its second chapter and that these are indeed seemingly fantastical in their content.

One way of thinking about whether to label Daoism as a philosophy or a religion is to follow scholar Isabelle Robinet (1997) and consider religious Daoism the practice of philosophical Daoism. This approach can claim support from a growing repository of new discoveries about ancient Chinese texts,

practices, and artifacts that have led scholars to appreciate more fully the dynamics of change and continuity in Daoist tradition.

Putting aside this distinction between philosophy and religion as a guiding interpretive frame, how can we best understand the identity of Daoism? Kohn and Harold Roth (2002) have collected a set of scholarly essays that explore just this problem of identity. The model that I think commends itself to us is to focus on how the development of the practices and teachings that show up in Chinese history and display what Ludwig Wittgenstein called "family resemblances" to one another. These we may group, then, as a family, under the concept of Daoism. These teachings and practices do not represent the "essence" of Daoism, because like a human family, there are continuities and differences, with no identifiable movement or historical period containing all of them in an exact way, just as no human family possesses the same traits in each of its members. The resemblances that may be called the Daoist family (daojia) represent a set of repeating, overlapping, and intersecting activities, beliefs, and strategies for engaging in the project of following dao and achieving biospiritual transformation.

Early in Chinese history, certainly by the 4th century BCE but probably earlier, some individuals invested their lives and energies in developing techniques for unifying and harmonising themselves with dao and thereby achieving awe-inspiring biospiritual transformations. We can call the people who succeeded in this project "masters of dao," although the classical texts call them such names as Perfected Persons (zhenren), sages (shengren), utmost persons (zuiren), and immortals/transcendents (xian). Sadly, little is fully appreciated about who those people were and how their teachings are reflections of their practices. Their names are hardly known to anyone, but in the pages of the Zhuangzi, traces of their activities and teachings do seem to be present.

Beginning sometime probably in the mid-300s BCE, these people attracted followers and interested students. We may think of the formation and interrelationship of these teacher-adept lineages as the analogy of a climbing organic plant like a vine growing from a solid trunk. The vine, which is most often called a "lineage," draws its sustenance from the roots sunk into the organic and life-giving source. If we think of the dao as the source of spiritual energy and wisdom employed by these teachers, who became the trunk, then students or groups of students became the vines. In the 300s BCE, some students began to collect their masters' teachings and the tales told to them about those who had undergone biospiritual transformations of various sorts. These collections we now know as the Daodejing and Zhuangzi. These great classical texts, which are more like anthologies than works by one person, began to circulate among teacher-adept lineages and even found their way into the libraries and homes of the well-educated and the aristocracy. Archaeological discoveries in recovered tombs like those at Guodian, dating to 300 BCE, contain some versions of these works. From these classical texts, all subsequent outgrowths of the tradition gain their strength in varying measures. Even as new teachers had experiences of enlightened and alternative consciousness throughout history, the new lineage vines they created never abandoned these two classical texts.

Already in the Zhuangzi, we find records of many teachers and their adepts, and we notice the interchanges and overlaps between these teacheradept lineages. One teacher may send an adept to another for further instruction or to receive knowledge in an area in which the teacher feels insufficient. This is exactly what happens in the story of Gengsang Chu, in the Zhuangzi chapter by that name. This suggests that even the process of following dao often involved apprenticeship to more than one teacher in more than one location. Later, the classical texts were formed by recording and collating the records

of what was taught and practiced by various masters. It should come as no surprise, then, that we find already in a work as early as the Zhuangzi (c. 300-250 BCE) some internal differences on such subjects as whether an adept or master should engage in political activity, or whether reason and argument can move one toward an understanding of what is most fundamental about existence, or even what one's attitude toward death should be. The Zhuangzi is a compendium of textual blocks (logic) arranged by an editor or editors. This seems not to have been a haphasard process, as such scholars as Harold Roth (1991), Michael La Fargue (1992), Liu Xiaogan (1994), and Ronnie Littlejohn (2010) have identified linguistic, historical, doctrinal, and literary criteria useful in classifying the strata in the text.

This process of growth did not stop with the creation of the classical texts but continued, as it was driven by two major forces: 1) lived experiences of consciousness, which we may simply call "revelations," and 2) the emergence of new sources (e.g., the Shangqing and Lingbao texts) and the development of new interpretive methods used in approaching the classical sources (e.g., Xuanxue, or Mysterious Learning).

Each new vine on the Daoist trunk or branch represents a lineage that leads back to a master, even if that master is sometimes thought of only as a spirit medium (jitong) for another higher voice. New lineages each tell a story of their origins. These narratives are usually tales of confirmations given through extraordinary encounters with numinal beings or while one is in an alternative state of consciousness, such as we find in the revelation to Zhang Daoling (34-156) on Mt. Heming. At other times, ways of following dao are disclosed by Perfected Persons through spirit mediums, as in the case of Yang Xi (330-386), or by means of the discovery of books containing mystical messages, for instance, in the "secret formulas of the Celestial Heart" (Tianxin bishi) buried in the ground at a spot where Rao Dongtian (fl. 994) was guided by a heavenly light.

We can imagine that some initial growth, just as a vine extending from its trunk, succeeded and others failed, dropped off, and died out. Just how many atrophied vines there were, what the masters of them taught, and why they failed are issues now lost to history. But what is important is that by using this analogy, we will not think of Daoism as a single identifiable movement, but as the living tangled vines of teacher-practitioner lineages.

One early vine recognisable in this process was what we call now Yellow Emperor-Laozi Daoism. This teacher-adept lineage shows up in the Zhuangzi and in the intellectual exchanges set up by Liu An from roughly the 160s to 120s BCE in the city of Huainan. Liu gathered a great number of thinkers and practitioners of divergent views at Huainan, and one result of their exchanges was a new compendium known as the Book of the Masters of Huainan (Huainanzi). The importance of this project should not be overlooked in a study of Daoism. Its main goal was to overcome tensions and internal conflicts within the Han imperial system by creating a sort of encyclopedia of learning. In this work, the collected materials offer a new understanding of rulership in which the emperor would not only be well educated in literati learning (i.e., Confucian texts), but also a practitioner of the signature Daoist behavior called wu-wei. The text suggests that acting in this manner can be achieved by following the disciplines and methods associated with the Yellow Emperor of ancient days and advocated by lineage masters present in Huainan; however, when the Book of the Masters of Huainan was presented at court in 139 BCE, the text was not accepted as a policy manual or plan for the future. Perhaps if the outcome had been different, the Han dynasty might have been restructured and prosperous.

Nonetheless, the Han dynasty continued in disarray, but the lineage vines that sought a new afe of Great Peace (Taiping) grew. They show up in Chinese history in several places. One of these is in the Yellow Turbans, who rebelled against the Han in the 180s. The revolutionary seal of this movement and the program it envisioned for a new era is preserved for us in the Classic of Great Peace (Taiping jing, CT 1101a). Then, sometime before 142, a Confucian-trained scholar named Zhang Daoling moved into the Heming mountains in Sichuan probably with the intention of setting up a kingdom of Great Peace in that remote region away from the Han imperial eye. One day, while in a state of clarity and quiescence in the Tiangu cave, Laosi appeared to Zhang and gave him the One True Orthodox Way (Zhengyi mengwei) between Heaven and Earth. Zhang began the Way of the Celestial Masters (Tianshi dao or Zhengyi Daoism).

Unlike the Yellow Turbans, the Celestial Master lineage created communities and began to practice Daoism as something other than an individual or small, collective method of transformation. Zhang and the leaders who followed him set up 24 administrative centers dedicated to the way of Great Peace. The Celestial Masters leaders (libationers) began to produce their new texts for guiding their Daoist communities. One of these was a commentary on the Daodejing (Xiang'er Commentary to the Laozi, S. 6825, Bokenkamp 1997). The families that made up these centers in Sichuan province were dispersed and resettled in 215-216, by Cao Cao, king of Wei. They were scattered in both Northern and Southern China.

The impact of this dispersion greatly weakened the unity of purpose and political power needed to realise the political goals of the Celestial Masters. To guide these newly settled communities and keep them within the path of the One True Orthodox Way, a revealed text emerged known today simply as the Commands and Admonitions for the Families of the Great Dao (Bokenkamp 1997). Later, Kou Tianshi (365-448), often called the founder of the Daoist Northern Theocracy, worked to reform the Celestial Masters communities. The History of the Wei (Weishu) reports that, while practicing in the Songshan mountains of Henan, Taishang Laojun (the Highest Lord Lao) appeared to Kou in 415. Laojun revealed a "New Code" for the people of the dao, and we know some of the details of this new revelation through the text Classic on the Precepts of Lord Lao Melodically Recited in the Clouds (Laojun yinsong jiejing, CT 785). The emperor was convinced to put the "New Code" into practice, and Kou was the designated administrator of this new civil order and addressed as Celestial Master. The "New Code" was extended into towns throughout the Northern provinces, and the theocracy reached its height in 440, when the emperor himself was ordained and changed his reign title to Taiping Zhenjun (Perfected Lord of Great Peace).

Some of the Celestial Masters adherents from Sichuan settled in the regions of Jiangsu, the province from which Zhang Daoling came. One form of renewal for the movement in this area occurred when the spirit medium Yang Xi (330-386), a retainer in the prominent Xu family in Jurong (near Nanjing, Jiangsu province), began to receive revelations stretching from the years 364 to 370, and originating from perfected beings dwelling in the dimension of Highest Clarity (Shangqing). One of these perfected beings was the numinal Wei Huacun. Yang wrote down the revelations and delivered them to Xu Mi (303-376) and his son, Xu Hui (341—?370). These revelations became the foundation for the Shangqing lineage of Daoism.

There was not only the Xu family in the Jurong region, but also the Ge family. Ge Hong (283-343), who identified himself as the "Master Who Embraces Simplicity" (Baopuzi), was a student of classical Chinese

texts and Daoist writings, and a collector of the methods for gaining transcendence and the stories of those who achieved it. Ge Hong was extremely interested in the unique contribution external alchemy (waidan) could make to the methods for becoming transcendent and even immortal. His Baopuzi collects a wide array of techniques and how to practice them. It was Ge Hong's grandnephew, Ge Chaofu (fl. 402), who began to receive revelations so powerful that when they were written down, they became talismans of numinous treasure (Lingbao). These texts disclosed new rituals and provided teachings that created a kind of synthesis with the emerging understandings of Buddhist practice and belief then known in China. The Lingbao texts are mentioned in a list of works by Lu Xiujing (406-477) dated to 437.

By the 400s, then, Daoism had two new major teacher-adept lines that joined that of the lineage of Celestial Masters; however, the Shangqing texts, unlike those of Lingbao, became foundational for an actual movement known as Shangqing. Lingbao seems to have been largely a set of texts exchanged between teachers of both Shangqing and Celestial Masters practice. Shangqing's development into a movement occurred through the efforts of a brilliant thinker named Tao Hongjing (456-536). As a result of his work, Shangqing developed its own liturgies, precepts, and rules of order, identifiable holy sites, and lineage of patriarchs and masters.

Tao, like Yang Xi and the Xu family, as well as Ge Hong and Ge Chaofu, was from Jiangsu. He was born in Moling, not far from the modern city of Nanjing, in close proximity to Jurong, the home of the Xus and Ges. In 483, Tao became interested in the Shangqing revelations that had been granted to Yang Xi, and he decided to collect the original texts because he felt there were already a number of forgeries and false teachings circulating and claiming to have their source in Yang Xi and the Perfected Persons that had disclosed themselves to him. In fact, Tao writes disparagingly in his work Declarations of the Perfected (Zhengao, CT 1016) that, "Ge Chaofu fabricated the Lingbao classics and the teaching flourished." Tao knew the Lingbao writings well because he studied with Daoist master Sun Youyue (399-489), who had been a disciple of Lu Xiujing, the standardiser of the texts. He even received training in chanting those texts and drawing supernatural talismans, both key practices of Lingbao (Pas and Leung 1998). But in 492, Tao resigned his position in court and moved to Mt. Mao (Maoshan) with the intention of editing the Shangqing manuscripts he had collected and writing true interpretations of their teachings. The result was two major works in the Shangqing tradition: Declarations of the Perfected (Zhengao, CT 1016), completed in 499, and Hidden Instructions for the Ascent to Perfection (Dengzhen yinjue, CT 421). Tao was closely associated with Xiao Yan (464-549), founder of the Liang dynasty, who later became emperor of the Southern Ti. Tao was supported by imperial patronage while living on Maoshan, and Shangqing teachers and adepts were favored with funding and the construction of various abbeys. The growth of the association of Shangqing with Maoshan explains why the movement is simply known as Maoshan Daoism.

Daoism gained official status in China during the Tang dynasty, largely because the surname of the Tang rulers was "Li" and they claimed descent from Laosi, who was reported to also have had this surname (Li Er). Such close proximity to power and rule brought influential Daoists of the Shangqing and Celestial Masters lineages to the attention of the imperial court. It also led them into conflict with both Confucian literati and Buddhist abbots and monks. Various debates between Daoism and Buddhism were held at court. Sometimes Daoism seemed to prevail, and the Daodejing was even included among the textbooks in the civil service exams. But there was no single trajectory for the relationship between Daoism and

Buddhism. One text used in the disputes between these two traditions was the Classic on the Conversion of the Barbarians (Huahujing). This work was an incendiary affront to Buddhism, claiming that the Buddha was actually one of Laosi's incarnations. Buddhists responded with polemical works of their own, including Daoxuan's (596-667) defense of Buddhism, entitled Collection Spreading the Light of Buddhism (Hongming ju). This conflict was not a mere academic one. At stake were prestige, power, wealth, and influence.

These forces always involve political and social consequences. In fact, every major persecution of Buddhism, first in 446, under the northern Wei, then in 574, under the northern Zhou, and finally in 845, under the Tang, is at least partly traceable to its rivalry with Daoism.

Several Song dynasty (960-1279) emperors, most notably Huisong (1082-1135), promoted Daoism. In 1106, Huisong began a decade-long search for leading Daoist masters. He issued a call in 1114, that every administrative circuit should send 10 masters of great powers to assemble at court in the capital in Kaifeng. The group included the 25th Shangqing Patriarch, Liu Hunkang (1035-1108), and the 30th Celestial Master, Zhang Jixian (1092-1126). Huisong wanted to make the Song capital of Kaifeng into a Daoist community. He created immense gardens in the city, modeled after his vision of the paradise of Daoist immortals on Kunlun (e.g., the Genyue imperial garden). He also built the great Daoist Temple of the Five Peaks (Wuyue Guan). During the Song period, one of the earliest versions of the Daoist Canon was produced.

One challenge faced during the Song dynasty was creating a national moral culture throughout the country. The strategies to accomplish this goal were many, but one was to use a village lecture system. This system made use of troupes of entertainers and teachers who traveled from village to village. Daoist teachings became part of the Three Teachings (Sanjiao) effort to spread a rather uniform moral value system. One way this was done was by the printing and distribution of morality books (shanshu) and ledgers (shanshu). The morality books in this system included Daoist, Buddhist, and Confucian teachings. They were distributed in Daoist abbeys (guan) and shrines (miao) throughout the country, as well as in Buddhist monasteries (si). The most prominent of these books was Tract of the Most High on Action and Response (Taishang ganging pian, CT 1167), still available today.

After the fall of the Song dynasty in the North (1126) and the transference of the court and capital to Hangshou in the South, a period of war and turmoil followed. In 1159, Wang Zhe (aka Wang Chongyang, 1113-1170), a former military officer, left behind a marginal political career and devoted himself to the practices of meditation and "nourishing life" (yangsheng), known as inner alchemy (neidan). Wang was residing in the Zhongnan mountains in Shaanxi province, where he made a dugout for himself for three years and spent four more years in a mountain hut practicing austerities. One day, when he was 48 years old, he entered into an altered state of awareness. The immortals Zhongli Tuan, Lu Dongbin, and Liu Haichan appeared to him and gave him a set of secret rituals and methods for reaching perfection. In 1167, he traveled to Shandong province, where he accepted a number of adepts as students. They gathered around his modest hut on the grounds of the estate of Ma Vu, and he promised to instruct them in a method he called -Complete Perfection" (Tuanshen). Among the disciples he had in Shandong, Tuanshen tradition focuses on a group who became known as the Seven Perfected Persons (qizhen ren: Ma Yu, Tan Chuduan, Liu Chuxuan, Qiu Chuji, Wang Chuyi, Hao Datong, and Sun Bu'er). They helped Wang establish five communities (hui) in Shandong and thus began the Tuanshen lineage, which endures until the present. He had such trust in these seven that he planned

to take four of them with him back to Shaanxi and the Zhongnan mountain area, but he died in Kaifeng before reaching his goal.

Under the leadership of Tiu Chuji (1148-1227), one of the original Seven Perfected Persons, Tuanshen gained significant official recognition when he met with Mongol ruler Chinggis Khan (Taisu, r. 1206-1227) before the Yuan dynasty was established. The khan summoned Tiu for an audience because he was seen as influential over a national movement. Tiu received a number of official titles and political privileges. After this, Tuanshen grew quickly and began to have widespread institutional identity. Sometimes local officials reassigned Buddhist temples to become Tuanshen sites. Nevertheless, in the 1200s, Daoism had a stormy relationship with the Yuan rulers. In 1281, Shisu (Khubilai Khan) even ordered the burning of all Daoist books in an effort to control the influence of Daoists throughout the country.

During the Ming dynasty, the Celestial Masters lineage was quite powerful, and Tuanshen influence diminished. Daoist centers like White Cloud Abbey (Baiyun guan) were directed by Zhengyi (Celestial Masters) masters. Under the rule of the third Ming emperor, Zhu Di (r. 1403-1425), best known by his era name, the "Yongle Emperor," Zhengyi Daoism grew significantly. The emperor studied Daoist techniques, learning talisman-making from two daoshi masters, and also alchemical practices. He patronised the Perfected Warrior (Zhenwu), the Daoist god of Wudang mountain, and promoted him as the numinal protector of the empire. He also gave an order to have a new canon compiled, and it was printed in 1445, during the reign of Zhu Tishen (r. 1435-1449), whose era rule name was Zhengtong. Thus, the Daoist Canon still in use is officially known as Daoist Canon of the Zhengtong Reign Period (Zhengtong daozang).

By the end of the Ming period, the Dragon Gate (Longmen) lineage had grown .within Tuanshen as a renewal movement. The founding legend of the order goes back to Tiu Chuji. The school's name is traceable to Dragon Gate Mountain (Longmenshan) in Longshou district, Western Shanxi, where Tiu underwent his training. The history of the movement traces the transmission of its methods from Tiu down to the Ting dynasty and the seventh-generation Longmen Master, Wang Changyue (d. 1680). Wang was the abbot of Baiyun guan (White Cloud Abbey), and he gathered many followers there. They went on to open Dragon Gate centers throughout China.

The Longmen vine of Tuanshen gained control of a great number of convents and monasteries throughout the country. The Daoist Canon made during the Ming period contains 60 Tuanshen works. In contrast to Zhengyi Daoism, an adept who decided to follow the Tuanshen Longmen way took up a celibate life. He or she would join a monastery or convent and follow a three-year novitiate life. Afterward, the adept could be ordained and make a commitment to a life lived according to monastic precepts. The Way of the Dragon Gate was and is one of self-cultivation through inner alchemy (neidan). By the Ting dynasty, the Daoist Association of China, with an estimated membership of more than 23,000, officially recognised Tuanshen (including Dragon Gate) Daoists in the country. Its center is now in White Cloud Abbey in Beijing, under the administration of the Dragon Gate sect masters.

During the Ting dynasty, the Taiping Rebellion (1851-1864), led by Hong Xiuquan (1812-1864), was hard on Daoist institutions and practitioners. Hong has been called "God's Chinese Son," and he tried to establish a Heavenly Kingdom of Great Peace (Taiping) in Nanjing following an interpretation of Christianity revealed to him through visions and encounters with the Heavenly Family of God, including his brother, Jesus, and his sister, Guanyin. The Taiping Rebellion was one of the bloodiest conflicts in

history. At least 20 million Chinese perished as a result of it. Hong's armies struck out at the "idols" of the Buddhists, as well as the City God (Chenghuang shen) and Daoist temples. Hundreds, perhaps thousands, of Daoist guan and miao were destroyed. Among those communities particularly hard hit were the Celestial Masters centers on Dragon and Tiger Mountain (Longhushan).

At about the same time, Daoism was introduced to the West. James Legge ^ (1815-1897), who had worked as a missionary in Hong Kong and China beginning in 1824, returned to England in 1873. He was awarded the first professorship of Chinese studies at Oxford University and soon joined the massive project of translating the Sacred Books of the East, edited by Max Muller. In 1880, Legge published The Religions of China: Confucianism and Taoism Described and Compared with Christianity (Legge 1880), and, in 1891, he published volumes 39 and 40 in the series, entitled The Texts of Taoism, containing The Book of the Way and Its Power (Daodejing), the Zhuangzi, and Tract of the Most Exalted on Action and Response (Taishang ganging pian).

After the collapse of the Ting dynasty, the Republican government of 1912 sought to confiscate Daoist temples and turn them into public buildings, schools, hospitals, and senior citisen centers. The May Fourth Movement (1919) continued this program. In the 1920s, the New Life Movement encouraged students to destroy Daoist statues and icons throughout the country. During the Anti-Japanese War (i.e., World War II), many Daoist temples were requisitioned as army barracks either by Chinese forces or Japanese ones. This meant that by the time of the establishment of the New China in October 1949, there were only about 300 Daoist temples in Beijing, where a century before there had been 1,000, and only about 50 in Shanghai, where before there had been 200.

Daoist practitioners and institutions had a hard time during the Great Leap Forward (1958-1960), and then came another attempt to eradicate Daoism during the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (1966-1976). Daoist holy sites were destroyed or repurposed as community centers or barracks for Red Guards. Dcjoshi of all lineages were forced to cease practice and lineage rituals. Doctrinal and ritual texts were destroyed. Some daoshi were sent to labor and reeducation camps. Daoism was banned during this 10-year period and labeled as a "feudal superstition."

We have to admit that in many ways, Daoism is still recovering from the bitter losses of multiple attempts at suppressing its expression and even destroying its very existence from the time of the Taiping in the mid-1800s to the late 1980s; however, in the late 1980s, leaders of the People's Republic of China (PRC) began to recognise Daoism as an important traditional belief system and a potential focus for physical health and improvement for the population at large. So, many of the more scenic temples and monasteries have been repaired and reopened. Daoism is one of the five officially approved religions recognised by the PRC (Daoism, Buddhist, Islam, Catholicism, and Protestantism). It is administered through a state bureaucracy, one arm of which is the Chinese Daoist Association (CDA). Daoist practitioners are required to register with the CDA, which sets rules about education, ordination, and the construction of Daoist temples and statues, and calls upon adepts to abandon superstition. While control of Daoism's development may be viewed with suspicion and much objected to, it is neither something new nor exclusively Communist. Emperors and imperial ministries wanted to control and administrate Daoism as long ago as the Tang dynasty, and they enacted policies to suppress or encourage it.

It is difficult to know how many Daoist masters there are in the PRC because a number of Zhengyi daoshi are unregistered and deliberately avoid the training and official certification procedures of the CDA. Some estimates are that there are more than 25,000 Daoist masters in China of both the Tuanshen and Zhengyi (Celestial Masters) lineages, but that number may be higher. There are more than 2,000 guan and miao in mainland China that are specifically identified as Daoist, but many Zhengyi masters do their work through associations with such sites as City God temples and even through individual contact with Chinese citisens apart from any official institution. The CDA, through its Daoist Research Office, has encouraged the study of Daoist history and philosophies both generally and in a few of the major universities in the PRC. Some of the most prominent and respected universities in China have established centers or faculties that focus on Daoism or at least research and write about it historically and philosophically. Several Chinese universities have also begun new comparative philosophy programs, many taught in English, which bring international students to China and foster their study of Daoism and its relationship to the philosophies and religions of the West.

Anyone interested in the training, belief, and practice of a currently living Daoist master could hardly do better than to undertake a reading of the authorised biography of Wang Liping (1949—), the 18th Generation Master of the Dragon Gate (Longmen) branch of Daoism, as told to his students, Chen Kaiguo and Zheng Shunchao. This work was translated under the title Opening the Dragon Gate: The Making of a Taoist Wizard, and it tells the 15-year story of Wang's training, which began in 1962. The work anchors Wang Liping to his three teachers and gives us an inside look at the development of a Daoist master, revealing that much remains unchanged since the time of Zhuangsi.

It is fair to ask whether a tradition as rooted in China as Daoism can ever find the right kind of soil in which to grow in other cultures and parts of the world. At first glance, it may seem impossible; however, perhaps the spread of Daoism to other global communities is not as unthinkable as it might first appear. After all, Anglo-Europe and even the Americas became fertile soil for beliefs and practices attached to a Jewish prophet from Nasareth and an Arab seer from Mecca.

As early as the Tang dynasty, an initial extension of Daoism into Korea and Japan occurred because these cultures were interested in all things Chinese (Kolin 2001). In both cases, Daoism was confronted with a full set of well-established indigenous beliefs and practices. In response, many of the same philosophical and social dynamics operated in these new cultures as they had during the period of the Song, when Daoism grew over, grafted onto, and became a hybrid with a wide range of popular Chinese beliefs, including Buddhist ones. Daoism's cosmology of yin and yang, and its traditions about immortals and numinal beings, as well as its techniques of exercise, meditation, medicinals, and diet, took hold in East Asia outside of China with varying levels of strength.

A second extension of Daoist influence in Korea took place in the 1500s and in Japan under the Tokugawa's (1600-1868). This wave of influence carried the techniques of inner alchemy and the use of the morality books to those cultures. In Vietnam during the early 20th century (1920s), Daoist ritual practices, talismans, and petitions were grafted into the Caodai tradition by Ngo Minh Chien, its founder.

Nevertheless, the situation with Daoism's growth in the West has been different. Edward Said has made us well aware of the problematic nature of the early constructions of the "Orient" as Westerners began to contact Chinese and other Asian worldviews. Orientalism was a way in which the West gained

strength and identity by setting itself apart from an imaginary, dreamy, and romantic Orient. It fed the imperialism and colonial domination of the West (Said 1978). And, yet, the Western attitude toward Daoism may not best be characterised under the rubric of Orientalism. Although the early exposure to Daoism in the West was shaped greatly by such figures associated with Anglo-European missionary expansionism as James Legge, Daoism featured only marginally in the Western consciousness during the colonial epoch. It came into view only at the end of that period (Clarke 2000). In his work The Tao of the West: Western Transformations of Taoist Thought, J. J. Clarke explores the rich diversity of the ways in which Daoism has been appropriated and engaged in the cultures of the West.

From 1927 to the end of World War II, the chief proponent of Daoism in the West was generally regarded as Henri Maspero in Paris. Michael Saso was the first Westerner to be initiated as a Daoist priest, and he subsequently served as coeditor of Taoist Resources, the earliest scholarly journal on Daoism for a Western audience. Although this journal is no longer published, it is indexed in most of the standard library collection searches.

William de Bary insists, and rightly so, that "no tradition ... can survive untransformed in the crucible of global struggle" (1988: 138). We have been witnesses to such transformations of Daoism in films like Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon (Wohu canlong, directed by Ang Lee, 2000) and Hero (Ping xiong, directed by Zhang Yimou, 2002), as well as in the fiction of such Western writers as American novelist Ursula Le Gunn. Le Gunn did her own translation of the Daodejing and grafted Daoism into much of her fiction, especially Books of the Earthsea and the novel The Dispossessed. These works represent the hybridisation of Daoism into Germanic and Anglo-European contexts and narrative frames in highly creative ways.

With the worldwide advent of the internet, Daoism is once more in flux, overlapping and intertwining its classical lineages with new versions trying through their minds and hearts to understand the tradition and its contribution to biospiritual transformation. Such Daoist cultivation practices as qigong and its understandings of "nourishing life" (yangsheng) in medicine and diet are being repackaged and made accessible throughout the world.

Some recent attempts to understand the historical interaction between Daoism and its new Western soil have been written. With respect to the United States, Elijah Siegler's The Dao of America: The History and Practice of American Daoism is a thorough work that provides a historical frame, a rather complete list of Daoist organisations in the United States, and a chart of North American Daoist lineages. In the United States, there are Daoist temples in Arisona, New York, Hawaii, and a number of other places. The Penglai temple in Toronto is perhaps the best known of Canadian sites of Daoist influence in that culture. In England, the British Daoist Association was founded in 1996, and likewise there is a Daoist Association in France. Daoism was first established by immigrants to Sidney, Australia, and there is also a community in New South Wales.

The living vine of Daoism will continue to grow and transform, as we have seen it do in each new era and culture. The new hybrid that is produced may have stems and shoots that are short-lived, but other vines may wrap themselves around new global challenges and realities, and transform them and the people involved, just as the Perfected Persons (zhenren) have been made and remade for 2,000 years.
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CELESTIAL MASTERS: HISTORY AND RITUAL IN EARLY DAOIST COMMUNITIES by Terry F. Kleeman [Harvard-Yenching Institute Monograph Series, Harvard University Asia Center, 9780674737167]

In 142 CE, the divine Lord Lao descended to Mount Cranecall (Sichuan province) to establish a new covenant with humanity through a man named Zhang Ling, the first Celestial Master. Facing an impending apocalypse caused by centuries of sin, Zhang and his descendants forged a communal faith centering on a universal priesthood, strict codes of conduct, and healing through the confession of sins; this faith was based upon a new, bureaucratic relationship with incorruptible supernatural administrators. By the fourth century, Celestial Master Daoism had spread to all parts of China, and has since played a key role in China's religious and intellectual history.

CELESTIAL MASTERS is the first book in any Western language devoted solely to the founding of the world religion Daoism. It traces the movement from the mid-second century CE through the sixth century, examining all surviving primary documents in both secular and canonical sources to provide a comprehensive account of the development of this poorly understood religion. It also provides a detailed analysis of ritual life within the movement, covering the roles of common believer or Daoist citizen, novice, and priest or libationer.

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Excerpt: This book is about an organized, institutionalized religions founded in western China around the middle of the second century of our era. At the time, followers of the religion called it the Way of the Celestial Masters (Tianshidao) and believed that it was founded upon a Covenant with the Powers (mengwei) that was both correct or orthodox (zheng) and unique in the world (yi), giving rise to

another term for the religion still in use today, the Correct and Unitary (Zhengyi). Outsiders who noticed that each family was responsible for an annual tithe of five pecks of rice (roughly nine liters) referred to the movement as the Way of the Five Pecks of Rice; some seeking to deny its legitimacy referred to believers as "rice bandits" (mizei). It was not the only such movement at the time; history records other movements like the Way of Great Peace that erupted in revolt a few decades later in eastern China, and there were, no doubt, dozens if not hundreds of similar new religious movements centering on a charismatic founder with a religious message during the early medieval period that arose and disappeared without attracting the attention of Chinese historians.

Over the ensuing centuries, the movement grew and transformed, absorbing a diverse body of practices and beliefs, many of which originated with other religious movements or esoteric traditions. From the beginning, adherents spoke of its tenets as the "teachings of the Dao" (Daojiao), and eventually this became the accepted reference for the movement itself, whereas its religious officiants, initially called "libationers" (jijiu), came to be called "gentlemen of the Dao" (Daoshi). In English, the religion has most commonly been rendered as "Daoism," and its religious professionals have been dubbed "Daoist priests." I will use these terms throughout this book.

Unfortunately, in English we have a limited range of terms to use with regard to traditional China, and this use of "Daoism" has been contested. The term is also applied regularly to certain philosophers from the Warring States era (479-220 BCE), especially those who preserved their thoughts in books called the Laozi or Master Lao and the Zhuangzi or Master Zhuang, and which were grouped together in a bibliographic category called the "lineage of the Dao" (daojia) around 100 BCE. The figure of Master Lao was revered by the Celestial Masters as a deity called Lord Lao, and the book Laozi was given a distinctively religious interpretation in the Celestial Master commentary, but the ideas animating the Celestial Master movement were for the most part quite at variance with the Warring States teachings of either book. The movement stressed explicit norms of moral conduct and the performance of sacred ritual, both of which the two books openly rejected. If one insisted on finding the true origins of the movement in Warring States thought, Confucianism and Mohism are better candidates.

A broader argument has also been advanced, claiming that any group or text that concerns itself with the Dao ("the way") deserves the epithet "Daoist." Since a wide variety of thinkers and groups referred to their preferred way to live or act as their "way," this expands the term to the point where it loses much meaning or utility. Moreover, it puts the modern historian of religion in the position of lumping together groups that clearly saw themselves as distinct. Thirty-five years on, it is high time to agree with Michel Strickmann's pronouncement that Daoism "came into social being with the Way of the Celestial Masters in the second half of the second century AD, and continues under the aegis of its successors and derivatives at the present day."

The early Daoists saw their world as comprising two types of people: the Daoist or the profane (su). In our earliest texts, like t lie Xiang'er commentary to the Laozi, we already see the Daoist (Daoren), sometimes referred to optimistically as the transcendent gentleman (xianshi), contrasted with the "profane person" (suren). Both are mortal and fear death, for example, but the would-be transcendent gentleman "believes in the Dao and keeps the precepts" (xin Dao show jie and is thus able to "unite with life" (he yu sheng), whereas the profane are fated to "shed this mortal coil before their time" (weiyang tuisi). Daoism offered salvation from an unsavory posthumous fate where the demonic agents of the

Earth Office might seize the deceased and subject him or her to torture-filled interrogations followed by a variety of punishments, as we see in this third-century passage from a spirit revelation:

> The Daoist and the profane person are indeed distant from each other! Why do I say so? The Daoist is pure and correct, and his name belongs up in the Heavens. The profane person is impure and defiled; when he or she dies, they belong to the Earth Office. Is this not distant? When foolish people keep to the profane and give no thought to serving the Dao, they can be called greatly deluded.

The purity claimed by Daoists derived from their refusal to participate in the most central of traditional Chinese religious rites, the offering of blood sacrifice to deities no different in kind from dead humans, gods who depended on the sustenance of regular offerings of meat and wine, and repaid the sacrificer with divine blessings that assured health, wealth, and good fortune. Daoists worshipped the Dao as a personified yet abstract deity who could temporarily manifest as a supreme deity, first the Supreme Lord Lao and later a trio of Heavenly Worthies, the Three Pure Ones (sanqing). These manifestations of the Dao required nothing of humans and accepted no offerings. They evaluated human conduct, reported by a variety of spirits both within the body of the Daoist and in an external bureaucratic network throughout the natural world, against a code of precepts that were tailored to the individual's level of spiritual development as reflected in religious rank. Their judgments could be swayed only by meritorious action or the ritualized submission of appropriate official documents.

Each Daoist in the early Celestial Master movement held a specific rank within a universal priesthood of believers, conferred through an ordination ritual that transmitted a document called a register (lu). The register installed a group of protective spirits in the believer's body and imposed a code of precepts, both of which increased with rank. Children of either sex and any social class could be accepted as novices (lusheng), where they progressed through a number of stages, learning to read and compose official documents destined for the Heavens while gaining control of progressively larger cohorts of divine protectors and emissaries. Upon completion of the program, novices became libationers (jijiu), who could gather their own followers and establish their own parishes (zhi). Each household contributed an annual grain tithe to the parish and made pledge offerings to demonstrate sincerity when requesting ritual services; both tithe and offerings were not offerings to the gods but contributions to the operating expenses incurred by the ritual activities of the religion. Each household was supposed to maintain a distinct ritual structure for daily devotional activities and to wear distinctive clothing when engaged in these activities. I follow earlier scholars like Anna Seidel in referring to this self-cognizant, organized, clearly delimited social group as a church.

In this book, I treat the origins and development of this Daoist church from its establishment in the mid-second century through the Period of Disunion, ending the inquiry with the reunification of China at the beginning of the seventh century. By then, the Daoist message had been elaborated and transformed in many ways, with the revelation of new gods, scriptures, and liturgies, and a monastic institution was beginning to form. Daoist communities retaining the ancient social organization survived into the Tang dynasty (618-907) and perhaps far beyond; the modern Yao f ethnic minority of South China and northern Southeast Asia retains a communal Daoism remarkably reminiscent of these original groups. Throughout most of China, however, Daoism eventually evolved into a religion of priests without a lay congregation. They were and still are called on by communities to celebrate specific periodic festivals or by individuals to deal with specific needs on an ad hoc basis. They act as caretakers of the broader

common religion, overseeing its sacrificial observances and confirming the official positions of its gods through esoteric Daoist rites that maintain a clear distinction between ritual activities directed toward popular gods and the pure rituals dedicated to the eternal deities of the Daoist pantheon. Even today, Daoist troupes across the breadth of China and in Chinese communities around the world maintain a ritual program that preserves theological concepts, liturgical forms, and divine appellations that originated in the period treated in this book.

This book is divided into two parts: one dedicated to the historical origins and development of the Daoist church, the other describing the ritual activities of its members. The historical section begins by examining in detail outsiders' accounts of the founding and early years of the Celestial Master movement, when it was still largely confined to West China, including the theocratic state that existed briefly (ca. 191-215) in the Hanzhong region of modern southeastern Shaanxi and northeastern Sichuan provinces. Our primary sources are the dynastic histories of China, a uniquely detailed and continuous source, which, however, is limited by its court-centered, elite nature and by generic conventions that limit its reporting of religious phenomena not controlled by the state. The second chapter looks at this same period from the viewpoint of Daoist sources, revealing the way members of the church conceived their founding and early history. A careful dating and sensitive reading of surviving materials reveals a narrative that in some ways confirms the testimony of conventional sources but also sheds new light on the significance of early church institutions and activities. The third chapter makes use of three early sources that can be confidently dated to the third century to trace the development of the church after the fall of the Hanzhong state and the subsequent great diaspora of 215, when church members were scattered across the breadth of North China, the central administration was disrupted in unknown ways, and many believers were left to their own devices. During this fecund period, huge numbers were converted to the faith at the same time that new practices and institutions evolved to cope with changed circumstances. The fourth chapter treats the fourth through sixth centuries. In West and North China we see a series of attempts to reconstruct the Daoist theocracy of the Hanzhong period. Meanwhile, as a result of the disruptions at the beginning of the fourth century, Northerners of all classes flood into South China, bringing with them Celestial Master Daoism. We can trace best the elite families who played significant roles in government, but rebellions like that of Sun En (?-402) demonstrate the prevalence of Daoism among peasants and tradesmen, as well. During this period several new scriptural revelations incorporated elements of southern occult traditions and Buddhism into Daoism. In both North and South China we see evidence of an increasing contestation between Daoism and Buddhism for government patronage.

The second half of the book looks at ritual life within the Daoist church, drawing on a body of liturgical and normative sources that accreted throughout this period, mixing authentically early materials with later additions. Chapter 5 introduces Daoist architecture and apparel, describing the oratory and parish buildings that were the site of almost all Daoist ritual and the specialized ritual garb that people wore during ritual performances. Chapter 6 focuses on the Daoist citizen (daomin), the most basic level of Celestial Master society. I describe the audience ritual that the head of household performed each morning and evening, bringing him or her directly into contact with potent Daoist deities. I also consider the kitchen-feast, Daoism's answer to the traditional communal sacrificial banquet, which had the same function of exhibiting status distinctions while affirming one's participation in the community. Chapter 7 focuses on the novice or register-student, who learned how to write formal documents to Daoist deities and how to perform the intricate rituals that presented them to the Heavenly Bureaus. There is a

detailed description of the ordination as well as an examination of the role of women and those of mean birth within the church. Chapter 8 is about the libationer or parish priest. It introduces the various functions of the libationer as evangelist, director of spirit revelations, judge, and pastor. Here I also present a new interpretation of the development of the parish system, arguing that it transformed from a fixed number of geographically based administrative centers, staffed by a large number of male and female officers with diverse responsibilities, to a diffuse system of smaller units led by a single libationer that functioned as a ranking system. I also look closely at the procedures for composing and submitting ritual documents like the petition and for drawing talismans that assure ritual efficacy. Finally, I describe the understanding of and ritual responses to death in Daoist communities.

I have adopted this dual structure, in part, because the nature of the sources dictated it. The first half of the book relies on datable sources and puts events in a clear chronological framework. Evidence from the standard histories is written by and for elites from a perspective close to that of the state, but even the Daoist sources exploited in this section were produced by church leaders, sanctioned and promulgated by the central administration of the religion. By combining these two types of sources, I hope to produce a much fuller historical account that preserves multiple voices and relates events as both the profane world and members of the church perceived them. Still, this material alone falls short of the sort of thick description that is the standard for studies of religion and society in a post-Geertzian world.

The materials informing the description of ritual life in the second section were used, to be sure, by church leaders and elite Daoists, but they were equally the property of village priests and peasant Daoist citizens. Before being edited into their final form, they went through a long process of manuscript transmission, handed down by generation after generation of local practitioners who added or deleted items according to need. A similar process has generated the handwritten scriptures (shouchao) that Daoist priests across today's China use. Each surviving liturgical manual or precept list is thus the product of a specific lineage of practitioners. The identity and geographical location of these transmitters is lost to history. This rules out a comprehensive overview of the ritual practice of any specific region of China. Nor can we limit our description to a specific period within the five centuries under examination. We can only claim that the social structures, ritual practices, and modes of interaction with the divine described here were broadly typical of the Daoist church during its formative period. But it is only these sources that can give us a sense of Daoism as a dynamic, vital lived religion, to which millions of Chinese over these centuries devoted their lives and pinned their hopes of divine aid and ultimate salvation in a time of near constant political and military strife, foreign invasion, natural disaster, and epidemic disease.

Religion in the Eastern Han

Since the first chapter opens with historical accounts of the early Celestial Master movement, I offer here some background to the religious milieu of the second century CE. The Eastern Han (23-220) was a particularly fecund period in Chinese religious history, when the religious world of imperial China began to take form. There were changes to every aspect of religious life, and some of these were directly involved in the birth of Daoism as an organized religion.

Two developments are closely tied to the interregnum between the Western and Eastern Han (6 BCE-23 CE). The first is the rise of the oracular literature most commonly referred to in English as the Aprocrypha (in Chinese, chenwei, or prognostications and weft texts).18 Although these texts are best

known for their use as political propaganda by the usurper Wang Mang (45 BC^-23 CE) and later claimants for the Han throne, they are rich in religious imagery and metaphor. Many of the deities and icons that would be prominent in Daoism are first mentioned in these texts, and their continuing revelation over a number of decades accustomed the populace to the idea of spirit revelation as an important source of religious truth.

The other development at this time is the first recorded popular religious movements. In 3 BCE, near the end of the Western Han, a prophecy appeared in northeast China, claiming that the Grandmother of the West, a goddess connected with death and immortality, would manifest in this mortal world. Thousands left their homes to make a pilgrimage to the capital, singing and dancing in a carnivalesque celebration of the coming divine epiphany. They transmitted plaques that they claimed were imperial commands (zhao) guaranteeing salvation. Some two decades later, in 18 CE, we hear the first reports of the Red Eyebrows, members of a communal religion worshipping Prince Jing of Cheng-yang Liu Zhang (d. 177), who had suppressed the rebellion of Empress L^ and hence represented the restoration of the Han royal house. Interpretations of the their distinctive eyebrows differ, with some claiming that coloring them with cinnabar represented long life, whereas others thought they were red for the fire element that was thought to rule the Han royal house. Members of this uprising traveled with their families in communities and took the titles of their leaders from those of village leaders, much like the later Celestial Master libationers. They were guided by a local spirit medium who conveyed commands from Prince Jing and were able to briefly install a direct descendant of Prince Jing as emperor.

There were also more prolonged manifestations or epiphanies of a deity. The primary figure associated with such beliefs is the divinized Laozi. The Scripture of the Transformations of Laozi (Laozi bianhua jing), studied by Anna Seidel (1969), traces the appearance of avatars of Laozi under a variety of names and guises up through the middle of the second century CE. The last recorded incarnation is in the Sichuan region, close to the founding revelation of the Celestial Masters both geographically and temporally. The text suggests that Laozi might return in the future, and, indeed, the appearance of these messianic manifestations continued for many centuries, sparking numerous popular rebellions. A parallel development was the appearance of popular temple structures (fangsi, fangmiao) dedicated to dead humans. Although periodically suppressed by the government and attacked by Daoists, such popular cults to local heroes or those suffering an abnormal death became the norm and allowed the masses to access divine powers once restricted to elites.

There is a significant change in burial practices during the Eastern Han. We find in tombs from that period land contracts (maidiquan) as well as grave-quelling texts (zhenmuwen) that tell us much about popular understandings of death. The land contracts record the purchase of the subterranean space occupied by the tomb, which is often described in religious terms ("to the limits of the four directions" and so on) and secure the soul of the deceased in that space, often with the stipulation that the dead will remain separate from the living. Grave-quelling texts (also called "infusion-releasing texts," or jiezhuwen) invoke a powerful deity like the Heavenly Thearch or the Yellow God to absolve the deceased from any blame incurred through the construction of the tomb. Both reveal a highly bureaucratized world of the dead and a fear of otherworldly curses on the living by or through their deceased relatives. Although the specific methods and deities were not prominent among early Daoists, worry about such matters led many to seek the protection of the Daoist. church.

The concept of a utopian world of Great Peace (taiping) was an important inspiration for the early Daoists. A text with this term in the title was presented to the Han throne twice in the late first century BCE and again in the mid-second century. Questions concerning the dating, stratification, and filiation of the transmitted text(s) are also complex, but large portions seem early, likely of Han date, and as closely related to Eastern Han philosophical works as to anything found in early Daoist texts. It is equally uncertain if the text reflects the beliefs and practices of a distinct religious community or just personal revelations to one or more inspired individuals. It does seem that some version of this text was known to and used by Zhang Jue, who led a religious rebellion in late-second-century East China known as the Yellow Turbans (huangjin) for their distinctive headgear. The Yellow Turbans shared with the Celestial Masters a belief in the origin of illness in misconduct, the efficacy of confession of sins, and the use of talismans. It is likely that they shared an aspiration for the advent of an age of Great Peace, when social conflicts would be lessened and all peoples would be dealt with equitably, and they may well have thought this would only be attained after an apocalyptic period of social upheaval. There is no evidence, however, that they thought of themselves as "seed people" who would repopulate the world, or that they practiced a sexual ritual like the Merging the Pneumas rite as a prerequisite to such salvation. The Commands and Precepts for the Great Family of the Dao of 255 makes clear that Zhang Jue was not considered favorably by the Celestial Masters.

The most far-reaching development during the Eastern Han was the entry of Buddhism, but the extent of its immediate influence is uncertain. In 65 CE, an imperial prince in modern Jiangsu was already hosting public Buddhist rituals with thousands of participants; in 165, the emperor offered official sacrifice to the Buddha. In both cases, the Buddha was associated with Laozi and the pursuit of immortality. By the late second century, we know of several teams of Buddhist monks and laymen in Chang'an translating Buddhist scriptures into Chinese. Although these translators sometimes turned to Daoist terminology to express unfamiliar Buddhist concepts, no one reading these translations would have failed to notice their alien character. Distinctively Buddhist terminology in a Daoist source is a reliable indication of later composition. Still, several features of the new religious movements of the second century are shared with Buddhism, especially the practice of the confession of sins. Moreover, Buddhists, like the Celestial Masters, rejected blood sacrifice, though their rationales for doing so were different. Buddhism may well have stimulated the rise of Daoism. By the mid-second century, Daoists were claiming that Buddhism was a degraded form of Daoism and the Buddha himself just another avatar of a divine Laozi. By the late fourth century, Buddhism had exerted an undeniable influence on Daoist ritual practice and theological conceptions and was competing with Daoism for official patronage.

All of these changes came together in the rise of Daoism. The fall of the Western Han and the lengthy, strife-torn interregnum had awakened all to the fragility of the Chinese imperial state. Political instability brought warfare, famine, and epidemic disease, leading to large-scale movements of population. Among these frightened and dislocated individuals, a variety of new forms of religious expression arose. The Celestial Masters were one such group. Driven by a revelation from Lord Lao that established a new covenant and guided by ongoing revelations from his representatives as well as deceased leaders of the movement, their teachings on sin as the origin of illness and misfortune, disaster as an apocalyptic punishment for an immoral age, ritualized confession and penance as an effective response to such dangers, and the promise of a utopian age of Great Peace resonated with the masses. Like the new foreign faith of Buddhism, the Daoism they fashioned in Sichuan had a broad appeal, winning converts across China until it was a truly national religion that provided a satisfying answer to the questions of its

day. Daoism proved adaptable to changing circumstance, developing new rituals for the salvation of all the living and all the dead, and remains to this day a vital part of the Chinese religious landscape.

Conventions

It remains to guide readers through a few pertinent conventions used in referring to and translating materials from medieval China. Located at the far eastern end of the Eurasian continent, China had traded with the West since Neolithic times but was not significantly influenced by the currents of history that prevailed in the Mediterranean world and later Western Europe. It developed unique ways to understand and describe the natural world and the imagined other world, populated by the dead and the divine, that its East Asian neighbors came to share but were seldom communicated to the Indian subcontinent, the Near East, or Europe. For this reason, translating the vocabulary of early Daoism into a Western language poses certain challenges. In the interests of making this book accessible to scholars of religion and history with no background in Sinology, I have sought approximations in English for every Daoist technical term and conception. Lest these be misunderstood as true equivalents, I note here some of the key problems.

I have followed Bokenkamp (1997) in translating as "pneuma" the word qi which seems etymologically to have referred to the steam of cooking grain but came to mean everything from essence to energy, scent, air, feeling, and spirit. In the Daoist context, it sometimes means a force within the body that can be manipulated, but it often refers to noncorporeal beings, and sometimes these usages are difficult to distinguish. The goal of much Daoist endeavor was the status of xian, which originally referred to nonhuman winged beings who could be found only in mountain fastnesses or divine realms but came to refer to humans who had attained some form of physical longevity or immortality. I translate this as "transcendent" because the word is etymologically related to words meaning "to ascend" and because many xian were not truly "immortal," the other common translation. For the early Daoists, this status was awarded by heavenly bureaucrats in return for exemplary moral conduct and proper ritual actions. Later, internal and external alchemy as well as various physical regimens were also employed. Another key term is zhen, which later came to mean simply "real, true" but originally designated a class of divine beings untouched by vulgar desire or impurity. I follow many others in rendering this as "perfected" in both nominal and adjectival usage, a nod to the austere Perfecti of the Cathar tradition, who eschewed both meat and sex. In Daoism, the perfected are the class of beings above the transcendents and just below the Daoist gods (shen).

Words for deity in Chinese are vexing. It is standard to render shen as "god" and gui as "demon" or "ghost" depending on the context, but guishen was a common locution for divine beings in general. We will see in chapter 2 that even the high god of the Daoists was sometimes called a gui. I have tried to sort these out,

translating appropriately for context, but have sometimes resorted to the ambiguous "spirit" for either term. The high god during the Shang dynasty (ca. 1500-1045 BCE) was called simply di and this remained a popular term for exalted deities, sometimes singular but often plural, throughout Chinese history. Beginning in the third century BCE, it was appropriated by temporal rulers, giving rise to the unfortunate translation "emperor." In an attempt to recapture the sense of a divine ruler, I regularly translate this term as "thearch." Other translation problems are noted as the terms come up.

Although there have been a number of Daoist canons, beginning in the fifth century, the only one to have survived is from the fifteenth. Transmission of these scriptures has been less than ideal, resulting in numerous textual variants. Moreover, up until recently, all Daoist texts were transmitted without punctuation, and only a minuscule number of texts have been published in modern critical, collated editions. For all these reasons and to aid readers interested in the source behind my translations, I have included a punctuated, corrected Chinese text in traditional characters for all of them. Citation is to the 1923-26 Hanfenlou photo reprint of the original Ming edition, cited by chapter, page, recto (a = front) or verso (b = back), and then line number if necessary. Citations of Buddhist works include the serial number of the scripture in the Taishó edition preceded by the letter "T," followed by the volume, page, and register (a, b, or c) on the page. Citations of the classics are to the 1815 Shisanjing zhushu edition reprinted by Yiwen Publishing in 1974. Citations of the dynastic histories are to the Zhonghua shuju punctuated editions, and other works are as noted in the bibliography. <>

DAOISM IN MODERN CHINA: CLERICS AND TEMPLES IN URBAN TRANSFORMATIONS, 1860–PRESENT edited by Vincent Goossaert and Xun Liu [Routledge Studies in Taoism, Routledge, 9781138889415]

This book questions whether temples and Daoism are two independent aspects of modern Chinese religion or if they are indissolubly linked. It presents a useful analysis as to how modern history has changed the structure and organization of religious and social life in China, and the role that Daoism plays in this.

Using an interdisciplinary approach combining historical research and fieldwork, this book focuses on urban centers in China, as this is where sociopolitical changes came earliest and affected religious life to the greatest extent and also where the largest central Daoist temples were and are located. It compares case studies from central, eastern, and southern China with published evidence and research on other Chinese cities. Contributors examine how Daoism interacted with traditional urban social, cultural, and commercial institutions and pays close attention to how it dealt with processes of state expansion, commercialization, migration, and urban development in modern times. This book also analyses the evolution of urban religious life in modern China, particularly the ways in which temple communities, lay urbanites, and professional Daoists interact with one another.

A solid ethnography that presents an abundance of new historical information, this book will be of interest to academics in the field of Asian studies, Daoist studies, Asian religions, and modern China.

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Excerpt: "Wherever there is a Daoist, a temple soon follows. So goes the common saying among the Daoists. Indeed, the modern history of Chinese temples and that of the Daoists seem to go hand in hand. Yet, while both temples and Daoists serve Chinese society, the relationship between the two has yet to be thoroughly analyzed. Most temples, now as before, operate without a Daoist, and many Daoists do not work in temples. So, are temples and Daoists two independent aspects of modern Chinese religion? Are they indissolubly linked? If so, what factors helped forge such a link? How have Daoists and temples fared through the political, social, and cultural changes in modern China?

This volume attempts to shed new light on these and other issues through an interdisciplinary approach combining historical research (tapping on archival resources and recently published material) and fieldwork. It focuses on urban centers because this is where sociopolitical changes came earliest and affected religious life to the greatest extent; it is also where the largest central Daoist temples were and are located. The chapters examine how Daoism interacted with traditional urban social, cultural, and commercial institutions and pay close attention to how it dealt with processes of state expansion, commercialization, migration, and urban development in modern times. By comparing their case studies from central, eastern, and southern China with published evidence and research on other Chinese cities, the authors reach larger conclusions as to how modern history has changed the structure and organization of religious and social life in Chinese cities, and the role therein of Daoism, in particular.

We examine the evolution of urban religious life in modern China, particularly the ways in which temple communities, lay urbanites, and professional Daoists interact with one another. We look at major Daoist sacred sites (both Quanzhen monasteries and Zhengyi temples) and their function as central institutions structuring local religious systems (training other clerics, organizing the large-scale festivals, etc.), but also at clerics working for neighborhood temples or trade and professional guild shrines either as resident specialists or as occasional ritual service providers. While there is a trend among lay temple leaders to marginalize and even replace religious professionals like Daoists, the latter still manage to retain control over important material and symbolical resources.

The political changes during the twentieth century have deeply changed relationships between lay institutions and clerics; yet, the question remains whether lay people or Daoist clerics can or should control temple life. These questions were addressed repeatedly from the last years of the Qing empire through the early Republican and the socialist periods, all the way to the present post-Maoist era. Our chapters follow these moments in sequence. Instead of a more conventional schematic tradition vs.

modernity narrative, we offer a more complex and interesting story of continuous negotiation and reinvention over some 150 years.

Historiography

A recent state of the field essay by one of us has outlined how modern history (transformations between the late imperial period and the present) has long been a neglected part of Daoist studies, which have traditionally been strong on textual studies of early scriptures, and on fieldwork-based investigations of ritual and other local practices in rural areas understood as the living tradition, sometimes even within a perspective of salvage anthropology. 1 While these studies are fundamental and must continue, new developments since the early 2000s, such as wider availability of sources materials (archives and local historical records) and an interest among scholars in China in religion as part of local history, have seen the field develop rapidly and strongly. Our volume is part and parcel of this larger movement, and it tries to showcase some of the best studies that have been published so far. It is a result of a cooperative project entitled "Temples, Urban Society and Taoists" conducted between 2007 and 2011 with the generous support of the Chiang Ching-kuo International Foundation for Scholarly Exchange as well as the French Agence Nationale de la Recherche. This volume builds on other publications also stemming directly from that project, including a volume of primary source materials in Chinese forthcoming from the Religious Culture Press in China, and a special issue of the journal Daoism: Religion, History and Society.

This new research trend that combines social and local history with Daoist studies is also embedded within a larger scholarly interest in the religious history of modern China, and of the first half of the twentieth century, in particular. 3 Rapidly growing interest and studies in the current religious revival and development throughout the Chinese world have led scholars to discard a simplistic opposition between tradition and modernity and to trace the roots of the contemporary evolutions. Many of these roots were found in the effervescent situation of the Republican period that witnessed not only widespread attacks on and destructions of local religion by the modernizing state and anti-superstition campaigners but also vibrant religion innovations: new cults, organizations, rituals, and ideas. While studies of the modern transformations have tended so far to pay particular attention to Christianity and Buddhism, Daoism was by no means a sideshow in that larger history. Therefore, while remaining ever keenly aware that it is self-defeating to isolate Daoism from the larger religious ecology of China, we have provided an intentionally Daoist perspective on the larger religious developments that have been taking place from the end of the empire to the present day. We hope that these Daoist stories add nuance, depth, and richness to the growing and larger picture of contemporary religious revival in China.

Definitions

We need to define from the outset the object of our enquiry. By Daoists we mean, in a broad definition, all professional or amateur providers of services (such as rituals and teachings) identified as Daoist by themselves and/or their clients. While this definition casts a wider net than those used by historians who look specifically to people with an ordination in either the Zhengyi or Quanzhen tradition, it allows us to embrace the continuum of the specialists teaching Daoist techniques and providing Daoist ritual services to urban communities; in any case, most of the specialists living in or employed by temples who are discussed in the present volume are Daoist by any definition. Defining urban can be trickier, as we are fully aware that the urban vs. rural divide has been a rhetorically loaded category in modern China, often serving as a foil for modern rationality vs. backward superstition; furthermore, moving beyond

rhetoric and looking at actual situations lead us to discover and argue alternatively for a rural-urban continuum extending from the major metropolises and their suburbs to smaller cities, townships, and large villages. Our focus here is clearly on the largest cities such as Shanghai, Suzhou, Hangzhou, Wuhan, Guangzhou, and Hong Kong, as well as sub-provincial centers such as Nanyang, while remaining aware of the dynamic circulations between these centers and their own peripheries.

We do not mean that these large cities were home to a specific form of Daoism or that there is such a thing as a distinctive "urban Daoism." By contrast, we look at dynamics of change caused by urbanization and other modern processes, how they impact Daoists and their practices and organizations in the urban setting, or indeed how Daoists face and experience the extremely rapid urban expansion. The specific conditions of urban life do not create just new constraints (temple seizures, zoning rules against temples, smaller public spaces for rituals, de-territorialization of identities and social bonds) but also new aspirations and possibilities. Indeed, throughout Asia, cities have been places of religious affirmation and innovations through the modern period. We aim to show that China and Daoism are no exception.

This volume, which has a strong social-historical focus, does not deal with the evolving contents of the Daoist ideas, teachings, and self-cultivation practices. These equally important issues have been addressed by other recent volumes, and we will return to them in future projects. 5 Similarly, we look less at liturgy, which tends to be conservative (even though denying its modern changes would be a flagrant mistake), than at the social context of rituals: who pays for and organizes Daoist rituals in modern Chinese cities, and where does it take place? Daoists today need access to (and ideally control over) temples to be able to perform their rituals and be recognized, but those with rights and authority over temples may have other agendas. Taking our hint from Kenneth Dean's idea of Daoism as one of the liturgical frameworks that organizes and structures Chinese local societies, we endeavor to explore how this (in relation to other) framework adapts to the social, political, and economical transformations that have shaped modern Chinese cities, notably the sweeping movements of temple appropriation, destruction, and reconstruction.

Structure of the volume

Part I, "Historical Overview," provides a historical framework for looking at our case studies, at two levels: first at the most general level of the Chinese world, and second, with a case study, located in Nanyang ?? in Central China, so as to place the various types of Daoist institutions and their trajectories through the history of modernization and urbanization.

Chapter 1 , "Urban Daoists, from 1860 to the Present," provides an analytical background for the whole volume by describing the various configurations for Daoism in Chinese cities by the late Qing period – central temples, neighborhood and guild temples staffed by Daoists, entrepreneurial Daoist ritual services centers, and lay spirit-writing halls – and the way these types experienced diverging trajectories through the upheavals of the twentieth century down to the present. The chapter concludes by presenting four general models through which Daoist temples adapted to the modern changes (first during the Republican period, then during the socialist period): (1) the classical model of the central temple ordering networks of lower-order neighborhood and guild temples, and negotiating with the state and local elites; (2) the Daoist association model of the temple as a conservatory of Daoist culture providing services to individuals; (3) the entrepreneurial temple ran by closed groups of devotees

expanding through charity and ritual services; and (4) the community temple that builds up legitimacy by identifying itself as Daoist (yet often keeps the Daoists at a distance). This line of analysis will contribute to understanding not only what was lost in the process but also how Daoist clerics, rituals, and communal forms of organizations resisted or weathered the twentieth-century modernization processes and embodied tradition and, actually, in an urban context, adapted and invented new ways of operating. The following chapters in the book provide cases for several of these models.

Chapter 2 , "The Martial Marquis Shrine: Politics of Temple Expropriation and Restitution, and Struggles of Daoist Revival in Contemporary Nanyang," traces the history of Daoists and their former temples in Nanyang, a prefectural seat and regional trade town located in the upstream Han River valley, from the 1980s to the present. In that city, the Quanzhen Daoist lineages and their temples had developed over the late imperial period close interactive ties with the local elite, guilds, cults, and local community. But, contrary to the story in other cities (such as those discussed in Chapters 5 and 6), the revival after 1980 has run into tall and seemingly insurmountable obstacles: the initial outright seizure of the temple by the local government in 1949, and the continued occupation and repurposing of the temple complex as municipal museum and tourist site from the early 1950s to the present, even though such occupation and repurposing are directly at odds with the post-Mao era CCP and state policies of religious liberalization and temple repatriation. As a result, Daoists who used to run the famed Wuhou, a temple in honor of the late Eastern Han era brilliant strategist and loyal minister Zhuge Liang, have never managed to date to recover their temple in spite of their sustained activism and mobilization. The story tells us that the local government's secularizing agenda and entrenched political interests have often proven too overwhelming for any Daoist revival to thrive.

Part II, "Spirit-Writing Temples and Their Networks," is devoted to one of the most important types of Daoist temples that developed in Chinese cities during the late imperial and modern periods. These temples are organized around the worship of deities that communicate with humans through spirit-writing (fuji ??) séances and answer individual queries. These divine-human communications and revelations often result in full-fledged scriptures and other sacred texts. Such temples and their communities engage as a rule in charitable activities and thus form a nexus for community organization. The two chapters in this section deal with such networks of temples devoted to the same deity (Patriarch Lü ??) in two different areas.

Chapter 3 , "The Jin'gaishan Network: A Lay Quanzhen Daoist Organization in Modern Jiangnan," describes the emergence during the turn of the nineteenth century of a major spirit-writing cult to Patriarch Lü at Jin'gaishan ??? (a hill just south of Huzhou, northern Zhejiang province) and its subsequent growth into a dense network that by the first half of the twentieth century included over 70 branches in all the major cities of the Jiangnan region, notably Shanghai. These urban branches had genealogies that listed thousands of members, most of them members of the local elites. Through a combination of internal and external sources (revealed texts, liturgical manuals, newspapers, archival documents, ethnography, etc.), the chapter describes the activities of the branch temples (ritual, self-cultivation, charity, and predication), their place in local religious life, and the process of their demise after 1949, to be followed by present-day renewal in some of the branches. This dense description provides new perspectives on the importance of Daoist temples in urban Jiangnan between the late Qing and the Republican period and what is left of this historical moment.

Chapter 4 , "The Dao in the Southern Seas: The Diffusion of the Lüzu Cult from Meizhou to Bangkok," tells a story that dovetails with the previous chapter as it starts with temples dedicated to the same deity, with similar patterns of urban development and elite membership, this time in the Hakka area of Meizhou, and then in the Chaozhou area of southern China. Because of the dense migrant networks of the Chaozhou people, this cult soon spread to Southeast Asia, particularly Thailand, where it has since flourished without interruption. Bringing a transnational and diasporic dimension to the volume, the chapter explores how the cult came to be a central institution in the lives of the Chinese settlers in Bangkok, and then it was brought back from there to the mainland in the 1980s.

Finally, Part III, "Householder Urban Daoist," looks at a different facet of urban Daoists: the married priests who are affiliated with urban temples (usually owned by local communities) but do not own or run them.

Chapter 5 , "The Modern Transformations of the Old Eastern Peak Temple in Hangzhou," based on several years of intense fieldwork and archival documentation, explores the modern history of a temple that used to be one of the most famous in the Jiangnan region and now struggles to revive. The Old Eastern Peak temple ???? in the suburbs of Hangzhou was up to 1949 the locus of a huge network of lay devotional associations that converged during the seventh month to participate in the Eastern Peak festival, where local deities and their human servants came to pay homage to their overlord, the God of the Eastern Peak. This was managed by a very large and influential family of Daoist priests, the Zheng. The local power of the Zheng caused their brutal downfall after 1949, and the temple was closed and razed down in 1958 as part of the struggle against "reactionary societies." Yet, the temple was rebuilt during the 1990s and now employs some of the Zheng as ritual specialists. This fascinating story encapsulates many elements of the story where the respective roles of Daoists priests, village leaders, and religious activists had to be reinvented through the contemporary revolutionary struggles, yet it also shows remarkable resilience at the level of ritual and worldviews of the believers.

Chapter 6 , "Zhengyi Daoists and Daily Life in the Baoqing Pier Neighborhood in Modern Hankou," based on archival and textual sources, and fieldwork notes, retraces the origins and history of the Zhengyi Daoist householders' settlement and practice among the central Hunanese migrant community in Hankou (Wuhan) from the nineteenth century to the present. The authors examine the various roles these Daoist householders played in the daily life of the Hunanese migrant laborers, merchants, and sojourners in the modernizing city, and pay particular attention to these householders' negotiation with the state's changing regulatory framework, new urban planning and development, increasing social mobility of the younger generations, and the post-Maoist economic reforms in order to survive and thrive in the swiftly changing social, economic, and cultural settings of Wuhan. <>

ZHU GUANGQIAN AND BENEDETTO CROCE ON AESTHETIC THOUGHT: WITH A TRANSLATION OF THE WENYI XINLIXUE (THE PSYCHOLOGY OF ART AND LITERATURE) by Zhu Guangqian, translated and commentary by Mario Sabattini, edited by Elisa Levi Sabattini [Emotions and States of Mind in East Asia, Brill, 97890043921 99]

In *Zhu Guangqian and Benedetto Croce on Aesthetic Thought*, Mario Sabattini analyses Croce's influence on the aesthetic thought of Zhu Guangqian. Zhu Guangqian is one of the most representative figures of contemporary Chinese aesthetics. Since the '30s, he had an active role in China both on the literary and philosophical scenes, and, through his writings, he exerted an important influence in the moulding of numerous generations of intellectuals. Some of his works have been widely read, and they still provoke considerable interest in China, on the mainland as well as in Taiwan and Hong Kong. The volume also presents a revised translation of Zhu Guangqian's *Wenyi xinlixue* (Psychology of Art and Literature).

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Zhu Guangqian is one of the most representative figures of contemporary Chinese aesthetics. Since the '30s, he had an active role in China both on the literary and philosophical scenes, and, through his writings, he exerted an important influence in the moulding of numerous genera tions of intellectuals. Some of his works, and particularly those aimed at the young (Zhu Guangqian has always declared that these readers were his favourites), have been widely read, and they still provoke considerable interest in China, on the mainland as well as in Taiwan and Hong Kong.

In the '30s and '40s, Zhu Guangqian constantly maintained a certain distance from political events, and he never embraced the positions of the Leftwing intellectuals who were at that time committed to sustaining the action of the Chinese Communist Party on a cultural level. Despite this, after 1949, his authority in the academic field was not significantly questioned, and he was able to continue his research and teaching activities in the Western Languages Department at Peking University. Violently attacked because of the idealistic concepts he espoused, Zhu Guangqian published a self-criticism and officially adhered to Marxist-Leninist doctrine, without however renouncing, de facto, the fundamental points of his aesthetic theory. During the Cultural Revolution, he fell into disgrace, like almost all of the intellectuals of his generation. However, with the fall of the so-called "Gang of Four" in 1976, he re-emerged in the Chinese cultural world with unquestioned importance and prestige, such as he had probably not experienced since 1949. Until his death, occurred in 1986, he continued to occupy an important place in the current renaissance and development of aesthetic studies in China, and some of his writings from the '30s and '40s have been reprinted on the mainland, including those which had been more subject to attack in the '50s and '60s.

Western Chinese studies have up to now demonstrated only scarce interest in Zhu Guangqian's work, despite the incontrovertible importance it has had in the cultural history of contemporary China. This is all the more surprising if we consider that Zhu Guangqian has been one of the main artificers of the "mediation" thanks to which the Chinese intellectual world has been able to absorb Western values and concepts. Certainly, his "mediation" has operated in a specific sector, which is that of a theoretical reflection on art and literature, but it is useful to underline the intimate connection existing between the theory and the practice of art and literature, especially as far as critical methodology is concerned. Zhu Guangqian's "mediation" has never signified passive assimilation: he has always "read" and interpreted Western theoretical doctrines and enunciations in the light of some of the fundamental presuppositions of traditional Chinese thought and the concrete practice of Chinese art and literature. This "contamination" in all likelihood helps explain why Zhu Guangqian's writings have been so successful in China and, at the same time, may account for the criteria which have regulated the choice and selection of Western doctrines.

In order to understand the significance of this encounter between Western and traditional Chinese cultures in the work of Zhu Guangqian, it would be worth our while to look briefly at his education, which was subject, as Zhu Guangqian himself has said, to "very old" and "very new" influences. Born in 1897 in the Zhu Guangqian district (Anhwei province), an area rich in cultural traditions, Zhu Guangqian came from a literary family. Up to the age of 15, his teacher was his father, who, according to custom, took great care to transmit to his son the fundamental aspects of classical Chinese culture. Following this period, Zhu Guangqian went to the Tongcheng Middle School (Tongcheng zhongxue), the curricula of which were still strongly in luenced by the literary school of the same name dating from the Qing dynasty (1644-1911). In 1917 he enrolled at Wuchang Higher Normal School (Guoli wuchang gaodeng

shifan xuexiao), where he chose Chinese as his main subject. The following year, however, disappointed by the quality of the teaching in that institution, he left Wuchang for Hong Kong, where, at the University, he began studying English and Western literature. He himself speaks of the effect on him in that period of the development of the "New Culture Movement", whose attacks against tradition and the use of literary language (wenyan) were already well-known nation ally thanks to the May 4th Movement. Zhu Guangqian, steeped as he was in classical Chinese culture, felt like a shopkeeper who had just been informed that all of his money, accumulated over many years of hard work, had lost all its value. At first he was overcome by sadness at the fact that wenyan was to be replaced by the vernacular (baihua), but then it was precisely his studies in Western culture which led him, after bitter inner suffering, to the conviction that the New Culture Movement was necessary.

This youthful distress, which Zhu Guangqian himself tells us about with a noteworthy dose of self-irony, helps illuminate the basic reasons which preceded the evolution of his mature thought. The close links which Zhu Guangqian firmly maintained with the ancient cultural tradition of his own country seemed threatened by the profound crisis into which that same tradition had fallen after the impact with the West. Like many other intellectuals of his generation, Zhu Guangqian turned to the West in order to seek a new cultural identity, and it is significant that, to him, West ern "knowledge" simply ended up becoming a synonym for scientific knowledge. For Zhu Guangqian, however, turning to the West could not mean breaking links with his own cultural tradition. The West assumed, on the other hand, the role of mediator in the identification of a new means of reading and interpreting that tradition, thus re-evaluating its more valid aspects and, consequently, in the final analysis, rendering his own links with that culture much firmer.

Zhu Guangqian spent five years in Hong Kong. Then, after receiving his Bachelor of Arts, he returned to China, where he became an English teacher. However, he did not yet consider his period of learning finished with, and he prob ably did not feel that China in that period could offer him the stimuli he required. In 1925 he went to the West, where he was to spend eight years undertaking intense study in the most diverse fields, from literature to psychology, from philosophy to art history. At first he attended courses at Edinburgh University, then at London University, the University of Paris and, finally, the University of Strasburg, where he received his Doctorate with a thesis entitled The Psychology of Tragedy: a Critical Study of Various Theories of Tragic Pleasure.

It was during this period of study in the West that Zhu Guangqian identified his own specific research area and elaborated the fundamental lines his own aesthetic theory was to follow. He himself states in the introduction to one of his most important works, The Psychology of Art and Literature (Wenyi xinli xue):

> My interests were centred on, firstly, literature, secondly, psychology, and lastly, philosophy. My love of literature leads me on to a thorough study of questions relating to criteria of criticism, and on the relationship between art and life, art and nature, form and content, and language and thought. My love of psychology lead me into a study of the relationship between emotion and imagination, of creation and appreciation as psychic activities, and, finally, of individual differences in taste. My love for philosophy lead me to a study of the writings on aesthetics by Kant, Hegel, and Croce. Thus aesthetics became the link between my favourite studies. I now believe that to neglect aesthetics is a serious lacuna for those who are studying literature, the arts, psychology, or philosophy.

For Zhu Guangqian, therefore, aesthetics ended up constituting a global "scientific" reply to a series of requirements and demands which had come to the fore in the years of his early studies. Emotionally tied to China's "past", in particular to its artistic and literary manifestations, he was however aware of China's "backwardness" in the scientific and technological fields, just as he was aware that the weight of tradition itself, and above all Confucian tradition, was at the origin of this backwardness. The problem was to separate those artistic and literary ex pressions from their "backward" context, while at the same time making sure that they did not become the object of condemnation that "Westernist" intellectuals formulated in reference to tradition in its entirety. Zhu Guangqian could not identify with the new literary and artistic production, which young Chinese writers and artists were trying hard to realise by basing themselves mainly on West ern models, in that he considered this production to be of a none too elevated quality, and certainly not comparable to that of the West, nor to classical Chinese production. Aesthetics could provide "scientific" critical criteria, in that it studied art as such, as the expression of moods and feelings and as man's creation, beyond the different social and cultural contexts in which the individual works had been produced. Within aesthetics, Chinese artistic and literary tradition could be placed at the same level as Western tradition, all the more so in that certain theoretical for mutations seemed to fit in perfectly with some of the typical expressions of that tradition. What is more, aesthetic "science" found a series of correspondences with Chinese tradition at the level of a critical reflection on art, for which the Chinese experience could offer its own valid contribution to a better definition of some concepts and thus render them more "universal" and comprehensive.

There is also another aspect which must be taken into consideration. For Zhu Guangqian, art and literature had assumed a function and meaning which went well beyond their specific context. As we will see below, they appeared to be connected with the most profound essence of life. Aesthetics, therefore, in that it is a "science" of art and literature, could be intended, in its broadest sense, as a "science" of life and man. Within this conception, which we could define as "aesthetic universalism", the Chinese and Western traditions could come together and reciprocally integrate one another with absolute equality and without contrast.

Zhu Guangqian himself said that he undertook his literary critical studies by beginning with Croce, and then by reading, through Croce's mediation, the writings of Kant, Hegel, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche and Bergson. Croce's theory has assumed, without doubt, an important significance within the complex of Western doctrines used by Zhu Guangqian. Zhu Guangqian's name therefore ended up being indissolubly linked with that of Croce, both in China and abroad. However, the label of "Crocian" which was given him as early as the '30s (at first certainly with his con sent) led Zhu Guangqian to repeatedly come to terms with Benedetto Croce's philosophy. His thought thus developed and defined itself, in reference to many questions, through constant reference to Croce's thought.

In my article "<Crocianism> in Chu Kuang-ch'ien's Wen-i hsin-li-hsueh", I tried to demonstrate that Zhu Guangqian was never, in reality, "Crocian", not even when he himself sustained he was, but that he took advantage of Crocian theory along with other doctrines of Western aes thetics in order to "valorise" a vision of art which was profoundly rooted within the Chinese tradition. A comment on my article by Zhu Guangqian himself, which appeared in 1981 in Dushu, confirmed my hypothesis. The choice of The Psychology of Art and Literature for analysis was not only due to the fact that it is Zhu Guangqian's most important and most "systematic" work, but also to the particular meaning it has in the history of

the Zhu Guangqian's "coming to terms" with the Crocian system. In the 1956 "self-criticism", in referring to the development of his thought in the aesthetic field, he distinguishes three different phases: the first, corresponding to the first draft of The Psychology of Art and Literature, is characterised by a complete acceptance of Croce's aesthetic theory; the second, corresponding to the second draft of the work, is marked by the emergence of an ever-more skeptical attitude towards Crocian aesthetics, and therefore contains many in congruent notes; the third, which coincides with the publication of the volume Criticism of Crocian Philosophy (Keluoji zhexue shuping) (1948), records the first sign of doubts regarding Croce's idealist philosophy, after a "superficial" reading of all his philosophical writings and a logical analysis of these.

In the introduction to The Psychology of Art and Literature, the first edition of which dates from 1936, there is a reference to the first draft of the work, written four years before publication, when Zhu Guangqian was still studying in Europe. He underlines that he had added five chapters to the final version (including the one dedicated to the criticism of Crocian aesthetics), and says:

> These five new chapters mark a change in my ideas on aesthetics, which are now very different from those I had when I wrote the first draft. I was then strongly influenced by the formalist aesthetic as it evolved from Kant to Croce. This theory held that aesthetic experience was only the intuition of form. This meant that we contemplated, with the greatest concentration, an image that was completely isolated, and free of all ties with other things. For this reason, abstract thought, association of ideas, moral concepts, etc. were all outside the domain of aesthetic. I now realise that human life is an organism, and that all types of activities, be they scientific, ethical or aesthetic, cannot, in reality, be separated from each other, however possible it may be to distinguish them theoretically. Thus, I am radically opposed to that mechanistic vision that forms the basis of Croce's formalist aesthetic, and the abstract analytical method it employs [...] I modified my first draft twice and on both occasions, this skeptical view I had of Formalism led me to correct the opinions I put forward when I was a follower of the theory. I am certainly not claiming to have demolished formalist aesthetics -there are many principles it has established that cannot be cast into limbo- but it does has the defect of being too restricted. My contribution to it is intended to be only a "rectification". It is a big mistake to reinforce one's prejudice in the course of studies. As soon as one sets out deliberately to reconcile conflicting views, one's prejudices are strengthened, as when one is blindly partisan. In fact, I had no intention of reconciling conflicting views, but, if I did set off on this course, I did so, perhaps, through over-caution, because I could not bring myself to believe with absolute convic tion in one-sided theories and conclusions drawn from insufficient facts.

I have chosen to cite the entire section from the introduction to The Psychology of Art and Literature as I believe that it significantly illustrates Zhu Guangqian's attitude not only towards Crocian theory, but also towards the other Western doctrines he uses in his analysis. This syncretism, which characterises his entire work, at least as far as the Western sources are concerned, seems to be a conscious choice, determined by the desire to arrive at a delineation of a non-"partial" and non-"unilateral" theory. This is why references to the doctrines of Croce, Münsterberg, Bullough, Lipps, Groos, Vernon Lee, Langfeld, Richards, Delacroix, Nietzsche and so on are to be found in perfect harmony in his work. What is the guiding thread linking all of these references? In the pages above, I have already hinted at a reply to this question. Now it might be worth our while to concretely analyse the way in which these different doctrines are fused in the formulation of the concept of "aesthetic experience", which is of seminal importance in Zhu Guangqian's thought.

"Aesthetic experience" is systematically analysed by Zhu Guangqian in the first five chapters of The Psychology of Art and Literature, but almost all his writings either implicitly or explicitly refer to this concept. Croce's theory of intuition is undoubtedly of great impor tance to this definition. There were no substantial modifications in this respect during Zhu Guangqian's "revision" of Croce's theory, which is referred to in the passage cited above. If, therefore, we clarify the meaning assumed by Crocian theory within Zhu Guangqian's concep tion of the "aesthetic experience", then it is possible to locate at the origin the mechanism of that "contamination" between Western doctrines and Chinese tradition mentioned at the beginning of this paper.

Zhu Guangqian defines aesthetic experience as "the psychological activity that occurs when we respond to the beauty of nature and of art", and adds that "[...] conditions, both those caused by nature, as well as those that spring from art, are, in all their variety, the stuff of "aesthetic experience" [meigan jingyan]. The big task of aesthetics is really the analysis of this experience." But Zhu Guangqian does not limit himself to using the concept of intuition (derived from Croce) in order to illustrate aesthetic experience. Another theory given substantial weight is that of "psychical distance", coined by the English psychologist Edmund Bullough. Zhu Guangqian uses this theory to demonstrate that, during aesthetic experience, it is necessary to look at things with a certain detachment, without allowing oneself to be absorbed by their "normality". Only by grasping their unusual, uncommon aspect, cut off from all possible practical implications, is one able to really appreciate their beauty. The theory of "psychical distance" is anything but secondary in the definition of intuitive activity: it establishes, in fact, the conditions which are necessary so that the intuition of form (= aesthetic experience) can take place. Zhu Guangqian also gives a series of examples of the application of the theory to artistic phenomena, and basing himself on this application he eulogises and defends traditional Chinese art:

> Modern technical advances have brought art gradually nearer reality and nature. This, though, is not necessarily artistic progress. The new Chinese artists consider the technique of Western art perfect -in their view a horse in a painting should look like a real horse, the representation of a moonlit forest should look like the real thing. In this view Chinese art is felt to be unworthy. Without doubt Western art has its merits, and Chinese art has its defects. But the merits of the one do not lie in its closeness to nature, just as the defects of the other do not stem from its failure to be naturalistic.

And again:

> If those who condemn the theatre of antiquity on the grounds that forcing the voice and singing in a high pitch is not reasonable were to see one of Wagner's musical dramas, then perhaps they would realise with surprise that that sort of game is not exclusive to the Chinese. If they were then to examine ancient Greek theatre a little more carefully, they would come to realise that wearing masks, painting the face, and wearing buskins are certainly not characteristic of a primitive art. In painting and sculpture, perspective was certainly a great technical advance, and this advance could lead to artistic progress. But art without technique is, in the end, much superior to technique without art. The sculptors of the medieval monasteries certainly knew that their carvings were not realistically proportioned, but their work lost none of its merit for that. In terms of technique, an ordinary apprentice today is probably more skilful than Giotto was, but the works of Giotto are immortal.

In analysing aesthetic experience, Zhu Guangqian also dedicates much time to the presentation and discussion of the doctrine of empathy (Einfühlung). He examines the theories of Lipps, Münsterberg,

Groos, Vernon Lee and Langfeld with the aim of arriving at a general and all-comprehensive definition of the phenomenon. In this case, too, as far as "distance" is concerned, Zhu Guangqian establishes a direct connection between it and the intuition of form:

> When we are concentrated in the contemplation of an isolated image, we usually forget that the ego and the object are two different entities, and we ar rive at ego/object identity. From the ego/object identity we reach the state in which the ego and the object flow one into the other and so we un wittingly introduce our feelings into the object, while the attitude of the object is transmitted to us.

This phenomenon, however, is not for Zhu Guangqian a "necessary condition" for aesthetic experience. The doctrine of empathy is also used to il lustrate traditional Chinese art. In particular, calligraphy is used as an example:

> Simple ink marks come to be seen as things endowed with life and temperament. These qualities at first exist only in the mind of the spectator. Through empathy he unconsciously transfers to the character the image it has given rise to in his mind. Thus the character can provoke empathy, and since, like all other art, it can express the temperament and the delight in the calligraphic act of the artist, it too can be termed "lyrical".

It already seems clear, therefore, that Zhu Guangqian's recourse to the Crocian theory of intuition to ex plain his conception of aesthetic experience (= intuition of form) is of a completely extrinsic character. In order to better understand the real meaning attributed by Zhu Guangqian to the term "intuition", it may be worth our while referring to the Chinese tradition. The concept of "intuition" is not new in Chinese philosophy, but constitutes the basis of the cognitive process proper to Daoism, in which there is no distinction between subject and object: both disappear in the essential unity of things which constitute the natural world. It is interesting to note how Zhu Guangqian, in order to explain the meaning of intuition, at a certain point cites a famous aphorism by Laozi:

> Laozi said: "Studying increases day by day, practising the Dao decreases day by day".

These words can be applied very aptly to aesthetic experience. Study is knowledge derived from experience; Dao is the possibility to intuit form in itself. The more we know about something, the more difficult it is to concentrate on the form in itself, to intuit the form, to stimulate a pure and authentic aesthetic sense. The aesthetic approach involves decreasing study and increasing Dao.

It means that by putting apart everything which has been learnt about an object, such as its composition, its use, its characteristics, it is possible to directly grasp its original form without any conceptual mediation. Just like the daoist sage who, in order to live in conformity with Dao and intuit the laws which govern the continual and incessant mutations of things in the universe, must decreasing study and increasing Dao, in order to experience the aesthetic approach, one must intuit form in itself by letting go knowledge. The attitude is similar: in both cases, one leaves out of consideration everything which is arbitrary and artificial in the logical categories and practical aims which man superimposes on reality in order to bring his own internal state into line with the nature of things.

Those who attain absolute happiness, according to Zhuangzi, identify themselves with Dao, go beyond the affirmations, negations and all common distinctions which constitute inferior knowledge, lose their own ego, because in Dao, the "ego" and the "non-ego" are no longer two things, but coincide in a superior unity. And Zhu Guangqian:

> In pure intuition there is no awareness of self. Self-awareness derives from the distinction between self and things, and when we forget this distinction then we can achieve the state of mental concentration.

It must also be pointed out that going beyond knowledge implies a deeper knowledge, which can be attained only through lengthy preparation and spiritual training. Ignorant people are not able to attain absolute happiness, identifying themselves with Dao and thus intuitively understanding the real essence of things, because they are still immersed in habitual things, still tied to certain instinctive reactions which can distance them from the truth, and they are still exposed to all the dangers that social life implies. First there is knowledge, then non-knowledge, and this latter cannot exist without the former. In the same way, aesthetic experience, according to Zhu Guangqian, cannot be considered an isolated and self-sufficient phenomenon, nor can it be considered an ingenuous way of seeing things. Aesthetic experience also presupposes a long spiritual apprenticeship, which varies from person to person, but which always nonetheless directly or indirectly determines its greater or lesser profundity.

It is in this context that the importance of "psychical distance" theory can be explained in Zhu Guangqian's conception. Ordinary people live their daily lives by paying attention solely to their own immediate needs; the joy, pain and pleasure of existence exert an unquestionable dominion over their mind. But some more fortunate people are able to escape from the needs imposed by the practical world, are able to place themselves above and beyond the normal events of life. That is, they are able to assume a "different" attitude towards things, a "detached" attitude. Intuition consists in going beyond immediate, habitual reality and in conquering an apparently different reality, but which is in fact deeper and realer. As Zhu Guangqian says:

> As a rule, we think of the world we ourselves see as being real, while the one the artists see as being only an illusion. But which is real, and which is illusory? Has a street its own natural form, or is it only a way of getting to a certain bank or shop? Has this world an intrinsic value or is it only an instrument or an obstacle for man?

In Zhu Guangqian, empathy is also given a specific function, and does not at all appear to be in contrast with "psychical distance" in that the former presupposes the lat ter: it is precisely through "detaching" oneself from things that one can understand (intuit) their essence, and therefore identify oneself with them. What is more, empathy, or the "ego-object identity", also has its basis in the Daoist Weltanschauung. The "loss of the self" is a characteristic of both Zhu Guangqian's aesthetic intuition and Zhuangzi's superior knowledge. There is, at the basis of this conception, and in both cases, a similar awareness of the relativity of judgement and opinion.

Let us now consider the meaning assumed by intuition in Crocian theory. The concept of intuition, as Croce intends it, is based on that vision of reality, which is proper to Italian Idealism, according to which the human spirit is completely separated from nature, conceived as a pure phenomenal world and simple instrument for the attaining of a superior Reign of Values. For Croce, intuition is not a psychological class able to be referred to the world of experience but is rather a moment in the life of the Spirit in its cognitive process, a moment which can only be in tended if placed on a transcendental plane, where men and things lose their concrete individuality to become only manifestation and extrinsication of the Spirit. By identifying art with intuition, Croce makes of art a category of the Spirit, an a priori form distinct from logical thought and practical activity. Through art, the Sprit expresses the external world, and by expressing it makes it exist. If it is true that art-intuition can do without, and it effectively does

do without, logical thought and practical activity, logical thought and practical activity cannot however do without art-intuition, in that these include it within themselves.

Zhu Guangqian takes his move from completely dif ferent presuppositions. The classical Chinese conception of reality does not allow for any separation between man and nature, between theoretical activity and practical activity, between thought and action. The individual, in his interior development, moves along with the organisation of society and with the events of the Cosmos, according to the laws which regulate the harmony of the Whole. The Sage is not contraposed to nature, but conforms to it, in that he feels a part, along with nature, of a single spiritual process. This implies an intimate union between thought and its practical extrinsication, such that these two moments seem to be logically inextricable.

We have already seen the close relationship between Zhu Guangqian's aesthetic intuition and Daoist intuition. Now, this latter, more than as a starting point can be defined, in its broadest sense, as a point of arrival. It presupposes, in fact, a profound maturation, which is made up of consciousness, distinctions and practical action. Daoist intuition has a meaning which is the exact opposite of that of Crocian intuition. For Croce, intuition is the first form of knowledge, it is the indispensable presupposition without which there could be no intellectual or logical knowledge. But it is intellectual knowledge, the concept, which grasps the real reality of things. For Daoism, on the other hand, conceptual knowledge, the logical constructions of the intellect and their concretisation in discussion, rather than bringing us closer to the reality of things, lead us away from it: they are nothing other than inferior knowledge. Higher knowledge is a going beyond concepts, it is intuition of the Dao. According to Daoist conception, therefore, intuition does not precede the concept, but goes beyond it; it is not the first form of knowledge, but the last and the most truthful. What is more, it is not a purely theoretical activity, but practical and theoretical at the same time, in an indivisible unity which does not al low for any logical distinction.

The interest Zhu Guangqian displays for Crocian aesthetic theory from the very beginning of his studies on Western culture derived in the first place from the importance given in this theory to intuition, a phenomenon which is intimately linked with the Chinese tradition both in the philosophical and artistic fields. At first, however, the Crocian concept of intuition was without doubt "filtered" through other doctrines, amongst which a consistent importance was given to German psychological aesthetics, English Idealist aesthetics and French Positivist aesthetics. It can be said that German psychological aesthetics decidedly contributed to giving a scientific stamp to Zhu Guangqian's handling of the subject. In fact, intuition as such was not at all in contradiction with a psychological approach to the aesthetic problem. Within German psychological aesthetics itself, numerous authors admitted the importance of the intuitive component in the artistic phenomenon. Crocian intuition was at first interpreted by Zhu Guangqian on an essentially psychological level. But as has already been hinted at, for Croce in tuition was something quite different from a simple psychological function, and the art-intuition identity im plied very precise consequences as far as aesthetic analysis was concerned.

In fact, if Zhu Guangqian shows that he is referring to Crocian theory as far as the concept of intuition is concerned, he openly and declaredly takes his distance from him on other matters of prime importance, such as the one pertaining to the art-intuition identity, that of the distinction between expression and communication and that of the value of the work of art. His confutation of the Crocian theory in reference to these specific matters belongs, according to what Zhu Guangqian himself states in the "self-

criticism" of 1956, to the second phase of development of his aesthetic thought, corresponding to the second draft of the The Psychology of Art and Literature. It is, however, difficult to believe that the theoretical presuppositions for this confutation were not already present in the first phase.

Zhu Guangqian says in the chapter of The Psychology of Art and Literature dedicated to a criticism of Crocian aesthetics:

> We follow Croce when we say that aesthetic experience is the intuition of form, when we deny that aesthetic sense is simply pleasure, when we reject the concept of art for morality's sake in the narrow sense, when we state that beauty is neither in things nor in the mind, but in expression. But at the same time, we turn our back on him when we deny that artistic activity can be con fined to the restricted sphere of aesthetic experience, when we admit that art has an appropriate relationship with perceptions and association of ideas, when we oppose the separation of aesthetic man from moral man and from scientific man, and when we maintain that the independence and autonomy of art are limited. Modern aesthetic theorists can be roughly divided into Crocians and non-Crocians. I believe that the Crocians are generally nearer the truth, but we are also very clearly aware of their faults. In our view, Crocian aesthetics has three major defects: -the first is its mechanistic view; the second is the way in which it explains "communication"; and the third relates to its theory of value.

It is necessary at this point to remember that the dis tinctions on which Croce based his philosophical speculation aim at delimitating the individual moments in the life of the Spirit in its unfurling, considered as the only Reality, which transcends common individual experience. They there ore have no bearing, nor could they have, on the individual classifications of empiric psychology, which are deprived, according to Croce, of all truth value. He says in his Breviario di estetica:

> If one asks which of the various activities of the Spirit is real, or if they are all real, one must reply that none is real, because the only real thing is the activity of all those activities, which is not to be found in any of them in particular: of the various syntheses which we have so far distinguished (aesthetic synthesis, logical synthesis, practical synthesis), the only real one is the synthesis of syntheses, the Spirit which is the real Absolute, the actus gurus. But from another point of view and for the same reason, all are real in the unity of the Spirit, in the eternal flowing and re-flowing, which is their eternal constancy in reality.

For Croce, this abstraction is necessary because it identifies a moment in the life of the Spirit, not a component of the human psyche considered empirically. Thus, once the theoretical nature of art has been established and once this has been identified with intuition, the only possible consequence was to exclude thought and morality from its field. What is more, the identification of intuition with expression led Croce to distinguish from this, considered solely as a theoretical activity, the moment of the practical extrinsication of the work of art, or rather of communication. This distinction was indispensable if he wanted to remain faithful to his conception of art as a category of the Spirit. Finally, by identifying art with intuition, Croce was forced to pose the distinction of art from non-art on a purely empirical, non-philosophical, level.

The entire difference between artistic intuition and common intuition, therefore, is quantitative, and, as such, indifferent to philosophy, scientia qualitatum. In order to fully express certain com plex moods there are those who have a greater aptitude and are more frequently disposed than others: some expressions, which are rather complicated and difficult, are much more rarely attained, and these are called works of art. The limits of expression-intuition, which are called art, as op posed to those which

are commonly called non-art, are empiric: it is impossible to define them. An epigram belongs to art: why not a simple word?

The art-intuition identity, with all of the consequences it implies, is the essential basis of Crocian aesthetics. His originality does not consist in having introduced the concept of intuition to the artistic phenomenon, but in having sustained precisely this identity. Now, if Zhu Guangqian willingly accepted intuition in his own aesthetic theory, giving it the meaning of momentaneous experience, attainable through an intimate process of maturation, he could under no circumstances accept that it be identified with art. How could art be cut off from morality and thought, how could it limit itself to a simple moment, to that fortunate moment in which it is possible to grasp the essence of things and appreciate them in all their beauty?

Completely extraneous to the problematic connected with Crocian speculation, Zhu Guangqian considers the aesthetics-intuition experience to be a form of higher knowledge, which it is possible to reach only after a long period of training (which takes place both at a conscious and unconscious level), and which, once attained, determines a series of modifications within the individual and, equally, within society. Art includes all these moments, and must therefore be considered from a broader point of view, bearing in mind all those factors which go together to form it and mark its development. Thus the association of ideas, morality, technique, all those elements which Croce excluded from the field of art, are once again fully a part of it.

In criticising Croce's theory relative to communication, Zhu Guangqian also indirectly brings into question the concept of expression. He points out, in fact, that the nature of the physical means exerts a determining influence on artistic creation. What is more, the artist is an integral part of a determined society, and cannot do without the act of creation; the artist is someone who speaks to others, not an isolated being speaking to himself. The wonder of art consists precisely in the immortality it confers on the artist because of that living feel ing of sympathy which links him with society.

Zhu Guangqian, in dealing with this question, could certainly not ignore some of the fundamental characteristics of Chinese artistic and literary production: the sense of "tradition", the importance of models, the weight of the influence of the various schools and the very meaning of "originality", which gained value when inserted creatively within a complex of techniques and styles handed down over generations. This "continuity" was determined by surroundings, which the artist felt himself to be a part of and which was the only context in which he could fully express his own personality. Separating communication from art and expression, albeit only "notionally", must have seemed to Zhu Guangqian as something simply incomprehensible.

As for the question of value, Zhu Guangqian points out that its annulment in Crocian theory derives from the elimination of communication. In the same way, Zhu Guangqian could not accept the exclusion from art of the phenomenon of the association of ideas. In fact, one of the essential instruments Chinese poetry (but not only poetry) uses to express itself is constituted precisely by the as sociation of ideas. Zhu Guangqian points out that

> The emotions in their original expression can simply be accepted deep within oneself, but cannot be described directly. In order to communicate them so that others understand, it is necessary to create metaphors that make use of indirect, concrete images.

Association of ideas, precisely because it presupposes a single reality which transcends man and nature and brings them together in intimate communion, is the most suitable instrument for grasping a certain mood, or, in general, a certain situation in all of its aspects and all of its connections. Each fact, each feeling, if seen artistically, can become symbols of countless other facts, of countless other feelings. Creative imagination sweeps over all reality and gradually encapsulates all the correlations which are determined between its single moments. Then a landscape, a tree or a flower are associated in the mind with a sensation, a memory, an attitude; the images which derive from this are nothing other, in the end, than the synthesis of this process. It is significant that, in order to sustain this theory, which is undoubtedly deeply rooted in the Chinese tradition, Zhu Guangqian should also have referred to Western points of reference, particularly to the aesthetics of the French scholar Paul Souriau and to French Symbolist poetry.

The distinction made by Zhu Guangqian between aesthetic experience and artistic activity inevitably implied the reinsertion of morality within the field of art. But, in Zhu Guangqian's conception, this is not in fact a simple reinsertion: it is clear from some of his affirmations that art assumes the function of vehicle through the agency of which it is possible to attain a higher morality. Art is able to develop these three elements to their maximum levels. Thus, Zhu Guangqian in the end leads the value and function of art back to "knowledge". This "knowledge" can be naturally realised only at an emotive level, in a field dominated entirely by imagination, but, precisely because of this, it is able to reach a higher level, placing man directly in touch with the real nature of things, able in the end to identify the "ego" with the "non-ego". Practical life, dominated by habit, stops us from grasping the real nature of things. Artists, however, are able to break the bonds imposed by daily reality. Real morality corresponds to this real knowledge.

In conclusion, it can be said that Zhu Guangqian is an original Chinese thinker who cannot be placed within any of the Western "schools", least of all the Crocian one. The so-called "third phase" of development of his thought (to which he alludes in his "self-criticism") is nothing other than the natural evolution of the first two: in the third there is no "repudiation" of Crocian philosophy, in that in precedence there had been no real "adherence". Even though he has never been a follower of Croce, Zhu Guangqian has ended up nonetheless becoming a populariser of his thought. Paradoxically, this happened so that he could all the better take his distance from Croce's thought, gradually defining and clarifying the limits of his alleged youthful "Crocianism". <>

THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY AND RELIGION edited by James R. Liddle, Todd K. Shackelford [Oxford Library of Psychology, Oxford University Press, 9780199397747]

THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY AND RELIGION offers a comprehensive and compelling review of research in religious beliefs and practices from an evolutionary perspective on human psychology. The chapters, written by renowned experts on human behavior and religion, explore a number of subtopics within one of three themes: (1) the psychological mechanisms of religion, (2) evolutionary perspectives on the functionality of religion, and (3) evolutionary perspectives

on religion and group living.

This handbook unites the theoretical and empirical work of leading scholars in the evolutionary, cognitive, and anthropological sciences to produce an extensive and authoritative review of this literature. Its interdisciplinary approach makes it an important resource for a broad spectrum of researchers, graduate students, and advanced undergraduates who are interested in studying the factors and mechanisms that underlie and/or affect religious beliefs and behaviors.

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Given that religious beliefs and behaviors are so pervasive and have such a powerful influence, it is vital to try to understand the psychological underpinnings of religiosity. This chapter introduces the topic of evolutionary perspectives on religion, beginning with an attempt to define "religion," followed by a primer on evolutionary psychology and the concept of evolved psychological mechanisms. With this

framework in place, the chapter then provides an overview of key adaptationist and byproduct hypotheses of various components of religion, highlighting the complementary nature of these hypotheses and their roles in forming a cohesive understanding of the evolution of religion. Concepts introduced in this chapter include hyperactive agency detection, minimally counterintuitive concepts, in-group cooperation, costly signaling theory, gods as moralizing agents, and cultural evolution.

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Religion has been and continues to be a powerful force throughout the world, having a substantive influence on individuals, communities, and even nations. Because religious beliefs and behaviors are so pervasive and have such a powerful influence, it is vital to try to understand the psychological underpinnings of religiosity. Psychologists have spent over a century examining religiosity (e.g., James, 2008/1902), but given the variety and complexity of religious beliefs and behaviors, there is still much that we do not understand. In recent years, an evolutionary psychological approach to religion has begun to add to our understanding, specifically by addressing the origins and functions of religion. The purpose of this chapter is to introduce much of the evolutionary psychological research on religion, setting the stage for the chapters that follow. By doing so, this chapter attempts to provide a coherent view of what we know about the origin and function of religious beliefs and behaviors, discuss what we do not know, and highlight directions for future research. However, before discussing these details, it is necessary to briefly discuss what is meant by "religion."

What Is Religion?

Religion consists of a complex suite of beliefs and behaviors, with much variability within and between particular religious worldviews. Slone (2008) illustrates this concept well, while only scratching the surface of religious diversity:

Nearly 2.5 billion of the world's people belong to an institution that regularly serves its members a small meal of baked dough and fruit juice. The members are told that the meal is the flesh and blood of a dead-but-living fatherless god-man who has the superpowers to grant utopian immortality to those who eat him. Nearly 1.5 billion of the world's people belong to a different institution that requires that five times a day members wash parts of their bodies with water, get down on their knees, bend over, and put their heads on the ground while repeating prescribed words. Members of this institution are also required to starve and parch themselves all day every day for a full lunar month. Some believe that taking even a sip of water during this time can result in eternal hellish punishment after death. (p. 181)

This description, while informative of the variability between two of the world's major organized religions, leaves out an even greater degree of variability that can be found when one includes tribal religions, in which adherents often believe in several gods, ghosts, and/or spirits with various abilities, personalities, and motivations, and have elaborate rituals and rules about how to interact with these agents.

Given the complexity of religious behavior and the degree to which religions can vary, generating a single definition of "religion" is extremely difficult. Indeed, there is no general consensus among those researching religion on how it should be defined (see Gervais, this volume; Cragun & Sumerau, this volume). Nevertheless, Atran has provided a definition of religion that serves as a useful starting point for the purposes of this chapter and is echoed throughout several chapters of this volume. Atran defines

religion by providing a list of components that he argues converge in all societies to become what we refer to as religion. The four components are:

1. widespread counterfactual belief in supernatural agents (gods, ghosts, goblins, etc.);
2. hard-to-fake public expressions of costly material commitments to supernatural agents— that is, sacrifice (offerings of goods, time, other lives, one's own life, etc.);
3. a central focus of supernatural agents on dealing with people's existential anxieties (death, disease, catastrophe, pain, loneliness, injustice, want, loss, etc.); and
4. ritualized and often rhythmic coordination of 1, 2, and 3—that is, communion (congregation, intimate fellowship, etc.).

This definition strikes a balance between specificity and generality, such that it likely captures almost all worldviews that we would intuitivelyconsider to be "religions" while excluding phenomena that should not be considered religions (e.g., political ideologies, devotion to one's favorite sports team, empiricism, etc.).

Atran's definition also above provides a useful roadmap for analyzing religion. Rather than attempting to analyze and explain religion as a whole, we can attempt to analyze and explain the individual components he identifies. The following sections of this chapter introduce how an evolutionary psychological perspective can aid in our under standing of these components of religion. But first it is worth clarifying what an evolutionary psychological perspective entails.

Applying an Evolutionary Psychological Perspective to Religion

Evolutionary psychology is not a subdiscipline of psychology, such as social psychology or personality psychology, but rather an approach to psychology that applies evolutionary theory (Buss, 2019). Evolutionary psychology is founded on the premise that the brain, like every other organ, has evolved and is therefore open to analysis from an evolutionary perspective, which means that the products of the brain (i.e., thoughts, feelings, behaviors, psychology) are open to evolutionary analysis as well. For example, an evolutionary psychological approach has proven useful in examining social behavior (Cosmides, 1989), learning (MacDonald, 2007; Weber & Depew, 2003), memory (McBurney, Gaulin, Devineni, & Adams, 1997), and perception (Rhodes, 2006), to name only a few topics. In short, all aspects of human cognition can be better understood by applying an evolutionary analysis, and religious beliefs and behaviors are no exception.

More specifically, evolutionary psychologists posit that the mind is composed of domain-specific (and possibly a smaller number of domain-general) modules, or "evolved psychological mechanisms," which evolved as solutions to specific and recurrent adaptive problems throughout our evolutionary history (Buss, 2019; see also Barkow, Cosmides, & Tooby, 1992). This is a particularly useful concept when attempting to understand religion. Given the complexity of religion, it makes sense that rather than attempting to understand religion as the result of the mind in general, we should expect that religion results from the activity of several domainspecific psychological mechanisms that evolved as a consequence of specific adaptive problems. However, an important question to consider is whether religious beliefs and behaviors themselves are the adaptive solutions that these mechanisms evolved to produce, or if they are better understood as byproducts of these or other mechanisms.

Despite what some critics of evolutionary psychology have suggested (e.g., Gould, 2000), evolutionary psychologists do not operate under the assumption that all behaviors are the product of specialized

adaptations. In addition to adaptations, evolution by natural selection is capable of producing what are known as byproducts (Buss, Haselton, Shackelford, Bleske, & Wakefield, 1998), and evolutionary psychologists acknowledge and apply this concept to the study of the mind. In terms of evolutionary biology, an often-cited example of a byproduct is the whiteness of bones (Buss et al., 1998). This trait has no impact on survival or reproduction, but it inevitably results from increased calcium concentrations in bones, which is an adaptation to increase bone strength. In terms of evolutionary psychology, examples of byproduct hypotheses include the possibility that music and art are byproducts of language acquisition and habitat preference, respectively (Pinker, 1997).

This leads us to the question of whether religion is an adaptation or a byproduct. However, not only is this question difficult to answer, it may be unanswerable because it is overly simplistic. As Shariff (2008) notes:

> Religions are complex. More than that, they are complexes, stitched together from many elements that have evolved at different times for different reasons. Some aspects of religion may be, or may have been, individually or culturally adaptive, whereas others may be more analogous to viruses. Asking whether religion, as a whole, is adaptive is a misleading question.

Therefore, instead of asking whether religion in general is an adaptation or a byproduct, a better approach is to ask whether particular components of religion are adaptations or byproducts. As the next two sections will show, approaching the problem from this perspective results in byproduct and adaptation arguments that are not mutually exclusive (see, e.g., Stagnaro & Rand, this volume), despite the fact that these different accounts of religiosity are often discussed as if they are pitted against eachother (Kirkpatrick, 2008; Schloss, 2008). But even if byproduct and adaptationist accounts are not in competition, it is still useful to examine the arguments and evidence for each separately, and then one can attempt to unify them into a coherent account of religion.

Byproduct Accounts of Religion

As Atran (2002) notes in his definition of religion, belief in supernatural agents is a universal component of religious worldviews. Therefore, a vital component of any thorough account of religion must explain why humans are predisposed to believing in supernatural agents. From an evolutionary perspective, the leading accounts of why people believe in supernatural agents suggest that these beliefs emerged as a byproduct of evolved psychological mechanisms designed for other purposes. This section discusses what some of those mechanisms may be, what their evolved functions may be, and how they contribute to religious beliefs.

Arguably the most important evolved psychological mechanism involved in the belief in supernatural agents is what Barrett (2000, 2004) has labeled the hyperactive agent-detection device, or HADD. Although not necessarily the first to recognize the human proclivity for detecting agency in the environment, this concept and the rationale behind it was developed by Guthrie (1980), who has since elaborated the idea (Guthrie, 1993, 2008, this volume). Guthrie's argument rests on three assumptions: "perception is interpretation, interpretation aims at significance, and significance generally corresponds to the degree of organization perceived" (1993, p. 41). These assumptions are explained in detail in what follows.

All stimuli that we perceive are necessarily ambiguous, in that they can be interpreted in an indefinite number of ways. This ambiguity is rarely noticed, though, because we have evolved predispositions to

interpret stimuli in ways that were most beneficial to our ancestors. In other words, we have evolved mental heuristics that resulted, on average, in interpretations that were the least costly for our ancestors relative to other interpretations. One such heuristic is to assume that agency is involved whenever this is a possibility, because agents are often the most significant interpretations possible, generating the greatest amount of inferential potential (Barrett, 2004). Even if we are wrong, a false-positive identification of agency is less costly than a false negative. For our ancestors, assuming that a particular stimulus was not an agent (or the result of an agent) could have resulted in the loss of a meal (if the stimulus was prey) or even severe injury or death (if the stimulus was a predator). These possibilities, while rare, would have been far costlier than the potential waste of time resulting from a false-positive detection of agency. As explained by error management theory (Haselton & Buss, 2000), such asymmetrical costs should result in evolved psychological mechanisms biased toward the less costly output. Therefore, we have likely inherited from our ancestors a mechanism best described as the HADD, a perceptual system that is designed to assume the presence of agency when faced with ambiguous stimuli.

There are many sources of evidence that support the existence of the HADD. For example, the logic behind the functionality of the HADD (i.e., that false-positives are less costly than false-negatives) can be observed in species other than humans. Guthrie (1993) notes that frogs respond to small moving objects with flicks of the tongue and large moving objects with leaps into the water, interpreting the stimuli as prey or predator, respectively. These interpretations are the best bets a frog can make, resulting in the greatest potential payoff and the smallest potential cost. Other animals are also predisposed to detect agency even when it is not necessarily there, as Darwin (2006/1871) observed while watching his dog:

> [M]y dog . . . was lying on the lawn during a hot and still day; but at a little distance a slight breeze occasionally moved an open parasol, which would have been wholly disregarded by the dog, had any one stood near it. As it was, every time that parasol slightly moved, the dog growled fiercely and barked. He must, I think, have reasoned to himself in a rapid and unconscious manner, that movement without any apparent cause indicated the presence of some strange living agent, and no stranger had a right to be on his territory. (p. 815)

Darwin's account of the cognitive process resulting in the dog interpreting the stimuli as an indication of agency is impressively prescient with respect to Guthrie's account of agency detection: The dog was presented with an ambiguous stimulus that could be interpreted as the result of agency or natural causes, but ultimately interpreted it as an agent because this represents the most significant, potentially useful, interpretation.

While these examples provide support for hyperactive agency detection in other species, substantial evidence exists for humans as well. Not only are human infants capable of detecting agency but also this detection appears to be hypersensitive. A study by Gergely and Csibra (2003, as cited in Bering, 2011) indicates that stimuli as simple as dots on a computer screen can activate perceptions of agency in infants. When a dot is shown moving in a particular direction on a screen and continually appears to bump into a wall, infants appear to be surprised when the wall is removed and the dot continues to perform the same motion. As Bering (2011) describes it:

> It's as if the baby is staring at the dot trying to figure out why the dot is acting as though it "thinks" the barrier is still there. By contrast, the infants are not especially interested . . . when

> the dot stops in front of the block, or when the dot continues along its path in the absence of the barrier. (p. 36)

Several other studies have also shown that both children and adults tend to view the movement of simple dots and geometric shapes as interacting agents with their own goals and motivations (for a review, see Atran & Norenzayan, 2004; Barrett, 2000, 2004; Bering, 2011). Infants are even capable of inferring moral behavior in geometric shapes. When shown a vignette of one shape moving up a hill, another shape "blocking" the first shape from reaching the top, and a third shape "helping" the first shape by pushing it up the hill from behind, infants prefer to play with the "helper" shape rather than the "hinderer" shape, suggesting that they perceive these as good and bad agents, respectively (Hamlin, Wynn, & Bloom, 2007). Importantly, when adults are shown the same vignette, they easily can describe the events as if these shapes are agents with individual goals and moral attitudes. In summary, the ability to detect agency and apply it to inanimate objects (given that these objects exhibit simple signs of agency, such as seemingly voluntary movement) emerges very early in life and persists into adulthood, supporting the idea that humans possess a HADD. However, there are still several questions that need to be addressed before the HADD can be invoked to help explain religious beliefs.

Even if we have a predisposition for detecting agency, how would this lead to us believing in agents that are invisible or immaterial (i.e., supernatural)? For starters, it is important to note that not all gods throughout history have had the qualities of invisibility and/or immateriality (e.g., the Greek gods; Guthrie, 2008). Furthermore, Guthrie (2008) notes that invisibility and immateriality are not as unusual as one may initially think as characteristics of agents. For example, several animals have the ability to use camouflage that makes them, for all intents and purposes, invisible when in the proper environments or until they move. Intangibility can also be achieved, to a certain extent, in certain animals, such as those who travel in schools, flocks, and so forth, making it difficult to differentiate individual agents.

It is also important to emphasize that detecting agency does not always involve detecting the agent directly; agency can often be inferred by detecting the effects of agents. The HADD not only predisposes us to view certain ambiguous stimuli as agents, but it also predisposes us to view certain ambiguous stimuli as the results of agents, because the same rules of false-positives and false-negatives apply: If it is possible that a certain event was caused by an agent, it is potentially more costly to assume it was not caused by an agent than to assume that it was. Therefore, it is not necessary to actually perceive agents in order to infer their existence, leaving open the possibility that certain stimuli are the products of agents that cannot be seen, leading to belief in supernatural agents.

Although the HADD provides a possible explanation for why humans are capable of believing in supernatural agents, the explanation provided so far offers little understanding of the particular characteristics of these agents. For example, why are supernatural agents almost always perceived as having human traits (e.g., human emotions, desires, motivations, etc.; see Boyer, 2001)? Guthrie (1993) notes that when interpreting ambiguous stimuli, "The most significant possibilities are usually organisms, especially humans. Practically, humans are most significant because their organization makes them most powerful and able to generate the widest range of effects" (p. 241, italics added). Furthermore, humans seem to be naturally inclined to believe in mind-body dualism, or the belief that the mind can exist independently of the body. Bering (2011) argues that this belief is "an inevitable by-product of our theory of mind" (p. 113). More specifically, we are unable to imagine what it is like to not have consciousness, such as after we die, and are thus unable to "turn off" our theory of mind when imagining

our own death or the deaths of others. This results in the universal belief in an afterlife of some kind (with the specific characteristics of the afterlife varying across cultures), and therefore the belief that the mind can exist independently of the body.

Studies by Bering and Bjorklund (2004) and Bering, Blasi, and Bjorklund (2005) indicate that the belief that certain mental states exist after death emerges in childhood and continues into adulthood. When asked questions following a puppet show of an anthropomorphized mouse being eaten by an alligator, most children 11–12 years old understand that biological, psychobiological, and perceptual abilities cease to function, but are less inclined to state that emotions, desires, and epistemic beliefs cease to function. This same trend is even stronger in adults, who are operating on the basis of afterlife beliefs that have been instilled in them for a greater length of time than for children. Even adults who explicitly deny believing in an afterlife demonstrate a tendency (albeit weaker than other adults) to believe that these mental functions survive death (Bering, 2002). In summary, because humans are predisposed to believing that the mind can persist without a body, they are capable of perceiving human agents without bodies (i.e., supernatural agents).

Finally, to further explain how belief in supernatural agents emerged in our ancestors, it is necessary to invoke another byproduct account advanced by Boyer (2001), who argues that our memory systems are susceptible to minimally counterintuitive concepts (MCIs), and that a byproduct of this susceptibility is belief in supernatural agents (see also Greenway & Barrett, this volume). This concept fits nicely with Guthrie's (1993) account of agency detection, in that it builds on the premise that we are likely to detect supernatural agents that possess human minds. Boyer argues that when humans perceive a stimulus, the ontological category to which that stimulus belongs is automatically activated, and with it several assumptions are made about that stimulus. For example, when we detect human agents, that agent is automatically endowed with all the physical and mental capabilities that are typical to the category of "human" (e.g., our theory of mind is activated). Concepts of supernatural human agents are particularly memorable because they keep most of these characteristics intact, but violate a minimal number of our ontological expectations, making them MCIs.

The idea that MCIs are more memorable than other concepts has been supported empirically. Boyer and Ramble (2001) performed a series of experiments to determine the recall rates of concepts that varied in terms of their counterintuitiveness. They found that MCIs elicited greater recall rates than both intuitive concepts that did not violate any ontological assumptions and concepts that violated several ontological assumptions. These findings were replicated by Barrett and Nyhof (2001), and they were also replicated cross-culturally (Boyer & Ramble, 2001; see Barrett, 2004, and Boyer, 2001, for a review).

Also, it is important to note that not just any MCI will be easily remembered and transmitted; this is only likely to occur when the MCI has a high degree of inferential potential (Barrett, 2004). For example, a rock that turns invisible when you look at it is technically an MCI, but this concept is not useful at all for explaining or predicting events. Human MCIs, on the other hand, have the potential to be extremely useful, because humans are known to have beliefs, desires, motivations, and so forth, that can be used to predict their actions.

With the byproduct accounts described so far in this section, we can begin to assemble a hypothetical account of how belief in supernatural agents may have arisen in humans. Our ancestors were almost

certainly exposed to many types of ambiguous stimuli that could have activated their predisposition for detecting agency. As Rossano (2006) notes, "Natural processes with no obvious explanation—storms, illness, animal behavior, and so forth—were all prime candidates for the actions of a supernatural agent" (p. 347). The best bet for attempting to explain such phenomena would be human-like agents, as humans were (and continue to be) viewed as the most capable agents for affecting the world. Even if these human-like agents could not be perceived directly, it would not have been difficult for our ancestors to assume their existence, because they most likely held the implicit belief that the human mind can exist independently of the body. Furthermore, beliefs in human-like agents who violated a minimal number of ontological assumptions, such as being able to control processes that normal humans have no control over, would have had a selective advantage over other interpretations, because our ancestors' memories were most susceptible to these kinds of beliefs. Therefore, beliefs in supernatural agents with human qualities who interact with the world were likely to be remembered and transmitted to others, laying a foundation for what would eventually become the supernatural agents found in tribal and organized religions today.

An additional byproduct account that has received comparatively little attention from those researching the evolution of religion has the potential to explain the emergence of ritualized behaviors, which Atran (2002) considers to be an important component of religion. Once our ancestors held the belief that supernatural agents were responsible for certain events, it is likely that they would have attempted to interact with these agents to attempt to influence their actions. This possibility was noted by Darwin (1871/2006), who reasoned that "The same high mental faculties which first led man to believe in unseen spiritual agencies . . . would infallibly lead him . . . to various strange superstitions and customs" (p. 816). However, if these supernatural agents did not actually exist, how could any behavior geared toward interacting with them persist? Would it not eventually be obvious that these attempts at interaction were futile? Not necessarily, due to the human predisposition to infer causation and the nature of reinforcement learning.

Much like our hypersensitivity to cues of agency, it appears that we are hypersensitive to cues of causation. It is reasonable to assume that this hypersensitivity exists for a similar reason that the HADD exists: Causal events provide a more significant, and therefore more useful, interpretation of events compared to randomness. Michotte (1963, as cited in Twardy & Bingham, 2002) was the first to demonstrate the ease with which individuals can be led to infer causation. For example, when shown a simple geometric shape on a screen moving toward another shape and touching it, followed by the touched shape moving, people assume that the first object caused the movement of the second. However, if there is a slight delay between the first shape touching the second and the second shape's movement, causation is no longer inferred. Therefore, the human perception of causation alone seems insufficient to explain the origin of ritualized behavior directed toward supernatural agents. Although it is possible that the occasional pairing of behavior and desired outcomes (e.g., a rain dance paired with the ending of a drought) would elicit a causal interpretation, the many instances in which the two events are not paired would seemingly deter a causal interpretation. However, even rare pairings of behavior and reward can result in ritualized behavior because of the way our brains are designed to facilitate reinforcement learning.

Given that any behaviors aimed at influencing supernatural agents would have fallen on deaf ears, our ancestors would have been exposed to a random schedule of reinforcement, in which their actions

would occasionally, but only rarely, correspond to desired outcomes, suggesting that their attempt at "communication" had been successful. The possibility for random reinforcement to elicit ritualized behavior was initially illustrated by Skinner (1948, as cited in Dennett, 2006) and his "superstitious" pigeons. Dennett (2006) provides an informative and entertaining interpretation of the series of events:

> Every so often, no matter what the pigeon was doing at the moment, a click and a food-pellet reward were delivered. Soon the pigeons put on this random schedule were doing elaborate "dances," bobbing and whirling and craning their necks. It's hard to resist putting a soliloquy into these birds' brains: "Now, let's see: the last time I got the reward, I'd just spun around once and craned my neck. Let's try it again. . . . Nope, no reward. Perhaps I didn't spin enough. . . . Nope. Perhaps I should bob once before spinning and craning. . . . YESSS! OK, now what did I just do?"

Recent work in neuroscience provides an explanation for this phenomenon, which applies to humans as well as to pigeons and any organism capable of learning through conditioning. Studies by Niv and colleagues (Niv, Duff, & Dayan, 2005; Niv, Joel, Meilijson, & Ruppin, 2002; Niv & Schoenbaum, 2008) have documented that dopaminergic spikes are an important component for the establishment of classical and operant conditioning. Without reviewing the details, the key is that this release of dopamine plays an important role in synaptic plasticity and learning, namely by strengthening the neural connections associated with whatever neural activity preceded the reward, whether it was the perception of a stimulus (in classical conditioning) or the initiation of behavior (in operant conditioning). The latter effect is of particular importance in explaining the emergence of ritualized behaviors. When our ancestors engaged in behaviors designed to influence supernatural agents, they were occasionally "rewarded" with desirable outcomes. When this happened, the neural connections associated with whatever behaviors they were engaging in at the time were strengthened, thereby increasing the likelihood of performing those behaviors in the future. Any elaborations added to the initial behaviors would be subsequently strengthened as well if they were initiated at a time when the reward was obtained again. In short, it seems feasible that reinforcement learning predisposed humans to develop rituals associated with attempting to communicate or otherwise interact with supernatural agents.

Adaptationist Accounts of Religion

The psychological mechanisms described thus far—the HADD, susceptibility to MCIs, afterlife reasoning (i.e., belief in mind-body dualism), the perception of causality, and reinforcement learning—are the best candidates so far for explaining the origin of what would eventually become the complex religious beliefs and behaviors that exist today. More specifically, these mechanisms provide an explanation for how our ancestors originally developed a belief in supernatural agents and ritualized behaviors aimed at interacting with these agents. However, the complexity of supernatural agents and rituals as they exist in tribal and organized religions today cannot be adequately explained by these mechanisms alone. The adaptationist accounts that follow in this section complement—rather than disprove—these byproduct accounts for explaining how religious beliefs and behaviors reached the level of complexity observed today.

Arguably the most compelling adaptationist account of religiosity is that certain religious beliefs and behaviors (i.e., belief in omniscient and omnipresent supernatural agents that are concerned with human moral behavior, and hard-to-fake religious behaviors) are adaptive solutions to the problem of potential free-riding in large groups, facilitating in-group cooperation (Atran, 2002; Atran & Norenzayan, 2004; Boyer, 2001; Bulbulia, 2004; Shariff, 2008; see also Bourrat & Viciana, this volume; Shariff & Mercier, this

volume; Shaver Fraser, & Bulbulia, this volume). For the majority of our evolutionary history, humans lived in small tribes of hunter-gatherers (Diamond, 1992). During this time, cooperation between humans within these small groups could be maintained via kin selection (Hamilton, 1964) and reciprocal altruism (Trivers, 1971). Because the members of these small tribes consisted mostly of genetically related individuals, cooperation could be maintained as a function of benefiting shared genes. In other words, although altruistic behavior toward another can be costly (i.e., resources that could have been invested in one's own fitness are invested elsewhere), these costs can be canceled if applied to a genetic relative, because improving their fitness means benefiting their genes, and because you share a certain proportion of genes with this individual, your fitness is ultimately improved as well.

Furthermore, with small groups, even if not all members are not genetically related, it is unlikely that any of the members are strangers to each other. Therefore, cooperation can be maintained based on the premise that if you help an individual at some point, you can count on them to help you later. Because nobody in the group is a stranger and repeated interactions are the norm, the ability to freeride (i.e., receive benefits from others in the group, or from group living in general, without paying the same costs as other members) is unlikely, because a free-rider will be discovered as such and will be punished (e.g., by being ostracized and no longer bestowed benefits by the other group members).

With the advent of agriculture roughly 11,000 years ago, some groups of humans could afford to give up their nomadic lifestyles and settle in one area. More importantly, they could sustain larger and larger populations (Diamond, 2005). As group sizes increased, kin selection and reciprocal altruism became less sufficient for ensuring prosocial behavior within the group (but see Crespi, this volume, for further consideration of kin selection's role in the evolution of religion). The chances of everyone in the group being related or knowing each other quickly decreased, and with anonymity came a greater potential for free-riding. This problem needed to be solved to prevent large groups from crumbling due to a lack of cooperation. In fact, Dunbar (2003) has estimated that if a group can not solve this problem, it will divide or collapse when the population exceeds 150 individuals. Whether this estimate is too conservative, several societal populations exceed this number by many magnitudes, and have done so for thousands of years. Humans have clearly managed to at least partially deal with the problem of free-riding, and religion may have been a key phenomenon in allowing this to happen (see Shaver et al., this volume).

Given that the belief in supernatural agents and rituals designed to interact with these agents were almost certainly already in place as a result of the psychological mechanisms described earlier in this chapter (i.e., the psychological mechanisms involved will have evolved prior to human group sizes increasing), these beliefs and behaviors could have been gradually molded via cultural evolution in such a way as to make them more suitable for reducing the possibility of free-riding. As Bering, Mcleod, and Shackelford (2005) put it:

> The psychological foundations of some religious behaviors . . . may be co-opted spandrels (Andrews, Gangestad, & Matthews, 2002; Buss et al., 1998). They may be side effects of other design features that, quite by chance, had salutary effects of their own on the organism's ability to pass on its genes and, over time, were independently subjected to natural selection.

In other words, religious beliefs and behaviors that originally served no adaptive purpose were "exploited" to solve adaptive problems that did not exist when these beliefs and behaviors originally came into existence. Once this process began, cultural evolution molded these beliefs and behaviors into

versions that were better suited to solve these new adaptive problems (see Shariff & Mercier, this volume). Adaptationist accounts of religiosity describe the end results of this process.

In smaller groups, free-riding can be eliminated (or greatly reduced) because one's reputation will determine whether others are willing to cooperate. If an individual has a reputation as a cheater or freerider, other members of the group will know this and be less likely to provide benefits to that individual. With increased group size and anonymity, an individual's reputation is less likely to be tarnished by acts of free-riding. Nevertheless, free-riders still need to be vigilant about avoiding a negative reputation and therefore should be sensitive to cues that their anonymity has been compromised. For example, the feeling of "being watched" should reduce one's willingness to free-ride and increase their prosocial behavior. Indeed, a study by Haley and Fessler (2005) confirmed this prediction. When strictly anonymous participants participated in a dictator game, exposure to stylized eye-like shapes on a computer desktop resulted in participants allocating a significantly greater amount of money to the other (unseen) participant, compared to those who were not exposed to the eye drawings.

The simple stimulus just described was apparently enough to invoke the feeling of being watched, but another stimulus that can be much stronger is the belief in a supernatural agent, because this belief will not be tied to any one location or time. However, it is first necessary to determine whether exposure to a supernatural agent concept, without any perceptual cues to that agent's existence or presence, can reduce cheating or antisocial behavior just as perceptual cues can (e.g., "eyes" that are "watching you"). A study by Bering et al. (2005) confirms this possibility. Each participant was instructed to complete a difficult test of spatial intelligence on a computer while alone in the testing room, and they were told that the person with the highest score would receive $50. They were also told that this test was newly developed and occasionally might display the answer to a question by mistake, and that they should press the space bar when this occurs to clear the screen and solve the problem honestly. In reality, the test was designed to display this "opportunity for cheating" at five random and counterbalanced times, and cheating behavior was measured as the length of time taken to press the space bar.

The key manipulation in this study was that some participants, before beginning the test, were asked to read a brief statement indicating that Paul J. Kellogg, a graduate student who had helped design this test, died recently and unexpectedly. Of those participants who were given this statement to read, some were also told by the experimenter, prior to beginning the test, that the ghost of this graduate student had recently been seen in the very room in which the test was occurring. A third group of participants was not given any such statements prior to testing.

The results of this study indicated that participants primed with the ghost concept performed significantly worse than the control group and exhibited significantly shorter latencies for pressing the space bar during opportunities for cheating. According to Bering et al. (2005), "These findings appear to show, therefore, that supernatural primes dealing with dead agents genuinely reduce people's willingness to intentionally cheat on a competitive task where the risk of social detection appears low" (p. 376, italics in original). In summary, it appears that the concept of a supernatural agency is enough to affect one's behavior, even if there are no cues to suggest the agent's presence. However, it is important to note that participants in the ghost condition were told that the supernatural agent had been previously detected in that testing room. In other words, it may not be enough to simply believe in a supernatural agent, but rather the agent must have the capability of watching you at the exact time you are tempted

to behave antisocially. Therefore, for religious supernatural agents to be effective deterrents of cheating or free-riding, there are particular characteristics that they should possess, which are described in what follows.

When groups are too large to ensure proper social monitoring by members to reduce feelings of anonymity, supernatural agents can act as a powerful substitute, provided that these supernatural agents have particular qualities (see Bourrat & Viciana, this volume). For instance, belief in an omniscient and omnipresent agent could lead individuals to believe that they are being watched at any time and that any instances of cheating or freeriding could be detected. Furthermore, this agent should not only be interested in the moral behavior of humans, but also be able and willing to punish humans for moral transgressions (Shariff, 2008). The God of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam meets these criteria, and as Sanderson (2008) notes:

> in 2250 BCE there were [estimated] only 8 cities in the world with a population of about 30,000, or a total urban population of about 240,000. By 650 BCE, there may have been some 20 cities ranging in population from 30,000 to 120,000, with a total urban population of approximately 1 million. . . . And 62 percent of the population of these cities in 650 BCE lived in or around the very small region that produced both Judaism and Christianity.

Further support for the notion that supernatural agents with particular qualities are selected for to combat free-riding is provided by Roes and Raymond (2003), who analyzed 167 societies from the Standard Cross-Cultural Sample (SCCC) in terms of whether they adhered to a belief in "a spiritual being who is believed to have created all reality and/or to be its ultimate governor," and whether this being is "present, active, and specifically supportive of human morality" (p. 129). Roes and Raymond refer to a being with these qualities as a moralizing god, and they found a significant positive correlation between society size and belief in such a god.

Given the logical relationship between society size and the potential for free-riding, these results are consistent with the idea that, ultimately, moralizing gods serve the adaptive purpose of minimizing the threat of free-riding. Snarey (1996, as cited in Norenzayan & Shariff, 2008) provides additional support for this conclusion by demonstrating that when controlling for society size, moralizing gods are more common in societies with high water scarcity, which is a factor that would increase the potential societal costs associated with free-riding. Norenzayan and Shariff (2008) summarize the results of this study and the study by Roes and Raymond (2003) by stating that "The cross-cultural evidence suggests that moralizing gods are culturally stabilized when freeloading is more prevalent or particularly detrimental to group stability" (p. 62).

Finally, although the studies by Snarey (1996) and Roes and Raymond (2003) demonstrate the importance of belief in moralizing gods for deterring free-riding by relying on results obtained at the societal level, a recent study by Atkinson and Bourrat (2011) provides additional cross-cultural support for this hypothesis at the individual level. Using the World Values Survey—specifically, responses to questions about belief in God and the justifiability of 14 moral transgressions—they showed that belief in God uniquely and significantly predicts the unjustifiability of moral transgressions, with stronger belief in God associated with stronger belief in the unjustifiability of all 14 moral transgressions. Furthermore, they found that among those who believe in God, those who believe in a personal God (who is even more likely to be viewed as a moralizing agent) have an even stronger belief in the unjustifiability of all 14 moral transgressions. Finally, they found that belief in a personal God significantly predicted belief in

the unjustifiability of 11 of the 14 moral transgressions when controlling for religious participation, religious denomination, country, and level of education.

Taken together, the results of this and previous studies mentioned here suggest that the emergence of supernatural agents with particular qualities, especially an interest in the moral behavior of humans and the ability to keep a watchful eye over them, served the adaptive purpose of facilitating cooperation in groups that have the potential for free-riding, even if beliefs in supernatural agents in general did not originate to solve any adaptive problem (see Teehan, this volume, for further discussion of the evolution of religion and morality). However, it is not just religious beliefs that researchers argue have been under selective pressure, but religious behaviors as well.

As described earlier, it seems plausible that at least some forms of religious ritualized behavior emerged as a byproduct of reinforcement learning. With some religious rituals likely already established before group sizes began to expand, another opportunity to reduce the possibility of free-riding and facilitate in-group prosocial behavior existed, as these rituals could be shaped into reliable signals of commitment to the group, thereby indicating that one is not likely to be a free-rider. In order for religious behaviors to be reliable signals of commitment, they must be hard to fake, and one way to achieve this is to make the behaviors costly.

The idea of religious rituals as costly signals of commitment was originally proposed by Irons (2001) and expanded on by Sosis (2003). The logic behind this idea is that if someone is willing to perform costly behaviors (e.g., elaborate, time-consuming, and energy-consuming religious rituals) to be part of a group, the other members of the group can safely assume this person is not a freerider, since they are already paying costs to be a member. A more specific proximate mechanism through which this process may work is cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1956, 1957). Religious rituals not only signal that one is willing to pay the costs necessary to be a part of the group, but also that they share the same beliefs and values of other group members. If one does not share these beliefs, but nevertheless engages in costly behaviors associated with the particular religion, they will likely experience cognitive dissonance because their thoughts and actions are incongruent. One option would be to stop engaging in the behaviors, but this is not an option if one still wants to be part of the group. Therefore, cognitive dissonance will be reduced by changing one's thoughts to be in line with one's behaviors; in other words, costly religious rituals signal that one has the same religious beliefs as others, and as such should be trusted as a fellow member of the group (Sosis, 2003). Of course, group members need not be aware of any of the logic underlying costly signals but should simply be more likely to accept someone as a member of their group if they display such signals.

In recent years, empirical support for the idea of religious behaviors serving as a costly signal of commitment has begun to accumulate. For example, a study by Soler (2008) examined followers of Candomblé, a religion in Brazil that arose out of a mix of faiths introduced by African slaves in the 19th century. The participants in the study came from 13 different terreiros, or houses of worship. Most important for the purposes of this study is the fact that costly displays are an important component of Candomblé. As Soler (2008) describes:

> Communication with the supernatural occurs through various rituals, including elaborate feasts during which the orixás [deities that are directly involved in human affairs] possess the faithful in a music-induced trance. Feasts consume a large proportion of the terreiro's income and require

> the coordination and cooperation of all members. . . . A devotee of Candomblé must also follow an exacting regime that includes proscriptions on food, dress, and codes of behavior related to terreiro hierarchy. (p. 168, italics in original)

Using a 14-item 7-point Likert scale survey of religious commitment and participation in a public-goods economic game, Soler (2008) investigated how much of an initial $10 participants were willing to invest in the group. The more money that is donated, the more money everyone in the group receives, but individuals who do not donate can benefit the most by free-riding. The results of this experiment indicated that religious commitment was a significant predictor of donation amount, with those who scored higher on the commitment scale (e.g., those who participated the most often in terreiro feasts) donating significantly more money than those with lower commitment scores. Furthermore, when a factor analysis performed on the results of the commitment scale indicated a "group commitment subscale" (e.g., "I have never missed a feast in my terreiro") and a "personal commitment subscale" (e.g., "There are certain foods I do not eat because of my orixá"), a regression analysis indicated that only group commitment predicted donation amounts. This is consistent with the costly signaling hypothesis, because group commitment behaviors are those that can be more easily monitored by others, thereby serving as more reliable signals than personal commitment behaviors.

Additional support for the costly signaling hypothesis can be found in a study by Ruffle and Sosis (2007). This study examined religious rituals and in-group cooperative behavior in several Israeli kibbutzim, which are essentially modern communes that were originally conceived as "small collective farming settlement[s] in which members based their social and cultural lives on the collective ownership of property and wealth" (Ruffle & Sosis, 2007, p. 3). Although kibbutzim have changed from focusing on farming to being involved in a wide range of industries, religious kibbutzim have maintained an equal distribution of income among all members regardless of their profession, which generates a "tragedy of the commons" problem that must be avoided by a high degree of cooperation and self-restraint. Most secular kibbutzim, on the other hand, have abandoned the practice of equally distributing wealth among their members.

By using a matched-pairs design, in which seven religious kibbutzim were each matched with one or more secular kibbutzim in terms of population size, year of establishment, degree of economic success, and degree of privatization, Ruffle and Sosis (2007) were able to compare cooperative behavior between religious and secular kibbutzim. They developed a two-player economic game in which anonymous participants are asked how much of a shared pot of 100 shekels they want to keep for themselves. They are told that if the amount chosen by both participants is greater than 100, they both will receive nothing, but whatever money, if any, is left over after they have made their choices will be multiplied by 1.5 and equally distributed to both of them. Therefore, greater cooperative behavior is demonstrated by taking fewer shekels initially. As predicted, members of religious kibbutzim demonstrated significantly greater cooperative behavior than members of secular kibbutzim, claiming on average 10 shekels fewer than secularists.

In addition to comparing members of religious and secular kibbutzim, Ruffle and Sosis (2007) also compared the cooperative behavior of men and women within religious kibbutzim. In religious kibbutzim, even though both men and women engage in many costly religious behaviors, the costly behaviors required of men are generally more publicly oriented. For example, men must engage in public prayer three times daily, which requires roughly two hours every day (and up to 3.5 hours on the

Sabbath). Women are not required to engage in this behavior, and even women who do wish to participate are separated from the men during the prayer and are not viewed as being a part of the ritual. Conversely, the rituals that women are exclusively required to engage in, namely the "laws of family purity" (Ruffle & Sosis, 2007, p. 5), are not performed publicly. Ruffle and Sosis therefore predicted, and found, that religious men were significantly more cooperative in the economic game than religious women, claiming 29.9 shekels on average, while women claimed 33.7 shekels. Furthermore, among religious men, those who attend synagogue daily claimed an average of 27.2 shekels, while those who do not attend daily claimed 33.1 shekels, indicating that the more frequently men engage in public rituals, the more cooperative they are likely to behave.

Finally, another study that supports the costly signaling hypothesis—but also suggests an important caveat—was conducted by Sosis and Bressler (2003). They analyzed the longevity of 83 (30 religious and 53 secular) 19th-century US communes and determined the degree of costly signaling in each by gathering data on the presence or absence of 22 costly requirements or constraints (e.g., constraints on certain foods and beverages, constraints on technology use or other material items, particular clothing or hairstyle requirements, fasting requirements, etc.). They found that secular communes were three times more likely to dissolve in a given year than religious communes, and that religious communes imposed twice as many constraints or requirements on their members compared to secular communes. In general, the number of costly requirements was found to be strongly positively correlated with commune longevity. However, this effect was found to be produced exclusively by religious communes. In other words, the number of costly requirements imposed on secular communes did not have any impact on their longevity. This is partially explained by the fact that secular communes had fewer costly requirements on average than religious communes, but even secular communes with a greater number of costly requirements than most reaped no benefit to their longevity as a result of this. This suggests, as Sosis and Bressler (2003) note, that "costliness is not the only feature of rituals that enable them to promote solidarity" (p. 227). They suggest that "the shortcoming of the costly signaling theory of religion . . . is [the] failure to capture some critical elements of religious belief that distinguish it from belief in a secular ideology" (p. 227). But what might this element—or elements—be?

One possible answer to this question requires a revision to the costly signaling hypothesis by acknowledging that what matters most is not whether a signal of commitment is costly, but whether it is hard to fake. Costly behaviors are certainly an important category of hard-to-fake signals of commitment, but another reliable signal may be emotional displays. Emotions are processed outside of the neocortex and are, therefore, largely outside of conscious control (Ramachandran, 1997), making it difficult to generate false emotions or to hide genuine emotions (Pinker, 1997). Other important qualities of emotions are that they are easy to perceive in others and often provide accurate information about an individual's motivational state (Bulbulia, 2004, 2008). Emotional signals may not be perfect and can be faked to some extent, but as Bulbulia (2008) reminds us, "we have seen that selection can work with imperfect materials, if their average benefits exceed their average costs" (p. 156).

Even if emotions represent hard-to-fake signals, how does this help to explain the results of Sosis and Bressler (2003)? Shouldn't members of secular communes have the same ability to express emotions as members of religious communes? Certainly, but the key difference, or "critical element" that Sosis and Bressler eluded to, may be that religions have the ability to elicit strong emotional states. According to Bulbulia (2004), some examples of emotions elicited by religious beliefs include, but are not limited to,

"hard to fake expressions of gratitude, shrinking before great authority, maternal and filial piety, fear of reprisal, hopeful expectation, [and] sibling love for co-religionists" (p. 28). Furthermore, religious rituals in particular are often capable of eliciting high physiological arousal (Schloss, 2008; Xygalatas, 2008). Although this specific hypothesis has yet to be tested directly, it may be that religious societies are successful because both costly rituals and strongly elicited emotional displays interact synergistically to create even stronger signals of commitment than either type of signal in isolation, thereby explaining why the religious communes analyzed by Sosis and Bressler were more successful than secular communes.

Another adaptationist account that some researchers have recently proffered is that certain religious beliefs serve an adaptive purpose as a result of being molded by sexual selection (Pyysiäinen, 2008; Slone, 2008; Sela & Barbaro, this volume; Weeden, Kurzban, & Kenrick, this volume). This idea is based primarily on the handicap principle (Zahavi & Zahavi, 1997), which can be viewed as a more specific version of costly-signaling theory. The handicap principle states that traits that are costly to develop and maintain can be used as signals of high mate quality, because one must be of high quality to

survive and thrive in spite of these "handicaps." A common example is the peacock's tail, which requires a large store of biological resources to develop and maintain while making it easier to be spotted by predators and more difficult to escape predators due to its burdensome size and extravagant color. In short, if a peacock can develop and maintain a large tail and still survive, this indicates the peacock has "good genes," and as such peahens have evolved a preference for peacocks with the largest tails.

Applying the handicap principle to religious beliefs, Pyysiäinen (2008) argues that ritual behaviors, which may have emerged for other reasons (as discussed earlier in this chapter), were "seized" by sexual selection as signals of mate quality. For example, "Men who could dance longer than others, who sacrificed more than their competitors, or who could memorize longer and more elaborate narratives, excited the interest of females, which meant a better reproductive success for these males" (Pyysiäinen, 2008, p. 177).

Slone (2008) focuses less on religious beliefs and behaviors that may be "handicaps" and more on how they might signal qualities that are desired in potential mates. Based on research conducted by Buss and colleagues (see Buss, 2003, for a review), women tend to be particularly interested in lonterm mates who can be relied on and display a willingness to provide for them and their offspring. Slone argues that:

> By being committed to a religious system (as evidenced by being willing to engage in its costly and apparently useless behaviors) and its ethical demands, which typically includes prohibitions against selfish, anti-social behavior, a man signals that he possesses the types of characteristics that a woman would find desirable.

In other words, in addition to costly religious displays signaling mate quality via the handicap principle (i.e., signaling good genes), the specific costly displays often expressed in a religion may offer additional information about whether one has desired mate qualities. These sexual selection hypotheses of religion (Pyysiäinen, 2008; Slone, 2008) represent another example of how specific religious beliefs and behaviors may have been shaped into their present forms because of selection pressures to solve particular adaptive problems.

Finally, another component of religion—as defined by Atran (2002)—that has yet to be discussed but may be explained with an adaptationist account is "a central focus of supernatural agents on dealing with

people's existential anxieties (death, disease, catastrophe, pain, loneliness, injustice, want, loss, etc.)" (p. 13). In attempting to understand how and why this component of religion emerged, it is useful to begin by determining what most, if not all, of the phenomena labeled as "existential anxieties" have in common. One possibility is that they refer to events or states that can be characterized by a lack of personal control, and religious beliefs may serve the adaptive function of reducing the anxiety associated with lack of control (see Liddle, this volume).

Several studies, using a variety of methodologies and addressing different levels of analysis, have provided empirical support for the compensatory effect religiosity has on an individual's perceived lack of control. For example, a series of studies by Kay and colleagues (Kay, Gaucher, McGregor, & Nash, 2009; Kay, Gaucher, Napier, Callan, & Laurin, 2008; Kay, Moscovitch, & Laurin, 2010; Kay, Shepherd, Blatz, Chua, & Galinsky, 2010; Kay, Whitson, Gaucher, & Galinsky, 2009) indicate that when an individual's feeling of personal control is decreased through experimental manipulations (e.g., asking participants to remember events from their life that they had no control over), the reported strength of belief in a personal God increases. Additionally, a study by Norenzayan and Atran (2004) demonstrated that inducing mortality salience—death being an inevitability that we have no control over—resulted in higher self-reported religiosity, particular belief in a personal God and supernatural intervention (i.e., external sources of control). Finally, societal level support for the idea that religiosity serves as compensation against the feeling of lack of control comes from a series of analyses by Norris and Inglehart (2004), as well as studies by Paul (2005, 2009) and Rees (2009), which have documented that as indicators of societal insecurity (e.g., economic inequality, lack of access to healthcare and education, crime, high infant mortality rates—all factors that could increase an individual's feeling of lack of control) increase, religiosity increases (see Liddle, this volume). Importantly, these results also indicate that societies with the lowest levels of societal insecurity are also the most secular, a conclusion further supported by a series of informal interviews conducted by Zuckerman (2008), who found that many people in Denmark and Sweden (i.e., nations with very low levels of societal insecurity) apparently have little interest in or need for religion. This suggests that compensatory control is an adaptive function of religious beliefs, because these beliefs seem to lose their appeal when this function is no longer required.

Religious Beliefs as Memes

The byproduct and adaptationist accounts discussed thus far provide a great deal of information for explaining some of the fundamental components of religion, but they do not explain why some religious worldviews are restricted to a small part of the world while others have spread to many societies. One controversial, but potentially useful, concept for explaining this is memetics. The term "meme" was coined by Dawkins (1976), who suggested that "units" of cultural transmission could be thought of as subject to the same rules of natural selection as genes. In other words, "Ideas can be thought of as competing with one another for residence in the minds of people, and those ideas that are most successful at being remembered will survive, get passed on and possibly change (i.e., evolve) over time" (Liddle, Bush, & Shackelford, 2011, p. 187). This concept has been expanded by several authors (Blackmore, 1999; Brodie, 2009, as cited in Liddle et al., 2011; see also Dennett, 2006, for a discussion of memetics in reference to religion) but remains controversial due to the speculative nature of memetics.

Importantly, the theory of memetics moves the focus of fitness from the individuals holding the ideas to the ideas themselves. In terms of religion, this suggests that particular religious beliefs may survive and

evolve independently of their effects on the fitness of humans, even if they are ultimately detrimental to human fitness. Memes are capable of being either symbiotic, parasitic, or neutral with respect to the fitness of their "hosts." However, as with the byproduct and adaptationist arguments of religion discussed earlier, it is best not to apply this logic to religion as a whole. In other words, rather than saying, for example, that religion in general is a parasitic meme, flourishing at the expense of human fitness, it makes more sense to discuss whether particular religious beliefs and behaviors are parasitic (or symbiotic or neutral). For example, the adaptationist arguments discussed earlier suggest that belief in a moralizing god may be a symbiotic meme, because it benefits its hosts by facilitating in-group cooperative behavior, and one can look to Christianity and Islam to see how successful this meme has been at spreading around the world. However, this does not mean that all of the beliefs and behaviors associated with Christianity and Islam are symbiotic memes. Therefore, applying memetics to religion would require an examination of specific beliefs and behaviors, rather than examining the transmission of an organized religion as a whole.

Research by Fincher and Thornhill (2008) provides an interesting account of religious diversity that can be interpreted within a memetic perspective. Using data on the total number of religions in each of 219 countries/territories, and the pathogen prevalence of these regions, they predicted and found that religious diversity was strongly positively associated with pathogen prevalence. This is presumably because pathogen-rich environments increase the potential costs associated with interacting with neighboring societies (e.g., exposure to pathogens to which one has not evolved immunity), and so humans living in such environments have evolved predispositions that minimize intergroup contact (e.g., collectivist attitudes and xenophobia). Liddle et al. (2011) describe how these findings may be understood in terms of memetics:

> If high pathogen stress limits contact between groups, there is less direct competition between different religious beliefs, which means that these different beliefs will continue to survive. Conversely, low pathogen stress translates into greater cultural transmission, which leads to competition between beliefs, and only the "fittest" beliefs survive.

Despite its speculative nature, memetics provides a unique evolutionary perspective on religion that may be useful in explaining the spread of particular religious beliefs and behaviors around the world. More specifically, the "pathogen-stress" model mentioned earlier (see Terrizzi & Shook, this volume, for further discussion) provides a compelling account of differing levels of religiosity internationally and a key factor that may have influenced the spread of religious beliefs throughout history.

Conclusion

The usefulness of applying evolutionary theory to explaining religion was noted by Darwin (2006/1871) himself, who reasoned that:

> As soon as the important faculties of the imagination, wonder, and curiosity, together with some power of reasoning, had become partially developed, man would naturally have craved to understand what was passing around him, and have vaguely speculated on his own existence.

In recent years, evolutionary psychologists have begun to demonstrate how evolutionary theory can aid in our understanding of both the origin of religious beliefs and behaviors and the possible functions that they may have evolved to serve. A coherent picture of religion begins to emerge when several byproduct and adaptationist accounts are integrated together.

Beginning with a reasonable definition of religion provided by Atran (2002), an evolutionary perspective can provide explanations for what are arguably important components of nearly all religions. Belief in supernatural agency may have emerged as a result of hyperactive agency detection, the belief in mind-body dualism, and susceptibility to MCIs. These supernatural agent concepts then evolved to include certain characteristics that made them suitable for partially solving the adaptive problem of free-riding in large groups. Religious rituals may have emerged as a result of human perceptions of causality and the neurological nature of reinforcement learning, as well as their impact on group cohesion via synchronized activities. These rituals then evolved to become more elaborate, more difficult to fake, in some cases costly, and in some cases capable of eliciting strong emotional reactions. All

of these qualities serve the adaptive purpose of signaling commitment to the group, thereby reducing the possibility that an individual who engages in these behaviors is a free rider. Costly displays in particular may also have been sexually selected, in that they satisfy the handicap principle (see Weeden et al., this volume, for further consideration of sexual selection's role in religiosity). Finally, religious beliefs may function to reduce existential anxiety by serving as a potent source of compensatory control, such that when an individual's feeling of personal control is reduced, whether by events in life, insecurity in the environment, or mortality salience, the resulting anxiety is diminished by adhering to particular religious beliefs, such as belief in a personal god.

The description and explanation of religion provided here is by no means complete. Such a complex topic needs to continue to be analyzed from a variety of perspectives. This chapter has hopefully provided a convincing argument that an evolutionary psychological perspective has much to offer to the study of religion and will likely continue to aid in our understanding of religion in the years to come—an argument further strengthened by the remainder of this handbook. <>

TREATISE ON AWAKENING MAHĀYĀNA FAITH edited and translated by John Jorgensen, Dan Lusthaus, John Makeham, Mark Strange [Oxford Chinese Thought, Oxford University Press, 9780190297701]

Dasheng qixin lun, or *Treatise on Awakening Mahāyāna Faith* , has been one of the most important texts of East Asian Buddhism since it first appeared in sixth-century China. It outlines the initial steps a Mahāyāna Buddhist needs to take to reach enlightenment, beginning with the conviction
that the Mahāyāna path is correct and worth pursuing. The *Treatise* addresses many of the doctrines central to various Buddhist teachings in China between the fifth and seventh centuries, attempting to reconcile seemingly contradictory ideas in Buddhist texts introduced from India. It provided a model for later schools to harmonize teachings and sustain the idea that, despite different approaches, there was only one doctrine, or Dharma. It profoundly shaped the doctrines and practices of the major schools of Chinese Buddhism: Chan, Tiantai, Huayan, and to a lesser extent Pure Land.
It quickly became a shared resource for East Asian philosophers and students of Buddhist thought.

Drawing on the historical and intellectual contexts of *Treatise*'s composition and paying sustained attention to its interpretation in early commentaries, this new annotated translation of the classic,

makes its ideas available to English readers like never before. The introduction orients readers to the main topics taken up in the *Treatise* and gives a comprehensive historical and intellectual grounding to the text. This volume marks a major advance in studies of the *Treatise*, bringing to light new interpretations and themes of the text.

Review

"This Oxford translation is thus a timely and long-awaited event in the field. It is well informed with current research, and well designed in its presentation of the important issues of the treatise; it is lucid in language, and explains difficult concepts and complex background in an in-depth, well-organized, and accessible way; it is thoroughly annotated, providing detailed discussions and explanations to almost all problems in the text. Thus marked by erudition, insightfulness, and clarity, this translation -- despite differences in the understanding of individual details -- makes an important contribution to the study of the treatise as well as Buddhist and East Asian philosophy, and will find its place on the bookshelves of all those in the field for years to come." -- Tao Jin, *H-Buddhism*

"This belongs in every Buddhological collection." -- Lukas Pokorny, *Religious Studies Review*

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Appearing in sixth-century China, the Dasheng qixin lun, Treatise on Awakening Maháyána Faith, has been one of the most important texts of East Asian Buddhism between the late sixth century—soon after it started to circulate—and the present. Conceptual structures derived from the Treatise became a shared resource for East Asian philosophers and religious theorists over centuries. Over three hundred commentaries were written on it in East Asia before 1900. It was crucial in the development of the Sinitic Buddhist schools of Huayan and Chan (Japanese Zen), and had some importance in Tiantai and Pure Land. The text was attractive because it was concise and relatively comprehensive. It seemed to resolve tensions and disparities between competing forms of Buddhist doctrine and practice, providing a model for later schools to harmonize teachings and sustain the idea that, despite different approaches, there was only one doctrine, or Dharma. It provided a theoretical basis for practice and stressed the importance of faith for beginners or those not yet committed to Maháyána Buddhism. See below<>

THE AWAKENING OF FAITH AND NEW CONFUCIAN PHILOSOPHY edited by John Makeham [Series: East Asian Buddhist Philosophy, Brill, 9789004471238]

This innovative volume demonstrates how and to what ends the writings of Xiong Shili, Ma Yifu, Tang Junyi and Mou Zongsan adopted and repurposed conceptual models derived from the Buddhist text **TREATISE ON AWAKENING MAHĀYĀNA FAITH**. It shows which of the philosophical positions defended by these New Confucian philosophers were developed and sustained through engagement with the critical challenges advanced by scholars who attacked the Treatise. It also examines the extent to which twentieth-century New Confucians were aware of their intellectual debt to the Treatise and explains how they reconciled this awareness with their Confucian identity.

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In China, and indeed throughout much of the world, Confucianism is typically presented as an expression of a native system of ideas and values, developed independent of external cultural influences

over two thousand years. It is privileged as the true representation of Chinese cultural ideals and values, and an integral part of traditional Chinese social and cultural identity. Despite being vilified for much of the twentieth century, over the past three decades various aspects of Confucianism have been rehabilitated. Diverse interest groups both within and outside the mainland Chinese academy have favored Confucianism over other forms of traditional thought and philosophy, touting it as the principal exemplar of indigenous Chinese thought and values and so best suited to nation- and state-building. Buddhism is excluded on the grounds that it is a foreign import – despite having first been introduced into China two thousand years ago and subsequently having shaped the development of indigenous Chinese traditions of religion, philosophy, art and literature. This exclusive privileging of Confucianism feeds a reductionist assumption that Confucian philosophy is a hermetically sealed tradition that can be understood and adjudicated only by reference to its own "internal" norms and premises. But to regard Confucian philosophy this way is to ignore the vital contribution that Buddhist thought has made to the development of Confucian philosophy. One consequence of this is that the intellectual constitution of the main exemplar of modern Chinese philosophy, so-called New Confucianism, continues to be misrepresented, both in China and beyond.

New Confucianism is a modern neo-conservative philosophical movement, with religious overtones, and the most successful form of philosophical appropriation, reinvention and creative transformation of "Confucianism" in China, Hong Kong and Taiwan since the 1970s. Representative first and second generation New Confucian thinkers – Xiong Shili 熊十力 (1885–1968), Ma Yifu 馬一浮 (1883–1967), Tang Junyi 唐君毅 (1909–1978), and Mou Zongsan 牟宗三 (1909–1995) – were clearly cognizant of their engagement with a broad range of Buddhist themes and constructs, which they integrated into conceptual hierarchies designed to privilege Confucian values. Working from the premise that key New Confucian philosophical ideas and constructs are the product of a sustained engagement with Buddhist thought, the broad aim of the research project that led to this present volume was to identify the role that one of the most important texts in East Asian Buddhism, the *Dasheng qixin lun* 大乘起信論 (Treatise on Awakening Mahāyāna Faith) (hereafter, *Treatise*), played in that engagement. The findings of that research, as represented in this volume, set out the arguments and evidence needed to explain how the *Treatise* features in the constitution of New Confucian philosophy, as evidenced in the writings of the above four New Confucian philosophers. It does this by pursuing three objectives: (1) demonstrating how and to what ends conceptual models derived from the *Treatise* were adopted and repurposed in those writings; (2) showing which of the philosophical positions defended by the New Confucians were developed and sustained through engagement with the critical challenges advanced by scholars who attacked the *Treatise*; and (3) examining the extent to which twentieth-century New Confucians were aware of their intellectual debt to the *Treatise* and explaining how they reconciled this with their Confucian identity.

The Treatise

Before introducing some of the key doctrinal issues concerning the *Treatise* that became the focus of ongoing discussion and controversy in twentieth-century China, a short introduction to the *Treatise* itself is in order. Appearing in sixth-century China, the *Treatise* purports to be a translation of an Indian text but the weight of modern scholarly opinion is that it is a work of Chinese not Indian provenance.[2] Addressing the problems of why it is so difficult to attain buddhahood and why so few are aware of their inherent buddha-nature, the *Treatise* states that it is aimed at novice Buddhists and was

composed in order to explain the importance of faith in the Mahāyāna path and how to develop it. "This text is about the first steps a Mahāyāna Buddhist needs to take, namely an initiation of faith, a conviction that Mahāyāna teachings are correct and effective and therefore should be practiced. Without this faith, there would be no grounds for practice. The *Treatise* outlines a theoretical framework of the psychological mechanisms that enable a deluded person to become enlightened." The *Treatise* provides a concise restatement of the complexities of the ten-stage path of bodhisattva (enlightened being) practice in Mahāyāna Buddhism, which enables deluded beings to free themselves from their false perceptions and suffering. The text's title, *Treatise on Awakening Mahāyāna Faith*, refers to the awakening of an aspiration to enter this path.

One reason for the popularity of the *Treatise* is its compelling vision of how to realize why we are deluded and then follow a path to actualize our inherent buddhahood. Another reason for its popularity is that it succinctly discusses many of the doctrines of greatest importance to Buddhists in China between the fourth and sixth centuries in a way that reconciles seemingly contradictory ideas in Buddhist texts introduced from India. Specifically, it explores why it is that most beings are enmeshed in delusion, given that the mind is inherently awakened, or originally enlightened (*benjue* 本覺), in the sense of being self-illuminating, like a mirror. The text attempts to guide the novice towards its soteriological goal by means of a number of strategies. One key strategy is via a monism that is deployed to show the pernicious effects of, but also the illusory nature of, ignorance.

One Mind, Two Gateways

As a system of thought that blossomed in China between the fifth and seventh centuries, the Tathāgatagarbha tradition within Mahāyāna Buddhism is particularly associated with a cluster of texts in which the *tathāgatagarbha* (*rulaizang* 如來藏) doctrine is central. *Tathāgatagarbha* means the repository of a buddha. The *tathāgatagarbha* doctrine is the idea that buddha-nature exists within all sentient beings but is concealed due to ignorance. In East Asia, one of the key texts in this tradition is the *Treatise*. The *Treatise* presents the "one mind" (*yixin* 一心) as the ultimate source of reality. The one mind has two modalities or aspects, which the text calls gateways, and these contain all dharmas, all phenomena, conditioned (existence that is subject to determination by the laws of cause and effect) and unconditioned.

> There are two gateways based on the dharma of the one mind. What are they? The first is the gateway of the mind as suchness. The second is the gateway of the mind as arising and ceasing. Each of these two gateways contains all dharmas. Why? Because these two gateways are not separate from one another.
> 依一心法，有二種門。云何為二？一者、心真如門，二者、心生滅門。是二種 門皆各總攝一切法。此義云何？以是二門不相離故。

The gateway of the mind as suchness[6] (*xin zhenru men* 心真如門) is the true mind – unchanging, eternal, and pure. It is identified as the *tathāgatabarbha*, the repository of a buddha, or buddha-nature. The gateway of the mind as arising and ceasing (*xin shengmie men* 心生滅門) is cyclic existence (*saṃsāra*) in which the mind's propensity to awaken struggles against the mental and physical behaviors that arise from the mind's defilement by ignorance. It is identified with the eighth or storehouse consciousness (*ālayavijñāna*; *alaiye shi* 阿賴耶識).

Both the mind as suchness and the arising and ceasing mind are ultimately the one mind but, because ignorance obscures realization of the one mind, deluded beings create false perceptions and so become mired in suffering. The arising and ceasing mind then generates misguided conceptual distinctions, which in turn provide new conditions for the ongoing defilement of the mind and for the suffering caused by taking the wrong sorts of actions:

> Because it is based on the dharma of suchness, there is ignorance. Because there are the defiled dharmas of ignorance as causes, they then habituate suchness. Because of this habituation, there is the false mind and, since there is the false mind, it then habituates ignorance. Because [the false mind] does not fully discern the dharma of suchness, it is non-awakened and so conceiving arises, presenting false perceptual fields. Because there are the defiled dharmas of false perceptual fields as conditions, these then habituate the false mind, so that conceiving and attachments generate all kinds of karmic action and one experiences all the sufferings of body and mind.
> 以依真如法故，有於無明。以有無明染法因故即熏習真如；以熏習故則有妄心，以有妄心即熏習無明。不了真如法故，不覺念起現妄境界。以有妄境界染法緣故，即熏習妄心，令其念著造種種業，受於一切身心等苦。

The *Treatise* presents the relationship between the two gateways as one in which the unconditioned (suchness, *tathāgatabarbha*) combines or integrates with (*hehe* 和合) the gateway of the mind of arising and ceasing (the adaption of *tathāgatagarbha* to phenomenal conditions) to constitute the *ālayavijñāna* (storehouse consciousness), even as the unconditioned *simultaneously extends beyond* the gateway of the mind of arising and ceasing, just as wetness exists in all waves but simultaneously extends beyond any particular wave:

> The arising-and-ceasing mind exists because it is based on the *tathāgatagarbha*. That is to say, non-arising and non-ceasing combine with arising and ceasing: they are neither the same nor different. This is called the "*ālaya* consciousness" [*ālayavijñāna*; storehouse consciousness].
> 心生滅者，依如來藏故有生滅心。所謂不生不滅與生滅和合，非一非異。名為阿梨耶識。

For the *Treatise*, the main import of the relationship between the *tathāgatagarbha* and the *ālayavijñāna* is that the *tathāgatagarbha* provides the ontological grounding for the *ālayavijñāna* and the *ālayavijñāna* represents the adaptation of the *tathāgatagarbha*, the mind of suchness, to phenomenal conditions. Crucially, *tathāgatagarbha*/suchness – the unconditioned – remains constant, unchanged, undiminished and undefiled by these phenomenal conditions.

Above and beyond this, however, the *Treatise* stands apart from other texts associated with the Tathāgatagarbha tradition by claiming that unconditioned suchness serves as the foundation of the phenomenal world and is able to cause conditioned dharmas (*youwei fa* 有為法) to be generated and also by presenting suchness as somehow being permeated (*xunxi* 熏習) by ignorance, *that the unconditioned is acted upon casually by the conditioned*. The *Treatise* also employs the metaphor of the ocean water and waves to explain how the unconditioned – suchness, *tathāgatagarbha* – can be acted upon casually by the conditioned:

> Because all the characteristics of the mind and consciousnesses are ignorance[11] and, since the characteristic of ignorance is not separate from the nature of awakening, the mind and consciousnesses are indestructible and destructible. This is like the great ocean, where water

> moves in waves due to the wind. The characteristics of the water and the wind [as waves] are not separate from one another. Since it is not in the nature of water to move [by itself], the characteristic of movement will cease if the wind ceases, without the wetness ever being destroyed.
> 以一切心識之相皆是無明，無明之相，不離覺性，非可壞，非不可壞。如大海水因風波動，水相風相不相捨離，而水非動性，若風止滅動相則滅，濕性不壞故。

Even though the wind stirs up the phenomenal appearance of waves and motion, the wet nature of the ocean is not affected and does not change, whether the wind blows or does not blow. Even though the deluded mind is stirred into erroneous distinction making, in fact, its self-nature – inherent enlightenment, suchness – is constant and unchanging. Only ignorance prevents us from realizing this.

Revival of the **Treatise**

By 1900, over three hundred East Asian commentaries had been written on the *Treatise*. Curiously, however, as John Jorgensen points out in the opening chapter, in China during the Qing dynasty (1644–1911), only one commentary was written on the *Treatise* (in 1687) and even that commentary attracted little attention. Indeed, the *Treatise* itself seems to have languished until Yang Wenhui 楊文會 (1837–1911) devoted significant energies in the 1880s and 1890s to promote the creation of an Aśvaghoṣa (Maming 馬鳴) school that combined the *Treatise* with Yogācāra doctrines and Pure Land practice, in order to revive Buddhism.

As it happens, a fresh perspective on the *Treatise* occurred about the same time in Japan. Prompted by the Meiji regime's persecution of Buddhism between 1868 and 1872, many Japanese monks and laymen participated in creating a new Buddhism (*shin Bukkyō*) that was supposed to be scientific and united, a "protestant" Buddhism. They adopted the *Treatise* as the "fundamental essence" of Buddhism because it was thought acceptable to all Japanese Buddhists, and because it was systematic and succinct. In 1879, at the only university in Japan, Tokyo University, the one-time Sōtō Zen monk, Hara Tanzan 原坦山 (1819–1892), began to use the *Treatise* as the text for a course on Indian Buddhist philosophy.

By the early twentieth century, however, both in China and Japan, the *Treatise* became the focus of sustained controversy. Its critics regarded it as inimical to Buddhism because at best it conflated contradictory doctrines, and at worst introduced non-Buddhist ideas. It was in this context of sustained controversy that the *Treatise* became integral to the development of New Confucian philosophy over much of the twentieth century.

As Jorgensen also points out in the opening chapter of this volume, from the very beginning of the twentieth century, Chinese scholars tended to discuss the *Treatise* in terms of doctrine rather than history and provenance. Thus, despite the fact that in 1922 Yang Wenhui's former student and political activist, Liang Qichao 梁啓超 (1873–1929), had introduced to a Chinese readership earlier Japanese debates on the provenance of the *Treatise*, "the issue of provenance was largely avoided by Chinese intellectuals until the late 1940s and early 1950s." While drawing attention to the important role that Chinese intellectuals, Zhang Taiyan 章太炎 (1869–1936) and Liang Qichao, respectively, had played in introducing Japanese scholarship on the provenance debate to a Chinese audience, in his chapter in this volume, Lin Chen-kuo 林鎮國 similarly emphasizes the significance of the philosophical debate that ensued from discussions of the *Treatise*, rather that the provenance issue *per se*.

The **Treatise** and Yogācāra

For opponents and critics alike, the *Treatise*'s relationship with Yogācāra continued to be a focus of attention. As noted above, Yang Wenhui had promoted a synthesis of Yogācāra and the *Treatise* as part of his project to build a grand synthesis of Chinese Buddhism, especially Yogācāra, Huayan and Tiantai. In turn, Jorgensen relates, Zhang Taiyan, a former pupil of Yang Wenhui, used "the Yogācāra teachings of the Three Natures (*san xing* 三性; *trisvabhāva*) and passages from the *Treatise*" to argue that "Buddhism was the religion that had the morality – as evidenced by such practices as the altruistic bodhisattva [being that pursues awakening] vow to save all beings – necessary for a social revolution."

Not all of Yang's students, however, were so sanguine about drawing positive associations between the *Treatise* and Yogācāra doctrine. The most prominent critic was Ouyang Jingwu 歐陽竟無 (1871–1943), head of the China Institute of Inner Learning (Zhina Neixue yuan 支那內學院), who was supported by his own students, Lü Cheng 呂澂 (1896–1989) and Wang Enyang 王恩洋 (1897–1964). They variously criticized the *Treatise* on that grounds that it violated cardinal Yogācāra principles, that it was not a Mahāyāna text, that its teaching resembled those of the Vibhajyavādins, and that it was akin to an inferior form of non-Buddhist Sāṃkhya. Specific criticisms focused on charges that the *Treatise* violated the laws of causation by positing suchness (*zhenru* 真如)/*tathāgatagarbha* as an ontological reality (*ti* 體), without beginning or end, that gives rise to all phenomena; and that even though it invoked the notion of perfuming (*xunxi* 熏習; habituation; permeation) it lacked the means to effect such perfuming, namely seeds as causes. They concluded that the *Treatise* provided no mechanism for salvation and had led to many abuses in Chinese Buddhism.

In positing suchness/*tathāgatagarbha* as the ontological basis that gives rise to all phenomena, the China Institute of Inner Learning critics maintained the *Treatise* had violated the Yogācāra tenet that a cause can produce a result only of its own kind, which then becomes the cause of another like result. And in maintaining that one dharma (here referring to uniform, undifferentiated suchness) produces many dharmas, the *Treatise* further contravened the principle that the result must be commensurate with the cause. Moreover, in treating suchness as an uncaused cause, this was tantamount to rendering suchness akin to non-Buddhist constructs such as Brahman, *prakṛti* (*shixing* 世性; primal matter), or *ātman* (*wo*).

In invoking the notion of perfuming, the critics charged that not only did the *Treatise* lack the notion of seeds, moreover, for suchness to be able to perfume ignorance or vice versa, requires that both are present simultaneously, yet, if that were the case, it would violate the principle that purity and impurity cannot co-exist. As for the *Treatise*'s claim that suchness can perfume ignorance and that ignorance can perfume suchness, critics appealed to the authority of Xuanzang's 玄奘 (602?–644) *Cheng weishi lun* 成唯識論 (Demonstration of Nothing but Consciousness), a foundational text of the East Asian Yogācāra tradition, which maintains that the only mental activity that is perfumable is the storehouse consciousness and the only mental activities capable of perfuming it are the first seven consciousnesses and their mental associates.

One of the earliest to respond to the China Institute of Inner Learning critics was another of Yang's prominent former students, the cleric Taixu 太虛 (1890–1947). In an effort to realize Yang's grand synthesizing project, Taixu wrote a commentary on the *Treatise* drawing on *Cheng weishi lun*. Taixu's

tactic was to respond to the criticisms by also appealing to Yogācāra teachings and concepts, one prominent example being the Four Conditions (*si yuan* 四緣), which are central to Yogācāra accounts of causality – in particular for explaining the causal relationship between seeds, consciousness, and cognitive objects.

As set out in *Cheng weishi lun*, the Four Conditions are: the causal condition (*yinyuan* 因緣; *hetu-pratyaya*); the condition for the causal support of consciousness (*suoyuan yuan* 所緣緣; *ālambana-pratyaya*); the continuous sequence of sameness condition (*deng wujian yuan* 等無間緣 *samanantara-pratyaya*), and the contributory factors as condition (*zeng shang yuan* 增上緣; *adhipati-pratyaya*). The "continuous sequence of sameness condition" refers to the apparent continuity in consciousness of the previous thought-moment with the following thought-moment. In response to the criticism that even though the *Treatise* deployed the notion of perfuming, it lacked the means to effect such perfuming, Taixu introduced the continuous sequence of sameness condition (*samanantara-pratyaya*) in his discussion of the role of the seventh consciousness or mentation (*yi* 意; *manas*) in the *Treatise*, a concept also of central importance in Yogācāra. He argued that it is this uninterrupted succession that provides the mechanism to move from being defiled to being undefiled, once the obstructing *manas* is removed. Elsewhere, he also claimed that Yogācāra accounts for perfuming only in terms of the causal condition (*hetu-pratyaya*), whereas the *Treatise* accounts for perfuming in terms of the other three conditions as well, thus providing a more comprehensive account by elucidating the role of the full set of conditions.

This initial period of intense debate about the *Treatise*, in which Yogācāra figured as the arbiter of doctrinal authority, had eased by about 1926, but as Lin Chen-kuo describes in his chapter in this volume, "this long running debate [subsequently] included the exchanges between Xiong [Shili] and Lü [Cheng] in 1943, and it was revived again in the 1960s and 1970s by Xiong's disciple Mou Zongsan 牟宗三." Philosophical positions defended by New Confucians such as Xiong and Mou, in particular, were developed and sustained by engaging with the critical challenges advanced by the China Institute of Inner Learning partisans, for whom the *Treatise* was as a consistent target of scholarly criticism.

Xiong Shili and the **Treatise**

Xiong Shili began his Yogācāra studies at Ouyang's China Institute of Inner Learning in 1920 and two years later was appointed to teach Yogācāra philosophy in the Philosophy Department of Peking University, where he taught for two years. He subsequently led a peripatetic and frequently interrupted academic career. Over the thirty-year period, from the early 1920s to the early 1950s, he moved from an uncritical belief in Yogācāra philosophy to a position where it served as a foil for his own constructive philosophy. His criticisms of Yogācāra grew progressively more trenchant over this period.

Xiong Shili is the subject of chapters 3, 4, and 5. Taken together, the chapters are broadly chronological. Sang Yu's 桑雨 chapter, "The Role of the *Treatise on Awakening Mahāyāna Faith* in the Development of Xiong Shili's *Ti-yong* Metaphysics," focuses on the period between the early 1920s and the mid-1930s. In chapter 4, "Xiong Shili and the *Treatise on Awakening Mahāyāna Faith* as Revealed in *Record to Destroy Confusion and Make My Tenets Explicit*," I examine Xiong's 1950 reflection on the achievements of his 1944 *Xin weishi lun* 新唯識論 (New Treatise on the Uniqueness of Consciousness) (vernacular edition). The period covered in chapter 5, "Xiong Shili's *Ti-yong* Metaphysics and the *Treatise on Awakening*

Mahāyāna Faith's 'One Mind, Two Gateways' Paradigm," spans the 1930s to the early 1960s, in which the 1950s marks a watershed in Xiong's ontological views.

Sang Yu seeks to show that Xiong's *ti-yong* 體用 (reality and function) metaphysics is isomorphic with key elements of the *Treatise*'s "one mind, two gateways" model. Although Xiong had cited the *Treatise* already in 1913, Sang identifies his 1923 work, *Weishixue gailun* 唯識學概論 (A General Account of Yogācāra Learning) as evidencing a limited, yet significant, appropriation of certain ideas that originated in the *Treatise*. For example, on the one hand, Xiong presented suchness as an unconditioned dharma, yet, on the other hand, he deemed it to be able to act on phenomena, to have function, just as material dharmas have the function of offering resistance (如色即礙用). While clearly deviating from standard Yogācāra views about unconditioned suchness, Xiong's position is consistent with the account in the *Treatise* that unconditioned suchness serves as the foundation of the phenomenal world and is able to cause conditioned dharmas to be generated. This is precisely the kind of view that the China Institute of Inner Learning camp severely criticized. As John Jorgensen relates, Ouyang's first resolution in his *Weishi jueze tan* 唯識抉擇談 (Talks on the Resolutions of Nothing but Consciousness; 1922) had asserted that reality (*ti*) and function (*yong*) correspond to the unconditioned (suchness and nirvana) and the conditioned (correct cognition and *bodhi*), respectively. Reality neither arises nor ceases; only function arises and ceases. "The trouble with the *Treatise*, according to Ouyang, is that it 'regarded *ti* as being function (*yong*), so that the nature of *ti* is confused [with function], and so the nature of function is likewise lost.'" (是則以體為用，體性既淆，用性亦失。)

Sang Yu finds additional evidence in *Weishixue gailun* of Xiong's appropriation of ideas and models in the *Treatise*, where Xiong characterizes Reality (suchness) as unchanging/constant (*bubian* 不變) and Function (consciousness) as transforming/changing (*bian* 變) – the transformation of consciousness into the phenomenal world. She shows that he posited suchness/*tathāgatagarbha* as the basis for the existence of consciousness from which the phenomenal world is generated, the same thesis that is advanced in the *Treatise*: "The arising-and-ceasing mind exists because it is based on the *tathāgatagarbha*." Moreover, in his 1932 *Xin weishi lun*, Xiong distinguished between Reality as "the true mind" (*zhenxin* 真心) and its Function as "false/deluded consciousness" (*wangshi* 妄識) – the mind that is intermixed with habitual defilements (*xiran* 習染) and grasps cognitive objects. In that same work, Xiong also characterized the mind as simultaneously quiescent (*jing* 靜) and moving (*dong* 動). Sang Yu presents both examples as evidence of a strong isomorphism with the *Treatise*'s one mind, two gateways model: the mind as suchness and the mind as arising and ceasing.

Further, in *Xin weishi lun*, "when Xiong presented Reality as possessing an aspect of activity, he also considered it to have an intimate relationship with the phenomenal world. Indeed, Xiong's reference to the movement of Reality/the mind was with respect to its illusory manifestation, namely, Function/the phenomenal world; and his reference to its quiescence was with respect to its unchanging nature, or Reality itself…. Movement is quiescence, and Function is Reality. It is precisely because phenomena do not have self-nature that they do not differ ontologically from Reality." Sang concludes that Xiong's thesis is consistent with the *Treatise*'s notion that "The arising-and-ceasing mind exists because it is based on the *tathāgatagarbha*. That is to say, non-arising and non-ceasing combine with arising and ceasing: they are neither the same nor different." She explains that although the various phenomena seem to change and move, they actually are unreal, devoid of self-nature. Supporting the illusory

phenomenal appearances is the mind as suchness, which neither changes nor moves. "To say that 'non-arising and non-ceasing' and 'arising and ceasing' are neither the same nor different is to say that suchness merges seamlessly with phenomena while remaining unchanged and undefiled."

In chapter 4, I examine Xiong's 1950 work, *Cui huo xian zong ji* 摧惑顯宗記 (Record to Destroy Confusion and Make My Tenets Explicit), which was written as a response to cleric Yinshun's 印順 (1906–2005) critical book-length review of Xiong's 1944 magnum opus *Xin weishi lun* (vernacular edition). *Cui huo xian zong ji* represents a unique retrospective summation of what Xiong himself then regarded as the most important philosophical accomplishment of the *New Treatise*; a work in which he was "finally able to bring to completion that which the Mahāyāna bodhisattvas had left uncompleted." In providing this summation, he also sets out his criticisms of both the Madhyamaka and Yogācāra traditions of Buddhist thought – which, following Buddhist doxographers in the Tang period, he refers to as calls the Emptiness school (*kong zong* 空宗) and the Existence school (*you zong* 有宗). Both schools were, however, also extremely important in Xiong Shili's intellectual development, as Xiong himself acknowledges in the opening pages of his 1958 publication, *Ti yong lun* 體用論 (Treatise on *Ti* and *Yong*): "My thought has certainly benefited from the inspiration I have received from both the Emptiness and the Existence schools. If I had not started with these two schools, I would not have come to understand how to think for myself, and so what could I have followed in order to awaken and enter the *Book of Transformation* [*Book of Change*]?" (余之 思想確受空有二宗啟發之益。倘不由二宗入手，將不知自用思，何從悟入 《變經》乎？)

As with his former teacher, Ouyang Jingwu, Xiong also discussed the unconditioned and conditioned in terms of *ti* and *yong*, respectively. In addition, Xiong used "the nature" (*xing* 性; short for *faxing* 法性; dharma nature: the true nature of reality; suchness) and characteristics (*xiang* 相; short for *faxiang* 法相; dharma characteristics: the phenomenal marks of dharmas) to articulate this distinction. He directed two main criticisms at the Emptiness school. The first is that it was prone to attachment to the concept of emptiness (*kong* 空). The second, and more fundamental, criticism is that it failed to maintain the "non-duality of intrinsic reality and function" (*ti yong bu er* 體用不二) – the core metaphysical tenet of Xiong's mature philosophy – owing to the powerful Buddhist preference to distinguish the unconditioned strictly from the conditioned. He was also critical of the Emptiness school for failing to accept that Reality (the unconditioned) can flow and actively create. For Xiong, the Emptiness school's refusal to accept that Reality is causal not only implies that some other ontological support must therefore undergird or give rise to the phenomenal world of conditioned dharmas, moreover, in doing so, it also sunders the non-duality of *ti* and *yong*.

In contrast, he finds that the Existence school's doctrine of the Three Natures (*san xing* 三性 ; *trisvabhāva*) provided a valuable corrective to the excesses of the Emptiness school's obsessive focus on emptiness. Xiong maintained that the Three Natures doctrine supports the thesis that although dharmas have no *self*-nature (*zixing* 自性) they do have *true* nature (*shixing* 實性), just as hemp fiber is the true nature of rope, the latter having no self-nature. He argues that this true nature (hemp fiber) is not separated from dependently originated characteristics (the rope), and by *removing attachment* to these characteristics the true nature can be discerned therein. He also referred to this as "seeing the nature in characteristics" (於相而見性). For Xiong, this is his alternative way of making the point that

the unconditioned and the conditioned, or *ti* and *yong*, are not separated from one another, and that the conditioned (*yong*) plays the heuristic role of revealing the unconditioned (*ti*).

In the end, however, Xiong concluded that just as with the Emptiness school, the Existence School also denied that the dharma-nature, the unconditioned, can arise, change, flow or be causal. His real complaint is that dharma nature (or *ti*) and dharma characteristics (or *yong*) thus become severed, "and so it cannot be said that *yong* is the manifestation of *ti*." This sundering of *ti* and *yong* is exactly the same complaint that Xiong directed at the Emptiness School.

Having refuted the shortcomings of both the Existence and Emptiness schools, Xiong then praised his own *New Treatise* (1944) as having addressed these shortcomings, thus preserving both *ti* and *yong*, the noumenal and the phenomenal. He describes a key moment in his own path of learning when he achieved "tacit realization of the True Realm" (默會於真際), a realm he characterizes as simultaneously transforming and tranquil: "It has always been empty tranquillity, and yet it has the continuity of unceasing production and reproduction, transformation and retransformation" (本來空寂，而有生生化化不息之繼). In then proceeding to deny that "empty tranquillity" is not an empty void but rather is replete with the four qualities of "constant, blissful, Self, and pure" (常樂我淨), Xiong reveals that his own doctrinal position is squarely aligned with the Tathāgatagarbha tradition, where these formulaic four qualities are used to describe suchness, which is also equated with the *tathāgatagarbha*. It also happens that the *Treatise* provides a paradigmatic expression of this formula and its connection with suchness, with the *tathāgatagarbha*. Although Xiong did not reference the *Treatise* in *Cui huo xian zong ji*, elsewhere in that work he did explicitly align his *New Treatise* with the so-called Truly Constant Mind (*zhenchang xin* 真常心) tradition, a modern epithet for the Tathāgatagarbha tradition, stating that the truly constant mind "is not something different from what I call innate wisdom (*xingzhi* 性智) or inherent mind (*benxin* 本心) in the *New Treatise*." "Innate wisdom" is a term Xiong coined in the *New Treatise* (1944) to refer to the awakening that one's inherent mind is nothing other than intrinsic reality. His description of it as an awareness or awakening (*juewu* 覺悟) that has always been self-knowing and self-aware (他元是自明自覺) has unambiguous resonances with the idea of inherent awakening (*benjue* 本覺), a key concept in the *Treatise*.

The chapter also draws attention to the high degree of consistency between Xiong's thesis that "Having entered ultimate truth, there are no characteristics to become attached to (there have never been any phenomenal characteris- tics nor [mental] characteristics of time and space); according with conventional truth, characteristics are not rejected" and the description of "explicit revelation" in the so-called third teaching identified by Huayan and Chan master Zongmi 宗密 (784–841) in his tripartite scheme of doctrinal classification, the Teaching That Explicitly Reveals That the True Mind is the Nature (顯示真心即性教), a teaching that Zongmi associates with a concentration of texts associated with the Tathāgatagarbha tradition, including the *Treatise*. The representative doctrine of this third teaching is that the mind of sentient beings is buddha-nature, the *tathāgatagarbha*.

The final part of the chapter argues that Xiong was attracted to the *Treatise* because it countenances the idea that the unconditioned can actively operate within the conditioned, that the non-arising and non-ceasing aspect of the one mind can combine or merge (*hehe* 和合) with the arising and ceasing aspect of the one mind to constitute the *ālayavijñāna*. He proclaimed that the import of *Treatise*'s notion

of *hehe* "is deep, broad and boundless" because it vouchsafes the non-duality of the unconditioned and the conditioned, *ti* and *yong*. Moreover, he concluded, it was able to do this precisely because it is *not* an Indian Buddhist text, but a hybrid text that integrates native Chinese and Indian Buddhist thought.

In chapter 5, I set out to show how Xiong drew on Huayan philosophical resources, and later on Tiantai philosophical resources, to articulate changing formulations and refinements of his core metaphysical tenet of the "non-duality of *ti* and *yong*." These resources were grounded in accounts of the relationship between *li* 理 (principle/pattern) and *shi* 事 (phenomena). The first of the chapter's two parts demonstrates that by the mid-1930s Xiong had begun actively to drew on the Huayan doctrine of the non-obstruction of *li* and phenomena (*li shi wu ai* 理事無礙), in particular the idea that *li* pervades all phenomena (*li bian yu shi* 理遍於事) and all phenomena pervade *li* (*shi bian yu li* 事遍於理), to articulate the "non-duality of *ti* and *yong*." This is evident in his increasing reference to "subsuming function into Reality" (*she yong gui ti* 攝用歸體), and "subsuming Reality into function" (*she ti gui yong* 攝體歸用; *rong ti gui yong* 融體歸用). One of Xiong's favorite metaphors to describe these two sets of relations is the ocean and the myriad waves. When the intersubsumption of the parts (function) is seen to reveal the whole (Reality), just as the waves reveals the ocean, then this represents the non-duality of *ti* and *yong* (體用不二) as viewed from the perspective of subsuming function into Reality (攝用歸體); when the whole is seen to manifest as the parts, just as the ocean is manifest as the waves, then this represents the non-duality of *ti* and *yong* as viewed from the perspective of subsuming Reality into function (攝體歸用). Despite this seeming evenhandedness, in Xiong's 1944 edition of the *New Treatise* we see a recurrent bias towards *ti*, in which *yong* is subsumed into *ti* (攝用歸體), reinforced by the persistent claim that phenomena lack self-nature. This bias towards *ti* is also evident in the formula "to reveal *ti* through *yong*" (*ji yong xian ti* 即用顯體), where the goal is to realize *ti* not *yong*. *Ti* has no characteristics that enable it to be directly revealed and so the characteristics of *yong*/phenomena serve to reveal *ti* indirectly. Because *yong* is nothing more than the expression of *ti* and not something real in and of itself, *yong* must be subsumed within, collapsed into *ti*. This ontological privileging of *ti* over *yong* is consistent with the position of Huayan theorists such as Fazang 法藏 (643–712), who had posited an irreversible structural *dependence* priority of *shi* upon *li*.

In the pre-1950 period, Xiong had maintained that, ontologically, *yong* depends on *ti*, just as an image depends on the brightness of the mirror. That dependence relationship is unilateral. By 1958, Xiong not only insisted on the ontological parity between *ti* and *yong*, but also on their ontological identity. This change represents a clear rejection of the Huayan privileging of *li* over *shi*, of *ti* over *yong*. It is also an unequivocal rejection of the Madhyamaka-inspired notion of "refuting [dharma] characteristics in order to reveal the [dharma] nature" (破相現性). The second part of this chapter argues that Xiong's late 1950s–early 1960s account of the non-duality of *ti* and *yong* thesis can be seen to be a creative appropriation of the Tiantai Three Truths doctrine and represents the final theoretical elaboration of his "non-duality of *ti* and *yong*" thesis. This elaboration was the culmination of rejecting both Yogācāran and Mādhyamikan views on the relationship between dharma nature (the unconditioned) and dharma characteristics (the conditioned), first in favor of Huayan accounts of the relationship between *li* and *shi* and subsequently Tiantai accounts of that relationship, both of which, in turn, were philosophical responses to, and developments of, the *Treatise*'s account of the relationship between the unconditioned and the conditioned, as encapsulated in its "one mind, two gateways" model. Lin Chen-

kuo is no doubt correct to conclude that Xiong's "Confucian identity is constructed through mirrors of language among which Buddhist language plays the most significant role." The main qualification I would make to Lin's assessment is that Xiong's Confucian identity is also grounded in problematics deeply informed by the traditions of Sinitic Buddhist philosophy, and that doctrinal differences both within and between those traditions provided rich conceptual resources he creatively appropriated to serve his own philosophical agenda.

Ma Yifu and the **Treatise**

Xiong Shili's friend and mentor, Ma Yifu, was an extremely eclectic scholar and philosopher, and also a prolific system builder, liberally applying his intertextual hermeneutic strategies to Buddhist and Confucian texts. In his detailed account of Ma Yifu in chapter 6 of this volume, Liu Leheng 劉樂恆 identifies both Yang Wenhui and the *Treatise* as having played the most direct and pivotal role in the formation of Ma's Buddhist thought: "Just as Yang Wenhui thought highly of the *Treatise* for its bridging of the Dharma Nature school and the Dharma Characteristics school, so too Ma Yifu emphasized the *Treatise* for its being able to reconcile the Emptiness school and the Huayan school." Curiously, Ma largely ignored the relationship between the *Treatise* and the Dharma Characteristics school (Yogācāra).

Liu characterizes Ma as a New Confucian who sought to reconcile and synthesize Confucian and Buddhist thought premised on the view that Confucian and Buddhist teachings share a common source, "seeing the nature" (*jian xing* 見性), which in turn amounts to discerning the "virtues of the nature" (*xingde* 性德). In Buddhist terms, Ma characterizes the virtues of the nature using such apophatic descriptions as not being subject to conditioned origination (dependent arising), as "being without that which they depend on" (*wudaixing* 無待性) and being "without falsehood" (*wuwangxing* 無妄性) – yet at the same time they have the quality of "being inherent" (*benjuxing* 本具性) and are "the true characteristic of dharmas" (*zhufa shixiang* 諸法 實相; i.e., suchness). In Confucian terms, the virtues of the nature are identified more specifically as humaneness, rightness, ritual propriety, wisdom, living up to one's word, sageliness, balance, and harmony, which, in turn, can all be subsumed under the overarching single "virtue of the nature," humaneness. This would seem clearly to have been inspired by Zhu Xi's 朱熹 (1130–1200) account of the unity of the virtues, in which one cardinal virtue, that of humaneness, is foundational for a group of other cardinal virtues. This is perhaps not altogether surprising, given that Ma identified two Confucian traditions that were able to "see the nature," "return to the nature," and "fully develop the nature": the tradition of humaneness-based learning (*renxue* 仁學) established by Confucius and continued by Mencius; and the tradition of Song-Ming Principle-centered Learning (*lixue* 理學).

Ma saw himself as inheriting both traditions, which he sought to integrate and develop as his own self-styled Theory of the Six Arts (Liuyi lun 六藝論), which Liu Leheng identifies as the hallmark of Ma's New Confucian system of thought. For Ma, the "Theory of the Six Arts" has both an "intrinsic reality" (*ti* 體) aspect and a "function" (*yong* 用) aspect. The former refers to the "virtues of the nature" inherent in the human mind and the latter to the expression of the virtues of the nature. As Liu explains, the Six Arts can be construed both narrowly and broadly. "The narrow sense refers to the *Odes, Documents*, ritual texts, music texts, *Change*, and *Spring and Autumn Annals* as classical texts, whereas the broad sense refers to the methods of moral cultivation, which include all that is perceivable within

human life as well as within heaven and earth…. Together, 'the intrinsic reality of the Six Arts' and 'the function of the Six Arts' are known as the 'Way of the Six Arts.'"

In turn, Ma's *ti-yong* structured Theory of the Six Arts replicates the structure of Zhang Zai's 張載 (1020–1077) and Zhu Xi's 朱熹 (1130–1200) thesis that "the mind combines/controls the nature and the emotions" (*xin tong xing qing* 心統性情). For Zhu Xi, the nature is the intrinsic reality of the mind and the emotions are the mind's function:

> The mind controls the person. As intrinsic reality, the mind is the nature; as function, the mind is the emotions.
> 心主於身，其所以為體者，性也；所以為用者，情也。
> "The mind combines/controls the nature and the emotions." It is because of the mind that the nature and emotions are both subsequently perceived. The mind is intrinsic reality. When expressed outwardly this is called [the mind as] function. Mencius said: "The human mind is humaneness." He also talked of "the mind of pity and compassion." He thus applied the term "the mind" to both the nature and to the emotions. "The human mind is humaneness" is referring to the mind as intrinsic reality; "the mind of pity and compassion" is referring to the mind as func- tion. There must be intrinsic reality for subsequently there to be function. From this explanation we can see the meaning of "The mind combines/controls the nature and the emotions."
> 「心統性情。」性情皆因心而後見。心是體，發於外謂之用。孟子曰:「仁，人心也。」又曰:「惻隱之心。」性情上都下箇「心」字。「仁人心也」，是說體；「惻隱之心」，是說用。必有體而後有用，可見「心統性情」之義。
> The mind has both an intrinsic reality aspect and a function aspect. Before it is outwardly expressed, this is the intrinsic reality aspect of the mind. Once it has been outwardly expressed then this is the function aspect of the mind. How could the mind possibly have a reference fixed exclusively to one or to the other?
> 心有體用。未發之前是心之體，已發之際乃心之用，如何指定說得！

For Zhu Xi, the mind is both the nature and the emotions; it is both the nature *as* intrinsic reality (體) *and* the emotions as function (用); it simultaneously comprises a *xing er shang* 形而上 (above form) aspect and a *xing er xia* 形而下 (within form) aspect.

In the same vein, as Liu Leheng relates, "The Way of each of the Six Arts is nurtured from the moral nature within the mind. Although this moral nature is concealed and not evident, the Six Arts … are manifest and not concealed. And precisely because the Way of each of the Six Arts is the outflowing and emerging expression of the moral nature of the mind, the moral nature within the mind is 'intrinsic reality' (*benti* 本體) and the Six Arts are the 'great function' that intrinsic reality gives appearance to." In turn, this functioning is expressed as "the emotions."

In order to strengthen and develop his account that the Six Arts can all be controlled by the one mind, Ma further maintained that the "mind unites/ controls the nature and the emotions" thesis and the *Treatise*'s "one mind, two gateways" doctrine are interconnected, identifying correspondences between "humaneness qua the mind" (*ren xin* 仁心) or "humaneness qua the nature" (*ren xing* 仁性) and the *Treatise*'s notion of "the mind as suchness" (*xin zhenru* 心真如). As Liu explains, for Ma, both humaneness qua the mind/nature and the mind as suchness are just different terms to describe the

"virtue of the nature." "Moreover, what the Confucians refer to as 'the emotions' corresponds with the mind as arising and ceasing (*xin shengmie* 心生滅) in the *Treatise*. Just as the emotions are differentiated as good and bad, so too the mind as arising and ceasing has both an awakening aspect and a non-awakening aspect."

Ma also appropriated and adapted the *Treatise*'s notion of the Three Greats. Early in the *Treatise*, the author introduces two aspects of Mahāyāna: dharma and meaning. Dharma here refers to the mind of sentient beings. The meaning of Mahāyāna is revealed through the mind of sentient beings. The *Treatise* describes this in terms of intrinsic reality (*ti* 體), characteristics (*xiang* 相), and function (*yong* 用). These concepts are presented as the three "Greats" denoted by *mahā-* in the word Mahāyāna, "Great Vehicle" (*da sheng* 大乘). According to the *Treatise*:

> There are three "meanings" [of *mahā-*, "great", in the word Mahāyāna, "Great Vehicle"]. What are they? The first is that Mahāyāna's intrinsic reality is great because the suchness of all dharmas is uniform, neither increasing nor decreasing. The second is that its characteristics are great because the *tathāgatagarbha* is replete with countless merits. The third is that its functions are great because it is the producer of all good causes and effects, both mundane and supramundane. That is why Mahāyāna [the "Great Vehicle"] is that on which all buddhas have always ridden and why all bodhisattvas ride on this Dharma until they arrive at the level of *tathāgata*s.
>
> 所言義者，則有三種。云何為三？一者、體大，謂一切法真如平等不增減故。 二者、相大，謂如來藏具足無量性功德故。三者、用大，能生一切世間、出世 間善因果故。一切諸佛本所乘故，一切菩薩皆乘此法到如來地故。

The meaning of Mahāyāna is revealed through the mind of sentient beings, and the mind of sentient beings contains all dharmas, as well as the two gateways of the mind as suchness and the mind as arising and ceasing. The mind as suchness reveals the intrinsic reality of Mahāyāna directly and the mind as arising and ceasing reveals it indirectly through its characteristics and functions. These characteristics are associated with the countless merits of the *tathāgatagarbha*, and which are the innate qualities in the mind of all sentient beings – the qualities of buddhas. When suchness adapts to and accords with phenomenal reality, the functioning of the one mind is revealed.

As characterized by Liu, "The intrinsic reality of the Six Arts in its entirety is the unchanging virtue of the nature – this is 'its intrinsic reality is great.' The flow and growth of the characteristics of the virtues of the nature are the characteristic of change – this is 'its characteristics are great.' When the full complement of the characteristics of the virtues of the nature are revealed as the Way of the Six Arts – this is 'its function is great.'"

In drawing these correspondences, Ma was also seeking to bolster the theoretical basis for two of his other intertextual appropriations: (1) "the mind controls/combines the nature and the emotions"; and (2) the Three Changes (*san yi* 三易) in the *Yiwei: Qian zuodu* 易緯: 乾鑿度 (Apocryphon to the *Book of Change*: Opening the Laws of the Hexagram *Qian*): "non-change" (*buyi* 不易), "change" (*bianyi* 變易) and "simplicity" (*jianyi* 簡易). Thus, on the one hand, Ma correlated "the nature" with "non-change," "the emotions" with "change," and "the mind controls/combines the nature and the emotions" with "simplicity." On the other hand, he also correlated non-change with "its intrinsic reality is great," change with "its characteristics are great," and simplicity with "its function is great."

Liu maintains that from Ma's perspective, a failure to integrate the Three Changes and the Three Greats, would have resulted in the meaning of Confucian teachings generally, and of the Three Changes specifically, being unable to be fully revealed. Moreover, "The other reason Ma Yifu used the integration of the Three Changes and the Three Greats to develop his theory of the Way of the Six Arts was in order to place particular emphasis on the aspect of 'its characteristics are great.' … He wanted to emphasize the characteristics of the virtues of the nature, particularly their qualities of vastness, immeasurability and boundlessness." The final example that Liu identifies of Ma's appropriation of concepts and models in the *Treatise* concerns the *Treatise's* account of habituation (*xunxi* 熏習), which Ma integrated with the Cheng-Zhu Principle-centered Learning's doctrine of "making reverential attention the master" (*zhu jing* 主敬).

Tang Junyi and the **Treatise**

In chapter 7, "Being, Seeing, and Believing: Ontological, Epistemological, and Soteriological Commitments in Tang Junyi's Reading of the *Treatise on Awakening Mahāyāna Faith*," Ady Van den Stock avers that unlike his former teacher, Xiong Shili, and his friend, Mou Zongsan, the influence of the *Treatise* in New Confucian thinker Tang Junyi's writings is not pronounced, and that Tang rarely even referred to the *Treatise* when elaborating his own ideas. Instead, Van den Stock focuses on Tang's interpretation of the *Treatise* as set out in *Yuan dao pian* 原道篇 (Retracing the Concept of Dao) and *Yuan xing pian* 原性篇 (Retracing the Concept of the Nature), both of which are parts of Tang's massive historical study, *Zhongguo zhexue yuanlun* 中國哲學原論 (On the Origins of Chinese Philosophy) (1966–1975). He further notes that Tang's *Zhongguo zhexue yuanlun* contributed substantially to the reworking and final presentation of Tang's own constructive philosophy as set out in his "gargantuan and hitherto often invoked but relatively understudied *Shengming cunzai yu xinling jingjie* 生命存在與心靈境界 (Life, Existence, and the Horizons of the Mind)" (1977), a work in which the triad of *ti* 體, *xiang* 相, and *yong* 用 (Three Greats) from the *Treatise* does play a central role in the formal and conceptual structure of that work: the "nine horizons of the mind" (*xinling jiu jing* 心靈 九境). (That work is the subject of Liu Leheng's chapter 8.)

Tang's understanding of the *Treatise* is very much aligned with two topics that were the focus of (renewed) debate, beginning in the early 1920s. The first concerns the relationship between the *tathāgatagarbha* and *ālayavijñāna*. In his 1923 publication, *Lengqie shujue* 楞伽疏決 (Clarifying Resolutions on the *Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra*), Ouyang had already argued that the *Treatise* was based on a misinterpretation of Bodhiruci's translation of the *Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra*'s theory of the *tathagatagarbha*: whereas the *Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra* had actually treated the *tathāgatagarbha* and the *ālayavijñāna* as the same referent, following Bodhiruci's mistranslation, the *Treatise* treated them as two entities. Ouyang's former student, Lü Cheng, also argued that Bodhiruci had mistranslated a number of key ideas in the *Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra*, which subsequently influenced the author of the *Treatise*. Similar to Ouyang, Lü insisted that whereas the author of the *Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra* treated the *tathāgatagarbha* as synonymous with the *ālayavijñāna* (in which the former amounts to a synonym for the latter), Bodhiruci instead understood relevant passages to differentiate the *tathāgatagarbha* and the *ālayavijñāna*.

Indeed, already for the author of the *Treatise*, the "one mind, two gateways" model was an attempt to accommodate Yogācāra and Tathāgatagarbha teachings, in particular the concepts

of *tathāgatagarbha* and *ālayavijñāna*. Thus, in the Sui (581–618) and Tang (618–907) periods, commentators and scholars drew attention to what they distinguished as the Northern and Southern branches of the Dilun 地論 school, said to have been active in sixth century northern China. As I have noted elsewhere:

These commentators and doxographers identified the main difference between the two branches to have been whether defiled phenomena arise from suchness (Southern position) or from the *ālayavijñāna* (Northern position). If these accounts are taken as accurate, then the *Dasheng qixin lun* can be seen to be consistent with the Northern branch in presenting the *ālayavijñāna* – identified with the gateway of arising and ceasing – as the basis for defiled phenomena; and it is also consistent with the Southern branch in presenting suchness or *tathāgatagarbha*, which exists within the defiled *ālayavijñāna*, as the basis of everything, no matter defiled or undefiled.

Tang similarly presents the *Treatise* as attempting to reconcile divergent approaches to the status of the *tathāgatagarbha* and the Yogācāra notion of the *ālayavijñāna*. Van den Stock relates how Tang proposed that the *Treatise* treats the *tathāgatagarbha* and the *ālayavijñāna* as belonging to two different "levels" (*cengci* 層次). He "treats the *tathāgatagarbha* as 'the mind in the primary sense [i.e., as an "absolute reality"; *paramārtha-satya*]' (第一義之心), on the basis of which the *ālayavijñāna* emerges, an approach Tang identifies as one of the major theoretical innovations of the *Treatise* and a largely reconciliatory intervention in the debates between the Northern and Southern Dilun as well as the Shelun 攝論 adherents." This position again contrasts with that of Lü Cheng, who argued that the *Treatise*'s claim that "The arising-and-ceasing mind exists because of dependence on the *tathāgatagarbha*" is doctrinally incoherent because it presents the unconditioned (what is not subject to the laws of cause and effect) as serving as the basis of the conditioned – and became the basis for a slew of problematic ideas proposed in the *Treatise*.

A second topic of debate where Tang defends a position he attributes to the *Treatise* concerns the relationship between the unconditioned and the conditioned. As Van den Stock explains, "Tang insists on reading the text as upholding a minimal but important distinction between [unconditioned] suchness, on the one hand, and the conditioned world subject to disintegration and decay, on the other … with Tang instead projecting the duality and polarity between the conditioned and the unconditioned onto the *ālayavijñāna* (as a 'combination' of suchness and ignorance) alone." He argues that the reason Tang was unwilling to follow influential commentators such as Wonhyo 元曉 (617–686) and Fazang 法藏 (643–712) in abandoning the distinction between unconditioned and conditioned dharmas came down to soteriological concerns: "Tang insists that without an affirmation of intrinsic awakening as a metaphysical premise – that is to say, one not subject to empirical contingency – buddhahood would be attained only to be lost again. In other words, the potential for enlightenment is something that needs to be 'disclosed' as a transcendental condition of the possibility for awakening before it can begin to be 'developed.'" In soteriological terms, this transcendental condition or metaphysical premise is none other than "intrinsic awakening" (*benjue* 本覺). In contrast to Yogācāra, in which enlightenment relies on the contingency of "perfumation through hearing [the Dharma]," and hence is dependent on external circumstances, for Tang the *Treatise*'s "mind as suchness" is able to manifest itself. "Tang claims … 'suchness' not only ceases being 'the principle of emptiness of the myriad dharmas' (萬法之空理), but

also becomes a 'fundamental reality with the actual function of giving rise to the myriad dharmas' (能生萬法，而有實作用之實體)."

Tang's position is clearly inconsistent with the account in the *Treatise*, where two senses or characteristics of suchness are distinguished, each with a role to play:

> The first is empty in accordance with what is real. This is because it is ultimately able to reveal what is real. The second is non-empty in accordance with what is real. This is because it has its own intrinsic reality, which is replete with untainted qualities. Suchness is "empty" because it has always been dissociated from all defiled dharmas. That is, it is free from the characteristics that differentiate all dharmas because it has none of the thoughts that the false mind has…. Suchness is "non-empty" because dharmas are intrinsically empty and without falsity, as has already been shown. It is precisely the true mind – constantly unchanging and replete with pure dharmas – and so it is called non-empty.
> 一者、如實空，以能究竟顯實故。二者、如實不空，以有自體，具足無漏性功 德故。所言空者，從本已來一切染法不相應故。謂離一切法差別之相，以無虛 妄心念故。… 所言不空者，已顯法體空無妄故。即是真心常恒不變淨法滿足， 故名不空。

Suchness is truly empty because it is free of false conceptual and verbal discriminations, and it can disclose what is real when defilements caused by ignorance are removed. Emptiness renders delusion unreal and so discloses the reality of "non-emptiness." Overturning delusion enables the practitioner to become aware of what is ultimately real. If it were not for delusion, the practitioner would not awaken to what is real, to the fact that the practitioner is already inherently awoken.

For Tang, however, the key attraction of the model provided by the *Treatise* is that the unconditioned "mind as suchness" is able to manifest itself. Tang further characterized the nature of this mind as an active "presentation" (*chengxian* 呈現) or "self-awareness." As Van den Stock explains, for Tang, Buddhism "implicitly commits itself to an axiological conception of 'the nature' (*xing* 性) as something that is not merely 'empty' of all determinations, but also has a normative component, in other words, the existence of a 'nature as value' (*jiazhixing zhi xing* 价值性之性)." This position is, in turn, much closer to that of the *Treatise*:

> [Ordinary people] think that the nature of suchness and nirvana is nothing but emptiness. This is because when they hear the sutra explain that the ultimate reality of mundane dharmas is empty, that even the dharmas of nirvana and suchness are ultimately empty, and that they have always been intrinsically empty and free from all characteristics, they do not know that this [is said] to refute attachments. What is the antidote? It is to make it clear that the dharma body of suchness' own intrinsic reality is not empty, but replete with countless qualities.
> 聞修多羅說世間諸法畢竟體空，乃至涅槃真如之法亦畢竟空，從本已來自空離一切相，以不知為破著故，即謂真如、涅槃之性唯是其空。云何對治？明真如 法身自體不空，具足無量性功德故。

In his concluding section to the chapter, Van den Stock re-iterates that Tang Junyi's conception of the mind's irreducible ontological status as non-empty "would remain more or less constant throughout the whole of his *oeuvre*, right up to his final work, *Life, Existence, and the Horizons of the Mind*, which Tang saw as a 'purely philosophical and theoretical basis' (純哲學理論之基礎) meant retroactively to support most of his previous writings."

That final work is the main subject of Liu Leheng's chapter 8. As with Ady Van den Stock, Liu denies that the *Treatise* had a "determinative influence" on Tang's philosophy or his thinking about Confucianism. He does, however, qualify this, by also maintaining that "Tang put his own philosophy and the *Treatise* into mutual verification and support, resulting in a two-way enrichment between his New Confucian system and his research into the *Treatise* and Buddhist thought generally." At the most general level, this kind of mutual verification is evident in Tang's soteriological agenda. As already noted, Tang was convinced that the "mind as suchness" is able to manifest itself; that it is an active "presentation." Liu similarly relates that, for Tang, the *Treatise* was written in response to Yogācāra's inability to explain how attaining buddhahood is possible, given its denial that suchness is a self-manifesting inherent mind, or what Liu variously refers to as the *tathāgatagarbha* pure mind or *tathāgatagarbha* True Mind: "Tang pointed out that the *Treatise* first established the idea of a *tathāgatagarbha* pure mind because this pure mind is directly, self-consciously experienced by the cultivator in the process of cultivation." And even though the *tathāgatagarbha* pure mind is, in Tang's terms, the ultimate horizon (*jingjie* 境界) of cultivation, it should also be considered the initial point for cultivation, because without it one would never be able to experience the first aspiration for cultivation. Moreover, as Liu notes, in Tang's view: "If I view my present non-awakening in light of my mind that can eventually be fully awakened, then it emerges that my present non-awakening is the same as my eventual awakening. Thus my 'non-awakening' can actually be regarded as a 'non-awakened awakening.'"

Liu also shows how Tang attached particular importance to what he deemed to be the pivotal role that the *Treatise* played in the development of Chinese Buddhist doctrine. In particular, Tang deemed the *Treatise*'s "one mind, two gateways" model – according to which the one mind gives rise to both the "gateway of suchness" and the "gateway of arising and ceasing" – as having provided the theoretical inspiration not only for both the Tiantai doctrine of "nature inclusion" (*xingju* 性具) and the Huayan doctrine of "nature origination" (*xing qi* 性起), but, moreover and importantly, for the Huayan doctrine of "according with conditions without changing" (*sui yuan bu bian* 隨緣不變) and the Tiantai doctrine that "the nature [paradoxically] includes both defilement and purity" (*xing ju ran jing* 性具染淨). As Liu explains, these latter two doctrines further developed and reinforced the thesis that "there is no hindrance between the mind's defilement and its purity, or between the defiled arising and ceasing mind and the clear, pure mind of suchness. On the one hand, the superficial arising and ceasing mind and the deeper mind of suchness both exist, yet, on the other hand, their relationship is also one of interpenetrating unity (*xiangguan guiyi* 相貫歸一)." In turn, "from this foundation, Tang proceeded to reflect further on the doctrine of 'one mind, two gateways,' concluding that within the one mind, the relationship between the two gateways is one of mutual interaction and mutual concealing and revealing."

Already in his 1973 publication, *Zhongguo zhexue yuan lun: Yuan dao pian* 中國哲學原論 原道篇 (On the Origins of Chinese Philosophy: Retracing the Concept of *Dao*), Tang had described the relationship between the two gateways as one of mutual concealment, mutual alternation, mutual habituation/perfuming. Liu describes the operations of this dynamic in Tang's reading of the "one mind, two gateways" doctrine as follows:

When the mind as suchness senses that it has become obscured by the defiled arising and ceasing mind, it actually cannot abide this situation and wants self- consciously to manifest itself so as to transcend its

obstruction by the arising and ceasing mind. So, in this situation, the mind as suchness can shift from *yin* to *yang*, concealed to revealed, negative to positive, and transform the defiled arising and ceasing mind, causing it to become completely the manifestation of the pure mind as suchness.

In regard to Tang's own theoretical priorities, the significance of the notion of "mutual interaction and mutual concealing and revealing" concerns the main theme of his 1977 publication, *Shengming cunzai yu xinling jingjie* 生命存在與心靈境界 (Life-Existence, and the Horizons of the Mind): *xin jing gantong* 心境感通 – rendered by Liu as "authentic feeling's connecting the mind and horizons":

As Tang saw it, authentic feeling is a two-way interaction between the mind and horizons. In other words, given a certain kind of mind, a certain corresponding kind of horizon must emerge, and given a certain kind of horizon, there must emerge a certain corresponding sort of mind. Mind and horizon interact with each other and relate to each other as a pair: there are neither horizonless minds nor mindless horizons…. Thus, the authentic feeling between the mind and horizons is a relationship of co-arising…. If the mind is to interact with a horizon, it must first retire and hide, allowing the horizon to manifest. Then, when the horizon is manifest, the mind transitions from its negative mode to its positive one and interacts further with the horizon.

Liu translates *gantong* 感通 as "authentic feeling" to convey the sense that this kind of feeling is an expression of the nature of the mind (*xinxing* 心性) and not just something confined to the domain of psychology. "Horizon" (*jing* 境; short for *jingjie* 境界) is also a nuanced concept for Tang Junyi. Tang himself suggested that *jing* should be translated as "horizon" or "world" and not as "object". According to Liu, "Whereas 'object' in Western philosophy often implies that the subject or the mind cannot be connected through authentic feeling, horizon (*jing*) in Chinese philosophy has the sense of being able to reveal that there is a relationship of authentic feeling between mind and object."

In *Shengming cunzai yu xinling jingjie* Tang set out a hierarchy of nine horizons – each of which is connected to the mind via authentic feeling. The nine horizons begin with three objective horizons (*keguan jing* 客觀境), then proceed to three subjective horizons (*zhuguan jing* 主觀境), and culminate in three absolute, metaphysical horizons (*juedui de xingershang zhi jing* 絕對的形上之境). The ninth and highest horizon – and a distinctly Confucian horizon – (or in this case, a double horizon) is the "flow of heavenly virtue" (*tiande liuxing* 天德流行) and "fully realizing one's nature and establishing the mandate" (*jinxing liming* 盡性立命). In turn, the three horizons in each tripartite grouping are respectively identified as intrinsic reality (*ti* 體), characteristics (*xiang* 相), or function (*yong* 用) – the Three Greats of the *Treatise*. As Liu explains, for Tang these Three Greats are the manifestation of the process of "authentic feeling's connecting the mind and horizons": "'intrinsic reality' is the self-nature (*tixing* 體性) of authentic feeling; 'characteristics' are the 'appearance' (*xiangzhuang* 相狀) of authentic feeling; and 'function' is its 'efficacy' (*gongneng* 功能)."

Just as Ma Yifu had repurposed the *Treatise*'s *ti, xiang* and *yong*, as part of his intertextual system building, so too Tang assigned the terms meanings from within his own philosophy. However, the terms also play an important ancillary role in reinforcing another more explicit aspect of the *Treatise*'s connection with Tang's metaphysics, one already introduced above: the notion of "mutual interaction and mutual concealing and revealing." As Liu explains, for Tang, the meaning of "intrinsic reality" and

"characteristics" must be demonstrated "through the process of the two successive 'functions' of authentic feeling's connecting the mind and horizons." The two successive functions are that of concealing and revealing. And although intrinsic reality will not be visible when in a state of contraction and concealment, as it inevitably reverts to a state with the manifest "characteristics" of extension, advancing, and revealing, it becomes visible. As such, Liu concludes, "'intrinsic reality,' 'characteristics,' and 'function' are internal to authentic feeling's connecting the mind and horizons."

Mou Zongsan and the **Treatise**

In chapter 9, "The Supreme Penultimate: The *Treatise on Awakening Mahāyāna Faith* According to Mou Zongsan," Jason Clower draws on, and treats as compatible, Mou Zongsan's remarks on the *Treatise* in the first volume of *Xinti yu xingti* 心體與性體 (Intrinsic Reality of the Mind and Intrinsic Reality of the Nature; 1968), *Foxing yu bore* 佛性與般若 (Buddha Nature and *Prajñā*; 1977), and *Zhongguo zhexue shijiu jiang* 中國哲學十九講 (Nineteen Lectures on Chinese Philosophy) (delivered 1978–1979). In his system of doctrinal classification, Mou distinguished two main groups of Chinese Buddhist philosophy: one based on Madhyamaka and the other on Yogācāra. In turn, he sub-divided the Yogācāra group into a Weishi Yogācāra school represented by Xuanzang and a Tathāgatagarbha system he referred to as the "True Mind system" (*zhenxin xitong* 真心系統), of which the *Treatise* is representative. One of the key distinctions is that the Tathāgatagarbha system employs what Mou refers to as a "transcendental analytic" (*chaoyue de fenxi* 超越的分析). As Clower explains, this refers to "a distinction between the mind of our ordinary experience – mundane, conditioned, determinate, finite, ordinary, unenlightened – and an unconditioned, non-determinate, enlightened '*tathāgatagarbha* pure True Mind' that provides a transcendental basis for our ordinary mind…. The important methodological principle Mou believes to be in play in the *Treatise* is that its doctrinal system must be presented as a 'transcendental analytic,' not the empirical or psychological analysis of the Yogācāra system."

For Mou, Yogācāra and the *Treatise* also differ in their accounts of suchness (*zhenru* 真如). As he writes in *Foxing yu bore*: "In Xuanzang's Yogācāra, suchness is merely the principle of emptiness; it is an object (所、相分) [i.e. lacks any subjectivity]. It can neither perfume nor be perfumed and therefore it can be said only to be 'changeless' and not also to 'follow conditions.'" In contrast, in the *Treatise*, suchness has agency and enables sentient beings to be habituated by it. The *Treatise*'s "*tathāgatagarbha* pure True Mind" or "suchness" particularly appealed to Mou because it evidenced three qualities essential to what Clower characterizes as Mou's "ultimate ground of reality" (UGR) or "ultimate value" (UV): activeness, universalism, and determinacy. Just as Tang Junyi maintained that the "mind as suchness" is able to manifest itself, that it is an active "presentation," so too for Mou, "it can take the initiative and act on the subject, both internally and 'externally,' in what the text calls, respectively, 'habituation by the characteristics of the intrinsic reality' of suchness (*ziti xiang xunxi* 自體相熏習) and 'by the functions' (*yong xunxi* 用熏習) of suchness." The True Mind is universal because it is equally available to all; it is also *a priori* and unconditional. In Mou's Kantian parlance, it provides the "transcendental basis" (*chaoyue genju* 超越根據) guaranteeing the necessity of buddhahood for all. As for the third quality, that of determinacy, although True Mind (= suchness, *tathāgatagarbha*) has no boundaries and is beyond determination, there are modes in which it can have finite qualities. As Clower explains, "We could say that Mou was committed to 'save the [determinate] phenomena' and arrive at an *articulated* monism, one which reconciles monism with the 'necessary existence of [distinct] things.'" For Mou, the *Treatise*'s

One Mind or True Mind provides the support (*yizhi* 依止) for all dharmas, their "transcendental basis," the *a priori* condition for their possibility. "Mou explains the text's famous passage about combining non-arising and non-ceasing with arising-and-ceasing (不生不滅與生滅和合) in the arising and ceasing aspect of the mind (心生滅), to mean that the mind is both 'transcendent and immanent' and the 'productive cause' (*shengyin* 生因) of pure (*anāsrava*) dharmas and also the 'supporting cause' (*þingyi yin* 憑依因) or 'indirect cause' of defiled (*āsrava*) dharmas, inasmuch as the latter are produced by the storehouse mind, which relies upon the True Mind."

Mou's best-known appropriation from the *Treatise* is his repurposing of the "one mind, two gateways" model for his own "two-tier ontology" (*liangceng cunyoulun* 兩層存有論): an "ontology with grasping" (*zhi de cunyou lun* 執的存有論) and an "ontology without grasping" (*wuzhi de cunyoulun* 無執的存有論), or more straightforwardly, an ontological account of (1) "appearances" or phenomena (*xianxiang* 現象) and (2) "things-in-themselves" (*wu zishen* 物自身). Unlike Kant, who held that humans have no faculty of intellectual intuition (*zhi de zhijue* 智的直覺), that noumena, or "things-in-themselves," can only be postulated and not directly intuited by humans, for Mou, noumenal reality can be directly intuited (or "presented" *chengxian* 呈現). Humans can apprehend both sides of the coin: the noumenal and phenomenal character of things.

In the fourteenth lecture of his *Zhongguo zhexue shijiu jiang*, Mou is both explicit and effusive about the connection between "one mind, two gateways" and his "two-tier ontology":

> One mind opening two gateways … is a very important philosophical framework. This framework makes a tremendous contribution and should not be viewed merely as some account internal to Buddhism. Rather, it should be viewed as a shared model with universal applicability, capable of dealing with a very important philosophical issue…. Therefore, that which is directly presented before moral knowing, the inherent mind, or the intrinsically pristine mind, is the in-itself (在其自己) of every single thing. Once facing the subject of sensibility and understanding, however, the in-itself of every single thing turns into appearances…. Is such a presentation with two faces not the same as Buddhism's "one mind opening two gateways"? Allowing a thing to have the double character of being appearance and thing-in-itself does not violate Kant's arguments. On the contrary, it helps to dissolve the unsatisfactory and inadequate parts of Kant's philosophy. Although "one mind opening two gateways" may be considered only a fantasy from Kant's standpoint, in actual truth, when duly gauged by the principles affirmed in Chinese philosophy, it is, indeed a more advanced philosophical vision than Kant's.
> 一心開二門的架構…是哲學思想上一個很重要的格局。這個格局非常有貢獻，不能只看作是佛教內的一套說法。我們可以把它視為一個公共模型，有普遍的適用性，可以拿它來對治一個很重要的哲學問題。… 因此，對着良知、本心或 自性清淨心直接呈現的，是事事物物之在其自己；而當它一旦面對感性與知性 主體時，則轉成現象。… 這種兩種面向的呈現，不就等於佛教所說的「一心開二門」嗎？這個意思並未違背康德的說法，相反地，卻足以消化康德哲學中的不圓滿與 不足之處。… 雖然依康德的看法，這些都只是「幻想」 (fantacy [sic])， 然從實際的道理來看，就當該照中國哲學所肯定的義理來說，這個哲學理境的確有進於康德處。

Intellectual intuition is associated with the inherent mind, the pure mind – the correlate of the *Treatise*'s mind as suchness. For Mou, it has the capacity to intuit things-in-themselves directly. The subject of

sensibility and understanding (also, variously, the "epistemic mind" [*renshi xin* 認識心], the "finite mind" *[youxian xin* 有限心*]*), is the correlate of the mind as arising and ceasing, the storehouse consciousness, and, like the storehouse consciousness, it gives rise to determinate objects.

As Clower explains, Mou's argument for the "uniqueness of Chinese philosophy" involves maintaining that all the highest practitioners of Chinese philosophy "preach that not only *can* human beings have sagely cognition, or 'intellectual intuition,' but also that we all *do* have it, innately and without exception" and to that end he had to find "a Buddhist point of view from which we can say that *prajñā* is constantly operating, in everyone, and that it can reach out to us from the inside, even in the absence of the right external cues." Although the *Treatise* had gone a long way to satisfying that requirement, for Mou, ultimately it was only the penultimate – albeit necessary – step on the way to a truly perfect (*yuan* 圓) teaching. Drawing on theoretical positions developed in the context of an internal schism in renascent Tiantai Buddhism of the Northern Song period, Mou concluded that the *Treatise* had failed to provide for the necessary existence of determinate things (差別法的必然存在). As described by Clower, "since in the *Treatise*'s account the enlightened mind does not experience variegated things, Mou concludes that it is only conditional, not necessary, that there be things at all, and hence that the True Mind is only 'indeterminately' (*wuding* 無定) absolute: it *excludes* determinacy," including not just material things but also differences among self and non-self and a plurality of moral actors.

What, then, was the constructive position that Mou proposed? For Kant, free will is a practical necessity for the possibility of a categorical imperative, because we cannot act as autonomous moral agents without presupposing the idea of freedom. As such, it is a necessary condition of morality. Yet, whereas for Kant the concept of free will is a postulate, for Mou it is a "presentation": it can be directly intuited by the moral subject. Mou insisted that all humans have the faculty of intellectual intuition and can have direct intuition of noumenal reality and direct intuition of free will. He characterized the moral subject as having an unlimited capacity for moral knowledge because all humans have a moral mind, one that transcendentally grounds us in the unceasing creative process of the cosmos, an inherently moral process.

Mou further maintained that practical reason (*shijian lixing* 實踐理性) (and hence the moral subject) harbors an inexorable inclination for dialectical development that propels it toward its own "contradiction" (*maodun* 矛盾). Because practical reason requires its antithesis – theoretical reason (*guanjie lixing* 觀解理性) – it artificially or forcefully instigates its own negation. (Practical reason is concerned with the *a priori* grounds for action, whereas theoretical reason enables us to have knowledge of objects given in experience.) It is in this connection that Mou proposed his "self-negation of innate moral consciousness" (*liangzhi ziwo kanxian* 良知自我坎陷) thesis, in which moral consciousness negates its inherent non-discriminating mode in order to allow the discriminating mind to arise and to effect action:

> This emergence is dialectical (in Hegel's sense rather than Kant's). We can describe it this way: (1) outwardly speaking, since people are human yet sagely and also sagely whilst human (or likewise humans yet buddhas and buddhas whilst human), scientific knowledge is necessary in principle and is also possible, for otherwise they would be impaired with respect to their duties as humans. (2) Inwardly speaking, in order to accomplish this task, the clear intuition of knowing-in-itself cannot linger forever as intellectual intuition. It must consciously negate itself

> and transform itself into "understanding." **This understanding is what confronts things (*wu* 物) and enables things to be constituted as "objects" (*duixiang* 對象) and investigated in their diversity** [JM emphasis]. It must undergo this self-negation in order to realize itself fully, and this is what is meant by dialectical emergence (*bianzheng de kaixian* 辯證的開顯). Its transformation into understanding by going through self-negation is the only way for it to solve all the special problems of humankind, and it is also the only way for its moral aspirations to flow unimpeded.
> 此步開顯是辯證的（黑格爾意義的辯證，非康德意義的辯證）。此步辯證的開顯可如此說明:（1）外部地說，人既是人而聖，聖而人，則科學知識原則上是必要的，而且亦是可能的，否則人義有缺。（2）內部地說，要成就那外部地說的必然，知體明覺不能永停在明覺之感應中，它必須自覺地自我否定（亦曰自 我坎陷），轉而為"知性"；此知性與物為對，始能使物成為"對象"，從而究知其曲折之相。它必須經由這一步自我坎陷，它始能充分實現其自己，此即所謂辯證的開顯。它經由自我坎陷轉為知性，它始能解決那屬於人的一切特殊的問 題，而其道德的心願亦始能暢達無阻。

Despite Mou's explicit reference to Hegel's dialectics, the connection strikes me as tenuous, given that Hegel's notion of sublation or suspension (*Aufheben*) concerns the idea of a ***finite determination*** transitioning to its opposite. Rather, it may well have been Mou's mentor, Xiong Shili, who sowed the inspiration for the "self-negation of innate moral consciousness" thesis with his account of contradiction, contraction and expansion.

Mou further complains that the *Treatise*'s other shortcoming is that "when you explain 'initial awakening' and liberation in terms of the intrinsically untainted mind that is the *tathāgatagarbha* (如來藏自性清淨心) as spontaneously giving rise to the aspiration [for enlightenment] and [capacity for] wisdom, it is hardly self-evident or necessary that it will eventuate in the [*Treatise*'s] type of flight to the trans-mundane." All that the text actually promises is that we must *wait* for our potential for enlightenment to be triggered by the right external circumstances. Just as wood has the capacity to burn, as the *Treatise* says, "If there is no-one who knows this, then people will not have recourse to the means necessary [to ignite the wood] – and it is impossible that the wood will be able to burn by itself." Inherent buddha-nature is the necessary cause of buddhahood yet it is not a sufficient cause for realizing buddhahood. In order to be sparked, sentient beings need to encounter buddhas, bodhisattvas or good teachers, who will employ skillful means to enable sentient beings to realize their potential.

The **Treatise** and East Asian Philosophy of Subjectivity

In the concluding chapter of this volume, Lin Chen-kuo identifies the *Treatise* as having played a key role in the formation of modern East Asian philosophy of subjectivity. Lin relates that the concept of "subject" or "subjectivity" was introduced from European philosophy into Japan during the Meiji era (1868–1912) and subsequently disseminated within Chinese intellectual circles where it quickly became associated with the notion of "self-awareness" (*zijue* 自覺). The *Treatise* is significant in that it helped to elucidate the internal relationship between subject and self-awareness, which in turn serves as the basis for praxis. The *Treatise* states that "all sentient beings have suchness" and because suchness has the power to habituate "it is capable of inducing sentient beings to weary of [the cycle of] birth and death and take pleasure in seeking nirvana, to believe that they themselves have the dharma of suchness, and to arouse the aspiration to awakening and cultivate practice." (能令衆生厭生死苦、樂求涅槃，自信己身有眞如法，發心修行。) Lin finds this to be consistent with "the idealist notion of a 'subject' imbued

with the kind of spontaneity that guarantees the possibility of freedom for the cognitive and practical subject. With regard to the *Treatise*, suchness/truth is both transcendent object and also the immanent basis of subjectivity, realized through the power of the subject."

Lin explains that the key motivation for him in linking the *Treatise* with East Asian philosophy of subjectivity had to do with how the ramifications of debates about the *Treatise* in the early period of the twentieth century in both China and Japan "went beyond the confines of the Buddhist scholastic studies and seeped into mainstream philosophical discourse in modern East Asia, to become a philosophical resource, either implicitly or explicitly, for both New Confucians and the Kyoto School. Viewed this way, the *Treatise* occupied an important place in the intellectual history of East Asia during the early twentieth century."

Indeed, from the late 1870s onwards, Japanese philosophers had begun appropriating the *Treatise* as a vehicle either to introduce Indian and European philosophy or to create a distinctive "Japanese philosophy." For example, as noted earlier, from 1879, the one-time Sōtō Zen monk, Hara Tanzan, used the *Treatise* as the text for a course on Indian Buddhist philosophy at the only university in Japan, Tokyo University. One of his many students, Inoue Tetsujirō 井上哲次郎 (1855–1944), introduced German philosophy as a means to create a "Japanese philosophy" out of Buddhism, based principally on the *Treatise*.[70]In the next generation, the *Treatise* was an important topic in the correspondence between Nishida Kitarō 西田幾多郎 (1870–1945), one of the most innovative philosophers in modern Japan, and his lifelong friend and propagandist of Zen, Suzuki Daisetsu 鈴木大拙 (D.T. Suzuki, 1870–1966), with some scholars even arguing that the basis of Nishida's thought lies in the *Treatise*.

Some of Nishida's students, members of the Kyoto School of philosophy, while immersed in German philosophy, openly based their ideas on the *Treatise*. For example, much of *Kegon tetsugaku shoronkō: Bukkyō no konpon nanmon e no tetsugakuteki apurōchi* 華厳哲学小論攷 – – 仏教の根本難問への哲学的アプローチ (A Brief Study of Kegon Philosophy: A Philosophical Approach to Fundamental Problems in Buddhism), published in 1922 by the prolific author Tsuchida Kyōson 土田杏村 (1891–1934), is explicitly based on the *Treatise*. Hisamatsu Shinichi 久松真一 (1889–1980), who promoted a philosophy and aesthetics of Zen for laypersons, wrote a philosophical analysis of the *Treatise* in 1947 (*Kishin no kadai* 起信の課題) based on his university lectures of 1936–1937, interpreting it using existentialism and "the theology of crisis." Another of Nishida's students, Takizawa Katsumi 滝沢克己 (1909–1984) even used the *Treatise* to create a Christian theology.

Just as criticism of the *Treatise* was principally carried out by scholars associated with the China Institute of Inner Learning, who promoted a return to genuine Buddhism, so too, in Japan, related criticisms were principally carried out by proponents of so-called Critical Buddhism (*hihan Bukkyō* 批判佛教). Thus, the standoff between the views upheld by Xiong Shili and Mou Zongsan, on the one hand, and by Ouyang and Lü Cheng, on the other, has, in more recent times, resurfaced in the context of controversies surrounding Critical Buddhism. Critical Buddhism is an intellectual movement initiated in mid-1980s Japan by Sōtō scholars Hakamaya Noriaki 袴谷憲昭 and Matsumoto Shirō 松本史朗. Critical Buddhism takes aim at any doctrine that posits an eternal, metaphysical substratum, underlying ground, or locus on which everything else is ontologically grounded, since it is contrary to the Buddha's teachings on impermanence. In particular, Critical Buddhism regards Sinicized forms of Buddhism to be false

Buddhism and incompatible with the project of modernity because they are not founded on rational critique.

Lin Chen-kuo points out that "Hakamaya distinguished two kinds of Buddhism, 'Critical Buddhism' and 'Topical Buddhism' (*basho Bukkyō* 場所佛教), and thereby extended the battle line of his criticism right to the doorstep of the Kyoto School." The *Treatise* is seen to be emblematic of so-called "topical Buddhism" or "topical philosophy" – "notions of a universal, ineffable, preconceptual ground or 'topos' from which all things are produced and to which they return at death" – because constructions such as *dharmakāya (fashen* 法身; dharma body) and *tathāgatagarbha* seemingly contradict the doctrine of no-self. These constructions, in turn, are foundational for doctrines such as intrinsic awakening, a doctrine that appears to be inconsistent with the doctrine of conditioned origination. "This forms an intriguing contrast in philosophical disputes concerning the *Treatise*: in China, it was the dispute between the China Institute of Inner Learning and the New Confucians; in Japan, it was between 'Critical Buddhism' and the Kyoto School."

More specifically, how does the philosophy of subjectivity concern Xiong Shili and Mou Zongsan, the two New Confucians featured in Lin's chapter? In the very opening paragraph of the first chapter in Xiong's 1932 *New Treatise*, "Explanation of the Thesis" (Ming zong 明宗), Xiong provides the following account of why he wrote the *Treatise*:

> Reality (*shiti* 實體) is not an external realm detached from one's own mind, nor is it a cognitive object of knowledge. This is because it is only by seeking within that there is correspondence with true realization. (True realization is the self's recognizing the self, with absolutely nothing concealed.) Correspondence with true realization is called wisdom (智 [**jñāna*]) because it differs from the mundane world, which is established on the basis of discernment [慧 (**prajñā*)]. 實體非是離自心外在境界，及非知識所行境界，唯是反求實證相應故。 (實證即是自己認識自己，絕無一毫蒙蔽。) 是實證相應者，名之爲智，不同世間依慧立故。

The subject of this correspondence with true realization – when the self recognizes the self – is "wisdom" and not "consciousness," underscoring a fundamental departure from what Lin characterizes as the China Institute of Inner Learning's revered doctrine – the theory of the subjectivity of the *ālayavijñāna* (storehouse consciousness). Moreover, "for Xiong this subject that is wisdom is none other than intrinsic reality itself (ultimate reality). Put the other way around, intrinsic reality is nothing but inherent mind, and inherent mind and intrinsic reality are non-dual. This line of thought is basically the same as Lu Xiangshan 陸象山 and Wang Yangming's 'mind *is* principle' (*xin ji li* 心即理), and it is also same as the view in the *Treatise* that mind and suchness are one."

Xiong also parted company with the China Institute of Inner Learning partisans on another key issue that involves the *Treatise* and the topic of subjectivity: the question of whether the nature of the mind is inherently quiescent (*xing ji* 性寂) or innately enlightened/awoken (*xing jue* 性覺), which Lin characterizes as representing two theories of subjectivity. This became a topic of contention in a series of exchanges with Buddhist scholar and former classmate Lü Cheng in 1943. At the most general level, this question touched upon the very legitimacy of the philosophical foundations of East Asian Buddhism. More specifically, this point of contention bears directly on a range of issues, including the interpretation of the doctrine, "the nature of the mind is inherently pure" (*xinxing ben jing* 心性本淨) and methods of cultivation.

As Lin explains, Lü maintained that whereas Indian Buddhist theory of the nature of the mind held that "the nature of the mind is inherently pure" and "inherently quiescent and pure, the self-nature is nirvanic" (本來寂淨，自性涅槃), under the influence of the *Treatise*, Buddhism in the Chinese tradition had "misconstrued 'the nature of the mind is inherently pure' to mean that 'the nature of the mind is inherently awakened.'" Consistent with this latter understanding, Xiong upheld the view that the inherently awakened (and hence dynamic) nature of the mind can be personally realized through the "inner realization" of our inherent mind – a doctrine associated in particular with the teachings of the *Treatise*. As Lin notes, in terms of practice, the doctrine that "the nature of the mind is inherently awoken" "seeks to 'directly reveal the nature of the mind'; and 'return to the root and source,' which does not require any change in cognition." Lü Cheng, on the other hand, upheld the Yogācāra view (as represented by Xuanzang and Kuiji) that although "the nature of the mind is inherently pure," realization of that purity requires a "transformation of the basis" of cognition (*renshi* 認識). Lin relates that such a transformation involves an attitude of renewal, whereas "Chinese Buddhism holds that the mind inherently possesses an awakened nature, which leads not only to the possibility of achieving buddhahood without spiritual effort but moreover that this awakened nature functions as a guarantee of the actuality of achieving buddhahood." For Lü, the criteria of Buddhist truth can be found only in logic and epistemological analysis, such as was privileged in Yogācāra. Recondite questions about whether truth (*tathatā*) is innate and realized by inward reflection or whether it is realized as an object of cognition had profound practical implications for methods of religious cultivation and ethical practice. He and his colleagues maintained that the doctrine of intrinsic awakening requires no motivation for personal religious cultivation or for social change and as such is favored by politically conservative ideologies.

Throughout most of the 1920s Xiong had upheld the view that the ontological character of the mind is transformation alone. As Sang Yu shows in her chapter, however, in *Zun wen lu* 尊聞錄 (Record of What Has Been Respectfully Heard), a collection of Xiong's sayings and letters between 1924 and 1928, he had already expressed the view that the mind is simultaneously moving (*dong* 動) and quiescent (*jing* 靜), but did not really begin to emphasize this view until he wrote the *New Treatise*, which was published in 1932. Xiong continued to develop this thesis. In correspondence with Lü Cheng in 1943 he stated:

> I believe that "the nature [of the mind] is awakened" and "the nature [of the mind] is quiescent" are inseparable. When speaking of "the nature [of the mind] is awakened," then quiescence is therein. When speaking of "the nature [of the mind] is quiescent," then awakening is therein. The intrinsic reality of the nature [of the mind] has always been truly quiescent and truly awakened. In other words, it is precisely awakening that is quiescence, and it is precisely quiescence that is awakening.
> 吾以為性覺、性寂，實不可分。言性覺，而寂在其中矣。言性寂，而覺在其中矣。性體原是眞寂眞覺，易言之，卽覺卽寂，卽寂卽覺。

It might be tempting to suggest that Xiong is here proposing a thesis akin to that proposed by early commentator on the *Treatise*, Tanyan 曇延 (516–588), who maintained that even though the *tathāgatagarbha* has since beginningless time followed the continuous arising of delusion (隨妄流轉), "its illuminating nature never changes and that is why it is said to be awoken" (照性不改，故名為覺。). However, the more likely reason for Xiong's insistence that the nature of the mind is both awakened

and quiescent is that he wanted to provide a solution to the Buddhist problematic of avoiding the two extremes (*er jian* 二見; *er bian* 二邊) of reification and nihilism, an agenda he pursued well into the 1950s.

Lin Chen-kuo also draws attention to the creative changes that Xiong made to the meaning of certain key terms. A case in point in this same letter is Xiong's statement: "Awakened is humaneness (*ren* 仁), and humaneness is the transformation of life" (覺者，仁也。仁，生化也。). Lin points out that "by using a concept drawn from Confucian metaphysics of creativity to re-interpret the Buddhist concept of 'awakening,' 'inherently awakened' becomes translated into a cosmological and moral philosophical subjectivity that is endowed with creativity." Lin further maintains that Xiong's use of *ren* to re-interpret the Buddhist concept of awakening "later opened the way for Mou Zongsan to take the further step of developing the concept of a free and limitless mind (*ziyou wuxianxin* 自由無限心) into a transcendental subjectivity."

How does the issue of subjectivity relate to Mou Zongsan? Let's begin with "transcendental subjectivity." With respect to the *Treatise*'s two gateways, Lin relates that for Mou, the gateway of "the mind as arising and ceasing" is the one mind's empirical aspect and "the mind as suchness" is its transcendental aspect, and suchness is the transcendental nature of the mind of sentient beings. The mind of sentient beings is inherently imbued with suchness, is of its own nature awakened, and does not need to be sought from without. Because suchness is the transcendental basis of the subject, "to know suchness (dharma-nature *[faxing* 法性*]*) requires only that one 'inwardly returns to awareness through personal realization' (*nijue tizheng* 逆覺體證). It does not require the long and arduous praxis of 'transformation of the basis' (*zhuanyi* 轉依), wherein 'suchness' is 'what is mentally appropriated as a cognitive object.'"

Mou's ontology of non-attachment (or ontology without grasping) is based on the transcendental mind, the correlate of the *Treatise*'s mind as suchness; and his ontology of attachment (or ontology of grasping) is based on the cognitive mind, the correlate of the *Treatise*'s mind as arising and ceasing. This intrinsically pure mind is identified with the moral subject who possesses intellectual intuition, and the cognitive mind is identified with the rational subject. By "inwardly returning to awareness through personal realization" and by "self-negating inherent knowing" Mou presented his two-tier ontology as enabling cognition of the noumenal realm and knowledge of the phenomenal realm. This was the structure of subjectivity as conceived by Mou, a structure that sought to guarantee the existence of the phenomenal realm and the metaphysical realm. Lin describes how the main driver of Mou's philosophical project in works such as *Zhi de zhijue yu Zhongguo zhexue* 智的直覺與中國哲學 (Intellectual Intuition and Chinese Philosophy; 1971) and *Xianxiang yu wuzishen* 現象與物自身 (Appearance and Thing-in-itself; 1975) was to bridge Chinese and Western philosophy, and in doing so:

> Figure out how China can become a modern country, and to realize, albeit critically, the demand for modern science and democracy. He was a traditionalist in search of modernization. And in his project of modernization, it was the *Treatise*'s "one mind, two gateways" that he employed as a "public model" for understanding Kantian philosophy. We thus see that, by that stage, the *Treatise* was no longer the subject of an internal debate within Buddhist doctrinal studies but had become the main bridge to interconnect Chinese and Western philosophy.

Despite the key role that the *Treatise* played in constructing Mou's ontology, ultimately it failed to be the Perfect Teaching. As already introduced, Jason Clower explains that this is because Mou concluded that

the *Treatise* had failed to provide for the necessary existence of determinate things. Lin Chen-kuo provides a similar explanation, maintaining that for Mou, the *Treatise*'s presentation of suchness (the unconditioned) and phenomenal reality (the conditioned origination of the myriad dharmas) as a *ti-yong* relationship was merely a "Buddhist understanding" of *ti-yong* – a flawed understanding in which phenomena are deemed not to be real, but merely serve to play a role as part of an expedient teaching (*quanshuo* 權說). "Mou wanted to emphasize that it is only by means of the Confucian understanding of *ti-yong* as an actual teaching [*shishuo* 實說] that a foundation can be established for the construction of a moral world and political systems. For Mou, it is only the subjectivity of the Confucian understanding of *ti-yong* that can truly be a subjectivity capable of responding vigorously to modern Western culture."

…

As the above overview shows, overwhelmingly, the main conceptual model that New Confucian philosophers adapted from the *Treatise* and repurposed is the "one mind, two gateways" model. In Xiong Shili's *New Treatise* (1932 edition) this is evident in the model's isomorphism with Xiong's distinction between reality (*ti*) as "the true mind" (*zhenxin* 真心) and its function (*yong*) as "false/deluded consciousness" (*wangshi* 妄識), and also in the one mind's being simultaneously quiescent and moving. Moreover, the final theoretical elaboration of Xiong's "non-duality of *ti* and *yong*" thesis is represented by his eventual rejection of Huayan accounts of the relationship between *li* 理 and *shi* 實 and subsequent embrace of the Tiantai accounts of that relationship. Both Huayan and Tiantai accounts of that relationship were philosophical responses to, and developments of, the *Treatise*'s account of the relationship between the unconditioned and the conditioned, as encapsulated in its "one mind, two gateways" model.

Ma Yifu explicitly interconnected the "mind unites/controls the nature and the emotions" thesis and the *Treatise*'s "one mind, two gateways" model. In turn, he linked both to two other intertextual appropriations: the Three Greats of the *Treatise* and the Three Changes of *Yiwei: Qian zuodu*.

Tang Junyi's account of the relationship between the two gateways as one of mutual concealment, mutual alternation, mutual habituation/perfuming became intimately connected to the main theme of his 1977 publication, *Shengming cunzai yu xinling jingjie* (Life-Existence, and the Horizons of the Mind): "authentic feeling's connecting the mind and horizons." Tang also appropriated the Three Greats in his hierarchy of the "nine horizons," so as to group the horizons into three tripartite groupings, deploying them to articulate his key notion of "authentic feeling."

Mou Zongsan's appropriation of the "one mind, two gateways" model provided the inspiration for his own "two-tier ontology." Moreover, for Mou, the one mind not only provides the "transcendental basis" guaranteeing the necessity of buddhahood for all, it also provides the support for all dharmas, the *a priori* condition for their possibility. This was important for Mou because it seemed to guarantee the necessary existence of distinct things.

Which philosophical positions defended by the New Confucians were developed and sustained through engagement with the critical challenges advanced by critics of the *Treatise*? Citing the authority of Indian Abhidharma and especially Yogācāra texts, the criticisms mounted by Ouyang Jingwu and his students, Wang Enyang, Lü Cheng and others, came in three waves: the early-mid 1920s, the early 1940s and the early 1960s. They were highly critical of the doctrines of intrinsic awakening, one mind, and the notion

of *tathāgatagarbha* associated with the *Treatise* and subsequently developed by other schools of East Asian Buddhism. They criticized the *Treatise* for failing to observe the distinction between unconditioned and conditioned dharmas, for violating the laws of causation, and for lacking a doctrine that could demonstrate how perfuming/habituation was possible. Seeking to "return to the roots" of Indian Buddhism, this group promoted "genuine" Buddhism over "pseudo" Buddhism, criticizing such doctrines as intrinsic awakening on the grounds that it is founded on the idea that the potentiality for buddhahood exists in all sentient beings and hence this is only faith-based and not true Indian Buddhism.

Just as Ouyang had used the *ti-yong* distinction to discuss unconditioned and conditioned dharmas, so too did his former student, Xiong Shili. In Xiong's case, however, most of his philosophical career was devoted to defending the idea of the "non-duality of reality and function." Xiong's critical engagement with, appropriation of, and radical re-interpretation of Yogācāra was sustained, even as he engaged with Madhyamaka and Huayan doctrines at various phases in that career. Other fundamental departures from Yogācāra include rejecting the *ālayavijñāna* (storehouse consciousness) as the locus of subjectivity in favour of constructs such as wisdom (*zhi* 智 [**jñāna*]), innate wisdom (*xing zhi* 性智) and inherent mind (*benxin* 本心). He also disagreed with the China Institute of Inner Learning partisans on the question of whether the nature of the mind is inherently quiescent or innately enlightened/awoken.

In contrast, Ma Yifu largely ignored Yogācāra, drawing theoretical resources and inspiration directly from the *Treatise* and Huayan doctrine.

Tang Junyi responded to criticisms advanced by Ouyang and Lü Cheng that the *Treatise* was based on a misinterpretation of Bodhiruci's translation of the *Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra* – and so had incorrectly treated the *tathāgatagarbha* and the *ālayavijñāna* as two entities – by proposing that the *Treatise* treats the *tathāgatagarbha* and the *ālayavijñāna* as belonging to two different "levels," and defending this approach as a major theoretical innovation. Unlike Xiong, in particular, Tang was unwilling to abandon the distinction between unconditioned and conditioned dharmas so as to guarantee that the unconditioned "mind as suchness" is able to manifest itself, being an active "presentation" or "self-awareness." This is in contrast to Yogācāra, in which true awakening relies on the contingency of "perfumation through hearing the Dharma," and thus is dependent on external circumstances.

Mou Zongsan was similarly critical of Yogācāra's account of suchness on the grounds that it lacked agency, neither able to perfume nor to be perfumed, admiring instead the agency attributed to suchness in the *Treatise*, whereby suchness enables sentient beings to be habituated. Accordingly, he also argued that the doctrinal system of the *Treatise* must be presented as a "transcendental analytic" – the distinction between the mind of our ordinary experience and an unconditioned "*tathāgatagarbha* pure True Mind" – and (in accord with Tang Junyi) not as the empirical or psychological analysis of the Yogācāra system.

To what extent were the New Confucians aware of their intellectual debt to the *Treatise* and how did they reconcile this with their Confucian identity? Xiong proclaimed that the import of the *Treatise*'s notion of *hehe* 和合 (merge, combine) is "deep, broad and boundless" because it preserves the non-duality of the unconditioned and the conditioned, *ti* and *yong*. Moreover, he was also adamant that the phrase "non-arising and non-ceasing combine with arising and ceasing" "is definitely *not* Buddhist in its import." He concluded that the *Treatise* was able to preserve the non-duality of the unconditioned and

the conditioned, precisely because it is *not* an Indian Buddhist text, but a hybrid text that integrates native Chinese and Indian Buddhist thought. In contrast, schools of Chinese Buddhism such as Tiantai and Huayan remain captive to the transcendent goals of their Indian origins. This alleged hybridity thus effectively vouchsafed that the text was sufficiently rooted in the native soil of Chinese wisdom as to be acceptable to Xiong's Confucian sensibilities. Moreover, the fact that in *Cui huo xian zong ji* he explicitly aligned the *New Treatise* with the so-called Truly Constant Mind (*zhenchang xin* 真常心) tradition – a modern epithet for the Tathāgatagarbha tradition, and of which the *Treatise* is emblematic – clearly underscores that Xiong did find a way of reconciling the *Treatise* with his Confucian identity, at least in the early 1950s.

The motivation for Ma Yifu's accommodation of elements in the *Treatise* within the system of his overtly Confucian Way of the Six Arts was, as Liu Leheng argues, Ma's conviction that "a failure to integrate the Three Changes and the Three Greats, would have resulted in the meaning of Confucian teachings generally, and of the Three Changes specifically, being unable to be fully revealed." In short, Ma's conscious efforts to integrate Confucian and Buddhist thought were deployed in the service of his own New Confucian philosophy.

Although Ady Van den Stock and Liu Leheng concur that the *Treatise* did not have a determinative influence on Tang Junyi's thought, focusing on Tang's final work, Liu argues that another kind of accommodation took place: "Tang put his own philosophy and the *Treatise* into mutual verification and support, resulting in a two-way enrichment between his New Confucian system and his research into the *Treatise* and Buddhist thought generally." Despite this accommodation, Tang's Confucian priorities remained consistent and privileged.

Mou's Confucian identity is similarly never in doubt. As important as the *Treatise* was in the construction of his two-tier ontology, ultimately Mou judged it to be only the penultimate – albeit necessary – step on the way to a truly perfect teaching. As Lin Chen-kuo concludes, "For Mou, it is only the subjectivity of the Confucian understanding of *ti-yong* that can truly be a subjectivity capable of responding vigorously to modern Western culture."

Working from the premise that the intellectual constitution of the main exemplar of modern Chinese philosophy, New Confucianism, continues to be misrepresented, both in China and beyond, this volume has sought to present a new narrative about the complex intellectual identity of modern New Confucian philosophy and its ties to Buddhist philosophy in twentieth-century China. It has done this by providing the arguments and evidence needed to explain how the *Treatise on Awakening Mahāyāna Faith* features in the constitution of New Confucian philosophy, as evidenced in the writings of four representative New Confucian philosophers. These philosophers did not just borrow concepts from the *Treatise*, but, as part of their system building, they repurposed those concepts to develop the most creative ontologies in modern Chinese philosophy, while also deploying those concepts more generally to articulate their distinctive metaphysical systems.

Appendix: Mou Zongsan's "Self-Negation of Inherent Knowing" and Xiong Shili

In correspondence dating from 1934 Xiong Shili had begun to use the term *maodun* 矛盾 (contradiction) to characterize the relationship between *xi* 翕 (contraction) and *benti* 本體 (intrinsic reality; Reality). The ideas Xiong describes in that correspondence, and which are translated below, may have

subsequently served to inspire Mou Zongsan's signature doctrine of the "self-negation of inherent knowing" (*liangzhi ziwo kanxian* 良知自我坎陷), which he first used in a journal article published in 1947. There Mou describes how innate knowing, in a process of self-transformation, decides to negate itself so as to discriminate the cognitive mind, which in turn functions to pursue things in order to know and to control them. The article was subsequently included in Mou's book, *Wang Yangming zhi liangzhi jiao* 王陽明致良知教 (Wang Yangming's Doctrine of Extending Inherent Knowing), published in 1954. In his 1934 correspondence, Xiong Shili writes:

> In the past, Zhu Xi also said that transformation ought to have a principle of contraction otherwise it would be empty and devoid of things. (It seems I have seen this in the *Topically Arranged Conversations of Master Zhu*, but I have not checked.) What I have verified, when checked against what Zhu said, suffices to corroborate [that he is correct]. Contraction is the flow of Reality. In other words, it is a kind of functioning that Reality gives expression to; one which is, moreover, inherently contradictory….
> Although Reality is certainly not material, in order for its functioning to be expressed it must have what is referred to as contraction. Contraction is [Reality's] illusorily seeming to become things. This is contraction as function. (Contraction is function.) This gives rise to the suspicion that contraction does not accord with Reality. In other words, contraction is precisely a kind of functioning that is the expression of inherent contradiction within Reality…. The [1932 literary edition of the] *New Treatise* states: "When contracting, it seems as if it is moving such that it will be severed from its root." It also states, "It contracts and so illusorily becomes things. This is how it manifests to resemble a material universe, giving rise to the suspicion that it does not preserve its self-nature." And further, "When [constant transformation] is contracting, it is as though it is about to lose its self-nature and so become transformed into things. This is the meaning of 'retreating.'" All these examples show that the inherent contradiction that is Reality's functioning is because as Reality draws near to becoming transformed by things, it [seems] no longer to preserve its nature.

昔朱子亦嘗謂造化含有一個翕聚的道理， 不然便是空洞無物。（此說似見《語 類》。茲不及檢）吾所參驗，質之彼説，適足印證。夫翕既即是本體之流行， 易言之，即是本體所顯現底一種作用，而且是自爲矛盾的一種作用。… 本體固不是物質性，但其作用顯現，不能不有所謂翕。翕即幻似成物。是則翕之用（翕即是用）。疑與體不相順。易言之，即此翕者，乃本體上顯現自相矛盾之一種作用。…《新論》云:「翕則疑於動而乖其本也」（<轉變>章，42 頁。）又曰「翕 而幻成乎物， 此所以現似物質宇宙，而疑於不守自性也」，79 頁）。又曰:「翕則若將不守自性，而至於物化，此退義也」<附識>語，42 頁）。凡此皆明其作用之 自爲矛盾，即以其將至物化而不守自性故也。 <>

Brains, Buddhas, and Believing: The Problem of Intentionality in Classical Buddhist and Cognitive-Scientific Philosophy of Mind by Dan Arnold [Columbia University Press, 9780231145466]

This book looks at first-millennium Indian arguments and contemporary debates on the philosophy of mind and shows that seemingly arcane arguments among first-millennium Indian thinkers can illuminate matters still very much at the heart of contemporary philosophy. It explains how pre-modern Buddhists are sometimes characterized as veritable "mind scientists" whose insights anticipated modern research on the brain and mind. It confronts a significant obstacle to popular attempts at harmonizing classical Buddhist and modern scientific thought: the fact that since most Indian Buddhists hold that the mental continuum is uninterrupted by death they disagree with the idea that everything about the mental can be explained in terms of brain events. It also shows that a predominant stream of Indian Buddhist thought, associated with the seventh-century thinker Dharmakīrti, turns out to be vulnerable to arguments that modern philosophers have levelled against physicalism. It explains that these issues center on what modern philosophers have called intentionality—the fact that the mind can be about (or represent or mean) other things. Tracing an account of intentionality through Kant, Wilfrid Sellars, and John McDowell, the book argues that intentionality cannot, in principle, be explained in causal terms. The book shows that despite his concern to refute physicalism, Dharmakīrti's causal explanations of the mental mean that modern arguments from intentionality cut as much against his project as they do against physicalist philosophies of mind.

Premodern Buddhists are sometimes characterized as veritable "mind scientists" whose insights anticipate modern research on the brain and mind. Aiming to complicate this story, Dan Arnold confronts a significant obstacle to popular attempts at harmonizing classical Buddhist and modern scientific thought: since most Indian Buddhists held that the mental continuum is uninterrupted by death (its continuity is what Buddhists mean by "rebirth"), they would have no truck with the idea that everything about the mental can be explained in terms of brain events. Nevertheless, a predominant stream of Indian Buddhist thought, associated with the seventh-century thinker Dharmakirti, turns out to be vulnerable to arguments modern philosophers have leveled against physicalism.

By characterizing the philosophical problems commonly faced by Dharmakirti and contemporary philosophers such as Jerry Fodor and Daniel Dennett, Arnold seeks to advance an understanding of both first-millennium Indian arguments and contemporary debates on the philosophy of mind. The issues center on what modern philosophers have called intentionality—the fact that the mind can be about (or represent or mean) other things. Tracing an account of intentionality through Kant, Wilfrid Sellars, and John McDowell, Arnold argues that intentionality cannot, in principle, be explained in causal terms.

Elaborating some of Dharmakirti's central commitments (chiefly his apoha theory of meaning and his account of self-awareness), Arnold shows that despite his concern to refute physicalism, Dharmakirti's causal explanations of the mental mean that modern arguments from intentionality cut as much against his project as they do against physicalist philosophies of mind. This is evident in the arguments of some of Dharmakirti's contemporaneous Indian critics (proponents of the orthodox Brahmanical Mimasa school as well as fellow Buddhists from the Madhyamaka school of thought), whose critiques exemplify

the same logic as modern arguments from intentionality. Elaborating these various strands of thought, Arnold shows that seemingly arcane arguments among first-millennium Indian thinkers can illuminate matters still very much at the heart of contemporary philosophy.

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Excerpt: "Neural Buddhism": Cognitive Science and the Philosophy of Dharmakīrti

The *New York Times* columnist David Brooks has ventured, notwithstanding the current popularity of books like Richard Dawkins's *The God Delusion*, that a new wave of cognitive-scientific research on religion may lead not to rampant atheism but to "what you might call neural Buddhism."[1] Brooks's point was that "the real challenge" for theists was likely to come not so much from the avowedly atheistic works of Dawkins and the like as "from scientists whose beliefs overlap a bit with Buddhism." He seems to have meant that cognitive-scientific research supports such characteristically Buddhist beliefs as that (Brooks says) "the self is not a fixed entity but a dynamic process of relationships," and he worries that such research thus encourages "new movements that emphasize self-transcendence but put little stock in divine law or revelation."

Brooks's column occasioned much reflection on the religious studies blog "The Immanent Frame," where scholars noted (among other things) that the assimilation of Buddhism to science represents a century-old apologetic strategy characteristic of modern Buddhism[2] and that the revolutionary character of cognitive-scientific explanation has perhaps been overstated.[3] Both points are important, but this book will focus on variations on the second one. Here, I want to look at what was arguably the dominant trajectory of Indian Buddhist philosophy—that stemming from Dharmakīrti (c. 600–660 c.e.)—through the lens of central issues in contemporary philosophy of mind. I want to suggest that there are indeed important respects in which Dharmakīrti's project is akin to those of contemporary cognitive-scientific philosophers—and that this is so much the worse for Dharmakīrti. My thought is that we can learn much, both about Dharmakīrti and about contemporary philosophy of mind, by appreciating that (and how) some of Dharmakīrti's central positions are vulnerable to arguments that also have been pressed against the kind of physicalist philosophy of mind recently informed by work in the cognitive sciences.

It should be emphasized up front that Dharmakīrti is a particularly difficult thinker; he takes on intrinsically complex and elusive philosophical topics, and his works are, to an even greater extent than is typical of first-millennium Sanskritic philosophers, at once dense and opaquely elliptical, and thus it is

unusually difficult to feel confident that one has definitively understood his thoughts on any subject. Dharmakīrti surely admits of various readings, and it would be foolhardy to claim that, by suggesting some respects in which he may be vulnerable to certain arguments, his philosophical project has been exhaustively considered. The present engagement with his thought, however, is animated not only by my sense that we can get some traction on his project by characterizing it as susceptible to certain modern arguments but also by my desire to make the arguments of some of his classical Indian critics seem more interesting than is sometimes appreciated.

In reading Dharmakīrti as I do, then, I am motivated partly by my sense that there are profound philosophical intuitions to be elaborated along lines suggested by some of his Indian critics—and particularly by some proponents of the Brahmanical Pūrva Mīmāṃsā and the Buddhist Madhyamaka schools of thought. I thus hope to reconstruct the arguments of these other Indian philosophers, too, in terms suggested by modern and contemporary philosophical debate. My aims will have been largely fulfilled if we gain some clarity on what may have been at issue among these thinkers—something I hope to achieve in part by showing that the seemingly arcane points at stake for these first-millennium Indian philosophers turn out still to be debated among contemporary philosophers.

I can introduce some of the issues that will come into play with reference to another item from the *New York Times*: a 2005 story concerning a talk by the Dalai Lama at an annual meeting of the Society for Neuroscience. Some five hundred brain researchers, it seems, had signed a petition calling for the talk's cancellation, saying it would "highlight a subject with largely unsubstantiated claims," and that it "compromised scientific rigor and objectivity." The *Times* article centered on debates internal to the scientific community—debates, for example, about whether scientific objectivity is compromised by the fact that some scholars engaged in this research are themselves practitioners of Buddhist meditation, and about what kinds of phenomena will admit of properly scientific study. Regarding the latter point, petition signatory Zvani Rossetti is reported to have said that "neuroscience more than other disciplines is the science at the interface between modern philosophy and science."

While Rossetti may be right, it is tendentious to conclude from this that (as he added in questioning the Dalai Lama's talk) "no opportunity should be given to anybody to use neuroscience for supporting transcendent views of the world." Depending, perhaps, on just what "transcendent views of the world" means, this arguably begs one of the most basic questions in contemporary philosophy of mind—the question whether fundamental issues in philosophy of mind are finally *empirical*, or whether instead they are (and there's a range of options here) metaphysical, transcendental, logical, or conceptual.[5] Impressed by the recently enormous advances in the scientific understanding of the brain (particularly those advances informed by research in computer science and AI), philosophers such as Jerry Fodor and Daniel Dennett take the questions at issue to be finally empirical and thus take it that the findings of empirical research in the cognitive sciences might answer the basic questions of philosophy of mind, which, we will see, chiefly center for these philosophers on the question of mental causation. What cognitive-scientific research provides, on this view, *just is* an account of mind. Against this, philosophers such as John McDowell take the basic issues in philosophy of mind to be (in a sense we shall consider) transcendental; for McDowell, someone like Dennett offers "what may be an enabling explanation of consciousness, but not a constitutive one. … We lack an account of what [consciousness] is, even if we have an account of what enables it to be present" (1998a, 357). An account of some of the enabling

conditions of the mental, in other words, is not to be confused with an account of what the mental *is*—though it's a fair question whether anything *could* count as an instance of the latter.

In light of this divide among contemporary philosophers of mind, it's revealing that Buddhist thought should have come to figure so prominently in cognitive-scientific discourse; David Brooks is far from alone in taking Buddhist thinkers and cognitive-scientifically inclined philosophers as philosophical fellow travelers. This makes sense insofar as Buddhist thinkers are virtually defined as such by their upholding the "without self" (*anātma*) doctrine; surely nothing could be more anti-Cartesian than to urge (as Buddhists do in elaborating this idea) that every moment of experience can be shown to depend upon a host of causal factors, none of which is what we "really" are. Many Buddhist philosophers thus urged a broadly *reductionist* account of persons, according to which we are not entitled to infer that our episodic cognitions and experiences must be the states of an enduring "self"; rather, only the particular and momentary causes themselves are to be judged finally real. Elaborating what he took to be the entailments of this idea, Dharmakīrti influentially said that "whatever has the capacity for causal efficacy is ultimately existent (*paramārthasat*); everything else is just conventionally existent." Surely, a reductionist account that thus privileges causal explanation could be taken to complement a characteristically cognitive-scientific project in philosophy of mind.

Pursuing this thought, Mark Siderits asks (in the subtitle of a recent article): "Is the Eightfold Path a Program?" (2001). That is, can characteristically Buddhist accounts of the person be harmonized particularly with those cognitive-scientific projects that, informed by the availability of the computer model, take thought to be somehow "computational"? Among other things, this amounts to the question whether the basic Buddhist commitment to selflessness might be compatible with *physicalism*.[9] For, as we will see in chapter 2, what computational accounts of thought may most significantly advance is broadly *physicalist* explanations of the mental—explanations, that is, according to which everything about the mental can be finally explained in terms of particular goings-on in the brain. Whether Buddhist thought is compatible with such an account (which Siderits calls "technophysicalism") is a pressing question insofar as contemporary technophysicalist accounts are, Siderits holds, "more difficult to resist" than earlier versions of physicalism (2001, 307). Siderits proposes that the basic Buddhist project *is* finally reconcilable with cognitive-scientific physicalism.

There is surely reason to suppose that Buddhist thought, particularly insofar as it centrally involves causal explanation, might thus be compatible with cognitive-scientific accounts. There remains, however, a significant obstacle to the view that Buddhist thinkers elaborated a position that is uniquely compatible with scientific understanding: while cognitive-scientific accounts of the mind are generally physicalist in character, *Buddhist philosophers are emphatically not physicalists*. Indeed, it is important to understand that exemplars of the Buddhist philosophical tradition—including, in Dharmakīrti, one of the most influential of all Indian philosophers—elaborated an eminently dualist account of the person. If, moreover, that account finally gives way to any sort of monism (as it arguably does, we will see in chapter 5, when Dharmakīrti lays his Yogācāra cards on the table), it is surely of the idealist sort.

The Buddhist emphasis on the dynamic and causally describable character of subjectivity is not, then, incompatible with the view that among the causes of this are constitutively *mental* existents that cannot be reduced to physical existents. What is denied by Buddhists, in other words, is only that "the mind" denotes (as the definite article perhaps suggests to speakers of English) an enduring substance; to argue, as Buddhists do, that our experience is better explained by an *event*-based ontology than by a *substance*-

based one is not by itself to say anything about whether there could be essentially different *kinds* of events. Indian Buddhist philosophers could (and did) coherently maintain both that "persons" consist simply in causally continuous series of events and that the series of mental events, insofar as it continues after the death of the body, has indefinite temporal extension. It is, indeed, just the postmortem continuity of any series of mental events that is called "rebirth."

It is perhaps especially the significance of rebirth for the Buddhist soteriological project that gave philosophers in this tradition a strong stake in refuting any version of physicalism. Indeed, the traditionally transmitted utterances of the Buddha include passages to the effect that physicalism is finally a more pernicious error even than self-grasping (which is saying a lot, since the latter is taken by Buddhists as the primary cause of our suffering). This is, Richard Hayes explains, because "if there is no rebirth, then the very goal of attaining nirvāṇa, understood as the cessation of rebirth, becomes almost perfectly meaningless. Or rather, nirvāṇa comes automatically to every being that dies, regardless of how that being has lived" (1993, 128). Indian Buddhist thinkers thus held that physicalism was tantamount to the extreme of nihilism, or (as Buddhists say) *ucchedavāda*—an extreme not misleadingly translated (to invoke a position in philosophy of mind) as *eliminativism*. This names views according to which everything of moral significance can finally be "eliminated" or explained away in terms of the preferred explanation—and the characteristically Buddhist conviction is that physicalism would be tantamount to such an "elimination" of the morally significant description of events, since on such a view suffering would be eliminated not by Buddhist practice but simply by dying.

Perhaps insofar as physicalism was not a widely entertained option on the Indian philosophical scene, there were few sustained attempts by Buddhist thinkers to refute such a position. There is, though, one revealing attempt to take on the challenge of physicalism; fittingly, this is to be found in the work that most influentially advanced a trajectory of thought that subsequent Indian philosophers took as practically coextensive with the "Buddhist" position in matters philosophical: Dharmakīrti's *Pramāṇavārttika*, or (we might translate) "Critical Commentary on Epistemic Criteria." As we will see in chapter 1, Dharmakīrti's magnum opus comprises a lengthy refutation of a physicalist interlocutor who denies the possibility of the Buddha's having cultivated his compassion over innumerable lifetimes; against the objections of this interlocutor, Dharmakīrti argues that mental events cannot be thought to depend on the body.

Insofar as Dharmakīrti's critique of physicalism is judged central to his approach, Siderits may be wrong to claim that the characteristically Buddhist form of dualism is not really integral to the Buddhist project; the significance of rebirth for that project is surely among several considerations that can be thought to commit Buddhists to refuting physicalism. It seems to me that Paul Griffiths is right, in this regard, to stress "just how radical a dualism" was advanced particularly by the Abhidharma and Yogācāra trajectories of Buddhist thought; physicalism "in any form (identity theory, epiphenomenalism and so forth) is not an option" for this tradition of Buddhist thought (1986, 112). As Richard Hayes more emphatically says, there is "no other philosophical view that is more radically opposed to the tenets of Buddhism than materialism" (1993, 128)—even if Dharmakīrti's refutation is exceptional in explicitly engaging that.

Intentionality, the Status of Universals, and the Problems with Cognitivism

That some Indian Buddhists strenuously rejected physicalism is not, however, the point I am developing in this book. While Dharmakīrti himself pressed the Buddhist tradition's most notable case against physicalism, we can appreciate some central features of his thought by recognizing that his own account of the mental nevertheless turns out to be vulnerable to a cogent line of critique that modern philosophers have leveled against varieties of physicalism. The central premise of this book, then, is that we can learn some important things about the conceptual "deep structure" of what is arguably the dominant trajectory of Indian Buddhist thought—and, as well, about some contemporary cognitive-scientific philosophies of mind—by understanding these significantly divergent traditions of thought as facing some of the same philosophical problems.

In particular, Dharmakīrti shares with cognitive-scientific philosophers of mind a guiding commitment to finally *causal* explanations of the mental, as well as (what arguably follows from this) the view that everything about the mental must be explicable with reference only to things somehow internal to the subject. I follow Vincent Descombes (among others) in characterizing this "solipsistic and causalist position in the philosophy of mind" as *cognitivist* (2001, xvi). Notwithstanding the considerations that (it will be allowed) can be taken to recommend cognitivist accounts in philosophy of mind, we will see that there are significant problems for any such attempt to explain all aspects of the mental in terms of causal relations among local particulars.

These problems, as they commonly arise for Dharmakīrti and for contemporary physicalists, can usefully be framed in terms of the concept of *intentionality*. The various uses of this philosophical term of art—familiar alike to students of continental phenomenology and Anglo-American philosophy of mind—commonly involve the idea of "aboutness"; that is, intentionality picks out the fact that mental events (like *thinking* or *believing*) perhaps uniquely exemplify the fact of being *about* their objects. Mental events, on another way of putting the point, constitutively have *content*; as Franz Brentano puts this in a canonical passage on the subject, "in presentation something is presented, in judgement something is affirmed or denied, in love loved, in hate hated, in desire desired and so on" (1973, 88). Among the ideas here is that whatever we might reasonably say about the relations of (say) a table to its surrounding environment, we would not say that it is *about* anything; the relation that characterizes a thought's being about its content, many have supposed, is peculiarly distinctive of the mental.

There is (we will see especially in chapter 3) much to be said about the history and the varying uses of this idea, but in one form or another, a main question in the philosophy of mind has thus been (in Lynne Rudder Baker's words) "to understand how one thing (some mental item) *can mean or represent or be about* some other thing (for example, some state of affairs)—to understand how anything can have content" (1987, 9; emphasis added). Here, it's relevant to note that for Baker's "some mental item" we might also substitute *some linguistic item*; surely linguistic items (sentences, stories, claims) are also rightly taken to "mean or represent or be about" states of affairs. In fact, there turns out to be a close relationship between the intentionality of the mental and certain features of language; indeed, linguistic items may represent the one case of something other than mental events that exemplifies intentionality.

While there are many ways one might tell the story of this relationship, this fact surely explains why so much contemporary philosophy of mind looks a lot like philosophy of language—a fact humorously noted by Jerry Fodor, who once characterized his own work as exemplifying "the philosophy of mind (or the philosophy of language, or whatever this stuff is)" (1990, 131). Thus, a great many contemporary

discussions in philosophy of mind often center on considerations in *semantics*—considerations, for example, having to do with such things as the truth conditions and referentiality of propositions. How we are to understand the relation between (as it were) "linguistic" and "mental" intentionality has, in fact, been chief among the points at issue in twentieth-century philosophy of mind. The contemporary debate can be framed by Roderick Chisholm, who said of Wilfrid Sellars's influential 1956 essay "Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind" that the main question over which they diverged was this: "Can we explicate the intentional character of believing and of other psychological attitudes by reference to certain features of language; or must we explicate the intentional characteristics of language by reference to believing and to other psychological attitudes?" (Chisholm and Sellars 1957, 215).

Sellars held the first of these positions, arguing in his famous 1956 essay that "the categories of intentionality are, at bottom, semantical categories pertaining to overt verbal performances" (1956, 94). Whatever one thinks is the right direction of explanation here (and in chapter 3, I will make a case for Sellars's view), it is perhaps especially the closeness of the relation between linguistic and mental "aboutness" that makes it so difficult to give (what many would take to define a scientific approach to any matter) a thoroughly *causal* account of the mental; for the way that things like sentences relate to what they are about does not (to say the least) readily admit of causal explanation. Insofar, then, as mental events are like linguistic items in this respect, a mental event's "being about" its content arguably involves something constitutively other than causal relations. The extent to which the intentionality of the mental thus resists causal explanation is, then, commonly problematic for Dharmakīrti and contemporary physicalists just insofar as they are alike committed to the view that only things that can enter into *causal* relations are finally real.

The issues here in play might also be put in terms of the category of "belief," which, despite its occurrence in the title of my first book, was not theorized there. In discussions of intentionality, belief represents the paradigm case of what philosophers since Bertrand Russell have called the "propositional attitudes." If mental events are characterized by their having content, propositional attitudes represent the various ways of "being about" any instance of such content; one can, for example, *affirm, doubt, hope*, or *think* that such-and-such is the case. Of the propositional attitudes, *believing* is arguably the most conceptually basic, since taking any other such attitude toward some state of affairs presupposes one's believing something to obtain; "it's impressive," Paul Boghossian notes, "how many concepts of the propositional attitudes depend asymmetrically on the concept of belief" (2003, 43).

Among the questions raised by this way of talking about intentionality is what sort of thing, exactly, the *content* of any belief is; while particular *acts of believing* are specific to individuals, what these are *about* may be common to many such acts. There is thus a case to be made for thinking that beliefs essentially concern things like *claims* or *states of affairs*—the kinds of things, many philosophers have noted, that can be individuated by *that*-clauses. When one says, for example, "she believes *that* it's raining" or "I believe *that Trout Mask Replica* is a great album," the content of the *that*-clause is a complex state of affairs under some description; these clauses embrace entire sets of facts, something of the world as *taken* from some perspective. To think of any instance of awareness (at least of the believing sort) as *contentful*, on such a view—to think of it as *about* anything—is thus to suppose that individuating or understanding the belief requires reference to some kind of abstraction. This is because "states of affairs" are not unique particulars; unlike, say, fleetingly occurrent mental representations, they are the kinds of things that can simultaneously be the object of many people's beliefs.

Buddhists and other Indian philosophers would recognize that what has thus been brought into play by the foregoing introduction of intentionality and propositional attitudes, then, is the question of the ontological status of universals and the relation of these to cognition. Another form of the question of intentionality, then, is whether it is possible to give a complete account of the mental (more precisely, of mental *content*) in terms of an ontology comprising only unique particulars—or whether, instead, such an account inevitably requires reference to some kind of abstractions or universals, whether those be understood as concepts, propositions, truth conditions, or whatever. Part of what I want to show, then, is the extent to which characteristically Indian philosophical debates about the status particularly of linguistic universals—debates, for example, between basically nominalist thinkers like Dharmakīrti and archrealists like the proponents of Mīmāṃsā—can also be understood to concern eminently contemporary questions about how we should understand our mental lives.

Thus, as we will see in chapter 4, Dharmakīrti (like Jerry Fodor) is centrally concerned somehow to explain linguistic universals with reference only to particulars; this is the point of his famously elusive *apoha* ("exclusion") doctrine. This doctrine elaborates the idea that concepts are more precise or determinate (more *contentful*) just to the extent that they exclude more from their purview; the scope of *cat* is narrower than that of *mammal* just insofar as the former additionally excludes from its range all mammals in the world that are not cats. Typically represented as the signal Buddhist contribution to Indian philosophy of language, this doctrine can also be understood more generally as an account of *the content of beliefs*. According to Dharmakīrti's elaboration of it, this complex doctrine emphasizes that conceptual content can finally be explained just in terms of particular mental representations; particular occurrences of perceiving or sensing, that is, provide the bases for the "exclusions" that finally explain the universals in play whenever we entertain discursive thoughts.

It's important that Dharmakīrti thus be able to explain universals with reference only to particulars since, for him, only particular things—only *this* sensation of a pot, and *this* one, etc.—are finally real; as ultimately unreal, abstractions (like the property *being a pot*) cannot finally explain any belief's having explanatory significance. When we get to Dharmakīrti's arguments for this, we will have seen (in chapter 2) that Jerry Fodor affords us good resources for thinking about what Dharmakīrti is up to in this regard; indeed, Fodor could be talking about Dharmakīrti's *apoha* doctrine when he says of his own representational theory of mind (RTM) that it purports to explain "how there *could* be states that have the semantical and causal properties that propositional attitudes are commonsensically supposed to have. In effect, RTM proposes an account of what the propositional attitudes *are*" (1985, 78).

We will see in chapter 2 that on Fodor's physicalist version of such an account, the particular "mental representations" that explain semantic content can be described in terms of correlated brain events—an idea that the antiphysicalist Dharmakīrti would strongly reject. What commonly characterizes Fodor's and Dharmakīrti's accounts, though, is the essentially cognitivist presuppositions that are arguably most significant for their views. Both accounts are driven by the idea that only causal relations among particulars can be thought finally "real," finally to *explain* anything. These thinkers share, moreover, the idea that the only such particulars that indubitably occur are those that are somehow—Dharmakīrti and Fodor diverge most sharply, of course, with regard to how—internal to a subject. For Fodor, the problem of mental causation thus recommends the adoption of a "methodological solipsism." On this view, anything that is called on to explain the causal efficacy of the mind must be intelligible without reference to the *semantic* properties of mental events—without reference (Fodor says) to "the property

of being true, of having referents, or, indeed, the property of being representations *of the environment*" (1980, 283). Instead, the explaining is finally to be done by brain events that can be exhaustively described simply in terms of their intrinsic properties.

We will see in chapter 5 that Dharmakīrti can be understood as similarly grounding his whole account of semantic content (the one elaborated in the form of the *apoha* doctrine) in what is, for Dharmakīrti, arguably the only really indubitable "epistemic criterion" (*pramāṇa*): *svasaṃvitti*, or "self-awareness." It is in the parts of his corpus where he elaborates this doctrine that Dharmakīrti has traditionally been taken most clearly to affirm the characteristically "Yogācāra" doctrine of Buddhist idealism. Whether or not that doctrine can be understood as metaphysical idealism, it is clear that Dharmakīrti's arguments for *svasaṃvitti* represent a case at least for *epistemic* idealism—for the view, that is, that what we are immediately aware of (which, note well, is logically independent of the ontological question of *what there is*) is simply the occurrence and contents of our own mental events. On my reading, the salient point of this epistemological claim is that mental content is autonomously intelligible; this is the idea, in other words, that we can know *how things seem to us* quite apart from any reference to *how things really are*—quite apart (with Fodor) from whether mental representations might have properties like *being true*.

Fodor and Dharmakīrti would, then, commonly have us explain conceptual mental content finally in terms of what irrefragably *seems to a subject* to be the case; anything's seeming so, moreover, is finally to be explained, for both thinkers, in causal terms. Among other things, the kind of cognitivist approach we will thus develop with reference to Fodor and Dharmakīrti can be said to aim at providing a finally *nonintentional* account of intentionality—to aim, that is, at explaining intentionality (at explaining how anything can mean or represent or be about some other thing) in terms of existents that do not themselves intrinsically "mean" anything. Expressing this point, Fodor quips that "if aboutness is real, it must really be something else" (1987, 97). Arguments to this effect represent, in one contemporary idiom, the project of *naturalizing* intentionality.

We will see that there are considerations that recommend such views, which can, it seems to me, be taken to have just the intuitive plausibility that empiricism more generally has. Indeed, the projects of Fodor and Dharmakīrti commonly fall on the side of the broadly empiricist divide in philosophy of mind; on the views of both of these thinkers, the answer to a question such as what it is to *mean* anything takes the form of a psychological account of causally describable processes involving particular states or events. Chief among the problems with such an approach, though, is that it may very well presuppose precisely the kinds of things it aims to explain. This is surely as Dharmakīrti's principally Brahmanical interlocutors argued with respect to his *apoha* doctrine: the very process of exclusion in terms of which Dharmakīrti explains universals is intelligible, his critics argued, only with reference to universals. I will suggest that the conceptual difficulties here can be more generally understood in terms of Dharmakīrti's own attempt to *explain* intentionality as necessarily exemplifying precisely what could be called an *intentional* level of description.

A basically transcendental argument to this effect—one that stems from Kant (and particularly from the *Critique of Practical Reason*) and that is variously carried forward by Wilfrid Sellars and John McDowell—takes its bearings from the idea that reason itself is the "intentional" phenomenon par excellence. Thus, the discursive realm with regard to which Indian philosophers focus on the problem of universals can also be characterized (as it is by Sellars) as the "logical space of reasons" (1956, 76). This

is the level of description at which it makes sense to think of persons in their capacity as responsive to *reasons*—the level, that is, at which we find intelligible somebody's demand that we *justify* any action or decision. The question for those who would "naturalize" intentionality, then, is how to account for the status and content of reasons; more precisely, insofar as reasoning constitutively involves (in John McDowell's phrase) "relations such as one thing's being warranted or correct in the light of another" (1996, xv), anyone who would reduce (or "naturalize") intentionality must, ipso facto, be able to show how such conceptual relations can themselves be explained by (or consist in) finally *causal* relations. The broadly Kantian argument against such a project is that any putative explanation of us in our capacity *as reasoning*—a physicalist's, say, in terms of brain events—inevitably turns out itself to presuppose or exemplify an intentional level of description; reason itself cannot be "explained" by any such account just insofar as it is only by reasoning that one could try to do so.

This is much as some of Dharmakīrti's principal Indian interlocutors variously argued. When Indian Buddhists and their Brahmanical interlocutors debate the status of linguistic universals, there is an important extent to which they can be taken as advancing arguments in philosophy of mind; indeed, this centuries-long debate between Buddhists and Mīmāṃsakas can be characterized as concerning precisely Chisholm's question to Sellars. Thus, Buddhists like Dharmakīrti clearly held that "the intentional characteristics of language" (most generally, its *meaning* anything) are to be explained "by reference to believing and to other psychological attitudes"—more specifically, that what language is about can finally be explained in terms of causally describable mental representations. Against this, Mīmāṃsakas who defended the view that language is eternal can be understood to have held, among other things, that there is something *irreducibly* linguistic about the mental—that language is a condition of the possibility of mind, not a product thereof. Among their most interesting arguments to this effect is one that can be generalized as concerning the ineliminable nature of an intentional level of description.

Similarly, Dharmakīrti's fellow Buddhists the Mādhyamikas, who characteristically urged (in Mark Siderits's apt phrase) that "the ultimate truth is that there is no ultimate truth," can be understood to have argued that the world must finally be understood as *irreducibly conventional*. The characteristically Mādhyamika deference to "conventional truth" (*saṃvṛtisatya*), I will suggest, can be understood as deference to an *intentional* level of description, and Mādhyamikas can be taken thus to have urged that intentionality is ineliminable in favor of any supposedly privileged level of description. I will, then, be characterizing both Mīmāṃsakas and Mādhyamikas (despite their enormously different overall projects) as having variously advanced something very much like the broadly Kantian line of argument that has been, in my view, most cogently advanced against physicalists. By thus reconstructing some Mīmāṃsaka and Mādhyamika arguments against the likes of Dharmakīrti as having advanced significant insights concerning what Kant called "practical reason," it is to be hoped that we will learn something not only about the various first-millennium Indian philosophers in view, but also about the nature and promise of what some have taken to be a profound argument against physicalism.

Whatever the extent, though, to which arguments such as the foregoing are cogent, it's revealing that they have purchase not only against contemporary physicalists but also against the decidedly antiphysicalist Buddhist philosopher Dharmakīrti. It is to the extent that he exemplifies a basically cognitivist approach that, even though having pressed the Buddhist tradition's most sustained case against physicalism, Dharmakīrti turns out himself to be vulnerable to what I will elaborate (in chapters 3 and 6) as perhaps the most cogent argument against physicalism. Insofar, that is, as he takes

the mental to be causally explicable in terms of particular moments of awareness, Dharmakīrti is vulnerable to arguments meant to show intentionality to be irreducible to and ineliminable in favor of such terms. If, as Sellars has it, the "logical space of reasons" is *sui generis*—if reasoning and believing will not admit of the kind of finally causal explanation that Fodor and Dharmakīrti commonly aim for—then significant commitments of Dharmakīrti's are called into question.

That Dharmakīrti, who was a strong critic of physicalism and probably himself an idealist, should thus be vulnerable to the same arguments that cut against contemporary iterations of physicalism is, I think, revealing of what are the most philosophically significant presuppositions in play. Our consideration of the Buddhist Dharmakīrti in light of contemporary debates about intentionality may, then, not only help us characterize some of the most significant issues in the interpretation of Dharmakīrti; it may also help us appreciate that despite recently enormous advances in the empirical sciences of cognition, Vincent Descombes is right that "the cognitivist conception of mind has been derived not from cognitive psychology but … from a particular philosophy. To hold that only certain kinds of explanations—e.g., causal explanations in terms of existents with specifiable identity criteria—are finally valid is not simply to follow the manifest deliverances of neutral inquiry; it is to have decided, a priori, for metaphysical commitments that are not themselves the results of such inquiry.

Plan of the Book

We will begin our development of the foregoing thoughts with a consideration, in chapter 1, of Dharmakīrti's critique of physicalism in the *Pramāṇavārttika*. This will be prefaced by a more general survey of some central commitments of Dharmakīrti; in particular, I will sketch the basics of his epistemology, focused in terms of the causally describable character of perception. We will then determine what kind of argument against physicalism is available to Dharmakīrti in light of these commitments. His argument, we will see, is finally to the effect that mental items are ontologically distinct from physical items—and that this is compatible with (indeed, that it relates closely to) Dharmakīrti's characteristically Ābhidharmika notions of causation. I will characterize his argument as basically empiricist in character, in a sense to be elaborated.

In chapter 2, we will begin a two-chapter excursus on some contemporary philosophical discussions of intentionality, developed with an eye toward giving us some conceptual tools for the interpretation of Dharmakīrti. This chapter will consider the "computational" models of cognitive-scientific physicalism developed by Daniel Dennett and (especially) Jerry Fodor, particularly insofar as these philosophers aim to account for intentionality. We will see that it is particularly the problem of "mental causation" that can be taken to motivate these projects. While Dennett and Fodor both claim to provide accounts that allow us to think of intentional attitudes (like believing and judging) as somehow real, it turns out to be at the scientific level of description that all of the explanatory work is done; this is as it must be, given their sense (comparable to Dharmakīrti's) that only things capable of involving a certain kind of causal efficacy can finally be thought *real*. It is, for these thinkers, only as alternatively described (in terms, e.g., of brain events) that things like "reasons" can be thought to *do* anything.

Aiming to clarify what is most interestingly problematic about the accounts of Dennett and Fodor, I will, in chapter 3, venture a basically Kantian story of intentionality, motivating an account of why concerns having to do with language should figure so prominently in philosophy of mind—an account of why it is reasonable to hold, with Sellars, that "the categories of intentionality are, at bottom, semantical

categories pertaining to overt verbal performances." Kant's appeal to the transcendental unity of apperception figures centrally in his development of what Sellars called the "logical space of reasons"—the conceptual order in terms of which it makes sense to think of persons as responsive to reasons as such. Kant characterized this conceptual order as exercising a faculty of "spontaneity," thus emphasizing the extent to which this level of description constitutively resists causal explanation. Chief among the Kantian arguments to be elaborated following Sellars and McDowell is one to the effect that the intentionality of awareness constitutively involves this conceptual space, and that we must, to that extent, suppose that intentionality cannot be exhaustively explained in causal terms. The argument is completed by pressing the point that the foregoing conclusion cannot be denied insofar as it is only by reasoning that one could do so; the cognitivist project of "naturalizing" intentionality cannot go through, then, just insofar as we can make sense of anyone's being *persuaded* of any view on the matter.

With chapter 4, we resume our engagement with Dharmakīrti, considering, in particular, the *apoha* doctrine. Dharmakīrti's peculiarly causal elaboration of this approach to explaining conceptual mental content—the distinctiveness of which will be brought out by comparing his version of the doctrine with that first promulgated by his predecessor, Dignāga (c. 480–540 c.e.)—has striking affinities with the "psychosemantic" account developed by Fodor. Thus, what is excluded from coming under any concept is, for Dharmakīrti, everything that does not produce the same kinds of effects—where, significantly, the "effects" in question consist finally in the cognitive "images" or "representations" produced by sensory contact with objects. I argue that this is an account according to which the intentionality of the mental (of what thought is *about*) is to be explained finally in terms of the proximate causes of particular episodes of awareness—and that despite the considerations that may be taken to recommend such a psychologistic approach, this move brings out the truth in Donald Davidson's observation that empiricism is, problematically, finally "the view that the subjective ('experience') is the foundation of objective empirical knowledge" (1988, 46).

We will complete this thought in chapter 5, which will find us confronting the challenge of understanding Dharmakīrti's arguably foundational doctrine of *svasaṃvitti*, or "self-awareness." This is reckoned by Dharmakīrti as a variety of perception, which is most significantly to say that it is constitutively nonconceptual. Among the arguments for the doctrine of *svasaṃvitti* are some meant to show that what we are immediately aware of (which is logically distinct from the ontological question of *what there is*) is only things—sense data, say, or mental representations—somehow intrinsic to awareness. We will also try to make sense of the stronger claim (arguably advanced by both Dignāga and Dharmakīrti) that *svasaṃvitti* is, in the final analysis, really the only indubitable epistemic criterion (the only real *pramāṇa*)—a view that may amount to a statement of characteristically Yogācāra idealism. It will be clear, in any case, that this doctrine develops the quintessentially cognitivist view that awareness is autonomously intelligible—that, on one way of putting this point, the phenomenological fact of anything's *seeming* blue is logically prior to (and intelligible apart from) our having the idea of anything's *being* blue. An understanding of the foundational role of this idea for Dharmakīrti's project will help us appreciate why Dharmakīrti is committed to explaining mental content as he does in developing the *apoha* doctrine—why Dharmakīrti must, that is, think that contentful thoughts are finally *about* nothing more than subjectively occurrent mental events.

In chapter 6, we will complete the case for thinking that the foregoing project of Dharmakīrti is vulnerable to the same kinds of arguments, first developed in chapter 3, that have been leveled against

the physicalist cognitivism of thinkers like Dennett and Fodor. Here, we approach this point by developing arguments from some first-millennium Indian interlocutors of Dharmakīrti and his school. With regard to the *apoha* doctrine, it is surely the Brahmanical school of Pūrva Mīmāṃsā that had the strongest stake in refuting Dharmakīrti; Mīmāṃsakas were archrealists about linguistic universals, and the critiques of *apoha* advanced by the Mīmāṃsaka Kumārila Bhaṭṭa (c. 620–680 c.e.) figured importantly in post-Dharmakīrti revisions of the doctrine. Rather than focus, however, on the arguments explicitly leveled at *apoha*, we will instead consider one of the principal arguments for the characteristically Mīmāṃsaka view that language is eternal—an argument that will be generalized as concerning the ineliminability of an intentional level of description. So, too, some characteristically Mādhyamika arguments concerning the irreducibly "conventional" (*saṃvṛtisat*) nature of existents will be considered through the lens of our issues in philosophy of mind. It will be noted, in this regard, that Mādhyamika arguments to this effect particularly center on questions of *causation*; it is, in other words, the supposedly privileged character of causal explanations that Mādhyamikas particularly have in their sights. It will be suggested that the "conventional truth" (*saṃvṛtisatya*) or "ordinary discourse" (*vyavahāra*) that Mādhyamikas show to be ineliminable in favor of such causal terms can, in keeping with the concerns of this book, be understood as most basically picking out an *intentional* level of description; among the things, then, that are ineliminable from any account of persons on the Mādhyamika view is reference, in one idiom, to their responsiveness to reasons as such.

Throughout the book, my goal is twofold: I want to advance the *interpretive* task of understanding the arguments and commitments of first-millennium Indian philosophers centering on Dharmakīrti, as well as the *philosophical* task of characterizing and advancing some arguments that classical Indian and contemporary philosophers alike would recognize as touching on central issues in (with Fodor) "the philosophy of mind (or the philosophy of language, or whatever this stuff is)." The interpretive, Indological task can be advanced whether or not the arguments here developed against physicalism are finally judged cogent; the exercise is valuable as a way to understand the classical Indian arguments as long as the characterization of the various philosophical interlocutors here invoked helps us to clarify issues of central concern to Dharmakīrti and his Buddhist and Brahmanical interlocutors. It **(p.18)** is my hope, though, that the enlistment of some Indian interlocutors can help in the mounting of a cogent case for a philosophical account of contemporary relevance; perhaps, that is, some first-millennium Indian philosophers can help us understand the nature and limits of some eminently twenty-first-century developments in philosophy of mind. <>

Bahudhā and the Post 911 World by Balmiki Prasad Singh [Oxford University Press, 9780195693553]

Today, in the age of terrorism and an unsafe world, there is a fresh need to understand the core meaning of the world religions, to reshape the educational system, and to strengthen the United Nations (UN) in a manner that can help people to build a better future. Drawing upon sources from the ancient roots of Indian culture and his experience as an international civil servant, B.P. Singh presents an essential framework for addressing the core twenty-first century global conflict and rebuilding for the post-September 11 world, while integrating the concept of the bahudhā philosophy. The futility of promoting violence and conflict in the name of religion is obvious to all except a few. Together, people

have to recognize that many factors drive public opinion, including education and media, and that a global view is required. Underlining the need to transcend age-old peace mechanisms and reconstruct the language of discourse, this book propounds the concept of bahudhā — an eternal reality or continuum, a dialogue of harmony, and peaceful living. Bahudhā recognizes the distinction between plural societies and pluralism, facilitates exchange of views, and promotes understanding of the collective good. This book argues that the answer to terrorism lies in respecting human rights and appreciating various cultures and value systems. This is crucial for facilitating and enhancing dialogue processes eventually leading to amity and a peaceful world.

The rise of terrorism and fundamentalism in recent times has brought about phenomenal changes in global politics. These unprecedented challenges call for a new, bold, and imaginative statecraft from world leaders. Underlining the need to transcend age-old peace mechanisms and reconstruct our

language of discourse, this book propounds the concept of Bahudhā — an eternal reality or continuum, a dialogue of harmony, and peaceful living. Bahudahā recognizes the distinction between plural societies and pluralism, facilitates exchange of views, and promotes understanding of the collective good.

The book is divided into five parts. The first part discusses the major events witnessed by the world during 1989DS2001 — the fall of the Berlin Wall, transfer of Hong Kong to China, and the terrorist attack on the USA on September 11 — and their implications for various nations, cultures, and

international peace. The next part discusses India's experiences in handling the pluralistic challenge by citing examples from the Vedas and Puranas and analyzing policies followed by Ashoka, Kabir, Guru Nanak, Akbar, and Mahatma Gandhi.

In the subsequent sections, the author underlines the importance of Bahudhā as an instrument of public policy for harmony and also discusses the global imperatives of following such an approach. He highlights the central role of education and religion in the building of a harmonious society and advocates the strengthening of the United Nations to become an effective global conflict-resolution mechanism.

B.P. Singh argues that the answer to terrorism lies in respecting human rights and appreciating various cultures and value systems. This is crucial for facilitating and enhancing dialogue processes eventually elading to amity and a peaceful world.

This interdisciplinary volume will interest scholars, students, and researchers of history, philosophy, politics, and international relations. <>

THE RĀMĀYAṆA OF VĀLMĪKI: THE COMPLETE ENGLISH TRANSLATION translated by Robert P. Goldman, Sally J. Sutherland Goldman, Rosalind Lefeber, Sheldon I. Pollock, and Barend A. van Nooten; Revised and Edited by Robert P. Goldman and Sally J. Sutherland Goldman [Princeton Library of Asian Translations, Princeton University Press, 9780691206868]

The definitive English translation of the classic Sanskrit epic poem—now available in a one-volume paperback A reader and student friendly edition in one hefty 960 page volume.

The **RĀMĀYAṆA OF VĀLMĪKI,** the monumental Sanskrit epic of the life of Rama, ideal man and incarnation of the great god Visnu, has profoundly affected the literature, art, religions, and cultures of South and Southeast Asia from antiquity to the present. Filled with thrilling battles, flying monkeys, and ten-headed demons, the work, composed almost 3,000 years ago, recounts Prince Rama's exile and his odyssey to recover his abducted wife, Sita, and establish a utopian kingdom. Now, the definitive English translation of the critical edition of this classic is available in a single volume.

Based on the authoritative seven-volume translation edited by Robert Goldman and Sally Sutherland Goldman, this volume presents the unabridged translated text in contemporary English, revised and reformatted into paragraph form. The book includes a new introduction providing important historical and literary contexts, as well as a glossary, pronunciation guide, and index. Ideal for students and general readers, this edition of the **RĀMĀYAṆA OF VĀLMĪKI** introduces an extraordinary work of world literature to a new generation of readers. Based on the The Princeron Válmiki Rámáyana: Critical Edition, 1960-1975.

Review

"Truly epic and millennial in scale. The translation and expertise that have gone into this are not likely to be surpassed."**—Frederick M. Smith, *Religious Studies Review***

"The translation admirably succeeds in pursuing its 'twin goals of accuracy and readability.' . . . The closest thing [readers] could get to what the original taste and texture of the text must have been. . . . This is a remarkable achievement."**—Yigal Bronner, *European Legacy***

"Goldman has chosen a translation style that is simple, direct, and very close to the text, without being prosaic. He has avoided the twin pitfalls of preciousness and pedantry. The *Rāmāyaṇa*, as he reminds us, is a poem in a sense we have almost lost touch with: intended to be heard, easily understood, chanted in a loose and repetitive meter that permits the lapidary phrase."**—Edwin Gerow, *Journal of Asian Studies***

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The current volume, edited and revised by the general and associate editors of the original translation project, represents the complete text of the original Princeton University Press seven-volume translation of the Oriental Institute of Baroda critical edition of the Rámáyana of Válmiki. That translation, accompanied by extensive introductions and a dense scholarly annotation, was published serially as the flagship work in the Princeton Library of Asian Translations from 1984 to 2017.

The present volume, which includes a new general introduction and eliminates the original's extensive annotation, is intended for two audiences: the general reading public, who may be interested in gaining access to a little-known masterpiece of Asian literature, and high school and collegiate students and faculty. As discussed in detail in the introduction, the original translation, directed more toward an audience of academic specialists, has been considerably revised by Professors Goldman and Sutherland Goldman with a view toward making it more accessible to these two audiences.

***

What Is the Válmiki Rámáyana?

When contemplating a reading of the Válmiki Rámayana, it might well occur to a reader unfamiliar with the work to ask, "What is a Rámáyana, and who or what is Válmiki?" If one were to be told that Rámáyana is the title of a famous and influential Sanskrit epic poem of ancient India, that Válmiki is the name of its author, and that the work is in many ways similar to epic poems like the Iliad, the Odyssey, and the Aeneid, one might then ask, "Why don't we refer to these latter works as `The Homer Iliad,' `The Homer Odyssey,' and 'The Virgil Aeneid'?" And thereby hangs a tale—or rather, many, many versions of the same tale.

The name Rámáyana, "Ráma's Journey," is actually a generic term that, over the last two and a half millennia, came to be applied, either specifically or generically, to the innumerable versions of the epic's central story that proliferated across the vast geographical, linguistic, cultural, and religious range of

southern Asia from antiquity to the present day. The collectivity of these versions in poetry, prose, song, drama, cinema, and the visual arts is sometimes referred to as the Rámakathá, "The Tale of Ráma." Thus, although specific versions of the tale, such as those found in Sanskrit and many other languages, may use the term Rámáyana in their titles, many others do not. Indeed, the massive diffusion of texts, art, and performance based on the Ráma story found throughout the nations of southern Asia makes the Rámáyana, writ large, arguably one of the world's most popular, influential, and widely circulated tales ever told. In this it can only be compared with two works that have been equally pervasive and influential, but far less variable and religiously adaptable—the Bible and the Qur'an.

The oldest surviving version of the great tale of Ráma, and the one that is doubtless the direct or indirect source of all of the hundreds and perhaps thousands of other versions of the story, is the monumental, mid-first millennium BCE epic poem in some twenty-five thousand Sanskrit couplets attributed to Válmiki. In several respects this poem is also, as we shall see, unique among all versions of the tale.

In its own preface the text calls itself by three titles: Rama's Journey (rámáyanam), The Great Tale of Sitá (sitáyás caritam mahat), and The Slaying of Paulastya (i.e., Rávana) (paulastya^^dhah). The first title reflects the salience in the story of its hero, while the second features its heroine and the third its villain. In modernity, in order to distinguish this work from its legion of later versions, many of which are called simply Rámáy^ ^^, scholars and others tend to name it for its author. Thus, in keeping with Sanskrit's predilection for nominal compounds, the poem is often referred to in that language as the Váb^ikir^m^ya^a, "Válmiki's R^máyana." In English we tend to separate the two parts of the compound: the name of the author and the name of his work.

Like other Rám^yanas, Válmiki's work purports to be a poetic history of events that took place on the Indian subcontinent and on the adjacent island of La^^ká (popularly believed to be the modern nation of Sri Lanka). Indeed, along with its reputation as a great literary composition, and like its sister epic, the ^^hábhárata, it is regarded by numerous Indian commentators, as well as by the Indian literary critical tradition and many pious Hindus today, as belonging to the genre of itihása, "historical narrative." Also like the Mahábhárata, but unlike most other versions of the Rama story, Valmiki's epic is believed to be the work of a divinely gifted rs^, "seer," who was endowed with an infallible and omniscient vision enabling him to witness directly all the events recounted in his poem. Thus, his version of the tale is widely regarded as the first and most authentic and unfalsifiabie historical account of the life of its hero, Ráma, and all the other characters—human, simian, avian, divine, and demonic—with whom his career intersects.

A unique characteristic of Valmiki's Rámáyana is that it is almost universally revered in the Indian literary tradition as the veritable funs et origo of the entire genre of kávya, "poetry," or what we would call belles lettres: texts whose purpose, among others, is to stimulate our aesthetic sensibilities. Thus, the work is widely revered as the Adikdvya, "The First Poem," from which all later poetry derives, while its author is venerated as the Adikavi, "The First Poet." Indeed, the poem's tale of the life of its hero, Ráma, has come down to us with a prologue in the form of a meta-narrative about exactly how Valmiki came to learn the story of Rama and how he was inspired to craft it into a massive musical and poetic history. In that prologue, we read that Lord Brahma, the creator divinity himself, inspired the sage to compose the tale of Rama in metrical verse, "to delight the heart." In other words, in addition to its other merits, Valmiki's magnum opus is a grand entertainment filled with emotional scenes, romantic idylls, heroic

warriors, beautiful princesses, monstrous villains, comical monkeys, and cataclysmic battles. And so, along with the innumerable subsequent retellings it has inspired throughout the countries and cultures of southern Asia, the work has both delighted and edified its audiences for millennia.

But the work is not merely a literary account of a legendary hero's life and struggles. It also functions on two other critical levels, the devotional and the ethical. We learn at the very outset of the poem that, despite appearances, its protagonist is no ordinary human. Together with his three brothers, Bharata, Laksmana, and Satrughna, he is, in fact, an incarnation of one of the supreme divinities of Hinduism, Lord Visnu, who takes on various earthly forms over the long, recurring cycles of cosmic time when the righteous and righteousness (dharma) itself are imperiled at the hands of some mighty, demonic being or beings who are too powerful for even the lesser gods to resist. Thus, the warrior prince and righteous monarch Rama is regarded as one of the principal ^^atáras, "incarnations," of the Supreme Being and therefore an object of veneration, worship, and devotion for hundreds of millions of Hindus worldwide from deep antiquity to the present day. In this way. Válmiki's epic poem is one of the earliest sacred texts of the Vaisnava tradition of Hinduism and stands at the head of all the many Hindu versions of the R^m^yana.1 Although it has sometimes been superseded in the affection of many of Ráma's bhaktas, "devotees," by later, regional versions of the epic, Válmiki's Rám^yana remains a central scripture for some schools of Vaisnavism to this day, and most Hindus revere both the poem and the poet. Indeed, the day traditionally regarded as Válmiki's birthday is a "restricted," or optional, holiday on the Hindu calendar.

The epic narrative is constructed as a kind of morality play, an illustrative guide to righteous behavior, in the face of the most dire challenges and ethical dilemmas. At the same time, it is a grand cautionary tale of the downfall of the unrighteous, no matter how mighty they may be. Thus, the work, along with its role as a historical and literary text, functions as both a guide to moral and religious conduct (dharm^^^stra) and a political treatise on the proper exercise of kingship and governance (nitisástra). It fulfills these roles through the creation of (in some cases literally) towering figures whose characters and actions represent positive and negative exemplars for its audiences to emulate or to shun. In this way, the epic hero Ráma serves as the model for the ideal son, the ideal husband, the ideal warrior, and the ideal king. Thus, not only is he a god come to earth, but he is the ideal man. Other central figures serve similarly in their specific roles. The heroine, Sit, is the ideal wife, a ^^ti^rat^, a woman perfectly devoted to her husband for better or for worse. Laksmana is the ideal younger brother, utterly faithful to his elder, Ráma. The monkey-hero Hanumán emerges as the very paragon of selfless devotion to one's lord. Then there is the anomalous figure of Vibhisana, the virtuous ráks^sa brother of the epic's villain, who abandons his family and his people to take refuge and ally himself with Ráma.

On the "dark side," as it were, there is the monstrous, ten-headed ráksasa king, Rávana, a ruthless conquistador who terrorizes all creatures, even the gods themselves. Rávana is a defiler of all sacred rites and a prolific sexual predator who rapes and abducts women throughout the three worlds until he meets his downfall at Ráma's hands. There is also Rávana's sinister and terrifying son, the sorcererwarrior Ravani Indrajit, who, through his powers of illusion and magical rites, can make himself both invisible and invincible. Rávana's colossal younger brother is the horrifying, if almost comically grotesque, Kumbhakarna, who must be aroused from his perpetual sleep to wreak havoc on Ráma's army of semidivine monkeys (vánaras).

In opposing these sets of figures, the righteous and the unrighteous, the epic narrative establishes itself as a major episode in the grand and never-ending struggle between the forces of dharma, "good or righteousness," and the forces of adharma, "evil or unrighteousness," for control of the universe—a struggle that, as noted earlier, occasionally necessitates the divine intervention of the Supreme Being to resolve it in favor of dharma. In the end, once Ráma has been victorious in his battle with Rávana and his evil minions, recovered his abducted wife, and established himself on his ancestral throne, he inaugurates a millennia-long utopian kingdom, the so-called Ramamdjya, Kingingdom of Ráma," which lives on in the political imagination of India to this day. This morality play, reenacted annually across much of India in the Ramlila, "The Play of Rama," a rather more cheerful popular celebration than the European Passion Play it parallels, continues to entertain and edify hundreds of millions who worship Ráma and Sitá (Sitaram). At the drama's conclusion, vast crowds of devotees and onlookers celebrate as a giant effigy of the demonic Rávana, packed with fireworks, is set ablaze for a glorious celebration of the triumph of good over evil. <>

BUDDHISM AS PHILOSOPHY by Mark Siderits [Hackett Publishing Company, 9781624669828]

In **BUDDHISM AS PHILOSOPHY,** Mark Siderits makes the Buddhist philosophical tradition accessible to a Western audience. Offering generous selections from the canonical Buddhist texts and providing an engaging, analytical introduction to the fundamental tenets of Buddhist thought, this revised, expanded, and updated edition builds on the success of the first edition in clarifying the basic concepts and arguments of the Buddhist philosophers.

Review

"Since the publication of the first edition of **BUDDHISM AS PHILOSOPHY**, the need for such a book has only grown as even more undergraduate programs are teaching Buddhist philosophy and looking for accessible materials that still do justice to the tradition's intellectual complexity. This updated version retains the first version's successful balancing act between fidelity to primary source material and application to general philosophical problems. The book teaches students how to do philosophy at the same time as it teaches them the particularities of Buddhist philosophy. Siderits moves fluidly from translations of primary texts to their explication and evaluation, both modeling expert philosophical methodology and pausing to explain to students how philosophical argumentation works." —Malcom Keating, Yale-NUS College

"I use **BUDDHISM AS PHILOSOPHY** as the core text of my 'Non-Western Philosophy' topics course; I'm a huge fan. Siderits's exposition provides a deeply illuminating, historically and philosophically informed walk through the underlying motivations for and diverse Indian Buddhist approaches to the doctrines of 'no-self' and 'emptiness.' This new edition improves on the previous with a new organizational structure, and clarified and expanded argumentation and discussion. Highly recommended for anyone interested in the metaphysical, epistemological, and ethical underpinnings and consequences of Buddhism." —Jessica Wilson, University of Toronto

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Excerpt: It must be emphasized that this is not done in order to show that Buddhist thought is "real philosophy." We think it will be evident to anyone who examines the Buddhist corpus that its authors are engaged in philosophical inquiry; special pleading is not necessary. This book was written to be suitable for use in undergraduate offerings in a philosophy department, and comparisons with similar or related concepts and theories in the Western tradition should make sense in that context, for two reasons. First, some students in such courses will already be familiar with parts of the Western tradition, and making connections with things one has already learned is a useful teaching strategy. Second, in the case of students not already familiar with the Western side of the comparison, philosophy instructors may want to encourage their students to engage in further exploration beyond the course content. But in any event, the instructor need not feel compelled to explain the Western side of a comparison to those students for whom this is the first and perhaps the last philosophy course. Something can be gained from getting the comparisons, but little is lost for those who don't.

Some of the material in this book will be challenging for some students, especially those with no prior exposure to philosophy. Some individual chapters (such as Chapters 5 and 7) are fairly lengthy and cover a great deal of ground. It may be best to have reading assignments consist of one or a few sections of a chapter, and not assign a whole chapter at a time. And while the material in the book can probably be responsibly covered in an advanced undergraduate philosophy course, it may not be possible to cover the entirety in other sorts of settings. The ninth chapter, for instance, might be a chapter too far in some cases. Here are some other parts of the book that the instructor who feels pressed for time might consider skipping over:

Sections 4.4 and 9.6, both of which take up the issue of whether it is possible to talk meaningfully of the utterly non-existent.
Section 5.9, which explores an argument for representationalism; since a different argument was presented in the immediately preceding section, and this argument is less clearly developed by its propounder, its discussion could be omitted without jeopardizing later uses of the representationalist thesis.
Section 7.7, which discusses an argument for the Yogācāra thesis that the natures of the ultimate reals are inexpressible.

Buddhism As Philosophy was written to fill a particular pedagogical niche: to serve as a textbook that could be used in undergraduate philosophy courses focusing, in whole or in part, on the Buddhist philosophical tradition. We certainly hope that it will also be of some interest to readers other than the students in such courses and their instructors. But a few words may be in order at the outset about how it might best be used in the classroom by indicating what it does and does not try to do.

The first point that should be made clear is the scope of the book. The Buddhist philosophical tradition began with the Buddha, developed in South Asia for another one and a half millennia, but also spread to Southeast Asia, Tibet, and East Asia, and continues to develop today. This book treats only the South Asian part of the tradition. It does provide the background necessary for investigating those other parts, all of which developed in response to the Indian tradition. But the book is already more than long enough. Doing justice to the other components of the tradition would require something far, far longer.

Recent years have seen a substantial increase in scholarship focused on Indian Buddhist philosophy. Not surprisingly, this has meant the emergence of scholarly disagreements concerning the best interpretation of this or that Buddhist philosophical text, theory, or doctrine. There have been disagreements over such matters as whether the Yogácára school of Maháyána Buddhism is a form of external-world antirealism, and whether any Buddhist philosophers hold that a contradictory statement can be true. Those disagreements will not be discussed here. The interpretations presented here are all, we think, defensible. But it was judged that their defense is probably best left to the pages of the relevant scholarly journals. Students might be interested to learn that there are other ways to read parts of the tradition than the ones presented here. Some of the Further Reading lists at chapter ends point them in useful directions. We felt, though, that substantive discussion of the interpretive disagreements among scholars might prove distracting at this comparatively early stage in student explorations.

At certain points in the book, there are comparisons of a Buddhist concept, theory, or argument with some related item found in the Western tradition.

For instructors wishing to strictly adhere to the historical record, sections 3.4, 3.5, and 5.2 might seem problematic.

Section 3.4 discusses an argument developed by the eighth-century Mádhyamika philosopher Santideva. Since the chapter as a whole seeks to explicate an approach to ethics that is already in place in early Abhidharma, this argument may strike some as out of place.

Section 3.5 discusses a problem that was not discussed by Indian Buddhist philosophers, the so-called free will problem. Students do frequently raise questions about this issue, and scholars have proposed several answers a Buddhist might give. But the solution described here is not found in the historical record.

Section 5.2 discusses an approach to establishing non-self that is never fully developed in the Indian Buddhist tradition. Moreover, the discussion is triggered by an episode found in a Maháyána text, the Maha Prajnaparamita Shastra, and so might be considered not to belong in a chapter on Abhidharma theory.

Yogācāra is treated in Chapter 7 and Madhyamaka in Chapter 8, reversing the historical order of initial development of these schools. The rationale is that students who have been exposed to Madhyamaka dialectic are sometimes reluctant to return to the sort of metaphysical theorizing found in Yogácára. Still, the instructor committed to adhering to the historical record might prefer to discuss these chapters in reverse order.

Instructors sometimes want to bring parts of the Buddhist philosophical tradition into a course that is otherwise devoted to the Western tradition. One way this book might be used to that end would be to begin with the material presenting the Buddha's basic teachings and a common core of philosophical elaborations (Chapters 1-3, possibly omitting 3.5), and then use parts of some of the remaining chapters to discuss different ways in which that common core was developed. From Chapter 5 (on Abhidharma), for instance, one might confine one's attention to sections 1, 3, 4, and 5. A discussion of Yogácára might be restricted to the material presented in sections 1-4 and section 6 of Chapter 7. A brief exploration of Madhyamaka might focus on sections 1-4 and section 7 of Chapter 8. And no doubt there are many other configurations of the material presented here that would be suitable for different classroom contingencies.

Buddhism As Philosophy?

The purpose of this book is, as the title suggests, to examine Buddhism as philosophy. Before we actually start doing that though, it might be good to first get a bit clearer about what each of these two things—Buddhism and philosophy—is. That will help us see what might be distinctive about studying Buddhism as a form of philosophy. And it is important to be clear about this, since there are some preconceptions about these matters that might get in the way of fully grasping how the philosophical study of Buddhism works.

What Is Philosophy?

When people first encounter philosophy, they want to know what it is about. Other disciplines have their own subject matter: biology is the study of life processes, sociology is the study of human societies, astronomy looks at planets and stars, and so on. So what is philosophy about? If you are not new to the study of philosophy, you know that what makes philosophy a separate discipline is not necessarily its special subject matter. True, there are questions that we naturally think of as "philosophical" in some sense. Questions such as, "How should I live my life?" and "How do we know anything?" and "How did all this come to be?" But the first question is also addressed by literature, the second by cognitive science, and the third by astrophysics. What distinguishes philosophy from other disciplines?

Someone who has already studied philosophy will also know that the answer has more to do with method than with content. What sets philosophy apart as a discipline is more its concern with how to answer questions than with the answers themselves. To study philosophy is to learn to think carefully and critically about complex issues. It is not necessarily to learn "the answers" that the discipline has arrived at. This can make the study of philosophy frustrating for some. When we first study a subject, we expect to learn the body of knowledge that has been developed by that discipline. When we study

chemistry we learn the atomic weights of the elements, when we study history we learn the causes of the First World War, and so on. Only later, if at all, does one start looking into the methods the discipline uses within its field of knowledge. The study of philosophy is not like that. True, one might find out in an introductory philosophy course that Plato thought the soul must be immortal, or that Descartes held the one thing that can't be doubted is that the "I" exists. But one also learns that not all philosophers agree with Plato or Descartes on these claims. Some students find this immensely frustrating. Where, they want to know, are the facts that philosophy has established? In all the centuries that philosophy has existed, has it made any progress, come up with any answers?

One response to this question is that indeed philosophy has established something quite significant—that the truth turns out to be very complicated. None of the simple answers to the questions that philosophy looks at is correct. This is an important (and unsettling) result. The questions that philosophers ask often seem like they should have simple and straightforward answers. Take, for instance, the question of how the mind and the body interact. The state of my stomach causes me to think about what there is to eat, and then the resulting state of my mind brings about bodily motion in the direction of the refrigerator. How do these things happen? One thing that philosophical investigation of this question has shown is that we still don't know the answer. Even more detailed scientific study of the brain won't succeed (at least by itself) in explaining how this works. Yet we rely on the mind and the body working together in everything we do. So perhaps philosophy has established something after all—that under the surface of seemingly mundane matters lurks surprising complexity. Getting to the bottom of things turns out to be really hard work.

But there is another way to answer the complaint that philosophy hasn't established any facts. Someone who says this might be wondering what the point of studying philosophy is. And the way the challenge is posed suggests that they think the point of studying some subject is to acquire a body of knowledge to add new facts to the facts they already know. So one response

to the challenge might be to question this assumption. Perhaps the point (or at least a point) of studying philosophy is to acquire a set of skills. Specifically, the study of philosophy might turn out to be one of the best ways to learn some critical argumentation skills: defining one's terms carefully, constructing good arguments in support of one's views, critically evaluating arguments (one's own and others'), responding to objections, and the like.' And these skills turn out to play a crucial role in many different areas of life. They are, for instance, extremely important to the practice of law. This would explain why the study of philosophy is recognized as one of the best ways to prepare for legal practice (something that was known in ancient Greece and in medieval India). Of course, the issues that philosophers grapple with can be intrinsically interesting to anyone who is at all thoughtful and reflective. But on this way of thinking about philosophy, the benefit of grappling with them is not so much that one gets the "right" answer, as that one learns to think more carefully and critically about complex matters in general.

To say this is not to say that the questions that philosophers ask are unimportant. It's because people find these to be pressing questions that they pursue the difficult task of trying to answer them—and thereby develop their logical and analytical skills. So something more should be said at this point about what sorts of questions these are. Philosophical inquiry can be sorted into several broad areas. One such domain is ethics. This has to do with the general question of how we should live our lives. So it includes not just questions about the nature of morality (which is concerned with what constitutes right and wrong in the treatment of others). It also deals with questions about what sort of life might be the

best life for persons. Now it is sometimes thought that questions of ethics and morality are questions for religion. And it is true that most religions have a great deal to say on these matters. But when people think of questions of right and wrong, good and bad, as matters for religion, they often have in mind the idea that a religion simply tells us how we ought to behave. So they are thinking of ethics and morality as a set of rules or commandments. This is not what philosophers mean by ethics, though. As they use the term, ethics involves critical examination of competing views about how we ought to conduct ourselves. And this is something that one can do regardless of what (if any) religious beliefs someone has. The medieval Christian thinker Thomas Aquinas was doing ethics in this sense when he tried to determine what conclusions we can draw about being virtuous from a certain view of human nature. But so was the nineteenth-century German atheist Friedrich Nietzsche when he asked how we should live our lives given that God is dead. What makes both their discussions of ethical matters philosophical is that both involve the critical examination of arguments.

Metaphysics is another major area of philosophy. The word "metaphysics" gets used in several different ways. For instance, in bookstores the "metaphysics" section often has books on astrology and the occult. But as it is used in philosophy, it simply refers to the disciplined investigation of the most basic features of reality. Where ethics concerns the question of how things ought to be, metaphysics concerns the question of how things fundamentally are, or what reality is basically like. Now we might think that questions about how things are, or what reality is like, should be left to the sciences. And it is true that if, for instance, we wanted to know what a certain chemical compound is like we should turn to chemistry. But metaphysical questions are much more basic or fundamental than those that science can answer. Chemistry can tell us what effects might be caused by mixing two chemicals. But it is a metaphysical question what the general nature of the relation between cause and effect is. Likewise the sciences tell us a great deal about the nature of the physical world. But it is a metaphysical question whether everything that exists is physical; this is not a question that scientists can or should try to answer using the methods of science. Some other examples of metaphysical questions include: What is the nature of time? Are there, in addition to particulars such as individual cows, universals such as a single cowness that exists in all of them simultaneously? Does there exist an all-perfect, eternal creator of the universe? Is there a self, and if so what might it be like? The pursuit of metaphysical questions like these has often led philosophers to related but separate questions in the philosophy of language, such as how it is that words and sentences have meaning, and what it means for a statement to be true.

Another important area of philosophy is epistemology, or the theory of knowledge. Here the basic question is how we can come to know what things are like and what should be done. Inquiry in epistemology has often taken the form of asking just what it means to say that someone knows something or other. For instance, can someone be said to know something if they haven't ruled out all the ways in which they could be mistaken (even when they're not mistaken)? But epistemological inquiry may also take the form of asking what the means or methods of knowledge are. Sense-perception and inference (or reasoning) are popular candidates for reliable ways to acquire knowledge, but what about authority (taking the word of some trustworthy person), or reasoning by analogy? And if there are different means of knowledge, how are they related to one another? Does each have its own distinctive sphere, or do they all serve equally well to give us knowledge about the same objects? Does anyone means of knowledge have precedence over others?

As you might have guessed given what was said earlier about the nature of philosophy, philosophers have developed a number of different theories in each of its different branches. And there is no general consensus as to which theories in metaphysics, epistemology, and ethics are correct. There is general agreement that the simplest answers are wrong. Take, for instance, the ethical theory of subject-based ethical relativism. This is the view that whether an action is morally wrong for someone to do depends on whether or not they sincerely believe that doing it is wrong. All philosophers today would agree that this theory is false. But when it comes to more sophisticated theories in these areas, agreement breaks down. For every theory that has been proposed in metaphysics, epistemology, and ethics, there are serious criticisms that have been developed by philosophers. Much of the practice of philosophy involves looking at these objections to a given view and seeing if it's possible to answer them. (It is through this process that philosophical theories have grown so sophisticated.) But in doing so one frequently discovers that there are important connections between the view one holds in one area of philosophy and the positions one takes in other areas. A particular theory in ethics might for instance turn out to be unworkable unless one holds a certain position on some metaphysical issue. Learning to see these sorts of connections is another important benefit of studying philosophy.

When we understand philosophy this way, we can say that not every culture developed its own philosophical tradition. But ancient Greece did—this is where modern Western philosophy began. And so did classical India. In each case the original impetus seems to have come from a concern to answer ethical questions. Out of dissatisfaction with the received view of how people should live their lives, there arose efforts at thinking systematically about these matters. But in both cases these inquiries soon led to major developments in metaphysics and epistemology. For philosophers became aware that if we are to make progress toward determining how we ought to live, we need to be clearer about the nature of the world and our place in it. And this in turn requires greater clarity about what constitutes knowledge and what processes lead to it. People sometimes wonder if it could be just a coincidence that philosophy arose in two such different cultures at roughly the same time. Now we know that there were trade contacts between classical India and the Hellenic world. So it is at least conceivable that some ancient Greek philosophers and some classical Indian philosophers knew something of one another's work. But the two philosophical traditions appear to be genuinely distinct. They tackle the same basic questions in ethics, metaphysics, and epistemology. And they employ the same basic techniques of analysis and argumentation. Sometimes individual philosophers in the two traditions even reach strikingly similar conclusions. But this should not lead us to suppose that there was significant borrowing between one tradition and the other. We know, after all, that the same invention can occur independently in two distinct cultures. In mathematics, for instance, the zero was invented separately, in ancient India, and also by the Mayans of precontact Mesoamerica.

What Is Buddhism?

Philosophy, then, is the systematic investigation of questions in ethics, metaphysics, and epistemology (as well as several related fields). It involves using analysis and argumentation in systematic and reflective ways. This will do, at least for now, as an account of what we will mean by philosophy. What about the other term in our title, Buddhism? We might seem to be on safer ground here. While many people might lack detailed knowledge about what it is that Buddhists believe and what Buddhist practice involves, surely everyone knows that Buddhism is the religion that was founded in ancient India by the Buddha, subsequently spread throughout Asia, and is now attracting adherents in the West? Well, yes,

but there's a load of mischief lurking in that word "religion." There is one sense in which Buddhism can matter will prove just as crucial to our undertaking as will being clear about what philosophy is.

We often base our understanding of a word on familiar examples. In the case of "religion," the familiar examples for most people in the West are Christianity, Judaism, and Islam. These are all monotheistic religions: they each involve belief in a single personal being who is eternal, is creator of the universe, and has all perfections. Not all religions share this sort of belief: Hinduism and Shinto are both forms of polytheism. It doesn't seem to be stretching things too much to group all the theisms together under one label, though. But particularly if the religion one is most familiar with is Christianity, one might also think of a religion as a "faith." To think of religion this way is to see it as a set of beliefs that one accepts out of a conviction that is not based on rational argument. Religion is then seen as falling on the "heart" side of the head/heart, or reason/faith, divide.

In modern Western culture there is a tendency to suppose that certain questions are to be settled through the use of reason, while others can only be addressed through faith and feeling. This is the dichotomy between reason and faith, with reason seen as a matter of the head and faith a matter of the heart. Along with this dichotomy there is a related one between facts, seen as the sort of thing that the sciences discover, and values, seen as private, subjective commitments that are not open to rational investigation and scrutiny. Suppose we agree that using our reason involves thinking about things in a cool, careful, detached, and deliberate way. Now it is probably true that some matters should not be decided entirely on the basis of calm, cool consideration of reasons. One's choice of life-partner, for instance, should probably involve considerable input from the "heart" side. But it is not at all clear that "head" and "heart" constitute a strict dichotomy. And in any event, it is not obvious that the matters we consider religious (or "spiritual") necessarily belong on the "faith" side of any such divide.

One thing that all the theisms (monotheisms and polytheisms) have in common is that they each try to articulate some vision of the ideal state for humans. This ideal state is usually depicted as being quite different from the way that people would live their lives if left to their own devices. The latter "mundane" (or "worldly") state is depicted as inherently unsatisfactory, as fallen away from how we ought to be. And the ideal state is represented as accurately be called a religion, but there is another sense in which it would be a mistake. And clarity about this sort of salvation from this fallen state. When we think of a religion as dealing with "spiritual" matters, it is this concern with attaining salvation, of escaping from an unsatisfactory way of being, that we have in mind. The concerns of religion are, in a word, soteriological. (A soteriology is a doctrine of salvation.) Now to think of religion as a faith is to suppose that soteriological concerns can only be addressed through a form of emotional commitment. It is to hold that the use of reason or logical investigation is of little or no use in seeking salvation. Many people in our culture believe this. But this was not the view of classical Indian culture. (Nor does it seem to have been held by the ancient Greeks, or by the philosophers of medieval Islam.) To many people in ancient India, including the Buddha, it made perfectly good sense to use our rational faculties in the pursuit of salvation. Of course this was not the only path that Indians recognized. Which path one should follow depends, according to the Bhagavad Gita, on one's talents and predilections. But all four paths described in the Gita culminate in salvation, for they all instill knowledge of our true identity. Indian Buddhism generally teaches that there is just one path to liberation, not four. But that path consists in the combined practice of philosophical reasoning and meditation. Indian Buddhists, like others in ancient India, thought that salvation from our unsatisfactory state was to be had through coming to

know the truth about who we are and where we fit in the universe. And they thought that attaining such insights requires the use of philosophical rationality.

Buddhism is, then, a religion, if by this we mean a set of teachings that address soteriological concerns. But if we think of religion as a kind of faith, a commitment for which no reasons can be given, then Buddhism would not count. To become a Buddhist is not to accept a bundle of doctrines solely on the basis of faith. And salvation is not to be had just by devout belief in the Buddha's teachings. (Indeed the Buddhists we will study would be likely to see belief of this sort as an obstacle to final liberation.) Rather, liberation, or nirvana (to use the Buddhist term), is to be attained through rational investigation of the nature of the world. As we might expect with any religion, Buddhist teachings include some claims that run deeply counter to common sense. But Buddhists are not expected to accept these claims just because the Buddha taught them. Instead they are expected to examine the arguments that are given in support of these claims, and determine for themselves if the arguments really make it likely that these claims are true. Buddhists revere the Buddha as the founder of their tradition. But that attitude is meant to be the same as what is accorded a teacher who has discovered important truths through their own intellectual power. Indeed the person whom we call the Buddha, Gautama, is said to have been just the latest in a long series of buddhas, each of whom independently discovered the same basic truths that show the way to nirvana. This may or may not reflect historical fact. But the spirit behind this claim is worth remarking on. What it seems to suggest is that the teachings of Buddhism are based on objective facts about the nature of reality and our place in it. And these facts are apparently thought of as things that human reason can apprehend without reliance on superhuman revelation.

If we expect all religions to be theistic, then Buddhism might once again not qualify as a religion. The Buddha is not the equivalent of the God of Western monotheism. Nor is the Buddha considered a prophet, someone whose authority on spiritual matters derives from privileged access to God. Gautama is seen as just an extremely intelligent and altruistic human being. Indeed Buddhism explicitly denies that there is such a thing as the God recognized by Western monotheism—an eternal, all-powerful, and all-perfect creator. To most people this denial is tantamount to atheism. So if we are to count Buddhism as a religion, it will have to make sense to say there can be atheistic religions.

Of course the Buddha acknowledged the existence of a multiplicity of gods. Should we then think of Buddhism as polytheistic, in the same sense in which some forms of Hinduism are ^^lytheistic? Perhaps we might if we wanted Buddhism to fit under a nice tidy definition of "religion" that required some form of theism. But this would be somewhat beside the point as far as Buddhism is concerned. The gods that ancient Indian Buddhists believed in were (like the gods of ancient Greece and all the rest of pre-Christian Europe) finite beings, rather like human beings only longer-lived and more powerful. More importantly; they play no role whatsoever in the quest for nirvana. Perhaps worship and sacrifice to the right gods might win one various mundane benefits, such as timely rainfall to make the crops grow, or the health of one's loved ones. But the gods cannot bestow nirvana on us. Indeed the fact that they are also mortal (they may live for unimaginably long periods, but they are still impermanent like everything else) is taken to show that they are no more enlightened than we humans are. For that matter, even an enlightened human being like a buddha or an arhat (someone who has attained nirvana by following the teachings of the Buddha) cannot bestow nirvana on others. That is something that one can only attain for oneself; enlightened beings can only help others by giving them pointers along the way. And the

point, for Buddhism, is to attain nirvana, to bring suffering to an end. So for this spiritual tradition, the question whether there are any gods turns out to be largely irrelevant.

The doctrine of karma and rebirth is another matter. As you may well already know, classical Indian Buddhism accepted this doctrine. These Buddhists believed that death is ordinarily not the end of our existence, that after we die we are reborn, either as humans or as some other form of sentient being (including non-human animals, gods, and the inhabitants of various hells). Which sort of rebirth one attains depends on your karma, which has to do with the moral quality of the actions you engaged in. If one's acts were primarily morally good, one may be reborn as a human in fortunate life circumstances, or even as a god. If one's life was full of acts done out of evil intentions, however, one might end up as a preta or so-called hungry ghost (so called because everything they can eat tastes like feces). Now to many ears this will sound like just the sort of thing that other more familiar religions offer: a promise of life after death, and a doctrine of retribution for one's sins. So is Buddhism really all that different from those other spiritual traditions? Is it really the case that it only expects us to believe those things for which there is objective evidence?

This is a good question. It may turn out that not everything Buddhists have traditionally believed can be rationally supported. This outcome is one of the possibilities that opens up when we examine Buddhism as philosophy. But before saying any more about that, we should clear up some possible confusions about the doctrine of karma and rebirth. The first point to make is that as Buddhists understand it, karma is not divine retribution for one's sins. You may have noticed that the laws of karma basically have to do with receiving pleasant results for acting out of morally good motives, and receiving painful results for acting with evil intentions. This prompts some to ask who determines what is good and what is evil. For Buddhists the answer is that no one does. Karma is not a set of rules that are decreed by a cosmic ruler and enforced by the cosmic moral police. Karma is understood instead as a set of impersonal causal laws that simply describe how the world happens to work. In this respect the karmic laws are just like the so-called natural laws that science investigates. It is a causal law that when I let go of a rock while standing on a bridge, it will fall toward the water below with a certain acceleration. No one passed this law, and no one enforces it. The laws of physics are not like the laws passed by legislative bodies. There are no gravity police. And if something were to behave contrary to what we take to be the law of gravity, that would be evidence that we were wrong to think it was a law. A true causal law has no exceptions. Likewise, the laws of karma are understood not as rules that can be either obeyed or broken, but as exceptionless generalizations about what always follows what. If we could keep track of enough persons over enough successive lives, we could find out what the laws of karma are in the same way that science discovers what the laws of nature are: our observations would disclose the patterns of regular succession that show causation at work.

A second point to make about the Buddhist attitude toward karma and rebirth is that belief in rebirth does not serve the same function that belief in an afterlife serves in many other religious traditions. The fact that after I die I will be reborn is not taken to be a source of relief or consolation. And the point of Buddhist practice is not to do those things that will help ensure a pleasant next life and prevent a painful one. The truth is just the opposite. As we will see in more detail in the next chapter, the Buddha claims that continued rebirth is just what we need liberation from. (The reason, briefly, is that rebirth entails redeath.) One could set about trying to use knowledge of karmic causal laws to try to guarantee that one continues to exist in relatively comfortable circumstances. But on the Buddhist analysis that would

just reveal one's ignorance about how things really are. And because such behavior was based on ignorance, it would inevitably lead to more of the suffering that Buddhism is meant to cure. The doctrine of karma and rebirth is not meant to make us feel better about the fact that we will die. For those Buddhists who accept it, it is part of the problem, not part of the solution.

A third point about the doctrine of karma and rebirth is that this was not a view that was peculiar to Buddhism. Instead it seems to have been commonly accepted by spiritual teachers from before the time of the Buddha, and to have been part of the common-sense conception of the world for most Indians for most of the time that Buddhism existed in India. So when Indian Buddhists claimed that we undergo rebirth in accordance with karma, they were not making claims that would have struck their audience as novel or strange. Now when we think of a religion as something that makes claims that must be taken on faith, we have in mind claims that are not already part of common sense. So the fact that Buddhists accepted the doctrine of karma and rebirth does not show that Buddhism is a religion in the sense of a creed, a set of doctrines for which there is no evidence and that are to be accepted on faith. Perhaps Indians accepted this doctrine without good evidence. But if so, it was not because they were required to as practicing Buddhists.

The doctrine of karma and rebirth is not a part of our common-sense worldview. So it would be reasonable for us to ask what evidence there is that this doctrine is true. It would be reasonable, that is, if we are investigating Buddhism as philosophy. For in studying philosophy we are interested in finding out what the truth is. (We may not always find it, but that's what we aim for.) Things might be different if we were studying Buddhism as an historical artifact, as part of the study of the history of religions. Perhaps then we would simply note that Indian Buddhists believed in karma and rebirth, and set aside the question whether they were justified in their belief. Instead we might simply explore how this belief affected other aspects of Buddhism: their ethical teachings, for instance, or the content of their artistic representations. There is a great deal we can learn by studying Buddhism and other religions in this way. By simply setting aside the question whether the teachings are true or false, and focusing on how different elements of the tradition might be related to one another, we can learn to see Buddhism's inner logic, how it hangs together as a system. This can help us see things we might otherwise miss. But it cannot tell us whether its teachings are reasonable. And this is something we might want to know when we study a religion like Buddhism. Buddhists claim that those of their teachings that run counter to common sense can be supported by rational arguments. Are they right about this? And if it turns out that some claim of theirs that strikes us as strange cannot be given rational support, how much damage does that do to the overall system? These are the sorts of questions that philosophical examination involves.

And this is how we will proceed with the doctrine of karma and rebirth (and with some other equally controversial views). We will ask (among other things) if there are good reasons to believe it. If there are not, we will go on to see whether other important teachings of Buddhism would also have to go if this doctrine were thrown overboard. This might come as a shock, particularly if you think of a person's religion as something sacrosanct that others shouldn't question. How can we criticize beliefs that might turn out to be central to another person's whole way of life? But someone who asks this is forgetting something: Buddhist philosophers thought that their most important claims should be subjected to rational investigation. This is what made them philosophers. They certainly criticized the views of other Buddhist philosophers. And there was a great deal of rational criticism exchanged between the

Buddhists and other Indian philosophers. So perhaps it would actually be dishonoring Buddhism not to subject its doctrines to rational scrutiny. To study it as no more than an item of historical interest, and not ask how much truth there is in its core teachings, might mean failing to take it seriously as an important human creation.

Examining Buddhism As Philosophy

We have said enough for now about what philosophy is and what Buddhism is. And we have already begun to discuss what it might mean to study Buddhism as philosophy. There are a number of other things that need to be said on that score. One is that this study will be selective. Like any other religious tradition, Buddhism is an immensely complicated phenomenon. To study Buddhism as philosophy means primarily studying texts. Specifically, it means studying those Buddhist texts that present philosophical theories and arguments. But this means leaving out of consideration many other sorts of Buddhist writings, such as those that specify the rules that monks and nuns must follow when they enter the Buddhist monastic order (the samgha), and those more popular writings designed to present simple moral teachings to an audience of lay followers. Moreover, there is much more to Buddhism than its literature (huge though that literature is). And our focus on texts means these other areas will go largely untouched. We will not be examining the many different kinds of Buddhist artistic expression to be found in such fields as sculpture, architecture, painting, devotional poetry, and drama. We will have very little to say about Buddhist institutions, their organization and history. We will say very little about the Buddhist practice of meditation, and nothing at all about such lay-Buddhist devotional practices as stupa worship. All of these aspects of Buddhism have been dealt with elsewhere, and there is no need to duplicate that scholarship here.

There are, though, other studies of Buddhism that focus on many of the same topics that we will be examining. These are works that try to introduce Buddhism through a survey of its chief schools and their principal doctrines. Since such studies are usually organized historically, they might be called doctrinal histories of Buddhism. Now this work will try to trace a historical progression as well. But there will be less concern here than in the typical doctrinal history to say who influenced whom, what influenced what, in the development of key Buddhist teachings. Indeed at times we will take things out of their historical order. This will happen where understanding conceptual connections takes precedence over working out the historical order in which ideas developed. But the most important difference between this work and doctrinal histories of Buddhism is that the latter are more likely to present just the conclusions of the Buddhist philosophers. Our job will be to look not only at their conclusions, but also at the arguments they gave in support of their conclusions. We will look at the objections that other Indian philosophers raised against the Buddhist views we examine, and we will consider the responses that Buddhists gave. We will try to come up with our own objections, and then try to figure out what (if anything) we think Buddhist philosophers could say to answer them. We will try, in short, to see how well Buddhist doctrines stand up to the test of rational scrutiny. Because we are examining Buddhism philosophically, we want to know what (if anything) in Buddhist teachings is true.

Now some of those teachings we can quite easily say are false. This is because some of the claims of Buddhist philosophers are based on views of the natural world very different from what our own sciences tell us about nature. For instance, some Buddhist philosophers hold that ordinary physical objects such as rocks and tables are made up of very large numbers of atoms of four different types: earth, air, water, and fire. (Similar views are found in ancient Greek philosophy.) Now this idea that

material things are made up of four different elements or kinds of stuff is one we know today is false. When ancient philosophers called water an element, they had in mind that there was just one fundamental kind of stuff present in every liquid. So the difference between ^20 and ethyl alcohol might just be a matter of how much fire element was present in addition to the water element. We now know that there are far more than four naturally occurring elements, and two liquids might be made up of completely different elements. Moreover, we know that each of these elements is in turn made up of more fundamental particles, until we reach what may be the most basic of these, the six kinds of quarks. So when Buddhist philosophers argue about a question like whether color is present in each of the four elements, we can say that the very question is misguided—no answer is likely to be true.

Does this mean that Buddhist philosophy can be dismissed as an outdated, prescientific view of the world? No. The situation here is like what we find when we study ancient Greek philosophy. The Greek philosopher Aristotle believed that the earth is the center of the universe. We know that this is false, and yet Aristotle is still considered an important philosopher. What we have learned to do in studying ancient philosophy is simply set aside those parts that conflict with our modern scientific knowledge, and focus on what remains. This is a legitimate approach. When philosophy began, both in ancient Greece and in ancient India, it was felt that philosophers ought to develop a truly comprehensive worldview. For the same methods of rational analysis and argumentation that philosophers were developing in order to answer questions in metaphysics, epistemology, and ethics, seemed to likewise be suitable for studying the natural world. So for instance Aristotle wrote treatises on biology and meteorology, and the Sámkhya school of Indian philosophy developed a theory of chemistry. Indeed most of our present natural sciences have their origins in philosophy. But they have since developed their own distinctive methods and have become independent disciplines. Philosophy now focuses principally on issues in metaphysics, epistemology, and ethics. (This can lead to philosophical investigation of the natural sciences themselves; but studying the sciences philosophically is different from doing science.) This is why, when we today look at ancient philosophers, we tend to set to one side the details of their views about how the natural world works. For it usually turns out that even when these details are simply wrong, this has little or no effect on their views in the core philosophical areas of metaphysics, epistemology, and ethics. This is how we will treat the Buddhist philosophers as well.

There is another element in the texts we will study that we shall also want to set to one side. What we will be examining are texts in which Buddhists give arguments for, and consider objections to, their key claims in metaphysics, epistemology, and ethics. But in some cases, the reason given to support a claim involves an appeal to the authority of the Buddha. This sort of thing happens when there is a dispute between two different schools of Buddhist philosophy over some doctrine. One school may then point to some passage in the sutras (the discourses of Gautama and his chief disciples) as grounds for accepting their position. Now this might count as a good reason to accept the view in question if you already thought that the Buddha's teachings were authoritative. But for those of us who do not, a dispute that is conducted in this way can only concern how to interpret the discourses of the Buddha. The question for us is not whether a certain doctrine is consistent with what the Buddha himself said. The question we want to answer is whether there's reason to think the doctrine is true. Sometimes the texts we will be looking at try to answer both questions. When this happens, we will focus on just their attempts to answer the second.

Most chapters in this book contain extracts, sometimes quite long ones, from primary sources in Buddhist philosophy, as well as extensive discussion. This means we will be reading passages from a variety of different Buddhist philosophical texts, beginning with the sutras, and ending with texts written some 1,500 years later. Reading and understanding these texts will pose some real challenges. Because these were mostly written for other classical Indian philosophers, it is not always easy to see what the argument is, and how the author responds to objections. But we will start slowly, and you will have plenty of help on this. The point here is for you to learn to read and understand these texts on your own. That way, if you want to look more deeply into some topic in Buddhist philosophy, you will be able to do so without having to rely on anyone else's interpretation. Then you'll be better equipped to try to find out what the truth is for yourself.

One final point before we begin our study of Buddhism as philosophy. Some people might take the title of this book to mean that it will tell them what the Buddhist philosophy is. But as you may have guessed by now, there is no such thing as the Buddhist philosophy. At least not in the sense in which we are using "philosophy" here. Given what the discipline of philosophy is, it should not be surprising that Buddhist philosophers disagree among themselves. By the same token, there is no such thing as the Christian philosophy, or the Jewish philosophy. There are philosophers who use the tools of philosophy to try to articulate what they take to be the basic truths of Christianity and of Judaism. But Aquinas and Kierkegaard disagree profoundly in their understandings of Christian teachings, and Maimonides and Spinoza likewise differ in how they approach the philosophical expression of Judaism. Things are no different when we come to Buddhism. While there are certain fundamentals on which all Buddhist philosophers agree, there are important issues over which they disagree. Sometimes these differences can make things quite complicated. So to help us keep track of things, it would be useful to have a taxonomy or classification of Buddhist philosophical systems. We can start with this basic division into three distinct phases in the development of Buddhist philosophy:

1. Early Buddhism: the teachings of the Buddha and his immediate disciples;
2. Abhidharma: the development of rigorous metaphysical and epistemological theories growing out of the attempt to give consistent, systematic interpretations of the teachings of Early Buddhism;
3. Mahayána: philosophical criticism of aspects of Abhidharma doctrines, together with an alternative account of what Buddhist metaphysics and epistemology should look like.

Both the second and the third phase saw the development of a number of different schools, reflecting different approaches to the philosophical challenges being confronted. For our purposes the important schools will be:

2a. Vaibhásika (Sarvástivida)
2b. Sautrántika
2c. Theraváda (the form of Buddhism presently practiced in much of Southeast Asia)
3a. Madhyamaka (the philosophical basis of much of Tibetan Buddhism)
3b. Yogācāra (Buddhist idealism)
3c. Yogácára-Sautrantika (Buddhist epistemology, the school of Dignága).

We will look at each of these schools in turn, seeing how their views developed out of the work of earlier philosophers, and trying to understand and assess the merits of their arguments. But we will

start, in the next three chapters, with the fundamentals that all Buddhist philosophical schools agree on, the basic teachings of Early Buddhism. <>

Buddhism and the Dynamics of Transculturality: New Approaches edited by Birgit Kellner [Series: Religion and Society, De Gruyter, 9783110411539] Open Access

For over 2500 years, Buddhism was implicated in processes of cultural interaction that in turn shaped Buddhist doctrines, practices and institutions. While the cultural plurality of Buddhism has often been remarked upon, the transcultural processes that constitute this plurality, and their long-term effects, have scarcely been studied as a topic in their own right. The contributions to this volume present detailed case studies ranging across different time periods, regions and disciplines, and they address methodological challenges as well as theoretical problems. In addition to casting a spotlight on topics as diverse as the role of trade contacts in the early spread of Buddhism, the hybrid nature of religious practices in Japan or Indo-Tibetan relations in Tibetan polemical literature, the individual papers jointly raise the question as to whether there might be something distinct about how Buddhism steers and influences forms of cultural exchange, and is in turn shaped by modalities of cultural interaction throughout Asian, as well as global, history. The volume is intended to demonstrate the need for investigating transcultural dynamics more closely in the study of Buddhism, and to suggest new avenues for Buddhist Studies.

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This volume originated with the conference "Buddhism and the Dynamics of Transculturality," which was held June 11-13, 2012, at the University of Heidelberg, within the congenial atmosphere of the International Academic Forum Heidelberg (IWH). Davide Torni contributed an additional essay based on new fieldwork conducted in Nepal, work that became even more relevant after the country was devastated by a series of earthquakes in April and May 2015.

During the long and complex history of Buddhism, extending back in time for more than 2500 years, doctrines, practices and institutions repeatedly crossed cultural boundaries, undergoing considerable change for that very reason. The involvement of Buddhism in processes of cultural exchange and transfer has been remarked upon frequently. However, perhaps owing to the nature of the subject, which is both pervasive and seemingly subject to endless variation, scholars have tended to treat cultural exchange and its short- to long-term aftereffects descriptively, demonstrating that transcultural processes played a role in the history of Buddhism. But they have not necessarily probed very deeply into the how. A new attempt at approaching the subject seemed timely, especially considering that the more recent growth of interest in aspects of transculturality across a variety of pertinent disciplines, including art history and archaeology, history as well as anthropology, had also begun to make itself felt here and there in the field of Buddhist Studies.

The Heidelberg conference, organized within the framework of the interdisciplinary research cluster "Asia and Europe in a Global Context: The Dynamics of Transculturality," was convened to bring together scholars of Buddhism across disciplinary boundaries for joint reflection on various topics that have emerged in connection with three critical aspects of Buddhism's global history:

- the spread of Buddhist doctrines, practices and institutions in terms of patterns of mobility, as well as in terms of the social networks that support or prevent the establishment of Buddhism in a particular region;
- the domestication of Buddhism in new cultural environments, and the various strategies and devices utilized towards this end;
- the production of Buddhist histories that newly framed and freshly contextualized previous processes of cultural exchange, histories that were crucial to Buddhism's spread and domestication in the relevant regions.

The papers now assembled in this volume loosely follow a long trajectory: from ancient Gandhára across medieval China and Japan, to nineteenth-century Tibet and contemporary Nepal. They are, however, not arranged in a strict chronological order of the historical periods they concern. The topics discussed under the umbrella of these three large thematic areas are as diverse as revelry scenes in Gandharan art, Buddhist stone inscriptions in Shandong, star worship and the arts of perfect memory in medieval Japan, and conformity with Indian tradition as a standard in Tibetan Buddhist polemical literature. The essays address religious practice and discourse, visual and material culture, as well as sociopolitical issues ranging from political legitimation to the formation of ethnic identities. Most of the papers are concerned with pre-modern Asian societies and cultures, but some explore how religious and cultural knowledge produced in the past was rediscovered and re-contextualized in early modernity, this connected to processes that still reach into the present. Each essay is intended as an original contribution in its own field and disciplinary context, presenting hitherto unstudied materials and

sources, while simultaneously striving to participate in a larger common conversation under the aegis of the somewhat elusive concept of transculturality.

In 1940, the Cuban anthropologist Fernando Ortiz propagated the term "transculturation" to "express the highly varied phenomena that have come about in Cuba as a result of the extremely complex transmutations of culture that have taken place there." In his study of the impact of sugar and tobacco on Cuban society, Ortiz argued that the complex cultural changes on an island where new waves of migrants arrived so many times through its history could not be properly considered a form of acculturation, a "process of transition from one culture to another." With his elaboration of transculturation, Ortiz placed himself in opposition to conceptions that dominated US-American anthropology at the time. Both elements - a fascination with particularly dense forms of cultural mixture effected by migration, and discontent with prevailing theories that approach cultures as homogeneous and stable systems - also characterize the theorization of transculturality as it intensified over the course of the 1990s, this focused on contemporary conditions of globalization. As the German philosopher Wolfgang Welsch argued, cultures "de facto no longer have the insinuated form of homogeneity and separateness. They have instead assumed a new form, which is to be called transcultural insofar that is passes through classical cultural boundaries."

Welsch's concern with moving away from conceptualizing cultures as stable and closed systems is frequently echoed in the rich literature on transcultural dynamics that has emerged since then. Elements of Welsch's approach have, however, been called into question. Most importantly in the present context, it cannot be assumed prima facie that the "new" form of cultures is a hallmark of the present. Processes of cultural contact and transformation can surely be studied in all epochs, well before the formation of global capital markets and the advent of the Internet, and even well before the European maritime expansion in early modernity. Building a theory with universalizing aspirations on the premise that transculturality marks a new era in human history risks begging the question, since the construction and dissolution of cultural boundaries is in itself a historical process.

In keeping with the critical spirit that has characterized the elaboration of the transcultural since Ortiz — distancing from entrenched modes of thinking — and through the increase in the number of studies that expand the temporal frame into a distant past and extend the geographical sphere beyond regions under direct influence of European powers, transculturality has shifted its status as a concept. Although the term is still occasionally used more narrowly to refer to particular features of situations of dense cultural mixture thought to be especially dynamic, the critical exploration of individual disciplinary histories as well as the expansion of the range of cultural phenomena under study have made it seem more productive to conceptualize transculturality as a heuristic tool, a perspective for interrogation, or an orienting concept (rather than an analytical notion).' The plurality of uses of the term that is now visible in a growing body of literature — a plurality that is to some degree also reflected in the papers in this volume — may seem disorienting. Yet, in an expansive research environment that might be thought to effect a "transcultural turn," it seems futile and ultimately misguided to insist on a rigid, stipulative definition.

Throughout the essays on Buddhism assembled in this volume, one can detect a shared set of methodological and conceptual premises that arguably mark a programmatic difference of transcultural from "cross-cultural" or "inter-cultural" studies. On the most basic level, cultures are not seen as stable, closed and self-reproducing systems, but they are rather conceived in relational, processual, and dynamic

terms. Second, the generative power of culture is placed in focus, leading to explorations of cultural elements — artifacts, practices, ideas — in terms of their meaning in a given setting, usually a particular locality during a more or less precisely circumscribed period of history. Third, such historically and geographically situated meaning is generally regarded as produced by a variety of actors that employ specific strategies, of which the papers illustrate a rich variety. The reconstruction of agency thus plays a particularly important role and guides many of the research efforts represented in this volume. Fourth, when studies with such a focus embark on tracing cultural elements further back in time and into other cultural contexts, this is undertaken with the larger goal of producing insights into the strategies found in the current situation. The enquiry is not guided by the question "where did X originate?" And the studies do not end with having identified such points of origin (that in the end invariably remain arbitrary). Rather, the question being asked is "what significance did local actors attribute to X, and how can insights into a transcultural history of X illuminate local strategies and meanings?" Fifth, close attention is paid to problems of labeling — especially those involved with cultural or religious belonging, and with social status — and to terms and concepts that are used to refer to religion(s) and cultural formations. In the past, concepts signaling a certain reflexivity on the part of historical Buddhist actors have occasionally been made the basis for general theories about Buddhism as a religious system as well as its approach to other religions. In particular, the final paper in this volume by Jonathan Samuels deserves to be highlighted for cautioning against such taxonomical abstraction (cf. below). Last, but not least, the critical spirit that informs transcultural studies supports self-reflective scholarly practice, self-reflection that results in a keen awareness of how prevalent modes of examining a subject might be marred not only by entrenched approaches and potentially unwarranted methodological premises, but also by historical "leftovers."

Turning to the individual papers, the first, by Ingo Strauch, addresses a period in the early spread of Buddhism from the Indian subcontinent. Following in the footsteps of Jason Neelis' recent exploration of networks in the Upper Indus Valley (Neelis 2011), Strauch reassesses evidence for Buddhist presence along the trade routes that connected the western parts of the Indian subcontinent with South Arabia, the Red Sea coast and regions further to the west. His focus is on a recently discovered corpus of inscriptions and drawings in the Hoq cave on the island of Socotra (Yemen) dating to the second to fourth or early fifth centuries CE. These inscriptions, individual names, dedications, and drawings of stupas pose vexing problems for determining the religious affiliation and social status of those who left them on the cave's walls. Traders and other "sub-elite" agents may have contributed a larger share to producing local forms of Buddhism than was hitherto presumed. Buddhism might indeed have been present among the Indian communities of traders that temporarily settled in these western regions, but it appears never to have left the boundaries of these communities. This would have been a prerequisite for patronage of the foreign religion by local elites and for monastic institutions to have been established, as would have been needed for a lasting Buddhist presence.

In the Upper Indus Valley/Gandhára, and more specifically in Swat (Udcliyana), Buddhist monastic presence left a rich archaeological record, including reliefs in Hellenistic style. Based on material provided by recent Italian excavations, Anna Filigenzi examines scenes depicting wine production and consumption, the latter in connection with more or less explicit erotic gestures. These have been read as a Greek cultural import and labelled "Dionsysiac scenes," but Filigenzi argues for a more complex interplay between the local and the foreign that amounts to a visual borrowing of foreign styles to express local cultural meaning. Combining archaeological evidence of wine consumption in the

northwest of the Indian subcontinent with the textual record of early Buddhist literature, Filigenzi concludes that the consumption of wine in Swat was "a component of the normal ambit of economic and cultural life, a status quo for which the [Buddhist] monastic communities certainly had to make accommodations." Accordingly, she argues for a reading of such "revelry scenes" as referring to forms of local social ritualism that can be connected with customs that are still current among the Kafirs of Hindu Kush. Juxtaposed with scenes from the Buddha's life in adjacent frames, revelry scenes and related icons then indicate a "transversal religious culture, which is at the same time formally Buddhist and faithful to a folk religion," intertwined not only in daily life, but also in conceptual and visual forms. Following Filigenzi's reconstruction of a fragmentary archaeological record, one may suspect that local elites patronizing Buddhism placed their own established customs within close range of the Buddha and his Dharma, in this case making use of a foreign visual repertoire. The difficulties of providing even a seemingly innocuous description of the situation that produced the revelry scenes demonstrate the methodological challenges involved in reconstructing local agencies without introducing overly hasty assumptions grounded in what the end are purely normative conceptions. Considering the problematic nature of wine consumption in Buddhist prescriptions of lay and monastic life, one may at first feel tempted to interpret revelry scenes as concessions made by a Buddhist authority to local customs that were important to their donors. Although this is one possibility, it suggests a social division between Buddhist monastics and their lay patrons that might in the end not reflect local realities at all, since these two groups cannot generally be presumed to have been neatly divided in terms of a local and foreign cultural background, respectively. The relationship between religious norm and social realities thus becomes a crucial issue in studying transcultural settings.

Toru Funayama expands the discussion from the epigraphic and archaeological record to the realm of language and addresses the cultural strategies adopted in the translation of Buddhist texts and terms from Indian languages during various stages of the domestication of Buddhism in China. The large-scale translation of Buddhist (and other) literature impacted language and linguistic practice on various levels. As for Chinese, new characters were created, new ways of using particles were devised, and a new phraseology emerged. The resultant innovations were by no means limited to translation, but also made their way into independent compositions by Chinese authors. Here, the area of greatest concern appears to have been terminology — how to cope with novel and foreign concepts while making use of already established literary idioms.

Although transcribing Indian terms might have seemed to Chinese translators the simplest solution when literal translations could not be easily devised, it also meant that resulting terminology remained markedly foreign, and was, initially at least, unintelligible to target audiences in China. In translation studies, the method of such translations has been called "foreignizing," resulting in translations that bring the reader closer to the world of the author, rather than vice versa. By contrast, the strategy of "translation by matching cultural categories" (Japanese bunko taio gata yakugo), as Funayama calls it, is more "domesticating" in that it brings the author's world — the world of Indian Buddhism — closer to the reader's, this consisting in "the translation of an Indic term based on a traditional Chinese concept that is similar to the original Indic term, yet not literally identical." For instance, Chinese dao, "way," does not literally translate Sanskrit bodhi, "awakening," but one still finds daoshu, "waytree," as a translation for Sanskrit b^dhivrksa, the tree under which Buddha Sákyamuni attained awakening. Such cultural translations look for local concepts that in their function or connotation somehow match foreign notions, without any literal, word-to-word correspondence between source- and targetlanguage.

The fate of translations devised through this method was not uniform; some such terms like wuwei for nirvana were eventually abolished, and translation by transcription was adopted instead. Other cases, such as sheng for Sanskrit árya, open windows for studying intricate semantic shifts between Daoist, Confucian, Buddhist and Nestorian contexts, as well-worn terms take on new connotations, but can also be once again reduced to their pre-translation semantics. The semantic repertoire constitutes a relatively flexible cultural resource, opening a space for subsequent re-signification.

Still within a Chinese context, Lothar Ledderose presents and discusses the Stone Hymn, a monumental inscription at Mt. Tie on the northern outskirts of Zoucheng in Shandong Province. This inscription — 17 meters long and 14 meters tall — is one of numerous inscriptions studied in a long-term project on Buddhist stone inscriptions in Shandong province conducted by the Academy of Sciences in Heidelberg. The Stone Hymn is only one of three colophons to an even more monumental sutra inscription. Through their size, their sutra content, and their strategically chosen positioning on widely visible mountain rock surfaces, these inscriptions can generally be understood as attempts to emplace and stabilize the Buddha's word in localities where Buddhism was contested. As stated in the Stone Hymn, inscribed in 579 (Northern Zhou dynasty) shortly after a persecution of Buddhism in the Shandong region, even when the end of this eon draws near with scorching winds, the engraved sutra will remain; it will never decay. Their material stability notwithstanding, the inscriptions were subject to far-reaching processes of re-signification in the course of later history, and in this respect, Ledderose's study picks up where Funayama's ended. Since the eighteenth century, epigraphers have studied inscriptions such as the Stone Hymn with a documentary interest, unveiling aspects of calligraphy and the historical circumstances in which such inscriptions were produced. Yet in the case of the Stone Hymn, they have ignored its Buddhist content as well as the large adjacent sutra to which it belongs and have not pursued the question as to why this particular text was engraved in the spatial and social setting in question. It was the inscription's calligraphic mastery, of such great importance in Chinese culture, that caught their attention.

Anna Andreeva's essay continues the theme of "emplacing" Buddhism and addresses complex sacred topographies in medieval Japan, centering on Mt. Asama in the eastern part of today's Mie prefecture, which lies in close proximity to the sacred Ise shrines that are of paramount importance to the articulation of Japanese cultural identity as well as for kami worship. As Mark Teeuwen and Fabio Rambelli have emphasized, medieval Japanese religion was characterized by a combinatory religious paradigm epitomized in the two notions of honji suijaku ("foreign buddhas as original ground and local kami as their manifest trace") and shinbutsu shug^ ("merging kami and buddhas"). Accordingly, in her exploration of Mt. Asama's history and its place in Japan's religious culture, Andreeva takes a long view in explaining the background for an event that took place 1750, when priests from the Ise shrines intervened in the performance of the established ritual Gumonjihó at Mt. Asama's Buddhist K^ngoshóji temple. Andreeva points to networks of relationships between cultic sites in Japan, while simultaneously tracing the worship of Bodhisattva ^^z^ (Sanskrit: ^kásagarbha) and celestial bodies in rituals designed to bring about perfect memory through the transmission of Buddhism from India across Central Asia and China to Japan. Shrine-temple histories called engi that hint at such connections can thus be seen as repeated attempts to inscribe cultic sites within larger frames of translocal and transcultural Buddhist memory, supporting the survival of religious sites in a competitive economy of the sacred. Andreeva's investigation into Mt. Asama illustrates how a full picture of a seemingly local historical event only

emerges after tracing the various transcultural links that made it possible, with such a picture then serving to reconstruct its significance.

In the Edo period (1600-1868), the myths and legends that connected Japan with the distant Indian lands, mediated through Buddhism and also perpetuated by engi histories such as those explored by Andreeva, were confronted by new information about the Indian subcontinent and the island of Lanka that was brought to Japan by Jesuits and the Dutch. Fabio Rambelli traces pathways of Japanese knowledge about India and Ceylon, centering on the site of Buddha Sákyamuni's life. Some in Edo Japan placed Sakyamuni on Lanka, while others thought he had lived in northern India (Mágadha) and in part believed that India was still a Buddhist country. Analyzing shifts in the Japanese imagination of the Indian lands as encounters between different sets of knowledge, Rambelli highlights how these encounters were premised on different authorities for certifying knowledge: from the historical, (Buddhist) text-based knowledge upon which Japanese conceptions of India were based, to the knowledge based on contemporary territorial access that European agents mediated to Japan.

Davide Torn takes a broader perspective of the role played by Buddhism in the production of ethnic identities among the Tibetanid communities of the Nepalese Upper Himalayas. He discusses both specific strategies of emplacement (or domestication) and the creation of shared Buddhist historical memory. With long-term historical connections to the Tibetan plateau, the remote mountain valleys in today's Nepal have often played a conspicuous role as "hidden lands" (Tibetan sbas yul), refuges for sheltering the Buddha-dharma in times of distress. They acquired this status through the agency of powerful Buddhist masters, most prominently Padmasambhava, who bound local divinities and spirits by oath to protect the Dharma. The "sequential subjugations" (Toni) effected by Padmasambhava, by the famous poet-mystic Milaraspa (ca. 1028-1111) and others are linked to conspicuous places and markings (footprints, carvings) that empower the landscape as a hidden land. Like pre- or non-Buddhist practices centering on the "gods of place" (yul lha), these Buddhist forms of emplacement support identities that are rooted in a locality. But in ways not unlike the Chinese stone inscriptions investigated by Ledderose and Mt. Asama as discussed by Andreeva, these sites inscribe the local in a larger, translocal (and transcultural) framework. In Helambu, the area where Torn i has conducted his fieldwork and which is the focus of his essay, the travels of the Ngagchang Shakya Zangpo (Tib. sngags 'chang shákya bzang po; 15th/16th cent.), who opened this particular hidden land, link this remote area in the Upper Himalayas with the first Tibetan monastery of Bsam yas, as well as with the stupa of Bodhnath in Kathmandu. In these relationships, Helambu is situated at a "double periphery" (Torri) - and is where (Kathmandu) most Hyolmo live today. Issues of Buddhist "landscaping" and the role of Buddhism in supporting the fractioned identities of Tibetanid groups in the Upper Himalayas acquire heightened significance through the recent transformation of Nepal from a Hindu monarchy into a republic supported by a conception of "ethnic federalism." The devastation of Helambu through the earthquake of April 2015, which has accelerated outward migradon even further, severely impacted the social fabric of the already dispersed Hyolmo community. Under these circumstances, it remains to be seen how increased migration will affect the locality-based identities of the Hyolmo and other Upper Himalayan communities.

The two final papers in this volume, by Markus Viehbeck and Jonathan Samuels, highlight in different ways how positions and concepts from within the Tibetan Buddhist tradition that arguably reflect partisan ideologies have guided the academic study of Buddhism, positions and concepts that were taken over as orienting models with less critical reflection than (as we know now) was necessary. David L.

Snellgrove most explicitly promoted the view that Tibetan Buddhism preserves authentic Indian Buddhism in an unadulterated form, epitomized in the notion of an "Ind^-Tibetan Buddhism." Recent discussions problematize such claims to privileged access in a larger Buddhist context, but, as Viehbeck points out, there is historical precedent for this. The clearest attempt to approach the relationship between Buddhism in India and in Tibet in a more nuanced fashion, by David Seyffort Ruegg, has distinguished between historically Indian and typologically "Indic" elements in Tibetan intellectual culture. Viehbeck argues that this distinction must be supplemented further by empirical studies on how the acclaimed Indian origin of particular positions manifests within Tibetan discourse and practice. For his part, he offers an exemplary study drawing on late nineteenth-century Tibetan debates on the proper interpretation of an Indian Buddhist "classic," Sántideva's ^^dhicarya^atára. These debates operated on the shared background of a strict binary logic that placed conformity to Indian tradition in opposition to aberration and deviation from it. Yet, the fierce controversies between 'Ju Mipham and his sparring partners not only show that even in the nineteenth century, Tibetan authors were still attributing greater weight to Indian textual authorities (in Tibetan translation) than to their own interpretive tradition. They also allow one to recognize how allegiance to Indian authorities was tempered by the creative application of a hermeneutic toolbox within a larger "space of negotiation" (Viehbeck). Polemical discourse on Indian Buddhist classics both confirmed their authority and offered opportunities for asserting Tibetan intellectual ingenuity. It may seem commendable at first to abandon the label "Indo-Tibetan Buddhism," as it simply reproduces, in academic discourse, an ideological position from within Tibetan Buddhist historiography. But this should not distract from the importance that conformity with Indian tradition held in Tibetan discourse and practice as a standard and value - or, for that matter, from the need to study the negotiation of conformity in a historically situated manner across different areas of cultural production.

Finally, Jonathan Samuels turns to conceptual schemes used within Buddhist traditions to locally articulate and organize relations to other religions, as well as to mark religion as a separate sphere from other social fields. The Japanese notions of honji suijaku and shinbutsu shug^, brought into play in Andreeva's paper (cf. above), operate as such schemes. They also respond to the perceived foreignness of Buddhism and serve as tools for bringing awareness of its translocal and transcultural character into focus. Samuels discusses the contrastive opposition between the "worldly" and the "other-worldly" — in Sanskrit: laukika and lokottara — which has served a similar purpose. It is conception that is found throughout Buddhist Asia, from ancient India across Tibet all the way to medieval Japan. Since this conceptual pair was widely employed across the boundaries of vastly different societies, it seems tempting at first to treat it as part of a universal order that transcends cultural boundaries. Indeed, it does have a striking similarity to meta-linguistic categories such as the sacred and the profane, or the religious and the secular. Samuels, however, argues forcefully against approaching the worldly/other-worldly binary as a taxonomy in the first place, which would be a prerequisite for mapping it onto metalinguistic categories, and articulates a fresh perspective for contextualizing it specifically in Tibet.

The worldly/other-worldly binary has been widely used, in Tibet and elsewhere, to arrange Buddhas, bodhisattvas and various divinities, as well as the practices devoted to them, in a hierarchical manner. While Buddhas and bodhisattvas are placed in the "other-worldly" category, local gods and spirits, as well as gods adapted from an ancient Indian religious matrix such as Indra or Brahma, are regarded as worldly. In the Tibetan context, Samuels argues, this binary has permitted the Buddhist monastic authority to assert itself in a complex religious environment: while veneration of worldly deities is not

prohibited, it is relegated to a subordinate level that, precisely because of its subordination, is always in a position of potentially being placed under more explicit Buddhist control. The perhaps unusually high involvement of Buddhist monastics in "worldly" elements can thus be seen as an assertion of authority. The frequent reference to the "subjugation" of local deities by Padmasambhava and other masters, as also discussed in Torri's essay in this volume, is a case in point. In reflecting on the relationship between the "emic and the academic," Samuels can be taken as forcefully underscoring a more general point, one that also emerges from Viehbeck's paper. When examining Buddhist attitudes towards other religious practices and its intersecting relationship to other cultures, an investigation of object-linguistic and meta-linguistic categories — of organizing categories used within religious communities and conceptual schemes employed in the academic study of religion — is not enough to avoid the risk of scientism, even though such investigations are necessary. Such investigations must be supplemented by close readings of these types of categories as they are used contextually, in view of historically situated rhetorical strategies and ideologies. <>

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Our world today requires us to accept the oneness of humanity. In the past, isolated communities could afford to think of one another as fundamentally separate. Some could even exist in total isolation. But nowadays, what happens in one part of the world rapidly affects people in many other places too. Within the context of our new interdependence, self-interest clearly lies in considering the interest of others.

Many of the world's problems and conflicts arise because we have lost sight of the basic humanity that binds us all together as a human family. We tend to forget that despite the diversity of race, religion, ideology and so forth, people are equal in their basic wish for peace and happiness. However, this will not be achieved by merely talking or thinking about it, nor by waiting for someone else to do something about it. We each have to take responsibility as best we can within our own sphere of activity. As free human beings we can use our unique intelligence to try to understand our world and ourselves. But if we are prevented from using our creative potential, we are deprived of one of the basic characteristics of a human being.

Human beings naturally possess diverse temperaments and interests. Therefore, it is inevitable that different religious traditions emphasize different philosophies and modes of practice. Since the essence of our diverse religious traditions is to achieve our individual and collective benefit, it is crucial that we are active in maintaining harmony and mutual respect between them. Concerted efforts to this end will benefit not only the followers of our own faith, but will create an atmosphere of peace in society as a whole. Cultivating harmony, respect, and tolerance is something that we can each start doing in our own lives and in our own actions.

India is perhaps the one country whose civilization and culture have survived intact from their first beginnings. It is a civilization that has given rise to a long series of great teachers endowed with both human intelligence and a sense of responsibility towards the community. As a consequence, different schools of thought and practice have evolved, some born here and others arriving from abroad. Because India and her people have, from ancient times, cherished a rich and sophisticated philosophy of non-violence at the core of their hearts, tolerance and pluralism have also flourished.

Today, India is self-sufficient, economically vibrant, and the world's largest democratic country. It is a force to be reckoned with not only in Asia, but also in the world. It is a country in which we can see *bahudhā*, which my friend and the author of this book Balmiki Prasad Singh has defined as something close to pluralism, as a living reality. Therefore, India has a very important role to play. It can be a model for other nations and peoples who are still striving to build civil societies, to institutionalize democratic values of free expression and religion, and seeking to find strength in diversity. India can also take the lead amongst other nations by formulating principled, courageous, and imaginative policies on regional and international issues.

The tragic events of 11 September 2001 and subsequently, have provided us with a very good opportunity. There is a worldwide will to oppose terrorism. We can use this consensus to implement long-term preventative measures. This will ultimately be much more effective than taking dramatic and violent steps based on anger and other destructive emotions. The temptation to respond with violence is understandable, but a more cautious approach will be more fruitful.

In today's reality the only way of resolving differences is through dialogue and compromise, through human understanding and humility. We need to appreciate that genuine peace comes about through mutual understanding, respect and trust. Problems within human society should be solved in a humanitarian way, for which non-violence provides the proper approach.

26 May 2007

HIS HOLINESS THE DALAI LAMA

It was during my tenure as Executive Director, World Bank, at Washington DC, that the catastrophe of 9/11 took place. In the aftermath of the tragedy, it became fashionable for every thinktank to discuss two questions: 'What went wrong?' and 'Why people hate us [Americans]'? I happened to attend one such meeting barely ten days after the catastrophe. The gathering was impressive, I was seated almost opposite the Chairperson. The guest speaker had concluded on the sombre note of the need for building a coalition of nations against terrorism. He also spoke of the radicalization of Islam, values of religious pluralism, and the need for tolerance. The presentation over, the Chairperson asked for comments and looked at me. She said that India may have the answer in view of its heritage of pluralism and originality of mind, and gave me the floor. I was not prepared. I recall having said then that 'while India may have the answer, I do not' and went on to narrate my experiences in handling terrorism in India.

I have been contemplating this theme since then with a view to exploring an enduring framework for a global public policy—a policy for harmony among different people and societies in the post 9/11 world as seen through the lens of the Indian experience.

It is said that when the student is ready the teacher will appear. I was drawn to an attitude that has greatly contributed to the enrichment of Indian life: 'respect for another person's view of truth with hope and belief that he or she may be right'.[1] This is best expressed in the Rigvedic hymn that enjoins

> *Ekam Sad Viṗra Bahudhā Vadanti*[2]
> The Real is one, the learned speak of it variously

Etymologically speaking, the word *Bahudhā* is derived from the word *bahu*, and *dhā* is suffixed to it to make it an adverb. 'Bahu' denotes many ways or parts or forms or directions. It is used to express **(p.xii)** manifoldness, much, and repeatedly. When the word is used with the root *kri*, it means to make manifold or multiply. Bahudhā is also used as an expression of intermittent continuity in various time frames. It is used to express frequency, as in 'time and again'. In the present work, the word Bahudhā has been used to suggest an eternal reality or continuum, a dialogue of harmony, and peaceful living in society.

Pluralism could be the closest equivalent to Bahudhā in the English language. Pluralism has been described in various ways in history, sociology, and politics—cultural pluralism, political pluralism, and pluralistic societies. Pluralism has also been seen in the context of the coexistence of nation-state and ethnicity, equality, and identity issues.

The Bahudhā approach recognizes that there is a distinction between plural societies and pluralism. Pluralism is an inevitable ingredient of democratic societies. The role of religion, language, and ethnicity is very significant in plural societies. Pluralism in this context is an imperative for both developed and developing societies.

Pluralist societies are necessarily multi-ethnic, multi-religious, and multilingual societies. In such societies, there are various boundaries: racial, linguistic, religious, and at times even ideological. The Bahudhā approach does not believe in annexation of boundaries or assimilation of identities and propagation of a simplistic world view. It merely facilitates dialogue and thereby promotes understanding of the collective good. The realization of one's own identity may sustain boundaries and yet, at the same time,

understanding of other identities may help formulate a public policy of harmony. The Bahudhā approach is conscious of the fact that societies without boundaries are not possible.

The great struggles of the twentieth century were against colonialism, fascism, and communism. The twenty-first century has a different conflict—a conflict between forces of fundamentalism and those of tolerance and peace.

With the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, there was a feeling of euphoria that peace had descended upon the world; that the time had come for diversion of funds from military budgets to developmental purposes. It also appeared that the forces of globalization and the liberalization of the market economy would secure the removal of poverty. But suddenly the importance of military conflict as a factor in our lives re-emerged, with the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq in 1991.

In today's world, the power of the militarily weak to create unrest and destruction has emerged as a global phenomenon. Economic power and the use of military force have proved inadequate agents for the preservation of peace. The moot question is how to cope with an enemy that is physically weak, but endowed with a 'do or die' mentality.

Today, we face not only the problems of terrorism and suicide squads but also of poverty, disease, illiteracy, and environmental degradation. Of the six billion people that inhabit the earth, five billion are in the developing countries. Near a billion people struggle to survive on less than a dollar a day. More than a 100 million children are illiterate. Almost three million people die annually from HIV/AIDS, with over two million of those deaths occurring in sub-Saharan Africa. Today, half of the world's population is under the age of twenty-five years. Many are unemployed. Millions are disillusioned by what they see as an inequitable global system. Clearly, the need for change is paramount.

We are witnessing phenomenal changes in global politics— unprecedented demands are being made upon traditional diplomacy and democratic approaches rooted in electoral politics. In fact, the instruments of traditional diplomacy are unable to cope with many of the fast emerging challenges. Democratic political processes are also under stress. All this calls for new, bold, and imaginative statecraft from world leaders. Notwithstanding unresolved territorial disputes and autonomy issues in different parts of the world, major nation-states are forging new partnerships and increasingly competing in trade. Regional alliances are also emerging. In these times of unprecedented change, we need to transcend old doctrines, and our language of dialogue too has to be reconstructed.

With the demise of colonialism and the collapse of the Soviet Union, democratic governance has emerged as the most important form of social and political ordering in the world. A major objective of democracy in a multi-religious and multi-ethnic society is to ensure that different faiths and cultures co-exist and flourish. Good governance in a democracy does not do away with alternative and opposing visions but deals with them in a manner that prevents physical conflict and violence. Argument and dialogue are important components of such a manner.

Today, in the age of terrorism and an unsafe world, there is a fresh need to understand the core meaning of our religions, to reshape our educational system, and to strengthen the United Nations (UN) in a manner that can help us to build a better future.

The re-emergence of religion as a vital force in the twenty-first century, both at the individual and community levels, needs to be taken into account in the formulation of a public policy of harmony. Blinkered visions about religion in general or about a particular religion is likely to create disaffection in society and make difficult the task of building a harmonious world order. Religion is a potent force. As an agent for the generation of peace and happiness, it generates goodwill among people, and helps them to lead a life of spirituality and fulfilment. In recent years, we have seen how people like Mahatma Gandhi and Martin Luther King have used it for achieving justice and freedom. Swami Vivekananda and Mother Teresa have been inspired by their religious faiths to serve the poor, the derelict, and the discarded. It is religious faith which has driven the Dalai Lama to propagate the message of love and peace not only among his Tibetan people (including those living in exile in India) but also in distant lands.

As an agent of destruction, religion is being used by radical leaders to spread hatred and inflict violence. Primarily, all faiths have emerged or been created to underpin a moral universe in which love, compassion, peace, and caring guide human conduct. Religion is to be an ennobling influence that leads men, women, and children to have respect for human beings, animals, and natural objects. In this background the recent phenomenon of suicide killings has indeed become a matter of concern. It is difficult to imagine that the young *jihadis* are totally impelled by a yearning for paradise. In reality, they are mostly misguided by political aspirations.

In this context, scholars have rightly seen links between fundamentalist movements and social conflict. For example, the eminent religious scholar Karen Armstrong[3] views the fundamentalism of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries as a reaction against scientific and secular culture. Modernization and rapid economic changes have been painful processes for several individuals and societies who have long been marginalized due to centuries of imperialist exploitative mechanisms. Fundamentalists openly proclaim that they are battling against forces that threaten their sacred values.

All major religions—Hinduism, Buddhism, Judaism, Christianity, and Islam—have fundamentalist elements, but it is militant Islam that is currently drawing maximum attention. Those who see links **(p.xv)** between terrorism and Islam need to take note of the fact that the Quran considers the killing of an innocent person a crime against humanity; it preaches tolerance and respect for all faiths. Far from promoting a clash of civilizations, the Quran celebrates social and cultural diversity. Jews, Christians, and Muslims lived peacefully for several centuries under Islamic rule in Spain. Similarly, Hindus and Muslims lived harmoniously under the rule of the Mughal Emperor Akbar and others in India.

While fundamentalist religious forces are likely to continue to dominate political discourse for some time to come, it is not likely to be a permanent feature of the world social and political order. As fundamentalism cannot satisfy growing human aspirations or meet the challenges of modernization, the present hold of extremist organizations over its followers in the Islamic world would gradually loosen and eventually recede substantially. We have strong mystical traditions in Islam that have found eloquent expressions in Sufi ideas and religious disciplines (to which Wahhabis and other fundamentalist groups are strongly opposed) that could be supported. The alienation of Muslims living in Europe and USA needs special attention as they feel alienated from their traditions. The problem gets accentuated as they are not fully accepted in the society where they live. In the prevailing situation both the civil society and the government needs to be sensitive. Intellectuals, women, and youth must be encouraged to play a

greater role in the social and political affairs of their land. The more democratic the world becomes, the less would be the threat of terrorism and suicide killings.

Mahatma Gandhi, more than any other public figure in contemporary history, supported an attitude towards religion that goes beyond toleration. He did this in several ways by encouraging greater knowledge and deeper commitment about one's own faith and traditions and also that of others. He wanted believers to realize that loyalty towards one's own religion did not justify it being superior than other religions. He stated that every religion is imperfect but a beautiful expression of human aspirations of love rather than hatred. Mahatma Gandhi believed that a religiously plural society contains enormous resources as long as religion is not regarded as the primary maker of identity. His technique of non-violent conflict resolution— *satyagraha*—was a dialogic process, inviting negotiation and compromise.

More than two millennia before Mahatma Gandhi, Gautama Buddha wanted a rational approach to conflict resolution. In matters of religion, he advocated the Bahudhā approach of dialogue and understanding. To quote:

if others speak against me, or against my religion, or against the order, there is no reason why you should be angry, discontented or displeased with them. If you are so, you will not only be using yourselves into danger of spiritual loss, but you will not be able to judge whether what they see is correct or not correct!

Education has a central role to play in building a harmonious society. Education must begin at home as it is here that intolerance towards other faiths has its origins. We know that it is not only love and compassion but also hatred and intolerance that are widespread. Just as people can be taught to hate, they can also learn to treat others with love, dignity, and respect. In fact, the issue of a public policy of harmony is critically linked with education. There is an urgent need to focus on the educational curriculum in order to purge it of content that spreads hatred and/or distorts history. Effective education also demands the development of a creative mind and scientific temper.

Resolving conflict, however, goes much beyond education. Towards this end, the UN has to be strengthened in terms of its Charter so that it becomes an effective conflict resolution organization. The global political order must reflect the best interests, rules, and practices that states hold in common.

The UN is the best forum for generation of understanding among nation-states in the realm of politics and economy. It can also be a forum where dialogue among nations can be initiated and sustained. Such dialogues can support efforts towards peace and attempts to resolve conflicts between groups and nations.

As we look towards the future, it appears that the prevailing state system would continue to be a primary body. An international order based on the rule of law and consent of nation-states can alone be an effective conflict resolution mechanism.

* * *

During my research on manifestations of the Bahudhā philosophy in the works of Rabindranath Tagore, I found a powerful observation in the 'Introduction' to *Gitanjali* by W. B. Yeats. He writes:

> We write long books where no page perhaps has any quality to make writing a pleasure, being confident in some general design while Mr. Tagore, like the Indian civilisation itself, has been content to discover the soul and surrender himself to its spontaneity.

This made me wonder whether to pursue writing this book. Was I judicious in accepting the challenge of trying to seek the soul of civilizational harmony? I knew then and I am conscious now that the Bahudhā approach is not a discovery but at best a reassertion of an old truth about the pluralist approach in society, religion, and politics. In writing this book, I realize that I have not been able to raise myself to that sublime level where one has 'discovered the soul' or has 'surrendered oneself to [the] spontaneity' of civilizational harmony. Those are the tasks of the great universal philosophies. Mine is just an individual's effort to seek a way of reconciling the disturbing disorder of our times. This work is not a technical study of either history or philosophy. My effort is to record what I have found relevant in the Indian and world experiences that could provide ways and means for the formulation of public policies that could bring more harmony into societies. Nevertheless, I have been selective in choosing events and personalities and I am conscious of the fact that one's own cultural baggage affects one's outlook. My aim was not to glorify either the past or an individual but only to draw lessons from their successes and failures. William Faulkner does not exaggerate when he says: 'The past is never dead; it is not even past'.

India has been living through this pluralistic challenge longer than several other nations. In terms of faith, well before the advent of Christianity and Islam, India was a significant playing field of civilizational encounters between Hinduism, Buddhism, and Jainism. Both Judaism and Christianity came to India in the first century AD. Islam commenced its entry through the coastal towns of peninsular India from the eighth century onwards. In the ninth century, when the Zoroastrians of Persia felt that their religion was being threatened by the invading Muslims, they moved to the north-west coast of India. Their descendants, known as Parsis, still live there. The birth of Sikhism in fifteenth century India had the avowed objective of bringing peace to conflicting encounters between Hinduism and Islam. In the last century, when the Tibetans felt a threat to their religion and culture, they chose India to be their new home. Multiculturalism, then, is a basic feature of India's civilizational experience.

The Indian civilizational experience in respect of pluralism or multiculturalism does not advocate a melting pot approach that facilitates domination of values and norms of the numerically strong and assertive community over others. The most important feature of pluralism is that people believe in their multiple identities. India's strength has always been to absorb external influences. It is not surprising, therefore, to see Indians speaking of Shakespeare and Tulsidas in the same vein, and without any strain, in seminar rooms as well as private homes.

Multiculturalism as practised in India is not atheistic in character but is a blending of religions. Mahatma Gandhi, a devout Hindu, highlighted this aspect of communitarian life in India when he had passages read from the holy books of all the major religions at his prayer meetings. Secularism in India establishes that the state shall be neutral in matters of religion. But multiculturalism goes beyond that—it demands the flowering of different faiths and belief patterns. Secularism and multiculturalism are not in conflict. It is this openness of the Indian experience that provides the basis for constructing a public policy of harmony. It establishes that disputes shall be settled through dialogue and there shall be a free flow of ideas and thought processes from different parts of the world.

One of the lessons of 9/11 is that we are living in an interdependent world. The futility of promoting violence and conflict in the name of religion is obvious to all except a few. It is here that public opinion needs to be groomed. We have to recognize that many factors drive public opinion, including education and media, and that a global view is required. There is a need for dialogue among the people of the world. Dialogue may or may not lead to consensus but it certainly creates understanding and relationships among people. The answer to terrorism lies not in repression, which only generates hatred and causes hindrances in the path of dialogue and peaceful change. Respect for the rights, beliefs, and cultures of all human beings can go a long way in facilitating and enhancing processes of negotiation and eventually in securing peace and harmony.

It is difficult to visualize a world where there will be no use of force. But, surely, military force should be only a last resort when all other methods to resolve conflict have been exhausted. While terrorism may gradually recede, the long-term threats to world peace are from poverty, inequality, environmental degradation (including global warming), disease, and illiteracy.

The message of this book relates to dialogue and compassion more than the mechanics of politics, statecraft, and diplomacy. And yet I am aware that without the rule of law, understanding and love cannot permeate social life. The process of dialogue would either be closed or cease to be a creative process and its value as a conflict resolution mechanism would get severely restricted. A progressive and peaceful world can only be one where both small and big nations receive a place under the sun and achieve a sense of recognition and worth.

Each book has its own destiny. I cannot predict the impact it will create or the attention it will receive. But my deep conviction of the relevance of the Bahudhā approach makes me hope that it will make some contribution to human affairs. In many ways, the writing of this book has been a *swantah sukhai* (pursuit of self-happiness). My thoughts and words have opened new doors of exploration for me. I hope it leads others to new possibilities too! In that spirit, I offer it to my readers. <>

TIBETAN BUDDHIST PHILOSOPHY OF MIND AND NATURE by Douglas S. Duckworth [Oxford University Press, 9780197616598]

TIBETAN BUDDHIST PHILOSOPHY OF MIND AND NATURE offers an engaging philosophical overview of Tibetan Buddhist thought. Integrating competing and complementary perspectives on the nature of mind and reality, Douglas Duckworth reveals the way that Buddhist theory informs Buddhist practice in
various Tibetan traditions. Duckworth draws upon a contrast between phenomenology and ontology to highlight distinct starting points of inquiries into mind and nature in Buddhism, and to illuminate central issues confronted in Tibetan Buddhist philosophy.

This thematic study engages some of the most difficult and critical topics in Buddhist thought, such as the nature of mind and the meaning of emptiness, across a wide range of philosophical traditions,

including the "Middle Way" of Madhyamaka, Yogacara (also known as "Mind-Only"), and tantra. Duckworth provides a richly textured overview that explores the intersecting nature of mind, language, and world depicted in Tibetan Buddhist traditions. Further, this book puts Tibetan philosophy into conversation with texts and traditions from India, Europe, and America, exemplifying the possibility and potential for a transformative conversation in global philosophy.

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This book Is a thematic survey of Tibetan Buddhist thought. It provides a theoretic framework to introduce a wide range of intersecting ideas. With many informed studies and translations of Tibetan traditions now available in English, I feel that the time is right to survey the intellectual terrain of Tibetan Buddhist thought with a wide-angle lens. What follows is my attempt to provide this lens and to map the terrain both descriptively and creatively. I do not base my framework around particular schools or sectarian traditions, but attempt to focus on issues and themes that structure the philosophical conversations within and among the schools. While doing so, I draw freely from European and American philosophical traditions to engage with and elaborate upon Buddhist thought and practice in Tibet. A central theme of Tibetan philosophy I draw out is the intertwining of mind, language, and world.

Understanding Buddhism in India is fundamental to understanding Buddhism in Tibet. Tibetan Buddhists played an essential role in preserving Indian Buddhist culture, not only by carrying on the traditions of study and practice from India into the present, long after their demise in India, but also by preserving Indian Buddhist texts in translation. Most Buddhist texts of the mature era of Indian Buddhist literature (fifth to eleventh centuries) are no longer extant in any language other than in Tibetan translation. Buddhist texts and traditions entered the Tibetan plateau from India from the eighth to eleventh centuries, just before living Buddhist traditions died out on the Indian subcontinent under the weight of Muslim incursions. After the eleventh century, Buddhist monastic institutions in India were left in rubbles, and Buddhist popular traditions came to be assimilated into Hindu traditions.

Given the importance of the Indian subcontinent for Tibetan Buddhism, I begin with a fair amount of discussion of Indian sources. The first chapter begins by looking to Nagarjuna, an influential second-century Indian Buddhist thinker, and his articulation of emptiness and interrelation. Emptiness is the ultimate truth in Mahayana Buddhism: the truth which, when known, sets you free. I highlight how the ultimate truth in Mahayana Buddhism comes to be interpreted along two main lines: as indicative of an inconceivable reality or as an absence of intrinsic nature. The former interpretation characterizes what comes to be known as "Mind-Only" in Tibet (or Yogacara), while the latter characterizes Madhyamaka, "the Middle Way." These two traditions represent competing interpretations of the ultimate truth and the Perfection of Wisdom (prajnaparamita) Sutras. Further, Tibetans hold Mind-Only and Madhyamaka to represent two main schools of interpretation elucidated within the two "great chariot traditions" (shing rta then po) of Mahayana Buddhism. While Tibetans use these terms to characterize distinct strands of interpretation of the meaning of the Buddha's message, we should keep in mind that these terms do not refer to individual schools or bounded canons of texts.

Also, what Tibetans refer to by the terms "Middle Way" and "Mind-Only" can be quite different, with usages that are highly charged within specific contexts of sectarian traditions and preferred interpretations of one's own school. In order to dislodge these terms from a single tradition's interpretive claims, for the purposes of this book I will use them differently. In my usage, "Mind-Only" highlights a particular phenomenological style of interpretation and orientation to contemplative practice. I use Madhyamaka, "the Middle Way," to highlight a critical orientation and deconstructive

ontology. These terms, and the. "schools" associated with them, are highly contested and polysemic, yet I appropriate them as a heuristic and to convey an intimate relationship between two intertwined trajectories of interpretation. I feel that the problems I create by continuing to use these terms, with the distinctive meanings I have assigned them, are less severe than the problems of avoiding them altogether or narrowly constraining them to definitions tied into a single sectarian tradition's interpretation.

With the interplay of these two trajectories I attempt to sustain a tension between two contrasting readings of Buddhist thought, as both are viable and widely attested interpretations of Mahayana Buddhist literature and practice. One reading is commonly found in the works of academic philosophers attuned to ontological analyses and the Madhyamaka tradition of the Geluk (dge lugs) school of Tibetan Buddhism. Another interpretation that I keep in play is a phenomenological reading that appeals to the irreducibility and inexpressibility of the lived world as experienced. I use "phenomenology" to represent this latter trajectory of interpretation, and while it may not be a perfect fit, the style of doing philosophy in phenomenological traditions clearly resonates here, and certainly shares a family resemblance with an important dimension of Mind-Only, which I shall highlight in chapter 1.

The relationship between these two orientations, of Madhyamaka and Mind-Only, or ontology and phenomenology, reiterates some of the problems and popular associations of a contrast between stereotypical "analytic" and "continental" ways of doing philosophy. That is, these two modalities are imperfect and simplistic caricatures of a complex and internally diverse relation of ideas. I take them to be co-constituted, like the first- and third-person perspectives on the world and the methodologies that grow out of these ways of reflection. In other words, what I characterize as ontological and phenomenological orientations are two dimensions of how a single individual relates to what is meaningful and true.

In chapter 2 I consider the ways that Madhyamaka and Mind-Only can be seen to offer distinct depictions of the world, framed in terms of a relationship between ontology and phenomenology. I suggest that the perspectives offered by ontology and phenomenology can be understood as taking their starting points in object-oriented and subject-oriented modes of inquiry, respectively. Mind-Only highlights the subjective orientations to a world; Madhyamaka undermines the finality of any objective world picture by highlighting the contingency of all objectifying constructions. I show how these perspectives are mutually entailed, and thus can be seen to share a common ground.

I have struggled with how to convey these two orientations, for "Madhyamaka" and "Mind-Only," along with its closely allied "Yogacara," are problematic and polysemic terms. Another alternative I considered was to represent the two orientations I aim to convey exclusively with the terms "ontology" and "phenomenology." Yet since this book is primarily rooted in Buddhist thought, rather than discuss Buddhist ideas solely in foreign terms imported from another culture, I opted to keep Buddhist terminology. Also, "phenomenology" is just as polysemic as Yogacara, so it does not solve the dilemma in the end. I have also thought about this issue with another pair of terms, "constructivism" and "realism." While these terms are relevant to this topic, they both fall into ontological orientations, and both trajectories of thought I am concerned with participate in each side of a constructivist-realist dichotomy; they are not actually distinct, but intertwined. For these reasons, rather than introduce a neologism, I continue to use "Madhyamaka" and "Mind-Only," following the Tibetans, to flag two orientations of interpretation that are entangled in such a way that each one supplements the other.

After aligning the axis of this book around these two orientations, in the next three chapters, I touch on mind, language, and world as a loose thematic framework. I begin with a theory of mind and a closely paired notion—self-awareness (svasamvedana)—in chapter 3. I show that the status of self-awareness is a wedge issue between the descriptive ontology of Madhyamaka and the phenomenological orientation of Mind-Only. Awareness can be understood as Janus-faced; it does "double-duty" as subject and object, as internal and external. This hybrid structure sets the stage for what I call objective idealism—a world in which perceiver and perceived take place in an internal relation. With the term "objective idealism" I aim to represent how subject and object are simply polarities within a higher structure that transcends (and includes) this duality. While the language of substance and idealism is anathema to Madhyamaka, the interrelation of perceiver and perceived I wish to convey is not an ordinary subjective idealism; here there is no internal subject reigning over objects, the relata are not separate and relation itself is internal and not a real (external) relation. Thus, without an external world, there can be no internal world either (nor a world in between). The nonduality I seek to convey is not only the stuff of metaphysics, but also exemplifies the creative interplay of inner and outer worlds.

Chapter 4 turns to language. I show how many philosophical disputes revolve around linguistic disputes, prompted by competing conceptions of language. I also discuss the relation between concepts and percepts. Here again we can see the collapse of yet another dichotomy—like the one between ontology and phenomenology, subject and object—as percepts and concepts are interdependent. While a dichotomy of percepts and concepts is central to the epistemological edifice of proponents of Yogacara such as the seventh-century Indian, Dharmakirti, I show how this dichotomy falls apart in two main ways: conception collapses into perception (with nondual self-awareness in Mind-Only) and perception collapses into conception (with the thoroughgoing conceptuality of radical contingency and universal mediation emphasized in Madhyamaka). In both cases, we see the collapse of a percept-concept dichotomy, and language plays an important role in shaping both sides of this apparent divide.

In chapter 5 I consider the contemplative traditions of tantra. While mind (gnosis) and speech (mantra) are undoubtedly important in this context, too, here we also turn to the body (deity). The body, like speech and mind, exemplifies another intertwining, as it too is both perceiver and perceived. The body is the organ of the universe, the flesh of the world, and the dynamic substance of objective idealism. The objective idealism I have in mind here is not a simplistic notion of subjective idealism,' but the irreducibility of the relationally constituted whole. This nonduality is a dynamic unity that comprises everything—the universe (one and many). It is not a static, metaphysical absolutism, but one that is participatory; it is enacted in the contemplative practices of tantra, as well as Mahamudra and the Great Perfection (rdzogs then), the culmination and transcendence of Tibetan tantric traditions. These traditions can be seen as performances of this nonduality, fostering freedom through re-cognition and creative enaction, while undermining sedimentary, reified conceptions of mind and nature (that delimit and/or superimpose the way the world is and must be).

In four appendices I include translated excerpts from Tibetan texts that illustrate and expand upon some of the issues I raise in the chapters of this book. Each translation represents a distinctive tradition and genre of philosophical writing, and demonstrates to some extent the diversity and complexity of Buddhist philosophical literature. It is also noteworthy that all four of these texts represent a part of a living Buddhist culture; each of these texts can be found among texts currently studied and practiced in

different Tibetan Buddhist communities across Asia today. This goes to show that the Tibetan Buddhist philosophy represented here is not only a vibrant and diverse tradition, but a living one, too.

In what follows, I take a broad view of what I see to be some of the most important philosophical issues at stake across Tibetan traditions, and try to avoid getting too bogged down within an exegesis on any particular tradition. This approach is admittedly ambitious and invites real dangers of overgeneralization (when fine-grained particularities are ignored) and superimposition (when personal preference overshadows an impartial description). Yet a thematic overview like this also can enable some insights into Tibetan forms of Buddhism that may not be visible when any single tradition is considered in isolation.

It is needless to mention that my interpretation of Buddhism is inflected by the European and American traditions I have inherited, but I should also acknowledge that the interpretation I offer here is influenced by the legacy of a nineteenth-century tradition stemming from eastern Tibet that has been called the "Gemang (dge mang) movement," named after the place where it flourished.' In contrast to an allegedly "non-sectarian movement" (ris med) that is antagonistic toward the Geluk tradition or incompatible with it, the Gemang movement is marked by an integration of Geluk and Nyingma (rnying ma) traditions of scholarship and practice in a way that they are configured to be mutually illuminating. That is to say, this Gemang tradition is neither tied to Geluk sectarianism nor to a sectarian identity built upon what is incompatible with the Geluk school. Rather, it is characterized by hybridity and integration, with an eye on practice.

While I try to steer away from adopting a single sectarian voice on Buddhist thought in this book, to a certain extent the "Gemang movement," like my academic training, has shaped the way I represent this subject matter. I acknowledge that the kind of hybrid tradition that informs my interpretation and methodology may be no more objective or valuefree than any other; nevertheless, I believe (with Gadamer) that the influence of some tradition is necessary when any standpoint is taken on a subject matter. That said, contortions, distortions, and creations inevitably take place when a methodological lens is used to convey a domain of knowledge. It is my hope that what is enabled by my approach outweighs the problems that this methodology introduces.

In this book I aim to communicate important facets of Tibetan tradition neither by parroting it nor by standing over it with domineering academic hubris. Rather, my agenda is to convey a way to think about (and with) Tibetan Buddhist philosophy of mind and nature. In outlining these aspects of Buddhist thought, I do not censure my own perspectives on the material and also draw freely from a range of Indian, European, and American philosophical traditions to explain and elaborate key issues in Buddhist Tibet. To date there is no such overview of Tibetan philosophical culture, as most scholarly texts and translations of Tibetan thought are embedded within the structure of a particular sectarian tradition. I aim to provide an alternative way to access the subject matter so scholars and interested nonspecialists can relate to Tibetan thought outside the confines of a single sectarian voice or a one-dimensional philosophical stance. This book is intended as a bridge, both for Buddhists who seek to enrich their knowledge in conversation with Northwestern European and American philosophical traditions, and for those more familiar with these philosophical traditions to engage with Tibetan Buddhist thought.

Nonspecialists can use this book to gain a perspective on Tibetan philosophy, a place from which to find points of departure and threads of conversation from the intellectual worlds they inhabit. Specialists, on

the other hand, can use this book to contextualize their particular areas of expertise. They may also feel compelled to highlight places that fall out of this frame, fill it out, or provide alternative frameworks to challenge or supplement the one I offer here. This book is a first step, not the last, to framing Tibetan Buddhism philosophically, and I hope readers will dig further into studies on topics that I outline here in broad strokes. <>

OTHER LIVES: MIND AND WORLD IN INDIAN BUDDHISM
by Sonam Kachru [Columbia University Press, 9780231200004]

Human experience is not confined to waking life. Do experiences in dreams matter? Humans are not the only living beings who have experiences. Does nonhuman experience matter? The Buddhist philosopher Vasubandhu, writing during the late fourth and early fifth centuries C.E., argues in his work *The Twenty Verses* that these alternative contexts ought to inform our understanding of mind and world. Vasubandhu invites readers to explore experiences in dreams and to inhabit the experiences of nonhuman beings—animals, hungry ghosts, and beings in hell.

OTHER LIVES offers a deep engagement with Vasubandhu's account of mind in a global philosophical perspective. Sonam Kachru takes up Vasubandhu's challenge to think with perspective-diversifying contexts, showing how his novel theory draws together action and perception, minds and worlds. Kachru pieces together the conceptual system in which Vasubandhu thought to show the deep originality of the argument. He reconstructs Vasubandhu's ecological concept of mind, in which mindedness is meaningful only in a nexus with life and world, to explore its ongoing philosophical significance. Engaging with a vast range of classical, modern, and contemporary Asian and Western thought, *Other Lives* is both a groundbreaking work in Buddhist studies and a model of truly global philosophy. The book also includes an accessible new translation of *The Twenty Verses*, providing a fresh introduction to one of the most influential works of Buddhist thought.

Reviews

Sonam Kachru has the uncanny ability to translate some of the deepest and thorniest questions in Indian philosophy—about consciousness, transmigration, dreams (questions whose scholarly labyrinths he brilliantly navigates and sequesters in the extensive notes)—into prose so lucid and inspired that one can read it like a Robert Frost poem or a folktale. He breaks into the mind of one philosopher, Vasubandhu, to open up a wide world of mind-boggling imagination that is at the same time very close to the bone of our deepest shared human concerns about reality and death. **Wendy Doniger, author of *The Implied Spider: Politics and Theology in Myth***

Other Lives is both erudite and graceful. Sonam Kachru provides a compelling reading of *Twenty Verses*, a persuasive account of Vasubandhu's understanding of experience, and a profound analysis of what it is to inhabit a world. If you care about Buddhist philosophy or consciousness, this beautiful book is mandatory reading. **Jay L. Garfield, Doris Silbert Professor in the Humanities and Professor of Philosophy and Buddhist Studies, Smith College and the Harvard Divinity School**

With exceptional imagination and boldness, this book steps inside the logic of one of the leading philosophers in Buddhist history. Sonam Kachru offers us a stunningly novel account of Vasubandhu's

thought and his appreciation of the fundamental entanglement of mind, world, and embodied experience. This is one of the very few works in modern Buddhist Studies that is simultaneously utterly fluent in the relevant philology, cosmology and history of ideas, and yet able to *think with* its object of study in ways that speak to pressing philosophical challenges today. Not the least of the latter would be the very possibility of experiencing the world from perspectives other than what we consider to be 'our own.' **Janet Gyatso, author of *Being Human in a Buddhist World: An Intellectual History of Medicine in Early Modern Tibet***

Attending to dreams on one side and non-human lives on the other, Kachru elegantly illuminates Vasubandhu's astonishing vision of the unfathomable, inextricable intertwining of minds and worlds. A marvelous book. **Evan Thompson, author of *Waking, Dreaming, Being: Self and Consciousness in Neuroscience, Meditation, and Philosophy***

Sonam Kachru's volume provides a philosophically profound and philologically rigorous analysis of Vasubandhu's concept of mind as inextricably tangled with the concept of world and other forms of life. The outcome is intellectually stunning. Kachru's account of Vasubandhu's notion of intentionality is revisionary, and his reconstruction of the deep context of his thought—showing Buddhist cosmology to be both philosophically valuable and necessary—will change the way we approach these materials in the future. **Roy Tzohar, author of *A Yogācāra Buddhist Theory of Metaphor***

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Excerpt: Human experience is not confined to waking life. Do experiences in dreams matter? Many maintain that humans are not the only living beings who have experiences. Does nonhuman experience matter? The Buddhist philosopher Vasubandhu of Peshawar, who flourished in the late fourth and early fifth centuries of the Common Era, appears to have thought so. In a work called The Twenty Verses, the only unimaginative thing about which is its name, he effectively argued that we cannot understand the relationship of mind and world without taking into account contexts of experience that go beyond those that many philosophers, working at different times and in different traditions, have deemed normative: the waking experience of human individuals.

Buddhist philosophy can suggest a way to connect the fact that we enjoy experiences when dreaming and the experiences of other life-forms. For they each, Buddhists supposed, provide us with contexts of

possible experience to which we are connected. We dream and wake, and then fall asleep and dream again. Buddhist philosophy, furthermore, teaches that we live now as one life-form, then another: most of us shall experience another way of being minded, and we have all experienced other ways of being minded in the past.

By "ways of being minded" mean to gesture at ways in which creatures can be oriented at the world in thought, given different ways of thinking, perceiving, feeling, attending, and so on. In the next chapter I will entitle myself to this way of talking with the help of Buddhist vocabularies of frames of mind. But we may use the phrase informally for now to say this: Buddhist accounts are committed to the thought that we do not live our entire life waking, nor are human beings unique for being minded. We exemplify a distinct way of being minded in dreams, and other lives exemplify other minds, to use this latter phrase in Peter Godfrey-Smith's sense of creatures who, even though only distantly connected to us, nevertheless exhibit forms of mindedness comparable to and yet unlike our own.

Here's why this matters. By beginning his work with an appeal to other human contexts of experience (like dreaming) and other life-forms and their environments important to Buddhist cosmology (such as the lives of hungry ghosts and beings in hell, more about which below), Vasubandhu effectively reminds his interlocutors that Buddhists must believe that other lives and other minds ought to influence the way we describe what being minded involves. He also takes it that doing so has consequences. Thinking with such alternating contexts of possible experience, to put it impressionistically for now, has the consequence that the concepts of "mind" and "world" can be shown to be peculiarly entangled.

The view in rough outline goes as follows. Some of Vasubandhu's interlocutors believed that perception is paradigmatic of what it means to be minded; and perception, they appear to suggest, is a context in which mind and world, two separable things, come into some variety of relation. From the vantage point Vasubandhu would have us occupy in The Twenty Verses, however, this is to start the story too late. Perception, he will attempt to show his interlocutors, is the culmination of a story which involves the twinning of beings and their environments. To exhibit mindedness just is to be the kind of being that it befits one's history of action to be; and this, it turns out, comes down to saying that to exhibit mindedness is to be the kind of being that is fitted to the environment one's actions have contributed to making. We don't always see it, but in perception we are being put in touch with history, the history of what we have made of the world and what we have made of ourselves. Or, that's what Vasubandhu would have his interlocutors acknowledge as the central thrust of their own tradition.

As it turns out, it is a revisionary view, and, as such, challenging.' So too is Vasubandhu's way of encouraging us to make the necessary revisions. Just how challenging will become clearer in this introduction as well as throughout this book, but it can be somewhat comforting to know that the difficulty is not our own.

This book takes up Vasubandhu's challenge to think with perspective-diversifying contexts for two reasons. I wish, firstly, to recover Vasubandhu's account of mindedness; not to defend it, mind you—merely to understand it. Secondly, and relatedly, I wish to recover Vasubandhu's conceptual toolkit. I want to know not only what he thought, but also how. That means, at the very least, that I wish to understand his vocabulary and his concerns better.

Unfortunately, this results in a bit of a tension: while seeking to contribute to a history of philosophy, because of its interest in concepts and norms governing explanation and description, this book tilts rather far toward an interest in the abstract. The paragraphs have the distressing feel of tedium in places, which is a shame because, to speak more grandly, and more tendentiously, I wish to evoke what it was like to think with his conceptual tools about the world to which he took himself to be responsible in thought.

Speaking of Vasubandhu's contemporary, Buddhaghosa, Maria Heim says that "he approaches scripture with a literary, even poetic, sensibility, alert to the special qualities of the Buddha's speech whereby it conveys something infinite within its limited forms."' I have come to believe that there is an aesthetic component to the norms governing successful description and analysis in Vasubandhu's work as well, one that may be made precise with the help of a vocabulary that straddles the norms of reasoning in scholastic Buddhism and the norms governing aesthetic appreciation in Sanskrit literary culture. Though I won't really address this issue explicitly till the conclusion of the book, I provide clues to that end in the conclusions to chapters 5, 6, and 7, resting on evocation for the most part until the very end. But there is an experiential texture to thinking in another time and place and while environed in a particular scriptural tradition, and I have tried to evoke a taste of Vasubandhu's intellectual world even in the driest of paragraphs.

Here, in this introduction, I will explain what I am explicitly after in this book and how to use it. I'll begin by showing my reader around The Twenty Verses, after which I'll introduce the perspective-defying examples and what I call Vasubandhu's "interesting thesis" about mindedness.

The Twenty Verses

This book does not offer an introduction to Vasubandhu. Nor does it seek to offer a high-relief picture of what we know of his life or oeuvre; it will not quarry for sources for his views. Instead, I will focus on one work in particular, the so-called Twenty Verses, by which title I shall here mean the twenty-two (or, as is more likely, the twenty-one) verses as well as the prose commentary in which the verses are embedded. In fact, for the most part I'll be focusing on only parts of it: the part from the beginning that takes up dreams and the experiences of nonhuman life-forms in other worlds; and the part at the end where Vasubandhu appeals to dreaming once again, this time as a metaphor and model for what understanding consists in. Relatedly, I should caution the reader that my unmarked use of "Buddhism" and "Buddhist" does not aim at generality; I seek, instead, to center myself within the intellectual world of Buddhist thought as presented in The Twenty Verses and related works (more about which below), expressing also thereby the sometimes contested perspectives that Vasubandhu and his interlocutors bring to bear on that world.

^ have included a translation of this short but endlessly engaging work in the appendix. Even as this book is not written as a commentary to the entirety of The Twenty Verses, the translation is not intended as a crib to the original. Keeping in mind the availability of many translations of this work aimed at specialists, as well as philologically and philosophically rich commentaries, I have offered my own (hopefully) user-friendly translation as an aid for readers unfamiliar with Indian Buddhist philosophy who wish to contextualize the use I have made of The Twenty Verses in this book. As my citations to The Twenty Verses refer to my own translation, readers are advised to consult the appendix for a brief statement of the principles that have guided the translation and its presentation.

Here's an overview of Vasubandhu's Twenty Verses. Beginning with a rather humdrum example of error in the prose introduction, it quickly goes on in verses 3 and 4 to invite us to think through the case of experience in virtual environments, in dreams, and in the hellish environments of life-forms quite distinct from our own. At the other end of the work, in verses 19 and 20, Vasubandhu introduces the topic of dying and madness, inviting us to think through what it means to be alive by appealing to narratives of possession and mental power.

It is helpful to think of the text as being framed by consideration of possibilities enshrined in Buddhist cosmology and narrative that may require revision of some part of the common-sense commitments of Vasubandhu's interlocutors and those of his readers, then and now. Inverse 21 Vasubandhu claims that we do not so much as know our own minds, an argument that brings this extraordinary work to a close.

In the intervening verses, Vasubandhu's work involves us in a consideration of phenomena at two extremities of scale. He considers the constitution of living environments and the beings who populate them in verses 4 through 7; and in verses 11 through 15 he considers the internal structure of matter, focusing on the very idea of indivisible atoms and the constitution of the familiarly scaled objects we take ourselves to perceive.

What is Vasubandhu after? In The Twenty Verses, Vasubandhu commits himself to defending a particular view as the Buddha's own. The view he ascribes to the Buddha is one that would have the Buddha council a restriction. When describing factors related to the full range of possible states sentient beings may enjoy, Vasubandhu understands the Buddha to recommend that we drop talk of the objects the experiences appear to be about, and which some believe serve as causes for these experiences.

I will offer a more precise characterization of this in chapter 1 when I discuss some features of Vasubandhu's technical vocabulary in more detail. For now, we may put things in the following way: Vasubandhu believes the Buddha's considered view to have been that we ought to speak of the full range of ways of being minded—all possible ways of being directed at the world in experience—without invoking objects as causes of content, without referring to anything, in fact, that goes beyond experience. <>

Women in Buddhist Traditions by Karma Lekshe Tsomo [Women in Religions, New York University Press, 9781479803415]

A new history of Buddhism that highlights the insights and experiences of women from diverse communities and traditions around the world

Buddhist traditions have developed over a period of twenty-five centuries in Asia, and recent decades have seen an unprecedented spread of Buddhism globally. From India to Japan, Sri Lanka to Russia, Buddhist traditions around the world have their own rich and diverse histories, cultures, religious lives, and roles for women.

Wherever Buddhism has taken root, it has interacted with indigenous cultures and existing religious traditions. These traditions have inevitably influenced the ways in which Buddhist ideas and practices

have been understood and adapted. Tracing the branches and fruits of these culturally specific transmissions and adaptations is as challenging as it is fascinating.

WOMEN IN BUDDHIST TRADITIONS chronicles pivotal moments in the story of Buddhist women, from the beginning of Buddhist history until today. The book highlights the unique contributions of Buddhist women from a variety of backgrounds and the strategies they have developed to challenge patriarchy in the process of creating an enlightened society.

WOMEN IN BUDDHIST TRADITIONS offers a groundbreaking and insightful introduction to the lives of Buddhist women worldwide.

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Why Study Women in the Buddhist Traditions?

The story of women in Buddhism is complex, because the world's Buddhist traditions and the roles of women within them are richly diverse. From India to Japan, Sri Lanka to Russia, each tradition has its unique history, culture, religious life, and cultural mores for women. Moreover, new refractions of each Asian Buddhist tradition are now developing in countries outside of Asia. It may be tempting to slip into simplistic stereotypes about Asian and non- Asian Buddhist women, but Buddhist societies span a multitude of different cultural heritages, geographical settings, and social strata, making it impossible to accurately characterize Buddhist women as a whole. In studying women in Buddhist traditions, therefore, we encounter a major challenge. Is it possible to identify patterns of Buddhist thought and behavior that influence gender roles or reinforce existing patterns of thought and behavior in such a wide spectrum of cultures and societies?

The Buddhist traditions extend over a period of twenty- five centuries, with roots in ancient Indian culture and branches extending to almost every corner of the globe. Not only did Buddhism put down roots over an extensive geographical area, but also these traditions have continued to evolve over a very long period of time, a process that is clearly in evidence throughout the world today. To

complicate matters, wherever Buddhist teachings put down roots, they found themselves on soil that was already home to a multitude of indigenous cultures with their own religious traditions. These traditions inevitably influenced, and continue to influence, the ways in which Buddhist ideas and practices are understood and adapted. Tracing the branches and fruits of these culturally specific transmissions and adaptations is as fascinating as it is challenging.

With few early historical materials to work with and countless cultural variations and interpretations, getting a clear picture of women's roles in the Buddhist traditions is not an easy task. Moreover, as in other religious traditions, women have often been neglected or erased in existing accounts. Nevertheless, after nearly three decades of research on Buddhist women by dedicated scholars in many disciplines, there is more information available today than ever before. In 1987 when, almost by accident, I began doing ethnographic research on Buddhist women, I discovered that very little had been written on the topic. The major study available was I. B. Horner, Women under Primitive Buddhism, published in 1930.

Horner's work was remarkable for its time and is influential even today, but it surprised me that Buddhist women's history and ideas had subsequently received so little attention. In many contemporary surveys of Buddhism, the topic of women appears to be simply an add- on. Fortunately, many new books, book chapters, and articles have appeared in the last few decades. Although certain areas of study, such as Buddhist feminist hermeneutics, have barely begun, we have far more information on women in Buddhism available today than ever before.

What can we learn from a study about women in Buddhist traditions? The task here is to provide a broad overview of women in Buddhist societies, taking examples from diverse cultures and communities, to learn what women value in the Buddhist teachings and what obstacles they face in putting those teachings into practice. Our focus will be not on specific social customs but on gaining a broad understanding of the status and self-understanding of women in societies that identify as Buddhist. The objective is not to frame a definitive picture, an impossible task, but to pique readers' interest in Buddhist women and raise questions for further reading and research. The study of women in Buddhist cultures provides not only a window on the religious lives of women but also a vantage point from which to learn more about Buddhist philosophy, psychology, culture, and society. Despite the variety and complexity of the Buddhist traditions, we can learn a great deal about them through the lives of women.

History in the Mirror

We can begin with the hypothesis that the teachings of the Buddha ("the awakened one"; ca. 563– 483 BCE) offered women a new outlook on life and greater independence in charting the course of their lives. The brãhmana social class in India was the most prestigious of the four primary social classes of that time. Although brãhmanas1 were not necessarily priests, many brãhmana men were priests, and they were the scholars and teachers of the Vedic scriptures composed in Sanskrit and conveyed orally for thousands of years. The worldview conveyed by the brãhmanas that was prevalent alongside Buddhism during the first millennium of its development on the Indian subcontinent included the ãšramas, the four stages of an ideal life for a male (student, householder, retiree, and renunciant, that is, one who renounces household life to pursue the spiritual path). The brãhmana worldview included four

aims of life (purusãrthas) for a male belonging to the first three varnas, or social classes: sensual pleasure in marriage, prosperity, moral values, and liberation.

The Buddhist traditions trace their roots to Buddha 8ãkyamuni, who was born Siddhãrtha Gautama sometime during the fifth or sixth century BCE in a park known as Lumbini, just north of what is today the border between Nepal and India. According to the traditional narrative, when he was just seven days old, his mother Mahãmãyã passed away and he was nursed and nurtured by her sister, Mahãprajãpatï, who proved to be an extremely kind foster mother. As a scion of the 8ãkya clan and the designated heir of his father's principality, Siddhãrtha grew up in relative luxury, enjoying all the pleasures of palace life, including innumerable courtesans. When he was sixteen years old, he married a beautiful cousin named Yašodharã, who was also sixteen. After many years, she gave birth to a son, Rãhula.

Around that time, Siddhãrtha's prodigious curiosity led him to venture beyond the palace walls, where he discovered sickness, old age, death, and a calm, introspective renunciant. Because of his sheltered upbringing, he had not been exposed to the ancient Indian tradition of šrãmanas, seekers who renounce householder life in order to engage in contemplative practices and pursue spiritual goals. After the shock of encountering suffering for the first time, he was deeply impressed by the serene countenance of this homeless wanderer. These experiences led the young prince to abandon his luxurious life, his wife, and his newborn son Rãhula in favor of the spiritual path. He spent six years learning different philosophical perspectives and engaging in strenuous religious practices, including extreme fasting and other arduous feats, but he remained unconvinced and unfulfilled, so he sat down to meditate under a tree and resolved not to arise until he had discovered the true meaning of life. After six days of intensive meditation, he awakened to the true nature of things "as they are": the problematic nature of human existence, the root causes of suffering, the possibility of ending suffering, and the way to achieve that goal. Gods, humans, and the earth itself acknowledged his discoveries. The Buddha (the Awakened One) spent the remaining forty- five years of his life sharing these discoveries with audiences all over northern India. It is believed by Buddhists that Buddha 8ãkyamuni, who lived during the present historical era, was not the only person to become awakened; there have been countless buddhas in previous eras, and there are many yet to come.

Buddha Sãkyamuni ("sage of the Sãkya clan") taught a path to liberation from suffering and dissatisfaction that was open to all who wished to purify the defilements of their minds. His followers included women and men of all ages, social classes, and backgrounds. Although the Buddha probably did not intend to be a social activist, the path of wisdom and compassion that he taught was quite revolutionary at the time. In place of the worship of gods and performance of rituals, which were restricted to male religious specialists of the brãhmana class, he taught an ethical interpretation of the law of cause and effect and an empirical method of self- discovery that could be practiced by everyone. The Buddha verified the prevailing belief in rebirth and the causal connection between actions and their consequences during meditation under the bodhi tree just prior to his awakening. He began to share his insights on the urging of divine beings and spent forty-five years teaching throughout northern India. He taught that mental defilements such as desire, hatred, ignorance, pride, and jealousy are the causes of repeated rebirth within the cycle of existence (samsãra). Rebirth inevitably entails suffering and dissatisfaction, and the only way to become free of suffering is to achieve freedom from rebirth. After gaining insight into these teachings and the contemplative practices that facilitate understanding, his disciples were sent out far and wide "in the four directions" to spread his teachings, and thousands of men and women achieved

the state of freedom from suffering and dissatisfaction. They became known as arhats, beings who are free from mental defilements and hence liberated from suffering and the bondage of rebirth in the wheel of birth and death.

Based on the insights he gained during meditation, the Buddha explained that sentient beings take different forms in samsãra, the wheel of repeated becoming, and there is nothing indelible, intrinsic, or enduring about these identities. Accordingly, a person may be born in a different body— male or female— in different circumstances from lifetime to lifetime. The circumstances of being reborn in a female body were thought to be more difficult and so a male rebirth was thought to be preferable. Female bodies were considered more difficult because, for example, women experience the sufferings of menstruation, childbirth, and menopause. Women are vulnerable to sexual harassment and rape and, at the time of the Buddha, were thought to require protection. At marriage, a woman had to leave her natal home and go to live with her husband's family, so daughters were often considered a liability— another mouth to feed until their marriage, which often required a large dowry.

In the patriarchal social milieu that prevailed in northern India at that time, women faced many limitations and difficulties. Aristocratic women such as the Buddha's stepmother Mahãprajãpatï and wife Yašodharã were subject to many restrictions, as were women of other social classes. In this context, the Buddha's declaration that women and men alike were capable of liberating themselves from suffering and from the cycle of rebirth was revolutionary. On a practical level, his decision to allow women to enter the monastic community (Pãli: sa^gha; Sanskrit: sa^gha) offered women an alternative to domestic life and the socially prescribed roles of wife and mother. The verses of some of the earliest Buddhist nuns, recorded in the Therïgãthã, are testimony to the spiritual achievements and freedom these awakened women experienced.

From India, the teachings of the Buddha spread in many directions and, at various points in history, became the dominant worldview in many parts of Asia. The main branches of Buddhism that developed were Theravãda and Mahãyãna. The Theravãda branch prevailed primarily in South and Southeast Asia, while the Mahãyãna became dominant in North and East Asia. Social customs and family practices vary widely in Buddhist societies, influenced by earlier cultures. Tracing the links and divergences among Buddhist beliefs, social practices, and religious institutions will be key to our understanding of attitudes toward women.

Buddhist Principles, Social Practices

In the social views disseminated by the brãhmanas, a woman was expected to marry and follow the dictates of her husband— indeed, she was taught to view her husband as god (pati means "god" and also "husband") and be totally devoted to him. By contrast, a Buddhist woman could decide, if she wished, to leave the household life and become a nun. If women from Buddhist families preferred to marry, they generally had more freedom than most to select their own partners. The Buddha gave advice about how to live a happy married life, but there are no religious laws that pertain to marriage in Buddhism. Marriage is a civil contract, in which religion plays little role. Monks or nuns may be invited to recite prayers or impart blessings, but marriage alliances are not sacred or sanctified by any higher power. There are no religious strictures against premarital sex or widow remarriage. Buddhists are encouraged to live by five lay precepts, which include abstaining from sexual misconduct, but these are personal

choices, not divinely sanctioned obligations. The closest thing to a Buddhist legal code is the vinaya, a collection of texts that explain the precepts for monastics.

Customs regarding marriage, divorce, and property rights are culture specific. In Buddhist cultures, religious authorities generally prefer to leave family matters to the discretion of those concerned, giving counsel according to the Buddha's teachings when it is sought, and avoiding what are deemed "affairs of this world." In most Buddhist societies, clerics are celibate monks and nuns. Although they may have been previously married (like Buddha Šãkyamuni himself), celibate monastics are not expected or encouraged to take part in worldly matters. They are to abide by Buddhist values including generosity, ethical conduct, patience, mindfulness, wisdom, and loving- kindness. Religious values and the exemplary conduct of well- restrained monks and nuns undoubtedly influence Buddhist decision- making and interpersonal relationships, but monastic institutions have no jurisdiction over the lives of laypeople and no influence or particular interest in marriage practices, except to impart blessings and wish everyone peace and happiness.

In the Buddhist view, violence against any sentient being, including animals, is never religiously sanctioned. Although some Buddhists may condone violence in a life- or- death situation, the first precept is to abstain from taking life and is widely interpreted to mean refraining from harming any sentient being. In the family, especially, because it is the environment for the nurturing of children, violence in any form is discouraged. Instead, the Buddha taught his followers to live with loving- kindness and compassion for all in thought, word, and deed. Meditations on loving-kindness focus especially on loved ones and then extend to all living beings. Although teaching nonharm as a moral principle does not ensure that all Buddhist families are havens of domestic peace and harmony, Buddhists value nonviolence and generally try their best to live up to this ideal.

Buddhist thought and social custom are often interwoven and influenced by beliefs and practices that predate the introduction of Buddhism. Gender hierarchies that privilege men over women, especially in politics and religion, are evident in all Buddhist societies. Although according to the Buddhist understanding of karma, the natural law of cause and effect, social and economic inequalities may be the result of a person's actions in the past, injustices cannot be justified by Buddhist teachings. The Buddha admitted seekers from all social and economic backgrounds into his community; in fact, the original Buddhist monastic community may be the earliest documented example of democratic governance. Still, socially embedded customs tend to give priority to males. These customs may reflect local practices or early Indian values, but the privileged place of males in Buddhist families, organizations, and societies may also be influenced by the privileged place of monks in Buddhist monastic institutions. In Buddhist societies even today, boys are more likely to get their parents' blessing and encouragement to enter a monastery. Boys are encouraged to become monks, in part to create merit (good karma) for their parents, but it is rare for girls to receive similar encouragement to become nuns. Until recently at least, the higher status of monks over nuns has contributed to a general preference for boys over girls. As a result, monks have traditionally far outnumbered nuns in Buddhist societies.

Relationships between monks and nuns are prescribed in the monastic codes, influenced especially by the "eight weighty rules" (Pãli: garudhamma; Sanskrit: gurudharma) in the vinaya that assign monks a superior status in the monastic ordering. Although the rules for monastics do not apply to laypeople, this gender differential in the monastic community seems to have been influenced by gendered social

norms and to have perpetuated certain gender-specific social practices, preconceptions, and expectations that give priority to men over women.

For example, at the time of the Buddha, monks outnumbered nuns, so the teachings that have been preserved are often directed to monks. As a first step in overcoming self- grasping, the Buddha advised his followers to visit graveyards and cremation grounds and to meditate on the nature of the human body. Through meditation, he taught, one can see things "as they are" and thus cut through ignorance and delusion. By understanding that all human beings are equally subject to death and decay, one can see through the illusion of a separate, independently existent self. By understanding the true impermanent nature of things, one can see that although human bodies may appear attractive on the outside, inside they are full of many disgusting substances. Insight into the true nature of the body thus helps to free one from sensual attachment and the disappointments that arise from that attachment. Because the Buddha was addressing an audience of celibate monks, he used the unpleasant qualities of the female body as an example. The Buddha presumably used the "foul" nature of the female body as an example to help his audience of celibate monks cut through desire and maintain their commitment to renunciation, but the teaching may have perpetuated preconceptions about the impurity of women in patriarchal culture. If the Buddha had been addressing an audience of celibate nuns, he would presumably have used the unpleasant qualities of the male body as an example. Unfortunately, out of context, the references to the disgusting nature of the female body have been interpreted to imply that the male body is somehow superior to the female body.

Such scriptural passages contributed to the impression that a male rebirth is preferable to a female rebirth. In Buddhist societies, one frequently hears that "being born as a woman is the result of bad karma," even though there is no evidence that the Buddha said such a thing. How do these teachings on the impure nature of the human body affect women, who are frequently associated with the body due to their unique reproductive capability?

The Buddhist scriptures include many positive representations of women, for example, extolling the love of mothers for their children, but the texts are inconsistent. One narrative describes the Buddha as being reluctant to admit women to his new mendicant community and portrays him as admitting Mahãprajãpatï only after she agrees to accept the eight weighty rules that subordinate nuns to monks. In this narrative, the Buddha is shown as predicting the decline and disintegration of his teachings, the Dharma, within five hundred years as a result of admitting women to the sangha, the monastic order. These narratives reflect the patriarchal gender relationships and expectations that existed in Indian society at the time. Despite the liberating nature of the Buddha's teachings and the practical alternative of monastic life for women, these stories have helped to reinforce patriarchal norms in Buddhist societies. Gradually, literary references to nuns' active, public participation in Buddhist activities became less frequent; the contributions of monks became the central focus, and often women are absent from Buddhist narratives altogether. This declining visibility of women in the scriptures seems to be linked with the socially and scripturally sanctioned subordination of women. Reinforced by unequal educational opportunities, gender inequalities in the sangha seem to mirror ambivalent attitudes toward women in society in general. As a consequence, in the Buddhist texts there are both powerful images of highly realized women and also passages that tend to diminish and disparage them.

The story of women in Buddhist traditions is multifaceted, varying over many centuries and a huge geographical expanse. The interrelationships among the Buddhist traditions are also complex and fluid,

transfigured with the spread of Buddhism to other Asian countries and now all over the world. In these pages, we will identify commonalities in the experiences of Buddhist women, keeping in mind that the histories and cultural developments of the Buddhist traditions make each one unique. In the coming years, as scholars uncover more materials about these traditions and women's roles within them, we will certainly need to revise our thinking beyond this introductory survey. For now, we will trace Buddhist women's history in its early stages in India, and then expand to later periods of historical development in selected Asian and non- Asian contexts. This history will include stories of Buddhist women who live celibate lives as nuns, women who live family lives as wives and mothers, and women practitioners who do not fit neatly into either of these categories. The stories of Buddhist renunciant women will include those who observe the more than three hundred precepts of a fully ordained nun (Sanskrit: bhikhunī; Pāli: bhikkhunī), as well as nuns who observe various enumerations of five, eight, nine, or ten Buddhist precepts. We will discuss whether and how these distinctions affect women's spiritual practice, education, social acceptance, and the economic support they receive from the lay community. We will mark the significant characters and turning points in Buddhist women's history, including recent developments that parallel the globalization of Buddhism.

The Buddha taught a path to the goal of awakening, attained by abandoning all mental defilements or destructive emotions. Awakening is therefore a quality of consciousness or awareness, and consciousness has no sexual markers or gender. In the course of re- becoming, over many lifetimes, sentient beings take different forms and different sexes. Lacking any intrinsic essence, beings also lack any intrinsic gender. The celibate ideal, which is perceived to be the ideal lifestyle for abandoning desire, is also ultimately devoid of any intrinsic gender identity. The celibate, renunciant state as well as the liberated state can therefore be conceived as beyond gender distinctions. Yet gender distinctions remain on the conventional level, retained in rituals, personal perceptions, everyday interactions, and practical matters in daily life. In Buddhist monasteries, monks and nuns are typically segregated. Celibate monastics are not free from gender identities or from gender discrimination.

It is common to hear apologists say that there is no gender discrimination in Buddhism and that awakening is beyond the distinctions of male and female. Claims of gender equality are contradicted, however, by numerous examples of inequality in the perceptions and treatment of women. Pollution taboos that prohibit women from entering religious sites while menstruating are still found in some Buddhist societies even today, for example, in Bhutan, Burma, Ladakh, and Thailand.

Gender distinctions may also be conceived in a positive light. For example, today the choice to identify with a specific gender or elsewhere on the gender spectrum—non-binary, non-gender conforming, or no gender at all—is considered by many to be a human right. Although the notion of erasing or going beyond gender identity may be held forth as a means of eliminating gender discrimination, erasing gender distinctions altogether is a contested ideal, especially for those who have struggled with gender identity and finally embraced a preferred gender.

In the modern era, with greater sexual freedom, some also challenge the traditional assumption that celibacy (brahmacarya, "the pure life") is the ideal lifestyle for achieving liberation.

When Buddha Šākyamuni presented his teachings on liberation from suffering, he taught a path of mental purification and transformation of consciousness that was equally accessible to women and men, both lay and monastics. Yet throughout much of Buddhist history, the experiences of women have most often

been confined to prescribed familial and monastic institutions, and women's own ideas, preferences, and contributions have often been dismissed, repressed, or overlooked. Today, many Buddhist scholars are drawing attention to the scriptures and legends that helped to shape attitudes toward women and are rethinking the complex interactions of religion, culture, and society that affect Buddhist women's lives and choices. Especially in recent decades, with a growth of interest in Buddhist and feminist ideas internationally, new questions are being raised about the status of women in Buddhist societies and also about the assumptions that underlie contemporary narratives about them. These studies illuminate the diverse spiritual paths that women have taken in this major wisdom tradition.

The Buddha taught that all beings have the potential to purify their minds and become free from mental defilements, suffering, and rebirth. As the various Buddhist traditions developed, a woman could aspire to the highest goal envisioned by her tradition, whether to become an arhat (a liberated being), a bodhisattva (a being on the path to perfect awakening), or even a fully awakened Buddha. Even if the path was described as arduous, especially in a female body, a woman could achieve the highest goal her tradition had to offer, in theory at least. In the tradition known today as Theravãda ("path of the elders"), prevalent in South and Southeast Asia, the goal is to become an arhat, one who is liberated from cyclic existence. In the tradition known as Mahãyãna ("great vehicle"), prevalent in North and East Asia, the goal is to advance on the bodhisattva path to become a fully awakened buddha. Many statements denying that a woman can become a buddha appear in both Theravãda and Mahãyãna texts, but the existence of numerous female arhats during the time of the Buddha is ample evidence that women were able to achieve that specific goal. In the Mahãyãna tradition, it is believed that all sentient beings not only are capable of becoming buddhas but also will eventually become buddhas. It follows that women have the potential to become fully awakened buddhas. However, according to the Sütrayãna branch of the Mahãyãna tradition, although it is possible for a woman to practice on the bodhisattva path and stages in a female body and eventually become a buddha, in her final lifetime she must appear in a male body, like Buddha Šãkyamuni. In the Vajrayãna branch of the Mahãyãna tradition, which teaches practices of visualizing oneself in the form of a fully awakened being, it is said that a woman can become a buddha in female form. The classic example is Tãrã, an exceptional woman who generated a strong determination to achieve full awakening in female form for the benefit of sentient beings, and successfully did so.

Only the Mahïšãsaka, an early Buddhist school of thought, in which phenomena are regarded as existing only in the present moment, taught that a woman cannot become a fully awakened buddha, but this school died out in India long ago.

In actuality, many women in Buddhist cultures do not aspire for these lofty attainments. Instead, they tend to pursue devotional practices quietly and to support the spiritual endeavors of men, who dominate the social and religious hierarchies. Nevertheless, throughout history there have been extraordinary women practitioners who challenged social norms and emerged from the silence, giving testimony to their courage and exemplifying Buddhism's liberative promise. Through the power of these stories, beginning with accounts of the first female arhats in ancient India, Buddhist women have glimpsed their own potential and gained inspiration to persevere on the path to awakening. In contemporary Buddhist feminist circles, these accounts, both in history and legend, are being highlighted as models for women's realization (direct insight into the Buddha's teachings) and spiritual liberation.

Buddhist texts and communities convey divergent representations of women. The presentation of women as the seducers and corrupters of men is epitomized in the story of the Buddha's temptation by the voluptuous "daughters of Mãra" the night before his enlightenment.

Some of the less favorable portrayals and attitudes toward women may be traced to the pervasive patriarchal bias that characterized ancient Indian society during the early centuries of Buddhism's development, but these attitudes may also be traced to the Buddha's alleged reluctance to admit women to the sangha, the eight weighty rules that he reportedly imposed upon Mahãprajãpatï, and predictions of resultant decline. The eight rules, which legislate monks' authority over nuns, may have contributed to persistent gender bias in Buddhist religious structures that have given priority to monks and ensured the continuity of the bhikkhu sangha (community of monks) but not the bhikkhunï sangha (community of nuns) in Theravãda Buddhism. Even if women in Buddhist societies are aware that female arhats existed in Buddhist history, they may easily become discouraged by the meager support contemporary nuns receive toward their requisites: meals, robes, medicines, and dwellings. They may also become discouraged by the lack of validation and encouragement for women, especially those who opt out of the culturally preferred roles for women as wives and mothers.

Gender discrimination in Buddhism is not a phenomenon that applies only to some bygone era. Even today, Buddhist women in many countries, including Western countries, may encounter ingrained prejudices and assumptions about women's nature and capabilities, perpetuated by women and men alike. These prejudices and assumptions become clear if, for example, a woman decides to remain single, to not give birth to children, or to become a nun. Learning more about the variety of roles women have played in Buddhist traditions illuminates the ways in which women in diverse cultures have navigated the expectations of society, by either accepting, ignoring, or transforming them.

Revolutionizing the Future

In a global community that is strongly influenced by democratic ideals of justice and equality, gender discrimination is generally no longer seen as justifiable and is associated with many social problems, including domestic violence, sex trafficking, and the neglect of girls' health and education. In the eyes of much of the world, archaic religious structures that put women at a disadvantage— materially, psychology, socially, and spiritually— run counter to a new global ethic of gender equity and seem sadly out of step with the times. Assumptions about women's supposed karmic inferiority and the reality of their often invisible roles in Buddhist institutions— patterns that have been taken for granted for centuries— are now coming under scrutiny both in Buddhist societies and internationally. Discriminatory attitudes and patriarchal structures not only appear contradictory to the liberating teachings of the Buddha but also may cause people to question the value of pursuing Buddhist practice in today's world, especially beyond Asia.

A dramatic increase in interest in the topic of women in Buddhism has generated a wave of new scholarship. Some studies focus on women in specific cultures or at different stages in Buddhist historical development, while others are literary analyses of the conflicting portrayals of women, as a category, that are found in Buddhist texts. As yet, however, there has been no updated introduction to women in Buddhism that offers an adequate treatment of the topic overall.

Tracing the path of Buddhism's historical and cultural development, this book begins with a discussion of Buddhist women in the early Indian context— the Buddha's mother, stepmother, wife, and earliest

female disciples. It then moves to the lives, challenges, and achievements of women in other cultural contexts and periods of Buddhist history, up to the present day. In recounting the struggles and attainments of a range of realized and ordinary women, we will explore several salient themes, including the ways in which Buddhist teachings have been spiritually liberating for women, and also the ways in which certain teachings have been used to reinforce women's subordination within patriarchal social structures and Buddhist institutions. Using selected examples from a variety of Buddhist cultures, we will investigate women's unique roles within specific Buddhist societies and trace common threads among them. A transformation of Buddhist attitudes is currently taking place to envisage what social, religious, psychological, and ideological changes are needed to revolutionize Buddhist societies and institutions create a truly egalitarian society.

Buddhist teachings and traditions are increasingly transnational, and many antiquated attitudes are up for review. One major issue is the seeming contradiction between the internally egalitarian organizational structures modeled by the early bhikkhu and bhikkhunī sanghas and the hierarchical structures of many Buddhist institutions today. Buddhist texts and teachings provide solutions to many forms of suffering, but they do not explicitly address the structural inequalities that underlie many forms of suffering and injustice. The ultimate goal of Buddhist practice— the achievement of liberation— is said to be beyond gender, but on a practical level gender matters very much. Without conducive circumstances for Buddhist learning and practice, the goal of liberation is merely a dream for many women. Liberation as a theoretical ideal needs to be aligned with conditions on the ground. In reality, women disproportionately experience the misfortunes of everyday life. Poor, illiterate, uneducated, and overworked, millions of women find little leisure time for Buddhist practice.

It is heartening that a revolutionary new vision of Buddhism includes a sincere concern for women and the benefits that awakened women can offer society. This new vision has spurred a vibrant transnational movement to work for Buddhist women, to allow access to all kinds of education and all levels of monastic ordination. Buddhist scholars, practitioners, and scholar/practitioners are engaged in efforts to understand the roots of gender inequities and to analyze critically the texts and unexamined assumptions that have perpetuated myths of women's inferiority. With new research methodologies and a broader knowledge base, scholars aspire to apply these tools to a thorough reinterpretation of texts and traditions, and to uncover more information about the contributions that women have made to Buddhist thought and practice. Transcending cultural differences, new modes of communication facilitate creative and mutually beneficial international exchanges. A Buddhist feminist movement that began in the 1980s stretches across cultural boundaries to investigate the gender- specific presuppositions and limitations that not only persist in Buddhist cultures but also confine many human minds. The Buddhist feminist imagination is both a natural historical development, spurred by the global women's movement, and an intensely personal journey for many Buddhist women, nurturing self-awareness and establishing solidarity with other women and male allies. Awakening, both as an attainment beyond gender, available to all, and as an awareness born of women's experience, holds the promise of liberating and revolutionizing humanity. <>

Tales of a Mad Yogi: The Life and Wild Wisdom of Drukpa Kunley by Elizabeth Monson [Snow Lion, 9781611807059]

A fascinating biography of Drukpa Kunley, a Tibetan Buddhist master and crazy yogi.

The fifteenth-century Himalayan saint Drukpa Kunley is a beloved figure throughout Tibet, Bhutan, and Nepal, known both for his profound mastery of Buddhist practice as well as his highly unconventional and often humorous behavior. Ever the proverbial trickster and "crazy wisdom" yogi, his outward appearance and conduct of carousing, philandering, and breaking social norms is understood to be a means to rouse ordinary people out of habitual ways of thinking and lead them toward spiritual awakening.

Elizabeth L. Monson has spent decades traveling throughout the Himalayas, retracing Drukpa Kunley's steps and translating his works. In this creative telling, direct translations of his teachings are woven into a life story based on historical accounts, autobiographical sketches, folktales, and first-hand ethnographic research. The result, with flourishes of magical encounters and references to his superhuman capacities, is a poignant narrative of Kunley's life, revealing to the reader the quintessential example of the capacity of Buddhism to skillfully bring people to liberation.

Review

"Truly enthralling."—*Publishers Weekly*

"**Tales of a Mad Yogi** is a wonderfully successful experiment in nonfiction narrative. Rooted in translation, field research, and oral history, yet expressed through immersive storytelling and prose-poetry, the book does what few works of scholarship can achieve: transport the reader to vast places and intimate spaces where the magic of Drukpa Kunley becomes real. With art, craft, and devotion, Elizabeth Monson brings the tales and teachings of Bhutan's great Buddhist saint to life."—Kurtis Schaeffer, professor of Tibetan and Buddhist Studies at the University of Virginia

"Elizabeth Monson gives a most compelling narrative of the Tibetan 'mad yogi,' Drukpa Kunley, revered in Bhutan for piercing through the hypocrisy of society to bring out the essence of the Dharma. The author, herself an academic and Buddhist practitioner, weaves together elegant prose, spiritual insights, folktales, and biographical elements of one of the most fascinating yet elusive religious figure of Tibetan Buddhism."—Françoise Pommaret, senior researcher, CNRS France, and associate professor, CLCS, Royal University of Bhutan

"There are few Buddhist saints as lively and humorous as Drukpa Kunley. Drawing on early autobiographical sources as well as the oral tradition, Elizabeth Monson's stunning creative biography captures the irreverent and joyful spirit of Drukpa Kunley's own voice. Written by the West's foremost scholar on Drukpa Kunley, this book is destined to become a classic. Liz Monson's creative rendering of Drukpa Kunley's life borrows on a classic of autobiographical literature that is absolutely unique. Shrugging off the trappings of convention, Drukpa Kunley reminds us that the essence of the dharma is a

life authentically lived."—Willa Blythe Baker, founder and spiritual codirector of Natural Dharma Fellowship

"A literary gem—reimagining the elusive Drukpa Kunley, based on exacting research and blended with lucid translations. Elizabeth Monson gives narrative flesh to the bare biographical bones found in his collected writings. The 'mad saint' comes to life, ever the social critic but more human and profound than in the folktales previously available in English."—Holly Gayley, associate professor of Buddhist Studies at the University of Colorado, Boulder

"Drukpa Kunley's outrageous deeds show us how the ways to teach the Dharma are beyond any conventional limitations. Many of his teachings are given in the form of songs where this great master humorously uncovers layers of subtle hypocrisy that may stain our practice. It is refreshing to have this new telling of his life story, based on his autobiography and folk accounts recorded by the author in Bhutan."—Gerardo Abboud, author of *The Royal Seal of Mahamudra: A Guidebook for the Realization of Coemergence*

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> An account of the periods of my life story that is factual and correct—from my birth to my present activities, up to the feasts offered at my death in the future—would be an insignificant piece of writing indeed! Except for the dried-up words with which I exhort my disciples toward the Dharma whenever they question me and with which I communicate the main points for performing spiritual practice these days, there is little need to write about the absurdities of my life, the food I ate in the morning, and where I shit it out in the evening.

Who was the Dharma Lord, Drukpa Kunley? He's been called many things: madman, crazy wisdom master, yogi, erudite scholar, wandering mendicant, scathing social and religious critic, lonely child, enlightened master, drunkard, adulterer, reincarnation of Saraha, great mahasiddha, and the list goes on. With so many manifestations, the question arises: Was Drukpa Kunley a real human being, with real challenges and sufferings, joys and achievements? Or is this legendary figure more mythic than human, more imaginary than historical, his name a label for a particular way of being in the world?

Drukpa Kunley's legacy has profoundly influenced ideas about how true realization can manifest in a religious world where selfishness, materialism, and hypocrisy often undermine the genuine transmission and practice of the Dharma. What does this manifestation of true realization look like? When we examine the speech and actions of Drukpa Kunley, we discover a complex nexus of interpenetrating and sometimes contradictory, but always fascinating, ideas of what realization might look like.

In Bhutan, where Drukpa Kunley's legacy flourishes, modern folk tales depict a bawdy, promiscuous, irreverent jokester—a philandering yogic madman who used any and all opportunities to engage in lewd or lascivious actions to shock ordinary people out of their habitual ways of viewing reality. This Drukpa Kunley had no qualms about breaking social mores or challenging the ethical and moral values by which people orient themselves both individually and collectively. He delighted in teaching average folks, while poking fun at those who call themselves Dharma practitioners. He elicits laughter and enjoyment as vociferously now as he did six centuries ago. He was the crazed yogic madman who slept with his own mother, separated women from their husbands, and drank himself unconscious, but who is also revered as a second Guru Rinpoche, pacifying and taming the wild demonic spirits that haunt the Himalayan mountain jungles of Bhutan. That he accomplished this primarily with his throbbing "thunderbolt of wisdom" continues to charm and amuse whoever hears of his exploits.

Today, in Bhutan, visitors can purchase replicas of his thunderbolt of wisdom from local gift shops, and many flock to Drukpa Kunley's temple, the Chime Lhakhang in the central valley of Punakha, to be blessed by the huge phallus said to have been carved by the saint, as well as by a replica of the bow and arrows he used for hunting. To this day, women who are unable to conceive travel from around the globe to this same temple to supplicate for the lama's blessing and to sleep on the ground in the hopes that their prayers for conception will be answered. And they are. Over and over again, reports of the efficacy of Drukpa Kunley's blessings emerge that enhance his reputation.

Lest we become too comfortable with this view of a dancing, drunken madman, Drukpa Kunley's own writings from the fifteenth century pull the rug out from underneath us. In the only known collection of his written works referred to above, the four-volume mix of both biographical and autobiographical writings, we encounter a different kind of madman. One whose weapons of pacification and education include his sharp tongue, his keen wit, and his penetrating critiques of religious hypocrisy. If this

manifestation of Drukpa Kunley is considered crazy, it is due to his unrelenting drive to unveil the insidious deceptions that those who claim to model a religious life use to fool both themselves and others. He is crazy, too, in turning this keen gaze onto himself, exposing his own faults, tricks, and surreptitious efforts to broadcast a particular image of himself—a madness of humility and truth-telling.

To try to nail down all the characteristics of the yogi depicted in these volumes, the yogi who dances nimbly through a field of literary genres, is as difficult as Drukpa Kunley himself states in the passage that opens the preface to this book. The Liberation Tales confronts the reader with a bewildering array of disparate compositions—from spontaneous songs of realization to stories, didactic tirades, mocking imitations, parodies, dream narratives, visions, and powerfully emotional responses to the impermanence and suffering experienced by all beings across time and space. While it is impossible to determine a single rationale for these writings, uncovering what it means to be a genuine human being traveling the path of the Dharma—both externally in terms of engagement in the mundane world and internally in terms of personal growth and realization—is a central theme. The madman who emerges from these pages is by turns compassionate, honest to a painful degree, spontaneous, fun-loving, sorrowful, romantic, practical, and mystical.

The Phenomenon of the Yogic Madman

To understand how and why Drukpa Kunley lived as he did, we can consider the emergence of a development in the fifteenth century coined by E. Gene Smith as the "nyonpa phenomenon."' While the tradition of saintly madmen is quite old in Tibet, Smith explores it as an emerging phenomenon in an age of impassioned doctrinal and religious reform.' The term nyonpa translates as "mad," "crazy," or "insane." Three main representatives of the nyonpa tradition in Tibet lived during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries: Tsang Nyon Heruka (1455-1529); Drukpa Kunley (1455-1529); and U Nyon (1458-1532). These three lived and traveled in roughly the same places in south-central Tibet in the same time period. Mad yogis are found in many Tibetan Buddhist traditions but most are associated with traditions focused on meditation rather than on scholastic studies. The famous mad yogis mentioned above belonged to or had affiliations with the Nyingma and Kagyu schools and with the Drukpa Kagyu lineage in particular.

Tibetan Buddhism understands different forms of "madness," and the one most relevant to Drukpa Kunley's story presumes a religious model that assigns saintliness to reversing normative or prescriptive behavior as a way to exhibit spiritual powers and the attainment of liberation. In this form of liberated madness, what appears to be mad is in fact the "highest state of spiritual achievement." The present Dalai Lama describes this madness as follows: "When a person gains experience of emptiness, the ultimate mode of existence of all phenomena, his perception is as different from that of ordinary people as a madman's...." Such a "practitioner completely transcends the conventional way of viewing the world."' If we apply this definition, the term nyonpa refers to individuals whose spiritual and contemplative power is visibly transcendent and whose goals are pure, with the result that they are considered beyond dualistic notions of good and bad, permitted and prohibited. Such individuals are often (but not always) solitary yogis who follow a peripatetic lifestyle rather than living as ordained monastics, although they might have been such at one time in their earlier careers.

Yogic madmen and madwomen set themselves apart from other practitioners in the realm of behavior. Through their ongoing violation of commonsense rules and ethical and societal norms, wandering crazy

yogis might dress oddly, decline to live in any sort of fixed dwelling, assert their ability to perform "miracles" and cure illnesses, and engage in eccentric and even antinomian behavior. As a result, these crazy yogis were highly visible from among the varieties of religious practitioners who populated the Tibetan landscape.

An important practice for mad yogis was that of "reversal."' In this practice, the yogi takes up various antinomian meditative techniques designed to bring about an experience of the reversal of the processes of birth, death, and becoming that arise due to ignorance of our true nature. Such practices gradually release the practitioner from the cycle of samsara. Through practicing reversal, practitioners recognize their original, unborn nature and learn how to stabilize that realization.' Additionally, a mad yogi might behave in impure or otherwise ritually proscribed ways. By acting contrary to social norms, they transcend conceptual distinctions such as good and bad, right and wrong, in order to experience everything as "one taste.'

In The Liberation Tales, Drukpa Kunley is represented as being aware of these practices and their pitfalls. He comments on these, criticizing those who, without having realized their ultimate nature, engage in such practices to show off yogic powers and impress people:

If they do not join all activities with the four times for practice, who are those who call themselves crazy madmen? If even those who have mastered one-pointed concentration do not know that the true view is beyond imputation, what use can this be?

> Hence, rather than depicting a Drukpa Kunley who engages directly in such practices, these writings instead reflect a keen observer, who positions himself a step removed—an observer who can ascertain the difference between those who display genuine "crazy wisdom" and those who only pretend, hoping to fool the world around them.

Another possible reason for the birth of the mad yogi phenomenon explored by Smith was that it arose as a protest against the increasing systematization and emphasis on scholasticism of Tibetan Buddhist schools in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, as quintessentially modeled by the Gelukpa tradition that was quickly gaining influence. From this perspective, crazy yogis represented the opposite of scholastic monks. They were a voice for reform—an attempt to return the Kagyu and Nyingma traditions to original tantric practices and views that were vanishing as powerful monastic institutions were established. These vanishing practices included oral transmission, individual solitary contemplation, and the deep spiritual bond formed between guru and disciple. In this view, the crazy yogi movement functioned as a means by which to reinvest the Kagyu tradition with some of its former religious fervor, to "rekindle the incandescent spirituality of the early yogis.' The chief symbolic figure for this movement was the great yogi, Milarepa (ca. 1052.—ca.1135).

Some characteristics of mad yogis include creating an outrageous public image as a front or disguise in order to act outside of commonly accepted moral boundaries. Some of these actions include stripping naked, drunken babbling, imbibing copious amounts of alcohol, and displaying outrageous and socially challenging behaviors, such as smearing oneself with feces or openly communicating with supernatural beings!' While Drukpa Kunley is indelibly associated with this image of the antinomian yogic madman in oral tales, in his own writings there is less evidence that he acted in these ways. However, both the outrageous figure of Drukpa Kunley so popular in contemporary Bhutan and the less overtly flamboyant

figure to be found in The Liberation Tales embrace the idea that the realization of truth does not occur from scholastic study, moral rules, or even from a personal teacher, but that it arises from a direct experience of phenomena, particularly the natural world, just as they are.

The characterization of Drukpa Kunley as someone who experiences the entire world as his guru can be seen in the following quote from his autobiography: "Who or whatever appears becomes my fundamental guru."

Once one recognizes the nature of all phenomena, including the self, as empty luminosity?' everything that appears reminds the practitioner of that realization. The attainment of this view may result in taking up the activities of a mad yogi, whether such activities manifest overtly—as in wandering around naked or shouting obscenities—or less obviously—as in the willingness to expose the truth of one's own and others' hypocrisies—as we see in Drukpa Kunley's writings.

It is possible there existed a trope of yogic madness that Drukpa Kunley is represented as having a particular relationship with. From the point of view of his own self-identification in his writings as a nyonpa to the attribution of this label to him by his disciples and descendants over time and space, the fact that this relationship is complicated cannot be denied. While certain aspects of his character appear to be nominally in line with some of the qualities associated with crazy yogis, in other significant ways Drukpa Kunley's self-representations in his writings either do not line up with or reconfigure them. Given the plethora of critical comments regarding unexamined "crazy" yogic behavior in his writings, there is no clear answer to this question. Perhaps the narrator effectively creates a new norm, an anti-norm, but at a higher level of abstraction, which dismisses all representations of the religious person as deluded except for those persons who have willingly exposed the truth of their own hypocrisies.

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Narrative Strategies and an Ethic of Joy

Finally, a discussion of the narrative strategies used in The Liberation Tales can shed some further light on Drukpa Kunley himself. Although, for the purposes of sharing the life story of this saint, this current book does create a cohesive narrative arc to Drukpa Kunley's life story, if we look closely at his rationale in The Liberation Tales for writing an autobiography or a biography, we see that for the narrator, the illusion of a cohesive self, created through narrative, is a subtle form of self-deception. This is because a cohesive narrative precludes the possibility of including aspects of a person's experience that may contradict or change the master narrative. Cohesive narratives allow for the illusion that real continuity exists between one moment of experience and another, directly contradicting laws of impermanence. Becoming attached to our ideas about ourselves and to a sense of a permanent "me" extended over time, human beings expend tremendous energy in sustaining such fictions. Attachment to our endless, deceptive story lines leads to further and further levels of misapprehension, suffering, and hypocrisy.

This issue has been explored in the academic field of literary studies. Whereas it was once taken for granted and expected in studies of autobiography that such texts were nonfiction literature in which real historical persons accurately and honestly represented the events, experiences, and vicissitudes of their lives, today it is more common to hear scholars discuss what happens when the unspoken "contract" for truth between autobiographers and readers is ruptured. In other words, what happens when authors of

autobiographies purposefully thwart readers' expectations that they will relate the facts of their lives exactly as they took place as a way to show that factual representation is ultimately impossible? Does embellishing the details or reordering the events of a life to streamline them into a cohesive narrative violate the reader's expectation that presenting a factual account of a person's life is possible? And beyond this, might not the fictionalization of "real life" through embellishment, reorganization, and imagination also undermine how we understand the ethics of what it means to live an honest life, to be a good person? While these are questions that contemporary scholars of autobiography continue to grapple with, they are just as pertinent to the project of creating a cohesive narrative from the hints found in The Liberation Tales. We might say that The Liberation Tales implicitly anticipated these issues long before there was any idea of "modern" or "postmodern" literary criticism.

However, in spite of the possible fictions involved in creating a cohesive narrative, The Liberation Tales does value the use of a narrative arc as long as it functions to disrupt the mind's patterns of creating and then attempting to reify an ideal vision of oneself by instead revealing the truth of who we really are. In The Liberation Tales, instead of a cohesive narrative arc, the reader is confronted with a cacophony of diverse literary forms and tropes. Through this seemingly haphazard format, rather than reifying a solid sense of self, The Liberation Tales unravels and undermines the mind's subtle but powerful methods of self-construction and deception. This is in an attempt to liberate the reader into a more spontaneous, open, and joyful understanding of life.

The Liberation Tales illustrates this liberative process through narrative strategies that mimic the moment-to-moment nature of experience. The content of each composition in the autobiography reveals how every moment of experience presents the possibility of acting, responding, or being in harmony with a situation as it arises—the autobiography demonstrates the context-specific momentariness of experience. This is evident in the way many of the individual compositions in the autobiography are introduced by someone asking a specific question to the narrator. From one composition to the next, the content often shifts radically, demanding that Drukpa Kunley adjust his answers to respond appropriately to each new situation that presents itself. Not only the content of the individual compositions, but also the autobiography as a whole, embodies this expression of context-specific truth through its mixture of a variety of literary styles and subjects—through what I call its textual cacophony.

Generally, due to the persistent human habit of creating the story of "me"—a "me" we presume will be the exception to the constant change and dissolution that lies at the root of every experience—we are unable to relax into the momentariness of our experience. In light of this, Drukpa Kunley's literary goals seem to consist in instructing and retraining our minds to recognize how the habit of self-narration is no more than a conceptual overlay onto raw experience. He achieves this result linguistically, by using words, language, rhetorical devices, styles, moods, and genres. By allowing each individual bead of experience to remain distinct and by demonstrating this via different literary forms, he reveals how we fail to see these moments of impermanent experience for what they are when we force them to be part of a master narrative. By resisting the impulse to continue to create cohesive narratives, we can relax, as Drukpa Kunley does, into the richness and fullness of our experience. We begin to see how, in the act of normalizing, labeling, and forcing our experiences into conceptual frameworks, we lose the wonder, the delight, and the joy of things as they are.

This experience of wonder, this joy, this delight in things as they are is one of the main themes that accompanies most of Drukpa Kunley's literary expressions. This theme of joy is also evident in the oral stories of Drukpa Kunley and in their tellings. The attempt to represent experience directly, as it is, is shown to be inseparable from delight. As he attends to the momentariness of his experience, Drukpa Kunley delights in showing how we can avoid the trap of self-deception and represent ourselves honestly. Trusting in the "truth" of the immediate moment, he also trusts himself to represent that truth—the truth that who we are cannot be unified, cannot be reduced to a single identity, but is continuously reforged in every moment, every context, every situation, and every composition.

The Liberation Tales' use of multiple genres, including the mixing of genres within genres, such as didactic prose sections that contain spontaneous songs, lists of colloquial or popular sayings, stories, or commentaries in quotations from teachers or sutras, is psychologically astute in that it to keep the reader off balance. It makes fun of the human tendency to constantly seek out reliable reference points. As soon as one refer-point is established in the autobiography, it is withdrawn and another its place. Bombarded by one literary mode after another, the reader has no opportunity to become complacent or distracted. This cacophony of textual mediums in The Liberation Tales demands the reader's ongoing attention and response. It "challenges the reader to alternative forms of existence," suggesting novel alternatives to habitual thoughts and actions. Like the Buddha, Drukpa Kunley recognizes that people hear only what they have the capacity to hear: "Whether my example is harmful or not is determined primarily by the different types of human intelligence." Thus the same themes, the same messages, communicated through multiple ways, will inevitably permeate into the minds of the recipients, just as the 84,000 teachings of the Buddha were always intended to do.

Ultimately, it is not possible to find one, definitive ethical message communicated through Drukpa Kunley's life. Instead, we find a plethora of tellings, constructions, and refigurings that shift our experience of the way things are. The truths displayed by Drukpa Kunley are always conditional, always relational, always reawoken into the present moment by the situations in which and to which the saint is summoned. Although in what follows, the reader will encounter a cohesive narrative arc (how else to tell a story?), it is worth bearing in mind that The Liberation Tales was not originally written in this way and to pay attention to the various mediums through which our protagonist expresses his teachings, thoughts, and feelings. <>

VAJRAYOGINÏ: HER VISUALIZATIONS, RITUALS, & FORMS: A STUDY OF THE CULT OF VAJRAYOGINÏ IN INDIA by Elizabeth English [Studies in Indian and Tibetan Buddhism, Wisdom Publications, 9780861713295]

Vajrayogini is a tantric goddess from the highest class of Buddhist tantras who manifests the ultimate development of wisdom and compassion. Her practice is prevalent today among practitioners of Tibetan Buddhism. This ground-breaking book delves into the origins of Vajrayogini, charting her evolution in India and examining her roots in the Cakrasamvara tantra and in Indian tradition relating to siva.

The focus of this work is the *Guhyasamayasadhanamala*, a collection of forty-six *sadhanas*, or practice

texts. Written on palm leaves in Sanskrit and preserved since the twelfth century, this diverse collection, composed by various authors, reveals a multitude of forms of the goddess, each of which is described and illustrated here. One of the sadhanas, the *Vajravarahi Sadhana* by Umapatideva, depicts Vajrayogini at the center of a mandala of thirty-seven different goddesses, and is here presented in full translation alongside a Sanskrit edition. Elizabeth English provides extensive explanation and annotation of this representative text. Sixteen pages of stunning color plates not only enhance the study but bring the goddess to life.

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About the Author

My interest in the Buddhist tantras—and in sãdhana meditation in particular—really began while I was in Oxford studying under Professor Alexis Sanderson. It was the inspiration of his research, as well as his personal encouragement, that led me one day to a Sanskrit manuscript in the Bodleian Library dating from the twelfth or thirteenth century, and preserved on palm leaves in a lovely, rounded ku^ila script. The text comprised a collection of some fifty sãdhanas—meditation and ritual works—all of which were concerned with the practice of Vajrayoginï, a deity of the highest tantras. With Professor Sanderson's help, and the untiring support of Dr. Harunaga Isaacson, I set about the tasks of editing the texts and attempting to understand their contents. Without the knowledge of these two outstanding scholars, I could hardly have begun to fathom the complexity of the Buddhist tantric traditions, let alone begin my doctoral thesis. The thesis was completed in 1999 and was entitled Vajrayoginï: Her Visualisation, Rituals and Forms. This book is an adaptation of that thesis.

Taken as a whole, the texts in the manuscript form a so-called garland of sãdhanas (sãdhanamãlã), which in this case includes praise verses and commentarial passages alongside the ritual and meditation manuals of the sãdhanas themselves. This book focuses upon one Sanskrit sãdhana from this unique collection, the Vajravãrãhï Sãdhana by Umãpatideva. At the same time, I hope to give a flavor of the breadth and richness of the other works in the Guhyasamayasãdhanamãlã. For while they all center upon Vajrayoginï as the generic deity, they describe many manifestations. Indeed, the collection contains over fifty iconographical descriptions, within which we can discern about twenty distinct forms of Vajrayoginï, some of whom —such as Vajravãrãhï—are significant tantric deities in their own right. In fact, although the collection receives the late title Guhyasamayasãdhanamãlã (GSS), the Secret Pledge Sãdhana Collection, a more suitable title might have been the *Vajrayoginïsãdhanamãlã, the Vajrayoginï Sãdhana Collection. I have therefore attempted to draw from all its major works in the course of this study and, in the opening chapters, I survey the diverse forms and practices of Vajrayoginï in India, according to this collection. In this way, I hope the book will serve a double purpose: examining, from our textual evidence, the cult of Vajrayoginï in India prior to 1200 C.E., and shedding light on tantric sãdhana meditation.

The decision to base the study upon a single sãdhana from the Guhyasamayasãdhanamãlã was made for several reasons. While scholarly interest in the Indian Buddhist tantras has increased in recent years, our knowledge of their vast array of texts remains in its infancy and will only improve as scholars produce critical editions of surviving texts along with informed study based upon them. The difficulty of drawing accurate conclusions from the texts currently available is due to the fact that the umbrella term "Buddhist tantra" actually covers a bewildering variety of methods, practices, and systems. These

competed in India within a highly fertile and inventive environment over several centuries. Even contemporary accounts in the eleventh to twelfth centuries that describe a range of different systems, such as Abhayãkaragupta's encyclopedic Vajrãvalï or Jagaddarpa^a's derivative Kriyãsamuccaya, cannot be taken as conclusive evidence for practice on the ground, as those authors themselves struggled with the various currents of opinion without necessarily reaching their own conclusions. In addition, the meanings of many terms remain obscure and will only come to light when a far broader field of reference is available.

Given this complexity, and the need to clarify so many aspects of tantric practice, I chose to focus my study upon a single feature of the whole. Key pieces of the overall picture are therefore missing. I give only the briefest sketch of the initiations that were the necessary preliminary to sãdhana practice, and only a hazy description of the place of sãdhana in the tãntrika's overall scheme of spiritual practice. And there are many points where my conclusions are at best provisional. Within these limitations, I have attempted to highlight those practices that characterize the Indian traditions of Vajrayoginï. In so doing, I hope to reveal how our particular author adapted earlier sources and responded to his own scriptural heritage, absorbing new trends and reflecting different developments within the highest Buddhist tantras.

The sãdhana that I have edited, translated, and studied here is the Vajravãrãhï Sãdhana (GSS11) by Umãpatideva, an early-twelfth-century author from northeastern India. This work is a fruitful subject because of the length, clarity, and excellence of its composition. It was also desirable to choose a work from the Guhyasamayasãdhanamãlã collection that was as yet unpublished, because some primary sources dealing with Vajrayoginï and Vajravãrãhï are already available in recent editions, including some studies in European languages. For a long while, the main academic accounts of Vajravãrãhï and Vajrayoginï were the iconographical descriptions given by Benoytosh Bhattacharyya in The Indian Buddhist Iconography (1924) and by Marie Thérèse de Mallmann's Introduction à l'Iconographie du Tântrisme Bouddhique (1975), both of which contain some errors (e.g., n. 228). These works draw heavily on Bhattacharyya's edition of the Sãdhanamãlã (1925 and 1928), which contains fewer than a dozen complete Vajrayoginï/Vajravãrãhï sãdhanas, all of which also appear in the Guhyasamayasãdhanamãlã.1 More recent studies also focus on selections from the Sãdhanamãlã sãdhanas, such as the short study of Vajravãrãhï by Mallar Mitra (1999: 102–29), which is too brief to be fully comprehensive. A beautiful collection of sculptures of the deity from different phases of Tibetan art have been published by von Schroeder (1981, 2001); however some of his iconographical comments are also erroneous (e.g., n. 83). A few other Sanskrit editions of Vajrayoginï sãdhanas have been published, such as the short Vajravãrãhïsãdhana by Advayavajra (=GSS3) by both Louis Finot (1934) and Richard O. Meisezahl (1967), a Trikãyavajrayoginïsãdhana (^GSS25) by Max Nihom (1992), and a handful of sãdhanas from the Guhyasamayasãdhanamãlã in Dhï^ (namely, GSS5, GSS10, GSS26, GSS42, and GSS43), as shown in the appendix. Published editions of highest tantric texts also provide an important resource for a study of Vajrayoginï/Vajravãrãhï, especially those from the Cakrasa^vara tradition, such as the Yoginïsa^cãratantra with both its available Sankrit commentaries, edited by J. S. Pandey (1998), and some chapters of the Sa^varodayatantra (possibly a later Nepalese composition)2 edited and translated by Shin'ichi Tsuda (1974).

The paucity of publications for the Indic Vajrayoginï tradition is in stark contrast to the number of Sanskrit manuscripts that must once have existed. Bongo Butten no Kenkyü (BBK) catalogs just over a dozen Vajrayoginï texts not found in the Guhyasamayasãdhanamãlã, appearing within works such as the

Yab skor (BBK: 261) and Yum skor (BBK: 273–77), commentaries on the Tattvajñānasa^siddhi (BBK: 279–80), the Jvālāvalīvajramālātantra (BBK: 493–94), as well as the later Nepalese Vajravārāhīkalpa in thirty-eight chapters (BBK: 261)—although many sādhana materials listed here are also found in our collection (details in the appendix). We can deduce the existence of yet more Indian Vajrayoginī sādhanas from the number of translations in the Tibetan canon that have no extant Sanskrit original. In an index to the Bka' 'gyur and Bstan 'gyur published in 1980, there are about forty-five sādhanas with Vajrayoginī or Vajravārāhī in the title, very few of which have (as yet) been correlated with a Sanskrit original by the compilers of the index. The popularity of the Vajrayoginī transmissions in Tibet is remarked upon in the Blue Annals (Roerich 1949–53: 390), which states, "The majority of tantric yogis in this Land of Snows were especially initiated and followed the exposition and meditative practice of the system known as [the Six Texts of Vajravārāhī] Phag-mo gZhung-drug" (p. 390). What is now known of her practice derives mainly from Tibetan Buddhism, in which Vajrayoginī (Rdo rje rnal 'byor ma) and Vajravārāhī (Rdo rje phag mo) are important deities.

Perhaps the main emphasis on forms of Vajrayoginī/Vajravārāhī (the names often seem to be used interchangeably) is found in the bKa' brgyud schools. This lineage is traced back to the siddha Tilopa (c. 928–1009), who had many visions of the deity, and who passed on oral transmissions to his pupil, Nāropa (c. 956–1040). Nāropa also had many visions of ^ākinī forms, the most famous of which is recounted in his life story, dated to the fifteenth and sixteenth century, in which Vajrayoginī appears to him as an ugly old hag who startles him into abandoning monastic scholasticism in favor of solitary tantric practice. However, this account does not appear in the earliest biographies (Peter Alan Roberts, personal communication: 2002).

The form of Vajrayoginī especially associated with Nāropa in Tibet is Nā ro mkha' spyod; "Nā ro [pa]'s tradition of the ^ākinī" or "Nāro's khecarī" (lit., "sky-goer"). This form is discussed below, as it is closest to that of Vajravārāhī described in the Indian sādhana translated here by Umāpatideva.

Several different practices of Vajravārāhī/Vajrayoginī were transmitted in the numerous traditions of the Tibetan bKa' brgyud school, through various teachers; for example, through the translator, Mar pa (Mar pa Chos kyi blo gros, 1012–97) into the Mar pa bKa' brgyud, and through Ras chung pa (Ras chung rDo rje grags pa, 1084–1161) into the several branches of the Ras chung sNyan rgyud, and yet another through Khyung po rnal 'byor, founder of the Shangs pa bKa' brgyud (eleventh–twelfth centuries) apparently from Niguma (sometimes said to be Nāropa's sister). This complex matrix of lineages continued in Tibet within the various bKa' brgyud traditions. In the Karma bKa' brgyud, the oral transmission was written down in the form of a sādhana by the third Karma pa, Rang byung rdo rje (b. 1284) (Trungpa 1982: 150). However, it is a sādhana by the sixth Karma pa (mThong ba don ldan, 1416–53) that serves as the basis for the main textual source in this school. This is the instruction text composed in the sixteenth century by dPa' bo gTsug lag phreng ba (1504–66).7 Vajravārāhī also appears in bKa' brgyud versions of the guruyoga, in which the devotee worships his guru (in one popular system, Mi la ras pa) while identifying himself as Vajravārāhī. Examples include the famous "four sessions" guruyoga (Thun bzhi'i bla ma'i rnal 'byor) of Mi skyod rdo rje, the eighth Karma pa (1507–54), and the Nges don sgron me, a meditation manual by the nineteenth-century teacher Jam mgon Kong sprul (1977: 119ff.), itself based on a sixteenth-century root text, the Lhan cig skyes sbyor khrid by the ninth Karma pa (dBang phyug rdo rje, 1556–1603). While Karma bKa' brgyud lamas around the world today frequently give the initiation of Vajravārāhī, they observe a strict code of secrecy in imparting the

instructions for her actual practice; however, published accounts of some practices within some bKa' brgyud schools are now available.

Vajrayoginï is also an important deity within the Sa skya school. According to Lama Jampa Thaye (personal communication: 2002), her practices were received into the Sa skya tradition in the early twelfth century, during the lifetime of Sa chen Kun dga' snying po (1092–1158), first of the "five venerable masters" of the Sa skya. Sa chen received from his teachers the initiations, textual transmissions, and instructions for three forms of Vajrayoginï. The first is a form derived also from Nãropa, and again called Nã ro mkha' spyod or "Nãro's khecarï" (although it is entirely different from the Tilopa-Nãropa-Mar pa transmission of Vajravãrãhï in the bKa' brgyud in that the deity has a different iconographical form with a distinct set of associated practices). The second is a form derived from the siddha Maitrïpa, known therefore as Maitrï Khecarï (Metri mkha' spyod ma). The third is derived from the siddha Indrabhüti, known therefore as Indra Khecarï (Indra mkha' sypod ma). This form is sometimes also known as Indra Vajravãrãhï, although as a deity in her own right, Vajravãrãhï has received much less attention among Sa skya pas than the Khecarï lineages.

These three forms are traditionally considered the highest practices within a collection of esoteric deity practices known as The Thirteen Golden Dharmas of Sa skya (Sa skya'i gser chos bcu gsum), as they are said to lead directly to transcendental attainment.12 However, it was Nãro Khecarï who became the focus of most devotion in the Sa skya tradition, and the practice instructions associated with her sãdhana were transmitted in the form of eleven yogas drawn from the siddha Nãropa's own encounter with Vajrayoginï. The most influential exposition of this system of eleven yogas emerged in the sixteenth century; known as The Ultimate Secret Yoga, it is a composition by 'Jam dbyangs mkhyen brtse dbang phyug (1524–68) on the basis of oral instructions received from his master, Tsar chen Blo gsal rgya mtsho (1494–1560). Since that time, the eleven yogas "have retained great importance in the Sa skya spiritual curriculum" (ibid.). The practices have retained their esoteric status for Sa skya pas, and are "secret" in as much as one may not study or practice them without the requisite initiations and transmissions.

In the eighteenth century, it appears that the Sa skya transmission of Nãro Khecarï and the eleven yogas entered the dGe lugs tradition. This seems to have occurred in the lifetime of the Sa skya master, Ngag dbang kun dga' legs pa'i 'byung gnas. His exact dates are unclear, but the next Sa skya lineage holder is his pupil, Kun dga' blo gros (1729–83). Ngag dbang kun dga' legs pa'i 'byung gnas is in fact the last of the Sa skya lineage holders given in dGe lugs sources (he appears as "Näsarpa" in the list given by K. Gyatso 1999: 343–46), and from this point, the dGe lugs lineage prayers reveal their own distinct sequence of transmissions (ibid.). The dGe lugs pa had originally focused upon Vajrayoginï/Vajravãrãhï in her role as consort to their main deity, Cakrasa^vara, following the teaching of Tsong kha pa (1357–1419). Cakrasa^vara was one of the three meditational deities, along with Yamãntaka and Guhyasamãja, whose systems Tsong kha pa drew together as the foundational practices of the dGe lugs school. In this context, Tsong kha pa's explanatory text, Illuminating All Hidden Meanings (sBas don kun gsal) is apparently the main source on Vajrayoginï (K. Gyatso 1999: xii); and she has actually been described as Tsong kha pa's "innermost yidam, kept very secretly in his heart" (Ngawang Dhargyey 1992: 9). This claim, however, was probably intended to bolster Vajrayogini's relatively recent presence in the dGe lugs pantheon, as the Sa skya tradition of eleven yogas was only popularized in the dGe lugs in the twentieth cenutury, by Pha bong kha (1878–1941). According to Dreyfus (1998: 246), "Pa-bong-ka

differed in recommending Vajrayoginï as the central meditational deity of the Ge-luk tradition. This emphasis is remarkable given the fact that the practice of this deity came originally [i.e., as late as the eighteenth century] from the Sa-gya tradition and is not included in Dzong-kha-ba's original synthesis." The Vajrayoginï practice passed on by Pha bong kha and his pupil, Kyabje Trijang, focuses on the set of eleven yogas; and despite their esoteric, and therefore highly secret, nature—and the absolute prerequisite of receiving correct empowerments— explanations of these practices have been published and are widely available in English: by Geshe Kelsang Gyatso (1991/99), Geshe Ngawang Dhargyey (1992), and Khensur Rinpoche Lobsang Tharchin (1997).

The rNying ma has also drawn the practices of Vajrayoginï/Vajravãrãhï into its schools. Her presence is read back into the life of Padmasambhava, the eighth-century founder of the rNying ma, who is said to have received initiation from Vajravãrãhï herself following his expulsion from the court of King Indrabhüti (Dudjom 1991: 469). Other important rNying ma lineage holders are also traditionally associated with the deity. For example, in the life story of Klong chen Rab 'byams pa (1308–63), as given by Dudjom Rinpoche (1991), he is said to have received visions of both a white Vãrãhï and a blue Vajravãrãhï, who foretell Klong chen pa's own meeting with Padmasambhava (ibid.: 577, 581). It is also Vajravãrãhï who leads him to the discovery of the treasure text (gter ma), Innermost Spirituality of the ^ãki^ï ((Man ngag) mkha' 'gro snying tig), the meaning of which is explained to him by Yeshe Tsogyel (Ye shes mtsho rgyal) (ibid.: 586). This identification between Vajrayoginï/Vajravãrãhï and Yeshe Tsogyel is significant—although Yeshe Tsogyel tends to be identified at different times with most of the major female deities of the tradition, such as Samantabhadrï and Tãrã (Dowman 1984: 12; Klein 1995: 17). In the account of Yeshe Tsogyel's life, a gter ma discovered in the eighteenth century (and now translated no fewer than three times into English), she is at times clearly identified with Vajrayoginï/Vajravãrãhï (e.g., Dowman 1984: 38, 85, 178); indeed, her sa^bhogakãya is said to be that of the deity (e.g., Gyelwa Jangchub in Dowman 1984: 4–5, 224; Klein 1995i: 147; J. Gyatso 1998: 247). The identification of Yeshe Tsogyel with Vajrayoginï/Vajravãrãhï is also suggested by Rig 'dzin 'Jigs med gling pa (1730–98), whose ^ãkki's Grand Secret Talk is revealed to him by a "paradigmatic" ^ãkinï, whom J. Gyatso (1998: 247) concludes is Yeshe Tsogyel herself.15 Various guruyoga practices within the rNying ma also formalize the connection between Yeshe Tsogyel and the deity. For example, in 'Jigs med gling pa's mind treasure, the Klong chen snying thig, the devotee longs for union with his guru as Padmasambhava, while identifying himself (and his state of yearning) with Yeshe Tsogyal in the form of Vajrayoginï/Vajravãrãhï. In other guruyoga practices, such as The Bliss Path of Liberation (Thar pa'i bde lam), the practitioner identifies directly with Vajrayoginï, who becomes "the perfect exemplar of such devotion" (Rigdzin Shikpo 2002: personal communication).

Over and above the deity's ubiquitous involvement in guruyoga meditations (a feature, as we have seen, of many Tibetan traditions), her popularity as a main deity in her own right is revealed by the growing number of liturgies devoted to her practice in the later rNying ma traditions. Robert Mayer (personal communication: 2002) mentions entire ritual cycles devoted to Vajravãrãhï, such as a volume entitled, Union of All Secret ^ãkinïs (mKha' 'gro gsang ba kun 'dus kyi chos skor). This was composed by the eminent nineteenth-century figure, 'Jams dbyangs mkhyen brtse'i dbang po, who believed it to be the "further revelation" (yang gter) of a gter ma dating back to the thirteenth century. The original gter ma revelation was by the famous female rNying ma gter ston Jo mo sman mo, herself deeply connected with Vajravarahi (ibid.; Allione 1984: 209–11). This volume is entirely dedicated to an important form of Vajravãrãhï in rNying ma practice, which is related to the gCod tradition, from Ma gcig lab sgron ma

(1031–1129) (Allione ibid.: 142–204). Here, the deity takes the wrathful black form of (ma cig) Khros/Khro ma nag mo or Krodhakãlï, also sometimes identified as Rudrã^i/ï (Mayer op. cit.). Patrul Rinpoche (1994: 297–98) describes an iconographical form that, apart from its color, is much the same as that of Indra^ãkinï (for a full tangka of Krodhakãlï with retinue, see Himalayan Art, no. 491). In full, however, this is an extremely esoteric practice and, in the case of the principal bDud 'joms gter ma cycles at least, is regarded as "so secret and powerful that practitioners are often advised to either take it as their sole practice, or not seek the initiation at all" (Mayer op. cit.).

Tibetans also recognize a living reincarnation trulku (sprul sku) of Vajravãrãhï (rDo rje phag mo). The first trulku was a pupil of Phyogs las rnam rgyal (also known as 'Jigs med grags pa and as Chos kyi rgyal mtshan, 1376–1452), the learned Bo dong Pad chen of the monastery Bo dong E (probably a bKa' gdams pa foundation in 1049). A Bo dong pa Monastery was subsequently founded at bSam sdings by the side of Yar 'brog mtsho (Yamdrog Lake), referred to as Yar 'brog bSam sdings dgon pa, and it was here that the trulku of rDo rje phag mo became established (Rigdzin Shikpo 2002: personal communication). The first abbess is one of the most famous incarnations, memorable for escaping from an invasion in 1717/19 of the Dzungar Tartars by apparently causing everyone in the monastery to appear as a herd of grazing pigs. But later incarnations have also been revered, and famed for their connection with Vajravãrãhï, until the present trulku (b. 1937/38) who became an eminent official in the Chinese administration (Simmer-Brown 2001: 185–86; cf. Taring 1970: 167; Willis 1989: 104).

The pervasiveness of Vajrayoginï/Vajravarahi in Tibet is attested by her appearance also within the Tibetan Bön tradition. Peter Alan Roberts (personal communication: 2002) has translated a meditation text by Shar rdza bKra shis rgyal mtshan (1859–1934) that focuses on the development of the experience of "the wisdom of bliss and emptiness" (bde stong ye shes), with "heat" (gtum mo/ca^^ãli) as a sign of accomplishment. The work is entitled The Inferno of Wisdom (Ye shes me dpung)17 and draws on Bön compositions going back to the eleventh or twelfth century gter ma texts. It describes a wrathful, cremation-ground ^ãkinï named Thugs rjes Kun grol ma ("She Who Liberates All through Compassion") who is clearly a form of Vajravãrãhï. She is ruby-red in color, adorned with skulls, and stands on one leg in the dancing posture; a black sow's head protrudes from her crown, and she brandishes a chopper aloft, holds a skull bowl of fresh blood to her heart, and clasps a skull staff in the crook of her left shoulder. The symbolism governing her attributes, as well as the metaphysical context of emptiness, all appear in typical Vajravãrãhï sãdhanas in the Buddhist tantric traditions.

The practice of Vajrayoginï/Vajravãrãhï is not exclusive to Tibet, however. In Nepal, Vajrayoginï is popularly worshiped as one of a set of four vãrãhïs or yoginïs: Guhyešvarï (also worshiped as Prajñãpãramitã, Nairãtmyã, and Agniyoginï), Vidyešvarï of Kathmandu, Vajrayoginï of Sankhu, and Vajrayoginï of Pharping (Slusser 1982: 256, 327). There are several temples of Vajravãrãhï and Vajrayoginï in the Kathmandu Valley, for example, at Chapagaon Grove (ibid.: 325–26, 341), and at the hilltop temple of Pharping (ibid.: 331). In Sankhu, Vajrayoginï is the tutelary deity of the town, and her temple is dedicated to the fierce cremation ground goddess "Ugratãrã Vajrayoginï" (Slusser 1982: 72 with n. 141). Here, Vajrayoginï is also identified with Prajñãpãramitã, "mother of all tathãgatas," and is considered the spouse of Svayambhü or Ãdibuddha, who is housed in a smaller shrine on the same site, while in the Hindu version of the local myth, she is identified with Šiva's consort, Durgã (Zanen 1986: 131). Gellner (1992: 256) comments that in Nepal, "Vajrayoginï seems...to play a role in uniting exoteric deities, such as Tãrã or Kumãrï and the Eight Mothers, with the consorts of the secret tantric deities,

viz. Vajravãrãhï... Jñãnadãkinï... and Nairãtmyã." Gellner goes on to describe tantric rites of initiation in current Newar practice that are taken mainly by Vajrãcãrya and Šãkya males (ibid.: 169–270). Here, "Tantric initiation (dïk^ã) means primarily the initiation of Cakrasamvara and his consort Vajravãrãhï" (ibid.: 268). The rites of initiation themselves are considered highly esoteric and are guarded with secrecy (ibid.: 273–80). Gellner's description—gleaned with difficulty from a learned informant—provides a rare insight into the modern-day practices. The first part of the initiation focuses upon Cakrasamvara, and is based on handbooks that follow the twelfth-century exegetical work, the Kriyãsamuccaya. The second part of the rite focuses on the consort Vajravãrãhï (or "Vajradevï") and is based upon material taken from the Samvarodayatantra, but also upon as yet unidentified sources (ibid.: 272). Despite drawing from early tantric sources, the rites currently in use in Nepal have been substantially altered in the process of taming and adapting them to suit tantric initiates who are householders (ibid.: 300ff.). Nevertheless, the preeminence of Vajravãrãhï in the tantric pantheon is retained in the modern Newar system. The series of rites that comprise the tantric initiation culminates with initiation into the practice of Vajravãrãhï, thus indicating her supreme position within the hierarchy of Newar religious practice (ibid.: 280; cf. ibid.: 261–62).

From this brief overview of the practices of Vajrayoginï and Vajravãrãhï outside India, it should be evident that we are dealing with a deity of major significance within tantric Buddhism. It is therefore unsurprising to find, within the burgeoning of modern publications on the highest tantras, a number of works that also relate to the subject. Some impressive studies on the ^ãkinï have appeared, such as the detailed monograph by Adelheid Herrmann-Pfandt (1992) and valuable explorations by Janet Gyatso (1998) and Judith Simmer-Brown (2001). Such studies tend to range also across other academic disciplines; notably, the image of the yoginï or dãkinï has inspired a large body of crosscultural and feminist theological discourse.

My own approach is predominantly textual: I have explored the contents of a major Sanskrit source that sheds light on the Indian origins of Vajrayoginï practice and underpins later traditions. The importance of the Guhyasamayasãdhanamãlã to the study of Vajrayoginï/Vajravãrãhï can hardly be overstated. Within this, I have restricted the scope of my work to Sanskrit sources (and as I do not know Tibetan, I am greatly indebted to others in the few instances where I cite Tibetan texts). My aim has been, simply, to represent my sources as faithfully as possible, either by translating or summarizing their contents. Although this type of undertaking may itself be prone to, perhaps even determined by, all kinds of subjective and cultural interpretation and selectivity by its author, I have tried to present the material in a manner that is more descriptive than interpretive. For example, my use of the masculine pronoun throughout reflects the usage in my source material; this, despite the fact that the practice of Vajrayoginï/Vajravãrãhï was—and certainly is—undertaken by women as well as men. What I hope emerges here is as accurate a record as I am able to give of the early origins of the cult from the textual evidence that remains to us.

I have begun in chapter 1 by locating Vajrayoginï within the complex traditions of the Buddhist tantras. I then turn to the Guhyasamayasãdhanamãlã itself and explore what is known of its provenance, both of its authors and of the tantric sãdhana that makes up the bulk of its contents. Chapter 2 forms a survey of all the different forms of Vajrayoginï within the Guhyasamayasãdhanamãlã, and also of the various ritual contexts in which these forms are evoked. It therefore gives an overview of the cult in India as it emerges from these texts. Chapter 3 is a study of one particular sãdhana from the collection, the

Vajravārāhï Sādhana by Umāpatideva, which is divided into its own distinctive meditation stages and final ritual portion. The Sanskrit edition (with notes) and the translation to the sādhana follow chapter 3. The appendix gives a list of all sādhanas in the Guhyasamayasādhanamālā (with witnesses where I have found them) and a summary of their contents. <>

THE PROFOUND REALITY OF INTERDEPENDENCE: AN OVERVIEW OF THE WISDOM CHAPTER OF THE WAY OF THE BODHISATTVA edited and translated by Douglas S. Duckworth and Künzang Sönam [Oxford University Press, 9780190911911]

- The first English translation of Künzang Sönam's commentary on the Wisdom Chapter of the Way of the Bodhisattva
- Brings the Way of the Bodhisattva into conversation with a vast Buddhist literature from India and Tibet
- Makes an important source frequently referenced in the Dalai Lama's lectures available in English for first time

The Way of the Bodhisattva, composed by the monk and scholar Śāntideva in eighth-century India, is a Buddhist treatise in verse that beautifully and succinctly lays out the theory and practice of the Mahayana path of a bodhisattva. Over one thousand years after Śāntideva's composition, Künzang Sönam (1823-1905) produced the most extensive commentary on the Way of the Bodhisattva ever written. This book is the first English translation of Künzang Sönam's overview of Śāntideva's notoriously difficult ninth chapter on wisdom.

The ninth chapter of the Way of the Bodhisattva is philosophically very rich but forbiddingly technical, and can only be read well with a good commentary. Künzang Sönam's commentary offers a unique and complete introduction to the view of Prāsangika-Madhyamaka, the summit of Buddhist philosophy in

Tibet, as articulated by Tsongkhapa. It brings Śāntideva's text, and Tsongkhapa's interpretation of Prāsangika-Madhyamaka, into conversation with a vast Buddhist literature from India and Tibet. By articulating the integral relationship between emptiness and interdependence, this text formulates a

sustained and powerful argument for emptiness as a metaphysical basis of bodhisattva ethics. This volume makes the ninth chapter accessible to English-speaking teachers and students of the Way of the Bodhisattva.

Review

"A wonderfully clear and readable translation of one of the most important commentaries on the ninth ("Wisdom") chapter of Shantideva's Way of the Bodhisattva. Essential reading for anyone interested in

how Shantideva's theory of emptiness was interpreted in Tibet."--José Ignacio Cabezón, Dalai Lama Professor of Tibetan Buddhism and Cultural Studies, UC Santa Barbara

"Kunzang Sonam's commentary on Śāntideva's Bodhicaryāvatāra is a tour de force, and one of the masterpieces of 19th-century Tibetan philosophical thought. Despite its status in the Tibetan philosophical canon, however, it has not been translated into English and is little known in the West. Douglas Duckworth brings us a superb translation of the commentary on the difficult wisdom chapter, a commentary that illuminates Śāntideva's discussion with great erudition. The philosophical insight shines brilliantly in Duckworth's precise, but highly readable English. Anyone interested in Śāntideva's thought should read this text."--Jay L Garfield, Smith College and the Harvard Divinity School

"An extraordinary, commanding presentation and translation of a most important text that penetratingly and thoroughly explains the full depth and reach of the Geluk perspective on Śāntideva's Wisdom Chapter by a truly eclectic Tibetan author, Künzang Sönam. Douglas Duckworth has done the superlative!"--Paul Jeffrey Hopkins, Emeritus Professor of Tibetan and Buddhist Studies, University of Virginia

"All in all, this is an excellent piece of scholarship which significantly contributes to our understanding of Prasangika-Madhyamaka." -- Karl-Stéphan Bouthillette, Ghent University, Religion

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Excerpt: The Way of the Bodhisattva

The Way of the Bodhisattva (Bodhicaryivatira), composed by Šāntideva in eighth- century India, is a Buddhist treatise in verse that beautifully and succinctly lays out the theory and practice of the Mahãyãna path of a bodhisattva. Over one thousand years after Šāntidevás composition, Künzang Sönam (1823–1905), a student of the famed Paltrül Rinpoché (1808– 887), in eastern Tibet, composed the most extensive commentary on the Way of the Bodhisattva ever written. Paltrül Rinpoché is said to have requested him to write a commentary on the Way of the Bodhisattva in accordance with the interpretation of the "new schools" (gsar phyogs). He did so in nearly one thousand pages.

There are several commentaries on the Way of the Bodhisattva from India, but only one has survived in Sanskrit, a lucid commentary from the eleventh century by Prajñãkaramati. There are many Tibetan

commentaries on the Way of the Bodhisattva as well, including important commentaries composed between the twelfth and sixteenth centuries by Sönam Tsemo (1142– 1182), Gyelsé Tokmé (1295–1369), Sazang Mati Panchen (1294–1376), Butön Rinchendrup (1290– 1364), Tsongkhapa (1357– 1419), Gyeltsapjé (1364–1432), and Pawo Tsuklak Trengwa (1504–1566).

The nineteenth century witnessed a revival of the study and practice of the Way of the Bodhisattva, spearheaded by Paltrül Rinpoché.2 Paltrül Rinpoché is said to have explained the Way of the Bodhisattva in accordance with the distinctive traditions of commentary in Tibet: the Sakya (sa skya) tradition in accord with Sönam Tsemo's commentary, the Kagyü (bka' brgyud) tradition in accord with Pawo Tsuklak Trengwás commentary, the Geluk (dge lugs) in accord with Gyeltsapjé's commentary, and the Nyingma (rnying ma) in accord with Prajñãkaramati's and Gyelsé Tokmé's commentaries. In this way, he fostered a teaching style that discouraged sectarian disputes and harmonized Buddhist traditions without compromising their distinctive interpretative styles of commentary.

Paltrül Rinpoché was part of what the late Gene Smith called "the Gemang (dge mang) movement," which was characterized by a rise in Nyingma monastic scholarship fused with an ethos of the Great Perfection (rdzogs chen). Evidence for this movement can be seen to stem from the activity of Gyelsé Shenpen Tayé (1800–1855?), who established the first Nyingma monastic college of Šrï Si^ha at Dzokchen monastery. Paltrül Rinpoché and his disciples took up this vision for Buddhist scholarship and practice at the Gemang retreat affiliated with Dzokchen monastery in Dzachuka (rdza chu kha), near the source of the Mekong River.

Paltrül Rinpoché embodies this spirit of fusion of study and practice, as seen in his life and works. In particular, we see this exemplified in a popular text he composed on the stages of the path as a preliminary to the Great Perfection, which has been rendered in English as the Words of My Perfect Teacher. Shabkar Tsokdruk Rang dröl (1781–1851), a kindred spirit with Paltrül Rinpoché, also flourished in this region of eastern Tibet, and his works similarly combined mind- training (blo sbyong) and the stages of the path (lam rim) with the Great Perfection in an ecumenical way. In contrast to a divisive approach that is sometimes found to fly under the banner of a "nonsectarian movement" (ris med)— where "nonsectarian" excludes the Geluk tradition— "the Gemang movement" brings together the best aspects of both the Nyingma and Geluk traditions, which harkens back to Gampopás twelfth-century synthesis of the lineages of Mahãmudrã and Kadampa.

Paltrül Rinpoché taught the Way of the Bodhisattva in Sakya, Geluk, Nyingma, and Kagyü monasteries. The tradition of its annual teaching that he instituted has continued at many monasteries in Dzachuka, such as Gegong (dge gong) and Sershül (ser shul). His commentarial style was tied to a practical orientation, and he outlined the ten chapters of the text into four sections around a prayer for the cultivation of bodhicitta, "the spirit of awakening":

> May the precious spirit of awakening
> Arise where it has not arisen,
> Where it has arisen, may it not dissipate,
> But further and further increase.

The first three chapters are explained to bring about the spirit of awakening where it has not arisen; the second set of three chapters make it not dissipate where it has arisen; and the next three chapters bring it to further and further increase. The culmination of the ultimate spirit of awakening, the purview of

wisdom (shes rab), is the ninth chapter, after which the text closes with a dedication for others in the tenth and final chapter.

Künzang Sönam composed two works on the famous ninth chapter of the text, one that consists of a commentary on the verses of the text and an "overview" (spyi don), which is translated in this volume. At the end of his text, he mentions a tradition that says some excellent things come from the Way of the Bodhisattva when it is understood in accord with the way it is explained in Gyeltsapjé's commentary, which he emulates in his own commentary. Other commentaries composed by Paltrül Rinpoché's students include an influential one by Khenpo Künpel (1870/ 2–1943), which has been translated into English as The Nectar of Manjushri's Speech. Khenpo Künpel was also a student of Mipam Rinpoché (1846–1912), who was himself a student of Paltrül Rinpoché and received teachings from him on the Way of the Bodhisattva as well. In contrast to Künzang Sönam's commentary, which relies on Gyelstapjé, Khenpo Künpel's commentary on the ninth chapter closely follows Mipam's commentary on that chapter, the Ketaka Jewel. Mipam's text famously sparked controversy and conversation from within Geluk scholarly circles. Mipam's commentary on this chapter, along with one of the criticisms it invoked and his response to that critic, have recently been translated into English in The Wisdom Chapter.

Khenpo Künpel was reported to teach the Way of the Bodhisattva to Khunu Lama (1895–1977), who taught it to the Fourteenth Dalai Lama. The Dalai Lama has said, "If I have any understanding of compassion and the bodhisattva path, it is entirely on the basis of this text that I possess it." The Dalai Lama often teaches this text, and in 1993, he presented an oral commentary on it in France that was published in a volume entitled Practicing Wisdom. In it, the Dalai Lama draws primarily from the commentaries of Khenpo Künpel and Künzang Sönam, and he points out areas of compatibility and contrast between them. When the Dalai Lama taught the first eight chapters and tenth chapter of the Way of the Bodhisattva in France in 1991, he requested that the two commentaries on the ninth chapter be translated into English before he completed the teaching on this chapter two years later; this sparked a volume of these two translations in Wisdom: Two Buddhist Commentaries. Therein, we find Künzang Sönam's "word- commentary" (gzhung 'grel) on the stanzas of the ninth chapter, and here in this volume a translation of his other commentary on the ninth chapter in the form of an "overview" (spyi don).

As mentioned, Künzang Sönam's word- commentary on the Way of the Bodhisattva closely follows the commentary by Tsongkhapás student Gyeltsapjé. Künzang Sönam's overview of the chapter is also framed by Tsongkhapás interpretation of Madhyamaka, and it, too, integrates many passages from Šãntidevás other extant text, the Anthology of Training (Šik^'isamuccaya), in addition to citing passages from over one hundred different sütras and treatises. Künzang Sönam's overview, in particular, integrates Candrakïrti with Šãntideva as representing a single voice of Prãsañgika-Madhyamaka, framed in terms of the unique features of Tsongkhapás Prãsa^gika view.

Tsongkhapás unique presentation of Prãsañgika comes up across Künzang Sönam's overview, and stems from Tsongkhapás influential commentary on Candrakïrti's Introduction to the Middle Way (Madhyamak'ivat'ira), in which he identifies eight unique features of Prãsa^gika: the unique ways of (1) denying the reality of a basic consciousness (kun gzhi rnam shes) that is distinct from the six sensory consciousnesses and (2) denying self-awareness; (3) not asserting that autonomous arguments (rang rgyud kyi sbyor ba, svatantraprayoga) generate the view of reality in the continuum of an opponent, (4)

the necessity of maintaining the reality of external objects in the same sense that the one maintains the reality of cognitions, (5) asserting that both Disciples (nyan thos) and Self- Realized Ones realize the selflessness of phenomena, (6) asserting that apprehending the self of phenomena is an afflictive obscuration, (7) asserting that disintegration is an entity, and (8) the consequent unique presentation of the three times. These features are all woven into Künzang Sönam's interpretation of the ninth chapter of Šãntidevás Way of the Bodhisattva. They are undergirded by his claim that nothing exists on its own, even conventionally, which is used to support the Madhyamaka view of the unity of the two truths of appearance and emptiness. Before we further explore the contents of his text, I will first introduce the author.

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Wisdom: The Ninth Chapter

The ninth chapter of the Way of the Bodhisattva, the Wisdom Chapter, is notoriously difficult, given that it is often cryptic and truncated, and it presumes knowledge of many Buddhist and non- Buddhist systems. It also propounds the view of emptiness and describes emptiness and interdependence as the metaphysical basis of ethics. The ninth chapter is also where we see pronounced differences in the interpretation of the text, as different commentaries on the other chapters for the most part accord with one another. Künzang Sönam's interpretation of the ninth chapter bears the mark of Tsongkhapás Prasangika- Madhyamaka, and he consistently emphasizes the unity of emptiness and interdependence, and the integration of an understanding of emptiness and ethics.

For the most part, Künzang Sönam's overview follows the order of the verses in the chapter, but he highlights particular verses, and skips others, as he puts the chapter into his own structure. The beauty of an "overview" (spyi don) style of commentary is that the author is not bound to follow a text word for word, but can elucidate the text's meaning more freely, in a way that is most appropriate to convey a clear message.

The first verse of chapter nine begins, "All these aspects were taught by the Sage for the purpose of wisdom." Künzang Sönam shows that all the aspects of method taught in the previous eight chapters, which bring happiness, are taught for the purpose of wisdom, which brings liberation. The second stanza goes straight into the two truths, where Šãntideva states that the conventional is within the domain of mind and that the ultimate is beyond that domain. On this topic Künzang Sönam gives an extensive, nine- part discussion of the two truths. Therein, he states that the basis of division of the two truths is objects of knowledge (shes bya), after showing that the two truths are defined in various ways by different Buddhist philosophical systems. He says that what distinguishes Buddhist philosophy is that it is "free from extremes" and that, though many different philosophies claim to be free from extremes, only the Prãsañgika-Madhyamaka lives up to that claim.

In his presentation of Madhyamaka, Künzang Sönam says that the relationship between the two truths is such that they are "essentially the same yet conceptually distinct" (ngo bo gcig la ldog pa tha dad). In other words, the conventional and ultimate truths are essentially the same, for one cannot exist without the other, yet they are distinct from the standpoint of their conceived aspects. While "conventional truth" has several meanings, he says that in the context of the Way of the Bodhisattva the "conventional" means what is obscuring or concealing, and he describes it as "everything that is understood to be truly existent by a conventional mind, like pots and so forth." Notably, he says that a

conventional truth, in contrast to what is merely conventional, is necessarily realized after the ultimate truth. This is because to understand anything to be merely conventional, and hence to understand it as it truly is, one must first understand that it is unreal, lacking true existence.

Following the tradition of Tsongkhapa, he highlights an important distinction between conventional truth and conventional existence, showing that everything that exists (including emptiness) does so only conventionally, whereas a truth that is conventional is just one of two truths (the other being the ultimate truth of emptiness). Likewise, there is a distinction to be made between that which is the ultimate truth, which is the lack of true existence, and that which is ultimately existent, which is a false conception that does not exist at all.

While making these distinctions, he points to another central topic in Tsongkhapás presentation of Madhyamaka: identifying the object of negation. In doing so, he draws another important distinction between misconceptions (e.g., apprehending a truly existent self) and the objects of those misconceptions (e.g., a truly existent self). Similar to the distinction between (an existent) "belief in God" and a (nonexistent) "God," the latter (e.g., truly existent self) does not exist, whereas only the former (e.g., apprehension of a truly existent self) does.

The third stanza of the ninth chapter continues by outlining the world in terms of the perspectives of ordinary beings on the one hand, and of yogis on the other. Künzang Sönam here describes the primary meaning of "ordinary beings" as those who have not been influenced by philosophical systems, in contrast to yogis, who have either directly realized emptiness or who understand it through study and contemplation. He explains that there are ascending levels of yogis, culminating with Prãsañgika-Mãdhyamikas, those who are free from the two extremes of existence and nonexistence.

Künzang Sönam's overview does a lot to clarify the distinction between Svãtantrika and Prãsañgika, the two interpretations of Madhyamaka first distinguished as distinct schools in Tibet. He says that Svãtantrikas maintain a basis of conventional truth that can be found upon analysis, whereas Prãsa^gikas deny this and also deny that anything exists on its own (rang mtshan gyis grub pa), even conventionally. In describing a Svãtantrika, "a proponent of autonomous probative arguments," he states that "autonomous" (rang rgyud), "independent" (rang dbang), and "objective" (rang ngos nas grub pa) have the same meaning. In contrast, he characterizes a Prãsañgika as a Mãdhyamika who does not accept that anything exists on its own, even conventionally, and as "one who accepts that the inferential understanding to be established in the continuum of an opponent arises only by means of a reductio."

A central element in this interpretation is the denial, even conventionally, of anything that exists on its own, a technical phrase that some translators have rendered as "established in virtue of its own characteristics," but I have translated here as "exists on its own" for clarity. One should keep in mind that the key term in this technical phrase, svalakhala (rang mtshan), takes on different shades of meaning in different contexts of Buddhist philosophy: in Abhidharma, it refers to a thing's specific characteristic in contrast to its shared properties; in the epistemological tradition of Dharmakïrti, it refers to an ineffable and efficacious particular in contrast to a concept or universal; and in the context of this interpretation of Madhyamaka, it demarcates the subtle object of negation that is only realized in Prãsañgika. It is the meaning in this last context that is important for understanding Künzang Sönam's reading of Šãntidevás text as Prãsañgika-Madhyamaka.

In contrast to Prãsañgika-Madhyamaka, Künzang Sönam says that the system of Svãtantrika-Madhyamaka maintains a distinction between correct and incorrect conventional truths. Prãsañgikas, however, do not accept this division because in this system, "Whatever is conventional necessarily does not exist the way it appears." The reason Svãtantrikas assert a distinction between correct and incorrect conventional truths, he says, is because they accept conventional truth to exist on its own; Prãsañgikas do not accept this, and so they need not make a distinction between correct or incorrect conventional truths. In this context, he adds that "correct" (yang dag pa) effectively means "on its own" (rang gi mtshan nyid kyis grub pa).

Künzang Sönam claims that accepting the difference between the respective existence and nonexistence of a real body and an illusory one does not conflict with Prãsañgikas not accepting correct or incorrect conventional truths. For a Prãsañgika, the difference between a conventional illusion (e.g., a ropesnake) and a conventional reality (e.g., a rope) can be and is drawn, but it is not a difference that is drawn objectively (yul de'i rang ngos nas). The essential point of the Prãsañgika view is that distinctions within the conventional— between truth and falsity, existence and nonexistence, real and unreal— are not objective; that is, they are not determined from the objects themselves.

Conventional distinctions between what is real and unreal are for Prãsañgikas made in terms of mundane conventions. These distinctions are not made based on any real differences in objects themselves; rather, what constitutes what is real and unreal is determined intersubjectively. Significantly, what is intersubjective necessarily incorporates a subjective dimension.

One might think that if a Prãsañgika does not accept objective distinctions, then this position would not be different from the subjective idealism of the Mind- Only school. Rather than claim that the mind is independently real in contrast to unreal external objects, as a subjective idealist does, Šãntideva explicitly affirms the interdependency of minds and objects. Following this, Künzang Sönam describes how minds and external objects are equally existent in mundane convention (and in Abhidharma) and equally nonexistent when their nature is sought in analysis (and in a sublime being's meditative equipoise). He argues that Prãsañgikas accept external objects conventionally because the coextensive presence or absence of objects and cognitions undermines the claim that even conventionally, there are no external objects. He reiterates this point by saying that not only does no conventional analysis negate external objects, but that conventional analysis undermines the absence of externality.

Elaborating on the difference between Madhyamaka and Mind-Only, Künzang Sönam says that "the distinction of whether or not external objects are accepted conventionally also comes down to whether or not one accepts something to exist on its own (rang mtshan gyis grub pa)." Once again, this is the main issue for his Prãsañgika interpretation. He argues that proponents of Mind- Only are not satisfied with assenting to the reality of the external world as it is accepted by ordinary people; they think that if there were external objects, they would have to be the types of things that would be findable upon analysis and that would exist separately from cognition. Yet since there are no such things, they deny them. Prãsañgikas, in contrast, assert the existence of external objects without appealing to these criteria, that is, without requiring any objective basis of designation for these claims. Thus, Prãsañgikas simply assent to external objects in accord with the ways of the world, and this is, once again, because of the fact that nothing is accepted to exist on its own, neither an external nor an internal world, even conventionally.

Künzang Sönam clarifies the Prãsañgikás acceptance of the empirical reality of external objects by arguing that it is not at all like the claims of those who posit the reality of external objects based on analysis, such as the Vaibhãsikas and the Sautrãntikas. This is because Prãsañgikas reject the kind of realism that is implicated in accepting an analytically determined external world. Rather, Prãsañgikas simply accept external objects (conventionally) in accord with the ways of the world, without (ontological) analysis. There is a subtle distinction to be made here that can easily be overlooked. That is, Prãsañgikas are not external realists, despite claiming the reality of an external world, because they acknowledge that the external world does not stand on its own, even conventionally; like minds and objects, an external world rises and falls together with an internal world.

As Šãntideva states in chapter five of the Way of the Bodhisattva, the instruments of torture in hell and hell itself are products of an evil mind. Thus, neither hell realms nor human worlds are external, but that does not necessarily mean that they are "all in your head," either. It is important to see that a Prãsañgikás affirmation of an external world is not an assertion from her own perspective that there is an external world in reality; it is only an assent to intersubjective agreement determined by mundane convention. Ultimately, there is no external world (or an internal world) for Prãsañgikas, so though Prãsañgikas may not be idealists, they are certainly not external realists either. In any case, the reason Künzang Sönam understands Šãntidevás Prãsañgika to deny objective foundations such as self- awareness (rang rig), the dependent nature (gzhan dbang), and the basic consciousness (kun gzhi) comes down again to the same issue: there is nothing that exists on its own even conventionally.

Tibetan interpreters of Šãntideva like Künzang Sönam clearly see the Way of the Bodhisattva as a Prãsañgika text. The key to the placement in this category is that, for Künzang Sönam, Šãntideva supports the idea that nothing exists on its own even conventionally. Šãntideva therefore has no need to ground conventions in any deeper foundation. Without the need for conventional foundations, such as a dependent nature or a basic consciousness, he needs no ultimate foundations either, as if a real ultimate were needed to ground unreal conventions. As Šãntideva says, an illusory buddha works just as well as a truly existent one.60 When there are nothing but groundless conventions— all the way up and all the way down— the ultimate and the conventional are no longer separate; the two truths are none other than two aspects of the same thing. For this reason, the two truths are not only noncontradictory; they are mutually entailing. This is a key to Künzang Sönam's interpretation of Šãntidevás Way of the Bodhisattva as representing Prãsañgika-Madhyamaka.

After presenting a section in which he outlines the position of the proponents of Mind- Only, their critique, and a response to this critique, Künzang Sönam then expands on self- awareness and its refutation. Here he elaborates further distinctions of a Prãsangika-Madhyamaka interpretation of Šãntideva's text. He argues that self- awareness is a reification and that it does not provide an adequate account of knowledge or memory. Following Šãntideva's verses in the Way of the Bodhisattva, he also says that it is a contradiction for the mind to act on itself; as a knife cannot cut itself, a mind cannot know itself, either. He says that self- awareness is simply a subjective representation of mind that proponents of Mind-Only want to maintain as something that acts as both a subject and a nondual awareness, which is a contradiction. Further, he says that there is no source of knowledge (tshad ma, pramãla) that can lay claim to a nondual mind, such as a pure dependent nature or self- awareness, so it is nothing but a theoretical posit, and one that should be relinquished, even conventionally, because if

something like it were to exist, it would exist on its own, and Prãsañgika concede nothing to exist this way, even conventionally.

Künzang Sönam does not only say that theoretical accounts of self-awareness are misconceived; he also argues against an alternative account of awareness, other object-awareness (gzhan rig). He says that a model of knowledge that takes the mind to stand apart from, yet know, what is other is also not a coherent account of the process of knowledge; nor is it a model that adequately accounts for the relationship between mind and world. In fact, he argues that all analytically determined accounts of knowledge, including self- awareness and other object- awareness, are misconceived. This is because any time a rich analysis of the conventional world is engaged, one is necessarily committed to the ultimate status of what is found. Moreover, it is because anything that is found in its basis of designation, even in the case of a conventional analysis, is by implication an ultimate entity, which Prãsañgika unequivocally deny.

In his depiction of Prãsañgika, there is no way to find any basis of designation, behind or beyond designation, other than emptiness. So what we are left with to account for the conventional world is simply the consensus of mundane conventions— "I see blue," "I remember her," etc.— period. Other than mundane convention, there is no deeper structure or rich account that gets us any closer to the way things are; and furthermore, when we seek anything more than this and find something other than emptiness, we are deceived.

Despite being established by consensus, the world as it is understood by ordinary beings is always wrong in a fundamental way, as Šãntideva says:

> Even the objects of perception, such as visible forms,
> Are established by consensus, not by sources of knowledge.
> That consensus is wrong,
> Like the popular view that impure things are pure.

Following Tsongkhapa, Künzang Sönam explicitly says that for Prãsañgika, being a distorted cognition ('khrul shes) does not contradict being a source of knowledge (tshad ma).63 In this way, sources of knowledge for conventional truths can be held to be right or wrong pragmatically (or intersubjectively) and at the same time be mistaken in terms of the ontological status of these truths when they appear as if they are truly existent. For this reason, an ordinary being's understanding of the conventional world is superseded by a perspective of higher knowledge, for which the way things appear does not conflict with the way things are— namely, when things are seen as illusion- like and empty of true existence. Künzang Sönam's description of epistemology (tshad ma) in his overview closely follows that laid out by Tsongkhapás student, Khedrupjé (1385– 1438), in his Great Exposition, which has been translated into English by José Cabezón in A Dose of Emptiness.

That conventional truth is intersubjective, that it "accords with the world," should not be confused with a view of relativism: the fact that things are empty and that the process of causality (karma) is incontrovertible are nonnegotiable in this interpretation of Prãsa^gika. Indeed, Künzang Sönam argues that causality proceeds while things are merely nominally existent or while they are empty. Yet in his interpretation of Prãsa^gika, a tension remains between what is represented as a correct truth for the world, as an intersubjective truth, and what is held to be the correct truth for anyone, as an objective truth— namely, emptiness (as a nonnegotiable ultimate truth) and the undeviating causal process (as a

nonnegotiable conventional truth). For the Geluk tradition in general, epistemic warrants come into play to keep the radical dialectic of Prãsañgika within the boundaries of Buddhist doctrine and in service of defending Buddhist claims of emptiness and the causal process.

Despite an ordinary being's conventional sources of knowledge always being wrong about the way things are, they are seen to deliver objects that to some degree correspond to objects in the world; thus, they are necessary, at least as long as the conditions for their existence (i.e., ignorance) are present. In other words, partially warranted and partially distorted conventional sources of knowledge continue to function until the ultimate is realized, just as an illusion continues as long as the conditions for its appearance remain, as Šãntideva said:

> For as long as the conditions are assembled,
> For that long illusions, too, will persist.

Thus, as long as the conventions of the world continue to function and are not undermined by another conventional source of knowledge, they work (for the time being).

Künzang Sönam further defends an interpretation of the Way of the Bodhisattva that is in tune with Tsongkhapás interpretation of PrãsañgikaMadhyamaka when he argues that everyone, including Disciples and Self-Realized Ones, must completely realize emptiness in order to achieve nirvana. He argues that there is really only one kind of emptiness, the lack of any findable reality, which has many different substrates, such as persons or phenomena. His interpretation of Prãsañgika thus claims that to apprehend true existence is an afflictive obscuration, not a cognitive obscuration, because there is no hard distinction between the self of persons and phenomena (other than simply being a different substrate). Therefore, he says that it is necessary to realize emptiness fully, the lack of intrinsic existence in phenomena, in order to achieve just liberation. In doing so, the way he distinguishes between Buddhist vehicles (i.e., Disciple, Self- Realized Ones, Bodhisattva) is explicitly based on a distinction with regard to method, not a distinction in terms of view,68 because he holds that all Buddhist paths to liberation necessarily entail the realization of emptiness as it is expressed in Prãsañgika-Madhyamaka.

After an extended discussion in which he establishes the validity of the Mahãyãna against dissenters and outlines the meaning of obscurations and the stages upon which they are eliminated, Künzang Sönam continues with a presentation and refutation of non- Buddhist positions that Šãntideva addresses in his text. He first treats the Sãmkhya and then the Nyãya-Vaišesika, before returning to a further defense of the unique features of Prãsañgika-Madhyamaka. As he mentions in the context of his presentation of the philosophical system of Mind- Only, it is important to identify a position in order to understand how and why it is refuted. Without understanding the position of another, one will not understand one's own system, nor will one understand the Way of the Bodhisattva when it references those views.

Later in his overview he comes back to refute the theistic views of those who claim a singular, permanent, and independent creator God, like Ïšvara. He also critiques the position of the Jains (a.k.a. Nigranthas) in the context of refuting a view of causality that accepts arising from both self and other. Künzang Sönam's explanation of non- Buddhist philosophical systems relies closely on Jamyang Shepás Great Exposition of Philosophical Systems, which has been translated into English by Jeffrey Hopkins in Maps of the Profound.

In between Künzang Sönam's refutations of different non- Buddhist views, he returns to a defense of Tsongkhapás unique features of Prãsañgika. In presenting a Prãsañgika account of causality without

substances, he describes the "entity of disintegration" (zhig pa'i dngos po) and the unique presentation of the three times that follows from this distinctive interpretation of causality.

After defending these last two features that Tsongkhapa had claimed were distinctive to Prãsañgika-Madhyamaka, Künzang Sönam recapitulates the arguments against a self-framed in terms of a relationship between the self and the aggregates. He elaborates first on a fivefold reasoning from Nãgãrjunás Fundamental Verses of the Middle Way (Mülamadhyamakakãrikã) and then on a sevenfold reasoning from Candrakïrti's Introduction to the Middle Way to show that a self is unfindable upon analysis when sought for as either identical with or different from the aggregates. He argues that the self is simply a nominal convention, designated in dependence upon the aggregates, just as a chariot is designated in dependence upon its parts. Any other self or chariot beyond mere designation cannot be found, nor is anything found in its basis of designation in Prãsañgika- Madhyamaka, even conventionally.

The fact that nothing is found in its basis of designation, even conventionally, is an important feature of Künzang Sönam's nominalist interpretation of Prãsañgika- Madhyamaka and a reason he does not accept any rich theory of causality— because such theories imply realism. That is, rich accounts of causality are those that are sought out in terms of a relationship between discrete things that are found upon analysis (e.g., to be the same or different); therefore, they are based on realist presumptions (e.g., identity and difference). In contrast, Künzang Sönam shows the way that causality can function while being merely asserted conventionally, based on named regularities in the world rather than based in any substructure or rich theoretical story beyond conventional designation.

Despite his claims, and his valiant effort to present a nominalist theory of causality, Künzang Sönam may be guilty of going against his own nominalist strand of Prãsañgika in his defense of the "entity of disintegration." The impetus for the theory of the entity of disintegration, or so it seems, is to provide an account of causality in the absence of foundations. That is, disintegration is said to function as other entities do in the absence of real entities. With no real entities, an entity's disintegration— which is typically held within Buddhist philosophical systems to be a non- entity— is thus attributed with the same status as an efficacious entity (nominal). That is, both an entity and its disintegration are nothing more than nominal designations. Although attributing causal power to disintegration is an attempt to preserve a nominalist theory of causality, this theory invites other problems such as the reification of absence (i.e., treating emptiness as a "thing"), which has been a frequent target for critics of the Geluk tradition. Others have argued that the notion of an entity of disintegration goes against the Prasangika commitment to accord with mundane convention renowned in the world. In any case, I leave the relative merits and demerits of this system of Prãsa^gika for readers to evaluate for themselves, and I will continue to outline this interpretation to set the stage for the translation of his overview of the Wisdom Chapter below.

In the next section, Künzang Sönam presents the fourfold "application of mindfulness"— of body, feeling, mind, and phenomena— before turning to the practices of calm abiding (zhi gnas) and special insight (lhag mthong). For calm abiding, he reiterates the nine stages of mental abiding that lead to a genuine calm abiding, drawing from the Stages of Meditation (Bh'ivan'ikrama), Distinguishing the Middle and the Extremes (Madhy'intavibh'iga), and the Ornament of the Mah'iy'ina Sütras (Mah'iy'inasütr'ila^k'ira). He then describes two kinds of special insight: mundane and transcendent. Only the latter special insight into selflessness leads to liberation. He again mentions that it is necessary to realize selflessness completely for liberation, and that this is to understand that nothing exists on its own, even

conventionally. For him, this is the province of Prasangika- Madhyamaka and the root of all its distinctions from realist views.

Künzang Sönam next connects Šãntidevás verses to a presentation of three arguments that establish the selflessness of phenomena. Drawing heavily from Candrakïrti's Introduction to the Middle Way, he first lays out "the argument of the diamond shards," which is a refutation of four positions that, respectively, assert that causality is a process of arising from self, other, both, or without cause. He pins the position of causeless arising on the materialist Cãrvãka school, and the position that there is self- arising on the Sãnkhyas. The claim to arising from both self and other he attributes to the Jains and says that arising from other is a position found in realist Buddhist schools, from the Svãtantrika on down.

In his presentation of a second argument for selflessness, that of interdependence, Künzang Sönam explains three meanings of dependent arising as "meeting" (phrad) "relying" (ltos), and "depending" (brten). The first, "meeting," connotes the dependent arising that is part of the general grammar of Buddhism. Dependent arising here is a feature of causal processes, the way there are regularities without substances: "When this is present, that arises; when this ceases, that ceases." Indeed, Šãntideva consistently links his Way of the Bodhisattva with this central feature of Buddhist doctrine.

The notion of dependent arising also extends from causal processes, or chains of events, to spatial relationships as well. This is where we find a second meaning of dependent arising, "relying," that Künzang Sönam mentions. Here, dependent arising is interpreted to connote the interdependent relationship between parts and wholes. The meaning of dependent arising here also has a major role to play in Buddhist thought in general, where singular persons or selves, like chariots, are critiqued as lacking singular, autonomous existence. "Teeth, hair, and nails, are not the self . . . " Šãntideva takes up this kind of analysis in the eighth and ninth chapters, when he deconstructs the notion of self and phenomena with analyses of the body, feelings, mind, and phenomena.

The last and subtlest view of dependent arising is found in the third of the three connotations of dependent arising, "depend." That all things exist in dependence upon linguistic and conceptual designation is a feature of a Madhyamaka view. Yet the fact that things do not exist otherwise, even conventionally, is a unique feature of Prasangika- Madhyamaka for Künzang Sönam— where all things without exception are conceptually or linguistically designated.

He calls the argument of interdependence "the king of reasoning" because it is the one through which the extreme of existence can be overcome through appearance (merely conventionally existing) and the extreme of nonexistence can be overcome through emptiness (merely the lack of intrinsic existence of appearances). This is a special argument, he says, because "there are no other arguments that formulate evidence from the side of emptiness that can simultaneously elicit certainty in both appearance and emptiness." The last of the three arguments he presents to establish selflessness is the argument that negates the production of an existent or nonexistent thing.

After presenting these three arguments, Künzang Sönam concludes his overview where Šãntideva concludes his chapter, with the benefits of realizing emptiness. He says that the function of realizing emptiness, the accumulation of gnosis, is the accumulation of merit, which manifests through an enacted understanding of the causal process. Thus, he links the logic of the end of the chapter with the logic with which it began, where "All these aspects are taught by the Sage for the purpose of wisdom." That is, he

shows how the two accumulations of merit and gnosis comprise the six transcendent perfections, and how emptiness is integrated with compassion. He thus shows how emptiness serves as both the culmination and the basis for ethics in Mahãyãna Buddhism. What is distinctive about this interpretation, and Madhyamaka, is that it seamlessly integrates the Buddhist view (interdependence/ emptiness) with Buddhist conduct (nonviolence and altruism), without promoting one at the expense of the other (either by making ethics merely instrumental to realizing the view of emptiness or by claiming that ethical conduct is a natural or magical product of realizing a view of emptiness that is disconnected from ethics). <>

MIDDLE BEYOND EXTREMES: MAITREYA'S MADHYÃNTAVIBHÃGA WITH COMMENTARIES BY KHENPO SHENGA AND JU MIPHAM

by Arya Maitreya, Jamgon Mipham, translated by The Dharmachakra Translation Committee [Snow Lion, 9781559395014]

Middle Beyond Extremes contains a translation of the Buddhist masterpiece *Distinguishing the Middle from Extremes*. This famed text, often referred to by its Sanskrit title, *Madhyāntavibhāga*, is part of a collection known as the *Five Maitreya Teachings*. Maitreya is held to have entrusted these profound and vast instructions to the master Asaṅga in the heavenly realm of Tuṣita. *Distinguishing the Middle from Extremes* employs the principle of the three natures to explain the way things seem to be as well as the way they actually are. It is presented in **MIDDLE BEYOND EXTREMES** alongside commentaries by two outstanding masters of Tibet's nonsectarian Rimé movement, Khenpo Shenga and Ju Mipham.

Trulshik Rinpoche in his foreword says that the Regent Maitreyanatha, lord of the ten grounds, granted five treatises to the master Asanga in the divine realm of Tuṣita, two of which are concerned with 'distinguishing.' **MIDDLE BEYOND EXTREMES** contains an English translation of one of these two treatises, namely *Distinguishing the Middle from Extremes.*

Accompanying Maitreya's teaching are two commentaries: The first, composed by Khenchen Shenga, was created by means of a classic Indian source. The book also contains the explanations by Mipham Nampar Gyalwa, the loving protector and king of Dharma. In this way, it contains, as it were, both Indian and Tibetan commentaries.

MIDDLE BEYOND EXTREMES contains one among the protector Maitreya's five treatises, *Distinguishing the Middle from Extremes*. It is accompanied by two commentaries: Khenchen Shenga's elucidations, which are all drawn from a classical Indian source, and the explanations of the supreme scholar, Mipham Chokley Nampar Gyalwa. These English translations were prepared under the auspices of the Dharmachakra Translation Committee. The translators are headed by his student, Thomas Doctor, who is devoted, committed, and knowledgeable. The translators followed a series of lectures on the texts, and they have worked hard to clarify their understanding with the help of several scholars.

The Dharmachakra Translation Committee draws its inspiration from the vision, commitment, and magnificent achievements of past Buddhist translators. Directed by Chökyi Nyima Rinpoche, the Committee is dedicated to making Buddhist classics available to modern readers in their native languages.

To those who read **MIDDLE BEYOND EXTREMES** Chökyi Nyima Rinpoche recommends following a program of lectures, since this is the best way to meet these texts. In any case, it is important that one actively seek to gain a clear understanding of these teachings. Whoever practices them will before long accomplish the stage of great enlightenment and, by relying on factors such as the six transcendences, arise as a great captain to guide all wandering beings.

In his Five Teachings *the protector Maitreya, the Regent who has mastered the ten grounds, reveals fully and flawlessly the view, meditation, conduct, and fruition that are accomplished through the Great Vehicle. With utmost profundity his teachings reach far and wide; they are a treasury of scripture, reasoning, and oral instruction.* – Chökyi Nyima Rinpoche

Unraveling the subtle processes that condition people's thinking and experience, Maitreya's teaching in **MIDDLE BEYOND EXTREMES** reveals a powerful path of compassionate vision and spiritual transformation. <>

THE PRINCE AND THE SUFI: THE JUDEO-PERSIAN RENDITION OF THE BUDDHA BIOGRAPHIES by Dalia Yasharpour [Brill Reference Library of Judaism, BRILL 9789004442740]

THE PRINCE AND THE SUFI is the literary composition of the seventeenth-century Judeo-Persian poet Elisha ben Shmūel. In **THE PRINCE AND THE SUFI: THE JUDEO-PERSIAN RENDITION OF THE BUDDHA BIOGRAPHIES,** Dalia Yasharpour provides a thorough analysis of this popular work to show how the Buddha's life story has undergone substantial transformation with the use of Jewish, Judeo-Persian and Persian-Islamic sources. The annotated edition of the text and the corresponding English translation are meticulous and insightful. This scholarly study makes available to readers an important branch in the genealogical tree of the Buddha Biographies.

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The Judeo-Persian Poet in the Context of History

The present study is a critical analysis, edition and annotated translation of Shahzãdeh lia Sufi "The Prince and The Sufi," the late seventeenth century literary Judeo-Persian composition by the poet Elïsha' ben Shmüel, pen named, Rãgheb, "the desirous one." The latter is a term with Sufi connotation, denoting one who desires proximity to God. Judeo-Persian, the Jewish language used until the first decades of the twentieth century, is largely Persian written with Hebrew script. As with other major Judeo-Persian compositions, Shahzãdeh lia Sufi is distinct in its linguistic, literary expression reflecting the convergence of Judaism with Iran, Islam and Persia over the space of centuries.

The Jews of Iran are among the most ancient of Jewish diaspora communities. Their settlement in the region adjacent to Iran most likely first took place when the Assyrians conquered the Northern Kingdom of Israel and exiled its people, circa 722 BCE. It is plausible to speak of a continuous Jewish presence in the region from the Babylonian conquest of Judea, circa 586 BCE. Despite their religious minority status, a millennia long presence inextricable linked them to the land and its culture. To this day, the Jews of Iran revere Persian poetry recounting Iran's ancient glory, name their children after ancient Iranian kings and celebrate Nawruz. Narratives from the Tanakh, including the Book of Daniel, Esther, Ezra and Nehemiah depict Jews in Iran's royal court interacting with kings who allowed subjects to practice their religion and customs. Historical accuracy notwithstanding, these accounts left an enduring mark on their collective consciousness. In his versified epic the JUDEO-PERSIAN poet, Shãhïn (thirteenth -fourteenth century CE), reveled in describing Queen Esther's amorous relations with her Iranian king and named Cyrus as the product of their loving union. Daniel, Esther and Mordekay's tombs are said to be located in modern day Susa and Hamadan. Viewed as tangible connections to the prophets and the Holy Land and not merely relics of a bygone past, Jews made pilgrimage there to seek physical or spiritual refuge, pray and celebrate Jewish holidays. Extant JUDEO-PERSIAN chronicles of religious persecution in the seventeenth and eighteenth century suggest that Persian Jewry perceived itself to be reliving Esther and Mordekay's plight.

The Babylonian centers of Jewish learning, Sürã and Pumbedita, were established at the end of the third century CE and functioned until the eleventh century. The Jews of Iran contributed to producing the Babylonian Talmud (completed circa 499 CE), one of the most important sources of rabbinic Jewish law and teaching. Accounts in the Babylonian Talmud indicate that at times respectful, friendly interaction existed between some members of the Sasanian monarchy and the rabbis. Moreover, the Sasanian ruler, Yazdegerd I (399– 420 CE), is represented in the Babylonian Talmud as an ally of the Jews and Iranian sources say he married the daughter of a Jewish exilarch. She is said to have established Jewish settlements in Iran and given birth to Bahrãm Gür, a continuation of a tradition of depicting Iranian kings being born of Jewish mothers.

In 642 CE, the Arabs conquered what had once appeared to be an all-powerful Iranian dynasty. Unlike the people of other conquered lands, the Iranian population refused to give up its language for Arabic. As a result, it maintained significant aspects of its national and cultural identity. Likewise, the acculturated Jewish population continued speaking a variety of Iranian dialects.

Islam saw itself as superseding Judaism and Christianity and therefore, from its inception, adopted a policy of inherent discrimination. Designated legal status as ahl al-dhimmah, "People of the Pact," they were permitted to continue practicing their religion and live according to their own customs. In return

for physical protection and protection of their property, Jews were obligated to pay jizyah, "annual poll tax." In addition to serving an economic function, the tax affirmed the subordinate status of religious minorities. Treatment of Jews varied with time and region and depended largely on whether the state was politically and economically strong and stable. Lack of stability resulted in increased religious observance and enforcement of the superior-inferior relationship between Muslims and non-Muslims. At such times, opportunities for minorities to acquire a measure of wealth or social mobility were minimized. In addition to the poll tax, other shurüi, "conditions," designed to demonstrate the supremacy of Islam were observed in variant degrees.

New social, economic restrictions were imposed with the institutionalization of the Shi^ah (Per. Shïyeh) sect of Islam by the Safavid Dynasty (1501– 1736 CE). It viewed Jews as a source of najesãt, "ritual impurity;" therefore, a broad set of restrictive conditions were enforced in every facet of daily life. Given the socio-economic restrictions imposed on them, Jews were predominantly employed as artisans, craftsmen, and peddlers. Others pursued occupations deemed ritually unclean or morally reprehensible; they were tanners, producers and distributors of wine, entertainers to the Persian courts or cleaners of cesspools, drying the contents for fuel. A relatively small number were engaged in professions that allowed them to cross the social and economic divide, including trade, medicine, and sorcery.

The reign of Shãh 'Abbãs I (1587–1629) saw Esfahan, long home to a community of Jews, replace Qazvin as the capital. The King and subsequent Safavid rulers contributed to the city's development and splendor. On the whole, military action and internal restructuring implemented by Shãh 'Abbãs brought political stability and economic prosperity to Persia. He accomplished the latter in part by fostering diplomatic and trade relations with European countries. Toward the latter half of Shãh 'Abbãs' reign, however, religious minorities faced hostility and oppression from Shï"ï clerics and the State's policy of religious uniformity. In the case of the Jews, religious persecution manifested itself in forced conversions, killings, and the destruction of their writings. The situation calmed during Shãh ^afi's rule (1629–1642) and Jews were granted permission to revert back to their faith after approximately seven years; however, the policy of forced conversion would resurface.

Shãh 'Abbãs II (1642–1666) has been compared to his great grandfather and namesake for his ability to rule effectively to the benefit of the majority. His twenty-four year reign was largely characterized by peace and prosperity. The Shãh was known for taking an active role in various aspects of administration; in matters related to the Jews, however, he apparently deferred to a few fanatical Shi'i clerics and those in governmental posts who shared their views. Consequently, the measure introduced under Shãh 'Abbãs I, granting apostates possession of all their Jewish relatives' wealth upon their death, was re-instituted. The Grand Vizier, Mohammad Beg, was allowed to do as he wished with respect to religious minorities. Jews throughout Persia were forcefully converted to Islam. Ketãb-e Ãnüsï, "The Book of Forced Conversion" by Bãbã"ï ben Loif, is a Judeo-Persian versified account of events that occurred between the reigns of Shãh 'Abbãs I, Shãh ^afi and Shãh 'Abbãs II. Its description of forced converts secretly practicing Judaism while outwardly professing Islam is one of several details corroborated by other sources.

Persecution continued during the reign of Shãh Solaymãn (1666–1694) and Shãh Sol^ãn Hosayn (1694–1722), both of whom lacked strength of character and the ability to rule effectively. The power and

influence of the Shi'i clerics increased during this period; both rulers expanded the heavy-handed policies of their predecessors with respect to the Jews, including forced conversion and heavy taxation.

The uncorroborated date of 1669 as the time Ben Shmüel lived and 1684, the date of composition for Shahzãdeh va Sufi, place the poet in this time period. Assuming that he was twenty-five years old in 1669 and forty years old when he composed the work, his dates would be roughly 1644–1704. He rarely provided biographical information in the body of his compositions and the MSS I have consulted yield few facts.

In his non-critical edition of Shahzãdeh va Sufi, Shim^on ^Arkham pointed to a manuscript, dated 1669, connecting the poet with the city of Samarqand.

> And I, Shim'on ^Arkham saw in the book, The Explanation of Isaac, in the commentary on The Binding of Isaac and the midrash of As An Apple Tree Among The Trees of the Forest and the study of Moses' Ascension on High, in a section at the beginning of the book was written, and I quote, "From me, Elisha' ben ha-Rav R. Shmüel, in the city of Samarqand in the year 1669." And, without a doubt, he is the author of this very book.

No one has been able to locate this manuscript since or to find another that corroborates Afkham's finding. For decades, some scholars repeated this assertion that the poet was from Central Asia. Vocabulary specific to this region can be found in the Judeo-Persian composition but the linguistic evidence is not enough to substantiate the claim; rather, due to the nature of MSS copies produced throughout Persia including Central Asia, one could argue either in support of the latter theory or against it.

More importantly, MSS suggest that he was the son of Shmüel Ben Pïr Ahmad, a poet of liturgical hymns who hailed from Kashan. The latter composed a versified Judeo-Persian commentary to Azharot "Warnings" on the positive ^^^^ ^^^ and negative commandments. In MS HU 8* 4374 the last couplet of an extant prologue to the work authored by Ben Shmüel titled, ^^^^^^^^^^ "Introduction to 'Warnings' of Rabi El'azar ben Bakuda," is written:

> Elïsha', the humble, arranged this rhymed prose
> By command of his father.

The passage is immediately followed by "The Book of Warnings" from the wisdom of Shmüel ben Mollã Pïr Ahmad.

The two employ similar language and style in their Hebrew liturgical hymns and Judeo-Persian translations/ commentaries.

The date in extant MSS for Elïsha' ben Shmüel is one of composition, found in the text at the conclusion of Shahzãdeh va Sufi—Hebrew date 5444, corresponding to 1684 CE. The date 1681 at the conclusion of Shmüel ben Pïr Ahmad's versified commentary enumerating the negative commandments places them in the same time period. Other than the possible familial connection to Ben Pïr Ahmad, I found one reference to Ben Shmüel's wife. In the preface to the Hebrew poem titled Elef Alfin, "One Thousand Alefs," the poet says that he composed it following her death. In the latter and another poem immediately following, he gives expression to his grief at her loss.

Ben Shmüel makes no mention of any political development in his compositions but Judeo-Persian authors and poets generally refrain from providing this kind of information. If he did, in fact, hail from

Kashan but at some point left to settle in Samarqand, his move may have been motivated by a desire to flee unrest since Bãbã'ï ben Loif says as much in his chronicle of persecution.36 Ben Shmüel and other Judeo-Persian poets' compositions demonstrate that despite the political and social difficulties facing religious minorities living in Persia from the Safavid period, Jews were not completely isolated. Rather, they continued to identify with Persian-Islamic culture and incorporated it into their literary, intellectual expression.

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Major Themes and Motifs

God as the source of all wisdom is a central theme that underpins almost all other themes in Shahzãdeh va Sufi. According to the text, the beginning of man's wisdom is recognition of God's existence. Two approaches to God are presented. The traditional views God as transcendent and omniscient; to act wisely, man must acknowledge God's existence, fear Him and embrace religious observance. The second and widely expounded approach allows for the individual to cultivate a personal relationship with God, primarily by means of love and devotion. The latter, in line with Jewish and Islamic mysticism, begins with the cultivation of one's intellectual and spiritual capacity to attain proximity to the divine. In the introductory section in praise of God the poet-narrator, Rãgheb, addresses the divine directly, saying, "you know my heart." He goes on to employ rhetorical devices that underscore an intimate relationship between the Creator and his creation including the metaphor of the lover and beloved; hyperbole and fanciful causes for natural phenomena. Similarly, Rãgheb's lit erary account of his spiritual awakening in the introductory section explaining his reasons for composing the work incorporates Sufi and lyric imagery and terminology as found in classical Persian poetry. A voice from heaven encourages him to develop his individual, spiritual consciousness by way of poetic expression.

Moses is the prophet who brings God's wisdom as manifested in the Torah to Israel. He exemplifies the best of human virtues. Moreover, he is designated as superior to all other prophets due to his intimate relationship with God. It is his knowledge of God that endows him with wisdom,148 described in the Judeo-Persian composition with references to Jewish and Islamic sources, as well as Sufism:

> Like the world illuminating sun, he took the path
> Of the light of wisdom, knowledge and truth,
> His lips, the treasury of attestations of faith,
> His heart, full of illumination from the candle of felicity.

The light imagery likening Moses' wisdom and intelligence to the illumination of the sun and the light of a candle is familiar to both traditions. As seen in the work of his predecessors, the latter description is combined with the depiction of Moses observing the three interdependent aspects of Sufi doctrine and practice—shahãdat "God-given law," ^arïqat "the Path to God" and ^Aqqad "the Truth." Likewise, the term 'elm, denoting "knowledge," "wisdom," and "understanding" is here, and in the body of the composition 5: 9–17, depicted as harmonious with the wisdom of the Torah.

The minister-turned-ascetic recounts his conversion to asceticism upon perceiving the world in its true guise. Likewise, in witnessing its harsh realities and the ravages that face man over time, not least disease and death, the prince intuits the importance of pursuing knowledge, "For, one may die quite easily having acquired knowledge." The Sufi instructs him on other attainments worth pursuing, which like

wisdom, are of lasting value. The parable of the man who is summoned to repay a debt to the King exemplifies Ben Shmüel's approach to this theme:

> The one benefit of that gold and silver
> Is that he will depart from the world wearing a shroud.
> Kinsmen who were his companions,
> Will deliver him to the grave and turn away.
> But kindness, good deeds and the knowledge of the Torah
> Will accompany him all the way to God.

The converse of wisdom is nãdãnï or jail lit. "lack of knowledge" "ignorance" also denoting hasty, mindless action. Chapter Seventeen, titled "Haste in Any Task Results in Penitence and Affliction" is illustrated by the anecdote of the dog whose haste and avarice result in grievous bodily harm. Chapter Twenty Four pairs emãqat "foolishness" with this sort of ignorance and reiterates that it leads to misery. The main object of Chapter Thirty One is to illustrate the importance of devoting oneself to the vocation he has mastered; it is important to note that the poor weaver's impulsive behavior is what leads to his demise.

Another prominent theme pervading the Judeo-Persian is the power of eloquent, timely speech. The instruction found in the layers of narrative is conveyed almost exclusively through speech. The prince, endowed with an extraordinary degree of wisdom and spirituality from childhood, intuits the necessity for a wise man to assist him in his intellectual and spiritual development. The Sufi, described as "an eloquent and wise sage," undertakes the dangerous task of educating the pagan king's son. Upon meeting the Sufi, the two immediately assume the role of spiritual guide and student; the prince asks questions and the Sufi responds. The prince, and by extension the readership, is urged to keep company with the wise so as to benefit from their wisdom. Proverbs, anecdotes and parables related by the Sufi are often introduced with "wise men have said," "I heard,"156 or some variation thereof.

There is danger in giving advice when none is solicited. In order for wisdom to be effectively conveyed one's audience must, like the prince, be receptive to acquiring it. The wise are cautious and patient, waiting for just the right opportunity to instruct. In the anecdote of Chapter Sixteen, the minister and the pagan king enjoy a close relationship. The minister, however, silently grieves over the king's lack of worship and agonizes over whether to broach the subject with him. The minister's friends reinforce his fear of the king's wrath and warn him not to advise regarding the matter. He speaks out only after the king has a disturbing dream and is instructed by having witnessed the loving interaction between a destitute couple:

> He said to himself, 'Now is the time
> To speak with the king
> And offer him advice regarding this idol worship,
> Sometimes gently and other times firmly.'

Had the minister spoken too soon, his friends' generalizations regarding the intolerance of rulers for advice and their tendency to mete out swift punishment when displeased, could have applied to him.

Throughout the work, the eloquence and argumentative force of an individual's speech determines whether he successfully advances his interests. Sometimes, as in the anecdote of the bird and the gardener, success makes the difference between life and death. When captured by the gardener, the bird manages to evade death by tricking him with promises and alluring speech:

When the bird realized that he intended to kill him,
He spoke in order to trick him;
He said, "If you would only listen to me,
You would receive many outpourings of grace."

As illustrated in this example, eloquent speech is not always employed altruistically but also, if necessary, to manipulate and deceive. Nonetheless, once the cunning bird successfully eludes his killer, he tauntingly relates three legitimate maxims concerning what transpired between them. The Sufi warns the prince about people who trick with their words but he himself engages in a battle of words earlier in the plot and later uses eloquent speech to diplomatically maneuver around the prince's desire to abandon his royal station. Life is often unpredictable and treacherous and one must know how to be cunning and manipulate others in order to survive. Those who can effectively employ eloquent speech to this end are most likely to successfully navigate through perilous circumstances.

While deception with speech is acceptable even advisable when advocating for oneself, disloyalty is considered a vice. The two friends in Chapter Twenty Seven who plot to trick a wealthy merchant out of his fortune only to scheme against one another both meet their death. A lack of fidelity motivated by greed is the opposite of the all-important moral virtue referred to as morovvat, "gallantry" in the sense of being brave, having good manners and being morally upright.

The transitory nature of this world and everything connected to it is a philosophical concept widely accepted throughout the Near East that complements pious tenets and practices and is another major theme of the composition. To warn man that what he perceives to be reality in this life is not enduring and therefore not real, the world is described in paradoxical terms. The more attached man is to this world, the more he is bound to be disappointed in the face of his mortality. In this vein the world is often associated with terms denoting time and fate, all of which are negatively depicted as inconstant and transitory. The world, time and fate are anthropomorphized and attributed with moral vices such as deceit and fickleness. The individual who recognizes that wisdom originates from God and observes moral and ethical tenets and practices is less likely to be lead astray by the world and its useless desires. In order to effectively convey a negative world view, the JUDEO-PERSIAN poet compared and contrasted it to its antithesis, the world to come. Similarly, the body is contrasted to the soul, outward form to spiritual meaning, as well as the preoccupation with worldly desires to the meditation on and preparation for judgment day.162 Chapter Eight's parable of the chests eloquently conveys the motif of outward appearance or form juxtaposed against inner meaning. It illustrates the importance of not judging people by their outward appearance and instead looking for spiritual substance. Similarly the husk and shell metaphor is used to convey these themes and motifs. Shahzãdeh va Sufi is pragmatic in its didacticism advocating a moderate form of piety, while its pervading world view is consistently and thoroughly negative.

A Hindu Critique of Buddhist Epistemology: Kumarila on Perception: The "Determination of Perception" Chapter of Kumarila Bhatta`s *Stokavarttika*: Translation and Commentary by John Taber [Routledge (Manohar), 9781138744233]

This is a translation of the chapter on perception (Pratyaksapariccheda) from Kumãnrila Bhatta's magnum opus, the Slokavarttika, which is one of the central texts of the Hindu response to the logico-epistemological school of Buddhist thought. It is crucial for understanding the debates between Hindus and Buddhists about metaphysical, epistemological, and linguistic questions during the classical period.

In an extensive commentary, the author explicates the argument of the Pratyaksapariccheda verse by verse while also showing how it relates to ideas and theories of other Indian philosophers and schools. Notes to the translation and commentary go further into the historical and philosophical background of Kumãnrila's ideas.

The book includes an introduction containing a summary of the history of Indian epistemology, an overview of Kumãnrila's philosophy, and a separate synopsis and analysis of Kumãnrila's text. It is a valuable contribution to the field of Indian philosophical studies.

John Taber is Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of New Mexico, where he teaches courses in Asian thought and continental philosophy. His research has focused on the history of Indian philosophy, especially logic, epistemology, and metaphysics during the classical period, 500-1200 CE. He is also the author of Transformative Philosophy: A Study of Sankara, Fichte, and Heidegger.

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A Hindu Critique of Buddhist Epistemology

The Routledge Curzon Hindu Studies Series, published in collaboration with the Oxford Centre for Hindu Studies, intends primarily the publication of constructive Hindu theological, philosophical, and ethical projects. The focus is on issues and concerns of relevance to readers interested in Hindu traditions and a wider range of related religious concerns that matter in today's world. The Series seeks to promote excellent scholarship and, in relation to it, an open and critical conversation among scholars and the wider audience of interested readers. Though contemporary in its purpose, the Series also recognizes the importance of a contemporary retrieval of the classic texts and ideas, beliefs and practices, of Hindu traditions. One of its goals then is the promotion of fresh conversations about what has mattered traditionally.

It is therefore most fitting that John Taber's A Hindu Critique of Buddhist Epistemology: Kumãrila on Perception should be one of the first volumes in the Series. Mimamsa ritual thinking and exegesis, traditionally listed as one of the six major systems of Hindu theology and philosophy (darsana), is a superlative and uniquely Indian mode of thought. As Taber explains in his own Preface and his Introduction, Kumãnrila Bhatta is not only a leading Mimãmsã thinker, but also one of the leading intellectuals of the Indian tradition, a formidable exemplar of the intellectual rigor, analysis, and argumentation for which India is rightly famous. Although Kumãnrila's Slokavarttika — of which a major chapter is translated and interpreted here — has been available in English for nearly a century, so great a

classic deserves the benefit of multiple renderings in English, and indeed has long been in need of a thoroughly accurate translation and elaboration. Taber's painstaking yet lucid translation, accompanied by valuable notes, brings Kurnãnrila's arguments to life, in a way that is accessible even for someone who is not a master of Sanskrit, while still satisfying trained Sanskritists.

As readers unfamiliar with Kumãnrila Bhatta gradually find their way into this demanding but richly rewarding treatise on perception, they may at first wonder whether and how this technical argumentation enhances our knowledge of Hindu religious traditions, even the ritual traditions connected with Mimãmsa. Yet A Hindu Critique of Buddhist Epistemology clearly illumines an important dimension of the Hindu traditions — in part simply by showing us a leading Brahmanical thinker at work, exemplifying how he thought through and deciphered the meantime of reality and our ways of knowing it, and how very elegant Indian religious thinking can be.

A Hindu Critique of Buddhist Epistemology also shows Kumãnrila in determined disputation with Buddhist opponents, arguing the fine points of epistemology; clearly, he is determined to concede nothing to his intellectual adversaries. As Taber points out — and highlights by the book's title — Kumãnrila's critique of Buddhist epistemology is a single extended argument (a treatise in itself, though actually only a part of the full argument that is the Slokavarttika), a stellar example of how a committed intellectual makes his case, stands by his insights and proposals, and probes his adversaries' positions for what can be learned from them and what in his view is mistaken or needs to be corrected. Modern concerns and values have largely moderated our modes of interreligious conversation today, and few of us are likely to proceed so unrelentingly and fiercely as did Kumãnrila. Nevertheless, his intellectual rigor and uncompromising commitment to clear understanding are values A Hindu Critique of Buddhist Epistemology fittingly highlights early on in this Series. Even in a crosscultural and interreligious environment, we need to remember how to argue well with one another.

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For a period of over eight-hundred years, from approximately the fifth century, the time of the composition of the oldest preserved commentaries on the Nyayasutra and Mimamsasutra, to the thirteenth century, the final demise of Buddhism in India, Indian philosophy experienced its Golden Age. What can be seen as a single, vigorous, and more or less continuous debate took place among the various schools of the three great religious—philosophical traditions, Hinduism, Buddhism, and Jainism, concerning the nature of reality and the means of salvation. Many of the problems of metaphysics, epistemology, logic, and philosophy of language with which we are familiar in Western philosophy were discussed at length, with great acumen and insight, by Indian thinkers during this period. Unique solutions to some of these problems, determined by the peculiarities of the historical development of the Indian debate and its broader cultural context, were achieved. Philosophers whose names are still mostly unknown to us in Europe and America — Vatsyayana, Vasubandhu, Bhartrhari, Mallavadin, Dinnaga, Bhavaviveka, Dharmakirti, Kumãrila, Akalanka, Mandanamika, Sankara, Santaraksita, Vacaspatimisra, Udayana, Sri Harsa, Ramanuja, and Abhinavagupta — composed works worthy of being compared with the greatest masterpieces of Western philosophy.

Although our knowledge of this splendid period in the history of human thought has advanced much in the past fifty years, thanks primarily to the pioneering historical and philological work of Erich Frauwallner and his students, and to the interpretive work and philosophical explorations of B. K.

Matilal, access to original sources has remained limited. The task of translating the texts of this era has just begun. We do not, for example, have full translations of either Dinnaga's magnum opus, the Pramanasamuccaya, nor of Dharmakirti's, the Pramanavarttika (into a modern European language, that is; both were translated into Tibetan in medieval times), which marked important advances in logic and epistemology and which were the focus of many of the controversies of the classical period. The same goes for the major works of Mallavadin, Bhavaviveka, Akalanka, Mandanamisra, Vacaspatimisra, Abhinavagupta, and Udayana. In fact, critical editions of many of these texts, which should ideally serve as the basis of translations, are not even available. Moreover, those translations that we do have are in many instances rough first attempts. The few high-quality, accurate translations that exist, on the other hand, have in most instances been produced by Indologists for other Indologists and are not easily used by the nonspecialist philosopher, let alone the general reader. (At the same time it must be acknowledged that it has been primarily through the production of philologically rigorous, annotated translations that our knowledge of classical Indian philosophy has advanced.) It would not be an exaggeration to say that our present state of knowledge of classical Indian philosophy is comparable to that of ancient Greek philosophy at the beginning of the Renaissance, when the first Latin translations of Plato's writings were starting to appear.

The present work is an attempt to provide a translation of a central chapter of one of the most influential systems of the classical period that both meets the criteria of an accurate, philologically correct translation and makes the text accessible to the nonspecialist. The text in question is the Pratyaksapariccheda or "Determination of Perception," the fourth chapter of Kumãrila Bhatta's magnum opus, the Slokavarttika, perhaps the greatest attack launched by a Brahmanical thinker against the metaphysical and epistemological theories of the Buddhists. One might doubt whether both of these purposes can be achieved in a single translation; indeed the translator acknowledges a certain hubris in his undertaking. I am well aware that it is an experiment that could easily fail. Nevertheless, I believe that one must make the attempt. Otherwise, if one does not try to make the text accessible outside a small circle of highly trained Indologists, modern philosophers will forever be denied firsthand appreciation of the rich reflection on issues of enduring philosophical interest that it contains. If one, alternatively, does not attempt a rigorously faithful translation, the reader will have been given access to ideas and theories that are not really Kumarila's but only the translator's, and therefore undoubtedly of an inferior sort.

The problem of achieving these two purposes in a single translation has, it is hoped, been solved by assigning them to distinct parts of the work. The Pratyaksapariccheda consists of 254 verses, called slokas. I have translated the verses more or less literally, based on a semiticritical edition of my own. That is to say, I have produced a new, emended edition based on five existing printed editions and the variants they cite; however, I have not made use of any manuscripts. This version of the Sanskrit text is presented in an Appendix. I have tried to keep the English wording of the verses as close to the original Sanskrit as possible —without, however, using square brackets to set off words and phrases I have had to add myself to complete the syntax or clarify the references of pronouns. I have only in a few cases used square brackets to introduce explanatory phrases that I believe are necessary to make sense of the verses. Then, in a commentary of my own, I have expounded the meaning of the text verse by verse, focusing on the philosophical argument it develops; it is by this means that I have tried to make the text as comprehensible as possible for the more general reader. With the benefit of the commentary the reader should be able to decipher the verses, which by themselves, without the commentary, will be obscure. In the end it is hoped that the reader, combining translated text and commentary, will be able

to see clearly the meaning of the text in the verses, while also coming to appreciate to some extent the remarkable precision and terseness of the language in which they are composed.

When learning a Sanskrit philosophical text it is customary in India, even today, not just to pick it up and read it but to study it with a teacher who will provide an oral commentary. In fact, most Indian philosophical texts are too difficult to comprehend without some kind of assistance. The wording of the texts is often elliptical, the arguments subtle, and a great deal of background knowledge — of the meanings of specific technical terms, of the theories of the other schools being attacked, etc. — is assumed. Perhaps the greatest obstacle to Westerners gaining a picture of what Indian philosophy is about is that it is presupposed that its texts will be studied in this way. It is, in any case, surely too much to expect a Western philosopher approaching this literature for the first time to be able to understand it without any of the advantages that Indian students have traditionally had. Therefore, the provision of a commentary along with the translation of an Indian philosophical text seems essential. However, it would defeat the purpose of a commentary if one were simply to translate along with the primary text one of the classical commentaries that has been handed down. That would just multiply the amount of (awkwardly) translated Sanskrit one must slog through. (For an accurate translation of philosophical Sanskrit is, I believe, almost of necessity somewhat awkward — though I am forced to acknowledge certain exceptions to this rule.) It seems better, rather, for the translator to provide his or her own commentary, after thoroughly studying and digesting the available classical ones, and attempt really to translate the traditional understanding of the text into a modern idiom.

Among modern translators of Indian philosophical texts, it was Erich Frauwallner who pioneered this approach, by prefacing his superbly accurate and readable translations with summaries of the main argument of the text. (See especially his Die Philosophic des Buddhismus [Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1958] and Philosophische Texte des Hinduismus, Nachgelassene Werke II, ed. Gerhard Oberhammer and Chlodwig H. Werba [Vienna: Verlag der Osterreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1992].) Nevertheless, that great scholar chose not to try to explain every unfamiliar concept and theory mentioned or alluded to — no doubt, so as not to place too many demands on the reader, in the hope of making the text accessible to as wide an audience as possible. As a result, however, he invariably, and intentionally, left certain aspects of the arguments of the texts he translated unexplained. Since, for the philosopher, who is above all interested in the validity of the theories she studies, the details of the text, especially the subtler twists and turns of its argument, are crucial, I have, in attempting to make the text at hand accessible to philosophers — for, after all, it is a philosophical text — gone a step farther than Frauwallner and attempted to provide a commentary that leaves very few, if any, stones unturned. That is to say, I have followed out its argument in every detail, ignoring no feature that could affect its cogency or soundness, and explaining to the best of my ability every concept and theory mentioned or alluded to that is relevant to understanding the context and import of the argument.

In this endeavor I have been fortunate to have had access to two other invaluable sources of information besides the classical commentaries, namely, two scholars with whom I read and discussed the Pratyaksapariccheda in Chennai (Madras) in the summer of 1997: Prof. J. Venkatarãma Sãstri of Madras Sanskrit College and Prof. K. Srinivasan of Vivekananda College. The former, a noted Mimãrpsaka (specialist in Kumãrila's school, the Purva Mimamsa), gave a superbly lucid, rigorous oral commentary on verses 52-86 and 111-185 of the text, in sessions attended by both Dr Srinivasan and me. Afterwards, in separate sessions, Dr Srinivasan and I reviewed the verses covered by Professor

Venkatarãma Sãstri and discussed further verses. (The young Japanese scholar Kei Kataoka was also present at some of these sessions and made helpful suggestions.) However, with only a few exceptions, I have not attempted in my commentary to distinguish the contributions of Professors Venkatarama Sãstri and Srinivasan from those of the classical commentaries of Umbeka, Pãrthasãrathimira, and Sucaritamisra, which I have also studied in detail; nor, for that matter, have I gone into the, for the most part, subtle differences between the classical commentaries. Rather, I have tried to synthesize all that I have read and heard into one smooth-flowing discourse. Nevertheless, certainly much of whatever understanding I have achieved of the Pratyaksapariccheda is due to the help of these two superb scholars.

In addition to a commentary on the translated verses I have provided some notes in which I attempt to illuminate the historical and philosophical background of the text. I have tried to keep these to a minimum, mentioning what I feel to be only the most essential points and avoiding digressions into disputed questions, so as not to encumber the work with too much scholarly apparatus. Nevertheless, even as they are, I fear that philosophers will find them too detailed and Indianists will find them incomplete. The latter may be particularly disappointed that I have not included detailed justifications of my choices of variant readings and translations of difficult terms and phrases, but I believe that, for the most part, my readings and translations will be justified implicitly by whatever sense I have been able to make of the text in my commentary.

I have also, in the introduction to the translation, attempted to give an overview of the philosophical and historical background of some of the issues discussed in the Pratyaksapariccheda, in particular, the problem of whether perception can be "conceptualized." Essentially, this is the problem of whether perceptual judgements, in which we identify objects as belonging to certain types or as possessed of certain properties — for example, "That is a cow," "The cat is on the mat," "The book is red" — are truly perceptual in nature, or whether only the bare, non-conceptualized given is the proper object of perception, perceptual judgements involving a rather substantial contribution by the mind (as opposed to just the senses). I also draw what I take to be some rather obvious connections to developments in contemporary Anglo-American philosophy pertaining to this issue. Here, again, Indologists might be inclined to feel that I have been too ambitious in trying to synthesize developments in Indian thought that extend over centuries, and in offering summary interpretations of theories that, in their details and evolution, are not completely understood — primarily because most of the texts in which such theories are expounded still await proper editing, analysis, and translation. Here, however, I must say that, having perused the extant secondary literature on the problem of conceptualized versus nonconceptualized perception in Indian philosophy — what there is of it — I have found that much of it seems lost in the details; except for the work of Matilal, it generally conveys little sense of what the debate is really about. Surely we should not have to wait until every Indian epistemological text has been philologically processed before we are permitted to make generalizations about Indian epistemology. I see nothing wrong in working from the top down as we work from the bottom up, that is to say, trying to sketch maps of extended areas of Indian philosophical thought as we continue to explore the terrain. Certainly, the maps — our broader interpretations and theories — will have to be revised continually as we proceed, but that is the nature of any scientific enterprise.

The Slokavarttika, including the Pratyaksapariccheda chapter, was first translated nearly a hundred years ago by the great polymath Ganganatha Jha (Calcutta: Biblioteca Indica, 1900-1909; rpt. Delhi: Sri Satguru

Publications, 1983). That translation represents an important scholarly achievement in that it is a complete translation of the Slokavarttika and thus attempts to give the modern reader a glimpse of Kumãrila's entire system. Although it contains, verse by verse, numerous mistakes, it also construes, sometimes quite felicitously, many difficult passages; overall it reflects a vast knowledge of Mimamsa philosophy. Its main defect, however, is that, supplied with only occasional footnotes based on the classical commentaries, not a sustained commentary of its own, it does not convey a coherent sense of Kumãrila's argument by itself. One must, in fact, read it together with the original Sanskrit text in order to benefit from it. (Alas, this can be said of most of the philologically correct translations of Indian philosophical texts we have today!) Thus, although Jha's translation serves as an invaluable aid for Indologists (and has indeed served as such for this translator), a new translation, if only of a fraction of the material Jha ambitiously took on, is clearly in order.

In the end, of course, a translation, or at least one that is more or less faithful to the original, cannot presume to remove every vestige of foreignness from a text. Nor, perhaps, should it. It would, in the first place, be highly misleading to give the impression that Indian philosophical theories can be completely separated from the forms of expression in which they are couched. A text in verse, at least, even if composed in a simple sing-song meter like the anustubh (the meter of the sloka), and even if it presents arguments like any proper philosophical text, will still amount to a quite different kind of discourse from a Western treatise in prose. In particular, it will have more the air of an authoritative "saying"; the author may rely as much on the art and power of his language to impress and persuade as on the force of his argument. (Surely what is stated so elegantly must be true!) More importantly, although many Indian concepts may be translated directly into Western ones, many others need to be explained in terms of indigenous concepts, which are in turn to be explained by other indigenous concepts, and so on. The scholar who studies a foreign philosophical text like the Slokavarttika will in the end find herself, of necessity, learning to navigate in new waters. Enlightened by what she sees there, she returns home, somehow changed, somehow looking upon old things in a new way; however, she cannot bring what she has seen back with her. A successful translation of a text like the Slokavarttika is perhaps one that will just assist the reader in feeling more comfortable in foreign surroundings.

The subtitle of this work alludes to the seminal study of the first chapter of Dinnaga's Pramanasamuccaya by Masaaki Hattori, published in the Harvard Oriental Series in 1965: Dignaga, On Perception. By making such an allusion I do not pretend that the present work is comparable in scholarship to Hattori's. In fact, I am greatly indebted to Professor Hattori for much of my knowledge of the logico-epistemological school of Buddhist philosophy; without knowledge of Tibetan myself, I have obviously relied heavily on his translation of the Pramanasamuccaya from the Tibetan translations in which it has been preserved. Nor, obviously, have I used Hattori's work as a model. The arrangement of that study, with its deeply learned, but rather dense historical and philological notes in the back (comprising twice as many pages as the translation and chock full of Sanskrit, Tibetan, and Chinese), and without a commentary that continuously traces the thread of the argument, makes it difficult for the nonspecialist to use. The significance of the allusion, rather; is as if to say: having allowed Dinnaga to present the Buddhist point of view on various epistemological and metaphysical issues, as well as trenchant criticisms of Brahmanical — that is, essentially, Hindu —theories of perception, it is now Kumãrila's turn to respond on behalf of his and the other Brahmanical schools. After more than thirty-five years of silence, it is now time for an orthodox thinker to be heard speaking in defense of his

tradition. Then we shall see, as I believe — and it is hoped that the reader will excuse this hint of partisanship on my part — that the Buddhist arguments are not nearly as clever as they first appear!

A translation of a text on epistemology might seem an odd choice for a series dedicated to fostering cross-cultural conversation between India and the West. Yet the study of problems of knowledge, in both India and the West, has always been related to deeper issues. In European philosophy, the investigation of the faculties of human knowledge and their limits, which began with the British Empiricists and culminated with Kant, ultimately had to do with the critical evaluation of "the pretense of reason," that is, the claim that the human mind can reach beyond experience and ascertain such things as the existence of God, the immortality of the soul, and the freedom of the will. So in Indian philosophy, questions about "the means of knowledge" (pramanas), even about so specific a faculty as perception, were to a great extent concerned with whether it is possible for humans to know, independently of scripture, the means of achieving happiness in this life and salvation in the next, that is, Dharma or righteousness — a matter which, Indians believe, also lies beyond the experience of ordinary humans. We shall see that this was the explicit context for Kumãrila's inquiry into the nature of perception. In India, more particularly, epistemology was the field upon which the debate over the authority of scripture was played out. The Brahmanical schools used epistemological arguments to defend the Veda, believed by them to be either an eternal, authorless document or the teachings of God, and challenged the scriptures of the heterodox traditions of Buddhism and Jainism, which were delivered by human teachers; the Jainas and Buddhists did the opposite. We also find epistemological questions — for example, the question concerning the relative strength ofperception and scripture—at the heart of controversies between the different Vedãnta traditions, Advaita, Dvaita, and Visista Advaita.

The study of Indian epistemology, then, in the final analysis is the study of traditions in conflict over fundamental presuppositions. It is a study in cross-traditional, if not cross-cultural, debate. A debate, of course, is not the same thing as a conversation. A conversation might be considered a friendly give-andtitake guided by an interest in achieving truth or understanding, or both. A debate may not be friendly at all, and may not be motivated by a concern to arrive at mutual recognition of the truth or understanding. Rather, it is a way of grappling with the Other in a contest governed by clearly defined rules, that is, a way of coming to terms with the Other in an arena where power is controlled and mediated in specific ways. The mediation of power in the arena of debate is through reason, and it is the visibility of reason as arbiter that distinguishes debate from all other forms of conflict. As a contest that is mediated by reason and presents evidence and logic as the criteria for victory or defeat, debate encourages and supports the growth of rational inquiry and reflection. Although Indian philosophical debates sometimes degenerated into polemics, for the most part they were conducted on a very high level. Participants were stimulated to achieve new insights and more compelling statements of their views. The greatest discoveries of Indian philosophy were achieved in the context of heated, highly charged debate. Debate may never reach resolution. In medieval India debates between the Buddhists and the Brahmins were publicly staged, as a form of entertainment. The losers were compelled to renounce their religion — which after all had been proven false — and convert to the other side. Nevertheless, short of such drastic consequences, debate is often an effective means for opposing camps to engage each other, resist and challenge each other, without coercion or domination. Although understanding, once again, is never guaranteed — however, it can also never be ruled out — mutual destruction is at least usually avoided. And yet, a kind of understanding — at the very least, mutual respect — also often emerges when two parties, offering clear reasons for their views, remain true to

their convictions. Understanding between humans should not be thought of just as the convergence of beliefs. In any case, sometimes it is unrealistic to think that we can arrive at understanding in the sense of a perfect seeing eye-to-eye and dispelling of conflict. Yet debate always remains a viable form of dialogue, a sphere in which opposing parties must still listen and respond to each other, and be held accountable for their views. Debate is a way for adversaries to live together in creative tension. Perhaps it is not the best way, but it is one that humans have employed for centuries. Unfortunately, it is a method we seem to have forgotten how to practice today. <>

KNOWING ILLUSION: BRINGING A TIBETAN DEBATE INTO CONTEMPORARY DISCOURSE: VOLUME I: A PHILOSOPHICAL HISTORY OF THE DEBATE by The Yakherds [Oxford University Press, 9780197603628

KNOWING ILLUSION: BRINGING A TIBETAN DEBATE INTO CONTEMPORARY DISCOURSE: VOLUME II: TRANSLATIONS by The Yakherds [Oxford University Press, 9780197603673]

- The first in-depth study of this essential debate
- Draws explicit connections to contemporary epistemology
- Assembles the joint work of a diverse team of scholars

Tsongkhapa (1357-1419) is by any measure the single most influential philosopher in Tibetan history. His articulation of Prasangika Madhyamaka, and his interpretation of the 7th Century Indian philosopher Candrakirti's interpretation of Madhyamaka is the foundation for the understanding of that philosophical system in the Geluk school in Tibet. Tsongkhapa argues that Candrakirti shows that we can integrate the Madhyamaka doctrine of the two truths, and of the ultimate emptiness of all phenomena with a robust epistemology that explains how we can know both conventional and ultimate truth and distinguish truth from falsity within the conventional world.

The Sakya scholar Taktsang Lotsawa (born 1405) published the first systematic critique of Tsongkhapa's system. In the fifth chapter of his Freedom from Extremes Accomplished through Comprehensive Knowledge of Philosophy, Taktsang attacks Tsongkhapa's understanding of Candrakirti and the cogency of integrating Prasangika Madhyamaka with any epistemology. This attack launches a debate between Geluk scholars on the one hand and Sakya and Kagyu scholars on the other regarding the proper understanding of this philosophical school and the place of epistemology in the Madhyamaka program. This debate raged with great ferocity from the 15th through the 18th centuries, and continues still today.

The two volumes of Knowing Illusion study that debate and present translations of the most important texts produced in that context. Volume I: A Philosophical History of the Debate provides historical and

philosophical background for this dispute and elucidates the philosophical issues at stake in the debate, exploring the principal arguments advanced by the principals on both sides, and setting them in historical context. This volume examines the ways in which the debate raises issues that are relevant to contemporary debates in epistemology, and concludes with two contributions by contemporary Tibetan scholars, one on each side of the debate.

Authors: THE YAKHERDS

The Yakherds is a collective of scholars in Philosophy and Buddhist Studies based in the USA, India, Australia, Nepal, and Germany, and comprises both Western and Tibetan scholars. Between them, they have translated, edited, and written over 70 books and several hundred articles and reviews, including numerous important translations of Tibetan philosophical texts and books on Buddhist philosophy.

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Glossary of English Terms
Glossary of Tibetan Terms
Glossary of Tibetan Place Names and Orders

This volume is a polygraph (as opposed to a monograph), a collaboration to which each member contributed. These contributions were then augmented, revised, and integrated with the work of the others. The first ten chapters represent the collective effort of the entire group. The consistency in style, voice, and translation, and the continuity of the argument, produced by a team of diverse scholars, yields a text that we believe is far better than anything that any one of us— or even any subset of our collective— could have produced. The final two chapters are a bit different. They are contributions by two traditionally educated monastic scholars in our collective to the debate we address. While the group has edited these essays and ensured consistency of style and translation choices with the remainder of the book, these two final sections represent the views of these scholars themselves and the living traditions they represent. For this reason, their names appear on those chapters.

As these essays indicate, the debates and texts we consider in this volume and in the volume of translations that accompanies it continue to inspire dispute and exegesis, and will continue to do so in the future. These disputes raise issues that go to the very heart of Buddhist thought and practice— emerging over the course of millennia in India and Tibet, they have engaged some of the best minds of South Asian Buddhism. They are also, as the reader will see, directly relevant to contemporary debates in epistemology.

The international group that produced this book— José Cabezón, Ryan Conlon, Thomas Doctor, Douglas Duckworth, Jed Forman, Jay Garfield, John Powers, Sonam Thakchöe, Tashi Tsering, and Geshé Yeshes Thabkhas— has adopted the collective name "Yakherds," an allusion to the Cowherds, who produced a groundbreaking collaborative study of the two truths, Moonshadows: Conventional Truth in Buddhist Philosophy (Cowherds 2011) and of Buddhist ethics, Moonpaths: Ethics and Emptiness (Cowherds 2015). The Cowherds' work demonstrates the usefulness of this methodology in Buddhist Studies and cross- cultural philosophy. Two Cowherds— Sonam Thakchöe and Jay Garfield— are also members of our present collective. In consideration of the fact that this book examines Tibetan debates regarding the two truths that have their origins in India, "Yakherds" (gyag rdzi) suggested itself as a Tibetan equivalent of the Indic "Cowherds" (gopãla).

The name "Cowherds" is an allusion to a famous passage in Candrakïrti's Autocommentary on Introduction to the Middle Way in which he denounces the confused thinking of philosophers who engage in niggling disputes regarding grammar, epistemology, and ontology. He contrasts this philosophical thinking with the pragmatic, evidence- based perspectives of ordinary, uneducated people. He claims that his approach to philosophy accords with the understanding of the latter group, but that philosophers— with their convoluted and internally inconsistent systems and hair- splitting dialectics— are unable to grasp this. He declares that his perspective is concordant with "what even people like cowherds and women recognize."

Despite the sexism encoded in Candrakïrti's phrase, it highlights the differences between how the world appears to philosophers versus how it is perceived by ordinary people unconcerned with academic philosophical debates and theses. In ancient India, women were seldom educated, and cowherds were the equivalent of today's "man in the street" (or in the pasture), whose knowledge of the world is derived from empirical observation and recognition of patterns and regularities. These are used to make pragmatic decisions (such as when to move cows into the fields, and when to bring them home) that are uninflected by the sorts of abstractions that engage philosophers when they are pursuing their craft. Candrakïrti, as we will see, claims to accept all of the epistemic instruments used by ordinary people (including perception, inference, testimony, and analogy), and to do so in a manner that is consistent with mundane epistemological practices. But this apparently down- to- earth approach to epistemic warrant— to understanding what justifies assertions— sparked heated debates in India, which continued and were expanded in Tibet. Some of the most philosophically compelling of these debates constitute the subject matter of the present volume.

This volume is accompanied by a separate volume of translations of the texts central to this debate. Those translations were produced by individual Yakherds, but each was read, edited, and approved by the entire collective. We urge the reader to consult that volume, as the texts themselves are classics of world philosophy, and the account we offer here will come to life when one reads these foundational treatises.

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Philosophy advances through debate. The frisson of critique, revision, defense, and counterargument generates the sparks of insight that illuminate the nature of knowledge, of reality, and of life. Buddhist philosophy is no exception to this rule, and the Buddhist tradition has always provided the context for lively debate, both between Buddhists and their non-Buddhist interlocutors, and— often with greater ferocity— among Buddhists themselves.

Despite the differences among the world's great philosophical traditions, we often find that debates in one tradition are relevant to questions asked in another. This is hardly surprising. After all, when reflective individuals ask about the fundamental nature of reality, about how knowledge is possible, and about how to lead a good life, we expect convergence— if not necessarily regarding the answers to these questions— at least regarding the questions themselves, and about the range of answers that one might offer to them. And we can often achieve deeper insight into philosophical traditions and disputes by juxtaposing relevantly similar debates from different traditions, allowing each to see what it might have missed, or how its insights are expressed elsewhere.

It is in this spirit of dialogue for mutual benefit that we present a debate concerning epistemology and its relation to metaphysics. A great deal of philosophical energy was devoted to this debate in Tibet from the mid- fifteenth century through the eighteenth century, and it remains active today. As we examine this controversy, we see philosophical progress evinced in the development and the sharpening of insights in committed philosophical contest. We also see questions raised regarding the relationship between knowledge and error and the status of fictional reality. The arguments we study in this book also address important questions concerning whether justification is even possible in the context of human fallibility and in the absence of any foundations of being or of knowledge.

These questions are relevant to the history of epistemology in the European tradition as well, and to contemporary epistemology. We hope that those who work in this tradition will find the ways that Tibetan scholars prosecuted these issues to be valuable. They are close enough to home to be relevant, and distant enough to provide useful perspective. We also hope that colleagues in Buddhist Studies will benefit from a philosophical analysis of this interchange that sheds light on what otherwise might seem like mere doctrinal disagreements.

The debate in question arises from a section in the work of the fifteenth-century Tibetan Sakya (Sa skya) scholar Taktsang Lotsawa Sherap Rinchen (sTag tshang Lo tsã ba Shes rab rin chen, 1405– 1477): his doxographical treatise, Freedom from Extremes Accomplished through Comprehensive Knowledge of Philosophy. A key section, entitled Eighteen Great Contradictions, launches a sustained attack on the interpretation of Madhyamaka by one of the most influential philosophers in the Tibetan tradition, and forefather of the Geluk (dGe lugs) order.

As the reader will see, Taktsang charges Tsongkhapa (Tsong kha pa bLo bzang grags pa, 1357– 1419) with creating an incoherent mélange of antifoundationalist Prãsa^gika Madhyamaka ontology mixed with an epistemology derived in part from the work of Dharmakïrti (c. seventh century). Taktsang also charges Tsongkhapa with inconsistently accepting both that the world we inhabit is thoroughly deceptive— appearing in a way that does not reflect its actual status— and that the same world is something about which we can have unerring knowledge. Since to be nonerring is to be nondeceptive

(mi bslu ba), Taktsang charges that this commitment is in tension with the claim that the world itself is deceptive (bslu ba). These issues, he points out, are relevant not only to ordinary epistemological investigation but also to the nature of buddhahood and the path to it, as well as to understanding normativity itself.

These charges ignited a sustained debate that occupied some of the greatest philosophical minds of Tibet. Tsongkhapa's Geluk followers defended his position. Scholars such as the first Panchen Lama, Losang Chökyi Gyaltsen (Pa^ chen bLo bzang chos kyi rgyal mtshan, 1567– 1662), Jamyang Shepa ('Jam dbyangs bzhad pa'i rdo rje Ngag dbang brtson 'grus, 1648– 1721/ 2), and Purchok (Phur bu lcog Ngag dbang byams pa, 1682– 1762)— drawing on both Tsongkhapa's own work and that of his disciple Khedrupjé (mKhas grub rje dGe legs dpal bzang, 1385– 1438)— argue with great precision that nonfoundationalist epistemic warrants and genuine knowledge of deceptive appearances are possible in a Prãsa^gika Madhyamaka framework.

Taktsang's banner was taken up in the Kagyü (bKa' brgyud) tradition by scholars such as the eighth and ninth Karmapas, Mikyö Dorjé (Mi bskyod rdo rje, 1507– 1554) and Wangchuk Dorjé (dBang phyug rdo rje, 1556– 1603), who contend that Prãsa^gika Madhyamaka entails a thoroughgoing skepticism. For this reason, they argue that it cannot be represented as a philosophical system at all, since a Prãsa^gika cannot claim to know anything. At issue, we will see, is whether a normative account of epistemological practice is even coherent given the fallibility of human perceptions and cognitions and the impossibility of providing foundations for knowledge.

This debate, like most great philosophical disputes, has a backstory, and like most controversies in scholastic traditions such as those of Western and Tibetan philosophy, that backstory includes disagreements regarding interpretation and commentarial practice. In this case, the story begins with classical Indian discussions regarding how to interpret Nãgãrjuna (c. second century) and ramifies into Tibetan disputes regarding how to interpret those interpretations.

Nãgãrjuna's Fundamental Verses on the Middle Way (Mülamadhyamakakãrikã) is the foundational text of the Madhyamaka school. It was subject to divergent interpretations, which came to be systematized by Tibetan doxographers using the terms Svãtantrika and Prãsaagika— those who assert their own propositions through probative arguments and those who only use reductio arguments to refute their opponents, respectively.

This distinction in rhetorical and hermeneutical strategy is understood by some Tibetan commentators to reflect a deeper set of ontological and epistemological commitments. In particular, many Tibetans argue that Svãtantrikas are committed to the idea that— at least conventionally, although not ultimately— entities have distinguishing characteristics, or essences. Prãsa^gikas, by contrast, deny that talking about the fundamental nature of anything makes sense even conventionally. Some argue that while Svãtantrikas are willing to make claims about the nature of reality, and are willing to justify those claims, Prãsa^gikas recuse themselves from making any such claims and from justifying any assertions.

While Tibetan exegetes generally agree that the Prãsa^gika reading associated with Nãgãrjuna's commentators Buddhapãlita (c. 470– 550) and Candrakïrti (c. 600– 650)3 is superior to the Svãtantrika interpretation articulated by his other major commentator, Bhãviveka (c. 500– 560), Tibetan philosophers disagree among themselves regarding how to interpret Candrakïrti's reading and who

follows him most faithfully. This is in part because of a tension in Candrakïrti's own position. On the one hand, he emphasizes the illusory nature of the conventional world and the inexpressibility of ultimate truth— thus suggesting a kind of quietism about both domains of truth. On the other hand, he insists on the appropriateness of conventional epistemic practices to life in the conventional world, suggesting the possibility of a positive epistemology.4 Different Tibetan exegetes emphasized each side of this position, and all of them attempt to reconcile these commitments. In the eleventh and twelfth centuries, scholars such as Patsap Nyima Drakpa (Pa tshab Nyi ma grags pa, b. 1055), Chapa Chökyi Sengé (Phya pa Chos kyi seng ge, 1109– 1169), and Mabja Jangchup Tsöndrü (rMa bya Byang chub brtson 'grus, d. 1185) debated the interpretation of Candrakïrti, and we will see that those analyses constitute an important context for the controversy that Taktstang instigates in his critique of Tsongkhapa.

Just as this fifteenth- to eighteenth- century debate has antecedents in classical India and in eleventh- to twelfth- century Tibet, it continues today. Contemporary Sakya and Kagyü scholars press lines of attack consistent with those of Taktsang against Tsongkhapa's epistemological and ontological framework, and Geluk scholars continue to defend it. We will see two late moments in that debate in the concluding chapters of this volume. We also suspect that as Western philosophers read this literature, this dispute will have echoes in contemporary Anglophone philosophy.

This book is part of a two- volume set. The second volume contains new translations of several of the principal texts from the Tibetan debate itself, and we urge readers interested in this material to read those treatises. This volume is our own study of the philosophical controversies initiated by Taktsang, their antecedents, and how they played out in Tibetan intellectual circles. We begin with a broad survey of the debate itself, its context, and its Tibetan history. We then turn to an examination of Candrakïrti's interpretation of Madhyamaka and its reception in Tibet, preparatory to a characterization of the philosophical issues at stake in these discussions.

Having laid the groundwork, we turn to the controversy itself, first articulating the views of Tsongkhapa's disciple Khedrupjé on the compatibility of Madhyamaka and epistemology, and then to Taktsang's critique. This leads in turn to a consideration of the earliest Geluk responses to Taktsang, followed by the Kagyü reply to Geluk understandings. We conclude our account of the historical debate with Purchok's defense of Tsongkhapa, the last of the principal texts in this premodern literature. The volume ends with one contemporary Geluk and one contemporary Sakya essay on these issues. These analyses do not study the history of this debate, but rather continue it in a contemporary Tibetan voice, demonstrating the fact that the Tibetan philosophical tradition is very much alive and that this debate continues to excite interest among Tibetan scholars.

We invite readers to this philosophical feast, comprising both a set of texts hitherto unavailable in any Western language and a study intended to bring them into conversation with the contemporary philosophical world. <>

QUESTIONING THE BUDDHA: A SELECTION OF TWENTY-FIVE SUTRAS by Peter Skilling, Foreword by Dzongsar Jamyang Khyentse [Wisdom Publications, 9781614293934]

In the forty-five years the Buddha spent traversing northern India, he shared his wisdom with everyone from beggar women to kings. Hundreds of his discourses, or sutras, were preserved by his followers, first orally and later in written form. Around thirteen hundred years after the Buddha's enlightenment, the sutras were translated into the Tibetan language, where they have been preserved ever since. To date, only a fraction of these have been made available in English. **QUESTIONING THE BUDDHA** brings the reader directly into the literary treasure of the Tibetan canon with thoroughly annotated translations of twenty-five different sutras. Often these texts, many translated here in full for the first time, begin with an encounter in which someone poses a question to the Buddha.

Peter Skilling, an authority on early Buddhist epigraphy, archaeology, and textual traditions, has been immersed in the Buddhist scriptures of diverse traditions for nearly half a century. In this volume, he draws on his deep and extensive research to render these ancient teachings in a fresh and precise language. His introduction is a fascinating history of the Buddhist sutras, including the transition from oral to written form, the rise of Mahayana literature, the transmission to Tibet, the development of canons, and a look at some of the pioneers of sutra study in the West.

Reviews

"In this volume, prose and verse join beautifully to celebrate the Dharma. The selections show how rich, how diverse, and how wonderful the Kangyur is—and how little we know about it." **—from the foreword by Dzongsar Jamyang Khyentse**

"A stimulating and delightfully readable book . . . Peter Skilling is probably the most versatile scholar of Buddhology today, equally conversant with philosophy, history, ritual, doctrine, art, and iconography. He has selected from the Tibetan twenty-five sutras that were lost in India long ago, which he has translated into elegant English. His introduction and first two appendixes together form a most lucid and up-to-date discussion of Buddhist thought that should be compulsory reading in any field of Buddhology." **—Pratapaditya Pal**, author of *Quest for Coomaraswamy: A Life in the Arts*

"Peter Skilling's selection of Buddhist sutras comes with an informative introduction, a meticulous exploration of sources, and an attractive and reliable rendering in English. Textual discoveries and expositions of this quality are a substantial contribution to Buddhist studies." **—Romila Thapar**, professor emerita of history, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi

"A magnificent scholar and a magnificent human being, Peter Skilling has always been an example for us all, for his unbounded erudition combined with an unflinching modesty. This precious volume will serve as a reference and an inspiration to present and future generations." **—Matthieu Ricard**, Shechen Monastery, Nepal

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About the Author

This book is a collection, an anthology, of twenty-five sutras translated from the Tibetan Kanjur. The Kanjur is one of the world's three great collections of Buddhist scripture: the Tibetan, the Chinese, and the Pali canons. The collected teachings of the Buddha translated into Tibetan, the Kanjur is made up of Indian texts translated by teams of learned Indian and Tibetan scholars over a period from about twelve to nineteen centuries after the Buddha's nirvana (between the eighth and about the fourteenth centuries CE). Many of these texts are lost in the original Indic languages and were not translated into Chinese or any other language. That is, they are preserved only in Tibetan. Even when a particular text does exist in Sanskrit or in Chinese translation, the Tibetan translation represents a particular moment in the life of the text. Even when the Tibetan, Sanskrit, and Chinese are close, they are not, and cannot be, identical. They are different recensions, different iterations, of what is ideally the same text.

Let us reflect on this: The Tibetan Kanjur preserves accurate translations of approximately 270 Buddhist sutra texts, some of them extremely long, the collaborative work of Indian and Tibetan scholars. This major and important collection of Indian texts has been preserved in Tibetan but has scarcely been translated into English or other modern languages. This lack of translation leaves a large lacuna in the materials available for the global study of Buddhist history, literature, philology, and philosophy. This raises the question: Can we appreciate or evaluate Indian Buddhist literature without taking account of the Tibetan corpus? Can we write satisfactory histories of Indian Buddhist literature without knowing more about the Tibetan collections?

We human beings are fond of certainties and conclusions. Nearly all the details of the history of Buddhist literature are, however, uncertain—date, authorship, provenance, production, circulation, reception—all of them. From the beginning, shortly after the Master's great decease, his followers redacted his teachings orally and organized them orally, through memorization and recitation. The oral canon developed for three or four hundred years before it began to be written down. I suspect that the process of writing started out with individual texts or groups of texts, rather than with single projects to transfer a complete Tripitaka from oral to written medium in a single go, despite the fact that some of the chronicles and their modern interpreters might suggest so.

Buddhist history begins with narratives of orality, and these narratives challenge, or even render invalid, the received notions of "prehistory" and "history." Prehistory is defined as the period before the development of writing systems and written records. This definition is inadequate insofar as it assumes that the only reliable history is written history, and it ignores or devalues other technologies of history, such as oral records or the study of the material record. Many societies have rich oral histories, and well into the twentieth century, indigenous communities from Borneo to Baffin Island preserved oral records that not only related a community's longue durée but also mapped their territories or known worlds in oral geographies of bodies of water, plains, mountains, and sacred sites—myths, stories, and songs that celebrate the features and life of the land. Today we look at these vanishing or vanished oralities as great and nearly impossible feats of memory, but is this not because our own memories, our own mental capacities and abilities, have changed? They have shrunk, they have withered, and we begin, or are already well on the way to, complacently outsourcing the work of memory to commercial conglomerates. These oralities were a vital part of the identity and the soul of the people. It may seem ironic, but it is good fortune that these records from the dawn of humankind's literary accomplishments

were eventually recorded in writing, before the practices of orality died out or were altered by the encounter with modernity. The stories were not simply written down: they were crafted and refashioned into the written media of sagas and epics. Writing inevitably transforms.

Early Buddhist texts share in the poetry of prehistory. The Italian word for history is storia, and the French and English words for history also mean "story": when all is said, history is but a story, a tale told by the ignorant, full of sound and fury, signifying less than we fondly imagine. This story starts from an unknowable beginning (in Sanskrit, anavaragra), and its pre- orproto-phases are scarcely retrievable. No specimens of everyday writing—notes, drafts, letters, diaries—survive from the earliest periods of written culture in South Asia, but as decades and centuries passed, burgeoning corpora of inscriptions, poems, dramas, and religious texts were produced. No early Indian books survive in India itself; it is an anomaly that the earliest Indian manuscripts come from outside of India proper, from Gandhãra, Afghanistan, and Central Asia. This is not a result of social convulsions—although these have certainly taken their toll—but of the relentless erosion of time. Whenever dynastic or economic centers declined, relocated, or disappeared, so also cities, markets, trade routes, and religious centers declined, relocated, or disappeared, and this happened not just once or twice but periodically and repeatedly. Libraries and library cultures need steady support systems; they need long-term patronage and constant maintenance. What happened to the books and manuscripts when monasteries or cultural centers were abandoned? We do not know.

This story has been told before, and many times. In the discussion of Buddhist history that follows, I prefer to let the old warhorses rest in their stables and avoid the familiar dichotomies of "Hinayãna/Sravakayãna/ early Buddhism" versus "later Buddhism/Mahãyãna: not to speak of the threefold division of "Srãvakayãna/Mahãyãna/Vajrayãna." I do not see much point in repeating the familiar narratives, the "well-worn plots and set-piece battles" of the orthodox accounts. Buddhism wears robes of many colors, and it loses a lot when painted in dull monochromes or when forced into stark dualities or tripartite periodizations. I may use an unfamiliar terminology, coupling, for example, Vaitulya with Mahãyãna, or describing texts as dharmaparyãya rather than sutra.' There are reasons for these choices, which I mention further on. Generally speaking, I hope to open new ways of investigating early Buddhist history by bringing attention to ancient but lesser-used categories than those that have been adopted in modern Buddhist studies. I aim for a holistic account that focuses on the shared core rather than easy segmentations into discrete "sects" or broad periodizations into Hinayãna, Mahãyãna, and Vajrayãna. Buddhist schools of thought developed not in isolation but in conversation and competition.

Later in this introduction, I consider how Buddhist texts were transmitted, how they progressed from the spoken to the written word, from Indian language "originals" to Tibetan translations, how a body of Buddhist texts migrated across the Himalayas and settled down in a very different language family.' This is an enormously complicated story. Originating in deep orality, it is a tale without a text, a historical drama without a script, and this is not the place to tell the long and fascinating storia, even if I knew how. I hope to provide an up-to-date background for readers, and to this end I try to give a no-frills account taking into consideration the recent manuscript discoveries that have made a big change in how we look at Buddhist history

A study like this ought to pay homage to the trope of incomplete knowledge and point out that the field and the interpretations of the field are in a state of perpetual flux, and as a result, "our knowledge is incomplete." This trope is accurate enough, because knowledge can never be complete. Knowledge

always strives for perfection. Here I am writing about the Kanjur, about the translation of twenty-five out of a total of about 270 sutras, a handful of leaves in the great and ancient forest of the Buddha's teachings. My knowledge, my perspective, cannot be complete, and I am not inclined to pretend to an omniscient command of the field. The ancients expressed the fullness, the gestalt of the teachings of the Buddha, as "84,000 units of teaching." But, as the Fortunate One points out to Sãgara, the lord of the nãgas, in translation 120 four summaries of the Dharma encompass all of the 84,00o units of teaching:

> All compounded dharmas are impermanent.
> All impure dharmas bring suffering.
> All dharmas are without self.
> Nirvãna is peaceful.

With these four summaries there arises insight into the inexhaustible teachings of the bodhisatvas, great beings.

This is more manageable. The teachings of the Buddhas are vast and incommensurable, and the scope of the buddhas is beyond our scope. We need to focus on core teachings, summaries, and outlines to bring our ideas and practice into focus.

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This book belongs to a series called Classics of Indian Buddhism. How is it possible to call these Tibetan texts "Indian classics"? Certain Mahãyana sutras are undisputed classics of Indian Buddhist literature and indeed of world literature. Idealistic epiphanies presented through innovative metaphysical dialogues and narratives, they are imperishable classics of the human spirit.' There are no universal criteria for defining classic or for settling a list of classics. Like "canon," "classic" is a subjective category, context bound, autonomous, and indeterminate. "Classics" are texts (or artifacts or practices) that individuals or communities privilege according their own criteria (taste, proclivities, needs).

The reader will soon see that I read the Tibetan texts as classical texts of Indian Buddhism, as Indian compositions, and I believe that the Tibetan scholars looked at them in a similar way. In the Kanjur (as well as the Tanjur), each translation is introduced, set apart, by the opening phrase, "in the language of India," which is followed by the Indian (usually Sanskrit) title written in Tibetan letters. The translation work was an intellectual collaboration between accomplished masters from India and learned Tibetans. At the same time, in terms of resources, patronage, and production, the Kanjur was a Tibetan effort. The Dharma kings, the nobles, and the Tibetan intelligentsia invited

Sakyamuni Buddha to cross the mighty mountains and settle down in the Land of Snows in the shape of his Dharma body—of his bka, his authoritative words. They then proceeded to conscientiously and methodically translate these words into the language of Tibet so that the sage of the Sakyas could settle down and feel at home. The opening formula "in the language of India" with its Sanskrit title is followed by "in the language of Bod (Tibet)" and the translated Tibetan title. In this way, the Kanjur has a double identity. We may call it Indo-Tibetan and celebrate its hybridity.

Translation must have begun in India during the Buddha's lifetime: the earliest translations would have been oral renderings within the Middle Indic family, from Prakrit to Prakrit.5 In a Vinaya passage about

which much has been written, two brahmans ask the Fortunate One whether they may render the Dharma into Vedic chandas; the Buddha turns down the proposal and authorizes his followers to transmit his teachings in their own dialects.' Texts started out in unprocessed, living Prakrits; as they circulated they underwent progressive processing—conversion and translation—into other Prakrits, including Pali and the canonical language of the Sammitiya school. Some of them were eventually recast in hybrid or in standard Sanskrit. It is the nature of things (dharmatã) that texts did not and do not stand still; they need to be regularly updated. This fulfills both the religious urge to participate in the creation of a perfect text and the social urge to edit or revise texts to ensure that they are comprehensible. The translation of Indian Buddhist texts was a grand and polyglot enterprise, and over the centuries a single text may well have progressed through several dialects or languages. The power of the Buddha's teachings and the fame of his words (kalyano kittisaddo) were remarkable, and they drew wider and wider circles of attention. Texts traveled across borders, and by the second century CE at the latest they began to be translated into Chinese, with the result that the earliest extant transcultural translations are those preserved in Chinese. Chinese Buddhists developed a culture of compiling catalogues of translations that give an idea of what was translated, when, where, and by whom. In Central Asia, the Dharma was translated into languages like Khotanese, Uighur, Tocharian, Tangut, and a range of others including Mongolian. Central Asian Buddhism was a multifaceted and dynamic force for over a millennium.

The Kanjur may be a cultural fusion, composite and heterogeneous, but honoring these texts as Indian classics does not in any way diminish the Kanjur's status as a treasure of Tibetan culture. It goes without saying that all cultures are composite and heterogeneous. The Kanjur stands in its own right as an extraordinary accomplishment of Tibetan Buddhists created over several hundreds of years and written, carved, wrapped, stored, and revered with care through the centuries till today. A vast body of knowledge was transferred from India to the Land of Snows. The process began by the seventh century CE, if not earlier, and continued, with periods of disruption, up to the thirteenth century and beyond. The result was the two collections called the Kanjur and Tanjur, the "collected translations of the Buddha's words" and the "collected of commentaries and treatises by later scholars." The Kanjur alone takes up over a hundred traditional volumes (pothi), amounting to an estimated 70,000 pages. The Tanjur takes up 224 volumes. In short, the production of the Kanjur and Tanjur was a stupendous human accomplishment. The translation project sponsored by the Dharma kings was certainly one of the greatest planned and sustained cultural exchanges in early world history.

This exchange, this transfer and transmission, was both cultural and spiritual. The Buddhist texts were carried to Tibet not only in letter but also in spirit, to constitute an enduring monument of culture in all its meanings. Buddhist thought, Buddhist philosophy, and Buddhist ethical and meditation practices were all part of the package. Renowned Indian masters like Sãntaraksita and his pupil Kamalasila crossed the Himalayas to help establish Buddhism in Tibet, to be followed by a regular stream of scholars in the centuries to follow. Tibetans in quest of manuscripts and teachings crisscrossed the ranges from Kashmir to Bengal, and Indians traveled to the high Tibetan plateau. The formidable snow mountains both separated and joined the two regions.

The Kanjur and Tanjur are not just collections of texts. They are important records of human and cultural history—a shared heritage of India, the Himalayan regions (including the Kathmandu Valley), and the Tibetan plateau. The prestige of the Kanjur and Tanjur was such that they were translated into

Mongolian, and such that in China opulent imperial editions were produced in Beijing by visionary rulers like the Yunglo, Wanli, Kanzi, and Qianlong emperors. By the nineteenth century after the Buddha (the fourteenth century CE), if not earlier, the Kanjur and Tanjur were recognized across Central and East Asia as primary resources for the study of the Buddhadharma.

By the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries CE, at the western end of the Eurasian continent, the frontiers of knowledge were expanding to inspire new intellectual concerns and interests, and the encounter with the cultures and religions in the east was very much part of this. One of the new fields of interest was the scriptures and literature of non-uropean religions, including those of India and Tibet. The grand pioneers of European Kanjur-Tanjur studies were the Hungarian scholar Alexander Csoma de Koros and the Frenchman Leon Feer—those were the days when giants strode the Earth. Feer wrote of the former that "by making known the vast sacred literature of Tibet, Csoma cast light on a part of the history of the human spirit that up to then was unknown."' In the modern period, in the twentieth century, the Kanjur and the Tanjur crossed the great oceans to spread around the world, and the Tibetan scriptures are now a world resource. <>

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