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Wordtrade Reviews: Contexts and Perspectives: Islam & Jung

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Editorial Appraisals:

Some qualified reviewers offer their own brief evaluation of the book. Otherwise, most of our content represents the authors'-editors' own words as a preview to their approach to the subject, their style and point-of-view. <>

THE STUDY OF ISLAMIC ORIGINS: NEW PERSPECTIVES AND CONTEXTS edited by Mette Bjerregaard Mortensen, Guillaume Dye, Isaac W. Oliver, Tommaso Tesei [Series: Judaism, Christianity, and Islam — Tension, Transmission, Transformation, De Gruyter, 9783110675436]

The study of Islam's origins from a rigorous historical and social science perspective is still wanting. At the same time, a renewed attention is being paid to the very plausible pre-canonical redactional and editorial stages of the Qur'an, a book whose core many contemporary scholars agree to be formed by various independent writings in which encrypted passages from the OT Pseudepigrapha, the NT Apocrypha, and other ancient writings of Jewish, Christian, and Manichaean provenance may be found. Likewise, the earliest Islamic community is presently regarded by many scholars as a somewhat undetermined monotheistic group that evolved from an original Jewish-Christian milieu into a distinct Muslim group perhaps much later than commonly assumed and in a rather unclear way. The following volume gathers select studies that were originally shared at the Early Islamic Studies Seminar. These studies aim at exploring afresh the dawn and early history of Islam with the tools of biblical criticism as well as the approaches set forth in the study of Second Temple Judaism, Christian, and Rabbinic origins, thereby contributing to the renewed, interdisciplinary study of formative Islam as part and parcel of the complex processes of religious identity formation during Late Antiquity.

CONTENTS

The following volume presents select proceedings from the second and third gatherings of the Early Islamic Studies Seminar (PISS). Both conferences took place in the beautiful Italian locations of Pratolino, near Florence, on June 12-16, 2017 and Gazzada (at the Villa Cagnola), near Milan, on June 16-20, 2019, respectively. They were hosted by the Enoch Seminar with the generous support of the Alessandro Nangeroni International Endowment.

The Enoch Seminar was founded by Gabriele Boccaccini in 2001 with the aim of gathering specialists of Second Temple Judaism from across the globe to share their research at conferences, which function more like small workshops, in which scholars intensively debate their ideas during several days in intimate settings that favor collegiality and dialogue. At its foundation, the Enoch Seminar sought - and still seeks - to recover both the integrity and the diversity of the intellectual traditions of the Second Temple period by breaking down the artificial and confessional barriers that have long divided its study. For too long the study of Second Temple Judaism(s) had been eclipsed by biblical studies, which naturally tends to prioritize the investigation of canonical literature. The Enoch Seminar offered ancient Jewish writings, movements, and traditions, which had hitherto been anachronistically sandwiched in between the "Old Testament" and the New Testament (and even the Mishnah), a central platform where they could be considered in their own right. Writings such as the sectarian documents discovered among the Dead Sea Scrolls or the so-called Old Testament Pseudepigrapha, received their due attention, shedding light on a period in which the Jewish Scriptures were still being composed.

Very soon, the Enoch Seminar incorporated the study of Christian origins within its scope of inquiry, since Christianity emerged from Second Temple Judaism and originally constituted but one of its many distinctive forms of expressions. This inclusion has coincided with recent trends in the scholarly investigation of Judaism and Christianity in antiquity, which sees tremendous heuristic value in studying the diverse traditions of these two entities in light of one another. Once upon a time, ancient Christianity was merely studied against a Jewish "background" (and consequently its Jewish character remained relegated to the back), while the New Testament was neglected as an important source for understanding Second Temple Judaism. The reigning assumption posited that Judaism and Christianity inevitably morphed into separate, discrete entities early on, that Jewish-Christian relations in antiquity were marked solely by antagonism and division. Studies on the New Testament/early Christianity and Second Temple Judaism were carried out in isolation from one another, with each field represented by its own academic programs, conferences, journals, specialists, jargon, and so on.

In recent decades, however, new intellectual paradigms have radically altered the historical understanding of Christian and rabbinic origins and redefined the disciplinary landscape that had hitherto reified the boundaries between Jews and Christians in antiquity. While admitting that relations between (some) Jews and (some) Christians were certainly marked by confrontation early on, many scholars now firmly situate primitive Christianity within its original Jewish environment while avoiding teleological views that reduce the complexity and diversity of early Jewish-Christian relations to inevitable fracturing and opposition. It is now more readily acknowledged that Jewish and Christian identities remained fluid, diverse, and in the making throughout Late Antiquity, with patristic and rabbinic "orthodoxies" proving formative rather than normative during this period. These newer perspectives have in turn necessitated greater collaboration between specialists from different fields, which the Enoch Seminar has readily been able to foster.

In more recent times, the Enoch Seminar has expanded its purview even further to encompass the study of Islamic origins. The genesis of this endeavor began in June 2013 in Brussels, during a meeting between Guillaume Dye and Carlos A. Segovia, who were soon joined by Emilio Gonzalez Ferrin, Manfred Kropp, and Tommaso Tesei as board of directors to create the Early Islamic Studies Seminar (EISS). With the support of the Enoch Seminar, the EISS has since then organized three Nangeroni Meetings devoted to the Qur'an and early Islam, convinced that the historical investigation of early Islam should be performed in a similar way as early Judaism and Christianity. In the inclusive spirit promoted by the Enoch Seminar, the EISS has accordingly invited to its meetings specialists in Qur'anic and Islamic studies as well as those who specialize in the Hebrew Bible, Second Temple Judaism, the New Testament. and other related fields. Indeed, the time seems ripe to appreciate the formation of the Qur'an and early Islam in light of Jewish, Christian, and other late antique traditions (Zoroastrian, Manichean, etc.). Perhaps, this type of inquiry will yield new unexpected results about the origins of Islam that will in turn enrich our understanding of the rich religious landscape of Late Antiquity. With the publication of this volume, we hope to offer promising glimpses into this kind of undertaking.

The first part of this volume begins with two essays that address theoretical and methodological issues concerning the study of early Islam. In "The Current Status and Problems of Islamic Origins: The View from the Academic Study of Religion," Aaron W. Hughes reflects on the current state of the study of Islamic origins. For Hughes, the study of Islamic origins entails a study of Jewish and Christian origins as well, since the Arabian Peninsula and Eastern regions of the burgeoning early Islamic Empire rose from and shaped a socially porous world that extended from the period of Late Antiquity. Islam, in other words, did not merely emerge from previously established monotheisms in the area but played an active role in their self-definition. Yet institutional, epistemological, and political issues beset this kind of historical enterprise, and it is to these problems that Hughes turns with the hope of showing how the academic study of religion can promisingly illuminate Islamic origins. Throughout, Hughes argues that the academic study of Islamic origins should be reframed as a late antique problem in which Islamic origins learns from and contributes to antique and late antique social formations.

An example of such a late antique framing of the question of the origins of Islam can be found in Stephen Shoemaker's contribution to the volume where he emphasizes the importance of genre by comparing the Qur'an to its late antique predecessors. This question has long vexed scholars of the Qur'án who have struggled to find a suitable category for what prima fade seems like a rather heterogeneous text. In "A New Arabic Apocryphon from Late Antiquity: The Qur'an," Shoemaker argues that the difficulty in determining the Qur'án's genre is not a consequence of its exceptionality but due to its amalgamation of various literary forms: oracular proclamations, hymns, instructional discourses, narrative evocations, legislative and paraenetic texts, battle exhortations, and polemical discourses. There is, however, a precedent in Late Antiquity to this type of assemblage that could shed light on the question: biblical apocrypha. Shoemaker defines biblical apocrypha broadly. They are not a genre per se but texts that maintain a solid connection with the writings of the Hebrew Bible and the New Testament (and other related writings), often focusing on persons and events from these books while occasionally expanding on them. This broad yet inviting definition allows for the inclusion of the Qur'an in a late antique environment that makes sense. Shoemaker accordingly qualifies the Qur'an as a biblical apocryphon written in Arabic, given its connection to biblical texts, which it originally sought to supplement rather than supplant, and inclusion of different genres.

The second part of this volume includes studies that assume some of these methodological and theoretical assumptions since they investigate the Qur'an in light of Semitic languages, the Hebrew Bible, the New Testament, rabbinic literature, targums, Syriac Christian materials, and other ancient Near Eastern sources. This section begins with Manfred's "Body Parts Nomenclature in the Qur'anic Corpus," which provides a preliminary discussion of the vocabulary used in the Qur'an to describe the human body and its constituent parts based on cognate languages and precedents set in biblical studies.

Ever since Abraham Geiger, a number of scholars have singled out notable affinities between the Qur'an and extra-biblical Jewish (rabbinic and targumic) traditions. The Qur'anic retelling of Queen Sheba's visit to Solomon finely illustrates this overlap. The Qur'anic account resembles 1 Kings 10:1-13 yet differs with significant details: in contrast to the biblical story, the Qur'an presents Solomon testing the Queen with the help of his servant jinn and emphasizes the Queen's conversion to proper religious practice, Solomon's magical powers and ability to speak the language of birds, and the oddities of the land of Sheba. Geiger and others accounted for these extra-biblical materials in terms of dependence by pointing to rabbinic and targumic parallels, claiming that Muhammad relied on Jewish tradition that was used in the creation of the Qur'an. However, in "The Queen of Shebah in the Qur'an and Late Antique Midrash," Jillian Stinchcomb reconsiders these parallels in a way that is not limited to dependence but points to a matrix of common discourses in the seventh-century Arabian Peninsula between nebulously Islamic and Jewish groups that later came to be sharply defined against one another.

Another notable parallel between the Qur'an and rabbinic tradition involves the depiction of Mount Sinai during the revelation of the Torah to Israel. At several points, the Qur'an states that God seemingly raised Mount Sinai before the Israelites. This depiction finds precedent in rabbinic midrash, which posits that God actually lifted the mountain over the Israelites. Isaac W. Oliver assesses this parallel in "Standing under the Mountain: Jewish and Christian Threads to a Qur'anic Construction." In this instance, the Qur'an does indeed seem to be indebted to rabbinic midrash. Yet the Qur'anic writer(s) did not simply "borrow" rabbinic materials. In the Qur'an, the mountain is deployed for rhetorical effect to serve specific interests. Ultimately, Mount Sinai is raised in the Qur'an against the Israelites, and by extension all Jews who do not accept the Qur'anic revelation, who are depicted in good Christian anti-Judaic fashion as rebellious sinners perpetually opposed to God's message and commissioned messengers. This image of the non-believing Jews contrasts with the Qur'an's literary construct of the ideal believers who readily accept the new revelation granted to its Messenger.

The Qur'an's interaction is not limited to rabbinic Jewish tradition but conversant with Christianity in many complex ways as well. In "Mapping the Sources of the Qur'anic Jesus," Guillaume Dye seeks to uncover the Qur'anic perspective(s) on Jesus. In some passages of the Qur'an, Jesus appears as a secondary character, standing along other prophets such as Noah, Abraham, Ishmael, Moses, and John. This inclusion precludes any simplistic qualification of the Qur'an as simply mirroring a Jewish, a Christian, or a Jewish Christian environment, since the mention of Jesus dismisses a purely Jewish background, while the rather marginal role devoted to Jesus apparently excludes Christian and Jewish Christian backgrounds. Other passages in the Qur'an, however, highly esteem Jesus. He is not only a preeminent prophet but also miraculously born from the virgin Mary, a wunderkind endowed with prophetic revelation, uniquely gifted with the holy spirit, and an eschatological harbinger. The Qur'anic Jesus, therefore, embodies several paradoxes: he is a secondary and primary figure; he seems Christian and yet unchristian (at least from an `orthodox" viewpoint); he is both a figure of convergence with

Christians and of cleavage with Christians and especially Jews. For Dye, this paradoxical Jesus is the result of several reworkings in the Qur'an that reflect the confessional identity of the burgeoning movement of the mu'minun. Interestingly enough though, virtually all of the main attributes of this composite Jesus can be found in Christian Scriptures, notably in Acts 2:22-24. Dye accordingly proposes that literati with a good command of Christian tradition used Christian texts, Acts 2:22-24 included, to subvert competing views and establish a Jesus that reflected their own convictions.

In "The Natural Theology of the Qur'an and Its Late Antique Christian Background: A Preliminary Outline," Julien Dechameux reads the Qur'anic call to observe the divine signs in the cosmos in light of Christian late antique natural theology. Toward the beginning of the third century CE, some Christian thinkers entertained the idea that divine knowledge could be reached through the contemplation of Scripture and Nature. This theological reflection flourished especially in the fourth century among various Christian authors. Decharneux suggests that the Qur'an's call to contemplate the universe is structurally in line with this Christian tradition of divine theoria. Beyond structural and thematic homologies, the Qur'an develops specific motifs and notions within this contemplative framework - not least, the notion of "divine signs" - which could well hint at a connection with East Syrian traditions of divine contemplation.

The studies in the third and final part of this volume consider the social, political, and religious circumstances in which the Qur'an emerged and how its founding members were active players in their immediate contexts. This section opens with a joint study by Gilles Courtieu and Carlos A. Segovia titled, "Q 2:102, 43:31, and Ctesiphon-Seleucia New Insights into the Mesopotamian Setting of the Earliest Qur'anic Milieu," which proposes Mesopotamia as a hypothetical setting for the earliest Qur'anic milieu, detecting allusions to Ctesiphon-Seleucia in Q 43:31 and 2:102. In a similar explorative vein, Peter von Sivers situates the Qur'an in Mesopotamia and Arabia Petraea between the Sasanid and Roman empires during 602-630 ("Prophecies Fulfilled: The Qur'anic Arabs in the Early 600s").

Wherever the Qur'an may have originated, it seems certain that the Persian Empire wished to exert its influence upon the Arabian Peninsula. This is demonstrated by Boaz Shoshan in "The Sasanian Conquest of Himyar Reconsidered: In Search of a Local Hero," who reassesses the Arab and non-Arab sources that relate the Persian conquest of the South Arabian kingdom of Himyar around 570. The evidence shows that the Sasanians had clear strategic interests in controlling this region. Boaz, however, calls for a more critical approach toward the early Arabic sources treating this event, since they have aggrandized and Islamized their local hero, Sayf of the Dhu Yazan clan, in the buildup leading to the Persian conquest.

In "Contextual Readings of Religious Statements in Early Islamic Inscriptions," Marcus Milwright offers interpretations of selected early statements of religious belief in the monumental Arabic epigraphy of the seventh and first half of the eighth centuries from the Arabian Peninsula, Syria, and Palestine. He argues that their creation was meaningfully informed by past practices that can be explained by the resilience of craft traditions in the Middle East, on the one hand, but also by the need to project messages in a visual language that was comprehensible to its target audiences, on the other hand. Thus, the ways in which early Arabic inscriptions were understood by their audiences went beyond the textual content to encompass the material and aesthetic dimensions, the location, and the broader context of late antique epigraphic and oral culture. Muslim writers such as Ibn al-Kalbi and al-Hamdani indirectly support this proposition, since they propagate the idea that the profession of faith itself existed in Arabia prior to the

time of the Prophet. While this may be a literary fiction, Milwright avers that statements about the oneness of God were in use among the "Abrahamic faiths" of Late Antiquity.

Archaeological work carried out in the last decades is slowly shedding light on the cultural environment of the pre-Islamic inhabitants of Arabia. Interestingly enough, newly discovered inscriptions name a number of gods, including the eight pagan deities mentioned in the Qur'an. In "The Gods of the Qur'an: The Rise of Hijázi Henotheism during Late Antiquity," Valentina A. Grasso provides an intertextual analysis of these pre-Islamic inscriptions and the Qur'an. She argues that stories of pre-Islamic idols have been restructured in the Qur'an in order to emphasize Muhammad's prophetic career within a polytheistic environment. However, Muhammad may very well have built his career on the existing basis of a flexible henotheism and subsequently professed a strict monotheism similar to those of the surrounding scriptural communities that developed autonomously in the distinctive Arabian milieu.

The volume concludes with a social critical analysis of early Islam by Ilkka J. Lindstedt, "'One Community to the Exclusion of Other People': A Superordinate Identity in the Medinan Community." How did the early (seventh-eighth century CE) Muslims categorize and view themselves? And what did their conceptions of themselves and the others entail? Lindstedt addresses these questions utilizing theories from the field of social psychology, especially "the social identity approach." The social identity approach argues that group identification and conduct are a central component of the human experience. Lindstedt sees this social process at play both in the so-called Constitution of Medina and the Qur'an. The Constitution of Medina, which Lindstedt views as an authentic document of the Prophet Muhammad, recategorized the Jews and the gentile Believers of Medina under one common ingroup identity yet allowed members of both groups to retain their tribal and religious identities as subordinate ones. By contrast, the Medinan stratum of the Qur'án articulates a sense of a community that is not very accepting of subgroup identities. Individual Jews and Christians are accepted as Believers but their identities as Jews and Christians remain suspect. Nevertheless, passages such as Q 3:110-115 contain both positive and negative depictions of the Jews and Christians. Thus it is misguided to simply posit that later Qur'anic strata repudiated Jews and Christians even if earlier Qur'anic passages seem more accepting of subgroup identities. <>

A Prophet Has Appeared: The Rise of Islam through Christian and Jewish Eyes, A Sourcebook by Stephen J. Shoemaker [University of California Press, 9780520299603]

Early Islam has emerged as a lively site of historical investigation, and scholars have challenged the traditional accounts of Islamic origins by drawing attention to the wealth of non-Islamic sources that describe the rise of Islam. *A Prophet Has Appeared* brings this approach to the classroom. This collection provides students and scholars with carefully selected, introduced, and annotated materials from non-Islamic sources dating to the early years of Islam. These can be read alone or alongside the Qur'an and later Islamic materials. Applying historical-critical analysis, the volume moves these invaluable sources to more equal footing with later Islamic narratives about Muhammad and the formation of his new religious movement.

Included are new English translations of sources by twenty authors, originally written in not only Greek and Latin but also Syriac, Georgian, Armenian, Hebrew, and Arabic and spanning a geographic range from England to Egypt and Iran. Ideal for the classroom and personal library, this sourcebook provides readers with the tools to meaningfully approach a new, burgeoning area of Islamic studies.

Reviews

"A marvel of concision and originality; best of all, it is readily accessible to the general reader. . . . *A Prophet Has Appeared* is one of the most readable and exciting books in Islamic history." — *Middle East Quarterly*

"Indeed, Shoemaker provides one of the most cohesive alternative visions to the emergence of Islam. *A Prophet Has Appeared* is a pivotal piece of this vision." — *Reading Religion*

"This excellent and concise volume presents the reader, both novice and informed, with the most important non-Islamic textual witnesses to the rise of Islam during its first century. In accessible English, Stephen Shoemaker has woven these sources together into a coherent narrative focusing particularly on Islamic settlement in and around Jerusalem and Syria. This book will prove essential reading in any undergraduate and graduate course on the early centuries of Islam."—Naomi Koltun-Fromm, Professor of Religion, Haverford College

The present volume aims to fill a significant gap in the materials presently available for studying the beginnings of Islam. It gathers for the first time in a single volume the most important (in my judgment at least) non-Islamic witnesses for understanding the formation of the Islamic religious tradition during the first century of its existence. It has long been a standard practice in religious studies to employ contemporary sources external to a given religious tradition in order to study its early history, particularly during its formative era. It is thus unfortunate that even at this late date such an approach to earliest Islam remains effectively sidelined. The study of Christian origins, for instance, has long benefitted from concerted, critical attention to the testimonies of contemporary Greek and Roman writers about Christianity during the first two centuries of its existence. And although in the case of early Christianity these sources are both sparser and sparer than they are for early Islam, specialists on Christian origins have long recognized these external witnesses as among the most valuable sources that we have for understanding the formation of Christianity.

The observations from these outside voices regarding the emergence of Christianity afford "a unique perspective unavailable in other writings from the period," as Robert Wilken states in The Christians as the Romans Saw Them. There he also notes that "much of what the pagan critics say is `true' but cannot be fitted into the Christian self-understanding. I am convinced that the perceptions of outsiders tell us something significant about the character of the Christian movement, and that without the views of those who made up the world in which Christianity grew to maturity, we will never understand what Christianity was or is. How something is perceived is an aspect of what it is. This is especially true in the social world, where the perception of others is an essential part of the reality people inhabit." One hopes someday to see a similar attitude and greater openness to the range of the available data in the study of early Islam. With such intent I decided to publish this volume.

Of course, this book is not the first effort to bring these external sources to bear on the study of Islamic origins. That honor belongs, it would seem, to Sebastian Brock. In 1975 at an Oxford colloquium on first-century Islam, Brock delivered a brief communication that gestured toward the importance of non-Islamic sources for understanding the beginnings of Islam with a paper entitled "Syriac Views of Emergent Islam." Henceforth, the study of Islamic origins would be changed. In effect, Brock's paper issued a challenge to the discipline to expand its data pool to include the witness of Christian sources contemporary with the events of earliest Islam. No longer could scholars of early Islam remain innocently ignorant of their invaluable testimony, content to reconstruct the rise of Islam on the basis of the Islamic sources alone. This challenge could, of course, simply be ignored, as it so often has been. Yet for those scholars who would embrace it and expand on it to include other non-Syriac and non-Christian sources, the resulting turn to integrate earliest Islam with its late antique milieu would prove transformative.

The first scholars to attempt an integration of these non-Islamic sources with study of formative Islam were Patricia Crone and Michael Cook, whose path-breaking work Hagarism: The Making of the Islamic World also took shape at the same Oxford conference and appeared only two years later in 1977.3 Hagarism proposed a bold reinterpretation of earliest Islam on the basis of these non-Islamic sources, yet its argumentation is deeply flawed by the uncritical credulity with which it approaches these non-Islamic witnesses while disregarding evidence from the Islamic tradition almost entirely, and the work was rightly criticized for this significant error, even among its most sympathetic readers But the overarching genius underlying its approach has nonetheless been unfairly marginalized and even maligned by far too many scholars of early Islam. Indeed, in part because of the controversial nature of this book, and also the scholars who wrote it, the study of formative Islam has often proceeded largely in ignorance of the invaluable witness that these contemporary sources have to offer as we seek to understand the earliest developments within Muhammad's new religious movement. One can see this tendency, for instance, in any number of recent studies of Muhammad and the beginnings of Islam.

Nevertheless, it remains essential that the evidence of these contemporary witnesses to the rise of Islam be fully integrated with the study of its earliest history. This is all the more so given the fact that the traditional Islamic accounts of the rise of Islam, as related in the earliest biographies of Muhammad, were composed only long after the events in question, and their accounts are notoriously unreliable and heavily determined by the beliefs and practices of Islam in the Abbasid Empire of the eighth and later centuries. Although these biographies relate copious and detailed information about Muhammad and the beginnings of his religious movement, as sources they are widely recognized as being highly tendentious and artificial. Yet most scholarship on Muhammad and the beginnings of Islam still looks to these sources to reconstruct the rise of Islam, believing them to preserve a reliable "historical kernel," even though the reliability of this kernel is merely asserted by scholarly fiat without a critical basis.

The Unique Value of the Non-Islamic Witnesses

According to the traditional narrative of Islamic origins, as stored in the collective memory of the Islamic historical tradition, Muhammad's new religious movement achieved its mature, traditional form before his death, which occurred, again following the Islamic historical tradition, in 632. Islam's faith and practice were fully elaborated and perfected by this time, so that the classical Islam of the later eighth century and beyond was already in place and in no need of any further development. Likewise, the contents of the Qur'an were complete by this time, having been revealed to Muhammad and through him to his followers over the course of his prophetic career, so the canonical text reached its close with his death. The text of the Qur'an was thus already established in its final form, as it has come down to us in the present, even if its contents were only codified decades later and the final vocalizations added later still. Accordingly, Muhammad's followers received the Qur'an as a distinctive and uniquely authoritative scriptural tradition from the very start.

The message of the Qur'an and of Muhammad's preaching shares substantial similarities to earlier Jewish and Christian traditions, a fact that the Islamic tradition itself also recognizes. Yet Muhammad and the Qur'an brought their divine message specifically to the Arabs in Arabic and in the originally perfect form that the ancestors of contemporary Jews and Christians had corrupted. Thus, while there was a genetic relationship between religious cultures of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam, according to the traditional narrative, Muhammad and the Qur'an owe no debt to their religious predecessors. Instead, they have directly restored through divine revelation the true religion of Abraham, which he observed in Arabia,

rather than the biblical Holy Lands, with his son Ishmael and his mother Hagar. Islam was therefore already by the death of Muhammad understood by his followers as anew, separate religious confession that revived an older faith and was clearly distinct from Judaism and Christianity with its own unique scripture and prophet.

Muhammad revealed his message and the Qur'an, according to tradition, in the Arabian Hijaz, the western part of the central Arabian Peninsula, in the cities of Mecca and Medina. Muhammad began to preach in his hometown of Mecca, which the Islamic tradition remembers as having been thoroughly pagan or polytheist in its religious belief and practice, although there is good evidence to suggest that this was not actually the case. The tradition reports, nonetheless, that Mecca possessed a major pagan shrine, the Ka'ba, and pilgrimage to this sanctuary was an important part of the local Meccan economy. For this reason, and for others no doubt, the citizens of Mecca did not welcome Muhammad's new message of exclusive monotheism. Although he managed to attract some followers in Mecca, after about ten years he migrated with them to another city to the north, Yathrib (later renamed Medina) at the invitation of its inhabitants. This event, known as the hijra, the "flight" or "migration" to Yathrib/Medina is the event that traditionally marks the beginning of the Islamic tradition as well as the beginning of the Islamic calendar in the year 622 CE.

In Medina, Muhammad was accepted as the city's leader, and again he found himself among large numbers of Arab pagans, but in their midst was also a large Jewish community. Neither Mecca nor Medina, one should note, had any Christian community at all according to the Islamic tradition, and there is likewise no external evidence for a Christian presence in either location at this time. Muhammad made a pact with Medina's Jews, at least for a while, allowing them to be members of his new politico-religious community while retaining their traditional faith and practice, but according to tradition this was a short-lived experiment. It was also in Medina that Muhammad, soon after arriving, changed the direction of prayer for his followers away from Jerusalem, their original orientation, and established instead the Ka'ba in Mecca as the focus of Islamic prayer henceforward. Although at the time the Ka'ba was still in use as a pagan shrine, according to Islam it had been founded by Abraham and was thus an originally monotheist shrine that had subsequently fallen into pagan misuse. In 627 CE, Muhammad and his followers conquered Mecca and cleansed its shrine, restoring it to its monotheist roots, elevating it as the most sacred shrine of his new religion, and integrating it into an elaborate pilgrimage rite that he established in Mecca and its environs. Several years later, in 632 Muhammad died in Medina just as his followers were preparing to spread the dominion of their new monotheist polity beyond Arabia and into the Near East and Mediterranean world.

Such is the portrait of Islamic origins that we find in the traditional Islamic biographies of Muhammad: an Arabian monotheism proclaimed by an Arabian prophet through an Arabic scripture focused on an Arabian shrine deep within Arabia, with some Jewish presence and an absence of Christianity. Yet Muhammad's traditional biographies, the *sira* traditions, as they are known, are widely recognized by modern historians as little more than pious imaginations about the beginnings of Islam that took shape in the collective memory among Muhammad's followers over at least a century after his death, at which time they were first collected and written down, around 750 CE. Relying on these traditional biographies as trustworthy sources for the beginnings of Islam is thus no different than if one were to write the history of first-century Christianity based on the second and third-century apocryphal acts of the apostles, something that no scholar of Christianity, by comparison, would ever even dream of doing.

Moreover, like these biographies of Muhammad, the early Islamic historical tradition first took shape only during the Abbasid Empire, and accordingly it betrays a pervasive bias against the Umayyad dynasty, the predecessors of the Abbasids who ruled as Muhammad's successors (caliphs) from 661 to 750 CE. Thus, the traditional Islamic accounts of the first century are regularly distorted not only by the pious memories of later generations, but also by a deliberate anti-Umayyad bias.

The traditions of the Qur'an, for their part, almost certainly belong to the first Islamic century. Nevertheless they convey virtually no information concerning the life of Muhammad and the circumstances of his prophetic mission, let alone the early history of the community that he founded." Indeed, it is this acute crisis of evidence for the history of Muhammad's new religious movement during the first century of its existence that makes attention to the witness of contemporary non-Islamic sources absolutely critical. Given the fundamentally unreliable nature of the early Islamic sources, one can highlight the problem clearly by simply reversing Jonathan Brown's argument that "to rely solely on these Christian sources would be like writing a history of the Soviet Union during the Cold War using only American newspapers." Point taken, but certainly to rely solely on the early Islamic tradition in this case would be like writing a history of the Soviet Union during Cold War using only Soviet newspapers. It is thus perhaps not the best analogy for him to make, since that is effectively what Brown and so many other Islamicists generally have done when writing the history of early Islam. For what it is worth, I more than suspect that an account based on the American news media would, in fact, prove more accurate than one drawn from the pages of Pravda or reports from TASS. Yet that is beside the point: surely any historian of the Cold War Soviet Union would use Soviet, American, and other sources together in a critical manner, and that is precisely what historians of formative Islam must also begin to do with more regularity and rigor.

Despite the frequent neglect of the non-Islamic sources in much scholarship, their study has by no means lain dormant since the publication of Hagarism. Fred Donner's volume on The Early Islamic Conquests, for instance, reconstructs the expansion of Muhammad's followers outside of the Arabian Peninsula through a synthesis of Islamic and non-Islamic sources, yielding admirable results in what remains the standard account of these events. Donner's more recent study Muhammad and the Believers presents a compelling reconstruction of earliest Islam using both Islamic and non-Islamic sources. Likewise, Crone herself and Gerald Hawting have both published a number of excellent studies on earliest Islam using these sources. I have myself also attempted two studies of early Islam that aim to synthesize evidence from the complete range of available sources." And Sean Anthony's recent monograph Muhammad and the Empires of Faith offers an outstanding exemplary model of how the Islamic and non-Islamic source can be productively used in tandem. Yet by far the most significant work on these non-Islamic sources is the magisterial inventory of these traditions in Robert Hoyland's Seeing Islam as Others Saw It. Indeed, given Hoyland's near exhaustive catalog of these sources and their content, one might well wonder what is the need for the present volume. Likewise, Michael Penn's recent When Christians First Met Muslims provides interested readers with a ready sourcebook of the earliest Syriac writings on Islam. In light of these two fine studies in particular, then, why would there be a need to publish this anthology of non-Islamic witnesses to the rise of Islam? Is not such a collection merely superfluous at this point?

In fact, this collection offers something quite different from these earlier publications. In contrast to Hoyland's tome, which includes at least some discussion of nearly every contemporary text that merely

mentions Islam, I have instead focused on a limited number of sources, offering a curated selection chosen on the basis of their quality as witnesses to the rise of Islam. To merit inclusion in this volume, a source should ideally satisfy two criteria: (1) it must date with a high degree of probability from the first century of Islam; and (2) it must convey information concerning the religious beliefs and practices of Muhammad's followers. Mere mentions of the "Arabs," reports of battles, discussions of diplomacy and other political issues, and so on have been largely excluded. It should be noted, however, that I have made certain exceptions to the second point for a handful of important sources that are noteworthy for their very early witness to Muhammad and his new religious movement. Moreover, in contrast to Hoyland's book, the focus here is on the texts themselves, each of which we give in translation—something that Hovland does only piecemeal and selectively. And while Penn's collection offers extensive translations from a range of sources, he limits his collection to only writings in Syriac and aims primarily to show how Syriac Christians responded to the rise of Islam. My objective, however, is to present something rather different. Each of the sources included in this volume holds significant value for understanding the early history of Muhammad's new religious movement itself. Moreover, while the Syriac tradition is of course vital for understanding the formation of Islam, as readers soon will see, it is by no means uniquely or singularly important. If one's goal is to use non-Islamic sources as important witnesses to the rise of Islam, then one must look beyond Syriac to the other linguistic communities of the late ancient Near East, including Greek, Hebrew, Armenian, Georgian, Arabic, and even Latin.

Readers familiar with some of my earlier publications will notice that this volume seeks to make some similar arguments about the nature of the religious movement founded by Muhammad that have already been raised in those studies. The main difference, however, lies in the approach. Rather than focusing on a theme—the end of Muhammad's life or apocalypticism, for instance, in this book we instead present all the relevant contemporary witnesses to the rise of Muhammad's new religious community from the non-Islamic primary sources themselves, allowing readers to encounter them directly. The result is not really a general reader for an introductory course on Islam (although, depending on the approach taken by the instructor, why not?). Instead, this volume seeks to encourage more attention to these sources and their historical witness to the rise of what would become Islam, especially in university classrooms where questions about Muhammad and the rise of Islam are engaged more specifically and narrowly. Yet I suspect that this anthology will also be of use to specialists in the study of early Islam and late antiquity, both graduate students and more advanced scholars, since most individuals working in these fields do not have facility in all the languages represented by the included texts. In many respects, I conceive of this volume as sharing much in common with Wilken's seminal volume The Christians as the Romans Saw Them, cited above, albeit with more direct attention to the texts themselves.

As a further point of clarification, I would note that in the endnotes I frequently refer readers to my earlier publications for further clarification of various points. This pattern should not be taken as a sign of vanity—as if to suggest that only my work on these topics is worth consulting. Far from it: this is a matter of convenience. Since in these works, I have already engaged a wide range of scholarship on a variety of matters, I refer readers to my publications in lieu of reproducing their arguments and references in the commentaries or notes of this volume. Readers can find in these publications' discussions of the range of scholarly opinion on given topics along with references to other important works on these same subjects. To facilitate direct interaction with the texts, I have presented them in the following manner. Each text is preceded by a sort of basic introduction, providing the reader with

the essential details of who wrote it, when, where, and why, insofar as we can know. These introductions will vary significantly in length depending on the nature of the text in question and how complicated such matters are in the current state of scholarship. The texts themselves will follow, and then I conclude each chapter with a historical commentary that seeks to explain what a particular source can tell us about the rise of Muhammad's new religious movement within the broader context of the late ancient Near East. In this way, I hope to provide readers with an approach to the texts that will enable them to form their own judgments about what they mean before reading my own comments. <>

LATE ANTIQUE RESPONSES TO THE ARAB CONQUESTS
edited by Josephine van den Bent, Floris van den Eijnde and Johan Weststeijn [Cultural Interactions in the Mediterranean, Brill, 9789004500617]

LATE ANTIQUE RESPONSES TO THE ARAB CONQUESTS is a showcase of new discoveries in an exciting and rapidly developing field: the study of the transition from Late Antiquity to Early Islam. The contributors to this volume engage with previously neglected sources, such as Arabic rock inscriptions, papyri and Byzantine archaeological remains. They also apply new interpretative methods to the literary tradition, reading the Qur'an as a late antique text, using Arabic poetry as a source to study the gestation of an Arab identity, and extracting settlement patterns of the Arabian colonizers in order to explain regional processes of Arabicization and Islamization. This volume shows how the Arab conquests changed both the Arabian conquerors and the conquered.

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The Arab conquests had far- reaching and long- lasting consequences. Not only did they usher in a new religion, but they also heralded a new cultural paradigm, as the Islamic caliphate came to encompass a territory stretching from central Asia to Spain. While this paradigm was indeed novel in many ways, it was also very much heir to what came before it. This assessment has not always received its due attention in the academic world. Twentieth- century scholarship long took the historical Muhammad as its main point of departure, largely following Islamic tradition, even if it replaced a spiritual- religious with a historical- scientific approach. This methodology has had serious implications for the way in which early Arab/ Islamic culture has been studied, to some extent disconnected from either its own prehistory or its wider historical context. In the past decades, however, scholarship has changed considerably. Beyond the traditional historiographical approach, with its attention to literary Arabic texts written sometimes centuries after Muhammad and the initial stages of Arab expansion, there has been a distinct movement towards new readings of these texts as well as to alternative fields of research, such as papyrology, numismatics, architecture, and archaeology. This engagement with alternative sources and perspectives has integrated early Islamic culture into the late antique context in which the Arab conquests took place and Islam came into being, as well as into the early medieval world that it helped shape.

This book brings together some of the approaches currently employed to study the impact of the Arab conquests on Mediterranean and Near Eastern cultures. Strongly embedding the rise of Islam within the context of Late Antiquity, it presents early Islam as a religion in- the- making that was entrenched within the cultural mosaic of its time, with as many points of connection as elements of departure from the antique past. In addition, we highlight the many new disciplines that have been added to the study of early Islam in hopes of contributing to a deeper understanding of the historical context in which the Arab expansion took place and from which Islam emerged as a dominant world religion.

Islam and the End of Antiquity: Revisiting the Pirenne Thesis in the Age of Connectivity

For archaeologists and historians, periodization is indispensable. By generalizing eras through the assignment of certain properties, historical themes can be separated from each other or connected into manageable categories. Inevitably, such an abstraction of the past leads to oversimplification and blind spots. One of history's major fault lines has traditionally been the transition from Antiquity to the Middle Ages. With the rise of Western European nation states in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries it became received wisdom that "Western civilization" had its roots in Classical Antiquity, and more specifically in the civilizations of Greece and Rome. According to Enlightenment historians such as Edward Gibbon, a period of darkness set in after the fall of the Western Roman Empire on the fourth of September 476, whereafter reason was exchanged for military force, and law based on the written word for law based on the sword. The cause for this decay was found within the rise of Christianity on the one hand, and a so- called "feminization" of the once martial Romans on the other.

Henry Pirenne was one of the first and most important voices to argue against such a periodization. He argued that "[f] or centuries after the political collapse of the Roman Empire in the West, the economic

and social life of Western Europe still moved exclusively to the rhythms of the Ancient world. Romania, a robust 'functional Romanity' (...), survived intact from the so-called 'Germanic Invasions' of the fifth century A.D." Egyptian papyrus was still imported into Marseille from Byzantine- controlled Alexandria, while textiles, papyrus, wine, and spices provided a "hint of the Roman elegance" that still defined high society in the eastern Mediterranean. This assessment ties in with a recent scholarly consensus that has coalesced onto a continuity of Roman political institutions, trade networks, and cultural forms, as evident in the establishment of a "Romanized" Vandal kingdom in northern Africa but most clearly in the "Justinian Renaissance," which briefly re- established Roman rule throughout much of the Mediterranean. Perhaps most vocally among recent scholars, Averil Cameron has reinforced Pirenne's notion of a continued Romania beyond the fifth century, with reference to a variety of cultural indicators such as urban models, institutional forms, and cultural "mentality."

Pirenne argued that the real break between Antiquity and the Middle Ages should be sought in the rise ` and military expansion of an Am ☐☐ er t h
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lived Justinian revival of the sixth century that stands out against the main trend, rather than the slump succeeding it.

Additionally, the question remains how much the Arabs were, in fact, attempting to shut out Europe. `Umar ii (r. 99–101 AH /717–20 CE), for example, issued a decree in which he professed that it was God's will that the ports would be accessible to everyone, and that trade would not be hindered by state intervention. He was likely referring to trade between Syrian and Byzantine ports. Moreover, an edict was ascribed to the first `Umar (r. 13–23 AH /634–44 CE) which set taxation rates, including for foreign merchants, aimed specifically at traders from the Byzantine empire. They were to pay 10 percent, as this was reportedly the amount paid by Muslim traders in Byzantine territory. Both Byzantine and Muslim merchants were clearly trading across borders. And while much has been made of the disruptive effects of naval warfare in the seventh through ninth centuries, hostilities were probably far from constant in either magnitude or frequency. Muslim maritime dominance may furthermore hardly have been as complete as it has sometimes been depicted, nor will internecine strife of whatever type have been a great hindrance to maritime redistribution. In any case, there is evidence to suggest that Islamic and Christian tradesmen freely intermingled and even cooperated when opportunity arose.

Horden and Purcell point to two further factors that should caution against blaming Islam for the evident economic depression that took place in the seventh, eighth, and ninth centuries: contemporary literary testimony and the misunderstood effects of piracy. One of the quintessential literary genres of the age, hagiography, recounts the lives of saints including some of their wanderings across the Mediterranean. From these accounts, a general picture emerges that shows the ease with which the protagonists enter Muslim- controlled territories, as well as the short coastal "hops" that led them from harbor to harbor to their destination. The hagiography of St. Willibald moreover mentions the presence of an Egyptian ship in an Italian port in the 720s, close to the acme of the economic slump. Similarly, Gregory the Decapolite's successful navigation through waters supposedly known for Muslim piracy is highly suggestive of an active panMediterranean maritime infrastructure. From the other side of the supposed divide stems a famous passage by Ibn Khurdãdhbih (d. third century AH /ninth century CE) on the Jewish traders known as al- Rãdhãniyya (Radhanites), who were ostensibly multilingual and maintained a trade network stretching from Francia, through Egypt and Arabia, all the way to China. A levy granted to the Abbey of Corbey in 712 by Chilperic ii confirms the picture that commerce from the east could still reach the port of Marseille in the eighth century.

Finally, Pirenne's allegation that Muslim piracy was the main impediment to international trade has been shown to be problematic. As David Abulafia has rightly pointed out, a persistence of trade relations is a prerequisite for piracy, with the latter predicated on the former, the predator unable to exist without prey. Nor can the scale of piracy ever exceed a certain ratio of commerce, unless the predator is willing to cannibalize his own livelihood and perish: "Pirates might pick off one or two ships but were highly unlikely to capture the whole lot." The piracy argument moreover overlooks one of the main aspects of buccaneering in any age, the fact that pirates often are tradesmen themselves: pirates need markets. Like government requisitions, piracy is thus just another form of economic redistribution. And lest we forget, piracy was never a one- sided (i.e., Muslim) affair, as is evident from the surviving anecdote of a Byzantine ship raiding a merchant ship making its way to North Africa.29 The fact remains that neither piracy nor war were characteristics uniquely attributable to either the early Islamic or even to the Pirenne period as a whole; they were and always had been part of Mediterranean life (periodic attempts

to quell the phenomenon notwithstanding). Judged by contemporary standards, the piracy argument is thus revealed as an unsuccessful attempt to discredit early Islam by blaming it for the early medieval depression— pirates after all are easily cast as "the other."

All this is not to deny that the Pirenne period marks a low tide in Mediterranean connectivity, but rather to emphasize the changing nature of that connectivity. Ports that previously had been bustling with international commerce— Marseille, Naples, and Carthage— were reduced to regional importance or vanished outright. But new actors were about to enter the arena, savvily adapting to new realities, in particular the rise of Islam as a dynamic new force with strong ties to the Near East and southern Asia. In Africa, Carthage fell to the Umayyads in 698 and was destroyed more comprehensively even than it had been at the hands of the Romans in 146 BCE; it was never to recover again. Fearing recapture of the province by the Byzantines, the Arabs reconstituted local control in the new administrative center of Tunis on the opposite end of the great laguna. In Italy, Venice and especially Amalfi were among the first to profit. Amalfi established its position through a consistently pro- Muslim policy, even as Arabs raided the Italian coasts in the ninth and tenth century. The Amalfitans were rewarded with special commercial concessions and trade rights in Arab ports. It is interesting, though perhaps not surprising, that the rise of these new European entrepôts coincides exactly with the heyday of the alleged Muslim thalassocracy. Both in the East and in the West, contacts between Christian and Muslim nations were largely mediated by Christian merchants, rather than Muslims venturing into the dãr almarb. In the East, Cyprus played a crucial role as a redistribution center for both the Byzantines and Arabs, while trading in the West was now confined to the narrow strait between Ifrïqiyya and Sicily, with the Amalfitans eagerly playing the part of middlemen. Unsurprisingly, the latter were known as much as merchants as privateers, operating as proxies in name of their Muslim allies or operating independently depending on the circumstances.

If we concede that a quantitative decline in connectivity characterized the Pirenne period, it nevertheless remained dynamic and adaptive to new circumstances, with shifting shipping routes marking rapidly changing consumer markets. A major problem in bringing this vibrancy to light is the fact that the Pirenne period has at times been undervalued by archaeologists (but see the contributions by Al-Jallad and Vroom in this volume), its material culture underappreciated in comparison to what came before and after it. Both field surveys and excavations generally have neglected to focus on this period— owing in part, one is reluctant to admit, to its underwhelming decorative traits. What is more, low-level connectivity of the kind prevalent in this period is especially hard to prove as it leaves little trace in the material record: coinage may be limited when trade is often in kind, shipwrecks are few and far between, non-durable materials are used, and pottery in particular is often too stylistically "crude" to be employed in meaningful analysis. Speaking of a collapse in the volume of redistribution may therefore be too rash. The small scale "hops" alluded to in the hagiographic account of the Burgundian bishop Arculf may leave less of a material footprint than the long- distance voyages of the sixth century, but they maintain connectivity nonetheless.

Pirenne may thus be rightfully criticized for substituting one migratory movement (that of the fifth-century Germanic invasions) with another (the Arab conquests in the seventh) as the effective cause of Antiquity's demise. But this misconception was mostly a consequence of mixing cause and effect. Pirenne was probably right in seeking a significant chronological extension of Romania— that is, of the Roman cultural traits transmitted by major urban centers of the ancient world— well into the early medieval period. The coup de grâce, however, was not delivered by marauding Arab invaders, but by a gradual

weakening of Mediterranean connectivity that had its roots in the High Roman Empire. What caused this waning of socio- economic, cultural, and political ties is difficult to assess and is not the subject of this book. It will, however, not have been monocausal and should be understood as having taken place over a very long period of time, a movement that required the full first millennium to unfold.

Returning to the Arab conquests, which is the subject of this book, we may therefore conclude that it was not the conquests that caused the depression, but that the depression (or more precisely, the weakening of Mediterranean connectivity) created the right conditions for the Arab expansion to ignite. This book seeks to understand that moment of ignition as part of its late antique milieu or rather within the context of the remnants of traditions that reach back centuries and more. The contributions to this volume all in one way or another seek to explain how early Arab culture dealt with these remnants and how those remnants were in turn transformed by conquest.

The Impact of Empire: Tradition and Change

By narrowing the resolution of our historical lens from the first millennium to only its sixth and seventh centuries, our focus shifts from continuity to disruption and from unity to fragmentation. If the longue durée perspective of the previous section has invited us to look for persisting connectivity, we must now focus our attention on the realities of conquest and empire, both lost and found, set in motion by changes in connectivity. During the sixth-century Justinian Reconquista, Byzantine naval power provided a brief reprieve from the long-term trend of weakening Mediterranean ties, ensuring that existing maritime connections remained protected and operable. But the amputation of its African and Asiatic limbs drastically curtailed the naval capabilities of the Byzantines. Likewise, their ability to draw upon the resources of the Mediterranean and Near East were severely impaired as well. Joanita Vroom's contribution to this volume shows that, for the Byzantine world at least, connectivity had to be rerouted to a certain extent to accommodate its new, strongly diminished dimensions. Items that were previously imported from the Levant or Egypt had to be found within the contracted borders, exchanged for more readily available items, or allowed to disappear altogether. That the importance of the Byzantine fleet in maintaining the empire cannot be over-emphasized is borne out by the observable fact that it maintained a tight grip on the Dalmatian coast, even at a time when Slavic tribes overran the rest of the Balkans. As long as the fleet remained intact, coastal areas could, within limits, stay protected. Even so, there may well have been a macro- economic aspect to complete this picture of increased "autarky." With its fiscal position inherently impaired by the contraction, there may have been a protectionist movement, whether deliberately decreed by Constantinople or imposed upon the commonwealth by economic necessity. In any case, it cannot be a coincidence that the Pirenne period, with its dramatically impaired access to material goods, is commonly seen as a turning point in Byzantine art and culture. A similar analysis may doubtlessly be employed for the other Christian regions— Spain, Gaul, and Italy.

Thus, the individual contributions to this volume identify both continuities and discontinuities. At a very minimum, however, this mosaic of case studies shows that a deep, gaping abyss between (Late) Antiquity and the Middle Ages— whether conceived of as the result of German migrations, following Gibbon, or of the rapidly combusting Arab revolution, following Pirenne— cannot be maintained. The abyss most certainly did not exist for the people living in these times. For them, present and past comprised a continuum of laws and customs, of shapes and symbols, and above all, of a deep- rooted conviction that the world was God's unique creation. While the rapidly evolving Islamic civilization generated a unique

architecture, an idiosyncratic corpus of literature, and a revolutionary new religious order, early Arab culture could build upon the existing, and transform the ancient into the new. As some of the authors argue in this book, many old habits took a long time to die, as new ones gradually began to emerge beside them. A quick glance at the Umayyad Mosque in Damascus shows that the first dynasts of this latest empire to claim universal authority imagined themselves as the inheritors of an ancient culture with deep roots in the Greco- Roman past. Built like Byzantine basilicas, with a large nave, aisles, Corinthian capitals, mosaics, and opus sectile, this first "Islamic cathedral" proclaims a message consisting of well- recontextualized traditions. Resting upon the foundations of an early Christian basilica dedicated to John the Baptist, the current building still contains a shrine in which the "original" relics of the Baptist are kept.

How then to explain the gap that has emerged in later perception? This question does not allow an easy answer, but part of an answer must be found in the period after the earth- shaking conquests of Muhammad and his descendants, in the inward- focused world of early medieval Europe. Peter Brown has cogently argued that Christian Europe was one of the few places in the world in which people were not taken by the dazzling dynamics of Arab expansion, where people considered Islam as the photonegative of themselves— not something to admire, or even to respect, but a despicable heathendom. The image of Islam as an anti- Christian counterpoint that was to be utterly annihilated is in a certain way the real break between Antiquity and the Middle Ages.

This break, as Edward Said had shown long ago, has never healed. When the nascent Western European nation states started to reinvent themselves according to a largely imagined tradition of a communal Greco- Roman heritage— the emergence of Antiquity's Nachleben— a recurrent theme was the search for an explanation for the colonial supremacy of Europe. Why was the Islamic world unable to oppose this European expansion? The answer was sought and found in the idea that the Islamic world had turned itself away from the foundation of civilization, laid out in Antiquity. With that, blame for the schism between East and West was retroactively, and squarely, placed upon the Arab expansion.

Echoes of these ideas, of a schism between East and West and a schism between Antiquity and Islam, are still prevalent in Western popular perception, politics, and at times even in scholarship. In recent decades, however, more and more scholars have come to recognize the importance of viewing the development and events of early Islam— religious, economic, political, cultural— in light of the broader contexts of Late Antiquity. This volume joins them in this focus and argues that Antiquity did not suddenly end with the rise of Islam (emphasizing that the Arab conquests did not originate in a vacuum), but rather took place in the context of a culturally integrated late antique Near East. For a proper understanding of the period and its developments, a perspective in which Islam is studied within the context of Late Antiquity, or even as part of a narrative spanning the first millennium, is essential.

A "Late Antique Turn"

For a long time, since the beginning of the nineteenth century, scholars of Islam and Arabic culture and history generally shared the traditional, Islamic idea that the emergence of Islam took place within relative isolation on the Arabian Peninsula during the life of Muhammad. Following the subsequent conquests, the new but already mature religion spread across the Near East, the Mediterranean, and beyond. This view of early Islam as well as the origins of the Qurán primarily followed Islamic, Arabic-language narrative reports about this early period. Historiographically, however, these sources are

riddled with challenges. The accounts contain numerous contradictions within and between source texts as well as other indications that they might not offer a reliable representation of events, exhibiting, for instance, anachronisms, a clear interest in numerological symbolism, topoi, and various other issues. Moreover, the stories about the early Islamic period were not put down in writing until the late eighth or ninth century CE, so that they were strongly colored by later concerns. By the time these sources were put into writing, their authors had an Islamic self- awareness that led them to present the rise of Islam as a rigorous break with the past and suggest that Islam was fully "developed" as such from the very start. In the same vein, they interpreted the Quránic text from their own cultural and political perspectives.

Yet, as early as the nineteenth century, scholars such as Gustav Weil, Ignaz Goldziher, and Theodor Nöldeke took a critical approach towards the Islamic source material. Similarly, the nineteenth century saw some scholars recognize the importance of looking at the temporal and cultural contexts of early Islamic history. The first steps in the process of placing the Qur án and the rise of Islam within a late antique perspective date back to the work of Abraham Geiger in the 1830s. In an essay entitled Was hat Mohammad aus dem Judenthume aufgenommen?, this German rabbi and scholar investigated the relationship between the Qurán and rabbinic literature. After a few interesting advances in the examination of connections between Judaism and Islam, this line of research was interrupted in the 1930s, as a result of the persecution of Jewish scholars by the Nazis. In the decades that followed, scholars abandoned the historical inquiry of the emergence of the Qurán within its late antique context and shifted their focus primarily to the person of Muhammad.

From the 1970s onward, however, a number of publications cast doubt on several or even many of the elements of the traditional Islamic narrative. Referencing the reliability problems of the Islamic sources, these works tended to dismiss the traditional narrative, in some cases discarding it altogether, focusing on outside sources instead. The authors, who devised entirely new interpretations of early Islamic history, are also known as "Revisionists"— even though they did not and do not constitute a coherent group with a singular argument. In fact, their arguments and conclusions frequently contradict one another irreconcilably. The term "Revisionist," therefore, does not convey much more information than the fact that the authors reject the traditional narrative. The theories themselves are rather controversial, with some leading to heated debate within academic circles while others were outright rejected; at times the theories have even attracted the attention of the popular media.

In 1974, Günter Lüling published Über den Ur- Qurñn, in which he argued that the Qurán consists of different layers: Christian strophic hymns at its base, which were later covered by Islamic layers of different dates. More followed in 1977, with the publication of John Wansbrough's Quranic Studies and Patricia Crone and Michael Cook's Hagarism. Wansbrough, in his infamously obtusely written Quranic Studies, challenged the traditional narrative in a variety of ways, but the best known is his assertion that the Qurán was not canonized until the second/ eighth or third/ ninth century in 'Abbãsid Iraq. Hagarism presented an entirely different theory. Crone and Cook, having completely set aside all Islamic sources on account of their unreliability, used contemporary external sources to reconstruct early Islamic history, suggesting that Islam originated from a Jewish messianic movement, the so- called Hagarenes (muhãjirün).

More "Revisionist" theories followed after the turn of the millennium. The first, and arguably most famous, was Christoph Luxenberg's (pseud.) Die syroaramäischen Lesart des Qur'an (2000). Pointing to the generally accepted fact that Syriac influenced the language of the Qurán, he argued that the Qurán was written in a mixed language of Aramaic and Arabic and consequently reread Quránic passages from a Syriac, Christian perspective. His argument that the houris of paradise in Q 44:54 are really bunches of grapes especially attracted ample and enthusiastic attention from Western media outlets. A few years later, in 2003, Judith Koren edited Crossroads to Islam, based on the work of Yehuda Nevo, who died in 1992. They argued for a planned but secret, centuries- long Byzantine withdrawal from its eastern provinces, the power vacuum being filled by their Arab vassals whose religion slowly developed from "indeterminate monotheism" into Islam.

The proposed "Revisionist" theories, the best known of which have been mentioned here, thus vary wildly and are in many cases mutually exclusive. All share, however, the controversy they generated— both within and without academia. What these "Revisionists" do have in common— besides this controversy and their departure from the traditional narrative— is that they devote a great deal of attention to the late antique context in which the Qurán and what we now know as Islam emerged. They look at the text of the Qurán from that perspective, and their distrust of Islamic sources has led them to focus on non- Islamic texts as well as material evidence. In that sense, these theories have posed a challenge and have helped breathe new life and a new sense of urgency into the field.

New lines of research opened in the last decades of the twentieth century, but it was in the first decade of the twenty- first century that they truly gained momentum. A number of conferences were organized, at least in part in response to the "Revisionist" challenge— taking up the proverbial glove, as it were. The 2004 conference "Historische Sondierungen und methodische Reflexionen zur Koranexegese— Wege zur Rekonstruktion des vorkanonischen Koran" and the 2005 conference "Towards a New Reading of the Qurán?" both resulted in edited volumes with contributions that pay ample attention to the late antique context of the Qurán. This trend has stuck: Islamicists, Arabists, historians, and other scholars have increasingly incorporated this perspective into their research. Their work acknowledges the importance of this context not only for insights into the text of the Qurán itself, but also to shed light on the development and spread of this new religion as well as social, cultural, and political trends in the early Islamic period.

Given the wide range of this scholarship— both in subject matter and in field of research— constraints of space prohibit an elaborate overview and analysis of individual contributions and contributors. However, two clear trends can be observed: renewed readings of the Qurán and an interest in the use of different source types, such as non- Islamic written sources, inscriptions, archaeology, and coinage. Like Islamic/ Arabic literature, these sources are not without interpretative challenges of their own, but they do offer new vantage points. The recognition of the importance of connections between late antique cultures and religions in combination with a multidisciplinary approach offers new insights and has made this field of research a fast-moving and exciting one.

The re-reading of the Qurán takes many different shapes. One approach is a philological perspective, in which scholars look at linguistic elements of and influences on the Quránic text. A particular interest in this respect in Syriac influences closely connects to another way of re-reading the Qurán: looking at its relationship with other texts, primarily religious, circulating in the region. Other scholars have focused

on internal elements of the text, while keeping its late antique context in mind. By looking carefully at the Quránic text, Fred Donner for instance has attempted to gain insight into the beliefs of the early followers of the nascent movement that would later become Islam, seeing it as a "Believers" movement that originally included Christians and Jews. Others have renewed scholarly efforts to look at the Qurán's composition through its literary elements, such as rhyme and structure. Another approach, with Michel Cuypers as its main advocate, has focused on the concentric structure of (parts of) suras, which has been (somewhat unfortunately) dubbed "Semitic rhetoric."

At the intersection of Quránic text and new source material is the research into early Qurán manuscripts (or rather: fragments thereof), whether discovered relatively recently or unearthed from long-held collections in European libraries. These manuscripts shed light on the history of the text itself— and will hopefully, in the not too distant future, contribute to a long-awaited critical edition of the Quránic text. A new focus on source types other than the traditional Islamic texts is similarly helpful in better understanding the Qurán. These source types include the abovementioned non- Islamic writings— in a variety of languages (Syriac, Hebrew, Ethiopic, Persian) and of different religious (Christian, Jewish, Zoroastrian) and political provenance— but also preIslamic Arabian texts such as inscriptions.

The Qurán and the earliest days of Islam are thus now understood more and more in their late antique context. Yet, these developments had relevancy and consequences outside the Arabian Peninsula as well, as they were followed by what is commonly known as the "Arab conquests." Communities living in areas that had previously been under Byzantine or Sasanian control— Christians, Jews, Zoroastrians, and others, of various sects and speaking different languages— now passed under Arab dominion. To trace how these populations and their cultures interacted with the new conquerors and their nascent religion, scholars have similarly turned to a much wider variety of sources than the Arabic literary texts. The conquests themselves, their events, causes, and consequences are revisited,58 but so too are the late antique contexts of early conquest societies. How did existing communities in conquered territories and the newcomers perceive and influence each other? How did contact between communities affect the way various cultural and religious groups defined and identified themselves? What continued and what changed in those conquered societies, and when and why? These questions are very broad and cover a wide variety of historical processes and social structures, which means that various scholars are each trying to answer (parts of) these questions for (parts of) the conquered territories.59 What these studies show is that although the Arab takeover indeed brought changes to the conquered territories and populations, the hard break envisioned in past scholarship does not hold. On the contrary, early Islamic history was very much part of wider late antique developments, in which the religion of Islam and Arab identity formed gradually.

The Qurán is thus a product of its late antique surroundings, and the transition from the cultures of Late Antiquity to those of Islam was a protracted and gradual process. Scholars have been able to come to and corroborate these insights to a significant extent by turning to previously little used and/ or recently discovered source material. The information offered by early Umayyad coins is of a different type than that which can be gathered from Syriac Christian apocalyptic text, the study of a rock inscription, or a receipt on papyrus. Yet they all offer up some evidence, some piece of the puzzle, shedding new light on this historical period, especially when used in conjunction with a critical engagement with the Arabic/ Islamic narrative sources. We do not yet have a new, widely accepted "grand vision" of the rise and

earliest history of Islam. But more and more pieces of it have been recovered, reinterpreted, or replaced.

A Survey of the Contributions to This Volume

This book offers a number of new pieces for the puzzle. We have elected to incorporate a diverse selection of research questions, source material, and methodologies, in order to showcase the range of current scholarship and its great strides. As a relatively young discipline, much remains to be discovered and developed. The broad approach of this volume also highlights that this field of study, on the interface of Late Antiquity and early Islam, requires a multifaceted and comprehensive approach. Only then will it succeed in contextualizing this time period and the many important contemporary developments without being hindered by received ideas about the period. At the same time, such an integration of approaches and methodologies also enables scholarship to deal with the many different challenges posed by the various types of source material.

The contributors to this volume have chosen different ways to tackle the problems inherent in the Arabic narrative sources. Both Clare Wilde and Johan Weststeijn have elected to ignore the narrative, literary Islamic sources in their investigations of how the Qurán's first audience would have understood certain Quránic passages. Harald Motzki, by contrast, subjects those very texts to a critical internal analysis. Other contributors consider non- narrative source types, available across the transitional period from Late Antiquity to Islam, allowing them to compare the situation before and after the Arab conquests. The sources considered range from Arabic poetry (Peter Webb) and Egyptian papyri (Petra M. Sijpesteijn) to rock inscriptions (Ahmad Al- Jallad) and pottery remains (Joanita Vroom).

Their findings highlight three elements in the relationship between Late Antiquity and early Islam: 1) the late antique characteristics of the Qurán; 2) the gradual transition from late antique to Islamic cultures—despite the relative speed of the conquests themselves; and 3) the profound impact of the Arab conquests on existing cultures that did not yield wholly (or at all) to the newly emerging Arabic cultural forms. Moreover, the transition from Late Antiquity to Islam was no clean break. Rather, processes of Arabicization and Islamization were incremental, as Kevin van Bladel, Webb, Sijpesteijn, and Al- Jallad demonstrate in their studies of ethnicity, language, script, and religion. Not only the Arabicization and Islamization of the conquered was piecemeal, but also the culture of the conquerors was similarly subject to gradual change and was very much in motion during this transitional phase. Among these contributions, Van Bladel stands out: rather than advocating the use of new sources, he proposes a new model to explain the processes of Arabicization and Islamization of the conquered.

The Qurñn as a Late Antique Text

Clare Wilde and Johan Weststeijn squarely read the Qurán in the context of its late antique historical environment: a different approach than the traditional, medieval Islamic exegesis. In traditional exegesis of the Qurán, religious scholars try to explain difficult Quránic verses by linking them to events from Muhammad's life, as they are known from the narrative literary sources that constitute the traditional biography of the Prophet. It is possible, however, that these narratives were invented only later or in hindsight, in order to clarify exactly those unclear Quránic verses, by Islamic authors for whom the late antique context of those verses was no longer understandable.

Clare Wilde considers Sura 30:2–5, the only passage in the Qurán that mentions al-Rüm, "the Romans," i.e., the Eastern Christian Romans or Byzantines. These verses mention a defeat and a victory of the Romans "in the nearby land" and are traditionally interpreted as referring to the military battle for Jerusalem, which the Byzantines lost in 614 in the last Persian-Byzantine War but then reclaimed in 628. According to Wilde, the first audience of the Qurán could have interpreted this passage about a defeat and a victory of the Byzantines in the "nearest land" differently than the later medieval Islamic exegetes. Wilde argues that this earliest audience could potentially have understood the defeat and victory of the Byzantines not only as a military conflict but also as a conflict of doctrine. Namely, as the failure and success of the attempts of the Byzantine emperors to reconcile the different groups of Eastern Christians in their heated theological disputes, beginning with the ecumenical Council of Chalcedon in 451. The "nearest land" was most probably not interpreted by the first audience as Jerusalem— which is seen, according to the Qurán, from the viewpoint of Mecca as the location of the "farthest house of prayer"— but as southern Arabia. That too was a battlefield in the Persian- Byzantine War, in which Ethiopians, supported by the Byzantines, fought with the Yemenites, supported by Persia.

Like Wilde, Johan Weststeijn argues that parts of the Qurán may have had a different meaning to their late antique audience than they did to medieval interpreters, who lacked this late antique context. In contrast to Wilde's historical context, Weststeijn examines the cultural component of the late antique view of the world, applied in a verse about wine. Aside from three dismissive passages about alcohol, the Qurán contains one verse (16:67) that, according to the majority of medieval exegetes as well as modern Western handbooks, is positive about wine. Medieval exegetes explained the paradox between this positive verse and the other negative verses by pointing towards the traditional biography of the Prophet: these verses would have been revealed at different moments in Muhammad's life. During his activities as a prophet, Muhammad's contemporaries would increasingly have misbehaved under the influence of wine, and thus the Qurán became more critical of this beverage over time. However, Weststeijn argues that if we place verse 16:67 in the context of late antique ideas about the oppositions between pure and impure, it becomes clear that this verse presents wine as something impure: in line with the other argumentative passages in the Qurán about the beverage, this verse is negative about wine as well.

While Wilde and Weststeijn elect to pass over the Prophet's biography, Harald Motzki endeavors to date those biographical sources through an internal analysis and to test their historical accuracy. Motzki is well known for his new approach to these texts, which he called the isnãd- cum-matn method, which combines the study of the chain of transmitters (isnãd) with the study of the contents (matn) of a report. By comparing different versions of a report about, for example, the Prophet, and their different chains of transmittance, he tries to reconstruct and date the original text of that report. In Sura 52:29–30 and 74:24, the Qurán argues against the criticism that its messenger was a soothsayer, a madman, or poet. According to a report in the traditional biography of the Prophet, these verses were revealed after a discussion among Muhammad's opponents about how they could best slander his good name and, thereby, stop the spread of his message. Has this report been created in hindsight to explain those Quránic passages? Motzki arrives, through his historical- critical method, at the conclusion that the report is much older than source critics suppose, and that it is most likely that Muhammad's opponents indeed painted such a negative picture of him.

Late Antiquity to Early Islam: A Gradual Transformation

Other authors focus on the early days of the young Arabic- Islamic empire, and its interactions with the late antique cultures of Egypt, Syria, and Iran. They not only show how the conquests changed both conquered and conquerors, but also emphasize the gradual pace of Arabicization and Islamization.

Criticizing existing explanations for these processes, Kevin van Bladel proposes a new model to explain differences in the rate and speed of Arabicization and Islamization in the different conquered regions. Rather than reasons of ideology and identity, Van Bladel argues that the differences are the result of variations in the settlement patterns of the conquerors. Van Bladel examines the local demographic state before, during, and after the conquests. Both Arabicization and Islamization occurred fastest in those places where the Arabs spread themselves over the conquered areas so that many points of contact with the local population emerged. This was, for example, the case in Spain, but also in the Levant, where a rapid transition to the Arabic language was additionally facilitated by the earlier emigration of the Greek- speaking, Christian elite towards the remnants of the Byzantine Empire. By occupying vacated dwellings, the conquerors mixed rapidly with the remaining, and often less educated, Armenian populace. In places where the conquerors isolated themselves from the local population, such as initially in Egypt and Iraq, the process of acculturation was considerably slower. The conversion to Islam usually followed only after Arabicization had already taken place. Practical considerations played a larger role here than identity. Important sources for this research are Arabic texts written by individuals who had not yet converted to Islam. These sources give an important insight into the lived experiences both before and during the processes of Arabicization and Islamization.

Peter Webb shows that the conquests not only affected the conquered but also changed the conquerors. He compares Arabic poetry from before and after the conquests. It is noteworthy that from the pre- Islamic period, much more Arabic poetry than Arabic narrative prose has been preserved that can within reason be considered as authentic. Webb demonstrates that the ethnonym "Arab" is not found in Arabic poetry before the conquests but only in Arabic poetry from the end of first century AH/seventh century CE onward. Webb draws the conclusion that the conquests caused the different ethnic groups that formerly inhabited the Arabian Peninsula to consider themselves as belonging to a single Arab ethnos.

Just as Webb compares Arabic poetry from before and after the conquests, Petra Sijpesteijn compares Egyptian papyri from the same vantage points to study the effect of these conquests. These papyri are often administrative sources that have been well- preserved by the dry desert climate. In contrast to the later literary sources, these papyri deal with common daily practice, and so have not been rewritten for later political, theological, or literary goals. For example, these papyri show which foods the Arabic conquerors ordered from their Egyptian subjects, and therefore which foods these new Muslims actually consumed. The conquerors ordered, for example, large amounts of syrup from boiled grape must (a by-product of wine production) for their workers. This syrup is interesting, not only considering the negative opinion towards wine in later Islamic law, but also considering Weststeijn's argument that Q 16:67 ("from the fruits of the palms and the grapevines you make intoxicant and good provision") was considered by the first, still late antique audience of the Qurán to denounce wine production and consumption.

One conclusion to emerge from these papyri is that the religious identity of the conquerors did not play an important role at first: the distinction between the new Arab rulers and their Egyptian subjects was not so much expressed in religious terms, but rather in political- economic terms. Additionally, this research highlights particularly the continuity that existed in administrative practice after the coming of the Arabs. Only at the beginning of the eighth century, argues Sijpesteijn, were administrative practices introduced that aimed for a greater Islamization and Arabicization of the Islamic Empire.

Ahmad Al- Jallad works with epigraphic sources, examining in particular a unique Arabic inscription that reads: "May God be mindful of Yazïd- w the king." Using linguistic and palaeographic elements he subsequently dates the inscription and identifies "Yazïd the king." Doing so, he concludes that the inscription dates to the seventh century. This date suggests that the Yazïd mentioned in the inscription is the Umayyad caliph Yazïd i (r. 60–64 AH/ 680–83 CE). Moreover, Al- Jallad examines, from the perspective of the Yazïd inscription, the development of the Arabic script, and concludes that possibly different Arabic scriptural traditions coexisted before the Islamic- Arabic variant gained the upper hand. This contribution is a case study from Al- Jallad's broader research on early Arabic inscriptions, which are documentary evidence for the pre- Islamic and early Islamic periods— research that is rapidly developing due to a myriad of new archaeological finds.

Adapting to the Arab Conquests

Many existing communities were affected by the Arab conquests. Joanita Vroom examines by contrast what impact the Arab conquests had on the Byzantines themselves. Vroom uses two case studies, Athens in Greece and Butrint in southern Albania, to sketch an image of the trading contacts of and the daily life in Byzantine cities in the period of the Arab conquests and immediately after it. Using archaeological materials, she shows that the rise of the caliphate negatively impacted, from the seventh century onwards, the Byzantine economy. However, this impact was absorbed through the resilience of the Byzantine trading networks by an active search for new possibilities of exchange within the Byzantine state. These networks inevitably limited themselves to contacts within the Aegean Sea and the southern Adriatic but nonetheless show the adaptive possibilities of the empire. Moreover, Vroom's study shows a rich city life in which many activities still took place, like the construction of houses and the placement of burials, roads, and wells.

Finally, the contribution by Constanza Cordoni asks how post- classical rabbinic and para- rabbinic literature— that is, a subset of post- Islamic Jewish literature that emerged in the period of transition between Late Antiquity and the Middle Ages— formulated a Jewish response to the rise of Islam and to Muslim rule in the land of Israel. The question is approached through three distinct themes. The article first deals with the scriptural Ishmael and his afterlife; it is shown that rabbinic literature tries to come to terms with the Muslim notion that Abraham's first son, Ishmael, not his second son, Isaac, was the more important of the two and the forefather of the Arabs. Rabbinic literature has downplayed to the point of slandering Ishmael, in order to prove God's favor of the Jews over the Muslims (who considered Ishmael their progenitor). Second, Ishmael's descendants are treated as the last in a consecution of world powers, a theme that has long antecedents in rabbinic literature that far preceded the Arab conquests. In this light, it is interesting that they are often included in pre- existing lists of world kingdoms— with Greece, Rome, Babylon, and Media/ Persia— but are generally not directly referred to as a kingdom. Rather, their rule is understood as a necessary precursor to a new order, the Messianic era, which is the third theme of Cordoni's discussion. The Arab empire is thus understood as

the final historical convolution that will lead to the ultimate delivery of the Jews. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the texts that deal with the latter theme take a more positive view of the Arab hegemony than the texts that view it in a longer line of previous world kingdoms. Viewed together, however, the rabbinic sources present an intriguing preoccupation with the integration of the actual historical context (Arab dominance) into scriptural tradition, offering a crucial insight into the mindset of a conquered nation dealing with the realities of Arab worldly power.

A Small Arab World: The Late Antique Arab Conquests from a Network Perspective

We noted above that cross- Mediterranean ties had been weakening since the second century, a process that was briefly interrupted during the Justinian Renaissance, but continued unabated from the late sixth century onwards. Viewed from the vantage point of connectivity it is not the Arab conquests that caused the downfall of the late antique world: it was rather the waning of network ties across the Mediterranean that created the right environment for the Arab conquests to occur. In other words, the weakness of Mediterranean connectivity provided an opportunity for new (Arab) networks to rapidly emerge. Of course, once these new networks of connectivity became successful, they did contribute to a further weakening of pre- existing ties— see Vroom in this volume— reaching an all- time low in the seventh and especially eighth century during the Arab conquests. This view takes fundamental issue with placing blame on the Arab conquests for the perceived disintegration of Romanitas.

Network connectivity, and in particular the confrontation of old and new networks, is an important concern of this book. We are not just interested in the way Arab culture (an emerging Islam included) developed within a world consisting of a myriad of local but interconnected social networks, but also how previous networks reacted to the newly emerging ones. Taking our cue from current networking approaches in late antique and early medieval scholarship as outlined above, we argue that late antique local, regional, and supraregional networks provided the quintessential historical context in which new cultural forms were able to flourish. To be sure, we do not suggest that late antique networks always coincided with early Arab networks. In fact, the contributions in this volume rather show how new networks built upon, coincided with, and sometimes replaced existing forms of connectivity in processes that were crucial to the emergence of Arabic culture.

This book thus redirects attention from a top- down, centralized view of the Arab world to the local dynamics of cultural adaptation. Like other network approaches, ours takes issue with earlier metanarratives that view the Mediterranean ecosystem as neatly distinct “cellular entities.” This “network” approach itself seems to have been a result of the fragmentation of political power and social coherence within the past decades and has had a profound influence on the views of social scientists and historians. Rather than studying the linear histories of “central” places, they have recalibrated their visors to the smaller “hubs” or “nodes” (in network theory jargon) that comprise such supposedly center-oriented systems. Indeed, looking back, many of the entities that were previously believed to be monolithic, centralized systems, no longer seem so easy to understand as such. As others have shown, cultural phenomena such as the different religions of the Mediterranean that have often been studied separately are understood better when viewed within a larger cultural context. Ancient religions in particular have recently been redefined within a multiscalar and network-oriented framework. They were not self- contained, monolithic phenomena, but were highly mobile and dynamic belief systems. As

this characterization applies to monotheistic as well as the polytheistic religions of Antiquity, we should expect Islamization to have taken place along a similar multiscalar and multidirectional pathway. So how did this take place in practice?

As Kevin van Bladel shows in this volume, local circumstances often determined the degree to which old and new networks interacted and thus impacted one another. In Syria, for example, the mass exodus of (presumably elite) Christians to Byzantine-controlled territory favored a situation where Arab invaders settled among the remaining population, thus speeding up the processes of Arabicization and Islamization. In areas such as Egypt or Iraq, however, Arabs settled away from existing centers of habitation, leading to a more fragmented cultural landscape and a slower pace of adaptation. In this case, settlement patterns, which are highly indicative of local networks, were responsible for the varying pace with which Arabicization and Islamization took place. But can we take the network approach further to explain why Islam was so successful and why the Arabic language was eventually adopted nearly universally? Or why previous cultural and linguistic differences between the original tribes were obscured rather than magnified during the centuries of conquest?

In this introduction we can do no more than make some very general suggestions. But however one may be inclined to approach these fundamental questions, it seems clear that any future explanation must in some shape or form take into consideration the implications of network studies. In particular, we suggest that one specific application of network theory, that of Small Worlds, opens a door to begin explaining these success stories. Small world theory holds that even in very large and complex societies, a rather limited number of intermediaries— the well- known "six degrees of separation"— is needed for individuals that are widely separated by geography or social status to be connected.70 A "Small World" is predicated on the proposition that while people are connected mostly to their immediate neighbors (strong ties), they are also connected to other local networks through seemingly random connections (weak ties) between certain individuals. As Irad Malkin has argued for the period of Greek colonization (eighth to sixth century BCE) these "weak ties" are— rather paradoxically— extremely important for the evident homogenization of Greek culture in its period of rapid expansion. According to Malkin, the "weak ties" (traders, mercenaries, artisans) connecting Greek communities living far and wide apart were responsible for communicating, very rapidly, new ideas and technologies throughout the Mediterranean and Black Seas. The very fact that these local Greek networks were often relatively isolated and surrounded by culturally distinct, if not downright hostile people, meant that they were extremely dependent on communications from overseas for the maintenance of their identity.

Did such homogenization take place in the wake of the Arab expansion? Interestingly, precisely such a process is described by Peter Webb in his contribution to this volume, when he observes that since the ethnonym "Arab" is absent in pre- conquest Arab poetry, it seems to have been the expansion itself that caused Arab cultural identity to emerge. If the example of Greek colonization is any indication, it was not the natural outcome of various individuals "mixing" together to create a blended whole. While a certain awareness of tribal affiliation among Arabs remained, homogenization over vast geographical expanses appears to have been the norm in the first centuries after Muhammad. Could it be that it was precisely these centrifugal forces that caused the widely dispersed Arab conquerors to seek common ground by means of the weak ties that kept their widely dispersed local networks connected? Did the dispersed Arab groups harken back to an invented and self- reinforcing tradition of homogeneity?

Perhaps herein lies a key to understanding the maintenance— even reinforcement— of cohesion in the wake of the Arab conquests: the emergence of what we may call a "Small Arab World." <>

THE MUHAMMAD AVATĀRA: SALVATION HISTORY, TRANSLATION, AND THE MAKING OF BENGALI ISLAM by Ayesha A. Irani [Oxford University Press, 9780190089221]

In **THE MUHAMMAD AVATĀRA: SALVATION HISTORY, TRANSLATION, AND THE MAKING OF BENGALI ISLAM**, Ayesha Irani offers an examination of the Nabivamsa, the first epic work on the Prophet Muhammad written in Bangla. This little-studied seventeenth-century text, written by Saiyad Sultan, is a literary milestone in the multi-ethnic, multi-cultural history of Islam, and marks a significant contribution not only to Bangla's rich literary corpus, but also to our understanding of Islam's localization in Indic culture in the early modern period. That Sufis such as Saiyad Sultan played a central role in Islam's spread in Bengal has been demonstrated primarily through examination of medieval Persian literary, ethnographic, and historical sources, as well as colonial-era data. Islamic Bangla texts themselves, which emerged from the sixteenth century, remain scarcely studied outside the Bangladeshi academy, and almost entirely untranslated. Yet these premodern works, which articulate Islamic ideas in a regional language, represent a literary watershed and underscore the efforts of rebel writers across South Asia, many of whom were Sufis, to defy the linguistic cordon of the Muslim elite and the hegemony of Arabic and Persian as languages of Islamic discourse. Irani explores how an Arabian prophet and his religion came to inhabit the seventeenth-century Bengali landscape, and the role that pir-authors, such as Saiyad Sultan, played in the rooting of Islam in Bengal's easternmost regions. This text-critical study lays bare the sophisticated strategies of translation used by a prominent early modern Muslim Bengali intellectual to invite others to his faith.

Review

"Ayesha Irani's carefully researched study shows how a monumental Bengali epic, Saiyad Sultan's *Nabīvaṃśa*, became canonical for Bengali Muslims between the mid-1600s and the late 1800s, just when that community was becoming consolidated. Exploring how the epic subtly co-opted Hindu culture while simultaneously adapting the Qur'an to the culture of Bengal's rural masses, this book will be essential reading for students of both religious studies and South Asian history." -- Richard M. Eaton, author of *The Rise of Islam and the Bengal Frontier, 1204-1760*

"Saiyad Sultān's seventeenth century *Nabīvaṃśa* is the first major work in Bangla to tell the life of Muhammad as the Prophet. In a display of marvelous hermeneutic virtuosity, Irani unpacks the text's hagiographical function as a larger exercise in 'conversion history.' Sensitively utilizing an array of literary critical tools that converge in translation and polysystem theory—and tracing with unerring accuracy the text's Arabic, Persian, Sanskrit, Hindavi, and Bangla antecedents —Irani gently unravels the text's rhetorical and theological strategies. She argues that Saiyad Sultān appropriated *hinduāni* Bengali [illegible]

making conversion a naturalizing process grounded in story, not a radical break with the past." -- Tony K. Stewart, Gertrude Conaway Vanderbilt Chair in Humanities, Vanderbilt University

"I have waited for a work like this for a long time. In the immense panorama of South Asian Islam, the study of Bengal has loomed as a vast territory only explored by a few intrepid scholars. The Nabīvaṃśa is clearly one of the most important textual monuments in this field, yet nonspecialists have not had any extended access to the text until now. This study presents an absorbing, detailed, and sophisticated picture of this rich literary creation and its role in the Islamization of East Bengal." -- Carl W. Ernst, Kenan Distinguished Professor of Religious Studies, University of North Carolina

CONTENTS

The Prophet of Light and Love: Núr Muhammad in Bengal's Mirror

A well-known seventeenth-century Bengali religious text opens with an invocation of God and his creation. The author writes:

> First I bow to the Lord, who is without beginning, a storehouse of riches,
> he who created the fourteen realms in the blink of an eye.
> He has neither beginning nor end, nor a fixed locus.
> His unbroken form permeates all things.
> He created the heavens, netherworlds, and the mortal world.
> Adorning himself, he sports in various forms.
> All know that he does not become manifest.
> He takes the guise of the manifest in the hidden;
> in the manifest, that of the hidden.
> Whether or not the Word (sabada) takes on many forms,
> it remains a single, congealed mass, devoid of vacant space.
> Imperceptible in the perceptible, he rests imperceptibly.
> Determining his unknown signs is utterly confounding.
> No syllables can enunciate him; to contemplate him frustrates.
> The void's form emerges from the vessel (ghata) of the void (súnya).
> Without Nirañjana, the Immaculate One, nothing is created therein.
> Within form, the formless form ever rests.
> Form imbues fire with heat;
> it perfuses the wind with cooling fragrance.
> It assumes viscosity in earth's clay,
> while it makes its descent (avatari) into water as the turtle (karma).
> Even as the sun's rays suffuse the moonlight,
> so too does Niranjana permeate all things.
> Even as butter inheres in cows' milk,
> so too is the Lord immanent in the world.

Anyone conversant with the Indic world's manifold cosmogonies will recognize the Vedic notion of creation through the Word and the division of created beings into the fourteen worlds. They might recognize the Vaisnava formulation of Visnu's periodic descent to earth in order to restore righteousness, or the Buddhist idea of the primal void (sunyata), or even the Sámkhya conception of the five elements (bhuta) that form creation's material basis. Yet this author does not write from the standpoint of a Vedic theologian, nor a Vaisnava, even though many Vaisnava texts refer to their supreme deity, Visnu, as Niranjana, the Immaculate One, and invoke his ten avatáras, such as the Turtle (karma). Neither does he write as a follower of the Buddhist or Dharma cults, nor as a promoter of Sámkhya philosophy. The author reveals his perspective in the very next line:

> Having taken the form of Muhammad—his own avatára—
> Niranjana manifests his own portion (amsa) to propagate himself.
> From time's beginning to its end, the Creator
> shall create messengers (paygámbar) to rightly guide all peoples.

The author is Saiyad Sultan, and his text, the Nabivamsa ("Lineage of the Prophet"), an epic work of some 17,396 couplets that chronicles the life of Muhammad. Beginning with creation, it records the tales of his prophetic predecessors, Muhammad's eventual birth and early years in Mecca, his endeavor to come to terms with his prophetic mission and crucial role in religious history, his persecution by the Meccans and emigration to Medina, his numerous campaigns against the Meccans, his ultimate conquest of Mecca and establishment of Islam in his hometown, and, finally, his unexpected demise shortly before his expedition to spread Islam beyond the Arabian peninsula. Saiyad Sultan was the first to write down this story for the people of Bengal in their mother tongue. His efforts to convince his people to turn to the one true God, forsaking all others, in pivotal ways replicated Muhammad's mission in the multireligious environment of sixth- and seventh-century Arabia.

Sultan continues his praise of the Lord, employing Samkhya conceptions of the three gunas, before invoking the various religious groups—Jaina, Buddhist, and Vaisnava—that were active in his world:

> By harnessing the active principle (rajah guna),
> the Lord creates the world;
> by means of the sentient principle (sattva guna),
> he then maintains this world.
> Through the principle of inertia (tamah guna), he destroys the world.
> Boundless is his glory through this triadic set.
> He made some contented by nature,
> for others he made the life of the sky-clad Jaina monk (digámbari);
> some he made householders, while others wanderers.
> He created the scholar to contemplate scripture (sastra),
> and fools to engage in vile behavior.
> He created Buddhist monks, who must beg that they may eat,
> and patrons to give them alms in charity.
> He planted much love for one friend in another:
> within both hearts, he quickened love for the other.
> To produce, between foes, discord and amity,
> to rouse between them dissent, disharmony,
> he created Ravana to capture Janaki,
> and Rama to slay the dreaded demons.

Hirañjana created Hari in Vrndavana to delight
in the savor (rasa) of the art of love's pleasures.
Once he created man, he brought forth woman,
to make both fulfilled by sexual union.
Having created good and evil upon earth,
he alone performs all deeds, never anyone else.
Know that all that is done is his very doing.
All that you see is nothing but Nirañjana.

What we have here, then, is a traditional Indic account of creation, and the unfolding of God's purpose in human life through the cyclical advent of his avataras, who unfailingly rid the world of evil, restoring harmony to humankind. But why does the author insert Muhammad into this characteristically Quranic account? And, if the author is writing an account of Muhammad's life, what does he hope to accomplish by invoking Rama and Krsna? I will argue that Saiyad Sultan's text was designed to persuade the people of Bengal to convert to Islam. But conversion, in the NV, is not cast as the adoption of a new religion through a break with the old. Rather, it is the recuperation of one's own lost religious heritage, a re-cognition of the role of Bengal's ancient gods and ancestors in Muhammad's lineage. Conversion, suggests Sultan, is nothing but a return to the fold.

The history of Muhammad that Sultan rewrites is, in fact, a translation into Bangla of a wide range of Persian and Arabic texts in the medieval Islamic Tales of the Prophets (qisas al-anbiyá') genre. Like all such premodern histories, whether Islamic or puranic, it adopts a historiographic approach which I call "salvation history," wherein all history is represented as unfolding according to a cosmic plan. In seeking to make the life of Muhammad and Islam comprehensible to a Bangla-speaking audience, Sultan adopts a gamut of sophisticated tactics to rewrite Bengali history, aiming to convince his audience—a decidedly non-Muslim audience—that they have had and will continue to have a major role in the grand teleology of Islam, if they can but recover their ways.

If the measure of a successful translation, as the NV itself proposes, is its ability to convert new peoples to Islam, how does this text seek to attain such a seemingly implausible desideratum? At stake here is not whether a single text can indeed accomplish religious conversion, but rather, how a text might harness the power of vernacular translation to inspire such monumental societal change. I show how the translation of salvation history has the potential to transform a people's imagination by altering the stories that matter, the cultural memories and myths that mold identity, and ultimately, the dogmas that are foundational to religious doctrine and faith. I explore the multiple ways in which translation infuses new meaning into received traditions, the potential challenges the author faces in doing so, and the interpretive procedures he mastered to create a tour de force of missionary writing. Indeed, his translation is anything but simple, for Sultan was attempting to naturalize an Arab prophet, and his history and doctrines, into a Bengali universe. Though the author's translational strategies will begin by demonstrating how Muhammad and Islam fit into the cultural and ideological landscape of Bengal, they will end by displacing traditional understanding with a new reading of Bengal and Bengalis into an all-encompassing Islamic world history.

But who was Saiyad Sultan, what world did he inhabit, and what spurred him to take up his pen as a tool for social transformation? <>

HAMLET'S ARAB JOURNEY: SHAKESPEARE'S PRINCE AND NASSER'S GHOST by Margaret Litvin [Translation/Transnation, Princeton University Press, 9780691113780]

For the past five decades, Arab intellectuals have seen themselves in Shakespeare's Hamlet: their times "out of joint," their political hopes frustrated by a corrupt older generation. **HAMLET'S ARAB JOURNEY** traces the uses of *Hamlet* in Arabic theatre and political rhetoric, and asks how Shakespeare's play developed into a musical with a happy ending in 1901 and grew to become the most obsessively quoted literary work in Arab politics today. Explaining the Arab *Hamlet* tradition, Margaret Litvin also illuminates the "to be or not to be" politics that have turned Shakespeare's tragedy into the essential Arab political text, cited by Arab liberals, nationalists, and Islamists alike.

On the Arab stage, Hamlet has been an operetta hero, a firebrand revolutionary, and a muzzled dissident. Analyzing productions from Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Jordan, and Kuwait, Litvin follows the distinct phases of Hamlet's naturalization as an Arab. Her fine-grained theatre history uses personal interviews as well as scripts and videos, reviews, and detailed comparisons with French and Russian *Hamlets*. The result shows Arab theatre in a new light. Litvin identifies the French source of the earliest Arabic *Hamlet*, shows the outsize influence of Soviet and East European Shakespeare, and explores the deep cultural link between Egypt's Gamal Abdel Nasser and the ghost of Hamlet's father.

Documenting how global sources and models helped nurture a distinct Arab *Hamlet* tradition, **HAMLET'S ARAB JOURNEY** represents a new approach to the study of international Shakespeare appropriation.

Reviews

"Absorbing . . . fascinating . . . richly detailed." - TLS

"Litvin succeeds in describing the Arab *Hamlet* as a political and sociological phenomenon, without ever losing her grasp on the aesthetic. She is also refreshingly free from literary theory orthodoxies. . . . Rather, in engaging and lucid prose, she tells a story, and it is a compelling one." - The Oxonian Review

"Underneath Litvin's scholarly chill, there is a lyrical elegy: at once she laments the passing of Egypt's theatrical golden age and the political dream that inspired it. . . . [An] agile negotiation of the uses and abuses of the Hamlet tale." - Bidoun

"A fascinating look at how one of the Western world's most iconic literary characters has been appropriated by Arabs as a symbol of secularism, nationalism, or Islamism, depending on the prevailing political mood. *Hamlet's Arab Journey* is not just a brilliant work of literary analysis—it is a wholly new way of thinking about modern Arab literary and political culture. Indeed, Litvin presents readers with a fresh interpretation of Arab history in the twentieth century, one told through the lens of perhaps the most famous play in the world. This is bold, clever, and fresh scholarship, written in clear and accessible prose, and intended for anyone who cares about the power of literature to transform society—for good or bad."**—Reza Aslan, author *No god but God and Beyond Fundamentalism***

"Presenting a strong and convincing argument, fascinating details, good historical contextualization, and a fast-paced narrative, this engrossing book shows how various productions and manifestations of Hamlet are in conversation with each other and with an enormous range of intellectual and artistic regions in the Arab world. It will reanimate conversations amongst various audiences interested in contemporary Arab cultural creation, the interplay of politics and culture, and of course, Shakespeare."**—Marilyn Booth, University of Edinburgh**

CONTENTS

Hamlet and Political Agency

The main theme of the Arab Hamlet conversation, already evident in the three Syrian examples sketched above, is political agency: the desire to determine one's own fate, to be an actor in history rather than a victim of it, "to be" rather than "not to be."In the Arab context, such agency is usually imagined as collective. In political debate Hamlet's main contribution has been a slogan—"Shall we be or not be?"—an urgent, collective call to arms. In the Arab theatre, the archetypal Hamlet is a decisive political actor, a seeker of justice and righter of wrongs. One observer has summarized him as "a romantic hero who sets out to fight corruption, and dies for the cause of justice." But it turns out that this archetypal Hamlet lasted less than a decade on the Arab stage. His style of political agency, then, is not the only style worth considering.

So let us listen to the conversation. First, let us explore how speakers of Arabic have chosen to "voice" the lexeme "Hamlet." 'These voicings have developed over time; several factors (political pressures, available models, gifted individual speakers, etc.) have shaped the social grammar that circumscribes acceptable new voicings. Then let us analyze Hamlet's function diachronically: the changing addressees, tone, and rhetorical goals. My book approaches these two sets of questions in turn. The first chapter presents, basically, a phrasebook: a synchronic ordinary-language study of the way "Hamlet" works in today's Arab political lexicon. The second focuses on the dramatic imagination of Egyptian leader Gamal Abdel Nasser (Jamál 'Abd al-'Asir; 1918-70), whose personality and policies did the most to shape the figure I will call the Arab Hero Hamlet. The rest of the book traces the stage history of this heroic Hamlet: his origins in a global kaleidoscope of Shakespeare versions, his brief heyday in the 1970s Arab theatre, and the long ironic afterlife that kept him in circulation for the following thirty years.

Chapter x explores Hamlet's meaning in today's Arabic political vocabulary. Hamlet has been invoked in reference to nearly every major and minor political crisis touching the Arab world in the past decade. Analyzing his function in recent polemical writings such as newspaper columns, speeches, and sermons, I show how Arab writers read "to be or not to be" not as a meditation on the individual's place in the world but as an argument about collective political identity. Hamlet comes to represent a group: the Arab and/or Muslim community. (Some writers try to conflate the two.) Because "the time is out of joint," the group's continuous collective identity is under threat. Its existence is menaced at the very moment at which it comes into being. Other themes from Hamlet—words/deeds, sleep/waking, madness/wholeness—help reinforce the urgency of the crisis. However, these cries of outrage and alarm are not the only approach to the issue of historical agency. As a counterpoint I offer an instance of Hamlet rewriting by the important Palestinian-Iraqi writer Jabra Ibrahim Jabra (Jabri Ibráhim Jabrá). Jabra's protagonist Walid Masoud constitutes himself through "words, words, words," pointing the way toward the more complex understandings of agency seen in the following chapters.

Turning to the stage history, we will find that Hamlet's link to political agency has remained remarkably stable across five decades. In different periods, however, writers and directors have used Hamlet to pursue quite different types of agency, and in different ways. Their preoccupations with Hamlet fall into four main phases: international standards (1952-64), psychological depth (1964-67),

political agitation (1970-75), and intertextual dramatic irony (1976-2002). Because Arab theatre people see their work as necessarily political and because Hamlet is read as a political play, these phases have largely corresponded to the prevailing political moods in the region: euphoric pride after the Egyptian Revolution of 1952; soul-searching and impatience for progress in the mid-1960; anger and defiance after the disastrous June War of 1967 and Nasser's death in 1970; and a mixture of cynicism and nostalgia since the mid-1970s, as stale autocracies spread through the region and stifled its dreams of national awakening.

Our journey begins in Egypt in 1952. As chapter 2 explains, much of what matters for Arab Hamlet appropriation in the postcolonial period—the international sources, the way they were absorbed, and the concerns they help express—was shaped by the legacy of Gamal Abdel Nasser. Nasser's geopolitical and cultural priorities made a range of Hamlets available and conditioned how intellectuals received them. Beyond this, from the moment in 1954 when he declared to his people, "All of you are Gamal Abdel Nasser," the Egyptian leader personally embodied his country's identity and acted out its drama of historical agency. Beyond Egypt's borders, he became (like his radio station) "the voice of the Arabs." His defeat in the 1967 war and his death in 1970 meant a promise broken and an inheritance withdrawn. The problem of how to mourn him would create a hunger for the very works of art, including Shakespeare adaptations, that his policies had helped import.

Chapter 3 presents the global kaleidoscope theory as a much-needed revision to the Prospero-and-Caliban model of postcolonial rewriting. To this end, I summarize the actual kaleidoscope of Hamlets available to Egyptian theatre professionals and audiences by 1964. The powerful but atypical reminiscences of Arab students who suffered under British schoolmasters (here represented by filmmaker Youssef Chahine and critic Edward Said) tend to obscure the broader origins of Arab Shakespeare. In fact, these origins were varied; different sources gained importance in different periods. Nineteenth-century French sources, including the hitherto-unidentified version from which Tanyus `Abdu (Tányús `Abduh) cribbed the earliest surviving Arabic Hamlet (1901), helped plant the seeds of a decisive, heroic Hamlet in pursuit of justice. Direct-from English translations, with a greater commitment to treating Shakespeare's plays as written texts, became part of the kaleidoscope by the 1930s, as did German-inspired Romantic readings of Hamlet's introspective depths. A transformative addition was Grigori Kozintsev's edgy and politically allusive

Hamlet film (1964), which became a Cairo sensation, although it was not imitated until the 1970s. At the juncture of these competing approaches, we will consider a high-profile Egyptian production of Hamlet in 1964-65: an effort to mediate between the British and Soviet readings of Hamlet and a bid to claim Egypt’s place on the world stage by showing mastery of the "world classics."

Chapter 4 examines a related bid for political agency (1964-67): the pursuit of interiorized subjectivity as proof of moral personhood. As the Egyptian theatre grew more ambitious, playwrights strove to create dramatic exemplars of authentic Arab political action. This in turn required characters who were 'deep" enough to qualify as fully fledged moral subjects and hence modern political agents. Here Hamlet was still the gold standard. Looking at two landmark plays in which critics have heard Hamletian echoes, Sulayman of Aleppo by Alfred Farag (Alfred Faraj) and The Tragedy by Salah Abdel Sabur (Salah Abd al-Sabúr), I argue that the "Hamletization" of their Muslim protagonists is neither subversive in spirit nor driven by any desire to seize mastery of a colonizer's text. Rather, Hamlet serves as a model and even an emblem of psychological interiority. But because both Farag's seminarian and Abdel Sabur's Sufi were

read as brave opponents of a tyrannical regime, these two Muslim heroes helped cement the link in the Arab audience's imagination between Hamlet and the theme of earthly justice.

Such appeals for recognition largely stopped after the Arab defeat by Israel in the June War of 1967. (The defeat also ended Egypt's unquestioned dominance of Arab culture. Therefore, starting in this period, we will begin to look at plays from Syria, Jordan, and elsewhere.) Chapter begins with the cultural impact of the June War and its coda, Nasser's death in 1970. As we will see, the defeat fundamentally altered Arab conceptions of political theatre's role. A well-developed high culture was no longer considered enough to guarantee the world's respect. Psychological interiority was irrelevant: what mattered was not deserving agentive power but seizing it. Disillusioned with their regimes, dramatists stopped addressing subtly allegorical plays to the government; instead, they appealed directly to audiences, trying to rouse them to participate in political life. Analyzing two early 19705 Hamlet adaptations from Egypt and Syria, we will see how the 1970s Hamlet became a Che Guevara in doublet and hose. Guilt and sadness over his father's death only sharpened his anger; his fierce pursuit of justice left no room for introspection or doubt.

But this agitprop effort, too, quickly hit a dead end. Rejecting activist theatre, the Egyptian, Syrian, and Iraqi dramatists of the past thirty-five years have instead deployed Hamlet for dramatic irony. Chapter 6 examines six Arab Hamlet offshoot plays performed between 1976 and 2002. The most recent of these plays, written in English, stands on the margins of the Arab Hamlet tradition. But the rest, aware of their predecessors' heroic Hamlet, turn him into a foil for their own pointedly inarticulate and ineffectual protagonists. These new antiheroes are "not Prince Hamlet, nor were meant to be"; most lack even the eloquence of a Prufrock. Meanwhile Claudius becomes a protean and allpowerful force who dominates the play; the ghost of Nasserism, discredited but not replaced, settles into the role of Hamlet's father's ghost. These bitter, often hilarious plays criticize the political situation, but they are at their best in mocking allegorical political theatre. The only real political agency available, they suggest, is the power to set oneself above one's circumstances through ironic laughter.

These plays highlight Hamlet's work as a political rewriter, one of the important themes Hamlet has offered Arab dramatists in recent years. For although he preaches against ad-libbing and clowning, Hamlet is not averse to adapting a foreign play when the need arises. When "benetted round with villainies," he is quick to turn a trope into a trap. Hamlet's timely staging of The Murder of Gonzago, "the image of a murder done in Vienna," has provided first a model and more recently an anti-model to politically engaged Arab playwrights and directors.

As we will see, by 1990 the obvious failure of political drama on Hamlet's terms—its failure, that is, to spark concrete change in Arab regimes or societies—had pushed some younger Arab playwrights away from Hamlet's instrumental view of political theatre. In a comic or ironic mode, their work dramatized its own inefficacy as political art. Thus their Hamlets came to resemble the dreamy hesitators of the Anglo-American tradition, but carrying a different valence resulting from their particular historical trajectory. With their unavenged fathers and their betrayed revolutionary convictions, these Hamlets were not simply unheroic but post-heroic. Whether they will again find their voice in response to changing political circumstances in Egypt and elsewhere in the region remains to be seen.

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The surprising events of early 2011 (which occurred as this book was in press) seem likely to accelerate all these trends. The postrevolutionary uncertainty in Egypt and Tunisia has energized theatre makers to claim the public sphere lest it disappear again. Meanwhile American television screens and front pages have celebrated the brave public performances of Arab "youth"; Egypt's popular uprising gave CNN's prime-time news shows their highest ratings ever. The images have swirled with increasing speed, appearing to merge Mideast and Midwest (for a few days, the example of Cairo even helped inspire prounion protesters in Wisconsin) and to fuse political theatre with theatrical politics. When the U.S. government released video of a much diminished Osama bin Laden watching video footage of himself on television, the gap between local action and global spectacle seemed to close up entirely.

Amid this apparent convergence between the political concerns of Anglo-American intellectuals and their Arab counterparts, will there continue to be a distinct Arab Hamlet tradition? On this question (which only time can answer) let me offer two closing thoughts. First: Arab theatre has been an international phenomenon from the start. As this book has shown, the Arab Hero Hamlet and his ironic successors were born into a world already overpopulated with competing versions and interpretations. In every period there has been a privileged interlocutor (from Alexandre Dumas and Victor Hugo to A. C. Bradley to Grigori Kozintsev), yet these sources have fed a distinct and coherent Arab tradition of Shakespeare interpretation.

Second: today's convergence may be only apparent. Even if different audiences arrive at the same spot, each remains marked by its separate history. They may thirst for the same stories but find different meanings in them. And with all the necessary caveats (global cultural flows on one hand, extreme localization like Afifi's on the other), I do believe that there is such a thing today as an Arab audience. The century of Arab nationalism is spent, but as an imagined community brought together by satellite television, "the Arab world" has more reality than ever. Whatever Hamlets Arab adapters may devise will surely reflect (and reflect on) that reality. <>

HIDDEN CALIPHATE: SUFI SAINTS BEYOND THE OXUS AND INDUS by Waleed Ziad [Harvard University Press, 9780674248816]

Sufis created the most extensive Muslim revivalist network in Asia before the twentieth century, generating a vibrant Persianate literary, intellectual, and spiritual culture while tying together a politically fractured world.

In a pathbreaking work combining social history, religious studies, and anthropology, Waleed Ziad examines the development across Asia of Muslim revivalist networks from the eighteenth to the twentieth centuries. At the center of the story are the Naqshbandi-Mujaddidi Sufis, who inspired major reformist movements and articulated effective social responses to the fracturing of Muslim political power amid European colonialism. In a time of political upheaval, the Mujaddidis fused Persian, Arabic, Turkic, and Indic literary traditions, mystical virtuosity, popular religious practices, and urban scholasticism in a unified yet flexible expression of Islam. The Mujaddidi “Hidden Caliphate,” as it was known, brought cohesion to diverse Muslim communities from Delhi through Peshawar to the steppes

of Central Asia. And the legacy of Mujaddidi Sufis continues to shape the Muslim world, as their institutional structures, pedagogies, and critiques have worked their way into leading social movements from Turkey to Indonesia, and among the Muslims of China.

By shifting attention away from court politics, colonial actors, and the standard narrative of the "Great Game," Ziad offers a new vision of Islamic sovereignty. At the same time, he demonstrates the pivotal place of the Afghan Empire in sustaining this vast inter-Asian web of scholastic and economic exchange. Based on extensive fieldwork across Afghanistan, Uzbekistan, and Pakistan at madrasas, Sufi monasteries, private libraries, and archives, *Hidden Caliphate* reveals the long-term influence of Mujaddidi reform and revival in the eastern Muslim world, bringing together seemingly disparate social, political, and intellectual currents from the Indian Ocean to Siberia.

Reviews

"An important work… Ziad provides a riveting account of how history has buffeted the fortunes of the Mujadidi Sufis, from Punjab to the Peshawar valley, Kabul, Bukhara and Turkey."—Farrukh Husain, *Friday Times*

"**HIDDEN CALIPHATE** announces the arrival of a major new scholar. By focusing on the more recent past of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, Ziad recenters the study of the Sufi tradition, which all too often has been relegated to the realm of metaphysics and poetry. He brings a contested period to light with encyclopedic insight. I heartily recommend this book."—Omid Safi, author of *The Politics of Knowledge in Premodern Islam: Negotiating Ideology and Religious Inquiry*

"A major achievement. In this innovative, well-written book Ziad shows us a region knit together by the networks of the Naqshbandi-Mujaddidi Sufis. He is the first to set out their massive influence across Central Asia, Afghanistan, and northwest South Asia, and in the process reveals how limited was the understanding of the colonial powers in the Great Game."—Francis Robinson, author of *The Mughal Emperors: And the Islamic Dynasties of India, Iran and Central Asia, 1206–1925*

"Equipped with an impressive array of primary sources, Ziad skillfully dismantles restrictive notions of region and sovereignty and casts aside binaries such as that of Sufis and ulama. He then offers us a breathtaking view of a Persian cosmopolis held together by vibrant networks of Naqshbandi Sufis in the politically turbulent eighteenth century. This hugely important book should be read across a range of disciplines."—Supriya Gandhi, author of *The Emperor Who Never Was: Dara Shukoh in Mughal India*

"A pioneering study of the Mujaddidi Sufi networks that spanned the eastern Islamic world, from Siberia to India, in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Grounded in a prodigious range of sources, *Hidden Caliphate* shows how the order's doctrinal, ritual, and institutional dimensions offered intellectual and social cohesion for Muslims across this vast region before and after the advent of colonial domination."—Devin DeWeese, author of *Studies on Sufism in Central Asia*

"Refreshingly original, **HIDDEN CALIPHATE** shows how the Mujaddidi Sufis combined high textual tradition with ecstatic Sufism and local rituals and thus built a seminal authority to unite diverse communities across Central Asia, Afghanistan, and South Asia. Ziad brings a vital new perspective on a region long understood only through the narrow lens of European imperial histories."—Muzaffar Alam, author of *The Mughals and the Sufis: Islam and Political Imagination in India, 1500–1750*

"A brilliant transregional study of the Naqshbandi-Mujaddidi scholastic–religious networks (the *batini khilafat*) in Khurasan, Hindustan, and Transoxiana that significantly advances the field of Persianate studies. Ziad traces sacred networks of cultural and economic exchange as well as the leadership structure that helped maintain a degree of stability during a time of political decentralization. A must-read for all interested in Sufism, the Persianate sphere in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and the history of the Afghan empire."—Jo-Ann Gross, Professor of History, Emeritus, The College of New Jersey

Beyond the Great Game

In 1821, the English explorer William Moorcroft reached Ladakh, a Buddhist mountain kingdom bordering Tibet to the north. Moorcroft, who began his career as a veterinary surgeon, was recruited by the East India Company to locate superior horse breeds for the Company's use and needed access to the fabled horse markets of Bukhara. He was accompanied by Mir `Izzatullah, his talented secretary, whose family had migrated from Bukhara to northern India two generations earlier.

We might have thought that Moorcroft's journey depended on the goodwill of political powerbrokers who controlled (in theory) the borders and roads. But in fact his journey was made possible by a batini, or "hidden," caliphate, a network of Sufi scholar-saints with whom Mir 'Izzatullah was affiliated. Mir 'Izzatullah suggested that they approach a certain Shah Niyaz—a Sufi born in a princely family of Tashkent, who had migrated first to Kashmir, then Yarkand in China. Shah Niyaz had been dispossessed of his Kashmiri properties after the Sikh occupation of 1819 and sought refuge in the relatively peaceful region of Ladakh, where he became a confidant of the Buddhist chief minister. Mir `Izzatullah's suggestion proved fruitful: Shah Niyaz graciously offered to refer Moorcroft to Mian Fazl-i Haqq of Peshawar, the son and spiritual successor of one of Peshawar's greatest saints, who could facilitate his journey.

From Ladakh, Moorcroft traveled on horseback about 1,300 kilometers westward to Peshawar, via Kashmir and northern Punjab, where he met Fazl-i Haqq, an approachable, mild-mannered holy man

who proved eager to help. Fortuitously, Fazl-i Haqq himself needed to travel to Bukhara to meet with the king, Amir Hayder, who was not just a devoted disciple of his father Fazl Ahmad Peshawari but had been appointed as one of his spiritual deputies. Moorcroft seized the opportunity. He offered to finance Fazl-i Haqq's journey to Bukhara, in return for good references to the various rulers en route, who all venerated the Peshawari saint. Fazl-i Haqq agreed. Some weeks later, however, due to a combination of mischief and miscommunication, Moorcroft found himself in a bind, detained by Mir Murad Beg of Qunduz, the famously obstinate ruler of an autonomous state south of the Amu Darya, known to Europeans as the Oxus River. Eventually, again through Fazl-i Haqq's network, Moorcroft was referred to Khwaja Qasim Jan, the venerated Sufi patriarch of Qunduz, who had considerable clout with the mir, who happened to be his son-in-law. After prolonged deliberations, the Qunduzi Sufi managed to negotiate Moorcroft's release in return for a payment to the mir. The Englishman finally succeeded in reaching Bukhara, becoming one of the few Europeans to have ventured into this legendary metropolis.

But this book is not about Moorcroft. In fact, he is no more than an incidental character in a much larger story that has been overlooked because, both during and after the nineteenth century, European writings on the region across which Moorcroft traveled have only been concerned with religious figures insofar as they seemed relevant to colonial interests.

HIDDEN CALIPHATE views this world from an entirely different perspective, that of the religious network that made Moorcroft's journey possible in a time of political fragmentation. It reveals an interconnected Persianate cosmopolis that persisted into the early twentieth century. This sphere of exchange stretched across the Indus and Amu Darya well into the Inner Asian Steppes and western China: regions mediated through a shared Persian cultural-linguistic tradition and historical memory even as British, Russian, and Chinese imperial expansion encroached.

Each of the real protagonists of my story—Mir 'Izzatullah, Shah Niyaz, Khwaja Qasim Jan, Fazl-i Haqq, Bukhara's king Amir Hayder, and thousands more—belonged to a vast, intricate network of scholar-mystics known as the Naqshbandi-Mujaddidi (or simply Mujaddidi, literally meaning "revivalist") order. Each had undergone a rigorous course of education and spiritual training spanning well over a decade at premier institutions of higher learning in cities like Bukhara, Kabul, Peshawar, and Delhi. The Mujaddidis followed a comprehensive "exoteric" curriculum ranging from Persian poetry, ethics, and logic to medicine and jurisprudence, before graduating to the higher "esoteric" or "hidden" sciences. Through carefully crafted courses on meditation, they learned to activate metaphysical energy centers mapped onto the physical body. These practices enabled an inward spiritual journey toward God and a return to the created world. With the knowledge and wisdom they gained, they became fit to lead others in spiritual development as well as worldly affairs.

Mujaddidi scholar-saints composed one of the principal corporate groups in regions as disparate as Kashgar and Kazan. In fact, their batini khila fat was arguably the most extensive Muslim scholastic-religious network of the seventeenth to early twentieth centuries. The Mujaddidis fused Persian, Arabic, and vernacular literary traditions; mystical virtuosity; popular religious practices; and the urban scholastic domain into a unified, yet flexible, articulation of Islam that provided coherence to diverse Muslim communities across wide-ranging territory. They also articulated some of the most effective social responses to the decline of Muslim political power and the ascendance of European colonialism;

by the late nineteenth century, they had even inspired the region's principal Muslim reformist movements.

HIDDEN CALIPHATE asks how the Mujaddidis were able to establish this remarkable parallel form of popular leadership, which transcended and outlived contemporary political structures, surviving to the present day. It follows the emergence and evolution of their trans-Asiatic networks, which bridged intellectual, economic, and religious domains across the fragile states of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, on both sides of the Indus River and Amu Darya. At the same time, it shows how the contemporary Persianate world order—its cosmopolitan urbanites, pastoralists, and agriculturalists; its petty princes, tribal chiefs, and landed gentry alike—relied on this overarching network for stability, communication, and mediation both between competing parties and between the visible and invisible realms.

Through this examination, I offer a new way of conceiving sovereignty in the Muslim world prior to the twentieth century. I argue that people across central and southern Asia understood authority structures to inhere in a two-tiered paradigm, the zahiri (manifest) and batini (hidden) caliphate. In this hierarchical model, which draws from terms deployed by the Sufis themselves, the hidden caliphate of Sufi networks maintained a transregional balance, positioned above the outer caliphate, the political authority made up of an amalgam of small fractured states. This model is markedly different from prevailing traditional visions of Islamic sovereignty, and certainly from more modern conceptions of so-called Islamic nation-statehood. And it challenges our understanding of the relationship between state, subject populations, and sacerdotal sphere. This book, then, explores sovereignty not from the perspective of rulers, governors, armies, and bureaucracies but from the vantage point of Sufi communities. And in doing so, it is grounded not in contemporary political theories or courtly literature but in the lived realities of Sufis who navigated this sphere, revealing their pivotal place in sustaining a transregional order in a time of decentralization and political transformation.

The Naqshbandi-Mujaddidi order had originated several generations earlier with Shaykh Ahmad Sirhindi (d. 1624), a widely revered Hindustani mystic. Sirhindi articulated the metaphysical concept of millennial revival (tajdid-i alfi) of Islam: that, a thousand years after the Prophet Muhammad's passing (1602), a restoration of the prophetic period's essence would be executed by a saint of the highest credentials.

Sirhindi was himself popularly designated the Mujaddid-i Alf Sani, or reviver of the second millennium. In modern historiography, he remains one of the most respected yet controversial Muslim thinkers. Today, a surprising range of Sunni socioreligious movements from Anatolia to Southeast Asia—including Salafi fundamentalists, modernists, and Sufi traditionalists—incorporate him and the Mujaddidi order into their intellectual lineage. Meanwhile, in South Asia, nationalist narratives view Sirhindi as the progenitor of the "two-nation theory," which ultimately spurred the creation of the separate states of India and Pakistan in 1947. In modern Turkey, his theology is considered an inspiration for the ruling Justice and Development Party. Needless to say, his place in history remains contested, with heated debates centering mainly on his political legacy.

Remarkably, however, very few of Sirhindi's writings have any direct relevance to the domain of politics and statecraft; only seven of the 536 epistles that comprise his magnum opus, the Maktubat, or Collected Letters, reference contemporary politics. The bulk of his work outlines a complex philosophical and cosmological system, synthesizing exoteric and esoteric Islamic sciences into a cohesive system. This required rearticulating the contours of shari'a to encompass external law, doctrine, and the mystical path. In effect, Sirhindi created a discursive space where the ecstatic mystic could communicate with the sober jurist, ultimately institutionalized in his hometown, Sirhind, between Lahore and Delhi. His college drew scholars and Sufis from across the Persianate world and repackaged an array of diverse pedagogies for onward travel.



FIGURE 1MAP POLITICAL GEOGRAPHY OF THE HINDUSTAN, KHURASAN, AND TRANSOXIANA, C. 1800

This study centers on Shaykh Ahmad Sirhindi's legacy in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, a time of drastic political transformations in the Persianate world. The great regional empires—the Mughals at Delhi and the Safavids at Isfahan, as well as the Uzbek Ashtarkhanid kingdoms at Bukhara and Balkh—were gradually disintegrating. The early eighteenth century not only witnessed deurbanization

in certain regions, tribal "breakouts," and revolts but also corresponding reorientations of overland Asiatic trade passages.

The Iranian soldier of fortune Nadir Shah Afshar (r. 1736-1747) turned this volatile milieu to his advantage and rapidly assembled territory extending from the Caucasus to Delhi. But Nadir Shah's imperial project proved ephemeral. After his death, his domains fragmented into petty feuding principalities; weak successor states at Shiraz, Khiva, Khoqand, and Bukhara eventually emerged through tribal consolidation and warfare. China's Qing dynasty absorbed Altishahr (now southwestern Xinjiang province). Simultaneously, Nadir Shah's erstwhile Afghan commander in chief, Ahmad Shah Durrani, consolidated power at Qandahar by skillfully engineering an alliance of Afghan tribes. Ahmad Shah briefly succeeded in carving out a so-called Durrani Empire from

Nadir Shah's eastern provinces. But by 1800 this short-lived Afghan empire, too, collapsed into an array of successor states ranging from Herat in northwestern Afghanistan to Sindh in southern Pakistan.

Virtually all these emergent ruling elites lacked popular legitimacy, maintaining limited sovereignty only through delicate negotiations with tribal elites and provincial potentates. By the first half of the nineteenth century, many of these nascent polities were reduced to buffer states in what came to be known in Western imperial parlance as the "Great Game" for dominance of Asia. Contemporary European accounts describe this period as one of cultural and intellectual decay, setting the stage for British and Russian colonial "corrective" intervention. They recount the isolation and ruination of cities like Kabul, Qandahar, Kalat, and Bukhara. When viewed solely through the lens of formal ruling structures, this indeed seems to have been the case.

However, contemporary Persian, Arabic, Chagatai, Tatar, Urdu, Pashto, and Sindhi sources tell a remarkably different story, intimately bound with the intricate network of shrines, khanaqáhs (centers for Sufi practice), and madrasas associated with various Sufi orders from Hindustan and Khurasan, which were expanding their reach in this turbulent period as far as Transoxiana, Kazan, Kashgar, and Istanbul. Foremost among these Sufis were the heirs of Shaykh Ahmad Sirhindi, now known as the Naqshbandi-Mujaddidis. From their base at Sirhind in the Mughal heartlands, they penetrated rural and pastoral-nomadic communities and emerging regional capitals like Khoqand in the Ferghana Valley and Hyderabad on the Indus in lower Sindh. By the first half of the nineteenth century, this Sufi suborder formed the dominant Sunni institutional network in the Persianate world. Although this study spans the seventeenth to twentieth centuries, I focus on the period between the death of Nadir Shah in 1747 and the ascendancy of Afghanistan's "Iron Amir" `Abd al-Rahman in 1880. It is at this time, following the Second Anglo-Afghan War, that many links across the two rivers were effectively severed, and the authority of the Sufis was most directly challenged.

Excavating this story problematizes several persistent myths about the political landscape of this region and the Muslim world at large. Notably, in addition to exploring the dual manifest / hidden caliphate as an alternative way of understanding how a decentralized region managed itself prior to the twentieth century, it also dislocates Great Game narratives, including their geographical concepts of South and Central Asia's supposed natural frontiers. I argue instead for the persistence of a Persianate world in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, encompassing Iran, Hindustan, Transoxiana, Khurasan, and beyond, and explore the interplay of cosmopolitanism and vernacularization within this ecumene. In parallel, I respond to enduring debates on the nature of lived Islam before colonialism. What did the sacerdotal domain look like before colonial interventions and modern transformations, before British and Russian bureaucrats and orientalists imposed their own definitions on Sufis and the ulama (scholars)?

Manifest and Hidden Caliphates

From Afghanistan's historian-laureate 'Abd al-Hayy Habibi to the acclaimed historian of the Arab world Albert Hourani, scholars have acknowledged that Sirhindi and his successors inspired new directions in Muslim culture and community. However, the structure and function of the Mujaddidi networks and the basis of their transregional authority remain a source of considerable controversy.

The cultural-political order obtained in the Persianate sphere of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries was distinct from the three most familiar paradigms of Islamic sovereignty. The first of these is the

originary caliphal model, effectively merging religious and political authority. This model was largely conceived by jurists, and it disregarded political realities after the end of the Rightly Guided caliphate (631-661), the tragedy at Karbala in 680, and certainly after the fall of Fatimids of Egypt and the Abbasid Caliphate at Baghdad in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, respectively. But it still informs scholarly discourse on Muslim statehood.

The second commonly available model is the bifurcated sultanate, premised on an understanding that states breaking off from the caliphate had no explicit religious ambitions and presided over societies comprised of associational or confessional religious organizations. In this model, religious organizations embodied sacred legitimacy and occupied a space functionally and physically separate from the state sphere. The so-called secular sultans would patronize religious functionaries, instrumentalizing them to rubber-stamp their kingship and buttress their own credentials among a believing population.

A third paradigm of sovereignty, the quadripartite circle of equity (a favorite of classical Muslim political theorists), is also inadequate to describe the Persianate environment in the period under scrutiny. Originating in Zoroastrian ideals of kingship, in this model, a monarch preserves a balance between mutually supportive classes, namely the religious hierarchy, the military, cultivators, and artisans. This model, however, fails to account for the limited sovereignty of state regimes, the transregional movement of human capital, and the complexities within the ulama and Sufi classes.

Understanding the Mujaddidis and how authority operated in this region and period depends on recognizing the radical change that occurred in the eighteenth century. As older imperial and state structures broke down, local ruling elites from Hindustan, Khurasan, and Transoxiana effectively entrusted scholastic and social services to Sufi orders, whose popular authority appealed to urban intelligentsia and tribal and rural populations. These Sufis generated institutional networks separate from the fiscal-military institutions of state and possessed greater resilience and longevity. Their khanaqahs, madrasas, and shrines formed a superstructure that enabled a transregional knowledge economy to provide coherence to the politically fragmented region through a constant flow of texts, practices, and human capital. In tandem, their rural institutions and land endowments spurred agricultural production. As in prior centuries, ruling elites did not confine themselves to a parallel "secular" space. Rather, they were active participants in the Sufi khanaqahs; their participation as patrons and disciples was inextricably tied to the practices of power. As such, my work is an inquiry into the nature of a "fibre," to use Joseph Fletcher's term, which held together parts of Eurasia and enabled horizontal continuities in the precolonial and early colonial periods.

How was this fibre fashioned? Relying on Sirhindi's pioneering theological interventions—specifically, on reconciling divergent Sufi pedagogies and the shari`a—the Mujaddidis represented themselves as a synthetic tradition, both transregional and local. Accordingly, they were able to absorb preexisting sacred communities and spaces, and inevitably became a point of convergence for urban ulama, Sufis, and intelligentsia; popular shrine-based Sufism; and the tribal and highland religious spheres. A diversified support and capital base meant that they were not restricted to any one region or dependent on localized sources of income. As Sufi saints, scholars, popular poets, and jurists, the Mujaddidis assumed the role of arch-intermediaries in a dynamic and fragile environment. They were called upon to mediate between urban and tribal elites and subjects, antagonistic polities, colonial and local authorities, and agrarian and highland communities.' They led interregional trade caravans across the spectacular terrain

of the Khyber Pass and Amu Darya, and, when required, even raised armies. Their institutions became public spaces furnishing a suite of social services well beyond exoteric and esoteric education and popular religious rituals. They were soup kitchens, caravanserais, and safe houses, as well as loci for trade, negotiation, and diplomacy. They were also sites for the production and propagation of didactic, polemical, and historical texts that helped define the contours of Persianate Islam in this period.

The expansion of Mujaddidi khanaqah networks went hand in hand with the mid-eighteenth-century political upheavals in the Mughal heartlands and contributed to a dramatic reorientation of trans-Asiatic religio-scholastic and commercial networks. Ulama and Sufis forcibly displaced from Mughal centers including Sirhind, Sialkot, Lahore, and Delhi were encouraged by rulers and tribal elites to relocate toward Khurasan, Transoxiana, and beyond. Correspondingly, cities like Kabul, Qandahar, Bukhara, Srinagar, Shikarpur, Thatta, and Peshawar emerged as sacred-scholastic hubs for new north-south networks through which ulama and Sufis from as far afield as Bukhara, Baluchistan, and Altishahr could access scholarship and literature from across the Mughal Empire.

The short-lived Durrani Empire was a critical catalyst for these reorientations. By the early nineteenth century, Mujaddidi institutions in Durrani territories linked Hindustan's towns with scholastic networks as far north as Siberia. A rapid movement of scholars into urban, tribal, and rural areas generated literary production in Persian, Arabic, and local languages including Pashto, Chagatai, Tatar, Sindhi, and Punjabi. But this revival of Durrani urban centers like Kabul and Peshawar as scholastic entrepôts in the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries has been largely erased from historical memory. These developments have, it seems, been eclipsed by Great Game narratives that relegate these regions to the status of barren "frontiers" or isolated "buffer states" straddling British and Russian imperial spheres of influence.

Why were Sufis solicited by the Durrani Afghans, Uzbeks, and their contemporaries, and what incentives did the Mujaddidis have to accept their invitations? It is helpful to view the story through the framework of "religious economy"—that is, analogizing the complex religious environment to a marketplace, with multiple firms, producers, and consumers; competition and collusion; and the generation and distribution of spiritual capital.

After Nadir Shah's death, his former lands witnessed an intense competition among successor polities for cultural, social, and symbolic capital. On the demand side of this religious economy, each of the nascent states—whether the Durrani Empire, Khoqand, Khiva, Kalat, Bukhara, or smaller regional polities—required a scholastic and spiritual institutional base. Such institutions could generate the fragile new states' bureaucracies and judicial apparatus, and in turn attract further cultural capital. Moreover, since most of their ruling families lacked historical legitimacy, Sufis and their institutions provided symbolic capital to strengthen the new dynasties. The local populations, likewise, required a range of religious services. Especially in a time of political turmoil, resettlement, and migrations, there was a high demand for blessings, faith healing, practical and spiritual guidance, and charity. Moreover, both the state and its subjects were in need of political, commercial, and suprarational mediation. This was best provided by an outside party with significant transregional, historically embodied social capital across rural, highland, pastoral-nomadic, and urban environments, including long-standing patronage structures and networks. Particularly at a time of gradated and limited sovereignty across this region, intermediaries became essential in continuing systems of exchange.

On the supply side, the Mujaddidis had some distinct advantages among the vast number of players in the unregulated post—Nadir Shah religious marketplace. The college at Sirhind and its subsidiaries had produced generations of scholar-mystics with expertise in law, scholastic theology, and Sufism. They inherited the centuries-old symbolic authority of the Naqshbandi order. Moreover, they personified the academic rigor of an urban Mughal high-cultural institutional environment. These Sufis, trained in the Mughal cosmopolitan milieu, could then fulfill the above areas of demand. And by the mid-eighteenth century, having lost their center at Sirhind, and many of the awqaf (charitable endowments) that undergirded their network, due to regional conflicts, the Mujaddidis needed both material resources and a support base to continue to propagate their teachings and methods.

A transregional, hierarchical social-religious-political structure emerged from this dynamic situation. Sufi networks essentially formed a potent supraregional cultural space, providing both sacred and practical brokerage functions for and between multiple layers of society. The Mujaddidis and their contemporaries in the eighteenth- to nineteenth-century Persianate ecumene, then, were fashioned—and fashioned themselves—to meet the challenges of trans-Asiatic political and market reorientations. This is not to say that they were entirely novel in character. They shared certain characteristics with earlier Sufi orders and other corporate and functional groups that have received some scholarly attention—for example, the munshi secretarial class, also cultural intermediaries who provided continuity amid political flux and could be transposed horizontally from one polity to another. Not unlike the Sufis, their specific blend of education and grasp of contemporary political and social realities meant that the secretarial class could easily transition between the Mughal court, successor states, and the British East India Company. It is indeed remarkable that even rival states often patronized the same munshis or Mujaddidi networks at a time of constantly shifting frontiers and looming threats from greater powers.

Although in their own literature the Mujaddidis saw themselves following in the footsteps of past mystics, in certain keyways they were very different from Sufis of earlier centuries. Their networks were far more widespread and institutionalized, guaranteeing exoteric and esoteric education of the highest available caliber. Thanks to Sirhindi's intellectual legacy, they could fast absorb and synthesize earlier communities and their writings, practices, and philosophies. Much of this was of course facilitated by the realities of their age; the fractured environment needed binding agents and required the Mujaddidis to perform a broader array of functions than most Sufis who came before them.

The expanded functionality of the Sufi networks can be viewed as an outgrowth of the idea of sacred kingship in the Timurid, Safavid, Ottoman, and Mughal eras. Charismatic empire builders like Shah Isma'il Safavi and the Mughal emperor Akbar came to embody a form of sovereignty that fused worldly power and sacrality. Notions of sovereignty were grounded in millenarian epistemology and in the corresponding figure of the Sufi shaykh or pir—meaning elder, guide, or master—as a heroic savior, heralding a new epoch in the history of mankind. By the eighteenth century, two structural transformations had taken place. First, the great empires had broken down, replaced with polities governed by new rulers lacking in sacred legitimacy. Therefore, the Mujaddidis and their contemporaries became even more critical in embodying and sustaining the sacred domains. As successors of Sirhindi, the Mujaddidis, in particular, fashioned themselves as the agents of a perpetual millennial renewal. Second, Sirhindian ontology had established a Sufi domain that encapsulated both záhini and batini

(exoteric and esoteric) scholastic functions, thereby expanding the domain and strength of the Sufi institutions to include juristic and spiritual functions.

The structure of hierarchical sovereignty was upheld by a notion circulating within the Mujaddidi and other Sufis orders of the záhiri (or apparent, outer, or manifest) and bátini (or inner or hidden) caliphate. This dual model of sovereignty had been articulated centuries earlier by foundational Sufi thinkers like the Andalusian mystic Ibn al-'Arabi in the twelfth century. Delhi's eighteenth-century Mujaddidi polymath Shah Waliullah (d. 1762) lays out their respective functions:

> And the caliphate is manifest and hidden. Thus, [the domain of] the Manifest Caliphate is establishment of jihad, and justice, and huddid, and levying the tithe and the land tax on whoever is the rightful [recipient]. And indeed the ones who are just, carry the burdens of this within the countries of Islam. And [the domain of the] Hidden Caliphate is teaching the Holy Book, wisdom, and spiritual purification [cleansing of the ego-self] with the light of the hidden, with harsh preaching, and the attractions of the [saintly] association. As the Almighty said: "Verily, Allah conferred favor on the believers, when He sent a messenger from among them, reciting on them his verses and purifying them and teaching them the book and wisdom, although before they were in clear error." [al-'Imran, 164] ... and the Prophet (peace by upon Him) said: "The ulama are the inheritors of prophets." And the caliph is naught expect he who ... preserves the Holy Book and the sunna, and provides training in laws of conduct [salak, or wayfaring] and nurtures the people of good conduct [sálikin, or spiritual wayfarers].

On the surface this model resembles the bifurcated sultanate / religious domain paradigm. But in substance it is very different. First, there is a strict hierarchy between the two caliphates. The hidden caliphs are responsible for higher metaphysical functions of governance, while the manifest caliphs are purely responsible for the material, worldly aspects of governance. Second, in the Sufi sense, the word caliphate in general signified much more than temporal rule or a functional clerical category; it was imbued with mystical notions of personal spiritual realization, Ibn al-'Arabi's "perfect" human being who "governs the affairs of the world and controls them by means of the divine Names." Through their piety, service, and self-realization, the hidden caliphs (khalafá', plural of khalifa, meaning "successors") were divinely appointed to manage affairs on a metaphysical level, to perform cosmic functions well beyond the reach of the everyday believer, and to guide humankind in the exoteric sciences as well as the esoteric sciences of spiritual perfection. As God's vicegerents, they were the keepers of hidden knowledge. Some, like the ones introduced in this study, were indeed public figures, but others remained anonymous.

Although the hidden / manifest caliphate model became pronounced in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, it also applied in degrees to earlier periods. Thus, this model not only offers a paradigm that makes sense of our period on its own terms but also a lens by which to critically evaluate other models scrutinized in recent scholarship of early modern Muslim states: sacred kingship, or the state as "military-administrative household," or notions of bargaining, balance, cooperation, and competition between multiple loci of political power. And it allows us to appreciate the transition between these older models of sovereignty and later discourses on Pan-Islamism or divine sovereignty that have animated intra-Muslim debates in the last two centuries. It illuminates, too, how modern constructs of the so-called Islamic state have both leveraged and entirely refashioned preexisting notions of religion, state, and subjecthood.

The Mujaddidis and their contemporaries rarely concerned themselves with matters of practical governance and worldly, secular sovereignty in their own discourse. Even when engaging with the court, they maintained a symbolic distance in both their public performance and epistolary correspondence. For this reason, we find a myriad of Mujaddidi tracts on spiritual wayfaring and meditation, rather than "mirrors for princes," manuals on statecraft, or opinions on military and chancery matters. In their biographies, political events (even great upheavals) are relegated to footnotes, while the primary functions of Sufis as teachers and spiritual guides are detailed and extolled. Contemporary rulers, too, acknowledged this hierarchy not only through symbolic performances exhibiting subservience to the Sufis, or through generous grants to their institutions, but as committed Sufi disciples and practitioners.

On the practical level, there were notable exceptions to the general principle of avoiding the state and military sphere. The system of hierarchical sovereignty was sustained through intermittent bargaining acts between states, local power brokers, and the Sufi networks, with each party exerting pressure on the other. Political pressures often induced realignments of Sufi networks, as we will see throughout. When rulers became intolerable and threatened the Sufi orders or their constituencies, as in the Anglo-Afghan Wars, Sufi networks could even mobilize their resources to undermine the ruling classes. And, in some liminal regions lacking political leadership, they even assumed direct political control—but this was, in their own literature, seen as a burden, an ancillary function to their primary vocation of spiritual guidance.

Pieces of a Chessboard

The first casualties of this story are the Great Game narratives, starting with romanticized first-hand accounts of European adventure, heroism, and espionage in inhospitable, hostile territory. In these narratives, the lands from the Indus westward exist primarily as imperial buffer zones. Despite their exaggerated depictions and blatantly racialized tone, these tales continue to shape our conceptions of Transoxiana, Khurasan, and to a lesser extent Hindustan in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. It is surprising that, while other "great power"—centric narratives in regional historiography have been substantially scrutinized and impugned, secondary literature still mostly perceives this region as a collection of isolated princedoms with limited agency at the mercy of the three great powers: Lord Nathaniel Curzon's "pieces of a chessboard upon which is being played out a game for the dominion of the world." The continuing political sensitivity of this region only perpetuates such paradigms.

The first Great Game histories were composed in the nineteenth century by political and military officials serving in various arenas where the British-Russian rivalry was playing out. These works were driven by policy objectives; it was in their best interest to rebrand "local questions" as imperial concerns, with their narratives of the complex internal dynamics of this area providing ammunition for their arguments that their home countries should focus more on this putative imperial battleground. The second phase of Great Game histories of the region appeared against the backdrop of the First World War and the Bolshevik revolution. These works, classical diplomatic accounts, zero in on individual colonial actors and their motives. The third phase corresponded to the growth of Russian studies in the United Kingdom and the United States during and after the Cold War. Among these works were the first substantive histories of Afghanistan and the khanates of Transoxiana. But the focus remained overwhelmingly political, and contemporary British and Russian archival materials were the anchoring sources. These histories were unable to critically integrate locally produced literature with

colonial European histories and travelogues. Nor could they break away from colonial and postcolonial borders and conceptions of sovereignty.

Imagined Frontiers

HIDDEN CALIPHATE is also an antidote to another enduring legacy of colonial "Great Game" histories—that is, the skewed geographic boundaries separating South Asia from Central Asia, with Afghanistan wedged awkwardly in between. These conceptualizations were informed by some assumptions deeply rooted in the colonial imagination.

When British colonial administrators partitioned the region, they followed the ancient Greeks, in defining the Amu Darya or Oxus River as the "border between civilization and barbarism." Transoxiana, to the river's north, was accordingly the domain of lawlessness and despotic government. Likewise, the Afghan tribal belt, demarcating the limits of British India, was seen as another natural frontier. As British and Russian zones of influence materialized in the late nineteenth century, with the Oxus as the dividing line, these concepts were reinforced. And the simultaneous formation of the Afghan state after Amir `Abd al-Rahman (d. 1901) ensured that historians approached Central Asia, Afghanistan, and British India (a precursor to the later category "South Asia") as distinct and isolated geographic units. This compartmentalized approach to the region persisted, obscuring complex relationships on and between both sides of the Indus and the Amu Darya in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Even today, most studies approach religious revival and activism in regions like rural Sindh, the Peshawar Valley, or urban Bukhara as localized phenomena, rather than connecting them to broader trends in the greater Persianate world.

A corresponding, and equally imperially inflected, historiographical pronouncement was that the eighteenth century was Hindustan, Khurasan, and Transoxiana's "dark century," ultimately rescued by an enlightened European colonial renaissance. A tradition of histories and ethnographies, going back to John Malcolm's History of Persia (1815), James Mill's History of British India (1826), and Mountstuart Elphinstone's Account of the Kingdom of Caubul (1815), held that the demise of the great Safavid, Mughal, and Uzbek empires went hand in hand with economic, intellectual, and cultural decline. This argument assumed many forms in the twentieth century, generally maintaining that political fractures and reorientations in the eighteenth century were the product of deficient administrative policies in imperial centers.

Persianate Ecumene

If we are to finally move away from this racialized, colonial take on this sweep of land, the false mythology of boundaries and regional decline, how can we define it instead? For the purposes of this book, I suggest that one alternative descriptor, "Persianate," is a more legitimate category of inquiry for the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.

In his 19705 magnum opus, Venture of Islam, Marshall Hodgson offered a concept of a Persianate ecumene stretching from Bengal to the Ottoman Empire. A shared Persian koine, with all its underlying cultural-linguistic tradition and historical memory, held this zone together. Yet for Hodgson and later scholars, this Persianate arena of exchange disappeared after the Middle Ages. The persistence, cohesion, and limits of a Persianate domain in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries is still contested. But an emerging body of scholarship evidences robust economic linkages between Transoxiana and

Hindustan in this period. We now know that these linkages were accompanied by large-scale economic growth and urbanization, and began to fade only with the rise of Russian and British colonialism after the mid-nineteenth century.

However, religious and intellectual exchange in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries remains largely unexplored. And notions of intellectual isolation have not been systematically critiqued. Relevant sources from the period have scarcely been scrutinized. There is, in particular, a dearth of microhistorical studies tracing the contours of Sufi and ulama networks that could provide the basis for exploring broader trends.

In this respect, interrogating Mujaddidi sources from both sides of the Oxus and the Indus is highly revealing. Despite political dissolution after the collapse of Nadir Shah's imperial project, the region evidently remained culturally, intellectually, and economically integrated. Intellectual traffic flowed both east to west and north to south; a wide array of economic classes were engaged in each locale. Without such a transregional inquiry it is difficult to perceive the existence of scholastic and religious superstructures—like the Mujaddidis—that ensured the persistence of a Persianate zone at least until the late nineteenth century.

Significantly, Mujaddidi sources also demonstrate that a range of social currents in the urban and tribal spheres, generally treated as distinct moments in local histories, actually formed part of an interconnected web of social-intellectual-religious movements. This web encompassed movements ranging from anticolonial resistance campaigns in the Peshawar Valley, to Bukhara's nineteenth-century renaissance, to the development of the Muftiate at Orenberg in Russia, an institution devised by the Romanovs to oversee Muslim religious affairs. Such movements cannot be understood in isolation.

The Durrani Empire became the fulcrum of these trans-Asiatic networks. This study is therefore as much a history of Persianate Sufism as it is a history of the Afghan Empire, reclaiming the pivotal place of its chief cities in sustaining inter-Asian scholastic and economic exchange. Although the empire covered most of modern-day Afghanistan and Pakistan, the nascent fields of Afghanistan and Pakistan studies ironically treat it as an ephemeral transitory phase between the Mughal and Safavid collapse and British colonialism. There is a dearth of literature on the religio-scholastic dynamics of the empire and, frankly, of Afghanistan and Pakistan themselves until well into the twentieth century. Even studies on the Afghan Mujaddidis, arguably the most widespread Sufi tradition in Afghanistan, are concerned with their political involvements at the expense of their broader scholastic and social functions and pedagogies.

HIDDEN CALIPHATE, instead, demonstrates that Sufi networks like the Mujaddidis, transacting within the Persian literary medium, perpetuated a supraregional Persianate cultural and political order centered on the Afghan dominions. Fusing terms from Hodgson and Sheldon Pollock, I refer to the zone in which the Mujaddidis transacted as a Persianiate cosmopolis. The term polls signifies the political dimension of this ecumene, while Persian suggests the role of language in, to borrow Pollock's description of Sanskrit, "producing the forms of political and cultural expression that underwrote this cosmopolitan order."

By establishing shrines, khánaqahs, and madrasas, the Mujaddidis sustained a Hindustan-Khurasan-Transoxiana zone of sacred authority through networks of pilgrimage, trade, and literary production. Their circulating texts, miscellanies, and genealogies in Persian and its vernaculars generated a shared knowledge economy and sacred memory. This study uses Mujaddidi biographies, hagiographies, and

genealogies to map the fluid contours of this world and the conceptual spaces of sacro-cultural exchange. Often revolving around the motif of travel and pilgrimage, these texts provide a unique window into how local actors conceptualized macrospaces, centers, and frontiers. Moreover, the patterns of reproducing and distributing these texts provides a map of the circulatory spaces of underlying knowledge systems.

The results demand a reevaluation of the interplay between the cosmopolitan and local or vernacular in the Persianate cosmopolis. The Mujaddidis no doubt embodied transregional cosmopolitanism. However, a localization of Mujaddidi identity was required to become properly embedded in each node of their transregional network. This study therefore considers the processes of cosmopolitan transculturation, asking how communities adopted sacred identities and pedagogies that affiliated them with distant, often personally unfamiliar, cosmopolitan structures.

A hybrid local and cosmopolitan identity was in fact necessary to the expansion of the network. Each node within the Mujaddidi network was oriented locally, regionally, and transregionally. For example, literature on cosmology and wayfaring was intended for audiences from Bukhara to Punjab; devotional poetry was composed in Arabic, Persian, and assorted vernaculars; and biographies and genealogies fused local Afghan and Uzbek tribal saints with great regional luminaries like Sirhindi. Mujaddidi shrine architecture employed vernacular media and was integrated into local sacred landscapes, forming a part of transregional and local pilgrimage circuits across the cosmopolis. At a broader level, therefore, this study suggests that the emergence of Sufi vernacular identities within the Persianate cultural-linguistic-sacred umbrella in fact sustained the broader Persianate sphere in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The forging of real and imagined communities of scholars and mystics with shared hagiographical narratives helped the region survive internecine conflicts between fledgling states. It even insulated them, at least temporarily, from some of the ruptures of colonialism.

Islam before the Twentieth Century

Hidden Caliphate also offsets some lingering presumptions—both scholarly and popular—on the nature of Islam and the religious sphere prior to colonialism. Most studies on the period acknowledge that the Mujaddidis were critical in redefining and preserving Muslim identity in a time of crisis. But they fail to adequately grasp the doctrinal and institutional characteristics of the order. The Mujaddidi legacy also remains contested, particularly given the seemingly inexplicable spectrum of social movements that have cited Sirhindi as a decisive influence. Much of the leadership of modern Muslim revivalist movements were products of Mujaddidi khanaqahs and madrasas, and actively engaged Mujaddidi ontologies. The range includes the Indian modernists of Aligarh University; the reformist Deoband madrasa (one branch of which famously spawned the Taliban); and the Jadidis in Central Asia and Russia who pushed for modern educational reforms. The Sufi Barelvi Indian "traditionalist" movement deploys Sirhindi's theology to defend Sufi shrine practices against fundamentalist critiques, arguing that Sufism is bound to the shari`a. Concurrently, Mujaddidi discourses on the primacy of the shari'a, censuring wayward religious practices, have been adopted by both modernists and Salafis to critique Sufi traditions—ironically, including the Mujaddidis. Since Sirhindi's name signifies authority and orthodoxy, modern religious movements have scrambled to fit him into their lineages—often selectively engaging his writings, often overemphasizing the few discourses with political, social, or communalist undertones.

Looking beyond these ideological narratives requires a dramatic shift in focus. To date, historians have placed much emphasis on late nineteenth and twentieth-century Mujaddidi-inspired revivalist movements. However, studies of the critical developmental period of the network before the mid-nineteenth century are lacking. Primary texts produced within the tradition as well as contemporary sources remain underutilized. Specifically, Persian, Arabic, and vernacular sources have not been adequately reconciled with European records to provide a holistic picture from both within and outside of the Sufi sphere of activity.

"Moolahs," "Holy Men," and the "Soofee" Sect

In exploring these uncharted domains, this study displaces certain rigid categorizations of Muslim religious authority in the region. For example, let us consider Mountstuart Elphinstone's seminal account of Kabul in the first decade of the nineteenth century, which he wrote when he was a British envoy to the city. This account continues to inform our understanding of the regional religious sphere. In reference to Peshawar and Kabul, Elphinstone divided religious functionaries into three discrete categories. The first were the "Moollahs," a diverse array of religious officials responsible for youth education, the practice of law, and the administration of justice. The second category were holy men, including Sayyids, "Derweshes," -Fakeers," and "Kulunders." Their domain was that of miracles, occult sciences, prophesizing, astrology, and geomancy. The third category included the "Soofees," a minority "sect" who considered the world to be an illusion. In later colonial and postcolonial historiography, ulama and Sufis continued to inhabit separate domains 41 Popular Sufis were conceived of as a syncretic, heterodox class on the fringes of society espousing quietist, pantheistic beliefs, and shunning normative Islamic practices. On the other hand, so-called orthodox ulama were viewed as generally intolerant of popular culture and were often politically active.

Although these characterizations are patently based on nineteenth-century European conceptions of religious orthodoxy and mysticism, they have an enduring legacy. In more recent literature, urban and "tribal" or "folk" Islam, or Sufis and the ulama, are also generally treated as mutually exclusive categories. Although there may be some discursive merit to these categorizations, this study shows that in practice these worlds largely overlapped. The Mujaddidis fit into none of Elphinstone's three categories yet comprised aspects of all three. They were intimately engaged in social and political affairs; taught hadith and jurisprudence; partook in ascetic, mystical practices; and were revered as miracle-making holy men. Their literary production, as I will discuss, reflected a knowledge system inspired by Sirhindi in which mystical theology and praxis coexisted and complemented jurisprudence and scriptural study.

Since the 1970s, a body of scholarship has challenged these earlier compartmentalized paradigms, addressing the sociopolitical dimensions of Sufi leadership. This work has shown how Sufis were engaged on multiple levels, from providing spiritual and personal guidance, to the practice of politics and warfare, to shaping collective memory and identity. These studies have also highlighted the overlapping spaces occupied by ulama and Sufis. They point out that Sufis and jurists often wrote both of shari'a and intoxicated states, and institutional linkages existed between shrines and the intellectual world of the urban ulama.

HIDDEN CALIPHATE develops from this newer work, building on studies of the sociology of sainthood and Sufi institutions that take new critical approaches to hagiographies and didactic texts. For example, I use biographies to explore the evolution of paradigms and archetypes of sainthood and draw

from cultural anthropological approaches in mapping transregional religious networks. I also rely on urban and architectural history to conceptualize how Mujaddidi institutions and shrines were physically integrated into social environments, how they adapted to urban transformations, and how shrines and other architectural forms served as tools for communal and identity formation.

The Sources

The fieldwork underlying this study has been carried out at sacred spaces, private collections, and libraries in over fifty towns and villages in contemporary Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Uzbekistan. I spent extended periods in Mujaddidi, Qadiri, and Chishti khanaqáhs observing day-to-day functions and their engagement with their host communities. Many of the khanaqahs in this region host libraries; some contain manuscripts and even feature publishing houses. In Pakistan and Afghanistan, for instance, there are several hundred independent libraries associated with notable families, Sufi orders, and other religious institutions that have cataloged manuscript, lithograph, and printed book collections. Many also publish older material and material in translation and produce new works on Sufism. In response to the specter of Talibanization, there has been a rise in grassroots interest in Sufism as a countercurrent, resulting in a prolific market in edited classical Sufi texts and histories from across South and Central Asia.

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HIDDEN CALIPHATE is divided into two major parts. Chapters 1-3 provide historical background, tracing the regional political, economic, and social reorientations of the eventful eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and discuss the sacred landscape of the Persianate world. Chapter 1 follows the dynamic processes through which new states gradually arose in the half-century after Nadir Shah's death. The following decades, from 1800 onward, witnessed two conflicting processes. On the one hand, the new states consolidated, but on the other, all faced intense political pressures from at least one of three great colonial empires. Later chapters reveal how these grand processes intrinsically shaped the Sufi networks.

The second chapter turns to the sacred landscape of the Persianate world. Stepping back to the early seventeenth century, it introduces Shaykh Ahmad Sirhindi and the key contributions that came to define the Mujaddidis. This discussion links Sirhindi's theology to the social movement that it inspired, particularly in its synthesis of the Sufi path and shari'a. Then it traces the early development of the Mujaddidi institutional network based at Sirhind until the mid-eighteenth century, setting the stage for the case studies that follow. Chapter 3 looks at the curriculum inspired by Sirhindi and the mechanisms of efficient transregional knowledge transfer within Mujaddidi institutional networks. The discussion thus introduces the core educational functions and pedagogies of every Mujaddidi institution.

The second part of the book is grounded in social history, but I work extensively with methods familiar to religious studies, sociology, and anthropology, specifically in those places where I substantiate historic analysis with ethnographic fieldwork. Chapters 4-9 comprise a sociohistorical case study of a Mujaddidi subnetwork spanning Hindustan, Khurasan, and Transoxiana: that of Fazl Ahmad Ma'sumi Peshawari, popularly known as "Hazrat Jio Sahib" (d. 1816), the progenitor of an extensive Sufi lineage that carried Sirhindi's teachings westward.

Fazl Ahmad, introduced in Chapter 4, was a descendant of Shaykh Ahmad Sirhindi's older brother. He settled at the Durrani winter capital of Peshawar, circa 1776. He traveled regularly to Bukhara, via Kabul and Mazar-i Sharif. His voyages are mapped out in Map 4. The khanatebuilder of Bukhara, Shah Murad (r. 1785-1800), became a devoted disciple and, eventually, a deputy. By the end of his life, Fazl Ahmad's network encompassed several hundred deputies, who supervised khánaqahs and madrasas from Balkh to Khoqand and Ghazni to Kashmir. These were sustained by grants from the Durrani sultans and their Barakzai successors; the khans of Bukhara; the mirs of Badakhshan and Qunduz, now in northeastern Afghanistan; and other regional powerbrokers.

Fazl Ahmad was among the most prominent of several thousand Mujaddidi Sufis who established their presence in Khurasan, Transoxiana, and beyond. Each one set up new institutions or affiliated itself with older institutions-including shrines—with preexisting symbolic capital. These institutions were generously patronized by local rulers and governors, who, in effect, outsourced the scholastic and spiritual apparatus of their nascent polities to the Mujaddidis and other Sufis. Through these institutions, the Mujaddidis were effectively able to import a set of doctrines and philosophies from Sirhind, which then interfaced with localized ritual practices, theologies, and sacred historical memory. Though all of the Sufis who migrated westward administered their own institutions and managed their own congregations, they perceived themselves as part of a single network in which texts, students, poetry, and practices constantly circulated.

My study of this subnetwork begins in roughly 1747 and continues into the late nineteenth century, to the cusp of the Russian, British, and Chinese annexation of Hindustan, Khurasan, and Transoxiana. This time frame modifies established periodizations of the history of South and Central Asia, which tend to separate the precolonial from the colonial period, generally at 1800. The pivotal point in my narrative is not the Russian or British arrival but the death of Nadir Shah and the disintegration of his empire, which inaugurated a new political, social, and religious order throughout the region.

At different times during this period, each node of the subnetwork developed its own identity and flavor as it adapted to the transformations and crises of the age. The stories emerging from each node highlight specific characteristics of the network that sometimes endowed it with resilience, alternatively, prevented it from adequately responding to contemporary challenges. In Bukhara, the Mujaddidis helped engender a new form of sacred kingship where monarchs became active participants in the khanaqahs (Chapter 5). At Peshawar, they mobilized their institutions and scholastic talents to deracinate the puritanical proto-Wahhabi Mujahidin movement that occupied the city in the 1820s, in the process redefining the contours of orthodoxy and heresy (Chapter 6). In Dera Ismail Khan and Ghazni, they merged the high-cultural Persianate tradition with an Afghan tribal saintly network (Chapter 7). In Ferghana, their functions as arch-intermediaries became formalized into a new role of diplomat-saint (Chapter 8). The Peshawar branch of the lineage later took refuge in the highlands to the north, where members became an Afghan saintly tribe, the "Hazaratkhel." As diasporic saints, they were called upon to mediate political disputes in Swat and Malakand (Chapter 9). And in the conclusion, we briefly meet the last active familial descendants, who kept the order afloat in Waziristan amidst the rise of the Taliban and one of the bloodiest wars of the last few decades. <>

SUFI COMMENTARIES ON THE QUR'AN IN CLASSICAL ISLAM edited by Kristin Zahra Sands [Routledge Studies in the Qur'an, Routledge, 9780415366854]

Meeting the ever increasing interest in Islam and Sufism, this book is the first comprehensive study of Sufi Qur'anic commentaries and includes translations of many writings previously unavailable in English. It examines the shared hermeneutical assumptions of Sufi writers and the diversity in style of Sufi commentaries. Some of the assumptions analyzed are:

- the Qur'an is a multi-layered and ambiguous text open to endless interpretation
- the knowledge of deeper meanings of the Qur'an is attainable by means other than transmitted interpretations and rational thought
- the self is dynamic, moving through states and stations which result in different interpretations at different times.

The Classical period of Islam, from the tenth to the fifteenth centuries, was the period in which the most influential commentaries on the Qur'an were written. Sufi Commentaries on the Qur1an in Classical Islam looks at the unique contributions of Sufis to this genre and how these contributions fit into the theological and exegetical discussions of the time.

The study begins with an examination of several key hermeneutical assumptions of Sufis, including their understanding of the ambiguous and multivalent nature of the Qur'anic text, the role that both the intellect and spiritual disciplines play in acquiring knowledge of its meanings, and the ever-changing nature of the self which seeks this kind of knowledge. The second half of the study is an analysis and comparison of the themes and styles of several different commentaries on the Qur'anic story of Musa (Moses) and al-Khadir; the figure of Maryam (The Virgin Mary); and the Light Verse. It demonstrates that, while Sufi interpretation has often been characterized as allegorical, these writings are more notable for their variety of philosophical, visionary, literary, and homiletic styles.

SUFI COMMENTARIES ON THE QUR1AN IN CLASSICAL ISLAM is the first comprehensive study of the contributions of Sufis to the genre of commentaries on the Qur'an and is essential reading for those with research interests in Sufism, Qur'anic exegesis and Islam.

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Review

'This book will serve as an excellent introduction to this genre ... the author deserves congratulations on her great effort.' — *The Muslim World Book Review*

Kristin Zahra Sands' Sufi Commentaries on the Qur'an in Classical Islam is certainly one of these meaningful studies. On account of its clarity, exemplary textual fidelity and sound translations from the Arabic and Persian, this monograph will serve as an effective basis for further inquiries into Sufi Qur'anic exegesis. It is, therefore, a welcome contribution to the growing literature on Islamic mysticism. —
- *Mohammed Rustom, University of Toronto*

'Teachers of Islamic studies in the West will surely welcome the publication of this valuable introduction to the principles and the practice of Sufi commentary on the Qur8:n. The book is well structured, written with clarity and simplicity, and the examples of exegesis presented are illustrative and illuminating. It renders this complex subject accessible to non-specialists and students of Islamic studies, while also providing some interesting insights for those who are already acquainted to some degree with Sufi exegesis' — *Reza Shah-Kazemi, Institute of Ismaili Studies, London, Journal of Islamic Studies 2009*

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The Qur'an, for Muslims, represents the word of God revealed to Muhammad. Its interpretation, then, requires a certain audacity. How can one begin to say what God "meant" by His revelation? How does one balance the praiseworthy desire to understand the meanings of the Qur'an with the realistic fear of reducing it to the merely human and individualistic? Is interpretation an art, a science, an inspired act, or all of the these? Sufi commentators living in the classical time period of Islam from the tenth to the fifteenth centuries answered these questions in their own unique way, based on their assumptions regarding the nature of the Qur'anic text, the sources of knowledge considered necessary for its interpretation, and the nature of the self-seeking this knowledge. The commentaries they wrote are distinct from other types of Qur'anic commentaries both in terms of content, which reflects Sufi ideas and concepts, and the variety of styles ranging from philosophical musings to popular preaching to literary narrative and poetry.

Early Western scholarship on Sufi Qur'anic interpretation focused on the origins of Sufi thought. In his Die Richtungen der islamischen Koranauslegung, Ignaz Goldziher characterized the Sufi approach as eisegesis, the reading of one's own ideas into a text.1 Goldziher firmly believed that Sufi thought is radically different from "original, traditional Islam," finding little basis for their beliefs in the Qur'an. Not surprisingly then, he viewed Sufi Qur'anic commentary as an attempt to reconcile these different belief systems and to justify the Sufi worldview within an Islamic framework through the method of allegoresis. According to Goldziher, the Sufis were influenced in this by Platonic thought which contrasts the world

of appearances with the world of Ideas, just as Sufi exegetes distinguish the exoteric (zahir) from the esoteric (batin) levels of meaning of the Qur'an. Although Sufis insisted that they were uncovering deeper meanings of the Qur'an, Goldziher found them reading ideas into a text essentially alien or even hostile to their system of thought.

The conclusions of Goldziher regarding the sources of Sufi thought were debated by Louis Massignon, who attempted to show through an analysis of early Sufi vocabulary that it was the Qur'an itself, constantly recited, meditated upon, and practiced which was the origin and genuine source for the development of Sufism. Paul Nwyia continued Massignon's research, focusing particularly on the mystical commentary attributed to Ja`far al-Sadiq (d. 765). Nwyia concluded that Ja`far al-Sadiq's commentary was the result of a dialogue between personal, mystic experience, and the text of the Qur'an. The vocabulary found in this commentary marks the beginning of the development of specific Sufi terminology that was not derived from foreign ideas and concepts but rather was created to describe the dialogue originating from and remaining within a Qur'anic context. Both Massignon and Nwyia insisted that the Qur'anic text remains primary for the Sufi; that is to say, the Muslim mystic does not impose his own ideas on the Qur'anic text, but rather discovers ideas in the course of his experiential dialogue with the text.

The term allegoresis used by Goldziher does not adequately convey the complex and varied use of metaphorical language in Sufi Qur'anic commentaries. Studies by such scholars as Henry Corbin, Toshihiko Izutsu and William Chittick on the use of language in other types of Sufi writings have shown the relationship between symbolic and metaphorical language and the concept of imagination, understood not as fantasy, but as an objective reality of the mind and cosmos. In his study of the Dhakha'ir al-a`laq of Ibn `Arabi (d. 1240), Chittick identifies imagination as a concept referring to three different things: a faculty by which humans may obtain knowledge, just as they obtain knowledge from prophetic revelations and rational thought; an intermediate realm between the world of pure spirit and the world of bodies, sometimes called the "world of images" (`alam al-mithal); and something that reflects the nature of the cosmos as a whole. The kind of language and discourse used in Sufi writings may, then, appear to be metaphorical while in fact being descriptive of experience in this intermediate realm, or it may be truly metaphorical since language using imagery is considered to be a better indicator of the nature of reality than abstract, rational thought.

The issue of language is related to the problem of defining the nature and objective of Sufi writings. The possibility that Sufis are merely describing the reality that they see is rejected by those who consider their experiences a form of fantasy and their writings fictive compositions. In an article on the concept of the "world of images" (alam al-mithal) Fazlur Rahman rejects the ontological existence of this realm and therefore criticizes the claim of some Sufis to mystical experience within it; instead of descriptions of theophanies, he sees only an artistic impulse struggling to express itself.

> Once the flood of imagination is let loose, the world of figures goes beyond the specifically religious motivation that historically brought it into existence in the first place and develops into the poetic, the mythical, and the grotesque: it seeks to satisfy the relatively suppressed and starved artistic urge. Much of the contents of the `alam al-mithal [the world of images], as it develops later, has, therefore, nothing to do with religion but indirectly with theater.

Leonard Lewisohn, on the other hand, suggests that reading Sufi literature without accepting the reality of mystical experience results in a distortion of their writings. If one approaches Sufi works from an aesthetic and literary perspective alone, one will see only allegories instead of metaphysical referents which can only be grasped experientially. While the aesthetic and literary element of Sufi writings is undeniable, Lewisohn states that there is no "art for art's sake in Sufi literature."

Hamid Dabashi has looked at the political dynamics behind Persian Sufi poetry, describing its development within the context of a competition for authority among jurists, philosophers, court politicians, and the Sufis. As Sufis began writing poetry, or when poets became Sufis, they became propagandists for their mystical doctrines rather than poets first and foremost, subordinating the artistic impulse to a mystical worldview. Like Lewisohn, he agrees that the artistic impulse is secondary, but describes the phenomenon as an appropriation of art for other purposes. Michael Sells views the interaction between these groups in a different way, as a creative clash of cultures. He suggests that the use of different language contexts by Sufis demonstrates a central aspect of classical Islamic culture, "the interpermeability and interfusion of discursive and cultural worlds." J.C. Bürgel notes the major role that Sufism played in allowing the arts to flourish in the Islamic world and suggests that this is because Sufi theories made acts of creativity "licit magic," while more orthodox Islam criticized and sometimes condemned poetry, representational art and music, seeing in their power an attempt to rival the creativity and power of God.

The objective of this book is to add to these previous discussions by studying the relationship of Sufis to the Qur'an more comprehensively. Understanding the nature of this relationship provides insight into the use of creative composition in other genres adopted by the Sufis as well. Part I of the study concerns Sufi hermeneutics, a word used here to refer to the way in which Sufis described the nature of the Qur'anic text and the types of knowledge and methods needed to understand it. The unique characteristics of Sufi interpretation are further highlighted by means of an analysis of the writings of those who criticized and defended it. Part II begins with a brief overview of the lives and exegetical works of the Sufi commentators studied for this work. Selections from their commentaries on the story of Musa and al-Khadir, the figure of Maryam, and the Light Verse will be presented in order to demonstrate common themes and different compositional styles.

The most basic question addressed in these works, and the question from which all other questions are derived, is how to best approach the Qur'an in order to discover its richness and transforming possibilities. It is a question asked directly in the hermeneutical writings and addressed indirectly in the commentaries themselves. Because interpretation is seen as an unending process which will be different for each individual, Sufi interpretations are more suggestive than declarative; they are "allusions" (isharat) rather than explanations (tafasir), to use the Arabic terms. They therefore indicate possibilities as much as they demonstrate the insights of each writer. The concept of imagination which plays such a prominent role in Ibn 'Arabi's thought is less pronounced in the writings studied here. There is instead an emphasis on the connection between knowledge granted directly from God ('ilm laduni) and the ethics and spiritual practice of the individuals seeking this knowledge. The language and type of discourse chosen to express this knowledge varies with the different commentators, and demonstrates the individuality of each. The interplay of language worlds and discourses in classical Islam which Sells notes is very much apparent here; many of these commentaries can only be understood within the context of discussions occurring within other areas of Islamic thought.

The role of creativity in these writings is not a question that is addressed, probably because the self is not viewed as the origin of this knowledge. This is not to say, however, that the writers studied here are unaware of issues of style and composition. On the contrary, these aesthetic matters are considered important because the primary function of these works is didactic. The question of creativity is addressed somewhat indirectly through the justifications made for the highly individualistic nature of these interpretations, especially in the apologetic writings of Abu Hamid al-Ghazali (d. 1111).

Much of the subject matter in this book could be productively compared to studies on the interpretation of books considered sacred in other traditions as well as contemporary hermeneutical and literary theories on reading texts. I have, however, deliberately avoided making these comparisons in order to keep the focus on the complexity of the classical Islamic and Sufi discussions on Qur'anic interpretation. Western scholarship has only just begun to scratch the surface of the vast literature included within the genre of Qur'anic commentary; this study represents only a small contribution towards what will hopefully be a greater appreciation of the enormous variety of Islamic thought.

A word should be said about the use of the terms Sufi and Sufism throughout this work. As Carl Ernst has pointed out, the Arabic equivalents to these words are terms used relatively infrequently in the writings we now label as Sufi. When they are used in classical works, it is in a prescriptive rather this descriptive sense. In the works studied here, the authors do not refer to themselves as Sufis but rather as "the people of allusion and understanding" (ahl al-ishara wa'l-fahm), "the people of meanings" (ahl al-ma2ani), "the people of love" (ahl al-2ishq), "gnostics" (2arifun), "verifiers" (muhaqqiqun), and "the people of states" (ahl al-mawajid), to give just a few examples. However, despite the different terminology and writing styles employed, these works share common hermeneutical assumptions and elements. The use of unifying terms to describe their approach, then, seems appropriate and the words "Sufi" and "Sufism" are the logical choice in English, despite the problems outlined by Ernst.

The translations in this work are my own unless otherwise noted. I have benefited greatly from the work of previous translators and the choice to use my own translation in many places is due to a concern for consistency in terminology rather than a criticism of the translations of my predecessors. The translations of the Qur'an have been made after consulting the translations of Arberry, Ali, and Asad. I have taken the liberty of omitting the frequent phrases of blessings that occur in these texts for the sake of brevity and clarity. The transliteration system used is that of The Encyclopedia of Islam with the exception of j for jim and q for qaf. <>

THE SECOND CANONIZATION OF THE QUR'ĀN (324/936): IBN MUJĀHID AND THE FOUNDING OF THE SEVEN READINGS by Shady Hekmat Nasser [Brill, 9789044401976]

In **THE SECOND CANONIZATION OF THE QUR'ĀN,** Nasser studies the transmission and reception of the Qur'ānic text and its variant readings through the work of Ibn Mujāhid (d. 324/936), the founder of the system of the Seven Eponymous Readings of the Qur'ān. The overarching project aims to track and study the scrupulous revisions the Qur'ān underwent, in its recited, oral form,

through the 1,400-year journey towards a final, static, and systematized text.
For the very first time, the book offers a complete and detailed documentation of all the variant readings of the Qurʾān as recorded by Ibn Mujāhid. A comprehensive audio recording accompanies the book, with more than 3,500 audio files of Qurʾānic recitations of variant readings.

CONTENTS

This book builds on the research I have been conducting on Qirã'ãt in the past few years, both in my first monograph and the group of articles I have published on the subject so far. The book is not dependent on these studies; however, it requires an advanced knowledge of the Qur'ãn and Qirã'ãt, since several introductory notions, concepts, historical narratives that were already discussed in detail elsewhere will not be reintroduced. Thus, no recapitulations or summaries will be given on the narratives of the collection and codification of the Qur'ãn, the 'seven a'ruf' tradition, the concept of shudhüdh (irregular and anomalous readings), tawãtur, or the biography of Ibn Mujãhid and his Seven Eponymous Readers. Since 2013, several publications relevant to Qirã'ãt have appeared, but they were not directly related to the study of Qirã'ãt and its transmission. Nonetheless, I will be referring to these studies when necessary, particularly those by Mustafa Shah, Yasin Dutton, Alain George, Devin Stewart, Omar Hamdan and other studies related to codices and codicology such as those by Alba Fedeli, François Déroche, Nicolai Sinai and Asma Hilali. I will not recapitulate the state-of-the-art scholarship on the subject, which I have already accounted for in my earlier work, and which has been further complemented by the works of other scholars I reference and cite.

The book is divided into an introductory chapter followed by four main chapters. The first chapter will present the main arguments of the book and its contribution to Qur'ãnic studies in general and to the Qirã'ãt discipline in specific. The concept of the Second Canonization will be explained vis-à-vis the new chronology I am proposing for the standardization of the Qur'ãnic text. The chapter will also introduce key concepts in Qirã'ãt terminology utilized by Ibn Mujãhid, important acronyms, and a detailed explanation of the transliteration system I am using throughout the book.

Chapter Two will discuss the concept of shawãdhdh al-sab`a, i.e., the non-canonical readings of the canonical Readings. Building on previous scholarship, the chapter will analyze in detail the chains of transmission of important Qur'ãn transmitters in Ibn Mujãhid's Kitãb al-Sab`a and account for the rise of the irregular readings in the Qirã'ãt tradition. The second part of the chapter will study in further detail

sixty-six transmission errors documented and recorded by Ibn Mujãhid. The chapter concludes by proposing a framework within which Qirã'ãt scholars operated to determine the validity and falsity of Qur'ãnic variants, as well as the criteria they might have considered for endorsing certain Qur'ãn transmitters as representatives of a particular Eponymous Reading.

Chapter Three is a comparative study of the mechanisms of transmission in both Qirã'ãt and hadïth. The criteria of accepting hadïth as sound and valid will be compared to the criteria of deeming a Qur'ãnic reading to be authentic and acceptable among the community of the Qurrã'. The conditions of jar^ and ta`dïl (cross examination) of transmitters will be explored in hadïth literature, after which the same criteria will be applied to Qirã'ãt transmission. The chapter concludes with important observations concerning the distinct natures of both disciplines, and how applying the rules of jari and ta`dïl to Qur'ãn transmitters produced different results from those of hadïth. Additionally, the later interference of hadïth methodol dld t e

recited, oral form through its 1,400-year journey towards a final, static, and systematized text. While scholarship on the stabilization of the Qur'ānic text is more attentive to its textual tradition, i.e. the mafā'if (codices) literature, paleography and codicology of early Qur'ānic manuscripts, my work is more concerned with understanding the process of the stabilization of the oral Qur'ān, the recited scripture. I argue that this oral Qur'ān developed and evolved at particular junctures in time; it was never a static corpus that remained unchanged since its revelation and inception. While many scholars, particularly in the West, believe that the Qur'ān (like any other scripture) did undergo changes during its canonization as a liturgical text, my research addresses the mechanisms of this canonization process in its oral form, looking at this gradual process of systematization through the lens of the variant readings of the Qur'ān. In the following pages, I would like to clarify certain concepts and flesh out some key ideas particular to the discipline of Qirā'āt, which I believe are essential for understanding what I mean by editing, canonization, and stabilization.

Currently, there is no reason or evidence to suggest that the Qur'ān underwent intentional textual changes as far as word manipulation, additions, or omissions are concerned. Since its codification in the regional codices, the Qur'ān seems to have been a "closed text", as Fred Donner has convincingly argued.

The question of whether this first canonization/codification process of the Qur'ān arranged, edited, or manipulated the text contrary to the original revelation that the Prophet received is currently unanswerable, considering the limited resources and poor documentation we have on this formative and critical period of Islam. As for the process of editing to which I believe the Qur'ān was subjected, it was an oral process of correcting and standardizing the defective script of the early codices through the discipline of Qirā'āt (i.e., the variant readings of the Qur'ān). Qirā'āt in general, and the sophisticated rules of tajwīd (recitation) in particular, were the tools Qur'ān readers and grammarians used to standardize and stabilize the Qur'ānic text. Standardizing the Qur'ān meant editing it, that is, correcting its substandard usages, eliminating its irregularities, and preparing it for public recitation. Thus, at a fundamental level, my treatment of the development of Qirā'āt literature builds on the idea that it was a process of editing and standardizing.

The premise of this project is to look at Qirā'āt from a new and different perspective. The arguments concerning the genesis of Qirā'āt in modern scholarship tend to focus on the "why ", that is, the reason(s) behind the emergence of the variant readings. While I find most of these arguments to be compelling and collectively true, my approach focuses on the "how ": the mechanisms through which variants emerged and were transmitted, which, if investigated thoroughly, may one day allow us to accurately answer the "why"-question. Variants did indeed emerge because of the 'defective' consonantal outline of the early codices, which caused confusion amongst Muslims and opened the door for multiple readings of the same word. Variants also emerged due to faulty memory and intentional manipulation of the voweling of the text to serve legal and theological arguments. Moreover, the Prophet did acknowledge different variant readings during his lifetime and accepted multiple readings of the same verse. All these factors together contributed to the emergence of the variant readings. However, what I hope to achieve in this study is to show the process through which the variant readings emerged and to account for the slow, subtle changes the Qur'ānic text underwent over a long period of time. The main theme of this study is that of the slow evolution of the Qur'ān; it did not change abruptly nor were there immediate steps of systematization that took place overnight. In other words, the

stabilization of the Qur'ãnic text was a collective, communal process that took place over decades and with multiple generations of scholars, rather than being conceived of as the final product of one individual or a few committee members who decreed and shaped its current form.

Connected with this theme and approach to Qirã'ãt are several arguments I am making in this book, the first of which is to dismantle the imaginary construct of the static, uniform, and single-authored Eponymous Readings and their two canonical Riwãyas. I will argue that this construct—namely, a well-defined Eponymous Reading transmitted through two Rãwïs, such as that of Warsh `an Nãfi` or lafti `an `Ãlim—was retroactively developed in order to suppress the extent of the variants, unify the Eponymous Readings as much as possible, and create the illusion of an ideal, unadulterated transmission of the Qur'ãn between the Prophet and the Eponymous Readers. I argue that there was no single, well-defined System-Reading by `Ãlim nor any of the Eponymous Readers, but that there existed multiple versions and renditions which were simultaneously circulating amongst the community of the Qurrã'. Similarly, there was no single, well-defined Riwãya or rendition transmitted by rafi on behalf of his master `Ãlim, but rather multiple versions of his rendition, all nevertheless attributed to him. What we today call the Reading of rafi `an `Ãlim is but one variety among many that rafi transmitted. The variety which survives today was selected from among different versions and became the Canonical Riwãya representative of rafi. Thus, neither `Ãlim nor rafi, and neither Nãfi` nor Warsh, recited and transmitted one version of their System-Readings.

The second argument I make concerns the concept of shawãdhdh and irregularity, an argument I made in my earlier study on the Seven Readings that is further developed here and supported by an extensive corpus of examples. Shawãdhdh was not confined to variant readings that diverged from the consonantal `Uthmãnic outline. Shawãdhdh pertained to the readings which diverged from the consensus of the collective community. That community was the elite Qur'ãn readers and grammarians who held the principal agency in rendering and shaping the Qur'ãnic text, which they then disseminated to the larger Muslim community. Indeed, a huge corpus of shawãdhdh readings can be traced back to the Eponymous Readers themselves. These anomalous readings coexisted with the Canonical readings; both corpuses were soundly attributed to the same source, the Eponymous Readers.

The third argument I make concerns a re-examination of the notion of the "oral" transmission of Qirã'ãt. Orality is, and has always been, emphasized as the dominant feature of transmission in Islamic literature. Furthermore, the oral transmission of the Qur'ãn became part of the Muslims' belief in the integrity of the text, where early Muslims reportedly relied only on their memory to transmit the Eponymous Readings, which were collectively taught by the Prophet down to their smallest detail.3 Orality has been a topic of discussion in both Western and Muslim literatures. While the former is mostly skeptical of the efficiency of oral transmission and its supposedly fantastic accuracy, the latter often emphasizes the superiority of oral over written transmission. I am not postulating a new hypothesis concerning oral as against written transmission in early Islamic literature, but I will introduce a new element to the discussion as far as Qirã'ãt is concerned. I will argue that the transmission of Qirã'ãt was from very early on heavily dependent on written transmission, such as notebooks, letters, and personal codices, which the community of the Qurrã' relied on as early as the late 1st/7th century to transmit, teach, edit, re-edit, and document the variant readings of the Qur'ãn. Indeed, a sizeable corpus of Qirã'ãt was transmitted only through written means, and the oral corroboration of these transmissions was applied retroactively. The early Qurrã' and Qur'ãn scholars used writing to transmit

and authorize Qur'ãnic readings. Ibn Mujãhid relied heavily on such written means in his book, where he documented many readings that he had no access to except through written communications.

Another contribution this book will offer is an in-depth study of the variant readings alongside the transmitters who were responsible for disseminating them. One will be able to get a closer look at how these transmitters (the Qurrã') interacted with the Qur'ãnic text and how they communicated with each other. Modern scholars in Qur'ãnic studies may be familiar with the names of `Ãlim, Nãfi`, Warsh, and rafi—and perhaps Abü `Amr b. al-`Alã' and al-Kisã'ï as philologists rather than Qur'ãn Readers. However, many scholars are less familiar with names such as Qãlün, Qunbul, al-Dürï, Khallãd, al-Süsï, and Sulaym. Likewise, only those who are specialists in the field of Qirã'ãt may recognize figures such al-hulwãnï, `Alï b. Nasr, al-Qawwãs, Hubayra, `Amr b. al-'abbãi, and many other crucial figures in the history of Qirã'ãt transmission. While I do not give biographical information on all these individuals, I will provide a table in the appendices of most Qur'ãn transmitters mentioned by Ibn Mujãhid, alongside their death dates, geographical affiliation, and the main biographical sources in which they could be identified.

In addition to the close study of the transmitters of Qirã'ãt, I will compare the dual mechanisms of transmitting hhadith and Qur'ãn. I will investigate the rules of cross examination of transmitters in the discipline of Qirãlãt, and how later hadïth scholars evaluated Qur'ãn transmitters by using the tools of hadïth criticism, particularly through the lens of `adãla (probity) and dab (scrupulousness/accuracy). The dichotomy between the collective transmission of the Qur'ãn by the umma versus the single sound chains of transmission of hadith by a select group of muhaddithün (hadïth transmitters) will be accounted for and discussed in detail.

Finally, the book will offer a comprehensive and detailed documentation of all the variant readings of the Qur'ãn as recorded by Ibn Mujãhid. First, the principles of Qur'ãnic Reading (ufül) of each Eponymous Reader will be laid out in detail. These principles of recitation offer a rich depository of linguistic and phonetic data, the diversity of which corroborates scholarly arguments concerning the development and normalization of the Arabic language (al-`arabiyya), a process which was manifest in the slow evolution of the Eponymous Readings. Those Readings passed through several experimental phases over hundreds of years, with the ultimate objective of standardizing and systematizing the performed aspect of the Qur'ãnic scripture. The second part of my data constitutes a comprehensive record of the individual variants (farsh) of the Qur'ãn. The transmitters of each variant will be listed in detail and comprehensive audio recordings will accompany this data. More than 5,000 audio files of Qur'ãnic citations from both the ufül and farsh will accompany this book. I encourage the reader to consult this audio material in order to get a better grasp of how variants are pronounced and articulated. Most of the audio material is taken from official recordings of professional Qur'ãn reciters. I have personally recorded the variant readings for which I was unable to find audio files, or those which fall under the category of shawãdhdh and are no longer recited liturgically. I will not utilize any mode of recitation in order to avoid the impression that these variants currently hold any kind of canonical status. <>

A Qurʾān Commentary by Ibn Barrajān of Seville (d. 536/1141): Īḍāḥ al-ḥikma bi-aḥkām al-ʿibra (Wisdom Deciphered, the Unseen Discovered) edition by Gerhard Böwering and Yousef Casewit [Series: Texts and Studies on the Qurʾān, Brill, 9789004295384] Introduction: English; Text Arabic. Not translated.

A Qurʾān Commentary by Ibn Barrajān of Seville (d. 536/1141) is a critical Arabic text edition of a medieval Muslim Qurʾān commentary entitled, *Īḍāḥ al-ḥikma bi-aḥkām al-ʿibra* (*Wisdom Deciphered, the Unseen Discovered*). The annotated Arabic text is accompanied by an analytical introduction and an extensive subject index.

This Qurʾān commentary is Ibn Barrajān's last and most esoteric work, and as such offers the most explicit articulation of his mystical and philosophical doctrines. It synthesizes his teachings, drawn from a wide array of Islamic disciplines, and provides a link between early Sufism and Muslim mysticism in medieval Spain (Andalusia). The *Īḍāḥ* moreover is the earliest known work of its kind to make extensive use of Arabic Biblical material as proof texts for Qurʾānic doctrines.

The *Īḍāḥ* is an important reference work of interest to scholars of Sufism, Muslim-Christian dialogue in medieval Spain, Qur'ānic exegesis and Islamic tradition (ḥadīth), Islamic intellectual history and astrology (including "the science of letters"), as well as studies on the work of Ibn al-ʿArabī (d. 638/1240).

Ibn Barrajān: His Life and Work

Al-Andalus in the Time of Ibn Barrajān

The author of the present Arabic text edition of Ïhāh al-Hikma bi-ahkām al-Iibra is Abu l-hakam `Abd al-Salām b. `Abd al-Rahmān b. Abi l-Rijāl Muammad b. `Abd al-Rahmān al-Lakhmï al-Ifrïqï al-Ishbïlï (d. 536/1141).1 He was known to his contemporaries as Ibn Barrajān and is often referred to by this name in the Arabic historical and biographical literature. He is also cited by his agnomen (kunya) Abu l-hakam, and listed under his proper name (ism) `Abd al-Salām. Born most likely in North Africa (Ifrïqiyā), in the area known today as Tunisia and northeastern Algeria, he spent his active life in the region of Andalusia (al-Andalus) in the southern half of the Iberian Peninsula, and died in the city of Marrakesh (Marrākush) in Morocco (al-Maghrib). He was probably born between 450/1058 and 455/1063, and died in 536/1141. Throughout most of his career he lived as a prominent Muslim scholar in Seville (Ishbïliya) and its surroundings.

The three names that describe the origins (nisba) of Ibn Barrajān refer to his affiliation with the Arab tribe of the Banü Lakhm (al-Lakhmï), the region of his birth or ancestry in North Africa (al-Ifrïqï), and the center of his scholarly activity in Seville (al-Ishbïlï). The Arab tribe of the Banü Lakhm, who together with the Banü Judhām had their nomadic origins in Yemen, migrated in pre-Islamic times to settle at the northeastern fringes of the Arabian Peninsula bordering Syria. The Banü Lakhm enjoyed an illustrious history from before the rise of Islam and came into prominence as the Lakhmid dynasty that adopted Nestorian Christianity and made al-hïra their capital for three centuries from ca. 300–600 C.E. Forming a semi-independent buffer state, the Lakhmids protected the civilization of the Sassanid Empire of Iran against incursions of Arab nomads from the desert into the Fertile Crescent. The inhabitants of the Lakhmid principality and its tribesmen of the Banü Lakhm were eventually integrated into the Islamic Empire during the Muslim conquests and the subsequent Muslim rule over the area. There is hardly any information about the history of their conversion to Islam. The 6th/12th – century historian Sam`ānï, however, mentions a number of Lakhmid Muslim scholars whose families had settled in Küfa and became well-known teachers first in Baghdad during early `Abbāsid times, and then in Egypt and Syria. To the best of our knowledge, there is no precise record about the time and circumstances when members of the Banü Lakhm tribe migrated to Ifrïqiyā and later settled in Andalusia.

The name of the Banü Lakhm reappeared in Islamic history during the period of the Reyes de Taifas ("Petty Kingdoms," mulük al-hawā'if) in 5th/11th century Spain after the break-up of the Umayyad Caliphate. The Banü `Abbād, a local dynasty of Arab tribesmen, established an independent regional principality over Seville and its adjacent territories beginning with the rule of Muhammad b. `Abbād from 414/1013 onward. They became known as the `Abbādids, claiming socio-political prestige by virtue of their descent from the Banü Lakhm. The cohesive and centralized polity founded by Ibn `Abbād enjoyed an agrarian economy that gradually surpassed the maritime economies of the coastal cities. Under the reign of Abü `Amr `Abbād b. Muhammad (r. 433/1042–460/1069), who took the honorific title of al-Mu`tahid bi-llāh ("The Divinely Assisted One"), the `Abbādids extended their rule over many of the adjacent villages and neighboring towns of Seville. They even came close to annexing all of southwest Andalusia, attracting scores of scholars and immigrants from both the northern regions of the Peninsula as well as North Africa, including our own author's grandfather.

The heir of al-Mu`tahid bi-llãh, Muhammad b. `Abbãd (r. 461/1069 – 484/1091), took the honorific title al-Mu`tamid ("The Reliant Upon God"). He had to cope with the advance of the Spanish Reconquista that achieved a decisive victory with the capture of Toledo in 478/1085. To counter the Christian attacks, al-Mu`tamid appealed to Yüsuf b. Tãshufin for Muslim assistance. The latter was the leader of the Almoravids (al-Murãbihün), a hanhãja Berber dynasty that had established rule over North Africa, founding their capital at Marrakesh in 454/1062. Yüsuf b. Tãshufin (r. 453/1061–500/1106) crossed the Straits of Gibraltar and achieved a decisive victory at Zallãqa in 479/1086 over the Christian king, Alfonso VI of Leon and Castille. In following up this victory, the emir pushed aside almost all of the Reyes de Taifa and established Berber rule over most of Muslim Spain, finally taking Seville and dispossessing al-Mu`tamid of his kingdom in 484/1091. Almoravid rule over North Africa and Spain continued until 541/1147, when the dynasty of the Almohads (al-Muwahuidün), founded by Ibn Tümart (d. 524/1130), captured Marrakesh. Almohad forces crossed over into Spain under `Abd al-Mu 'min (r. 524/1130–558/1163), who established Seville as their local capital. During Ibn Barrajãn's early years, the city of Seville experienced a period of political and cultural prosperity under the `Abbãdids. This was followed by many changes provoked by the influx of Berbers under Almoravid rule over the city that lasted for 55 years. The larger part of Ibn Barrajãn's active life and scholarly career at Seville, however, fell into the time of Almoravid rule; a period in which this city rose to become one of the main centers of Islamic culture in Spain. ***

The Principal Works of Ibn Barrajãn

Over the course of his long and prolific career, Ibn Barrajãn authored four sizeable works in the following order: (1) the aforementioned Al-Irshãd ilã subul al-rashãd, devoted to hadïth-Qur'ãn concordance but now surviving only in fragments in Zarkashï's Burhãn; (2) Shari asmã ' Allãh al-husnã, a monumental commentary on the divine names which has been printed twice;89 (3) Tanbïh al-afhãm ilã tadabbur al-kitãb al-hakïm wa-ta`arruf al-ãyãt wa-l-naba ' al-`alïm, his major Qur'ãn commentary which has also been printed twice; (4) the fourth, Ïhãh al-'ikma bi-ahkãm al-hibra, is his minor Qur'ãn commentary and the subject of the present text edition based on two witnesses. Ibn Barrajãn possibly even authored a fifth minor work, entitled 'Ayn al-yaqïn, which Ibn Khaldün attributes to him. Since ^Ayn al-yaqïn left neither a trace in the Islamic historical nor the biographical literature, it is possible that it represents a parallel title to Ibn Barrajãn's last work, the Ïhãh.

To establish the sequence in which Ibn Barrajãn compiled his major works, three sources of information have to be considered. First, the references that Ibn Barrajãn offfers in his own writings; then additional marginal data available in the manuscripts; and finally the occasional references found in the Arabic biographical sources. All three factors contribute to establish the following l'hijrm and solid chronological sequence of composition: (1) al-Irshãd ilã subul al-rashãd, (2) Sharh asmã' Allãh al-husnã, (3) Tanbïh al-afhãm, and (4) Ïhãh al-hikma. The chronological sequence and authenticity of the Irshãd is confirmed by three of his own references to the work in Sharh asmã' Allãh al-husnã with its full title, stating each time that he had discussed the point under consideration in his earlier book. Furthermore, in his Tanbïh al-afhãm, commenting on Q 10:38, Ibn Barrajãn refers to a passage in his Kitãb al-Irshãd to shore up his argument. We have found no explicit reference to the Irshãd, however, in Ïfãi al-hikma probably on account of the fact that so many years had already passed by since he had authored his first work. On the other hand, Ibn Barrajãn refers frequently to the Shar^ asmã' Allãh al-^usnã in his Tanbïh

al-afhãm94 and does so six times also in his Ïhãh al-hikma. Twice in Ïhãh al-hikma he makes an explicit reference to Tanbïh al-afhãm.

Our determination of the sequence of Ibn Barrajãn's writings is confirmed not only by the author's internal references, but also in a marginal note added to the first folio of MS Çarullah 53m (f. 1a) which is a manuscript of Tanbïh al-afhãm. In a brief remark, we were heartened to note that the 8th/15th century Ottoman scholar Çarullãh observes correctly,

> Abu l-hakam compiled first, Kitãb al-Irshãd, second, Shari asmã' Allãh al-husnã, and third, his Tafsïr al-Qur'ãn.

Çarullah makes no mention of the Ïiãi and was probably unaware of it since this late work, which obviously is not cited in any of his early works, was almost completely eclipsed by the Tanbïh and has not left a trace in the works of Islamic biography and bibliography aside from references in some of Ibn 'Arabï's own works. Like Çarullah, Ismail Pasa Bagdatli also cites only three works of Ibn Barrajãn in his Hadïyat al-^ãrifïn, namely: 1) al-Irshãd fi Tafsïr al-Qur'ãn (a reference to the Tanbïh), 2) Shar^ asmã' Allãh al-^usnã, and 3) Kitãb al-Irshãd (a reference to the qur^ãn-^adïth concordance al-Irshãd ilã subul al-rashãd). He does not pay attention, however, to the chronological sequence of their composition. Moreover, Bagdatli's confusion of Ibn Barrajãn's titles is a common mistake shared by medieval biographical literature as well as modern secondary studies of our author.

In what follows, we shall briefly describe the contents of the Shar^ and Tanbïh, list their manuscripts, then turn to a detailed description and analysis of the Ï^ã^ and its manuscripts:

Sharh asmã ' Allãh al-^usnã is also known under the title, Shar^ ma`ãnï al-asmã ' al-^usnã and has survived in many manuscripts. In it Ibn Barrajãn presents a disquisition of over one hundred and thirty beautiful divine names, discussing them one by one. The Sharh features a tripartite treatment of the divine names. In efffect, it amounts to three separate levels of commentary on the divine names, since each name receives three distinct commentaries (fu^ül). The f^ijrst is a philological examination (istikhrãj lughawï), the second is doctrinal, focused on the "crossover" into the traces of each divine name in the cosmos (i`tibãr), and the third is devotional and admonitory advice in light of any given divine name (ta`abbud). This tripartite organizational pattern informs the structure of his two Qur^ãn commentaries as well, which are divided under similar headings. This contemplative crossover (`ibra) represents the crux and central concern of Ibn Barrajãn in the Sharh as in his later works, and herein lies its originality, for it represents an attempt at grafting Ibn Masarra's concept of `ibra onto the Sharh al-asmã ' genre.100

Tanbïh al-afhãm ilã tadabbur al-kitãb al-hakïm wa-ta`arruf al-ãyãt wa l-naba ' al-`alïm. In the manuscript tradition, this title of the work is rarely recorded and in its place one finds various other titles, such as Tafsïr al-Qur'ãn li-Ibn Barrajãn, Kitãb al-Irshãd fi Tafsïr al-Qur'ãn, Tafsïr 'Abd al-Salãm al-musammã bi-l-Irshãd, or al-Irshãd fi Tafsïr al-Qur'ãn. It can also be observed that the title Tanbïh al-afhãm cannot be found in the Islamic biographical literature that prefers to refer to this Qur'an commentary as Ibn Barrajãn's Tafsïr al-Qur'ãn, frequently attaching to it the title of al-Irshãd. Fortunately, many manuscripts have survived, including the Konya MS Yusuf Aga 4744–6 which was copied from the original (aml).

The Tanbïh is a running commentary on qur'ãnic verses taken up in the order of the suras from the first to the last. It gained lasting fame primarily on account of a passage in which Ibn Barrajãn accurately prognosticates the Muslim recapture of Jerusalem from the Crusaders in 583/1187 based on an

astrological analysis of the opening verses of sura 30 (Rüm). The Tanbïh, which continued to be recopied for over six centuries until at least 1129/1716, had already assumed a legendary quality in the eyes of scholars of the 6th/12th century. For instance, the contemporaneous Egyptian belles-letterist ‘Abd al-Rahmãn b. al-Nãjir al-Sadïd (d. 537/1142) held that one could predict events up to the day of resurrection with an accurate comprehension of Ibn Barrajãn’s tafsïr. Ibn Barrajãn’s prediction, for which the Tanbïh became famous throughout the Islamic world, receives a supplementary treatment in the Ïmãi. This supplementary passage in the does not add essential elements to the prediction. The prediction, moreover, is recorded and summarized by a second hand along the margins of our MS. Murad Molla. We have included these marginal notes lifted from the Tanbïh in appendix form. Given the fame of this prophecy, it is worth a very brief discussion. It should be stressed at the outset, however, that there is a need for a better understanding of Ibn Barrajãn’s cosmological concepts in order to appreciate this prediction. Specifically, these include the “cycles of decree” (dawã hir al-taqdïr), the significance of numbers six and seven -all of which fall outside the scope of an introduction. That said, his prognostication is based on an analysis of the qur'ãnic passage 30:2–4, which has two distinct readings. The majority version reads as follows: The Byzantines were defeated (ghulibat) in the lands close-by; and they, after their defeat shall win within a few years. Most scholars understand this passage to have been revealed in Mecca after the defeat of the Byzantines in 614 to the Sassanians, and to foretell of the forthcoming Byzantine victory over their Persian enemies in a few (binn = 3–9) years. In efffect, in the spring of 622 the Byzantines subjugated the Sassanians at the Battle of Issus, then decisively at Nineveh in 627.

The alternative vocalization reads: The Byzantines have won (ghalabat) in the lands close-by; and they, after their victory shall lose within a few years. Those who ascribe to this variant reading hold that the verse was revealed at the battle of Badr in year 624 after the Muslims were heartened by the news that their fellow “People of the Book,” the Byzantine Christians, defeated the Sassanians at Battle of Issus in 624, which was followed by their decisive victory at Nineveh in 627. According to this reading, the Qur'ãn foreshadows `Umar b. al-Khamnãb’s (r. 13–23/634–44) conquest of the Byzantine-controlled towns in Syro-Palestine at the Battle of Yarmük in 636, that is, 9–12 years after the revelation. Ibn Barrajãn gives equal weight to both variants, and proclaims that the passage foretells not only of `Umar’s conquests, but of a second Muslim victory that was yet to come. Equating each of the annual units of within a few years with 1000 lunar months (based on the qur'ãnic expression alf shahr, cf. Q 97:3), he reckons roughly that Muslims shall win within “a few thousand lunar months” of the revealed date of the verse. Writing in the year 522 AH, he prophesizes that the tables would turn in favor of the Muslims when the grand cycle of 7000 lunar months would come to a close, that is, roughly around year 583 and a third, or 1st: of Jumãdã I, 583/ July 1187. This prediction gained instant fame after Saladin’s reconquest of Jerusalem, and has been held up as a prime example of Sufi epistemological claims as well as the doctrine of qur'ãnic inimitability (irjãz). Later scholars, however, accepting Ibn ‘Arabi’s hindsight analysis of Ibn Barrajãn’s teachings at face value, took the Jerusalem prophecy to be representative not of Ibn Barrajãn’s astrological prognostication but a jurüf calculation.

Astrological predictions and letterist manipulations of the cosmos are secondary to the Tanbïh as a whole. Ibn Barrajãn’s overarching concern is to demonstrate the inherent complementarity of divine revelation and natural symbols (ãyãt Allãh), and secondly to show how a total immersion in these two modes of divine self-disclosure can generate a concrete awareness of God’s presence in this life. In

addition, it is in the Tanbïh, with its pronounced emphasis on variant qur'ãnic readings (qirã ‘ãt), philological, poetical, theological, and sometimes legal or even medical material, that Ibn Barrajãn proves himself to his readers as a “professional scholar” with a mastery of the traditional exoteric sciences. Thus on the one hand, the Tanbïh is known for being an occult tafsïr; on the other, it was intended as Ibn Barrajãn’s most active engagement with formal qur'ãnic sciences and the broader Sunnï exegetical tradition.

The Ïhãh al-Hikma bi-ahkãm al-Iibra

This work presents Ibn Barrajãn’s highly personal interpretation on select verses of the Qur'ãn. Because it is the subject of the present edition, we shall discuss it at length in what follows. It is extant in two manuscripts, one copied in two parts and bound in two separate codices and the other consisting of one codex. Its full title is cited by both manuscripts as Ïhãh al-Hikma bi-ahkãm al-Iibra, although Murat Molla adds fï ma`ãnï al-qur 'ãn al-`azïz which was probably a later scribal addition.

MS Mahmut Pasa 3 has 275 folios and includes the first part (al-juz ' al-awwal) of the Qur'an commentary, from the beginning to sura 19 (Maryam) inclusively. It is in excellent condition, without any physical damage, and bound in a leather binding. The manuscript was copied in Sha’bãn, 596 h (= May, 1200 C.E.) and is written in regular and clear naskhï, with 21 lines per page. It places diacritical points only where absolutely necessary and lacks any vocalization. It includes neither marginal notes nor glosses and shows no signs of collation in its margins. The qur'ãnic verses are fully integrated into the text without appearing in red ink, while the sura headings are written in bold strokes. The title page (f. 1a) presents the codex as the first part (al-juz ' al-awwal) of Kitãb al-Ïmãh f’ij l-tafsïr. It identifies the author as “Abu l-^akam...” whose name a second hand has erased and replaced with “al-Qushayrï.” Another second hand, however, recorded the full title of the book on the title page as Ï^ã^ al-hikma bi-a^kãm al-`ibra, attributing it to Abu l-^akam ^Abd al-Salãm, Ibn Barrajãn. The full title is repeated in the colophon (f. 275a), which cites the exact date of copying and indicates that the second volume (al-juz ' al-thãnï) is to follow. The name of the copyist, however, is not recorded and the colophon ends with a praise of God and a eulogy of the Prophet. to the end of the text, continuing the f^ijrst part seamlessly. It is in excellent condition without any physical damage and bound in a leather binding. Written in the same regular and clear naskhi, with 21 lines per page, it has been copied in the handwriting of the same copyist as MS Mahmut Pa§sa 3. It places diacritical points only where necessary and lacks any vocalization. It includes neither marginal notes nor glosses and shows no signs of collation in its margins. The qur'ãnic verses are fully integrated into the text without appearing in red ink, while the sura headings are written in bold strokes. The title page (f. 1a) cites it as the second volume (al-juz ^ al-thãnï) of K. al-Ï^ã^ f^ij l-tafsïr and identif^ijes the author as “Abu l-^akam...” whose name a second hand has again erased and replaced with “al-Qushayri.” A third hand, however, recorded the full title of the book on the title page as Ï^ã^ al-^ikma bi-a^kãm al-^ibra, attributing it to Abu l-^akam `Abd al-Salãm, Ibn Barrajãn. No date is recorded in its colophon (f. 262b), which includes no information on the copyist and simply ends with a praise of God and a eulogy of the Prophet.

MS Mahmut Pa§sa 3 (f. 375b) and MS Mahmut Pa§sa 4 (f. 262b) include an identical note about the ownership of the manuscript when, in a legal transaction, it passed into the hands of Abu l-^asan `Ali al-Muqri ' (al-Maqqari?) al-Mu 'addib, known as Ibn al-Banhãwi, on the f^ijrst Monday in the month of Safar, 688 (= January, 1289). The seller’s name was Najm al-Din Ibn al-`Anbari al-Wã`i^ known as Mu^ammad al-Maghribi al-Asmar al-Dallãl in the book-sellers/Kutubiyin market (süq al-kutubïyïn). The name of the

town in which this book market was located is not recorded. However, the note of purchase is not written in Maghribi script, which suggests that the transaction took place not in Marrakesh around the Kutubiyya, but in another major center of learning such as Cairo. Moreover, it is noteworthy that the Ï^ã^ reached Tunis at least by 590/1194 where it was studied by the young Ibn `Arabi under Mahdawi's direction. This means that MS Mahmut Pa§sa 3–4 was copied later than Ibn `Arabi's study of the text. Since Ibn `Arabi studied the Ï^ã^ from an earlier copy in Tunis (possibly the archetype), the copying of MS Mahmut Pa§sa 3 in 596/1200 seems more likely to have occurred in Cairo's süq al-kutubïyïn. This would explain why neither the MS nor the transaction note were copied by a Maghribi hand.

MS Murat Molla 35 has 306 folios and includes the complete text of the Qur'ãn commentary. It is in excellent condition, without any physical damage, and bound in a leather binding. The manuscript was copied in Dhu l-^ijja, 612 h (= March, 1217 C.E.) and is written in fluid and clear naskhï, with 23 lines per page. It shows no signs of collation in its margins, places diacritical points somewhat regularly but lacks any vocalization. It includes neither marginal notes nor glosses, except for one extensive gloss along the margins of sura 30 (al-Rüm) that has been copied in summary fashion from the commentary on the same sura in Ibn Barrajãn's Tanbïh al-afhãm. The qur'ãnic verses are fully integrated into the text without appearing in red ink, while the sura headings are clearly set apart as headings of chapters and written in the same stroke. The title page (f. 1a) quotes the full title of the book as Ï^ã^ al-^ikma bi-a^kãm al-`ibra fi ma`ãni l-Qur^ãn al-`azïz and records the name of its author as Abu l-^akam ^Abd al-Salãm al-Maghribï al-Andalusï, known as Ibn Barrajãn. The colophon (f. 306b) cites the exact date when the copyist completed his task and mentions his name as Ya^yã b. Mu^ammad al-A^bahãnï, ending with a prayer.

The title page (f. 1b) shows a number of ownership notes. One is by Fat^ Allãh Tãshkandï, who identif^ijes himself as an inhabitant of Samarqand (nazïl Samarqand). Three other owners were a certain Abü Bakr b. Rustam b. A^mad b. Mu^ammad al-Shirwãnï, a certain Mu^ammad b. Ma^müd b. Ya^yã al-Qay^arï, and a certain Abü Mu^ammad who acquired the manuscript in 1130/1717. This MS may have been copied in Central Asia, given the place of transaction (Samarqand).

The two witnesses of Ï^ã^ al-^ikma bi-a^kãm al-`ibra, namely MS Mahmut Pa§sa 3–4 and MS Murat Molla 35, offfer a highly accurate text and display only minor variants that have been noted in the apparatus of our Arabic text edition. Given the fact that the manuscripts were copied within less than eighty years after the author's death, the agreement of the two witnesses of Ï^ã^ al-^ikma bi-a^kãm al-`ibra point to a great proximity to the archetype of Ibn Barrajãn's work. Though copied only about 18 years apart, the minor textual variants of the manuscripts evidence that MS Murat Molla 35 does not depend directly on MS Mahmut Pa§sa 3 and MS Mahmut Pa§sa 4; rather the two witnesses depend on a common archetype (perhaps the copy Ibn `Arabï read with Mahdawï). Furthermore, the slight shared def^ijciencies of the text of the Ï^ã^, i.e., the commentary on suras 9 (al-Tawba), 18 (al-Kahf), 28 (al-Qa^a^), 103 (al-`A^r) and 106 (Quraysh) missing from both MSS, confirm the solid and close proximity of our MSS to the archetype.

Composition and Exegetical Approach of Ïhãh al-hikma

The Ï^ã^ follows a method and approach uniquely particular to Ibn Barrajãn. In it the author comments on a selection of qur'ãnic verses, choosing them at will and interpreting them at length. His selections of qur'ãnic verses throughout the body of his work are picked from almost all suras and always cited from memory. Many are chosen from textually disjointed settings that, however, are topically interrelated.

Quite consciously, Ibn Barrajãn passes over the vast majority of the qur'ãnic verses because they do not attract his personal attention. For instance, verses of legal import (ãyãt fijiqhiyya) rarely receive consideration. On the other hand, he frequently returns to particular verses that are dear to him and inspire his interpretation again and again. A handful of qur'ãnic verses, Q 7: 172; 14: 48; 23: 88; 25: 2; 57: 3, 4 and 7, are the most frequently cited in the Ïhãh. They are privileged verses that operate as keynotes enlivening his inspiration and soliciting his reflections. This handful of qur'ãnic verses is focused on four central themes of Ibn Barrajãn's interpretation: (1) the rule of divine omnipotence over all things at their beginning and end (Q 57:3; 25:2 and 23:88); (2) the divine omnipresence at each and every moment of human existence (Q 57:4 and 7); (3) the origin of humanity at the Day of Covenant in pre-existence (Q 7:172); and (4) the final transformation of this earth into a new earth and heavens on the Day of Arising (Q 14: 48).

In general, Ibn Barrajãn follows the order of the suras in which they appear in the Qur'ãn, using standard names for sura titles. He omits the titles of suras 9 (al-Tawba), 18 (al-Kahf), 28 (al-Qa^a^), 103 (al-^A^r) and 106 (al-Quraysh) and lacks a commentary on their verses, though includes references, e.g., of sura 18, in other passages of his commentary. He cites the first sura as Umm al-Qur'ãn, rather than al-Fãtima, and considers it to be the most concise summation of the Islamic revelation as a whole. In contrast to the Tanbïh, the Ïhãh's introduction (muqaddima) and sura 1 do not offfer a summary of Ibn Barrajãn's interpretive ideas.

With respect to Ibn Barrajãn's vision of the Qur'ãn, it should also be noted that the author distinguishes between two key terminological givens which are easily overlooked. These are, (1) the "Tremendous Qur'ãn" (al-Qur'ãn al-`a^ïm) and (2) the "Exalted Qur'ãn" (al-Qur'ãn al-`azïz). These labels are technical terms to designate two distinct levels of the revelation, and have been noted in the index. Thus when he notes in passing, for instance, that such-and-such a key passage "pertains to al-Qur'ãn al-`a^ïm;" he has a very specif^ijc understanding in mind. The Tremendous Qur'ãn is the highest level of revelation, since it comprises the sum of all divine names and attributes mentioned in the Qur'ãn, as well as certain very key synoptic passages, like sura 1. It is that aspect of the Qur'ãn which is undiffferentiated (mujmal) and thus all-encompassing. Verses of the Tremendous Qur'ãn are the closest to the Guarded Tablet whence the revelation descends. In contrast to the all-encompassing verses of the Tremendous Qur'ãn, the other remaining qur'ãnic verses fall within the fold of the "Exalted Qur'ãn" (al-Qur'ãn al-`azïz). Such verses are diffferentiated (mufa^^al) and more accessible, and thus serve as entry points into the higher, more condensed reaches of the Tremendous Qur'ãn.

In presenting his interpretations, it is quite remarkable that Ibn Barrajãn neither refers to any direct teacher of qur'ãnic exegesis nor cites a Qur'ãn commentary of another author as sources for his work – except for rare minor exceptions noted in the index, and ad hoc references to his own Shar^ asmã ' Allãh al-^usnã (six times) and Tanbïh al-afhãm (twice) as mentioned above. He conveys the clear picture that the entire text is his own creation independently from any other author. Not only does he generally refrain from citing his sources, but he very frequently cites his sources from memory (^adïth and sometimes even biblical material), and according to general meaning rather than verbatim. His discreetness certainly poses a formidable challenge to the modern intellectual historian. In the medieval Andalusian context, however, it should be recalled that Ibn Barrajãn did not have a pronounced sense of ownership over ideas. Refraining from citing sources, moreover, broadened his readership appeal and deflected allegations of doctrinal deviance. Furthermore, Ibn Barrajãn may have preferred to keep

concealed the extent to which extent his thoughts were influenced by the treatises of the Brethren of Purity (Ikhwãn al-^afã) and similar writings deemed suspect at the time.

Figures named in the Ï^ã^ are generally those mentioned in the Qur^ãn, a^ãdïth, or biblical material and are interpreted in the twilight of these scriptural reference points. Among them are the great prophetical f^ijgures, Adam, Noah, Abraham, Joseph, Moses, David, Jesus and Mary, while Eve, Seth, Sem, Cham, Lot, Isaac, Ishmael, Jacob, Pharaoh, Aaron, Khidr, Solomon, Yunus, Job, Daniel, Idris, Isaiah, Zakariya and John the Baptist play minor roles. The Jinn are frequently mentioned and the angels (al-malã 'ika) appear as a group, with Archangel Gabriel holding pride of place before Israf^ijl, Michael, and the angel of death Azrael. Goliath, Gog and Magog, `Ifrït, and al-Dajjãl appear, but the names of Iblïs and Shay^ãn are wanting though are understood as hidden behind "the enemy" (al-^aduww). The ancient Arab peoples of Thamüd and `Ãd are mentioned together with the pre-Islamic prophets, Hüd and Shu`ayb. Jews and Christians are cited as Ahl al-kitãb, the Jews appear separately as Banü Isrã ^ïl, and the Sabeans are mentioned. The terms Torah (Tawrãt), Psalms (Zabür), and Gospel (Injïl) appear occasionally and are also mentioned cumulatively as the "noble scrolls" (al-^u^uf al-mukarrama), while "The Books of Prophecies" (kutub al-nubuwwãt) refer to the prophetical books of the Old Testament. Although Ibn Barrajãn was interested in the Bible already when he wrote his commentary on the names of God, the Ïhãh marks his most pronounced and extensive engagement with biblical material in all his works. The biblical verses Ibn Barrajãn quotes are taken primarily from the Gospel of Matthew and the Book of Genesis, on the basis of what appears to be a Mozarab translation of the Bible from the Latin Vulgate. Finally, the term of "scriptures of the ancients" (kutub al-awã ^il) is applied to the writings of the ancient philosophers.

Working through the Ï^ã^, it became increasingly apparent to us that this work is a lightly edited transcription of ad hoc lectures on the Qur'ãn recorded by a scribe. Ibn Barrajãn seems to have read the text of the Qur'ãn in the presence of a group of students, over many months in his private smallscale center of instruction, explaining to them the inspirations and intimations that he received as he moved from verse to verse. The transcriptions were recorded, assembled, proof-edited under his direction, then read back to him in dictation (amãlï) style, thus forming the basis of the text. The oral dictation explains many features of the form and content of the Ïhãh. Proceeding in this way, he appears coming to a moment of reflection at one point and reading over many other qur'ãnic passages until he feels drawn to comment again when he happens on another verse to his liking. This procedure presents his Ïhãh as a highly personal, syntactically challenging text. His expository style, moreover, makes it impossible to draw a line of demarcation between exegesis of the qur'ãnic text and eisegesis of his world of ideas. There are no boundaries between his drawing meaning out of the text and his reading meaning into the text. What he reads into the text is extracted from a store of hadïth statements, biblical verses, and various religious and esoteric sciences that have formed a world of ideas in the inner recesses of his soul. The world of ideas encounters the keynotes offered by the mythic language of the Qur'ãn, and both of them merge to promote his interpretation.

Obviously, these lectures must have difffered from Ibn Barrajãn's ordinary ^adïth courses, if he even taught such courses at this advanced stage in his life.111 In the Ï^ã^, Ibn Barrajãn lifts the cloak of formal scholarship and speaks his heart against the backdrop of a highly synthesized cosmology drawn from a broad array of sciences – ranging from ^adïth and theology, to Suf^ijsm, sciences of the letters, and astrology – and woven into an elaborate vision of reality. He is more contemplative, somewhat prolix

and preachy, and disinterested in deeply engaging the formal sciences of qur'ãnic readings (qirã hãt), causes of revelation (asbãb al-nuzül), legal theory (u^ül al-f^ijqh), jurisprudence (fijqh), and the like. Stylistically, moreover, he is less structured than in earlier works, especially in comparison with the Shar^ and the first half of the Tanbïh. His central objective in the Ï^ã^ is to illustrate ways of attaining the essence of all scholarship: the apprehension of realities of the unseen world (ghayb) in a tangible and direct manner. He incessantly enjoins his listeners to "crossover" (`ibra) into the unseen through contemplation of natural symbols, qur'ãnic verses, and the remembrance of God.

To elaborate on the structural arrangement of the Ïhãh: it can be observed that Ibn Barrajãn uses generally the term of faql ("section") to place markers between topical blocks of his commentary, dividing the text into organizational units. These fu^ül probably marked the end of a daily lesson, which could have lasted from ten minutes to an hour, depending on circumstance and his own inspiration. Two other terms that Ibn Barrajãn employs repeatedly as markers, however, have a specific meaning for him and were probably parenthetical remarks noted in the middle of a lesson. They indicate diffferent levels of interpretation, and are termed, "tanbïh," caveats or explanations of particular points that the author considers as problematic, and "bayãn," elucidations on specific points. Aside from such subheadings, it is important to pay close attention to the oft-repeated formulaic transitional sentence "qawluhu `azza wa-jalla" ("His statement, Lofty and Exalted is He), since this expression consistently marks the beginning of his commentary on a new cluster of verses. This marker is key to locating the exact passage of the Qur'ãn that Ibn Barrajãn is commenting upon within a given sura, amidst running commentary and a plethora of qur'ãnic verses, hadith reports, and biblical citations. For this reason, we have generally placed the phrase qawluhu `azza wa-jalla at the head of a new paragraph to mark the beginning of a new thought pattern.

Ibn Barrajãn also employs the phrase taqaddama l-kalãm ("mentioned previously") at the head of many discussions to refer to points he already went over in earlier passages from this work, the Tanbïh, or the Shar^, or perhaps the Irshãd. Unfortunately, these cross-references are generally of little use because he almost never specif^ijes the exact work or location of the passage that he has in mind. Given the complicated organizational structure and oral composition of both the Ï^ã^ and his works as a whole, it is clear that Ibn Barrajãn's thought-system does not lend itself easily to generalizations. Much like the doctrines of Ibn 'Arabï, Ibn Barrajãn's doctrines demand a close reading of the totality of his works from beginning to end.

The Central Teachings of Ïhãh al-Hikma

With respect to cosmology, Ibn Barrajãn envisions the physical universe of the heavens and the earth as the world of creation (al-khalq) that has been conceived by God from eternity in the spiritual world of the command (al-amr) – a pair of notions that appears about 50 times in the Ï^ã^. Ibn Barrajãn imagines the physical universe as consisting of seven stories each, seven heavens and seven earths. His minutely developed perception of cosmology is accompanied by a vividly experienced world of the stars, constellations and planets. He was also intimately aware of a variegated world of plants and animals, evidencing an educated and specif^ijc knowledge of both.

Ibn Barrajãn emphasized that God's signs (ãyãt) in existence are not mere markers with no link to the hereafter. Rather, they are ontologically connected to the realities that they signal. As unobstructed passageways, they convey something of the luminosity of the next world. Hence Ibn Barrajãn's

continuous emphasis upon the importance of contemplating the signs of God, and even retreating into the countryside for this purpose. Among his favorite signs are sun and moon, which he calls the "Special Signs" (ãyãt khãsha) since they solely herald the beatific vision in the hereafter. Another cherished and oft-discussed symbol is water (mã ^) that acts as an active principle of existence, since it originates underneath the divine throne, irrigates the vegetation of heaven, and descends to earth to give life to God's creatures. Water thus symbolizes, among many things, the revivifying effect of God's revelation on human souls.

The physical universe is brought into existence by God's primordial decree (al-taqdïr al-awwal) when he gives the command, "Be!" at the moment of creation and will return to its original spiritual state at the Day of Final Assembly. In the vision of this pair of notions, the visible physical world of al-khalq appears to be separated from the invisible spiritual world of alamr by a deep isthmus (barzakh) – a term that appears more than 60 times. It separates this world (al-dunyã) from the world to come (al-ãkhira) and at the same time separates the visible and physical from the invisible and spiritual universe. It is this isthmus that Ibn Barrajãn tries to cross, reaching from temporality into eternity. Like a catalyst, the alpha and omega verse, which appears only once in the Qur^an (57:3), "He is the First and the Last, the Outward and the Inward," serves Ibn Barrajãn repeatedly in the Ï^ã^ to precipitate his vision of these two worlds he tries to bridge.

The attempt to bridge the two worlds, or the cross-over into the unseen, is central to Ibn Barrajãn's thought. The word he uses is jibra, which is commonly understood to mean an "admonition or exhortation by which one takes warning or example." Since the consonantal root of ^ibra, `-B-R, means "to cross over," it can also be def^ijned as a crossover "from the knowledge of what is seen... [to] the knowledge of what is not seen" (Lane), or in his own words from what is visible (shãhid) to what is invisible (ghã ^ib). It is this second literal def^ijnition of ^ibra, namely crossing over into the unseen world through penetrating the depths of qur'ãnic verses and natural symbols that Ibn Barrajãn continuously plays with. Inasmuch as can be stated, this term of jibra refers to a "cross-over" or "dis-covery" of a point of insight and reflective awareness that Ibn Barrajãn discovers hidden in the meanings (masãnï) of words and phrases included in the qur'anic text, a sign of God in nature, or in the human being. These hidden meanings are tokens of the eternal world to come that are spotted in the visible world. For Ibn Barrajãn, the ^ibra is thus a gradual spiritual recognition of the divine marks in existence and an assimilation of this truth into the very being of the aspirant. The mu^tabir is he who has accomplished the paradigmatic shift of religious consciousness from abstract faith to concrete realization. In this process the interpreter reaches wisdom (hikma), the realm of gnosis that describes the essence of Ibn Barrajãn's vision of existence.

The central objective of the ^ibra is enshrined in the title of the present work, which may be translated as "The Deciphering of Wisdom Through the Principles of the Crossover." It should be emphasized that the keyword here is jibra or "crossover," whose fruit or discovery is wisdom (hikma). A mu^tabir is by def^ijnition a possessor of wisdom, since he has achieved supreme awareness of the unseen. This is why we prefer the more free translation of the title as "Wisdom Deciphered, the Unseen Discovered." Moreover, although it falls beyond the scope of this introduction, it appears that Ibn Barrajãn's notion of ^ibra harks back to the teachings of Ibn Masarra and probably Abü `Umar al-^alamankï (d. 429/1037) in his wake, where istibãr becomes a means of ascending up to divine knowledge through non-discursive, associative contemplation of God's signs in the world.

Ibn Barrajãn was convinced that the two worlds are bridgeable since he conceived of existence (wujüd) itself as a unitary whole with no independent parts. He held the cosmos to be an ontological and almost physical extension of the hereafter. In his oft-repeated words: this world is a "bundle yanked out of the next world" (jadhba judhibat min al-ãkhira). The next world is present in the visible world, or "in the belly of this world" (fi ba^n al-arh). The outward dimension of the world is an offfshoot, or a "branch" (far^) of the root (a^l) of the hereafter. Yet, the next world is ontologically superior, more real (ziyãdatan f^ij l-wujüd) and nobler (akram wujüdan) than this world. For Ibn Barrajãn, any honest reading of ^hadith literature confirms this cosmological worldview. Among his favorite Prophetic statements in support of his ontology is the following:

> This world in relation to the next is like unto a f^ijnger that is dipped into a river: behold how much it draws from it.

In the final analysis, Ibn Barrajãn rejects the common understanding of the unseen world (ghayb) as a transcendent abode that is "out there" spatially, and "yet-to-come" temporally. From this point of view, the paradisiacal and infernal realities of the hereafter are not invisible in the herebelow, only to be grasped in the beyond. Rather, the visible world both conceals and reveals the invisible. This world signals the next world because it is an integral part of it. The way to access the unseen is to undertake the "crossover from the visible into the invisible" (al-'Ibra min al-shãhid ila l-ghã 'ib). Ibn Barrajãn also f^ijnds reference for his idea of ontological oneness in qur'anic verses that speak of God as He Who brings out what is hidden (khab ', see index) in the heavens and the earth (Q 27:25). Another scriptural reference is the idea of "The Two Breaths" (fayhayn, see index). This notion of the two fay^s originates in a hadith, which states that cool breezes hail from the opening of the gates of heaven (fat^), while scorching summer heat waves stem from the breath (fayn) of the fires of Hell. Ibn Barrajãn posited that the four elements (al-usül al-arba^), which make up physical existence, derive from the Opening (fat^) of heaven, and the Scorching (fay^) of Hell. The balanced fusion and mixing of these elements account for the diversity in the world.

Although existence is fundamentally one, and this world and the next are profoundly interconnected, Ibn Barrajãn insists on the distinction between God as such and creation as such. His doctrine of the Universal Servant (al-^Abd al-kullï) marks this line of separation between eternity and temporality. It is among the most important cosmological doctrines in the Ïdãh, appear ing almost a hundred times in various contexts. This doctrine is foreshadowed in Sahl al-Tustarï's notion of the pre-existential nür Muhammad that bows in prostration as it stands like a column of light (^amüd al-nür) before the Lord of creation. In Arabic terminology and qur'anic imagery, al-^Abd al-kullï may also be seen as representing an appropriation of the notion of the Logos that dominated the theological thought in Late Antiquity in the Mediterranean world. For Ibn Barrajãn, the Universal Servant is the fhijrst creation of God as one totality and one harmony (jumla). It is the initial, all-comprehensive, meta-cosmic reality that encompasses all things. It is neither divine, nor does it pertain to the world of created existence. Occupying a quasi-incomprehensible space between eternity and temporality, al-^Abd al-kullï engulfs all realities of existence. It is through its intermediacy that God the One interacts with the world of multiplicity. This doctrine, like so many others in Ibn Barrajãn's work, anticipates and inspires Ibn 'Arabï's teachings on the Perfect Man (al-insãn al-kãmil), building a bridge between the ideas of nür Muhammad and al-insãn al-kãmil. In this process, Ibn Masarra may have served as the historical channel for the transmission of the early Sufi tradition to the Iberian Peninsula.

All of existence issues from the reality of the Universal Servant. Adam, the microcosm, is the "Particular Servant" (al-^Abd al-juz ^ï) and was made in the form of the Universal Servant, which is none other than the form of God. The universe (macrocosm) derives ontologically from the Universal Servant as well. Thus the universe and the Adamic form correspond to each other like macrocosm to microcosm. Revelation, on the other hand, descends from the Guarded Tablet (al-law^ al-ma^fü^), which Ibn Barrajãn seems to identify in its function with the Universal Servant. Thus Ibn Barrajãn sees correspondences between the human being, the universe, and revelation (wahy). The human being has free will and is the compact and comprehensive (mujmal) reflection of the Universal Servant; the universe is the unpacked and differentiated (mufathal) cosmic reflection of the Universal Servant; while revelation resembles both the human being and creation as it comprises both differentiated and undifferentiated modes of divine self-disclosure: the muskamãt and mutashãbihãt, the Tremendous Qur'ãn and the Exalted Qur'ãn.

Another important feature of Ibn Barrajãn's writings as a whole, as well as the Ï^ã^ in particular, is his doctrine of al-^aqq al-makhlüq bihi l-samãwãt wa-l-arh, that is, "The Reality By Virtue of Which the Heavens and Earth Are Created." This idea has its roots in the writings of the Ikhwãn al-safã and f^ijnds an echo in the works of Ibn `Arabï and his followers. Ibn `Arabï and his disciples used this concept to illustrate cosmogonic notions of the divine Word (kalima) and command (amr), the "Reality of Realities" (maqïqat al-haqã fiq), and the "Existentiating Breath of the All-Merciful" (al-nafas al-rahmãnï al-wujüdï).

In Ibn Barrajãn's writings, this doctrine often emerges in meditations upon the verse We did not create the heavens and the earth except according to the haqq (bi-l-haqq) (Q 44:38–39). While cosmogonic elements are detectable in these discussions, Ibn Barrajãn seems to use this notion most often in a cosmological context. Specifically, he defines this ^aqq is an uncreated mode of divine self-disclosure. God reveals Himself through the "traces" (ithãra), "pathways" (masãlik), and inherent "requirements" (muqtatã) of His names and attributes in the cosmos (khalq), in the Qur'ãn and in the human being. The sum total of these divine manifestations is encapsulated by this ^aqq that resembles the concept of the pleroma describing the fullness of the divine reality in gnostic thought. Ibn Barrajãn stresses that this doctrine is not just one of many ways of conceiving of or accessing the truth. Rather, the ^aqq in question is the only means by which God can be known, for in the f^ijnal analysis God discloses Himself in "everything other than God" (mã siwã Allãh), namely the universe, revelation, and the human being.

For Ibn Barrajãn, al-^aqq al-makhlüq bihi l-khalq ("The Real through whom the cosmos has been created") also embodies the origins of the cosmos, while al-^aqq alladhï ilayhi l-ma^ïr ("The Real To Whom is the Return") anticipates the f^ijnal return of all things. It is at that moment of the f^ijnal return that the full, unobstructed theophany on Judgment Day occurs. He calls this theophany al-^aqq al-mubïn, "The Most Evident Real," the original source and f^ijnal end of all things. Ibn Barrajãn finds reference to this idea in qur'ãnic statements which relate that on the Day of Judgment man will know that God is al-^aqq al-mubïn" (e.g. Q 24:25); that is, man will know the Real who clarifies and manifests (mubayyin) all realities. For Ibn Barrajãn, the term al-^aqq al-mubïn clearly has a cosmogonic function in the universe. When emphasizing the nearness and inevitability of al-^aqq al-mubïn, Ibn Barrajãn employs the term of al-haqq alladhï ilayhi l-ma^ïr to remind his reader of the inevitability of this major theophanic event. When stressing the origin (or God's presence) in all things, however, he uses the term al-haqq al-makhlüq bihi l-khalq.

The extent of influence of the Neoplatonist writings of the Ikhwãn al-safã, Ismã^ili propagators (dã`ïs), and/or Fatima authors upon Ibn Barrajãn seems both likely and important to his worldview. He probably had direct exposure to their doctrines orally or textually, and may have had teachers who initiated him into various Ismã^ili doctrines. Ibn Barrajãn's anonymity with regard to sources fhijts him into the pattern of dissimulation and secrecy (taqiyya and kitmãn) among Ismãmili authors. For the most part, however, he intentionally coins new doctrinal terms couched in Qur'ãnic and hadith sources. He avoids using terms such as "Universal Intellect" (al-`aql al-kullï) in favor of "Universal Servant" (al-`Abd al-kullï) and other alternatives in an efffort to avoid Ismaili or bãtinï association and the scrutiny of his contemporary jurists. Aside from Ibn Barrajãn's terminological discretion, several afff^ijliational markers are worth noting: his ancestral ties to the Yemen, his training in astrology, knowledge of medicine and philosophy, the presence of the concept of al-haqq al-makhlüq bihi l-khalq, as well as his binary mode of thinking betrays a familiarity with the Ismã^ili curriculum. However, despite possible secrecy and initiations, it must be stressed that it would be an error to identify Ibn Barrajãn as a committed member or follower of the Ikhwãn al-hafã or Ismã^ilism. These sources, like so many others, informed his synthetic worldview yet did not earn his full allegiance. Ibn Barrajãn's inquisitiveness and engagement with these sources mark an early attempt at incorporating, naturalizing, and modifying Neoplatonic cosmological notions within the context of the Sunni mystical tradition. <>

Conciliation in the Qur'an: The Qur'anic Ethics of Conflict Resolution by Shafi Fazaluddin [Thought, Culture, and Society, De Gruyter, 9783110747201]

Conciliation in the Qurʾan addresses an existing imbalanced focus in Islamic Studies on conflict in the Qurʾan, and moves beyond a restrictive approach to *ṣulḥ* (reconciliation) as a mediation process in fragmented social contexts. The book offers a critical analysis of conciliation as a holistic concept in the Qurʾan, providing linguistic and structural insight based on the renowned pre-modern Arabic exegesis of Al-Rāzī (d. 1209) and the under-studied contemporary Urdu exegesis of Iṣlāḥī (d. 1997). This ambitious thematic study of the entire Qurʾan includes an innovative examination of the central ethical notion of *iḥsān* (gracious conduct), and a challenging discussion of notorious passages relating to conflict. The author offers solutions to unresolved issues such as the significance of the notion of *iṣlāḥ* (order), the relationship between conciliation and justice, and the structural and thematic significance of Q.48 (*Sūrat Al-Fatḥ*) and Q.49 (*Sūrat Al-Ḥujurāt*). *Conciliation in the Qurʾan* offers a compelling argument for the prevalence of conciliation in the Islamic scripture, and will be an essential read for practitioners in Islamic studies, community integration, conflict-resolution, interfaith dialogue and social justice.

CONTENTS

Despite its nature as a historical, religious text, different interpretations of the Qur'an's social message regarding intra-community and inter-community relations can have significant contemporary implications. A balanced understanding of this important aspect of the Qur'an's discourse is therefore crucial, particularly in light of increasing diversity resulting from global migration. An over-riding focus on conflict in the Qur'an by historical and contemporary commentators has, however, obscured the subject of Conciliation in the Qur'an, which remains an under-researched field of study. This study aims to analyse, and evaluate the importance of, Conciliation in the Qur'an to provide a more balanced and complete understanding of the Qur'an's perspective on social relations.

Traditional Islamic authorship on the subject of Conciliation in the Qur'an, such as Mustafá (2007), has also been unduly restrictive, often content to cite repetitively a small number of Qur'anic verses such as Q.4:35 and Q.4:128 which deal with marriage disputes and Q.49:9-10 which deal with group disputes. More academic literature has sufficed with an examination of Conciliation as an Alternative Dispute Resolution process in isolated social contexts such as Employment or Islamic Finance (see Hassan, 2006; Rasyid, 2013). Two important studies in the Arabic language by `Abd Al-Qudd^s (1999) and Táhá (2009) provide more in-depth examination but their relatively descriptive approach and restricted linguistic emphasis on the Arabic terms sulk (reconciliation, settlement) and islah (reconciliation, reform/order, proper conduct) have also resulted in a fragmented consideration of the subject. In particular, the context of suras such as Q.12 (the story of Joseph) and Q.48 (regarding Sulh A1-Hudaybiya) relates almost entirely to Conciliation, despite not mentioning sulk. In addition to a handful of Arabic language academic papers which largely reproduce classical legal theory of sulk in specific contexts such as criminal law, there are Arabic works on the important historical events of $ulh Al-Hudaybiya, such as Hijázi (1986).

Whilst much has been written about Conciliation in Western literature, there is a dearth of material on the subject in relation to the Qur'an. In my previously published research on `Conciliation Ethics in the Qur'an' (Fazaluddin, 2016, ^^.336-39), I included a review of literature regarding the importance and application of sulk, and discussed some Western Conciliation theories which I also reference in this work. The same paper deals extensively with Conciliation in the context of marriage by reference to Q.4:35 and Q.4:128, mentioned above, and other verses. I will therefore not address this subject matter again in this research but provide a brief summary of the key points arising from the earlier analysis in Chapter 1.

Scope of Research and Research Questions

This research aims to redress the fragmented approach of existing research, by examining Conciliation as a holistic concept and evaluating its relative importance in the Qur'anic discourse. This will necessarily result in a broader interpretation of Conciliation than mere Qur'anic references to sulk, and may bring

to light new concepts whose relevance and significance becomes fully apparent only after a detailed investigation. In examining Conciliation in the Qur'an, I consider the notion of Conciliation in its modern usage, where most definitions indicate the following two meanings:

1. the informal restoration of good relations between two parties or perspectives, and
2. the use of certain formal processes to resolve actual or potential legal disputes through an intermediary.

In line with my holistic approach, I will also examine those matters that deal with the avoidance of conflict, which may be considered a form of pre-emptive Conciliation. ^ holistic study of my subject will also necessitate a study of both Social and Divine-Human Conciliation, given the Qur'anic dual societal and theological narrative, although Divine-Human Conciliation will predominantly be studied as a means to informing the primary study of Social Conciliation. In order to provide an appropriately balanced analysis, I will additionally engage with significant segments of text which deal extensively with conflict, although my study will be limited to how conflict relates to Conciliation rather than providing a complete study on conflict of itself. I will also discuss the use of persuasive argument in the Qur'anic discourse, in order to explain its essential role in the proper contextualisation of the Qur'anic engagement with conflict.

In order to analyse and assess the relative importance of Conciliation within the Qur'anic discourse, I will address the following specific questions:

1. How pervasive is Conciliation in the Meccan and Medinan suras?
2. What range of aspects of Conciliation are manifest?
3. What, if any, literary techniques are used to emphasise Conciliation?
4. How coherent is the Conciliation material?

Question 1 will include a comparison of how pervasive Conciliation is in the Meccan and Medinan suras, to evaluate a suggestion of greater belligerence in Medinan suras (Cragg, 2001, p.90), as explained in the following section of the Introduction. Question 2 is self-explanatory and follows from my holistic approach to the study of the subject. Question 3 acknowledges the important role of literary techniques in fully understanding the meaning of a text and conveying the attitude a text imbues towards a given subject, as explained towards the end of the Introduction in the section `Research Framework and Methodology'. Finally, Question 4 follows from an increasing contemporary academic interest in perceptions of the Qur'an as a coherent text based on different theories of nazm (arrangement), which are explained and discussed further below in the section of the Introduction entitled 'The Development of Coherence Studies'. Although there may be an element of `inherent' coherence in Qur'anic exegesis, as explained in the Research Framework and Methodology, it should be possible to go beyond this interpretive level to evaluate overall patterns of structural and thematic coherence in the Conciliation material examined.

Meccan and Medinan Suras

In Western literature, some writers have perceived a distinct contrast between the tone of the Meccan and Medinan revelation. Cragg (2001, pp.90, 95), for example, contrasts the `innocent preachment' of

the Meccan period with the `transition to belligerence' in the Medinan period, seeing combat as the `central feature' of the Medinan Qur'an. By contrast, other writers emphasise the freedom of religion and peace treaties established by the Prophet in the Medinan period, referring to a 'pax Islamics' (Watt, 1961, pp.219-20). Furthermore, the prominent conciliatory teaching emphasising human equality in Q.49:13, quoted at the Prophet's Conquest of Mecca in 8 A.H. (Iqbal, 1965, p.43), has been judged later revelation but `essential doctrine from the beginning' (Levy, 1969, ^^.55, 192), suggesting a consistency between the two periods. Levy also recognises that such `ethical doctrine in Islam is intimately connected with the law'. The development of Islamic Law is generally attributed to the Medinan period of revelation (Hallaq, 2005, pp.21, 195; Hallaq, 2016).

Whilst the generally shorter length, formulaic structures and common themes of the Meccan sums have made them accessible to academic writers (see, for example, Dayeh, 2010), the Medinan suras have largely escaped a systematic study due to their sheer size and divergence of style and theme. This is clearly illustrated by the extensive work on Qur'anic register and arrangement provided by Robinson (2003) in relation to Meccan suras, whilst dealing with only one Medinan sura. Even the comparative study of Locate-Timol (2009) provides structural, thematic and textual analysis of selected Medinan sums. Neuwirth (n.d., "Types of Medinan sums") considers a systematic study of the Medinan suras 'an urgent desideratum' in the field. I will partially address these issues, by examining the concentration of Conciliation passages in the Meccan versus the Medinan Qur'an comparatively to assess whether Conciliation is more or less emphasised in the Medinan Qur'an.

The Development of Coherence Studies

Classical commentators on the Qur'an often focussed on specific verses or concepts in the Qur'an in an isolated manner which may be referred to as an `atomistic' approach. Perhaps surprisingly, therefore, Faiq (2011, para. 2) argues that there was always a historical desire amongst early scholars to find coherence in the Qur'an although it was expressed through different disciplines and sectarian doctrines. These early scholars, he argues, considered the choice of words, content and eloquent composition of the Qur'anic material to be demonstrative of its i'jaz (miraculous nature), but the most significant advancement and contribution was that of ^bd Al-Qáhir sl-Jurjáni (d. 471/1078). According to Faiq (2011, paras. 7-8), al-Jurjániic theory sees all language as a system of relations so that the precise and holistic arrangement of words within a single discourse becomes instrumental to the overall meaning. ^l-Jurjáni expounded a developed theory of nazm, which remains of great importance in al-balágh^ (study of the rhetorical style of the Qur'an).

Another perspective on Qur'anic coherence is highlighted by Abdul-Raof (2003, p.73) in the notion of al-m^^^saba (conceptual and textual chaining) within Qur'anic discourse. Amongst classical exegetes who emphasised this notion, he refers to Fakhr Al-Din ^l-Rázi (d. 606/1209), and amongst contemporary exegetes he highlights Sayyid Qutbic (d. 1966) tafsir Fi Zilál al-Qur'an. However, I believe it is important to distinguish between Al-Razi's focus on drawing connections of meaning between specific verses, and Qutbic focus on a mihwar (central thematic axis) in suras which takes the concept of coherence to the level of a much more systematic arrangement of internally and externally coherent blocks of text. Abdul-Raof (2003, pp.74-75) draws a contrast between the classical view of the Qur'an as being highly coherent based on the concept of chaining, and the view of modern Western scholars who often viewed the Qur'anic text as being disconnected and disparate.1 Abdul-Raof (2003, p.92) also argues that the application of text linguistic strategies demonstrates that lexical items and grammatical structures are

not random but rather support a continuity of meaning and sequentiality of concepts which is an essential feature of the Qur'anic discourse. Furthermore, he finds that the juxtaposition of provides a natural progression of related themes and development of cons, such as Prophethood or the Book.

It is surprising that Faiq's earlier discussion of subsequent modern approaches does not mention the important contributions of the Indian scholar Hamid Al-Din al-Farahi (d. 1930) and his student and successor Amin Ahsan Islahi (d. 1997) to the study of coherence, discussed in detail below. Abdul-Raof (2003, p.74) also makes only passing reference to these scholars, although his conclusions appear to be based almost entirely on the Farahi-Islahi theory, despite using the terminology of chaining in his analysis.

The Farhi-Islahi Theory

In his Urdu tafsir ^^dabb^r-e-Q^r'^m, Islahi argues the apparent existence of well-defined themes in verse sequences, the pairing of complementary suras and the grouping of suras into seven distinct groups, with each group systematically developing a master theme. His teacher Farahi's original Qur'anic structural schema is outlined in his own Arabic work Dalail ^^-^izam. Despite originating from the Indian subcontinent, Farahi has authored several important works on Qur'an Studies in classical Arabic, demonstrating his linguistic expertise and command of the language.

The Farahi-Islahi theory has been brought to light in Western academia in particular through the writing of Mir (1983b, 1986, 2013) and, to a lesser extent, of Khan (2002, 2008). Mir (1983a) emphasises that the work of exegetes such as Al-Razi merely highlights that the Qur'an is a connected text, which is to be contrasted with the modern phenomenon of Muslim scholars presenting the Qur'an as a text with significant thematic and structural unity, a point on which he considers there to be an increasing consensus (see also Nadeem, 2015). The modern trend amongst Muslim scholars identified by Mir towards recognising the sura as an important building block in the overall Coherence of the Qur'anic arrangement has also been recognised by Neuwirth (n.d., "Canonization and the problem of the `sura' as a unit", pars. 6).

The apparent approval of the Farahi-Islahi theory by other writers is further confirmed by the work of Farrin (2014) who bases his book on the same theory, agreeing with many of its principles and additionally finding a concentric symmetry in the Qur'anic arrangement around a central group of suras. El-Awa (2006, p.20), another important writer in the field of Coherence Studies, also recognises the significant contribution of the Farahi-Islahi theory to the field. El-Awa's pioneering work represents a further advance in the methods used to study the Qur'anic text (in this regard, see Arkoun, n.d.). She examines two suras ^^-^hzab and ^^-Qiyama in detail and applies two linguistic theories for the study of textual relations: Relevance Theory and Coherence Theory.

The Farahi-Is^ahi theory uses the terminology of nazm but must be distinguished from the limited principle-based theory of ^l-Jurjani, by its comprehensive theory of Qur'anic textual arrangement. In light of all the above, the Farahi-Islahi theory arguably represents the most systematic, contemporary and accepted theory of Qur'anic arrangement to date. Despite the above merits, however, the Farahi-Islahi model remains a theory and should not be considered proven, as highlighted by Rippin (2013, p.1). In his view, this approach to coherence reflects contemporary ideas based on trends in Biblical studies and general literary theory. I would argue that if this is the case, then it can at least be observed that studies of Qur'anic coherence are developing in line with the wider study of other religious texts and literary

theory in general. This in turn should provide greater credibility and accessibility to the findings of those studies.

Research Framework and Methodology

In my own Qur'anic analysis, I will adopt a contextual hermeneutic, interpreting text in light of both the immediate and related context, in line with the classical approach. It is an established maxim of Qur'anic exegesis that: ^l-Qur'an^ yufassiru ba`d^hi ba`da (different parts of the Qur'an explain each other). ^ context-based approach is also emphasised in contemporary works on the subject of Qur'anic interpretation (Abdel Haleem, 2017). Linguistically, I will also examine the wording and rhetorical usage of language to construe the Qur'anic text both literally and purposively, seeking to ascertain the Qur'anic attitude to Conciliation. In support of this approach to analysing and interpreting texts, Bauer et al. (2014, .3, 10, 20) highlight both the need to enter into a `reflexive dialogue' with the text, and the special importance of `higher orders of text' such as narratives, rhetorical proofs and argumentation, metaphors and the framing of ideological discourse. In light of the above, my proposed dual contextual and linguistic approach is in line with established textual analysis pratice and also results in what I consider an accurate interpretation. Where I sometimes derive principles of general application based on language, whilst restr^cting the scope of other verses by context, this is not for the purpose of achieving a desired outcome but follows from my hermeneutic approach.

For my overall Qur'anic analysis, I draw extensively on the two influential ommentaries of the renowned exegete Fakhr Al-Din Al-Razi and the innovative scholar of the Indian subcontinent, Amin Ahsan Islahi (for biographical information, see Nadeem, 1998), offering a balanced perspective between classical and contemporary exegesis. These commentaries are also highly complementary with :he first providing linguistic emphasis and the other providing structural insight, both of which are especially pertinent to my specific research questions. In the Arabic language, Al-Razi's highly analytical tafsir (exegesis) Mafatih Ai-Ghayb has been selected for its authoritative elucidation of key terminologies based on comprehensive and encyclopaedic reference to linguistic resources, legal rulings, historical context, Prophetic narrations and the opinions of earlier commentators (regarding Al-Razi's methodology, see Jaffer, 2013). Islahi's Urdu tafsfr Tadabbur-e-Qur'an, based on the works of his teacher Hamid Al-Din Al-Farahi (for biographical information, see Esposito, 2007), has been selected for its relatively unique insights and systematic approach to the structure and coherence of the Qur'an (regarding Islahi's methodology, see Khan, 2008).

Despite its significance as perhaps the only comprehensive tafsir of the Qur'an based on a coherence approach, the study of Islahi's tafsir has previously been limited due to it being written in the Urdu language; I will draw extensively upon this tafsir providing new insight into this voluminous work, although without endorsing the Farahi-Islahi schema. Importantly, my study is not dependent on the validity of the Farahi-Islahi theory, but analyses the theory critically. It is also my intention to use Farahi and Islahi's hierarchical classification to frame my thematic study of Conciliation in the Qur'an, providing an organisational framework for my data analysis, segmenting my data in accordance with its sura groups and referencing its sura and group themes in my own thematic analysis. I believe this innovative approach to a thematic study has not previously been undertaken, with thematic and coherence studies often perceived as distinct research areas in Qur'anic Studies. In light of the above, this work provides an original contribution to research in the field, both through engagement in a holistic thematic study of Conciliation in the Qur'an, and by utilising and presenting a significant portion of Islahi's comprehensive

tafsir, developing and implementing a methodology which combines thematic and coherence studies of the Qur'an.

In analysing the Qur'anic material, I conducted a manual survey of the entire Qur'an selecting some 250 verses relating to Conciliation. I then conducted a second more structural review in which I studied large segments of text surrounding these Conciliation verses, identifying and tabulating text segments of around 10100 verses in which Conciliation featured in a sustained fashion. By analysing this structural review data, I identified key Conciliation themes which form the skeleton of my argument. Having also recorded the sura groups, pairing and themes according to the Farahi-Isláhi theory (based on Farahi (1968), the introduction to Islahi's Tadabbur-e-Qur'án and Mir (1986)), I critically assessed this classification in light of my review. For each text segment, I then reviewed Islahi's sura overview and tafsir, tabulating material pertinent to my research questions, and then reviewed al-Razi's more detailed tafsir of key terminologies within the segment. In total, around 1500 pages of Islahi's tafs^r in Urdu and several hundred pages of Al-Razi's tafsir in Arabic were reviewed. My approach of conducting a preliminary global structural analysis of the text followed by a more in-depth analysis of the constituent segments is broadly inline with the iterative combination of recursive surface thematic mapping and indepth interpretive work, argued for by Davidson et al. (2019) in analysing large-scale qualitative data sets. Davidson et al. refer to this as a 'breadth-and-depth' method.

From this tafs^r material, I have selected those insights which are most relevant to my research questions, and which facilitate my analysis by providing in-depth linguistic or structural focus. I have adduced such material not only where it supports but also where it challenges my argument, providing critical discussion. Given the volume of research material and the desire for greater depth of analysis, I have generally restricted my research to the work of two principal exegetes, albeit carefully selected to provide a complementary balance and range of insights as highlighted above. Given the long-standing tradition of scholarship around interpretations of the Qur'an, I believe it would be difficult to provide a plausible purely subjective contemporary analysis, detached from reputable and authoritative classical tafsir works. At the same time, I do occasionally utilise what might be considered contemporary terminology such as `freedom of religion' and `conflict management systems' in my own analysis in seeking to correlate a historical text with a relevant, contemporary understanding of the notion of Conciliation and its related discourse.

I have tabulated the layout of Conciliation verses and segments across each sura group, providing a `Conciliation Map' at the end of each chapter. The tabulated presentation of Qur'anic data is a common contemporary format in Qur'anic analysis. These Maps serve both as an interim figurative summary of key verses and an incremental device for the consolidation of data through the chapters, ultimately informing the structural and thematic analysis in the overall Conciliation Map and final conclusions at the end of the book. Subjectivity is inherent in original Qur'anic research (El-Awa, 2006, p.21) and the content of my society is similarly limited by the subjectivity of my analysis. I have counterbalanced by greater transparency in presenting underlying material. The research is based primarily on historical texts and does not deal with any human subjects. Ethical issues should therefore be limited to proper acknowledgement and referencing 01 primary source material and secondary literature.

In English translations of the Qur'an, I use Abdel Haleem (2005) as m^ main translation due to its academic authorship, literary focus on the Qur'anic text and contemporary English language. I also

occasionally refer to Vusuf All (2001), Nasr (2015) and Asad (2003) for additional insight into some key verses based on their comparative translations, elucidatory alternative meanings and explanatory notes - although I give much greater emphasis to primary sources of Tafsir, namely ^l-Razi and Islah^, in accordance with my general methodology. For Qur'anic and Arabic dictionaries, I refer to Mufradat ^lfa ^l-Qur'an (Al-Isfahani, 2009), Al-Mu jam Al-Mufahras Li-Alfa. Al-Qur'an Al-Karim (`^bd Al-Baqi, 2001), the Dictionary of Qur'anic Usage (Abdel Haleem and Badawi, 2013) and Lisan Al- Arab (Ibn Manzur, 2014). Variant Qur'anic readings, often indicated by Al-RazI or otherwise highlighted in this work, are listed in 'jama Al-Qira'at al-Qur'aniyya (`Umar and Mukarram, 1983).

In presenting my Qur'anic analysis in each chapter, I progress sequentially through the respective sura group, discussing in turn the key Conciliation verses or longer text segments identified in m^ structural review, as explained above. Where necessary, I adduce relevant intertextual references from further on in the sura group or elsewhere in the Qur'an to enrich my analysis of these verses, for example where a Qur'anic concept under discussion features elsewhere. Key Conciliation verses or text segments are identified in the initial overview of each chapter and also included in the summary table at the end of each chapter. Due to the volume of Qur'anic material, references to English translations of Qur'anic text and Al-Razi's tafsir are by Qur'anic verse number, whilst references to Islahi's tafsir, which is less readily searchable by verse number, are by volume and page number. Due to the number of references, I use `Prophet', capitalised, to refer to the prophet Mohammed, mentioning other prophets b^ name (in Islamic convention, the names of prophets are customarily followed by the honorific expression `peace be upon him'). Although I generally translate each instance of Arabic and Urdu terms, I omit recurrent translations where the meaning should be apparent from frequency of use or a proximate earlier translation. English translations of Qur'anic text without citations are my own. All translations of Urdu and Arabic tafsir are my own.

Having introduced the motivation behind this research as well as its scope and methodology, the following section now provides the historical and contemporary context for this thematic study of Conciliation in the Qur'an. <>

THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF ISLAMIC PHILOSOPHY
edited by Khaled El-Rouayheb and Sabine Schmidtke [Oxford Handbooks, Oxford University Press, 9780199917389]

The study of Islamic philosophy has entered a new and exciting phase in the last few years. Both the received canon of Islamic philosophers and the narrative of the course of Islamic philosophy are in the process of being radically questioned and revised. Most twentieth-century Western scholarship on Arabic or Islamic philosophy has focused on the period from the ninth century to the twelfth. It is a measure of the transformation that is currently underway in the field that, unlike other reference works, the Oxford Handbook has striven to give roughly equal weight to every century, from the ninth to the twentieth. The Handbook is also unique in that its 30 chapters are work-centered rather than person- or theme-centered, in particular taking advantage of recent new editions and translations that have renewed interest and debate around the Islamic philosophical canon.

THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF ISLAMIC PHILOSOPHY gives both the advanced student and active scholar in Islamic philosophy, theology, and intellectual history, a strong sense of what a work in Islamic philosophy looks like and a deep view of the issues, concepts, and arguments that are at stake. Most importantly, it provides an up-to-date portrait of contemporary scholarship on Islamic philosophy.

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ʿAllāma Ṭabāṭabāʾī (d. 1981), Nihāyat al-ḥikma by Sajjad H. Rizvi and Ahab Bdaiwi
Zakī Najīb Maḥmūd (d. 1993), Naḥwa Falsafa ʿIlmiyya (Toward a Scientific Philosophy) by Muhammad Ali Khalidi
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Excerpt: The study of Islamic philosophy has entered a new and exciting phase in the last few years. Both the received canon of Islamic philosophers and the narrative of the course of Islamic philosophy are in the process of being radically questioned and revised. The bulk of twentieth-century Western scholarship on Arabic or Islamic philosophy focused on the period from the ninth century to the twelfth. It is a measure of the transformation that is currently underway in the field that the present Oxford Handbook has striven to give roughly equal weight to every century from the ninth to the twentieth. 1.1. Rethinking the Course of Islamic Philosophy Older assumptions about the study of Islamic philosophy were part of a grand narrative according to which the Islamic world preserved and interpreted the Greek philosophical heritage during the European "Dark Ages" and later handed over this heritage to the Latin West in the course of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. At this point, the role of the Islamic world in the narrative was over, and little scholarly attention was given to later Islamic philosophy. Some even speculated that, due to the disapproval of orthodox the¬ologians, the philosophical tradition died out in the Islamic world in the twelfth century— so that, by a stroke of luck, the Latin West managed to take over the Greek philosophical heritage just in time, before the Islamic world itself repudiated this heritage and sank into fideist darkness. (Influential and older studies in this tradition include De Boer 1901; O'Leary 1922; Madkour 1934; Fākhūrī and Jurr 1957; Watt 1962.) Three pioneering figures who questioned this narrative in the West starting from the 1960s were Henry Corbin, Seyyed Hossein Nasr, and Nicholas Rescher. Corbin and Nasr, influenced by a very different narrative of the history of Islamic philosophy that has survived in Iran, showed in a series of studies that the Islamic philosophical tradition continued without interruption in Shīʿī Iranian circles down to the modern period (see, for example, Corbin 1964; Nasr 1961, 1964). They emphasized in particular the rise of the anti-Peripatetic Platonist "Illuminationist" (ishrāqī) school of Suhrawardī (d. 587/1191) and the later synthesis of Illuminationist and mystical philosophy in seventeenth-century Iran. Rescher, for his part, drew attention to the continued vigor and sophistication of Arabic works on logic in the thirteenth century, a century after the supposed demise of the Islamic philosophical tradition (Rescher 1964, 1967). The insights of Corbin, Nasr, and Rescher have since been incorporated into mainstream presentations of Islamic philosophy. The excellent Cambridge Companion to Arabic Philosophy (edited by Peter Adamson and Richard C. Taylor, 2005), for example, emphasizes the period from the ninth to the twelfth centuries, but also includes chapters on Suhrawardī and later Shīʿī Iranian philosophy, and its chapter on logic acknowledges and develops the insights of Rescher concerning thirteenth-century Arabic logic. In recent years, however, the field has moved decisively beyond the points made by Corbin, Nasr, and Rescher in the 1960s, and it is high time for a new presentation that reflects this fact. It is now generally recognized that Corbin and Nasr unduly stressed the Platonist-mystical-Shīʿī synthesis of later centuries. Especially Hossein Ziai and John Walbridge have drawn attention to aspects of the Illuminationist philosophical tradition such as physics and logic that were of little interest to Corbin and Nasr (see especially Ziai 1990; Ziai and Alwishah 2003; Walbridge 2005; Ziai 2010; Walbridge 2012). At the same time, it is beginning to emerge that there is a largely untold story of continued philosophical activity outside Illuminationist and Shīʿī-Iranian circles. Particularly the work of Dimitri Gutas, A. I. Sabra, Ayman

Shihadeh, and Rob Wisnovsky has drawn attention to the fact that the supposed demise of philosophy in the (majority) Sunnī Islamic world is a myth (Gutas 2002; Sabra 1994; Shihadeh 2005; Wisnovsky 2004b, 2013). It may be that the word falsafa ("philosophy") was typically avoided due to association with specific ideas deemed heretical by mainstream religious scholars (for example, the eternity of the world, the denial of the possibility of miracles, the denial of God's knowledge of particulars in the sublunary world, and the denial of bo
sense of the word was still pursued under other names. Especially the field of Islamic theology (kalām) became thoroughly suffused in later centuries with terminology, issues, and modes of argumentation derived from Greek philosophy. Widely studied handbooks of theology after the twelfth century typically de voted considerable attention to thoroughly rational discussions of philosophical topics such as the nature of knowledge, the relation between essence and existence, the soul and its relation to the body, the ten Aristotelian categories, predication, modality, the nature of time and space, physics and cosmology (see, for example, the table of contents of one such theological handbook translated in Calverley and Pollock 2002, or the contribution by Alnoor Dhanani to the present volume, on another handbook from the fourteenth century). The study of logic also became incorporated into the curricula of Islamic colleges (madrasas) in later centuries, and the continued vitality of the later tradition of logic even beyond the thirteenth century has been brought out by recent research (for example El-Rouayheb 2010). The upshot is that sophisticated epistemological, metaphysical, natural-philosophical, and logical discussions in later centuries were often carried out by scholars who did not self-identify as falāsifa largely because they would have associated the term with acceptance of an Aristotelian and/or Neoplatonic cosmology. Supplementing these recent insights have been a number of further developments in the field. In the past decades, there has been a steady stream of modern editions of philosophical works, largely thanks to the efforts of modern scholars in the Islamic world. According to the older vision of Corbin and Nasr, Mullā Ṣadrā Shīrāzī (d. 1045/1635) marked the culmination of the later Islamic philosophical tradition. Nevertheless, recent years has seen editions of works by important later philosophers active in Iran, some of whom were highly critical of Mullā Ṣadrā, such as Rajab ʿAlī Tabrīzī (d. 1080/1669), Āqā Ḥusayn Khwānsārī (d. 1098/1687), and Aḥmad Aḥsāʾī (d. 1243/1826) (see, for example, Hiravī and Bayraq 2007; Iṣfahānī 1999; Bū 'Alī 2007). Furthermore, the older narrative of later Islamic philosophy tended to jump from Suhrawardī in the twelfth century to Mullā Ṣadrā in the seventeenth. Recent editions and studies have drawn attention to important figures in the intervening centuries, such as Ibn Kammūna (d. 683/1284), Quṭb al-Dīn alShīrāzī (d. 711/1311), Ibn Abī Jumhūr al-Aḥsāʾī (fl. 883/1479), and Najm al-Dīn Nayrīzī (fl. 928/1522). (See, for example, Walbridge 1992; Schmidtke 2000; Schmidtke and Pourjavady 2006; Ḥabībī 2009; Pourjavady 2011.) There has also been an awakening of interest in Ottoman philosophy in recent years in Turkey, with scholars beginning to edit works by important figures such as Ṭāşköprüzāde (d. 968/1561), Ebū Saʿīd Ḫādimī (d. 1176/1762), and Ismāʿīl Gelenbevī (d. 1205/1790) (see Gül 2009; Konevi and Konevi 2012; Öküdan 2007). Later Indo-Islamic philosophy is also beginning to receive some of the attention it deserves, especially in the work of Asad Q. Ahmed and Sajjad Rizvi (see, for example, Ahmed 2013a, 2013b; Rizvi, 2011). Equally important, there has lately been a significant re-evaluation of the literary forms of commentary (sharḥ) and gloss (ḥāshiyah). For much of the twentieth century, the predominant assumption was that the commentaries and glosses of later centuries were pedantic and uncritical expositions that would not merit closer examination. However, this was largely an "armchair" assumption not grounded in a patient examination of these works. In recent years, the older view has been questioned, and more and more

scholars are coming to recognize that commentaries and glosses were important vehicles for critical reflection in later centuries (see especially Wisnovsky 2004a; Ahmed 2013b). The fifteenth-century Persian scholar Jalāl al-Dīn al-Dawānī (d. 908/1502), for example, was ar guably one of the most innovative and influential of later Islamic philosophers. Yet his major writings—widely studied for centuries in Iran, India, and the Ottoman Empire—took the form of commentaries and glosses on works by earlier figures (see Reza Pourjavady's contribution to this volume for further details). I.2. A New Presentation of the Field The present volume is different from earlier overviews in two conspicuous ways. First, as mentioned above, it strives to give roughly equal weight to every century from the ninth to the twentieth. Second, its entries are work centered rather than person or theme centered. In other words, contributors focus, after briefly introducing a philosopher's life and oeuvre, on one major work and give a relatively detailed exposé of it. Article-length entries on individual philosophers can be excellent, but they often have to sacrifice depth to breadth. Entries on movements would have to sacrifice depth to breadth to an even greater degree, and would risk becoming little more than a list of names and titles. Entries on themes are arguably not feasible given the present stage of research. Too few contemporary scholars have a solid command of both earlier and later Islamic philosophical literature, and thematic entries would risk being slanted toward the earlier centuries and more well-known figures at the expense of the later period and lesser-known figures. Particularly at a time when the canon of Islamic philosophy is being reconsidered and new figures and works are emerging from undeserved obscurity, a thematic approach would be counterproductive. The work-centered format is also intended to allow room for the attention to detail and sustained exposition that are often sacrificed in article-length surveys of the entire range of contributions by an individual philosopher. This should hopefully give the reader a better sense of what a work in Islamic philosophy looks like and a better idea of the issues, concepts, and arguments that are at play in works belonging to various periods and subfields within Islamic philosophy. The selection of entries has aimed to bring out the uninterrupted history of Islamic philosophy down to the modern period, and to emphasize the fact that philosophical activity in later centuries was not confined to one region of the Islamic world and was not exclusively preoccupied with a single set of issues. Works that were the product of the vibrant philosophical scene in Iran in the Safavid (1501–1722) and Qajar (1779–1925) periods have been supplemented by including less-known works from Egypt, Ottoman Turkey, and Mughal India, and later works with the expected focus on metaphysics and ontology have been supplemented with works on logic and natural philosophy. The twentieth-century works that are covered include an attempt by a traditionally trained Shīʿī scholar to solve Hume's problem of induction, and an influential Egyptian philosopher's adaptation of the ideas of the logical positivists. By covering such works, we hope to challenge a widespread assumption that later Islamic philosophy is necessarily an arcane (or peculiarly "spiritual") discipline that, for better or worse, bears little relation to the concerns of modern Western analytic philosophers Though one of the aims of the present work has been to broaden the geographic and temporal scope of the field of Islamic philosophy, some major figures and works that ideally should have been included have unfortunately had to be left out. Inevitably, some of the scholars who were asked to contribute to the volume were unable to do so, for reasons ranging from prior commitments to medical issues. Though we actively sought contributions from scholars who are based in the Islamic world, many of these scholars were not comfortable writing in English. Due to such factors, our volume has had to forgo including contributions on works by, for example, the important logician and philosophical theologian Saʿd al-Dīn al-Taftāzānī (d. 792/1390), the Ottoman scholars Ahmed Ṭāşköprüzāde and Ismāʿīl Gelenbevī, as well as Safavid and

post-Safavid philosophers such as Ghiyāth al-Dīn Dashtakī (d. 948/1542), Rajab ʻAlī Tabrīzī, Mahdī Narāqī (d. 1209/1795), and Aḥmad Aḥsāʾī. There is a long-standing dispute over whether to call the field of study "Arabic philosophy" or "Islamic philosophy." Neither term is entirely satisfactory. The term "Arabic philosophy" is often deemed offensive by non-Arab Muslims. To some extent, this might be because it is difficult to capture the distinction made in English between "Arabic" (a linguistic designation) and "Arab" (an ethnic designation) in some relevant languages. In Arabic and Persian, for example, both would be translated as ʻarabī, and the term "Arab philosophy" is clearly both inadequate and offensive. But even the linguistic term "Arabic" elides the fact that especially in later centuries philosophical works were written in Persian and Turkish (and even English, as in the case of Muhammad Iqbal). At the same time, the term "Islamic philosophy" does not do justice to the role of non-Muslims in this tradition, for example the Christians Ḥunayn ibn Isḥāq (d. 260/873), Yaḥyā ibn ʻAdī (d. 363/974), and Abū l-Faraj Ibn al-Ṭayyib (d. 434/1043), or the Zoroastrian student of Avicenna Bahmanyār (d. 457/1065), or the Jewish philosophers Abū l-Barakāt al-Baghdādī (d. 560/1165) and Ibn Kammūna. Furthermore, some contributors to the tradition, such as Abū Bakr al-Rāzī (d. 313/925), were born Muslims but came to reject fundamental precepts of the Islamic religion (such as prophecy). In light of these difficulties, some modern scholars prefer locutions such as "philosophy in the Islamic world" or even "Islamicate philosophy," but the first of these is unwieldy and the second unfamiliar. In the end, there are more important tasks than getting bogged down in issues of nomenclature. "Islamic philosophy" may not be ideal, but a choice had to be made, and it may be less unsatisfactory than the alternatives. <>

Perspectives on Early Islamic Mysticism: The World of al-Hakim al-Tirmidhi and his Contemporaries by Sara Sviri [Routledge Sufi Series, Routledge, 9780415302838]

This monograph explores the original literary produce of Muslim mystics during the eighth–tenth centuries, with special attention to ninth-century mystics, such as al-Tustarī, al-Muḥāsibī, al-Kharrāz, al-Junayd and, in particular, al-Ḥakīm al-Tirmidhī. Unlike other studies dealing with the so-called 'Formative Period', this book focuses on the extant writings of early mystics rather than on the later Ṣūfī compilations.

These early mystics articulated what would become a hallmark of Islamic mysticism: a system built around the psychological tension between the self (*nafs*) and the heart (*qalb*) and how to overcome it. Through their writings, already at this early phase, the versatility, fluidity and maturity of Islamic mysticism become apparent. This exploration thus reveals that mysticism in Islam emerged earlier than customarily acknowledged, long before Islamic mysticism became generically known as Ṣūfism.

The central figure of this book is al-Ḥakīm al-Tirmidhī, whose teaching and inner world focus on themes such as polarity, the training of the self, the opening of the heart, the Friends of God (*al-awliyāʾ*), dreams and visions, divine language, mystical exegesis and more.

This book thus offers a fuller picture than hitherto presented of the versatility of themes, processes, images, practices, terminology and thought models during this early period. The volume will be a key resource for scholars and students interested in the study of religion, Ṣūfī studies, Late Antiquity and Medieval Islam.

CONTENTS

Perspectives on Early Islamic Mysticism – the world of al-Ḥakīm al-Tirmidhī and his contemporaries

The chapters brought together in this monograph are the outcome of an enduring study of Islamic Mysticism, in particular its early manifestations. Historically, these refer to the period from the second/eighth to the fourth/tenth centuries, during which Muslim mystics wrote the earliest documents that became available to us. In literary terms, it draws mainly on texts written by individual authors rather than on manuals and compilations. This can also be said to refer to the phase before Islamic mysticism became known as Ṣūfism. The main protagonist of my study has been al-Ḥakīm al-Tirmidhī, a ninth-century mystic from the town of Tirmidh in Transoxiana. The main notions that have inspired my monograph are 'Sweetness and Inner Struggle'; al-Tirmidhī often uses the word 'sweetness' (ḥalāwa), by

which he describes the resonance of the mystical experiences that occur in his heart, while the notion of 'inner struggle' reflects the effort vis-à-vis the nafs, the 'lower-self', the 'personality', which stands in his way. These two facets are inseparable; they delineate the polar process familiar to generations of seekers and wayfarers on the mystical path.

Overview

My study started with a PhD dissertation on the ninth-century mystic al-Ḥakīm al-Tirmidhī. The dissertation was supervised by Prof. Shaul Shaked, one of the great experts of the Iranian religions, who, at that time, had been teaching also courses on Islamic mysticism. Before embarking on a research proposal, I had consulted with my university teacher and mentor, Prof. M.J. Kister. As I recall, he simply referred me to an article by Othman Yahya titled "L'oeuvre de Tirmiḏī (Essai Bibliographique)". Prior to this, I had not been aware of an al-Ḥakīm al-Tirmidhī, a mystic, to be distinguished from Abū ʿĪsā al-Tirmidhī, the renowned ḥadīth compiler. But reading Yahya's article – mostly a bibliography with a short biographical introduction – a few things caught my attention: first, the large number of titles under al-Ḥakīm al-Tirmidhī's name – Yahya lists 106 titles. Though I had already started to familiarize myself with some literature concerning Ṣūfism, I had not hitherto come across al-Tirmidhī's name. In view of the vast corpus attributed to him, I wondered why he had not become a 'household' name in the history of Ṣūfism, on a par, say, with al-Junayd, al-Ḥallāj or al-Ghazālī. Second, I was intrigued by the information about an autobiographical text that he composed, apparently with anecdotes concerning his spiritual awakening and journey and records of his and his wife's dreams; in other words: a personal account of a mystical journey. Yahya's allusion to al-Tirmidhī's doctrine of the 'Seal of Saints' (khātam al-awliyāʾ), which seemed – and indeed is – an audacious parallel to the 'Seal of Prophets', also sparked my student's curiosity. When I realized that a work by al-Tirmidhī, titled Masāʾil al-taʿbīr (Questions concerning interpretation [of Dreams]), had been published by A.J. Arberry as early as 1940, I felt encouraged by the interest in him by one of the eminent modern scholars of Islamic mysticism. These scant pieces of information, against the background of al-Tirmidhī's early historical appearance and relative obscurity, were stimuli strong enough for me to embark on a study of his writings and teachings for a PhD project. In time, as I plunged into the original texts, and as the volume of reading grew, my initial curiosity deepened and became an absorbed interest which energized my research. These 'original texts', most of them written by al-Tirmidhī or by his contemporaries, opened for me the richness and complexity, as well as the lasting impact, of the early Muslim mystics. Over the years, my study branched out into enquiries of historical, terminological, phenomenological and comparative nature. The ideas and insights that these enquiries produced were articulated in papers and lectures, published and delivered in various publications and venues, as well as in folders full of draft material. This monograph, then, presents my cumulative appraisal of certain themes and teachings that make out the early period of Islamic mysticism as I have learnt to see and value it.

Although I touch on historical events and processes, my writing does not follow, primarily, historiographical and chronological parameters. I am not intent on presenting a systematic chronology of figures or events, although these too are touched upon and referred to. My main objective is to bring out themes and phenomena which, to my understanding, present crucial interests, understandings, outlooks and struggles of the early Muslim mystics – as can be gleaned from their own writing. The main protagonist of these presentations is al-Ḥakīm al-Tirmidhī. Since the early days of studying his writings, I have never stopped marvelling at his original and resolute, not to say audacious, viewpoints concerning

what we may describe as the 'Phenomenology and Typology of Friendship with God' (succinctly: ʿilm al-wilāya). Erudite in the traditional sciences of religion (ʿulūm al-dīn), faithfully falling back on traditions (ḥadīths) and commentaries (tafsīrs) handed to him by his father and by other transmitters, al-Ḥakīm al-Tirmidhī nevertheless firmly upholds the notion that divine knowledge (ʿilm Allāh, maʿrifa, ḥikma) is handed directly to chosen men, the 'Friends of God' (awliyāʾ Allāh), not by means of learning and intellection, but by means of revealed inspiration. This appears in the heart, when it is ready to receive it; it may descend in the form of dreams, visions and intuitions. Undoubtedly, his writing implies that he considered himself to be one of the chosen ones; accordingly, what he wrote, he saw as emanating from direct divine teaching. As his short autobiography shows, he most probably also regarded his wife, whose name he does not disclose, as one of God's 'friends'. Among dreams and revelations that she had experienced in the night, related to him in the morning and which he consequently recorded in his own time, one in particular should be mentioned, in which it was revealed to her that both she and her husband "are together at the same place …" (see Chapter 11). Moreover, her dreams in many respects conveyed messages addressed to him as divine teachings. Here is an example: his wife dreams about a menace impending on their hometown from an invading army and its formidable commander. All the town's inhabitants crowd together terrified on the high road, for the commander (al-amīr) and his army are known for their ferocity and mercilessness. Thirty-nine men are taken captive and incarcerated in an enclosure. All are waiting for the fortieth, the saviour; the crowd even murmur his name: Muḥammad ibn ʿAlī, her husband. Then he indeed appears, tall and regal in new white clothes, and joins the thirty-nine captives in the enclosure. He is the awaited fortieth who completes the number of the chosen ones, without whom, the world with all its localities and denizens cannot subsist. When he arrives, the commander is appeased, the troops withdraw and the town and its inhabitants are out of harm's way (on the forty abdāl, see Chapter 10). In the context of the 'science of the Friends', it is obvious that al-Tirmidhī's bold and uncommon doctrine of the 'Seal of Saints' (khātam al-awliyāʾ), a doctrine that had sparked off my interest in the early days of studying him, should be reiterated.

Al-Ḥakīm al-Tirmidhī is the central figure in these assembled chapters, but I also refer to other early mystics whose writings are extant. The literary corpus, which existed prior to the later compilatory literature, merits a special label: I refer to it as 'the pre-compilations' literature. Indeed, most of our information concerning Islamic mysticism derives from the genre known as Ṣūfī compilations, or Ṣūfī manuals. The earliest compilation, probably al-Kalābādhī's Kitāb al-taʿarruf li-madhhab ahl al-taṣawwuf, or al-Sarrāj's Kitāb al-Lumaʿ, appeared in the late fourth/tenth century. Yet the earlier extant corpus of mystical writings originated from the second/eighth to the fourth/tenth centuries. It includes writings by Shaqīq al-Balkhī (d. 195/810), al-Muḥāsibī (d. 243/857), Sahl al-Tustarī (d. 283/896), Abū Saʿīd al-Kharrāz (d. 286/899) al-Ḥakīm al-Tirmidhī (d. c.910), Abū al-Qāsim al-Junayd (d. 298/910), al-Ḥusayn b. Manṣūr al-Ḥallāj (d. 309/922) and a few other mystics whose writings, apparently original, survived. The lives and teachings of these early mystics, to a greater or lesser extent, have been researched by modern scholars. Since my own research has focused on al-Tirmidhī, it behoves me to list a few of the scholarly works concerning them that have inspired and informed me.

First and foremost on this list is the monumental study of al-Ḥallāj by Louis Massignon.8 Written in French, its four volumes, data-laden, were translated into English by Herbert Mason, who wrote also an abridged version and his own short monograph titled Al-Hallaj. Massignon's study is indispensable not only for the study of al-Ḥallāj but for many themes concerning the religious culture of the first Islamic

centuries. Al-Ḥallāj's Dīwān, his Kitāb al-Ṭawāsīn and the collection of narratives titled Akhbār al-Ḥallāj concerning his extraordinary life and feats were first published by Massignon (the Akhbār together with Paul Kraus) and came out henceforth in various editions and translations. This rich corpus has strengthened my conviction that in the third/ninth century, mystical life and writing had already been vibrant and variegated.

Second in the line-up comes al-Ḥārith al-Muḥāsibī. He first caught the attention of Margaret Smith (d. 1970), an early twentieth-century scholar of Christian and Islamic mysticism and one of the first women to study at the University of Cambridge. In al-Muḥāsibī's teachings, she recognized a special attention to 'inner work', the 'actions of the hearts' (aʿmāl al-qulūb), and the continuation of the inward-looking practices of the Syriac Church fathers, especially Isaac of Nineveh (c.613–c.700). Her seminal work An Early Mystic of Baghdad: A Study of the Life and Teaching of Ḥārith B. Asad al-Muḥāsibī a.d. 781–85713 was joined by an edition of al-Muḥāsibī's important work, Kitāb al-riʿāya li-ḥuqūq Allāh (The Book of Observance of what is due to God). Later, Josef van Ess, one of the most esteemed contemporary scholars of Early Islam, also took interest in al-Muḥāsibī. His Die Gedankenwelt des Ḥārit al-Muḥāsibī has been a great source of information as well as offering a methodological paradigm for the study of early Islamic mysticism. In 1994, ʿUwaiḍa's monograph in Arabic came out in Beirut titled Al-Ḥārith b. Asad al-Muḥāsibī al-ʿālim al-zāhid al-faqīh (Al-Muḥāsibī: Scholar, Renunciant and Jurisprudent). The most recent study of al-Muḥāsibī is Gavin Picken's Spiritual Purification in Islam: The Life and Works of al-Muḥāsibī.

Sahl al-Tustarī, too, caught the attention of several scholars. In 1980, Gerhard Böwering published his brilliant monograph on him. For me, it has always been an exemplary study of the earliest mystical Qurʾān commentary recorded. Its astute observations and analysis of al-Tustarī in particular, as well as of early mystical manifestations in Islam in general, have been an eye-opener. More recently, Annabel and Ali Keeler took up the massive task of publishing an annotated English translation of Sahl's tafsīr.

Abū al-Qāsim al-Junayd and Abū Saʿīd al-Kharrāz are two well-known and often cited early mystics. The study of their original works, however, has been rather scarce. In 1962, Abdel-Kader's monograph, The Life, Personality and Writings of al-Junayd: A Study of a Third/Ninth Century Mystic, was published. In 2004, Suʿād al-Ḥakīm published the collected works of al-Junayd, together with an analysis and study. It is titled Tāj al-ʿārifīn, al-Junayd al-Baghdādī: al-aʿmāl al-kāmilah (The Crown of the Knowers: Al-Junayd's Collected Works). Roger Deladrière's 1983 annotated French translation, titled Abū 'l-Qāsim al-Junayd. Enseignement spirituel: traités, lettres, oraisons et sentences, should also be mentioned.

As for Abū Saʿīd al-Kharrāz, scholarly works on him are oddly wanting. Despite A.J. Arberry's 1937 edition and translation of Kitāb al-Ṣidq (The Book of Truthfulness)23 and al-Sāmarrāʾī's 1967 edition of Rasāʾil al-Kharrāz – both publications contain enlightening Introductions – I am aware of one study only: Kīlānī's 2012 al-Imām al-Kharrāz shaykh al-fanā' wa-al-baqā' (Al-Kharrāz, The Master of Annihilation and Permanence).25 Between Arberry's and Sāmarrāʾī's editions, we have at our disposal seven 'epistles' (rasā'il) or 'books' (kutub) composed by al-Kharrāz: on Truthfulness (ṣidq); on Purity (Kitāb al-Ṣafā'); on Bright Light (Kitāb al-Ḍiyā'); on Revelation and Explication (Kitāb al-Kashf wa 'l-Bayān); on Emptiness (Kitāb al-Farāgh); on True Realities (Kitāb al-Ḥaqā'iq) and on Secret (Kitāb al-Sirr). They are a treasure

trove for anyone interested in the development of terminology, ideas, practices and issues pertaining to the mystical culture during the third/ninth-century Islam. Had I not been intent on compiling this monograph with particular attention to al-Ḥakīm al-Tirmidhī, and had I longer research time on my hands – I would no doubt turn my scholarly attention to this central figure. At any rate, such research should not fail to follow the important material and astute analysis concerning al-Kharrāz in Paul Nwyia's seminal Exégèse coranique et langage mystique.

I have left Shaqīq al-Balkhī, the earliest mystic whose works are extant, to the end of this list. This is in order to connect him with Paul Nwyia just mentioned above, to whom I feel indebted in many ways – especially for making available the writings of this early mystic. I refer to Shaqīq al-Balkhī in various chapters of this monograph, as one in whose writings we can already observe the basic parameters of Islamic mysticism (see especially Chapters 1, 3 and 8). Scrutinizing Nwyia's publications associated with early mystics, I can only conjecture that he too saw the importance of exhibiting their early writings and of drawing from them the structure and essence of Islamic mysticism. It is thus sad and unfortunate that his premature death in 1980 left his endeavour unfinished. Indeed, I concur with what I assume had been Nwyia's perspective, namely, that these first-hand works, written in different parts of the Islamic world, throw light on the early stages at which the mystical culture, subsequently known as Ṣūfism, had been taking shape. In studying the early phase of Islamic mysticism and in referring to works written earlier than, and outside of, the later compilatory literature, I humbly follow in the footsteps of this esteemed scholar (whom I had never had the good fortune to meet) and dedicate this monograph to his memory.

The twofold perspective of this study: a digression

The compilatory literature, though not central, remains present in this monograph, not only for relevant parallels and references, but also to put in relief the evolutionary lines of what was eventually identified as Ṣūfism, an identification based mainly on these very compilations. Hence, in studying original writings as the basis for analyses and comparisons with the later genre, I will envisage the materials at hand from two perspectives simultaneously: the one finite and closed – as behoves past things; the other fluid and open-ended as befits a process at work. I maintain that without holding such a twofold perspective, one risks losing sight of the mutability, fluidity and diversity of processes in transition implied by the very notion of 'early manifestations', which, at times, is referred to also as 'the formative period'.

A digression is due here for pondering this twofold perspective in the study of a 'formative period'. Viewing and reviewing a 'formative period' of any historical body presents a methodological and epistemological challenge. While bias and preconceived ideas can hardly be avoided in any historical study, what is specific to studying a 'formative period' – which is ostensibly in the throes of being formed – is the need to be aware of built-in distortions that stem from observing, in hindsight, evolving processes as faits accomplis. In terms of Islamic mysticism, such distortions are apparent not only in academic research, but also in the sources themselves, namely, in the Ṣūfī compilations, upon which research falls back. Whereas the compilatory genre bears the hallmarks of later redactors, who, in line with by now established paradigms and favourite narratives, rewrote, fashioned, sorted out and selected memories, events and concepts pertaining to former personalities, the original writings of the earlier stage record ideas, persons, experiences and terminology in a more immediate, less designed, fashion. The later Ṣūfī corpus, therefore, should be reviewed alongside its built-in distortions and bias. Expressed more bluntly: comparing earlier materials with the cumulative compilatory corpus reveals deliberate

attempts at aligning the early with the contemporary. We can see in it a deliberate wish to iron out what became obsolete or distasteful to later perceptions.

A well-known case in point is the wide-ranging Ṣūfī attitude towards al-Ḥallāj. Not only was he incarcerated by the ʿAbbasid authorities in Baghdād, apparently for his ecstatic utterances, he was executed there – for all intents and purposes a dramatic event with severe consequences.28 The Baghdādī Ṣūfīs, some of whom had been his former companions, and especially al-Junayd, his former master, ignored him and turned their back on him – all but a few. Regardless of these unusual events, the compilatory literature, especially al-Sarrāj's Kitāb al-Lumaʿ, virtually ignores him.29 In stark contrast, al-Sarrāj dedicates several sections to the ecstatic utterances of Abū Yazīd al-Biṣṭāmī, despite their being no less audacious. These are accompanied by al-Junayd's extensive apologetic interpretations of these ecstatic utterances. What are the implications of such a discrepancy and such omissions? I suggest that the later compilers often chose the method of silencing, not to say censoring, the voices which appeared too offensive and out-of-line to their contemporaries' taste and ideology. Beyond the different leanings of the third/ninth and fourth/tenth centuries – mystical, theological, sectarian – that played out their different 'political' roles in the events of this period, and which had been researched in depth by Massignon and his followers, one should also heed to the method of 'silencing', or adjusting, of the materials at hand. Thus, omissions and variances surely reflect the way in which the compilatory culture attuned itself to the prevailing preconceptions and prejudice of its ambience.

Another example of a remarkable divergence, to which there is hardly any evidence in the compilations, takes me back to al-Ḥakīm al-Tirmidhī; it concerns the divine name al-Ḥaqq. As is commonly known, one of the most characteristic usages in Ṣūfī vocabulary is the divine name al-Ḥaqq (literally: the True; the Truth; the Just). In the Ṣūfī lore, al-Ḥaqq – one of the ninety-nine beautiful names of God – had become the one by which Ṣūfīs chose to refer to Allāh. However, in the writings of al-Ḥakīm al-Tirmidhī, the meaning and use of al-Ḥaqq is altogether different. For him, al-Ḥaqq appears as a formidable, disciplinary, heavenly persona, or hypostasis, nominated over law and order in the world at large as well as in the lives and afterlives of human beings. Among his special tasks is watching over the process of edification to which the 'Friends of God' (awliyāʾ Allāh) are subjected. As I deal with this theme at length in Chapter 9, I shall defer its elaboration to that chapter. A few points, however, should be observed here: al-Tirmidhī's distinctive and extensive view and use of al-Ḥaqq did not have a follow-up in contemporary or later writings. The compilations, as we recall, reflect conclusively the Ṣūfī predilection for al-Ḥaqq as the unequivocal designation of Allāh. Nevertheless, a few other paradigms, not necessarily directly stemming from al-Tirmidhī's outlook, echo his understanding of al-Ḥaqq's extraordinary cosmic function. The first relates to mystical-philosophical writings, mostly those inspired by Neoplatonic modes of thought, where we find the concept of al-ḥaqq al-makhlūq bihi – 'al-ḥaqq by means of which creation was created'. This phrasing, or rather 'paraphrasing' of the Qurʾān (especially of Q.10:5), eschews the use of al-ḥaqq as an abstract noun denoting Truth, Reality and Justice, and sees in it a personified, instrumental entity in the Creator's service. Two early illustrations of this understanding will suffice: in the Epistle on Letters, Ibn Masarra, the tenth-century CE Andalusian philosopher-mystic, in the context of describing the sacred meanings of letters, writes: "The ḥāʾ stands for al-ḥaqq, by which the earth and the heavens were created". And the Brethren of Purity (Ikhwān al-Ṣafāʾ), a tenth-century CE (or earlier) group of intellectuals with Ismāʿīlī leanings from Baṣra,32 write in their Epistles:

> …The root (aṣl) is that for which the heavens and earth and what inheres in them and between them were created – this is al-ḥaqq al-makhlūq bihi, concerning which Allāh said: "Allāh did not create all this except by means of al-ḥaqq" (Q.10:5).33

These illustrations show that, alongside al-Ḥakīm al-Tirmidhī, other mystical currents in the early Muslim world, undoubtedly echoing late antique esoteric traditions, also envisaged a cosmic divine system, in which al-Ḥaqq played a creative, dynamic and instrumental role. These mystical currents, represented here by Ibn Masarra and the Brethren of Purity, portray a non-Ṣūfī mystical model concerning which the classical compilations are silent. Although al-Ḥakīm al-Tirmidhī, despite his idiosyncratic ideas, was ultimately endorsed by the Ṣūfī compilers – as can be seen by his presence in most Ṣūfī compilations – the Andalusian and Ismāʿīlī mystics were not. The Ṣūfī compilations include neither Shīʿī-Ismāʿīlī mystics nor Andalusian ones. As for the sixth/twelfth–seventh/thirteenth-century Ibn al-ʿArabī, an Andalusian mystic who discusses al-ḥaqq al-makhlūq bihi at length and who, despite having many radical ideas, did eventually become part of the Ṣūfī lore, he belongs to a later period, later than most classical compilations and definitely beyond the boundaries of the so-called 'formative one'.34

Late Antiquity

Throughout this monograph, I refer to 'Late Antiquity'. The historical and cultural background of Late Antiquity vis-à-vis Early Islam is, I am aware, a contentious point among the faithful and scholars alike. Leaving argumentations aside, in my work I have come to realize that this pre-Islamic period, with its rich religious cultures and philosophies, should be revisited without prejudice, for it reveals many signposts that mark the continuous flow of thought patterns, images and models into Early Islam. Currently, there has been a growing scholarly interest in the juxtaposition of Late Antiquity and Early Islam. However, despite a number of prestigious research projects, initiated and carried out by eminent scholars in related fields, the 'mystical' spheres, to the best of my knowledge, have not been systematically included or researched.

The material gathered and explored in this monograph shows that Early Islam has been porous to ideas, images and other cultural patterns, which had existed for centuries in the former historical phase labelled 'Late Antiquity'. I confine my statement to Islamic mysticism, though I am convinced – and the research projects mentioned above support my conviction – that it is valid also in respect of other cultural areas and literary branches. As for Islamic mysticism, to the extent explored in this monograph, these are my contributions: the image of the 'myrtle', explored in Chapter 10, is particularly laden with late antique antecedents. Mystical Linguistics, as can be seen from Chapter 12, is another subject matter which is hard to review without attention to a plethora of a late antique background examples. Clear traces of Jewish, Christian, Neoplatonic or Gnostic traditions are reverberated also in mystical hermeneutics, as I show in Chapter 13. The widespread engagement of mystics with 'polarity' (also binarity) – in Existence, in the divine realm, in human psychological make-up, in mystical states and in phenomena at large – reveals an obvious continuation, in particular of the mitigating coincidentia oppositorum structures, spreading from Hellenistic philosophies, Rabbinic Judaism, Gnosticism and Neo-Platonism. This theme I explore in Part III: "Polarity". The build-up of the particular type of 'asceticism', which advocates sincere attitude rather than extroverted behaviour, can also be seen in light of the challenge of contemporary Christian and Manichaean monastic and ascetical practices and ideologies. This I explore in Part I: "Asceticism and Mysticism".

A word about 'continuity' versus 'influence'. In scholarship, the topic of 'influence' often opens a polemical or apologetic discourse: Who influenced whom, how, why – these and similar ones are imminent questions in dealing with historical aspects of cultural patterns. With regards to Scriptures, questions of influence and borrowings are especially pregnant with the opposition of faith versus free thought, observance versus heresy. For example, the stories of the prophets in the Qurʾān: is there a biblical influence behind them or must the biblical versions be rejected as a tendentious corruption, abrogation or forgery (taḥrīf)?36 My research has convinced me that 'influence' is too rigid a concept in relating to the slow osmotic flow of late antique patterns into Early Islam. 'Rigidity' in methodology may be the response of honest philologists and historians to a touch of laxity in the approach of scholars who assign 'influences' too easily, without thorough historical and/or philological research. I concur with this methodology, which had been part of my academic schooling. However, I also suggest that the distinction between 'influence' and 'continuity' should be highlighted. Behind genuine influence there exists a certain awareness, manifested as either reception or rejection, of that which, allegedly, has been the source and content of influence. Continuity, on the other hand, does not require a conscious attitude from either agent or receiver; it is simply there, evidenced by the occurrences themselves presented, usually innocuously or even unconsciously, in the sources. Moreover, in terms of continuity, it is not always easy or possible to show the precise or original agent/s of the flow of patterns and images, as these are copiously prevalent in different late antique sources. Chapter 11 exemplifies this osmotic process by means of an in-depth reading of a dream, laden with ancient symbolic meanings, dreamt by al-Ḥakīm al-Tirmidhī's wife.

Al-Ḥakīm al-Tirmidhī and mainstream Ṣūfism

How, after all this, is al-Ḥakīm al-Tirmidhī linked to mainstream Ṣūfism? Mainly by two cords: first and foremost by means of his teaching on wilāya, the intimate and potent relationship between man and God. Although he was not the first to write about the friends of God, the awliyāʾ, his comprehensive study and observations which are steeped with the theme of the 'friendship with God', was bequeathed to all later strands of the Ṣūfī tradition.37 Evidently, it is for this reason that al-Hujwīrī, in Kashf al-maḥjūb, discusses wilāya in the section he devotes to the Ḥakīmīs, namely, the followers of al-Ḥakīm al-Tirmidhī.38 This teaching is inextricably connected with al-Tirmidhī's concern with an in-depth understanding of human nature and his ensuing psychological system – what I have called his 'Mystical Psychology'; in particular, his exploration of what is required for the making of an extraordinary human being. These themes are mainly discussed in Chapter 10.

Both wilāya and mystical psychology are described by al-Tirmidhī in terms of a binarity which he observes overall – in the world, in human life and in the divine realm. Binarity – which is often named 'polarity' or 'the complementarity of opposites' – is a most prolific feature of Ṣūfī teaching. Being rooted in Qurʾānic verses, it has been evinced in Islamic literary records from their earliest phases onwards; it is particularly associated with the polar states and stations on the mystical path (al-aḥwāl wa-'l-maqāmāt, al-aḥwāl al-muqābila). Thinking and imagining in polar categories became prevalent in all strata and phases of Ṣūfī literature, hence many references here are derived from both the early writings as well as from the later compilatory literature. In Chapter 7, "Between Fear and Hope", I discuss the ubiquitous presence of polarity in the nascent Ṣūfī culture and beyond and explore some of its antecedents in the

Qurʾān and in Late Antiquity. Experientially, through fluctuating polar states, the mystic is being pulled to experiencing a state of cognitive and spiritual integration (jamʿ) of polarity into a mystical oneness (jamʿ al-jamʿ, unio mystica, coincidentia oppositorum). The inner personal polarity experienced on the mystical journey reflects, according to Ṣūfī statements, the vision of God's supreme polar attributes and names: He is both awe-inspiring and majestic as well as merciful and all-embracing; both the Avenger (al-muntaqim) and the Merciful (al-Raḥmān). This coincidence is pithily formulated by the sixth–seventh/twelfth–thirteenth-century Ibn al-ʿArabī who, quoting the third/ninth-century mystic Abū Saʿīd al-Kharrāz, sees in polarity and the ensuing integration of the opposites the key to fathoming the mystical knowledge of God: "Abū Saʿīd was asked: by what have you known God? He said: by [the fact] that He brings opposites together (bi-jamʿihi bayna al-ḍiddayni)".40 This is how Ibn al-ʿArabī, delving deeper, sums up the inherent paradox of existence seen through the mystical cognition of polarity: "Every entity (ʿayn) predicated on being (wujūd) is it/not it; the entire world is it/not it; al-Ḥaqq who appears in a form is He/not He – He is the limited that is unlimited; the seen that is unseen."

To sum, and as I write in the Appendix to "Between Fear and Hope" (Chapter 10): "[I]n the large corpus of al-Ḥakīm al-Tirmidhī, this structure inheres in the core of his thought." It can thus be seen as one of his major bequests for later generations of Islamic mystics, mainstream and otherwise.

Ṣūfism, asceticism, mysticism

In the early days of studying al-Ḥakīm al-Tirmidhī, I referred to him, as well as to the contemporaries with whom he had been in contact, by the attribute ṣūfī, with no second thoughts. Hence the title of my dissertation: "The Mystical Psychology of the Ṣūfī al-Ḥakīm al-Tirmidhī". I was studying an early Muslim mystic; hence, 'Ṣūfī' seemed the appropriate designation, confirmed by the overarching and accepted application of 'Ṣūfīs' and 'Ṣūfism' to Islamic mystics and mysticism. We, researchers in the field of early Islamic mysticism, had been 'seduced' by what appeared to be the common knowledge which the later compilations inspired. Subsequently, however, it became evident that, from the perspective of the early period of Islamic mysticism, this designation was not at all appropriate. Early figures such as al-Muḥāsibī, al-Tirmidhī, the Malāmatīs of Nīshāpūr and others, were indeed mystics, but they were hardly identified by themselves or by others as 'Ṣūfīs'. Moreover, most of them intensely disapproved of the practice of wearing a rough woollen garment (libās al-ṣūf) – the ascetic practice denoting a wilful renunciation of life's comforts. This practice, in due course, lent itself to the designation ṣūfī or mutaṣawwif, but in the eyes of most early mystics, such conduct announced showing off (shuhra), of which they strongly disapproved. The literary outcome has proven to be rather confusing. In early sources, a ṣūfī, namely, a 'wool-wearer', was synonymous with 'ascetic' (zāhid) and the infinitive taṣawwuf with 'asceticism' (zuhd). Some of these so-called 'Ṣūfīs' were wandering beggars, roaming the roads and towns of Early Islam, living off leftovers and coins donated by settled townsmen. But the early mystics saw this dress code, when not resulting from genuine circumstances of poverty, as an act of 'showing-off' (shuhra, riyāʾ) – ostentatious behaviour that, to them, was counter-productive to the cultivation of sincerity (ṣidq) and faithfulness (ikhlāṣ), virtues that are enhanced by man's interiority rather than exhibited in his outer behaviour. Since the path of extroverted asceticism did not go hand in hand with the path of inner sincerity, ṣūfī, for many early mystics, was a pejorative term, unbecoming of a true seeker of divinely bestowed truth.43 Part I of the monograph deals with several aspects of asceticism versus mysticism – in particular, Chapters 2 and 3.

One of the outcomes of exploring this topic, is also my reconsideration of the conventional paradigm, according to which Islamic mysticism, eventually known as Ṣūfism, emerged from asceticism (zuhd) through a gradual process of interiorization and contemplation. This paradigm, which, curiously, is one of the most unchallenged theories in the field of Islamic studies, has become so widespread among academic scholars that it may prove hard to uproot. As I show in Chapter 1, the first to formulate it among Muslim scholars, to the best of my knowledge, was the eighth/fourteenth-century Ibn Khaldūn. Subsequently, it was embraced by modern scholarship, most notably by Ignaz Goldziher, and henceforth has been adopted by (almost) all scholars engaged with Islamic mysticism (for more details, see Chapter 1, notes 39–42). In the above-mentioned chapters, I have tried to distinguish between different views of asceticism in Early Islam and have discussed the distinction which early mystics and pietists make between 'attitude' as an internal psychological phenomenon and 'conduct' as a behavioural phenomenon. I have thus pursued their distinction between false and sincere conduct and its traditional, conceptual and mystical implications.

It may be asked why, then, I insist on labelling early personalities such as al-Muḥāsibī and al-Ḥakīm al-Tirmidhī as 'mystics' in the first place – what makes them 'mystics' when there are no social or behavioural parameters by which to underpin them? From the point of view of the Study of Religions discipline, this is a tricky question to answer. For many decades, scholars have attempted to define, defend or dethrone the twin concepts of 'mysticism' and 'mystics' – concepts so slippery and biased that they defy clear nomenclature and definition. Among contemporary scholars of religions at large, these concepts have fallen out of favour altogether. Strong objections have been raised particularly by scholars of Jewish and Islamic systems, since neither Hebrew (or, for that matter, Aramaic) nor Arabic have terms precisely equivalent to, or etymologically related to 'mysticism', whose origins are Greek and Christian. In comparison, the term 'Ṣūfī', regardless of its ambiguity and shifting meanings, allows, at least, for some social, historical, behavioural and etymological underpinnings nurtured in the field of Islamic Studies. But since my monograph is concerned with the "Early Manifestations of Islamic Mysticism", a choice has to be made; in fact, it has been made: I choose to use derivatives of 'mysticism' liberally, rather than to steer towards alternatives such as 'spiritual/ity', 'esoteric/ism' or to devise individual neologisms. My approach, phenomenologically and historically, is therefore to accept 'mysticism' as a valid term for a particular type of religious quest; by the same token, 'mystic', for me, is an appropriate term for a certain type of person engaged in a quest which I dare to name 'mystical'. In order not to perpetuate a possible tautology, I shall simply argue that the primary question at hand, as I see it, is not of designation, but of the delineation of the typology that makes out those who may be labelled, and have been labelled, 'Muslim mystics',45 and in particular those who may be additionally labelled 'early'. In this attempt, I have resorted, whenever available, to primary sources rather than to modern (or post-modern) scholarly deliberations on the phenomenology, sociology and anthropology of mysticism. In Chapter 1, I discuss these issues in more detail. As for the features of Islamic mystics, early and late, Ṣūfī and non-Ṣūfī, the following is a brief outline of the perspectives conveyed in this monograph.

The nature of early Islamic mysticism

Primary literature from as early as the second/eighth century portrays Muslim men and women who, despite their undisputed piety and loyalty to traditional precepts, felt unfulfilled by their sheer religious observation or by hopes for reward in the afterlife. They were stirred by a yearning to seek, while still in their earthly lives, God's intimate nearness (qurb, uns) and love (ḥubb) and to search out the path that

would take them to the realization of these aspirations. Hence, they were known as 'seekers' (murīdūn) and nicknamed 'wayfarers' (sāʾiḥūn, sālikūn). Their yearning for God's nearness led them to seek a direct 'knowledge of God' (al-ʿilm bi-llāh, maʿrifa); thus, they were also nicknamed 'the knowers' (al-ʿārifūn, ahl al-ʿilm bi-'llāh). They were convinced that clues to the divine knowledge had been strewn in verses of the Qurʾān and in sacred traditions, prophetic and divine. Thus, they were intent on exploring, and finding, the hidden meanings of verses and sayings. These defining elements – search, intimate nearness to God, love of and by God and God's knowledge – are the essential components of the mystical life in Early Islam and beyond. In their own vocabulary, Muslim mystics have been stirred by an aspiration to fulfil their highest vocation as 'men of sincerity' (ahl al-ṣidq), men of certitude (ahl al-yaqīn) and God's friends (awliyāʾ Allāh) – a spiritual elite (al-khāṣṣa) among ordinary worshippers (al-ʿāmma). Contemplating their fallible human nature, they realized that the main obstacle for realizing their aspirations was their inbuilt culpable interiority, characterized by ceaseless appetites and attachments to things of this world. They named this 'interiority' the nafs, the self, and watched how she collaborated with a cluster of associates (aʿdāʾ, enemies), psychological as well as cosmic: the inclination (al-hawā) and the Adversary (al-ʿaduww). Antithetical to the nafs in the human make-up was the heart (qalb), with its subtle, layered structure. This was the inner-layered member which held the true core of their being (the sirr, secret) – in their imagery: the abode of God on earth. Hence, a prerequisite to attaining their inspirations was the cleansing of the interiority; in their idiom: fighting the self (mujāhadat al-nafs) and polishing of the mirror of the heart (taṣqīl mirʾāt al-qalb). It meant striving to 'cut the worldly attachments' (qaṭʿ al-ʿalāʾiq) and to 'curtail the selfish appetites' (qaṭʿ al-shahawāt). This preliminary stage in the cleansing process, they often named 'abstention' (zuhd). According to one of the earliest texts available to us, the objective of this stage was to begin the transformation of the dark forces governing human nature into luminous energies that herald a mystical existence. Zuhd or zahāda, in the sense of abstention from worldly interests, thus denoted a stage in the process of self-transformation, rather than extroverted practices. These questions, and their contribution to the understanding of what Islamic mysticism actually entails, are pondered throughout this monograph, and mainly in Chapters 1, 3, 4, 8 and 10.

Practices and the power of language

Conventionally, Ṣūfism is associated with certain practices, in particular dhikr (remembrance) and samāʿ (listening). In addition, Ṣūfī compilations include many sections exhibiting special etiquette, ādāb, designed to regulate the behaviour of the companions in Ṣūfī gatherings, for example, in terms of eating, dressing, conversing and cleansing; they also include etiquettes prescribing norms of behaviour when alone and in the company of a Master. To students of Ṣūfism, old and modern, such practices seem a sine qua non of the Ṣūfī path. In the early literature, however, communal practices – to be distinguished from individual practices of 'training of the self' (riyāḍāt al-nafs) – are scarcely discussed.49 Nevertheless, occasionally some practices can be traced. Dhikr, for example, in the sense of periods allocated to the 'remembrance of God' beyond the prescribed canonical prayers, is no doubt a very old practice. In Badʾ shaʾn, al-Tirmidhī's autobiographical document, he briefly mentions night gatherings, in which he and his companions used to convene in order to 'remember' God: "We used to have meetings in the nights in which we would debate matters with one another (natanāẓaru), remember with one another (natadhākaru), call out [to God] (nadʿū) and beseech [Him] (nataḍarraʿu) till dawn."50 A few

sections later, he recounts a mystical experience which took place when he was on his way home after such a gathering:

> While this was going on, we convened one night for dhikr (ijtamaʿnā laylatan ʿalā 'l-dhikr) in the hospitality of one of our brethren. … [On my way back home], my heart was burst open in a manner that I cannot describe (fa'nfataḥa qalbī fatḥan lā aqdiru an aṣifahu); it was as if something fell into my heart (wa-ka-annahu waqaʿa fī qalbī shayʾ).

That dhikr had been pondered and practised in depth by al-Tirmidhī and his companions is evident also from one of his teaching treatises titled "A Question Concerning Dhikr and its Levels" (masʾala fī 'l-dhikr wa-darajātihi). This is a detailed composition, presented as a teaching discourse, which explores the multifaceted processes – physiological, psychological, mystical and cosmic – that take place when dhikr is sincerely practised. This is an extraordinary piece of writing, which may be described as an Ode to the Remembrance of God. It should be read in conjunction with two other works by al-Tirmidhī, which I repeatedly mention: Sīrat al-awliyāʾ and Riyāḍāt al-nafs. But since I have not dealt with this piece in any of the monograph's chapters, I will not linger on referring to it in this Introduction.

Associated with dhikr is the notion of the sanctity and efficacy of language, what in modern terminology may be referred to as 'performative language'. In Chapter 12, I explore al-Tirmidhī's deep regard for language as a sacred and potent tool and his faith in the protective power of linguistic formulae against personal and collective calamities. These linguistic formulae are 'words of power' pronounced repeatedly with intention and attention at certain rituals, or spontaneously in times of need: these are prayers, invocations (duʿāʾ, adʿiya, daʿawāt), silent discourse with God (najwā, munājāh) and, most importantly, the calling out of divine names to invoke the divine power. In exploring this topic, I follow al-Tirmidhī's mystical linguistics – perhaps the most profound aspect of his teaching – and his unconventional understanding of the intrinsic connection of a 'name' (or 'word') with the essence of a thing (shayʾ). A name is a name by dint of 'something' active, and potentially activating, that inheres in its root letters and their combination. This mysterious 'something', when grasped and decoded, both reveals the essential nature of the 'thing' it names as well as empowers it. The origin of this power is in the life-bestowing word kun (Be!), spoken by God in each and every creative act. Hence, the ability to activate 'things' by 'words' derives from a superior knowledge of the power of creative language, a knowledge that is not universally available; it inspires only the 'Friends of God', the awliyāʾ, those endowed with divine wisdom, without which the mysteries of the life-energy contained in language cannot be perceived or acted with. This is an essential feature of the 'friendship with God' typology: ʿilm al-awliyāʾ is, in fact, tantamount to the knowledge of the secrets of language.

Deciphering and decoding language, especially sacred language, are vital to scriptural hermeneutics (tafsīr), to the understanding of the divine words contained in the Qurʾānic verses. Exploring the ideas and concepts of Muslim mystics in this field, I have again become aware of the prevailing pre-Islamic reverberations that they encompass. In Chapter 13, relying on original works as well as on the Ṣūfī compilations, I explore some aspects of mystical hermeneutics which advocate the practice of 'listening'. The chapter unfolds from exploring the notion of istinbāṭ, 'drawing out', which, allegedly, was thought to denote Ṣūfī hermeneutics in particular, in distinction from other types of exegesis. I conclude that istinbāṭ is not confined to Ṣūfī writings and terminology but should be seen in larger literary contexts. My exploration has led me also to re-evaluate the practice of 'listening', istimāʿ. Evidently, this is an ancient practice, somewhat neglected in Ṣūfī writings and research. It is related to, but earlier than, the

renowned Ṣūfī samāʿ. As a practice, it requires the honing of the auditory experience of 'listening' to Qurʾān recitations as well as to sacred texts at large; in other words, it requires the aligning of the physical ears with the inner ones in a state of undistracted openness. When this is done with sincere attentiveness, the texts become enlivened and powerful, as though recited by the Prophet or by the angel Gabriel or even by God Himself. In the process of such an in-depth experience of istimāʿ, an understanding of the sacred texts is revealed. This understanding does not depend on received traditional commentaries, but on the light of understanding that shines in the heart – hence, "understanding has countless faces".

Centres, teachers and disciples

The various developments and writings outlined in this monograph took place in both individual and collective spaces. When reviewing al-Ḥakīm al-Tirmidhī's life as it emerges from his writings, a twofold picture emerges: he seems to be solitary, individualistic and, according to his own admission in one of his extant letters, also critical of the dependence on 'teachers'.54 But he also had social interactions of sorts, as transpires from his correspondence with some of his fellow men and from answers to questions addressed to him.55 Most interesting, historically and phenomenologically, is his correspondence with two figures associated with the 'People of Blame' (al-malāmatiyya, ahl al-malāma): Abū ʿUthmān al-Ḥīrī, one of the most eminent teachers of the Malāmatīs of Nīshāpūr, and Muḥammad b. al-Faḍl, a younger contemporary from Balkh associated with both al-Tirmidhī and the Malāmatīs. From the outset, in my attempt to figure out the early landscape of early Islamic mysticism, the extant correspondence between such early personalities became an important milestone for me. Hence, in my dissertation, I have attentively studied al-Ḥakīm al-Tirmidhī and the Malāmatiyya and have included also relevant edited texts. The whole of the second part in this monograph, therefore, is devoted to Early Schools and Teachers. In Chapter 4, I describe the teachers and disciples of the third/ninth-century malāmatī centre in Nīshāpūr and their emphasis on 'self-blame' (malāma) as a practice leading to a constant watch over and control of the activity of the nafs. I also discuss al-Tirmidhī's critique of this practice. Based on the compilations, I observe the interesting relationships between the Nīshāpūrī and the Baghdādī centres. My main sources here are the extant correspondence between al-Ḥakīm al-Tirmidhī and two malāmatī figures as well as "The Epistle on the Malāmatiyya" by al-Sulamī (d. 1021).

In Chapter 6, I focus on al-Ḥakīm al-Tirmidhī and Muḥammad ibn al-Faḍl. Both lived in the north-eastern region of the Islamic world known as Transoxiana, mostly during the third/ninth century. Extant letters addressed by al-Tirmidhī to Ibn al-Faḍl show that they had known each other. They are also connected by their acquaintance with certain of the Malāmatīs of Nīshāpūr. The fact that both had experienced harassment and opposition in their hometowns of Tirmidh and Balkh has always intrigued me. Out of the sources, which leave much to be conjectured, I have tried to clarify the circumstances and nature of the opposition levelled against them in their respective hometowns. With the help of al-Tirmidhī's works, I try to figure out why he was blamed for writing on the rationale of the religious law (ʿilal al-sharīʿa) and why his work on this subject could have been the cause for criticism, ordeal and perhaps even exile. This exploration, too, helped me to fill in some lacunae in sketching the multifaceted landscape during this early period of Islamic mysticism.

Epilogue: transition and inclusion

My understanding of a radical transition in the history of Islamic mysticism, heralding the eventual inclusion of the school of Nīshāpūr within the Ṣūfī school of Baghdād, came when I started exploring al-Khargūshī's Tahdhīb al-asrār (= Edifying the Inmost Hearts). In Chapter 5, I explore this compilation, previously hardly utilized, which was compiled by a contemporary and compatriot of al-Sulamī. I drew out of it new material for the understanding of the early mystical landscape, its developments and transitions. Focusing on an intriguing section in the Tahdhīb concerning the correct performance of the ḥajj, I follow a meaningful interaction between Ibn al-Munāzil of Nīshāpūr and al-Shiblī of Baghdād. I find the narrative and their exchanges illuminating for the understanding of that significant historical moment in which mystical Islam became 'Ṣūfism'. <>

THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF ISLAMIC THEOLOGY edited by Sabine Schmidtke [Oxford University Press,

THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF ISLAMIC THEOLOGY provides a comprehensive and authoritative survey of the current state of the field. It provides a variegated picture of the state of the art ar □" t th] ! d□

The present volume provides a comprehensive overview of theological thought within Islam, from the earliest manifestations that have come down to us up until the present. Given the numerous desiderata in the study of Islamic theology, the overall picture that evolves is inevitably incomplete, and in many ways the volume is intended to serve as an encouragement and a guide for scholars who wish to engage with this field of study. The approach in the preparation of this volume has been an inclusive one—rather than defining 'theology' in a narrow way or preferring one interpretation of what 'orthodox' belief consists of over another, an attempt has been made to cover the doctrinal thought of all the various intellectual strands of Islam that were engaged with theological concerns—including groups such as the philosophers and Ismāʿīlīs, whom theologians of different shades condemned as heretics. Moreover, this volume also acknowledges the significance of inter-communal exchanges between Muslim and Christian as well as Jewish thinkers over the course of the centuries. The theological thought of Jews and Christians not only mirrored at times that of Muslims, Christian methodologies of speculative reasoning and, at times, doctrinal notions contributed to its shaping. While the Jewish reception of kalām methods and the doctrines of the Muʿtazilite school in particular are touched upon in Chapter 9, the interplay between Muslim and Christian doctrinal thought at various points in time is discussed in detail in Chapters 1, 5, and 31.

The overall arrangement of the chapters is primarily diachronic. The unevenness of the three parts reflects, on the one hand, the robust scholarship that has developed in the study of Islamic intellectual history from early Islam to the classical period, contrasted with, on the other hand, the deplorable paucity of scholarship on the post-classical period. Part I, by far the most detailed, comprises chapters discussing forms of Islamic theology during the formative and the early middle period; Part III focuses on the later middle and early modern periods; and Part V addresses Islamic theological thought from the end of the early modern period to the modern period. Wedged between the three diachronic blocs are two parts that address thematic issues. Part II comprises four case studies that explore intellectual interactions of Islamic theology(ies), while Part IV, also comprising four case studies, focuses on the impact of political and social history on Islamic theology.

The Foundations of Islamic Theology

The thematic range of theology is, to a large extent, in the eye of the beholder. Over the centuries, Muslim theologians were preoccupied in their deliberations with two principal concerns: first, God, His existence, and nature, and, secondly, God's actions vis-à-vis His creation, specifically humankind. Both thematic concerns touch upon numerous related issues, such as anthropomorphism and the conceptualization of the divine attributes and their ontological foundation; and the thorny related questions of theodicy and human freedom versus determination. In their attempts to systematize doctrinal thinking, the various theological schools in Islam have provided an abundance of often contradictory answers to those questions. Moreover, in terms of methodology, Muslim theologians championed two different, contradictory approaches—while rationally minded theologians employed the

methods and techniques of speculative theology, 'kalãm' or '^ilm al-kalãm', as it is typically called, traditionists categorically rejected the use of reason and instead restricted themselves to collecting the relevant doctrinal statements they found in the Qur'ãn and the prophetic tradition (sunna). These statements are in their view the 'principles of religion' (u^ül al-dïn), the second term used among Muslims for theology, alongside the above-mentioned term 'kalãm', which came to mean 'theology' for the rational theologians. Those who engaged in kalãm, the mutakallimün, went beyond the two basic doctrinal concerns, namely God's nature and His actions, by adding to the thematic spectrum of theology other concerns such as natural philosophy—encompassing the created universe, which comprises everything other than God.

The factors that have contributed to how Islamic theology has been shaped and developed in its variegated forms over the course of history are multiple and various. Although the Qur'ãn, the founding text of Islam, is not a theological disquisition, it is still the most hallowed authoritative source for Muslims engaged with doctrinal concerns. It lays down some of the fundamental doctrinal conceptions that characterize Islamic theological thought and have been shared in one way or another by most if not all Muslim thinkers throughout the centuries. Beyond the revelatory text, there is the larger historical, religious, and theological context in which doctrinal thought in Islam evolved and developed over time. This doctrinal development is apparent in the treatment of issues on which the Qur'ãn either remains silent or mentions, but with largely ambiguous statements, issues which Muslim theologians considered—and continue to consider—controversial. These include topics such as man's freedom to act versus determinism, which was hotly debated during the first and second centuries of Islam, as well as complex topics such as anthropology, ontology, epistemology, and cosmology, discussion of which was largely inspired by the wider intellectual-cultural environment of early Islam. These influences include religious notions that were prevalent in pre-Islamic Arabia, concepts originating in other local traditions, and the religio-philosophical heritage of late antiquity, pre-Islamic Iran, and, to some extent, India. Moreover, the political schisms in the early Islamic community following the death of the Prophet Muhammad made questions such as the validity of the imamate, the nature of faith (ïmãn), and the conditions for salvation relevant for consideration among theologians.

The central tenet in the Qur'ãnic revelation is the belief in God, and it is the notion of God as the creator and sovereign ruler of the world that is the dominant motif throughout the revealed text. He is described as 'the master of the worlds' (rabb al-`ãlamïn), as being 'mighty and glorious' (dhü l-jalãl wa-l-ikrãm) (Qur'ãn 55: 78), 'the sovereign Lord' (al-malik al-quddüs) (Qur'ãn 59: 23), and 'owner of sovereignty' (mãlik al-mulk) (Qur'ãn 3: 26). He is said to be 'the high and the great' (al-`aÏy al-kabïr) (Qur'ãn 22: 62), and that 'in His hand is the dominion over all things' (alladhï bi-yadihi malaküt kull shay') (Qur'ãn 36: 83). God is 'the creator and the one who shapes' (al-khãliq al-bãri' al-mu^awwir) (Qur'ãn 59: 24) and 'He who created the heavens and the earth' (alladhï khalaqa l-samawãt wa-l-ar^) (Qur'ãn 36: 81). In accordance with the idea of God as a sovereign ruler, readers of the Qur'ãn are constantly reminded of God's oneness and admonished to refrain from any kind of polytheism (shirk)—'God, there is no God but He' (Allãhu lã ilãha illã huwa) (Qur'ãn 2: 255 etc.). The locus classicus is süra 112 (entitled 'Sincere Religion', al-ikhlã^), which, in the translation of A. Arberry, reads 'Say: 'He is God, One. God, the Everlasting Refuge, who has not begotten, and has not been begotten, and equal to Him is not any one'. While initially intended apparently as a refutation of pre-Islamic polytheism in Arabia, the text was later interpreted as primarily directed against the Christians. The (post-Qur'ãnic) Arabic term for

monotheism is tawhïd. The frequent use of the root wud in the self-appellation of numerous Islamic groups throughout history up until the modern period indicates the central position the concept occupies in the self-perception of Muslim believers. Monotheism is thus one of the central doctrines of Islam, although the interpretations and conceptualizations of tawhïd are manifold.

God's sovereignty sharply contrasts with the way humans—who are invariably described as His servants—are depicted in the Qur'ãn. As to the question of whether man's actions and destiny are ordained by God's decree, deterministic and non-deterministic sayings stand side by side in the Qur'ãn. The Qur'ãnic concept of the last judgement, when God will demand individual reckoning from each human being, presupposes that human be ings exercise individual liberty with respect to what they do in this world and thus are responsible for their destiny in the hereafter. Free choice is also expressly stated in those passages where God is said not to lead the human being astray, unless he or she chooses to disobey. Other passages of the Qur'ãn emphasize God's omnipotence and omniscience, to an extent that human responsibility appears completely eclipsed. Here, human destiny is said to depend on the will of God. He is the originator of belief and unbelief and He guides or leads astray as He pleases. 'Whomsoever God desires to guide, He opens his heart to Islam; whomsoever He desires to lead astray, he hardens his heart, narrow, tight, as if forced to climb to heaven unaided. So God lays abomination upon those who believe not' (Qur'ãn 6: 125).

The Qur'ãn contains numerous descriptions of God, which later gave rise to the conceptualization, in a variety of ways, of the divine attributes, their ontological foundation, and how they compare with the attributes of human beings. He is described as being 'alive' (^ayy), 'eternal' (qayyüm) (Qur'ãn 2: 255), 'self-sufficient' (ghanï) (Qur'ãn 2: 263), 'all-embracing' (wãsi'), 'knowing' ('alïm) (Qur'ãn 2: 247), and 'wise' (^akïm) (Qur'ãn 2: 32), as the one who 'hears and sees' (al-samï' al-ba^ïr) (Qur'ãn 17: 1), is 'able to do all things' ('alã kull shay' qadïr) (Qur'ãn 2: 20), and He is 'the strong and the mighty' (al-qawï al-'azïz) (Qur'ãn 11: 66). At the same time, God is said to have 'knowledge' (al-'ilm 'inda Llãh) (Qur'ãn 67: 26) and to possess 'might' (al-qüwa) (Qur'ãn 51: 58). Moreover, the Qur'ãn contains passages that stress God's transcendence (Qur'ãn 19: 65; 42: 11) as against those which emphasize His immanence (Qur'ãn 50: 16), two contrasting notions that are also expressed in Qur'ãn 57: 3, 'He is the Outward and the Inward' (huwa l-^ãhir wa-l-bã^in). Also disputed were references in the Qur'ãn that suggest that God has a human form. God's 'countenance' (wajh) is mentioned (Qur'ãn 2: 115 and passim), as are His 'eyes' (a'yãn) (Qur'ãn 11: 37; 23: 27; 52: 48; 54: 14), His 'hand/hands' (Qur'ãn 3: 72f.; 5: 64; 38: 75f.; 48: 10; 57: 29), and His 'leg' (sãq) (Qur'ãn 68: 42), and He is said to be seated on a 'throne' ('arsh) (Qur'ãn 7: 54 and passim). Descriptions which may suggest deficiencies in God also gave rise to speculative thinking, such as God being 'the best of schemers' (wa-Llãh khayr al-mãkirïn) (Qur'ãn 3: 54), that He mocks (yastahzi') (Qur'ãn 2: 15), derides (sakhira) (Qur'ãn 9: 79), or forgets (Qur'ãn 9: 67). Moreover, the attributes and qualifications ascribed to God that have equivalents in humans prompted speculation about the ontological foundations of God's attributes as against those of human beings, for the Qur'ãn also states that 'like Him there is naught' (laysa ka-mithlihi shay') (Qur'ãn 42: 11).

The amalgam of the Qur'ãnic data, doctrinal concepts, and concerns originating in the wider cultural environment of early Islam, as well as the political controversies and schisms of the early Islamic community, gave rise to a highly variegated spectrum of Muslim theological thought, with respect to both doctrinal positions and methodological approaches. Religious dissension was and is considered to be a deplorable departure from the initial ideal of unity; and what would constitute the right, 'orthodox'

belief, as opposed to heresy, was typically decided by the winning power, post factum. Controversy and diversity as characteristics of Islamic theology are reflected in some of the characteristic literary genres of Islamic theology, namely professions of faith ('aqïda), the preferred genre among the traditionalists, which served to encapsulate the faith of the community and to refute 'heterodox' doctrines; heresiographies, compiled on the basis of the prophetic ^adïth according to which the Muslim community will be divided into seventy-three groups, only one of which will merit paradise (al-firqa al-nãjiya); works that display the dialectical technique of kalãm, which was the prevalent genre among representatives of rational theology, be it in the form of refutations or, as was increasingly the case during the scholastic phase, in the form of theological summae. The variegations in doctrine and methodology notwithstanding, the historical development of Islamic theological thought is characterized by complex interdependence among the various strands.

The State of the Art

Between 1842 and 1846, W. Cureton published his edition of the heresiographical Kitãb al-Milal wa-l-ni^al, by the sixth/twelfth-century Ash`arite author Mu^ammad b. `Abd al-Karïm al-Shahrastãnï (d. 548/1153). For a long time, this text was the single available source for modern scholars on the history of Islamic theology. Since then, over the course of the last century and a half, there has been a steady flow of discoveries of new textual sources. Nevertheless, contemporary scholarship on Islamic theology is still in an age of discovery, and the production of critical editions of key texts, many of which up until recently were believed to be lost, remains a major occupation for any scholar engaged in this field of research. One of the reasons for the relatively slow progress in the study of Islamic theology is that the place of reflection on doctrinal issues within the intellectual life of Muslim thinkers has for a long time been (and often continues to be) underestimated. Theology can rightly be described as one of the most neglected subdisciplines within Islamic studies, a subdiscipline which up to today attracts far fewer scholars than, for example, Islamic law, ^adïth, or Qur^ãnic studies. A telling indication that the discipline is still in an early stage is the numerous recent discoveries and first-time publications of works that were long believed to be lost. Surprisingly many among them date from the very first centuries of Islam, thus contradicting the commonly held assumption that the earliest literary sources of Islam are by now all well known and taken into account in scholarship. Many of these discoveries are bound to bring about revisions of long-held views about the history of Islamic theology. By way of example, mention should be made of several doctrinal texts by second/eighth and third/ninth-century Ibã^ï authors—the Ibã^iyya being one of the earliest opposition movements under the Umayyads, with a distinct kalãm tradition and with close interaction with the Mu`tazila, the other early religiopolitical opposition movement during that time. The new finds comprise six kalãm treatises, or fragments thereof, by the second/eighth-century Kufan scholar `Abd Allãh b. Yazïd al-Fazãrï, discovered in two twelfth/eighteenth-century manuscripts in Mzãb, in Algeria. If we can assume their authenticity, Fazãrï is thus the earliest kalãm theologian whose doctrines can be studied on the basis of his own extant works. His sophisticated treatment of the divine attributes suggests that this was an issue discussed among Muslim theologians much earlier than has so far been assumed (Madelung in press; Chapter 14). Several doctrinal texts by the `Umãnï Ibã^ï scholar Abü l-Mundhir Bashïr b. Mu^ammad b. Ma^büb (d. c.290/908) were recently found in some of the private libraries in Oman and are now available in critical edition. Other important discoveries in recent years include the Kitãb al-Ta^rïsh of ^irãr b. `Amr, who had started out as a Mu`tazili (Ansari 2004–5; Ansari 2007: 23–4; van Ess 2011: i. 132–40; see also Chapter 3), and a substantial fragment of the Kitãb al-Maqãlãt by Abel `Ali al-Jubbã'i (d. 303/915), the earliest

representative of the Basran school of the Mu`tazila during the scholastic era (Ansari 2007; van Ess 2011, i. 156–61).6 Mention should also be made of the ever-growing number of quotations from the important early doxographical work Kitãb al-Ãrã^ wa-l-diyãnãt, by the Twelver Shi`i author al-^asan b. Melsã al-Nawbakhti, who flourished at the turn of the fourth/tenth century (van Ess 2011: 219–60, esp. 224–30; Madelung 2013).

Focusing on research done since the beginning of the twenty-first century, significant progress has been made in the scholarly exploration of virtually all strands of Islamic theology. These achievements go hand in hand with an ever-growing awareness of the enormous number of unexplored sources and glaring lacunae.

The study of Mu`tazilism—arguably the most influential early theological movement in Islam—has particularly thrived over the past fifteen years. As a result of the adoption of Mu`tazilite notions by Shi`i Muslims (both Zaydis and Twelver Shi`is) as well as by Jewish thinkers, large corpora of Mu`tazilite sources are preserved among the manuscript holdings of the numerous private and public libraries of Yemen and in the various Genizah collections around the world, most importantly the Abraham Firkovitch collections in the National Library of Russia, St Petersburg. Accessibility of these materials has improved considerably over the past two decades, thanks to the enhanced technical possibilities of digitization, joint efforts of Yemeni and international scholars (in the case of the manuscript holdings in Yemen), and the fortunes of international politics (in the case of the Abraham Firkovitch collections, the dissolution of the Soviet Union, which has resulted in easier access to materials for international scholars). Recent efforts to catalogue some of the collections of manuscripts of Yemeni provenance in European and North American libraries (Sobieroj 2007; Löfgren and Traini 1975–2011), as well as their partial digitization and open-access availability,8 have also prompted a growing awareness among scholars of the numerous Mu`tazilite (Zaydi and non-Zaydi) works in Western libraries. Over the course of the past fifteen years, a considerable number of works by Mu`tazilite authors of the fifth/eleventh and sixth/twelfth centuries have been made available, among them many works that were previously believed to be lost. One of the earliest preserved theological summae by a Mu`tazilite author is the Kitãb al-U^ül of Abel `Ali Muhammad b. Khallãd al-Ba^ri, the distinguished disciple of the Mu`tazilite theologian and founder of the Bahshamiyya, Abel Hãshim al-Jubbã'i (d. 321/933), which is preserved embedded in several later supercommentaries on the work, which have partly been made available in edition (cf. also Ansari and Schmidtke 2010b). D. Gimaret published an edition of the Kitãb al-Tadhkira fi a^kãm al-jawãhir wa-l-a^rã^ by the fifth/eleventh-century representative of the Basran Mu`tazila, al-^asan b. A^mad Ibn Mattawayh, by far the most detailed extant exposition of natural philosophy10 (cf. also Zysow 2014). In 2006 a facsimile publication of a paraphrastic commentary on the work, possibly by Ibn Mattawayh's student Abel Ja`far Mu^ammad b. `Ali [b.] Mazdak, a Zaydi scholar of the late fifth/eleventh century who was active in Rayy, was published (cf. also Gimaret 2008b; Schmidtke 2008). Nu merous fragments of writings by `Abd al-Jabb&r al-Hamad&ni (d. 415/1025), Ibn Mattawayh's teacher and the head of the Basran Mu`tazila during his time, were found in some of the Genizah collections—apparently none of them had ever reached Yemen. Apart from some additional volumes of his theological summa, Kitãb al-Mughnï fi abwãb al-taw^ïd wa-l-`adl, these comprise his Kitãb al-Man` wa-l-tamãnu` (Schmidtke 2006: 444f. nos 26, 27) as well as his al-Kitãb al-Mu^ï^ which is otherwise known only on the basis of Ibn Mattawayh's paraphrastic commentary, Kitãb al-Majmü` fi l-mu^ï^ bi-l-takl'if. The Tathbït dalã'il al-nubuwwa, which is attributed in the single extant manuscript to `Abd al-Jabbar, has

attracted scholars' attention over the past years. G. S. Reynolds devoted a monograph to the work (Reynolds 2004), followed by a new edition and translation, which he produced in collaboration with S. Kh. Samir. H. Ansari has recently questioned the authenticity of the work as a text by `Abd al-Jabbur (Ansari 2014a, 2014b). On the basis of Jewish copies, extensive fragments of a comprehensive work on natural philosophy by the Büyid vizier al-^&^ib b. `Abb&d (d. 385/995) could be restored, together with a commentary by `Abd al-Jabb&r, as well as large portions of what seems to be his otherwise lost theological summa, Nahj al-sabïl fi l-u^ül.15 The holdings of the Firkovitch collections also allow for a partial reconstruction of a work on natural philosophy by the qã^ï `Abd All&h b. Sa`id al-Labb&d, another student of `Abd al-Jabbur. In the library of the Great Mosque of ^an`&^, a copy of the Kitãb Masã'il al-khilãf fi l-u^ül by `Abd al-Jabbur's foremost pupil, Abü Rashid al-Nisubüri, has been identified (Ansari and Schmidtke 2010a), and D. Gimaret has laid the foundation for a new critical edition of Abü Rashid's second major work on kalãm, the Kitãb Masã'il al-khilãf bayn al-Ba^riyyïn wa-l-Baghdãdiyyïn, which is preserved in a unique manuscript in Berlin (Gimaret 2011). Kh. M. Nabh& has collected the extant fragments of exegtical works by Mu`tazilite authors that have been published since 2007, in the series Mawsü`at tafãsïr al-Mu`tazila.

Fragments of the magnum opus in theology of Abü l-^usayn al-Ba^ri (d. 436/1045), a former student of `Abd al-Jabb&r and the founder of what seems to have been the last innovative school within the Mu`tazila, were discovered among the manuscripts of the Firkovitch collections.18 These are complemented by several texts by Jewish authors that testify to the impact Abü l-^usayn's thought had on Jewish thinkers of his time (Madelung and Schmidtke 2006). Moreover, the doctrinal writings of his later follower Rukn al-Din Ma^müd b. Mu^ammad al-Mal&^imi (d. 536/1141) were retrieved from various private and public libraries in Yemen, India, and Iran, and are now also available in reliable editions. The renewed engagement with Mu`tazilism in modern times (often labelled 'Neo-Mu`tazilism') has been the focus of several studies over the past years (Hildebrandt 2007; Schwarb 2012).

Among the numerous lacunae that remain for future research are critical editions of the doctrinal works by Abü Sa`d al-Bayhaqi 'al-^&kim al-Jishumi' (d. 493/1101), particularly his encyclopedic `Uyün al-masã'il with his autocommentary, Shar^ `Uyün al-masã'il, as well as editions of the various above-mentioned doctrinal works by `Abdu al-Jabbur as preserved in the Firkovitch collections. Moreover, although scholarly investigation of Mu`tazilism has significantly advanced over the past decades and a fairly accurate picture of its development can by now be given (editors' introduction to Adang, Schmidtke, and Sklare 2007; Schwarb 2006a, 2011; see also Chapters 7–11 in this volume), it should be kept in mind that the extant literary sources represent only a select number of Mu`tazilite schools. For other strands within the movement, such as the School of Baghdad, whose last prominent representative was Abü l-Qãsim al-Ka`bï al-Balkhï (d. 319/931) (el-Omari 2006), or the Ikhshïdiyya, named after the prominent theologian, jurist, and transmitter of ^adïth Abü Bakr A^mad Ibn al-Ikhshïd (d. 326/938) (Mourad 2006; Kulinich 2012), to name only two examples, we have to rely on the scant and often biased accounts provided by their opponents, with next to no possibility of controlling this information by checking it against primary sources and next to no possibility of reconstructing their respective doctrinal systems in their entirety.

The intensive scholarship that has been devoted to Mu`tazilism over the past fifteen years, which is significantly indebted to the Zaydï reception of the school's doctrine, its transmission, and the eventual preservation of its literary legacy in the libraries of Yemen, has gone hand in hand with an increase in the

scholarly investigation of theology among the Zaydï communities of Iran and Yemen. Numerous doctrinal works by Zaydï authors have been made available in critical or semi-critical editions by Yemeni and other international scholars, and a number of substantial analyses on the history of theology among the Zaydï communities of Iran and Yemen have been published over the past years (with Madelung 1965 still serving as the main point of departure for contemporary scholarship), in addition to a considerable increase in Zaydï (and Yemeni) studies in general (see the editors' introductions to Schmidtke 2012b; and Hollenberg, Rauch, and Schmidtke 2015; Ansari and Schmidtke 2016). Among the rather unexpected recent findings is a fragment of a theological tract by the fifth/eleventh-century Jewish Karaite theologian Yüsuf al-Ba^ïr. The fragment was transferred from Iran to Yemen, together with a large corpus of other literary texts, in the aftermath of the political unification of the two Zaydï communities of Northern Iran and Yemen, beginning in the sixth/twelfth century. Given its fragmentary state, the tract's Yemeni readers were clearly unaware of its author being a Jew (Ansari, Madelung, and Schmidtke 2015). Again, despite much progress, many lacunae remain, especially with respect to the history of Zaydï theology since the seventh/thirteenth century and the doctrinal teachings of marginal strands within Zaydism, which disintegrated at some point. An example of such a strand is the Mu^arrifiyya, against whose followers Imam al-Man^ür bi-Llãh `Abd Allãh b. ^amza (d. 614/1217) led a merciless war, which eventually resulted in the extinction of the sect (see Chapter 27).

Over the past fifteen years there has been a steady flow of new publications on Twelver Shï¨ï theology (see also Chapters 11 and 26). Moreover, Twelver Shï¨ï studies in general have profited immensely over the past years from the increased accessibility of manuscript collections in Iraq. Mention should be made, by way of example, of the recent edition of the Risãla al-Mü^i^a—a theological work concerned with the notion of the imamate—by the fourth/tenth-century author al-Mu^affar b. Ja`far al-^usayni, which is based on a manuscript from the Ãl Kãshif al-Ghi^ã collection. With respect to theology during the time of the Imams, until recently scholarship had evaluated the Imami turn towards Mu`tazilism, dating from the beginning of the twelfth Imam's occultation, as a rupture with the earlier doctrinal tradition of the Imams. But W. Madelung's recent groundbreak ing study of Mu^ammad b. Ya`qüb al-Kulayni's (d. 329/941) Kitãb al-U^ül min al-Kãfi (Madelung 2014b) significantly revises this view, showing that it was already the Imams who 'progressively came to endorse Mu`tazilite perspectives' (Madelung 2014b: 468), thus preparing the groundwork for the later reception of Mu`tazilite thought during the occultation period and thereafter. For the early stages of Shi`i theology, H. Ansari's indepth analysis of the notion of the imamate and the evolution of the doctrine deserves to be mentioned (Ansari in press). In view of the intimate connection between ^adïth and doctrinal thought, a feature characteristic of Shi`ism, especially during its early period (cf. Kohlberg 2014), the recent edition of the Kitãb al-Qirã'ãt by the third/ninth-century author A^mad b. Mu^ammad al-Sayyãri, an important text for the study of early Shi`i theology, also merits mention. The renewed significance of ^adïth for Twelver Shi`i doctrine during the Safavid and, more importantly, during the Qajar period still needs to be investigated in detail (Pourjavady and Schmidtke 2015: 255ff.). Progress has also been made in the scholarly exploration of the doctrinal thought of al-Sharif al-Murta^ã (d. 436/1044). In 2001, M. R. An^ãri Qummi published an edition of the single extant (partial) manuscript of al-Murta^ã's most comprehensive theological summa, al-Mulakhkha^ fi u^ül al-dïn, and in 2003 An^ãri Qummi published an edition of his Kitãb al-^arfa. A recent doctoral dissertation was devoted to al-Murta^ã's life and thought (Abdulsater 2013; cf. also Abdulsater 2014). The next generation of Shi`i thinkers was the subject of a detailed study of al-Murta^ã's prominent student, the Shaykh al-^ã'ifa Mu^ammad b. al-^asan al-^üsi (d. 460/1067), which was

published together with a facsimile edition of a commentary by `Abd al-Ra^mãn b. `Ali b. Mu^ammad al-^usayni (d. 582/ 1186) on the former's Muqaddima, which is preserved in a unique manuscript25 (cf. also Ansari and Schmidtke 2014). Increasing evidence has surfaced that shows the extent to which the writings of Imami thinkers, especially al-Sharif al-Murta^ã and some of his students, were received by Jewish readers (Schwarb 2006b; Schwarb 2014a; Schmidtke 2012c; Schmidtke 2014; Madelung 2014a). A major lacuna in the study of Imami theology concerns the period between the generation of al-Sharif al-Murta^ã's students and the time of Sadid al-Din Ma^müd b. `Ali b. al-^asan al-^imma^i al-Rãzi (d. after 600/1204), the author of al-Munqidh min al-taqlïd, i.e. mid-fifth/eleventh to the end of the sixth/twelfth century. During this period, Twelver Shi`i theologians were engrossed with the controversial rival doctrinal systems of the Bahshamiyya and of Abü l-^usayn al-Ba^ri. While al-Murta^ã and most of his students by and large endorsed the doctrines of the Bahshamiyya, al-^imma^i al-Rãzi preferred the views of Abü l-^usayn al-Ba^ri whenever the latter disagreed with the Bahshamites. The evolution of this process, which may already have started with al-Shaykh al-^üsi, still needs to be reconstructed (Ansari and Schmidtke 2014; Ansari and Schmidtke forthcoming a). Scholarly interest over the past years in the doctrinal developments among the Twelver Shi`is up to the time of Na^ir al-Din al-^üsi (d. 672/1274) has been limited, but the latter's literary output, thought, and reception, as well as the later development of Imami thought, attracts considerable attention in international scholarship (e.g. ^adrãyi Khüyi 2003; Pourjavady 2011). Mention should be made, by way of example, of the numerous publications over the past years on Ibn Abi Jumhür al-A^sã^i (d. after 906/1501). A first monograph, in German, devoted to his life and thought, published in 2000 (Schmidtke 2000), resulted in discoveries of some of his texts that were believed to be lost, and critical editions of most of his writings have been published in recent years, as well as a detailed inventory of his writings (al-Ghufrãni 2013, with further references).

In the study of Ash`arism, scholars have also brought to light important new sources over the past fifteen years. For the thought of the movement's eponymous founder and its early history, the numerous studies of scholars such as R. M. Frank (collected in Frank 2007; Frank 2008) and D. Gimaret still remain authoritative, with Abü Bakr Muhammad b. al-^asan Ibn Fürak's (406/1115) Mujarrad maqãlãt al-Shaykh Abï l-^asan al-Ash`arï being the single most important secondary source on the doctrinal thought of Abü l-^asan al-Ash`ari (d. 324/946).26 The work also served as a basis for a still unsurpassed study on his doctrinal thought by D. Gimaret (Gimaret 1990). More recently, Gimaret published a new edition of Ibn Fürak's Kitãb Mushkil al-^adïth, another text of central importance for the study of the history of Ash`arite kalãm, and in 2008 his Shar^ al-`Ãlim wa-l-muta`allim appeared in print. Substantial portions of Abü Bakr al-Bãqillãni's (d. 403/1013) magnum opus, the Hidãyat al-mustarshidïn, have been discovered and partly edited (Gimaret 2008a; Schmidtke 2011), and a number of works by other representatives of the Ash`ariyya during its classical period have recently been published, among them al-Bayãn `an u^ül al-ïmãn by Abü Ja`far al-Simnãni (d. 444/1052), a student of alBãqillãni, as well as the section devoted to metaphysics from the Kitãb al-Ghunya by alJuwayni's student Abü l-Qãsim al-An^ãri (d. 521/1118). The recently discovered Nihãyat al-marãm fi dirãyat al-kalãm by ^iyã^ al-Din al-Makki (d. 559/1163–4), the father of Fakhr al-Din al-Rãzi, which is now available in facsimile publication, is a paraphrase of al-An^ãri's Ghunya. Over the past decade, North African scholars have been active in retrieving relevant primary sources in the libraries of the Maghrib (e.g. Zahri and Bükãri 2011) and in studying the development of Ash`arism in the Islamic West (e.g. al-Bakhti 2005).32 The retrieval of these works is an ever-growing concern, shared by scholars based in Spain and the United States

(Schmidtke 2012a; Spevack 2014; Casasas Canals and Serrano Ruano forthcoming; Thiele forthcoming; El-Rouayheb forthcoming; see also Chapters 13 and 29). Recently published critical editions include works by `Abd al-^aqq b. Muhammad b. Hãrün al-$iqilli (d. 466/1073–4),33 Muhammad b. al-^asan al-Murãdi (d. 489/1096),34 Abü Bakr Muhammad b. Sãbiq al-$iqilli (d. 493/1099–1100),35 Abü Bakr `Abd Allãh Ibn ^alha al-Yãburi (d. 523/1124–5), `Abd al-Salãm b. `Abd al-Rahmãn b. Muhammad 'Ibn Barrajãn' al-Lakhmi al-Ishbili (d. 536/1141),37 Abü Bakr Muhammad b. Maymün al-`Abdari al-Qur^ubi (d. 567/1171), Abü `Umar `Uthmãn al-Salãluji (d. 594/1198), Mu^affar b. `Abd Allãh al-Muqtarah (d. 612/1215–6),39 `Ali b. Ahmad b. Khumayr al-Umawi al-Sibti (d. 614/1217),40 Muhammad b. Muhammad Ibn `Arafa (d. 803/1401),41 Sa`id b. Muhammad b. Muhammad al-`Uqbãni (d. 811/1408–9), and `Ïsã b. `Abd al-Rahmãn al-Saktãni (d. 1062/1652).

Despite this progress, the textual basis for the study of classical Ash`arism remains deplorably limited, and numerous important works by representatives of the movement remain unpublished, such as the Kitãb Ta^wïl al-a^ãdïth al-mushkilãt al-wãrida fï l-^ifãt by al-Ash`ari's student `Ali b. Muhammad b. Mahdi al-^abari (d. c.375/985–6), one of the principal sources for Ibn Fürak's Mushkil al-^adïth (cf. the editor's introduction to Mushk il al-^adïth, ed. D. Gimaret, Damascus, 2003, 23–5), the Kitáb al-Ni^ámï by A^mad b. Mu^ammad Ibn Fürak (d. 478/1085), and the Tafsïr al-asmá' wa-l-^ifát by `Abd al-Qãhir b. ^ãhir al-Baghdãdi (d. 429/1037), who was a student of the prominent Ash`arite theologian Abü Is^ãq al-Isfarã^ini (d. 411/1020), most of whose writings are lost. The majority of extant commentaries, paraphrases, and summaries of al-Juwayni's Kitáb al-Irshád (^ibshi 2006, 1/166–8) also still lack critical edition, let alone scientific analysis. Among the exceptions are Ibn al-Amir al-^ãjj's (d. 735/1335) al-Kámil fï ikhti^ár al-Shámil, a summary of al-Juwayni's magnum opus, the Shámil fï u^ül al-dïn,45 the commentary on the Irshád by the above-mentioned Mu^affar b. `Abd Allãh al-Muqtara^,46 and the Shar^ al-Irshád by Abü Bakr Ibn Maymün.

The post-classical era of Ash`arism has been very much at the forefront of international scholarship over the past fifteen years. Apart from publications devoted to the thought of Abü ^ãmid al-Ghazãli (d. 555/1111) (Griffel 2009; Treiger 2012; Tamer 2015; Griffel 2015), the works and thought of Fakhr al-Din al-Rãzi (d. 606/1209) have been the subject of numerous studies (e.g. Shihadeh 2006; Eichner 2009, passim; Türker and Demir 2011; Jaffer 2015; Shihadeh in press). Moreover, his comprehensive theological work, Kitáb Niháyat al-`uqül fï diráyat al-u^ül, is now available in print, as is his doxography, al-Riyá^ al-müniqa fï árá' ahl al-`ilm. Increased attention is also being paid to his otherwise still little-explored reception, both among the generation of his immediate students and beyond (introduction to Pourjavady and Schmidtke 2007; Shihadeh 2005; Shihadeh 2013; Schwarb 2014b; Swanson 2014; Takahashi 2014). With the Kitáb Abkár alafkár, which has recently been edited twice, the theological oeuvre of Sayf al-Din `Ali b. Abi `Ali al-Ãmidi (d. 631/1233), a younger contemporary of Fakhr al-Din, is now also available in print. Another milestone is the recent edition of Part One of `Alã^ al-Din `Ali b. Muhammad al-Qüshji's (d. 879/1474–5) commentary on Nazir al-Din al-Jüsi's Tajrïd al-`aqá'id, which served as the basis for numerous commentaries and glosses among later Ash`arite and non-Ash`arite scholars, among them the two prominent thinkers and antagonists of Shiraz, Jalãl al-Din al-Dawãni (d. 909/1504) and Qadr al-Din al-Dashtaki (d. 903/1498), both of whom in theology represented Ash`arism and whose thought is very much at the forefront of contemporary scholarship (Pourjavady 2011; Bdaiwi 2014).

Following the publication in 1997 of U. Rudolph's groundbreaking monograph on the doctrinal thought of Abü Man^ür al-Mãturidi (d. 333/944), the eponymous founder of the Mãturidiyya (Rudolph 1997), there has been a rise in the number of publications on Mãturidi and his thought (e.g. Daccache 2008; Jalãli 2008; Matsuyama 2009; Matsuyama 2013; Kutlu 2012; Brodersen 2013; and the contributions to Büyük Türk Bilgini Îmâm Mâtürîdî ve Mâtürîdîlik). For the subsequent development of the school and its reception among later Ottoman scholars, the textual sources collected by E. Badeen should be mentioned (Badeen 2008), as well as the studies by A. Brodersen on views on divine attributes held by the representatives of the school (Brodersen 2014) and on the Kitáb al-Tamhïd fi bayán al-taw^ïd by the fifth/eleventh-century representative of the Mãturidiyya, Abü Shakür al-Sãlimi. Numerous works by later followers of the school have been published over the past decade or so, among them Abü Mu`in Maymün b. Mu^ammad al-Nasafi's (d. 508/1114) al-Tamhïd li-qawá`id al-taw^ïd, A^mad b. Ma^müd b. Abi Bakr al- ^&büni's (d. 580/1184) al-Muntaqã min `l^mat al-anbiyã' 53 and his al-Kifãya fi l-hidãya,54 Abü l-Barak&t al-Nasafi's (d. 710/1310) al-I`timãd fi l-i`tiqãd,55 and ^asan b. Abi Bakr al-Maqdisi's (d. 836/1432) commentary on Abü Mu`in al-Nasafi's Ba^r al-kalãm,56 as well as Abü Is^aq Ibr&him b. Ism&`il Z&hid al-^aff&r al-Bukh&ri's (d. 534/1139) Talkhï^ al-adilla li-qawã`id al-taw^ïd57—a work that was the focus of a recent doctoral dissertation (Demir 2014). What has otherwise been achieved over the past fifteen years primarily serves to consolidate research. Rudolph's monograph of 1997 has, since its initial publication in German, been translated into Russian (Almaty 1999), Uzbek (Tashkent 2001 and 2002), and English (Leiden 2012), and is thus being made available to a wide range of international scholars. Turkish scholars have been actively engaged in producing well-documented editions of M&turidi's extant writings. In 2003, a new edition of his Kitãb al-Taw^ïd was published by Muhammad Aruçi and Bekir Topaloglu, and the latter also supervised a collaborative critical edition of M&turidi's exegesis, Ta'wïlãt al-Qur'ãn, published between 2005 and 2011, in eighteen volumes. The remaining lacunae primarily concern the later development of the school, including editions of numerous works by its main representatives, which are preserved in manuscript (Rudolph 2012: 15ff.; see also Chapters 17, 32, 33, 39).

Hanbalite theology has likewise been in the forefront of research in recent years. Several scholars have critically examined the creeds traditionally attributed to the eponymous founder of the school, A^mad b. Qanbal (d. 241/855). These, as has been shown by S. al-Sarhan, in what is so far the most comprehensive study on A^mad b. ^anbal's literary oeuvre, in fact did not originate with Ibn Hanbal but were attributed to him only at a later stage (al-Sarhan 2011). M. Fierro has edited and analysed a version of one of the creeds attributed to Ibn ^anbal that circulated in al-Andalus (Fierro 2015). Studies such as these are complemented by analyses devoted to specific aspects of Ibn ^anbal's theological thought (Picken 2008; Williams 2002) as well as publications focusing on his biography (Melchert 2006). Several theological summae by later representatives of the ^anbaliyya have been edited in recent years, such as the Kitãb al-Ï^ã^ fi u^ül al-dïn of Abü l-^asan `Ali b. `Abd All&h b. al-Z&ghüni (d. 527/1132),58 though none surpasses in significance the Kitãb al-Mu`tamad fi u^ül al-dïn by Abü Ya`l& Mu^ammad b. al-^usayn b. Farr& (d. 458/1066) (since 1974 available in the edition by W. Z. ^add&d), the first ^anbalite author to adopt elements of speculative reasoning (kalãm) in his deliberations on theology and legal theory (Vishanoff 2011: 190ff.). Another focus of recent scholarship is the doctrinal history of the school in its later phase, with special attention being paid to Najm alDin Sulaym&n b. `Abd al-Qawi al-^üfi (d. 716/1316),59 and the 'Neo-Hanbalites' Ibn Taymiyya (d. 728/1328) and Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya (d. 751/1350) (Hoover

2007; Rapoport and Ahmed 2010; Bori and Holtzman 2010; Adem 2015; Krawietz and Tamer 2013; Vasalou 2015; cf. also Chapter 35).

There is now a growing awareness of other religio-theological strands that had for a long time been completely neglected, partly as a result of their seeming marginality and at times due to a complete loss of relevant sources. Some of these have received increasing scholarly attention over the past fifteen years. Among the groups that had been considered to be of only marginal significance up until recently is the Ibn'i^iyya. Its literary lega cy has come to the forefront of research in recent years, partly thanks to funding by the government of Oman, resulting in numerous conference proceedings (e.g. Francesca 2015), historical studies (Wilkinson 2010), and bio- and bibliographical reference works (N&^ir 2000–6; Custers 2006). Specifically relevant for the history of Ib&^ï theology are the above-mentioned critical text editions by A. Salimi and W. Madelung, as well as a recent annotated translation of two theological primers by Ib&^ï theologians of the late thirteenth/nineteenth century, namely the `Aqïda al-wahbiyya by N&^ir b. S&lim b. `Udayyam al-Rawahï and the Kitãb Ma`ãlim al-dïn by `Abd al-`Azïz al-Thamïmï (d. 1223/1808), with an introduction to the history of Ibadi doctrinal thought (Hoffman 2012). Given the growing interest of international scholars in Ibadi studies, I Ibadi theology will certainly play a prominent role in future scholarship.

Another strand that has received increased attention over the past years, especially among Iranian scholars, is the Karramiyya, an influential theological and legal movement active from the fourth/tenth to the seventh/thirteenth century in the Islamic East. The Karrimiyya's ideas can be only partly reconstructed and this nearly exclusively on the basis of data provided by the trend's opponents, who considered its eponymous founder, Abü `Abd All&h Muhammad Ibn Karr&m (d. 255/869) and his followers to be unbelievers. Next to none of the Karr&mï literary output has been preserved, with the exception of a substantial number of exegetical works (cf. Gilliot 2000; Ansari 2001; Ansari 2002a; Ansari 2002b; Zysow 2011; as well as numerous studies by Muhammad Ri^& Shafï¯ï Kadkanï, references given in Zysow 2011; cf. also Chapter 15). Some of those texts have been published in recent years, among them the Tafsïr of Abü Bakr `Agi b. Muhammad Nïs&bürï 'Sür&b&dï' (late fifth/eleventh century);60 the Qi^a^ al-anbiyã^ by the fifth/ eleventh-century author al-Hay^am b. Muhammad b. al-Hay^am;61 and Zayn al-fatã fï shark Sürat Hal atã which, according to the editor of the text, was authored by Ahmad b. Muhammad al-`Ã^imï.62 H. Ansari questioned this attribution and suggested that the work was instead written by Abü Muhammad ^&mid b. Ahmad b. Bis^&m (Ansari 2002a).

Other strands of thought that were important at some time in history have until today mostly escaped scholars' attention, as is the case, by way of example, with the Salimiyya, named as such after the group's eponymous founders, Muhammad b. Ahmad b. S&lim (d. 297/909) and his son Ahmad b. Muhammad b. Ahmad b. S&lim (d. 356/967) (Ohlander 2008), or the ^ufriyya, another off shoot of the Kharijites movement (Madelung and Lewinstein 1997). <>

PEACE IN THE NAME OF ALLAH: ISLAMIC DISCOURSES ON TREATIES WITH ISRAEL by Ofir Winter [De Gruyter Contemporary Social Sciences, De Gruyter, 9783110735123]

From Anwar al-Sadat's dramatic gambit in 1977 to the surprising declaration of the Abraham Accords in 2020, making peace with Israel was always a tough sell for Arab regimes. Through an analysis of hundreds of fatwas, sermons, essays, books, interviews, poems, postage stamps and other media, *Peace in the Name of Allah* examines how Egyptian, Jordanian, and Emirati political and religious authorities introduced Islamic justifications for peace with Israel, and how those opposed countered them. The discussion demonstrates the flexible and ambiguous nature of revelation-based political discourses; Islam is neither 'for' nor 'against' peace with Israel – people are, as different Muslim political actors take competing or even contradictory positions.

- The first book to systematically examine, in a comparative historical perspective, Arab-Islamic discourses promoting peace with Israel.
- A comprehensive analysis of hundreds of *fatwa*s, sermons, essays, interviews, textbooks, poems, and other content.

CONTENTS

The way to the Sheikh Zayed bin Sultan Aal Nahyan Mosque in Abu Dhabi, one of the world's largest and most magnificent Islamic houses of worship, passes through a covered and airconditioned corridor called the Path of Tolerance. All visitors to the mosque must traverse this underground passage, adorned throughout with slogans celebrating Islam as the religion of tolerance, coexistence, and diversity, and with photos of interfaith meetings held under the sponsorship of the Emirati government. Inaugurated in November 2020, the passage represents the strategic decision taken by the leadership of this tiny but wealthy state to become the ambassador of moderate and pluralistic Islam. This decision led, among other things, to the August 13, 2020, declaration that stunned the international community—the imminent signing of a peace agreement between the UAE and Israel called the Abraham Accords, after the common forefather of the Jews and Muslims.

One of the popular and charismatic imams at this mosque was Sheikh Wasim Yusuf, a young Jordanian cleric born in 1981 who migrated to the UAE in 2012 and was naturalized there two years later. Since he arrived in the UAE, Yusuf has become a darling of the Emirati regime and one of its staunchest defenders. Making frequent appearances on local television and with over 1.5 million followers on Twitter, ^usuf preaches fervently against Islamic extremism.

But preaching tolerance is more straightforward than practicing it, and Yusuf's story is a case in point. Following intense disputes with other Emirati imams on social media, in February 2020, he was removed from his position at the Sheikh Zayed Mosque and appointed imam of another mosque in Abu Dhabi: the Sheikh Sultan bin Zayed the First Mosque, which is also large and magnificent, although a Path of Tolerance does not lead to its gates.

Until the signing of the Abraham Accords, Yusuf was virulently hostile to Israel, Zionism, and the Jews. Describing the Jews as the eternal enemies of Islam who tried to assassinate the Prophet Muhammad, he blamed them for every crisis and calamity that has befallen the Muslim world and treated Israel as an illegitimate entity. However, once the peace agreement with Israel was announced, Yusuf, a loyal regime supporter, immediately became an ardent advocate of this policy. Like other Emirati clerics, he echoed the leadership's conciliatory message that Islam mandates the peace agreement. Yusuf argued that the agreement is compatible with the Islamic shari`a, which commands the leader to ensure the security of his people, and harshly condemned the Muslim Brotherhood clerics who were criticizing this move by the Emirati regime. Describing Islam as the religion of peace, he passionately argued that the activists of political Islam, who precipitated the catastrophe of the Arab Spring, have caused Islam greater harm than Israel ever did.

Yusuf's shifting attitude toward Israel shows how Islam can be harnessed—even by the very same preacher—for either opposing peace or for promoting it. His videos in favor of the Abraham Accords were widely circulated and even appeared on the Arabic-language Facebook page of the Israeli Foreign Ministry. The detractors of the agreement inside and outside the UAE—for whom the peace agreement with Israel was illegitimate and a betrayal of Islam and the values and rules that the believers are commanded to follow—noted the sudden reversal in his position and accused him of hypocrisy.

The peace agreement between Israel and the UAE was the third agreement signed between an Arab country and the Jewish state since the latter's founding in 1948. It was preceded by the Egypt-Israel peace treaty of 1979 and the Jordan-Israel peace treaty of 1994. In all three Arab countries, Islamic concepts and arguments played a central role in the campaigns for and against peace with Israel. Each of the agreements was accompanied by a heated polemic in which both sides, the supporters of peace and its detractors, defended their positions using Quranic verses, Prophetic traditions, stories from the lives of the Prophet and his companions, and applications—often controversial—of Islamic legal mechanisms. While the regimes and the clerics loyal to them presented their support for the agreements as a faithful reflection of the spirit of Islam, their opponents, especially representatives of political Islam, condemned the agreements as incompatible with God's directives. The religious arguments cultivated by the regimes and their loyalists reflected the centrality of Islam as a source of public legitimacy in contemporary Muslim societies. They required a fundamental reversal that was not easy to justify since the regimes that were now calling for peace in the name of Allah had been calling, only a few years earlier, for uncompromising struggle against Israel, also in the name of Allah.

This book offers a comparative examination of the contrasting Islamic arguments presented in Egypt, Jordan, and the UAE by the supporters and opponents of the peace agreements with Israel. The book's central thesis rejects the widespread claim that "Islam" has an inherent, unchanging, and absolute position on the legitimacy of peace with Israel. It demonstrates that the very same Quranic verses, Prophetic traditions, and jurisprudential mechanisms are used by forces with opposing interests to argue

either for or against peace with Israel. This shows that no definitive position on the agreements or their specific terms, either positive or negative, emerges as an obligatory conclusion from the Islamic sources. It is the various sides that have a position, and they interpret the written sources of their faith in a manner that conforms to their views.

The importance of the religious polemic about the peace agreements with Israel stems from the central role of Islam in legitimizing and de-legitimizing Arab regimes and in swaying public opinion in favor or against their policies. The religious argument between the proponents and opponents of peace reflects broader controversies between two camps in the contemporary Arab and Islamic world: the pragmatic forces that accept the existing domestic, regional, and international order and the radical forces that challenge it in the name of revolutionary ideals.

The Islamic dimension of the campaigns for and against the peace agreements with Israel has received limited attention in academic literature. Yitzhak Reiter analyzed the communiques issued in favor of the Egypt-Israel peace agreement in May and June 1979 by the heads of Al-Azhar and Egyptian Mufti Jad al-Haqq `Ali Jad al-Haqq, respectively; Shimon Shamir discussed the religious overtones of Anwar al-Sadat's 1977 visit to Jerusalem, as well as the terminology used by King Hussein of Jordan to glorify the shared religious heritage of Muslims and Jews; and David Warren examined the religious and political arguments presented by the chairman of the Emirati Fatwa Council, Abdullah bin Bayyah, in support of the Emirati peace agreement with Israel. These studies and others shed light on the ways in which the advocates and detractors of the agreements campaigned for their positions. However, these studies focused only on certain parts of the polemic. This study seeks to present a comprehensive and detailed picture of both sides of the controversy, based on a wide range of sources, including speeches and interviews with key figures, religious rulings and treatises, press articles, propaganda publications, sermons, religious conferences, school textbooks, poems, and even postage stamps, while also taking a comparative perspective, to offer a broad thesis on the religious conceptualizations of the support for and opposition to the agreements.

The book consists of an introduction and three chapters. The Introduction addresses the meaning of the terms "jihad" and "peace" in early Islamic sources and contemporary Islamic jurisprudential literature. It explains the distinction between state Islam, with its pragmatic exegetic approaches to peace with Israel, and the radical Islamist opposition forces—which compete for the right to interpret the sacred texts and Islamic traditions and to determine their implications in this context. Chapter One is devoted to the religious dimension of Egypt's pioneering peace agreement with Israel. It analyses the changing role of religion in the relations between the two countries during the conflict period that preceded the signing of the peace agreement, the Islamist opposition to its signing, and the religious and other arguments used by the Egyptian regime in its advocacy for the agreement. Chapter Two turns to the peace treaty between Israel and Jordan and the Islamic arguments presented by the Jordanian monarchy on the one hand, and by the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood on the other, in militating for and against this historic move. It examines the competing claims of the regime and its opponents regarding the establishment of a "warm" peace involving extensive normalization between Jordan and Israel. Chapter Three examines the polemic over the Islamic legitimacy of the Abraham Accords between the JAE and Israel. It explores the role of peace with Israel in Abu Dhabi's overall efforts to cultivate a local ethos of moderate Islam while weakening Islamist forces at home and abroad and burnishing its international image.

The discussion here is informed by the concept of discourse, in the Foucauldian sense of struggle for hegemony in a particular area, in this case, in the political-public sphere. Following Foucault the present study assumes that maintaining and consolidating control over power-centers involves a constant delineation of the boundaries between what is legitimate and illegitimate, normative and non-normative, or allowed and forbidden in the discourse on various issues of society, state, and religion. Any regime, certainly a regime whose legitimacy is not anchored in agreed-upon electoral mechanisms, seeks to create a situation whereby at least some sectors of society accept its positions and reject those of its opposition. Control over the discourse becomes even more critical —and more challenging—in times of radical political change, which requires the hegemorilal forces to cultivate a new discourse corresponding to the new direction and goals of the community. In the shift from prolonged conflict to peace with Israel, Arab regimes and their loyalists had to establish their pro-peace position as sensible while putting opposing views—which threatened their control over the discourse—beyond the pale of acceptability. Since Islam serves as a major source and tool of political legitimacy in the three countries examined in this study, and since the most considerable and most committed opposition to the peace agreements consisted of Islamist forces, the religious component formed a pivotal part of the polemic over their validity.

The discourse analysis conducted in this study is based on thousands of sources, textual and other, which had a role in shaping public opinion in the context of the agreements with Israel. Aiming for a textual understanding of these sources, the analysis explored their explicit and implicit meanings and direct and indirect messages, their use of symbols and codes, their processes of identity construction, and their political, cultural, and social nuances. It included a systematic examination of hundreds of newspapers from Egypt, Jordan, and the UAE, affiliated with the regimes and the Islamist opposition,' emphasizing articles and especially editorials published in the two weeks before and after key milestones in the peace processes. <>

Metaphors of Death and Resurrection in the Qur'an: An Intertextual Approach with Biblical and Rabbinic Literature by Abdulla Galadari [Bloomsbury Academic, 9781350244528]

This book is available as open access through the Bloomsbury Open Access programme and is available on www.bloomsburycollections.com.

Through extensive textual analysis, this book reveals how various passages of the Qur'an define death and resurrection spiritually or metaphorically.

While the Day of Resurrection is a major theme of the Qur'an, resurrection has largely been interpreted as physical, which is defined as bones leaving their graves. However, this book shows that the Qur'an sometimes alludes to death and resurrection in a metaphoric manner – for example, rebuilding a desolate town, typically identified as Jerusalem, and bringing the Israelite exiles back; thus, suggesting awareness and engagement with Jewish liturgy. Many times, the Qur'an even speaks of non-

believers as spiritually dead, those who live in this world, but are otherwise zombies.

The author presents an innovative theory of interpretation, contextualizing the Qur'an within Late Antiquity and traces the Qur'anic passages back to their Biblical, extra-biblical and rabbinic subtexts and traditions.

Considering all the themes that scholars have explored in combination with the Qur'an – Jesus in the Qur'an, women in the Qur'an, and so forth – the subject of death in the Qur ' anQur'an has anchored relatively few modern studies. It is a curious ratio because eschatology and the concept of the Day of Resurrection together constitute a major theme in the Qur 'an, and perhaps the theme to which the text is most devoted.

If the major Qur ' anic discourse is on death and resurrection, then by Socratic definition, it is a book of philosophy. The German philosopher Arthur Schopenhauer (d. 1860 CE) said,

> Death is the real inspiring genius or Musagetes of philosophy, and for this reason Socrates defined philosophy as [thanatou meletë]. Indeed, without death there would hardly have been any philosophizing.

Commenting on Schopenhauer's statement, R. Raj Singh understands from this that, 'Death is described here as not just one among many concerns and issues of philosophy but as the business of philosophy.' Some will debate around the edges, but theology and philosophy are closely intertwined. Ingolf U. Dalferth has sketched their relationships in this way:

> Theology is not philosophy, and philosophy is not a substitute for religious convictions. But whereas religion can exist without philosophy, and philosophy without religion, theology cannot exist without recourse to each of the other two.

Plato (d. 347 BCE) narrates that Socrates (d. 399 BCE) defined philosophy as ' meletë thanatou ' (rehearsal for death). The theological arguments of the Qur 'an concentrate greatly on the topic of death and resurrection. Thus, one needs to understand what the Qur ' anic philosophy about death and resurrection is.

One of the scholarly works on death in the Qur'an in the last century is Thomas O'Shaughnessy's Muhammad's Thoughts on Death: A Thematic Study of the Qur'an ic Data. O'Shaughnessy sifts through possible Syriac sources for the concept of death in the Qur'an. He asserts that the Qur'an adopts in manyn instances a biblical view of death, although the earliest references to death in the Qur'an, according to the chronological order he adopts, are metaphoric:

> The subject of death occupies a place of growing frequency and importance in the Qur'an as one passes from the Meccan to the Medinan period. Its earlier occurrences are more often in figures of speech, but these gradually yield to a greater preoccupation with the reality as Muhammad advances in years. Even a casual paging through the Qur'an will show to what extent it reflects the many faceted Biblical view of death, more evidently as set forth in the Old Testament but as closer inspection will reveal, also as propounded in the figurative language of the New.

One of the great scholarly books written on the topic of death in Islam is The Islamic Understanding of Death and Resurrection, in which Jane I. Smith and Yvonne Y. Haddad study how the topic evolved throughout history and through various teachings and theological schools in Muslim traditions. This study, in contrast, does not solely focus on the Muslim tradition, and when it does refer to tradition, it generally uses it as a comparative tool through a critical lens. The aim of this book is to look at the principles of death, life and resurrection in the Qur'an. The intention is not to completely ignore the Muslim tradition but to investigate the definition of death in the Qur'an and any possible subtexts that the Qur'an adopts. The reason for such an approach is simple: investigating the Qur'anic concept; it is not necessarily because Muslim tradition has been viewed by many scholars with a sceptical eye in adequately interpreting the Qur'an, and sometimes with good reason; John Wansbrough, Patricia Crone, Michael Cook, Fred Donner, and Gabriel Reynolds have been among the many who point out such inadequacy. However, it is in an attempt to read the Qur'an for what it is without completely ignoring some of the insights that may also be found from the Muslim tradition, which allows us to appreciate the plethora of interpretations that also already exist within it. In other words, it is an attempt to do some form of ijtihãd (independent reasoning) in Qur'anic hermeneutics and not simply an imitation of it (taqlïd al-ijtihãd).

Indeed, there are numerous legends in circulation, many of which have been drawn on to fill lacunae in Qur'anic interpretation by traditional exegetes. For example, traditional exegetes have misrepresented and to some extent misinterpreted the Qiblah passages in the Qur'an by asserting that they are arguing with Jews and Christians about the prophethood of Muhammad or the superiority of the Ka`bah, when

it seems highly likely that the passages are instead alluding to the Shema^ in Deuteronomy and its rabbinic commentary. This sometimes calls into question the reliability of Muslim tradition in the interpretation of the Qur'an. Thus, this book treads carefully when comparing Muslim tradition with the Qur'anic text, but still appreciates the diverse and insightful understandings already found from within the tradition.

Patricia Crone is a scholar who has, more recently, discussed resurrection in the Qur 'an. She mainly focused on the nonbelievers' attitudes towards the Qur 'anic concept, yet, like most scholars, took the Qur ' anic understanding of bodily resurrection for granted. She divides the nonbelievers into a spectrum of attitudes, those unconcerned about the resurrection (perhaps because some believe they will be saved) and those who doubt or deny it. Crone identifies Qur'anic passages about those who doubt resurrection using such terms as rayb (e.g. Qur'an 22:5), shakk (e.g. Qur'an 34:21) or zann (e.g. Qur'an 28:39).

While Crone upholds that the Qur'an does not much discuss other forms of an afterlife or their nature, she particularly endorses the notion that the Qur 'an argues for bodily resurrection:

> In short, the unbelievers in the Meccan suras are depicted now as believing in the resurrection without paying much attention to it, now as doubting it, and now as denying it outright, rejecting the very idea of life after death. Their emphasis on the impossibility of restoring decomposed bodies could be taken to mean that some of them believed in a spiritual afterlife, but there are no polemics against this idea, nor against other forms of afterlife such as reincarnation. In so far as one can tell, the disagreement is never over the form that life after death will take, only about its reality. The choice is between bodily resurrection and no afterlife at all.

She implies two main things: that the Qur'an did not engage with people who believed in different forms of an afterlife, and that it advocates bodily resurrection. However, as is discussed in the first chapter of this book, pre-Islamic Arabia made space for various views of an afterlife, and it is conceivable that Mu ^h ammad might have known many of these views. If the Qur'an did not engage with them, either for or against, it may actually be very telling: the Qur'anic portrayal of what is seemingly a bodily resurrection may not be as literal as one would expect.

Yet one cannot discuss death and resurrection in Qur'an without also discussing the nafs. The meaning of this term, whether in the Qur'an or the Bible, has always daunted scholars of the Near East: is it the soul, an embodied self, or an ethereal spirit? It is said that the concept of a disembodied soul comes from ancient Greek philosophy and is foreign to Semitic people. However, Richard C. Steiner has argued that this is not the case and that the Semitic people from the times of the ancient Near East, including the ancient Israelites, had an understanding of a disembodied nepeš even before Hellenistic interaction. Therefore, this book closely investigates the concept of the nafs in the Qur'an to understand further the concept of death and life in the Qur'an.

Other issues this study introduces to readers concern reincarnation and resurrection. These two concepts appear to be distinct philosophies that existed in the ancient world. Eastern philosophies, and even ancient Greek philosophy, embraced various concepts of reincarnation or the transmigration of souls. Contrariwise, ancient Egyptians, the Semitic people, and, with the rise of Zoroastrianism, the Persian culture embraced concepts of resurrection instead. These two great philosophies, reincarnation

and resurrection, existed in the Near East by the time the Qur'an was formulated. Therefore, it is imperative to understand such notions.

The traditional view, accepted by most scholars, interprets most Qur'anic passages concerning resurrection as bodily resurrection. For example, Jane Smith states, 'That resurrection at the time of judgment means a resuscitation of the physical body is an accepted reality in Islam and well attested by the Qur'an.' While some studies on death in the Qur'an focus on physical death and resurrection, this book analyses the definition of death and resurrection in the Qur'an focusing on the metaphorical and spiritual aspects of death, especially in light of some of the intertextual relationships of some Qur'anic passages with biblical, extrabiblical and rabbinic literature. It argues that the Qur'an portrays two different kinds of death and resurrection, that of the body and that of the nafs, which may be understood as the body's soul or life force. Therefore, there needs to be a distinction between what the Qur'an describes as the resurrection of the body and what it describes as the resurrection of the nafs.

Several passages in the Qur'an appear to allude to bodily resurrection, but many of those passages, including some that are very lucid in their description of resurrection, do not necessarily refer to it in a literal way. Throughout Muslim history, several Muslim philosophers and mystics have interpreted resurrection as being completely spiritual, not bodily. Ibn Sina (d. 428/1037), for example, rejected the concept of physical resurrection because of its irrationality. In some of his works, such as Kit ãb al-najãh and Kit ãb al-shifãi, he does concede that it is to be accepted as a doctrine of faith disregarding reason, but in his more esoteric book on metaphysics, Risãlah fil-adwiyah al-qalbiyah, he completely allegorizes and rejects physical resurrection.

At times, the Qur'an appears to be explicitly talking about people who are spiritually dead, who may be described as walking tombs or, in other words, zombies. Certain Muslim schools of thought have very distinct interpretations of an afterlife that mainstream Muslims consider heretical. In some Isma`ïlï discourse, the resurrection has been understood spiritually, which is the resurrection of the nafs (soul) enabling one to understand the esoteric meanings of divine revelation. The Haftbãb by Hassan-i Mahmüd-i Kãtib (d. c. 1242 CE; previously attributed to Hassan-i Sabbãh) depicts the Isma`ili doctrine of resurrection in a spiritual manner when the esoteric understandings of the shari^ah (Islamic law) become manifest.

Setting prophetic traditions (ahãdïth) aside and looking mainly at the Qur'an, we can identify that physical resurrection is not what the Qur'an is always alluding to in the passages that discuss resurrection. Schools of thought with different interpretations for resurrection do not necessarily need to go out of their way to explain their standpoints.

For the purpose of this book, physical resurrection is defined as dead bodies leaving their graves. The reason this needs to be made explicit is that metaphorical resurrection can also be physical: the resurrection of a city may be metaphorical in the sense of a city being rebuilt and repopulated. Therefore, the main argument this book makes is that passages concerning resurrection in the Qur'an are not always physical, and when they are physical, they can still be understood metaphorically, without necessarily denoting bodies leaving their graves. However, this argument does not imply that Islam does not teach physical resurrection. Some Muslim doctrines do not necessarily explicitly trace themselves to the argument made is that the Qur'an does not always denote physical resurrection, I am not at all arguing that the doctrine of physical resurrection is not Islamic.

Another important finding this book tries to understand is the type of audience with whom the Qur'an is in conversation. Understanding the possible subtexts or oral traditions from biblical, extrabiblical and rabbinic traditions open a door in understanding the community with whom the Qur'an engages. It appears that the Jewish community with whom the Qur'an is in dialogue is well-aware of the Torah, rabbinic literature and even Jewish liturgy. This provides us some insights to this community. When analysing Islamic sources about this possible Jewish community, Haggai Mazuz concludes that the Jews, during the earliest years of Islam, were Talmudic-Rabbinic Jews who were observant and held beliefs in accordance with the midrash (rabbinic interpretations). While his approach was mainly through Islamic traditional sources and not necessarily the Qur'an, the findings of this book might echo some of his own: the Jewish community with whom the Qur'an is in discussion are well aware of rabbinic tradition, interpretation and liturgy. <>

Essay: The Obsession with Life: Jung, Khidr and the Sufi Tradition by Sara Sviri

What is the goal of the mystic?

The interface between religion and psychology is not a simple one; less simple is the interface between psychology and mysticism. Whereas key themes, such as search, journey, transformation, self-knowledge can be seen as mutually endorsed by these two areas of introspective activity, the vision of the end, of the telos, of the final goal, may vary. The telos of the psyche, according to Analytical Psychology, is to achieve individuation. Although this is not the time and I am not the person to define individuation, I think it would be fair to say that individuation is the process by which the integration of psychological opposites is attained, and by which unconscious material is raised to consciousness and is incorporated by it. Individuation is, in a way, a rounding off of the psyche and is therefore often symbolised, in art and dreams, by mandala patterns. Now the principle of a mandala pattern, whether round or square, is that it has a centre, and this centre is a point. In Aion (CW91 vol.ii para.342), Jung offers the following quotation from the writings of Plotinus, the 3rd-century philosopher whose mystical philosophy became known as Neoplatdnism:

> Self-knowledge reveals the fact that the soul's natural movement is not in a straight line ... It circles around something interior, around a centre. Now the centre is that from which proceeds the circle, that is, the soul. The soul will therefore move around the centre, that is, around the principle from which she proceeds ... The souls of the divinities ever direct themselves toward it, and that is the secret of their divinity; for divinity consists in being attached to the centre ... (Ennead VI, 9, 8)

And in the same volume (^ara.310) Jung also quotes from the writings of the Gnostic Naasenes:

> This point, "being nothing and consisting of nothing," becomes a "certain magnitude incomprehensible by thought."

Whereas individuation can be seen as the stage at which the hidden circular movement of the soul around its centre emerges in fullflowering into the daylight of mature consciousness, the goal of the mystic, as it is often expressed by Sufis as well as by other mystical traditions, is, conversely, to drown, or be annihilated, within the ineffable abyss of the centre point, within that "nothing consisting of nothing" that is "incomprehensible by thought", that is, by consciousness. Sa' d al Din Shabistari, a 13th/

14th-century Persian Sufi, articulates this radical attitude in the following assertions which stretch the boundaries of formal logic as well as those of individuation:

> The summit of knowledge, which is 'conscious apprehension', is inapprehension; for, whereas the Real 'object of apprehension [= i.e., al-Haqq, God] is infinite, knowledge is finite. This apprehension is a type of apprehension without consciousness of either apprehension or inapprehension, and at this point one finds dumbfounded stupor (hayra) and absorption in the (divine) object of apprehension ...
> After the experience of this state, all sense of relationship is dissolved ... At this point the timeless summon of Truth/ al-Haqq, "Whose is the Kingdom's today?" (Qur'an 49:16) ... is addressed to the ear of ... the mind-bereft wayfarer, whereupon, from the emptiness of his true annihilation (khala-i fana '-yi haqiqi) the answering cry returns: "It is God's, the One, the Omnipotent" (ibid., cited with slight modifications from Leonard Lewisohn, Beyond Faith and Infidelity, 243-44).

The state of "dumbfound stupor" — bewilderment, perplexity, unknowing, is often portrayed by Sufis as one of the highest of mystical experiences. Bewilderment is certainly ranked higher than knowledge, whether of God, World, or Self. In fact, what in this state is brought into extreme opposition and unbearable tension is the inner-contradiction inherent in knowledge as such, namely, the knowledge that there can be no knowing, that certainty based upon any kind of evidence is fundamentall^, and in the last resort, flawed and invalid. Immediately, in fact synchronically, this bewilderment results in the withdrawal of the knowing ego, of that seat of consciousness without which, seemingly, no owning or testimony of knowledge and the objects of knowledge can take place. The mystic's consciousness in some way dissolves. In the end, as well as in the very beginning, nothing remains. In the words of the Indian Sufi master Bhai Sahib, "there is nothing but nothingness." A very perplexing statement indeed.

Although this is not a philosophical statement, some philosophers, as well as mystics, have achieved the state of unknowing through inner reflection. For example, this is the point of departure as well as of end for those philosophers, within Christianity, Judaism and Islam, who describe the Unknowability of True Reality in terms that have been named Negative Theology. The great medieval Jewish philosopher, Moses Maimonides, in order to make this point, quotes biblical passages, such as Ps. 97:2, "Clouds and darkness are round about him"; or Ps. 18:12, "He made darkness His hiding place ..." and adds:

> [These verses] draw attention to the fact that the apprehension of His true reality is impossible for us because of the dark matter that encompasses us and not Him ...; for near Him there is no darkness but perpetual dazzling light the overflow of which illuminates all that is dark ... (The Guide of the Perplexed, 111:9, pp. 436-7).

And here are the opening lines of a well known text, the Mystical Theology, by an enigmatic writer who assumes the name [pseudo-] Dionysius the Areopagite, probably a 5th or 6th-century Christian monk from Syria:

> Trinity, which is beyond all Being, all Divinity and all Goodness! Guide us to that topmost height of mystic lore which is beyond light and which more than exceeds knowledge, where the simple, absolute, and unchangeable mysteries of heavenly truth lie hidden in the dazzling obscurity of the secret Silence, outshining all brilliance with the intensity of their darkness, and surcharging our blinded intellects with the utterly impalpable and invisible fairness of glories which exceed all beauty! Such be my prayer ... (cited with slight modifications from The Mystical Theology, ch. 1, p. 191).

Countless illustrations can be adduced here from the writings of Plotinus, Meister Eckhart, The Cloud of Unknowing, St. John of the Cross, Teresa de Avila and many others. In our own times one thinks of the relentless and non-compromising search of Martin Heidegger, the allegedly atheistic philosopher in the tradition of Phenomenology, for the essence of Being, a search which made him utter statements such as, "Being is veiled by beings."

In Sufi terms, this "stupor" in face of truth Itself, dos ding als sick, when it results in the withdrawal of ego consciousness, is called 'annihilation' (fana'). In my talk I shall follow the thread of that strange, but well documented, mystic drive for the ultimate state that is described as nothingness, darkness, poverty and death.

The Conference of the Birds: the parrot's excuse and the hoopoe's retort.

But what has all this to do with the vital, effervescent and ever-present figure of Khidr, the Green Man of the Sufi tradition, who heralds mystical knowledge, life, growth and change? What has inspired the theme of this talk in the first place are some perplexing, even disturbing, verses from The Conference of the Birds, a mystical epic by the 12th-century Persian poet Farid al-Din Attar. In this epic, birds from all corners of the world set out in search of the Symorgh, the fabulous silver bird who resides in a hidden palace beyond seven frightful valleys. In the litany of excuses put forward by different types of birds for not wishing or not being able to join in the journey, the green parrot, in her [!j turn, speaks out:

> If I could reassert my liberty
> I'd find the stream of immortality
> Guarded by Khizr — his cloak is green like mine,
> And this shared colour is an open sign
> I am his equal or equivalent.
> Only the stream Khizr watches could content
> My thirsting soul — I have no wish to seek
> This Symorgh's throne of which you love to speak.
> (Davis-Darbandi's translation)

Now to this excuse the Hoopoe, who is the guide and leader of the birds' expedition, retorts first with a rebuke, then with a story. Here is the rebuke:

> You are a cringing slave ...
> To think your being has no other end
> Than finding water and a loyal friend.
> What is it you hope to gain?
> Your coat is beautiful, but where's your brain?
> Act as a lover and renounce your soul;
> With love's defiance seek the lover's goal.

(Note that we are dealing here with ends and goals.) And here's the Hoopoe's teaching story:

> There was a man, mad from love of God. Khizr said to him: "0 perfect man, will you be my friend?" He replied: "You and I are not compatible, for you have drunk of the water of immortality so that you will always exist, and I wish to give up my life. I am without friends and do not know even how to support myself. Whilst you are busy preserving your life, I sacrifice mine every day. It is better that 1 leave you, as birds escape the snare, so, good-bye." (C. S. Nott's translation)

Why does Attar object so forcefully to the parrot's search for the water of life, Khidr and immortality? Does Attar, the poet, voice here a subversive, eccentric, iconoclastic view of Khidr? Surely this is not quite univocally so, since in his opening exhortation to the Conference of the Birds, Attar, with very positive reference to Khidr, encourages the reader to do the following:

> Abandon self-love and you will see
> The Way that leads us to Reality.
> There knowledge is your guide, and Khizr will bring
> Clear water drawn from life's eternal spring. (Davis-Darbandi's translation)

Also worth considering in this context is a short poem by Abdallah Ansari (Afghanistan, 11th century); a poem that he was inspired to write in the wake of meeting his teacher al-Kharaqani:

> Abdallah was a wild and restless type
> He went to seek the source of the water of life
> By chance he met up with al-Kharaqani
> And there he found the spring of the water of Life
> He drank his fill
> Until
> Nor he remained nor Kharaqani.
> (From Hasan Shushud, Masters of Wisdom of Central Asia,)

What, then, does Attar mean when he rebukes the parrot for allying herself with Khidr and the search for the water of life rather than with the quest for the Symorgh? After all, in the Sufi tradition, is Khidr not the enigmatic divine messenger who has been granted by the King Himself the mysterious hidden knowledge that has eluded even Moses? (see Qur'an 18:60-82).

In these short snippets Attar challenges precisely those values, such as life, greenness, mystic knowledge and spiritual immortality, that conventionally, and what's more spiritually, we have learnt to cherish above all else. In the search for God, he urges, the genuine seeker should renounce everything. Even the water of life and all that it stands for; the individuated consciousness must not become the goal. A search which is not for truth itself is not worth the effort. The sincere seeker will not be compromised or satisfied by any substitute, be this Khidr or the water of eternal life. Attar's lovely poem, full of enchanting stories and beautiful poetic language, is, in fact, an uncompromising sermon calling for total renunciation in the search for Truth, and this includes life itself. And yet the poem is lovely, it does impress itself upon our poetic sensibilities, our sense of uplifting joy that springs from the beauty and lightness of life and being. Can we reconcile these two, I mean the austerity of the non-compromising search with the sensuousness of the poetry, its music and its images? Why does love, which is the prime agent in this epic, make the protagonists wish or be prepared to die rather than to live? Is it because death is a strong metaphor for union? For the cessation of dualism? For that withdrawal of the conscious ego in the aftermath of the devastating encounter with the boundaries of knowledge? For fans'?

> I was just now listening to Start the Week on the radio, where the discussion revolved round "Honour killing of women in Pakistan ". This act is considered the most powerful deterrent for women against committing adultery. Now this makes me think, but there will always be women who, in spite of this ruthless deterrent, will commit what is regarded as illicit sex. Does it not show that the sexual drive is so strong that a woman, despite putting her life on the line, will prefer to endanger it altogether rather than give up the act of love? So also the moth, who, in its

> all-consuming need to know what fire is, is annihilated in fire's devouring essence. (See "The Moth and the Flame", The Conference of the Birds 1984, pp.206-207.)

Does this not unravel the function of love as passion and untiring commitment for the search after Truth and Reality; concepts that, for Sufis, converge in the divine name al-Haqq? To quote Kierkegaard (a Sufi at heart if not by name), "Essential existing', as against 'loosely-called existing', demands passion and commitment".

Khidr and 'boundary situations'.

In fact, there is hardly any contradiction here. Khidr is, at one and the same time, the immortal one who has drunk from the water of life and who confers upon the seeker the perennial knowledge, as well as the one who heralds death and the breakdown of all that the psyche is familiar with. Life is death and death is life. Or, to somewhat hone this statement, life is within the horizon of death inasmuch as death, the breaking down of a life form, allows and heralds the appearance of a new life form. Khidr is to be found there "where the two seas meet". He is to be found there where the sea of life meets the sea of death. Yes, he is symbolized by the colour green; it is said of him that wherever he treads, new shoots grow. He is the principle of life and growth insofar as life is ever-flowing and unceasing. He is represented by the grace of rain and by the blessing, the baraka, that radiates from the friends of God, the awtiya', who, like him, are the revivers of dead souls. But for this revival and grace to take place, old life forms, old habits, old understanding, old knowledge, have, at all times, to be placed on the edge, on the verge of being given up. This is often said, and it is always easier said than done. We can't escape our character, our temperament, our in-built conception of time, space and relationships, our upbringing, our historical time, convictions, beliefs, aspirations . All these are powerful determinations, but they are not truth. Love, however, can release us, and mystics are in search of that freedom. This freedom is death, but it is death in life. In fact, it is life itself. Life with a capital 'L'. Life, period. Freed from predicated concepts and projections. Love and life, love and death are interlinked. Perhaps here lies the fundamental paradox of the mystical life.

Standing at the twilight zone, Khidr is a barzakh, an isthmus. This 'nowhere-place', this 'nonexisting line' between here and here, between now and now, does not exist, yet it makes up our reality. It is like imagination, like a dream, like a mirror, reflecting images yet at the same time showing that reality is neither there nor not-there; that everything, including our ideas and notions of God, is both it and not-it. In our post-modern parlance, Khidr is liminality or 'boundary situation' or chaos, which in one stroke breaks down all our predictions and assumptions, yet at the same time yields infinite as-yet-unknown-but-already-forthcoming possibilities.

In our times it was Karl Jaspers who coined the 'term 'boundary situation'. Here is what Hans Georg Gadamer, a pupil of Jaspers and an eminent philosopher in his own right, says with reference to this notion:

> Jaspers described what all of the different forms of existence ... have in common with the concept of boundary situation. By boundary situations he meant such situations whose boundary character demonstrated the limits of scientific mastery of the world. One such boundary situation is the appearance of something that no longer can be conceived of as just another example of a general rule and, hence, a case where one can no longer rely on the scientific control of calculable processes. Some examples of such a situation would be death, which we all must face; guilt, which everyone must carry; or the whole formation of a person's life, in which

> each of us as an individual — that one and only individual — must come to realize himself or herself. It is meaningful to say that it is precisely in these boundary situations where what one is first really emerges. This emerging, this stepping out of the controllable, calculable reactions and ways of behaving of social beings, constitutes the concept of existence. (Gadamar, Heidegger's Ways, 5.)

The emphases are mine.

And Jung, in his well known 'Concerning Rebirth', (CW9 vol.i para.240 ff.) writes about Khidr:

> He appears in the Eighteenth Sura of the Koran entitled "The Cave." This entire Sura is taken up with a rebirth mystery. The cave is the place of rebirth, that secret cavity in which one is shut up in order to be incubated and renewed. The Koran says of it: "You might have seen the rising sun decline to the right of their cavern, and as it set, go past them on the left while they [the Seven Sleepers] stayed in the middle." The "middle" is the centre where the jewel reposes, where the incubation or the sacrificial rite or the transformation takes place ... Just such a place of the centre or of transformation is the cave in which those seven had gone to sleep, little thinking that they would experience there a prolongation of life verging on immortality. When they woke, they had slept 309 years ...

(Following this, Jung relates and interprets the complete story of Khidr and Moses.)

The 'boundary situation', then, places us, every one of us, at each and every moment, between knowing and unknowing, between being and non-being, breakdown and renewal, life and death. These boundary situations have an affinity with homelessness, with wayfaring and the non-attachment of the vagabond at heart. To dwell in permanence in any kind of certitude means to have reached the end of the journey. More often than not this is a deluded state, since the journey does not have an end, it's a perpetuum mobile. For this reason, ideas that pertain to the ever-deepening and never-ending quest for truth are often formulated in paradoxes, in riddles, in apophatic language and at times, from the aspect of formal logic, in statements that appear circular, repetitive, and empty.

But precisely from these boundary situations — the void, the cave, the middle, the point, the uncertain, unpredictable, uncharted — life springs. The search for the Divine Nothingness is, after all, the same as the search for the water of life. The pendulum always swings between the two, and so too must we. It calls for letting go of all preconceived ideas. But, mind you, even this letting go can become a pre-conceived truism that from time to time needs to be challenged. This is what Attar does in the Hoopoe's address to the parrot. The certainty that life, light and consciousness always constitute a superior set of values is shown from a different vantage point. Somehow, for me, it is this paradoxical figure of Khidr, always a barzakh (isthmus) that enables and maintains the oscillation between truth and non-truth, knowledge and non-knowledge, apprehension and nonapprehension, growth and breakdown, progress and regression, belonging and detachment, fana' and baqa' (annihilation and permanence), into ever deeper layers of being and freedom.

The Familiar, Cliches, and Renewal.

The so-called Pavlovian Classical Conditioning is at work in every domain, even in spiritual life. Even in a keen psychological analysis, in an intuitive insight, in an emotional ecstatic response, one is restricted by preconceived patterns and notions. Truth is bare. It is a vibrating point with no delineation. On the road to truth, to sincerity, one throws away all predicates, one after another. Naked Being, with no

attributes; or, as the Sufis would have it, colourless and featureless. When you are committed to a search with Khidr, it's as though everything has to be reinvented, re-found-out. At every turn a New-Found-Land. Even language must be re-forged:

> When someone asked Jami why he seldom used the technical. language of Sufism, he said: "That would be all very well if we wished to deceive each other for a while, turning a subject of real importance into a verbal plaything." (Hasan Shushud, Masters of Wisdom of Central Asia, 113.)

Khidr, then, is the principle which never abides by the familiar and the trodden path. Qushayri, an important Sufi master of the 11th century, in his 'Instructions to Novices' (wasiyya lil-muridin), distinguishes between two critical states/stages that the seeker may encounter on the path: fatra) and waqfa. Fatra means, approximately, a state of regression; the wayfarer turns away, or turns round, from the path. It is a well documented stage that teachers and disciples have been known to acknowledge and confront. But there is also waqfa. This means stability and hence stagnation. "The difference between fatra and waqfa', writes al-Qushayri, "is this: fatra is when the murid (= novice, seeker) turns away from his quest and walks out of it; waqfa is when he becomes comfortable on the path and stays content in states of laziness". (Risala, 182; in Arabic) The message, therefore, seems to be, may the seeker never play safe!

Sincerity and the Dark Night of the Soul

It is not easy to observe, identify, and own these moments of stability and stagnation. A lot of what is thought of as spiritual can be delusional. Yet, it does happen that, as a result of a breakdown, a chaotic experience, a period that the Christian mystical tradition names 'the dark night of the soul', a new awareness arises. One important aspect of the 'dark night' is sincerity. When the melancholy, pointlessness, boredom, depression are not denied but, rather choiceless'); embraced and persevered in, then it might turn into a fruitful 'boundary situation', one that is impregnated with new and unforeseen possibilities. In her seminal work Mysticism, Evyn Underhill studies, in-depth, this phenomenon on the mystical journey. Basing herself on the diaries of the French 17th-century mystic Madame Guyon, she writes:

> Madame Guyon, who has described with much elaboration ... her suffering during the oncoming and duration of the Night — or, as she calls it ... the Mystic Death — traces its beginning in short recurrent states of privation, or dullness of feeling, such as ascetic writers call "aridity": in which the self loses all interest in and affection for those divine realities which had previously filled its life. This privation followed upon, or was the reaction from, an "illuminated" period of extreme joy and security, in which, she says, "the presence of God never left me for an instant ...". As Madame Guyon never attempted to control her states, but made a point of conforming to her own description of the "resigned soul" as "God's weathercock", we have in her an unequalled opportunity of study. (pp. 383-84).

I find these words, "Madame Guyon never attempted to control her states, but made a point of conforming to her own description of the 'resigned soul' as 'God's weathercock' ", deep and worth pondering. States of darkness and nothingness may sometimes seem as our own fault, as though there's not enough light in us, as though we have misunderstood something, erred and have done something wrong. Sometimes it takes on an aspect of betrayal; we accuse ourselves of having betrayed truth, God, the Teacher, the Tradition, the Path, etc. At such states or stations we may be left with one asset only,

sincerity; the fact that we are not prepared to falsify or deny the truth of our situation as it is, without masks — lowly, humiliated, deprived of light and meaning. So be it. A term of resignation. If the Emperor is naked, so be it. Perhaps the message in this parable goes deeper than what at first glance meets the eye. The Emperor is naked, meaning: kingship, truth, is indeed naked. Truth does not wear any clothes. So where is its majesty? Where is its beauty? Its many attributes that clothes it as befits royalty? The mystic is plunged into the void and darkness of the abyss of nudity and has only this truth to hold on to, however much it devastates him or her. The Emperor is naked. And where do I go from here?

The Man Made of Rain

Khidr must not be left a mythological image, a dream apparition, a revered icon, an archetype — inspiring and revealing as this may be. His essence, symbolized in the Sufi tradition by rain, must be brought to life by our particular needs and circumstances, by our particular need for living really, with as few preconceptions as possible. For him to be at work, we have to bring him to our level of quest. If we are novices, he'll have something to say to us from the level, and in the idiom, of novicehood. If we have reached some maturity, he'll address us afresh from that level; perhaps calling upon us to heed our time, our contemporaries, to open up to the images of our culture, to its pains and dreams, to its aspirations which we, too, embody. He will call upon us to partake, to not withdraw, to not wrap ourselves with judgmental and self-righteous morality. Yes, ours is a consumerist culture. Yes, the internet is brimming with child-abusive pornography. Yes, journalism, in the name of democratic duty, breeds and is bred by sensationalism and profiteering. Yes, communal institutions have become ruled by the principle of cost-effectiveness. Yes, our cities have become more polluted, more crowded, more stifling, more dangerous. Yes, political correctness is a shallow pretence and hidden bigotry. Yes, who knows what the new millennium has in store ... more earthquakes? tornadoes? cyclones? deluge? ethnic cleanings? mass emigration? But I am not better than anyone else in that cultural theatre in which my life, too, is played out. I am part and parcel. I live, as we all do, in the eye of the storm. I have no immunity from the on-goings, be they cataclysmic or ordinary. Anything can happen, anytime, anywhere, to anyone, including me. And yet I live within the horizon of Khidr, the principle of being, with the possibility of forever inventing and allowing new ways of being. This, only this, grants me a measure of freedom from identifying with anything. So I am neither attached nor detached. At least, to a certain degree, I am, and in order to give this fundamental sense of being space for expansion, I keep my doorways open to all directions.

Something has been at work. Yet time is needed. Khidr, a messenger from being who can exist only when I exist, is the master of waiting, of hiding, of simulating absences. I know about absences. Yet something has been at work, as before, so many times before; fogginess and aimlessness ('being in the wrong film'), when I lose the capacity to truly exist. Then, in the haze-covered woods, a raw path emerges, and there, beyond the tyranny of the past, he is; alive, fresh, new, present. Winking.... What is present is sometimes present on a very basic level in a simple joy; warm food, cool water, the way the breeze in February caresses the green as-yet-nonbudding stems of daffodils; the freshness that comes with rain, the notes of a simple melody, a joke ... These things are signs of healing, the healing of the wounds of the aching soul in her night. You know the fable about the princess who forgot how to laugh. The king who loved her was ready to give his kingdom for any man who'd make her laugh. Laugh and life and the greenness of Khidr — his playfulness, his trickster quality. Playing is relating. Playing is changing places, changing roles. Playing is the exhilaration of winning and the shame of losing, but neither for too

long; the principle of motion, temporality, cherishing the moment. Beggars become kings, kings become beggars, and Life flows on! There's here a link with the future, with new possibilities, with coming to fruition, with maturation, with becoming what one is, and finally, with death.

To end, here are two direct experiences of 'Life' in liminal situations. The first occurred to me in a street in Oxford. The second occurred in a Dublin intensive care ward, where a man made of rain appeared to a poet who had just had a quadruple bypass operation.

> August 22 1996
> This morning, at the junction of Queen Street and New Inn Hall, approximately opposite Argos, two old ladies. Tiny, slow, uniform, both wearing identical navy-blue blazers that could have been bought at a school outfit store, or at a church fete. For a moment, walking arm-in-arm, the sun bathes in their curly white hair. They are alive.
> There is very little that I can say by way of interpretation. My memory cannot now produce the immediacy, poignancy and vividness of the witnessing of Life embodied in these two anonymous old ladies; even less so can my words. All ^ can say is that, through the experience then and its absence now, I know that very seldom are we given to witness life. All that we normally witness are the motions of Life. This sounds almost theological. But then, pondering it theologically will take it even further away from the primacy of the experience itself. Das ding als sich.

October 1996

The Irish poet Brendan Kennelly went through a quadruple bypass operation. He writes:

> The day after the operation I had a number of visions ... I saw a man made of rain. He was actually raining ... His raineyes were candid and kind, glowing down, into, and through themselves. He spoke to me and took me to journeys ... He took me into brilliant confusions to experience thrilling definitions, or moments of definition. He taught me the meaning of presence, what it means to be truly and fully in somebody's presence, a process of complete dream surrender to another's reality at its most articulate and vital ... (from the 'Note' to The Man Made of Rain, 7).

In the winter that followed his operation, while convalescing, Brendan Kennelly wrote a long poem based on his experiences, visions, and insights. He named it The Man Made of Rain. I happened to hear him reading from this poem on the radio in December 1999, when, having just returned home from a talk on Khidr I had delivered in Oxford, I switched on the radio at random. Here is what I heard:

> Between living and dying
> is the calmest place I've ever been.
> He stood opposite me and smile
> I smiled too, I think, because this was the first time
> I'd seen a man made of rain ...
> The rain poured through him,
> through his eyes, face, neck, shoulders, chest, all his body
> but no rain reached the ground,
> It ended at his skin.

He looked at me with eyes of rain
and said, "I'll be coming to see you
now and then from this moment on.
Today, I'm colours, all colours.
Look at me, I'll be colours again
but different next time, maybe.
See my colours today.
I looked. I saw the flesh of rain,
I looked into and through the rain
and saw colours I'd never seen before.
As I looked, the colours began to dance
with each other ...
He never asked me to trust him but I
would trust the man made of rain
to the lip and into the mouth and belly
of eternity, it isn't even a question of trust
more of the kind of interest you find
when you put aside the fear of dying
and look at the light
or listen to the sound of water
or pay attention to pigeons
or her hair when she's unaware ...
It is calm in the place beyond trust
and especially calm if you walk there
in the company of your own hurt,
in the company of the man made of rain
pouring beside you ...
He steps forward ... he vanishes,
nowhere to be seen,
the silver rain is everywhere ...
where live and die
secret and open
dark and light
chaos and wonderplan
are wideawake in the heart of sleep.
(The Man Made of Rain, 15-17)

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Death, Power, and Apotheosis in Ancient Egypt: The Old and Middle Kingdoms by Julia Troche [Cornell University Press, 9781501760150]

Death, Power, and Apotheosis in Ancient Egypt uniquely considers how power was constructed, maintained, and challenged in ancient Egypt through mortuary culture and apotheosis, or how certain dead in ancient Egypt became gods.

Rather than focus on the imagined afterlife and its preparation, Julia Troche provides a novel treatment of mortuary culture exploring how the dead were mobilized to negotiate social, religious, and political capital in ancient Egypt before the New Kingdom.

Troche explores the perceived agency of esteemed dead in ancient Egyptian social, political, and religious life during the Old and Middle Kingdoms (c. 2700–1650 BCE) by utilizing a wide range of evidence, from epigraphic and literary sources to visual and material artifacts. As a result, *Death, Power, and Apotheosis in Ancient Egypt* is an important contribution to current scholarship in its collection and presentation of data, the framework it establishes for identifying distinguished and deified dead, and its novel argumentation, which adds to the larger academic conversation about power negotiation and the perceived agency of the dead in ancient Egypt.

Review

"*Death, Power, and Apotheosis in Ancient Egypt* is a well-approached study that brings fresh perspectives on ancient Egyptian religion and the concept of afterlife in the pre-New Kingdom. Troche integrates current research with individual case studies and provides an essential stepping-stone for anyone interested in ancient Egyptian concepts of the afterlife." -- Jiří Janák, Czech Institute of Egyptology, Charles University

"Julia Troche provides a crucial and an excellent synthesis of the development of religious beliefs in ancient Egypt?the selective use of some practices to create identities involving the participation of the dead and to the sociology of ancient Pharaonic religion." -- Juan Carlos Moreno García, author of *The State in Ancient Egypt*

CONTENTS

Standing on the island of Elephantine, ancient Abu, near Egypt's traditional southern border, is an ancient Egyptian temple dedicated to Heqaib (figure 1). One of his followers, a man named Sarenput, commissioned its construction around 1950 BCE. The entire monument is covered in images and texts venerating the divine Heqaib.

On the outer face of the back wall, where passersby would see it, Sarenput instructs Heqaib to "See with your own face, that which I have done for you. May a god act for the one who acted for him. May you make my years last upon earth, and cause that my voice be made true in the necropolis." This prayer is clearly directed at Heqaib, who is described as "a god," and whose perceived powers enable him to affect someone's life and afterlife. Heqaib, though, was once just a man.

Heqaib was a local official of Elephantine who lived during Egypt's Old Kingdom, about 2200 BCE, some 250 years before Sarenput erected this shrine. How did this mere mortal man become a god? How did he acquire claims of divinity that were normally exclusively held by the ancient Egyptian king? Only the king was supposed to wield power over life and the afterlife, but a close examination of this period illuminates additional men who, upon death, were similarly deified. Why, and how, did this deification occur, and what were the political, social, and religious impacts of these possibly subversive acts? These are some of the questions that drive this book.

Broadly, this book explores the perceived agency of the dead in ancient Egyptian social, political, and religious life, during the Old through Middle Kingdoms (c. 2700-1650 BCE). In particular, it investigates the phenomenon of apotheosis—the process through which one becomes deified—and the articulation of certain dead as elevated in status vis-à-vis networks of power. Scholarship on the dead in ancient Egypt has primarily focused on the preparations of death and the supernatural afterlife—for example, the construction of a tomb, mummification, funerary rituals, and so on—where engagement with the dead is often confined to ancestor worship. This is so prevalent as a basic assumption within the field, that more productive lenses of analysis, such as the social or political impacts of the dead, are often ignored.' This volume explores and uncovers ancient Egypt's investment in three distinct, yet interdependent, historical areas during the third millennium BCE: (1) death, and imagined life after death;

(2) power, via public displays of social capital for eternity; and (3) apotheosis, specifically the processes of deification of certain dead.

Death

The ancient Egyptian worldview included the lived reality of everyday experiences on earth, and the imagined, supernatural afterlife (the divine Hereafter) comprising the gods, dead, and other supernatural entities. Death was only the beginning; it was a transformation of form that did not negate the dead's ability to interact with the living. In many ways, death freed the individual from the physical constraints of the human body. The dead in ancient Egypt remained actors whose social capital—that is, their worth and influence—could be effectively exploited within the social, religious, and political networks of the living. Being buried near the king's pyramid was an expression of an individual's worth through physical association. A priest commissioning a larger shrine for a local god's cult would place the priest within a favorable religious and social position. Renovating and keeping tidy the tomb of a once powerful ancestor could help to solidify a descendant's political influence within his town. These presentations of capital could be orchestrated before death, such as the arrangement of one's tomb near an important monument or at a particularly visible spot within the local landscape. Other expressions, though, were made posthumously, by descendants or other interested parties. In either case, these expressions of the dead's social, religious, and/or political capital could have profound historical impacts.

Power

Arguably, the most powerful individual in ancient Egypt was the king. But the king's power was the result of negotiations that occurred between the king and the other the social actors of Egypt: the Egyptian people, the gods, and the dead. The latter two (the gods and the dead), despite lacking corporeal or physical agency, were nevertheless perceived to possess real influence in the world of the living. One of the ways in which the king asserted his power was in his role as guarantor of mortuary benefaction—that is, he helped to ensure people's admittance into the divine Hereafter. In order to enter the divine Hereafter, the recently deceased had to pass judgment before Osiris. Due to the king's unique relationship with the gods, he was able to put in a "good word" on someone's behalf. Not only could the king influence this admittance, but it was only through association with him that the dead could enjoy the fullest privileges of the afterlife. The acceptance by the Egyptian people of the king's knowledge of funerary spells and his exclusive access to the gods allowed him to wield immense power. Thus, this power was a direct negotiation with and dependent on the people of Egypt. Indeed, Leslie Ann Warden has noted that "power cannot be simplified to a top-down pyramid model. Rather, complex processes of state and local administration, kinship ties, and patronage created webs of power" (2015, 24-25). What happened, however, when these webs of power were redefined, and the dead were mobilized in an effort to undermine established royal authority?

Apotheosis

Near the end of the Old Kingdom, certain types of dead began to receive greater status and perceived influence. I have subdivided the dead into four main groups:

1. The dead who did not pass the judgment before Osiris, and who therefore possess no perceived agency.
2. The "average dead," who passed this judgment and thus retained perceived social influence. They were known as akh (p1. akhu) in ancient Egyptian (lit., "effective ones").

3. The "distinguished dead," who are marked as distinct from the average dead and are revered but not deified.
4. The "deified dead," who are in an exceptional group and underwent apotheosis to become gods.

The "esteemed dead" is a term I use to refer to both groups 3 and 4 (the distinguished and deified dead)—as a group of "above-average dead."

The "distinguished dead" were distinct from "average dead" in that they were called on by the living to help ensure their admittance to the divine Hereafter—a duty once exclusively performed by the king. Other dead were celebrated so much that they were elevated to the status of gods through a process called apotheosis. These deified dead were also called on for assistance, an act that was once exclusive to the king and the traditional gods of Egypt, but they did not replace the king as the ideological benefactor of Egypt. Instead, the deified dead provided communities with an alternative means of ensuring access to the gods and to the divine Hereafter. In this way, royal power was essentially subverted by these "esteemed dead."

Death, Power, and Apotheosis

This book is structured in two parts that together explore the perceived agency of esteemed dead in ancient Egyptian social, political, and religious life during the Old through Middle Kingdoms. Part I of this book, "Death and Power," begins with an introduction to Egyptian mortuary culture (chapter 1), which explores the social role of the dead, lays the foundation for quotidian mortuary practices, and describes components of the ancient Egyptian self. Chapter 2 considers the supernatural, social aspect of the dead—the akhu. It establishes the "norm" from which esteemed dead diverge. An updated discussion of the akh considers funerary literature (Pyramid Texts and Coffin Texts), Appeals to the Living, and Letters to the Dead. I show that quotidian interactions with the dead were part of expected social behavior and that these interactions were fundamentally personal, concerned with issues of fertility or illness, rather than more profound concerns, such as admittance into the afterlife. Chapter 3 tackles "power," first as a larger concept and then situated within the historical context in which the Egyptian king was the sole ideological benefactor of mortuary access. I emphasize that this role was a primary means through which the king in the Old Kingdom constructed and maintained his power.

Part 2, `Apotheosis," considers esteemed dead—which are distinguished and deified dead—with chapter 4 explaining my approach for identifying these figures in the textual and archaeological records. Chapter 5 presents three case studies of distinguished dead: Ptahhotep, Hordjedef, and the governors of Áin Asil. These distinguished dead were elevated above "average" ancient Egyptian dead but were not fully deified. To prove that my identification of these dead as "distinguished dead" is accurate, I consider onomastic, literary, and architectural/ archaeological evidence. I conclude that these distinguished dead could be mobilized to undermine royal authority; specifically, the distinguished dead were invoked in the imakhu kher formula that is shown to be evidence for the king's role as mortuary benefactor. This makes evident that the distinguished dead were taking on roles once exclusive to the king.

Chapters 6 and 7 lay out the evidence for the six confirmed cases of deified dead in the Old and Middle Kingdoms (Djedi, Mehu, Kagemni, Isi, Heqaib, and Wahka). The main purpose of these two chapters is to provide evidence in support of the identification of these individuals as deified dead so that diachronic conclusions can be drawn in the conclusion about their roles in changing systems of royal power. First, I

argue that evidence for apotheosis in the Old Kingdom was intimately tied to the funerary realm, where display of social capital was determined by ingrained royal networks of power. As these power structures shifted at the end of the Old Kingdom, so did access and display. Then, I suggest that the modesty of these cults could be explained by their proximity to the capital, where decorum was more restrictive. Finally, I show that there is an observable shift away from the mortuary-based structures of power at the capital toward a temple-based system following the conclusion of the Old Kingdom. Altogether, this allowed for more fully expressed displays of divine status in the First Intermediate Period and the Middle Kingdom. Kings of the Middle Kingdom coopted local cults into national building programs in an attempt to thwart local threats to recently re-established royal power. Finally, the conclusion analyzes the sociopolitical and historical impact of these esteemed dead. It reaffirms that the mobilization of these esteemed dead undermined royal authority and was one of many catalysts that contributed to the decline of royal authority at the end of the Old Kingdom. It similarly demonstrates how Middle Kingdom kings reacted to evolving systems of political power, which can be generalized as a shift in emphasis from mortuary access to the temple. <>

THE QUEST FOR GOD AND THE GOOD: WORLD PHILOSOPHY AS A LIVING EXPERIENCE by Diana Lobel [Columbia University Press, 9780231153157]

Diana Lobel takes readers on a journey across Eastern and Western philosophical and religious traditions to discover a beauty and purpose at the heart of reality that makes life worth living. Guided by the ideas of ancient thinkers and the insight of the philosophical historian Pierre Hadot, **THE QUEST FOR GOD AND THE GOOD** treats philosophy not as an abstract, theoretical discipline, but as a living experience.

For centuries, human beings have struggled to know why we are here, whether a higher being or dimension exists, and whether our existence is fundamentally good. Above all, we want to know whether the search for God and the good will bring happiness. Following in the path of the ancient philosophers, Lobel directly connects conceptions of God or an Absolute with notions of the good, illuminating diverse classical texts and thinkers. She explores the Bible and the work of Plato, Aristotle, Augustine, Maimonides, al-Farabi, and al-Ghazali. She reads the *Tao Te Ching*, *I Ching*, *Bhagavad Gita*, and *Upanishads*, as well as the texts of Theravada, Mahayana, and Zen Buddhism, and traces the repercussions of these works in the modern thought of Alfred North Whitehead, Iris Murdoch, Alasdair MacIntyre, and Charles Taylor.

While each of these texts and thinkers sets forth a distinct and unique vision, all maintain that human beings find fulfillment in their contact with beauty and purpose. Rather than arriving at one universal definition of God or the good, Lobel demonstrates the aesthetic value of multiple visions presented by many thinkers across cultures. **THE QUEST FOR GOD AND THE GOOD** sets forth a path of investigation and discovery culminating in intellectual and spiritual communion.

Review

She enlists her readers in a close reading and careful analysis of enduring texts from several major religious and philosophical traditions as a way to gain and understanding of key issues in fundamental metaphysics and moral philosophy. — *Choice*

For those looking for an introduction to world philosophy, this is an excellent option...Lobel is to be thanked for providing us with a wonderful book that both instructs and inspires our own philosophical and spiritual journeys. -- Tracy Sayuki Tiemeier — *National Catholic Reporter*

Lobel's **QUEST FOR GOD AND THE GOOD** *is* about the travel, not the destination; it is about raising the questions, not answering them once and for all. -- Yaniv Feller — *Journal of Jewish Thought*

Among the enduring works of twentieth-century literature is Victor Frankl's Man's Search for Meaning. A psychoanalyst and concentration camp survivor, Frankl testifies that human beings can survive tremendous suffering if they understand it to have some purpose. Any of us can triumph over incomprehensible pain if we can reframe our challenges to discover their hidden meaning and value.

Drawing upon this insight, Frankl developed the psychological discipline of logotherapy (from the Greek logos,"meaning," and therapeia,"healing, care, or attention"). He posits that the fundamental human drive is not the search for pleasure or power, but the search for meaning; each individual must find a personal understanding of his or her own life purpose. The search for the meaning and purpose of life is indeed universal. Human beings want to know why we are here, whether there is a transcendent being or dimension in the universe, and whether reality is fundamentally good. Above all, we want to know whether the search for God and the good will bring us happiness and fulfillment.

The discipline of philosophy has traditionally addressed these fundamental questions. Contemporary historian of philosophy Pierre Hadot has shown that for ancient thinkers, philosophy was not simply a theoretical discipline, but a way of life. Philosophical arguments were in essence spiritual exercises whose goal was to transform the self. "Philosophy," he writes, "then appears in its original aspect not as

a theoretical construct, but as a method for training people to live and to look at the world in a new way. It is an attempt to transform mankind." The truths revealed by ancient texts may appear simple at first glance, even banal. "Yet for their meaning to be understood, these truths must be lived, and constantly re-experienced. Each generation must take up, from scratch, the task of learning to read and to reread these old truths". The task of reading for self-transformation is itself a spiritual discipline, for "we have forgotten how to read, how to pause, liberate ourselves from our worries, return into ourselves, and leave aside our search for subtlety and originality, in order to meditate calmly, ruminate, and let the texts speak to us".

Dale Wright, a scholar of Buddhist philosophy, likewise advocates a meditative reading practice that entails philosophical, reflective activity, one that "is never content with the obvious; it will refuse to hold onto customary forms of understanding in order to push beyond what is already within grasp. The initial act of reading serves to lure the mind out of complacency and inertia by challenging it to consider something new, or to experience more deeply what has already been thought."

In that spirit, the goal of this study is to explore the insights of central thinkers and texts from throughout the world that address fundamental existential questions. Specifically, we will explore the connections between concepts of divinity or an absolute and the good life. While we as moderns often associate religion with the search for eternal liberation or immortality, central texts of many of the world's religious and philosophical traditions are equally concerned with uncovering the meaning and purpose of life in this world. These key texts and thinkers maintain that human beings find true fulfillment by making contact with fundamental values at the heart of their lived reality.

Our first question as we undertake this search: Why is spiritual life so often described using metaphors of quest and journey? A "journey" implies movement in space, a physical going out toward a destination. A "quest" too requires setting forth in search of something. The quest and the journey suggest that history, events, and narrative are meaningful—perhaps that they even hold intrinsic, sacred importance. In contrast, many traditions speak of God, ultimate reality, or nirvãna as a spiritual absolute that does not move or change; they suggest that the ultimate human goal is to arrive at a static eternal perfection. For example, Aristotle's philosophical God does not change—it is pure Being, the Unmoved Mover, thought thinking itself. It does not seek or lack; it eternally contemplates its own nature. Similarly, (Plato's realm of the Forms is a beautiful mosaic of eternal, unchanging essences. The metaphor of the quest, in contrast, suggests that narrative, search, and change are meaningful; that the journey itself is its own reward. The latter perspective is at the heart of this study. It is not my goal to arrive at a universal definition of God and the good. Rather, I will endeavor to present the aesthetic beauty of multiple visions presented by thinkers across history and across cultures. I will suggest that investigation and discovery are themselves processes of value.

The book begins by examining the relationship between God and the good in the creation accounts of the Bible and Plato. Why does the Bible begin with creation? And do we have a real creation here? In fact, if we examine the text of Genesis closely, we discover that God does not create from nothing; "in the beginning" we find darkness, water, a formless void, and the deep. Creation is really the shaping of chaos into an orderly, intelligible cosmos. God does not appear to be all-powerful; rather, God does the best God can with the materials he has to work with. Nor does God appear to be omniscient; God does not necessarily know beforehand how his work will turn out. God is rather like an artist who is

pleased with his or her creation. In the second creation story, which we find in Genesis 2, humans choose the tree of knowledge of good and evil—adult life, with painful consequences and moral maturity—over the innocent childhood of Eden. It is not that God punishes the first human beings; they discover the realities of adulthood. All of life, with its hardships and difficulties, is part of the good world God created.

Why is there an orderly cosmos? In chapter 2 we explore Plato's answer: God is good, and wanted the world to be as good as he is. God is an artisan or craftsman who shapes anarchy into goodness and order. Both Plato and the Bible describe a primordial state of chaos that a good God orders. Neither depicts God as creating from nothing; God must work with what is given. The Divine brings order to what seems chaotic and out of control. Plato goes on to argue that we too can bring goodness and order to the world by shaping our lives to reflect the good. The twentieth-century Platonist Iris Murdoch argues forcefully that even in a world without God, we can indeed shape our lives according to a moral ideal of the good.

While Plato holds up an eternal, unchanging realm of values as an ideal, we learn in chapter 3 that for Chinese thought, in contrast, change itself is fully real and good. The Way (the Tao) is expressed through the ever-changing cycles of nature. Human good furthers the moral virtues embodied in nature. However, there is a tension in Chinese culture between Confucian and Taoist streams of thought. While Confucians value civilization, rules of propriety, and assertiveness, the Tao Te Ching tells us that real strength is found in natural spontaneity, receptivity, and the feminine. The Tao Te Ching even values non-being over being, for non-being represents infinite potential. Anytime we value something in particular, we lose the vast field of possibility from which it springs. The text invites us to return to the uncarved block, the mysterious root of all change. By letting go of attachment to a fixed perspective, we can remain flexible and fluid. Thus we can attune ourselves to new situations as they arise. The process philosophy of twentieth-century philosopher and mathematician Alfred North Whitehead offers us a Western parallel to Chinese thought. All of nature is in process; the fundamental fact about the universe is its newness and creativity. Quantum physics has abandoned the notion of isolated atoms; physicists describe interconnected events or occasions, each of which exhibits novelty. Whitehead creates a bridge between science, philosophy, and religion; he maintains that what philosophers have called God is the principle that brings definiteness to random possibility. This perspective allows Whitehead to respond to the problem of evil. Evil, he argues, is the force of disintegration; it is by nature unstable. However, if there were only instability, the world could not survive. God is the force that brings harmony and integration. Whitehead sees an aesthetic harmony in scientific order that is akin to the beauty Chinese culture finds in nature.

In chapter 4 we learn that like the modern philosopher Whitehead, the medieval philosophers Augustine and Maimonides draw on both Plato and the Bible to express the relationship between God and the good. Both argue that every entity that exists inhabits a unique rung upon the great chain of being. Evil is lack of being, or privation; judging things to be evil reflects a limited, subjective point of view. Things appear to be evil because they are in conflict with one another, or because they interfere with our limited desires. However, if we look at things in the context of the whole, we see that indeed, the whole of being is greater than the higher things alone. If we saw all events in the context of the whole, we would achieve contentment and neither suffer nor harm others.

In chapter 5 we find that the Hindu scriptures known as the Upanishads maintain that the Absolute has qualities not only of being and goodness, but of awareness and joy. In fact, when we discover our true inner Self (ãtman) we discover that it is one with the universal Spirit (brahman), which is existence, knowledge, and joy. Like Plato, the Upanishads believe that knowledge has existential, transformative power. However, a popular Hindu devotional text, the Bhagavad Gita, points out that to discover the Absolute by knowledge alone requires intense concentration. The Gita thus sets forth two additional paths more accessible to the average person: continuing to act in the world while letting go of attachment to the results of our actions, and a relationship of devotion to a loving personal God.

Buddhism grew up against the background of Hindu thought and practice, as we learn in chapter 6. In contrast to the Upanishads, which posit an eternal Self, the Buddha denied the existence of any eternal principle or of a real entity that corresponds to our experience of a self. Buddhism denies, however, that it is nihilistic or pessimistic. Buddhist teachers argue that we find true freedom and flexibility when we let go of attachment to limiting definitions and labels. Instead, by realizing the ubiquitous nature of change, and the fact that there is nothing that has permanent, substantial identity, we discover the openness of reality, a way of being that combines wisdom, fluidity, and compassion. Enlightenment is a way of awareness—a way of seeing reality as it is—and a way to live in the world that is a gift to others.

In chapter 7 we focus on Aristotle, who, like the Bhagavad Gita and the teachings of the Buddha, offers an earthy, practical path to human flourishing. His ethical works reflect the tension we see in the Upanishads and Gita (and between monastic and engaged Buddhism) between the contemplative life of the philosopher and the active life that is engaged in society. Surprisingly, we find a bridge between these two paths in the notion of contemplation or study (theõria). Aristotle's use of the concept in varied contexts suggest we can find fulfillment through learning about every aspect of our world. Like the Gita, Aristotle proposes that we can engage in a kind of contemplation in action. Charles Taylor, a contemporary thinker, shows us that the evaluations we make in our own lives reflect frameworks much like Aristotle's moral thinking.

Chapter 8 turns to the Islamic philosopher al-Farabi, who tells us that the goal of philosophy is not to achieve fulfillment only for ourselves; a true philosopher is a teacher, someone who guides others to realization. Plato, too, had suggested that the philosopher must return to society, for this is a philosophical duty. Al-Farabi goes further: he insists that our own happiness is not complete until we share it with others.

In chapter 9 we return to Maimonides, who suggests (like al-Fãrãbï, whom he read and greatly admired) that our knowledge of God will overflow into our lives with others—into teaching and embodying the qualities God expresses in nature. Just as God's existence overflows to create a world, knowledge of God's attributes overflows into graceful human action.

In chapter 10 we come to the example of al-Ghazãlï, a Muslim religious judge and teacher who at the height of his theological career was beset by a crisis that caused him to leave his position and retire into contemplation. Ghazālī testifies that it was in fact God who guided him to withdraw into seclusion and then return to teaching. What he discovered, he writes, was the true purpose and end of religious life: direct experience of the Divine. When Ghazālī was teaching theology and religious law from a solely intellectual point of view, God caused his tongue to dry up, and he went into retreat to study and

practice with the Sufi mystics. He discovered that the Sufis were people of experience, not words, and that he could not attain their knowledge without actually traveling the path of mystical exercises culminating in direct experience. And yet the summit of his journey did not arrive with experience of mystical states. God just as surely told him it was time to go back and share with others what he had learned. Ghazālī expresses in a mystical context the Platonic motif of return to the cave—reentering society to share the fruits one has gleaned from vision of the truth. Thus the key to a person's journey may be found in inner aim and intention, irrespective of whether the journey externally appears to embody an active or a contemplative life. Ghazālī returned to the life of teaching with an entirely different motivation, one infused with the divine presence he had encountered. Ghazãlï was called both to abandon and to return to an active life of teaching. His experience thus speaks to the power of knowledge gained in contemplation to transform action in the world.

Some comparative studies embrace what is known as a perennialist vision: the notion that in reality there is one universal truth that all cultures express from multiple points of view. This study, in contrast, explores many varied approaches to several fundamental questions of philosophy. My goal is not to present one truth, but to give the reader an appreciation of diverse ways of approaching these questions, each with its particular point of view, each expressing the integrity of its own system.

There is a conventional philosophical saying that every person is either an Aristotelian or a Platonist—that we share either Aristotle's passion for scientific investigation of our world or Plato's love for an ideal realm of pure eternal truth. In contrast, I would like to suggest that when we study Plato and Aristotle with sincerity and conviction, we find each thinker's worldview compelling within its own framework. My aim in this study is to share that joyous process of discovery.

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What have we discovered in the course of our study? The book began by examining the relationship between God and good in the creation accounts of the Bible and Plato. We discerned a strong connection between God and goodness in both the Bible and Plato. In the Bible God creates and sees that all is good. Creation is not from nothing but from a preexisting chaotic state. Similarly, Plato's Demiurge takes a preexistent chaotic mix of earth, air, fire, and water and shapes them into an intelligible order, on the model of the Forms. Creation is the shaping of chaos into order.

What is good about order? The Hebrew Bible sees beauty in the orderliness of nature. This world may be built upon chaos, but has become an orderly cosmos. And it is so because there is a Sovereign Being who has fashioned the messiness of what simply is into a beautiful, meaningful whole. The Bible does not begin with a sheer void, but with the basic elements without which we could not make sense of the world as it is. And although there is some chaos underlying all, at the heart of reality is goodness. The creation myth of Genesis 1 does not tell the story of a primordial battle between the forces of chaos and those of order, but of a quiet ordering and the satisfaction of seeing how good and beautiful is our world. This is ontological, not moral goodness; the world is structured, balanced, and whole, and it works. While moral decisions are complex and the world can sometimes seem to be a frightening place, the Genesis story tells us that the rhythms of nature are constant and signal a deeper order at work in reality. The rabbinic tradition goes further and asserts that even evil is part of the goodness of creation. Even the elements of reality that seem negative or superfluous offer a benefit to the goodness of the

whole, including the human inclination to evil. In the first creation story, everything that is created is good; the words "bad" or "evil" do not appear in Genesis 1.

Genesis 2–3 shows a different image of God and introduces the word "evil" in the story of the tree of the knowledge of good and bad. The second creation story introduces a God who is in relation to human beings—not a majestic, transcendent sovereign but a God who interacts with humans. The Biblical text suggests that God is not simply an impersonal artist who creates the laws of nature, but also a personal being—that love and compassion are as much a part of the cosmic order as the laws of physics. The second creation story also tells the tale of humans' acceptance of responsibility for their actions. Humans must have had free will in potential, otherwise they could not have eaten from the tree, disobeying the express command of God. But the story tells us that we chose freely the freedom to choose, growing away from the innocence of childhood in the process, and that as a result, life is difficult, and actions have difficult and steep consequences. But being adults is also wonderful; it is thus that we come into deeper relationship with ourselves, one another, and our creator. It is reality in all its complexity that enables us to learn and grow.

In Plato's Timaeus, too, we hear of a process of creation of order from a preexisting chaos. Random elements of earth, air, fire, and water were moving about chaotically in a Receptacle until a craftsman, the Demiurge, looked to the Forms and shaped the chaos on the model of the Forms. Since the earliest interpreters, there has been a question of whether this is meant to be a literal creation story or a figurative account. Perhaps what Plato wants to say is that were it not for the presence of reasoning Mind, all would be chaotic. Some scholars suggest that the Demiurge represents the Forms themselves or the Form of the Good. What is fascinating is the parallel to the Hebrew Bible; both cases may reflect a theodicy, an explanation of why there is evil in the world. Both accounts suggest that a good God ordered the world for the good. The reason there is evil in the world is that God operated under some constraints; God did the best God could given the materials that were present to work with. The world is both good and orderly; God's motive for creation was to make the world as beautiful as the eternal realm of Forms. God's motive for creation is wanting to share in goodness, from God's lack of jealousy. The goodness of the world is also related to its intelligibility; the Good allows the world to be known.

Plato paints a portrait of a world that is neither pure chaos nor pure order. Our goal as philosophers is, like the Demiurge, to shape our world in accordance with the moral ideals at the heart of reality. Modern scientists also see patterns of order structuring our world: the double helix of the DNA structure, the laws of physics. And Plato's thought moved in an increasingly mathematical direction; he saw the Forms patterned upon number. Mathematical equations are expressed physically in our physical world. Plato's teleological worldview may not diverge as far from our scientific conception as might appear at first glance. His notion of the Good might also be intelligible in modern terms. Plato sees the world as an organic whole, in which each part performs a vital function. We can see this biologically; every part of a biological organism has a function with respect to the whole. We can see this also with respect to any being of complexity, in inorganic nature as well as organic nature. It is the principle of unity that binds all things together, to make individual things into a unity and to bind the universe together as a whole. Plato thus may have identified the Good with the principle of unity. Things are insofar as they participate in unity, Goodness, intelligible order; things exist insofar as they are unified and coherent. The Good gives the Forms their coherent order; the Forms are forms of excellence, so what they share in common is participation in Goodness.

In the Hebrew Bible, we moved from universal goodness in chapter 1 to goodness in the human sphere in chapter 2. Likewise we moved in our discussion of Plato from the cosmic goodness described in the Timaeus to his discussions of human excellence in the Meno, Protagoras, Gorgias, and Republic. In the Republic, he presents the image of the tripartite soul: the goal of the soul is justice, the proper ordering of the soul so that each part performs its proper function, with reason ruling over appetite with the aid of the will. In the Phaedrus, too, Plato presents the soul as divided. In the earlier dialogues, however, Plato presents a different argument. Here he suggests that every soul wants what is genuinely good—to live a happy, balanced, fulfilling life. The reason we don't achieve what is good is that we are ignorant of what will make us genuinely happy. Thus the key to both excellence and happiness is knowledge of what is genuinely good for the psyche. The key to achieving excellence is the proper ordering of our soul. Just as the Demiurge crafted the world into an orderly whole, so our goal is to craft a soul in which each part sings its proper part in the choir. Goodness is order and balance, both in the cosmos and in our psyches.

Iris Murdoch is a modern Platonist who integrates the Platonic tradition in a modern light. In "On God and Good," she reinterprets the traditional concept of God in Platonic terms; the Good, she argues, is a single, perfect, transcendental non-representible real object of attention. Commitment to a moral ideal can be a powerful inspiration for our energy; we can contemplate the Good the way theists contemplate God. The Good is a magnetic force drawing and inspiring moral action. Virtue or excellence (aretë) is single, in that it unites and undergirds the many virtues. Likewise the Good is single, in that it is that which unifies and inspires diverse spheres of excellence: the courage of the mountain climber, the creativity of the artist, the sensitivity of the teacher who works with special needs children.

Murdoch argues that moral values are transcendent in that they are objective, rather than subjective and relative. Thus we sense in the power of an inspiring act of moral courage something that lives on behind the individual deed. There is a certainty that there exists an absolute standard of goodness, despite the relativity, ugliness, and flux we see in our world. Moreover, we are inspired by a transcendent ideal of perfection—an absolute standard that motivates us in a way no partial standard can. The moral ideal holds an objective authority for us; we strive to get ever closer to that ideal, even as we know that no finite being can ever fully achieve it. Murdoch argues further that this moral ideal possesses the necessity traditionally ascribed to God through the ontological proof. The idea of Good possesses an absolute certainty that is not merely psychological.

The Good possesses the necessity of reality. To see by the light of the Good is to see reality as it is, rather than through the partial vision clouded by our subjective needs and desires. The artist, scholar, and mathematician all aspire to this objectivity; we must do so when we are learning a language. These disciplines correspond to the traditional discipline of prayer: they demand our objective, focused attention, and bring us into the magnificent truth of what is. These are training for the ultimate discipline of the moral sphere; to see the complexity of a moral situation and the reality of what is good for all. The same honesty is demanded of the scholar, the artist, and the parent or child; and it is the Good that sheds light on how we are to balance these very different spheres of our life. For Murdoch, then, morality is the true mystical attunement; to seek unbiased guidance is the highest form of prayer. The radiance of the Good awakens our love and our desire to draw close to it. For Murdoch, Good is more absolute than God; we can do without God, but we cannot do without Good.

In chapter 3, we explored Chinese thought with its view that nature, as it is, is Good. The ancient Chinese belief system does not see a conflict between what ought to be and what is; for the I Ching, the Tao Te Ching, and some branches of Confucian thought, the way of nature is the way things ought to be. It is our goal to pattern ourselves according to the way of nature, the Tao. To follow our nature is to continue the Tao, which expresses itself in the rhythms of yin and yang and the principle of reversal—to restore equilibrium and homeostasis after disequilibrium. Human nature is naturally good; when humans attain harmony within themselves and extend these to the world of nature, the task of Heaven and Earth is completed.

In the Tao Te Ching we have an account of the coming to be of all things. It is not clear whether creation is a one-time event or a description of the mysterious process of formation by which things come to be determinate from the indeterminate. The text shows us the way of wu-wei, nonintrusive action, to stay attuned to the larger context from which things emerge. When we overvalue the formed, we lose the larger good of the whole—we forget that the beautiful flower depends also on the dirt, fertilizer, and entire ecosystem to emerge. We can act with assertiveness and creativity, as long as we remain attuned to the larger context of potential, and don't get attached to any one reified entity. We achieve greater effectiveness if we can be open to the many possibilities of the evolving situation, rather than remaining attached to any one purpose. Thus while Western ontology values Being, Taoism values non-being, emptiness, the vast, spacious openness of pure potential. Rather than superimposing our preconceived ideas upon a situation, we become aware of the interconnectedness of mutually defining opposites.

The Confucian Tao is prescriptive: it outlines defined courses of action: the way of the father, the way of the son, the way of the sage. The Taoist way in contrast is a non-course: to return to pure potentiality and follow the natural path that emerges. The Confucian sage rules by the power of ethical authority developed by living in cultured company; this authority is awe-inspiring and brings others to yield to it. Confucian moral virtue is the virtue of civilization; Taoist virtue is the subtle, lowly power of nature, in which the quiet and tranquil moves over the restless and agitated. Taoism and Confucianism, both built upon the goodness of nature, express the yin and yang of Chinese civilization itself. The Confucian sage inspires people to become responsible ethical agents through moral self-cultivation. The Taoist sage encourages people to cast off the masks of civilization and return to natural, spontaneous unself-conscious action, which in the eyes of Lao Tzu is a more authentic kind of virtue. The Absolute of Taoist tradition is the Tao, the unlimited Source of all. For Confucianism the Absolute may be Heaven or the harmony and equilibrium between Heaven, Earth, and Humanity. Good is an ongoing dance of finding balance amidst the uncertainties of life, and of finding harmony in the polarities of nature.

In a coda to chapter 3, we found in the philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead a modern parallel to the classical Chinese tradition. Whitehead's goal is to rethink the modern scientific ontology that denied the real existence of qualities in the world. He insists that the sights, sounds, and sensations of nature are real, and that values are as much a part of nature as facts. In fact, modern quantum physics shows relationship as an integral part of life even at the quantum level. Relationship is basic to our knowledge of the world; "if anything out of relationship, then complete ignorance to it." The entire fabric of nature is an interconnected web of experience; we only think that experience is anthropomorphic because we think all experience must be conscious. Even particles experience and respond to one another. The universe is a feeling universe; the selfish gene is only one side of the picture. There are also elements of

cooperation and harmony throughout the ecosystem, as beings create an environment that supports their growth. The continuity between moments represents a primitive kind of memory; the universe is not a fabric of static things but an organism of interconnected events or occasions of experience, which continually choose to renew themselves and establish patterns of value in nature.

Like Murdoch, Whitehead is a Platonist; he recognizes an equivalent of Plato's Ideas or Forms, which he calls eternal objects. These are the constituent qualities without which the world would not be as it is. But unlike Plato and Murdoch, for Whitehead the real is more valuable than the ideal. Actuality is the ground of value; the greatest paper in the world is of little value until it is written. The first word of the paper makes it less than the potential masterwork—and yet more, because it is real.

Good for Whitehead is realized here on earth. God is that foundation of being that envisages all potentials and inspires us to crystalize new forms from the underlying pulse of creativity that flows throughout the universe. Whitehead insists that he includes God within his system for philosophical and not purely religious reasons. If there were just an underlying pulse of creativity and open potential, the world would have no direction. God is required to draw the choices of actual occasions into a harmonious whole. While every entity has free will to choose what it will be, God inspires choices that will blend with the creative order. For Plato, it is the One or the Good that guarantees unity, order, and intelligibility. For Whitehead, there is a personal willing God. And yet God needs other beings to realize values, to bring potentiality into actuality; the universe is the sum of our collective choices. There is an aesthetic beauty to the workings of nature that is akin to the Chinese vision of the web that has no weaver. And yet for Whitehead there is an artist; the universe is a collectively created symphony. God and humans together realize the Good.

The Biblical tradition tells us that God created the world and saw that all was good. How then does evil enter creation? In chapter 4, we saw that Augustine and Maimonides, separated by centuries and cultures, draw upon a common Biblical and Neoplatonic tradition to account for evil in creation. Both argue that every entity that exists inhabits a unique rung upon the great chain of being. Evil is lack of being or privation; judging things to be evil reflects a limited, subjective point of view. Things appear to be evil because they are in conflict with one another, or because they interfere with our limited desires. However, if we look at things in the context of the whole, we see that indeed, the whole of being is greater than the higher things alone. If we saw all events in context of the whole, we would achieve contentment and neither suffer nor harm others.

Both Augustine and Maimonides differentiate between moral evil and metaphysical, natural evil. Anything that has being is good; metaphysical evil is negation, the corruption or deprivation of being and thus goodness. Things begin intact; evil is that which deprives them of being or corrupts their goodness. Moral evil, too, is due to corruption or deprivation: it is the corruption of the original good will that we are given. Augustine is comforted by realizing that when he himself does evil, it is the result of his own free will, and does not have to be blamed upon God or a Manichean principle of evil.

Like Augustine, Maimonides affirms the Platonic assertion that all being is good, that God is the absolute good and God's bringing us into being is the greatest good. He affirms the notion of the great chain of being, in which God's intention is to bring about the greatest amount of being and thus good as possible. Maimonides' statement that God is the absolute good is problematic, as it conflicts with his strictures about the use of language with respect to God. All we can know about God is that God's existence is

Necessary and all other beings are contingent, and thus there is an absolute disjunction between language about God and about all other beings. We cannot know anything positive about the essence of a being whose mode of existence is Necessary; all we can know are the acts that emanate from God. Thus we can use language of action or of negation; we can deny anything of God that we can affirm of the contingent world. Negation also avoids introducing multiplicity in a God whose essence Maimonides insists is absolutely unified.

"Good" is thus for Maimonides an equivocal term; it means different things when applied to God and to creatures. In its absolute sense it simply points to God as the ultimate source of being and value. In 3.11 Maimonides asserts that if we realize this fact, we will neither hurt nor oppress ourselves or others; we will treat all beings as of intrinsic dignity and worth as expressions of the one God. Good also has different meanings when applied to humanity in its ideal state and in its actual state. In the ideal state of humanity, represented by Adam and Eve in the Garden of Eden, humans see only true and false, reality as it is. From an absolute standpoint, there is no evil; all being is good. Humans see evil when we look at reality from our individual, subjective point of view. From the perspective of an individual, death is an evil because it deprives us of our life. But from the perspective of the whole, death is necessary for it makes room for new life and the continuity of generations. Natural evils such as earthquakes and hurricanes simply happen; they are an unfortunate by-product of the fact of material existence. If the Infinite had not chosen to create a material universe, there would be no earthquakes and hurricanes—but we would also be deprived of the beauty of existence. Death and loss are the price we pay to enjoy the gift of our being as finite creatures. If we want to enjoy the splendors of existence, we must accept its consequences. Moral evil, he suggests, is also the result of a lack or deprivation. Whereas Augustine, developing the Christian notion of original sin, describes moral evil as due to the corruption of the will, Maimonides chooses the Socratic language of lack. Moral evil is due to ignorance, the lack of knowledge. If we had knowledge of God—which is equivalent to the Truth—we would harm neither ourselves nor others.

Maimonides thus suggests that while absolute Good is the equivalent of the Truth, that which is, in our actual state we use the terms "good" and "evil" to describe the world as distorted by our subjective, relative judgments. Thus eating from the tree of the knowledge of good and evil represents a deprivation of knowledge, which sees only true and false. In humanity's ideal state, the term "good" represents the absolute commandment of God: to know only the Truth, to know God. In our actual state, the terms "good" and "evil" represent the changing face of human morality, dictated by our subjective desires.

Augustine is a more conscious Platonist; his God is Goodness itself, a personal embodiment of the Form of the Good. Maimonides' God is at face value more austere: the Necessary Existent about whom no positive assertion can be made, the unknowable Neoplatonic One. Yet both assert that being itself is a good; God is the source of all being and goodness, and evil is simply lack, deprivation, or corruption. The Good for both thinkers is the Truth that is God, and for humans to know and contemplate Truth.

Thus human happiness for Augustine and Maimonides is found through contemplation of eternal truths—that is, through knowledge of God. In chapter 5, we saw that like Augustine and Maimonides, the Indian sacred texts known as the Upanishads suggest that peace and ultimate happiness are found through communion with the Divine, and that the Bhagavad Gïtã offers four practical paths to achieve

that communion: the paths of knowledge, action, devotion, and meditation. To Augustine and Maimonides, the Upanishads add that the Absolute has qualities not only of being and goodness, but awareness and joy. In fact, when we discover our true inner Self (ãtman) we discover that it is one with the universal Spirit (brahman), which is existence, knowledge, and bliss. Like Plato, the Upanishads believe that knowledge has existential, transformative power. The Absolute for the Hindu tradition is brahman, originally the power of the sacrifice, but later conceived as an essential spirit, the fine essence undergirding all of reality. Ancient Indian thought saw the sacrifice as so essential to reality that the cosmos itself was said to be created and sustained by sacrifice. But by the end of the period of the

Brãhma^as, the sacrifice had become internalized, so that it was not ritual knowledge but metaphysical knowledge that held the key to brahman. One who knew brahman became one with brahman and was liberated from sa^sãra, the cycle of birth and death. The absolute Good for this tradition was beyond moral good and evil; it was to transcend the world of distinction and find eternal freedom.

However, the Bhagavad Gïtã, a popular devotional text, pointed out that to discover the Absolute by knowledge alone requires intense concentration. The Gïtã thus sets forth two additional paths more accessible to the average person: continuing to act in the world, while letting go of attachment to the results of our actions (karma yoga); and a relationship of devotion to a loving personal God (bhakti yoga). For the Gïtã, the personal God Krishna is more ultimate than the impersonal brahman, and the Good is to join Krishna in a relationship of loving devotion. The goal is not becoming one with brahman—a drop returning to the ocean—but eternal abiding with Krishna; the dualistic metaphysics of Sã^khya—in which many individual separate souls seek to get free of nature and return to the Lord—prevails over the nondualistic notion of union between the individual self (ãtman) and brahman. And the path is one of non-attached action, devotional practice, and active meditation rather than pure contemplative knowledge.

Chapter 6 showed that like the ancient Chinese texts the I Ching and Tao Te Ching, Buddhism sees change as fundamental to reality. Like these ancient Chinese streams of thought, Buddhism suggests that by accepting change, we can let go of the grasping and frustration the Buddha saw as endemic to human life. The flame of our existence is fed by our desire, anger, and greed; when we abandon this, we "nirvã^a," we cease to feed these flames and can exist in a way characterized by wisdom and compassion. Abandoning the limitations we have put upon ourselves by definitions of our identity, we experience freedom, flexibility, and vitality. Mahãyãna Buddhism in particular emphasizes that we can experience this new way of being and remain engaged in the world; moreover, this awareness can be a gift to others along the path. Buddhist meditation—in particular that of the Ch'an and Zen schools—emphasizes the mindfulness with which we approach every moment of our lives. Not only can we release ourselves from suffering, but we can appreciate the freshness of every moment. Zen teachings do this through humor, playfulness, and paradox, constantly undercutting the predilection of the human mind to attach itself to views and doctrines—including those of Buddhism and Zen.

Chapter 7 showed that Aristotle, like Buddhist meditation and the Bhagavad Gïtã, offers an earthy, practical path to human flourishing. His ethical works reflect the tension we see in the Upanishads and the Bhagavad Gïtã between the contemplative life of the philosopher and active, engaged life in society. He describes two forms of excellence or virtue: intellectual virtue, which is excellence of thinking; and practical virtue, which is excellence of moral qualities and actions. While Plato's Socrates teaches that

virtue is a form of knowledge, that to know the good is to do it, Aristotle insists that moral excellence requires practice and habit. Discovering the principle of the mean and deliberating about practical action are important, but the key to developing a moral character is practice. Our actions create our character, and appropriate behavior requires the subtle art of sensitivity and attunement developed through active moral training.

Aristotle begins the Nicomachean Ethics by informing us that the good is that to which all things aim. The human good or telos is eudaimonia—the fulfillment and flourishing of the human

being's potential. Human beings are fundamentally biological and have a function. The acorn's function is to become an oak tree; the human's function is active exercise of his or her ability to reason. When we actively exercise reason in matters of human action, we achieve moral excellence. When we exercise reason in theoretical matters—when we study mathematics, the unchanging principles of nature, and the metaphysical principles of being and divinity—we achieve intellectual excellence. In this we liken ourselves to the Unmoved Mover, who is the pure activity of thinking.

While much of the Nicomachean Ethics is concerned with the active moral life and the human virtues, chapters 7 and 8 of book 10 suggest that the ultimate fulfillment of our human telos lies in pure theoretical contemplation, like the life of the Unmoved Mover. As human beings, we find a secondary kind of flourishing in developing moral virtue. But we also have glimpses of a divine flourishing that will fulfill the divine part of our nature, and perhaps suggests our true divine potential. The question is whether Aristotle thought the ideal life consists of the pure activity of contemplation (the dominant view) or thought that the ideal is a balance of expressing all the diverse forms of excellence (the inclusive view).

The Eudemian Ethics offers an alternative vision of a mixed or integrated ideal of human flourishing in happiness as complete, inclusive virtue—not just excellence of one part of the soul, the part that studies, but the whole soul, including the part that engages in moral actions. Just as all the parts of one's body have to function well to be in physical health, it is likewise with the virtue of the soul insofar as it is a complete whole. Again, Aristotle suggests clearly that to express true excellence of soul, we must develop not only theoretical virtue but also moral virtue. At the end of the Eudemian Ethics, he suggests that our practical wisdom should aim for whatever balance makes contemplation and service of God possible. Service of God may simply mean the fulfillment of our natural telos, when we perfect our natural essence and purpose, imitating God and serving the divine order.

There is evidence even in the Nicomachean Ethics for an integrated ideal. Passages from the Nicomachean Ethics and throughout the Aristotelian corpus suggest that Aristotle uses the verb theõria ("to contemplate") for active engagement with many aspects of our world. Pericles studies political actions; friends learn from studying the virtuous actions of their friends. Thus Aristotle suggests a kind of contemplation in action, which bridges the gap between the exalted contemplation of Nicomachean Ethics 10 and the dynamic, active life in the polis Aristotle describes in the middle books of the treatise. While the focus of a political life may be directed toward political good and the ultimate focus of the philosophers' life the fruits of theoretical study, both will engage in learning about human beings and life in community.

In a coda to chapter 7, we saw that contemporary philosophers Alasdair Macintyre and Charles Taylor bring the Aristotelian tradition into the twenty-first century. Modern Kantians like John Rawls put justice and human rights at the center of moral argument. Macintyre, in contrast, argues that we need a conception of the purpose of our entire lives to see where justice fits into our overall scheme of value. Charles Taylor argues that we as human beings cannot exist without an orientation to the good. A self is not an objective, neutral entity that can be studied like other objects of empirical scientific research. Selves are inextricably oriented toward goals and the overall values around which we structure our lives.1 Moreover, love for the good is itself among the most powerful motivators for moral action. Hence Socrates' notion that the unexamined life is not worth living; the articulation of our most deeply held moral values inspires not only love for philosophy but love for the good itself and for expressing the good in action. Taylor thus offers a robust defense of Aristotle's ethical vision, expressed in the opening of the Nicomachean Ethics: every craft, activity, and action aims at some good. In Aristotle's teleological universe, this includes the natural world, but all the more so the human. To be human is to have a function that sets us apart from nature: to use our reason to consciously direct us toward ends we choose. Alasdair Macintyre and Charles Taylor argue that this vision holds as true for moderns as for ancients. Moderns have gone astray in locating the sphere of morality narrowly in the question of rights and obligations, of what we ought to do. Macintyre and Taylor argue that ethics is most properly concerned with who we are, with how we orient our lives toward the good.

In chapter 8, we saw that the ninth-century Islamic philosopher Al-Fãrãbï took this integration one step further. Al-Fãrãbï suggests that the fruits of contemplation must express themselves in action; the philosopher who does not return to the cave to improve the social order has not fulfilled his or her role as philosopher. Al-Fãrãbï in fact suggests three models of happiness. The first is purely theoretical: to become a separated intellect, divorced from matter, contemplating eternal truths. This is beyond anything Aristotle might have envisioned. The second is an integrated ideal, which claims that theoretical perfection includes knowledge of ethics and politics as well as metaphysics. Theoretical knowledge begins with metaphysical knowledge of the beings that constitute the cosmos but continues on to humanity and to an understanding of how individuals and nations can achieve happiness. Al-Fãrãbï argues that false philosophers are those who gain theoretical knowledge but do not share it with others. Illusory philosophers learn theory, but do not perform acts of moral virtue. They thus fail to realize the reason for which philosophy is pursued: to practice virtuous actions, and to bring others as well as ourselves to happiness. In this remarkable statement, Al-Fãrãbï suggests that the purpose of philosophy is to achieve human flourishing and to teach others how to achieve human flourishing and fulfillment as well.

Al-Fãrãbï's altruism is in fact grounded in his metaphysics: the Neoplatonic notion of the great chain of being. Plotinus suggested that perfection naturally overflows, just as the seed ripens and produces fruit. When things come to maturity they ripen and overflow. Just as God's goodness brims over to create a world, so the wisdom of the philosopher overflows to help others reach fulfillment. When humans discover the key to flourishing, they cannot help but share it. God's goodness pours out and creates a world; prophets receive revelation and share it to create a religious community. The teacher receives the first teaching and then shares it with others. True knowledge must be expressed; contemplation cannot be separated from action.

As with Aristotle and Al-Fãrãbï, an important theme in Maimonides is the struggle to find the appropriate balance between contemplation and action. In chapter 9 we saw that Maimonides argues in Guide of the Perplexed 3.17 that moral perfection is only a stepping stone to intellectual perfection, that the ultimate perfection does not include moral qualities at all. However, he goes on to suggest at the end of 3.54 that beyond the perfecting of the rational soul itself lies the overflow from that perfection. Just as God's graciousness overflowed to create the earth, so knowledge of the attributes of God expressed in this world can flow into graceful human action. Plato asserts that those who spend their time contemplating the eternal Forms will take on these eternal qualities; he also asserts that humans should take as their goal the imitation of the divine. Maimonides asserts that while we cannot know God's essence, we can imitate God's attributes of action; when we understand God's kindness in creating a world, our own deeds will come to reflect that kindness. In Guide 3.11 he asserts that those who have true knowledge of the deity will neither hurt nor oppress themselves or others. Maimonides suggests that when human beings apprehend God and the Good, actions and desires fall into place; we express this understanding in our words, in our gestures of gratitude and thanksgiving, and in our lives. Contemplation is the gesture of continually returning to the Source to shed light on all reality, including human action.

In chapter 10, we saw that al-Ghazali expresses this dialectic in his own life story. His autobiography describes several crises in which he is constrained to turn within and discover a truth by contemplative experience. He suggests that the truth known by revelation must be appropriated by each of us through direct experience. When we return to active life, the fruits of contemplation will express themselves in a renewed way of being in the world. The change is subtle but revolutionary. Outwardly we may engage in the same way of life, but our being is transformed by the reality we have touched. The qualities of God and the Good express themselves in our lives.

I indicated at the outset that my purpose in this study is not to discover a single, definitive model of God and the Good. Rather, my belief is that the search itself is intrinsically rewarding. In this spirit, Kenneth Seeskin has suggested a novel interpretation of Socrates' teaching that knowledge is virtue: the pursuit of knowledge itself entails acts of moral courage. Likewise, opening ourselves to a genuine search for the Absolute brings purpose, fulfillment, and challenge to our lives. Each approach we explore adds a color to the spectrum, a dimension without which the whole would be incomplete. To recognize the beauty and wisdom of each perspective expands our vision both as spiritual seekers and as moral agents.

Al-Ghazãlï suggests that in the quest for God and the good, it is God and the good themselves that guide our human search. It is my hope that this small offering may aid others in their quest. <>

Runes Across the North Sea from the Migration Period and Beyond: An Annotated Edition of the Old Frisian Runic Corpus by Livia Kaiser [ISSN, De Gruyter, 9783110723281]

This annotated edition of the Old Frisian Runic Corpus presents a commentary and catalogue of 24 runic objects (ca. AD 400-1000) found in the modern-day Netherlands, Germany and England. It

provides a detailed overview of the research history of each object, comparative linguistic analyses of the inscriptions with references to the Old English runic tradition, and also places the objects within their archaeological context.

Die Germanische Altertumskunde Online wird - wie bereits das in ihr aufgegangene Reallexikon - durch Ergänzungsbände begleitet. Diese Reihe umfasst Monographien ebenso wie Sammelbände zu spezifischen Themen aus Archäologie, Geschichte und Literaturwissenschaft. Damit wird der Inhalt der Datenbank um jene Aspekte erweitert, die einer ausführlichen Analyse bedürfen. Inzwischen sind bereits mehr als 100 Bände erschienen von Germanenproblemen in heutiger Sicht bis zur Germanischen Altertumskunde im Wandel.

[The Germanische Altertumskunde Online is accompanied by supplementary volumes - as is already the Reallexikon merged into it. This series includes monographs as well as anthologies on specific topics from archaeology, history and literary studies. This extends the content of the database to include those aspects that require a detailed analysis. In the meantime, more than 100 volumes have already been published, ranging from Germanic problems in today's view to Germanic antiquity in transition.]

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The Old Frisian Runic Corpus [OFRC] is a collection of 24 runic inscriptions from the Netherlands and adjacent regions and constitutes one of the most important sources of evidence for the understanding of Frisian language development in the Early Medieval period, ca. AD 400-1000. Whilst these objects have been scantily edited and listed before (cp. Chapter I.2), previous research suffers from substantial drawbacks: These concern the actual number of items in the corpus, the criteria for a corpus attribution and identification of characteristic Frisian linguistic features, the existence of a distinctive Frisian runic writing tradition in comparison to the Anglo-Saxon runic tradition, and the question of early Frisian identity and the relation to North-Sea neighbours. The scattered research history of Frisian runic studies calls for a comprehensive and systematic reprocessing of the inscriptions: A new and extended, as well as annotated edition, which incorporates and evaluates previous linguistic as well as archaeological research, is very much needed. This includes the comparison of previous results against new interpretations based on autopsies and high-resolution documentation of the finds.

Whilst the number of items in the corpus is small, the interpretation is challenging in many ways: Most of the objects are stray finds, i.e. unassociated and unstratified, which considerably limits the assessment of the find context, provenance and the resulting dating. However, recent archaeological research carried out on the development of the northern Dutch coastline (cp. Knol 1993, Vos 2015) and excavations of terps such as Wijnaldum and Hoogebeintum (cp. Besteman et al. 1993, 1999) allow sketching a socio-historical background for the finds. The materials of the inscription-bearing objects represented in the corpus are quite diverse: Inscriptions are found on bone, ivory, wood and metal, while inscriptions on stone are yet absent from the corpus. Judging from the assemblage — and disregarding the preservation conditions, which contribute decisively to the corpus composition — there seems to be an emphasis on the use of bone, a writing material more commonly featuring in the Older Germanic and Scandinavian runic traditions. In previous research, the OFRC has mostly been compared to the Old English Runic Corpus [OERC] and consequently became the object of research in OE runological studies, as both share the extended Anglo-Frisian fothorc row with the new additions, runes no. 25 ac I and no. 4ós ^, the so-called `Anglo-Frisian' runic innovations. Despite this common ground, the OFRC displays some highly unusual graphical forms (i.e. presumably non-runic characters on BERGAKKER [OFRCI3], multiple-lined runes on BRITSUM [OFRCI7], possible manuscript rune forms on WESTEREMDEN B [OFRCI9]), which have not been elucidated yet. The scarcity of objects, as well as the different use of writing materials (i.e. focus on bone in comparison to the OERC) and the unusual graphical forms of the OFRC contribute to the "baffling nature" (cp. Page 1996) of the Frisian inscriptions, raising the question of the place of this corpus within the North-West Germanic runic writing traditions. Relating to this, Page (1996, p. 147) questions the existence of a distinct runic writing tradition in Frisia:

> [...] we must wonder whether there was a Frisian runic tradition, or only a confused scatter of different, mixed and hazy traditions. Certainly for its small number of individual inscriptions, Frisia demonstrates a remarkable range of unusual forms, and this too might lead us to wonder if runes were ever a serious and useful script in the Frisia of the Early Middle Ages.

Looijenga points to a Frankish connection of some finds traditionally incorporated in the Frisian corpus (i.e. BERGAKKER [0FRC15] and BORGHAREN [0FRC15], cp. Looijenga 2005c), but questions whether the OE and OFris runic inscriptions in fact represent two distinct runic traditions. Eventually, she argues for one Anglo-Saxon corpus, rather than two separate ones (cp. Looijenga, forthc.):

I am convinced that the early OE and OF[ris] runic inscriptions belong to an inseparable and common tradition, a purely Anglo-Saxon phenomenon. The conclusion that there exists a Frisian runic corpus because runic objects have been found in Frisia is not satisfactory. It suggests that there existed something that probably did not: a specific Frisian runic culture. If the new runic innovations, the development of c- and os-runes took place in England, then there is no reason to give Frisian runes a status aparte.

Resulting from this recent, critical discussion pertaining to the status aparte of the Frisian runes, it is the aim of this study to critically explore the objects traditionally attributed to the OFRC by drawing from both linguistic and archaeological disciplines in order to obtain a comprehensive understanding of these specific finds, and to eventually contribute to the question of their position within the North-West Germanic runic writing traditions of the Early Middle Ages. For this purpose, an empirical source-body was compiled, i.e. Part III, the edition of 24 objects, which comprises most of the previous literature, including transliterations and readings, find history, archaeological datings and typology, and a final,

comprehensive discussion by the author. Based on this material, Part II, the linguistic discussion of the OFRC was conducted, which consists of a phonological (Chapter IV), graphemic (Chapter V), and pragmatic analyses (Chapter VI) of the material against evidence from the OERC and, as far as possible, material from the Early Runic corpus (Nielsen 2000) and the Southern Germanic corpus (Opitz 1987, Waldisplihl 2015).2 The methodological groundwork for the phonological and grapho-typological analysis was provided by Waxenberger's (2010, 2017a, 2017b) research on OE runic inscriptions and her reconstructed phasal development of the OE futhorc rows. Pragmatic interpretation concepts for runic inscriptions are yet being developed by the RuneS Project; therefore, the presented analysis here is based mainly on preliminary considerations by Duwel (2008), and Waldisplihl's (2015) interpretation model. Part I comprises preliminary basic concepts and frameworks for runological methodology, as well as a literature review on previous editions and publications on the Frisian corpus. Chapter II elaborates on the position of English and Frisian in the macrogrouping of the Germanic languages and explores the different models for their close relation, i.e. the `Anglo-Frisian' hypothesis, the North-Sea Germanic model and the Convergence model. Chapter III focusses on the question of the `Frisians' and follows their mention in the early Classical sources to their rise as a well-connected, North Sea trading nation in the 7th and 8th centuries.

The relevance of these 24 inscriptions lies in their documentation of hitherto reconstructed, early language stages. Earlier phonological reconstructions can now be re-evaluated against empirical evidence, thereby tackling the question whether (or not) the runic inscriptions support the reconstructed sound changes for Pre-OE and Pre-OFris, and whether they allow for a distinction between Frisian and English at their earliest stages. As OFris is traditionally assigned to the period AD 1200-1550 (cp. Sjolin 1969, p. 7; Chapter II.5.2), it is necessarily reconstructed on the basis of manuscript evidence. The OFRC will therefore shed light on Pre-OFris (ca. AD 400-600/650) and Early Runic OFris (ca. AD 650-900). The `Ante-OFris' period (cp. Nielsen 1994a) provides sparse but decisive written evidence, which has not been extensively considered in published monographs and grammars books so far. This is an attempt to contribute to these research lacunae in a comprehensive and interdisciplinary approach. <>

Overlapping Cosmologies In Asia: Transcultural and Interdisciplinary Approaches edited by Bill M. Mak, Eric Huntington [Crossroads - History of Interactions across the Silk Routes, Brill, 9789004511415]

The history of cosmology is often understood in terms of the development of modern science, but Asian cosmological thought and practice touched on many aspects of life, including mathematics, astronomy, politics, philosophy, religion, and art.

Because of the deep pervasion of cosmology in culture, many opportunities arose for transmissions of cosmological ideas across borders and innovations of knowledge and application in new contexts. Taking a wider view, one finds that cosmological ideas traveled widely and intermingled freely, being frequently reinterpreted by scholars, ritualists, and artists and transforming as they overlapped with ideas and practices from other traditions.

This book brings together ten diverse scholars to present their views on these overlapping cosmologies in Asia. They are Ryuji Hiraoka, Satomi Hiyama, Eric Huntington, Yoichi Isahaya, Catherine Jami, Bill M. Mak, D. Max Moerman, Adrian C. Pirtea, John Steele, and Dror Weil.

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What is Cosmology?

Ask a selection of modern scholars of cosmology about the subjects of their research and you will receive surprisingly diverse responses. Contemporary cosmologists as such generally study the origins [illegible] and workings [illegible]

might consider related. For example, some ancient Chinese authors considered the general observation of celestial phenomena (tianwen, heavenly pattern) to be a different discipline than the precise computation of celestial motion (li, astronomical system/ephemeris/calendar).

In seeking to understand cosmology across periods of history, regions of the world, and different academic disciplines, then, one must begin by looking broadly enough to be inclusive but also precisely enough to support productive analyses. At a very basic level, the English word "cosmology" ultimately originates in the Greek" (world) and "(discourse), referring to topics of understanding the world that attracted diverse opinions not only among the ancient Greeks but also elsewhere in the ancient world. Indeed, impulses to understand the world, and especially humanity's place within it, seem to occur in some of the earliest surviving documents from ancient cultures. The three-thousand-year-old Mesopotamian Epic of Gilgamesh tells the story of a man from civilization and a man from the wilderness, with the character of each determined by their place of origin.5 The similarly ancient Indic ^g Veda divides the world into four cardinal directions and three horizontal layers, with the creation of the world sometimes characterized as an act of measurement and compared to the process of building a house. Perhaps as an indication of the centrality of cosmology to human experience, similar writings on humanity, nature, and the world seem to remain relevant even in the present day. One need only compare these millennia-old texts to more recent works, such as Henry David Thoreau's Walden or Stephen Hawking's A Brief History of Time, to see that such investigations continue to be compelling to large and diverse audiences. The desire to understand our world is early, longstanding, and widespread.

Given the centrality of such thinking to human experience, it is perhaps not surprising that some key features of cosmology appear almost universally in traditions across the globe. The sun is a focal point of theorization and worship in regions from ancient Greece and Egypt to India, Japan, and South America, despite the vast separations and differences in histories between these various places. Other elements that are widely recognized as important in human existence, like the moon, water, and earth, also frequently become crucial aspects of cosmological thinking and narratives across cultures. Among these, celestial phenomena have often been a focus of special attention not just because they are experienced so widely but also because some so remarkably align to patterns of human activity while others remain provocatively inscrutable. On the one hand, phenomena like solstices and equinoxes clearly connect to the changes of the seasons and therefore agricultural cycles and other aspects of human life. In Egypt, the reappearance of the star Sirius in late summer was identified with the all-important annual flooding of the Nile as early as 3000 BCE. The ability to mark and predict such events provided unquestionable utility in the ancient world, and cultures that tended to deify important natural phenomena often saw gods in the features of the sky (in Egypt, Sirius was identified with the goddess Isis). On the other hand, celestial events like eclipses and the appearance of comets have less obvious relationships with human activity but seem no less worthy of explanation. In some Indian traditions, eclipses were understood as the devouring of the sun or moon by the demon Rãhu, with the particular direction at which the shadow enters the disc of the sun or moon portending disaster for specific groups of people.8 Because the features of the sky can be both mechanically predictable and unaccountably mysterious, the study of astral science has understandably become a focal point of many kinds of cosmological inquiry across human history.

At the same time, one also quickly sees that different people from diverse regions have developed wildly varying explanations of the world, often for reasons specific to their geography or culture. Several

traditions of South Asia describe the inhabited world as essentially a mass of land surrounded by great oceans, just as the Indian subcontinent is a peninsula, while the people of ancient Egypt saw their cosmos as divided into two banks across the fertile Nile river and surrounded mostly by desert and mountains.9 Because each model purports to capture the structure of the known or knowable universe, they are influenced by local geography, agriculture, and trade. Other differences in cosmology relate more to philosophical or religious factors. To the ancient Chinese, correlative thinking across different aspects of the cosmos prompted explanations in terms of abstract structures of political hierarchy, theories of yin and yang, and the five phases (wuxing)." An alternative Buddhist view divides the world into three vertically stacked realms that correlate to specific psychological, ethical, and meditative states, modeling a path to enlightenment."

Historical Approaches to Cosmology and Cosmologies

Tackling such breadth and complexity across cultures, modern historians of cosmology have adopted a variety of approaches. On the one hand, many have favored description, working to thoroughly explain single traditions by becoming immersed in single cultural or linguistic domains, mathematical systems, or textual or artistic sources. This research is unquestionably foundational, but because it requires such high degrees of specialization, it sometimes problematically creates artificial divisions of topics based on differences in the languages, cultural knowledge, or techniques necessary to understand these different expressions. In the field of Buddhist studies, for example, it has often been assumed that certain Chinese and Indian traditions must diverge simply because of their distinct cultural and linguistic contexts, despite the fact that they have common forebears and features, and without critically examining how this supposed divergence affects contemporary theorization or relates to historical realities. Following such an essentialist division by broad cultural and linguistic groups, a typical global survey of cosmology in history divides topics into supposedly distinct regional cosmologies, with separate chapters on Babylon, Egypt, India, Scandinavia, Mesoamerica, and so on, even though it might also instructively be organized by types of calendrical cycles, notions of sacred mountains and waters, or specific applications of technology.

On the other hand, focusing on the clear commonalities and differences between such cosmologies, other historians have adopted more comparative approaches. One frequent goal of comparison has been to trace the origins and dissemination of persistent or influential ideas, especially with a teleological eye toward the development of modern science from ancient traditions. Such approaches were especially popular among the encyclopedists of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, including Louis-Pierre-Eugène Sédillot, Moritz Cantor, and George Sarton, whose Introduction to the History of Science was among the most ambitious works in its field. Revising the Hellenocentrism of earlier scholars, Otto Neugebauer later convincingly demonstrated the indebtedness of Greek astronomers to their Egyptian and Babylonian predecessors. Indeed, many Egyptian and Babylonian astronomical conventions remain with us even to the present day, such as the twenty-four hour clock and sexagesimal units of measurement, revealing a continuous dissemination and development of ideas over the past three millennia and across significant linguistic and cultural boundaries.

The comparativist tendency to see cosmologies in terms of origins, transmissions, and the eventual development of modern science, while clearly productive, also tends to further encourage the view that cosmologies are essentially independent systems associated with particular cultural groups or individuals. When contact between these putative monoliths occurs, it is often assumed that one must take priority

over the other, either in terms of chronology (being earlier) or in terms of scientific accuracy (being more effective), thus allowing scholars to propose decisive conflicts and linear models of transmission between supposedly disparate traditions. This almost Kuhnian analysis often precludes other ways of thinking, despite the fact that the history of cosmology is not limited to the history of science. In recent decades, historians of science have noted this problem well, especially Nathan Sivin, who proposed the concept of cultural manifolds as part of a multidimensional approach to research on ancient science. As he argued, the development of a body of knowledge such as cosmology is often driven by factors extrinsic to the knowledge itself, including political, bureaucratic, and personal ones. Consequently, statements asserting that modern astronomy is fundamentally Babylonian in origin or that religious cosmologies have been rejected in favor of more convincing observational science are deeply problematic, since the real histories are usually not teleological and depend on a variety of complex factors.

The traditional teleological interest in the development of modern science has also led to emphasis on Mediterranean and European traditions, such as Hellenic-Judaic-Christian cosmologies and Arabic astronomies, even though Asian cosmologies have been equally impactful on cultures both in the past and in the present, not to mention their diversity and richness in their own right. When Asian cosmologies do take primary focus, analyses often rely on Western categories and models of progress. David Pingree and Joseph Needham, for example, used comparative approaches to detail cosmological and astral traditions in India and China, respectively. Particularly in the case of Needham, these efforts were often driven by a positivist agenda, giving disproportionate importance to matters that appealed to modern scientific sentiments even while affirming the value of non-Western traditions.

Such focus on origins and accuracy also poses other difficulties, since both characteristics imply judgements of value and therefore incite nationalistic controversy. Some Indian, Chinese, and Japanese scholars, for example, have vigorously debated the possibilities of foreign-origin versus native-origin of their knowledge, and foreign scholars also weigh in on these issues. Of course, the tendency to view history in relation to modern political boundaries is inherently problematic and tends to efface many different kinds of social identity, cultural interaction, and historical change. Recognition of this complexity has been one factor in helping scholars turn away from approaches to history built around nation-based cultural identities.

As attention to questions of primacy have similarly subsided, scholars have more widely recognized that premodern cosmologies were not just abstract systems that occasionally met in brief moments of competition. In fact, many ancient cultures, especially those across Asia, were in continuous contact throughout the longue durée of history. It has become clear that, at any given moment in any particular region, there likely existed multiple bodies of cosmological knowledge and practice interacting with each other in myriad ways. Foreign ideas or new indigenous interpretations were regularly introduced and engaged in ongoing processes of negotiation with tradition, resulting in widely varying patterns of appropriation, conservation, and transformation. Many apparently stable cornerstones of cosmology actually never stopped evolving, as they were continually reengaged and reinterpreted by endless networks of individuals over time. Other cosmological forms seem almost to have fossilized, becoming markers of tradition or regional difference maintained without critique as novel models and practices developed around them.

With such diversity in mind, one alternative to viewing cosmologies as monolithic systems becomes to focus especially on particulars: individual thinkers, texts, artworks, ideas, transmissions, and other forms of evidence that provide snapshots of cosmological thinking or historical processes in their own contexts. With this approach, a cosmology is not a coherent and broadly applicable system of ideas; rather it may be an individualized expression of a singular agenda in one specific text, artwork, or other form. In this way, one may productively contrast the cosmologies of Vasubandhu and Buddhaghosa, two contemporary Buddhist thinkers who describe nearly identical models of the world, but do so for entirely disparate purposes in different contexts. The absolutist position that there is some single abstract or rational system that unites such diverse artifacts becomes untenable.

At the same time as one looks to particulars instead of absolutes, however, the opposite problem arises: relativism. If every instance of cosmology is its own unique and fascinating expression, how can one weigh them against each other to characterize larger historical processes of innovation, stabilization, transmission, or change? Not every expression of cosmology is equal, and one must be able to explain as a matter of history not only why Einstein's theories advance on Newton's but also why traditional cosmologies of Buddhism or Daoism remain central to ethics and ritual even as religious leaders and practitioners agree that they are disproven by modern science.

In the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, different academic disciplines have grappled with these problems of absolutism, relativism, and finding the in-between in their own ways. Historians of science articulated the need for a middle ground decades ago, and historians of religion and art have similarly moved through phases of Structuralism, Post-modernism, and beyond. This book seeks, in part, to find new ways of thinking about this balance between absolutism and relativism by extending the discussion beyond any single field to look more generally across disciplines. By identifying values besides rationality and progress (in the history of science) or ritualism and symbolism (in the history of religions), new ways of thinking about the nature of cosmologies and their positions in history can emerge. As an edited volume, this book emphasizes finding diverse views from experts in different fields who may define cosmologies and their interactions quite differently. A cosmology may be changed simply by being expressed in a different form (see the chapter by Isahaya), or it may be defended against an opposing cosmology using the techniques of its competitor (Moerman). New cosmological knowledge may be adopted not as part of a coherent system but only slowly and piecemeal (Mak and Jami), or it may be accepted only to be interpreted in a radically different way (Pirtea). Seemingly contradictory systems may even exist unproblematically alongside each other and be used to express each other (Hiraoka and Huntington).

Structure of the Book

In order to highlight cosmology as a dynamic intellectual tradition rather than static bodies of knowledge, this book eschews the normal organization by supposedly monolithic cultural groups or division by historical periods. Rather, given the paradigm of overlapping cosmologies, we ask the questions of what overlapped and how, who the agents were, and what resulted. The chapters of this volume are thus organized thematically to explore: i) varying dynamics of cultural interactions; ii) the importance of agents of interpretation; iii) intersections of mathematical technique; and iv) intersections of religious thought and visual imagery. Instead of presenting an historical overview of cosmology in Asia, then, these articles reveal specific subjects, methodologies, and insights into context that may help the field of cosmological studies grow in new directions. Further, beyond the interdisciplinary approach of

the volume itself, several of the authors also use notably interdisciplinary methods, helping to bring the study of cosmology beyond any single field to broadly connect the history of science, religious studies, art history, and more. The result of all this is greater power to explain what a cosmology or cosmologies might be in a given context, the precise ways that cosmologies can overlap and interact, and how the theories and methods of seemingly disparate disciplines may combine to form a picture of history greater than the sum of the parts.

The first section of the book, Transmissions of Knowledge, examines some of the ways that ideas can travel and transform across vast cultural and linguistic boundaries, as well as the importance of perspective in understanding these cultural histories. Its chapters establish a key premise of this volume, that transmissions and overlaps of cosmologies are complex and multivalent, may happen in multiple or unpredictable stages, and must constantly be reexamined from new viewpoints.

Steele's chapter begins the volume with an example of why the continual reinterpretation of history is necessary, not just because of new sources of evidence but also because of changes in the disciplines in which historical questions are posed and answered. Analyzing not only transmissions of knowledge in Asia but also lineages of interpretation in Western scholarship, it focuses on the bases for a mistaken understanding of relationships between ancient Babylonian and Chinese systems. Presenting three case studies of claims of Babylonian influence on Chinese astronomy and astrology, Steele reveals not only the errors in these arguments but more importantly the intellectual milieux that supported these interpretations, demonstrating the necessity of understanding transmissions of knowledge not only in the past but also in modern scholarship.

Mak's chapter continues the story by confronting the paradigm-shift model of cosmological history and showing that a number of Hellenistic astral concepts were repeatedly introduced to East Asia in multiple waves by Syriac Christians, Islamic astronomers, and the Jesuits. Bringing concepts of sexagesimal measurement, planetary weekdays, zodiac signs, and horoscopy in translated texts, these three different versions of Hellenistic astral science all carried unusual features of their own and met very different fates as they were encountered by the Chinese, who ultimately developed their own strategies to accommodate these new concepts. Foreign ideas were rejected in some cases and acculturated in others, thus challenging the idea of Hellenism as a monolithic cultural force that dispersed throughout Eurasia.

While the first section of the book highlights complex relationships between the larger cultural groups that are typically associated with cosmological bodies of knowledge, the second section, Interpretive Communities, draws closer attention to the importance of small groups and individuals as agents of knowledge and change, including not only mainstream scientists and scholars but also religious leaders and members of cultural minorities. Cosmologies can be understood to overlap not only in terms of vast cultures but also in terms of smaller groups with varied statuses and roles inside larger communities.

In a chapter that shows the value of combining histories of religion and science, Pirtea relates mythological stories about eclipses to astronomical concepts of lunar nodes (points in the sky where the paths of the sun and moon intersect, allowing eclipses). Examining accounts of a dragon that swallows the sun and moon to create eclipses, often treated as a kind of pseudo-planet, Pirtea reveals a fascinatingly complex history of the transmission and interpretation of ideas by particular groups for

specific goals. Especially focusing on the work of Mani and his followers, Pirtea suggests a highly skilled adaptation of foreign traditions into a particular theological and soteriological system.

In the subsequent chapter on a Jesuit Aristotelean-Ptolemaic cosmology, Hiraoka argues that an author employed Chinese yunqi theory not to obscure the Christian origins of the knowledge but rather to make sense of novel ideas using well-established Chinese intellectual tools, an approach that was inherited and strengthened by subsequent scholars who came to form a community of interpretation. Neither wholesale adoption of foreign ideas nor a compromising syncretism, this account of a group of intellectuals interpreting and commenting on diverse theories reveals a subtler form of intellectual engagement.

Weil's contribution expands beyond a singular community to examine the complex interactions of several different groups in a single historical milieu, focusing on minority Muslims in the Ming and Qing empires. Between the fourteenth to eighteenth centuries, several different kinds of communities were responsible for transmitting and interpreting aspects of Arabo-Persian astral knowledge to various Chinese groups, including the imperial court and literati circles. Here, a special emphasis is placed on a cultural subgroup not only as a source of knowledge but also as part of a complex process of mediation.

The third section of the book, Mathematical Techniques, departs from these historical accounts to take a closer look at technical aspects of cosmology, revealing how the translation of foreign concepts, terms, and practices may itself be seen as a process of negotiation and overlap. Just as entire systems are not adopted in toto, so too must individual ideas and methods be interpreted and adapted to unique local circumstances, transforming in each case.

Isahaya's contribution identifies a rare example of Ptolemaic geometry being used to understand Chinese astronomical concepts in a fourteenth century Persian almanac. While some Western astronomical traditions are traditionally understood in terms of geometric representations of the heavens, Chinese systems are traditionally framed in terms of numerical values and tables. Here, the author al-Nïsãbürï inventively uses the mathematical tools of one system to explain the logic of another. The rarity of this kind of example, rather than minimizing its historical importance, gives some indication of the wide variety of interpretive strategies open to commentators on diverse traditions.

In the following chapter on the Chinese reception of the Euclidean concept of the circle in the seventeenth century, Jami identifies three separate periods of interpretation in which this foreign knowledge is adapted not only with different levels of sophistication but also in relation to different scientific instruments and technical applications. Focusing particularly on cartography and surveying, Jami shows that cosmological enterprises of ordering the world did not only focus on the heavens but also on the earth, a consideration that importantly reappears in the chapters by Huntington and Moerman. Once again, the adoption of foreign ideas is revealed not to be a wholesale and monovalent conversion to a new knowledge system. Rather, each new context and application of ideas is a new kind of overlap, providing further opportunities for adaptation and reformulation.

The final section of the book, Religious Images, reverses the technical focus of the third section to look at the impact of cosmological knowledge on religious and artistic traditions. While some scholars of cosmology focus almost exclusively on a history-of-science perspective, in reality, cosmology has been intimately tied to numerous other aspects of traditional life, everything from the procedures of ritual

performances to the architecture of sacred temples. In focusing specifically on visual representations, this section also highlights another important medium for the transmission of knowledge beyond the expected texts and oral communications. Indeed, artistic examples often complement or contradict what is known from texts, providing unique and compelling narratives of cosmological history. This section also reveals how cosmological concepts can carry important meaning beyond providing tools for calculation or astral observation, such as establishing the basis for ritual programs at a specific site.

Moerman's chapter examines conflicts over the introduction of Jesuit cosmology to Edo Japan, focusing especially on the reactions of Buddhists who sought to justify their traditional model of the world that was centered around an enormous mountain called Sumeru. Entsü and his followers created various kinds of hybrid maps and devices that combined European cartography and science with Buddhist cosmology, exemplifying diverse kinds of accommodation, adaptation, and rejection of the new foreign worldview.

Contrasted with this account of conflict between traditional and foreign cosmologies in Japan, Huntington's chapter examines a negotiation between two mutually contradictory systems of cosmology that exist simultaneously in a purely Buddhist context. Recent mural paintings in Bhutan depict side-by-side two opposed cosmological systems, one of abhidharma philosophy and the other of Kãlacakra tantrism. Close examination reveals that these images borrow characteristics from each other in unique kinds of conflation and comingling that could not be represented in textual sources, providing a new way of understanding how cosmologies might be understood to overlap.

Hiyama's contribution similarly examines a combination of multiple cosmological systems, this time at the Silk Road site of Mogao Cave 285 at Dunhuang. In this single place, elements of prototypically Indian and Chinese cosmological imagery were blended in an eclectic but coherent set of murals that represents another unique overlapping of cosmologies in history. While Dunhuang is already well-recognized as a site of significant multi-cultural interaction, specific relationships between cosmological bodies of knowledge must be investigated through rare examples such as this complex and extraordinary cave.

While the chapters of this volume cannot hope to capture the full complexity of interacting cosmological traditions across Asian history, they provide a thematic overview of many of the key issues, methodologies, and sources that are propelling the field into a new generation of scholarship. Looking at visual and religious sources, understanding the shifting interpretations of individual scholars, and identifying influential communities and intra-cultural interactions are all crucial to developing a more complete and nuanced picture of the intellectual history of the many ever-changing and overlapping cosmologies of history. Instead of being defined systematically by monolithic and isolated cultures or even elite individuals, cosmologies were constantly in flux. New or foreign ideas were transmitted, often without the context of an entire cosmological system, and many different kinds of people interpreted and adapted these ideas using their own bases of knowledge and as suited to diverse purposes. The notion of overlapping cosmologies provides a groundwork for ever-growing sophistication in future explorations of the cosmologies of traditional civilizations. <>

Overlapping Cosmologies

The picture that begins to emerge is one of multiple kinds of cosmologies, from abstract systems of ideas to singular expressions or practices, that relate to each other in widely varying ways, from contradiction and competition to adaptation, assimilation, translation, conflation, reinterpretation, and conservation. Even in a single time and place or a single text by a single author, one does not necessarily find the monolithic systems of isolated traditions, representing either historical culs-de-sac or teleological connections to more progressive ideas. Rather, there are widely varied bodies of cosmological knowledge and practice that have been continually reinterpreted and renewed by each person or community who has brought their own assumptions and skills to bear. As traders traveled between distant regions, intellectuals interpreted texts, or itinerant artists moved from community to community, cosmological ideas, expressions, and practices continually overlapped and transformed in myriad ways.

With this new picture of Asian cosmologies as complex and overlapping, a whole variety of new questions about the history of knowledge becomes possible. Instead of simply asking which group knew something first, more accurately, or more influentially, one can more broadly and deeply interrogate the variety of interactions that can occur when different ideas and practices meet in particular historical moments. What kinds of factors other than accuracy were considered by particular historical agents in deciding whether to adopt or reject a novel or foreign idea? Who were the mediators of knowledge, and did these people see themselves as such? Were changes in practice necessarily accompanied by changes in paradigm? How did the bodies of knowledge and practice of different kinds of people (scholars, artists, bureaucrats) interact with others? What were the roles of particular social groups, especially minorities, in preserving, destroying, developing, or communicating cosmologies?

Recent scholarship has started to address some of these issues, most notably in relation to the introduction of Western scientific cosmology to different Asian traditions, a process that often took decades or centuries and involved vigorous debates between various individuals readily identifiable in the historical record. The wealth of available archival materials has provided a highly nuanced picture of cultural interactions in this relatively recent turn of events, but because the end result of these exchanges has often been the eventual acceptance of Western science, even this relatively refined story may sometimes amount to little more than a slower kind of scientific revolution, one measured not in terms of paradigm shifts but rather in terms of specific actors and intermediate processes of hybridization, adaptation, and interpretation.

In reality, even more varied encounters of cosmologies have occurred in numerous ways throughout history. Asian traditions were richly complicated, circulating and developing in dynamic, multilayered, and multidirectional interactions over time. Persian astronomers sought and read texts of their counterparts thousands of miles away (Isahaya), artists in Central Asia intermixed the cosmic mythologies of groups that met along transcontinental trade routes (Hiyama), minority Muslim communities influenced cosmological knowledge at the Ming and Qing courts (Weil), and the interpretation of such histories by modern scholars has been influenced by factors completely outside of Asia (Steele). As more and more complex interplay between traditions comes to light, it becomes increasingly difficult even to provisionally apply the traditional cultural, linguistic, and geographic names (such as "Chinese," "Persian," "Indian," and "Japanese"), let alone reify such distinctions as historical realities. For the sake of clarity, however, this volume does allow the use of such terms at each author's

discretion and definition, whether it be to capture a specific geographic region, language of discourse, or cultural complex. Such labels will continue to remain useful in the service of individual arguments and histories, even as their varied usage across this volume begins to deconstruct them and show the possibility of other forms of conceptualization.

Indeed, the convergence of these discussions highlights another form of cosmological overlap that is key to this book, the coincidence and multiplication of ideas and practices not just in historical contexts but also across modern academic disciplines. In the historical sense, one may speak of overlapping cosmologies in terms ranging from the competition of scientific paradigms to the uncritical incorporation of mathematical techniques or artistic motifs. In the modern academic sense, one may consider how the slow adoption of foreign astral sciences in China (Mack) might provide insights into the hybridization of mythic and artistic cosmologies at Mogao (Hiyama). While these two examples have few cosmological concepts or practices in common, such comparisons can lead to insights into historical processes of adoption, adaptation, and hybridization that extend beyond the histories of either science or art.

It is hoped that the case studies selected for this volume, each expressing a different perspective on overlapping cosmologies, will help lay a groundwork for more significant theorization and study in the future. While subtler than the radical changes of scientific revolution, the processes described in the following pages are no less profound for understanding the history of cosmological thinking. The bodies of knowledge of pre-modern Asia were not static and conservative but active sites of interpretation by specific individuals and groups. In other words, cosmology has been a vigorous and dynamic force in Asian intellectual history.

THE INVENTION OF GREEN COLONIALISM by Guillaume Blanc, translated by Helen Morrison [Polity Press, 9781509550890]

The story begins with a dream – the dream of Africa. Virgin forests, majestic mountains surrounded by savannas, vast plains punctuated with the rhythms of animal life where lions, elephants and giraffes reign as lords of nature, far from civilization – all of us carry such images in our heads, imagining Africa as a timeless Eden untouched by the ravages of modernity.

But this Africa does not exist. It has never existed and the problem is that we have convinced ourselves of the opposite. The more nature disappears in the West, the more we fantasize about it in Africa. The more we destroy nature here, the more energetically we try to save it there. With UNESCO, the WWF (formerly known as the World Wildlife Fund and then as the World Wide Fund for Nature) or the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN), we manage to convince ourselves that, in the African national parks, we are protecting the last vestiges of a world once untouched and wild.

In reality, these institutions are responsible for the rapid naturalization of large areas of the continent. By naturalization, I am referring to the dehumanization of Africa, a process which involves turning territories into national parks, banning agriculture in these areas, evicting people from their homes and getting rid of their fields and grazing land in order to create a supposedly natural world, in which people

are absent. And this battle for a phantom Africa has no impact whatsoever on the destruction of biodiversity. On the contrary, this process is proving to have disastrous effects on all of those living in the natural world. The enforced eviction of local people, fines, prison sentences, social breakdown, beatings, sometimes rapes and even murders: these are the catastrophic consequences of this westernized vision of Africa.

This book investigates the mechanisms of this violence. It describes the history and the ongoing reality of the injustice which continues to permeate the lives of those living in or near the African national parks.

CONTENTS

History as a Starting Point

THE INVENTION OF GREEN COLONIALISM. By virtue of its title, as soon as it was published, this book was associated with postcolonial studies, even with `decolonial' thinking. These fields of study have of course influenced my work, but what I wanted first and foremost was to write a book focusing on environmental history. With this discipline, 'we can create a more usable past, one more relevant to the everyday lives of people today', as Ted Steinberg puts it. And to do that, the American historian tells us, we need to re-establish 'the way power operates through and across landscape'.

Still in North America, this time in Canada, Stephane Castonguay explains how we can achieve this. There is no point in trying to distinguish between the natural and the cultural, given that in the world around us, everything is hybrid. However, Castonguay explains, the environmental historian can decipher the mechanisms which result in a landscape ending up being defined in one place as `natural' and in another as `cultural'. And for that to be achieved, nature needs to be regarded as a battleground: the institutional battle over how a territory is controlled, the cultural battle to establish an image of the environment in the public domain and the material battle over the exploitation of a resource. In this book, these three dimensions of social relationships with nature are a constant presence.

Let us begin with the institutional aspect. For many environmental historians, confining nature within a park represents a double act of appropriation and of disappropriation. This is the case everywhere and perhaps particularly in Africa. Under colonial rule, the colonists first set about creating hunting reserves as a way of demonstrating their capacity to dominate nature and space. Next it was the turn of

European administrations to use the national parks as a means to better control, manage and suppress populations. Then, once the postcolonial period had begun, the international conservation institutions continued to impose coercive models for the protection of nature, models which involved displacing local people, restricting right of access to resources and criminalizing use of the landed The majority of those African states called upon to put these programmes in place took advantage of the situation to impose tighter controls over their citizens. And the latter therefore found themselves seeking out any available gaps which would enable them to get round the conservation rules, and even to use them to exercise political advantage over their neighbours and their communities? Put differently, for all the actors involved in the institutionalization of the environment, protecting nature always involves the exercise of power.

However, if it is to be effective, this power to define the `good' and 'bad' use of nature needs to be underpinned by a certain number of specific perceptions — of the `good' images of nature, to put it briefly. Environmental historians have long clashed over this issue, wondering whether the way we think about nature might or might not affect the way we conserve it. William Cronon, a major theoretician of the American wilderness, made a positive contribution to this debate by demonstrating that `pristine' nature was never a reality but, primarily, 'the reflection of our own unexamined longings and desires'. And no matter how elitist they are, `ideas do matter', as Cronon reminds us. Here too, the argument is particularly relevant to contemporary African societies. By linking the field of perceptions of nature with that of political action, many historians have shown the determining nature of the European and, later, western vision of Africa. A steadily increasing media coverage in the form of travel journals, novels, guidebooks, wildlife documentaries or animated films has, over the course of more than a century, portrayed Africa as a supremely natural landscape, sadly damaged by its inhabitants. Yet perceiving African ecologies as 'wild things' implies wanting to experience them as such and, consequently, needing to protect them as such. This is why it is crucial always to link conservation norms to the emotions and affects which govern their definition. If we wish to understand why conservationists are still determined to make the African national parks wild spaces, we need to ask how it was that they came to believe that `good' African nature is always uninhabited.

Finding an answer to this question also means considering the material dimension underlying social relationships with nature. The British historian Richard Grove was the first person to throw light on the links between ecologist and capitalism. The more Europeans cultivated, exploited and damaged the soil and the wildlife of the tropics, the more determined they were to protect the environment from this destruction. Except that, in order to do so, they restricted the rights of `local indigenous people', accused of destroying nature and therefore needing to be removed. And since that time, this dual concept of predation/protection has continued to shape global policies for nature in Africa. The imperatives of the capitalist economy cause ever more damage, ecological demands result in the creation of a growing number of protected zones, and farmers and shepherds are once again seen as those largely responsible for the massive deterioration of the environment.

Many environmental historians have turned their attention to this anti-rural ethic. Yet, very often, one question remains unresolved: what is it that these famous `indigenous people', constantly singled out, but then ignored, by the conservationists, actually do? For the majority of them, as Ramachandra Guha and Madhav Gadgil demonstrated in India as early as 1992, ecologism only serves to exacerbate their poverty. That said, since farmers and shepherds continue to exploit the land, they also fall into the

category of `environmental banditry', as Karl Jacoby points out with reference to the United States. And since the 1980s, in Africa, in Asia or in Latin America, given that those who live in the natural world are also trying to earn a living from the new community conservation, this can result in confrontations, divisions and conflicts between them. It is one of the main consequences of 'the tyranny' of participation in that once nature becomes monetized, there will inevitably be both losers and winners.

Consequently, inside the national parks, everyone finds themselves caught up in the struggle to control, represent and exploit nature. This principle lies at the heart of environmental history, and is central to this book. However, the book also draws on at least three other fields of study.

In the first place, postcolonial studies allow us to simultaneously observe global conservation and the form it takes locally: that is to say, the system and the individuals, from the top to the bottom. The work of Edward Said helps us, for example, to have a better understanding of the injustice of global policies which, in Africa, involve criminalizing those who live off and in the natural world. What kind of discourse could have succeeded in convincing western conservationists of the radical otherness of African peasants? What discursive practices could ever have justified this approach to the Other (`the African'), an attitude which would, moreover, be morally unacceptable in western societies? As for this `Other', the difficulty lies in being able to identify him or her, not just as a passive subject, but as a fully participating actor. The work of Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak sets us on the right track here. By formulating the famous question 'Can the subaltern speak?' the literary theorist urges us to restore a voice to those whom power has silenced. It is a process which requires work on a personal level — trying to see the world through the eyes of others — as well as on a historical one — tracking down, in the sources produced by the dominant, the actions of the dominated. In this book, by mixing archives and real-life stories, I have therefore tried always to keep in mind the fact that nature was shaped just as much by those at the top as by those at the bottom, each having a role to play in the invention of green colonialism.

Because they are produced by authors who fluctuate between a scholarly position and a militant stance, these postcolonial theories can sometimes end up being as useful as they are misleading. So, for example, orientalism as defined by Said can easily edge us towards occidentalism. Just as there is no single Africa but instead many African societies, we cannot refer to a single western conservation system: there are the international institutions, who negotiate their norms with the African states responsible for applying them. As for the famous `subaltern' whom so many postcolonial theorists seek to defend, there too the trap of essentialism is never far away. It is an indisputable fact that, in the eyes of the experts and the leaders who judge and govern them, the sub-Saharan African peasants are all too often only a `third something', this `tertium quid' defined by W.E.B. Du Bois to describe the condition of black people in America in the early twentieth century, and recently updated by Paul Gilroy to describe the victims of a `postcolonial melancholia'. Nevertheless, however much they are dominated, the farmers and shepherds of the African natural parks know how to deal with power, often refusing to accept it and finding a way around it, sometimes appropriating it themselves and imposing it on their neighbours.

The main difficulty of this book was therefore to study both the system and the individual, without ever losing sight of the complexity of social life generated by the global government of African nature. This is why two methodological safeguards have guided the story set out in these pages.

The first of these comes from science studies. As Bruno Latour explains, ever since the end of the 1980s, scientific knowledge has been a social construction. Thus, throughout the book, I have tried to envisage conservation experts as `centres of calculation', as intermediaries who link together the observations made by the personnel of African parks, the data compiled by the international institutions based in the West and the norms produced, in due course, by the national administrations in power. This approach enabled me to define nature as an object enforced and negotiated on a daily basis, constructed and reconstructed at ground level.

This `bottom-up' approach owes much, finally, to the field of African studies. In the furrow traced by historians such as Frederick Cooper, I have resolutely abandoned all neo-colonial theories and instead focused on dynamics which are specifically African 20 During the 1960s, the archives reveal ongoing encounters between the colonial administrators subsequently converted into international experts, auxiliaries of colonization now transformed into national leaders, and peasants inured to a regime of submission and resistance. And in postcolonial Africa today, the same type of interactions are still taking place. It is precisely these global African encounters that explain why green colonialism still exerts its influence on the present. <>

THE DECOLONIAL ABYSS: MYSTICISM AND COSMOPOLITICS FROM THE RUINS by An Yountae [Perspectives in Continental Philosophy, Modern Language Initiative, Fordham University Press, 9780823273072]

This book probes the ethico-political possibility harbored in the Western philosophical and theological thought for addressing the collective experience of suffering, socio-political trauma, and colonial violence. To this end, it rethinks the mystical figure of the abyss in philosophical and theological literature by rethinking its meaning from a wider, socio-political perspective. Theologically, the abyss denotes the blurring of boundaries between creaturely finitude and divine potency as reflected in the writings of certain Neoplatonic and medieval mystics. The book carves the channel of a constructive conversation by examining the ethico-political meaning of the abyss as the book locates its trace within the trajectory of continental philosophy by way of Schelling and Hegel. With the end of exploring an emergent socio-political meaning of the abyss beyond the Eurocentric vision, it further extends the conversation to the twentieth-century Afro-Caribbean decolonial thinkers who employ the trope of the abyss in order to articulate the historical/political trauma. By reading the abyss as an all-pervading ontological groundlessness of being that involves an insurmountable material and political devastation, this book re-invents a new idiom for articulating the ethico-political possibility that the mystical thought opens up for the historically marginalized communities.

Review

THE DECOLONIAL ABYSS offers a decolonial political theology that carefully considers but seeks to avoid pitfalls often found in political theologies and philosophies that are based or propose views grounded on absolute negativity, perpetual deconstruction, or on apparent radical views that collapse into Eurocentric conservatisms. It is a required reading for anyone interested in political theology,

liberation theologies, decolonial thinking, as well as Caribbean literature and philosophical thought.**---—Nelson Maldonado-Torres, *Rutgers University***

"The abyss provides a fascinating lens through which to politicize the mystical on the one hand and theologize the post- and decolonial on the other. Each of these is a worthy project on its own and even more compelling in relation to the other. . . . A sophisticated, readable, and important book."**---—Mary-Jane Rubenstein, *Wesleyan University***

...**THE DECOLONIAL ABYSS** is an erudite, insightful, and exceptionally important text. — *Reading Religion*

Staring into the Abyss

Afuera hay sol. No es más que un sol pero los hombres lo mirany después cantan. Yo no sé del sol Yo sé de la melodía del ángely el sermón caliente del último viento. Sé gritar hasta el alba cuando la muerte se posa desnuda en mi sombra....

Afuera hay sol.
No es más que un sol
pero los hombres lo miran
y después cantan.
Yo no sé del sol
Yo sé de la melodía del ángel
y el sermón caliente
del último viento.
Sé gritar hasta el alba
cuando la muerte se posa desnuda en mi sombra.
Yo lloro debajo de mi nombre.
Yo agito pañuelos en la noche y barcos sedientes de realidad
bailan conmigo.
Yo oculto clavos
para escarnecer a mis sueños enfermos.
Afuera hay sol.
Yo me visto de cenizas.
—Alejandra Pizarnik, "La Jaula"

[It's sunny outside. It is nothing more than a sun but the men look at it and then sing. I don't know about the sun I know about the melody of the angel and the hot sermon of the last wind. I know how to scream until dawn when death poses naked in my shadow....

It's sunny outside.
It's just a sun
but men look at it
and then they sing.
I don't know about the sun
I know of the angel's melody
and the hot sermon
of the last wind
I know how to scream until dawn
when death poses naked in my shadow.
I cry under my name.
I wave handkerchiefs at night and ships thirsty for reality
they dance with me
I hide nails
to mock my sick dreams.
It's sunny outside.
I dress myself in ashes.
—Alejandra Pizarnik, "The Cage"]

With her gloomy poetic imagination, the twentieth-century Argentinian poet Alejandra Pizarnik delves into the depth of meaninglessness, the source of inspiration that marks her entire writing career through the 1950s and '60s. Her obsession with lack, also represented as the void, absence, and death, points to her existentialist poetic vision that privileges darkness and silence over the "sun" or "word."[1] However, the dark night of *nihil* does not seem capable of redeeming Pizarnik's despairing existential cry, for after her encounter with the void she confesses, "I cry beneath my name" (Yo lloro debajo de mi nombre). Despite "the sun outside," her melancholic tone culminates in "I dress in ashes" (Afuera hay sol, yo me visto de cenizas). These ashes perhaps encode immense historical experience if we consider that she was born in 1936 to Russian-Jewish parents who had immigrated to Argentina in flight from the Nazi holocaust. Her desolation is further manifested by her tormenting life trajectory, one marked with severe borderline personality disorder that eventually led her to end her own life at the young age of thirty-six. In her abyssal poetic world, Pizarnik discloses the void as a site of revelation. However, it is not a revelation that leads to the reconstruction of ground and meaning. Rather, the poet's revelation gravitates around nothingness and emptiness, vacillating between silence and absence.[2]

The utterly negative character of the abyss depicted in Pizarnik's poems is indicative of the existential chasm encountered at the horizon of finite human existence. But such a view fails to capture another important aspect of the abyss: a space replete with potential. Facing the abyss, in this sense, is different from facing nothing or the void. Pizarnik's conflation of the abyss with a void covers over the abyss's complex polysemy and ambiguous nature. For the abyss does not signify a mere lack of meaning. It signifies something more material. In this regard, the abyss is not synonymous with finitude. It is rather a

paradox. It puts you face to face with finitude, but this finitude at the same time signals possibility by revealing itself to be the passageway to infinitude, an absence (or lack) that can possibly lead to replenishment.

This might sound like a classic narrative of triumphalism, the story of the resilient self who (re)discovers and reconstructs itself after a series of failures. Such stories are usually accompanied by teleological accounts of theologies that regard evil and suffering as a necessity. It is from this perspective that the early church apologetic Irenaeus viewed suffering and evil as part of the process of growth to maturity in God, and the world as the "vale of soul-making." These stories regard finitude as a necessary component of the progressive cycle of life. Experiences of finitude may shatter one's horizon of life, but there is a promise of reward, of growth and self-discovery: reconstruction of what has been dismantled and compensation for what was lost.

What this book is about to unfold is not stories of victorious reconciliation. Rather, I attempt to examine the shuttling movement of the self, the oscillation between the two opposites across the abyssal chasm, the possible and the impossible, finitude and infinitude. When we accept the shadow of the abyss not as a necessity but as a reality, a constitutive element of the self-conditioning its existence, numerous questions and possibilities are opened up for a new understanding of the self—with implications for philosophy, theology, ethics, and possibly politics. Briefly speaking, that the self is the result of an incessant dialectical tension and movement raises important philosophical and ethical questions about the place of the "other" in the constitution of the self. To what extent is the self-indebted to or implicated in the other(s)? Is it possible to build a coherent and cogent account of the self who is clearly demarcated from the other? If the answer is no, in what ways does this reshape the philosophical discourse of God and ethics in relation to the other?

Another important question that I encounter in the face of the abyss concerns the restlessness of the self who negates finitude, namely the self who (counter)negates negation. For the abyss often induces the self, who is confronted by negation (whether we call it finitude or loss) and is agonizing in despair, to gather herself resiliently. This is why the abyss designates passion rather than resignation. I am here by no means trying to contradict my own statement above by invoking a narrative of the self who successfully conquers the shadows of darkness and rises above her limits. Rather, my intention is to probe the work of negation that displaces the self and her old world and gives birth to a new self at the same time. The work of the negative or the way negation works is complex. For it is neither a mere antithesis conducive to resignation, nor a magical remedy that heals the irreparable breach. Negation does not guarantee a triumphant and predictable outcome. Yet the power of negation lies in its evocation of the self as a relentless and insistent movement, the restless movement of struggle, becoming, and dialectical mediation across the valley of the abyss. We no longer imagine the self as a determinate substance but as a force: a movement of incessant self-creation and unfolding.

If the double move implied in the abyss nurtures a sense of possibility for thinking newly about the self in her ethical and political relation to the other, my hope is to carefully explore such possibility by relocating theological and philosophical texts to the contextualized horizon of history. For as much as philosophy builds universalized theories of reality, these thoughts do not simply transcend the historical contexts out of which they are constructed. After all, the self in trial in the different philosophical

inquiries I engage here is not a disembodied notion but a living body with a specific shape, flesh, and history.

The familiar tone of metaphysical narratives of the abyss reverberates in an intriguing way with stories of survival that are marked by historical loss and physical suffering. At the intersection of such similarity among dissimilarities, I wonder about the possible crossings between these two distinct kinds of stories of loss and finitude, one shaped by metaphysical contours, the other marked by sociopolitical conditions. These questions extend my inquiry further to the divide lying between the spiritual and the political. The spiritual, or, to be more specific, mystical spirituality, has long been misperceived as a privatizing affair, a self-absorbed form of religious experience unable to make an ethical/political offering to the community in despair. And to push the "political" even further, my query extends to the divide between the West and the global South, the subject of knowledge production and the colonial other. Indeed, as the Portuguese sociologist Bonaventura de Sousa Santos remarks, the gap between the West and the global South indicates an "abyssal" divide. The word *abyssal* here has pessimistic overtones suggesting an unbridgeable gap, for Santos is describing a separation of the social reality of the West from that the global South in which whatever lies on "the other side of the line" is deemed nonexistent and radically excluded.

Globalization is a reality that shapes us all today. If continental philosophy of religion has opened the new millennium with its distinctive orientation toward ethics, it is imperative that it now respond to this new phenomenon, system, or configuration of the old world as we knew it. Globalization is perhaps not all that new when we remind ourselves of the legacy of the power network that has long exercised sovereign rule over those who live on the other side of the line: from the ancient Christian image of cosmopolitanism named the *Orbis Christianus* (the Christian cosmos) to the hegemonic installment of European modernity upon the back of its colonial other (the "New World"), and from imperialism, the expansion of the colonial order to the rest of the world through military force, to the planetary dominion of capitalist expansion, namely capitalist globalization. Pressing these questions in the philosophical discourse of religion is a daunting task. Yet leaving these questions unaddressed would perpetuate the abyssal divide between the Western philosophical discourse of religion and the political realities of the global South, and would fail to hold discourses about God, ethics, and political responsibilities accountable to the reality of global communities. How, then, can we bridge the mystical abyss of theology and the abyss of sociopolitical trauma engulfing the colonial subject?

The question that remains and haunts this book will largely rest on the unique perspective that the thematization of the abyss in each one of the different (con)texts opens. As my reading reconstructs the figure of the abyss, I will demonstrate how questions of theology, philosophy, ethics, and politics cut across these seemingly distant contexts. In other words, this book demonstrates that mystics' concern for union with the divine and decolonial thinkers' concern for the reconstruction of a collective identity share a common ground—or is it groundlessness?—in the abyss. The unquenchable passion (and the failure) to name the "unnameable" name of God need not be separated from the passion (and the failure) to name the unnameable historical trauma from which the fragile name of the community is born. In this strange crack, we witness the double work of the abyss that dissolves the self and opens up possibility. And precisely here the central question driving the narratives of this book intervenes. What kind of future does this crack open? Or does it open a future at all? For the universalizing accounts of dialectical becoming might certainly open a future, but a future perhaps all too familiar to us: one that

does not break from the genealogy of the old Christian cosmopolitan world order that keeps reproducing itself each time with a different name: modernity, capitalism, liberal democracy, postmodernity, globalization, and so forth. Indeed, is this not the totalitarian future that (the misreading of) Hegel opens for us? Since my goal here is to write a different narrative of dispossession and reconstruction, accountable to the reality of the globalized world living under perpetual systems of violence and exploitation, it is crucial that my argument take on the structure of violence deeply embedded in the system. And this is why, in a way, this book suggests a form of political theology, or better, a cosmo-political theology, as it aims to displace the sovereignty of coloniality, which grounds the Eurocentric production of knowledge and West-led capitalist globalization.

The methods and disciplinary boundaries shaping the polyphonic voices of this book are often blurred as I navigate through philosophy, theology, postcolonial thought, and poetics. While largely philosophical, this book also invokes a theological discourse, a secular theology—if we may call it that—perhaps concerned less with making theological claims about dogmatic notions such as God or transcendence than with disclosing the overlooked political possibility lurking in mystical thought while probing the mystical depth implicated in political thought.

Chapter 1 of the book provides a general overview and definition of the key themes and questions of the book. It begins with the questions that Martinican thinkers Frantz Fanon and Édouard Glissant raise regarding the possibility of constructing being, self, and collective identity in the context of colonial oppression. A brief review of philosophical discourses and critical theories that address questions of race, (post)coloniality, and the global state of trans-spatiality such as theories of cosmopolitanism, postcolonial theory, and Latin American decolonial thought ("the decolonial turn") will provide the methodological framework for both theorizing some of the central terms of the book and reading the figure of the abyss from diverse perspectives.

Chapter 2 examines the notion of the abyss as it has been developed within the tradition of Western philosophy and theology. It traces the abyss back to its inception in Neoplatonic philosophy by Plato in his *Parmenides*, followed by Plotinus, who develops the traces of panentheist mysticism lurking in Plato's system into the seed of negative theology. In the Neoplatonic tradition and the medieval mysticism of Pseudo-Dionysius and Meister Eckhart, the abyss points to the theological crossroads where finitude and infinity, creaturely vulnerability and divine potency, intersect. The paradoxical path of the *via negativa* renders the abyss a site of uncertainty and unknowing in which both God and the self are uncreated (Eckhart). Subsequently, the ethical implication or potential of the abyss is probed via the works of contemporary philosophers (Jacques Derrida, Jean-Luc Marion, Slavoj Žižek) who engage negative theology from a postmodern perspective.

Chapter 3 examines explicitly the ethico-philosophical meaning of the abyss by locating its trace in German idealism and Hegel. Jakob Boehme's elaboration of the abyss as *Ungrund* (groundlessness) and Schelling's appropriation of it pave the way for the transition from mysticism to dialectic via Hegel. I then move to Hegel in order to examine the ethico-philosophical questions implicated in the abyss. My reading demonstrates that while the trace of the abyss is underdeveloped in Hegel, it nevertheless structures his dialectical system. The abyss signals the moment or movement of passage from the negative to the positive, through which the shattered self transforms its eroded ground into the

condition of a new possibility. I interrogate the terms of such reconstruction or passage by engaging both Judith Butler's feminist and Slavoj Žižek's materialist readings of Hegel.

Chapter 4 extends the meaning of the abyss by giving it a specific contextual shape. By investigating the colonial impasse from which the Afro-Caribbean decolonial imagination of the (post)*Négritude* movement emerges, I probe the complex crossings that take place between the mystical and the political. In the writings of Caribbean thinkers one witnesses an understanding of identity based on relational ontology; the story of the shattered other shapes the very contours of the collective history from which the traumatized self emerges. In this middle, the groundless site lying between the devastating past and the equally impaired present, one begins to reflect upon the possibility of *passage*, of *beginning* after trauma. I explore the possibility of reconstructing the traumatized self in the extended notion of identity based on relational ontology found in Édouard Glissant's philosophy of creolization.

Finally, chapter 5 explores the possibility of using the reconceptualized notion of groundless ground as a new framework from which to envision a new form of self and of thinking and inhabiting the world. A comparative reading of Glissant's poetics, a poetic of resistance he calls a "forced poetic," and of continental philosophers' theopoetics (Jacques Derrida, John Caputo, Richard Kearney, Catherine Keller) suggests the poetic as an epistemological alternative and political instrument that makes possible an open future and a relational self-born from the wombs of pain and trauma. Poetics in the colonial abyss is not a glamorous, apolitical escapism but a mode of being in the world, a mode of recreating the self amid unrealized possibilities, and hence is inescapably political. (Theo)poetics of creolization thus leads us ineluctably to cosmopolitics. If this cosmopolitics offers some kind of theological possibility, it indicates perhaps the possibility of conceiving the name of the divine right at the site where the cosmopolitical struggle of the creolized masses creates, uncreates, and recreates itself and its ground for a future of cosmopolitan justice and solidarity.

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In *Beyond Good and Evil*, Friedrich Nietzsche writes, "When you stare for a long time into an abyss, the abyss stares back into you."[1] The journey that I have taken in this book can be read, perhaps, as an act of staring into the abyss. Perhaps, to be more accurate, the path that my inquiry has taken through the chapters of this book might be better described as "plunging into" the abyss rather than just gazing on it. As I have been consistently arguing, the abyss, after all, cannot be restricted to matters of epistemology. Rather, it signals an ontological question. What, then, does the abyss that stares back at us look like? What happens to us as we gaze upon the abyss and as it gazes back upon us?...

In *Beyond Good and Evil*, Friedrich Nietzsche writes, "When you stare for a long time into an abyss, the abyss stares back into you."[1] The journey that I have taken in this book can be read, perhaps, as an act of staring into the abyss. Perhaps, to be more accurate, the path that my inquiry has taken through the chapters of this book might be better described as "plunging into" the abyss rather than just gazing on it. As I have been consistently arguing, the abyss, after all, cannot be restricted to matters of epistemology. Rather, it signals an ontological question. What, then, does the abyss that stares back at us look like? What happens to us as we gaze upon the abyss and as it gazes back upon us?

My answer, to echo the central argument of this book, is that the self is reconstructed, assembled anew, as she walks through the unfathomable valley of the abyss. This is not, as I hope has become evident,

some refreshed version of the all-too-familiar story of a triumphalistic theology. Rather, my reading of the abyss points to the ceaseless movement of the dialectical tension lurking at the heart of the indeterminacy structuring the self. This implies, first, that the self and her world are not constituted by an immutable, prefigured substance but by an open-ended process made of the relentless unfolding of a dialectical oscillation. The self emerges through the process of becoming, always in *relation* to the other. Second, the *dialectical* movement does not indicate resignation or passive surrender to the unknown. Rather, it points to the self's arduous labor and commitment to take on the movement of passage from the negative to the positive, from limit to possibility, from death to life. It is to this resilience of the self and her act of the passage that the accounts of the abyss in both Neoplatonic mysticism and the Hegelian dialectic testify.

Nevertheless, the question that is somewhat overlooked in these accounts is what happens when the self is not just a metaphysical notion of a disembodied self but a contextualized self, a racialized and gendered/sexualized self. Do the modes and forms of the passage take the same shape or trajectory for the different selves entangled and conditioned by various forms of power relations infused with violence and foreclosure? Is the passage or the reconstruction of the self even possible at all for certain subjects? These questions become crucial for thinking about theology, philosophy, and politics in the era of capitalist, neocolonial globalization. By staring at the abyss of the traumatic historical womb of modernity/coloniality, namely, the middle passage, I am proposing the possibility of a decolonial cosmopolitics conceived upon the horizon of colonial difference. The long journey of conversation with multiple intersecting voices in this book leaves us with a complex idea of the self, the subject, and God through which our previous understanding of the self and of the world is undone. The theological and political potential of the overlooked figure of the abyss has then been lurking all along in the theological thought of the mystics in which ontotheology yields to a relational understanding of God, just as the apophatic gesture of mystical theology hints at the failure of ontology. The Neoplatonic abyss, a constitutive element structuring the self and its relation to God, becomes in the Hegelian dialectic the ethical threshold that opens and mediates the self's place in relation to its exteriority ingrained at the heart of itself, namely the other. If the Hegelian dialectic unveils the ethico-political significance of the passage in the abyss, Caribbean decolonial thought shows us that any actual such passage for the contextualized self is possible only through counterpoetics, a poetics of resistance that invokes the theological, and through the persistent force of Relation that survives the terrifying depth of the middle passage. Thus reconceived, the political promise of the creolized self-inaugurated in the middle passage lies in that it comes to be itself through the restless struggle to found the ground.

As we stare at the abyss and as the abyss stares back at us, we lose ourselves for a creolized self yet to be created on the ever-unfolding horizon of the groundless middle. In the colonial abyss, passage implies plunging not only into the abyss of the self and the other but also into the abyss of becoming—sinking into the unknown mystery and thus the generosity of becoming, and of the other, that solicits a future; generosity that fosters the original (ex)change—an exchange that takes place at the very outset of being—which therefore exceeds the capitalist economy of exchange. A gift: the gift of becoming and creolization, the exchange before being; the sacred. Being, Malabou teaches us, is a site of change and exchange. It points to nothing but its mutability: "Being is from the outset changeable and changed. It substitutes for itself and is exchanged—in exchange for nothing; it loses its name." It is perhaps here that the boundary between the human and the divine or between the spiritual and political dissolves, at this

juncture of exile in the groundless middle, between absolute solitude and the inexhaustible ties of our solidarity with suffering others. **<>**

LOVE AND SOUL-MAKING: SEARCHING THE DEPTHS OF ROMANTIC LOVE by Stacey Shelby, Ph.D. [Chiron Publications, 9781685030391]

LOVE AND SOUL-MAKING brings awareness to both the patriarchal origins of romance and the unarguably magical, archetypal experience of love. Relationships can serve as an alchemical vessel for the development of the soul as part of the individuation process. The struggles of relationships, whether one is partnered or not, can allow us to engage more deeply with the psyche and can guide us further into her territory.

For those experiencing romantic difficulties, the myth of Psyche and Eros can serve as a guide to the stages involved in soul-making and how that is enacted in human relationships. This book encourages contemplating relationships both literally and metaphorically. With metaphorical vision, we create possibility for the alchemical transmutation process and the development of the soul. This book provides context to the soul-making process, and it can help to re-animate your creativity and vitality. Soul (Psyche) follows what she loves (Eros).

CONTENTS

In **LOVE AND SOUL-MAKING**, Dr. Stacey Shelby articulates with care and depth the relationship between love and soul—as particularly told in the myth of Eros and Psyche. But she doesn't simply recount the myth and restate what has been told before. She dreams the myth onwards as C. G. Jung instructed. Shelby judiciously presents how love and soul have traditionally been conceptualized in depth psychology, and then tests this against the bar of ongoing human experience—showing how those pricked by Eros' arrow and captured by Psyche's beauty have continued to re-imagine their relationship. The result, then, is not just a retelling of ideas, but an evocation of what it feels like to love soul, and to make soul from love—from its ecstasy and pain, its pathology and divinity.

In the process, Shelby reveals how Eros and Psyche show up in human relationships, in romance, in idealizations and projections. But more importantly, she sees through these literal enactments as James Hillman described, to disclose the deeper significance of Eros and Psyche, their archetypal significance for every individual—regardless of relationship status. As Shelby brilliantly and convincingly argues, romance is first and foremost about the individual's calling to love soul, their own soul, and the soul of

the world, and reciprocally to find soul in, to make soul from, and to serve soul through love's many expressions. **LOVE AND SOUL-MAKING** itself exemplifies this love and calling--embodying the soul Shelby has made from her life and experiences. Dylan Hoffman, Ph.D.

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Love and Soul: Invocation

Romantic love is the ultimate transformer. It enthrals with a sip of love potion or enchants with the prick of Eros' arrow. Who can resist? But as romance unfolds, we are enticed int^ greater awareness ^f self and other—sometimes through a crisis that ensues. The only way through is one tentative step in front of the other. The old idealized life dies away and a new life gestates quietly. With each step, we are invited to look int^ our deepest recesses, t^ discover what we didn't even know existed. Each revelation is a mirror and a glimpse of our own soul. We come t^ marvel at the person we are getting to know, the one who is looking back at us with a new gaze—and who is giving us a new view ^f ourselves. Something within us doesn't follow societal rules, but has its own, which are only revealed to us a bit at a time. This 'Other' within us challenges us and brings out the best and worst in us—our fullness. She is Psyche, the human soul. She pursues what she loves, which is beyond all logos and rational safety. Psyche follows Eros, who is the immortal god of love. He is Love as the sacred connecting principle. We encounter these two most poignantly in the arena of romantic love. As we walk with them, we get to know paradox, including the paradox of knowing sacred, divine love through the experience of embodied human love. In embracing soul as life's muse, we come into relationship love, we follow soul, and experience enchantment in our own unique and precious life.

Explorations of Psyche and Eros

In each chapter, we will explore Psyche and Eros and include select perspectives from other depth psychology writers to help us navigate. We begin with the myth of Psyche and Eros; and will rely on this tale as a path to love of soul. This book has developed from the graduate course I teach on the same topic at Pacifica Graduate Institute, in Santa Barbara, California. The content includes a crated selection of Jungian authors designed to offer various perspectives and invoke your own perspective that will hopefully lead to your unique inquiry into love (Eros) and soul (Psyche). As we go through the chapters in this book, I'll offer my thoughts, synthesize in my words, and highlight other authors. The process of reading this book is meant to be psychoactive and interactive for the reader as it weaves its way toward the alchemical gold: the love of soul and the birth of pleasure.

Also, every chapter includes Reflection Questions and Active Imagination Questions and Answers. The "Reflection Questions" are for you, the reader, to contemplate and journal about. Journeying helps us connect to the quiet inner world and hear soul's tender voice. The Active Imagination Q & A allows for a broader range of responses to inspire the reader, and affords me the creative license to flesh out ideas in dialogue and illustrate the wisdom at work in the imaginal. True to psyche's preference for polyvalence, this approach allows for multiple perspectives and ideas to be explored and shared beyond the monovalence of my conscious perspective.

Finally, in many of the chapters, I have included additional exercises for the reader to engage with: a projection exercise; working with Psyche's four tasks; and a beauty exercise. These six exercises are designed to open up the material for the reader. I encourage these be done through journeying and

ideally with a therapist or trusted friend(s) to share your responses and have them witnessed. I usually facilitate these six exercises in a group workshop format but have adapted it here.

We will start with an introduction to the story of Psyche and Eros and then consider what this myth is about, and why we even look to myth. The story of Psyche and Eros was originally written in the 2nd century C.E. by Lucius Apuleius in a novel called The Golden Ass. It's the story of a hero's journey; however, in the middle of the story there's the beautiful little tale of Psyche and Eros, which has come to inspire the imagination of many Jungians and, indeed, is probably the birthplace of the model of romantic love in the West. Myths and fairy tales are important as guides for how archetypes interact with each other within the psyche. As such, we can read it as a symbolic dream. Because it's universal—it comes from the collective unconscious—it doesn't necessarily apply to any particular culture, it represents an archetypal pattern. We can interpret it both on the personal level and the collective level.

As we explore this story, consider the terrain it maps and the guidance it provides. There are varied perspectives available in contemplating myth, my suggestion is to allow all of them to wash over you and see what resonates. In Robert Johnson's view, shared in his 1989 book She: Understanding Feminine Psychology, he suggests the story is about understanding feminine psychology in both men and women. Conversely, Marie-Louise von Franz, (1970) in The Golden Ass of Apuleius: The Liberation of the Feminine in Man, suggests that, because it's within the context of a larger story that follows the hero's journey, it is about the liberation of the feminine principle in men. Erich Neumann also wrote about it and we'll approach his ideas more toward the end of the book—he's aligned with Robert Johnson in his approach to it as the development of the feminine.

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Such experiences and encounters are exquisite, maybe they are not meant to be caught and kept, but enjoyed just as they are, and when it comes time to release them, to let them gently glide back into the water. I have come to love the process of loving: the vulnerable bid for connection, the rejections, the excited potential, the intimacy, the heart swelling, the disappointments, the fading or disappearing—not seeking the heady rush of falling in and out of love pursuing the king in the external world, but appreciating the gift of being human and feeling all the emotions as they arise in my life. My life's journey has not been one of long-term romantic love, I believe that is why I investigate it. At the conclusion of this work, I find there is a joyful acceptance of what is. I value my freedom, son, home, work, writing, being engaged with Psyche, Eros, Aphrodite, and the archetypes, nature, and many friends. What I do have is a beautiful, full, loving life, which I love. It is unexpected, and not what I dreamt of for myself in terms of companionship, but there is peace in the acceptance. I've had stages of ambiguous grief about the absence of companionship. I expect I'll probably have more of those waves, and, at the same time, | am grateful for the abundance of love and soul in my life. Loving is so essential t^ living. What a blessing to share these moments of beauty and aliveness—even grief becomes beautiful when it is flooded with glistening rays of gratitude.

In conclusion, living a soulful life embraces and celebrates our humanness and intimate relationships and their messy entanglements—it is not seeking to transcend t^ spiritual heights or escape the confines of the body. it is a way to live in this world and celebrate each glorious moment with its monotony, pain, joy, and pleasure. It is essential to recognize that the unconscious is a codetermining factor along with consciousness and that, with conscious will alone, it is futile to attempt to force or control anything—

especially something as archetypal as love. The qualities of receptivity, patience, and acceptance all make the transition from one conscious attitude to another smoother. To live a meaningful, purposeful, rich life, follow what you love and what you are drawn to: soul always follows love and love always. <>

LIFE AND WORK OF ERICH NEUMANN: ON THE SIDE OF THE INNER VOICE by Angelica Löwe, translated by Mark Kyburz, Foreword by Micha Neumann [Routledge, 9780815382355]

LIFE AND WORK OF ERICH NEUMANN: ON THE SIDE OF THE INNER VOICE is the first book to discuss Erich Neumann's life, work and relationship with C.G. Jung. Neumann (1905–1960) is considered Jung's most important student, and in this deeply personal and unique volume, Angelica Löwe casts Neumann's comprehensive work in a completely new light.

Based on conversations with Neumann's children, Rali Loewenthal-Neumann and Professor Micha Neumann, Löwe explores Neumann's childhood and adolescent years in Part I, including how he met his wife and muse Julie Blumenfeld. In Part II the book traces their life and work in Tel Aviv, where they moved in the early 1930s amid growing anti-Jewish tensions in Hitler's Germany. Finally, in Part III, Löwe analyses Neumann's most famous works.

This is the first book-length discussion of the existential questions motivating Neumann's work, as well as the socio-historical circumstances pertaining to the problem of Jewish identity formation against rising anti-Semitism in the early 20th century. It will be essential reading for Jungian analysts and analytical psychologists in practice and in training, as well as scholars of Jungian and post-Jungian studies and Jewish studies.

Angelica Löwe has undertaken the difficult task of writing the first-ever book-length account of the work and life of Erich Neumann. This volume is now before us, thanks to Ms Löwe's courage, spirited inquiry, patience and attention to detail. She has gathered an unprecedented wealth of information about Neumann, through which she brings to life his personality and his hitherto unexplored and hence unknown life. This book also provides the interested reader with access to Neumann's work, which includes many of his unpublished writings about Judaism. After more than 50 years, which have passed since Neumann's premature death in 1960, we now finally have a work before us that offers so many insights of which I, as his son, was unaware.

My father was a very busy man. He was always at his desk, writing, and could not be disturbed. When he was not writing, he looked after his many patients. The breaks from work that he granted himself, and during which he found time to talk to me, were few and far between. The exception was Sabbath, when he enjoyed playing with me and told me stories, in particular from the Bible. He would sometimes paint beautiful colour pictures to accompany those stories.

In the battle for my father's attention, I had numerous rivals, including some of great importance—first and foremost my mother, Julie Neumann, of course. My sister and I knew that our father's relationship with our mother took priority. Others rivals included C.G. Jung and Olga Fröbe-Kapteyn, with whom my father corresponded for many years, and then of course his favourite places: Moscia on Lago Maggiore, where the Eranos conferences were held every year; and Sils Maria in the Upper Engadin, where my mother and he went to recuperate. Last but not least, there were his other children: his books.

My father was not at all like my friends' fathers. I felt and knew that he loved me and that I mattered a lot to him. Yet from an early age I also realised that his life was determined by great and important

tasks. Because I understood this, I never reproached him. Often, I identified with him and imagined that, at some stage, I might also matter to so many people.

Of particular value in Angelica Löwe's book are her excellent interpretations of my father's work. She helps us feel our way into and thus to experience Erich Neumann's inner world. The language and structure of her book provide subtle access to his complex and at times difficult ideas. Of all the interpretations that I have read, those presented in this volume are the most profound. I am most grateful to Ms Löwe for her work. This is a very well-written, highly absorbing and beautiful book. It makes exciting and gratifying reading. Not once did I feel like putting it down.

For me, as Erich Neumann's son, this book is therefore of particular importance. It gives me great pleasure to wish that *Life and Work of Erich Neumann* will attract the large and interested readership it fully deserves.

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Erich Neumann is widely considered C.G. Jung's most important student. His extensive work, translated into many languages, is still read today. Of particular importance are *The Origins and History of Consciousness*, *Depth Psychology and a New Ethic*, *The Great Mother* and *Amor and Psyche*. And yet the fact that Neumann's life, his relationship with C.G. Jung or the evolution of his work have received precious little attention (or indeed none) is striking as much as it is baffling. Thus, we have engaged with an important body of work, not only for the Jungian world, without the slightest knowledge of its creator. This has suggested that this lack of knowledge was a blind spot, reflective of historical obliviousness and symptomatic of failing to recall the exodus of the Jewish intellect brought about by National Socialism.

In essence, the development of this book is closely linked to the activities of the working group for "Analytical Psychology and History." One of the group's main concerns is to remember the Jewish colleagues who were persecuted by the Nazi regime. A conference held in Vienna in 2005, entitled "100 Years of Erich Neumann, 130 Years of C.G. Jung," provided further impetus for pursuing the project of a book about Neumann's life and work. The children of Erich and Julie Neumann—Micha Neumann and Rali Loewenthal-Neumann (who both reside in Israel)—were invited to the conference to deliver lectures, which provided an initial opportunity for discussion. Further interviews and research took place at a later stage in Israel, Moscia near Ascona, the site of the Eranos conferences, and London, where I met Julie Neumann's youngest (and now deceased) sister.

This project began with an admission: I realised that not only I knew almost nothing about Neumann's Jewish background, but that very little was known about his life in either Germany or Israel. The outcome of my research is a book whose main sources are my conversations with those people who knew Neumann, as well as his unpublished letters and manuscripts; it is an attempt to paint a lively picture of the life and work of a man who was characterised by his strong desire for independence, by his immense creativity and by tremendous intuition. He was a scholar and writer whose work, in his own assessment, "sits between all faculties." Neumann himself did not see his cultural, philosophical and critical writings in the context of the emergence of psychoanalytic theory, but as contributions to "cultural therapy" or metapsychology. They were the work of "a proud Jew," as Gershom Scholem described Neumann in his obituary.

To return to the strange misalignment between the active reception of Neumann's work and a lack of biographical knowledge: Neumann and C.G. Jung engaged in an intense and at times even dramatic correspondence. These letters, whose publication in 2015 will mark one of the most important events in the history of analytical psychology, bears witness to a complex intellectual dialogue, an essential part of which concerns the examination of Jewish identity. For this reason, Erich Neumann's life can only be adequately retraced if it is understood as a historical-critical examination of Jewish life and of the political situation prevailing in Germany before and after the Nazi's rise to power in 1933. This perspective also means taking into account the history of German Zionism, which exercised a lasting influence on Neumann. The present examination of Neumann's biography places personal statements and aspects of his work in the context of the massive rupture caused by a series of political catastrophes. No such inquiry can be guided by the idea of a "German-Jewish conversation," which, as Gershom Scholem observed, takes place "in an empty fictitious space." It attempts, instead, to reveal the fault lines of a dialogue that is in many respects inadequate, and even severed. Thus, this biographical account of Neumann's life and work also contributes to the historiography of psychoanalysis.

I have divided this book into three parts:

Part I traces the origins of Erich and Julie Neumann. It considers the historical and socio-political conditions of Jewish life in Germany, in particular in Berlin during the first quarter of the 20th century. It reviews the key intellectual currents that shaped Neumann's thinking, first and foremost Martin Buber's "Jewish Renaissance" and Kurt Blumenfeld's concept of post-assimilation (Chapter 1). Chapter 2 discusses Julie Blumenfeld's family background and social engagement at the beginning of her career as an analyst. Chapter 3 illumines Neumann's early writings, including his doctoral dissertation, his (unpublished) studies on Franz Kafka and excerpts from his (also unpublished) novel *Der Anfang* (The Beginning). On the one hand, it is important to delineate the lines running between Neumann's early and later work, and on the other to convey a palpable sense of the young Neumann's intellectual independence, which later led him to develop the concept of "mystical anthropology." My main purpose throughout is to trace the emergence of Neumann's key concepts from his early, unpublished works to his later writings. Those early works were, as becomes evident, a "quarry" for the later ones.

Part II explores the correspondence between Erich Neumann and C.G. Jung, in order to bring into view Neumann's chief concern: his struggle for Jewish identity. We will, however, be able to assess the definitive scope of the Jung–Neumann correspondence only after the publication of Neumann's complete letters. Chapters 4, 6 and 7 explore Neumann's intellectual debate with Jung. These chapters consider Jung's examination of Judaism, his statements in various publications, which are nothing other than anti-Semitic, and also his theorising of the unconscious and its effect on the young Jewish intellectual, who had decided to place Jungian theory over others. Jung's theory of the Jewish unconscious is particularly significant in this respect. Chapter 6 involves a brief excursion into the history of ideas. It provides a brief overview of Martin Buber's *Reden an das Judentum* (On Judaism), which concerns emigration to Palestine, in comparison with Jung's deliberations on the relationship between the collective unconscious and the "soil." Chapter 8, which considers Neumann's life in Tel Aviv, draws on manuscripts gratefully provided by Rali Loewenthal-Neumann and Dvora Kutzinski, and on Neumann's unpublished letters to Olga Fröbe-Kapteyn, the founder of the Eranos conferences. Chapter 9, which conjures up the spirit and flair of the annual Eranos conferences on Lake Maggiore in southern Switzerland, is also based on a close reading of Neumann's unpublished letters to

Olga Fröbe-Kapteyn, the "Magna Mater" of Eranos. Neumann was one of the most important speakers at the gathering, from 1948 until his untimely death in 1960.

Part III discusses Neumann's key works in the context of his long unpublished manuscripts on the *Psychologie des jüdischen Menschen* (Psychology of the Jewish Person), which he began writing in the 1930s. Published in 2019 as *The Roots of Jewish Consciousness*, only this early work enables one to open up the impressive and highly significant world of thought that would emerge in Neumann's later work. Here, in these early manuscripts, Neumann devotes himself to the fundamental philosophical question of how consciousness forms time and space. The crucial concept of time in Jewish thought is *messianism*, from which Neumann developed his concept of *actualised messianism* (Chapter 10).

Neumann places the theme of space within the highly charged, dichotomous debate over "land, home, earth, soil," which Martin Buber and C.G. Jung both addressed from their different ideological perspectives (Chapter 6). Here, Neumann develops, not least as part of his critique of Jewish theology, which he believes fails to respect the feminine, and influenced by Rilke's *Duino Elegies*, a line of thought that addresses *the transparency of the earthly* (Chapter 11). The chapter on his *Depth Psychology and a New Ethics* examines Neumann's "new ethic" in terms of its Nietzschean influence and places this work in the context of *Jewish Nietzscheanism* (Chapter 12). Chapter 12 discusses a vision that Neumann wrote to Jung about in one of his letters. Its interpretation is based on the philosophy and basic ideas of the French philosopher Emmanuel Lévinas (Chapter 13). The last two chapters are dedicated to the "heroic path" of the modern human being. This theme assumes many mythological guises, in which Neumann found the development of human consciousness (i.e. ego complex) delineated in metaphorical terms. Characteristic of Neumann's work in this respect is his distinction between the development of male and female consciousness. Thus, Chapter 14, in discussing the central theses of his *Origins and History of Consciousness*, focuses on Neumann's critique of the Freudian concept of the Oedipus complex. The final chapter, an account of Apuleius's tale of *Amor and Psyche*, traces woman's "heroic path." <>

JUNGIAN PSYCHOLOGY IN THE EAST AND WEST: CROSS-CULTURAL PERSPECTIVES FROM JAPAN edited by Konoyu Nakamura and Stefano Carta [Routledge, 9780367766894]

It is well known that Jung's investigation of Eastern religions and cultures supplied him with an abundance of cross-cultural comparative material, useful to support his hypotheses of the existence of archetypes, the collective unconscious and other manifestations of psychic reality. However, the specific literature dealing with this aspect has previously been quite scarce. This unique edited collection brings together contributors writing on a range of topics that represent an introduction to the differences between Eastern and Western approaches to Jungian psychology.

Readers will discover that one interesting feature of this book is the realization of how much Western Jungians are implicitly or explicitly inspired by Eastern traditions – including Japanese – and, at the same time, how Jungian psychology – the product of a Western author – has been widely accepted and developed by Japanese scholars and clinicians.

Scholars and students of Jungian studies will find many new ideas, theories and practices gravitating around Jungian psychology, generated by the encounter between East and West. Another feature that

will be appealing to many readers is that this book may represent an introduction to Japanese philosophy and clinical techniques related to Jungian psychology.

CONTENTS

This is a collection of papers presented by prominent analysts, analytical psychologists, and scholars from all over the world at the 2019 International Association for Jungian Studies (IAJS) Regional Conference, titled "Jungian Psychology: East and West, encountering differences", in Osaka, Japan, the first such meeting held by the International Association for Jungian Studies (IAJS) in Asia. This event was held at Otemon Gakuin University and was supported by the Japan Association of Jungian Psychology (JAJP). I had the honor of hosting the conference as chair.

Kiley Laughlin and I came up with the theme. As is well known, in the early 1920s C. G. Jung's interests drifted toward Eastern religion and culture (Jung 1936, 1939, 1944, 1948, 1953, 1954). This turning point in Jung's career serendipitously coincided with his study of Richard Wilhelm's Secret of the Golden Flower and Heinrich Zimmer's Artistic Form and Yoga in the Sacred Images of India. Jung's investigation of Eastern religion and culture supplied him with an abundance of cross-cultural material to compare with his hypotheses of archetypes, the collective unconscious, and other manifestations of psychic reality. There was something else in the East, however, that seemed to form the nucleus of his personal myth. In fact, this myth seems to have culminated with a figurative journey to the East, where the sun is continuously reborn, a motif that Jung referred to as a night sea journey, symbolizing an effort to adapt to the conditions of psychic life. The wisdom found in the East seems to have provided Jung with a sense of psychic orientation, and a partial road map, to navigate his own journey of individuation. Based on this, Jung further adapted his theories and practices and applied them to his psychology. His encounter with Eastern culture thus marked an attempt to synthesize a greater whole by showing what we can learn from differences.

Our conference, therefore, focused on what is created when differences are encountered, a difficult task indeed. In Japan alone there are various traditions, religions, social systems, and cultures, developed over a long history that has involved adapting science, religious, and cultural influences from abroad (Reischauer 1970). Jung noted:

> To us [in the West], consciousness is inconceivable without an ego…. If there is no ego there is nobody to be conscious of anything. The ego is therefore indispensable to conscious processes. The eastern mind, however, has no difficulty in conceiving of a consciousness without an ego. Consciousness is deemed capable of transcending its ego condition; indeed, in its "higher" forms, the ego disappears altogether. (1954, para 774)

On the other hand, Kawai (1976) opined that Japan is a "maternal society" differing from the Western paternal one in that the Japanese ego is nearer unconsciousness. This theme aptly suited the first IAJS conference held in Japan.

A lot of excellent papers were presented, including four keynote presentations, by Iwao Akita, Stefano Carta, Andrew Samuels, and Megumi Yama, plus 25 speeches by Jungian analysts, psychotherapists, and scholars from places as diverse as America, United Kingdom, China, Italy, Japan, Latvia, and Taiwan. It was attended by more than a hundred participants from around the globe. It lasted only two days but led to sparkling discussions and sparked enduring friendships. It thus literally embodied meaningful bonds between East and West in the name of Jungian psychology.

This book includes some of the notable papers presented, divided into four sections:

> Part I: East and West, Part II: Images, Part III: Clinical Issues, and Part IV: Identity and Individuation. The separate chapters are introduced in detail by Professor Stefano Carta.

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Here, the point is not only whether this interpretation about the "typical" introversion of the East or extroversion of the West actually adheres to reality (which would imply that there should be a definitely reduced minority of extroverted individuals in the East and of introverted ones in the West, therefore making of these anthropological worlds wholly disadaptive cultures and anti-symbolic milieus for those who do not fit the typological majority) but also how much, on a hermeneutic level, this reference to such "typical" characteristics – this way of looking at reality through similarities – instead of revealing actually conceals the complexities of our object of enquiry.

I think that a well-tempered attitude must keep the tension between the two opposite polarities of sameness and difference, for which something like "the East" or "the West" at the same time exists and does not exist. In fact, when we approach our subject from a unifying attitude, we decide to look at the forest from far away in order not only to search but actually see what all its parts have in common. Yet, at the same time we must also accept to deconstruct this unity into its multiple differences and into the process of their historical unfolding. Therefore, my recommendation is to read this book with this double perspective in mind, for which what may be recognized as the "same" – in our case belonging to an "East," or to a "West" – may be recognized only through different individual vantage points, whose symbolic and historical specificity must be cherished and protected. After all, this may be one of the ways to describe what Jung called the individuation process itself.

For instance, in the first chapter of this book Megumi Yama writes:

> In this era of rapid globalization, it is sometimes heard that it may be doubtful that the concepts of "the West" and "the East" are as applicable as they were in the past. However, I would like to posit that however borderless our globe seems to be at a superficial level, if we go down deep to the roots, we can see a fundamental difference in the structure of each culture's psyche. This is perhaps because they were established on a basis of their own unique psychological histories and backgrounds that should not be ignored.

This issue regarding sameness, difference and identity is specifically discussed by Kazunori Kono in Chapter 5.

Discussing the Freudian concept of "narcissism of minor differences" in clinical and social situations, Kono revisits the concept of narcissism from the perspective of Freudian-Lacanian psychoanalysis and Jungian analytical psychology. For him,

> The concept of narcissism has been misunderstood and abused. Contrary to common belief, narcissism as well as sublimation is at the intersection of the individual and society. Encountering differences through others causes us to react in a variety of ways. Worrying about differences, we may fall into the pursuit of objects beyond our reach. Or, the pursuit of differences itself would lead to the denial and annihilation of others. In this regard, we can point out that the pursuit of difference is tied to fear of uniformity. Therefore, it is also important to be aware of that fear and accept the fact that you are, to some extent, the same as others. And yet, we continue to reconstruct our identity with minor differences.

In my opinion, this dialectical movement between sameness and otherness through big or little differences is a key issue that we must always take into consideration when we deal with comparative issues such as the ones this collection of writings is dealing with. In fact, this is the fundamental starting point for this whole book – the recognition of fundamental differences between the Eastern and the

Western psyche and similarities within them while keeping in mind that also what seems similar will eventually reveal specific "individual" differences that are as precious as the similarities. Seen this way, this is not a just good starting point, but it actually is a necessary one.

If we go back to the Jungian paradigm of the dialectic relationship between opposites, we may describe it in psychodynamic terms as the relationship between consciousness and the unconscious. The more the Eastern psyche seems "introverted" to the Westerner (or the other way around, extroverted for the Easterner), the more probable it is that the latter is actually coming into contact with his own introversion through his extroverted conscious attitude. In this regard, I find quite telling that the text that perhaps was the most revelatory for Jung, a protestant Swiss, was the Secret of the Golden Flower, a Chinese treatise that Richard Wilhelm brought to his attention in 1928.

In Memories, Dreams, Reflections (1989) Jung wrote:

> I devoured the manuscript at once, for the text gave me undreamed-of confirmation of my ideas about the mandala and the circumambulation of the center. That was the first event which broke through my isolation. I became aware of an affinity; I could establish ties with something and someone.

I think that through the Eastern psyche Jung could come into contact with his personal and his anthropological unconscious. Similarly, the most influential Japanese Jungian analyst and author, Hayao Kawai, could initiate his own dialogue with himself and his unconscious through a dream:

> In the dream, I picked up many Hungarian coins. These coins had the design of an old Taoist sage on them. Given my association to Hungary, the dream seemed to suggest that, to me, Hungary was a bridge to East and West. My analyst said that, to judge from this dream, I eventually might gain insights of great value for the relationship between East and West. When I reflect on the course of my life, I recognize that what my analyst surmised indeed has been realized.

I find this dream, and what it meant for Kawai, very moving and meaningful, as it represents a special form, very noticeable indeed, of Jung's "transcendent function" at work, for which the opposites – in this case Kawai's own Easterness and Westerness – were recognized and transcended.

From many of Kawai's invaluable contributions, another very important feature of the unfolding of this process is that, through his own West, Kawai found his own East in a deeper and highly personal (individual) form. Perhaps, the most interesting example is his reference to Buddhism as something that he did not wholly understand, something that he could not really be. Yet, through his pages one may appreciate how much of such Buddhism he had discovered and recognized in himself. This is to say that the dialogue between West and East may well bring a Westerner to be more conscious of his own Western nature through his own unconscious East and vice versa.

In the case of Jung, this relationship with the unconscious, seen as the relationship with one's other side of the world, has been described in Chapter 1 of this book by Megumi Yama as a descent into the world of the dead, that Jung commenced in his Gnostic diary Septem Sermones ad Mortuos (in Jung, 1989). Therefore, if from an Ego point of view we are dealing with an East–West relationship, for the point of view of the Self we are actually transiting between the world of the living and the world of the dead.

From my Westerner perspective, reading the chapters that I am trying to introduce I often felt to be in contact with a deep dialogue between differences which have been contaminating each other. In fact,

while through these pages the authors were describing the specificities and peculiarities of the East and the West, I kept recognizing also many striking underpinning similarities. This may well be caused by the very nature of my training, profession, and, perhaps, individual inclination, but it may also be due to the very fabric of analytical psychology itself which, together with other psychodynamic currents of thought, such as those by Fromm, Bion, or Winnicott, are able to come closer to a core common to all humans, belonging to the West as to the East.

One example is the reference to the fact that in the Japanese psyche the boundary between consciousness and unconsciousness is much vaguer than in that of Westerners, and that it may actually lack a center at all. Megumi Yama describes this condition through some wonderful examples and images of gardens and art (Chapter 1), yet, while reading her contribution, I could recognize the "Western" trace of Hilman's position, for whom there is no need to posit any center of the psyche. In this situation we experience a fundamental shift of psychological perspectives – from an ego-centric monotheist one to a polycentric polytheist one. Once again, here Hilman and his archetypal approach develop Jung's idea of the plurality of souls/images that compose the psyche/world and idea that we will find again described in other terms in Chapters 6, 8, and 16.

Another essential difference, often discussed in these contributions between the East and the West, is the status and the position of the Ego. It seems that in the West and the East the Ego, as described and discussed in the pages that follow, is quite different. Yet, such differences may also produce projections and, therefore, faulty forms of dichotomic understanding: if in the East the Ego is different, the Westerner may think that there is no Ego in the East. Nevertheless, from the discussions that will follow, we will learn that this state of affairs is not at all true, as differences do not mean any yes/no, either/or approach.

In Chapter 2 Lynlee Lyckberg discusses this issue. She quotes Mokusen Miyuki, who

> suggested in Buddhism and Psychology, this is an erroneous assumption and common error in Western thinking. From an Eastern perspective, Buddhism does not require a dissolution of the ego; rather, "the ego is strengthened in meditation, and what gets dissolved is ego-centricity.

Now, when, in her discussion of the symbol of the mirror she writes:

> The underlying sensibility in Japan is simply that of impermanence, where the brief moment of existence framed by a unique and personal identity is conceptually nothing more than a mirage (mirror illusion) without substance, arising from the place of no-thing (emptiness) and returning to no-thing, symbolically represented by both the sacred mirror as a most auspicious symbol in Buddhism and by the Zen Enso circle.

I find a very similar trace of such a description of the Enso circle in Bion's concept of O, and when Lyckberg writes about the two conditions of nothingness and no-thingness, I, once again, recognize Bion's reference to "nothing" and "nothing" as discussed in his Attention and Interpretation (1970). Also, Winnicott's concept of the true self as a potential, implicit, innate space from which reality (and the Ego) flows into the material, relational and historical world flow, seems to me something like a Western version of an Eastern image. Furthermore, in her comparison between Daoist qualitative numbers to the Western quantitative numbers, Lyckberg herself rightly mentions Jung's and M.L. von Franz's adherence to Eastern thought. To this I may add that throughout Western history, its deep

counter current (fundamentally Gnostic and Alchemical) always maintained a qualitative understanding of numbers. The shift from the qualitative numbers to the purely quantitative ones was a product of a historical process, which culminated with the querelle between Kepler and Fludd in the seventeenth century. If, as we know, Kepler's position won and mathematics was since then thought more mathematice ("mathematically"), today it is hard not to see the qualitative aspect of numbers in quantum physics – for instance, the numbers associated with the spin of an elementary particle.

Once again, it seems that the East and the West are contaminating each other in a wonderfully fruitful way.

"Emptiness in Western and Eastern cultures" is the title of Tsuyoshi Inomata's Chapter 15, in which the author draws a history of nothingness, which, in the West wholly devoid of its symbolic pregnancy eventually turned into nihilism.

Quoting W. Giegerich, the author writes:

> Paradoxically, it is the Western way of the soul that – with its process of consecutive negations finally leading to what has been crudely and summarily condensed in the term "nihilism" – in fact produced an "emptiness consciousness," an "emptiness consciousness" as a real (i.e., inescapable) condition of the subject in real social reality and an objectively prevailing cultural mindset.

The connection of the emptiness of the modern Western psyche with the sacred, creative void of the Eastern one may transform Western nihilism into "a precondition for the creation of a rich animated world in which diversity is tolerated, if attitudes towards it change from pessimistic and rejective to empathic and receptive."

In order for this to occur, a change should also take place within the Eastern – in this case the Japanese – psyche, as its empty center (Kawai, 1996) lacks a subject "with its own will and freedom." This is something that, again quoting Giegerich, Inomata describes as "the Arctic vortex, a force of nature that swallows everything," which may be a concurrent cause of the spreading of autism (and perhaps, I might add, the hikikomori condition, now present also in the West?) within the Japanese psyche.

The image of the Enso is also discussed by Kojiro Miwa in Chapter 11.

Referring to the theories of Jung and of the Zen philosopher Shinichi Hisamatsu, Miwa discusses the encounter between the Western Jung and the Eastern Hismatsu. His contribution deals with the fundamental component of silence and nonverbal communication within psychotherapy, such as the use of the Tree Test, or, in more general terms, the use of nonverbal approaches, such as art therapy or sandplay. Equating the Self with the "Buddha nature," Miwa discusses the transformative, productive density of silence and of apparent void of nonverbal communication.

The clinical meaning of the tree and the use of the Tree Test is also discussed in Chapter 12 by Himeka Matsushita. In both these chapters, the theme of compassion emerges. A theme thoroughly discussed, in comparative terms, also by Shoichi Kato in Chapter 10.

Through two moving clinical cases, Kato highlights the fundamental importance of compassion. Once again referring to the transformative power of silence, Kato writes:

> in the depth of self-consuming emotions, a silent moment would arrive in which we could see the person so far recognized as the source of our misfortune in a new light, as a genuinely Other person. It is in this I – Thou relationship that Compassion would rise from our deep psyche to surround the two remotely separated individuals with silence.

In Buddhist scriptures, compassion (in Mahayana Buddhism: /karuṇā/) is often coupled with sadness and friendship. Reading Kato's chapter my mind went to Heinz Kohut's contributions on empathy and to the fundamental nature of the analytical relationship in analytical psychology, which is indeed based on a sort of friendship between two human beings – analyst and patient – who try to integrate the emotional meaning of life and its challenging, sad, mournful aspects (Carta, 2013).

Such a deep attitude of mutual understanding, the key to the Jungian psychological method, for which the analyst should "go where is the patient" and for which any real encounter implies a mutual transformation, is echoed in Ryutaro Nishi's Chapter 17, in which he discusses "Makoto Tsumori's philosophy of care and education in relation to Jungian psychology." For Nishi, both Jung and Tsumori "emphasised the need to understand children's inner world, without reducing it to the limited confines of past experiences." In fact, both demonstrated how children's expressions are always meaningful and should never be rejected or refused through a castrating form of education.

These considerations show some important common features of Tsumori's early childhood care and education (ECCE) method – based on play and imagination and a sustained relationship between children and practitioners – and play therapy, although the latter is conducted within the confines of a playroom.

In Chapter 14 Evija Volfa Vestergaard explores "leadership styles in Japan (East Asia) and Latvia (which is on the boundary between East and West) as an important element in creating a sustainable future for humanity."

Analyzing the apparent overlapping of the mythological images of the dragon in Latvian and Chinese cultures, she suggests that

> in general, both the Japanese and Latvian psyches are characterized by a greater permeability between their conscious and unconscious layers, expressed in a heightened sense of embeddedness with their surroundings, and the multiplicity of perspectives held by their leaders. Using the language of myths, these leaders find ways to dance with the dragons rather than slaying them. They form a relationship with the surrounding natural environment and human-made worlds, rather than striving to separate and cut away one from the other. While, from a Western perspective, this permeability may be viewed as lacking a healthy ego, [she argues] that a sense of interconnectedness is beneficial in a world of expanding global interdependencies.

For Vestergaard, the mythological beneficial kinship with dragons is connected with a life well-balanced with nature in agrarian Latvia and with the Yin/Yang opposites in the East. It describes an Ego development that resembles that of both the Latvian and the Eastern Egos.

Quoting Akita Iwao (2017), Vestergaard describes the Ego's relationship with the unconscious as a "dancing with the shadows," instead of "integrating the shadow in the Ego." Quite a compelling image, indeed.

In Chapter 13, Hirofumi Kuroda also focuses her contribution on the peculiar nature of the relationship between subject and object and its representations in the East versus the West.

She writes:

> In the Western individualistic perspective, the focus is on subject and object, and the one-to-one interaction between subject and object. There is a center point where the image of self/I resides, which is the ego. However, in the Eastern collectivistic perspective, the focus is on the context, the circumference, and the many-to-many interactions in foreground and background.

In Chinese, the central field, in which the relationship between subject and object takes place, is expressed by the expression "心 ," (heart, soul, and mind), which, in ancient times, was represented by the image "方寸/fāngcùn," which literally means square inches.

Through a clinical case with a psychotic patient Kuroda describes the progressive reintegration of the psychotic patient's Ego, which took place along the development of recurrent images of the house imago:

> [From this case] we learn that the constellation of the house imago is an attempt for reintegration, which brings the individual back to "方寸 / fāngcùn," the heart and the Self. The creation of circumference provides a sense of being grounded without locating the center point. This is consistent with Jung's statement that "the Eastern mind, however, has no difficulty in conceiving of a consciousness without an ego." Because of this core difference, I would propose that the process and product of symbol formation (in Jungian's term, the "constellation") should be different between Western psyche and Eastern psyche.

In Chapter 3, David Fisher discusses the "Implications for Japan's maternal culture" of the meeting – indeed a clashing – of West and East. His starting point is Hayao Kawai's description of the Japanese psyche as essentially based on a strong maternal principle and of the discussions that have arisen out of such an interpretation.

He writes:

> If we take Kawai's assertion at face value, how does that square with Japan's very masculine Bushido and martial Imperial past? It seems that we have a very different thing, a radical restructuring of psychic energy that occurred rapidly, violently, and emerged from the extreme tension between two things of opposite polarity: in short, an enantiodromia.

A valuable aspect of Fisher's contribution is its historical perspective, which places the Japanese psyche within the flow of events that ultimately led Japan to the catastrophic defeat of World War II. Japan's "unconditional surrender," unbearably humiliating, caused an archetypal trauma which led to the enantiodromia of the Father principle into the Mother.

The issue of the relationship between the Father and the Mother principles is also discussed by Elly Lin in Chapter 4. In her contribution, the author gives two clinical examples of the very deep divide between a male American patient (from the United States of America) and a female patient living in the United States but of Asian origin.

She writes:

> In my experience, cultural differences, if ignored or interpreted in a narrow, personalistic frame, fall flat and meaningless at best; at worst, they are cause for misunderstandings and mishaps. The archetypal considerations, however, can expand the interpersonal dyad into a much larger and

> deeper context where differences become portals into a previously unknown psychic realm of richness and aliveness.

This becomes particularly true since

> While, according to Neumann, the image of the Mother remains relatively constant across cultures, the image of the Father tends to vary from culture to culture. (Neumann, 1970)

In the case of the Asian patient, the Father archetype and complex were structured along Confucian principles based on filial piety, family and social hierarchy, and shame. Using Edinger's model of the Ego–Self axis, Elly Lin shows us how such an overly dominant, in this case negative "Confucian Father complex," was hindering the patient's development and individuation process. This was the opposite for the American man, for whom the weakness, if not absence, of the Father image was equally blocking his individuation for the opposite reason.

In the case of this interesting contribution, as a Westerner my mind goes to such a pervasive issue of the historical evaporation of the Father that has taken place in the last 50 years. Yet, I also see that within the West there still exist quite many differences between, for instance, the Protestant and the Catholic ethics. This plural aspect of a shared phenomenon such as the crisis of the Father image (a crisis which today is slowly finding new avenues and potential symbolic solutions) shows us how important it is to place our psychology within a historical and (trans)cultural perspective.

Such a perspective is wholly assumed by Andrew Samuels, who, in Chapter 9, discusses another extremely complex and quickly evolving issue of the intimate relationship between genders, i.e., between differences.

He writes:

> The very idea of gender also has a hidden bridge-building function: it sits on a threshold half-way between the inner and outer worlds, and thus is already half-way out into the world of politics.

On the one hand, gender is a private, secret, sacred, mysterious story that we tell ourselves and are told by others about who we are. But it is also a set of experiences deeply implicated in and irradiated by the political and socioeconomic realities of the outer world. The notion of gender, therefore, not only marries the inner and outer worlds, but actually calls into dispute the validity of the division.

This perspective, which unites such apparently far realms of human life – gender intimacy and politics – has a truly invaluable epistemic significance, as it makes it possible to produce new metaphors to express the human complexity and therefore deal with fundamental questions such as those which Andrew Samuels discusses in his contribution: "Can men change? Are men powerful? Do men hate women?"

A number of the chapters of this book deal with images, as the affect-laden image is considered in analytical psychology the building block of the psyche.

The historical perspective on images is discussed by my colleague and coeditor Konoyu Nakamura, who, in Chapter 7, draws a short history of what today are known all over the world as manga. Mangas are symbolic manifestation of images that have often taken the form of monsters. Nakamura compares such images with Jung's contact with the "Others," the inhabitants of his (our) unconscious – the complexes and archetypal images that form our psychological universe. The Shinto Japanese description is that of a universe full of spirits – kami – everywhere.

A very striking fact regarding these Japanese manga monsters is their enormous impact in the contemporary world, both in the East and in the West. Somehow, the Japanese and the Eastern psyche seems to be communicating something not just understandable but actually urgently needed by the Western psyche.

It seems as if, after the war lost by Japan, the psyche of the winners – that of the West and most of all the American psyche – has eventually been conquered by the Japanese manga, some of which actually represent the long and difficult elaboration of the post-traumatic effect of the defeat (for a thorough discussion, see also Allison, 2006).

The mythical-historical roots of such a universe full of soul is also described in Chapter 16 by Mayumi Furukawa, as she discusses the importance of the Ainu culture, which thrived for 10,000 years, for the Japanese psyche.

Furukama writes:

> the Ainu had a worldview that the very essence of all human beings, all animate beings, including animals, and all inanimate beings had an eternal and immortal soul that was part of their very essence. The word "Ainu," means human beings and "Kamuy," deities. The Ainu believed that human beings had their unique afterlife and so as Kamuy, as divine, had the ability to circulate back and forth between their respective present life and afterlife. Kamuy for the Ainu, however, is not equal to God or Gods, the higher deity of many faiths. Kamuy is not an overarching "master" of human beings but rather on an equal footing with human beings. Nakagawa (1997), a linguist, stated that Kamuy should be close to "nature." In other words, sparrows do not have their own divine nature. Every sparrow is Kamuy and every tree is also Kamuy.

Furukama connects this "animistic" worldview with the dream phenomenon that Hayao Kawai (1995) called "interpenetration," in which Kawai noted that the distinction between oneself and others was ambiguous in medieval Japanese tales. In fact, as Furukama writes:

> these tales portrayed a state of mind where realities and dreams, and life and death, could freely communicate with each other. [Kawai] continued, "The remarkable synchronicity of events in dreams, this world, and the land of death was not considered unusual."

As I have already noted, this deep layer of an Eastern culture such as Japan not only is expressed through literature (for instance Murakami) or cinema (Miyazaki) but, along with the Mangas discussed in Chapter 6 by Konoyu Nakamura, seems to act as a powerful compensative symbolic force for the Western psyche, as the immense success of these Japanese forms of art have literally conquered the contemporary Western psyche.

The Shinto view of the world as a wholly animate reality is somehow similar to the Italian Saint Francis, whose story of conversion is discussed in Chapter 8 by Jun Kitayama. It is impossible to underestimate the stature of Francis of Assisi, who anticipated the second millennium after Christ to come (which marked the end of the Age of Aries and the beginning of the Age of Pisces). The dawn of the second millennium AD marked the inversion of the vertical orientation of the Spirit – for which God was far and alien to the material world and nature – therefore spiritualizing what is horizontal – this natural, physical world. As I wrote, it is of course impossible to summarize the complexity of the figure of Saint Francis, yet, within this book it is interesting to notice how much some of fundamental views of the Japanese Shinto religion, for which everything is alive and full of soul, was one of the key factors that, through St. Francis' re-sacralization of nature, radically transformed the Western psyche of the Middle

Ages into the modern one. Today, it seems that this aeonic movement has exhausted its path and, while the Age of Pisces enters in the Age of Aquarius, the spirit that had to animate matter in the West seems to have wholly drowned into materialism.

In Chapter 7, Adelina Wei Kwan Wong formulates the hypothesis that Chinese hieroglyphs are a stylized form of archetypal pattern, similar to the archetypal themes of the myths and fairy tales. Following this interesting hypothesis, she carried out two clinical researches using clinical expressive materials, sand pictures and drawings, created by patients who are well versed in Chinese written characters. The therapeutic modes for the patients with early-life traumas often involve non-verbal expression and imagination like body movement, imagery painting, or Sand-play with 3D images on the sand (Manuhin 1992, Bradway 1997, Klaff 2003, Malchiodi 2014). All these are means for the patients to access the instinctual emotions of their "wounded inner child," to create images embodying the emotions, and to be acknowledged by the consciousness.

In conclusion, I hope that these collections of writings, so rich in contents and comparisons, may interest and stimulate the readers as an incentive for further discussions on such fundamental issues that involve the potential totality of the psyche, embedded, as it is, within the symbolic, cultural world and its historical development. <>

JUNG, DELEUZE, AND THE PROBLEMATIC WHOLE edited by Roderick Main Christian McMillan David Henderson [Philosophy and Psychoanalysis, Routledge, 9780367428747]

This book of expert essays explores the concept of the whole as it operates within the psychology of Jung, the philosophy of Deleuze, and selected areas of wider twentieth-century Western culture, which provided the context within which these two seminal thinkers worked.

Addressing this topic from a variety of perspectives and disciplines and with an eye to contemporary social, political, and environmental crises, the contributors aim to clarify some of the epistemological and ethical issues surrounding attempts, such as those of Jung and Deleuze, to think in terms of the whole, whether the whole in question is a particular bounded system (such as an organism, person, society, or ecosystem) or, most broadly, reality as a whole.

JUNG, DELEUZE, AND THE PROBLEMATIC WHOLE will contribute to enhancing critical self-reflection among the many contemporary theorists and practitioners in whose work thinking in terms of the whole plays a significant role.

Review

'This extraordinary, edited volume is based on key papers from the first conference of its kind exploring the problematic arising from the writings of C. G. Jung, and Gilles Deleuze on holism. The wealth of expertise offered here provides a much-needed in-depth exploration of rhizomatic holism found in Jung and Deleuze, but is also further expanded to assist readers in realizing the tremendous implications for 21st-century psychology and philosophy. The editors are to be celebrated for crafting this remarkable collection; it will not disappoint!' **Joseph Cambray**, PhD, President/CEO, Pacifica Graduate Institute

'The configuration of systems and the relationships of interconnecting parts to a whole is a fascinating conceptual puzzle, and one vital to our understanding of the functioning of society and our relationship with ourselves, others, and the world at large. *Jung, Deleuze, and the Problematic Whole* asks important epistemological and ethical questions of wholeness through the lens of heavyweight thinkers, Gilles Deleuze and C. G. Jung. Written by experts in continental philosophy and Jungian studies, this book is insightful in its scrutiny of a variety of interrelated issues, including reductionism, totalitarianism, privilege and exclusion, identity, creativity, and personal and social transformation. A wholly compelling book.' **Lucy Huskinson**, Professor of Philosophy, Bangor University, UK; author of *Architecture and the Mimetic Self* (Routledge, 2018)

'*Jung, Deleuze, and the Problematic Whole* is essential reading for those interested in the flourishing area of Jung/Deleuze studies. From a Jungian perspective, Deleuze's ideas allow an interpretation of Jung's writing on the *unus mundus* that both critiques and revitalizes his work. For those who study Deleuze, this is added evidence of the potential for a psychology consonant with the ideas of schizoanalysis. Overall, this book marks an important contribution to the ongoing exploration of Jung's influence on the philosopher of the rhizome.' **Barbara Jenkins**, Professor, Department of Communication Studies, Wilfred Laurier University; author of *Eros and Economy: Jung, Deleuze, Sexual Difference* (Routledge, 2016)

CONTENTS

This book explores the concept of the whole as it operates within the psychology of Carl Gustav Jung (1875–1961), the philosophy of Gilles Deleuze (1925–1995), and selected areas of wider twentieth-century Western culture, which provided the context within which Jung and Deleuze worked. Addressing this topic from a variety of perspectives and disciplines, the book aims to clarify some of the epistemological and ethical issues surrounding attempts, such as those of Jung and Deleuze, to think in terms of the whole, whether the whole in question is a particular bounded system (such as an organism, person, society, or ecosystem) or, most broadly, reality as a whole.

While reflection on the concept of the whole and its relations to the elements that constitute the whole has been a staple of Western philosophical and cultural traditions since the ancient Greeks (Dusek 1999: 19–22; Esfeld 2003: 10), such reflection has had, from the beginning of the twentieth century, several moments of particular salience. The significance of wholeness was much discussed, for example, in the life and mind sciences as well as in the physical sciences of the first half of the twentieth century, especially within the German-speaking world (Harrington 1996) but also more broadly (Lawrence and Weisz 1998). Ideas about wholeness were later a prominent influence on the countercultural movements of the 1960s and 1970s (Wood 2010), and continue to be so in the alternative spiritualities, therapies, and work practices that have proliferated since the 1980s (Hanegraaff 1998; Heelas and Woodhead 2005). Concern with how to think in terms of wholes also underpins much of the current preoccupation with complexity theory (Cambray 2009), transdisciplinarity (Nicolescu 2002, 2008; Rowland 2017), and, certainly not least, ecology (Marietta 1994; Fellows 2019).

In most of these contexts, concern with the concept of the whole has been both epistemological and ethical. On the one hand, scientists and researchers have been taxed with how to acquire adequate knowledge and understanding of phenomena, such as those relating to life, consciousness, or culture, whose complexity does not readily lend itself to the kind of reductive analyses that have proven so successful in physics and chemistry (Phillips 1976). On the other hand, cultural commentators have argued that many of the environmental, political, economic, social, and psychological problems besetting the modern world have their deep roots in forms of thinking that embed divisive and fragmenting dualisms – for example, between humans and nature, spirit and matter, Creator and creation – and have advanced concepts of wholeness as means to foster a greater sense of interconnectedness, reconciliation, and unity (Berman 1981; Hanegraaff 1998: 119).

Perspectives giving central importance to the concept of the whole have also acquired, especially in the English-speaking world, an influential new moniker: holism (Smuts 1926). Coined by Jan Smuts in 1926, the term ‘holism’ and its adjectival form ‘holistic’ are now used, with varying emotional loading and varying degrees of clarity and emphasis, in practically every area of contemporary life, including academic as well as popular contexts (Main, McMillan, and Henderson 2020: 1–6). Reflecting this widespread usage, the terms ‘holism’ and ‘holistic’ are also used at many points in the present work, even though Jung seems never to have employed the German translation of holism (Holismus) nor Deleuze its French translation (holisme) – they wrote instead in terms of the German and French words for ‘the whole’: die Ganzheit (and its cognates) and le Tout, respectively.

Whether dubbed holism or not, thinking in terms of the whole has a presence in recent and contemporary academic and popular thought that could benefit from being more fully examined. Despite the salience their ideas have achieved in some quarters, advocates of holistic thinking have been charged with unrealisable epistemological ambitions, with misrepresenting reductionism, and with logical

absurdity (Phillips 1976), as well as with claiming desirable outcomes, such as environmental outcomes, that are attributable to other factors (James 2007). Again, contrary to the claims that holistic thinking has beneficial ethical and political implications because of its reconciliation of deleterious dualisms, other commentators have charged holism with fostering 'totalitarian intuitions' (Popper 1957: 73). Again, the irony has not gone unnoticed that Smuts himself, for all that he promoted unity and wholeness on the highest international stage through his involvement in establishing both the League of Nations after the First World War and the United Nations after the Second World War, nevertheless was a proponent of segregation between whites and blacks in his home country of South Africa (Shelley 2008: 103). Although attempts have been made to address these epistemological and ethical criticisms (Bailis 1984–85; Harrington 1996), there continues to be deep intellectual suspicion of holistic perspectives.

With these and related issues in mind, the present book is a contribution towards clarifying the status of holistic thought through comparing relevant aspects of the work of Jung and Deleuze.1 In focusing on Jung and Deleuze we have selected two influential twentieth-century thinkers whose work has in crucial respects been governed by the concept of the whole. For Jung, psychological wholeness, signified by the archetype of the self, was the goal of individual development, abetted where necessary by therapy (1928, 1944). Furthermore, in his later work he theorised that the wholeness whose realisation was aimed at was not just psychological but included also the world beyond the individual psyche: psyche and matter were considered two aspects of a single underlying reality which he referred to as the unus mundus or 'one world' (1955–56: §662). The process of realising wholeness was for Jung central not only to therapy and individual development but also to addressing many social, cultural, and political ills, which he considered largely to stem from thinking in a one-sidedly conscious (usually materialistic and rationalistic) way, without taking due account of the unconscious (1957). In his early work, the concept of the whole was an implicit concern for Jung, inasmuch as his work at that time was devoted to understanding what could be considered the opposite of wholeness, namely, psychic fragmentation that manifested as pathology (Smith 1990: 27–46). However, from the time of the experiences that led to his writing The Red Book (2009), wholeness became increasingly explicit as the central focus of Jung's psychological model and psychotherapy, and in the guise of the concepts of individuation and the self it pervades all of his mature writing.

Only a few prior works have explored the connections between Jung and Deleuze in any detail. Of seminal importance among these is Christian Kerslake's Deleuze and the Unconscious (2007), which meticulously uncovers the substantial influence of Jung on Deleuze's development of a conception of the unconscious that had more affinity with symbolist and occultist thought and the work of Janet and Bergson than with Freud's psychoanalysis. Although Deleuze was not explicit about this Jungian influence, Kerslake shows that it continued 'to shape his theory of the unconscious right up to Difference and Repetition' (ibid.: 69). Nor, arguably, is Kerslake's book important only for enriching understanding of Deleuze; it has also recently been hailed as '[t]he real turning point for a more comprehensive understanding of Jung's theorizing' (Hogenson 2019: 692).

Also significant, in this case for demonstrating the productivity of jointly applying the ideas of Jung and Deleuze, are works by Inna Semetsky and Barbara Jenkins. Semetsky, in a series of books going back over a decade, has applied concepts from Jung and Deleuze in developing a theory of 'edusemiotics', on the role of signs and their interpretation in education. Her focus has been sometimes on Deleuze (Semetsky 2006), sometimes on Jung (Semetsky 2013), and sometimes on both (Semetsky 2011, 2020). No less insightfully, Jenkins (2016) has drawn on both thinkers to offer a highly original exploration of

how the 'social relations between things' can illuminate the role of desire and sexual difference in culture and the economy.

Kerslake's, Semetsky's, and Jenkins's books touch on many issues germane to the concept of the whole, but it is not their main focus. The same can be said of the various shorter discussions of connections between Jung and Deleuze that have been slowly increasing in number over the past couple of decades (e.g., Hauke 2000: 80–83; Kazarian 2010; Pint 2011; Holland 2012; Semetsky and Ramey 2013; Henderson 2014: 113–18; Cambray 2017; Hogenson 2019). There have also been several substantial works that have addressed the concept of the whole and/or holism either in Jung (Smith 1990; Kelly 1993; Huskinson 2004; Cambray 2009) or, albeit often via implicated terms rather than directly, in Deleuze (Ansell-Pearson 1999, 2007; Badiou 2000; Hallward 2006; Ramey 2012; Justaert 2012). However, these works have not brought the two thinkers together.

Most relevant to the present book are several works that were either a prelude to or part of the same overall project. The prelude was a study by McMillan (2015), which undertook a Deleuzian critique of Jung's concept of the whole and compellingly flagged some potential ethical problems with Jung's formulations, raising the question of whether and how these problems might be addressed. In a later work, focusing on late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century debates about vitalism that were of interest to both Jung and Deleuze, McMillan identified the importance of relations of interiority or exteriority in determining different kinds of holism and their ethical implications (McMillan 2020). The relations of interiority in organicistic holism imply that the whole is pre-given and closed, which could potentially give rise to forms of totalitarian and exclusionary thought. In Deleuze's criticisms of organicism and postulation of relations of exteriority, McMillan argues, it is possible to identify an alternative form of rhizomatic or 'transversal' holism, as well as a corresponding 'material vitalism', in which the whole remains always open and creative (ibid.: 122–23). Despite Jung's affinity with a range of pre-modern organicistic thinkers, his own dynamic concept of the whole can, McMillan argues (2018, 2019), also be understood as open and creative, with concepts such as psychic reality (esse in anima), the psychoid archetype, and synchronicity providing openings onto relations of exteriority. These studies show how an encounter between Jung's psychology and Deleuze's philosophy can foster an enhanced reflexivity in both, ensuring that any holism ascribed to these thinkers is a critical holism, one that challenges rather than reinforces the boundaries of systems.

In a paper complementary to his chapter in the present volume, Main (2017) has argued that, contrary to disenchantment, which is rooted in the metaphysics of theism whereby nature and the divine are considered ontologically separate, much holistic thought, including Jung's, has its roots in panentheistic metaphysics, in which nature is considered to be an expression or aspect of the divine. This metaphysics underpins, usually implicitly, many of the positive claims made for holism in relation to, for example, ecology, healthcare, education, social and political relations, and spirituality. It also, negatively for some, associates holism with heterodox traditions of Hermetic and mystical thought. In this context, both Main (2019) and McMillan (2018) have discussed the relevance for holism of Jung's concept of synchronicity – which is also a feature of several essays in the present volume (Semetsky, Hogenson, and Atmanspacher).

Also complementary to the present book is the same team of editors' Holism: Possibilities and Problems (McMillan, Main, and Henderson 2020). This companion volume focuses specifically on the concept of holism, and it encompasses a wider range of theoretical perspectives than just those of Jung and

Deleuze, although the latter are well represented. The present book, however, is the first to focus specifically and in depth on the problem of the whole as it jointly figures in the works of Jung and Deleuze.

The contributors to the present book, as already noted, are all experts on the thought of either Jung or Deleuze, if not both. All are, or have been, academics, while some are also practitioners (Henderson, Hogenson, Semetsky, Ramey). Between them they represent a significant array of disciplines: philosophy (Ramey), psychotherapy/analysis (Henderson, Hogenson), education (Semetsky), physics (Atmanspacher), German studies (Bishop), and psychosocial and psychoanalytic studies (Main, McMillan). Some of the contributed essays explore the tensions between Jung's and Deleuze's different concepts of the whole and their respective ethical implications (Main, McMillan, Bishop). Others use the two authors primarily to amplify each other's thought (Henderson, Semetsky, Atmanspacher). Others again focus on contexts or topics equally informed by or equally relevant to both authors (Ramey, Hogenson). Among the epistemological, ethical, and methodological questions relating to the concept of the whole that are raised by the essays are the following:

- What is the relationship between a particular concept of ultimate wholeness and the multiplicities of experience?
- Can unitary reality be experienced directly?
- What is the status of symbolic knowledge of the whole?
- What are the ethical (including social, cultural, and political) implications of different concepts of the whole?
- Is there an intrinsic relationship between concepts of the whole and totalitarian thinking?
- Is it possible to avoid totalitarian dangers of holism by developing a form of critical holism based on the concept of an open whole?
- What is gained for the thought of Jung and Deleuze by staging an encounter between them?
- Can psychotherapeutic concepts such as Jung's be usefully appropriated by a philosophy such as Deleuze's, and can philosophical concepts such as Deleuze's be usefully appropriated by a psychology such as Jung's?
- How do the preoccupations of Jung and Deleuze in relation to the whole connect with other thinkers (such as Kant, Bergson, Klages, and Pauli) and other fields (such as complexity theory, physics, political economy, esotericism, and cultural history)?

Considering the magnitude of the questions being posed, the answers given to them are inevitably partial and provisional, and each essay refracts the questions through the author's own specific preoccupations and expertise. Nevertheless, there are many convergences among the essays. Important points that connect several of the contributions, even if they do not explicitly connect them all, include, far from exhaustively: that for both Jung and Deleuze wholeness is important because it helps to keep thought open to creativity and relationship; that wholes, or even the ultimate whole, can be creatively expressed through symbols (including symptoms, signs, and images); that these symbols are generated by estranging 'encounters', whether with art, exceptional experiences, or expressions of otherness or the unconscious more generally, each of which disturbs static patterns of thought; that knowledge of the whole can be direct (through immanent experience) as well as symbolic; that in either case knowledge of the whole is transformative, making ethical demands on the knower; that symbols of the whole are

not just conscious constructions but are expressions of a natural process; that attempts to reify symbols of the whole result in one-sided or static representational thinking, and attempts to capture the practice of generating symbols are vulnerable to institutional control; and that many paths lead back from thinking about the whole to traditions of esoteric and mystical thought.

There are, of course, many aspects of thinking in terms of the whole that this book, largely for contingent reasons, has not been able to address as fully as we would have liked. The two most significant omissions are probably gender issues (useful resources would be Jenkins 2016 and Rowland 2017) and issues relating to environmentalism and the Anthropocene (see, for example, Fellows 2019). Another neglected topic is the relation between holistic thinking and Eastern thought (see, however, Yama 2020 and Main 2019: 67–68). Additional work could be usefully undertaken in each of these areas, as well as many others. Meanwhile, we hope that the following essays will, each in its way, spur further reflection both on the problem of the whole and on the thought of Jung and Deleuze, especially as the two thinkers creatively connect with each other.

In the opening chapter,2 Roderick Main examines the disputed ethical status of holism through comparing aspects of the thought of Jung and Deleuze on the concept of wholeness. He first highlights relevant holistic features of Jung's psychological model, especially the concepts of the self and unus mundus (one world), and traces the cultural and social benefits that are claimed to flow from such a version of holism. He then confronts Jung's model with Deleuze's more constructivist way of thinking about wholes and totality in terms of difference, multiplicity, and pure immanence, which aims to ensure that his concept of the whole remains open. The Deleuzian perspective arguably exposes a number of questionable philosophical assumptions and ethical implications in Jung's holism – especially concerning the notions of original and restored wholes, organicism, and internal relations, with their implicit appeals to transcendence. In order to assess whether this Deleuzian critique is answerable, Main focuses attention on the understanding of transcendence and immanence within each thinker's model. Distinguishing between theism, pantheism, and panentheism, he proposes that the metaphysical logic of panentheism can provide a framework that is capable of reconciling the two thinkers' concepts of the whole. In light of this, Jung's position turns out to be an ally of the Deleuzian critique whose real target is the kind of strong transcendence characteristic of classical theism, which both thinkers eschew.

Focusing more explicitly on political issues, Christian McMillan (Chapter 2) also explores conceptual affinities between Jung's work and that of Deleuze together with his co-writer Guattari. McMillan draws extensively from one of Jung's final essays, 'The undiscovered self (present and future)' (1957), which was first published after the two world wars and in the immediate aftermath of the Red Scare in the United States. Jung's essay is noteworthy for its critique of the role of the State in modern times. It analyses the ways in which the State organises and orientates thought in a one-sided, ethically deleterious manner that excludes alternative forms of organisation. McMillan parallels this with Deleuze's critical focus on the organisation and distribution of relations within thought systems, of which the State is one variation. In the first half of the chapter, McMillan examines various concepts that Jung presents in his essay: positive concepts such as 'individual' and 'whole man' and negative concepts such as 'mass man', 'statistical man', and 'State'. In the second half of the chapter, McMillan relates Jung's analysis of the ways in which thought is orientated by the abstract idea of the modern State to Deleuze's critique of the image of thought, which formed a crucial part of his Difference and Repetition (1968a).

The uncanny internal resonance between Jung's psychological theory and Deleuze's philosophy receives further scrutiny from David Henderson (Chapter 3). Through a discussion of Deleuze's concepts of symptomatology, percept, and minor literature, from his Essays Critical and Clinical (1993), Henderson demonstrates the rich potential of Deleuzian thought for amplifying elements of Jung's psychology. According to Deleuze, 'Authors, if they are great, are more like doctors than patients. We mean that they are themselves astonishing diagnosticians or symptomatologists' (1969: 237). Jung can be read in this way as a symptomatologist, a 'clinician of civilization', who discovered the collective unconscious and prescribed a renewed relationship with wholeness as a remedy for the personal, cultural, and collective 'dis-eases' of modern life. The percept is a type of vision or hearing, and Henderson uses this concept of Deleuze's to reflect on Jung's capacity to see the unconscious. Finally, Henderson shows how Deleuze's concepts of minor literature and minority politics throw light on the corpus of Jung's writing and on the role of analytical psychology within the wider field of psychoanalysis.

Inna Semetsky (Chapter 4) continues the discussion of how symptoms, symbols, and signs can paradoxically express the unconscious or irrepresentable dimension of reality and thereby promote wholeness. She draws parallels between the axiom of the third-century alchemist Maria Prophetissa ('One becomes two, two becomes three, and out of the third comes the one as the fourth'), which Jung refers to as a metaphor for the process of individuation, and Deleuze's paradoxical logic of multiplicities (problematic Ideas) – both of which are based on the notion of the tertium quid, the included third. Semetsky argues that the reading of signs is an experiment that involves experiential learning (self-education or apprenticeship) and, ultimately, self-knowledge in the form of deep gnosis. Only through such knowledge can we become in-dividual, 'whole' selves. Semetsky's chapter also addresses ethics as the integration of the Jungian shadow archetype that may manifest in events of which, according to Deleuze, we must become worthy. To conclude, Semetsky presents an example of a transformative, healing ('making whole') practice that demonstrates the actualisation of the virtual archetypes via their 'dramatisation' in the esoteric yet 'real characters' of a neutral language, such as envisaged by Wolfgang Pauli, Jung's collaborator on the concept of synchronicity. By means of such a practice, for Semetsky, Deleuze's call to retrieve and read the structures immanent in the depth of the psyche is answered: we self-transcend by becoming-other.

Complementing Semetsky's appeal to esoteric thought, George Hogenson (Chapter 5) also explores the relationship between certain mathematical patterns and symbols of wholeness, but within a more scientific framework. He compares formally constructed mandalas and other geometric forms associated by Jung with the notion of wholeness with the iterative elaboration of the equations associated with Mandelbrot's fractal geometry. Hogenson argues that these symbols of wholeness are manifestations of fundamental mathematical structures that manifest throughout the natural world and connect psyche to the rest of nature in a fundamental form. Additionally, his analysis illustrates how the breakdown of psychic wholeness can be modelled in the breakdown of unity into chaotic states, thereby providing an argument for Jung's model of the psyche moving from the individual complex to the unus mundus and the unity of the self.

In an argument also thoroughly grounded in science, in this case physics and consciousness research, Harald Atmanspacher (Chapter 6) explores relational and immanent experiences in relation to what he has called the Pauli-Jung conjecture, which is a coherent reconstruction of Pauli's and Jung's scattered ideas about the relationship between the mental and the physical and their common origin. It belongs to the decompositional variety of dual-aspect monisms, in which a basic, psychophysically neutral reality is

conceived of as radically holistic, without distinctions, and hence discursively inexpressible. Epistemic domains such as the mental and the physical emerge from this base reality by differentiation. Within this conceptual framework, Atmanspacher identifies three different options to address so-called exceptional experiences, that is, deviations from typical reality models that individuals develop and utilise to cope with their environment. Such experiences can be understood (i) as either mental images or physical events, (ii) as relations between the mental and the physical, and (iii) as direct experiences of the psychophysically neutral reality. These three classes are referred to as reified, relational, and immanent experiences.

Paul Bishop (Chapter 7) is also concerned with ideas and experiences that express a holistic and enchanted view of reality. He argues that for Friedrich Nietzsche – a key influence on Jung and Deleuze alike – the world is both disenchanted and enchanted. From a transcendental perspective (associated with Judeo-Christianity), the world is disenchanted; it is 'the work of a suffering and tormented God'. Yet from an immanent perspective, the world is in fact enchanted – or potentially so, and the means by which Nietzsche proposes to re-enchant (or rediscover the primordial enchantment of) the world is the doctrine of eternal recurrence. In Thus Spoke Zarathustra, his animals proclaim Zarathustra to be 'the teacher of the eternal recurrence', and this passage has caught the attention of numerous commentators, including Heidegger and Deleuze. Another critic of Nietzsche's doctrine of eternal recurrence is Ludwig Klages, himself deeply invested in the challenges of disenchantment and re-enchantment. Central to Klages's philosophy are his doctrine of the 'reality of images' and his related notion of 'elementary similarity'. Elementary similarity informs the kind of perception he associates with die Seele, that is, with the soul or the psyche, and which he regards as essentially symbolic. Can the concepts of identity, similarity, dissimilarity, and difference, Bishop asks, help us to relate and coordinate the thought of Klages, Jung, and Deleuze – and not just in relation to Nietzsche?

The volume concludes with Joshua Ramey's highly original perspective on the relationship between divination and financial markets (Chapter 8). Ramey explores how extreme variants of neoliberal ideology about the power of markets, particularly as articulated in the late work of Friedrich Hayek, produce illusions about the kind of meanings that can be construed on the basis of chance or random processes. Randomness poses an interesting problem for holism in general, but here Ramey focuses on the specific power that uncertainty (linked to the basic fact of extreme contingency, or chance) is supposed to display, within 'correctly' functioning markets, to generate meaning. In Ramey's book, Politics of Divination: Neoliberal Endgame and the Religion of Contingency (2016), he has argued that the extreme version of neoliberal market apologetics holds that markets can function as divination processes – that is, as inquiries into more-than-human knowledge. The complex and unstable relation between chance and the Whole is figured here in an equivocation over whether chance means everything or nothing, and helps to explain the particular relation between neoliberal ideology and nihilism. <>

THE SUBTLE BODY: A GENEALOGY by Simon Cox [Oxford STU Western Esotericism Series, Oxford University Press, 9780197581032]

How does the soul relate to the body? Through the ages, innumerable religious and intellectual movements have proposed answers to this question. Many have gravitated to the notion of the "subtle body," positing some sort of subtle entity that is neither soul nor body, but some mixture of the two. Simon Cox traces the history of this idea from the late Roman Empire to the present day, touching on how philosophers, wizards, scholars, occultists, psychologists, and mystics have engaged with the idea over the past two thousand years.

This study is an intellectual history of the subtle body concept from its origins in late antiquity through the Renaissance into the Euro-American counterculture of the 1960's and 70's. It begins with a prehistory of the idea, rooted as it is in third-century Neoplatonism. It then proceeds to the signifier "subtle body" in its earliest English uses amongst the Cambridge Platonists. After that, it looks forward to those Orientalist fathers of Indology, who, in their earliest translations of Sanskrit philosophy relied heavily on the Cambridge Platonist lexicon, and thereby brought Indian philosophy into what had hitherto been a distinctly platonic discourse. At this point, the story takes a little reflexive stroll into the source of the author's own interest in this strange concept, looking at Helena Blavatsky and the Theosophical import, expression, and popularization of the concept. Cox then zeroes in on Aleister Crowley, focusing on the subtle body in fin de siècle occultism. Finally, he turns to Carl Jung, his colleague Frederic Spiegelberg, and the popularization of the idea of the subtle body in the Euro-American counterculture. This book is for anyone interested in yogic, somatic, or energetic practices, and will be very useful to scholars and area specialists who rely on this term in dealing with Hindu, Daoist, and Buddhist texts.

Review

"Finally—a book that tracks the idea of a subtle body within Western history. Cox starts from early Greek formulations of a subtle body through its renaissance renditions up through the especially fruitful period of modernity, with the West's extensive borrowing from Indian traditions, to offer a history of how we acquired that ubiquitous phantasm of the new-age subtle body. With his own story interspersed, Cox's delightful history captivates throughout." -- Loriliai Biernacki, author of *Renowned Goddess of Desire: Women, Sex and Speech in Tantra*

"How do we imagine, experience, and discuss the phenomenology of embodied being? Is there an essential subtle body? And if so, what is it? In this book, we join Simon Cox on his comparative journey from late antiquity to modernity, from East to West and back again, to track and catch the sparrow. The journey to track subtle matter and particles, pneuma and meridians, energies and light is deep and rich DS even glorious. At the end of the journey, we find ourselves at the top of a spiral staircase, looking out, wondering at the mutability of our perceptions of a subtle body. We are challenged to consider whether the subtle body can be sufficiently analyzed as an object of knowledge at all, or

whether, as Cox determines, the subtle body is what it does." -- April D. DeConick, author of The *Gnostic New Age: How a Countercultural Spirituality Revolutionized Religion from Antiquity to Today*

How to Compare Esoteric Anatomies

As one of Simon's doctoral mentors, perhaps it is appropriate to say that none of the brilliance of this dissertation-become-book surprised me in the least, but that it still surprised me. Moreover, and here is the potentially narcissistic piece, I clearly recognize something of my younger self in his emerging thought and theorization of the subtle body.

But Simon really did it. When I was his age, I just saw the situation, felt hopelessly muddled, and threw up my metaphorical hands. I was in graduate school, and someone asked me to review Lilian Silburn's recently published Kundalini: Energy of the Depths (1988). It is a perfectly fine book, a study of Kundalini Yoga in the nondual Kashmiri sources. Somewhere in it was a casual and innocent comment about how the Christian experiences of the Holy Spirit might in fact be related to the yogic phenomena tracked and described with such care by the South Asian Hindu and Buddhist traditions. My own mind goes to some of the very strange mystical-physical phenomena of Teresa of Avila, the great sixteenth-century Spanish saint and doctor of the Church, phenomena which included things like (embarrassing and public) physical levitation, locutions (distinct voices without any human presence), and angelic-erotic thrusts into her "entrails" accompanied by exquisite suffering, literal moanings, and union with God.

I happen to think Lilian Silburn was correct (and it is no accident at all that she herself has led what her biographer calls un vie mystique and was the disciple of an Indian Sufi master). The physio-spiritual phenomena clearly are related. But how?

Something in me responded. It was not a criticism of Lilian Silburn or of the book. It was a criticism of the reigning comparative imaginations of the time. It was the late 1980s, and what we might call the New

Age hermeneutic of a single "subtle body" or what Kurt Leland calls the "Western chakra system" was still in place, although this California countercultural imagination had in turn deeper historical and experiential roots, particularly in the life and work of the British judge Sir John Woodroffe in the first decades of the twentieth century, whose work was itself likely driven by his own subtle energetic experiences (evidence suggests that he received initiation from a Tantric saint before whom he reported a powerful spiritual-electric "shock" [shakti-pat] on the night of Kali-puja in 1906).

Why, I asked, do we feel it appropriate or helpful to explain Christian mystical phenomena in Hindu or Buddhist yogic terms? Why not explain Hindu or Buddhist yogic experiences in Christian terms? Not the Holy Spirit as unconscious kundalini, then, but kundalini as unconscious Holy Spirit. That kind of thing. The latter Christian theological reduction would have felt especially forced, to me and my graduate peers of the time anyway. So why the attractions of the former? Why not refuse both reductions, and yet still recognize that, yes, something is there, something is indeed happening in both historical and cultural contexts that is very different and yet somehow the same? Sir John Woodroffe, and ten thousand other New Age seekers, have been "shocked," literally, spiritually, and physiologically. So was Teresa of Avila. By what?

What I was asking for, in some unformed way, was what Simon delivers here to such stunning effect—a new comparative imagination that refuses any easy reduction to a particular cultural, historical, or religious frame, and, precisely as a result of this refusal, concludes with a most surprising and most constructive theory of the subtle body and its energies. That theory comes down to what he calls "radical somatic mutability" or "multinatural somatic pluralism, where these many bodies can be seen as gateways into alternate realities." Or, to put it differently but similarly, "different cultural conditions give rise to different embodied beings."

Whoooaaaa.

I got excited. I got excited because this finally makes good sense of our historical sources and their phenomenological descriptions in both their obvious similarities and their obvious differences. I also got excited because it implies that the powers of the human mind and imagination (we need a new word) and its symbolic, ritual, and visionary forms are awesome. As I have put it elsewhere, we really become in Simon's thought "authors of the impossible," co-creating new mental-material realities in which we and future others can live and dream.

There is no permanent separation between subjectivity and objectivity here. The human mind somehow shapes the behavior of matter. And the material world, on a "subtle" or, what the New Age hermeneutic calls an "energetic" level, responds accordingly (since it, too, is somehow "mental"). We are close to what Henry Corbin called the imaginal realm, where spirit becomes body and body becomes spirit.

But this is not quite that, either. For one thing, Simon's multinatural somatic pluralism is a much broader comparative theorization that can be applied anywhere, and not just to medieval Persia. It can embrace Corbin's Persian sources, for sure, but it can also embrace Silburn's Indian Sanskrit sources, or Tibetan or Japanese Buddhist ones, or Chinese Daoist ones, or Christian European ones.

Or contemporary American ones, Allow me a few words on just how complex and mind-bending our contemporary sources really are here, and how they cry out for a model like that of Simon Cox, how we need this book. Such phenomena are not just in East or South Asia or in ancient Greece, after all. They are also right here, in our backyards as it were, with Batman no less (you'll see).

Here is where I want to issue a kind of universalist plea. I want to question whether cultural context and a local imagination are always really necessary or definitive. In my ethnographic experience anyway, the simple truth is that what people call and experience as "kundalini awakenings" (one sophisticated interpretive framework that just happens to be lying around in the transnational conversation, as it were) happen to all sorts of individuals in all sorts of cultural contexts and time periods. No particular religious, racial, gender, or sexual coding is required. None. I have personally worked with and written about numerous individuals who have described in great detail these subtle (or not so subtle) energetic openings. They happen in sickness and in health. They happen on retreat. Or not on retreat. They happen in "alien abductions." They happen in board rooms. They happen during sexual activity. They happen in psychedelic trips. To take just one of hundreds of potential examples, the American neuroscientist Marjorie Woollacott has recently led a professional study of these bio-spiritual awakenings, and she has reported her own dramatic awakening at the touch of a contemporary Hindu guru. It happens, even to Western scientists.

I would also not count out just yet the usefulness and interpretive power of the Neoplatonic ochema or "vehicle" of the soul. The ochema, after all, is often described as spherical. Ioan Culianu once described it as the "space shuttle" of the soul. Or, I would add, a humanoid UFO. It is probably no accident at all that one of the twentieth century's greatest researchers of the UFO and alien abduction phenomena, the Harvard psychiatrist John Mack, had a Sikh guru and therapist who was also a kundalini teacher, Gurucharan Singh Khalsa. Nor is it an accident that it was the Esalen Institute and the human potential movement in the figure of the psychiatrist and holotropic breathwork teacher Stanislav Grof who, in the late 1980s, first set Mack on his life-changing path and later passionate interest around the UFO topic. As Mack himself put it with respect to the Grofs, "They put a hole in my psyche and the UFOs flew in." Sounds about right to me.

Nor can the Christian materials be ignored, even and especially the scriptural and classical ones. Dale Allison, Jr., has recently written a very large book on the resurrection appearances in the New Testament and has compared them—to "think in parallels"—to other religious phenomena, from Roman Catholic Marian apparitions to contemporary Protestant angelic, bereavement, and near-death visitations, to the "rainbow body" of Tibetan Buddhism. Allison rightly suggests that what this comparative material ultimately asks is not whether or not the resurrection happened (he thinks it probably did in some form), but what a body really is.

We really do not know. This is Simon's question, too, of course. His developing answer, I hope, will shock you: "Whatever we want it to be."

Jeffrey J. Kripal

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Restoring the Body of Light

> WANTED: Energetic madmen. Those who have
> Thought themselves a body large enough to
> Devour their dreams. —W. H. Auden

In most styles of the martial art taijiquan (tai chi), there is a movement called "grasping the sparrow's tail." It is a seminal posture, usually near the beginning of the form, in which the four most essential taiji techniques are contained. The poetic name is meant to summon the image of a nimble bird, able to take flight at any moment. How is a comparatively clumsy human supposed to grab one by the tail? This predicament becomes even more unfavorable if we do our ornithological homework. Sparrows are tiny, fat birds with little stubby, almost nonexistent tails. The image is a koan. How to grasp the quite nearly ungraspable?

Dealing academically with the subtle body presents an analogous situation. On the ontological level, we are told it is something very subtle, ethereal, mercurial. It seems, perhaps, to be composed of some sort of superfine particles. Or maybe it is made of light or electricity, or is somehow the manifestation of a higher spatial dimension. On the epistemic level we can see it is not an entirely objective phenomenon. Subtle bodies do not seem to leave subtle corpses. So it is at least in part, and perhaps wholly, a mental imputation (however that fits into our worldview). On the historical level, we are told it is absolutely ubiquitous, something represented in all times and climes: from the occult physiology of Siberian shamans or Ju/'hoansi hunter-gatherers to medieval Daoist recluses, Renaissance magicians, and Mayan medicine people.

How appropriate, then, that one of the more persistent images of the subtle body, a motif present in so many of these contexts, is the bird. When we try to grasp it without sufficient methodological finesse, it slips right through our fingers. To catch the sparrow, to resolve our koan, the shaman might suggest becoming more bird-like ourselves. Similarly, in the prodigious and learned corpus dedicated to the epistemological problems of the subtle body, there seems to be a general acknowledgment that fruitful engagement is predicated on a subordination of theoretical discourse to praxis.

But alongside these larger philosophical issues lies the more approachable historical question, one that allows us to remain within the skin of our own very human bodies and maintain a comfortable scholar's distance. Where is it that this subtle body concept came from? And how did it ever come to contain these multitudes, from the luminous bodies of late antique Neoplatonic philosophers to the subtle sheaths of the soul from Indian Yoga and Vedánta? When we take measure of the capacious scope of the term, in both its popular and academic uses, its ubiquity calls out for an explanation.

It is my intention here to perform a genealogy of the term, where the facts of my investigation are philological, and the trails are textual. I begin with a prehistory of the idea, rooted as it is in late antique Neoplatonism (Chapter 1). I then proceed to the signifier "subtle body" in its earliest English uses among the Cambridge Platonists (Chapter 2). After that, I look forward to those fathers of Indology, who, in their earliest translations of Sanskrit philosophy relied heavily on the Cambridge Platonist lexicon, and thereby brought Indian philosophy into what had hitherto been a distinctly Platonic discourse (Chapter 3). At this point in the story, I take us on a little reflexive interlude into the source of my own interest

in this strange concept. Chapters 4 and 5 deal with Helena Blavatsky and the theosophical import, expression, and popularization of the concept. Chapter 6 zeroes in on Aleister Crowley, focusing on the subtle body in fln-de-siecle occultism. And Chapters 7 and 8 deal with Carl Jung, his colleague Frederic Spiegelberg, and the popularization of the idea in the Euro-American counterculture.

Resurrecting an Old Idea

The status of the subtle body has risen and fallen with the tides of debunking and rebunking that constitute the history of philosophy, and whether the subtle body constitutes a central and valuable philosophical concept or some dusty pagan myth is displayed most prominently in the history of the question in which it is most centrally implicated. What is the relationship between the mind and the body?

This book rides on a recent upswing in the fortunes of the concept. Following a variety of recent turns in academia (namely participatory, spatial, and ontological), new worldviews and new materialisms have created new spaces for models of embodiment, thought, and mind-body interactionism, and when it comes to the ancient concept around which this book is constellated, new spaces for an old idea. Here it is my intention to unpack the philological baggage, to disambiguate the many strands and various discourses that have coalesced into the modern, highly syncretistic category of the subtle body. I do this fairly conventionally by bringing a philological, historical-critical lens to bear on literary and historical material from late antiquity through to the present.

Things get a bit more interesting after my third chapter, when I turn this lens back on myself, on my own life and motivations, and interrogate what possessed me to write this strange book anyway. I address this question through four kuden, a term I first learned through Japanese martial arts meaning "oral transmission," referring to teachings passed down outside the textual tradition. I include these four mini-chapters throughout the second half of this book as a sort of phenomenology or personal playing out of the larger historiography I trace through the main chapters. Here we see that the very same themes that make the subtle body relevant through its history—the Orientalist and mystical-esoteric discourses in which abides—are driving forces in the playing out of my own fate. And just as I retroactively connect dots as an historian of ideas, to make some sense of this messy concept, I retroactively connect the dots of my own life, to transmute the chaos of a life lived into narrative, into language, into something that can be understood.

T^ put it plainly, this book hopefully serves as a bit of historical housekeeping for an idea that, to my mind, has been unfairly maligned. It follows quite closely J. ^. Smith's famous summary of the purpose behind the field of religious studies: to make the strange familiar and the familiar strange. People who know about the subtle body typically fall into two camps. On the one hand, there are scholars, usually of some Asian area studies, who are familiar with the idea and almost universally see the subtle body concept as it exists in the West as a late-phase theosophical import inspired by the Oriental renaissance of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. To these scholars, for whom we might say the subtle body is a strange idea, perhaps as Erwin Rohde put it, abiding in Western philosophical discourse like "a drop of alien blood in the veins of the Greeks," I hope to make it familiar by demonstrating its elite pedigree extending from the very fountainheads of the "Western tradition." On the other hand, there is the lay audience for whom the subtle body is somehow ubiquitous and transhistorical. For them I seek to make the familiar strange by demonstrating the development and genealogy of the subtle body concept,

focusing on how the very historical discourses of Orientalism and transhistoricity are implicated in its development.

Morphologies of the Subtle Body

But beyond the historical and autobiographical dimensions of this book lies a third path. Perhaps we can think along the lines of the trifold—outer, inner, secret—hermeneutics of esoteric Buddhism. We can call this the secret dimension, and it is this reading that I hope will be useful to people beyond the narrow world of the academy, beyond historians or the area specialists to whom this genealogy will be of practical value. In the pages that follow you will find a veritable library of subtle body formulations, contextualized within various epistemological and metaphysical frameworks, for purposes ranging from psychological integration to personal salvation, brought to life through everything from theurgical ritual to meditative visualization to mythological hermeneutics. This variety itself challenges any unitary answer to the question of what the subtle body refers to. But if we invert our gaze, and instead of staring downward at the via negativa of conceptual deconstruction and historical contextualization we cast our eyes skyward to the practical deployment of subtle bodies in subtle worlds, this variety can be reread in a positive light. Instead of many views (various cultural instantiations of subtle bodies) referring to one reality (that one culturally transcendent body to which they all gesture), we find a variety of realities (multiple ontological frameworks) and experiences of body, all hooked, gestured to imperfectly by this large umbrella term.

This genealogical project began as a search for the ground of a concept. What I quickly found, and found again and again, was that any apparent ground soon evaporates under the blazing perspicacity of historical vision. The illusion of conceptual uniformity vanished before my eyes. And instead of that one book, that one ur-body on which the rest were all grounded, I found one hundred blooming flowers. Instead of the secret scroll that contained the definitive map, I stumbled upon a library of infinitely greater value. In the secret hermeneutic, this book can be read as a table of contents to just one narrow section of the archive of the subtle body. <>

Psychology of Yoga and Meditation: Lectures Delivered at ETH Zurich, Volume 6: 1938–1940 by C. G. Jung, edited by Martin Liebscher, translated by John Peck and Heather McCartney [Philemon Foundation Series, Princeton University Press, 9780691206585]

Jung's illuminating lectures on the psychology of Eastern spirituality

Between 1933 and 1941, C. G. Jung delivered a series of public lectures at the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology (ETH) in Zurich. Intended for a general audience, these lectures addressed a broad range of topics, from dream analysis to the psychology of alchemy. Here for the first time are Jung's illuminating lectures on the psychology of yoga and meditation, delivered between 1938 and 1940.

In these lectures, Jung discusses the psychological technique of active imagination, seeking to find parallels with the meditative practices of different yogic and Buddhist traditions. He draws on three

texts to introduce his audience to Eastern meditation: Patañjali's Yoga Sûtra, the Amitâyur-dhyâna-sûtra from Chinese Pure Land Buddhism, and the Shrî-chakra-sambhâra Tantra, a scripture related to tantric yoga. The lectures offer a unique opportunity to encounter Jung as he shares his ideas with the general public, providing a rare window on the application of his comparative method while also shedding light on his personal history and psychological development.

Featuring an incisive introduction by Martin Liebscher as well as explanations of Jungian concepts and psychological terminology, Psychology of Yoga and Meditation provides invaluable insights into the evolution of Jung's thought and a vital key to understanding his later work.

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Gustav Jung's university lectures, conducted in the winter semester 1938/1939 (28 October-3 March) and the first half of the summer 1939 (28 April-9 June), and announced as "Introduction to the Psychology of the Unconscious," were dedicated to the topic of Eastern Starting out with the psychological technique of active imagination, he sought to find parallels in Eastern meditative practices. His was on meditation as taught by different yogic traditions and in Buddhist practice. The final four lectures of the summer semester 1939 (16 July) dealt with those meditative practices in Christianity that He saw as equivalent to the aforementioned examples from the East. Jung was particularly interested in The Spiritual Exercises of Ignatius of Loyola, which formed the main topic of the following winter 1939/1940. Those four lectures will be published together with lectures of 1939/1940 as volume 7 of this series. After a break over summer of 1940, Jung restarted his lectures with a summary of the previous semesters. As Jung briefly returned to the topic of Eastern meditation as part of a summation, the first and second lectures of the winter semester 1940/f/1941 are published at the end of this volume.

Jung's engagement with Eastern spirituality and yoga can, at least, be rd back to the time of Transformations and Symbols of the Libido which included a psychological reading of the Upanishads and Rigveda. His acquaintance with John Woodroffe's (aka Arthur Avalon) The Serpent Power — Jung owned a copy of the first edition of 1919—which was basically a commentary on the Sat Cakra Srupana, gave Jung his initial knowledge of Kundalini Yoga. This interest in Kundalini and Tantric Yoga culminated in the seminar series by the Tubingen Sanskrit scholar Jakob Wilhelm Hauer in the Psychological Club Zurich in 1932. Hauer's lectures were accompanied by a psychological commentary from Jung. At the same time Olga Frobe-Kapteyn was organising the first Eranos conference which took place in her house near Ascona in the summer of 1933. The idea of dedicating this annual confer ence to the topic of the relationship between Eastern and Western philosophy and religion came from Jung himself. Consequently, the first conference was on 'Yoga and Meditation' in the East and West.22 At Ascona in the 1930s Jung had the opportunity to discuss I^dian thought and spirituality with scholars, colleagues, and friends such as the Indologist Heinrich Zimmer, the French Orientalists Paul Masson-Oursel, and th scholars of Buddhism Caroline Rhys Davids and Jean Przyluski—to on but a few. And, finally, Jung experienced India at first hand he was invited by the British government to take part in the celebrations of the twenty-fifth anniversary of the founding of the Indian

Philosophy Congress Association at the University of Calcutta. He left Zurich at the beginning of December 1937 together with Harold Fowler McC^rmick and travelled through India for three months. Afterwards he wrote two articles entitled "The Dreamlike World of India" and “What India Can Teach Us" (1939)—the latter being a clear reference to Max Muller's 1883 article by the same t□ r e. Another t xt of Jung's, pub ications in Calcutta in 1936, was specifically dedicated to the topic of Yoga and the West."

In his lectures of 1938/1939, Jung chose three texts for introducing audience to the practice of Eastern meditation: Patanjali's Yoga Sútra, ^mitayur-Dhyana-Sutra from the Chinese Pure Land Buddhist tradition and the Shri-chakra-sambhara Tantra, a scripture related to Tantric practice. <>

Consciousness and the Unconscious: Lectures Delivered at ETH Zurich, Volume 2: 1934 by C. G., edited by Ernst Falzeder, translated by Mark Kyburz, John Peck, and Ernst Falzeder [Philemon Foundation Series, Princeton University Press, 9780691228570]

Jung's lectures on consciousness and the unconscious—in English for the first time

Between 1933 and 1941, C. G. Jung delivered a series of public lectures at the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology (ETH) in Zurich. Intended for a general audience, these lectures addressed a broad range of topics, from dream analysis and yoga to the history of psychology. They are at the center of Jung's intellectual activity in this period and provide the basis of his later work. Here for the first time in English is Jung's introduction to his core psychological theories and methods, delivered in the summer of 1934.

With candor and wit, Jung shares with his audience the path he himself took to understanding the nature of consciousness and the unconscious. He describes their respective characteristics using examples from his clinical experience as well as from literature, his travels, and everyday life. For Jung, consciousness is like a small island in the ocean of the unconscious, while the unconscious is part of the primordial condition of humankind. Jung explains various methods for uncovering the contents of the unconscious, in particular talk therapy and dream analysis.

Complete with explanations of Jungian concepts and terminology, Consciousness and the Unconscious painstakingly reconstructs and translates these talks from detailed shorthand notes by attendees, making a critical part of Jung's work available to today's readers.

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When Jung started lecturing for his second semester at ETH Zurich, on 20 April 1934, he had a full workload amid the turbulent times in the world surrounding him. Apart from his clinical practice, and the time he devoted to the preparation and delivery of these lectures, he ended the Visions seminar on 21 March 1934 (Jung, 1977) and a few weeks later, on 2 May 1934, started a new seminar on Nietzsche's Zarathustra (Jung, 1988). He had also become engaged in the Eranos meetings in Ascona, organized by Olga Frobe-Kapteyn. He had given a talk at its first meeting, in August 1933 (Jung, 1933a), and would do so at its second meeting the following year. In general, these years were marked by his turn to the intense study of alchemy (see below), as he embarked on a new area of investigation that occupied more and more of his time.

In addition, he published, in 1934, The Reality of the Soul: Applications and Advances of Modern Psychology, an anthology with contributions from Hugo Rosenthal, Emma Jung, and W. M. Kranefeldt (Jung et a1.,1934), and a number of smaller texts, including his rejoinder to Gustav Bally (Bally, 1934; Jung, 1934e); "The state of psychotherapy today" (Jung, 1934a); "The soul and death" (Jung, 1934c); "Archetypes of the collective unconscious" (his Eranos lecture; Jung, 1934d); and a number of greetings, forewords and afterwords, and reviews.

Hardly anything of these activities, however, is reflected in the lectures. Instead of sharing his interests at the time with his audience, he went back to his beginnings.16 As he had already pointed out at the beginning of the first semester, any questions addressed to him (which were to be sent to him through the post) should be strictly "within the scope of these lectures, rather than broaching the future of European currencies, for instance, or the prospects of National Socialism, etc." (Jung, 2018, p. 2). He wanted to present himself as an "objective" university professor, limiting himself to psychology and its history sensu stricto. He had, in the first semester, given an overview of the field and presented various theories and systems of thought in a historical survey, as well as discussing in detail two historic case

histories, thus setting the background for his own views, and situating himself in a line of pre-eminent thinkers over the centuries. He was now ready to cautiously move toward an elucidation of his own theories, which he did by retracing his own steps in developing them.

He was in his late fifties, and would turn fifty-nine on 26 July. He had long since gained an independent standpoint vis-à-vis the theories of his erstwhile teachers and mentors, such as Theodore Flournoy, Pierre Janet, Eugen Bleuler, and Sigmund Freud. In an "Address on the occasion of the founding of the C. G. Jung Institute," on 24 April 1948, Jung gave a succinct summary of his own development (1948, S 1130):

> As you know, it is nearly fifty years since I began my work as a psychiatrist.... Freud and Janet had just begun to lay the foundations of methodology and clinical observation, and Flournoy in Geneva had made his contribution to the art of psychological biography... . With the help of Wundt's association experiment, I was trying to evaluate the peculiarities of neurotic states of mind ... my purpose was to investigate what appeared to be the most subjective and most complicated psychic process of all, namely, the associative reaction... This work led directly to a new question, namely the problem of attitude... From these researches there emerged a psychological typology ... and four function-types.... From the beginning ... [this] went hand in hand with an investigation of unconscious processes. This led, about 1912, to the actual discovery of the collective unconscious.... This expansion found expression in the collaboration with the sinologist Richard Wilhelm and the indologist Heinrich Zimmer.

In short, he had extensively and intensively traveled both the inner and outer worlds. Starting from humble origins, he had become a worldrenowned, if highly controversial, figure, scientifically as well as politically. And now, after having resigned from his lectureship at the University of Zurich in 1913 as a Privatdocent, he was reentering the world of academia, and would shortly become a full university professor at ETH in 1935.

One can say that he had arrived at the zenith of his career. His old rival

erstwhile friend, Sigmund Freud, still cast a long shadow, however. Although Jung had secured the highest academic position, had gathered a Liege international followership around him, had developed an all-enc^mpassing psychological theory that was much talked about, had become a sought-after interview partner in international media, had acquired friends and donors among the famous, rich, and mighty in finance, politics, nobility, academia and science, literature and the arts, and had become a household name in many circles all over the world—still his name was often mentioned only in connection with Freud. Even today, as Sonu Shamdasani observed, Freud and Jung are the two "names that most people first think of in connection with psychology" (in Jung, 2009, p. 193). More often than not they were not named as equals, however, but Jung was portrayed as Freud's former disciple and follower, as someone, like Alfred Adler (who often completed the trio), who had further developed Freud's theory and method, and was either praised or criticized for it, but was still perceived as coming second after Freud, the "original" innovator who had opened up a whole new field of psychological investigation and treatment. The number of his followers, the "Jungian," never surpassed a quarter of the membership of Freud's International Psycho-Analytical Association (IPA), and they were also much more loosely and less effectively organized (cf. Falzeder, 2012).

This was especially so in Germany, where Jung for obvious reasons also wanted to create a strong foothold and not be eclipsed by Freud and the Freudians. As he still wrote in a letter of 1932, even if with a bit of coquettish understatement: "I am just beginning to get known in German speaking countries" (1972, p. 151). Or even, in 1933: "as a matter of fact, there are only few people who have realized that I am saying something other than Freud. Unfortunately, I am unknown in Germany.... I also want to correct the impression that I emerged from Freud's school" (ibid., p. 161). It was his conviction, however, that the development of psychotherapy in Germany would be decisive for its future in general. Shortly before the start of the term, on 28 March 1934, he wrote to Max Guggenheim: "Freud once told me quite accurately: 'The fate of psychotherapy will be decided in Germany.' At first it was absolutely doomed, because it was regarded as completely Jewish. This prejudice I have stopped through my intervention" (ibid., p. 203).

But even if Jung was successful in gaining some ground among psychotherapists in Germany, and had also succeeded in having bylaws passed that individual members of the International General Medical Society for Psychotherapy (IGMSP)—that is, German Jews who were banned from membership in the German chapter of the IGMSP by the Nazis—could become individual members, this affected primarily the practical psychotherapeutic application of analytical psychology. The members of the IGMSP, as psychotherapists, were mostly practicing medical doctors, and only a few of them did important theoretical work or had ties to academia. Here, at ETH, in his new role as a university professor, he faced a different challenge.

Freud had been appointed Professor extraordinarius at the University of Vienna in 1902. This was a merely nominal title, but apart from giving prestige and being bound to attract patients, it also gave him the right to give lectures. After having lectured there for thirty years, he gave his last lecture series in the winter terms of 1915/1916 and 1916/1917, which were then published in 1917 under the title Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis (Freud, 1916-1917). This became "Freud's most popular book." Writing in 1955, Ernest Jones listed "five German editions, in addition to several pocket ones issued.... It was translated into sixteen languages.... There have been five English editions and two American ones" (Jones, 1955, p. 218).

In March 1932, Freud began writing a new series of his Introductory Lectures, which appeared in book form on 6 December 1932 (Freud, 1933; Freud and Eitingon, 2004, p. 841). These were actually not held at the university, and were written mainly to help the floundering Internationaler Psychoanalytischer Verlag, to which he donated his royalties. These Lectures did, however, keep the dialogue format and continued the numbering of the previous Lectures. Both sets of lectures were not specifically addressed to analysts but to the, now imagined, "multitude of educated people" (ibid., p. 6), and presented to them "what novelties, and what improvements it may be, the intervening time has introduced into psychoanalysis" (ibid., p. 7).

Jung was well aware of this and had indeed obtained a copy of the New Introductory Lectures. How did he himself try to address "the multitude of educated people," his own wider audience? What were his own "Introductory Lectures on Analytical Psychology"? He had all but completed his own mature theoretical edifice. Nearly all the elements were there: theory of complexes, the collective unconscious and the archetypes, persona, shadow, anima/animus, the self, individuation, symbology, circumambulation, enantiodromia, dream theory, typology and the four functions, active imagination

("transcendent function"), and so forth, and the germs of synchronicity (see, e.g., pp. 20-30). After having found in 1928, through Wilhelm, what he thought was an independent confirmation (outside the field of psychiatry) of his views and experiences, he took up the comparative study of Eastern texts, first in collaboration with Jakob Hauer and Heinrich Zimmer (cf. Jung, 1996; in prep. [1933]). And after having identified the Secret of the Golden Flower as an "alchemical treatise," he embarked on his immersion into alchemy and the mysterium coniunctionis: "it was the text of the Golden Flower that first put me on the right track. For in medieval alchemy we have the long-sought connecting link between Gnosis and the processes of the collective unconscious that can be observed in modern man" (Jung, 1938, p. 4). And indeed he spent the rest of his life studying the psychology of Western alchemy and Christian symbolism. Barbara Hannah dates the beginning of his serious study of alchemy to the spring of 1934. It was at this time that he engaged Marie-Louise von Franz as a research assistant to work on alchemy, as his Greek and Latin were rusty (Hannah, 1976, p. 229). <>

Jews and the Qur'an by Meir M. Bar-Asher, translated by Ethan Rundell, Foreword by Mustafa Akyol [Princeton University Press, 9780691211350]

A compelling book that casts the Qur'anic encounter with Jews in an entirely new light

In this panoramic and multifaceted book, Meir Bar-Asher examines how Jews and Judaism are depicted in the Qur'an and later Islamic literature, providing needed context to those passages critical of Jews that are most often invoked to divide Muslims and Jews or to promote Islamophobia. He traces the Qur'anic origins of the protection of Jews and other minorities living under the rule of Islam, and shows how attitudes toward Jews in Shi'i Islam are substantially different from those in Sunni Islam. Bar-Asher sheds light on the extraordinary contribution of Jewish tradition to the Muslim exegesis of the Qur'an, and draws important parallels between Jewish religious law, or halakha, and shari'a law.

An illuminating work on a topic of vital relevance today, Jews and the Qur'an offers a nuanced understanding of Islam's engagement with Judaism in the time of Muhammad and his followers, and serves as a needed corrective to common misperceptions about Islam.

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Excerpt: the present work seeks to consider the nature of the affinities between Islam and Judaism. To do so, it is indispensable to return to the sources—that is, to the issues at play in the Qur'an itself. As it is neither possible nor fair to consider the Qur'an in isolation from the literature to which it gave rise, however, I will also as far as possible consider the Islamic religious literature that draws its inspiration from the Qur'an: the oral tradition attributed to the Prophet of Islam, known as the Hadith; the

commentaries on the Qur'an; the Islamic polemical literature against Judaism, and so on. The same dynamic characterizes Judaism, for the written and oral Torah are also inextricably mixed. Very often, it is impossible to understand Qur'anic text and context without appealing to the post-Qur'anic tradition. At the very least, this oral tradition allows us to grasp how, at various periods, Muslims understood the Qur'an. This is why a11 of this book's chapters call upon post-Qur'anic sources to varying degrees.

I have attempted to account for the Qur'anic relationship to the Jews across all of its shades and gradations, from the brightest to the most somber. Jews, their religion and their Holy Scriptures are quite frequently mentioned in the Qur'an. It recounts many well-known biblical episodes in close detail, some of them more than once. These include: the history of the Patriarchs; the servitude of the children of Israel in the land of Pharaoh; their departure from Egypt; their arrival and settling of the Holy Land; and the giving of the Torah. One also finds references to various miracles that occurred to the children of Israel during their time in the desert: the pillar of cloud that accompanied them; the manna from heaven; the quail that fell from the sky; and the water that sprang forth from a rock to slake the people's thirst.

The biblical figures whose stories are mentioned several times include those of Abraham and his family; Lot and his kin; Moses and the children of Israel's suffering in Egypt; and, in passing, the story of the scouts sent by Moses before entering the Promised Land; David and Solomon, Jonah (Yunus), also called Dhu 1-nun (the man of the fish), Job (Ayyub), and many others.

It is not only the voices of the Bible's heroes that we hear in the Qur'an. Faith and law—public, private, and religious—all occupy a very prominent place, in the text and all show extensive evidence of cross-pollination with Biblical and other Jewish sources. These we will discuss later.

First let us consider the extent and depth of the ties joining the Qur'an to the Bible and postbiblical Judaism, a question that has of course been much debated by scholars. In this book, I shall present the historical and cultural context in which Islam emerged by describing in detail Judaism as it was practiced by the Jews of Arabia at the time Muhammad began his prophetic career. As recounted by Muslim tradition, this period spanned twelve years, from 610 to 622, and follows Muhammad from Mecca, his birthplace, to Yathrib, later known as al-Madina (Medina). Muhammad is said to have come into contact with

Jews primarily in Medina and its surroundings, where he was active during the last ten years of his life, from 622 to 632. It was there that he learned their religion and history.

The book will first present the historical background of the encounter between Jews and Arabs in the centuries preceding the advent of Islam, mainly as related by Arab sources, and will later explore early relations between Jews and Muslims. We will then look at the image of Jews and Judaism presented by the Qur'an.

We shall begin by examining the terminology and various names by which the Qur'an refers to Jews. I shall identify the characteristics of each of these names and what they tell us about how the Jews and their religion were regarded. Three terms will receive particular attention: banu isra'il (the children of Israel, al yahud (Jews) and ahl al-kitab (the People of the Book).

I will then note the various, contradictory ways in which the Qur'an depicts Jews and their religion. On the one hand, there are the positive declarations: the Israelites are presented as the chosen people upon whom God lavished his kindness, freeing them from slavery in Egypt, bestowing upon them the Torah, creating prophets in their midst, and leading them to the Promised Land. On the other hand, they are presented as a people that broke its Covenant with God, reverted to idolatry, falsified the God-given Torah, and killed the prophets sent to restore them to the straight and narrow path. In short, a people who, by virtue of having broken their Covenant with God, were unworthy of alliance: "0 you who believe, do not take the Jews and Christians as friends. They are friends of each other" (Q 5:51).

The last two chapters, in particular, call for an additional word of explanation. Devoted to the "Qur'anic foundations of the legal status of Jews under Islamic domination," Chapter s might at first glance seem a doubtful fit in this book to the degree that it concerns politico-theological developments that took place after the Qur'anic source had achieved its final form. Its inclusion is nevertheless justified by the fact that this process, though not "Qur'anic" in itself, drew upon Qur'anic verses in elucidating the legal status of Jews and other religious minorities. The same goes for Chapter 6, devoted to "the place of Judaism and Jews in Twelver Shi`ism": while it is true that these are late developments in Islam, they appeal to notions that are in fact discussed in the Qur'an itself. This closing chapter also allows us to move beyond a strictly Sunni majoritarian vantage point to encompass the Shi`i world that, minoritarian though it maybe, is none the less powerful. It is estimated that the various Shi`i branches count 150 million followers, or a tenth of the world's Muslim population; and within Shi`ism, the Twelver branch occupies by far the majority position today.

This book seeks to reveal the extent to which the two religions are inextricably entwined—at once close and distant, friendly and hostile. This ambivalence lies at the heart of Islam's relationship to Judaism and the Jews, and it assumes several aspects that are worth exploring. It may be detected in the Qur'an's complex attitude toward the Bible. On the one hand, the Qur'an sees the Bible as a text revealed by God to the human race and thus as a book capable of authenticating the revelation offered Muhammad in the Qur'an, as both have the same divine source. On the other hand, the Qur'an sees the Bible as a book given the Jews that lost its value after they knowingly altered it, among other reasons so as to remove all references to the future advent of Muhammad and the new religion he would bring into the world. It goes without saying that the Bible's falsification renders it inferior to the Qur'an, which is considered to be the authentic word of God. In other words, the Jews are as much

People of the Book (ahl al-kitab) as they are "an ass carrying books" (Q 62:5)—that is, a people bearing an immense heritage on their shoulders but of which they are ignorant and which, in reality, they do not deserve.

The Qur'an's ambiguity vis-à-vis the biblical (and postbiblical) heritage is also evident in Qur'anic law. Everything that concerns prayer, fasting, dietary rules, purity, and impurity bears a clear relation to the Bible and post-biblical Jewish sources. Yet one also observes many laws that exhibit a deliberate desire to draw away from Judaism. Among the most striking examples, one may note the decision to shift the direction of prayer (qibla) from Jerusalem to Mecca, changes to the fasting (sawm) and dietary laws, and revisions to the calendar, a subject we will revisit.

The links between the Qur'an and the Bible have been noted from the earliest days of Islamic studies and the pioneering work of Abraham Geiger, best known as a founding father of the Jewish reformist

movement in Germany. In 1833, he published his study, *Was hat Mohammed aus dem Judenthume aufgenommen?* (translated as, Islam and Judaism), in Bonn. A large number of scholars have followed his lead. I will only cite a few of them here, all of whom devoted major studies to the ties between Judaism and Islam. In his book, *Koranische Untersuchungen* (Qur'anic Studies), which appeared in Berlin and Leipzig in 1926, Josef Horowitz identified the various passages where the Qur'an and the biblical and post-biblical sources intersect. In *Die biblischen Erzahlungen im Qoran* (Biblical Stories in the Qur'an), published in Hildesheim in 1961, Heinrich Speyer noted the many parallels between accounts in the Qur'an and those in the Bible and Talmudic literature. In the same vein, one may cite David Sidersky, *Les Origines des légen-des musulmanes dans le Coran et les vies des prophètes* ("The Origins of Muslim Legends in the Qur'an and the Lives of the Prophets").

Closer to our times, one may mention the many articles by Sidney Griffith and, more particularly, his book, **THE BIBLE IN ARABIC: THE SCRIPTURES OF THE "PEOPLE OF THE BOOK" IN THE LANGUAGE OF ISLAM**, as well as the work of Uri Rubin, especially his *Between Bible and Qur'an*. A major contribution was Jacqueline Chabbi's *Le Coran décrypté, Figures bibliques en Arable* (Paris, 2008). Daniel Sibony authored a general study, Coran et Bible en questions et réponses (Paris, 2017), and most recently we have Gabriel S. Reynolds' book, *The Qur'an and the Bible: Text and Commentary* (New Haven, 2018). These are just a few of the titles to have appeared in this proliferating field over the past two centuries. <>

MODERN MUSAR: CONTESTED VIRTUES IN JEWISH THOUGHT by Geoffrey D. Claussen, Forward by Louis E. Newman [JPS Anthologies of Jewish Thought, The Jewish Publication Society, 9780827613508]

How do modern Jews understand virtues such as courage, humility, justice, solidarity, or love? In truth: they have fiercely debated how to interpret them. This groundbreaking anthology of musar (Jewish traditions regarding virtue and character) explores the diverse ways seventy-eight modern Jewish thinkers understand ten virtues: honesty and love of truth; curiosity and inquisitiveness; humility; courage and valor; temperance and self-restraint; gratitude; forgiveness; love, kindness, and compassion; solidarity and social responsibility; and justice and righteousness. These thinkers—from the Musar movement to Hasidism to contemporary Orthodox, Reform, Conservative, Reconstructionist, Renewal, Humanist, and secular Jews—often agree on the importance of these virtues but fundamentally disagree in their conclusions. The juxtaposition of their views, complemented by Geoffrey Claussen's pointed analysis, allows us to see tensions with particular clarity—and sometimes to recognize multiple compelling ways of viewing the same virtue.

By expanding the category of musar literature to include not only classic texts and traditional works influenced by them but also the writings of diverse rabbis, scholars, and activists—men and women—who continue to shape Jewish tradition, *Modern Musar* challenges the fields of modern Jewish thought and ethics to rethink their boundaries—and invites us to weigh and refine our own moral ideals.

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The past few decades have seen a marked revival of interest in the tradition of musar, variously translated as "moral discipline" or "pietistic ethics." Though its roots are in the world of medieval ethical treatises that focus on rigorous, even severe, moral self-examination, the contemporary reappropriation of this tradition has focused largely on the cultivation of certain moral virtues, or middot. This emphasis on virtue or character clearly appeals to contemporary Jewish sensibilities, which (outside of Orthodox communities) reject a more legal, rules-based approach to ethical issues. The renewed interest in musar can be seen in the emergence of the Mussar Institute, in the initiatives by all the non-Orthodox movements to offer intensive musar training to both rabbis and laypeople, and in the proliferation of books on musar written for general audiences.

The significance of these developments is multidimensional. Musar in its contemporary inflections reflects a resurgence of interest in personal moral development, as distinct from the focus on social and political ethics that dominated much of the Jewish ethical discourse in the late twentieth century. It also dovetails with the desire among large segments of the North American Jewish community to reconnect Jewish life with spiritual life, and with a quest for meaning that many felt had been eclipsed by the post-Holocaust emphasis on Jewish identity and continuity. Finally, the interest in musar is almost certainly at least partly a corrective to the contemporary culture's emphasis on materialism and status, as well as widespread corruption and a perceived decline in personal ethics among many highly public figures.

Against this background, Geoffrey Claussen's book offers important insights into the development, scope, and diversity of the musar tradition. As a scholar of Jewish ethics whose earlier work focused on a key figure in the nineteenth-century Musar movement that sought to revive this tradition, as well as someone sympathetic to the goals of the movement, Claussen is ideally situated to guide us through its contemporary expressions. His stated aim here is to demonstrate the diversity within this tradition and so to challenge simplistic presentations of Judaism as having monolithic views on complex topics like

humility, courage, compassion, and righteousness. He does this by carefully juxtaposing diverse views on these and other key virtues in ways that highlight the controversies among these thinkers. If this were all that he achieved here, it would be a worthwhile volume and an important contribution to the growing literature on musar.

But Claussen's collection of contemporary musar texts is valuable in several other ways.

- By including a number of writers who do not explicitly identify themselves as "musar thinkers," Claussen expands the scope of this phenomenon. Many of these individuals are concerned with particular themes, among them war, interfaith dialogue, the environment, and family life, but nonetheless have much to say about the personal ethics and values that animate their approach. By highlighting the musar dimensions of their thought, Claussen shows us that this charactercentered approach to Jewish ethics is far more widespread, and takes many more forms, than has been previously acknowledged.
- The selections themselves showcase the many ways in which contemporary Jewish thinkers have drawn on a wide range of philosophical traditions and ideologies, from feminism to nationalism to universalism. The richness of the musar tradition emerges from these pages with striking clarity. Modern musar, as Claussen presents it here, is no mere adaptation of classical thinkers like Bahya ibn Pakuda or Moshe Hayyim Luzzatto. Rather, it is a dynamic tradition, very much in conversation with the intellectual movements and social trends that have shaped late twentieth- and early twenty-first-century life.
- Claussen has also brilliantly brought into conversation not only the thinkers who very much were in dialogue but also a range of thinkers who never met and, in all likelihood, would not have wanted to be in conversation even if they had. Creating this wide-ranging interchange of writers with widely disparate viewpoints and drawing out the implications of each contributor's views has the additional benefit of enabling us to see the distinctiveness of each position more fully. Like the anonymous redactor of the Talmud, Claussen has brought together the views of generations of important (and many lesserknown) thinkers so that we are drawn fully into the discourse and forced to consider what is really at stake in these debates.
- Finally, Claussen's selection of thinkers here is bold and challenging in itself. Many of these figures — Meir Kahane is a prime example — have been highly controversial within the Jewish community. Without endorsing any of the extreme positions represented here, Claussen challenges each of us to take seriously many views we might otherwise have dismissed out of hand. Importantly, he helps us to see that all of them have a place within our very wide-ranging tradition.

In all, this book is an expression of Claussen's own humility: his willingness to concede that he (and we) have something to learn even from views with which we strongly disagree. Modern Musar is an invitation to us to reconceive the boundaries and significance of this important religious-ethical tradition.

I cannot conclude this foreword without a brief personal acknowledgement. Twenty years ago, a young man showed up in my Introduction to Religion course at Carleton College, where I was then a professor of religion. Quiet and unassuming, he quickly distinguished himself as one of the most insightful and talented students I had the privilege of teaching there in more than thirty years on the faculty. He went on to take several other courses from me before he graduated and went on to

rabbinical studies and then doctoral work in the field of Jewish ethics. That former student became a valued colleague and conversation partner as well as a personal friend. And now, with the publication of this and other works in this field, he has become an important teacher as well. For this I am profoundly grateful. That he has become a major scholar and interpreter of musar is something for which we can all be grateful.

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What kinds of people should we aspire to be? What characterizes human beings at their very best? Jews have often answered these questions in the same sort of way that members of other communities have answered them: by articulating moral qualities —virtues — that people ought to possess. Diverse Jews throughout history have often agreed on the importance of moral virtues such as honesty, humility, forgiveness, compassion, and justice. But their agreement that these virtues are important does not imply that they have agreed on the meaning of these virtues. Indeed, virtues that are important to communities are almost always the subject of fierce disagreement and debate.

Students of Jewish ethics may be misled by claims that suggest otherwise. It is not uncommon for contemporary books about Jewish ethics to describe, for example, "the Jewish view of forgiveness," "the uniquely Jewish view of compassion," or "the Jewish sense of justice." Descriptions like these often reflect efforts to give authority to particular ethical views, implying that they are supported by some consensus or authentic line of tradition and casting doubt on the authentically Jewish character of dissenting opinions.

This book seeks to counter such efforts. The pages that follow introduce readers to the diversity of musar— broadly defined in this volume as Jewish discourse about virtue and character—without making claims about the authority or authenticity of any particular view. Approaching my task as a historian of modern Jewish ethics, I document how influential Jewish thinkers have developed diverse approaches to musar and how these thinkers have passionately disagreed with one another. While some have claimed that their views represent the authoritative and authentic "Jewish view," this book makes clear that when we look at the history of disagreement, debate, and dissent in Jewish ethics, it is impossible to identify "the Jewish view" of any particular virtue. This is especially clear when we focus on the modern era, a period that this book defines as beginning with the upheavals of the late eighteenth century.

Modern Jewish discourse about virtue has been highly contested. Amid massive political, economic, and cultural changes, and with the crumbling of traditional Jewish authority structures, modern Jews have had little agreement on what might constitute "Judaism" or "Jewish ethics." Over the past two and a half centuries, they have variously embraced, pushed back against, and argued about the merits of individualism, universalism, secularism, historicism, rationalism, romanticism, feminism, capitalism, socialism, communism, anarchism, and nationalism. They have spoken with very different perspectives on controversial questions regarding national identity, religion, and politics; questions regarding gender, sexuality, and family; questions regarding the existence and character of God; questions regarding the authority and meaning of the Torah's laws and narratives; questions regarding the ethics of war and violence; questions regarding the relationship between humans and nonhuman animals; questions regarding the relationship between Jews and non-Jews; and questions regarding the Holocaust, Zionism, and the establishment of the State of Israel. Amid debates on these topics and many others, they have

articulated very different perspectives on virtues such as honesty, curiosity, humility, courage, self-restraint, gratitude, forgiveness, love, solidarity, and justice.

The Genre of Musar

Jewish literature that discusses virtue and character is often known in Hebrew as sifrut musar—"musar literature," where the word musar (sometimes spelled mussar) may be translated as "moral discipline," "moral instruction," "moral correction," or simply "morality" or "ethics." This term is generally used to refer to writing that discusses character traits, especially writing that defines virtues, recommends their acquisition, and teaches how to acquire them. Musar literature is a form of normative ethical literature — literature that makes explicit claims about how human beings should think, feel, speak, or act. It may be distinguished from another prominent form of normative Jewish literature, halakhic literature, which defines rules and laws. While halakhic literature teaches norms for conduct, musar literature points to ideals of character—not just how people should act, but what people should be like.

Scholars have sometimes defined the "classical" form of musar literature as books organized around particular aspects of the ideal life, with sections of musar texts typically devoted to individual virtues treated one at a time. For example, a popular medieval treatise in this form, Rabbi Bahya ibn Pakuda's eleventh-century Book of Direction to the Duties of the Heart, includes chapters devoted to humility, asceticism, and love of God, among other topics; an early modern classic of this genre, Rabbi Moshe Hayyim Luzzatto's Path of the Upright (1740), includes sections on watchfulness, zeal, and the fear of sin. But virtue-focused literature— that is, musar literature — in the medieval and early modern periods took a variety of other forms: ethical letters, treatises, monographs, homilies, commentaries on classical texts, and even stories and poems. Musar literature is appropriately defined not by a particular literary form but by its focus on virtue and character.

In the modern era, musar literature has continued to be produced in the classical form of books that devote individual chapters to individual virtues. Some examples discussed in this volume include The Book of Moral Accounting (Sefer Heshbon ha-Nefesh, 1808) by Menahem Mendel Lefin, a leader of the Haskalah (Jewish Enlightenment) movement in Poland; The Book of Character Traits (Sefer ha-Middot, 1811) by the Hasidic rabbi Nahman of Bratslav, Ukraine; Wondrous Adviser (Pele Yo'etz, 1824) by the Bulgarian Sephardic rabbi Eliezer Papo; or, more recently, The Jewish Moral Virtues (1999) by the American Reform movement's Rabbi Eugene Borowitz and Frances Schwartz.

Other modern musar literature discussed in this volume replicates other forms mentioned above — letters, treatises, monographs, homilies, and commentaries. And as new literary forms have emerged in recent centuries, musar literature has found expression in those forms as well. Thus, for example, when the Lithuanian rabbi Israel Salanter sought to found a mass movement focused on musar literature and the development of moral virtue in the mid-1800s—what came to be called the "Musar movement"—he wrote not only ethical letters and homilies but also journal articles, using a new literary form that could help him communicate his moral teachings. When Jewish ethicists, philosophers, and theologians in contemporary academic settings have sought to communicate their ideas about virtues, they have also written journal articles, though these are guided by contemporary academic norms and so take a very different form from Salanter's. Other Jewish thinkers have laid out their conceptions of virtues in books, essays, articles, or (more recently) blog posts. Writings focused on virtues, in all of these forms, constitute important examples of modern musar

writings that take diverse forms and illustrate the broad diversity of modern Jewish approaches to virtue.

About This Book

This volume is organized around ten particular virtues or closely related qualities, with each chapter devoted to a different virtue or set of related virtues: honesty and love of truth; curiosity and inquisitiveness; humility; courage and valor; self-restraint and temperance; gratitude; forgiveness; love, kindness, and compassion; solidarity and social responsibility; and justice and righteousness. As such, this volume itself would seem to take the form of a classical musar text. But this book is not a work of normative literature that makes claims about what kinds of people its readers should aspire to be and what characterizes human beings at their very best. Rather, it is a work of descriptive literature that demonstrates how diverse Jewish thinkers have made claims about what human beings should be like.

I have not chosen these ten qualities because I think they are the most important virtues for modern Jews to cultivate; rather, I have chosen them because they have been appreciated and thoroughly debated by a broad range of influential Jewish thinkers, from a wide range of perspectives, diverse geographic locations, and various time periods from the late eighteenth century to the present. These virtues have appealed to Jews who might be viewed as more "liberal" or "conservative" or "Orthodox"; Jews who might be viewed as "religious" or "secular"; and Jews of various genders, sexual orientations, and racial and ethnic backgrounds. In seeking virtues that would be embraced by a particularly broad range of Jews, I have excluded virtues, such as "love of God" or "fear of sin," that large groups of Jews have plainly rejected. The selected virtues are more broadly popular but are also, at the same time, fiercely contested.

Likewise, I have chosen the primary sources included in this volume because I believe they illustrate significant tensions or arguments—and not because I think they are the most compelling or inspirational texts. Some of the selected texts express views that I personally find problematic, disturbing, even horrifying, and readers are likely to judge certain selections negatively as well. Understanding the diversity of modern Jewish thought requires understanding both the modern Jewish thought that we judge positively and the modern Jewish thought we judge negatively.

That having been said, I hope that this volume may stimulate readers to think about how the virtues under discussion play out in their own lives, and to weigh and refine their own ethical perspectives. One of the most important reasons to study the history of ethics, with all of its warts and blemishes, is that the honest study of the past can help to inspire our ethics in the present. Studying the past may encourage us to learn from the past, and it may also help us to see how we might improve on or reject models from the past. And Jewish ethical approaches are improved when we are able to evaluate a broad range of sources and locate our own judgments within the wide terrain of modern Jewish thinking. As such, I intend this volume not only for readers whose primary motivation is to understand modern Jewish thought from a distance but also for those whose primary motivation is to gain instruction from the history of modern Jewish thought. This volume encourages the critical study of modern Jewish ethics, but it may also encourage thinking critically about one's own ethical formation. Whether read in a classroom setting, an adult-education setting, a musar or other group, with a havruta, or on one's own, this volume invites us to consider our own moral ideals and moral characters

Each chapter of this volume features the writing of approximately ten Jewish thinkers from diverse times, locations, and perspectives, generally presented chronologically. Each is a Jewish thinker who was (or is) in a position of relative influence in shaping the attitudes of other Jews. The seventy-eight Jewish thinkers featured in the volume (some appear in more than one chapter) are elite figures: most of them have either rabbinical ordination, a doctorate, a public profile as an author, or some combination of these. Rabbis who engage with classical Jewish texts are especially well represented— not because I am claiming that their perspectives are more authentic or that their positions best represent modern Jewish ethics, but because their disparate uses of shared texts illuminate how virtues have been contested.

These diverse Jewish thinkers have generally agreed that the virtue they are discussing is important but have disagreed about its character, its significance, and how it ought to be applied. Often the sources that I have selected focus on the same issue, employ similar language, or quote the same classical text—and are in disagreement or in tension. The juxtaposition of these sources allows us to see these tensions with particular clarity.

Many influential thinkers are included in this volume, though influence has not been the decisive criterion for inclusion and there are many influential Jewish thinkers whose writing does not appear here. The twenty-one thinkers discussed in more than one selection across chapters —Rebecca Alpert, Hannah Arendt, Shalom Arush, Shalom Noah Berez^vsky, Eliyahu Eliezer Dessler, Amy Eilberg, Marc Ellis, Natan Tzevi Finkel, Emma Goldman, Abraham Joshua Heschel, Menahem Mendel Lefin, Emmanuel Levinas, Meir Kahane, Abraham Isaac Kook, Amanda Mbuvi, Nahman of Bratslav, Judith Plaskow, Susan Schnur, Shneur Zalman of Liadi, Sherwin Wine, and ShmulyYanklowitz—receive particular attention because their writings fit particularly well into the debates featured in this book.

Seeking to highlight disagreement, I have sometimes featured thinkers and sources that are particularly provocative, idiosyncratic, or radical. Some readers may wonder whether some of these sources should count as "Jewish," because their views seem too extreme or because they don't seem strongly connected to Jewish communities or traditions in the way that certain readers consider normative. But such thinkers and sources are part of the history of modern Jewish ethics, both in their own right and also because of the influence they have had (or have sought) in shaping the perspectives of other Jews. I have sought to include a wide range of thinkers who identify as Jewish and who have (for the most part) had interest or success in shaping Jewish identities, communities, or traditions, even if their writings quoted in this volume are not primarily directed at a Jewish audience. And while, to be sure, not all of the sources in this volume claim to represent authentic or authoritative musar, all of them represent perspectives that have been of interest to some groups of modern Jews, especially modern Jews considering how their Jewish identities might inform their moral lives.

The decision about which voices should be included in this volume has also been shaped by a desire to include figures from a range of modern Jewish movements. Particular attention has been given to those Ashkenazi Orthodox movements in Europe, the United States, and Israel among which the production of modern musar literature has especially flourished. As Joseph Dan, the leading contemporary scholar of musar literature, has noted, the Hasidic and Musar movements were particularly prolific in producing musar literature in the eighteenth, nineteenth, and early twentieth centuries; such literature was also produced by the Mitnagdic movement (non-Hasidic Lithuanian traditionalists, e.g., Hayyim of Volozhin),

the Religious Zionist movement (e.g., the writings of Abraham Isaac Kook), and other Orthodox movements in the United States and Israel following the Holocaust.

Dan's presentation of modern musar, however, neglects to note the flourishing of musar literature produced by non-Orthodox Jews. This volume adds to Dan's discussion by pointing out how prominent figures associated with the Reform movement, such as Hermann Cohen and Kaufmann Kohler, wrote about the virtues in the early twentieth century. So did secular Zionists including, for example, Mikhah Yosef Berdichevsky. Later in the twentieth century, musar writing was produced by rabbis associated with the Conservative movement such as Abraham Joshua Heschel, rabbis associated with the Reconstructionist movement such as Mordecai Kaplan, rabbis associated with the Reform movement such as Eugene Borowitz, and rabbis from Humanistic Judaism such as Sherwin Wine. Looking to more recent writing, this volume highlights the contributions of female rabbis such as Amy Eilberg and Danya Ruttenberg (Conservative), Sandra Lawson and Rebecca Alpert (Reconstructionist), Ruth Abusch-Magder and Karyn Kedar (Reform), and Lynn Gottlieb (Jewish Renewal).

That said, Jewish movements such as these include diverse ethical perspectives, and any particular text should not be taken as representative of that movement. Similarly, readers are cautioned not to judge a particular thinker's ethical perspective solely based on the selections featured in this volume. Since these texts were chosen because of the ways in which they contrast with other perspectives, and not because they epitomize the thought of any particular thinker, individual thinkers may not always be well represented by a given selection. I hope that readers interested in particular figures will be inspired to read more of their writings.

Nor should any particular text be taken as representative of Judaism or Jewish ethics. Many of the views presented here could be—or have been—portrayed as "the Jewish perspective," "the view of Jewish ethics," "the musar perspective," or "the view of the Torah," but this volume invites readers to challenge such claims. As you will see, there are many different Jewish perspectives, many different views of Jewish ethics, many different musar perspectives, and many different views of the Torah. Modern Jewish ethics in general, and modern musar in particular, has been complex, multivocal, dynamic, and highly contested. <>

THE SAMARITANS: A BIBLICAL PEOPLE edited by Steven Fine [Brill, 9789004466906]

THE SAMARITANS: A BIBLICAL PEOPLE celebrates the culture of the Israelite Samaritans, from biblical times to our own day. An international team of historians, folklorists, a documentary filmmaker and contemporary artists have come together to explore ways that Samaritans, Jews, Christians, and Muslims have interacted, often shunned and always interpreted one another across the expanse of western civilization.

Written for both the general reader and the scholar, **THE SAMARITANS: A BIBLICAL PEOPLE** is a centerpiece of the Israelite Samaritans Project of the Yeshiva University Center for Israel Studies. This exquisitely illustrated volume celebrates a traveling exhibition produced jointly with the Museum of the Bible in Washington D.C.

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From the Heights of Mount Gerizim

The day of the Passover sacrifice, the qorban, is the most honored and greatest day for the Samaritan community. My father and older brothers told us that on one of the sacrifice days there remained only half an hour [before the end of the time prescribed for the sacrifice on Passover eve], and they had no sheep to slaughter. They could not find sheep anywhere in the city [of Nablus]! This distressed them greatly and they prayed to God. They asked: "What should we do, there are no sheep!"

Suddenly, from a distance, they heard bells ringing, coming closer. They saw a shepherd coming, and he had an entire flock of sheep! They asked him: "Will you sell them to us?" He said to them: "Yes, I will sell them to you. How many would you like?" They took two or three sheep and said: "We will take them now, and bring you back the money later." They came to slaughter the sheep at the time of the sacrifice.

Suddenly, a group of evil men came upon them, many in number, and threatened ominously. They said: "You will not sacrifice the qorban today." My father said to them: "If I do not sacrifice the qorban today, I will no longer be considered a Samaritan."

Suddenly, horsemen arrived from somewhere, saw what was happening, threatened the evil ones, and chased them away. The Samaritans managed to sacrifice the qorban on time, ate it, completed the ceremony, and later went looking for the shepherd to pay him. They were not able to find him. They were very happy to have been able to fulfill the commandment, offering the Paschal sacrifice.

There has never been a time when the people of Israel did not sacrifice the Passover qorban!

— Badri Cohen

Badri Cohen lives in the Samaritan community of Kiryat Luza, near the summit of Mount Gerizim, above modern Nablus, biblical Shechem. The wife of a communal prayer leader, a ^azz an, and daughter of a high priest, Badri is herself a leader of the Samaritan people. The story translated here from her spoken Arabic was collected and edited by filmmaker Moshe Alafi as part of the YU Israelite Samaritans Project. Badri's tale is set in a simpler, even mythic, time. It happened when "she was perhaps one year old," and before the Samaritan Passover was transformed into a tourist attraction during the early decades of the twentieth century. It encapsulates the spiritual and historical experience of the Samaritans, a window into this tightly patriarchal culture, as told to Badri by her "father and older brothers." These kohanim, elite members of the priestly class caste, we are told, were leading participants in this unfolding drama.

The tale takes place in the city of Nablus and upon holy Mount Gerizim, the "blessed mountain," which is believed by the Samaritans to have been "chosen by God" above all others. It is set at Passover, the high point of the Samaritan calendar, when the entire community ascends to the peak of Gerizim to slaughter, roast, and eat the Passover sacrifice—the qorban. Badri today lives near the sacrifice compound. She was filmed in the community center, which was built between the sacrificial compound and the synagogue. The entire Nablus Samaritan community relocated here as a result of difficulties experienced in Nablus during the Intifada of 1987.

This is a tale of deprivation, persecution, faith, and deliverance —typical of stories passed from generation to generation by "the people of Israel"—as Badri refers to the Samaritans. These descendants of the biblical Northern Kingdom of Israel, the capital of which was in Shomron, Samaria,

refer to themselves as the Shemarim—"the guardians" of the Torah. In this way, they transform the geographical designation used by outsiders, Shomronim, "Samaritans." Their will to "keep" the biblical commandments, especially to perform the Paschal sacrifice atop the Holy Mountain, is central to their identity.

Three events appear "suddenly" in our highly structured narrative. Each marks a "sudden" transition, seemingly out of the blue. In the first, a shepherd appears, his presence announced by bells worn by his sheep to track their locations. He supplies sheep for the sacrifice at the last possible minute, near dusk before the start of Passover. This liminal moment at the border of sacred time is a moment of transformation—and miracles. The Samaritans cannot pay for the sheep immediately, perhaps signaling their poverty, likely owing to the closeness of the holiday, on which Samaritans do not carry money. This arrangement is accepted by the amenable shepherd. In the second, marauders appear to prevent the sacrifice. In the third, multiple horsemen—"the cavalry" in cinematic terms—appear to protect the defenseless Samaritans. These three episodes (this number providing a sense of completeness) reflect the precarious lot of the Samaritans, who were steadfast in their adherence to their tradition while impoverished, persecuted, and in need of protection throughout the nineteenth century and well into the twentieth. Poverty and the animus of their neighbors always threatened this small community (141 in 1920). Finally, horsemen—note that under Islamic law non-Muslims were not allowed to ride horses—sweep in from nowhere to save the Samaritans and the qorban. At the turn of the twentieth century, the sacrifice was, in fact, protected by Turkish soldiers from disturbance by local hooligans.

The appearances of the shepherd and of the horsemen are portrayed as acts of divine deliverance. These are intensified by the disappearance of the shepherd before he could be paid. The righteousness of the then-impoverished Samaritans, who "went looking" for the shepherd to pay him, is emphasized. Significantly, the unnamed shepherd is the only non-Samaritan with a speaking part. In Jewish terms, the shepherd is a kind of an "Elijah the Prophet" figure, a divinely ordained intermediary stepping in at a critical moment, who then disappears, as do the horsemen. They represent divine intervention, support, and favor. The three sections of our tale together illustrate the concluding assertion that "there has never been a time when the people of Israel did not sacrifice the Passover qorban!" This is a widely held statement of faith and pride among Samaritans, who claim to have faithfully carried out the sacrifice on Mount Gerizim every year since Joshua Son of Nun erected the Tabernacle there thousands of years ago.

This story asserts just how fragile that thread of tradition is; one Passover missed, Badri believes, and an individual (and perhaps the entire community) is excised from the people—karet in biblical terms. It simultaneously exemplifies the resilience of the Samaritan people, expressing their sense of continuity from the first Passover to our own days. On numerous occasions throughout Samaritan history—during the nineteenth century and before—Samaritans were, in fact, barred by their neighbors from performing the sacrifice on Mount Gerizim. That Badri knows nothing of this lapse and nostalgically imagines a far more simple age is a testament to the absolute commitment of the Samaritans to their sacred memory with its emphasis on communal continuity and personal responsibility for the future of "the people of Israel."

The Samaritans: A Biblical People is a book of memories preserved by Samaritans, Jews, Muslims, and Christians. It is a cacophony of stories, objects, and other documents: a curated group of snapshots of

the Samaritans and their culture from the time of Moses to our own present. It is a metaphoric stroll "in the vineyards of Samaria," as Raphael Kirchheim lovingly titled the first Hebrew exploration of Samaritanism in 1851, Karme Shomron. Many of the texts discussed here are drawn directly from Samaritan literature, while others reflect the ways that Jews, Christians, and Muslims have interacted with and thought about Samaritans across history. Each of the articles that make up this book begins with one of these documents, which serves as the focal point for a "thick description" of this shared past. The articles are arranged chronologically and written in a way that we hope is inviting. They begin, as traditional Samaritan history books often do, with the entry of the Children of Israel into the Land of Israel, the establishment of the Tabernacle of Moses on Mount Gerizim, and continue on to the present. By far, the longest and most sustained relationship explored here is that between Samaritans and Jews—the descendants of the northern tribes of Israel and the descendants of Judah to the south.

In this focus on stories, our volume is unique. The focal texts, interpreted by the community of academic scholars assembled here, allow us a glimpse into the world of the Samaritans and their place in Western culture—in ways long known but seldom articulated—as an accessible cultural history. It also allows a glimpse into ourselves—that is, our interests, interpretative choices, and the good will that each of the authors holds toward the traditions of the others. This amity itself is very contemporary, and in itself is a very complicated piece of our story. That the Israelite Samaritans Project has been organized by Yeshiva University, and the exhibition in partnership with the Museum of the Bible, is no small feat. The perspectives brought to bear by our communities are an essential part of the project. This is a tale of a real people over a very long span of time—the books they wrote, write, and record; the artifacts they create; the tensions that separate them; and the commonalities that bind them together.

We open this volume with issues that stand at the center of Samaritan identity. In "'The Consolation of Souls, the Assurer of Hearts, and the Certainty of Truth': The Abisha Scroll," I set the tone for our project through the story of the Abisha Scroll, the most precious possession of the Shemarim. This relic is the connecting point between biblical sacred time and our own, the physical manifestation of Samaritan claims and hopes. Through a series of photographs of this scroll and the priests who preserve and interpret it, I provide a kind of overview of Samaritan beliefs, history, and interactions with Westerners. Reinhard Pummer then turns to "The Samaritan Tabernacle: From Sinai to the Mountain of Blessings," where he presents the central role of the biblical tent to Samaritan self-understanding throughout history. Its disappearance in biblical times marked the end of the idyllic Exodus wandering and Joshuas conquest of the Holy Land—when the Tabernacle came to rest on Mount Gerizim. Stefan Schorch continues this focus upon "the blessed mountain" with a warning: "'Woe to Those Who Exchanged the Truth for a Lie, When They Choose for Themselves a Different Place': Samaritan Perspectives on the Samaritan–Jewish Split." It was this biblical "parting of the ways," Samaritans believe, that set the northern Israelites and the southern Judeans on vastly different trajectories—Samaritans venerating Mount Gerizim, and Jews venerating Mount Zion and Jerusalem.

Our volume then turns to ways that Jews interacted with the Samaritans in the Greco-Roman world, from the Hasmoneans to the end of antiquity. Joseph L. Angel opens with "'Kinsmen' or an 'Alien Race?': Jews and Samaritans from the Hasmoneans to the Mishnah." Relations between Jews and Samaritans were decidedly complex during this period, ranging from warlike contempt and destruction of the Samaritan "Temple" on Mount Gerizim by John Hyrcanus I in 111–110 BCE, followed by the destruction of the Jerusalem Temple in 70 CE, followed by positive acceptance of the Samaritans by early rabbis.

This complexity is further explored by R. Steven Notley and Jeffrey P. García in "'But a Samaritan ... Had Compassion': Jesus, Early Christianity, and the Samaritans," which interprets this relationship through the prism of the early followers of Jesus of Nazareth. Finally, Shana Strauch Schick and I bring us to the end of this long period with "'Do You Have an Onion?': Rabbis and Samaritans in Late Antiquity," reading rabbinic texts edited under Christian Rome and early Islam against the grain to uncover complex and very human relationships between rabbis, regular Jews, and Samaritans.

The next two articles focus on the inner life of the Samaritans during late antiquity and beyond, with emphasis on the ancient synagogue and the Samaritans' celebration of the fall festival of Sukkot ("Tabernacles"). In "'A Place in which to Read, to Interpret and to Hear Petitions': Samaritan Synagogues," I present this institution from its earliest appearance during the Hellenistic period to the present read through the lenses of Samaritan literary sources, archeological discoveries, and modern fieldwork. In "Sukkot in the Garden of Eden: Liturgy, Christianity, and the Bronze Bird on Mount Gerizim," Laura Lieber marshals late antique literature and poetry to explore the complexities of Samaritan life under Christian Rome and the continuing implications of that experience for the Samaritan celebration of Sukkot.



JACOB SON OF UZZI, "THIS IS THE IMAGE OF THE HOLY TABERNACLE," TABERNACLE DRAWING, NABLUS, EARLY TWENTIETH CENTURY. A NOTE IN ENGLISH IN THE LEFT BOTTOM CORNER IDENTIFIES THE ARTIST AS "JACOB SON OF SHAFEEK SON OF JACOB, THE HIGH PRIEST IN NABLUS

The profound changes in the lives of Samaritans, Jews, and Christians that were wrought by the coming of Islam is the subject of Daniel Boušek's "'This Covenant of Peace for the Samaritans': The Prophet Muhammad's Encounter with a Samaritan, a Jew, and a Christian." Stories of this pact are told by all three communities, this "covenant" guaranteeing their status as "peoples of the book"— and hence their survival. For Samaritans, this status has always been precarious. Jesse Abelman then turns to Jewish interaction with the Samaritans in "'These Are the Jews of Shomron who Are Called Samaritans': Jews and Samaritans in the High Middle Ages," which explores day-to-day interactions during this period that are preserved in Jewish sources. Finally, Matthew Chalmers brings us into the Early Modern period and to the brink of the twentieth century with "'Do You Have the Chronicles of the Kings of Samaria?': Jewish Knowledge, Christian Hebraists, and the European 'Discovery' of the Samaritans."

Our sources multiply once we reach the nineteenth century, when European interest in the Samaritans exploded. We set the stage with Reuven Gafni's "Two Minorities on the Brink: Jews and Samaritans in Nineteenth-Century Nablus," which describes the complexities of survival for Samaritans during this period, how they dealt with the threat of extinction, and the aid they

received from both Europeans and the chief rabbi of Jerusalem that helped them avoid this fate. This event profoundly changed Jewish–Samaritan relations, preparing the way for Zionist support decades later. In "'T he Priest Salama Son of Ghazal and the Tailors': Palestinian Arab Justice and the Samaritans," Haseeb Shehadeh presents a thick description that encompasses both the complex world of its nineteenth-century protagonist in Ottoman Nablus and of a twentieth-century Samaritan storyteller under British Mandatory Palestine, and under Jordanian and Israeli rule. In "And We Shall be One People": Abraham Firkovich, Karaism, and the Samaritans," Golda Akhiezer introduces one of the most colorful characters to encounter the Samaritans during the nineteenth century. Akhiezer explores Firkovich's fraught and fascinating relationship with both the Samaritans—whom he saw as kinsmen—and other Jews. Yitzchak Schwartz then describes interventions in Samaritan life by American Protestants near the turn of the twentieth century in "Samaritans on the American Protestant Mind: William Barton, Edward Warren, and the American Samaritan Committee." Finally, in "'Joined at Last': Moses Gaster and the Samaritans," Katharina E. Keim presents modern Jewish cultural interest in the Samaritans through the lens of one of the most important Jewish scholars of his age, who corresponded extensively with the legendary high priest Jacob son of Aaron.

The next cluster of articles explores aspects of the Samaritan experience with Zionism and modern Israel, bringing our exploration to the present. The late Israel Sedaka's article, "To This Day the Samaritans have Never Left Shechem and Mount Gerizim: Izhak Ben-Zvi, David Ben-Gurion, and the Samaritans," presents relations between the Israeli Samaritan community from an Israeli Samaritan perspective. David Selis and I then explore the profound changes caused by the 1967 Six-Day War through the Passover sacrifice ceremony. In "Passover, 1968: Johanna Spector, Israeli Civil Religion, and the Ethnographic Study of the Samaritans," we present this transition as experienced by American ethnographer Johanna Spector. Dina Stein then explores the real complexities of Samaritans becoming modern Israelis with "Samaritan Stories in the Israel Folktale Archives: Poetics and Cultural Exchange in Modern Israel." Changes in the relationship between the Samaritans and the modern state were profound and expressed in the ways that they told and recorded their precious stories. This complexity is further shown in "A 'Samaritan Renaissance': The Tsedaka Legacy and the Samaritan Community in Israel," in which I translate pieces of an obituary written by the late folklorist Dov Noy for Samaritan leader and scholar Ratson Tsedaka, a primary agent in the formation of modern Israeli Samaritan culture. I then continue with the work of Ratson's sons, Benyamim and Yefet, who, like their father, are essential bridges and agents of contemporary Israeli Samaritan culture. This section closes where our volume began, with six stories told to us by contemporary elders of the Samaritan people, collected by Moshe Alafi and preserved here for posterity.

In the final section, Moshe Alafi and I reflect upon our work together. We begin with Moshe Alafi's "Reflections of a Documentary Filmmaker," which presents Alafi's personal experiences while embedded with the Samaritans throughout this project. In 2020, at the height of the COVID-19 ordeal, a remarkable international group of Jewish artists assembled virtually, studied the content of our project and then set out to create art. In "Contemporary Jewish Artists Encounter Samaritan Culture: A Visual Essay," Richard McBee and I curate some of the works these artists produced. We close this volume with my own reflections, called "Why the Samaritans?" In it, I consider questions that I have fielded from people of diverse backgrounds, and share my personal experiences and responses.

Though I have divided our articles into thematic groups in this introduction, the volume itself presents a single (if multi-lane) "path" through the thicket of sources and approaches that make up Samaritan Studies. Our collective contribution intentionally crosses temporal boundaries in our attempt to capture the uniqueness of each source and moment, and, at the same time, to express the bonds that connect Samaritan culture and our own. Is this volume a complete history of the Samaritans? Absolutely not. There is so much more to say! Like a Samaritan chronicler, who updates his work even as he "copies" it —"forgetting" recent strife and emphasizing recent successes—we began at the beginning of Samaritan sacred time, and, with him, have moved forward with our own stories, interests, and scholarly methods to (and from) our own moment. <>

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