SPOTLIGHT 100

Wordtrade Reviews: Meaning Implies Thinking

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Editorial Appraisals:

Some qualified reviewers offer their own brief evaluation of the book. Otherwise, most of our content represents the authors'-editors' own words as a preview to their approach to the subject, their style and point-of-view. <>

SAD LOVE: ROMANCE AND THE SEARCH FOR MEANING
by Carrie Jenkins [Polity, 9781509539581]

As a woman with a husband and other partners, philosopher Carrie Jenkins knows that love is complicated.

Love is most often associated with happiness, satisfaction and pleasure. But it has a darker side we ignore at our peril. Love is often an uncomfortable and difficult feeling. The people we love can let us

down badly. And the ways we love are often quite different to the romantic ideals society foists upon us. Since we are inevitably disappointed by love, wouldn't we be better off without it?

No, says Carrie Jenkins. Instead, we need a new philosophy of love, one that recognizes that the pain and suffering love causes are a natural, even a good part of what makes love worthwhile. What Jenkins calls "sad love" offers no bogus "happy ever afters". Rather, it tries to find a way properly to integrate heartbreak and disappointment into the lived experience of love.

It's time we liberated love.

Review

"This book will transform the ways people think about their love relationships." **Myisha Cherry, author of** *The Case for Rage*

"Do you ever get that feeling that a book just sees you? That was how I felt reading *Sad Love*. Jenkins deconstructs popular notions of happiness and romantic love with her characteristic combination of compassion, originality and rigour, challenging us to reconsider our foundational assumptions about what our relationships should even be for. I want everyone to read this book." **Eve Rickert, co-author of** *More Than Two: A Practical Guide to Ethical Polyamory*

"Sad Love zings with frustration at fairy tales, Valentine's cards, romance novels and the 'happy ever after'." ***The Sunday Telegraph Magazine***

"Jenkins […] brings a light-touch speculative air to her ruminations." ***London Magazine***

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Tell a philosopher you love her, and you'd better be ready to define your terms.

It's funny because it's true. Well, sort of. Some philosophers spend their entire working lives on questions of definition or the analysis of concepts. And this is not a pathology. It's important. Put a concept such as love under the microscope and you see how vague and fuzzy it is. How layered. Where the spiky bits are. Patterns invisible to the naked eye suddenly become fascinating objects of study.

That's why some of us spend our whole lives trying to get a better look. Philosophy, when it's working well, offers us a treasury of intellectual and imaginative tools: new ways of seeing things. Conceptual microscopes, of course, but also conceptual telescopes, and distorting mirrors, and tinted lenses ... we need all kinds of different approaches. We need to examine our concepts close up, but we also need to get a better look at the ones that feel remote, and we need ways to look at things from new angles, through different filters. That includes the things we think we understand, the things most familiar to us.

In fact, it's especially important to examine those, as they're often highly influential in structuring the way we live (whether or not we appreciate their playing that role). Deflecting and diffracting our most familiar images can reveal something totally new, perhaps something we would never have imagined it was possible to see.

As I suggested in my preface, this particular book is an attempt to build a conceptual mirror. I'm trying to reflect back to us an image of ourselves, and specifically of our ideas and ideals of romantic love. It's not an entirely flattering image, the one I end up with. It's almost grotesque. No doubt there are some distortions. But, as I said, sometimes we need a new angle, a vantage point from which the familiar looks weird.

I start from a curiosity about the real lived experience of sad love — love that defies the assumption that love stories end in "happy ever after." Sad love in our songs and stories tends to be a failure condition: a disaster and a tragedy. But I think there is much more to it than that. The realities of sad love are a clue that we're not seeing something properly. Something is missed because we tell only certain kinds of love stories. Sad love can't be happy ever after, of course. But it can be something else: something that I'll call eudaimonic (more on this word a moment). Eudaimonic love has deep connections with creativity and meaningfulness, of a kind that the search for happy ever after doesn't and could never have.

But who is this "us" I keep talking about? Words like "us" can be sneaky. Unless we're paying attention, "us" tends tacitly to exclude a "them." A simple word can mask swathes of assumptions about who one is writing for, who's included and who's excluded, who's normal and who's "other."

For the purposes of this book, "us" means me and the people in the same boat as me, as far as romantic ideology goes. It means people who were fed the same cultural soup that I was raised on, who imbibed the same "received wisdom" about what (real) romantic love is. In the broadest terms, it's those of us who grew up with the dominant (white, patriarchal, capitalistic and colonial) culture of North America and the UK serving as our baseline worldview. That's a vague and messy way to define an intended audience, but the vagueness is intentional. It's the only way to capture the group I have in mind, which is itself vague. This book is about — and for — those of us who are still swimming in that soup.

Much of the soup is made of stories. And our love stories are remarkably consistent, almost as if we are just telling one story over and over. Here's the short-form version of it:

> X and Y sitting in a tree,
> K-I-S-S-I-N-G.
> First comes love, then comes marriage,
> then comes baby in a baby carriage.

We teach this story to children. We teach them very early, before they are equipped with adult critical thinking, bullshit detectors, defensive armour of the mind. We feed kids this story, this bit of cultural soup, in simple rhyming packages, and that makes it easy for them to swallow and repeat to others. They receive it over and over again in fairy tales and stories and in snatches of adult culture - romcoms, romance novels, Valentine's Day greetings cards. And, of course, children watch grown-ups, and grown-ups model the story. We are supposed to start living out the story when we come of age, or at least do our darnedest to conform. For the children. If we cannot or will not conform, we aren't supposed to let the children see that.

It reminds me of something Wittgenstein said about rules: we just keep going. We call that "following" the rule. But, however it might feel from the inside, we're not really "following" anything. The way we go on is not determined by pre-existing constraints: it's up to us. We are creating the rule by going on the way we do.

I don't think all rules work this way, but a lot of them do. In particular, most of our "rules" for romantic love are created by our own choices about how to go on, individually and in social groups. By practicing love in a particular way, by representing it as being that way, we are constructing the rules and norms and expectations for what a loving relationship should look like. We teach all of this to children. We keep going, and call that "on." It's not only about creating the rule, it's also about creating the "us."

It doesn't stop when we grow up, of course. The cultural messaging comes blaring at us all the time. It comes in at us from every direction and can occupy any and every available medium: magazines, news, music, friends, colleagues, family members. Anything can become an avatar, a conveyance of cultural soup. (Have you ever noticed how much text is on display in your bathroom while you are brushing your teeth?)

We cannot exactly tune all this out, but we can stop paying conscious attention. Indeed we have to stop paying conscious attention, because we have to use our attention — that limited and precious resource — for other things. So most of the time we just let the messaging wash over us, and it seeps into our subconscious unchecked. This makes it even more powerful: the less attention we pay to all these messages hiding in plain sight, the more easily they reach into the most intimate parts of our lives. (These days, I wear underpants only from the company that advertises on all my favourite podcasts.)

But let's tune in for a moment: let's pay some conscious attention. There's more than just stories in the soup. There's also received wisdom. For now, I'm not going to analyze or critique this. I just want to lay it out, as cleanly and simply as possible.

> 1 A good life is one full of love and happiness. A bad life is one with neither.
> 2 Love and happiness (the best things in life) are "free."
> 3 In order to live a good life, one should pursue love and happiness (as opposed to crass things such as wealth, power or fame).

These three messages may sound very familiar and homey. Perhaps they seem "obvious." But my hope, in writing them out so starkly here, is that I can begin to defamiliarize them a little bit. What might we think of these messages if they were entirely new to us? If we were strangers to the social world they define?

When you listen in to that third message, the one about what one should do in order to live a good life, you might hear some moralistic overtones. Something like: it is unethical to pursue money, power and fame. That's what evil people do. But in this context I am calling attention to message number three, not as an ethical proposition, but as a piece of strategic advice. A "good life" in this context is not necessarily an ethical life but the kind of life that is good for the person living it. The kind of life we would wish on our friends, or that a loving parent wants for their child. That's what I'm homing in on here. And, in the context of the first two messages, we can see how the third message makes sense as strategic advice. If you want a good life, you've got to pursue the things that constitute a good life, right?

The messages might strike us at first as simply discouraging avarice. We are advised to replace the pursuit of worldly goods with that of immaterial, abstract things. But it's not that simple. There may be ways to live a good life that do not involve the pursuit of any of these things. Indeed, that's where I think eudaimonia comes in. But, before we go there, let's take a look at where sad love fits into this cultural soup.

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Let me round out this introduction with a summary guide to the rest of this book. To lay my cards on the table, the book's primary agenda is to urge that we replace the romantic conception of love with a eudaimonic conception. The romantic conception aims at an ideal (not realistic, but idealized) "happy ever after" — that is to say, a state that is pleasant for the individuals involved and is permanent. This ideal is what our current ideas about marriage are modelled on: monogamous and (mostly) heteronormative, and hence conducive to the creation of nuclear families which are culturally idealized as the locus of the happiest and most permanent kind of love. By contrast, the eudaimonic conception of love ditches the focus on pleasure (or "happiness") and orients instead towards meaningful, creative co-operation and collaboration.

This can occur in a wide range of forms and configurations, not all of which look like the nuclear family structure.

My understanding of what eudaimonic love is, and why it matters, came about through thinking about sad love. I called this book Sad Love for that reason. Sad love was my intellectual spark because it spoke back to romantic ideology so directly, demanding that I pay attention to the "happy" in the happy ever after and ask why it's there, what it's doing, and what is left of love when it goes away. But my goal isn't merely to talk about sad love or sadness per se. I am trying to frame a conception of love in which sadness has a role to play as something other than a failure condition. A eudaimonic conception of love has room for the full range of human experience, because it isn't oriented towards the "positive" emotions.

I will argue that the contemporary romantic ideal tends to make us miserable. But there are insights to be drawn from a close look at why that is the case and, indeed, why it's actually a predictable result given what we already know about how humans work. That's where I'll start in chapter 1. One thing philosophers have been trying to tell us for a long time is that, when we are deliberately trying to make ourselves happy - that is, when we are pursuing happiness for its own sake - it doesn't work. This is what's known as the Paradox of Happiness. This first chapter also surveys the contemporary context, against which this old philosophical idea sits somewhat awkwardly: North American positivity culture positions individualistic happiness as a core ideal, and the "pursuit of happiness" is baked right into the dominant ideology of my time and place. Against this, the Paradox of Happiness emerges as an important clue about who and what we are. It suggests important failings in a positivity oriented culture, which will turn out to have analogues in the context of romance.

Chapter 2 begins by tracing out those analogies. I argue that, just as pursuing happiness doesn't work, pursuing the romantic happy ever after doesn't work either. In fact this, too, tends to make us miserable. I call this the Romantic Paradox.

In chapter 3, I discuss a well-known response to the Paradox of Happiness, which I think will also help us with the Romantic Paradox. This response requires us to distinguish happiness from something else. The "something else" is often called eudaimonia, which tends to be translated as "flourishing" or "well-being." And so the classic resolution to the Paradox of Happiness, then, is to recognize that eudaimonia is more important than happiness and to engage in activities that promote eudaimonia (which may, as a side benefit, bring happiness in its wake).

It's one thing, however, to appreciate that eudaimonia is different from happiness. It's another — much tougher — thing to say what eudaimonia is. The concept of eudaimonia is ancient and is generally associated with the philosophy of Aristotle. But he didn't invent it. In any case, we have all kinds of tools at our disposal now for sharpening the concept that Aristotle didn't have, such as twentieth-century literature and contemporary empirical research. Conceptions of eudaimonia inspired by Aristotle do not appeal to me, and some of his ideas about "human flourishing" all too easily spill over into ableism, or even eugenics. So in the remainder of chapter 3 I take up some of the tools available to me and try to fashion a very different conception of eudaimonia.

I take my cue from the etymology of the word eudaimonia, calling attention to the daimons — literally, "spirits" — that shape our loves, and indeed our lives. Daimons don't have to be understood as literally supernatural, but the daimon metaphor can be extremely useful for thinking about everything from an individual's "vibe" to the environment of a workplace, the spirit of a nation state, or the intangible presence of capitalism in our lives.

Chapter 4 brings further ingredients into the mix that I will use to expand upon what eudaimonic love is. It begins by surveying some of the (serious) methodological challenges that face anyone trying to understand love and happiness, which I try to locate in the context of general difficulties with "knowing ourselves." This leads into a conception of who and what we are that draws from existentialist philosophical traditions, emphasizing our agency in the process of creating ourselves.

This in turn can be applied to help me explain how eudaimonic love differs from romantic love, to which I turn in chapter 5. One of the most important differences is that eudaimonic love is active and dynamic, while romantic conceptions are typically passive and static. In the romantic framework we talk about "falling" in love, as if it were something that simply happened to us, like falling into a pit. Or being struck by a bolt of lightning (another common romantic metaphor). In eudaimonic love we choose our own way, guided by what makes our lives and our projects meaningful. Such choices are constrained by circumstances and the choices of others, but I understand these constraints by analogy with the role of constraints in artistic creativity. I also draw on research concerning "job-crafting" (a process by which employees craft their roles, adding to or even going against their job descriptions) to develop an analogous notion of "love-crafting," which is the creative practice of tailoring loving relationships to the skills, needs and values of the people in them.

Ultimately, I argue, we need to stop hearing "romantic" as a positive description. It's actually something that should raise a sceptical eyebrow. I urge that we move towards understanding ideal love as eudaimonic, not romantic. I also think we would do well to stop thinking so much about whether our partners "make us happy" and focus instead on whether they lovingly collaborate with us in the co-creation of meaningful work, and of our selves.

That, then, is this book's destination. Its starting point is a conversation I had a few years ago, with my American husband, about "the pursuit of happiness" ... <>

THE FUTURE OF DECLINE: ANGLO-AMERICAN CULTURE AT ITS LIMITS by Jed Esty [Stanford Briefs, Stanford University Press, 9781503633315]

As the US becomes a second-place nation, can it shed the superpower nostalgia that still haunts the UK? The debate over the US's fading hegemony has raged and sputtered for 50 years, glutting the market with prophecies about American decline. Media experts ask how fast we will fall and how much we will lose, but generally ignore the fundamental question: What does decline mean? What is the significance, in experiential and everyday terms, in feelings and fantasies, of living in a country past its prime? Drawing on the example of post-WWII Britain and looking ahead at 2020s America, Jed Esty suggests that becoming a second-place nation is neither disastrous, as alarmists claim, nor avoidable, as optimists insist. Contemporary declinism often masks white nostalgia and perpetuates a conservative longing for Cold War certainty. But the narcissistic lure of "lost greatness" appeals across the political spectrum. As Esty argues, it resonates so widely in mainstream media because Americans have lost access to a language of national purpose beyond global supremacy. It is time to shelve the shopworn fables of endless US dominance, to face the multipolar world of the future, and to tell new American stories. The Future of Decline is a guide to finding them.

Review

"The USA will never again dominate world politics as it did at the end of the twentieth century. So far, American politics and culture have mainly thrashed and flailed in the face of this reality. *The Future of Decline* offers the necessary and urgent lesson that comparative national decline can, instead, be managed with good grace—as a blessing rather than a curse. In keeping with its teaching, Esty's book is a wise and even beautiful one." -- Benjamin Kunkel — *author of Utopia or Bust*

"The best thing about history is that it can always take another turn. *The Future of Decline* is a powerful provocation to craft a new national narrative, one that faces reality and locates tools for building something better." -- Catherine Hall — *author of Macaulay and Son: Architects of Imperial Britain*

"This is a consistently intelligent, sweepingly synthetic, and urgently important book." -- Michael Szalay — *author of Second Lives: Black-Market Melodramas and the Reinvention of Television*

"This book is a generative call to arms. Esty insists we have reasons to be cheerful amidst American decline—if we do the hard work of providing a renewed vision of a more equitable future for the nation." -- James Vernon — *author of Distant Strangers: How Britain Became Modern*

"*The Future of Decline* is sharp, provocative, and engaging at every turn." -- Gayle Rogers — *author of Speculation: A Cultural History from Aristotle to AI*

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Lost Greatness as a Way of Life

In August 2008, Americans watched the Beijing Olympics opening ceremony, marveling at Zhang Yimou's spectacle of a newly confident, abundantly creative nation. Commentaries popped up all over the US media, noting that the impeccable organization, the daring aesthetics, the avant-garde architecture, and the massive scale of project management in Beijing heralded the arrival of a new Asian superpower. A month later, Lehman Brothers fell and tipped the world into financial crisis.

By the time 2012 rolled around, an economic recovery had been engineered in the US with the indispensable aid of Chinese capital. Over in London, the Olympics kicked off again, this time with an opening ceremony masterminded by Danny Boyle. Boyle's films, Shallow Grave and Trainspotting as well as Slumdog Millionaire and Steve jobs, tell stories of cold poverty in the UK, hot wealth in the colonies. His "Isles of Wonder" show seemed forced even on the spot. It confused spectators.

Flashes of imperial glory jangled against dashes of socialwelfare pragmatism. Dancing health-care workers as a global sign of Britishness? The grandiloquent blend of past and present, with its hipster revisionism and blenderized ideologies, seemed to signify everything at once about the UK and therefore nothing at all. It highlighted the UK's unfinished business of reckoning with an imperial past and a European future.

Beijing 2008 and London 2012 struck a nerve for American viewers. The rising superpower across the Pacific and the fading empire across the Atlantic seemed to sandwich an American Century on the wane. The glamorous techno-futurism of Beijing and the zombie wax-museum antics of London threw America's uncertain fate into relief. With Wall Street so recently in free fall, the US media was divided between faltering belief in national power and swaggering insistence on American greatness.

For those of us who came of age in the 1970s, the two Olympic ceremonies simply rekindled what I suspect was a familiar sense of diminished expectations. For Generation X, political awareness began with Vietnam and Watergate. After the end of the gold standard, the oil crisis, stagflation, the drug wars, and the crime waves, the 1970s ended with the Iran hostage crisis and Carter's so-called national malaise speech. Where young Baby Boomers saw American greatness embodied in the Apollo missions, we saw the fiery failure of the Challenger crash in 1986. The 1980s and 1990s—the time of our youth—featured a strange subterranean battle between the slow steady ebb of national confidence and the resurgent rhetoric of "Morning in America," victory in the Cold War, and the tech boom. Those signifiers of American renewal often seemed stagey and brittle, more bravado than strength. Twilight and morning, autumn and apex: for my generation, the rhetoric of American destiny felt like a game of bad metaphors, a partisan opera played over a deep bass note of loss.

The twin crises of the Bush II era therefore hit like a return to the norm of national decline. 9/11 revealed the fragility of American security. The subprime crisis revealed the fragility of American prosperity. Both brought back familiar anxieties of a tottering superpower. They marked an Islamophobic and Sinophobic reboot of aggressive political sentiments that had already been aimed at Russia in my childhood, Japan in my youth.

As a graduate student and young scholar, I spent the last half of the 1990s studying literary culture in the UK's age of imperial contraction. Looking back now, I can see that my research was a refracted and delayed investigation into a problem closer to home: American decline. It was also an intellectual evasion of the racial and colonial problems underlying American supremacy Back then, I wanted to know if Great Writing in English—the ability to capture whole worlds in a novel or a poem—depended on Britain's status as a Great Power. My research eventually took the form of a book somewhat misleadingly entitled A Shrinking Island. What it suggested was that British contraction produced a number of effects, not all of them negative, nativist, or scarcity-driven. The era of decolonization, of modernizing sex and gender norms, and of the Keynesian welfare state represented a step forward for many in the UK. Imperial contraction was not pure loss. Nor did the shrinking of the British domain translate into social backwardness. It was part of a modernization process, not a tumble back through time. To cede the pretensions of global hegemony—then or now—is not to regress or decline, except in the minds of those in thrall to superpower nostalgia.

The optimistic idea driving this book is similar: the US can move forward while its power wanes. The questions that faced the UK on its historical downslope face the US now. Can the waning of global power reinvigorate domestic society? Will post-peak America be even more divided? Can a culture of contraction inspire citizens to find an inclusive, egalitarian, contemporary sense of national purpose? The Trump-Brexit era has dramatized with remarkable immediacy the doubt embedded in such questions. The questions are not new, but they are more urgent as America becomes—any day now—a second-place nation. The answers will redefine US culture and society in the decades ahead.

The Future of Decline is a short study of a long American twilight, informed by British precedent. The undisputed peak of US power started in 1945, and its fade began in the 1970s. Americans have now been on the downslope for almost a generation longer than they were at the superpower summit. And the UK, which was a global hegemon from the end of the Napoleonic wars (1815) through to World War I (1914) has now been, by that time line, in decline for more than a hundred years.

Decline, in other words, lasts a long time. Empires fall dramatically in our lore, but hegemony dies slowly in fact. And declinism—the rhetoric of once and future greatness—lasts even longer. One hundred years of ebbing force in the UK have not stilled its lingering dreams of glory. Can the US escape that fate, or will the morbid symptoms of declinist thinking—MAGA and melancholia—stay with us for the long haul ahead? In America, declinism is practically a way of life, a cultural birthright, from the Puritan Jeremiad to the paranoid hegemony of the Cold War, from the lost City on a Hill to the closing frontier of F. J. Turner, from Sputnik to Watergate, from oil crisis to climate emergency, from the subprime crash to the Covid-19 pandemic.

As this book goes to press, the perennial dark fantasy of American declinism is converging with a new structural reality. By most projections, the 20205 will be the last decade when the US economy is the largest in the world. China already leads the world in so-called purchasing power parity—one leading

indicator of national wealth. Countless books about the American eclipse will quickly follow, glutting an already saturated market. Whether left-leaning or right-leaning, fatalistic or optimistic, such books share certain features. First, mainstream declinist writing in the US—dominated by economists, journalists, and political scientists   tends to battle over metrics

and statistics while ignoring the decisive story lines that shape most Americans' perception of decline. Second, such writing tends to filter decline anxieties through an elite worldview. Declinism in most of its forms overidentifles with elite fears of lost power and position. It underi-dentifies with nonwhite, nonmale, nonpropertied citizens. Third, the prophets and pundits of US decline too often use the specters of fallen Rome and shrunken Britain to shake rather than inform readers.

By contrast, this book uses UK history to advance the idea that the loss of national greatness is neither quick nor catastrophic, neither tragic nor avoidable. The UK experience provides suggestive examples— and counterexamples—for US citizens hoping to live good, meaningful lives in an ex-superpower. Rather than evoke British imperialism as a spectacle of diminishment, it considers UK history since Suez as a story about the struggle for unevenly distributed resources. British decline forced UK citizens to try to redefine their national identity without the governing narratives of crown and empire at the forefront. Brexit shows how far from complete that process is (Barnett, O'Toole, Ward and Rasch). But it is a cultural process, not shackled to the iron laws of global trade. An ex-hegemon can become something other than a shadow of its former self. In the coming decades, Americans will need to relinquish Cold War certainties about American power in order to reinvent the shared meaning of US society.

For now, the narcissistic goad of "lost greatness" still resonates for many Americans, and not just right-wing patriots. It will resonate even after the memory of Trump's gross demagoguery fades. It resonates because there is a wide, bipartisan, and popular desire to stay on top after four decades of fading economic supremacy.

Most of all, it resonates because Americans do not have access to a galvanizing alternative language for a common national purpose. It is time to shelve the old habituated language of US dominance, to face the multipolar world of the future, to tell new American stories. To find and circulate those stories is a difficult but necessary task. They will have to be vivid and visceral, dense with real US history, ripe for collective affiliation. They will have to make multiracial democracy and social welfare compatible with the lived experiences and popular culture of most Americans—not some, not half. That is a serious project for media, political, and academic elites—for cultural gatekeepers and knowledge workers of all kinds. To advance it, the traditional center must cede the language of US supremacy, and the progressive left must cede the language of anti-nationalism. America has to represent something more than global supremacy now. Eternal superpower status is a fantasy and—even were it true—it is a broadly antidemocratic desire, at odds with the nation's egalitarian ideals.

Conservative declinism blocks both the liberal goal of incremental progress and the progressive goal of social transformation. It tells its anxious adherents that America was once more truly itself than it is now. That is nonsense. America in 2020 is no less (nor more) America than it was in 1950. Heroic narratives of endless growth now obscure rather than reveal the meaning of America. We can no longer just light out for the frontier. The nation is no Huck Finn today, if it ever was. And even Huck was no innocent.

Rather than ape the nostalgia of the British governing classes over the long imperial twilight, US citizens might prefer—however much they are invested in social hierarchy—to abandon morbid and melancholy delusions. They might prefer to see the US as a decent society rather than a diminished hegemon. The American future need not repeat the Brexit present—a nation holding fast to its glory days like an aging quarterback. That's a geopolitical sequel nobody wants to see. The loss of the hegemonic top slot is an economic given. But the culture and politics of the response is not. What has a pressing claim on American attention now is the story of British adaptation to loss, not the spectacle of the loss itself.

Yet declinism almost always sells as part of the epic historical cycle of imperial rise-and-fall. That mesmerizing epic is, in a way, the subtext of almost all modern historical thinking, from Edward Gibbon's The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire to Sid Meier's Civilization VI. It has served as the subtext and context for almost every consequential discussion of arts, politics, economics, ideas, and social institutions in the US since 1975. The welter of fading-hegemony literature feeds a national fascination with how fast and far we will fall, or—for the hopeful—how long America will hold on to solo superpower status. Both sides—the tragic and the magic—obscure a fundamental question: What does decline mean? What is the significance, in experiential and everyday terms—in feelings and fantasies as well as in metrics and policies—of living in a country past its prime? We know plenty about rising and falling empires.

But we have a fundamental—and bipartisan—deficit in our imaginative understanding of life after hegemony.

America is old enough now to have two archives telling the story of its destiny. One existed before it was a global power (but still a juggernaut of continental and colonial expansion). One came into being while it was a global power, in the twentieth century. At this new turning point in history, a third archive is beginning to emerge. What trajectories can we glimpse for an American future after its apex as a global power—even, perhaps, after Americans have acknowledged and adjusted to the downslope of history? In an effort to detach the national gaze from lost greatness, this book pursues four interlocking projects: (i) a critical overview of US declinism since 2000, outlining its bugs and features; (2) a list of ten theses for describing the future of decline without the pervasive drag of superpower nostalgia; (3) a comparative analysis of British and American thinking about national identity after global supremacy; and (4) a map of emerging narratives about American history and American destiny for the age of limits.

Growing up in the 1970s, I took in a steady stream of declinist images and narratives. By contrast, I believe that my grandparents, coming of age in the 1920s, saw the US as a nation on the rise and that my parents, coming of age in the 1950s, saw the US as a secure superpower. As this book goes to press in 2022, I'm not sure my children believe in a meaningful American future. Four generations, one arc: from upswing to peak to downslope to crisis. America's season of global supremacy set the horizonof expectation for the Greatest Generation and the Baby Boomers. Even as they recede into historical haze, those expectations still define the outer limit of the public discourse. Few leaders or politicians will demur when asked if the US is the greatest country now, the greatest country ever. But the boomers are aging fast and the world is changing even faster. The old reflex to declare US greatness will stop twitching at some point, maybe sooner than we think.

Belief in US national superiority lives inside almost all the ordinary and available languages of American patriotism. It took a long time to build up this rigid version of nationalist feeling, and it will take a

conscious effort to shed it. Belief in natural superiority was made in America the military-industrial complex's most successful

product. It can be unmade, too, without destroying patriotic sentiment, without losing wealth and security, without ceding the idea of robust citizenship. It can be unmade unless the rhetoric of greatness stays lodged in the American mind, too sacred to be dispatched by the light and logic of history on the downslope. <>

THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF AMERICA AND THE WORLD 4 VOLUME HARDBACK SET edited by Mark Philip Bradley, Eliga Gould, Paul Mapp, Carla Gardina Pestana, Kristin Hoganson, Jay Sexton, Brooke L. Blower, Andrew Preston, David Engerman, and Max Paul Friedman [Series The Cambridge History of America and the World, Cambridge University Press, 4 volume pack ISBN: 9781108419208]

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- The volumes cover a five hundred year period in chronological order across four volumes: 1500–1820, 1820–1900, 1900–1945, and 1945 to the Present
- Brings together 120 contributors to provide a new narrative of the history of American foreign relations
- Offers new perspectives on seminal events and developments in American foreign relations history

THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF AMERICA AND THE WORLD offers a transformative account of American engagement in the world from 1500 to the present. Representing a new scholarship informed by the transnational turn in the writing of US history and American foreign relations, the four-volume

reference work gives sustained attention to key moments in US diplomacy, from the Revolutionary War and the Monroe Doctrine to the US rise as a world power in World War I, World War II and the Cold War. The volumes also cast a more inclusive scholarly net to include transnational histories of Native America, the Atlantic world, slavery, political economy, borderlands, empire, the family, gender and sexuality, race, technology, and the environment. Collectively, they offer essential starting points for readers coming to the field for the first time and serve as a critical vehicle for moving this scholarship forward in innovative new directions.

General Introduction: What is America and the World? by Mark Philip Bradley

The Cambridge History of America and the World (CHAW) offers a far-reaching and novel account of American engagement in the world from 1500 to the present day. CHAW takes as its interpretive starting point a deceptively simple insight: adopting frameworks that cut across rather than stop at the nation's borders could upend established stories and generate new interpretive possibilities. What might happen, as nineteenth-century American historian Thomas Bender asked in a seminal 2002 essay, if historians followed "the movement of people, capital, things, and knowledge" across borders in ways that ignored artificial and state-defined boundaries? An outpouring of work over the last two decades has followed this translational turn in US history to deprovincialize how we understand the American past. It has now produced a fundamentally new history of America and the world.

Infused with common transnational sensibilities, this novel scholarship has taken a variety of interpretative paths. Some of these new histories were pioneered by diplomatic historians who increasingly placed the perceptions and policies of presidents, diplomats, and generals on a global stage or employed new and sometimes non American-based archives to illuminate the perspectives of non-state actors from the worlds of business, activism, religion, and what we now call nongovernmental organizations. Other scholars have crafted social and cultural histories, offering a wider vision of American engagement in the world by exploring how the construction of American state and society has intersected with global forces and contestations over identity abroad. At the same time this work shares many of the convictions that have animated new work on the Atlantic world, slavery, borderlands, migration and the environment, and in critical race and queer studies. In all these ways, historians have embraced multiple transnational optics to reimagine how US history was made.

CHAW brings this exciting new scholarship together for the first time to map the contours of these transformative approaches to the place of America and Americans in the world. In some ways CHAW builds upon more traditional diplomatic approaches to the field. It gives sustained attention, for instance, to such key moments in US international history as the Revolutionary War, the War of 1812, the Monroe Doctrine, the nineteenth-century US rise as a world power, World War I, World War II, and the Cold War. But importantly the volumes open out to other larger and smaller analytical frames for apprehending American engagement in the world while at the same time situating multiple actors and developments within broader global political, social, economic, cultural, and ecological processes.

The four volumes that make up CHAW feature more than 120 contributors from a variety of subfields within American history who explore these new explanatory vistas. While many diplomatic historians are among the contributors, the volumes cast a more inclusive scholarly net to include historians of Native America, the Atlantic world, slavery, political economy, borderlands, empire, the family, gender

and sexuality, race, technology, and the environment. Collectively their contributions offer essential starting points for readers coming to the field for the first time, and serve as a critical vehicle for moving this scholarship forward in new directions.

The history of early America and the world that unfolds in Volume I occupies an especially important place in this Cambridge history. As readers will see, it quite self-consciously does not foreground the thirteen colonies that became the United States or the Revolutionary War, nor does "America" simply connote British America as it once did for many histories of American foreign relations. Volume I opens with first contacts in the early fifteenth century in the waters off North America's northeastern and western coasts, where fishing and fur brought Native peoples and Europeans together, and in the tropical band around the Caribbean and the territories that made up the Inca and Aztec empires, where exotic commodities along with gold and silver attracted the Spanish. It then moves to the comparatively late arriving colonists like the Dutch, French, and finally the English, who were left with what would become British North America. Indian Country, which in 1825 still covered much of what was later the continental United States, receives sustained attention throughout the volume, reflecting the crucial ways in which Native American history has become central to new narratives of America and the world. So, too, the histories of men and women brought as slaves or indentured servants to the colonies that European settlers founded.

Volume I carries the narrative of early America and the world through relations between the great empires, Indigenous as well as European, before turning to revolutionary challenges to those empires. Here the focus is not only on the American Revolution but also antislavery campaigns, the broader Atlantic revolution, and state-making in the early republic. At the same time, contributors offer a set of thematic essays on statelessness, imperial trade, international law, women, the environment, and the circulation of ideas. It is important to note that much of the scholarship informing Volume I has occurred in isolation from the general field of American foreign relations, and its more traditional focus on the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries. In offering a layered understanding of the complex nature of empires in the making, the volume provides a completely original take on America and the world in the early period. As the volume editors suggest, early America was a "messy, complicated and multidirectional world." Those transformative insights set many of the central interpretative pathways for the volumes of CHAW that follow.

Volume II takes the story of the United States and the world from the War of 1812 to the imperial wars of 1898 in Spain and the Philippines. Here, too, the essays that make up the volume mark a fundamental shift in how historians now see this period from global perspectives. "[^]mperial denial and self-congratulation," the editors of Volume II note, often colored an earlier historiography of this era, whereas in these chapters the nineteenth-century United States emerges as "an exclusionary nation-state forged in violence and an expansive, multiethnic imperial formation." The Mexican-American War and the Civil War, explored here in their transnational and global dimensions, become the fulcrum that links the volume's consideration of continental expansion and settler colonialism on the one hand and the late nineteenth-century worlds of industrial capitalism and racialized imperialism on the other. As one contributor to the volume puts it, these interpretative modes uncover "the myriad ways in which American history in the nineteenth century is inseparable from an understanding of the world beyond the United States." Together the chapters that make up Volume II illuminate the multiple pathways

through which what had been previously seen as an isolationist nineteenth-century United States were in fact embedded in global fields of imperial power.

None of the nineteenth-century developments foregrounded in Volume II of CHAW emerge as preordained. The contributors painstakingly trace out the remarkable contingencies shaping the exercise of political and economic power over the course of the century from the perspectives of multiple actors. In part an emergent transportation and communication infrastructure along with a blue water navy and a growing state bureaucracy began to bind and integrate the national economy. At the same time iterative panics and extreme economic volatility increasingly linked the United States to the firmament of Victorian globalization and brought new domestic social unrest and political instability. Just as the state and its role in the rise of a two-ocean American empire is disaggregated in these chapters, the engagements of multiple non-state actors receive sustained consideration, among them migrants from Europe and Asia, African American activists, working-class mariners, Christian missionaries, military personnel, and Indigenous peoples. The making of space in the nineteenth-century American state is always near the surface of the volume, particularly the fluidities of its population and borders, processes of racializati^n and practices of ethnic cleansing, and the vast ecological transformations wrought by unrestrained capitalist development.

The first half of the twentieth century, sometimes oversimplified and even more often overshadowed by the Cold War that followed in an earlier historiography, emerges in Volume III of CHAW as a revolutionary era. "There was nothing inevitable," the volume editors point out, about "American global ascendancy." They remind us that for all the transformations of the previous century, the United States in 1900 was still very much a developing nation. And Cold War was only cold in the West. Hot wars in Korea, Vietnam, and later Africa, along with sustained US campaigns of covert action against what were seen as left-leaning governments in Latin America, the Middle East, Asia, and Africa, often brought havoc and devastation in their wake, in part prompting massive transnational migration that unintentionally would put the United States on a path toward becoming a majority-minority country by the middle of this century.

Volume IV also traces the ways in which the intensification of neoliberal capital flows beginning in the 1970s, along with the growing power of nonstate challenges by human rights and environmental advocates, put further pressure on more conventional notions of American state sovereignty and power in the late twentieth century. Chapters on what the volume editors characterize as contestations over the rule of states uncover the often destabilizing role of oil, global religious formulations, and an emergent queer geopolitics in American engagements in the world during this period. At the same time chapters that trace the involvements and commitments of African Americans and Native Americans in a variety of translational projects open up the actors and issues that were critical to the making of America in the world after 1945. As the editors suggest, the post-Cold War world that closes the volume, particularly the forever wars following the September xi attacks and the specter of climate change, further deepened the fluidities of power in an era in which the United States was often thought of as a singular superpower.

The chapters that make up all four volumes of CHAW can be read in multiple ways. Perhaps the configuration that allows readers to see just how radical a departure they are from past ways of seeing American foreign relations is to encounter them topically across time and space. For instance, each volume features chapters on Indigenous peoples and their centrality to a fuller understanding of how a

plurality of "Americans" operated in the world. The environment also receives sustained treatment. An ensemble of chapters on the centrality of geographies and ecologies in the making of early America opens up Volume I, and this major interpretive thread gets taken up in subsequent volumes. Empire is another important strand across the volumes in chapters that place American empire in a global perspective, whether it be the encounter of Indigenous peoples with European and later American empires, the rise of intertwined domestic and imperial American empires in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, or the tensions between empire, decolonization, and domestic social movements after 1945. The complex story of Americans and the world from 1500 to the present gains further nuance and richness in chapters throughout the four volumes that explore the histories of capitalism, gender and sexuality, borderlands, race and ethnicity, migration, religion, human rights, and humanitarianism. I encourage readers to pick up one or more of these threads that seem most intriguing, and to read the chapters on that subject across the four volumes to better appreciate the critical building blocks through which collectively CHAW offers a transformational set of new interpretative approaches to the merican past.

Questions of power are always at the center of work by historians of American foreign relations. Power in an earlier scholarship and for some historians today can sometimes be disconnected from the global flows and processes that affected other states and peoples. This kind of American exceptionalism was reinforced in the period after 1945 when many policy-makers and some of the scholars who chronicled their footprints in the world insisted that the preponderance of American power meant that opening up a discussion of its potential messiness and fragility was a fool's errand. The chapters that make up the four volumes of CHAW suggest a different path forward, offering histories that are simultaneously connected to the world and attentive to the multiple particularities, and singularities, of the American experience. Each of the contributors to these volumes helps us see a critical piece of how that more capacious vision moves toward a fundamentally new understanding of the exercise of American power in the world.

The final volume of CHAW lands on the Anthropocene with a searching chapter in which historian Joshua Howe points to the opportunities and potential perils that this conceptualization of climate change poses for future scholarship. He also reminds us that planetary environmental change, and the outsized role the United States has played in it, shapes our present century in ways that Americans cannot fully control. Howe writes, "Time will tell how — and how well — America deals with the world it has made." Together the four volumes that make up this Cambridge History of America and the World provide a frame to help us better come to terms with the always contingent, often unequal, and sometimes dangerous worlds that a diverse cast of American peoples have made and unmade, and to anticipate what future worlds may be in the process of becoming. <>

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Selections from: What Does America and the World "Mean" before 1825? by Eliga Gould, Paul Mapp, and Carla Gardina Pestana

Studying "America and the World" in the period before the advent of the United States carries a different meaning than it does after 1776. As used by historians of the modern United States, as in the other volumes in this series, America and the world usually refers to the foreign policy and global interactions of the American republic, with the United States occupying the role of an independent power and, increasingly, an empire. This volume calls for a different agenda: to understand how the United States emerged out of a series of colonial interactions, some involving Indigenous empires and communities that were already present when the first Europeans reached the Americas; others the adventurers and settlers dispatched by Europe's imperial powers to secure their American claims; and still others men and women brought as slaves or indentured servants to the colonies that European settlers founded. For most of the 300 years after the first European voyages of discovery, we use America to refer not to a single political entity, much less an empire, but rather to a space within which other states, peoples, and empires, many of them centered outside the Western Hemisphere, interacted and vied for supremacy and control.

Invariably, the early history of America and the world is the history of contacts among places and peoples that had formerly been largely separated. Mostly fruitless Norse ventures and errant Pacific craft aside, Eurasia and Africa had little to do with North America before the late fifteenth century. Then, Europeans in growing numbers and with greater persistence began visiting North Atlantic fisheries, exploring Atlantic coasts, and gradually establishing their presence and that of Africans, who were sometimes among their number, in American lands. A handful of Europeans had come back with them first to prove the existence of American lands and later to sell as laborers. In West Africa, the Portuguese and their imitators traded for ivory and gold long before they treated enslaved Africans as a major commodity. The signal feature of early modern Atlantic history, what unites these disparate phenomena, is that water began to link the peoples and economies on both sides of the ocean rather than separating them. New societies and eventually nations were one result, as were tragedies —

disease, the slave trade, the ravaging of the American environment — on a scale that centuries of hindsight have made, perhaps, easier to understand intellectually, perhaps harder to comprehend emotionally. As we wrestle still with the legacy of early America's inhumanity, we wonder more why humans acted as they did.

The people of four continents intermixed. In North America, in no small part because Western Hemispheric peoples were disproportionately struck down by Eastern Hemispheric diseases, migrants from Europe and Africa had an especially significant impact. Major migration streams contributed to the repeopling of British North America: colonists and bound laborers especially from England in the seventeenth century, and Scotland, Northern Ireland, and Germany in the eighteenth, as well as enslaved people from many parts of West Africa increasingly from the late seventeenth. Out of this migration, the colonies that Britain claimed became fairly densely populated. African arrivals — either directly from West Africa or coming via the West Indian islands — more often went to more southerly or urban locations, laboring in agricultural fields especially, in the south, and in urban households and businesses throughout British North America. Although the European migrants were primarily from the Irish and British archipelago, others came from northern European locations where their Protestant identities were challenged (French Huguenots, Salburgers Exulanten) or their economic livelihoods threatened. This eclectic migration, in contrast with more rightly controlled movements of populations in the Spanish colonies to the south or New France to the north, meant that British North America was comparatively diverse. In further marked contrast to the French in North America and the Spanish in New Mexico, Texas, Florida, and California, the British colonies were densely populated, less reliant on Native alliances, labor, and missions, and more covetous of Native lands.

As Europeans moved into American lands, they imposed their own particular imperial forms, adapting institutions of long standing or creating new mechanisms for managing distant dominions. For the English, expansion was initially the work of designated individuals or groups: noble proprietors given American lands or chartered companies deputized to develop specific regions . As more people moved into the English Atlantic, a few even set up squatter settlements that had no official authorization. Eventually a scattering of English outposts flourished with burgeoning populations and increasing maritime trading connections. Their success drew the attention of metropolitan authorities and, over time, the central government took direct control over the majority of these outposts. In every colony's case, royal authority was overlaid upon older ways of conducting business. By the mideighteenth century, most colonies had a governor and a council appointed by the king, as well as a legislative body to make local laws (that had to be, in most cases, approved by the monarch). In all places, law courts met, magistrates kept the peace, and title to lands passed to heirs. The particulars of a given place created variation; for instance, all colonies had laws governing the institution of slavery, but colonies with many slaves boasted more such regulations as well as harsher penalties for certain infractions. Despite local variants, British North American colonies carried similar features that made up a British imperial practice. Everywhere, slavery marked British America's major difference from the British Isles, where, despite the presence of a small enslaved Afro-British population, the American form of chattel slavery did not exist. As a rule, Britons did not migrate in large numbers to colonies that lacked a representative assembly to promote their interests. Historians are still tormented by this juxtaposition of American slavery and American freedom.

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The American Revolution marked the denouement of this early era, in which the "America" of later volumes in this series was in the process of becoming, and the start of a new era, in which the United States became a distinct entity — the America that henceforth interacted with the world. When the United States broke from Britain, that split drastically shifted how this part of America related to the world. Having been part of a global empire, British North America's interaction was previously shaped and limited by that fact. Although residents pursued their own trading policies and commercial connections to the extent that they were able, these activities took place within the context of overarching British policy. Similarly, the migrants who arrived and the relations with neighboring states were affected by the region's place in the empire. As a newly independent nation, the United States created new trade relationships beyond those that came to it within the bounds of empire, welcomed its own choice of European and inter-American migrants, hammered out its own foreign policy, and undertook not only the transportation of the enslaved Afr^cans that American consumers wanted but also set its own policies about slavery and the slave trade without regard to changing metropolitan norms. The new United States had suddenly to construct its relationship to the wider world.

If one task of the volume is to use the messy, complicated, various, multidirectional early modern Atlantic-American world to explore the question of how the United States emerged, implicit in this question is a consideration of what emerged. Should we see the young republic as a departure from the early modem empires treated in this book, or as a successor to them? As the heir of Athenian democracy, Roman republicanism, Magna Carta, and medieval assemblies? Or of Athenian, Roman, and English imperialism and two millennia of Old World servitude revived in the new? A colonizer, certainly, and therefore inescapably an empire? Or a colonizer whose racial exclusivity was one technique for escaping empire — at a moral cost we are still reckoning with? Perhaps a republic, as Edmund Morgan warned us decades ago, not simply whose ideas of freedom arose in part from the practice of slavery, but whose republicanism made the United States in some respects and for some people preferable to a typical empire, for other peoples tragically worse. Early America has always been more diffuse than a straightforward national narrative might like; the question now is whether it is too diffuse for a cohesive national narrative to stand, or comprehensive enough to serve as a foundation on which a more perfect union can be built. These questions, as difficult to answer as they have ever been, are far from new. <>

THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF AMERICA AND THE WORLD, VOLUME 2: 1820-1900 edited by Kristin Hoganson, Jay Sexton [Cambridge University Press, 9781108419239]

The second volume of The Cambridge History of America and the World examines how the United States rose to great power status in the nineteenth century and how the rest of the world has shaped the United States. Mixing top-down and bottom-up perspectives, insider and outsider views, cultural, social, political, military, environmental, legal, technological, and other veins of analysis, it places the United States, Indigenous nations, and their peoples in the context of a rapidly integrating world. Specific topics addressed in the volume include nation and empire building, inter-Indigenous relations, settler colonialism, slavery and statecraft, the Mexican-American War, global integration, the antislavery international, the global dimensions of the Civil War, overseas empire-building, state formation,

international law, global capitalism, border-crossing movement politics, technology, health, the environment, immigration policy, missionary endeavors, mobility, tourism, expatriation, cultural production, colonial intimacies, borderlands, the liberal North Atlantic, US-African relations, Islamic world encounters, the US island empire, the greater Caribbean world, and transimperial entanglements.

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Selections from the Introduction by Jay Sexton And Kristin Hoganson

The nineteenth century witnessed the transformation of the United States from an insecure association of erstwhile colonies to a continental empire with a global reach. Though forged in a struggle for independence from the British Empire, the United States became a formidable empire in its own right. Historians have long recognized the significance of this transition for the United States and the world, but they have given different meanings to it over time and place. In contrast to critics in Latin America, the Caribbean, and other loci of anti-imperialist sentiment, most US scholars writing before the Vietnam War and contemporaneous civil rights movement regarded the "rise" of the United States as something to be celebrated. America's republican institutions, in this telling, challenged the oppressive monarchical order of the Old World, while white settlers' extension of the North American "frontier" gave birth to an exceptionally democratic national character. Even as they denied the existence of US imperialism, such appraisals echoed the boasts of avid US empire builders, among them Massachusetts statesman Henry Cabot Lodge, who heralded the US "record of conquest, colonization, and territorial expansion" as "unequalled by any people in the nineteenth century."

Both imperial denial and self-congratulation came under increasingly intense criticism from the 1960s onwards. As the historical actors deemed worthy of study expanded and diversified — not coincidentally at the same time as did the historical profession — the nineteenth-century history of the United States began to look very different. The republican ideology of elite statesmen ceased to serve as cover for the exploitative practices of enslavement and colonial dispossession. A broader array of US historians looked beyond triumphalist accounts reeking of white nationalism to foreground other perspectives, such as those of Paiute activist Sarah Winnemucca Hopkins. In her autobiographical account, Hopkins described the violence that forced her people onto a reservation and the violence that followed them there, including an 1865 attack by US soldiers on a group of families encamped by a lake: "The soldiers rode up to their encampment and fired into it, and killed almost all the people that were there. Oh, it is a fearful thing to tell, but it must be told. Yes, it must be told by me." If Lodge's account is one of imperial advance, Hopkins's is one of national retreat and existential struggle, extending beyond the murderous attacks on her own people to the campaigns that her grandfather, in alliance with US forces, waged against Mexicans. As her account suggests, centering Indigenous peoples' experiences and perspectives brings different themes to light, including horrific violence, suffering, loss, survivance, strategic maneuvering, and anticolonial resistance.

As the blind spots of once-dominant nationalist narratives have become increasingly clear, the pursuit of US economic, strategic, and cultural interests has appeared less as a harbinger of a thoroughly

progressive "American century," and more as manifestations of an imperial power with illiberal tendencies. By the turn of the twenty-first century, American "exceptionalism" had been turned on its head: From the vantage point of a more multiracial democracy and the precipitous heights of seeming hegemony after the Soviet collapse, the nineteenth-century United States stood out not only for its "blessings of liberty" but also for its relentless pursuit of economic advantage, racist hierarchies, and imperial domination.

This volume takes these recent reappraisals of US nation and empirebuilding as its cue. It starts from the premise that, though it pioneered forms of republican self-government, the nineteenth-century United States was an exclusionary nation-state forged in violence and an expansive, multiethnic imperial formation. This volume's other starting premise — that there is no single perspective or narrative that can fully capture the history of the United States in the world — makes this history of US imperialism appear more contested and thus less inevitable than celebrants have made it out to be. The history of nineteenth-century North America is teeming with alternative political formations, ranging from Indigenous alliance systems to maroon communities and breakaway settler republics, most notably the slaveholding Confederate States of America. Though widely manifest, US empire-building in this period was certainly not destiny. The diverse peoples caught in the vortex of the expanding American empire were not passive pawns in imperial chess games; they were important foreign relations actors whose on-the-ground actions — from family formation to intercultural mediation, knowledge dissemination, economic production, resource exploitation, diplomatic negotiations, and armed resistance — shaped the character and boundaries of the expanding United States and the extraterritorial exercise and reach of US power. The history presented in this volume differs from traditional accounts of the "rise" of the United States — of both the celebratory and condemnatory types — by foregrounding the contingency and on occasion sheer chaos that characterized struggles for sovereignty and power in this period.

To make sense of this complex story, this volume places US history into its wider, oftentimes global, context. Vicissitudes in international capital markets, dynamics of colonial competition and collaboration, individual decisions of millions of migrants, voters, and consumers — all of these and more determined the trajectory of the United States. The US empire took root within a hospitable geopolitical environment, one that was rapidly integrating under the auspices of Europe's imperial powers. As an ascendant power in a multipolar world, the nineteenth-century United States benefited tremendously from its ties to the leading empires of the day, Britain foremost among them. Despite rivalries with other powers and a policy tradition of remaining neutral in European conflicts, the United States assembled tacit alliances based on race and culture, with its ruling lasses aligning more with imperial powers and creole elites than subjugated peoples. Yet even as it profited from its relations with European empires, the United States rattled these empires through de-stabilizing exports such as evangelical Christianity, financial panics, and the anti-imperial nationalism articulated in the globally reproduced Declaration of Independence.

The coalescence and magnitude of the US empire along with Americans' ability to work with strategic partners in a larger world not of their own making ultimately shifted the gravity of global power. The events of the nineteenth century made the United States the leading force field of the twentieth. This volume tells the story of these converging developments, pairing its eye on the big-picture exercise of power with an eye on the ways things played out on the ground. Mixing top-down and bottom-up perspectives, insider and outsider views, cultural, social, political, military, environmental, legal,

technological, and other veins of analysis, it places the United States, Indigenous nations, and their peoples in the context of a rapidly integrating world.

Building and Resisting US Empire

There was no masterplan that guided the imperial expansion of the United States in the nineteenth century. Rather, the building of the US empire was piecemeal and contingent, though marked by periodic flurries of significant development. This volume opens with the War of 1812, the new republic's "second war of independence" against Britain and its first major war against a Pan-Indian resistance movement. The significance of the war for the United States is to be found both in the nationalism and in the acceleration of the conquest of Indigenous territory that it unleashed. Both facets of the conflict came to be personified in the titanic, and controversial, celebrity of Andrew Jackson, the hero of the Battle of New Orleans and the most notorious practitioner of Indigenous dispossession, including in Florida, acquired by treaty from Spain in 1821. There is perhaps no better personification than Jackson of the connection between the United States' ongoing struggle for independence in a European dominated world order and the rapid development of its own imperial practices. And yet it is worth remembering that Choctaws provided essential assistance to Jackson at the Battle of New Orleans and his subsequent victory at the Battle of Horseshoe Bend. Jackson achieved his victories through alliance politics that reveal some of the strategic calculations made by Indigenous people in increasingly constrained circumstances as well as the ongoing military capacity of Indigenous people in the trans-Appalachian West.

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The anti-imperialist movement that arose in response to the Philippine-American War denounced the United States for coming full circle. The "antis" expressed horror and shock that the postcolonial polity born in a struggle against British rule had evolved into an ocean-spanning empire bent on crushing anticolonial resistance movements and governing subject peoples. But the circle had been closed from the start. As the arch imperialists of the dominant Republican Party insisted, the wars that rang out the century were not so much a new departure as they were an extension in circumference.

Imperial Structures

Contingent and haphazard though the expansion of the United States in the nineteenth century was, underlying structures channeled the development of the US empire. As the chapters in this volume demonstrate, these included legal systems, religious institutions, political movements, newspapers, magazines, the US military, racist and other ideologies, and diasporic networks. Environmental considerations also undergirded the growth of the American empire, which was powered by a fabulous array of resources, including water, soil, coal, minerals, and commodifiable animals. To illuminate the workings of power, the chapters that follow pay particular attention to two structural forces, capital and the state, which often worked in concert to advance the interests of the middle and upper classes.

The close connections between private capital and the state can be seen in the development of transportation and communication infrastructures. These infrastructures were central to the imperial expansion and integration of the United States, a geographically immense entity that by mid-century spanned the continent with extended tentacles to Caribbean, Pacific Island, Latin American, and trans-oceanic markets. The construction of sprawling and financially volatile transport systems integrated markets, funneled migrants along certain pathways, and helped to account for the shapeshifting footprint

of the US empire. The canal boom of the 1820s, which decreased transp^rt costs, brought producers, traders, and consumers into closer association, and spurred financial innovations, including public subsidies to private transportation companies, set the stage for the era of steam that followed.

The spread of steam power in the mid-nineteenth century shifted an already rapid process of infrastructure development into hyperdrive. Even before the conclusion of the Mexican-American War, the United States government subsidized shipping lines that connected its ports on the Atlantic to the Pacific coast. By 1855 the United States had inaugurated regularly timetabled steam transportation between New York and San Francisco, with stops in Havana and the de facto US colony along the Panamanian transit route. Though only forty-seven miles long, the Wall Street-owned Panama Railroad became a vital node within a broader transportation network that channeled connections between hitherto distant peoples and markets. As early as 1860, the United States had more railroad mileage than the rest of the world combined, including what was then the longest railroad in the world, the Illinois Central, which connected Chicago and its midwestern hinterlands to the pulsing Caribbean port city, New Orleans. What an earlier generation of "transportation revolution" historians characterized as "internal improvements" were in truth a manifestation and enabler of imperial development.

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Americans and the World

The title of this volume, "America and the World," may bring to mind a single entity, "America," but one of the main takeaways of this volume is that this abstraction hides the complexity of its many component parts. To be sure, the pages that follow contain plenty of analysis of state actions and actors. Yet they also illuminate divisions among state actors as well as the historical significance of non-state actors. By opening the subject out beyond the state, the volume brings to light previously overlooked histories of Americans in the world. The diverse cast of characters who play a role in this history serves as a reminder that the category "American" has not always been self-evident. For starters, it is a European-origin term applied to the people of an entire hemisphere. But even if we take the word Americans to refer specifically to US Americans, this designation was not always clear cut in an age of shifting allegiances, stateless populations (such as enslaved workers and the Indigenous people subject to US sovereignty), racist restrictions on political inclusion, the assumption that a married woman's citizenship should be that of her husband, and tremendous human mobility.

Even as the people of the United States ventured beyond established borders, in many cases pushing and tugging those borders toward their new homes, the United States also drew millions of newcomers in, attracting an estimated 25 percent of international migrants in the long nineteenth century. For most of the nineteenth century, the British Isles, including Ireland, were the source of the majority of immigrants to the United States. Arrivals from German states and, to a lesser degree, Scandinavia, also figured largely in the early to mid-nineteenth century. The demographics of immigration changed in the final decades of the century with the arrival of "new immigrants" from southern and eastern Europe. Immigration from across the Pacific also grew in this period. The 1868 Burlingame Treaty with Qing China facilitated the arrival of workers desired by Western railroad builders. As early as 1870, the percentage of the nation's population that was foreign born surpassed 14 percent. It would remain around this level until 1920, peaking at 14.8 percent in 1890.

Earlier generations of historians were preoccupied with how migrant communities became "American," as they allegedly dissolved into a mythic "melting pot." But the inverse dynamic — how foreign-born migrants recast the American crucible — looms larger in this volume's chapters. The immigration booms of the nineteenth century provided the labor-hungry US economy with the muscle its growing industries and homesteads required. New arrivals — many of them not yet naturalized — provided military power in the United States' greatest moment of need: no less than a quarter of the mighty Union army in the Civil War was foreign born. Migrants brought to America their languages, cultures, religions, and social practices, diversifying their new homeland in the process.

Important, too, were the nativist backlashes that became a defining feature of US politics. The unprecedented inflow of Irish Catholics during the 1840s potato famine triggered the meteoric rise of the anti-Catholic Know-Nothing Party. Though the Know-Nothings soon dissolved as a distinct political organization, they anticipated future nativist movements. Prominent among the legislative results yielded by the anti-Catholic, anti-Semitic and anti-Asian xenophobia of the Gilded Age was the 1882 Chinese Exclusion Act, a prototype for future discriminatory immigration restrictions. A short-term implication of Chinese exclusion, however, was to reveal the incapacity of the United States to enforce its borders. In the absence of a federal immigration facility, the United States outsourced the implementation of restrictions to an overburdened consular service and to private shipping companies. The ethno-nationalist nativists of the coming decades took on board this lesson, engineering a more powerful state apparatus capable of surveillance, border enforcement, and deportation. By the 1920s, nativism and state capacity met in the form of the National Origins Act, which filtered immigrants according to their presumed racial characteristics.

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As the vast cast of characters who participated in US foreign relations suggests, there was a staggeringly wide array of interests at stake. There was no helmsman directing the United States in the nineteenth century; rather, competing interests jostled to turn the wheel of this motley ship of state in directions of their choosing. The result was a nation whose foreign relations were notorious for sudden zigs and zags. The objectives of human tramckers were in direct opposition to those of the people they trafficked; tariff promoters found their opposition in importers; immigration restrictionists among those more open to new arrivals; proponents of an empire of slavery among those who envisioned one of freedom or no empire at all. Self-interest, religious interests, racist interests, ethnic interests, class interests: all had their proponents. So did non-US national interests, as advanced not only by Confederates but also by expatriate Cubans, Fenians, and other diasporic nationalists resident in the United States. Encompassing humanitarians, filibusterers, reformers, blockade runners, naval theorists, consumers, political theorists, refugees, labor migrants, commercial agents, itinerant performers, the offense intellectuals (as opposed to defense intellectuals) of US expansionism, and others, this volume pushes past the homogenizing abstraction of "America and the world" to bring to light the textured history of Americans in the world. And even as Americans abroad often sought to extend their own values and lifestyles, US foreign relations played a pivotal role in constituting the racialized, class conscious, gendered, religiously informed, politically driven, and indeed, nationalist world views that these "Americans" held so dear.

America in the World

Yet one more theme that carries prominently through this volume is the making of space. From our current perspective, much of the contents of this volume pertains to what is now US domestic history. But places such as Florida, Texas, New Mexico, the Great plains, Oregon, California, Hawai`i, Alaska, and Puerto Rico were not part of the United States at the start of our story. They were the lands of people such as the Seminoles, Karankawas, pueblos, Navajos, Utes, Sioux, Modocs, Yumas, Washoes, Mojaves, Hawaiians, Tlingits, Inupiats, and Yupiks, as well as places claimed by the Spanish and Russian empires, and by 1821, newly independent Mexico. The US nationals who ventured into such places were as much extraterritorial Americans as were the filibusters who went to Nicaragua and the goldseekers who crossed the Isthmus of Panama en route to California. After proclaiming themselves as separate from the United States for four years in the 1860s, the Confederate States of America attacked the United States and its citizens on land and sea. The eventual incorporation of all these places into the United States should not erase this past, nor its ongoing legacies for Indigenous nations, other peoples brought into the US fold, and the ways in which the United States has been always, simultaneously, both a nation in the making and a de facto empire. The stories of the places that got away — places such as Canada, Cuba, and Santo Domingo that were not annexed despite filibustering and state efforts to bring them under US jurisdiction — remind us that the current boundaries of the United States were never the inevitable outcome of some kind of divinely determined manifest destiny, but rather the contingent result of conflict and negotiation.

The current borders of the United States were also the product of its selective embrace of demographic mobility. Freedom of movement was integral to America's democratic identity and social consciousness. The United States was a nation perpetually on the move. But not all of the inhabitants of North America determined when and how they relocated. Enslavers and government agents forcibly relocated African Americans and Indigenous people, whether in chained comes or under the armed guard of removal agents, and they spatially constrained racialized groups through such measures as internment on reservations, the ruthless tracking efforts of slave patrols, and incarceration on military posts and in penal institutions. Oppressed racial groups responded with subversive movement: Indigenous peoples evaded their would-be captors and slipped away from reservations; enslaved workers followed the `Underground Railroad" toward freedom, in many cases in Canada and Mexico; and — most successfully of all — fled in large numbers toward Union lines during the Civil War, leading to the implosion of the Confederate slave empire.

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This volume echoes previous accounts in its attention to European imperial powers. Yet along with highlighting the significance of the North Atlantic, it also tilts the East-West, US-European, axis that has captured so much attention in accounts of US foreign relations in this period. By reckoning more fully with the imperial scope of European states, the chapters in this volume add North-South depth to transatlantic relationships. In addition to drawing more attention to places such as Sierra Leone, Haiti, and mission sites from Africa to East Asia, they broaden the scope of analysis beyond bilateral framings to show how entire matrices of power shaped US relations with European empires and the rest of the world. Taken together, the stories of continental and overseas connections disprove old theses of US isolationism during the nineteenth century. Across vast geographies and interests, Americans sought

cross-border connections, often working in conjunction with other states and foreign nationals to achieve their ends.

If the United States and its nationals did not truly have direct relations with the entire world by the end of the nineteenth century, the nation's official representatives and its private sector were certainly active participants in a globally networked system, just a handful of intermediaries away from microbes, merchandise, and news emanating from far reaches of the world.

This was the era in which the United States reached its maximum territorial size, before the relinquishment of the Philippines in the mid-twentieth century and the loss of low-lying coastal areas to the rising seas of the twenty-first century. As the United States grew in population, domain, power, and impact, new technologies seemed to shrink the world by speeding connections along the proliferating and intertwined routes of capital and empire. This is not to say that globalization proceeded in linear fashion: interconnectivity sparked disaggregative impulses such as higher tariffs, quarantines, border patrols, and immigration restrictions. The term "America first" emerged at the end of the century, in response to the all-too-palpable power of global capitalism. Yet long before the word "globalization" entered the Anglophone lexicon, its effects were palpable from banana plantations to dining rooms; steerage to guided tours; extractive frontiers to secret ballots; women's rights campaigns to opium interdiction efforts, Wild West shows to fairground encounters among Native peoples on display.

By the dawn of the so-called American century, most Americans reveled in their nation's power, celebrating US practices and attainments as harbingers of the future. Nevertheless, before the hubris-inducing victory in World War I, even prideful Americans understood their nation as a newly arrived power that might still learn from more time-tested empires and progressive pathbreakers. For all its power and ambition, the United States remained dispensable in most parts of the world. For all its potency, it could not impose its will at whim. Those who failed to grasp the extent to which the wider world had shaped the contours and character of the United States may have regarded it. as a singular beacon, but the chapters that follow present the nineteenth-century United States as an empire among empires, even as it laid the groundwork for the awesome exercise of power to come. <>

THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF AMERICA AND THE WORLD, VOLUME 3: 1900–1945 edited by Brooke L. Blower, Andrew Preston [Cambridge University Press, 9781108419260]

The third volume of The Cambridge History of America and the World covers the volatile period between 1900 and 1945 when the United States emerged as a world power and American engagements abroad flourished in new and consequential ways. Showcasing the most innovative approaches to both traditional topics and emerging themes, leading scholars chart the complex ways in which Americans projected their growing influence across the globe; how others interpreted and constrained those efforts; how Americans disagreed with each other, often fiercely, about foreign relations; and how race, religion, gender, and other factors shaped their worldviews. During the early twentieth century, accelerating forces of global interdependence presented Americans, like others, with a set of urgent

challenges from managing borders, humanitarian crises, economic depression, and modern warfare to confronting the radical, new political movements of communism, fascism, and anticolonial nationalism. This volume will set the standard for new understandings of this pivotal moment in the history of America and the world.

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On the eve of the twentieth century, the devoted British imperialist Rudyard Kipling made his first visit to the United States. Arriving at Chicago's Palmer House Hotel, he found the gilt and mirrored bar

"crammed with people talking about money, and spitting everywhere." Others — he called them "barbarians" — "charged in and out of this inferno with letters and telegrams in their hands." Outside, the streets of this so-called most American city assaulted the young poet's senses. He discovered no color or beauty, only dirt for air, drab stone flagging underfoot, and overhead a tangle of wires and "absurd advertisements" for overpriced, inferior goods. Having seen firsthand the "grotesque ferocity" of the Midwest's largest metropolis, he desired "never to see it again." Chicago, he said, was "inhabited by savages" who seemed to have no higher purpose than personal profit. Americans, he thought, had yet to develop the will to use their political and economic gifts to earn themselves a place among the world's leading nations.

Many Americans understandably did not share Kipling's pessimism about their nation's potential and defensively countered such judgments. Preaching at Washington, DC's Metropolitan Methodist Church on New Year's Eve, 1899, with President William McKinley and his family listening on from their personal pew, Reverend Frank ^. Bristol extolled the glorious global future that awaited the United States. "America has not proven herself a coward in the face of sublime and awful duty," he boasted, and for that reason Americans had been entrusted with the fate "of the civilized and civilizing nations of the world." The "unforeseen" struggle to bring the Philippines under control was the first of what would surely be many tests, but Reverend Bristol welcomed their coming. "God," he continued, "has taken the light of our glorious Americanism out from under the bushel and put it on the candlestand, nay, on the mountain-top; nay, in the highest heaven." McKinley, a devout Methodist who had decided to colonize the Philippines in the name of humanity, must have agreed.

But other Americans decidedly did not. Staring at the start of a new century, only five years after becoming the first Black recipient of a Ph.D. from Harvard University, the activist and scholar W. E. B. Du Bois saw the moment as an opportunity not for Americans to emulate the civilizing pretenses of European imperialists but to forsake them entirely in favor of greater racial equality and inclusion. "In this age, when the ends of the world are being brought so near together," he told attendees at the first ^a^-Africa^ conference gathered in London in July of 1900, "the millions of black men in Africa, America, and the Islands of the Sea, not to speak of the brown and yellow myriads elsewhere, are bound to have great influence upon the world in the future, by reason of sheer numbers and physical contact." He appealed to the United States and the other "Great Powers of the Civilized world" to recognize that "the problem of the twentieth century" would be "the problem of the color line," and to reflect on "how far differences of race — which show themselves chiefly in the color of the skin and the texture of the hair — will hereafter be made the basis of denying to over half the world the right of sharing to utmost ability the opportunities and privileges of modem civilization." White men like Kipling and Bristol had assumed themselves to be the rightful leaders and sole interpreters of the world and its future. But during the first half of the twentieth century a growing chorus of voices like that of Du Bois rose to challenge them.

As these contrasting prophesies suggest, there was nothing inevitable about US global ascendancy. In 1900, the United States was still a developing nation with a predominantly rural population. It may have just emerged as the world's preeminent industrial and agricultural producer, but this remarkable growth masked chaotic boom and bust cycles and enormous inequalities. By other measures, the United States lagged far behind the most powerful nations in Europe, which dominated international affairs. London investors underwrote US industrialization and westward expansion. To project their power

internationally, Americans relied on the financial resources and communications and transportation links forged and maintained by the British. The US Foreign Service comprised very few ambassadors and largely amateur, unpaid consuls. The nation's armed forces did not even rank among the world's top ten militaries. The US Navy depended on the coaling and bunkering stations of Britain's superior fleet, and in 1900, the US Army was bogged down in a protracted war with Emilio Aguinaldo's hastily assembled freedom fighters in the Philippines. Many, like Kipling, dismissed the United States as a backwater. Aspiring American artists, intellectuals, architects, and others — John Singer Sargent, Mary Cassatt, Henry Ossawa Tanner, and Edith Wharton among them — sought training and inspiration in the universities, ateliers, and salons across the Atlantic. At home, aspirational Americans decorated their parlors with luxurious imports from Europe and Asia, but Europeans and Asians did not yet in turn crave the American consumer goods that would later become so ubiquitous in the world's markets. Little suggested that the United States would become the site of some of the modern age's most incredible technological and cultural innovations. The automobile, the radio, cinema — they had all been invented in Europe.

Yet by 1945 the United States would conquer an overseas empire, fight its first wars on the mainlands of Europe, Asia, and Africa, and supplant Europe as the nerve-center of industrial capitalism. By then Americans had built a modern welfare and warfare state, knitted together not only by national markets and communication networks but also by a widely shared sense of international importance and duty. While much of the rest of the world lay in ruins, the United States had raised the world's largest navy and air forces and its second largest army; it had invented the world's first nuclear weapons. The nation's universities and laboratories drained talent from abroad. Its consumer goods, movies, music, fads, and fashions poured outward, inspiring or angering millions beyond US borders. In retrospect the period's most startling development would be clear: during the twentieth century's first forty-five years, in the midst of a deadly era of sickness, famine, economic crisis, and global warfare, the United States became the most powerful nation in the world, possibly the most powerful for over a millennium.

Given the enormity of US state capacity at the end of World War II— and its further growth in subsequent decades — scholars of modern American foreign relations have often paid far more attention to the twentieth century's second half than its first. By the measurements of the national security state and prolonged conflicts of the Cold War, these earlier decades seemed little more than prologue. During and after World War II, internationalists who advocated sustained and even pre-emptive US intervention in world affairs laid the groundwork for such an assessment by promoting the idea that the United States had been misguidedly "isolationist" before 1941. Especially after Woodrow Wilson's brief and unhappy attempt at global leadership during World War I, longstanding conventional wisdom held, the nation turned sharply inward with fatal consequences that should never be repeated again. Historians who focused on formal US relations with Europe during the 1920s and 1930s found much to substantiate this interpretation. Congress, after all, refused to join the League of Nations, offer a security guarantee to France, or reconsider Allied war debts, and it passed a series of tariffs and neutrality acts that undermined the possibility for international economic cooperation and curtailed the president's ability to support overseas allies.

But over time two methodological shifts in the field have challenged these assumptions and revived a widespread interest in this period. First, as more and more scholars explore Americans' connections to Latin America, Asia, and Africa, they have broadened our understanding of the scope of US engagements

beyond the North Atlantic world, dramatizing in the process just how Eurocentric the narrative of American isolationism has been. Second, as scholars have reconceptualized the nature of power itself — recognizing it not only in the hands of official statesmen but all kinds of informal actors, and finding its operations not only in the halls of government but also in everyday places and encounters — they have revealed the often subtle but consequential ways in which Americans projected their influence, or reckoned with that of others, especially at a time before the US state assumed such large proportions.

The rich histories that have emerged in recent decades offer deeper insight into the spectacular transformation of the United States from regional upstart to global superpower, casting that process not as a straightforward success story but as one founded on a series of unresolved contradictions. As actors on the world stage, Americans appeared liberal yet imperial, internationalist but also nationalist, progressive but at the same time often reactionary, sometimes peaceful and at other times militaristic, promoting self-determination but denying it to millions, intent on making the world safe for democracy while sanctioning racist hierarchies both at home and abroad, founding the League of Nations only to turn away from it. How these habits of engagement took shape — how Americans fought over and wielded their newfound influence, how they sometimes made shrewd decisions and at other times squandered goodwill, how their hopes and hypocrisies animated their evolving world views, and how their impact unfolded on a global scale — is the subject of this volume.

American Power in the Modern Era

The period between the Civil War and World War I^ marked a time of tremendous social and economic change as well as a burst of technological innovation that was unprecedented then, and possibly unmatched since. A number of modernizing developments that began in the nineteenth century —a set of processes the historian C. A. Bayly aptly dubbed "the great acceleration" — picked up pace and intensity after 1900.4 Steamships, railroads, automobiles, airplanes, telegraphs, telephones, and wireless communications such as radio brought people all over the world into closer and closer contact. Meanwhile, the advent of new industrial methods, such as standardized Fordist assembly-line production, and technological advances in electricity and petrochemicals reshaped daily life for millions worldwide. The result, which came much later to be known as globalization — with nations not just interconnected but interdependent, and societies not simply associated but increasingly integrated — dramatically altered the expectations, and the fates, of people around the world. Faster and cheaper forms of transportation enabled migrants to traverse vast distances in search of higher wages and better lives. Global migrant streams, which peaked in the 1910s and 19205, linked Italian villages with Argentine homesteads, Polish shtetls with American factories, Chinese ports with Sumatran plantations, and Indian towns with South African mines. All kinds of other travel opportunities, for business and pleasure, proliferated during this the age that brought forth the opening of the Panama Canal and the gift of flight. Ritual journeys once reserved for the elite, from the Grand Tour of Europe to the Hajj to Mecca, suddenly fell within reach of the masses.

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Competing Perspectives

Americans' world views and foreign policy preferences ran along all kinds of fault lines during the first half of the twentieth century. Matters of trade and tariffs pitted producers against consumers. Assessments of security threats often differed by region; fears about Asian migration, a so-called "yellow

peril," emanated from the West Coast while calls for military "preparedness" against German militarism animated elites on the East Coast. Religious leaders offered contrasting solutions to the problems of the world and how the nation should use its growing power. With their extensive overseas missionary network, mainline — that is, mainstream and establishment — Protestants stood among the most prominent advocates of a new, US-led world order. Wilson's diplomatic ambitions, and later those of Franklin Roosevelt, drew heavily from the currents of their thought, especially ideas about ecumenical cooperation. However, fundamentalists, so-called because they refused to compromise the tenets of faith to the onrush of modernity, excoriated international organizations as violations of US sovereignty and the purity of the nation's Christian identity. In the process, they forged a new, long-enduring strain of populist antiglobalism.

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The perils of Interdependence

Many Americans hoped that as the world became more interdependent, it would become more peaceful and just. Clearly this did not happen; the first half of the twentieth century stands as one of the most violent eras in human history. The heightened pace and intensity of interaction meant not just new opportunities but also new vulnerabilities. Knowledge spread faster and easier, but so did pathogens. Commodities traveled farther and wider, but so did market crashes. The facility of movement brought the world's cultures more frequently into contact, but the same could be said for its rival militaries. By the end of the era, the perils of interdependence threatened to destroy the world itself.

In one of the era's cruelest ironies, the forces of globalization actually stimulated national rivalries and set the states of Europe, and in time others, on the path toward the Great War (1914-18). The ability to have a "world war" — to mobilize more than 100 million soldiers and sailors, bring Australians to fight in Gallipoli and Gaza, deploy Senegalese troops to the fields of Flanders, send Indians to invade German East Africa, and cause Americans to lock arms in the woods of Belleau — required modem transportation networks capable of shipping men, horses, and materiel over vast distances. It also took modem industrial production and weapons technologies to produce a crisis of such magnitude that it toppled four empires, wiped entire villages off of the map, and killed upwards of 20 million people. The war's knock-on effects caused even more dislocation. Millions of Armenians, Jews, and others fled as the Russian, Austro-Hungarian, and Ottoman empires crumbled, new etbno-nationahst authorities took charge, or as entire regions descended into chaos and civil war. The movements of so many troops and refugees added deadly fuel to the flu pandemic of 1918-19. Following an early outbreak among conscripts at Camp Funston in Kansas, the disease ripped through the close quarters of other camps, barracks, and mass transports worldwide before ultimately infecting a third of humanity and killing 50 million people, including some 675,000 Americans, more than twelve and a half times as many US citizens as had died during World War I itself.

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Americans' ambivalence about their place in the world matched an unease about US power felt by many others witnessing the end of World War II. This was fitting, for people and events elsewhere would shape Americans' engagement with the rest of the world after 1945. Imprisoned since 1942 at Ahmednagar Fort for his part in the Quit India movement, the Indian nationalist Jawaharlal Nehru found plenty of time to think about the rapidly changing world outside. Into his prison notes he poured

arguments for India's freedom and a manifesto for the anticolonial uprising that was about to sweep across much of the planet. A year after Nehru regained his freedom in June 1945, and the year before he became the first prime minister of an independent India, he published his wartime writings as The Discovery of India. His was a defiantly anti-Eurocentric book, but one that also came with a foreboding prediction: "Whatever the future may hold," the future leader of the Non-Alignment Movement warned, "it is dear that the economy of the U.S.A. after the war will be powerfully expansionist and almost explosive in its consequences. Will this lead to some new kind of imperialism? It would be yet another tragedy if it did so, for America has the power and opportunity to set the pace for the future."

Nehru was prescient. In the decades following World War II, the United States would be both expansionist and explosive. Its consumer-capitalist economy fueled spectacular growth in Europe and elsewhere, leading even the Marxist historian Eric Hobsbawm to call the postwar decades "the Golden Years." But the United States would prove to be explosive in other ways, too, not least as Cold War calculations eclipsed commitments to decolonization, leading to protracted wars and heavy-handed covert operations especially Ain Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East. As Nehru appreciated, the conditions for this kind of vast influence did not emerge suddenly in 1945. They were products of ambitions and sensibilities developed during the first forty-five years of the twentieth century when Americans dramatically expanded their investments beyond US shores, both through the political and military power of the national state, and through private institutions and the transnational travels and interactions of thousands of citizens learning to think about what it would mean to be an American in the modern world. <>

THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF AMERICA AND THE WORLD, VOLUME 4: 1945 TO THE PRESENT edited by David C. Engerman, Max Paul Friedman, Melani McAlister [Cambridge University Press, 9781108419277]

The fourth volume of The Cambridge History of America and the World examines the heights of American global power in the mid-twentieth century and how challenges from at home and abroad altered the United States and its role in the world. The second half of the twentieth century marked the pinnacle of American global power in economic, political, and cultural terms, but even as it reached such heights, the United States quickly faced new challenges to its power, originating both domestically and internationally. Highlighting cutting-edge ideas from scholars from all over the world, this volume anatomizes American power as well as the counters and alternatives to 'the American empire.' Topics include US economic and military power, American culture overseas, human rights and humanitarianism, third-world internationalism, immigration, communications technology, and the Anthropocene.

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This volume of The Cambridge History of America and the World opens as World War II ends and the United States stands at the pinnacle of its power relative to the rest of the world. Indexes of that power abound: In 1950, for instance, the United States accounted for only 6.0 percent of the world population — but 27.3 percent of all economic activity (and a far larger share of industrial production), along with 66.3 percent of world military expenditure. Other forms of American global power were just as significant but harder to measure: the United States had taken the lead diplomatically, treating wartime allies like England and France as junior partners; it took a harsher attitude toward its other major wartime ally, the USSR. Economic and military strength, along with the ability to shape world politics —

Since the early 1990s, scholars interested in expanding the horizons of diplomatic history have joined with social, cultural, and intellectual historians looking abroad. They have done so both within the nomenclature of existing fields as well as in this new field of "America and the World." The intellectual antecedents and institutional movers behind these changes are many and varied, but include increasing attention to flows of people, texts, and ideas across national borders; growing attention to the roles of actors beyond the US State Department and the White House; and a focus on the ways that activists drew energy from international events and movements — and on the ways that international events could shape domestic movements.

These changes were especially visible in studies of US global engagements after 1945. One index for the expanding enterprise of "America and the World" is the annual conference and the journal of the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations (SHAFR). Founded in the late 1960s as social history began to take root in the American historical profession, this new organization brought together those interested in studying the history of American foreign policy. Debates within the field were varied and frequently fierce, but typically revolved around approval or disapproval of specific American foreign-policy decisions, often linked directly or indirectly to questions about contemporary US politics. When SHAFR created a journal, Diplomatic History, the early issues had an eagle on the cover. Changes in the field were driven above all by archival openings, tracking closely the declassification of diplomatic records; the subfield came of age racing to interpret newly available American archival materials from the 1940s and 1950s. The subfield grew rapidly, and focused increasingly on studies of the post-World War II period. But this growth unfolded in ways that frequently led diplomatic historians to criticize "mainstream" study of American history, which in this telling had left state power behind in favor of social and cultural history. A number of criticisms of the field — from within and without — only increased the alienation of diplomatic historians through the 1980s.

In the subsequent decade, however, the tide began to turn. Key diplomatic historians ushered in new approaches to scholarship by advising the work of students who did not abide by the previous assumptions and strictures of the field. Senior scholars, in their capacities as journal editors and program committee chairs, self-consciously opened these core vehicles of scholarly communication to a wider set of voices. Pioneering works of scholarship showed just how much these new approaches could achieve. As the momentum for looking beyond the State Department grew, SHAFR also welcomed cultural and social historians whose own interests had led them to look beyond the borders of the United States. The result was a vibrant organization that hosted an increasingly diverse and intellectually dynamic field. And no area was more energized by these new approaches than studies of the post-World War II period.

This internalise account — which focuses on scholars interacting with each other and their sources — is, of course, only one way to tell the story. Another would be to see the changes in the field since the 1980s in conversation with historical circumstances. It might not be such a surprise, for instance, that the Cold War shaped scholarly discourse about foreign relations; arguments about diplomatic history were — often explicitly — arguments about the Cold War itself. The sudden and unexpected end of the Cold War led to a period in which globalization became a cause for both celebration and criticism. And who, after the events of September it, 2001, could say that American power abroad had no effect on life within the United States?

Whatever the origins of the field's transformation, "America and the World" has become a scholarly enterprise all its own. Those publishing work under its banner vary markedly in their subjects of interest as well as their views of American power. We have tried in this volume to represent as wide a range of perspectives and approaches as we can. This volume of The Cambridge History of America and the World, like those that precede it, assembles scholars well-positioned to write authoritative accounts, to fashion their own arguments, and to offer not just coverage of events and trends but new ways of thinking about their topics.

These new histories, and new generations of historians, have helped reinterpret many aspects of the United States since 1945. This work has, among other things, brought about new understandings of the Cold War and the United States. The period following 1945 included — but was not limited to — the global American-Soviet conflict, which ended with the transformation and collapse of the Soviet Union between 1985 and 1991. A history of America and the world that ignored the origins, operations, and implications of this global ideological conflict would be profoundly incomplete; the Cold War structured American foreign policy, most obviously, but also its domestic political, economic, and cultural orders. By the same token, the Cold War hardly encompassed everything Americans thought and did for over the four-plus decades of American—Soviet antagonism. In fact, imposing a Cold War framework on the analysis of the multifarious forms of American engagement with the world since 1945 — aside from excluding the whole period after 1991 — would repeat the same distortion produced by policymakers who did just that when confronted by nationalist leaders in developing countries, or movements for social justice at home and abroad, or cultural and intellectual developments that challenged US predominance. These multidirectional and multifarious influences applied all the more to understanding the US role in the world after the Cold War ended in 1991.

While the different components of this volume do not adhere to a strict timeline, they do move in roughly chronological order. The efforts to order a world of states predominated in the first fifteen or so years after 1945. The challenges that this order faced — from domestic as well as transnational forces — did not of course begin in the 1960s. But the newly emerging international system, with the United States playing an outsized role, underwent serious, even existential, challenges from many quarters in the two dozen years after 1960. And challenges only deepened in the subsequent years of "new world disorder."

Ordering a World of States

World War II contributed to a major restructuring of world power and world politics, accelerating some trends, redirecting others. Any accounting of the war has to begin with the tens of millions of lives lost, not just through the methodical killing of the Holocaust but also battlefield casualties and major disruption of civilian life. Millions more migrated, either by force or in an effort to flee violence. Economically, the war itself wreaked tremendous destruction across Europe and Asia; it also wrecked global patterns of trade and investment. And these are just some of the calculable costs of the war.

Even more importantly, the war challenged the imperial world order that had defined- international politics for centuries if not longer. The economic demands of the war strained existing European empires, especially the British and the French, but also the Dutch and the Belgian. The ideological claims of the war, furthermore, gave significant ammunition and momentum to anti-colonial movements, especially in Asia. Nowhere were these trends more visible than in the `Jewel" of the British Empire:

India. The Indian declaration of war against Nazi Germany, issued from London rather than the British-led government of India in New Delhi, prompted a massive "Quit India" campaign from the Indian National Congress. And the use of Indian resources to fight the war in Asia meant that England owed millions of pounds to the government of India — and ultimately to its postcolonial successor states.

To be sure, there was not a single moment of decolonization. Portugal fought ruthlessly to hold onto its African colonies well into the 1970s. Anticolonial activists worked, in their colonies and in international forums such as the Asian-African Conference in Bandung (1955), against the imperial world order. The "Year of Africa" in 1960, which saw the independence of seventeen new nations, in short order fundamentally altered the balance of voting power within the United Nations (UN), which itself became a venue for opposing imperial rule. The European powers lost their major colonies, some as a result of military defeat at the hands of anticoloiiial forces, and others because the price of maintaining the colonies grew politically and economically untenable. They reconfigured — uncomfortably — their national identities to be less reliant on their imperial status, even as they still maintain territorial control of islands in the Pacific and elsewhere. Yet those caveats should not occlude recognition of the fact that territorial empires were no longer the fundamental unit of international relations.

That function — the basic unit of international relations — had passed to the states. This was true in Europe, the home of the former colonial powers, and just as much so (if not more) in the former colonies in Asia and Africa. While the nation-state was not the only possible successor to the colony, efforts to create other units like federations quickly came to naught.

The rise of the state coexisted uneasily with the second major change of the post-1945 years: the emergence of American-Soviet tensions. These tensions, which were visible even during World War II's Grand Alliance, deepened quickly as the two antagonists differed significantly over the postwar settlement of Europe; their armies stood against one another without firing shots. The doyen of American foreign-policy commentators, Walter Lippmann, called this circumstance a "Cold War" — a term that came to define a whole era. Yet the term only described the conflict in Europe; as the tensions moved into the global arena, "hot wars" ensued.

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Challenging a World of States

Secretary of State Dean Acheson found the task of ordering the world "just a bit less formidable than that described in the first chapter of Genesis," and those present at the creation may soon have felt they were witnessing the fall. Faith in American superiority over any possible rival state or system, an asymmetry that in 1947 gave President Harry Truman the confidence to declare an unlimited commitment to shape events around the entire globe, began to yield to anxieties, from intense fear that nuclear-armed intercontinental ballistic missiles made the United States vulnerable to Soviet attack, to mouse apprehensiveness over the changing racial order in the areas of the world emerging from colonial rule. As the civil rights movement began to undermine the tenets of white supremacy in the US political system, decolonization movements — which the Soviet Union ideologically and sometimes materially supported and opportunistically embraced as "wars of national liberation" — inflicted further military defeats upon European armies, most of hem US allies, and even upon the United States itself. Although the country was at the pinnacle of its power, it faced the twin threats of an assertive Soviet Union and the rise of the "darker nations," in the coinage of W. E. B. Du Bois, who predicted that "the wicked

conquest of weaker and darker nations by nations whiter and stronger but foreshadows the death of that strength." These two threats were interlinked in the minds of American policymakers and commentators, creating the spectacle of a superpower confident that its system naturally should be extended around the world, only to be startled at the world's ambivalent reception.

Ambivalence took many forms. Transnational processes and actors posed challenges to the system the United States had fostered. The United States prescribed an economic development strategy for other countries in which the state would build institutions and capacity while the invisible hand of the market would distribute rewards, American producers would supply goods and services, and American investors would be welcome to contribute their capital in remunerative ways. Yet the results were not always satisfying to those on the receiving end of the investment. Chile's Foreign Minister Gabriel Valdes irritated US officials by pointing out that for every dollar the United States sent to Latin America in aid, Latin America sent 3.8 dollars back north in repatriated profits, yielding endemic underdevel^pment. With such analyses leading to import substitution industrialization, capital controls, and other measures, developing countries increasingly turned to state-led models of economic development and national control of their natural resources while limiting American access.

Many came together at the United Nations to promote a New International Economic Order (NIEO) in the mid-1970s. The NIEO was an economic nationalist program aimed at the defense of state sovereignty, one that also worked across national borders, bringing states together to challenge global inequities. Tanzania's socialist president, Julius Nyerere, saw the potential of South-South solidarity as a "trade union of the poor" — and American officials responded like a union-busting employer, seeking to undercut the message and divide the messengers.' An even starker challenge to the heart of the Western economic system came in the form of oil nationalism, as producing countries formed a cartel that enabled them to quadruple the price that the United States and its allies were accustomed to paying for the fuel that kept their industrial economies running. As Washington focused on the problem, it shifted from a policy of seeking to ensure access to sources of oil to seeking to control the price, a far more difficult endeavor.

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Those relationships and that disparity began to seem unsustainable even as the organizing principle of the Cold War itself was called into question by the reconfiguration of superpower relations and the emergence of detente. Americans and Chinese had within living memory sent their troops to shoot at one another in Korea and were still jockeying for influence as one of them rained bombs upon a stubbornly independent Vietnam. Now their leaders drank toasts to one another and began to move toward mutual recognition and even "strategic partnership." Meanwhile, Moscow, long the villain in apocalyptic nightmares of nuclear war, became the site for the signing of far-reaching controls on the nuclear arms race. These trends furthered an uneasy equilibrium at the level of geostrategic contest between East and West, even as transnational social movements of all kinds and the global circulation of capital, people, goods, and ideas increased their pace and further challenged the order the United States had tried to foster since 1945.

New World Disorder?

Perhaps the most important transnational actors of the late twentieth century were corporations, which increasingly challenged the sovereignty of states as anchors of the late Cold War order. Even as the US

state supported the profit-making activities of corporations on a global scale, the corporations had little allegiance to the state. Neoliberals argued forcefully for a decreased role for the state and an increasing dominance of the market as an arbiter of global economic relations. And liberals like Robert Reich complained that "we are witnessing the creation of a purer form of capitalism, practiced globally by managers who are more distant, more economically driven — in essence more coldly rational in their decisions, having shed the old affiliations with people and place."

Nonetheless, neoliberalism was never simply a refusal or sidestepping of the state. It was, instead, a complex process of reorienting states to serve as the facilitator of the free market while limiting actions that would constrain the social or environmental consequences of capitalist expansion. In the ideal neoliberal order, the state might provide some welfare protections, but its role was increasingly understood as secondary to the market, except as a guarantor of the rights of capital. Corporations could cross borders freely, and US military and political power was increasingly used to support the freemarketization of the globe, sometimes under the auspices of transnational organizations such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) or World Bank, other times — as with Cuba or Iraq — with threats or actions to remove "illiberal" regimes. As economic globalization increased in the late twentieth century, even the notion of "American" or "Dutch" corporations came to seem quaint: it mattered less and less that Exxon was based in the United States or Shell Oil based in the Netherlands. Of course, states did not cease to matter in economic relations, and "national" corporate identities were never entirely unimportant. US economic sanctions on Sudan in the 1990s, for example, kept US corporations out and opened the way for China's National Petroleum Corporation to move in. Still, the expansive reach of transnational corporations, once a "chosen instrument" of US policy, made them increasingly independent of the far-reaching goals of the US state.

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Any understanding of the future of America and the world must account for the reality that the world itself is undergoing transformation. Its fundamental material reality is altering, as temperatures rise, ice caps melt, forests recede, and deserts spread, and as species (animal and plant) disappear. The United States has been an outlier among the wealthy democracies for decades, often outright hostile to any limitations on economic expansion and slow to join the series of treaties that attempt to stave off environmental collapse. Thus this volume ends with a discussion of the Anthropocene — and the ways in which climate change is inevitably altering our global context, from the collapse of unsustainable forms of economic life to increasing numbers of refugees to the likelihood of more resource wars. The Cold War came and went, with short-lived triumphalism and claims that history itself had ended in a victory for the American way of life. Meanwhile, that way of life was promoting patterns of production and consumption that were altering the planet in undeniable and largely irreversible ways.

To some observers, the relationship between humans and the non-human world seemed to send a message through a global pandemic in 2020 and 2021 that forced industrial production, many kinds of consumption, and most forms of travel to come to a sudden halt. The results were complex and even contradictory. The spread of the disease highlighted the stakes of longstanding inequities, within and between nations. The shutdowns amid the COVID-^9 pandemic devastated employment in many countries — but stock markets reached new highs. The reduction in individual movement and economic activity produced the first clear skies in decades overcrowded cities. The longer-term effects are likely to be geopolitical as well, as everything from tracking the disease to how to protect against it revealed

new elements of American engagements with the world. President Trump's decision to abandon multilateral efforts by scapegoating and then withdrawing from the World Health Organization, and the onset of "vaccine nationalism" and "vaccine diplomacy" on the part of the United States and other nations, showed that even unprecedented pandemics fit into familiar patterns. From its origins in human-animal contact to its impact on cities, the pandemic also laid bare the reality that, in the twenty-first century, the planet will continue to leave its mark, indelibly, on the futures that America and the world navigate. <>

RETHINKING UTOPIA: INTERDISCIPLINARY Approaches edited by Ebru Deniz Ozan [Political Theory for Today, Lexington Books, 9781666906950]

Rethinking Utopia is a collection that discusses utopian thinking in relation to different philosophical themes. It seeks utopianism in political theory (particularly in Kant and Derrida), populism, Turkish Islamism, international law, and it fleshes out themes of modernism and classless society in the selected utopian examples. By discussing and showing the relationship between utopia and these topics, the book shows that the range of subjects related to utopias is wider than the current literature suggests.

The book attempts to bring together academic fields, which are not cross-fertilized in the existing debates on utopia, by building bridges between actual politics and futuristic visions. On the one hand, it looks at utopia as a means to think about and reconfigure contemporary politics (as in the case of international law and populist politics); on the other hand, it investigates how different philosophical/literary texts, from widely-known More and Le Guin to lesser-known Turkish Islamists Kısakürek, Karakoç and Özel, imagine their distinct utopian vision where a new form of anarchist, classless or Islamist society could be possible.

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Rethinking Utopia

Ruth Levitas says that "For those who still think that utopia is about impossible, what really is impossible is to carry on as we are, with social and economic systems that enrich a few but destroy the environment and impoverish most of the world's population. Our very survival depends on finding another way of living". Truthfully, the world is witnessing a multitude of crises ranging from the economic crisis to the pandemic and from the climate crisis to the migration crisis. In addition, humanity is facing and struggling with poverty, environmental problems and increasing authoritarian tendencies. While some relate these issues with the process of neoliberalism, others take a less holistic view by addressing the issues one by one. Regardless of how these problems are analysed, the re-emergence and re-thinking of utopianism take place exactly at these times. It seems that we resort to utopias especially in the times of crises or catastrophes, since utopias are expressions of our desire for being otherwise or being better. If we abandon utopian impulse in personal or political thinking, we imprison ourselves within the world as it is, and we are stuck with the way things are. The time and density of crises and discontent may awaken the desire for a better life both personally and collectively. Utopian thinking as a guiding spirit provides the necessary tools for the image of alternative societies and indicates their possibility.

This book shares the above-mentioned views of Ruth Levitas and Simon Critchley. Rethinking utopia or revisiting utopian texts is a way to remind ourselves, at a moment where actual politics imprison us to the exigencies of the present, that there have indeed been alternative ways of looking at the world throughout history. Thinking together with utopia might be an antidote to the learned helplessness of the present day: rather than bouncing back to "more of the same," utopian thinking as discussed in this book can be a means to envisage a world beyond the crisis, rather than trying to develop resilience and coping strategies.

In line with our conviction that utopia is a multidimensional and dynamic concept, this book acknowledges and expresses the value of seeing utopias in different ways rather than creating a working model of utopian thinking. It contains chapters on utopian thinking in relation to different disciplines, ranging from political thought and action (i.e., politics) to the reviews of some utopian texts. It emphasizes utopia as desire. It discusses populism and utopian thinking as two examples of redemptive politics. It also questions whether international law can be a guide in the world that is turned upside down, and whether it can provide a basis for the dream of a better world. It asks whether the concept of utopia is specific to modernism and whether it is an old-fashioned concept or not. It also examines the relationship between Islam, which has the feature of longing for another world like all religions, and utopian thought. Thus, the aim of the book is to link utopian thinking with all these issues and to open a discussion in these areas.

This book brings fields, which are not cross-fertilized in the existing debates on utopia, together by building bridges between actual politics and futuristic visions. While some contributors are looking into utopia as a means to think about and reconfigure contemporary politics (e.g. chapters on international law and populism), some are investigating how very different philosophical texts (e.g. Derrida and Kant) can be connected to utopia and how literary works, from widely known More and Le Guin to less known Turkish Islamists Kisakurek, Karakoc and Ozel, imagine their distinct utopian vision where a new form of society (anarchist/classless or Islamist) will be possible.

The book is divided into two sections. Although the chapters are related to each other in different ways, they can be read by themselves in a different order. The first part of the book is more theory oriented while the second part is more applied, in the broadest sense of the word. The aim of the first part is to discuss the concept of utopia in different disciplinary contexts and explore its relation to different concepts. Hence, rather than a general theoretical discussion of utopia, the chapters in the first part aims to broaden our perspective related to utopia by asking new questions about it and relating it to different concepts. The second part is where we look at specific utopian texts and examine them with novel focuses and considerations. We consider going back to the utopian texts important, because, as mentioned above, they remind us that there are alternatives, which we need today arguably more than ever. Therefore, while theoretical discussions in the first part engage with new questions and concepts, the chapters in the second part focus on some important utopian texts.

The first chapter (Utopia as Free Play) focuses on utopian thinking in terms of its relationship with political theory. Ozler underlines the free play characteristic of the utopian thinking referring to some theoretical debates that range from Kant to Derrida. After discussing the intermediary, communicative and transient aspects of utopias, he argues that utopian thinking is somewhere between pure reason and practical reason whereby one can free play.

The second chapter (The Search for a Better Place: Populist and Utopian Redemption) discusses populism and utopianism as two ways of thinking about a "better" social and political life. Although a vision for a better place is often associated with utopianism since utopia means a better place that does not exist, this chapter will bring populism into our yearning for a better place. Discussing populism in this respect makes sense because populism is clearly arguing for and promising a better place. This also highlights the redemptive character of populism. Thus, while utopianism and populism generally are not discussed together, they are in fact two different modes of redemptive politics. The chapter aims to flesh out the redemptive qualities of both by looking at how they create their better place. To do this, the chapter will look at their engagement with the past, the present and the future.

The third chapter (Utopia and The Law of Humanity: An International Humanitarian Law Perspective) examines the relationship between the principle of humanity and utopia. The main aim of this chapter is to explore how this principle influences the IHL improvement process. It attempts to answer as to whether the principle, which is mostly considered as part of utopianism, plays an effective role in this process. The chapter claims that utopianism provides us with crucial guidance to transform IHL and utopian ideas substantially affect the process.

The fourth chapter (Modernism in Thomas More's Utopia) analyses the main text of utopian thinking, Thomas More's Utopia, in terms of modernism. It argues that Utopia is a multifaceted and complex work that reflects ancient Greek heritage, the traditional values of the Middle Ages and the innovative ideas of the modem-bourgeois society of the future. Sidal argues that More's work reveals the contradictions inherent in modernity.

The fifth chapter (The Classless Society in Ursula K. Le Guin's Utopia: Always Coming Home) analyses a utopian text, Always Coming Home. The chapter mainly traces a classless society in Ursula Le Guin's utopia. To do this, it analyses the property relations and the relationship with nature in Kesh society, focusing on the meaning of ownership, "giving," competition, technology, and exploitation in the society. In addition, the chapter argues that the society and the universe defined in the book are open to change

and always can be reconstituted, as the metaphors of "the hinge (heyiya) and the gyre" and the metaphors of way and "coming home" in the book imply. This chapter claims that Always Coming Home in which Ursula K. Le Guin describes a utopian society is a work that can respond to critics who condemn utopianism as being either idealist or totalitarian.

The final chapter (Turkish Islamism and Utopia: Collating the Works of Necip Fazil Kisakurek, Sezai ^arakoc, and Ísmet Ozel) discusses utopian thinking in terms of Turkish Islamism, focusing on the works of Necip Fazil Kisakurek, Sezai ^arak^c and Ísmet Ozel, successively Ideological Knit, The Credo of the Generation of the Resurrection and Three Issues. Zengin claims that the common significance of these three texts relies on their ability to respond to the question of whether Islamism can or should formulate a perfect state and social order, a utopia. While the first two texts manifest Islamist utopia, the third one by Ísmet Ozel is not a manifestation but a critique of utopianism. <>

THE METAPHYSICS OF CULTURE: DEFINITIVE ABSOLUTE PHILOSOPHY by Rod Cameron [Academica Press, 9781680537604]

In this new and persuasively argued study, philosopher Rod Cameron argues that definitive absolute Idealism changes the definition of logic, annuls ethics, and diminishes objective truth. Entitlement to "logic" is due to knowledge of the logos. The logos is religion and reasoning's common origin. They are thus made compatible. Logic accesses ontology: a metaphysical realm of causation. Logic performs philosophy's missing function: synthesis. The individual and the nation, Cameron argues, share the same essences. This correlation allows the nation to cater to the individual. It answers major political questions and discloses purposefulness in history. Ontology and this teleology define culture, which allows "race" to be categorized as an attribute of culture. Joined to absolute truths, race matters. Defending culture rebuffs both multiculturalism and antiracism. The ability to defeat pseudo-absolutes is vital for our existence and effectively preempts authoritarianism. Those searching for meaning in these troubled times will absorb Cameron's clear exposition of these concepts with great interest.

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Preparations:
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     i. Heterodoxy Rules
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     iii. The End of Ethics
     iv. The Metamorphosis of Reason
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Chapter One:
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     Part One: Political Truths and Their Philosophical Implications Part Two: Logic and Sexuality
Chapter Two:
     Ontology

All absolute Truths are life-supporting, existential dichotomies. Dichotomies furnish expected attributes of the Absolute: transcendent Reason, synthesis, unarguable causation and certainty. It is presumed that the Absolute will be rich in meaning. The Absolute has no meaning. It is extremely austere, only dichotomies – no meaning, no proof.

The simplest and seminal example of an existential dichotomy is male—female. We all come into the world via this dichotomy. This fact is sufficient to identify male—female as an absolute Truth. Male—female is causative, in the form of offspring, but this dichotomy is not an obvious example of knowledge of Truth and cause being synonymous. If male— female was recognised as a Truth our c.152 Td[[B) a1.1.8(8.8-1..2()-2(is)

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Contents: Chapter One introduces logic and its political Truths, then analyses these Truths for ethical and epistemic implications, in addition to providing scientific substantiation for logic. Chapter Two builds a system from the political Truths to define ontology and impart a theory of creation. This leaves teleology [Chapter Four] and then the joining of ontology to teleology for a theory of Belonging [Chapter Six]. Chapters Three and Five provide continuity.

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Ontology is the core of metaphysics and the most important topic in philosophy. Ontology is about 'being.' 'Being' has been a mystery since Platonic times but reasoning through dichotomies spells out what it implies. Being for humans is 'social being.' The dichotomy that explains social being is individual—nation.

We live in nations, yet do not know their metaphysics. The cornerstone of ontology is National Mind, the archetypal nation. National Mind is the key to identity, political Truth, religious Truth and history.

Knowledge of immanence depends on logic as a governing precept and actualities that add detail. Jungian archetypes detail logic to facilitate the systematising of immanence. The joining of archetypes and logic is the most consequential synthesis.

Extrapolating National Mind takes reasoning to the mystical heart of religion. The "creative cause" is the essential, religious doctrine. Duality blandly credits God with creation. Idealism can do better than attribute creation to God. The logos, the key to creation, is common to religion and philosophy, so when creation is rationalised, philosophy supersedes dogma.

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Teleology is tasked with providing a plausible chronicle of the discovery of the Absolute. European exceptionalism has its origins in medieval circumstances. By the High Middle Ages, Europe had regained civilization without an empire. The potential to be superior to other civilizations resided in the contrariness of duality, the divide between religious and secular authority and numerous kingdoms providing alternative politics. Changes to 'authority' are the telling developments. The Reformation, monarchical revolutions: English, Dutch, American and French, mercantilism, industrial revolution and ideological division account for the gestation of the seminal Idea: the logic of political economy. What to

Both culture and race are beyond the capabilities of duality to categorise because they require synthetic reasoning to be understood. Consequently, racial matters are mishandled by truth and ethics. Liberals think they have the holocaust absolutely understood but they have neither knowledge of the Absolute nor a philosophy of history. The Nazis left philosophy problems the dualistic mind cannot process: cultural identity, the failure of truth to account for reality, the failure of ethics politically, racism as normal behaviour and consciousness being expedited by evil. These are matters that only Idealism can tackle.

The Absolute manifests through culture and, unbeknown to liberals, culture is the decisive absolute factor in racial matters. Ontology—teleology—race presents culture—race free of ethical attitudes. It declares multiculturalism a liberal delusion, an ethical subversion and a blight on identity. It takes the ultimate philosophy to make these points.

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Transcendence is accessed by divine revelation, meditation or metaphysical logic. Only metaphysical logic can comprehensively explain what precedes appearances, i.e., immanence. Occasionally a mystic bears witness to immanence possessing another system of reasoning, but mystics cannot explain anything about absolute Truth. Still, mystics delineate distinct revelations in the meditative progression to the Godhead. The stages are repeated in this metaphysic, including the voidness of all things and the transcendence of good and evil. <>

HANNAH ARENDT AND THE HISTORY OF THOUGHT
edited by Daniel Brennan, Marguerite La Caze [Continental Philosophy and the History of Thought, Lexington Books, 9781666900859]

Hannah Arendt and the History of Thought, edited by Daniel Brennan and Marguerite La Caze, enrichens and deepens scholarship on Arendt's relation to philosophical history and traditions. Some contributors analyze thinkers not often linked to Arendt, such as William Shakespeare, Hans Jonas, and Simone de Beauvoir. Other contributors treat themes that are pressing and crucial to understanding Arendt's work, such as love in its many forms, ethnicity and race, disability, human rights, politics, and statelessness. The collection is anchored by chapters on Arendt's interpretation of Kant and her relation to early German Romanticism and phenomenology, while other chapters explore new perspectives, such as Arendt and film, her philosophical connections with other women thinkers, and her influence on Eastern European thought and activism. The collection expands the frames of reference for research on Arendt--both in terms of using a broader range of texts like her Denktagebuch and in examining her ideas about judgment, feminism, and worldliness in this wider context.

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Acknowledgments
Introduction by Daniel Brennan and Marguerite La Gaze
PART I: ANTECEDENTS

The breadth and depth of Hannah Arendt's reception in the world of ideas has been growing rapidly in recent decades. Her life and her writing continue to excite scholars, students, social thinkers, political commentators, filmmakers, and general readers alike. Numerous biographies have tried to capture the sense of Arendt's life as a narrative to study, by reading her ideas through the events of her life, and there is already a sizeable body of secondary literature that reads Arendt's thought for whatever specialist issue the volume considers—race, law, literature, politics, feminism.

Young-Bruehl and Kristeva's respective and seminal biographies of Arendt have provided scholars with a picture of Arendt as a life to be studied; however, each provides a different perspective on how that life should be read. On one hand, Young-Bruehl provides insight into Arendt's life to help explain the development of her political theory. Kristeva, on the other hand is not so much interested in how Arendt came to develop certain theories, but rather how the themes of love, and narrative, mostly in her earlier work on love in Augustine, and Arendt's biography of Rahel Varnhagen, with its unique discussion of Jewish identity, offer a complex portrait of humanity that is both in Arendt's writing and in her own life. This volume moves past those important works for understanding Arendt's life in two ways. Firstly, by in a sense combining historical; narrative, and philosophical perspectives the papers of this volume, taken together, offer a complex and nuanced account of the difficulty of unpicking one aspect of Arendt's thought from another. For example, in Laura McMahon's chapter, "The Phenomenological Sense of Hannah Arendt: Plurality, Modernity, and Political Action," the author shows how a consideration of Arendt's phenomenology necessarily leads to her political theory, and her enthusiasm for civil disobedience. Additionally, Paul Dahlgren's chapter "The Course of True love': Arendt's Shakespeare, Love, and the Practice of Storytelling," looks at Arendt's readings of Shakespeare and other literary texts, while also considering events in Arendt's life and relationships to help enrich the discussion. The second way this volume moves past the older biographies of Arendt and collections

of essays on her work is by taking into account the ideas only relatively recently published in Arendt's thought diaries—her Denktagebuch.

More recently The Bloomsbury Companion to Arendt, a broad-ranging collection of scholarship on Arendt, demonstrated the incredible profundity and range of Arendt's thought, as it contains sixty-seven chapters, each devoted to a theme of Arendt's writing and life, from her key writings, philosophical foundations, politics, and social thought. However, by separating Arendt's themes from her writing, and from her sources, something can be missed, despite the size of the volume. The present volume, rather than asking Arendt's ideas to fit loose categories, considers her contribution to and involvement in the history of ideas. That perspective change allows the authors of this volume to show much more nuance to Arendt's thinking, as they are able to see a bigger picture, or as Arendt might say, an "enlarged" idea, by combining history, thematic focus, philosophical bases, and social and political thought. Hence pausing to consider Arendt as a thinker embedded in the history of ideas, and not as an outlier on the periphery of philosophy, despite her own denials that she is a philosopher or writing philosophy, is timely. This volume adds depth to those debates in which Arendt's ideas are now considered, by increasing our consideration of her role in the history of ideas, both as an inheritor of history and a driver of change.

Arendt was thorough in her engagement with thinkers of the past, from Ancient Greece, early Christianity, Rome, the Enlightenment, Romanticism, and phenomenology. She was equally as thorough and rigorous in her engagement with those contemporaneous to herself. In her editor's introduction to Arendt's Rahel Varnhagen: The Life of a Jewess, Liliane Weissberg recounts an anecdote shared by Alfred Kazin. It is worth recounting here:

> I met Hannah Arendt in 1946 at a dinner party given for Rabbi Leo Baeck by Eliot Cohen, the editor of Commentary. It was that long ago. She was a handsome, vivacious forty-year-old woman who was to charm me and others, by no means unerotically, because her interest in her new country, and for literature in English, became as much a part of her as her accent and her passion for discussing Plato, Kant, Nietzsche, Kafka, even Duns Scotus, as if they all lived with her and her strenuous husband Heinrich Bluecher in the shabby rooming house on West 95th Street. (Kazin in Weissberg, Arendt, 1997, 3)

Weissberg considers the anecdote, suggesting that Arendt is not described as a philosopher but as a host, "a person who offered room as well as words for others" (1997, 3). The consideration of Arendt as a host for Weissberg leads to a discussion of Varnhagen' s salon, and the significance of such places that could create light in dark times—the theme of her later book (1983). But to think this quote differently, to read against its sexism, many decades after its original context, one can also discern, along with the problematic reduction of the woman intellectual to a lively host, a recognition of her incredible knowledge across the history of ideas. Arendt herself invites us to consider the malleability of the roles society places on us. In the prologue to Responsibility and Judgement, which is the transcript of a speech delivered by Arendt upon receiving the Danish Sonning Prize, Arendt writes that individuals are recognized by the roles assigned to us through our professions, but within those professional masks there is the potential for natality to transform the meaning of the persona (2003, 13).

> It is through this role, sounding through it, as it were, that something else manifests itself, something entirely idiosyncratic and undefinable and still unmistakably identifiable, so that we are not confused by a sudden change of roles, when for instance.., a hostess, whom socially we know as a physician, serves drinks instead of taking care of her patients. In other words, the

> advantage of adopting the notion of persona for my consideration lies in the fact that the masks or roles which the world assigns us, and which we must accept and even acquire if we wish to take part in the world's play at all, are exchangeable. (Arendt 2003, 13)

Arendt is obviously more than mere host. Her knowledge of and engagement with Augustine and Rousseau, for instance, and the philosophical autobiographical tradition, deeply informed her writing of the Varnhagen biography, and as one glances at the sheer breadth of her writing's themes and references, these are more than conversational contributions. Even though the idea of the Berlin salon and the place of a meeting of the intelligentsia were formative spaces for Arendt, her work on historical thinkers and contemporaries lives outside of such rooms and conversations as well.

Her ability to inspire critique and drive public discourse decades after her death means that the time is right to take stock of Arendt's standing in the history of ideas, and to encourage new avenues for scholarship. Rather than acting only as a primer on Arendt's texts and the themes therein, this volume of essays offers a guide to the ideas that drove Arendt's writing by exploring the contexts in which they were written, and the thinkers she worked through. Her readings of canonical figures offered different ways to understand established interpretations, and some of the chapters of this volume explore Arendt's way of reading and interpreting these figures. Essentially, Arendt's defense of the inherent pluralism of the world and concern with the dangers of imposing a certainty upon human affairs was not only a theoretical matter, explained in political writings as a warning against philosophical systems promising truth and fixed certainties, but embedded in her practice of thinking and writing as well.

This volume is strategically divided into three parts, Antecedents, Peers, and Prospects, which each aim to capture the way that Arendt simultaneously mined and undermined the history of ideas, while critically engaging with her contemporaries, and also inspiring future debates by leaving a body of work that can be used to initiate new conversations with those writing today, and also with those writing in her time that she did not explicitly enter into dialogue with, such as Simone de Beauvoir and Claudia Jones.

The volume also treats themes that are pressing and crucial to understanding Arendt's work, such as feminism, questions of ethnicity and race, civil disobedience, phenomenology, and thinking. The rigorous and broad reading Arendt extends through all of her explorations in ideas means that there is a need to expand the frames of reference for Arendt scholarship—this volume does just that. Arendt reads great works of philosophy and literature as multifaceted, pluralistic gems. As the author of the first chapter of this volume, Paul Dahlgren announces, there is also much more to say by reading the writers such as Shakespeare that Arendt quotes, beyond the parts that she quoted. When Arendt writes her biography of Rahel Varnhagen, she is, as Kimberly Maslin notes in her chapter "Hannah Arendt and Early German Romanticism" doing more than exploring questions of Jewish identity, she is also employing the style and form of the disparate traditions of the Enlightenment and Romanticism to say something new.

The chapters of this book hence pay attention to Arendt's unique and varied style, and the processes of crafting her arguments, such as the way she reads Immanuel Kant's aesthetics, or how her relationships and letters can shed light on her thought beyond the semantic content of the writing. Discussions of Arendt's Denktagebuch (journal) also enriches the chapters' engagement with her reflections on the themes and philosophers' work (2002; Berkowitz and Storey, 2017). Furthermore, the book looks for the specters of ideas through her thought, which at times emerge explicitly, and other times remain beneath the surface of the text. For example, as a student Arendt's doctoral dissertation, supervised by

Karl Jaspers and defended in 1928, reached back to the thought of Saint Augustine of Hippo. As Julia Kristeva notes in her biography of Arendt, years after the thesis was defended Arendt wrote to Jaspers that she was surprised to find traces of herself in the thesis (2001, 31). The thesis explored Augustine's thoughts on love. Arendt was searching for a paradigm of love in Augustine's work, and the resulting, quite secular account, written in a language very much indebted to Arendt's phenomenological education, is far from Augustine's intended theological arguments. Yet this is not to say that Arendt is a mis-reader; rather her reading is infused with a philosophical desire to say something new. While reading Augustine, Arendt is not only asking, "what is he saying?," but also "what does this mean for me?" This kind of reading, that Jaspers noted in his comments on the dissertation as perhaps doing "violence to the text" is arguably a feature of Arendt's engagement with the history of ideas and some of the chapters in this volume, such as Matthew Wester's "Kant, Jaspers, and the Origins of Hannah Arendt's Theory of Judgment" show the productive nuance to Arendt's readings which transform accepted interpretations, revealing new considerations concerning the autonomy of judgment. Furthermore, as Arendt herself notes in her glance back at her early thesis, her reading of the history of ideas leaves traces throughout her oeuvre. These traces, especially on love, are picked up by the contributors to this volume, as Arendt's unique style of reading was employed to make startlingly original arguments.

One especially sharp trace in Arendt's work is, as Kazin notes in the previously quoted anecdote, the literature that Arendt read voraciously and referred to throughout her writing. Authors like Karen Blixen, Franz Kafka, and Bertolt Brecht are the subject of essays and lengthy discussion in her work. Yet also throughout her writing are scatterings of references to contemporary authors, who appear fleetingly, yet are appropriately in place in her work. For instance, Patchen Markell has recently explored the references to William Faulkner's novels in Arendt (2015). Markell notes that in her references to Faulkner, Arendt adds nuance to her descriptions of action by including anonymity, whereas usually the activity of the unnamed is found in labor or a depersonalized society (2015, 78). That attention to the literary images and passages that Arendt cites can add to the pluralistic interpretation of concepts usually considered quite settled in the reception of her ideas is important. In her essay "Some Questions of Moral Philosophy," Arendt concludes her discussion by suggesting that the examples found in literature are richer ways to consider one's duties, and that one can even learn to judge through a consideration of the examples of great works of literature (2003, 145). Arendt makes explicit reference to the examples of Shakespeare's tragedies, such as King Lear. She is also saying something more than that literature provides mere instruction to follow. If we look at Arendt's response to Eric Vogelin's criticisms of The Origins of Totalitarianism, originally published in The Review of Politics and now found in the collection Essays in Understanding, Arendt discusses her perception of the role of style, the feature most fully embodied in literary truths, which might be empty of objective statements.

> Thus, the question of style is bound up with the problem of understanding, which has plagued the historical sciences almost from their beginnings. I do not wish to go into this matter here, but I may add that I am convinced that understanding is closely related to that faculty of imagination which Kant called Einbildungskraft and which has nothing in common with fictional ability. (Arendt, 1994, 404)

Style does more than evoke images. Style shows things to the imagination which turns the vision of understanding to show a different face to the world. Hence when Arendt evokes the literary examples of Hamlet and King Lear for instance, she is not simply suggesting that one emulates literature, but that

more significantly literature reinforces pluralism, and through the operations of imagination, on which style leaves impressions, increases the effectiveness of judgment.

Critique of Judgment, to show how Arendt developed her ideas, under the influence of her mentor Jaspers and his interpretation of Kant, of judgment in the political sphere. What Wester locates is a strong claim by Arendt to have discovered a political philosophy in Kant's aesthetic theory. Wester points out that for Arendt, Kant was unaware that when he was writing on aesthetic judgments he was also describing a political theory that she claims supports her idea of the pluralism at the heart of judgment. The ability of Arendt to see something that the author did not is for Wester in part due to Jaspers 's influence on Arendt. Jaspers, who wrote The Great Philosophers (1962), Wester contends, specifically inspired Arendt to read Kant's aesthetic theory to find political insights. Jasper's treatment of reflective judgment in Kant allowed Arendt to read Kant as not abandoning the particularity of phenomena in judgments—significantly, as particularity is so central to Arendt's understanding of politics. As Wester notes, her reading of Kant through Jaspers was happening at the time that she was preparing the final draft of The Human Condition (1998). Even if not explicit until later, that reading's presence is still there early on her writing, guiding the direction her thought will take.

Arendt not only engaged with Enlightenment thinkers including Kant but also with Romanticism. Kimberly Maslin, in her chapter, "Hannah Arendt and Early German Romanticism," the third chapter of this volume, shows how the style of Arendt's biography of Rahel Varnhagen marked her break with philosophy, allowing her to make her own mark in the world of ideas. If Kant's philosophy grounded the fact of pluralism for Arendt, Maslin shows that the writing of the Varnhagen biography is Arendt's own attempt at writing to engender pluralism. Maslin appeals to Arendt's use of images of twilight rather than daylight to blur attempts of politics or philosophy to arrive at truth or certainty. For Maslin, Arendt revels in contradictions and the ability of art to shake certainties in a manner consistent with the Romantics. Maslin shows how Arendt employed irony in her biography to place contrasting and incompatible ideas beside each other so meaning can in a sense organically emerge through the activity of considering them, of active reading. For Maslin, the Romantic style, using irony and in fragments, allowed the space for her Jewish writings to consider how to foster a Jewish identity. Maslin contends that the style, developed in the Varnhagen biography, permeates her other Jewish writing—that is, the Romantic experiments with writing, and their focus on the passion gave Arendt a means of recasting Jewish identity as heroic, by using the literariness of the style to rethink history. That rethinking is not to rethink what happened, but the meaning of what happened.

As noted above, another powerful theme in Arendt, developed early in her writing, which is still present even when not explicitly articulated, is love. The ideas from Arendt's thesis on Augustine and love are found throughout her writing, developing, and inflecting her depictions of people acting with and toward each other. Wolfram Elienberger, in Time of the Magicians, marks her dissertation as a decisive move from Heidegger, after their relationship, and a response to his philosophy—a filling of gaps that she identified in his work.

> Arendt's philosophizing is distinguished by the ability to trace, illuminate, and elaborate all existential dimensions of the event of "You"—to which Heidegger, in the dwelling of his thought, had to remain blind,

For Elienberger, the development of amor mundi in Arendt's work is a part of the ennobling of public action, that moves beyond Heidegger's more pessimistic conception of the collective "they." Whereas Heidegger saw us entangled in the world, Arendt's love allows us to make it anew—it fills relations in private spaces, and illuminates action by resisting certainty and embodying spontaneity. Looking at the

multiple meanings of love in Arendt's work, apart from amor mundi, Maria Tamboukou's chapter 4, "The Gendered Politics of Love: An Arendtian Reading," explores the connection between the myriad kinds of love, gender, and her conception of pluralistic politics. Tamboukou's interest in Arendt relates to narratives and life-writing, and she has previous considered Arendt's thought in relation to Rosa Luxemburg's letters and writings (2014). She focuses on Arendt's Denktagebuch to bring out how much more there is to say on the topic of love in Arendt that has not been remarked in scholarship hitherto. By showing how the original notion of the otherworldliness of love that is, the way love flies away from the world to find its beginning—developed in her thesis on Augustine, to the larger, and at times only implied consideration of love across Arendt's oeuvre and in her diary, Tamboukou demonstrates the richness of Arendt's uses of love by describing it through literary consideration of two examples of epistolary discourse. Through an analysis of the letters of the feminist activist Desiree Veret-Gay, Tamboukou adds layers to our understanding of amor mundi as a reconnection, through love, to the network of human relations in our social lives. Similarly, the letters of the activist Emma Goldman, brimful with the oscillations of passion, and exacerbated by the complex political situations Goldman found herself in, for Tamboukou demonstrate the complex way that love, as a destabilizing force, adds to the unpredictability of the human condition, demonstrating the way that plays out in all of the human interactions that Arendt characterizes in her writing.

The second part of the book, "Peers," looks closely at Arendt's relationships with her contemporaries, in her inner circle, and in her reception as she published. In the chapter on Gotthold Lessing in Men in Dark Times, Arendt celebrates the ability that the speech and action between friends has to preserve a space of openness and plurality, even under political conditions that threaten such spaces (1983, 30). As a student of Heidegger, Arendt was described by Richard Wolin as one of Heidegger's children (2015). Arendt's philosophical response to Heidegger has already been alluded to; however, in exploring the relationship she had with her contemporaries, it is necessary to search further into that Heideggerian collective, and Arendt's place in phenomenology more generally. In the fourth chapter of this volume, "Arendt and Beauvoir on Romantic Love," Liesbeth Schoonheim uses Arendt's break with Heidegger, especially his understanding of Mitsein, to place Arendt into dialogue with Simone de Beauvoir's, philosophy which was similarly indebted to Heidegger's Mitsein. Her research investigates themes of freedom and resistance in Arendt, Beauvoir, and Foucault, and she has considered Arendt's phenomenology of love in relation to personhood (2018). In exploring the differing ways that Arendt and Beauvoir responded to the strengths and weaknesses of Heidegger's ideas, Schoonheim is able to position the two thinkers, who had little to say about each other in their lifetimes, into a fruitful exchange that shows further how the concept of love, in the differing kinds of relationships where it can emerge and operate, adds to our understanding of how the personal and political impact on each other. Furthermore Schoonheim, through the conversation she initiates, is able to use Beauvoir's thought to highlight important questions that Arendt considered misplaced, such as the role of embodied romantic love in political situations, further shedding light on the complicated relationship Arendt's ideas have to feminism.

Another of Arendt's peers with a shared Heideggerian departure point is Hans Jonas. Jonas, another of "Heidegger's children," who delivered the eulogy at Arendt's funeral, is placed into contrast with Arendt in the sixth chapter of this volume, Eric Stephan Pommier's "Arendt and Hans Jonas: Acting and Thinking After Heidegger." Pommier has published a significant body of work on Hans Jonas, bringing Jonas's thought into conversation with major figures in phenomenology such as Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Martin

Heidegger, and Hannah Arendt. With Arendt, he has already provided an important comparison with Jonas, looking at their respective moral and political ideas (2013). Pommier has more recently focused on the biological philosophy of Jonas and in this volume the insights from that research enable a more thorough and updated comparison and contrast between Arendt and Jonas (2017).

While the philosophical positions of Arendt and Jonas are quite distinct, Pommier traces their origins to certain disagreements with how to move past Heidegger, especially from a humanist standpoint. Pommier considers the relationship between thinking and acting in both scholars, showing that whereas for Arendt they are distinct, although thought can lead back to action, for Jonas, thought can be action. The differences, in Pommier's account, provide a fruitful way to approach the complexities of questions of science and technology, especially in developing the environmentally responsible actions required of us today. Rather than simply placing Arendt and Jonas into contrast, Pommier uses the opportunity to compare their thought to highlight gaps in both Arendt and Jonas, and to use the thought of the other to fill those gaps with a meaningful response.

The rich knowledge found by placing Arendt in dialogue with her peers is continued in a slightly different vein in Kataryzna Stoklosa's paper, the seventh chapter of this volume, "Hannah Arendt's Influence on Eastern European Dissidence: The Example of Poland." Stoklosa has previously published on Arendt's influence in Polish intellectual circles, and her large scholarship on Eastern bloc social and political crises, historical and current, are at the forefront in this revitalized look at how Arendt's ideas were received and circulated in Poland (2008). An emergent theme found across the chapters of this volume is the changing shape and terms of debates that have been conducted through Arendt's ideas. For instance, a number of the chapters have pointed out that the relatively recent publication of Arendt's thought diaries has revealed new avenues for scholarship and thinking that recast seemingly settled debates. What Stokiosa demonstrates is that in Eastern Europe, where significant dissidents were influenced by Arendt, such as Jan Patocka and Adam Michnik, the staggered publications of Arendt's work, and the manner in which her ideas could be debated publicly, as well as the drastic and rapid social and political changes, mean that it is impossible to speak of a unitary influence on Eastern European thought. That is, Stoklosa's chapter charts the historical reception of Arendt over time, noting its change as political events force a different perspective to be taken.

Focusing on the shifts in debate and focus on Arendt in Poland, Stoklosa looks at the Polish reception of Arendt's ideas, from her thoughts on the 1956 revolution in Hungary, through to the reception of her writing today, asking the question, "Why read Arendt in Poland any more?" It is accurate to say that Arendt's reception in Polish ideas was and remains turbulent. Arendt's thought has helped political theorists in Poland to frame discussions, from the teaching of Arendt's The Origins of Totalitarianism clandestinely, in unofficial and private seminars, in the 1970s, to the publication of her major works in the late 1980s and early 1990s, where major differences between Eastern and Western European political theory became blurred as Eastern thinkers quickly adopted many Western ideas as the iron curtain fell. Many Polish political thinkers, in the 1970s, used the ideas of Arendt they had access to and debated them in ways that were permitted in public discourse, or smaller audiences discussed them in secret. Even then, when limited numbers of people engaged in debate, Stoklosa demonstrates that the conversation was far from surface level. For instance, Polish political thinkers were pointing out that her definitions of totalitarianism, and the inherent use of violence in such systems did not quite capture their own experience of living under totalitarianism. Ultimately Stoklosa shows how Arendt was both a figure

of freedom and a philosophical source—that is. she inspired action, but also was rigorously thought through—and even though the totalitarian system failed, Stoklosa details how Arendt's reception continues as issues of freedom and equality still pervade Polish political life, as they do elsewhere.

The final part of this volume, "Prospects," looks to explore the conversations Arendt might not have had and consider new directions in her research. The eighth chapter, Laura McMahon's "The Phenomenological Sense of Hannah Arendt: Plurality, Modernity, and Political Action," rather than looking at Arendt's reception over a period of political upheaval, instead takes a fresh look at Arendt's phenomenological perspective to revitalize Arendt's political thought. McMahon in her previous research has placed Arendt's ideas, such as natality and temporality, into conversation with those of major phenomenologists such as Merleau-Ponty, to add to our understanding of those concepts (2019). There has been much made of whether Arendt supplies a sufficiently systematic phenomenology to be considered a phenomenologist, and McMahon joins the debate by demonstrating not only the cohesion of Arendt's phenomenological account of the world in which we each share, but also the distinct place Arendt has alongside her peers and forebears in phenomenology. She does this by showing the consistency with which Arendt reflects the ideas and foci of major phenomenological writings. Beginning with Arendt's phenomenological account of pluralism, and situating it alongside the thought of Edmund Husserl, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, and Martin Heidegger, McMahon explores the problematic nature of modern bureaucratic logics that dehumanize and resist pluralism. In McMahon's account, when considering Arendt's critique of science, it has to be through Husserl's late works on the crisis of the sciences, as well as, more obviously, Heidegger's critique of technology, and Erich Fromm and Merleau-Ponty's work. By linking the phenomenology of pluralism to modernity's attempt to preclude plurality from our understanding of appearances, McMahon uses the phenomenology of Arendt to shine light on her political ideas. However, the effect is larger than simply declaring Arendt to be a phenomenologist, as McMahon demonstrates the essential connection between the phenomenological account of the world, and Arendt's politics. Also, importantly, her account of the political reinforces the significance of the phenomenology to her work, and, vice versa, the focus on the phenomenology also reinforces the strength of the political ideals.

The chapter addresses the complex question of the relationship between phenomenological thought and politics, as in Schoonheim's paper on Arendt and Beauvoir. McMahon weaves the phenomenological perspective of Arendt's ideas concerning political action through a discussion of the disability activists, who in 1977, organized by Judith Heumann, took part in a twenty-five-day sit-in protest to petition for disability rights to accessibility to become written into law. McMahon considers the protest, and uses both Arendt's phenomenology and politics to unpack the powerful significance of this protest, and the years leading up to it (now publicized in the documentary Crip Camp [2020]).

Arendt has become a major touchpoint for thinking about human rights, the meaning of experiences of statelessness, and the crimes committed against those whose rights are withheld from them. In part this is due not only to the writing she produced on the topic, but also to the seeming absence of a normative account of human rights. Critics of Arendt have sought in many different ways to ground a theory of human rights in Arendt's work, and all take different departure locations in her style and writings to do so. For instance, in Hannah Arendt and Human Rights, Peg Birmingham examined Arendt's work, especially that on literature, to ground a theory of rights based in a shared humanity (2006). More critically than Birmingham, Seyla Benhabib explored Arendt's thoughts on communication

in the public sphere as the starting point for a discourse on rights, arguing that the thought of other thinkers, such as Jurgen Habermas, is needed to fill in gaps in thinking that Benhabib identifies (2007). Taking stock of the many approaches to Arendt's thoughts on rights, Marieke Borren's "Arendt's Phenomenological Political Thinking: A Proto-Normative Account," the ninth chapter of this volume, observes that thus far no major consideration of Arendt's thoughts on rights and stateless has started from her phenomenological perspective. Borren specializes in Arendt's work, political philosophy, and philosophical anthropology, and has published influential work on Arendt and statelessness and refugees (2008). Again, the importance of using Arendt's phenomenology to show the relationship of phenomenological modes of thinking to politics highlights not only the uniqueness of Arendt's phenomenology, but also the depth of her political thinking.

Borren notes that a feature of Arendt's distinctive phenomenology is not a shared humanness, but worldliness. As in McMahon's earlier chapter, Borren, by turning close attention to the phenomenological description of worldliness in Arendt, especially in The Human Condition (1958), discusses the political solutions offered by Arendt as being grounded in her phenomenology. Borren considers how throughout Arendt's writing on rights and statelessness, her concern is always a loss of a world, a place and that consequently human dignity is tied to worldliness rather than a human essence. Borren hence demonstrates that the criticisms of Arendt for not offering a normative account of rights miss the point that deeply embedded in her phenomenological account of human action is a proto-normative notion of human dignity. Again, it is the theme of amor mundi, which appears in a number of the contributions to this volume, that shows this dignity as worldliness.

Further exploring Arendt's thoughts on the stateless, the condition of statelessness and her related ideas on the "right to have rights," Andrew Schaap, in chapter ten of this volume, places Arendt into conversation with her contemporary Claudia Jones. There is a clear gulf between the two political thinkers that stems from their respective views on the American Republic and its promise of beginning anew. On one hand, Richard King, in Arendt and America, describes Arendt's fascination with the American Republic as leading to the development of the idea of natality. For Arendt, America's promise to overturn corrupt practices, and begin things anew, was a counterpoint to the totalitarianism she witnessed and analyzed in Europe. She was, according to King, thus working to advance those aspects of republicanism in America that allowed new political beginnings and working to identify and resist the tendencies in the same system that could lead to a nation of thoughtless consumption and bureaucracy (King, 2015, 3). Claudia Jones, on the other hand, had a vastly more pessimistic view of the promise to empower new beginnings for immigrants and refugees due to her experience of racism, exclusion, and eventual deportation from America.

Arendt and Jones never met, nor referred to each other, and they are distanced by many other factors than their perception of the American republic, including Arendt's critique of socialism and Jones's support for it, Jones's preclusion from the European canon of political ideas and their never having discussed each other's work; however, Schaap demonstrates the timely necessity of bringing these thinkers into conversation. What Schaap brings out is that Arendt and Jones in fact shared many similar experiences, such as statelessness, McCarthyist politics, and the postwar anticommunist fervor of the United States, and that these shared experiences were central to the ideas of these respective writers. Hence it is very interesting that their ideas are so different. Schaap has previously written on Arendt's political ideas in relation to democracy and struggles for emancipation and inclusion (2020). In this

chapter he breaks new ground by overcoming the neglect of Jones's important thought and bringing it to bear on Arendt's established ideas which are starting to gain the recognition they deserve (Dunstan and Owens, 2021). Rather than forcing a philosophical framework on them both and claiming that it is shared, Schaap treats their respective thought in its difference, using the historical events and experiences they shared to open the comparison. The chapter forges new paths in considering the importance and limitations of Arendt's understanding of race in her political theory, and also in showing the strength and nuance to Jones's thoughts, as well as where she diverges from more mainstream political thought.

Schaap uses the concepts of citizenship and statelessness—issues central to the lived experience of Arendt and Jones, and to their writing, to show how these concepts impact racialization and violent totalitarian responses to immigrants and refugees. Schaap shows how a racial understanding of citizenship, something Arendt failed to adequately recognize, and the operations of politics that make people stateless, mutually reinforce each other in the maintenance of political structures. Arendt has already been criticized for her lack of understanding of the way that political racialization affected people of color in the United States (Gins, 2014). Schaap, by approaching this issue through the experiences and ideas of Jones, points to new directions in research, which are not simply a furthering of Arendt criticism, but an insightful look at how racialization impacts the creation of stateless people—for instance he considers the recent treatment of Windrush migrants in Britain who were denied their rights through politically and racially motivated processes. By expanding the canon and removing postcolonial prejudices that preclude Jones from canonical political debate, Schaap shows how that when we think with Arendt on issues of citizenship and rights, we must keep the very real and concrete processes of racialization and racially charged criminalization in the forefront of our minds as well, something that the European influenced lens of Arendt's analytical eye was not able to always focus on.

The final chapter of this volume takes stock of the ways that engagement with Arendt's ideas have moved from written arguments to filmic depictions. Its aim is to show how Arendt studies is moving into this new field of philosophy and film and the way the medium of film can expand our understanding of Arendt's thought. Focusing on Ada Ushpiz's (2015) documentary film Vita Activa: The Spirit of Hannah Arendt, but also drawing from Margarethe von Trotta's earlier fictionalized film Hannah Arendt (2012), which he has published work on previously (2014), Joel Rosenburg creates a tripartite dialogue between the depiction of Arendt's ideas on film, her written ideas, and the events of her time. Rosenberg considers how Arendt's thoughts on statelessness, between the world wars and after, is understood as it appears in selected shots, with the voices of actors softening or punctuating what usually is read on text. Arendt's ideas, as fragments in a documentary, for Rosenburg engage with themes through that layering of visual imagery. According to him, the film, even though it is made for a general audience, and focuses on Arendt's more generally popular works, is also an opportunity to return to her writing and see it with a fresh perspective enabled by having seen the ideas presented through the imaginative devices of film. Presented through a voice-over in the film, her words make her a kind of narrator and storyteller of the documentary. Like a number of other chapters, this chapter focuses on the role of love, conceived as unruly by Rosenberg, in Arendt's life and thought, which she felt affirms us and creates a home in the midst of the world. This experience of love, for Arendt, can act as a kind of counter to the experience of rightlessness.

Cumulatively these chapters, by focusing on Arendt and her role and place in the history of ideas, has done much more than catalog and reinforce a canon. While Arendt's commitment to pluralism is at the heart of her project, these chapters demonstrate that the attempt to look at the historical Arendt and her ideas in fact opens new roads for scholarship. The papers reconsider Arendt's writing as a whole, reading the ghosts in her texts, and the themes that travel across her writing. Love is clearly a central concern, not only in her doctoral theses, but through her phenomenological analysis of the social world, through to her diaries and personal private experiences, and her thoughts on action and her public activities. The link between her phenomenology and politics is another example, as the contributions of this volume show that when reading her politics, one should always keep her phenomenological approach in mind as well. The world, which for Arendt is a human concept, discovered through phenomenological deliberations, is shown in these chapters as another of these ghosts throughout Arendt's writing, and visible as amor mundi—a concept linking love, phenomenology, politics, thought, and action. Arendt's work has also been placed into conversation with thinkers of her time, such as Beauvoir, of whose work she wrote little, despite their shared interests. Those conversations have shown promising ways to critique, and move with and past Arendt, in debates ranging from love, to race, literature, rights, disability, identity, gender, the world and the environment. The consideration of Arendt and her relation to the history of the philosophical tradition is enriched and broadened, and new paths of inquiry are indicated. <>

FREEDOM, RESENTMENT, AND THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS by Pamela Hieronymi [Princeton Monographs in Philosophy, Princeton University Press, 9780691194035]

An innovative reassessment of philosopher P. F. Strawson's influential "Freedom and Resentment"

P. F. Strawson was one of the most important philosophers of the twentieth century, and his 1962 paper "Freedom and Resentment" is one of the most influential in modern moral philosophy, prompting responses across multiple disciplines, from psychology to sociology. In Freedom, Resentment, and the Metaphysics of Morals, Pamela Hieronymi closely reexamines Strawson's paper and concludes that his argument has been underestimated and misunderstood.

Line by line, Hieronymi carefully untangles the complex strands of Strawson's ideas. After elucidating his conception of moral responsibility and his division between "reactive" and "objective" responses to the actions and attitudes of others, Hieronymi turns to his central argument. Strawson argues that, because determinism is an entirely general thesis, true of everyone at all times, its truth does not undermine moral responsibility. Hieronymi finds the two common interpretations of this argument, "the simple Humean interpretation" and "the broadly Wittgensteinian interpretation," both deficient. Drawing on Strawson's wider work in logic, philosophy of language, and metaphysics, Hieronymi concludes that his argument rests on an implicit, and previously overlooked, metaphysics of morals, one grounded in

Strawson's "social naturalism." In the final chapter, she defends this naturalistic picture against objections.

Rigorous, concise, and insightful, Freedom, Resentment, and the Metaphysics of Morals sheds new light on Strawson's thinking and has profound implications for future work on free will, moral responsibility, and metaethics.

The book also features the complete text of Strawson's "Freedom and Resentment."

Review

"Hieronymi is an expert guide to the twists and turns of Strawson's 'Freedom and Resentment,' arguably the single most influential paper on free will and moral responsibility. The book is an important contribution to our understanding of Strawson, and will become an essential reference for philosophers."—**Sarah Buss, coeditor of** *Contours of Agency*

"This is an exciting and groundbreaking book that has the potential to reshape our understanding of the nature of morality and our practices of holding one another responsible."—**Angela M. Smith, coeditor of** *The Nature of Moral Responsibility*

CONTENTS

When P. F. Strawson's "Freedom and Resentment" first appeared, nearly sixty years ago, it forced a profound shift in the debate about free will and moral responsibility. For decades since, it has inspired views on wide-ranging topics. Most of the ongoing attention has focused on Strawson's fascinating and

fecund notion of "reactive attitudes." In contrast, the central argument of the paper has received relatively little attention.

The central argument claims that, because determinism is an entirely general thesis, true of everyone at all times, its truth would not show that we are not, in fact, morally responsible. It is a startling claim. The neglect given to the argument for it would be surprising, if that argument were not so difficult to discern.

When the argument is considered, it is often interpreted as relying on a thought about our psychological capacities: we are simply not capable of abandoning the reactive attitudes, across the board, in something like the way we are simply not capable of remembering everything we are told. We do not have the right equipment. Given our psychological limitations, we are stuck treating one another as if we are morally responsible—we are incapable of doing otherwise. Therefore, according to this interpretation, we should rest content in the thought that we are morally responsible—asking whether we ought to treat one another differently is useless. I will call this "the simple Humean interpretation" and the thought on which it relies "the simple Humean thought."

A different line interprets Strawson as relying on something like a conceptual point: you can neither support nor call into question the whole of a practice using notions that are; themselves, constituted by that practice. Thus, you cannot ask whether our moral practices, taken as a whole, are, themselves, morally just, right, appropriate, or fair. Doing so would be like asking whether the game of baseball is, itself, "fair" or "foul" in the sense of those words established by the game—"fair" or "foul," in that sense, can be rightly asked of batted balls or of territory in the baseball field, but the question cannot be sensibly asked of the game itself, taken as a whole. On this second interpretation, Strawson accuses his opponent of a sophisticated kind of confusion. I will call this "the broadly Wittgensteinian interpretation" and the thought on which it relies "the broadly Wittgensteinian thought:'

Both the simple Humean thought and the broadly Wittgensteinian thought can be found in Strawson's paper, and he makes use of each. But neither interpretation would lead you to expect what you will find, looking at the central text: Strawson twice accuses his opponent of being caught in some kind of contradiction. So neither interpretation, on its own, is correct.

By providing a close reading of the central text, I will do my best to articulate Strawson's more interesting, and more powerful, argument. The argument depends on an underlying picture of the nature of moral demands and moral relationships—a picture that has gone largely unnoticed, that is naturalistic without being reductionistic, and that is worthy of careful consideration. Having drawn out this underlying metaethical picture, I will begin to subject it to some philosophical scrutiny. I hope to show that it can withstand the objections that are both the most obvious and the most serious, leaving it a worthy contender.

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Let us now retrace from the beginning. Strawson is thinking, from the start, that we have a natural, nonrational commitment to engaging in characteristically interpersonal relationships—he is thinking that the quality of others' wills toward us matters to us, that we put some (or another) set of demands on the quality of others' wills, that we will react in certain (or other) ways when those demands are violated or exceeded, and that this fact about us is given with human society, not something for which

there are or need to be reasons. Thus we will, as a matter of fact, typically engage with others in the characteristically interpersonal way. Moreover, the exact demands and reactions, the details of our ordinary interpersonal relationships, are themselves a natural fact, a product of life as it actually happens. And so the detail of our system will be sensitive to typical human capacities and typical circumstances. We sometimes suspend characteristically interpersonal relating when circumstances are extreme or when someone is incapable of engaging in it. More curiously, we sometimes exercise our "resource" to opt out of such relating, just to avoid the strains of involvement, or for therapeutic purposes, or out of curiosity. But it could not be the case that everyone is in unusual or extreme circumstances, nor could it be that everyone is incapable of ordinary relating—to say either is to assert a contradiction. Thus, the only condition worth considering is whether we could or should come to exercise our resource all the time, and so give up characteristically interpersonal relating. Could we do so? While saying so involves no contradiction, it seems practically inconceivable that we would do so. Should we do so? Engaging in characteristically interpersonal relating is not done for reasons, nor something that requires justification, and so the question is idle—we need not take it seriously. But there is a further point that can now be made explicit: we can know, in advance, that being determined* (the sense of "determined" at issue in the thesis of determinism) is not a reason to exempt, because (given Strawson's social naturalism) we can know that the principles that govern moral and interpersonal relating will not include the contradiction that would require: if we discover an apparent contradiction in our principles, we have discovered that we ought to revise our understanding of those principles. Thus we can rest assured that nothing true of everyone will provide a reason to exempt. If this is not enough, we can also note that, even if we could face a choice about whether to abandon our commitment to characteristically interpersonal relating, a choice Strawson finds unreal, our reasons for making the choice would not be the kind that motivate the pessimist—they would not be moral reasons. If we were to decide that no one should be held responsible, we would have to make that decision for reasons that concern not questions of desert or justice, but the gains and losses to human life. And, as Strawson says, the truth or falsity of determinism would have no bearing on this choice. <>

THE EXPERIENTIAL ONTOLOGY OF HANNAH ARENDT
by Kimberly Maslin [Lexington Books, 9781793612441]

In The Experiential Ontology of Hannah Arendt, Kim Maslin examines Hannah Arendt's political philosophy through a Heideggerian framework. Maslin argues that not only did Arendt grew beyond the role of naïve and beguiled student, but she became one of Heidegger's most astute critics. Well acquainted with and deeply respectful of his contributions to existential philosophy, Arendt viewed Heidegger's work as both profoundly insightful and extraordinarily myopic. Not contented to simply offer a critique of her mentor's work, Arendt engaged in a lifelong struggle to come to terms with the collective implications of fundamental ontology. Maslin argues that Arendt shifted to political philosophy less to escape her own disappointment at Heidegger's personal betrayal, but rather as an attempt to right the collective flaws of fundamental ontology. Her project offers a politically responsive, hence responsible, modification of Heidegger's fundamental ontology. She suggests that Heidegger's allegedly descriptive and non-normative insight into the nature of being is necessarily incomplete, and potentially irresponsible, unless it is undertaken in a manner which is mindful of the collective implications. As such,

Maslin shows how Arendt attempts to construct an experiential ontology that transforms Heidegger's fundamental ontology for use in the public sphere.

Review

"Kim Maslin's book offers a bold and comprehensive reassessment of Arendt's work in relationship to Heidegger's. It is lucid, daring, and timely, and will appeal to those interested in harnessing Arendt's work in order to understand contemporary events. This is a book of quality and importance." -- Martin Shuster, Goucher College

"Even politicians deeply opposed to identity politics will often talk about who it is that "we are" as a country. In so doing, they reveal not only that ontology is political, but also that politics always has ontological roots. This basic insight guides Kim Maslin's rethinking of Arendt's relation to Heidegger, and their mutual relation to contemporary social existence. This book is excellent and the conclusions are persuasive even when surprising. It is a game changer in how we all should think ourselves, others, and politics as a philosophical task." -- J. Aaron Simmons, Furman University

"Maslin helps resituate Hannah Arendt against her most enduring philosophical background by showing that Arendt was first and foremost a critical (post-)Heideggerian thinker. Arendt consistently took Heidegger's phenomenological insights as her own implicit points of departure, repeatedly criticizing and seeking to move beyond Heidegger in her own work. Building critically on her understanding of Heidegger in this way, Maslin contends, Arendt developed an innovative and coherent ontological approach of her own that remains relevant and challenging today." -- Iain Thomson, author of The Cambridge History of Philosophy, 1946-2015 (2019)

"Kimberly Maslin offers a fresh perspective on 'thinking Arendt through Heidegger.'
She traces the sweep of Arendt's work from Totalitarianism to its prescient compatibility with current issues: including fake news, alternative facts, and ultimately identity politics and #MeToo. Maslin's argument gives life to Arendt's brilliance and relevance for our times, bridging the gap between philosophy and political action." -- Jennifer Ring, University of Nevada

"Kim Maslin's book glitters with philosophical and literary erudition. It provides readers with scholarly honed insight into the entirety of Hannah Arendt's thinking. As such, it represents a major contribution to applications of political theory in the study of history, particularly genocide. Maslin's analysis reveals the central themes and abiding concerns that initially shaped Arendt's analytical perspectives and eventually became transformed into her theoretical vision. Maslin brilliantly reinterprets Arendt's relationship with Heidegger and shows both Arendt's admiration but also the vitality of her critique of Heidegger." -- Edward Weisband, Virginia Tech

CONTENTS

The recent publication of Martin Heidegger's Black Notebooks has led to a resurgence of interest in his affiliation with National Socialism. Most of the first wave of scholarship following the publication of these notebooks focused on the question(s) of whether or not Heidegger's antisemitism had a philosophical grounding and the implications for philosophy of answering this question in the affirmative.' Although these efforts produced a fascinating body of scholarship, the latter question strikes me as off the mark, which is to say it takes us down a dead end path and, in the process, it misses a productive line of inquiry. The question of Heidegger's moral standing in philosophy misses the mark and the risk we run, in dismissing Heidegger as morally bankrupt, is that despite his shortcomings, he has important things to teach us about identity. Not in spite of, but because of, his disastrous foray into the political sphere, his students struggled with a particular set of questions. Despite her intense disappointment, Hannah Arendt was unable to abandon either existential philosophy or Heidegger's basic precepts. These precepts help us understand Heidegger's own failure, by suggesting that even the great philosopher existed in the world in a state of thrownness, simultaneously transcending and falling prey to his own throw. Given that falling prey and projectivity represent the quintessential human struggle, ever present in our daily lives, why would we expect Martin Heidegger to be exempt from this most human of all challenges?

Hannah Arendt shifts to political philosophy, less to escape her own personal disappointment than to reveal (and ultimately remedy) the flaws of fundamental ontology. She not only grew beyond the role of naive and beguiled student: she became one of Heidegger's most astute critics. Well acquainted with and deeply respectful of his contributions to existential philosophy, Arendt viewed Heidegger's work both as profoundly insightful and extraordinarily myopic. Moreover, not contented to simply offer a critique of her mentor's work, Arendt engaged in a lifelong struggle to come to terms with the political implications of fundamental ontology. In short, Arendt's goals are more distinctly Heideggerian than previous scholarship would have us believe. Moreover, I suggest that Arendt's work, far from rejecting fundamental ontology, may be to offer a politically responsive, hence responsible, modification of Heidegger's fundamental ontology. In other words, she suggests that Heidegger's descriptive and non-normative insight into the nature of being is necessarily incomplete, and potentially irresponsible, unless it is undertaken in a manner which is mindful of the collective implications, as such she constructs an experiential ontology. Drawing on Heidegger's fundamental ontology, she turns our attention to the ways in which concrete structures and experiences in the world shape our manner of being. In so doing, she illustrates the importance of political ontology.

Many have noted the Heideggerian impulse in The Human Condition and the philosophical preoccupation of The Life of the Mind. In this vein, The Human Condition is sometimes described as Arendt's return to philosophy. It is my contention that Arendt never returns to philosophy because she never leaves it. Rather, her entire oeuvre can be understood as an attempt to modify Heidegger's descriptive framework for use in the political sphere, because philosophy and politics, perhaps particularly existential philosophy and democratic theory, are utterly inseparable. Her Heideggerian roots are not something Arendt returns to, rather she uses Heidegger's insight into the nature of Being to help us understand the plight of the nineteenth-century Jewess, the development of antisemitism, as well as, imperialism. My claim is that all of Arendt's work can be read as existential philosophy; my aim is to reveal the Heideggerian impulse in her early work, in particular. In what follows, I argue, first, that our reading of Arendt is informed by an examination of the Heideggerian concepts underlying it. Second, Arendt's project, far from rejecting fundamental ontology, may be to offer a politically responsive, hence responsible, modification of Heidegger's fundamental ontology, by grounding it in lived experiences, hence her work should be read as experiential ontology.

In the first chapter I examine Arendt's "Heidegger the Fox" essay, suggesting that Arendt uses the metaphor of a physical trap to both conceal and reveal her critique of Heidegger. She opines that Heidegger's approach to fundamental ontology leaves him unable to extricate himself from his own conceptual framework. Heidegger's project is to develop fundamental ontology and to reveal the limitations of philosophy as a mode of inquiry under conditions of modernity. Ironically he becomes so thoroughly subsumed by ontological questions that he fails to recognize that he has fallen victim to several of his own concerns about modernity. In the second chapter, I examine the role of rootlessness in the thought of both Heidegger and Arendt.

Though their politics differ, both assert that a lack of grounding in a particular place lies at the core of the Jewish problem. Moreover, their notions of rootlessness are strikingly similar as both derive from a deficient connectedness and lead to an inauthentic manner of being-in-the-world. The third chapter takes up the often overlooked, Rahel Varnhagen, arguing it should be read as a case study of three of Heidegger's most political concepts: thrownness, fallenness and projectivity. In short, Arendt undertakes an examination of Varnhagen's life in order to "thickly constitute" thrownness, fallenness, and projectivity, to reveal the ontological core of rootlessness, as well as the political implications of taking oneself up as a project. The Human Condition is often touted as Arendt's return to philosophy; whereas Origins of Totalitarianism is usually described as either a piece of political sociology or a historical text and vehemently criticized, as such. In chapters four, five and six, I examine Origins, not as a traditional historical work, but rather as a public performance of Heideggerian historicity which has two predominant impulses. First, it comprises part of the constitutive structure of Dasein, as such it plays a critical role in the search for transcendence. Second, it serves as a critique of the dominant interpretation of historical events. Thus, in her quest to take herself up as a project, Arendt challenges the dominant interpretations of Jewish and European history, by highlighting the interaction between ontic structures, existential choice and ontological conditioning.

The trial of Adolph Eichmann has often been described as a point of transition in the work, as well as the life, of Hannah Arendt. In the seventh chapter I argue, alternatively, that it represents a point of continuity in the development of Arendt's normative experiential ontology, both with and against Heidegger. Though Arendt never does get around to laying out a systematic theory of evil, she begins

from a more or less Kantian perspective, uses the lived experiences of Adolph Eichmann to concretize abstract Heideggerian concepts in an attempt to understand both the ontological conditions, as well as the political implications of evildoing.

Chapters eight, nine and ten consider the implications of Arendt's experiential ontology for the political philosophy. Loneliness draws on the Heideggerian notion of the inauthentic and applies it to the public sphere. The eighth chapter examines the use of isolation and loneliness in Arendt's work and suggests that a richer understanding of both concepts, as well as their politi

cal importance, can be attained by examining them through a Heideggerian lens. Building on the notion that Arendt's work can be understood as an attempt to take seriously Heidegger's claim that the ontological can only be approached through the ontic, chapters nine and ten turn our attention to identity politics. Both Heidegger and Arendt are often read as either indifferent to or hostile to identity politics. Since Arendt's project is to first ground herself ontically, a rereading of Arendt, suggests that both thinkers are producrve resources for contemporary identity politics. Chapter nine demonstrates that Arendt ends up anticipating someone like Judith Butler, by pointing us toward a phenomenological approach to identity. Moreover like Adriana Cavarero, she understands that taking seriously concrete political identities requires listening to historical narratives. In ways that will be picked up and expanded by thinkers such as Jean-Luc Nancy, they both attend to the ontological stakes of such identity. Finally, chapter ten turns our attention to what these efforts might have to say about a moment in identity politics, such as #MeToo and its potential to rethink democratic theory, particularly the concrete ways that we construct our Being-with.

In the end, Arendt carves out her own path, an experiential ontology, by drawing on Heideggerian concepts, grounding them in lived experiences, demonstrating their political value and transforming the purely descriptive concepts into prescriptive ones. Any notion of a political ontology must draw on individual lives set in socio-historical context and only as such can they illuminate political events. Thus far from rejecting philosophy, she simply admonishes that as a matter of political prescription, philosophical categories can be used only with the utmost circumspection. Arendt's experiential ontology transforms fundamental ontology from its, at best, apolitical and, at worst, anti-political orientation and allows the ontological to assume its rightful place at the cornerstone of democratic theory. Since as she makes clear in The Human Condition, one's manner of being in the world is of the utmost importance in public life.

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Elzbieta Ettinger's 1995 expose suggested that far from a mere youthful fling, Hannah Arendt and Martin Heidegger shared a deeply passionate, lifelong, devoted relationship.' Moreover, Ettinger implied it was also a profoundly exploitative relationship in which Heidegger pulled the strings and Arendt never grew beyond the role of enthralled and devoted student. This revelation might have remained a topic of tangential academic interest, except that it also called Arendt's professional judgment into question, a damning charge to level against a political philosopher interested in judgment. In this project 1 argue that Arendt not only grew beyond the role of nave and beguiled student, she became one of Heidegger's most astute critics. Well acquainted with and deeply respectful of his contributions to philosophy, she viewed his work as both profoundly insightful and extraordinarily myopic. Additionally, not contented to simply offer a critique of her mentor's work, Arendt engaged in a lifelong struggle to come to terms

with the political implications of fundamental ontology. She shifts to political philosophy, less to escape her personal disappointment, than to right the collective flaws of fundamental ontology. Moreover, I argue that Arendt's purpose, far from rejecting philosophy, is to offer a politically responsible, modification. In other words, she suggests that Heidegger's insight into the nature of being is necessarily incomplete, and potentially irresponsible, unless it is undertaken in a manner which is mindful of the collective implications.

Martin Heidegger elucidates highly abstract, descriptive concepts, primarily aimed at exploring the individual experience of being as Being. For example, he considers the challenges of thrownness without offering a single example. He claims that his concepts are non-normative, which is to say that he merely describes deficient and proficient forms of care, rather than attaching value judgments to either. Moreover, his focus is on the experience of Being, as an individual. He leaves questions related to the being-with of Being to the side. For example, can being-with ever facilitate projectivity? Arendt, on the other hand, employs Heideggerian concepts in a political context. She utilizes Heideggerian concepts in a manner that is attentive to the collective implications of the manner of being of Being, mindful of the imperative that political engagement must be a widespread, as well as authentic, endeavor. She grounds the political, ontologically and illustrates that the manner of being of Being is inherently political. Moreover, she advocates an approach to the study of Being that derives guideposts or cautionary tales from the lived experiences of real people.

Hannah Arendt had an ambivalent relationship with feminism. As a German-Jewish political thinker, indebted in many ways to Martin Heidegger, gender was never the most salient marker of political identity for her. In thinking back over her relationship with Arendt, Elizabeth Minnich reveals, "I think Hannah Arendt did not want to be bothered much with `the woman question.' Being a Jew pressed much harder on her." Arendt was mindful of the degree to which her Jewishness limited her ability to choose. I have suggested that Arendt can be read as less opposed to identity politics than is often thought if we understand her oeuvre to center around the project of taking up ontological questions through the ontic. As we have seen, in this way, Arendt continues an important Heideggerian philosophical strategy but toward a different end. For Arendt the ultimate goal was a collective one, that of learning to share the earth. With this interpretation in mind, Heidegger and Arendt can be viewed as important resources for contemporary debates concerning identity politics occurring within the frame of continental philosophy and political theory. While Heidegger rarely addresses otherness, Arendt routinely deals with otherness, albeit in ways that at times appear contradictory. None of her voluminous writings deal specifically with gender, though some of her work certainly deals with notable women. She both smoked cigars with the men and suggested that certain occupations were not very becoming to women. Moreover, she warned of potential danger in any political movement based only on shared victim status and touted the importance of finding political solutions to political problems. Yet both Heidegger and Arendt contribute in important ways to contemporary debates in identity politics by providing a framework within which the challenge of identity can be constructed, as well as, deconstructed.

They both understand, anticipating someone like Judith Butler, that taking seriously concrete political identities requires constructing and listening to historical narratives of such identities. Moreover, in ways that will be picked up and expanded by thinkers such as Jean-Luc Nancy, they both attend to the ontological stakes of such identity. Namely, thrownness and the goal of projecting oneself into the future

are neither the results of history nor should they be undertaken in the absence of some form of connectedness to or rootedness in self-understanding. Rather, thrownness and projection illustrate that historicity is the ontological condition for the ontic practice of history itself. As such, like Adriana Cavarero, Arendt and Heidegger allow us to attend to the specifics of historical existence without being tempted to reduce existence to history.

Further, the leaping-in/leaping-ahead distinction could be an important supplement to contemporary debates in identity politics. In particular, this distinction allows us to remain sensitive to the complicated ways in which identity is never something stable such that it could be taken over and handed back to a person or group, even with the best of intentions. Instead, identity is itself a project that allows a person or group to find their own possibilities, at least in part, in the task of taking themselves up as projected into the future in particular ways. These projects are shaped by, though never owned by, group affiliation. Relating to others by "leaping-ahead," allows us to take seriously the potential importance of interventionist political strategies, while attending to concrete ways that "handing back" could manifest itself. This approach requires us to always remain vigilant not to regard such intervention as a terminus (telos), but instead as an opening up for others to a future in which they have the necessary ontological, as well as, political tools (status and power) to be able to activate their own identity as a matter of their own project.

Thus, an examination of Arendt's own project, particularly when juxtaposed with her concern regarding political movements based on "shared victim status" and her attention to otherness suggests another possible interpretation of the metaphorical trap. Certainly one of Heidegger's main contributions to philosophy is the gender neutral, ontological concept: Dasein. As "that being for whom its being is a question," neither gender nor race nor socio-economic status are relevant to Dasein 's ability to take up questions of Being. As an ontic matter, Dasein is, of course, gendered. Ontologically, Dasein is not. In other words, for Heidegger, questions of being are not matters of gender, ethnicity nor socio-economic status. The neutrality of Dasein, though ontologically defensible, may also constitute a trap from which Heidegger cannot escape in so far as it leads him to undervalue certain questions and devote little attention to the nature of being-with-others. Without taking into consideration the concrete, ontic concerns which comprise the world in which Dasein finds herself, being-with-others is merely labeled a constitutive feature of Dasein without that proposition itself meriting sustained attention. Thus, both philosophically and perhaps personally, Heidegger's being-with-others is deficient. In an attempt either conscious or unconscious to remedy this flaw of fundamental ontology, Arendt approaches the ontological through the ontic by first situating herself in the world as a German Jewess and offering up her experiences as a way of reclaiming being-with-others as constitutive of Existenz and illustrating the concrete ways that being-with-others was a genuinely constitutive component of her authentic political existence.

In her 1960 address to the American Political Science Association, Arendt offered a justification of political philosophy as an undertaking.

Thought itself ... arises out of the actuality of incidents, and incidents of living experience must remain [the] guideposts by which it takes its bearings, if it is not to lose itself in the heights to which thinking

soars, or in the depths to which it must descend. In other words, the curve which the activity of thought describes must remain bound to incident as the circle remains bound to its focus.

In other words, since thought requires isolation, any responsible philosophizing must necessarily remain "bound to incident." As such identity politics should be undertaken mindful, at least, of several admonishments that can be drawn from the conjoined work of Hannah Arendt and Martin Heidegger. First, Vogel suggests that we must, at the very least, regard the Other as a projecting being and pose the following question: can we facilitate the Other's transition to authenticity^ In keeping with the rest of Arendt's work, this proposition sets a standard for authentic political engagement that may be nearly impossible to attain. Yet it is not an elitist conception. Authenticity in the public realm, though possibly rare, is a viable option for us all—indeed, this is one of the important results of Heidegger's conception of authenticity, as an ontological possibility, and not merely an ontic accomplishment. It does not require one to be conversant in Greek philosophy nor trained in legal precedents. In fact, extensive training in a particular system of thought may prove more of a distraction or even a trap. The most useful insight may derive from those who are quite simply willing to offer up their own experiences for interpretation. Herein lies the importance of a moment like #MeToo, which originates quite simply with individuals' willingness to share their own experiences for reflection, interpretation and reinterpretation.

Second, Arendt illustrates both personally and philosophically, the continued relevance of Stern's insight. Moments of self-revelation are inherently alienating. In other words, even if one approaches the ontological through the ontic, with an awareness of one's throw, a sense of rootedness in a time and place, the individual's act of projecting sets her apart from the group. The act of self-revelation, in and of itself, creates a separation from the group, if not necessarily a fissure within the group. Herein lies the paradox of being-with-others in the world, particularly as a political phenomenon. The political goal of a cohesive group or a stable agenda is antithetical to the individual's project of self-revealing. Moreover, in trying to act on a political agenda, the group presses upon and constricts, if not constructs, the individual's self-concept. The myriad of ways in which a group can press upon an individual may either undermine the individual's awareness of his or her thrownness (as in the case of Benjamin Disraeli) or ostracizes the individual who does not conform to the group's definition of itself (as in the case of the pariah). Either one threatens the authenticity of the individual's project and undermines one of the primary goals of identity politics: facilitating the individual's transition to authenticity. As such the challenge of arriving at a legal definition or set of procedures may, in and of itself, undermine the project of identity.

In this text, I have tried simply to open the space for beginning to think about such contributions. I hope that in light of my arguments, the suggestion that Arendt and Heidegger are the wrong places to look for positive conceptions of identity theory within contemporary philosophy is problematized. Though neither thinker offers a fully formed theory, as we might have wished, each provides a way of thinking through the stakes of what such a theory might involve. The experiential ontology of Arendt—as a critical response to and appropriation of Heidegger's phenomenological approach to human existence—is a productive place to look as one continues to think through the critical questions in identity politics. Who is it that "one" is in the context of a "we"? Who do "we" understand ourselves to be and how do we arrive at that understanding? <>

CONSPIRACY THEORIES IN THE TIME OF CORONAVIRUS: A PHILOSOPHICAL TREATMENT by Rachel Robison-Greene and Richard Greene [Open Universe, 9781637700068]

Microchips, government-replaced bird drones, QAnon and vaccine tracers: these are just a few of the most common conspiracies we have heard over and over again throughout most of 2020-2021's news cycles. There are common categories of conspiracy theories, variants of which pop up over and over again, and new and outrageous theories that seemingly appear overnight. While most of them are easily debunked, conspiracy theories and their root causes can be used to closely track people's most significant philosophical concerns at a point in time. In this up-to-date study of conspiracy theories, the authors look at the history of conspiracy theories, discuss the history and hallmarks of such theories, and examine what counts as a conspiracy theory--and what doesn't.

Review

In a time when conspiracy theories have made their way into mainstream media in unprecedented amounts, two Utah professors are exploring the impact conspiracy theories have on society with their new book "Conspiracy Theories in the Time of Coronavirus: A Philosophical Treatment."

Conspiracy theories meet at the intersection of the specialties of Weber State University philosophy professor Richard Greene and Utah State University philosophy professor Rachel Robison-Greene. The couple began writing "Conspiracy Theories in the Time of Coronavirus" before the 2020 presidential election, just as the conspiracy theory landscape began to change rapidly. Greene specializes in the best practices of belief formation and the study of epistemology - theories of knowledge, while Robison-Greene is an expert on ethics and moral psychology. Both also study pop culture and their publisher thought they were well suited to research the impact of conspiracy theories on society.

"Our account of what a conspiracy theory was didn't change very much," Richard Greene said. "However, all the social implications and the ways conspiracy theories spread and affected society changed quite a bit during the time of the election. We had to rethink a lot of our previous research."

According to Richard and Rachel, conspiracy theories have almost always existed and will continue to exist, but harmful conspiracy theories being shared in unprecedented amounts on social media affects people's health, lives and political leanings.

"The conspiracy theories surrounding the pandemic had significant real world implications," Richard Greene said. "We're talking about people's lives here, and as we note in the book, conspiracy theories are being passed about in unprecedented ways and numbers — it's a public health crisis really. So that's why we wanted to focus on it in the book. We knew it was the case that everyone was being impacted by conspiracy theories related to the pandemic."

Each chapter of the book begins with discussing different conspiracy theories that have been popular at various points throughout history such as birds not being real, the Illuminati and the assassination of President John F. Kennedy.

"So many conspiracy theories employ racsist and antisemitic motifs," said Richard and Rachel. "We hope to help people avoid becoming susceptible to that mindset."

Richard and Rachel also hope that readers get a clearer understanding of what conspiracy theories are and how they've been used over time. Though the book covers lighter and heavier material, it is written for all ages.

"I think conspiracy theories at their core are about people feeling marginalized and frustrated at power imbalances," Rachel Robison-Greene said. "If we constructed social systems where people felt less marginalized and focused on societal inequalities, we could mitigate some of the harmful conspiracy theories we're seeing now."

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The Current Landscape

At the time of this writing the world is in a horrible state. We are in the middle of a global pandemic that, at the time this book was written, has taken approximately 5.5 million lives with no end currently in sight despite there being a number of vaccines available, each of which has been proven to provide outstanding protection against death. As if that weren't enough, the political division that exists in many countries, including perhaps most notably the United States, presents serious existential threats to their most fundamental political systems and institutions—across the globe, democracy, where it exists, is hanging by a thread. Interestingly, conspiracy theories play a huge role in both of these things.

A New Plague

Deep in a cave somewhere in China, a virus mutated inside of a horseshoe bat. These bats aren't bothered much by coronaviruses. New strains regularly develop inside of them, some of them harmful to other creatures, others perfectly benign.

Enter, a pangolin. Pangolins are unique for two related reasons. First, they are the only mammals with scales. Second, they are the world's most trafficked creature. Pangolins call to mind both anteaters and pill bugs. They have long snouts and tongues that they use to forage for ants, termites, and larvae. When predators are near, pangolins roll up into a ball and their scales make them impenetrable to most hungry carnivores.

Somehow, a pangolin came into contact with the novel coronavirus. Coronaviruses are zoonotic diseases, which means that they can spread from one species of animal to another. This might have been the end of the story. The novel coronavirus may have thrived and then fizzled in bats and pangolins, were it not for the introduction of new predators—human beings. The scales of pangolins are highly valued in traditional medicinal practices. A 1938 article in Nature describes some of those practices:

The animal itself is eaten, but a greater danger arises from the belief that the scales have medicinal value. Fresh scales are never used, but dried scales are roasted, washed, cooked in oil, butter, vinegar, boy's urine, or roasted with earth or oyster-shells, to cure a variety of ills. Amongst these are excessive nervousness and hysterical crying in children, women possessed by devils and ogres, malarial fever and deafness.

It's illegal to sell pangolins, but that doesn't stop it from happening. In fact, the taboo related to the animals confers even more social standing to those who are able to acquire them and imbues the scales with more of a mystical status than they had before. As a result, it's likely that the pangolin which contracted the novel coronavirus from a horseshoe bat was poached and traded on the wildlife black-market.

Scene: A wet market in Wuhan, China. Wet markets exist all over the world. They are places where customers can buy fresh meat and produce. In some wet markets, animals are even slaughtered right in front of the customers. As one might imagine, conditions in these places are not always sanitary. Some wet markets are clean, and one might even think of them as models of local, sustainable food practices. Others, however, are breeding grounds for disease. It is in the latter position that we find our pangolin, contagious with SARS-CoV2. Once this virus spread at the market to human beings, globalization ensured that it steamrolled into a global pandemic. It would go on to kill millions of people, while devastating economies, putting a huge strain on medical resources, filling up hospital beds, shutting down schools, and increasing anxiety levels world-wide.

That is, in all likelihood, what happened. Many Americans believe other explanations altogether.

Fake News and Big Lies

We are undoubtedly living in a golden age of conspiracy theories. Conspiracy theories have nearly always existed, and there have been other golden ages in which conspiracy theories have existed in large numbers while playing key roles in the unfolding of significant events, but we've never seen so many conspiracy theories playing such prominent roles.

A number of factors serve to make this the case.

First, conspiracy theories spread much more easily due to the ways in which the Internet connects all of us together, and they do so in real time (this is particularly true since social media became a significant part of the Internet).

Second, conspiracy theories have been weaponized by politicians to discredit their political enemies as well as news sources that would speak out against them. Again, this is nothing new, but it is now happening with greater frequency and at the highest levels of government.

Third, there is a level of distrust of our leaders that is unparalleled in recent centuries. This distrust is not just a distrust of political leaders, although there is plenty of that to go around. There is distrust of business leaders, religious leaders, academics, scientists, the press, and just about any other group that might have wielded some influence at one time or another. In some cases, the distrust is warranted— members of each of the above groups have lied to the public at one time or another, although some groups are more prone to doing so than are other groups. In many cases the distrust is simply not warranted.

Fourth, there are a number of psychological factors at play that predispose certain people to be more readily accepting of conspiracy theories, not the least of which are the feelings of powerlessness and anger that a great number of people feel due to the fact that the pandemic has put a great many lives on hold. We find ourselves in a holding pattern due to circumstances beyond our individual abilities to control (although collectively we have more power than many people realize).

It's distressing, to say the least. Accepting conspiracy theories, at least to the extent that doing so gives us people to blame for our predicaments, allows some people to regain a little bit of that lost power. Finally, there are shameless promoters of conspiracy theories with huge followings and large bullhorns with which to spread their theories. Why would they want to do this? Well, it turns out that there is quite a bit of money to be made in peddling conspiracy theories. These are just a few of the factors that have given rise to this golden age of conspiracy theories. We'll discuss many more in the pages to follow.

It is noteworthy that conspiracy theories are so much a part of daily life now. It was not all that long ago that the majority of people were not all that familiar with the term and even fewer had a keen grasp of

the concept; now one seldom goes more than a day or so without hearing about some conspiracy theory or other. Certainly, the change in public awareness of them is partially due to the global pandemic, which has itself spawned a great number of conspiracy theories. Conspiracies theories breed in times of crisis. For example, there are conspiracy theories about the origins of the pandemic, there are conspiracy theories about the production, distribution, and contents of the vaccines, and there are conspiracy theories about the virus itself. (Poor Bill Gates! Most of these theories have attached themselves to him at one time or another.) The change in public awareness also has much to do with the current political climate. The top news stories of the day frequently make reference to conspiracy theories.

Despite the increase in awareness of conspiracy theories, there is still much to be said about them. People have the concept, but it is not clearly defined in the minds of many. Moreover, there are a

number of questions pertaining to conspiracy theories that need to be addressed. The main purpose of this book is to highlight and answer many of these questions.

We need, for example, to know just what conspiracy theories are. Some maintain that any theory about a conspiracy counts as a conspiracy theory. We'll argue that this is not the case. What sort of features do conspiracy theories have? In what ways do they change and evolve? What features are unique to conspiracy theories? What is the epistemically responsible attitude to take with respect to conspiracy theories?

Should they always be rejected? Is there ever a time when one is justified in accepting a conspiracy theory? Some theorists argue that we should all become conspiracy theorists—or perhaps that we already are all conspiracy theorists. (See, for example, "From Alien Shape-shifting Lizards to the Dodgy Dossier" by M R.X. Dentith and "Everyone's a Conspiracy Theorist" by Charles Pigden, both listed in the References to this volume.) We'll argue that once conspiracy theories are properly understood, neither of these options are acceptable (even if we all turn out to be persons who accept or embrace some theories about conspiracies).

Conspiracy theories also give rise to questions about the obligations of politicians, the nature of existence, and human psychology. What do we bring to bear on the problems raised by conspiracy theories?

Finally, there are important questions to be addressed pertaining to the ethics of conspiracy theories. In just what ways do conspiracy theories harm us? Who is responsible for the promulgation of conspiracy theories? How bad is it to believe conspiracy theories? And, perhaps most importantly, who is responsible for solving the various problems raised by conspiracy theories? Alas, the solution to these problems of is not going to be a simple one. It's not, for example, a matter of merely educating people that believing conspiracy theories is bad, or having everyone take a critical thinking course at their local college. There is an interesting paradox at play here. Seemingly the more one responds to conspiracy theories, that is the more one refutes, rejects, and debunks conspiracy theories, the more entrenched certain believers of conspiracy theories become. For many, accepting conspiracy theories is an essential part of their identity. Responding to conspiracy theories is tricky business.

We hope that these introductory remarks make it clear that conspiracy theories are generally not to be taken lightly, and especially not in light of our current political predicament and against the backdrop of a deadly ongoing global pandemic. The stakes are quite high and the threat is very real. Ironically, to many it doesn't seem that way. A lot of people think conspiracy theories are mostly fun. In some cases, this is correct.

(We do hope you have fun reading about conspiracy theories in this book!) There is something entertaining about thinking that aliens are being held in Area 51 or that birds are not real or that Jim Morrison is still alive. These, however, as we will see, are the exceptions. In a world where conspiracy theorists are being elected to congress, citizens are storming the capitol, and people are casting votes based on conspiracy theories, we can ill afford to take conspiracy theories with a chuckle or a grain of salt.

How to Read this Book

For those of you reading this book who are, in fact, conspiracy theorists, you'll want to search for the hidden messages that were written just for you. Perhaps you might try taking the first letter of each word and seeing if that amounts to anything. Alternatively, you might try stringing together the first words from each paragraph or the first sentences from each new section to see if either of those reveal the secret messages. If these don't yield results, try reading the odd pages backwards, or using all the hints in The Da Vinci Code to point you in the right direction. One of these things is bound to work, and if none do, then keep trying. The truth is out there (or in here) and as no one says, fortune favors the diligent.

For those of you reading this book who are not conspiracy theorists, we can tell you that there are no secret hidden messages in the text. We would tell the conspiracy theorists, but they wouldn't believe us anyway. Still, you will be interested to know a bit about how this book is structured. Each chapter begins with a prominent conspiracy theory (or, in some cases, a handful of related conspiracy theories), which get related to the main themes in the chapter. The idea was to make the book both informational for the person interested in conspiracy theories, and philosophical. It's great to learn about both the philosophy of conspiracy theories, as well as about the conspiracy theories themselves.   <>

PLATO'S CRATYLUS: PROCEEDINGS OF THE ELEVENTH SYMPOSIUM PLATONICUM PRAGENSE edited by Vladimír Mikeš [Proceedings of the Eleventh Symposium Platonicum Pragense, Series: Brill's Plato Studies Series, 9789004473010]

The present volume offers a collection of papers on one of Plato's most intriguing dialogues. Although not a running commentary, the book covers the majority of difficult questions raised by the dialogue in which the subjects of language and ontology are tied closely together. It shows why Plato's Cratylus has been highly regarded among readers interested in ancient philosophy and those concerned with modern semantics and theory of language. This collection also presents original views on the position of the dialogue in the whole Plato's œuvre and in the context of Plato's contemporaries and successors.

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Making Sense of the Cratylus by Vladimír Mikeš

This volume is a collection of papers originally presented at the *Eleventh Symposium Platonicum Pragense*, held in Prague in November 9th and 10th, 2017.

Some dialogues in the corpus of Plato's works have a straightforward importance, position and overall role. The *Cratylus* is not one of them. In this dialogue Plato touches on questions of longstanding importance to him – as we can conclude from other dialogues – and raises new questions which, given the space dedicated to them, should be worth asking when one is dealing with "correctness of names". And yet there has been wide disagreement about the dialogue's meaning. It contains queries about speech and its parts, about things having their own natures *versus* consisting in mere appearances, about general flux *versus* the good and beautiful remaining always the same. There are examinations of semantics and of Forms behind names, and a famously lengthy exploration of etymology. Although for some of these questions we see where Plato's leaning is, we cannot be sure about his views of almost anything that is explicitly stated. And scholars indeed differ so much in saying what Plato's opinions are in this dialogue that it is almost without parallel in the whole corpus. Is Plato conventionalist or rather non-conventionalist in what concerns names? Is he giving any genuine answer to the initial question of the correctness of names? Are his etymologies to be taken seriously? Is he entirely sceptical about words and language as means to achieve knowledge or does he rather make distinctions with a purpose to show the way forward? Is the dialogue aporetical in its nature or does it convey some positive message we should retain? These are the main questions which have been raised. Most of them have not only received different answers from different scholars – which would not be exceptional – but to an unusual extent these answers are directly opposite. This controversial status of the dialogue has not escaped anyone's attention. It is therefore not surprising that there is something like a golden thread that can be observed going through many different interpretations. Very often interpreters have not taken their task to be to merely explain this or that particular theory or problem of the *Cratylus*, but to make sense of the dialogue as a whole, to defend its overall meaning, or to propose the way it should be understood in the collection of other dialogues, even in cases when they seek to interpret only a part of the text. We can observe this with a higher than usual frequency in the interpretations adopting an approach which can be seen as the most traditional, offering a closer scrutiny of chosen passage or passages. Very often the question of what makes the *Cratylus* worth reading is recognizable in the background. But there are also other approaches which are more directly related to its puzzling nature like larger summarising overviews of its arguments and different attempts to show how the dialogue appears in the context – the context of Plato's other dialogues, of ancient thought more generally or, last but not least, of distinctions made by modern semantics and philosophy of language.

All the aforementioned approaches are represented in the present volume. This may be taken as one of the features making it a worthy contribution to the debate. In relatively little space, it displays the controversial standing of the dialogue by exemplifying the variety of interpretations and approaches it

allows for – and yet it does this without falling into repetition or stalemate. The texts offered here either propose new points of view or build upon preceding literature to make further steps in directions which have already been advocated. On the whole the volume proves that the *Cratylus* is an inevitable starting point for anyone who wants to learn about Plato's views on speech – *logos* – and the ontology related to it. It also makes clearer that it is a very complex dialogue that does not offer straightforward answers but necessitates a careful reading and evaluation of individual arguments against other arguments. This is an important achievement in that it shows a general way to approach a highly literary author whose style of thought and expression is everything but simple. Moreover, the *Cratylus* is probably the dialogue most resistant to the simplifying *either/or* kind of interpretation, as this volume makes sufficiently plain. For all these reasons, this collection of papers is readable as a single book from beginning to end. It might be also of some interest that it is the first collective monograph on this dialogue.

The volume starts with *Steffen Lund Jørgensen*'s contribution advocating a new way to look at Socrates' interlocutor Hermogenes as a means to better understand certain puzzling claims of the first part of the dialogue. It is followed by *Francesco Ademollo*'s paper in which the author of the only modern commentary on the dialogue expands his views and provides a helpful comparison with modern semantics of Kripke, Russel and Frege, thereby giving a fine example of the context-widening interpretation as mentioned above. A not-dissimilar approach – taking an overview of central passages against a background of modern notions of referentiality and intentionality – is offered by *Francesco Aronadio*. In the same vein, the author of this introduction offers summary of the first part of the dialogue in order to make a case that even without bringing in modern concepts we can distinguish here a valuable insight into the nature of language. The paper by *Anna Pavani* is then a natural follow-up, defending the view that a key conceptual distinction is made in one of the arguments of the first part, namely the argument of the Forms of names.

The paper by *Jakub Jinek* revisits a much debated etymological part of the dialogue, in particular the etymologies o

Chapter 1 The Opening of Plato's Cratylus A Prelude to a Socratic Reading of the Dialogue by Steffen Lund Jørgensen

The paper argues that the opening of the *Cratylus* is a prelude to a Socratic reading of the dialogue. The paper has two main sections. The first section argues that the opening of the *Cratylus* characterizes Hermogenes as a Socratic philosopher and thereby introduces the reader to a Socratic reading of the dialogue. Specifically, the section argues that the opening portrays Hermogenes as modelling himself on Socrates by using two conversational devices that are characteristically Socratic: Socratic questioning and Socratic irony. In addition, the paper argues that Hermogenes displays a Socratic attitude to knowledge and inquiry. The second section argues that a Socratic reading of the dialogue significantly improves our understanding of the Socratic nature of the *conversation* between Socrates and Hermogenes as well as the Socratic nature of the *theory* they develop. Specifically, the paper argues that the general assumption of a Socratic conversation between Socrates and Hermogenes best explains the significance of the invalidity of Socrates' argument about the nature of things and actions (386d8–e9). In addition, the paper argues that the general assumption of the Socratic nature of the theory developed by Socrates and Hermogenes best illuminates Socrates' account of the expert name-maker as a *nomothetes* (388d6–389a4).

Chapter 2 Why the Cratylus Matters, or: Plato's Cratylus and the Philosophy of Language by Francesco Ademollo

In this paper I survey some central stages and aspects of the argument of Plato's *Cratylus*, paying special attention to their affinities with themes from modern and contemporary philosophy. My aim is to show that the dialogue is close to some of our current philosophical concerns and that, in particular, it can be read as a profound inquiry into the relation between reference, on the one hand, and description and representation, on the other. Among other things, I explore the dialogue's connections with Frege's sense/reference distinction and Kripke's arguments against it.

Chapter 3 Intentionality and Referentiality in Plato's Cratylus by Francesco Aronadio

The paper aims to show that in Plato's conception of names, and more generally of language, there is room for a differentiation between referentiality and intentionality. Firstly, Plato's account in the *Cratylus* of the relationship between names and named things is taken into consideration, in order to highlight the nature and the limits of the connection between linguistic units and reality. Secondly, particular attention is paid to Plato's awareness of the distinction between the epistemic and the merely communicative function of language, which vividly shows how language works even in the absence of knowledge of the true essence of things (and, consequently, in the absence of referentiality). Thirdly, and on this basis, it is argued for the possibility of distinguishing within Plato's ontological framework between intentionality, understood as the *dynamis* of linguistic units (i.e. their capability to address something), and referentiality, intended as the effectiveness of the relationship of those units with things named. Fourthly, the fruitfulness of this interpretative approach is pointed out by its application to the pages 237b–239a of the *Sophist*, which focuses on the problematic notion of *medamos on*.

Chapter 4 What Remains of Socrates' Naturalist Theory Once Conventionalism Is Accepted by Vladimír Mikeš

What is the main philosophical gain for a reader of the *Cratylus*? Led by this question, the author claims that the non-conventialist theory of names developed in the dialogue's first part is not entirely nullified by the acceptance of conventionalism in the dialogue's second part. Against some older and some more recent readings, he argues that a core of the non-conventialist theory remains valid in Plato's view and, together with Plato's professed conventionalism, represents a complex position on the relation between names and *nominata* – this is the main outcome of the dialogue (and is also consonant with much of what Plato says in other dialogues). For this reason the paper points out several important distinctions that are made in the first part of the dialogue, notably the introduction of forms of names as a third kind of thing distinct from both names and *nominata*. It is argued that the forms of names manifest a rational structure behind names, which, in its turn, is the basis for Plato's semantics and comes forth behind the etymologies and the principle of resemblance as they are successively introduced.

Chapter 5 Forms and Names: On Cratylus 389a5–390a10 by Anna Pavani

In discussing the way "the artisan of names" works, Socrates introduces the puzzling notion of the "*pephykos onoma*" (*Crat*. 389d4–5). What is usually downgraded to a "ghostly name" (R. Robinson) is to be understood within its argumentative context. Within the framework of the "tool analogy", Socrates defines both the *kerkis* (a weaving tool to be identified not with a "shuttle", but rather, as I argue, with a kind of comb) and the name as instruments whose specific function is to differentiate. As the structural and terminological parallels testify, producing a name is presented as strictly analogous to producing a *kerkis*. To refute Hermogenes' conventionalism as unfolded in the first part of the dialogue, Socrates shows that producing a name, just as producing a *kerkis*, entails two non-arbitrary components. There is room for arbitrariness when it comes to the actual choice of the phonetic material and this is the reason why lawgivers from different places can produce names that are equally correct. By contrast, there is no room for arbitrariness for the Ideal Name, which the artisan has to look at, and for the *pephykos onoma*, which the artisan has to put into sounds and syllables. What different concrete names share, if they are to be equally correct, is the same *pephykos onoma*. This does not correspond to a "Platonic Form" nor to a "linguistic type" nor to a "meaning", but rather, as I argue, to a concept.

Chapter 6 Platons Theologie der Götternamen by Jakub Jinek

The paper claims that the question of the correctness of divine names cannot be resolved by reference to the authority of the poets or by a certain semantic theory, but by turning to metaphysics. Socrates proceeds from revision of beliefs of the poets, through the formulation of the principle of "genetic synonymy", which yet does not apply without exception, to the discovery of the cosmology and the metaphysics of principles hidden behind the theology of the names of the highest divine triad Zeus – Cronus – Uranus. However, it is, on the one hand, the current context of the debate shaped by the Aristophanic comic, and, on the other hand, the decision not to communicate the most important doctrines in the text that prevents Socrates from presenting these teachings explicitly; yet a number of intertextual references and allusions as well as the indirect Platonic tradition can help complete the whole picture.

Chapter 7 Commerce, Theft and Deception: The Etymology of Hermes in Plato's Cratylus by Olof Pettersson

In the light of Socrates' largely neglected etymological account of the name Hermes, this article reexamines the dialogue's perplexing conclusion that reality should not be sought through names, but through itself. By a close scrutiny of three claims made in this etymology – that language is commercial, thievish and deceptive – it argues that Socrates' discussion about the relation between names and reality cannot only be meaningfully understood in terms of his characterization of language as deceptive and therefore tragic, but that this point is also confirmed by the dialogue's larger comedic structure and by Cratylus' framing joke about Hermogenes' name. As a consequence, the article also suggests that a closer examination of the etymology of Hermes can both help to assess a certain unwarranted optimism common in contemporary scholarship and the claim that the dialogue's overarching purpose, rather than being an explanation of how human language grants access to the truth about the existing things, is a critical examination of such a project and of its hubristic assumptions.

Chapter 8 Gorgias and the Cratylus Author: Mariapaola Bergomi

The following paper argues that Gorgias, and his anti-eleatic treatise *Peri tou me ontos* (*PTMO*), must be included among the critical points of reference of Plato's *Cratylus* and, although Plato (as well as Aristotle) never mentions the treatise explicitly, that Gorgias' linguistic conventionalism significantly influenced especially the third section of the dialogue and the arguments against Cratylus' naturalism. The paper starts with some considerations on the importance of the *PTMO*, continues highlighting some interesting clues in the dialogue that may point to Gorgias as a philosopher and a philosophical character in Plato, and ends with some references to the arguments against Cratylus and especially to the argument on the impossibility of uttering false statements.

Chapter 9 Quelques Différences entre le Cratyle et le Sophiste by Frédérique Ildefonse

In this contribution I seek to propose an approach to certain aspects of the *Cratylus* by combining two paths: an approach to the *Cratylus* by way of the *Sophist,* and an approach, enlightened by Stoicism, that considers what each one of the dialogues develops. I do not propose to consider what the *Cratylus* anticipates in the *Sophist* in terms of language study, but rather how the *Sophist* will shift the terms of the investigation of the name, specific to the *Cratylus*. By reading the *Cratylus* closely, one can better see what operations the Stranger carries out in the *Sophist*: on truth, on the relationship between *legein* and *logos*, on *logos* and its parts, as well as on the interlacing between the question of truth and the distinction between *legein* and *logos*, as well as on the interlacing between the question of truth and the relation between *logos* and its parts. I also propose to read some aspects of the *Cratylus* and the *Sophist* in light of Stoicism, which, for these dialogues as for others, sheds a particular light on the Platonic issues, but also allows us to understand the genesis of the Stoic concepts that arise, many of which emerge from a certain reading of Platonism.

Chapter 10 A Theory of Language between the Cratylus, the Theaetetus and the Sophist by Filip Karfík

On the surface, the *Cratylus* presents us with two competing theories concerning the "correctness of names", a naturalist and a conventionalist one. More in depth, it attacks the very idea that the study of language is the privileged or even the only way of acquiring knowledge. Besides casting doubt upon the epistemological value of words it raises the question of the ontology allowing for a theory of knowledge. In comparison with the *Cratylus*, the theory of language put forward in the *Theaetetus* and the *Sophist* marks a double shift: from *onoma* to *logos* and from the relation *onoma–pragma* to the relation *logos–dianoia–eide*. The alternative between an ontology of flux and an ontology of unchanging Forms which underlies the debate about the correctness of names in the *Cratylus* resurfaces in the *Theaetetus* and the *Sophist*. The *Sophist* tries to resolve this conflict by assigning motion and rest their proper places among the greatest genera, thus replacing the primitive ontology of single Forms with a structured ontology of relationships among them. This ontology provides a basis for the theory of falsehood of judgement and speech and, more generally, for the theory of imitation which can be true or false. On this new basis, the conception of speech as a kind of *mimesis* can be reformulated. Since speaking and judging consist in a kind of imitation and since imitation, as such, allows for falsehood, neither speech nor judgement can be the criterion of truth. Only what is not itself an imitation can provide this criterion. <>

PHILOSOPHY OF CULTURE AS THEORY, METHOD, AND WAY OF LIFE: CONTEMPORARY REFLECTIONS AND APPLICATIONS edited by Przemysław Bursztyka, Eli Kramer, Marcin Rychter, and Randall Auxier [Series: Philosophy as a Way of Life, Brill, 9789004515789]

The "idea" of culture comprises almost all human activities, from science to art, from music to microscopy. Does anything important escape the limits of this idea? The authors of this collection argue that all philosophy is really the philosophy of culture, since in some way each and every discipline and subdiscipline is foremost a manifestation of our collective cultural effort. Further, they argue that by engaging with philosophy as a cultural activity and as a discipline to meaningful engage with all dimensions of (inter)cultural life, we can live more meaningful, flourishing, and wisely guided lives.

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This volume is the expression of an ongoing dialogue between American and Polish philosophers on philosophy of culture, and its status and meaning in relation to philosophy as a way of life (PWL). The question at the heart of this dialogue is rather simple and striking: What does it mean to do philosophy of culture? Is it primarily theoretical inquiry, methodological orientation, a way of living, and in what ways and to what degrees?

Cassirer himself sought to at least partially answer some of these questions in several of his works,[1] and in our times Zofia Rosińska and David L. Hall have done so as well. Others have sought to put it into clear practice and let their work speak for themselves, such as Roger Ames and John J. McDermott. One might also think of books that are even more tightly focused on particular kinds of or subjects within the domain of philosophy of culture, such as Morton White's A Philosophy of Culture: The Scope of Holistic Pragmatism or Kwame Anthony Appiah's In My Father's House: Africa in the Philosophy of Culture. In the English language there are as yet no collections that give contemporary reflections on and applications of the meaning, purposes, status, and practice of philosophy of culture.

This volume seeks to take up this task. Further, by having the opportunity to dialogue with scholars of philosophy as a way of life, including those who consider themselves philosophers of culture, the contributors have sought to position philosophy of culture in relation to this nascent field. While some

essays directly address Pierre Hadot scholarship and the philosophy of culture, others utilize their own approaches to PWL drawing on Kant and other figures. Other contributors to the volume seek to look at philosophy of culture's broader role in society, and/or argue that PWL is only a part of (arguably) broader philosophy of culture endeavors. In all cases, this dialogue between PWL and philosophy of culture has fostered a community of scholars that want to help foster a much needed revival of the field outside a small group of departments in Europe and the United States.

We are convinced of the potential of philosophy of culture inside the academy and in greater culture as a force for humane-ization. We use "humane" here not in the sense of supporting the territorialization of anthropocentrically constructed human subjectivity, but in the sense of humanitas, as a critical, careful, and caring attention to holistic growth of the diversity of others and ourselves (however one defines the creaturely existence of ourselves and the personhood of others). Humane-ization is thus not tied to a mission of "civilizing" as a uniform project with a univocal vision of "progress" and cultivation. Such a vision is inherently dangerous. It is perennially used as part of the logic of imperialism, nationalism, fascism, and commitments to and structures of racial (especially White) supremacy with a correlate xenophobic attitude. Rather humane-ization is inherently pluralistic, expressing the diversity of ways philosophers of culture support critically challenging and attending to the condition of ourselves and others, and cultivating ourselves accordingly. It is a function of philosophy of culture, with ever new reconstructive projects emerging in different periods and contexts. As "persons of letters" philosophers of culture have a special role to play in the development of a fertile and pluralistic cultural life.

In the rest of the introduction, we sketch how in the very inception of Western philosophy of culture (though we think it is true for other traditions as well) one can find this commitment to humane-ization. From this preliminary outline we will be able to elucidate what role we think philosophy of culture can play today in this kind of rich cultural cultivation. We then turn to the essays themselves and their relation to this task. We conclude by inviting the reader to the serio ludere (serious play) of this volume, finding the fun, passion, adventure, and zest for life that is inherent to the philosophy of culture.

The Origins of Philosophy of Culture

Trying to look at philosophy of culture from a historical standpoint is not an easy task because of the ambiguities inherent in this very phrase. If the term itself seems to have been coined only in the nineteenth century, the questions concerning culture were of interest to philosophers at least since the times of the Greek sophists who were discussing the problems of human and earthly laws (nomos, physis), justice (dike) and education (paideia). In fact, the idea of paideia, seen by many as central to the ancient Greek civilization,7 was the idea of a certain model of culture (paideia is translated alternatively as "culture," "education" or "upbringing"). Plato's Republic may be considered as a complete presentation, along with a philosophical discussion and justification of a model of culture. A model that designs issues such as education, family and sex relations, gender roles, politics, ethics and morals, religion, art, poetry and music, astronomy, mathematics and others, also providing them with a general metaphysical foundation and framework. Notwithstanding, culture as paideia is, among other things, always being thought of as a transition, a process, and a task being put upon its participants. Thus understood, it marks out an account of a "civilized way of life," by presenting a distinct and ultimate goal to aim at and by teaching the means of achieving this absolute. Cicero, grafting this tradition on to the Latin world, famously compared culture to the agricultural process of cultivating (colere). People of culture tend to their souls (a process in which their bodies are also involved through gymnastics and

sports) such as farmers do to their crops. According to this model, culture involves self-mastery and self-restraint, it also favors reason over emotions or desires. More generally, it sides always with that which is one and the same against what may be many and different. It also prefers identity and stability over dissimilarity and change. This moral and theoretical ideal of antiquity (aspects of which then permeated Christian thought and imagery), along with the philosophical discourse that has laid it out and defended it, could be possibly, historically speaking, taken as one meaning of philosophy of culture.

Already within the antiquity, however, we find a discourse of a quite different sort which still, from a historical perspective and retroactively, might be referred to as philosophy of culture. This approach is different from Plato's one as it is more on the objectifying side, aiming at comparing, at analyzing different approaches rather than at promoting any central one. As such, it is also the more difference-focused one. Aristotle, to name just the first example in this series, putting forward in his Politics the principle of the succession (actually it is a succession by degeneration) of political orders, which describes the mechanisms of a historical, political and cultural change: oligarchy turns into tyranny which eventually gives in to democracy which inevitably degenerates back into oligarchy and so the circle closes. Notably, Aristotle, as the personal teacher of Alexander the Great was himself a witness to a decisive cultural change in the ancient world, namely the decline of the monoethnical and independent cities-states (poleis) and the rise of the multi-cultural, vast, and interconnected empire of Alexander. In the capital of this empire, at the very beginning of the first century, worked a philosopher responsible for an impressive cultural translation which might be taken as another philosophical approach to cultural diversity. Philo of Alexandria (or Philo Judaeus) successfully attempted the transcription of Jewish scripture into the very different language and concepts of Greek philosophy. As a means for this task, he developed the method of allegorical reading and interpretation which then became essential in theology and philosophy. Another philosophical approach to cultural diversity is to be found in Augustine's The City of God. While the whole book is an apologia for Christianity, Augustine also discusses there in depth religious and cultural practices of pagans and heretics (amongst other social and political topics). He describes the two rival models of culture, the conflict of which constitutes world history. The culture centered around the Catholic Church of Christendom, or the City of God, was aimed at reaching the otherworldly salvation with the help of divine providence. Opposed to this is the Earthly City, representing various cultures, goals, and lifestyles of people who are focused on wordily gains and pleasures, such as fame, political power, wealth, or bodily pleasures.

Yet another historical layer of philosophical reflection on culture may be associated with the thinkers of the Enlightenment, however their views are everything but univocal. One of the predominant topics in the philosophical literature of the eighteenth century was education and culture which German writers addressed using a single word, Bildung, that was meant as a translation and transposition into modernity of Greek paideia. To Kant Bildung meant freeing oneself from the irrational prejudices, both in theoretical and practical matters. This opinion was, however, criticized by Herder (and later by Schiller) as one-sided and downplaying the role of art and human creativity developing which, according to them, were essential for the process of education as it was for a good life of the humane individual. These opposing views were subsequently synthesized in the work of Wilhelm von Humboldt, a philosopher, linguist, and the architect of a massive educational reform project in the eighteenth century Prussia. In the English-speaking world, a similar idea of restoring the ancient ideal of paideia in the modern context was put forward by a British poet and essayist, Matthew Arnold, who identified culture with a total perfection achieved by knowledge and conscious self-development.

However, since the beginning of the Enlightenment, many affirmative philosophical positions promoting culture as the progress of liberty, autonomy, and reason which is achieved due to education, science, and technology, were accompanied by something that could be retroactively named a radical critique of culture – and here we approach yet one more historical semantic field that may be associated with philosophy of culture. To Rousseau, culture was first and foremost oppressive and the reason for that remained within its very essence. Strictly opposing culture to nature, he claimed the former was inseparable from property and inequality. People want to be envied by possessing more than the others, and for that reason they produce things and ideas. In the pursuit of effectiveness and productivity, culture becomes ever more refined in every aspect. This in turn leads to isolating people from each other and narrowing the scope of their experience, as we see comparing the job of a factory machine worker to that of a traditional farmer, or comparing modern, narrowly scoped science to the holistic wisdom of ancient Greece. For Rousseau his current culture consisted of alienation-inducing factors which should be overcome – an idea which later reappeared in many different shapes (in Hegel, Kierkegaard, Marx, Heidegger, Adorno, just to name a few instances) and still is essential to many critical discourses of today.

The nineteenth century with its widespread interest in nations, national identity, cultures, and the human subject, is an especially important historical period for philosophy of culture. It is also the one that marks the beginning of its emancipation as a separate field, discipline, or discourse, so in the narrow sense (which we do not adopt here) one could say that philosophy of culture originated in the nineteenth century. An important historical context here is the emergence of the opposition against positivism and scientism at the humanistic faculties of the universities of the late nineteenth century. Their employees sometimes felt unsafe in the wake of the spectacular progress of rival natural sciences and engineering, and the amount of tangible profits they provided. In order to protect their disciplines, faculties and positions, the humanistic professors had to somehow defend or bolster their position. Wilhelm Dilthey, the father of contemporary hermeneutics, justified the legitimacy of philosophical and philological exegeses by stressing the opposition between explaining (erklären) and understanding (verstehen). The natural science explains things and events simply by providing their reasons, whereas the hermeneutic understanding reaches the domain of senses or meanings of cultural phenomena. This understanding requires a detailed and professional knowledge of the historical and cultural context: the more we know about the epoch the better we understand the works of a certain author belonging to it. This idea of a shift from the tangible, material reality of natural sciences to the humane world of senses, meanings and values, along with a certain reserve, if not open hostility, toward the "hard" sciences, influenced many philosophers of culture of the twentieth century, especially those on the phenomenological and hermeneutical side.

This hermeneutical root of philosophy of culture is accompanied by a neo-Kantian one. Kant claimed that philosophy should explore the hidden framework of human experience which precedes the experience itself (or its apriorical structure, as the philosopher himself would have put it). If Kant himself was focused on the a priori foundations of epistemology and ethics, his later inheritors, such as Windelband, Cohen, Rickert and, most famously, Ernst Cassirer, wanted to uncover the a priori mechanisms of culture, the mechanisms of creation of the cultural meanings which Cassirer called a philosophy of symbolic forms. Both the hermeneutical and neo-Kantian tradition share the assumption that there is deeper meaning (a sense or a symbolic structure) to cultural phenomena which needs to be uncovered and which is of intelligible nature.

To complete this sketch of a historical presentation we need to mention yet another historical model of philosophy of culture, one which rejects precisely the above-mentioned premise. For Marx, Nietzsche, Freud, to name only this most famous trio here, culture is a symptom or an epiphenomenon of something non-cultural and non-intelligible itself, be it ownership of the means of production and class conflict, healthy or unhealthy life, and the intensity of will-to-power, or the socially repressed sexual drive.

This short summary was not meant as a history of philosophy of culture, rather the goal was, as indicated at the outset, to work through the historical contexts loaded up into the phrase itself. In particular, it shows how throughout its history philosophy of culture has had an attention to our personal condition and how to cultivate ourselves for the better, while challenging and pluralizing our vision of who and what we are.

Philosophy of Culture's Role in Humane Flourishing

It seems to us that there are, at least, a few roles philosophy of culture not only can, but should play in serving the humane-ization of contemporary culture. And to say so already implies one particular role which will not be mentioned separately, but rather as permeating all others. This role has a specific vocational nature and refers to a fundamental obligation which is inscribed into philosophy of culture as such. To put it differently: philosophy of culture is always permeated – whether consciously and intentionally or not, explicitly, or implicitly – by a certain kind of normative/axiological determination and orientation. Both can be articulated in many different ways, but they certainly cannot be suspended. And so, there is some philosophical work to be done on culture. However, since philosophy as such originates from culture as its specific self-referential and self-reflective moment – this work on culture is always, by necessity, a work undertaken from within culture. This equivalence indicates a specific situation that is expressive of both philosophy and culture. Simply put, in this case there is no distance, no separation between the object of analysis and the analysis itself. The latter does not stand outside, or beyond, or on the margins of the former – it belongs to and is expressive of it. The former, in turn, even if cannot be limited to philosophy certainly cannot be separated from it. And that is so, for at least one significant reason – both culture and philosophy, when properly understood, share the same fundamental aim and the same fundamental feature. That is, both provide a kind of cultivation, a humane-ization (again in the sense of an attending to the development of oneself and the other) of reality. This entanglement of culture and philosophy calls for a specific reflective attitude which questions culture as at once the origin and the object of philosophy. What is culture that it emanates from itself philosophy? Why does philosophy direct itself to culture? Is this directedness something accidental or rather essential for philosophy as such? What are the purposes and potential values of this directedness?

This kind of question leads us to the first role philosophy of culture should certainly play, namely that of metaphilosophy. The latter is not to be understood here in a traditional way as an abstract philosophical reflection on ways, modes and methods of philosophizing. In this context the term "metaphilosophy" has a broader meaning.8 It is to be a philosophical reflection on culture understood as an originary realm of all human meaningful activities, of philosophy in its pre-theoretical, pre-reflective form. As Martin Heidegger put it: "So long as man exists, philosophizing of some sort occurs." If so, then philosophy of culture understood as metaphilosophy is to be an activity of interpreting out of culture meanings which appear there long before any speculative, conceptually, and methodologically rigorous, explicit philosophical reflection. They are present and operative in the form of works and products (both

material and intellectual), narratives, social imaginaries and shared emotions, symbols and archetypes, common forms of sensitivity and axiological frameworks which all at once emerge out and govern social praxis. All these workings of culture provide the most basic – ontological, existential, and axiological – coordinates drawing landscapes of our personal and communal lives, of our Lebenswelten. As such all these forms are, in fact, more spontaneous and more immediate responses to the very same questions philosophy poses. All these forms are primal modes of understanding reality, of making sense of what is "simply given," they are attempts at making reality more comprehensible and humane, of reconciling ourselves to our cosmic condition so we can best serve ourselves and others. Philosophy of culture, as metaphilosophy, is to uncover and elucidate the ever-developing basic categories and values which underlie and constitute as meaningful even the most basic forms of social praxis. In this sense it becomes a specific form of its own genealogy: It reveals its primordial, spontaneous, most "natural" self-expressions. It also traces origins and development of its different modes and forms.

The second role philosophy of culture can and should play is strictly connected with the first one. That is, it should take a particular form of metahermeneutics. The world of human culture is inherently plural and highly diversified. It is divided into different regions of meaning to which correspond different forms of its articulation. Culture is never univocal, one-dimensional. It consists of different universes of meaning. Each such universe represents its own irreducible and, more or less, comprehensive form of understanding reality. Correlatively it also represents its own ways and modes of articulating what was understood. Human understanding, as trivial as it sounds after Heidegger, begins with the most basic forms of practical engagement with our environment. And each such engagement, each human action pre-reflectively and pre-theoretically presumes/constitutes the world as a certain "totality of signification" without which it would be meaningless. We do not necessarily follow Heidegger with regard to the priority of practical engagement over other forms of meaningful, that is, constituting activities. We believe that it is not a question of priority, but rather of plurality and multiformity of meaning. That means, each developed and consistent form of human activity – be it practical or theoretical is a form of understanding, that is, it presumes/constitutes, more or less, a complete and meaningful world, even if only pre-reflectively. Practical dealing with things, scientific theories, philosophical systems/discourses, religions, artistic endeavors, and so forth – they all project some world which has its own coordinates, its own forms of space and time, to which correspond different forms of experience. They are not necessarily opposed to each other. Neither are they reducible to each other or to some meta-dimension. The main tasks of philosophy of culture are to recognize this irreducible plurality in its actual forms, but also to recognize in them their possible character, that is, to see each of them as one among infinitely many forms of human self-actualization. All that means philosophy of culture should take on the form of metahermeneutics, that is, hermeneutics of hermeneutics (the latter is obviously plural), hermeneutics of different, irreducible, comprehensive forms of reflecting on reality. It is to be an ongoing critical analysis of particular forms of the world we, as humans, relentlessly project; an analysis of their historical conditions, of their ontological status, of different forms in which humans experience them. As metahermeneutics, philosophy of culture helps humanity learn to attend to and openly interpret different horizons of meaning, without letting them dominate and foreclose others, different ways we can engage with and see the world. Such an open ability to interpret helps us expand and deepen ourselves as persons and helps us teach others to do so.

Given the highly complex, dynamic, fluid, ephemeral, and ever more virtualized character of contemporary culture one can say that even the celebrated phrase from Karl Marx – "all that is solid

melts into the air" – seems to be not sufficiently radical as its description. This characterization obviously affects also all possible systems of values, philosophical and scientific theories, religions whose truths and validity have an ever more local and transient nature. Their truths are gradually reduced to transient truth-claims subject to ever possible modification. If we add to this picture the permanently fragmentating sphere of social praxis – not only the way it is ever more divided into mutually disconnected segments, but also the way it develops ever-new dimensions which often play a radically subversive role – and increasing specialization with which we are confronted in the world of academia, then we arrive at the point where can appear perhaps the most important role philosophy of culture should play. This role of crucial importance, and at the same time perhaps the most difficult one, is to create a kind of synoptic picture of the world we live in. Thus, the aim of philosophy of culture is here initiating and entering into a dialogue with different disciplines, languages, symbolic systems – sciences (natural as well as humanities), world-views, religions, and so forth. Furthermore, it aims at bridging the gap between theoria and praxis which throughout the history of, at least, Western culture was a kind of fundamental tension, but nowadays it seems that these two spheres constitute, for the most part, a radical opposition. The latter can take two apparently opposite forms – that of impoverishment of practical sphere (which often led to experiences of meaninglessness, axiological and existential disorientation, growing anxiety of individuals, etc.), and that of impoverishment of theoria (subject to superficial appropriation and instrumental usage by cultural dilettantes). In this context philosophy of culture is, in a sense, obliged to create a comprehensive conceptual, existential, and axiological map, a set of basic coordinates which would help us to orient ourselves in the whole myriad of cultural meanings. Philosophy of culture, understood in this way, does not see culture in terms of a set of contents, but rather as a functional apriori within which all phenomena can appear in their essential inter-relatedness. Thus, while creating a synoptic picture of the world philosophy is to analyze all phenomena, all fragmentary contents of culture as expressive of a presumed unity of culture. But this unity is "not a unity of effects, but a unity of action; not a unity of products, but a unity of the creative process." One can rightly say that in this highly complex and diversified contemporary culture any synoptic picture of the world can be seen only in terms of a regulative ideal, which, never fully attainable, can give us only a sense of direction. Well, yes and no. We intentionally speak here about a synoptic perspective that is never as solid, stable, and permanent as any "great synthesis," which as a conception and as an actuality belongs exclusively to the past. We are fully aware that any synoptic picture is, by its very nature, transient and as such subject to reconfiguration. And only in this way can it provide us with a basic sense of orientation in a changeable cultural universe, as well as defend us against the intellectual temptation to reduce the plurality of cultural phenomena to any single principle, paradigm, or perspective which is to organize humane reality.

These remarks lead us to another significant role to be undertaken by philosophy of culture. Since culture, in most of the presented essays, is understood neither as a product, nor as a "complex whole that includes …," nor as any kind of substance, but rather as an all-encompassing horizon of all possible meanings or as a creative function – it follows that it has, in a sense, no object of knowledge. It is not interested in this or that region of reality, but in the whole of reality understood as the realm of meaningful activities. If so, it is not a discipline/sub-discipline among other disciplines. The very term "philosophy of culture" indicates rather a mode of philosophizing which is, by necessity, methodologically and "regionally" plural and perspectival as much as it is inter- and trans- disciplinary. That means, in all its analyses it tends to cross, move in-between, and even break the boundaries between itself, other philosophical subdisciplines, other humanities, and the sciences. What is of crucial

importance here is not any uncompromising defense of the purity of a discipline but, above all, the fundamental care for the meaning of the thing in question. This strategy allows us to see, analyze, and describe it from different angles – in short, to see its different aspects and dimensions. In other words, philosophy of culture while analyzing any cultural phenomenon follows the logic inherent to that very phenomenon, which in most cases requires recourse to other disciplines. In all these cases philosophy of culture mediates between different languages, constitutes connecting links, projects and/or clarifies ideas and concepts, revealing an ontological status and axiological dimension/s of the analyzed phenomenon. But most importantly it is capable to situate this phenomenon in the broader context of human values, purposes, concerns, that is, to show it as being part and parcel of that great unifying, creative function called culture. It is in this sense an intra-disciplinary endeavor, moving between, across, and through disciplines to provide a moving image of the rich continuities and fraying that makes up the tapestry of culture life. In such a way philosophy of culture provides what Hadot called a "view from above" of the process of humane becoming of culture. It provides us the opportunity to see the systole and diastole of the living cultural activity and gives us the opportunity to reimagine it to serve humane growth and ends.

In short, philosophy of culture, in its metaphilosophical, metahermeneutical, and intradisciplinary dimensions is seeking to support a diversity of critically reconstructive and humane persons. While, given our ever complexifying and diversifying culture, and our own limited talents, we cannot hope to be master polymaths such as Cassirer, we aspire as philosophers of culture to model passion and engagement with our ever pluralistic cultural life. We are ever open to new connections, moving across, between, and through horizons of meaning, finding new continuities and disruptions, novelties and perennial wisdom, worth cherishing, challenging, and reconstructing anew. We can be "persons of letters," seeking broad and open societies, instead of in-group navel gazing and overspecialization.

The Structure of the Collection

This dialogue on what it means to do philosophy of culture – a discussion we contend illuminates the value of philosophy of culture to humane-ization in the way described above – is broken into three distinct sections. The first two sections illuminate two different general orientations on doing philosophy of culture: First, those philosophers who integrate (and sometimes contest in some degree) the way of life dimension of philosophy of culture within different sorts of metaphilosophical, theoretical, and methodological perspectives; second, those philosophers who tend toward the opposite trajectory: integrating the other metaphilosophical, theoretical, and methodological dimensions of philosophy of culture within a distinct approach to philosophy as a way of life. The third section is devoted to philosophers who start "walking these paths" and enacting philosophy of culture as a way to address a variety of topics and themes.

In the first section, "Philosophy of Culture as Theory and Method," we begin with Jared Kemling's piece, which provides an accessible and succinct vision of five different forms of philosophy of culture: descriptive philosophy of culture, critical philosophy of culture, process philosophy of culture, teleological philosophy of culture, and cultural philosophy of culture. He then advocates and defends the essential value for philosophers of culture and philosophy more broadly of "cultural philosophy of culture" (or "cultural philosophy" for short). He insightfully provides a clear and flexible heuristic of the range of approaches to philosophy of culture, including a compelling account of what might be called "cultural philosophy as a way of life," and for that reason it makes for a helpful introduction to the whole volume. Next, we have a piece by one of the world leading intercultural philosophers of culture

and systematic philosophers of today, Robert Neville. In the essay, he seeks to untangle the messy situation of the relationships between culture and nature, and between philosophy of culture and systematic philosophy, which are meant to address the former areas of inquiry. The third essay in the section, by Przemysław Bursztyka, speaks to both of the proceeding pieces, providing an account of the apophatic "form" of philosophy of culture, and offering a unique synoptic vision of the field as a systematic project. Marcin Rychter undergirds such an account with a reflection upon the essential need for an ontology of culture and its relation to PWL.

Monika Murawska follows by providing yet another critical and different sort of theoretical/methodological perspective, that of an aesthetic post-phenomenological orientation on philosophy of culture. Kenneth Stikkers then provides yet another route, promoting a revitalization of Scheler's approach to philosophy of culture, with its horizontal axis of "real and ideal sociological factors" and its horizontal axis of "ethos" in the ordo amoris. Although his essay focuses on a historical figure, because Scheler's philosophy of culture has only recently joined the broader discussion of the nature of philosophy of culture (through the work of Stikkers), we consider it as part of our contemporary dialogue. It is particularly salient when trying to make sense of the ethos of global culture (especially in the U.S. and Europe) at this epochal moment. Randall Auxier's essay provides prescriptive suggestions for the future of humanistic philosophy of culture, so that it can avoid the teleological reductionism ever embedded in Western conceptions of cultural progress, including in the philosophy of culture itself, especially when it comes to the sciences as a putative "progressive" symbolic form. We end with the late eminent American philosopher of culture Joseph Margolis' account of pragmatism as a metaphilosophy. We consider this piece to be a succinct and critical piece on pragmatism as philosophy of culture, which avoids the reductionism of Morton White's work previously mentioned.

The second section entitled "Philosophy of Culture as a Way of Life" begins with another propaedeutic essay: Matthew Sharpe provides an account of humanism as a way of life, defending it from Heidegger's and later continental philosophy's sometimes dismissive reading of it, and articulating it as a critical foundation for philosophy of culture. Philosophy of culture, as building on humanism as a way of life, can in this light be considered the "road not taken" by most of broader professional philosophy after the Heidegger and Cassirer debate at Davos in March 1929. Eli Kramer then seeks to articulate the virtues one can find in the "lives of philosophers of culture." This piece proposes a virtual symbol of the sage/exemplary philosopher of culture as an authentic "renaissance person." Andrew Irvine then provides a vision of what might be called "intercultural philosophy of culture as a way of life," showing how the global spiritual exercises of paradox and parrhesia provide two interconnected bases for this eco-systematic way of living. Laura Mueller follows with her own account of philosophy of culture as a Bildungs-virtue-philosophy in the spirit of Kant. Lucio Privitello ends the section with a hermetic and highly creative vision of the moments of philosophical conversion and insight in our cultures, and especially in our philosophy of culture as a way of life classrooms.

Our third section, "Applications of Philosophy of Culture," begins by touching on a critical but highly contested horizon of meaning for philosophers of culture: science. Gary Herstein explores science as a cultural activity and the kinds of knowledge it produces, as well as reflects on its own dogmatisms and progressive potentials. His piece is followed by Chris (Krzysztof) Piotr Skowroński's exploration of the role of philosophy of culture as Rortian cultural politics, and how public philosophy can expand and engage with the internet in ways that serve a richer, more humane culture. As one of the leading

experts on Kant's Critique of Judgment, hermeneutics, and as a philosopher of culture himself, the late Rudolf Makkreel explores the moral role that the arts and aesthetic experiences play in our personal and social lives. He challenges certain fundamental assumptions he sees in the work of the philosopher of culture Susanne Langer. Myron Jackson brings together many of the threads in this volume by providing a challenge to the assimilatory and appropriatory, territorializing behavior of a great deal of Western culture toward what it deems other, with what might be considered the spiritual exercises of "cultural adoption and sponsorship." The volume ends with the long-time "Socrates" of this philosophy of culture dialogue, Zofia Rosińska, who provides us with a thoughtful account of the circle of reactionary longing for old values and traditions, while through creative anachronism bringing in the vital and new, in culture.

Conclusion: An Invitation

As can be seen, there is a pluralism to both reflecting on and engaging with humane-ization in the philosophy of culture, historically and today. There is yet however one key missing dimension to this humane work. From our own experience philosophers of culture engage with the serious work of humane flourishing, as, at its richest, playful, fun, and joyful, especially when in the company of friends. It has a zest for the adventure of ideas and for living well. In this spirit, we invite our readers to what the Italian academies of the Renaissance called serio ludere (serious play). We invite you to our festivities, luring each other to more joyful insight and fulfilled lives. <>

PROJECTING SPIRITS: SPECULATION, PROVIDENCE, AND EARLY MODERN OPTICAL MEDIA by Pasi Väliaho [Stanford University Press, 9781503630857]

The history of projected images at the turn of the seventeenth century reveals a changing perception of chance and order, contingency and form. In **PROJECTING SPIRITS**, Pasi Väliaho maps how the leading optical media of the period—the camera obscura and the magic lantern—developed in response to, and framed, the era's key intellectual dilemma of whether the world fell under God's providential care, or was subject to chance and open to speculating. As Väliaho shows, camera obscuras and magic lanterns were variously employed to give the world an intelligible and manageable design. Jesuit scholars embraced devices of projection as part of their pursuit of divine government, whilst the Royal Society fellows enlisted them in their quest for empirical knowledge as well as colonial expansion. Projections of light and shadow grew into critical metaphors in early responses to the turbulences of finance. In such instances, Väliaho argues, "projection" became an indispensable cognitive form to both assert providence, and to make sense of an economic reality that was gradually escaping from divine guidance. Drawing on a range of materials—philosophical, scientific and religious literature, visual arts, correspondence, poems, pamphlets, and illustrations—this provocative and inventive work expands our concept of the early media of projection, revealing how they spoke to early modern thinkers, and shaped a new, speculative concept of the world.

Review

"This commanding, erudite history of the 'magic' that goes with optical technologies makes a major and enduring contribution to visual studies, to the history of science, and to the political economy of

images." -- Tom Conley — *Harvard University*

"Moving seamlessly from early modern sources to current media studies theories, this book adds subtlety and nuance to our understanding of the ways optical instruments and visual metaphors shaped cultural sensitivities, modes of thought, and economic practices." -- Raz Chen-Morris — *The Hebrew University of Jerusalem*

"Pasi Väliaho provides a captivating take on projection. *Projecting Spirits* includes a historically rich and deep understanding of the connection between images and economies of both money and souls. As it maps how the virtual and the imaginary become effective anchors of the real world, this wonderful book amounts to nothing less than a project about time: an invention of such a future that becomes a speculative project." -- Jussi Parikka, Aarhus University and FAMU — *Prague*

CONTENTS

It was commonplace in the early modern period to emphasize a distinction between the study of two types of phenomena of light. Catoptrics focused on the production of appearances by reflective surfaces such as mirrors, while dioptrics studied refractions of light on transparent bodies such as lenses. These two operations of light could not be easily set apart in the design of actual optical instruments, but it serves to bear the distinction in mind to the extent that, as Siegfried Zielinski intimates in his sketch for a genealogy of projection, dioptrics and catoptrics connoted two intertwined but nonetheless distinct techno-aesthetic practices. Whereas the former dealt with optical devices contrived for looking through into the world outside the apparatus, such as microscopes and telescopes, the latter implied beholding a surface inside the apparatus onto which images were projected, such as the screen of the camera obscura or the magic lantern. To put it schematically, whereas dioptric apparatuses were designed to function as "artificial eyes" (as the German Jesuit scholar Johann Zahn called the telescope) to augment reality, catoptric ones could also be fashioned for the production of artificial realities—wavering therefore, uncannily for many, on the uncertain threshold between what was in the seventeenth century called "natural" and "artificial magic."

Microscopes and telescopes put a definitive stamp on the formation of the modern scientific worldview, marking what Hans Blumenberg called a "caesura," beyond which the perceptually and epistemologically accessible reality started to expand indefinitely. They made space stretch toward the infinite and introduced a plurality of worlds alongside the actual one. Although the contribution of camera obscuras, magic lanterns, and related contrivances to the development of early modern thought has been perhaps less straightforward to assess, these devices, too, played a role in shaping ways of seeing, visualizing, and

knowing during the early modern period. The Italian scholar Francesco Algarotti proclaimed in the ^76os that "painters should make the same use of the Camera Obscura, which Naturalists and Astronomers make of the Microscope and Telescope, for all these instruments equally make known, and represent Nature." In this vein, historians of art and visual culture have evaluated the place of optical instruments in early modern artistic practice, as well as uncovering how the camera obscura's projections stood for a model of truthfulness and naturalness in seventeenth-century painting, and more generally for a model of the rational, disembodied intellect—even of a kind of "phantasy subject of reason"—in the early modern periods Historians of science and ideas have more widely mapped the meanings and functions of camera obscuras and magic lanterns in early modern thought, encompassing such diverse fields as the development of modern optics as well as counterreformation metaphysics. Media historians, for their part, have provided detailed accounts of the generation of image projection devices along with their makers, often situated on a long lineage of "screen practices" culminating in the cinema. Historians of literature and philosophy, furthermore, have traced how the magic lantern's ghost projections became key epistemic figures in Enlightenment writing, from the emergence of German idealism to new conceptions about the status of the imagination in early nineteenth-century fiction and psychology.

This book's impetus is to contribute to this heritage with its own account of how optical media lent their shape to Western thought at the turn of the century. The book pursues a historical epistemology interested in the medial conditions of thinking (not only scientific but also philosophical, religious, and economic) based on the assumption that the movements of the intellect are embedded in and hinged on the objects, techniques, and visualizations that the intellect is surrounded by, and fundamentally "patched together from shifting object relations," as Sean Silver proposes. The following chapters play out a media history of thought, by exploring how circa 1700 optical projections—light-borne images cast by a more or less elaborate technical device onto a surface—gave a meaningful cognitive shape to attempts at planning and plotting how the world could, and should, turn out. The English novelist and trader Daniel Defoe famously characterized this historical moment in his native country as a "projecting age." By "projecting," Defoe, to be sure, did not primarily mean the practice of conjuring a colorful play of light and shadow on a screen—although his concept was not far removed from the aesthetics of optical projection, as we will later see. Rather, Defoe was referring to new speculative economic practices and ideas emerging within colonial trade and finance, which not only eroded older concepts of wealth but also radically challenged traditional ways of thinking about the purpose of human activity and God's place in the world. Projection meant a way of embracing the future immanently for the sake of taking risks and profiting on what was contingent and probable, instead of submitting the future to a pre-established design. Defoe's "projection" was cast against more established notions of God's providential care and governance of the world and human history, quietly questioning the basic premise, critical to the Christian cognitive universe still prevalent during the period, about the presence of divine guidance in the course of events and in one's actions. Within this universe, both intended actions as well as seemingly contingent occurrences were ruled by superior causes. As Thomas Aquinas forcefully argued:

> Since man is ordered in regard to this body under the celestial bodies, in regard to his intellect under the angels, and in regard to his will under God it is quite possible for something apart from man's intention to happen, which is, however, in accord with the ordering of the celestial bodies, or with the control of the angels, or even of God.

The concept of projection embraced this epistemological problematic of "ordering," which gradually shifted its meaning from predetermination and divine intervention into speculative attempts at design and control that subsumed the future, or "fortune," into monetized relations. Projecting Spirits takes the conceptual and cognitive reorientation illustrated by Defoe as the general intellectual background for configuring the meanings and functions performed by optical media at the turn of the century. It is here that the book's historical excursion departs from more well-trodden paths. For some, approaching the history of optical media in relation to (apparently) far removed metaphors, analogues, and practices—and, at first sight, distant intellectual problems—might not come across as a most straightforward gesture. However, the intuition guiding this book is that from roughly 1650 to 1720, the aesthetic forms embodied by camera obscuras and magic lanterns became symbolic of a range of intellectual transitions: "symbolic" in the sense of providing the fitting figures of thought through which a world undergoing a series of changes could be made sense of, and in that respect also rendered as operable, actionable. This book sets out to show how, circa 1700, the projective screens of the camera obscura and the magic lantern became critical cognitive surfaces where the world was witnessed in ambiguously shifting shapes—where notions of preestablished divine harmony gradually dissolved into a complex sphere of contingent events, as well as the empty time of eternity into a future open to opportunities and risks. On these surfaces, furthermore, hermeneutic quests for invisible divine truths became juxtaposed with empirical observations of "matters of fact, and the divine management of the world anticipated the emergence of liberal, and above all speculative, economic ideas. These shifts were by no means linear and uniform; they were continuous and reversible, something akin to topological transformations where things can shift shape, bend, stretch, and twist—all without losing their key properties or functions.

This book's take on the early modern history of projection does not pretend to be exhaustive. It is centered on a handful of protagonists, both humans and machines: philosophers, scholars, friars, merchants, sailors, missionaries, and nuns, as well as the optical apparatuses they encountered and interacted with. As for the latter—the machines—this book focuses on camera obscuras and magic lanterns. These two apparatuses, designed for the processing of optical signals (light waves), shared the aesthetic function of projecting images but in symmetrically opposing ways: While the camera obscura transmitted light rays that projected mirror images of objects in the environment inside the apparatus, the magic lantern had a light source, such as a candle, positioned to illuminate a figure, drawn on a transparent slide, through a system of mirrors and lenses and to project that image outside onto a screen. As for the former—the humans—this book's historical excursion comprises individuals who were somehow in contact with camera obscuras and magic lanterns: those who developed new instruments or tweaked old ones; who wrote about the machines or used them in their artistic or scientific practice; who pictured the camera obscuras and magic lanterns in illustrations—satirical, scientific, or otherwise; and who thought, or merely dreamed, about the machines and their projections and turned them into tropes and metaphors, noetic analogues, as well as figures of thought.

The diverse and sometimes disparate stories of these devices and persons are brought together to show how the main aesthetic and cognitive function carried out by optical media in turn-of-the-century thought was to superimpose the real with a perceptual frame that could render the chaos of life as a negotiable design. The first chapter demonstrates in more detail how, during this historical moment, camera obscuras and magic lanterns were varyingly associated with an intuition of the world as a continuum of movements, differentiations, and variations (rather than as something fixed and unified per se), and they were simultaneously understood as pertinent conceptual tools to rationalize and arrange

these movements, differentiations, and variations into more or less durable shapes. Alongside anamorphic images, optical projections performed a play of differing perspectives—distorted and blurred, clearer and more comprehensible—that also acted out a distinction between the human and divine modes of apprehending the world. For philosophers like Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, projection became a critical concept as well as an optical metaphor to understand how the universe varied from one viewpoint to another but was at once unified within a single divine optic that organized things into a geometric and logical harmony. Projection signaled what Leibniz called God's "government of the universe," thereby associating optical media importantly with an older Christian concept of "economy" (oikonomia), or divine administration and rule.

Taking its cue from Leibniz, this book is concerned with a changing economy of projection, both in the ancient and modern senses of the word "economy." Most generally, the concept of economy is used in this book to explore how the projective screens of camera obscuras and magic lanterns facilitated drawing relations between phenomena and one's imaginations, beliefs, and reasonings and to cognitively manage those relations. In this respect, the following chapters chart the visual economy of early modern optical media, to borrow a concept from Mar^e Jose Mondzain who explores how images became conceived as indispensable connectors between visible and invisible realities in the Byzantine era. In its original Greek sense, oikonomia signified the administration of the household (oikos), which in Christianity shifted its meaning to designate the divine providential government of the world and human history toward salvation. In both cases, indeed, economy meant a science of relations and their management. But whereas for the Greeks economy suggested the arrangement of goods, animals, and humans into a harmonious and profitable whole, in Christianity the concept was made to account for God's organization of divine life into a trinitarian form (the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit), on the one hand, and the earthly, temporal unfolding of God's eschatological plan, on the other hand. Economy became reconsidered on a universal scale, encompassing the disjunctive relations between transcendence and immanence, the infinite and the finite, eternity and historical time, universal providence and human freedom, as well as concealment and disclosure. In Christianity, what is crucial is that images became considered as essential mediators of these relations, as "living linkages," as Mondzain puts it, between heaven and earth.

In the later seventeenth century, optical media became critical to this Christian concept of (visual) economy, as we will see in Chapters 2 and 3. Jesuit scholars in particular—the polymath Athanasius Kircher (also famous from extended histories of audiovisual media) at the forefront—drew optical apparatuses firmly into the providential oikonomia' Projections of light and shadow by technological means became regarded as relays between the holy and the profane space, and hence as potent agents of the divine providence and its economic and globalizing process. "N^ divine power without projection," the Jesuits of the late seventeenth century seemed to think. Chapter 2 focuses on the development of the concept and practice of optical projection among Jesuit scholars against the backdrop of Catholic counterreformation and colonial expansion, which it plots by tracing the movements of artifacts, books, missionaries, images, and ideas, not only within Europe, but also between Rome and New Spain as well as China. Among the Jesuits, optical projection became understood as natural but prodigious mediation between the spiritual and the temporal and therefore also as a potentially expansive, possessive form.

Chapter 3 studies how central to the Jesuits' concept of optical media was the association of projection, not only with the celestial but also with the phantasmatic—spirits, ghosts, and demons of all sorts. The key "property" to be annexed to ecclesiastic rule on a planetary scale was the individual soul, and the providential grasp of images cast on a screen was to expand, through homology, onto images in the mind. Immersing their beholders into a realm of illusions and visions, projections of spirits (or, spiritual projections) were to direct individuals toward perfection—the "government of souls," to borrow a concept of Michel Foucault's.

However, during this historical period the economy of projection also played out in a different sense. While Anglican priests in England were preaching against the worship of images of all sorts (including the Catholics' relics and miraculous apparitions), seeking to lodge the holy firmly under the purview of words only, camera obscuras and magic lanterns simultaneously developed from media of theocracy and items of curiosity into experimental and exploratory devices—especially within the exploits of the Royal Society of London for Improving Natural Knowledge, established in 1660, which was a new type of public body devoted to the corporate pursuit of knowledge. Among the Royal Society scholars—who promoted the radical reassessment of vision and cognition by Johannes Kepler at the turn of the sixteenth century and the new principles of scientific study proclaimed by Francis Bacon—devices of projection were turned toward empirical reality, to quasi-mechanically procure information about things and beings both near and distant, familiar and strange, ranging from the operations of light to flora and fauna in the West Indies, for instance. Charting these developments, Chapters 4 and s survey situations where established interpretations of projection and divine rule became challenged (although by no means unambiguously) within empirical investigations that sought to apprehend the world objectively as open to "chance and opportunity" (as Francis Bacon put it), sticking onto the visible surfaces of things rather than striving to interpret every contingent event as a manifestation of a deeper cosmic order.

Chapter 4 focuses on Robert Hooke's invention of a portable camera obscura, which illustrates how devices of projection participated in key epistemic developments at the turn of the century, in addition to becoming involved, at least in Hooke's imaginary, in the colonial expansion of both knowledge and trade. Crucial here was the implicit association that Hooke and his contemporaries made between the concepts of projection and property—the latter now starting to be relinquished from celestial possession in the writings of John Locke, among others, and becoming an extension of the person laboring and thereby appropriating the commons originally bestowed upon humanity by divine providence. Projection became involved in the calculation of financial gain and prospects for improvement, surplus and growth, which, as Devin Singh notes, the notion of oikonomia retained historically also in the Christian era. Chapter ^ continues on this theme, exploring how the mixed realities of optical media—alongside practices of calculation, which emerged as key cognitive techniques of finance during the period—gave an intuitive shape to processes in which property and value lost their traditional supports and became volatile, fluctuating, and subject to the conceits of speculative minds. Especially the magic lantern's ephemeral images, in want of solidity and stable form, provided the effective mental analogues for the emerging speculative economy as an ambiguous and illusory perceptual realm seemingly unmoored from material restraints. Overall, these two chapters show how in England circa 1700, optical media became cognitive relays allowing the subsumption of material relations under abstract and invisible, noetic, and even imaginary designs, facilitating thus the development of a new economic concept of the world as a tabula rasa for man-made projections.

Readers, be advised that this book wants to implicitly disengage, both historically and theoretically, the study of early modern technologies and cultures of projection from the shadows cast by film theory and its cinematic archaeologies. The historically specific economic concept of projection advanced in this book shouldn't be conflated with the psychological and ideological powers of optical projection explored and critiqued in (p^st-)1970s film theory in particular, most often from psychoanalytic and Marxist perspectives. In these debates, early modern optical devices found their place in deep histories of darkness, illusion, and influence that extended from Plato's cave to the movies, arguably committing to a fundamental optical and conceptual inversion whereby "men and their circumstances appear upsidedown," as Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels famously put it in their metaphoric association between the camera obscura and ideol^gy. In these debates, furthermore, projection became primarily interpreted as a mental mechanism and associated with the regimenting of the gaze and positioning of individuals into conformity through identification and disavowal. For Sigmund Freud, as Jean Laplanche and Jean-Bertrand Pontalis tell us, projection was "always a matter of throwing out what one refuses either to recognise in oneself or to be oneself." Psychoanalytic projection, Laplanche and Pontalis note, is partly "comparable to the cinematographic one," in the way it describes the process in which the individual casts onto "the external world an image of something that exists in him in an unconscious way."

Such "repressed" manifestations of all sorts—spirits, demons, ghosts—featured prominently in the early history of optical media, ranging from the experiments by the Jesuits, and even sometimes by their fellow Protestant scholars, to popular projected image shows organized by traveling entertainers. In this book, I have decidedly avoided interpreting such apparitions in terms of the psychoanalytic concept of projection, as "embodiments of bad unconscious desires." By doing so, my aim has been not to refute this concept but to offer a historical account that doesn't employ psychoanalytic theory as an overarching narrative of modernity. Terry Castle suggests that it was not effectively until the turn of the eighteenth century that the ghosts and spirits conjured by means of magic lanterns became circumscribed as primarily inner mental phenomena, as products of the brain rather than as anything supernatural per se, and that projected images started to come across as belonging to a mental reality understood first and foremost in psychological terms.

The meanings and functions of projected images circa 1700 were neither fixed nor symmetrical; the form was in flux. Furthermore, the demarcations we today draw between economy, science, religion, and (optical) media—as well as rationality, factuality and fiction, or the phantasmatic—were not yet clearly in place during the historical period studied in this book. In the original turn-of-the-century context, these meanings and functions entered into an odd but creative mix. Projecting Spirits hence demands its readers approach a techno-aesthetic form (now familiar to us in the more limited sense of cinematic and "post-cinematic" entertainment, or a constituent function of the modern psyche) in its former semantic openness, complexity, and strangeness.

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The turn of the seventeenth century signaled a particular historical juncture where the institution of divine harmony in the world and God's care of human history gradually shifted into a reality of contingencies, which presented unforeseeable risks as well as unprecedented opportunities: where the divine plan gave way to a spontaneous but fundamentally insecure organization, and the privilege of

knowing the future was wrested from God by projecting minds that turned the world into its speculative image.

The previous chapters sought to demonstrate the place and meaning of the period's dominant optical media—camera obscuras and magic lanterns—in this process. "Projection" as both a techno-aesthetic practice and a concurrent cognitive form marked a particular threshold of modernity expressed by changing relations between contingency and organization. On one side, this involved a transition with which we are familiar: from theological models of interpretation and influence, based on the divine manufacture of miracles ^ and sensory deceits, to modern science's claims for objectivity and the factual and its program for the domination and "improvement of things and beings. Images cast inside the camera obscura, in particular, shifted from natural executors of divine rule to mechanical (and, therefore, purportedly objective) informants about the aleatory empirical world. On the other side, however, the history of optical media does not lend itself to a straightforward narrative of disenchantment. The spirits conjured by the Jesuits by means of their apparatuses of parastatic magic reappeared in attempts at grappling with the cognitive and socioeconomic disorder brought about by new capitalist ventures premised on speculation and credit. What appears as a program of rationalization from one angle, comes across, from another angle, as a rewriting of the providence-problematic in relation to the unfathomably contingent and spontaneous processes of speculative capitalism, seemingly beyond the reach of human control and comprehension.

Although it coincided with the rise of modern science as well as economic relations, the history of camera obscuras and magic lanterns outlined above was thus not simply a purposeful progression from a world of superstition and belief to a world of rationality and knowledge. It did not simply spell the discovery of the "real" but rather different, even if concurrent and mutually implicated, modes of virtualization. Otherwise put, the techno-aesthetic form of optical projection provided an important intellectual frame of reference for a series of abstractions, each equally (ir)rational in its own way. At the turn of the seventeenth century, "projection" symbolized, at a minimum: (i) the theocratic abstraction of the world under divine light and providential care; (2) the epistemic abstraction of things and beings into "data" and objects of appropriation ("property"); and (3) the economic abstraction of things and relations into speculative mental designs in the processes of financialization. In each of these instances, optical projection afforded shadowy and virtualizing frames within which the world could be referenced with respect to the not (yet) realized. Optical projection, in other words, instantiated the critical visual economy of these dissimilar yet equally expansive and colonizing frames, which yoked visible effects with invisible powers. 'The Jesuits' planetary mission of converting souls, the English project of expanding networks of knowledge and trade, and the rise of speculative capitalism all involved, and even necessitated, a centrifugal visual system where distributions of light and shadow provided cognitive relays to virtualize physical and mental realities within an ideally growing system of government and/or profitability.

Although each of these historical processes of abstraction would merit a more detailed genealogy of its own, let's briefly highlight the one with the most contemporary repercussions, concerning the rise of finance and the colonization of time as an (imaginary) source of potentially infinite wealth. We have seen how the magic lantern's artificial realities helped in coming to terms with the early development of today's massive and triumphant form of capitalism that crunches basically anything into bits and pieces within its system of evaluation and accumulation, contributing to making sense of the "ghostification" of

economic relations brought about by finance in its early days. Here, importantly, were laid the conceptual foundations for later attempts at understanding the operations of financial economy. Consider how Karl Marx drew on the ideas of optical projection and virtualization in a series of notes and remarks published in 1894 as part of the third volume of Capital, which focused on the development of bank credit, public debt, and shares. Marx outlined a process of abstraction whereby the value of securities became more and more speculative the more the securities circulated in the market. For instance, shares in shipping companies, Marx noted, initially represented real capital (the capital invested in these companies), but through the process of being sold from one investor to another and yet to another, and so on, the value ascribed to the shares lost its connection with the original investment and became instead determined based on the investors' predictions about future revenues (on those shares themselves). What, in other words, according to Marx gave rise to speculative capital was valorization detached from productive activity per se and based instead on the anticipation of future accumulation. Crucially, Marx observed how "everything in this [financial] system appears in duplicate and triplicate, and is transformed into a mere phantom of the mind." What Marx (following Charles Jenkinson) deemed "fictitious capital" was but the mind's projection, a product of desire and fantasy, a mere mirage transposed onto real relations.

The implicit media reference in Marx's characterization of speculative capital—"brain phantoms" (Hirngespinst, in the original German)—was the art of magic lantern projections that the philosopher famously also evoked when discussing the nature of commodities. The commodity, Marx wrote, "is nothing but the definite social relation between men themselves which assumes here, for them the fantastic [phantasmagorische] form of a relation between things:'¢ With his choice of terminology, Marx evoked the phantasmagoria shows popularized by a Belgian physicist and magician Etienne-Gaspard Robert (or Robertson, which was his stage name), from the 1780s onward in France. In an abandoned Capuchin convent in Paris—which was, ironically perhaps, located near the residence that John Law owned for a brief period of time on the Place Vend^me in the late 1710s—Robertson "call[ed] forth phantoms" and "command[ed] ghosts" by means of optical media. With a range of visual effects—dark surroundings, mirrors, movable magic lanterns, black backgrounds of magic lantern slides, back projections, projections on hidden screens, smoke, and so on—Robertson staged spirit-shows that had a powerful emotional grip on their beholders, exploiting in particular, as he expounded, involuntary fears and "religious terror." The screen was not lowered until the audience was seated and the lights were dimmed; in this way, the spectators were lacking a spatial frame for the projections, which seemed to be hanging in air indeed like supernatural "bubbles." Phantasmagoria shows were first and foremost meant to trigger and exploit the "strange effects of the imagination," as Robertson put it'

Phantasmagoric magic lantern projections, as Stefan Andriopoulos shows, enjoyed a specific place and meaning in late eighteenth-century epistemological discussions about sensory perception and the limits of knowledge, particularly in Immanuel Kant's description of a subject "that projects its forms of intuition onto the external world and that is inclined to mistake subjective ideas for objectively given substances."8 The magic lantern embodied the mind's tendency to confound subjective ideas and imaginations with material objects, the endogenous with the exogenous. This is also the key idea behind Marx's analysis of the accumulation and circulation of financial capital. The Hirngespinste—"brain phantoms," loosely translated—that Marx used to characterize the logic of speculation echoed Kant, who was tackling how the ghostly visions of spirit-seers were formed, how indeed the soul transposes "such an image, which it ought, after all, to represent as contained within itself, into quite a different

relation, locating it, namely, in a place external to itself."9 In Marx's analysis, financial "projectors" equated with spirit-seers—seers whose visions Kant explained with reference to optical effects. Optical tricks with mirrors and magic lanterns, in other words, served to make sense of perceptual and epistemic distortions, which in turn became symbolic of the workings of finance capitalism.

Marx's understanding of speculative capitalism was indebted to two hundred years of development, not only in economics and philosophy, but also in optical media. Robertson's phantasmagoria shows took their inspiration from Athanasius Kircher and his fellow Jesuit scholars. The very notion of finance as optical illusion was first formulated by Defoe and others with reference to the magic lantern during the early eighteenth century. To be sure, such conceptual displacements from the past may seem irrelevant to present-day speculative economic practices, which appear to have become altogether divorced from the slow pace of human cognition, being driven instead by algorithms that crunch and manipulate numerical data circulating in optical fiber networks at infinitesimal speeds. Yet, if Marx was right, a certain process of perceptual and cognitive abstraction by which forms of property could dissolve into flows of capital was needed for such processes to function in the first instance. To arrive there, some optical adjustments were needed that could reinforce (if not realize) one's more-than-human dreams of infinite accumulation—adjustments that took place at the turn of the seventeenth century, when the world projected by camera obscuras and magic lanterns ceased to appear as a visual emanation of God's sovereignty and care and became instead a place of profitable knowing and speculating. <>

THE ILLUSIONIST BRAIN: THE NEUROSCIENCE OF MAGIC by Jordi Cami, Luis M. Martinez, Translated by Eduardo Aparicio [Princeton University Press, 9780691208442]

How magicians exploit the natural functioning of our brains to astonish and amaze us

How do magicians make us see the impossible? THE ILLUSIONIST BRAIN takes you on an unforgettable journey through the inner workings of the human mind, revealing how magicians achieve their spectacular and seemingly impossible effects by interfering with your cognitive processes. Along the way, this lively and informative book provides a guided tour of modern neuroscience, using magic as a lens for understanding the unconscious and automatic functioning of our brains.

We construct reality from the information stored in our memories and received through our senses, and our brains are remarkably adept at tricking us into believing that our experience is continuous. In fact, our minds create our perception of reality by elaborating meanings and continuities from incomplete information, and while this strategy carries clear benefits for survival, it comes with blind spots that magicians know how to exploit. Jordi Camí and Luis Martínez explore the many different ways illusionists manipulate our attention—making us look but not see—and take advantage of our individual predispositions and fragile memories.

THE ILLUSIONIST BRAIN draws on the latest findings in neuroscience to explain how magic deceives us, surprises us, and amazes us, and demonstrates how illusionists skillfully "hack" our brains to alter how we perceive things and influence what we imagine.

Review

"This exploration of neuroscience through the lens of magic will appeal to science-oriented readers, as it is first and foremost a deep dive into how the brain processes information. It's also sure to find an audience in anyone who has ever witnessed a magic trick and wondered how the heck it works."**---Ragan O'Malley,** *Library Journal*

"Camí and Martínez provide an exciting and rich introduction to the cognitive science behind magic, showing us the fruitful relationship between both disciplines while also pointing to as yet unanswered questions. Through this book, we can all enjoy the search for answers!"**—Juan Tamariz, magician**

"It may seem odd that a magician is interested in neuroscience or, likewise, that a neuroscientist is interested in magic. However, both seek an understanding of how the brain works. While magicians may want to learn basic principles underlying their tricks, neuroscientists may find in magic a completely refreshing approach to study the brain. Camí and Martínez provide a superb account of these interactions, offering the most up-to-date and comprehensive introduction to the emerging field of neuromagic."**—Rodrigo Quian Quiroga, author of** *NeuroScience Fiction*

"Camí and Martínez give us the gift of a wonderful book that leverages one mystery—magic—to explain an even deeper one, how the brain makes sense of our experiences and how these, in turn, change our brains."**—Judith Hirsch, University of Southern California**

"This book will satisfy the curiosity of anyone who wants to know how the brain's perceptual failures work, through the lens of magic. It will also help us magicians, who have always acted out of intuition, to understand why our tricks work. Books like this one allow us the opportunity to understand each other better."**—Dani DaOrtiz, magician**

CONTENTS

Where We Go in This Book

Although magic uses many techniques and devices drawn from scientific disciplines as varied as mathematics, physics (including optics), mechanics, electronics, chemistry, and new materials, in this book we will focus on cognition.

When we refer to "cognitive processes," we mean those tasks or operations that the brain executes continuously to process the information we receive from the environment: attention, perception, memories, emotions, decision-making, reasoning, planning, problem-solving, and learning (focusing here on those processes that the magician usually controls or manipulates). It is through our cognitive processes that we create, analyze, and interact with reality, all the while relying on our prior experience and knowledge. Cognitive processes thus allow us to be flexible and to adapt our behavior almost immediately based on the changes and demands imposed by the different situations of everyday life.

When we discuss "magic tricks," we are focusing exclusively on the mechanisms of magic tricks that provoke the "illusion of impossibility"—the ones that audiences consider impossible because what happens at the end goes against the laws of nature. We do not cover the techniques used by "psychics" or any other practitioner of a method of divination; their universe of knowledge is different from—but not alien to—the procedures, resources, and methods used by magicians.*

Magic has its own schools, experts, and centuries of accumulated experience. Beyond its deceits, magic is a scenic art that combines resources from theater and other sources to achieve successful effects, always at the service of a surprising outcome. After centuries of tests and empirical trials, today's magic is the result of a wisdom accumulated overtime, based on experience and the perfecting of an immense catalog of materials and methods that magicians have created and baptized with their own names or unique characteristics.

In the past, the world of magic was responsible for discovering and validating these techniques. Today neuroscience wants to learn from this wisdom. The American magician Persi Diaconis, a scientist and professor of statistics, has verified that original contributions from magic have helped open new

pathways of knowledge in the mathematical fields of cryptography and the analysis of DNA sequences. Our aim is to follow the lead of mathematics and facilitate an equally fruitful dialogue between magic and neuroscience.

The Grammar of Magic

To perform good magic, magicians rely on solid principles based on experience, most of which respond to cognitive processes. During the second half of the twentieth century, some theorists of magic, like the Spanish magicians Arturo de Ascanio and Juan Tamariz or the American Darwin Ortiz, developed authentic "grammars" of their language. In this book, we often refer to concepts coined by Arturo de Ascanio. Ascanio was born in 1929, and in the 1950s, after meeting the great Dutch magician Fred Kaps, he created a vast work on magic that he continued to build and elaborate on until his death in 1997. One of our goals has been to interpret and "translate" this language coined by magicians into concepts that cognitive neuroscientists can use to explain how the brain works. As the following pages demonstrate, we are convinced that exploring how magic works can bring new perspectives to neuroscience.

Your Journey with Us

In part I, we lay the foundation for understanding the neuroscience of magic. Chapters 2 and 3 present a simplified model of the structure and function of the brain, with special emphasis on the visual pathway, because magic enters through the sense of sight.

In part II, we examine the different cognitive processes involved in magic tricks. In chapter 4, we describe how the brain creates an illusion of continuity to compensate for the fact that we capture external information in a fractured way in both space and time. We'll see that magic takes advantage of this phenomenon in multiple ways. In chapter 5, we describe the key concept of contrast: magicians can either avoid or provoke contrast as a tool for attention control.

In chapter 6, we turn to attention, one of the brain processes that magic has learned to control with great precision. Through our attention, we continuously filter and select from the enormous amount of information we receive. Chapter 7 explores the creative world of perception, arguing that perceiving is literally a process of interpretation.

The neuroscience behind magic does not stop with information processing. As we will see in chapter 8, magicians are actually able to manipulate our memories during the few minutes that a magic trick lasts.

Chapter 9 looks at how magicians can condition us and take advantage of the multiple mechanisms of the unconscious brain. Moreover, as chapter 10 shows, magicians, unbeknownst to us, also know how to induce certain responses and decisions.

Part III of the book opens with chapter 11, a reflection on the magic experience and different audience reactions to it. We should note that all discussions of the magic experience in this book refer mainly to the Western culture with which we are familiar. In other cultures, the illusionist or magic experience may be interpreted differently: some may conclude that the magician possesses divine powers, while others may react to inexplicable effects with fear and aggressiveness. In this book, however, we do not delve into these other perspectives.

To close the book, chapter 12 recognizes the pioneering research efforts on magic that were made at the end of the nineteenth century and details how much more is still to be done.

We hope we have conveyed in this first chapter that magic is able to seduce us with its effects because of the way our brains understand the world around us. Knowing how the brain works and understanding the cognitive processes involved in magic effects can help us develop a full appreciation of magic—and help theoreticians of magic create the best possible magic.

At the same time, the empirical knowledge that magic has accumulated over time is a valuable source of knowledge for neuroscience. Though some techniques used in magic tricks correspond to wellknown mechanisms in the field of cognitive neuroscience, scientists do not yet understand the processes that underlie other magic techniques. These techniques therefore offer very attractive research opportunities. Many neuroscientists believe that artists in general—and magic is no exception—have intuitively discovered, after years of trial and error, how the brain works and how it interprets the world. Artists use this knowledge to enhance the impact of their work.

Jorge Wagensberg expressed that idea when he said: "The least banal relationship between science and art occurs when an artist offers scientific intuition to a scientist or when a scientist offers artistic insight to an artist."

Finally, this book is a recognition of the scientific foundations of magic and of those who practice it honestly and with good intent, as opposed to those who use its methods for illegitimate purposes or to make the public believe that they are endowed with supernatural powers, as some psychics do. Partway into the twenty-first century, we believe that there is no artistic endeavor important enough to justify deceiving spectators. We do well enough constantly deceiving ourselves.

Scientific Research and Magic

> We presume that everyone will agree to the recognition of magic as an art. As a matter of fact, magic embodies both art and science. —Nevil Maskelyne and David Devant, Our Magic (1911)

The Science of Magic

Often in scientific research, to make observations as objective as possible, experimental designs have reached extremes that are far removed from reality—as when the experiment is carried out in a laboratory, with the subjects isolated, watching magic recorded on a computer and unable to move while the researchers monitor their reactions. In a contrary trend, current experimental models have become more ecological, with the magician performing live before an audience. This model is closer to reality because, after all, the goal is to make the results as representative and generalizable as possible, but it has a steep price: experiments conducted in especially realistic conditions are much more complex and expensive.

In the context of classic, laboratory-based cognitive experiments, a hypothesis is generally considered confirmed when the results are 60 percent positive. In a live magic session, however, the magician cannot help but hope that 100 percent of the spectators will experience the illusion of impossibility without exceptions! Ideally, this would be the scenario in which all magic experiments are done, and the result to which all scientific experiments on magic should aspire.

Magic tricks can be the subject or the object of scientific research. In other words, in addition to being the focus of research itself, magic can be used as a privileged toolbox for the scientific understanding of how the brain works. Neuroscience can learn from the experience that magicians have accumulated. Magic tricks can be magnificent resources for studying effects and mechanisms related to brain functioning in order to understand how people behave and how audiences are managed. The collective behavior of audiences in manipulated environments is a very topical subject, but it requires a much deeper knowledge than is currently available.

Is There a Scientific History Related to Magic?

Many magic tricks and almost all key methods in magic have been performed and practiced for hundreds of years. The methods used in magic were discovered to be effective in a totally empirical way, based on trial and error, by those in the magic community, who had little knowledge of the cognitive processes that we cover in this book.

Throughout the evolution of magic, renowned magicians have made important theoretical contributions to the fundamentals of magic tricks, such as how best to construct and present them. From the end of the nineteenth century to the middle of the twentieth, the work of Robert-Houdin, Dessoir, and, later on, Maskelyne and Devant stands out. In this book, we have also cited the later works of Fitzkee and Sharpe, as well as the extensive theoretical contributions of other magicians throughout the twentieth century, including Ascanio, Randal, Bruno, Tamariz, Ortiz, and many others. For a closer look at these authors and their theoretical contributions, we refer the reader to Magic in Mind, a very interesting compilation edited by Joshua Jay and published in 2013.

One of the fathers of modern magic was the French magician Jean Eugene Robert-Houdin (1805-1871). He took magic off the street and into the theater. He also made countless contributions, some of which are still reproduced onstage. In Robert-Houdin's treatises on magic tricks, texts that he began with some "general principles of prestidigitation," he dealt with such diverse aspects as the show's structure, the demeanor that magicians should exhibit, and their appearance—he recommended wearing a tailcoat. Although Robert-Houdin was not the first magician to wear one, his sartorial choice became a model.

It was precisely at the end of the nineteenth century, at a time when magic was still linked to religious and supposedly supernatural experiences, that the formal interest in the science behind magic arose. Many magicians, like the nineteenth-century French magician Richard, affirmed that they should not claim supernatural powers for themselves. In those days, and for the first time, some famous magicians collaborated with scientists by revealing their tricks. We cannot overemphasize the value of this collaboration between professionals in two fields with such opposing methodologies—one of them based on deception and secrets and the other on transparency and open communication. This interest in collaboration was triggered by the increasing success of mediums, who flaunted their supposed supernatural powers to stage spectacles that competed directly with illusionism.

Alfred Binet (1857-1911), a psychologist at the Sorbonne, was a notable pioneer in the study of the foundations of magic; it was he who introduced the Binet-Simon scale to determine IQ. Binet studied prominent magicians of his time such as Arnould, Dicksonn, Melies, Pierre, and Raynaly. In 1894, Binet published "La psychologie de la prestidigitation," in which he revealed early on that magicians controlled the audience's gaze and attention. Binet also proposed that "passive illusions," from the perspective of magic, could be broken down into "positive illusions" (seeing what does not exist) and "negative

illusions" (looking but not seeing). These concepts were based on James Sully's archaic distinction between active illusions, such as hallucinations, and passive ones, which everyone could experience. Concepts that we now know as open or covert deviations of attention were clearly already empirically grasped.

A contemporary of Bidet's, the German philosopher and psychologist Max Dessoir (1867-1947), upon discovering the importance and richness of psychological techniques in magic, argued that psychologists had much to learn from magicians.'

The outstanding work of the American psychologists Joseph Jastrow (1863-1944) and Norman Triplett (1861-1934) followed Dessoir's line of inquiry.$ Jastrow worked with the two great magicians and rivals Alexander Hermann and Harry Kellar and applied psychophysiological techniques to test whether they had above-average abilities. In a version of his doctoral thesis published in the American Journal of Psychology in 1900, Triplett proposed a very extensive taxonomy of magic tricks, outlining the methods used by magicians. The categories he proposed were tricks involving scientific principles, tricks involving superior mental abilities (such as mathematics), and tricks depending on the use of gimmicks, sheer manual dexterity, or fixed mental habits in the audience.

Scholars in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries identified many of what have always been the great principles of magic, as explored in this book. Binet, for example, highlighted the importance of optical illusions in magic, spoke of screens that prevented perceptual reconstruction (by amodal perception), and described exogenous capture with an overt diversion of attention (what he called the ABCs of the craft) and covert diversion (looking but not seeing). He also provided a good example of divided attention, warned that the illusion of magic tricks was lost with repetition, and, as noted in chapter 4, experimented with chronophotography to identify those tricks performed so fast that they are undetectable by the eye.

As for the principle of non-repetition, it is interesting to read the advice of the British Charles De Vere to include different methods in the same trick if the same effects are to be repeated, a practice still followed today.

The nineteenth-century French magician Richard focused most of the "preliminary instructions" for his tricks on advice based on the principles of nonrepetition and non-anticipation. Even back then, he encouraged magicians to be inventive and to strive to rejuvenate old tricks, "if not in substance, in form."

Max Dessoir, besides anticipating concepts that would later be published by Binet (open deviation, divided attention), highlighted the illusion of impossibility, the necessary naturalness of the magician to avoid contrast, and the magician's need not to reveal where he is going with his tricks. Furthermore, Dessoir, in a time when nobody talked about what memory was, described techniques of disinformation and the elaboration of false clues while emphasizing that not everything that happens is going to be remembered. Dessoir felt that the word "prestidigitation" was not the best term for magic: it is not that the spectator is surprised by the marvelous speed used, he believed, but that the magician's success stems from ars artem celandi, art concealing art. According to Dessoir, magic is the art of disconcerting the spectators to such an extent that they are unable to suggest any solution to the wonders they have witnessed, and they go home accepting the explanations as conclusive, with a lingering feeling of having briefly lived in a world of wonder.

As mentioned in chapter 11, scientific interest in magic faded in the twentieth century, coinciding with a gradual decline in magic shows, largely because of the great expansion of cinema and television. More recently, the world of science has renewed its interest in magic and its mechanisms. But why did magic tricks receive little attention from the neuroscientific community for more than a century? An editorial by the renowned neuroscientist Richard Gregory, published in 1982 in the journal Perception, asked this very question. He remarked that the topic goes unmentioned in Hermann Helmholtz's treatise on physiology, which is considered the "bible of perception:' Was this lack of interest related perhaps to the low visibility of magic shows and the smaller audiences during that period?

Although we have no clear answer to that question, we are confident that the accrued experience of magicians and the wealth of knowledge to be derived from magic tricks can enrich human knowledge about how the brain works. But proving this point requires work.

The current work of cognitive science to understand how magic works is led by, among others, Gustav Kuhn, the Swiss psychologist and magician. He has published several studies on the psychology behind magic tricks and theorized about the potential contributions of magic principles to the advancement of cognitive sciences. Kuhn was the lead author of one of the first experimental studies on divided attention and the perception of a magic trick. In 2008, he published an article in which he argued for the value of developing a "science of magic." Subsequently, Kuhn wrote other articles in which he elaborated on his theoretical proposals. One of these articles detailed an exhaustive taxonomy of tricks, always from a psychological perspective (see the section on misdirection in chapter 6).17 More recently, Kuhn has presented a plan for comprehensively and systematically tackling the study of the effects and methods of magic tricks from the same perspective. Other authors have followed a similar path, also from a psychological perspective

Simultaneously, in 2008, a team led by Susana Martinez-Conde and Stephen Macknik proposed the need for a more causal approach to magic tricks, one based on their neurobiological underpinnings. These neuroscientists explored some neuronal processes involved in magic tricks, in consultation with well-known magicians after a joint meeting in 2007. They later became extraordinarily popular after the publication of Sleights of Mind, a best-seller about magic and neuroscience. This notoriety, in turn, unleashed greater interest in both neuroscience and magic.

Peter Lamont, a psychologist and magician, objected to both Kuhn's and Macknik and Martinez-Conde's proposals. Arguing that the construction of a "science of magic" was an impossible goal to achieve (itself an illusion, if you will), he felt that the most realistic goal was to use magic tricks as tools to study cognition and other brain functions. Lamont himself acknowledged, however, that "there is currently no reason to believe that such processes are any different from those that have already been identified, or might be identified, in terms of attention, awareness, persuasion, deception, belief, and so f^rth."

To show that magic tricks are based on common mechanisms already studied in neuroscience has been precisely the purpose of this book. We have presented the cognitive processes behind the effectiveness of the diverse methods and techniques used to achieve the illusion of impossibility. In doing so, we have provided a fresh look that is focused not on the phenomena of magic, which is what characterizes the proposals of Kuhn's group, but on how those techniques and magic effects could be theorized and systematized to be used as experimental tools and guides in cognitive neuroscience.

During this tour, we have cited some of the most relevant, contemporary research-based literature relating to the impossible illusion provoked by magic tricks. A partial list of this literature appeared in a special issue of the open-access journal Frontiers in Psychology, entitled "The Psychology of Magic and the Magic of Psychology." In the aftermath, the Science of Magic Association (SOMA) was created. SOMA organized its first two congresses in 2016 and 2017 at Goldsmiths, University of London, and in 2019 it held its first conference in the United States, in Chicago. SOMA "promotes rigorous research directed toward understanding the nature, function, and underlying mechanisms of magic."

How Could Magic Contribute to Neuroscience?

Exploration of the relationship between science and magic so far has been mostly one-way, based on the work of a few scientists doing research to understand how magic works. We believe that the field should take a different but complementary route, reversing the direction of explanatory work. Instead of using the brain and behavioral sciences to study magic, we want to highlight the opportunity to use magic to study the brain and behavior.

The different cognitive processes involved in the magic tricks we have analyzed here suggest unexplored routes of research in which magic could contribute to a better understanding of human cognition. For example, we do not know the basis of the cognitive dissonance that leads to the illusion of impossibility, or its characteristics, degrees, types, and neural correlates, or whether these differ from those of deception and surprise, among other effects. Magic is experienced very differently depending on the context in which it is performed, the particular cultural background of the spectators, and the wide range of individual reactions to magic. As we have already explained, magic is also very different depending on whether it is directed at adults, children, or other magicians. Magicians rarely experience the illusion of impossibility, although they enjoy the technical skills and conceptual innovations of their peers. In addition, the reasons why magic does not draw huge crowds (compared to movies or serials) and why some people dislike magic tricks are, surprisingly, still open questions.

Beyond illuminating the questions that arise when we consider cognition through the lens of illusionism, magic can help us with the general challenge of developing a real-world neuroscience. Neuroscience and behavioral sciences have thrived in laboratory conditions, but do the processes measured in such artificial contexts accurately capture phenomena that occur in the real world? In fact, the very effectiveness of magic in real situations, compared to the lesser success of laboratory studies, invites a reexamination of many cognitive paradigms that have eluded an ecological approach. Most of the few existing research studies have been carried out under extreme laboratory conditions—that is, magic tricks are performed on video, often by less experienced magicians, with very few participants and without a representative audience. What we propose here is that, for several reasons, scientists should essentially adopt the role of the magician.

First, a simple magic trick can integrate many different cognitive processes at once. Alternatively, magic effects can be designed that target a particular cognitive process, allowing the experimental dissection of cognition into possibly more natural tasks than those normally explored in artificial laboratory environments. Second, while magicians always take the context into account when designing and presenting their effects, it is the other way around in laboratory experiments. In the lab, experiments attempt to eliminate any contextual information not directly related to the concrete process under study but doing so takes us far away from reality. Moreover, ensuring the absence of contextual

information does not prevent participants from subjectively taking the context into account, adding a layer of confusion not considered by the scientist.

Third, magicians do not base the success of their tricks on statistical measures that blur the individual in favor of a nonexistent average spectator. They address each and every attendee and often with complete success, as we have discussed. Fourth, magicians perform their cognitive manipulations in real time, in direct contact with the audience, and in a single trial, since they cannot afford to repeat the trick if it fails. Finally, beyond individual behavior, social dynamics are a significant component of magic, as the individual cognitive processes of each spectator are combined with the group dynamics that emerge spontaneously from signals such as applause or laughter.

Following the analogy between science and magic also reveals unexplored conceptual territory. Consider the two realities that coexist in magic tricks, internal and external life. It is not unreasonable for magicians to conceive and perform their magic tricks in a manner comparable to how nature operates. Therefore, scientists maybe compared to spectators of a magic trick and impelled to discover how nature works from their own particular and limited point of view. We would even go so far as to speculate that some of the mysteries of how the brain works are discernible in the distinction between the external and internal realities of any magic trick.

In short, for neuroscience to benefit from magic and its refined methodology, overwhelming successes, and unique perspective, it is essential that the joint work between magicians and scientists continue. This is an area of interdisciplinary research with a long journey ahead. In fact, from the late nineteenth century to the present, fewer than one hundred experimental research articles (not including reviews and editorials) in which magic tricks have been used as a source or as a research objective have been published. That is a very low figure from all points of view, and it would not be an exaggeration to say that, compared with the state of research in any other scientific field of study, when it comes to the relationship between magic and science, practically everything is yet to be done.

We believe that our breakdown of the cognitive processes behind magic provides a valuable toolbox for expanding our knowledge of how cognition works. It is our hope that the work presented here will help generate a greater interest in magic as a unique research opportunity for neuroscientists, psychologists, cognitive scientists, and all who study the brain and human behavior. <>

PEACEFUL APPROACHES FOR A MORE PEACEFUL WORLD edited by Sanjay Lal [Series: Value Inquiry Book Series, Philosophy of Peace, Brill, 9789004507210]

Events in recent times have led many to rightly question the compatibility such traditionally revered concepts as democracy, liberal tolerance, and capitalism have with the realization of social peace. Clearly, it can no longer be uncritically assumed that the values championed by earlier generations are conducive to reaching peaceful outcomes. In Peaceful Approaches for a More Peaceful World, a wide array of scholars explore the challenges presented in the current age to conventional understandings of what is required for peace and provide insights that are both practical and constructive to a world in urgent need of conceiving new ways forward.

CONTENTS

For peace activists and scholars a very real crystallization has occurred in recent times. During the past two decades, we've more clearly seen the challenges particular to the current age for better realizing a peaceful order. Can democracy and capitalism really underlie a just social system? What approach should those seeking a positive peace take toward nationalism? How should we understand the place of tolerance as well as strive to overcome polarization in liberal society? In what ways can we work to bring about greater levels of peace while celebrating the presence and perspectives of the historically marginalized? Throughout the 21st Century so far, world events have underscored just how crucial these questions are. In October 2018, Concerned Posophers for Peace held its annual conference at the University of Colorado, Boulder. The above questions (and so many related to them) were central

acceptance of oppression to a "positive peace, which all men will respect the dignity and worth of human personality."[1] It cannot be overemphasized that outward and physical expressions of violence are ultimately mere symptoms of the underlying absence of inner peace within individuals and societies. If nothing else, recent events have brought to greater light just what the specific matters are that demand our attention as we seek to bring about a world that better manifests the core elements of a positive peace.

While the authors in this volume cannot be said to speak with one voice, a survey of the various chapters reveals certain commonalities of emphasis and value among the diverse frameworks applied and perspectives represented. All of the contributors are aware of and sensitive to certain structural realities (however lamentable those may be) and seek to advance solutions that are both theoretically sound as well as practically viable. The charge of utopianism is typically (and not without some basis) leveled against advocates of peace. The essays in this volume however help to show that there is no reason to assume the pursuit of greater levels of peace within society (and indeed the world at large) necessary entails eschewal of a realistic understanding of human affairs.

In "Democracy and Peace: Is Democracy Good for Peace?" Fuat Gürsözlü the author explores the little considered relationship democracy has to domestic peace. While many of us today, given the much bemoaned phenomena of partisanship, may be inclined to answer the author's question in the negative Gursozlu insightfully advances a notion of partisanship that underscores its positive value for democracy and distinguishes the concept from "social sorting"—identified as the real problem for attempts to realizing domestic peace within democracies. He ultimately calls on us to overcome political isolation in order to avoid the all too present adversarial political situations in which compromise and negotiation have become anathema. This chapter is a most useful and timely contribution to, not just peace studies, but also political philosophy. It does much to counter the disheartening tendencies of the present age.

In political theory, the matter of partisan disunity goes hand in hand with that of conflict resolution. Edward Demenchonok's chapter, "In Search of Justice Through Dialogue: Discourse Ethics and Virtue Ethics" offers additional reflection related to the philosophical merits of democracy (with a particular focus on the idea of justice). Among both political philosophers and peace theorists, the place of justice has unquestionably been sacrosanct. Demenchonok comparatively analyzes leading understandings of procedural justice (as advanced respectively by Habermas and Rawls). Applying the insights of Fred Dallmayr, Demenchonok argues that the practice of "discourse ethics" can overcome criticisms of universal and deontological conceptions of justice. Of particular significance to him is that not only does discourse ethics emphasize a global approach but that it is a response to social tensions. This author's chapter helpfully illuminates ways theorists can incorporate the affirmation of pluralism and diversity in conceiving the just society. The chapter is thus a significant contribution to understanding the ways in which modern society can be more inclusive and therefore better prone to harmony.

Anna Taft's chapter, "A Personal Approach to Engaging with Others: Applying Levinasian Insights to Intercultural Community Initiatives", gives a concrete and practical conceptual illumination of many of the preceding chapters key ideas. Taft adopts insights from Emmanuel Levinas while elaborating on her work as the founder and director of the Tandana Foundation. She shows why international development workers should forgo a "detached perspective" (one that she associates with Western cultures) and instead foster adoption of a "personal perspective" in pursuing their efforts (which are commonly

thought to be an integral part of engendering peace). This chapter is a remarkable demonstration of applied philosophy.

Andy Fitz-Gibbon's chapter, "Economic Consequences of the Peace and Nationalism: Revisiting John Maynard Keynes", nicely dovetails with the arguments in the two proceeding chapters. By invoking aspects of his own British upbringing, Fitz-Gibbon provides an engaging first person narrative as part of his defense of Keynes' critique of nationalism. Fitz-Gibbon argues that though nations are inevitable their existence does not necessitate nationalism. While he directly focuses on the historical dynamics responsible for wwi, in recent years the rise of nationalist ideology and the obstacles it presents to realizing a more peaceful world order has become more evident than perhaps at any time since the beginning of the 20th Century. Thus, this chapter is also a timely contribution to the contemporary world.

It has been well-known that cultural chauvinism (clearly a close relative of nationalism) presents serious problems for the prospects of global peace. In the chapter "The Virtue of the Chickadee, or Ethics for the End of the World: Chief Plenty Coups, and Judith Butler, and Anti-Genocidal Ethics" Will Barnes offers a unique and refreshing perspective from which the matter of cultural chauvinism can be approached. He incorporates Judith Butler's psycho-analytic insights (which emphasize the significance of reckoning with vulnerability) with Jonathan Lear's reading of Chief Plenty Coups' philosophy. This chapter provides an instructive synthesis and application of ethical theory that can serve as a model for addressing the psycho-social causes of identitarian hatred and genocide. Barnes aptly illustrates the immense virtue exhibited by Plenty Coups in not only understanding and accepting his existential plight but in responding to the profound cultural devastation around him. In addition to its value for Peace Studies Barnes' chapter is a remarkable example of comparative philosophy.

This is also an accurate description of the contribution "Transforming Contradictions: Dialectics of Nonviolence in Mao and Martin". As two major historical and intellectual figures of the 20th century Mao Zedong and Martin Luther King are seldom (if ever) associated with one another. Greg Moses however examines their respective speeches to show that distinctions drawn by Mao between "antagonistic" and "non-antagonistic" contradictions provide insight into King's logic of nonviolence. Since Moses sees King's approach as dialectical it is concluded at least some common ground exists between Mao and King regarding the former's advocacy of contradiction without synthesis. Moses then applies these insights to the contemporary social issue of Medicaid expansion. Ultimately, it is argued that a truly nonviolent analysis must go beyond ideological critique in order to practice "transformational contradiction". This chapter ably shows the relevance earlier social reformers have for current attempts to advance a greater positive peace within the present world.

Also in keeping with the focus on social conflict and partisan divisions the chapter "Lies of the Land: The Erosion of Democracy, and the Challenge for Positive Peace" cpp President Paula Smithka examines the degree to which utter disregard of and, indeed, outright disrespect for truth has characterized contemporary political discourse. Smithka argues that present day realities, as they pertain to the place of facts, conflict with Kantian principles of respect for persons and thus hamper the realization of positive peace within so-called democratic societies (like our own). She guides the reader through notable political news items of recent years while drawing connections between them and (among other insights) the literary themes explored by George Orwell and T.S. Elliot. Instead of advocating a "fighting fire with fire" approach in which distortions of fact are countered with other factual distortions this

author ultimately calls on society to undertake efforts that make the "respect for persons" principle foundational to our political system. The author sees this proposal to entail turning our attention to rectifying what actually causes polarization in the first place. In a world dominated by social media disagreements and cable news sound bites that are commonly seen as impediments to maintaining healthy levels of discourse (not mention blood pressures) Smithka offers a needed approach for elevating seemingly fruitless communication.

Issues relevant to partisanship (specifically how it relates to the limits of tolerance within liberal society) are also discussed by Hunter Cantrell in "Tolerating the Intolerable—A Method to Prevent Radicalization". In keeping with the spirit of the preceding author's proposal, this author calls on us to better understand the process by which individuals get radicalized (specifically by acknowledging the place that the wrongfully setting back of interests has to that process). For this author, moreover, it is the very act of toleration that we should see as essential for effectively countering9809(o)-2.3(l)1.6(p)-3(r)1.7(o)-5.3(ce)-2 understanding liberal political philosophy.

Paul Churchill in his chapter "Gun Violence, Honor, and Inequality, in America" directs our attention to the more concrete topic of gun violence; specifically, he suggests new ways in wch tos controversy could be better engaged. The partisan implications of the gun violence topc are obvious. Moreover, its pertinence for peace studies is beyond question. Churchill counsels against responding with counter arguments to familiar pro-gun assertions and seeks instead to expose the "subterranean and occluded motives for wanting too own firearms." In recent times, armed protestors have descended on various American state capitals and even disrupted the American tradition of a peaceful transfer of power. This has happened during a time in which mass shootings have become commonplace in 809(o)-2.3(l)1.6(co)-5.3(u)-3(n)7.8(t)-6 counters this assumption. Rentmeester situates the Kantian injunction that people have a duty to respect other persons as autonomous agents within Kant's project for perpetual peace. The author argues that this duty can be fulfilled only if there are social conditions intact which allow for individuals to flourish—a necessary condition for attaining, what Kant calls, "rational freedom". Thus, Rentmeester

In "'A Useful Resource: Work for People with Mental Illness'" Abigail Gosselin gives further specific insight on the kind of positive action that would be conducive to genuine social peace. The author calls on our society to value work in a way that is broader than has traditionally been the case. Using a "positive peace/structural framework" the author argues that the individualistic approach of capitalist society oppresses those with mental illness in regard to employment matters. The author concludes that society must address certain structural issues in order to attain better levels of justice (and thus better overall levels of peace) regarding employment for the mentally ill. The chapter is another valuable demonstration of applied philosophy.

Like this author, Jennifer Kling in "Wealth, Violence, and Injustice: Refugees, Robin Hood, and Resistance" challenges conventionally accepted ethical understandings as they relate to the socially disadvantaged. Kling considers two contemporary real life examples—the seizing of assets from Syrian refugees and the "economic hacktivism" of internet groups siphoning small sums from the accounts of the wealthiest 0.01% in their attempts to help the less well-off. Both examples involve common notions of theft and injustice and also have wider implications for how schemes of distribution become legitimatized in society. Kling's analysis hones in on the question of what constitutes violence. She argues that since an acceptable understanding of violence should be neither too restrictive nor too permissive it makes sense to think of violence in terms of a violation of integrity or unity. From this point, it follows to Kling that Robin-Hood style tactics (like those pursued by the "hacktivists") are acceptable tools available for those who seek to nonviolently resist unjust systems. This chapter's approach to questions of violence and distributive justice is uniquely insightful and its challenges to commonly held intuitive understandings makes the chapter a fine example of public philosophy.

The challenges and insights these authors provide invite broader reflections on the philosophical viability of capitalism. In "The Capitalist Peace and Pacific Capitalism" Andrew Fiala critically explores the alleged link between capitalism and peace. Invoking the Gandhian emphasis on the unity of means and ends, Fiala argues for envisioning capitalism in such a way that profit and prosperity can result from peaceful (rather than exploitative) transactions. Thus, he concludes, "Profit and prosperity ought properly to be connected to a larger account of just and peaceful social relations." At a time when discussions regarding economic justice are commonly characterized by binary thought and intense polarization Fiala's analysis compellingly reveals an unexplored middle ground and is therefore also a valuable contribution to Peace Studies.

Similarly, in "Discourse that Advances Economic Democracy" William Gay emphasizes a distinction between "economic democracy" and "democratic socialism". While the author is sympathetic to the goals of those who advocate for the latter he acknowledges that for many in our present day society the conversation has not reached a level that can enable them to see democratic socialism as a viable alternative. Additionally, Gay holds that the economic sphere provides a more promising space for the advancement of democratic ideals. He calls on us to be aware of and find alternatives to the negative memes and metaphors that are so prevalent in public discussions and examines ways in which an alternative frame of economic discourse can employ the terminology of care ethics. Since this is an approach to ethics that emphasizes the primacy of caring relationships, the preceding chapter is both a nice complement to this contribution as well as an insightful resource for anyone who seeks ways to better promote positive peace within the dominant institutional settings of our times. What's more is

that this chapter offers insights that would be interest to anyone who has wondered about the compatibility of a capitalism and care ethics.

The mixture between theoretical and practical considerations contained in these chapters testify to the value of reflective equilibrium. The ground covered by the authors as well as the depths of their analyses make each contribution worthy of serious consideration for peace scholars and activists alike (and not just peace philosophers). The present-day challenges confronting attempts for realizing genuine positive peace in the world underscore that this volume is a needed resource for our times. <>

DOMESTIC CAPTIVITY AND THE BRITISH SUBJECT, 1660–1750 by Catherine Ingrassia [University of Virginia Press, 9780813948096]

In seventeenth-and eighteenth-century Britain, captivity emerged as both persistent metaphor and material reality. The exercise of power on an institutional and personal level created conditions in which those least empowered, particularly women, perceived themselves to be captive subjects. This 'domestic captivity' was inextricably connected to England's systematic enslavement of kidnapped Africans, even as early fictional narratives suppressed or ignored the experience of the enslaved.

DOMESTIC CAPTIVITY AND THE BRITISH SUBJECT, 1660–1750 explores how captivity informed identity, actions, and human relationships for white British subjects as represented in fictional texts by British authors from the period.

Author Catherine Ingrassia is Professor of English at Virginia Commonwealth University and author of *Authorship, Commerce, and Gender in Early Eighteenth-Century England: A Culture of Paper Credit.*

Drawing on the popular press, unpublished personal correspondence, and archival documents, Ingrassia provides a rich cultural description that situates a range of literary texts within the material world of captivity. The book accentuates the difference between and among the discrete conditions while asserting captivity's significance for understanding Restoration and eighteenth-century culture. As the first chapter reveals, even those who, by any measure, occupied a position of privilege still perceived themselves as living within a culture of captivity.

An original and necessary contribution to the field of eighteenth-century transatlantic studies. Ingrassia's bookd

THE SOCIOLOGY OF SLAVERY: BLACK SOCIETY IN JAMAICA, 1655-1838, 2nd edition by Orlando Patterson [Polity, 9781509550982]

Orlando Patterson's classic study of slavery in Jamaica, **THE SOCIOLOGY OF SLAVERY**, reveals slavery for what it was: a highly repressive and destructive system of human exploitation, which disregarded and distorted almost all of the basic prerequisites of normal social life.

Patterson is John Cowles Professor of Sociology at Harvard University and Chair of the Jamaica Education Transformation Commission at the Office of the Prime Minister of Jamaica.

What distinguishes Patterson's account is his detailed description of the lives and culture of slaves under the repressive regime in Jamaica. He analyses the conditions of slave life and work on the plantations, the psychological life of slaves and the patterns and meanings of life and death. He shows that the real-life situation of slaves and enslavers involved a complete breakdown of all major social institutions, including the family, gender relations, religion, trust and morality. And yet, despite the repressiveness and protracted genocide of the regime, slaves maintained some space of their own, and their forced adjustment to white norms did not mean that they accepted them. Slave culture was characterized by a persistent sense of resentment and injustice, which underpinned the day-to-day resistance and large-scale rebellions that were a constant feature of slave society, the last and greatest of which partly accounts for its abolition.

THE SOCIOLOGY OF SLAVERY is not intended solely for sociologists. It fills a vital gap in the history of Jamaica and the other English speaking West Indian Islands. For the fist time it analyzes the nature of the society which existed during slavery in Jamaica, and in particular, concentrates on the mass of the Negro peoples whose labor, skills, suffering and perseverance and at times, defiance, managed to maintain the system, without breaking under its yoke.

This **2nd edition** of **THE SOCIOLOGY OF SLAVERY** includes a new introduction by Orlando Patterson, which explains the origins of the book, appraises subsequent works on Jamaican slavery, and reflects on its enduring relevance.

… *a lucid, densely packed, and extremely intelligent analysis of slavery… indispensable* – Eric Hobsbawm, *The Guardian*

… *an inventive and perceptive book* – Jack P. Greene, *The American Historical Review*

… *a valuable contribution to the study of West Indian history… Patterson has asked new questions and elicited some new answers in his discussion of the Jamaican slave society.* – Elsa Goveia, *The Times Literary Supplement*

This book is a badly needed and well done study of the slave society of Jamaica… Refreshingly free of romanticism, it deals frankly with the impact of slavery upon all the members of Jamaican society. – Gwendolyn Midlo Hall, The Historian

Widely recognized as a foundational work on the social institution of slavery, **THE SOCIOLOGY OF SLAVERY** is an essential text for anyone interested in the role of slavery in shaping the modern world. <>

THINKING LIKE AN ICEBERG by Olivier Remaud, translated by Stephen Muecke [Polity Press, 9781509551460]

When we imagine the polar regions, we see a largely lifeless world covered in snow and ice where icebergs drift listlessly through frozen waters, like solitary wanderers of the oceans floating aimlessly in total silence. But nothing could be further from the truth.

This book takes us into the fascinating world of icebergs and glaciers to discover what they are really like. Through a series of historical vignettes recalling some of the most tragic and most exhilarating encounters between human beings and these gigantic pieces of matter, and through vivid descriptions of their cycles of birth and death, Olivier Remaud shows that these entities are teeming with many forms of life and that there is a deep continuity between iceberg life and human life, a complex web of reciprocal interconnections that can lead from the deadliest to the most vital. And precisely because there is this continuity, icebergs and glaciers tell us something important about life itself – namely, that it thrives in the most unexpected of places, even where there seems to be no life at all.

At a time when we are increasingly aware that the melting of ice sheets, glaciers and sea ice is one of the many disastrous consequences of global warming, this beautiful meditation is a poignant reminder of the interconnectedness of all life and the fragility of the Earth's ecosystems.

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The Issue

Icebergs have been considered secondary characters for a long time now. They made the headlines when ships sank after hitting them. Then they disappeared into the fog and no one paid them any more attention.

In the pages that follow, they take centre stage. Their very substance breathes. They pitch and roll over themselves like whales. They house tiny life forms and take part in human affairs. Today, they are melting along with the glaciers and the sea ice.

Icebergs are central to both the little stories and the big issues.

This book invites you to discover worlds rich in secret affinities and inevitable paradoxes.

There are so many ways to see wildlife with new eyes.

✳✳✳

Thinking Like an Iceberg

In one of the chapters of his Almanac, Aldo Leopold addresses cowherds on mountain pastures who are afraid of the wolf. He recounts the moment when his life changed. One day, as a hunter, he shoots at a she-wolf and her pack of cubs as they cross a river ford. When he sees the `green fire' of life disappear in the mother's eyes, he understands the mystery that unites not the hunter and his environment but the wolf and the mountain. He guesses that the wolf regulates the possible supernumerary deer and helps to prevent trees from becoming too defoliated. If it wants to maintain the balance of life in its biome, the mountain needs the wolf to avoid the fear of too many deer. The farmers would benefit from extending the relationship they have with their cows to the environment that includes all beings, together with predators. They would hear the cry of the wolf with a different ear:

A deep chesty bawl echoes from rimrock to rimrock, rolls down the mountain and fades into the far blackness of the night. It is an outburst of wild defiant sorrow, and of contempt for all the adversities of the world. Every living thing (and perhaps many dead one too) pays heed to that call ... Only the mountain has lived long enough to listen objectively to the howl of a wolf.

The deer is frightened, the pine anticipates the blood on the snow at the base of its trunk, the coyote rejoices in the leftovers he will enjoy, the cowherd fears for his finances. The hunter sharpens his weapons. The mountain understands the `hidden meaning' of the howl. Leopold suggests that the cowherd should `think like a mountain'.

Who has ever thought like an iceberg?

Let's imagine one last time the young Inuit imitating an iceberg in front of his friends sitting in a circle. In the igloo, seal oil is burning on the soapstone. His mother regularly snips the wick of dried moss so that the smoke does not extinguish it. A soft light spreads, shadows float in the warm atmosphere. The boy stands. He rests his forearms across his chest, lifting his shoulders a little, and begins to bend over. His body moves closer to the ground. He defies gravity. His voice makes slight squeaks. Then a cry comes from his mouth. He falls suddenly. The iceberg has just fallen into the ocean, causing the water to crest as if it were breaking on a reef.

Hiccups, snores and various gurgling sounds suggest that the boy is imitating the raging waves on his back. He restores his balance by banging the ground with his elbows. He then stretches his arms and starts to shear the air with grace. His limbs have become the pectorals of a whale calf. He twists subtly, leaning on his joined feet as if on a caudal. He is now flat on his stomach and shows his back. He opens his mouth. The waves are high. It is not easy to breathe. He finally rolls over and slowly stands up.

His eyes widen and his face turns in all directions. He has become an iceberg again. He is on the lookout because he has heard a noise in the distance. It is a motor. A boat is coming. His gaze fixes on a point above the heads of his assembled friends. He frowns. He is going to get angry. In order to frighten the members of crew approaching him, he manipulates his vocal cords to produce an ominous growl. He rests his cheek on his shoulder. His left side bows. Suddenly, the spectators roar and he throws his hands down in a violent gesture, as if he had to get rid of a burden. A heavy piece of ice breaks away from his sides. Bits of it brush the visitors. Then there is a long silence. The young boy turns and walks

away towards the bottom of the igloo, where the shadows reign. The iceberg enters the mist and begins to drift. The theatre is over. Everyone applauds the performance. The artist is congratulated.

We are in the boat. From the deck, once we got over our fright, we interpret the departure of the iceberg as a banishment. Our eyes are clouded with melancholy. Since we do not attribute any concrete intention to them, the blocks seem to us to be emblems of solitude. We look at them in the way we look at the details of a seventeenth-century still life. A basket of old apples, wilted flowers, a burnt-out candle, an hourglass running out. They reflect the image of an inevitable end. The painting by Frederic Edwin Church which opens this book says the same thing. Mirrors of our states of mind, icebergs are allegories of the passing of time, lures in our mundane life. They are beautiful vanities.

We deduce from the fate of the iceberg that the coldness of the ice extinguishes the glow of life. The frosty mists frighten us. They also reassure us. The slight shiver we feel comes from the fact that we do not live in these harsh lands and that we contemplate their dramas from more welcoming shores. We have constructed a scene and prefer the artifice of the show to the realities behind the decor. We can guess that what happens to them affects our lives. But they are out there. We look first deep into the icebergs for evidence of our mortal condition. We then turn our face to one of the surfaces and see only our reflection. Narcissus is no longer a mythological character, as in Ovid's Metamorphoses.

Our narcissism condemns us to the cult of appearances.

The illusion is strange. The iceberg sliding across the ocean is a biotic environment in its own right. We understand this with difficulty because life develops below the waterline of the berg. We would have to put on thermal underwear and a wet suit. Diving into the cold waters, we would see it up close. You could walk beside its submerged walls. You could see organisms clinging to the little ice cups carved out by the saltwater currents. The polar cod would open its mouth facing upwards to pick up the suspended plankton. The bearded seal would come up from the depths and grab the cod. Then it would pull itself up onto a ledge to bask in the sunlight, vocalising.

Within seconds, the illusion of a dead block would be reversed.

Any iceberg that breaks off becomes a biological ark in no time. The cracking of its ice is like the howling of a wolf. It reveals the diversity of life forms. The iceberg brings people together around it. Why picture its birth as a sad and lonely fate? Is the ocean so ghostly to us? Let us awaken our pelagic consciousness. Icebergs carried by marine currents are not decorative elements in vanitas paintings, or images of solitude, but essential actors in the primordial cycles of life. The inertia of icy worlds is a misnomer. None of the places we call `desert' are in fact deserted.

Icebergs illustrate a wild life at work everywhere. They share with animals the same art of appearing and disappearing. As we know, wild life is not always on display. The philosopher Irene J. Klaver reminds us that 'to be wild is to stand out and to disappear.' The animal shies away so as not to be devoured. It does not get too close in order to see better. It conceals itself in order to interpret the ways in which other beings inhabit their specific environment. Camouflaging oneself means erasing the contours of one's body, blending into the context, moving without being perceived, and then reappearing at the appropriate moments.

Being wild means knowing how to be discreet.

The iceberg also unites the visible and the invisible. Its identity is not limited to its appearance, nor its value to its visibility. We know how voluminous its underwater part is. Yet it always ends up turning over. What was visible disappears. And what remained hidden shows itself. Each iceberg plays a game of fleeting appearances. Its vital centre depends on the rotating movements that bring the submerged volumes to the surface and engulf the others, so that the visible and invisible sides are never the same. To see an iceberg is thus to see the visible and the invisible in alternation. Nothing is immobile, even if everything seems frozen to the eye that remains on the surface.

Like all living things, the iceberg is characterised by the way it expresses itself, moves, is born and dies. It falls with a crash into the water, only to disappear into anonymity a few months or years later. In the meantime, it shows a part of itself and hides the rest from us. Then it reverses this perceptual pattern by rolling over itself. Like the wolf, the deer, and so many other animals, it is distinguished by its ability to conceal itself. Even when it is huge and very apparent, it knows how to hide from view. It suddenly disappears into the mist, almost silently. It reappears all the more strikingly when it is no longer expected. Its presence is paradoxically light. It slips away and leaves other things to live their own presences.

Basically, icebergs do not `need' us. Above all, they need us to `disappear' from time to time. This wild part is imitable. We could learn to develop an art of withdrawal that would be 'an experience in the midst of and with beings and things'. This art would require, for a time, `laying down all sovereignty in order to open up to the unlimited possibilities of anonymous life.' If we became more discreet, we would in this way be wilder. If we were less visible, we would be more faithful to our principle of freedom. If discretion were our hallmark, we would undoubtedly inhabit environments populated by fabulously varied beings. We would finally imagine 'how much less lonely the world would be'.

Are icebergs too far away for us to be conscious enough of them? It is a reasonable objection. How can we feel close to entities that do not move at the same latitudes as most of the planet's inhabitants? How can we grasp the fact that our personal existences here are linked to their life cycles there? The gap is difficult to bridge. Abstract explanations are not enough. It can only be overcome if we interpret this distance as a figure of continuity; us being part of a common world in which each depends on the other. Icebergs are not solitary. They exist 'by themselves' by being 'well connected' to other beings. They are `among us', with us, not far away in a wilderness devoid of life.

But there are more and more of them among us. The more they flood the fjords, the more their quantity is a sign of an anomaly. Their increase precedes their disappearance. The more heralds the less. This is the current vertigo, the equation of our near future. The glaciers are tired and the eternal snows are melting. The polar waters are turning blue. The Arctic is gradually becoming a great Mediterranean.

Considering the facts, icebergs are the best teachers. They teach us that every being is a world that brings together other beings and conjugates other worlds. They remind us that life teems in the most seemingly empty places. They invite us to make ourselves indistinguishable at times in order the better to coexist with all living things. Icebergs are discreet colossi, antidotes to narcissism. In them lies the preservation of the world. <>

IMMATERIAL: RULES IN CONTEMPORARY ART by Sherri Irvin [Oxford University Press, 9780199688210]

Irvin argues that rules are the key to understanding what's going on in contemporary art.

Contemporary art can seem chaotic: it may be made of toilet paper, candies you can eat, or meat that is thrown out after each exhibition. Some works fill a room with obsessively fabricated objects, while others purport to include only concepts, thoughts, or language. Immaterial argues that, despite these unruly appearances, making rules is a key part of what many contemporary artists do when they make their works, and these rules can explain disparate developments in installation art, conceptual art, time-based media art, and participatory art.

Sherri Irvin shows how rules are now an artistic medium: they are part of the work's structure and shape what it expresses. Rules are meaningful in themselves and help to activate the meanings of non-art materials and found objects, so audiences need to know about the rules to get the most out of their art experiences. Loss of information about the rules, like loss of a chunk of marble, can seriously damage the work, and preserving rules as well as objects is reshaping how museums maintain their collections. Where rules collide with real-world circumstances, they may be broken maliciously, mistakenly, or for good reasons, threatening the work's meanings and sometimes its very existence.

Should we celebrate the prominence of rules in contemporary art? Irvin argues that, while rules aren't always used well, they can be used to create distinctive meanings and provide powerful immersive experiences not achievable through any other means.

- A lively discussion of how rules create and distinctive experiences and possibilities for expression
- Takes a careful look at the practices of contemporary artists, curators, conservators, and critics
- Draws on a rich and detailed set of examples across a variety of visual art forms
- Provides a novel explanation of disparate developments in contemporary art

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In this book, I focus on a cluster of developments in contemporary art. They have to do with material and what to do with it. Developments having to do with material have been widely recognized: many

contemporary artworks are made of materials that are weird or have been put through a weird process on their way to arthood. The material of some artworks is an event instead of an object. For many artworks in new media, it is hard to pin down what the material is at all: neither the "thing" label nor the "event" label works very well. As the material has gotten weirder, the boundaries between (what used to be) different art forms have broken down.

One development about what do with the material has been widely noticed: interactivity. These days we may be able to walk around in an artwork, eat a piece of it, change its appearance, play with it, or take part of it away with us. A couple of other developments, though, have gotten less mainstream attention. First, the issue of how to display the material has gotten vastly more complicated. Some artists spend as much time telling museums how to display things as they spent making the things in the first place. Some artists don't make any things at all! They just tell museums to get some things and display them. Second, there are new questions about how to take care of the material, even when it isn't on display. These matters of display and conservation might seem like technical issues that only a museum professional could love. In this book, though, I'll argue that getting a handle on them is crucial to understanding much art these days. They affect what artworks are and what they can mean. Here is a quick taste of where we're headed.

Pranking Painting

Consider the art of painting up until, say, the late nineteenth century. Paintings were made on (approximately) flat supports. A painting was a picture of something. Displaying the painting was straightforward: the painted surface should face away from the wall, and the picture should be right side up. Conserving the painting was always a complicated business, but it had a central goal: preserving the look and substance of the painted surface.

Now let's think about some twentieth- and twenty-first-century interventions in painting.

Intervention #1: Georg Baselitz (1978)

Georg Baselitz made pictures to be displayed upside down. The Gleaner is bending down to glean, but her feet and head are at the top of the painting rather than the bottom (Figure 0.1). Somebody who found The Gleaner in an attic (okay, unlikely), and didn't know the figure is supposed to be upside down, would seriously misunderstand it.

Intervention #2: Fiona Banner (2007)

Fiona Banner made a text-based drawing in graphite and framed it (Figure 0.2). She flipped it around and applied the words "Shy Nude" on the back. Then she gave instructions to show it leaning into a corner with the back side, rather than the drawing, facing the audience.

Figure 0.1 Georg Baselitz, Die Ahrenleserin (The Gleaner), 1978. Oil and egg tempera on canvas, 129/8 x 98% in. (330.1 x 249.9 cm). Solomon R. Guggenheim Museum, New York. Purchased with funds contributed by Robert and Meryl Meltzer, 1987. © Georg Baselitz 2022, Artwork photo: Friedrich, Rosenstiel, Cologne, Courtesy Archie Georg Baselitz

Figure 0.2 Fiona Banner, Shy Nude, 2007. Graphite on paper with spray paint and aluminum frame. Frame: 50I/2 x 343/4 in. (128.3 x 88.3 cm). Richard Brown Baker Fund for Contemporary British Art, 2009.11 © Fiona Banner. Courtesy of the artist and the RISD Museum, Providence, RI

Intervention #3: Saburo Murakami (1957)

Saburo Murakami made a series of Peeling Pictures (Figure 0.3). Historically, breaches of the painted surface had been a crisis—something to be stopped, fixed, hidden. Murakami made paintings that are designed to erode via peeling paint, and embraced this erosion as part of the work. (See discussion in Schimmel 1999.)

Intervention #4: Gerald Ferguson (1979-82)

Gerald Ferguson made a series of Maintenance Paintings. Each carries a label saying that the "end user" is allowed to repaint it (Figure 0.4). He said, "If someone bought a green painting, for example and felt it would look better white, they could repaint it. That would be aesthetic maintenance."I

Gerald Ferguson, "Notes on Work: 1970-1989." Undated document supplied by Curator of Collections Shannon Parker at the Art Gallery of Nova Scotia. Punctuation as in original.

Figure 0.3 Saburo Murakami, Peeling Picture, 1957. Oil on canvas, 20 7/8 x 17 15/16 in. (53 x 45.5 cm).Collection Axel & May Vervoordt Foundation, Belgium

These interventions changed how we have to understand painting as an art form. They destabilized the connection between the object and the artwork: if all you have is the object without further information, you don't yet quite know what the artwork is. They also highlighted something that was true all along, though not obvious: works of painting aren't just physical objects, but physical objects governed by rules. These rules were once fixed by social conventions that were so reliably in force that they were invisible: no one would have had to tell you that you should hang Artemisia Gentileschi's early seventeenth-century Judith Slaying Holofernes with the picture right side up, facing away from the wall so that it is visible to the viewer, or that preserving the painted surface is essential to avoiding the work's destruction. These rules were obvious enough to go unmentioned—but they were still rules. But one by one, our interventionists (those I've listed, as well as many others) challenged these conventions. Baselitz challenged the idea that the picture must be right side up. Banner challenged the idea that the principal marked surface must be presented to the viewer. Murakami made the work's surface an essentially evolving thing, transforming painting into a time-based medium. And Ferguson challenged the idea that the viewer must leave the painting alone. These challenges operate by violating conventions that had at previous points applied to all paintings. The violations do two things: they force us to notice the conventions, and they weaken their force.

Figure 0.4 Gerald Ferguson, labels on the reverse of Maintenance Painting No. 30, 1980-94. Latex on canvas, 12 x 10 in. (30.3 x 25.4 cm). Collection Art Gallery of Nova Scotia, 2005.801 Gift of Bruce Campbell, Antigonish, Nova Scotia, 2005 Courtesy of the Art Gallery of Nova Scotia. Photograph by RAW Photography

So: painting involves not just physical things but rules, and we have entered an era in which these rules are not fixed by rote application of convention. Artists can fashion custom rules for their work. This means we can no longer walk up to a painting and be sure we know what the rules are. If we see that a painting is hung at different orientations on two different days, does this mean someone hung it wrong at least one of those times? Or does it mean that the artist gave permission to hang it however you like? Or did the artist supply a strict schedule for changing the orientation? All of these possibilities, and others, are open. The artist gets to write the rules. This is what makes the situation I'm describing unique: it's not just that artists are breaking earlier rules—which has surely characterized artistic innovation in many contexts and historical periods—but that they are creating specific, custom rules that partly constitute works in art forms like painting that are often defined in terms of physical media.

The interventions I've listed feel like pranks, and they are. Instead of just making paintings, these artists are remaking painting. Some people find this annoying or boring: annoying because now you need background information just to know what the work is, and boring because all this attention to rules can undermine the attention to creating a surface that is visually satisfying. Why create a really stunning surface if you're just going to give people permission to paint over it or turn it away from the viewer? Neither Ferguson nor Banner has prioritized a visually lush surface.

I'm not here to tell you whether or not these pranks are annoying or boring. But I will say that writing custom rules for the artwork has become a big part of the job for some artists, and the rules themselves have become part of the medium that artists are working in. Painting used to mainly involve manipulating paint. Now artists can choose to manipulate paint + rules to make their work. This point about rules extends well beyond painting and has helped to break down the boundaries of medium in contemporary art. These rules are part of the medium because they help to generate the work's meanings. If it were turned so that the inscribed surface faced the viewer, Fiona Banner's Shy Nude couldn't lead us to question, in the same way, the tradition of presenting nude bodies, especially nude female bodies, in art while treating their display as lewd and shameful in other contexts. The rule that thwarts our vision is essential to the way the work makes its point.

Feeling impatient? Here are some FAQs:

Q. Is it good for artists to have the power to write these rules?

A. Sometimes.

Q. What if we lose track of the rules over time?

A. What if we lose a physical chunk of an artwork? Depends how big the chunk is. Same story for rules.

Q. What if the rules aren't followed?

A. Depends how badly they are violated. The work might be destroyed, it might fail to be on display, or things might be mostly fine.

Q. What if audience members don't know (or care) about the rules?

A. Depends how significant the rules are. The audience might miss the work's point entirely, or it might be a minor issue.

Q. Where do the curators, conservators, and other folks who have to follow the rules fit in?

A. Everywhere.

Q. Is this story relevant to contemporary art that doesn't involve the artist devising custom rules?

A. Yes.

These questions are why I've written a whole book. I'll elaborate on the answers in subsequent chapters.

Disclaimers

Philosophy of "contemporary" art

What do I mean by "contemporary"? I don't care very much about the specific details of the definition. There is some art that I want to talk about, and I'm going to slap the label "contemporary art" on it because that's a label other people tend to slap on it.

If you like time periods: most of my examples are from the 1980s and forward, though at some points we will stretch back to 1960. So long ago, right?! Some of my claims about contemporary art apply to works created even earlier in the twentieth century. Is this my fault, or is it because the word "contemporary" is used in a strange way when it comes to art? Or both? You be the judge.

I include works that are obviously "visual" and works that are conceptual or performative but clearly connected to visual art traditions. Many of my examples are of what is often called "conceptual art" when that term is used broadly. [Narrowly speaking, conceptual art belongs to a movement mainly of the 1960s and 1970s—though, for some, it stretches as far back as the works of Marcel Duchamp in the early twentieth century—in which, as Sol LeWitt put it, "The idea itself, even if it is not made visual, is as much of a work of art as any finished product" (LeWitt 1967). However, the label `conceptual' is frequently applied to works of later decades that do not seem to exist as ideas independent of material realizations—and, indeed, where fabricated objects can play quite an important role—if these works also involve questioning of the nature of art, challenge to traditional boundaries among mediums, or reference back to the intention of the artist.] This is not because I think all contemporary art is conceptual, or only conceptual art is interesting. But conceptual art is the locus of key developments that affect how we should think even about contemporary artworks that aren't conceptual.

Philosophy of contemporary "art"

I'm not talking about all art made these days. How could I? I focus on art that is linked to the international network of contemporary art galleries, museums, and biennials: art that is shown there, aspires to be shown there, or responds to work shown there. Artists, galleries, museums, and art communities all over the world participate. I like and value many other kinds of art that don't fit this description—art that emerges from local communities or cultural traditions that either aren't in touch with the international gallery scene or just aren't engaging with it—where by "not engaging" I don't mean actively rejecting or disdaining, which are ways of responding that do fall within my purview. But these forms of art won't make much of an appearance here.

"Philosophy" of contemporary art

I am a philosopher, so this is a philosophy of contemporary art, not a history. I won't be examining specific artistic movements and how they influenced one another. I won't be looking much at the historical progression of the developments I discuss or offering a sociological perspective on the reasons why they came about. Even the interventions in painting I discussed weren't in chronological order—did you notice? I will pay more attention to showing that these developments have occurred and are pretty widespread and showing why and how this is important: because they affect what artworks can mean and what we need to know about them.

Some of the artworks I'll discuss are important and well known; others are obscure, perhaps rightly so. I chose some because they illustrate a point especially cleanly, some because I happened upon compelling

documentation or intriguing details, and still others because they function jointly to show the very different ways that structurally similar rules can shape aesthetic experience and meaning in different contexts. Not all of the works I discuss are of deep art historical significance, but this is, in my view, as it should be. The developments I track are relevant to works both central and marginal; they are not restricted to a remote segment of the contemporary art world.

"Immaterial"??

Lucy Lippard wrote a famous book in which she spoke about the "dematerialization" of art in the late 1960s and early 1970s (Lippard 1973). Martha Buskirk (2003) writes of "the contingent object of contemporary art," also beginning in the 1960s. Art around that time was sometimes sold in the form of unrealized plans, and artists were given to saying things like this:

> The idea becomes a machine that makes the art. (LeWitt 1967)

> The art is formless and sizeless; however the presentation has specific characteristics. (Joseph Kosuth, quoted in Lippard 1973, 72)

> 1. The artist may construct the piece.

> 2. The piece may be fabricated.

> 3. The piece may not be built.

> Each being equal and consistent with the intent of the artist ... (Lawrence Weiner, quoted in Lippard 1973, 73-4)

Such declarations by artists, along with the dematerialized structure of many conceptual works, has led some theorists, such as Goldie and Schellekens (2009), to suggest that ideas are the very substance or medium of conceptual art. I will argue, to the contrary, that conceptual artworks are continuous with prior materialized works in that they consist of structures that express ideas. The dematerialization of art consists not in a shift from objects to ideas, but in a shift from object-based works with implicit, conventional rules defining a fixed form to works that consist wholly or partly of explicit, custom rules for constituting a display, with rules functioning as a medium that is especially apt for expressing certain kinds of ideas.

Since the "high conceptual" period, art has been substantially rematerialized, but the relation of the artwork to its material has shifted. Whereas a specific fabricated object was once an unquestioned necessity, now the relation between the artwork and the material on display is far more variable. Some artworks have no necessary material: displays are newly constituted for each exhibition and then destroyed, leaving nothing in storage except documents (and, occasionally, not even those). Some artworks have materials that are necessary, but can or must be displayed in different ways on different occasions. Some have a combination of necessary objects and replaceable parts. And even for those with only necessary objects, what can or must be done with these objects varies: some must be carefully preserved in an ideal original state, while others may or must be interacted with or permitted to decay.

How does it happen that this relation varies from work to work? And what are the implications of this variable relation for audience members, for museum practitioners, and for the very nature of the artwork itself? This renegotiation of the relation between the artwork and the material of its display is

what this book is about. I won't ignore the artwork's material elements, but I will argue that immaterial elements—like rules—have an equally critical role to play. <>

AS DEEP AS IT GETS: MOVIES AND METAPHYSICS by Randall E. Auxier [Open Universe, 9781637700082]

A lot of thought goes into making Hollywood films and television series. The best artists of the twentieth century chose this medium over the arts they would have practiced in previous centuries -- the painters, sculptors, writers, musicians, actors, and most of all the director, the master auteur, packed up their gear and went west. As time has gone on, television and movie-making converged into one huge canvas for all that creative thinking. Let's think about some of the best things that got thunk in the last hundred years, see if we can uncover the deeper layers of that thinking and sling a little philosophy at the screen.

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From the Alamo Draft House to the Livingroom Couch (Or There and Back Again)

Don't be a slyboots. No one likes a shyboots. —STEVE MARTIN, Cruel Shoes

First things first. I don't claim to be a sophisticated film critic. I'm just like you (unless you are a sophisticated film critic, in which case, bully for you). I watch movies because I like movies. I think about movies because I think about everything. It's a problem. I'm a problem thinker, maybe an addict. Be that as it may, I figured out a way to make a living from my problem, so, from the jaws of pathology comes ... what? Does pathology have jaws? Maybe it has Jaws. Shit that movie scared me. I was fourteen when I saw it at the theater. Still thinking about it. See what I mean?

So I admire sophisticated film critics. They know all sorts of fancy things I don't know. They actually study movies and stuff. I mainly watch and think. I know a little bit. I was the main character in a student movie once (like, in 1983), may my friend who made it rest in peace. He was not a happy person but I liked him. I hope he destroyed the movie, which was inspired by A Clockwork Orange. My university had a well-known film department and people came from all over to major in filmmaking.

The guy who lived across the hall from me in the dorm became a famous Hollywood director. We talked about movies all the time. He took our group of friends to the art cinema to see this great young pair of brothers who had made a student film called Blood Simple. He said they would be famous. He was right. He also took us all to see Mystery Train, the Jim Jarmusch movie. We were all in Memphis where the film was set, so it was a lesson in how to use a city as a set. That now famous director explained many things to us. He doesn't answer my e-mails. So I won't name him.

Ironically, I had a bit part in another movie last year. I played an irritable and demanding Sollywood director, modeled roughly on Jim Jarmusch. I think he's a great director, but I'm a terrible actor. In one scene I lose my temper and smash a cell phone to bits. We had to do about twenty takes (very complicated scene with many moving parts), so I got to smash that phone twenty times (the props people had one that would fly into pieces but could be re-assembled). It was out of doors and started to rain before the director really got what he wanted, but he later said he made it work with what he had.

How? I have no idea how something like that is done. Fortunately, the movie is in Polish (my parts are in English, but the rest isn't), so that should discourage my friends from wanting to see it. I still have no idea how movies are really made. That's my point. Seems like magic to me. I am fascinated by movies in about the way a gorilla is fascinated by a big red ball. If I seem to know what I'm talking about regarding movies at any point in this book, I assure you it's an illusion.

So, I do know some things, but I don't know shit about the movies. This book is for people who don't know shit about the movies. People who do know shit will be disappointed, so they should stop reading.

Or not. But it's on you. If you keep reading and you find yourself saying "This idiot doesn't know what he's talking about," just remember, I said it first. Na-na-na-na-na. I hope this is out of the way. I am thinking of one of my colleagues at the university who is a professor of film studies, and I hope he doesn't read this. I admire him, but I don't wish to bear his opinion.

The Slow Death of My Imagination (and Yours)

What I do know about is what it's like to love movies. And so much so that they really do and always have been the images that fill my head and accompany both my waking and dreaming with narrative, shots and angles, continuities and discontinuities that make me wonder whether people who lived before movies existed didn't have a completely different sort of consciousness than we have.

Let me give an example. I read Tolkien's hobbit books long before anyone had tried to bring them to any kind of screen. I had a mental image of Bilbo and Frodo and Golem and Smaug. I know I did. But now I can only see Peter Jackson's versions of them. I am stuck with Elijah Wood. You probably are too. I can't even remember how I once imagined these characters that were so close to my heart. It's just gone. Same for the Harry Potter characters. Once I've seen a movie, it's like I can't unsee it and return to the power of images that was mine. My autonomy of imagination has been seized by some casting director or art director and becomes his/her permanent captive. There is a part of me that hates this, doesn't want to see the movie after I read the book. But I always do it anyway.

My lifetime coincides with the rise of "TV consciousness." By contrast, "movie consciousness" already existed when I appeared on the scene. My mother had read Gone with the Wind before it was a movie. They had no movie house where she grew up in rural Alabama. And the one that was closest was well beyond her family's reach and means—not a good use of money when having shoes to wear was a genuine luxury. I never asked her whether Clark Gable, et al., had replaced her imagined characters. But I know she loved the movie when she finally saw it. I have never read that book. I don't intend to, now that I realize it glorifies and sentimentalizes things I hate. But for people of my mother's generation, movies were magic beyond my imagining. They only knew the big screen.

If you grow up with TV, it can even be confusing to grasp the difference. You know it's different, but TV is not some Johnny-come-lately for people my age, like it was for my parents; it's the visual record of our lives. I can't easily imagine the world without it. Sort of like my students today try to imagine the world without cell phones —and fail. For my parents' generation, the movies played that role, that and the radio, especially radio theater. By the time I was cognizant, radio was for cool music and news, and that was about it. Movies were for family outings, and TV was for everyday entertainment. That's just how the world is, I grew up believing.

I now understand the story of TV and the movies better. Yet, none of us knew where it was going. I now had two lethal instruments to kill my imagination. By the time video games, computers, and cell phones arrived on the scene, I had little left to destroy. But you young people? How will your imaginations survive this barrage of images? If I do have some young readers, buckle-up kiddies, I'm taking you on a tour of the past so you can learn some things about how we arrived in the glorious present (and I grant it is pretty good to be alive right now, since I still am and so many others aren't).

A Little History (Very Little)

When television appeared on the mass market (late 1940s—and that is before my time, if you're wondering), people said it would kill the movies. People were wrong. If anything, the movies got more popular. The movie experience was different from TV, and—my point—so were the shows. Early television was more indebted to the theater than the movies. If TV killed anything, it was radio theater. I love watching those old TV shows, but they have no kinship to the movies of the same time. By the time I can remember any new movies they were very sophisticated. TV was simple and stupid: game shows, soap operas, situation comedies, cowboy serials, an occasional baseball game (man, I lived for the Saturday Game of the Week).

But soon enough, TV decided to try to compete. They were tired of paying exorbitant prices for the rights to air Hollywood movies. They said "fuck it, we'll make our own." In 1966, NBC started its World Premier Movie series, and ABC followed in 1969 with its Movie of the Week series. Most of these were B-quality movies, but people ate 'em up, sorta like they ate up B-movies from Hollywood. We like bad movies. We always liked bad movies. Quentin Tarantino taught us how good bad movies really are. I have a bit to say about him in what follows.

Once in a while something among the dull made-for-TV movies shined, like Stephen Spielberg's first feature film ever, Duel (1971), starring Dennis Weaver. That one even had a theatrical release in Europe in 1973. Christ on a cracker! The lines began to blur. There used to be a real distinction between TV stars and movie stars, and it wasn't easy to make the transition —Clint Eastwood managed it by taking risky roles in Spaghetti Westerns, but it paid off for him. The spell of the movie house's superiority was broken gradually as more and more movie stars began to realize that they needed to do TV. It took thirty years. The path is still rougher from TV to movies than from movies to TV. But the path into the movies as a starting place is no cakewalk either. You're an actor, you're waiting tables, someone says, "Hey, I got a commercial for you, pays $350." You take it.

Over time, there was a greater convergence of TV and the movies. As HBO and Cinemax emerged, the made-for-TV movies got better and better. Hollywood began releasing some of its (unpromising) movies straight to video so they could compete in the growing video rental market. People finally were staying home, preferring that to the arduous (not) trip to the multiplex cinema at the mall. They could have a beer at home, after all, and popcorn, for a lot less money. The cinema owners had to get creative. The seats got more comfortable, the beer became available (still highway robbery), and eventually they had to start selling total experiences.

Remember the Alamo

It was 1997. Enter the Alamo Draft House. The clever people in Austin realized that the experience of going-to-the-movies was actually what they needed to sell, and that the movie was important but not the only important thing. People would get a group of friends together and go see a movie they could easily watch on their increasingly large TVs at home, but do the Alamo for a night out. A classic movie was just as good (indeed, better) than a first run movie. Who doesn't want to see Casablanca on the big screen, again? Hell, I do. Here's looking at you Humphrey. They made a shit-ton of money and now they have, like, forty cities all over North America.

So, the wait staff seats us, takes our order (and the food is going to be good, too), brings it to us just as the main feature starts, comes by to refill our beer every half hour, and they will kill anyone who talks

or pulls out a cell phone, and it costs about the same as dinner out. Everyone here has seen this movie before. There are occasional comments. From the screen we hear: "It seems the Colonel has been shot," and we hear in our minds, as everyone thinks "Round up the usual suspects." The audience shares a public laugh. The experience is different from the living room couch, and we will pay for it.

Is the first-run movie in trouble? Yes and no. The Alamo doesn't need it, can take it or leave it. Still, the opportunities for high-end writers, directors, crews, and actors have never been better. A new type of TV series is appearing at about this same time—The Sopranos leads the way. No one grasps yet that this is going to change everything. These series offered ambitious directors, writers, and eventually actors, a path around what little was left of the Hollywood studio system. The HBO movies were often good enough to compete with the Hollywood films, so the Golden Globes (RIP) starts to offer an important series of awards for these films, and the recipients don't want to "thank the Academy and all the little people." You wanna talk about biting the hand that feeds you? Jesus.

Down but Not Out in Hollywood

At this moment in history, the idea of a bigger canvas to paint ^n---the story arc of a seven-season series—began to become a clear path to the sort of stardom that only the Hollywood blockbuster could have produced in earlier decades. The new Richard Burton is the unlikely Brian Cranston, straight from Malcolm in the Middle to Heisenberg and showbiz immortality. And shortly thereafter, the subscription services start to kill the video stores, and eventually Netflix and Hulu become as important in moviemaking as any major studio ever was. That was where the energy, the risk-taking, and the big budgets settled in. The talent followed the money. They have a way of doing that. You would too.

Hollywood was down but not out. They had to learn a few licks from their more adventurous new competitors, but they were still selling tickets. To give one example, Stephen King's epic coming-of-age horror novel It was released in 1986. By then, a number of King stories and novels had been made into successful shows of numerous sorts. Stand By Me, was breaking records at that very moment, critically acclaimed, taken seriously. This is not to mention The Shining (the critics hated it, the public loved it), The Dead Zone, and of course Carrie. Salem's Lot was a made-for-TV mini-series that worked (nominated for three Emmys and with European theater releases in a cut-down version).

But there was a problem with It. It was over 1100 pages long and featured seven main characters, none of whom could be consolidated or cut. And scene after scene was simply written as if for the screen. And everybody read the book. You just couldn't get It into a movie intact. So they tried a TV miniseries (1990). Not very satisfying, even with the creepy and oh-so-excellent Tim Curry as Pennywise the evil clown. Everyone who ever read the book wanted to see, well, every scene, excepting perhaps the orgy scene featuring eleven-year-old children. I couldn't even read that part. Geez Louise, Steve! Is nothing sacred? Could you just not do that, please? I'm going to leave that aside, and I wish Mr. King had done the same. Still, this novel is an astonishing organic whole and needed to be presented whole. Definite exception of an orgy among children.

It still hasn't been done as a whole, so let me play the prophet. To show, in passing, that Hollywood is down but not out: Hollywood's establishment center, from New Line Cinema to Warner Brothers, collaborated on a huge new production, in two parts, released in 2017 and 2019, of It. Part one became the fifth highest grossing R-rated film of all time (even adjusted for inflation) and the highest grossing

horror film of all time. People wanted It. And they went to the big screen to get It. Part two didn't do as well, but it grossed $473 million as of this writing.

Anyone can see the next thing that will happen. So maybe I'm not a prophet. There will be a Netflix or Hulu or HBO series—after all, that's how Hulu did, with fair success, the equally long King novel 11/22/63. I personally subscribed to Hulu just to see it, and we still have Hulu, so I guess that worked for them. They had the time, the space and the budget, so 11/22/63 was pretty well done. They spread it over eight two-hour episodes. But now my picture of the main character, Jake Epping, will always be James Franco, dammit. Couldn't they have gotten Tom Hanks?

The Disaster

And then, to bring this story to its ugly end, COVID. Great for Netflix and Hulu and HBO. A bummer for the cinemas. Who could have imagined the whole damn world locked in their living rooms for a fucking year? (Pardon my French. You will have much to pardon in this book.) There we were. With nothing to please us but ... HBO, Netflix, Hulu, and their lesser cousins. You want a conspiracy theory? How about HBO created COVID? But even the lucky (if luck it was) streaming services had to halt production on their new content. I have been waiting a very long time for the next season of Outlander…

Will the cinemas ever bounce back? Hard to say, but in my little town, they just re-opened the multi-plex cinema at the mall, and it had been closed for five years. I think some people are betting that there is likely a real itch in the pants of the public to get back out and into their comfy new stadium-style cinema seats. The pandemic keeps sucking, in waves, but beyond it? Probably movies. The movies and TV have merged and then re-emerged as new and better beasts than they were apart. The lines have been effectively erased and we still have both and better, if you ask me.

Like a lot of people, then, I have also spent a lot more time with movies of all kinds since the disaster. I took the time to see a bunch of movies for the first time that I had "always been meaning to see," and binged a bunch of series too, and I rewatched some of my favorites, including pretty much everything in this book. It is amazing to me how different things seem on the far side of this disaster—if we are on the far side, which is unclear as of spring 2022. A young friend of mine wrote an article recently in which he argued, convincingly, that the movies have lost the power they once had to bind us together, socially, culturally.) But he was talking about the old way of seeing the cinema and movies, pre-pandemic. I think something else is afoot now, something we couldn't have foreseen, something culturally and socially powerful.

I did not have that criterion specifically in mind when I chose the movies and series that are discussed in this book, but as I now survey the whole, ^ see that one thing a11 these shows have in common is tremendous social and cultural impact—some were mainly important at some time in history, like Lifeboat, while others have perpetual power, like Oz. Some are yet to exercise their full power, like His Dark Materials, but ^ am pretty confident people will say that all of these shows are "important" in some sense.

These movies and TV series end up covering, somewhat unevenly, pretty much the whole history of the movies, with representatives from about every decade since the advent of the talkies (with a cluster from the 1990s, admittedly). I wasn't trying to do that either, but I now appreciate the span that ended up getting covered. There was also an unintended predilection for American-made shows. The Brits will

get some serious creds when I discuss Monty Python and House of Cards, but pretty much it's a New World affair. In my view, the US has contributed very little to the world that is of lasting significance, but our movies and our music are exceptions. It's not that Americans are better at this than other places and peoples, it's that Americans are not good, in the scope of history, at very many things (making money is an exception, too), and in movies and music, we actually do have something permanent to contribute.

The criteria I actually used in selecting the shows were opportunity and preference. In terms of opportunity, often someone was doing a book and I was invited to contribute. Or in the case of Oz, I was (co-)doing the book and contributed. Many of the chapters in this book appeared, in a different form, in other books. They have been updated and rewritten into a single narrative here. In terms of preference, all of these shows made me think, as I said, and I liked that and liked something (or many things) about these shows, and all of them led me to trace my reflections on the action, dialogue, photography, etc., into what I know about philosophy. So, that's what every chapter does, in some way. The shows are platforms for thinking philosophically. And that brings me to this next (and final) topic.

Movies and Metaphysics: Better Together

This book is going to take cinema and TV together under the name "the movies." There are a few things I will talk about that never made it to the big screen. I will talk about South Park, for example, but after all, there was a very successful movie (war with Canada!). Even the most movie-ish of movies eventually shows up on our increasingly huge home theater screens. I don't see any point in treating these shows as fundamentally different. Even if they once were, they aren't for us today. It's all the movies.

But, as I said, what does any of this really have to do with philosophy? A lot, actually. I think that most people find themselves thinking about the philosophical ideas they see depicted in the movies —they're everywhere. But more important is the thinking we do on our own as a result of the movies. Most movies, even bad ones, have themes and moral dilemmas and existential struggles that we understand and identify with.

I watched Forbidden Planet for the first time recently. It is awful, in an excellent way. I had meant to see it ever since I was an undergraduate and was seeing The Rocky Horror Picture Show every week—they sing about that movie in the wonderful opening number. It took over thirty-five years and COVID to provide the opportunity. But there you are: the well-meaning Mad Scientist has externalized his own ego-id complex and now it's trying to have sex with his daughter, Anne Francis.

You think I could write an essay on that? Hell, anybody could. As if that macho astronaut-hero doesn't have in mind to do the same thing to Anne. (And as if the male half, and some of the females in the audience aren't following that same naughty path of unconscious desire from their seats.) The distance between Stephen King's actual gangbang of Beverly Marsh in It and the imminent situation of Anne Francis in that movie is, well, the distance is not great. And it's icky, and we don't want to see it, but we sort of do want to think it, unconsciously, from a safe and condemning distance.

And that's only the beginning of the boundaries that movies allow us to transgress in our minds, while feeling shocked in our senses and sensibilities. In this book I will connect some of the movies to some of the issues. Nobody could get at all the issues. But I'll cover a pretty big spread here. I hope it confirms some of what you already thought about. I also hope it gives you new things to think about and guides you to some of the philosophers in our history who explored those thoughts.

But why metaphysics and not, say, epistemology or ethics? The first reason is personal. Everything I touch turns to metaphysics anyway, and I can't help it. I'm like Joyce Taylor in "Rappaccini's Daughter" (from Twice Told Tales, 1963, one of Vincent Price's best performances, in my opinion). I have been slowly poisoned by a life of metaphysics and now am unable to touch anything without killing it ontologically. I note that the first vignette in that movie is "Dr. Heidegger's Experiment," and it seems almost impossible to me that Nathaniel Hawthorne could have, in 1837, understood what Heidegger would write in 1927, but seeing is believing. "Time takes its toll," as Riff Raff famously said. I'll take on that Heidegger problem in Chapter 5.

So, in my weird brain (and I have the scans to prove it is in fact weird), ethics and politics and logic and aesthetics all just become types of metaphysics. Whether I was born that way or got that way by drip-drops is immaterial. Second, metaphysics is, they say, the Queen of the Sciences. I looked around and found there was no King of the Sciences, which suits me just fine, so I settled for the highest ranking royal available, and I assume it commands all the others. About like the venerable Elizabeth II so successfully controls her own family ... (and who among us didn't watch The Crown? Fess up). So in the end, this is both metaphysics in the movies and a metaphysics of the movies. You'll see.

In my opinion, you can justify the time spent here, to yourself and others, by feeling like you're learning something. Or you can just have fun with it. I'm doing some of both. I watch these movies and I think. Having thought I want to discuss. Having discussed I want to write. Having written I want someone to read it. That's your job. I hope you enjoy your work. <>

ASCETICISM, ESCHATOLOGY, OPPOSITION TO PHILOSOPHY: THE ARABIC TRANSLATION AND COMMENTARY OF SALMON BEN YEROHAM ON QOHELET (ECCLESIASTES) by James T. Robinson [Études sur le Judaïsme Médiéval, Karaite Texts and Studies, Brill, 9789004191341]

Salmon b. Yeroham (fl. 930-960) – foundational figure in the Jerusalem school of Karaite exegesis – produced a substantial and influential corpus of polemical writing and biblical interpretation, including commentaries on Psalms, Proverbs, Job, Song of Songs, Lamentations, Qohelet, Esther, Ruth, and Daniel. **ASCETICISM, ESCHATOLOGY, OPPOSITION TO PHILOSOPHY: THE ARABIC TRANSLATION AND COMMENTARY OF SALMON BEN YEROHAM ON QOHELET (ECCLESIASTES)** presents a first critical edition of the Judaeo-Arabic Qohelet commentary together with an annotated English translation. The introduction situates Salmon's work in the history of Jewish Qohelet exegesis, explains Salmon's method of translating Qohelet into Arabic, identifies his sources and discusses his method of interpretation. The main themes Salmon finds in "Solomon's" book of wisdom – central themes in the early Karaite movement in general – will be explored at length, especially asceticism, eschatology, and an uncompromising opposition to reading "foreign books."

Review

"Robinson's edition is exemplary...This volume is an important addition to any collection of Karaitica, medieval Jewish biblical exegesis and Judeo-Arabic studies." -Pinchas Roth, Tikvah Scholar at the NYU Tikvah Center

This is a very different book than the one I set out to write three years ago. The original plan was a single-volume history of medieval Jewish Qohelet commentaries that would update, expand, and supplant the pioneering survey of C.D. Ginsberg. But the more I worked on the different stages of this history, the more the book divided into separate units: first into a series of volumes organized by tradition—the Karaites, Spanish Peshat, French Peshat, the Philosophers, the Kabbalists, and the late medieval and early Renaissance commentaries; and then, when I realized that there is just too much basic research still to be done: that there are too many texts still languishing in manuscript, that we lack a complete foundation for writing such a history, I settled on a much larger project—a book-by-book, commentary-by-commentary study of the history of Qohelet exegesis, a serial history which will lay the groundwork for a synthetic study of the commentaries on and reception of a very difficult, always challenging, usually controversial, ever appealing biblical text: "Solomon's" Book of Ecclesiastes.

The groundwork for this history was, in many ways, already laid in my dissertation-book on Samuel Ibn Tibbon.3 This present volume can be considered the second in the series. In terms of chronology, however, Salmon ben Yero ^ham's commentary comes first: it is the earliest Jewish commentary on Qohelet that has come down to us. To follow will be a book dedicated to Yefet b. #Eli (to be published in Karaite Texts and Studies), then separate volumes on David b. Boaz, Isaac Ibn Ghiyath, Abdal-Barakát al-Baghdád¯í, Isaac Ibn Latif, Tan ^hum ha-Yerushalmi, and Immanuel of Rome—for starters. Each volume will give the opportunity to explore the commentary in exegetical, social, cultural, literary, and intellectual context. The goal is a "total" history of exegesis (though never possible, always worth

aspiring to), exploring each commentary in relation to the biblical text it is commenting on, the history of the biblical book's reception, and the intellectual world of the commentator that made possible his exegesis of it.

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Qohelet In Karaism

> All the words of Sulaymán in this book lead to the proclaiming of divine unity, to acting with obedience and doing good work, to the teaching of reward and punishment, and to the renunciation of this world. -Salmon b. Yero^ham, commentary on Qoh 3:11'

> Sulaymán the sage adds here warning and threat regarding the desire for foreign books, saying: "More than these my son beware" (Qoh 12:12)—that is, beware lest you come to desire books other than the revealed holy books ... We learn that any speculation in and occupation with any book other than the books of the prophets is forbidden for Israel, for it leads to the beliefs of the Gentiles. -Salmon b. Yero ^ham, commentary on Qoh 12:122

The "Middle Ages" in Jewish history began not with the Fall of Rome in the fourth century but with the rise and spread of Islam in the seventh and eighth. The Islamic conquests of Persia, Mesopotamia, Syria, Palestine, Egypt, North Africa and Spain completely changed the political landscape of world Jewry, as suddenly the majority of Jews throughout the world were living under Muslim rule. Jews were no longer subject to the policies of the Romans, Persians, Byzantines, and Christians. Instead they were allowed relative autonomy under Muslim leaders. This shift in political power also changed Judaism's relationship with Christianity since both Jews and Christians were minorities ruled by Islam. They were equally "peoples of the book" subject to the same restrictive legislation.

In literary and cultural history an epochal change took place one century later. Up until the ninth century most of Jewish literature was still very much in continuity with Rabbinic Judaism as it had developed in late antiquity. Writing took place in Hebrew or Aramaic, and communities throughout the Islamic world looked to the Talmudic Academies in the East for legal and religious guidance. In the ninth century, and especially in the tenth, this continuity was broken. Arabic displaced Aramaic and Hebrew as the primary language of Jewish culture, new forms and methods of writing—often very individualistic and untraditional—developed, and Karaism, a Biblicist movement, emerged as a rival to the Rabbinic establishment. It seems that the Karaites were the first Jews to adopt Arabic as the primary language of discourse and the first to cultivate the new genres and approaches to traditional texts, including systematic Biblical commentary, which appears for the first time at precisely this time.

Among the many Karaite contributions to Jewish thought and literature during this formative transitional period was a unique and distinctive interpretation of Qohelet—a "contemptus mundi" reading, to borrow a term applied to early Christian commentaries. The Karaites saw "Sulaymán's" book of wisdom as encapsulating many of the movement's core ideas and aspirations. They considered it a theological

Ya`qúb al-Qirqisán¯í, Salmon b. Yero^ham, Yefet b. `Eli, and David b. Boaz. In contrast, the first Rabbanite commentary was not written until the eleventh-century in Spain by Isaac ibn Ghiyath.

The goal of this chapter is to set out the background relating to the emergence of Karaism in general and the Karaite reading of Qohelet in particular. The various views about the origins and early development of the movement will be surveyed briefly and the main figures introduced before turning to the commentaries produced during the "golden age." Attention will also be given to secondary use of Qohelet in Karaite writings—in works of grammar, lexicography, polemics, and theology. In the following chapters Salmon b. Yero^ham's commentary will be the primary focus of our investigation. Here in this chapter Salmon's work will be situated in a much larger historical and literary context.

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In Antiquity, translation played an important role in liturgy, popular instruction, and exegesis. The Greek, Syriac, Armenian, Georgian, Coptic, Ethiopic and Latin translations of the Bible laid the foundations for the emerging Christian cultures of the Near East, whereas the Aramaic Targumim served the Rabbinic communities in Palestine and Babylonia. With the rise of Islam and the general assimilation of non-Muslims into the Arabic-Islamic world, translation of Scripture became a subject of great concern once again during the Middle Ages. Christians, Samaritans, Rabbanites and Karaites all produced different, sometimes competing translations of the Bible into Arabic.

Within these different communities, most attention was given to the Torah, the central text of the religious cult. But the other Biblical books were translated as well, often several times. This is certainly true of Qohelet. Assuming that the commentaries by Dáwid al-Muqammi^s and Ya`q^b alQirqisán¯í included translations, Qohelet was rendered into Arabic no less than eight different times during a period of about two hundred years: by Dáw ^d al-Muqammi^s, Ya`q^b al-Qirqisán¯í, Salmon b. Yero ^ham, Yefet b. `Eli, David b. Boaz, Anonymous (Brit. Lib. Or. 2552; IMHM 6329), along with the two Rabbanite exegetes Isaac ibn Ghiyath and Ab ^al-Barakát al-Baghdád¯í. Among other things this means that Salmon's translation is the earliest Judaeo-Arabic rendering of Qohelet that currently survives. For this reason alone it deserves special attention.

The Karaite translations of the Torah have received full monograph treatment by Meira Polliack. Through careful linguistic, literary and historical study of the surviving translations by the Jerusalem Karaites Yefet b. `Eli, David b. Boaz, Yeshu#ah b. Yehudah, #Al¯í b. Sulaymán, and Anonymous, in comparison with the Rabbanite translation by Saadia Gaon, she has shown that the competing traditions developed very different approaches to rendering the Torah into Arabic. The Jerusalem Karaites were hyper-literal in their approach, sometimes creating a very artificial translation language which imitated the original Hebrew. In contrast, Saadia translated much more idiomatically and aimed toward consistency with classical Arabic usage. To say it in a slightly different way: The Jerusalem Karaites privileged the source text and source language over the target text and target language; they forced Arabic to accommodate the peculiar needs of Biblical Hebrew; they brought the target reader to the source text and not vice versa. Saadia did just the opposite: he adapted Biblical Hebrew to Arabic thus producing a readable target text; he made readability and accessibility in Arabic the primary goal; he brought the source text to the target reader and not vice versa.

Salmon b. Yero^ham, who produced the first known translations in the Jerusalem Karaite tradition, represents an intermediate position.' In general he translates Qohelet literally, even hyper-literally: He translates word-for-word, reproduces the Hebrew word order even when awkward in Arabic, and prefers to translate with Arabic cognates and lexical equivalents. Yet he often abandons the literal approach, varying his word choice and changing word order, introducing unstated referents, paraphrasing and providing alternative translations, expanding the text in order to solve a textual problem or eliminate an impious interpretation, and changing the text to fit standard Arabic usage. The result is a translation that is literal yet readable; and which, more important than anything, works closely with the commentary, supporting and representing, really mirroring the interpretive work of the commentator. In other words, the translation is not simply a hyper-literal rendering to work off of or against, a starting point or background against which the exegete can show his work. It is very much a part of the interpretive process itself; it is an integral part of the commentary.

Throughout the notes to the English translation in Part II, I provide specific discussion of Salmon's translation technique with reference to M. Polliack's book and other sources; I include remarks about terminology, grammar and syntax, alternative translations, pious interpolations, and comparisons with the other Arabic translations. Here in this chapter, in order to introduce Salmon's Arabic translation of Qohelet more generally, the focus will be on the verses in Qohelet which include Salmon's explicit remarks about his translation. There are more than twenty such comments which cover a range of subjects and reveal much about the translator's sources, methods, and ideals, from his reflections on translating prepositions and particles to the rendering of figures of speech and euphemisms. A selection of these remarks will be presented with a view to bringing out the relationship between translation and interpretation, that is, to highlighting the interpretive repercussions of the translator's choice of one word or phrase over another. To provide some contrast Salmon's translation will be given together with the King James Version (KJV, 1611). I will occasionally refer to the later Arabic translations mentioned above as well, also for comparative purposes: to identify continuity and show contrast. <>

CREATION: THE STORY OF BEGINNINGS by Jonathan Grossman, translated by Sara Daniel [The Noam Series, The Michael Scharf Publication Trust of Yeshiva University Press, Maggid Books, 9781592645039]

In **CREATION: THE STORY OF BEGINNINGS**, Jonathan Grossman unveils the hidden meaning of the first eleven chapters of Genesis. His insightful and creative literary analysis interweaves theology, psychology, and philosophy, extracting a fresh and refreshing understanding of the biblical text. Drawing upon the words of the sages and the great medieval commentators, and employing contemporary literary tools, Grossman journeys back to the beginning of creation to show how human initiative goes hand in hand with both sin and progress. This volume is part of the Maggid Tanakh Companion series and is published in partnership with YU Press.

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Excerpt: In Jewish tradition, peshat or "plain sense" exegesis is often regarded as a gold standard for interpreting the Hebrew Bible (Tanakh). Much ink has been spilled defining peshat exegesis. By now it is clear that peshat is not simply "the literal sense:' After all, the Bible — like any literary work — often employs figurative language. Is peshat the "original intention"? Is it the way the text was understood by its original audience? Is it the sense determined through philological analysis? How does peshat relate to midrash? These questions can hardly be answered in this context. Yet they are relevant to consider when reading Jonathan Grossman's Creation: The Story of Beginnings, which to my mind illustrates the potential richness of peshat interpretation in a contemporary setting. Firmly rooted in the multi-faceted tradition of parshanut hamikra (Jewish Bible interpretation), this work also engages fully with modern scholarship while opening new avenues in understanding the cultural-religious significance of the Hebrew BBu(h)8.8(m)8.199999809(o)(ly)n,. ic

peshat rather than its singularity was already evident in the formative medieval period — and continues to this day.

Indeed, modern critical theory questions the very notion that "the text itself" ever has a singular meaning. As the British literary critic Frank Kermode has remarked, "the plain sense ... must be of the here and now rather than of the origin," since "the body of presuppositions which determines our notions of the plain sense is always changing:' The plain sense thus depends on the imaginative activity of interpreters who provide Scripture with a variety of contexts, some imposed by authority and tradition, others b^ the need to make sense of the ancient text in a different world ("The Plain Sense of Things," Midrash and Literature, ed. G. H. Hartman and S. Budick [New Haven 1986], 190-191). While peshat exegesis aims, in some sense, to illuminate an original meaning, it also necessarily bridges chronological and cultural gaps between the Bible and its readers.

Both the classical tradition of Jewish peshat interpretation and modern critical theory inform Jonathan Grossman's Creation: The Story of Beginnings. This rich and highly learned volume also incorporates midrashic material, modern Bible scholarship, and contemporary Jewish thought. Grossman extracts new meaning from the biblical text, drawing upon the words of the sages and the great medieval commentators, such as Ibn Ezra and Nahmanides, both of whom recognized the symbolic dimensions of the opening chapters of Genesis. Grossman lays the theoretical groundwork for his readings of Genesis 1—11 by discussing the representational nature of the Creation, Eden, and Flood narratives, which "depict ... the raw materials, the basic elements, of our familiar world as they come into being:' In the opening chapters of Genesis, as Grossman observes, we witness "a world where primal boundaries have not yet been stabilized, where giants walk and terrorize all around:' These chapters are "the stuff of myth and legend, of a wild prehistorical age, where heaven seeps into earth, and men live for centuries alongside giants. The world has not yet been tamed into the familiar, natural, mostly realistic setting of the rest of the Bible:' Maimonides advanced this sort of approach in the twelfth century, drawing upon rabbinic learning and Greco-Arabic philosophical and literary conceptions; Grossman offers a twenty-first-century account using the tools made available by contemporary scholarship and the rich Jewish tradition.

According to Grossman's reading, the opening narratives of Genesis depict humanity gradually achieving independence from God — a theme that continues throughout the Book of Genesis, as Grossman himself has argued in earlier published works. While the lineage of Abraham becomes the focus of Genesis from chapter 12 onward, its first chapters "are universal stories, and there is therefore room for comparison between biblical etiology and parallel stories from the ancient Near East that depict the creation of the world and humanity." Within these stories Grossman finds universal messages in the Bible relevant for all of humanity.

A fine example of Grossman's insightful reading of the biblical narrative relates to the Garden of Eden episode, which endows the familiar story with new meaning through literary-structural analysis. According to Grossman, it is a "story of autonomy achieved by rebellion," through which every person stakes his or her own path, becoming "aware of his or her own body and its mortality." Grossman cites Sigmund Freud, who describes how an individual achieves freedom from the authority of his parents at the cost of the pain of independence. Within this reading, the serpent represents an internal voice aroused within mankind — bringing him out of the innocence of childhood into turbulent adolescence. Placed at the Tree of Knowledge, the serpent invites Eve to become "like God, knowing Good and Evil."

Were it not for the serpent, Eve would not have even taken notice of the forbidden tree. The serpent induces her to perceive its bold, bright colors — and succumb to their temptation.

Adam and Eve believed that rebelling against God by eating the forbidden fruit would bring them independence, autonomy, and control over their own lives. Their punishments, howeve, reveal the harsh truth adolescents inevitably learn as they become adults: freedom comes at the cost of the heavy — sometimes even crushing — burden of adult responsibilities. Rebellion leads to a new sort of enslavement, not the absolute liberation initially imagined. Informed by the perspective of modern psychology, Grossman offers the following paraphrase of the biblical text:

Woman will long for man, and he will rule over her; man will toil away at the earth, and reap in sorrow for the rest of his life. Woman's freedom is handed over to others; man no longer controls the ground that he must work and keep, and it will bring forth thorns and thistles along with man's hard-earned bread. The serpent's promise of godlike power and freedom is eclipsed by the daily struggle of survival this freedom exacts.

And as Grossman concludes:

> In this narrative, maturity is presented as a painful process.... Knowledge comes at a heavy price, shattering the child's world of blissful ignorance. The rebellious teenager leads himself to a world tainted with sin and burdened with toil, but the ground is waiting for him, waiting for him to break the crust of the soil and tease out its fruits....

In this way, the Garden of Eden plays a dual role in the narrative: it is a physical site, the source of four mighty rivers and the setting of humanity's first drama, but it also functions as a symbolic site that every person passes through over the course of his or her development.

Grossman here echoes Nahmanides, who wrote that "the Garden of Eden exists somewhere in this world," along with "the four rivers and the Tree of Life and the Tree of Knowledge," since "everything appearing in Scripture in the Creation section is true in its literal sense:' Yet Nahmanides goes on to say that "the matters are twofold in meaning": they "all are literal (kemashma ám) ... true and firmly established, but also are written to convey a wondrous mystery (sod)" (Kitvei Ramban, Chavel ed., 11:295-297). Nahmanides in the thirteenth century evinced the symbolic meaning of the Creation narrative through Kabbalah. Grossman does so using tools provided by contemporary scholarship and thought — both Jewish and non-Jewish.

The serpent in the Garden has long been identified with the "evil inclination" (yetzer hara) in Jewish (and Christian) tradition. Grossman's nuanced reading of this myth-like creature is based more directly on Rabbi Abraham Isaac HaKohen Kook's depiction of the "evil inclination hidden deep in the depths of the soul" as "a bone-rotting envy that drenches any hint of light in dismal darkness:' This "is envy of God," as "humanity envies God for His infinite joy, His absolute perfection. This envy," continues Rabbi Kook, "distorts reason and plunges sense into darkness.... It results in utter heresy" (Shemona Kevatzim,1:129). Grossman takes this "heresy" as a reference to Nietzsche, for whom the ideal man (Ubermensch; "over-man" or "super-man") must break the shackles of religion, effectively replacing God. Yet Rabbi Kook's characterization implies a spark of light in this darkness, since the desire to be "like God" is a creative force that at once is the source of rebellion and idealism. As Grossman writes:

Reality and Symbolism

Everything follows its beginning," quotes Rabbi Haim Vital in the name of Rabbi Isaac Luria, the Ari, and even without delving into deep kabbalistic secrets, we intuitively feel its truth in many realms of our lives. The root of something reveals much about its nature, and exposing its point of origin often illuminates its entire process. This is certainly true when we shift our gaze to how the world came into being, indeed how being itself began. These primeval narratives reveal the nature of the world and its purpose, and the nature of humanity and man's role in the world. At the same time, they reveal those first primordial conflicts and failures that are imprinted deep, deep within the world's formation and being.

The primordial nature of these narratives affects their style and design. The first eleven chapters of Genesis are clearly distinct from the rest of Genesis and the Bible as a whole, in regard to their content, style, and atmosphere. Beginning with God's revelation to Abraham in chapter ii, the narrative takes on the classic biblical historical style. Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob are realistic, fleshedout characters, whose lives resemble the paths our own lives take. While most of us, of course, are not approached by God, or even while the sages made various attempts to identify the Tree of Life and the Tree of Knowledge as actual species, suggesting that the forbidden fruit was either the citron, the fig, wheat, or grapes, the most straightforward reading is that of Ibn Ezra:

> Many hold that the Tree of Knowledge was a fig tree, as they "sewed fig leaves." Howeve, if this was so, it would have read this way: `And they sewed the leaves of the Tree of Knowledge." Many also say that it was wheat. I believe that these two trees were inside the Garden of Eden, and cannot be found anywhere else on earth.

As we will see below, Ibn Ezra is generally wary of charging the text with symbolism, but his approach towards the Tree applies to the wider context of the story, which is painted in the bold, bright colors of ancient myth. This is a vastly different palette than the realistic shades of the rest of the Bible.

This is true not only of the Eden narrative, but of the rest of the stories in this section. The Creation narrative depicts the raw materials, the basic elements, of our familiar world as they come into being; the Flood narrative paints a world immersed in primal waters, a world where primal boundaries have not yet been stabilized, where giants walk and terrorize all around. This is the stuff of myth and legend, of a wild prehistorical age, where heaven seeps into earth,

visited by angels, such interactions are a normal part of the biblical narrative, and they are an integral part of the more routine aspects of the forefathers' lives, such as birth, marriage, and death. This kind of biblical realism is not present in Genesis ^—11. These narratives present an entirely different biblical reality. For example, when the serpent opens up its mouth and speaks to the woman in the Garden of Eden, she is not surprised, and casually responds. In contrast, when Balaam is addressed by his donkey, the narrator explains that this is a miracle, that "God opened up its mouth," and Balaam recoils in shock, just as we would if we were to witness it ourselves. The serpent's capacity for speech, however, seems part of life in Eden, and loss of speech is not mentioned as part of its punishment, which implies that the text views its uncanny ability to speak as nothing unusual.

Nahmanides notes this phenomenon and views it as proof that the serpent is also a symbol of something mystical:

> Know, believe, that the Garden of Eden is within the Land, and so is the Tree of Life and the Tree of Knowledge, and from there the river flowed out and separated into four rivers we are familiar with, for the Euphrates is in our own land and within-our own borders, and the Pishon is the Nile of Egypt, as the sages say. But while they are on earth, they all have heavenly counterparts, which are their elemental counterpart, as it says, "Let the king bring me into his chamber".... These are the chambers of Eden, from here they said, the work of the heavens is like the work of the Garden of Eden (Song of Songs Zuta 1:4). The rivers are parallel to the four heavenly camps, from where the powers of earthly rule are drawn ... and the serpent does not have the power of speech today, and if it had in the first place it disappeared with its curse, for it was the fiercest curse of all! But all these are double entities, truly revealed and secret together.

Nahmanides emphasizes that not only can the serpent be read as a mystic symbol, but also the rivers, and the entire narrative. and men live for centuries alongside giants. The world has not yet been tamed into the familiar, natural, mostly realistic setting of the rest of the Bible.

This does not mean, of course, that the first chapters of Genesis are tantamount to the myths of the ancient world. In fact, a comparison with myths from other cultures reveals yawning disparities, not only in content but in moral and theological premise and atmosphere.' Yet, these first stories should be read as a unique biblical genre in themselves, as stories that predate and illuminate familiar history, its premises, and its purpose.

This paradigm has several implications. I especially wish to focus on the question of interpreting these stories as vehicles of symbolic meaning. This substantial question can be applied generally to the rest of the Bible as well: When should something be read as a symbol for a more abstract concept?

This question is exemplified in a fascinating midrashic debate about the Burning Bush, in the form of a dialogue between R. Yehoshua b. Karha and "a certain non Jew":

> A certain non Jew asked R. Yehoshua b. Karha, "Why did the Holy One, blessed be He, decide to speak to Moses from within a bush?"
> He said to him, "Had it been from a carob or sycamore, you would have asked the same question. But as I cannot leave you without an answer, why from a bush? To teach you that there is nowhere without Divine Presence, even a bush:'

The fact that the Midrash places this question in the mouth of a non Jew undermines its legitimacy. R. Yehoshua's initial response cautions against loading symbolic meanings onto narrative elements. Yet his next statement is somewhat confusing. Why does he feel compelled to further answer him if he believes that the bush does not necessarily have symbolic meaning in itself? Moreover, his answer is a typical midrashic didactic answer, one without any show of contempt for the questioner. And strangest of all, this midrash is part of a series of midrashim where various sages ask the very same question as that non Jew and propose various answers, and the midrash itself goes on to list eight different explanations that charge the Burning Bush with symbolism. To cite just two of them:

• R. Yohanan: Just as the bush serves as a fence for a garden, Israel serves as a fence for the world.

- ^ Another option: Just as a bush can flourish only with water, Israel can flourish only with the Torah, which is called water, as it says [regarding the word of God], `Áll who are thirsty, come to the water" (Is. 55:1).

The logical flow of this midrash, therefore, has a keen effect, where the initial impression is that this question lacks legitimacy, but is then swiftly echoed and thereby legitimized by Israel's own sages. While the question of when and whether narrative elements can be ascribed a symbolic meaning exceeds the scope of this discussion, in the context of Genesis 1—11, this issue has special weight. I wish to recall Nahmanides' interpretation of the serpent in Eden in light of the polar debate between medieval commentators. Rabbi Obadiah Sforno begins his commentary of the Eden narrative with a declaration that the serpent is merely a metaphor:

> The serpent is the devil, the evil inclination.... For some entities are described in ways that are similar to it, just like the king is called a "lion," as it says, "The lion has come up from its copse" (Jer. 4:7), and dangerous enemies are called "poisonous serpents," as it says, "I am about to unleash poisonous serpents against you" (Jer. 8:17). In the same way, the Omnipresent refers to the enticing Evil Inclination as a "serpent," because it is similar to the serpent, whose benefit is minimal and whose harm is great.

Following the sages, Sforno identifies the serpent with the devil, with the evil inclination. Note, however, that he is not merely claiming that the evil inclination is like a serpent. Rather, he considers the serpent an actual metapho, and its narrative a parable. Just as a king is referred to as a lion, or an enemy is likened to a snake, without any real lions or snakes involved, the evil inclination is referred to as a serpent in this narrative, without any actual serpents present in the scene. The advantage of this reading is that it easily justifies the serpent's human speech and intelligence, and the fact that it lures the woman to sin, since real serpents do not speak any human language, nor lure people to sin.

In contrast to Sforno, the Ibn Ezra writes:

> Some say that the woman understood the language of animals ... while others said it is the devil. But then how can they explain the end of the scene? How will "the devil" crawl on his belly, and eat dust? And what is the point of the curse "He will strike your head"?... Rather, it seems to me that things are as they are, and the serpent originally walked upright, and He who made humans sentient beings also made it a sentient being. As the verse itself testifies, it was craftier than any other creature, just not as much as a human.

Ibn Ezra is opposed to the idea that the serpent is an embodiment of the evil inclination, and he supports his position with the fact that the actual serpent — the familiar snake that crawls on its belly and bites people — is cursed at the end of the story. Why would such a curse be relevant if the serpent were merely a symbol of the evil inclination?

This dispute is a good example of the deliberation that accompanies the reading of the Eden narrative, and the first eleven chapters of Genesis in general. Do the regular rules of allegory apply, or does the unique mythical nature of these narratives invite a reading more heavily inclined towards symbolic understanding? Even those who believe that the historical narratives (beginning with Abraham) should be read as historical accounts with minimal symbolic weight must admit that the question is more complex when applied to Genesis 1—11.

I believe that a certain compromise can be reached between Ibn Ezra and Sforno. Sforno is correct that these narratives have substantial metaphorical weight; the creation account is not merely a historical

event, but reflects a fundamental approach to reality. We will yet explore how the story of Eden takes place in every generation, within every individual. From this perspective, it is an archetypal narrative that certainly tends towards the allegorical. Yet these primeval stories are not merely theological allegory. If this were the case, its allegorical nature would presumably have been more obvious. And, with the exception of the Eden narrative, there are no scenes of a fantastical nature. These narratives function on the premise that they actually took place.

The solution lies in a simple semantic substitution with great implications: rather than the term "parable" or "allegory," the appropriate term to use is "symbol." Unlike a parable, which dissipates with interpretation, the literary symbol remains substantial, adding another layer of significance on top of the literal meaning of the text. To claim that the Burning Bush is a symbol does not negate its actual existence — its leaves and branches, its color and shape, its form. It only means that this bush, beyond its botanical existence, also represents certain abstract ideas. The same is true of the first eleven chapters of Genesis. To paraphrase the aforementioned words of Nahmanides, while these narratives take place on earth, they also have heavenly counterparts. Each historical event, and each element of these narratives, express certain abstract concepts as well.

One of the boldest philosophers in this context is Rabbi Abraham Isaac HaKohen Kook. Discussing the relationship between the biblical narratives and parallel stories from the ancient Near East, he writes that they should be considered symbolic ideas more than actual historical events. As he responds to Dr. Moshe Seidel, who often consulted with him about philosophical and ideological issues:

> In regard to this, I believe that anyone with proper sense should know that even if there is no truth whatsoever in [the new studies about the formation of the biblical text], there is no need to deny their actual questions, because it is not the Torah's purpose to relate simple facts and events that took place. The main part is its content, its inner reflection about its ideas, and this can be elevated yet further wherever there is an apparent contradiction we are encouraged to overcome. Most of these ideas have already been stated by the medieval commentaries, and above all in Guide for the Perplexed, and today we are prepared to develop these ideas further.

It makes no difference whether there was an actual golden age when humankind exulted in all the physical and spiritual goodness, or whether reality began from the bottom, from the lowest level of being and continually rises. All we need to know is that there is the ultimate possibility that humanity, even if it reaches utter greatness, can lose everything if its ways are corrupt, and can bring evil upon itself and many generations that follow, and this is what we can learn from the reality of humankind in the Garden of Eden, its sin, and its expulsion.

The understanding that the genre of these stories is close to myth shapes our reading, and may also influence the interpretation of specific verses. An apt example is the definition of "day" in the creation narrative. John Day, a noted Bible scholar, challenges the claim that the creation narrative is merely symbolic:

> Moreover, the text clearly speaks of creation in seven, or rather six, days, and since each day has an evening and a morning it is hardly plausible that we should interpret the days as geological periods, as some apologists have sometimes supposed.

However, while he is correct that the first narrative in the Torah is a description of actual events rather than a mere parable, his claim that each day represents a regular twenty-four-hour period is misguided. If this narrative were part of the historical narrative of Genesis ii and on, he would be correct. There is

no justification for interpreting, "Be prepared for the third day, for on the third day the Lord will descend before all the eyes of the people upon Mount Sinai" (Ex. 19:11), as a symbol for three stages of preparation before the revelation at Sinai. Here, three days means three days. Even if these three days have further symbolic meaning, their primary meaning is a simple chronological description. Given that the creation narrative is rooted in the symbolic sphere, however, each "day" may well be a stage in the process of the "six days of creation" leading up to the Sabbath, without necessarily entailing the actual passing of time. I concur with the reading that each "day" marks a certain "peri^d." This is certainly supported by the fact that three "days" pass before the creation of the celestial bodies that dictate Earth's diurnal course. While day and night are defined on the first day, with the creation of light, the passing of each day is described with the phrase Ánd there was evening (erev) and there was morning (boker)," words that denote the movement of the setting sun (maariva) marking the onset of night, and the rising sun lighting up the dawn. How can these phrases have literal meaning before the creation of the sun and moon?

We will yet discuss the significance of a week of days leading up to the Sabbath. The week necessarily consists of days, but this does not of necessity mean that the sky was created in twenty-four hours, on the second day of creation. What is important is to distinguish between various stages of creation and to define them as "days" that comprise a "week," as a chronological paradigm to perpetually recall how the world came into being.

This example, of course, is but a window into the vast sea of deliberations that accompany these chapters. On one hand, the Tree of Life certainly functions as a symbol, but on the other hand, the shame of nakedness is real, as are the clothes that cover it up. Our task is to navigate these stories by walking the fine line between symbol and reality, which is to appreciate the symbolic interpretation as a convenient, sometimes obvious solution, while recognizing the historic reality that the narrative seeks to illuminate. The boundary between symbol and reality is diaphanous, and we will flit back and forth as we attempt to explain reality and, at the same time, give it meaning.

Is Genesis 1-11 an Independent Unit?
In order to focus on these chapters, we must first assume that they form a distinct, cohesive section. Unlike the Abraham cycle or the Jacob cycle, which each revolve around a single protagonist and are thus easily defined, Genesis 1—11 rushes through the first two millennia of world history, with no single central character or narrative, yet everyone who divides up the book of Genesis defines the first eleven chapters as a separate section. This is undoubtedly related to their unique character, the prehistorical atmosphere that ends with the birth of Abraham. This section, therefore, can be seen as an introduction to Abraham, or as an introduction to national history.

The definition of this section as an independent unit does not negate profound connections between this unit and the rest of Genesis. On the contrary, it leads up to the Abraham cycle and the ancestral cycles that follow with perfect continuity. This is generated, first and foremost, through chronological synthesis, with chapter 11 ending with the birth of Abraham. Other factors also contribute to this unit's cohesion within the rest of Genesis, despite its distinct character. I wish to point out several components that will inform our discussion throughout the rest of this book.

Theological development: I will propose that a process connected to character development and divine providence unfolds throughout Genesis. From this perspective, the first eleven chapters of the book are

an integral part of this process. In these first narratives, we see humanity gradually achieving independence, something that continues to be developed throughout Genesis. This idea also has implications for the inner process of chapters 1—11 and its literary structure. a contingency plan. While not strictly ideal, this new plan was more successful given the circumstances.

Although simple, this idea is also unspeakably audacious, with two extreme theological implications for the biblical approach towards God's relationship with the world. The first touches upon the issue of free choice as a meta-principle in biblical thought. The second asks: why is the world so far from ideal?

Above all, the basic idea of a failed first creation that requires the Creator to renew the world differently teaches about the biblical emphasis on free choice. Time and again, the premise of these narratives will be that it is up to humans to determine the course of the future. This is salient through the contrast between chapter 1 and chapter 2. In chapter 1, God speaks and the world becomes; "Let there be light" instantly produces light. The success of creation is constantly reiterated in the refrain, `And God saw that it was good." What a painful disparity there is between this divine refrain and the second creation and its aftermath, when divine command cannot determine the course of human action. Human beings have free will, and they do not always act in accordance with divine will. Adam and Eve eat from the forbidden fruit. God's words to Cain do not prevent Abel's subsequent murder. These decisions will affect the course of history. The genesis of the world unfolds through the tension between divine will and human will, to the extent that God regrets the course set by humanity and wipes out the world to begin anew.

The second principle that arises from the understanding that the world is not ideal is that history reflects a process, that history is not just a series of sporadic, coincidental, unconnected events. Rather, there is an ultimate purpose to the course of history, that gradually, painstakingly, reality will reach an ideal state, and that once-lost paradise will be regained. There is still a promise of utopia, of a divine garden where animals do not kill each other, where man and woman live in harmony. The parallel structure of Genesis 1—11 is not a chiastic structure that reflects tragic, irreparable reversal, but a classic structure that often conveys a two-step process. The ideal state of the beginning of the first half is not negated; it is simply not yet fulfilled. In this way, Genesis 1—11 serves as an introduction to the entire Bible, as a blueprint for the course of history.

Repentance Preceded the World's Creation

In other words, reality is moving and evolving towards its point of origin. The world was created with Adam and Eve living in the Garden of Eden, without death, without suffering, with complete harmony between them and their surroundings. After their expulsion from the garden, and moreover, after the Flood, the human's relationship with the world changes. We will explore this change in human status at length, but for now, I will point out the most drastic change. After the Flood, Abraham is elected to lead the world back to its ideal state through God's name. This is not merely the election of a leader; this is a profound change in human order. After the Flood, nations are born, and the world evolves and develops through these nations.

This pattern of failure and a new path to tikkun is woven throughout Genesis 1—11. The Eden narrative revolves around this theme, where man and woman fail to meet Eden's standards and they must leave the garden, but the conclusion of the narrative hints that with the establishmerit of the Tabernacle and

the cherubim, man will once again walk alongside God. The Tower of Babel narrative assumes that linguistic

diversity is the result of divine intervention, and a return to one universal language is also anticipated in messianic prophecies: "For then I will change the speech of the peoples to a pure speech, that all of them may call on the name of the Lord and serve Him with one accord" (Zeph. 3:9). After the Flood, the once-vegetarian world was divided into predators and prey, but there are messianic visions of a return to a world where animals are no longer eaten (see especially Is. 65:25). As we will see, the general sense that accompanies Abraham's election is despair of the old world and hope that change and rectification will transpire through Abraham and his covenant with God, that through Abraham, "all the families of the earth will be blessed" (12:3).

In light of this pattern, it emerges that the world is heading not to an unknown destiny, but back to its beginning. The optimistic vision of the future guides the world throughout history back towards its familiar primal ^rigin. Similar to Plato's theory of forms, the shadow of Eden is imprinted upon the universal subconscious. The fact that the distant future is embedded within the distant past renders it possible, within reach. This is no wild apocalyptic vision without any relation to reality. On the contrary, redemption is rooted deep within the nucleus of reality. Similar to Franz Rosenzweig's idea that creation anticipates revelation and redemption, Genesis 1—11 contains the fruits of the ancient past that, in turn, bear the seeds of the imminent future.

Genesis and the Ancient Near East

Given that Genesis 1—11 describes the beginning of creation and the birth of humanity, its horizon transcends nationality. While the course of history depicted in the Bible gradually narrows its focus to the line of Abraham, its first chapters are universal stories, and there is therefore room for comparison between biblical etiology and parallel stories from the ancient Near East that depict the creation of the world and humanity.

Over half a century ago, one scholar coined the scholarly obsession of comparing biblical narratives to other narrative traditions as "parallelomania," and some noted that this "mania" was especially rampant in regard to Genesis 1—11. The perpetual scholarly search for comparisons between Genesis 1—11 and other Mesopotamian creation myths is often exaggerated. It is actually difficult to find legitimate parallels between the biblical creation account and the Babylonian creation epic Enuma Elish or other Babylonian myths. While the Egyptian creation myth is more closely related, the disparities remain significant, and only specific parallels can be justified. While other Mesopotamian myths share certain elements that are found in the Eden narrative (especially the Babylonian myth of Adapa, who refuses the food of immortality), such as the creation of humans from clay, these are specific motifs rather than grounds for comprehensive comparison. Such parallels with the story of Cain and Abel are very weak, and even though the Tower of Babel narrative has many Mesopotamian characteristics, there are no parallel plots to be found in Babylonian literature, only certain shared motifs.

The only biblical narrative with substantial Mesopotamian counterparts is the Flood narrative. The main elements of the plot can also be found in the story of Atrahasis, the Akkadian flood myth, and the story Utnapishtim tells Gilgamesh in the Epic of Gilgamesh. The scholarly consensus is that these flood myths spread from ancient Babylon towards the west during the Amarna period in the fourteenth century ^CE. It thus makes sense that the Israelites were familiar with these myths before they heard the biblical

account, and it thus makes sense to focus on the differences between these myths and the biblical version, and whether it contains any polemic subversion. Even given this fascinating premise, many have rightly commented that there are still substantial disparities between the biblical Flood narrative and other flood myths, both theologically and on the level of plot. The same holds true of the vast range of motifs and themes common to biblical narratives and other ancient traditions.

Again, with the exception of the Flood narrative, it is difficult to find ancient material that can substantially be compared to Genesis 1—11, and the most precise formulation of the connection between biblical narratives and other narratives from the ancient Near East may be that some central themes of Genesis ^—11 can also be found in other ancient myths of the beginning of the world and humanity. The premises of these stories, such as the assumption that the world was actually created, are common to many cultures, but these are alternate descriptions rather than works that sustain textual comparison. It is thus no wonder that some saw these parallels as evidence of a "common universal memory": "The proposal, however, is not of a common text or an original story or a cultural continuum, but rather a common universal memory."

Ray Kook wrote of these common motifs:

> When the idea of prophecy is understood in its proper depth, we will also understand its relationship to science and knowledge... and thus we will find that many concepts in the Torah, both in the laws and the narratives, are certainly present in the works of the great leaders of the ancient nations.

Even if this is not a strictly literary parallel, and even if one text is not in intentional dialogue with another, the common motifs encourage exploration of their function in the biblical narrative based on their function in other ancient texts. In this way, we can point out how the biblical perspective differs from other prevalent perspectives in the ancient world. While I will discuss specific motifs in context, for now I wish to point

out the fundamental disparity between the premises of these ancient myths and those of Genesis 1—11. Many have pointed out that the idea of monotheism is the main biblical revolution, and the introduction of monotheism is certainly one of the salient themes throughout the Bible. Even if this principle is not central in the patriarchal cycles, it is certainly a major idea championed throughout the rest of the Bible.

However, even more then monotheism, a completely new concept of divinity is presented in the biblical text. To quote Yehezkel Kaufmann's response to Preuss' claim that the Witoto tribe's belief in their god Naimuena is another example of early monotheism:

> Naimuena is nothing but a pagan god in all respects. This god is the head of a pantheon, a god who was born.., this god dies and goes down to the underworld, and from there he sends forth water to fertilize the earth. He is associated with fertility. He makes the forest sprout up from his own saliva, and the trees and plants from his own urine.

This comment is crucial to the understanding of the biblical revolution. The essential difference between biblical divinity and pagan divinity is not a factor of how many gods rule in the world — one or many — but of an entirely different paradigm of the concept of divinity. In the Persian religion of Zoroastrianism, for example, it is believed that there are only two forces at play (Ahura Mazda and Angra Mainyu in the case of Zoroastrianism), but these two forces can also be considered as part of the general "pagan concept." According to Zoroastrianism, Ahura Mazda, while not actually created, is not fully omnipotent.

That is, the existence of these gods are subject to external conditions, and they themselves form an essential part of life and the world. In contrast, the biblical God's unique nature is His essential being. He is extrinsic to the world and its rules.

The ancient world perceived their gods as part of reality, and this is evident in their creation myths. This is especially salient in Babylonian creation myths, where the heavens and earth are formed from the corpse of the defeated goddess Tiamat, and humankind is formed from the blood of Kingu, Tiamat's son, whose arteries are slashed to obtain his blood. In this sense, the gods were an almost physical presence in human life, and they are characterized as such. They quarrel and fight, they require sustenance, and they give birth. Similarly, the Babylonians believed that humans could turn into gods or demigods, that a state of divinity was achievable by man. This motif is a fundamental component of many ancient Mesopotamian myths, such as the myths of Tammuz, Lugalbanda, and Gilgamesh, who are all humans who became gods or demigods. This potential transition is even reflected in the Sumerian language, whose nouns are divided into two separate grammatical categories: one for gods and humans, and one for animals and inanimate objects.

Such fusions do not exist in the Bible. A person cannot become a god, and is never granted immortality. Even Moses, referred to as "the man of God," is only described so in the same verse that mentions his future death (Deut. 33:1). The only narrative that seems to allude to the blurring of boundaries between the human and the divine — the sons of God who take the daughters of man — ultimately retains the barrier between deity and mortal. On the contrary, it is this very episode which leads to the limitation of the human life span.

Characterization: God and Human

In Genesis 1—11, there is almost no penetration into the characters' thoughts. This is not surprising, given that it is also true of most of the biblical narrative. Here, however, not only are their thoughts and emotions concealed from the reader, but there is almost no direct speech. To prove this point, it suffices to present all the direct quotations from the four main human protagonists of this unit:

1. Adam: He names "woman" (2:23) and responds to God after he eats from the forbidden tree (3:10-12).
2. Eve: She responds to the serpent (3:2), to God after her sin (3:13), and names Cain and Seth (4:, 25).
3. Cain: He answers God after Abel's murder (4:9,13-14).
4. Noah: He responds to his sons' actions by cursing Canaan and blessing Shem and Japheth (9:25-27).

Even considering the general paucity of speech in biblical narrative, the characters' silence in this section is extreme. Throughout three intense chapters, before, during, and after the Flood, Noah opens his mouth just once, only to promptly close it again and step off the biblical stage.

On the other hand, these chapters are not entirely devoid of speech, or even thoughts. The characters' silence is complemented by God's relative effusion. Creation is a series of divine statements, and in the Eden narrative, a full thirteen verses are God's direct speech. In the story of Cain, God makes two substantial speeches, the first after Cain's offering is rejected (4:6-7), and the second after Abel's murder

(4:9-15). The contrast between God and the human characters is especially salient in the Flood narrative, when Noah silently obeys all of God's lengthy orders (6:13-21; 7:1—4; 8:15-17; 8:21; 9:1—7; 9:8-17). These narratives are full of God's speech to Himself and to others, including orders and punishments, blessings and curses, and promises and covenants. Yet, throughout these stories, His human audience is almost silent. The only narrative in which there is balance between human speech and divine speech is the story of the Tower of Babel. There, humans make two consecutive speeches in the brief, nine-verse narrative:

- And they said to one another, "Come, let us make bricks and burn them thoroughly" (11:3).
- And they said, "Come, let us build us a city and a tower whose top will reach heaven, and let us make a name for ourselves, lest we be scattered over the face of the whole earth" (11:4).

In contrast, God also makes two statements after He witnesses the construction of the city:

- And the Lord said, "Look, they are one people and with one language, and this is what they have begun to do. Now nothing they intend to do will be impossible for them" (11:6).
- "Come, let us go down and there confuse their language, so that they will not understand one another's language" (11:7).

The balance between human and divine speech here is logical, given that the main theme of this narrative is human language and communication. God's response is that humans will no longer be able to understand each other's language.

Given the ratio of divine speech to human speech in these chapters, it emerges that God is its main actor. This is true of other biblical narratives, but unlike those of a more historical nature, here the relationship between God and His world is based on a stark hierarchy of divine intervention in the world.

This premise is consistent with the theory I will develop below, namely, that over the course of the book of Genesis, divine providence evolves from a salient, active force to a subtle Hand that works behind the scenes. This is especially evident in the final episode of Genesis, the Joseph story.

And indeed, in the first eleven chapters of the book, God is wholly active. He brings the world into being and gives names to each creation, He plants a garden and walks about in the cool of the day, He refuses to accept Cain's offering but responds to him personally, He shuts the door of Noah's ark before unleashing the Flood upon the earth, He goes down to see the city of Babel under construction and muddles the workers' language. This overt intervention gradually winds down over the course of Genesis, with the most obvious cut-off line between Genesis i1 and the patriarchal cycles that begin in Genesis12 (which sees a similar but more subtle process). This gradual change has profound theological significance for questions of God's relationship with the world and divine providence. It is no wonder, therefore, that Genesis 1—11 sees several episodes that are deeply concerned with the boundaries between heaven and earth, such as God's concern that after eating from the forbidden fruit, humanity would indeed be "like God," or the allusions in the brief story of the sons of God intermingling with the daughters of man, or the divine interruption of the building of a "tower whose top reaches the heavens." At the same time, human characterization also undergoes a stark change between Genesis ii and the Abraham cycle. We kn^w nothing about Adam and his life outside of Eden, we know very little about Cain, who murdered his brothe, and despite almost four chapters describing the Flood and its aftermath,

we hear Noah's voice only once. There is a rapid shift from human protagonist to human protagonist in the first eleven chapters of Genesis. In contrast, the Abraham cycle focuses fully on a single character, his family, and the events that befall him. This allows for developed characterization and identification with the protagonist. Moreover, it reflects interest in a particular human, interest both literary and theological. In the Abraham cycle, there are several episodes in which God plays no part at all (such as Lot's rescue from captivity in Genesis 14) and other narratives of a striking political-national nature (such as Abraham's covenant with Abimelech in ch. 21).

In parallel to the broader process of the book of Genesis, a similar process takes place over the course of chapters 1—11. God is obviously the sole player in the creation story of chapter 1; He alone invents reality and brings it into being. As we will see in our analysis of the Eden narrative (chs. 2-3), the central theme is humankind's "maturation," man and woman's transformation to autonomous beings who converse with God for the first time and even stray from His instructions. It is no coincidence that the serpent's temptation focuses on the illusion that man and woman can become "like God" by eating from the Tree of Knowledge (3:5).67 In this sense, humanity achieves certain independence in the second story of Genesis. In the next generation, Cain takes initiative and offers up an offering to God from his own free will. This offering

is not ordered by God, but is a voluntary act that expresses independence and free moral choice. This initiative eventually leads to murder, which is an expression of the dangerous side of this free will. I will yet point out the profound connection between the story of Cain and the story of Eden. Beyond this connection, there is a crucial difference between Adam and Eve and their son Cain. Adam and Eve hang their heads and silently accept their punishment, while Cain speaks up and responds to God's decree. Whether his response should be understood as a solemn expression of regret, or as a complaint at the severity of his punishment, his reaction differs from that of his parents. His exchange with God after his sentence leads to a certain sign "so that no one who found him would kill him" (4:15). The Midrash draws attention to this disparity from another angle:

> `And Cain went out from the Lord's presence." From where did he go out?.... R. Hama, in the name of R. Hanna son of R. Isaac said, "He went out happy, as it says, 'He is coming out to meet you, and when he sees you his heart will be glad— (Ex. 4:14). He met Adam, who said to him, "What was your decree?" He said to him, "I repented and made reconciliation:' Adam slapped his own face, "Such is the power of repentance, and I had not known."

Humanity's role develops further by the end of Cain's line in chapter 4. There, the human is presented as the key to a complex cultural world of fscience and art, and at the end of the chapter, with the birth of Seth's dynasty, there is even religious development: "Then people began to call on the name of the Lord" (4:26). Even if, as some have noted, this description is in dialogue with Abraham's calling on the Lord's name (12:8), Abraham does so as a result of God's revelation to him, while the worship of Enosh's generation is presented as a voluntary human initiative. As we will see, these developments are complex, but in light of my current argument, this undoubtedly marks a new stage in human development and initiative.

While the precise identity of the "sons of God" in chapter 6 requires careful analysis, regardless of whether these beings are human or divine the story conveys a sense of violated boundaries, of upheaval and the loss of order.

If so, the world's development from creation, until the Flood that brings its destruction, sees the gradual rise of human independence. From being sheltered under the trees of God's garden, huddled under the wings of the Shekhina, eating from the Tree of Life, humanity begins its journey towards autonomy and independence. This autonomy gives rise to culture, art, science, and religion, but also to violence and destruction, for "the inclination of the human heart is evil from its youth" (8:21). As we will see in our analysis of the Flood narrative, the difference between the prediluvian world and the postdiluvian world hinges on this very point. After the Flood, humanity becomes God's partner in the world's re-creation, and its role changes in the world. While the crown, the privilege granted to humanity with creation, is taken away, there is hope and an expectation that the crown will be restored through human action and responsibility.

Genesis 1—11 reflects a complex process that unfolds in each individual unit and over the course of the entire section. It is not merely a "prelude" or an "introduction" to the book of Genesis. While it does lead up to the story of Abraham and the chosen people, it tells the story of the first attempt to build a world, of the distant past that anticipates the distant future. <>

BECOMING ELIJAH: PROPHET OF TRANSFORMATION by Daniel C. Matt [Jewish Livesm, Yale University Press, 9780300242706]

The story of the prophet Elijah's transformation from fierce zealot to compassionate hero and cherished figure in Jewish tradition

"In a series on Jewish Lives, this volume is about the Jewish life—the one that goes on forever. Becoming Elijah blends meticulous scholarship with bold literary and poetic imagination. Don't miss it!"—Arthur Green, author of Judaism for the World

"The author's erudite prose and masterful command of history and faith traditions bring his subject to vibrant life. This is an edifying and accessible chronicle of a towering religious figure."—Publishers Weekly, starred review

In the Bible Elijah is a zealous prophet, attacking idolatry and injustice, championing God. He performs miracles, restoring life and calling down fire. When his earthly life ends, he vanishes in a whirlwind, carried off to heaven in a fiery chariot. Was this a spectacular death, or did Elijah escape death entirely? The latter view prevailed. Though residing in heaven, Elijah revisits earth—to help, rescue, enlighten, and eventually herald the Messiah. Because of his messianic role, Jews open the door for Elijah during each seder—the meal commemorating liberation from slavery and anticipating final redemption.

How did this zealot turn into a compassionate hero—apparently the most popular figure in Jewish tradition? *Becoming Elijah* explores this question, tracing how Elijah develops from the Bible to Rabbinic Judaism, Kabbalah, and Jewish ritual (as well as Christianity and Islam). His transformation is pertinent and inspirational for our polarized, fanatical world.

Review

"The author's erudite prose and masterful command of history and faith traditions bring his subject to vibrant life. This is an edifying and accessible chronicle of a towering religious figure."—*Publishers Weekly*, starred review

"A lucidly written religious biography/history that will appeal to readers of all faith traditions."—*Kirkus Reviews*

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"*Becoming Elijah* is a work of rare intellectual and spiritual depth. With erudition, Daniel Matt captures the unique role Elijah has played in the Western religious imagination and demonstrates how this prophet continues to inspire millions of spiritual seekers today!"—David Ellenson, Brandeis University

"A jewel of scholarship and poetic imagination, this lucid and beautifully crafted book highlights the tensions in Elijah's personality as it evolves from the biblical narratives through to its final, Hasidic reconfiguration."—Avivah Zornberg, author of *Moses*

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His electrifying name—Eliyyahu—means YHVH is my God." Many Hebrew names include a divine element, but Elijah has two, an excess of divinity. In the biblical book of Kings, he lives his intense name. A zealous devotee, he is enraged by the idolatrous worship of Baal and Asherah spreading through Israel, promoted by King Ahab and especially by Queen Jezebel and her cohort of prophets. He seeks to purge the Israelites of this taint and restore their faith in the one true God, bringing them back "beneath the wings of Shekhinah (the Divine Presence)."

Empowered by his intimacy with YHVH, Elijah confronts Ahab and declares a devastating drought. After several years, by silent prayer, Elijah finally brings rain, but only after he champions YHVH by vanquishing the prophets of Baal on Mount Carmel, rousing throngs of Israelites to exclaim, YHVH, He is God; YHVH, He is God! (i Kings 18:39).

The biblical Elijah is a miracle worker, promising a starving widow that her jar of flour and jug of oil will be wondrously replenished for as long as she needs. Soon afterward, he revives the woman's lifeless child with divine help, after accusing God of having killed the boy. Twice he calls down fire from heaven: once to consume his sacrifice during the contest with the prophets of Baal, and later when he incinerates a hundred soldiers sent to apprehend him.

Immediately after defeating the false prophets on Mount Carmel, Elijah's zeal to extirpate idolatry impels him to slaughter them. Yet he can be zealous for human justice too, as when he condemns King Ahab to death for murdering an innocent man to expropriate his vineyard.

Elijah is fearless, fierce, and untamed—a hairy man, with a leather loincloth bound round his waist (2 Kings 1:8). The world, it seems, cannot bear him; finally, he is taken up to heaven in a chariot of fire. His ascent may have been a spectacular, supernatural death; but the scriptural account is ambiguous, leaving open the possibility that Elijah endures, living forever. If so, couldn't he return to earth? He frequently does so in rabbinic literature, Jewish folklore, and popular imagination. In this scenario, Elijah's disappearance from the world marks the beginning of a new career, in which he is transformed. His outstanding quality is no longer zealotry but compassion. He helps the poor, rescues those in danger, defends Israel from its enemies, and will one day redeem the whole world by heralding the Messiah.

Because of Elijah's messianic role, Jews open the door for him at each Passover seder—the ceremonial meal that commemorates the liberation from Egyptian slavery and includes the hope for ultimate redemption. Similarly, every Saturday night around the world, as the Sabbath departs, traditional Jews chant: "Eliyyahu ha-Navi (Elijah the prophet)! ... May he come to us speedily with the Messiah, son of David!"

Elijah follows the path of the archetypal hero: uncertain origins, trials and adventures, transformation, and return into the world. In his case, the fierce biblical zealot turns into the most beloved, cherished figure in Judaism. In the Israel Folktale Archives (fittingly located in Haifa on Mount Carmel, site of the prophet's triumph), there are more stories about Elijah than Moses, King Solomon, or anyone else. Over the centuries, the belief in his powers sustained the masses, while his inspiration enthused the mystics.

Whereas the biblical Elijah is a chastiser of Israel, the postbiblical Elijah is a benevolent savior. Undeniably, there are compassionate elements in his biblical personality and harsh elements in his later one, but it often seems there are two different Elijahs. What links them? Why does Elijah return to earth? How does the original figure become full-fledged?

To explore him we must begin, of course, with the biblical account. But how reliable is it? Some scholars contend that if he ever existed, Elijah was a charismatic holy man, purportedly able to bring rain, who lived in the time of King Ahab in the ninth century BCE. Gradually, legends were woven around him and then given literary form in the scriptural saga.

According to one view, the biblical tale of Elijah was composed to justify a coup against Ahab's son, King Jehoram, led by an army commander named Jehu. As the book of Kings records, Jehu assassinated Jehoram, had Jezebel thrown down from a window of her palace, and killed Ahab's descendants and then the prophets and followers of Baal. To legitimate this extermination, court scribes may have produced accounts of Elijah condemning Ahab and predicting Jehu's rise to power and his slaughter of the idolaters.

Whether or not such speculation is correct, there are certainly legendary elements in the biblical cycle of Elijah stories. Over the following two millennia, Jewish folklore (in the Talmud, Midrash, and countless later tales) expanded his role and his powers. He became the protean prophet, capable of assuming numerous forms—often that of an old man, but also a young man, an Arab, a Roman official, a slave, and once (for a noble purpose) even a prostitute.

Who is Elijah? His flexible identity keeps us wondering. In his fervor, he recalls the earlier biblical zealot Phinehas, grandson of Aaron the priest, who stopped a divinely sent plague by killing two flagrant sinners. But according to a persistent tradition, Elijah did not just resemble Phinehas; he was Phinehas! Despite the chronological impossibility of this identification, it is psychologically revealing and accords with Elijah's timeless, elastic nature.

Elijah is not limited to the confines of a single personality. Since he is destined to return and announce the Messiah, followers of Jesus could believe that John the Baptist was none other than Elijah, proclaiming Jesus as the Christ, the anointed one. According to the New Testament, Jesus accepted this identification of John with Elijah, while some of Jesus's followers thought that Jesus himself was Elijah.

Elijah is elusive, like the ruah (wind, spirit) with which he is associated. King Ahab's God-fearing steward knows how hard it is to locate Elijah and tells the prophet worriedly, The spirit of YHVH will carry you off to ^ know not where (Kings 18:12). This is how Elijah's contemporaries conceived of him: appearing and disappearing unexpectedly, as if blown by the wind, conveyed by the divine ruah. When he leaves earth—vanishing in a whirlwind, aboard the fiery chariot—his disciple's followers wonder if the spirit of YHVH has carried him off and flung him down on some hill or into some valley (2 Kings 2:16).

Elijah's disciple, Elisha, yearns to inherit his master's ruah. As Elijah ascends heavenward, Elisha lifts up the master's fallen mantle and receives the spirit. Empowered, Elisha proceeds to strike the Jordan River with the mantle, splitting the waters in two. Elisha's followers declare, The spirit of Elijah has settled upon Elisha! (2 Kings 2:15).

As Elijah evolves in rabbinic literature, he learns how to convey ruah ha-qodesh (the Holy Spirit). To worthy sages, he transmits teachings from the Academy of Heaven, which he regularly attends; occasionally he reveals what God is saying or feeling. He personifies the Holy Spirit.

In the Kabbalah, Elijah expands his inspirational role. According to various sources, several founders of Kabbalah experienced gillui Eliyyahu (a revelation of Elijah), channeling mystical insights. If some of those insights seemed radically new or unorthodox, their authenticity was guaranteed by the noble figure of Elijah, whose felt presence validated the mystics' creativity. With some exaggeration, it has been claimed that "what Moses was to the Torah, Elijah was to the Kabbalah."

Elijah is filled with ruab, at times obsessed by it. The spirit makes him zealous and stormy, unpredictable, restless. He is always on the move, his biblical roaming spanning the entire land of Israel: from Zarephath in Phoenicia (north of the Israelite border) to Beersheba in the south and on to Mount Horeb in the Sinai Desert; from the wadi of Cherith (east of the Jordan River) to Mount Carmel on the Mediterranean coast. Fittingly, in the Talmud, he is credited with originating tefillat ha-derekh (the Prayer for the Way). By then, he has become Master of Wings, riding the ruah, and his range has increased immensely. With four strokes of his angelic pinions, he can traverse the entire world.

In roaming the world, Elijah enacts a narrative that parallels the theme of the Wandering Jew; but he is the antitype of that dark, derogatory image. In medieval Christian folklore, this mythical Jew is seen as cursed for rejecting the Messiah, doomed to wander aimlessly until Christ returns at the end of days. Elijah, too, is destined to rove the world until the Messiah arrives, but always for a purpose or on a mission: helping those in need, spreading the awareness of God, and ultimately making the world fit for redemption.

Elijah refuses to be pinned down. We should refine the question "Who is Elijah?," reframing it: "How is Elijah imagined and reimagined? Who does Elijah become?" Each generation pours their yearnings into him and draws comfort from him. Consequently, the various portrayals of the immortal prophet reveal at least as much about the mind of the people of Israel—their needs and ideals—as about the character of Elijah.'

The chapters that follow explore the major stages so far in Elijah's endless career. Chapter i traces the prophet's biblical life in the book of Kings. Chapter 2, focusing on rabbinic literature, shows Elijah evolving from a zealot into a compassionate hero and an angelic colleague of the sages. Chapter 3 discusses Elijah's formative influence on Kabbalah, his role and personality in the Zohar, and his relationship with the messianic pretender Shabbetai Tsevi.

In Chapter 4, I turn to the figure of Elijah in Christianity and Islam—the daughter religions of Judaism. As mentioned above, the New Testament links Elijah with both John the Baptist and Jesus. In medieval times, Elijah inspired the formation of the Carmelites, who became one of the main mendicant orders of the church. The original Carmelites were crusader pilgrims who forged a monastic life on Mount Carmel and who believed they were following in the footsteps of Elijah, who long ago had supposedly established a contemplative group there.

In Islam, the mysterious figure of al-Khidr (the Green One) is associated, and sometimes identified, with Elijah. Al-Khidr shares many characteristics of Elijah, including immortality. Often appearing as an old man, he is capable of numerous other guises. He saves those in trouble, spreads kindness, and enlightens spiritual seekers, before suddenly vanishing.

Chapter 5 discusses Elijah's extensive role in Jewish ritual, especially at the Passover seder, circumcision, and Havdalah (concluding the Sabbath). Every year, every week—even several times a day in the grace after meals Jews around the world mention Elijah or chant his name, many anticipating his arrival. Most Jews who know anything about Elijah remember opening the door for him during the seder or seeing his goblet of wine on the seder table. These enduring ritual moments demonstrate that whoever he was twenty-nine hundred years ago, Elijah is still active.

In the concluding chapter I delve further into Elijah's transformation and reflect on behinat Eliyyahu (an aspect of Elijah) within each of us, which expands the meaning of this book's title. <>

THE CHARACTER OF DAVID IN JUDAISM, CHRISTIANITY AND ISLAM WARRIOR, POET, PROPHET AND KING edited by [Themes in Biblical Narrative, BRILL, 9789004465961]

King David if one of the most central figures in all of the major monotheistic traditions. He generally connotes the heroic past of the (more imagined than real) ancient Israelite empire and is associated with messianic hopes for the future. Nevertheless, his richly ambivalent and fascinating literary portrayal in the Hebrew Bible is one of the most complex of all biblical characters.

This volume aims at taking a new, critical look at the process of biblical creation and subsequent exegetical transformation of the character of David and his attributed literary composition (the Psalms), with particular emphasis put on the multilateral fertilization and cross-cultural interchanges among Jews, Christians and Muslims.

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The Variety of Davids in Monotheistic Traditions: An Introduction by Marzena Zawanowska

One of the most central figures in all of the major monotheistic traditions is King David. He personifies, in many respects, the heroic past of the (more imagined than real) ancient Israelite empire, of which he is commonly believed to have served as a unifying and effective king for about forty years (ca. 1010–970 BCE). David's religious persona as a righteous king is underlined in the Hebrew Bible and in the New Testament, where he is hyperbolically described as a man after God's own heart (1 Samuel 13:14; Acts 13:22), while in the Qurán he is depicted as God's "vicegerent on earth" (Sura 38:26). His prophetic abilities are also elaborated in the Hebrew Bible through God's various revelations to him and prophecies conveyed through him, while his righteousness is underscored in the Psalms attributed to him, which led to his subsequent recognition as a prophet in Islam.

In religious imagination, as well as in wider culture, literature and the arts, the figure of David has not only come to symbolize the golden period in the remote past of the ancient Kingdom of Judah and Israel of the first millennium BCE, but also as a source of revival and messianic hopes for the future, as in the famous biblical metaphor "a shoot from the stump of Jesse" (Isaiah 11:1–12). From post-exilic times, Jews believed that the messianic savior-king who will usher in an era of eternal peace and prosperity was to come from Davidic lineage, and it is in this light that the early Christians conceived his connection to Jesus which they made clear in two of the Gospels (Matthew 1; Luke 3:23–38).

While the reception exegesis in all three religious traditions generally tended to idealize his image, David's literary portrayal in the Hebrew Bible is one of the most complex of all biblical characters. On the one hand, he is depicted as a valorous warrior who bravely defeated Goliath (1 Samuel 17:49–50), the powerful army commander and ruler responsible for unifying a kingdom around the Jebusite city, Jerusalem, which he conquered and then established as capital, a gifted musician (1 Samuel 16:14–22), who by himself invented musical instruments (Amos 6:5; 1 Chronicles 23:2–5), a pious poet who authored some of the psalms contained in the Book of Psalms (generally attributed to his authorship in later sources), an affectionate lover (e.g., of Abigail in 1 Samuel 25), and a devoted friend (e.g., of Jonathan in 1 Samuel 13–23) and father (cf. his mourning over Absalom's death in 2 Samuel 18:33). On the other hand, he is described as a vassal of the Philistine king Achish of Gath (^ Samuel 27), a ruthless politician, who ended the dynasty of Saul through acts of murder and force (2 Samuel ^–^^), and someone who committed adultery with a married woman, Bathsheba, and eventually conspired to murder her husband, Uriah, one of his chief warriors (2 Samuel ^^–^2). For having "shed much blood" (^ Chronicles 22:8–^^) and his infamous love affair, he is strongly criticized in the Bible itself (2 Samuel ^2). By divine decree, and as a result of his morally dubious behavior, his offspring fall into calamity, culminating in the rebellion and subsequent killing of his beloved son Absalom (2 Samuel ^^–^ Kings 2) and God defers the building of the Temple to the time of his son from Bathsheba, Solomon (2 Samuel 7; ^ Kings 8; ^ Chronicles ^7:4; 2 Chronicles 6:9). Little wonder, therefore, that David's richly ambivalent and fascinating biblical portrayal engendered varied interpretative traditions and that his character consequently underwent significant transformations in perception and reception in the three monotheistic traditions.

For many centuries, one of the most dominant and common modes through which the story of David was addressed was the translation and commentary of the sanctified texts. Yet there were also other important forms of composition (such as legends, liturgical poems, homilies etc.) which developed alongside this traditional form of religious expression and which not infrequently elaborated on the Davidic narratives. Consequently, there existed in the pre-modern period a range of literary works which were used as a framework for intellectual reflections on David and his attributed book of Psalms, ranging from geographic, historical, and grammatical, through pietistic, ethical and heresiographical, to mystical, philosophical and/or theological. In the modern period, the popular genre of biblical translation and exegesis was used alongside secular literature and art in addressing King David. The present volume is devoted, in the main, to the pre-modern understanding and interpretation of David in the three monotheistic religions, as reflected in the translations and commentaries on the Scriptures written by Jews, Christians and Muslims. Nevertheless, papers devoted to selected works belonging to other genres of their respective religious (and to a lesser extent non-religious) literature are also included.

The most fervent exegetical activity took place in the Middle Ages, the period when Judaism, Christianity and Islam consolidated their respective religious traditions, by creating or reshaping them in constant conversation with and (often polemical, or apologetic) response to one another. After the canon of the Hebrew Bible had been sealed, sometime around the mid second century CE, Jews, later joined by Christians, engaged in interpretative processes not only to establish its inherent meaning but also, and more importantly, its meaning within a given religious community. Muslims, too, became part of this process due to the Prophet Mu^ammad's essential verification of the divine message contained in the Scriptures of the "People of the Book" (Ar. ahl al-kitāb) and the acceptance of their Prophets as God's chosen messengers in the Qurán. Thus the three groups needed to position themselves vis-à-vis the

others, with whom they shared a belief in the revelatory nature of some (if not all) of the Scriptures. In this sense, the medieval period, ranging from the rise of Islam to the High Middle Ages (around the eighth to the twelfth centuries CE) constituted a mosaic of different monotheistic traditions and their intellectual legacies, and was characterized by intensive, cross-fertilizing contacts as well as cross-cultural transfers of concepts and ideas between Judaism, Christianity and Islam. This was the most important period in the theological crystallization of the three religions, all of which were engaged in defining their cultural and religious identities vis-à-vis the other. It is likely that the common core of these three religions, as we know them today, gained many of its distinctive traits during this period, through a complex process of "dialogue," by which is meant mutual interchanges and subsequent transformations of textual traditions, including their appropriation to their own specific cultural and intellectual contexts, as well as their considerable propensity for strife and conflict.

The wide array of exegetical techniques elaborated during the medieval period includes: Jewish, midrashic atomizing and homiletical gap-filling methods; allegorical and analogical readings typical of Christian exegesis; grammatical, literary-contextual and historical approaches, which significantly developed in the realm of Islam. These systems eventually overlapped in their usage and cross-fertilized each other, and the specific explanations they offered in resolving scriptural conundrums and interpretative cruxes became fundamental to many later approaches to reading and studying the sacred texts. They also informed later interpretative methods, including modern secular ones.

The main focus of the present volume is therefore on the Middle Ages, although articles exploring works composed in other periods are also included as comparative sources, in an attempt to trace the development of chains of interpretive traditions, as well as the evolution and transformation of exegetical ideas. An additional reason for focusing on the medieval period is that it witnessed a conspicuous rise in popularity of the biblical figure of King David and his post-biblical lineage. Jewish and Christian traditions, prior to the emergence of Islam, exhibited a concern with the House of David but it is only after the emergence of Islam in the seventh century CE that a gradual growth of the spiritual importance of his family, as well as of the social-administrative status of its members may be observed in Jewish and Christian sources. The concern with Davidic ancestry is borne out by the fact that the number of individuals claiming to be either direct (Heb. n^ši^ïm), or at least spiritual (Byzantine, Carolingian and Capetian kings) descendants of King David noticeably increased, and that for the first time in history pedigrees tracing medieval dynasties back to their alleged Israelite forebear were produced. Also, the new and unmistakable preference for the name David, until then avoided and (with only few doubtful exceptions) completely absent from earlier epigraphic, literary, and documentary sources, suddenly emerged sometime in the eighth century, in the Islamic realm.2

Finally, the Middle Ages witnessed an unusual degree of spiritual unrest, especially in the Middle East, which brought about not only the emergence of new religions like Islam and other religious movements and sects, described in medieval heresiography, but also major divisions within existing religions such as the split between the adherents of Sunnism and Shi^ism within the Muslim world, or between the Rabbanites and Karaites within the Jewish world. The example of Karaism is particularly important in the context of the present volume since it seems to have emerged as the result of the Jews' encounter with the Islamic scriptural model.3 The Karaites' rejection of the rabbinic concept of the "Oral Torah" and the post-biblical texts in which it was incorporated (mainly the Mishnah and Talmuds) seems to be connected to the medieval Jews' need to authenticate the Hebrew Bible vis-à-vis the Qurán. At least at

the initial stage of its development, Karaism was a conglomerate movement, which combined representatives of the Jewish (gaonic) elite alongside marginalized Jewish sectors and members of various heterodox groups and, consequently, it played an important role in cross-cultural interchanges with Christians and Muslims.4 As such it constitutes a salient case study for exploring cross-cultural interchanges among different monotheistic traditions, especially in the Middle Ages.

...

The present volume aims at taking a new, critical look at the process of biblical creation and subsequent exegetical transformation of the character of David and his attributed literary composition, with particular emphasis put on the multilateral fertilization and cross-cultural interchanges among Jews, Christians and Muslims. To this end it brings together scholars from various research disciplines (such as literary, linguistic, cultural and religious studies) related to Jewish, Christian and Islamic studies, who critically examine different source texts related to King David and the book of Psalms. Thanks to this, the volume encompasses a detailed and comparative view of converging and diverging tendencies in the way David, his character and narratives on his life, as well as his attributed book were reclaimed, and fashioned in these religious cultures. It includes papers whose authors not only investigate transformations of the biblical materials in one given religious tradition, but also – and above all – in the intertwined worlds of the three major monotheistic cultures in cross-fertilizing contact. Therefore, in addition to monographic chapters devoted to the reception of David and the Psalter in individual religious movements and cultures (e.g., Ethiopian Christianity, Carolingian and Capetian empire, or Frankism), a significant number of articles utilise a comparative approach, scrutinizing the various texts in which David's character and his attributed book have been appropriated and re-positioned in different traditions of the so-called "People of the Book" from biblical times and late antiquity until the early modern period. The twenty two chapters of the book are divided into four coherent thematic sections which focus on different aspects of the reception history of David and the Psalms in monotheistic traditions. As far as it was possible, individual chapters within each section were ordered chronologically.

Structure

Everything begins with the Hebrew Bible, the chief (if not unique) textual evidence on the historical King David, which served as an inexhaustible source of inspiration for later literature, especially of an exegetical nature, composed in different times and places by representatives of different religious traditions. Therefore the opening chapter, contributed by Lukasz Niesiolowski-Spanò, David in History and in the Hebrew Bible, is devoted to an historical survey of this scriptural character, offering a rich review of various scholarly approaches to the intricate and much debated question of David's historicity. It explores the complex relationship between the biblical and extra-biblical evidence for David, discussing inter alia the etymology of the name David, the reliability of extra-biblical testimonies (inscriptions) to the House of David, as well as historical context and circumstances in which the biblical character was supposedly active. It conjectures that, assuming the historicity of this figure, David might have been a local leader of a small, Habiru-like group active in the tenth century BCE in the Southern territories dominated by the Tribe of Benjamin and politically controlled by the Philistines from the City of Gath.

The Images of David in Medieval Jewish, Muslim and Christian Sources

The first chapter in this section focuses on 1 Samuel 16:14–22, where David is depicted as an accomplished musician and 1 Chronicles 23:2–5, where he is credited with the invention of musical instruments. Due to his centrality to all Abrahamic religions, medieval sources, both Jewish and Muslim, had to consider how to address David's proclivity for music in a manner that would suit their different religious traditions, communities and views on music. In the paper David the Pious Musician in Midrashic Literature and Medieval Muslim Sources, Sivan Nir explores different ways in which Judaism and Islam treated the subject, highlighting their mutual interdependence as well as originality in this respect. It shows that the Talmuds, Ruth Rabbah and Midrash on Psalms depict David as a musician turned nightly scholar, and investigates how the midrashic imagery informed medieval Jewish commentaries on Psalms 107– 108, as well as how it influenced portrayals of David's piety in Islam and the depictions of his musical skills (used against the demons) in various classical Muslim sources.

In the next chapter of this section, The Weeping King of Muslim Pietistic Tradition: David in the Kitãb al-wara^ of Ábd al-Malik b. ^abïb (d. 238/853) and in Earlier Islamic Sources, Mateusz Wilk discusses the image of king David (Dãwüd) in the traditions contained in the Kitãb al-wara`, a compilation of Islamic piety – more specifically, religious scrupulosity – by ^Abd al-Malik b. ^abïb (d. 238/853), against the backdrop of earlier and contemporary Muslim literature. He argues that this hitherto unpublished work contains numerous traditions on prophets, yet David is the only one to whom a separate chapter is dedicated. The article presents and analyzes the role of David in the paradigm of Islamic piety of the third/ninth century through comparisons of Kitãb al-wara` with other similar sources from this period (e.g., Ibn ^anbal's Kitãb al-zuhd). By doing so, it serves a starting point for further investigation of the role of prophets in the classical Islamic pietistic literature.

The following article by Yair Zoran, David and the Temple of Solomon in Medieval Karaite Sources. The Arabic Commentaries of Yefet ben `Eli on the Books of Kings and Chronicles, delves more deeply into the subject of the medieval Karaite tradition of interpreting the Hebrew Bible, a tradition which exerted significant influence on later Jewish exegesis of Scripture as a whole. One of its most important and influential representatives was Yefet ben ^Eli who lived in the second half of the tenth and the beginning of the eleventh century, mostly in Jerusalem. He was the first to compose a comprehensive commentary, including running Arabic translation, on the entire Hebrew Bible. The article explores his treatment of David's testament to Solomon in 1 Chronicles 28 which relates to the building of the Temple, demonstrating the exegete's literary sensibilities, as well as his ingenuity and originality in the artful way in which he combines different biblical passages and weaves them together into a unified literary structure that sheds a new light on the interpreted text.

King David was a central figure not only in medieval exegetical and pietistic texts, but also in poetry. Our next author, Barbara Gryczan, contributes a paper David as Warrior, Leader, and Poet in Medieval Hebrew Poetry of al-Andalus: Shmuel ha-Nagid's Self-Portrait as "The David of His Age," in which she provides a detailed analysis of an autobiographical poem, Back away from me now, my friend, composed as a commemoration of Shmuel ha-Nagid's victory over the troops attacking the foregrounds of Granada. During the battle, he served as the-commander-in-chief of the army of the Berber king of this city-state. The article explores the process of artistic auto-creation, unravelling the complex matrix of biblical intertexts and historical allusions as well as artistic devices and poetical mechanisms introduced by the poet in order to portray himself not only as a righteous leader of the nation and a direct heir of

the Levites, but also a divinely inspired poet, an anointed "singer of God," and "the David of his age." It also offers a commentary on the cultural and socio-historical background of ha-Nagid's times, as well as specific biographical insights, which put the examined poem in the broader context of the author's various activities as poet, scholar, soldier and community leader.

In the following article, David in Medieval Jewish Thought. Judah Halevi's Book of the Kuzari as a Reconciliation Project, Marzena Zawanowska investigates the way in which the character of David was used in a philosophical-theological text written by one of the most famous medieval Jewish poets, Judah Halevi. She demonstrates how the author of the Kuzari de-biblicized the biblical character of David, using his idealized image as an instrument to convey and underscore what he considered the chief values and most important legacy of Judaism, namely: the Hebrew Bible (David as one of its authors); the Hebrew language (David as the author of the Psalms); the Chosen People with their unique gift of prophecy (David as a prophet); the Land of Israel with the Temple in Jerusalem as its "holy of holies" (David as responsible not only for providing the plans of the Temple, but also for establishing the cultic ritual in it). Zawanowska argues that the figure of David served Halevi as a vehicle to transmit his constructive critique of his present day Jewry, aimed at healing or repairing and improving the entire Jewish nation – in terms of both Rabbanites and Karaites alike – and bringing about their re-unification, thereby restoring Judaism to its former glory.

The next author, Jerzy Pysiak, brings us to the medieval Kingdom of France, showing how the late thirteenth and early fourteenth century French chroniclers and hagiographers fashioned Saint Louis's image after the model of biblical King David, as the pious and godly king of a New Israel – France. In his Saint Louis as a New David and Paris as a New Jerusalem in Medieval French Hagiographic Literature, he demonstrates that the development of this royal ideology was closely connected with the cult of saints and relics, and especially with the translation of Passion relics which, already in the Byzantine empire, was believed to have been tantamount to the translation of Jerusalem to a new location – the Christian capital city of Constantinople in that case. Exploring the complex history of the origins of the royal ideology of the Capetian kings, the paper argues that although it undoubtedly echoes the Byzantine imperial ideology, it evolved independently and its origins should be sought more accurately in the Carolingian epoch, in which – starting from the time of the anointing of Pepin the Short, David had become an ideal model for the kings of the Franks.

In the last chapter of this section, Ruth Mazo Karras focuses on Latin Christian literature. In her David and Jonathan as a Paradigm of Male Friendship in Medieval Latin Literature, she uses the story of David and Jonathan to examine how Christian and Jewish traditions in the Middle Ages treated friendship between men in relation to marriage between men and women. It demonstrates that David and Jonathan's friendship was most often invoked in the Christian Central Middle Ages in a monastic context, but also outside it. The deep and intimate love between two men could parallel that which would be found in a marriage, or even go beyond it. It argues that discussions of friendship in the Jewish tradition often occur in commentaries on Pirqe Avot. Male friendship is seen in this treatise in two ways: in terms of (1) companionship and partnership in Torah study, and (2) a relationship between David and Jonathan, which is on a spiritual level. This second kind of male friendship is contrasted with love between men and women. Karras concludes that the common denominator between both traditions is that the line between friendship and love is not sharp.

The Psalter of David in Monotheistic Traditions

In contrast with mutual influences between medieval Jewish and Muslim cultures and literatures, relatively little attention has so far been paid to Jewish Christian cross-cultural interchanges in the Middle Ages. In his paper, David the Prophet in Sa^adya Gaon's Commentary on Psalms and its Syriac and Karaite Contexts, Arye Zoref analyzes Sa`adya's Commentary on the Book of Psalms against the backdrop of similar commentaries produced by Christian (in Syriac) and Karaite (in Arabic) exegetes. He argues that in an attempt to stress the unity of the book of Psalms and its prophetic nature, Sa`adya adopted only those concepts from the Syriac commentaries which best suited his purpose, and demonstrates that the Gaon modeled his introduction to the commentary on Psalms on the introductions of two Syriac commentators (Moshe Bar Kepha and Ishodad of Merv), and that he adopted the Syriac Nestorian idea that David wrote all the Psalms, but rejected some of the Nestorian interpretative approaches, such as a general disregard for the Psalms' headings.

In the following chapter, Psalms to Reason, Psalms to Heal. The Scriptures in Early Rüm Orthodox Treatises, Miriam Lindgren Hjälm examines different approaches to Scripture in general, and exegetical uses of the Book of Psalms in particular, in early Rüm Orthodox (Melkite) texts. From this corpus of texts, she singles out general statements relating to Scripture and explains them both in terms of reception of the Patristic heritage and as a message delivered to an audience in a specific context. Another question discussed in the paper relates to the authors' conception of the Hebrew text of the Bible (e.g., Abü Qurra seems unaware that certain biblical books are not canonical among the Jews as well as ignorant of the fact that the Hebrew, Syriac and Greek versions sometimes differ, while Agapius of Manbi^ invests much effort in proving that such deviations were introduced by the Jews for the purpose of obfuscating the notion that the Christ was the Messiah). In addition, the paper investigates the uses of the Psalms' quotations in the analyzed texts. She demonstrates that, most often, Psalms that are understood to be prophetical are chosen to prove Christian doctrines as expressed in the New Testament. By Agapius, however, they are also used to recapitulate events recorded within the Old Testament corpus. Finally she shows how Agathon of Homs, makes the most complex use of the Psalms. The conclusion is that the genre of the text dictates the exegetical use of the Psalms.

Among the many extant Arabic manuscripts of "the Psalms of David" are some that begin by sounding like translations of the biblical Psalms but turn out, on further investigation, to contain fresh compositions by Muslim authors. Our next author, David R. Vishanoff, in his paper Images of David in Several Muslim Rewritings of the Psalms, identifies several different versions of these psalms, each of which starts with a shared core of one hundred psalms and then edits, reorganizes, rewrites, and adds to that core material. It demonstrates that each version presents David in a somewhat different light: although all present him as a model of repentance and otherworldly piety, some emphasize the gravity of his sin and tearful repentance, while others minimize his sin and promote a piety of strict orthodoxy and obedience. In addition, the article shows that each editor uses the shared symbol of David and his Psalms to advance his own vision of Islamic piety, not in opposition to Jewish or Christian pieties, but as a critique of worldliness within the Muslim community.

Among all the Arabic versions of the Book of Psalms produced by Christian translators, one stands out for its unique features. It is a translation of the text of the 151 Psalms from the Greek original (according to the Septuagint) prepared by the eleventh century Melkite deacon Abü 'l-Fat^ ^Abd Allāh ibn al-Fa^l ibn ^Abd Allāh al-Mu^rān al-An^ākï. The author also added a fine commentary (in Arabic) to

his translation. In the chapter David's Psalter in Christian Arabic Dress: Ábd Allãh ibn al-Fa^l's Translation and Commentary, Juan Pedro Monferrer-Sala offers a description of Ibn al-Fa^l's Arabic translation and commentary on the Psalms, and argues that the importance of this text is confirmed by the existence of numerous revisions of the original Arabic version. In addition, the article includes an edition and analysis of Psalm 28 according to Ms. Sinai Ar. 65 which illustrates the changes to which the original Arabic version was subjected through the various revisions.

In the next paper of this section, King David and the Psalter in Ethiopian Cultural Setting, Witold Witakowski demonstrates that although few compositions in Classical Ethiopic (Ge^ez) are devoted specifically to David, or attributed to him, he is not an insignificant figure in Ethiopian culture and tradition. The paper argues that his importance and popularity depend on two circumstances: (1) David is regarded to be the author of the biblical Book of Psalms, which in Ethiopia is simply referred to as Dãwit, and whose popularity is based on the fact that the Psalter is used as a primer in traditional schools by which children learned how to read and write; (2) David is connected to the sphere of the cult of Mary as one of her ancestors, sometimes just being called "The Father of Mary." Consequently, he often appears in the texts devoted to Mary, such as the Miracles of Mary. In addition, Witakowski shows that even more impressive testimonies of David's importance can be found in iconographic representations. For instance, the image of David playing bägäna, a traditional Ethiopian stringed instrument, can be found in manuscript illuminations and in wall paintings in various churches. The article offers a synthetic overview and analysis of all these diverse sources, which have so-far been unstudied or understudied.

The Book of Psalms has always played an important role in the life of Eastern European Karaites, who had been using the Hebrew Psalms in liturgy held in the prayer houses called kenesa. At the turn of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth centuries, the language of liturgy changed from Hebrew to the Turkic vernacular of the Eastern European Karaites (so-called Karaim language). At about the same time, new Latin and Cyrillic based orthographies were introduced, and started to gradually replace the previously used Hebrew orthography. In the paper David's Psalms in Eastern European Karaite Literature, Zsuzsanna Olach investigates how these processes, together with the "emancipation" of the Eastern European Karaites, brought about the emergence of Eastern European Karaite Bible translations, including translations of the Book of Psalms, both in old Hebrew script and in new orthographies. She argues that the significance of the Psalms among the Eastern European Karaites goes far beyond the liturgical context, demonstrating that individual Psalms have been adapted into hymns and religious poems by Karaim poets (e.g., Zarax ben Natan and Josef ben Shemuel), while singular verses and stanzas from the Psalms were profusely quoted in their poetical compositions. The article discusses various adaptations of individual psalms into poems offered by Karaim poets, offering the first results of a study of the use of the Book of Psalms in Eastern European Karaite literature.

David and His Women: The Cross-Religious Reception Exegesis of the Bathsheba Narrative

The Bible did not emerge in a cultural vacuum. Rather it bears witness to the fruitful cultural encounters between the ancient Jewish and the surrounding non-Jewish cultures, most notably the Greek/Hellenistic one. In the first chapter of this section, The Four Wives of David and the Four Women of Odysseus: A

Comparative Approach, Daniel Bodi offers a literary analysis which juxtaposes the female biblical characters of Michal, Abigail, Bathsheba and Abishag, with those of the Greek epic, Odyssey: Calypso, Circe, Nausicaa and Penelope. It demonstrates that the Hebrew Bible places women at significant moments in David's career – from a young humble warrior to a seasoned warlord and an aging ruler – which is comparable to the role played by women in the career of Odysseus from his ten-year absence from his island Ithaca for the duration of the Trojan war and his additional decade-long return voyage home to his faithful wife Penelope. The paper argues that all these female figures (symbolically representing the four types of women a man can meet in his life), who played a crucial role in the lives of David and Odysseus, act as reflecting mirrors, bringing to the fore different aspects of David and Odysseus' personalities and, allowing both characters to acquire a truer perception of themselves, their limits and shortcomings. In addition, Bodi points to the existence of other similarities between the analyzed narratives: Both Odysseus and David are major cultural heroes who are the main characters of the stories associated with them. Both the Homeric Epic and the biblical story of David offer fine observations on human nature. Both cultural heroes are depicted as being in need of the help of women in order to advance their lives and careers. In both cases, weakness or failure occurs because of their impulsive, heroic temperament – a traditional theme.

Yet, the Bible has always inspired interest not only as literature, but also – and perhaps above all – as a historical document. From the exegetical point of view, one of the most problematic episodes in the biblical narrative on David is his affair with Bathsheba (2 Samuel 11:1–12:25). Many questions arise from this remarkable story: How is David evaluated by the biblical narrator? What was Bathsheba's part in this affair? Why did Uriah not go to his house as ordered by David? Did he know of David and Bathsheba's affair? Why did Nathan choose to convey the divine message through a parable, rather than convict David directly? Why was David punished for his sin in a different way than Saul? In the chapter, Josephus' Retelling of the David and Bathsheba Narrative, Michael Avioz focuses on the way in which the ancient Jewish historian addressed these questions and rewrote the David-Bathsheba narrative. He discusses the subject against the backdrop of the biblical text and its traditional rabbinic interpretations, and demonstrates that although it posed a great challenge to Josephus' generally positive view of King David and despite the fact that he could have followed the Chronicler's account and omitted this episode, the author of the Antiquities of the Jews decided to retain most of the problematic source material (with minor changes) and to confront it head-on. Avioz uncovers Josephus' techniques when rewriting this narrative and tries to understand the reasons behind the changes he introduced (as influenced by Greek culture and its values, such as piety, justice, courage, obedience).

The next, panoramic article by Diana Lipton and Meira Polliack, Our Mother, Our Queen: Bathsheba through Early Jewish, Christian and Muslim Eyes, considers the complex portrayals of David and Bathsheba in the three religions which, in different ways, see themselves as David's heirs. In a story about succession and inheritance, Bathsheba appears at first to be a cartoon character in a cautionary tale about the dangers that beautiful women pose to powerful men. But, eventually, Bathsheba turns out to be pivotal in the so-called "succession narrative"; her son, Solomon, is David's heir. Lipton and Polliack analyze a representative selection of textual and visual sources, mainly – though not uniquely – medieval, in an attempt to better understand Jewish, Christian and Islamic exegetical approaches – internal and in relation to each other – to dealing with complications in the Davidic lineage.

Ancient Christian Bible exegesis has much in common with rabbinic interpretations, largely due to the common use of the Hebrew Bible/Old Testament. This is true in the Syriac literature even more so than in the Greek and Latin works. Syriac Christian writings contain many exegetical points that appear to have been influenced by rabbinic Judaism. At the same time, the Syriac-speaking church had been in constant conflict with Judaism since Syriac literature first emerged in the late third century, and consolidated in the fourth century. In the next chapter, God's Master Plan: The Story of David and Bathsheba in Some Early Syriac Commentaries, Orly Mizrachi argues that all this is reflected in the Syrian exegesis of 2 Samuel 11–12. So, for instance, David is perceived as a prefiguration of Christ and his repentance is perceived as characteristic of His future era, when the biblical law will be annulled and the most important act of the Christian believer will be repentance. The paper demonstrates that during the Christological controversy in the fifth and in the sixth centuries, two independent Syriac-speaking churches were established. Thus, the biblical commentaries on these chapters are also a source of information concerning an internal dialogue between Jacob of Edessa and his predecessors in the Syrian Orthodox Church, on the one hand, and Ishodad of Merv and those who preceded him in the Church of the East, on the other.

In the last article of this section, Ibn Ka^ïr's (d. 774/1373) Treatment of the David and Uriah Narrative: The Issue of Isrã^ïliyyãt and the Syrian School of Exegesis, Marianna Klar demonstrates that Ibn Ka^ïr's treatment of the David and Uriah narrative, held by many to underpin the quránic pericope at Sura 38:21–25, is tantalizingly brief. Indeed, the visible tip of his act of exegesis consists merely of a two-pronged dismissal of "the story that the exegetes relate," a gloss of the quránic vocabulary, and an aphorism: "the good deeds of the pious are the bad deeds of [God's] intimates." The paper argues that underlying this, however, is a sizeable degree of unspoken scholarly interaction between Ibn Ka^ïr and the works of his peers. It demonstrates that Ibn Ka^ïr may rarely cite later exegetes by name, but he appears to have engaged substantially with their works, and indeed to have assumed his scholarly audience to be as familiar with their main points and their principal arguments as he was. It posits the existence of a specifically Syrian school of exegesis, whose parameters influenced Ibn Ka^ïr much more profoundly than has previously been acknowledged: the importance of al-^ãzin al-Bagdãdï, in particular, would appear to have been critically overlooked. Finally, it postulates that Ibn Ka^ïr's usage of the term isrã^ïliyyãt should meanwhile be viewed within a much wider discussion of contemporary attitudes towards inherited exegetical material in general.

Reinventing David in Early Modern and Modern Religious Thought and Literature

The first chapter of this section brings us to eighteenth century Poland and the fascinating figure of Jacob Frank (1726–1791), a Polish-Jewish religious leader who claimed to be the reincarnation of the biblical patriarch Jacob and of the self-proclaimed messiah Sabbatai Zevi. Frank arguably created a new religious movement, later called Frankism, which combined some aspects of Judaism and Christianity. In the chapter, "David Was Secretly a Woman": King David as a Messianic Topos in the Teaching of Jacob Frank, Jan Doktór explores the reception of King David and the shaping of his image in the teaching of Jacob Frank. The article investigates the reason why the figure of David caught Frank's attention, despite his having pointedly abandoned the traditional messianic idea of returning to the Holy Land and the restoration of the kingdom of David. In addition, it addresses the question concerning which of David's "messianic attributes" Frank wished to imitate and why, and demonstrates that Frank viewed David as "secretly a woman" (an incarnation of the Shekhinah [Heb. Še^inã]). Accordingly, in his opinion, it was David's femininity that endowed him with salvific skills. Finally, the paper delves more deeply into the

question of how this Davidic femininity should be understood – whether, in a literal sense, he was a woman, or whether a feminine aspect of divinity manifested itself in his person – and deals with Frank's progressive idea that the arrival of the messianic era will put an end to gender segregation.

The next paper by Elzbieta Lazarewicz-Wyrzykowska, Davidic Narratives in the Contemporary Roman Catholic Liturgical Readings, examines the passages from Davidic narratives in the books of Samuel and 1 Kings included in the contemporary Roman Catholic breviary and lectionary as "readings," in light of the Christological focus of these liturgical collections. It argues that the decision about the inclusion of these passages in spite of the complex and potentially problematic image of David they convey was influenced by a number of interpretative traditions. This includes both the praise of David in Sirach 47:2–11, easily yielding itself to generally Christian and specifically Catholic exegesis, and the Christian reception of David in the Gospel passion narratives, as well as later exegetical traditions, i.e., medieval monastic teachings of Aelred of Rievaulx and thirteenth century Dominican homiletics. The article explores also the means employed by the compilers of the liturgical collections to harmonize the selected biblical passages with these traditions.

Finally, in the last chapter, The Reception of David and Michal in Twentieth and Twenty-First-Century Literature, Sophia Lena Tiemeyer analyses the way in which four selected twentieth century novels function as midrash, understood in its broad sense as literature which interacts with and interprets the biblical material. The paper focuses on the novelists' interpretations of the relationship between David and Michal. The biblical narrative offers but a brief description of their interaction, yet these sparse references encourage readers to explore further their respective feelings for each other and the motives behind their actions. The article is centered around a set of questions, originally posed by David Clines vis-à-vis the biblical narrative. (1) Why does David marry Michal, given that Saul initially offered his elder daughter Merab as a reward? (2) Why does Michal love David? (3) Does David love Michal back? (4) How should Michal's position between her husband David and her father Saul be understood? (5) How should the presence of the terap^im in David's and Michal's bedroom be understood? (6) What does Michal feel about her husband Paltiel? (7) Why does Michal reproach David when he dances in front of the Ark of the Covenant? In addition, Tiemeyer addresses the following questions: What answers do these select novels offer and how do their modern perspectives influence their readings of the ancient tale? She argues that all the novels base their readings on existing narrative gaps in the text which they, in turn, seek to fill. The biblical story is ambiguous and this ambiguity paves the way for a wide range of interpretations. Thus, in a broad sense, these novels offer valuable interpretations of the biblical Davidic narrative.

...

We believe that the collection of chapters included in the present volume will contribute to our understanding of how different religious traditions accommodated one another and shaped their respective boundaries through the process of an ongoing, intensive and extensive dialogue over their sanctified texts. Its main beneficiaries will be scholars and students of Jewish, Christian and Islamic studies, especially those interested in Bible and Qurán exegesis and other religious literature, but also scholars of comparative literature and literary theory, historians, historians of art, cultural scientists and possibly also sociologists. Yet, we hope too that the book will offer something of interest to a wider public which will also benefit from its results, given the socio-historical importance of interreligious

relations and the impact that these religious traditions had on the development of human culture and civilization as a whole.

Far from offering a comprehensive account of the reception history of King David and the Psalms in all monotheistic traditions throughout the ages, the volume intends to illustrate the diversity and richness of the process of cross-cultural interchanges among Jews, Christians and Muslims, especially in the Middle Ages, as exemplified in their perceptions and receptions of this central biblical figure and his attributed book, recognized in all monotheistic traditions as a sacred text. Accordingly, it contributes to our understanding of the multilaterally fertilizing effect that these interchanges had upon the major monotheistic religious traditions, their cultures and literatures, helping us to recalibrate and reassess the nature of the complex, enduring relationship between Judaism, Christianity and Islam, and to reconstruct the trajectories of cross-cultural contacts and transfers of ideas between them. <>

MEDIEVAL JEWISH PHILOSOPHY AND ITS LITERARY FORMS edited by Aaron W. Hughes and James T. Robinson [New Jewish Philosophy and Thought, Indiana University Press, 9780253042514]

Too often the study of philosophical texts is carried out in ways that do not pay significant attention to how the ideas contained within them are presented, articulated, and developed. This was not always the case. The contributors to this collected work consider Jewish philosophy in the medieval period, when new genres and forms of written expression were flourishing in the wake of renewed interest in ancient philosophy. Many medieval Jewish philosophers were highly accomplished poets, for example, and made conscious efforts to write in a poetic style. This volume turns attention to the connections that medieval Jewish thinkers made between the literary, the exegetical, the philosophical, and the mystical to shed light on the creativity and diversity of medieval thought. As they broaden the scope of what counts as medieval Jewish philosophy, the essays collected here consider questions about how an argument is formed, how text is put into the service of philosophy, and the social and intellectual environment in which philosophical texts were produced.

Review

This well-written, accessible collection demonstrates a maturation in Jewish studies and medieval philosophy. It convincingly opens up the canon of philosophical texts and authors, and will enrich readers' understanding of the diverse literary forms of medieval Jewish philosophical projects. . . . Highly recommended. — *Choice*

Comprising sophisticated scholarship and realizing its goal of challenging conventions in the study of medieval Jewish philosophy, [*Medieval Jewish Philosophy*] convincingly advocates for a fruitful approach that, it may be hoped, others will be inspired to pursue. — *H-Judaic*

Succinctly put, this book argues that form matters. When medieval Jewish philosophy is analyzed as a socially constructed practice, it emerges as nuanced, complex, compelling, and meaningful, inviting Jews

and non-Jews to appreciate it anew. -- Hava Tirosh-Samuelson, author of *The Legacy of Hans Jonas: Judaism and the Phenomenon of Life*

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> We raise the issue of the nature of narrative is to invite reflection on the very nature of culture and, possibly, even on the nature of humanity itself.... Far from being a problem, then, narrative might well be considered a solution to a problem of general human concern, namely, the problem of how to translate knowing into telling, the problem of fashioning human experience into a form assimilable to structures of meaning that are generally human rather than culture-specific.

With this statement, Hayden White suggests that the only meaning that history can have is the one that narrative imagination assigns to it. In this volume, we wish to suggest, in a similar vein, that the only meaning that philosophy can have is through the various literary genres that provide it form. There is not one abstract notion of philosophy, in other words, to which we assent but only various narratives of philosophy that organize, build an argument, and, in the process, ultimately seek to influence a readership. This is as true for Jewish philosophy, as White suggests, as it is for all types of philosophy.

The academic study of medieval Jewish philosophy began in Central Europe in the middle of the nineteenth century. In their desire to make Jews rational and to show how Jewish philosophy coincided with the various species of non-Jewish rationalism, towering figures such as Moritz Steinschneider (1816-1907), Hermann Cohen (1842-1918), and Jakob Guttmann (1845-1919) created the parameters of a field of study that is still largely in Place to this day. Such individuals wrote during a period of inner turmoil Within Judaism to be sure, one wherein all of the major denominations of Judaism were created, all of which revolved around the perceived relationship between Jews and non-Jewish ideas and culture. While none of this Was unique to the nineteenth century—Jews after all had been intimately involved in other cultures since at least the first century CE--what was new was the creation of a distinct field devoted to the academic study of Judaism in general and medieval Jewish philosophy in particular. Methods supplied by larger disciplinary frameworks such as history and philology formed the context for

this new endeavor. Wissenschaft des Judentums, the predecessor to the modern field of Jewish studies, also established many of the categories and subdisciplines—medieval Jewish philosophy, Kabbalah, rabbinics, parshanut (i.e., biblical exegesis), and so on—that continue to structure how premodern Jewish texts are categorized and studied both in North America and Israel. In addition to these rubrics, the non-Jewish temporal periodizations of medieval Jewish philosophy, which continue to be employed, were also developed to subdivide medieval Jewish philosophy: Platonic, Aristotelian, Neoplatonic, Averroistic, humanist, and so on.

While recent years have witnessed many new trends and developments in the more general study of the Middle Ages, many of these trends and developments have made few or no inroads into the field of medieval Jewish philosophy. The field continues to develop largely along the technical and insular lines laid out by Wissenschaft des Judentums over a century and a half ago. Despite the increased intersection between medieval studies and the larger humanities in which they are located, the study of medieval Jewish philosophy remains a fairly technical and unwelcoming field. The present volume seeks to redress this oversight by providing what we believe to be a set of new and critical investigations into the study of medieval Jewish philosophical texts by focusing on the important role of genre.

This overwhelming evidence on a generically constructed "medieval Jewish philosophy" too often overlooks the ways in which ideas contained within the texts associated with them are presented, articulated, and developed. While this may be forgiven in the modern period, in which philosophy tends to be written in technical monographs and disseminated through university presses, this has not always been the case. The medieval period, for example, witnessed a host of different genres and forms to express, to communicate, and to teach the more technical aspects of Platonic and Aristotelian philosophy. Because of this diversity of genres, proper attention must be paid to the various literary forms of these texts and not just their contents. It is not insignificant, for example, that some philosophers chose to express their ideas using the genre of dialogues, that some did so using poetic meter, or that others chose to present their ideas through commentaries of either earlier philosophers or sacred scripture.

Such literary genres, of course, need not mean that the contents are not philosophical. However, too often within Jewish studies that deal with the medieval period, "nontraditional" genres are written off as unoriginal and then subsequently lumped into another subfield created by Wissenschaft des Judentums, such as parshanut or poetry. It is frequently assumed, for example, that a philosophical commentary is an unoriginal genre because it simply restates, albeit in different language, that which is found in an earlier composition (be it Plato, Aristotle, Maimonides, or Averroes). Such an assumption, however, overlooks the often extremely original and creative ideas embedded in the genre. Indeed, one could even go so far as to claim that the genre provides a certain conservative cover under which innovative or even dangerous ideas could be expressed. A similar case could be made for poetry. Today there is a tendency to think, and this may well be part of our Platonic inheritance bequeathed to us by our Wissenschaft forebears, that poetry is the antithesis of philosophy. Yet we all know that Plato was an expert in mythopoesis, and that some of the great Islamic philosophers, such as Al-Farabi and Avicenna, argued for the philosophic importance of the genre. Such a conceit also ignores the fact that many medieval Jewish philosophers—especially the Neoplatonists associated with the Andalusi tradition--were highly accomplished poets and made a conscious effort to write their philosophy in poetic style. This does not mean they were inept philosophers, as Hermann Cohen implied, but, as Aaron Hughes argues in his

chapter devoted to poetry, these philosophers felt that the poetic medium offered a particular way of thinking about the cosmos and metaphysics that the standard philosophical treatise fundamentally lacked.

A renewed attention to genre shows us to what extent medieval thinkers made connections between the literary, the exegetical, the philosophical, and the mystical—three spheres that Wissenschaft des Judentums tore asunder and made into separate subdisciplines. However, this artificial and retroactive distinction betrays both the creativity and what we today call the "interdisciplinarity" of medieval philosophical thought. In order to correct some of these wrongs, we have commissioned chapters from some of the leading voices currently engaged in the study of medieval Jewish philosophy. The result, Medieval Jewish Philosophy and Its Literary Forms, is meant to challenge many of the conventions that have grown up around the field and to simultaneously set an outline for new and future research into the material. In so doing, we also hope to widen the scope of what gets to count as medieval Jewish philosophy. Rather than perpetuate tradition and confine analysis to the usual suspects—such as Solomon ibn Gabirol, Judah Halevi, Maimonides, and Gersonides—we hope that a renewed attentiveness to genre might open up the traditional canon. Unfortunately, it is the types of assumptions documented above that were responsible for constituting that canon in the first place. Maimonides's Guide is the perfect example. Although Leo Strauss famously defined it as a book of biblical exegesis,' it has nevertheless been held up by generations of scholars as the most original work of medieval Jewish philosophy. While there can be no denial of this treatise's importance, its elevation may come at the expense of other works and other thinkers, most of whom are imagined either as leading up to Maimonides or as his subsequent epigones. This can be seen in the overwhelming volume of secondary works published on Maimonides to the detriment of other medieval Jewish thinkers.

This is certainly not to deny that there exist several important introductory books, edited collections, and monographs devoted to some of the more technical features of medieval Jewish philosophy. Very few of them, however, focus specifically on genre. We would further not be so bold as to imply that no work has been done on the role of several literary forms employed by medieval Jewish philosophers. Much important work has been done, for example, on the genres of commentary on the Bible, commentary on rabbinic Aggadah, dialogue, encyclopedias, sermons, and poetry, to name a few. What is unique about the present volume is the sustained theoretical focus on all of these forms, an abiding interest in the various ways that genres produce content, and an attentiveness to the various contexts in which this occurs. When taken as a whole, as opposed to considering individual parts, we are able to see some of the lines that connect these diverse genres, thereby appreciating how these literary forms develop and disseminate philosophical ideas and, in the process, what features they have in common.

Within this context, our goal as editors has been to assemble a leading team of internationally recognized scholars and to charge them with the task of writing a chapter on a particular genre or literary form. While chapters are rooted in medieval sources, they are also forward-looking, and authors are not afraid to engage with more modern issues in both literary studies and contemporary philosophy. The end result is a unified collection that seeks to reframe some of the questions traditionally asked of

both medieval and modern Jewish philosophy and to begin the process of breathing new life into a field of study that has unfortunately remained isolated from some of the larger frames of analysis supplied by the humanities.

MEDIEVAL JEWISH PHILOSOPHY AND ITS LITERARY FORMS has several aims. Our primary goal is to create a new path into the field of medieval Jewish philosophy by developing a set of questions about form as well as content and by focusing on how an argument is presented in addition to the actual argument. Whereas we possess many studies that focus on the latter, our claim is that we also need to spend time contextualizing and assessing the former. How a philosophical (or indeed any) text generates an argument is intimately connected to the argument itself. The frame and what is framed cannot be neatly extracted from each other. Instead, an appreciation of the complex entanglements between genre and content shows us the ways texts are imagined and constructed and the purposes for which they are written. In this way we see something of the larger contexts of medieval Jewish philosophy. Do Jewish philosophers, for example, employ genres that are similar to or different from those of non-Jewish philosophers? If similar, do they deviate in important ways from the others and, if so, for what purposes? Likewise, if Jewish thinkers compose philosophical treatises using genres that differ from the majority, why do they do so and again for what purposes?

Second, a sustained analysis of genre and literary form illumines the social construction of meaning. Rather than imagine philosophical treatises as existing in hermetically sealed and timeless bubbles, the chapters that follow demonstrate clearly that philosophy takes place in specific communities and often in response to distinct concerns within them. Despite the claims of many philosophers, philosophy is not an unembodied and timeless activity. Instead, individuals who write philosophy are connected to and embedded in real communities. Within these contexts, philosophical texts are written with specific audiences in mind and as a way to persuade them of a particular position. It is thus important to understand the connections between philosophers and their social and intellectual environments. Our goal in the present volume is to understand how various literary forms relate to the social production and dissemination of philosophy.

Third, we hope to create a new understanding of medieval Jewish philosophy by opening it up to questions supplied by other fields, such as literary studies, religious studies, and medieval studies. Within this context, we seek to develop an analytical framework that will focus not just on a text's content, as mentioned, but also upon the form wherein that content is expressed. An understanding of genre, the way in which an argument is framed and constructed, is just as important as the argument. With so many genres to choose from, why did certain philosophers choose one over another? Why, for example, are some arguments framed as dialogues as opposed to poems, and vice versa? What does the literary and technical structure of a dialogue provide an argument that a poem cannot?

Fourth, most the chapters focus on some of the minor or at least lesser known thinkers of medieval Jewish philosophy. Many of these thinkers were often seen as unoriginal or epigonic precisely on account of the genres in which they expressed themselves. By examining them and their treatises, we hope to widen the canon of medieval Jewish philosophy. In this sense, we sincerely hope that our volume will function as an accessible and nontechnical introduction to the breadth of medieval Jewish philosophy by focusing on one aspect of its production—that of genre. <>

Unveiling the Hidden—Anticipating the Future: Divinatory Practices Among Jews Between Qumran and the Modern Period edited by Josefina Rodríguez-Arribas and Dorian Gieseler Greenbaum [Series: Prognostication in History, Brill, 9789004445062]

In **Unveiling the Hidden—Anticipating the Future: Divinatory Practices Among Jews Between Qumran and the Modern Period,** Josefina Rodríguez-Arribas and Dorian Gieseler Greenbaum collect ten studies based on primary sources ranging from Qumran to the modern period and covering Europe and the Mediterranean basin. The studies show Jews practising divination (astrology, bibliomancy, physiognomy, dream requests, astral magic, etc.) and implementing the study and practice of the prognostic arts in ways that allowed Jews to make them "Jewish," by avoiding any conflict with Jewish law or halakhah. These studies focus on the Jewish components of this divination, providing specific firsthand details about the practices and their practitioners within their cultural and intellectual contexts—as well as their fears, wishes, and anxieties—using ancient scrolls and medieval manuscripts in Hebrew, Aramaic, and Judaeo-Arabic.

Contributors are Michael D. Swartz, Helen R. Jacobus, Alessia Bellusci, Blanca Villuendas Sabaté, Shraga Bar-On, Josefina Rodríguez-Arribas, Amos Geula, Dov Schwartz, Joseph Ziegler, and Charles Burnett.

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The Inevitable Presence of Divination in Culture

This monograph opens with a quotation from a Spanish contemporary poet in which the poetic *persona* complains about his inability to get good peaches from a market stall. He has never cared about distinguishing peaches by their visible colors—yellow and red—, so how will he be able to distinguish good from bad, these qualities being even less apparent to the eye? This inability to be mindful of visible details in order to discern hidden qualities—he confesses—is the root of all his misfortunes, but it does not prevent him from continuing to demand good peaches from other people, namely, the fruit seller. Is he wise in deeming the fruit seller an expert in distinguishing good from bad (fruit), or is he just leaving his decision to someone else? Whichever the case, is it not perhaps his attitude and corresponding assumption the root of all his misfortunes—namely, his dependence on the knowledge of others? The subject of this book, inquiring—from others or by means that are not entirely within one's reach—about what is hidden or unknown (whether these be the future, secrets, or far away things), reminded me of this poem and the paradoxical circumstances of its poetic *persona*.

Divination was a controversial subject in some religions and societies, but a careful eye cannot fail to detect the persistence of this phenomenon in most cultures. Why do people want to anticipate the future or uncover what is hidden? The answer is apparent: to avoid errors in the important decisions of life, to have some advantage over chance and the unexpected, to improve a given situation with reliable decisions, to make easy money, to keep only trustworthy friends, to choose the right partner, etc. Not all of those who practice divination or believe in omens and portents have the same understanding about the state of things in the world and the result of individual actions, what one might call fate. The divinatory phenomenon seems to work within different mental attitudes regarding past, present, and future events, for instance a *hard* or a *soft* version of fate as regards the future (using modern terminology and leaving room for a spectrum between the two). In the *hard* version nothing can be changed, while in the *soft* version there is a possibility of changing the outcome or of adapting or preparing oneself for whatever is anticipated. These different understandings of fate are usually not referred to explicitly or discussed in the context of the divinatory performance and are likelier to emerge in theological and philosophical discussions disconnected from actual practices. However, careful analysis of the specific divinatory practice and the use of the language and terminology of the practitioner and his/her client can reveal underlying beliefs and assumptions regarding fate and the role of human choices. The ancient *heimarmene* of the early Stoics—"the compulsion/necessity" of the stars or "interdependence of causes" in the universe—left room mainly for a *hard* version, while the interrogational astrology outlined by Dorotheus Sidonius implied that individual fate is not completely determined and divination can help to mold it. This is not the place to discuss these long and contradictory traditions, which do not concern only Judaism or divination, but also other cultures and other human endeavors. Nevertheless, we can say that most Jewish divinatory practices presented and discussed in this book seem to work in a more or less *hard* understanding of fate, although—as several examples mentioned in its chapters show—the belief was that Jews can tip the balance to a *softer* version when they live within the path indicated by their religion.

In the Middle Ages, astrology was classified among the empirical and mathematical sciences, although it was also frequently considered an art rather than a science. Along these lines, the Iberian astronomer Abraham bar Ḥiyya (twelfth century), considered astrology an art based on experience whose results are not always accurate. But astrology was also considered as one of the highest forms of divinatory technique, because it deals with signs coming from the highest levels of the universe (stars and planets). Similar classifications of divination are used in Christian Latin sources; for example, the twelfth-century Iberian translator Dominicus Gundisalinus defined divination as conjectural knowledge of the future based on human opinion (i.e., probable knowledge), and the Dominican Albertus Magnus (thirteenth century) interpreted prognostic knowledge as knowledge based on conjecture (conjectural knowledge). Fidora reflects on this classification in his interesting introduction to a monograph on the epistemology of medieval divination. As interesting as Fidora's study is, its understanding concerns a limited selection of Christian Latin authors, disciplines (astrology, medicine, and meteorology), and a very specific definition of divination (as only knowledge of the future).

Even a superficial glance at divinatory practices among medieval Jews reveals that not all practitioners and clients of divination undertook the divinatory performance with the same assumptions of what they were doing and why it might work. There are important differences in terms of the epistemology that underlies the different divinatory practices that were in use, an assertion that also applies to divinatory practices in other cultures and religions. Those practices based on randomness (bibliomancy), those based on technical knowledge (astrology, physiognomy, palmistry), and those based on a combination of both (for instance, astrological geomancy) evidently operated within different epistemological frameworks that need further study beyond the specific cases that have received scholarly attention so far. Differences also emerge in the gap between learned or sophisticated forms of practices (any of those previously mentioned) and folk or popular forms of them (e.g., onomancy, omens, etc.). Gundisalinus' and Albertus Magnus' understandings of divination do not do justice to the complex and multicultural phenomenon of divination and the different forms in which it was practiced in the medieval period. Their approach excludes inspired divination and divination based on randomness, as well as mixed forms of divination—all practices that were in use in the Middle Ages.[4]These definitions also exclude a divination that is intended not to know the future, but rather what is hidden or unknown, whether it be something in the past, the present, or the future.

As for the specific nature of the divinatory signs, which are the stuff of all divination, technical or inspired—a sign or a message has to be interpreted not just in technical, but also in inspired divination when the message is not directly given. Depending on their understanding, signs determine whether divination is considered a non-science (in the Aristotelian understanding), or a conjectural or non-Aristotelian science (in Gundisalinus' view) in which the practitioners consider that divinatory/prognostic signs indicate but do not cause what they indicate. Nonetheless, divinatory signs deserve careful study, for their role in Jewish and non-Jewish sources is complex and at times even contradictory. It is clear that some signs are just signs (e.g., any geomantic figure) or symptoms (as in medicine), while others seem to have some causal role depending on the authors and the disciplines (e.g., stars can work as secondary or intermediate causes in astrology). Furthermore divinatory signs are more often than not perceived as unequivocal, unequivocal, and infallible in their roles either as signs or as causes, and thus human interpretation is considered the main reason for mistakes in judgments related to divination.
perceived and then interpreted. The sign can be natural, spontaneous, or constructed or sought (as in

lecanomancy, referred to in Chapter Seven of this book). It can be normal (the regular periodical movements of the stars, or non-periodical like the croaking of a raven) or abnormal (like monsters, comets, etc.). It can be established as a sign *a priori* (a pre-coded sign), *a posteriori* (one decides that something is a sign after perceiving it), or simultaneously. The semiology of divination is a topic that rarely emerges in scholarship, except in the form of case studies, which gives a very partial and biased insight into their nature and status.

We need more sources to be edited and published and more case studies analyzed before we can obtain a more accurate general picture of this intriguing human inclination to fathom the unknown by pushing the limits of human knowledge, especially now that divination and other *dark* disciplines have become a licit (if not *respected*) scholarly subject.

Criteria and Limitations of the Approaches in This Book

At the end of the long process that is reading, properly understanding, organizing, and creating a common structure from the different subjects collected in this book, we realized two paradoxes: first of all, it is not at all easier to be a historian than a diviner; and secondly, somehow it is a less complicated task to write a book than to edit one. We can predict with a high degree of accuracy that not everybody (authors, editors, and readers) will find what they are expecting here, but let us hope that ultimately we are better historians than diviners!

As previously said, this monograph emerged from a workshop, with most of its chapters stemming from the papers presented at it; other papers were requested and added later during the collection of the contributions in an effort to reflect as much as possible the catalogue of divinatory practices available and used in Jewish cultures. We were more interested in actual divinatory practices, both the variety of ways used to unveil what is hidden and unknown, and with how Jews understood their divinatory pratices within the frame of contemporary religion, philosophy, and science. I think both aspects are well (though partially) reflected in this book (the former in Chapters Two, Three, Four, Five, Eight, and Nine, the latter in Chapters One, Six, and Seven). It is, however, apparent that further research in both dimensions must be pursued in order to get a more comprehensive and accurate understanding of the divinatory phenomenon in pre-modern societies, cultures, and mentalities.

Given that divination seems to be a human phenomenon in all periods and cultures, the choice of the papers was determined—following the workshop—by the focus on what might be specifically Jewish about the forms of divination that Jews practiced, some of which are still in use. Divination, prognostication, and manticism are used in this book as synonyms. Bar-On (Chapter Five) and Ziegler (Chapter Nine) are the only ones to use the term "manticism" to denote divination, perhaps because the authors of these chapters are aware of certain connotations in the root of the word "divination" that they prefer to avoid. Prognostication, as Ziegler uses it (Chapter Nine), is a term more connected to medicine and related to physiognomy and its non-divinatory aspects.

The field of Jewish divination has inherent limits but also a huge scope, and is still barely explored, as Villuendas Sabaté (Chapter Four) makes clear in relation to dream divination: her account implies that between the Babylonian Talmud, the first example of a Jewish dream book, and the last, most famous, dream handbook by Solomon Almoli (1516), the study of Jewish medieval dream books remains virtually unexplored. She concludes that more critical editions and further study are necessary to understand the transmission and connections of dream divination in medieval Arabic and related cultures. A similar

conclusion can be applied to the remaining forms of divination described or mentioned in this book: we need to collect and analyze more case studies in order to understand how, why, and what for.

In this monograph, two necessary self-restrictions are evident in the table of contents and the titles of the different chapters. One restriction is temporal and relates to the decision to exclude the Biblical period and its contexts, which are so rich in this respect. Divinatory practices in the Bible have long been discussed in the context of Biblical scholarship, as well as in books and articles dealing with ancient Near Eastern religions, though this should not imply that there is nothing left to refute, confirm, or discover: for instance, the highly relevant connection of prophecy with divination, and especially with inspired divination might need further research. Notwithstanding the stated omission of Biblical divination, forms of divination mentioned in the Hebrew Bible are still present everywhere in this monograph within the context of discussions about the legitimacy of divination in Jewish religion, and Biblical sources are quoted, cited, and used with this purpose in several chapters of this book (notably, Chapters Three and Seven). The convenor of the workshop is a medievalist, and medieval divinatory practices, underexplored in Jewish culture, were her main interest, though some latitude was allowed for studies dealing with antiquity (Chapters One and Two) and the modern period (Chapter Five). Readers should keep in mind that this is the first book in the field of Jewish studies dealing exclusively with divination among Jews, as its title makes clear, and only for that it is already an important contribution.

The other self-restriction is methodological, resulting from the absence in this book of any discussion about the definition of divination and its relation to magic. Magic is a popular subject in the field of Jewish studies, perhaps due to the long historical association of Jews with it. Possibly divination's neglect in general scholarship is exacerbated by its overlapping with magic, which in some cases is clearly indistinguishable, and not only in Jewish sources. The end of Chapter One discusses this overlap of magic and divination, which might have been customary in ancient and medieval times (see also Chapter Eight), but the fact is that some medieval Jewish authors saw them as very different fields (see Chapters Six and Seven), at least in the intention of the practitioner and the forces being put to work. Bellusci, following Gideon Bohak and others, considers dream-requests and divination in general to be a branch of magic (she calls dream-requests a "magical technique" several times in her chapter). The relationships of divination and magic need further clarification, especially regarding certain forms of divination in which non-human or angelic revelation plays no role at all (for example, astrology as in Chapters Six and Seven, physiognomy as in Chapter Nine, geomancy, etc.), though divination always operates in Jewish cultures within a more or less theocentric understanding of the universe. Did ancient and medieval practitioners consider both kinds of practices—magical and divinatory—as identical, similar, or just related? This is a highly complex question that indirectly emerges in this book and awaits further research.

A few excellent monographs dealing with magic in Judaism have been cited in this book (these can be found in the general bibliography); however, none of these books extensively discusses the relationship between magic and divination, considering both as one single category, magic. Though this assumption could be questioned, most authors wrote their chapters with the understanding that there is no separation between magic and divinatory practices, but the author of the twelfth-century Hebrew text translated in Chapter Seven was very concerned with this separation.

In theory, magic and divination might look like closely related fields separated only by their goals. On a simplistic level, one might say that knowledge is the purpose of divination, even if its acquisition is frequently intended to change things in the world, while action/change/control of the world and its beings would be the main purpose of magic. However, magic and divination historically frequently overlapped in practice, for instance in astral magic or in the knowledge of the hidden and the future attained by revelatory means (for instance, in dream-requests and bibliomancy). Magic and divination can both be considered forms of technology; some form of control is the intended purpose in both and their knowledge is built upon experience and tradition, though also upon divine inspiration. Hence, they are both technical knowledge in different degrees, depending on the specific form of the practice and the expectations of the practitioners and their clients. They can also be understood, in certain cases, as forms of science, especially considering that in ancient and medieval times *science* denoted just *knowledge*, any knowledge, contrary to the very specific meaning of the modern concept, based in mathematics (measure) and the experimental method (repeatability of the same phenomena under the same conditions).

Many of the chapters let us glimpse how intrinsic the assistance of non-human or spiritual beings might be to the diviner in attaining the desired knowledge about the future or the hidden. All the divinatory techniques explained in this book are either forms of technical or deductive (also known as artificial or mechanical) divination, and natural or emotive (also known as inspired) divination (for example, divination by possession or oracles), or a combination of both. What separates technical from natural is the training required by the performer of technical divination, who needs the tools of deductive thought to attain a result and, above all, his/her independence from non-human beings and means to achieve the intended knowledge. Nevertheless, inspired or natural divination also requires some sort of technique or experience in order to get an answer (as in Chapter Three). These questions should be considered in more depth in future research, for they concern not only Jewish divinatory practices but the phenomenon of divination in general in all cultures and periods. Diviners are technicians, just like magicians.

The diviner who forecasts when possessed by the god has no possibility of being wrong (only of being misunderstood, as many examples in ancient sources show), while technicians of any sort can always make mistakes either in the procedure or in the interpretation, so that they need a long training period to become experts through study and experience. Diviners perform their art and display their expertise and knowledge before clients but also before their peers, other fellow diviners, who confirm or refute their expertise. Certain divinatory performances (like astrology, geomancy, dream interpretation, etc.) imply some sort of negotiation of meaning, just as in any dialogic situation between people. If the speech of the diviner turns out to be unrelated to the circumstances of the client, it is always possible to work retrospectively and correct previous inaccurate or wrong answers in the light of the new information provided by both, or by changing the questions, for wrong questions can invalidate the whole process. It is unfortunate (but significant) that most of the time this dialogical process, and, in general, the process of interpretation is neither written nor described in manuscripts or printed texts. We frequently are given just a few sentences that do not help much in reconstructing the actual scenario and dialogue of the divinatory seance. The dialogic character of technical divination allows us to consider it a form of rationality, just as Marcel Sigrist holds for magic.

It is also pertinent to keep in mind that there is an important body of material culture that illuminates different and unexpected aspects of divination that do not emerge in textual sources and frequently escape the attention of scholars. An attentive reader will notice the explicit mention or the silent necessary presence of divinatory artifacts in some of the chapters, though almost all the studies take a textual approach to their respective subjects. As Chapter One (Swartz) enunciates it, divination is "a quest of meaning" and it looks for signification in everyday objects and events, but most material aspects of divinatory practices are not to be found in texts. Notwithstanding, the physicality of the divinatory act is, in some practices, very clear, for instance in the handling of books in bibliomantic contexts (Chapter Five) or in the use of specific materials and their handling in magical performances (Chapter Ten), in horoscopes calculated and frequently drawn on paper or parchment for astrology (Chapters Six and Seven); as well as, in other senses, in the facial and corporeal signs that have to be interpreted in physiognomy (Chapter Nine), or the lists of specific signs and their corresponding specific meanings in dream handbooks and lottery books (Chapters Three and Five, respectively). Chapter Ten focuses directly on the materiality of its topic, with a complete immersion in the most material aspects of the kind of magic that relies on writing names (using skins, inks, writing tools, etc), a practice which seems to be especially associated with Jews or Jewish figures (notably, King Solomon).

Comparative approaches are frequent, especially with Christian and Islamic cultures. Chapter Three gives keys for understanding the historical background of dream-requests in antiquity (notably the Greek and Demotic magical papyri) and in the Middle Ages in both Jewish and non-Jewish sources (Arabic *istiḵāra* in *ḥadīth* literature and dream requests in magical Latin texts). Dream-requests can be studied not only in the long tradition of dream divination in ancient and medieval Near-Eastern and Mediterranean civilizations, but in the context of an extensive tradition of interrogational systems for decision-making, in which the Arabic *masāʾil* and the Hebrew *šeʾilot* (both of which deal with different systems to get an answer) are clearly placed. Further research could explore this approach, with possible roots in Babylonian sources of the second millenium BCE: one of the Akkadian words denoting a diviner is *šaʾilu* ("one who asks or questions"), which suggests that *the art of divining* might have started and developed as *the art of inquiring*, the art of "framing a question" in such a way that the given answer would be clear and unambiguous. With this in mind, a clear difference should also be made among divinatory practices according to the kind of answer they can provide: a yes or no answer to a definite question resulting from a procedure based on revelation or randomness, or a more complex answer resulting from a more or less long and complex interpretational process performed by a specific diviner. As Guillaume put it: the former can only answer the question *shall*, while the latter can answer the question *what*. It was not infrequent in medieval divination for the client to ask the diviner to provide not only the answer to a question, but sometimes also the question itself, often with the intention of testing the expertise of the diviner, as Judah al-Ḥarizi's *maqama* shows.

Physical books and written words are read or heard in different divinatory contexts (Chapters One, Three, and Five), and these could be combined. Thus it is possible to find bibliomancy at the heart of an oneirocritic episode, so that the forecast would be given by a Biblical verse heard during a dream (examples in Chapters Three and Five). Astrology is present in our volume under different aspects (Chapters Two, Five, Six, Seven, and Eight), and a physical artifact associated with its practice (an astrolabe) is briefly mentioned in Chapter Six. Chapter Two gives an idea of how astrological anticipation was dependent on tables and written calculations, which are, in the end, artifacts of a written variety. Chapter Six mentions the use of astronomical data in Bar Ḥiyya's *Letter*, which must have

been available in the form of tables or through the use of an astronomical instrument. Furthermore, instruments in Chapter Two are mentioned as evidence. Qumran scrolls 4Q208–4Q209 present "gates" numbered 1 to 6 that Jacobus contends are here synonymous with the zodiac signs. She completes the fragmentary calendar in these scrolls and proposes that it synchronizes a lunar year of 354 days with a solar year of 360 days. The gates of this calendar refer to twelve points of a local horizon where the sun rises, which—using the astrological notion of the ascendant—she makes equivalent to the twelve zodiac signs, i.e., the horizon-based zodiac system of Babylonian MUL.APIN astronomy. Jacobus underpins her hypothesis with evidence found in astronomical Greco-Roman instruments. One of the editors is working on medieval scientific instruments and is familiar with the use of different devices in prognostication and divination contexts. The use of instruments in these contexts can give us an insight into the actual practice that very frequently is not in texts and can confirm how *real* the actual practice was, as well as providing daily-life details about the specific performances.

This book cannot and did not intend to examine all the forms of divination practiced among Jews, so that some widespread practices are mentioned only briefly (palmistry, geomancy, scrying, etc.). However, the second part of Bar Ḥiyya's *Letter* translated in Chapter Seven constitutes a treasure of divinatory practices certainly known if not practiced by many of Bar Ḥiyya's contemporaries (both Jews and non-Jews). Some of these missing practices are shown in images as they appear in Hebrew manuscripts (notably, geomancy and palmistry, see Figures in pp. 260 and 332, respectively).

It is possible to find underlying epistemological connections among different prognostication practices. In Chapter One Swartz, who follows Richard Gordon's four characteristics for building the authority of a practitioner in a healing event—namely, empirical knowledge, prestige of traditional knowledge, ritual actions, and verbal utterances or charms—finds an identity between the states of the person consulting a healer and the person consulting a diviner. Furthermore, the Jewish text translated in Chapter Seven compares the practice of astrologers choosing the right moment to perform an activity with that of physicians who choose the right drug to treat an illness. It is relevant to remember that medicine was likewise considered a prognostic art or science.

Swartz, who approaches ancient and early medieval Jewish divination within the larger framework of ancient divination, underscores our reliance on textual sources to know and understand divination in the ancient world (Chapter One). The exclusively textual approach of this book allows readers to realize some linguistic aspects of Jewish divinatory texts (though not exclusive to Jews). Chapter One opens with the frequently under-acknowledged fact that divination is also "a field of literature," which Swartz confirms with examples taken from Qumran to the medieval period, notably through the introductions and preliminary prayers distinctive of magic and divinatory texts, which root them in a long and legitimate Jewish tradition. The language and style of these texts and what they might have in common with similar texts in other cultural and lingüistic traditions are sources about the nature, scope, and roles of these practices in Jewish societies.

Chapters Three and Four, dealing with dream divination, are, consequently, focused on the philological: they include the edition and translation of several Genizah fragments in Hebrew and Judaeo-Arabic, respectively, but they also analyse the language and the structure of these specific divinatory texts. Chapter Three (Bellusci) considers Hebrew recipes (instructions) and finished products (part of the ritual) of the dream-request, which are equally based on ritual sleep (the necessary condition for

experiencing the ritual dream) and linguistic magic (adjurations, invocations, magical formulae, and prayers, many of them consisting of clusters of Biblical verses). This linguistic aspect of dream-requests allows Bellusci to make an illuminating analysis of the language, verbal constructions, and prayers that are distinctive of these Genizah texts, pinpointing their proximity to the language of mysticism, liturgy, and magic. Chapter Four (Villuendas Sabaté) presents the topic in the context of a "cross-cultural written legacy of dream symbol codification" dating back to 2000 BCE, which also shares the linguistic expression of dream *omina* in the form of conditional sentences ("if you see x, y will happen"), also noticed by Bellusci in the expression of dream-requests. Villuendas Sabaté disinguishes between earlier dream books (lists of symbols and their meanings in conditional form) and later dream treatises (expanded versions of the former that include more materials related to the interpretation of the dream). Villuendas Sabaté perceptively notes that dreambooks are composed of "units that can be easily isolated and then relocated elsewhere within the text or transferred to others," which is explained by their formulaic language, the recurrence of lists, and the weakness or absence of textual coherence that characterizes this literary genre. This structure might be applicable to most kinds of divinatory texts and their formulae, but this remains the subject of future research.

Finally, is there something specifically Jewish in the divinatory practices described and analysed in this book? Chapter One (Swartz) is quite right in not placing any emphasis on differences between cultures and religions regarding divinatory practices, although he points out that, in contrast to other ancient civilizations that institutionalized divination, Jewish divination (except for a short period with the ʾurim and *tummim* of the high priest) was always a private business. It remained a private business throughout the Middle Ages, even when divination was performed in courtly contexts for the sake of rulers and princes. Bar-On forthrightly acknowledges "the inevitable presence of manticism in the Jewish tradition" in Chapter Five: divination and prognostication are an ubiquitous phenomenon in Jewish cultures, from Biblical times up to the present, albeit with bans, discussions, nuances, and conflicts that depend on the author and the period. However, it is still clearly a Jewish phenomenon, too, because it happens among Jews and in distinctive Jewish contexts. Bar-On, Bellusci, and Villuendas Sabaté underscore the persistence of these divinatory techniques even up to present times. Are there specific Jewish forms of divination? This is another topic needing further research.

Some chapters (One, Three, Five, and Nine) suggest that certain divinatory practices have a long tradition among Jews and might have an origin in Biblical times, but most practices seem to be Jewish adaptations or Jewish developments of divinatory practices that were not originally Jewish; more research would clarify their history. These adaptations or developments took on a Jewish flavor to fit Jewish religious and customs, possibly to escape religious and social polemics and elude halakhic bans. Bar Ḥiyya (Chapter Seven) echoes the Jewish belief that Abraham was an astrologer, which certainly presents astrology as a distinctively Jewish science and art. The patriarch Joseph and the prophet Daniel practiced dream divination (Chapters Three and Four), which also presents this practice as genuinely Jewish. The *Book of Daniel* seems to be of paramount importance in the Jewish tradition (Chapters Three and Seven) and is frequently quoted in the context of dream-requests, though it remains uncertain whether there was a established Second Temple period tradition of Jewish oneiric divination.

Preliminary prayers and invocations (Chapters Three and Five) addressed to the God of Israel somehow made the practices *Jewish* and licit and certainly gave them a Jewish flavor. What is more concretely Jewish is the introduction of certain sources (Hebrew Bible, Talmud, Rabbinic literature) and figures

(Moses, Abraham, King Solomon, etc. and later figures like Ḥai ben Sherira Gaon and Elijah Gaon of Vilna) in the discussion and the practice of divination. Another intriguing and distinctive feature of Jewish divination is the belief that Israel is entitled to a special comunication with God, which separates it from the other nations of the world, as mentioned in Chapter One. This topic also figures prominently in Chapter Seven regarding the talmudic question about whether Israel has a star. As Bar Ḥiyya states in his *Letter*: "*Israel does not have a star*. This means that the righteous ones of Israel can nullify the stellar decrees that act upon them, by their righteousness and their prayers. The other nations of the world cannot do this." Specifically Jewish ritual aspects are also fundamental in establishing the Jewish character of the practice (Chapters One, Three, and Five), even if ritualistic aspects in divinatory performances generally are present in all cultures and religions. These established ways of performing and validating the practice usually include preliminary prayers and serve to legitimate it. Bar-On (Chapter Five) classifies the ritual as "magical pietism" following a expression coined by Swartz (Chapter One), which Bellusci (Chapter Three, "magical piety") also uses to denote the religious attitude of the practitioner of divination. It should be noted that prayer is especially important in the preparatory rituals preceding those forms of divination that rely more on revelation and randomness than on the technical and professional expertise of a diviner, though it can be found everywhere.

MS London British Library Or. 10878, fol. 17v (Hebrew fortune wheel). Collection of brief texts on astronomy, mathematics, music, and astrology (parchment, fifteenth century, Ashkenazi semi-cursive script). Image by permission of the British Library

Arrangement of the Chapters and Overview of Their Contents

As for the arrangement of the chapters, the order is roughly chronological according to their contents. Chapters One (Swartz) and Two (Jacobus) discuss the oldest forms of divination in Judaism presented in this book, namely Second Temple practices dating before or around the turn of the eras—leaving aside references to divinatory practices in the Hebrew Bible that surface many times in different chapters (notably, Chapter Seven and Bar Ḥiyya's discussion on Biblical terms related to divination and magic). Chapter One takes a theoretical and general approach which justifies its introductory position and gives context for the topics that follow. Chapter Two discusses Aramaic calendars in the fragmentary scrolls of Qumran. These calendars (which Jacobus has reconstructed) are based on a luni-solar cycle that considers the days of the lunar month that the sun and the moon entered the different signs of the zodiac and constitute a schematic zodiac ephemeris that can be easily adjusted for any date for all time. Jacobus' proposal is that this ephemeris was used by the sectarians of Qumran to construct simple horoscopes using just the positions of the sun and the moon in the zodiac across a year of three-hundred and sixty days with twelve months of thirty days each. Most of the remaining chapters deal with the description of specific divinatory practices.

Thus Chapters Three and Four deal with dream divination. Bellusci (Chapter Three) studies Hebrew dream-requests in fragments of the Cairo Genizah, in which the client, after performing certain preparatory rituals (concerning the body of the sleeper and the sleeping place), inquires about a subject with an answer expected during the dream. This answer may come from a divine or angelic source, or from the interpretation of certain codified signs perceived in dreams. Villuendas Sabaté's study (Chapter Four) focuses on a fragmentary dream handbook attributed to Ḥai ben Sherira Gaon in its Hebrew versions (Pseudo-Ḥai's *Pitron ḥalomot*), which she reconstructs from eleven Judaeo-Arabic Genizah fragments, providing the edition, Hebrew parallel version, and English translation of the chapter dealing with bloodletting.

Chapter Five (Shraga Bar-On) discusses the divinatory practice known in Hebrew as *goralot*, an ambiguous Hebrew term that here denotes, specifically, bibliomancy, in the form that was most widespread among Jews, namely the use of the Hebrew Bible for decision-making.[25] Bar-On (quoting Van der Horst) shows that some form of bibliomancy might have been used in Qumran, but it remains unexplored how and why Jews passed from a specific and limited "Lot of the Torah" to broader and unspecific "lottery books" that seem to be a whole literary genre, expanding the use of Biblical texts to include other literary pieces of different (and perhaps non-Jewish) provenances. Though Bar-On states that bibliomancy was the most accepted form of divination among Jews, this is perhaps something to be discussed and explored in more detail given, for instance, the frequent occurrences of dream divination (Chapters Three and Four) and astrology (Chapters Two, Six, Seven, and Eight) in Jewish cultures.

Chapter Six (Josefina Rodríguez-Arribas) presents an introduction to the *Letter* (a *responsum*) that Abraham bar Ḥiyya addressed to Judah bar Barzillai, with the personal purpose of defending himself from an accusation of "consultation of Chaldeans" for supporting the use of electional astrology to choose the hour of a wedding. The broader and more ambitious purpose of the *Letter* is to defend astrology as a

legitimate, beneficial, and required knowledge and practice for Jews. Because it uses halakhic language and arguments, this *Letter* becomes a very important document in the history of divination among Jews. Judah ben Barzillai is doubtless the addressee of the Letter, but he has been also identified as the objector by most scholars. Rodríguez-Arribas refutes this identity and concludes that the objector must have been a foreigner who attended the wedding.

Chapter Seven (Josefina Rodríguez-Arribas and Amos Geula) presents an English translation of Abraham bar Ḥiyya's *Letter* to Judah bar Barzillai, whose basic features the previous chapter has already introduced. This *Letter* is an essential document to understand the halakhic strategies that allowed medieval Jews to learn and practice astrology.

Chapter Eight (Dov Schwartz) is a good companion piece to Chapters Six and Seven. While Chapters Six and Seven deal with the defense of astrology and the illicit character of other divinatory practices for Jews (those related to magic and some forms of *qesamim*), Chapter Eight deals with Maimonides' refutation of any form of divination and magic based in stellar knowledge. According to scholars, Maimonides forbade all kinds of magic in his halakhic works and in the *Guide of the Perplexed*, but Schwartz argues for some nuance in this position. Maimonides differentiated between professional (astral magic) and popular magic (non-astral magic); the former was the only one targeted in Maimonides' condemnation, but he did accept experiential science (*segullot*), whose knowledge can only be attained by experience, as long as it was unrelated to astral magic. The double classification of magic extends to idolatry, which also presents two forms, one learned (which involves astral magic) and the other popular (with no knowledge of astrology and relying only on the tradition or authority of others). The former is actual true idolatry while the latter is not, only resembling true idolatry. In Schwartz' view, Maimonides' major challenge was refuting the first form. Maimonides made a separation between *segullot* (true and halakhically permitted) and "the ways of the Amorite" (imaginary and banned) in the efficacious character of *segullot* confirmed by experience and unrelated to astrology with respect to Amorite practices.

Chapter Nine (Joseph Ziegler) deals with physiognomy in medieval Jewish and non-Jewish sources and discusses the increasing non-mantic character of this discipline, which places this practice closer to the fields of medicine, natural philosophy, and psychology than to divination. There is textual evidence that the Second Temple community at Qumran imported physiognomical knowledge which was clearly divinatory from Babylonia, and used it together with the zodiac sign of the person to determine the adequacy of candidates for membership in the sect. Similar practices, as well as chiromancy and metoposcopy, were also used among Merkavah and Hekhalot mystics to determine the qualities of applicants, in the Zohar and later kabbalistic movements, and among the *Ḥasidei Ashkenaz* to determine not only a man's character but also his future. These practices relied on mastering the techniques of the art but also on religious intuition and union with the divine intellect. Ziegler notes the "skewed understanding of Hebrew physiognomy by modern historians of Jewish thought and science, who stressed its mantic character and transposed it entirely to the realm of esoteric magic."

Chapter Ten (Charles Burnett) introduces the consideration of the material aspects of books of magic, namely the different skins and writing supports, inks, writing instruments, and bindings used in the making of these books and the ways in which these materials were selected and handled. The focus is on Latin books of magic dealing with those practices that the *Magister speculi* in the *Speculum*

astronomiae considers "detestable," i.e., "spirits, demons, or jinns are summoned with these names." King Solomon appears especially associated with this category of talismanic magic that relies on "the writing of characters which have to be exorcised through certain names," i.e. magic that works through "writing names" rather than "speaking names out loud," which links this chapter with Jewish culture, as well as the use of magic to foretell future. The chapter closes with an Appendix by Nicholas Pickwoad on the making of a grimoire as described in *The Four Rings of Solomon*, pinpointing the very specific material steps that underlay the process of making the grimoire. Burnett concludes that "the emphasis on writing … is likely to reflect the character of the works originally written in Hebrew."

In conclusion, in spite of necessary omissions of content, what is covered in this book makes an intriguing and variegated display of what divination meant and implied in Jewish cultures (though not all Jewish cultures are equally represented here). With this volume we hope to open a window on some illuminating views, even if partial, of this enticing and neglected landscape of Jewish culture. <>

EMMANUEL LEVINAS'S TALMUDIC TURN: PHILOSOPHY AND JEWISH THOUGHT by Ethan Kleinberg [Cultural Memory in the Present, Stanford University Press, 9781503629448]

In this rich intellectual history of the French-Jewish philosopher Emmanuel Levinas's Talmudic lectures in Paris, Ethan Kleinberg addresses Levinas's Jewish life and its relation to his philosophical writings while making an argument for the role and importance of Levinas's Talmudic lessons. Pairing each chapter with a related Talmudic lecture, Kleinberg uses the distinction Levinas presents between "God on Our Side" and "God on God's Side" to provide two discrete and at times conflicting approaches to Levinas's Talmudic readings. One is historically situated and argued from "our side" while the other uses Levinas's Talmudic readings themselves to approach the issues as timeless and derived from "God on God's own side." Bringing the two approaches together, Kleinberg asks whether the ethical message and moral urgency of Levinas's Talmudic lectures can be extended beyond the texts and beliefs of a chosen people, religion, or even the seemingly primary unit of the self. Touching on Western philosophy, French Enlightenment universalism, and the Lithuanian Talmudic tradition, Kleinberg provides readers with a boundary-pushing investigation into the origins, influences, and causes of Levinas's turn to and use of Talmud.

Review

"Can we read Levinas's work as wholly immanent to the history of philosophy, or must we see it as the worldly trace of a transcendent truth? Kleinberg explores this contest between history and revelation without presuming to declare the victor. A venturesome and ingeniously crafted book that confirms the author's leading role in modern European intellectual history." -- Peter Gordon — *Harvard University*

"A boundary-pushing, interdisciplinary work, challenging scholars and students to think through and with the audacity of Levinas's claim for alterity." -- Sarah Hammerschlag — *University of Chicago*

CONTENTS

Constitutive Dissymmetry

The question that vexes me and has vexed me throughout the writing of this book is one Fred Moten posed in The Universal Machine, why can't we let ourselves go? Why couldn't Levinas let himself go? Clearly, his turn to the study of Talmud was marked and motivated by the issues of Jewish existence and identity after the Holocaust. The three strands of the braid—Western philosophy, Enlightenment Universalism, and Lithuanian Talmud—were woven together for the purpose of ensuring the survival of Judaism in the post-Holocaust world. In Levinas's Talmudic lectures, however, we encounter the ways in which the lessons he taught encourage us to let go of essentialist notions of identity based on a particular history or people. As we saw in Levinas's lecture "Beyond Memory," the primary lesson to be taken from Exodus is that we must work toward the future emancipation from servitude and enfranchisement of all humanity while the historical event of the exodus from Egypt is the secondary one. The emphasis is not on the self but on the other. Yet even here, the names of both Jacob and Israel are conserved as is the particular history: "`You will not be called Jacob, but your name will be Israel' does not mean that Jacob `loses his place,' but that Israel will be his primary name and Jacob his secondary name" (BM 70, AS 95). In our everyday existence, is it even possible to let go of identity, character, personality, or nationality?

The particular history of Levinas's turn to Talmud in the years after the Holocaust and following World War II demonstrates the myriad ways that Levinas's Talmudic lectures and his related category of "being-Jewish," conceived in the confinement of a German prisoner of war camp, conserve an emphasis on identity, essentialism, and exemplarism that is in tension with the teachings of his Talmudic lectures and his philosophical works in general. As we saw at the end of chapter i and throughout chapter 4, this tendency created a blind spot in which Levinas conserved aspects of the authentic/inauthentic distinction inherited from the philosophy of Heidegger, which in turn enabled Levinas to afford a privileged and exemplary status to Judaism by emplotting its historical journey past religiosity, past atheism, and then back to a relation with God purged of immaturity or hubris. These retentions cannot be taken lightly because in the aftermath of the Holocaust, Levinas realized all too well the potential and actual danger of these constructs in both the Hegelian and Heideggerian form. And yet, it is because of the Holocaust

that Levinas could not let go of Judaism for fear that the very annihilation assigned to the Jews by the Nazi final solution would come to be fulfilled by assimilation into the "modern" world.

This same desire to maintain Judaism and what he calls the ontological category of being-Jewish simultaneously motivate Levinas's commitment to ethics as first philosophy and the concomitant deposition of the self in favor of the other. For Levinas, Jewish Scriptures and their interpretations are what make such an ethics of alterity possible. "Alterity becomes proximity. Not distance, the shortest through space. but initial directness, which extends as unimpeachable approach in the call of the face of the other, in which there appears, as an order an inscription, a prescription, an awakening (as if it were a `me'), responsibility—mine, for the other human being." Here we reach a seemingly intractable problem. The basis for the ethical lessons that Levinas asserts should apply to all humanity are only to be found in the reading of particular sacred texts and on the basis of a particular tradition of textual interpretation.

> The role played by ethics in the religious relation allow us to understand the meaning of Jewish universalism. A truth is universal when it applies to every reasonable human being. A religion is universal when it is open to all. In this sense, the Judaism that links the Divine to the moral has always aspired to be universal. But the revelation of morality, which discovers a human society, also discovers the place of election, which, in this universal society, returns to the person who receives this revelation. This election is made up not of privileges but of responsibilities.

Any access to the universal ethics, of which Levinas writes, must be drawn from Judaism and from the reading of sacred Jewish texts.

Not just any reading of these texts but the strategy of interpretation offered by Levinas himself in what we can call the postrabbinic Lithuanian tradition. As we have seen, Levinas's dynamic reading of Torah and Talmud, based in Jewish tradition and his tutelage under Shushani but also his particular training in philosophy, is the mechanism by which he attempts to recover what was destroyed in the Holocaust: the very academies and practitioners of the Lithuanian Talmudic tradition. It is also the means by which Levinas employs his own interpretative methods to make sense of Jewish scripture in a post-Holocaust world.

The problem of exemplarism, essentialism, and identity is further complicated by the creation of the State of Israel, the instantiation of an actual political state as opposed to a diasporic relation with God. In a short piece, "From the Rise of Nihilism to the Carnal Jew," written for the edited volume D'Áuschwitz á Israel, vingt ans a^res la Liberation from 1968, Levinas ties these two historical events together.

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There is a firm distinction between Israel understood as a relation with the Infinite and Israel understood as a modern state or a particular people. Israel as relation with God or the Infinite is on our side but as such is the opening to the other side. The means by which this relationship occurs for Levinas is through the study of Torah. "A God not incarnate, surely, but somehow inscribed, whose life, or a part of it, is being lived in the letters: in the lines and between the lines and in the exchange of ideas between the readers commenting upon them—where these letters come alive and are echoed in the book's precepts—ordering without enslaving, like truth—to answer in justice to one's fellow, that is, to love the other". Israel conceived as a modern political state or particular people exists only on our side and as such it is nonrelational and solipsistic. This Israel is akin to what Levinas calls idolatry. As in the discussion of the Exodus, the relational understanding of Israel should be the primary lesson while the

state or people of Israel must be the secondary one. The Israel of state or people takes the Jew to be a category that belongs to a historically and culturally conditioned ontology. Israel as relation takes the Jew to be the relationship with the name for the infinite itself.

This is a shift in temporality from the past to the future and in emphasis from the particular to the universal even if the constitutive dissymmetry that is its condition will not allow for either to fully unfold. The past is always in the future and the future is always in the past. The meaning and the message is larger, more universal, than the particular individual, even if it is the particular individual or event that provides the impetus, the memory, to inspire the action. Each pushes the other forward wherein the good for the one is directed to the good for all but the good for all must always account for every one. It is innovation that liberates a meaning for the future from a tradition or memory of the past. To achieve human universality (and a universalism that extends beyond the human animal) we must be prepared to jettison our prior and proper identity, even if it is that very identity that provides the template by which we seek human universality, as was the case with Levinas's Judaism. The invisible universality of which Levinas speaks is a universality that begins and ends with the individual (it is enacted by the individual) but directed toward the other (a particular subject in a particular place and time). If all commit to such an ethics of deferral, we are in the kingdom of heaven on earth and it is in this sense that we are each the Messiah. "The Messiah is Myself; to be Myself is to be the Messiah.... Who finally takes on the suffering of others, if not the being who says 'Me.' The fact of not evading the burden imposed by the suffering of others defines ipseity itself. All persons are the Messiah." Messianicity. Of course, the humility at play recognizes the inhuman as well as the Inhuman, which undergirds the predisposition to self-sacrifice.

It is not enough to read about ethical action and responsibility or even to write about them. It is certainly not enough to claim affiliation with the people and texts Levinas sees as the model for such action. "That the mere fact of race is not a guarantee against evil, the Talmud saw and said better than anyone and with nearly unbearable force: the Jew without mitzvot is a threat to the world". Actions are what count. It is not enough to recognize the grounds on which our institutions have been built and the peoples displaced or enslaved to do so. We must actually do the work to repair the future. This, of course, brings one perilously close to the "inaugurative structuring of the subject through persecution and ethical demand," but in the act of repair we are always close to identifying the subject as victim. The ethical imperative of constitutive dissymmetry destabilizes any such essentialist logic through the emphasis on self-sacrifice that conditions the vulnerability but the emphasis on the work, the mitzvot, that need to be done, the not yet. When one is cut off from the world to come, one is also cut off from the world in which one lives. By deactivating the possibility of justice in the future the idolaters threaten not only their future but also their present as well. By contrast, attention to the work that needs to be done in the future leads to action now.

The history of Emmanuel Levinas's Talmudic lectures is about identity and authority on one side or the other. The story can be told on our side by looking to the contextual circumstances, influences, and relations that led him to Talmud or in relation to the other side by accepting the possibility of a transcendent relation between God and Humans made manifest in a text. Working through this history on both registers forces one to think twice, to think differently. While this applies to the specific case of Levinas, asking one to think differently about Levinas is also asking one to think differently about everything. It is to consider an alternative logic of what makes sense and how the world works, which in

turn questions the logic and stability of the assumptions we hold dear. It makes one uncomfortable and uneasy because it dislodges our sense of what we consider to be essential. The goal is to imagine what happens when we let ourselves go to think about the past and the future in accord with a totally different logic. This means letting go of all the coordinates by which we find ourselves privileged so as to dissociate from essentialism as much as we can, in regard to how we comport ourselves as a person, a people, a religion, or a temporal vector. This would truly be an opening to the other. <>

WHY AM I A JEW? SPINOZA REVISITED by Michael Baum [Resource Publications, 9781666730999]

The book starts by considering mankind's role in the complex ecological system of our planet and then considers the place of mankind in the cosmos while also looking inward at our own microcosm. It then explains how these scientific insights lead to the ontological search for God. The good, the bad, and the ugly sides of religious beliefs are considered and it is suggested that we are looking for "God" in the wrong place. The book then explains a justification for the author's apparent cognitive dissonance of retaining a Jewish identity whilst denying the existence of a God with the attributes of man. The author then argues that we should look for "God" in the infinitely small spaces within ourselves instead of the infinitely large spaces of the universe. His "God" would not mind whether individuals believed in "him" or not, so long as they practiced their life as the author practices his medicine: in a never-ending quest to improve the length and quality of the lives of his patients. This book should improve the reader's knowledge of the philosophers who wrote on the ontology of God. It also rediscovers that Baruch Spinoza had already reached the conclusions of modern-day thinkers more than 350 years ago.

Review

"This is not merely a hugely ambitious book but a courageous one. Baum invites readers of all faiths and none to accompany him on his extraordinary and deeply personal spiritual journey in quest of the essence of God and the nature of Jewish identity. The result is an exhilarating and rewarding intellectual adventure. Hold on tight and enjoy." --David H. Stone, University of Glasgow, emeritus

"This most-readable, impressive, and challenging account of the mysterium tremendum that reveals itself to Baum through the sciences he has mastered and the moral philosophy he has embraced gets mightily close to a religious odyssey. His blistering critique of the numerous atrocities that are perpetrated in the name of religion is most timely, and his basic thesis that 'we are looking for God in the wrong place' resonates strongly with some Jewish mystical ideas." --Jeffrey M. Cohen, author of The Book of Psalms: Poetry in Poetry

"A thought-provoking memoir. . . . Baum has internalized the Royal Society's motto--'Take nobody's word for it'--as a directive to study and refine medical treatments and to wrestle with God's teachings . . . . in a continuing attempt to heal the world. I would love to be his next-door neighbor, sharing

experiences and insights and debating our obligations to this world and its people." --Avrum Z. Bluming, University of Southern California, emeritus

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Prologue

This is a very ambitious book and at the time of writing I was never sure of completing the task and not even sure how it would end. In other words, I made it up as I went along and much of it surprised me as it appeared in writing. I'm not implying that there was anything supernatural about this process, I don't believe I was taking dictation from above (God forbid) or that there was a muse sitting on my right shoulder, but the book seemed to write itself. Effectively this work attempts to put my beliefs on trial as witness for the defense as I challenge myself, on behalf of the prosecution, to justify myself for those opinions. In this book, I express my opinions on multiple philosophical and religious questions that have challenged all the great thinkers of the past. I am a dilettante and self-taught philosopher but if I see further, it's not so much that I'm standing on the shoulders of giants (pace Isaac Newton), it's because I've had to practice their philosophical teachings in my efforts to support and cure my patients facing the existential threat of cancer.

I have been privileged to enjoy more than one career in my long and busy life.

I qualified as a doctor in 1960 and was appointed to my first chair of surgery in 1980 at Kings College London and went on to be appointed Professor of surgery at the Institute of Cancer research in 1990 and then to a chair of surgery at University College London (UCL) in 1997. I retired from my clinical work as a surgeon at the age of 67 but was kept on as a part time non-clinical post with the title of visiting professor in Medical Humanities at UCL. In that role, I helped set up a new curriculum in the teaching of the humanities to medical students. This involved teaching scientific philosophy, moral philosophy, the psycho-social impact of disease, communication skills, narrative based medicine, the history of medicine, and the role of the performing arts and the visual arts in the practice of medicine. The students took to this novelty in their curriculum, like ducks to water but many of my senior colleagues who had spent their careers isolated in silos, were deeply skeptical.

After my hectic life as a surgeon and a leader of a cancer research group, I found my life as a Professor in the "soft sciences" much less stressful, allowing me the time to develop other interests including philosophy and art.

I set out to write this book to leave a legacy to students and teachers of medical humanities of the future, however as I described above, it took on a life of its own. I seem to have ended up with a dissertation that attempts to unify many different aspects of scholarly discourse that cross boundaries of all the faculties of the Universities that have employed me. C.P. Snow, preempted me in part with his Rede Lecture in 1959, "The Two Cultures and the Scientific Revolution" (Cambridge University Press). I would like to quote from this as follows.

> Literary intellectuals at one pole-at the other scientists, and the most representative, the physical scientists. Between the two a gulf mutual incomprehension-sometimes hostility and dislike, but most of all a lack of understanding. They have a curious distorted image of each other. Their attitudes are so different that, even on the level of emotion, they can't find much common ground.

In my lifetime things have greatly improved and the fact that we were able to establish a course in the humanities in the Science faculty at UCL is evidence enough but there has been no reciprocity. I'm unaware of any teaching of the scientific method in the Arts faculties of British universities. The model of harmony I'm trying to compose is multi-dimensional to include the biological sciences, cosmology and the ontology of God!

I start off by describing my encounter with a very small red spider and my awe of the beauty of its structure and its microscopic function. This then sets me off thinking about the meaning of "her" life compared with the meaning of my life and our roles in the complex ecological system of our planet. This is followed by considering the place of mankind in the cosmos but also looking inward at our own microcosm at increasing degrees of magnification.

I then set about trying to explain how all these scientific insights set me off in the ontological search for God. I start off by describing the good, the bad and the ugly sides of religious beliefs and argue that we are looking for "God" in the wrong place. I then try to justify my apparent cognitive dissonance of retaining my Jewish identity whilst denying the existence of a God with the attributes described in the five books of Moses. I argue that we should look for "God" in the infinitely small spaces within ourselves instead of the infinitely large spaces of the universe. My "God" would not mind whether I believed in "him" or not, so long as I practiced my life as I practice my medicine; in a never-ending quest to improve length and quality of life for all those in my orbit in the hope that others would do the same.

Along the way whilst writing this book I was trying to improve my knowledge of the philosophers who wrote on the ontology of God. To my delight, I realized that all my efforts ended up by rediscovering Baruch Spinoza, he reached the same conclusions in the mid 17thC, more than 350 years ago. He got there first, so I dedicate this book to the eternal memory of this humane and much misunderstood man. <>

A History of Modern Jewish Religious Philosophy: Volume III: The Crisis of Humanism: A Historical Crossroads by Eliezer Schweid, translated by Leonard Levin, annotated by Leonard Levin, Christoph Hopp, Yuval Lieblich [Series: Supplements to The Journal of Jewish Thought and Philosophy, Brill, 9789004375383]

The culmination of Eliezer Schweid's life-work as a Jewish intellectual historian, this five-volume work provides a comprehensive, interdisciplinary account of the major thinkers and movements in modern Jewish thought, in the context of general philosophy and Jewish social-political historical developments, with extensive primary source excerpts.

Volume Three, **The Crisis of Humanism**, commences with an important essay on the challenge to the humanist tradition posed in the late 19th century by historical materialism, existentialism and positivism. This is background for the constructive philosophies which sought at the same time to address the general crisis of moral value and provide a positive basis for Jewish existence. Among the thinkers presented in this volume are Moses Hess, Moritz Lazarus, Hermann Cohen (in impressive depth, with a thorough exposition of the *Ethics* and *Religion of Reason*), Ahad Ha-Am, I. J. Reines, Simon Dubnow, M. Y. Berdiczewski, the theorists of the Bund, Chaim Zhitlovsky, Nachman Syrkin, and Ber Borochov.

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Historical and Methodological Introduction

The third period in the history of modern Jewish religious philosophy began at the beginning of the 1880s and continued to the middle of the twentieth century.

These dates demarcate a distinct period in the history of the nations of Western culture and of the Jewish people. We make this determination on the basis of general historical considerations, not because of changes in philosophical thought. In retrospect, we can say that this period saw the emergence of new philosophic systems, representing new intellectual movements and ideals. It was also a watershed for the research of Jewish history, in terms of both method and the quantity and quality of knowledge: description and documentation, terminology and evaluation. These justify the determination that we are speaking here of a unique period in the history of general and Jewish philosophy, although its boundaries and terms were determined by historical developments that expressed transformations in the social and cultural structure and constituted a challenge for research and for philosophy.

During the hundred years that passed from the end of the eighteenth century until the early 1880s, economic and political arrangements were formed and started to fall apart; social stratification developed and started to be undermined; educational and spiritual cultures were developed and already appeared out of date; patterns of life were established and cast into doubt; and the prospects—or more correctly, the fears—of the future were overthrown. An understanding of the historical events and the processes that drove them already necessitated methodological and conceptual changes in philosophical thinking at the start of the period. Philosophy was forced to adapt itself to social transformations and events that it had not anticipated and that did not fit with its preconceived rational certainties. This required it to reevaluate the sources of philosophical thought: Was it as independent as it had assumed? Did it flow independently from the regularity of intellect and reason? Or did it perhaps reflect developments whose regular pattern had its roots in irrational nature? And if it turned out that it was not reason that shaped the course of history—and consequently of the twists and turns of thought that guided it— then everything was up for reexamination: epistemology, sociology, ethics, and political theory—and not least, the question of the role of religion in culture had to be reexamined as well.

The challenge was expressed in the falsification of the social, political, and cultural expectations that had nourished both the rationalistic, idealistic philosophies of the Enlightenment and rational humanism and their counterparts—the philosophies of Romanticism that were skeptical of progress but trusted that a return to ancient sources would foster a renaissance. By the early 1880s it was already clear that there was no compatibility between the social and political changes actually taking place and humanistic idealism. The nation-state did not resolve the struggles with the Church or the conflicts among the religious faith-communities. On the contrary—it intensified these confrontations and generated new ones, especially on the social and international fronts. Attacks were thus opened from various directions on the fundamental assumptions, values, ideals, and modes of thought that had nourished the prospects of "progress." Radical philosophers sought revolutionary alternatives, and those who sought to defend the original ideals of gradual progress that did not generate traumatic crises or demand great sacrifices were required to update their thought through critical self-examination: Where had they erred? Where had they failed? What had they not taken into account?

We must emphasize the tremendous sense of urgency. The unrest from the social and international reality was expressed already at the beginning of the period through the organization of revolutionary mass movements that strove to change the social and international order by wresting power from the strata that held it. Even if these movements were not yet ripe enough to realize their desire, they presented an immediate tangible threat. Obedience to law was undermined. Planned organized disturbances broke out that threatened the social and political orders with impending downfall. It was

sensed that the masses harbored within them instinctual forces beyond the control of intellect and reason, and it appeared to the political leadership that it was better to divert them into international war to prevent their bringing down the government at home. It stood to reason that if this cynical policy embodied the "cunning of reason" operating in history, as Kant and Hegel taught, this was a crafty and wicked reason indeed that would lead in the end to establishing tyrannical regimes.

The immediate result at any rate was the appearance of revolutionary mass movements of the left and the right. The movements of the left represented the working class and turned in the direction of socialist revolution, whether moderate (Social Democracy) or radical (Communism), whereas their counterparts on the right turned in the direction of a nationalist revolution that would solve all problems through military conquest. The common aspect of these was a violent struggle between forces that fought for the realization of messianic goals: the "end of history" in the messianic formula of the left, or a "return to the beginning of history" in the messianic formula of the right. They also had in common a turn to the masses to enlist them in seizing power by force in order to realize a new order through violent compulsory means, not shrinking from any form of cruel punishment. But no side knew what the new order would be or how they would realize the good that was promised to the masses that should support its establishment. The goal was first of all to obtain the power that would enable them to achieve whatever would occur to the minds of the new rulers in accord with their principles. There thus emerged an equivalence of the left and the right, with respect both to their authoritarian objective and to their means: the end sanctified the means. Utility was the only ethical criterion for which these movements had regard, and thus the humanistic ideals lost their validity both for the socialist left, though it seemed to be striving for realizing the values of justice, freedom, and human dignity, and for the right, which spoke in the name of national honor and glory.

Another aspect of agreement between the revolutionary left and right was expressed in their attitude to religion. It appeared to both sides as a fundamentally conservative factor that gave support to the current regime and sought to deter the masses from realizing their desires through the direct, purposeful use of the enormous power latent in them. The idea of human autonomy, and the recognition that religion's idea of God was nothing but the creation by certain human beings designed to serve their sovereign interests as opposed to another's, appeared in both opposing camps of the radical mass movements: man himself must realize his sovereignty directly, and the only question that remained open for decision in the struggle of violent forces was who was the authentic representative of "the general will" in its universal collective meaning of the will of humanity. Here, too, was a kind of realization of the idea of humanism in a way that overturned its ethical, idealistic sense, turning it into a prop of a regime whose enslaving and oppressive power purported to embody the sovereignty of humanity.

The first signs of this profound ethical crisis were riots, violent demonstrations, threats of war, and the outbreak of war itself. Mass organization under the banner of revolution revealed the growing strength of movements subversive of the regime whether of social or nationalist background: Marxist socialism (antireligious and anti-Jewish) on the one hand, and extreme nationalism (anti-Semitic) on the other. International tensions based on power struggles, in the European and imperial arenas, intensified in parallel, as we have said, in a calculated response of the defensive regimes, which intentionally incited international tensions as well as internal tensions against national or religious minorities (especially against the Jews) in order to assuage the fury of the masses.

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In summary: Most of the numbers and institutions of the Jewish people in European countries stood in the 1880s at a fateful crossroad. The collective future of the people faced the choice of survival or perishing. There were several avenues of refuge from physical destruction or loss of identity, which were bound up with each other, but the traditional communal frameworks of the people were in a process of breakup, and their leadership was losing its authority and effectiveness. In order to cope with the new reality, what was required was an inclusive representative political organization and leadership that could represent the consensual collective will, present a solution, and lead the people together toward its realization, but such an organization did not exist, and the processes of breakup destroyed the basic conditions for setting up an effective alternative. The meaning of the Emancipation from the standpoint of collective existence was thus a deepening and worsening of the condition of exile: not only dispersion but uprooting and disconnecting, homelessness, and breakup of the frameworks that maintained the independent identity and the capability of collective coping with the environment.

In these conditions, the need to organize anew and establish effective collective leadership stood at the head of the ladder of priorities, even from the viewpoint of those individuals who found themselves isolated and powerless in the face of the existential challenges whose root cause lay in their own collective identity. Already in the Enlightenment period, this need was expressed in the appearance of the modern movements that proceeded from the Haskalah, but in the early 1880s it became clear that these movements did not provide a sufficiently effective alternative to the traditional communal organizations, perhaps because from the outset they were designed to serve the process of entry into general society, not to stand up to its opposition. In any case, in the early 1880s one saw the emergence of energetic collective organizations of a new kind, imitating the forms of political organization in the general society in order to deal with them: national and international parties and umbrella organizations whether national or international (the Zionist Organization was the most outstanding example of general-Jewish political movements). A guiding theory was required among other things to help direct the foundation and policy of such organizations.

But we must emphasize again that the power of these organizations was very limited and their utility doubtful. We are speaking of a voluntary organization that could not create organs for imposing obligatory authority on its members. Its functioning was dependent on the willingness of individuals to affiliate with them, the willingness of other individuals—and they were few—to contribute the money necessary for their functioning, and the voluntary readiness of other individuals, whom nobody has counted, to bear the responsibility of leaders who would set policy and propose a direction. And as there was no infrastructure for a political organization with authority and the personal positions multiplied and clashed with each other, the act of organizing gave expression to splintering, fragmentation, and anarchy more than to an expression of the will to unity. At this fateful crossroads, the people organized themselves into contending parties in order to move at the same moment in several contradictory directions: toward emigration, toward aliyah to the land of Israel, toward absorption by way of assimilation or joining the revolution, or toward the formation of "autonomous" national frameworks in the Diaspora. It is clear that each direction determined also a form of comprehensive social and cultural identity, and the theoretical thought that guided the mobilization of the people for its struggles needed to cope with the exceptional challenges of this anarchic reality.

The fateful decisions for which these individuals had to bear direct responsibility were complex and had consequences in all areas of life: choosing a place of residence, choosing an occupation or profession, choosing a class affiliation, choosing a social and national affiliation, choosing a political orientation, choosing a spoken language, choosing professional education, choosing a world outlook and values that would determine a way of life and especially the education of children, choosing the forms in which individuals would concretize their desire to continue to be Jews or to flee from their identity. It was clear that every decision in each of these areas had direct or indirect implications on the others. Choosing a place of residence was distinct from considerations of affiliation and preferences of identity, but at the same time it had a shaping effect and consequences in these areas, whether one wished it or not. What had priority over what? What was preferable to what, from the standpoint of the individual or of the community? These were the questions one needed to address, not only from some general orientation, but also from paying attention to circumstances and the real possibilities embodied in them. Jewish thought needed to provide guidance for this whole range of issues.

As we said, the decision was entrusted to individuals, and they bore responsibility for its realization. It is thus clear that each of them set his priorities and sought the organization that would assist him in following his path. The array of parties and organizations that came and went, that united in order to split and split in order to unite, grew in this manner and varied sometimes from year to year. At this historical crossroads it appeared that the people were wandering in confusion and turmoil in all areas of their life at the same time but in contradictory directions, and they were not able to progress in sufficient measure to the realization of a single one of them. What prevented complete disintegration? Probably the pressure of hostility and rejection from the outside: the despairing sense of "no exit" that engendered from time to time also a certain measure of solidarity and indicated, for want of an alternative, the direction where they must go at that time because there was no other. These facts also influenced the crystallizing patterns of thinking that strove to achieve orientation and responsible guidance. They had to fathom the direction to which the "no alternative!" in the Jewish people's destiny was pointing—could one divine it?

Rifts appeared, to be sure, in all areas of collective activity, but the most serious from the standpoint of the inner continuity of the people's existence was the rift that continued widening from the beginning of the Enlightenment period between the parental generation and their children. In the period that we are discussing it turned into a burning controversy with feelings of rage, deep frustration, and hatred between the generations. Most of the parents could not change their situation because of the yoke that lay upon them, because of their poverty, and because of their limited, one-sided education. They had no choice but to remain in the place where they were on account of their residences, their livelihood, their education, way of life, and faith. On the other hand, the young were forced to leave. They had no choice but to choose their path far from the place and far from the situation where they had been born and had received their first education, even though it was doubtful if everything that appeared attractive and within reach was indeed for them to choose. Their parents could not stop them. On the contrary—by opposing their course and digging zealously into their positions, they incited them. But could the confronting generations sever their ties without causing damage to themselves? Could they renounce responsibility toward each other without betraying themselves?

In respect of fidelity to self-identity, the moral and existential dilemma of the generation gap was the existential axis of the profoundest discussion regarding one's respective relation to the sources of

Judaism and of general culture, as well as regarding one's motivation to struggle for a Jewish future despite the persecutions. The generation gap fed the pressures toward alienation, uprooting, and change of identity through acculturation—and these would require further in-depth examination—but it also fed the idealistic readiness to self-sacrifice for the sake of the people, as well as the sense of mission that brought certain individuals, prominent in their talents and their dedication, to found the movements and parties, to take charge and strive for realization by setting an example of personal devotion. The extremism that was a factor inciting polarized schisms and the war of all against all stemmed also, of course, from the same traumatic gap, and it is clear that the guiding theoretical literature expressed this trauma in its depths, and its models and objectives were determined by it.

These, then, were the existential, personal-collective circumstances that shaped the intellectual agenda. They were what determined the perspectives, the methods, the styles, and above all the planes of discussion. From the viewpoint of writing the history of Jewish philosophy, it is proper to emphasize that philosophical discussion on the topics of intellectual, religious, national, or cultural identity in this period generally appeared too remote, abstract, and irrelevant to the immediate existential challenges, especially when we are speaking of guiding mass revolutionary movements on the one hand and of individuals driven by tempestuous emotions, acting out of pressure and intuition, on the other hand. The communal agenda comprised mainly practical problems that required scientific research and a response hammered out on the ideological plane.

But it was nevertheless clear that it was impossible to sacrifice the deeper dimensions. On the contrary—these dimensions were uncovered by the traumatic events on every side. The motivation to act also stemmed from them, not only among the individual thinkers who acted out of a sense of mission, but among the people. Feelings welled up from the depths, and insights embodied values and perceptions of truth that nourished the searching, debates, and questioning until the light of some ideology shone forth, which, even if it was one-sided and simplistic in itself, nevertheless radiated the power of faith that shone forth from the depths.

There was thus a need to express truths and value-assertions that were of the genuine stuff of philosophy, within a more topical deliberation on practical questions of economics, social stratification, national belonging, and organization both along party lines and transcending them. In this way the connection was uncovered between the practical plane and the values that determine cultural or religious identity, and when deeper grounding was called for, it was aimed mainly at clarifying the substance of this connection. It thus turned out that the philosophical discussion on the question of Judaism focused during this period on topics that were regarded as marginal from the standpoint of the formation of Jews' religious and cultural identity. This applied especially to social theory in its economic and class aspects and to national theory in its political aspects: How should Judaism be expressed as a social doctrine in all its domains? How should Judaism be expressed as a theory of nation and state in all its domains? Even religious thought was required to weigh in on these topics: Did the Jewish religion have a special contribution to the combination of problems that arose in these areas? How does faith come to expression in social and national existence? The discussion of the status of halakha and its evaluative elements was channeled in this direction.

It is self-evident that the change in definition of the principal topics of discussion had implications for those disciplines that could help deal with them: Jewish thought of this period had recourse to prephilosophical and prehistoriographical disciplines—the disciplines of social and political sciences and

the humanities—more than to philosophy as a discipline. However, although thought that begins in research and concludes in ideological decisions does not belong to philosophy proper, it would seem that a discussion of the full trajectory of the thought that guided the consciousness of Jewish identity in this period would be deficient and defective if it did not deal also with those areas of thought that were expressed primarily in these terms, for the philosophical basis is plotted out by way of them, whether explicitly or implicitly.

In the same connection, it is proper, in the end, to point out the development of alternative forms of thought than philosophy from the standpoint of the role of the educator, who conveys values, establishes worldviews, sets forth ideals and ways of realizing them, and awakens the motivation to identify, devote oneself to, and achieve realization: belles-lettres, especially existential reflective poetry, the essay literature that connects philosophy to ideology without being immersed systematically in either, and the publicistic literature that grounds and enriches the ideology through interpretative observation of developing social and political reality. The thought that was created with these tools is not considered philosophy in the proper disciplinary sense, and rightly so, yet one cannot document the Jewish philosophical thought that was created in this period without having recourse to all varieties of thought in the effort to uncover the philosophical basis that nourished them or permeated them.

The guiding principle and objective of these chapters in the study of the history of Jewish philosophy should thus be to present the agenda of the period and all the directions of thought whose influence on the people's existential reality came to expression in intellectual movements that strove for concrete realization. To this end we need to expand the notion of "philosophy" in this work as follows: all modes of thought that sought to crystallize an inclusive worldview on the basis of values and insights into truth should be included in its framework, even if they were not philosophical in the academic sense. We observed this practice in effect in some chapters of the previous section. We shall thus show that, as in the previous periods so in this period, most of the influential systems of thought in central- and west-European Jewry came to expression on the philosophical level, whereas in eastern Europe they took the forms of literature and poetry, the essay and the pamphlet, which indeed were based on the ideas of general and Jewish philosophy that developed in central Europe but preferred their own original forms of expression.

Because of the complexity of the process that we have described above, we shall divide the discussion of the history of Jewish religious philosophy in this period into two parts. In the first part, we shall describe the crossroads as it was reflected in general philosophical thought in respect of the problematic that was set on the intellectual agenda and the philosophical methodologies that branched out from it. This description is of course necessary as general background, but it is required no less because of the participation of Jewish philosophers in the formation of the general philosophical agenda and its specific intellectual tools—philosophers who made an original contribution to it, whether they dealt directly with the problems specific to Jewish religious philosophy or whether they ignored them and identified the problem of Jewish religion or Jewish national-social existence with the problem of religion, nationhood, and society in general as the problems of humanity. Prominent in this respect is the phenomenon that has already been presented in the previous sections of our work: general philosophy became combined with Jewish philosophy, either directly by dealing with it or indirectly by absorbing its influence, to the same extent that Jewish philosophy became combined with general philosophy, so that

one could not draw a definite distinction between them. In the second section we shall present the Jewish religious philosophical systems that were proposed on the basis of the general background.

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Defense of Humanism through a Return to the Sources of Judaism in Germany

The intensification of the crisis of humanism in German society in the final decades of the nineteenth century found the majority of German Jews as individuals (not as a collective entity) quite immersed in German culture and identifying with the idealism of liberal German nationalism. Insofar as it was up to them, they saw themselves as Germans in every respect. German was their mother tongue, and German culture was the foundation of their education. The fact that they were Jews did not in their view separate them from their German environment. Just the opposite—they saw in their Judaism an original German value, and their spiritual leadership reiterated to them that their religious distinctiveness was a providential contribution to humanity in general and to Germany in particular. Ordinary Jews, who did not serve as rabbis, teachers, or communal leaders, immersed themselves by and large in their civic lives—in their economic, social, political, and cultural activities—each in his own domain. Intellectuals, too—writers, thinkers, artists—made their creative contribution in the general arena. Their Judaism was given marginal expression, mostly ceremonial, in the synagogue and to some extent in the family. As an inevitable result, they became disconnected from Jewish sources. Their Jewish literacy was shallow compared to their general German education. Jewish identification was reduced to an ideological affirmation, signified by superficial rites lacking connection to a fuller lifestyle.

Thus the Jewishness of German Jews was being uprooted and dying on the vine. At a certain stage this process aroused uneasiness and fear in the hearts of the leaders of the modern religious movements, who had encouraged integration into German society but did not wish assimilation to progress to the point of disappearance. It called for a critical stocktaking of the messages that the leaders continued to recite by rote to their flocks. Perhaps the mission of cultural integration had overshot its mark. Perhaps the time had come to change the emphasis and to start to speak of intensifying the connection to the sources of Judaism so that Jewish identification should once again be deep, serious, and affirmative?

There was no direct connection between this transition and the crisis of humanism. It was an inherent consequence of the process of assimilation. But it gained strength and urgency from the sobering realization forced on German Jews by the crisis, which undermined the fundamental assumptions of the policy of emancipation. The first response was naturally a denial to recognize that this was no mere temporary setback but a longer-term historical reversal that would intensify and was liable to eventuate in catastrophe. In the end, it was impossible to ignore the fact that the majority of German society, especially the cultural elites into which German Jews wished to integrate, did not see the Jews as the Jews saw themselves. Just the opposite—the cultural elites, who had the absorption of the Jews forced on them by the law (and exacerbated by the eager impatience of the Jews themselves), saw them as uninvited foreign guests who burst into their homes and saw themselves as free to do whatever they pleased.

The anger grew the more the Jews increased their involvement. The more that they reiterated their claim of being rooted in German culture, the more the Germans saw them as counterfeiting that legacy. Some sensitive individuals, such as Graetz, responded to this charge with a lofty disclaimer and a sharp critique of German culture. It is especially instructive that precisely those assimilating Jews who cut

themselves off completely from their Jewish heritage considered themselves qualified to launch a piercing critique of German society and culture for betraying its humanistic values. But most of the Jews who identified with the German nationality responded in the opposite way: this turn of events reinforced their faith in the importance of their providential contribution to the culture of Germany. German society was betraying its humanistic ideals, but the Jews were true to them. By identifying with their Jewish values, they were standing strong in defense of the authentic ideals of German culture. It followed that the Jews had to return to their original self-identity and deepen their attachment to it in order to fulfill their mission and restore German society to its fundamental values.

In any case, if in the previous generation there was a need to emphasize the Jews' obligation to reform themselves and to become worthy of integration in German society and culture, in this generation it was necessary to emphasize the identification with Jewish values in order to reform German society. This was a mighty ambition, whose inevitable consequence was to intensify the distancing of German society from the Jews, especially in those intellectual and cultural elites that the Jews aspired to join. Thus was fashioned the myth of Jewish-German "symbiosis," which the Jews desired and felt to be a reality, whereas the German elites despised it and categorically denied it.

In hindsight, we can see that the return to Jewish sources was not totally novel but was built on tendencies that were expressed among certain thinkers of the previous generation, such as Solomon Ludwig Steinheim and Samuel Hirsch. Modern Orthodoxy developed originally from this tendency, and now the principal leaders of Reform and Conservatism were drawn to it. But the intensification of the crisis of humanism caused not only a deepening of the desire to reconstitute Jewish identity within the framework of the modern movements but also an awakening of a desire for return among Jews who had assimilated and cut themselves off from the Jewish establishment. Among them were prominent individuals—mostly from assimilating families— who had succeeded in achieving positions of leadership in German society and culture. Their acquired knowledge and experience of Jewish culture was quite meager. But a typical phenomenon was manifested in them: the greater the distance that they had to skip over in order to return to themselves and the more profound the alienation that they had to overcome, the greater was their willpower and devotion. For them this was an intensive process whose objective was to reconstitute their Jewish selves by raising their level of education and deepening their Jewish experience to the same heights and depths that they had achieved in their German cultural achievements, if not higher. To be sure, they did not forsake their German culture, but they strove to Judaize it by setting their Jewish self-identity at its core. One should not be surprised, therefore, that the most penetrating philosophical and literary expression of the movement of return to Judaism for the sake of saving humanism came precisely from such individuals. Nor should one be surprised at the strong resonance that they generated, both within the Jewish community and outside it. Their achievements and status in the general society and culture afforded them the authority—transcending institutions—of the spirit that was manifested in full force in their mission to their people.

Indeed, this phenomenon should not be so novel or surprising. We saw that the modern religious movements within the Jewish people arose out of a pendulum-like alternation from assimilating pressures to a corrective reconstitution of the original self-identity. There were also precedents for the return to the Jewish sources on the part of Jews who had been cut off from Judaism— even to the point of apostasy—and had achieved prominence in German culture. An outstanding example was the career of the German-Jewish poet Heinrich Heine (1797–1856). He converted to Protestant Christianity in

order to gain acceptance as a German poet, but he never denied his origin or his responsibility to his suffering compatriots.1 All his life he struggled with the question of his relation to Judaism and to Christianity. It was no attraction to Christianity that brought him to forsake Judaism. The Protestant Church offered him a compromise way out; within it he was able to defend his individual intellectual freedom in a state that required of its citizens at least formal affiliation with a religious community. On this basis he was able to permit himself a certain measure of freedom to criticize his state, his society, and his culture and to preach liberal humanism.

Belonging to the Jewish community imposed severe restrictions on the freedom of critical expression, as did belonging to the Catholic Church, so Heine chose Protestantism. But the ideal life for him in his youth was secular and worldly. He was attracted to the classical esthetic Greek legacy in Western culture, as expressed especially in the creative achievement of Goethe. Indeed, it was typical that despite this he criticized Goethe on account of his amoral world outlook, which was expressed among other things in his equivocal attitude toward the struggle for liberal democracy in Germany. In this respect Heine embraced the un-Hellenic ideal of moral obligation. It would seem that his aspiration for a synthesis between the legacy of Athens and that of moral obligation (whether Jewish or Christian) inclined him toward the philosophy of Kant and afterward towards that of Hegel. Both of these reinforced his critical attitude toward Judaism and Christianity. But in the course of his later struggling with the social, political, and cultural reality in Germany, he became critical of the philosophies of Kant and Hegel as well.

It became clear to him that the dogmatism of idealistic philosophy fostered a political nationalism that was dangerous to individualistic liberal humanism. This recognition, as well as his existential suffering as a man exiled from his homeland and eventually growing old and sick in increasing isolation, influenced him in the end to forsake the estheticist idealism of the legacy of Athens. He recognized the hubris implied in man's ambition to supremacy, and he rediscovered the Bible: the belief in a personal God before whom a person could pour out his distress while acknowledging his human frailty, and the superiority of the prophetic commandment of ethics and justice.

Heine testified to a turning point that occurred in his world outlook—his distancing from Hegel, to the point of destroying the manuscript of a book that he wrote about him, and his return to the faith of the biblical prophets—in his Confessions.4 He did not manage to develop his new outlook in a separate work. But his personal struggles and the turning point that occurred in his thought stand out as a harbinger of the turning point that occurred with Moses Hess in his grappling with the amoral, anti-Jewish, and anti-Christian dialectical materialism of Karl Marx.

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The Debate in Eastern Europe on Judaism as a Secular Culture

Ahad Ha-Am's doctrine was created in stages through essays that were written in the course of the debate that took place around them. This was a bitter and stormy debate among a wide spectrum of personal and movement positions that confronted each other on the historical "crossroads." Several additional axes of the debate (which will be examined shortly) were manifested. However, we can say that Ahad Ha-Am's essays constituted the principal axis of the debate that broke out among the various streams of the Zionist movement—and to some extent, between Zionists and non-Zionists—around the questions of continued Jewish existence and the continuity of Jewish spiritual identity. The doctrines

of several prominent thinkers, of both the right and the left, were developed in the course of the same debate.

Ahad Ha-Am himself initiated the practical debate over the essence of the Zionist idea and how it should be realized. But the principal disputations revolved around the fundamental assumptions of Judaism, around which Ahad Ha-Am wished to unite the people. We discussed above his innovative efforts to discover in the depths of the canonical sources values that could be the basis for a broad cultural and national consensus. We saw how he labored to mediate between the older generation clinging to the "past" and the younger generation eager to welcome the modern "future"; between those who held firm to Jewry's absolute distinctiveness from all nations and those who aspired to be like all the nations and accept their culture; between those who felt that preserving the spiritual identity of the people was the exclusive task of Zionism and those who sought in it a solution to their material distress. But in order for them to agree on a common denominator, Ahad Ha-Am demanded in the name of their interest of survival that they change the orientation that led them toward polarization—in other words, that they recognize that, even from their own various standpoints, the will to national unity that expressed the "will to life" of the whole Jewish community (and that must therefore throb in their heart of hearts) ought to overcome the personal and factional wills that made for rifts that could doom them all in the end.

It is therefore understandable why Ahad Ha-Am's demand for unity should arouse stormy opposition from all sides. Precisely because each side could find something of the truth dearest to its own heart in his words, they objected to it the more vehemently. From his opponent's perspective (though not from his own), his doctrine said one thing and its opposite, so the truth that they found in his words was falsified in their eyes. In the eyes of the older generation wedded to religion, he appeared the most dangerous rebel against the Jewish heritage, whereas in the eyes of the younger generation, he appeared as a conservative who came to quash the wave of their rebellion.

To explain the severity of the debate, we should mention that this was the period in which the divisions that had developed in east-European society from the start of the Enlightenment period found organic institutional expression. Even those independent thinkers who operated as individuals beyond party lines were accepted in effect within the party frameworks and contributed to their crystallization. This was the political significance of the "parting of the ways" with which Ahad Ha-Am grappled. The community that encompassed within itself the strata, the generations, and the streams as a single society disintegrated; the authority of spiritual leadership was undermined and collapsed. The vacuum was filled by parties and factional voluntary organizations of various kinds that used ideological confrontation and propaganda as their primary strategy to enlist the masses to their ranks. Of course, each of the parties sought to unify the people by seizing hegemony for itself, not through consensus among the various parties.

This tragic reality explains both the admiration of Ahad Ha-Am's disciples, who saw him as a prophet and pathfinder for a generation that was wandering like a flock without a shepherd, as well as the hostility that he provoked among his opponents. But in the context of the history of the development of philosophical thought on Judaism, we should reemphasize that, despite the opposition that he provoked or perhaps even on account of it, he became the teacher from whom all learned, whether through agreeing with his views or disagreeing with them—and most of all from the various combinations and permutations of agreement and disagreement.

We mentioned earlier the polemic of Jehiel Michal Pines against Ahad Ha-Am from the viewpoint of Orthodox religious Zionism. However, Pines crystallized his worldview before Ahad Ha-Am, and one should see him as a rival peer rather than a disciple. It is our interest here to clarify how religious Zionist thought took a developmental path parallel to that of Ahad Ha-Am through confrontation that led it to internalize his way of thinking. Indeed, it appears that even from the religious side a pattern of opposition was evident that internalized the thought categories of the opponent through an inverted interpretation. In place of a doctrine that appeared, from the religious perspective, as a humanistic-nationalistic transformation of religious values, some thinkers of religious Zionism proposed a religious transformation of humanistic and national values. Like Ahad Ha-Am, they wished to create through their transformative interpretation a common denominator for the unity of the people but within the circle of religious discourse, not outside it. This development was discernable first among two thinkers prominent for their originality in religious Zionism—Rabbi Samuel Aleksandrow and Rabbi Isaac Jacob Reines—and found systematic expression somewhat later in the thought of Rabbi Abraham Kook.

The religious thinkers rejected Ahad Ha-Am's secular substitute for the religious definition of Judaism as a falsification. The same complaint was also found among his left-wing critics. For them, it was a double falsification: of the religious version of truth against which they were rebelling (but of which they had inside knowledge), and of the humanistic truth they sought to attain. Like Ahad Ha-Am, they thought that the time had passed for religion in general and Jewish religion in particular. It could no longer play the role that it had in the past—of crystallizing the people's cultural identity. Inclined to radical approaches, they concluded that the secular transformation of religion that Ahad Ha-Am proposed was also doomed to failure, like the religion from which it sprang. They therefore opted to cut themselves off not only from religion but from all the cultural values that it represented.

In the eyes of the "younger" generation, the values of the old Judaism were the perverted products of "Galut" [Jewish Exilic] existence. In order to achieve full redemption, they had to liberate themselves from the whole Jewish-exilic mode of existence and to internalize the earthy cultural values of "normal" European nations. But did it follow from this that the Jewish people must assimilate to the point of fading away and disappear from the stage of history? There were many youths in eastern Europe who answered this question with a decisive "Yes," especially among those who joined the ranks of the socialists and marched forward toward the revolution. However, the external and internal obstacles soon became clear, in proportions that were orders of magnitude greater than the obstacles to assimilation in central and western Europe. Even those who turned to the way of revolution were forced to form separate Jewish workers' parties (of which the most prominent was the Bund) because anti-Semitism had infiltrated the revolutionary workers' parties and was tailored to serve the needs of revolutionary propaganda.

To this were added internal social, emotional, and cultural impediments. Most of the rebellious "youths" in eastern Europe came, like Ahad Ha-Am, from religious homes that shaped their primary education, their habits of thought and feeling, and the ethos that was expressed in their social conduct. This was the source of their powerful rebellion against their parental homes and communal existence, which bore more than one stripe of self-hatred. But it was the source, too, of the forced recognition of the truth that Ahad Ha-Am had pointed out: whoever was raised in Judaism bore the impress of its values and contents, whether he chose it or not. Such a person was Jewish to the core of his being, and it was impossible to change that fact by external imitation of the surrounding culture. Indeed, the modern

Hebrew literature of this period documented the tragic experience of this sort in the phenomenon of the deracinated hero: a young Jew in rebellion, who seeks to cut himself off from his people and to assimilate into his "goyish" environment, but who is left in the end a stranger both to his own people and to the surrounding culture.

The combination of the obstacle of anti-Semitism and the inner recognition that assimilation was a falsification of one's own nature, leading to self-effacement devoid of self-respect, turned a portion of the rebellious youths in the direction of Jewish nationalism and Zionism. But once they arrived at the nationalist position, they were faced with another truth that Ahad Ha-Am had pointed out. In order to preserve the Jewish people as an independent nation, they had to find a basis of independent national identity like those that distinguished the "normal" peoples around them. There is no nationalism without a connection to the distinctive cultural memory of the people: a national language, a national literature, a national homeland, a historical consciousness that preserved the connection to these elements, patterns of a unifying social ethos, and unifying cultural patterns. Even Herzl, who thought of creating a modern Jewish national culture with a universal Western character, understood that distinctive elements such as these are the conditions for grounding the argument that the Jews were a nation deserving of independent existence like all other nations. If so, despite the aspiration to be liberated from the Galut existence and from its culture, even the young rebels who turned toward nationalism and Zionism had need of an infrastructure comprising language and literature, historical memory, and a historical homeland, which could be found only in the ancient tradition against which they were in rebellion.

The dialectic of opposition to Ahad Ha-Am's doctrines among the "younger generation" who found their way to Zionist nationalism or autonomism thus brought about the realization that, if the nationalist alternative to religion that he proposed was unacceptable to them, it was up to them to come up with a revolutionary alternative to his alternative. This was achieved by a transvaluation of the values of the traditional legacy or by creating a modern national culture that would draw the larger share of its values from the outside but would develop them independently in the national language of the Jews, which would be converted from the "sacred tongue" to a secular tongue, and in their historical homeland—the Land of Israel—which would no longer be the Holy Land but a "normal" homeland. Several solutions were arrived at in this spirit by prominent thinkers and writers of the younger generation. Their principal spokesman was Micha Josef Berdyczewski. <>

HUMANITY DIVIDED: MARTIN BUBER AND THE CHALLENGES OF BEING CHOSEN by Manuel Duarte de Oliveira [Series Studia Judaica, De Gruyer, 9783110740745]

With exacting scholarship and fecund analysis, Manuel Oliveira probes through the lens of Martin Buber (1878-1965) the theological and political ambiguities of Israel's divine election. These ambiguities became especially pronounced with the emergence of Zionism. Wary, indeed, alarmed by the tendency of some of his fellow Zionists to conflate divine chosenness with nationalism, Buber sought to secure the theological significance of election by both steering Zionism from hypertrophic nationalism and by a sustained program to revalorize what he called alternately "Hebrew Humanism."

As Oliveira demonstrates, Buber viewed the idea of election teleologically, espousing a universal mission of Israel, which effectively calls upon Zionism to align its political and cultural project to universal objectives. Thus, in addressing a Zionist congress, he rhetorically asked, "What then is this spirit of Israel of which you are speaking? It is the spirit of fulfillment. Fulfillment of what? Fulfillment of the simple truth that man has been created for a purpose (...) Our purpose is the upbuilding of peace (...) And that is its spirit, the spirit of Israel (...) the people of Israel was charged to lead the way to righteousness and justice."

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> I do not know of anyone else who is as honest as he [Martin Buber] is with respect to spiritual and intellectual matters, and as dependable in human affairs. —Franz Rosenzweig

With exacting scholarship and fecund analysis, Manuel Duarte de Oliveira probes through the lens of Martin Buber the theological and political ambiguities of Israel's divine election. These ambiguities became especially pronounced with the emergence of Zionism. Wary, indeed, alarmed by the tendency of some of his fellow Zionists to conflate divine chosenness with nationalism, Buber sought to secure the theological significance of election by both steering Zionism from hypertrophic nationalism and by a sustained program to revalorize what he called alternately "Hebrew Humanism" and "Biblical Humanism," as he entitled two of his most seminal essays on the spiritual and cultural renewal of Judaism.

In these and allied essays, as Oliveira deftly demonstrates, Buber viewed the idea of election teleologically, espousing a universal mission of Israel, which effectively calls upon Zionism to align its political and cultural project to universal objectives. Thus, in addressing a Zionist congress, he rhetorically asked, "What then is this spirit of Israel of which you are speaking? It is the spirit of fulfillment. Fulfillment of what? Fulfillment of the simple truth that man has been created for a purpose

(...) Our purpose is the upbuilding of peace (...) And that is its spirit, the spirit of Israel (...) the people of Israel was charged to lead the way to righteousness and justice." In elucidating the presuppositions of Buber's ramified writings on "the challenge of chosenness," Oliveira provides the reader with the conceptual leverage to confront with refined theological and ethical sensibilities what the former Chief Rabbi of Great Britain, Jonathan Sacks has aptly called, "Chosenness and its Discontents." —Paul Mendes-Flohr

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> In order to stimulate new thinking, it is necessary to undermine the myths that have determined structures of thinking. Some of my findings may cause storms of controversy. But they may also serve as a catalyst in evolving new positions and alternate solutions. —Simha Flapan

> I have decided not to postpone what I have to say. ^ consciousness of my responsibility urges me to speak before the confusion increases. What I am going to deal with is the unambiguous demarcation of a kind, a degenerate kind of nationalism, which of late has begun to spread even in Judaism. —Martin Buber

> There appears to be no escape from the most evil of all idolatry. —Martin Buber

> If Israel renounces its own mystery, it renounces the heart of reality itself. National forms without the eternal purpose from which they have arisen signify the demise of Israel's specific fruitfulness. —Martin Buber

Yet, a deeper and perplexing question remains: how could such a theological concept ever have become the driving force of a project so ubiquitously secular in its genesis?

"Written over a period of about thirty years, the essays in this volume represent a dual attempt: first, to clarify the relation of certain aspects of Jewish thinking and Jewish living to contemporary intellectual movements, and second, to analyze (and refute) those trends within Jewish life which, surrendering to certain current ideologies, tend to weaken the teachings of Israel internally. (...) My presentation aims to point to the reality of this historical moment: out of its distress one can find a way only by rediscovering the eternal, forgotten truth, one of whose rays has entered the teachings of Israel.s So begins Martin Buber [1878-1965] the Preface of what would become one of his most important works, entitled Israel and the World: Essays in a Time of Crisis, published in Jerusalem, in February 1948, just a few months before the creation of the State and the beginning of the War of Independence.

This book has also been in the making for an extended period of time. It started as a sincere, yet perhaps `naive' search for an understanding of what might be implied in the concept of the divine electi^n/ch^senness of Israel. As Daniel Frank stated in his Introduction to A People Apart: Chosenness and Ritual in Jewish Philosophical Thought: "It is unarguable that the doctrine of chosenness (or election) is the most difficult for modern Jews to accept. It smacks of elitism or, at least, an antiassimilationist ideology. (...) `Chosenness,' `apartness,' seems to resist the modern age. (...) [H]ow can chosenness be rendered meaningful and viable for the modern Jew, all of whose social and political affiliations are permeated by an egalitarian outlook?" And Frank concludes: "Is it possible for the modern Jew, ex hypothesi dwelling in a democratic society, a society that accords equal legal and political rights to all of its members on the basis of a natural equality, to defend the traditional Jewish doctrine of chosenness?"

It is indeed particularly difficult to assess how to strike the right balance between the dimensions of singularity/particularity and universality implied in this concept. In one of his commentaries to Jehuda Halevi's poems, Franz Rosenzweig refers to Jewish `singularity' in the following manner:

> This people's singularity (...) consists in the fact that the people sees itself exactly as it is seen from the outside. An entire world calls the Jewish Tribe both rejected and chosen, and the tribe itself confirms these words of others, instead of countering them with words of its own. It is only that the thing as perceived from the outside assumes the form of an external connection, of a historical consequence, while on the inside it is experienced as intrinsically inseparable, meaning that the vessels of curse and of blessing are so interconnected that the one can run over only when the other is also filled to the brim.

How open and inclusive should chosenness be vis-^-vis other human beings? As Dana Hollander emphasizes, for Hermann Cohen and Franz Rosenzweig, Jewish chosenness is a chosenness viewed from a messianic perspective, involving an impact in universal history: "The Jewish people derives its eternal existence not from the fact of being the contingent bearer of a trait or a message, but from living the chasm between the particularity and the universality of ch^senness."

A significative number of similar questions remain open: Is the concept of divine chosenness still binding on the Jewish people today? If yes, does it also bind the large percentage of secular Jews, or only the religiously committed ones? What are the contents of that concept vis-a-vis the relationship between the Jewish nation and other nations? Is the prophetic call for service on behalf of other nations still binding or has it been tacitly/unwillingly entrusted to other monotheist religious traditions such as Christianity and Islam? If the call for the service of others has been entrusted to other traditions, does that substantively change the nature of the Jewish tradition itself? Does God exercise preferences vis-^-vis His chosen ones, or are those preferences only ancillary to a larger goal, and will thus disappear once the goal will be reached? Can the Jewish nation, or the Jewish State, be considered an 'end-in-itself'? What would be wrong with that? Is the concept of 'alterity'/otherness — represented from a horizontal perspective in the call for service on behalf of other nations and, from a vertical one, in the unflinching demand of loyalty and commitment to be observed in the covenanted relationship with the Caller — an intrinsic element to be taken into consideration in the fulfillment of chosenness? Does the absence of a conscience of `otherness' (i.e., if one loses sight of the distance between one's self and the reference point one intends to achieve) inevitably lead to the dreadful consequence of idolatry and the potential oppression of others (under the impression of acting according to an absolute power overriding other potential considerations)? These were some of the questions that set me on the way.

As my research evolved into the second half of the nineteenth century, a growing apprehension arouse: the realization of how deep the inspiration that Jewish thinkers received from nineteenth century streams of European nationalist thought was increasingly being absorbed and subsequently integrated into Jewish nationalist ideology. Gradually, this influence became evermore self-evident. The similarities and impact that neo-Romanticism had on both the Jewish and German nationalist ideologies was indeed overwhelming. This sense of bewilderment would merge into a feeling of urgency, given the outcome that one of these ideologies had already proven to be able to unleash on others, in a not so distant past. Could the previous mistake of attempting to idolatrize a whole nation under false pretenses of racial supremacy, taint the emerging Zionist project itself, albeit under ifferent theological/ideological premises?

More recently, I became aware of yet another serious aspect to be considered: the realization of how a significant number of Jewish thinkers conceive the `Jewish soul' par rapport the `soul' of other human beings, hideously imagined as deprived of a divine semblance and thus considered immensely inferior. The consequences of such a world view, I think, can likewise be appalling, especially if such world view will ever become sufficiently predominant to be integrated in the power structures of a State. Given the urgency of the hour, I decided to bring this study to light, perhaps with the sole consolation of having done as much as I could, by refusing to become silently complacent with a political process that progressively trumps upon fundamental values that ought not to be ignored.

A deep passion and admiration for Jewish Thought has enlightened my study of the Jewish tradition during the last four decades of my life. In this process, as my awareness of certain critical issues of Jewish nationalism grew deeper, so grew the understanding that such research, if fallen into the wrong hands, could potentially have a negative impact on the fragile community that I so much loved. That made me set back and silence the unflinching intuition that year after year resounded ever more forcefully. I waited for as long as I could. Today, though, to continue in silence would be tantamount to betrayal of some of the important principles that I was honored to discover in that ancient tradition. The threat that some forms of religious, political, and messianic Zionism bring to the Jewish civilization, has the potential to trigger the downfall of Judaism itself, including those crucial principles that have enabled our deeper understanding of human dignity and other fundamental values transversal to humankind.

During my ten years of doctoral studies in the Department of Jewish Thought at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem, I had the privilege and frequent opportunity to witness the amazing things that the revival of the Jewish presence on the Land brought into life. However, I also witnessed the dramatic existential conditions lived by the other side of the story, the non-Jewish side. It is painful to watch one people breaking another, methodically, generation after generation. The most recent steps of this process

Country, state, and nation impose pressing obligations and tasks that are sometimes very difficult. They do not, on that account, acquire sanctity. They are always subject to judgment and criticism from a higher standpoint. For the sake of that which is holy - and perhaps only for its sake - man is capable of acting without any restraint.

And Leibowitz concluded: "In our discourse and practice we have uprooted the concept of holiness from its authentic ground and applied it to matters for which it was not destined, courting all the dangers implied by its distorted use." In doing so, Yeshayahu Leibowitz was well aware of the unforgiving excesses practiced by important sectors of Israeli society, such as those instigated by Zvi Yehuda Kook, who unabashedly declared:

We must remember now and forever: What is sanctified is sanctified! (...) the State of Israel and the order of government in Israel - is holy. And all that is necessary to perform this commandment, all the tanks and all the other weapons (...) all belong to this sanctity.

This reminds me of an interesting story shared by a colleague of the Hebrew University, in the context of the scud missiles launched each night from Iraq, during the First Gulf War in 1991. As we were standing in a packed bus driving from Mont Scopus through the Central Bus Station, I asked my friend who lived in Tel-Aviv with her family: "How are you enduring down there?" "Well, we are fine," she said, "but for our daughters it is a bit more complex. The other day, the one who is five asked the older one who is nine: `If God is all powerful, why does He allow the scud missiles to reach us? Isn't He everywhere?' `Of course, He is! [the older replied] He is even inside those missiles!" Yes, there is some truth here, but God's omnipresence should not be held responsible for the human decisions and actions taking place in His place, as R. Zvi Kook appears to imply.

A crucial question remains: for how long will Israeli parents consent to send their children to the front lines, while also allowing them to participate in such ignominious abuses that betray the singular ever-legitimate purpose of self-defense? This reminds me of an important text by Martin Buber regarding the 'sacrifices' demanded of young people (including those that serve the subjugation of whole populations):

Time and again, when I ask well-conditioned young souls, 'Why do you give up your dearest possession, your personal integrity?' they answer me, 'Even this, this most difficult sacrifice, is the thing that is needed in order that (...).' It makes no difference, 'in order that equality may come' or 'in order that freedom may come,' it makes no difference! And they bring the sacrifice faithfully. In the realm of ^^loch honest men lie and compassionate men torture. And they really and truly believe that brother-murder will prepare the way to brotherhood! There appears to be no escape from the most evil of all idolatry. There is no escape from it until the new conscience of men has arisen that will summon them to guard with the innermost power of their souls against the confusion of the relative with the Absolute, that will enable them to see through illusion and to recognize this confusion for what it is. To penetrate again and again into the fa s' absolute with an incorruptible, probing glance until one has discovered its limits, its limitedness — there is today perhaps no other way to reawaken the power of the pupil to glimpse the never-vanishing appearance of the Abs^lute.

As time goes by and the gap between the two sides of this drama grows deeper, I fear that mistreating each other might ultimately lead to the demise of the long awaited Jewish project. Yet, so long as hope is not completely destroyed (although with unswerving trepidation, I must confess, as I feel that the Shekhinah [the divine Presence] is set, once again, to go into Exile), I proudly will support a form of Zionism that constructively acknowledges the need to create space for a covenanted commitment to

establish a society where Truth and Justice will determine the purpose of its existence, a place where the inalienable fundamental rights and existential aspirations of each human being living on the surface of that special Land will be thoroughly respected, not in letter alone, but in fact and attitude, independently of ethnicity or religious affiliation. However, in the current situation, those goals seem ever more unreachable, not only given the outstanding alienation within major secular sectors of Israeli society from the Jewish sources that were supposed to bring this project into being, but also because some of the religious sectors that attempt to take selective aspects of those sources into consideration, tend to consider them from a messianic / quasi-apocalyptic perspective, dangerously trumping upon other fundamental considerations — especially ethical and legal in nature — frequently falling in the trap of degrading segments of the non-Jewish reality to a quasi-infra-human level. Their main purpose consists in imbuing Zionism with messianic religious contents, reinstating divine worship within the context of a theocratic national framework that might enable the revival of some form of kingship, the reinstatement of sacrifices on the Temple Mount, and the re-establishment of the Sanhedrin.

In the course of those intense years of study in Jerusalem, I frequently had the pleasure of visiting friends and spending time in different places in the country. In one of my journeys to Eilat, for example, as we were passing through a checkpoint in the Negev, three or four Israeli soldiers entered the bus and asked for the identity cards of only a small number of passengers (they did it gently; much worse would happen in years to come). Astonished with that highly selective scrutiny, I asked one of them how they knew which ones to check? Unabashedly, he replied: "I look at their humiliated faces [panim mushpalot]!" In doing so, these soldiers were just applying a policy called `mediniyut hashpalah' [the policy of humiliation], which methodically struggled to create such unbearable existential conditions for the `non-Jewish' residents living on the Land, that in the end they would either freely leave the country on their own or, alternatively, 'be put into cages and transported away.' Those `humiliated faces' transported the marks of untold sufferings, sometimes endured beyond comprehension.

In her critical essay on "Zionism as Psychoanalysis," following Hannah Arendt's prediction that an ethos of survival 'at any price' could not only become brutalized but place the safety and sanity of the nation at risk, Jacqueline Rose unveils the perplexing memories of Liran Ron Furer, while serving in the territories: "I was carried away by the possibility of acting in the most primal and impulsive manner. Over time the behaviour (...) became nonnative (...) without fear of punishment and without oversight (...) a place to test our personal limits - how tough, how callous, how crazy we could be." I could not but be deeply shocked and appalled with the shortsightedness of such policies. How in the world could a civilized nation use such `methods' in order to impose its power and control over another nation? Which values in the Jewish tradition could sanction such a despicable behavior? Wasn't Jewish history dangerously in the process of writing one of its darkest pages? Why do light and darkness have to walk 'hand-in-hand' in human history? After all, as a doctoral student, I was trying to understand the core of one of the most complex theological / philosophical concepts - the divine Election of a particular People, believed to be brought into being as a `Light to the Nations.' In the end, I might have found way more than in my wildest dreams I could have expected, but it should be acknowledged that the great majority of Israelis are decent people who deplore those and similar policies, frequently displaying their public condemnation of abuses of power, considered abhorrent in the eyes of any sensitive human being. The Land remains both a kaleidoscope and a magnifying glass of human nature and, as such, it contains and reflects the complexities, hopes and contradictions that the human mind is able (and willing) to conceive.

Ithamar Greenwald, professor of Jewish history at the Tel Aviv University, and someone deeply aware of the complexities in the Land, in an article entitled "Can Messianism Survive Its Own `Apocalyptic' Visions?" portrayed the situation in the following manner: "Although criticism was occasionally raised against extreme forms of maltreatment of the non-Jewish, mostly Arab, population, the overall attitude toward the Palestinian Arabs was largely oriented by uncompromising ideologies. Here religious ideas taken with no further thinking out of the pages of Scripture set the desired attitude toward those Arabs on the same premises as the attitude toward the ancient People of Cana'an. All this amounted to fundamentalism par excellence. When linked to orthodox views of the non-Jewish `other,' that maltreatment was often theologically `upgraded.'"

All things considered, it is possible that the expected relation between Israel's divine Election and its tangible universal projection, from a Jewish point of view, was a misplaced hope. After all, just a few years before my arrival in the Land, it had already been written and well understood that such a prophetic aspiration would be beyond the reach of the present contours of Jewish history. For example, just one decade after the Six-Day War, in an essay entitled "The Religious and Moral Significance of the Redemption of Israel," Yeshayahu Leibowitz unambiguously asserted that: "The state of Israel does not radiate the light of Judaism to the nations, nor even to the Jews. I vehemently oppose the view that Zionist theory and practice are necessarily or essentially connected with the idea of `Light to the Nations.'" Indeed, Leibowitz proclaimed:

> The idea that the people of Israel has been endowed with a capacity for instructing and guiding all of humanity has no basis in authentic Jewish sources, and played no role - at least no more than a marginal one - in the consciousness of generations of Jews who assumed the yoke of the Kingdom of Heaven in the form of the yoke of Torah and Mitzvoth. This idea was fabricated by the heretics - from the Apostle Paul to [David] Ben-Gurion - who meant to cast off the yoke of Torah by substituting for it a faith in an abstract `vocation.' The Jewish people were not given a mission; it was rather charged with a task - the task of being servants of God (`A Kingdom of Priests and a holy nation')

As my research continued to develop, and I came across a few additional unexpected experiences, I started to realize that, side by side some incredible gems of Jewish wisdom and examples of virtuous behavior, there were deeply troubling contradictions and dark spots that could explain the abuse of power and humiliation of non-Jewish others in Israeli society, both in practice and discourse. But how could such attitudes take shape in a public space and be endorsed and condoned by this special Community and by those representing a People who too frequently had been victim of some of the most atrocious crimes and horrendous persecutions perpetrated in the course of [un]human history? "Am I my brother's keeper?" (Gen. 4,9), some could ask. "Yes [I should reply]! At least as long as he/she is under your direct jurisdiction and control! And, besides that, how can you not be aware of and respect the divine image in each and every human being living in your midst?" As we will see in the following pages, there is a 'method' for that too: Deny them the fundamental right to be considered Human, by scandalously stating that not all humans are, in fact, descendants of Adam from a theological perspective commonly assumed as the Father of Humanity], and you will feel empowered and justified to treat them as less than human and, perhaps in the eyes of some, even bellow common `beasts.'

These are profoundly perplexing issues that lie beneath the structural foundations of the study that follows. As the former Chief Rabbi of the United Kingdom, Jonathan Sacks, wisely acknowledges, in his work on The Dignity of Difference:

"One belief, more than any other (...) is responsible for the slaughter of individuals on the altars of the great history of ideals. It is the belief that those who do not share my faith - or my race or my ideology - do not share my humanity. At best they are second-class citizens. At worst they forfeit the sanctity of life itself. As mentioned above, time and again I asked myself what is it in this amazing tradition, that enables such a mistreatment of the other, sometimes beyond reasonable proportions, as in countless humiliations perpetrated under State control? Perhaps, better than anyone else, Ya'akov Cohen, in his poem "The Zionist Revolution," in just a few words, offers a hint that might help probe a larger answer - Sacred Cruelty:

> Daring to the point of chutzpah [somewhere between shameless audacity and insolent arrogance], courageous to the point of risking his life, defending his opinion to the point of fanaticism, fanatic to the point of cruelty - these are the characteristics that are praiseworthy and sacred to the revolution. Sacred audaciousness and sacred cruelty - audaciousness toward the mighty ancient gods, their doctrine and regime, and cruelty toward himself and others, near and far, for the sake of the sacred goal.

It is possible that a few aspects of the critique expressed in this study might elicit a sense of discomfort or unease in some. Yet, in my humble view, serious research should dare to be above such concerns which, most often, in an attempt to overcome the potential embarrassment of historical reality, succumb to apologetical thinking. This work tries to go beyond the fateful drive towards such apologetical thinking, which frequently defile not only Jewish thought, but so many similar streams of theological/political reasoning. Only recently, I think, are Jewish scholars, in particularly Israeli ones, daring to be more self-critical of their own tradition(s), exploring ways to venture beyond previous ideological motivations, frequently disguised under a litany of victimhood and self-justification. Fortunately, a courageous new generation of Jewish critical thinking is on the rise. One trailing in the path that Seyla Benhabib so acutely describes in just a few words: "It is my hope to create cracks and fissures in the edifice of discursive traditions large enough so that a new ray of reason which still reflects the dignity of justice along with the promise of happiness may shine through them." Yet, it should be acknowledged, as courageous and as new as this remarkable undertaking might seem, it is not unique. In his own time and environment, a number of centuries ago, Moses Maimonides, one of the greatest pillars of Jewish thought, shining into eternity, dared to declare in the Introduction to the perplexed readers of his and future generations:

> Lastly, when I have a difficult subject before me - when I find the road narrow, and can see no other way of teaching a well-established truth except by pleasing one intelligent man and displeasing ten thousand fools - I prefer to address myself to the one man, and to take no notice whatever of the condemnation of the multitude; I prefer to extricate that intelligent man from his embarrassment and show him the cause of his perplexity, so that he may attain perfection and be at peace?

Maimonides was indeed ready to confront the `multitude'! Are we? <>

THE LIFELINE: SALOMON GRUMBACH AND THE QUEST FOR SAFETY by Meredith L. Scott [Brill's Series in Jewish Studies, Brill, 9789004514393]

During the first months of World War II, nearly one thousand refugees and asylum seekers held in French internment camps sought the help of one man: Salomon Grumbach. Meredith Scott's **THE LIFELINE** is a ground-breaking study of Grumbach, an Alsatian Jew, journalist, and socialist politician who became one of Europe's most important interwar refugee advocates. Focusing on his remarkable life in Germany and France, it uncovers the identities that drove his international crusades for democracy and human rights. *The Lifeline* offers lessons that transcend national boundaries and historical moments, challenging us to rethink our ideas about resistance, mobilization, and activism.

CONTENTS

"In my great distress and immense despair, I write to you in the name of nearly 400 Germans and Austrians interned at Camp de Catus," begins a December 1939 letter to Salomon Grumbach, Deputy of Castres and known refugee advocate.1 "We are poorly housed, like cattle. We live in stables and sleep on rocks and sand barely covered with filthy straw. The rats roam around night and day. In these conditions, not even the least hygiene is possible." The author, like thousands of other men, women, and children since 1933, fled the Third Reich for safe haven in France. France, however, was no longer the

land of asylum that they had hoped to find. Its legacy of universal republicanism, generous immigration policies, and human rights had eroded in the face of economic depression, fear of war, and restricted visions of nationhood. Rather than acquiring asylum, the author of this letter was arrested and sent to an internment camp where daily miseries were surpassed only by fear of repatriation to Germany and the threat of the Nazi war machine.

Using the pseudonym "Schneider" to protect himself from camp guards' strict monitoring of correspondence, the letter writer details his situation and appeals to Grumbach for help:

> There are six German- speaking doctors here, but they cannot help due to lack of instruments and medications. The military doctor promised us an improvement in our situation, but nothing has changed. We cannot properly clean ourselves because the water is not quite clean. Thanks to this state of affairs, one man in the camp, aged 60, is dead ... transported to the hospital only to die there. That's how they treat humans here and if our situation doesn't change soon, the same fate will be reserved for many others among us. The food isn't sufficient and it's bad ... one of my friends who wrote the truth about the camp was put in the cachot and his letter was confiscated. For that reason, I am wary and sign with a false name. Most people here want to fight Hitler and have voluntarily signed up. However, I don't think the situation in the camp will deepen their love for France ... Please help us, before others die.

Against improbable odds, Schneider's letter made its way, uncensored, into the hands of Salomon Grumbach. And it is not surprising that Grumbach was its intended recipient. He had already received hundreds of other letters just like it. At a time when France restricted its borders, tracked foreigners, and created an internment camp system, upwards of a thousand refugees and asylum seekers wrote to Grumbach as their best chance for help. He was a known champion for human rights and refugees, a reputation gained through both ordinary and extraordinary forms of personal and political intervention for over two decades. In journalism, voluntary associations, and politics, he nurtured connections and resources forged through years of deliberate engagement in France and beyond. These experiences proved crucial in the last years of the Third Republic, in 1939 and 1940, when he helped secure the liberation of refugees from French internment camps. Yet Grumbach's activism did not begin in 1939. Examining the fullness of his efforts reveals a worldview that transcended spheres of belonging and national frontiers; it enriches our understanding of Jewish life in twentieth- century France and Germany.

An Alsatian Jew, journalist, and socialist politician, Salomon Grumbach is known for his roles in the Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (German Social Democratic Party— sPD), the Section Française de l'Internationale Ouvrière (French Section of the Worker's International— sFlo), and the Ligue des Droits de l'Homme (Human Rights League— LD h). However, his extensive social and political activism and his fight for refugee rights during the 1930s have remained largely hidden from view. This is the first study of Grumbach, who brought together diverse international actors and resources in his efforts to influence French and European political developments and, in the 1930s, to protect refugees. The Lifeline excavates Grumbach's extensive involvement in European political and associational life, which enabled him to make connections throughout France and the international community. It presents a history of Jewish activism that facilitated critical resistance and aid during the fraught years of the late Third Republic and World War II. Born of his cumulative experiences, this

activism was aimed at protecting the rights of all and upholding the French Republic's core commitments to its people.

The case of Grumbach allows us to follow the development of Jewish activism across multiple decades and countries. It enriches our understanding of how Jews in interwar France adapted to changing circumstances to fight for their rights and the rights of others. Grumbach's example illustrates how members of democratic societies can engage civic spaces even at times of turbulence and adverse public opinion. But more specifically, his life provides insight into critical events of the first half of the twentieth century, as well as the mentalities that underlay his work. This study considers Grumbach's efforts within a transnational framework, stressing the importance of his experiences in Alsace under the German Empire and during the Great War before giving central focus to interwar France and World War II.

This book relies substantially on Grumbach's hitherto unavailable personal papers held at the Alliance Israélite Universelle (AIU) in Paris, as well as his files in the Pantheon collection at the French National Archives. Both sets of documents are invaluable. Those at the AIU contain letters to, from, and about hundreds of refugees and interned foreigners, while the Pantheon collection details additional aspects of his public life and refugee advocacy. After the fall of France in 1940 and Grumbach's subsequent arrest, German authorities took them from his home, probably looking for information about him and those with whom he had been working.6 The portion now held in the National Archives was recovered after the liberation of France, while Grumbach's other papers— a key source for his interventions on behalf of refugees in the late 1930s— remained unavailable for nearly seventy years.7 They were first sent to Berlin, and after the Soviets occupied the city, these documents made their way to Moscow. They remained there until his son, Jean- Marc, requested their return to France, designating the AIU archives in Paris as their repository.

The papers at the AIU preserve the details of Grumbach's largely unknown work on behalf of refugees, many of whom were Jews and socialists fleeing the Third Reich. I was fortunate to discover them in 2008, while they were still in the process of being catalogued. They deal with around eight hundred individuals between 1939 and 1940 alone, offering details on life in France, the Third Reich, and French camps long missing from the historical record. Paired with his papers at the National Archives, they allow me to trace much of Grumbach's refugee work. However, to build a holistic study that considers his contributions prior to and after the refugee crisis, I also turn to departmental and municipal repositories, Grumbach's public writings, and articles in French newspapers such as L'Humanité, L'Œuvre, Le Populaire, and La Lumière. Together, these sources shed new light on Jewish life in France prior to World War ii. They document how Grumbach acted through a wide range of organizations, both Jewish and non- Jewish, to work towards common goals within the realms of politics, social involvement, and humanitarianism.

Grumbach belongs to a group of humanitarian and political figures in interwar France— including Léon Blum and Victor Basch— who were known as much for their leadership roles as for their Jewishness. These men were state Jews who, in the words of Pierre Birnbaum, "took advantage of the universalistic and egalitarian values of the post- revolutionary French state, advancing through the meritocratic system to achieve emancipation through public service ... serving the state as bureaucratic and civil servants and military officers, doing their utmost to protect and defend it." Grumbach joined this cohort after World War i, and his experiences under the German Empire prior to 1918 profoundly shaped his interwar

activities. Conceptions of Jewishness and Jewish solidarity molded his outlook, as did his adolescent participation in Alsatian socio- political activities and his involvement in the spd of Rosa Luxemburg and August Bebel.

Throughout these activities, Grumbach maintained a firm dedication to internationalism, developing commitments and contacts that were unimpeded by national frontiers. He therefore viewed most matters, including the regional particularism of Alsace- Lorraine, through an internationalist lens, positioning them within broader European concerns. This was about more than ideological frameworks; Grumbach's internationalist mindset also had pragmatic implications. His approach to socio- political engagement comprised a surprising mix of local, national, and international contacts who together constituted an enormously useful and efficient collection of resources. Talbot Imlay's work on international socialism sheds light on this practice. Internationalism, he points out, is not a linear process of increasing connectivity; rather, it comprises "clusters of activity, some interconnected and some not, occurring in multiple spaces, at various speeds and intensities, and with different durations."10 Indeed, Grumbach sought varying levels of international involvement as he adapted to ongoing circumstances. He created a flexible and informal network that stretched into the worlds of journalism, voluntary associations, and politics on both sides of the Rhine River.

Grumbach's political work allowed him to influence French foreign policy in the 1920s and agitate on behalf of refugees in the 1930s. His position in the sfio, as well as his tenures as Deputy of Mulhouse and Deputy of Castres, facilitated enduring relationships within, and a nuanced understanding of, the apparatus of the French state. Even when out of elected office, he deliberately remained close to the halls of government. Yet official positions in government were not the sole focus of his work, and one has to wonder whether Grumbach would have participated as extensively in French and international organizational life if he had experienced electoral victory early in his career. Repeated losses in legislative elections prior to 1939 (apart from those of 1928 and 1936, which he won) forced him to find other means of political involvement. Onlookers often referred to his seemingly ubiquitous presence at all conferences and meetings throughout Europe. Moreover, he gained a reputation for routinely criticizing the French state. He believed in France's foundational ideals and publicly held it accountable for what he believed to be its shortcomings. In these ways, Grumbach leveraged his roles as activist, politician, and writer in meaningful ways for more than thirty years.

This book has two central objectives. First, it explores how decades of activism through French and German public life allowed Grumbach to exert influence on matters of European peace, human rights, and democracy prior to the 1930s. It highlights details of Alsatian life not often considered and underscores the importance of his efforts in the years before Hitler's rise to power. These decades reveal the contours of his international approach and ever- widening circle of contacts. I first examine the years before 1914— while he still lived in the German Empire— and the emergence of his outlook on activism and politics, considering the evolution of his ideas on public engagement and the various influences on his worldview. I explore the roots of his political convictions and the encounters that challenged them. In the 1920s, Grumbach, now a French citizen, applied himself to the fragile postwar situation. He exposed human rights abuses and drew attention to the need for improved FrancoGerman relations to ensure enduring European peace. He made himself indispensable to those who decided foreign policy and gained a reputation for incisive political analyses. He was both a longtime admirer of the French republic and a frank critic of its policies, whether they concerned Germany after World War

i or the handling of Alsace- Lorraine. This willingness to oppose the state meant breaking with former colleagues and it earned him enemies from across the political spectrum.

The Lifeline's second objective is to investigate Grumbach's activities during the 1930s and throughout World War ii. As France anxiously dealt with the Great Depression and neighboring fascist regimes, it was also on the frontlines of the refugee crisis. It was, in the words of Vicki Caron, the "foremost nation of asylum in the world." When Hitler took power in Germany in 1933, Grumbach found many ways to advocate for refugees and refugee rights in France. He also began to receive letters from, or on behalf of, German Jews, socialists, and other targets of Hitler's persecutory regime. He received these letters first as a private citizen and then, after 1936, as the Deputy of Castres. They continued to arrive, even after war broke out, as word of his successful interventions reached more of those in need of help. Grumbach was one of several figures in France at the vanguard of the fight for refugees, and he worked alongside colleagues who prioritized refugee rights, such as fellow socialists Leon Blum and Marius Moutet and Victor Basch of the LDh. His working knowledge of the French state, his relationship to Jewish communal life, and his connections to refugee initiatives made him a valuable ally and successful advocate. When France established internment camps and began arresting German- speaking foreigners in 1939, many refugees considered Grumbach their best hope for liberation.

In the context of these efforts, Grumbach's knowledge of the state was of paramount significance. He became a vital intermediary between refugees and the government. He knew the best means to expedite cases through government channels and secured liberation for scores of internees until the spring of 1940, when developments in France jeopardized his own life. Under Vichy, authorities arrested Grumbach as a traitor and moved him several times between political prisons and house arrest. In these perilous years, he took the same approach that he had in previous decades, reaching out to potential allies— in this case, members of the Resistance. His already- precarious situation became even worse after 1942, when his name appeared on Nazi arrest lists. Grumbach and his wife fled the Gestapo and ss on more than one occasion, with one particularly close call in early 1944, and survived the war by hiding in the Cévennes. After liberation, Grumbach returned to the National Assembly and became President of the Commission of Foreign Affairs. In these roles, he addressed France's postwar relationship with Germany, called for the Marshall Plan to help Jewish organizations such as Obschestvo Remeslenovo i Zemledelcheskovo Trouda (Society for Trades and Agricultural Labor— ort), and worked alongside the architects of European integration.

The relationships that Grumbach fostered through his social and political life were critical to his activism and its effectiveness. Throughout this book, I use the term network to describe these relationships, even though they belong to an era before modern conceptions of networking or network theory. Although never expressing it as such in personal writings or public appearances, Grumbach's systematic creation of individual and organizational contacts was neither haphazard nor unintentional. Community activism through organizational life has gained attention in works on twentieth- century France and its empire. It is within that contextual framework that Grumbach should be understood, but his work was exceptional in that it cut across political, national, and religious boundaries. He could pursue his form of activism because of France's particular socio- political context— namely, a multifaceted civil society and a political culture that encouraged popular involvement in voluntary associations.

Foundations

THE LIFELINE is both a national and an international story, one that considers events and encounters in France within a transnational context. It explores Jewish use of the public sphere and the vitality of international Jewish activism, enriching the findings of foundational twentieth- century scholarship that wrestled with interwar Jewish experiences amid the refugee crisis, recrudescent antisemitism, and the Shoah. These works on Jews in modern France broke new ground and illuminated details that, without which, today's research would not be possible. As Pierre Birnbaum asserted in Jews of the Republic, for example, Jews during the Third Republic did not have to repress their identities in order to be French or take part in civil society. Nadia Malinovich's more recent study of Jewish society in twentieth-century France supports similar conclusions. She posits that Jews successfully navigated "the challenge of carving out a place for themselves in the French nation that would allow them to express their particularism fully while simultaneously holding on to the values of republican universalism." The Jewish experience in the 1930s, however, remains largely untouched since Vicki Caron's examination of the refugee crisis in France, in which she highlights not only the fluctuation of immigration policies but also the ways that French Jews worked to aid Jewish refugees and influence politics.

THE LIFELINE returns to interwar France with a fresh set of questions that benefit from a new generation of scholars, including Ronald Schechter, Lisa Moses Leff, Maud Mandel, Laura Hobson Faure, Nadia Malinovich, and Ethan Katz. These scholars have constructed innovative frameworks for examining Jewish history across the centuries. Zvi Jonathan Kaplan and Nadia Malinovich's edited volume The Jews of Modern France offers a variety of case studies covering topics ranging from legal and architectural history to arts and politics. Meanwhile, Ronald Schechter's examination of Jews in eighteenth-century France reveals how, prior to emancipation, they asserted their place in the nation through symbolic acts and patriotic liturgy. In addition, Lisa Leff's study of the aiu in the nineteenth century shows that French Jewish internationalism facilitated aid for foreign coreligionists and created alliances across political divides, advancing both the secular state and the anticlerical movement. She sheds light on ideals that were critical to Grumbach's own worldview, particularly a form of international cooperation that highlighted "tolerance, equality, and religious freedom." According to Leff, French Jews "developed the rhetoric of Jewish international solidarity ... to defend their own rights by linking them to the progress of the revolutionary tradition."

My study of Grumbach especially benefits from the scholarly focus on organizational life in both national and international contexts. Laura Hobson Faure, for example, examines the interplay between American and French Jewish aid organizations as they facilitated care for Holocaust survivors, especially children, and re- established Jewish life in France. In particular, she focuses on the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee (JDC) and its interactions with Jewish communities in France. Closely related works include Daniella Doron's study of Jewish youth, memory, and reconstruction in France and Maud Mandel and Ethan Katz's cross- generational examinations of Jewish politics in the second half of the twentieth century. Other scholars have considered state and non- state Jewish actors within global contexts; for example, Jaclyn Granick focuses on Jewish humanitarianism during World War I, while Nathan Kurz analyzes Jewish internationalism after the Holocaust. Similarly, my study of Salomon Grumbach demonstrates that twentieth- century Jewish activism addressed issues related to democracy, peace, and human rights by focusing on international political and organizational life. Thus, Grumbach's story contributes to the growing body of Jewish history that approaches questions of identity, self-representation, and public engagement.

The first comprehensive examination of America's response to the Holocaust through visual media, **AMERICA AND THE HOLOCAUST: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY** explores this complex subject through the lens of one hundred important documents that help to illuminate and amplify key episodes and issues.

The history of how America responded to the Nazi persecution of European Jewry revolves around the interplay between government officials, rescue advocates, and bystanders. The one hundred documents selected for this volume present a cross-section of perspectives reflecting the attitudes and actions of political leaders, activists who sought to influence policymaking, and ordinary individuals.

Each of the twenty chapters focuses on five key documents: two original images and three documents that have been recreated. The introduction to each chapter prepares the reader for understanding the context and back story of the documents. Explanatory text, analysis of historical implications, and suggestions for further reading follow.

Proceeding sequentially from the rise of Hitler to power, in 1933, until the end of World War II and the Holocaust, in 1945, the chapters cover a broad range of subjects, among them Americas response to Hitler's rise, U.S. immigration policy, Americans who rescued Jewish refugees, U.S. news coverage of Nazi atrocities, American Christian and Jewish responses to the Nazi genocide, obstacles to rescue, campaigns by American refugee advocates, the question of bombing Auschwitz, and the Allies' liberation of Nazi concentration camps. By examining the period chronologically, rather than thematically, **AMERICA AND THE HOLOCAUST: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY** will enable high school and college students as well as adult learners to explore responses to the news from Europe in the context of what was actually known—and which rescue options may have been feasible—at each point along the timeline. A concluding state of the field chapter documents the process by which scholars have arrived at the information presented in this book.

There is a broad consensus among the vast majority of scholars in this field as to the major findings of the research to date: that sufficient information about the mass murder was known in time for the the United States to have intervened; that President Franklin D. Roosevelt and his administration spurned opportunities to rescue Jews from. the Holocaust; that major U.S. news media chose not to publish or give prominence to much of the available information about the genocide; and that political action by rescue advocates and dissidents within the government brought about limited U.S. aid to refugees near the end of the war. The documents comprising this book reflect that scholarly consensus.

AMERICA AND THE HOLOCAUST: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY will be useful to teachers of students with varying degrees of background in American, Jewish, and world history, as it does not presuppose prior knowledge. Discussing these documents as examples of core issues will deepen readers' involvement with this material. Instructors will find it useful for teaching broader subjects such as U.S. immigration history, the history of American Jewry, or contemporary human rights issues, as well as focusing on American responses to the Holocaust. All readers are encouraged to make use of the companion teacher's guide featuring suggested questions for discussion at https://jps.org/study-guides/.

The question of America's response to Nazism and the Holocaust remains as compelling today as ever, in light of continuing mass atrocities around the world and the ongoing public debate over whether the United States should intervene against human rights abuses overseas. Understanding how Americans responded to news of the Nazi persecution of European Jewry provides lessons for responding to crises in our own era. <>

FROM ARISTOTLE TO CICERO: ESSAYS ON ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY by Gisela Striker [Oxford University Press, 9780198868385]

FROM ARISTOTLE TO CICERO: ESSAYS IN ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY draws together a selection of Gisela Striker's essays from the last forty years in the areas of research for which she is best known. The first two essays are translated from German: they address specific questions in Aristotle's logic and also complement her commentary on Prior Analytics I. Following on from these, there are three papers on Aristotle's ethics and moral psychology, and the second part of the volume presents five recent studies on Hellenistic epistemology and ethics. Three of the essays have not been published previously.

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This collection brings together different lines of research that I have been pursuing throughout my academic career: Aristotle's logic and ethics, and Hellenistic epistemology and ethics.

At the University of Göttingen, where I got most of my philosophical education, a doctoral degree in philosophy required the addition of two secondary fields, for which I chose the two classical languages, Greek and Latin, which I had already learned in high school. After receiving my doctoral degree with a

dissertation on Plato's Philebus, I continued to work on ancient philosophy, but turned to the Hellenistic period, a field less studied by scholars than the great classics, although it had an enormous influence on later European philosophy. Now, since teaching is not limited to one's specialty, during the first fifteen years, while still in Göttingen, I was also teaching courses in contemporary philosophy—epistemology, ethics, philosophy of mind—that kept me in touch with recent developments. Since I moved to the United States, I have been mostly responsible for teaching ancient philosophy, but I have continued to follow contemporary philosophy in the fields I was studying in the ancient authors. This seemed to me the best way to engage with historical texts, not limiting oneself to exegesis, but engaging in discussion with authors who often had a different perspective, not treating them merely as predecessors, but also to learn from them. So, for example, Greek ethics saw morality in the wider framework of a good human life, and the ancient Sceptics were not fascinated by questions about the existence of an external world, questions that seem to have been prevalent ever since the time of Descartes.

A few years into my time in Göttingen, I was invited to produce a new German translation and commentary on Aristotle's Analytics. Since I had long been interested in Aristotle's logic, I accepted—vastly underestimating the difficulties of the task and the time it would take me to complete it. In the meantime, Hellenistic philosophy was having a kind of renaissance among philosophers interested in the history of their subject, who had until then more or less limited themselves to the study of the Presocratics and the two great classical philosophers, Plato and Aristotle. This led to a lively exchange of ideas between scholars, both philosophers and classicists, now working in this field. So I continued my research in both areas, slowly making my way through Aristotle's Prior Analytics, first in German, then in English, while also publishing papers on Hellenistic epistemology and ethics.

The present collection includes a number of essays on Aristotle's logic that deal with questions in more detail than would have been appropriate for a commentary, including an, as yet unpublished, paper on the title 'Analytica' (chapter 7), and a short piece outlining the development of Aristotle's theory of argument that might serve as a background to the paper on analysis (chapter 6). It was presented at a conference to celebrate Aristotle's 2400th birthday in Sofia, Bulgaria. The first two chapters were originally published in German. I am very grateful for the meticulous translations of Joshua Mendelsohn.

The four articles on Aristotle that follow those chapters are mainly the result of teaching these subjects for many years. The second part of the collection contains later studies in Hellenistic epistemology and ethics. After a lot of discussion and new contributions by other historians of philosophy who had begun to investigate Hellenistic philosophy in the preceding decades, I have been going beyond the earlier generation of Stoics and Epicureans and Sceptics, and also sometimes trying to correct my earlier views. The series ends with a, yet to be published, study of a work by Panaetius, a Stoic of the second century Lc, whose book on appropriate action Cicero used as a model for his last philosophical work, the De Officiis. At a time when Cicero was still being read as a philosopher in his own right, that book, dedicated to his son, became a vademecum for young gentlemen from the Renaissance until at least the end of the eighteenth century. It was clearly read as a general book of morality and manners, not as a work of Stoic philosophy, and I was interested in the changes, if any, in Stoicism that made this book enormously influential, quite apart from the influence of Stoic philosophy in other fields. <>

THE BRILL DICTIONARY OF ANCIENT GREEK, 2 VOLUME SLIPCASE: DELUXE EDITION, ENGLISH AND ANCIENT GREEK EDITION by Franco Montanari, Editors of the English Edition: Madeleine Goh & Chad Schroeder under the auspices of the Center for Hellenic Studies, Washington D.C.: Advisory Editors: Gregory Nagy & Leonard Muellner [Brill, 9789004298118]

THE BRILL DICTIONARY OF ANCIENT GREEK, DELUXE EDITION is also available as a single volume and online. This luxury edition offers the same high-quality content as the regular edition but is bound in two slimmer volumes with linen stamped covers and comes in a linen-clad box. **THE BRILL DICTIONARY OF ANCIENT GREEK, DELUXE EDITION** is the English translation of Franco Montanari s *Vocabolario della Lingua Greca*. With an established reputation as the most important modern dictionary for Ancient Greek, it brings together 140,000 headwords taken from the literature, papyri, inscriptions and other sources of the archaic period up to the 6th Century CE, and occasionally beyond.

Features:

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Translators:

Rachel Barritt-Costa, Michael Chappell, Michael Chase, Ela Harrison, Patrick Paul Hogan, Jared Hudson, Sergio Knipe, Peter Mazur, Serena Perrone, Chad Schroeder, Chris Welser

Review

"Franco Montanari is a giant in our field, and his Dictionary is a major leap forward for us." --Professor Gregory Nagy, Harvard University

"For a number of years now, scholars at ease in Italian have benefitted enormously from the riches, layout, concision, and accuracy of Professor Montanari's Vocabolario della Lingua Greca, with its added advantage of the inclusion of names. Hence classicists in general will welcome the English version of this very valuable resource." --Professor Richard Janko, University of Michigan

The layout is attractive and easy to use, and scholarly depth is exceeded only by the (still incomplete) Diccionario Griego-Espanol production overseen by the Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Cientificas, Madrid. Brill is releasing single-volume and online editions in addition to the boxed, two-volume deluxe set, to suit a variety of users' needs. For all collections supporting study of classics, religion, philosophy, and Greek language and literature. Summing Up: Essential. --P.E. Ojennus, CHOICE June 2016 vol. 53 no. 10

See Preview next

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Greek | English

The Brill Dictionary of Ancient Greek

Franco Montanari

Preview

The Brill Dictionary of Ancient Greek

, Genoa
English Edition edited by   and   ,
under the auspices of the Center for Hellenic Studies
Advisory Editors: , Harvard, and   , Brandeis

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***The Brill Dictionary of Ancient Greek* will also become available as an online resource.**

* This booklet is a preview of *The Brill Dictionary of Ancient Greek*.
  The format and paper used for this preview are not indicative of the final, printed version of the dictionary.

The Brill Dictionary
of Ancient Greek

By

Franco Montanari

Editors of the English Edition

Madeleine Goh (β–σ) & Chad Schroeder (α, υ–ω)

under the auspices of the

Center for Hellenic Studies, Washington D.C.

Advisory Editors

Gregory Nagy (*Harvard, CHS*)
Leonard Muellner (*Brandeis, CHS*)

BRILL

Visual Guide

Grammatical tag (*indecl.* = indeclinable)

Translation (bold text)

Entry — **A, α,** τό (ἄλφα) *indecl.* **alpha,** *first letter of the*

Comment (italic text)

Greek alphabet: ἐγώ εἰμι τὸ ἄλφα καὶ τὸ ὦ, ὁ

Example — πρῶτος καὶ ὁ ἔσχατος, ἡ ἀρχὴ καὶ τὸ τέλος I am the

Translation (regular text) — Alpha and the Omega, the first and the last, the

beginning and the end NT. *Apoc.* 22.13 ‖ *num.* α′

Source (New Testament, *Revelation* 22.13)

= 1; ͵α = 1,000.

ἀ- *and* ἁ- [*IE* *sm̥-; *Lat.* sem-, sim-, *Skt.* sa-; *see*

Etymology (*IE* = Indo-European;

the asterisk signals a reconstructed form;

ἅμα] *copulative prefix* (α ἀθροιστικόν) *express-*

Explication and commentary — *ing* togetherness: ἅ-πας all; ἄ-λοχος bed com-

Lat. = Latin, Skt. = Sanskrit.)

panion, wife | τὸ ἄλφα σημαίνει πολλαχοῦ τὸ ὁμοῦ
alpha often signifies 'together' PLAT. *Crat.* 405c

article, nominative feminine singular Lesbian — ἀ̈ *art. nom. fem. sg. Lesb., see* ὁ, ἡ, τό.

article, nominative feminine singular Doric — ἁ̇ *art. nom. fem. sg. Dor., see* ὁ, ἡ, τό.

relative pronoun, nominative feminine singular — ἅ̈ *rel. nom. fem. sg. Lesb., see* ὅς, ἥ, ὅ.
Lesbian

present indicative middle 3rd person singular — ἄαται HES. *Sc.* 101, *pres. ind. mid. 3. sg. of* ἄω.

of the verbs ἄω and ἀάω respectively — ἀᾶται *pres. ind. mid. 3. sg. of* ἀάω.

ἀγαθοδότης -ου [ἀγαθός, δίδωμι] **giver of good**
DIOTOG. (STOB. 4.7.62) *etc.* ◆ *adv.* ἀγαθοδότως

Reference entries

giving good EUSTR. *in EN.* 387.11 | **generously**
DION[21]. *CH.* 120B

[…]

adverbial form of ἀγαθοδότης as separate entry — ἀγαθοδότως *adv., see* ἀγαθοδότης.

ἀγαθοεργία *and* ἀγαθουργία -ας, ἡ [ἀγαθοεργός]

Variant form of the entry

good deed, benefit HDT. 3.154.1 IUL. 4.135d *etc.*
● *Ion.* -ίη.

Numbers on a black background demarcate uses — ἀγαθός -ή -όν ❶ *of pers.* **good:** Ⓐ **well-born, no-**

and senses of the word. Further distinctions of — **ble** IL. 21.109 *etc.* | *with* ἀφνειός IL. 13.664 | *with*

significance and usage are introduced by letters — εὐγενής SOPH. *fr.* 724.1; καλοὶ καὶ ἀγαθοὶ ἄνδρες

Source (*Iliad* 21.109; *etc.* = et cetera, when

in square boxes. — well-born men, aristocrats PLUT. *Demosth.* 4.1

the word is also found in other authors)

cf. καλοκἀγαθός Ⓑ **valiant, skilful, capable, ex-**
cellent: ἀ. βασιλεύς good king IL. 3.179; ἀ. θερά-
πων excellent servant IL. 16.165 ‖ ► *with acc. of*
relation: βοὴν ἀ. good at the battle-cry, of power-
ful voice IL. 2.408, *al.*; ἀ. γνώμην skilled at giving

Source (*Iliad* 2.408; *al.* = *alibi* (elsewhere),

when the word is found in other passages

of the same author)

Sign introducing the adverb — 934 ◆ *adv.* ἀγαθῶς **well** HP. *Off.* 4.7 ARISTOT. *Rh.*
1388b 6 *etc.* | *interject.* **good!, very well!** VT. *Reg.*

Sign introducing grammatical and — 1.20.7 ● *crasis* τὸ ἀ. > τἀγαθόν, τοῦ ἀ. > τἀγαθοῦ,

dialectal forms and graphic variants — οἱ ἀ. > ἁγαθοί, τὰ ἀ. > τἀγαθά ‖ *prodelision* ὦ ἀ.

Indicates transformation (in this case

τὸ ἀγαθόν becomes τἀγαθόν by crasis)

> ὦ' γαθέ (*instead of crasis* ὦγαθέ) ‖ *Lac.* ἀγασός
ARISTOPH. *Lys.* 1301 | *Lesb.* ἄγαθος | *Cypr.* ἀζαθός ‖
later compar. ἀγαθώτερος (*common. suppl.* ἀμεί-
νων *and* ἀμεινότερος, ἀρείων, βελτίων *and* βέλ-
τερος, κρείσσων, λῴων *and* λωίτερος, φέρτερος) |
later superl. ἀγαθώτατος (*common. suppl.* ἄρι-
στος, βέλτιστος *and* βέλτατος, κράτιστος, λῷστος,
φέριστος *e* φέρτατος).

Numbered homographous entries — **1. ἀκτή** -ῆς, ἡ **wheat,** *as flour or food* IL. 11.631
etc.; Δημήτερος ἀ. fruit of Demeter IL. 13.332, *al.*
[…]

2. ἀκτή -ῆς, ἡ [ἀκ-] Ⓐ **shore** (*of the sea*), **high**
cliffs, land's end, promontory IL. 24.97, *al.*

Α α

A, α, τό (ἄλφα) *indecl.* **alpha**, *first letter of the Greek alphabet:* ἐγώ εἰμι τὸ ἄλφα καὶ τὸ ὦ, ὁ πρῶτος καὶ ὁ ἔσχατος, ἡ ἀρχὴ καὶ τὸ τέλος I am the Alpha and the Omega, the first and the last, the beginning and the end NT. *Apoc.* 22.13 ‖ *num.* α′ = 1; ͵α = 1,000.

1. ἀ- (ἀν- *bef. a vowel*) [*IE* *n̥-; *Lat.* in-, *Skt.* a(n)-, *Goth.* un-] *privative prefix* (α στερητικόν) *with negative force, indicating lack or absence:* ἄ-φιλος without friends, ἀν-ώνυμος nameless ● *in poetry often* ᾱ *when followed by two short syllables*

2. ἀ- [*see* ἀ-] *intensive prefix* (α ἐπιτατικόν) *with strengthening force, related to the copulative* ἀ- (*see*) *but distinguished by the gramm.:* ἀ-τενής stretched tight, very intent

3. ἀ- *prothetic vowel, bef. a consonant or consonant cluster:* ἀλείφω, ἀστήρ (*or followed by a vowel after the disappearance of* F: ἀ-Fείδω > ἀείδω).

ἀ- *and* ἁ- [*IE* *sm̥-; *Lat.* sem-, sim-, *Skt.* sa-; *see* ἅμα] *copulative prefix* (α ἀθροιστικόν) *expressing* togetherness: ἅ-πας all; ἄ-λοχος bed companion, wife ǀ τὸ ἄλφα σημαίνει πολλαχοῦ τὸ ὁμοῦ alpha often signifies 'together' PLAT. *Crat.* 405c

ἁ *art. nom. fem. sg. Lesb., see* ὁ, ἡ, τό.

ἁ *art. nom. fem. sg. Dor., see* ὁ, ἡ, τό.

ἅ *rel. nom. fem. sg. Lesb., see* ὅς, ἥ, ὅ.

1. ἅ *rel. nom. acc. neut. pl., see* ὅς, ἥ, ὅ.

2. ἅ *rel. nom. fem. sg. Dor., see* ὅς, ἥ, ὅ.

ᾇ *rel. dat. fem. sg. Dor., see* ὅς, ἥ, ὅ.

ἇ *and redupl.* ἇ ἇ *interjec.* **ah!** *and* **ah! ah!**, *expressing pity, contempt, warning, amazement* ARCHIL. 109.1 (*doub.*) AESCHL. *Ag.* 1087, *al.* SOPH. *Ph.* 1300, *al.* EUR. *Hel.* 445, *al.* ARISTOPH. *Ran.* 759, *al. etc.*: ἇ, μὴ κόλαζε, πρέσβυ, τόνδε Ah! Do not rebuke him, old man SOPH. *OT.* 1147; *often with adj.* IL. 11.441, 17.443; ἇ δειλοί ah! miserable ones OD. 20.351 *etc.*; ἇ τάλας ah! unfortunate man SEM. 7.76; ἇ μάκαρ ah! blessed one THGN. 1013 BACCHYL. *Dith.* 16.30 HIPPON. 117.6; *also* ἇ ἇ ἇ *and* ἇ ἇ ἇ ἇ EUR. *Cycl.* 157 (*codd.*) ● *poet., rare in prose:* PLAT. *HipMa.* 295a.

ἇ ἇ *interjec.* **ah! ah!** COM. *CGFP* 239.17 EUR. *Rh.* 687 (*v.l.*) [GREG.] *ChrPat.* 637, 809, *al., see* ἇ ǀ σχετλιαστικὸν ἐπιφώνημα HSCH. α4; ἀπόφασις ἀρνητική PHOT. *Lex.* α1 SCH. PLAT. *HipMa.* 295a

ἃ ἅ (*or* ἇ ἇ) **ha! ha!**, *expressing laughter,* γέλωτα δηλοῖ HSCH. α2 PHOT. *Lex.* α2; *problematic attestation: conject. in* EUR. *Cycl.* 157 (*codd.* ἇ ἇ ἇ) *and* PLAT[.1] 16

ἀάατος -ον [*see* ἀάω ?] **inviolable** *or* **undeceiving**, *of the water of the Styx* IL. 14.271 (ᾱᾰᾱ) ‖ **unimpeachable, without error**, *thus* **decisive** *or* **terrible, fatal,** *of a contest* OD. 21.91, 22.5 (ᾰᾱᾰ) ǀ κάρτος ἀ. invincible in strength AP. 2.77 (ᾰᾱᾱ) **NB** *unc. signif. and etym.*

ἀαγής -ές [ἄγνυμι] **unbreakable, solid** OD. 11.575 THEOCR. 24.123 ● ᾱᾱ AP. 3.1251 QS. 6.596.

ἀαδής *see* ἀηδής.

ἀάζω [*see* ἄζω] *onomat.* **to exhale, breathe**, *only pres.* ARISTOT. *Pr.* 964a 16, *al.*

ἀάλιος -ον *doub. signf.* **confused, weak,** *or perhaps* **untouched** AP[.9] HSCH. PHOT. *Lex. etc.*

ἀάνθα, ἡ [οὖς, ἄνθος ?] **earring** ALCM. 127 ARISTOPH[.2] *fr.* 422

ἄαπτος -ον **untouchable, dreadful, invincible** IL.

1.567, *al.* HES. *Op.* 148, *al.* OPP. 5.629 ● *v.l.* ἄεπτος (*trag.*).

Ἀαρών, ὁ *Hebr. indecl.* Ⓐ **Aaron**, *brother of Moses* VT. *Ex.* 4.14, *al.* NT. *Lu.* 1.5, *al.* Ⓑ **ark** EPIPH. *Mens.* 4 (43.244C) (*perhaps for* Ἀρών).

ἄας (ἀᾶς ?) [*see* ἀάω] *gen. sg. of* * ἄα **tomorrow** *or* **the day after tomorrow** IL. 8.470 (ZENOD[.2]. *v.l.* for ἠοῦς, *see* ἠώς) HSCH.

ἄασα, ἀασάμην, ἀάσθην *aor. ind. act., mid., pass. of* ἀάω.

ἀασιφόρος -ον [ἀάω, φέρω] **bringing harm** HSCH.

ἀασιφρονία -ας, ἡ [ἀάω, φρήν] **folly** AP[.9]. PHOT. *Lex.* α14

ἀασιφροσύνη *see* ἀεσιφροσύνη.

ἀασίφρων *see* ἀεσίφρων.

ἀάσκω [ἀάω] **to harm** HSCH

ἀασμός -οῦ, ὁ [ἀάζω] **exhalation, breath** ARISTOT. *Pr.* 964a 18

ἄασπετος QS. 3.673, *al., see* ἄσπετος.

ἄασχετος IL. 5.892 *etc., see* ἄσχετος.

ἄαται *pres. ind. mid. 3. sg. of* ἀάω.

ἄαται HES. *Sc.* 101, *pres. ind. mid. 3. sg. of* ἄω.

ἀάτη -ης, ἡ HES. *Op.* 352 (*v.l.*) CALLIM. *fr.* 557, *see* ἄτη.

ἀατήρ -ῆρος, ὁ [ἀάω] **dishonorer** MAN[.1]. 4.56

1. ἄατος, *contr.* ἄτος -ον [ἄω] **insatiable**: ἄατος πολέμοιο insatiable in war HES. *Th.* 714 = ἄτος πολέμοιο IL. 5.388 (*v.l.* ἄτος); μάχης ἀ. insatiable in battle IL. 22.218, *al.*; ἄατος ὕβρις insatiable violence AP. 1.459 (ᾱᾱ)

2. ἄατος QS. 1.217, *see* ἄητος.

ἀάω ❶ *active* **to disturb, upset** (*the mind*), **deceive, harm** IL. 8.237 OD. 11.61, *al.* QS. 13.429; ἀασάν μ᾽ ἕταροι my companions ruined me OD. 10.68 ❷ *middle* Ⓐ = *active* IL. 19.91 Ⓑ *gener. intrans.* (*aor.*) **to be bewildered, blind**, *in one's mind* IL. 9.116, *al.* AP. 1.1333, *al.* QS. 5.422, *al.* NONN. *D.* 5.478, *al.* ❸ *passive* (*aor.*) **to be disturbed, upset, bewildered** IL. 19.136 OD. 4.503, *al.* HOM. 2.258 HES. *Op.* 283 AP. 4.412, *al.*; φρεσὶν ᾗσιν ἀασθείς bewildered in his mind OD. 21.301 ● *pr. only mid. 3. sg.* ἀᾶται (*contr.*) ‖ *aor.* ἄασα (ᾰᾱ IL. 8.237; ᾱᾱ OD. 10.68; ᾱᾱ MATR. *Conv.* 29, *conject.*) *contr.* ἄσα, *mid.* ἀασάμην *contr.* ἀσάμην, 3. *sg.* ἄᾱσ(σ)ατο IL. 9.537 ǀ *contr. inf. act.* ἄσαι AESCHL. *fr.* 417 ǀ *pt.* ἄσας SOPH. *fr.* 628 ‖ *aor. pass.* ἀάσθην ‖ *esp. epic, rare in trag.*

ἄβα *Lesb., see* ἥβη.

1. Ἄβα -ης, ἡ *Aba, city:* in Phokis (*sanctuary of Apollo*) HDT. 1.46.2, *al.* ARISTOT. *fr.* 601 *etc.* ǀ *in Arabia* DIOD. 32.10.2 ǀ *in Karia* STEPH[.1]. ǀ *in Lykia* SCH. SOPH. *OT.* 899 ● *also pl.* Ἄβαι -ῶν, αἱ.

2. Ἄβα -ης, ἡ *Aba, female name* STRAB. 14.5.10 ǀ *nymph* HARP[.1]. (*s.v.* Ἐργίσκη) *etc.*

Ἀβα(δ)δών, ὁ *Hebr. indecl.* **Abaddon**, *name of a fallen angel* NT. *Apoc.* 9.11

ἀβάδιστος -ον [βαδίζω] **untrodden, unploughed**, *the sea* SCH. OPP. 2.526

ἀβαθής -ές [βάθος] **not deep, without depth** GAL. 11.127 (*wounds*) ARR. *Tact.* 5.6 SEXT. *P.* 3.43 SIMP. *in Phys.* 572.25

ἄβαθρος -ον [βάθρον] **without foundation, immense** GEORGP. *Hex.* 131 CYR[.2]. (C)

Ἄβαι *see* Ἄβα.

Ἀβαῖος -ου, ὁ [Ἄβα 1] **Abaian, inhabit. of Aba** PAUS. 10.3.2, *al.* STEPH[.1]. (*s.v.* Ἄβαι) ● *also* Ἀβεύς STEPH[.1]. *l.c.*

ἀβάκ, ὁ *Hebr. indecl.* **byssus**, *fine linen cloth* VT. *Chr.* 1.4.21

Ἀβάκαινα -ης, ἡ **Abakaina**, *see* Ἀβακαινῖνος.

Ἀβακαινῖνος -η -ον [Ἀβάκαινον] **inhabit. of Abakainon** DIOD. 14.78.5, 19.110.4 STEPH[.1].

Ἀβάκαινον -ου, τό **Abakainon**, *city in Sicily* DIOD. 14.90.3 PTOL[.4]. *Geog.* 3.4.12 STEPH[.1].; *in Media* PTOL[.4]. *Geog.* 6.12.17 ● *also fem.* Ἀβάκαινα.

ἀβάκειον *see* ἀβάκιον.

ἀβακέω, *contr.* [ἀβακής] **to stay silent**, *out of amazement or surprise:* οἱ δ᾽ ἀβάκησαν πάντες they said nothing, kept quiet OD. 4.249 *cf.* AP[.9]. 2.16 HSCH. α54 PHOT. *Lex.* α21-22 **NB** *doub. signf.* (*perhaps* to fail to recognize: EUSTATH. 1494.60, *al.*) ● *aor. inf.* ἀβακῆσαι.

ἀβακέως *adv., see* ἀβακής.

ἀβακήμων -ονος [ἀβακέω] **speechless, silent** *or* **foolish** AELD. α3 HSCH. PHOT. *Lex., see* ἀβακής.

ἀβακής -ές [βάζω ?] *prob.* **speechless, silent, hence** **calm, tranquil:** ἀβάκην τὰν φρέν᾽ ἔχω I have a calm mind SAPPH. 120 (*cf.* HSCH. α51, 53) ◆ *adv.* ἀβακέως **foolishly** (*doub.*) PHOT. *Lex., see* ἀβακήμων. ● *Aeol. acc.* ἀβάκην SAPPH. *l.c.*

ἀβακίζομαι [ἀβακής] **to be kind, gentle**, *only pres. ptc.*: μεμάθηκά σε ... τῶν ἀβακιζομένων I have learned that you are one of the kind-hearted ones ANACR. 99.4

ἀβάκιον -ου, τό [ἄβαξ] Ⓐ **small abacus, small board**, *used for counting* (*with stones*) ALEXIS 15.3 POL. 5.26.13 ǀ **board**, *covered with sand, for drawing geometric figures* PLUT. *CMi.* 70.8 ǀ **board**, *for playing dice* POLL. 10.150 Ⓑ **plate** ₚCAIR.ZEN. 71.1 (III[a]) Ⓒ **stair** (*unc. signf.*), *dim. of* ἄβαξ L. *Sud.* α16 ● ἀβάκειον ₚCAIR.ZEN. *l.c.*

ἀβακίσκος -ου, ὁ [ἄβαξ] **small stone**, *for mosaic or inlay work* MOSCHIO[.1] (ATH. 5.207c)

ἀβακοειδής -ές [ἄβαξ, εἶδος] **shaped like a small board** SCH. THEOCR. 4.61

ἀβάκτης *and* ἀβάκτις, ὁ [*Lat.* ab actis] *indecl.* **secretary, clerk** NILANC. *Ep.* 2.207 (79.309B) (*title*) ₚFLOR. 71.509 (II[p])

ἄβακτος -ον **unfortunate** *or* **irreproachable** HSCH. PHOT. *Lex.* ‖ *as a proper name* Ἄβακτος, ὁ *Abaktos* [HDT.] 32 (*v.l.*) ● *v.l.* ἄβυκτος (*see*).

ἀβάκχευτος -ον [βακχεύω] Ⓐ **uninitiated in the Bacchic rites** EUR. *Bac.* 472 LUC. 17.3 NONN. *D.* 40.295 *etc.*; ἀ. θίασος un-Bacchic, *i.e.* joyless, band EUR. *Or.* 319 Ⓑ **without wine**, *of a table* NONN. *Ev.* 2.15

ἀβακχίωτος -ον [βακχιόω] **not of Bacchus, undrinkable**, *of rain* TIMOTH. 15.62

Ἀβάλας -ου, ὁ **Abalas**, *port in Calabria* APP. 17.112

ἀβάλε [ἄ, βάλλω] **oh that..., would that** ALCM. 111 *cf.* AP[.9]. 2.15 HSCH. PHOT. *Lex. etc.* ǀ ▸ *with unreal ind.* CALLIM. *fr.* 619 ǀ ▸ *with inf.* AP. 7.699.3 ‖ *cf.* βάλε.

ἀβαμά *Hebr. indecl.* **high place** VT. *Iez.* 20.29 ● *also* ἀββαμά *and* ἀβανά.

ἀβαμβάκευτος -ον [βάμβακος] **not seasoned, without spices**, *of food* PYRG. 1 (ATH. 4.143e) ● *v.l.* -κευτος.

ἀβάναυσος -ον [βάναυσος] **liberal, generous** CAP. 2.3.3 ◆ *adv.* ἀβαναύσως **with generosity** *or* **dignity** CLEM[.1]. *Ep.* 44.3

Ἄβανθις, ἡ *Abanthis, female name* ALCSAPPH. 35.8 SAPPH. 22.10 (*conject.*) ● *voc.* Ἄβανθι.

Ἄβαντες -ων, οἱ **Abantes**, *people of Euboia* IL. 2.536 HDT. 1.146.1 *etc.*

Ἀβαντία, ἡ HDN. 2.370.14, see Ἀμαντία.

Ἀβαντιάδης -ου, ὁ [Ἄβας] **descendant of Abas** BACCHYL. *Epin.* 11.40 AP. 1.78, *al. Dor. gen.* -δα.

Ἀβαντιάς -άδος, ἡ CALLIM. *H.* 4.20, see Ἀβαντίς.

Ἀβαντίδας -ου, ὁ **Abantidas,** *tyrant of Sikyon* PLUT. *Arat.* 2.2 PAUS. 2.8.2

Ἀβαντίς -ίδος, ἡ [Ἄβαντες] **Abantis, region of the Abantes,** *Euboia* EUR. *HF.* 185 STEPH[1].

ἄβαξ -ακος, ὁ [/ἄ/] [*Heb.* ' ābāq?] Ⓐ **abacus, board,** *for counting votes* ARISTOT. *Ath.* 69.1 | **board,** *sprinkled with sand, for drawing geometric figures* SEXT. *S.* 9.282 IAMBL[1]. *Protr.* 34, *al.* ‖ **small board,** *for playing dice* CARYST. 3 Ⓑ **plate, coarse** CRATIN. 93 Ⓒ *archit.* **abacus,** *of a column* VITR. 3.5.5 (*Lat.* abacus) | **square, panel** VITR. 7.3.10 ‖ **step,** *of the entrance to an arena or balustrade, in an amphitheatre* AAP. *PTh.* 36 (p. 262.7) *etc.*

ἀβάπτιστος -ον [βαπτίζω] Ⓐ **that does not sink,** *of a net* PIND. *P.* 2.80; ἀ. τρύπανον trepan with a guard (*to prevent it from drilling too deep*) GAL. 10.447 | *fig.* BAS. *epist.* 161.2.5 Ⓑ **that does not plunge itself** PLUT. 46.686b (*in drunkenness*) ‖ *Christ.* **not dipped** *in baptismal water,* **unbaptized** ATHANAS. *EpEnc.* 5 *etc.*

ἄβαπτος -ον [βάπτω] **not tempered,** *of iron* HSCH. L. *Sud*

Ἀβαρβάρη -ης, ἡ **Abarbareë,** *nymph* IL. 6.22 *etc.*

ἀβαρβάριστος -ον [βαρβαρίζω] **free of barbarisms** L. *Vind.* 294 ◆ *adv.* ἀβαρβαρίστως **without barbarisms** L. *EM.* 331.37

Ἀβαρβίνα **Abarbina,** *city in Hyrkania* PTOL[4]. *Geog.* 6.9.6

ἀβαρής -ές [βάρος] **not heavy, light** ARISTOT. *Cael.* 277b 19 *etc.;* ἀ. γῆ light earth MELEAG. (AP. 7.461.2) ‖ *fig.* **light, slight,** *of freedom of speech* PLUT. 4.59c | *of the pulse* ARCHIG. (GAL. 8.651) | **unburdensome** *to others, of pers.* NT. *Cor.* 2.11.9 ◆ *adv.* ἀβαρῶς **without pain or sorrow, without penalty** SIMP. *in Epict.* p. 85

ἄβαρις [βᾶρις] **without a boat, belonging to dry land** HSCH

Ἄβαρις -ιδος, ὁ **Abaris,** *male name* PIND. *fr.* 270 HDT. 4.36.1 PLAT. *Ch.* 158b *etc.* ● *Ion. gen.* -ιος | *acc.* -ιν.

ἀβαρκηνεῖν *Hebr. indecl.* **thorns, brambles** VT. *Iudic.* 8.7

Ἀβαρνιάς -άδος, ἡ ORPH. *A.* 487, see Ἄβαρνίς.

Ἄβαρνίς -ίδος, ἡ **Abarnis,** *city and prom. in Mysia* XEN. *Hel.* 2.1.29 AP. 1.932

Ἄβαροι -ων, οἱ *Lat.* **Avars,** *people near the Danube* AGATH. (AP. 16.72.3)

ἀβαρῶς *adv.,* see ἀβαρής.

Ἄβας -ντος, ὁ **Abas,** *male name* IL. 5.148 PIND. *P.* 8.55 *etc.* | *a river in the Caucasus* PLUT. *Pomp.* 35.3 *etc.*

ἀβασάνιστος -ον [βασανίζω] Ⓐ **not subjected to torture, not tortured** IOS. *BI.* 1.635 *etc.* Ⓑ **unexamined, untried, unverified, inaccurate** ANTIPHO 1.13 POL. 4.75.3; πίστις faith EUS[1]. *PE.* 1.1.11; ἀρετή virtue BAS. *epist.* 166.10 | *subst.* τὸ ἀβασάνιστον ignorance τῶν δογμάτων *of doctrine* ORIG. *Io.* 6.6.31 ◆ *adv.* ἀβασανίστως Ⓐ **without suffering** AESOP. 177; ἀ. ἀντιβλέπειν ταῖς ἀκτῖσι τοῦ ἡλίου to stare at the rays of the sun without suffering AEL. *NA.* 10.14 Ⓑ **without critical examination, without foundation, without care** THUC. 1.20.1 DION. *Comp.* 25.34 PLUT. 2.28c AL. *in Metaph.* 48.13; οὐκ ἀ. not without critical examination ATH. 1.2b

Ἀβασγία -ας, ἡ **Abasgia,** *region of the Abasgoi, in Kolchis* PROC[1]. *B.* 4.9.15, see Ἀβασγοί.

Ἀβασγοί see Ἀβασκοί.

ἀβασίλευτος -ον [βασιλεύω] **not ruled by a king** THUC. 2.80.5 XEN. *Hel.* 5.2.17 | *extens.* **without**

government, without rule PLUT. 74.1125d ‖ *Christ.* **against the kingdom** *of God* GREG. *Or.* 30.4.7

ἀβασκάνιστος -ον [βάσκανος] **free from envy, grudge** PLUT. 47.756d (*prob.f.l.* for ἀβασάνιστος).

ἀβάσκανος -ον [βάσκανος] Ⓐ **free of envy** *or* **jealousy** TEL. p. 56.1; ἀ. ὄμμα look free of envy GREG. *Carm.* 1.2.15.117 | *subst.* τὸ ἀβάσκανον lack of envy PHIL[2]. *Post.* 138 Ⓑ **deserving faith** IOS. *BI.* 1.192 ◆ *adv.* ἀβασκάνως **without envy** *or* **jealousy** MAUR. 1.16.6

ἀβάσκαντος -ον [βάσκανος] Ⓐ **protecting against spells** *or* **woes** DIOSC[2]. 3.91 (*v.l.*) Ⓑ **free from charms** *or* **evils, misfortunes,** *often with auspicious force* pGISS. 76.8 (IP) pPGM 13.802 HSCH. *etc.* Ⓒ *voc.* ἀβάσκαντε, *of pers.* AESOP. *Vit.* W 30: *signf. unclear* Ⓓ *bot. subst.* τὸ ἀβάσκαντον **mugwort,** *see* ἀρτεμισία [GAL.] *Lex.* 386.12 ◆ *adv.* ἀβασκάντως **safely from harm** *or* **envy** AP. 11.267.2 pOXY. 292.12 (IP)

Ἀβάσκαντος -ου, ὁ **Abaskantos,** *male name* GAL. 13.278, 14.177 *etc.*

Ἀβασκοί -ῶν, οἱ **Abaskoi,** *people of Kolchis* ARR. *Eux.* 11.33 *etc.* ● -σγοί PROC[1]. *B.* 4.3.18, *al.*

Ἄβασκος -ου, ὁ **Abaskos,** *river* ARR. *Eux.* 18.2

ἀβάστακτος -ον [βαστάζω] **that cannot be carried** PLUT. *Ant.* 16, 3 | **unbearable** ARR. *EpictD.* 1.9.11 (*v.l.*) ‖ *subst.* τὸ ἀβάστακτον **unbearableness,** *of the glory of god* DID[1]. *Trin.* 1.9 (3b), *al.* ‖ **not removed** iPERG. 8(3).37 ◆ *adv.* ἀβαστάκτως **unbearably** HSCH

ἀβατάς, ὁ CALLIM. *H.* 5.109, *Dor.* for ἡβητής.

Ἀβάτης -ου, ὁ **Abatean,** *a Kilikian wine* ATH. 1.33b

ἄβατον -ου, τό **abaton,** *plant (eaten pickled)* GAL. 6.623

ἀβατόομαι, *contr.* [ἄβατος] **to be devastated, made desolate** VT. *Ier.* 30.14 (*aor. subj. pass.* ἀβατωθῇ).

ἄβατος -ον [βαίνω] Ⓐ **where one cannot walk, inaccessible,** *of land* EMPED. *PStras.* a(ii).13; *of mountains* HDT. 4.25, *al.* SOPH. *OT.* 719 | **not fordable, impassable,** *of a river* XEN. *An.* 5.6.9; *of the sea* PIND. *N.* 3.21 | **impenetrable,** *of a forest* SOPH. *OC.* 675 STRAB. 5.4.5 ‖ **sacred, inviolable** SOPH. *OC.* 167, *al.* PLAT. *Criti.* 116c *etc.;* ἀβατώτατος ὁ τόπος the place is most inviolable (*of tombs*) ARISTOT. *Pr.* 924a 5 | *subst.* τὸ ἄβατον **sanctuary** THEOP[1]. 313 Ⓑ *fig.* **inaccessible,** *to the human senses, of the knowledge of god* CLEM. *Str.* 5.6.33.6 Ⓒ **untrodden, inviolate:** ἀ. ἐπὶ λειμῶνας on untrodden meadows EUR. *fr.* 740.4; οὐρανίη δ'οἶμος ἀ. inviolate celestial way ALPH. (AP. 9.526.4) | **virginal,** *of women* LUC. 63.6, 46.19 ‖ *fig.* **chaste, pure,** *of the soul* PLAT. *Phaedr.* 245a Ⓓ **desolate, deserted** VT. *Ier.* 12.10 | (*sc.* γῆ) **desert** VT. *Ier.* 33.18, *al.* Ⓔ **impeding the ability to walk,** *of gout* LUC. 74.36 ‖ *superl.* -ώτατος ARISTOT. *l.c.* ● *fem.* ἀβάτη EMPED. *l.c.* | *acc.* ἀβάταν PIND. *N.* 3.21.

Ἀβαύχας -ου, ὁ **Abauchas,** *male name* LUC. 57.61

ἀβαφής -ές [βάπτω] **not tempered,** see ἄβαπτος, *thus of wine* **without strength,** *diluted and pale in color* PLUT. 46.650b (*conject., v.l.* ἀναφής) ‖ **not dipped,** *of bread* ORIG. *Io.* 32.22.289 ● ἄβαφος -ον GLOSS. 2.215.9 (*prob.f.l.*).

ἀββᾶ and ἀββᾶς, ὁ [*Aram.* abba] *indecl.* **father** NT. *Mar.* 14.36, *al.* ‖ *of a monk* PALL. *L.* 22.6 | **abbot** EVAGR. *Or.* 108 ● *also* ἀβᾶ *and* ἀπᾶ.

Ἄβγαρος -ου, ὁ **Abgaros,** *male name* PLUT. *Cr.* 21.1 *etc.*

ἀβδέλυκτος -ον [βδελύσσομαι] **not execrable, pure** AESCHL. *fr.* 137 HSCH

Ἄβδηρα -ων, τά **Abdera,** *city in Thrace* HDT. 1.168 *etc.* | *in Spain* STRAB. 3.4.3 PTOL[4]. *Geog.* 2.4.7 ● Ἄβδαρα PTOL[4]. *l.c.*

Ἀβδηρίτης -ου, ὁ [Ἄβδηρα] **Abderite, inhabit. of Abdera** HDT. 8.120 *etc.* ‖ *prov.* **simpleton, fool** DEMOSTH. 17.23 HP. *epist.* 14.20

Ἀβδηρῑτικός -ή -όν [Ἄβδηρα] **of Abdera, like an Abderite,** *prov.* **foolish, stupid** LUC. 59.2 CIC. *ad Att.* 7.7.4

Ἀβδηρῖτις -ιδος, ἡ [Ἄβδηρα] **Abderitis, region of Abdera** THPHR. *HP.* 3.1.5

Ἀβδηρόθεν [Ἄβδηρα] *adv.* **from Abdera** LUC. 27.13

Ἀβδηρολόγος -ον [Ἄβδηρα, λέγω] **speaking like someone from Abdera, stupid** TAT. *Or.* 17.1

ἄβδης, ὁ **whip, lash** HIPPON. 130

ἀβέβαιος -ον [βέβαιος] **unsteady, moving,** *of the eye* ARISTOT. *HA.* 492a 12 ‖ **insecure, unstable** ALEXIS 283 (*sup.*) MEN. *Dysc.* 797 | **unstable,** *of the state of a disease* HP. *Aph.* 2.27; *of sleep* HP. *Coac.* 1.147 | **fickle,** *of fortune* DEMOCR. B 176; *of friendship* ARISTOT. *EE.* 1236b 19; *of pers.* DEMOSTH. 58.63; ἀ. αἰτία cause without basis EPIC. 4.134.6 ‖ **not valid,** *of an opinion* BAS[1]. *Or.* 4.1 (85.65B) ‖ *subst.* τὸ ἀβέβαιον **instability** HERACLIT[4]. 7; *of fortune* POL. 15.34.2 | ἐξ ἀβεβαίου from an insecure position ARR. *An.* 1.15.2 (*v.l.*) ‖ *superl.* -ότατος ◆ *adv.* ἀβεβαίως **changeably** MEN. *Georg. fr.* 1.4

ἀβεβαιότης -ητος, ἡ [ἀβέβαιος] **instability, inconstance,** *of fortune* POL. 30.10.1, *of pers.* DIOD. 14.9.8 PHIL[2]. *Deus* 27, *Somn.* 1.202

ἀβεβαίως -εως, ἡ [ἀβέβαιος] **instability** AN. *in Rh.* 117.34

ἀβέβηλος -ον [βέβηλος] **inviolable, sacred, pure** PLUT. *Br.* 20.6 *etc.*

ἀβει(ρ)ρά *Hebr. indecl.* **fortified city, citadel** VT. *Neem.* 1.1

Ἀβ(ε)ιρών, ὁ *Hebr. indecl.* **Abiram** VT. *Num.* 16.1 ● Ἀβίραμος -ου, ὁ IOS. *AI.* 4.19 *al.*

Ἄβελ, ὁ *Hebr. indecl.* **Abel,** *son of Adam* VT. *Gen.* 4. 2 NT. *Lu.* 11.51 ● Ἄβελος -ου, ὁ IOS. *AI.* 1.67.

Ἀβέλη see Ἄβιλα.

ἀβελτέρειος [ἀβέλτερος] HDN. 1.137.10, see ἀβέλτερος ● ἀβελτέριον *or* -τήριον PHOT. *Lex. s.v.* ἀβέλτερος L. *Sud. s.v.* ἀβέλτερος.

ἀβελτερεύομαι [ἀβέλτερος] **to play the fool** EPIC. 31.28.7 (*pres. ptc.*)

ἀβελτερία -ας, ἡ [ἀβέλτερος] **stupidity, fatuousness, ignorance** PLAT. *Theaet.* 174c, *al.* DEMOSTH. 19.98 PHILOD. *LL.* 87.9 *etc.* ‖ *Christ.* **corruption** *of human nature* [IO.] *HPasc.* 8.278C ● *s.times* -τηρία: *perhaps an ancient alternate*

ἀβελτεροκόκκυξ -υγος, ὁ [ἀβέλτερος, κόκκυξ] **fool** PLAT[1]. 64

ἀβέλτερος -α -ον [βέλτερος] **foolish, stupid** ARISTOPH. *Nub.* 1201, *al.* PLAT. *Phil.* 48c, *Rp.* 409c DEMOSTH. 19.338 MEN. *Epit.* 450, *al.* | *compar.* ἀβελτέστερος GAL. 18(2).337 | *superl.* -τερώτατος ◆ *adv.* ἀβελτέρως **foolishly** POLYSTR. *Cat.* 8 PLUT. 11.127e, 38.531c

Ἀβεντῖνος -ον **Aventine:** τὸ Ἀ. ὄρος the Aventine Hill STRAB. 5.3.7, *al.* = *simpl.* τὸ Ἀ. PLUT. *Rom.* 9.4, *al.*

ἀβέρβηλος -ον **large, heavy, awkward, stupid, unsteady** (*unc. signf.*) HSCH. L. *Sud*

Ἀβεύς see Ἀβαῖος.

Ἀβιά, ὁ *Hebr. indecl.* **Abia,** *male name* VT. *Chr.* 1.3.10 NT. *Mat.* 1.7, *Lu.* 1.5

Ἀβιαθάρ, ὁ *Hebr. indecl.* **Abiathar,** *male name* VT. *Reg.* 1.22.20 NT. *Mar.* 2.26 ● Ἀβιάθαρος -ου, ὁ IOS. *AI.* 7.110.

ἀβιαστικός -ον **irresistible** pPGM *Suppl.* 95.12 (VP)

ἀβίαστος -ον [βιάζω] Ⓐ **unforced, free, not subject to coercion** PLAT. *Tim.* 61a PORPH. (EUS[1]. *PE.* 5.10.10) Ⓑ **unaffected, natural,** *of style* DION. *Dem.* 38.6 Ⓒ **irresistible** SCH. OPP. 2.8 | **invincible** ISID[4]. *epist.* 3.148 ◆ *adv.* ἀβιάστως

without violence ARISTOT. *MA.* 703a 22 (*conject.*) AET[1]. 9.28

ἀβίβαστος -ον [βιβάζω] **inaccessible** *p*OXY. 1380.115 (II[P])

ἀβίβλης -ου, ὁ [βίβλος] **without books** TZ. *Hist.* 6.401, *al.*

Ἄβιλα -ων, τά **Abila**, *city (various)* POL. 5.71, *al. etc.* IOS. *AI.* 4.176, *al.* PTOL[4]. *Geog.* 5.15.22 *etc.* ● *also fem. sg.* Ἀβίλη, Ἀβέλη *or* Ἄβιλα, Ἄβελα.

Ἀβίλη -ης, ἡ **Abile**, *prom. in Mauritania* STRAB. 17.3.6

Ἀβιληνός -ή -όν [Ἄβιλα] **Abilene** *or* **of Abila**: *fem.* Ἀβιληνή, ἡ (*sc.* γῆ) **Abilene** *or* **Abila**, *in Coele-Syria* NT. *Lu.* 3.1

Ἀβίλλιος -ου, ὁ **Abillios**, *male name* PLUT. *Rom.* 14.8

Ἀβιλυκός -ή -όν [Ἀβίλυξ] **of Abilyx**: ἄκρα *prom.* SCYL. 111 = στήλη HSCH. *cf.* Ἀβύλη *and* Ἀβίλυξ, ἡ.

1. Ἀβίλυξ -υγος, ὁ **Abilyx**, *male name* POL. 3.98.2, *al.*

2. Ἀβίλυξ -υκος, ἡ **Abilyx**, *prom. in Mauritania* STRAB. 3.5.5

Ἄβιοι -ων, οἱ **Abioi**, *Scythian people* IL. 13.6 *etc.*; *interpreted also as adj.* ἄβιοι **without fixed subsistence, nomads** SCH. IL. 13.6d STRAB. 1.1.6 STEPH[1]., *see* Γάβιοι.

1. ἄβιος -ον [βίος] Ⓐ **unlivable, unbearable**: ἄ. βίος life that cannot be lived LEON. (AP. 7.715.3); αἰσχύνη ἄ. unbearable shame PLAT. *Leg.* 873c Ⓑ **without livelihood, poor** LUC. 77.15.3 *etc.* ǁ **nomad**, *people without fixed subsistence or agriculture* (*cf.* Ἄβιοι) SCH. IL. 13.6d STRAB. 1.1.6 NICOL[1]. 104 STEPH[1]. Ⓒ [ἀ- *intens.*, βίος] **wealthy** ANTIPHO[1] B 43 SCH. IL. 13.6d

2. ἄβιος -ον Ⓐ [ἀ- *cop.*, βιός] **archer** NICOL[1]. 104 STEPH[1]. Ⓑ [ἀ- *priv.*, βιός] **not using a bow** HSCH

3. ἀβῖος -ον [βία] **not violent** AP[9]. HSCH. STEPH[1].

ἀβίοτος -ον [ἄβιος 1] **unlivable, making life unbearable** EUR. *Hip.* 821, *Ion* 764 (*conject.*) AP. 9.574.2 (*v.l.*)

Ἀβιούδ, ὁ *Hebr. indecl.* **Abihud**, *male name (various)* VT. *Chr.* 1.8.3 NT. *Mat.* 1.13 *etc.*

Ἀβίραμος *see* Ἀβ(ε)ιρών.

Ἀβισάρης -ου, ὁ **Abisares**, *Indian king* AEL. *NA.* 16.39 *etc.*

ἀβίωτον -ου, τό [ἀβίωτος] **hemlock** DIOSC[2]. 4.78a, *cf. al.*

ἀβιωτοποιός -όν [ἀβίωτος, ποιέω] **making life unbearable** SCH. EUR. *Hip.* 821 (*gloss. of* ἀβίοτος).

ἀβίωτος -ον [ἄβιος 1] **not to be lived, unbearable** EUR. *Alc.* 242 ARISTOPH. *Pl.* 969 PLAT. *Pol.* 299e; ἀβίωτον ᾤετ' ἔσεσθαι τὸν βίον αὐτῷ he thought that life would be unbearable for him DEMOSTH. 21.131 | ▸ *abs.* ἀβίωτον (*sc.* ἐστί) it is impossible to live PLAT. *Rp.* 407a = ἀβίωτον ζῆν PLAT. *Leg.* 926b; ἀβίωτον ἡμῖν life is unbearable for us EUR. *Ion* 670 ǁ *subst.* τὸ ἀβίωτον **hemlock** DIOSC[2]. 4.78a ◆ *adv.* ἀβιώτως **so as to make life insupportable, unbearably**: αἰσχρῶς καὶ ἀ. ὑπ'ὀδύνης διετέθησαν (some) have been reduced through grief to a shameful and unbearable situation PLUT. *Sol.* 7.4; ἀ. ἔχειν to be unlikely to live PLUT. *Di.* 6.2

ἀβλάβεια -ας, ἡ [ἀβλαβής] Ⓐ **harmlessness, innocuity**: *Lat.* innocentia CIC. *Tusc.* 3.8.16 Ⓑ **freedom from harm, safety, peace** PLUT. 73.1090b; ἐπ' ἀβλαβείᾳ so that there be no harm AESCHL. *Ag.* 1024, *see* ἀβλαβία.

ἀβλαβέως *adv., see* ἀβλαβής.

ἀβλάβής -ές [βλάβος] Ⓐ **not causing harm, harmless, innocent** AESCHL. *Eum.* 285 PLAT. *Rp.* 375b; ▸ *with dat.* AESCHL. *Eum.* 474 POL. 11.29.10 EUS[2]. 1 = ▸ *with gen.* PORPH. *Aph.* 32 = ▸ *with* πρός *and acc.* PHILOD. *Piet.* 65.7 p. 95 ǁ **preventing** *or* **averting harm** THEOCR. 24.98

Ⓑ **not suffering harm, unhurt, unscathed, safe** SAPPH. 5.1 PIND. *O.* 13.27, *al.* AESCHL. *Sept.* 68 PLAT. *Rp.* 342b XEN. *Cyr.* 4.1.3 POL. 5.110.11 PLOT. 2.1.4 Ⓒ *signf. specified by verb*: ἀ. τοῦ δρᾶσαί τε καὶ παθεῖν without harm in acting or suffering, *i.e.* without causing or suffering harm PLAT. *Leg.* 953b ǁ *compar.* ἀβλαβέστερος | *superl.* -έστατος ◆ *adv.* ἀβλαβῶς Ⓐ **without causing harm, without causing offence, without injuring** ARR. *An.* 6.19.2 *al.*; ἀ. τῇ ξυμμαχίᾳ ἐμμένειν respect the alliance without violating the terms THUC. 5.47.8; ἀ. τῇ γαστρί without hurting the stomach METROD[1]. 41 Ⓑ **without suffering harm, in safety, with impunity** HLD. 10.8.1 | ἀβλαβέως: ἀ. ζώειν to live in safety THGN. 1154 | *superl.* -έστατα: ἀβλαβέστατα ἑαυτῷ without causing any harm to oneself XEN. *Hip.* 6.1 ● *Ion. gen.* -βέως | *dat.* -βί HDN. *Epim.* 254.11 | *Aeol. acc.* ἀβλάβην SAPPH. *l.c.*

ἀβλαβία -ας, ἡ [ἀβλαβής] **harmlessness** PHILOD. *Piet.* 28.20 p. 148; ἐπ'ἀβλαβίῃσι νόοιο with innocence of mind, without bad intentions HOM. 4.393, *see* ἀβλάβεια.

Ἀβλάβιος -ου, ὁ **Ablabios**, *male name* AP. 7.559.2 *etc.*

ἀβλαβύνιον -ου, τό **rope made of Egyptian papyrus**, *perhaps a magical object* HSCH

ἀβλαβῶς *adv., see* ἀβλαβής.

ἄβλαπτος -ον [βλάπτω] **harmless** NIC. *Th.* 488 ◆ *adv.* ἀβλάπτως **without injuring** ORPH. *H.* 64.10

ἀβλαστέω, *contr.* [ἀβλαστής] **not to produce leaves**, *of a plant* THPHR. *CP.* 1.20.5 ǁ **not to germinate**, *of seeds* THPHR. *Ign.* 44

ἀβλαστής -ές [βλαστάνω] **not growing**, *of a plant* THPHR. *HP.* 2.2.8; *of a seed that does not germinate* THPHR. *HP.* 8.11.7 | **unfruitful**, *of places* THPHR. *CP.* 2.4.1 GEOP. 9.9.4 (*comp.*) ǁ *fig.* **not productive** *or* **causing to grow**, *of virtue* PLUT. 3.38c; *of wealth* THEM. *Or.* 18.221d | *compar.* -έστερος.

ἀβλάστητος -ον [ἀβλαστής] **not sprouting** THPHR. *CP.* 1.3.2 (*v.l.*)

ἄβλαστος -ον [ἀβλαστής] **not growing**, *of fiber* THPHR. *HP.* 1.2.5

ἀβλασφήμητος -ον [βλασφημέω] **not subject to blame**, *of Christ* GREG[1]. *Mart.* 46.776A *etc.* ǁ *subst.* τὸ ἀβλασφήμητον **immunity from blame** SOCR[3]. *HE.* 5.19.9 (*PG* 67.617A).

ἀβλαυτος -ον [βλαύτη] **barefoot, without slippers** OPP[1]. 4.369 PHILOSTR[1]. 5.2 HSCH

ἀβλεμέως *adv., see* ἀβλεμής.

1. ἀβλεμής -ές [ἀ- *intens.*, βλεμεαίνω] **strong** NIC. *Al.* 82 ◆ *adv.* ἀβλεμέως **without moderation** PANYAS. 17.8

2. ἀβλεμής -ές [ἀ- *priv.*, βλεμεαίνω] **weak** SCH. NIC. *l.c.* HSCH. EUSTATH. 892.5 | *fig.* **without force** AN. *Subl.* 29.1

ἀβλεννής -ές [βλέννα] Ⓐ **without fluid** AP[9]. 51.32 (*gloss.* ἄχυμος) Ⓑ *ichthyol.* DIPH[2]. (ATH. 8.355f), *see* ῥαφὶς *and* βελόνη.

ἀβλεπτέω, *contr.* [ἄβλεπτος] *act.* **to overlook, disregard** POL. 30.6.4 HDN. 1.433.24 | **to commit an error of valuation** EUS[1]. *HE.* 10.8.8 *etc.* ǁ *subst. ptc. pass.* τὰ ἀβλεπτηθέντα disregarded things HP. *Dec.* 13

ἀβλέπτημα -ατος, τό [ἀβλεπτέω] **omission, error** ARR. *EpictD. fr.* 12 HSCH. L. *Sud.* = POL. *fr.*

ἀβλεπτής -ές [*see* ἄβλεπτος] **overlooking** HSCH

ἄβλεπτος -ον [βλέπω] Ⓐ **unknowable, invisible, obscure** SCH. OPP. 1.778 HDN. 1.433.23; *of life after the resurrection* GREG[1]. *Res.* 46.88B Ⓑ **blind** SOPHRON. *Mir.* 69 (87.366oD) Ⓒ *astr.* **independent, unconnected**, *of stars* (*Lat.* ableptus) FIRM. 2.22.1, 2.23.7

ἀβλέφαρος -ον [βλέφαρον] **without eyelashes** ANTIPHIL. (AP. 11.66.2)

ἀβλεψία -ας, ἡ [βλέπω] Ⓐ **blindness, inability to know** HIEROCL[3]. *in CA.* 25.17, *with gen.* POLYSTR. *Cat.* 9 | **blindness** *of the mind, in mystic perception* ORIG. *Cels.* 6.31.6 *etc.* ǁ *fig.* **thoughtlessness** SUET. *Caes.* 5.39.1 Ⓑ **invisibility** *p*PGM 13.267

Ἄβληρος -ου, ὁ **Ableros**, *Trojan warrior* IL. 6.32

ἀβλής -ῆτος [βάλλω] **not shot**, *of an arrow not used* IL. 4.117 AP. 3.279

ἄβλητος -ον [βάλλω] **not hit**, *by an arrow* IL. 4.540 HSCH

ἀβληχής -ές [βληχή] **without bleatings** ANTIP[1]. (AP. 9.149.5)

ἀβληχρής -ές [ἀβληχρός] **weak, mild** NIC. *Th.* 885

ἀβληχροποιός -όν [ἀβληχρός, ποιέω] **rendering weak** EUSTATH. 1676.57

ἀβληχρός -ά -όν [βληχρός] **weak, delicate, light**, *of walls* IL. 8.178; *of the hand of Aphrodite* IL. 5.337; *of natural death, not violent* OD. 11.135; *of mild pain* EPIC. 6.4.3; *of sleep* AP. 2.205; *of fever* PROCL[1]. *B.* 2.22.16

ἀβοᾱτί [βοή] *Dor. adv.* **without being called, spontaneously** PIND. *N.* 8.9 ● ἀβοητί *v.l. in* EUPHOR. 54.2.

ἀβόᾱτος *Dor., see* ἀβόητος.

ἀβοηθησία -ας, ἡ [ἀβοήθητος] **helplessness** VT. *Sir.* 51.10

ἀβοήθητος -ον [βοηθέω] Ⓐ **incapable of being helped, incurable, without remedy** HP. *Acut.* (Sp.) 33 THPHR. *HP.* 9.16.6 POL. 1.81.5, *al.* PLUT. 29.454d *etc.* ǁ **helpless, without resources**, *of pers.* VT. *Sal.* 12.6 PLUT. *Arat.* 2.3 EPICT. *Ench.* 2.4 Ⓑ **unserviceable, useless, ineffective** PLUT. 4.61b DIOD. 20.42.2 ◆ *adv.* ἀβοηθήτως **without the possibility of help, irreparably** [Diosc[2].] *Th.* 12 GAL. 5.122

ἀβοηθί [βοή] *adv.* EUPHOR. 59.2 (*doub.*), *see* ἀβοηθήτως.

ἀβοητί *see* ἀβοατί.

ἀβόητος -ον [βοάω] Ⓐ **not announced, not spread by voice, in silence** NONN. *Ev.* 12.173, 18.62; *of fame* *i*IG 2-3²12764.3 (II[a]) Ⓑ **without lament** *i*GVI 1539.1 (II[P]) = EPIGR. 2.200.2 ● *Dor.* ἀβόᾱτος.

Ἀβοιόκριτος -ου, ὁ **Aboiokritos**, *Boiotarch* PLUT. *Arat.* 16.1

ἀβολέω, *contr., fut.* ἀβολήσω ǁ *poet. aor.* ἀβόλησα | *inf.* ἀβολῆσαι HSCH.; **to meet, come together** AP. 2.770 CALLIM. *fr.* 24.5, 619

ἀβολητύς -ύος, ἡ [ἀβολέω] **meeting, coming together** HSCH

ἀβολήτωρ -ορος, ὁ [ἀβολέω] **one who meets, witness** (*unc. signf.*) ANTIM. 76 HSCH

ἀβόλιστος -ον [βολίζω] **unfathomable**, *with a sounding line (of ocean water)* *or* **unsinkable, that does not sink to the bottom** (*of bodies*) [ATHANAS.] *Quaest.* 136

ἀβολιτίων -ίονος, ἡ [*Lat.* abolitio] **cancellation, annulment, abatement**, *of a lawsuit* PALL. *Io.* 14.46 (*mss.* ἀβουλητ-).

ἀβόλλα -ας, ἡ [*Lat.* abolla] **cloak** [Arr.] 6

Ἄβολλα -ης, ἡ **Abolla**, *city in Sicily* HDN. 1.55.34 STEPH[1]. ǁ *name of a river* HDN. 2.652.37, *see* Ἄβολος.

Ἀβολλαῖος -α -ον [Ἄβολλα] **inhabit. of Abolla** HDN. 2.872.22 STEPH[1].

ἀβόλλης -ου, ὁ [*see* ἀβόλλα] **cloak**, *of wool* *p*OXY. 2593.24 (II[P]) *etc.*

1. ἄβολος -ον [βόλος] **that has not lost its first teeth**, *of a colt* SOPH. *fr.* 408 PLAT. *Leg.* 834c ARISTOT. *HA.* 576b 15 *etc.* ǁ *subst. neut. pl.* τὰ ἄβολα **unlucky throw**, *of dice* POLL. 7.204 ● *f.l. for* ἄβωλ- *in pap.*

2. ἄβολος -ου, ἡ [*see* ἀβόλλης] **cloak**, *of wool* ALCIPHR. 3.40.2 (*conject.*)

Ἄβολος -ου, ἡ **Abolos**, *river in Sicily* PLUT. *Tim.* 34.1, *see* Ἄβολλα.

ἀβόρβορος -ον [βόρβορος] **without filth** SOPH. *fr.* 367 (*mss.* ἀβαρ-).

Ἀβοριγῖνες -ων, οἱ **Aborigines** DION. 1.9.1 *etc.*

ἄβορος -ον [βιβρώσκω] **greedy, gluttonous** SCH. Il. 8.178

ἀβόσκής -ές [βόσκω] **unfed, fasting** NIC. *Th.* 124

ἀβόσκητος -ον [ἀβόσκής] **without pasture, not grazed** BABR. 45.10 (*of a mountain*) PAUS². α38

ἀβότανος -ον [βοτάνη] **without vegetation** [IO.] *Salt.* 8.40B

Ἄβοτις, ἡ **Abotis**, *city in Egypt* HEC. 313 STEPH¹.

Ἀβοτίτης -ου, ὁ [Ἄβοτις] **inhabit. of Abotis** STEPH¹. ● *also* Ἀβοτιεύς STEPH¹.

ἄβοτος -ον [βόσκω] HSCH., *see* ἀβόσκητος.

ἀβουκόλητος -ον [βουκολέω] *fig.* **unobserved, disregarded**: ἀβουκόλητον τοῦτ᾽ ἐμῷ φρονήματι **this does not concern me** AESCHL. *Suppl.* 929

Ἄβουλα -ας, ἡ **Aboula**, *city in Spain* PTOL⁴. *Geog.* 2.6.61

ἀβουλεί [ἄβουλος] *adv.* **inconsiderately** HDN. *Epim.* 255.7 PHIL². *Leg.* 3.187 (*mss.* -λί) L. *Sud.*, *cf.* ἀβούλως.

ἀβούλευτος -ον [βουλεύω] **inconsiderate, without reflection** OR. *Sib.* 12.220 HIPPOL. *Noët.* 10 (p. 251.18; *PG* 10.817A) ◆ *adv.* ἀβουλεύτως **without thinking, inconsiderately** VT. *Mac.* 1.5.67

ἀβουλέω, *contr.* [ἄβουλος] *aor. inf.* ἀβουλῆσαι HSCH. | *ptc.* ἀβουλήσας DCASS. 55.9.8; **to be unwilling** *abs.* PLAT. *Rp.* 437c; ἀβουλοῦντος αὐτοῦ **without his wishes** PLUT. 72.1076d; οὐκ ἀβουλῶν **not without wishing** PLOT. 6.8.13 | ▶ *with acc. and inf.* PLAT. *epist.* 347a ‖ **to disapprove of** ▶ *with acc.* DCASS. *l.c.*

ἀβουλησία -ας, ἡ [ἀβούλητος] **lack of will** CYR¹. *Trin.* 2.456a, *al.*

ἀβούλητος -ον [ἀβουλέω] Ⓐ **involuntary, without the intervention of will** GAL. 2.610 (*heartbeat*) *etc.* Ⓑ **not according to wish** *or* **desire, unpleasant** PLAT. *Leg.* 733d (*interpol.*) PHIL². *Cher.* 29, 34 *al.* DION. 5.74.3 PLUT. 44.599b *etc.* Ⓒ **inconsiderate** CYR¹. *epist.* 5².22B ◆ *adv.* ἀβουλήτως **involuntarily** GAL. 1.66, *al.* PORPH. *Abst.* 4.15 PLUT. 46.63ic SEXT. *P.* 1.19

ἀβουλί *see* ἀβουλεί.

ἀβουλία -ας, ἡ [ἄβουλος] Ⓐ **thoughtlessness, ill-advisedness** PIND. *O.* 10.41 HDT. 7.9. γ, *al.* AESCHL. *Sept.* 750 (*pl.*) EUR. *Med.* 882 PLAT. *Crat.* 420c MEN. *fr.* 714.8; ἐξ ἀβουλίας πεσεῖν **to fall through senselessness** SOPH. *El.* 398 Ⓑ **irresolution, indecision** DEMOCR. B 119 THUC. 5.75.3 ● *Ion.* -ίη.

Ἀβουλίτης -ου, ὁ **Aboulites**, *male name* PLUT. *Alex.* 68.7

ἄβουλος -ον [βούλομαι] Ⓐ **thoughtless, inconsiderate, senseless** SOPH. *Ant.* 1026 MEN. *Peric.* 812 THUC. 1.120.5 PLUT. *Di.* 43; ἄ. ἔργον **senseless work** SOPH. *OC.* 940 Ⓑ **heedless, indifferent** ▶ *with dat.* SOPH. *Tr.* 140 ‖ *pejor.* **ill-disposed, hostile** SOPH. *El.* 546 ‖ *compar.* -ότερος | *superl.* -ότατος ◆ *adv.* ἀβούλως **thoughtlessly** HDT. 3.71.3, *al.* EUR. *Rh.* 761 ANTIPHO 1.23 *etc.* ‖ *superl.* -ότατα.

ἀβούτης -ου [βοῦς] **without oxen**, *thus* **poor** HES. *Op.* 451 (*gen.* -τέω) PLUT. *fr.* 66

Ἄβρα -ας, ἡ **Abra**, *female name* PLUT. *Cic.* 28.3

ἄβρα -ας, ἡ [*Aram.* habra?; *or see* ἁβρός] **favorite** *or* **devoted slave, maidservant** MEN. *fr.* 58, 371, 453 VT. *Ex.* 2.5, *al.* PLUT. *Caes.* 10.3 LUC. 57.14 CHARIT. 1.41 | *fm. com. stock character* POLL. 4.154

Ἀβρ(α)άμ, ὁ *Hebr. indecl.* **Abraham**, *man* VT. *Gen.* 17.5, *al.* NT. *Mat.* 3.9, *al.* AP. 1.65.1 *etc.* ● Ἄβραμος -ου, ὁ IOS. *AI.* 1.148 *etc.*

Ἀβραδάτας -ου *and* -α, ὁ **Abradatas**, *male name* XEN. *Cyr.* 5.1.2 LUC. 37.20 *etc.*

Ἁβράθοος -ου, ὁ **Habrathoos**, *male name* NONN. *D.* 26.153

ἀβραμιαῖος -α -ον [Ἀβρ(α)άμ] **of Abraham, of the stock of Abraham** VT. *Mac.* 4.9.21, *al.* ATHANAS. *Ar.* 3.40 *etc.* ‖ **similar to Abraham** ATHANAS. *Hist.* 45 *etc.* ● ἀβρααμίθιος *v.l. in* VT. *Mac.* 4.18.1.

Ἀβραμίδης -ου, ὁ [Ἀβρ(α)άμ] **Abramides**, *descendant of Abraham* GREG. *Carm.* 1.1.18.72, 2.2.3.318

Ἀβράμιος -ου, ὁ **Abramios**, *male name* PALL. *L.* 53 SYN. *Ep.* 99

ἀβράμις -ίδος, ἡ *ichthyol.* **mullet**, *fish* OPP. 1.244 ATH. 7.312b (ἀβρ-) ● *also* ἀβραβίς *in pap.* | *dim.* ἀβραμίδιον -ου, τό XENOCR¹. 78.

Ἀβραμῖτις -ιδος, ἡ [Ἀβρ(α)άμ] **Abramitis**, *descendant of Abraham* VT. *Mac.* 4.18.20

Ἄβραμος *see* Ἀβρ(α)άμ.

Ἀβρασάξ *indecl.* **Abrasax**, *name given by the Basilidian heretics to the first of the 365 heavens, namely:* α´ =1 + β´ =2 + ρ´ =100 + α´ =1 + σ´ =200 + α´ =1 + ξ´ =60 *equals* 365, *the same as the number of days in a year* HIPPOL. *Haer.* 7.26.6 *POxy.* 1566.4 (IVP) *etc.*

ἄβραστος -ον [βράζω] **not boiled** [GAL.] *Lex.* 389.8 SCH. ARISTOPH. *Tz. Ran.* 553a

Ἀβρέας -ου, ὁ **Abreas**, *male name* ARR. *An.* 6.9.3

ἄβρεκτος -ον [βρέχω] **not wet, dry** HP. *Aff.* 52 CALLIM. 384.34 GAL. 14.97 PLUT. 23.381c MOSCH. 2.114 NONN. *D.* 17.129

Ἀβρεττηνή -ῆς, ἡ **Abrettene**, *region of Mysia* STRAB. 12.8.9 STEPH¹.

Ἀβρεττηνός -ή -όν **inhabit. of Abrettene** STEPH¹., *see* Ἀβρεττηνή.

ἀβρίζομαι [ἁβρός] **to be refined, be adorned** (*doub.*) HSCH. L. *EGud.*

ἀβρῑθής -ές [βρῖθος] **of no weight**: βάρος οὐκ ἀβριθές **a not inconsiderable weight** EUR. *Suppl.* 1125

ἄβρικτος -ον [βρίζω] **wakeful** *or* **hard of hearing** (*doub.*) HSCH. L. *Sud.*, L. *EM.* 4.48

ἀβρίξ [βρίζω] *adv.* **watchfully, as s.o. wakeful** HSCH. L. *EM.* 4.49

Ἀβριόριξ, ὁ **Abriorix**, *male name* PLUT. *Caes.* 24.2 (*v.l.*)

ἀβροβάτης -ου [ἁβρός, βαίνω] **with an effeminate gait** AESCHL. *Pers.* 1073 ‖ ὁ Ἀβροβάτης **Habrobates**, *male name* BACCHYL. *Epin.* 3.48 (*conject.*)

ἁβρόβιος -ον [ἁβρός, βίος] **living effeminately** BACCHYL. *Dith.* 18.2 PLUT. *Demetr.* 2.3 *etc.*

ἁβροβόστρυχος -ον [ἁβρός, βόστρυχος] **with effeminate hair** Tz. *Hist.* 1.233, *al.*

ἁβρόγοος -οον, *contr.* ἁβρόγους -γουν [ἁβρός, γόος] **lamenting effeminately** AESCHL. *Pers.* 541

ἁβρόδαις -αιτος [ἁβρός, δαίς] **of refined foods** ARCHESTR. 61.1

ἁβροδίαιτα -ης, ἡ [ἁβροδίαιτος] **refined lifestyle, soft living** L. *Sud.* AG. *Bek.* 322

ἁβροδιαιτάομαι [ἁβροδίαιτος] **to have a refined lifestyle** SCH. ARISTOPH. *Pax* 1227b

ἁβροδιαιτέω, *contr.* [ἁβρός, διαιτάω] **to live dissolutely** THEOD⁸. *epist.* 11.33

ἁβροδίαιτος -ον [ἁβρός, δίαιτα] **of refined, effeminate lifestyle** AESCHL. *Pers.* 41 GAL. 13.949 | *subst.* τὸ ἁβροδίαιτον **effeminacy** THUC. 1.6.3 *etc.* ◆ *adv.* ἁβροδιαίτως **luxuriously** PHIL². *Agr.* 154

ἁβροείμων -ον [ἁβρός, εἷμα] **dressed effeminately** COM. *CAF* 1275

Ἁβροζέλμης -ου, ὁ **Habrozelmes**, *male name* XEN. *An.* 7.6.43

Ἁβρόθοος -ου, ὁ **Abrothoos**, *male name* NONN. *D.* 26.153 (*v.l.* Ἀβράθοος).

Ἄβροια -ας, ἡ **Abroia**, *female name* LUC. 39.4

Ἀβροκόμας -ου, ὁ **Abrokomas**, *male name* XEN. *An.* 1.3.20, *al.* ● *Ion.* -ης HDT. 7.224.2.

ἁβροκόμης -ου [ἁβρός, κόμη] **with luxuriant foliage**, *of palm* EUR. *Ion* 920 ‖ *of pers.* **with long** *or* **abundant hair** ORPH. *H.* 56. 2 NONN. *D.* 13.91, *al.* MELEAG. (AP. 12. 256.9)

ἁβρόκομος -ον NONN. *D.* 13.456 MAN¹. 2.446, *see* ἁβροκόμης.

ἁβρόμιος -ον [Βρόμιος] **without Bacchus** AP. 6.291.5

ἁβρομίτρης -ου [ἁβρός, μίτρη] **with elegant diadem** HSCH

ἄβρομος -ον Ⓐ [ἁ- 2, βρόμος] **rowdy, noisy** IL. 13.41 Ⓑ [ἀ- 1, βρόμος] **noiseless, silent**, *of a wave* AP. 4.153 QS. 13.68 Ⓒ COSM¹. 11.12 *etc.*, *see* ἄβρωμος.

ἁβρόπαις -παιδος [ἁβρός, παῖς] **of tender children** *inscribed epigr. from Ptolemais in Riv. Fil.* 1937 p. 54.

ἁβροπάρθενος -ον [ἁβρός, παρθένος] **made up of delicate maidens**, *of a chorus* LYR. *Al.* 22

ἁβροπέδιλος -ον [ἁβρός, πέδιλον] **of delicate** *or* **elegant footwear**, *of Eros* MELEAG. (AP. 12.158.2)

ἁβροπενθής -ές [ἁβρός, πένθος] **suffering languidly**, *of Persian women* AESCHL. *Pers.* 135 ● *v.l.* ἀκρόπενθ-.

ἁβρόπεπλος -ον [ἁβρός, πέπλος] **with delicate robes** *I*ZPE 14.21

ἁβροπέτηλος -ον [ἁβρός, πέτηλον] **with soft leaves** IO². 2.2

ἁβρόπηνος -ον [ἁβρός, πήνη] **of delicate texture** LYC. 863

ἁβρόπλουτος -ον [ἁβρός, πλοῦτος] **luxuriant, rich**, *of hair* EUR. *IT.* 1148

ἁβρόπους -ποδος [ἁβρός, πούς] **delicate-footed** HSCH. (*s.v.* σαυκρόπους)

ἁβρός -ά -όν [*see* ἄβρα; *see* ἥβη ?] Ⓐ **delicate, tender** HES. *fr.* 339 SAPPH. 44.7, *al.* ANACR. 37.1, *al.* SOPH. *Tr.* 523 PLAT. *Symp.* 204c *etc.*; *of the body and limbs* PIND. *O.* 6.55 EUR. *Tr.* 506 ‖ **alluring** CHARIT. 5.3.6 ‖ **magnificent, splendid**, *of things* PIND. *I.* 8.66, *al.* ‖ **precious**, *of speech* HERMOG. *Id.* 344.25 Ⓑ **soft, effeminate**, *of the pop. of Asia* HDT. 1.71.4, *al. etc.*; ἁβρὰ παθεῖν **to live softly** SOL. 18.4 THGN. 474 ‖ *adv. neut. sg.* EUR. *Med.* 1164; *pl.* [Anacr.] 43.3, 44.5; ἁβρὰ βαίνων **stepping delicately** EUR. *Tr.* 821 ‖ *compar.* -ότερος | *superl.* -ότατος ● *Lesb.* ἄβρος ‖ *poet. fem. also* -ός ‖ *gener. poet.* ἀβ- EUR. *Med.* 1164, *Tr.* 821, *not ep., rare in Att. prose* ◆ *adv.* ἁβρῶς **delicately, softly, delightfully** STESICH. 35.2 ANACR. 93. 2 EUR. *Med.* 830 *etc.* ‖ *compar.* -ότερον HLD. 1.17.1 ‖ *Aeol. adv.* ἄβρως SAPPH. 2.14.

ἁβροσαρκία -ας, ἡ [ἁβρός, σάρξ] **physical delicacy** GEORGP. *Carm.* 1.100

ἁβροσία -ας, ἡ **luxury** SCH. EUR. *Or.* 350, *see* ἁβροσύνη.

ἁβροστάγής -ές [ἁβρός, στάζω] **drenched in perfumes** L. *Sud*

Ἀβρόστολα -ων, τά **Abrostola**, *city in Phrygia* PTOL⁴. *Geog.* 5.2.23

ἁβροσύνη -ης, ἡ [ἁβρός] SAPPH. 58.25 (*acc.* -αν) EUR. *Or.* 349 *etc.*, *see* ἁβρότης.

ἁβρόσφυρος -ον [ἁβρός, σφυρόν] **with delicate ankles** LYR. *Al.* 3.3

ἁβροτάζω [*see* ἁμαρτάνω] **to miss**, *only aor. subj. act. i. pl.*: μή πως ἁβροτάξομεν ἀλλήλοιιν ἐρχομένω **lest we miss each other as we go** IL. 10.65

ἁβρόταξις -εως, ἡ [ἁβροτάζω] **error** HSCH. EUSTATH. 789.52

ἁβροτήμων -ον [ἁβροτάζω] **erring** HSCH

ἁβρότης -ητος, ἡ [ἁβρός] Ⓐ **splendor, luxury, softness, delicacy** PIND. *P.* 11.34 XEN. *Cyr.* 8.8.15 *etc.*; ἁβρότατος ἔπι μεγάλας **in a state of great**

luxury PIND. *P.* 8.89; οὐκ ἐν ἁβρότητι κεῖσαι you are in no position to play the delicate one EUR. *IA.* 1343 [E] *rhet.* **grace, charm**, *of style* HERMOG. *Id.* 311.21 ● *Dor.* ἁβρότας.

ἁβρότῑμος -ον [ἁβρός, τιμή] **fine, of great value**, *of sails* AESCHL. *Ag.* 690 (*lyr.*)

ἀβροτόνινος -η -ον [ἀβρότονον] **made of abrotonum** DIOSC[2]. 1.50

ἀβροτονίτης -ου [ἀβρότονον] **scented with abrotonum**: οἶνος wine, *medicinal vermouth* DIOSC[2]. 5.5[2]

ἀβρότονον (*and* ἀβρότονος) -ου, τό *bot.* **abrotonum**, *aromatic plant* THPHR. *HP.* 6.7.3 *etc.*; ἀ. ἄρρεν male abrotonum GAL. 11.804; ἀ. θῆλυ female abrotonum DIOSC[2]. 3.24 ● *rar. fem.* -ος EPIPH. *Haer.* 51.1.1.

Ἁβρότονον -ου, ἡ **Habrotonon**, *female name* PLUT. *Them.* 1.1 *etc.*

ἄβροτος -ον *and* -ος -η -ον [βροτός] [A] **immortal, divine, holy**, *of night* IL. 14.78 (*fem.* -η *v.l.* ἀμβρότη) [B] **without men, deserted**, *of solitude* AESCHL. *Pr.* 2 (*fem.* -ος: *v.l.* ἄβατον) ● *see* ἄμβροτος.

ἁβροφυής -ές [ἁβρός, φύω] **of delicate nature** PHILOD. (*AP.* 9.412.4, *conject.*).

ἁβροχαίτης -ου [ἁβρός, χαίτη] **with abundant hair** AP. 9.525.2 [ANACR.] 43.8 ● *Dor.* -ας.

ἀβροχέω, *contr.* [ἄβροχος] *aor.* ἠβρόχησα ‖ *pf.* ἠβρόχηκα; **not to be inundated**, *of fields* *P*FAY. 33.13 (II*P*) *etc.*

ἀβροχία -ας, ἡ [ἄβροχος] **lack of rain, drought** VT. *Sir.* 35.24, *al.* IOS. *AI.* 8.324 *etc.* ‖ **lack of inundation** *of fields* *P*SB 8858.15 (III*a*)

ἀβροχίζω *pf. ptc.* ἠβροχισκώς *see* ἀβροχέω *P*FAM.TEBT. 52.10 (III*P*) *etc.*

ἀβροχικός -ή -όν *P*FLOR. 286.23 (VI*P*), *see* ἄβροχος.

ἀβροχίτων -ωνος [ἁβρός, χιτών] **with soft blankets** AESCHL. *Pers.* 543 ‖ **with soft tunic** AP. 9. 538.1 *I*LINDOS 197f5 (-κιτ-)

ἄβροχος -ον [βρέχω] **not wet, dry** AESCHN. 2. 21 *etc.* ‖ [▶ *with gen.* NONN. *D.* 1.75 ‖ **waterless, dry, arid** EUR. *Hel.* 1485 CALLIM. *H.* 1.19 AP. 1.58.2 ‖ **not inundated** *P*HAMB. 188.8 *al.* (III*a*) ● *adv.* ἀβρόχως **without getting wet** LIB. *Or.* 11.217

ἄβρυνα -ων, τά [*see* ἀβρύνω ?] **mulberries** PARTH. (ATH. 2.51f)

ἁβρυντής -οῦ, ὁ [ἀβρύνω] **fop, dandy** ADAM. 1.23

ἁβρύνω [ἁβρός] *impf.* ἥβρυνον PHILOSTR. *VS.* 2 (p. 567.16), *mid.* ἡβρυνόμην ‖ *aor. mid.* (ἐν)ηβρυνάμην EUSTATH. 1961.3 ❶ *active* **to make delicate, charming**; μὴ γυναικὸς ἐν τρόποις ἐμὲ ἅβρυνε do not soften me in womanly wise AESCHL. *Ag.* 919; εἰς γάμον ἀβρύναις may you deck (her) out for marriage LEON. (AP. 6.281.4: *corr. in* ἀδρ-) ❷ *middle and passive* **to be haughty, put on airs, be fastidious** AESCHL. *Ag.* 1205 SOPH. *OC.* 1339 PLAT. *Ap.* 20c ‖ ἀβρύνεσθαί τινι to boast, brag, be proud of sthg. EUR. *IA.* 858 XEN. *Ag.* 9.2 CLEAR[1]. 48

ἅβρωμα -ατος, τό [ἀβρύνω] **woman's garment** HSCH

ἄβρωμος -ον [βρῶμος] **free of bad odor** DIPH[2]. (ATH. 8.355b) *etc.* ● *gener. v.l.* ἄβρομος.

Ἅβρων -ωνος, ὁ **Habron**, *male name* DEMOSTH. 43.19 *etc.*

Ἁβρώνιχος -ου, ὁ **Habronichos**, *male name* HDT. 8.21 THUC. 1.91 *etc.*

ἀβρώς -ῶτος [βιβρώσκω] **not devoured** *by mosquitoes* P[1]. (AP. 9.764.5)

ἀβρωσία -ας, ἡ [ἄβρωτος] **lack of food, fast** POLL. 6.39 ‖ **abstinence** EUR. *Hip.* 136 (*conject.*)

ἄβρωτος -ον [βιβρώσκω] [A] **inedibile, uneatable** ARISTOT. *HA.* 505b 20, *al.* MEN. *Dysc.* 452 PLUT. 46.733e *etc.* ‖ **not eaten** PORPH. *Abst.* 2.27 *etc.* | **not devoured** (*by moths*), *of wood* THPHR. *HP.*

5.1.2 [E] *of pers.* **fasting, without food** SOPH. *fr.* 967 CHARIT. 6.3

ἀβστινατεύω **to disinherit** IUST. *Nov.* 89.3 *P*ANT. 3.153.8a5 (VI)

Ἀβῡδηνός -ή -όν [Ἄβυδος] **of Abydos** HDT. 7.44 *etc.* ‖ ἡ Ἀβυδηνή (*sc.* χώρα) territory of Abydos XEN. *Hel.* 4.8.35

Ἀβῡδόθεν [Ἄβυδος] *adv.* **from Abydos** IL. 4.500, *see* Ἄβυδος.

Ἀβῡδόθι [Ἄβυδος] *adv.* **at Abydos** IL. 17.584, *see* Ἄβυδος.

Ἀβῡδοκώμης -ου, ὁ **Abydokomes**, *nickname for a sycophant* ARISTOPH. *fr.* 755 ● *v.l.* Ἀβυδηκώμης *and* -κόμος.

Ἄβῡδος -ου, ἡ **Abydos**, *city in the Troad* IL. 2.836 *etc.* | *in Egypt* PLUT. *Caes.* 69.7, 23.359a *etc.* ● *masc.* ὁ Ἄ. ATH. 12. 525b *etc.*

ἀβύθητος -ον SCH. OPP. 2.216, *see* ἄβυθος.

ἀβῠθος -ον [βυθός] **bottomless** PLAT. *Parm.* 130d (*v.l.*)

ἄβυκτος -ον AG. *Bek.* 323, *see* ἄβακτος.

Ἀβύλη στήλη *prob.* **prom. of Abyla** PTOL[4]. *Geog.* 4.1.6, *cf.* Ἀβιλυκός.

ἀβύρσευτος -ον [βύρσα] **untanned** Sch.D Il. 2.527

ἀβυρτάκη -ης, ἡ **spicy sauce** PHERECR. 195 *etc.*

ἀβυρτακοποιός -οῦ, ὁ [ἀβυρτάκη, ποιέω] **making spicy sauce** DEM[3]. 1.5

ἀβυρτακώδης -ες ἀβυρτάκη **like spicy sauce** HSCH. (*s.v.* νεοδάρτης)

ἀβύσσαιος -ον [ἄβυσσος] **of** *or* **from an abyss** ALCH. 403.1 *al.* (*v.l.* ἐναβύσσ-).

ἀβυσσικός -οῦ [ἄβυσσος] **abyssal** HIPPOL. *Haer.* 5.14.1

ἄβυσσος -ον [βυσσός] [A] **bottomless, profound, unlimited, boundless** HDT. 2.28.3 AESCHL. *Suppl.* 1058 *etc.*; ἄτης ἄβυσσον πέλαγος unfathomable sea of ruin AESCHL. *Suppl.* 470; ἀ. πλοῦτος immeasurable wealth AESCHL. *Sept.* 950 [B] *subst.* ἡ ἄβυσσος **great depth, abyss**, *before creation* VT. *Gen.* 1.2, *al.; depths of the underworld* NT. *Lu.* 8.31, *Apoc.* 9.1; *realm of the dead* NT. *Rom.* 10.7 *etc.* ‖ *depths of the sea, thus* **sea, ocean** VT. *Is.* 44.27 ‖ *fig.* ἀ. ... ἀγαθότητος abyss of goodness, *of God* THEODORET[1]. *QuGen.* 1.8 ‖ **infinity** *P*PGM 3.554

ἀβωλόκοπος -ον [βῶλος, κόπτω] **not hoed** POLL. 1.246

ἄβωλος -ον [βῶλος] **not mixed with earth, pure, clean** (*of grains*) *P*TEBT. 370.13 (II-III*P*) *etc.*

Ἀβώνου, τεῖχος, τό **Abonuteichos**, *city in Paphlagonia* LUC. 42.9 *etc.*

ἀβώρ (= ἀFώρ) HSCH., *Lac. for* ἠώς.

ἄβως *and* ἀβῶς [βοή] **speechless** HSCH. L. *EM.* 4.54

ἀγ *apoc. of* ἀνά *before* κ, γ, χ (*see* ἀνά).

ἀγα- [*cf. IE.* *ṃg-?, *see* μέγα; *or cf. Av.* aš-aojah?] *intens. pref.* **very**

ἀγά *Dor., see* ἀγή.

ἀγᾶ *Dor. see* ἄγη.

ἀγάασθαι, ἀγάασθε *ep., see* ἄγαμαι, ἀγάομαι.

Ἀγαβάτας -ου, ὁ **Agabatas**, *Persian* AESCHL. *Pers.* 959

Ἄγαβος (*and* Ἄγαβος) -ου, ὁ **Hagabos**, *prophet* NT. *Apost.* 11.28, *al.*

ἀγαγεῖν *aor*[2]*. inf. act. see* ἄγω.

Ἀγαγύλιος -ου, ὁ **Agagylios**, *name of a month in Thessaly* *I*IG 9.2.554.5

ἀγάζω [ἄγαμαι ?, ἄγαν ?] *act. only pres.* ‖ *impf. mid.* ἠγαζόμην ORPH. *A.* 64 ‖ *fut. mid.* ἀγάσομαι *and aor. mid.* ἠγασάμην *see* ἄγαμαι ❶ *active* [A] **to exalt**, *perhaps in* τὰ θεῶν μηδὲν ἀγάζειν do not exalt (too much) the things of the gods *or* nothing in excess even as regards the gods (*oth.* do not inquire *or* submit with resignation) AESCHL. *Suppl.* 1061 | **to admire**

THEODOS. *Can.* 17.20 | **to get irritated** HSCH. [E] **to be trusting** *or* **daring** SOPH. *fr.* 968 (*doub.*) ❷ *middle* **to honor, venerate, adore** PIND. *N.* 11.6 HSCH. L. *EM.* α12 | **to be irritated** OD. 10.249 (*v.l.*), 20.16 (*v.l.* GAL. 5.305) HSCH. *ecc.*

ἀγαθάγγελος [ἀγαθός, ἄγγελος] **bringing good news** NICOL[1]. 66.13 (*trans. of Persi.* οἱ βάρας).

ἀγαθαίνω SIMP. *in Epict.* P. 70, *see* ἀγαθύνω.

Ἀγάθανωρ -ορος, ὁ **Agathanor**, *male name* AP. 7.554.1

ἀγαθαρχία -ας, ἡ [ἀγαθός, ἄρχω] **beginning** *or* **source of the good**, *of the Trinity* DION[21]. *DN.* 3.1

Ἀγαθαρχίδας -ου, ὁ **Agatharchidas**, *male name* THUC. 2.83.4 *etc.*

Ἀγαθαρχίδης -ου, ὁ **Agatharchides**, *of Knidos, historian and geographer* LUC. 12.22

ἀγαθαρχικός -ον [ἀγαθαρχία] **that is the beginning** *or* **source of goodness**, *of the Trinity* DION[21]. *DN.* 3.1, *al.*

Ἀγαθαρχίς -ίδος, ἡ **Agatharchis**, *female name* AP. 6.352.4

Ἀγάθαρχος -ου, ὁ **Agatharchos**, *male name* THUC. 7.25.1, 70.1 *etc.*

ἀγαθείκελος -ον [ἀγαθός, εἴκελος] **like the good** HDN. *Epim.* 187.1

ἀγάθεος *Dor. see* ἠγάθεος.

Ἀγαθιάς -άδος [Ἀγαθίας] **of Agathias** AGATH. (*AP.* 6.80.1) ● *v.l.* Ἀγαθιάς.

Ἀγαθημερίς -ίδος, ἡ **Agathemeris**, *female name* *I*IG 9.2.545.20 (I*P*) *etc.*

ἀγαθήμερος -ον [ἀγαθός, ἡμέρα] **of good days** AGATHANG. *Greg.* 99 (p. 50)

Ἀγαθήμερος -ου, ὁ **Agathemeros**, *male name* *I*IG 12.5.772 | *geographer* GGM 2.471 *etc.*

ἀγαθηφόρος -ον, ὁ [ἀγαθός, φέρω] **bearer of the good** HIPPOL. *Haer.* 5.7.28

Ἀγαθίας -ου, ὁ **Agathias**, *historian and poet* AP. 6.79 *title* L. *Sud.* ● *Ion.* -ίης.

ἀγαθίδιον -ου, τό [ἀγαθίς] **small ball of thread** HSCH.

ἀγαθικός -ή -όν **earnest, honest** EPICHAR. 99 EUDEM[3]. 2a.15 *ecc., see* ἀγαθός.

Ἀγάθῖνος -ου, ὁ **Agathinos**, *male name* XEN. *Hel.* 4.8.10 *etc.*

ἀγάθιον -ου, τό **poultice** PAEG. 2.57

Ἀγαθίππη -ης, ἡ **Agathippe**, *female name* (*myth.*) PLUT. *Fluv.* 7.1 *etc.*

ἀγαθίς -ίδος, ἡ **ball of thread, skein** PHEREC. 148 AEN. 31.19 *etc.* ‖ *prov.* ἀγαθῶν ἀγαθίδες skeins of goods, *i.e.,* great prosperity COM. *CAF* 827 EPICHAR. 226

Ἀγαθόβουλος -ου, ὁ **Agathoboulos**, *philosopher* LUC. 9.3 *etc.*

ἀγαθογνώμων -ον [ἀγαθός] **of good opinions** HEPH. 3.45.4

ἀγαθογονία -ας, ἡ [ἀγαθός, γίγνομαι] **creation of good** IAMBL[1]. *Nic.* 82.22

ἀγαθοδαιμονέω, *contr.* [ἀγαθοδαίμων] *astr.* **to occupy the position of the good genius** VETT. 62.20, *al. etc.*

ἀγαθοδαιμόνημα -τος, τό [ἀγαθοδαίμων] **position of the good genius** HEPH. 2.11.4, 11

ἀγαθοδαιμονητικός -ή -όν [ἀγαθοδαιμονέω] *astr.* **belonging to the position of the good genius** IUL[1]. (*CCA* 5.184)

ἀγαθοδαιμονισταί -ῶν, οἱ [ἀγαθοδαίμων] **moderate drinkers**, *i.e.,* who drink only to the good genius ARISTOT. *EE.* 1233b (*v.l.* -νιασταί).

ἀγαθοδαίμων -ονος, ὁ [ἀγαθός, δαίμων] [A] **good genius**, *astr.* **position of the good genius, in the heavens towards the east** VETT. 128.22 [E] **agathodaimon**, *Egyptian serpent* PHILUM. *Ven.* 29

ἀγαθοδοσία -ας, ἡ [ἀγαθός, δίδωμι] **action of giving good** AL. *in Metaph.* 707.19

ἀγαθοδότης -ου [ἀγαθός, δίδωμι] **giver of good** DIOTOG. (STOB. 4.7.62) *etc.* ◆ *adv.* ἀγαθοδότως **giving good** EUSTR. *in EN.* 387.11 | **generously** DION[21]. *CH.* 120B

ἀγαθοδότις -ιδος [ἀγαθός, δίδωμι] **lavishing good** DID[1]. *Trin.* 2.14 (126a) (*the Trinity*) *etc.*

ἀγαθοδότως *adv.*, see ἀγαθοδότης.

ἀγαθόδωρος -ον [ἀγαθός, δῶρον] **generous, munificent** MAX[2]. *Amb.* 215a

ἀγαθοειδής -ές [ἀγαθός, εἶδος] **like good** PLAT. *Rp.* 509a *etc.* ‖ **having the form of good** PLOT. 1.7.1, *al.* IUL. 4.135a IAMBL[1]. *Protr.* 3 *etc.* ‖ *compar.* -έστερος | *superl.* -έστατος ◆ *adv.* ἀγαθοειδῶς **in a good manner, benevolently** DION[21]. *CH.* 257C, *al. etc.*

ἀγαθοειδῶς *adv.*, see ἀγαθοειδής.

ἀγαθοεργασία -ας, ἡ [*see* ἀγαθοεργία] **doing good** PROCL. *Aed.* 1.7.5 (*unc.*)

ἀγαθοεργέω and **ἀγαθουργέω**, *contr.* [ἀγαθοεργός] *aor.* ἠγαθούργησα; **to do good, benefit** NT. *Tim.* 1.6.18, *Apost.* 14.17 *etc.*

ἀγαθοεργία and **ἀγαθουργία** -ας, ἡ [ἀγαθοεργός] **good deed, benefit** HDT. 3.154.1 IUL. 4.135d *etc.* • *Ion.* -ίη.

ἀγαθοεργός and **ἀγαθουργός** -όν [ἀγαθός, ἔργον] **doing good deeds, beneficent** PLUT. 68.1015e IUL. 4.144d DAMASC. *Isid.* 296 PROCL. *Theol.* 122, 133 ‖ *pl.* οἱ Ἀ. **Agathourgoi**, *Spartans sent on missions abroad* HDT. 1.67.5 ◆ *adv.* ἀγαθουργῶς **beneficently** DION[21]. *EH.* 3.11 (441B), *al.*

ἀγαθοθέλεια -ας, ἡ [ἀγαθοθελής] **desire of good** L. *Sud.* ‖ **good will** NILANC. *Ep.* 1.298 (79.192B).

ἀγαθοθελής -ές [ἀγαθός, θέλω] **benevolent** HEPH[1]. 2.18 GLOSS

Ἀγαθόκλεια -ας, ἡ **Agathokleia**, *female name* PLUT. *Cl.* 33.2 *etc.*

Ἀγαθοκλῆς -έους, ὁ **Agathokles**, *male name* PLAT. *Lach.* 180d *etc.*

ἀγαθολογέω, *contr.* [ἀγαθός, λέγω] **to speak kindly, politely** EUSTATH. 378.30, *al.* ◆ *aor[1]. ptc. act.* ἀγαθολογήσας EUSTATH. 1236.46.

Ἀγαθονίκη -ης, ἡ **Agathonike**, *female name* AP. 1.18.1

Ἀγαθόνικος -ου, ὁ **Agathonikos**, *male name* AGATH. (AP. 7.574.1)

ἀγαθοποιέω, *contr.* [ἀγαθοποιός] *fut.* ἀγαθοποιήσω PHOT. *Bibl.* 221b19 ‖ *aor.* ἠγαθοποίησα [A] **to do good, act well** NT. *EPe.* 1.2.20 SEXT. *S.* 11.70 *etc.* | ▸ *with acc.* **to benefit**: τινα s.o. NT. *Lu.* 6.33 = ▸ τινι VT. *Mac.* 2.1.2; ▸ τινά τι s.o. in sthg. VT. *Num.* 10. 32 [B] **to make good** PLOT. 6.7.22 *etc.* ‖ **to exert a beneficent influence** PROCL. *Ptol.* 292 | *astr.* **to make propitious** VETT. 194.4 IUL[1]. (CCA 5.1.185: *pass.*).

ἀγαθοποίησις -εως, ἡ [ἀγαθοποιέω] EUSTR. *in EN.* 17.25, see ἀγαθοποιία.

ἀγαθοποιία -ας, ἡ [ἀγαθοποιός] **action of doing good** NT. *EPe.* 1.4.19 (*v.l.*) *etc.* ‖ **favorable influence** PTOL[4]. *Tetr.* 38

ἀγαθοποιός -όν [ἀγαθός, ποιέω] **doing good, beneficent, acting well** VT. *Sir.* 42.14 NT. *EPe.* 1.2.14 PPGM 13.1028 | ▸ *with gen.* PPGM 8.16; *name of Osiris* PLUT. 23.368b *etc.* ‖ **creating good** DAMASC. *Pr.* 33 | *astr.* **exerting a beneficent influence** PTOL[4]. *Tetr.* 38, *al.* ARTEMID. 4.59

ἀγαθοπρεπής -ές [ἀγαθός, πρέπω] **suiting the good** DION[21]. *DN.* 2.1, *al.* ◆ *adv.* ἀγαθοπρεπῶς **in a way suiting the good, benignly** DION[21]. *CH.* 121B

ἀγαθοπρεπῶς *adv.*, see ἀγαθοπρεπής.

ἀγαθοπτικός -όν [ἀγαθός, ὁράω] **capable of seeing good** DION[21]. *DN.* 4.23

ἀγαθόρρυτος -ον [ἀγαθός, ῥέω] **from which good**

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flows, *of the divine source* SYN. *H.* 9.129 • *gen.* -οιο.

ἀγαθός -ή -όν ❶ *of pers.* **good:** [A] **well-born, noble** IL. 21.109 *etc.* | *with* ἀφνειός IL. 13.664 | *with* εὐγενής SOPH. *fr.* 724.1; καλοὶ καὶ ἀγαθοὶ ἄνδρες well-born men, aristocrats PLUT. *Demosth.* 4.1 *cf.* καλοκἀγαθός [B] **valiant, skilful, capable, excellent:** ἀ. βασιλεύς good king IL. 3.179; ἀ. θεράπων excellent servant IL. 16.165 ‖ ▸ *with acc. of relation:* βοὴν ἀ. good at the battle-cry, of powerful voice IL. 2.408, *al.*; ἀ. γνώμην skilled at giving advice SOPH. *OT.* 687; ἀ. πᾶσαν ἀρετὴν endowed with every virtue PLAT. *Leg.* 899b; ἀ. τὰ πολέμια valiant in the things of war HDT. 9.122.3; ἀ. τὰ πολιτικά politically adroit PLAT. *Gorg.* 516c, *al.* = ▸ *with dat.:* πολέμῳ ἀ. brave in war XEN. *Oec.* 4.15 | ▸ ἀ. εἴς τι skilled at, fit for, capable in sthg. PLAT. *Alc.1.* 125a = ▸ πρός τι PLAT. *Rp.* 407e = ▸ περί τι LYS. 13.2; ἀ. κατὰ πάντα capable, fit for everything THUC. 4.81.3 | ▸ *with inf.:* ἀ. μάχεσθαι fit for fighting HDT. 1.13.16; ἀ. ἱππεύεσθαι skilled at horsemanship HDT. 1.79.3; ἀ. ἱστάναι practiced at weighing PLAT. *Prot.* 356b [C] **good**, *morally* THGN. 438 SOPH. *El.* 1082 PLAT. *Rp.* 409c *etc.*; πιστὸς κἀγαθός faithful and good SOPH. *Tr.* 541; δίκαιος κἀγαθός just and honest SOPH. *Ph.* 1050; καλὸς κἀγαθός fair and good, *i.e.*, respectable, excellent, perfect man (*common., see* καλὸς *and* καλοκἀγαθός): οἱ καλοὶ καὶ ἀγαθοὶ good citizens PLUT. *Cic.* 11.2 ‖ *iron.:* τὸν ἀγαθὸν Κρέοντα the good Creon SOPH. *Ant.* 31 [D] **propitious, favorable, benevolent:** ὁ ἀ. δαίμων the good genius ARISTOPH. *Ve.* 525; ἡ θεὸς ἀγαθή the good goddess, *at Rome* (*Lat.* bona dea) PLUT. *Caes.* 9.4 *etc.*; ἀγαθῇ τύχῃ good fortune PLUT. 15.198a [E] *of courtesy:* ὦ' γαθέ my good man, my good friend PLAT. *Prot.* 311a *etc.*; *crasis* ὠγαθέ AESCHL. *fr.* 78c ❷ *of things* **good:** [A] **excellent, perfect:** δαὶς ἀγαθή excellent meal OD. 15.507; ἀγαθὴ κουροτρόφος (Ithaca) good rearer of youths OD. 9.27 [B] **suitable, useful** ▸ *with dat.:* ἀ. ἀνδρὶ suitable for a man OD. 17.347; ἀ. τῇ πόλει useful to the city XEN. *Cyn.* 13.17 ‖ ▸ *with gen.:* ἀ. ἑλκῶν καὶ φυμάτων (*a root*) good for wounds and abscesses THPHR. *HP.* 9.11.1, *al. etc.* ‖ ▸ *with inf.:* ἀγαθὸν (ἐστι) it is good IL. 7.282, *al.* OD. 3.196 *etc.*; ἀγαθὸν ὅτι it is good that VT. *Reg.* 2.18.3 ‖ *abs.* εἰς ἀγαθὸν *or* ἀγαθὰ to good purpose, with good intention IL. 9.102, *al.* [C] **propitious, favorable, auspicious:** ἀγαθὴ ἡμέρα propitious day XEN. *Oec.* 11.6; *of days or omens* HES. *Op.* 783, *fr.* 240.11 | **prosperous, fortunate, lucky:** ἀγαθόν τί σε βούλονται πράττειν they want your affairs to prosper XEN. *Oec.* 12.7 [D] **good, sound,** *morally, of thought* AESCHL. *Eum.* 1013; *of action* DEMOCR. B 177 NT. *Rom.* 2.7 *etc.* ❸ *subst. neut.* τὸ ἀγαθόν [A] **good, benefit:** φίλον ὃ μέγιστόν ἀ. εἶναί φασι a friend, which they say is the is the greatest good XEN. *Mem.* 2.4. 2; μέγ' ἀγαθόν darling, *of a baby* MEN. *Sam.* 28 | ἐπ' ἀγαθῷ τινος for the good of s.o. THUC. 5.27.2 *etc.*; ἐπ' ἀγαθῷ τοῖς πολίταις for the good of the citizens ARISTOPH. *Ran.* 1487; τίνος ἀγαθοῦ τοῦτο ποιοῦσιν for what purpose do they do this LUC. 34.1 | **good, good action** NT. *Rom.* 2.10 *etc.* ‖ *philos.* **good** ARISTOT. *EN.* 1094a 3, *al.* EPICT. *Ench.* 24.3, *al. etc.*; ἡ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἰδέα the form of the good PLAT. *Rp.* 508e, *al.* | *Christ.* **highest good**, *of God* CLEM. *Paed.* 1.8.63.2 GREG[1]. *VMos.* 1.7 *etc.* [B] *pl.* τὰ ἀγαθὰ and τἀγαθά **goods of fortune, wealth, power, endowments** HDT. 2.172 THUC. 1.82.3, *al.* PLAT. *Leg.* 661a, 697b XEN. *Mem.* 1.2.63 *etc.* | *Christ.* **worldly goods**, *in contrast to spiritual ones* NT. *Lu.* 12.18, *al. etc.* ‖ **good qualities, spiritual gifts** ISOCR. 8.32 *etc.* | **poetic virtues** ARISTOT. *Poet.* 1460b

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2 ‖ **good physical traits**, *of a horse* XEN. *Hip.* 1. 2 ‖ **good advice:** οὔτοι καμοῦμαί σοι λέγουσα τἀγαθά I shall never tire of giving you good advice AESCHL. *Eum.* 881 ‖ **good news** SOPH. *OT.* 934 ◆ *adv.* ἀγαθῶς **well** HP. *Off.* 4.7 ARISTOT. *Rh.* 1388b *etc.* | *interject.* **good!, very well!** VT. *Reg.* 1.20.7 • *crasis* τὸ ἀ. > τἀγαθόν, τοῦ ἀ. > τἀγαθοῦ, οἱ ἀ. > ἀγαθοί, τὰ ἀ. > τἀγαθά ‖ *prodelision* ὦ ἀ. > ὦ' γαθέ (*instead of crasis* ὠγαθέ) ‖ *Lac.* ἀγασός ARISTOPH. *Lys.* 1301 | *Lesb.* ἄγαθος | *Cypr.* ἀζαθός ‖ *later compar.* ἀγαθώτερος (*common. suppl.* ἀμείνων and ἀμεινότερος, ἀρείων, βελτίων and βέλτερος, κρείσσων, λώων and λωίτερος, φέρτερος) | *later superl.* ἀγαθώτατος (*common. suppl.* ἄριστος, βέλτιστος and βέλτατος, κράτιστος, λῷστος, φέριστος e φέρτατος).

ἀγαθοσύμβουλος [ἀγαθός, σύμβουλος] **good adviser** GLOSS

ἀγαθότης -ητος, ἡ [ἀγαθός] **goodness** VT. *Sal.* 1.1, *al.* PLOT. 4.8.6 *etc.* ‖ *your* **benevolence**, *honorific tit.* IUL. *epist.* 12.36 GREG. *epist.* 28.2 *etc.*

ἀγαθοτυχέω, *contr.* [ἀγαθός, τύχη] *astr.* **to occupy the position of good fortune** VETT. 79.30 CCA 1.118 (*see* τύχη).

ἀγαθουργ- *see* ἀγαθοεργ-.

ἀγαθοφανής -ές [ἀγαθός, φαίνω] **appearing good** DEMOCR. B 82

ἀγαθοφιλής -ές [ἀγαθός, φίλος] **loving good** DION[21]. *epist.* 8.1

ἀγαθοφόρος -ον [ἀγαθός, φέρω] **bearing good news** PPGM 4.3166 ‖ τὸ ἀ. **the bearing of good news** CCA 2.170

ἀγαθόφρων -ον, *gen.* -ονος [ἀγαθός, φρήν] **of good intentions, well-disposed** PTOL[4]. *Tetr.* 169 VETT. 378.30

ἀγαθοφυής -ές [ἀγαθός, φύω] **good by nature**, *of the Word* DION[21]. *DN.* 2.1

ἀγαθόω, *contr.* [ἀγαθός] *fut.* ἀγαθώσω ‖ *aor. inf.* ἀγαθῶσαι ❶ *active* **to do good, benefit** ▸ τινι s.o. VT. *Reg.* 1.25.31 = ▸ τινα VT. *Sir.* 49.9 *etc.* ❷ *passive* **to be made good** NUM[1]. (EUS[1]. *PE.* 11.22.6)

ἀγάθυνσις -εως, ἡ [ἀγαθύνω] **action of making good** EUSTR. *in EN.* 276.32

ἀγαθύνω [ἀγαθός] *fut.* ἀγαθυνῶ ‖ *aor.* ἠγάθυνα ‖ *aor. pass.* ἠγαθύνθην ‖ *fut. pass.* ἀγαθυνθήσομαι ❶ *active* [A] **to do good, benefit** ▸ τινι (το) s.o. VT. *Iudic.* B 17.13, *al.* HLD[4]. *in EN.* 86.41 ‖ ▸ *abs.* **to do good, do well** VT. *Ps.* 35.4 [B] **to make good** DION[21]. *DN.* 4.35 [C] **to honor, magnify** VT. *Reg.* 3.1.47 ‖ **to adorn** VT. *Reg.* 4.9.30 ‖ **to cheer:** ἀ. καρδίαν to make the heart merry VT. *Iud.* 19.22 ❷ *passive* [A] **to be made good** DION[21]. *epist.* 2, *al.* [B] **to rejoice, exult** VT. *Iud.* 16.25, *al.* [C] **to be esteemed** VT. *Esd.* 2.12.5 ‖ *impers.* **to seem good or opportune:** ἐπί τινα ἔν τινι to s.o. concerning sthg. VT. *Esd.* 2.7.18

Ἀγάθυρσοι -ων, οἱ **Agathyrsoi**, *Scythian people* HDT. 4.48.4, *al.*

Ἀγάθυρσος -ου, ὁ **Agathyrsos**, *female name* HDT. 4.10.2

ἀγάθωμα -ατος, τό [ἀγαθόω] **personification of good** PROCL. *in Parm.* p. 683

Ἀγάθων -ωνος, ὁ **Agathon**, *male name* IL. 24.249 PLAT. *Symp.* 172a, *al. etc.*

ἀγαθωνυμία -ας, ἡ [ἀγαθός, ὄνομα] **the name of good**, *divine attribute* DION[21]. *DN.* 3.1, *al.*

ἀγαθωσύνη -ης, ἡ [ἀγαθός] **good** VT. *Chr.* 2.24.16; εἰς ἀγαθωσύνην for my good VT. *Neem.* 13.31 ‖ **goodness, benevolence** VT. *Neem.* 9.25 NT. *Gal.* 5.22, *Eph.* 5.9 *etc.*; *also* ἀγαθοσύνη ORIG. *frag. Io.* 124.12 *etc.*; ἡ ἡμέρα ἀγαθωσύνης the day of judgement HYPER. *Mon.* 150 (PPG 79.1488D)

ἀγαίομαι [ἄγαμαι] [A] **to be indignant:** τι at *sthg.*

Od. 20.16 *etc.* ‖ **to be enraged, angry** ▶ τινι with *s.o.* Hes. *Op.* 333 Hdt. 8.69.1 (*v.l.*) Ⓑ **to admire** ▶ τι *sthg.* Archil. 19.2 Opp. 4.138 | ▶ *abs.* ἀγαιόμενος full of admiration Ap. 1.899, *al.* ● *only pres. and ep. and Ion.* | *impf. 3. sg.* ἀγαίετο Hes. *fr.* 211.4.

1. ἀγαῖος -α -ον [ἀγα-] **enviable** Hsch. AG. *Bek.* 334 L. *EM.* 8.50

2. ἀγαῖος -α -ον [ἄγω] **leading the procession** *I*GDI 2561 *D* 38 (IVᵃ) (*doub.*)

Ἀγαῖος -ου, ὁ **Agaios**, *male name* Hdt. 6.127.3 *etc.*

ἀγᾰκλεής -ές [ἀγα-, κλέος] **very famous, illustrious**, *of pers.* Il. 16.738, *al.* | *of things and places* Bacchyl. *Dith.* 16.12 Pind. *Pae.* 4.12, *al.* ◆ *adv.* ἀγακλεῶς **famously** Hp. *Praec.* 12 ● *voc.* -κλεές | *ep. gen.* -κλῆος | *dat.* -κλέι | *acc.* -άκλεᾰ Pind. *P.* 9.106, *al.*; *pl.* -κλέᾱς Antim. 67 ‖ *ep.* (*not* Od.) *and lyr.*

Ἀγᾰκλέης -ῆος, ὁ **Agakleës**, *male name* Il. 15.571 *etc.*

ἀγακλειτός -ή -όν [ἀγα-, κλέος] *of pers.* **very famous** Il. 2.564 Hes. *Th.* 1016 *etc.* ‖ *of things* **splendid, magnificent** Od. 3.59, 7.202 ‖ **extraordinary**, *of suffering* Soph. *Tr.* 854 (*lyr.*)

ἀγακλεῶς *adv., see* ἀγακλεής.

ἀγακληεῖς *nom. pl. see* Man¹. 3.324

ἀγακλήεις -εσσα -εν [*see* ἀγακλεής] **famous** *I*MAMA 1.267.8

ἀγακλῠμένη -ης [ἀγα-, κλέος] **very illustrious** Antim. 16.2

ἀγακλῠτός -ή -όν [ἀγα-, κλέος] **very illustrious**, *of pers.* Il. 6.436 Od. 8.502 AP. 9.672.3 *etc.* | *of things* Od. 3.388, *al.*

ἀγακτῐμένη -ης, ἡ [ἀγα-, κτίζω] **well-built** (*city*) Pind. *P.* 5.81

ἀγαλακτία -ας, ἡ [ἀγάλακτος] **lack of milk** Autocr. 3

ἀγάλακτος -ον [γάλα] Ⓐ **deprived of milk** Hp. *NatPuer.* 30 | **weaned, deprived of mother's milk** Aeschl. *Ag.* 718 | **having never suckled** Nonn. *Ev.* 9.103 ‖ **not suited to producing good milk**, *of a pasture* Gal. 6.346 Ⓑ **of the same milk, related** Hsch

ἀγάλαξ -ακτος [γάλα] **without milk** Callim. *H.* 2.52

ἀγαλλιάζω [ἀγάλλω] ❶ *active* **to insult** Hsch. L. *EM.* ❷ *middle* **to rejoice** *P*SB 7695.9 (VI-VIIᴾ) Io. *CGal.* 10.729D ● *only pres.*

ἀγαλλίᾱμα -ατος, τό [ἀγαλλιάω] **transport of joy, exultation, happiness** VT. *Is.* 16.10, *al.* Bas. *epist.* 243.2.34 *etc.*

ἀγαλλιάς -άδος, ἡ Nic. *fr.* 74.31, *see* ἀγαλλίς.

ἀγαλλίασις -εως, ἡ [ἀγαλλιάω] **exultation** VT. *Ps.* 29.6 NT. *Lu.* 1.14, *al. etc., see* ἀγαλλιάς.

ἀγαλλιάω, *contr.* [ἀγάλλω] *impf. mid.*

total freedom (*opp. to* ἡ ἄ. δουλεία complete slavery) PLAT. *Rp.* 564a | *without art.* PLAT. *Rp.* 564a ‖ *subst. with article*: τῶν ἄ. γὰρ ἅπτεται θεός for the god is engaged in important things EUR. *fr.* 974 ‖ *with a verb* AESCHL. *Pr.* 180 ⓑ **too much**, *gener. in* μηδὲν ἄ. nothing in excess (*ὄγαν.*) THGN. 335 PIND. *fr.* 35b EUR. *Hip.* 265 | *iron.* οὐχ ἄγαν not too, not particularly EUR. *Med.* 305, 583, *El.* 1105, *al.* ARISTOPH. *Eq.* 598 ⓒ ἄγαν γε *also* **unfortunately** AESCHL. *Ag.* 1241 SOPH. *Tr.* 896, *al.* ● *gener. Aeol. Dor. and in trag., not in* IL. *and* OD. ‖ *later poet.* ἄγᾰν.

Ἀγανάγαρα -ας, ἡ **Aganagara**, *city in India* PTOL[4]. *Geog.* 7.2.7

ἀγᾰνακτέω, *contr.* [ἄγαμαι ?] *impf.* ἠγανάκτουν ‖ *fut.* ἀγανακτήσω ‖ *aor.* ἠγανάκτησα, *ptc. mid.* ἀγανακτησάμενος ‖ *pf.* ἠγανάκτηκα, *mid.* ἠγανάκτημαι HYP. *fr.* 70 ‖ *aor. pass.* ἠγανακτήθην ❶ *active* Ⓐ **to bubble, ferment**, *of wine* PLUT. 46.734e | *fig. of the soul* PLAT. *Phaedr.* 251c; καί μου τὰ σπλάγχν' ἀγανακτεῖ my guts are seething, *with anger* ARISTOPH. *Ran.* 1006 Ⓑ **to shudder, be vexed, be irritated, be angry, regret** ARISTOPH. *Lys.* 499 | ▶ *with compl. of a thing*: τινι by s.o. PLAT. *Phaed.* 63b = ▶ τι PLAT. *Phaed.* 64a = ▶ ἐπί τινι LYS. 1.1 ISOCR. 16.49 = ▶ ὑπέρ τινος PLAT. *Euthyd.* 283e = ▶ περί τινος PLAT. *epist.* 349d = διά τι PLAT. *Phaed.* 63c = ▶ πρός τι EPICT. *Ench.* 4.4.31, *al.* | ▶ *with compl. of pers.*: τινι with *or* at s.o. XEN. *Hel.* 5. 3.11 = ▶ πρός τινα PLUT. *Cam.* 28.5 = ▶ κατά τινος LUC. 25.18 | ▶ *with ptc.*: ἀ. ἀποθνῄσκοντας to regret their death PLAT. *Phaed.* 62e | ▶ *with* ὡς *or* ὅτι that, because *common.* ‖ ▶ *with* εἰ *or* ἐάν if, at the fact that AND. 1.139 PLAT. *Lach.* 194a ⓒ *med.* **to feel** *or* **experience irritation** HP. *Liq.* 2 GAL. 13.632 *etc.* ❷ *middle = active* LUC. 32.4 HYP. *fr.* 70.1 ● *ptc.* ἀγανακτέων HP. *epist.* 27.13 LUC. 48.19 *and* (προσ)αγανακτεῦντες HP. *epist.* 17.289.

ἀγανάκτησις -εως, ἡ [ἀγανακτέω] **irritation, pain** PLAT. *Phaedr.* 251c (*from teething*) AN. *Par.* 34.3.3 (*of the diaphragm*) GAL. 10.251 (*of a wound*) ‖ **indignation** THUC. 2.41.3 PLUT. *Marc.* 33.8 *etc.*

ἀγανακτητέον [ἀγανακτέω] *verb. adj.* **it is necessary to be irritated:** τινα at s.o. PLOT. 4.8.7

ἀγανακτητικός -ή -όν [ἀγανακτέω] **irritable** PLAT. *Rp.* 604e (*v.l.*), 605a.

ἀγανακτητός -ή -όν [ἀγανακτέω] **irritating** PLAT. *Gorg.* 511b

ἀγανακτικός -ή -όν [ἀγανακτέω] **irritating** LUC. 28.14 ◆ *adv.* ἀγανακτικῶς **with irritation** MAUR. 11.13, *see* ἀγανακτητικός.

Ἀγάνζαβα **Aganzaba**, *city in Media* PTOL[4]. *Geog.* 6.2.11

Ἀγᾰνίππη -ης, ἡ **Aganippe**, *female name* AP. 14.120.4 *etc.*

Ἀγᾰνιππος -ου, ὁ **Aganippos**, *female name* QS. 3.230

ἀγάννῐφος -ον [ἀγα-, νίφα] **covered in snow, snow-clad**, *of Olympos* IL. 1.420, *al. etc.* | *of a peak* EPICHAR. 130

ἀγᾰνοβλέφᾰρος -ον [ἀγανός, βλέφαρον] **with a pleasant look**, *Persuasion* IB. 7.3 *etc.*

ἀγανόμματος -ον [ἀγανός, ὄμμα] LYR. *Al.* 20.1, *see* ἀγᾰνοβλέφᾰρος.

ἀγᾰνορ- *Dor. see* ἀγηνορ-.

Ἄγανος **Aganos**, *male name* CYP. 12

ἄγᾰνος -ον [ἄγνυμι] **broken** (*wood*) SOPH. *fr.* 198b

ἀγᾰνός -ή -όν [*see* γάνος] **pleasant, mild, gentle** IL. 2.164, *al.* OD. 2.230, *al.* PIND. *P.* 4.101, *al.* AESCHL. *Ag.* 101 (*doub., unique in tragedy*) *etc.* | *of the shafts of Apollo and Artemis that cause an easy death* IL. 24.759, *al.* OD. 15.411, *al.* ‖ *superl.* -ώτατος ◆ *adv.* ἀγᾰνῶς **mildly, gently** ANACR.

28.1 EUR. *IA.* 601 ‖ *compar.* -ώτερον ARISTOPH. *Lys.* 886

ἀγανοφροσύνη -ης, ἡ [ἀγανόφρων] **kindness, gentleness** IL. 24.772 OD. 11.203

ἀγανόφρων ῐ ᾰφρο νός
ᾰ ̔ irr ἀγ

AESCHL. *Sept.* 99 AP. 14.123.3 NONN. *D.* 46.207 ‖ **lamentable** NAUM. (STOB. 4.22.32)

ἀγαστός -ή -όν [ἄγαμαι] Ⓐ **worthy of admiration, admirable** AESCHL. *fr.* 268 XEN. *Hel.* 2.3.56, *An.* 1.9.24 PLUT. *Aem.* 22.6 etc. Ⓑ **lovable, dear** ▸ *with dat.*: οὐκέτι μοι βίος ἀγαστός ἐν φάει life in the light of the sun is no longer dear to me EUR. *Hec.* 168 ◆ *adv.* ἀγαστῶς **admirably** XEN. *Ag.* 1.24 ● *Hom.* ἀγητός (*see*).

Ἀγάστροφος -ου, ὁ **Agastrophos**, *female name* IL. 11.338

1. ἀγάστωρ -ορος [ἀ-, γαστήρ] **born from the same womb, kindred, consanguine** LYC. 264

2. ἀγάστωρ -ορος [ἀ- 1, γαστήρ] **fasting** GREG. *Carm.* 2.2.5.148

ἀγασυλλίς -ίδος, ἡ *bot.* **ferula** DIOSC². 3.84

ἀγάσυρτος -ου [ἀγα-, συρτός] **dirty** (*doub.*) ALC. 429

ἀγατός *Dor.* THEOCR. 1.126.7 (*v.l.*), *see* ἀγητός ● ἀγάτον *f.l. for* ἐρατόν HOM. 3.515.

Ἀγαυή -ῆς, ἡ **Agaue**, *Nereid* IL. 18.42 etc. ● *Dor.* -ά ‖ *according to some, accented* Ἀγαύη, *cf.* SCH. IL. 9.150.

Ἀγαυός -οῦ, ὁ **Agauos**, *male name* DEMOSTH. 23.202

ἀγαυός -ή -όν [ἄγαμαι] Ⓐ *of pers.* **illustrious, noble** IL. 3.268, *al.* OD. 11.213, *al.* SAPPH. 21.10 PIND. *P.* 4.72 AESCHL. *Pers.* 986 (*unique in trag.*) etc. Ⓑ *of things* **splendid, magnificent** HOM. 4.442 ARAT. 71 (*v.l.*) etc. ‖ *superl.* -ότατος.

ἀγαυρίαμα -ατος, τό [ἀγαυριάομαι] **pride** VT. *Is.* 62.7, *al.* etc.

ἀγαυριάομαι, *contr.* [ἀγαυρός] **to be proud** VT. *Iob* 3.14 (*impf. 3. pl.* ἠγαυριῶντο) | *later act.* EUS¹. *Is.* 2.32 HSCH. *etc.*

ἀγαύρισμα -ατος, τό [ἀγαυρός] **wrestling** EUSTATH. 1444.8

ἀγαυρός -ά -όν [*see* γαῦρος] **majestic, proud, splendid** HES. *Th.* 832 ‖ *superl. neut.* -ότατον NIC. *Th.* 832 | *superl. adv. neut. pl.* ἀγαυρότατα **with great splendor** HDT. 7.57.1

ἀγάφθεγκτος -ον [ἀγα-, φθέγγομαι] **much resounding** PIND. *O.* 6.91

ἀγάω, *contr.* [ἄγαμαι] ❶ *active* **to admire**, *only* ALCM. 129, *see* ἀγάζω ❷ *middle* Ⓐ **to admire, marvel at** OD. 16.203 Ⓑ **to be jealous, envy** ▸ *with dat.* HES. *Th.* 619; ▸ *with dat. and inf.* OD. 5.119 Ⓒ **to be angry, be irritated** HES. *fr.* 30.12; ▸ τινι *with s.o.* OD. 5.122 ● *ep. pres. mid. 2. pl.* ἀγάασθε | *inf. mid.* ἀγάασθαι | *ptc. mid.* ἀγώμενος ‖ *impf. 3. sg.* ἀγάτο HES. *fr.* 30.12 | *ep. mid. 2. pl.* ἠγάασθε ‖ *Lesb. aor. opt. mid. 3. sg.* ἀγήσαιτο ALC. 310.

Ἄγβαλος -ου, ὁ **Agbalos**, *male name* HDT. 7.98

Ἀγβάτανα -ων, τά HDT. 1.98 etc., *see* Ἐκβάτανα.

Ἀγβάτας, ὁ **Agbatas**, *male name* AESCHL. *Pers.* 961

Ἄγγαισοι -ων, οἱ **Angaisoi**, *Italic people* LYC. 1058

ἄγγαρα, τά [ἄγγαρος] **daily stage**, *of couriers* L. *EM.* 7.17

ἀγγαρε(ί)α -ας, ἡ [ἄγγαρος] **enlistment for public service** *I*OGIS 665.21 (IP) ARR. *EpictD.* 4.1.79 COD. *Iust.* 12.37.19 HSCH. ‖ *pl.* **courier service** *I*SYLL³. 880.53 (IIIP)

ἀγγαρευτής -οῦ, ὁ [ἀγγαρεύω] *act.* **recruiter** HSCH. ‖ *pass.* **recruit, laborer** *p*PSI 200.2 (VIP)

ἀγγαρεύω [ἄγγαρος] *Byz. impf.* ἠγγάρευον ‖ *fut.* ἀγγαρεύσω NT. *Mat.* 5.41 ‖ *aor.* ἠγγάρευσα ‖ *aor. ptc. pass.* ἀγγαρευθείς ❶ *active* **to press into service** *p*PSI 1401.9 (IIᵃ) | *fig.* **to compel, force** NT. *Mat.* 27.32, *al.* ❷ *passive* **to be enlisted** MEN. *fr.* 373 | *fig.* **to be constrained** PROCL¹. *Arc.* 13.29

ἀγγαρήιον -ου, τό [ἄγγαρος] **postal service** HDT. 8.98.2

ἀγγαρήιος -ου ὁ [ἄγγαρος] *Ion.* **courier** = ἄγγαρος *doub.* HDT. 3.126.2 (*v.l.*: ἀγγελιηφόρον).

ἀγγαρικός -ή -όν [ἄγγαρος] **relating to the postal service** *p*CAIR.PREIS. 33.6 (IVP) (*conject.*), *see* ἀγγαρήιος.

ἄγγαρος -ον Ⓐ *subst.* ὁ ἄγγαρος **mounted courier, for the postal service** XEN. *Cyr.* 8.6.17 etc. ‖ *fig.* **messenger, courier**, *used of a beacon fire* AESCHL. *Ag.* 282 ‖ **postal**, *of mules* LIB. *Or.* 18.143 Ⓑ *derog. of pers.* **stupid** MEN. *fr.* 186, 349 L. *Sud*

ἀγγαροφορέω, *contr.* [ἄγγαρος, φέρω] **to be a messenger** PROC¹. *Arc.* 30.16, *al.* ‖ **to toil** MEN. *fr.* 353

ἀγγείδιον -ου, τό [ἀγγεῖον] **small vessel** THPHR. *HP.* 9.6.4 (*pl.*) HERO *Pn.* 1.6. etc. ‖ *anat.* **gall bladder** RUF. *Anat.* 30

ἀγγειολογία -ας, ἡ [ἀγγεῖον, λέγω] **treatment of blood vessels** ANTYLL. HLD². (ORIB. 45.18.32) AET¹. 7.95 PAEG. 3.22.5, *al.*

ἀγγεῖον -ου, τό [ἄγγος] Ⓐ **vessel, container** HDT. 1.188.2, *al.* THUC. 4.4.2 PLAT. *Pol.* 287e XEN. *An.* 6.4.23 PLUT. *Lys.* 16.2 VT. *Reg.* 1.25.18, *al.* NT. *Mat.* 25.4 etc. ‖ *extens.* **reservoir** PLAT. *Leg.* 845e, *Criti.* 111a (*hollow of the sea-bed*) XEN. *Oec.* 9.2 | **wardrobe** PLUT. *Alex.* 22.10 | **chicken coop** PLUT. *TG.* 17.1 ‖ **sarcophagus** *i*IG 12.2.494 etc. Ⓑ *med.* **blood vessel, artery, vein** HP. *Morb.* 4.37, *Epid.* 6.3.1 ERASISTR. 161.9, *al.* | **cavity, covering**, *of an organ* SOR. 1.33.5 etc. | *of the entire body* MAUR. 3.6 | **placenta** SOR. 1.57.2 ‖ *bot.* **covering, capsule**, *of a plant* THPHR. *HP.* 1.11.1 ● *Ion.* ἀγγήιον | *also* ἀγγίον, ἀνγίον *in pap.*

ἀγγειοτομία -ας, ἡ [ἀγγεῖον, τέμνω] **cutting of a vein** PAEG. 6.31.2

ἀγγειουργός, [ἀγγεῖον, ἔργον] **potter** *i*IG 2².1576.69 (IVᵃ)

ἀγγειώδης -ες [ἀγγεῖον] **in the shape of a vessel, hollow** ARISTOT. *PA.* 671a 23 MAUR. 10.38.2 etc.

ἀγγελία -ας, ἡ [ἄγγελος] Ⓐ **news, message** ▸ τινος about s.o. *or* sthg. OD. 1.408, *al.* THUC. 8.15.1 etc.; ἐμήν ... λυγρήν ἀγγελίην sorrowful news concerning me IL. 19.337; οἵαν ἐδήλωσας ἀνέρος αἴθονος ἀγγελίαν what news of the fiery warrior have you revealed SOPH. *Ai.* 222 | ▸ *with* ὅτι: ἀ. τῶν πόλεων ὅτι ἀφεστᾶσι news about the cities: namely, that they revolted THUC. 1.61.1; ἤκουσεν ἀ. ὅτι ἐλήφθη ἡ κιβωτός he heard the news that the ark (*of the covenant*) was taken VT. *Reg.* 1.4.19 | ἀγγελίην φέρειν to bring news IL. 15.174; φάτο δ' ἀγγελίην he reported a message IL. 18.17 = ἀ. ἀπέειπε IL. 7.416 | ▸ *with verbs of motion*: ἀγγελίην ἐλθεῖν to come to deliver message, to bring tidings IL. 11.140 | *gener.* τευ ἀγγελίης μετ' ἔμ'ἤλυθες; have you come to bring me some news? IL. 13.252, *see* ἀγγελίης | *Christ.* **gospel message**: ἡ ἀγγελία ἣν ἀκηκόαμεν ἀπ' αὐτοῦ the message which we have heard from him NT. *EIo.* 1.1.5 etc. Ⓑ **announcement, proclamation** PIND. *P.* 2.4 ‖ **order, command** HOM. 2.448 PIND. *O.* 3.28 Ⓒ **narration, description** AN. *Subl.* 43.3 ‖ *personif.* Ἀγγελία, ἡ **Fame, Report** PIND. *O.* 8.82 ● *ep. Ion.* -ίη.

ἀγγελίαρχος -ου, ὁ [ἀγγελία, ἄρχω] **head of the angels** AGATH. (AP. 1.34.1)

ἀγγελιαφόρος -ον [ἀγγελία, φέρω] **messenger** HDT. 1.120.2 ARISTOT. *Mund.* 398a 31 etc. ‖ **king's chamberlain**, *in Persia* HDT. 3.118.2 ‖ **military courier** DCASS. 78.15.1, 79.39.3 ● *Ion.* ἀγγελιηφόρος.

ἀγγελίη, ἀγγελιηφ- *Ion. see* ἀγγελία, ἀγγελιαφ-.

ἀγγελίης, ὁ [ἄγγελος] **messenger** ANTIP². (AP. 6.198.2) ● *proper. gen. sg., see* ἀγγελία *in* IL. 3.206 (*but as nom. masc. in Sch.*), 13.252, 15.640.

ἀγγελικός -ή -όν [ἄγγελος] Ⓐ **of a messenger, conveying information** PHRYN². *SP.* p. 45 [GAL.]

Def. 19.378 etc. Ⓑ **angelic** BAS. *Asc.* 1.2 GREG. *Or.* 38.9.5 PROCL. *in Tim.* 1.341.16, *al.* etc. ‖ *subst.* οἱ ἀγγελικοί **Angelics**, *Christ. sect* EPIPH. *Haer.* 60.1.1 Ⓒ *prob.* **sacred to Artemis Angela**: ὄρχησις dance, *at Syracuse* ATH. 14.629e etc., *cf.* ἄγγελος, ▸ *adv.* ἀγγελικῶς **angelically, like an angel** PROCL. *in Tim.* 3.192.27 ORIG. *Io.* 13.7.41, *al.*

ἀγγελιτέω *i*CRET. 44.146.4 (IVᵃ), *see* ἀγγέλλω.

ἀγγελιώτης -ου, ὁ [ἀγγέλλω] **messenger** HOM. 4.296 CALLIM. *H.* 1.68

ἀγγελιῶτις -ιδος, ἡ [ἀγγέλλω] **female messenger** CALLIM. *H.* 4.216

ἀγγέλλω [ἄγγελος] *impf.* ἤγγελλον, *mid. pass.* ἠγγελλόμην ‖ *fut.* ἀγγελῶ ‖ *aor¹.* ἤγγειλα, *mid. pass.* ἠγγειλάμην *in compd.* ‖ *pf.* ἤγγελκα, *mid. pass.* ἤγγελμαι ‖ *ppf. mid. pass.* ἠγγέλμην ‖ *aor. pass.* ἠγγέλθην *later aor².* ἠγγέλην ‖ *fut. pass.* ἀγγελθήσομαι GAL. 16.699, *later* ἀγγελήσομαι *in compd.* ❶ *active* Ⓐ **to bear a message, bring news** IL. 8.409; ▸ τινι *to s.o.* OD. 4.24, *al.* | *with inf.* IL. 8.517 OD. 16.350 | ▸ *abs.* **to bring news** ▸ τινα *of s.o.* OD. 14.120 = ▸ περί τινος SOPH. *El.* 1111 Ⓑ *gener.* **to announce, report, bring news** ▸ τι sthg. ION 8a *TrGF*, *al.*; ▸ τί τινι (*of*) sthg. *to s.o.* IL. 15.159, *al.* THUC. 8.74.3 etc. = ▸ τι πρός τινα XEN. *An.* 1.7.13 etc. | *prov.* οὐ πόλεμον ἀγγέλλεις you're not announcing war, i.e., that is good news PLAT. *Phaedr.* 242b, *al.* ‖ ▸ *with* ὅτι that IL. 22.439 = ὡς EUR. *IT.* 704 DEMOSTH. 18.169; ἀγγελλε ... ὀθούνεκα τέθνηκ' Ὀρέστης announce that Orestes has died SOPH. *El.* 47 ‖ ▸ *with ptc.* Κῦρον ἐπιστρατεύοντα ... ἤγγειλα I announced that Cyrus was undertaking an expedition XEN. *An.* 2.3.19 | *with ὡς and ptc.* ἤγγειλας ὡς τεθνηκότα you announced that I was dead SOPH. *El.* 1341 ❷ *middle* (*only pres.*) **to announce oneself**: Τεύκρῳ ἀγγέλλομαι εἶναι φίλος I announce that I am a friend of Teukros SOPH. *Ai.* 1376 ❸ *passive* **to be announced, be reported** THUC. 6.34.7; τὸ δ'αὖ λίαν παρεῖλες ἀγγελθεῖσά μοι γενναῖος but the report of your noble comportment has reduced the excess (*of my grief*), to EUR. *Hec.* 591 ‖ ▸ *with ptc.* THUC. 3.16.2 XEN. *Hel.* 4.3.13; ζῶν ἢ θανὼν ἀγγέλλεται; is there word whether he is living or dead SOPH. *Tr.* 73 | ▸ *with inf.* PLAT. *Ch.* 153b | *with ὅτι* that XEN. *Hel.* 1.1.27 ‖ *iter. impf.* ἀγγέλλεσκον HSCH. ‖ *fut. Ion.* ἀγγελέω | *aor².* (παρ)ήγγελον *later doub.* ‖ *ppf. mid. pass. 3. sg.* ἄγγελτο *v.l. in* HDT. 7.37.1.

ἄγγελμα -ατος, τό [ἀγγέλλω] **news, message** EUR. *Or.* 876 etc.

ἀγγελοδείκτης -ου, ὁ [ἄγγελος, δείκτης] **revealer of angels** *p*PGM 4.1374

ἀγγελοειδής -ές [ἄγγελος, εἶδος] **similar to an angel, angelic** GREG¹. *VEphr.* 46.840A DION²¹. *CH.* 145B, *al.* etc.

ἀγγελόεις -εσσα -εν *i*CRET. 2 XXIV 13.7 (IVP), *see* ἀγγελικός.

ἀγγελοθεσία -ας, ἡ [ἄγγελος, τίθημι] **condition of an angel, angelic condition** CLEM. *Str.* 7.2.9.3, *al.*

ἀγγελομαρτύρητος -ον [ἄγγελος, μαρτυρέω] **testified by the angels** [IO.] *Ador.* 11.824B

ἀγγελομίμητος -ον [ἄγγελος, μιμέομαι] **imitating the angels** MAX². *SchDion. DN.* 4.204B etc. ◆ *adv.* ἀγγελομιμήτως **in imitation of the angels, similarly to the angels** DION²¹. *DN.* 1.5

ἀγγελοπλήρωτος -ον [ἄγγελος, πληρόω] **full of angels** TIMOTH³. *NatBapt.* 1 (28.908D)

ἀγγελοπρεπής -ές [ἄγγελος, πρέπω] **suiting the angels** DION²¹. *DN.* 1.5, *al.* etc. ◆ *adv.* ἀγγελοπρεπῶς **as suiting a messenger** DION²¹. *CH.* 181D ‖ **like the angels** DION²¹. *epist.* 10

ἀγγελοπρεπῶς *adv.*, *see* ἀγγελοπρεπής.

ἄγγελος -ου, ὁ, ἡ Ⓐ **messenger, emissary, envoy**

IL. 1.334, *al.* XEN. *An.* 1.2.21 *etc.*; δι᾽ ἀγγέλων through messengers AESCHN. 3.95 | female messenger IL. 24.561; *epith. of Iris* IL. 2.786, 3.121, *al.* | *of birds of augury* IL. 24.292, *al.* PLUT. 25.405d ‖ ▸ *with gen.* ὁ πρῶτος νύχιος ἄγγελος πυρός the first nocturnal messenger of fire (*fig.*) AESCHL. *Ag.* 588; ἄγγελον κακῶν ἐπῶν messenger of bad news SOPH. *Ant.* 277; ἄγγελον γλῶσσαν λόγων tongue, messenger of words EUR. *Suppl.* 203 ⒝ angel VT. *Gen.* 28.12, *al.* NT. *Mat.* 1.24, *al.* ORIG. *Cels.* 5.4.3 *etc.* ‖ *philos.* semi-divine being IUL. 4.141b IAMBL[1]. *Myst.* 2.6 *etc.* ● *neut. pl.* NONN. *D.* 34.226.

Ἄγγελος -ου, ὁ Angelos PLUT. *Pyr.* 2.1 ‖ *fem.* Ἄγγελος Messenger, *epith.* of Artemis at Syracuse HSCH

ἀγγελότης -ητος, ἡ [ἄγγελος] being an angel [ATHANAS.] *Def.* 1.8 (*PG* 28.540A).

ἀγγελτήρ -ῆρος, ὁ [ἀγγέλλω] OR. *Sib.* 2.214, *al. etc.*, *see* ἀγγελτής.

ἀγγελτικός -ή -όν [ἀγγέλλω] announcing, premonitory PORPH. *Abst.* 3.3 *etc.*

ἀγγέλτρια -ας, ἡ [ἀγγέλλω] female messenger OR. *Sib.* 8.117 ● *v.l.* ἀγγέλτειρα ORPH. *H.* 78.3 (*doub.*).

Ἀγγενίδας -α, ὁ Angenidas, *Spartan* XEN. *Hel.* 2.3.10

ἀγγήιον, τό *Ion. see* ἀγγεῖον.

Ἀγγίτης -ου, ὁ Angites, *river in Macedonia* HDT. 7.113.2

ἀγγοθήκη -ης, ἡ [ἄγγος, θήκη] receptacle for vessels ATH. 5.210c

ἄγγος -εος, *contr.* -ους, τό ⒜ *gener.* vessel, container, *for liquids* IL. 16.643 OD. 16.13 ‖ *thus* vat HES. *Op.* 613, *al.* | pitcher HDT. 5.12.2 *etc.* | bucket HDT. 4.62.3 ‖ cup, bowl EUR. *IT.* 953, 960 ⒝ chest, casket, coffin SOPH. *Tr.* 622 | *for fish* NT. *Mat.* 13.48 | basket HDT. 1.113.1 EUR. *Ion* 32, 1337 ‖ funerary urn SOPH. *El.* 1118, 1205 ⒞ *analog. of the body* uterus HP. *Epid.* 6.5.11 *etc.* | *of the stomach* τροφίμων ἄ. nourishing vessel TIMOTH. 15.73 ‖ cell, *in honeycomb* DIOD[3]. (*AP.* 9.226.5) ⒟ covering, shell, *of the crab* OPP. 2.406

ἄγγοσδε [ἄγγος] *adv.* in the vessel, *of the clepsydra* EMPED. B 100.12

ἀγγούριον *and* ἄγγουρον -ου, τό watermelon AN. *Med.* (*PhMG* 2.323.13) *al., etc.*

Ἄγγουρον -ου, τό Angouron, *mountain on the Ister* AP. 4.323

Ἀγγουστία Angoustia, *city in Dacia* PTOL[4]. *Geog.* 3.8.7

ἄγγρεσις -ιος, ἡ inclination, choice, *Thess. for* αἵρεσις *I*BCH 59.56

ἀγγρίζω [*see* ἀγρίζω] *aor.* ἤγγρισα ROM[1]. 3.17.8; to irritate VT. (Sym.) *Prov.* 15.18 (*conject.* ἀγρίζω, *see*) HSCH. L. *EM*

ἄγγρίς L. *Sud., see* ἀγγρισμός.

ἀγγρισμός -οῦ, ὁ [ἀγγρίζω] irritation GLOSS

ἀγγριστής -οῦ, ὁ [ἀγγρίζω] one who irritates GLOSS

Ἄγγρος -ου, ὁ Angros, *river in Illyria* HDT. 4.49.2

ἀγγροφά, ἡ *I*IG 4[2].103.140 (IV[a]), *see* ἀναγραφή.

ἀγγροφεύς *see* ἀναγραφεύς.

ἄγγων -ωνος, ὁ javelin AGATH. 2.5

ἀγδαβάτης -ου, ὁ *member of a Persian class* AESCHL. *Pers.* 924 (*codd.*)

ἄγδην [ἄγω] *adv.* by carrying, by bringing LUC. 46.10

Ἄγδιστις, ἡ *Phrygian title of Kybele* MEN. *Th. fr. dub.* 20 (Ἄγγιστι) STR 10.3.12 (Ἄγδιστιν) *I*SEG 36.1201 (*ca.* 200[P]) (*dat.*) *etc.*

1. ἄγε, ἄγετε *pres. imper. act.* 2. *sg. and pl., see* ἄγω ‖ *as an exhortation* come on!, let's go!, *sg.* ἄγε, *often strengthd.* ἀλλ᾽ ἄγε, εἰ δ᾽ ἄγε, ἄγε δή, νῦν δ᾽ ἄγε, *Att.* ἄγε νυν ‖ ▸ *with another imper.* 2. *sg. or pl.* εἴπ᾽ ἄγε come now, speak! IL. 3.192; ἄγε

τάμνετε come on, cut! OD. 3.332 | *rar.* 3. *pl.* IL. 2.437 | ▸ *with subj. rar.* 1. *sg.* OD. 13.215, *esp.* 1. *and* 2. *pl.* IL. 3.441, 11.348 AESCHL. *Pers.* 140, *Eum.* 307 XEN. *Cyr.* 5.5.15 | ▸ *with* ὅπως *and fut.* ARISTOPH. *Nub.* 489 PLUT. 11.135d | *abs.* EUR. *Cycl.* 590 | ▸ *with ptc.* PLUT. *Aem.* 31.10 ‖ *pl.* ἄγετε, *strengthd.* ἀλλ᾽ ἄγετε common, | ▸ *with another imper.* 2. *sg.* AESCHL. *Ch.* 803 | ▸ *with subj. rar.* 1. *sg.* OD. 22.139, *esp.* 1. *pl.* IL. 2.139 OD. 1.76 *etc.*

2. ἄγε *impf. ind. act.* 3. *sg. poet. see* ἄγω.

ἄγε *impf. ind. act.* 3. *sg. Dor. see* ἄγω.

Ἀγεάναξ -ακτος, ὁ Ageanax, *male name* THEOCR. 7.52, *al.*

ἀγέγωνος -ον [γεγωνός] speechless *I*GVI 1279.1 (II–III[P])

ἄγειος -ον [γῆ] landless AESCHL. *Suppl.* 858 (*f.l.*) ‖ *Christ.* beyond this world, celestial MACMGN. *Apocr.* 3.14

ἀγείοχα *pf. act., see* ἄγω.

ἀγείραος CORIN. 1.iii.25, *Boeot. for* ἀγήραος ● *acc.* -ρω.

ἀγείρατος -ον [γέρας] *poet.* HDN. 2.269.4, *see* ἀγέραστος.

ἀγείρω *impf.* ἤγειρον, *mid.* ἠγειρόμην ‖ *fut.* ἀγερῶ, *later mid.* ἀγεροῦμαι ‖ *aor*[1]. ἤγειρα, *mid.* ἠγειράμην ‖ *pf. act. in compd.* -αγήγερκα, *mid. pass.* ἀγήγερμαι ‖ *ppf. mid. pass.* 3. *sg.* ἀγήγερτο, 3. *pl.* ἀγηγέρατο ‖ *aor. pass.* ἠγέρθην ‖ *fut. pass.* ἀγερθήσομαι HSCH. ❶ *active* ⒜ to collect, gather, *with acc.* IL. 2.438, *al.* THUC. 1.9.1 XEN. *An.* 3.2.13 *etc.* ‖ *of things* to collect, take provisions OD. 3.301, *al.* ⒝ to collect by begging, beg: ὡς ἂν πύρνα κατὰ μνηστῆρας ἀγείροι that he beg bits of bread from the suitors OD. 17.362; ὥσπερ τινὰ τῶν ἀγειρουσῶν like a beggar HLD. 7.7.6; *subst. ptc.* οἱ ἀγείροντες the beggars CELS. (ORIG. *Cels.* 1.50.10) | *abs.* to make a collection of money, *for the gods* AESCHL. *fr.* 168.16 HDT. 4.35.3 PLAT. *Rp.* 381d LUC. 42.13 ‖ to go about begging PHILOSTR. *Ap.* 5.7 *etc.* ⒞ to bring together, accumulate arguments, *in a speech* τί τῶν δ᾽οὐκ ἐνδίκως ἀγείρω; which of these examples do I not justly gather? AESCHL. *Ch.* 638 ⒟ to knit one's brows P[1]. (AP. 5.300.1) ❷ *middle* to collect, *by begging*: ἀγειρόμενοι κατὰ δῆμον gathering among the people OD. 13.14 ❸ *passive* to gather, assemble IL. 2.52, *al.* OD. 2.88, *al.* ● *rare in prose* ‖ *pres. Aeol.* ἀγέρρω | *imper.* 3. *pl.* ἀγειρόντων ‖ *poet. impf.* ἄγειρον ‖ *aor*[1]. *ep.* ἄγειρα | *aor*[2]. *ep. mid.* 3. *sg.* ἤγρετο (*v.l.* ἔγρετο IL. 7.434, 24.789), 3. *pl.* ἀγέροντο (*pass.* IL. 18.245) | *inf.* ἀγερέσθαι (*or pres.* ἀγέρεσθαι OD. 2.385, *cf.* ἀγέρονται AP. 3.895) | *ptc.* ἀγρόμενος ‖ *aor. pass.* 3. *pl. ep.* ἤγερθεν, ἄγερθεν.

ἀγείσωτος -ον [γεῖσον] without a cornice L. *EM.* 8.55

ἀγείτων -ον [γείτων] neighborless, solitary EUR. *El.* 1130: οὕτως ἀγείτων οἶκος ἵδρυται φίλων; is this house so deprived of neighbors and friends? AESCHL. *Pr.* 270 (*conject.*); οὐκ ἄφιλον οὐδ᾽ ἀγείτονα not without friends nor neighborless PLUT. 26.423d ● *gen.* -ονος.

Ἀγελάα, ἡ Agelaä, *epith. of Athena*, *I*SEG 21.527.90 (IV[a]), *see* ἀγελεία.

Ἀγελάδας -α, ὁ Ageladas, *male name* AP. 16.220.3 (IV[a]), *see* ἀγελεία.

Ἀγελάδης -ου, ὁ Hagelades, *male name* POSIDIP[1]. *PMil.* 10.10 ● *Dor.* -δας *I*CEG 380 (V[a]) *etc.*

ἀγελαδόν *Dor. adv.* THEOCR. 16.92 (*v.l.*), *see* ἀγεληδόν.

ἀγελάζω [ἀγέλη] *aor. inf.* ἀγελάσαι HSCH. ❶ *active* to guard the flock, pasture APOLLIN[2]. *MetPs.* 77.158 ❷ *middle* to live in a flock, flock ARISTOT. *HA.* 597b 7, 610b 2 *etc.*

ἀγελαιαστός -ον [ἀγελαῖος] common EUDEM[3]. 3.23

ἀγελαιοκομικός -ή -όν [ἀγελαιοκόμος] pertaining to cattle breeding ‖ *subst.* ἡ ἀγελαιοκομική (*sc.* τέχνη) cattle raising PLAT. *Pol.* 275e, *al.*

ἀγελαιοκόμος -ου, ὁ [ἀγελαῖος, κομέω] keeper of cattle, herder PALL. *Io.* 4.77 (*mss.* ἀγελοκόμων).

ἀγελαῖος -α -ον [ἀγέλη] ⒜ belonging to a herd, grazing freely, *of oxen* IL. 11.729 OD. 10.410 SOPH. *Ai.* 175; *subst.* αἱ ἀγελαῖαι those grazing freely: αἱ ἀ. τῶν ἵππων broodmares XEN. *Hip.* 5.8 ⒝ in herds, in flocks, gathered in a group: ἀ. ἰχθύες fish that live in schools HDT. 2.93.1 | *of pers.* τοὺς συναχθέντας ἀγελαίους ὄχλους the crowds that had gathered in a group VT. *Mac.* 2.14.23 ‖ *subst.* τὰ ἀγελαῖα cattle, animals that live in herds PLAT. *Pol.* 264d ARISTOT. *HA.* 487b 34 (*opp. to* μοναδικά), *Pol.* 1256a 23 (*opp. to* σποραδικά) ⒞ gregarious, ordinary, common, vulgar, *of pers.* PLAT. *Pol.* 268a (*opp. to* ἄρχοντες) ISOCR. 12.18 | *of things* EUP. 374 PLAT[1]. 76 *etc.*

ἀγελαιοτροφία -ας, ἡ [ἀγελαιοτρόφος] keeping of herds PLAT. *Pol.* 261e

ἀγελαιοτροφικός -ή -όν [ἀγελαιοτροφία] pertaining to the keeping of herds: *subst.* ἡ ἀγελαιοτροφική (*sc.* τέχνη) raising herds PLAT. *Pol.* 261e

ἀγελαιοτρόφος -ον [ἀγέλη, τρέφω] keeper of herds MAX[1]. 26.6, *al.*

ἀγελαιών -ῶνος, ὁ [ἀγελαῖος] place for herds, pasture L. *Sud*

ἀγέλαοι -ων, οἱ [ἀγέλη] members of an ἀγέλη, *band of youths on Crete* *I*CRET. 1 IX 1.11 (III–II[a])

Ἀγέλαος -ου, ὁ Agelaos, *male name* IL. 8.257, *al. etc.* ● *ep. Ion.* -εως.

ἀγελαρχέω, *contr.* [ἀγελάρχης] to lead a herd PHIL[2]. *Somn.* 2.153 | *fig.* τῶν παλλακίδων τὴν ἀγελαρχοῦσαν she in charge of his concubines PLUT. *Galb.* 17.7 | to hold the office of ἀγελάρχης *I*XANTH. 21.5 (*aor. ptc.* ἀγελαρχήσας)

ἀγελάρχης -ου, ὁ [ἀγέλη, ἄρχω] leader of a flock, group leader, captain LUC. 49.22 PLUT. *Rom.* 6.4 LONG. 2.31.2 *etc.* | *Christ., of spiritual guides* EUS[1]. *DE.* 4.6.9 (angels) *etc.*

ἀγελάρχησις -εως, ἡ [ἀγελαρχέω] command, leading of the flock (*fig.*) PHIL[2]. *Somn.* 1.255

ἀγελαρχία -ας, ἡ [ἀγελάρχης] leadership of an ἀγέλη (*see*) *I*IGR 3.648.15 *al.* (II[P]) ‖ command of a crowd DION[21]. *CH.* 137C

ἀγελαρχιανός -όν [ἀγελάρχης] of the leader of an ἀγέλη (*see*) *I*IGR 3.648.4 (II[P])

ἀγελαρχικός -όν [ἀγελάρχης] of the leader PROCL. *in Tim.* 1.467.29

ἀγέλαρχος -ου, ὁ [ἀγελάρχης] PORPH. *ad Il.* 2.478, *see* ἀγελάρχης.

ἀγέλασμα -ατος, τό [ἀγελάζω] gathering, crowd PROCL. *Hym.* 7.44

ἀγελαστέω, *contr.* [ἀγέλαστος] to not laugh HERACLIT[4]. 7.2.9 *etc.*

ἀγελαστί [ἀγέλαστος] *adv.* without laughter PLAT. *Euthyd.* 278e *etc.*

ἀγελαστικός -ή -όν [ἀγέλη] living in flocks, in groups, social PHIL[2]. *Dec.* 132, *Spec.* I 162 MAX[1]. 21.7

ἀγέλαστος -ον [γελάω] ⒜ not laughing, serious, grave HOM. 2.200 VETT. 72.19; ἀγέλαστα πρόσωπα grim faces AESCHL. *Ag.* 794; ἡ ἀ. πέτρα the laughless rock, *of Demeter at Eleusis* APOLLOD[7]. 1.5.1; ἀγέλαστος ... καὶ σκυθρωπός with a severe, frowning look PLUT. *Cic.* 38.2 ‖ *nickname of Crassus* CIC. *Fin.* 5.30 ⒝ not to be laughed at, dire: ἀγελάστοις ξυμφοραῖς πεπληγμένων struck by grave misfortunes AESCHL. *Ch.* 30

ἀγελάτας, ὁ [ἀγέλη] *Dor.* chief, overseer, *of youths* HERACL[6]. 15

ἀγελεία -ας, ἡ [ἀγελαῖος] ⒜ *mystical name of*

the number seven [Iambl[1].] 42.30 Ⓑ **plunderer,** epith. of Athena IL. 4.128 etc. ● Ion. -είη.

Ἀγέλεως, ὁ Ion. see Ἀγέλαος.

Ἀγέλη -ης, ἡ **Agele,** daughter of Daphnis and Chloe LONG. 4.39.2

ἀγέλη -ης, ἡ [see ἄγω] Ⓐ **flock, herd,** of oxen IL. 11.678, al. SOPH. OT. 26 XEN. Mem. 1.2.32 etc. | of horses IL. 19.281 | of swine HES. Sc. 168 NT. Mat. 8.30, al. | of camels VT. Is. 60.6 ‖ of birds **flock** SOPH. Ai. 168 LONG. 2.3.5 | of fish **school** OPP. 3.639 ‖ of pers. **group** PIND. fr. 112 VT. Mac. 4.5.4; ἀγέλας … τὰν μαινάδων **troop of maenads** EUR. Bac. 1022 | Christ. **flock of the church** ADAM[1]. Dial. 2.22 etc. ‖ fig. πόνων ἀγέλαι **heaps of pains** EUR. HF. 1276 ‖ ἄστρων ἀ. **the heavens** SYN. H. 4.17 Ⓑ **band of youths,** in Crete and Sparta PLUT. Lyc. 16.7 HERACL[6]. 15 etc. Ⓒ pl. **celestial spheres** [Iambl[1].] 43.6

ἀγελησά [ἀγέλη] adv. ARAT. 965, 1079, see ἀγεληδόν.

ἀγεληδόν [ἀγέλη] adv. **in herds, in groups, en masse** IL. 16.160 HDT. 2.93.1 etc. ● Dor. -ᾱδόν THEOCR. 16.92.

ἀγέληθεν [ἀγέλη] adv. **from a herd** AP. 1.356, 406

ἀγεληΐς -ΐδος, ἡ [ἀγελαῖος] Ⓐ **plunderer** CORN. 20, see ἀγελεία Ⓑ NUM. (ATH. 7.327b), see ἀγελαῖος.

ἀγεληκόμος -ον [see ἀγελαιοκόμος] **keeping herds** NONN. D. 47.208

ἀγελημαῖος -ον [ἀγέλη] **concerned with herds,** thus vulgar MAC. Hom. 15.45, al.

ἀγελήτης -ου [ἀγέλη] **belonging to a herd** (ox) L. Sud

ἀγελητρόφος -ου, ὁ [see ἀγελαιοτρόφος] **horse-tender** POLL. 1.181

ἀγέληφι [ἀγέλη] **in the herd** IL. 2.480, al., see ἀγέλη.

ἀγελίζω [ἀγέλη] **to aggregate** GLOSS

ἀγελικός -ή -όν [ἀγέλη] **of the flock** PSB 4322.9 (Iᵖ) | **gregarious** BAS. Hex. 8.3 (172A)

ἀγελισμός -οῦ, ὁ [ἀγελίζω] **group, flock** SCH. OPP[1]. 1.240, see τὸ ἀγελαῖον.

ἀγέλοιος -ον [γελοῖος] **not laughable:** οὐκ ἀγέλοιόν ἐστ᾽ ἴσως **it is perhaps not unfunny** HENIOCH. 4.6 ◆ adv. ἀγελοίως **without laughing** ARISTOPH. Ran. argum. 1

ἀγελοκομικός -ή -όν [see ἀγελαιοκομικός]: ἡ ἀ. (sc. τέχνη) **leading to pasture** CLEM. Str. 1.7.37.5

ἀγελοκόμος PALL. Io. 4.77 (mss.), see ἀγελαιοκόμος.

ἄγελος -ου, ὁ [ἀγέλη] **celestial spheres** [Iambl[1].] 43.6 (cf. ἀγέλη).

ἀγελοτροφ- later for ἀγελαιοτροφ-.

Ἀγελόχεια -ας, ἡ **Agelocheia,** female name HEGESIP[1]. (AP. 6.266.1)

ἀγέμεν ep. pres. inf. act., see ἄγω.

ἀγέμιστος -ον [γεμίζω] **not loaded** (on board a ship) PAVROM. 1b 34 (Iᵃ)

ἀγεμον-, ἀγεμών Dor. see ἡγεμ-.

ἄγεν aor. ind. pass. 3. pl. ep. see ἄγνυμι.

ἀγενεᾱλόγητος -ον [γενεαλογέω] **without genealogy** NT. Heb. 7.3 ORIG. Io. 1.4.21 etc.

ἀγένεια -ας, ἡ [ἀγενής] **low birth** ARISTOT. Pol. 1317b 40 ● cf. ἀγέννεια, with which it is sometimes confused.

ἀγένειος -ον [γένειον] Ⓐ **beardless:** pl. οἱ ἀ. **beardless youths, adolescent boys** PIND. O. 8.54 ARISTOPH. Eq. 1373 PLAT. Leg. 833c PAUS. 6.6.3 etc. ‖ of a thing **puerile** LUC. 21.29 Ⓑ subst. neut. τὸ ἀγένειον **lack of beard** LUC. 47.9 ◆ adv. ἀγενείως **without a beard:** ἀ. ἔχειν **to be beardless** PHILOSTR. VS. 1.8.1

ἀγενεσία -ας, ἡ [ἀγενής] **uncreatedness,** of the world [IUSTIN.] QuChr. 6.1445C, al. etc.

ἀγενής -ές [γίγνομαι] Ⓐ **unborn, uncreated** PLAT.

Tim. 27c Ⓑ **of low birth, ignoble, base** SOPH. fr. 84; τὰ ἀγενῆ τοῦ κόσμου **the base things of the world** NT. Cor. 1.1.28 ‖ of things SCH. OD. 11.568 etc. Ⓒ **childless** IS. (HARP.)

ἀγενησία -ας, ἡ [ἀγένητος] **uncreatedness** SIMP. in Cael. 139.24

ἀγενητογενής -ές [ἀγένητος, γίγνομαι] **created without generation** (of the Son) ARIUS (EPIPH. Haer. 69.6.3) (v.l. ἀγεννη-).

ἀγένητος [γίγνομαι] Ⓐ **unborn, unoriginated** HERACLIT. B 50 PLAT. Phaedr. 245d ARISTOT. Cael. 281b 26, al. ‖ Christ. theol. **uncreated** CLEM. Protr. 6.68.3 (of God) etc. Ⓑ **nonexistent , unreal** AGATHO 5; τὸ γὰρ φανθὲν τίς ἂν δύναιτ᾽ ἂν ἀγένητον ποιεῖν; **who could make nonexistent what has already come to light?** SOPH. Tr. 743; αἰτίαι ἀ. **groundless charges** AESCHN. 3.225 ‖ **not having happened, not done** ISOCR. 20.8 ◆ adv. ἀγενήτως **without origin, without birth** PLUT. 68.1015b SYR. in Metaph. 146.1 etc. | Christ. **without creation** EUS[1]. DE. 5.1.19 etc.

ἀγέννεια -ας, ἡ [cf. ἀγεννής]

ἀγεωργίον [γεωργός] *adv. neut.* **without cultivating:** ἀ. δικάζεσθαι to bring a legal action for neglected care of land PHRYN². *SP.* 33B

2. ἄγη *aor. ind. pass. see* ἄγνυμι.

3. ἄγη *neut. pl. see* ἄγος.

1. **ἄγη** -ης, ἡ [*cf.* ἄγα-] Ⓐ **wonder, amazement, admiration:** ἄγη μ' ἔχει wonder grips me IL. 21.221 OD. 3.227, *al.* Ⓔ **envy, jealousy** HDT. 6.61.1 *etc.*; ἄγα θεόθεν envy of the gods AESCHL. *Ag.* 131 ● *Dor.* ἄγα AESCHL. *l.c.*

ἀγή -ῆς, ἡ [ἄγνυμι] Ⓐ **breaking, fragment, wreckage** EUR. *Suppl.* 693; ἀγαῖσι κωπῶν with pieces of oars AESCHL. *Ag.* 131 Ⓑ **breaker, shore, beach** SOPH. *fr.* 969 AP. 1.554 *etc.* Ⓒ **curve, bend, inlet** ARAT. 668, 729 (*v.l.*) ● *Dor.* ἄγαν *f.l. for* ἄταν PIND. *P.* 2.82.

ἀγηγέραται ἀγηγέρατο *pf. and ppf. ind. mid. 3. pl. Ion., see* ἀγείρω.

ἀγηθής -ές [γῆθος] **joyless** SOPH. *Tr.* 869 (*conject.*), *fr.* 583.10 (*conject.*)

ἀγῆλαι *aor. inf. act. see* ἀγάλλω.

ἀγηλατέω, *contr.* [ἄγος, ἐλαύνω] *fut.* ἀγηλατήσω; **to reject as impure, drive out, purify, expiate** HDT. 5.72.1 NICOM. *fr.* 14 *etc.*; κλαίων δοκεῖς μοι ... τάδε ἀγηλατήσειν I think that you will atone for this with your tears SOPH. *OT.* 402

ἀγηλατίζω L. *EM., see* ἀγηλατέω.

ἀγήλατος -ον [ἀγηλατέω] **purifying** LYC. 436

ἄγημα -ατος, τό [ἡγέομαι] **army corps, division,** *at Sparta* XEN. *Lac.* 11.9 *etc.* | *Macedon* POL. 5.65.2, *al.* ARR. *An.* 1.1.11, *al.* PLUT. *Eum.* 14.8 *etc.*

ἄγημαι *pf. ind. mid. Dor. see* ἡγέομαι.

Ἀγήν -ῆνος, ὁ **Agen,** *title of a satyr play* ATH. 2.50f

ἀγηνία -ας, ἡ **attack, assault:** τὴν καλουμένην ἐν τοῖς πολέμοις μιμησάμενοι ἀ. having imitated that which in wars is called assault ASTAM. *Hom.* 12 (40.348A)

ἀγηνορέω, *contr.* [ἀγήνωρ] **to be courageous** NONN. *D.* 12.206, 37.338, *al.* ● 2. *sg.* ἀγηνορέεις NONN. *D.* 37.338 | *subj.* ἀγηνορέωσι EUPHOR. 38 c 51 | *ptc.* ἀγηνορέων GREG. *Carm.* (*PG* 37.1393.9) NONN. *Ev.* 3.170, *al. etc.*

Ἀγηνορίδης -ου, ὁ [Ἀγήνωρ] **descendant of Agenor** AP. 2.178 *etc.* ‖ οἱ Ἀ. **Thebans** EUR. *Ph.* 217

ἀγηνορίη -ης, ἡ [ἀγήνωρ] *ep.* Ⓐ **courage, valor** IL. 22.457 | *of a boar or lion* IL. 12.46 Ⓑ **pride, arrogance** IL. 9.700 (*pl.*) NONN. *D.* 42.384 *etc.*

Ἀγηνορίς -ίδος, ἡ [Ἀγήνωρ] **daughter of Agenor,** *Ino* OPP¹. 4.237

ἀγήνωρ -ορος [ἄγω ?, ἀνήρ] Ⓐ **manly, courageous, heroic** IL. 9.635, *al.* | *of a lion* IL. 24.42 Ⓑ **proud, arrogant** IL. 2.276, *al.* OD. 1.106, *al.* HES. *Th.* 641 AESCHL. *Sept.* 124 HLD. 4.5.5 *etc.* Ⓒ **magnificent, splendid, noble** PIND. *O.* 9.23 (*horse*), *P.* 3.55, 10.18, *I.* 1.43 ● *Dor.* ἀγᾶν-.

Ἀγήνωρ -ορος, ὁ **Agenor,** *male name* IL. 4.467 SOPH. *Or.* 268 *etc.*

ἀγήοχα *pf. ind. act. see* ἄγω.

ἀγήραντος -ον EUR. *epigr.* 2.1 (*conject.*) ANTIP¹. (AP. 7.6.3) (*v.l.*), *see* ἀγήραος.

ἀγήραος -αον, *contr.* ἀγήρως -ων [γῆρας] **unaging, eternally young** IL. 8.539, *al.* OD. 5.136, *al.* HES. *Th.* 955; ἀγήρως δὲ χρόνῳ δυνάστας ruler to whom time does not bring old age SOPH. *Ant.* 608 ‖ *of things* **imperishable, eternal** IL. 2.447 (*aegis*) SIM. (AP. 7.253.4) PIND. *P.* 2.52 THUC. 2.43.2 PLAT. *Phil.* 15d *etc.*; χάριν τ' ἀγήρων ἕξομεν and we shall have eternal gratitude EUR. *Suppl.* 1178 | *of a plant* **perennial:** ἀγήρω καὶ χλοερὰ luxuriant and evergreen PLUT. 46.649d ‖ *Christ.* **immune to aging, eternal** (*of God*) CLEM. *Str.* 5.11.68.2 *etc.* | *subst.* τὸ ἀγήραον **unaging part,** *of man* METH. *Symp.* 2.7.47 ● *contr.*: *acc. sg.* -ων and -ω | ἀγείρω CORIN. 1.3.25 ‖ *nom. pl.* -ῳ, *dat.*

-ως ARISTOPH. *Av.* 689, *acc.* -ως | *nom. dual* -ω ‖ ἄγηρος HES. HSCH.

ἀγηρασία -ας, ἡ [ἀγήρατος 2] **eternal youth** SCH. IL. 11.1-2

ἀγήρατον -ου, τό [ἀγήρατος] *bot.* **marjoram** DIOSC². 4.58 ‖ **savory** (*see* θύμβρα) DIOSC². 3.37a GAL. 11.814

1. ἀγήρατος -ου, ὁ [γῆρας ?] **abrasive stone,** *for polishing shoes* GAL. 12.201, 12.962, *al.* ASCLEP³. (AET¹. 8.43)

2. ἀγήρατος -ον [γῆρας] **unaging, imperishable, eternal** SOPH. *fr.* 972 XEN. *Mem.* 4.3.13 PLAT. *Ax.* 307d *etc.*; κλέος ἀγήρατον imperishable fame EUR. *IA.* 567

ἄγηρος -ον HES. *fr.* 25.28 HSCH., *see* ἀγήραος.

ἀγήρως, *contr. see* ἀγήραος.

ἀγής -ές [ἄζω] Ⓐ **pure, holy,** *of the sun* EMPED. B 47 Ⓑ **cursed, guilty** HIPPON. 19 (*doub. read.*)

Ἀγησανδρίδας, ὁ **Agesandridas,** *male name* THUC. 8.91.2

Ἀγήσανδρος -ου, ὁ **Agesandros,** *male name* THUC. 1.139.3, *al. etc.*

Ἀγησιάναξ -ακτος, ὁ **Agesianax,** *male name* PLUT. 60.920d

Ἀγησίας -ου, ὁ **Agesias,** *male name* PIND. *O.* 6.12, *al. etc.*

Ἀγησίδαμος -ου, ὁ **Agesidamos,** *male name* PIND. *O.* 10.18, *N.* 1.29, *al. etc.*

Ἀγησίλαος -ου, ὁ **Agesilaos** XEN. *Hel.* 3.3.4 CALLIM. *H.* 5.130 *etc.* ‖ *pl.* οἱ Ἀ. men like Agesilaos PLUT. *Fl.* 11.5 ● *Ion. and Att.* Ἡγησίλεως | *Dor.* Ἀγησίλας (Ἀγεσ-) *gen.* Ἀγησίλα PIND. *fr.* 123.15.

ἀγησίλαος -ου, ὁ [ἡγέομαι, λαός] **leader of the people, leader,** *epith. of Hades* AESCHL. *fr.* 406 ● ἀγ- *codd.* ‖ *ep.* ἡγεσίλαος NIC. *fr.* 74, 72, *Ion.* ἡγησίλεως HEGESIP². (AP. 7.545.4), *Dor.* ἀγεσίλας.

Ἀγησίμαχος -ου, ὁ **Agesimachos,** *athlete of Aegina* PIND. *N.* 6.22

Ἀγησίπολις -ιδος, ὁ **Agesipolis,** *male name* XEN. *Hel.* 4.2.9 *etc.*

Ἀγησιππίδας -α, ὁ **Agesippidas,** *male name* THUC. 5.52.1

Ἀγησιστράτα -ας, ἡ **Agesistrata,** *female name* PLUT. *Agis* 4.1

Ἀγησίστρατος -ου, ὁ **Agesistratos,** *male name* XEN. *Hel.* 2.3.10 *etc.*

Ἁγησιχόρα -ας, ἡ **Hagesichora,** *female name* ALCM. 1.77

ἀγησίχορος -ον [ἡγέομαι, χορός] **leading the chorus** *or* **dance** PIND. *P.* 1.4

ἀγητήρ, ὁ *Dor. see* ἡγήτηρ.

ἀγητορεύω [ἀγήτωρ] **to occupy the office of** ἀγήτωρ (*see*) *i*BSA 56.37 (II-Iᵃ)

ἀγητός -ή -όν [ἄγαμαι] **admirable, wonderful** IL. 22.370, *al.*; εἶδος ἀγητοί admired only for (your) physical appearance IL. 5.787, 8.228 | *with dat.* SOL. 5.3 THEOCR. 1.126 OPP¹. 1.364 | *of things* [Anacr.] 55.36

Ἄγητος -ου, ὁ **Agetos,** *male name* HDT. 6.61.5 *etc.*

Ἀγήτωρ -ορος, ὁ **Agetor,** *epith. of Zeus* XEN. *Lac.* 13.2

ἀγήτωρ, ὁ *Dor. office of priest of Aphrodite on Cyprus* HSCH., *see* ἡγήτωρ.

ἄγι, ἄγιτε [ἄγ' ἴτε ?] ALC. 38.4, *al.* SAPPH. 27.5, 43.8, *al.*, *Lesb. for* ἄγε, ἄγετε.

Ἁγιάδαι -ῶν, οἱ **Agiadai,** *royal Spartan line* PLUT. *Lys.* 24.3

ἁγιάζω [ἅγιος] *impf.* ἡγίαζον, *mid. pass.* ἡγιαζόμην ‖ *fut.* ἁγιάσω, *inf. mid.* ἁγιάσεσθαι PROC. *Is.* (*PG* 87.2029.13) | *aor.* ἡγίασα, *mid.* ἡγιασάμην [ATHANAS.] (*PG* 28.932.6) ‖ *pf.* ἡγίακα, *mid. pass.* ἡγίασμαι ‖ *aor. pass.* ἡγιάσθην ‖ *fut. pass.* ἁγιασθήσομαι ❶ *active* **to make sacred, consecrate** VT. *Gen.* 2.3, *al. etc.*; ▶ ἀ. τί τινι to

consecrate sthg. to s.o. VT. *Esd.* 2.22.47 ‖ **to glorify** CLEM. *Str.* 4.23.148.1 *etc.* ❷ *passive* **to be consecrated, be sacred** VT. *Ex.* 29.21; ἁγιασθήτω τὸ ὄνομά σου hallowed be thy name NT. *Mat.* 6.9 | *Christ. by means of the sacraments*: ὁ δὲ ἱερεύς ... ἁγιάζεται the priest is consecrated DION²¹. *EH.* 5.2 (509B) *etc.* | *subst. ptc. pf. pass.* οἱ ἡγιασμένοι the Nazarites, *Hebrews who consecrated themselves completely to God and observed a series of prohibitions* VT. *Am.* 2.12

Ἀγίας (*and* Ἁγίας) -ου, ὁ **Agias,** *male name* XEN. *An.* 2.5.31 PLUT. *Arat.* 29.6 *etc.*

ἁγίασμα -ατος, τό [ἁγιάζω] Ⓐ **holiness, consecration** VT. *Ps.* 92.5 CLEM. *Paed.* 3.13.98.1 *etc.* Ⓑ **consecrated place, sanctuary** VT. *Ex.* 15.17, *Am.* 7.13, *al.* Ⓒ **sacred object** VT. *Iez.* 20.40 DOR². *Doct.* 77.8 (*of the chrism*) *etc.*; ἁγιασμά ἐστιν it is a sacred thing VT. *Ex.* 29.34, *al.* Ⓓ **sacrament, sacrifice** CAP. 2.28.7

ἁγιασμός -οῦ, ὁ [ἁγιάζω] **consecration, sanctification, holiness** VT. *Iudic.* 17.3, *Mac.* 2.2.17, *al* Io. *HIo.* 8.380A *etc.*; ἐν ἁγιασμῷ πνεύματος through the sanctifying work of the Spirit NT. *Thes.* 2.2.13, *EPe.* 1.1.2; πηγὴ ἁγιασμοῦ fount of sanctification, *of the Holy Spirit* BAS. *Eun.* 3.2.53 ‖ *liturg.* **acclamation of the Holy, "Holy"** GREG. *Or.* 38.8.22 *etc.*

ἁγιαστεία [ἁγιάζω] EPIPH. *Haer.* 69.64.2 *etc.*, *see* ἁγιαστία.

ἁγιαστήρ -ῆρος, ὁ [ἁγιάζω] **consecrator** *i*DEFIX.AU. 16.10.7 (IIIᵖ)

ἁγιαστήριον -ου, τό [ἁγιαστήρ] **sanctuary** VT. *Lev.* 12.4, *al. etc.*

ἁγιαστής -οῦ, ὁ [ἁγιάζω] **one who sacrifices** *p*OXY. 2068.3 (IVᵖ)

ἁγιαστί, *adv.* **in a pious manner** *p*PGM *Suppl.* 87.6 (III-IVᵖ)

ἁγιαστία -ας, ἡ [ἁγιάστης] **holiness** VT. *Mac.* 4.7.9, *see* ἁγιαστία.

ἁγιαστικός -όν [ἁγιάζω] **sanctifying** BAS. *epist.* 214.4.14, *al. etc.*

Ἀγιᾶτις -ιδος, ἡ **Agiatis,** *daughter of Gylippos* PLUT. *Cl.* 1.1, *al.*

ἁγιαφόρος -ον [ἅγιος, φέρω] **bearing sacred objects** *i*IG 2².4771.13 (IIᵖ), *see* ἱεραφόρος.

ἀγίγαρτον -ον [γίγαρτον] **without seed, without pit** THPHR. *CP.* 5.5.1 GAL. 13.205 (*of grapes*) AET¹. 9.30 *etc.*

ἁγίζω [ἅγιος] *impf.* ἥγιζον ‖ *aor.* ἥγισα EPIGR. 2.245.2 ‖ *pf. mid. pass.* ἥγισμαι L. *EGud.* ‖ *aor. ptc. pass.* ἁγισθείς; ❶ *active* **to sanctify, consecrate,** *with sacrifices* ARISTOPH. *Pl.* 681 *etc.*; Ποσειδανίῳ θεῷ βούθυτον ἑστίαν ἁγίζων consecrating to the god Poseidon an altar with the sacrifice of a bull SOPH. *OC.* 1495 ❷ *middle* **to venerate** ALCM. 128 ❸ *passive* **to be consecrated** PIND. *O.* 3.19 DION. 1.38.2

ἁγίνέω, *contr.* [ἄγω] ❶ *active* **to lead, bring, carry** IL. 18.493, *al.* OD. 17.294, *al.* HDT. 3.89.3, *al.* CALLIM. *H.* 2.82 *etc.*; πλοῦτον ἀ. ... εἰς ἀρετήν to bring wealth to virtue CRAT¹. 18; παιγνίην ἀγίνῃτε to take vacation, *at school* HEROND. 3.55 ❷ *middle* **to have brought** HDT. 7.33 ❸ *passive* **to be led, be brought** ARR. *Ind.* 32.7 *etc.* ● *esp. ep. and Ion. pr. and impf.* ‖ *ep. pres. inf.* ἀγινέμεναι ‖ *Ion. impf.* ἠγίνεον, ἀγ- *iter.* ἀγίνεσκον (ἠγίνεσκον ARAT. 111) | *fut.* ἀγινήσω.

ἁγιόβλαστος -ον [ἅγιος, βλαστάνω] **having holy buds** EPHR. 3.529F

ἁγιόγραφος -ον [ἅγιος, γράφω] **written under divine inspiration, scriptural** DION²¹. *EH.* 1.4 (376B), *al.* | *subst.* τὰ Ἁγιόγραφα **holy books,** *definition of the historical books of the VT.* EPIPH. *Mens.* 4 (43.244B) *etc.*

ἁγιόλεκτος -ον [ἅγιος, λέγω] **chosen in holiness** [SOPHRON.] *Triod.* 87.3880D

ἁγιολόγος -ον [ἅγιος, λέγω] **speaking of holy things** ENOCH 1.1.2 (*dub.*).

ἁγιοποιέω, *contr.* [ἅγιος, ποιέω] **to sanctify** PHOT. *Lex.* LEONTH. *Nest.* 3.12 (86.1648B), *al.*

ἁγιοποιός -όν [ἁγιοποιέω] **sanctifying** CYR[3]. *Cat.* 16.14 (*of the Holy Spirit*) etc.

ἁγιοπρεπής -ές [ἅγιος, πρέπω] **holy** CLEM[1]. *Ep.* 13.3 etc. ‖ **worthy of a saint** CYR[1]. *Ps.* 9.36, *al.* ◆ *adv.* **ἁγιοπρεπῶς** **in a manner befitting the saints** *or* **holy things** DION[21]. *CH.* 144B, *al. etc.*

ἁγιοπρεπῶς *adv., see* ἁγιοπρεπής.

ἁγιόριζος -ον [ἅγιος, ῥίζα] **of holy root** TIMOTH[3]. *Descr.* 1 (28.944B)

ἅγιος -α -ον [*see* ἅζομαι] A **sacred, holy, venerated**, *of things* THESP. 4.5 (*altars*) XEN. *Hel.* 3.2.19 VT. *Ex.* 3.5; αἱ γραφαὶ ἅ. **holy scripture** NT. *Rom.* 1.2 | ▶ *with gen.* PLAT. *Criti.* 116c; Ἀφροδίτης ἱρὸν ἅγιον **the holy temple of Aphrodite** HDT. 2.41.5 | *of pers.* **holy, pious, pure** ARISTOPH. *Av.* 522 VT. *Deut.* 7.6, *al.*; πνεῦμα ἅ. **Holy Spirit** NT. *Mat.* 3.11, *al.* | *of the church* SOPHRON. *EpSyn.* 87.3196B etc. ‖ *subst. masc.* ὁ ἅγιος **Holy**, *said of God* VT. *Ps.* 77.41; *plur.* οἱ ἅγιοι **the faithful, believers** NT. *Apost.* 9.32, *al.*; *neut.* τὸ ἅγιον **sacred thing, holy place, temple, tabernacle** VT. *Ex.* 36.1, *al.* NT. *Heb.* 8.2, *al.* | τὰ ἅγια (τὸ ἅγιον) (τῶν) ἁγίων **Holy of Holies** (*Lat.* sancta sanctorum) VT. *Ex.* 26.33, *al.* NT. *Heb.* 9.3, *al.* | τὰ ἅγια **holy things**, *of the eucharist* DION[20]. (EUS[1]. *HE.* 7.9.4) etc. B **execrable, cursed** (*cf. Lat.* sacer) CRATIN. 402 etc. ‖ *superl. adv. neut.* -ώτατα DEMOSTH. 23.74 ◆ *adv.* **ἁγίως** **in a holy manner** ISOCR. 11.25 etc. ● *not in* IL. OD. HES.

ἁγιότης -ητος, ἡ [ἅγιος] **holiness** VT. *Mac.* 2.15.2 NT. *Heb.* 12.10, *al.* GREG. *Or.* 34.13.2 etc. | *honorific title of bishops* SOPHRON. *EpSyn.* 87.3196B etc.

ἁγιοτρισσολογέω, *contr.* [ἅγιος, τρισσός, λέγω] **to acclaim with the triple " Holy "** DID[1]. *Trin.* 2.8 (92b) (*aor. inf.* ἁγιοτρισσολογῆσαι).

ἁγιότροπος -ον [ἅγιος, τρέπω] **living a holy life** AGATHANG. *Greg.* 62 (p. 32)

ἁγιοφανής -ές [ἅγιος, φαίνω] **appearing holy** EUST[1]. *Eng.* 4

ἁγιοφόρος -ον [ἅγιος, φέρω] *fig.* **bearing holy things**, *of Christians* IGN. *Eph.* 9.2, *al.*

Ἆγις -ιδος, ὁ **Agis**, *male name* THUC. 3.89.1 etc. ● *acc.* -ιν | *Ion.* Ἦγις -ιδος HDT. 7.204.

ἁγισμός -οῦ, ὁ [ἁγίζω] **purification, funeral offering** DIOD. 4.39.1

ἁγιστ(ε)ία -ας, ἡ [ἁγιστεύω] A **sacred ritual, religious ceremony** *pl.* PLAT. *Ax.* 371d ISOCR. 11.28 etc. | *sg.* STRAB. 9.3.7 PLUT. *Rom.* 22.1 IUL. 5.178d etc. B *Christ.* **glory, holiness** ISID[4]. *epist.* 3.326 etc.

ἁγίστευμα -ατος, τό [ἁγιστεύω] **sanctuary** PROC[1]. *Aed.* 1.4.17

ἁγιστεύω [ἅγιος] *fut.* ἁγιστεύσω ‖ *aor. ptc.* ἁγιστεύσας ❶ *active* A **to perform a sacred rite** PLAT. *Leg.* 759d | ▶ *with acc.* DION. 1.40.3 B **to purify**: φόνου χεῖρας **hands of murder** OR. (PAUS. 10.6.7) C **to live devoutly**: βιοτὰν **one's life** EUR. *Bac.* 74 ‖ **to be holy** PAUS. 6.20.2, *al.* ❷ *passive* A **to be performed** *or* **celebrated**, *of sacred rites* PHIL[2]. *Spec.* 1.125 B **to be considered holy**, *of places* STRAB. 9.3.1 DION. 1.40.6

ἁγιστήριον -ου, τό [ἁγίζω] **vessel for holy water** *I*PERG. 255.9, *see* περιρραντήριον.

ἁγιστός -ή -όν [ἁγίζω] **sanctified** L. *EGud.* (*s.v.* ἁγιστεία)

ἁγιστύς -ύος, ἡ [ἁγίζω] **ceremony** CALLIM. *fr.* 178.3 (*acc.* -ύν)

ἁγιωδῶς [ἅγιος] *adv.* **in a sacred manner**: *only*

superl. -έστατα **in the most sacred manner** PHIL[2]. *Somn.* 2.123 (*doub.*)

ἁγιωσύνη -ης, ἡ [ἅγιος] A **holiness** VT. *Mac.* 2.3.12 NT. *Rom.* 1.4 etc. | *of a bishop, as honorific title* THEODORET[1]. *epist.* 82 (92v) ‖ **chastity** AAP. *Thom. A* 97 (p. 210.10) B **sanctuary** CYR[3]. *Cat.* 2.17

ἀγκ- *poet. for* ἀνακ- (*see*)

ἀγκάζομαι [ἀγκάς] A **to take in the arms** IL. 17.722 CALLIM. *fr.* 236.1 NONN. *D.* 7.318 B **to embrace** EUPHOR. *Sh.* 415.i.9 ● *impf. 3. pl.* ἀγκάζοντο and ἠγκάζοντο HSCH. ‖ *fut. 3. sg.* ἀγκάσσεται P[1]. *Soph.* 375 ‖ *aor.* ἀγκασάμην and ἠγκασ(σ)άμην.

ἀγκάθεν [ἀγκάς] *adv.* **in the arms**: παλαιὸν ἄγκαθεν λάβων βρέτας **having held in (your) arms the sacred image** AESCHL. *Eum.* 80 ‖ **on the elbows**: κοιμώμενος ἄγκαθεν **leaned on my elbows** AESCHL. *Ag.* 3 (*oth.* = ἀνέκαθεν **up above** HSCH. AG. *Bek.* 337).

Ἀγκαῖος -ου, ὁ **Ankaios**, *male name* IL. 2.609, 23.635 etc. ● *epic gen.* -οιο IL. 2.609.

ἀγκαλέω *poet. for* ἀνακαλέω.

ἀγκάλη -ης, ἡ [*see* ἀγκών] A **arm**, *bent, gener. pl.*: ἐν ἀγκάλαις λαβών **having taken in (your) arms** AESCHL. *Suppl.* 481; τινὰ φέρειν ἐν τῇ ἀγκάλῃ **to carry (s.o.) in one's arms** HDT. 6.61.4 = ἐν ταῖς ἀγκάλαις περιφέρειν τινά XEN. *Cyr.* 7.5.50 = ἀγκάλαις περιφέρειν EUR. *Or.* 464; ἀγκάλαις ἔχειν **to hold in one's arms** EUR. *IT.* 289; ἐπ᾽ἀγκάλαις λαβεῖν **to take in (your) arms** EUR. *Ion* 761; δέχεσθαι εἰς τὰς ἀγκάλας **to take in the arms** NT. *Lu.* 2.28 | *fig.* ἀγκάλαις ἀσμενίζειν **to receive with open arms** SOPHRON. *EpSyn.* 87.3188B B *fig.* **embrace, envelop, grip**: κυμάτων ἐν ἀγκάλαις **in the grip of the waves** ARCHIL. 213; πόντιαι ἀ. **the embraces of the deep** (*the sea*) AESCHL. *Ch.* 587; πετραία δ᾽ἀγκάλη σε βαστάσει **a rocky embrace will hold you tight**, *of a cave* AESCHL. *Pr.* 1019 | *of the air* ὑγραῖς ἐν ἀγκάλαις **in its soft arms** EUR. *fr.* 941 C *extens. pl.* **breast** SYN. *Ep.* 5 ‖ **bend of the knee** CAEL. *TP.* 5.1.3 D *meton. that which is held in the arms, thus* **bundle** EPIPH. *Haer.* 51.31.8 ● *dat. pl.* ἀγκάλησι Corinn. 7.2.

ἀγκάλισμα -ατος, τό [ἀγκαλίζομαι] A **that which is carried in the arms** *or* **embraced** LUC. 49.14 | **favorite**, *of pers.*: τερπνὸν ἀγκάλισμα συγγόνων **sweet darling brothers** LYC. 308 B **embrace**, *of the air* TIMOTH. 15.80-1 ACH. 2.37.6 (*pl.*)

ἀγκαλισμός -οῦ, ὁ [ἀγκαλίζομαι] **assembling into bundles** *P*OXY. 1631.9 (III*P*)

ἄγκαλος -ου, ὁ [*see* ἀγκών] **armful, bundle** HOM. 4.82 *P*OXY. 3354.9

ἀγκάς [*see* ἀγκών] *adv.* **into the arms, in the arms** IL. 14.353, *al.* OD. 7.252, *al.* THEOCR. 8.55 AP. 1.276 etc.

ἀγκάσιν *see* ἀγκών.

ἄγκειται *poet. for* ἀνάκειται: *see* ἀνάκειμαι.

ἀγκηθής HSCH., *see* ἀβλαβής.

ἀγκιστρεία -ας, ἡ [ἀγκιστρεύω] **fishing with a**

hook PLAT. *Leg.* 823d AEL. *NA.* 12.43 | *fig.* ARISTAEN. 1.17

ἀγκιστρευτικός -ή -όν [ἀγκιστρεύω] **pertaining to fishing** GAL. 5.861 ‖ *subst.* τὸ ἀγκιστρευτικόν **fishing** PLAT. *Soph.* 220d

ἀγκιστρεύω [ἄγκιστρον] *fut. mid.* ἀγκιστρεύσομαι ‖ *aor.* ἠγκίστρευσα, *mid.* ἠγκιστρευσάμην PHIL[2]. *Spec.* 4.67, *al.* | *pf. mid. pass.* ἠγκίστρευμαι GAL. 19.102 | *aor. pass.* ἠγκιστρεύθην; **to fish**, *thus fig.* **to lure, snare** ▶ τινα S.O. ARISTAEN. 1.5 CLEM. *Paed.* 3.5.31.3 (*of women*) etc. ‖ *mid.* = *act.* PHIL[2]. *Op.* 166, *al.*

ἀγκίστριον -ου, ὁ [ἄγκιστρον] **small hook** THEOCR. 21.57 PLUT. 58.877f BIT. 51.1

ἀγκιστρόδετος -ον [ἄγκιστρον, δέω 1] **to which a hook is bound**, *of a fishing line* THEAET. (AP. 6.27.2)

ἀγκιστροειδής -ές [ἄγκιστρον, εἶδος] **like a hook, hooked** AET. 1.3.18 etc.

ἀγκιστροθηρευτής -οῦ, ὁ [ἄγκιστρον, θηρευτής] **fisherman** THEODORET[1]. *Is.* 19.8

ἄγκιστρον -ου, τό [*see* ἀγκών] A **hook, fishing hook** OD. 4.369, *al.* HDT. 2.70.1 etc. ‖ **hook**, *of a spindle* PLAT. *Rp.* 616c | **hook**, *for surgery* GAL. 19.69 PHILUM. *Ven.* 2.6 CAEL. *TP.* 5.1.19 PAEG. 4.53.1, *al.* ‖ **hook** DCASS. 60.35.4 B *fig. for a snare* **hook** BAS. *Hom.* 7.7 etc. ‖ *with accept. posit.* GREG[1]. *OrCat.* 24 etc. ● *Dor. crasis* τώγκ. < τοῦ ἀ. *and* τῷ ἀ.

ἀγκιστροπώλης -ου, ὁ [ἄγκιστρον, πώλης] **seller of hooks** POLL. 7.198

ἀγκιστροφάγος -ον [ἄγκιστρον, φαγεῖν] **biting the hook** ARISTOT. *HA.* 621b 1

ἀγκιστρόω, *contr.* [ἄγκιστρον] *aor. ptc.* ἀγκιστρώσας HLD. 9.15.2 ‖ *pf. ptc. mid. pass.* ἠγκιστρωμένος PLUT. *Cr.* 25.5 ❶ *active* **to fasten as with hooks** HLD. 9.15.2 ❷ *middle* **to be furnished with barbs** PLUT. *Cr.* 25.5 ❸ *passive* **to be caught by a hook** LYC. 67 (*fig.*)

ἀγκιστρώδης -ες [ἄγκιστρον] **like a hook** POL. 34.3.5 etc.

ἀγκιστρωτός -ή -όν [ἀγκιστρόω] **hooked** POL. 6.23.10 etc.

ἀγκλ- *poet. see* ἀνακλ-.

ἀγκλάριον -ου, τό [κλῆρος] *Dor. for* ἀνακλήριον **distribution** *I*CIG 2562.13

ἄγκοινα -ης, ἡ [ἀγκών] A **arm** (*folded*), *only pl.* IL. 14.213 HOM. 2.141, *al. etc.* B *fig.* **embrace, grasp** IUL[2]. (AP. 9.398.2) OPP. 3.34.2 ● *ep. Ion.* -νη | *poet. for* ἀγκάλη.

ἀγκοινίζω POLL. 3.155 (*doub.*), *see* ἀγκαλίζομαι.

ἀγκομ- *poet. see* ἀνακομ-.

ἀγκονίω **to agitate**: *pres. ptc.* ἀγκονίωαι ARISTOPH. *Lys.* 1311 (*conject.*).

ἄγκος -εος, *contr.* -ους, τό [*see* ἀγκών] **bend, hollow, valley** IL. 20.490 OD. 4.337 HES. *Op.* 389 HDT. 6.74.2 EUR. *Bac.* 1051 THEOCR. 8.33 etc.; ἠδ᾽ἄγκος ὑψίκρημνον ὄρεσι περίδρομον **and a valley with high crags surrounded by mountains** TRAG. 445a

Ἄγκος -ου, ὁ **Ankos**, *Roman* PLUT. *Cor.* 1.1 etc.

ἀγκρ- *poet. see* ἀνακρ-.

ἄγκτειρα, ἡ [ἀγκτήρ] **suffocating** OR. *Chald. fr.* 161

ἀγκτήρ -ῆρος, ὁ [ἄγχω] A **fastener, clip**, *used for closing wounds* CELS. 5.26 PLUT. 30.468c GAL. 1.385 etc. B *part of the throat* POLL. 2.134 C **bandage, dressing** HLD[2]. (ORIB. 48.28.5) | *fig. pl.* **bonds** PROCL. *in Eucl.* 20.25 ● *also* ἀκτήρ.

ἀγκτηριάζω [ἀγκτήρ] *aor.* ἠγκτηρίασα ‖ *aor. pass.* ἠγκτηριάσθην; **to bind a wound with a fastener**, *see* ἀγκτήρ CRIT[2]. (GAL. 13.878) ● *v.l.* ἀγκτηρίζω; *impf. mid. pass. 3. sg.* ἠγκτηρίζετο GAL. 18(1).823.

ἀγκυλένδετος -ον [ἀγκύλη, ἐνδέω] **bound with straps**, *of a javelin* TIMOTH. 15.22

ἀγκῠλέω, *contr.* [ἀγκύλη] *impf.* ἠγκύλουν Hsch.; **to fold** (*the arm*) Ath. 15.667a,b Cratin. 299 ‖ *mid.* **to hurl like a javelin**, *thunderbolt* Sat. (Ath. 12.534e) (*pf. ptc.* ἠγκυλημένος).

ἀγκῠλη -ης, ἡ [*see* ἀγκών] Ⓐ **bend, folding, ligament, joint**, *of the arm or wrist* Cratin. 299 Hsch. A 575 *etc.*; ἀπ' ἀ. ἱέναι to cast from the wrist, *of the way in which the wrist was bent when casting the cottabus* Bacchyl. *fr.* 17.2 | *of the knee* Hp. *Fract.* 30 Philostr. *Im.* 2.6.4 ‖ *med.* **ankylosed joint** Hp. *Liq.* 6 Asclep[4]. (Gal. 13.968, 13.967) Ⓑ **strap, thong, cord**, *of a bow* Soph. *OT.* 204 | *of a javelin* Strab. 4.4.3 Plut. *Phil.* 6.9 | *extens.* **javelin** Eur. *Or.* 1476 *etc.* ‖ **loop, knot**: πλεκτὰς ἐξανῆπτεν ἀγκύλας grasped the woven loops Eur. *IT.* 1408 | *in a leash* Xen. *Cyn.* 6.1 | *in a bandage* Gal. 18(1).790 | *in a torsion engine* Hero *Bel.* 83.1 ‖ **lace**, *for sandals* Alexis 32 ‖ **ring** *or* **hook**, *for a curtain* VT. *Ex.* 38.18, *al.* | *on the end of a chain* Greg[1]. *Prof.* 3.244 (*PG* 46.244B).

ἀγκῠλητός -ή -όν [ἀγκύλη] Ⓐ **thrown**, *in the game of kottabos* Aeschl. *fr.* 179 Ⓑ *subst.* τὸ ἀγκυλητόν **javelin** Aeschl. *fr.* 16

ἀγκῠλίδιον, τό [ἀγκυλίς] *dim. of* ἀγκύλη (*see*) ιDélos 1442 B 59 (II[a])

ἀγκῠλίδωτός -όν [ἀγκύλιον, δίδωμι] **having a loop** Hp. (Gal. 19.69)

ἀγκῠλιον -ου, τό [ἀγκυλίς] Ⓐ **loop**, *of a knot* Heracla. (Orib. 48.2.1) ‖ **ring**, *of a chain* AG. *Bek.* 329 Ⓑ *med.* **ankyloglossia**, *reduced mobility of the tongue* Antyll. (Orib. 45.15.2) Ⓒ *pl.* **small shields** (*Lat.* ancilia) Plut. *Nu.* 13.9

ἀγκῠλίς -ίδος, ἡ [ἀγκύλη] **pike**, *for hunting* Opp[1]. 1.155

Ἀγκῠλίων -ωνος, ὁ **Ankylion**, *male name* Aristoph. *Ve.* 1397

ἀγκῠλλω [ἀγκύλος] **to bend back** Aret. *SA.* 1.6.6

ἀγκῠλοβλέφαρος -ον [ἀγκύλος, βλέφαρον] **with contracted eylids**: *subst.* τὸ ἀγκυλοβλέφαρον **adhesion of the eyelids** Cels. 7.7

ἀγκῠλόγλωσσος -ον [ἀγκύλος, γλῶσσα] **suffering from ankyloglossia**, *i.e., reduced mobility of the tongue* Aet[1]. 8.38; τὸ ἀ. πάθος ankyloglossia Orib. 45.15 (*title*) Paeg. 6.29.1

ἀγκῠλόγλωχιν -ῖνος, ὁ [ἀγκύλος, γλωχίς] **with hooked spurs**, *of a cock* Babr. 17.3

ἀγκῠλόδειρος -ον [ἀγκύλος, δειρή] **with a crooked neck** Opp. 4.630

ἀγκῠλόδους -οντος [ἀγκύλος, ὀδούς] Ⓐ **with crooked teeth**, *of a scimitar* QS. 6.218; *of an anchor* Nonn. *D.* 3.50 Ⓑ **barbed** Maced[1]. (AP. 6.176.1) Nonn. *D.* 6.21

ἀγκῠλοειδής -ές [ἀγκύλος, εἶδος] **winding, sinuous** L. *Sud* ◆ *adv.* ἀγκυλοειδῶς Erot. 76.3 (*conject.*).

ἀγκῠλοειδῶς *adv.*, see ἀγκυλοειδής.

ἀγκῠλοκοπέω, *contr.* [ἀγκύλος, κόπτω] *Byz. aor.* ἠγκυλοκόπησα; **to lame** *p*Lond. 2.415.15 (IV[p]) *etc.*

ἀγκῠλόκυκλος -ον [ἀγκύλος, κύκλος] **in coils**, *of a tail* Nonn. *D.* 35.217

ἀγκῠλόκωλος -ον [ἀγκύλος, κῶλον] **with deformed limbs** Archestr. *fr.* 172.3 *SH*

ἀγκῠλομαχία -ας, ἡ [ἀγκύλος, μάχη] **contest with the javelin** *ι*IPE 1[2].435.9

ἀγκῠλομήτης -ου, ὁ [ἀγκύλος, μῆτις] **of crooked counsel, wily**, *epith. of Kronos* Il. 2.205 Od. 21.415, *al. etc.* | *of Prometheus* Hes. *Th.* 546, *Op.* 48 ◆ *gen. Ion.* -εω ‖ *Boeot.* ἀγκυλομείτας -αο Corin. 1.i.14-15.

ἀγκῠλόμητις -ιος [ἀγκυλομήτης] Nonn. *D.* 21.255, *see* ἀγκυλομήτης.

ἀγκῠλόπους -ουν, *gen.* -ποδος [ἀγκύλος, πούς] **with**

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curved feet: ἀ. δίφρος curule chair Plut. *Mar.* 5.2, 10

ἀγκῠλόπρυμνος -ον [ἀγκύλος, πρύμνα] **with crooked stern** *p*Hib. 172.116 (III[a])

ἀγκῠλόρινος -ον [ἀγκύλος, ῥίς] **with curved nose** ιoMal. *Chron.* 5 p. 106

ἀγκῠλος -η -ον [*see* ἀγκών] Ⓐ **curved, crooked** Il. 5.209, *al.* Od. 21.264 *etc.*; ἀρότροις ἀγκύλοις with curved plows Moschio *fr.* 6.9 | *of an eagle* ἀ. κάρα beaked head Pind. *P.* 1.8 | ἀγκύλαις ταῖς χερσίν with hooked hands Aristoph. *Eq.* 205 Ⓑ *fig.* **wily, cunning** Lyc. 344 Alciphr. 3.28.1 Ⓒ *of style* **contorted, intricate** Dion. *Thuc.* 35.3 Luc. 29.21 | **concise, incisive, terse**: ἀ. φράσις too terse expression Dion. *Thuc.* 25.4 (*comp.*) | *compar.* -ώτερος ◆ *adv.* ἀγκύλως **with concise style** Dion. *Thuc.* 31.1, *al.* Damasc. *in Parm.* 187

ἀγκῠλοτομος -ου, τό **hooked instrument** (*used for tonsillectomy*) Paeg. 67.18

ἀγκῠλοτοξος -ον [ἀγκύλος, τόξον] **with curved bow** Il. 2.848 *etc.*

ἀγκῠλοχείλης -ου [ἀγκύλος, χεῖλος] **with curved beak** Il. 16.428 (*vultures*) Batr. 294 (*v.l.*) Hes. *Sc.* 405 (*codd.*) ‖ *prob. always f.l. for* -χήλης.

ἀγκῠλόχειλος -ον Greg. *Carm.* 1.2.2.625 *etc.*, see ἀγκυλοχείλης.

ἀγκῠλόχηλος -ον [ἀγκύλος, χηλή] **with curved claws** Aristoph. *Eq.* 197 (*v.l.* -χείλης), 204 Batr. 294 (*v.l.* -χείλης).

ἀγκῠλόω, *contr.* [ἀγκύλος] *aor. ptc.* ἀγκυλώσας Dicaearc. 97 ‖ *pf. mid. pass.* ἠγκύλωμαι ‖ *aor. pass.* ἠγκυλώθην; **to bend** Plat[1]. 47; ὄνυχάς τις ἠγκυλωμένος with curved talons Aristoph. *Av.* 1180

ἀγκῠλωμα -ατος, τό [ἀγκυλόω] **loop, knot** Gal. 18(1).798

ἀγκῠλωσις -εως, ἡ [ἀγκυλόω] **stiffness of the joints, ankylosis** Paeg. 4.55.1 ‖ **ankyloglossia** Antyll. (Orib. 45.16.4) ‖ **adhesion of the eyelids** [Gal.] *Intr.* 14.772

ἀγκῠλωτός -ή -όν [ἀγκυλόω] **furnished with a strap** Eur. *Bac.* 1205

ἄγκῠρα -ας, ἡ [*cf.* ἀγκών] Ⓐ **anchor**: ἄγκυραν καθιέναι to cast anchor Hdt. 7.36.2 = βάλλεσθαι Pind. *I.* 6.13 = μεθιέναι Aeschl. *Ch.* 662 = ἀφιέναι Xen. *An.* 3.5.10; ἄγκυραν αἴρειν to weigh anchor Plut. *Pomp.* 50.2 = αἴρεσθαι Plut. *Pomp.* 80.1 = ἀνελέσθαι Leon. (AP. 10.1.5) = ἀναλαμβάνειν Plut. *Mar.* 37.8 = ἀνασπάειν Ach. 2.32.2; ἐπ' ἀγκυρέων ὁρμεῖν to lie at anchor Hdt. 7.188.1 = ἀποσαλεύειν Demosth. 50.22 *etc.* ‖ *fig.* **anchor of salvation, support, hope** Eur. *Hel.* 277, *Hec.* 80 Hld. 4.19.9 Plat. *Leg.* 961c; ἀλλ'εἰσὶ μητρὶ παῖδες ἄγκυραι βίου but children are a mother's hope of life Soph. *fr.* 685; ἐπὶ δυοῖν ἀγκύραιν ὁρμεῖν to ride at two anchors, *i.e.* to have it both ways Demosth. 56.44 (*cf.* Pind. *O.* 6.101 ff.); ἀ. ἱερὰ holy anchor, *i.e.* last hope Plut. 52.815d Luc. 21.51; ἀγκύρας δίκην like an anchor Lyd. *Ost.* 16 (*prob. f.l. for* ἀγκτῆρος: *see* ἀγκτήρ) Ⓑ **pruning hook**, Thphr. *CP.* 2.3.2 Ⓒ **genitals** Epichar. 191 ◆ *Ion.* ἀγκύρη | *Aeol.* ἄγκυρρα.

ἀγκῠρειος -α -ον [ἄγκυρα] **of an anchor** *ι*IG 2[2].1609.101 (IV[a])

ἀγκῠρηβόλιον -ου, τό Democr. B 148, *see* ἀγκυροβόλιον.

ἀγκῠρίζω [ἄγκυρα] *aor.* ἠγκύρισα; **to trip** Aristoph. *Eq.* 262 ◆ *Cret.* ἀγκυρίττω Hsch.

ἀγκῠριον -ου, τό [ἄγκυρα] **small anchor** Plut. 41.564c Luc. 19.1 *etc.* (*only sg.*; *for the pl., see* ἀγκύριος).

ἀγκῠριος -ον [ἄγκυρα] **of an anchor**: *subst.* τὰ ἀγκύρια anchor cables Diod. 14.73.4

ἀγκῠρίς -ίδος, ἡ [ἄγκυρα] **small anchor** *ι*IG

22.1550 (III[a]) ‖ **a theatrical device** Plut. *Prov.* 2.16 ‖ **name of a plant** Hsch.

ἀγκῠρισμα -ατος, τό [ἀγκυρίζω] **trip** Hsch

ἀγκῠρίτης λίθος [ἄγκυρα] **anchor stone** Hsch. *s.v.* μασχάλην

ἀγκῠρίττω [ἄγκυρα] *Cret.* **to defeat** Hsch.

ἀγκῠροβολέω, *contr.* [ἄγκυρα, βάλλω] *aor.* ἠγκυροβόλησα Erot. ‖ *pf. mid. pass.* ἠγκυροβόλημαι; **to anchor, fasten securely** Hp. *Os.* 18

ἀγκῠροβόλιον -ου, τό [ἀγκυροβολέω] **anchorage** Strab. 3.4.7 Plut. 35.507b *etc.*

ἀγκῠροειδής -ές [ἄγκυρα, εἶδος] **anchor-shaped** Gal. 2.766 Diosc[2]. 3.158 *etc.* ◆ *adv.* ἀγκυροειδῶς **like an anchor** Erot

ἀγκῠροειδῶς *adv.*, see ἀγκυροειδής.

ἀγκῠρόμαχος, ὁ [ἄγκυρα, μάχη ?] *a type of boat* Isido. 19.1.16

ἀγκῠρομήλη -ης, ἡ [ἄγκυρα, μήλη] **hooked probe** Hp. (Erot. *in* Gal. 19.69) *etc.*

ἀγκῠρουχία -ας, ἡ [ἄγκυρα, ἔχω] **lying at anchor**: ἐν ἀγκυρουχίαις being at moorings Aeschl. *Suppl.* 766

ἀγκῠρωμα, -ατος, τό **anchor** Sch. Aristoph. *Eq.* 762

ἀγκῠρωτός -ή -όν [ἄγκυρα] **curved like an anchor** Phil. 85.36 | *subst.* ὁ Ἀγκυρωτός **Ancoratus**, *title of a work by Epiphanios* Epiph. *Haer.* 69.27.2, *al.*

ἀγκών -ῶνος, ὁ [*IE* *ank-, *cf. Lat.* ancus, *Skt.* áñcati] Ⓐ **elbow** Il. 10.80 Od. 14.494 Hp. *Fract.* 3, *al. etc.*; εἰς ἀγκῶνα διαναστὰς raising himself on his elbow Plut. *Br.* 11.3 | **arm** Pind. *N.* 5.42 Soph. *Ant.* 1237 *etc.* | *of animals* **joint**, *of the legs* Xen. *Cyn.* 4.1 ‖ **curve, bend, angle** Il. 16.702 Hdt. 1.180.2 ‖ **bend**, *of a river* Hdt. 2.99.2 ‖ **bay, recess**, *of a region* Soph. *Ai.* 805 ‖ **inlet, bay** Strab. 12.8.19 Ⓒ *ballist.* **arm, lever, bar** Hero *Bel.* 78.4, 81.9 Phil. 53.40 *etc.* ‖ **arm**, *of a throne* VT. *Chr.* 2.9.18 *etc.* ‖ *a type of vase* Artemid. 1.74 Ⓓ *prov.* γλυκὺς ἀ. sweet bend, *euphem. of a difficulty* Plat. *Phaedr.* 257d | sweet nook, *of a brothel* Clear[1]. 43a | sweetheart, darling, *of a lover* Plat[1]. 178 ‖ *bot.* **abrotonon**, *plant* Diosc[2]. 3.24 ◆ *dat. pl.* -ώνεσσι Pind. *N.* 5.42 ‖ *prob. dat. pl.* ἀγκάσιν to the arms Opp. 2.315.

Ἀγκών -ῶνος, ἡ **Ankon**, *city in central Italy* Strab. 5.4.2 Ptol[4]. *Geog.* 3.1.21 *etc.*

ἀγκώνη -ης, ἡ Sch. Dion[6]. 191.37, *see* ἄγκοινα.

ἀγκωνίζω [ἀγκών] *aor. mid.* ἠγκωνισάμην ❶ *active* **to recline at table** Gloss. ❷ *middle fig.* **to use circumlocutions** Com. *CGFP* 252.8 ◆ *other tenses only in compd.: see* ἐξ-, παρ-, περιαγκωνίζω.

ἀγκώνιον -ου, τό [ἀγκών] **elbow** Gal. 4.452

ἀγκώνιον -ου, τό [ἄγκυρα] **small hinge, hook** Hero *Pn.* 1.42

ἀγκωνίσκος -ου, ὁ [ἄγκυρα] Hero *Pn.* 1.42 VT. *Ex.* 26.17, *see* ἀγκωνίσκιον ‖ **wooden board**, *of the tabernacle* Cosm[1]. 5.23

ἀγκωνισμός -οῦ, ὁ [ἀγκωνίζω] **stretch**, *of an estuary* Eustath. 1712.29

ἀγκωνόδεσμος -ου, ὁ [ἀγκών, δέω] **cushion**, *for leaning the elbow on* (*Lat.* cubital) Gloss

ἀγκωνοειδής -ές [ἀγκών, εἶδος] **curved, bent** Bit. 58.88 (*v.l.*)

ἀγκωνοφόρος -ου, ὁ [ἀγκών, φέρω] **vase-bearer** (*see* ἀγκών) *ι*IG 2[2].2361.8 (III[p])

ἀγλαέθειρος -ου, ὁ [ἀγλαός, ἔθειρα] **bright-haired** Hom. 19.5

Ἀγλαΐα -ας, ἡ [ἀγλαός] **Aglaïa**, *one of the Graces* Il. 2.672 Hes. *Th.* 909 *etc.* ◆ *Ion.* -ῐη.

ἀγλαΐα -ας, ἡ [ἀγλαός] Ⓐ **splendor, beauty** Il. 6.510 (*pl.*) Od. 15.78, *al. etc.* ‖ **pride, vanity** Od. 17.244 (*pl.*), 310 Eur. *Hel.* 192, *al.* Ⓑ **joy, triumph, festivity, mirth** Hes. *Sc.* 272, 285 (*pl.*) Pind. *O.* 13.14 *etc.*; μηδέ ποτ' ἀγλαΐας ἀπόναιατο may they

never enjoy triumph Soph. *El.* 211 [C] **ornament** Xen. *Hip.* 5.8 (*mane*) Ael. *NA.* 10.13 (*oyster*) *etc.* ● Ion. -ῃ *ep.* -ῃφι.

ἀγλαΐζω [ἀγλαός] *impf.* ἠγλάϊζον, *mid.* ἠγλαϊζόμην ‖ *fut.* (ἐπ)αγλαϊῶ, *mid.* ἀγλαΐουμαι Il. 10.331 ‖ *aor.* ἠγλάϊσα, *mid.* (ἐν)ηγλαϊσάμην Eustath. 9.44 ‖ *pf. mid. pass.* ἠγλάϊσμαι ‖ *ppf. mid. pass.* ἠγλαΐσμην Iul[6]. p. 254.10 ‖ *aor. pass.* ἠγλαΐσθην *in compd.* ‖ *fut. pass.* (κατ)αγλαϊσθήσομαι Io. *HPs.* (*PG* 55.675.34) ❶ **active** [A] **to make splendid, glorify** Bacchyl. *Epin.* 3.22 Isyll. 28 Plut. 63.965c Ael. *NA.* 8.28; πολλοῖς μὲν ἐνάλου, ὀρείου δὲ πολλοῖς ἄγρας ἀκροθινίοις ἀγλαΐσας having glorified the hunts with much spoils of the sea, much from the mountains Trag. 415a ‖ **to adorn** Il. 10.331 Sem. 7.70 [B] **to offer as an honor** ▸ τί τινι sthg. to s.o. Lyr. *CP.* 5(b).1 Theocr. *epigr.* 1.4 [C] *intrans.* **to shine** Antiph. 294 (*codd.*) ❷ **middle and passive** (*ep. and lyr.*) **to adorn oneself, take delight in** Il. 10.331; ▸ τινι (with) sthg. Sem. 7.70 = ἔν τινι Pind. *O.* 1.14 ● *never in trag. or Att. prose* ‖ *fut. mid. 3. sg. Byz.* (ἐν)αγλαΐσεται ‖ *poet. aor.* ἀγλάϊσα.

Ἀγλαΐς -ΐδος, ἡ **Aglaïs**, *female name* Ael. *VH.* 1.26 *etc.*

Ἀγλαΐων -ωνος, ὁ **Aglaion**, *male name* Plat. *Rp.* 439e

ἀγλαόβοτρυς -υ [ἀγλαός, βότρυς] **with splendid bunches** Nonn. *D.* 18.4 ● *gen.* -υος.

ἀγλαόγυιος -ον [ἀγλαός, γυῖον] **with beautiful limbs** Pind. *N.* 7.4

ἀγλαόδενδρος -ον [ἀγλαός, δένδρον] **with beautiful trees** Pind. *O.* 9.20

ἀγλαοδίνης -ου, ὁ [ἀγλαός, δίνη] **with beautiful eddies** *p*Hib. 172.106 (III[a])

ἀγλαόδωρος -ον [ἀγλαός, δῶρον] **of splendid gifts** Hom. 2.54, *al. I*EG 1062.5 (*Mary*)

ἀγλαοειδής -ές [ἀγλαός, εἶδος] **of noble aspect** *p*Lond.Lit. 38.26 (III[p])

ἀγλαοεργός -όν [ἀγλαός, ἔργον] **of splendid deeds** Max. 68

ἀγλαοθηλές [ἀγλαός, θῆλυς] **tender, delicate** Hsch

ἀγλαόθρονος -ον [ἀγλαός, θρόνος] **with splendid throne** Pind. *O.* 13.96, *N.* 10.1 (*Danaids*) Bacchyl. *Dith.* 17.124 (*Nereids*)

ἀγλαόθυμος -ον [ἀγλαός, θυμός] **with noble heart** Comet. (AP. 15.40.25)

ἀγλαόκαρπος -ον [ἀγλαός, καρπός] [A] **with splendid fruits** Od. 7.115, *al.* Hom. 2.4, 23 *etc.* [B] **with beautiful wrists** Pind. *N.* 3.56 (*Tethys: v.l., see* ἀγλαόκολπος).

ἀγλαόκοιτος [ἀγλαός, κοίτη] **very precious, dear** Phot. *Lex.* L. *Sud*

ἀγλαόκολπος -ον [ἀγλαός, κόλπος] **with splendid bosom** Pind. *N.* 3.56

ἀγλαόκουρος -ον [ἀγλαός, κοῦρος] **with splendid youth**, *of Corinth* Pind. *O.* 13.6

Ἀγλαοκρέων -οντος, ὁ **Aglaokreon**, *male name* Aeschin. 2.20, 126

ἀγλαόκωμος -ον [ἀγλαός, κῶμος] **giving splendor to the feast**, *of a voice* Pind. *O.* 3.6

ἀγλαομειδής -ές [ἀγλαός, μειδάω] **with a splendid smile**, *of Eros I*Bulg. 1579.5 (II[p])

ἀγλαόμητις -ου, ὁ **of rare wisdom** *I*SEG 36.1198.8 (IV[p])

ἀγλαομητία -ας, ἡ [ἀγλαόμητις] **great wisdom** L. *Sud*

ἀγλαόμητις -ιος [ἀγλαός, μῆτις] **of rare wisdom** Greg. *Carm.* 1.2.339.3 Triphiod. 183 Procl. *Hym.* 5.10

ἀγλαόμολπος -ον [ἀγλαός, μολπή] **of beautiful song** *p*Harris 7.8 (II-III[p])

ἀγλαομορφέομαι, *contr.* [ἀγλαόμορφος] *pass.* **to be endowed with beautiful forms** *p*PGM 13.143

ἀγλαόμορφος -ον [ἀγλαός, μορφή] **of beautiful form** AP. 9.524.2 *etc.*

Ἀγλαονίκη -ης, ἡ **Aglaonike**, *female name* Hedyl. (AP. 5.199.1) *etc.*

ἀγλαόπαις -παιδος [ἀγλαός, παῖς] **with beautiful children** Opp. 2.41 ‖ **with beautiful offspring** *I*EG 896.1 ‖ *fig.* **splendid:** ἀ. ἀοιδή marvellous song P[1]. *Amb.* 112

ἀγλαόπεπλος -ον [ἀγλαός, πέπλος] **with a beautiful veil**, *of a peplos* QS. 11.240

ἀγλαόπηχυς -υ [ἀγλαός, πῆχυς] **with splendid arms** Nonn. *D.* 32.80 ● *gen.* -εος.

ἀγλαόπιστος -ον [ἀγλαός, πιστός] **splendidly faithful** Hsch

ἀγλαοποιέω, *contr.* [ἀγλαός, ποιέω] **to make famous** Ammi[1]. 17.4.19 (*aor. ptc.* ἀγλαοποιήσας).

ἀγλάϊος -α -ον [ἀγλαός] **splendid** *I*MAMA 3.79.2, *see* ἀγλαός.

ἀγλαός -ή -όν [*see* γελάω ?] [A] **splendid, magnificent, beautiful**, *of water* Il. 2.307 | *of limbs* Il. 19.385 Hes. *Op.* 337 Bacchyl. *Dith.* 17.103 | *of gifts* Il. 1.213, *al.* | *of works* Od. 10.223 | *of a wood* Il. 2.506 *etc.* | ἀγλαὸν ἀνδρὶ μάχεσθαι it is fair (glorious) for a man to fight Callin. 1.6 [B] **illustrious, noble, glorious**, *of pers.* Il. 2.736, *al.* Bacchyl. *Dith.* 17.2 *etc.* | *iron.* κέρα ἀγλαέ you, proud of your horn *i.e.* bow Il. 11.385 ◆ *fem.* -ός Thgn. 985 Eur. *Andr.* 135 ‖ *ep. and lyr., in trag. only* Soph. *OT.* 152 (*lyr.*) and Eur. *l.c.* | *Aeol.* ἄγλαος Theocr. 28.3 ◆ *adv.* ἀγλαῶς **splendidly** Aristoph. *Lys.* 640.

Ἀγλαός -οῦ, ὁ **Aglaos**, *male name* Dion[12]. (AP. 7.78.5) *etc.*

ἀγλαότευκτος -ον [ἀγλαός, τεύχω] **splendidly built** Or. *Sib.* 14.130

ἀγλαότιμος -ον [ἀγλαός, τιμή] **splendidly honored** Orph. *H.* 12.8

ἀγλαοτρίαινα [ἀγλαός, τρίαινα] *epith.* **lord of the bright trident**, *of Poseidon* Pind. *O.* 1.40 (*acc.* -αινάν).

Ἀγλαόφαμος, ὁ *Dor.* **Aglaophamos** Iambl[1]. *Pyth.* 28.146 *etc.*

ἀγλαόφαντον, τό [ἀγλαός, φαίνω] *bot.* **peony**, *plant* CCA 8.35.154

ἀγλαοφαρής -ές [ἀγλαός, φάρος] **with splendid clothing** Or. *Sib.* 3.454

ἀγλαοφεγγής -ές [ἀγλαός, φέγγος] **with vivid splendor** Max. 189 *etc.*

ἀγλαόφημος -ον [ἀγλαός, φήμη] **of splendid fame** Sim. *I*EG 10.5, *al.* Orph. *H.* 31.4

ἀγλαόφοιτος -ον [ἀγλαός, φοιτάω] **living splendidly** Max. 403

ἀγλαοφορέω, [ἀγλαός, φέρω] **to bear splendid gifts** (*of earth*) Vett. 330.19

ἀγλαοφόρτος -ον [ἀγλαός, ἀγλαοφορέω] **carrying a splendid load** Nonn. *D.* 7.253

Ἀγλαοφῶν -ῶντος, ὁ **Aglaophon** Sim. (AP. 9.700.1) Plat. *Gorg.* 448b, *Ion* 532e

ἀγλαόφωνος -ον [ἀγλαός, φωνή] **with a beautiful voice** Procl. *Hym.* 32 *etc.*

ἀγλαοφῶτις -ιδος, ἡ [ἀγλαός, φῶς] *bot.* **peony**, *plant* Diosc[2]. 3.140 Plin. 24.160 Ael. *NA.* 14.24 ● *also* -οφωτις.

ἀγλαοχαίτας -α [ἀγλαός, χαίτη] **with splendid locks** Pind. *Pae.* 7e.2

ἀγλαόχαρτος -ον [ἀγλαός, χαίρω] **radiant with joy** AP. 15.11.8 (*doub.*).

Ἀγλάπιός, ὁ *Lac.* **Asklepios** *I*IG 5.1.1313 (V[a])

ἀγλασινός -ον [ἀγλαός] **beautiful** Hsch

ἀγλάϊσμα -ατος, τό [ἀγλαΐζω] **splendor, beauty, ornament, offering** Aeschl. *Ag.* 1312 (*perfume*) Soph. *El.* 908 Eur. *El.* 325, *Hel.* 11 *etc.*; εἶναι τόδ' ἀγλάϊσμά μοι τοῦ φιλτάτου βροτῶν Ὀρέστου that this is an offering of Orestes, dearest to me of mortals Aeschl. *Ch.* 193; τὸ ἀ. τὸ ἐμόν τε καὶ

Δελφῶν my pride and that of Delphi Hld. 3.6.2 | *of a rose* Ach. 2.2 ● *poet. and later*

ἀγλαϊσμός -οῦ, ὁ [ἀγλαΐζω] **ornament** Plat. *Ax.* 369d

ἀγλάϊστός -ή -όν [ἀγλαΐζω] **adorned, splendid** [Io.] *HPs.*76.4 10.745C

Ἀγλαϊτάδας -α, ὁ **Aglaïtadas**, *male name* Xen. *Cyr.* 2.2.11

ἄγλαυρος -ον [ἀγλαός] Nic. *Th.* 62, 441, *see* ἀγλαός.

Ἄγλαυρος -ου, ἡ **Aglauros**, *female name* Hdt. 8.53.1 Plut. *Alc.* 15.7 *etc.* | *in an oath* μὰ τὴν Ἄγλαυρον by Aglauros Aristoph. *Th.* 533 ● *v.l.* Ἄγραυλ-.

ἀγλαφύρως [γλαφυρός] *adv.* **inelegantly** Ath. 15.677f *etc.*

ἀγλαώψ -ῶπος [ἀγλαός, ὤψ] **shining** Soph. *OT.* 214

ἀγλευκής -ές [γλεῦκος] **without sweetness, sour, harsh** Hier. 1.21 (*compar.*) Aristot. *Pr.* 877b 25 Luc. 46.6 (*wine*) | *fig.* **sour, irritable**, *of pers.* Epichar. 140 ‖ **harsh**, *of style* Hermog. *Id.* 195.16 Lgn. *Rh.* 410.16 ‖ *compar.* -έστερος ● *irreg. acc.* ἀγλεύκην Nic. *Al.* 171 ◆ *adv.* ἀγλευκῶς **harshly** Philostr. *Ap.* 4.39.

ἄγλευκος -ον Sch. Nic. *Al.* 171a, b, *see* ἀγλευκής.

ἀγλευκῶς *adv.* *see* ἀγλευκής.

ἄγληνος -ον [γλήνη] **without eyes, blind** Nonn. *Ev.* 9.6

ἀγλίδια [ἄγλις] **cloves of garlic** Hsch L. *EM., see* ἄγλις.

ἀγλιθάριον -ου, τό [ἄγλις] **small clove of garlic** Ruf. (Orib. 8.39.10)

ἄγλις -ιθος, ἡ [*see* γέλγις] **clove of garlic** Hp. *Mul.* 2.188 Antyll. (Orib. 8.16.3) Diosc[2]. 2.152 *etc.* ‖ *pl.* **head** *or* **bulb of garlic** Aristoph. *Ach.* 763, *Ve.* 680 Callim. *fr.* 495, 657 *etc.* ● *gen.* -ίθος Choerob. *Theod.* p. 327.9 | *pl.* -ῖθες -ίθων Callim. *ll.cc.* Nic. *Th.* 874.

ἄγλισχρος -ον [γλίσχρος] **not sticky** Hp. *Prorrh.* 1 Gal. 4.528 (*v.l.*) *etc.*

ἀγλίτης -ου, ὁ **inhabitant** L. *EM*

ἄγλυ **swan** Hsch

ἀγλυκής -ές [γλυκύς] Thphr. *CP.* 6.14.12, 6.18.8, *see* ἀγλευκής.

ἄγλυφος -ον [γλύφω] **uncut, rough**, *of stone* Sch. Soph. *OC.* 100

Ἀγλώμαχος -ου, ὁ **Aglomachos** Hdt. 4.164.2

ἀγλωσσία, *Att.* ἀγλωττία -ας, ἡ [ἄγλωσσος] **lack of eloquence** Eur. *fr.* 56 Antipho[1] 97b

ἄγλωσσος, *Att.* ἄγλωττος -ον [γλῶσσα] [A] **without a tongue**, *of the crocodile* Aristot. *PA.* 690b 23 ‖ **without a reed**, *of a flute* Poll. 2.108 [B] **lacking eloquence** Pind. *N.* 8.24 *etc.* ‖ **dumb** Arch. (AP. 7.191.5) [C] **barbaros**, *i.e., not knowing the Greek language* Soph. *Tr.* 1060

Ἀγλώχαρτος -ου, ὁ **Aglochartos** AP. 15.11.8 (*v.l.*) *I*IG 12.1.783 (*priest*)

1. ἄγμα -ατος, τό [ἄγνυμι] **fragment** *I*IG 2².1648.12 (IV[a]) Plut. *Phil.* 6.10 ‖ **fracture** Pall[1]. *in Fract.* 18.9

2. ἄγμα, τό **nasalized g** (*sound*) Ion. 3a Prisc[1]. 2.30.16 (*Varro*) ● *doubtful accentuation.*

ἀγμηρός -όν **tranquil** Hsch

ἀγμός -οῦ, ὁ [ἄγνυμι] [A] **fracture** Hp. *title* Gal. 16.532 (*title*) [B] **crag** Eur. *IT.* 263, *Bac.* 1094 Nic. *Al.* 391 *etc.*

Ἀγναῖος -ου, ὁ **Agnaios**, *name of a month in Halos I*IG 9.2.109a 28 (II[a])

ἀγναιώτου -ου, ὁ **burned to a great extent** Hsch

ἀγνάκορος -ου, ὁ Sch. Nic. *Th.* 71 (*doub. for* -κοπος), *see* ἀνάγυρος.

ἀγναμπτοπόλεμος [ἄγναμπτος, πόλεμος] **unbending in war, invincible** Hsch

ἄγναμπτος -ον [γνάμπτω] **inflexible, unaffected** Bacchyl. *Epin.* 9.73 (*doub.*) Aeschl. *Pr.* 163

PLUT. *CMi.* 11.4 (*subst. neut.*) P[1]. (AP. 16.278.3) *etc.* ● *also* ἀκ-.

ἄγναπτος -ον [κνάπτω] Ⓐ **not fulled, new**, *of fabrics* PLUT. 46.691c *etc.* Ⓑ **not washed** PLUT. 14.169c

ἀγνατικός -όν [*Lat.* agnaticius] **pertaining to relatives**, *on the father's side*: *subst.* τὰ ἀγνατικὰ **rights of relatives** ATHANAS[1]. *coll.* 3.4

ἀγναφάριος **maker of fabrics** *i*MAMA 3.252 *etc.*, *also* ἀκνα-.

ἄγναφος -ον [*see* ἄγναπτος] **not fulled** NT. *Mat.* 9.16, *Mar.* 2.21 *p*CAIR.ZEN. 92.16 (III[a]) *etc.*, *see* ἄγναπτος.

ἀγνεάρχης -ου, ὁ [ἁγνός, ἄρχω] *religious official at Ephesos i*EPH. 1045.5 (II[p]) (*list of* κουρῆτες).

ἁγνεία -ας, ἡ [ἁγνεύω] Ⓐ **purity, chastity** ANTIPHO 2.1.10 GAL. 11.808: εὔσεπτον ἁγνείαν λόγων **reverent purity of words** SOPH. *OT.* 864 *etc.* | *Christ.* **chastity, virginity** ORIG. *HIer.* 20.4 *etc.* Ⓑ *pl.* **consecration, purification** PLAT. *Leg.* 909e ISOCR. 11.21 Hp. *MS.* 1 *etc.* Ⓒ *name of the number seven* ARISTID[2]. 3.6

Ἁγνε(ι)ών -ῶνος, ὁ (*sc.* μήν) **Agneion**, *name of a month in Magnesia i*MAGN. 100a 2 *al.*

ἄγνευμα -ατος, τό [ἁγνεύω] **chastity** EUR. *Tr.* 501; ἄ. θεῖον **vow of chastity** EUR. *El.* 256

ἁγνευτήριον -ου, τό [ἁγνεύω] **place of purification** CHAEREM[1]. 6 AG. *Bek.* 267 *etc.* ‖ *Christ., of a monastery* GREG. *Or.* 4.111.8; *of a church* GREG. *Carm.* 1.2.34.224

ἁγνευτικός -ή -όν [ἁγνεύω] Ⓐ **inclined to chastity** ARISTOT. *HA.* 488b 5 Ⓑ **purificatory, expiatory** PHIL[2]. *Deus* 8, *Mos.* 2.149

ἁγνεύτρια -ας, ἡ [ἁγνεύω] **female purifier** GLOSS

ἁγνεύω [ἁγνός] *impf.* ἥγνευον ‖ *fut.* ἁγνεύσω ‖ *aor.* ἥγνευσα ‖ *pf.* ἥγνευκα | *ptc. mid. pass.* ἡγνευμένος POLL. 1.25 ‖ *ppf.* ἡγνεύκειν THEODORET[1]. *QuReg.* (*PG* 80.576.27) Ⓐ ▶ *abs.* **to be pure** AESCHL. *Suppl.* 226 PLAT. *Leg.* 837c Hp. *MS.* 1 *etc.*; χεῖρας ἁ. **to have pure hands** EUR. *IT.* 1227, *al.* | ▶ *with gen.* **to keep oneself pure** ▶ τινος **from sthg.** DEMOSTH. 22.78 LUC. 49.5 *etc.* ‖ ▶ *with inf.* **to consider it pure** (*as religious duty*) HDT. 1.140.3 Ⓑ **to purify** ANTIPHO 2.3.11; ▶ τινος **of sthg.** PHILOD. *LL.* 55.11 Ⓒ *Christ.* **to live in chastity** CLEM. *Hom.* 40.5 *etc.*

ἁγνέω *Dor. i*IG 9².1.79.5 (II[a]). (*pf. ptc.* ἁγνηκώς), *see* ἅγνω.

ἁγνεών -ῶνος, ὁ [ἁγνός] **place of purification** CLEAR[1]. 43a (*iron.*)

Ἁγνιάδης -ου, ὁ [Ἁγνίας] **son of Hagnias** AP. 1.105 *etc.*

Ἁγνίας -ου, ὁ **Hagnias**, *male name* DEMOSTH. 43.3 *etc.*

ἁγνιασμός -οῦ *VT. Num.* 8.7 (*v.l.*), *see* ἁγνισμός.

ἁγνίζω [ἁγνός] *impf.* ἥγνιζον, *mid. pass.* ἡγνιζόμην ‖ *fut.* ἁγνίσω, *Att.* ἁγνιῶ CYR[1]. *Is.* (*PG* 70.40.36) ‖ *aor.* ἥγνισα ‖ *pf.* ἥγνικα, *mid. pass.* ἥγνισμαι ‖ *aor. pass.* ἡγνίσθην ‖ *fut. pass.* ἁγνισθήσομαι ❶ *act.* Ⓐ **to purify, cleanse, wash** SOPH. *Ai.* 655 EUR. *IT.* 1039 PLUT. 18.263e (≠ καθαίρειν "with fire"); χέρας σὰς ἁγνίσας μιάσματος **after having purified your hands from pollution** EUR. *HF.* 1324 | *Christ.* **to purify**, *through baptism* IUSTIN. *Dial.* 86.6 (*PG* 6.681C) Ⓑ *with fire* **to burn, destroy** SOPH. *Ant.* 545, *fr.* 116 *etc.* Ⓒ **to sacrifice** EUR. *fr.* 314 ❷ *mid.* Ⓐ **to purify oneself** PLUT. 73.1105b VT. *Chr.* 1.15.12, *al.* NT. *Apost.* 21.24 Ⓑ **to abstain**: ἀπὸ οἴνου **from wine** VT. *Num.* 6.3 Ⓒ *Christ.* **to offer oneself in expiatory sacrifice**: ὑπέρ τινος **for s.o.** IGN. *Eph.* 8.1, *al.* ❸ *pass.* Ⓐ **to be purified**: ἵνα ... σώμαθ' ἡγνίσθη πυρί **where their bodies were purified by fire** EUR. *Suppl.* 1211 | *Christ.*: *subst. ptc.* οἱ ἁγνιζόμενοι **the purified** (*through baptism*) METH. *Symp.*

8.9.194 Ⓑ **to be consecrated** ARISTONOUS 1.17; ἀμφὶ βωμὸν ἁγνισθεὶς φόνῳ **consecrated with blood at the altar** EUR. *IT.* 705

ἄγνινος -η -ον [ἁγνός] **of chaste tree** PLUT. 46.693f *etc.*

ἅγνισμα -ατος, τό [ἁγνίζω] **means** *or* **object of purification, expiation** AESCHL. *Eum.* 327 VT. *Num.* 19.9

ἁγνισμός -οῦ, ὁ [ἁγνίζω] DION. 3.22.8 VT. *Num.* 6.5 PLUT. 26.418 b *etc.*, *see* ἅγνισμα ‖ *Christ.* **purification** *of baptism* METH. *Symp.* 8.9.192 *etc.* ‖ **purity, sanctity** GREG. *Carm.* 1.2.34.171 *etc.*

ἁγνιστέος -α -ον [ἁγνίζω] *verb. adj.* **it is necessary to purify** EUR. *IT.* 1199

ἁγνιστήριον -ου, τό [ἁγνίζω] **instrument for purification** HERO *Pn.* 2.32

ἁγνιστής -οῦ, ὁ [ἁγνίζω] **purifier** GLOSS

ἁγνιστικός -ή -όν [ἁγνίζω] **purificatory** EUSTATH. 43.6

Ἁγνίτας -α, ὁ *Dor.* **Hagnitas**, *epith. of Asklepios* PAUS. 3.14.7

ἁγνίτης -ου, ὁ [ἁγνός] Ⓐ **purifier** LYC. 135 POLL. 1.24 Ⓑ **one who requires purification** AG. *Bek.* 338 HSCH

ἁγνόδικος -ον [ἁγνός, δίκη] **conscious of the just** HSCH. PHOT. *Lex.* AG. *Bek.* 338

Ἁγνόδωρος -ου, ὁ **Agnodoros**, *male name* LYS. 13.55

ἀγνοέω, *contr.* [γιγνώσκω] *impf.* ἠγνόουν, *mid. pass.* ἠγνοούμην ‖ *fut.* ἀγνοήσω *mid.* ἀγνοήσομαι (*with pass. signf.*) ‖ *aor.* ἠγνόησα ‖ *pf.* ἠγνόηκα, *mid. pass.* ἠγνόημαι ‖ *ppf.* ἠγνοήκειν, *mid. pass.* ἠγνοήμην ‖ *aor. pass.* ἠγνοήθην ‖ *fut. pass.* ἀγνοηθήσομαι ❶ *act.* Ⓐ ▶ *gener. with acc.* **not to know, not recognize** OD. 20.15, *al.* PLAT. *Phaedr.* 228a Hp. *VM.* 21 *etc.* Ⓑ **not to know, not perceive, be ignorant of** HDT. 4.156.1 SOPH. *Tr.* 78, *al. etc.* | **not to understand** NT. *Mar.* 9.32 *etc.* | ▶ *with other constr.* ἀ. περί τινος **to be ignorant of sthg.** PLAT. *Phaedr.* 277d | ▶ *with gen. and rel. cl.* ἀγνοοῦντες ἀλλήλων ὅ τι λέγομεν (we never ceased) **failing to understand what the other was saying** PLAT. *Gorg.* 517c | ▶ *with ptc.* τίς ... ἀγνοεῖ τὸν ἐκεῖθεν πόλεμον δεῦρ' ἥξοντα **who does not see that the war begun there will be transferred here?** DEMOSTH. 1.15 | ▶ *with ὅτι or ὡς* **that** DEMOSTH. 21.156 *etc.* | ▶ *with εἰ if* XEN. *An.* 6.5.12 | ▶ *with inf.* VT. *Sal.* 7.12 | ▶ *with pred. ptc. agreeing with subj.* ἠγνόουν αἰτοῦσα ... κατ' ἐμαυτῆς φάρμακον **without knowing it I asked for the potion** (*prepared*) **against me** ACH. 5.25.3; ἀγνοῶν ἐποίησα **I acted ignorantly** NT. *Tim.* 1.1.13 Ⓒ ▶ *abs.* **to be in error** (*out of ignorance*) Hp. *Art.* 46 ISOCR. 8.39 *etc.*; ▶ **by mistake** XEN. *An.* 7.3.38; ἀγνοοῦντες ἁμαρτάνουσιν **they err out of ignorance** ARISTOT. *Rh.* 1402b 10 | *mor.* VT. *Lev.* 4.13, *al.* NT. *Heb.* 5.2 POL. 5.11.5 *etc.* Ⓓ *often with neg.* **not to be ignorant of, know well** VT. *Sal.* 12.10 *etc.* ❷ *mid.* **to err** GAL. 14.630 ❸ *pass.* **not to be known, be unknown** PLAT. *Euthyph.* 4a *etc.*; δίκαιά τε καὶ καλὰ ἀγνοούμενα ὅπῃ ποτὲ ἀγαθά ἐστιν **the just and the beautiful, if their relation to the good is not known** PLAT. *Rp.* 506a; ἠγνοῆσθαι (φημί) σύμπασιν ὅτι **I say that all are ignorant that** PLAT. *Leg.* 797a ● *contr. pres.* ἀγνοῶ, *epic* ἀγνοιέω, *pres. subj. 3. sg. epic* ἀγνοίῃσι ‖ *epic aor.* ἠγνοίησα, *iter. 3. sg.* ἀγνώσασκε.

ἀγνόημα -ατος, τό [ἀγνοέω] Ⓐ **error** (*through ignorance*), **oversight** GORG. 11.19 THPHR. *HP.* 9.4.8 VT. *Tob.* 3.3, *al.* NT. *Heb.* 9.7 PLUT. 46.698a *etc.* Ⓑ **ignorance** STRAB. 7.2.4 *etc.* ‖ **object of ignorance** DAMASC. *Pr.* 7

ἀγνοηματίζω [ἀγνόημα] **to fail to observe** VT. (*Aq.*) *Ps.* 118.10 (*aor. subj. 2. sg.* ἀγνοηματίσῃς).

ἀγνόησις -εως, ἡ [ἀγνοέω] **ignorance** PHILOD. *D.* 1.7.32

ἀγνοητέον [ἀγνοέω] *verb. adj. with neg.* οὐκ **it is neccesary to not fail to note** DIOSC[2]. *pref.* 7 PHIL[2]. *Abr.* 53, *al.*

Ἀγνοητής [ἀγνοέω] **Agnoetes**, *member of a Monophysitic sect* LEONTB. *Sect.* 10.3 *etc.*

ἀγνοητικός -ή -όν [ἀγνοέω] **erroneous** (*through ignorance*) ARISTOT. *EE.* 1246a 38

ἀγνόητος -η -ον [ἀγνοέω] **ignored** DAMASC. *Pr.* 6 (*subst. neut.*) ◆ *adv.* ἀγνοήτως **mistakenly, wrongly** THEODORET[1]. *Trin.* 23

Ἀγνόθεμις, ὁ **Agnothemis**, *male name* PLUT. *Alex.* 77.3

Ἀγνόθεος -ου, ὁ **Agnotheos**, *male name* IS. 4.1 *etc.*

ἄγνοια -ας, ἡ [ἀγνοέω] Ⓐ **ignorance** AESCHL. *Ag.* 1596 SOPH. *Tr.* 350 THUC. 8.92.11 XEN. *Cyr.* 3.1.38 *etc.* ‖ *philos.* PLAT. *Rp.* 477a, *al.*; ἡ τοῦ ἐλέγχου ἄ. **ignorance of the method of refutation** (= ignoratio elenchi) ARISTOT. *SE.* 168a 18, *al.* | *opp. to* γνῶσις: φωτισμὸς ... ἡ γνῶσίς ἐστιν, ὁ ἐξαφανίζων τὴν ἄ. **knowledge is an illumination which effaces ignorance** CLEM. *Paed.* 1.6.29.4, *al. etc.* Ⓑ **lack of knowledge, innocence**: ἔγνωσαν ... ὅρκοισι πιστοῦσθαι τὴν ἄγνοιαν **they decided ... to affirm with oaths their own innocence** HLD. 9.11.4 Ⓒ **mistake, mistaken conduct** DEMOSTH. 18.133, *epist.* 2.19 VT. *Esd.* 1.9.20 POL. 27.2.2 Ⓓ *med.* **loss of consciousness** Hp. *Epid.* 7.85 ● *poet.* (*Att.*) -οίᾱ | *Ion.* -οίη.

ἀγνοιῇσι *pres. subj. act. 3. sg. ep. see* ἀγνοέω.

ἀγνόκοκκος, ὁ [ἁγνός, κόκκος] **fruit of the chaste tree** GAL. 14.552 *etc.*

ἀγνοοῦντως [ἀγνοέω] *adv. from the pres. ptc. act.* **out of ignorance** ARISTOT. *Top.* 114b 10

ἁγνοποιός -όν [ἁγνός, ποιέω] **making pure** *or* **holy** CYR[1]. *Is.* 2.776B, *al. etc.*

ἁγνοπολέομαι, *contr.* [ἁγνοπόλος] **to be purified** HSCH. PHOT. *Lex*

ἁγνοπόλος -ον [ἁγνός, πέλομαι] **purifier** ORPH. *H.* 18.12, *A.* 38

ἁγνόρυτος -ον [ἁγνός, ῥέω] **with pure flow** AESCHL. *Pr.* 434

1. ἄγνος -ου, ὁ, ἡ *bot.* **chaste tree** HOM. 4.410 PLAT. *Phaedr.* 230b (*masc.*) Hp. *NatMul.* 32, *al.* DIOSC[2]. 1.103 GAL. 11.807 *etc.* ‖ *Christ. symbol of chastity* METH. *Symp.* 9.4.252

2. ἄγνος, ὁ *ornit.* **agno**, *bird* L. *Sud.* ittiol. **fish** DIPH[2]. (ATH. 8.356a: *corr. in* ἄγνος).

ἁγνός -ή -όν [*see* ἄζω *signf.* 2] Ⓐ **pure, holy, sacred, chaste**, *of places and things* HOM. 4.187 (*wood*) PIND. *P.* 4.204 (*sanctuary*) AESCHL. *Pr.* 280 (*ether*) SOPH. *El.* 86 (*light*), *Tr.* 287 (*sacrifices*) EUR. *Ion* 243 (*oracle*) *etc.* | *subst.* τὰ ἁγνά **chastity**: τὰ ἁγνὰ τῆς παρθενίας **chaste virginity** VT. *Mac.* 4.18.8 ‖ **upright, honest** XEN. *Symp.* 8.15 (*friendship*) *etc.*; μεγάλων ἀέθλων ἁγνὰν κρίσιν **the pure** (correct) **judgment of the great games** (at Olympia) PIND. *O.* 3.21; ὅσα ἁγνά ... ταῦτα λογίζεσθε **give thought to whatever is pure** NT. *Phil.* 4.8 Ⓑ **pure, holy, sacred, casto**, *of gods and men* OD. 5.123, *al.* (*Artemis*) HOM. 2.203 (*Demeter*) PIND. *P.* 9.64 (*Apollo*) AESCHL. *Suppl.* 653 (*Zeus*) SOPH. *Ph.* 1289 (*Zeus*) EUR. *Hip.* 102 (*Hippolytus*) NT. *Io.* 1.3.3 (*God*), *Cor.* 2.11.2 (*virgin*) *etc.* ‖ **free of guilt, innocent** SOPH. *Ant.* 889, *al.* EUR. *Or.* 1604, *al.* NT. *Cor.* 2.7.11; ἁγνὰς χεῖρας αἵματος **hands pure of blood** EUR. *Hip.* 316; φόνου ἁ. **not guilty of murder** PLAT. *Leg.* 759c; Δάματρος ἀκτᾶς ... ἁ. **pure from Demeter's grain**, *i.e.* **fasting** EUR. *Hip.* 138 Ⓒ *of animals* **never yoked** AESCHL. *Pers.* 611 (*heifer*) ◆ *adv.* ἁγνῶς **purely, holily** HOM. 3.121 HES. *Op.* 337 XEN. *Mem.* 3.8.10 *etc.*

ἀγνόστομος -ον [ἁγνός, στόμα] **with pure mouth** Tz. *Hist.* 6.36

ἁγνοσύνη -ης, ἡ [ἁγνός] **purity** PHILOD. *D.* 3 *fr.* 76

ἁγνοτελής -ές [ἁγνός, τέλος] **with holy rites**, *of Themis* ORPH. *A.* 549

ἁγνότης -ητος, ἡ [ἁγνός] **purity, chastity** NT. *Cor.* 2.6.6 DION[21]. *EH.* 6.1.3 (532D) *etc.*

ἁγνοτόκος -ον [ἁγνός, τίκτω] **bearing purification**, *of the waters of baptism* SOPHRON. *Carm.* 5.98

ἁγνοτραφής -ές [ἁγνός, τρέφω] **raised in purity** *P*SB 6647.9

Ἁγνοῦς -οῦντος, ὁ **Agnous**, *Attic deme* SOL. *fr.* 473 M. (STEPH[1]. *s.v.*) ● *also with rough breathing* Ἁ.

Ἁγνούσιος -ου [Ἁγνούσιος] **of Agnous** AESCHN. 2.1.13 PLUT. *Thes.* 13.4 *etc.* ● *also with rough breathing* Ἁ.

Ἁγνόφιλος -ου, ὁ **Hagnophilos**, *male name* DEMOSTH. 47.60 *etc.*

ἁγνόφυτον -ον [ἁγνός, φύω] **of pure stock** *I*GVI 1245.1 (II-III*P*)

ἄγνῡμι [*cf. Toch. A, B* wak-] ❶ *act.* **to break, smash** IL. 7.270, *al.* OD. 3.298, *al.* ACHAE. *fr.* 26.1 AP. 16.250.1 ❷ *mid. and pass. and pf. act.* **to break, be smashed** IL. 3.367, *al.* OD. 10.123, *al.*; περὶ δέ σφισι ἄγνυτο ἠχώ and around them an echo crashed HES. *Sc.* 279, 348; ποταμὸς περὶ καμπὰς πολλὰς ἀγνύμενος river breaking into many turns, *i.e.* with a winding course HDT. 1.185.6; ἀγνυμένη δ'ὑπ'ὀδόντι (bait) broken with its teeth APOLLON[1]. (AP. 7.702.5) ● *impf. mid.* (κατ)εαγνύμην, *3. sg. poet.* ἄγνυτο ‖ *fut.* ἄξω IL. 8.403 (*in tm.:* κατ-) ‖ *aor.* ἔαξε, *ep. Ion.* ἦξε | *subj. 3. sg.* ἄξῃ | *opt. 2. sg.* ἄξαις, *3. pl.* ἄξειαν | *inf.* ἄξαι | *ptc.* ἄξας ‖ *pf.* ἔαγα (*with pass. signf.*), *Ion.* (κατ)έηγα, *mid. pass.* (κατ)έαγμαι ‖ *aor. pass.* ἐάγην; ἐάγην IL. 11.559, *epic 3. sg.* ἄγη, *pl.* ἄγεν ‖ *gener. poet.: act. never in prose, mid. pass. only* HDT. *l.c.; ordin. used in compd.* κατάγνυμι.

ἀγνύς -ῦθος, ἡ **stone for weaving** PLUT. 13.156 (*pl.*)

ἄγνωδες -ες [ἁγνός] *f.l.* THPHR. *HP.* 3.18.4, *see* ἀκανθώδης.

ἀγνωμονεύω PLUT. 31.484a (ἀγνωμονούμενος) (*codd.*), *see* ἀγνωμονέω.

ἀγνωμονέω, *contr.* [ἀγνώμων] *impf.* ἠγνωμόνουν, *mid. pass.* ἠγνωμονούμην SEVER. *in* «ZKTh», 31 (1907), p. 153.21 ‖ *fut.* ἀγνωμονήσω | *aor.* ἠγνωμόνησα ‖ *pf.* ἠγνωμόνηκα ‖ *ppf. 3. pl.* ἠγνωμονήκεσαν DEMOSTH. 18.94 ‖ *aor. pass.* ἠγνωμονήθην ‖ *fut. pass.* ἀγνωμονηθήσομαι ❶ *act.* Ⓐ **to be imprudent, inconsiderate, to act disloyally, unfeelingly** XEN. *Hel.* 1.7.33; ▸ εἴς τινα towards s.o. DEMOSTH. *l.c.* MEN. *Sam.* 637 = ▸ πρός τινα MEN. *Sam.* 248 *etc.* ● ▸ περί τινα PLUT. *Alc.* 19.4; τῶν δὲ Κελτῶν περὶ τὸν σταθμὸν ἀγνωμονούντων because the Gauls cheated concerning the weight PLUT. *Cam.* 28.5 Ⓑ **to treat unjustly, badly**, *with acc.* HIM. 6.31 ❷ *pass.* **to be mistreated** PLUT. 17.249e, *Cam.* 18.7

ἀγνωμοσύνη -ης, ἡ [ἀγνώμων] Ⓐ **ignorance** PLAT. *Theaet.* 199d Ⓑ **lack of discernment, stupidity** THGN. 896 *etc.* ‖ **senseless severity** HDT. 2.172.2, *al.* EUR. *Bac.* 885 Ⓒ **insensitivity, harshness** DEMOSTH. 18.252; ἀ. τύχης iniquity of fortune DEMOSTH. 18.207.2 Ⓓ **ingratitude** LUC. 38.16 CYR[3]. *Cat.* 7.2 *etc.* Ⓔ **misunderstanding, incomprehension** XEN. *An.* 2.5.6 (*pl.*) *etc.*

ἀγνώμων -ον, *gen.* -ονος [γνώμη] Ⓐ **imprudent, inconsiderate, senseless** PIND. *O.* 8.60; καρτερὸς ἀγνώμων στέφανος a hefty crown of foolishness THGN. 1260; τὰ ἄφωνα καὶ τὰ ἀγνώμονα voiceless and senseless objects AESCHN. 3.244; ἐννόησον ὡς παντάπασιν ἄγνωμον ποιεῖς consider how utterly unreasonable you are acting LUC. 54.24 Ⓑ **unfeeling, harsh, ungrateful**

XEN. *Mem.* 2.8.5 (*sup.*), CYR. 8.3.49 (*comp.*) ‖ *of things*: σε ... φρονοῦσαν θνητὰ κοὐκ ἀγνώμονα that you have mortal (human) and not unfeeling thoughts SOPH. *Tr.* 473 Ⓒ **headstrong, arrogant, cruel, ruthless** HDT. 9.41.4 (*comp.*) SOPH. *OC.* 86 XEN. *Mem.* 1.2.26; ὦ θάνατε, σωφρόνισμα τῶν ἀγνωμόνων o death, warning to the arrogant! ARISTAR. *fr.* 3; ὦ θάλασσα ἄγνωμον o cruel sea! ACH. 3.23.4 Ⓓ **ignorant, inexpert** HP. *Vict.* 1.6. PLAT. *Phaedr.* 275b, *al.* ‖ *compar.* -έστερος ‖ *superl.* -έστατος ◆ *adv.* ἀγνωμόνως **imprudently, inconsiderately, disloyally** DEMOSTH. 2.26 XEN. *Hel.* 6.3.11 PLUT. 38.352d ‖ **ungratefully, thanklessly** GREG[1]. *VMacr.* 21.4 *etc.* ● ἀγν- MEN[1]. 5.338.

Ἄγνων -ωνος, ὁ **Hagnon**, *male name* THUC. 2.58.1 *etc.*

Ἀγνώνειος -α -ον [Ἄγνων] **of Agnon** THUC. 5.11.1

Ἀγνωνίδης -ου, ὁ **Hagnonides**, *male name* PLUT. *Phoc.* 29.4 *etc.*

ἀγνώριστος -ον [γνωρίζω] **not recognized, unknown** THPHR. *HP.* 1.2.3

ἀγνώς -ῶτος [γιγνώσκω] Ⓐ **unknown, unfamiliar** OD. 5.79 ARISTOPH. *Ec.* 640 THUC. 1.137.2; ἀγνὼς πρὸς ἀγνῶτ' εἶπε a man, unknown to me, spoke to me, unknown to him AESCHL. *Ch.* 677; παῖδα τόνδ' ἀγνῶτ' ἐμοί this boy unknown to me SOPH. *Ph.* 1008; ἀγνὼς δὲ πατρί unknown to her father EUR. *Ion* 14 ‖ **not known, obscure** PIND. *I.* 2.12 EUR. *IA.* 18; ἐκ βίου ταπεινοῦ καὶ ἀγνῶτος from his lowly and obscure existence PLUT. *Sul.* 3.8 *etc.* Ⓑ **incomprehensible, obscure**: ἀγνῶτα φωνὴν βάρβαρον an unknown barbarous tongue AESCHL. *Ag.* 1051; ἀγνῶτα ... φθόγγον ὀρνίθων an unintelligible noise of birds SOPH. *Ant.* 1001 Ⓒ **not knowing** *or* **recognizing, ignorant**: ἀγνῶτ' ἀναμνήσω νιν I shall remind him, even if he does not remember SOPH. *OT.* 1133; σοῦ μὲν τυχὼν ἀγνῶτος having found you incapable of understanding me SOPH. *OT.* 677; εἰ δέ τις ... ἀγνὼς εἴη τι δύναται φέρειν ἡ γῆ if one is ignorant about what the earth can produce XEN. *Oec.* 20.13 ‖ ▸ *with gen.* **not knowing, unaware** THUC. 3.53.4 ARISTOT. *SE.* 178a 26; οὔτ'ἀγνῶτα θηρῶν (land) not acquainted with wild animals PIND. *P.* 9.58

ἀγνώσασκε *iter. aor. ind. see* ἀγνοέω.

ἀγνωσία -ας, ἡ [ἁγνώς] Ⓐ **ignorance** (*opp. to* γνῶσις) PLAT. *Soph.* 267b HP. *MS.* 14, *al.* | *with gen.* THUC. 8.66.3; συμφορᾶς ἀγνωσίᾳ not knowing the circumstances of the misfortune EUR. *Med.* 1204 *etc.* ‖ *theol. as a super-rational and mystical knowledge of God:* ἡ κατὰ τὸ κρεῖττον παντελὴς ἀ. γνῶσίς ἐστι τοῦ ὑπὲρ πάντα τὰ γινωσκόμενα perfect ignorance-in a good sense-is the knowledge of him who is above all known things DION[21]. *epist.* 1 Ⓑ **obscurity** PLAT. *Menex.* 238d Ⓒ **lack of acquaintance**: ἀμιξία ... καὶ ἀγνωσία keeping to oneself and not having acquaintances LUC. 25.42

ἀγνώσσω [ἁγνώς] **not to know** MUS[1]. 249 COLLUTH. 8 LUC. 70.25 *etc., see* ἀγνοέω ● *only pres., gener. poet.*

ἀγνωστέος -α -ον [ἀγνώσσω] **it is necessary to ignore**: οὐκ ἀγνωστέον it is necessary to not ignore DID[1]. *fr.Ps.* 563.3

ἀγνωστί [ἄγνωστος] *adv.* **secretly** [CALLISTH.] 3.19.2

ἄγνωστος -ον [ἀγνοέω] Ⓐ **unknown, unheard of, ignored** EUR. *IT.* 94 (land) GAL. 1.82; διὰ τὸ ἄγνωστον τῆς γυναικός because the woman was unknown CHARIT. 3.2.15 | ▸ τινι to s.o. OD. 2.175 | **not recognized**: ἦν ... ἔτι ἄγνωστος αὐτοῖς they did not yet recognize her XEN[1]. 5.12.3 ‖ *personif.* Ἄγνωστος, ὁ **the unknown god**

LUC. 82.9 Ⓑ **unknowable, incomprehensible, invisible** OD. 13.191 THUC. 3.94.5 (*sup.*) PLAT. *Theaet.* 202b | *gnost., attribute of God* HIPPOL. *Haer.* 7.28.1 *etc.* ‖ **unrecognizeable** MIMN. 5.7; κατασκευάσασα Σαβῖνον ἐσθῆτι ἄγνωστον having dressed Sabinus so that he be unrecognizeable PLUT. 47.771a Ⓒ **not knowing, ignorant** ▸ *with gen.* PIND. *O.* 6.67 (*v.l.*) GAL. 1.352 ‖ ▸ *with πρός and acc.* ORIG. *fr.Io.* 17. | ▸ *abs.* LUC. 72.3 | *compar.* -ότερος ‖ *superl.* -ότατος ◆ *adv.* ἀγνώστως Ⓐ **without knowing** PROCL. *in Alc.* 52 *etc.* ‖ **secretly** CLEM. *Str.* 7.13.81.5 ‖ *philos.* **without discursive reasoning** DION[21]. *Myst.* 1.1, *al.* Ⓑ **greatly** [Clem[1].] *Hom.* 9.20

ἀγνώτης -ου, ὁ [ἀγνοέω] **one who is ignorant** MAX[2]. *Opusc.* 91.57B

ἀγνωτίδιον -ου, τό [ἀγνοέω] *ichthyol.* **fish** ATH. 3.118d, *see* μύλλος.

ἄγνωτος -ον [ἀγνοέω] **unknown** ▸ *with dat.* ARISTOPH. *Ran.* 926 CALLIM. *fr.* 620; γνωτὰ κοὐκ ἄγνωτά μοι things known to me and not unknown SOPH. *OT.* 58

Ἄγξανον -ου, ὁ **Anxanum**, *city in Latium* PTOL[4]. *Geog.* 3.1.65

ἀγξηραίνω *see* ἀναξηραίνω.

ἄγξις -εως, ἡ [ἄγχω] **strangling** L. *EM.* 194.50 GLOSS

ἀγόγγυστος -ον [γογγύζω] **not murmuring** *or* **muttering** CYR[1]. *HDiv.* 14 (5[2].415C) *etc.* ◆ *adv.* ἀγογγύστως **without murmuring** SOR. 2.19.13

ἀγοήτευτος -ον [γοητεύω] **not to be deceived, beguiled, cheated** PLOT. 4.4.44 *etc.* ‖ **not subject to magic** SYN. *Opusc.* 4.3 ◆ *adv.* ἀγοητεύτως **without guile** CIC. *ad Att.* 12.3.1

ἀγόμφιος -ον [γομφίος] **without teeth** (*molars*) DIOC. 14.4

ἀγόμφωτος -ον [γομφόω] **not connected** [IO.] *Marth.* 10.757E

ἀγόνατος -ον [γόνυ] Ⓐ **without a knee** ARISTOT. *IA.* 709a 3 ‖ *fig.* **not bending the knee, inflexibile** SOCR[3]. *HE.* 6.15.9, *al.* Ⓑ **without knots** *or* **joints**, *of plants* THPHR. *HP.* 4.8.7 *etc.*

ἀγονέω, *contr.* [ἄγονος] *aor.* ἠγόνησα; **to be sterile, unfruitful** PHIL[2]. *Virt.* 157, *al.*

ἀγονία -ας, ἡ [ἄγονος] **sterility** ARISTOT. *GA.* 746b 20 PLUT. *Rom.* 24.1 (*pl.*) IAMBL[1]. *Math.* 15 IOS. *BI.* 4.453 DIOSC[2]. 2.179 *etc.*

ἀγονοποιός -όν [ἄγονος, ποιέω] **making sterile** DID[1]. *Trin.* 2.14 (123a)

ἄγονος -ον [γίγνομαι] Ⓐ **unborn** IL. 3.40 EUR. *Ph.* 1598 *etc.*; γόνος ἄ. offspring that is not offspring, *because born of incest, of a horse* OPP[1]. 1.260 Ⓑ **sterile, infertile**, *of animals and plants* HP. *Aph.* 5.59, *Art.* 41 ARISTOT. *GA.* 726a 3, *al.* THPHR. *HP.* 1.13.4, *al.* | ▸ *with gen.* PLAT. *Menex.* 237d; χώραν καρπῶν ἄγονον unfruitful region PLUT. *Art.* 24.2 | **childless** EUR. *HF.* 886 HLD. 4.12 | *fig.* ἄ. ἡμέρα (odd-numbered) day unlucky for conceiving children HP. *Epid.* 2.6.8; ἄ. ἔτος (odd-number) year unlucky for conceiving children HP. *Epid.* 2.6.10; ἄ. σοφίας not productive of wisdom PLAT. *Theaet.* 150c; ἄ. κακῶν without evils PLAT. *Ax.* 370d (*v.l.*); ἄ. γέγονε he ceased to produce, *of a poet* PLUT. 22.348b | *astr.* **impeding generation**, *of a sign of the zodiac* VETT. 10.2, 14.11 Ⓒ *bot. subst.* ἡ (ὁ) ἄ. **chasteberry**, *plant* DIOSC[2]. 4.103a, *see* ἄγνος | τὸ ἄ. **butcher's broom**, *plant* DIOSC[2]. 4.144a, *see* μυρσίνη ἀγρία ‖ *compar.* -ότερος.

ἄγοντι *Dor. pres. ind. act. 3. pl. of* ἄγω ‖ *Att. pres. ptc. act. dat. sg. of* ἄγω.

ἄγοος -ον [γόος] **unmourned** AESCHL. *Sept.* 1063 (*lyr.*)

Ἀγορά -ᾶς, ἡ **Agora**, *locality in Thrace* DEMOSTH. 7.39 *etc.*

ἀγορά -ᾶς, ἡ [see ἀγείρω] ❶ Ⓐ **assembly, meeting**, *of the pop.* (≠ βουλή, *of the leaders*) IL. 2.51, *al.*; OD. 2.26, *al.*: ἀγορὴν ποιεῖσθαι to have an assembly IL. 8.2; ἀγορὴν δὲ καλεῖσθαι to summon to assembly IL. 1.54 = κηρύσσειν IL. 2.51; ἀγορὴν λύειν to dissolve the assembly IL. 1.305 OD. 2.69; ἀγορὰν ποιῆσαι to hold a meeting AESCHN. 3.27; ξυναγαγεῖν ... ἀγοράν to call a meeting (of soldiers) XEN. *An.* 5.7.3; ἀγορὰν δικῶν προτιθέναι to hold a judicial session, administer justice LUC. 29.4 = καταστήσασθαι LUC. 29.12 ‖ *esp.* **assembly of demes**, *at Athens* DEMOSTH. 44.36 *etc.*; ἀγοραὶ Πυλάτιδες gatherings at Pylae, of the Amphictyonic Council SOPH. *Tr.* 638 ‖ *fig.* μυρμήκων ἀ. assembly of ants LUC. 24.19 Ⓑ **address, speech**, *given before an assembly, gener. pl.* IL. 2.275 *etc.*; οἱ δ'ἀγορὰς ἀγόρευον they were delivering speeches IL. 2.788 ❷ Ⓐ **place of assembly, square, agora** (*at Athens*), **forum** (*at Rome*), *common.* GAL. 2.57, 11.311; ἐν τῇ ἀγορᾷ in the public square, in the agora XEN. *Oec.* 7.1; εἰς τὴν ἀγορὰν ἐμβάλλειν to go into the agora, *i.e.*, to be an Athenian citizen LYCURG. 5; ἐν τῇ πόλει σύνεγγυς τῆς ἀγορᾶς in the city (Rome) near the forum DION. 5.48.3 ἐν τῇ καλουμένῃ βοῶν ἀγορᾷ in the so-called Forum Boarium PLUT. *Marc.* 3.6 ‖ **marketplace, market** HOM. *epigr.* 13.5 *etc.*; ἀγορὰν ἔξω τῆς πόλεως ἐπεποίηντο they had opened a market outside the city THUC. 1.62.1; ἐξ ἀγορᾶς εἶ you're from the marketplace ARISTOPH. *Eq.* 181; οἱ ἐκ τῆς ἀγορᾶς the merchants XEN. *An.* 1.2.18; ἐν τῇ ἀγορᾷ ἐργάζεσθαι to work in the market, trade goods DEMOSTH. 57.31 Ⓑ **market, commerce, merchandise, supplies** THUC. 6.50.1 ARISTOT. *Pol.* 1331a 31; αὐτοῖς ἀγορὰν παρεῖχον they allowed them a market (commerce) THUC. 6.44.3; ἡ ἀ. παρεσκευάσθη the market was furnished for supplies THUC. 7.40.1; ἀγορὰν παρασκευάζειν to prepare the provisioning XEN. *Hel.* 3.4.11; ἀγορὴν πέμπειν to send victuals (*to market*) XEN. *An.* 5.5.19 = κομίζειν to bring XEN. *Cyr.* 6.2.11; ἀγορὰν ἄγειν to bring goods, trade XEN. *Cyr.* 2.4.32 *etc.*; ἀγορᾷ χρῆσθαι to have supplies, provisions XEN. *An.* 7.6.24 *etc.*; τὸ ἔλαιον καὶ τὸν οἶνον καὶ τὴν ἄλλην ἀγοράν olive oil, wine, and other goods ARISTOT. *Oec.* 1347b 6; ἐλπίζων ἀγορᾷ χρήσεσθαι φιλανθρώπῳ hoping to have victuals at a good price PLUT. *Cor.* 16.2; ἐπιλιπούσης δὲ τῆς ἀγορᾶς the provisions having run out PLUT. *Sul.* 4.5; ἀγορὰς αὐτῶν περιέκοπτον they cut off their supplies DION. 10.43.6; μικρολόγος εἶναι περὶ τὴν ἀγορὰν to be fussy about the price HLD. 2.30.2 ‖ **market, sale**: τῶν βιβλίων ἀ. Luc. 31.19; ἀγορὰν προκηρύττειν to proclaim a public sale AEL. *VH.* 4.1 Ⓒ *often indicating time of day*: ἀγορᾶς πληθούσης when the market is full, *i.e.*, in the morning HDT. 4.181.3 HP. *Epid.* 7.31; XEN. *Mem.* 1.1.10 = ἐν ἀγορᾷ πληθούσῃ PLAT. *Gorg.* 469d = ἀγορῆς πληθώρη HDT. 2.173.1; περὶ ἀγορὰν πλήθουσαν around the time when the market is full XEN. *An.* 2.1.7 *etc.* | ἀγορῆς διάλυσις the winding down of the market, just after midday HDT. 3.104.2 *etc.* ‖ *later* **market day** (= [*Lat.* nundinae]) DION. 7.58.3; εἰς τρίτην ἀγορὰν the third market day PLUT. *Ale.* 18.9 ● *Ion.* ἀγορή -ῆς | *Lesb. gen.* ALC. 130.18.

ἀγοράασθε *pres. ind. mid. 2. pl. ep.* see ἀγοράομαι.

ἀγοράζω [ἀγορά] *impf.* ἠγόραζον, *mid. pass.* ἠγοραζόμην DEMOSTH. 50.25 ‖ *fut.* ἀγοράσω ‖ *aor.* ἠγόρασα, *mid.* ἠγορασάμην DEMOSTH. 50.55 ‖ *pf.* ἠγόρακα, *mid. pass.* ἠγόρασμαι ‖ *ppf.* ἠγοράκειν ‖ *aor. pass.* ἠγοράσθην ‖ *fut. pass.* ἀγορασθήσομαι ❶ *active* Ⓐ **to be at** *or* **go to the marketplace**

HDT. 2.35.2, *al.* THUC. 6.51.1 *etc.* ‖ **to wander the agora, loiter** PIND. *fr.* 94d ARISTOPH. *Eq.* 1373 Ⓑ **to buy**, *at the market* ARISTOPH. *Ach.* 625, *al.* XEN. *An.* 1.5.10 | ▶ *abs.* **to trade goods** HLD. 5.18.3 ‖ *fig. Christ.* **to redeem, ransom** NT. *Apoc.* 5.9 CLEM. *Ecl.* 20 *etc.* ❷ *middle* **to buy for oneself** XEN. *An.* 1.3.14 DEMOSTH. 35.19 | *fig.* **to acquire, obtain**: ἵν'ἐνταῦθα βασιλείαν οὐράνιον ἀγοράσῃς so that you acquire here the kingdom of heaven CLEM. *Hom.* 32.2 *etc.* ❸ *passive* **to be bought** DEMOSTH. 50.25 IS. 8.23 MEN. *fr.* 805, *al.* ‖ *fig. Christ.* **to be redeemed, ransomed** GREG[1]. *Inst.* (PG 46.297C) *etc.* ◆ *Dor. pres. inf.* ἀγοράσδειν THEOCR. 15.16 ‖ *later fut. 1. pl.* ἀγορῶμεν VT. *Esd.* 2.20.32 | *Meg. ptc.* ἀγορασοῦντες ARISTOPH. *Ach.* 750.

ἀγοραῖος -ον [ἀγορά] Ⓐ **of the assembly, of the agora, of the market**, *of patron gods* AESCHL. *Ag.* 90 | *of Zeus* HDT. 5.46.2 AESCHL. *Eum.* 973 *etc.* | *of Hermes* ARISTOPH. *Eq.* 297 *etc.* | *of Athena* PAUS. 3.11.9 | *of Artemis* PAUS. 5.15.4 | *subst. of things* τὰ ἀγοραῖα **market affairs** PLAT. *Rp.* 425c ‖ *of pers.* **frequenting the market, trading** XEN. *Hel.* 6.2.23 ARISTOT. *Pol.* 1291a 4, *al. etc.* | *subst.* οἱ ἀγοραῖοι **traders, merchants** HDT. 1.93.2 XEN. *Vect.* 3.13 Ⓑ **wandering the marketplace, idle, vulgar, common** ARISTOPH. *Eq.* 218, *Ran.* 1015 PLAT. *Prot.* 374c *etc.* | *of meddlers* NT. *Apost.* 17.5 PLUT. *Aem.* 38.4 | *of rabble* PTOL[1]. 3 (*comp.*) ‖ *of things* ARISTOT. *EN.* 1162b 26; σκώμμασιν οὐκ ἀγοραίοις with no vulgar jokes ARISTOPH. *Pax* 750; ψυχὴ μηδὲν ἀγοραῖον ἔχουσα soul without vulgar features LUC. 64.17; ἀ. ἄρτοι common bread ATH. 3.109d Ⓒ **concerning the agora** *or* **the forum, political, forensic**, *of an orator or advocate* PLUT. *Per.* 11.1, *al. etc.* ‖ *subst.* ὁ ἀγοραῖος **advocate** PHILOSTR. *Ap.* 6.36 | **notary** ARISTID[1]. *Or.* 50.94 *etc.* | *fem.* ἡ ἀγοραῖος (*sc.* ἡμέρα) **day of hearing, hearing**, *of court* STRAB. 13.4.12 NT. *Apost.* 19.38 *etc.* ‖ *compar.* -ότερος ◆ *adv.* ἀγοραίως Ⓐ **vulgarly** DION. *Rh.* 10.11 Ⓑ **in forensic style** PLUT. *CG.* 4.5, *Ant.* 24.7 ● *fem.* -αία PAUS. *ll.cc.*, *al.*

Ἀγορακρῖτος -ου, ὁ **Agorakritos**, *male name* ARISTOPH. *Eq.* 1257 *etc.*

Ἀγοράναξ -ακτος, ὁ **Agoranax**, *poet* AP. 6.311.1

ἀγορανομεῖον -ου, τό *P*MERT. 75.12 (II*p*) *etc., see* ἀγορανόμιον.

ἀγορανομέω, *contr.* [ἀγορανόμος] *fut.* ἀγορανομήσω ‖ *aor.* ἠγορανόμησα DCASS. 36.43.5, *al.* ‖ *pf. ptc.* ἠγορανομηκώς ‖ *ppf.* ἠγορανομήκειν DCASS. 76.8.6; **to be market overseer** ALEXIS 249.1 *etc.* ‖ *at Rome* **to be aedile** DION. 10.48.3 PLUT. *Caes.* 5.9 APP. 14.1 *etc.*

ἀγορανομία -ας, ἡ [ἀγορανόμος] **office of market overseer** ARISTOT. *Pol.* 1331b 9 *etc.* ‖ *at Rome* **office of aedile** ([*Lat.* aedilitas]) POL. 10.4.1 DION. 5.18.1 *etc.*

ἀγορανομικός -ή -όν [ἀγορανομία] **concerning the market overseer** PLAT. *Rp.* 425d ARISTOT. *Pol.* 1264a 31 *etc.* ‖ *at Rome* **of the aedile** ([*Lat.* aedilicius]) PLUT. *Pomp.* 53.3 DION. 6.95.4

ἀγορανόμιον -ου, τό [ἀγορανομία] ❶ **office of market overseer** PLAT. *Leg.* 917e (*conject.*) ❷ **public register** *P*OXY. 238.3 (I*p*)

ἀγορανόμιος -ον [ἀγορανομία] **forensic** *I*PERG. 333 *A* 6

ἀγορανόμος -ου, ὁ [ἀγορά, νόμος] **market overseer** HP. *Epid.* 4.24 ARISTOPH. *Ach.* 723, *al.*, LYS. 16, 22 PLAT. *Leg.* 849e *etc.* ‖ *at Rome* **aedile** ([*Lat.* aedilis]) DION. 7.14.2

ἀγοράομαι, *contr.* [ἀγορά] Ⓐ **to participate in an assembly** IL. 4.1 Ⓑ **to speak in an assembly, harangue** IL. 1.73, *al.* OD. 7.185 HDT. 6.11.1 ‖ *extens.* **to speak, say**, *with acc.* IL. 8.230 THGN.

159 ‗| τινι with s.o. SOPH. *Tr.* 601 ● *pres. 2. pl.* ἀγοράασθε IL. 2.337 ‖ *impf. 2. sg.* ἠγορῶ *pl.* ἀγοράασθε, *3. pl.* ἀγορόωντο ‖ *aor. 3. sg. epic* ἀγορήσατο.

ἀγοράσδω *Dor., see* ἀγοράζω.

ἀγορασία -ας, ἡ [ἀγοράζω] **acquisition, purchase** TELECL. 54 DIOG. 2.78 (*pl.*) *etc.*

ἀγορασιαστικός -ή -όν [ἀγοράζω] **commercial** *P*LOND. 1727.32 (VI*p*), *see* ἀγοραστικός.

ἀγόρασις -εως, ἡ [ἀγοράζω] **acquisition, purchase** PLAT. *Soph.* 219d

ἀγόρασμα -ατος, τό [ἀγοράζω] **merchandise, wares**, *gener. pl.* AESCHN. 3.223 DEMOSTH. 34.9 *P*CAIR.ZEN. 16.1 (III*a*) *etc.*

ἀγορασμός -οῦ, ὁ [ἀγοράζω] **acquisition, purchase**, *as an act of buying* PHINT. (STOB. 4.23.61a) *etc.* | *as a thing bought* VT. *Gen.* 42.33 *etc.*

ἀγοραστής -οῦ, ὁ [ἀγοράζω] Ⓐ **slave in charge of making purchases** XEN. *Mem.* 1.5.2 Ⓑ *extens.* **buyer** MEN. *fr.* 433 AEL. *VH.* 12.1 *etc.*

ἀγοραστικός -ή -όν [ἀγοράζω] **commercial** PLAT. *Crat.* 408a | ἡ ἀγοραστική (*sc.* τέχνη) **commerce** PLAT. *Soph.* 223c

ἀγοράστρια -ας, ἡ [ἀγοράζω] **female buyer** *P*BGU 907.11 (II*p*)

Ἀγόρατος -ου, ὁ **Agoratos**, *male name* LYS. 13.1, *al. etc.*

ἀγορατρός -οῦ, ὁ [ἀγοράομαι] **delegate to the Amphictyonic Council** *I*IG 2².1132.8 (III*a*)

ἀγοράχος -ου, ἡ [ἀγορά] **priestess at Sparta** *I*IG 5.1.589.2

ἀγόρευσις -εως, ἡ [ἀγορεύω] **speech** L. *EM.* 13.51 *etc.*

ἀγορευτήριον -ου, τό [ἀγορεύω] **place for speaking** *I*IG 14.742 (I-II*p*)

ἀγορευτής -οῦ, ὁ [ἀγορεύω] **speaker** (*doub. signf.*) *P*OXY. 1590.1 (IV*p*)

ἀγορευτός -ή -όν [ἀγορεύω] *verb. adj.* **expressible** IUSTIN. *Dial.* 4.1 (PG 6.484A).

ἀγορεύω [ἀγορά] *impf.* ἠγόρευον, *mid.* ἠγορευόμην LIB. *Or.* 31.15 ‖ *fut.* ἀγορεύσω ‖ *aor.* ἠγόρευσα, *mid.* ἠγορευσάμην ‖ *pf.* ἠγόρευκα, *mid. pass.* ἠγόρευμαι SCH. IL. 18.319b ‖ *aor. pass.* ἠγορεύθην ❶ *active* Ⓐ **to speak in public, harangue** IL. 8.542, *al.* ARISTOPH. *Ach.* 45 DEMOSTH. 18.170 | ▶ *with int. obj.* IL. 2.788, *al.* | ▶ *with dat.* IL. 1.571, *al.* Ⓑ *gener.* **to speak, say** ▶ τί τινι sthg. to s.o. HDT. 6.97.1 = ▶ τὶ πρός τινα IL. 24.142; κακόν τι ἀ. τινά to abuse s.o. with words OD. 18.15 = κακῶς ἀ. τινά ARISTOT. *fr.* 417 PLUT. *Sol.* 21.1; ὑπέρ τινος ἀ. to speak about s.o. PLAT. *Leg.* 776e; μή τι φόβον δ'ἀγόρευ(ε) do not talk of flight IL. 5.252 | ▶ *with* ὡς *or* ὅτι that IL. 1.109 HDT. 3.156.1 ARISTOPH. *Pl.* 102 | ▶ *with inf.* ἀ. μὴ στρατεύεσθαι to say (advise) not to undertake the expedition HDT. 7.10. α2 ‖ **to narrate** PLUT. 57.874b Ⓒ **to proclaim, declare, enjoin** IL. 1.385 *etc.*; ὁ νόμος ἀγορεύει the law declares ANTIPHO 3.3.7 ARISTOT. *Rh.* 1354a 22; ἀγορεύω τινὶ ἐμὲ μὴ βασανίζειν I command anyone whatsoever not to torture me ARISTOPH. *Ran.* 628 Ⓓ **to count** PLAT. *Leg.* 950e ❷ *middle* **to say, proclaim** HDT. 9.26.3 ❸ *passive* **to be said, pronounced, proclaimed** THUC. 2.35.1; κακὸς ἀγορευέσθω let him be declared guilty PLAT. *Leg.* 917d ● *poet. impf.* ἀγόρευον ‖ *epic aor. 3. sg.* ἀγόρευσε ‖ *in Att. prose only pres. and impf.; others in compd.*

ἀγορή -ῆς, ἡ *Ion., see* ἀγορά.

ἀγορήιος *Ion., see* ἀγοραῖος.

ἀγορηγός, ἡ [ἀγορά, ἄγω] **conveying provisions** (*ship*) L. *EM.* 13.52

ἀγορῆθεν [ἀγορά] *adv.* **from the assembly** IL. 2.264, *al.*

ἀγορήνδε [ἀγορά] *adv.* **to the assembly** IL. 1.54

ἀγορητής -οῦ, ὁ [ἀγοράομαι] **speaker** Il. 1.248, *al.* Timo 30.1 *etc.*

ἀγορητύς -ύος, ἡ [ἀγοράομαι] **eloquence** Od. 8.168

ἀγορῆφι [ἀγορά] **epic in the assembly** Hes. *Th.* 89

ἄγορος -ου, ὁ [*see* ἀγορά] **group, gathering, assembly** (*pl.*) Eur. *IT.* 1096, *El.* 723, *Andr.* 1037; ἄγορον ἁλίσας φίλων having gathered a band of companions Eur. *HF.* 412 (*only sg.*) ● *only in* Eur. (*lyr.*).

2. ἄγος -εος, τό [ἄγνυμι] **fragment** Hsch. L. *EM.* 418.2

ἀγός -οῦ, ὁ [ἄγω] **leader, chief** Il. 4.265 Pind. *N.* 1.51 Aeschl. *Suppl.* 248, Eur. *Rh.* 29 *etc.*; πόλεως ἀγοὶ πρόμοι foremost men of the city Aeschl. *Suppl.* 905

1. ἄγος -εος, contr. -ους, τό [ἄζομαι] Ⓐ **pollution, sacrilege, guilt, impurity**; ἐν τῷ ἄγεῖ ἐνέχεσθαι to incur sacrilege Hdt. 6.56; ἄ. φυλάσσου guard against guilt Aeschl. *Suppl.* 375; ἄ. φεύγειν to escape pollution Soph. *Ant.* 256; παντὸς ἄγους καθαρεύειν to purify of all impurity Hld. 9.1.5 ‖ **filth, execrable** or **impious person** Soph. *OT.* 1426; τὸ ἄ. ἐλαύνειν to drive out the foulness, *i.e.,* those guilty of sacrilege Thuc. 1.126.2 Ⓑ **expiation, expiatory sacrifice** Soph. *fr.* 689; ὡς ἄ. as expiation Soph. *Ant.* 775 ● ἄγος L. *EGud. etc.*

ἀγοστός -οῦ, ὁ Ⓐ **palm** (*of the hand*): ἕλε γαῖαν ἀγοστῷ he clutched the ground with his hand Il. 11.425, *al.*; χειρὸς ἄ. hollow of the hand Ap. 3.120 ‖ **arm**, *folded* Theocr. 17.129 P[1]. (AP. 5.255.15), *al. etc.* | *fig.* ἐν ἀγοστῷ in the bosom (*of the Academy*) AP. 14.44.3 Ⓑ **dirt** Sch. Il. 6.506

ἄγουρος, ὁ *youth* Eustath. 1788.56

ἄγρα -ας, ἡ [*see* ἀγρέω ?] Ⓐ **hunt** Od. 22.306 Trag. 415a (*pl.*) *etc.*; ἄγρην ἐφέπεσκον they turned to hunting Od. 12.330; ἐς ἄγρας ἰέναι to go hunting Eur. *Suppl.* 885; ἐπὶ τὰς ἄγρας on hunting expeditions Ach. 2.34.1 | *of men* Plat. *Leg.* 823e | *of fish* **fishing** Soph. *Ai.* 880 (*lyr.*) ‖ **way of catching** Hdt. 2.70.1 (*pl.*) Ⓑ **game, prey, quarry** Hes. *Th.* 442 Aeschl. *Eum.* 148 Soph. *Ai.* 64; δαφοινὸν ἄγραν bleeding prey Pind. *N.* 3.81; ἐπὶ τῇ ἄγρᾳ τῶν ἰχθύων at the catch of fish = fishing NT. *Lu.* 5.9 | *fig.* δορὸς ἄγραν spear-prey ‖ *of a city* Aeschl. *Sept.* 322 (*lyr.*) ● *Ion.* -η -ης.

Ἄγρα -ας, ἡ **Agra**, *place in Attica* Plat. *Phaedr.* 299c *etc.*; τὰ πρὸς Ἄγραν the mysteries of Agra Plut. *Demetr.* 26.3 ‖ *pl.* αἱ Ἄγραι **Agrai**, *sanctuary of Artemis* Paus. 1.19.6 *etc.*

ἀγράδε [ἄγρος] Callim. *fr.* 72, *see* ἀγρόνδε.

Ἀγραῖοι -ων **Agraioi**, *pop. of Aetolia* Thuc. 2.102.2 *etc.*

ἀγραῖος -α -ον [ἄγρα] **of the hunt**, *epith. of Apollo* Paus. 1.41.6 | *of Artemis* Paus[2]. α20 | *of gods* Opp. 3.27 (*v.l.*)

Ἀγραῖς -ίδος, ἡ [Ἀγραῖοι] **region of the Agraïans** Thuc. 3.111.4

Ἀγραϊκός -ή -όν [Ἀγραῖοι] **of the Agraïans** Thuc. 3.106.3 *etc.*

ἀγραμματία -ας, ἡ [ἀγράμματος] **lack of education, ignorance** Phil[2]. *Her.* 210 Ael. *VH.* 8.6 *etc.*

ἀγράμματος -ον [γράμμα] Ⓐ **illiterate, ignorant** Plat. *Tim.* 23a Xen. *Mem.* 4.2.20 *etc.* ‖ **without words**, *of a song* Philod. *Poem.* 2.25 III 22 Ⓑ **unwritten** Plat. *Pol.* 295a ‖ **incapable of being written** Porph. *Abst.* 3.3 *etc.* Ⓒ **inarticulate**, *of sound* Aristot. *Int.* 16a 29 Diog. 3.107 ‖ **unable to utter articulate sounds**, *of animals* Aristot. *HA.* 488a 33 ◆ *adv.* ἀγραμμάτως **without education** Phil. 1.195; γράφειν ἄ. to write incorrectly Arr. *EpictD.* 2.9.10

ἀγράνδις [ἄγρος] *Dor. adv.* Theognost. 163.33, *see* ἀγρόνδε.

ἄγραπτος -ον [γράφω] **unwritten:** ἄγραπτα θεῶν

νόμιμα the unwritten laws of the gods Soph. *Ant.* 454; περὶ ἄλλου μηδενός ... πράγματος ἐγγράπτου μηδὲ ἀγράπτου by no other transaction, written or verbal pMich. 5.352.10 (Ip) ‖ ἄ. δίκη annulled judicial action Poll. 8.57

ἀγραρεύω [ἀγραρία] **to be on garrison** pCair.Masp. 22.1.8 (VIp), *cf.* ἀγραρεύεις· περιέρχῃ Hsch.

ἀγραρία -ας, ἡ [*Lat.* agraria] **garrison** pLond. 1889 r 12 (VIp) *etc.*

Ἀγραστυών -ῶνος, ὁ (*scil.* μήν) **Agrastyon**, *name of a month in Locris* IG 9.1.331 *etc.* ● *also* Ἀγρεσ-, Ἀγρασ- IGDI 1757, 1880.

ἀγρατέρα *see* ἀγρότερος *signf.* b.

ἀγραυλέω, *contr.* [ἄγραυλος] *impf.* ἠγραύλουν; **to live in the open, spend the night outdoors** Aristot. *Mir.* 831a 29 Plut. *Nu.* 4.1 Strab. 4.4.3 | *of shepherds* NT. *Lu.* 2.8

ἀγραυλής -ές [ἄγραυλος] **rural, rustic** Nic. *Th.* 78

ἀγραυλία -ας, ἡ [ἄγραυλος] **living outdoors, service in the field** Diod. 16.15.1 *etc.*

Ἀγραυλίδες -ων, αἱ [Ἄγραυλος] **daughters of Agraulos** Eur. *Ion* 23

ἀγραυλίζω [ἄγρός, αὐλίζω] **to camp in the open** Theophylact. *Hist.* 5.1.10 (*impf.* ἠγραύλιζεν) *al.*

ἄγραυλος -ον [ἄγρός, αὐλή] **living** *or* **spending the night in the fields**, *of shepherds* Il. 18.162 Hes. *Th.* 26 Ap. 4.317 *etc.*; ἄ. ἀνήρ boor P[1]. (AP. 11.60.3) | *epith. of Pan* Arch. (AP. 6.179.1) ‖ **rustic**, *of animals* Il. 10.155 Od. 12.253 Soph. *Ant.* 349 (*lyr.*) Eur. *Bac.* 1188 (*lyr.*) *etc.* | **wild, savage** Lyc. 893, 990 ‖ *of things* rustic: ἀγραύλους πύλας rustic gates Eur. *El.* 342

Ἄγραυλος -ου, ἡ, *see* Ἄγλαυρος.

ἀγραφής -ές [ἄγραφος] **unwritten, on one's word** pBGU 895.31 (*loan*) (IIp)

ἀγράφιος -ον [ἄγραφος] Ⓐ *perhaps* **not suited for writing**, *of papyrus* (≠ ἄγραφος unwritten, new) pMich. 2.123 v 7.25 (Ip) Ⓑ *subst.* **registry** (*for commercial transactions*) pHarr. 104.12 pMert. 24.17

ἀγραφίου γραφή, ἡ [ἄγραφος] **accusation of failed inscription** *or* **illicit debt cancellation**, *in the list of debtors of the state* Demosth. 58.51 Aristot. *Ath.* 59.3 *etc.*

ἄγραφος -ον [γράφω] Ⓐ **unwritten:** ἄ. μνήμη unwritten record Thuc. 2.43.3; ἄ. δόγματα unwritten doctrines (*of Plato*) Aristot. *Phys.* 209b 15; ἄ. διαθῆκαι verbal, nuncupatory will Plut. *Cor.* 9.3; ἄγραφα λέγειν to speak without written text Plut. *Demosth.* 8.5; ἄ. κληρονόμος heir not written (in the will) Luc. 57.23 ‖ ἄ. νόμοι *or* νόμιμα unwritten laws, *i.e.,* natural laws Demosth. 18.275 *etc. or* traditions, customs Thuc. 2.37.3 Plat. *Leg.* 793a *etc. or* religious traditions Lys. 6.10 ‖ ἄ. δίκαιον moral justice, equity Aristot. *EN.* 1162b 22 Ⓑ **not written, not registered** Io[1]. *in Phys.* 513.30 pBGU 1782.15 (Ⓘ[a]); ἄ. πόλεις unregistered cities, *i.e.,* not included in a treaty Thuc. 1.40.2 ‖ *Christ.* **not scriptural, not recorded**, *in Holy Scripture* Bas. *Spir.* 27.66.20, *al. etc.* Ⓒ **not capable of being represented** *or* **expressed** [Greg.] *ChrPat.* 923 ◆ *adv.* ἀγράφως **not in writing, without written text, verbally** Clem. *Str.* 5.10.62.2 Procl. *in Parm.* p. 553 *etc.* ‖ *Christ.* **not scripturally, without reference to Scripture** [Clem[1].] *Hom.* 17.15, *al.*

ἄγρει, ἀγρεῖτε *pres. imper. act. 2. sg. and 2. pl., see* ἀγρέω.

ἀγρεῖος -α -ον [ἄγρος] **rural, rustic** Leon. (AP. 6.35.2) ‖ *fig.* **rough, coarse** Alcm. 16.1 Aristoph. *Nub.* 655, *Th.* 160 ‖ *adv. neut.* ἀγρεῖον **coarsely** Callim. 24.13

ἀγρειοσύνη -ης, ἡ [ἀγρεῖος] **rusticity, uncouthness** AP. 6.51.10

ἀγρεῖφνα -ης, ἡ [γρῖφάω] **harrow, rake** Phan. (AP. 6.297.1) (*v.l.*)

ἀγρελάτης -ου, ἡ [ἄγρα, ἐλαύνω] **gamekeeper** pOxy. 1917.41 (VIp)

ἀγρέμιον -ου, τό [ἀγρεμών] **quarry, prey** Theodor. (AP. 6.224.2)

ἀγρεμών -όνος, ὁ [ἀγρέω] **hunter** L. *EM.* 13.56 ‖ **lance** (*unc. signf.*) Hsch. Aeschl. *fr.* 141 (*prob.*)

ἄγρενον *see* ἀγρηνόν.

ἀγρεσίη -ης, ἡ [ἀγρέω] *Ion.* **hunt** Leon. (AP. 6.13.2)

ἀγρεταί -ῶν, αἱ [ἀγρέω] **Agretai**, *priestess of Athena on Cos* IBM 968 A 6 Hsch

ἀγρετέρα *prob. for* ἀγρτέρα, *epith. of Artemis* IG 2². 4573 (IV[a])

ἀγρετεύω [ἀγρέτης] **to hold the office of** ἀγρέτας (*Att.* ἀγρέτης) IG Lacon. 5.1.1346 (IIp) (*aor. ptc.* ἀγρετεύσας).

ἀγρέτης -ου, ὁ [ἀγρέω] **leader, chief** Aeschl. *Pers.* 1002 (*corr. for* ἀγρόται) | *epith. of divinities* IGDI 5666 (*Apollo*) Hsch

ἀγρεύμα -ατος, τό [ἀγρεύω] Ⓐ **quarry, prey** Eur. *Bac.* 1241 | *fig.* Xen. *Mem.* 3.11.7 Ⓑ **net**, *for hunting, gener. fig.:* ἀγρεύμα θηρός snare for a beast, *said of the peplos in which Agamemnon was killed* Aeschl. *Ch.* 998; ποικίλοις ἀγρεύμασιν with crafty nets Aeschl. *Eum.* 460; ἐντὸς ... μορσίμων ἀγρευμάτων in the nets of fate Aeschl. *Ag.* 1048; τύχης ἀγρεύμασιν by the tricks of fate Gorg. B 11.19

ἀγρεύς -έως, ὁ [ἄγρα] Ⓐ **hunter**, *epith. of gods* Pind. *P.* 9.65 (*Aristaeus*) Eur. *Bac.* 1192 (*Bacchus*) | *of Poseidon* **fisherman** Luc. 28.47 ‖ ἄ. ἠέρος ἢ ξυλόχοιο hunter in the air (*of birds*) or in the wood P[1]. (AP. 6.75.6) Ⓑ *ornith.* **agreus, bird** Ael. *NA.* 8.24

ἀγρεύσιμος -η -ον [ἀγρεύω] **easy to catch** Sch. Soph. *Ph.* 863

ἀγρεῦσις -εως, ἡ [ἀγρεύω] **hunting, catching** Hsch

ἀγρευτήρ -ῆρος, ὁ [ἀγρεύω] **hunter** Callim. *H.* 3.218; ἰχθύος ἀγρευτῆρες fishermen Theocr. 21.6 | *adj.* **hunting** (*dogs*) Opp[1]. 3.456 | **fishing** (*net*) Man[1]. 5.279

ἀγρευτήριον -ου, τό [ἀγρεύω] **trap, snare** [Proc.] *Prov.* 6.5 *etc.*

ἀγρευτής -οῦ, ὁ [ἀγρεύω] **hunter** Soph. *OC.* 1091 (*Apollo*) | *fig.* Meleag. (AP. 12.125.6) | *adj.* **hunting** (*dogs*) Sol. 13 | *in fowling, of reeds covered with birdlime* Mnasalc. (AP. 7.171) ● *Dor. acc.* -τάν Soph. *l.c.*

ἀγρευτικός -ή -όν [ἀγρεύω] **of hunting, skilled in the hunt** Sch. Aristoph. *Ve.* 368a,c; ἀγρευτικόν (ἐστι) it is useful for ensnaring (*an enemy*) Xen. *Hippar.* 4.12 ● *adv.* ἀγρευτικῶς **in a manner suited to hunting** Poll. 5.9

ἀγρευτίς -ίδος, ἡ [ἀγρεύω] **female hunter** Sch. Aristoph. *Ve.* 368a,c

ἀγρευτός -ή -όν [ἀγρεύω] **caught** Opp. 3.541

ἀγρεύω [ἀγρεύς] *impf.* ἤγρευον, *mid. pass.* ἠγρευόμην ‖ *fut.* ἀγρεύσω, *mid.* ἀγρεύσομαι Luc. 655 | *aor.* ἤγρευσα, *mid.* ἠγρευσάμην | *pf.* ἤγρευκα, *mid. pass.* ἤγρευμαι ‖ *aor. pass.* ἠγρεύθην ‖ *fut. pass.* ἀγρευθήσομαι ❶ *active* Ⓐ **to catch, to take by hunting** *or* **fishing** ▸ *with acc.* Hdt. 2.95.2 *etc.* | φιλεῖ πόλεμος ἀγρεύειν νέους war loves to catch young men Soph. *fr.* 554; ἄγραν ἀ. to catch prey Eur. *Bac.* 434 ‖ ▸ *abs.* **to go hunting, hunt** Xen. *Cyn.* 12.6 Ⓑ *fig.* **to pursue, go after** Eur. *Bac.* 138 Meleag. (AP. 7.196.7) *etc.* ‖ **to catch in error** NT. *Mar.* 12.13 Ⓒ *Christ. in neg. sense* **to entice, snare, seduce**, *of sin* VT. *Prov.* 5.22; τὸν ἄνθρωπον ὁ διάβολος ἤγρευσε the devil ensnared man Meth. *Symp.* 10.5 *etc.* ❷ *middle = active* **to catch, by hunting or fishing** Eur. *IT.* 1163, *Andr.* 841 ❸ *passive* Ⓐ **to be hunted** Xen. *An.* 5.3.8 ‖ **to**

be caught, *by fishing* ISID². (AP. 9.94.5) *etc.* Ⓑ **to be attracted**, *to the good* EUS¹. *fr.Th.* 6 (19.29) *etc.*

ἀγρέω, *contr.* [*see* ἄγρα ?] Ⓐ **to take, seize, get hold of** ▶ *with acc.* AESCHL. *Ag.* 126 (*city*) *etc.*; ἀγρεῖ δ'οἶνον ἐρυθρόν take red wine ARCHIL. 4.8; τρόμος δὲ παῖσαν ἀγρεῖ a trembling seizes all of me SAPPH. 31.14; ἀγρεῖ ... ῥίζαν take a root NIC. *Th.* 534 || **to catch**, *by fishing* PHAN. (AP. 6.304.3) Ⓑ *Hom. imper.* ἄγρει, ἀγρεῖτε **come on!**, *gener. with other imper.* IL. 5.765 OD. 20.149 (*pl.*) AP. 1.487 ● *contr. pres.* ἀγρῶ.

ἄγρη -ης, ἡ *Ion. see* ἄγρα.

ἀγρήγορος -ον [γρηγορέω] **from which there is no awakening**, *of sleep* *I*CIG 9449.1 (VIᵖ)

ἄγρηθεν [ἄγρα] *adv.* **from the hunt** AP. 2.938

ἀγρηνόν -οῦ, τό [*see* ἄγρα, ἀγρέω] **net** HSCH. || **net-like fabric** POLL. 4.116 ● ἄγρενον DION⁹. 9.20 (*corr.*)

ἀγρηυθῶσιν, αἱ μῆτραι *f.l.* HP. *Mul.* 2.154 (*v.l.* προσθέωσι), *cf.* EROT. (ἄγρας χρῄζουσιν: *perhaps from* ἀγρευθῶσιν ?) HSCH. (συνειληθῶσιν)

ἀγρία -ας, ἡ [ἄγρα] **hunt** *P*BGU 1123.9 (Iᵃ), *see* ἄγρα || *bot.* **spear grass** SCH. THEOCR. 13.42b, *see* ἄγρωστις.

ἀγριαγγούριον -ου, τό [ἄγριος, ἀγγούριον] **wild cucumber**, *as an explanation of* ἀγριοσίκυον AG. Bek. 1097 (ἀγρανγούρην *cod.*).

ἀγριαίνω [ἄγριος] *impf.* ἠγρίαινον, *mid. pass.* ἠγριαινόμην || *fut.* ἀγριανῶ PLAT. *Rp.* 501e || *aor.* ἠγρίᾱνα || *aor. pass.* ἠγριάνθην || *fut. pass.* ἀγριανθήσομαι VT. (Th.) *Dan.* 11.11 ❶ *active* Ⓐ **to be or become wild, be angry, rage** ▶ τινι *at* s.o. PLAT. *Symp.* 173d = ▶ πρός τινα PORPH. *Abst.* 3.12 | *of animals* ARISTOT. *HA.* 608b 31 | *of a river* PLUT. *Caes.* 38.4 || *med.* **to be inflamed**, *of sores* ARET. *SD.* 2.11.4 *etc.* Ⓑ *causat.* **to enrage, make angry, provoke** DCASS. 44.47.1 ACH. 2.7 ❷ *passive* Ⓐ = *active* **to become wild, rage**: τῆς θαλάσσης ἀγριανθείσης the sea having become stormy DIOD. 24.1.2 Ⓑ **to be irritated** PLUT. *Ant.* 58.3 DION. 9.32.4 *etc.* ● *in Att. the pass. is supplied by the pass. of* ἀγριόω.

Ἀγριᾶνες -ων, οἱ **Agrianes**, *pop. of Macedonia* HDT. 5.16.1 THUC. 2.96.3 *etc.*

Ἀγριάνης -ου, ὁ **Agrianes**, *river in Macedonia* HDT. 4.90.2

ἀγριάνθρωπος -ου, ὁ [ἄγριος, ἄνθρωπος] **wild man** [CALLISTH.] 3.28

Ἀγριάνιος -ου, ὁ ([*Scil.* μήν]) **Agrianios**, *name of a month at Sparta, Rhodes, etc.* *I*IG 5.1.18 *B* 8

ἀγρίαπις -ιδος GLOSS., *see* ἀγριοαππίδιον.

ἀγριάς -άδος [ἄγριος] **wild**, *fem.* AP. 1.28 CALLIM. *fr.* 75.13 (*goat*) PHILIP¹. (AP. 9.561.2) (*vine*) OPP¹. 3.139 (*bears*) *etc.*

ἀγριαχράς, ἡ [ἄγριος, ἀχράς] *bot.* **wild pear** ZOP². (ORIB. 14.61.1)

ἀγριάω, *contr.* [ἄγριος] **to be wild** OPP¹. 2.49 (*ptc.* ἀγριόωντα).

ἀγρίδιον -ου, τό [ἀγρός] **small field** ARR. *EpictD.* 1.10.9, *al.* MAUR. 4.3 *etc.*

ἀγριελαία -ας, ἡ [ἄγριος, ἐλαία] *bot.* **wild olive** HP. *Mul.* 2.112 DIOSC². 1.105 *etc.*

ἀγριελάινος -ον [ἀγριελαία] **of wild olive** *I*SYLL³. 972.188 (IIᵃ)

ἀγριέλαιος -ον [ἀγριελαία] **of wild olive** ERYC. (AP. 9.237.6) || ἡ ἀ. **wild olive** THPHR. *HP.* 2.2.5 THEOCR. 7.18 NT. *Rom.* 11.24 *etc.*

ἀγρεύω [ἄγρα] **to catch by hunting** *or* **fishing** *P*RYL. 98a 8 (IIᵖ) *etc.*

Ἀγρίζαμα **Agrizama**, *city in Galatia* PTOL⁴. *Geog.* 5.4.8

ἀγρίζω [ἄγρα] *act.* **to irritate** VT. (Sym.) *Prov.* 15.18 (*conject. for* ἀγγρίζω, *see*).

ἀγρινός -ή -όν [ἄγριος] **wild** OR. *Sib.* 7.79 (*bird*)

Ἀγρικόλας -α, ὁ **Agrikolas** ([*Lat.* Agricola]) AP. 9.594.3

ἀγρικός -ή -όν [ἀγρός] *P*OXY. 1675.4 (IIIᵖ), *see* ἄγριος.

Ἀγρίλιον -ου, τό **Agrilion**, *city in Bithynia* PTOL⁴. *Geog.* 5.1.14

ἀγριμαῖος -α -ον [ἄγρα] **wild** || τὰ ἀ. **game** PTOL¹. 9

ἀγριμέλισσα, ἡ [ἄγριος, μέλισσα] **wasp** HSCH. (*fig.*) ● -ττα GLOSS.

ἀγρῖνος -ου, ὁ *I*MAMA 3.663 HSCH., *see* ἀγρονόμος.

ἀγριόαιξ -αιγος, ἡ [ἄγριος, αἴξ] **wild goat** RHETOR. *in CCA* 7.225.9

ἀγριοαπ(π)ίδιον -ου, τό [ἄγριος, ἀπίδιον] **wild pear** GEOP. 8.37.3

ἀγριοβάλανος -ου, ἡ [ἄγριος, βάλανος] *bot.* **ilex, wild oak** VT. (Aq., Th.) *Is.* 44.14

ἀγριόβουλος -ον [ἄγριος, βουλή] **of wild purposes** ADAM. 1.18

ἀγριόβους -βοος, ὁ [ἄγριος, βοῦς] **wild ox, yak** COSM¹. 11.5

ἀγριογνώμων -ονος [ἄγριος, γνώμη] **of wild nature** AGATHANG. *Greg.* 151 (p. 77)

ἀγριοδαίτης -ου, ὁ [ἄγριος, δαίομαι] **eating wild fruits** OR. (PAUS. 8.42.6)

ἀγριοειδής -ές [ἄγριος, εἶδος] **wild in appearance** APOCDAN. C 45 (p. 117)

ἀγριόεις -εσσα -εν NIC. *Al.* 30, *al.*, *see* ἄγριος.

ἀγριόθῡμος -ον [ἄγριος, θυμός] **of fierce temper** ORPH. *H.* 12.4 GREG. (AP. 8.104.5)

ἀγριοκάνναβος -ου, ὁ [ἄγριος, κάνναβος] *bot.* **hemp mallow**, *plant* HSCH

ἀγριοκάρδαμον -ου, τό [ἄγριος, κάρδαμον] **water-cress** (*see* ἰβηρίς) GAL. 13.353

ἀγριοκάρυον -ου, τό [ἄγριος, κάρυον] **wild nut** HSCH

ἀγριοκινάρα -ας, ἡ [ἄγριος, κινάρα] **white acacia** DIOSC². 3.12a || **thistle** GLOSS

ἀγριοκοκκύμηλον -ου, τό [ἄγριος, κοκκύμηλον] **wild plum** GAL. 6.619

ἀγριοκρόμμυον -ου, τό [ἄγριος, κρόμμυον] **bulb, onion** SCH. ARISTOPH. *Pl.* 253.1

ἀγριοκύμῑνον -ου, τό [ἄγριος, κύμινον] *bot.* **wild cumin**, *plant* SCH. NIC. *Th.* 710, 713

ἀγριολάχανα -ων, τά [ἄγριος, λάχανον] **wild vegetables** SCH. THEOCR. 4.52

ἀγρίολον, τό [ἄγριος] *bot.* **Alexanders**, *plant* DIOSC². 3.67 (*see* ἱπποσέλινον).

ἀγριομαλάχη -ης, ἡ [ἄγριος, μαλάχη] *bot.* **althea**, *plant* SCH. NIC. *Th.* 89a

ἀγριομέλιττα -ης, ἡ [*see* ἀγριμέλισσα] **wasp** GLOSS., *see* ἀγριομέλισσα.

ἀγριόμορφος -ον [ἄγριος, μορφή] *f.l. for* συαγριόμορφος ORPH. *A.* 979

ἀγριομυρίκη -ης, ἡ [ἄγριος, μυρίκη] *bot.* **wild tamarisk**, *plant* VT. *Ier.* 17.6

ἀγριομυρίκινος -ον [ἀγριομυρίκη] **of tamarisk** *P*HAMB. 12.19 (IIIᵖ)

ἀγριόμυρμηξ -ηκος, ὁ [ἄγριος, μύρμηξ] **weevil** GLOSS

ἀγριόμωρος -ον [ἄγριος, μωρός] **savagely foolish** CYR¹. *Is.* 2.834C

ἀγρίονους -ουν, τό [ἄγριος, νοῦς] **with a fierce mind** *I*IG 12.7.115.4 (IIᵃ)

ἀγριοπήγανον -ου, τό [ἄγριος, πήγανον] *bot.* **wild rue**, *plant* AEL¹. 1.295, *al.*

ἀγριοπηγός -ου, ὁ [ἄγριος, πήγνυμι] **wheelwright** SCH. ARISTOPH. *Eq.* 464a

ἀγριοποιός -όν [ἄγριος, ποιέω] Ⓐ **poet of ferocity, of savage characters**, *Aeschylus* ARISTOPH. *Ran.* 837 Ⓑ **making savage, fierce** SCH. AESCHL. *Pers.* 614 SCH. NIC. *Al.* 30c

ἀγριορίγανος -ου, ἡ, ὁ [ἄγριος, ὀρίγανος] *bot.* **marjoram**, *plant* DIOSC². 3.29

ἀγριόρροδον -ου, τό [ἄγριος, ῥόδον] **nard** (*see* Κελτικὴ νάρδος) GLOSS

Ἄγριος -ου, ὁ **Agrios**, *centaur* IL. 14.117 *etc.*

ἄγριος -α -ον [ἄγρός] Ⓐ **of the fields, wild, savage**, *of animals* (*opp. to* τιθασός, ἥμερος) IL. 3.24, *al.* HDT. 7.86.1, *al.* ARISTOT. *HA.* 488a 26, *al. etc.* | *of men in a wild state* HDT. 4.191.4 | *of trees and fruits* AESCHL. *Pers.* 614 SOPH. *Tr.* 1197 HP. *Mul.* 1.75, 78, 79; μέλι ἄγριον wild honey NT. *Mat.* 3.4 || **uncultivated**, *of lands* PLAT. *Phaed.* 113b, *Leg.* 905b | *of a hairstyle* ACH. 3.12.1 Ⓑ *fig.* **savage, violent, cruel**, *of pers.* IL. 6.97, *al.* OD. 1.199, *al.* PLAT. *Gorg.* 510b, *al.* THEOCR. 23.19; ἄγριον εἰς ἡμᾶς ἔχεις you cause (your husband) to be cruel to me EUR. *El.* 1116; ἄ. κυβευτὴν keen dice player MEN. *fr.* 705; οὐ χαλεπός ἐστιν οὐδ' ἄγριος ἀνδρὶ φίλῳ he is neither rude nor harsh towards a friend PLUT. 4.69b || *of temper* ἄ. χόλος fierce anger IL. 4.23 = ἄ. θυμός IL. 9.629; ἀγριώτατα ἤθεα most savage customs HDT. 4.106; φιλία ἀγρία fierce friendship PLAT. *Leg.* 837b | *of things* HDT. 8.13 (*night*) AESCHL. *Pr.* 175 (*bonds*) PLAT. *Rp.* 564a (*slavery*) *etc.*; νοσεῖ μὲν νόσον ἀγρίαν he suffers from a fierce (malignant) disease SOPH. *Ph.* 173 (*cf.* 265) | *subst.* τὸ ἄγριον **savageness** PLAT. *Crat.* 394e Ⓒ *adv. neut.* **savagely, cruelly** HES. *Sc.* 236 MOSCH. 1.11; ἄγριον HLD. 2.13.1 || *compar.* -ώτερος | *superl.* -ώτατος ◆ *adv.* ἀγρίως **savagely, cruelly** AESCHL. *Eum.* 972 PLAT. *Leg.* 867d, *Symp.* 218a (*comp.*) || *compar.* -ωτέρως *and* -ώτερον ● ἄγ- AESCHL. SOPH. (*lyr.*); ἀγ- EUR. | -ρῑ- IL. 22.313 *for the meter* || *fem.* -ος IL. 19.88 PLAT. *Leg.* 824a *etc.*

ἀγριοσέλῑνον -ου, τό [ἄγριος, σέλινον] *bot.* **Alexanders**, *plant* DIOSC². 3.67

ἀγριοσίκυον -ου, τό [ἄγριος, σίκυος] *bot.* **squirting cucumber**, *plant* HIPPIATR. 4.3, *al.*

ἀγριόσκορδον -ου, τό [ἄγριος, σκόρδον] **wild garlic** PAEG. 260.25.

ἀγριοσταφίδες *e* καὶ ἀγριοσταφύλιες [ἄγριος, σταφίς] **wild grapes** HSCH

ἀγριοσταφυλίτης -ου, ὁ [ἄγριος, σταφυλή] **from wild grapes**: οἶνος wine DIOSC². 5.6

ἀγριοσυκέα *and* ἀγριοσυκῆ -ῆς, ἡ [ἄγριος, συκέα] **wild fig** HORAP. 2.77 *al.*

ἀγριότης -ητος, ἡ [ἄγριος] **savageness, wild nature**, *of animals* XEN. *Mem.* 2.2.7 ISOCR. 12.163 | *of plants* THPHR. *HP.* 3.2.4 | *of uncultivated land* GEOP. 7.1.4 || *fig.* **harshness, ferocity, cruelty**, *of men* PLAT. *Symp.* 197d, *al.* DEMOSTH. 26.26 (*pl.*) *etc.*

ἀγριόφαγρος -ου, ὁ [ἄγριος, φάγρος] *ichthyol.* **wild porgy**, *fish* OPP. 1.140

ἀγριοφανής -ές [ἄγριος, φαίνω] **appearing wild** CORN. 27

ἀγριόφρων -ονος [ἄγριος, φρήν] **wild** CYR¹. *Iul.* 9 (6².297D)

ἀγριόφυλλον -ου, τό [ἄγριος, φύλλον] *bot.* **hog's fennel** DIOSC². 3.78a (*see* πευκέδανος).

ἀγριόφυτα -ων, τά [ἄγριος, φυτόν] **wild herbs** SCH. NIC. *Al.* 429

ἀγριόφωνος -ον [ἄγριος, φωνή] **with savage voice** (*language*) OD. 8.294 EPIGR. 3.74.22

ἀγριοχηνοπρυμνίς -ίδος, ἡ [ἄγριος, χήν, πρύμνα] *sc.* ναῦς, **ship with a wild goose as acrostolion** *P*MON. 4.9 *al.* (VIᵖ) (-πρύμνης *pap.*).

ἀγριόχοιρος -ου, ὁ [ἄγριος, χοῖρος] **wild hog** SCH. ARISTOPH. *Pl.* 304

ἀγριοψώρα -ας, ἡ [ἄγριος, ψώρα] **chronic itch** HSCH

ἀγριόω, *contr.* [ἄγριος] *impf. mid. pass.* ἠγριούμην || *aor.* ἠγρίωσα || *pf. mid. pass.* ἠγρίωμαι || *ppf. mid. pass.* ἠγριώμην || *aor. pass.* ἠγριώθην ❶ *act.* (*only aor.*) **to make savage, provoke, irritate** ▶ πρός τινα against s.o. PLUT. *Per.* 34.5; ἥ

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