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Wordtrade Reviews: Neglected Paradise

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Editorial Appraisals:

Some qualified reviewers offer their own brief evaluation of the book. Otherwise, most of our content represents the authors'-editors' own words as a preview to their approach to the subject, their style and point-of-view. <>

TEN NEGLECTED CLASSICS OF PHILOSOPHY, VOLUME ONE edited by Eric Schliesser [Oxford University Press, 9780199928927]

What makes for a philosophical classic? Why do some philosophical works persist over time, while others do not? The philosophical canon and diversity are topics of major debate today. This stimulating volume contains ten new essays by accomplished philosophers writing passionately about works in the history of philosophy that they feel were unjustly neglected or ignored-and why they deserve greater attention. The essays cover lesser known works by famous thinkers as well as works that were once famous but now only faintly remembered. Works examined include Gorgias' *Encomium of Helen*, Jane Adams' *Women and Public Housekeeping*, W.E.B. DuBois' *Whither Now and Why*, Edith Stein's *On the Problem of Empathy*, Jonathan Bennett's *Rationality*, and more.

In this volume ten distinguished philosophers share their enthusiasm about ten unjustly neglected classic works in the history of philosophy. In so doing they explore the ways professional philosophy is practiced today, reflect on its patterns of exclusion, and offer exciting pathways to renewing philosophy. The essays are written in engaging and often personal style and are, thereby, invitations to join in the conversation(s).

While each chapter is an expression of engagement with an individual work, the volume as a whole, and Eric Schliesser's introduction specifically, address timely questions about the nature of philosophy, disciplinary contours, and the vagaries of canon formation.

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Introduction: On Being a Classic of Philosophy

I borrow a so-called intuition pump—that is, a carefully constrained thought experiment—which induces, even shapes, readers to use their intuition to develop an answer to a problem—from Dan Dennett. Dennett's "Faustian bargain" is articulated as follows:

For several years, I have been posing the following choice for my fellow philosophers: if Mephistopheles offered you the following two options, which would you choose?

Some philosophers reluctantly admit that they would have to go for option (B). If they had to choose, they would rather be read than right. Like composers, poets, novelists, and other creators in the arts, they tend to want their work to be experienced, over and over, by millions (billions, if possible!). But they are also tugged in the direction of the scientists' quest. After all, philosophers are supposed to be trying to get at the truth.

When I have presented the same Faustian bargain to scientists they tend to opt for (A) without any hesitation—it's a no-brainer for them. (Daniel C. Dennett [2013], "A Faustian Bargain," in Intuition Pumps and Other Tools for Thinking, p. 411)

1 Gorgias's Encomium of Helen by Rachel Barney

Gorgias's Helen is one of the earliest and most enigmatic Greek philosophical texts. An epideoxis, or set-piece speech, it's a pioneering argument about moral responsibility and a fascinating Sophist argument for the power of language [logos]. In it, Gorgias attempts to show that the beautiful Helen of Troy, whose adultery and flight with Paris was the proximate cause of the Trojan War, should suffer no unjust blame for the war nonetheless. If either fate, the gods, logos, or eros (love) compelled her, she is blameless. Though rigorously argued, it is also playful and self-undermining (it can be either a narrow argument that Helen's act was irrational and self-destructive, or a claim that no one is ever responsible for anything). This paper attempts to do justice to all these different dimensions.

2 Fénelon's Telemachus by Ryan Patrick Hanley

This paper examines three aspects of the treatment of the relationship of love to virtue in François Fénelon's Telemachus. As one of the great French intellectual figures of the early eighteenth century, Fenelon was at first admired but then banished from the royal court. This was largely because of Telemachus, an imagined narrative of the prince's search for his wandering father, Ulysses, during which he absorbs many moral and political lessons. The work was viewed as radical because of its stress on peace, austerity versus luxury, and an egalitarian ethical vision opposed to Louis XIV's ruling creeds. But Telemachus above all considers the place of love in ethics and politics: first the potential conflicts necessitating a choice between love, especially eros, sexual love, and virtue; second, the work's scheme for cultivating a different kind of love, the love of virtue; and third, its conceptual treatment of love as virtue.

3 Thomas Paine's "Agrarian Justice" and the Origins of Social Insurance by Elizabeth Anderson

In "Agrarian Justice," Thomas Paine developed the first realistic proposal in the world to abolish systematic poverty: a universal social insurance system comprising old-age pensions and disability support and universal stakeholder grants for young adults, funded by a 10% inheritance tax focused on land. He argued for a form of equality consistent with liberty. In justifying his proposal using social contract theories and John Locke's principles of property, Paine offered a third way between proto-communism—symbolized by the French Revolution's "Equals" radical contingent and their desire to confiscate all wealth—and England's Poor Laws, which offered humanitarian relief but stigmatized the poor and subjected them to harsh social control and workhouse conditions. Paine defended the private property system, while also theorizing large-scale poverty as preventable injustice and conceiving of universal entitlements to limit poverty caused by property-holding inequality. Thus Paine helped forge the modern idea of distributive justice.

4 Lotze's Mikrokosmus by Frederick Beiser

This article is a brief account of the context, genesis, and intention behind Hermann Lotze's Mikrokosmus, his three-volume largely forgotten magnum opus. Lotze's work was an attempt to resolve the conflict between science and faith that became especially intense during the second half of the 19th century. He aimed to create a new anthropology to answer the question of what meaning human life had in the cosmos, responding to new advances in chemistry, physics, and biology. In his defense of theism and critique of materialism (part of German philosophy's materialism controversy), Lotze believed that he could resolve this conflict not only by a new distinction between scientific mechanism and teleology, but also by an even newer distinction between value and reality. Lotze's

distinction between the realms of value and reality, and validity and existence, are still fundamental for modern thought.

5 Bradley's Appearance and Reality by Michael Della Rocca

This paper explains and defends F.H. Bradley's central argument in Appearance and Reality, i.e. his infinite regress argument concerning relations. Relata depend on other relata which depend on other relata and so on. Since Bradley's argument claims that relations have to be grounded, and he can find no rational grounding given such regress and circularity of relations, he concludes relations are not real. Bradley thus emerges as an idealist and a monist; like the ancient philosopher Parmenides and many succeeding philosophers, he rejects diversity and multiplicity in favor of an underlying unity. Bradley's central argument is strong and therefore the founding story of analytical philosophy, according to which Bertrand Russell and G.E. Moore vanquished the hapless Bradley, is nothing more than a founding myth.

6 Jane Addams's "Women and Public Housekeeping" by Sally Haslanger

Jane Addams' broadside, "Women and Public Housekeeping" (1910), argues that household tasks keeping women out of the public realm also provide knowledge that would make them excellent city leaders. This is an early example of feminist epistemology that provides a social critique that tackles gender bias and also challenges assumptions about where to find excellent philosophy (in part due to its very form as a broadside, reflecting the need for women to keep their non-housework efforts brief). Addams' work is also an example of philosophy that might help advance women in politics, since it states men's military conception of government should give way to public housekeeping. Finally, Addams challenges the public/private distinction that has burdened political philosophy and leads to gendered concepts of work and labor that don't serve communities well. Civic housekeeping must learn from private housekeeping, and in turn such municipal participation would enrich women's lives.

7 On Making Philosophy Functional: Ernst Cassirer's Substanzbegriff und Funktionsbegriff by Alan W. Richardson

This essay offers a reading of the importance of Ernst Cassirer's 1910 Substance and Function against the background of a now standard story of the rise of analytic philosophy from the ashes of Kantianism. Cassirer's book makes that story much more complicated and the history of early twentieth-century philosophy correspondingly more interesting. Kant rescued rationalism in philosophy: even if reason does not give us knowledge of beings beyond the physical world, the transcendental standpoint of the mind determines the world. But nineteenth-century philosophy undid that system, in part due to Bertrand Russell's elaboration of fundamental changes in logic, and led to analytic philosophy, which grounded antimetaphysical logical truths in the meanings of words.

Nonetheless Cassierer wrote a neo-Kantian work stating mathematical and other concepts are determined through relations among them and within the system of knowledge itself, restoring Kantian intellectual functions and continuing some form of the Kantian tradition.

8 Edith Stein: On the Problem of Empathy by Kris McDaniel

Edith Stein, who began her career as Husserl's research assistant, was an important philosopher in the phenomenological tradition, but her work was ultimately marginalized in Nazi Germany and she died in a concentration camp. This paper unearths and discusses her first substantive work, On the Problem of Empathy, which is the problem of how other persons and their inner states can be given to others. In terms of "the problem of other minds," how we perceive those is through the irreducible intentional state of empathy. Stein wants to distinguish between the descriptive-psychological (distinguished by Husserl's ideation of intentional states) and genetic-psychological (supported by empirical analysis) aspects of this problem. Stein felt empathy was an act of ideation through which we can systematically and comprehensively discern not only others' spiritual types but our own. Empathy is a prerequisite for both knowledge of others and the self.

9 W. E. B. Du Bois's "Whither Now and Why" by Chike Jeffers

W.E.B. Du Bois's 1960 essay, "Whither Now and Why," is a neglected but brilliant sequel to his 1897 essay, "The Conservation of Races," which inspired much of the pioneering work in philosophy of race. In both works DuBois stresses perpetuation of black racial identity and cultural difference; a race should predominantly be understood as a kind of cultural group. Discrimination must end, but cultural identity must remain. In "Whither Now" his position evolves to state the need for education of black children in socialism, but he also states that historical consciousness necessary for social progress mandates that all people, but especially African Americans, recognize Africa and the American Negro's distinct identity and cultural contributions to world civilization in ancient and modern times. For Dubois postracial thinking was dangerous if it went beyond dismantling an unfair American social hierarchy to blotting out voluntary education in cultural diversity and a pan-African cultural identity.

10 Jonathan Bennett's Rationality by Daniel Dennett

Bennet's Rationality is an imaginative essay that sought to change the methodology of conceptual analysis, i.e. ordinary language philosophy, by asking how language contributed to human rationality. Since this movement had been launched by towering figures like Wittgenstein and Austin it had gotten bogged down in analyzing nuances of meaning. Bennett considered much more ambitiously the central rational principles of "human talk." He began with Karl von Frisch's Nobel Prize-winning work on honeybees. Through an extended analysis of whether the waggle dances of honey bees transmitting information about the location of food constituted linguistic communication— and if

not, what would need to be added—Bennett arrived at an understanding of rule-guided communication and other parameters as going beyond nonrational bee behaviors to constitute true rational language.

NEGLECTED CLASSICS OF PHILOSOPHY, VOLUME 2
edited by Eric Schliesser [Oxford University Press, 9780190097196]

The prominent contributors to this edited volume were asked to discuss neglected classic works in both Western and non-Western philosophy, and to make a case for their contemporary importance in an accessible and inviting way. The result - a successor to an earlier 2016 volume, also edited by Eric Schliesser - is an invitation to consider new ways of defining, and doing, philosophy. The works discussed here are written in a variety of literary styles, in different ages and intellectual cultures. Many contributors note the meta-philosophical features of the works, and how these can be salient today, and thus inspire reflection on the nature of philosophy and the varieties of roles it can play professionally and existentially. In particular, many of the chapters inspire reflection on the gendered, racial, and cultural patterns of exclusion in the development of the contemporary philosophical canon.

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In this introduction I use Bertrand Russell's (1945) The History of Western Philosophy (hereafter: History) to introduce the metaphilosophical themes that recur throughout the chapters of this book.

In particular, I focus on the way the distinction or opposition between rustic thought, which is supposed to characterize barbarous societies, and the urbane thought that is purported to characterize civilized society can help explain some entrenched patterns of exclusion visible in contemporary philosophy. I embed these remarks in a larger, speculative historiography of the very idea of "Western philosophy." Along the way, I provide an overview of the chapters of this volume.

In the twelfth century Ibn Tufayl, writing in what we would call Spain, presented himself as a "Western" philosopher in order to remind his readers that he was at the periphery in the vast world of learning within the interconnected Islamic empires. He did so not without pride, but also to call attention to the fact that he lacked access to manuscripts of some of the books he knew existed, penned by ancient authors like Plato and Aristotle and more recent luminaries writing in the "East," like Al- Farabi, Ibn Sinna (Avicenna), and Al- Ghazali.

Ibn Tufayl's book, Hayy ibn Yaqzãn, is a philosophical allegory that in addition to Islamic themes draws on Platonic, Sufi, and revealed sources. It offers the theoretical and spiritual journey of a man (Hayy ibn Yaqzan, or "Alive, Son of Awake") who grows up and develops intellectually outside civilization. It connects metaphysical speculation with subtle hints about the political context of philosophizing.

A 1671 Latin translation gave it the subtitle Philosophus autodidactus, or "The Self- Taught Philosopher"; this made it available to learned Europeans, who in turn translated it into various vernaculars. For example, Simon Ockley, who plays a nontrivial role in Edward Said's account of the origins of orientalism, translated it into English in 1708 as The Improvement of Human Reason Exhibited in the Life of Hai Ebn Yokdhan By Ibn Tufail. In 1672 it was translated into Dutch in the circle of Spinoza's friends. It then remained familiar to intellectuals for another century. For example, at the height of the German Enlightenment, Lessing enthused about the book, sending it to Mendelsohn, urging him to read it.

Did Ibn Tufayl originate the very idea of Western philosophy? I would not bet on it. Perhaps the phrase was already used in late antiquity, contrasting philosophical or clerical work being done in the Western Roman Empire with that being done in the Eastern Roman Empire. Of course, somebody may object that what Ibn Tufayl meant by "Western philosophy" is not quite how more contemporary thinkers use it. After all, in the present context, Ibn Tufayl's work would, despite its many debts to Plato and Aristotle, be often treated as "non- Western" in virtue of the fact that is the product, in part, of the Islamic world.

The first use of "Western philosophy" that I am familiar with to mark an implied contrast between the speculative thought of Europe with that of a distinct, contrasting civilization occurs in volume 4 of the Letters Writ by a Turkish Spy (originally in French: L'Espion Turc). This once hugely popular, eight-

volume work was published around the time when translations of Ibn Tufayl's Hayy ibn Yaqzãn first circulated in European circles. The book is surrounded by mystery and mystification, and the author of volume 4 is unknown. The conceit of the book is a series of missives from Paris sent to Constantinople, commenting on European mores, politics, and philosophy (among many other topics). The work is clearly a model for Montesquieu's (1721) Lettres Persanes, one of the foundational texts of the Enlightenment.

The context of that first use of "Western philosophy" in the more familiar sense is a bit complicated to convey succinctly, in part because it occurs in the midst of a ridiculing digression by the "spy" on the misguided faith in the divine origin of holy texts by various peoples. That was an explosive topic, then much debated in the wake of Spinoza's suggestion that the Hebrew Bible as we have it was pretty much the work of Ezra at the refounding of Israel as a political entity. He (the "spy") goes on to offer a heterodox argument to the effect that whatever else is true, something, be it God or a vacuum, must exist eternally. And at that very point the "spy" introduces a scholastic distinction, in part for comic effect, with terminology used by "Western philosophers." Part of the comedy is that the scholastic terminology of the Western philosophers must have felt already dated to the learned audiences of the Letters Writ by a Turkish Spy because a new, modernizing anti- scholastic philosophy (familiar to us through names like Bacon, Descartes, Hobbes) was sweeping away the Scholastic kind in that very "West."

With such suspect origins, it is no surprise that "Western philosophy" rarely gets used in subsequent centuries. In fact, as a scholarly term it starts to receive modest traction only as late as the start of the twentieth century, alongside growing interest in the very idea of a "Western civilization." In the context of an imperial and globalizing world economy, the phrase "Western philosophy" is then used regularly in scholarly discussions of what we would now call "comparative philosophy," comparing the philosophies of different "great" civilizations, primarily those found in Europe, India, and China.

The phrase "Western philosophy" gains wider currency in the wake of Albert Schweitzer's (1923) Civilization and Ethics. Schweitzer, a great humanitarian, was an admirer of classical Indian and Chinese philosophy especially, and so for him "Western philosophy" was not the standard by which he judged others. But he treats "Western" philosophy as the contrast to Indian and Chinese philosophy.

Bertrand Russell admired Schweitzer and his writings, but he wrote a critical review of Civilization and Ethics which included some reservations about Schweitzer's tendency to disparage Western philosophy at the expense of the philosophies found at the other "great" civilizations. When Russell published his History he focused, as the title suggests, nearly exclusively on "Western philosophy."

Russell was one of the outstanding philosophers of the first half of the twentieth century who made major contributions to logic, epistemology, philosophy of mathematics, and philosophy of language.

Together with Frege, he is naturally thought of as one of the founders of analytic philosophy. When he wrote his History, Russell had already become a public intellectual, well known for his pacifism and atheism, among other causes. In fact, the book is an enduring bestseller. As it turns out Russell's History did not just popularize the phrase "Western philosophy"; it has shaped how philosophers think of their own past to this day.

The grand theme of Russell's History is the very survival of Western civilization— then in doubt amidst world war (pp. 400, 556, 640, 790). For Russell it would not be the first time that civilization could collapse. This is connected to the history of philosophy because Russell argues that ages and nations are shaped by philosophy and, in turn, shape it (pp. xiii– xiv). And so Russell gives special attention not just to academic philosophy, but to thinkers whose ideas had a big impact on the intellectual development of "the West."

Russell was, in turn, reflecting a wider discussion in English intellectual circles in which proposals for Anglo- Atlantic or Western federation (sometimes including their colonies) were a matter of great public interest. It was thought only such a federation could help save Western civilization against the twin evils of fascism and communism.

For Russell, philosophy is an intrinsic part of civilization. When it disappears, philosophy also vanishes. This is for Russell an urgent question, and this, alongside his opinionated and often insightful treatment of other thinkers, gives his book much of its poignancy. Because Russell and his early readers assumed there were multiple civilizations, the focus on Western philosophy in History can be a matter of intellectual humility; it does not entail superiority toward the philosophies of other (great) civilizations.

For example, Russell admits, in passing, his "undue concentration on Western Europe," noting for example how "the brilliant civilization of Islam flourished" from India to Spain during Europe's "dark ages" (History, 399). And he predicts that "if we are to feel at home in the world after the present [world] war, we shall have to admit Asia to equality in our thoughts, not only politically, but culturally" (History, p. 400).

However, embedded in this generous and capacious vision, Russell adopts a contrast between civilization and barbarism which, together with his definition of philosophy, involves a number of intellectual exclusions, some of which were new with Russell and some very entrenched in philosophy since Plato to this day. And I suspect that one unfortunate, and possibly unintended, effect of the manner in which the contrast is deployed shifts the use of "Western philosophy" from a comparative perspective where Western philosophy is one of several great intellectual traditions to a use of "Western philosophy" to be opposed to a more homogeneous category, non- Western philosophy, which in practice risks becoming no philosophy at all.

For Russell treats philosophy as standing halfway between science and theology. While echoing some Enlightenment philosophers, Russell treats religion as resting on the illicit authority of faith and tradition; science, by contrast, is the application of reason and rational methods of inquiry to generate secure knowledge. Philosophy is intrinsically speculative, but is based on autonomous reason (History, pp. xiii– xiv, 835– 836). Because of this attitude, the ninth- century monk John Scotus of Erigena, who maintained the "authority of a philosophy independent of revelation" (p. 403), is one of the unlikely and memorable heroes of the History. By contrast, works primarily influenced by theology and revelation, or that present themselves as so influenced, are de facto treated as unphilosophical. Here Russell echoes the contrast between Athens and Jerusalem in which Jerusalem is disparaged.

While the previous paragraphs are a bit speculative, they help to account not just for the tendency to treat philosophy as Western, and to treat non- Western writings as religious and non- rational, but also for some of the curious patterns of exclusion in his work. So, for example, in Russell's History, Hesiod is mentioned a few times when Russell is conveying the views of other thinkers on Hesiod (pp. 40– 41), including the views of Xenophanes, Heraclitus, Socrates (as reported by Plato in the Apology), and Plato (in the Republic as summarized by Russell). With the exception, perhaps, of Socrates's desire to converse with Hesiod in the afterlife (p. 89, quoting Apology 41a), none of these passages suggests there is any philosophical merit in Hesiod, and he is treated as belonging to Greek religion rather than philosophy.

By contrast, in the first chapter of the present volume, Barbara Sattler makes the case that Hesiod's "poems can be seen as the starting point for central philosophical discussion, which has made him an important point of reference for philosophers in the past and that as such he should also be taken into account by philosophers today." And while she does not insist on the claim that Hesiod should be taken to be a philosopher, she argues for the claim that he is a systematic thinker.

Another consequence of Russell's distinction is that the Hebrew Bible is treated as lacking in philosophical content and quality. This helps explain why Russell spends quite a bit of time on The Fourth Book of Maccabees, which self- consciously shows that Judaism is in accord with Stoic philosophy. Yet, Philo of Alexandria, in whose writings one can find, say, a criticism of slavery and an early argument for gender equality, is only treated "as the best illustration of Greek influence on the Jews in the sphere of thought" (p. 322). The influence of Judaism on Christianity is treated as "simple" (p. 326).

Now, another view of the possibility of Jewish philosophy, and the significance of at least one rustic perspective, could emerge if we take Machiavelli's, Thomas More's, and Spinoza's conception of Moses as an exemplary rustic statesman seriously. In the Hebrew Bible, a key moment in Moses's education as a legislator occurs when, while dwelling in the desert, he accepts the advice of his

(pagan) father- in- law, Jethro, who suggests to create a hierarchical judiciary, which will be guided by "statues and theory". Moses is advised to create norms or mores and articulate their works. That is to say, Jethro encourages Moses not just to embrace the judicial division of labor, but also to become a genuine lawgiver and an encompassing political theorist. Jethro is a nomadic shepherd. And it is a familiar trope of the Torah— derived from the root ^^^, which means "to guide" or "to teach"— to treat rustic wisdom favorably, in contrast to the corrupt cosmopolitan and urbane civilizations of the great empires of the day (Egypt, Babylon, etc.).

By contrast, in Plato's Phaedrus (e.g., 230D), Socrates is critical of rustic wisdom, which he thinks cannot ground the path toward self- knowledge. In particular, as the Stoics developed the point, rusticity stands for lawlessness and lack of self- control, that is, if we take the platonic inspired analogy between city and soul seriously, a tyrannical soul.17 Throughout the History, Russell echoes the Socratic polemic against rusticity, which is homogenized as non- philosophical. One thing I am suggesting here is that undifferentiated, rusticity is itself a very broad category involving many different kinds of intellectual productions of different kinds of societies and examples.

A further problem is that the rustic perspective on this polemic tends to be underexplored. In Alexander Guerrero's Chapter 12 in this volume, "Ethics in Place and Time: Introducing Wub- e- ke- niew's We Have the Right to Exist: A Translation of Aboriginal Indigenous Thought," the question of who counts as "civilized," or who should become civilized, is never lurking far from the argument. The target of Wub- e- ke- niew is "an abstract entity, Western Civilization." And, as Guerrero shows, the picture that is presented is far from flattering.

One may suspect that the reason the rustic perspective is less familiar is that it tends not to be written down. However, traditional Islam is also treated as rustic by Russell in the History. Whatever philosophical sophistication it contains is, according to Russell, derived from Persian and Hellenic sources. Even so, according to Russell's definitions, Ibn Tufayl's allegory ought to be classified as a work of philosophy. Oddly, when Russell mentions how Ibn Tufayl's famous student, Ibn Rushd (also known as Averroes), was introduced to the "Caliph" Abu Yaqub Yusuf "as a man capable of making an analysis of the works of Aristotle," Russell does not mention Ibn Tufayl, the very man who introduces Ibn Rushd! This is no surprise because Russell treats the Islamic philosophers in brief, and as uninteresting and derivative.

In principle, Russell could have been more favorably disposed to intellectual history of India and China, which are not treated as rustic. Russell acknowledges that these traditions have a long history of sophisticated metaphysical, epistemological, and ethical theorizing. In his History, Russell primarily associates engagement with Buddhist philosophy with the thought of Schopenhauer, who was genuinely interested in Buddhism (p. 754). Unfortunately, Schopenhauer is treated as one of the key dangerous "romantic" thinkers to devalue knowledge. Even so, that Russell could appreciate

Buddhism (which he associates with urbane philosophy (p. 772)) is clear from the following curiosity: when he turns to Nietzsche, Russell uses a fictional dialogue between Buddha and Nietzsche to try to refute Nietzsche (History, p. 771ff.)! Russell admits it will not fully persuade everybody.

By contrast, the present volume includes two chapters on two very different Buddhist thinkers. In Chapter 3, Bryce Huebner discusses Vasubandhu's The Treatise in Twenty Verses (Vi^šatikãkãrika). He seems to have been a Buddhist monk from Gandhãra (the northernmost part of the Indian subcontinent), who wrote during the fourth and fifth centuries CE. In discussing Vasubandhu's fascinating epistemology and metaphysics, Huebner argues that these, in the encounter with our own commitments, "can help us to change how we experience the world, by disclosing possibilities that have been obscured by the historical situation where we find ourselves." Yumiko Inukai, in Chapter 4, discusses Hõnen's Senchaku Hongan Nembutsu Shü. Hõnen is a Japanese Buddhist monk who founded the Pure Land ("Jõdo" in Japanese) School as an independent sect of Buddhism in Japan in the twelfth century CE. Senchaku Hongan Nembutsu Shü defends and explains the uses of the recitation of the name of Amida Buddha, "Namu Amida Butsu." In Inukai's presentation, this is a book about the transformative journey of the self.

Russell name- checks Confucius a few times in the History, but there is no mention of Mencius, Master Mo, Master Zhuang (369– 298 BCE), or the (purported) authors of any of the other Chinese philosophical classis. This is no surprise, given his focus on "Western philosophy." In Chapter 2, Amy Olberding takes on the challenge of "commending the Zhuangzi to others"; it is a challenge because it is by no means obvious "how to accurately represent a text that not only declines to stay put, but that effectively mocks you for trying to hold it still." It would be misleading to suggest that the main interest in Zhuangzi is its therapeutic pretensions of curing us from certain philosophical maladies (of the sort now often associated with Russell's colleague, Wittgenstein); but that's because, as Olberding argues, part of the point is to dwell on living, not philosophy.

Given Russell's embrace of progressive commitments (including women's suffrage, contraconception, and more liberal divorce laws), the most surprising, perhaps,19 pattern of exclusion in Russell's History is the near- complete absence of women philosophers in the philosophical West, while a number of queens, royal princesses, mothers, and wives of philosophers are mentioned! Even when women of considerable philosophical ability are noted— e.g., Princess Elizabeth of the Palatine, who corresponded astutely with Descartes— Russell rarely mentions their philosophical ability or views. The exception to the rule, Hypatia, is primarily mentioned in order to illustrate the dangers of religious bigotry.

This pattern of exclusion is also illustrated by the major works penned by women that Russell praises. These are Jane Harrison's Prolegomena to the Study of Greek Religion, Mary Shelley's Frankenstein, and the novels of Jane Austen. The latter two are discussed because they fit his criticism of

romanticism. Shelly's mother, Mary Wollstonecraft, who helped shape the feminist thought of subsequent ages, goes unmentioned altogether.

In his History, Russell offers an unwavering polemic against John Stuart Mill without ever once mentioning Harriet Taylor or their feminism. Feminism is mentioned only in the context of the cult of Bacchus and its impact on Plato's views. Russell's stance in all of this is really shocking because he was familiar with excellent female philosophers, including his then famous contemporary, Susan Stebbing, and he had reviewed May Sinclair, a philosopher of the previous generation, with whom he had corresponded.

In the present volume, several chapters show how much is lost by Russell's stance. In Chapter 7, Jessica Wilson treats Mary Shepherd (1777– 1847) not just as an astute critic of Hume's account of causation, but as herself a formidable and original metaphysician whose arguments are very interesting and whose positions anticipate views taken to be more recent inventions. While the neglect of Mary Shepherd raises important historiographic issues, to which I return below, that she should be treated as a philosopher does not require any interrogation of contemporary ideas or re-examination of contemporary categories about the nature of philosophy.

Liam Kofi Bright, in Chapter 8, also takes advantage of the idea that argument is constitutive of philosophy in order to show that a famous work of journalism, Ida B. Wells- Barnett's The Red Record (1895), is philosophical. In particular, Bright shows that in her critical survey of lynching, Wells-Barnett pioneers a form of argument that we now call "severe testing." Bright explains how this form of argument is especially suitable to a form of activism by those whose standing may be questioned.

By contrast, Lisa Shapiro's exploration of Sor Juana Inés de la Cruz's poem "Let us pretend I am happy" (circa 1680– 1690), in Chapter 5, self- consciously explores the nature of such categorization. On the surface, this is a poem about, in part, the futility of arguments to refute skepticism about the possibility of knowledge. But there is more to thought than argument. And Shapiro suggests that "in the poem Sor Juana presents a conception of thought as essentially affective." And this opens the door to a kind of therapy that tempers our epistemic desires and so opens the possibility to "move beyond skepticism."

Audre Lorde was a poet, activist, and essayist. While she never worked in academic philosophy, her work has become a lodestone for recent feminist scholarship. In Chapter 11, Serene Khader focuses on Sister Outsider (1984), a collection of essays and speeches that is already "a classic source on what is now called 'epistemic oppression.' " In particular, Khader shows that Lorde provides a useful guide to a form of epistemology often ignored by professional philosophers: how "oppression impedes the attainment of knowledge about social reality."

One chapter that confronts the risk of intellectual effacement in nuanced yet polemical fashion is Joel Katzav's Chapter 9, "The de Lagunas' Dogmatism and Evolution, Overcoming Modern Philosophy and Making Post- Quinean Analytic Philosophy." Dogmatism and Evolution (1910) was written by Theodore de Laguna and Grace de Laguna. And Katzav takes full theatrical and argumentative advantage of the fact— highly significant from the perspective of such internal dialectics— that Grace de Laguna was part of the same symposium where Quine first presented "Two Dogmas of Empiricism." Katzav offers the post facto judgment that the de Lagunas represent an epistemically and metaphysically more adventurous form of holism than the one Quine settled on.

I do not mean to suggest that this volume was conceived primarily as a corrective or in polemical opposition to Russell, or even to recent analytic philosophy. Russell's History is, despite its limitations, a gripping read that seduces people toward an intellectual voyage. In addition, we know that Russell was admired, not without qualification, by B. R. Ambedkar, just after he first wrote "Castes in India: Their Mechanism, Genesis and Development" (1916). In Chapter 10, Meena Krishnamurthy shows how Ambedkar argues that "the oppression of women— through the practices of sati, widowhood, and girl marriage— played an essential role in the establishment and maintenance of the caste system by ensuring the rigid boundaries of caste." Krishnamurthy uses Ambedkar's essay to show how analysis of concrete reality in political philosophy can lead "to new ideas about how to resolve social and economic inequality."

In addition, the intent of this volume is not to offer a programmatic statement of a new unified way of doing an inclusive history of philosophy. Even if the editor's heavy invisible hand were to try to nudge his authors in that direction, the underlying material would be recalcitrant. This resistance to our classificatory desiderata, and intellectual fashion, is, perhaps, best illustrated and thematized by Justin Smith's Chapter 6 on Anton Wilhelm Amo's Treatise on the Art of Soberly and Accurately Philosophizing (1738). Amo was born and died in Ghana, but "from 1707 to 1747, he lived in Germany, and from 1729 made a series of contributions to German jurisprudence and philosophy at the Universities of Halle, then Wittenberg, then Jena." Smith does not deny that "Amo's work is interesting and revelatory, both because it tells us quite a bit about the intellectual world he inhabited in early eighteenth-century Germany, and because it is a testament to the life and existence of a remarkable individual." But Smith also explains why one might feel unease with the idea that this is a work of "African philosophy." If Amo's Treatise has to be categorized at all, Smith prefers to call it an "academic Latinate German philosophy in the modern Lutheran university tradition, closely reflecting the curricula in place at the universities of Halle, Wittenberg, and Jena, and with a curious admixture of French Catholic late Scholasticism."

Rather, the main conceit behind this volume and its predecessor, Ten Neglected Classics of Philosophy (hereafter: TNCP), is to ask leading professional philosophers to share their passionate

commitment to works in the history of philosophy they think their peers unfairly ignore. Behind the conceit lies the idea that this will not just tell us something about the commitments and aspirations of these thinkers, but also provide us with an oblique glimpse into the state of philosophy today and, perhaps, open spaces for reflection on its renovation where needed.

One other reason why the aims of the volume are less revisionary than they might seem at first is that unlike, say, in social theory or English literature, the dominant strain of contemporary anglophone philosophy, analytic philosophy, does not treat a canon as constitutive of the field. Perhaps because analytic philosophy's self- identity is constantly reinvented over time, it has no felt requirement for a fixed canon of texts to give it identity. So, for example, Feigl and Sellars's (1949) Readings in Philosophical Analysis was welcomed as a "book" which "contains a good number of the classics of analysis and should therefore provide useful source material for courses in Contemporary Philosophy, Problems, and Methods." Most of the authors of these classics are still familiar names: "Feigl (4 essays), Kneale, Quine (2), Tarski, Carnap (3), Frege, Russell, [C. I.] Lewis (3), Schlick (4), Aldrich (2), Adjukiewicz, [Ernest] Nagel, Waismann, Hempel (4), Reichenbach (2)." But it is to be doubted that most of the articles themselves, or even what they argue for, play much of an explicit role in contemporary undergraduate or graduate education (outside those that cater to specialists in the history of analytic philosophy). I also bet a few names are completely unfamiliar even to seasoned scholars. One can play a similar game with Rorty's (1967) more recent (and larger) Linguistic Turn. To be a classic within analytic philosophy is to risk oblivion quickly from the perspective of eternity.

The claims in the previous paragraph are compatible with the further thought that contemporary philosophy, despite re- enacting a gesture familiar from Descartes— to start totally anew without any reference to what has gone before— is shaped by commitments derived from preexisting canons and intellectual traditions that have generated relatively enduring classics (Plato, Aristotle, Descartes, Hume, Kant, etc.). In the introduction to TNCP, I aimed to capture how there are many ways to be a classic within philosophy, and how many classics are capable of serving multiple functions.

Drawing on, and appropriating, J. M. Coetzee's "What Is a Classic" to my own ends, I argued in the introduction to TNCP that classics sustain and survive ongoing scrutiny in the long run from a variety of perspectives, which may include their creative rewriting. Such ongoing scrutiny comes close to being a necessary condition on being a philosophical classic; one may suspect it is a kind of performative requirement for a classic.

With Coetzee, I identify five features that enable a work to become a classic: (1) the work needs to be studied and discussed in small circles, relatively untouched by the general public's fashion; (2) one can become an advanced student in a discipline based on some kind of competent engagement with such works; (3) there needs to be ongoing learned commentary or criticism; and (4) the existence of a form of advanced emulation through creative imitation or reworking. In addition, (5) a work counts as

a classic only if it can eventually catch the interest of a wider audience beyond the most advanced professionals.

In editing the volume in your hands, my dear adventurous reader, I see no reason to revise my earlier appropriation of Coetzee's analysis. I hope the twelve chapters collected here give you pleasure and food for thought. All of these chapters contribute to ongoing discussions in more general meta-philosophy, as well as ongoing discussions about particular philosophers and more specialist topics. I hope they invite you to explore and study some excellent philosophy and, perhaps, reconsider what you thought you already knew about its nature.

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Introduction by Eric Schliesser

The Introduction to Neglected Classics of Philosophy, Volume 2, uses Bertrand Russell's The History of Western Philosophy (1945) to analyze the meta-philosophical themes that recur throughout the chapters of the volume. In particular, it focuses on the way the distinction or opposition between rustic thought, which is supposed to characterize barbarous societies, and the urbane thought that is purported to characterize civilized society can help explain some entrenched patterns of exclusion visible in contemporary philosophy. It embeds these remarks in a larger, speculative historiography of the very idea of "Western philosophy." Along the way, an overview and brief summary of the chapters of the volume is provided.

1 The Theogony and the Works and Days: The Beginnings of Philosophical Questioning in Hesiod by Barbara M. Sattler

This chapter shows Hesiod's work as the beginning of central discussions in the area of natural philosophy, ethics, and political philosophy and as the first attempt in Western literature to account systematically for the different phenomena in the universe. It is demonstrated that Hesiod is the first to offer a general account of time and space: space is shown as a necessary condition for anything to come into being; time is depicted as cyclical in connection with the natural year and as linear in the progress of the divine generations and in the decline in human history. Hesiod's Works and Days is discussed as the first attempt to sketch the big structures of human history, which is seen a story of moral decline. Finally, Hesiod's suggestions for how to act rightly in corrupt times and how to account for normativity in terms of the natural world are investigated.

2 Zhuangzi by Amy Olberding

The early Chinese text, the Zhuangzi, can only count as "neglected" if we likewise neglect the millions and millennia of the East Asian regions broadly influenced by the text. So the author seeks to draw attention to the text for a particular audience, those trained largely or exclusively in Western-lineage philosophy. As both putative author and exemplar of the text, Zhuangzi offers a model of what a

philosopher can be that we do well to notice. Comic, uncertain, and playful, Zhuangzi challenges a philosopher's impulse to order and sort the world, evincing instead a model of philosophical inquiry that largely eschews solutions to problems but revels in the curious, the ambiguous, and the puzzling perplexity of experience. Zhuangzi serves as an exemplar of a healthy and flourishing stupidity that one would do well sometimes to embrace.

3 Vasubandhu's Viṃśatikākārikā by Bryce Huebner

This chapter provides a brief overview of the philosophical framework, as well as some of the interesting arguments, that are presented by Vasubandhu in his Treatise in Twenty Verses. It is not, however, an attempt to provide a close reading of any part of this text. Instead, it explores several different ways of thinking with Vasubandhu, in contexts that include habituated understandings of the history of philosophy, experiences of dreams and hallucinations, and habituated understandings of the world as a space of racialized possibilities. And it concludes with an argument for treating this widely read and highly influential work of philosophy as a neglected philosophical classic.

4 Hōnen's Senchaku-Shū by Yumiko Inukai

This chapter explores Hōnen's teachings of the nembutsu presented in the Senchaku Hongan Nembutsu Shū, a doctrinal text of the Pure Land Buddhism founded in Japan in the twelfth century CE. It is shown how intriguing and astute Hōnen is, especially with regard to his sole endorsement of the nembutsu and his insight into its psychological implications. It is argued particularly that his teachings of the nembutsu are informed by his own spiritual journey of profound self-reflection and self-realization, and he consequently places much weight on the psychological process of the nembutsu practice in which the practitioner's sense of the self becomes transformed to the point where she "forgets herself." It aims to show the authenticity of the Senchaku-Shū, as it represents personal experiences and awareness of what it is to be a human, written by someone who indeed underwent very common aspects of human life—failure and disappointment.

5 Sor Juana's "Let us pretend I am happy" by Lisa Shapiro

This chapter considers Sor Juana Inés de la Cruz's poem, "Let us pretend I am happy." The poem on its face offers a series of skeptical arguments that undermine the possibility of knowledge. The author articulates this core argument, and argues that, unlike her contemporaries, Sor Juana does not think skeptical challenges can be answered by a recognition of the limits of human understanding. The interpretive question then is whether she thinks there is a response to skepticism, and if so, what it is. The author suggests that Sor Juana's choice of poetry as the genre to express her philosophy should be factored into one's interpretation. Taking into account its poetic form, the author argues that Sor Juana aims to temper the natural desire to pursue knowledge, to avoid its excesses, through affective elements of the poem itself. By tempering one's epistemic desires, it is possible to move beyond skepticism. The author further suggests that in the poem, Sor Juana presents a conception of thought

as essentially affective, and that account of the nature of thought makes poetry a particularly appropriate genre for her philosophy.

6 Anton Wilhelm Amo: Treatise on the Art of Soberly and Accurately Philosophizing (1738) by Justin E. H. Smith

In 1738 the German-based African philosopher Anton Wilhelm Amo published the last and by far the longest of his three philosophical works: the Treatise on the Art of Soberly and Accurately Philosophizing. It is first and foremost a work of logic, evidently intended for students following the courses he taught. In it, Amo covers a wide range of topics, and notably makes some original contributions on the subject of hermeneutics. It also draws on some surprising and unexpected sources, and often poses difficult questions to today's reader seeking to understand why Amo was attracted to this or that predecessor's ideas rather than another's. Notably absent among his sources is any other African philosopher or author interested in African philosophical traditions, and here we are pushed toward another sort of interpretive question: Was Amo himself an African philosopher in any meaningful sense?

7 On Mary Shepherd's Essay upon the Relation of Cause and Effect by Jessica Wilson

Mary Shepherd (1777–1847) was a fierce and brilliant critic of Berkeley and Hume, who moreover offered strikingly original positive views about the nature of reality and one's access to it, which deserve much more attention (and credit, since she anticipates many prominent views) than they have received thus far. By way of illustration, this chapter focuses on Shepherd's 1824 Essay upon the Relation of Cause and Effect, Controverting the Doctrine of Mr. Hume, Concerning the Nature of that Relation (ERCE). After a brief setup, the author canvasses certain of Shepherd's trenchant objections to Hume's argumentation; and then presents the positive core of Shepherd's response to Hume, which consists in providing novel accounts of how reason alone or reason coupled with experience can justify, first, that every effect must have a cause, and second, that it is necessary that like causes produce like effects. Among other contributions here, Shepherd provides a distinctively metaphysical argument for the claim that nothing can begin to exist "of itself" (going beyond an appeal to the Principle of Sufficient Reason, in particular), and leverages difference-making considerations to make the case that a single "experimentum crucis" can justify causal belief (anticipating Mill's "method of difference"). The chapter closes by highlighting salient features of Shepherd's metaphysics of causation, whereby causation is singularist and local (anticipating Ducasse and Anscombe) and involves synchronic interactions (anticipating Mill's and certain contemporary accounts), and according to which objects are essentially characterized by their causes and effects (anticipating contemporary causal or dispositional essentialist positions).

8 Ida B. Wells-Barnett's The Red Record by Liam Kofi Bright

Ida B. Wells-Barnett's argument against the obvious moral crime of lynching has a lot to teach the reader. By paying attention to her own deliberate use of newspaper sources that were, by her own lights, biased toward white interests, one can gain insight into how best to be a scholar-activist. One can see that there are good epistemic reasons for Wells-Barnett's restriction of her own evidence set, and the underlying epistemic good she sought to attain has been precisely explicated in contemporary work on philosophy of statistics. That she sought this good, and why she did so, turn out to be illustrative for the virtues that a scholar-activist should seek to uphold.

9 The de Lagunas' Dogmatism and Evolution: Overcoming Modern Philosophy and Making Post-Quinean Analytic Philosophy by Joel Katzav

Willard V. Quine's 1951 article, "Two Dogmas of Empiricism" (Two Dogmas) was taken to be revolutionary because it rejects the analytic-synthetic distinction and the thesis that empirical statements are confirmed individually rather than holistically. The present chapter, however, argues that the overcoming of modern philosophy already included the overcoming of these theses by Hegelians, pragmatists, and two critics of Hegelianism and pragmatism, Grace and Theodore de Laguna. From this perspective, "Two Dogmas" offers a Hegelian epistemology that was already superseded in 1910. The perspective is largely based on the de Lagunas' 1910 book Dogmatism and Evolution: Studies in Modern Philosophy. The de Lagunas' book also helps to make clear that the real revolution "Two Dogmas" participated in was the marginalization of their work and that of other speculative philosophers. Grace de Laguna surely recognized much of this when she stood opposite Quine as he first presented "Two Dogmas."

10 B. R. Ambedkar on "Castes in India: Their Mechanism, Genesis and Development" by Meena Krishnamurthy

In "Castes in India," Ambedkar gives a pathbreaking account of the origin and evolution of caste in India. This chapter begins by explaining what caste is and why it originated, in Ambedkar's view, and by discussing the role that caste plays in the oppression of women in India. The author argues that, in giving a causal explanation of women's oppression, Ambedkar departs from other important political works of the time, including Gandhi's, which all but ignore the oppression of women as an important form of social inequality. The author discusses the philosophical lessons that can be learned from reading Ambedkar's essay. Drawing on Charles W. Mills's criticisms of liberal political theory, the author closes the chapter by arguing that, because of the insights it offers, Ambedkar's "Castes in India" serves as an important corrective to the traditional canon in political philosophy.

11 Civility, Silence, and Epistemic Labor in Audre Lorde's Sister Outsider by Serene J. Khader

Audre Lorde writes that conditions of oppression and injustice make it difficult to arrive at an accurate shared understanding of social reality. This chapter identifies three mechanisms by which Lorde takes oppression to impede shared knowledge of social reality. The first is a distorting or deficient conceptual repertoire. The second is unjust epistemic labor flows that demand that the oppressed, rather than devoting their energy to pursuing the questions that they prioritize, devote labor to the questions, and framings of those questions, that interest the dominant. The third is the perception that anger is epistemically disadvantageous, and that expressing it is a violation of the spirit of collective inquiry. The piece suggests connections between Lorde's ideas and contemporary discussions of cancel culture, emotional labor, and the expectation that the oppressed educate the dominant.

12 Ethics in Place and Time: Introducing Wub-e-ke-niew's We Have the Right to Exist: A Translation of Aboriginal Indigenous Thought by Alexander Guerrero

This chapter introduces the Ahnishinahbæótjibway philosopher Wub-e-ke-niew's classic book, We Have the Right to Exist: A Translation of Aboriginal Indigenous Thought. Wub-e-ke-niew presents a distinct philosophical worldview and way of life, that of the Ahnishinahbæótjibway, and contrasts it with what he calls the Lislakh (Western, Euro-American) perspective. This chapter concentrates on two central philosophical themes that emerge: (1) the contrast between Lislakh and Ahnishinahbæótjibway conceptions of time; and (2) the related differences between Lislakh and Ahnishinahbæótjibway conceptions of ethical life. In doing so, it suggests that the Ahnishinahbæótjibway ethical view articulated by Wub-e-ke-niew can help illuminate and support possible responses to the "cluelessness" objection to consequentialist ethical theories, in addition to grounding a principled environmentalist perspective. <>

Foolosophy? Think Again, Sophie: Ten Reasons for Not Taking Philosophy Too Seriously by Colin Swatridge [ibidem Press, 9783838217888]

We all philosophize at times. What do we do when we philosophize? We think in a rather concentrated, deep sort of way. In so doing, we do not call ourselves Philosophers; it would be rather pretentious of us if we did. Philosophers are those—generally in university departments of Philosophy—who think, and ask questions, about what reality is made of, what we know, and how we should behave. Philosophers are not fools; but after two and a half thousand years, they have not come up with agreed answers to their questions that are any more useful, or certain, than thinkers who do not call themselves Philosophers. Many of those who do are still caught up in the thought-forms of theology; all are in

pursuit of a lost cause except those who write what might be written by thinkers in other domains. Is it not time to admit that there is nothing very special about Philosophy?

Review

I have spent enjoyable hours reading Colin Swatridge's book. I really did enjoy it and was very impressed by the range of sources he used and the scope of his analysis, the focus of his specific critiques. -- Anthony Morgan, editor of 'The Philosopher', the journal of the Philosophical Society of England

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The Argument

declined to play cards and was therefore requested to discourse on philosophy; after which no one spoke to me at all — a result which I did not regret. —Fyodor Dostoevsky, Poor Folk, 1845

Philosophy has been around for something like 2,500 years — or so we're told. Plato, Aristotle, Augustine, Aquinas, Descartes, Kant, Russell, Wittgenstein: these and others were 'great' Philosophers. That's how we think of them. The subject 'Philosophy' is taught in all the 'great' universities, world-wide, and you probably regard it as a subject for those with sharp minds confronting the 'big questions'.

But is it a subject at all? The writer of Psalm 14 wrote: 'The fool has said in his heart there is no God'; I shall argue that there is no goddess Wisdom for the 'Philosopher' to seek out; that it's foolish to make a subject of it, and to give it a capital P. We all philosophize at some time in our lives: we do so as children when we ask 'Do numbers go on forever without stopping?', or 'Why do we eat lamb, but not puppy?'; and we do so as adults when we cast about for answers. Plato, Aristotle, and company philosophized, asking deep questions, eager to understand the world they lived in. They weren't fools — on the contrary — though the answers they came up with aren't ones we can make much use of now.

Thinkers in the ancient world, and indeed, into modern times, believed in gods, or God — everybody did; one couldn't be wise and be an atheist. Their (public) thinking had to take God into account if they

wanted to live, so there was very little difference between philosophy and theology — the study of God and (in practice, mostly the Christian) religion. Thinkers right up until the late 1800s who were later thought of as Philosophers with a capital P were theologians, too. Many of them were Theologians with a capital T. I shall argue that there are still echoes of theology in a lot of present-day Philosophy. (One such is the so-called 'mind-body problem': it has religious roots and taxes Philosophers and mental health services to this day.)

Who am I? More particularly, who am Ito call Philosophy foolish? I studied Theology when I was a believer (and was expected to be a believer), and Philosophy when I ceased to be a believer. Philosophy, I thought, would be more open-minded. Both were a disappointment. I have taught a number of subjects at the university level — but not Theology or Philosophy. I'm an outsider who has read his fill of Philosophy books, academic and popular; and much of what I read there I'm prepared to call foolish. There are those who profess Philosophy who've expressed doubts about the project; but they don't pin their theses to the doors of their Philosophy Departments. The doubters haven't resigned their posts, and they still call themselves 'Philosophers'. Why would they saw through the branch on which they're sitting quite comfortably?

I should add here that I don't call Philosophers foolish: they argue in wonderfully artful ways, and pick holes in each other's work, finding all manner of faux pas, fallacies, and category mistakes in it — and they'll probably do the same with this short book. I don't question their motives or their professionalism, just their loyalty to a lost cause.

And who are you, (whom I'm calling 'Sophie' because she was the first person to read the book, and because she has the last word)? I'm imagining that you've embarked on the study of Philosophy, or you plan to; or that you're a more than usually thoughtful 'general reader' who has always supposed Philosophy to be a rather rarefied subject pursued by donnish intellectuals. You may believe it to be a worthwhile, even necessary subject that has contributed immensely to our understanding of the world and of ourselves in it. Of course, we should all think, and the more we think reflectively the better; but such thinking shouldn't put us in the rather small box that Philosophy has become, in which Philosophers mainly talk among themselves. I'll not base my argument on those works in which Philosophers write for each other; I shall focus in the main on those thinkers who address an intelligent, but non-specialist readership.

I shall argue that Philosophy as an academic subject — at any rate, in the 'West' — is not one that should be paid as much respect as it thinks it deserves; indeed, I shall give you ten reasons why you should revise whatever high opinion you might have entertained of the subject. Should those who call themselves Philosophers read this book, I shall not expect them to say: 'He's right'. I would be happy enough if you, whom I know to philosophize, were to say: 'He's not wrong'.

Note: this is not an academic book written for academics. It is written for outsiders like myself, or for only-just-insiders. It is, I hope, the final version of a string of versions, the last of which was provided with notes and references to all the scores of books listed in a bibliography. It was judged that its intended readers would find this apparatus unnecessary and off-putting —even you, Sophie, might not have got beyond the Introduction. So, this is a more straight-to-the-point, less cluttered version. If you find this one too hard-going, you've found reason number eleven for not taking up Philosophy.

I do quote a number of Philosophers in this book, and I do refer to the sources of the quotations, but there are no bibliographical details given. Further information about those sources can easily be found online.

(By the way, I hope all those of you who are not called Sophie will not feel excluded. This book is for you, too).

I have tried to show that philosophy, the quest for knowledge, the love of wisdom, became Philosophy, an academic discipline, only after long years in which it was indistinguishable from Theology, and later ran in parallel with it. Faith and Reason were sometimes happily married; sometimes one was dominant; and sometimes — and certainly in modern times — they have slept in separate beds. I have argued that, in a number of ways, and despite everything, the relationship is still a close one.

Philosophy as an institution has separated itself from Theology in most universities, though in some they have been reconciled, perhaps, for economic reasons. It is recognizably a 'humanities' subject — not maths, not science, not social science — alongside History, Literature, and Cultural Studies. It wears all the badges of membership of the academic community: it has its own specialist journals, its conferences, its PhD programmes. It enjoys prestige as (generally speaking) a post-school subject, whose subject matter is accorded respect by the uninitiated. A Professor of Philosophy is regarded with some awe, even though that professor may not be any clearer than the rest of us about what Philosophy is, or might be.

The closeness to Theology, though, is still evident in the way it thinks: there's still that assumption that its propositions apply universally, or that they ought to; it's still inclined to divide ideas, approaches, the world, in two; it views knowledge as hard won, if it can be won at all, and truth as an entity that's 'out there' ready to be pinned down; it's reluctant to accept that everything that exists is physical —that thinking is as physical a process as walking; and it tends to believe, or to hope, that there are moral facts to which we might all assent, wherever and whenever we live.

I hope to have shown that Philosophy, like Theology, has sought foundations for its beliefs: ultimate bases for propositions that hold in all possible worlds. They've wanted absolutes because what's only relative is too slippery, too subjective, too fashionable. They've shouted relativism down suspecting that it permits, where it only describes. They've pointed to torture, genocide, abuse of innocents, cruel and unusual punishments, to make their moral case, when none of us — on good days — would approve of these abominations. I've said they have looked for absolutes, foundations, ultimate principles, not that they do, because many Philosophers now settle for less. They recognize that it's not 'wrong' to let women choose whether or not to bring an unviable foetus to full term, or to campaign for doctor-assisted dying in defined cases, any more than it's wrong to prefer Bowie to Bach. It's not 'wrong' to legalize the recreational use of cannabis, or to grant citizenship to economic migrants, any more than it's wrong to favour the adaptation of a novel for the cinema over the hardback original.

There might have been less 'sting' in the arguments of Philosophers if they had preferred facts over truth. Facts by definition, and facts by discovery, aren't antagonists like truth and falsehood are. If they'd traded in facts Philosophers might have succeeded in being more like scientists, except —again as I hope to have shown — they don't have the tools to establish facts in Philosophy, both because there can't be any, and because the tools they've used aren't up to the job. Reason doesn't establish facts; intuition,

thought-experiments don't establish facts; and logic does little more than demonstrate the 'truth' of truisms. Since it can't trade in facts, Philosophy can only trade in beliefs, and these — like all other claims that aren't facts — are matters of degree, and infinite petty dispute.

If Theologians and Philosophers hadn't given currency to the idea that there was Truth, out there, to be revealed or discovered, and believed in, we might have been spared talk of our own post-modern time being called a 'post-truth' age.

I've said that philosophy is an elevated word for thinking: I should, perhaps, have said that it's equivalent to critical thinking. This involves weighing the judgment of informed others to mitigate confirmation bias. Critical thinking is no more a subject than philosophy is: arguing effectively, by defining terms, considering counter-claims, marshalling facts, and coming to safe conclusions is what one hopes to do when one thinks in and beyond the borders of any subject, intuitive claims; choosing the claim, or set of claims, that's supported by the best empirical evidence; coming to an informed judgment; and putting it to A case could certainly be made for a course in the history of ideas, just as a case has been made for rebranding Theology as Religious Studies, where the phenomenon under review is religion, rather than God or gods. Bryan Magee, when he wrote The Great Philosophers, in 1987, wasn't a Philosopher: he was Honorary Research Fellow, and later Visiting Professor, in the History of Ideas, at King's College, London (though his book only contained material on Philosophers as conventionally defined). A course in the history of ideas would certainly contain as many social and physical scientists, historians, fiction-writers, essayists, and political reformers as theologians and Philosophers. The choice of thinkers would vary interestingly from teacher to teacher. It would be a multidisciplinary subject in a world in which there is too much compartmentalization, at all levels of education beyond the primary phase. It would include many more thinkers who never thought of themselves as Philosophers with a capital P, than it would those who've professed Philosophy, and been paid to do so.

More and more Philosophers think outside the box — acknowledging as they do so that the conventional box of Philosophical tricks is too small for them —they think to take their theories into the boxes of other subjects. But what new thinking can a professor of social and political theory, for example, bring to sociology and political science that thinkers in these boxes can't devise for themselves? They have well-established bodies of knowledge, and methods of enquiry of their own. Of course, Philosophy is changing, as I hope to have shown, impressionistically, in Reason 1: as issues to philosophize about evolve and diversify, so Philosophers will train their sights on them alongside their colleagues in other departments. But if thinkers who call themselves Philosophers have neither subject content nor methods of thinking that mark them out as specialists, what confidence can they have that they have anything of value to contribute? And what value can their colleagues place on their judgments?

Historian and philosopher Yuval Noah Hariri wrote this during the coronavirus pandemic of 2020:

When the present crisis is over, I don't expect we will see a significant increase in the budgets of philosophy departments. (...) Governments anyhow aren't very good at philosophy. It isn't their domain. (...) it is up to individuals to do better philosophy. —Yuval Noah Hariri, in The Guardian, 25 April 2020

Philosophy with a small p is everyone's 'domain"; but I couldn't agree more that it is up to the individual to think— and to think again.

This is not an end-of-philosophy book, and it's certainly not an end-of-philosophizing book. If it was it might have borne these wordls in its title. Its an end-of-being-fooled-by-Philosophy book that hopes to have questioned whether Wisdom should have been thought of as a holy grail once the 'holy' had gone Ire way of 'heaven'. <>

COMING BACK TO THE ABSURD: ALBERT CAMUS'S THE MYTH OF SISYPHUS 80 YEARS ON edited by Peter Francev and Maciej Kaluza [Value Inquiry Book / Studies in Existentialism, Hermeneutics, and Phenomenology, Brill, 9789004526754]

This collection of essays from some of the world's leading Camus scholars is a celebration of the enduring significance and impact of Albert Camus's first philosophical essay *The Myth of Sisyphus*. **COMING BACK TO THE ABSURD** examines Camus's unique contribution to philosophy through *The Myth* since its publication. The essays within are intended to engage students and scholars of existentialism, phenomenology and the history of philosophy, as well as those simply seeking greater understanding of one of the most influential philosophers and philosophical constructs of the twentieth century. In revisiting *The Myth*, the authors hope to inspire a new generation of Camus scholars.

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Can We Still Imagine Sisyphus Happy?

The task of introducing the reader to this volume is certainly a difficult one. It very rarely happens that one possesses the talent of introducing to the volume with such skill, as Albert Camus. Almost everybody who has read *The Outsider* may agree that he was the master of introductory lines. Alas, hardly anyone may forget the initial impact of words, that open the Absurd reasoning:

> There is but one truly serious philosophical problem, and that is suicide. Judging whether life is or is not worth living amounts to answering the fundamental question of philosophy.

It immediately follows that the essence of the Camusian *pensée* is far from abstraction, and rooted in the existential tradition of human centered approach. The task Camus has undertaken stems from awareness of severe cognitive limitations of the asking subject. These limitations are additionally enforced by Camus's stubborn decision not to resign from such a human-centered and limited approach. Such 'bracketing out' may have been – and almost instantly was – criticized and condemned as a form of implicitly introducing nihilism, by Camus's theistic counterpart Gabriel Marcel. Nevertheless, it seems that Camus firmly believed that he is simply offering 'merely the description, in the pure state, of an intellectual malady'. Such a phenomenological stance might not have allowed to broaden the description with anything else than criticism of answering through and by eternal values, transforming the serious initial question to a rhetorical one. Camus also noted that he is not inventing, but studying a phenomenon, 'an absurd sensitivity that can be found widespread in the age—and not with an absurd philosophy which our time, properly speaking, has not known'. In such a claim, Camus was far from isolated: French intellectuals at the time were engaged in a widespread debate, the 'Bad masters quarrel' accusing writers, poets and philosophers of poisoning the souls of the nation with philosophy of despair, leading, among others, to the military catastrophe of 1940. Instead of lamenting, like all generations have, on the scandalous disobedience of the young to the values of the old, Camus wanted to focus on the most disturbing aspect of the absurd, he felt, as represented by the literary figure of Kirilov from Dostoevsky.

The Myth of Sisyphus was (and still is), read as an analysis of using logic in decision-making process, regarding living on, or resigning from life by sheer act of suicide, making the absurd one of most disturbing representations of philosophy in practice. It may be that from an ethical standpoint, the question, whether life is or is not worth living is, in itself, far too abstract, to allow for a serious consideration, as it implicitly assumes that solving the issue in the realm of logic and reasoning will suffice. It may be that the context of the asking person is essential, and one can hardly separate the question from the situation of the asking person, his gender, culture, health and many other factors. On the essayistic level, however, Camus's stubborn resignation from eternal values along with his firm refusal to follow, like Caligula, the logic of absurd to the very end, have made him, and his Sisyphus remarkably interesting, leading to many, many excellent philosophical, ethical, and literary resonations.[1] It would seem unsatisfactory, however, to claim that because of the resonance (and criticism)[2] of the philosophical theme, we should simply study it further, adding to countless books, and articles, published so far. There seems to be much more of an urgency, given our context and times, in the decision to celebrate the 80th anniversary of publication of *The Myth of Sisyphus.* Hardly anyone in 2022 would agree that the world, which was depicted as indifferent and distant to human struggles in 1942 can still be seen as such. As Dale Jamieson remarked: 'Climate change confronts us with questions of global justice, of how to live, of how to think about science and policy, and of how to

move ourselves and others to act'.[3] It may have been that the world responded with silence to human questions about the meaning of life. But it seems to be shouting at us today, calling for action, for solidarity and care for the natural environment. In this context, the feeling of absurd Camus described, seems to resonate well to our growing anxiety, caused by alarming news about carbon dioxide, Earth's temperature and sea-level.

Shortly after the publication of his *Sisyphus,* Camus wrote his *Letters to a German Friend.* He noted, that conquest of Nazi-Germany was, at the heart, initiated by the same feeling of absurd, the French experienced in difficult interwar period. But one of possible ways of revolting against absurdity, Camus noted, was 'not to let yourself be "possessed" by the absurd, in any case, is to seek no advantage from it'[4] The political reaction to the absurd – Camus had warned – results in contempt of intelligence and affirmation of efficacy.[5] Both of these features may well be seen today in the global rise of populism and far-right political movements. Camus consequently developed his ideas to search for a remedy in renunciation (but not: resignation), in limiting one's desires and ambitions for the sake of common good and in dialogue and solidarity with others. Such advice, in the era of post-truth seems not only timely. It seems to be urgent, as being 'possessed' by the absurd seems to limit the possibility of communication. It seems to be urgent also, because the contempt for intelligence which Camus saw as one of dangerous consequences of the absurd, almost certainly may lead us back to watching political debates, where the winner simply shouts louder. Finally, what seems to change entirely our perception of Camus's essay nowadays is not only the political plague of post-truth and nihilism but the fact of living in the global pandemic, in isolation and fear for life, accompanying us since 2020. When enumerating ways, in which we may experience the absurd, Camus remarked: 'Men, too, secrete the inhuman. At certain moments of lucidity, the mechanical aspect of their gestures, their meaningless pantomime makes everything that surrounds them. A man is talking on the telephone behind a glass partition; you cannot hear him, but you see his incomprehensible dumb show'. So many of us today may relate to this experience after lockdowns. We have been seeing people we care about only on our phone or laptop screens; our brothers and sisters separated by hospital windows. A virus has alienated us from each other, teaching us to maintain social distance, to remain vigilant, to avoid others. At the very core, for the last two years we have been experiencing not a pandemic, but absurd.

…

Merleau-Ponty – who, shortly after the war, will be violently criticized by Camus for his political essays – inspired many generations of thinkers to closely study the subject of analysis in its multiple relations with the environment. Camus's essay may easily be understood as a work, limited to the time and space of the French intellectual current, shaped by: Nietzsche, Husserl, Heidegger, Marxism and Existentialism. Hundreds of pages were written, to ground the place of Camus's absurd next (or

against) the philosophical conception of Sartre, his ties with existential phenomenology and other philosophical conceptions of that time. In such view, rethinking Camus's essay is predominantly of historical value, appreciable mainly by academics.[7]

Others, like Benatar or Nagel, treat Sisyphus as a starting point for own reflections on the question of the meaning of life, developing, rather than situating the debate around the conception of the absurd, which Camus himself treated rather as a starting point, not a conclusive element of his philosophical journey. With different ways of understanding absurdity, quite obviously, conclusions differ, leading Nagel to a much more stoic approach to the 'cosmic insignificance'. Benatar seems to have gone in the opposite direction, judging that living with the consequence of awareness of life, suffering and inescapable death may lead to conclusions opposite to what Camus could have agreed to.

Much has also been written about the role of the writer or an artist, whom Camus portrays as an important figure for communicating the problem of absurdity by means of art, provoking scholars to devote special attention to the literature of the absurd, treating the feeling of absurdity as an aesthetic, rather than purely ethical or existential experience.

Interestingly, however, the discussion of the book in the Marxist or post-Marxist surrounding is rather scarce. Such an observation may be considered even stranger given the special place Simone Weil had in Camus's thought. If we focus on Camus's chosen, mythical character, this observation becomes even more curious. Sisyphus, as seen by Camus, derives his most notable (and famous) experience of accepting and revolting against absurd (accepting his condition while rebelling against consolation coming from outside of his condition) from labor. It is from seemingly endless, repetitive work that Camus's hero gains consciousness and, finally existential freedom, allowing him to find a way to live meaningfully (or, a meaningful life, see George Heffernan). Labor, like the absurd, is between consciousness and the world, Sisyphus and the stone: without the possibility to perform his seemingly useless job, Sisyphus would be condemned to immobility, to boredom; to an existential impasse of not having a moment to decide, whether to continue or surrender. Camus observers, in the presentation of different moments that initiate the feeling of absurdity: 'Weariness comes at the end of the acts of a mechanical life, but at the same time it inaugurates the impulse of consciousness. It awakens consciousness and provokes what follows'.

'The workman of today works every day in his life at the same tasks, and this fate is no less absurd. But it is tragic only at the rare moments when it becomes conscious. Sisyphus, proletarian of the gods, powerless and rebellious, knows the whole extent of his wretched condition: it is what he thinks of during his descent. The lucidity that was to constitute his torture at the same time crowns his victory. There is no fate that cannot be surmounted by scorn', making Camus's Sisyphus a mindful, conscious worker confronting his unsurpassable condition, rather than an artist, resisting his fate by creation. And whilst each of our excellent, invited authors will give you a different answer, as to why we came

back to *The Myth of Sisyphus* 80 years after the publication of the essay, we would like to add here another one we have recently debated. Many of us, forced to experience the pandemic and lockdowns, looked for an analogy between our situation and *The Plague*. In contrast, what we think is happening now, in times of 'disappearance of labor' and the development of 'intelligent capitalism' makes re-reading *The Myth of Sisyphus* especially interesting and thought provoking. Will we still be able to imagine Sisyphus happy, when his heroic, conscious effort is followed by the vision of him being replaced by "intelligent" machine, taking over his mundane, repetitive task? Or, on the contrary, will technology and science weaken our feeling of absurdity, by taking away the repetitive work, giving us more time for creation, art and finding meaningful lives?

The reality of Sisyphus of 1942 was the reality of industrialism and political violence; genocide performed on industrial scale and with industrial means, making his confrontation a revolt of human dignity, confronted with the cold silent and possibly meaningless world. Camus believed that to win, one has to confront this silence, to break this silence, and (*Combat* pp. 44–45) uncover the lies of ideologies, tied with *political realism.* His rebellion, initially levelled against metaphysics and suicide, gradually became more occupied with murder and politics. In both cases, Camus noted, courage is essential to act; awareness does not suffice. And while such rebellion, against both social and metaphysical absurdity is born in isolation of human consciousness, it (*Je me revolte*), it aims at solidarity with others (*donc nous sommes*) David Carroll perceptively noted, that '*Le Mythe* says nothing more as to where such a proletarian consciousness could lead in the case of the worker, however, especially if he were to join with others in active protest and then resistance'. In this aspect, reading *The Myth* without *The Rebel* seems incomplete and demands continuation in the study of the intersubjective realm of human fraternity and solidarity. But even if for Camus, the outcome of the absurd is to be found in rebellion, he quickly acknowledges that such a rebellion must rest on both negation (saying no to someone or something) and affirmation (affirming the truth, the bond between humans). In 1942, he seemed not ready yet to provide anything more than outlines of such a solution. But he was fully aware that such a state must require constant attention, and resistance to withdraw from the tension, caused by the tension between the desire to live meaningfully and the difficulty of finding such meaning in life.

An introduction to a volume, dedicated to Camus's study of the absurd would be pointless without noting, what consequences of the absurd Camus arrived at himself, after the publication of the essay. And it seems equally important to note, that separation of absurd from his later works is detrimental to the perception and understanding of his oeuvre. In 1940 when drafting the essay, Camus certainly had more questions than answers. But in his later works, he clearly underlined, that the experience he described in *The Myth if Sisyphus* was never a final position: 'Written fifteen years ago, in 1940, amid the French and European disaster, this book declares that even within the limits of nihilism it is

possible to find the means to proceed beyond nihilism. In all the books I have written since, I have attempted to pursue this direction'.

It is not an isolated statement. The essay *Le Meurtre et L'absurde*,[12] later integrated as the introduction to *The Rebel,* contains confirmation that it is both possible and necessary to move beyond nihilism in search for meaning. The same statement is also presented in less-known but propably most important lyrical essay on the absurd, *The Enigma* (1950)*:*

> … in the experience which interested me, and which I happened to write about, the absurd can be considered only as a point of departure—even though the memory and feeling of it still accompany the further advances. (…) how can one limit oneself to saying that nothing has meaning and that we must plunge into absolute despair? Without getting to the bottom of things, one can at least mention that just as there is no absolute materialism, since merely to form this word is already to acknowledge something in the world apart from matter, there is likewise no total nihilism. The moment you say that everything is nonsense you express something meaningful. Refusing the world all meaning amounts to abolishing all value judgments. But living, and eating, for example, are in themselves value judgments.

Coming but to the absurd may then be seen as coming back to the doubt, that is a necessary first step for further development of a more positive answer. In an unpublished draft, Camus wrote down: 'The existential philosophy is the recognition and acceptance of the absurd. But the absurd should have been recognized, but not accepted'. Taking this judgment into consideration, Sisyphus never comes back to his stone in full acceptance of fate. He comes back, but with a new, redefined meaning of the world, of the stone and of himself: this is what allows us to imagine him happy. Our coming back to Sisyphus and to the absurd should have, and most certainly has accomplished this. Rather than being an acceptance of an agreeable vision of the absurd, we offer to the reader a multidimensional view of the absurd, taken from the perspectives of different scholars, different fields of thought. What binds them, we firmly believe, is the conviction that we all agree with Camus on one issue: if the absurd is – as he claimed – a serious philosophical problem relating to real-life experience, it demands constant attention and hopefully a possibility of transgression. Let us see, in the second part of this introduction, how such movement beyond the absurd is understood by our most-valued colleagues and friends.

Sisyphus at 80: The Essays

The following collection of essays mark some of the dynamic research that is currently be conducted within the field of Camus studies. In recent years the annual conference has helped germinate the ideas for some of these papers, and the field has grown considerably (despite the setbacks incurred due to the global covid-19 pandemic) and fostered new avenues for research, discussion and friendly debate (among these is Eric Berg's podcast 'Albert Camus Radio'). The scholars before you are some of the brightest minds within Camus studies and their approaches to *The Myth of Sisyphus* reflects the diversity of thought and perceptions of understanding from where we come in our appreciation for

what Camus was trying to do with his philosophical essay. He was not, by any circumstances, trying to establish a foothold within the budding development of Existentialism (In fact, Camus famously argued that he was *not* a philosopher.), and while the authors here will not engage in that debate what we see, as a collective whole, is a work that is fundamentally trying to guide its reader within the parameters of absurdism. The essays before you illustrate the ways in which one can explore Camus's absurdist philosophy by utilising *The Myth* as a 'guidebook' (if you will) to exploring and understanding this most relevant of humanistic philosophies.

The collection begins with Meaghan Emery's essay 'Sickness, Heartache, Punishment, and War: Lessons on the Absurd, or Birth of an Ethic'. Here, Emery examines Camus's early life and the circumstances surrounding his life that would enable the earliest of ideas to be planted in his mind. These ideas would then grow into *The Myth.* If life amounted to suffering for Albert Camus in 1936 and 1937, when he was formulating the ideas that would be central to his oeuvre on the absurd, then rising above suffering through resistance and love – without completely being relieved of it – is perhaps where his ethics lie. Eager to become a writer, but for whom tuberculosis had precluded brilliant university studies, Camus would nonetheless go on to engage with the most important issues of his time: colonialism and racism, antisemitism, the demise of the Spanish and French Republics, and world war. His personal life, however, would cause him the most heartache. Just at the moment when the meaning of life appeared to elude him, faced with a failing marriage. For in a world where one is condemned to suffer and die, which Camus believed to be an imminent sentence, suicide is an act of freedom. It is also potentially an act of sacrifice. However, as the first section of *The Myth* makes clear, the essay is not a philosophical reflection on whether to live but rather how to live. The ultimate question the essay raises, therefore, is what to do with one's freedom when death is the only absolute.

Camus begins his philosophical essay on the absurdity of life by approaching suicide as a conscious act. In his formulation of the literary genre that he would pursue, and his fiction come to embody, the search for meaning in a godless world was nothing less than a courageous quest. Emery argues that Camus takes as his point of departure this indefinable or indescribable feeling that made him alert to the precariousness of life's meaning and which ultimately led him to a purpose. For Camus, the absurd quest for creative self-realization as a writer had taken form when he was studying philosophy at university. Demonstrating that Camus seeks to avoid the 'leap of faith' taken up by Kierkegaard, Emery argues that he lays out his thoughts and ambition and specifically explores his own limitations which had to be overcome, or 'conquered' as she traces the emotional connection to the absurd.

Continuing with the 'emotional connection', Peter Francev's '*The Myth of Sisyphus*, the Absurd, and the Question of Empathy' seeks to establish a connection between Edith Stein's phenomenology of empathy and Camus's philosophy of the absurd. Whilst there is no mention of the empathy or ethics

of Edith Stein (1891–1942) in the fiction and non-fiction of Albert Camus (1913–1960), one can easily surmise that Camus, being a part of the Parisian café scene during the years leading up to, including and beyond the second world war, would have encountered some discussions of Stein's thought through Jean-Paul Sartre (1905–1980), Simone de Beauvoir (1908–1986) or Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1908–1961), prior to his falling out with both men. Whilst these two philosophies appear mutually exclusive of one another, Francev contends that one can examine Camus's absurdist philosophy from a Steinian phenomenological point of view and makes the case that these ideas can be taken together in order to see the absurd from an empathetic point of view.

Bruce Baugh's essay 'Benjamin Fondane and Albert Camus: Reason and the Absurd' continues the pattern of exploring the interconnected relationships that help shape Camus's thought, especially those related to the absurd. In June 1943, Albert Camus paid a visit to the Romanian expatriate Benjamin Fondane. The young Camus had recently attracted the literary world's attention with two books published the previous year: *The Stranger* and his essay, *The Myth of Sisyphus*. Fondane, for his part, was by then a well-known poet and exponent of the existential philosophy that forms the background to Camus's essay, most notably in his 1936 book, *The Unhappy Consciousness*. The two men would have had a lot to talk about, not least the philosophy of Lev Shestov, sharply criticized by Camus in *The Myth of Sisyphus*, and vigorously defended throughout Fondane's philosophical works. Baugh goes on to point out that had both men lived to meet each other again, after World War ii, then it is possible that Fondane would have help persuade Camus to soften his tone against Shestov, that, really, both men were aiming to achieve the same thing – a philosophy of existence, rather than a philosophy of existentialism as posited by Heidegger and Sartre.

Next comes Kimberly Baltzer-Jaray's essay 'Revolt, Absurdity, and the Artist as Sisyphus'. Here, she will argue that the necessary groundwork for 'Create Dangerously' was crafted in the pages of *Myth* – specifically, in the three consequences drawn from the absurd: revolt, freedom, and passion. She then connects these two works thematically; after a brief discussion of the absurd, the essay will explore absurd art and the absurd artist – the one who is supposed to take risks, envision better alternatives, and thereby thrust society forward by unsettling the status quo. For Camus, the artist must be truthful, and truth is always dangerous, 'To create today means to create dangerously. Every publication is a deliberate act, and that act makes us vulnerable to the passions of a century that forgives nothing'. The artist must draw attention to the social issues that crush and divide us, and this means she or he must be immersed in the reality of their time, to wrestle from it something timeless that can be understood by the audience as universal, and as beacon for change. The greatest hope lies in artists' obligation to their own freedom, which is also bound to that of others – present and future. The artist, much like Sisyphus, is an absurd hero but unlike the Greek tragic figure, the artist lives and struggles amongst us, and brings us along with each push forward. Finally, it should be noted that

Baltzer-Jaray's essay is one of the first to examine 'Create Dangerously' in English, and it will no doubt foster new scholarship within the field.

'The Metaphorical Language of the Absurd' by Sophie Bastien examines the metaphorical language that Albert Camus used to express the absurd, and then the reclamation of that language by another writer, Samuel Beckett. It is divided into three parts. The first part focuses on *The Myth of Sisyphus*, the theoretical reference for the concept of the absurd, and identifies three main metaphors that Camus regularly employed to develop this concept throughout his essay: the theatre, the desert and the walls. The second part of the study looks at Camus's works of fiction in the cycle of the absurd. It demonstrates that *The Stranger* and the plays *Caligula* and *The Misunderstanding* apply the same three metaphors. Finally, the last part of the study examines the treatment of these metaphors by a major playwright in the second half of the 20th century. Bastien's essay provides a nice balance between the analysis of language and a comparative study on Camus and Beckett, who clearly influenced the French-Algerian author.

'Why Did the Stranger Kill the Arab? A Study in the Absurdity of Moral Motivation' by George Heffernan continues the concentrated analysis of *The Stranger* and provides an added dimension to its analysis by looking at Meursault's motives in killing the Arab on the beach. During his interrogation, the examining magistrate repeatedly asks Meursault why he first fired one shot at the Arab, then paused for a short time, and finally fired four more shots into the motionless body lying on the beach. Meursault has no answer to the magistrate's question. Rather, he thinks that the magistrate is wrong to focus on it because it really does not matter. Yet Meursault learns at his trial that his pause is crucial because it makes all the difference between a case of self-defense and a case of premeditated murder, as well as that it has profound existential implications and legal-moral consequences. Heffernan thoroughly and methodically examines several plausible answers to the question of why Meursault not only shot but also killed the Arab and explores the roles of rationality and absurdity in human moral motivation.

Following Heffernan's essay, Eric Berg asks readers 'What is it about Camus that harnesses such a strong grip on Christian theologians and on Christian apologetics?' This thought-provoking question is the basis for his essay 'The Blood that Trickles from The Gospels Is the Color of Printers' Ink: The Relationship Between Religious Texts and the Absurd'. Berg's essay is the only one in this collection that looks to rectify the theist and atheistic positions in finding some common ground within the absurd. It seems there is an unusually strong bond between Christianity and Camus and Berg argues that beyond the intentional, relentless, Christian imagery and language Camus uses in his work, it is the relationship between his fundamental concept of the absurd, best articulated in *The Myth of Sisyphus,* and the historical construction of the foundational texts of the Christian faith, The Gospels. By way of this relationship, they both articulate the same unique metaphysic. Berg's essay is a

desperately needed addition to the field of Christianity and Camus and will be of interest to all readers.

Matthew Bowker's essay 'Unlikely Heroism: Sisyphus, Camus, and the Absurd Posture' looks to re-establish the myth of Sisyphus for a new generation of scholars. Looking well-beyond the myth, as outlined at the end of Camus's essay, Bowker seeks to establish a connection with Greek mythology as a way for the reader to understand where Camus obtains his ideas that ultimately culminate in using the Sisyphean myth as the groundwork for his absurdist philosophy.

Next is the essay 'Explanation and The Unreasonable Silence of the World', by Craig DeLancy. Here, DeLancy offers an analytic philosophical interpretation of *The Myth.* DeLancy holds that some of Camus's concerns are teleological, and some of them are epistemic. The teleological accounts of the absurd concern purpose, and our sense that we lack a justified or sufficient purpose. Camus also makes use of a teleological approach when he uses the term 'absurd' to refer to a passion or experience. He describes a tension, a struggle, between our desire for a sufficient purpose, and a recognition that history and the universe are without purpose, but, in contrast to these teleological uses, Camus also makes an explicit argument that the absurd is our inability to understand the world. This epistemic absurd he describes as a failure of 'rationality'. DeLancy continues by looking at these two different approaches to the absurd which present readers with a problem: they appear independent. Therefore, DeLancy asks 'Can we then reconcile Camus's two approaches? Or is he using diverse and independent notions of the 'absurd' in *The Myth of Sisyphus*?' In this essay, he will argue that we can reconcile Camus's approaches. Although they are distinct, and some aspects of his account are indeed independent of others, readers can reconcile the teleological and epistemic notions of the absurd by recognizing the central importance of teleological (often called 'functional') explanation in our everyday lives. By using this account of teleological explanation, DeLancy shows how the teleological and epistemic accounts of the absurd are fundamentally related.

The final essay in the collection is 'Sisyphus in Hell: the Absurd Through Against (New) Fascism', by Samantha Novello. Novello seeks to challenge the political philosophical input of *The Myth* by delineating 'Absurd Thought' as a phenomenological method of rational agency for resisting against phenomena of emotional contagion and mimetic behaviour which plague the political sphere coalescing in the contemporary phenomenon of (new) fascism. The first part of Novello's essay examines Maurice Blanchot's interpretation of *The Myth* by focusing in particular on the image of Hell as negation of the political community founded by the rebellious act. The second part of her essay explores the affinities and differences between Georges Bataille's and Camus's understanding of freedom. Finally, in the third part, Novello's contribution dwells on the role played by emotional acts in our capacity for revolt, bringing the phenomenological matrix of the 'Absurd Thought' as theorised in *The Myth* to the forefront of contemporary consciousness.

As you can see the field of Camus studies is alive and vibrant, and with each of these essays scholars have relied on their areas of expertise to elucidate and expound upon a new arena of scholarship – one that looks to *The Myth of Sisyphus* not as a document that has 'run its course', but one that is still very much at the forefront of Camus's philosophy. It is our sincere hope that each of these essays fosters an inquiry in their readers, as well as inspire a new generation of Camus scholars who can contribute to the absurdist discussion. <>

The Mysticism of Ordinary Life: Theology, Philosophy, and Feminism by Andrew Prevot [Oxford University Pres, 9780192866967]

The Mysticism of Ordinary Life: Theology, Philosophy, and Feminism presents a new vision of Christian mystical theology. It offers critical interpretations of Catholic theologians, postmodern philosophers, and intersectional feminists who draw on mystical traditions to affirm ordinary life. It raises questions about normativity, gender, and race, while arguing that the everyday experience of the grace of divine union can be an empowering source of social transformation. It develops Christian teachings about the Word made flesh, the indwelling of the Holy Spirit, and the Christian spiritual life, while exploring the mystical significance of philosophical discourses about immanence, alterity, in-betweenness, nothingness, and embodiment. The discussion of Latino/a and Black sources in North America expands the Western mystical canon and opens new horizons for interdisciplinary dialogue. The volume challenges contemporary culture to recognize and draw inspiration from quotidian
manifestations of the unknown God of incarnate love. It includes detailed studies of Grace Jantzen, Amy Hollywood, Catherine Keller, Karl Rahner, Adrienne von Speyr, Hans Urs von Balthasar, Michel Henry, Michel de Certeau, Luce Irigaray, Julia Kristeva, Gloría Anzaldúa, Ada María Isasi-Díaz, Alice Walker, M. Shawn Copeland, and more.

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The Path Ahead

This book updates a model of interdisciplinary scholarship practiced by twentieth- century Catholic theologians such as Karl Rahner and Hans Urs von Balthasar, who combine fidelity to the Christian mystical tradition with a critical use of the regnant philosophical and cultural resources of their context (which, in their case, mainly consisted of certain German- language sources from the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries). Although a similarly conceived relationship between theology and philosophy remains attractive today, there is a need for mystical theologians to adapt their arguments to changing landscapes, such as those represented by the predominantly Francophone (but now also Anglophone) conversations of postmodern philosophy and by certain underappreciated U.S. Latino/a and African American discourses— to name just a few possibilities. These diverse historical and intellectual contexts adjust, complicate, and expand the meanings of both ordinary life and mysticism. The task for Christian mystical theology going forward is not merely to think about how the Christian mystical tradition might offer a remedy for the woes of secularity. Christian mystical theology must also consider whether important changes to its self- understanding are warranted by its interactions with diverse takes on the mysticism of ordinary life arising after modernity and from beneath its ruins.

The Catholic model of interdisciplinarity does not subordinate the Christian mystical tradition to philosophical readings, as Jantzen and Hollywood do in their later works. It does not intermesh theology and philosophy in such a way that the two become one "anatheistic" contemplation of the divine unknown in worldly relations and processes, which is Keller's approach. It does not stipulate that the Christian mystical tradition one- directionally addresses the problems of postmodern culture, as Coakley suggests. Rather, the Catholic model of interdisciplinarity upholds a distinction between theology (as prayerful thinking of God) and philosophy (as an exercise of critical reason that does not necessarily presuppose such a relation with God). It prioritizes theological norms of interpretation drawn from Christian scripture and tradition (such as doctrines about creation, grace, Christ, the Holy Spirit, and so on), and it uses these norms to engage and evaluate Christian and non- Christian sources alike. In such interactions, it seeks to retain whatever is beautiful and true in philosophy and any other cultural products and religious traditions that do not adhere to Christian faith. It welcomes critiques, developments, and variations that come from such interactions, provided they support the most essential Christian and mystical theological norm of incarnate divine love.

This book has a distinctly Catholic character, not only because it adheres to a Catholic model of relating theology and philosophy but also because its sources have explicit ties to the Catholic tradition. Rahner, Balthasar, and Adrienne von Speyr are obvious examples. But beyond them, this book's main postmodern philosophical sources (Michel Henry, Michel de Certeau, Luce Irigaray, and Julia Kristeva) also have significant Catholic roots and inclinations, and several of its intersectional feminist sources (especially Ada María Isasi- Díaz and M. Shawn Copeland) are Catholic theologians.

This contemporary Catholic focus is another feature that distinguishes this project from the comparable studies by Jantzen, Hollywood, Keller, and Coakley.53 While this book appeals to Catholic thinkers by offering a constructive theological discussion congruent with their own tradition, it is not meant only for them but for Christian theologians in general and, indeed, for anyone interested in how Christian mysticism and related mystical traditions are employed in various efforts to affirm ordinary life.

The argument is organized into three parts, each with two chapters. Part I, "Catholic Mystical Theologians in the Twentieth Century," bridges a divide between Rahnerian and Balthasarian approaches to the mysticism of ordinary life by demonstrating that the two are closer than some commentators assume. It retrieves insights from these Catholic theologians regarding the grace of divine union, connecting it with topics such as Christology, pneumatology, Mariology, asceticism, obedience, love, and the paschal mystery. At the same time, it advances a feminist interpretation of their works that challenges aspects of their treatments of gender and suffering. The chapter on Rahner defends the Christian theological status of his understanding of mysticism against charges that it is overdetermined by modern transcendental philosophy, clarifies what he means by "ordinary life," questions his ability to offer a gender- neutral theory of divine union, and concludes with a discussion of his sometimes- neglected prayerful writings. The chapter on Balthasar is equally focused on his contemplative friend, Adrienne von Speyr. It considers the controversial question of how to understand their relationship, offers a feminist critique of their gender essentialism, reveals certain antiessentialist features of their hagiography, and attempts a critical retrieval of their mystical accounts of obedience, love, and suffering.

Part II of the book, "Christian Mysticism and Postmodern Philosophy," turns to a series of thinkers who draw selectively on Christian mystical sources to advance revisionist phenomenological and psychoanalytic theories of ordinary life. It recognizes various ways in which these postmodern theorists contribute to both philosophy and theology, while offering a critical assessment of them from the perspective of Christian mystical theology. The chapter on Henry and Certeau distinguishes two postmodern styles of the mysticism of ordinary life, which, though not atheistic, are arguably more philosophical than theological. One style, represented by Henry, locates the divine in the auto-affective immanence of the flesh. Another style, represented by Certeau, associates the divine with a condition of alterity vis- à- vis norms and structures. The chapter on Irigaray and Kristeva shows how these postmodern mystical styles of immanence and alterity are combined in "French feminist" constructs of mystical femininity. Although Irigaray's and Kristeva's understandings of "woman" as a potentially divine or quasi- divine "other within" resist the masculine focus of much theological and philosophical discussion of Christian mysticism, they do not overcome the problem of gender essentialism and remain, like the sources featured in previous chapters, Eurocentric. Nonetheless, Christian mystical theology stands to benefit from this mystically aspirated postmodern literature in

many respects. Among other things, it can embrace Henry's praise for life as such, Certeau's love for others who suffer from and escape systems of control, Irigaray's affirmation of women's jouissance and subjectivity, and Kristeva's therapeutic care for the conflicted condition of human souls.

Part III, "Intersectional Feminism: Mystical Traditions from the American Side of the Atlantic," turns to a set of North American mestizo/a, womanist, and Black sources that are not always recognized as belonging to mysticism, let alone theology or philosophy, but that do indeed reflect the grace of divine union at work in quotidian lives and that do offer sophisticated interpretations of it in relation to Christian faith and other noteworthy intellectual and aesthetic traditions. This final part of the book discusses how the mysticism of ordinary life needs to be understood differently and what liberative ends it may achieve if it is approached through the interconnected matrix of gender, racial, and socioeconomic conditions that continue to be produced by the violent legacies of conquest and slavery. The chapter on Gloria Anzaldúa, Isasi- Díaz, and other mestizo/a mystical sources discusses several topics, such as a mystical way of interpreting mestizaje (mixture or inbetweenness) that resists the colonial and patriarchal violence often associated with this concept, experiences of an empowering divine presence in the context of la lucha (struggle) and lo cotidiano (the everyday), popular devotion to La Virgen de Guadalupe (Our Lady of Guadalupe) and crit ic al feminist receptions of it, and mystical identifications with the crucified Christ in the midst of daily hardships and through communal celebrations of El Via Crucis (the Way of the Cross).

The chapter on Alice Walker, Copeland, and other womanist and Black mystic al sources similarly highlights a range of distinctive contributions, such as a meditation on Blackness as a mystically charged symbol of both being and nothingness; an account of the grace of divine union in the lives of nineteenth-century Black women evangelists and ordinary Black women struggling to survive and flourish; an account of mystical corporeality that unites bodies with one another in suffering, joy, and freedom (particularly in the crucified and risen Christ); and a reassessment of the meaning of divine darkness in view of the opacities of Black women's lives.

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Although Christian mystical theology wants to speak with the words or silences of eternity, this does not change the fact that it has a history, indeed many histories. We have seen that these histories are not limited to Europe or the Middle Ages and that they feature various gender performances and embodied identities in diverse contexts, which challenge simplistic binaries and closures. The communal work to excavate and interpret these histories is far from complete. Such work honors the testimonies of the dead (who may indeed now live in God), but it is not primarily for them. It is for those compelled to live in the present and the future, those who must struggle with the hardheartedness of the world and seek God in its midst. To some extent, it is for monks and vowed contemplatives who dedicate their lives to mystical pursuits, but it is also for the vast majority of

human beings who do not have such formal vocations but may nevertheless ex peri ence the grace of divine union in their quotidian lives. It is for everyday people who, in their strangeness and singularities, are more or less resistant to socially constructed norms. At the same time, it is an effort to remember the mysterious and all- important norm of incarnate love.

One scholarly aim is to get the history "right," to whatever extent this is possible. Another is to think with it in a constructive fashion, advancing immanent and intertextual critiques and formulating new proposals. Through its studies of twentieth- century Catholic theologians, postmodern philosophers, and intersectional feminist thinkers as readers of Christian mystical sources, this book has prioritized the latter objective. It has not, for example, sought to establish new facts about what Meister Eckhart, Teresa of Avila, Juan Diego, or Rebecca Cox Jackson did, experienced, or said. Rather, it has weighed the stakes of different theological and philosophical ways of using such sources to elaborate a theory of the mysticism of ordinary life.

The purpose of this sort of theory is to show that what is called "mystical" is not foreign to the lives of so- called "ordinary" people but rather deeply characteristic of them. To grasp how and why these phenomena go together, it is necessary to ask probing questions about various construals of mysticism, ordinariness, and their connection, recognizing that these terms do not mean the same thing to everyone who uses them. It would be possible to analyze the permutations of such a theory— tracking distinct ways of framing and answering these questions— without endorsing any particular position or even the overarching idea of the mysticism of ordinary life. However, I have not taken such a neutral, distanced attitude toward my subject matter. In my hermeneutical efforts, I have been both analytical and evaluative. I have distinguished diverse instances of theological, postmodern, and intersectional accounts of the mysticism of ordinary life while seeking ways to adjust, integrate, and develop them.

More specifically, I have embraced a Catholic model of interdisciplinarity, which welcomes the contributions of philosophy while incorporating them into a Christian theological perspective centered on the grace of divine union. I have stressed that the philosophy under consideration need not only be that of a Greek or Latin antiquity or even German modernity, since there is much to learn about the mysticism of ordinary life from philosophical texts in Francophone postmodernity (in its phenomenological and psychoanalytic streams) and from analogous materials produced within Latino/a and Black cultures on the American side of the Atlantic. I have discussed challenges associated with treating transcendental consciousness, obedience, marriage, suffering, immanence, alterity, femininity, mestizaje, and Blackness as sufficient grounds on which to attribute a mystical meaning to ordinary life. At the same time, I have highlighted ways in which these philosophically describable aspects of human existence can mediate a theologically recognizable intimacy with the unknown God of incarnate love.

Following feminist authors, I have contested sinful norms of phallocentrism and gender essentialism that have shaped the construction of both mysticism and ordinariness. I have suggested that an abstract stance of gender neutrality, in which one would avoid stating or implying anything about this area of human difference, is neither desirable nor attainable. As an alternative, I have drawn specific attention to quotidian negotiations and subversions of such normative constraints and emphasized the ways in which union with God scrambles gender expectations. Following mestiza, womanist, and other intersectional theorists, I have argued that the feminist study of Christian mysticism needs to attend more rigorously to the mystical lives of poor women of color. I have suggested that gender and race must be interrogated together if we are to understand their effects on everyday existence and on the meaning of union with God. I have argued that, when interpreted in such critical- contemplative ways, the mysticism of ordinary life becomes a wellspring of spiritual consolation and material empowerment for women and other persons oppressed by histories of conquest and slavery.

Throughout this book, I have maintained that the God revealed in Christ and the Holy Spirit, in the goodness of the natural world, and in La Virgen de Guadalupe seeks to unite with human beings regardless of their status in any given social or religious hierarchies. This All- Good, this abyssal mystery, this undying wisdom, this nameless power does not remain aloof. It enters into histories and societies and supports only those norms that encourage holistic love, joy, and freedom. It is not a respecter of any other norms and, in fact, emboldens its recipients to resist them whenever they become harmful or overly entrenched. On my account, the mysticism of ordinary life is more precisely a normativity- critical mysticism of quotidian life, which celebrates the Christological, pneumatological, and apophatic features of human bodies, psyches, and relationships. All in all, I have not merely presented a map of different theories of the mysticism of ordinary life. I have charted a particular course through such territory and given locally argued reasons for following this route.

To be clear, my goal has not been to persuade nonbelievers to become believers or, for that matter, philosophers to become theologians. In this regard, I acknowledge that the truth of my account of the mysticism of ordinary life is not something I can prove. Perhaps virtue is only ever a product of human effort or, at most, an effect of created (as opposed to uncreated) grace; perhaps the divine is nothing other than nature writ large; perhaps the desire to unite with the divine is a psychological wound caused by the loss of early attachment to one's mother; perhaps the evil of history shows that divine union is inaccessible in this life or even that there is no God. These objections and other argumentative or personal reasons might incline one more toward philosophy than theology, and I respect this possibility. To the extent that I have appraised philosophical sources from a Christian theological viewpoint, I have done so mainly for the benefit of Christian theologians who have an interest in understanding what can be gained from such an interaction, how much common ground can be found, and how certain theological traditions have been altered (for better or worse) through philosophical transpositions. Given the complexity, opacity, and variability of the mysticism of

ordinary life, I believe that it makes sense to approach differences in the study of this phenomenon with a spirit of generosity and a desire for mutual understanding.

Yet my confessional, theological perspective is meaningful to me and to others who share it. I am committed to the view that mysticism is not merely a variable historical construct or replicable modification of consciousness but a gift of God's very life. When I read sources from the Christian mystical tradition, including from neglected racialized communities within it, they increase my desire for this grace and support my intuition that it is real and being poured out everywhere. In my moments of contemplative stillness, when I strive to perceive and bear the excessive beauty and violence of existence, I sense that there is a heart of love at the center of it, a longing for healing and connection that does not have its origin in finite things (however remarkable they may be) but in the infinite itself. This sense stays with me in my unexceptional daily habits and encounters. It sustains my experiences of wonder at the mysteries of the world. It guides my religious, intellectual, and political practices.

I hope that the arguments of this book have persuaded Christian readers to think more deeply about the mystical dimension of their faith in Christ and the ways in which it troubles certain intersecting norms of gender and race that have corrupted the historical practice of Christianity. For Christians, Jesus of Nazareth is the most perfect icon of God's desire to be one with humanity in all its precarity. He is the revelation of an uncreated grace that breaks into the hells of this world, both deadly institutions and anguished bodies and souls, and promises a liberation as yet unconceived. In the context of overlapping sinful structures, such as White supremacy and patriarchy, quotidian practices of resistance, lucha, prayer, and community nurture possibilities of divine union. The Spirit of Christ breathes life into persons left for dead. It works in and through them, inspiring prophetic words and actions. It gives women levels of subjectivity and authority unanticipated by male- dominated reason. It builds up intersectional feminist movements in history. Mysticism is political but not only political. It is the abundance of eternity in time and place. It is an ever- greater love, which one can touch and embody but never capture. <>

Being: A Study in Ontology by Peter van Inwagen [Oxford University Press, 9780192883964]

A leading metaphysician offers a general account of existence

For millennia, philosophers have debated about the existence of things - not only the existence of things like God, demons and the soul, but things like mathematical objects, qualities and attributes, or merely possible states of affairs and people. Ontology is the present-day name for the part of philosophy that addresses such questions. *Being* attempts to answer these old questions-and the question of how one should go about attempting to answer them.

Brings together ontology ('What is there?') and metaontology ('How should we do ontology?')

This book presents and defends a meta-ontology and an ontology. Quine has taught us to use the word 'ontology' as a label for the part of philosophy that addresses "the ontological question" - 'What is there?' Meta-ontology, then, is the part of philosophy that addresses two questions, 'What is it to be (or to exist)?' and 'How should one attempt to answer the ontological question?' Chapters 1 and 5 are devoted to meta-ontology - Chapter 1 to a defense of the "neo-Quinean" meta-ontology, Chapter 5 to an examination of various alternative meta-ontologies. The essence of neo-Quineanism is that 'x exists' and 'Something is x' and 'The number of things that are x is not 0' mean more or less the same thing'. Neo-Quineanism obviously entails that there are no non-existent things, for nothing is such that nothing is it and everything is such that the number of things identical with it is 1. Chapter 2 is an examination of various positions that imply that there are non-existent things. The topic of Chapter 3 is the ancient "problem of universals," or the problem of the existence and nature of abstract objects. Chapter 4 is devoted to questions concerning possible worlds and other objects belonging to the ontology of modality.

Illuminates all kinds of existence - God, mathematical objects, abstract and possible objects, states of affairs, as well as everyday objects and properties.

CONTENTS

No one can deny that W. V. Quine wrote many splendidly quotable (and in consequence much-quoted) sentences. Among them is the first sentence of his preface to Set Theory and Its Logic: 'A preface is not, in my book, an introduction.' I refuse, however, to be simply one more philosopher who has quoted this sentence. I will not quote it. I will borrow it: A preface is not, in my book, an introduction.

One of the many introductions that this Preface is not—the Introduction to this book—follows it.

The intellectual context of Being: A Study in Ontology is this: it is an historical document, a book of the nineties of the last century. I began work on Being in the early eighties. The chapter headings of the original plan for the book were much the same as those of the book that is in your hands (or those of the book one page of which is on a screen before you), with two exceptions: Chapter VI was added in response to a suggestion made by a reader for O.U.P., and there was originally to be a chapter called "Being and Materiality." I had a year's research leave (thanks to the generosity of the National Endowment for the Humanities) and eagerly started work on the book. I began with the chapter "Being and Materiality" because, at the time, that was the area in which the ideas were coming. But that chapter took on a life of its own and eventually became a book—Material Beings. Material Beings (like An Essay

on Free Will before it) took seven or eight years to write. But I was able to do quite a lot of work (here and there, now and then) on Being even when the main focus of my attention was on Material Beings. I submitted an incomplete draft of Being to the Oxford University Press and in 1994 it was—conditionally, of course—accepted for publication. I took it for granted that—given the time it had taken to write An Essay on Free Will and Material Beings—I should finish the book in a few years, certainly before the end of the century.

It was not to be. The pressure of other work—I was in those days the recipient of a seemingly unending series of invitations to write papers on topics I badly wanted to write papers on—caused me again and again to put off work on Being, each time "for a few months." I found myself unable to do any further work on the book if I could not devote my undivided attention to it for some considerable period of time, and no such considerable period of time ever presented itself.

Eventually my manuscript became obsolete, or at least I eventually began to think of it as obsolete. In 1994, no one to speak of was writing on the topic that today is called meta-ontology,' but, all of a sudden, at some point early in this century, it seemed that everyone was. (In 2008, Ross Cameron published a paper that contained the soon-to-be-much-quoted sentence `Metaontology is the new black'.) And my manuscript addressed none of that work. A cloud of metaphysicians were now writing about fundamentality and grounding, Aristotelianism vs Quineanism, easy ontology, neo-Carnapianism, Ontologese, modes of being, ... And none of these topics was so much as alluded to in the draft manuscript of Being—for, of course, when I was writing the various chapters that draft comprised, I had never heard of any of them.

By the time the new century had got well under way, whenever I happened to be in Oxford, Peter Momtchiloff, the Senior Commissioning Editor for Philosophy at O.U.P., would give me lunch, during which meal he would delicately press me for information about how work on Being was coming along. Unless my memory deceives me, I was on every such occasion honest enough to tell him that it was not coming along at all. During one of the more recent of these luncheons, I laid out in some detail the problem I mentioned in the preceding paragraph, and Peter suggested that I publish the book as an historical document, a creature of its time—and that I refer readers to my more recent papers for my current thoughts on ontology and meta-ontology.

And this I have done. I have, I confess, deeply revised the "nineties manuscript" of Being in preparation for the publication of this book. And I have written a lot of wholly new material—for the manuscript that had been submitted to Oxford in the nineties was, as I have said, incomplete. But the revisions are revisions that might have been made, and the added material is material that might have been composed, before meta-ontology became the new black. For my current thinking about the matters addressed in this book,' the reader is directed to my collections Existence: Essays in ontology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014) and The Abstract and the Concrete, which will be published by Oxford University Press. Almost nothing in these later essays contradicts anything in the present book. The rare inconsistencies between the later essays and the material in this book pertain to minor technical matters....

This book presents a meta-ontology and an ontology. An ontology is a detailed and systematic answer to "the ontological question": 'What is there?' A metaontology is a reflective answer to the question, 'What are we asking when we ask the ontological question and how shall we go about trying to answer

it?' Or, to use the two words as mass terms: in ontology, we ask and attempt to answer the ontological question; in meta-ontology, we attempt to understand what we are doing when we do ontology.6 Chapters I and V are devoted to meta-ontology, Chapter I to the presentation of a meta-ontology, and Chapter V to consideration of its rivals. Chapters II, III, and IV are applications of the meta-ontology presented in Chapter I to questions about what there is: Are there things that do not exist?; Are there abstract objects?; Are there objects of the sort that seem to be presupposed in much of our modal reasoning: unrealized possibilities, possible worlds, possible fat men in the doorway? (Chapter VI was not a part of the original plan of the book. It is based on a suggestion of a reader for the Oxford University Press. In Chapter VI, I present a single, unified framework within which the positions defended in the earlier chapters can be placed.)

The meta-ontology presented in Chapters I and V is, so to speak, deeply Quinean. This is no accident. I did not set out to develop a meta-ontology and later discover that the one I developed happened to be identical with Quine's. My meta-ontology is Quine's meta-ontology (or something very much like it) because I have read what Quine has to say on the subject and have been convinced by it. The ontology presented in Chapters II, III, IV, and VI is, by contrast, deeply anti-Quinean. (It is, for example, friendly to propositions and attributes and modality de re, although it agrees with Quine's views in the matter of non-existent things.) This is an accident. I did not set out to refute or disagree with Quine. I have simply come to different ontological conclusions from his, despite the fact that I have thought about ontological problems in the way (if I may so speak of my relationship to a philosopher who has been my teacher only through the written word) he has taught me to think about ontological problems.

I will try to give some sense of what I mean by saying that the meta-ontology I present in this book is "deeply Quinean." But I do not mean to anticipate the detailed and technical discussion of meta-ontological questions that comprises Chapters I and V. I will simply comment on two quotations that represent metaontological views antithetical to Quine's, and on one quotation that misrepresents Quine's views. The first is from Arthur Prior's Objects of Thought:

[Quine's difficulty with such quantifications as 'Paul believes something that Elmer does not'] seems to me to be quite unnecessary; like many other difficulties of his, it arises only through his insistence that all quantification must govern variable names. I see no reason why we should not— ... following Ramsey— quantify our sentential variables and concoct such complexes as Tor some p, Paul believes that p and Elmer does not believe that p', without thereby being `ontologically committed' to the view that there are objects which sentences name. (I doubt whether any dogma, even of empiricism, has ever been quite so muddling as the dogma that to be is to be a value of a bound variable.)

The burden—or a good sixty percent of the burden—of Chapters I and V could be summed up by saying that the ideas on display in this passage are radically defective.' In this passage—I say—, a philosopher accuses another philosopher of being wrong-headed and muddled on just those points on which he himself is wrong-headed and muddled and his target exceptionally insightful and clearminded. I will be particularly concerned to commend Quine for "his insistence that all quantification must govern variable names" (that is, must govern variables that occupy nominal positions). More exactly, I will commend Quine for his insistence that there can be no such thing as a variable that does not occupy a nominal position—for it's not as if Quine conceded that there were, for example, sentential variables but held that, for some reason, quantification couldn't govern them...

Lightweight Platonism An Ontological Framework

This final chapter presents, in outline, a single, unified framework within which the conclusions of the five preceding chapters can be placed. It will, inevitably, contain some repetition of things said in the first five chapters. I'll try at least not to use the same words.

I will call this "framework" Lightweight Platonism. Lightweight Platonism comprises a meta-ontology and an ontology.

The meta-ontology incorporates the conviction that being is a thin concept. (And existence, since it is the same thing as being, is therefore a thin concept.) Heidegger has asked, "... is 'being' a mere word and its meaning a vapor, or is it the spiritual destiny of the West?"' One can see why he presents his readers with that opposition, for 'a mere word and a vapor' is the position of Nietzsche and 'spiritual destiny' is his own position and Nietzsche is one of the very few modern philosophers for whom Heidegger has any very great respect. However this may be, Heidegger has presented his readers with a false opposition. 'Being' is a word with a very precise meaning, not a vapor at all, and it is not the spiritual destiny of the West—not in the sense, which I take to be Heidegger's sense, that the spiritual destiny of the West is hostage to the West's undertaking to uncover the meaning of being. Being is an everyday concept, a hard-working concept, but it stands in no more intimate relation to the spiritual destiny of the West than does the concept of the antecedent of a conditional (or the concept of a planar projection or the concept of an accentual meter or...).

Both the thinness of the concept of being and the precision with which the concept of being can be defined are displayed in two facts (I say they're facts) about the open sentences in the following list: the fact that they are unambiguous and clear and the fact that each of them is necessarily co-extensive with each of the others. <>

PLATO OF ATHENS: A LIFE IN PHILOSOPHY by Robin Waterfield [Oxford University Press, 9780197564752]

A up-to-date introductory biography of the founder of Western philosophy

Considered by many to be the most important philosopher ever, Plato was born into a well-to-do family in wartime Athens at the end of the fifth century BCE. In his teens, he honed his intellect by attending lectures from the many thinkers who passed through Athens and toyed with the idea of writing poetry. He finally decided to go into politics, but became disillusioned, especially after the Athenians condemned his teacher, Socrates, to death. Instead, Plato turned to writing and teaching. He began teaching in his twenties and later founded the Academy, the world's first higher-educational research and teaching establishment. Eventually, he returned to practical politics and spent a considerable amount of time and energy trying to create a constitution for Syracuse in Sicily that would reflect and perpetuate some of his political ideals. The attempts failed, and Plato's disappointment can be traced in some of his later political works.

In his lifetime and after, Plato was considered almost divine. Though a measure of his importance, this led to the invention of many tall tales about him-both by those who adored him and his detractors. In this first ever full-length portrait of Plato, Robin Waterfield steers a judicious course among these stories, debunking some while accepting the kernels of truth in others. He explains why Plato chose to write dialogues rather than treatises and gives an overview of the subject matter of all of Plato's books. Clearly and engagingly written throughout, **PLATO OF ATHENS** is the perfect introduction to the man and his work.

Review

"If all Western philosophy is as has been claimed a series of footnotes to Plato of Athens, it's fortunate indeed that all his dialogues have survived and attracted translators and interpreters of the caliber of Robin Waterfield. Brilliant, witty, profound--and perplexing: Plato's all those and more (a uniquely resonant stylist too), and it's no mean tribute both to him and to the author to say that Robin Waterfield has done him justice." -- Paul Cartledge, author of *Thebes: The Forgotten City of Ancient Greece*

"Whitehead once characterized the history of Western philosophy as a series of footnotes to Plato. Here, at last, we have an authoritative body text for the man himself. 'No philosopher,' Waterfield writes, 'is as accessible to non-specialists as Plato.' The same can be said for this remarkable, impeccably researched biography" -- M. D. Usher, author of *Plato's Pigs and Other Ruminations*

"Writing a biography of Plato is a tricky endeavor, to say the least. Robin Waterfield nonetheless succeeds in delivering a gripping, plausible, and enlightening portrait. Those new to Plato as well as seasoned scholars will come away from Plato of Athens not only with as rounded a picture of Plato the

man as may be possible, but also with an excellent sense of his philosophy and the historical times in which he lived and with which he engaged." -- Iakovos Vasiliou, author of *Aiming at Virtue in Plato*

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The prospect of writing a biography of Plato is daunting, and many have judged it a lost cause. The sources are mostly thin and unreliable, the information sporadic and often uncertain, the chronology of his written works impossible to determine with precision. No official Athenian documents survive that mention him. Moreover, Plato hardly refers to himself in the dialogues (as his written works are called) and never speaks in his own name. Nevertheless, as I hope this book demonstrates, a book-length treatment is both possible and desirable. As well as unearthing biographical details, one has to delve into many areas that have the potential fundamentally to impact what one thinks of Plato, such as: What kind of writer was he? How should we read the dialogues he wrote? Is what we call "Platonism" true to its origins? Plato is a household name— a rare status for a philosopher— and he effectively invented the discipline we call philosophy. It would be good to gain some idea of the man himself.

Naturally, many books on Plato start with a chapter or a few paragraphs on his life, but, as far as I am aware, the last dedicated biography in English of any length was published in 1839, when B. B. Edwards translated the Life of Plato by Wilhelm Tennemann and included it in his and E. A. Park's Selections from German Literature. The book you hold in your hands shares with this predecessor little except a critical approach. That is, I do not just write down "facts" and conclusions but also to a certain extent, suitable for a book designed for a general audience, explain what the evidence is and how I understand it, because nothing is uncontroversial in Plato studies. But otherwise my book is different in that it ranges wider and is longer than Edwards's fifty- six pages. And since the main fact about Plato's life is that he was a writer, my book will also serve as an introduction to his work. I do

mean “introduction”: finer points of interpretation and philosophical complexities play no part, and I have toed a fairly conservative line on most issues that exercise interpreters of Plato. This is not a book about Plato’s philosophy but about Plato, though, as a biography of a philosopher, references to aspects of his thought are inevitable. But I focus more on general characteristics than the particulars and the ever- contended details. I am more likely to tantalize readers with suggestive and intriguing ideas of Plato’s than elaborate them or spell out their pros and cons.

After about 2,400 years, Plato’s books have scarcely aged; they are as brilliant, witty, profound, and perplexing as they have always been. Most of them are not only inspired but inspiring; they are very enjoyable to read, and even the few drier ones contain ingenious and delightful passages. No philosopher is as accessible to non- specialists as Plato. I hope that this book will stimulate readers to turn next to reading the dialogues themselves and to find out more about Plato’s work. To this end, I have appended a fairly long bibliography. In terms of my personal biography, the book is a kind of summation, the fruit of many years of thinking and writing about Plato (not that he has always been my exclusive focus). Almost the first article I had published, more than forty years ago, was on the chronology of Plato’s dialogues— a topic that, naturally, has exercised me in this biography. So, although I now disagree with the thesis of that article, the book completes a circle for me.

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Plato’s importance as a philosopher is universally acknowledged. He was the first Western thinker systematically to address issues that still exercise philosophers today in fields such as metaphysics, epistemology, political theory, jurisprudence and penology, ethics, science, religion, language, art and aesthetics, friendship, and love. He was the heir to a long tradition of thinking about the world and its inhabitants, but the use he made of this inheritance was original. In effect, he invented philosophy, and he did so at a time when there was little vocabulary or framework for doing so— no words for “universal,” “attribute,” “abstract,” and so on. Moreover, he founded a school, the Academy, which was dedicated not just to philosophy, but to scientific research and practical politics, and fostered thinkers of the stature of Aristotle and Eudoxus, whose multiple influences on subsequent thinkers were profound. The Academy taught philosophy and encouraged research for almost a thousand years, a span still unsurpassed by any other educational establishment in the West.

The range of topics Plato addressed, the depth with which he addressed them, and the boldness of his theories are astonishing. It is not just that he raised questions that still provoke us, but he also asked, as a philosopher must, whether it is possible to come up with secure answers to the questions, and even whether knowledge is possible at all. He was concerned not just with conclusions but with how we reach them. He had certain definite doctrines, or theories perhaps, but even they might find themselves tested in the dialogues. This sense of philosophy as an ongoing quest is one of the most attractive features of his work. What is more, these ideas are generally presented in a way that is

accessible to every intelligent reader because Plato's brilliance as a philosopher was matched by his talent as a writer. In later centuries, many thinkers have written philosophical dialogues, but none of those dialogues has captured the fluency and conversational realism of Plato's work at its best.

I said just now that Plato raised questions that still provoke us, but the "us" in that sentence consists chiefly of practicing philosophers. It is more to the point to say that he raised questions that should still provoke us— all of us, not just philosophers. In a world in which even liberal democracies can be distorted by fanatical, incompetent, and emotionally immature leaders, should we perhaps not pay more attention to Plato's prescriptions for turning out political leaders who are both competent and principled? In a world in which information and misinformation are more widespread than ever before, especially thanks to social media and the Internet, should we not reconsider Plato's insistence that our actions should be based on knowledge, not belief or opinion? When many perpetuators of popular culture drag us down to the level of the lowest common denominator, let's reflect on Plato's reasons for loathing both trivialization and the unthinking acceptance of ideas and practices even when they are widely sanctioned by society. Plato was an idealist in that he believed that perfection, or at least a far better state of affairs, is achievable in every area of human life, starting with personal reformation. Should we not similarly devote our energies to improving ourselves and the world around us, so that each generation bequeaths to the next conditions that are healthier and more sustainable than what went before?

Plato's work generated discussion and responses throughout antiquity and in every generation since. There is still such an enormous output of scholarly books and articles every year that it would take more than a single lifetime to master all the publications and all the languages required to read them. He is read and studied in, I dare say, every country in the world. The indexes of a good proportion of the nonfiction books on any reader's shelf will have an entry for Plato.

Plato was not just important but super- important. And so he has been judged by some of the greatest intellects of recent times.

Perhaps the most famous such assessment is that of the English philosopher Alfred North Whitehead (1861– 1947), who wrote in Process and Reality, published in 1929: "The safest general characterization of the European philosophical tradition is that it consists of a series of footnotes to Plato." I believe this to be correct, in the sense that Plato invented what we call the discipline of philosophy, though like all great thinkers and innovators, he also built on the work of his predecessors. He could have echoed Isaac Newton: "If I have seen further, it is by standing on the shoulders of giants."

But let's be clear on what Whitehead was saying: every great Western thinker, from Aristotle onward, has been indebted to Plato. Aristotle's debts are more close and obvious than those of, say, Judith Butler, but the foundations of even Butler's work were laid down by Plato. If the mark of genius, rather

than merely great intelligence, is that the field in which the person works is forever changed, or a new field created, then Plato was a genius. In saying that he invented philosophy, Whitehead and I are not saying that he got everything right. Of course not: that would make all subsequent philosophy even more of a waste of time than many people already think it is! And in any case, it is the job of philosophy to inquire, more than it is to come up with solutions. Plato launched philosophical investigation.

Whitehead's estimation of Plato is so famous that it has long had the status of a cliché. But it is not commonly noted that Whitehead was preceded on the other side of the Atlantic by Ralph Waldo Emerson, leader of the Transcendentalists. Whitehead was ensconced within the establishment, while Emerson was more of an outsider; perhaps this is why the latter's saying has been forgotten. "Out of Plato," Emerson said, in his chapter on Plato in Representative Men (1876), "come all things that are still written and debated among men of thought." We note his "all things," a measure of Plato's great importance.

I could add testimonials from many others, such as Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770– 1831), who said in his Lectures on the History of Philosophy that Plato and Aristotle "above all others deserve to be called the teachers of the human race." I could add testimonials from thinkers and commentators of our own time, but it is the way of things that current philosophers and scholars have not yet passed the test of time and attained the stature of Whitehead, Emerson, and others. So I rest my case on these quotations from earlier thinkers, and on the fact that Republic at least, and often more of Plato's works, are invariably included in the canon of Great Books of the World. Nor is this reverence for his books a new phenomenon. Most ancient Greek literature has been lost, sometimes by accident, but more often because it was felt to be not worth preserving, in the sense that, in the centuries before the invention of the printing press, no one was asking scribes to make copies. Yet we have the complete set of Plato's dialogues; not a single word that he published has been lost. Every generation of readers in antiquity and the Middle Ages felt that Plato's work was worth preserving.

In short, without Plato, European culture would be poorer, or at least it would have had to struggle to attain the same richness. Plato cannot be dismissed as just a dead white male. It is safe to say that, apart from the Bible, no body of written work has had such an impact on the Western world as Plato's dialogues. Over the centuries, Platonism has reappeared in some form or other in philosophical contexts— in much early Jewish, Christian, and Islamic thought; in the ideas of the Cambridge Platonists such as Henry More and Ralph Cudworth; in the slightly later seventeenth- century dispute between John Locke and Gottfried Leibniz; even in the late nineteenth- century "Platonism" of Gottlob Frege's mathematical philosophy. But that is not my point, which is that Plato bears some responsibility for forming and tuning the way all of us think, whatever our gender, skin color, cultural background, or philosophical or political affiliation. In saying this, I am not promoting the

chauvinistic notion that the only discipline worthy of the name "philosophy" is the Western version, founded by Plato; but I am saying that, whether or not we know it, our minds have been affected by him. Moreover, I have suggested that he still has important lessons for us— that he should continue to affect the way we think about many of the issues that currently trouble or perplex us. This book, then, attempts to contextualize the work of this important thinker and to uncover as much as possible what else he did other than write books. <>

Aristoteles, › Poetik‹: Einleitung, Text, Übersetzung und Kommentar. Mit einem Anhang: Texte zur aristotelischen Literaturtheorie 2 volumes (Aristotle, "Poetics": Introduction, Text, Translation, and Commentary; With an Appendix: Texts on Aristotelian Literary Theory) by Martin Hose [Sammlung wissenschaftlicher Commentare (SWC), De Gruyter, 9783110703191] Text in German, Greek, Latin.

Aristoteles' Poetik ist der vielleicht wichtigste antike literaturtheoretische Text; er entwickelt und begründet erstmals den Begriff 'Poesie', definiert insbesondere Tragödie und Epos als Gattungen und liefert Kriterien, wie die Qualität von Poesie beurteilt werden kann. Der Text der Poetik wird seit Beginn der modernen Philologie intensiv analysiert und interpretiert: Für die Textgestalt und die teilweise schwierig zu verstehenden einzelnen Partien sind insbesondere in jüngerer Zeit erhebliche Forschungsfortschritte zu verzeichnen: Die Überlieferung ist durch die Neubewertung einer wichtigen Handschrift (B) und der arabischen Übersetzung neu geklärt, für zentrale Partien und Konzepte liegen bedeutende neue Verstehensvorschläge vor. Das vorliegende Buch will dies durch einen neu konstituierten Text, eine textnahe Übersetzung und einen philologischen Kommentar zur Darstellung bringen. In einem Anhang werden Partien zweisprachig vorgelegt und kommentiert, die für die Rekonstruktion des verlorenen Teils der Poetik relevant sind.

[This volume presents a revised Greek text of Aristotle's Poetics, a literal translation, and a commentary that summarizes the philological work that has been conducted on this central work of ancient literary theory in the last thirty years. An appendix provides bilingual fragments (some of them recently discovered) and other ancient and Byzantine texts that are relevant to the reconstruction of the lost part of the Poetics.

Aristotle's Poetics is perhaps the most important ancient text on literary theory; he developed and founded the term 'poetry' for the first time, defined in particular tragedy and epic as genres and provided criteria for assessing the quality of poetry. The text of the Poetics has been intensively analyzed and interpreted since the beginning of modern philology: Considerable research progress has

been made, particularly in recent times, on the form of the text and the individual passages that are sometimes difficult to understand: the transmission has been confirmed by the re-evaluation of an important manuscript (B) and the Arabic translation has been clarified, there are significant new suggestions for understanding central parts and concepts. This book wants to present this through a newly constituted text, a translation close to the text and a philological commentary. In an appendix, games relevant to the reconstruction of the lost part of the Poetics are presented and commented on in two languages.]

INHALTSVERZEICHNIS

Das hier vorgelegte Buch hat eine dienende Funktion: es soll das Verständnis der Aristotelischen Poetik fördern, eines Textes, dessen Bedeutung für die Literaturwissenschaft nicht eigens herausgestellt werden muss.

Der Weg, der hierbei beschritten wird, bedarf einer kurzen Erläuterung. Im Zentrum soll der Text der Poetik stehen,' zu dem die Einleitung hinführt, der mit einem knappen kritischen Apparat ediert, übersetzt sowie schließlich kommentiert wird. Diese Erschließung der Poetik hat durchaus ihre Berechtigung, hat doch die Konstitution des Textes durch Neubewertungen der Überlieferungsträger wichtige neue Impulse erhalten. Dass der neu erarbeitete Text hier zudem übersetzt wird, mag begründungsbedürftig erscheinen, liegt doch die Publikation einer neuen Übersetzung (Schmitt 2008, mit ausführlichem Kommentar) erst wenige Jahre zurück.

Jedoch handelt es sich bei dieser wie auch bei den älteren Übertragungen von Olof Gigon (1950/1961), Walter Schönherr/Ernst Günther Schmidt (1960/1972) oder Manfred Fuhrmann (1976/1982) um Zielsprachen-orientierte Übersetzungen, die einen gut lesbaren, dabei jedoch auch geglätteten deutschen Text bieten.z Die hier neben den griechischen Text gestellte deutsche Version hat dagegen das Ziel, den griechischen Text — soweit noch bei angemessenem Deutsch möglich — in seinen spezifischen Schwierigkeiten zu übertragen und damit eine Art ersten Kommentars zu liefern. In der eigentlichen Kommentierung soll der griechische Text auch philologisch erläutert werden (aufgrund der Zielsetzung der Reihe, in der Schmitt 2008 erschienen ist, war dies Schmitt nicht möglich; die letzte im engeren Sinn philologische Kommentierung ist inzwischen über 5o Jahre alt: Lucas 1968; der letzte deutschsprachige philologische Kommentar ist sogar vor über 85 Jahren erschienen: Gudeman 1934).

Der Text der Poetik ist ein Fragment: das zweite Buch, das offenbar die Komödie (und vielleicht den lambos) diskutierte, ist verloren. Indes: Wie spurlos ist dieses Buch verloren? In jüngerer Zeit sind bedeutsame Versuche unternommen worden, für das zweite Buch spätantike bzw. byzantinische Traktate als Zusammenfassungen oder Fragmente in Anspruch zu nehmen, und zudem bietet sich die Perspektive, aus neu edierten Philodem-Papyri aus Herculaneum neue Fragmente der Aristoteles-Schrift über die Dichter zu gewinnen, einer Schrift, die offenbar in auf ein größeres Lesepublikum hin berechneter Form über dieselben literaturkritischen und -theo-retischen Probleme handelte wie die Poetik. Hier ist die Forschung noch im Fluss. Es scheint jedoch der Mühe wert, auch diese immer wieder mit der Aristotelischen Literaturtheorie in Verbindung gebrachten Texte zweisprachig vorzulegen und wenigstens knapp zu erläutern, um der nicht-gräzistischen Literaturwissenschaft das Material zur eigenen Beurteilung zur Verfügung zu stellen. Dies soll der Anhang dieses Buches leisten….

Der Ort der Poetik in der griechischen Literaturgeschichte

Aristoteles' Poetik ist zwar vielleicht die bedeutendste literaturtheoretische Schrift der griechischen Literatur, doch steht sie, wie könnte es anders sein, in einer weit zurückreichenden Tradition der Reflexion über Literatur, die bereits mit den frühesten Werken dieser Literatur beginnt, den homerischen Epen. Dass die griechische Kultur so intensiv über ihre Literatur nachdachte und sich wiederholt Rechenschaft gab (und dies in einem Umfang und in einer Qualität, die in anderen Kulturen des Altertums mit Literaturproduktion nicht zu finden ist), verdankt sich einer Konstellation von Faktoren, die für die Genese einer veritablen Literaturtheorie günstig war. Diese Faktoren lassen sich mit den Stichworten ‚Konkurrenz' bzw. ‚Atonalität` „Intensität` und ‚Schriftlichkeit` charakterisieren.

Doch stellt die Poetik nicht nur eine literaturtheoretische Schrift dar, sondern gibt sich formal als, als eine, Dichtungs- Technik'. Mit dem Terminus Tim pflegt die griechische Sprache eine zunächst ‚praktisch' gedachte Fähigkeit in einem bestimmten Bereich zu bezeichnen, die auf Erfahrungen und Regeln basiert. Sowohl die demgemäß sachgemäße Handhabung einer Materie oder eines bestimmten Bereichs wie auch, in übertragenem Sinn, das Wissen um diese Handhabung kann mit bezeichnet werden. Die Vermittlung derartigen Erfahrungswissens erfolgte in der griechischen Kultur der Archaik einerseits durch mündliche Weitergabe, andererseits durch ‚Musterstücke' der betreffenden Techne. Seit dem 5. Jh., wiederum als Folge der sich intensivierenden Buchkultur, zeigt sich eine Tendenz, Technai als immer deutlicher systematisch angelegte Lehrbücher zu vermitteln. In diesen Kontext stellt sich damit die Poetik als (dazu unten 1.2.).

Summa summarum kann man also festhalten, dass in der griechischen Kultur eine beachtliche Kontinuität der praktizierten wie auch reflektierten Literaturkritik zu erkennen ist, die sich im 5. Jh. zumal an einem Ort wie Athen verdichtete, der durch seine Festkultur vielfältige Notwendigkeiten zur Beurteilung von Poesie (die damit zudem per se als wichtig definiert war) geschaffen hatte und der zudem zu einem Zentrum geworden war, das Intellektuelle aus der gesamten griechischen Welt anzog. Kennzeichen der Literaturkritik am Ende des 5. Jh. ist dabei jedoch auch eine Fülle von ‚Einzelfällen', die dem Urteil überstellt werden: Einzelfälle im Sinn von Entscheidungen in konkreten Wettbewerben über bestimmte Dichter oder Einzelfälle als Fragen wie: Sind bestimmte Wörter bei Homer oder anderen Dichtern ‚richtig'? Ist Aischylos oder Euripides der bessere Dichter? Ansätze zu einer Generalisierung der Kritik sind erkennbar, wenn — wie in Aristophanes' Fröschen — die Frage gestellt werden kann, was der Zweck von Dichtung sei. Von hier aus sind zwei Möglichkeiten eröffnet, weiter über die Dichtung nachzudenken: Man kann im Horizont der Zweckbestimmung des späten 5. Jh. (d.h. der ‚aristophanischen' Zweckbestimmung) verharren und von da aus fragen, ob Dichtung diesem Zweck gerecht werden kann — dies ist der Weg, den Platon im Staat beschreitet; oder man kann die Zweckbestimmung selbst hinterfragen und daran eine Analyse knüpfen, was eigentlich gute Dichtung ist — dies ist, wie wir sehen werden, der Weg der Poetik. <>

Translation:

The book presented here has a serving function: it is intended to promote the understanding of Aristotelian Poetics, a text whose importance for literary studies does not need to be specifically emphasized.

The path that is followed here requires a brief explanation. The focus should be on the text of the Poetics', to which the introduction leads, which is edited with a brief critical apparatus, translated and finally commented on. This opening up of the poetics is certainly justified, since the constitution of the text has received important new impulses through re-evaluations of the bearers of tradition. The fact that the newly compiled text is also translated here may seem justified, given that a new translation (Schmitt 2008, with detailed commentary) was only published a few years ago.

However, like the older translations by Olof Gigon (1950/1961), Walter Schönherr/Ernst Günther Schmidt (1960/1972) or Manfred Fuhrmann (1976/1982), this is a target-language-oriented translation that makes for an easily readable , but also offer anti-aliased German text. The German version placed here next to the Greek text, on the other hand, has the aim of translating the Greek text - as far as this is still possible with appropriate German - in its specific difficulties and thus providing a kind of first

commentary. In the actual commentary, the Greek text should also be explained philologically (due to the objective of the series in which Schmitt appeared in 2008, this was not possible for Schmitt; the last philological commentary in the narrower sense is now more than 50 years old: Lucas 1968; der last German-language philological commentary appeared more than 85 years ago: Gudeman 1934).

The text of the Poetics is a fragment: the second book, which apparently discussed the comedy (and perhaps the iambos), is lost. However, how completely lost is this book? More recently, significant attempts have been made to use late antique or Byzantine tracts as summaries or fragments for the second book, and there is also the prospect of new fragments of Aristotle's writings on the To win poets, a writing that apparently dealt with the same literary-critical and theoretical problems as Poetics in a form calculated for a larger readership. Research is still in progress here. However, it seems worthwhile to present these texts, which are repeatedly associated with Aristotelian literary theory, in two languages and at least to explain them briefly in order to provide non-Greek literary scholars with the material for their own assessment. This is what the appendix to this book aims to do….

The Place of Poetics in Greek Literary History

While Aristotle's Poetics is perhaps the most important literary-theoretical work in Greek literature, it stands, how could it be otherwise, in a long tradition of reflection on literature that begins with the earliest works of this literature, the Homeric epics. The fact that Greek culture reflected so intensely and repeatedly on its literature (and did so on a scale and in a quality not found in other ancient cultures that produced literature) is due to a constellation of factors that genesis of a veritable theory of literature was favourable. These factors can be characterized with the keywords 'competition' or 'atonality', 'intensity' and 'literacy'.

However, the Poetics does not only represent a literary-theoretical writing, but formally presents itself as a 'poetry technique'. The Greek language uses the term Tim to designate an initially 'practical' ability in a specific area, which is based on experience and rules. Both the appropriate handling of a matter or a specific area as well as, in a figurative sense, the knowledge of this handling can be designated as . In the Archaic Greek culture, such experiential knowledge was conveyed on the one hand by oral transmission and on the other hand by 'patterns' of the relevant techne. Since the 5th century, again as a result of the intensifying book culture, there has been a tendency to teach technai as textbooks that are more and more systematically structured. In this context, poetics is placed as (on this below 1.2.).

All in all, one can say that in Greek culture a remarkable continuity of practiced and reflected literary criticism can be seen, which in the 5th century intensified in a place like Athens, which, due to its festival culture, had a variety of needs for the assessment of poetry (which was also defined as important per se) and which had also become a center that attracted intellectuals from all over the Greek world. However, a characteristic of literary criticism at the end of the 5th century is a wealth of 'individual cases' that are subject to judgment: Individual cases in the sense of decisions in specific competitions about certain poets or individual cases as questions such as: Are certain words in Homer or other poets 'right'? Is Aeschylus or Euripides the better poet? Approaches to a generalization of the critique are recognizable when—as in Aristophanes' Frogs—the question can be asked what the purpose of poetry is. From here, two possibilities are opened up for thinking further about poetry: one can stay within the horizon of late fifth-century purpose (i.e., the 'Aristophanic' purpose) and ask from there whether poetry can do justice to that purpose—this is the way that Plato treads in the state; or one can question

the purpose itself and tie it to an analysis of what good poetry actually is—this, as we shall see, is the way of poetics. <>

The Intellectual and Cultural Origins of Chaïm Perelman and Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca's New Rhetoric Project: Commentaries on and Translations of Seven Foundational Articles, 7933–7958 edited by Michelle Bolduc, David A. Frank [Studies in the History of Rhetoric, Brill, 9789004528970]

Chaïm Perelman, alone, and in collaboration with Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca, developed the New Rhetoric Project, which is in use throughout the world. This book offers the first deep contextualization of the project's origins and original translations of their work from French into English.

Chaïm Perelman, alone, and in collaboration with Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca, developed the New Rhetoric Project (NRP), which is in use throughout the world. Sir Brian Vickers, in his historical survey of rhetoric and philosophy for the Oxford Encyclopaedia of Rhetoric, states that the NRP is "one of the most influential modern formulations of rhetorical theory." This book provides the first deep contextualization of the project's origins, offers seven original translations of the writings of Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca from French into English, and details how their collaboration effectively addresses then philosophical problems of our age.

CONTENTS

Chaïm Perelman (1912–1984), a Belgian Jew, achieved global recognition as a scholar in the humanities. He was also celebrated for his leadership of the Jewish underground in Belgium during World War II, an experience central to the purpose of his scholarship, which was to redeem reason and civil society in the wake of war and genocide. After the war, Perelman alone, and in collaboration with Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca (1926–1994), wrote more than 350 books, book chapters, and essays outlining a vision of rhetoric as an answer to the post-war "crisis of reason".

Perelman, alone and with Olbrechts-Tyteca who joined him in 1946, sought to answer the question: How can humans reason about values and cultivate a moral civil society in the aftermath of the Holocaust, World War II, and the absence of absolutes? Their answer was to develop a new rhetoric, or what we term the New Rhetoric Project [NRP]. The NRP was initiated by Perelman in his 1933 article "De l'arbitraire dans la connaissance" [On the Arbitrary in Knowledge], crystallized by Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca in their 1958 magnum opus, Le Traité de l'argumentation: La nouvelle rhétorique [The New Rhetoric: A Treatise on Argumentation], and brought to a finale in their 1983 contribution to a special issue of a Swiss journal dedicated to reviewing the influence of Vilfredo Pareto in the study of argumentation and their work sixty years after his death.

Sir Brian Vickers, in his historical survey of rhetoric and philosophy for the Oxford Encyclopedia of Rhetoric, states that the NRP is "one of the most influential modern formulations of rhetorical theory;" it is the only twentieth-century rhetoric mentioned in the entry. The University of Chicago's Wayne Booth, in his Rhetoric of Rhetoric, writes that Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, with the publication of the Traité (and its translation a decade later into English as The New Rhetoric), launched a "major revolution" with "an amazingly deep, rich, all-inclusive exploration of rhetorical resources, both from classical giants, especially Aristotle, Cicero, Quintilian, and from Renaissance anti-Cartesians on to 1969". Relative to the other twentieth-century rhetorics of I. A. Richards, Kenneth Burke, and others, Booth found Perelman's work (and that with Olbrechts-Tyteca) to be the "most complex effort to explore all the rhetorical resources for combating 'absolutism' and 'Cartesian' and 'views of truth'". James Crosswhite suggests that the New Rhetoric project is "the single most important event in

contemporary rhetorical theory". Many European philosophers, including Hans-Georg Gadamer, Paul Ricoeur, and Jacques Lacan, engaged with the NRP.

In our study of the NRP, we build on the insights that Christian Delacampagne made in his A History of Philosophy in the Twentieth Century.10 Delacampagne insists that the major philosophical movements in the twentieth century are products of history and culture. The material and cultural devastation left in the aftermath of World War I an intellectual crisis: reason had failed to prevent war, genocide, and the death of over 100 million people. European and Belgian intellectuals responded to this crisis with a host of philosophical balms, including logical positivism, existentialism, phenomenology, and Marxism.

Central to this crisis was Perelman's status as a Jew and that of the Jewish people in Europe. Reason did not prevent the rise of eliminationist antisemitism and the Holocaust, leading Delacampagne to argue that it is "[p]recisely because it constitutes the ultimate scandal of reason, the Nazi genocide forces us today to consider the Jewish question as the "turning point in history'".11 Toward the end of creating a civil society anchored in reason, accepting of the value diversity representing pluralism, and the lived experience of European Jews, Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca established reason and justice as the polar stars of the NRP, a justice achieved through informal reason expressed through argumentation and rhetoric. The time period considered in this volume was dominated by the questions raised in philosophy by logical positivism and the threat to life posed by totalitarianism.

Those who founded logical positivism and empiricism held that they were "integral to the struggle against fascism" as they "represented Enlightenment values of reason and progress, sense against nonsense, truth against fiction".12 Perelman's agenda, from the beginning, was to extend reason beyond the spheres of sense and truth to include values, a topic that logical positivism and empiricism of this period defined as the realm of the irrational, without meaning. As Edmonds writes,

> Logical positivists held that in the end, there is nothing we can do to reconcile our disagreement, and there is nothing to be gained by my claiming that my values are true and yours false. We may simply have to live with our difference of opinion. … It is perfectly legitimate for me to posit ethical judgments, so long as I acknowledge that they do not belong in the same category as empirical statements.

We see Perelman struggling with these constraints. He agrees with and is committed to Enlightenment values of reason, but he resists the boundaries placed on reason by logical positivism. Values must be seen as reflections of reason, Perelman would later maintain, if fascism and totalitarianism are to be contained and defeated. Rhetoric and argumentation would, for Perelman, become the logic of ethical judgments.

Perelman, the budding philosopher, made an audacious debut at age 21 in 1933 when he confronts the problem of modality in his initial two scholarly articles.14 Modality in logic hosts claims of necessity

and possibility, which can suggest that there are different modes and expressions of reason.15 In the tradition of logical positivism, modalism is either rejected completely, with reason limited to deduction and a logic of necessity, or severely restricted in its scope.16 In his earliest scholarship, Perelman embraces the coherence of logic, but he seeks its freedom from necessity and the arbitrary. However, during the decade of the 1930s, he nevertheless studies logic and reason within the worldview of those who subscribed to a version of positivism that embraces necessity and the arbitrary.

Over the course of Perelman's scholarly career, he would develop the modal logic of possibility and probability, which led him back to Aristotle, the father of Western logic. Aristotle had distinguished two forms of reason, analytic and dialectic, the former characterized by necessity and deduction, the latter by probability and rhetoric. The trajectory of Perelman's scholarship alone and with Olbrechts-Tyteca climaxes in the Traité with its goal of "breaking" with the Enlightenment's restrictive definition of reason, which limited it to the necessary, and effected a "rapprochement" between analytical and dialogical reasoning. As we will see, Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca also broke from their understanding of Aristotle's view of reason and rhetoric.

The NRP's take on justice, reason, and rhetoric remains an important influence on studies of law, ontology, epistemology, axiology, and argumentation, as well as in the humanities, social sciences, and natural sciences. John Rawls, in his Theory of Justice, cites Perelman's 1945 De la justice, which Perelman wrote while in hiding from the Nazis and leading the Belgian Jewish underground (Le Comité de défense des Juifs, or CDJ).17 Oxford's H. L. A. Hart celebrated Perelman's scholarship. More recently, the NRP is seen as influential in contemporary Arab, Korean, Spanish, and Israeli scholarship.19 Judges in Poland continue to cite the NRP in their legal rulings.20 Scholars in the English-speaking world make use of the NRP to study law, political communication, math, and a host of topics across the spectrums of humanities, social sciences, and natural sciences.

Between 1931 and 1947, Perelman set forth the questions at the center of the project, writing 50 articles and one book before Olbrechts-Tyteca joined him in 1947. In the period between 1947 and 1958, Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca wrote 15 articles and two books to develop the NRP.23 Olbrechts-Tyteca would, after 1958, write two articles and one book, making use of the theories outlined in the NRP. Perelman would write over 200 articles and four books on his own between 1958 and his death in 1984 that defend, extend, and refine the themes of the NRP.

A vast number of the articles belonging to the NRP, which offer important and original insights on NRP's rhetorical theory, remain in French. Scholars and readers lacking access to the NRP's original French must rely on only four volumes containing essays of English translations: The Idea of Justice and the Problem of Argument (1963), The New Rhetoric and the Humanities: Essays on Rhetoric and its Applications (1979), Justice, Law and Argument (1980), and The Realm of Rhetoric (1982).24 These

volumes are foundational for scholars from wide-ranging disciplines, including rhetorical history, communication, philosophy, legal studies, religious studies, literary criticism, the history of ideas, mathematics, the history of science, women's studies, and history. However, these volumes contain only translations of articles written after 1958 and do not offer an account of the origins or beginnings of the NRP; furthermore, these volumes lack both commentaries and translator notes to explain difficult concepts and to clarify the specific sociohistorical and cultural context in which Perelman (and Olbrechts-Tyteca) were working, which would enrich the reading experience.

Some of the existing English translations of Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca's oeuvre are flawed, leading to misreadings and misleading interpretations of the NRP. Our translations and commentaries intend to fill a historical vacuum in the study of the NRP, making them accessible and readily available to the English-speaking reader. Even scholars with a command of French have not read the totality of the texts that make up the NRP, which prevents an appreciation of the diachronic development of its approach.

Our work answers criticisms of the NRP made by some modern critics who have not plumbed the intellectual and cultural depths of the NRP. Alan Gross and Ray Dearin note that "while there has been some useful exegesis in English, most of it merely perpetuates misunderstandings that stem from superficial acquaintance beyond recovery in dusty and largely unread periodical volumes". Gross and Dearin are right; far too many commentaries by English-speaking readers of Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca betray and distort their analysis. Gross and Dearin are also right when they point to the articles Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca wrote offering explanations and embellishments of their central ideas that were not included in the Traité and that can be found in "unread periodical volumes".

Gross and Dearin are mistaken, however, when they write that there are but a "few articles" that could help illuminate the NRP.26 Perelman and Olbrechts- Tyteca's Traité was the result of a ten-year collaboration, one that sought to set forth a system of argumentation designed to persuade embodied audiences. According to Perelman's daughter, Noemi Perelman Mattis, the final product was over 2,000 pages; the press required the collaborators to condense it to 734 pages. The rather underdeveloped, elliptical writing in Traité may thus be due to space limitations. Concurrent with the 1958 publication of Traité, Perelman alone and with Olbrechts-Tyteca published articles on the relationship between thought and action (Perelman, "Rapports théoriques de la pensée et de l'action"), classical and romantic topoi in argument (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, "Classicisme et romantisme"), pragmatic argument (Perelman, "L'argument pragmatique"), and the role of time in argumentation (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, "De la temporalité comme caractère de l'argumentation").

We have identified many articles that precede, appear alongside, and postdate the Traité that shed expository light on the NRP's central concepts. We have dusted off Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca's unread articles, translated them into English (several of them here for the first time), and have provided commentaries specially written for this volume that situate these articles in their historical contexts. Our studies of the NRP, which include its history and cultural context, should provide the English-speaking reader with a better understanding of the historical origins and intentions of the key terms and arguments in the NRP, which have, far too often, been misunderstood by those who have not had access to adequate English translations and to the rich, multilingual cultural and political environment of the NRP.

We have studied the Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca collaboration in depth, conducted exhaustive research in the Perelman archives at the Université Libre de Bruxelles [ULB], the United States Holocaust Museum, and engaged in extensive interviews with Perelman's daughter, Noemi Perelman Mattis, and other contemporaries. We have also read the exchanges between Perelman and Hans Georg Gadamer, Richard McKeon, Norberto Bobbio, and many other prominent intellectuals contained in letters and philosophical society reports held in the archives, which have provided us with insight on the development of his thought.

Our archival research has allowed us to read first drafts of the articles that we have translated into English for the first time, lecture notes, and unpublished manuscripts. We have consulted the notebooks that Perelman kept between 1934 and 1948, which record the philosophical and rhetorical texts with which Perelman was engaged while at the early stages of his research on logic and rhetoric. These materials reveal the cultural and philosophical context in which the NRP was developed and provide the foundation for our translations and commentaries. We dedicate our commentaries and translations of the NRP to English-reading scholars and societies seeking to cultivate reason-based decision-making.

The Contribution of Translations and Commentaries on the NRP

Scholars from many disciplines and countries continue to turn to the NRP for insight on rhetorical theory and behavior. Our translations and commentaries of two of the NRP's keystone articles have been recently cited by two important scholars: James Crosswhite, Deep Rhetoric: Philosophy, Reason, Violence, Justice, Wisdom (Chicago, 2013) and Christopher Tindale, The Philosophy of Argument and Audience Reception (Cambridge, 2015).28 Crosswhite draws heavily on our translation of and commentary on Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca's 1958 article on time in argumentation to develop the theme of his book.29 Tindale makes use of our translation of Perelman's 1949 article on "regressive philosophy" in order to anchor his appropriation of Perelman's thought.30 Our work in translating and commenting upon these early articles has also led to Bolduc's recent major work, Translation and the Rediscovery of Rhetoric.

We anticipate that scholars will welcome and draw from The Intellectual and Cultural Origins of Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca's New Rhetoric Project. We translate the most significant pieces of Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca's work that remain in French, providing them with necessary contextualizations; we also aim to correct misunderstandings that derive from mistranslations. In 2014, we received a major National Endowment for the Humanities (NEH) Grant that has allowed us to complete a contextually sensitive series of translations and commentaries on the work of Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca. The present volume, one product of the NEH, entitled "The Intellectual and Cultural Origins of Chaïm Perelman and Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca's New Rhetoric Project: Commentaries on and Translations of Seven Foundational Articles, 1933–1958" ["Origins"] presents the initial phase of our project, featuring seven translations of and commentaries on articles published by Perelman alone and with Olbrechts-Tyteca between 1933 (Perelman's first article) and 1958 (the publication of Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca's Traité).

Readers of "Origins" will encounter here seven carefully selected translations and accompanying commentaries. They are intended to illuminate six touchstones in the NRP, offering readers insight into the development of the NRP and what these early writings offer to problems faced by contemporaries. These include:

1) The Intellectual Origins of the NRP: Toward a Logic of Values

Perelman, Chaïm "De l'arbitraire dans la connaissance". Archives de la Société Belge de Philosophie 5:3 (1933) 5–44.

This is the first substantive article Perelman wrote in 1933, at age 21, displaying many of the key concepts that would come to populate the NRP. Perelman's agenda, from the beginning, was to find a logic of values, a logic that acknowledged the sociology of knowledge and the need for reason-based judgments.

2) The Cultural Origins of the NRP: The Jewish Question and Double Fidélité

Perelman, Chaïm. "Réflexions sur l'assimilation". La Tribune juive. 31 July 1935. Perelman, Chaïm. "La Question juive". Synthèse 3 (1946) 47–63.

These two articles highlight the Jewish question and Perelman's response to it. Jews could be Belgian and Jewish, subscribing to double fidélité, Perelman argues, which thereby inverts the antisemitic slur of dual loyalty. This is an enactment of his philosophy of pluralism, one informing the NRP.

3) The Ontology and Philosophy of the New Rhetoric: Regression Toward Truth

Perelman, Chaïm. "Philosophies premières et philosophie régressive". Dialectica 3:11 (1949) 175–191.

Written in the aftermath of World War II and as a full professor, this article outlines a mature version of Perelman's views of axiology, epistemology, and ontology. The target of Perelman's system is "regressive" knowledge, which is served by rhetoric, which he mentions briefly.

4) The Debut of the NRP: A Rapprochement between Logic and Rhetoric

Perelman, Chaïm, and Olbrechts-Tyteca. "Logique et rhétorique". Revue philosophique de la France et de l'étranger 140:1–3 (1950) 1–35.

This article, which is the first Perelman/Olbrechts-Tyteca collaboration, is the blueprint for the Traité-New Rhetoric. The article outlines a realignment and rapprochement of rhetoric and logic, placing them in equal relationship.

5) The Role of Reason in the NRP: Eternal or Temporal

Perelman, Chaïm. "Raison éternelle, raison historique". L'homme et l'histoire. Actes du 6e Congrès des Sociétés de philosophie de langue française. Paris, 1952: 346–354.

Perelman, in search of a logic of values, sought to extend reason into the realm of the temporal, which philosophers had limited to the eternal. This contribution, which is the first citation in the Traité-New Rhetoric, explains this new vision of reason.

6) Time in Argument: Dissociating Values

Perelman, Chaïm and Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca. "De la temporalité comme caractère de l'argumentation". Archivio di Filosofia 2 (1958) 115–133.

In this article, included in an Italian journal that had dedicated a special issue to the topic of time, Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca develop the difference between formal and informal logic. The difference is the role that time plays in both logics and the need to dissociate and reorganize values with argumentation based on this exigence.

These six touchstones will help historians of rhetoric gain a better understanding of the NRP's birth and intellectual trajectories (touchstone one). Scholars of rhetoric, philosophy, and Jewish studies will hear the Jewish voice in the NRP and how it affects the interpretation of the NRP's stance on pluralism and reason (touchstone two). Scholars of rhetorical theory, the history of ideas, and philosophy will find Perelman's essay on first and regressive philosophies to be an enlightening reframing of the relationship between rhetoric and philosophy. Perelman's study precedes and complements the work of European scholars newly available to English-speaking audiences on ancient rhetoric, particularly the epideictic (touchstone three).

Scholars who have drawn from the NRP in their research should leave the translation of and commentary on Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca's debut essay on their New Rhetoric with a much better understanding of the history and intent of their project to bring logic and rhetoric back into alignment (touchstone four). These same scholars should find Perelman's essay on reason and rhetoric illuminating, helping them to avoid misinterpretations of the NRP's take on logic (touchstone five). In addition, Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca's essay on temporality in argument offers scholars, irrespective of discipline, a surprisingly relevant and philosophical analysis of time, one that both

explains the underlying philosophical intent of the NRP and a framework scholars can use to critique rhetorical behavior (touchstone six).

Translation in/and the New Rhetoric Project

English and North American scholars with a command of French understood the striking breakthroughs made by Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca and the importance of translating their work into English. Richard McKeon, who served as dean of the humanities division at the University of Chicago, recommended the translation and publication of what would become Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca's first article to appear in English in 1951.32 A. J. Ayer, one of the most important analytical philosophers of the twentieth century, translated Perelman's critique of pragmaticism in 1959. The University of Notre Dame's Otto Bird was one of the translators of Perelman's "The New Rhetoric: A Theory of Practical Reasoning", published in the Great Ideas Today series by Encyclopedia Britannica. John Wilkinson, who had finished a translation of Jacques Ellul's La technique: L'enjeu du siècle (The Technological Society) in 1964, turned to the task of translating the Traité into English. A professor of philosophy at the University of California at Santa Barbara, and a fellow in the UCSB's Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, Wilkinson collaborated with Purcell Weaver, known for his translations of Edmond Bordeaux's Cosmos, Man and Society: A Paneubiotic Synthesis, to move the Traité into English.

Michael Leff called the Wilkinson and Weaver's 1969 English translation of the Traité a "bombshell", a work that affected the trajectory of the humanities in North America. Scholarly audiences have found Wilkinson and Weaver's English translation of the Traité complex and challenging. As Gross and Dearin have observed, "The New Rhetoric [the English translation of the Traité] is difficult to read, a task made even more difficult for North American audiences because virtually all its examples and illustrations are from a literature in a foreign language". Wilkinson and Weaver do not provide commentary to elucidate these numerous references.

Further, as Richard Graff and Wendy Winn have pointed out, "even today many aspects of Perelman's work remain enigmatic". Near the end of his life, Perelman himself lamented in a 1984 article that much of his work remained inaccessible and misunderstood by non-Francophone, and specifically American, rhetoricians; nearly 40 years later, this situation has scarcely changed.

His daughter, Noemi Perelman Mattis, has told us that the 734-page Traité is a 'succinct' version of the NRP. The pages culled from the original 2,000-page manuscript seem to be the basis for two of the articles that appear in this volume. Indeed, several key ideas in the Traité-New Rhetoric that appear enigmatic or provoke misunderstanding are more fully developed in the articles we have translated. Wilkinson and Weaver's 1969 English translation of the Traité lacks an annotated commentary making reference to Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca's writings between 1931 and 1983. This left readers without competency in French with a weak grasp on many of the NRP's key ideas.

One idea that is as critical to the NRP as it is frequently misunderstood is that of the universal audience. In an article published the year of his death, Perelman pointed out how such scholars as James W. Ray and Laura S. Ede misunderstood the conception of the universal audience in the Traité, which is due, as we have discovered, to a mistranslation in Wilkinson and Weaver's translation of a key passage concerning the universal audience.42 Readers with knowledge of Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca's 1950 article, "Logique et rhétorique", which discusses the universal audience, would immediately understand that something was amiss in Wilkinson and Weaver's translation. Translating these pre-1958 articles will provide scholars in English with a better development and embellishment of the key concepts of the NRP, leading to a more refined understanding of the project's presuppositions.

One might argue that scholars of rhetoric and the humanities should not have to read in translation. However, the reality of language learning for graduate degrees in rhetoric and the humanities generally demonstrates the opposite: Foreign language competency is not considered critical to the study of rhetoric, and the products of our doctoral programs in rhetoric are frequently at a beginning level of foreign-language competency. Making the assumption that doctoral students—the future professors of rhetoric and other humanities disciplines—will be able to read these articles in the French original, whose subject matter and stylistics are complex, is idealistic at best. This volume is destined for those scholars who are not well versed in French; moreover, it is also intended for undergraduate students and their teachers in many different fields. The demand for English translations of the NRP is not only felt in rhetoric and communication, for the NRP is finding its way into the citations of social and natural scientists, as these and other scholars transcend disciplinary boundaries.

Salazar has noted that "most of current French writing in rhetoric and philosophy, or philosophy and rhetoric, is unavailable in English". In the case of the NRP, this need for English translations of articles associated with the project was felt as early as 1963, when the first of four collections of NRP articles appeared in English. Despite the publication of these collections in English, misunderstandings of the key ideas of the NRP were common enough for Perelman himself to point them out. The translation of key articles that witness the origins and development of the NRP in this volume may respond to a particularly Anglo-American scholarly demand; furthermore, it is also a thematic well established in Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca's methodology. That is, as one of us has argued elsewhere, translation is an important feature of the New Rhetoric Project and was of specific interest to its authors.

Few scholars of rhetoric at the time, or today, would imagine that Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca were active as translators: Perelman was a logician and philosopher, and Olbrechts-Tyteca had a background in statistics and sociology. Translation was nevertheless an important facet of their scholarly work. It may be that Perelman's and Olbrechts-Tyteca's sensitivity to issues of translation

was a natural outcome of their multilingual background and their European—specifically, Belgian—context. Perelman, who was born in Poland and emigrated to Belgium as a teenager, spoke numerous languages, including Polish, Yiddish, French, Flemish, German, Italian, and English. We know that Olbrechts-Tyteca read widely in French, German, Italian, and Spanish, and unlike in the Traité, she chose to quote directly from foreign sources in the original in her Comique du discours.

In any case, both Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca were very involved in the translation of the works of the NRP. Perelman's correspondence shows him actively seeking to have translations made of his work into numerous languages, including German, Italian, English, Flemish, Japanese, Romanian, and Hebrew. Even one of the very last letters Perelman wrote, some five days before his death, was to Masashi Miwa, in hope that his "Logique juridique" would appear in Japanese. Perelman not only corresponded directly with his translators, offering to be a resource for their practice of translating his work, but he also actively assessed the quality of their translations (see Perelman, letters to Schick; Mayer [October]; Richtscheid; Krawietz). He even corrected the translations of his works, particularly those in German, Italian, and English; in a letter to Norberto Bobbio, for example, we find Perelman suggesting how to translate into Italian a particularly difficult French term. Olbrechts-Tyteca's role in translation was much more hands-on: on at least one occasion, she served as a translator from Italian for Perelman.52 She also ensured the quality of the Italian translation of their Traité, of which Perelman describes her as the primary reader and editor (Perelman, letter to Mayer [December]). Translation was thus at the forefront of their efforts to disseminate their new rhetoric.

While translation is an integral, if unacknowledged, facet of philosophical activity in general, it was for Perelman a matter of the utmost importance, and he publicly raised the issue of the importance of the translation of philosophy for the discipline at the report on the Commission of Translators, given at the General Assembly of the International Institute of Philosophy held in L'Aquila, Italy in September 1964. Translation was even a feature of Perelman's pedagogy at the ULB: in 1965 Perelman proposed replacing courses focusing on the translation of Greek and Latin authors with courses exploring the translation of Greek and Latin philosophical terms.

Translation also served to foster intellectual bonds with other scholars, as is witnessed by A. J. Ayer's personal investment in the translation and publication of Perelman's The Idea of Justice and the Problem of Arguments. Perelman's intellectual allies—A. J. Ayer, Norberto Bobbio, and Richard McKeon, among others—played a very active role in the translation of his works. Even Henry Johnstone, who eventually repudiated Perelman, translated Perelman's "Rhétorique et philosophie", which appeared in English before its publication in French.

The topos of translatio also figures prominently in the NRP. The Latin etymological source for the word "translation" in English, translatio, describes a transfer, especially of learning, in space and time. It is key to understanding the origins of the NRP in Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca's rhetorical 'turn.'

Translatio is particularly effective for describing how Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca come to envisage rhetoric as a means of providing a logic of value judgments.57 That is, in retrospective accounts of their turn to rhetoric, Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca alike name Jean Paulhan's translation of Brunetto Latini's translation/adaptation of Cicero's De inventione as instrumental in their rhetorical turn.

As Bolduc has written elsewhere, both Olbrechts-Tyteca and Perelman tell the story of how their reading led them to trace in reverse order the transfer of knowledge from classical philosophers (Cicero and Aristotle), to a medieval notary and author (Brunetto Latini), to a contemporary literary critic (Jean Paulhan). In their retrospective accounts of how they discovered rhetoric, they establish a modern version of the medieval trope of translatio studii et imperii, the complex notion referring to the transfer of the classical learning and power of Athens and Rome to Paris. In other words, Olbrechts-Tyteca and Perelman describe Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca's stories of the origins of their work emphasize how translation—both in theory and in practical application—allowed them, through Latini's and Paulhan's studies and translations of rhetoric, to rediscover rhetoric.

Guiding Principles of Translation

We would like to set out here some of the principles guiding our edition and translation.

First, we observe the notions of accuracy, adequacy, appropriateness, consistency, and explicitness that underlie the overarching principle of reliability espoused by the MLA Guidelines for Editors of Scholars Editions. Second, we adhere to the best practices of translation as detailed not only in ISO 17100:2015 but also in the Code of Ethics of the American Translator's Association [ATA], the Code of Professional Conduct of the Chartered Institute of Linguists [CIOL], and the Charter of the International Federation of Translators [FIT].

Translation, the aim of which is frequently supposed to be a clear, unambiguous rendering of ideas from one language to another, is confronted here, as in philosophy generally, with the enigmatic nature of its philosophical subject matter.

Further complicating our translation activity is the fact that the articles we include here span a nearly 30-year period in which Perelman develops not only his ideas but also his scholarly ethos, which is manifest in his style of writing. The earliest article here, "De l'arbitraire dans la connaissance", shows Perelman as a young 21-year-old scholar, his style indirect and his ideas at times oblique, a reflection of how a youthful Perelman is still working out a way to chart a new path that diverges from that of his mentors. From the elliptical prose of "De l'arbitraire", Perelman quickly establishes his scholarly voice. In his later writings, then, his style follows that of a standard academic model, in which he systematically develops his ideas and relies upon the convention of an abstract, neutral voice.

Perelman's style of writing changes not only over time, but also in response to a particular article's subject matter and the context in which it was composed. When writing about philosophical questions, Perelman adopts a decidedly analytical methodology (and this, even as he refashions the very principles of analytical philosophy). He uses the language and processes of formal logical analysis (and especially deduction), his sentences often marked by a plethora of secondary clauses and the use of the impersonal, passive voice. On the other hand, when he writes in collaboration with Olbrechts-Tyteca, we find a disciplinary expansion beyond philosophy: in addition to references to philosophers such as Aristotle and Kant, references to literary authors and quotations in the original language are common.

For topics that hold personal resonance—assimilation and the Jewish question—Perelman's style of writing is particularly striking, revealing a literary and poetic style filled with undisguised emotion. Our translations here aim to retain the linguistic and affective valences of Perelman's style of writing. We have also chosen to retain the original French titles of the articles translated here in our references to them in the commentaries, so as to remind the reader not only of our translational practice, but also of the linguistic and cultural alterity of the originals. For this same reason, in our notes to the translations, we endeavor to provide the most likely French sources of Perelman's and Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca's references, even when his citations are incomplete. Even if this means that we must speculate based on our knowledge of the most significant editions available in the years immediately preceding the publication of the article in question, we aim to remind the reader that Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca were not reading in English (or at least, only at times). By not smoothing over this alterity, or the gaps, of the originals, our translation takes to heart the notion that the principal work of philosophers and translators alike is the search for meaning.

We also recognize that any translation is fundamentally interpretive: George Steiner has cautioned translators not to forget that Aristotle's hermenia, or a discourse that signifies because it interprets, is inherent to translation.62 As translators, we aim not to do away entirely with the ambiguity of the NRP, but rather to provide readers with a scholarly apparatus for making better sense of the ideas proposed in these articles. As a result, we provide explanatory interpretive material both in brackets (especially terms in the original French) and in translators' notes, which appear in italics as a part of the footnotes to distinguish them from the original footnotes. We add translators' notes even to translations of articles previously published without notes ("Philosophies premières et philosophie régressive"; "De la temporalité comme caractère de l'argumentation"), although to a lesser extent than to the initial translation presented here, "De l'arbitraire". These notes intend to elucidate the meaning of Perelman's ideas and the intellectual context in which they should be read, serving as a gloss to Perelman's writing. They effect Kwame Anthony Appiah's practice of "thick translation", which prescribes providing readers of the target text with the cultural (and here, philosophical and intellectual) information necessary for "a thick and situated understanding" of the NRP. Please be

aware that we have chosen to fill out Perelman's own footnotes, which are often abbreviated in form, and have made any necessary corrections to them.

The commentaries and translations we offer here are meant to excavate the intellectual origins and chart the trajectories of the NRP. Our goal is to nest the translations in commentaries that help explain the problems Perelman alone and then in collaboration with Olbrechts-Tyteca faced and addressed. We seek to give cultural texture to the ideas they set forth as they are responses to the twentieth-century crisis of reason and the Jewish question.

Six New Insights on the Origins and Meaning of the New Rhetoric Project

Perelman's Intellectual Journey to the NRP is an Evolution rather than a Conversion

From the beginning of his intellectual journey, Perelman resisted the overreach of logical positivism and sought to extend reason into human time as a vehicle to cultivate social tolerance. Perelman identifies a clear break in his thinking that took place after World War II. Before the war, he portrayed himself as a logical empiricist in despair about the possibility that reason could help make value judgments or enter human time. After the war, Perelman reports, he had a "revelation" when he read Latini's translation of Cicero and made his "rhetorical turn". This story, dramatic as it is, is not supported by our translations and commentary.

Our translation and commentary on Perelman's first major article (1933) reveal that his agenda from the start was to embrace the commitment to reason made by the logical positivists in the 1920s, to critique their definition of reason as overly narrow, and to seek an expansion of reason into societal affairs. The logical positivism movement of the 1920s was responding to the deep traumas of World War I, which many adherents traced to the disease of emotional-based nationalism, superstition, and the irrational. Their response was to develop an expression of reason and rationality that would lift human deliberation and judgment out of the human community into the realm of mathematics, geometry, and the impartial.

Over the course of his scholarly career, Perelman worked through the traumas of World War I, World War II, the Holocaust, and the founding of Israel by fetching out of human reason a rhetorically inflected nonformal logic intended to create the conditions necessary for social tolerance. This aspiration is crystal clear in the agenda he established in a brief 1931 article on the need for a logic of values. The logical positivists of the 1920s had declared them meaningless. The translation of and commentary on his 1933 article that we have included here corroborates our claim that Perelman, from the start, resisted the limitations placed on reason by the logical positivists and, as we have

observed, was at work creating concepts in his early work that he and Olbrechts-Tyteca would later populate with a rhetorical vocabulary.

Our characterization challenges as much Perelman's description of his intellectual journey as it does the story told in the secondary literature of Perelman as a despairing logical positivist in the pre-World War II setting who had a conversion to rhetoric after the war. That story is more dramatic than the one we tell, which is based on our close readings of his articles of the 1930s and 1940s, and yet we recognize that it was precisely the dramatic nature of this conversion narrative that served him so well in his efforts to promote the NRP. In the end, we believe that Perelman's intellectual evolution provides a splendid illustration of a thinker engaged in serial episodes of the process of dissociating concepts, a process Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca describe in Part Three, sections three and four of the Traité.

2 Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca's NRP is an Answer to the Jewish Question

The fact that Perelman was a Jew born in Poland, faced antisemitism, led the Belgian Jewish underground against the Nazi occupiers, supported the state of Israel, and was a loyal citizen of Belgium influenced his views on philosophy and rhetoric. We draw significantly from the historian of philosophy Christian Delacampagne's position that the philosophies of the twentieth century do not fall, immaculate, from the air; they are functions of the century's traumas.3 Among the most important and consequential twentieth-century traumas, Delacampagne writes, was the Jewish question and the answer offered by eliminationist antisemitism, the Holocaust. This trauma, and the efforts necessary to work through its meaning, has a universal importance beyond the horrific murder of six million European Jews. Antisemitism generally, and the Holocaust in particular, reflect a mindset and system of discourse that mutate and destroy the possibility of human community. Delacampagne found within the Jewish tragedy a crisis of reason—why did Enlightenment values and Western culture's commitment to reason fail so spectacularly during the twentieth century?

Perelman alone and in collaboration answered by recovering a new rhetoric that would allow human communities to embrace pluralism, democracy, and the use of the argumentative method to deliberate in value disagreements. As our commentaries and translations of Perelman's writings on the Jewish question reveal, Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca witnessed, resisted, and then sought by means of the NRP to work through the trauma of the Holocaust.

Scholars of rhetoric and rhetorical theory, who are quite skilled at a kind of contextual analysis that assumes that discourse is a response to a perceived exigence, often fail to place rhetorical theory itself and Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca's NRP in their respective culture and time. They view the NRP as a treasure chest of rhetorical tools, and do not reflect on the intent of Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca's endeavor to develop, over a 10-year period, what is a cornucopia of argumentative strategies. Their NRP was designed to inoculate against totalitarian and antisemitic impulses with the vaccine of

philosophical pluralism, to strengthen and sponsor the common values necessary for just action with a reformulated epideictic, and to foster the use of the argumentative method and nonformal logic to equip advocates with the skills needed to judge well. Perelman recognized that these values and tools were available, but underdeveloped, in both the Western Classical and Jewish traditions.

3 The New Rhetoric Project is a Regressive Philosophy that hosts a Pluralistic Ontology, Axiology, and Epistemology, turning on Bergson's "durée"

Between 1931 and 1947 Perelman alone, and then between 1947 and 1958 in his collaboration with Olbrechts-Tyteca, developed the philosophical anchors for the Traité. Our translations and commentaries reveal the development of the NRP's philosophical anchors. The sources of these anchors can be traced to his mentors Dupréel and Barzin, the Lwów–Warsaw school of logic, Gödel's antimonies, Frege's mathematical logic, and the works of Gonseth and McKeon. His path to rhetoric begins with Paulhan's translation of Latini's Trésor, prompting his return to Plato, Aristotle, Quintilian, and, eventually, Vico.

By 1958, Perelman was clear that he found the essential foundations of Western thought problematic, because these foundations were, he held, advanced by the first philosophies of Plato, Aristotle, and the classical tradition.6 Perelman's complaint centered on the ontology, axiology, and epistemology of first philosophies. In short, the shortcomings in logical positivism that Perelman identified in his 1933 essay on the arbitrary in knowledge had their origins in ancient Greek philosophy, which, he argued, sought the eternal rather than the temporal, contemplation rather than action, and saw first principles as ruling minor premises. After World War II, Perelman drew from philosophical traditions within Western culture, Jewish and non-Jewish alike, that aspired to bring into alignment the eternal and temporal, contemplation and action, and a reasoning that was not required to obey first principles.

The most complete expression of Perelman's philosophy is found in our commentaries and translations of his 1949 article "Philosophies premières et philosophie régressive" and his 1950 collaborative article with Olbrechts- Tyteca that, as its name implies, attempted a rapprochement between logic and rhetoric. Perelman's essay devoted to his understanding of a regressive philosophy sets forth a direct response to the limitations of first philosophies and those of logical positivism without abandoning the promise of reason to irrationalism. A regressive philosophy, Perelman maintains, is reflexive, adaptive, and learns from experience. It sponsors a view of ontology, epistemology, and axiology that is pluralistic, and located in human time. This article sets up the rapprochement Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca seek to accomplish in this 1950 article, "Logique et rhétorique".

4 Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca attempt the first full rapprochement between Logic (Reason) and Rhetoric in the Twentieth Century

We do not believe it is a coincidence, as do some scholars, that several works appeared in 1958 that either turned to rhetoric as an answer to the post-World War II crisis of reason or sought to display more humane and pluralistic expression of rationality. Walter Ong, in 1958, published his monumental book on Peter Ramus. Perelman, as we noted, would later draw from Ong's research the claim that it was Peter Ramus who was responsible for the explicit division between logic (which he defined as the realm of reason) and rhetoric (the realm of tropes and eloquence). While Ong's biography of Ramus details how he affected the divide between logic and rhetoric, Ong does not concern himself with attempting to effect a rapprochement between the two.

Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca do concern themselves with this rapprochement, one designed to achieve a realignment rather than the conflation commonly criticized in the secondary literature. They make explicit in the first pages of the Traité that they want to place reason and rhetoric into better relationship, that they view a reason limited to the eternal and abstract as sterile with no possibility of action, and that a rhetoric without a foundation in reason is dangerous. Their rapprochement has its critics. Some of the criticism is a function of poor translations; other criticism is the result of Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca's failure to define key terms carefully. Other critics, in our judgment, suffer from what Bloom termed the "anxiety of influence" in their attempt to overthrow Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca's NRP as the prominent rhetoric in the Western world.

5 Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca address the postwar Crisis of Reason with a rhetorically inflected definition of Reason

The rapprochement between reason and rhetoric Perelman and Olbrechts- Tyteca try to effect required both a redefinition of the received understanding of reason and a rescue of rhetoric from the realm of tropes and eloquence. In bringing reason and rhetoric into better alignment, Perelman understood that the role of time in a definition of reason was critical. If reason in a first philosophy seeks the eternal and timeless truths in moments of quiet, motionless contemplation, then it cannot dwell in the marketplace, deal with the ephemeral, or inform human action, a critique Hannah Arendt offers in her 1958 The Human Condition.

Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca redefine reason to include expressions of reason that deal with lived time, what Henri Bergson, who plays a major and yet unappreciated role in the NRP, called "la durée". The translation and commentary we offer of Perelman's essay on the role of time in knowledge is an attempt to broaden the range of reason to include human and lived time, and is the first modestly extended discussion of the universal audience. Although Perelman does condemn the overuse and misuse of apodictic reasoning, we do not find in his body of work a call to eliminate formal logic, only a proposal that the place of formal logic lies within the search for immutable truths.

On the other hand, a rhetorically inflected definition of reason, Perelman held, would produce mutable, reflexive, and regressive knowledge products, open to revision, change, repair and, if necessary, rejection if the evidence justified such a move. The key variable that distinguishes a formal logic, which seeks eternal truths, from a nonformal logic located in an unfolding and sometimes chaotic reality, is time. Formal reason does not concern itself with time; nonformal reason is hitched to what Bergson defined as the "la durée", the human experience of time.

Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, in the final commentary and translation we include in this volume, dedicate an extended article to the relationship between time and argument.

This relationship (human time and argument) is the Ariadne's thread in the NRP. The complaint Perelman makes about classical philosophy and logical positivism is that they do not allow reason to enter the world of the human, the courthouse and the marketplace, because they hold reason hostage within timeless realms of contemplation and the abstract. Reason belongs in the world of lived time, they argue, requiring readers to understand that their treatise (and they highlight this by placing it in italics) "constitutes a break with the concept of reason and reasoning due to Descartes …"

6 Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca offer Rhetorical Reasoning in Human Time and the Argumentative Method as an answer to the Twentieth Century's Crises of Reason

We believe three articles in this volume best capture the trajectories of Perelman's intellectual trajectory and that of his collaboration with Olbrechts- Tyteca: Perelman's 1949 "Philosophies premières et philosophie regressive", Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca's 1950 "Logique et rhétorique", and their 1958 "De la temporalité comme caractère de l'argumentation". The first creates the philosophical justification of the NRP, marking Perelman's 18-year effort remain within the realm of reason but to expand it beyond the boundaries set by the first philosophies of classical philosophers and those enforced by the logical positivists. The second is the blueprint of a new rhetoric that affects a rapprochement between reason and rhetoric. The third, which is the last commentary and translation in this volume, describes how this rapprochement between reason and rhetoric works in their NRP.

In "De la temporalité comme caractère de l'argumentation", Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca develop a theory of reason marked by temporality: human reasoning takes place in lived time in concert with, and through, argumentation, a thesis recently developed by Mercier and Sperber, among others.12 Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca held that formal logic was unaffected by the passage of time. In contrast, the problems humans face invite communal deliberation and require an expression of reason that is yoked to its social context and to time. It is here that their rapprochement between reason and rhetoric becomes concrete.

"De la temporalité" helps to explain the two steps that Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca take to bring rhetoric into alignment with reason in the first pages of the Traité. First, the audience, rather than systems of timeless and abstract systems of rationality, becomes the focus of reason. How audiences and humans reason is thus primary. Second, social argumentation becomes the method of testing values and facts for their truth claims. Because audiences reason in human time and may disagree, argumentation is the method of using reason to make judgments about disagreements.

We believe "De la temporalité" outlines a sophisticated vision of rhetorical reason. Indeed, it may very well be a vision that captures something essential and timeless about human nature. We make this observation understanding its paradoxical implications, given Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca's critique of formal logic's take on time. The NRP, we believe, remains the best site for the development of truly cosmopolitan theories of rhetoric, argumentation, and civil society.

We hope, in a second phase of our project, to provide translations of and commentaries on articles Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca that were published between 1958 and 1983. These demonstrate how nonformal reason and rhetorical argumentation may be applied in various domains, ranging from judicial decisions to medical ethics.

A Hermeneutics of Contemplative Silence: Paul Ricoeur, Edith Stein, and the Heart of Meaning by Michele Kueter Petersen [Studies in the Thought of Paul Ricoeur, Lexington Books, 9781793640000]

A Hermeneutics of Contemplative Silence: Paul Ricoeur, Edith Stein, and the Heart of Meaning brings together the work of Paul Ricoeur and Edith Stein and locates the role of silence in the creation of meaning. Michele Kueter Petersen argues that human being is language and silence. Contemplative silence manifests a mode of capable human being whereby a shared world of meaning is constituted and created. The analysis culminates with the claim that a hermeneutics of contemplative silence manifests a deeper level of awareness as a poetics of presencing a shared humanity. The term "awareness" refers to five crucial levels of meaning-creating consciousness that are ingredients in the practice of contemplative silence. Contemplative awareness includes self-critique as integral to the experience and the understanding of the virtuous ordering of relational realities. The practice of contemplative silence is a spiritual and ethical activity that aims at transforming reflexive consciousness. Inasmuch as it leads to openness to new motivation and intention for acting in relation to others, contemplative awareness elicits movement through the ongoing exercise of rethinking those relational realities in and for the world. The texts of Ricoeur and Stein reveal a contemplative discourse of praise and beauty for capable human beings whose actions and suffering respond to word and silence.

Reviews

"In an age marked by increasing hostility to 'the other,' Prof. Michele Kueter Petersen offers a timely and engaging thought experiment concerning the importance of 'contemplative silence' in terms of thinking reflectively about being while also thinking creatively about one's self and one's relationship to others and to the larger world. Paul Ricoeur and Edith Stein, two brilliant phenomenologists of the twentieth century whose lives were indelibly marked by the suffering of two world wars, help Prof. Petersen guide the reader through an analysis of various contemporary philosophical issues impacted by dialectic and hermeneutics, empathy and difference, institutional conflicts and personal–social transformation."
— Michael F. Andrews, Loyola University Chicago

Stein's profound intellectual and spiritual integrity are gifts shaped by her Jewish heritage, her contemplative heart, her dynamic intellect, her newfound Christian faith lived as Carmelite nun known as Teresa Benedicta of the Cross. Finally, this Carmelite martyred at Auschwitz was shaped by her understanding and practice of contemplative silence. **— Keith J. Egan, Adjunct Professor of Theology, University of Notre Dame**

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A Poetic Presence

The primary task of this study is to develop a hermeneutics of the religious phenomenon of contemplative silence that is in conversation with the philosophical hermeneutical theory of Ricoeur. As part of that endeavor, I want to locate the role of silence in the creation of meaning. I also engage the work of Stein with the objective to illuminate the significance of her texts for contemporary philosophical and theological inquiry, especially given her lifelong philosophical interest in the relation between individual uniqueness and a shared humanity, and between person and community.' Further, in addition to her concern with meaning, Stein is a practitioner of contemplative silence. The practice of contemplative silence is not merely a theoretical phenomenon.

Contemplative silence does not exist except as it is embodied in the activity of contemplating silence—an activity that is also the mode of being it intends to achieve. I therefore will approach the phenomenon of contemplative silence as a practice that produces the end that it seeks. It has also the nature of an ethical activity since it is a practical mode of being. The practice of contemplative silence, in its manifestation as a mode of capable being, is a self-consciously spiritual and ethical activity that aims at a transformation of reflexive consciousness.

My goal is to engage in a constructive analysis and a creative interpretation of contemplative silence in which I assert that contemplative silence manifests a mode of capable being in which I have an awareness of the awareness of the awareness of being with being whereby I can constitute and create a shared world of meaning(s) through poetically presencing my being as being with others. The doubling and tripling of the term "awareness" refers to five contextual levels of contemplative awareness, which include (1) immediate self-awareness, (2) immediate objective awareness, (3) reflective awareness, (4) reflexive awareness, and (5) contemplative awareness. I will analyze all five levels and make the case that contemplative silence manifests a mode of capable being, one which creates the condition of the possibility for contemplative awareness. Contemplative awareness includes both an experience and an understanding of the virtuous ordering of my relational realities. My claim is that contemplative awareness can and should accompany the practice of contemplative silence in order to appropriate the meaning of a silence embodied in the here and now, through the hermeneutical endeavor. Contemplative awareness elicits movement in thinking and involves the ongoing exercise of rethinking those relational realities in and for the world. The continuous movement of rethinking my relational realities—including the relation to God (theology) and the idea of God (philosophy)—is itself integral to ethical action, insofar as I am thereby open to new motivations and intentions for acting in relation to other human beings. In appropriating contemplative silence, there is the actualizable possibility to live as a transformed human being.

In considering the purpose of this study, on the one hand, a theoretical description of a phenomenological/hermeneutical mode of being bears upon how the practice of contemplative silence is possible. On the other hand, there is the history of texts that give witness to that practice. They can be considered primordial texts in giving a description of the practice. They are an image around which I can constellate the practice. They also give principles of the practice itself through the itinerary of the threefold path, or the three ways—the purgative, illuminative, and unitive. The three ways denotes the fundamental structure that religious writers through the ages have used to articulate the experience of contemplative silence in marking the passage of spiritual growth. The texts have a descriptive and an expressive quality to them that invites participation in their multi-leveled meanings. Ricoeur's philosophy enables reflection on the condition of the possibility of the practice. At times, his work is a reflexive consciousness in a theoretical mode. Thus, I will deal with both sides—how to talk about a tradition with a practice, and textual instruction, together with Ricoeur,

whose work allows me to explain both the role of silence in the creation of meaning and the practice itself.

There are a few provocative questions that animate this study: First, how best can one live with, in, and even through the conflict of interpretations? Second, in the light of intersectionality, what are some ways in which one can work for transformative change at personal, communal, and sociocultural levels, simultaneously and therefore at times paradoxically, both within and outside of institutions that perpetuate systemic injustice? Third, is it possible to expansively, generously account for faith tradition belonging and acknowledge the fluidity of relational reality without being reductive (reducing the question solely to identity or a litmus test for orthodoxy), or closed-minded (refusing to consider the question a legitimate one), while avoiding religious syncretism? That is, how best to account for the figure of Edith Stein in terms of the study of philosophy of religion?

One final note before proceeding: For the seasoned scholar of Ricoeur, the initial chapters provide the reader with an opportunity to ponder the profundity of his thought as I rehearse his philosophical anthropology and his hermeneutical philosophy, albeit with a subtle difference in that eventually I insert the notion of silence where appropriate as I begin to build my argument. For the new reader of Ricoeur, my aim is to capture the different frames of his seminal texts and the moving, shifting horizons of his rich explorations as he writes a portrait of the acting and suffering human in the world. Any finality to this expressive portrait is continually elusive in his concern with the mystery and meaning of human being.

A Brief Overview of The Study

I present a conceptual framework that opens to hermeneutics, and a way to think about ongoing appropriation of a mode of capable being as continual growth in the human capacity to make, unfold, discover, and carry meaning.' I want to note that capacity is Ricoeur's central concept. Also, there is reflexivity to the structure, because a study of the practice is an exemplification of the practice, which produces the very practice that it is talking about.

In Chapters 1-3, I address the question, How is the practice possible? In order to respond to this question, I turn to the work of Ricoeur. Everything contained in those chapters, or Steps 1-6 of my argument, lays the groundwork for providing a context within which to situate the practice of contemplative silence. The context is theoretically determined in terms of fallibility and capability within the basic capacity of fallible existence.

The context is religiously determined in terms of the purgative, the illuminative, and the unitive ways, or the path to transformative spiritual and ethical maturity according to the Christian tradition. The purpose of Chapter 4 is to introduce a succinct historical discussion of the threefold path. A historical context is therefore established in addition to a hermeneutical and phenomenological context for the

practice of contemplative silence. A description of the practice is presented in this chapter by focusing on material about the practice dating from Origen and extending into the twentieth century with Edith Stein and Thomas Merton. This highly selective exposition also includes a short discussion of negative theology and self-reflective critique. And whereas in Chapter 4, both John of the Cross and Stein are contextualized and assume their place within the Christian contemplative tradition, Chapter 5 is dedicated to the life and work of Stein in order to show her in continuity with the Carmelite tradition. John of the Cross is privileged in that it is his work that Stein interprets and interpolates—and which enables her to build on the tradition. She does so in language that resonates with contemporary existence. I then proceed to an analysis of the practice of contemplative silence—that includes Step 7 of the argument—and the philosophical thinking that grounds the five levels of awareness in Chapter 6, engaging the texts of Ricoeur and Stein for the most part, but of other thinkers as necessary.

In Chapter 7, I ask and address the following questions: (1) What does the practice mean? The meaning is the intended transformation. And, are those transformations real? This is where texts are brought in that exemplify those transformations. How so? First, given Ricoeur's notion of the semantic autonomy of the text, it transcends the author's finite horizon; and, the meaning of the text now is considered more important than what the author meant in the event of writing it. Second, discourse carries dual meaning: Meaning is objective in that in the textual sentence a noun-verb conjunction yields an utterance meaning; meaning can be considered subjective insofar as it has to do with what it is the speaker intends to utter, or an utterer's meaning.' In contrast to spoken discourse, textual discourse is different, however, in that insofar as a reader responds to a text, the text can be regarded as a subjectivity that takes the place of the speaker's subjectivity.' These texts are capable of uttering then, and are capable of the transformed consciousness that I refer to in previous chapters. (2) Does it, i.e., the transformed consciousness exist? So far I have only said that it is possible. Work is carried out that articulates the transformation that is being discussed. Textual evidence for transformations are brought to bear. A case is made for the possibility of transformation, and the interpretive part shows how the transformations have been actualized using the language of the Carmelite tradition. The creative imagination is brought to bear, but it is unitive through and through. The transformation of reflexive consciousness, as well as what happens to the summoned subject, are interpreted in each of the final three steps of the argument, Steps 8 and 9, which span Chapter 7, and then, Step 10, in Chapter 8, points the way forward.

An Outline of The Study

The opening chapter lays out the philosophical anthropology of Ricoeur, taken primarily from the work, Fallible Man. His thought and anthropological model provide the best conceptual framework and structure, as well as the origin point for a hermeneutics of contemplative silence, despite the fact that Ricoeur rarely, if ever, discusses silence. Human being is a mediating being between the finite

and the infinite, but these mediations are partial, and so, a fallible human being. Language is the medium of the fragile mediations between receiving and acting in the world. This is the articulation of the possibility of human being.

Chapter 2 explains the move from reflective philosophy to hermeneutics, Ricoeur's change in method. The concept of fallibility, the relationship between freedom and evil, and Ricoeur's work on a hermeneutics of symbol serve as focal points. To consider human being fallible is to say that the noncoincidence of human being to itself is a primordial weakness that can give rise to evil. The evil arising in its being posited leads to a symbolics of evil: "The symbol gives rise to thought."' Through the giving of the symbol, the circumstances arise to be able to engage in thought. Thought is confined, and yet free, as the immediacy of the symbol and thought are held together with hermeneutics. The mixture of original affirmation and existential difference increasingly appears as a "fault." The fault affirms as well as negates in "the Joy of Yes in the sadness of the finite." The activity of mediating outside reality results in a fragile mediation.

Through the exercise of human freedom, evil is made manifest only if it is recognized as such.' That I am fallible and capable of failing is due to my weakness—the limitation from which my capacity for evil derives; this is so only in positing it. Evil is the source of actualized self-awareness in language and confession of responsibility, as well as the occasion for the human search for redemption. With Ricoeur's move to hermeneutics as a transition point, there is a shift in emphasis away from the fallible human in order to focus on the capable human.

I identify four elements in Chapter 3 that contribute to what it is to be capable human for purposes of this study. Further, the basic capacity of fallible existence "needs the 'how much more' of superabundance" in the ever-present struggle with dysfunction and error, and fault and evil, so that constitutive goodness can be liberated." This mediating work involves the reform of attitudes, motivations, intentions, and patterns of acting with regard to human being's life and world. Ricoeur's second naiveté is a critical and interpreted immediacy, which includes his "hope for a re-creation of language." His interest in hermeneutics is a qualitative one of depth that aims at transforming reflexive consciousness. He explains that the disclosure of a new mode of being gives the interpreter a new way of understanding herself. Acknowledging his debt to Kant's work, especially Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason, Ricoeur unequivocally affirms goodness as originary, a constitutive part of the ontological structure of the human person. I want to emphasize this point about his work, a point that cannot be overstated. He also says that "there is a hermeneutics of daily life that gives introspection the dimension of an interpersonal practice." While admitting of interpersonal dimensions to this inner space, there is still the dialogue of the soul with itself articulated using the phrase "for interieur, one's heart of hearts—literally a 'forum' in which one speaks to oneself"—a deep interiority with its own particular standing that eludes scientific knowledge.

An explanation of Ricoeur's hermeneutical theory is foundational here: Expression as the thought and experience of human being is at the center of this discussion of the nature of discourse as it appears in the mediating function of language. However, a discussion of discourse is incomplete without an explanation of the relation of silence to discourse. Here, I turn to the phenomenological analysis of Bernard P. Dauenhauer to elucidate this relation. Ultimately, I build upon his work with the insertion of contemplative silence into it, and I bring that to the fore. Ricoeur's move to hermeneutics, discussion of expression and discourse as developed in his text, Interpretation Theory, and the relation of silence to discourse, which builds on the work of Dauenhauer, provide three of the four key elements that contribute to an explanation of what it is to be capable human.

The fourth key element is the hermeneutical self, derived primarily from Ricoeur's text, Oneself as Another. There are two aspects that comprise personal identity in that work, "idem-identity" and "ipse-identity." It is possible both to create a moving, meditative image of reflexivity, in which one thinks about thinking, and to portray it as a moral space. He presents a dynamic of thinking that is always already open to the ongoing reality of human becoming and that constitutively forms the self through the movement of reflexivity. The human person is thought through "composition," rather than directly, as Ricoeur employs "the dialectic of original affirmation and existential difference." In the dialectical reflexivity between self and self as other on the one hand, and between self and other on the other hand, interiority is cultivated as reflexivity creates depth. The hermeneutical self has a narrative identity that is expressed in the question, "Who am I?" The hermeneutical self has the capacity to speak, to act, to tell a story, and to be imputed. These capacities are moral powers. The hermeneutical self has, too, a moral identity that is expressed in the statement, "Here I am!" Finally, the hermeneutical self has, I assert, an aesthetic identity insofar as the self understands the relation between silence and discourse. With these aspects of selfhood in place, the chapter closes with a discussion of the notion of recognition. Recognition is critical to an understanding of the event of transformation.

Chapter 4 deals with the practice of contemplative silence as a historical phenomenon and culls out of texts an image of contemplative silence and its fundamental principles and specifies this tradition as one of practice—that there is textual testimony or avowal to the practice which tells what the practice of contemplative silence is. Chapter 5 contextualizes the work of Stein within the long and rich tradition of Carmelite spirituality in order to bring out what Stein has in common with the other Carmelites. In Chapter 6, an examination of the five levels of consciousness that comprise the phenomenon of the practice of contemplative silence round out and complete discussion of the capable human. This discussion will position me so that I can eventually interpret the meaning of capable human.

It is essential to note at the outset of the study that silence is less an act of fleeing the world and more a focus for life and action (while also acknowledging that harmful action, for example, in the form of crimes against humanity have been perpetrated throughout human history, sometimes under the guise of, and in, complicit silence). Hermeneutical activity assumes the quality of an ethical action, emerging beyond the confines of formal thinking. Moreover, there must be knowledge of the five levels of awareness ingredient in the phenomenon itself as potentialities in order to understand the transformation involved. The first contextual level of a hermeneutics of contemplative silence is immediate self-awareness, the direct experience of the self It is the awareness that I am here—the Ito whom I ascribe actions. Immediate awareness of my own being refers both to "what is," to the manifest and present, and rather oddly to "what is" as unmanifest and absent as well.

The second contextual level of awareness is immediate objective awareness, the direct experience of the world. It is the awareness of a perceptual flow and is a conversion of sense impressions into percepts or perceptions. This is the awareness of what is not I—although it can include awareness of the self's productions. Perceptual awareness includes the imagination as well as perceptions. The flow of sense impressions is stabilized by an image en route to perception. It is awareness of the world. Ricoeur says that it is to the world that I am first directed. The body is read as an openness unto the world, so that through the body things or persons that are perceived appear. The world is a correlate to existence and immediate self-awareness.

The third contextual level of awareness is reflective awareness. With reflection, I can say what that immediate awareness is—it is awareness of objects in the world. It has to do with the formulation of proper concepts that define percepts. The concept, when joined with a percept, and expressed in the linguistic form of subject-copula-object, produces a judgment. The meaning of a judgment can be ascertained or denied. Hence the possibility of reflection on truth appears at the reflective level. The important point is that being appears in the form of a judgment in language as well as in the world as reality, in the connectedness of the universal and the particular.

The fourth contextual level is reflexive awareness. This level of awareness has to do with the truth about truth, or reflection on the temporal event of being in truth. The truth about truth brings out the temporality of being—that being is not just the awareness of being but has a temporal structure in appearing. There is consciousness of the identity and difference linking thinking and being-with, being with tended being, when I think about my acts of thinking. There is a distinction here between "being-with" (mitsein) as a mode of being, and "being with" as a gerund plus a preposition, which is awareness of time. There are strong interpretive possibilities concerning the meaning of this primary relation, in terms of both the givenness of the object and of the receptivity of the subject. The study involves an inquiry into what kind of being in the world there is at this level, and the shape and the givenness of being. I can inquire into what is manifest in the being of the temporal object; it is not just

a placeholder but a "being-with" that has to be brought out. The temporal object has a meaning—namely a meaning of being. Its meaning reciprocally determines the meaning of my being, and so it discloses a mode of being. Hermeneutics enters into discussion at this point. The activity of methodically grasping and responding to symbols is interpretation. Discussion is extended to objects not only grasped intellectually, but also to symbols, language (such as the word-event), and anything that appears with power and meaning.

The fifth contextual level of a hermeneutics of contemplative silence is contemplative awareness, a transformation of reflexive consciousness, which culminates in the idea of the summoned subject with contemplative awareness. Contemplative awareness includes negation, absence, and presence, in addition to discourse and silence. With the consideration of the practice of contemplative silence and the five contextual levels of awareness, I have all of the essential elements in place in order to understand the meaning of capable human.

Transformation is interpreted in the final two chapters of the study. In Chapter 7, the transformation entailed includes metaphor and overturning in Ricoeur. First, I reinterpret Ricoeur's four "I can's" in terms of the practice of contemplative silence as a transformative spiritual and ethical activity. Second, I interpret texts of the Carmelite tradition—specifically those of John of the Cross—to elucidate transformation as contemplative action. The activities of contemplative awareness have to do with carrying out ordinary daily life with a heightened degree of awareness. Authentic life is seeing the unity of opposites which through the very seeing is to transcend them; this is the unitive way. In the ongoing practice of contemplative silence, there is further deepening and understanding of the meaning of capable human.

The manifestation of this mode of capable being is considered a creative way of being on the way, that is, a way of poetically presencing our humanness in conscious solidarity with all of humanity. The summoned self is the unitive way. The theory of discourse couples with the capable self who is capable of being summoned and responding. There is an opening onto a mode of capable being that is summoned to ongoing response to the Word in silence. The awareness of absolute poverty and dependence along with ardent desire together correspond to the awareness of the greatness of the Word and the inability of adequate response. In humble acceptance of finitude, there is joy and gratitude for the grace of the silence of the Word.

The story moves between an understanding of finite freedom and human fallibility, and infinite capacity and human capability, which ultimately gives way to a new mode of capable being. The summoned self continues to respond to the symbolic mode of capable being through ongoing mediation of fallibility (the acceptance thereof) and capability (openness to new meaning). Through the practice of contemplative silence, human being recognizes in understanding the relation between silence and language within the Word, that it has an infinite capacity to transcend itself through

ongoing transformation of reflexive consciousness. Truth claims are referred back to lived existence in the moral striving to live life with integrity and in greater depth.

In Chapter 8, the emphasis is on transformation as movement and the continuity of movement—a concern that Ricoeur has. Stein, too, attempts to show how from a hermeneutical perspective, one can experience and express an awareness of a shared humanity. Ultimately, the practice of contemplative silence manifests as an operative force for good in the world. I conclude the study by briefly proposing the contours of a third naiveté. <>

Edith Stein's Life in a Jewish Family, 1891–1916: A Companion by Joyce Avrech Berkman [Edith Stein Studies, Lexington Books, 9781666912494]

Edith Stein's Life in a Jewish Family, 1891–1916: A Companion is a treasure trove for the study of Stein's youth and early adulthood, her approach to writing autobiographically, and her intricate relationship with historical influences of her time and place. Through intellectual mining Stein's narrative and conducting a comprehensive historical analysis of Stein's achievement as a distinct type of autobiography, Joyce Avrech Berkman argues that a key axis of Stein's consciousness, values, philosophical ideas, and life choices is a deep, tense, unresolved, philosophical, and spiritual struggle to both uphold traditional societal and cultural values and practices and also critiquing them to pioneer new patterns of thought. Berkman further probes the sharply controversial nature of Stein's autobiography for her family members and Stein scholars in the decades after her death. Edith Stein's Life in a Jewish Family, 1891–1916: A Companion serves as an important guide to scholars in autobiographical studies, history, philosophy, and theology, as well as to a broader readership interested in Stein's life for religious and cultural reasons.

Review

The studies philosopher Joyce Avrech Berkman has long conducted on Edith Stein have not only left a significant mark on the scholarly community but are also a guarantee of attention to the sources. All of Berkman's interpretations of Stein are solidly grounded because they are based on Stein's own writings. This new book is yet further testimony to the author's deep knowledge of Stein's works. Readers will find the book very useful because, in her "exegesis," Berkman helps us understand how scholarly research on Edith Stein is closely connected to her life events. Indeed, the study of Stein's phenomenological activity and that of her personal vicissitudes are so intimately intertwined that one sheds light on the other. Professor Berkman is able to deal skillfully with these two aspects because of her masterful command of both, and she draws on her many years of experience and careful study of Edith Stein's works. This book will help readers approach Stein by offering new and illuminating insights. At the same time, it opens up a new pathway for thought while providing scholars a unique and compelling opportunity to revisit Stein and her philosophical contribution. **— Francesco Alfieri, Pontifical Lateran University**

The worldwide attention to Edith Stein is based on her outstanding intellect and her death in Auschwitz, which deepened and revealed her holiness. But it speaks to her character that her inner life is mostly hidden within her philosophical works. Only in the letters and in her autobiography does she allow a view into her crisis as a youth, her loves and scientific passions, and her conversion to a ripe Judeo-Christian faith. She gives testimonies of a gifted and endangered generation, of the rich life of a Jewish family before the Holocaust, and of the religious and philosophical battles of the time. This book is a document of rare intensity in searching the truth. **— Hanna-Barbara Gerl-Falkovitz, Dresden University of Technology**

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The Existence of Life

As an historian and theorist of first-person documents, as well as a student of philosophy, I find Stein's autobiographical writings a treasure trove not only for the study of Stein's singular life choices and behavior but of the historical factors, in the fullest sense, that shaped the content and style of her narrative. A close investigation of her major autobiography, Life in a Jewish Family, 1891-1916 offers striking insights into her perception of herself, her life-changing decisions, her interpersonal relationships, her moral and ethical concerns, and her philosophical development. This Companion study aspires to meet the interests of many readers of Stein's works, to experience what Stein asserted was her motive in writing biographical sketches of saints, such as that of St. Elizabeth: "to pursue what lies behind the outer facts, to feel the beat of the heart that bore such a fate and did such things, to internalize the spirit that governed her."

My focus, to be clear, is on what Stein's autobiography illuminates and not on Stein's life more generally. This study is not a biography of Stein; rather my purpose has multiple interpretive interdisciplinary dimensions. After setting forth the remarkable story of the very existence of the autobiography, summarizing major elements in each section of the autobiography, and providing historical background where useful, I intend to analyze her effort within the framework of the history of autobiography as a genre and of contemporary autobiographical theory, to examine the central concepts informing her work, to compare selected examples of the ideas and values implicit and explicit in her autobiographical text with relevant discussions in her philosophical treatises, and, finally, to treat the reception to and use of her published autobiography following her death.

Stein's autobiography, henceforth identified as Life, traces step by step her intellectual and academic evolution that climaxed in 1916 when she became the second woman in Germany to earn a doctorate in Philosophy, the doctorate enhanced further by her being awarded the rare distinction of Summa

cum Laude. Following her dissertation defense, her mentor, Edmund Husserl, whom Stein and her classmates called "the Master," the founder of Phenomenology, a philosophical movement that transformed the humanities in the twentieth century, hired Stein to serve as his Assistant, a position she initially enthusiastically fulfilled.

Stein portrays the years from her birth to this climactic triumph within the context of her family, friendships, mentors, and, more broadly, the German society and culture of her time, thereby providing exceptional fodder for historical interpretation of early twentieth-century Germany. Tellingly, Stein's Life contributes to a far fuller understanding than any other autobiography of the early years of the development of the philosophy of phenomenology and more broadly of the experience of educated youth in Germany before and during World War I. Notably, too, given the paucity of published autobiographies by German women prior to World War II, Stein's narrative carries particular value for those who seek to understand changes and continuities in German female experience, especially of Jewish women. With an historian's sensitivity (as an undergraduate at the University of Breslau Stein trained as an historian) she integrates national and European political and cultural dynamics with turning points in her life. Endowed with an artist's sensitivity, she paints vivid geographical and historical milieus—landscapes, monuments, architecture, material artifacts—supplemented with sharply etched human portraits. In sum, Stein, in Life, vivifies with luminous clarity her experiences within diverse settings of her time and place.

Stein's narrative further contributes to the vigorous field of autobiographical theory, reflective of the booming industry of autobiographical writing in the last fifty years. Analysis of self-narratives as developed since the 1970s by historians, literary and postmodern theorists, and by feminist scholars examining gender and sexuality formation and expression, and more recently by philosophers offer helpful, even if time bound in certain respects, interpretive perspectives.' A vast number of memoirs and autobiographies are available that were composed by women who fled Nazi Germany to other countries. These may be useful in understanding the lives of Stein's family members who number among these exiles, but their usefulness to an analysis of Stein's autobiography is minimal.

The outpouring, however, of autobiographical writing has transformed autobiographical studies into a broadly based intersectional examination of the interaction of the multiple forces shaping a person's identity in addition to gender, such as race, ethnicity, nationality, religion, and social class. In many ways Stein's narrative, as Chapter Two of this study probes, is a unique, fascinating, and challenging text relative to the traditions of both European male and female self-narratives.

Stein's autobiography is all the more precious because during the 1930s and early '40s German Nazis destroyed much of German Jewish society and culture. Life serves as a particularly illuminating window into a world the Nazis tried to erase. Stein's Life, in effect, flies in the face of that effort. She preserves the history of Jewish life in Breslau as well as that of a generation of young people who were

blazing new ways of thinking and being in society. Her autobiography as a Jewish woman in the Nazi era is unique in that she remained and died in Germany, while the bulk of other first-person narratives are by Holocaust survivors.

Unfortunately, between scholarship on Edith Stein's philosophical and theological works and that on her life experiences, including her first-person observations and reflections, a scholarly chasm appears, reinforced by the academic structure of separate disciplines. According to Christopher Cowley, until he published his volume of essays in 2015, we have "very little direct, theoretical and systematic interest from philosophers" concerning autobiography. Those who have focused primarily on Stein's personal experiences and life choices are usually not philosophers. Apart from a very small contingent of philosophers and some of the translators involved in the original and subsequent publications of Stein's writings, published accounts of Stein's life are generally the work of family kin and Stein-revering members of religious, predominantly Roman Catholic, communities and a growing number of feminist intellectuals. Alasdair McIntyre is among the few philosophers who interrelates to a limited extent Stein's personal life and her intellectual and philosophical development, though his work is focused primarily on the background of her conversion to Catholicism, the influence of teachers and friends, and on the differences between her phenomenology and that of her other contemporaries. Some of these biographies are stellar, but these various biographical accounts grapple minimally with Stein's philosophical writings. Too often scholars address her mind as somehow distinct from her life experience, reflecting a philosophic tradition since Descartes that poses a dualism between mind and body. They slight or ignore the historical and psychological roots and evolution of her ideas, no doubt fearing that would subvert an objective and impersonal analysis of her ideas, a fear especially prevalent among philosophers. Manheimer makes explicit the common philosophical implicit rule: "Do not obscure the impersonal truth with the incidental details of your personal existence."' This view, of course, opposes Socrates' exhortation to "Know Thyself," as a fundamental philosophical task. As a result, philosophers often fail to perceive the personal grounding of Stein's thought, how her life experience interacted with and influenced her intellectual foci and approach, as well as the provocative contradictions, dissonance as well as consonance between the content of her philosophical treatises and that of her observations and reflections recorded in her personal writing. Alasdair Maclntyre, citing scholars teaching and writing about Heidegger, faults them for compartmentalizing the philosopher's philosophy from his or her life. This leads, he points out, to ignoring the

> bifurcation of the personality [Heidegger], so that one set of character traits was exhibited in that part of his life given over to philosophy, but a very different set in his public and political life . . . in fact the story of this division within Heidegger is a piece of mythology . . . that enables those who teach Heidegger's philosophy . . . to domesticate it and render it innocuous, while at the same time projecting onto Heidegger the type of compartmentalization that they take for granted in their own academic lives.

Another unfortunate consequence of this compartmentalization is that most philosophers ignore the rich body of scholarly theory outside of philosophy about the nature of first-person narratives, which has developed since the 1980s. This Companion study of Life will seek to interknit these different disciplinary projects and open new ways to encounter Edith Stein's life and works.

Crucially, Stein's Life is both biography and autobiography, both genres of much interest to Stein. Life began as a biography of her mother and family predecessors that then evolved into an autobiography. Even as an autobiography the work abounds in biographical sketches of key figures in her life. Similarly, How I Came to Carmel, her memoir examining the evolution of her decision to enter a Carmelite convent, includes both biographical and autobiographical narrative.

Throughout Stein's adult life her experience reading autobiographies sparked indelible changes in her life and thought. One need only ponder the pivotal impact of Stein's reading during the summer of 1921 of Saint Teresa of Avila's autobiography, Life of Teresa of Avila by Herself on Stein's decision to convert to Roman Catholicism. Similarly, St. Augustine's Confessions inspired empathic identification. Stein recalls:

> Someone gave me the Confessions of St, Augustine . . I had hardly opened this book than I thought that I saw myself in it . . . I cannot describe what happened in my heart when I read the description of his conversion and followed him into the garden where he heard the voice of heaven. It seemed to me as if God was speaking to me.

After having entered the Carmelite Convent in Cologne in 1933, Stein wrote biographical accounts for her Sisters, a substantial one on St. Teresa, and somewhat shorter ones on Saint Elizabeth, Saint Teresa Margaret, and Sister Marie-Aimee de Jesus, relying, of course, on these women's first-person documents. During the late 1920s, at Erich Pryzwara's urging, Stein became immersed in reading and translating John Henry Newman's Letters.12 Further, Stein's own prodigious correspondence is replete with autobiographical content. So, too, her philosophical works. She incorporates and taps her past and present experience in her analysis of phenomena. At many points, her allusions to her own described and reflected upon experience, and her philosophical discussion are inseparable. Stein's Life, however, is the central focus on this study, with other autobiographical writings incorporated as seems fit.

Unfortunately, we have no records of her personal experience writing any chapter of Life, nor of her vision of at what point she would end her story. Did she intend to take readers to and beyond her religious conversion? Was her conversion, rather than her victorious dissertation defense, her desired conclusion? Or did she envision taking her readers to 1933 and her decision to enter Carmel, perhaps composing a sequel to her memoir, How I Came to Carmel? What did she think and feel as she composed this remarkable memoir? These are not tangential questions. If her projected ending had been her religious conversion, for example, then her narrative is very much in the tradition of St. Augustine and St. Teresa of Avila and other spiritual and religious narratives of the past. If not, as will

become clear in Chapter Two, her narrative represents the classic modern secular autobiography, epitomized by Goethe's autobiography.

At the heart of these questions is the larger question: who is Edith Stein—both in her own mind and as we encounter her? When Stein began Life, she was 42, about to embark on a radical transformation in her life. She would leave her successful teaching career at the University of Munster and her public career as a popular lecturer and enter a Carmelite convent as the first step in becoming a nun, cloistered from friends and family. If it had not been for Hitler's Aryan laws, Stein might well have remained at Munster or even landed a professorship, as in the early 1930s she had sought, at a prestigious university. Although she had expressed a desire to become a nun when she had converted to Catholicism, that choice periodically competed with her professional ambition to hold an academic professorship. Her choice in 1933 to enter a convent was not inevitable. I imagine Stein at this life crossroad wrestling with her identity, who she was and who she had become and with whether her decision was warranted and with the meaning of abandoning so much of her past identity. It was not easy for her to leave Munster for Carmel. She remarks that "I now left a large circle of people who were bound to me in love and loyalty. I have always held the beautiful old town and the Münster countryside in fond and grateful memory."" Attempting to understand herself and to harness her mind's tumult and gain perspective on the trauma of her radical shift in life direction, she also contended with her sense of abandoning her family, especially her mother, who adored Stein, as she did her. I infer that she began the first section of Life that focused on her mother and her forebearers as a gift of love to her family and an easing of Stein's feelings of loss and guilt. But when, in subsequent chapters, she placed herself at the center of Life, other intentions likely entered, and Stein never revealed these in extant correspondence.

A final observation: All scholarly encounters with autobiographies are inherently intersubjective. I bring my own life experience, training, and values to this study. Stein's emotions and thoughts stir mine, and I cannot claim that my description, analysis, and interpretation of Life is free of subjective elements. My aim is to be as objective and as fair as I can. I wear several hats. Chapter One's exegesis of Life is primarily descriptive, even in its presentation of relevant historical background. My exegesis is reflective of the manner in which a lay reader would approach the text, though this chapter concludes with a presentation of Stein's vital contributions to historical understanding of early twentieth-century German. In marked contrast, in Chapter Two I wear the scholarly hat of the autobiographical theorist. I analyze Stein's approach to her personal narrative in the context of the history of autobiography as a genre and the field of autobiographical theory from the nineteenth century to the present. In this chapter I also compare key aspects of her narrative with her philosophical writings, and I highlight in the process her narrative's strengths and limitations." This chapter further highlights her presuppositions and strongly felt values, which then guide my analysis

of the similarities and discrepancies between Stein's narrative and her philosophical works. Here subjective factors, such as selection and prioritization of information, inevitably enter.

Stein's genius in her pathbreaking philosophical and theological writings as well as in her personal bravery creates a tendency either to downplay her intellectual and personal shortcomings or to produce a counter-phobic overly harsh account of these. My approach strives to maintain a double lens, seeking to situate and empathically connect with Stein during her own time and place, while also holding as important my knowing the future. I have struggled to be balanced and leave it to the readers of this study as to my success. Nonetheless, I am aware of the tension that John Sturrock somewhat hyperbolically and negatively describes:

> The autobiographer .. memorializes himself in the form of a book; the theorist takes down that book from the shelf, suspicious of its claims to integrity, and anaesthetizes it, in the hopes of conducting on this temporarily lifeless specimen a biopsy full of advantage to the literary specialist.

I hope that my Chapter Two analysis does not undermine the vitality of Life and also contributes to the understanding of Stein's life and work. Regarding that analytic chapter, my life as a feminist scholar and activist and as a woman of Jewish descent make me particularly sensitive to Stein's treatment of gender, ethnicity, and religion. The concluding chapter on the afterlife of Life is both descriptive and investigative. Of course, even descriptive passages in any of the chapters involve my choices over what to include, those choices necessarily reflecting my judgment of what is important or meaningful to convey. <>

Edith Stein's Finite and Eternal Being: A Companion by Sarah Borden Sharkey [Edith Stein Studies, Lexington Books, 9781666909678]

There are few topics more central to philosophical discussions than the meaning of being, and few thinkers offer a more compelling and original vision of that meaning than Edith Stein (1891–1942). Stein's magnum opus, drawing from her decades working with the early phenomenologists and intense years as a student and translator of medieval texts, lays out a grand vision, bringing together phenomenological and scholastic insights into an integrated whole. The sheer scope of Stein's project in Finite and Eternal Being is daunting, and the text can be challenging to navigate. In this book, Sarah Borden Sharkey provides a guide to Stein's great final philosophical work and intellectual vision. The opening essays give an overview of Stein's method and argument, and they place Finite and Eternal Being both within its historical context and in relation to contemporary discussions. The author also provides clear, detailed summaries of each section of Stein's opus, drawing from the latest scholarship on Stein's manuscript. Edith Stein's Finite and Eternal Being: A Companion offers a unique guide, opening up Stein's grand cathedral-like vision of the meaning of being as the unfolding of meaning.

Review

Sarah Borden Sharkey's companion to Edith Stein's *Finite and Eternal Being* is a clearly and beautifully written and fascinating read for students, scholars, and indeed anyone with an interest in Stein's magnum opus. Its three initial essays, shedding light on the work's argument, its context and its potential contributions to contemporary debates are deeply insightful and highly thought provoking. 'Essay III' could be studied on its own with a view of thinking through the implications of Stein's work for a renewed understanding of metaphysics as ,first, the philosophy of being.

The close reading of Stein's text that follows is written by a master whose engagement with the work is long standing. She is unwilling to say things she cannot stand over, so when she is puzzled by Stein's choices, she will let it shine through. This will facilitate future readings that have the advantage of knowing Borden's introduction. For these reasons it will be the first port of call for many students of the Stein's work, and it will lay the foundation for many detailed investigations of the problemata listed in Essay III. **— Mette Lebech, Maynooth University**

An expert guide written by a leading, internationally recognized Edith Stein scholar, this book will lead readers though the intricate, original insights and arguments synthesizing phenomenology and medieval scholastic thought to present a profound sense of the layers of being that constitute reality. Borden Sharkey's work will serve as an important scholarly reference work for those interested in grasping Stein's master work, *Finite and Eternal Being*. Written with great lucidity and cogency, this work paves the way for a novel understanding of Stein's later philosophy. **— Antonio Calcagno, King's University College at Western University**

Equipped with a keen grasp of Edith Stein's thought and extensive knowledge pertaining to Stein studies, Sarah Borden Sharkey articulately navigates Stein's opus with clear and concise contextual essays, summaries, and occasional commentary and questions posed for further study. Numerous notes and a German glossary add to making this companion a very valuable resource for Stein research for readers of all levels of familiarity with Stein's writings. This work is undoubtedly a major and much needed contribution to Stein studies! **— Marian Maskulak, Professor Emerita, St. John's University**

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Edith Stein's Finite and Eternal Being is a grand bringing together of phenomenology, Thomistic metaphysics, Carmelite spirituality, twentieth-century physics, debates regarding the soul, and reflections on the Trinity, all centered on the question of the meaning of being. It is an ambitious book, addressing crucial questions in philosophy and presenting an account of how we might bring ancient and medieval insights into conversation with contemporary scientific and philosophical concerns. Stein spent months waiting to receive treatises on atomic physics; she studied evolutionary theory; she gives us a reading of Dionysius's hierarchy of angels, dives into nuanced debates on Aristotle's texts, and engages in extended discussions of grace and freedom, the Fall, and the privation theory of evil. It is, in short, an utterly stunning book and perhaps as close as we can get in the contemporary world to a classic summa. The aim of this text is to provide a guide for co-travelers and a small introduction to Stein's great opus. Although I cannot unpack all that Stein has woven into her grand project, my hope is that perhaps this book may help push open the door a bit so others may enter more fully into her great work.

This book is organized into two major parts. The first half includes three essays, each of which provide more overview-level context. The first essay looks at the method and argumentation of Finite and Eternal Being, with a brief synopsis of the work as a whole. I begin with brief comments on Stein's method in the text, and then walk through the overarching argument and primary claims. The second essay presents the historical context of Finite and Eternal Being, beginning with discussion of the various German editions and available English translations and the place of Finite and Eternal Being within Stein's corpus, and then turning to a brief discussion of some of the theoretical positions and theorists from the 1920s and 1930s with whom Stein interacted most closely. The third essay focuses on the relevance of Stein's arguments for more contemporary conversations, noting the key claims relevant to discussions in (a) metaphysics and theories of being, (b) philosophy of religion and philosophical theology, (c) phenomenology, (d) aesthetic theory, and (e) philosophy of science. The aim of the third essay is not to be exhaustive, but simply to highlight some of the distinctive claims and arguments of this text that ought to be brought into broader theoretical conversations.

The second and core part of this book is a longer, more detailed synopsis of Stein's text, walking through each section, following the order and structure given us by Stein. This longer synopsis is intended to be read alongside Stein's text, providing a brief summary—and thus orientation—to the main points in each section.

There are three things I would like to note about the second synopsis segment of this book. First, in order to provide a concise summary, I frequently had to remove reference to Stein's many examples

and illustrations for her points. This is a true loss. There are comparatively few philosophers who give truly illuminating examples, but Stein is among those few. Her examples nearly always leave one with greater clarity regarding the core theoretical point she is making, but they also often provide a greater understanding of the finer points of the example itself, such as how one might interpret certain historical events or linguistic shifts. She also has some examples that are stunningly beautiful and memorable in their own right and thus have value independent of the point they are introduced to illustrate. Her discussions in chapter 2 of divine Providence in her own life, for example, have been oft-quoted and give us insight into Stein's own spiritual life, even if one is less interested in her particular claims about essences. For the sake of concision, however, I have cut discussion of nearly all of the extended examples from this guide, but I encourage all readers to savor her illustrations and examples—as well as the philosophical discussions they illuminate.

Second, this reading guide will follow the German critical edition,' utilizing Walter Redmond's translation of Finite and Eternal Being when picking English terms or quoting from the text. (For more on editions and available translations, see the essay on the historical context of Finite and Eternal Being.) At the time of my writing, Redmond's translation has not yet been published, and I am working from a near-final-draft version. I expect, however, that Redmond's translation will soon be published and that it will become the standard English-language version. (When quoting from Finite and Eternal Being, I will cite it as 'ESGA 11/12' and then give the page number in the German critical edition.)

There are numerous strengths to Redmond's rendering of the text, among them his sensitivity to the philosophical nuances that Stein is struggling with and his attempts to render these nuances in clear ways. Of particular importance for this work is Stein's distinction between Sein and Seiende. Both are `being,' but Sein refers not to a particular entity but, rather, to the being of that entity (i.e., 'being' as a verb or gerund). In contrast, Seiende refers to 'a being' or an entity (i.e., 'being' as a noun). Redmond helpfully distinguishes these by always hyphenating Seiende, being, while leaving Sein, being, without a hyphen. It takes a bit of time to get used to this way of making the distinction in English, especially in the more complex discussions. I will try here both to follow Redmond's practice and to clarify and emphasize the distinction when necessary.

[Because of the centrality of Sein and Seiende in Stein's work, certain English terms become complicated, particularly 'human being.' Most of us think of a particular entity or being, when speaking of a human being. Stein, however, is interested both in (a) particular entities, beings, and (b) in the distinct kind of being (Sein) of humans. This complicates the translation of Stein's text, particularly when she discusses extensively both Mensch and menschliches Sein, both of which could be rendered 'human being.' Distinguishing these two is, however, crucial to Stein's project of exploring the meaning of being. In order to make the distinction clear, Redmond worked with different possible

translations of key terms. I believe I am working from a nearly final version of the translation, with the rendering of Mensch as 'human' and menschliches Sein as 'human being.' My own preference is to clarify menschliches Sein in some way, rendering it as 'being in a human way' or even 'humanly being.' When I give a differing translation (at least from the draft version I have), I will note that the translation has been adapted.]

Some of Redmond's other choices are also distinctive and even surprising, but I have found most to be illuminating once one becomes familiar with the choices. For example, he renders `Inneres' as `innerness' rather than 'interiority' and Selbstand' as `self-dependent' rather than 'independent' (and its contrast as `nonself-dependent' rather than `dependent'). The last is particularly helpful because it brings out the linguistic and philosophical meaning of Stein's language well. I provide a fuller discussion of Redmond's translation choices, as well as comparison with other renderings, in the glossary. But given the prominence of these for the synopsis, I would like to alert the reader to them at the beginning.

Third, although I aimed for both clarity and concision in the synopsis, some of Stein's arguments are quite subtle and dense. There is, in some sections, more than one way to interpret Stein's claims or her path to those claims. I have aimed for accuracy, but in some cases my presentation may miss key points, elide significant moves, or offer a reading with which others may disagree. If, however, the summary here enables others to enter Stein's arguments with greater depth and more capacious understanding, this work will have achieved its primary purpose—even if missing, at those points, its secondary aim. <>

Places in Knots: Remoteness and Connectivity in the Himalayas and Beyond by Martin Saxer [Cornell University Press, 9781501766879]

Tracing the experiences of mobile Himalayans across the globe, *Places in Knots* describes the ways in which Himalayan people relate to the multiple places they inhabit and the work and trouble of keeping their communities tied together.

Martin Saxer describes global Himalayan ventures as a form of expansion of community rather than out-migration. Moving out does not sever the bonds of community. Instead, it is the pull that tightens the knot.

Coffee-table books and trekking agencies continue to advertise the Himalayas as remote "hidden valleys," and NGOs see them as fragile mountain ecosystems to be protected from global forces of destruction. *Places in Knots* shows how these tropes of remoteness inform development and conservation policies and thus shape the contexts in which Himalayan connections with the wider world

are forged and maintained. Following Himalayan journeys between valleys in Nepal and beyond, Saxer draws a picture of globalization that emerges not from the centers or below—but rather from the edge.

Review

Moving between highland Nepal, Kathmandu, and New York City, *Places in Knots* is an original work of the highest caliber. It illuminates the ways that communities and individuals sustain and remake themselves in response to major forces of social, political, and economic transformation. -- Sienna R. Craig, Dartmouth College, author of *The Ends of Kinship*

Beautifully written and delightful, *Places in Knots* makes important interventions into debates in sociocultural anthropology and human geography on remoteness and connectivity, globalization and place, transnationalism and mobility, and the importance of distribution in political economy and livelihoods. -- Emily Yeh, University of Colorado Boulder, author of *Taming Tibet*

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Juggling Worlds

Sunday morning in Jackson Heights, a neighborhood in the borough of Queens, New York City. Standing in front of the subway station, I can listen to the chatter of the commuters passing by— a mixture of Spanish, Nepali, Hindi, and Bengali. A delivery truck decorated with " Free Tibet" stickers drives up next to me. I move a few steps away to remain in sight. I have a meeting with Tenzing Ukyab. He promised to pick me up by car and told me to wait outside the station. I hope he will recognize me.

A few minutes later, Tenzing arrives and waves at me. I hop on the passenger seat to start a ride through the many worlds Tenzing and his friends keep juggling here. Tenzing is in his mid- fifties and originally from a place called Walung, a little village in eastern Nepal close to the Tibetan border. I am here to learn about the Walung community in New York. Tenzing, the former president of the Walung Community of North America is my guide. He promised to introduce me. This is not an easy task, he admits. " People are very, very busy here," he says. They work hard and often have several jobs. And the weekends are even busier with all the community events.

Today, the weekly Tibetan class is taking place in the basement flat that the Walung Community of North America rents to hold events. A dozen people, mostly women, have gathered to improve their Tibetan language skills. Their native language is a Tibetan dialect, but most of them grew up in Nepal and only a few of them have learned to read and write Tibetan. The class includes reading a religious text. The teacher is a lama whose wife is from Walung. I sit and listen to the rhythmic chanting, waiting for the lesson to wind down.

Tenzing quickly lines up a couple of interviews for me. I explain my interest in the old trading village of Walung and the cosmopolitan biographies of its people. I ask a few simple questions to start the conversation. Soon, however, I realize that the language students are in a hurry to catch another event taking place at the Sherpa Association. The topic is life insurance, which seems to strike a chord with many here. I give up on my interviews and join the crowd.

We head to the posh new Sherpa Association house a few blocks away. More than a hundred people are already waiting for the event to begin. The banner on the stage reads "insurance terror"—in a mix of English and Nepali. A Nepali TV host leads the event. Four insurance experts present their takes on the topic and answer questions.

The most engaged of them is a Chinese woman in her late thirties. Her name is Wei Wei— like the popu lar instant noodle soup every body knows in Nepal. Wei Wei works as an in de pen dent insurance agent. While she doesn't speak Nepali, she is clearly familiar with the needs and fears of immigrant communities. "You have come to Amer i ca to make money and have a better life. You work hard, and you don't mind working hard. But how to protect your hard- earned money, how to protect your family?" she asks rhetorically. "We have all come here for education, for work, and regardless of whether we speak good English or not— we are not stupid! Don't let yourselves be fooled!" she continues. Then, she explains the differences between term and whole life insurance and the pitfalls of the latter.

The event quickly becomes emotional. Many are here to vent their frustration with life insurance companies. One young man has signed four insurance contracts for him and his family. He is currently paying a monthly premium of US$1,450. He feels cheated.

After more than three hours, the Nepali TV host tries to bring the session to an end. There is unrest and disappointment in the audience because so many issues still remain unclear. Wei Wei takes side with the audience, saying that she will stay until all questions are answered. "And if you get hungry, I will buy you food."

During the event, Tenzing's phone keeps buzzing. There are yet more worlds to juggle. Currently, the Asia Week is taking place in New York, with exhibitions and auctions of Asian art at Sotheby's and

elsewhere. Tenzing tours the many events to expand his network of customers and see what is currently in demand. He trades in everything Tibetan, from furniture and antiques to jewelry, carpets, and Buddha statues.

A week later, Tenzing shows me his impressive outlet on the ground floor of ABC Carpet & Home, a fancy emporium at a prime and auspicious address in the heart of Manhattan: 888 Broadway. Tenzing's store brings a breath of Hi malayan style into the vast assemblage of con temporary interior design and indigenous trea sures from around the world. ABC Carpet & Home was featured in Vogue and Vanity Fair; the Obamas were said to come here for shopping. ABC Carpet & Home advertises itself as a "portal into collective creativity," presenting "commerce as a vehicle for insight and for action in the aid of creating a better world."

From 888 Broadway we walk up to Union Square. It is a warm spring day in Manhattan. We buy a coffee and find a bench to sit and talk. It is Saturday, Greenmarket day at Union Square. In their early days in New York, Tenzing and his wife worked here at the farmers market. At one point, he says, almost all the vendors were Nepali or Tibetan.

As many ambitious young men from Himalayan villages, Tenzing tried his luck in various businesses and careers. At one time, he ran a shop in Kathmandu, then he worked as a language and culture instructor for the Peace Corps. He managed to obtain a visa to Japan and planned to build a life there. He didn't like it and came back to Nepal. He also worked as a research assistant for an American PhD student. When she invited him to visit her in the United States, he packed two big suitcases full of merchandise— "we always do business, you know"— and flew to Seattle. He stayed at her house for a couple months, trying not to be a burden and figure out what to do next. He finally came to New York and worked his way up, paying taxes, bringing his family to the United States, starting his own business, and finally becoming a US citizen.

While we talk, Tenzing receives two phone calls from a detention center at the US– Mexico border. A fellow Walungnga needs help— a bond, an address, a place to stay. People are still arriving. Many follow the arduous route through South and Central America.

Tenzing is a role model for many new arrivals— not just for his success in business but also for his social engagement. He got involved in vari ous efforts to help the Walung community both in the United States and in Nepal. Presently, his mission is to build a road from the Tibetan border to Walung. He shows me a letter to the local government of the neighboring county in the Tibet Autonomous Region of the People's Republic of China, asking for assistance. He wrote it in Nepali and his daughter translated it into En glish. Tenzing laughs while remembering how his US- born daughter, who grew up amid the Tibetan exile community and their critical stance toward China, was slightly irritated by the conciliatory tone of the letter. But the stakes are high, and Tenzing fears that without a road and help from China, Walung will not have a future.

In the afternoon, Tenzing and I visit a Tibetan art gallery nearby. Then I head back to my Airbnb in Queens. Overwhelmed by all these stories, all the ventures and worlds Tenzing and his friends are engaging in— from religious Tibetan classes to "insurance terror," from posh design at 888 Broadway and con temporary Tibetan art to detention centers and plans for a Himalayan road— I switch on the TV. It is March 2016. Donald Trump is on all channels. His campaign is gaining steam. My Airbnb host, a

Latina immigrant herself, has put a copy of "Make Amer i ca Great Again" on my desk. What an irony! While the xenophobic rhetoric of the president- to- come blames immigrants for Amer i ca's decline, the American dream cannot be more alive than among the people I just met.

Pondering over this irony, another thought crosses my mind. I realize that seeing the Walungnga in New York as an immigrant community aspiring to the American dream— one of several hundred in Queens alone— may only capture half the story here. What if the American dream pursued by these Himalayan immigrants is rather a continuation of an old Himalayan dream? If so, what would this mean for seemingly remote mountain villages and their global connections? What would it imply for notions like remoteness, migration, and diaspora?

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In 2011, five years before Tenzing introduced me to the world of Himalayan communities in Queens, New York, I was looking for a guide and research assistant to accompany me to Walung. I had just started a new proj ect on the question of what China's rapid economic development meant for the people living directly along its borders. The Walung area of northeastern Nepal had caught my attention. During my previous work on the creation of a Tibetan medicine industry, I had learned that many of the medicinal herbs traditionally imported from Nepal were not shipped through the main road between Kathmandu and Lhasa. Instead, they were traded along the old and, I assumed at the time, largely defunct trade routes across Himalayan passes along the border. Walung, I had heard, was one of the places this cross- border business was taking off.

Sitting in a coffee shop in Kathmandu, I stumbled on the Facebook page of the Walung Community of North Amer i ca. I wrote a message explaining that I was an anthropologist working on trade and exchange in the Himalayan borderlands, that I had read about the importance of Walung as an old trading hub, and that I was interested in the recent revival of trans- Himalayan trade. Fifteen minutes later, I received a phone call on my Nepali number from a relative of the president of the Walung Community of North America. Within days, I met with several Walungnga in Kathmandu.

At that time, I did not make much of the fact that my entry into Walung circles was mediated by a member of the community on the other side of the globe. I took the circuitous route of communication as an example of how uneven the much-heralded space- time compression of our era was. While reaching Himalayan villages at the border with China still required long bus rides, mountain flights, and days of hiking, news and rumors were no longer dependent on messengers treading the trails. Over the years, I came to understand that my initial contact with Walung was more than serendipity helped by social media. The relations of Himalayan communities between a mountain village, Kathmandu, and a neighborhood in New York City are not just a matter of remittances from the diaspora and dreams of a better life back home. These relations are part of everyday life in ways much wider and deeper than I presumed.

In this book, I focus on two mountain regions in Nepal close to the Tibetan border: the Walung area and Upper Humla in the northeastern and northwestern corners of the country, respectively. Both Walung and Upper Humla are home to Tibetan- speaking populations that thrived on the once vibrant trans- Himalayan trade between the Tibetan Plateau and the plains of South Asia. In both places, like in the majority of villages across the region, agriculture and pastoralism have never been able to guarantee

subsistence. Following the demarcation of the border between Nepal and China in the early 1960s, both places found themselves at the very margins of nation- states and needing to expand their business ventures into new territories in Nepal and abroad. Historically as well as today, it is not uncommon for people from Walung and Upper Humla to spend most of their lives outside their village of origin—on business trips and foraging expeditions, as transhumant herders, monks, and students. Yet there is a strong sense of place and belonging in Himalayan communities. This sense of place and belonging is neither based on a sedentary life in one locality, nor does it stem from a nostalgic imaginary of a homeland fostered in a global diaspora; it is rather derived from the shared experience of repeated movement between a limited number of localities. These localities are so tightly enlaced that I came to think of them as places in knots.

My concern with these two Tibetan borderlands in northern Nepal is fundamentally translocal. What happens outside profoundly shapes lives and dreams in these mountain valleys. And the other way around, being part of a community named after a Himalayan village or valley is crucial for the ambitions and endeavors of those spending most of their time outside. The story I seek to tell, then, is not so much about out- migration and the ties between home and diaspora, but rather about the evolving configurations of these places in knots that continue to shape translocal Himalayan lives.

Before the 1960s, such place- knots included trading districts in cities like Shigatse or Kolkata, a village close to the Nepal– Tibet border, and perhaps a seasonal trade mart along the way. The entanglements between these places through investment, marriage, and ritual friendship were crucial to facilitate business. Some places in these knots have since lost their relevance, while others— the neighborhoods of Boudha in Kathmandu and Jackson Heights in New York City— are being tied in. The basic challenge of making community in a translocal setting, however, has remained.

Remoteness

If Himalayan communities evolve in knots of places rather than individual localities, this pro cess is also shaped by global agendas regarding development, migration, heritage, and conservation. These agendas are based on particular imaginaries about the role and position of Himalayan villages in the wider world. One dominant figure of thought that undergirds these imaginaries is remoteness and its assumed antidote, connectivity.

Even the base camp of Mount Everest has Wi- Fi now. In early 2017, the Nepal Telecommunications Authority announced their plans with some fanfare (Giri 2017) and later that year, Everest Link, a small Sherpa- owned com pany, set up a hot spot. The global media responded promptly. “If you can get Wi-Fi on Mount Everest, then you can prob ably get it anywhere on Earth,” VentureBeat heralded (Takahashi 2017). National Geographic followed up with a story on Everest Link CEO Tsering Gyaltsen Sherpa, the “super- charged Nepali entrepreneur” who led “his native Khumbu Valley into the 21st century” (Wilkinson 2019).

More puzzling than live Instagram stories from one of the world’s more crowded campsites is perhaps the fact that Wi- Fi in the Hi ma la yas makes headlines. The reason, I believe, lies in a deep- rooted assumption about the spatial and temporal logic that structures global difference. On one end of the spectrum is the con temporary global space— connected, vibrant, polluted, diverse, and mostly urban; a space in which Himalayan mi grant communities in New York live next to Wall Street and the United

Nations. On the other end of the spectrum are the last pockets of remoteness— timeless, wild, au then tic, mostly poor, sometimes dangerous, and always already on the verge of being steamrolled by the forces of modernity.

Mountain villages in Nepal find themselves imagined squarely at the latter end of this spectrum. In descriptions of the Hi ma la yas, the trope of remoteness is pervasive. Coffee- table books and travel agencies use it to advertise the last realms of untouched Buddhist culture; nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in their reports emphasize remoteness to undergird the urgency of their projects; and Tsering Gyaltsen Sherpa, the CEO of Everest Link, writes in a blog post for the com pany that provides his weatherproof equipment that the Nepal he calls home is "entirely remote" (Sherpa 2017).

Remoteness is seldom just a descriptive device. As a figure of thought, it defines challenges and missions. It comes packaged with expectations of its imminent unmaking through more and better connectivity. And, almost always, it serves as an analytical starting point: remote communities, in the highlands of Asia and elsewhere, are seen as backward, au then tic, or unruly because—for better or worse— they are isolated and far away from developed, urban centers.

When the trope of remoteness underpins analy sis, several things get lost.

First, the trope of remoteness assumes a degree of isolation. Looking at a place from the outside, remote areas may indeed seem out- of- the- way and isolated; but, as Edwin Ardener (2012, 523) notes with re spec t to supposedly remote areas in Cameroon and Scotland, "from the inside outwards, there was an almost exaggerated contrary sense of the absence of any barrier to the world."

This observation reminds me of my experiences in the highlands of Nepal. The lives of the families I met during the research for this book are not just revolving around a remote mountain village but, quite the contrary, around a veritable obsession with the outside world, a high degree of mobility, and a sense of community that is clearly not local. Many leave their native valleys for education (Childs and Choedup 2019; Childs et al. 2014) or their transnational business ventures (Fisher 1986; Ratanapruck 2007). Their ambitions and endeavors reach far beyond the Hi ma la yas. What I see is thus not isolation but cosmopolitanism.

This cosmopolitan orientation is not a recent phenomenon. As a contact zone (Pratt 1991) between China and South Asia, the arid Tibetan Plateau and the monsoon- fed hills and plains in Nepal and India, the Hi ma la yas have long been home to populations serving as avid brokers between economic, po lit i cal, and cultural spheres.

Second, in public discourse, remoteness often goes together with marginality. In the case at hand, this is only partially true. There is no denying that Himalayan villages and valleys remain severely underrepresented in the po lit i cal arenas in which their future is debated. From the 1854 Muluki Ain (Höfer 1979), Nepal's Hindu civil code that put the Tibetan- speaking mountain people in the lowest category of "enslavable alcohol drinkers," to corvée obligations (Holmberg, March, and Tamang 1999) and questions of citizenship (Shneiderman 2013, 2015), Himalayan populations have faced outright discrimination and marginalization. At the same time, however, the largely Tibetan- speaking populations straddling the borders between the People's Republic of China and its southern neighbors attract much attention. They do so internationally through the networks offered by global Buddhism, the "Tibet question," tourism, or debates on the "third pole" and climate change. They also feature prominently in

national conversations on security, migration, federalism, and development. Close to the sensitive skin of the "geo- bodies" (Thongchai 1994; Billé 2018) of China, Nepal, and India, the Hi ma la yas often play an outsize role in national imaginaries. In other words, there is no shortage of attention on the Hi ma la yas and its populations. This combination of inhabiting niches in a contact zone at the edge of nation- states and overwhelming media attention often translates into global connections and opportunities that truly marginalized communities elsewhere can only dream of.

Third, remoteness carries strong connotations of subsistence- oriented lifestyles and poverty. While the Himalayan districts of Nepal and the Tibet Autonomous Region across the border are listed at the bottom of national development statistics, Himalayan populations are far from universally poor. Business and trade are of paramount importance in this context, especially since most of the higher Himalayan villages and valleys do not guarantee agricultural or agropastoral subsistence. In the old days, trade in salt from Tibet and grain from Nepal, combined with all kinds of goods in demand in Tibet and India, was not just crucial for survival, it was also widely seen as the main avenue to prosperity. The CEO of Everest Link, for example, may use remoteness to explain his ambition, yet he is also a member of a prolific trading community in the Himalayas— the same one that built the impressive community center in Queens where I attended an "insurance terror" seminar. Rather than being a "super- charged" exception from an other wise rural and agropastoral community, the CEO of Everest Link follows in many ways the footsteps of his forefathers who did business between Tibet, Nepal, and India.

The trope of remoteness glosses over such long- standing entanglements. It leaves little room for stories that do not conform to the narrative of the "big transformation" that allegedly sweeps across the globe, eventually finding its way to the most hidden corners and bringing them into the fold of a globally connected world.

To be clear: My aim is not to claim that "they have never been truly remote" just as "we have never been modern" (Latour 1993). Such a claim would simply invert and thereby reiterate anthropology's obsession with the other. Remoteness may not have much analytical value, yet it is more than just a ghost blurring the gaze of outside observers. The fantasy of the remote as the "most other of others" (Gupta and Ferguson 1992, 6, liberally quoting Hannerz 1986, 363) not just lingers on in the West or the global North. It is put to work by all parties involved—as a figure of thought and as a potentially useful positionality on the global stage. While in the spatial and temporal imaginaries of globalization, remoteness appears as connectivity's alter ego— one a reflection of the other— from the perspective of seemingly remote highlands, the self- proclaimed centers of globalization rather feel akin to some kind of cousin: a prob ably rich, often a bit boisterous, and sometimes overbearing one who is nonetheless family and whose com pany can be inspiring and useful.

As argued elsewhere (Saxer 2019), remoteness is fundamentally a relational condition— a perspective bred in places that consider themselves to be the opposite of remote (see Tsing 1994, 2005; Ferguson 1999; Ardener 2012; Harms et al. 2014). Once an area surfaces on the radars of states, development agencies, or mining companies as "remote," it does so with certain ambitions that already carry the seed of a future relation involving the selective unmaking of remoteness for a specific purpose. As these ambitions are embedded in larger po lit i cal and economic agendas, remoteness is seldom the kind of prehistoric leftover as it is sometimes cast. Remoteness, rather, is actively made and unmade, and thus tends to return at par tic u lar historical junctures (Saxer and Andersson 2019).

In the Hi ma la yas, the current incarnation of remoteness was triggered by twentieth- century geopolitics: the demarcation of borders in the 1960s, the history of Tibet under Chinese rule, and the decline of erstwhile forms of trade. This arrival of remoteness altered long- standing relations with Tibet. At the same time, it fostered new ties to development agencies with their prestige and money, to the international tourism and mountaineering industry, and recently to China, with its new business opportunities. In this context, remoteness is a useful asset. The claim to au then tic cultural heritage in hidden Buddhist valleys attracts tourism; the notion of remote wilderness resonates with conservation agendas; and the sketchy presence of the Nepali state combined with China's hunger for natu ral resources drives trade in medicinal plants and wildlife products.

Seen this way, connectivity is not stamped on the other side of the coin of remoteness, leaving us with an either-or. Neither do remoteness and connectivity define the two ends of a gamut between marginality and integration. They rather stand for diffuse yet omnipresent figures of thought folding into each other in par tic u lar ways. Their vari ous entanglements, I seek to show, profoundly affect Himalayan experiences of global history.

A generation after the end of the Cold War, remoteness is not on the way out; neither is universal connectivity on the horizon. The Hi ma la yas are crisscrossed by sensitive borders, rich in biodiversity and natu ral resources, and imbued with fantasies of future infrastructure. A multitude of stakes are attached to these frontiers. Quests for border security and resource extraction clash with ideas of development and conservation. Amid the rumblings of these discordant visions, those targeted frequently find themselves wedged between conflicting agendas, which can both afford new opportunities and lead to further marginalization. In this sense, the Hi ma la yas are not only a contact zone between ecological and economic spheres but also between analytic stakes and ambitious interventions that come along with them.

The notion of places in knots is my starting point to tackle these lines of friction and, hopefully, allow for a new perspective on seemingly remote areas in the world at large.

Long before I started thinking about places in knots, I found myself tied into one. First, it was the Walungnga of New York who put me in touch with members of the community in Kathmandu. Then, the Walungnga residing in Kathmandu set me up to travel to Walung. Nyima, a fellow anthropologist who grew up in the village, agreed to accompany me. We flew to Biratnagar and found a share jeep to Taplejung, the district headquarters.

A general strike had been announced and our driver tried to circumvent the road blockages that were being set up everywhere. In 2012, six years after the end of a decade- long civil war, tensions remained high. A few months before, the constitutional assembly tasked with writing a new constitution was dissolved; new elections were announced and then postponed. A major bone of contention remained the federal restructuring of the former Kingdom of Nepal. Taplejung, our destination, was the center of the Limbu movement that campaigned for a federal state of its own.

Once we arrived in Taplejung and descended into the Tamur Valley, the world of fraught Nepal politics quickly faded away. Walking up the valley through lush green forests harboring black cardamom plantations, we crossed path with dozens of Walungnga. Phutuk, the yearly monastery festival, had just ended, triggering an exodus of Walungnga intending to spend the winter in Taplejung, Hile, or

Kathmandu. All Walung families, I learned, had at least one other place where some if not all family members would spend much of the year.

We entered the Kanchenjunga Conservation Area (KCA), Nepal's first fully community- managed conservation proj ect. We duly registered at the checkpoint and set out to climb the path that follows the Tamur River. From my previous research on trade in medicinal plants (Saxer 2011; 2013a, 104), I knew that the area was one of the main sources for Swertia chirayita, known as chiraito in Nepal and tigta in Tibet. The Mountain Institute, a US- based conservation NGO, was running a proj ect to cultivate chiraito in the buffer zone of the KCA. This, they hoped, would reduce unmanaged collection within the conservation area. On the way to Walung, we saw huge quantities of the herb, bundled and ready to be sold to Tibet. However, we learned that most of it was still collected in the conservation area rather than cultivated in the buffer zone.

On the third day, a few hours before reaching Walung, we met a couple of civil engineers surveying the prospective road that was supposed to connect Taplejung with Walung and the Tibetan border. According to the plan, the engineers said, the road was to be completed by 2014. Accustomed to promises followed by years of suspension, nobody believed that this would be the case. In fact, nothing happened after the initial survey until Tenzing pushed the matter with his letter asking local Tibetan authorities in China for assistance.

Reading my field notes from this first visit to Walung, I see now that the three big strands of this book were already pre sent. First is the theme of community and place. The Walungnga were clearly not the kind of "local community" that would fight (as the Limbu did) for territorial sovereignty amid Nepal's constitutional turmoil. A second theme is the importance of old pathways and the quest for new roads. And third is the story of the efforts of NGOs and development agencies to improve the health of mountains and people by setting up communitymanaged conservation areas or teaching people how to grow herbs they used to collect.

These three themes structure the three parts of this book. Each of them holds a conceptual proposition, which I will now sketch out in broad strokes.

Locality and Community

The first part of this book— Locality and Community—is concerned with the making and maintaining of communities between Himalayan villages and neighborhoods in Kathmandu and New York City. Exploring locality and community in a context in which mobility has always been at the core of livelihood strategies challenges the notion of the "local community," which continues to shape the global rhe toric of development and conservation. The communities of Walung and Upper Humla are less concerned with a single village than with a small number of places intertwined in deep and lasting ways. Village rules mandating presence, monastic obligations, and norms of marriage become en meshed in the vagaries of border business, opportunities for paid labor in Tibet, the activities of welfare socie ties in Kathmandu and New York, and the ritual needs to cater for local deities.

These communities are clearly different from the closed corporate peasant villages Eric Wolf described in Mexico and Java (Wolf 1955, 1957, 1986). Although Wolf never meant his observations to become a grand theory of nonurban regions applicable around the world, anthropologists have since ferociously criticized the "sedentarist metaphysics" (Malkki 1992) such isomorphism of place and culture implies

(Gupta and Ferguson 1992). Arjun Appadurai, for example, notes that the very term "native" so intrinsically relevant to the discipline of anthropology not only denotes origin from a certain place but people somehow incarcerated in those places (Appadurai 1988, 36–37). As a counter image, he suggests the notion of global ethnoscapes (Appadurai 1996) to make sense of a world in which communities are no longer bound to a par tic u lar territory. Deterritorialization and complex diasporas affect social relations, loyalties, cultural production, and the politics of home and belonging, he argues.

While I agree with Appadurai that the "loosening of the holds between people, wealth, and territory" raises questions about the "nature of locality as a lived experience" (Appadurai 1996, 49, 52), I see different processes at work in the Himalayas. Wealth and territory were never quite as tight a link in mobile trading societies; the work of joining places into knots tells a different story than disjuncture; the diagnosis of deterritorialization is difficult to reconcile with the realities of Himalayan terrain; and "diaspora" is both too vague and too full a term to describe the challenge of making a translocal community between places in a knot.

Moreover, the public imaginary of remoteness as a supposedly defining condition in the Hi ma la yas has served as a strong repellent against the insights of Appadurai, Gupta, Ferguson, Malkki, and the many others arguing along similar lines. In global urban space, we speak of the LGTBQ community or the scientific community. The term community is no longer tied to questions of origin or a single locality. In areas considered remote, however, the rural peasant community remains the guiding figure of thought and the "local" seems to stick with "community." Discussions about benefit sharing in relation to the Convention on Biological Diversity and its Nagoya Protocol, for example, implicitly take the local (and often remote) community as their point of reference. Similarly, development and conservation proj ects focus on "local communities."

This double vision— isolated and closed communities in remote areas, open and cosmopolitan ones everywhere else— continues to haunt global debates on development, mobility, and identity. It results in a pronounced disconnection between the discussions led in the offices of state planners and development organizations and the experiences and ambitions of those they target— a gap I have witnessed on a daily basis during my tenure as a research fellow at the International Centre for Integrated Mountain Development (ICIMOD) in Kathmandu.

It is against this background that I started thinking about places in knots. The three chapters comprising the first part of the book develop and test the notion of place- knots from differ ent angles.

In chapter 1— Tying Places into Knots— I meet Tenzing and half a dozen of his fellow New Yorkers again in the village of Walung. Building on these encounters, I explore the intimate ties and the conflicts that arise in the pro cess of tying and retying places into a knot.

Chapter 2— Moving In, Moving Up, Moving Out— gives more historical background on Walung and its mobile population. I tell the story of the changing figurations of remoteness and connectivity since the 1950s and argue that moving out is better understood as an expansion of a given community rather than simply as out- migration. Tracing the mobile biographies of elderly Walungnga who witnessed these transformations, I show the ways in which social mobility remains linked to physical mobility.

While Walung entirely lacks agriculture, the economy of most Tibetan-speaking Himalayan villages along the border is based on a mixture of trade, agriculture, and pastoralism. Leaving Walung for Upper

Humla, chapter 3— Binding Rules— looks into a context in which agropastoralism is an integral part of livelihoods. Most people here also spend most of the time outside their villages. In Upper Humla, however, strict village rules, the norm of polyandry, and monastic obligations play a crucial role, particularly in the Limi Valley bordering Tibet. The story of a mother anxious about her son's uncertain ambitions provides the entry point into a discussion of the work and trouble of tying places into knots. The son hangs out in the town of Purang across the border in Tibet, where most people from Limi work on Chinese construction sites over the summer. He seems less than keen to marry and take up his responsibilities in his household and village. He is not alone in this dilemma. As re sis tance to strict rules is growing, the monks arrange a meeting to set new fines for breaking the rules—an attempt to adjust and retie a place- knot in a rapidly changing socioeconomic environment.

The notion of place- knots affords a perspective on mobility and community that gives narratives of migration and diaspora a new twist. Global Himalayan ventures, I argue, are a means of expanding a community and, unlike simple rural- urban migration and moving out, do not necessarily sever community bonds.

Pathways

Doreen Massey suggests that we understand place as a collection of "stories- so-far" (Massey 2005, 130). Pondering this idea while walking Himalayan trails, I noted that the stories I kept hearing on the way were typically stories of journeys— journeys actually made between the places in a knot. Following up on this observation, the second conceptual proposition, and the second part of the book, examines these journeys and the routes they take place.

Against this background, I trace the transformations of western Himalayan trade, local efforts at building new roads, the cycles of boom and bust in the business of wildlife and medicinal plants, and the ebbs and tides of the Nepal– China border regimes associated with them.

In the Hi ma la yas, exchange, movement, and ambition usually congregate along certain lines defined by the geo graphical features of terrain, such as valleys cutting through the main Himalayan range or passes known to be free of snow for much of the year. In chapter 4— The Business of Wayfaring—I suggest calling these lines of repeated movements pathways. A pathway, I argue, is more than just another term for a venerable trade route but rather a site along which life unfolds. Very often, proximity to a pathway is more important than the distance to an urban center. Pathways are thus as much a social as a topographical configuration. They frequently stand in competition to each other, and their importance is linked to infrastructure as well as shifting border regimes and market demands.

A source of inspiration in this endeavor to understand Himalayan pathways is Tim Ingold's distinction between wayfaring and transport (Ingold 2008). As a mode of movement, wayfaring gives attention to the land that opens along the path and the myriad of interactions that take place. Transport, on the other hand, is concerned with the logistics of moving goods and people from place to place. This neat distinction, however, gets more complicated in the Himalayas. Here, wayfaring was always in the service of transport, and the "business of wayfaring" is directly dependent on infrastructure.

In chapter 5— A Quest for Roads— I discuss the role of roads for the business of wayfaring. After a de cade of road construction frenzy on the Tibetan Plateau, many valleys in northern Nepal are now easily accessible from the north while they still lack road access from within Nepal. This has led to a quest for

new roads down from the Chinese border into the valleys of northern Nepal. Both in Humla and in Walung, such road projects were privately initiated. This chapter tells the story of these road construction projects, the revival of the old Himalayan institution of the seasonal trade mart, and the complex interactions with the state.

It examines a brief period of a boom followed by a tightening of border regimes and shows how the construction of roads in the name of connectivity is related to the emergence of new forms of remoteness and marginalization. Tracing the transformations in the business of wayfaring from sheep and goat caravans to mules and trucks, I discuss how they relate to investment in education, a shortage of agropastoral labor, and ambitions to profit from the new China trade.

Closely related to the quest for roads and their effects on old pathways is the question of distribution. After one of the roads described in chapter 5 was opened as a rough dirt track, I spent a couple of weeks with one of its initiators. He tried his luck as a government contractor, shipping subsidized rice to Humla in the context of a looming food crisis. Navigating the bureaucratic jungle of crossing borders and trying to find pack animals while a gold rush for one par tic u lar medicinal herb was raging through Humla, he encountered conflict between his role as a contractor and the frustrations of many house holds in Humla over the system of rice subsidies. Chapter 6— The Labor of Distribution— analyzes these issues. Distribution is at once a logistic prob lem and a matter of distributive justice. Both are intrinsically tied to the Himalayan business of wayfaring. I show how subsidies for rice and salt have altered the balance between the two dimensions of distribution. The subsidies have affected the role and position of Himalayan brokers and altered Himalayan trade as well as the relations between places in a knot. Engaging with James Ferguson's book Give a Man a Fish (2015), I argue that global development not only has a sedentarist bias but also emphasizes production over distribution.

Curation at Large

The third and last part of the book looks into the development industry and its initiatives in the Himalayas. They shape the wider sociopolitical context in which the work of maintaining translocal community and the business of wayfaring take place.

With a plethora of development agencies and NGOs seeking to address Nepal's most urgent prob lems, and a developmental state across the border in China rapidly reconstructing Tibet, the Himalayas find themselves enmeshed in a variety of external interventions. Unlike earlier "schemes to improve the human condition" imbued with high- modernist hubris (Scott 1998), the current mainstream of development discourse focuses on green and participatory approaches. This calls for a differ ent analytic perspective. I propose the idea of curation at large in order to analyze con temporary interventions in the name of development and conservation. Curation is thereby not understood in the museum sense of the term but rather in its original meaning of curare—to heal or to cure. The fragile mountain ecosystem, people suffering from underdevelopment, and cultural heritage are the primary targets of curation. The curational interventions to this end often ignore what I describe as place- knots and pathways. However, they also channel subsidies, open career paths, and provide temporary niches for lucrative business endeavors. The efforts of curating seemingly out- of- the- way places, then, facilitates certain kinds of connections while reinforcing remoteness for the sake of preservation.

Chapter 7— Curation at Large— and the preceding vignette describe a two-day planning workshop for the Kailash Sacred Landscape Conservation and Development Initiative (KSLCDI), one of ICIMOD's

signature projects. While Upper Humlalies right at the center of the initiative's project map, no local expert was among the 150 participants from China, India, and Nepal. During the two days I spent in a fancy hotel in Kathmandu, and especially in the coffee breaks between a tightly scheduled stream of pre sentations, frictions between the Chinese delegation and their Indian and Nepali counter parts came to light. While the delegations engaged in a shared universe of development rhetoric, the under lying curational ambitions differed substantially.

ICIMOD's transboundary landscape initiatives are inspired by the "landscape approach." In Chapter 8— Landscapes, Dreamscapes— I explore how such global approaches to development and conservation inform ICIMOD's programs and the practices of my colleagues. I argue that, for all their benefits, such ideas also obscure and partially erase the livelihood strategies, dreams, and ambitions of those they seek to help. A comparison of ICIMOD's approaches with the current efforts of the People's Republic to cure Tibet reveals a shared language yet a different emphasis. The Himalayan valleys along the northern border of Nepal find themselves wedged between these overlapping curational ambitions, which both have direct implications on the ground.

Chapter 9— Mapping Mountains— explores in more detail ICIMOD's tools and methods to research the ground realities they seek to understand. Mapping and geographic information system (GIS) technology are of utmost importance in this re spec t. A few weeks after the planning session I attended a workshop to assess the value of the "cultural ecosystem ser vices" in the Kailash Sacred Landscape with the help of artificial intelligence. While the endeavor failed, it clearly revealed that mapping is more than just an effort to gain a graphical representation of real it y. It serves as an ontogenetic strategy with the purpose of curating the reality it pretends to describe (Kitchin and Dodge 2007).

Weaving together the work of tying place-knots, the effort to tarmac and regulate old pathways, the business of wayfaring, the labor of distribution, and the curational ambitions of interventions in the name of development and conservation, the tenth and final chapter— Translating Ambitions— addresses the question of collaboration. It tells the story of four young Humli and Walungnga I met over the past de cade. While they helped me understand their cosmopolitan Himalayan lives, I helped them translate their experiences into the language of global development and academia. The chapter revisits the triangle of conceptual propositions regarding remote places and the cosmopolitan ambitions of those who call them—in one way or another— home.

The epilogue— Navidad— leads back to Queens, New York, where a young man tells me the story of his journey from Nepal to the United States of Amer i ca— a wayfaring odyssey following the pathways of mi grants and drugs through South and Central Amer i ca. His is a journey that goes against the grain of curational ambitions at large and, instead, relies on the assistance of the translocal Walung community.

In a nutshell, the three parts of book pre sent three intertwined themes: the notion of place-knots reveals the ways in which community is made translocally and sets the stage; the idea of pathways follows the storied threads woven into these place- knots and reconsiders the relationships between evolving socio-spatial configurations; and the concept of curation at large helps reflect on the context of global development and conservation efforts in the Himalayas.

While these three conceptual propositions are grounded in Himalayan particularities, they raise fundamental questions relevant for seemingly remote yet cosmopolitan communities around the globe. They suggest an approach to study globalization not from above or from below but from the edge. <>

BANDITS IN PRINT: "THE WATER MARGIN" AND THE TRANSFORMATIONS OF THE CHINESE NOVEL by Scott W. Gregory [Cornell East Asia Series, Cornell University Press, 9781501769214]

***Bandits in Print* examines the world of print in early modern China, focusing on the classic novel *The Water Margin* (Shuihu zhuan).**

Depending on which edition a reader happened upon, The Water Margin could offer vastly different experiences, a characteristic of the early modern Chinese novel genre and the shifting print culture of the era.

Scott W. Gregory argues that the traditional novel is best understood as a phenomenon of print. He traces the ways in which this particularly influential novel was adapted and altered in the early modern era as it crossed the boundaries of elite and popular, private and commercial, and civil and martial. Moving away from ultimately unanswerable questions about authorship and urtext, Gregory turns instead to the editor-publishers who shaped the novel by crafting their own print editions. By examining the novel in its various incarnations, *Bandits in Print* shows that print is not only a stabilizing force on literary texts; in particular circumstances and with particular genres, the print medium can be an agent of textual change.

Review

This is a page-turner. Framing its discussions within the text's material history, *Bandits in Print* paints a new picture of the life around the novel in Ming China and gives a fresh perspective on *The Water Margin*, dubbed one of the four masterpieces of traditional Chinese novels, in clear and engaging prose.

-- Yuming He, UC Davis

*Bandits in Prin*t is the history of an influential tale, a material object, and a movement: the rise of the long novel and how it reflected and fashioned the reconfiguration of intellectual life. This fascinating book will appeal to anyone interested in the circulation of power, objects, and information in the late Ming.

-- Andrew Schonebaum, University of Maryland

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The Bandits' Reception

The traditional long-form novel, as developed in late Ming China, could be endlessly reshaped and repackaged. Its text could be freely altered. Commentaries could be added to its chapters, whether at their beginnings, at their ends, or even interpolated into the text itself, in order to assist less-experienced readers or to provide interpretations. Prefaces could be appended in order to orient readers' expectations and understandings from the outset. Illustrations could be added, whether to the chapters themselves or in a folio at the front of the work. Decisions about what shape the novel would take—its text, paratext, and physical form—were made by editors and publishers of print editions in anticipation of their target readerships' needs and desires. As such, the Ming novel was a genre intimately tied to the medium of print.

Shaping the Novel

The novel The Water Margin (Shuihu zhuan), which appears to have been first printed in the early sixteenth century, exemplifies the relations between the genre and the dynamic print culture of the era. It was among the earliest such works, and among the most influential. It appeared—and continues to appear—in a wide range of forms, for different readerships, with different implied meanings. It created a sensation among its earliest readers and was the inspiration for many works that followed. This book follows the transformations of the Ming novel genre in print by tracing print editions of The Water Margin, a pathbreaking example.

The process by which a novel such as The Water Margin could be reshaped by editor-publishers is perhaps best illustrated by a note included in the front matter of a commercial edition printed by the Fujian publisher Yu Xiangdou, one of the most renowned such editor-publishers of the Ming. In the note, Yu distinguished his edition of the novel from the many others available on the market. He warned potential customers of the many shortcomings of his competitors' editions: many of them were only partially illustrated, or their texts lacked shi poems and ci lyrics and were therefore less suitable for recitation aloud. They were printed from woodblocks that had worn with age, creating images and text that were indistinct and difficult to make out. Only the edition of his own Shuangfeng tang publishing house, Yu declared, was fully illustrated and featured commentary in its margins. Yu went on to note that he had edited the text, removing all impediments to leisurely browsing and ensuring that all of the characters used were correct. "From front to back," he concluded, "in all twenty volumes of the book, there is not a single mistake in a single sentence. Gentlemen customers can recognize the mark of the Shuangfeng tang house."

It is apparent that, in shaping his edition, Yu took into account his potential readership. He calculated that they demanded texts that were clearly printed and easy to read, with illustrations and a mix of prose and verse of various kinds. He recognized that they had heard of The Water Margin before, and

that they did not want to miss out on any of the features that the competition offered in their own editions. With these factors in mind, he crafted an edition of the novel and had it carved on wooden blocks. He, or his Shuangfeng tang firm, would have had to estimate the number of copies that the market could bear, purchase paper accordingly, and turn the visions into material reality through print. Since printers of novels in the Ming used woodblocks rather than moveable type, the calculations did not need to be exact; there was no need to tear down the page layout and recover the font after a run. An edition's woodblocks could be kept indefinitely—or at least until they became blunt and blurry through repeated stamping. They could also be rented out or sold to other printing establishments, perhaps in different geographical areas, to further defray costs.

Other than the expectations and desires of their readerships, Ming editor-publishers like Yu were unimpeded in their ability to repackage and reshape the novel at will. In terms of legality, it almost goes without saying that there was no formal copyright system in place that would have prevented editor-publishers from altering the texts of novels as they saw fit. If anything, it was they and not any authors who could claim legal rights to the texts of their editions; there was a precedent of woodblock imprints containing warnings against unauthorized copying, and at least one publisher, as this book will show, made indignant assertions that his editing work was a form of intellectual labor from which he was entitled to profit. There are some parallels here with the development of the copyright system in Europe, wherein it was publishers who claimed that authors held the natural rights to their creations, and that those rights were transferred to them. Titles would be recorded in a central registry so that the publishers could prove that they held the rights to their texts and pursue action against "pirates" who appropriated them unlawfully. Despite the similarities between these claims of some publishers in the Ming and those in the Europe, the former did not enter claims of ownership in a registry or conceive of an exclusive right to a text.

Moreover, an editor-publisher reshaping a novel for publication would not have felt any compulsion to be true to an author's "original" text. The names of novelists were shadowy at best, and even when a name was closely associated with a work, that name rarely held much significance for how the novel was understood. In the case of The Water Margin, authorship was attributed to two names, Luo Guanzhong and Shi Nai'an, usually in some combination as author and editor or compiler. Yet next to nothing is known about either man, and the existing sources seem to indicate that they lived long before known editions of The Water Margin began to appear in the sixteenth century. The earliest available sources claim that Luo Guanzhong was a loner who took the sobriquet "Wanderer of the Lakes and Seas" (Huhai sanren) and lived sometime around the time of the Yuan-Ming transition. Various accounts claim he was from either Taiyuan, Qiantang, or Dongyuan. In addition to The Water Margin, Luo Guanzhong was also credited with the authorship of Romance of the Three Kingdoms and a handful of other works, including Record of the Sui and Tang (Sui Tang zhizhuan), The Three Sui Quash the Demons (San Sui pingyao zhuan), History of the Remnant Tang and Five Dynasties (Can Tang wudai shi), and The Rouge Chamber (Fenzhuang lou). However, judging from the various commentaries, prefaces, and other writings, readers do not seem to have taken these works to form a consistent oeuvre, whether stylistically or thematically. As for Shi Nai'an, almost nothing is known of him; claims that he lived in the late Yuan or that he was a native of Qiantang appear to be based merely on the assumption that he worked in tandem with Luo. Whatever the case, editor-publishers would hardly have had to worry about someone like Luo Guanzhong or Shi Nai'an lodging a complaint about their treatment of their

work. Nor, more important, would they have to worry about their readerships expecting a work to conform to a particular authorial style known from that author's other works.

Finally, an editor-publisher would also not have felt any obligation to maintain fidelity to the moral character of an author. More culturally privileged forms of writing such as shi poetry were tightly bound to their authorial figures; there was an underlying assumption that, by reading the poem, one came to know its author. This close association would discourage overt textual meddling. With the nascent long-form novel genre of the Ming dynasty, there was no such hermeneutic of character to prevent editorial tampering.

In sum, the Ming novel was a highly flexible genre that could be reshaped endlessly in print by editor-publishers. Editor-publishers would shape editions with an eye to their anticipated readerships, not to an author or any other original stakeholder. Editor-publishers were free to modify a novel, add to it, or cut from it to suit the needs and desires of that readership, whether the goal was to express membership in a certain group, to create profit, to use it to circulate ideas or police interpretations, or any combination thereof.

Editions

In the case of The Water Margin, the differences between editions were far from simple or cosmetic ones. Rather, they struck to the very heart of the work's significance. The Water Margin is in essence a collection of intertwined stories telling of men such as Lu Zhishen, the "tattooed monk" who caused havoc in a monastery with his drunken brawling, or Wu Song, who battled a tiger to the death with only his bare hands. There is Song Jiang, the minor official who goes on the run after killing his adulterous wife and who becomes an underworld leader. And there is Li Kui, the "Black Whirlwind," whose exaggerated fits of blind rage lend a comic edge to the proceedings. The novel moves from one story to the next, at times weaving them together as the men cross paths, and in the denouement they all gather in the Hall of Loyalty and Righ teousness in a lair beyond the watery marshes of the title. Yet through paratextual materials such as prefaces, "how-to-read" essays, and inter textual commentaries, the editions suggest to their readers widely dis parate interpretations of the meaning of these intertwined tales. Some treat the rebellious content cautiously, while others unapologetically glorify these outlaws and suggest that they are paragons of virtue in an age of corruption.

The sheer variety of editions of The Water Margin that appeared in the Ming demonstrates this flexibility of the novel. In addition to the competing editions, now lost, of which Yu Xiangdou complained in the 1590s, there were others that had appeared at least fifty years earlier Those editions, the earliest known, were not the products of for-profit publishers like Yu, but rather of the elite world around the Jiajing court Both the Censorate bureau and the Marquis of Wuding, Guo Xun, pro duced editions. Another edition, published in the 1580s, purported to be based on the Wuding edition and featured a preface signed Tiandu waichen, believed to be a pen name of Wang Daokun. Within a decade after Yu Xiangdou's edition, multiple editions featuring commentaries attributed to the noted iconoclast Li Zhi appeared in the marketplace Then, on the eve of the Ming's collapse, Jin Shengtan produced his severely truncated and reworked edition. A fragment of yet another edi tion, believed to be from the Jiajing or even the Zhengde reign and sim ply called Record of the Loyal and Righteous (Zhongyi zhuan), was discovered in the collection of the Shanghai Municipal Library in 1975. The main texts of the various editions are divided into two major recensions, the so-called simple recensions (jianben) and full

recensions (fanben). These differ in both style and content, with the former narrating more epi sodes but in simpler language, and the latter narrating fewer events but using a more elaborate prose style.

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A Phenomenon of Print

As Yu's note about his competitors' editions makes clear, variation in Ming novels like The Water Margin was different from the types of variation seen in poetry and manuscript. It occurred in print, but print did not stabilize the text, nor did it transform the shadowy Luo Guanzhong and Shi Nai'an into "authors" in the strong sense of the word, with an oeuvre, as it did with Shakespeare. It did not even firmly fix the moment of the novel's creation in time, as the yawning gap between those purported authors' eras and the earliest known editions of The Water Margin attest. With no strong presence of an author, no assumption that the work expresses the author's aims, and no textually fluid manuscript transmission process, editor-publishers held the power to reshape The Water Margin as they saw fit. Their guiding purpose was to meet the needs and expectations of their anticipated readerships. They would speculate as to those particular needs, have their visions set to woodblocks, and print books for those readerships. The variation of The Water Margin is a phenomenon of print.

By treating The Water Margin as a phenomenon of print, this book sidesteps several thorny problems that have plagued studies in the past. First, it avoids the question of authorship, not by solving it once and for all but by rendering it moot. As we have seen, even if the attribution to Luo Guanzhong and/or Shi Nai'an is accurate, these men would have lived more than a century before the appearance of printed editions in the record in the early sixteenth century. The earliest known printed editions, which appeared in the period of time I call "before the fire" in this book, were then followed by a steady stream of new editions and comments about the work—what has been called "Water Margin fever." Earlier editions, whether manuscript or print, would not likely have had the same impact either in their time or afterward.

Second, by treating The Water Margin as a phenomenon of print, we sidestep the question of the literary merit of vernacular fiction. Studies of this complex of genres often assume that they were of "low" status, "despised" by the literati for its "vulgar" language. In this study, I suspend such literary judgments, instead returning particular editions to the circumstances in which they were produced. This includes other works printed by their publishers, cutting across generic lines we might otherwise impose on them. Rather than considering a work such as The Water Margin as the product of a particular genre, we can think of it as one of many literal products of a particular publishing agency of some kind, in particular social, historical, and literary contexts. This book will also take into account, to the extent possible, specific readerships and how they read the novel.

Finally, this approach considers a work like The Water Margin not as a single idealized work that is substantiated in various forms but as a series of reshaped works. By doing so, the relations between not only the work itself and other works of the genre, or the genre and other genres, but also between the work and other instantiations of itself come to the fore. Here, we must modify the concept of the reception of a work. Reception theory, as outlined by figures such as Hans Robert Jauss, places individual works of literature into a "literary series," in which each successive work can "solve formal and moral problems" presented by the previous and pose new ones for the next.24 In the case of the late Ming novel, with its varying editions and textual fluidity, it is necessary to move away from the

"work" and toward the "edition" to better conceive of the "literary series" into which it is to be inserted. That literary series will oftentimes contain previous editions of the same work, and subsequent editions will attempt to solve the formal and moral problems presented by previous editions.

Chapter Outline

This study is divided into two main parts, with an interlude in-between. The first section focuses on the early, elite editions of The Water Margin that were printed by and circulated among the elite of the Jiajing court during the period "before the fire." Chapter 1 is concerned with an edition printed by Guo Xun, Marquis of Wuding, a military figure of hereditary rank whose ancestors had taken part in the founding of the Ming. Chapter 2 deals with an edition printed by the Ming Censorate, the dynasty's highest oversight body. Neither of these editions survives, precluding textual analysis. However, the purpose of this study is to reconstitute the field around these two missing editions and to reconstruct the social environment in which they were created. What did it mean to print and publish The Water Margin in this early era, long before the publishing boom of the late sixteenth century? What sorts of other books were "adjacent" to it, and what were their genres? Toward whom were the printing projects of Guo and the Censorate oriented? These chapters turn to historical records; bibliographies; "casual jottings," or biji; and other such materials in order to answer these questions.

The interlude, Chapter 3, turns from the early publishers of The Water Margin to one of its earliest known readers, the literatus and playwright Li Kaixian. It will demonstrate how Li Kaixian and his extended social circles bring together the two publishing entities of the first section. It will also attempt to deduce what The Water Margin meant to Li both before and after his exile through a reading of his casual writings and one of his dramatic works. Additionally, it will contrast these activities with the gradual emergence of a more commercially oriented mode of novel creation, as personified by Li Kaixian's near-contemporary, the printer Xiong Damu.

The second section follows The Water Margin as it was transformed by the dynamic commercial publishing industry of the late Ming, in the period "after the fire," as Water Margin editions began to answer the Jaussian "formal and moral problems" posed by other editions of itself. Chapter 4 follows The Water Margin as commercial editor-publishers adapted it for the tastes of their particular readerships. In particular, they added prefaces, commentaries, and other forms of paratext with particular points of view, often satirizing the social order and flirting with "outlaw" values. These include the aforementioned Shuangfeng tang edition of Yu Xiangdou and the slightly later Rongyu tang edition featuring commentary (spuriously) attributed to the renowned iconoclast Li Zhuowu. This chapter suggests that the voices of these added materials were distinct enough that they could be considered "characters" themselves, rivaling the characters in the novel in terms of their presences.

Chapter 5 then looks to the edition of Jin Shengtan, which eclipsed all others upon its appearance in the waning years of the Ming. Jin appeared to be both inspired and outraged by the Li Zhuowu edition, and staged his own radical intervention in the novel. He made drastic changes to its text and appended to it several prefaces and an elaborate commentary. Because of their close attention to the surface of the text, these paratextual materials have frequently been mined by scholars for insights into the aesthetics of the traditional Chinese novel. However, this chapter will argue that such "literary" qualities of Jin's commentary have been overemphasized at the expense of his own original thought, which engages in the discourse of values surrounding previous editions of The Water Margin.

The conclusion returns to the legacy of The Water Margin in its various incarnations, and to the traditional novel genre to which they belong. It also discusses implications of treating the novel as a phenomenon of print for the study of the genre. <>

THE HUMANIST ETHICS OF LI ZEHOU by Zehou Li, Robert A Carleo [SUNY series, Translating China, State University of New York Press, 9781438491431]

Li Zehou's thought has achieved wide popularity and influence among both academic readers and the broader Chinese-reading public. His culminating views on ethics are collected here in a series of essays that highlight the importance of Confucian philosophy today. Li's groundbreaking ethics presents a powerful contemporary theory--one that inventively reconciles longstanding oppositions between relativism and absolutism, emotions and rationalism, and relationality and individuality. Seeing ethical values and principles as embedded in human psychology, society, and history, Li affirms their relativity; he also affirms the objective rightness and wrongness of beliefs, norms, and acts through their contribution to human progress and flourishing. Li thereby endorses modern Enlightenment liberal values, including individualism, rights, and freedoms, but from an original philosophical foundation. By drawing on classical Confucianism to prioritize the situated, relational, emotional constitution of human life, this concrete brand of humanism offers unique modern conceptions of the nature of reason, the source of morality, selfhood, virtue, and much more.

Review

"Imbued with Li Zehou's unique anthropo-historical approach and theory of sedimentation, these essays creatively integrate liberal principles and traditions with classical Confucian ethics to propose a new global ethics system. Robert A. Carleo III translates Li's most mature and culminant essays into unerringly precise and graceful English." -- Jinhua Jia, University of Macau

"This is another valuable addition to the growing field of Li Zehou studies. Li is a highly original thinker, who offers a nuanced extension of classical Confucian ideas by drawing on Western figures such as Kant and Marx. The book offers an inviting commentary on what modernity could mean for China, and even humanity as a shared concern. Carleo's translation is first-rate and offers numerous helpful notes and recommendations for further readings, thereby opening up the text to readers unfamiliar with Li's work." -- Andrew Lambert, College of Staten Island, City University of New York

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A Particular Sort of Rationalist Humanism

The works collected and translated here culminate a prodigious effort—the effort with which Li Zehou met our third millennium. In them, and especially in the concluding essay on "History, Ethics, and Metaphysics," Li gives the final word on his "ethics." This ethics, as I understand it, is an ultimately humanist project: Li affirms actual living humans to be the fundamental source of morality and insists we take into account the specific, empirical conditions of human life in deciding what principles to live by. So rather than a didactic or exhortatory argument promoting humanist ideals or principles, Li argues for a comprehensive view of morality that is humanist in its structure and orientation.

Below I draw in broad strokes some basic elements of these ideas as put forth in the writings that follow. Many were first elaborated in the foundational essays of Li's Ethics, originally published 1999-2004. The dedication he thereafter poured into elaborating these views and their implications shows how dear they were to his heart, as well as the urgent philosophical and social import he assigned to them. Those original statements of Li's moral philosophy were collected alongside subsequent explication as his Ethics (Lunlixue gangyao) in 2010,1 which became part of Li's larger Outline of a Philosophy (Zhexue gangyao), published the following year.' Therein, Li prioritized Ethics in presenting his overall philosophy, placing it first in Outline's tripartite organization of Ethics, Ontology, and Epistemology in both the original and later expanded editions.' That grander philosophy offers much beyond Li's moral theory, but is also deeply integrated with it. Even a basic understanding of Li's ethics intertwines with his broader views on human existence and understanding. But there and across much of his published work, Li's ethics takes pride of place. Most importantly, elaboration of these views, and especially their uniquely rationalist and humanist dimensions, poured forth in recent years through Li's ever-impressive industry.

The texts in this volume were originally published 2014-2019 and culminate that prolific rush. As with the foundational essays on ethics, these recent works bear less on specific questions of ethical conduct (substantive rules for how we should or should not act) and more on how to understand and approach those questions in the first place. In them, Li pushes us to see that our vision of human values and morals, of ethical acts and moral principles, occurs through a lens of human psychology that is shaped by culture and history. Li guides us to critically examine that lens itself rather than just the moral landscape we see through it, and he induces us to adjust the lens to a more humanist tint.

Li Zehou spearheaded these later writings by elaborating his ethics as "A Response to Michael Sande'," included as the appendix to this volume. But there Sandel, a major contemporary moral philosopher, functions mostly to offer a thin comparative framework for re-presenting and contextualizing Li's own views, and less as a true object of criticism. Why Michael Sandel? For one thing, Li tells us below that addressing "questions like those Sandel puts forth" is the "true task of philosophy"—a task largely lost in the more specialized inquiry that dominates the academic discipline today (Response §1.2). This makes Sandel a model philosopher, and also one of the relatively few scholars who engage in the same kind of discussion as Li. It probably doesn't hurt either that Sandel has risen to astronomical heights of popularity in Mainland China, not simply academic but among the broader public—and so matches Li Zehou here as well. But most important, I expect, is that like the main thrust of Li's Response, Sandel's work forms a robust and sustained attack on modern liberal philosophies of individualism and rationalism. Their outlooks and agendas overlap. So what is Li responding to, exactly?

Li insists we shift our basic approach to ethical questions and bid farewell to the typically modern search for abstract principles by which to reliably, rightly guide moral choice. Sandel's works of public philosophy—his bestsellers Justice: What's the Right Thing to Do? and What Money Can't Buy in particular—largely rehearse the familiar ways that modern philosophers have attempted to answer moral questions: Should we sacrifice the fat man to stop a trolley about to kill five people? Or is there a proscription from harming him that means the trolley should run its brutal, murderous course? Especially in Justice, Sandel uses this approach as a heuristic to examine the strengths and weaknesses of predominant moral philosophies, and in doing so he illustrates that none of the familiar lines of philosophical reasoning seem broadly successful. This dramatically, if unintentionally, illustrates part of Li's main point: that sort of purely rational, abstract, universalizing approach to moral reasoning fails us. We need to move beyond asking simply what principles—deontological or utilitarian—better guide our choices and which better align with moral intuition. Sandel gives us a bunch of ethical lenses to try out. Li wants us to consider where the lenses come from and why.

This is one important reason to have centered his discussion on Sandel. Another is to more precisely frame his true targets of criticism and praise. Sandel offers arguments that, like "communitarians" generally, criticize liberalism while remaining to some extent philosophical bedfellows with it. Li intends to do the opposite. He affirms rather than rebukes liberal principles and liberal tradition: though hardly infallible, the tenets of liberalism are of tremendous value and should be broadly implemented, affirmed, and prioritized. But he wants to graft these onto a new philosophical foundation, one based in concrete human life, its situated history, and its emotional relations. Here Li is often much closer to Sandel than he lets on.' Both fundamentally reject the individualist Kantian conception of the self. But Li wants us to turn our sights further, and perhaps even in a different direction, than Sandel—toward the classical Confucian outlook of an "emotional cosmology," "emotion as substance and the integration of emotion and reason in Chinese virtue ethics. The contrast with Sandel's turn toward republican and Aristotelean conceptions of virtue, which remain relatively individualist and tend to oppose the passions to reason, helps more sharply distinguish and precisely delineate the finer points of Li's arguments.

Li's refined elaborations of these views in "On Ethics" and "Further Comments on Ethics" were published following a series of symposiums held in 2014 (the year Response was published) in which Li deployed the ideas of Response in the style of Sandel himself, as public philosophy. At open forums with students and professors in Shanghai, Li discussed Sandel's examples within the framework of his own philosophy.

His published comments, translated below, bring out Li's insights, concerns, and clarifications in reflecting on those discussions so as to better elucidate ideas central to his Ethics: the nature of moral psychology, the Confucian conception of the self, the distinctively Chinese tradition of virtue ethics, the pervasive but implicit influence of Xunzi's philosophy in Confucian tradition, the contemporary importance of classical Confucianism, the shortcomings of sociobiologist explanations of morality, and other themes broached in Response. Li is relatively systematic in these comments compared with the freer dialogic style of the rest of this volume, and in this more organized manner he develops select points of his ethics—those of particular importance and continuing relevance—in novel and illuminating ways.

The crown jewel of these short texts on ethics is "History, Ethics, and Metaphysics." In many ways it presents a distillation of the core points of Response and Ethics—their ultimate maturation and

refinement. The dialogue—this time with an actual, real-life interlocutor, Liu Yuedi (in Response Li poses the questions to himself)—is informal and loosely structured. It is itself the maturation of public, published discussion between Li and Liu that has been ongoing for years Here the ethical role of "emotion" so highly emphasized in Response, although still crucial, takes a backseat to Li's rationalism and concrete historicism. The dialogue centers on his argument that "metaphysics" and the "a priori" are constructions of human reason that arise historically through lived human culture. In elaborating this, Li brings forth new dimensions of his theory. For one, he adds emphasis on Mencius's "tremendous contribution" to his affirmation of traditional Chinese "emotional cosmology" Having long celebrated the thought of Xunzi, a main philosophical rival of Mencius, Li here "tops off" his philosophy by lauding core dimensions of Mencius's moral teachings. He also renounces the label "Marxist," which he has long given himself. For those familiar with Li's oeuvre, this is a dialogue of fireworks. It has depth, color, and excitement to boot.

The texts below thus have a particular chronology to them, and their interconnections trace the path and crescendo of Li Zehou's culminating work on ethics. The later texts give increasingly refined expression of the arguments of the former. They are also richly informed by the former and fully grasped only in light of them. At the conclusion of the final dialogue, Li expresses that he is content to leave it all at this: he has said what he has to say on the issues. We have here a tremendous finale. <>

DAO COMPANIONS TO CHINESE PHILOSOPHY edited by Kim-chong Chong [Dao Companions to Chinese Philosophy, Springer, 9783031180019]

This book provides an analysis of the complex philosophy of Liang Shuming. This twentieth-century thinker opened up a number of paths that were to become central components of modern Chinese philosophy. For the first time, experts are brought together to analyze the complexity of his philosophy, which continues to exert a considerable influence today. This edited volume covers Liang's multifaceted thought as informed by his many identities as a Buddhist, a Confucian, a Bergsonian, a rural reformer, and a philosopher. The volume will appeal to students, scholars, and general-interest readers.

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The different chapters in this Dao Companion to the Philosophy of the Zhuangzi cover different aspects of, and reflect different styles and methods in approaching, the Zhuangzi. Part I, Authorship and Commentary, involves the question of authorship and other textual issues. Part II, Concepts, contains accounts and analyses of some central concepts in the text. Part III, Language and Metaphor, is concerned with the significance of the language and metaphorical styles of the text. Part IV, Zhuangzi in the Context of Chinese Philosophy, situates Zhuangzi's philosophy in terms of its relation to and comparisons with other Chinese philosophies. Part V, Ethical, Social and Epistemic Issues brings up issues of values and knowledge arising from readings of the text. Finally, Part VI, The Zhuangzi and Western Philosophy, draws comparisons between the text and Zhuangzi on the one hand, with some Western philosophical texts and figures on the other.

Instead of summarizing all the individual chapters (some authors have contributed two each: Lo, Raphals, and Fried), I will do the following. I shall first describe what we know about the person Zhuangzi, his ideas and what he represents, both through the text of the Zhuangzi and through the records about him. In the course of this, certain questions and issues arise and we shall then see how the various parts and chapters address them. We shall also have occasion to make certain remarks about the scope of "philosophy" with reference to the Zhuangzi.

Who was Zhuangzi? Much of what we know comes from anecdotes in the text named after him. These tell of his poverty, scorn of officialdom and those who lower themselves for office and wealth, questioning the distinction between being useful and useless, and the value of being useful by conventional standards. In one memorable anecdote, Zhuangzi is outrageously sitting with his legs sprawled out, pounding on a tub and singing at the funeral of his wife (Watson 1968: 194). Some people have (jokingly) remarked that perhaps he did not love his wife and was happy over her departure. However, this story is one representation, among others, of Zhuangzi's criticism of Confucian ritual norms. In the story, Zhuangzi goes on to describe the process of life and death as being equivalent to the change of the four seasons. Thus, this story informs us too about Zhuangzi's attitude of equanimity toward life and death and his philosophy of living in accordance with nature.

Apart from the stories, there is hardly any historical record of Zhuangzi the person. We have, for instance, the Confucian philosopher Xunzi's remark that Zhuangzi was blinded by heaven (i.e. nature) and did not know the human. There is also a biography of Zhuangzi by the Han dynasty historian Sima Qian (c.145-86 B.C.E), brief enough to be cited in full here.

Zhuangzi was a man of Meng (è'™). His personal name was Zhou. Zhou once served as an official at Qi Yuan in Meng. He was a contemporary of King Hui of Liang and King Xuan of Qi. There was nothing on which his learning did not look into, but in essence they derived from the words of Laozi. Thus his writing, over 100,000 characters, consisted mostly of imputed words (yuyan). He wrote Yu Fu (The Old Fisherman), Dao Zhi (Robber Zhi), and Qu Qi (Rifling Trunks), in which he defamed the followers of Confucius and brought to light the teachings of Laozi. The likes of Wei Lei Xu, Geng Sang Zi and others were all empty words without reality. Yet he was skilled in writing and turns of phrases, veiled references and analogies, and with these he excoriated the Confucians and Mohists. Even the learned men of that time were not free (from this). His words overflowed without restraint to suit himself. Thus important people from kings to dukes downwards were unable to make use of him in any capacity. King Wei of Chu heard that Zhuang Zhou was a worthy. He sent a messenger with lavish gifts to welcome him (to his court) with the promise of making him prime minister. Zhuang Zhou laughed and told the messenger from Chu: "A thousand jin is great profit and the ministership an esteemed position. But how is it that you have not seen the sacrificial cow in the suburban sacrifices? Fed for several years, it is then dressed in embroidered silk to enter the Great Temple. At that point in time, although it wishes to be a solitary piglet, how could it be realized? Go away quickly, do not pollute me. I would prefer to romp happily in a slimy ditch, not to be restricted by any ruler. Till the end of my life I shall not take office so that I can happily do as I wish. (Sima Qian 1982: 2143-2145)

Despite its brevity this biography provides information about Zhuangzi's affiliation with the teachings of Laozi, his criticism of the Confucians and Mohists (the major philosophical schools of his time), and the style of his writing. It also tells us that the rulers were unable to make use of him in any capacity because " His words overflowed without restraint to suit himself." However, the anecdote at the end suggests

that this had more to do with Zhuangzi's rejecting the rulers rather than their rejecting him. Apparently because of his fame as a "worthy," King Wei of the state of Chu extended an invitation to take office which Zhuangzi scornfully rejects. A similar story can be found in Chapter 17 of the text, "Autumn Floods" (Watson 1968: 187–88). This story is significant in representing Zhuangzi's anti- authoritarian streak and the value that he places on individual freedom. While many other intellectuals of his time were concerned with giving advice on governance to the rulers, Zhuangzi kept them at a distance.

Sima Qian also mentions three writings which can be found in the extant Zhuangzi.4 These are "The Old Fisherman" (Chapter 31), "Robber Zhi" (Chapter 29), and "Rifling Trunks" (Chapter 10). The first of these criticizes the extent toward which the performance of ritual propriety had become mechanical and devoid of spontaneous feeling; the second attacks Confucius as being self-deceptive and hypocritical; and the third expresses moral skepticism.

None of these, however, belong to the first seven "Inner" chapters of the extant text, widely believed to be the work of Zhuangzi himself. Esther Klein's earlier "Were there 'Inner Chapters' in the Warring States? A New Examination of Evidence about the Zhuangzi" has been very influential in questioning the common assumption that the Inner Chapters were written by Zhuangzi (Klein 2011). The chapters in Part I, Text and Authorship, take up this and related issues. In "Early Chinese Culture and the Zhuangzi Anthology: An Alternative Model for Authorship," Esther Klein develops her views further by, among other things, questioning the provenance of anecdotes about Zhuangzi or Zhuang Zhou, and giving an account of the processes of textual formation and concluding that the Zhuangzi is "an anthology of somewhat uncertain authorship."

In "The Authorship of the Zhuangzi," Yuet Keung Lo reexamines a variety of historical, textual, philosophical and archaeological evidence to give a more nuanced answer as to whether the historical Zhuang Zhou authored the Inner Chapters. Lo agrees that the very idea of "authorship" makes it practically impossible to ascertain that Zhuang Zhou was the author of the Zhuangzi. Nevertheless, he argues that this traditional belief has yet to be disproved. Zhuang Zhou was a real historical person and hence there is a real possibility that he wrote some parts of the Zhuangzi as we know it. Nor can we rule out the possibility that at least some of the Inner Chapters as we know them did exist in the Warring States period. However, their existence does not necessarily mean that they originally belonged to what we identify as "Inner Chapters" since Guo Xiang had redacted the Zhuangzi. While acknowledging the strength of some of Klein's arguments in her earlier paper, Lo at the same time gives others the scholarly attention that they deserve. He is probably the first (so far as I am aware) to engage this earlier paper properly and in substantive detail. Scholars on the Zhuangzi will, I am sure, appreciate this exchange of ideas between Klein and Lo.

In The lashi chunqiu as Commentary on the Zhuangzi, Scott Cook shows how the former established a model for a commentarial tradition on the latter with its reading of certain key passages. Several chapters in the later sections will refer to traditional commentators and tell us more about their views on the Zhuangzi (see for example, the chapters of Chai, Lin, and Tan) in their discussions of certain concepts and ideas.

The mention of King Hui of Liang (370-319 BCE) and King Xuan of Qi (319-301 BCE) in Sima Qianâ€™s biography indicates that Zhuangzi was a contemporary of Mencius (Mengzi) who is recorded in the Mencius as having conversations with both kings. This was the height of the chaotic Warring States

period when various states fought for power and control over vast territories, culminating in the final victory of the state of Qin and resulting in the unification of the Chinese empire in 221 BCE. Some studies suggest that Zhuangzi belonged to a ruling clan in the state of Song that was deposed by another. Eventually, Song was conquered by other states and divided up among them. Zhuangzi was probably greatly affected by these events and instead of writing tracts or treatises on governance, devoted himself to more spiritual matters (Wang 2012: 169â€“178). If true, this account might partly explain the element of self-preservation in his philosophy.

There is no record of any philosophical rivalry between Mencius and Zhuangzi in the texts named after them.6 However, we find the following aims, thoughts and beliefs in the Zhuangzi to which Mencius was directly or indirectly opposed. These are the aims of self-preservation and nourishment of one's own life; the claim that morality is an artificial construct; the assertions of skepticism (both moral and epistemic); the thought of tian (heaven) as referring to nature or the natural and as nonnormative; the assumption of and belief in the possibility of an ideal primitively simple life; and the belief that there is no essentially moral human nature apart from basic desires, needs and capacities. In the Zhuangzi, we also find something that is not in the Mencius: metaphysical speculation about the non-distinctness and oneness of all things, and about dao as the origination of things opposed to the dao or way of bringing about proper moral governance (Chong Forthcoming).

Sima Qian says that Zhuangzi brought to light the teachings of Laozi. In con-temporary terms, this would make him a Daoist (daojia) and in fact Zhuangzi is regarded as the second most representative figure of Daoism after Laozi. However, we should note that this classification was made later in the Han dynasty and there was no such designated school during Zhuangzi's time. Certainly, there was no reference to any Daoist school in the Mencius, and as we have mentioned, Mencius and Zhuangzi were contemporaries. The philosophy of the Zhuangzi, in fact, has an unique integrity of its own. It is therefore important to understand it in terms of some concepts that occur in the text. A careful study will reveal intricate relationships between them and both the unique and unified nature of Zhuangzi's philosophy as a whole. It may also help us to understand what was behind Xunzi's astute remark that Zhuangzi was blinded by heaven (i.e. nature) and did not know the human. Indeed, the term tian or "heaven" may be said to be the overarching concept of Zhuangzi's philosophy which encompasses all the others mentioned.

Thus, in Part II, Concepts, Franklin Perkins examines the divisional relation between "Heaven" (tian) and the "Human" (ren). Masayuki Sato discusses the concepts of "Transformation" and the philosophy of "Transformation of Things" (hua and wu hua), showing how this philosophy links together and runs through several chapters of the Zhuangzi. Steve Coutinho discusses the "Ontology of the Vast and the Minute" (da and xiao); Keqian Xu examines the nature of the "True Person" (zhen ren) and its relation to "True Knowledge" (zhen zhi); David Chai discusses the idea of having "no-emotion" (wu qing; and Lisa Raphals analyzes the philosophical import and scope of ming in Zhuangzi's philosophy, a term which has commonly been translated as "fate" or "destiny."

Sima Qian says that (Zhuangzi) was skilled in writing and turns of phrases, veiled references and analogies...." He mentions the use of imputed words or metaphorical words (yuyan). In the Zhuangzi, beside yuyan, two other tropes are mentioned. These are zhongyan or the words of those whom people respect, and zhiyan or iœgoblet words. This is a reference to a wine goblet which, when full, would tip and pour out its contents. Similarly, Zhuangzi's goblet words are such as to empty themselves

when poured forth (see the chapters of Fried and Lin in Part III. Also, Lin 1989, 1994. Shang, in Part VI, provides another interpretation in his comparison of Zhuangzi with Nietzsche.). An investigation of the significance of these metaphors will necessitate analysis of different facets of his style of writing and use of language, which is so uniquely different from the more prosaic style of other texts in the period of the Warring States.

This is the subject of Part III, Language and Metaphor. Zhuangzi thinks that language is inadequate in some way or ways to communicate ideas. What exactly is the problem and is there a paradox here? Why does the Zhuangzi use language in such paradoxical ways? Roy Porat, iœ Language in the Zhuangzi, provides a synopsis of these issues. Daniel Fried's "Three Words" discusses the three tropes mentioned earlier. In "Humor and its Philosophical Significance in the Zhuangzi," Hans-Georg Moeller argues that Zhuangzi's humor serves a philosophical purpose or purposes in different ways. Philosophical argument has conventionally been conceived in terms of propositional syllogisms and theories (metaphysical, epistemic, and so on). Instead, Moeller shows how the stories in the Zhuangzi serve to deconstruct certain entrenched ideas and ways of looking at things. In "Those Who Fly Without Wings," Shuen-Fu Lin shows how, in the Inner Chapters, Zhuangzi skilfully uses variation on the leitmotif of flying to depict the supreme ideal figure of the Sage, Perfect Person, or Daimonic Person and who embodies absolute spiritual freedom. At the same time, Lin reveals an intricate coherence and unity to the Inner Chapters in terms of this technique of variation. Lin's chapter provides many insightful readings of passages in the Zhuangzi, including the views of various traditional and contemporary commentators.

Together, the chapters in this section provide an important insight, namely, that a conception of philosophy which sharply separates it from literature is untenable. This point has been made by others, elsewhere. Romain Graziani, for instance, has stated that in the Zhuangzi, "the tale, the parable or the fable is never the lesser relative of philosophy...Zhuangzi sets himself and his thought in the constantly changing depiction of the particular, by alternating voices, locations, characters, and tones. His style of composition is clearly in tune with his purely philosophical intentions" (Graziani 2021: 6). And Julianne Chung has argued that Zhuangzi is a "fictionalist" whose language does not aim at propositional truth but instead allows the reader to recognize and to engage with more open-ended perspectives (Chung 2018, see also Chong 2006). In this regard, aesthetic features of works of art, including literature, might be related to, or can be said to have, cognitive or epistemic value (Chung 2018). It should be noted that "philosophy" in a more traditional Chinese sense is inseparable from literature and would also be inclusive of other cultural elements such as practices of "self-cultivation." We shall say a bit more about this later.

Despite questions about who wrote the Zhuangzi, the person, character, and free spirit of Zhuangzi have long become an integral part of, and entrenched in, Chinese philosophy and culture. The chapters in Part IV, Zhuangzi in the Context of Chinese Philosophy, compares Zhuangzi and his philosophy with other Chinese philosophers and philosophies across some periods of Chinese history. These comparisons enable us to highlight and to better understand some aspects of Zhuangzi's philosophy.

Thus, in "Zhuangzi and the Laozi: An Intertextual Approach," Daniel Fried discusses the relation between Zhuangzi and Laozi from an examination of the texts named after them, and other texts as well. Sai-Hang Kwok analyzes a somewhat neglected topic, namely, the interaction between Zhuangzi and the Logicians, showing us how the former responded to the latter; and Angel Ting looks at the philosophical differences between Zhuangzi and Xunzi. The Confucian Xunzi is widely believed to have

been influenced by Zhuangzi, even though critical of him. An examination of their different views helps to illuminate Zhuangzi's philosophy. Yuet Keung Lo discusses "Wei-Jin Xuanxue." The Wei-Jin (third to sixth century A.D.) was a period of disunity during which certain figures provided new readings of texts such as the Analects, Laozi, Yijing, and the Zhuangzi. Lo pays particular attention to the work of Guo Xiang who is widely known for his redaction of the Zhuangzi in 33 chapters, and which serves as the extant text which we all rely on today.

It is common for readers of the Zhuangzi to remark that it reminds them of Buddhist philosophy, given passages in the text about the attitude of equanimity toward life and death. It is also commonly believed that it paved the way for the reception of Buddhism in China. In "The Zhuangzi and Buddhism." Lynne Hong describes the intellectual interaction between the two philosophies in different periods of Chinese history, and investigates the differences between them via two shared topics: the pursuit of liberation and the methodology of dual negation. With reference to the early Buddhist canon Nikãya in Pãli, and Ãgamas in Chinese, she compares the Buddhist idea of liberation with that of the Zhuangzi. And she draws upon the philosophy of Nãgãrjuna in discussing how some later Daoists came to base their methodology of dual negation on both the Zhuangzi and Buddhism.

Mingran Tan's chapter is "Wang Fuzhi's Evaluation of the Zhuangzi." Wang Fuzhi was a Neo-Confucian in the early part of the Qing dynasty. Although critical of Zhuangzi, Wang reinterpreted both Zhuangzi's philosophy and Confucianism, eventually reconciling the two. Wang belongs to a school of thought that ultimately regards Zhuangzi as admiring Confucius and articulating his views, and may perhaps even be said to be a part of the Confucian school.

Earlier, we mentioned that "philosophy" in a traditional Chinese sense would include practices of "self-cultivation." For the Confucians, this largely refers to moral self-cultivation. For Daoists, however, this refers to a practice or practices of nourishment of the body and even certain religious practices. In this regard, Pierre Hadot's remarks about ancient philosophy in the West would apply equally to ancient Chinese philosophy: "Philosophical discourse...originates in a choice of life and an existential option—not vice versa...The philosophical school thus corresponds, above all, to the choice of a certain way of life and existential option which demands...ultimately a certain desire to be and to live in a certain way. This existential option, in turn, implies a certain vision of the world, and the task of philosophical discourse will therefore be to reveal and rationally justify this existential option, as well as this representation of the world" (Hadot 2004: 3). In "Inner Alchemy and Mystical Experience in the Zhuangzi," Kei Yeung Luk discusses passages in the Zhuangzi from which we may try and understand the concepts related to the practice of self-cultivation. And in "Zhuangzi and Religious Daoism," Livia Kohn describes how Zhuangzi is situated, and how he became venerated, within the tradition and practice of religious Daoism.

Scholars of a more purely sinological bent sometimes complain that present-day philosophers treat Zhuangzi as if both the person and the text can be understood in contemporary philosophical terms. Others, too, might even say that doing this subordinates Zhuangzi to Western philosophy and philosophers. These are legitimate concerns. But as Tao Jiang has aptly put it elsewhere, philosophers place "much more emphasis on studying the conceptual resources contained in the inherited texts available to Chinese intellectuals over the ages and on reconstructing those ideas as a potential conceptual resource in dealing with philosophical issues of contemporary significance, often in dialogue with Western philosophy" (Jiang 2016: 52). Indeed, the Zhuangzi is a highly stimulating and imaginative

text prompting philosophical reflection. The nature of the Zhuangzi is such that more than any other ancient Chinese text, it can be said to invite, and indeed welcome, a diversity of methods and philosophical approaches towards its study. Used with some care, the conceptual resources and instruments of philosophical investigation, argument, and analysis can enrich readings of the text and bring out issues in ways that a purely sinological or traditional approach may be unable to. These include eliciting from the Zhuangzi ethical, social, and epistemic insights.

Thus in Part V, Ethical, Social and Epistemic Issues, Chris Fraser gives an account of what he calls "Interpersonal Ethics" in the Zhuangzi given its rejection of Confucian moral norms; Wai Wai Chiu discusses the notion of "Filial Piety" in the Zhuangzi, in a way that is very different from some others who have regarded it as endorsing the Confucian idea of filial piety; and Tao Jiang discusses "Personal Freedom and the Good Life in the Zhuangzi," giving an account of the "Zhuangist" (other authors alternatively use "Zhuangzian" or "Zhuangian") conception of freedom and what constitutes a "good life." In "The Social and Political Implications of Zhuangzi's Philosophy," Kim-chong Chong shows how, instead of being merely a spiritually comforting idea in the face of death or a means of attaining spiritual freedom, the philosophy of "transformation of things" and its corresponding idea of the "oneness of things" can ground the values of freedom, pluralism, and a sense of common humanity with others.

Three chapters in this section deal with different aspects of knowledge. The issue of whether and how Zhuangzi is a skeptic has been much discussed in the literature. David Wong describes what he calls "Constructive Skepticism" in the Zhuangzi. This also involves a reading of how the notion of perspectives is to be understood. Next, the question of how to understand the knowledge and agency of certain "skill masters" has also been a subject of much discussion (see for example, Lai and Chiu 2019). This is taken further by Karyn Lai, in "Performance and Agency in the Zhuangzi." She presents an account of agency embedded in some of the stories of the mastery of certain skills in terms of action, habit, attentiveness, responsiveness and cultivation. The performances of the masters, though seemingly automatic, are not just merely habitual, however. There is the need to respond attentively to situational contingencies, and hence also the risk of failure. But at the same time, this allows us to understand the possibilities of human achievement. And in the last chapter of this section, Lisa Raphals provides an account of "Neuroscientific and Cognitive Perspectives on the Zhuangzi" where she discusses insights gained from it about the nature of the self, the intimate connection between the body and cognitive processes, and how techniques of meditation allow for "forgetting," "emptying the mind," and dissociating the mind from the body.

Increasingly, both Zhuangzi and the text have become subjects of comparisons with Western philosophy and philosophers. The subjects of comparison in Part VI, The Zhuangzi and Western Philosophy, though evidently not exhaustive, nevertheless show what is possible. Such comparisons, if done well, may both help to illuminate some ideas of the Zhuangzi and provide philosophical insights generally. In the first chapter of this section, Rohan Sikri discusses "The Art of Nourishing Life" in relation to the "Therapeutic Dialectics" of the Platonic dialogues. Next, Sonya Özbey discusses "The Cementing and Loosening of Human Bonds" in her comparison of Spinoza and the Zhuangzi. Geling Shang provides a study of "Zhuangzi and Nietzsche." Both philosophers have often been briefly compared. Here, Shang provides a more thorough and systematic comparison. Eric Nelson discusses "Heidegger and the German Reception of the Zhuangzi." And finally, in "Zhuangzi's Notion of the True Master and Wittgenstein's Grammatical Investigation," Leo Cheung analyzes the concept of "I" in the Zhuangzi, and

shows how it can be further elucidated through certain "grammatical" remarks of Ludwig Wittgenstein's.

It is of course impossible to provide a "comprehensive" account of any philosophical text, let alone one as rich as the Zhuangzi. The present volume also does not cover venerable traditions of scholarship on it in other European languages, such as French and German, for instance (although Eric Nelson does discuss the German reception of the Zhuangzi), not to mention Asian languages such as Japanese and Korean. But the chapters in this volume should serve as a "companion" and guide by informing the student and relatively uninformed reader about various aspects of the Zhuangzi as we have described above, including the different styles and methods of approaching it. Together, they offer an appreciation of, and insights into, a complex and fascinating text with many different layers of meaning.

Accommodating the different methodologies and styles has meant giving some leeway to the presentation of the chapters. For instance, some authors have required more space than others. This is generally the case with the more sinologically grounded chapters. Also, authors cite or make use of different editions of the Zhuangzi, together with different translations of passages and chapter titles. No attempt has been made to standardize them and the reader should be aware that part of the complexity in attempting to understand the Zhuangzi lies in its different translations and readings. This includes the readings of the traditional Chinese commentators (as may be gathered from some of the chapters in this volume) and translations in contemporary Chinese. There are some overlaps and different treatment of certain terms and issues among the different chapers (such as on authorship, transformation, goblet words, skepticism, Zhuangzi's metaphysical position, the idea of the self, the good life, and so on). The more specialized readers should find the contents of (at least some of) the chapters to be original and engaging. As one reviewer aptly said, although he/she does not agree fully with some of them, "this is due to the complexity of Zhuangzi's thought itself, and different views can be inspired by each other." <>

THE MATTER OF WONDER ABHINAVAGUPTA'S PANENTHEISM AND THE NEW MATERIALISM by Loriliai Biernacki [Oxford University Press,9780197643075]

In the early 11th century, the Kashmiri philosopher Abhinavagupta proposed panentheism-seeing the divine as both immanent in the world and at the same time as transcendent--as a way to reclaim the material world as something real, something solid. His theology understood the world itself, with its manifold inhabitants--from gods to humans to insects down to the merest rock-as part of the unfolding of a single conscious reality, *Siva*. This conscious singularity-the word "god" here does not quite do it justice--with its capacity to choose and will, pervades all through, top to bottom; as Abhinavagupta writes, "even down to a worm -- when they do their own deeds, that which is to be done first stirs in the heart." His panentheism proposed an answer to a familiar conundrum, one we still grapple with today: Consciousness is so unlike matter. How does consciousness actually connect to the materiality of our world? To put this in more familar twenty-first-century terms, how does mind connect to body?

These questions drive Loriliai Biernacki's **THE MATTER OF WONDER: ABHINAVAGUPTA'S PANENTHEISM AND NEW MATERIALISM**. Biernacki draws on Abhinavagupta's thought--and

particularly his yet-untranslated, philosophical magnum opus, the *Isvara Pratyabhijña Vivrti Vimarsini*--to think through contemporary issues such as the looming prospect of machine AI, ideas about information, and our ecological crises. She argues that Abhinavagupta's panentheism can help us understand our current world and can contribute to a New Materialist re-envisioning of the relationship that humans have with matter.

CONTENTS

In this book I argue that the panentheism of an 11th-century medieval Indian Hindu thinker can help us to rethink our current relationship to matter. Writing in northern India from 975 to 1025 CE, the Kashmiri philosopher Abhinavagupta (950–1016) articulated a panentheism— both seeing the divine as immanent in the world and at the same time as transcendent— as a way of reclaiming the solidity, the realness of the material world. His theology understood the world itself, with its manifold inhabitants, from gods to humans to insects down to the merest rock as part of the unfolding of a single conscious reality, Šiva. This conscious singularity— the word "god" here does not quite do justice to the pervasive panentheism involved— this consciousness, with its capacity to choose and will, pervades all through, from top to bottom; human and nonhuman, as Abhinavagupta tells us, "even down to a worm— when they do their own deeds, that which is to be done first stirs in the heart." His panentheism proposed an answer to a familiar conundrum, one we still grapple with today— that is: consciousness is so unlike matter; how does it actually connect to the materiality of our world? To put this question in more familiar 21st-century terms, how does mind connect to body? This particular question drives the comparative impetus for this book.

Abhinavagupta

A towering figure in India's philosophical landscape, influential far beyond the boundaries of his native Kashmir in the thousand years since his death, Abhinavagupta wrote extensively on Tantra, an innovative religious movement that began in India in the first half of the first millennium. Tantra as a religious system cut across religious boundaries, steering Buddhist groups and sectarian Hindu groups, Saiva and Vai^^ava, and even an abstinency minded Jainism6 away from an earlier ascendant asceticism to a philosophy and a praxis more keenly focused on the body as part of the path of enlightenment and on ritual, especially ritual involving the body. Perhaps in keeping with Tantra's attention to the body, it may not be surprising to find Abhinavagupta exercising his keen intellect as well in the domain of the senses, writing also on aesthetic theory. And while Abhinavagupta is especially well known today for his writing on Tantric philosophy and ritual, it is probably fair to suggest that historically in India his pan-India fame rests especially on his writings on aesthetics, where his theoretical interventions shaped aesthetic understanding through the following centuries. This material, sensual orientation shapes a physical

portrait we have of him as well. One of his devotees, as Pandey tells us, a disciple who studied directly with Abhinavagupta, Maharaja Yogin, gives us a visualization of Abhinavagupta. Certainly, the intervening centuries make it hard to accord it any genuine accuracy; still the image we have is evocative, redolent of a sensual, physical embrace of the world. His long hair tied with a garland of flowers, bearing the insignia of a devotee of the god Siva, rudrākla beads, and three lines of ash on his forehead, he plays a musical instrument, the vïna, and in an anticipated Tantric gesture, two women are at his side holding lotus flowers and the aphrodisiac betel nut. Portraits aside, Abhinavagupta's writing is compelling and fresh even after these ten centuries precisely because of Abhinavagupta's ability to weave philosophy within a mundane material awareness. Keen in its psychological comprehension, his acute sensibility of how the mind works can help us navigate our own contemporary engagement with the matter all around us.

My Argument

Particularly for a New Materialism, I propose that Abhinavagupta's articulation of panentheism, centered around a foundational subjectivity, gives us a first- person perspective that may offer a helpful intervention for our world today as we rethink our own relationship to matter, to the natural world around us, other humans and nonhumans, and the rapidly disappearing insects and worms that cross our paths. Abhinavagupta's panentheism postulates a single reality, Šiva, which unfolds out of itself the wonderful diversity of our world. He tells us that

> the category called Šiva is itself the body of all things. "On the wall [of the world which is itself Šiva] the picture of all beings appears, shining forth"— This statement indicates the way that all these appear.

His panentheism aims to keep our sights on the world, with all its matter and multiplicity, as real. A tricky endeavor for a singular reality, Šiva, a nondualism. Classical, familiar attempts at nondualism try mostly to show us how our idea of the multiplicity of the world as real is just a mistake in judgment. Abhinavagupta's panentheism instead reformulates the relationship between matter and consciousness. He draws on psychological, linguistic modes, the idea of subject and object, to tell us that we find nested within materiality the possibility of a first- person perspective, even in a mere rock. We find consciousness at the heart of matter. Rethinking the boundaries of life, matter, and consciousness, his strategy offers a way to think through materiality, for a New Materialism in particular, compelling in its decentering of the human.

I focus on key elements of Abhinavagupta's panentheism to address central issues for a New Materialism. First, his use of wonder (camatkāra), I propose, serves to alter our vision of matter, pointing to its essential liveliness. Moreover, it reinscribes transcendence within a bodily subjectivity. Second, I suggest his use of the term vimarša, a kind of active awareness, can help us think through how we get the idea of sentience, that is, to think through the relationship between what is living and what is not. Third, I propose that he uses his inherited cosmological map of what there is (familiar to students of India as the tattva system) to map phenomenologically how this originary consciousness, Šiva, progressively transforms its original subjectivity in stages to become objects, the materiality of earth and water that make up our world. Fourth, in addition, I suggest that he draws on the tattva system to chart how we get the many out of the One. Fifth, I propose that we may read the theology he gives us of the subtle body as a way of affording intentionality to the affective processes of the body, outside of human egoic intentions.

Finally, I propose that Abhinavagupta's strategy for connecting consciousness to materiality can instruct our own century's adoptions of panpsychism and dual-aspect monisms, models that contemporary philosophers and scientists use to solve the problem of how life and consciousness relate to mere matter— particularly in terms of our current enthusiasm for ideas of information. In this, I use Abhinavagupta's philosophy to address issues relevant for us today, and I do so comparatively, drawing on our own current cultural preoccupations to frame his panentheism. In sum, I argue that Abhinavagupta's panentheism is too important a resource to not be used in our current construction of our world, particularly in the face of our rapidly increasing capacity to manipulate matter— and, indeed, in view of the consequent ecological results.

In the five chapters that follow I present an outline of Abhinavagupta's panentheism, charting how his panentheism maps the relationship between materiality and consciousness, between immanence and transcendence. But my particular focus is on the material side of the equation. Abhinavagupta's nondualist panentheism has, assuredly, been invoked more generally in the context of an idealism, that is, more on the consciousness side of things. Here, I contend that paying attention to his sophisticated articulation of materiality can help us in our own understanding of what matter is and how it matters. To get a feeling for the importance of matter in his nondualism, we can compare him with another nondualist, the great nondual mystic of the 20th century, the South Indian Ramana Maharshi (1879–1950). Ramana Maharshi's philosophy is often aligned with the nondualism of Advaita Vedanta, the well-known Indian philosophical conception, in a nutshell (though this is perhaps too brief), that the world we experience here is illusory, is Mãyã. Ramana Maharshi instructs us to ignore the world. We do not need to know about the world, he tells us; we just need to know about the Self. He instructs us

> [t]o keep the mind constantly turned inwards and to abide thus in the Self is the only Self-enquiry. Just as it is futile to examine the rubbish that has to be swept up only to be thrown away, so it is futile for him who seeks to know the Self to set to work enumerating the tattvas that envelop the Self and examining them instead of casting them away.

In other words, we do not need to know what our world is made of in order to get enlightened. It is rubbish, futile knowledge; simply toss it out. In contrast, Abhinavagupta tells us:

> Now, it would not be correct to say that for our present topic— i.e., to convey the recognition of the Lord— it is not necessary to ascertain the world as object to be known; [this is not correct, because] only to the extent that one makes the world into an object, to the extent that it is known, can one then transcend the level of object, of thing to be known and allow the true sense of the knower to take root in the heart, its fullness being grasped by mind, intellect and ego.

Abhinavagupta addresses head on the assumption that enlightenment means we drop the idea of a world out there. Even if his readers might think that the path to enlightenment means concerning ourselves only with the highest, the recognition (pratyabhijñã) of the Lord, as we hear in the echoes of Ramana Maharshi's advice, Abhinavagupta instead reminds us that the fullness of insight also includes the materiality of the world. Only by knowing the world do we allow the real sense of the knower to blossom in the heart. It is, of course, important not to understate the legacy of transcendence and idealism that Abhinavagupta inherits and embraces. However, in this book I will focus especially on the materialist side of Abhinavagupta's thought. Rather than on the wall of the world that is Šiva, my center of attention is instead on the fantastic diversity of the picture, which has mostly been neglected in much of the excellent work on this thinker.

My Primary Source Material

My thinking on Abhinavagupta and his perspective on the materiality side of things has been especially influenced by my primary source material. I have worked particularly with the third section of one of Abhinavagupta's last works, his massive Ïšvara Pratyabhijñã Vivti Vimaršinï (IPVV), the Long Commentary on the Elucidation of Recognition of the Lord, composed in 1015 CE. The Sanskrit text, handed down in manuscript form through generations from Abhinavagupta's time, was first published in Kashmir in three volumes from 1938 to 1943; I draw primarily from the third section, titled the Ãgamãdhikãra, comprising 100 pages of Sanskrit. Abhinavagupta's text is a commentary; he provides explanatory notes to a text written approximately 50 years earlier by his great grand teacher Utpaladeva, the Ïšvarapratyabhijñãv IVTI (Elucidation of Recognition of the Lord), which is itself a commentary on a shorter set of verses composed by Utpaladeva, Ïšvarapratyabhijñãkãrikã (The Verses on Recognition of the Lord). Thus, we have a commentary on a commentary on an original set of verses. Abhinavagupta also wrote a shorter commentary on Utpaladeva's compelling verses, and Utpaladeva wrote his own autocommentary as well.

The Ãgamãdhikãra deals particularly with received knowledge, what the tradition has passed down. Ãgama is typically translated as "scripture" or "revealed text." Abhinavagupta and Utpaladeva, however, use the term not so much to focus on particular scriptures or textual sources, but rather to discuss knowledge of the cosmos, the cosmology that we find in the tattva system, the classification of all that exists, handed down by tradition. Abhinavagupta explicates the received tradition of cosmology, the tattva system, within his understanding of a subject– object continuum, offering us a map of how an originary consciousness, Šiva, unfolds to become the myriad objects that make up our world. The two chapters of the Ãgamãdhikãra chart out what the world is made of, following Abhinavagupta's Tantric classificatory scheme of cosmology, the tattvas, and then addresses the tradition's understanding of different modes of subjectivity in relation to the objects we find in the world. Describing these two chapters, Abhinavagupta tells us:

> So far [Utpaladeva] has explained how the group of tattvas exist as object and immediately preceding that he explained the nature of the subject also. Here, because of its importance, the text reveals the essence of the object because it is helpful for the recognition of one's own divinity. So it is a topic worth delineating in detail.

Again, we see Abhinavagupta telling us that we need to know the world; we need to know the essence of the objects we encounter if we want to achieve our own enlightenment. The Ãgamãdhikãra charts out the nature of the world, the materiality all around us.

Abhinavagupta's Long Commentary is interesting and helpful because he at times offers long and insightful expositions on various ideas that we do not find anywhere else; it is also difficult because Utpaladeva's autocommentary, the Elucidation (vivti), has been lost. As a result, Abhinavagupta's Long Commentary makes reference throughout to particular specific words whose source is no longer extant. Still, many of his long excursions are coherent and compelling without recourse to Utpaladeva's lost text; the situation is also remedied to some extent by the availability of Abhinavagupta's earlier shorter commentary (IPV). A translation for the Long Commentary as a whole and for this third section, the text of the Ãgamãdhikãra, is not yet available. For this reason, when I offer translations drawing from Abhinavagupta's writing and particularly this text, the Ãgamãdhikãra, to explicate Abhinavagupta's

thought, I give the passages of Sanskrit in the notes section at the end of each chapter. All translations are my own.

Panentheism and the New Materialism

Abhinavagupta's panentheism maps out the nature of matter, telling us we need to understand matter if we want to understand ourselves and our own enlightened divinity. This focus on what matter is, I suggest, can help steer our own thinking as we face a rapidly crashing environment and help to rethink how we relate to our material world. For a nascent New Materialism in particular, keenly attuned to how the way we think about matter directs what we do, Abhinavagupta's panentheism with its sophisticated articulation of subjectivity in relation to the matter of our world may help to refine our contemporary attitudes toward the rocks and insects and worms all around us. Of course, I am premising this suggestion on the provocative thesis that Lynn White articulated all those years ago— that our model of the world, our theology or cosmology, sets the stage for how we treat the matter of our world. Indeed, as the **OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY** attests in its helpful list of dated examples of usage, as early as 1991 we start to see panentheism associated with a way of addressing our environmental challenges. What is it about panentheism that makes it environmentally friendly? The answer to that question, I might venture, has to do with the idea of linking things that seem quite different from each other. Panentheism links the material world to something that is quite apart from its materiality, an outside force, a divinity, that transcends matter altogether. This cozy material affinity is indeed encoded linguistically in the word. As a concept itself, the prefix pan— that is, the world, matter, and materiality— is affixed to theism, the transcendence of deity. The two are not made into one, merged as in pantheism, but rather the materiality of the world and the transcendence of deity are linked, yet still held apart in a productive tension. In this sense, panentheism operates as a ligature holding in tension both the many and the one, both matter and transcendence.

I suspect that what made panentheism particularly attractive for Abhinavagupta in the 11th century was the ligature, its rather Tantric assertion to have one's cake and eat it too— that is, its claims toward both the materiality of the world and the transcendence of divinity. Panentheism can give us both consciousness and matter, not dissolving one or the other. Consciousness as something outside transcends the materiality of our world, yet it is held in productive tension with the world, not erasing the messy matter of immanence.

In this respect, panentheism points to a way of thinking about the link between matter and consciousness, a metaphysical hitching together of two seemingly polar opposites. This book as a whole also proposes a similar sort of ligature, a comparative project bringing together disparate elements in the hope of a productive tension, an 11th-century Tantric on the one hand and a contemporary New Materialism on the other. It focuses on our contemporary concerns around what is sentient— animals? viruses? artificial intelligence?— set in relation to Abhinavagupta's articulation of what gives rise to sentience. And the book deals with our current conceptions of information as data— articulated in juxtaposition to Abhinavagupta's theology of mantra, mystic sound. In this sense, the comparative project that unfolds in the following five chapters operates in the style of the 17th-century English Metaphysical poets, like John Donne, hitching together disparate things to reveal at the heart of things a sense of wonder.

Chapter Outline

Chapter One looks at Abhinavagupta's conception of subjectivity (ahantã) in relation to matter, and specifically in terms of what it can impart for a New Materialism. Subjectivity, (ahantã), a first- person person perspective, works as the fulcrum of his panentheism. What makes us sentient depends on our capacity to identify with the sense of "I," rather than the "this" (idantã), a state of being an object. Abhinavagupta reminds us that attention to subjectivity is needed for thinking through our relationship to matter. Notably, Abhinavagupta uses psychological, linguistic modes, rather than our more familiar ontological distinctions, to parse out the differences between humans and nonhumans and matter. Not ontologically driven, this modal formula, rather helpfully for a New Materialism, decenters the human in our cosmology. Humans and rocks alike share a fluid ability to move between being a subject or an object, giving us consciousness innate to matter. At the same time that Abhinavagupta asserts an innate capacity for sentience, even for things that seem to be dead objects, like rocks, he also proposes a way to differentiate between things that are sentient and things that are not. With this distinction we also examine how Abhinavagupta helps us to think through how we get multiplicity within a philosophy that claims there is only one reality. Throughout this chapter I offer a comparative assessment of Abhinavagupta in relation to a New Materialism. Walt Whitman, for instance, a figure frequently invoked for a New Materialism, also poses an expansive first-person perspective in his poetry, a similarity, I suggest, that shares with Abhinavagupta's first- personcentered philosophy a capacity to enliven objects. Chapter Two begins with a discussion of how science and scientists, from Carl Sagan to some contemporary neuroscientists such as Anil Seth, invoke wonder as a way of bringing in an atheistic transcendence. This chapter delineates Abhinavagupta's formulation of wonder (camatkãra), arguing that the phenomenology of wonder serves to underscore an inherent subjectivity, even in mere matter. Tracing out the Indian genealogy of wonder through its roots in cooking, we see Abhinavagupta emphasizes the sensory and sensual elements of wonder. At the same time, Abhinavagupta's conception of wonder offers a way of delineating between what is alive and what is not in a way that offers a permeable boundary between mere matter and life. Wonder happens, Abhinavagupta explains, when the "I" can reflect on itself; it is the signal of life, sentience. With a keen phenomenological attention, Abhinavagupta's analysis of wonder turns on its head the way we usually think of wonder. He tells us that the power of wonder is not so much that it offers a transcendence that leaves behind the fetters of an earth- bound material body, but rather that wonder instead alters our vision of matter, pointing to its essential liveliness. This in turn alters how we understand transcendence. It is not an up and out situation, leaving behind sluggish dumb matter; instead it points to an inwardness, a heightened subjectivity. Abhinavagupta rewrites transcendence in one other way as well. We typically imagine transcendence as a space of timelessness, above the change of the world. Abhinavagupta instead rewrites time back into this transformed notion of transcendence.

Chapter Three begins with a discussion of Darwin's description of his loss of faith when he witnesses the parasitic wasp infecting the caterpillar. How could a benevolent God create this sort of monstrosity, he asks— a parasitic wasp inside the caterpillar, two beings, one body, boundaries transgressed. Here the focus is on the boundaries of bodies and agency. In this context, I discuss Abhinavagupta's idea of the subtle body as a body also inhabited by something other than the person claiming the body. Here, however, in this Tantric case, the other consciousness inhabiting the body is not an invading parasite directing the body, but an image of deities directing the body. I suggest that Abhinavagupta's theological inscription of deities driving human action adds an important element to the notion of bodies and

matter. Abhinavagupta's theology offers a perspectival shift toward recognizing the body's own claims to intentionality, an intentionality that typically is only accorded to mind or spirit. In this sense, the panentheism out of which Abhinavagupta fashions his conception of the subtle body enfolds within it an upgrade for the idea of bodies, of matter. Theology here registers a respect for the affective processes of the body. Locating gods in the body tells us that the mind is not the master in the house; rather, sentiency, will, and desire arise throughout the body's functions, separate from the mind's desires. Moreover, this theology of the body proposes these multiple affective registers in a way that does not dwell (neither lamenting nor rejoicing) on the subsequent disappointment and loss of the sovereignty of the ego and its free will. So while a contemporary thinker like Brian Massumi strives to find a model to understand the complex, refractory affective flows of the body in a language of the virtual, Abhinavagupta instead reads this complexity of multiple affective flows through a lens of the forces of deities with their own conscious trajectories. In this respect, this panentheist theology affords a foundational liveliness to the multiplicity of agencies that make up the body. Here it is referenced in Abhinavagupta's map of the subtle body, which sees the body itself as an ecology of beings, materially embedded.

Chapter Four opens with the conundrum of computer sentience: Stephen Hawking's and Elon Musk's deep fears of artificial intelligence. This chapter uses this framework to address a key element of Abhinavagupta's panentheism: how we attain sentience. This chapter first points to the differences we find between a currently popular panpsychism and Abhinavagupta's panentheism. Even as contemporary panpsychism is appealing precisely because it brushes aside dualistic conceptions of God, still we see in its formulation the influences of a Western legacy of transcendence. In this chapter I propose also that rather than look at the terms ubiquitously used to translate the notion of consciousness from Indian languages to English— terms like cit, citi, or savid, which are typically employed to talk about consciousness— instead the term vimarša more closely approximates what contemporary neuroscience understands as consciousness. I suggest that Abhinavagupta affords priority to vimarša precisely because of its links to activity, a capacity to do things in our material reality. With this observation, drawing on Harald Atmanspacher's classificatory work, we look at how Abhinavagupta's dual- aspect monism stacks up in relation to other 20th-century Western conceptions of dual aspect monisms. I conclude the chapter by returning to my initial query regarding computer sentience.

Chapter Five returns to Darwin's anguish and loss of faith over the parasitic wasp and discusses newer findings that suggest the idea of signaling and information- sharing across species. The parasitic wasp comes to lay its eggs inside the caterpillar because the plants being attacked by the caterpillars signal to the wasps via pheromones. Using this framework, I then take up the idea of information where information, as I have discussed elsewhere, takes on a dual nature, both as material substance and as something that conveys mental intentionality. I draw comparisons with contemporary Western ideas of information, its links to New Materialism and to Abhinavagupta's panentheism as a way of thinking about consciousness as information. The idea of information, I suggest, is attractive for a current perspective because it seems to take away the subjective element of knowledge, giving us something we can measure and manipulate. Yet, if we examine it more closely, I propose that instead what makes information powerful as a concept for us today is that it embeds an unspoken bivalency, which links back to the intentionality and meaning of the subject who knows. The final section of this chapter ties this bivalency back to Abhinavagupta's articulation of subjectivity (ahantã) and its corollary, a state of being object (idantã). Through this background, I examine Abhinavagupta's account of how we get diversity, agonistic

relations of wasps and caterpillars, in a nondualism, a system where there is only one consciousness. I suggest that interpreting the tattva system, the cosmology Abhinavagupta inherits, as a phenomenology of consciousness moving from subjectivity to object, Abhinavagupta demonstrates a panentheism that is capable of unfolding to embrace the rich diversity that makes up our world.

This book, then, is about this medieval philosopher's panentheism and what it might have to offer for our world today as we think through the complexity of our relationships to our world's myriad others, to both biologically living and nonliving matter. My hope is that it will afford us new ways of thinking about materiality that can help alleviate our current planetary predicament. <>

WHY LOOK AT PLANTS? THE BOTANICAL EMERGENCE IN CONTEMPORARY ART edited by Giovanni Aloi [Series: Critical Plant Studies, Brill, 9789004375246]

Winner of the 2019 Outstanding Academic Titles award in Choice, a publishing unit of the Association of College & Research Libraries (ACRL)

WHY LOOK AT PLANTS? proposes a thought-provoking and fascinating look into the emerging cultural politics of plant-presence in contemporary art. Through the original contributions of artists, scholars, and curators who have creatively engaged with the ultimate otherness of plants in their work, this volume maps and problematizes new intra-active, agential interconnectedness involving human-non-human biosystems central to artistic and philosophical discourses of the Anthropocene.

Plant's fixity, perceived passivity, and resilient silence have relegated the vegetal world to the cultural background of human civilization. However, the recent emergence of plants in the gallery space constitutes a wake-up-call to reappraise this relationship at a time of deep ecological and ontological crisis. Why Look at Plants? challenges readers' pre-established notions through a diverse gathering of insights, stories, experiences, perspectives, and arguments encompassing multiple disciplines, media, and methodologies.

Amarcord

Plants on the table, plants on the floor, plants on chairs, plants hanging on the walls, plants perched on windowsills, plants spilling over either side of the balcony railings—my grandmother's terrace was a miniature forest in its own right, or at least, so it seemed to me. I was five years old. From my lower than average viewpoint, her balcony was a true wilderness: one with its mythologies, enchanted inhabitants, unrepentant villains, and secret passages. A climbing jasmine, a honeysuckle, different varieties of pansies, variegated petunias, the sculptural dish-like foliage of leopard plants, red geraniums, deep red gloxinias, tall ferns, fuzzy fern-asparagus, a giant rubber plant, slender orange and yellow zinnias, African daisies, sharp mother-in-law tongues, dark-leaved Irish roses, two small palms, nasturtium, nasturtium, nasturtium, and a bonsai-like money-tree were only some of the many plants she grew there. These varieties did not come from fancy gardening centers.

Her botanical collection was assembled between the 1960s and 1970s, and was at its peak in the early 1980s. Each plant had a story: almost all came from local friends or family members. My grandmother's passion for plants was well-known in the small Calabrian village, Italy's deep south, where she lived. It was therefore not unusual for a friend to come around for coffee— always unannounced—with a cutting wrapped up in wet cotton wool, or sticking out of a small container of some sort. Small size terracotta pots were not readily available, and plastic ones were rare too, so anything from an empty coffee tin to a jam jar, or a well-rinsed tuna tin could do. My grandmother would duly transplant the cuttings into bigger containers, but tins and jars would always stay around. She needed them to reciprocate vegetal gifts at the earliest opportunity. So, some small plants would spend prolonged periods of time growing out of a beans tin, waiting for the next family friend to stop by.

Cuttings were part of an open-ended botanical-dialogue between plants, people, balconies, and gardens. Giving cuttings was a deep sign of affection—a heartfelt gift—a sharing of something personally treasured to whose growth and well-being a person had directly contributed over time. Care was inscribed in this gift on two registers: in the act of giving and in the gift itself. In time, the plants would become place-markers for memories, special occasions, alternative family genealogies, births, and deaths. They were much more precious than any plant bought at the market on the streets behind the church. Biologically speaking, these plants were most regularly "old" varieties, some of which could not be found, or were never available, in the commercial realm at the time.

There was a sense of magic to those gifts—some plants would acquire mythical status. You'd regularly hear that such and such had a blue variety of this usually white flowering plant; or that an elusive giant strand of this or that had been sighted, somewhere, in someone's garden many moons ago.

My grandmother and other relatives had a few plants that, they claimed, came from cuttings gifted to them by the richest woman in town. She was only ever referred to as "the Baroness" and lived in a beautiful villa a couple of miles inland. My grandmother helped with the housekeeping. The building was surrounded by acres of land planted with bergamot, figs, and olive trees—that was partly where her wealth came from. A giant palm grew next to the building, granting a stately demeanor. She lived in Milan for most of the year and only stayed at the villa during the summer months. She loved plants and regularly shipped rare and expensive varieties down south from the most prestigious gardening business in Italy: The Fratelli Ingegnoli. The business opened its doors in 1789 and pioneered crossbreeding as well as genetic manipulation techniques in Italy. Their catalog was simply jaw-dropping: amongst others,

it featured utterly beautiful exotic varieties, and rare European strands of sought after roses. My great-aunt owned a mesmerizing wholly white tropical hibiscus, claimed to be from the Baroness's own collection—she was very proud of it and would not make cuttings from it very often. I remember looking at those pure-white flowers against the dark green foliage—it was somewhat unreal—the unicorn of flowering shrubs—I have never encountered it ever again, anywhere.

But my grandmother didn't seem to be preoccupied with notions of rarity just as much as she was not concerned at all with a systematic approach to her collection—and that is what made her gathering of plants so interesting and unique. She deeply loved them and regularly anthropomorphized them. Her plants could be "sad," or they would "smile at her," or could be "annoyed with her." To a certain degree, it was all knowingly humorous. Despite the popular culture stereotype that casts those who love plants as lonely lunatics, my grandmother was the center of the family—she was deeply loved. Yet, there was something fascinating about her enjoyment of plants that surpassed the simple notion of "hobby" or "pastime." They made her world so rich. She cared for them on the grounds of this joy they brought to her life. She loved them just as much as she loved animals. She never liked captivity—most of her pets came and went as they pleased. Like plants, they were usually brought to her by friends and family—a nestling found under a tree and unable to fly, or a bird with a broken leg, or wing, due to a window collision. She would take care of them and release them thereafter—some of them would stick around for a while. I remember that, for years, a magpie would come back to visit after being cared for by her as a chick. My mom remembers an owl that, well before my time, used to come back to visit almost every evening. It is safe to say that when it came to plants and animals, my grandmother instinctively operated a flat ontology of some sort—an ontological orientation of compassion for the nonhuman that much anticipated contemporary philosophical concerns in the posthuman sphere. Today, at the tender age of forty-one, as I continue to cultivate my own interest for plants and animals, I consider myself lucky to have been exposed to her influence.

But back then, things were different. Towards the end of the 1980s, her nonscientific approach to the nonhuman became the point of divergence between us. My early interest in animals and plants, for which she was largely responsible, began to be influenced by the disciplinary optics of natural history and its patriarchal ways. Around the age of ten, David Attenborough became my undisputed hero—I watched every single one of his wildlife documentaries with religious devotion. A couple of years later, my science teacher set Gerald Durrell's My Family and Other Animals as summer reading—I was ready. Jars, meshes, boxes, tweezers ... anything I could use to catch an animal or put an animal into, to look at, for a while, was fit for purpose. My grandmother did not approve—the question: "and when are you going to release that?" would be inevitably directed at me with impeccable timing. I could no longer see the magic in her terrace. To my eyes, the adventurous wilderness had turned into a jumble of intricate and unguided vegetal growth. Mind you, not much had changed with it, but I had. I was more and more interested in taxonomy, collecting, archiving, drawing what I found, taking notes, and reading "young naturalist" manuals.

My grandmother passed away in 2003 after a long battle with cancer. Much of her exuberant plant collection had already been dispersed when she moved from her old home by the creek to a modern apartment with a narrow and smaller south east facing balcony which, she lamented, was "always too sunny and baked the plants." Some of the original plants still exist today. They are in family members'

homes and gardens. The plants that outlived her have become invaluable material markers of absence in a complex and lengthy process of mourning: an extension of our dead ones in the silence of the living.

The Silence of the Plants

In the years that followed my grandmother's death, my interest in nature remained constant. However, growing up, I struggled to find ways to incorporate this interest in my professional life. Nature was the subject of my photographic work while studying at the London College of Printing. It was at Goldsmiths University that I had the opportunity to shape my own views on animal presence in art for my MA thesis whilst attending the meetings of the British Animal Studies Network.4 Animal Studies was still much of an underground movement—for better or worse, it has since been institutionalized and incorporated in the fierce capitalist system that now rules academia worldwide. Publishers have quickly taken note of the field's commercial potential and conferences on the subject are now a regular occurrence around the globe. Twenty years ago, the so-called "animal-turn" was still "philosophically fresh" and conceptually exciting—its promise was to recover animals from the anthropocentric erasure operated by the sciences and the humanities to rethink our entanglements and coevolution beyond the traditional ontology of species. It was this genuinely bold proposal that brought me to launch Antennae: The Journal of Nature in Visual Culture in March 2007. The journal pioneered a hybrid magazine/academic approach, mixing scholarly texts with interviews, fiction, artists' portfolios, and poetry to widen participation in cultural/ artistic discourses. Since its inception, Antennae has encouraged multidisciplinary dialogue and knowledge crossover among artists, scientists, environmental activists, museum curators, scholars, and most importantly students around the world.

What's in its name? The word antennae was lifted from Ezra Pound's (famously requoted by Marshall McLuhan) essay titled "Henry James" in which he wrote: "Artists are the antennae of the race, but the bullet-headed many will never learn to trust their great artists." Still today, this quote underlines Antennae's ethos and cultural mission. I had no other alternative names in mind for it. The animal/technology connotation the word antennae encapsulates seemed to perfectly nod to the posthuman sensitivities emerging at the time. Yet, I knew that the masthead needed a line to more clearly fasten the content—that is when I decided that "animals in art" would have been far too restrictive. I wanted the journal to be as open as possible to reflect my understanding of an ontological turn, not simply an animal one. So, I decided to settle with the utterly complex, old-fashion, and stereotypically open term nature. At that time, I had come to conclusion that nature is nothing more than a representational construct—the multiple overlapping configurations through which we reduce, rationalize, and moralize the nonhuman as Other. From the word go, it was evident to me that discussing human/animal relations in an arena where human and animals ontologically occupy privileged agential roles, came with unsustainable critical limitations.

The epistemic limits of animal studies became very clear to me pretty early on, in 2008, when I was invited to speak at the first The Animal Gaze symposium. There I presented a paper titled "The Death of the Animal" on the controversial artists whose works included animal killings. The argument was plain and simple: some contemporary art involving animals, despite its aesthetic appeal, is very classical in essence: animals are reduced to metaphors and the message being sent is deeply anthropocentric. In the impossibility of materializing human death, some artists used animals as proxy.

I thought this subject would be well received at a conference of this kind at which artists and humanities scholars constituted the vast majority in the audience. But I was about to find out otherwise. When time for the Q&A came, I was attacked on two fronts. On one side were those who just did not want to see those works. Instead of facing animal death in art for the purpose of critically understanding the phenomenon, some blamed me for "promoting" such works. On the other, were those who simply could not come to terms with my criticism of Peter Singer's conceptions of "journey model" and "interest".

According to Peter Singer's now mostly outdated and highly anthropocentric views, what outlines the possibility of granting equal consideration to a nonhuman being is an individual's capacity for "suffering and enjoying" which defines the trajectory of a "journey model of life" driven by agency and intentionality. In other words, only animals that appear to share a similar understanding of a human conception of "being alive" deserve ethical consideration. I have always found this view, one of the foundations of animal rights, to be extremely problematic. On what account should I consider myself the arbiter, or the normative measure of other nonhuman beings' sentience or will to live? I provocatively addressed my critics, saying that both a cow and a carrot pursue equally valid "journey models" involving different forms of "personal interests" and displaying various forms of agency and intentionality. The attack intensified, my point of view was duly trivialized via wholly personal and nonacademic "ethical" and moral schemes—there was no mediation, no compromise, or remediation. I was laughed off—the horrid idea that animal and vegetal life could be, even momentarily, compared on any grounds was safely put in the back of everyone's mind—order was restored, coffee was served, everyone filled their mouths with pastries throughout the break.

This experience marked the next few years of my involvement in Animal Studies. I kept thinking about plants and how they seem to short-circuit animal studies discourses in such a profound way. As a result, I became more and more fascinated by this phytophobia, so much that in 2011 I published two issues of Antennae entirely dedicated to plants in contemporary art. The autumn issue featured the results of an online experiment called "The Silence of the Plants." An article on the subject of plants and ethics published by The New York Times was offered for public commentary on a blog platform. It led to a challenging and interesting discussion amongst some of Antennae's readers, contributors, and board members. The article titled "Sorry Vegans, Brussels Sprouts Like to Live Too" was an intentionally provocative piece that triggered interesting responses.8 The exchange encompassed many important points including the Derridian notion of "eating well"; pressing questions about the possibility/impossibility of having compassion for the vegetal world; the vegan reluctance to acknowledge plant sentience as mitigator of animal killing; the questioning of the validity of sentience as a tool of measure in these discourses;9 the possibility of envisioning new notions of "being sentient" that might exceed human phenomenology; the primacy science still retains in shaping Western knowledge and ethical approaches in opposition to the holistic views of Eastern philosophies; the anthropocentric privileging of mammals in animal studies discourses as a speciesist trait that prevents any serious consideration of plants; the challenges and limitations posed by anthropomorphism; the possibility or impossibility to productively engage with biocontinuity; the productivities involved in the elusive search for an objective outlook; and Peter Singer's rejection of the notion of "plant intelligence."

The exchange was not meant to draw specific conclusions about the troubling ontological instability plants ignite when ousted from their objectified/silenced cultural dimension. However, it nonetheless

proved extremely useful in mapping key concerns and anxieties as seen from an animal studies perspective. The following year, the animal/plant ethical debate gained momentum as Michael Marder and animal rights/vegan ambassador Gary Francione exchanged their views on ethics, plants, animals, and veganism on the Columbia University Press website. Marder wisely opened the exchange acknowledging that "plant ethics" should not constitute a threat to, or invalidation of, veganism. He explained that it should rather constitute an invitation to surpass the obsolete conceptions of pain and sentience to consider the violence perpetrated on other living-beings, such as plants, which, in Marder's words, have been "thoroughly instrumentalized by the same logic that underpins human domination over other animal species." Francione's line of defense, however, was defined by deeply misconstrued and obsolete notions about plants. He obstinately claimed that "they are not sentient," or that they "have no subjectivity," or that they "have no interest." Francione claimed: "They cannot desire, or want, or prefer anything." He thus deliberately refused to acknowledge new evidence of scientific research to support the exceptionalism of animal life. Francione is in denial. His simplistic argument wrongly claims that we have no evidence of plant suffering or plant agency: the anthropocentric conception of pain therefore becomes the normative tool with which the worth of other beings' life is assessed and established. However, his personal views on plants are firmly contradicted by scientific evidence he would rather ignore. This seems at odds with the demarcated interest vegan quarters have for recent scientific research demonstrating that lobsters suffer and that fish have longer memory spans than we previously thought. So why is Francione insistently resistant to the notion that plants could also, in very different ways from our own, experience something akin to pain, and that they might also have, in their own ways, "desires"? Why should the idea that a plant could have "subjectivity" be so troubling? Even more uncanny is that Francione's position, and that of some vegan scholars I have encountered at animal studies conferences, is intrinsically based on the same hubristic logic perpetrated by those who, in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, proclaimed that animals had no souls, no intent; in brief: that animals are automata. The Cartesian paradigm is the same; only this time the target has changed.

In Writing On An Ethical Life, Peter Singer also discounted any conception of plant agency, their "will to live," or desire to seek nourishment as mechanical responses. He insisted, again based on no scientific research, that plants are not conscious and that they cannot engage in intentional behavior. But what's most disconcerting is that Singer's deliberate reduction of plants to mechanized beings, in the context of his book, unfolds at the expense of holistic philosophical approaches. Singer's real targets were the theories of Albert Schweitzer and Paul Taylor whose principle of morality entailed revering the "will-to-live" in all beings, "whether it can express itself to my comprehension or whether it remains unvoiced." Paul Taylor's argument that every living being is "pursuing its own good in its own unique way" was equally dismissed. Why would Singer undermine these productive holistic approaches and prioritize animal suffering against views that can benefit entire ecosystems? Likewise, on what ethical grounds can Francione state: "I reject completely the notion that we can have direct obligations to plants. I reject completely that plants have any interests whatsoever." According to his philosophy then, razing a forest to the ground poses no ethical problem, as we do not have any moral obligations to any plants. Alternatively, do obligations arise only when we consider that animals and plants are closely interconnected in ecosystems? Does any ethical obligation simply rest on animals? I am afraid that matters are much more complex than this.

Francione's and Singer's arguments have been reverberating through the recent tilting of the animal studies axis towards vegan and animal rights agendas and away from truly innovative thinking on human-

nonhuman relations. While this is not a problem, some issues are nonetheless caused by the inherent anthropocentric parameters of these frameworks. The initial premise of animal studies was to sidestep anthropocentrism to develop a more complex understanding of what animals might be and do. In this context, anthropocentrism requires a certain fine-tuning, and Singer's and Francione's ethical approaches are far from that.

Most importantly, underneath the unwillingness to acknowledge that plants are active agents, that they want and desire, that they are aware of their surroundings, and that they might even feel pain in very different ways from ours lies a form of deep anxiety that is entirely human and exclusively about us. I would hate to be misunderstood here: animal rights and vegan ideologies have positively contributed to the well-being of animals and, in some respect, of the planet more generally—at no stage do I deny this. Yet, the obsoleteness of their core foundational beliefs is now clearly undermining their credibility. The very idea of assessing a being's "sentience" to define ethical paradigms smacks of an anthropocentric arrogance that belongs to the nineteenth century.

Relying on anthropocentric notions like sentience and intention, or pain, and desire, implicitly forces specifically human parameters upon animals. In this way we build an empathic bridge of some sort. But ethically speaking, this is a highly problematic move, for it implies that the more an animal is human-like, the more likely it is that we can strike an empathic bond with it, and the more appropriate it seems that such animals should be granted rights. The problem lies in the measuring tools that words like pain, sentience, desire, interest, and will impose on discourse—how they limit it. Therefore, and paradoxically so, much in animal rights discourses is inherently speciesist. Whilst ethical consideration is reserved for primates and farm animals, or endangered charismatic megafauna, where is the objection to insecticides on sale

in all supermarkets around the world? Animal rights activists have been quick at protesting the use of butterflies in Damien Hirst's work, but what about the millions of insects, arachnids, and rodents systematically exterminated every day by an agricultural industry worth millions of dollars?

What assures Singer and Francione that our senses might suffice to assess the sentience levels of beings with which we cannot communicate using language or establish meaningful eye contact? What about those animals that cannot make a sound, or at least a sound that we can hear, or those anchored at the bottom of sea beds? Do we owe them any ethical obligations? Are they too plant-like to be considered? At what point are we prepared to seriously acknowledge that our sensorial is just as partial as, and in many cases more limited than, those of other nonhuman beings? At what point can we acknowledge that we only access a very superficial notion of nonhuman perceptiveness and that ultimately animals and plants see, hear, smell, sense, and feel the world in ways we cannot yet even conceive? Most importantly, at what point can we incorporate these different modalities of awareness, something scientific research has been piecing together over the past century, within philosophical discourses without drowning into a naïve new age sensitivity based on personal mythologies alone? Feminist Science Studies, Multispecies Ethnography, and New Materialism have all capitalized on the latest scientific research for the purpose of speculating on human/nonhuman sympoiesis. However, the field of animal studies is, generally speaking, far from engaging with these approaches.

Ultimately, what do philosophers really know about animals or plants that is not derived from scientific knowledge and personal experiences? From Agamben's spider to Heidegger's lizard, or Deleuze's

wolves, the continental tradition in Western philosophy has failed animals on two accounts: the constant use of the singular/plural 'animal' and the lack of actual engagement with specific species or individual animals. Derrida famously objected to the totalization operated by the word animal as it designates an undifferentiated multiplicity of nonhuman life-forms. His proposed neologism, animot, acknowledged the essential representative nature inscribed in the word while reminding the reader of the undermined human/animal complications the word animal has produced through history. Indeed this largely is a matter of language—language inserts itself between human and animal, it wraps both, defining and problematizing beyond the register of materiality.

In addition to their anthropocentric reliance on a terminology that cannot account for the sensorial complexity of the variety of species on this planet, philosophers are guilty of not spending enough time with animals (and dogs and cats do not count here, sorry!), or with plants. This is the other way in which western philosophy has failed animals, and this essentially is the epistemic modality we need to avoid at all costs in our botanical speculations. Agamben, for instance, drew very generic and arbitrary conclusions on a spider's presumed lack of knowledge of what it feeds on and the coincidental affinity between the web it builds and the fly it catches. His notion of attunement between fly and web is purely poetic. At no stage did Agamben tell us which species of spider he is referring to—that's of course not relevant in the scope of the Western philosophical tradition. Spiders have very varied diets, they don't simply eat flies and have not evolved to exclusively aim to catch flies. In consequence, their webs are designed to catch a multitude of differently sized insects, that's what's marvelous about them. And beyond this, spiders exhibit an astute sense of awareness in deciding where to build their webs. They choose locations in which insect traffic is high, nearby stagnant water, light sources, in the undergrowth, dark cavities—they make choices and take decisions that are directly linked to their survival. How they know about their preys is incomprehensible to us, so incomprehensible that the verb "know" loses all meaning.

Let's not mistake, Agamben's "spider" only exists as a word on the page of his book The Open—there the spider is written as a chimerical conglomerate of multiple species that paradoxically add up to a "dumb-spider": one which, in a Heideggerian sense, is not capable of grasping its own being nor that of the food it catches. Similarly, Heidegger's (generic) lizard is caught up in a series of captivations with other objects or animals, but it lacks the ability to know the rock it sits on as a rock, never mind grasping an essential-notion of the sun. According to most Western philosophers, animals are akin to automata that hopelessly wander around the world with no reference points, priorities, knowledge, or ability to truly experience anything. The truth is that a lizard has no use for any essential construction of what a rock or the sun might be, at least not in the sense a Western philosopher might. We might never know what the stone or the sun "means" to the lizard that returns to the stone over and over. However, could the lizard know something we will never know about the stone? Who's the short-sighted, the limited, the one that lacks, here?

These reductionist approaches have brought me to wonder how many lizards Heidegger must have studied before coming to his conclusions. Likewise, how many spiders must have Agamben gazed at, days on end, before formulating his theory? Very likely, the answer, in both cases is very few, if any at all. These philosophers have written about animals as transcendental entities—place-markers of human finitude—their animals are specifically constructed and reduced to assess human's presumed exceptional position in the world, and so they implicitly contribute to the structure of an ethical scale of compassion

or lack of thereof. Why should one care for a dumb spider or a lizard that has no clue about the rock it sits on? Maybe spending some time with these animals prior to entrapping them in philosophical discourses could have produced different results. But perhaps spending time with animals might have been time badly spent. It might have undermined the hubris that suggests we can know everything about other beings and that our perception of them is wholly exhaustive.

Scientific advancements have, over time, substantially changed our perception of nonhuman life. From Anton van Leeuwenhoek's founding of microbiology and Lynn Margulis's work on eukaryotic cells to James Westwood's discovery that some parasitic plants meddle with their hosts on a genetic level, two hundred and fifty years of science have drastically reconfigured what we thought we knew. We have become aware of the importance of pheromones, or the ability certain insects have to see the infrared range, or the use of ultrasounds in bats and dolphins—and this sensorial range, which by far exceeds human abilities, only constitutes the tip of the iceberg. What else are we bound to discover about the many ways in which animals communicate with each other, and how they navigate or intermingle with the biosystems they inhabit? New technologies have enabled us to understand that individuals of some plantspecies communicate to each other using their root systems; that plants under attack by parasites can release biochemical signals capable of attracting "companion insects" that will take care of the threat. More recently, a hormone which releases pain in stressed plant tissue has also been identified—this opens up the serious possibility for a notion of awareness and pseudo-sentience in plants to gain traction. At this moment in time we are

at an important junction. Philosophy has had the best part of twenty years to brush up with the animal and come to terms with its alterity. The time has come to reconsider the role of philosophical poetics in the face of ethical urgency. If one is to write about an animal or a plant, let's make it specific and learn from the perspectives of other disciplines first.

This picture might explain why plants still constitute the last frontier in ethical discourses involving animals and the nonhuman more generally. Which returns us to animal rights and vegan theories once more. In brief, vegan and animal rights philosophies rely on an intrinsic notion of shame, which implicitly articulates itself over a stark disassociation with human-on-human violence. As argued by Agamben in The Open: Man and Animal, during the Second World War, Jews (along with other minority groups) came to represent "the non-man produced within the man." As it is known, direct comparisons between the structural overlaps in the mass slaughter of animals and the atrocities committed in concentration camps recur in animal rights arguments. Likewise, the invitation to think about animals as children also regularly plays a vital role in animal right's cry for empathy. From here, and understandably so, stems the desire not to inflict pain on sentient beings.

Whilst I could not agree more with this notion, it is also impossible to ignore that this very desire, because its roots are grounded in the shame which permeates the traumatic memories of the Holocaust, or more generally any type of genocide, leads to the forming of prioritized animal categories: those whose suffering is more similar to our own get attention. It is at this point that one thing becomes clear: to some radical animal rights and vegan discourses, acknowledging plants' agency or alternative modes of sentience entails risking the human once again, and this time, with that, risking the animal too. Not causing suffering is the essential aspiration of animal rights and vegan beliefs. Digging too deep into vegetal-being to detect forms of suffering, distress, or sentience poses a fundamental threat to the foundations of these philosophies. Yet is it ethically defensible to continually and deliberately deny the

complexity of plants in order to retain the validity of one's beliefs? Acknowledging that plants are much more complex beings than previously thought should not involve a rethinking of what we eat and what we do not—like all other living beings on this planet we need to consume other living organisms to keep ourselves alive. In the context of the environmental global challenges we currently face, I seriously advocate that our responsibility as humans must encompass entire ecosystems rather than soley focus on outdated. Acknowledging that plant-being means much more than mechanistic responses to stimuli upturns the Cartesian perspectives that have culturally impoverished the world we live in. Now more than ever before, as digital technologies distract us from the natural world, we need to use the new types of knowledge we have at our disposal to generate curiosity for the living, not for the purpose of reassessing a hierarchy of animal life structured around anthropocentric values. Ultimately, I respect everyone's freedom to ignore new scientific research, but I object to the notion that someone's will to ignore should limit my own thinking about the living world.

Plants and Animals: Issues of Representation

Plants and animals share analogous histories of objectification that have been substantially defined by representation. This is why it is important to look at the presence of plants in art before engaging with contemporary practices that attempt to upturn plant objectification. For this purpose, a productive starting point is constituted by the European medieval period and the epistemic source that introduced a modern

conception of animal and plant objectification in Western culture.

During the Middle Ages, the Physiologus, a book likely to have originated from Egypt and written in Greek, became much more influential than any painting or other work of art. It was translated in different languages including Syriac, Ethiopic, Coptic, Armenian, and Latin, and it traveled far and wide across the continent. Essentially a religious text, the Physiologus gathered pagan tales of animal stories infused with Christian morals and became the most adopted reference of iconographical sourcing in art. Its impact upon the epistemology of the natural world was defining and long-lasting. The book provided the visual and literary arts with many allegorical scenarios populated by phoenixes, unicorns, and an array of fantastical plants that generally served as backdrops, or as scenic dividers, in rare number of illuminated versions. In principle, the Physiologus' plants occupied a secondary/ornamental role in the narration of religious events.

As a didactic text, the Physiologus constituted a new epistemic spatialization in which humans, animals, plants, and fantastic beings were essentially represented through the enmeshing of nature semantics. Nature semantics are the words interwoven in the very fabric of "represented nonhumans.' Every representation of a human or nonhuman-being effectively is, to different degrees, inscribed with language, with an intrinsic signifying, symbolic register. A horse in a painting is never just a horse; dogs represent fidelity, butterflies the soul, cats witchcraft, and so on. In medieval and classical art, symbolism functioned as a representational crux between human and nonhuman. The representation of certain nonhuman-beings and the exclusion of others in art is motivated by the cultural coordinates that make them worthy of representation in the first place. Nature semantics were, therefore, the linguistic elements that structured iconography beyond the formalist concerns of mimesis. Over time, nature semantics directly formed the essential representational sedimentations of an archive of symbolic

modalities, practices, and discourses. Nature semantics are narratives—a chain-link of attributes, myths, and anecdotes all of which share a deep anthropocentric matrix.

Thereafter, the formula of the Physiologus became the blueprint of the Bestiarium—a zoological-epistemological site that profoundly marked Medieval and Renaissance culture in Europe. The Latin text of the surviving early bestiaries effectively is a translation of the Physiologus.30 However, most importantly, moving beyond the Physiologus' unorganized assemblage of information, the Bestiarium provided more visual representations, first unclassified (before the twelfth century) and thereafter classified in loose orders.



FIGURE 0.1 The Tree Peridexion in Oxford Bestiary, c. 1220.

In the Bestiarium nature semantics materialized animals and plants as morally charged, symbolicobjects of religious value: the "medieval naturalist" was a theologian. With time, as collections of stories dispersed across different geographical and cultural areas, bestiaries established new iconographies that subsequently informed the discipline of natural history. In bestiaries, the newly formed relationship between animals, plants, text, and

illustration was initially a substantially fluid one. Since the text was essentially religious, animals and plants appeared as actors on the stage of a morality play. Realism did not matter in this context, and in fact, many of the artists who illustrated multiple copies of bestiaries had never seen firsthand the animals and plants they represented.

Since the fall of the Roman Empire (5th century CE), realism had lost prominence in artistic production throughout Central and Eastern Europe.33 Christianity appropriated artistic production for funerary and educational purposes. Thus, the role of representation was that of educating, and to do so in a clear way. The many details involved in a too realistic representation would distract the viewer from the essential moral teaching. Therefore, naturalistic realism simply became inadequate to the rendition of a world constructed through the "already coded eye" of God.

From an art historical perspective, the departure from naturalistic realism that characterized the postclassical Greek phase has generally been acknowledged to be the result of the influence of the art of Celtics, Germanics, Hiberno-Saxons, and Vikings. In many ways, medieval painting was the result of discourses and practices that prioritized representation as an ordering agent in a highly dystopian world. Furthermore, nonnaturalistic approaches enhanced the urgency of appeal in the viewer—form became substantially subjugated to content, and it ostensibly veered towards flatness. Painting became the site of God's materialization on earth: a limited, filtered, flattened, and a miniaturized world better lent itself to

metaphorical control and could be better assimilated into discourses. It is thus that medieval painting and manuscript illuminations reciprocally validated one another—God's word was the truth, and the representation of God was the word.

Within the flatness of medieval painting two major accomplishments took place. First of all, the flattening of animals and plants operated as the "marker of the spiritual." Flatness suggested the lifting of the object from the metaphysical— figures were deliberately extrapolated from the spatial as well as temporal flux of the world. As such they exclusively existed in spiritual, symbolic registers. Second, extrapolating figures from the three-dimensionality of the world, medieval art enhanced the possibilities of organizing it according to the omnipotence of the word of God. Bypassing realism enabled artists to construct clear hierarchical structures in which human figures were arranged in size according to their theological importance, not their positioning in relation to the viewer's gaze. Thus, images and words ontologically coincided in the material condition they shared: the flatness of

the manuscript pages or the wooden boards of paintings. Repeated and disseminated through the manual reproduction of bestiaries around Europe, the newly acquired visibility of animals and plants defined a new representational space in which nature could be constructed.

The Flattening of Nature

By the second half of the thirteenth century, the flattened representations of animals and plants in bestiaries had become the aesthetic norm. One of the most widely circulated early natural history books to include illustrations was Historia Animalium by Conrad Gesner, published between 1551 and 1558. One of the main innovations introduced by this book was the emergence of a new epistemological optic based on Aristotelian notions of empiricism. In the attempt of prioritizing order, that which will eventually become taxonomy, Gesner organized his collection alphabetically. Yet nature semantics still populated nature representations. The result still featured many symbols, emblems, and metaphors, but Gesner's work also demonstrated new awareness of the importance images played in the study of nature. In the preface to the first volume, he states:

princes of the Roman Empire used to exhibit exotic animals in order to overwhelm and conquer the minds of the populace, but those animals could be seen or inspected only for a short time while the shows lasted; in contrast, the pictures in the Historia animalium could be seen whenever and forever, without effort or danger.

During the Renaissance, princes, kings, and aristocrats routinely used exotic animals and plants as markers of power—the possession of exotic species, live or preserved, immediately spoke of substantial wealth and intellectual ability. However, metaphorically, the taming and pacifying of these animals also implied a high moral strength of the owner—he, who could tame the wild beast, would also possess impressive ruling qualities. Gesner's passage demonstrates the importance of this power/knowledge relation and how representations of the natural world also mattered in this context. Books like those by Gesner's and other naturalists were extremely sought after as they encapsulated a more defined taste for erudition and art besides the spectacle of the menagerie. It is also in this context that the cabinets of curiosities became extremely popular in Europe around the same time. Developing knowledge of the natural world became a valuable way to demonstrate one's mastery over the world. The new importance images played in animal and plant representation contributed to the shift from the theological symbolism to a more empirical realm of early scientific concern where animals and plants

could be inspected. This way, natural history contributed to a transhistorical process of objectification in which animals and plants essentially functioned as emblems of power.

A significant innovation in Gesner's work was the inclusion of exotic animals arriving to Europe from the far North, the New World, and the East Indies.40 These new animals appeared somewhat suspended between the empirical and the fantastical as the novelty of their colors and shapes made them implicitly otherworldly. However, their newness challenged authors with a blank space in the place of narratives. These new animals were wholly or mostly unknown and did not carry with them any natural

semantics: they were symbolically bare. It is likely that the impossibility to interpret these animals through an anthropocentric, sociosymbolic schemata brought Gesner to focus on their surfaces and morphology in order to register with accuracy the only meaningful features at his disposal. As a result, his illustrations capitalized on a representational naturalism that had already resurfaced in the sculptural and pictorial arts through the revival of Classical art and Greek philosophy during the Renaissance.

As these animals travelled to Europe accompanied by little or no information about what their environments looked like, Gesner left most of the backgrounds plain. In many cases, plants had disappeared entirely from their assigned backdrop role. In the absence of specific cultural knowledge of exotic animals, the new iconographical modality at play positioned animal bodies in a contextual vacuum. This aesthetic shift was also characterized by a different positioning of animal bodies within the space of the page, as they more regularly began to appear longitudinally. Unlike the animals in the illustrations of bestiaries, which usually participated in some narrative act surrounded by a contextualizing backdrop, Gesner's animals were still.

Transcribed into the discourses of natural history, starkly rendered, and longitudinally positioned in the pictorial plane so to display formal attributes with heightened clarity, animal bodies appeared aligned as closely as possible to the words that described them on the surface of the page. Simultaneously silenced, immobilized, posed, isolated, and flattened, they were fully exposed to the objectifying gaze of the natural historian.

Botany: Setting the Iconographies of Objectification

Having outlined the role played by representation in the process of animal objectification, it is now important to take a step back to evaluate the synergy involved in the illustration of plants and animals since this informs their shared ontologization as subjugated others. I will argue that the herbarium effectively was an iconographical precursor of natural history objectification; one in which the aesthetic "flattening of animals" of early natural history in the Renaissance was laid.

The work of Aristotle, Theophrastus, and that of Crateva di Mitridate from the 4th century BCE is considered the beginning of botanical studies. Crateva di Mitridate's body of work

has been entirely lost, but it is claimed that his drawings were incorporated in medieval texts. Pliny (23–79 CE) and Pedanios Dioscorides (54–68 CE) also notably advanced the study of plants, although not much remains of their work.44 However, one of the most interesting examples of the iconographical approach originally employed by botanical illustration can be identified in the Vienna Dioscurides, an early 6th century illuminated, medical manuscript from Greece that cataloged roughly five hundred plants. In this collection of illustrations and medical texts, plants already appeared morphologically flattened—their parts were clearly manipulated to best fit the flatness and borders of the page upon

which they were drawn. The background was neutral, like in the later images by Gesner, while the vast majority or totality of the leaves and flowers appeared parallel to the page.

These examples show that the iconographical modalities of zoological representations are discursively linked to the study of botany. A contemporary work, Herbarium Apuleii Platonici incorporated similar representational strategies, and it became one of the most popular herbaria of the middle ages. Similarly, The Old English Herbarium (late 10th century) proposed flattened and largely synthetic representations of plants. However, it was the Codex Vindobonensis, with its four hundred illustrations of Mediterranean plants, that introduced a new level of naturalism in the representation of plants—one that transcended the stylistic synthetic approaches of Byzantine art. The epistemic shifts that enabled the emergence of the new iconography of natural history simultaneously produced more realistic images in Brunfels's Herbarum Vivae Eicones (1532–36) and Fuchs's De Historia Stirpium (1542).

FIGURE 0.2 Diptannum (Dittany) and Solago maior (Heliotropium europaeum). Solago minor (African Marigold) and Peonia (Peony). Herbal England, Ps. Apuleius, M.S. Ashmole, fols. 17v-18r, St. Augustine's Abbey, Canterbury; 11th century, c. 1070–1100.

But it was also around this time that, alongside the epistemic importance gained by illustration in the study of plants, the emergence of herbaria in which plants are not graphically illustrated but preserved as pressed specimens started to rise. The practice of collecting live plant specimens for the purpose of

studying them was introduced by Luca Ghini: founder of the academic study of nature in Bologna and Pisa. In the 1530s, Ghini introduced field trips and specimen collections as essential parts of his courses in which he produced the first "modern" herbarium including dried specimens.

FIGURE 0.3 Leonhart Fuchs, Papaver. From De Historia Stirpium, 1542.

Flattened and dried, plants were affixed to sheets of paper in ways that aesthetically overlapped with the preceding tradition of botanical illustration. Leaves and flowers were made to adhere to the surface of the page, while stems were organized to impose a sense of clarity and definition to the plant-body; the overlap of leaves and stems was avoided wherever possible. The drying process substantially distanced the specimen from the morphology of its living referent. Beyond the required flattening, which aesthetically aligned the specimen to the ontology of illustration, the color and texture of leaves and flowers would also be conspicuously altered. However, what the dried specimen provided was the much-needed evidential truth necessary to begin a secular, taxonomical project based on empirical scientific methodologies.

The introduction of dried specimens in botanical studies should not be understood as a replacement of the illustration methods that preceded it. In fact, Gherardo Cibo, one of Ghini's students, collected, pressed, and set specimens just as much as he illustrated them. Alongside the complex changes and different alternatives that shaped the discursive field of botanical research, zoology and the illustration of animals defined their epistemic spatializations, organized their practices, and set their iconographical standards. This is moreover confirmed by the fact that the prominent Italian zoologist Ulisse Aldrovandi cited Cibo's influence on his own work on animal illustration in Catalogus Virorum qui mea studia adjuvarunt. Aldrovandi built upon Cibo's contribution by developing a keen interest in the epistemic value of illustration and consistently advocating the importance of color in painting specimens ad vivum (from life). Aldrovandi claimed that:

> There is nothing on earth that seems to me to give more pleasure and utility to man than painting, and above all painting of natural things: because it is through these things, painted by an excellent painter, that we acquire knowledge of foreign species, although they are born in distant lands.

FIGURE 0.4 Leonardo da Vinci, Virgin of the Rocks (detail), National Gallery, London. About 1491/2–9 and 1506–8. PUBLIC DOMAIN.

FIGURE 0.5 Leonardo da Vinci, Virgin of the Rocks (detail), The Louvre, Paris. 1483–85. PUBLIC DOMAIN.

In Renaissance painting, realism found a new spiritual dimension. In da Vinci's painting, a palm symbolized victory and referred directly to the Virgin Mary. Irises stood as symbols for the Immaculate Conception, while the daffodils might have been included as a funerary symbol of love after death. Within the

semantic structure of the painting, plants and flowers anchored meaning—they fixed the identities of the main figures and simultaneously extended the narrative alluding to future or related events. It was therefore crucial that species should not be mistaken for another due to inaccurate rendering.

Cast as vessels for entirely human affairs, plants and their flowers shared a very similar representational destiny with animals. Renaissance animal presence in art was characterized by the same symbolic trajectories defined by Medieval manuscripts and bestiaries—animals were always symbolically tamed and domesticated by representation. An emblematic example of this condition is provided by the whimsical use of plants in the late sixteenth century paintings of the Italian artist Giuseppe Arcimboldo. In some works based on the superficial notion of the "scherzo" or "capriccio," the artist produced vegetal compositions inscribing a human portrait. It has been claimed that his "composite heads" aimed to criticize rich people's conduct, and their frivolous and superficial approach to culture. The flowers and fruits represented in these paintings essentially are an attention seeking device through which purely anthropocentric concerns are expressed.

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FIGURE 0.6 Giuseppe Arcimboldo, *Four Seasons in One Head*, c. 1590, oil on panel. Paul Mellon Fund COURTESY OF THE NATIONAL GALLERY OF ART, WASHINGTON DC.

At this point in the history of Western representation, we witness a peculiar bifurcation in the processes of objectification of animals and plants. On the one hand, the scientific herbaria of natural history objectified plants (and animals) by representationally isolating them against a plain background for observation purposes. Through this process, a plant became a specimen, the generalized and ideal body representing a whole species in the taxonomic order. On the other hand, classical painting immersed plants (and animals) in complex anthropocentric tableaus in which they featured as silent and yet eloquent normative tools.

The Rise of Botanical Illustration

Another important factor that led to the prevalence of optical realism in the representation of plants was related to their medicinal importance. As previously seen, stylized representations dominated the pages of late medieval and early Renaissance herbaria—but thereafter, as the study of plants became central to medicine, mistaking one species for another could be fatal. For this very reason, the work of German physician and botanist Leonhart Fuchs helped to shift the representational register of plants towards a greater realism. His De Historia Stirpium Commentarii Insignes (Notable Commentaries on the History of Plants), published in 1542, featured 497 alphabetically ordered species, many of which were originally identified by Dioscorides, Hippocrates, and

Galen. Its innovative aspect lied in the inclusion of more than five hundred woodcuts proposing the classical iconography of natural history representation, featuring a singled out plant, usually uprooted, (so that the root system could be seen) and flattened against a plain background. This new iconographic standard was the result of the previous representational strategies of Italian natural history, the cataloging work of Ghini and Cibo, and an integration of the artistic dexterity of three artists who produced the plates for Fuchs: Albrecht Meyer, Heinrich Fullmaurer, and Veit Rudolf Speckle.

FIGURE 0.7 Maria Sibylla Merian, from *Metamorphosis Insectorum Surinamensium*, 1705.

Thereafter, new standards in botanical illustration were set by Maria Sibylla Merian, the famous Swiss naturalist who researched, wrote about, and painted plants and insects in a maledominated scientific field. Between 1701 and 1705 she produced sixty copperplate engravings documenting the lives of insects as connected to host-plants. Forming the core of Metamorphosis Insectorum Surinamensium, these were the first illustrations to closely consider bioin-terconnectedness between plants and animals and between different stages of a plant's and an insect's life. Her animal and plant knowledge was derived from correspondence with European scientists and by personal observation.

Compositionally, Merian's iconography was essentially in line with the spatializations of knowledge devised by her predecessors. The plants and animals were singled out against a white, plain background. Yet, Merian's work differs from theirs on two accounts. The realism she employs is not solely reliant on accuracy of detail. Her butterflies usually appear aligned with the representational plane—the wings are spread open and flat, as you would prepare specimens for an entomological collection. Her plants exceed the previously seen parameters of realism by displaying a heightened three*dimensionality. This might be because Merian's focus was on reproducing, as accurately as possible, the patterns and shapes of butterflies. However, she was less concerned with the same level of epistemological formalism when painting plants. As a result, sometimes, her blooms bore holes, and more regularly, her leaves were damaged by insects. These imperfections are of capital importance to her understanding of what the scientific gaze should be concerned with: the interconnectedness between plants and insects rather than the aesthetically perfect, unblemished specimen held captive by an objectifying gaze. These details in Merian's plates laid the foundations for a new optics of natural history, partially anticipating, at least visually, the theorization of umwelt by German biologist Jakob von Uexku^ll.

Plant Representation in the East

Many of the discourses and practices that objectified plants and animals in Western culture can be seen playing similar roles in the East. In India, the use of animals and plants as markers of aristocratic power,

and their enmeshing into symbolic representational dimensions, was also common. Menageries and botanical gardens became popular during the Mughal Empire between 1556 and 1862. Prior representations of animals and plants, from the 12th and 13th centuries, show the influences of the Physiologus on earlier Buddhist art.60 Miniatures and illuminations showing animals and plants in India present a similar approach to composition and iconography seen in Medieval Europe: a predominant flatness of the representational plane proposes a hierarchization of figures based on narrative importance, rather than perspectival concerns.

FIGURE 0.8 Attributed to Muhammad Khan, *Flower studies*, 1630–33.
ADD.OR.3129, F.67V, PUBLIC DOMAIN.

The first, "modern" treatise of Indian natural history, Mriga-Pakshi-Shastra by the Jain poet Hamsadeva was published in the 13th century CE and is considered to be the most exhaustive descriptive account of Indian animals to date. The illustration of Ustad Mansur, one of the earliest and best-known Mughal painters, presented animal and plant iconographies similar to their contemporary counterparts in Europe. The subjects appear somewhat flattened on the representational surface while the background is most regularly plain and monochromatic to make the body of the animal stand out. A synthetic realism pervades the images—surfaces and forms appear simplified while lighting is uniform, contributing to the general impression of flatness. However, it is known that around the 1580s Catholic priests traveled to some Indian courts with the intent of converting the Muslim population. For that purpose, they brought with them illustrated Bibles and oil paintings that incorporated a realism starker than the scenes depicted by Mughal artists of the time. While they failed in their theological intent, the aesthetic influence of those illustrations on local art was conspicuous.

Thereafter, the Emperor Jahangir, who was a keen hunter, and kept a sumptuous menagerie, requested that royal court artists painted animals with heightened realism in order to convey the magnificence of their bodies and colors. While at the same time, commercial relationships with Portugal introduced new varieties of plants from their South American territories. Marigolds, most especially, became devotional offerings. Again, the iconography of plants, as it was like in Europe, prescribed the flattening of the stems, arranged the leaves, and turned the flowers upwards against a plain background. The Mughal period nurtured a keen interest in plants and plant representation, which was initiated by Babur, the founder of the dynasty. His accurate descriptions of plants and substantial interest for the power of representation had a profound impact on the emergence of a new realism in art. Yet, this desire to

objectively represent living beings was, as in European culture, countered by the symbolic inscription of nature semantics. The Qur'an described four Gardens of Paradise organized in two highly anthropomorphic registers: the Garden of the Heart and the Garden of the Soul are of basic importance while the Garden of the Spirit and the Garden of the Essence stand above them. From the very beginning, therefore, the garden inscribed divine transcendence as the beauty of nature reflected transcendent truth: roses symbolized feminine, sublime beauty, while the lotus stood for fertility.

Similarly, Chinese representations of plants were highly symbolic. At times the symbolic meaning was inscribed through myths or tradition and at others, and perhaps more interestingly, it was the result of linguistic or phonetic analogies, like in the case of the chrysanthemum, which pronounced in Chinese sounds like the verb "to remain." Its symbolization of long life is further anchored by the phonetic analogy between "nine" and "long time" in relation to the fact that the chrysanthemum is the flower of the ninth month in the old Chinese calendar. These instances of symbolic inscription in plants clearly highlight the disconnect between the meaning and the actual plant—in many cases, the symbolic layer has nothing to do with specific qualities or behavior of the plant/animal in question. As Wang Xiangjin wrote in Record of All (Flowers) Fragrant:

> I try to observe the morning flowers putting on their splendor, competing in all their great beauty and fragrance. Some keep company with others as they grow, while others go against time and show their preciousness. Despite their great floral beauty and exotic nature, such myriad manifestations are not easy to grasp. Their flourishing stems bloom and wither, also bringing joy and sorrow. Who says that such lodgings of joy and pleasantries of the heart are unrelated to the emotions and character?

FIGURE 0.9 Yun Shouping, *Peonies*, 17th century.
PUBLISHED IN THE U.S. BEFORE 1923 AND PUBLIC DOMAIN.

Symbolism domesticates. Allegories subjugate the otherness of the plant in a simple move that conceals behind a preinscribed screen of signification what we cannot comprehend. The plant is thus turned into a hollow vessel for human concerns and feelings. Animal studies identified the strictures of symbolism in representation from the early days. In his theorization of the postmodern animal, Steve Baker claimed that "symbolism is inevitably anthropomorphic, making sense of the animal by characterizing it in human terms, and doing so from a safe distance." Baker's theorization overlooks the importance of symbolism in actual human/ nonhuman relations beyond the specific register of artistic representation. For instance, the cultural and commercial popularity of many cut flowers is directly linked to their assigned symbolic meaning. The same is true for many animals that were sought after in menageries, natural history museums, as well as those that have become protected by laws today. Symbolism affects human/nonhuman relations in many unpredictable ways, and while it surely aids processes of representational objectification, it might as well be the only reason why certain species are alive and thriving today as they rather appear to have domesticated us. Some species have conquered a cultural space in our lives which makes us tend to them, breed them on an industrial scale, and thus perpetuate their own success as species amongst others.

While the negative concerns with symbolism were specifically marked by postmodernist sentiments, symbolism in art and culture should not be considered wholly negative and requires more careful consideration to better map the intricacies involved in human/nonhuman relations. Part of the provocative proposal of this book lies in the possibility to consider objectification as an inescapable

FIGURE 0.10 Jan van Huysum, *Still Life with Flowers and Fruit*, c. 1715, oil on canvas. PUBLIC DOMAIN, COURTESY OF THE NATIONAL GALLERY OF ART, WASHINGTON DC.

Fruit and vegetable themed still-lifes worked in very similar ways. Like flowers, fruits inscribed the passing of time and seasons, and with that, the desire to preserve beauty and prosperity indefinitely. Caravaggio's Basket of Fruit from 1599 was an influential and yet very unusual instance of fruit still life in which insect-nibbled fruits and blemished leaves tipped the utopian harmony of the classic still-life towards new philosophical and aesthetic notions of problematized realism. In this painting, the inevitability of death is embraced as part of a harmonious cycle of life and death. And as with the flower still-life genre, fruits appear as place-markers of religious symbolism. Amongst others, lemons symbolized the Virgin Mary, pomegranates resurrection, apples symbolized temptation and the original sin, and figs fertility.

Further underscoring the objectifying nature of the representations of flowers and fruits was the hierarchy of genres in the figurative arts, which was formulated in 16th century Italy. The structure of the hierarchy remained highly influential until the beginning of the 20th century and was inherently anthropocentric. It posited historical, religious, and mythological subjects as the most valuable genres because of the ethical and moral values associated with them, but also because painting the human body was considered the most difficult to appropriately accomplish. Portraits came just below, only because their ethical value was subjugated to the preponderance of the sitter's identity. Further down the list were everyday scenes, landscape, and cityscape—the lack of substantial human presence in the paintings reduced their importance. At the very bottom of the hierarchy were paintings of animals, plants, and fruits: ontologically aligned to man-made objects, animals, plants, and fruits incarnated the passivity of matter that man could exercise dominion upon—they temporarily put at bay the defining anxiety intrinsic to human existence.

FIGURE 0.11 Michelangelo Merisi da Caravaggio, *Canestra di Frutta*, 1599.

One of the main purposes of Western classical painting was that of objectifying the world to affirm the power of the viewer over it. It is possible to identify a gradation of objectifying parameters in which women and nonwhite humans, for instance, are more regularly objectified than white men, and in which animals and plants are more closely aligned to the registers of objectification reserved for the human-made, than the living. It is for this reason that the representation of flowers and fruits in art is always ambiguously suspended in a symbolic realm of objectification that transfigures the nonhuman into a metaphorical vessel for the human. What's left in the wake of this process is a relative form of interest for the natural in which we only seem to have two alternatives: the scientific objectification and the metaphorical objectification.

Gustave Courbet's paintings of fruit baskets created between 1871 and 1872, for instance, have a Caravaggesque quality. The fruits are blemished, and the bowls chipped. These representations depart from the scientific notion of the specimen, and they simultaneously are the antithesis of the opulent, symbolic works of the Dutch and Spanish Baroque. Courbet's fruits provide an interesting instance of the slippery intricacies involved in the representation of the natural. Refusing the rhetoric of the specimen, Courbet's fruits still propose a realist-scientific iconography of decay which grounds the

representation in a metaphorical realm. Courbet was the leader of the Realist movement in France— a revolutionary and highly political congregation of artists that rejected the idealized classical style of the French Academy in favor of a predilection for recording the raw materiality of objects and the straining lives of peasants and working classes in general. He was arrested in 1871 because of his involvement in the socialist government of the Paris Commune and painted fruit baskets in his cell—those were the fruits his sister brought to him at the prison of Sainte-Pelagie. He was forbidden from painting human figures, therefore, to paint damaged apples instead constituted an act of resistance. These fruits are symbolically charged. As part of Courbet's longstanding commitment to expose the hardship faced by the proletariat and the working classes the blemished fruits embody the rough essence of an existence in which aesthetics and food could simply not afford to go together. But is it even possible to represent the nonhuman without relentlessly totalizing them through anthropocentric and anthropomorphic lenses? What aesthetic paradigms would enable a different optic to arise, one in which the representation is not scientifically illustrating the fruit or the flower? Moreover, what would a nonobjectifying paradigm tell us about the represented plants?

FIGURE 0.12 Gustave Courbet, *Still Life With Apples and Pomegranates*, Oil on canvas, 1871–72.

Victorian Britain developed an obsession for ferns that spanned between the 1840s and 1890s. Remembered as "Pteridomania": the craze for ferns that, to a degree, transcended social class and gender divisions, represented one of the many cultural facets of the colonialist approach to curiosity

during the colonial period. Equally great was "Orchidelirium," the orchid craze that saw rare orchids being sold at London auctions for exorbitant prices. Both phenomena essentially involved the indiscriminate pillaging of exotic land, the destruction of untouched environments, and the waste of many plants as the vast majority of imported varieties were simply not suited to the dim lighting and cold drafts of the British Isles.

Victorian excitement for new exotic forms and natural colors was complemented by the simultaneous prominence acquired by floriography. A cryptological communication through the depiction of mainly European flowers, floriography originated in France during the first half of the nineteenth century and became central to the spiritual paintings of the Pre-Raphaelites Brotherhood. Most notably, John Everett Millais's Ophelia, from 1852, successfully straddles scientific realism with the poetic demands of Shakespearean narration. The artist's determination to accurately capture each plant painted on his canvas led him to perch his easel on a precise spot on the bank of the Hogsmill River for a five month period. He allegedly spent eleven hours a day, six days a week on the bank, sometimes through adverse weather. Surprisingly, the realism of the scene clearly annoyed some critics who reprimanded the artist on his approach to vegetation. The Times' critic said: "there must be something strangely perverse in the imagination which sources Ophelia in a weedy ditch, and robs the drowning struggle of that lovelorn maiden of all pathos and beauty." Meanwhile John Ruskin reportedly took issue with the lack of idealization in the portrayal of nature. "Why the mischief should you not paint pure nature," he asked, "and not that rascally wire fenced garden rolled-nursery-maid's paradise?"

FIGURE 0.13 John Everett Millais, *Ophelia*, oil on canvas, 1851–52, Ophelia, Google Art Project.

To paint Ophelia, Millais returned to the then out of fashion Caravaggesque memento mori expedient. The rotting leaves of the greater pond sedge pictured on the left-hand corner of the canvas underlined, a little too much for some, the deathly theme of the painting. As Ruskin's comment shows, the classical ideal that painters should improve nature, rather than simply reproduce its imperfections, still had much currency in art. But Millais was a deeply religious man and therefore resorted to floriography to embed symbolism in his work. Thus, the willow becomes a text speaking of forsaken love; crowflowers a gesture towards ingratitude; nettles to pain; daisies towards innocence; roses speak of youth, love, and beauty; violets hint at faithfulness; forget-me-nots foreground memory; pansies point at unrequited love; fritillaries to sorrow; and poppies evoke death.

Thereafter, with the exception of Renoir's many paintings of cut flowers in which the interest of the painter was primarily focused on chromatic clashes and brushstroke effects, Impressionism was not particularly interested in plants. But Monet was different. The latter part of his life was spent painting his garden in Giverny where he moved in 1883 after his canvases found some commercial success in the United States. Monet was a fond horticulturalist. Not only would he tend to his plants personally with the help of some gardeners, he also experimented with hybridizing processes with dahlias, irises, and poppies, a variety of which he called Moneti. But it is his passion for water lilies that has been much celebrated in popular culture. Monet's interest in water lilies began in 1889 when botanist Joseph Bory Latour-Marliac exhibited his hybridized specimens at the World's Fair in Paris in the water gardens of the Trocadero. Up until that point water lilies were only available in white, so the yellow and pink varieties exhibited by Latour-Marliac caught the artist's eye. It is interesting that Monet's choice of subject for his many paintings was grounded in a personal passion for plants, rather than from the desire to convey encoded religious symbolism. Monet's water lilies are not symbolic—Impressionism rejected symbolism in favor of documenting the optical impression of everyday-life as represented by its surfaces and the effects of light upon them. Because of the lack of details in impressionist paintings, Monet never used herbaria as source books. Monet's water lilies appear caught up in the artist's dialectics of color and lighting—their plant-beings dissolved through brushstrokes have become one with the water, the sky, and the foliage that usually surrounds them.

But it is important to note at this point that traditional art historical discourses have not valued the type of inquiry I have led here— to the anthropocentric discourses of history of art there only are two types of objectification worth critically acknowledging: race and gender stereotypes. Yet, there is something subtler about the ability of painting's idiom to objectify anything, including nonhuman beings, that has played a vital role in animal and plant representation through art. This objectifying ability is intrinsically bound to the gendering agency of optical realism: its scientifically inherent capacity to delineate the object of scrutiny as absolutely separate from the subject whose gaze beholds the object. It is in the absolute clarity of scientific illustration and the structural solidity of classical painting that the anthropocentric base is structured for the humanist subject. The optical clarity, key to the essence of the Enlightenment, produces affirmation in the viewer—that fictitious confidence that enables one to say: "this is..." and to, therefore, exercise power over it. Subjectivity is formed on these epistemological grounds and modalities— grounds that implicitly reassess sociocultural crystallize shared knowledge and contain the multitude of lifeforms. The repetition of specific statements, modalities and forms of writing was necessary to the effectiveness of information and to set knowledge as truth. Likewise, classical art deployed a vast vocabulary of specific statements, modalities and styles, all of which relied upon clarity to deliver explicit messages and specific meanings.

Let's not forget that Monet started to paint water lilies in 1897–99, at the very end of a century that saw a substantial fragmentation of artistic realities and movements in Europe. Through this period, realism in art became a political bone of contention—one equally ideologically charged with highly conservative values or with revolutionary ideals. The invention of photography (1826) problematized matters by materializing the possibility for blurred/out of focus images right under the eyes of the artists. Blurred photographs, the failed attempts to capture optical reality during the mid-nineteenth century, were inspirational to Monet and other Impressionists. What was at stake in this representational unclarity produced by the mechanical optic? To a degree, a process of de-objectification. Blurred photographs broke the straightforward linguistic connection between form and content—they inserted hesitation where once was affirmation. They shattered the sensuality of surfaces to focus on a broader overview of connectedness. Epistemologically speaking, this was a moment of paramount importance in the history of Western art—one that history of art usually simplifies through the notion of style or the biographical notion that Monet was losing his eyesight. If we can look beyond these discipline specific filters, it becomes visible that Monet's water lilies are amongst the very first paintings about plants and flowers to embody this new "freedom of the image." Open form and lack of detail free the represented body from many economic, social, and cultural implications—if there is a symbolic register to be found in these extremely open paintings, it is that the water lilies are interconnected with everything else around them: the sky, the water, the grass, the trees hanging over them, and the human perceiving them. There's an eco-continuity and interconnectedness at play in these paintings that is unprecedented in the history of representation—one that simultaneously operates through the medium of paint as an ontological equalizer and one that bypasses any notion of scientific epistemology in representation itself. In more than one way, it is with the water lilies that a truly modern, and perhaps more than a modern history of representation begins.

FIGURE 0.14 Claude Monet, *Water Lilies*, Google Art Project (431238) 1915–1926.

Power, Epistemic Spatializations, and Materiality

Thus far, the two parts of this introduction have representationally summoned the specificities of different plant/human relationships. They are deliberately written in different styles and from different

epistemic perspectives to problematize the very notions of materiality and epistemology. In the first section, titled "Amarcord," plants emerged through my childhood memories as a sociocultural agent situated in a specific local reality of the south of Italy during the 1970s and '80s. In the narration of these memories, I have avoided the use of scientific names, privileging the common names of each plant I recalled and making sure that their appearance was as enmeshed as deeply as possible in the social relations that seeded, propagated, and cared for them. But these social relations have been transcribed on the pages of this book through memory: a space of knowledge construction in its own right; one in which time warps, the outlines of objects blur, and mythologies intertwine with facts. The material bodies of the plants I recalled have gone through multiple mediatic reincarnations.

The diaristic, idiosyncratic tone of the first section was counterbalanced by the section that followed it, "Plants and Animals: Issues of Representation," in which plants emerged through the rendering operated by different disciplinary optics (natural history and art history) and media (illumination, illustration, and panting). In both cases, the first and the second part of this introduction, all plant materializations have taken place through my writing voice inscribed on the surface of the pages of this book. The only reason why I am drawing attention to this epistemic contingency is because it reminds us that nothing ever really is, in a universal sense, but that every encounter with others, nonhumans, objects, particles is utterly defined by the materiality, modality, structure, and histories of the epistemic spatializations in which the encounter takes place.

In order to more clearly outline the importance of this concept I will recur to Michel Foucault's notion of "epistemic spatialization" and adapt this to the representation of plants in art. Foucault discussed the importance of architectural/material spaces and the production of knowledge in Discipline and Punish. There he developed Jeremy Bentham's eighteenth-century design for a prison system characterized by economies of power dispensed through a structural configuration imposing visibility for surveillance: the panopticon.

Bentham's panopticon is architecturally constituted by a tower surrounded by an annular building. The building is divided into cells, each with two opposed windows that allow light to flood each space. By the effect of backlighting, an observer in the tower can control each prisoner in the building. The all-seeing nature of the panopticon defines specific economies of the gaze; it enables surveillance, but it also shapes the nature of what can be seen. The architecture of the cells limits prisoners' mobility and capitalizes on the stark appearance of silhouettes. What is surveyed in the panopticon no longer is a human, but a specific reduction, simplification, and objectification of a human—a form of visibility of what a human is made into by the conditions of the observation-process—a specific representational materialization constructed by the intersection of the panoptic architecture and surveilling gaze.

However, the panopticon is a transferable and adaptable mechanism of power, not simply an architectural space in the classical sense. In "The eye of power," Foucault's attention turned especially to institutionalized spatializations in which knowledge is produced and distributed, such as the hospital, the prison, and the asylum. As an architectural figure encapsulating the practice of segregation and monitoring originally enforced by the syndic during a plague in medieval society, the panoptic mechanism "arranges spatial unities that make it possible to see constantly and to recognize immediately." Its functionality is very practical, but its cultural meaning extremely complex: the panopticon makes visible the socio-normative politics intrinsic to governmental, medical, and educational institutions.

In The Order of Things, Foucault returned to the notion of spatializations of knowledge focusing on the specific subject of natural history illustration, the representation of plants, and how Linnaean taxonomy was facilitated by these very spatializations. There, Foucault outlined natural history as a "spatialization of the object of analysis." By this he meant that illustration, as a physical, epistemic space in which the object of study was materialized to become part of discourses, substantially impacted the type of knowledge produced about the object itself. Further clarifying his idea, in an interview, Foucault said:

Then there was the spatialization into illustrations within books, which was only possible with certain printing techniques. Then the spatialization of the reproduction of the plants themselves, which was represented in books. All these are spatial techniques, not metaphors.

This statement points to a broader implication related to materiality, space, and epistemology that in The Order of Things remains unexplored. If the knowledge that can be produced about an object of study is intrinsically bound to the architectural spatialization through which the object is studied, be it a cell, a photograph, or an illustration, then it appears clear that not only the space in which the object is materialized matters, but that the materiality of the spatialization involved is of paramount importance too. As previously seen, the flattening of animals and plants operated by natural history illustration bears practical as well as metaphorical implications—the optical flattening of plant bodies corresponded to a contextual flattening of the individual plant or animal into a specimen—silenced, immobilized, objectified, and extrapolated from its interconnectedness with biosystems for the consumption of the scientific gaze. The materiality of the book page, the flatness of the paper upon which the object is made to materialize, defines the power/knowledge relations specific to the epistemic modality. In turn, it can be stated that the scientific gaze is never all-seeing, but that it is always defined by disciplinary, institutional, and ideological lenses that define its "visual scope".

This tension between the objectifying gaze, the other, and the space in which the encounter takes place is the determinant factor in the nature of the relationship that can be visualized. This tension is the matrix of what Foucault called biopower: the constant and intrinsic struggle between repression and resistance at the "level of life" which produces subjectivizations that are simultaneously passive and active. In most human/nonhuman relationships, both the human and the nonhuman engage in a relation characterized by the flickering of these roles—sometimes this flickering is almost imperceptible, but it is nonetheless present, and it is substantially defined by the cultural norms, rules, and conventions inscribed in the space in which the relationship develops. The history of humankind has been characterized by a regularly occulted operation of disciplinary powers towards the nonhuman, be it selective breeding practices, mass-farming, pruning, transplanting, grafting, harvesting. Human-animal and human-plant relationships have always entailed forms discipline in which the human sets specific rules around the limitations imposed by the bio-specificities of the bodies of the nonhuman. Although at first glance it might seem that the human is the sole operator of agency, more careful consideration can reveal that the nonhuman always poses a form of resistance of some sort, or that, in not very obvious ways, the nonhuman responds to the disciplining of domestication with subtler forms of re-wilding. In these instances, plants and animals change human behavior by determining economies of care, regimes of sustenance, production of wealth, and inscribing power and economic value.

Foucault's conception of power as that which outlines an ensemble of actions inducing others in the production and consumption of epistemological objects becomes relevant in this context. Foucault conceives power as a noncentralized entity—power is inextricably enmeshed in objective capacities (skills and preexisting knowledge) and communication (production and dissemination of knowledge, and exchange of information). Power, in its many different iterations, permeates everything; and where there's power, there's resistance.85 Resistance is not always antagonistic. It is productive in essence, and it is intrinsic and internal element to power itself: it is part of an asymmetry in which power gives structure to a field of possible actions that individuals or groups can enact. Power thus determines possibilities; it defines actions taking place within specific spatializations. This is one of the most important contingencies involved in the definition of Foucauldian power and resistance conceptions. Whether these notions are applied to governments, institutions, familial nuclei, or organizations, the essential objective for the work of power and resistance is containment, either operated by physical boundaries or by the law.

It is for this very reason that this book is organized around chapters defined by actual spatializations, physical and cultural, in which the bodies of plants, as well as those of animals, objects, and humans materialize. The premise is simple. For instance: the abstract notion of "an orchid," is only epistemologically useful to the Platonic tendencies of Western philosophy—but why should we reduce our everyday shared experience with plants, or any other being, to the objectifying approaches of scientific knowledge or the totalizing ways of Western philosophy, when they have been proved to construct very limited relational modes with nonhuman beings?

An orchid situated in a bathroom defines different biopower relationships to an orchid of the same species in a hotel lobby, to one in a botanical garden, or one in a gardening center. The power-fields at play in these very different spatializations of knowledge guide very different behaviors/levels of interactions or care between humans and plants. Being able to take these differences into consideration can productively problematize the agency of plants, their bodily presences, their materialities, and the powernegotiations plants and humans establish in specific spaces. Like natural history illustration and painting, the epistemic spatializations around which this book is structured are material and define human/plants relationships alike. But they are also defined by laws, rules and regulations, ethical and moral values, and most regularly, if not always, these spatializations are defined by capitalism. A spatialization is never just delimited space—a spatialization is constituted by perimeters and inscribed cultural codes. At times the perimeters of the spatialization are optically visible, they are marked by specific materialities, in other instances, the perimeters are imposed by the cultural norms and financial values inscribed in the spatialized area. This book proposes an alternative approach designed to address the contemporary challenges we currently face. As climate change, more than ever, threatens all forms of life on the planet, considering human-plants relationships from new perspectives is essential to providing answers to pressing sustainability issues, to revealing the importance of essential biointerconnectedness in ecosystems, and to leading us to a more complex appreciation of the variety of living organisms we share the planet with. It is now unattainable to discuss human-nonhuman relationships without properly acknowledging the interconnectedness between capitalist shifts, environmental concerns, and biopolitical registers. It's not so much a matter of encountering plants in an abstract sense anymore, but one of mapping the interconnectedness between them and the ecosystems (biosystem and cultural system) they inhabit with us, along with the animals they host, the mineral

balances and unbalances they cause in the soil, the air quality, the geological shifts they operate, and so on.

In this sense, Foucault's conception of "power-knowledge" relationships, the notion that power and knowledge are interrelated and that they impact on epistemology as well as upon the material world around us, is problematized by the preponderant logics of capitalism, which, in the Anthropocene, constitutes the essence of the episteme governing discourses and practices. In this book, the notion of built environment is provocatively expanded to include agricultural fields, hotel lobbies, shop windows, greenhouses, as well as forests and grass fields. This is done in the knowledge that capitalist logics permeate and define the essence of everything either by carefully pre-structuring or simply by allowing, or by perpetuating. In Capitalist Realism: Is There No Alternative?, Mark Fisher discussed the role commodification played in the cultural production of the twentieth century, emphasizing the essence of a naturalized and pervasive regime of pre-corporation as preemptive formatting: a pervasive atmosphere conditioning everything that can emerge in capitalist culture, encompassing all production systems and modes. Power structures and the power-knowledge relationships inscribed in capitalist realism are actualized and stabilized according to specific registers and logics of visibility and consumption that ultimately impact on the presence or absence of plants, on their bodies, their biorhythms, as well as our own.

Capitalist growth with its necessity to insert "bodies into the machineries of production," relies on this power-knowledge relational to substantiate itself. It is this modern conception of power as biopower enmeshed into capitalist realism, that which capitalizes on the living as intrinsically intertwined to the sphere of economic processes that can be more productively reconfigured to think about plants from new perspectives. It is in this Foucauldian context that I propose to think about plants as bodies in constant dialogue. Bodies that partake into complex, reflexive, and intra-active relationships of coevolution and becoming. It is in this context that their perceived passivity can be overcome as an obsolete and convenient relational mode that has deliberately impoverished the vegetal world. As it is known, art has played a substantial role in the configuration of the so-called animal turn in the humanities. Through its ability to enrich, problematize, and unhinge philosophical and scientific conceptions, in the case of plants too, contemporary art appears situated in a privileged epistemological position. It is in this sense that the examples discussed in this book will provide starting points, departures, paths of flight, and new directions that will prove productive in overcoming plant blindness. <>

THE PLANT CONTRACT: ART'S RETURN TO VEGETAL LIFE by Prudence Gibson [Series: Critical Plant Studies, Brill, 9789004353039]

THE PLANT CONTRACT argues that visual and performance art can help change our perception of the vegetal world, and can return us to nature and thought. Via an investigation into the wasteland, robotany, feminist plants, and nature rights, this phytology-love story investigates how contemporary art is mediating the effects of plant-blindness, caused by human disassociation from the natural world. It is

also a gesture of respect for the genius of vegetal life, where new science proves plants can learn, communicate, remember, make decisions, and associate. Art is a litmus test for how climate change affects human perception. This book responds to that test by expressing plant-philosophy to a wider public, through an interrogation of plant-art.See Less

This book focusses on the art aesthetics of new plant discoveries. It proposes that contemporary visual art and culture can mitigate the way we have forgotten the natural world. Art can address the problems of no longer recognizing nature, by re-introducing us to it. This is more than a call for a return to nature and specifically to plants. It is also an effort to engage with the massively distributed and globalized issue of climate change, in a small and localized way, human by human, artist by artist, plant by plant. Humans will always see the bear not the woods, the lion not the grasslands, the camel not the desert dunes. We are attuned to see animals, and to see ourselves. This book aims to train our eyes and thoughts back to the landscape; it marks a return to the vegetal backdrop that becomes a multitude of subjectivities.

If we can 'see' the vegetal world once more, we might remember what we are. Plants are the key to curing vegetal blindness. What are these plants and how did we forget them? In partnership with art, within the larger field of aesthetics, plants are calling us back to the world. Somewhere, somehow, we have lost respect for the world, for nature and for each other. When I was a child, I disliked accompanying my father as he walked through the neighbourhood to collect kindling from the local park to make our evening winter fire. Why? Because he would stop to chat courteously with almost every person we came across. He had an uncanny knack of showing the greatest of respect to all who passed him by. He would also pause and bring my attention to a flowering camellia sasanqua or a spectacular squiggly gum tree trunk. Now I look back and see the virtue of taking time and showing courtesy.

Michel Serres, in his text The Natural Contract, mourns the lost pact among sailors on the high seas, where common courtesy and a code of conduct flourished. Serres promises, in his natural contract exposition, that 'the natural world will never again be our property, either private or common, but our

symbiont.'1 The earth, Serres explains, speaks to us in terms of bonds and pacts, forces and interactions, which require a contract.2 It is an agreement amongst humans to honour the Earth, the world, to honour nature as our mutual symbiont.

This book is a deep endorsement of Serres' natural contract. The Plant Contract emerges directly from my conclusion that a contractual nature study requires further attention and that there is a place in Critical Plant Studies and alongside vegetal philosophy for such inquiry. It is also a gesture of respect for the genius of vegetal life itself,3 via an investigation into nature rights, the wasteland, feminist plants, robotic technologies and the greatest artists working in this sphere of vegetal philosophy. It is an inquiry into how art can mediate and express plant-philosophy to a wider public. This is a phytological project based on plant-love. But it also acknowledges that some plants are wicked, some are defiant and others cannot be controlled. Respect and maybe even a little fear for plants reminds humans of our true place in the world.

Later in this introduction, after establishing the aesthetic (visual art) angle, this text elaborates the kinds of contractual emphases that the book chapters elaborate. However here, at the beginning of the beginning, it needs to be explained that climate change's inestimable scale, its vastness, is altogether too imposing for humans to consider or contend with. Humans have tread a course of dominion or sovereignty over nature which has contributed to the ecological damage we know today. We no longer understand the seasons, the weather or vegetal life around us. Only when our car gets bogged on a friend's farm or when heavy rain causes leaks inside the house or we start sneezing from spring pollen do we even notice that we live in a natural world. These days, we live indoors, indifferent to weather. We have neglected the world, we have turned our back on the crops, the farm animals and the harvests. We don't remember the plough or the horse's harness or the hay bales. We stare at our screens and keep typing, whether or not the weather is inclement.

A plant contract is a further development of the natural contract. It supports Serres' notion of a need to rediscover, however naively, the natural world. Serres notes that the social contract (presented in 1762 by Jean Jacques Rousseau) marked an abandonment of nature in order to create a social pact. Humans formed a governance structure that managed society fairly and equitably. From that moment, Serres suggests, we forgot our aforementioned nature, which is now distant and mute. A plant contract is an effort to un-mute nature, via plant science and art showing evidence that plants communicate to one another via emissions. If we stop talking, and stop typing, for brief periods, we may be able to hear the plants and to remember nature which has become so distant. If, via the social contract, we have cast off from nature, then the plant contract is a means of re-rooting (or re-mooring) us into the land.

The Plant Contract is an act of resuscitation, a breath of renewed life into a natural contract. We must avoid the behavior of the destroyer and the devourer, for this is parasitism. With our endless human

desire to own property and to exert influence over the land, we have become intractable and reduced to human nature, rather than the human. The 'rights of mastery and property come down to parasitism. Rights of symbiosis however are reciprocal and must give back to nature now a legal subject.'4 The plant contract is symbiosis, rejecting parasitism.

If a natural contract brought our attention to the collectivity and the totality of the world, the plant contract continues that tradition, by bringing attention to the totality of the vegetal world and the way in which art punctures that world to disrupt devastating human habits. This totality affords and encourages the power and forces of art. The impact of the aesthetic experience can assist a renewed view of the totality of the natural world.

The Plants in Art

My inquiry here is immersed in the realm of visual art. There is a cohort of performance, video, bio, sonic, environmental, installation and social engagement artists who are interpreting and experimenting with plant information in their artworks. This creates a mediation and a communication, as well as an expression, of vegetal thought. Yes, art raises awareness for critical issues but it also infiltrates our cultural and social being. Plant art has a greater capacity than mere aesthetic instrumentalism. Just as art has its own independent entelechy or energizing force, so too plants exist outside any human manipulation of them. This connection between plant and a flat art ontology (the collapse of any hierarchical structure) drives the ideas in this book and helps to begin a process of devising what we might call this plant contract, a new deal for the vegetal world: a means of altering our perception of nature by attempting to see all the parts, as well as the overall sum, of plant art.5 As we discover more and more about the radical and uncanny life of plants, it is easy to be inspired by what this could mean for our existing contracts in social and political life. Greater care? A sustainable approach? Mutuality?

Nature can no longer be seen as an inert backdrop to human action. A tree does not call itself a tree: it is a complex organism of charging hormones, firing synapses, busy photosynthesis and strange excrescences. At the same time that plants have been modified, synthetically acclimatized, commercialised and commodified, word is spreading about how interesting and capable they are, for-themselves and in-themselves. It is not difficult to speculate that there may be a future collision between those that acknowledge the appearance of plants as ontologically independent entities, and those who rely on plants' agricultural and corporatized profit potential. We are moving into the epoch of the plant, where careless productions and practices relating to vegetal life are becoming more controversial. How this epoch will unfold relies upon how humans deal with plant world relations.

In the context of art, my interpretation of Critical Plant Studies is as a perception of various ecologies of the world, as interactions of energetic activity. Each ecology connects with the next and to its entirety as well. This is an aggregated system of addressing changes to notions of nature, away from

transcendence, away from sublime aesthetics. Instead of the human mind thinking like a machine, in this text, the human mind approaches its environment like a plant system. At the very least, this book is the metaphoric gesture of attempting to do so. Vegetal studies can assist in understanding human connections with its ecologies, and human cultural practice can help humans to assist plant functions, in order to provide a more cooperative way of living. Bringing art practice into the mix provides an accelerating mediation. This is the purpose of combining art and plants within a critical context: the dovetail effect.

In an interview with Michael Marder on the relations between plants and art, he said,

> Art, in turn, is sublimated plant-sensing. Aesthesis, at the root of sensation and aesthetics, is not the exclusive province of animals and humans; as we know, plants are highly receptive to a variety of environmental factors, from light and moisture gradients to vibrations. To be sure, plants neither think nor see in images, but this does not mean that they neither think nor see.

Sublimated plant-sensing reminds us of the capacity of art to create reactive sensory experiences outside the everyday. The thinking, sensing and seeing of plants and of aesthetics are deeply connected, despite their apparent differences. Plants root, shoot, flower, photosynthesise and self-generate. Aesthetics creates, represents, expresses. The latter mobilises analogy and allegory and is a human-centred study of the nature of beauty and taste. The connection lies in the deep beauty of considering plants outside the confines of their functionality and beyond the reductive consideration of those with 'taste.' Marder's point that plants don't think or see in images, but they do think and see, also reminds us of how art can create an experience that shows us something we couldn't see or understand before; art creates a level playing field for everyone to experience sensory stimuli. This equality is in keeping with vegetal experience.

Ascribing greater status to plant life is a political act, and art that draws attention to this shift in structures of legitimacy is also political. Jacques Ranciere's aesthetic regime focuses on the political capacities and sensations of art. Art is no longer a self-purge, he says, but a moment in political time.7 The way in which an ecosystem flourishes, the way its elements vie for and share nutrients or don't, is political. Where Ranciere moves away from conventions of aesthetics and concentrates on where and how an artwork or art experience exists in a particular moment in time can also be connected with critical plant studies in terms of time. Like Ranciere's regime of political time, the elements within a given plant environment exist at a certain time and a certain place. The force of these extraneous constituent elements are a part of the work itself. Plant life, too, exists as part of a wider ecology and also as discrete individual ecologies.

In keeping with Ranciere's political regime for aesthetics, this book places art and plants on the political environmental agenda as an inter-species inter-relation. It also highlights the necessary social and moral functions of creating a new aesthetic that relies emphatically on plant life. The artists discussed in this volume have been selected due to their synchronized connection to the critical plant

concepts that have been developed and include artists from across the world, whose work I have come across during my inquiries to date. An online database is being developed to gather data on all artists working in this area and it will be maintained as an ongoing adjunct resource.

The Plant Aesthetics

Environmental aesthetics is an emerging field, as is Critical Plant Studies. These are innovative, if not radical, areas of research due to the sense of impending climate crisis that many of us feel we are living in. The emergent scientific evidence to support what we already suspected – that plants have capacities and capabilities beyond human comprehension – has been a monumental impetus for plant scientists, philosophers and art writers. Plant science (care of, Gagliano, Simard, Chamovitz et al.) shows us that plants communicate chemically, that they make decisions that suggest associative learning and that they communicate using complex fungal systems amongst their roots. Plants sense danger and vibrations, they manipulate insects and animals in order to thrive. We now know that plants remember.10 They can function asexually and usually prosper as a community.

These are plant qualities many humans in Western culture have forgotten, or have lost touch with. Art and narrative writing has the ability to tie together plant knowledge and cultural studies, so that we can re-learn why our connection with plant life is so important. It is also important so that humans can see that, despite all the watering, fertilizing and positioning of plants that we do in our gardens or balconies so that plants grow, plants do not rely on humans for anything (except perhaps as composting, once we die). We breathe out useful carbon dioxide but so do myriad other animals. The philosophical and economic relationship between humans and plants has been patronising at best, and life-threatening at worst.

The discourse of plants and art falls within enviro-aesthetics. All that we yearn for, within a context of aesthetics, stems from conscious spirited awareness, a sentient life. These are not attributes we have historically associated with plants. However, the discoveries in plant science over the last decade have led us to reconsider the convention of denying plants a sentient life. If aesthetics creates a collective human mediation of the world, for a better understanding of being, then the varieties of plants, with their decidedly non-human and seemingly mechanical activities, do not at first seem to complement aesthetics. Yet, increasingly, artists and scientists are drawing attention to the similarities between plant life and human life, and between plant life and media technology. These art and plant-science intersections are the connections I hope to make. These are also the creative elaborations I want to develop.

The Unclassifiable

The epoch of plant discovery, from the turn of the 21st century onwards, marks a profound change in human perceptions of nature. This has resulted in a period of extreme confusion as artists, writers and other humanists grapple with the philosophical implications of science research that shows plants

remember, learn, associate and decision-make. As an Australian, this difficulty excites an alarming memory of an earlier time. Australia was invaded by white Europeans around 1788, when German Idealism and the Enlightenment were directing scientists to observe and to categorise, to denominate and to taxonomise the examples of plant life collected on sea voyages. The aesthetic decisions and praxes of the time were firmly entrenched in Romantic conventions. That is, they were still referencing classical motifs and Picturesque structures of creating paintings.

Once landed on Australian soil, the unwieldy bushland and the unclassifiable characteristics of the bush, the native plants and their foreign forms were too much for colonial artists. European mimicry and artifice flourished in early Australian art, due to a kind of paralytic inability among artists to create new visions. They simply did not know what to make of these strange new flora and fauna, and they couldn't absorb the oddities of new information into their aesthetic vision. Whereas back in the 18th–19th century, Goethe, Humboldt, von Neumayer and other roving scientists were searching for a unified whole, a system of recording nature that could be harmonised by an archetype; scientists are now searching for information about plants that transcends the hierarchies we have adopted since Linnaus. In other words, German Idealists yearned to find a plant archetype. Now we, or at least I, yearn to find a distributed plant knowledge system. This is Critical Plant Studies: to identify how these disruptive times affect culture and society's relations with the plant world, and to document the philosophical and aesthetic fallout. Both periods of history, the Enlightenment and the Anthropocene, are bound to disrupt and inconvenience what we thought we knew and who we thought we were.

Therefore, I am arguing that the same problematics are presenting now. This book interrogates art being made in this framework of new Critical Plant Studies. There is a need to negotiate the criteria of aesthetic value of current plant-based and plant-theoretical art work. There has not yet been enough critical aesthetic discussion of the artwork being made that focuses on plant studies, despite the magnitude of enthusiasm artists are experiencing. There is some aesthetic refinement and critical formulation to be done.

If plants are performing their own subjectivities, as I will argue they are, the classical tradition of aesthetics is made difficult to start with. Art has a long history of object-based making. Even performance and video work relies upon the body as object, the experience as something which must be recorded or archived before we can make aesthetic sense of it. Much post-modern artworks challenged these object-oriented criteria for what constitutes art; but it is the post-human turn, with its focus on moving beyond the limits of subject/object dyads, that best addresses the problems we face once we accept that plants are subjects, as well as objects. Plants perform subjectivities and art does the same. This book is dedicated to illuminating how this occurs.

The Science and the Theory

Subjectivity is important when thinking of plant scientist Monica Gagliano's careful experiments with the Mimosa pud

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The Glasshouse

Excavating terms such as plant intelligence in science may require an equally radical approach in the humanities (including art and writing). To move across disciplines requires order and argument, but in this book there is also an effort to incorporate experience and memory, just as Marder did in his recent collaborative book The Chernobyl Herbarium. The benefit of allowing narrative to creep into the crossover of art and science is that it allows generosity and growth; it also concedes the chance of failure in any experimentation.

I have a strong memory of my grandfather's glasshouse. The front gate to his house, for example, was not much more than knee-high and it opened onto a liver-brick pathway leading down the garden. The house had two wings, like double sentries, and lead-lined window panes in dappled glass. It was a big cold house in winter, due to the shadow of the hill behind, but cool and dim in summer.

His glasshouse was located around the side of the house and along the eastern perimeter of the rear garden. A glass structure of five metres by four metres, it had the smell of manky earth and seaweed. The seaweed concentrate was used to fertilise the many pots of orchids along the benches. Above the benches were two long suspended water reticulation systems that emitted a haze of water twice a day on a timer. It was warm in this space, the glass was smeary with dirt and cast strange shadows across the orchids. There were two long benches on either side.

He fed the orchids the seaweed solution via a squirt bottle. Not too much, he used to warn, handing the plastic bottle to me. Too much and it will raise their hormone levels and they will develop ugly extrusions on their stems. I squirted sparingly, drinking in the aroma of fetid and manky salt and wet earth. More than that, he directed, too little and they won't have enough nutrients. This time in the glasshouse was precious to me but I soon noticed that my grandfather rarely cared for the orchids, he instructed his wife and various female offspring to care for the flowers instead. Whilst this memory of him showing me how to care for his orchids holds happiness, it also heralds a warning. How can women, like plants, move beyond our instrumentality? How can we disrupt old habits so that women have the space to grow and bloom without being assimilated into the 'other's' being? This question dances across the lines of this book, and is ongoing and irreducible.

There are several female writers who are holding the flag of feminist plant studies, such as Luce Irigaray and Elaine Miller. Elaine Miller's investigation of the vegetative soul, through continental philosophy, reminds us of Heidegger's term the 'groundless ground,' which displaces the fiction of a univocal origin.16 No plant is the same, no plant umvelt is the same. Miller believes Irigaray's trope of efflorescence 'explicitly performs what we have called a plant-like reading.' Miller explains that Irigaray's efflorescence complicates the idea of a single reduced subject and a singular phallic reading, whilst reclaiming the ivy-like growth.18 In Deleuze and Guattari's introductory rhizome chapter of A Thousand Plateaus they talk about the One (the reflection of nature) becoming two. Whilst their logic

extends to computer and it studies, ones and twos, their ideas also allow for the distribution and multiplicity that we are increasingly experiencing in our digital lives. For art, that means a shift from one-to-one (viewer to painting) to one-to-many (viewers and experience). However, the impact of art remains the same: localized, personalized and intimate.

Plant Writing

Is this writing that I am doing here today a kind of pharmakon? Nearly a poison, nearly a cure? Do we need a changed perception of nature to redress the relationship between humans and the plant world in order to lessen the effects of climate change? People will suffer eco-crisis fatigue if we keep hammering away at the same doom-and-gloom points. However, if we create something, a means of communicating that may initially lurk in the shadows of a creative approach to writing, then this might be a way for creative writing to become real – this is hyperstition. Create the narratives of bio-rights and eventually the laws will change too. This was the kind of experiment that Derrida conducted in his writing. Write it down. It may be a trick, it may be a curse/cure. It may not be reliable or trustworthy, but once it is deconstructed and rewritten, it is done.

Marder said, of plant writing,

But, no doubt, more needs to be done, boldly and experimentally, to invent a way of writing that would respond and correspond to plant life. Patience plays an important role here, as does the absolute openness to the other. Connected to this, I always wonder how to give my writing back to plants. My dream for Plant-Thinking was to embed seeds into its covers and to urge readers to bury the book after it has been read, letting it decompose and germinate.20

In this book, I adopt Marder's call for bold and experimental writing. I present vignettes and case studies of artists and scientists working with plant science. This is a means of making the invisible visible. Plants are inseparable from their environment. That is one reason why they have been considered as having a non-identity.21 Humans think of themselves as independent, thoughtful and wilful entities. They see plants as trapped in their places. They are bound to the ground by their roots, unable to move far or travel across the planet's surface. This suggestion of immobility surely is the strangest critique of plants. In an effort to reduce them to a less relevant species than humankind, we have cast them as insentient and immobile, neither of which is correct (seeds travel in the wind, roots dig for miles and miles, vines and ground-cover can extend across vast distances).

Marder walks through a philosophical arbor of plant-related concepts in his writing. His theses move the prominence of vegetal life away from categorization and away from a solely human subjectivity. He speaks of plants as the fifth element: air, fire, water, earth … and plants.22 In this book, I would like to respond to Marder's work, by asking why have we not paid more attention to the high-functioning, communication and sensory intelligence of plants in previous decades, particularly in art aesthetics,

and whether that emergent art/plant area is effective? A consequential question will be what effect a radical reinterpretation of vegetal relevance will have on art and culture.

In an effort to align the philosophical ideas of aesthetics and ontology with plants, Marder charts various continental thinkers who refer to plants in their writing, for instance, Nietsche's interest in vegetal digestion, Hegel's concession that the act of devouring extends to the nutritive properties of plants, and Freud's repression as an interference with flowering as sexual maturation and human ripeness.23 When Marder draws a link between 'spirit consciousness' as being only partly exposed to the light, as are plants whose roots are hidden in the dark soil, we see his wish, the urge, the desire to connect plants with 'life.'

The art world is a discipline that can provide an interpretation of the changed way we understand or conceive of plants. For instance, much of the artwork being conducted around plant neurobiology is performance art, such as Australian Cat Jones and Latvian Spela Petric, and is known for its durational extremes and temporal qualities. The temporality of plant life, likewise, functions on a different scale and under a different model from the temporality of human life. Although the sun, moon and seasons have a direct effect on the opening and closing of flowers and on their ephemeral ways, short plant life-times and tree longevity mean that the operations are different. Plants operate on time scales of growth, dispersal and regeneration that are very different from human experiences. Plants operate within time scales we can't understand. Consequently, artists who create technological interfaces that mediate or alter plant time, and mediate their cellular communication and metabolic activity, are especially interesting as a means of learning from plants. Mancuso in his new book Brilliant Green asks 'What does art tell us about the relationship between human beings and the plant world?' The groundswell of plant-related artworks marks a time in history where we are turning to plants for better models of living and creative solutions to climate change problems, presented as aesthetic acts.

Razing Terra Mater

An additional resounding point of curiosity at the plant-science and art nexus is the role of the female. This discourse is part of the emergent state of radical reinterpretation of vegetal life. Nature, of course, has conventionally been cast as a womanly figure. A mother, a fecund vessel within which life can grow. Plants, since the 19th century burgeoning of female interest in botanical studies, have attracted women. This is a domain of thought and scholarly engagement that has a strong female heritage. Many male philosophers have written about plants and trees in their work; for instance, Marder writes essays on Aristotle's wheat, Leibniz's blades of grass and Derrida's sunflowers in his book The Philosopher's Plant: An Intellectual Herbarium. Marder follows ten male philosophers, but he only refers to one female: Luce Irigaray. Marder and Irigaray work together on different writing texts, both scholarly and journalistic. There is the sense they conspired, for Marder's intellectual herbarium book, to draw connections with her favourite plant, the water lily. However, there have already been deep

connections with plants for Irigaray. She has said to Marder in private correspondence that, 'All my work develops as a plant grows' and she has said that thought needs 'to be ready to listen to nature, to the sensible.'

Sex doesn't correspond to sexism in the plant world, a mode that humanity might learn from. Most plants have a male and a female part in the one plant. Some mosses have male plants and female plants. Some conifers have two types of cones; one is the stamen cone, the second catches the pollen if the wind is howling right. Flowers have both stigma and stamen in the one plant. These self-fulfilling processes of reproduction have enormous significance for a culture where gender and sexual politics are a constant source of change and fluidity. There are potential provocations for a re-thinking of the world, when individual species have hybrid sexuality. This book will address plant and art hybrids as provocateurs in an art-science discourse.

We can't escape the bind of only understanding the state of being through the sieve of humanness. This is why, according to Claire Colebrook, 'becoming-woman' is still required. An alternative can be to shake the tree and find a women's movement that is pluralised amongst male and female and all other gender combinations, to create new political and cultural units of thought. Interesting, here, to reiterate that Luce Irigaray's choice of plant as a means of elucidating philosophical ideas in Marder's book is the water lily. The water lily is both rooted and it floats across the water. It moves on a fluidly female surface and the lily reproduces asexually with the help of insects carrying seed from the anther to the stigma. The water lily, then, relies on no man, will not be tied down and requires the help of an entire ecological community to thrive. This plant is the perfect analogy for my aesthetic approach to plant studies.

It is time to reject terms such as Mother Nature or Terra Mater as terms that paralyse women into a role of carer, nurturer and healer. Instead, it is time to embrace the plant as a feminine symbol – growth and transformation, a female subjectivity. As Miller says, 'Woman is supposed to have an essence that defines her as a woman, once and for all. She is relegated to the status of nature or matter, and in this sense can do no more that assist or ground man in the actualization of his subjectivity.' In this book, I discuss artworks as part of Irigaray's efflorescence, as a blooming metamorphosis and as an endless individuation. These bloomings cannot be confined or bound in discourse. Irigaray's nonhuman and non-animal feminine subjectivity is an always sexed subject. Elaine Miller notes Irigaray's thoughts when she,

> Proposes a feminine model of subjectivity, one that returns to a close connection to the philosophy of nature, and in particular to the figure of the plant. In doing so Irigaray is not suggesting that a return to unmediated nature – in itself an impossible task – would bring about a meaningful change for women. Rather, she implies that a return to and a reworking of the symbolics of nature might be a place from within the social or symbolic order from which to

> retroactively restructure the ways in which women's embodiment, natural role, and passage into subjectivity are thought, and thereby to effect a real change for women in the cultural order.

In my own modest way and as an homage to Irigaray, this book's focus is also not a return to unmediated nature. It is, contrarily, bound in aesthetic mediations of plants. The artworks discussed in this book are a reworking of the symbolics of nature and are real examples of restructuring women's embodiment and passage into subjectivity, leaving room for sexual difference.

The Contracts

As mentioned earlier, to establish a plant contract, I first need to turn to Rousseau's Social Contract and then move to Serres' The Natural Contract. Rousseau's earnest call, to mark a difference between the general will and the collective individual will, was a proposal that the individual give up his or her sovereignty in return for the care of the state: 'Let us take it that men have reached the point at which the obstacles to their survival in the state of nature overpower each individual's resources for maintaining himself in that state. So this primitive condition can't go on; the human race will perish unless it changes its manner of existence.' Research in plant science shows that plants share information and all plants, in the given ecology, benefit from the resources that are communicated and also protected by that information. Rousseau's acknowledgement of the individuals and the collective are important in terms of perception of the parts and the whole of any given group.

Rousseau said, 'But, besides the public person, we have to consider the private persons composing it [the social contract], whose life and liberty are naturally independent of it. We are bound then to distinguish clearly between the respective rights of the citizens and the Sovereign, and between the duties the former have to fulfil as subjects, and the natural rights they should enjoy as men.' This blueprint for a civil society, of the community as one being cared for by 'the one,' was established only 250 years ago. In the history of Western thinking, this is not so long ago. An animal contract and a plant contract are yet to be devised, but the sentiments of Rousseau's pre-democratic collective of individual wills are interesting to note in terms of a move towards a plant contract.

The Natural Contract

Michel Serres elaborated a 'natural contract' and developed his idea from Rousseau's 'social contract.' These precedents are a useful consecutive model for analyzing artworks, and collaborating with artists in their 'plant' endeavours. We are no more than renters on the planet and we must therefore be aware there is a bond to pay if we leave a mess at the end of the lease. Our worries these days, according to Serres, are weather patterns and time. Climate change has affected our relationship to the weather, in the short term rather than the long term. How does that affect the long-term now – decision-making with longevity? He writes, 'But more than that is at stake: the necessity to revise and even re-sign the primitive social contract. This unites us for better and for worse, along the first diagonal, without the world. Now that we know how to join forces in the face of danger, we must envisage, along the other diagonal, a new pact to sign with the world: the natural contract.'

So even while some of the criteria for Darwinian and Linnaen classification and ordering of various natural life science species were a way of placing humans in the apical position, as species that can speak and move and think, there is new evidence that plants can do many of the same things as humans. Michel Serres writes, 'Would a new Eden emerge if we agreed to a Natural Contract?' He is referring to Eve in the garden, where her toes grow longer in the viscous humus and she is a garland climbing around the great tree. There is a sense, in Serres' writing, that Eve is a plant, entwining and braiding around the limbs of the Tree of Knowledge, which was of course cut down by Adam to make the first dwelling. A plant contract seeks to make amends for that original error.

The Plant Contract

The Plant Contract is a promise to hold a candle for Michel Serres' ideas within the natural contract. A contract suggests that something must be given up in order to reach an agreement. I will give you this, if you give me that. I will stop doing this, if you stop doing that. The plant contract reminds us that we have forfeited our responsibility, within the pact, to the vegetal world. In doing so, we have lost something ourselves. The code of conduct, the unspoken courtesy of the high seas has been washed away. This plant contract seeks to renew the agreement. The plant contract tells us that human sovereignty over nature has been occurring for too long. The plant contract acknowledges that dominion over nature must stop and that we can each sign our own small contract to address the Anthropocene, which refers to the damages done to the natural world at human hands. This is a series of plant contracts on a small and individual, human scale. It is written in the spirit of the 'one by one.'

My personal tree spirit is the poplar tree. Its leaves flicker in the sunlight and represent irresolution. Despite owning up to being 'indecisive' as a personality trait, I can confirm that the poplar tree propagates using a rhizome. These underground rhizomes or creeping rootstalks can survive for thousands of years, even when the surface trunks and foliage have been devastated by fire or drought, insect attacks or fungus. The rhizome is a source of longevity, fecund with creative possibility. In asexual plant reproduction, the rhizome can act as a reproduction system. The tips of the underground or underwater roots can break off as new plants. This is one means of reproduction in the water lily, couch grass and nettles. The attraction of the rhizomic model in plants is their subterfuge, their activity away from human eyes.

New discoveries about how plants feel and think seem outlandish, because botanical specimens have no human-like brains. Instead, of course, they have complex rhizomic systems and methods of communicating via chemical emissions or via the communicative power of fungi that grows among their roots. The electro-chemical activities caused by remembering previous stresses, such as animals overeating their leaves or extended periods of drought, are the same chemicals that humans emit when remembering stresses. These may be procedural memories in plants, rather than emotional memories, but we have more in common with plants than previously thought.

It is important to understand our experience of the botanical world. There is a long tradition of cultivating plants: the activities of gardening, ordering, classifying, collecting, picking and harvesting. Not to mention genetically modifying them and using hazardous chemicals to enhance and augment their growth. Indigenous Australians used traditional methods of burning the bush for regeneration and would plant a tree if a community needed shade. So it is human nature to admire a well-manicured garden, to enjoy the produce of an apple tree and to baulk at unsightly weeds. The question this investigation asks is whether we have been treading the wrong track of plant aesthetics. Better to consider the bounty and liveliness of plants in-themselves, rather than for-us. By 'for-us' I mean for our aesthetic delectation, for our sustenance, shade and oxygen. Can we instead consider plants in their own right, via the mediations of art?

The plant contract is a method of telling stories about plants and art together. It is an aesthetic contract and as such has systems, rather than rules. It harnesses aesthetics as an analogic act, a way of drawing connections between species and things. It has the courage to be playful and celebratory, even in the face of possible failures. This is what it means 'to essay,' to venture out and experiment even though the potential for success is slim.

Art usually functions as an open-ended inquiry of becoming and of change, without proscription. The discourse surrounding the artworks that align plant and aesthetics is not already made, already decided. It is presented only as provocations, just some water for your pot plant of thought. Miller summarises Irigaray's plant thinking by saying that 'Irigaray subverts traditional metaphors as a rhetorical weapon against the tradition that has worked to exclude and at the same time to assimilate women.' I hope to embrace the traditions of metaphor, as Irigaray does, and to also allow them to blossom and change without constantly being reduced.

The chapters of this book serve as clauses in a Plant Contract. They start with the wasteland in Chapter 1. The iterations of the wasteland chapter are not confined to the land but are the outskirts of all kinds of environments, even those under the sea or within a bio-hazard zone. Artists who work with the most resilient of plants and engender that suppleness in their own work, are introduced here. Wastelands provide us with provocations about civilising the wilds, creating class structures in terms of 'work' and upsetting the order of how we see plants and their growing environments. Wastelands refer to spaces that have had their usage changed as the result of toxic accident, corporate misuse, civic repurposing and via artistic mediation. This chapter grapples with definitions and outcomes of the wasteland.

The history of the Green Man chapter charts the foliage-spewing stone motif that has decorated churches and cathedrals since the 2nd and 1st centuries ad. Green Man, an architectural iconic motif,

emerged seven centuries before the number zero was used in mathematics and is a source of playful and apotropaic wonder. The foliate-faced, leaf-speaking Green Man is especially relevant when considering our human limitations in 'speaking' about plant life: we are bound by our ineffective vocabularies in this field of plant studies. This chapter extends how culture/nature interactions in contemporary art now, as with historical Green Man motifs of the past, affect our desire to relate closely to plants. Any human yearning to connect to the plant world in a hybrid mode collapses the distinction between the self and the other. Therefore, this chapter also introduces the abject nature of human/plant hybridity.

Robotany is developed in the next chapter as an emergent order of post-human interspecies connectivity. Extending beyond humanoids or plantoids, this chapter charts the science of plant systems and the technological intersections of plants as networks and computer systems as plants. There is much research into the circuitry possibility and root-probing functionality of plants, mimicked in new technological devices, but artists are also flipping these concepts and engaging with ways to bring attention to the complex vascular and communicative systems of plant life.

The legal complexities of a world surface when plants are believed to behave in human-like cognitive ways. Nature rights. Although we are vilified for calling it intelligence, the way plants function using distributed cognition creates a call for new legal and political approaches to earth or plant jurisprudence. The eco-punks in Chapter 4 present the artists, philosophers, poets and activists who create opportunities for environmental change. The dyad of ethics versus morality is extended to the law, which inspired the concept that a plant contract might be a means of proposing the right for plants' rights. There have been some epic examples of earth jurisprudence and nature rights globally but they are few. The greatest obstacle, apart from neo-liberal greed, to greater care of our natural tracts of land, is the separation of ethics and morals. This chapter elaborates work done in this legal mine field.

Marking the water lily as a feminist plant inveigles the cross-species and eco-feminist concepts by such thinkers as Plumwood and Irigaray and lays bare the differences between sexuate beings that humans repeatedly either ignore or reduce to a unified whole. The secret magic of plant properties has been utilised in dark magic and in Western anaesthetics and medicines too. The ungrounding of plants in the last chapter involves removing them from the environment they cannot be separated from. This disruption is temporary. Ungrounding is, in itself, a metaphor for the way we have mechanised plant life and the need to restore a synergistic relation with the vegetal world. This is not to suggest that we no longer include plant specimens in our medicines, our magic or our artwork but merely to take care when doing so. The geo-philosophy unearths the ugly and mournful last stratum of the earth's surface, but with a message of future multiple subjectivities, leaving behind the horrors of past exploitation.

Vegetal life and plant thought is an exhilarating topic, especially when grafted to aesthetics and these myriad examples of plant artwork. The chance to grow and effloresce, to allow the appearance of plants to show themselves to us rather than impose how they should look, is the thematic of the writing here. To write without a script, without confinement, without being enclosed by prescribed outcomes is invigorating. It feels like there is the chance to grow from here. That efflorescence is due to Irigaray's suggestion that vegetal and feminine openness toward the other, in themselves, is a way of giving service to life: 'Thinking is reunited with growth.'

Why Look at Plants?

The Botanical Emergence in Contemporary Art

Series:

Critical Plant Studies, Volume: 5

Volume Editor: Giovanni Aloi

Winner of the 2019 Outstanding Academic Titles award in Choice, a publishing unit of the Association of College & Research Libraries (ACRL)

Why Look at Plants? proposes a thought-provoking and fascinating look into the emerging cultural politics of plant-presence in contemporary art. Through the original contributions of artists, scholars, and curators who have creatively engaged with the ultimate otherness of plants in their work, this volume maps and problematizes new intra-active, agential interconnectedness involving human-non-human biosystems central to artistic and philosophical discourses of the Anthropocene.

Plant's fixity, perceived passivity, and resilient silence have relegated the vegetal world to the cultural background of human civilization. However, the recent emergence of plants in the gallery space constitutes a wake-up-call to reappraise this relationship at a time of deep ecological and ontological crisis. Why Look at Plants? challenges readers' pre-established notions through a diverse gathering of insights, stories, experiences, perspectives, and arguments encompassing multiple disciplines, media, and methodologies. <>

FEMINIST PHILOSOPHY OF MIND edited by Keya Maitra and Jennifer McWeeny [Oxford University Press, ISBN 9780190867614]

This is the first collection of essays to focus on feminist philosophy of mind. It brings the theoretical insights from feminist philosophy to issues in philosophy of mind and vice versa. *Feminist Philosophy of Mind* thus promises to challenge and inform dominant theories in both of its parent fields, thereby enlarging their rigor, scope, and implications. In addition to engaging analytic and feminist philosophical traditions, essays draw upon resources in phenomenology, cross-cultural philosophy, philosophy of race, disability studies, embodied cognition theory, neuroscience, and psychology.

The book's methods center on the collective consideration of three questions: *What* is the mind? *Whose* mind is the model for the theory? *To whom* is mind attributed? Topics considered with this lens include mental content, artificial intelligence, the first-person perspective, personal identity, other minds, mental illness, perception, memory, attention, desire, trauma, agency, empathy, grief, love, gender, race, sexual orientation, materialism, panpsychism, enactivism, and others.

Each of the book's twenty chapters are organized according to five core themes: Mind and Gender & Race &; Self and Selves; Naturalism and Normativity; Body and Mind; and Memory and Emotion. The introduction traces the development of these themes with reference to the respective literatures in feminist philosophy and philosophy of mind. This context not only helps the reader see how the essays fit into existing disciplinary landscapes, but also facilitates their use in teaching. *Feminist Philosophy of Mind* is designed to be used as a core text for courses in contemporary disciplines, and as a supplemental text that facilitates the ready integration of diverse perspectives and women's voices.

CONTENTS

What Is Feminist Philosophy of Mind? by Jennifer McWeeny and Keya Maitra

We first conceived of a book that would put feminist philosophy in conversation with philosophy of mind while attending the 2012 National Endowment for Humanities (NEH) Summer Institute "Investigating Consciousness: Buddhist and Contemporary Philosophical Perspectives." The Institute was premised on the idea that the philosophical study of consciousness is furthered by employing resources from diverse disciplines such as cognitive science, phenomenology, analytic philosophy, and Buddhist studies. As philosophers of mind trained by thinkers who were early advocates for interdisciplinarity (Mark Johnson and Ruth Millikan, respectively), we were delighted to see our field approached through these cross- cultural and cross- disciplinary engagements, and we discovered that the juxtaposition of multiple perspectives on consciousness was fecund for our own work, as did many of the Institute's other participants.

At the same time that we were inspired by the Institute's approach to philosophy of mind, as feminist philosophers who work with women of color feminisms and as women situated in postcolonial matrixes (albeit in different ways), we were struck by the conspicuous absence of a prominent feminist or critical social perspective among the Institute's faculty members and readings. Even in a philosophical space that we found to be one of the more inclusive and interdisciplinary we had yet experienced, there were few opportunities for rigorous analysis of feminist perspectives. "Feminist philosophy" is an umbrella concept that holds together multiple manners of doing philosophy that share the following feature: they regard the voices and experiences of women and members of underrepresented groups such as people of color, LGBTQ individuals, working- class people, and people with disabilities as philosophically significant. Because this regard is not proportionally distributed across these groups in individual instances of feminist philosophy, and because such approaches span diverse motivations and literatures, the plural form, feminist philosophies, is more apt to describe this type of work.

Noticing the absence of feminist philosophies at the NEH Summer Institute, and the corollary tendency on the part of discussants to talk about minds in the abstract as "the [universal] mind" rather than "this [particular person's] mind" or "my, your, his, her, or their mind," generated a series of provocative questions that ultimately led to the present study: Would contemporary debates in philosophy of mind be furthered by taking note of feminist insights? Would feminist philosophical projects benefit from employing theories and vocabularies from philosophy of mind? Would new philosophical questions, topics, and phenomena be revealed by an integration of the two fields? This book demonstrates affirmative answers to these questions by featuring twenty essays that combine insights from feminist philosophies and philosophies of mind.

Philosophy of mind is that subfield of philosophy that seeks to answer the question "What is the mind?" (Chalmers 2002, xi). Philosophers of mind look for identifying features of the mind— features that are shared among minds and are therefore universal. They ask what conditions a thing must fulfill in order for it to be a mind (or a particular component of minds such as consciousness or memory), and they frequently employ thought experiments, conceivability problems, and appeals to empirical data to reveal these conditions in finegrained ways. This focus has resulted in careful accounts of events and episodes of minds such as thoughts, desires, and dreams; contents of minds such as beliefs and feelings; functions of minds such as perception, attention, imagination, and emotion; and properties of minds such as intentionality, consciousness, and intelligence. Explanations of mind- body interaction, mind- world interaction, self- knowledge, and knowledge of other minds have been central preoccupations of the field and have led to the development of a number of its prominent views, including dualism, physicalism, functionalism, individualism, externalism, enactivism, and many others.

Although they rarely use the same vocabularies as philosophers of mind, feminist philosophers have written extensively on the natures of consciousness, the self, personal identity, and agency, and have attended to differential experiences of these phenomena across social groups. Analyses of the roles of first- person and third- person perspectives in the constitution of self- consciousness in oppressive contexts have played an important part in feminist, critical race, and trans studies, as has the question of whether the self is unitary or plural. Scholars have also considered whether cognitive science, and in particular neuroscience, can explain phenomena such as sex, gender, and sexual orientation, as well as illnesses that predominantly affect women. Critical social theorists have developed original theories of emotion, reason, memory, perception, imagination, belief, and desire that attend to the social and relational nature of these mental phenomena. In addition, they have crafted alternative ontologies and accounts of mind- body relations that grow from unique criticisms of naturalism, physicalism, and dualism that are not readily voiced in philosophy of mind. Many of these feminist views foreground the context and particularity of minds. They follow from asking questions such as

"Whose mind is the model for the theory?" and "Are some groups of people attributed minds (or certain mental capacities) more readily than others?"

Studies of mental phenomena undertaken by feminists bring new perspectives to standard accounts in philosophy of mind, just as advancements in philosophy of mind offer important resources to feminist philosophers. For example, the vocabularies of philosophy of mind can be useful when describing the ways that oppression takes root in thoughts, beliefs, desires, and emotions. Naomi Scheman's classic paper "Individualism and the Objects of Psychology" offers a paradigmatic example of this approach (Scheman 1983). Here Scheman argues against "individualism," or the idea that factors internal to an individual alone produce the meaning and content of mental phenomena. She expands upon criticisms of individualism expressed by Hilary Putnam and Tyler Burge in order to reveal an original theory of mental content that sees beliefs and desires as social and relational phenomena, and that implicates a method for cultivating liberatory rather than oppressive beliefs and desires in a population (Putnam 1975a; Burge 1979).

Ned Block's article "Sexism, Racism, Ageism, and the Nature of Consciousness" indicates the benefits of dialogue between feminist philosophy and philosophy of mind in a different way and thus serves as another precursor to the field (Block 1999). Block presents a critique of representationism, the view that the phenomenal character of an experience is captured fully in its representational content, by emphasizing variations in color vision across populations demarcated by gender, race, and age. This paper demonstrates how thinking about the particularity of minds in relation to social categories can contribute to ongoing debates in philosophy of mind. Similarly, a number of topics that have recently gained attention in philosophy of mind, such as embodiment, social cognition, the extended mind, enactivism, externalism, mindreading, empathy, and crosscultural approaches highlight the context and particularity of minds, and thus dovetail with feminist projects.

Defining Feminist Philosophy of Mind

Feminist philosophy of mind is an area of study that investigates the nature of mind with reference to social locations marked by categories such as gender, race, class, sexuality, nationality, and ability, and/ or investigates the nature of social locations with reference to theories about the mind. Although this emerging field grows from seeds of its parent disciplines and speaks to their central debates, it is ultimately distinct from them because it takes the three focal questions already mentioned— What is the mind? Whose mind is the model for the theory? To whom is mind attributed?— and treats them collectively rather than separately.

Asking "Whose mind?" and "To whom is mind attributed?" alongside "What is the mind?" brings much complexity to theorizing about the mind, as recent attention to topics such as artificial intelligence, animal cognition, and panpsychism has shown. Conceiving of "Whose?" and "To whom?" not only in terms of species categories such as humans, bats, and machines, but also intraspecies categories

delineated by gender, race, class, and so on, likewise promises to bring further innovation. The interrogative triad of What? Whose? and To whom? forms a method for investigating the mind that invites theorists to think beyond their own perspectives and discourages them from confusing their own socially and culturally situated views and disciplinary intuitions with universal human experiences. This is a method attentive to the philosophical consequences of assuming third- person perspectives when studying the minds and bodies of others, and of subsuming the first- personal perspectives of others under our own.

Alternating between these frames of What? Whose? and To whom?, feminist philosophy of mind does not prematurely foreclose the questions of whether minds are uniform across beings and groups of beings, and of when and whether sameness or difference among distinct minds should be prioritized in our theorizing about the mind. It welcomes the expertise that comes with disciplinary and subdisciplinary specializations in a particular area while also questioning the habitual assumptions and conventional practices that accompany such specializations. This field is born of the conviction that considering multiple perspectives and methods together will generate more nuanced understandings of the mind and its various components than would otherwise be possible.

The differences between the three guiding questions at the center of feminist philosophy of mind are aptly illustrated by the following foundational claims in the history of philosophy: René Descartes's "I am. I exist . . . as long as I am thinking" (1984, 19); Simone de Beauvoir's "I am a woman" (2010, 5); and Sojourner Truth's "Ain't I a woman?" (Gage 2005, 104). It does not seem to us a coincidence that these claims are respectively associated with distinct social locations and philosophical literatures.

For Descartes, his certainty in his own experience of thinking demonstrates that mind is immaterial and therefore distinct from the body (and, by implication, his sex); it is defined by its action, thought, which in turn is a hallmark of the human. Notably, Descartes's experience also implicates an individuated mind, one that is essentially private and bounded rather than social and relational.

On the contrary, Beauvoir's social location is inescapably primary in her experience. Noting the difference between a man's relation to his sex and her own, she explains, "If I want to define myself, I first have to say 'I am a woman'; all other assertions will arise from this basic truth" (2009, 5). The concept "woman" must therefore be analyzed philosophically in order for Beauvoir to have the same certainty in her first- personal experience as Descartes does, before she can theorize about consciousness and the mind in the style of her countrymen, Descartes, Jean- Paul Sartre, and Maurice Merleau- Ponty. Her skepticism is about the internal world rather than the external one, and about the integrity of her own experience when it has been shaped in contexts of sexist and economic oppression. The divergence between third- person and first- person accounts of womanhood that Beauvoir respectively chronicles in the two volumes of The Second Sex, "Facts and Myths" and "Lived

Experience," shows the importance of asking "Whose mind is the model for the theory?" and, another variation of the "whose" question: "Whose theory is modeling the mind?"

Sojourner Truth's call, "Ain't I a woman?" begins at a different place still. Bell hooks's interpretation of Truth's sentiment emphasizes that the dictates of racism and sexism establish Black men as representative of Black people and White women as representative of women, thus discounting the lived experiences of Black women.16 In this context, Truth's status as both a human and a woman is always in question, rendering invisible or irrelevant her first- personal experiences, her subjectivity, and her mind: "In the eyes of the 19th century white public, the black female was mere chattel, a thing, an animal" (hooks 1981, 159). Rather than begin with a statement or proposition that is self- evident and self- certain like those of Descartes and Beauvoir, Truth's experiential starting point is interrogative. She asks why what is self- evident to her is not self- evident to others; her skepticism is fueled by this irrational discrepancy in attitudes toward her own existence. Hooks's analysis stresses that even feminist theorizing that foregrounds the particularity of social locations can repeat the mistake of confusing the experiences of certain individuals— White, bourgeois women, for example— with those of all individuals in the group "women," a criticism that has often been levied against Beauvoir (hooks 1981, 7). Such moves evade the fact that a long- standing justificatory strategy of oppressions has been to attribute mind differentially— to code racial and cultural Others as either mentally deficient ("primitive") or altogether lacking a mind in the Cartesian or Kantian sense ("animal" or "bestial").18 Concepts of mind inevitably tally with this social history: the "primitive" helps define the "rational"; what is "animal" helps to define what is "human"; beings who are seen as "uncivilized" help to define what a "woman" is (hooks 1981; Spillers 1987; Oyêwùmí 1997; Lugones 2007).

At the same time that we characterize feminist philosophy of mind as a field that considers the What? Whose? and To whom? questions about mind collectively, we also recognize that these questions are interpreted in different ways and engaged in varying degrees across individual instances of the category, as the diversity among the chapters in this collection attests. Nonetheless, the twenty chapters in Feminist Philosophy of Mind reveal five predominant themes for this new philosophical area that are respectively detailed in each of the book's parts: "Mind and Gender&Race&," "Self and Selves," "Naturalism and Normativity," "Body and Mind," and "Memory and Emotion."

We chose these themes for this inaugural collection because, with the exception of the first one, they already populate the literatures of both feminist philosophy and philosophy of mind. The first chapter of parts II– V therefore consists in a reprint of a classic article that has in some way set the stage for current research on these topics. Further, representing each theme with a paired set of terms rather than one term evokes the different histories and emphases of feminist philosophy and philosophy of mind and raises crucial questions of interaction and integration between the terms. What is the

relationship, if any, between mind and gender&race&? The self and other selves? Naturalistic explanations and normative standards? Bodies and minds? One faculty of mind such as memory and another such as emotion? In what follows, we trace how and why each of these subjects has come to be a central thematic for feminist philosophy of mind with reference to the existing literature in its parent fields and discuss the original interventions that this book makes to contemporary debates.

Part I: Mind and Gender&Race&

Folk understandings of mind often suggest that minds are gendered and raced like people are; they can be classified into different types that mirror gender-categories or race- categories.20 For example, Louann Brizendine's bestseller The Female Brain attributes personality differences between men and women to hormonal fluctuations that effect differences between the groups' respective brain structures (Brizendine 2006). Brizendine claims that women may be better at expressing emotions and remembering events because the hippocampus in the female brain is larger than it is in the male brain (Brizendine 2006, 5). The male brain, for its part, has a larger amygdala and "two and a half times the brain space devoted to sexual drive" (Brizendine 2006, 5). Studies undertaken from a feminist perspective frequently argue that minds are gendered from the other direction: it is not that biological differences in brain structure produce gendered minds, but that society and culture act differently on minds in ways that eventually yield different ways of perceiving, reasoning, feeling, and thinking between men and women, including different ways of conceiving of what mind is (Gilligan 1982; Belenky et al. 1986).

Stephen Jay Gould's The Mismeasure of Man famously details how widespread social and cultural biases have shaped purportedly scientific claims about differential capacities for intelligence and cognitive function among different races (Gould 1981). Whether appealing to biological factors or cultural influences, a number of recent book titles continue to reflect concepts of raced and racialized minds. These include The Chinese Mind (De Mente 2009), The Indian Mind (Moore 1967), The Black Mind (Dathorne 1974), The African Mind (Chinweizu 1987), The Crisis of the European Mind (Hazard 2013), and For Indigenous Minds Only (Waziyatawin and Yellowbird 2012). Everyday language also implies that in folk psychology minds are tied to other identity categories such as class, sexuality, and ability. Claims such as "That's how poor people think" or "Gay men are more emotional than straight men" repeat this tendency to see minds as personalized in ways that mirror features of social identities.

In contrast to these popular ideas about minds, philosophers of mind more often than not presume that minds are not the kinds of things that are influenced by gender, race, culture, and society in constitutive or structural ways, though they may admit that minds may be gendered or raced contingently in terms of their content.22 Even recent work that considers the embodied, embedded, enactive, extended, and social components of cognition rarely conceives of embodiment or

socialization in terms of gender or race. This trend may be linked to a presumption that whatever it is that makes a mind a mind is likely to be gender-and race- neutral. It may also reflect a political fear of making space for discriminatory claims that would suggest that women and people of color have different mental capacities than men and White people.

Though not usually referenced in the philosophy of mind literature, W. E. B. Du Bois's notion of double consciousness presents what is likely the most formidable challenge to the idea that mental structure is universal among different social groups. In The Souls of Black Folk, Du Bois writes that Black people living in a racist world lack a true self- consciousness (Du Bois 1903, 3). Instead, they possess a "double consciousness," which he defines as "a sense of always looking at oneself through the eyes of others" (Du Bois 1903, 3). This description suggests that oppression can alter the very structure of an individual's consciousness to the point where a third- person perspective eclipses the first- person perspective. Frantz Fanon's well- known criticism of Sartre's theory of consciousness makes the point emphatically: "ontology does not allow us to understand the being of the black man" (Fanon 2008, 90). Moreover, double consciousness afflicts all Black people in a racist world (and arguably all marginalized people), and so it is a broader and different phenomenon than mental "disorders" such as dissociative identity.

Each chapter in part I brings questions about the connections between social location and mental architecture out from the margins of the field and sows seeds for a vibrant contemporary debate. Are minds gendered in terms of their content, their structure, or not at all? At what point specifically (or in which faculty/ capacity) do factors like gender, race, class, sexuality, culture, social context, and ability become relevant to investigations into the nature of mind? Is gender only a matter of third-person ascription, or does it live in first- personal structures of a consciousness? Do our ways of conceiving of mental properties such as intelligence reflect our ways of conceiving of social or physical properties such as sex and race? How does recognizing the differential attribution of mind across racial groups affect our understanding of the problem of other minds?

Chapter 1, by Lynne Rudder Baker, enters this conversation with a careful consideration of the first-person perspective, or the capacity to "conceive of oneself as oneself in the first- person." In "Is the First- Person Perspective Gendered?" she argues that although the first- person perspective may be de facto gendered within certain cultural contexts, it is not gendered de jure. Even though language is embedded with ideas about gender and the first- person perspective requires language, Baker suggests that gender identity is formed only after the first- person perspective has already been established. Contrary to thinkers who would claim that this aspect of mental structure is necessarily gendered, Baker claims that it is only contingently so.

In chapter 2, "Computing Machinery and Sexual Difference: The Sexed Presuppositions Underlying the Turing Test," Amy Kind argues that our standard ways of conceiving of the attributes of thought

and intelligence are implicitly modeled on how we understand the attribute of sex. Kind's discussion reminds us of an oft- forgotten element of the Turing test; namely, that the original Imitation Game involves convincing a neutral questioner that a man is a woman. Kind concludes that our tendencies to think about intelligence as an all-or- nothing affair and to value superficial markers of intelligence are related to the way sex attributes were conceived in the mid- twentieth century.

Keya Maitra's contribution, chapter 3, "Toward a Feminist Theory of Mental Content," shows that the feminist emphasis on the experiences of women and other underrepresented groups pushes in the direction of content externalism. While most externalist theories fail to account for the roles of social organization and social power in the production of mental content, Maitra argues that Millikan's teleosemantic theory offers a promising foundation. A feminist theory of content allows us to appreciate the nuanced role that historical and sociocultural forces play in shaping the content of our languages and minds.

In chapter 4, "Disappearing Black People through Failures of White Empathy," Janine Jones reveals a difficulty with the classic problem of other minds: namely, if racism entails that Black people are not recognized as having minds in the first place, or are recognized as having "attenuated" minds in comparison with White people, then empathy between members of the two groups cannot proceed as it would in a context where they are equally attributed minds. Jones argues that the construction of Black people's minds in Manichaean opposition to that of White people's renders White empathy for Black people improbable, and that therefore self- empathy on the part of White people is a more productive project for countering racism. Jones's theory of empathy thus departs from models that rely solely on the self's positive perceptions, memories, and imagination, and includes what the self could not have perceived, remembered, or imagined in experience.

From these summaries, we see how jointly engaging the questions of What? Whose? and To whom? leads to new insights. The chapters in part I answer "What is the mind?" by respectively proposing theories of the first- person perspective, intelligence, mental content, and other minds. They do so largely by asking "Whose mind?"— by considering these aspects of minds in relation to different groups of people, including women and men, immigrants and citizens, and Black people and White people. The question "To whom is mind attributed?" (and the variation "How is mind attributed?") is crucial to Kind's explanation of how we think of the property of intelligence as a property akin to sex discussed in chapter 2, and to Jones's development of the multidimensional description of empathy offered in chapter 4. Moreo ofr, in chapter 3, Maitra suggests that the analysis of mental content is furthered by looking at whose content it is, that is, the social and historical context that shapes content over time and that grounds the meaning of concepts such as "whiteness."

Part II: Self and Selves

Whereas the chapters in part I consider a range of mental phenomena in light of social location, those in part II discuss the self in particular, addressing questions about the ontology of the self, self-consciousness, agency, and personal identity. This theme in philosophy of mind has been attended to by feminist philosophers more so than any other and so it is fitting that it be addressed after the introductory chapters illuminating certain relationships between mind and the social categories of gender, race, sexuality, and nationality.

In the existing literature on the self, feminist philosophers have explored a wide variety of topics, including how experiences of self and agency are influenced by sexism, racism, and other traumas (Anzaldúa 1999; Brison 2003; Alcoff 2011); how boundaries between one's self and others may become confused in relationships of care and dependence (Kittay 1999; Meyers 2014; Dalmiya 2017); how a woman's consciousness of her self affects her possibilities for liberation (Butnor 2011; Fatima 2012; Maitra 2014; Leboeuf 2018); how agency and autonomy are structured in oppressive situations (Veltman and Piper 2014; Herr 2018); and how studies of oppressed consciousnesses like those described by Du Bois and Beauvoir often prioritize a self's inherent multiplicity or plurality over its unity (Barvosa 2008; Ortega 2016; McWeeny 2017).

By contrast, philosophy of mind's engagement with the question of self has largely come through one particular lens, namely, the lens of personal identity, which may be a marginal topic in the field due to its association with metaphysics. The question of personal identity considers which mental structures make a person the same person from one moment to the next and what unites diverse experiences together into one consciousness. Philosophers of mind have recognized a variety of phenomena as central to identity and consciousness, from memory (Locke 1996), to causal dependence (Shoemaker 1984), to the first- person perspective (Zahavi 2005; Baker 2013; Ganeri 2012), a lack of first- personal perspective (Albahari 2007, 2009), a feeling of ownership or intimacy (de Vignemont 2007), and the self- reflective character of consciousness (MacKenzie 2015). They have also questioned whether an enduring self or ego exists at all beyond the flow of consciousness, and sought to explicate the relationship between agency and personal identity.

Ian Hacking, who is known for emphasizing the importance of social context in his work in philosophy of science, ironically suggests that examples involving dissociative identity disorder, for instance, do not undermine the unity of consciousness because the central question of personal identity is not "who I am, but what I am" (Hacking 1995, 221; emphasis added). As long as the "what" of self is universal, philosophers need not bother with experiences of discontinuity or multiplicity implicated by "who" one is. When discontinuity and fragmentation of the self is acknowledged in philosophy of mind, this is often taken to signal the existence of a different self rather than plurality and contradiction within one self (Nagel 1971; Lewis 1976). For example, even though Galen Strawson's

book on the self is titled Selves, he nonetheless stresses that "the idea of any such experience of separate interests [multiple points of view in one self] is unimaginable and bewildering. . . . I find it hard to believe that anyone really has such experience" (Strawson 2009, 16).

Contrary to Hacking's claim, feminist theory often begins with the idea that the "who" of self is inextricable from the "what" of self, and that therefore the possibility of a plural self is an empirical and phenomenological question, not merely a logical one (Radden 2011). For this reason, feminists have generally preferred to analyze real- life, concrete examples of fractured or multiple selves in contexts of oppression, trauma, and human rights abuses rather than hypothetical thought experiments.27 Further, feminists frequently understand the self to be both "embodied" and "relational"— constitutively linked to the body and constitutively dependent on its relations to others.

The four chapters in part II engage questions about the self's relationality and embodiment and, in so doing, significantly extend theorizing about the self in philosophy of mind. How is the self affected by its social context and the particularity of the body to which it is tied? Is a person's sense of self or self-consciousness gendered, raced, classed, or otherwise marked by social location? Is the self singular or plural? To what extent is agency facilitated or hindered by one's gender and race? Does taking account of social location affect the ways that we think about the continuity of self over time?

In chapter 5, "Playfulness, 'World'- Traveling, and Loving Perception," first published in 1987, María Lugones articulates her landmark notion of " 'world'traveling." "World"- traveling involves traversing oppressive social structures, such as when one moves between communities where one is respectively seen with and without racist perceptions. In such cases, it seems that the same person is capable of possessing two contradictory properties at the same time: playfulness and seriousness. Lugones explains how this is possible by arguing that properties of self are world-dependent, and that, contrary to how the self has generally been conceived in the history of philosophy, the self is actually "a plurality of selves" insofar as it is keyed into a plurality of "worlds" or social structures.

Chapter 6, "Symptoms in Particular: Feminism and the Disordered Mind," offers a critique of unitary, ahistorical, and reductive accounts of self. Here Jennifer Radden presents a theory of mental disorder that reconsiders the role symptoms play in medical and cognitivist models of mind. Instead of treating symptoms as mere downstream effects of brain dysfunction, she takes them as moments of voiced distress of a self embedded in a particular network of social relationships. The first- person experience of the sufferer thus becomes decisive for articulating the nature of the disorder and its diagnostic process, as well as for understanding at which point multiplicity becomes a sign of disorder.

Presumptions of agency and activity often follow from the idea of a freestanding, unitary self. Challenging this presumption, recent feminist accounts have valorized the roles of passivity and

relational receptivity in autonomy, maintaining that these features are just as important as activity and agency. Diana Tietjens Meyers's essay, chapter 7, "Passivity in Theories of the Agentic Self: Reflections on the Views of Soran Reader and Sarah Buss," reveals why such approaches are problematic and emphasizes the roles of interactivity and capacity over and above passivity in establishing relational forms of agency. When dependency is understood in terms of capacities rather than passivity, respect for the agency of victims of human rights abuses is not compromised.

In "The Question of Personal Identity," chapter 8, Susan James criticizes analytic accounts of personal identity that too hastily embrace the hierarchical and gendered opposition between mind and body. According to these views, personhood and its survival are treated as a matter of psychological continuity, that is, continuity of psychological states such as desires, intentions, beliefs, and memory, and bodily continuity (or discontinuity) remains irrelevant. Drawing from feminist research on memories of bodily trauma including Susan J. Brison's pathbreaking work featured in chapter 17, James points out that although in such cases psychological unity can be shattered, it can also be restored through practices of bodily respect and recognition by others.

Part II shows us how the recognition of feminist philosophy of mind's core triad of questions advances existing debates and theories about personal identity and selfhood. Lugones's response to the What? question is an original account of identity— the self is a "plurality of selves"— that she develops by attending to the To whom? question: she examines the differential attribution of properties such as playfulness across diverse national and social contexts. In a similar fashion, Radden's and James's analyses center the consideration of women's minds (the Whose? question) in order to get at the "What?" of mental disorder and bodily continuity in ways that recognize women's experiences of their own selves. Meyers's theory of agency is likewise dependent on thinking about agency in the context of human rights abuses, thus taking up the questions of "Whose agency?" and "To whom is agency attributed?"

Part III: Naturalism and Normativity

The preceding two parts raise questions about the relationship between social location and certain types of mental phenomena. Part III shifts our focus to the mind's embodiment and, in particular, how best to conceive of the brain and the rest of the physical body in our theories about the mind. The chapters in this part each consider the place of naturalism in philosophy of mind, but they do so from diverse angles, respectively appealing to the methods and literatures of phenomenology, enactivism, cognitive science, and philosophy of language. Philosophers of mind often link the concepts of naturalism and normativity by asking whether or not normative aspects of experience, such as morality, judgments, or values can be "naturalized." Feminist philosophers frequently approach this question from an inverse direction; they reveal mechanisms whereby normative values regarding gender and race creep into naturalistic explanation.

For our purposes, we can define naturalism broadly as the view that the mind can be fully explained by the sciences. In a recent article titled "Naturalisms in Philosophy of Mind," Stephen Horst writes that "naturalism has become a kind of ideology in philosophical circles— that is, it is a widely shared commitment to a way of believing, speaking and acting whose basic assumptions are seldom examined or argued for" (Horst 2009, 221). Current disagreements within philosophy of mind over naturalism generally arise over how best to fulfill these kinds of commitments and not over whether or not naturalistic approaches to mind should be pursued in the first place. Notably, new naturalisms that interpret the requirement about scientific explanation more loosely than others have been developed. These include nonreductive naturalism (Millikan 1984), naive naturalism (Hornsby 2001), and liberal naturalism (De Caro and Macarthur 2004).

The automatic acceptance of naturalism in philosophy of mind contrasts sharply with the place of naturalism in feminist circles. As Sally Haslanger and Ásta observe, "Feminists tend to be wary of any suggestion that a category is 'natural,' or that what's 'natural' should dictate how we organize ourselves socially" (2017). We can define naturalism about sex as the view that sexual categories can be fully explained by the sciences and/ or that sex is constitutively related to physiological and/ or anatomical aspects of the body. Feminist philosophers largely reject the folk tendency to see sex as a "natural" phenomenon in these senses of the term.32 Likewise, biological conceptions of race are widely criticized (Appiah 1985; Haslanger 2000; Zack 2002), as are physiological explanations of sexual orientation (Stein 1999; Johnston 2008).

Feminist criticisms of naturalism emphasize the pragmatic concern that science is not a socially and politically neutral enterprise. As many mainstream philosophers of science have pointed out, observation and interpretation are situated in social and historical contexts (Kuhn 1970; Latour and Wooglar 1986). Insofar as science does not incorporate methods to keep its social assumptions in check, it will be ripe for reading current social arrangements into scientific data.33 We must note, however, that feminist criticisms of naturalism do not necessarily lead to social construction, the view that social factors play a causal role in the existence of the phenomenon. Nor do they inevitably lead to the sexgender distinction, often used to shield naturalistic ideas about sex from amendment or criticism by relegating considerations of social and cultural factors to the concept of "gender."

The essays in part III inhabit the tense intersection between philosophy of mind's embrace of naturalism and feminist philosophy's skeptical attitude toward natural categories. In so doing, they take a wider view on mental phenomena than is common in either field, attending to both the "natural" and "sociocultural" aspects of mind, and, more important, questioning presumptions of hard and fast divisions between nature and culture, fact and value, and science and phenomenology. How do we best eliminate social bias and falsely normative standards when relying on third- person scientific descriptions? How can 4E cognition theory better take account of the social and political

contexts of minds? What can neuroscience and evolutionary biology contribute to theories of gender? To what extent can feminist methods make science more rigorous? What kinds of metaphysical views are implicated by the language that we use to talk about the body and its sex(es) and gender(s)?

In chapter 9, "Sexual Ideology and Phenomenological Description: A Feminist Critique of Merleau-Ponty's Phenomenology of Perception," first published in 1989, Judith Butler notes that naturalistic accounts of sexual desire partake in an obvious category mistake: they attempt to explain first- person experiential phenomena purely with reference to third- person scientific studies of the objective body. However, a phenomenological approach, which begins in first- personal experience, also invites the false universalization of particular social biases. For example, Maurice Merleau- Ponty conceives of "normal" or "non- pathological" sexual desire only in terms of a male subject who is aroused by a female object. Butler emphasizes that not only does this normative and normalizing view of sexual desire apply only to a subset of humans (namely, heterosexual men), but that it is also wielded politically to pathologize those who do not conform to the presumed standard.

Chapter 10, "Enactivism and Gender Performativity," answers Butler's call to develop a theoretical framework that is capable of attending to the social particularity and individuality of the subject in question by providing an enactivist account of gender. Ashby Butnor and Matthew MacKenzie argue that enactivism, or the view that cognition is a product of the dynamic interaction between organism and environment, has not yet gone far enough in its recognition of the social, cultural, and intersubjective nature of cognition. To address this gap, feminist theories can provide enactivism with ways to account for the role power plays in shaping cognition and an individual's life- world. Inversely, enactivism can offer feminists an account of how gender is produced by the confluence of relational, pragmatic, and biological processes.

Anne Jacobson's chapter, "Norms and Neuroscience: The Case of Borderline Personality Disorder," addresses the question of whether dominant practices of cognitive neuroscience are shaped by patriarchal values. She focuses on the case of borderline personality disorder, a syndrome that is predominantly diagnosed in women and whose distinguishing features include gender- associated characteristics such as a fragile sense of self and a deficit in empathy. Jacobson argues that neuroscience can be useful for feminist analysis due to its focus on explaining a being's well-functioning within a given niche, which provides a way to take account of an organism's values and interests while still employing a third- person investigatory framework.

Chapter 12, "Embodiments of Sex and Gender: The Metaphors of Speaking Surfaces," by Gabrielle Benette Jackson highlights a problem with much feminist literature on embodiment: most theorists appeal to metaphors— "the metaphors of speaking surfaces"— to capture the ways that social forces mold bodily behavior into sexes and genders. Using verbs such as "manifest" or "generate," feminists represent women's bodies as "texts," "scripts," "surfaces," and "sites." This move misleads in regard to

the underlying ontology of sex and gender because it implies that human experience should be categorized reductively, according to exclusive dichotomies between the internal and external, subjective and objective, active and passive, and natural and cultural.

By asking "Whose mind?" and "To whom is mind attributed?" the chapters in part III not only provide unique accounts of what the mind is, but also foreground important methodological considerations when working with third-person and first- person perspectives on mental phenomena. Butler's chapter exposes the tendency in both science and phenomenology to take examples of male, heterosexual desire as models for all sexual desire. In chapter 10, Butnor and MacKenzie reveal that the methods of 4E cognition theory often evade the question of "Whose mind?" by employing too narrow meanings of concepts such as "embodiment," "embeddedness," and the "social." Jacobson's observation in chapter 11 that borderline personality disorder is not proportionally distributed among men and women leads to a theory about how best to account for values using neuroscientific explanation. Finally, Jackson's chapter shows us how using certain metaphors to describe the body can ironically instill a neglect of bodily and social context in theories about the mind, a separation that feminist scholars have long sought to overcome.

Part IV: Body and Mind

Most anthologies in philosophy in mind begin with a part on mind- body dualism. In contrast, we have placed this part near the end of our book because the problems and vocabularies respectively employed by philosophers of mind and feminist philosophers have traditionally implicated different conceptions of "mind" and "body." Having first familiarized ourselves with differences between individualist and relational notions of mind, as well as naturalist and phenomenological notions of body in parts I– III, we are better able to see how the arguments in part IV employ these broadened perspectives on "mind" and "body" in order to make original contributions to a centuries- old debate.

The prevalence of naturalism in philosophy of mind goes hand in hand with the prevalence of physicalism, the view that the mind is entirely physical in nature. Gilbert Ryle's idea that the mental realm is connected to the observable realm via dispositions to behave in certain ways is a precursor to present- day approaches such as eliminativism, functionalism, and computationalism that likewise insist, contrary to Descartes's dualism, that there is nothing occult about the mind (Ryle 1949).38 Various versions of physicalism attempt to explain the mental in terms of its identity with, reducibility to, or supervenience on, the physical.39 The physical is in turn conceived of as a brain state, which shifts the focus from the external observations of behaviorism to internal functionings of the brain and thus to empirical data derived from brain- imaging technologies.

The question of the nature and basis of consciousness parallels the question of the body- mind relationship because providing a theoretical account of experience, including its phenomenal or "what it's like" aspects, presents the hardest problem for physicalism. The "hard" problem of

consciousness is the problem of explaining consciousness in physical terms (Chalmers 1995, 1996). It highlights what many have called the "explanatory gap" between matter and consciousness, the idea that no amount of explanation at the level of matter can yield an understanding of our phenomenal experience (Levine 1983; Drayson 2015). Many recent accounts in philosophy of mind offer suggestions for how to close or bypass this gap.

Ironically, contemporary physicalisms often embrace the terms of Descartes's dualism even as they are rejecting the position overall; they deny that an immaterial mind exists while also preserving the Cartesian/ Newtonian conception of matter as that which is passive, unthinking, divisible, and knowable by science. By contrast, some philosophers of mind challenge both Cartesian dualism and materialism by theorizing in terms of mental and nonmental properties instead of mental and physical categories (Russell 2004; Montero 2001).

Feminist philosophers share with contemporary philosophers of mind the tendency to seek ontological possibilities beyond mind- body dualism. Unlike many philosophers of mind, however, they are critical of a reductive physicalism that would identify mind with a physical, biological, anatomical, or neurological state. Feminists and other theorists who are likewise invested in fostering liberatory social change have long argued that mind- body dualism enables not only sexist oppression, but also racism, colonialism, heterosexism, ableism, and speciesism.43 Such views maintain that dualism entails a hierarchical ordering of mind and body that has inevitably been mapped on to social groups such as men and women, colonizers and the colonized, White people and people of color, and upper- class and working- class peoples, thereby facilitating social mechanisms of differentiation, discrimination, and oppression. Moreover, dualism seems inconsistent with the experiences of the oppressed.44 Reductive physicalism has also been deployed historically to justify the use and abuse of nature and the subordination of women (Merchant 1980).

Like the scholarly terrain in philosophy of mind, a careful examination of consciousness has gone

how material conditions shape the form and contents, and thus the epistemic and cognitive capacities, of particular minds. Articulating this relationship between the internal/ experiential and external/ material is one of the hardest problems for feminism, just as describing subjective experience in objective terms is the hardest problem for philosophy of mind.

Part IV features questions and arguments that emerge at the intersections of these two different literatures that investigate the relationship between body and mind. Is physicalism compatible with the idea that beliefs, desires, and emotions are social and relational, constituted in part by external factors? Does a "materialist feminism," or a "feminist materialism," suggest a contradiction in terms? How are views about who (or what) has a mind related to theories about the nature of minds and their connections to bodies? Would studies of animal cognition benefit from employing feminist methods for theorizing across disciplines and power relations? Is sexual orientation a mental disposition, a biological urge, or a mix of both?

In chapter 13, "Against Physicalism," first published in 2000, Naomi Scheman builds on her early critique of individualism to present a unique argument against physicalism (Scheman 1983). She begins by challenging philosophers' unexamined conviction that mental events, states, and processes enter into psychological explanation as particulars. Given this faith, the reasonableness of the physicalist project seems irresistible. By contrast, Scheman brings to the fore the irreducibly relational nature of our mental lives by acknowledging the role of social practices and their patterns of salience in shaping the meaning of beliefs, desires, and emotions. She concludes that physicalism is not necessarily false, but that it is empty or vacuous because mental objects are not particulars.

Chapter 14, "Why Feminists Should Be Materialists and Vice Versa," by Paula Droege places feminism in conversation with cognitive ethology in order to mount an argument against Scheman's critique of physicalism. Droege believes that taking a materialist approach to reality can help feminists gain an understanding of the physical forces that contribute to our beliefs and values. Likewise, materialists gain from feminism an array of epistemic and ethical tools for examining faulty assumptions that misdirect research, as well as strategies for surmounting common obstacles to interdisciplinary collaboration.

In chapter 15, "Which Bodies Have Minds? Feminism, Panpsychism, and the Attribution Question," Jennifer McWeeny reframes the classic metaphysical problem of how the mind interacts with the body in terms of the question of mental attribution: Which bodies have minds? She develops a taxonomy of possible answers to the question by jointly examining critical social theorists' descriptions of experiences of mental attribution associated with the bodies of women, Black people, laborers, and others and theories of physicalist panpsychism from the philosophy of mind. McWeeny's analysis reveals that our theories about what a mind is are inextricably connected with our beliefs about who (or what) has a mind.

E. Díaz- León's contribution, chapter 16, "Sexual Orientation: The Desire View," argues that, contrary to accounts that would locate sexual orientation in physiology, orientation is a complex mental state grounded in a person's relational beliefs, desires, and dispositions. She maintains that the ordinary concept of sexual orientation is determined by a combination of two factors: (1) one's own sex and gender, and (2) the sex and gender of the persons for whom one is disposed to have sexual desires. In a move not unlike Scheman's, Díaz- León's view of sexual orientation builds on the idea that the link between a certain mental state and a certain behavior cannot be specified independently of other mental states.

Part IV highlights how thinking about to whom mind should be attributed spurs innovative "what" positions that shed a different light on the mind- body relationship. Scheman develops a formidable argument against physicalism by questioning the entrenched habit of construing mental events and states as particulars that belong to one person rather than to a society or culture. Droege's discussion of nonhuman minds leads her to advance a form of feminist materialism. Through the juxtaposition of feminism and panpsychism, McWeeny shows how mental attribution patterns reflect views about whether bodies are the types of things can exist without minds and vice versa. Moreover, the whose question is presupposed in the concept of sexual orientation that is the focus of Díaz- León's study. Inversely to those who seek a physical explanation for mental phenomena, Díaz- León traces what is standardly thought to be a physiological phenomenon, namely, sexual urges, to the content of desire.

Part V: Memory and Emotion

The four chapters in the final part of Feminist Philosophy of Mind generate accounts of specific mental phenomena by appealing to notions from the book's other parts, including the ideas of a gendered mind, a raced and encultured mind, the relational self, relational agency, and the embodied mind. How does thinking of mind as a gendered and raced phenomenon yield new ways of thinking about the structure and function of emotions? How does trauma affect the continuity of memory and thus personal identity? How does thinking of the self in relational terms complicate traditional accounts of memory and emotion in philosophy of mind? How does thinking of grief and love specifically as they occur in the experiences of non- Western women and women of color alter our accounts of the natures of these emotions?

Philosophers of mind are increasingly interested in memory. They generally theorize about memory in three main ways. First, it is discussed in the context of theories about the continuity of self and personal identity. Second, taxonomies of different kinds of memory have been developed with particular emphasis placed on "episodic" memory, or the memory of past events that one has experienced (Tulving 1983; Droege 2012; Cheng and Werning 2016). Third, considerable effort has been devoted to constructing causal theories of memory. One of its most comprehensive articulations connects mental representations through memory traces (Bernecker 2009). Finally, the need to study

memory and emotions together given their functional similarities has also been proposed (Goldie 2012; de Sousa 2017).

Somewhat similar to memory, emotions had received a cursory treatment in analytic philosophy of mind until the 1970s. This early lack of interest in emotions as mental phenomena likely resulted from the folk belief that emotions are unintelligent bodily impulses structurally opposed to thought and reason (Rorty 1980). However, the recent embrace of interdisciplinarity in philosophy of mind, and related engagements with developmental psychology, social psychology, and neuroscience, have opened the study of emotions in exciting ways. For example, contemporary emotion theory delineates a variety of parts to emotional experience including evaluative, physiological, phenomenological, expressive, behavioral, and mental components (Ben- Ze'ev 2000; Scherer 2009). Philosophers have also focused on assessing emotions' appropriateness and rationality, in addition to determining their role in motivating action (de Sousa 1987; Zhu and Thagard 2002). Others have argued that emotions are best theorized in terms of their similarity with perceptions (Prinz 2004; Döring 2007; Tappolet 2016).

Like contemporary philosophy of mind, feminist literature has paid special attention to developing theoretical descriptions of the faculties of memory and emotion. Such work has feminist import since women's accounts of states of affairs are often put into question on the purported grounds that women are emotional, irrational, and prone to cognitive inaccuracies. For instance, several feminists have formed theories of memory by looking to concrete examples of the way that memory functions in traumas that disproportionately affect women and other demographic groups, such as rape, sexual abuse, racism, colonization, and genocide (Brison 2003; Alexander 2005; Alcoff 2011).

A primary aim of feminist theories of emotion is to consider how particular emotions are differentially cultivated and experienced by members of different social categories (Lorde 1984; Narayan 1988; Jaggar 1989). For example, anger has been a frequent object of feminist analysis given its gender-specificity and race- specificity in oppressive societies: the anger of women and people of color is readily dismissed as irrational and unfounded, while the anger of men and White people is often celebrated as rational and righteous (Scheman 1980; Frye 1983; Lorde 1984). Other emotions including love, shame, disgust, rage, and hope have been theorized with a feminist lens.

In the opening chapter of this part, chapter 17, "Outliving Oneself: Trauma, Memory, and Personal Identity," first published in 1997, Susan J. Brison lays the groundwork for current work on memory in a number of ways. First, she references real- life cases rather than thought experiments. Second, the trauma she discusses in relation to theories of memory is her own. It is thus a breakthrough piece where a woman has the courage to analyze her first- personal experience of trauma philosophically, and where the communicative and narrative practice of philosophy helps her and others heal. Finally,

she shows how her sense of self and her memory are constitutively affected by her relationships, so it cannot be that self and memory are nonsocial, nonrelational phenomena.

Chapter 18 by Iva Apostolova, "Does Neutral Monism Provide the Best Framework for Relational Memory?" builds on Sue Campbell's argument in favor of a relational model of memory as opposed to an archival one. Apostolova suggests that Bertrand Russell's theory of neutral monism offers the best epistemological and metaphysical framework for relational memory because it charts a solution to the problem of "semantic contagion," a term first used by Ian Hacking to signify the phenomenon that occurs when a condition seems to spread immediately after it is publicly identified and described (Hacking 1995, 238). This concept is often used to discredit the memories of survivors of sexual assault and so developing an alternative explanation is crucial for a feminist response to this dismissal.

In chapter 19, "The Odd Case of a Bird- Mother: Relational Selfhood and a 'Method of Grief,' " Vrinda Dalmiya offers an account of selfhood that centers on the perspective of a bereaved mother. Experiencing extreme forms of being out of control due to grief, the bereaved mother's self emerges from a pervasive self-mistrust that then goes on to ground the acceptance of herself as dispositionally open to being undone by grief. In its ability to capture the opacity of the self, Dalmiya's "method of grief" turns out to be a far more effective means for self-awareness than Descartes's method of doubt, which operates according to epistemic certainty.

Chapter 20, "Equanimity and the Loving Eye: A Buddhist- Feminist Account of Loving Attention," focuses on loving attention, which Emily McRae defines as a way of paying attention to others that is motivated by care, respect, and kindness. This way of attending, integral to Mahayana Buddhist philosophy of mind and ethics, is also central to many influential feminist conceptions of moral perception. McRae shows how Buddhist skills of equanimity and mindfulness are necessary for cultivating loving attention in feminist realms. She also highlights their roles in effecting a person's self- transformation from an arrogant perceiver to someone who can lovingly attend to others.

Employing an approach that thinks the What? Whose? and To whom? aspects of mind together brings different perspectives to familiar philosophical topics, as we have already witnessed in parts I– IV. The authors of part V theorize memory, grief, love, and attention not merely in abstract terms, but as phenomena associated with particular bodies situated in specific social locations. In chapter 18, Apostolova observes that different capacities for memory are often attributed to women than to men. Brison and Dalmiya analyze concrete examples of women's trauma and grief to emphasize the relational nature of the self and self- knowledge. McRae's chapter concentrates on different modes of attending carried out by different social actors in contexts of oppression, and this perspective illuminates the interconnectedness of faculties of attention, perception, and love.

The Future of Feminist Philosophy of Mind

When we consider the twenty essays in this book collectively rather than individually, we begin to see feminist philosophy of mind not merely as a trending topic of interest but as a recognizable field or tradition with its own distinctive set of core questions, methods, and internal conversations. Together, the chapters in FEMINIST PHILOSOPHY OF MIND establish a basis for further inquiry and future growth of the field, and for new ways of combining the questions What is the mind? Whose mind is the model for the theory? and To whom is mind attributed?, as well as adding others to the method. We expect that subsequent research will not only extend the themes and debates pursued in this book, but will also utilize the fecundity of these methodological approaches to grow in new, not- yet-imagined directions. Here are a few that seem most obvious.

First, it is likely that a more direct and expansive debate will soon take shape over the question of whether minds are necessarily or contingently gendered, raced, oriented, classed, cultured, and so on. While theorists may agree that the mind is relational and situated, they will likely disagree about the mechanisms and consequences of social situation. The parallels between the theoretical landscapes surrounding theories of mind and theories of gender are liable to come into greater relief (for example, that there are physicalists, eliminativists, dispositionalists, extensionists, externalists, and so on, in both areas). Moreover, we expect that more "mental" theories of sex, gender, and other social categories will be developed that identify specific genders with a particular structure of consciousness, disposition, functional attitude, or mental content rather than with physiology, behavior, or performance (Ayala and Vasilyeva 2015; Demb 3;(0)6(9(0)2 3)206(a16;(9(0)Mf)-2(e)75 TD10(s)-8(e)-7i0)-1y

Third, there are a number of topics in feminist philosophy of mind that have so far been underexplored and undertheorized. For instance, while many have noted the relationship between perception and the mechanisms of sexism and racism, more in- depth analysis is needed (Rohrbach 1994; Ngo 2017; Ortega 2019). We also expect that many emotions such as joy, regret, frustration, and equanimity that have not yet been examined in detail, as well as mental processes, such as sensation, attention, and imagination, will be further explored with a feminist perspective (Jones 2012; Kind 2013). Extending existing theories of action, agency, and autonomy also constitutes a rich horizon for feminist philosophy of mind (Veltman and Piper 2014; Brancazio 2018). Additionally, developing the intersections between feminist philosophy of mind and epistemology, metaphysics, ethics, aesthetics, as well as interdisciplinary areas such as neuroscience and global health is an obvious next step (Dalmiya 2017; Rippon 2019).

Fourth, the topics of artificial intelligence and posthumanism are evident points of overlap for feminist philosophy and philosophy of mind since they entail the consideration of the To whom? question and the need to examine social and political concepts like "human," "natural," "man- made," "object," "thing," and their relations with social categories like "women," "people of color," and "trans" (Haraway 1991; Braidotti 2013; Weheliye 2014; Schneider 2019). Inversely, smart technologies and artificial intelligences along with technological and genetic enhancements are now part of our contemporary milieu and have already had an enormous impact upon social relations, as well as the contours of political and economic life.

As we look to the future of feminist philosophy of mind, our sincere wish is that more and more philosophers begin to approach philosophical questions not merely from the purview of one specialization, but with the compound eye that follows from a willingness to build on insights from multiple domains of inquiry and multiple framing questions. Though the professional practice of surrounding oneself with others who are fluent in a specialized vocabulary and who predominantly share a social and cultural demographic has generated many important innovations throughout the history of philosophy, it has also limited us— herded our creativity into certain myopic channels.

The authors of **Feminist Philosophy of Mind** push against these barriers and beckon us to explore fertile landscapes where mind and social location, self and selves, naturalism and normativity, body and mind, rationality and emotion, and other historically opposed pairings are not cordoned off from one another by fiat, but mingle unchecked in the reality of everyday experience and everyday theorizing. This new space of inquiry is both an opening in the ossified edifice of our ancient and modern discipline and a precipice from where we can begin to see the promise of a professional milieu that values the search for truth and illumination above adherence to disciplinary conventions and the comfort of known professional practices and discourses. Feminist philosophy of mind makes explicit that multidimensional theorizing requires considerable self- reflection on the part of the

theorist so that he/ she/ they are aware of the ways his/ her/ their membership in a certain species, race, gender, sexuality, nationality, class, and ability is imbricated in both the oppression of others and the very fabric of theorizing. We all must be wary of the ways social location can inadvertently direct theorists to take up and guard certain positions for reasons other than philosophical ones.

Because the concept of mind is a keystone aspect of most philosophical theories from ethics to epistemology, from language to action, from logic to aesthetics, we believe that the insights generated by feminist philosophers of mind in the coming decades will have reverberations across our discipline and beyond. This potential for impact coupled with the openness of the field at this early moment in its development makes it a most exciting time to pursue the themes taken up in FEMINIST PHILOSOPHY OF MIND. We invite you, the reader, whatever your professional training, cultural background, gender & race& to find your own ingresses into this evolving terrain, to explore the rich philosophical questions posed by the authors in this book, and to participate in shaping this nascent field into a widespread and indispensable philosophical project. <>

THE ENVIRONMENTAL UNCONSCIOUS: ECOLOGICAL POETICS FROM SPENSER TO MILTON by Steven Swarbrick [University of Minnesota Press, 9781517913816]

Why has psychoanalysis long been kept at the margins of environmental criticism despite the many theories of eco-Marxism, queer ecology, and eco-deconstruction available today? What is unique, possibly even traumatic, about eco-psychoanalysis? *The Environmental Unconscious* addresses these questions as it provides an innovative and theoretical account of environmental loss focused on the counterintuitive forms of enjoyment that early modern poetry and psychoanalysis jointly theorize.

Steven Swarbrick urges literary critics and environmental scholars fluent in the new materialism to rethink notions of entanglement, animacy, and consciousness raising. He introduces concepts from psychoanalysis as keys to understanding the force of early modern ecopoetics. Through close readings of Edmund Spenser, Walter Ralegh, Andrew Marvell, and John Milton, he reveals a world of matter that is not merely hyperconnected, as in the new materialism, but porous and off-kilter. And yet the loss these poets reveal is central to the enjoyment their works offer—and that nature offers.

As insightful as it is engaging, *The Environmental Unconscious* offers a provocative challenge to ecocriticism that, under the current regime of fossil capitalism in which everything solid interconnects, a new theory of *dis*connection is desperately needed. Tracing the propulsive force of the environmental unconscious from the early modern period to Freudian and post-Freudian theories of desire, Swarbrick not only puts nature on the couch in this book but also renews the psychoanalytic toolkit in light of environmental collapse.

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This book argues that four early modern poets—Edmund Spenser, Walter Ralegh, Andrew Marvell, and John Milton—advanced a poetic materialism not only at odds with the empirical science of their time but also one that challenges theoretical inclinations in the new materialisms today. The new and old materialisms both propose a return to matter in order to overcome loss. For early modern materialists like Francis Bacon, the loss was empirical knowledge; now, for the new materialists, it is the loss of more-than-human lifeworlds. By contrast, this book shows that Spenser, Ralegh, Marvell, and Milton used their poems to teach readers how to enjoy loss. Moreover, it argues that a poetry that invites us to enjoy loss is of radical importance to ecological politics today. Writing at the dawn of the Anthropocene, when nature's resources seemed limitless and the risk of loss merely contingent with respect to the wealth and freedom promised by capitalism,' Spenser, Ralegh, Marvell, and Milton crafted an ecological poetics in which loss was no longer contingent but rather constitutive of desire. This focus on the pleasures of loss presents a new kind of materialism. Following a reading tradition running from Lucretius to Lacan, I argue that these writers invite us to read matter as structured by loss—just like poetic form.' By aligning matter with poetic form, these poets not only took pleasure in the dissatisfactions of the present but also resisted the promise of future gain.

Recent studies in early modern ecocriticism have devoted considerable attention to the natural historical underpinnings of early modern literature. Laurie Shannon has posited a human—animal cosmopolitics in the time of Shakespeare; Dan Brayton and Steve Mentz have each cast sails in the maritime literature of early modernity; Jonathan Goldberg, Stephen Greenblatt, and others have revealed a subrepresentational level of atomic Lucretian matter or seeds; and Phillip John Usher has extracted a subterranean awareness of early modern geomedia. Although these and other ecocritical projects have done much to reveal the articulate relations that early modern materialism makes possible, they leave underexplored the disarticulating force of matter—its semiotic excess.' Gerrard Passannante refers to this disarticulating power as the "catastrophizing" power of materialism, leaning on the sense of strophe as a turning that turns the poetic imagination against itself.' By not attending to this catastrophic power, we, posthumanists, produce instead a hyperhumanism that sees matter from the perspective of the human subject alone. Rather than foregrounding materialism's explosive force, ecocriticism has become a vehicle for the humanist belief that matter and meaning must coincide.

To attend to materialism's explosive force, this book develops an environmental poetics that investigates the complex relations among new and old materialist discourses, environmental theory, and an early modern poetry pierced by lack. The writers in this study all shape their poems around objects that fail to satisfy. The truth that Spenser's Redcrosse Knight pursues is forever unclaimed, coming only in the

form of a trauma enacted on trees. Likewise, Ralegh's pursuit of wealth ends disastrously in the tropics, where local ecologies disrupt his adventures. Marvell's vision of home vanishes in the time-lapse of history. And Milton's paradise proves a site of loss and contradiction. Although the poets in this study partake of the early modern fascination with material objects, evidenced by the historical rise of empiricism, colonial extraction, and aesthetic realism, the materialism they put forth is highly counterintuitive: theirs is a materialism without matter because it gives priority to the structuring role of the unconscious in psychic life.

Taking a page from psychoanalytic theorists like Lacan, The Environmental Unconscious asserts that matter, far from being immediate, knowable, or countable, houses an incognizable lack. This lack underpins the subject of ecocriticism while pinning that subject to the singular nub of their enjoyment—what Lacan calls the sinthome. The sinthome refers to the missing signifier of desire, that which is in the other more than the other, in the world more than the world, and which sustains the subject's libidinal circuit while remaining unknowable and unspeakable. A kernel of jouissance that resists symbolization, the sinthome, in Lee Edelman's queer reading of Lacan, "binds the subject to its constitutive libidinal career, and assures that no subject, try as it may, can ever get over' itself—get over,' that is, the fixation of the drive that determines its jouissance: The sinthome functions as a point of attraction and bewilderment, organizing the subject's "libidinal career" while endangering the subject's illusory identity. This, then—the sinthome as the locus of the drive—is what the ecological subject cannot "get over"; indeed, despite its many attempts at surpassing, posthumanizing, and networking its way into harmonious accord with the web of life, where all is entangled, the ecological subject cannot surpass or entangle the obscene jouissance at its core, since this core of enjoyment paradoxically sustains the ecological subject as a breach or tear. Hence Lacan's rewriting of existence as ex-sistence, a formalization of the inexorable ek- (out) or exit from concrete reality that the sinthome, ever bordering on madness, names. Ingeniously, Edelman calls this mode of ex-sistence sinthomosexuality and aligns it with queer subjects who refuse the relentless pull of reproductive futurity. For my part, I offer the term sinthomoenvironmentality,' a precursor, if you will, to Edelman's queer sinthome in that it pays tribute to Lacan's premodern etymology: "Sinthome is an old way of spelling what was subsequently spelt symptome." Sinthomoenvironmentality invites greater appreciation of the eco-negativity at the heart of life—a negativity that throws life into contradiction; perforates matter; haunts ecological subjectivity with its own abject enjoyment; and, what is more, gives the subject its freedom to enjoy beyond the network of objects and their relations. Desire, so conceived, has no object, and thus no relation. The eco-psychoanalysis I model in this book is radically nonobject-oriented.

If this merger of eco-psychoanalysis sounds like a "strong theory," out-of-joint with the current fashion of "weak" epistemology in that it uses a universalist language to examine ideas like the split subject, the unconscious, and desire (desire as such)—it is." The poets in this study exemplify a universal failure of language that could (why not?) be applied to other poets and other periods. I assemble these poets not like "the beads of a rosary," moving from one causal connection to the next, as in Walter Benjamin's metaphor of what historicism does." Instead, I adopt a strong methodology of reading for exemplarity. There was a time, not long ago, when reading for exemplarity was alive and well: William Empson's Seven Types of Ambiguity, for example, or, in the 1990s, Joan Copjec's Read My Desire. The first would be impossible today. The second is a clarion call against the strictures of historicism, which Copjec links to the notion of immanence. When everything is immanent, entangled, or enmeshed, when the outside has been curtained off, Copjec argues, one thing is undoubtedly missing: desire." That is because desire

can only appear as a fissure in the web of life. Since Copjec's writing in 1994, the situation has only gotten worse for desiring subjects. "Always historicize!" has become the drumbeat of the humanities and environmental humanities." Theories of immanence are everywhere (see my Conclusion). But as biospheric conditions continue to unravel, as the capitalist death machine continues to speed up, and as the crisis of the humanities worsens from austerity, I am convinced of nothing more than the urgency of big, symptomatic readings." Today's task isn't to historicize. The task is to symptomatize."Enjoy your symptom!" is the battle cry of psychoanalytic ecocriticism."

Building on the pathbreaking ecomaterialism of medieval and early modern scholars like Jonathan Gil Harris, Karen Raber, Karl Steel, and Julian Yates," and focusing on the "surplus vitality" of psychoanalytic theories of desire, as articulated by Edelman, Mari Ruti, and others," this book foregrounds the compromised workings of the environmental unconscious with its intrusions and interruptions (slips of the Real) into the steady flow of life and meaning as the poetic underside of environmental thought. Each of my chapters reads material objects—including trees, oceans, rivers, animal dwellings, plants, and fossils—as poetic forms demanding our close reading, not because of their supposed thereness (signaling the "great outdoors" in Quinten Meillassoux's sense) but because of their failure to be there. In circling endlessly around ciphered objects, these poets reveal that loss is central to the enjoyment poetry offers—and that nature offers. They offer readers an environmental poetics in which loss is not the obstacle to desire, but its aim.

Outline of Chapters

My first two chapters form a conceptual couplet. Chapter 1, "Sex or Matter? (Malabou after Spenser)," theorizes what I call the allegorical event—a term derived from Spenser's epic romance, The Faerie Queene, but related in important ways also to what materialist philosopher Catherine Malabou calls the "accident." For Spenser, accidents or events are key elements of allegorical materialism. In the invocation to Venus in book 4, Spenser figures the allegorical event as both form-giving and form-destroying. The two sides of allegory—formation and destruction—are inseparable from how Spenser views poetry and how poetry views "matter." The latter always risks becoming a "darke conceit," and poetry, consequently, becomes what Malabou calls "destructive plasticity": a demonic materialism that demolishes its own creations. The biology of the brain is Malabou's exemplary figure of destructive plasticity, which she opposes to the plasticity of sex in psychoanalysis, arguing that Freud had too much sex on the brain; he missed, therefore, according to Malabou, the dynamics of the brain itself, not only its creativity but also its destructions (we are all the outcomes of the brain's creative/destructive art). Although Malabou introduces "cerebrality" as an advance over Freud's theory of sexuality and frames destructive materialism as a "new materialism;' my chapter reads the ontology of the accident vis-a-vis Spenser to show that sexuality in Spenser's poem, represented by the invocation of Venus, is already other to itself—is already allegorical (from the Greek allos, meaning "other"). This otherness or destructive plasticity reveals itself in Spenser's poetry not, as in Malabou's argument, by turning from sex to matter, but by reading "matter" as already sexual, and therefore unconscious to its destructive impulses.

I travel this theoretical path from Spenser to Malabou in order to prepare the way for chapter 2,"Trauma in the Age of Wood (Spenser after Malabou)," where I explore the consequences of my—and Spenser's—theoretical intervention in destructive form for a reading of book 1 of Spenser's Faerie Queene. There, I sharpen my analysis of the allegorical event by turning to a privileged moment in both

literary and psychoanalytic history: the wounding of a living, speaking tree. Freud turns to this moment in Torquatto Tasso's epic romance, Gerusalemme liberata (1581), to showcase his theory of traumatic repetition. Cathy Caruth turns to it again and makes this moment the centerpiece of her theory of the traumatic event—what she calls "unclaimed experience:' Neither Freud nor Caruth theorizes Tasso's tree allegory. Neither asks what it means to have a tree that not only speaks but suffers the allegorical event. Spenser does. By entering this psychoanalytic terrain, Spenser reframes psychoanalytic history as natural history. He makes psychoanalysis say something "other" than itself; that "other" is the environmental unconscious. This chapter builds on the theoretical insights of the first chapter to show that Spenser's allegorical materialism is not only a destructive materialism but also one that reads destructive plasticity at its root: as wood.

Spenser undoes hylomorphism by positing a wooden materialism that is both form-giving, as in the new materialisms, and form-destroying. From this focus on wooden materialism, we turn to bluer horizons. From wood, we enter deep. Spenser points us in this direction. In book 3 of the Faerie Queene, Spenser praises Ralegh, nicknamed "Ocean"; Ralegh's liquefacient verse promises (or indeed, threatens), according to Spenser, to lull the reader into "slomber of delight"—a slumber that is both vitalizing and, as I argue, avital. Chapter 3,"The Oceanic Feeling (Ralegh)", reads Ralegh's ocean ecologies in light of the blue humanities as "transcorporeal" (Alaimo). Ralegh's travel writing and verse collates human and nonhuman bodies in a state of perpetual dissolve. From his Ocean to Cynthia poem to his writings in the American tropics, Ralegh's transatlantic verse epitomizes Freud's idea of "the oceanic feeling," which Freud characterizes (disparagingly) as a feeling of eternity, of oneness with the world's flesh. Although Freud is cautious not to indulge in such transversal affect, Ralegh drips with it.

What is more, he plumbs the oceanic for what I call the not-all of ecological materialism. Far from returning us to the image of the One (Freud's fear), Ralegh imagines the tides of his life as a tempest, wherein human action confronts nonhuman durations—what I call ocean writing. Ralegh writes obsessively of his personal and extraterritorial failures. He makes those failures the object of his poetry—our "delight".

Chapter 4, "Architectural Anthropologies (Marvell)," returns to solid ground, but a ground that more closely resembles the torsional metaphysics of topography (the branch of geometry that considers geometric objects undergoing constant change—the square becoming a circle, the circle becoming a torus, and so on) than the timeless metaphysical objects of Plato and Euclid. Marvell's poem, Upon Appleton House, partakes of a long metaphysical tradition stretching from Vitruvius to Heidegger and beyond, which sees the human as both a cognizer and builder of architectural forms. Marvell enters this tradition, but only to turn it upside down. In Marvell's proto-surrealist poem, not only humans but also animals, plants, and the earth itself build: This chapter picks up an important thread from chapters 1 and 2 by reading Marvell's architectural anthropology as a strange geometry of events. Following Lucretius and in dialogue with Deleuze and Guattari, I show that Marvell's cryptic line, "In ev'ry figure equal man" inverts human exceptionalism by making "man"—not the measure of all things but—level with nonhuman measures, or meters.

Marvell focuses on figure/ground relationships—How does the ground generate the figure? How does the figure explicate the ground? Chapter 5, "Queer Life, Unearthed (Milton);' takes us underground, where the past has never been past and emerges in the form of fossil remains. This chapter radicalizes my claims about the environmental unconscious, which appears in Milton's Paradise Lost as a geologic

unconscious. Instead of witnessing deep time as a steady evolutionary progression, Milton's Paradise Lost draws a jagged line through the geologic record (marked by discontinuity, rupture, and break), and so anticipates the extinction events that Elizabeth Kolbert and others outline in the present.'" Milton reads fossil life as a tear in the universe's tidy fabric. Echoing the allegorical event in Spenser, Milton's geologic events are both form-giving—they birthed organic life—and form-destroying—they cut through life like so many caesurae, intermixing bios and geos at once. I read Milton's geologic cuts as queer for that reason, not because they promote life's furtherance but because they interrupt life with its own archive of disappearance.

Milton locates queerness in the unlivable durations of the earth. My conclusion, "Toward Wild Psychoanalysis," locates desire in the impossibility of ecocriticism itself. To say that ecocriticism is impossible is not, in psychoanalytic discourse, a rejection, quite the opposite. The impossibility of ecocriticism makes it desirable, if, for that same reason, untenable. In putting forth an impossible ecocriticism, my conclusion says "no" to environmentalism's big Other (the figure who demands that matter and meaning must cohere) and takes up cause with poets who found the world of matter and meaning wanting, their place in it, abyssal. Spenser, Raleigh, Marvell, and Milton desired more from life than the possible, more from sense than the sensible, and more from matter than the cliche. **THE ENVIRONMENTAL UNCONSCIOUS** invites speculation into that something more. It asks us to enjoy what early modern poetry lacks. <>

PARADISE LOST: "A POEM WRITTEN IN TEN BOOKS": AN AUTHORITATIVE TEXT OF THE 1667 FIRST EDITION by John Milton, edited by John T. Shawcross and Michael Lieb [Medieval and Renaissance Literary Studies, Penn State University Press, 9780271095455]

This authoritative text of the first edition of John Milton's Paradise Lost transcribes the original 10-book poem, records its textual problems and numerous differences from the second edition, and discusses in critical commentary the importance of these issues.

"PARADISE LOST: A POEM WRITTEN IN TEN BOOKS": ESSAYS ON THE 1667 FIRST EDITION edited by Michael Lieb and John T. Shawcross [Medieval & Renaissance Literary Studies, Penn State University Press, 9780271095462]

Appearing in tandem with the publication of an authoritative text of the first edition of John Milton's *Paradise Lost*, these insightful essays by ten Miltonists establish the significant differences between the text, context, and effect of the poem's first edition (1667) and those of the now-standard second edition. In bringing together essays by various hands, editors Michael Lieb and John T. Shawcross seek to map what may be termed a new frontier in Milton studies, one that acknowledges the

importance of what Milton himself considered to be the work of a lifetime when he offered *Paradise Lost* to readers in 1667.

While the scholars writing here do not claim that the first edition of Milton's epic should be viewed as supplanting the second and later editions, they do seek to demonstrate the importance of coming to terms with the original ten-book edition both as a work with its own identity and value and as a source of fundamental insight into the nature of the editions that would follow in its wake. *Paradise Lost* cannot be fully understood without an awareness of the dynamic and ever-changing nature of the forces through which it made its first and subsequent appearances in the world at large.

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This volume grew out of a lively and engaging session titled "The Discovery of a New Milton Epic: Paradise Lost 1667," organized on the occasion of the International Milton Congress, hosted by Duquesne University, March 11-13, 2004. The purpose of the session was to stress the importance of a long-overlooked document in Milton studies, that is, the first edition of Paradise Lost. Obviously, the title of the session was ironic. After all, how is it possible to speak of the discovery of a new Milton epic if the edition in question has been known all along? The answer is that an awareness of the existence of a work is not sufficient to qualify as evidence that it is really known. In this case, the lack of attention has been so much in evidence that the term "discovery" (rather than, say, "rediscovery") appeared to be entirely appropriate. Despite all the critical and scholarly effort bestowed upon the second edition of

Milton's "diffuse epic," little effort has been exerted in bringing the first edition to the fore. The present collection is offered, in part, in an attempt to rectify this lacuna. One might suggest that the purpose of this collection is archeological: it seeks to unearth what has long been buried. In keeping with this enterprise, the editors of this collection have also produced an edition of Paradise Lost 1667, one that can be used with confidence as the basis of future scholarly endeavors. Both undertakings—the collection and the edition—represent a "first" for Milton studies.

The purpose of these projects is not to "supplant" the second edition of Paradise Lost 1674 and its heirs. Quite the contrary is true. The collection, and the edition are offered as a means of reasserting not only the significance of the 1667 edition as a poem with its own identity and value but also the way in which that edition provides fundamental insight into the nature of the later edition, how it is to be conceived and how it works. By focusing on the 1667 edition, one is likewise invited to come to terms with the contemporary political, social, religious, biographical, and literary contexts out of which Paradise Lost first emerged. Although one need hardly assert the importance of distinguishing the earlier contexts (those of 1667) from the later ones (those of 1674 and beyond), those distinctions are worth remembering.

Accordingly, the present volume makes a point of engaging the first edition of Milton's epic both as a "thing-in-itself" and as the product of the milieu to which it responds. With these goals in mind, the volume brings together ten previously unpublished essays that elucidate major aspects of the first edition of Paradise Lost. Of immediate interest is the text of Paradise Lost, that is, the poem as a "book." The first three essays here are concerned with the "material culture" that shaped the conception of the epic as it originally appeared in 1667, as well as the changes this edition underwent both in its subsequent issues (1668 and 1669) and in its publication as the second edition in 1674. Complementing these chapters, in turn, are the next four essays, all of which develop historical, literary, social, and political contexts against which the first edition of Paradise Lost may be placed. The concluding three essays round out the volume through detailed thematic and textual analyses that address the philosophical, theological, and structural implications of the epic in its original format.

The structure and logic of the volume are made evident by the issues that the individual essays address. Initiating the discussion of the first edition of Paradise Lost, Michael Lieb's essay functions both as an introduction to the volume as a whole and as an analysis of the changes incorporated in the poem from its first appearance to its later incarnations. As such, Lieb's essay lays the groundwork for the essays that follow. In his finely nuanced study, Joseph Wittreich focuses on the way in which the alterations that emerged between the 1667 text and those that appeared in 1668 and 1669 provide evidence that Milton's epic is "an oracle of its own history," an idea that Wittreich develops in his detailed account of the first edition and its subsequent issues. Rounding out this triad of approaches to the text of the poem in its original incarnation, Stephen B. Dobranski explores the relationship between Milton and his publisher, Samuel Simmons, which is evident in the changing faces of the title pages that preface the first edition of Paradise Lost. The underlying premise of each of these essays is that "meaning" resides as much in the poem as physical object as it does in the poetry itself. In order to come to terms with the later editions of Milton's epic, one must attend to the various aspects that constitute the changes the epic underwent in its initial appearances.

Elaborating upon such concerns, the second section of the volume engages the all-important question of milieu. The underlying assumption here is that a truly enlightened understanding of the first edition must

take into account the historical milieu out of which the poem emerged. Achsah Guibbory's essay discloses how the 1667 edition of Milton's epic participated in the "cultural conversation" that distinguished the decade following the Restoration. In response to that task, Guibbory delineates the historical and literary setting against which one might most profitably place the first edition of Paradise Lost. Doing so, she demonstrates the extent to which Milton's epic is a work that must be read in the context of both the literature and the events of the time. Drawing upon the political life of the Restoration, Richard DuRocher, in turn, addresses the issue of regal attire both in the 1660s and in Paradise Lost. Specifically, DuRocher offers what he terms "contextual evidence" that associates Charles II with Milton's Satan, both of whom, it appears, adorn themselves with a "shared mode of dress and imperial styles." What results is a reading of the first edition as sensitive to the topical dimensions as to the larger thematic concerns of the epic. Essays by Laura Lunger Knoppers and Bryan Adams Hampton bring this issue of milieu to a close. Focusing on the social implications of the gardens and royal parks that flourished during the Restoration, Knoppers views Milton's depiction of his own "pleasure garden" or garden of Eden (from "gan `ceden" or "garden of pleasure" in Hebrew) in the context of the detailed descriptions of the pleasure gardens by Samuel Pepys, among others. Knoppers's essay thereby provides a renewed sense of how the Miltonic depiction of Eden implicitly comments upon "the commercialization of leisure" in the 1660s and beyond. Concluding the group of four essays that address the contemporary milieu, Hampton provides a way of locating the insurrection of the rebel angels in Paradise Lost within the "crackling atmosphere of persistent paranoia, political conspiracy, and importunate dissent" that followed hard upon the Restoration. In particular, Hampton contends that the politics of the Clarendon Code represents a contemporary context through which to approach Milton's portrayal of the dissenting angels in the first edition of Paradise Lost. All of the essays in this second group prove themselves germane to an understanding of the first edition of Milton's epic within its contemporary setting.

Rounding out the volume as a whole, the final three essays mount detailed thematic and textual arguments that engage the philosophical, theological, and structural implications of the epic as it originally appeared. Phillip J. Donnelly addresses essential questions about matters of structure and narrative treatment in the 1667 edition by highlighting Plato's Republic. Through an analysis of various aspects of this seminal work, Donnelly demonstrates the existence of a "sustained intertextual engagement" between the Republic and Paradise Lost 1667. At issue is what Donnelly calls the "architectonic symmetries" that bind the two works. So compelling is the architectonic relationship between them that Milton's epic does not simply reenact Platonic themes; rather, as a ten-book epic, it veritably subsumes the argument in Plato's great work. Moving from the philosophical dimensions of Donnelly's essay to the theological dimensions of Michael Bryson's essay, one is made aware yet once more of the primacy of Milton's epic in its first incarnation. Once again, the ten-book structure is at issue, but for Bryson the energies that shape the poem assume particular importance in the strain of negative or apophatic theology that underlies the depiction of God at various points in the narrative. Complementary accounts of the philosophical and theological implications of the ten-book epic, Donnelly's and Bryson's respective essays demonstrate the extent to which the first edition of Paradise Lost is its "own poem," one that demands to be read and understood on its own terms as well as in conjunction with the later editions of the poem. A coda to this third and final group of essays, John T. Shawcross's study comments implicitly upon the volume as a whole. Through an analysis of both structure and theme, Shawcross, like Donnelly and Bryson, reinforces the idea that Milton's epic in its

first incarnation must be accorded the kind of careful attention that has been given its later incarnations over the centuries.

Paradise Lost 1667 can no longer be "silenced" as a poem that simply anticipates the "true" version that appeared some seven years later and that has subsequently been canonized as Milton's final statement. Drawing attention to the significance and complexities of the first edition, this volume seeks to justify the title of the session mounted on the occasion of the International Milton Congress: the essays gathered here amount in effect to "The Discovery of a New Milton Epic: Paradise Lost 1667." Having sought to accord that epic its due in the present collection, the editors hope to generate renewed interest in a work that later generations would not willingly let die. <>

THE SPIRIT SAYS: INSPIRATION AND INTERPRETATION IN ISRAELITE, JEWISH, AND EARLY CHRISTIAN TEXTS

edited by Ronald Herms, John R. Levison and Archie T. Wright [Ekstasis: Religious Experience from Antiquity to the Middle Ages, de Gruyter, ISBN: 9783110688214]

THE SPIRIT SAYS offers a stunning collection of articles by an influential assemblage of scholars, all of whom lend considerable insight to the relationship between inspiration and interpretation. They address this otherwise intractable question with deft and occasionally daring readings of a variety of texts from the ancient world, including—but not limited to—the scriptures of early Judaism and Christianity.

The thrust of this book can be summed up not so much in one question as in four:

- What is the role of revelation in the interpretation of Scripture?
- What might it look like for an author to be inspired?
- What motivates a claim to the inspired interpretation of Scripture?
- Who is inspired to interpret Scripture?

More often than not, these questions are submerged in this volume under the tame rubrics of exegesis and hermeneutics, but they rise in swells and surges too to the surface, not just occasionally but often. Combining an assortment of prominent voices, this book does not merely offer signposts along the way. It charts a pioneering path toward a model of interpretation that is at once intellectually robust and unmistakably inspired.

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He hid himself from the Romans for two days. When tribunes came to offer him safe passage, he rebuffed them, refusing because he could not imagine that someone who had done so much damage to the Romans would be let off the hook. So Roman general—one day to be emperor—Vespasian sent yet a third tribune, an old friend, to Josephus to compel him to come. Nicanor explained that the Romans are kind to conquered peoples and that Josephus was admired by the Romans for his courage, so Vespasian would keep him safe from harm.

The self-congratulatory tenor of this account is stifling. Josephus had brought such harm to the Romans. The Romans admired Josephus. Vespasian wanted to preserve a man of his courage. This narrative is so self-promoting as to be specious, so self-aggrandizing as to be suspect.

Even still, by his own account, the Jewish general resisted, so the Roman soldiery wanted to burn down his hiding-place. Nicanor would not allow it and pressed Josephus further, prompting him to

recall "those nightly dreams, in which God had foretold to him the impending fate of the Jews and the destinies of the Roman sovereigns. He was an interpreter of dreams and skilled in divining the meaning of ambiguous utterances of the Deity; a priest himself and of priestly descent, he was not ignorant of the prophecies in the sacred books. At that hour he was inspired [to read their meaning], and, recalling the dreadful images of his recent dreams, he offered up a silent prayer to God."

What Nicanor could not do through entreaty, Josephus' memory of dreams and his aptitude at the inspired interpretation of scripture did. With that recollection the deal is sealed, the die is cast, or—an expression more remote and apt—Josephus has crossed his Rubicon. It is now off to the Romans, though not until Josephus acknowledges in prayer that good fortune— is a favorite word of his—has gone over to the Romans. He is, thanks to dreams and the prophecies of scripture, on the right side of history.

His decision, claimed Josephus, stemmed less from the pragmatic vagaries of Roman power than from direct revelation. He had a steady diet of nightly dreams that prepared him for this moment of capitulation. Like his namesake, an interpreter of dreams, Josephus would serve in the lavish courts of the Flavians. Josephus had also mastered the ability to interpret ambiguous oracles—prophecies embedded in the sacred books. Inspired, he was able to fathom, at just the right moment, their meaning.

The glimpse of bias, this peek at questionable motivations, at debatable incentives, offers apt entrée to this volume on the inspired interpretation of scripture. Josephus' claim two millennia past unlocks some of the serious questions that will surface in this book.

The first, of course, is the role of revelation in the interpretation of scripture. Few readers of this book would eschew study of the languages in which ancient authors wrote, the cultures in which ancient authors were reared, the literary conventions ancient authors used, the oral traditions ancient authors would transform into literature, and the communities that would collate and canonize what those ancient authors wrote. But what else is needed? Is virtue necessary to exceptional exegesis? Is inspiration—a conscious reliance upon the Holy Spirit, needed in order, with Josephus, to wrest clarity from ambiguous oracles? Or is the better linguist the better exegete, the better anthropologist the better student of ancient culture? To put this matter another way, few of us have burned the vaunted volumes of our Theological Dictionary of the New Testament because Gerhard Kittel, its editor, was an acknowledged champion of National Socialism. We rely on the erudition, even if we do so with a blush of shame and a flush of Schadenfreude.

No single answer to this question will emerge from the pages of this volume, but there will be pointers, a wink and a nod to inspiration. Or perhaps a better image of our task is Abel's blood crying out from the ground; we discover inspiration sunk below the surface by the sweat of our brows, as we

pluck the thorns and uproot the thistles in order to find fresh green shoots of inspiration in the gardens of Antiquity. Not Eden, for sure, but perhaps fertile enough soil to support an occasional glimpse of what inspired interpretation might look like—or at least what ancient authors believed inspiration means.

Josephus' experience raises a second question: what it might look like to be inspired. He cannily adopts an ambiguous term, to describe his experience. These words may well indicate a heightening of human ability, such as when Vespasian, "like one inspired," evoked extraordinary courage and resolve in his soldiers (B.J. 4.33), or when Saul, inspired, dismissed citizens of Jabis with a promise to come to their aid (Ant. 6.76), or when Elijah kept pace with Ahab's chariot (Ant. 8.346). In each of these instances, each moment when someone was native abilities were heightened ordinately. Yet the expression can refer as well to a loss of mental control, such as when Elisha, under the influence of a harp, prophesied, ordering certain kings to dig pits in a stream (Ant. 9.35 — 36), or when Saul, becoming inspired prophesied in an assembly of prophets (Ant. 6.56). Could ancient partisans of prophecy have read Josephus' Antiquities without discovering in Israel's annals, as Josephus retold them, ecstasy akin to Delphic enthusiasm or the sibyls? The ambiguity of Josephus' description draws attention to a central issue in the inspired interpretation of scripture. Does it look more like rapture or intellectual rigor? The dichotomy, of course, is a false one. The answer lies somewhere on a spectrum, but a somewhere scholars have not yet located with any degree of certainty, and for good reason. The difference between a surfeit of adrenaline and a surge of the Spirit can look awfully like one another.

A false dichotomy, perhaps, but one that is alive and kicking. Take Exodus 28:3, in which inspired artisans are selected to create magnificent clothing for Aaron the high priest. The text reads literally, "now speak to all the wise-of-heart whom I have filled with spirit-of-wisdom." Brevard Childs translates this, "Next you shall speak with all who are skillful, whom I have endowed with talent.' Pentecostal Roger Stronstad comments, "The first concentrated outburst of charismatic activity is associated with the founding of the nation of Israel in the wilderness ... The workers who are charged with the preparation of Aaron's priestly garments or the building of the Tabernacle are endowed with craftsmanship skills through being filled with the Spirit of God."' What does inspiration look like? Skills well-honed or a burst of charismatic activity? Yes, it may be a false dichotomy, but not one that has skulked away. Nor should it, given its significance. Hence, this book by a spirited band of scholars unabashed by the ambiguity of it all.

Josephus' claim introduces a third question: what motivates a claim to the inspired interpretation of scripture? Josephus' motivation is, at least in part, self-preservation. His nightly diet of dreams, his aptitude at dissolving the opacity of prophecies, are, he knows now, omens of Rome's ascendance and the inevitability of Jewish defeat. They serve, in short, to save Josephus from suicide and offer him a future of Flavian benefaction.

Antiquity is peppered with claims to inspiration that served to bolster the convictions of a particular community or the status of a particular interpreter. Ben Sira praised the inspired scribe in a thinly veiled description of none other than himself (Sir 39:6 8). The poet of the Qumran hymns claimed to have unlocked mysteries because he listened loyally to God's Holy Spirit (1QH 20.11-12). Philo Judaeus made audacious claims to inspiration as the source of his allegorical interpretation: floating on the winds of knowledge in heavenly ascent (Spec. 3.1- 6); coming to his writing-desk empty-headed, only to receive a flurry of inspiration so powerful that it rendered him nearly unconscious (Cher. 27- 29); and receiving words of instruction, intelligible teaching, from his customary friend, the divine spirit (Somn. 2.252). The apostle Paul saw himself as a teacher and an interpreter of mysteries because of his inspired vocation; in 2 Corinthians 3, he offers a skilled—he would say inspired—interpretation of Moses' bright face that supports, at the expense of others, the status of his own community of followers of Jesus. Time and again in the book of Acts, Jesus' followers deliver powerful speeches by dint of inspiration, such as when Peter, standing before the Sanhedrin, offers a brief sermon anchored in Ps 118:22—a cherished text in the early church—when he is filled with the Holy Spirit (Acts 4:8-12). His point is made, his opponents not just impressed but flabbergasted.

We would be remiss not to ask the question of whether claims to inspiration culled from Antiquity are self-serving, either a community's convictions or an individual's standing. Are there examples to the contrary, to inspired interpretation that leads not to safety but to insecurity, not to embrace but to exclusion? There are. There is a nearly forgotten Zechariah, son of the priest Jehoiada, who, when the Spirit clothed him, as it had Gideon, accused the people, who responded by stoning him, according to 2 Chronicles 24:20 - 21. The deacon Stephen, too, having delivered a diatribe that undercut commitment to temple and land, found himself filled with the Spirit but brutally stoned, too, according to Acts 7:1-60. These examples to the contrary function to heighten the chiaroscuro of Antiquity with respect to status and to raise afresh the question of the legitimacy of claims to inspiration when they serve tidily to support the position and pedigree of those who stake those claims.

This question leads inevitably to a fourth raised by Josephus' defence of his dubious decision with an appeal to inspiration. Who is inspired to interpret scripture? Josephus claims to know the meaning of ambiguous oracles because he is not just a priest but of priestly descent. Twice-said, his pedigree is so unassailable that he can tinge his boasting with a light touch of litotes: he was not ignorant of prophecies in the sacred books. Yet the situation he finds himself in, in which transferring his allegiance to the Romans is a more palatable alternative than suicide, calls into question the legitimacy of his claim to inspiration. Yes, he has the pedigree, but has he interpreted the texts in a solipsistic way—all in the guise of inspiration?

Social anthropologist I. M. Lewis, in his Ecstatic Religion: A Study of Shamanism and Spirit Possession, distinguishes central from peripheral contexts of ecstasy. Ecstasy in what Lewis identifies as central contexts—where clear social hierarchies dominate—lends divine support to the status quo. This is Josephus' world. Ecstasy in peripheral contexts, which may look like an illness at first, ultimately enhances the marginal status of the ecstatic. Female ecstatic mediums, for example, tend to function in peripheral social contexts because they can speak directly as a conduit of the divine, free of the constraints of the status quo. Lewis' dichotomy is not universally accepted, but it does pose the question well. Are the ancient authors in this book—representatives on the whole of central contexts—an adequate representation of the inspired interpretation of scripture? What would the answer to our questions look like had someone recorded the words of female Corinthian prophets, whose head coverings allowed them to speak as women of God's glory rather than as mouthpieces for the glory of their husbands (1 Cor 11:2— 16)? That final question is not meant to undermine the worth of this book. We have to begin somewhere, and we have chosen to begin with an exceptional array of scholars and an exemplary collection of ancient texts. Still, we have only just begun. <>

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