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Wordtrade Reviews: Labyrinthine Standpoints

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Editorial Appraisals:

Some qualified reviewers offer their own brief evaluation of the book. Otherwise, most of our content represents the authors'-editors' own words as a preview to their approach to the subject, their style and point-of-view. <>

CAMUS'S THE PLAGUE: PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES edited by Peg Brand Weiser [Oxford Studies in Philosophy and Literature, Oxford University Press, 9780197599327]

La Peste (in English *The Plague*), originally published in 1947 by the Nobel Prize-winning writer Albert Camus, chronicles the progression of deadly bubonic plague as it spreads through the quarantined Algerian city of Oran. While most discussions of fictional examples within aesthetics are either historical or hypothetical, Camus offers an example of "pestilence fiction."

Camus chose fiction to convey facts--about plagues in the past, his own bout with tuberculosis at age seventeen, living under quarantine away from home for several years, and forced separation from his wife who remained in Algiers while he was abroad in Nazi-occupied France. His own lived experiences undergird an imaginative account of shared human realities with which we can identify: vulnerability to the disease, isolation, fear, and finally humanitarianism. *The Plague* teaches us to neither covet nor expect what we so casually took for granted.

This collection of original essays on philosophical themes in *The Plague* is of special relevance during and in the aftermath of Covid-19 but also provides reflections that will be of lasting value to those interested in this classic work of literature. The novel explores questions of enduring importance. Do we collectively meet the threshold of ethical behaviour posed by Camus who wrote, "What's true of all the evils in the world is true of plague as well. It helps men to rise above themselves"? Or does the absurd undermine the compassionate? Do "heroes" dutifully fight a plague with "common decency," or does human nature resign itself to the normalization of uncontrollable suffering and death? There are myriad ways to approach the novel and this volume encourages readers to ponder human dilemmas in fictional Oran informed by our current pandemic.

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The Relevance of Camus's The Plague by Peg Brand Weiser

[T] here's no substitute for finally sitting down and reading the 1947 novel "The Plague," by Albert Camus. Its relevance lashes you across the face."

1. Argelino Con Turbante [Algerian with Turban] En El Patio De La Mezquita, Oran, Algeria. Album/Art Resource, NY.

Camus's classic narrative La Peste (The Plague) is a timely philosophical read in an era when a deadly pandemic rages worldwide. An allegory rich with suggestion, it rewards an imaginative reader with innumerable meanings as our own lived experiences mirror the novel. We witness protesters who argue for individual freedom and the autonomy to defy government- imposed regulations. They openly clash with followers of science who recommend shared actions of self-sacrifice to mitigate the spread of infection. Choosing either to act in one's own interest or to sacrifice for the good of all has become a haunting theme of American life in which the "richest nation on earth" experienced the highest number of cases and deaths in the world while under the leadership of former president Donald Trump as well as through the first year, 2021, of the administration of President Joe Biden. Political divisions over wearing masks, social distancing, police killings, Black Lives Matter, the January 6, 2021, assault on the United States Capitol, and

recommended or mandated vaccines sow discord at a time when solidarity could have united the United States to lead the world against the pandemic. Instead, misinformation campaigns have stoked opposition among the populace and away from the virus. "We're all in this together," was repeatedly uttered by Dr. Bernard Rieux, Camus's narrator. How seldom did we hear that call for unity from the podiums of power, for example, the leaders of America, Brazil, and India (the three countries with the highest death counts in the world)? After two years into the coronavirus pandemic with over 1 million deaths in the United States and over 6 million worldwide, we might ask ourselves, do we measure up to Camus's optimistic assessment of human behavior under duress? Do we collectively meet the minimum threshold of ethical behavior posed by Camus who wrote, "What's true of all the evils in the world is true of plague as well. It helps men to rise above themselves"?

His Life and Work

Albert Camus was born on November 7, 1913, in Mondovi, Algeria. As a pied noir (black foot), he was the second- generation offspring of European colonists who settled in North Africa from 1830 until the 1960s, when indigenous independence was regained after the Algerian War of 1954–1962. Unlike Arab and Berber inhabitants, he was born a French citizen: a unique status. He was described by one scholar, Stephen G. Kellman, as both "a stranger in his native land" and "a ragged interloper among the literary sophisticates of Paris."

His father, killed in World War I in 1914, prompted his Spanish mother (born deaf) to relocate him and his older brother (born deaf- mute) to an apartment in Algiers where they lived with three other persons without electricity or running water. Diagnosed with tuberculosis at age seventeen, a transmitted disease for which there was then no cure nor satisfactory treatment, he was forced to leave home and live in self- imposed quarantine with an uncle. A lycée professor influenced him to study philosophy, particularly the ancient Greeks and Nietzsche. Forced to abandon his love of swimming and aspirations of becoming a professional football player, he relinquished the position of goalkeeper for a local team, later remarking, "What little I know on morality, I learned it on football pitches and theater stages. Those were my true universities."

Beginning in 1933, he studied philosophy at the University of Algiers and completed his studies (equivalent to a master's degree) in 1936 with a thesis on Plotinus. First married in 1934 and divorced in 1936, he wrote theatrical works and traveled Algeria as an actor. He visited Paris for the first time in 1937, where he wrote for several socialist newspapers, and in 1940 moved to Paris to become editor-in-chief of Paris-Soir. As the buildup to World War II intensified, he attempted to join the army but was rejected due to his illness. As Germany invaded Paris, he fled to Lyon, married again in 1940, and by 1942 had published The Stranger, The Myth of Sisyphus, and Caligula. He and his wife moved to Oran where he taught in primary schools, but due to a recurrence of tuberculosis, he moved again in 1942 to a mountain village in the French Alps where he began writing La Peste. Stranded in France, he was

separated from both his wife and mother who were back in Algeria. In 1943, he returned to Paris to edit the underground newspaper Combat as part of the French Resistance. In 1944, he met Jean- Paul Sartre, André Gide, Simone de Beauvoir, André Breton, and, since he was already well- known, easily assimilated into the group of French intellectuals living in Paris. In Paris after the war in 1945, his wife gave birth to twins, and in 1946, as a celebrated writer, he visited the United States and Canada, delivering a speech at Columbia University and publishing a series of essays from Combat entitled "Neither Victims nor Executioners."

La Peste was published in 1947 and translated into English the following year. He continued to write, to travel to other countries— including Algeria where he expressed disapproval of oppressive French colonialist policies— and to see performances of his dramatic works on stage. In 1951, he published The Rebel to negative reviews, broke off his friendship with Jean- Paul Sartre, and rejected the label "existentialist." He repeatedly took political stands against oppressive governments, including France in the 1950s, when he tried to find a way to negotiate Algerian freedom amid anticolonialist uprisings. Conflicted by a complicated social dynamic of sympathy for the Algerian cause but also identification with his French lineage, he failed to satisfy both the Left— particularly those sympathetic to communism— and the Right. Yet the complexity of his views continues to provide opportunities for present- day readers to study his words and actions more carefully: to credit him for meeting his literary and humanitarian goals while withholding praise for what we judge, in retrospect, as failures and omissions. A pensive short story published in 1957, "The Artist at Work," captured the "good luck" and rise in popularity of a painter who, like Camus, vacillated between solidarity and solitude as he came to lose prestige and influence. That same year, Camus accepted the Nobel Prize in Literature whereupon he wrote in his journal, "Strange feeling of overwhelming pressure and melancholy."10 He died in a car crash at age forty- six on January 4, 1960. An unfinished manuscript found with him at the scene of his death was later published in 1994 as Le Premier Homme (The First Man).

Then and Now

As winter turns into spring of an unspecified year in the 1940s, Camus's narrator, Dr. Bernard Rieux (whose identity is revealed only at the end of the novel), leads us through dire events in Oran as it is voluntarily shut off from the outside world. Oran is cast as a "treeless, glamourless, soulless" town of 200,000. Beginning with the first dead rat on April 16 and ending the following February with the ceremonial opening of the town gates, Rieux tracks time, the promise of a curative serum, and corpses. Death rates climb through the hot summer and into the fall. At first counted by the week— at 16, 24, 28, 32, 40, 100, 302, then nearly 700 per week— administrators switch to counting them by the day to report "lower" numbers (reaching 92, 107, then 130 deaths per day) in order to forestall panic. The narrative chronicles the progression of deadly bubonic plague through the town as its inhabitants deny the obvious, struggle to comply with orders of quarantine, and cope with denial, fear, isolation, and loss of loved ones. The invasion of the plague bacillus is unexpected, unwanted,

and uncontrollable: exemplifying for Camus the inevitable human condition of "the absurd" and man's helplessness in the face of it. The response of Rieux is not to succumb, however, but to fight, thereby finding meaning in resistance. He cites his duty, urges others to decency, and invokes their shared concern for humanity. The novel raises issues of truth, honesty, ethics, the problem of evil, faith, the pathology of illness, death, the absurd, freedom, love, heroism, and time.

One might trace the relevance of the novel along at least three notable lines: (1) the narrative's depiction of a range of human reactions to the absurd, (2) its historical weight within the context of plague literature and pandemic fiction, and (3) its fictional triumph over the facts— the numbers, the data, and the daily developments— in chronicling a story of diverse individuals thrown together by fate who succeed in pulling together, acting in solidarity, and surviving the worst conditions of the plague. This story of plague could have easily resulted in a shallow, documentary- style work of nonfiction or a dry, didactic philosophical tome that, either way, ended on a less optimistic note. An alternative informed reading, on the other hand, casts the relevance of the novel in terms of three additional features conceptualized as what the novel lacks, namely (4) any significant description of women as fully functioning human beings— female caregivers, doctors, workers, wives, partners; (5) depictions of Algerian and Arab characters who represent the majority indigenous population; and (6) an awareness and analysis of class differences, only minimally represented in the text by starving, rioting, destructive mobs. On this competing interpretation, Camus's novel is relevant for revealing the long- standing hierarchical power structures of the privileged that maintained systemic inequalities and oppression of the less powerful, non- male, non- white, non- European, poor, and vulnerable populations. As a result, some readers of The Plague find Camus's advocacy of solidarity, cooperation, and hope a form of "naïve idealism" that ignores pervasive structural differences and ideologies that continually harm those who are truly suffering and dying, particularly during a pandemic. On this reading, according to critics Kabel and Phillipson, Camus's book fails to inspire social change.

The unraveling of our own story parallels that of Oran. Some say we began to mark "Covid time" as early as December 2019, with March 11, 2020, as the official pronouncement of pandemic by the World Health Organization (WHO) due to a novel coronavirus that emerged from Wuhan, China, to blanket world populations in sickness and death. For over two years, government agencies and concerned citizens have tracked daily statistics of contracted cases, hospitalizations, and deaths. "The United States continues to have the highest cumulative number of cases and deaths globally . . . despite the widespread availability of vaccines in the country" and now lags behind in vaccines in comparison to much of the rest of the developed world. Reporters chronicled the experiences of front line medical workers in overcrowded hospitals. Families awaited a plan, a cure, and finally, a vaccine, while politicians and pundits posited an "existential crisis" to describe our world in peril. Under the new administration of President Biden— which began on January 20, 2021— vaccines- in- arms came to

exceed 3 million per day while simultaneously more transmissible variants of the virus began to spread. Citizens cautiously sought a return to "normal" but medical epidemiologists doubted that even if at least 60– 70 percent of the country's population received at least one vaccine, it could escape the reach of the virus when other countries were unable to attain sufficient vaccines or control recurring outbreaks. What the vaccine has done, however, is severely limit the death toll, particularly in America. Not so in other parts of the world. On May 19, 2021, India reported the highest number of deaths in one day worldwide— 4,500, surpassing the highest number of 4,400 in the United States on January 20, 2021. Photos revealed dozens of Covid- infected bodies floating down the Ganges River due to shallow graves unable to hold them.19 After a long respite from conflict in the Middle East, fighting between Hamas and Israel posed the dual threat of war injuries and spread of the virus in Gaza.20 With severe shortages and unequal distribution of vaccines— "only 0.3% were in low-income countries, while richer countries administered around 85%"— some countries are not expected to obtain vaccines until 2024.

It should be noted that the numbers of both cases and deaths are assumed to be severely underreported in the United States as well as elsewhere, due to lack of testing and transparency of reporting. In May 2021, one study estimated an actual number of 912,345 deaths— compared to a then reported 578,555— in the United States alone. The uneven distribution of medical treatment, ventilators, vaccines, and proper burials worldwide has been criticized as evidence of the "catastrophe" of Covid that "makes indigenous peoples acutely vulnerable to the ravages of the virus, further deepening their material, physical and spiritual plight and collective loss."

Camus Sets the Stage

Consider the speech delivered by Camus at Columbia University on March 28, 1946, during his only trip to America, entitled, "La Crise de L'homme" ("A Human Crisis")— judged by one scholar as providing us with a "blueprint" to a number of Camus's works, including The Plague, The Fall, The Rebel, and First Man. Fresh from postwar France, the thirty- two- year- old Camus represented "his generation" of young French citizens as he addressed American academics sitting comfortably in a packed auditorium in New York City.25 Few listeners had undergone the unspeakable horrors of World War II, survived the occupied rule of Hitler, been stripped of freedoms that resulted in being held prisoner in one's own country— trapped in one's home, separated from loved ones— as if attacked by a veritable plague. After the novel was published in 1947, Camus acknowledged its allegorical nature as a chronicle of Nazi invasions of Europe, but, as many authors in this volume have argued, it was so much more: it offers us relevance beyond its original place in time. It opens a lens that probes deep and wide; it portrays any person in any town at any unspecified time anywhere that becomes "victim" to the brutality of "the executioner" (referred to by Camus in his speech as "the brutes taking charge in the four corners of Europe"). Recall that in 1946, Camus also published a collection of essays from Combat entitled, "Neither Victims nor Executioners."

As Camus came to write in The Plague, through the words of Dr. Rieux's friend, Tarrou, who was adamantly opposed to capital punishment and violence: "on this earth there are pestilences and there are victims, and it's up to us, so far as possible, not to join forces with the pestilences." Foreshadowing the main themes of resistance against an oppressor, disease, or injustice by inspiring solidarity among men and women who come together in a common fight, Camus added, "I grant we should add a third category: that of the true healers." Surely this explains why Camus chose a physician, Dr. Rieux, as the main character and narrator:

> Nonetheless, he knew that the tale he had to tell could not be one of a final victory. It could be only the record of what had had to be done, and what assuredly would have to be done again in the never ending fight against terror and its relentless onslaughts, despite their personal afflictions, by all who, while unable to be saints but refusing to bow down to pestilences, strive their utmost to be healers.

In his 1946 speech, Camus outlined four symptoms of "the human crisis" resulting from human indifference and passivity within a world of violence, "mistrust, resentment, greed, and the race for power": (1) the rise of terror consisting in an uncertain future that begets fear and anxiety, solitude and unhappiness; (2) the impossibility of persuasion, that is, the failure of reason and passion to trump irrationality and indifference; his example is a concentration camp victim "who cannot hope to explain to the SS men who are beating him that they ought not to"; (3) the growth of bureaucracy where paperwork replaces persons; and (4) a "cult of efficiency" where "real men" are replaced by "political men" who engage in destructive abstractions (like Nazism) in which harmful instincts are "elevated to the status of an idea or theory."

The remedy for "the human crisis"— Camus's suggested "lesson of those years . . . of blood spilled"— is an end to "the cult of silence" in the face of "the reign of abstraction" and a rediscovery of "the freedom of thought" needed "to resolve any of the problems facing the modern conscience." This consists of freely seeking "the common good" in "communion among men" and in forming a "brotherhood of men struggling against fate." For the sake of justice, Camus argues, we must eliminate lying, violence, slavery, and terror.

> It is too easy in this matter to simply accuse Hitler and to say, "Since the beast is dead, its venom is gone." We know perfectly well that the venom is not gone, that each of us carries it in our own hearts.

Consider that at the end of The Plague, Dr. Rieux ominously "remembered" to himself:

> He knew what those jubilant crowds did not know but could have learned from books: that the plague bacillus never dies or disappears for good; that it can lie dormant for years and years in furniture and linen- chests; that it bides its time in bedrooms, cellars, trunks, and bookshelves; and that perhaps the day would come when, for the bane and the enlightening of men, it would rouse up its rats again and send them forth to die in a happy city.

On a positive note, Camus shares Dr. Rieux's reasoning for chronicling the story of the plague in fictional Oran with another direct link to his speech that serves to explain why he himself was motivated to write his own fictional account, La Peste:

> Dr Rieux resolved to compile this chronicle, so that he should not be one of those who hold their peace but should bear witness in favor of those plague- stricken people: so that some memorial of the injustice and outrage done them might endure; and to state quite simply what we learn in time of pestilence: that there are more things to admire in men than to despise.

This conclusion, in the face of the incomprehensible and insurmountable absurd— man's suffering, evil, and death— reflects a change in Camus's writings when he moved beyond advocating that one merely face the absurd, alone, like Sisyphus, to instead combat it by forming "a brotherhood of men":

> [I] f there is one fact that these last five years have brought out, it is the extreme solidarity of men with one another. Solidarity in crime for some, solidarity in the upsurge of resistance in other. Solidarity even between victims and executioners.

We, too, witness a monumental human crisis enacted in real time. Our full story is yet to be written but one might conclude that ultimately nearly 81 million Americans (51.3 percent of the votes cast) denied Donald Trump a second term in favor of Joseph Biden and Kamala Harris, and that the state of Georgia elected two Democrats to the U.S. Senate to split the numbers 50- 50 with Vice President Harris becoming the deciding majority vote. In keeping with campaign promises, Biden met and surpassed his goal of 100 million vaccines within his first one hundred days in office and signed economic relief into law for economically disadvantaged citizens. No such political accounting surfaces in Camus's story while it is integral to understanding ours. The highest number of American citizens voted in a safe election that insured the country's turn toward fighting the pandemic rather than ignoring it or calling it a "hoax." President Biden acknowledged both the dead and grieving as he held the first communal memorial for the nation on the eve of his inauguration. Camus would have called this a form of resistance and a form of solidarity. He would have empathized with victims lost to the virus while valorizing the healers, particularly health care personnel and other essential workers, for whose ordinary, everyday deeds of decency and healing he reserved the term "heroic."

Range of Human Reactions to the Absurd

Camus's characters adopt a variety of stances from the extremes of exploitation (Cottard) and religious fervor (the Jesuit priest, Father Paneloux) with a host of options in- between: the narrator, Dr. Rieux, who seeks to cure but cannot; Rieux's new friend and confidant, Jean Tarrou, who organizes squads of workers to fight the disease; the visiting journalist, Raymond Rambert, who longs to escape and return to his lover in Paris; the heroic yet nondescript office clerk, Joseph Grand, who diligently tallies the dead; other doctors, citizens, and the family of Monsieur Othan, particularly his young, innocent son— recipient of a long- awaited serum— who dies a painful death nonetheless. Rieux's inability to cure the sick moves him to lead others to volunteer, work, organize: to do something—

anything— against an invading, unwieldy, arbitrary killing force. Doing nothing constitutes complicity with the enemy.

It is not until the New Year that hope begins to return to the inhabitants of Oran, although Dr. Rieux remarks, "it is doubtful if this could be called a victory." The story takes on new relevance and meaning as we, too, lived sequestered- in- place in our respective homes and communities— waiting: for adequate testing, for the death toll to drop, for social distancing requirements to ease, for a possible "next wave," for businesses and schools to remain open, for ample doses of a vaccine, and for the normalcy we once knew. The Plague teaches us to neither covet nor expect what we so casually took for granted. As we progress through long, drawn- out stages of our own twenty- first- century "plague," the passing of time reveals new problems such as loss of employment, hunger, eviction, lack of internet access for children to attend school remotely, and the disproportionate susceptibility to contracting the disease if one is a person of color, an "essential" worker forced to continue laboring in an unsafe environment, an "undocumented/ unauthorized noncitizen," poor, or someone lacking health insurance. As with the growing spread of the disease in Oran, crises we experience multiply over time. Covid "variants"— such as the deadly Delta and highly contagious Omicron variants of 2021— pose new threats to health and welfare, just as the extension of vaccines to young children and a third "booster" shot offer a glimmer of hope to the weary. Millions of anti- vaxxers, however, complicate recovery for all.

The Narrative's Historical Weight

Consider how Camus crafted the novel in its historical and literary contexts. Numerous commentaries have been written during our current pandemic to motivate readers to appreciate the novel's plot and details. For example, Clay Jenkinson gleans commonalities with other plagues from a study of pandemic literature dating back to the Justinian Plague of 541 CE, the Black Death (1348– 1352), the Great Plague of London (1665– 1666), the Third Plague Pandemic beginning in 1894 (China, Australia, India), and the Spanish Flu (1918). These documents record a pattern of human reactions of denial, flight (for the wealthy), suffering of the poor who are often essential workers unable to flee, legitimate strategies to mitigate the spread of the disease (government laws, quarantine, social distancing, masks), confidence men and conspiracy theories, economic fallout, and a rush to normalcy that often causes prolonged infection and death. Kim Willsher notes that the novel is loosely based on a cholera epidemic in Algeria which reportedly killed a large proportion of the population in 1849, almost twenty years after French colonization began. Sean Illing suggests, "The beauty of The Plague is that it asks the reader to map the lessons of the pandemic onto everyday life. The principles that drive the hero, Rieux, are the same principles that make every society worthwhile— empathy, love, and solidarity."

Alain de Botton credits Camus with both exposing the absurdity of one's life which can end at any moment, for any reason, as well as encouraging an internalization of human vulnerability that necessitates loving our fellow man. Robert Zaretsky suggests that the lessons learned from Camus are complex wherein "ordinary" characters can function as role models who exemplify "resistance against the inhuman force of the plague," but it is the ignorance of the politicians and powerful that are the real threat (although, in the end, not a reason for despair, given Camus's faith in man). Simon Critchley argues that basic anxiety about vulnerability and death— experienced acutely during a pandemic— can actually function as a "vehicle of liberation." Ronald Aronson offers the observation that "there is nothing political about his plague, while our situation is profoundly so. . . . our plague takes place through the social and political madness of Trumpism. . . . its viciousness, its sense of grievance, its cult of personality, its proud rejection of science and reason." No comparable critique of Oran's leadership appears in The Plague.

Orhan Pamuk cites Daniel Defoe's chronicle of seventeenth-century London, A Journal of the Plague Year, as "the single most illuminating work of literature ever written on contagion and human behavior."42 That work influenced Camus, but it is worth noting that while Dafoe's narrator ends his chronicle bemoaning "all manner of wickedness among us," Camus cautiously celebrates the cooperation that sustained the doctors, workers, and the general populace. Moreover, Defoe notes the contributions of women as nurses, their tribulations as mothers, the many burdens of caregiving relegated to women: all of which are absent from The Plague. Other epidemic literature that preceded La Peste includes History of the Wars by Procopius (542 CE, The Justinian Plague), The History of the Peloponnesian War by Thucydides (431 BCE, The Plague of Athens), Giovanni Boccaccio's 1353 Decameron (fourteenth- century Black Death in Italy), and The Diary of Samuel Pepys (seventeenth-century bubonic plague in London). The closest factual description of plague in Algeria to that fictionalized by Camus is that referenced by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention that occurred in 1946, just when Camus is writing The Plague (in France). Clearly he was able to pick and choose how to craft his version, resulting in an uplifting testament to men's strength united against an enemy, fighting a foe.

Not everyone responded positively. Even early criticisms by Jean- Paul Sartre and Roland Barthes found fault with Camus's moral message overwhelming his aesthetic concerns. More recent readings further problematize Camus's intentions, style, and overall effect on generations of readers and critics. Scholars influenced by the writings of Frantz Fanon, Edward Said, and other race theorists fault Camus for ignoring the indigenous population of Algeria, its struggle for autonomy, and the pervasive inequalities a colonized country bears: all of which were apparent to the author. As he engaged in various political pronouncements and publications in real life, he omitted them from his fictional account of Oran. He is criticized for deliberately evading the topic of French colonial oppression and violence, "erasing" the Algerian uprising and resultant 1945 massacre of at least 20,000 Algerians, and

"masking" the indigenous peoples' fight for freedom.46 For some critics, Camus silences the voice of the North African "subaltern" who fails to see herself reflected in the text; that is, "Individual travails overshadow the decimation of Arabs by the plague." More pointedly, as argued by Robert Solomon in a 2008 essay, "In The Stranger the Arabs who make up most of the population don't have names, but in The Plague they don't seem to have deaths either." Camus is accused of choosing to write a "classic imperialist discourse that, directly, overtly, and with complicity, accepts the racist hierarchy that all European countries imposed on other parts of the world. Solomon added, "Camus describes Algeria here as in The Stranger as if it is nothing but a European colony."

Fictional Triumph over Fact

The shift toward critical readings of the novel lies in the difference in time periods— ours and that of Camus— as well as what is considered to be Camus's outdated response to "the executioner," oppressor, or purveyor of injustice. Scholars Kabel and Phillipson write, "The anti- fascism that was important for Camus in occupied France is largely immaterial to Algerian politics. His advocacy of assimilation in Algeria predated and continued after the 'demise' of fascism." In effect, he grew out of step with the times— his own— with an exhortation to "universal humanism" that was said to exclude the indigenous population and conceal "his parochial colonialist politics," thereby rendering his "hope" for the future "romanticized." More awareness of what is missing, eliminated, and structurally barred from the novel results in reading the novel's advocacy of solidarity as incomplete, hollow, and empty.

LeBlanc and Jones, however, offer a 2002 reading of The Plague in which they see Camus offering an alternative narrative model that moves beyond "conflict models of discourse" to one in which "the binary logic of the conflict between France and Algeria" is rejected and "far from embodying and promulgating a colonial mentality, his second published novel actually anticipates postcolonial critiques of French control of Africa." They argue, "The intersections of religion, art, and politics in his work problematize models of political discourse and open a way to think about the place of narrative and story- telling and their meaning for being at home with 'others' and the self, in community, in a place."

Specifically with regard to the inequities seemingly perpetuated by Camus's neglect of the Arab population, David Carroll tracks the origins of the earliest and most intensely negative claims against the novel to a 1970 book by Conor Cruise O'Brien to which Camus never had a chance to respond. Carroll defends what he insists is Camus's clear and consistent anticolonialist stance with ample documentation from both his fictional and political writings. In explaining the complexity of Camus's strategic choice of Oran— "his least favorite Algerian city," Carroll offers evidence of contrasting procolonialist writings of Camus's literary predecessors, particularly from 1938.56 Carroll's incisive historical and textual analysis provides evidence that cannot be denied: "The charge that 'Camus and

his friends' did not find colonial racism and oppression repugnant and that he did not denounce them and see a link between colonial and Nazi racism and violence simply does not hold up to scrutiny." Carroll's analysis also considers the literary fact stressed by Camus himself, namely, that the novel was fictional and allegorical and thus necessarily resistant to historicalpolitical accuracy. Carroll emphatically argues that Camus was not only anticolonialist but also an Algerian who did not ignore his fellow Algerians. Moreover, Camus had always advocated multireferentiality, that is, multiple readings of "the plague"— for instance, Stalinism in addition to Nazism as a form of unacceptable political oppression (much debated by fellow French intellectuals of the day). Previously, O'Brien had questioned Camus's intentions on this matter, claiming that the author only intended "the plague" to refer to Nazism. Perhaps this entire controversy surrounding Camus's portrayal of Oran's citizens as colonialists would be moot if characters had just been given non- French names.

Thus, at this unique time in the wake of the work, when readers accumulate lived experiences of their own during an unprecedented pandemic and are acutely aware of systemic injustices, new commentators and critics should be given wide berth to find additional "layers of meaning" in the words on the page as well as names and phrases that do not appear. As informed readers and critics, we continue to question the author's literary and philosophical intentions, choices, and omissions in order to judge for ourselves. The essays in this volume begin that discussion in the twenty- first century, mid-pandemic.

Strategically, Camus chose fiction to convey facts. The Plague is not just fiction, since it is based on haunting facts from the historical past; nor is it merely literary journalism, as it attends to newsworthy details of everyday life in a storytelling setting.59 It may function as escape fiction, but our escape is illusory as we ourselves— living in a pandemic reproducing the restrictive conditions like those of bubonic plague in 1940s Oran— identify with the actions of fictional characters like those we witness in real life: in the media, on the streets, in hospitals, on Zoom, within our own families. Our lived experiences— the starting point for phenomenologists seeking to chart the theoretical— map onto Camus's narrative, confirming Simone de Beauvoir's similar intuition to choose to write fiction over philosophy. Her mode of existentialist writing, with an "emphasis on the particular and the concrete, from which philosophical propositions may be drawn, invites the use of fiction as a medium for philosophical discovery, especially at the ontological level." A similar observation might be offered of Camus, namely, "there is no question but that Camus's philosophical concerns were best captured in literary form." Even in English translation, Camus's prose is vivid, powerful, and arresting; it is often so pleasing that one risks becoming too absorbed in his words, similes, and metaphors, thereby forgetting the horrors of plague. Simple and direct, Camus elevates the words of everyday sights and sounds to an aesthetically high level of creative endeavor. Perhaps the frustrated writer, the clerk named Grand, said it best when he insisted, "It's only artists who know how to use their eyes." Borrowing from Defoe— in an epigraph intended to appear at the beginning of The Plague— Camus

also chose fiction to convey what he imagined might have happened in a town called Oran: "It is as reasonable to represent one kind of imprisonment by another as it is to represent anything which really exists by that which exists not."

New Perspectives

This collection of essays invites contemporary thinkers to reflect— in light of Camus's original fictional narrative— upon the progression of the coronavirus as it spread worldwide, felled millions of victims, and posed moral challenges to us as individuals, governments, and global societies. Conversely, readers are encouraged to reread and reconsider Camus's fiction in light of contemporary life. Authors range from fields as diverse as philosophy, French and comparative literature, English, history, gender and women's studies, medicine, medical ethics, feminist bioethics, and medical humanities. Informative and provocative essays were penned at different times over the duration of one year, 2021, within an atmosphere that posed a dangerous and lethal level of political discourse: one of falsehoods, denials, and "alternative facts." This anthology seeks to explain what constitutes the timeliness and timelessness of Camus's fictional plague by drawing on contemporary commentary, prevailing scholarship, and personal observations, interpretation, and (aesthetic) judgments.

First, Steven G. Kellman interrogates the social context of our time in "The Plague and the Present Moment" when American protesters resisted both oppressive government tactics against their civil liberties and expressed demands for racial justice. These actions— during the 2020 presidential election— parallel the Algerian population's war for independence in the 1950s and 1960s. The dissimilarity to Oran's naturally occurring plague— for which no one was held morally responsible— highlighted the autocratic and punitive practices of former president Trump, who exacerbated an already urgent medical situation by denying its importance and calling it a hoax. Both the novel and the 2020 pandemic raise questions about human behavior that ranges from the heroic to the unethical, conspiratorial, and criminal.

The absence of women on the front lines of fighting the plague in Camus's Oran raises the specter of medicine as a masculinized and exclusionary profession at odds with our own contemporary situation. In "Present in Effacement: The Place of Women in Camus's Plague and Ours," Jane E. Schultz notes that the midtwentieth- century context of Algerian society is dominated by Camus's choice of nearly all male characters in the novel: leaders like Dr. Rieux, doctors, workers, and even patients. Women are relegated to marginal roles: maternal, spousal, or desired and distant lover. In contrast, the history of nursing illuminates the role of women who function as risk takers and caregivers in a profession in which they labor as active agents of change and comfort.

Camus's treatment of the arbitrariness and contingency of life— the absurd— leaves us, like many characters in Camus's novel, searching for order and purpose. Andrew Edgar examines the underlying foundations of this loss of control in an essay entitled, "The Meaning of a Pandemic." Invoking

Camus's Myth of Sisyphus from 1955, Edgar contrasts various coping strategies in human behaviors that either acquiesce to the absurdity of existence or find meaning in the challenge the absurd inevitably presents. The influence of phenomenology, particularly the work of Heidegger, informs a reading of The Plague that elucidates the current pandemic.

According to Kathleen Higgins, those impacted by plague or pandemic are naturally afflicted with common psychological symptoms of grief following loss, but also with a sense of anticipatory grief that might be diminished or overcome by means of collective action. In "Grief and Human Connection in The Plague," Higgins casts this sense of expected dread as contributing to one's sense of isolation, exhaustion, and apathy. We, however, like Camus's more heroic characters, can extract ourselves from loss and progress toward healing by working together toward common goals that benefit all.

The erosion of the physician's role as healer when faced with a fast- spreading disease in the absence of any prevention or cure is analyzed by Edward Weiser through a comparison between Dr. Rieux and contemporary medical practice in "Examining the Narrative Devolution of the Physician in Camus's The Plague." Much like the situation in Oran, the current pandemic thwarts medical successes which physicians routinely seek and expect. Comparisons between Dr. Rieux and today's physicians serve to highlight the achievements of medical practice in spite of its limitations.

Cynthia A. Freeland presents Camus's exploration of the multifaceted problem of evil— evidenced as great human suffering— in her essay, "Horror and Natural Evil in The Plague." She probes "zoonotic villains" such as rats and bats which function like monsters (reminiscent of Dracula) as well as Camus's use of natural phenomena like the incessant winds that rattle Oran. These nonhumanmade causes inspire dread, placing the novel in the category of "natural horror" to which Dr. Rieux must respond.

Particular words uttered by both patients on ventilators as well as Black Lives Matter protesters in the streets open a path to interpreting the tragedies of Covid-19 and Camus's plague. An essay by Margaret E. Gray, "'I Can't Breathe': Covid-19 and The Plague's Tragedy of Political and Corporeal Suffocation," recalls the last words spoken by George Floyd on May 25, 2020, that inspired maskwearing protestors to take to the streets by the thousands in the name of justice. The act of breathing, particularly when thwarted, prevented, or denied, functions as a trope for freedom and life— in opposition to oppression, death, and sociopolitical tyranny.

Not everyone faces "modern" death equally, whether in Oran or today's world.65 In the essay, "Modern Death, Decent Death, and Heroic Solidarity in The Plague," Peg Brand Weiser argues that the "difficulty" in Oran of "modern death" as described by Camus is still with us today in that Americans neither faced death together in any form of solidarity under the Trump administration nor faced

death individually in any traditional "decent" manner (as proposed by the character Tarrou), that is, comforted by family or friends. One reason is overwhelming fear of death— what neuroscientists call "existential anxiety"— that can motivate human behavior toward either selfishness or an ethics of care. As a result of lived experiences of the pandemic, a sense of "heroic solidarity" has perhaps finally been achieved that moves us from despair to hope, confirming Camus's faith in humanity.

Conclusion

Within a year of its publication, The Plague had been translated into nine languages; current translations number at least twenty- eight. It is currently a worldwide bestseller with its British publisher, Pelican/ Penguin Classics (now part of Viking Penguin, Penguin Random House, publisher of the original 1948 translation by Stuart Gilbert), struggling to meet demand. A second English translation by Robin Russ appeared in November 2001, with a commentary by Tony Judt noting the relevancy of reading the novel just after the September 11th attack on New York and the Pentagon. A new translation for the original English publisher (Alfred A. Knopf, Inc.) by Laura Marris was begun before the current pandemic and arrived in print in November 2021; she argues that "while Camus was writing for the moment, he was also writing for the future. He knew that his book would be needed again, long after his death, in a context he couldn't predict or imagine." Indeed, an entirely new field of pandemic bioethics has begun.

Readers are invited to engage with Camus's text in new and innovative ways, allowing the fictional flow of events and imaginary human actions to triumph over the facts of the matter, the undeniable truths of our current state of affairs. The plague never really ends; it lies dormant while time passes and while we choose— or not— to address the persistent inequalities and sufferings of a world under siege. Remedies require solidarity and sacrifice, but we can imagine a future when the elimination of exterminators and the safety and health of all victims are realized. "Perhaps with the lockdown we will have some time to reflect about what is real, what is important, and become more human," observed Catherine Camus, seventy- four- year- old daughter of Albert Camus, early in the Covid- 19 pandemic (March 2020). Camus may not have provided the most complete account of how to achieve "a brotherhood of man," but he starts us down a path of self- awareness toward inclusivity and justice when he warns us early on, "no one will ever be free so long as there are pestilences." <>

Reading History in the Roman Empire edited by Mario Baumann and Vasileios Liotsakis [Millennium-Studien / Millennium Studies, de Gruyter, 9783110763782] Open Access

Although the relationship of Greco-Roman historians with their readerships has attracted much scholarly attention, classicists principally focus on individual historians, while there has been no collective

work on the matter. The editors of this volume aspire to fill this gap and gather papers which offer an overall view of the Greco-Roman readership and of its interaction with ancient historians. The authors of this book endeavor to define the physiognomy of the audience of history in the Roman Era both by exploring the narrative arrangement of ancient historical prose and by using sources in which Greco-Roman intellectuals address the issue of the readership of history. Ancient historians shaped their accounts taking into consideration their readers' tastes, and this is evident on many different levels, such as the way a historian fashions his authorial image, addresses his readers, or uses certain compositional strategies to elicit the readers' affective and cognitive responses to his messages. The papers of this volume analyze these narrative aspects and contextualize them within their socio-political environment in order to reveal the ways ancient readerships interacted with and affected Greco-Roman historical prose.

CONTENTS

The twenty-first-century could justifiably be deemed an era that was highly fertile to examining ancient readerships of classical historiography. This is because recent decades have contributed to the liberation of modern scholarship from the nineteenth century's persistently positivist outlook in scrutinizing the "objectivity" of ancient historians, which often led scholars to view them as no more than celebrated exemplars of critical acumen and scientific conscientiousness. As a counterpoise to this, if we try to summarize the prevailing modern perspectives on classical historiography, we can refer toa modern focus on four particular dimensions: (a) the ancient historians' views of the nature of historical development, (b) their goals in preserving the past by writing history, (c) the literary qualities of ancient historical accounts, and (d) the techniques which the ancient historians used in order to disseminate certain ideological and interpretive messages and to create specific emotions in their readers.

The questions emerging from these perspectives cannot be satisfactorily answered unless they are examined against the backdrop of the ancient readership of classical historiography. This is because the ancient historians' views of historical development are closely associated with several features of their readerships (e.g. current philosophical trends, the readers' interests in the past, and their awareness of natural science), while topics such as the literary qualities of classical historiography and the rhetorical strategies which ancient historians used in order to lead their audience towards certain ideological and emotional reactions cannot be fully interpreted if we neglect the readers' mentality, as well as their literary and linguistic competence, as is attested both in the historical works themselves and in theoretical treatises of antiquity.

The present volume applies this perspective of reader-response criticism to the field of historiography during the period of Late Republican and Imperial Rome. The historical texts of the Roman Era area particularly suitable topic for such a reader-oriented approach because of the double expansion which characterizes the development of historical writing in this period: the audiences of historiography widen, and the number of writers in the genre increases. This evolution of the field is well attested, among others by Cicero, Strabo, Dionysius of Halicarnassus and Lucian.

The pleasure – and utility– of reading history

Many chapters of this volume refer to Cicero's comments about the readership of historiography in his own lifetime. This is not only because the Ciceronian corpus provides us with an extraordinary number of explicit statements about the reception of historical writings, which, when they are all taken together, almost assemble a reader-response theory of historiographical texts. Moreover, Cicero's comments on reading history testify to two trends which form the backdrop against which the historians of Late Republican and Imperial Rome write: the audience of such texts has widened, both in number and in its sociological make-up, and reading history for pleasure is an established and, as it seems, common mode of reception. The famous question from Cicero's de Finibus: quid, quod homines infima fortuna, nulla spe rerum gerendarum, opifices denique delectantur historia?,"What of the delight that is taken in history by men of the humblest station, who have no expectation of participating in public life, even mere artisans?", neatly links these two trends– even opifices read history, and they do it for pleasure, as do (according to the same passage of de Finibus) readers in general who are lured by the intrinsic appeal of historiographical accounts: ipsi enim quaeramus a nobis [...] quid historia delectet, quam solemus persequi usque ad extremum: praetermissa repetimus, inchoata persequimur,"Let us ask ourselves the question [...] why we derive pleasure from history, which we are so fond of following up, to the remotest detail, turning back to parts we have omitted, and pushing on to the end when we have once begun".

The pleasure of history is also the focus of Cicero's reasoning in his letter to Lucceius, where he provides an explanation of the basic mechanism behind the delectatio lectoris: the reader is made

involved by a good historical narrative, but he is also kept at a distance; the safety of histemporally and spatially removed position enables him to enjoy the depiction of past events. Or, in the words of Cicero, referring to his consulate which he wants to be treated byLucceius ina historical monograph:

> nihil est enimaptius ad delectationem lectoris quam temporum varietates fortunaeque vicissitudines. quae etsi nobis optabiles in experiendo non fuerunt, in legendo tamen erunt iucundae. habet enim praeteriti doloris secura recordatio delectationem; ceteris vero nulla perfunctis propria molestia, casusautem alienos sine ullo dolor e intuentibus, etiam ipsa misericordia est iucunda.
> Nothing tends more to the reader's enjoyment than varieties of circumstance and vicissitudes of fortune. For myself, though far from desirable in the living, they will be pleasant in the reading; for there is something agreeable in the secure recollection of bygone unhappiness. For others, who went through no personal distress and painlessly survey misfortunes not their own, even the emotion of pity is enjoyable.

The pleasure of praeteriti doloris secura recordatio stands at the core of Cicero's explanation, a point which is remarkably similar to models employed by the modern psychology of reading.

That many Ciceronian passages highlight the aspect of historiographical delectatio does not mean, of course, that reading for utility is absent from the broad spectrum of interactions with historiography that Cicero– or characters in his texts– unfold. Rather, different readers of history who appear in the Ciceronian corpus engage with historiography in distinct and often very personal ways, at times leaning more to one side of the utility versus pleasure debate, but often combining both approaches. We thus hear Antonius claim inde Oratore that he reads Greek historiographers non [...] utilitatem aliquam ad dicendum aucupans, sed delectationis causa, "not because I am on the look-out for aids to oratory, but just for pleasure", while Cicero portrays himself in the Brutus as a reader with a multifaceted interest in historiography: he has read Atticus' Liber annalis, and this rather short summary of Roman history proved to be pleasurable as well as useful because it gave Cicero solace ina moment of crisis and motivated him to take up writing again.

The picture of a diverse audience which emerges from Cicero's texts is mirrored in historiography itself: historical writers of the Roman Era are aware of the existence of multiple kinds of readers and often try to address as many of them as possible. Two telling examples are Strabo and Dionysius of Halicarnassus who explicitly state this aim. Strabo does so when he compares his Geography to his Historical Treatise:

> In short, this work [sc. the Geography] is meant to be both for the man in public life and useful to the common people, Just as was my history. [...] And just as in that earlier work only that which concerned distinguished men and lives was remembered [...], so too here we must leave aside what is small and obscure, and spend time instead with what is renowned and great, or which has practical use, or is easily remembered, or affords pleasure.

Strabo in this self-referential comment combines a wide social definition of his audience with an extensive set of "bonuses" his various readers can expect from his works. In a similar vein, Dionysius of Halicarnassus envisages a broad readership for his Roman Antiquities:

> The form I give my work [...] is a mixture of every form of public eloquence and theoretical reflection, so that those who dedicate themselves to political eloquence, as well as those who are engaged in philosophical contemplation, and (if there are any) those who want only undisturbed amusement when they read history, will find it advantageous.

Again, a historian names a whole range of possible reasons for reading history and promises to cater for all these interests or needs.

Readers turned into writers

Penetrating into the readership of history-writing in the Late Republican and Imperial Eras becomes even more intriguing in light of the fact that the expansion of a historical readership was achieved in such a way that it affected physiognomy of historical literature. Lucian, whose ideas about historical narratives are also exploited in the papers of this volume, reflects in a very illuminating way on how the widening of this historical readership, already pointed out by Cicero in the first century BCE, was consolidated until the second century CE as a dominant and formative parameter of historiography. First, according to Lucian, historians were fully aware of the fact that one of the audience's main motives in reading history is the pursuit of pleasure (Hist. Conscr. 9 – 10). Many authors thus colored their accounts with a laudatory flavor, poetic embellishments, myths, and plenty of other elements which they believed would render their works more attractive to readers (Hist. Conscr. 7– 8,22). Of course, in many cases Lucian's satirical eye is a misleading kaleidoscope of the likely truth, given that he often overstates the practices he wishes fruitful mutual communication contributed to the enrichment of the perspectives of reflection upon historical prose's style and its usefulness in a plethora of communicative situations in the lives of its readers.

Outline of the present volume

The contributions are organized in a chronological order. However, even chapters devoted to different authors or periods are closely linked by a number of common ideas and perspectives. First, many authors of this volume focus on the testimonies offered by the ancient readers themselves in non-historical works, such as treatises into literary theory, commentaries, and satirical prose (cf. especially the contributions by Aurélien Pulice and Pauline Duchêne). Greco-Roman literature offers a variety of passages in which these readers discuss their intellectual and affective reactions to past narratives, the process of reading them, and what they expected from such works with regard to issues of style and reliability. The treatises of literary theory, whose production had begun increasingly to flourish since the Hellenistic Era, can be seen as the first efforts, on the part of readers, to systematically penetrate their own evaluative mechanisms and their interaction with current literary genres, including historiography. These readers, who must have represented the Greek and Roman litterati, composed

works that themselves constituted meta-reception, as it were, in which they aimed to coin terms to describe the emotions experienced by the audience of historical narratives as well as the qualities of the accounts that sparkled those emotional reactions and conveyed certain impressions of a historical work. By exploiting testimonies of this kind, the authors of this volume investigate certain aspects as a procedure (oral recitation, use of past narratives in language courses), which aspects of historical accounts enthused or disappointed, as well as the influence of current intellectual trends on the reception of narratives involving the past.

Some other papers the aforementioned ones the complementary movement "from the text to the reader". This means that they engage in close readings of historical works and explore how these texts imply and "shape" a specific audience. To this end, the authors employing this perspective focus on the use of certain stylistic or narrative techniques which allow a definition of the texts' "imagined readers", and on explicit discussions of the readers' roles in prefaces or similar programmatic passages. In the context of the present volume, three findings are particularly important: (1) the texts analyzed in those studies all imply an active audience. Their narratives involve the reader, their style and programmatic statements call for critical reflection, and in the case of Pliny's letters (cf. Ari Zatlin's contribution) it is even up to the reader to history in the first place. (2) The writers of history consciously exploit the widening of for historical texts in Republican and Imperial Rome, be it to make full use of the enlarged readership, as in Livy's case (cf. Dennis Pausch's contribution), Or to deliberately restrict the audience, as Sallust does (cf. Edwin Shaw's chapter). (3) Even texts which do not present the reader with a historical narrative may take up these "historiographical" modes of appealing to and activating the reader, in order to create their own.

Moreover, most contributors share the belief that the "implied reader" of historiography in (and of) the Roman Empire is an active one who is willing to engage with the text. In this respect, special emphasis is laid on what is arguably the strongest form of involving the readers, i.e. stirring. Chapters as e.g. Dennis Pausch's, George Baroud's and Vasileios Liotsakis' study a broad spectrum of affective responses which the texts stimulate; they range from feelings of insecurity and suspicion to sheer pleasure of reading. In doing so, these contributions show that the emotional reactions elicited by the texts form an inextricable part of the historians' strategies to make understand the historical processes.

Special attention is also paid to those cases in which readerly expectations dictated the authors of historical narratives to adopt manifold authorial masks. It is true that writing history in the Roman Empire was in many respects affected by concern fora number of readerly demands. The treatises, for example, of literary theory reflect, if anything, on how literate a fashion readers expected historians and biographers to compose their works. Simultaneously, Roman monarchy imposed one further, and far more peremptory, agenda of what was "allowed" to be written down or not, and of how everything

was supposed to be written. These, sometimes dangerous, readerly demands were to be respected especially by authors of non-Roman origins, who struggled through their accounts to defend their cultural identity while also showing the highest respect to their Roman readerships. The authors of this volume (especially Vasileios Liotsakis and Adam M. Kemezis) make the case that ancient historians and biographers took into serious consideration all these readerly expectations and defined their style and rhetoric on the basis of these demands. One from among their many tools in fulfilling this purpose was the fashioning of a multi-dimensional– and thus flexible– authorial "I", through which authors endeavored to satisfy (cf. e.g. Liotsakis' paper) or, sometimes, to play (cf. Kemezis' contribution) in provoking way tastes.

Last, two papers (those of Marine Miquel and Christoph G. Leidl) focus on descriptions or narrations of spaces (both in a geographical and topographical sense) in Latin historical texts. They explore the relation of such depictions to the texts' audiences by reconstructing the ancient readers' "horizon of expectations" (H.R. Jauss) as and topography, thereby allowing them to interpret the specific– and, for modern readers, often peculiar– ways in which Roman historiography refers to spaces and places as strategies to engage with ancient audiences' expectations. These two contributions converge in one main result: historiographical descriptions or narrations of spaces mirror the experience of their Roman readers visà-vis the growing (cf. Miquel's chapter) or contested empire (cf. Leidl's contribution), and thus offer an interpretation of the contemporary state of affairs.

Here are the summaries of the papers: in his contribution, Edwin Shaw explores the idea that the form and content of Sallust's works imply– and construct– a particular audience of their own. Against the context of a fairly wide audience for various forms of historical writing in the late Republic, Sallust deliberately restricts access to his texts to an intellectual and political elite. He does so by setting up various "barriers to entry" within the text itself: (1) he emphasizes the difficulty of reading his works and thus explicitly problematizes the role of the audience; (2) he uses a difficult style characterized by broken syntax, a fondness for antithesis, archaic vocabulary and above all extreme breviates; (3) by selecting Thucydides as a literary model, he marks off his texts as something which requires serious and sustained consideration; (4) he opens his monographs with prefaces whose content configures the texts right from the beginning as being aimed at a philosophically engaged audience. In light of these findings, Shaw concludes that the restriction of Sallust's audience to an educated elite serves to distinguish its lessons from the didactic model of Latin annales and exemplary memorialization, in order to highlight the need for critical reflection on the historical content, and tolink it intoa wider intellectual context, for example to texts such as Cicero's philosophy, which formed part of a contemporary literary exploration of Republican values.

Marine Miquel focuses on geographical descriptions in Latin historical works of the first century BCE. She reaches a twofold conclusion. First, she suggests that the historical texts of this century were

intended for an audience who was no longer the political elite, but who consisted of a broader part of the general population. The latter now had access to common ethno-geographical knowledge which was conveyed by texts, by orally transmitted information, by the images located all over the cities, and by spectacles like funeral or triumphal processions. Miquel contends that the spatial depictions in historical works were destined for the , and therefore that they contained the same common ethno-geographical knowledge. Historians seemed thus to try to shape their descriptions to fit to the expectations of their audience. Second, Miquel points out that both Roman and Italian audiences were eager to be told about unknown territories and longed for marvelous depictions, but also deep interest for the new world that had been built by Roman conquest and most of all by the new ways of representing and looking at it. Ethno-geographical depictions were thus written by historians as a means to understand better the new setting of the world. They no longer taught the elite how to rule the empire; they rather offered to a broader audience debates and questions on the role that spaces had in the realization of Roman conquest and its future.

In his chapter on Livy's Ab urbe condita, Dennis Pausch takes a close look at how Livy narrates of the past and, in doing so, addresses the question of what kind of reader Livy had in his mind as the ideal counterpart in his conversation with his audience. Livy's narration of Hannibal's crossing of the Alps asa model case, Pausch shows that the historian wrote for an "imagined reader" who wanted to gain useful knowledge from his reading of historiography as well as the pleasure of being involved in a good story. To both ends of utility and pleasure, Livy uses, as Pausch demonstrates, narrative techniques which activate the reader and make him wonder about the future course of events: by shifting the object of focalization, Livy invites the reader to adopt the perspective of different characters or groups, especially the Carthaginians, while strongly focalized previews into the narrative future are meant to unsettle the reader and to shake his confidence about the assuredly "happy ending" of the story he is reading. In both cases, the resulting involvement in the narrative leads to pleasure, but it also enhances the understanding of history by teaching the reader about what in history is contingent and what perhaps is not.

Aurélien Pulice investigates how Thucydides was received by the Greco-Roman readership during the Julio-Claudian dynasty. His paper examines the commentary of the History that is preserved inP. Oxy. 853 of the second century CE, and whose prototype is dated in the period between the very end of the first century BCE and the first decades of the second century CE. In light of the Byzantine scholia on Thucydides' work, Pulice estimates that the author of this relatively unexplored commentary deviated from the traditional interest in grammatical issues and transferred the focal point of interest to the rhetorical aspects of Thucydides' style. Drawing from both Greek and Latin sources of the period, Pulice contextualizes the rhetorical orientation of the commentary in question and propounds the stimulating idea that the exemplifies a general shift of Thucydides' readership's interest in that period towards the rhetoric dimension of his style and its utility as a prototype in the procedure of

acquainting oneself with the Attic language both in schools of rhetoric and generally in educational circles. As is the case with most ancient commentaries, the of P. Oxy. 853, being written by an educated reader of Thucydides and addressed to scholars and young students, reflects the way in which the interests of Thucydides' readership influenced the development of scholarly treatises on his work.

Pauline Duchêne broadens the scope beyond the reception of the fifth-century BCE historians and examines how Seneca satirizes in his Apocolocyntosis Divi Claudii the of keeping up with current readerly demands in terms of reliability. Seneca programmatically explains to his readers that he will narrate the events pertaining to Claudius' end and what happened to him after his death. Although the Apocolocyntosis isa non-historical work, Seneca fashions himself as a caricature of contemporary historiographers, mocking their current typical declarations about their methodological pedantry and informative validity. The satirical attitude of Seneca as well as of other litterati of the Roman age (such as Tacitus and Lucian) against the ancient historians' pompous schemes of self-fashioning betray the current readership's familiarity with the fact that Greco-Roman historians, despite the traditional practice of emphasizing the validity of their accounts, were far from reliable informants.

 analyzes the intersection between epistolography and historiography in Pliny's Letters. The key passage of his close reading of Pliny's text isa programmatic statement from the collection's opening letter: collegi non servato temporis ordine (neque enim historiam componebam), sed ut quaeque in manus venerat ("I have collected [the letters] here not as a slave to chronology – since I'm not writing history– but as each one came into my hands." Zatlin interprets this sentence as an expression of how to read the letters as a whole. In a first step, he shows that this opening statement contains a strong allusion to Ovid's Epistulae ex Ponto, by which Pliny establishes his prose letters to be considered as a kind of poetry, and to be read not in isolation, but as a whole and polished book. Zatlin then turns to the effects of Pliny's rejection of historiography: letters like 6.16 and 6.20 (Pliny's account of hisuncle's death on Vesuvius),taken on their own, stand as a kind of history; but when placed within their sequence, they betray their form as epistles, and in doing so, potentially withhold the notoriety, truth, and fame that they presented on first and separated inspection. Audiences, however, may take up the Letters, respond to them, and read and create from them a history that was never written. And this, Zatlin contends, is precisely what Pliny's epistolography calls for.

Tacitus' Annals and its infamously difficult language are the focus of George Baroud's chapter. Taking Tacitus' depiction of the "accession" of Tiberius (Annals 1.7) as a case study, Baroud zeroes in on three kinds of ambiguities: ambiguous chronology (the distortion of time), ambiguous grammatical constructions, and ambiguous diction. He argues that the resulting text is deliberately confusing, and even deceptive – a puzzle that "reproduces" for the audience feelings of insecurity, ignorance, and suspicion that highlight the paranoia and confusion felt by contemporaries at this transitional and

deeply uncertain moment in Roman history. Based on ancient theories of vividness – enargeia –, Baroud's proposition is that certain details and intricacies of Tacitus' language reflect andrecreate the atmosphere of the time-periods in question, and are all designed to create a text so intensely vivid that the audience becomes implicated in the narrative itself. Thus, this style compels the audience to become active participants in the text and to undergo an analogous mental and emotional process to those which are experienced by the historical subjects themselves (as Tacitus presents them). Baroud concludes by contending that we must imagine both a private, solitary readership and a public audience listening to historical literature at recitations. He offers some examples of how these diverse modes of consuming historical literature might have conditioned the ways in which the historical writings were received.

In a second chapter devoted to Tacitus, Christoph G. Leidl analyzes the importance of the focalization of space in Tacitus' Histories. He highlights two main aspects of the Histories' narrative strategy: the spatial organization of the content is reflected in the narrative organization of the literary work, and multiple overlaying perspectives invite the reader and/or spectator to reflect on the narrative. The first effect is visible at the beginning of the Histories, where Tacitus hints at the limits of the annalistic scheme: it becomes more and more difficult to mirror the structure of Roman history in the structure of a literary text. His vision is that of a circle of provinces around a dominating, but no longer indisputable, Rome. Rather than the centre of power, Rome stands at the centre of narratorial perspective. Tacitus does not try to make chronological simultaneity the basic structuring principle of the book, but rather the spatial outline of the empire: events are presented to the reader's eye as they affect the city of Rome. This focalization points to a reader who is sitting in Rome and whose experience of state affairs in his own time is mirrored by Tacitus in his book. A pertinent example of the second effect is Vitellius' visit of the battlefield near Cremona in Tac.Hist. 2.70– 71.1: here, the reader is led to see the battlefield from three different points of view at the same time (Vitellius, his generals, the soldiers; as well as possibly the Cremonans too), none of which can be seen as the correct one. Moreover, Tacitus leaves it to the audience to pass their judgement on the intra-textual observers of the scene, all of whom will be consigned to a sorry destruction.

Vasileios Liotsakis examines Flavius Arrian's Anabasis of Alexander. Liotsakis' main point of argument is that Arrian often composes the account of one and the same event by fashioning for himself multiple authorial persona in order to satisfy simultaneously a number of different, and very often colliding, readerly expectations. Liotsakis organizes his study in four sections pertaining to (a) the Homeric elements of the work, (b) geographical data, (c) the criticisms of Alexander, and (d) the exploitation of myth. On all these levels, Arrian very carefully seeks to render his work a multiply targeting composition, an effort which resembles and stems in many respects from the practices of the Second Sophistic rhetoricians who rendered their speeches attractive to as many listeners as possible from among their audiences.

Adam M. Kemezis takes the crux of the identity of Historia Augusta's author and the work's generic peculiarities as starting points for an original, reader-oriented approach of the work. Historia Augusta, a collection of thirty bioi of Roman emperors and carrying the signature of six authors, has been the object of intense scholarly dispute mainly with regard to the identity of its author(s), with the most prevailing view being that the work is the product of a single author, who hides behind the fiction of multiple scriptures. Kemezis addresses the question of how ancient readers engaged with this puzzle concerning the origins and physiognomy of the work in the process of reading it. Kemezis proposes two hypothetical stages of reading HA: the first stage is that of initial contact. At this phase, readers will leaf through the codex and look for the contents and authors by selectively focusing on the incipits, explicate, and potential headings of each section. In this way, they are very soon faced with intriguing questions pertaining to the work (second stage): it was composed by more than one author, and, equally interestingly, it includes the lives of non-canonical emperors. As Kemezis puts it, "understanding how a text like the HA worked in its historical milieu can illuminate what people in that milieu thought of the relationship of literature to politics in constructing and deconstructing an authoritative past and indeed of the Roman monarchy itself as a continuing but ever-changing political institution". <>

City of Caesar, City of God: Constantinople and Jerusalem in Late Antiquity edited by Konstantin M. Klein and Johannes Wienand [Millennium Studies in the Culture and history of the first millennium C.E., De Gruyter, ISBN 9783110717204] Open Access

When Emperor Constantine triggered the rise of a Christian state, he opened a new chapter in the history of Constantinople and Jerusalem. In the centuries that followed, the two cities were formed and transformed into powerful symbols of Empire and Church. For the first time, this book investigates the increasingly dense and complex net of reciprocal dependencies between the imperial center and the navel of the Christian world. Imperial influence, initiatives by the Church, and projects of individuals turned Constantinople and Jerusalem into important realms of identification and spaces of representation. Distinguished international scholars investigate this fascinating development, focusing on aspects of art, ceremony, religion, ideology, and imperial rule. In enriching our understanding of the entangled history of Constantinople and Jerusalem in Late Antiquity, **City of Caesar, City of God** illuminates the transition between Antiquity, Byzantium, and the Middle Ages.

CONTENTS

Constantinople & Jerusalem in Late Antiquity: Problems – Paradigms – Perspectives

In the early fourth century AD, the city of Byzantium looked back on an urban history spanning almost a millennium: Greek colonists from Mega ra had founded the city in the first half of the seventh century BC. From the Archaic era to the Roman imperial period, however, the city had remained on the fringes of the larger power blocs, its geopolitical significance being largely defined by its location on the Bosporus, the maritime entrance to the Black Sea. The urban development of the city of Byzantium had always been limited, and it had never in any particular way been connected to the city of Aelia Capitolina in the province of Palestine, an even older city that was located about 1,200 Roman miles away in a different peripheral region of the vast Empire. In the early fourth century AD, the cities of Byzantium and Aelia Capitolina looked back on their own individual and separate millennium-old histories, and yet, at the same time, they faced the beginning of an entirely new era: no other two cities of the late-antique world experienced a more remarkable rise than the cities of Byzantium and Aelia Capitolina. Under their new and renewed names of Constantinople and Jerusalem, they rose to become the most

important hubs of both the Christian Empire and the Church for centuries to come, and they were interconnected in an increasingly dense and complex net of reciprocal dependencies. The intensifying links between the two cities were reflected in the mid-620s by Theodore the Syncellus, an attentive observer who even saw in the capital of the Byzantine Empire 'the figure and the example of old Jerusalem'.

The impulse for this momentous and far-reaching development was given by the Emperor Constantine. In AD 326, he ordered the re-foundation of the city of Byzantium on the Bosporus, and only four years later, Constantinople was established as a new imperial residence. Initially, the city of Constantinople was an urban symbol, promulgating the lasting peace after the decisive military victory of Constantine over his remaining rival to the imperial throne. Over the years and decades that followed, the city transformed into the most important center of the Empire and for centuries served as the vibrant capital of the Byzantine Empire. Constantine also encouraged the construction of the first monumental churches in and around Aelia Capitolina / Jerusalem – a region that slowly but steadily transformed into the Christian Holy Land over the next centuries. The evolving Christian topography of the Biblical lands represented the power of Constantine 's newly adopted Christian religion. Jerusalem, with the imperially founded Church of the Holy Sepulcher (consecrated in 335) at its heart eventually became a theological reference point of both the Christian Empire and the Church.

Throughout late antiquity, the two cities were constantly transforming (and transformable) spaces of religious-political interaction between the monarch, the Church, and the population of the Empire. Imperial influence, initiatives by the Church, and projects by individuals transformed and reshaped both these significant urban centers into intertwined symbols of imperial and divine power and triumph. Constantinople and Jerusalem thus became important Christian realms of memory and identity as well as central places for Roman imperial representation and legitimation. The most vivid manifestation is to be found in the imperial building program and the development of sacred topographies in the two cities, but also in the translation of relics, in the imperial ceremonial, in the Church calendar, in the symbolic and pictorial idiom of the monarchy, and in pilgrimage. Each of the two cities, however, would run under their distinct frameworks with their own sets of rules for social interaction, communication, conflict resolution, ritual, and discourse. Presumably the most important factor reinforcing a fundamental asymmetry between the two cities was the emperor's almost continuous presence in Constantinople, but absence in Jerusalem: Heraclius in AD 630 was the first Christian emperor to visit the Holy Land – no less than three centuries after the implementation of the first imperial Church building projects in Jerusalem.

The chapters collected in this volume aim to shed light on the late-antique histories of these two cities, their roles for both the Roman monarchy and the Christian Church, their ideological impact, and their unique relationship of mutual influence and independent development. The individual chapters pursue a comparative approach, illuminating the reciprocal relations and interdependencies of Constantinople and Jerusalem in their late-antique contexts: To confine the role of Constantinople to the political and of Jerusalem to the religious sphere would not do justice to the complexity of both cities. Whereas the importance of religion in Constantinople is obvious, it is more difficult to answer the question as to how political (or politicized) late-antique Jerusalem actually was and how the character of the two cities changed over time.

The volume examines the roles and perceptions of Constantinople and Jerusalem from a range of different perspectives and various disciplines. An introductory section (Part One: The Centers of a New World Order), with two complementary chapters, locates both cities in their distinct, yet interconnected, late-antique contexts, while the chapters in the subsequent sections cover archaeology and urbanism (Part Two: Urban Topographies Connected), the role of religio-political ideologies (Part Three: The Power of Religion and Empire), and the rising importance of eschatology on the eve of the Arab conquests, including the historic reverberations of imperial entrances to the Holy City up until the 20th century (Part Four: Jerusalem, Constantinople and the End of Antiquity).

In order to understand how the individual parts of this book approach the late-antique cities of Jerusalem and Constantinople within this transformation of world-historical significance and how the individual chapters relate to one another, it will be useful to provide brief outlines of their aims and methods and to introduce their themes and arguments.

Part One: The Centers of a New World Order

The two chapters that form the opening section of this volume provide the basic historical framework. They investigate the long-term developments, and analyze the forces that shaped the late-antique metropolis of Constantinople on the one hand and the Holy Land with Jerusalem as its religious center on the other. The first of the two chapters presents a thorough study of the history of the Holy Land that reevaluates the imperial influence exercised in the Holy City and its surroundings, while the second meticulously investigates the rise of Constantinople with particular attention paid to its relation to Jerusalem.

In the first chapter, Kai Trampedach draws a careful picture of the development and growth of Christian Jerusalem, firmly locating these processes within their Roman imperial context ('The Making of the Holy Land in Late Antiquity'). While for many Christians, and certainly for the emperor Constantine, it must have been clear that Jerusalem was and had always been a very special place, Trampedach shows that the parameters of the city's rise were confined within established traditions and models. This analysis provides an important reminder that while Jerusalem was conceived as the city of God, it became a city of the Caesars as well, who did lend their support to this religious center, but according to the same rules that applied for other cities in the late Roman Empire. At the same time, Trampedach's contribution on the city of Jerusalem firmly introduces important themes for the remaining volume, namely the rise of pilgrimage and desert monasticism, church constructions, as well as the capturing of the city by the Sasanians and the Arabs.

Rene Pfeilschifterinvestigates the political and religious impact of the new capital on the Bosporus and its complex relationship to Jerusalem ('Always in Second Place: Constantinople as an Imperial and Religious Center in Late Antiquity'). Constantinople became the center of the (East) Roman socio-political system which was characterized by an almost unbreakable bond between city and emperor. Pfeilschifter shows that, for Constantinople, being the city of Caesar went hand in hand with aspiring to become the city of God as well. As Constantinople lacked a distinctly pagan or Jewish character (as in Rome or Jerusalem respectively), an infusion of Christian elements faced fewer obstacles than elsewhere, and an important stimulus was the fact that the inhabitants of Constantinople persistently constituted themselves as a Christian community. In the process of becoming a city of God, Constantinople took more than it gave: It imported relics, eschatological meaning, and finally even the True Cross. Jerusalem received less in

return, as Pfeilschifter shows. Above all, it did not become a political or administrative center. While Constantinople assumed functions that originally or primarily belonged to Jerusalem, the opposite did not occur. In fact, Constantinople did not become a model for any other city. In spite of all the importance and all the originality of its development, its political power was seen as having been transferred from Rome. Likewise, Constantinople's growing holiness and its importance for salvation only resulted in a Second, New Jerusalem.

Part Two: Urban Topographies Connected

Proceeding from the insights gained by Trampedach and Pfeilschifter in the opening chapters, the three case studies of the second section cast a close look at the urban, art historical, and archaeological developments in Constantinople and Jerusalem.

In their jointly written assessment of the late-antique city walls of Constantinople and Jerusalem, Neslihan Asutay-Effenberger and Shlomit Weksler-Bdolah start from close surveys of the construction methods, building techniques, and defensive qualities of the walls – both case studies are based on extensive archaeological fieldwork ('Delineating the Sacred and the Profane: The Late-Antique Walls of Jerusalem and Constantinople'). Both authors revise previous scholarly assumptions on the structure and chronology of the fortification systems. From there, the contribution tackles questions concerning the role of patronage for the walls and, in particular, what it meant for the population of Constantinople and Jerusalem that their cities became fortified. The contribution discusses the structural similarities and differences between the two fortification systems. It is striking that Jerusalem's walls deliberately incorporated largely unchanged and highly visible building blocks from dismantled Jewish structures, which were obviously meant to demonstrate the victory of Christianity over Judaism and to underline the founder's piety. The walls of Constantinople, on the other hand, were instead meant to express security and imperial power. Thus, the walls of the two cities delineate two different but complementary notions of the Christian monarchy.

In investigating the infrastructure that connected Constantinople with Jerusalem and vice versa, Marlena Whiting employs the concept of 'braided systems ' ('From the City of Caesar to the City of God: Routes, Networks, and Connectivity Between Constantinople and Jerusalem'). As she demonstrates, a complex interplay of three key needs brought about and maintained the communication networks between the imperial and the holy city: the needs of the imperial administration and the military; the need to ensure the movement of goods and trade; and the need newly arising in the fourth century of ensuring the safety and comfort of pilgrims. The roads to Jerusalem served pilgrims so well because they connected theatres of military activity and trade nodes, because they were maintained for transport of important raw materials and money, and because they were also needed to feed the capital, including products such as the holy wine of Palestine.

In his contribution, Konstantin Kleincasts a close look at the presence of saints as well as living holy men and women in the cities of Constantinople and Jerusalem ('Neighbours of Christ: Saints and their Martyriain Constantinople and Jerusalem'). Holy places commemorating the life and passion of Christ took a paramount role in Jerusalem from the beginning, but (in stark contrast to Constantinople) there were no churches and almost no private memorial sites for saints in Jerusalem before the mid-fifth century, and no attempts to incorporate living holy men and women within its walls. Then the situation changed rather suddenly: Klein shows that it was Constanti nopolitan influence in Jerusalem, namely the

sojourn of the empress Eudocia, which brought the cult of saints back to the Holy City that once had produced Christianity's first martyr, St Stephen. With the construction of the first church to him between 438 and 460, Jerusalem's ecclesiastical landscape opened up to martyriafor saints, and Eudocia's endeavors were soon to be extensively imitated by other inhabitants of Jerusalem. At the same time, Eudocia also left her footprint on the urban topography of Constantinople. This set the stage for reciprocal influence of Christian topography between the Holy Land and the imperial capital on the Bosporus.

Kai Trampedach's contribution on the Ju stinianic Nea Church further explores this theme, focusing on one of the most ambitious imperial building programs in the history of Jerusalem (' A New Temple of Solomon in Jerusalem? The Construction of the Nea Church (531 – 543) by Emperor Justinian'). In this chapter, Trampedach examines the religious and political dimensions of the urban refurbishment in Justinianic times. Through a trenchant analysis of the archaeological remains and literary sources, Tr ampedach carves out the symbolic meaning of the edifice. Since the church did not highlight a locality of salvific history, our understanding of its position within the dense sacred topography of the Holy City depends on its spatial references and its embedment within the religious calendar of Jerusalem, among others. The analysis shows that the building was meant to compete not only with the Constantinian structures, but even with King Solomon's temple. As Trampedach is able to show, Justinian's building activities in the Holy Land also served specific political and religious aims in the center of imperial rule in Constantinople.

Part Three: The Power of Religion and Empire

The third part of the volume focuses on the ecclesiastical, political, and symbolic meaning of Constantinople and Jerusalem.

In his contribution, JohannesWienand examines two of the earliest literary sources we have concerning the Constantinian re-foundations of Jerusalem and Constantinople: two orations by the bishop Eusebius of Caesarea, one given in 335 in the course of the inauguration ceremonies for the Constantinian basilica in Jerusalem, the other given in 336 in the imperial palace of Constantinople on the occasion of the festivities for the thirtieth jubilee of Constantine 's reign (' Eusebiu s in Jerusalem and Constantinople: Two Cities, Two Speeches'). Both speeches deal with the ramifications of the Constantinian religious transformation for the Roman monarchy in a religiously heterogeneous empire. As the differences in character between the two speeches clearly show, the two cities of Jerusalem and Constantinople played diverging but complementary roles in the imperial concept of a Christian monarchy on the one hand and in the interpretations by a Christian bishop on the other. A close examination of the two speeches in their ceremonial contexts sheds light on the earliest phase of the formation of a Christian Roman Empire and the two single most important cities of the new era.

Nadine Viermann's contribution shows how references to Old Testament Jerusalem were exploited for the political discourse in sixth-century Constantinople ('Surpassing Solomon: Church-Building and Political Discourse in Late Antique Constantinople '). In particular, King Solomon (as the builder of the First Temple) was used as a role model and point of reference for the staging of a distinct imperial self-perception. Viermann employs the example of the church of St Polyeuctus, built by Juliana Anicia, to show how the building's various semantic levels demonstrate the imperial aspirations of its founder. The contribution does not only discuss the famous epigram inscription with its explicit references to King

Solomon but also places St Polyeuctus in the context of Prophet Ezekiel 's temple vision and of the contemporary eschatological expectations of the sixth century. This subversive and presumptuous concept of St Poly euctus is contrasted with Emperor Justinian's reactions to Juliana's provocation that also took on the shape of explicit references to the Biblical king. The contribution shows that Solomon served as a multifaceted bearer of meaning in various communicative contexts. We can thus observe the creation of a topospredominated by the aspect of surpassing the Old Testament king and his Temple.

The chapter by Jan-Markus Kötteranalyzes the impact the Council of Chalcedon (451) had on the status and standing of the Church of Jerusalem within the imperial church system ('Palestine at the Periphery of Ecclesiastical Politics? The Bishops of Jerusalem after the Council of Chalcedeon'). The outcome of the Council enabled Jerusalem to compete with the most important players within the empire-wide church hierarchy (Rome, Constantinople, Alexandria, Antioch). However, prestige and relevance were not precisely fixed but subject to a broad spectrum of negotiation processes. To understand the quest of the Jerusalem church for empire-wide recognition of privileged status, Kö tter focuses in particular on the relations between Jerusalem and Constantinople, since the support of the imperial court had a crucial impact on the competition for authority and competences within the Church. Through an indepth analysis of the relevant power brokers, their social networks, and their communication strategies, Kötter shows that the Church of Jerusalem enforced its claim to pre-eminence vi s-à-vis the emperor on the one hand and the patriarchates on the other within a complex field between the two poles of autonomy and influence.

Part Four: Jerusalem, Constantinople and the End of Antiquity

The fourth part of the volume provides two case studies on the relationship between Constantinople and Jerusalem on the eve of the Arab expansion and an analysis of the historic reverberations of imperial entrances to the Holy City up until the 20th century.

Paul Magdalino's contribution analyzes the political and religious significance of the Church of St John the Apostle situated between the Hippodrome and the Hagia Sophia in Constantinople ('The Church of St John the Apostle and the End of Antiquity in the New Jerusalem'). The building process was begun under Phokas (602 – 610) and finished by Hera clius (602 – 641). It was the last recorded major religious foundation in Constantinople before the ninth century, and the last new construction of a major, free-standing public church. In more ways than one, therefore, it marks the end of late antiquity and early Christianity in Constantinople. Furthermore, the church was built in a distinctive form at a central and prestigious location. All this raises compelling questions about the motivation behind the remarkable edifice and the choice of its patron saint. Magdalino conclusively shows how all emperors of the early Byzantine era shared a strategy to accumulate relics and to increase the sacred status of Constantinople in order to transform it into a second Jerusalem and not, as a set of contemporary interpretations suggests, into a second Babylon.

James Howard-Johnston's contribution, on the other hand, analyzes the long-term political and religious repercussions caused by the capture of Jerusalem by Persian forces in spring 614 ('Jerusalem in 630 '). On the Roman side, imperial propaganda focused on the True Cross, which had been seized and removed to the Persian capital. On March 21, 630, H eracliu s staged a carefully orchestrated ceremony in Jerusalem to celebrate his victory in the long, hard-fought, ideologically charged war, by which the emperor finally restored Roman dominion over the eastern provinces and returned the True Cross to

Jerusalem. The emperor tried to use his triumph to bring together the main sectarian factions of the Church, and to bring recalcitrant Jews into the Christian fold. His plans, however, were overtaken by the course of events: the existing world order was challenged by the Arab conquest and its underlying ideology of Holy War. Again the prime focus was Jerusalem, claimed by the Arabs as descendants of Ismael. The cities of Palestine capitulated by the spring of 635 at the latest. Three years later, another solemn ceremony was staged in Jerusalem to receive the second Caliph, Umar I, who was marking Islam's emergence as the new world power.

Lutz Greisigertakes in a diachronic array of entry ceremonies into the Holy City of Jerusalem, starting with Biblical paragons such as Melchizedek and King David, and Jesus Christ's entry to Jerusalem according to the Gospels ('From "King Heraclius, Faithful in Christ" to "Allenby of Armageddon" : Christian Reconquistadores Enter the Holy City'). He defines both entries as epochal and – within their respective narratives – revolutionary acts. More than half a millennium later, Heraclius 's visit to Jerusalem and his restoration of the True Cross can be interpreted as a similarly epochal change with striking eschatological undertones. Greisiger traces the impact of imperial entry ceremonies in Jerusalem throughout the Middle Ages when, e.g. Godfrey of Bouillon's entry into the city in 1099 following the Crusader conquest was clearly meant to emulate Hera clius 's visit. The powerful imagery as well as the political importance the act engendered never became unfashionable, as Greisiger demonstrates in his discussion of the entries into Jerusalem by the Russian Grand Duke Konstantin Nikolayevich, the Austrian Emperor Franz Joseph, the German Emperor Wilhelm II – and in particular the highly symbolic and meticulously planned entry by General Allenby, who in 1917 took possession of the city of Jerusalem on behalf of the British Crown and was again likened to Godfrey of Bouillon. Strikingly, the manifold connections between Jerusalem and Constantinople salient in the late-antique adventus narratives became less important for the Christian 'conquerors' of the modern age.

Taken together, the chapters that make up this volume situate the entangled histories of late-antique Constantinople and Jerusalem in their wider cultural settings. As the City of Caesar and the City of God, Constantinople and Jerusalem are nodal points in a fascinating transition from the ancient Hellenistic and Roman worlds to the more regionalized but still deeply entangled medieval cultures between the Mediterranean and the Middle East. <>

Hellenism, Early Judaism, and Early Christianity: Transmission and Transformation of Ideas edited by Radka Fialová, Jiří Hoblík and Petr Kitzler [Arbeiten zur Kirchengeschichte, De Gruyter, ISBN: 9783110795073]

Papers collected in this volume try to illuminate various aspects of philosophical theology dealt with by different Jewish and early Christian authors and texts (e.g. the Acts of the Apostles, Philo, Origen, Gregory of Nazianzus), rooted in and influenced by the Hellenistic religious, cultural, and philosophical context, and they also focus on the literary and cultural traditions of Hellenized Judaism and its reception (e.g. Sibylline Oracles, Prayer of Manasseh), including material culture ("Elephant Mosaic Panel"

from Huqoq synagogue). By studying the Hellenistic influences on early Christianity, both in response to and in reaction against early Hellenized Judaism, the volume intends not only to better understand Christianity, as a religious and historical phenomenon with a profound impact on the development of European civilization, but also to better comprehend Hellenism and its consequences which have often been relegated to the realm of political history.

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The individual papers collected in this volume are united by their aim to illuminate the links between Hellenism, early Judaism, and early Christianity. The interconnection of these phenomena defies holistic analysis due to the breadth of the topic; nevertheless, individual case studies can help us grasp different aspects of such ties and answer the question of the impact of Hellenism on the development of early Judaism and early Christianity. This question is rooted in an understanding of Hellenism as an epoch of Greek influence upon the Mediterranean and the Near East as a result of the expansion of Alexander the Great, exerted until the end of the Hellenistic empires and the beginning of Octavian's monarchist rule. However, we need first to emphasize the complex nature of the cultural exchange between these areas: the cultural impulses brought by Alexander vastly transcended the Peloponnese perspective, and in this regard the word "Hellenism" does not fully correspond to such complexity. By "post-Hellenism", a term used occasionally in this book but not yet fully and firmly established, we understand not a

historical epoch but rather a sphere in which the secondary consequences of Hellenization are to be found, visible in action, for instance, in the evolution of early Christianity; we also use this term to indicate the continuity between Hellenism and later times. By studying the Hellenistic influences on early Christianity, both in response to and in reaction against early Hellenized Judaism, we intend not only to better understand Christianity as a religious and historical phenomenon with a profound impact on the development of European civilization, but also to better comprehend Hellenism and its consequences, which have often been relegated to the realm of political history.

Most of the studies in this book are based upon the selected papers delivered at "Hellenism, Early Judaism, and Early Christianity: Transmission and Transformation of Ideas", an international conference held in Prague on September 12-13, 2019, and organized by Radka Fialová, Jiri Hoblík and Petr Kitzler, who immediatelly afterwards began preparing this volume. This conference was attended by some twenty-five speakers, not only from Western, Eastern and Central Europe but also from further afield, such as from Argentina, Hong Kong, and the USA, its main objective being to investigate individual topics from the field of early Judaism and Christianity in the context of the Hellenistic and post-Hellenistic period, especially with regard to the history of thought. Both the conference and this volume contribute to a three-year project, funded by the Czech Science Foundation, researched by a team from the Centre for Classical Studies at the Institute of Philosophy of the Czech Academy of Sciences. It is worth mentioning that within this grant-aided project the research team has also been working on the interdisciplinary "Encyclopaedia of Hellenism, post-Hellenism and early Christianity": this encyclopaedia, currently in an early phase of its development, aims to gather current knowledge in the field in the form of extensive entries, scholarly yet accessible not only to experts but also to the Czech public in general, and to boost Czech research into Hellenism, which despite its steady pursuit has been somewhat fragmentary.

To give just some examples of this long-term interest, there is the monograph Recke dedictviv Orientu (Greek Heritage in the Orient; Praha: OIKOYMENH, 1993), by one of the most prolific Czech biblical scholars, Petr Pokorny (1933-2020), which summarizes the political, philosophical and religious development during the Hellenistic epoch. Petr Pokorny was also one of the founders of the interdisciplinary Centre for Biblical Studies, a joint research facility of today's Centre for Classical Studies at the Institute of Philosophy, CAS, and the Protestant Theological Faculty of Charles University in Prague. For nearly thirty years, this Centre and its researchers have been striving to bridge the sometimes artificially fabricated gap between biblical scholarship, a broad conception of early Christian theology, and classical studies, and the present book can be considered one of the fruits of this endeavour. Petr Pokorny died in January 2020, just a few months after the conference at which he delivered his short paper which, thanks to the kind permission of his family, is posthumously printed in this volume. Unfortunately, in January 2021 he was followed by another Czech pioneer in the study of Hellenism, the doyen of Czech classical philology and an eminent historian of Antiquity, Pavel Oliva (1923-2021), who himself devoted two monographs to the history of Hellenism and its context: Recko mezi Makedonií a Rimem (Greece between Macedonia and Rome; Praha: Academia, 1995) and Svet helénismu (The World of Hellenism; Praha: Arista, 2001). It is to the memory of these two great scholars that we dedicate this volume.

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The chapters in this book are arranged into two slightly overlapping thematic sections. The first section comprises papers illuminating different aspects of philosophical theology dealt with by different Jewish and Christian authors and texts, rooted in and influenced by the Hellenistic cultural and philosophical context; the second section features studies focused on the Jewish literary and cultural tradition and its reception.

The book opens with a study by Jiri Hoblík (Prague) on Philo and the concept of "power(s)" present in his vast oeuvre. Hoblík persuasively demonstrates the philosophical background of Philo's multifaceted understanding of this notion, in this respect correcting the position held by David Runia. As also well documented in Hoblik's paper, this also provides the philosophical grounding, drawn from various philosophical traditions of Antiquity and transformatively employed to meet Philo's concept of monotheism, which can be seen to underlie his preference for the Greek over the Septuagint's when speaking about "power"; Hoblík also analyses this issue with reference to Philo's attitude to the concept of God's power found in the Torah. For Philo, as Hoblik concludes, the term "power" combines primarily cosmogonic and cosmological but also historical and anthropological elements.

The paper by Ana Carolina Delgado (Los Polvorines, Argentina) also deals with Philo. She focuses on the passage in Philo's Quod Deus sit immutabilis (51-69) in which the Alexandrian seems to deviate from his usual allegorical method of scriptural interpretation and prefers to cling to the literal meaning of the story of God's regret for having created people as recorded in Gen 6:1-8. As Delgado shows in an in-depth analysis, Philo's approach in this instance is most probably influenced by (and to be understood against the background of) Plato's account of "beneficial falsehood" found in his second book of the Republic. In following this argumentative strategy of Plato, Philo himself can interpret the anthropomorphisms as falsehoods beneficial to a certain type of reader, false only on a literal level whilst communicating a doctrinal truth.

With the brief essay by Petr Pokorny (Prague), we turn to the beginnings of Christianity: Pokorny ponders the early Christian redefinition of Hellenistic heritage and the attempt to construct a new Christian paradigm by transforming the Hellenistic and Jewish cultural and religious substrates. He uses as exemplar the Acts of the Apostles, especially Paul's speech in Athens (Acts 17), which documents Paul's confrontation with Greek philosophy, and which reveals not only the legacy of Hellenism, but also a significant tension opposing it.

With the paper by Jan Kozlowski (Warsaw) we stay on that same track leading to the very foundations of the Christian paradigm, to the message of Christ's resurrection conveyed by Lukan Paul in his famous Areopagus speech mentioned above (Acts 17:22-31). As Kozlowski shows, the overall contents of this speech and its grand finale announcing Christ's is only seemingly in discord, since from the beginning Luke alludes to this event through a subtle net of literary and cultural allusions deeply rooted in the shared classical tradition. Kozlowski not only unravels them but also offers possible explanations for this Lukan strategy.

Damian Mrugalski (Krakow) presents an overview of the concept of infinity from the Presocratics through Plato, Aristotle and Middle Platonism to Philo and the Greek Christian thinkers of the 2nd and 3rd centuries. He shows how, via Plotinus, Gregory of Nyssa, Augustine and many others, this fundamental philosophical category has evolved, and through the philosophical reflection of the Bible has been transformed, losing its negative connotations, to positively refer to divine infinity.

In her study focused on Origen, to a certain degree summing up her numerous scholarly contributions devoted to the philosophical context of early Christian thought, Ilaria Ramelli (Milan and Durham) shows how this influential Christian theologian and thinker truly embodies the very title of the present volume and the conference upon which it was based. Ramelli abundantly documents how deeply Origen's thinking was rooted in the Greek philosophical tradition and how he applied many of its topics and methods to Christian philosophy and theology, providing in turn novel and original impulses to the development of Christian doctrine. Although Origen disapproved of certain (in his view false) philosophical doctrines, Plato's teaching he considered not only in accord with Christian ideas but his project of "orthodox Christian Platonism" was even conceived by him as a completion of Plato's thought.

Lenka Karfíková (Prague) further illustrates the philosophical background of Christian thought through the example of the arithmological metaphor used for the Trinity in one of the Orationes of Gregory of Nazianzus. While she identifies some similarities of Gregory's account with the speculations found in the Neopythagorean treatise Theologoumena Arithmeticae, an important witness to the influence of the Pythagorean tradition in Late Antiquity, Karfíková — in order to shed further light on the context of Gregory's thinking — also draws our attention to arithmological explanations of biblical texts found across the works of Philo, who himself was called "the Pythagorean" by some early Christian authors.

The second section of this book is opened by Agata Grzybowska-Wiatrak (Warsaw), who focuses on the noted piece of Jewish Second Temple literature, the Sibylline Oracles, specifically on the Titanomachy story found in the third book. Grzybowska-Wiatrak, subscribing to the dating of Sib. Or. 3 to the 1st century BCE and confirming the indebtedness of Titanomachy's account in Sib. Or. 3 to the Book of Jubilees, proposes a new interpretation of the function of this passage by emphasizing the literary dimension of the work, which tends to be overlooked in favour of its religious character.

Next, the paper by Barbara Crostini (Uppsala), focusing on the Prayer of Manasseh, is also grounded in Jewish tradition, or rather, on the ground where Jewish and Christian elements and contexts intertwine to such an extent as to baffle later interpreters in their assessment of this para-biblical text. Taking due note of its different pedagogical uses, Crostini surveys the various occurrences of Manasseh's story from the Didascalia apostolorum through Josephus and 2 Baruch. She ultimately concentrates on the hitherto unpublished 5th-century scholia on the Book of Odes by Hesychios of Jerusalem, also providing glosses on most verses of Manasseh's prayer (printed in the appendix to the paper) including the reference to Manasseh's torture in the bronze bull, which thus represent a conscious continuation of its combined Jewish-Classical exegesis in the Byzantine tradition.

The last two papers, by David Cielontko and Juraj Franek, whom the editors also wholeheartedly thank for their help with reading and editing this volume, focus on material culture. David Cielontko (Prague) deals with the newly discovered "Elephant Mosaic Panel" from Huqoq synagogue. Cielontko carefully examines and scrutinizes recent interpretations of the scenes depicted on the mosaic panel, and offers a new interpretation, suggesting that the mosaic depicts the martyrdom of the Maccabees, recorded in 2 and 4 Maccabees, as seen through the lens of the living collective memory. He also investigates potential issues with the suggested interpretation, such as offering reasons for the mosaic's lack of a mother figure, and corroborates his interpretation by stressing the importance of the Maccabean martyrs' story to the construction of Jewish identity within the context of the changing religious landscape of eastern Lower Galilee in Late Antiquity.

The last paper, by Juraj Franek (Prague and Brno), offers a fresh and original analysis of a Latin Carnuntum defixio, published for the first time in 1926 by Rudolf Egger, which along with a standard invocation of infernal deities, the curse itself being targeted at certain Eudemus, contains two damaged lines in Greek mentioning the "Seal of Solomon". Providing an ample Hellenistic context for the figure of "Solomon the Magician", a victor over demons, Franek proposes a new reading of the damaged Greek two-liner which, according to his emendation, would specify the apotropaic use of the "Seal of Solomon" to protect women during premature birth.

This volume, as a whole, does not pretend to capture in their entirety the complex influences of the Greek intellectual, religious and philosophical traditions upon both early Judaism and early Christianity. However, it is hoped that the studies collected in this book, authored by researchers with differing scholarly and cultural backgrounds and various research foci, convincingly demonstrate how vital the Hellenistic tradition has been to both of these religions, and that when approaching them, their Hellenistic dimension must always be taken into account. <>

THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO RELIGION AND WAR
edited by Margo Kitts [Cambridge Companions to Religion, Cambridge University Press, 9781108835442]

Why is religion intertwined with war and violence? These chapters offer nuanced discussions of the key histories and themes.

This Companion offers a global, comparative history of the interplay between religion and war from ancient times to the present. Moving beyond sensationalist theories that seek to explain why 'religion causes war,' the volume takes a thoughtful look at the connection between religion and war through a variety of lenses - historical, literary, and sociological-as well as the particular features of religious war. The twenty-three carefully nuanced and historically grounded chapters comprehensively examine the religious foundations for war, classical just war doctrines, sociological accounts of religious nationalism, and featured conflicts that illustrate interdisciplinary expressions of the intertwining of religion and war. Written by a distinguished, international team of scholars, whose essays were specially commissioned for this volume, **THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO RELIGION AND WAR** will be an indispensable resource for students and scholars of the history and sociology of religion and war, as well as other disciplines.

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The association of religion with war is as old as our earliest writings from China (Yates 2003) and the Near East (Ballentine 2015) and continues to find expression in contemporary discourse. Despite myriad laments about this association, it is indisputable that religious rhetoric has supported military aims across geographies and historical eras. While there is arguably a propagandistic dimension to some of this rhetoric, there is no good reason to suppose that warriors on the ground have been indifferent to it. For instance, it is well-known that some Christian crusaders were inspired by portents, dreams, prophecies (Housely 2008; Gaposchkin 2017) and by devotional songs (Riley-Smith 1997), and that the same have inspired passionate millennial groups in the USA and abroad (Graziano 1999; Filiu 2011; Barkun 2013; Hegghammer 2017). Even for seemingly secular wars, just war principles rooted at least in part in religious thinking (e.g., Gratian, Aquinas) seep into war's justifications, as do inspirational fighting models based on religious legends (e.g., David, Huseyn, Arjuna). However secular the aims of military leaders today, no astute historian can deny that religion has played a role in shaping the way war has been imagined for centuries. It still does so, as we see in today's strident religious nationalisms. In short, the subject matters.

This volume explores the link of religion with war under four rubrics: classical foundations; just war; religious nationalism; and featured conflicts. Part Ion classical foundations, consisting of eight chapters,

investigates war as conceived at the origins of eight major religious traditions. Part II addresses just war theories as lodged in religious thinking, and Part III treats various expressions of religious nationalism, a subject with special relevance to contemporary times. Part IV features conflicts that illustrate interdisciplinary approaches to religion and war, touching on rituals, poems, piety, fierce goddesses, messianic rebellions and autonomous fighting groups thriving outside the margins of the Mughal state. This essay introduces the four parts and then summarizes each chapter.

CLASSICAL FOUNDATIONS

While definitions of religion will be endlessly debated, that religion does bear on classical wars and literature about wars may be ascertained in part by art and in part by the attribution of extraordinary passions to warriors. Beyond vivid renderings of military triumph overseen by gods (Bahrani 2008) and poetic visions of gods leading battles (Kitts 2013, 2017), we have ancient reports ascribing a conspicuous religious enthusiasm to the fight, as if to elevate the fighting register. We see this, for instance, in zeal for the holy land, in righteous indignation about perceived wrongs and in devotional performances on the battlefield, all of which conceivably endow battles with the transcendent mantle of "cosmic war," as Mark Juergensmeyer has applied the term to certain terroristic impulses (2016). Rituals, both individual and communal, might confer some of this religious enthusiasm (Kitts 2010, 2018, 2022 and Chapters 19 and 20). On an individual level, bodily purifying, swearing oaths, praying and anointing weapons historically have sanctified warriors before battle, whereas communal rituals, such as marching in formation, singing, waving standards and cursing enemies have been thought to strengthen solidarity (Von Rad 1991[195 8]; Riley-Smith 1997; Hassner 2016; Gaposchkin 2017; Chapter 17). Postwar commemorations, such as passion plays, poetry, dance, art and pilgrimages, can add to the religious fervor, particularly when these celebrate victors or lionize the fallen (Sells 2003; Chapters 6 and 20). A further influence might be legends of betrayal and of the ethical dilemmas of heroes, which surely too disturb and engage audiences (Chapters 4 and 12). It would seem impossible to grasp war in religious imagination without studying these very human experiences.

At the same time, war as conceived in religious imagination can enjoy an obvious freedom from human experiences, or at least be not entirely tethered to them. Some of our earliest Near Eastern narratives, for instance, herald heavenly wars culminating in the imposition of order over chaos: Sky gods subduing riotous waters is a popular theme (Collins 2003, 2007; Fishbane 2004; Wyatt 2005; Schwemer 2007, 2008; Kitts 2013, 2017). While these violent encounters set in illo tempore may have signaled a feeling of relief for some audiences, others arguably were thrilled by them, as we can ascertain from reportedly regular oral performances of the Babylonian Enuma Elish and as we see on Mesopotamian cylinder seals depicting fantastic deicides, raging monsters and god-on-monster combat.' A certain glee in myths that violently impose order might be inferred too by the astonishing number of eschatological expectations in world religions, although such expectations are not only triumphal but can be mired in cataclysmic predictions and/or messianic hopes (see Chapters 1, 2 and 15). A diversity of aims for such narratives thus must be acknowledged, including aims to entertain as well as to comfort.

Narratives of religious war can be fantastic but also sentimental. Many religious war tales are set within cosmic schemes that emphasize mysterious forces at work in history and worldly conditions that have gone somehow awry. It is not uncommon for scriptures and classical epics to bemoan a pattern of fallen ages and to express a certain tristesse (e.g., the Heike Monogatari, the Mahabharata), qualities that make them universally appreciable and poetic. On the fantastic side, and especially within the epic genre, an

effort to remediate chaos and suppress sinister foes may occasion the harnessing of supernatural weapons and godlike powers (Arjuna and his Gandiva bow come to mind). Despite the glamor to such tales, there is also a restorative theme. For instance, one Buddhist just war doctrine is rooted in the need to redeem an a-dhammic world through samsaric militarism until worldly dhamma is restored and people begin to behave morally (Frydenlund 2017). This example highlights the intersection of cosmic and human themes.

JUST WAR

As already implied, if there is a religious urge to correct worldly instabilities, it is not only poetic. We see real-time implications in just war theories that strive to clarify the conditions and modes of justified military conduct. Just war theory has roots in the earliest centuries of virtually all the religious traditions treated herein. European just war theory stems actually from pre-Christian times (e.g., Cicero) and is still compelling in principle. However ancient, concerns for jus in bello, or the regulation of how warriors actually fight, are integrated into the Geneva Conventions, and violation of those rules today provokes feelings of outrage based on a presumed fairness whose religious roots are rarely contemplated (but see Chapters 9 and ro).

In fact, there are evolutions and historical contingencies to all just war theories. For instance, in the eleventh century Maimonides reinforced the prescriptions for biblically commanded war (Deuteronomy 20: 16-18) and at the same time softened those for optional war (Deuteronomy 20: 10-12), at a time when a war led by Jews had become virtually inconceivable. He famously engaged with Greek and Islamic notions as well as biblical ones (see Chapter 9). In Islamic traditions, although ideals of right conduct on the battlefield are laid out in the Qur'an, Islamic thinking on fighting evolved and adapted first when Islam expanded out from the Arabian Peninsula in contact with the multicultural empires surrounding it, and then later when it brushed up against European ideals (see Cook 2012; Chapter 11). Some contemporary dichotomies that we see in extremist thinking, such as the tension between Dar al Harb (abode of war) and Dar al Islam (abode of peace), appear to be adapted notions (Hashmi and Johnson 2012), and they diverge from the ideals of defensive war advocated in the earliest Quranic verses (Afsaruddin 2012; Chapter 3).

As for Asian traditions, some just war notions are embedded in literary classics. Indian ideals are exceedingly old and vary from text to text, but the epic poem the Mahabharata famously crystallizes religious rationalizations for war and right conduct on the battlefield (see Chapters 4 and 12). Karmayoga and rajadharma are some of the rubrics under which the ethics of fighting are explored, but there are also deeper themes, such as the imagined conflation of killing in war with killing in ritual sacrifice (Heesterman 1993; Johnson 1998; Brekke 2005; Chapter 4). As for Buddhism, the world's many Buddhist traditions do not universally reject the doctrine of just war, although they have come to terms with war in their own disparate ways (see Chapters 5, 7, 8, 13 and 18). Some just war doctrines, as represented above, are driven by a restorative theme, but others are symbolically ferocious, as we see in Buddhist tantric texts and spectacular rites designed to invoke protective deities and to shield warriors by defensive magic (Sinclair 2014). Even the most pacifistic of Buddhist doctrines is compelled to address the bloody aftermath of war, and consequently theories jus post bellum have resonated with some Buddhists (Chapter 13).

RELIGIOUS NATIONALISM

It may seem strange that as all of us become more globally connected in our economies and social interactions there has emerged a number of fervent religious nationalisms that seem to differ in sensibility from the old allegiances to nation-states. Whereas nation-states were once seen as guaranteeing individual liberties and freedom from constraint (per Hobbes, Hume and others; Gorski 2010), at least in the West, now in many parts of the world religious identities seem to be overwhelming national identities (Lahr 2007; Eisen 2011; Gorski and Perry 2022; Chapters 14-18). Arguably, religious fervor is not a new feature of politics, and nor, for that matter, are reports of theophanic battles led by marching gods and goddesses who rally warriors (Kitts 2013) and cradle their favorites in death (Chapter 21). Yet the merging of national and religious identities has become conspicuous today, in some cases built on foundational religious legends whose contemporary reconstructions are historically dubious. In many cases, religious nationalism is forged by conflict, such as by the flaring of antagonisms over contested religious sites (Sells 2003; Jaffrelot 2007; Hassner 2012). Collective rituals, such as pilgrimages, songs, dramatizations and also riots, tend to anchor these sites in public imagination (Van der Veer 1996; Chapter 17). Of course, many factors - economic, political, situational - can inflame religious nationalism (Juergensmeyer 2008).

FEATURED CONFLICTS

The point of Part IV is to offer a sampling of analyses of historical conflicts that cannot be understood well without consideration of religious imagination. Part IV therefore supports the aim of the entire volume through illustrations. Hence, Chapter 19 addresses the significance of liturgy and ritual for creating the mentality of earliest Christian crusaders. Chapter 20 explores how the pursuit of piety was understood to sanctify warriors before battle, as reconstructed from Islamic military history. Chapter 21 investigates the multilayered worship of Durga and Kali, Indian goddesses associated with destruction and protection, in various guises (also see Chapters 4 and 12). Chapter 22 highlights the messianic hopes of the astonishingly destructive Taiping Rebellion. Chapter 23 focuses on autonomous martial communities, violence and the state in early modern South Asia. All five chapters are authored by stellar scholars who can validate the premise of the volume, which is that religious imagination has infused and shaped the mentalities of warriors in diverse historical settings. Following are brief summaries of each chapter. <>

Myth and Authority: Giambattista Vico's Early Modern Critique of Aristocratic Sovereignty by Alexander U. Bertland [SUNY series in Contemporary Italian Philosophy, SUNY, 9781438490205]

Argues that Giambattista Vico's early modern account of Roman mythology was a sophisticated attempt to present an epistemological and political critique of the aristocratic way of conceiving the world.

Living in a province dominated by powerful oligarchs, Giambattista Vico (1668–1744) concluded that political philosophy should work to undermine aristocratic authority and prevent political devolution into feudalism. Rejecting the possibility that the free market could successfully instill civil behavior, he advocated for a strong central judicial system to work closely with citizens to promote stability and

justice. This study puts Vico in conversation with other Enlightenment thinkers such as Locke, Rousseau, and Mandeville to show how his alternative warrants serious consideration. In contrast to scholars who read Vico's New Science as a defense of the imagination, this study casts his account of poetic wisdom politically as an epistemological critique of the aristocratic mentality. Myth and Authority argues that Vico's depiction of pagan religion is a refined attempt to explain how oligarchy maintains its stranglehold on power. While Western civilization did not follow the path Vico suggested, it may now be more relevant as concerns grow about the increasing influence of the wealthy on civil institutions.

Reviews

"This is an exceptionally erudite and quite original historical-philosophical reconsideration of the original context and pith of Vico's thought. It strives to understand Vico's famed theory of poetic imagination as first and foremost a political critique of the entrenched interests of the Neapolitan aristocracy and to carve open space for juridical reform that widened the scope of interests that its economic and political structures served." — Jason M. Wirth, Seattle University

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Giarrizzo highlights the fact that Vico dedicated most of the New Science to the age of the heroes. He spends almost no time on the age of humans outside of the passages where he describes institutions across the ages and a very brief passage in the conclusion (1101-1108). The age of gods often gets the most attention by commentators because of its dramatic story of the creation of Jove, the birth of pagan religion, and early poetic language (385-399, 404-412). Most of the book on poetic wisdom, however, deals with the class conflict that occurred during the heroic age. Even his discussion on poetic language treats the way in which the heroes communicated their power to the plebeians (412-427). Book 3 highlights the harsh actions of Achilles and Agamemnon and other heroes in Homer's epics (786). This came from an oral tradition that depicted the heroic age (808). While the birth of civilization with the thunder and the collapse of civilization into the barbarism of reflection raise some of the most immediate questions that come out of the New Science, Vico's interest was held by the heroic age. This is what I will later connect to his account of feudalism.

To understand the role of human agency in this metaphysical pattern, it is necessary to look at the mechanism that drives it. Divine providence guides civilization through the three ages by orchestrating

events in such a way that humans produce the opposite of what they desired. In an important section of book 2, he summarizes moments when divine providence produces more advanced human institutions out of the human desire to keep things the same. He opens this passage by writing, "Herein is divine providence to be supremely admired, for when men's intentions were quite otherwise, it brought them in the first place to fear the divinity, the cult of which is the first fundamental basis of commonwealths" (629). The prime example of this is that the pre-civilized giants wanted to act solely on their animalistic passions, but they ended up checking those desires by creating a god to worship. Divine providence does not work through some mechanism of direct spiritual intervention. It works through human responses to events that are either natural or spring from the evolution of human institutions.

Vico actually gives a metaphysical argument to explain why divine providence does not rely on miraculous phenomena. While Vico does not emphasize it as much as other early modern philosophers do, he does hold that God is perfect. So divine providence must act in the most perfect way possible. This means that it must direct humanity in the most efficient manner possible. He writes, "Since divine providence has omnipotence as minister, it must unfold its institutions by means as easy as the natural customs of men" (343). His point is that divine providence is so potent and efficient that it does not need to use supernatural miracles to achieve its purpose. If one knows where to look, divine providence may thus be found in the ordinary course of human events.

The term divine in "divine providence" does refer to the existence of a higher power or, at least, a higher ordering principle for reality. This is shown in the frontispiece where it is symbolized by the ray coming from the triangle in the sky (5). He also uses the term divine in the sense of hidden (342). It is up to the Vichian scientist to divine—in the sense of divination—and to recognize how providence has orchestrated human events to help humanity along. This is an occasion where he does play up the similarity between the first poets, who used divination to understand the commands of the pagan gods, and the philosopher, who looks for signs in human history. The key point, however, is that providence is hidden in plain sight. To see it, a philosopher has to break out of a particular perspective to see history from a metaphysical perspective.

If one were to ask Vico what evidence he has for the existence of divine providence, he could say, at least initially, two things. First, he would emphasize that the bestial passions lying within humans are too strong for them to control on their own. They would need some sort of divine consultation or motivation to invent the pagan religions that inspired self-restraint (178). This will be a major focus in the next chapter when I explain his account of the creation of Jove. Vico is committed to the idea that no human civilization has ever come into being without the moralizing force that comes with religion (179). The key point here is that even the false first religions could not develop without divine guidance. Second, he could say that without a divine order, there is no way that many different cultures would develop the same institutions separately. The conceit of nations has tricked people into thinking their civilization created all institutions first and gave it to others. From a more objective view, Vico claims, one can see that different civilizations created the institutions independently, thereby demonstrating the influence of providence (146). Every nation, in Vico's view, had its own unique independently created thunder god (193). While his application of this idea to history is unusual, in general this is not an unusual line of reasoning to attack skepticism and defend metaphysical truth.

Despite finding this universal pattern in history, Vico tells us that science and philosophy ought to have practical value. He tells us in axiom V that, "to be useful to the human race, philosophy must raise and

direct weak and fallen man, not rend his nature or abandon him in his corruption" (129). This claim may surprise those who see Vico as an apolitical thinker. Nevertheless, it confirms Naddeo's claim that he was interested in promoting justice in politics. He underlines this in axiom VI, where he says, "Philosophy considers man as he should be and so can be of service to but very few, those who wish to live in the Republic of Plato and not to fall back into the dregs of Romulus" (131). While this may confirm that Vico has a fairly low opinion of humanity, he does think leaders can come forward and govern well in popular commonwealths or monarchies in the third age of humanity. He describes human judgments in the third age in this way: "In these the governing consideration is the truth of the facts, to which, according to the dictates of conscience, the laws benignly give aid when needed in everything demanded by the equal utility of causes" (974). Just human rulers should look carefully at the facts and the needs of people. They should then consult their conscience and the divine order of the universe to rule fairly. As Fabiani discusses, the leaders need to avoid error and see the greater metaphysical processes of the universe to make sound judgments. Studying the New Science can aid this process. This is what Vico thinks philosophy ought to do. Yet, how can this conform to his idea of an ideal eternal history?

To answer this question, I think it is helpful to relate it to the way seventeenth-century French philosophers debated the relationship of God's will, human civility, and human virtue. Given that Vico is interested in defending a metaphysical order of history and civil behavior, this debate would have been particularly relevant for him. While contemporary philosophers working on the early modern period may not be familiar with this debate, it had a major impact at the time. In Putting on Virtue: The Legacy of the Splendid Vices, Jennifer A. Herdt presents a deep and thorough historical analysis of the question of whether acting in a civil manner would help one achieve virtue and, more importantly, grace." The question could be expressed as whether worldly virtue had any relationship to divine goodness. More directly and broadly, the question was whether human society was corrupt and should be avoided or whether it was an arena for positive action. Vico, of course, took the later option.

What is particularly relevant for Vico is Herdt's account of the anatomists, who included Baltasar Gracián, Blaise Pascal, and Pierre Nicole. These thinkers were interested in moral anatomy which looked at the way human desires were shaped by political and social context. Gracián, a Jesuit, argued that if approached the right way civil life could lead to proper virtue. For Gracián, nature was incomplete and required human art and civility to complete it. If one builds on nature properly and follows those aspects of courtly life that allow for human stability and tranquility, then one can achieve virtue." Herdt writes that Gracian's view goes so far as to suggest that "heroic human virtue acquires a certain likeness to divine greatness, a likeness capable of winning God's love and grace."" The Jansenists went the other way. Nicole argued that courtly life and pagan philosophy can create the appearance of virtue but do not produce actual virtue. When the pagan strives for a happy and tranquil life they do it out of self-love, but true charity does not come from love of oneself at all. For writers in Nicole's tradition, God has already created the best universe and it is hubristic to think that the universe could be improved or that one can find grace on one's own. In Nicole's view, pagans have the potential to act with general grace absent of God's blessing. One can only be truly virtuous, however, if one receives efficacious grace from God. This was a key debate in a long discussion of the relationship of grace to human agency.

In Tra religion e prudenza: la 'Mos* practica' di Giambattista Vico, Enrico Nuzzo discusses how this debate came to Naples. He describes the way that the works identified as saggezza moderna appeared in Naples in the middle of the seventeenth century, and he focuses on the works of the disciple of Montaigne, Pierre Charron (1541-1603). This movement, which was in line with the Jansenists, separated the true self from civil institutions and social development. Nuzzo discusses the way Neapolitan intellectuals opposed saggezza moderna. They connected a Cartesian theory of the passions to the natural law of Grotius in order to show the importance of the connection between psychological states and civil engagement. Further, they rejected the ideas of Nicole and other Jansenists because they saw their inward turn as opposed to classical humanism." This represented a general movement toward finding universal truth in the civil World and promoting the ethical value of political activity. Nuzzo goes into great depth into Vico's response. He particularly emphasizes the way Vico presents an intersubjective view of human nature to justify the philosophical importance of civil society. This point becomes important in the next chapter. Here I want to return to the question of divine providence and human agency.

The intellectual culture of Naples wondered whether the study of civilization could lead to metaphysical knowledge of God. Given that God is perfect how could historical investigation not lead to metaphysical truth? Yet, given the fallen and corrupt nature of human beings, how could human history reveal anything about God? Even further, how could human virtue be connected to human civility? When one reads the New Science in this context, it becomes easier to see how it envisions moral action. It does not want to deny the importance of God's influence, but it also wants to defend the study of human institutions and the value of human behavior.

I think Vico reveals his position in the commentary on axiom CIV. The axiom itself states, "The remark of Dio Cassius is worthy of consideration, that custom is like a king and law like a tyrant; which we must understand as referring to reasonable custom and to law not animated by natural reason" (308). Dio Cassius suggests that people enjoy obeying custom because it conforms to what they do anyway, while the law is an external imposition. Vico accepts this point but with a major caveat. He clarifies that laws can only exist over the long term if they conform to custom. So ultimately, law and custom must merge. When Vico qualifies the statement, however, he adds "reasonable custom," which suggests that some customs are not reasonable, and "law not animated by natural reason," to confirm that some laws are unjust. This implies that there is the possibility for civilizations to err not only in the way they make legislation but also in the way they develop customs. Vico acknowledges that civilizations do have the potential to stray from the proper metaphysical path. Moreover, it suggests that Vico does not defend the moral value of all law and all custom but only of those that conform to the divine order. This already connects both the discovery of truth and advancement of moral virtue to both God's order and civil activity. He then explains how this is possible.

The bestial state of barbaric giants living outside of civilization does not reveal their inherent nature. I will explain this more fully in the next chapter. The point here is that they are in a state of privation from community and from their own physical and mental capacities for living in civilization. In this state, they cannot do good works. Humans have "a potentiality for them [good works] which is ineffectual" (310). This has the form of Nicole's claim about the difference between general grace and efficacious grace. There is a major difference, however. For both Nicole and Vico, God's will is needed to give humans efficacious grace. For Nicole, this happens through God's act of charity. Vico grounds this in civil

action. For Vico, providence naturally provides humans with the opportunity to actualize their natural civil potencies. By guiding humanity back into civilization, providence allows humans to do real good works. In this way, Vico connects God's divine will to doing good works in society. By valuing civil activity in this way, Vico is more on the side of the Jesuits than Nicole in this debate.

More significantly, in Vico's model free choice and human agency become quite important. If one views grace as Nicole does or, more strongly, as the Calvinists do, then it is God's decision to grant grace or not. Human agency may have a role to play in the decision, but God's act directly bestows grace whether a person desires it or not.

In Vico's model, divine providence creates an opportunity for humans. Providence can only bestow grace once humans have freely chosen to follow its advice. Free civil action is actually a necessity for receiving grace. He writes, "it [grace] therefore cannot act without the principle of free choice, which God aids naturally by His providence" (310). This is not exactly humans forcing God to give grace, since it is up to God to bestow God's providence initially. Nevertheless, humans do have the freedom to accept or decline the advice and so can choose to accept the gifts of providence or not. If they perform the civil actions counseled by providence, they can accept grace and advance along the course of the ideal eternal history.

Axiom VIII states that "things do not settle or endure out of their natural state" (134). In Vico's chronology, humans have spent far more time in civilization than outside of it. So the civil state is natural to them. He writes that "man has free choice, however weak, to make virtues of his passions; but that he is aided by God naturally by divine providence and supernaturally by divine grace" (136). He adds here "divine grace," but that is beside the point. Divine providence is not the cunning of reason in that it does not force humans along a dialectical path. Instead, it uses natural circumstances to advise humans. Its mechanism can only spiritually and practically function if humans make decisions to follow the direction in which one leads. Vico emphasizes that divine providence does not force humans to act. The natural signs it gives encourage humans to follow the path, but they can choose not to listen.

When one understands this view of providence, one can understand an exceptionally important point in Vico that is often overlooked: he really does think that the Roman civilization was the best one. He writes, "Thus the very care for piety and attachment to religion brought the people to civil sovereignty. In this respect the Roman people went beyond all others in the world, and for that reason it became master of the world" (1101). Vico does not try to defend this claim by comparing Rome with other global civilizations, and it is pretty clear this is a Eurocentric statement one would expect from an eighteenth-century European writer. Nonetheless, it tells the reader that one should regard the history of Rome not as the product of an inevitable course of history.

Ancient Rome achieved what it did because its people chose to follow the advice of providence. Whereas other civilizations regressed back into feudalism or were conquered, the Romans actually made it to the final stage. It is easy to lose sight of this point in the New Science because Vico rarely speaks in this way directly. Regardless, it is an essential point for his political philosophy. Ancient Rome is the goal that Naples or some other European power ought to achieve. The human age will not come automatically. Civilization must work for it.

Norberto Bobbio's discussion of Vico's political philosophy helps explain why this point about Rome is so hard to see in the New Science. He points out that the text does not spend time discussing corrupt forms of government like many other works of political theory. This is because Vico's focus is on explaining how different types of government are appropriate in different eras. Since laws and customs conform to the people governed, if a system of power works for people at a certain stage of the ideal eternal history, then it is the appropriate form of government. Systems of power change, Bobbio argues, because the lower classes force that change on the rulers. So Vico is not interested in describing what it would mean to rule poorly." I would add, however, that while Vico does not describe what it would mean for a system of government to become corrupt, I think he gives reason to think about why a form of government, heroic aristocracies, could last too long. Rome avoided this problem, and Vico is hoping that Naples also could avoid it.

I think this reading of the ideal eternal history also changes how one might think of the barbarism of reflection. It would be easy to read that barbarism as a tragedy that civilization should do anything in its power to avoid. After all, he describes it as a horrible time of civil conflict that brings civilizations like Rome to destruction. If one were to read that too strongly, then a civilization would try never to leave the age of gods or the age of heroes if it could avoid it. Why move closer to the precipice if one does not have to? Riccardo Caporali, however, makes the important point that Vico did not really develop a full theory of the barbarism of reflection or the recourse of nations until the 1730 New Science." This is when I suggest Vico fully formed his position against feudalism. Caporali argues that the barbarism of reflection, rather than being a warning, demonstrates that providence will keep humanity from completely collapsing. Rather than being a disaster to avoid at all costs, it is a safety net that providence uses when humanity can no longer sustain the balance it needs to keep society together." In this view, Vico may actually be suggesting that risking the fall into barbarism might be superior to remaining in a state of feudal authority once it is has outlived its usefulness. The barbarism is providence's way of protecting humanity's survival.

In this introduction, I have discussed my approach to the New Science and to some of the traditional issues that authors have found in Vico. My goal, ultimately, is to get to an explanation of his poetic wisdom and to show how it presents a picture of aristocratic power in Naples. To do this and to adhere to the "getting things right" approach, I want to find a key point of connection between the New Science and its contemporaries. I have laid a groundwork for reading him as an early modern thinker rather than a renaissance or proto-contemporary one. Nevertheless, I want to pin down one key debate in early modern philosophy to which he responded. That debate will be the problem of human socialization. I propose that by seeing poetic wisdom as a response to this philosophical problem, it will be possible to understand both the picture of power that the New Science gives and the practical political

ideas that fall from it. <>

Bessarion's Treasure: Editing, Translating and Interpreting Bessarion's Literary Heritage edited by Sergei Mariev [Byzantinisches Archiv – Series Philosophica, De Gruyter, 9783110601800]

The importance of Bessarion's contribution to the history of Byzantine and Renaissance philosophy and culture during the 15th century is beyond dispute. However, an adequate appreciation of his contribution still remains a desideratum of scholarly research. One serious impediment to scholarly progress is the fact that the critical edition of his main philosophical work "In Calumniatorem Platonis" is incomplete and that this work has not been translated in its entirety into any modern language yet. Same can be stated about several minor but equally important treatises on literary, theological and philosophical subjects. This makes editing, translating and interpreting his literary, religious and philosophical works a scholarly priority. Papers assembled in this volume highlight a number of philological, philosophical and historical aspects that are crucial to our understanding of Bessarion's role in the history of European civilization and to setting the directions of future research in this field.

CONTENT

The title of this volume originated as the conference "Bessarion's Treasure: Editing, Translating and Interpreting Bessarion's Literary Heritage", which was organized by Sergei Mariev, Monica Marchetto and Katharina Luchner in Venice on 4-5 April 2014.

The main aim of the conference was to present a critical edition, with German translation and extensive philosophical commentary, of the De natura et arte, the sixth and last book of Bessarion's main philosophical treatise "In calumniatorem Platonis" (ICP). In 2014, on the very eve of publishing the results of this research project, it seemed important to the members of our research group to discuss in greater depth our findings with other scholars working on closely related subjects. Thanks to generous support from the German Research Foundation (DFG), the Centro Tedesco di Studi Veneziani in Venice and the Venice International University, it was possible to welcome participants from all over the world to this conference.

The word "treasure" in the title of the conference and of the present volume echoes the word thesaurus that Bessarion frequently used to refer to his own collection of books, for example in his Letter to the Doge and the Senate of Venice that accompanied the act of donation of his library to Venice. Bessarion, as this choice of word makes clear, viewed his book collection as the greatest treasure he had ever possessed in his life. The subtitle "editing, translating and interpreting" refers to the three main phases of our research project on De natura et arte and the three components of our edition, which we wished to present and discuss during the conference. At the same time, these three categories have broader significance. At the present state of research into Byzantine philosophy in general, and not only into Bessarion's philosophical texts, these words call attention to the three fundamental aspects that can ensure substantial advances in this field. "Editing" was one thematic strand during the conference. It is important to stress that it is impossible to make any progress without the publication of modern, "state of the art" critical editions of Byzantine philosophical texts. Accordingly, one of the aims of the conference was to discuss modern editorial practices that should be applied to Byzantine texts and, in particular, philosophical texts. During the early 20th century, Byzantine texts in general, and the few philosophical texts that appeared in print, were edited by adhering to the same rules, procedures and assumptions that had been developed by Classical philologists for "their" texts. These conventions were formulated for texts with significantly different textual histories and manuscript transmissions. When preparing a critical edition of a 15th-century treatise, it is frequently not the quest for the archetype that occupies an editor's attention, simply because sometimes we are fortunate enough to have one or even several autographa. Depending on the transmission of a particular text, it becomes necessary instead to offer a comprehensive overview of the entire textual evidence available to us, namely the evidence that would normally have been discarded or reduced at the stage of eliminatio codicum descriptorum. In other cases, we might even have in our possession versions that reflect the state of the text prior to the final circulation of copies of the work. "Translating" was another thematic area that was explored during the conference. Over recent years, the simplistic or even condescending view that translations are merely a stopgap for those who do not read the original Greek or Latin has been yielding ground to a growing understanding that translation may become a medium in which the intrinsic ambiguities of the original(s) can and should be subjected to critical evaluation. The heuristic potential of the translational process is enormous and the translated text, that is the result or last stage of such a process, should ideally elucidate and not obscure the ambiguities and difficulties of the original. Finally, "interpreting" was included in the title of the conference, on the one hand, as a reference to the philosophical commentary on the De natura et arte, and, on the other hand, as an implicit invitation to all to share relevant topics and scholarly results of particular importance to our understanding of Bessarion's literary, and not only philosophical, output or "heritage".

The call for papers was met with great enthusiasm by the scholarly community. Looking back at the two days in Venice, I would like to reiterate, also on behalf of my co-organizers of the conference, our enormous gratitude to all those who attended. In particular, gratitude is due to Professor John Monfasani, who graciously agreed to be the key-note speaker, and whose scholarly work, as is widely known, is in large part dedicated to the main antagonist of Bessarion, George of Trebizond. I am grateful to John Demetracopoulos and Panagiotis Athanasopoulos, whose scholarly work embraces the reception of Thomas Aquinas, a source of primary importance for Bessarion in his philosophical arguments. I am also very much obliged, for both his attendance and invaluable insights, to Fabio Pagani, who has completed a critical edition of George of Trebizond's translation of the Platonic Laws into

Latin; to Eva Del Soldato, whose research explores the large network of Bessarion's scholarly contacts for a glimpse into a nearly complete "atlas" of Bessarion's Nachleben; to Annick Peters-Custot, an expert in Bessarion's monasticism, to Georgios Steiris, whose research focuses on Michael Apostoles, and to Frederick Lauritzen, whose research sheds light on Bessarion's early years. I am also very grateful for the insights that Christian Brockmann, Antonio Rigo, Vito Lorusso, Delphine Lauritzen and Aslihan Akisik Karakullukcu shared during the conference.

In 2014, there were as yet no definite plans to publish all the papers presented in Venice, as the two-day meeting was structured as a workshop and its main aim was the exchange of ideas along the thematic lines outlined above. However, after some time had elapsed, it became increasingly obvious that the research that many of the participants carried out in the aftermath of the gathering in Venice has many points of contact, and so the idea of publishing a volume of collected papers that would bring together several insights from philosophical, philological and historical perspectives on Bessarion's texts has gradually become a reality. The present volume assembles papers that, in one way or another, go back to presentations and discussions, or even reproduce in part the actual papers that were read at the conference. However, the majority of the papers published here contain new or significantly updated research results and an updated bibliography of the five years that have elapsed since the date of the conference.

It is to be expected that a number of major publications in the field of Bessarion's Studies will appear in the near or nearest future. To name only a few, the critical edition and English translation of George of Trebizond's Comparatio Platonis et Aristotelis that is being prepared by John Monfasani, several new volumes from the Thomas Byzantinus Project of John Demetracopoulos, Panagiotis Athanasopoulos and other colleagues, Fabio Pagani's critical edition of George of Trebizond's translation of the Platonic Laws, and my own critical edition of books 1-5 of the ICP. While all these longer-term projects approach completion, the present volume seeks to offer some new and important "midterm" results from research into Bessarion's "literary heritage". <>

Teaching through Images: Imagery in Greco-Roman Didactic Poetry edited by Jenny Strauss Clay and Athanassios Vergados [Mnemosyne Supplements, Brill, 9789004373488]

In ancient didactic poetry, poets frequently make use of imagery – similes, metaphors, acoustic images, models, exempla, fables, allegory, personifications, and other tropes – as a means to elucidate and convey their didactic message. In this volume, which arose from an international conference held at the University of Heidelberg in 2016, we investigate such phenomena and explore how they make the unseen visible, the unheard audible, and the unknown comprehensible. By exploring didactic poets from Hesiod to pseudo-Oppian and from Vergil and Lucretius to Grattius and Ovid, the authors in this collective volume show how imagery can clarify and illuminate, but also complicate and even

undermine or obfuscate the overt didactic message. The presence of a real or implied addressee invites our engagement and ultimately our scrutiny of language and meaning.

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The fundamental question that underlies the contributions in this volume is 'how do didactic poets teach'? In other words, what means and methods do they use in order to convey a body of knowledge to their audience? Related to this is the more general question: what is it that didactic poetry teaches? In what follows we focus our enquiry on the use of imagery by the didactic poets, a concept that we acknowledge is broad and can refer to shorter or longer similes, metaphors, allegory, personification, analogy etc. How do these phenomena, which are by no means confined to didactic poetry, become didactic means? Furthermore, since several of the didactic poems examined in the contributions to this volume purport to instruct their audience on matters that lie beyond human experience: how

does a didactic poet help his audience conceptualize remote constellations, the depths of the sea, invisible atoms, or far-away lands?

This brings us to a further question: what exactly is the 'didactic poetry' that this volume addresses? Ancient definitions of the genre are virtually non-existent. Any classical scholarly discussion that may have existed has left but very few traces, and the same is true of the stylistic means and imagery employed by the didactic poets. But it is clear that the question must have troubled ancient critics, witness Aristotle's ambivalent treatment of Empedocles: whereas in the Poetics he thinks that Empedocles cannot be called a poet but a ^^^^^^^^^^ despite the poetic form of his work, elsewhere he praises the poetic qualities of his work, including metaphor. One has to wait until the fourth century ad for the first concrete and explicit reference to didactic poetry as a genre. Modern literary theory has treated didactic poetry as a secondary offshoot of hexameter poetry, as the oft-cited passage from Goethe's essay Ober das Lehrgedicht (1827) shows. Despite the attitude of ancient and modern critics, didactic poetry was alive and thriving in antiquity; from the Hellenistic period on it achieved great prominence. In fact, it has been argued (Sider 2014) that the didactic genre was a Hellenistic invention retrojected into the past, which resulted in Hesiod's elevation to the status of the prime model for the Hellenistic poets. Even in the absence of explicit critical discussions, allusions to earlier predecessors found in later didactic poets demonstrate an understanding that they belong to a particular generic tradition. Modern philological discussions have to a large degree ignored the breadth of ancient didactic poetry. It was only after the publication of Bernd Effe's 1977 study that the discussion resumed, for the most part through studies which, with few exceptions, were devoted to individual didactic poets or traced the reception of specific themes.8 Few studies have undertaken a diachronic examination of didactic poetry, while the question of imagery and other stylistic means has only been raised sporadically. It is precisely this gap that this volume aims to bridge by exploring the imagery through which a wide range of ancient didactic poets realized their didactic intent.

Effe's typological analysis of the genre derived from what he perceived to be its authorial intention: he posited a "normal" (sachbezogen) or "ideal" form, in which the poet genuinely aims at conveying knowledge of a specific subject to his audience. The poetic form in such a didactic poem has a "psychagogic" effect as a means that supports the instructional intention. Lucretius' De Rerum Natura is an example of this type, and in fact one may think of his "honeyed cup" image (1.936–950 = 4.11–25) for the relation that is sometimes thought to obtain between poetic form and philosophical content: just as physicians often smear the cup that contains bitter wormwood with sweet honey so that ill children may not shrink from ingesting the medicine, in the same way Lucretius presents his philosophical teachings through the pleasant poetic form. Lucretius thus assumes the role of the physician, and his addressee that of the patient who is cured through Lucretius' philosophical lesson.

Effe's second type ("formal") is the polar opposite of the previous one. The poet presents material in which he is not interested or with which he does not personally engage, his focus lying rather on turning an unpromising subject-matter into a poetic text. The poetic form is, in other words, an end in itself. Nicander's poetry belongs to this type. Finally, there is a third type, according to Effe, the "transparent" form, in which the poet intends to teach a subject-matter, but the didactic aim is not the subject-matter itself. Rather, the poet indirectly teaches something higher through the material he chooses to present in his poem (e.g., how the workings of the divine influence the cosmos). Aratus' Phaenomena falls into this category. If Aratus, Lucretius and Nicander are the ideal examples of these types, the other surviving didactic poems may belong to one category but may also at times fluctuate between categories. While Effe's typological analysis has met with objections, it nevertheless draws attention to the fact that didactic poetry is a highly heterogeneous genre in terms of both content (what exactly is being taught? Is the explicitly stated material the only lesson to be derived from the poem?) and form (what is the role of the poetic and stylistic means?).

For Katharina Volk, on the other hand, the genre is characterized by (i) explicit didactic intent; (ii) the teacher-student constellation; (iii) poetic self-consciousness; and (iv) poetic simultaneity. Thus, while poetry in antiquity was generally regarded as having a didactic purpose, what distinguishes didactic poetry from other poetry is that the didactic poets make explicit mention of their intention to teach. As a result, there is an addressee, whether named (e.g., Empedocles' Pausanias or Lucretius' Memmius) or unnamed (e.g., Aratus' second person addressee) to which this instruction is directed. This is done in an explicitly self-conscious manner, with the poet drawing attention to the fact that he is performing poetry (e.g., by describing his activity as ^^^^^^^ or canere, by using "proems in the middle," or by asking himself about the direction his poem should take). Finally, the poet instructs while he is "singing"; in other words, the teaching coincides with the poem which unfolds "in front of" the addressee. Even though these elements can be found in several didactic poems, they are not present in all of them. Hesiod's Theogony or Parmenides' poem would, according to Volk's analysis, not count as didactic, but the Works and Days would.

What these studies show is that didactic poetry is an elusive genre that cannot be easily defined. Moreover, even non-didactic poems can have their didactic moments or be in a "didactic mode," to use Katharina Volk's useful category.15 Anchises' words in Aeneid 6.724–751 are a case in point: in that passage Vergil has Anchises use characteristic Lucretian structure and language to articulate a non-Epicurean conception of the soul. Anchises presents his speech as instruction (docebo, 759); the argument is articulated using adverbs and phrases familiar from the structure of Lucretian arguments (principio, 724; inde, 728; hinc, 733; non tamen, 736; ergo, 739); and the Lucretian/didactic mode is underscored by further Lucretian "tags" (e.g., globum lunae, 725; seminibus, 731; aurai, 747).

To this we should add a further consideration: given that prose scientific texts likewise aim at conveying a body of knowledge to their readers, one may ask whether didactic poetry is somehow more effective than prose. Lucretius is explicit about the function of poetry in propounding his Epicurean doctrine, but Empedocles likewise chooses his poetic form to set himself apart from contemporary cosmologists. If Parmenides and Empedocles make a conscious choice to compose their works in verse, thus tapping into, and taking issue with, a long hexameter tradition, some Hellenistic writers seem to revel in the challenge of putting intractable matter, such as poisons, into verse. This brings us back to Effe's typology discussed above. At the same time, poetry is more memorable and impressive than prose, an idea that resonates in Plutarch's Quomodo adolescens poetas audire debeat 16c:

In poems lies mixed with plausibility cause amazement and are more prized than the construction that is elaborate in meter and diction but lacks mythos and fiction ... for we know of sacrifices that lack a chorus or the aulos, but we do not know of poetry that lacks mythos and lies. And the hexameter poems of Empedocles and Parmenides, the Theriaca of Nicander, and the maxims of Theognis are speeches that have borrowed from poetry its meter and lofty diction as though a vehicle, in order to avoid the ordinariness of prose.

The poetic form is here something added to the of didactic poetry, and in line with Aristotle's exclusion of Empedocles from the poets didactic poets borrow only the meter and the loftiness of poetry that they add on to their work. Crucially, what is missing from them is and (fiction). In more practical terms, Galen makes the point that poetry is preferable to prose, not only for aesthetic but also for practical reasons, because it can preserve the precise details in medical recipes. For Galen then the metrical form is an expedient that ensures the correct transmission of the information contained in the

Ancient authors clearly present diverse views on the poetic dimension of didactic poetry, but what we hope will emerge from the following chapters is that the poetic form of didactic poetry is not simply a matter of embellishment or virtuoso display on the part of the poets, but the result of a conscious choice to engage with a long literary tradition. Didactic poetry is an inclusive genre, an ocean into which several streams flow: the perception that poetry aims at the addressee's moral edification and includes elements from other genres, both poetry (e.g., heroic epic, hymn) and prose (e.g., scientific literature, philosophy, from the Hellenistic age onwards). As several contributions demonstrate, intertextuality plays a powerful role in didactic poetry, evoking images found in earlier works and redeploying them in order to illustrate the subject taught. As such, intertextuality is an important aspect of how didactic poetry teaches: while this poetry purports to convey knowledge about a specific subject-matter, it invites the audience to engage in interpretation, by importing intertexts that inform the didactic poem the audience is reading. The addressee is thus an active learner who

contributes to the interpretation and who is expected to detect when the image or intertext enhances or runs against the grain of the didactic message. The plasticity of didactic poetry, the fact that it allows the poet to combine elements from different sources, also supports the authority of the didactic poet who shows himself as not only competent in a technical subject, a kind of knowledge which may derive from his personal experience or from reading or translating a prose treatise composed by a real expert (e.g., Aratus or Nicander), but also as a master of the poetic tradition which he redeploys into an explicit didactic instrument. The difference from narrative epic lies in the fact that whereas narrative epic tells a story that has a plot, the didactic poet creates a plot out of a field of knowledge which the addressee must methodically follow to attain. All in all, imagery and intertextuality are ways in which didactic poets offset the fact that didactic poems cannot be exhaustive, in that they do not present the totality of the body of knowledge they purport to impart to their audience. But even if didactic poets do not exhaust the topic they teach, they show their audience how this knowledge is linked to other important texts and contexts, thus making it, however obscure it maybe, part of an intricate literary and cultural tapestry.

In the preceding pages we have been speaking of images and imagery. To be sure, the English term image has a broader range of meanings compared to its Greco-Roman counterparts that covers the 'representation of something to the mind by speech or writing; a vivid or graphic description' (OED, s.v. 6a), but also concepts like a 'simile, metaphor, or other figure of speech that suggests a picture to the mind' (OED, s.v. 6b). The Greek term, however, has a more limited semantic field. It literally denotes an image in the sense of picture, statue, or bust, but it may also have the sense of comparison. Thus, in Plato, R. 487e–489a an answer involves a comparison, while in Smp. 215a Alcibiades' description of Socrates is conveyed: in praising Socrates Alcibiades likens him to figurines of ugly Sileni which, when opened, reveal the effigy of a god. The Cratylus employs and ; in the context of using sounds and words to represent things through language: thus, at 424e Socrates uses the image of a painter preparing an mixing to illustrate how linguistic elements () might be mixed; and at 432b he introduces an argument that treats words as of what they are meant to designate. ^^^^^ in the sense 'comparison' is also found in Aristophanes (Nub. 558, Ran. 906) as well as elsewhere in Plato (Ph. 87b; Men. 80c together with, , and later, e.g., in Galen (Hipp. and Plato Dogm. 5, v 432 Kühn). Aristotle Rhet. 1407a, however, distinguishes from metaphor, though the two are akin to each other: a simile is a metaphor preceded by a r, i.e. an expression such as 'just as' etc. On the other hand, Men.Rh. 433 distinguishes it from 7, both of which are forms of Images, , may be thought to mitigate the effect of an utterance, but may also aim at clarity. Related to this is the idea that an ^^^^^ might contribute to But, itself a metaphorical term with a philosophical dimension, does not always have positive connotations. While Democritus B142 D-K (= D206 L-M) underscores the representational value of names as ('speaking icons', Laks-Most's translation), Plato relates figurative speech) to the teaching of sophists like Polus at Phaedr. 267c: it causes amazement to those who may possess skills preparatory

to rhetoric but who do not understand what rhetoric is (269a). And Plutarch De gloria Atheniensium 348b presents a gradation between implying that the is of lesser value compared to the original.

A common thread throughout this volume concerns the degree to which the imagery used is appropriate to the topic related in the poem. In some cases we find that poetic style (form) mirrors the contents of what is presented: Ovid's calendrical Fasti presents temporal (i.e. topic-specific) imagery (Walter's chapter), Lucretius exhibits verbal atomism, his elementa being both the smallest part of the world and of language (Buglass' and Noller's chapters), Hesiod's imprisoned deities are surrounded and confined by verbal bonds (Strauss Clay's chapter), Grattius' poem on hunting makes use of military imagery in line with the idea that hunting is related to and preparatory for military activity (Leidl's chapter). Images may appear in clusters, as when, for instance, a poet attempts to illustrate a point through multiple examples. Imagery can also help make present something the audience has never seen, for instance, monsters (Stamatopoulou's chapter) or make intelligible something that is not known or accessible to everyone, as e.g., the constellations which we observe from afar. As Aratus shows, our knowledge of them is the result of a primordial act of reading the celestial tapestry. But we also discuss cases of dissonance between image and topic, where the imagery employed seems to be in tension with the message conveyed, as for instance the gigantomachic imagery in the Georgics (see Rider's chapter) or the exemplum of Pasiphae in Ovid's Ars Amatoria (see Miller's chapter). In this sense, imagery in didactic poetry can involve more complex interactions with its material beyond merely illustrating what is being described, as diagrams, drawings, maps etc. might do in a prose scientific work.

At the same time, there is often a further tension in didactic poetry, that between the poem's "main topic" and passages often referred to as "digressions" in which imagery is often found. If digressions become a distinctive feature of the didactic genre, as Monica Gale has argued, can we really claim that "digressions" truly divert the addressee away from the topic or do they illuminate the subject indirectly from a different perspective? There is a significant terminological problem here: "digression" implies straying away from the proper "path of song," whereby the poet abandons his subject-matter and elaborates on what might appear of secondary importance. But would anyone think the Theogony was complete if it only included the genealogical catalogues but lacked the "digressions" on Hecate, Styx, or the Typhonomachy? Is Lucretius' message truly conveyed only in the expository parts of his poem? And do Oppian's similes in the Halieutica only fulfill a cosmetic function, adding poetic charm to an otherwise 'dry' (!) subject-matter? While digressions are by no means characteristic of didactic poetry alone,34 as the genre evolves, digressions become set-pieces that treat conventional topics: Hesiod, Th. 362–370, where the poet declares his inability, as mortal narrator, to present his subject matter in its entirety becomes a common "purple passage" in Dionysius Periegetes, Oppian, and pseudo-Oppian. As Monica Gale 2001, observes, "digressions are in their nature a locus of particularly intense intertextual engagement with other texts in (and beyond)

the didactic tradition, and thus offer a clear opportunity for the poet to situate his own work within a range of (in a broad sense) political frameworks."

It is clear, then, that imagery and the other features discussed in the papers that follow (e.g., metaphor, similes, analogy, exempla, digressions etc.) are not unique to didactic poetry but are found both in prose and in narrative poetry. We would argue, however, that these features fulfill a special function when they appear in didactic poetry. Whereas a simile in narrative epic may illustrate or enrich a situation by comparing it to a known image (e.g., a throng of soldiers to a swarm of flies), when used by a didactic poet, the same device often seeks to explain something that is unknown or inaccessible to the audience. When Lucretius compares atoms to letters, for instance, he tries to persuade his audience that his account of how the world is constructed is correct, by explaining the unfamiliar and invisible through an image that is known to his addressee. In addition to this rhetorical function, imagery and related devices in didactic poetry also fulfill a cognitive function as they enable the audience to conceptualize and grasp what is unfamiliar, invisible, or inaccessible.

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The following chapters explore these questions, examining a wide array of didactic poems across time. These poems range from archaic to imperial Greek (Hesiod's Theogony and Works and Days, Empedocles, Aratus, Dionysius of Alexandria, ps.-Oppian), and Roman didactic poetry of the Republican era and the Principate (Lucretius, Vergil's Georgics; Grattius; Manilius, Astronomica; Ovid's Fasti and Ars Amatoria). While not all the major didactic poems could be explored in this volume, some of the discussions also interact with texts such as Aratus'Phaenomena, Ovid's Metamorphoses, Oppian's Halieutica, Avienius and Priscian.

Three chapters on early Greek didactic (Hesiod, Empedocles) open the volume. Jenny Strauss Clay explores the interplay between form and content in Hesiod's Theogony. In particular, she examines a well-known feature of early hexameter poetry, ring composition, that scholars have often regarded as a characteristic of oral poetry. Without delving into the controversy of whether these poems were composed orally or with the aid of writing, a question that cannot ultimately be answered securely, Strauss Clay demonstrates that Hesiod's ring composition not only structures his narrative but also indicates how certain characters (e.g., Prometheus, the Titans, monsters) remain bound and imprisoned within the underworld or the caverns of Gaia. The result is a series of verbal icons, or "words that bind," that imitate the stories narrated and, when adequately taken into consideration, can point towards solutions to old cruces in the constitution of the Hesiodic text.

If didactic poetry in some sense explains the world as it is now, one strategy to convey such an explanation involves contrasting the present cosmos with its past, thus throwing the differences into relief by contrast and thereby highlighting the present constitution of the world. In this vein Zoe

Stamatopoulou looks into how Hesiod in the Works and Days and Empedocles represent bodily forms that are unfamiliar to the audience's experiences and expectations. Zeus' order to fabricate Pandora whose resemblance to goddesses with human characteristics is normalized in the phase of its execution: the fabricated woman corresponds to audience experience, a point that echoes Andolfi's paper. At the same time, the focus is on her inner nature, and the point is the contrast between the two. The same is true of the men of the Five Races who despite their exceptionality are integrated within the audience's experience and provide aetia for aspects of the human experience and patterns of behavior. Furthermore, only the Bronze men receive detailed description, but in this case their monstrous appearance corresponds to their violent and self-destructive behavior. It is remarkable in this context that, contrary to the Theogony, the Works and Days elides monstrosity, a feature that does not form part of the audience's experience. In Empedocles, on the other hand, hybridity emerges as a principle. Fragmentary body-parts, for instance, are formed and fitted with each other inside the earth, although the poet leaves out important details. These omissions invite the audience to supply what is missing and to reflect on both the viable life-forms that they know and the examples of monstrosity known from poetic tradition. This is reflected also on the level of language, through Empedoclean coinages and the semantic shift of even familiar words that are now used as vehicles to express something novel. Thus, while nor- malization is the rule in Hesiod's Works and Days, defamiliarization of known forms, hybrids, and fragmentary forms characterize the zoogonic process in Empedocles. In conclusion, one might note that the contrast between these two depictions of the past reinforces the opposition of the Empedoclean cyclic view of cosmic evolution to Hesiod's linear temporality.

Ilaria Andolfi examines how Empedocles employs imagery drawn from craftsmanship (wood or metal working, pottery, cooking, carpentry, joining, and ship-building) when describing Aphrodite's role in the creation of the cosmos. Her results argue against Solmsen's view that no philosophical underpinning underlies this use of imagery. These are poetological images of course, but it is also important to note that—unlike Hephaestus and Athena—Aphrodite is not usually associated with crafts. By analyzing these images, Andolfi shows how Empedocles visualizes what is unseen (the workings of the cosmic elements) by means of images drawn from the audience's experience. Besides their aesthetic value, they also imply an analogy that reveals the hidden workings of the Empedoclean cosmos, which is thus visualized through images that humans comprehend. At the same time, these crafts, it is argued, did not arise by necessity but belonged to human beings from the very beginning, and combine aesthetic and moral goodness.

The following chapter by Patrick Glauthier explores topics related to didactic poems about the cosmos from an astronomical perspective. In Glauthier's contribution, the Milky Way emerges as an image through which Aratus and Manilius teach their audiences about celestial inquiry. For both poets the description of the Milky Way inspires a sublime experience that encourages contemplation

of the stars and the divine, and tracing this sublime wonder is homologous to the experience of reading the Phaenomena or the Astronomica. In other words, both the text and the natural world elicit a sense of the sublime. At the same time, the Milky Way constitutes for Manilius an image that points to an aetiology: how does the cosmos work? This image, thus, mirrors what the whole of the Astronomica purports to do. Manilius, further, engages polemically with Aratus: while for Aratus the observation of the Milky Way amounts to travelling back in time and a sublime experience, Manilius underscores the progress made by humankind and their control over the sublimely terrifying aspects of nature. Manilius' account is, furthermore, more inclusive as it contains several explanations of the nature and derivation of the Milky Way. In a sense, then, Manilius' attempt to explain the Milky Way through recourse to natural philosophy, myth, or social and political history resembles Phaethon's ride through the heavens, inasmuch as he embraces the heavens and stars. In contrast to Aratus, Manilius' quest thus models Phaethon's and achieves sublimity.

Five chapters on Lucretian topics follow. Abigail Buglass explores the role of repetition and internal allusion in representing the atomistic world of Lucretius: these techniques enable the reader both to visualize and, ultimately, to believe in Lucretius' teaching. Crucial for Buglass' analysis is the analogy between letters and atoms: just as letters can be rearranged to create different words, so can atoms be combined in different ways and create different substances. This analogy forms the basis for the intellectual arrangement of Lucretius' poem in which language is made to mirror reality, a point made also by Jenny Strauss Clay in her chapter. The repetition of the analogy is important for the construction of the argument as is the insistence on the order and arrangement of the letters/atoms (elementa). At the same time, each occurrence of the analogy is found in a different context and differs from its other iterations, though together all iterations raise important questions on the nature of matter and material generation, suggesting a link between the elementa of language, of physical matter, and of the poem's teaching. In the end, the poem's argumentative strategy mirrors the way in which the world is built up: just as atoms are combined to create the entire cosmos, so do the complex arguments of DRN arise from the combination of more elemental, fundamental propositions.

Whether Lucretius' imagery is clear is the question that Joseph Farrell asks in his contribution to this volume. Starting by exploring whether poetry or philosophy takes precedence in the DRN and the various critical responses to it, Farrell focuses on ambiguity and clarity and the interpreters' tendency to deny or explain away ambiguities in Lucretius so as to preserve clarity in his poetry. Lucretius is perceived either as a philosopher, in which case consistency with Epicurus' teachings is sought, or as a poet, which implies that the same standards of interpretation (that admit obscurity and further layers of meaning) apply to him as do to other poets. Furthermore, the fact that Lucretius chose to write poetry, even if Epicurus was not as hostile to poetry in general as was once believed, is still in conflict with the master's view, since Lucretius' poem is intended as a vehicle for instruction. This leads Farrell to a discussion of clarity in Lucretian imagery in which he examines the ancient critical tradition,

both Greek and Roman, on the issue of clarity and concludes that Lucretius' images do not aim at clarity but vividness.

As so many of the present contributions argue, the function of imagery in didactic poetry is to render the invisible visible. Eva Marie Noller's paper focuses on the DRN and Lucretius' use of images to illustrate the nature and behavior of invisible atoms, but she engages more particularly with cases where the correspondence between the image and what it illustrates is imperfect or what she calls "broken" images. The famous analogy of atoms and letters breaks down because of their incommensurability, yet the words formed by the letters of Lucretius' text can and do convey the plenitude and complexity of his atomic cosmos. The image of the shipwreck, on the other hand, invoked to illustrate how a finite number of atoms cannot come together in a "sea" of infinite space to form visible objects, undermines the explicit teaching by presenting an image of dissolution, of flotsam and jetsam. Thus, the gaps or inconsistencies in Lucretius' imagery open venues for deeper understanding.

Noah Davies-Mason offers an interesting case of indirect polemics involving didactic imagery by showing how Lucretius avoids the musical analogy that forms the basis of the theory of the relation of the body and soul as a kind of harmony. Lucretius gives prominence to his refutation of this view for both philosophical and poetic reasons. Philosophically the theory advocates a kind of monism that could compete with the Epicurean monistic view of the soul as bodily substance. But, in addition, the harmony theory has a kind of poetic charm that might attract his readers; hence Lucretius eschews auditory language in his refutation. Davies-Mason thus provides a negative example of a competing didactic analogy—the view of the body-soul as a kind of harmony—by refusing to use the language the analogy implies.

Starting from general considerations on the definition of imagery (trope, metaphor) in relation to the genre of didactic poetry, Monica Gale argues for a more complex understanding of metaphor as being "reversible": while, for instance, in Vergil animals may resemble humans, so too humans may resemble animals, especially when they succumb to passion and disease. Crucially, metaphors are to be understood both literally and metaphorically. This is demonstrated through Lucretius' account of the plague in Athens that both reports a historical event and acts as a symbolic account that influences the perception of any subsequent plague narrative in later didactic poets. The notion of the philosopher as a medical doctor who heals ^^^^ through his teaching finds its application in the DRN, for instance in the famous simile of the honeyed medicine-cup, but also in the description of the plague. In contrast to the medical doctors who are unable to cure the plague, the poem emerges, according to Gale, as a pharmakon that can heal the psychological sufferings faced by those uninitiated in the Epicurean doctrine, sufferings which resemble those experienced by people visited by the plague. Monica Gale further looks at the reception of this passage. Vergil's handling of the

plague at Noricum emphasizes the lack of human control over many aspects of nature and the limitations of didactic authority. Grattius, on the other hand, inverts Vergil's pessimism, and shows that medicine is reliable and efficient, which resonates with his treatment of artes (hunting, war) in his Cynegetica. Manilius, finally, is another didactic poet who echoes Lucretius' description of the plague (via Vergil): his astronomy, in contrast to the other artes, turns out to be infallible. All in all, the poem itself becomes the true cure that is effectuated through the poet's artes.

In his contribution Zackary Rider explores the link between gigantomachic imagery and spontaneous growth in Vergil's Georgics. To be sure, imagery related to earth's spontaneous generation is associated with the Golden Age, but it is also reminiscent of earth's giving birth to such agents of chaos as the Giants or Typhoeus, against whom Jupiter must battle in order to restore order in the cosmos. Zeus' cosmic battles are reflected on the human level in the farmer's continuous struggle with earth's spontaneous production of wild growth (e.g., weeds). While the analogy posited between these two images does not advance the addressee's instruction in farming per se, it invests farming with political and ethical meaning: just as Jupiter brings order to the cosmos, so does the farmer repel earth's chaotic vegetative force. But there is more. Consideration of the ambiguous use of gigantomachic imagery in the Georgics and the Aeneid adds a further, destabilizing element into the analogy, while Jupiter's destroying the farmer's works through his storm, the same works that are compared to Jupiter's civilizing activity, calls this initial equation into question. From Rider's analysis it emerges that while imagery may be employed to clarify the poet's didactic message, it can also complicate or undermine it, as is also demonstrated in John F. Miller's chapter on Ovid's Ars Amatoria.

Two chapters on Ovidian didactic follow. Time as a subject of didactic poetry presents special challenges: it is invisible, cannot be touched, heard, or smelled; nevertheless, it is omnipresent and pervasive and can only be observed through the perception of movement and change. Anke Walter's contribution on Ovid's Fasti, which frames time within the cyclical Roman calendar and its festivals, nevertheless conveys the unique events that precipitated its recurrent rituals. As Walter points out, Ovid self-consciously redeploys the language of metamorphoses—of his own Metamorphoses—to convey the past act that becomes an aetion for a repeated action. While the earlier poem focused on a unique transformation and its permanence, the later composition emphasizes the change from one kind of temporality to another: linear irreversible time, to an orderly continuous and recurrent time. With the taming of time comes a taming of the gods, no longer actively and often violently intervening in human affairs, but now duly celebrated in their yearly festivals. Yet, as Walter also notes, the calendar itself is not exempt from change, as Augustus makes revisions and inserts himself into the calendrical agenda. Moreover, by harking back to his earlier work, Ovid places himself in the grip of temporal transformation.

The use of mythological exempla to illustrate a didactic point constitutes one of the commonest tropes in didactic poetry. As a persuasive device it can be traced back to the tale of Meleager in Phoenix's speech in Iliad 9 or Achilles' attempt to console Priam through his evocation of Niobe in Book 24. The mythic parallels allow the didactic poet to reinforce his argument by appealing to the shared cultural background uniting reader and addressee. But they can also be used in unconventional ways; thus, Lucretius can describe Iphigeneia's sacrifice to bolster his contention of the evils of religio, but he can also evoke the punishments of the great sinners in the underworld to undermine the whole traditional notion of punishment after death and reinterpret his examples as paradigms of the mental suffering before death of those who do not understand the nature of mortality. John F. Miller's contribution offers a typically Ovidian take on the use of the illustrative exemplum to prove the point that female lust far surpasses men's erotic desires. This in turn is a crucial part of Ovid's argument that it is easy to seduce women, if only one follows his instructions. Pasiphae's lust for the bull provides an elaborate example which Ovid recounts with his usual wit and learning, but he quickly moves into the outlandish and absurd, which undermines the whole didactic purpose of the praeceptor amoris; the grotesque passion of Pasiphae and her ilk might well quickly cool the erotic interest of Ovid's student.

Arnold Bärtschi adopts a geopoetic approach to the Periegesis of Dionysius of Alexandria and examines literary landscapes that preserve memory through intertextuality. The poet's allusive language allows the reconstruction of a hidden imagery which informs the descriptions of geographical spaces that are beyond the poet's and reader's horizon of knowledge. Such language presupposes an equally learned reader who perceives the intertextual links and activates the hidden references embedded in the image. Similes thus become nodal points which do not only illustrate the geographical places discussed, but also invite the reader to engage in a specific kind of reading and decoding. At the same time, Dionysius' practice is given further perspective through a comparison with Avienius, who reduces the reference to Greek material but introduces Vergilian references, and Priscian, who besides introducing the Christian God as the creator of the cosmos includes further Greek and Roman intertextual references.

Two chapters on didactic Cynegetica round off the volume. Christoph Leidl's contribution on Grattius' Cynegetica first explores the intimate connection between war and hunting in the Roman imagination before turning to the extensive use of military imagery throughout Grattius' didactic poem. Thus, for the Romans hunting was not only a preparation for warfare, but also one of the fundamental artes that defined human civilization insofar as the war against the wild beasts formed an essential step in the development of human communities. With Grattius' anthropomorphizing of dogs, and his equation of the training of dogs to military and political command, the lines between human and animal become increasingly blurred as does the distinction between hunting as the key to human progress and the imperial ambitions of first-century Rome. At a certain point, Grattius quite

consciously makes it impossible to disentangle the didactic subject matter, hunting, from the military imagery used to convey it. At lines 328–336, for instance, only the word catulis gives away the fact that it is the commander of the dogs rather than of a band of soldiers that is being discussed. Hunting emerges as a cultural activity (a pastime or digression) that enables us to understand the central characteristics of organized political life under Augustus. Hence, as Leidl puts it: "the question naturally arises: What is really being taught here?"

Finally, Athanassios Vergados explores how the image of the path is used in ps.-Oppian's Cynegetica. To be sure, this is an image already known from archaic hexameter poetry, including didactic. The paths in ps.-Oppian's poem are both literal and metaphorical, a point that calls to mind Monica Gale's observations in relation to digressions in didactic poetry. On the one hand, we have the actual paths trodden by hunters in the woods; we also meet the path as the trajectory of the poet's poetic career, his poetic (intertextual) models, especially Oppian's Halieutica. The path is further a powerful metapoetic image with clear references to Callimachus' poetic program in the Aetia, as well as the paths (cross-references) established by the poet throughout his work that imply a plan of organization. In particular, the metapoetic image of the path creates a tension between the poet's quest for innovation and his observing concrete poetic models. This tension is resolved through ps.-Oppian's agonistic relation towards his predecessors, his re-interpretation of known myths, and through his invention of mythological aetia that transmit obscure or unparalleled information.

The papers presented here do not aim at completeness nor even a survey of the use of imagery in ancient didactic. Rather, they represent points of provocation meant to inspire further exploration of the use of imagistic language in relation to the object being taught. The use of imagery can clarify and illuminate, but it can also complicate and even undermine or obfuscate the overt didactic message. The presence of a real or implied addressee invites our active engagement and ultimately our scrutiny of language and meaning. <>

Wisdom, Love, and Friendship in Ancient Greek Philosophy: Essays in Honor of Daniel Devereux

edited by Georgia Sermamoglou-Soulmaidi and Evan Robert Keeling [Beiträge zur Altertumskunde, De Gruyter, ISBN: 9783110701210]

This volume consists of fourteen essays in honor of Daniel Devereux on the themes of love, friendship, and wisdom in Plato, Aristotle, and the Epicureans. Philia (friendship) and eros (love) are topics of major philosophical interest in ancient Greek philosophy. They are also topics of growing interest and importance in contemporary philosophy, much of which is inspired by ancient discussions. Philosophy is itself, of course, a special sort of love, viz. the love of wisdom. Loving in the right way is very closely

connected to doing philosophy, cultivating wisdom, and living well. The first nine essays run the gamut of Plato's philosophical career. They include discussions of the >Alcibiades<, >Euthydemus<, >Gorgias<, >Phaedo<, >Phaedrus<, and >Symposium<. The next four essays turn to Aristotle and include treatments of the >Nicomachean Ethics< and >Politics< as well as the lesser-known works >Protrepticus< and >Magna Moralia<. The volume ends with friendship in the Epicureans. As a whole, the volume brings out the centrality of love and friendship for the conception of the philosophical life held by the ancients. The book should appeal to anyone interested in these works or in the topics of love, friendship, or wisdom.

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This volume of essays is a Festschrift for Dan Devereux, who taught at the University of Virginia for more than 40 years. In his time at Virginia he has mentored and inspired many students, graduates and undergraduates, and has made major contributions to Plato's ethics, Aristotle's metaphysics, and many other areas of Greek philosophy. As he has recently retired, the time is ripe to recognize these contributions. To this end a number of his colleagues, scholars and recent students have contributed to this volume in his honor.

The present book discusses friendship, love, and wisdom. Philia (friendship) and eros (love) are topics of major philosophical interest in Plato and Aristotle; they are also topics of growing interest and importance in contemporary philosophy, much of which is inspired by ancient discussions. Philosophy is itself a special sort of love, viz, the love of wisdom. Loving in the right way is very closely connected to doing philosophy, cultivating wisdom, and living well.

Wisdom's central importance is brought out in Michael Ferejohn's discussion of wisdom and good fortune in Plato's Euthydemus. Ferejohn examines some passages in the Euthydemus where Socrates

seems to commit himself to the implausible position that anyone who possesses wisdom does not need good fortune in addition in order to do well and be eudaimôn. He first considers and rejects attempts to avoid this consequence by attributing to Socrates the "Proto-Stoic" view that wisdom consists in eliminating all desires whose satisfaction is contingent upon external factors. He then examines the broader context of the problematic passages and argues that, according to Socrates, good fortune is one of those goods that can't be pursued or acquired directly, and the best and only way to acquire good fortune is by cultivating wisdom. Andrew Beer argues that the great aspiration of Plato's Gorgias is towards a rhetoric of friendship, one that takes as its model the style of conversation both practiced and promoted by Socrates himself. The argument draws upon the many passages wherein Socrates pauses from his argument to reflect on the nature and ultimate purpose of his style of conversation; Plato thus depicts a kind of speech that can generate and foster the most stable kind of friendship. Continuing our focus on the Gorgias, James Doyle discusses the relationship between Socrates and his most interesting interlocutor in the dialogue, Callicles. Doyle brings out the conflict between these two characters' pre-rational commitments — their loves. Given these underlying psychological differences, the use of dialectic is put into question. Plato is showing us, Doyle argues, that there are sorts of psychic conflict which need not manifest themselves in contradictory beliefs. Georgia Sermamoglou-Soulmaidi discusses love in Plato's Alcibiades, questioning a long standing interpretation of Platonic love as entirely self-involved on the part of the lover, and proposing that the beloved is in fact loved for his own sake, rather than for the benefit the lover expects to draw from the relationship. Jenny Strauss Clay proposes a reconstruction of the spatial arrangements in the andrôn in Plato's Symposium. She explores the ways in which the seating arrangement reflects the interactions between the guests, including role reversals between lovers and objects of love. Gwen Nally seeks to explain why beauty stands atop the philosophical lover's epistemic ascent in the Symposium and, in doing so, proposes a novel theory of the significance of love in the philosophical enterprise. By loving correctly, she argues, one learns to properly perceive beauty; this, in turn, is a way of learning to infallibly identify what is good. In other words, love is such an important part of Platonic philosophy because, when properly undertaken — when love's object is true beauty — it is a foolproof way of pursuing what is valuable. Mary Louise Gill discusses love, true rhetoric, and philosophy, but her main argument is that in the Phaedrus Socrates is playing the role of true rhetorician in his oral performance, but our author Plato has written a work of philosophy and is prodding us to query Socrates' critique of writing. Thus she is discussing two compositions, one oral and one written, and arguing that they are doing different things. Doug Reed addresses a worry that arises in the Phaedo: what will Socrates' friends do when he is dead? Reed argues that the dialogue responds to this concern: By modeling a proper philosophical attitude and furnishing his friends with opportunities to engage in a genuine philosophical discussion, Socrates does his best to ensure that his friends will live well without him. The Phaedo is famous for its discussion of recollection and innatism, a new reading of which is given by Gail Fine. She discusses the general assumption that, in the Phaedo, Plato is some sort of innatist. But there are many varieties of innatism, and many reasons for favoring some version of it. She asks whether any version of innatism is favored in the Phaedo; on what grounds it is favored, if it is; and why, if it isn't, it is so often thought to be favored.

The role of love and friendship is also brought out, this time with respect to Aristotle, in Robert Bolton's contribution, which explores the origins of Aristotle's practical moral wisdom (phronêsis) in love. In this ambitious paper, Bolton explores Aristotle's role as trailblazer of an ethical school of thought which rejects the view that there is an accurate, universal account of how we ought to act.

Since he rejects the Platonic picture on which moral knowledge is essentially the mere application of invariable and precise principles available in theoretical science, Aristotle is obliged to develop an alternative picture of moral knowledge which respects his idea that ethics does not admit the precision and invariability of theoretical science. To fill out Aristotle's alternative account, Bolton explainsc the nature of and the way to reach phronêsis. Evan Keeling discusses the necessity of philosophy itself for human life, arguing in addition that the Protrepticus represents early evidence for Aristotle's distinction between practical and theoretical wisdom — a distinction not accepted by Plato. Pierre Pellegrin also takes on Aristotle's philia — this time its political importance for Aristotle's properly functioning polis. Love and friendship, therefore, have both an important ethical and political role to play. Terence Irwin's contribution is a detailed analysis of some passages on friendship from the Magna Moralia, an under-discussed work. He draws some important conclusions for the relationship between the MM and Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics. Ending the volume is Michael Papazian's piece on the possibility of Epicurean friendship. Papazian argues that Epicurean communal living and practices make it so that friendship, though painful when a loved one dies, still contributes to the good life. The paper also discusses the Stoic and some aspects of the Aristotelian view of friendship.

What the volume adds up to, then, is a coherent discussion of love and friendship and their contribution to the philosophical life in ancient Greek philosophy. It does not, of course, cover every passage or nuance. But taken as a whole it presents the reader with a good overview of the topic. It touches on important aspects of ethics, moral psychology and politics. The essays on Plato discuss a number of different dialogues from more than one period in Plato's career, thus allowing for a comparison of Plato's views. The essays on Aristotle also run the gamut from apparently early works like the Magna Moralia and the Protrepticus to the Nicomachean Ethics and the Politics. Our aim has been to avoid rehashing the same well-trod territory, such as the famous discussion of friendship in Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics, and to break new ground.

Dan Devereux represents, in his own life, the ideals of philosophy and friendship we find in Plato and Aristotle. He combines philosophical acuity with a generosity of spirit systematically shown to those who cross his path. We write about philosophical friendship in honor of a friend for whom friendship and philosophy go hand in hand. <>

Living Toward Virtue: Practical Ethics in the Spirit of Socrates by Paul Woodruff [Oxford University Press, 9780197672129]

In **Living toward Virtue,** Paul Woodruff shows how we can set about living ethically through self-questioning, which enables us to avoid moral injury by getting clear about what we are doing and why we are doing it. Self-questioning also helps us recognize the limits of our knowledge and so to avoid the danger of self-righteousness. Using real-life examples, Woodruff shows how we can nurture our souls, enjoy a virtuous happiness, and avoid moral injury as much as possible.

This is in the spirit of Socrates, who urged everyone to commit to a lifelong activity of self-examination. By contrast, modern philosophers who follow Aristotle in ethics have mostly taught that living well depends on having virtues that are robust traits of character. Traits are not reliable in all situations,

however, and they do not help us make hard decisions. Having a trait is no substitute for the activity we need to practice in order to live toward virtue.

Written for anyone interested in answers to ancient questions about how to live ethically, as well as those engaged with current debates, **LIVING TOWARD VIRTUE** represents the culmination of decades of scholarship by one of its most distinguished figures.

- Shows the practicality of Socratic philosophy by applying ethics to real-life situtions
- Gives virtue ethics a fresh look and lays the groundwork for future work in ethics
- Solidifies the importance of Socrates in modern-day philosophy
- Shows how to Socrates' ideas can be put into use today

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I hope this book will be like the sting of a gadfly—a challenge to all who think about ethics to think about the subject in unaccustomed ways both new and old: new in paying attention to what social science teaches us about how best to avoid moral error and injury, old by going back to Socrates and trying to work out how to live his life of questioning.

When I began to write about reverence and other virtues, in the late 1990s, I had Aristotle's theory in mind. I thought any talk of virtues had to use Aristotle's framework, although not necessarily his accounts of individual virtues. Then in 2014 I revised my book on reverence and started to see that

Aristotle's framework did not suit the work I was doing; his virtues seemed static, whereas I needed an approach that called for a lifelong activity. And so I began to fall back on an earlier approach to virtue—that of Socrates in Plato's earlier dialogues.

In this book I present a neo-Socratic approach to virtue ethics—a modern virtue ethics that takes as its starting points three Socratic proposals. The first one is that we should all take on the self-care of our souls, our moral selves—epimeleisthai tes psyches as Socrates insists in the Apology. This entails the second proposal, that we should keep up a kind of relentless self-examination that maintains human wisdom—which consists largely in an understanding of our cognitive limitations in ethics, that is, of our lack of any wisdom or knowledge that could guarantee our virtue. Epimeleisthai also entails the third proposal, that we should pay utmost attention to avoiding moral injury. From these three proposals a great deal follows for a practical approach to virtue ethics. This approach makes a little headway in solving theoretical problems, but its main value lies in the activity of self-care that it explores. That is why I put Practical Ethics in the title of this book.

Neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics goes well beyond Aristotle, and this book goes beyond Socrates in developing a practical neo-Socratic ethics. Socrates does not tell us how, with our cognitive limitations, we should practice the care of the self, which is the care of the soul. Nor does Socrates tell us how to pursue virtue in our lives when it is an ideal that appears to be beyond our reach during our lifetimes. In what follows I try to fill in these gaps, using resources from modern thinkers such as Kant, recent philosophers such as Hampshire and Hursthouse, as well as teachings from other ancient traditions—Judaism, Christianity, and Confucianism. I will also confront contemporary issues such as moral conflict, asking whether moral dilemmas are real or apparent, and whether that difference matters to the care of the soul. I treat such technical issues in appendices to the relevant chapters; general readers may pass over them.

Don't expect to find here a virtue ethics that could stand as a rival on equal footing with theories such as utilitarianism or deontology. Some thinkers have tried to provide such a virtue ethics. My goal, however, has been simply to fill in practical details of ethics on a Socratic model. Theory-making is an obstacle for approaching this goal, as I will show in the course of my argument. In making and defending theories, philosophers tend to distract themselves from the hard real-life issues we all face in trying to live virtuously.

From a practical point of view, I will consider why we would be unwise to suppose that we can protect ourselves from moral injury simply by cultivating habits or character traits. A far better protection comes from keeping up the activity of epimeleisthai: that is, examining ourselves as we go along with two purposes: To keep remembering what it is to have merely human wisdom, so that we know we can't safely pause the activity of self-examination, and to keep ourselves as clear as we can as to what we are actually doing at each point. Given our innate desire to think well of ourselves, and with merely human wisdom to go on, we can easily deceive ourselves as to what we are doing. The speaker in Camus' Plague states it well: if we don't call murder "murder" we may do a wrong that will plague our souls. Ethics in the spirit of Socrates (as I propose to understand it) calls for a life-long activity of soul. Keeping a soul active in this way makes it beautiful. <>

THE ENNEADS OF PLOTINUS, A COMMENTARY | VOLUME 1 by Paul Kalligas [Princeton University Press, 9780691154213]

The first volume in a landmark commentary on an important and influential work of ancient philosophy

This is the first volume of a groundbreaking commentary on one of the most important works of ancient philosophy, the *Enneads* of Plotinus—a text that formed the basis of Neoplatonism and had a deep influence on early Christian thought and medieval and Renaissance philosophy. This volume covers the first three of the six *Enneads*, as well as Porphyry's *Life of Plotinus*, a document in which Plotinus's student—the collector and arranger of the *Enneads*—introduces the philosopher and his work. A landmark contribution to modern Plotinus scholarship, Paul Kalligas's commentary is the most detailed and extensive ever written for the whole of the *Enneads*.

For each of the treatises in the first three *Enneads*, Kalligas provides a brief introduction that presents the philosophical background against which Plotinus's contribution can be assessed; a synopsis giving the main lines and the articulation of the argument; and a running commentary placing Plotinus's thought in its intellectual context and making evident the systematic association of its various parts with each other.

THE ENNEADS OF PLOTINUS: A COMMENTARY | VOLUME 2 by Paul Kalligas, translated by Nickolaos Koutras [Princeton University Press, 9780691158266]

The second volume in a landmark commentary on an important and influential work of ancient philosophy

This is the second volume of a groundbreaking commentary on one of the most important works of ancient philosophy, the *Enneads* of Plotinus—a text that formed the basis of Neoplatonism and had a deep influence on early Christian thought and medieval and Renaissance philosophy. This volume covers *Enneads* IV and V, which focus on two of the principal "hypostases" of Plotinus's ontological system, namely the soul and the Intellect. Paul Kalligas provides an analytical exegesis of the arguments, along with an account of Plotinus's principal sources, references to other parts of his work, and a systematic evaluation of his overarching theoretical aspirations. A landmark contribution to Plotinus scholarship, this is the most detailed and extensive commentary ever written for the whole of the *Enneads*.

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The present volume continues my commentary on the Enneads by adhering to the format established by the first volume published in 2014. It reflects the arrangement of Plotinus' works in Porphyry's original edition, which is further reproduced in the manuscript tradition and is adopted by Paul Henry and Hans-Rudolph Schwyzer in dividing the Greek text for their monumental editions. The commentary pertains to the contents of Enneads IV and V, following the order of the individual treatises as codified by Ficino's numbering, which is commonly used for referring to them. A minor discrepancy occurs in the numbering of treatises IV 1 and IV 2 for reasons analyzed in the respective introductions. Throughout the commentary, I use the abbreviation "P." for "Plotinus."

It is relatively clear that in these two Enneads Porphyry has included treatises that he regarded as addressing issues related with two of the main "hypostases" of Plotinus' system, namely, the soul and Intellect. This endows them with a fair amount of thematic unity, thus allowing the reader to form a more or less consistent picture of the author's overall views on the relevant subjects, albeit Plotinus' treatises are notorious for interweaving a variety of topics at any particular part of his work. My commentary aims, in part, to bring to the foreground these associations between the various treatments of a subject, in order to facilitate the reader of the text to reach a reasonably comprehensive understanding of the philosopher's insights.

In P.'s ontological system the soul constitutes the lowest of the three modes of being that are known as "hypostases" and, as such, represents the point at which supra-sensible reality is thought to come into some kind of "contact" with the realm of perceptible realities. This position allows it to mediate between the eternal immutability of the intelligible beings and the perpetually changing realm of sensible

bodies, making it key to comprehending the structure of this entire system, and more specifically how transcendent entities are called upon to explain the organization and workings of the world of everyday experience. At the same time, psychical life is of course bound up with the level at which our experiences occur, where each of us acts as a cognitive agent, further pursuing all the variegated activities that define one's overall presence in the world. In this way, the soul constitutes the pole that determines our personal identity, but also our relations to the various planes of reality, acting as a vantage point from which we can discern the diverse manifestations of Being.

In antiquity, the debate surrounding the subject of the soul chiefly focused on two particular groups of phenomena. The first pertains to the biological characteristics that differentiate living organisms from lifeless material objects, positing the soul as the "principle" (arche) of life, as the organizing power that imparts to all living bodies the ability to manifest their various vital functions, acting as constituted and, to a certain degree, self-regulating entities. On the other hand, the existence of soul is also correlated with the capacity that certain living organisms, mainly humans, have to become aware of themselves and their actions, apprehending themselves as distinct and unitary points of reality, as autonomous and self-determined subjects of creative or merely performative acts, and consequently as moral agents.

Plotinus engages with all these aspects. His first and foremost concern, of course, is with the ontological question of the soul's nature, the "mode of being" that soul represents. For, as a Platonist, he understood soul as a supra-sensible substance, an incorporeal, autonomous, and, furthermore, self-sufficient entity, that depends on nothing else—especially body—to be what it is; he also conceived it as a "principle of movement," characterized by an inherent and ceaseless motility, which the soul also imparts on what depends on it, thereby causing all manner of coming-to-be in the sensible realm, even occasioning the birth of time itself (which, it should be remembered, in III 7.11.43-45, is defined as the soul's inherent life in the course of the discursive unfolding of its thoughts). Accordingly, qua entity, the soul cannot become fully integrated in the realm of sensible reality, nor in the purely transcendent plain of the intelligible Forms, whose existence is tied with extratemporal eternity. What remains, then, is to clarify its intermediate position, and the manner in which the peculiarity of each soul is defined, on the basis of which it is also determined with respect to its individuality, that is, how each discrete soul is distinguished from the rest, thereby acquiring a specific individual identity. In fact the soul, as the unifying element of its variform experiences, should obviously possess a lasting character, which brings us face to face with the question of its duration and, ultimately, its immortality.

Yet, as we have already seen, as a knowing subject the soul can also observe itself and engage in introspection. Through this perspective it is able to discover its deeper ties to the intelligible world, whence it originates and on which it depends, a world that is the foundation of its power, but also of its inherent moral predispositions. Philosophical reflection, then, is the supreme expression of psychical life, whose main constituent is rational investigation of the contents of our experiences and the processes involved in perceiving and comprehending them, but also of their relation to their corresponding reality. This is the path toward recognizing the fundamental truths that inform not just the constitution of the world, but also psychical life itself, and culminates with the contemplation of Being in its dynamic multiplicity and, finally, of Being's unique and ineffable supreme principle.

As the principle of motion or change in the world, the soul is not limited to animating the individual organisms but, as Plato diligently argues the Timaeus, it also possesses a cosmic dimension. The cosmic Soul, that mysterious, ancient remnant of animistic beliefs, is put to work to account for the existence of

universal natural laws that permeate and regulate the world as a living organism, that is, all the multifarious changes occurring in the cosmos, in a manner that is consonant with the specifications laid down by its intelligible model in the plane of the Forms. Exploring a number of questions pertaining to the conditions, limitations, and circumstances in which the cosmic Soul carries out its task of arranging and providentially ordering of the natural world, P. presents his basic principles, which, in his view, determine the constitution, behavior, and interactions between its various, celestial or earthly, parts. At the same time, he has the opportunity to examine a series of issues concerning phenomena that can be described as "psycho-physical," such as the distribution of the different psychical functions in the living body, as well as the operation of sense-perception and memory, both on the level of the individual and on that of the cosmos.

In general, the inexhaustible variety of the themes related to the soul renders the fourth Ennead, in which Porphyry collected, as he mentions (VP a5.31-3a), "all the treatises whose subject is the soul itself: exceptionally wide-ranging, a reflection of P.'s characteristically "psychocentric" perspective. In his engagement with philosophical investigation P. is generally inclined to take as his central point of reference the consciousness of individuals as chiefly psychical beings, which imparts to his entire oeuvre a character of pronounced introversion and introspective meditation. Furthermore, from this perspective P. takes exceedingly bold steps in exploring the innermost facets of psychical life, posing crucial questions, for example, about the intellectiveness and discursiveness of the soul's thoughts—its consciousness and unconsciousness; the different types of apperception, self-consciousness and self-knowledge that characterize it; the links and differences between the soul's sensation, perception, and intellectual judgment on things—but also its notable versatility in adapting its apprehensive faculties to the nature of the objects on which it focuses its "attention" (prosochë). At the same time, studying the soul as an explanatory principle of sensible reality allows for a fuller understanding of the powers contributing to the constitution of natural objects and the manner in which these powers bind together the various parts of the universe into a multifarious, albeit stable and rational organic unity. All the above make the fourth Ennead one of the most important and exciting in terms of the perspectives for philosophical inquiry that it opens up.

On the other hand, the fifth Ennead is more thematically consistent than all the rest. As noted by Porphyry, VP A,5.32-33, it comprises chiefly the "treatises on the Intellect: but it also contains references to other related matters of psychological and epistemological nature. The Intellect, on which P.'s examination mainly focuses, constitutes the second of his so-called hypostases; it corresponds, roughly speaking, to what in the history of Platonism is often described as "the intelligible world" or the "world of the Forms." Yet, according to P., this is not a mere agglomeration of fixed and inert intellective abstractions. On the contrary, it is a densely interconnected synthesis of active intellects vibrant with vital power; these intellects articulate and manifest the ceaseless potency of the first and supreme principle of everything, the One-Good. This is because Intellect, apart from a system of intelligible objects, constitutes also an organic composite of intelligizing intellective subjects, whose active coexistence renders them mutually dependent on one another through indissoluble relations of coherence of meaning. As a result, if we were to take as our point of departure any one of these and proceed on the basis of the purely logical, or rather (one could claim), semantic methods of analysis and synthesis, we could gradually re-create the entire structure that sustains and determines intellective subjects.

Plotinian theory regarding the hypostasis of the Intellect can therefore be regarded as an entirely unique synthesis of the Platonic theory of the Forms with Aristotelian noology, For, on the one hand, analysis of the structure and content of the Intellect can be carried out by employing the Platonic dialectical method, as the multitude of the intelligible beings that constitute it is infused with and governed by the "greatest genera" of Plato's Sophist, which also perform the function of the most general categories of Being. On the other hand, the description of the operation of intellective activity is further guided mainly by the findings of the Stagirite's doctrine, expounded both in book A of the Metaphysics, and in the third book of his De anima: as a result, intellective activity emerges as a manifestation of an inherent, unquenchable, and self-determined vital energy.

It is noteworthy that the range of themes around which the discussion in the various treatises of this Ennead revolves is rather limited if we consider how vastly important the Intellect is in the structure of P.'s overall ontological edifice; this is because it focuses mainly on points that reveal the tensions underlying his attempt to combine and harmonize its aforesaid heterogeneous theoretical origins. Most prominent among these points are the following:

1. Intellect, qua hypostasis, that is, as a mode of being, is distinguished by the fact that it constitutes a multiple unity or "one-many" (hen polla) of jointly articulated entities. It is an intelligible realm populated by clearly determined eternal beings that are distinct from one another, and whose overall structure resembles that of the propositions of a theoretical scientific discipline, for example, Euclidean geometry: each of these is connected to all the rest through stable and immutable a priori relations, so that it "contains" them in some manner; it also "results" from these as their logical, necessary consequence without, however, relinquishing its autonomy and the peculiar character that defines it as an object of intellective apprehension.

2. As already pointed out, the Intellect as a whole, but also the specific Forms that comprise it, are not mere inert semantic abstractions, but active entities, vitally coarticulated in a system of mutually dependent particular intellects that exist in a state of constant and full activation. Yet, ultimately, the object of their intellective activity is their own self, hence this activity of the Intellect turns out to be an eternal and incessant self-intellection.

3. The multiplicity that, as we have seen, is a constitutive feature of Intellect viewed as an intelligible world, represents, according to P., the foremost and crucial indication that Intellect cannot be the supreme principle of everything, which is what Aristotle held. Because, just like the series of numbers, which is the regulatory principle governing any multitude of things, necessitates the existence of another principle, the one, which comes before it and operates as the measure of their constitution, so too a supreme principle, the primordial One, must necessarily precede the multiplicity of intelligible beings; this functions as their starting point, but also as the organizing principle that constitutes them into a unitary system of interdependent realities.

4. The One must be radically distinct from the beings contained in Intellect; but these beings constitute the whole of intelligible "Essence" (ousia). This means that the One must be something beyond both Essence and intellection, an ineffable and utterly transcendent principle that defies any attempt to categorize and delimit it. As such, it will be inaccessible to our cognitive and expressive powers.

5. The Intellect derives from this supreme principle by means of a process that occurs in two distinct stages. During the first stage, an inchoate preliminary version of the Intellect results as a simple and pure otherness vis-à-vis the One, something that is absolutely non-One, that is, a confused and unarticulated multiplicity utterly lacking unity. Subsequently, this is constituted into a unified system of articulated and delineated beings (which, as noted, is the Intellect) by turning toward the principle that "gave birth" to it and by having a "trace" of the One imposed on it as its measure. This entire process (which, of course, is extratemporal) is accomplished on the basis of a peculiar productive system that is fundamental to P.'s ontology and is known as the theory of the "two activities."

The above-mentioned cardinal themes demarcate the range of issues examined in the fifth Ennead, and, naturally, they are accompanied by a wealth of reworkings and extensions, so as to make up a cohesive, albeit certainly singular, synthetic theory on the nature of the Intellect and the intelligible beings contained in it. Yet, a concomitant of precisely this thematic coherence that links the various treatises are the regular repetitions and overlaps in terms of their content, which at times also bring to light certain discrepancies that are mainly due to the fact that the relevant passages were composed at different times: ranging from the very early V 9 [5] and V 4 [7], and the middle sections of the mature so-called Great Treatise (V 8 [31], V 5 [32]), to the rather bold, in terms of its conception, treatment of the subject in V 3 [49]—the author's final and quite ambitious undertaking in the field of epistemology. Hence, in this case I sought to make my explicatory notes briefer and more allusive, emphasizing chiefly the correlations between P.'s different positions on the questions readers are faced with each time, to provide them with a multifaceted, "stereoscopical" (so to speak), view of these from different, yet mutually complementary, perspectives.

The Greek text of the Enneads used as a basis for my commentary is again that of H-S2, and references to it are given in the customary manner by mentioning the number of the pertinent Ennead (in Roman numerals) followed by treatise number (and occasionally the chronological order of the treatise placed in square brackets), number of chapter and line numbers as in H-S2. I normally discuss in my commentary the few cases where I have deviated from the standard text, and I provide a list of all such discrepancies at the end of the volume. Certain technical difficulties in the translation of the ancient text, which also come up in the other Enneads, become rather poignant in the case of the fourth and fifth. In my commentary, I capitalize the first letter when referring to the cosmic Soul as opposed to the individual souls inhabiting the sensible universe. I also capitalize "Intellect" as the overall hypostasis, as well as the individual "Forms" that are contained in it as transcendent and purely intelligible universal entities, chiefly when I deem it necessary to underline this aspect of their nature; in other cases, when, for instance, the reference is to the "intellect" that inheres in the soul as a specific cognitive faculty, or to the formative "forms" (eidë) inherent in sensible bodies, I have opted to write these in lowercase letters. In some cases, naturally, the decision on which of the two is intended is a matter of debate, and depends on the interpretation proposed, for which of course the responsibility is mine. In general, however, I have tried to be frugal with capitalization, resorting to this only where the relevant choice appears rather uncontroversial.

Another point that may appear surprising to some readers is the frequent switch between the neuter and masculine when referring to the supreme principle (usually preserved in Armstrong's translation), which is sometimes described as the One-Good (i.e., to agathon) and sometimes as God (ho theos). In some cases this vacillation is quite recurrent and persistent (as, e.g., in chapters 7 to 9 of "treatise" V 5),

giving the impression that P. purposefully seeks to emphasize the futility of trying to consistently and precisely discuss something that lies beyond ordinary intellectual distinctions, something that language cannot accurately express. In some cases this may cause difficulty for readers; nonetheless, effort has been made so that this stylistic peculiarity does not also entail semantic ambiguity.

The basic principles underlying my commentary are essentially identical to those operative in the first volume, as outlined in my preface there. The sole significant technical difference here pertains to our ability to utilize the testimony of the Arabic tradition when carrying out textual emendations. Recourse to the Arabic tradition is available for the last three Enneads, and I am providing further relevant information in a special appendix to the current volume. A list of suggested further readings, occasionally updated so as to include important recent additions to the literature, is also provided for each treatise, mentioning only those works that focus on that particular text. A consolidated full bibliography will be included at the end of volume 3. <>

Gods and Mortals: Ancient Greek Myths for Modern Readers by Sarah Iles Johnston Princeton University Press, ISBN: 9780691199207]

An entrancing new telling of ancient Greek myths

Gripping tales that abound with fantastic characters and astonishing twists and turns, Greek myths confront what it means to be mortal in a world of powerful forces beyond human control. Little wonder that they continue to fascinate readers thousands of years after they were first told. **Gods and Mortals** is a major new telling of ancient Greek myths by one of the world's preeminent experts. In a fresh, vibrant, and compelling style that draws readers into the lives of the characters, Sarah Iles Johnston offers new narrations of all the best-known tales as well as others that are seldom told, taking readers on an enthralling journey from the origin of the cosmos to the aftermath of the Trojan War.

Some of the mortals in these stories are cursed by the gods, while luckier ones are blessed with resourcefulness and resilience. Gods transform themselves into animals, humans, and shimmering gold to visit the earth in disguise—where they sometimes transform offending mortals into new forms, too: a wolf, a spider, a craggy rock. Other mortals—both women and men—use their wits and strength to conquer the monsters created by the gods—gorgons, dragons, harpies, fire-breathing bulls.

Featuring captivating original illustrations by Tristan Johnston, **Gods and Mortals** highlights the rich connections between the different characters and stories, draws attention to the often-overlooked perspectives of female characters, and stays true both to the tales and to the world in which ancient people lived. The result is an engaging and entertaining new take on the Greek myths.

Review

"This book is a triumph! All of human nature is beautifully and strikingly portrayed in this magnificent retelling of the Greek myths. Readers will find here everything they could possibly want—intrigue, love, lust, revenge, and every sort of behavior, both good and bad. It would be hard to find a better

introduction to that vast body of tales or a better written one."—Alexander McCall Smith, author of the No. 1 Ladies' Detective Agency series

"In the venerable tradition of Edith Hamilton, Sarah Iles Johnston retells the classical tales of ancient Greek mythology with verve and a storyteller's passion. This is a book readers should turn to—and return to often—to appreciate anew these myths in all their grandeur and complexity."–Adrienne Mayor, author of *Flying Snakes and Griffin Claws: And Other Classical Myths, Historical Oddities, and Scientific Curiosities*

"Move over, Edith Hamilton! Sarah Iles Johnston has hit the magical refresh button on Greek myths. Presto, the tales sparkle and shine for a new generation of readers. Like the poets, bards, and rhapsodes of ancient times, Johnston reminds us that there is no single, authoritative version of a myth and that stories are kept alive by adding new ingredients to the old, improving their flavor, zest, and aroma."—Maria Tatar, author of *The Heroine with 1001 Faces*

"**GODS AND MORTALS** is a remarkable achievement, a rare combination of great storytelling and deft scholarship. It reads like a novel, with many nested plots, but it is suffused with deep knowledge of the texts. You can read it front to back as a single story, or you can dip in to check what the ancients really wrote about the Titans or that Trojan horse. Johnston has become our best guide to these myths—to what they are and how their characters come to feel alive to people."—T. M. Luhrmann, author of *How God Becomes Real: Kindling the Presence of Invisible Others*

"**GODS AND MORTALS** is a brilliantly executed narration of ancient Greek myth. Johnston outdoes her predecessors, like Bulfinch, Hamilton, and Graves, in the unadorned clarity of her presentation. The book is masterful and promises to help steer a widening interest in this precious body of terrifically good stories."—Peter Struck, author of *Divination and Human Nature: A Cognitive History of Intuition in Classical Antiquity*

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Gods, Mortals And The Myths They Inhabit

Imagine for a moment that somehow you've managed to transport yourself back to an ancient Greek city. Look around: you're surrounded by myths. In the marketplace, you see gleaming statues of Athena holding a spear and Poseidon wielding his trident. Nearby, images of Theseus fighting the Amazons look down upon you from a temple. If you're invited to an aristocratic home, you'll be served wine from a bowl painted with a mythic scene and drink it from a :up decorated with another one: Zeus in the form of a bull, surging through the sea with Europa on his back, or the hero Peleus wresting with the shape-shifting goddess Thetis. If you stay in the city long enough, you'll watch actors performing myths on stage during public festivals—if you're a man, that is. Greek women didn't go to the theater. Women did attend other festivals in honor of the gods, however, where poets recited myths: you might hear about Deianira murdering her husband, Heracles, or Penelope fooling her suitors by means of that most feminine of all contrivances, her loom. If you linger in the city long enough to get married, the song that's sung at your wedding may refer to a great mythic love story, such as that of the doomed warrior Hector and his wife, Andromache. You'll encounter myths in less formal ways, too—as a woman working wool alongside other women who tell myths to pass the time or as a man at a drinking party, where excerpts from the most admired works of the poets are recited.

Nothing in our own culture compares to this—nothing is embraced by all of us with the same fervor and fidelity with which the Greeks embraced their myths. Certainly, there are stories that all of us (or nearly all of us) have at least heard of, but even the most popular of them have not suffused our cultural landscape as thoroughly as myths suffused that of ancient Greece. We wouldn't be surprised to encounter Harry Potter in a book or a movie or miniaturized as a LEGO action figure, but we'd be very surprised to spot his statue gracing a public building or hear a song about his courtship of Ginny Weasley at a wedding. And, leaving aside a few tenacious exceptions, such as the Bible, Shakespeare's plays and the novels of Jane Austen, even our best-loved stories seldom remain popular for more than two or three generations.

In part, this is because diction and manners tend to become stale and remote as time goes by. Samuel Richardson's novel Pamela; or, Virtue Rewarded was wildly popular for several decades after it was published in 1740. Now, the smaller group of readers who embark upon Pamela's pages must be willing to decode some of its words (what exactly is a "sauce-box," anyway?) and accept a narrative premise that may seem bizarre (did children and parents really sit down and write lengthy letters to each other, once upon a time, as Pamela and her parents did?). To continue to thrive, even the most wonderful stories need to be updated. But another reason that stories don't remain popular very long anymore is that nowadays, if authors borrow plots or characters from other authors' works, they run the risk of being called derivative, unless they make their own contributions abundantly clear in some way—by completely changing the time, the setting and the names of the characters, for example, as Leonard Bernstein did for Romeo and Juliet when he composed West Side Story. In contrast, ancient Greek authors didn't hesitate to borrow plots, times, settings, characters and even details from both earlier authors and their own contemporaries. As long as they did this well, adding their own brilliant touches,

there was no shame in it—there might even be acclaim. In the process, they continually refreshed the myths, ensuring that they remained exciting and relevant.

Indeed, in ancient Greece, anyone who wanted to narrate a myth had to think about earlier versions because they could be sure that most of the people in their audience knew at least the basics of the story they were about to tell. What we now call Greek myths, most Greeks considered to be part of their history, relayed by poets since the time of Homer. When an author narrated one of them, he was doing something like what Cecil B. DeMille did when he retold the story of Moses in his 1956 film, The Ten Commandments. DeMille added intriguing new secondary characters (Queen Nefretiri, for instance) and some thrilling new subplots (Moses's romance with Nefretiri, for example), but no one doubted that he was telling the same story as the Bible had told. In fact, the film won awards from Jewish and Christian organizations for presenting the biblical story to a twentieth-century audience so successfully. Nor was DeMille's film disparaged as derivative: it was a huge box-office hit and is still admired for its accomplishments in filmic narration. Forty-two years later, DeMille's The Ten Commandments inspired DreamWorks to create The Prince of Egypt, an animated version of the biblical story that introduced its own changes and that also net with commercial and critical success.

Similarly, for example, in 458 BCE, when the tragedian Aeschylus retold the well-known story of Orestes in his trilogy of plays called the Oresteia, he innovated upon an old story, too. The final part of Aeschylus's version, which focuses on what happened to Orestes after he avenged his father's murder by killing his mother, studies to the Areopagus, the place in Athens where the court that tried cases of intentional homicide was located. Aeschylus showed Athena establishing that court so that Orestes could be tried by a jury, which was also presented as a brand-new invention within the world of the play. Earlier versions of Orestes's story had resolved his problem in other ways, which has prompted scholars to suggest that Aeschylus revised the age-old tale in order to celebrate recent Athenian civic reforms—particularly those that cleaned up what had become a corrupt and overly powerful Areopagite court. That's not all that Aeschylus's version of Orestes's story is about, of course. If it's well-narrated, the tale of a young man who is forced to kill his mother in order to avenge his murdered father will always be compelling, and Aeschylus narrated it very well, indeed. He gives us foul-breathed Erinyes who pursue Orestes all the way to Delphi and then onwards to Athens; an Apollo who delivers a clever, protoscientific speech in defense of Orestes; and an Athena who deftly transforms the Erinyes, who are furious at having lost their prey, into kindlier goddesses who promise to nurture Athens. All of these additions that Aeschylus made to the story, as expressed by his glorious language, revitalized a well-known myth. Aeschylus received first prize for his Oresteia at the Dionysia, the great Athenian festival that honored Dionysus, the god of drama, and his Oresteia continues to be presented on stage today.

It was in this spirit of both tradition and constant innovation that the Greeks told the same myths for more than a millennium, until the coming of Christianity began to mute their voices. Even then, Christianity couldn't silence the myths completely. In the fourteenth century, an anonymous Franciscan monk composed The Moralized Ovid, a renarration of Ovid's Metamorphoses with allegorizing interpretations that he thought would make it safe reading for Christians. Chaucer redeveloped the myth of Theseus and the Amazons in his Canterbury Tales, Shakespeare drew frequently on Greek myths and an army of Renaissance painters and sculptors busily represented them for wealthy men. In the seventeenth century, Monteverdi used the myths of Orpheus and Ariadne as librettos for the first

operas and Racine revived tragedy with his own tellings of ancient myths. And the reason you're holding this book now is that we still tell them.

Why do we—and why did the Greeks—love these stories? Certainly, one reason is that they do important cultural and social work. Myths explain and endorse the origins of significant institutions, such as the Athenian jury system. Myths help to instill social codes, such as the expectation that hosts and guests will treat each other honorably. Lycaon didn't abide by that rule, and Zeus turned him into a wolf. They reflect feelings that lie deep within the human heart, such as the difficulty of losing a spouse and the dangers of refusing to come to terms with that loss. Orpheus tried twice to retrieve his wife from the land of the dead but failed and ended up dead himself. They warn against the dangers of character flaws such as arrogance: Odysseus boasted about outwitting the Cyclops Polyphemus, and Polyphemus's father, Poseidon, impeded Odysseus's homeward journey for many years.

Other messages are embedded in the myths, too, not all of which make as much immediate sense to their modern readers as those I've just mentioned. Most strikingly, in myths the Greek gods are so frequently fickle and cruel in their treatment of mortals that the two groups seem to be eternally pitted against one another. The mortals constantly strive to rise above the limits that confine them and the gods repeatedly smack the mortals down. Why would the Greeks want to imagine that the very gods whom they worshipped would behave that way? Part of the answer lies in the fact that myth and worship expressed two extremes. Myths presented dreadful, worstcase scenarios and what one prayed for during worship presented the best that one could hope for. Together, these articulated the human condition—a persistent aspiration and struggle to become something better, which was often thwarted but could never be extinguished. Of course, the biggest difference between gods and mortals was that the former lived forever and the latter were fated to die. The many myths in which a mortal tries to evade that destiny and fails—not only the story of Orpheus, but also the stories of Sisyphus and Asclepius, for example—repeatedly drive home this point. The gods had infinite time, as well as infinite power, to accomplish almost anything they pleased, and mortals who wished to survive for even the small numbers of years that the Fates allotted them had to live according to the rules that the gods imposed and to tolerate their fickle temperaments. That is why this book is called Gods and Mortals; the myths that I tell here often express the crucial differences between the two parties. Yet any purpose that a myth serves is secondary to the telling of the myth itself. Unless an author or artist narrates a myth in a lively, engaging way, no one will bother with it—or at least, they won't bother with the version served up by that particular author or artist. "A man killed his mother because she killed his father" is simply a statement. It was what Aeschylus added to that statement that turned it into a myth. So, too, for the poets who came before and after Aeschylus, each of whom created his Orestes with his own twists: Stesichorus, Pindar, Sophocles, Euripides and so on.

I've tried to make the narratives that I'm offering in this book engaging, too, so that the myths will speak to my readers with at least some of the impact that they had in antiquity. To do this, I've not only chosen my words carefully, but also knit into my stories details about the ancient world in which they're set. I've done this in the hope that if my readers have some sense of the harsher realities of such things as disease and hunger in antiquity, the wilder natural environment that Greek women and men confronted and the tighter social constraints under which they lived, then the myths will resonate more fully. My telling of Pandora's story, therefore, includes details about the household duties of ancient Greek women and the plethora of illnesses that continually lay in wait for human victims. My story of

Erigone makes clear how dire a fate it was for a Greek woman to remain unmarried. I've also given some sense of what it was like to worship the gods: my descriptions of Oedipus's and Neoptolemus's visits to the Delphic Oracle express what Apollo's inquirers would have seen and heard at the god's great sanctuary high up in the mountains, and I recount the rituals that the Argonauts performed to appease the anger of the Mother of the Gods. I've woven what we know about the mechanics of ancient looms and the sources of ancient dyes into my story of Arachne and what we know about the ancient way of throwing a discus into my story of Hyacinthus. My stories unfold against the real physical landscapes of ancient Greece and their real fauna and flora.

But as much as I've striven to present my myths within their ancient contexts, I've also been determined not to allow the voices of the ancient authors themselves to dominate my tellings. Although I've drawn my plots and characters from ancient sources and sometimes borrowed their brilliant phrases and imagery, too, I haven't simply translated their narratives into English. Instead, I've created new narratives that have lives of their own. My Odysseus expresses a keener appreciation of his wife's intellect than Homer's did, for instance. And, although the events in my story of Apollo's attempted rape of Daphne closely follow those of Ovid's version, I cast a shadow over Apollo's final action and give Artemis a closing line that is meant to emphasize how little the gods, at least as we meet them in myths, cared about the suffering of their mortal companions.

Indeed, the tone of my stories often parts company with the ancient authors when I narrate rapes or, in the cases of Daphne and Syrinx, attempted rapes. In Greek myths, both gods and mortal men force themselves upon females with alarming frequency, using physical strength, deception or both to satisfy their desires. Ancient narrators often ignored or minimized the damage that these encounters would have wreaked upon their victims. To take but one example, the Homeric Hymn to Demeter tells us that Hades snatched Persephone away from her friends and dragged her into the Underworld, but leaves it largely up to us to imagine, if we choose, how this was experienced by the young goddess herself. There were some exceptions to the rule: Aeschylus sympathetically narrates the ghastly ordeals that Io suffered after Zeus decided to rape her, and Ovid evokes our pity for several victims, most notably Philomela. In every case of rape that I narrate, I, too, have tried to convey the shock or horror that the woman or goddess felt—and in the one instance where a goddess sexually violates a man (Salmacis and Hermaphroditus), I've tried to imagine how he felt, too. It's worth clarifying, in connection with this topic, that what we now consider to be two separate situations—rape and seduction—were scarcely distinguished in antiquity. At the root of their conflation lay the fact that women were meant to be controlled by men. A girl was under the guardianship of her father until she married, at which point she came under the guardianship of her husband. If she were widowed, either her father resumed his role or another male relative took it on. The guardian's responsibilities included ensuring that the woman did not have sex without his permission. In real life, this meant that she would have sex only with the husband to whom her guardian gave her in marriage. In myths, some fathers seize other, unusual opportunities to give their daughters to men, as well. For example, Thespius gives his fifty daughters to Heracles because he wants a crop of strong grandsons (chapter 65) and Pittheus gives his daughter Aethra to King Aegeus of Athens because he wants to forge a stronger link with that city (chapter 93). Of course, if your wife or daughter were impregnated by a god, you were expected to count it an honor and duly raise the child, as do several men in these stories. And of course, in both real life and myths there were women and men who, through choice or necessity, became prostitutes and there were slaves of both genders who, as their master's property, owed him their sexual favors. <>

THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF GREEK AND ROMAN MYTHOGRAPHY edited by R. Scott Smith (Editor), Stephen M. Trzaskoma [Oxford Handbooks, Oxford University Press, 9780190648312]

The field of mythography has grown substantially in the past thirty years, an acknowledgment of the importance of how ancient writers "wrote down the myths" as they systematized, organized and interpreted the vast and contested mythical storyworld. With the understanding that mythography remains a contested category, that its borders are not always clear, and that it shifted with changes in the socio-cultural and political landscapes, **THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF GREEK AND ROMAN MYTHOGRAPHY** offers a range of scholarly voices that attempt to establish how and to what extent ancient writers followed the "mythographical mindset" that prompted works ranging from Apollodorus' Library to the rationalizing and allegorical approaches of Cornutus and Palaephatus.

Editors R. Scott Smith and Stephen M. Trzaskoma provide the first comprehensive survey of mythography from the earliest attempts to organize and comment on myths in the archaic period (in poetry and prose) to late antiquity. The essays also provide an overview of those writers we call mythographers and other major sources of mythographic material (e.g., papyri and scholia), followed by a series of essays that seek to explore the ways in which mythographical impulses were interconnected with other intellectual activities (e.g., geography and history, catasteristic writings, politics). In addition, another section of essays presents the first sustained analysis between mythography and the visual arts, while a final section takes mythography from late antiquity up into the Renaissance. While also taking stock of recent advances and providing bibliographical guidance, this Handbook offers new approaches to texts that were once seen only as derivative sources of mythical data and presents innovative ideas for further research. **THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF GREEK AND ROMAN MYTHOGRAPHY** is an essential resource for teachers, scholars, and students alike.

CONTENTS

1. GREEK AND ROMAN MYTHOGRAPHY TODAY

In 1987 Albert Henrichs concluded an important article by noting that "[l] arge areas of the history of Greek mythography are still unexplored, and several important collections of myths lie ignored," further admonishing us that "[m]odern interpreters of Greek myths must constantly re- examine and strengthen the old foundations. If not, they build castles in the air" (1987: 267). This handbook is a testament to how different matters are today with regard to Henrichs's first assessment and how little they have changed with regard to his second. In the retrospect provided by the passage of some three decades, Henrichs's article seems to straddle a line that divides an earlier period, in which mythography— which for the moment we will define at a broad level as ancient writing about myth or the recounting of myth in prose with no pretensions to artistry— and the suriving mythographical works were seen as having interest only as sources of mythical data and variants, and our current scholarly era, when new approaches have advanced our understanding of the aims and motivations of the works themselves. Although mythography is yet firmly fixed in the minds of some classical scholars as a specialist's marginal enterprise, not only have mythographical works become the object of broader and more intense study, but the very nature of mythography has been investigated more thoroughly, and the extant texts have come to be seen both for their continuing value as sources for Greek myth and for the inherent interest in their role in intellectual and cultural life down to the end of antiquity and beyond. The various chapters in this handbook are intended to take stock of that progress by carefully examining the status of the scholarship on the subject, but also to cultivate additional advances by making more accessible to nonspecialists the important mythographical authors and works and the

practical and theoretical questions that surround them— and, where possible, pointing to outstanding complexities and new avenues for research.

To get a sense of how the landscape has been altered, one need only do a quick scan of the entries in the "References" sections of the individual chapters in this book to see how much scholarship has appeared since the 1990s, especially in Catalan, English, French, German, Italian, and Spanish. The texts of most of the stand-alone mythographical collections have been re- edited (often multiple times, with productive results; for instance, for Ps.- Apollodorus we now have both Papathomopoulos 2010 and Cuartero 2010 and 2012), as have the fragmentary and dispersed texts, most notably, Fowler's edition of the remains of the earliest mythographers (2001), which is now supplemented by his fine commentary (2013). New translations have made most of the main mythographical sources much more accessible, and many are available in more than one language; for example, for Heraclitus the Allegorist's Homeric Problems we now have both the Italian of Pontani (2005) and an English version in Russell and Konstan (2005). The same period has seen the appearance of numerous articles, edited volumes (for instance, Pàmias 2017, on Apollodorus), and full commentaries on individual authors and texts (for example, Brown 2002, on Conon). There has also been a welcome turn to addressing broader questions about the nature of mythography and its methods. While it would be out of place to list all the recent contributions on this subject, we may point further not only to seminal monographs like those of Cameron (2004), Greek Mythography and the Roman World, and of Hawes (2014) on rationalizing, but also to collected volumes that take mythography as their only or main focus: Nagy (2013), Trzaskoma and Smith (2013), and Romano and Marincola (2019). There is also now an international network of scholars and a journal devoted specifically to mythography (Polymnia, https://polymnia-revue.univ-lille.fr/.). On the whole, we have both a clearer picture of the origins of mythography and its survival beyond antiquity, as well as its characteristics and development in the intervening eras.

Of course, much is still unknown or remains mysterious, and much is contested, but it is undeniable that headway has been made and that new pathways are being blazed by an international array of established and emerging researchers, many of whom have authored chapters of this handbook. Most importantly, the questions we ask today about mythography have moved beyond (but not abandoned) source criticism and transmission to querying the very nature of mythography and the place of the mythographical impulse and its methodological elaborations and presentations in the intellectual, artistic and cultural life of the ancient Greek and Roman worlds. This explains why this handbook contains chapters not only on authors traditionally deemed mythographers but also on ones that seek to connect mythographical thinking and activities with other domains of knowledge and life, from the visual arts to politics. In the next section, we discuss a broad intellectual rationale for the handbook and consider the boundaries of what we can call "mythography." In the third section, we then give a brief overview of the volume's organization and contents.

2. THE NATURE(S) OF GREEK AND ROMAN MYTHOGRAPHY

At the center of Part I of the handbook is an attempt to sketch an overview of mythography across more than a millennium, from its initial impulses in oral poetry in the archaic period to the end of the western Roman empire. It will be immediately obvious that there is no simple definition of what constitutes "mythography," especially since responses to what we call the mythical story world constantly evolved along with political, literary, and cultural changes, sometimes upheavals, over the longue durée. As Bremmer (2013: 56) succinctly puts it, mythography is polymorphous, and its function

"clearly varied according to the time and place of its production." Because of the many approaches to the mythical story world, establishing absolutely clear boundaries for a genre of mythography or defining a corpus of mythographers, even within a single era, is destined to fail. Even for the period from which we have the richest set of complete works that we call mythographical, the imperial period, we face a "complex ensemble of writing practices, whose borders with other practices remain porous" (Delattre in this volume, p. 78).

We might pose the problem in another way: Is our definition of mythography simply a matter of convenience for modern scholars attempting to corral the wide- ranging responses to what we call myth? This is precisely the approach Pellizer took in the foundational article in which he defines mythography as the "activity of recording and transmitting in writing the narrative and descriptive material . . . that we normally call mythical" (1993: 283, with note 2). Although this runs the risk of making mythography, like myth (Delattre 2010; Edmunds 2021: xv–xxix), a "trash can category" (catégorie poubelle) or "dumping ground" (fourre-tout), such a generalizing view has one great advantage: it allows us to adopt our etic category and avoid confronting the details of the debates over the contested concept of "myth" itself, specifically when (if ever) "myth" became an emic category for the Greeks, a question of particular importance when we are trying to think strictly about the earliest period, when Acusilaus and Pherecydes— whom modern scholars often identify as the first mythographers— began transmitting "mythical" material in prose. To some degree, this handbook follows Pellizer's lead in casting our net widely over the various products that seem to emerge from what we (the editors) call "a mythographical mindset," which we will explore more below.

And yet, though there is hardly space here to cover such a complicated and probably insoluble problem, the question of whether mythography could exist in the earliest period is a pressing one— and an example of the productive disagreement and tension one will find in these pages precisely because consensus is impossible. If we are to imagine mythography as a self-conscious category of intellectual activity, this requires the pre- existence of an emic category of "myth." In other words, for a writer to know that he was producing mythography, even in the broadest sense, "myth" already had to be a recognizable category for the Greeks themselves. Few would vigorously argue against the notion that, after Thucydides, and certainly after Plato, myth had been decisively distinguished from history and had taken on a meaning that approaches our own conception of the word. Whether a category "myth"— and so "mythography"— can be pushed back in time is precisely the subject of two chapters in this handbook that come to different conclusions. Reviewing the activities of the earliest writers we regularly call mythographers and reminding us that the term mythographos does not occur before the 2nd century BCE (unless the occurrence in Palaephatus is original) and that mythographia is first found in Strabo, Calame in this volume (p. 464) concludes that "it is not possible to speak of 'mythography' as a genre or even as a critical activity before the end of the 4th century BCE." Since those who were cataloging the stories of the earliest periods had no conception of myth as separate from accounts of the past generally, their activity dealt with what we call the mythical story world but which they simply saw as events of the past.

Whether one agrees with Calame's position depends on whether one accepts myth as an early and "autonomous form of thought (Denkform)," as Pàmias champions as the triumph of modern scholarship on myth (p. 32). If this is correct, then even the Homeric epics are an "early form of appropriation and reception of myth," and myth was something that could be abstracted and set down into writing. We

take such summary accounts for granted, but it should be remembered that abstracting stories typically belonging to the realm of poetry and committing them to prose "was an act of great intellectual imagination" (Fowler 2017: 18). Whether or not writers such as Pherecydes would have labeled themselves mythographers or conceived of themselves as producing what we call mythography, they "were already in possession of a category comparable to myth, being understood as a type of account that belongs to a heritage from which they were separated by a gap, and onto which they can cast an objective gaze" (Pàmias p. 34). If myth as Denkform existed in the archaic period, then we should not be surprised to find, already in the earliest poetic forms, "a good deal of explanation, commentary and interpretation" of stories that resembles later mythographical forms (Nieto Hernández p. 14). In other words, from the beginning, myth- making was self- reflective, and stories were understood as an object of analysis, redefinition, and, potentially, rejection. After all, for Pindar to actively reject a theologically inadmissible myth about Tantalus, Pelops, and the gods, that version of the myth not only had to be available and known but capable of being rejected in favor of a more palatable one.

If myth is one element of the compound mythography, the other is, of course, writing. Although the exact contours are hard to trace, the emergence of writing as a widespread technology in the archaic period was a necessary precondition both for recording and preserving stories and for serious collection, analysis, and comparison of them. In particular, as Pàmias demonstrates (pp. 38–42), the development of prose writing, removed from the performative context, opened up the path to the construction of the "author" as the locus of authority removed from the influence of the Muses. If the widespread use of writing was a precondition for the earliest mythographical writing, the evolution of a literary culture and a wider availability of books in the 4th century led to increasingly frequent critical activity around myth precisely because any piece of mythographical writing in turn became, alongside the underlying literary texts, a source for the next mythographer down the line, something that becomes obvious from the way in which later mythographers cite both poetic and prose mythographical writers as authorities, although the question of the nature, purpose, and meaning of such citations is a contested matter (see Cameron 2004: 88– 123, esp. 93– 94).

In considering the emergence of a literary culture that was establishing the material and cultural conditions making it possible for mythography and other forms of scholarship to evolve, we should not underestimate the special role of tragedy, not only as the object of study (for example, by Asclepiades of Tragilus, 4th c. BCE), but also for the way it was both influenced by and perpetuated mythographical conventions already in place— a twin process that Meccariello in this volume describes as a "coevolution of tragedy and mythography" (p. 300). Naturally, the Great Library of Alexandria and other academic centers, such as Pergamon, provided extensive material resources for mythographers, such as Lysimachus, and grammatici, such as Apollodorus of Athens (see Smith and Trzaskoma, "Hellenistic Mythography," in this volume) to conduct research, and for poets to mine as they created innovative poetry, much of which reflects what might be called a "mythographical mindset" (see Sistakou in this volume; we will return to this concept).

It is not uncommon to see a teleological view of mythography, where the protomythographical impulses (genealogical work, catalogs, narrative- as- history) gradually coalesce into a genre or separate discipline at some point in the Hellenistic period. Such a view, however, effaces the great variety of writing practices involving myth that we have been pointing to. Leaving aside the difficulty of saying anything about the Hellenistic period with certainty, from which there is but one extant text (Palaephatus, not

unproblematic: see Koning in this volume), we encounter an immense range of mythographical products from the imperial period. We can point to the comprehensive Library of Ps.-Apollodorus; the rather wild revisionist histories of Dares and Dictys; the thematic collection of metamorphoses of Antoninus Liberalis; collections of narratives keyed to Homer (the Mythographus Homericus); and the Stoic theological work of Cornutus that allegorizes the gods. Even where form or technique overlap, there are also major differences of approach, which becomes even more obvious as more comparanda are added to the mix.

Given all of the above, it may seem unwise to propose a grand unifying theory that can contain the variety of responses to the mythical world, but even so, we can see critical responses to myth as they develop over time and through varying conditions. Literature- based educational practices took shape in the 4th century BCE, which is precisely the same time frame in which mythography as a generic activity became part of Greek intellectual life. As we show in the chapter on education, an elite child's education was built on a successive series of steps involving myth: learning, organizing, narrating, criticizing (rationalizing), defending (allegorical approaches), and finally creatively using it to demonstrate one's mental agility, interpretive skills, learning— or apparent learning— in creating coherent arguments. From the very beginning students are asked to start thinking "mythographically" by uniting like with like (for instance, who belongs to the Trojan War), and then later are asked to narrate stories. In the final stages, the advanced learner breaks them down to build them back up again. Although it is impossible to say whether mythographical practices led to the creation of such an educational structure, the practice of employing myth as a centerpiece of that system must have come from somewhere. And although not all students were trained to become mythographers, the net effect was that "the general intellectual atmosphere of the ancient world consisted of mythographical elements, and this formed an epistemological cycle" (Smith and Trzaskoma in this volume on education, p. 410).

Elsewhere, we have proposed, for convenience, the distinction between what we called "systematic" and "interpretive" mythography (Smith and Trzaskoma 2007: xiv–xv), which provides another axis along which to array the surviving texts. Systematic mythography is concerned with organizing and retelling the vast and chaotic mythical story world, which often contained contested and contradictory accounts, gaps, and other inconsistencies because of the various ways in which mythical traditions developed and proliferated among the Greeks. Interpretive mythography seeks to uncover the origins, function, and hidden meanings (often with attention to etymologizing) of the myths. This is a useful distinction, and those works that seem most purely mythographical tend to fall strongly in one category or the other rather than to mix modes, but ultimately both are part of the same intellectual enterprise, the taming of myth's complexities.

Such a focus not on the actual products of mythography, but on the mythographical mentalité that led to them, may also lend more insight into the "mythographical" expressions that are found in art, including the organization and composition of art in wall painting in Roman houses to the potentially symbolic meanings of myth on sarcophagi. Ultimately, artists may not be mythographers, as such, but their practices intertwine and interact with mythography as they treat their common subject, and these connections are of especial interest as we consider a broader cultural and intellectual response to the mythical storyworld. Mythography was not merely a limited activity of formal writing by a few; it was also an orientation woven into ancient life. In the pursuit of apprehending this wide scope and the

specifics of interaction, some contributors to this handbook turn their attention to mythography's connections to topics as diverse as politics, geography, and Christianity.

3. A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE CONTENTS

This book is divided into five parts, each with its own purpose and goals, and an overall aim of providing a clear statement of where the field is today, to push beyond that position where possible, and to limn some possible avenues for future study. Part I, "Mythography from Archaic Greece to the Empire" traces the key developments in myth criticism and mythographical impulses from the earliest period in Greek poetry (Nieto Hernández) and prose (Pàmias) to the imperial period, from which the majority of our extant mythographical works come. Of particular importance is the Hellenistic period, which, as the authors (Smith and Trzaskoma) note, must have been crucial to the development of various forms but must be approached with caution given that nearly all of those works have been lost or survive only in fragmentary form. In an analysis of the vast extant mythographical output in Greek from the imperial period, Delattre suggests that we should approach the surviving works not as a closed category but as "open texts" (see also Fletcher on Hyginus), while at the same time testing the validity of the divisions between Hellenistic and imperial and even Greek and Roman. Smith provides an overview of the surviving mythographical texts in Latin and considers the rationale behind the production of mythographical material in Latin when so much was available in Greek.

Part II, "Mythographers," is meant to provide a complete overview of the authors and texts that are the main sources of mythography— a sort of handbook within a handbook that offers a survey of each in turn. One will of course find the systematic mythographers whose works are extant, including Apollodorus's comprehensive overview of the entire Greek mythical system (Trzaskoma), the more narrowly focused collections of Antoninus Liberalis (on metamorphoses: Delattre) and Parthenius (love stories gone wrong: Francese), and the less clearly organized collection of narratives by Conon (Sanz Morales) and Hyginus (Fletcher). But one will also find works that do not feature simple, straightforward narratives but offer interpretations of those stories, such the allegorical approaches in Cornutus (Ramelli) and Heraclitus's Homeric Problems (Konstan), or the rationalizing versions of Palaephatus (Koning) and Heraclitus the Mythographer (Hawes), although the latter also blends in allegory as well. Finally, there are the ludic, revisionist histories of Dictys and Dares (Dowden), whose inventive rewriting of Homeric myth hardly prevented them from becoming immensely popular in the Middle Ages and Renaissance.

At the same time, we recognize that not all mythographical thinking emerged in a self- contained prose works about myth. Indeed, the mythographical mindset is clearly at work in the poetic production of Hellenistic poets, as Sistakou systematically demonstrates in her chapter on Alexandrian verse, which can be seen as a pendant to Nieto Hernández' earlier chapter on early Greek poetry and a harbinger for Farrell's overview of mythography in Ovid. Broadly speaking, the same "universalizing macrostructures" that underpin Ovid's comprehensive treatment of myth from the beginning of time in the Metamorphoses can also be found earlier in the Library of History of Diodorus of Sicily, whose early books form a sort of compendium of the mythical story world. Even if they are drawing on earlier Hellenistic models, both Ovid and Diodorus are, like most mythographers, actively shaping their presentation of the mythical world (see especially, Sulimani on Diodorus). Another author who employs mythography, but in a larger matrix of topography and history, is Pausanias, whose view of the Greek

landscape is decidedly linked to the mythical past, even if he tends to offer rationalized accounts of it (Hutton).

Rounding out this part is an overview of another important source of mythographical narratives, the so-called Mythographus Homericus (hereafter MH), an otherwise unknown author now seen as the source of a scattered but important group of narratives in the D- scholia to the Iliad and Odyssey. Because this collection has analogs in texts found on papyrus, the MH merits a separate essay (see Pagès), but similar mythographical narratives and notes are found in the extensive scholiastic traditions of other poets, not least Pindar, Euripides and Apollonius of Rhodes. As Villagra systematically demonstrates, a close reading of the scholia to each author often reveals subtle differences in aims and content, perhaps reflecting the commentators' perceived ideas of what aspects of the mythical story world needed emphasizing. A review of mythography in all its forms (exegetical, narrative, catalogic) would not be complete without a survey of the variety and massive amount of mythography that has been found on papyri (Harder)— the sheer volume of which is a strong indicator of how much mythography has been lost to us. One important collection of stories that has emerged from papyri is the so- called "Tales from Euripides," alphabetically arranged summaries that doubtlessly served as a convenient source for mythographers, though as Meccariello suggests, tragedy, especially the late plays of Euripides, was already taking part in mythographical conventions.

The reciprocal relationship between mythography and tragedy naturally leads us to Part III, "Interpretations and Intersections," which treats both interpretive approaches to myth and the ways in which mythography is naturally connected to or combined with other intellectual pursuits. In the former category, because of the importance of rationalizing and allegorizing approaches in the reception of myth in antiquity and beyond, there are two substantial chapters on the main developments and practitioners of each method (Hawes on rationalizing, Ramelli on allegorizing). Among the interpretive methods employed by Stoic allegorizers especially, but not limited to them, is the use of etymologies to reclaim the symbolic or deeper meaning of the myth, but etymologies were a frequent part of myth- building in other ways as well (Pellizer).

Since myth involves Greek heroes from the distant past, who move through a protoGreek landscape, mythography is often found as part of geographical exposition, as we mentioned in regard to Pausanias. Pretzler's overview of mythography in geographical writing also includes a close analysis of Strabo's Geography, which, despite the geographer's early protests, includes a substantial amount of mythographical material. Myth is, of course, also part of the Greeks' conception of the past, and, again, Calame's analysis of the work of the earliest mythographers argues that what we call mythography in the earliest period is inseparable from historiography. Also focusing on the early period, Berman explores the blurred edges between local mythography and its Panhellenic counterpart, teasing out how one might think of "local mythography" as different from "local historiography," as Jacoby defines a group of writers in FGrHist. Local appropriation, especially of genealogical connections, through myth for political means is the focus of Patterson's chapter, which analyzes mythographical elements in charter myths and treaties, with additional focus on the authorial intent of the practitioners. Part III also contains explorations of how mythographical methods intersected with two other important intellectual trends in the ancient world: first, the cluster of issues surrounding the myths about the disposition of constellations (Zucker on catasterisms); second, the mythographical connections to be found in

literature on wonders and rarities, a genre that arose formally and distinctly from the rest of historiography in the Hellenistic period (Pajón Leyra on paradoxography).

Part IV, "Mythography and the Visual Arts," features the first sustained attempt to view art— composition, organization, symbolism— from a mythographical point of view. Although the word mythography evokes the idea of writing, our three contributors take the view that representations of myth on vases, wall paintings, and sarcophagi can be viewed as texts— ones that reflect a mythographical mindset, guided by some of the same impulses that are found in literary or subliterary mythographical writing. From this point of view, Topper analyzes the 6th- century BCE François Vase and pendant images featuring the abduction of Helen, all of which "share narrative and rhetorical structures with texts that contributed to, or were appropriated into, the ancient mythographical tradition." Likewise, Leach considers the compositional and organizational strategies of wall painting that parallel mythographical writing, with an important look at Philostratus's Imagines, which dramatizes the viewer's engagement with paintings and offers a series of interpretive strategies one must bring to viewing a static image— reminding us that paideia was deeply steeped in mythographical training. Finally, Newby analyzes images of myth on Roman sarcophagi of the high empire as expressions of "interpretive" and "systematic" approaches of mythography (which reflects the Cumont- Nock controversy over the symbolic aspects of sarcophagi from the mid- 20th century). In all, these essays provide a first look at the potential of viewing artistic products from a mythographical perspective.

Part V, "Christian Mythography," focuses on mythography in the forms it took after the rise of Christianity fundamentally shifted the role of myth in the wider culture. In a sweeping essay Nimmo Smith provides a chronological survey of the Christian authors that engaged with pagan myth, and in two separate chapters Garstad investigates the roles of mythography, first in the Byzantine world, which continued to have access to most of the Greek mythography from the previous periods, and again in the Latin West, which continued to need mythography to explain and interpret the pagan myths but which had lost direct access to Greek mythographical texts as bilingualism disappeared. Picking up in the 14th century with Bersuire, Petrarch, and Boccaccio, Solomon traces the further developments as Greek material were reintroduced to western Europe in the Renaissance, culminating in the massive and influential mythographical compilations such as those composed by Cartari and Conti in the 16th century. <>

Naming and Mapping the Gods in the Ancient Mediterranean: Spaces, Mobilities, Imaginaries, 2 volumes edited by Thomas Galoppin , Elodie Guillon , Max Luaces , Asuman Lätzer-Lasar , Sylvain Lebreton , Fabio Porzia , Jörg Rüpke , Emiliano Rubens Urciuoli and Corinne Bonnet [de Gruyter, ISBN: 9783110796490] Open Access

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Ancient religions are definitely complex systems of gods, which resist our understanding. Divine names provide fundamental keys to gain access to the multiples ways gods were conceived, characterized, and organized. Among the names given to the gods many of them refer to spaces: cities, landscapes, sanctuaries, houses, cosmic elements. They reflect mental maps which need to be explored in order to gain new knowledge on both the structure of the pantheons and the human agency in the cultic dimension. By considering the intersection between naming and mapping, this book opens up new perspectives on how tradition and innovation, appropriation and creation play a role in the making of polytheistic and monotheistic religions.

Far from being confined to sanctuaries, in fact, gods dwell in human environments in multiple ways. They move into imaginary spaces and explore the cosmos. By proposing a new and interdiciplinary angle of approach, which involves texts, images, spatial and archeaeological data, this book sheds light on ritual practices and representations of gods in the whole Mediterranean, from Italy to Mesopotamia, from Greece to North Africa and Egypt. Names and spaces enable to better define, differentiate, and connect gods.

CONTENTS

In a world "full of gods", the question "where are the gods?" is at the same time simple and complex. The gods are here, there, anywhere, or even everywhere – but the gods are also invisible, unreachable, ungraspable. This tension is directly related to the ontological ambivalence of the divine entities: they are radically different from the human beings, but they are culturally determined; they are conceived, represented, established in specific locations, and constructed by different kinds of human agency; their existence is closely bound to historical and social factors. Among the latter, names and locations, with the whole set of material evidence they generate, play a salient role. Too often however, because of the growing specialization of knowledge, these two interrelated aspects of "religions" are studied separately. The naming systems are explored and possibly compared by historians of religions, philologists and linguists, while sanctuaries and artefacts are studied by archaeologists and art historians. The principal aim of this book is to promote a dialogue between different approaches to one and the same research question: how did social communities or individuals create the possibility of a communication between the human and the divine spheres? Naming and mapping the gods are two crucial embedded strategies, but how do they intersect and interact? This problem is addressed in the 51 contributions gathered in this book, which bring together multiple disciplines and methods – archaeology, history, history of

religions, philology, anthropology, geography, social network analysis – and new or renewed analysis of a large set of evidence from the Mediterranean world, exploring Egypt, the Ancient Near East, the Greek, Roman and Punic worlds. By revisiting the notion of "religious landscape", it engages a reflection on the processes of space appropriation, delimitation, exploitation and organisation that involve the gods. This volume also provides a reassessment on the tools, such as cartography or graphs, which are most suitable to visualize the dynamic deployment of gods and cults in space and their different forms of mobility and connectivity. At the same time, working on the onomastics of the gods show a massive predominance of local designations, related to the lived experience of space. The god on the corner, the protector of the village, the god of the vicinity are figures extremely present in the everyday life, much more than the big international "stars" of the divine system. The parallel investigation on spaces and names is also an opportunity to critically reconsider the exponential amount of scholarship on networks, connectivity, and exchanges, that, in Hans Beck's words, "has altered the landscape in classical studies". He rightly remarks that "few have commented on the limitations of the network paradigm to capture the vertical depths of the lived experience – in power relations, social configurations, cultural expressions, and so forth – that was so characteristic of the Greek city". Such an observation may be extended to many different contexts beyond the Greek world and does not deny the existence of divine mobilities on different scales of spatial reality.

Moreover, a particularly challenging aspect of these issues is that far from being confined to their sanctuaries, the gods are rooted and embedded in the human environment in multiple ways. They "inhabit" towns and rural areas, crossroads, borders and boundaries, forests, mountains and peaks, seas and coastlines, heaven and underground areas, and many other spaces where they permanently or occasionally dwell and act. Equally, they colonise imaginary spaces, described or evoked by different authors, in literary texts or metric inscriptions, which refer, for instance, to the divine entity "who holds the subterranean palace of all Erinyes". In echo to the recent Unlocking Sacred Landscapes: Spatial Analysis of Ritual and Cult in the Mediterranean, our approach aims at crossing three main perspectives: first, religion, understood as discourses, ritual and social interactions involving agents, objects and places, informed by the conception and possibility of communication with the gods; secondly, landscapes, which can no longer be approached as simple frameworks, but need to be considered as complex settings hosting multiple religious interactions and reflecting mental representations, between constraints and opportunities; and finally, material aspects produced, manipulated, moved, used by agents, sometimes endowed with power, which have their own agencies and biographies, and leaving traces.

Inspired by the main goals and achievements of the ERC Advanced Grant project "Mapping Ancient Polytheisms. Cult Epithets as an Interface between Religious Systems and Human Agency" (MAP), this volume addresses the naming processes applied to divine entities as strategies which define, characterise, differentiate, but also connect them. Names and divine onomastic attributes10 give access to a dynamic and complex "mapping" of the divine, where toponymy and topography, along with genealogies, functions and modes of action point to specific and shared identities within contextual divine configurations. In this perspective, the MAP database (DB MAP) offers a robust corpus of data and metadata, gathering all divine onomastic attributes in Greek and West-Semitic epigraphy, between 1000 BCE to 400 CE, now available to the largest audience. Although it is a work in progress with a non-exhaustive coverage of the available edited inscriptions, it already provides a huge quantity of coherent evidence and specifically designed tools to make tailor-made queries and to map them. From these data, it appears that toponyms and topographical elements are massively mobilized in the divine

onomastics. They even represent the most frequent kind of onomastic attribute of the gods, with a whole set of slightly different formulations; for example, a god connected with Delphi, mainly Apollo, would be Delphikos, Pythaios, Pythios, Pythaeus, Lord of the rocks of Delphi, in Delphi. All these designations convey different semantic nuances and relate to narratives, images, genealogies. In a nutshell, despite Shakespeare's famous interrogation "What's in a name? That which we call a rose by any other name would smell as sweet", naming the gods by choosing specific onomastic elements to give them a charis scent is definitely not a random process. Allusions to spaces, places, locations, settings, and spots provide a huge stock of information, especially when combined with all the Greek and Semitic onomastic attributes registered in the DB MAP. Historians of religions could not remain impermeable to the spatial turn which has influenced, directly or indirectly, the whole field of social sciences. Spaces are inextricably linked with time, providing an access to a dynamic study of religious practices, in as much as they constitute two major cognitive coordinates used by people to frame their interactions with the gods. Time and space determine and are affected by evolutions, transformations, destructions, forms of resilience, which constantly reshape the human-divine communication. Here is the background of the three main directions followed in this volume.

Naming and Locating the Gods: Space as a Divine Onomastic Attribute

The abundance of spatial onomastic attributes requires an in-depth analysis of the geographical lexicon mobilized in this context, both from a morphological, syntactical, and semantic point of view. What do these designations say about the link between the gods and the locations attached to their name? When Melqart is called "the one who is in charge of the rock", what does that mean precisely? The Phoenician word for "rock" is, which is also the name of the city of Tyre. The allusion to the "rock" refers to the actual reefs that Tyrian sailors may encounter during their travels in the Mediterranean, but it also conveys the memory of the birth of Tyre, when Melqart fixed two wandering rocks and made them habitable for the Tyrians. A similar interpretation can be given for the title "Baal/Lord of Tyre", but do the first and the second onomastic sequences differ in their semantic scope, like Delphikos, Pythaios, Pythios, Pythaeus, Lord of the rocks of Delphi, in Delphi mentioned above? Spatial onomastic attributes may express spaces of different qualities and scales, and follow different spatial dynamics; they also sometimes implicitly or explicitly refer to ritual practices and/or to agents involved in them. They can shed a significant light on a debated issue, the so-called polis religion, and the connection between politics and religion. Beyond binary oppositions between local and global, it is imperative to rethink the embeddedness of cults and the polis structure. The obvious pre-eminence of the polis in religious affairs does not imply that the civic life and/or scale mediated the entire scope of relations between the citizens and the gods. The local imprinting on cultic practices (naming, mapping, sacrificing, etc.) involves many agents, collective and individuals, public and private so to say, and it does not exclude the recourse to regional, transregional, panhellenic, or multicultural paradigms. The dichotomy between local and global can be a limit to a better understanding of these phenomena; and a new scenario, in which strands of religious representations and agency intertwined and entangled idiosyncratic and multiscalar paradigms, could give additional results. On the other hand, the city is not the only space permeated by the gods' presence: multiple and varied words, often problematic, between emic and etic perspective, refer to the gods' abode, like "tophet", "saint of saints", "adyton" or "alsos", not to forget the notion of "sacred", inherited from the phenomenological school of religions, which suggests a clear-cut separation between divine and human spaces. The terminology used to define the spaces devoted to the gods is an important epistemological stake which has rarely been the object of a reflexive approach among

historians of religion and archaeologists. A comparative perspective suggests the need to reassess this pivotal issue with greater flexibility, and to provide definitions and categories which are more suited to the complex inscriptions of divine powers in space.

Mapping the Divine: Presenting Gods into Space

Another core issue is how correlated names and spaces contribute to the configuration of divine entities, especially to their "presentification", corporeality, and embodiment. To answer the question raised in his 2016 book Where the gods are, Mark Smith explores "the spatial dimension of anthropomorphism in the biblical world". "Where the gods are" basically requires an investigation on "How the gods are": how do they occupy a spatial dimension, be it terrestrial, celestial, subterranean, or cosmic? How do their images, anthropomorphic or not, contribute to giving form to their presence? Names and spaces both contribute to shaping divine "bodies", material or literary, which, despite or due to their otherness, create the conditions for an interaction between humans and gods. Mark Smith distinguishes three types of divine bodies in his book: the "natural" or "physical body", which is the portrayal of a god recurring to human, animal or other physical elements in order to picture agency, in discourses and images; the "liturgical body", related to the sacerdotal and temple embodiment of a god, with or without a material image, and the "cosmic" or "mystic body", the largest scale of divine manifestation, which refers to the very universe itself. For each body, interrelated names and spaces produce a cognitive signal, which builds a certain indexical knowledge on the gods and helps situating the gods in relation to each other, on a mental map, whose main characteristic is fluidity and flexibility.

To give an example, the onomastic sequence "Artemis Ephesia" designates a goddess venerated in Ephesus and whose origin is part of her identity. She has a close relation to the city and its inhabitants. She dwells there. In her worldwide famous sanctuary, she was "embodied" through a typical image, which became an "index" of her presence, profile, and story: the image is at the same time a kind of iconographic narrative on the goddess, and an object that played a role in the ritual. Since the Artemis Ephesia moved and was adopted in different places all over the Mediterranean, her "official" name and her "official" image travel together, as tokens of her prestigious origin. In Marseille (Phocaea/Massalia) the onomastic and iconographic attributes of Artemis Ephesia were both local and global, driven by communal strategies of distinction, competition, and spatial hierarchy. Connected spaces and times were expressed in her name, as well as in the ritual since a priestess from Asia Minor was in charge of the cult performed according to ancestral standards. The paradoxical nature of the divine body and the complexity of its inscription in different spatial dimensions are reflected in the naming practices, with a whole set of nuances and variations. The propensity of the gods, with their multiple names, to be ubiquitous (in Ephesus and Phocaea for Artemis Ephesia, in Tyre, Tharros and Ibiza for Melqart) raises the tricky question of the articulation between uniqueness and plurality of gods.

Gods and Cities: Urban Religion, Sanctuaries and the Emergence of Towns

Although the world is full of gods, it seems that peculiar landscapes, specific spatial configurations or even particular constructions attract some gods or groups of gods. How did the ancient societies put gods and places in equation, and how did they express this kind of elective affinities in divine designations? The opposition between gods of the "nature" and others considered as "civic" or "urban" is questioned in the following pages. On the one hand, the "Urban Religion" project conducted in Erfurt shows that the town, defined by its topographical/physical density, its social and ethnical diversity, provides specific settings for religious action, interaction and innovation.21 Considering that "space is

condition, medium and outcome of social relations", Jörg Rüpke claims that city-space engineered the major changes that affected religions and played a decisive role in the development of intermittent and multiple religious identities as forms of urbanity. Collective religious identities and religious plurality, triggered by migration to and between cities, had an impact on the multiple equations between names and places. The case of the Mother of the Gods, a foreign and ancestral deity, named "Cybele", "Mother of the Gods" (Mater deum), "Great Mother" (Mater Magna), "Great Idaean Mother of the Gods" (Mater Deum Magna Idaea), etc., and established in different areas of Rome illustrates the multifaceted religious environment of the Verbs. On the other hand, the (re)foundation of sanctuaries and the emergence of towns feed a powerful dialectic: the presence of gods in given landscapes can also give birth to cities and lead to urbanisation of landscapes. From this perspective, while it is clear that urban environments are subject to frequent developments, changes, re-appropriations and redefinitions, they remain in close relation with non-urban areas and welcome divine entities connected with "natural" landscapes, such as Nymphs, Fauns, Silens, or the god Pan. Despite their elective affinity with mountains, groves or springs, these divine powers are not confined to natural spaces and find their way in different spaces, even in the very heart of the cities and at the imperial court, for what concerns Pan, cherished by Augustus. Beyond the opposition between urban and rural areas, each polis can be seen as "a tapestry of localities that were both malleable and permeable, stitched together into a convoluted 'space syntax' ". In other words, country sides do participate to the urban spatial identity and dynamic: physical space both segregates and aggregates. The polyphony of gods and names thus shaped different horizons of social and spatial communication. The triangulation between names, spaces and gods is a key-aspect within the social dimension of the "religions in the making", both polytheistic and monotheistic.

The present book attempts to reconstruct religious action as a social practice that is sensitive to the variety of locations and creative of polysemic designations echoing the gods' spatial dimensions. The MAP database, among other tools, shows that body of evidence for this endeavour is fragmented, and yet, overwhelming at the same time. We all know that continued stories are impossible when it comes to ancient history. As random and incomplete as it is, and with regards to space and time distinctiveness, the evidence enables to propose a consistent image, if not a full picture of the interactions between men and gods in the ancient Mediterranean world. The numerous and original case studies collected here provide stimulating insights on names, spaces and their interactions, within an ample and transdisciplinary – yet not exhaustive – overview of ancient Mediterranean religious practices. They invite us to move between global and local points of view, between short-term and long-term perspectives, if we want to experiment with names and spaces of the divine. Both names and spaces fuel ordinary as well as extraordinary experiences, representations and knowledge of gods and goddesses, and both store memories of past and present times. <>

Ancient and Medieval Greek Etymology: Theory and Practice I edited byArnaud Zucker and Claire Le Feuvre [Trends in Classics - Supplementary Volumes, De Gruyter, ISBN: 9783110714852]

This volume on Greek synchronic etymology offers a set of papers evidencing the cultural significance of etymological commitment in ancient and medieval literature. The four sections illustrate the variety of approaches of the same object, which for Greek writers was much more than a technical way of studying language. Contributions focus on the functions of etymology as they were intended by the authors according to their own aims. (1) "Philosophical issues" addresses the theory of etymology and its explanatory power, especially in Plato and in Neoplatonism. (2) "Linguistic issues" discusses various etymologizing techniques and the status of etymology, which was criticized and openly rejected by some authors. (3) "Poetical practices of etymology" investigates the ubiquitous presence of etymological reflections in learned poetry, whatever the genre, didactic, aetiological or epic. (4) "Etymology and word-plays" addresses the vexed question of the limit between a mere pun and a real etymological explanation, which is more than once difficult to establish. The wide range of genres and authors and the interplay between theoretical reflection and applied practice shows clearly the importance of etymology in Greek thought.

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The difference between modern and ancient etymology

Modern etymology is Greek solely by name: the nature and rules of this scholarly discipline, which today arbitrate in the research on the origin of words, are completely alien to ancient theory and practice. It would moreover be wrong to believe that this branch of linguistics constitutes a modern form of an ancient science, so different are its principles and uses. Therefore, if the reader wishes to understand the focus of this book, he must consider the word 'etymology', used here to refer to ancient etymological exercises, in its genuine meaning. Two persistent mistakes render the original manner of dealing with words, known as the `truth of words' in antiquity, difficult to understand: firstly, the belief that there exists a continuity of ideas and concepts, while language, poetic creation, interpretation, teaching, etc., are not continuous, nor even constant, ideas; secondly, the belief that, in pre-modern times, scientists did the same thing as modern scientists but in a primitive way. In etymology, as in botany, history or physics, Greek scholars did not pursue the same goals, nor did they apply the same methodologies as those used in modern sciences.

Etymology, in a modern sense, refers both to the official origin of a word and to the discipline that establishes it (Buchi 2019). The latter aims at retracing the history of lexical forms through a diachronic analysis and to offer a formal biography of words through the succession of their morphological appearances, at the cost of a series of phonetic transformations. It consists in a historical and etiological explanation that defines objective filiations of a formal type, but this archaeology is detached from current usage and constitutes a restrictive and abstract version of lexical development. Voluntarily external and as impervious to the experience of the speakers as possible, it takes into account accidents and unconscious dimensions of language (such as confusion, contamination, patronymic transfer, re-motivation, etc.) only when regular phonetic and morphological changes cannot account for a given wordform. In particular, it disqualifies both the appearance and affinities of signs even though their sound and semantic proximity make them obvious neighbors, considering them simply as false friends. What linguists call 'false etymology' or euphemistically dub 'folk-etymology' is acknowledged as a reality, but modern etymology resorts to it with caution. Cases of disconnection between the objective reconstitution of filiation or derivation of forms on the one hand, and the subjective awareness of the speakers of the 'kinship' of words on the other, belong to the field of scientific etymology, but they are not its primary interest. Yet, it is precisely the second aspect, the perceived etymology, the morpho-semantic proximity of words in the language system that motivates the ancient etymologizing process.

The ancient conception of etymology, considered by many modern linguists as a language 'disease' (Beguelin 2002), is more a discourse than a science, and more precisely an inquiry (iotopia). It aims at revealing in a word all the other words hidden therein that helped bring it into being, treating words like palimpsests. For the idea shared by ancient authors, thinkers, commentators, poets and others is that each word hides other words which are matrices that once served to create it and that enclose and express part of its meaning. For instance, in "prayer" the Greeks did hear "well", and indeed prayers are formulated for the good of the one who prays, hence the etymology given by Orion (5th c. CE): "the asking for well-being" (Etymologicum, epsilon, p. 53), the word being etymologized as a nominalization of

the phrase eu. Although this is not correct from a modern etymological perspective, the fact that euxn did contain eu) was obvious for Greek speakers. This has the advantage of providing a motivation to the word euxn which is otherwise unmotivated in Greek: that is, it relates the word to one or several other Greek words which supposedly explain it, instead of leaving it isolated. And this is what Ancient Greek etymology is about: finding the motivation of words, be it obvious or hidden (and in the latter case the game is much more exciting). The etymological inquiry practiced intensely or incidentally by all ancient authors is a kind of linguistic anatomical investigation and aims both at revealing the compositional formula ("the words beneath the words," to borrow a phrase from J. Starobinski)—in the example above, Eu and gvo beneath euxn—and at revealing the intimate connivance between the form and the meaning (Orr 1954, 134).

Cultural reflection and language organization

In this process of lexical genesis or onomatopoiesis, the meaning is more important than the form or phonic material. Both in Greek (as in the etymological variations of Socrates in Plato's Cratylus) and in Latin (and Varro testifies to this by his typology of onomastic deformations in his Latin Language) etymologists admit to multiple and deep torsions in their rebuilding and harmonization of words and their etymons. For Greek etymology must be instructive, operative and functional (Orr 1954, 130). It must permit demonstration of the correlation between words (between all words) of a language and their congruence with things. The synchronic relationship set between Greek words is expressed by prepositions, the variety of which show the flexible character of its relationship with the supposed etymon: ek, ato, tapa, dia. It is not a matter of filiation, but a kind of complicity, collusion or influence.

The essential quality of this ancient practice of analyzing, decoding and elucidating linguistic signs is that it renders clear and meaningful unconscious ways of thinking and verbal creations that are sometimes called associations of ideas, paronyms, word games, slips... It is therefore a reflection that is more a matter of semantic and cultural investigation than of regulated study of the evolution of phonemes and words. Ancient etymology can be defined, following the ancient rhetoricians and lexicographers, as the search for the (supposed) original truth of words.

Etymological or etymologizing practices reveal or motivate uses, rites, narratives, and "reflect the (semio-)logical strategies deployed by speakers to organize their lexical knowledge" (Béguelin 2002, 5). Etymology is "also an organizing instrument. Sometimes it operates on the form and sometimes on the meaning of words, grouping by form words that are associated by meaning, or grouping by their meaning words that are similar in form" (Orr 1954, 132). This is the reason why the theoretical and practical dimensions of this serious game are closely intertwined, and why both aspects are combined and considered in this book.

Of course, the relationship it establishes between the words is not always genetically correct even if always culturally relevant, since it is essentially based on intuition—reflective intuition. By favoring the basic principles of phonetics, i.e. sounds (phonemes) and their evolution, modern etymology validates relationships that are often oblivious to users: for instance, it tells us that the aorist Theooacathai "to pray for" and the verb totgew "to long for" are related, but no Greek speaker was ever aware of that. This genetic relationship cannot surface as a synchronic relationship in the consciousness of speakers. And ancient Greek etymology is about synchronic relationships.

In the Greek conception, all words imply more than they mean or echo. In a game of mirrors each word refers to others it contains, sometimes in a residual way, because each word has been conceived and formed from other pre-existing words that collectively express its meaning. We tend to view the relationship between words in a language too intellectually and in a narrow-minded way, whereas a language is anything but rigid and controlled. Modern lexicography, dependent on the classical age's academic police, contributes to repressing the linguistic unconscious and to normalizing semantics. The radicalization of the etymological approach, in a kind of formal asceticism, considering semantic proximity illusory and useless for determining the etymology of a given word, is recent. In the 17th century, semantic proximity was still the main criterion in etymological research. Gilles Ménage was thus able to assert that the word `laquais' (lackey) derived from the Latin verna "slave born in the house", despite all formal appearances, because of their similar meaning (Baldinger 1954, 233-236). Romanticism reversed the etymological perspective, which gradually based everything on phonetics and abandoned what L. Spitzer (Gamillscheg/Spitzer 1915) called 'spiritual etymology', that is, real and living etymology. This mutation is, however, more theoretical than real. As Muller's critical history of etymology in the 19th century shows, authors continue to juggle with the senses. Thus, Grimm (1819, 11.30) derived 'Name' from 'nehmen', while nomen was at hand. The list of authors who more or less admittedly practiced amateuristic or fanciful etymology is vast, and continues to date, including authors as diverse as J.-P. Brisset, M. Heidegger, J. Lacan or L. Wolfson.

Lexicology and exegesis

For ancient intellectuals, all words, especially names, are portmanteau words (Gourinat 2008, 80-82). They are contracted forms, as indicated by the ancient definition in a commentary on the Grammar of Dionysius the Thracian (GG 1.3, p. 14 Hilgard):. Etymology is the unfolding of lexemes, by which truth is made clear; what is true is indeed said to be etymos (authentic).

This deployment of the constituents of the word proposed by the etymologist thus constitutes a kind of definition, a synchronic and simultaneous definition of words and things. The collection of all ancient etymologies proposed for the word avyjpwtos makes it possible to grasp this function. In ancient texts, the word receives the following definitions: man is the one who carefully 'reconsiders what he has seen' (av(v)thpw(v a), Plato, Cratylus 399c); the one who 'rushes towards (and reflects on) what he has seen' (av(a)thpw(akeuv Kai avalthoyiceoacai, a) otw(rtcv), Et. Gudianum, alpha p. 147); he who 'does and looks' (tapa to dpw) Meletius, De natura hominis 7.8); 'he who (squinting) his eyes considers what is above' 600p(civ), Et. Gudianum, alpha p. 147); 'he who aspires to that which is high' Meletius, De natura hominis 7.9); and `who has an articulate vocal sound or holds his countenance aloft', Ammonius, in Aristotelis De interpretatione 38.16).

Etymology is considered an instrument of exegesis and a form of the interpretation of words, but in fact, it is equally a means of creating concepts. The links established between terms considered as secondary and their etymons are intellectual constructions that reorganize notions and constitute a lasting network. Etymology is a convenient way of glossing a word and appears at the very foundations of lexicology, the term Etymologica designating a major corpus of Byzantine dictionaries (Etymologicum Genuinum, Etymologicum Gudianum, Etymologicum Magnum...) that define the meaning of words through anatomical dissection. But etymological discourse is also, necessarily, hermeneutics. The etymon, that is 'the true name', is a concentrated form of discourse. Zeus (Dia) is 'the one by which (dia) beings are alive (zen)'. This equation is debatable, but if we place it in the name itself it ceases to be,

or rather it becomes perfectly 'sheltered'. The interpretation is lodged in the heart of the name, as if it were the germ of the name.

Even though this cultural construction including its intellectual gymnastics is very precocious and furnishes the most vivid results in the field of theonyms, it was nonetheless active throughout ancient literature. As evidenced by A. Filoni, Apollodorus of Athens (2nd c. BCE), an Alexandrian grammarian converted to theology and influential in neoplatonic philosophy, is a representative of this mainstream scholar activity. Before Cornutus (1st c. CE) and his Compendium of Greek theology based exclusively on the etymological unfolding of divine names, epiclesis and attributes, Apollodorus sought to reconstruct the logic and the true oixria of the Greek deities through the exegesis of the divine epiclesis. He proposed a method, both opportunistic and scientific, of interpreting divine onomastics in an etymological and symbolic way, relying on the tradition of the Homeric lexicons and using various registers (physical, geographical, moral, etc.) for his interpretations.

A rhetorical argument and heuristic practice

As Aristotle says, the justification of the 'eponymous' name of a god is part of the praise that is given to him (Rhetoric 1400b18-24), but it is more broadly a type of enthymema (Rhetoric 2.23) which is used in all forms of discourse and a topos: "This is how Conon called Thrasybule 'man of strong will' (thrasyboulos), how Herodicos said to Thrasymachus: 'you are always a resolute fighter' (thrasymachos) and to Polos: 'you are always a colt' (pólos), and in speaking of Dracon the Lawgiver: 'his laws are not of a man but of a serpent-dragon' (drakón), because of their severity; that Euripides' Hecuba said of Aphrodite: 'it is with good reason that the name of madness (aphrosyne) is the beginning of the name of the goddess'; that Chaeremon said that Pentheus (`mourning') had a deserved name, that of his coming misfortune...".

This form of motivation, which is a creative and dynamic process, is not limited to gods' names. This is a general but serious intellectual game. Indeed, all poetic texts in particular use paronomasia and similar puns, in archaic or ancient poetry, from Homeric epos onwards (see Porphyry, Quaest. Horn. 122 Sodano: , where it appears as a central concern of composition (see Louden 1995, and Nagy 2004, chap. 5-6). It is no wonder if Odysseus is said, in the first verses of the epics, to lament Od. 1.55, 5.151-153) and to face the hatred of the gods, Od. 1.62, 19.407-409).

As shown by C. Cusset in his contribution to this volume, Alexandrian poets (including Callimachus, Apollonius of Rhodes, Lycophron and Aratos) passionately conducted onomastic research, in which etymological developments are not erudite digressions but have an etiological and narrative function. Proper names constitute micro-narratives that etymological interpretation seeks to resemanticize within mythological narratives, while proposing through them a program of valorization and re-reading of the tradition.

Etymology opens up words like oysters, exposing their semantic flesh, because words somehow hide their meanings within their folds. And discovering the precise meaning by forcing things a little is a guarantee of truth, since truth is not immediately visible, and the wear and tear of time and philosophical discourse proceed in the same way: by slightly hiding the substance of things in words. What a word 'hides' is naturally what it is: past

Search for linguistic motivation is some sort of intellectual drive, which is probably universal. As Stephanus of Alexandria (In Int., CAG 18.3, p. 10) says, from an Aristotelian perspective: There are, in any case, reasons that led the 'baptizers' to choose their names, even if the true meaning of each name is unknown.

This passage mentions the `name-givers', mysterious and hypothetical men to whom Plato attributes the creation of nouns in the Cratylus, who appear to be known entities: they were the first to give names to things. Whether it is a supreme legislator who suddenly gave all the names, or different individuals who started circulating words, there must be a primary user and this inaugural user, this early prótos heuretes of the word, did not just say anything, he chose his words.

The entire Greek tradition is ensconced in this etymologizing passion and affected by a certain Cratylean' sensitivity, the pedagogical virtue of which is largely depicted by A. Vergados, in an unexpected text: Oppian's didactic epic On fishing (Halieutica). The ichthyologic poet offers a number of etymological motivations, all faithful to the tradition of Hesiod, who knew and systematized not only a plethora of divine names but also the reasons that lay behind the establishment of each. In this domain etymological explanations seldom fulfill a single function (i.e. explaining the origins of the name of the fish in question); they are in fact more links within a network of issues pertaining both to ichthyic matters and to epistemic questions and pedagogical issues, embedding scientific information (from Aristotle, for example) in fish names that consequently appear as micro-narratives.

In Western tradition, Isidore of Seville, with his encyclopedic lexicon dually entitled Origins and Etymologies (ca 620) consecrates etymology as the universal principle of motivation (and definition) of words: "in Greek, the king is called basileus because he supports the people (laos) as a basis" (Etym. 9.3.18). The motivational function is obviously more important, because it guarantees that nomina sunt consequentia rerum (Dante, Vita nova 13.4). This entry into the res through the nomen, meaning the power (vis) to tell the truth, is a constant medieval practice, which can even be seen in the biographies of saints in Michel de Voragine's Golden Legend, which always begin with a tour of the etymologies of their name.

An intellectual and literary driving force

The motivation (and re-motivation) of words is in fact the creation of etymons, an etymopoiesis, a sporadic or systematic process. This activity, which plays a dynamic role in cultural knowledge, is a symptom of great linguistic vitality. It is pedagogically a source for multiple developments: in mythology, grammar, geography, literature, philosophy, medicine, etc. As a matter of fact, mythology often consists in unfolding the program of the name which is a destiny in a nutshell. Telemachus, Oedipus, Lycaon etc. all prove this rule. The 'etymology' or discourse on 'the truth of the name' is a line on the mythographic score and is presented as an undertone of the narrative language. It is not the name alone that has signification, but the name-in-a-plot. This is how the Titans 'stretched out' their hand to their father (Hesiod, Th. 209) or how Helen fulfilled her destiny of destruction in accordance with their name, a linguistically fatal destiny that is underlined by the Agamemnon's choir (681-682):

"Who invented this name, name so fitting, so right?"

Scholarly speculation can shift, without warning, from motivation well supported by tradition to pure fantasy, giving rise to ingenious prowess. This is the case with the New Inquiry/History from the

grammarian Ptolemy Chennos analyzed by V. Decloquement, a work of mythographic narration and exegesis providing a kind of alphabet of heronyms. The author argues that Odysseus was called (not because he lied to Polyphemus (Odyssey 9.365 ff.), but because he would have been born with big ears. Decloquement reviews the various etymological compositional techniques used by Ptolemy Chennos (reversal of common sense, substitution of one name by another, assimilation of an object to a name, etc.) and proposes a typology of these etymological manipulations which feed a work of factitious exegesis of Homeric poems, revealing new mythological options and alternative narratives.

The name is not limited to itself; or to put it another way, the name is nothing more than the result of a discourse, whereas one often stubbornly assumes that it is a constitutive element that makes it possible. Genesis is often the movement that leads from the narrative to the name. The etymological argument, as an 'enthymeme', is indeed in discourse "the most decisive means of persuasion (or proof)" (Aristotle, Rhet. 1355a6, 1356b25, 1394a10), and it can be used in all sciences, as N. Rousseau shows for medicine through the example of Galen.

A serious game

There is undoubtly always a certain amount of play and taste for puns present in the etymology practiced by the Greeks, but it is a serious game, as are all mind and language games. The Palatine Anthology (especially book 14) is full of serious and pedagogical puns, as shown by the selection studied by S. Beta, who argues that these linguistic acrobatics presented in the form of enigmas can rarely be reduced and interpreted in a univocal way. They are not mere virtuoso playful exercises, but models, used throughout the Byzantine period, to teach not only language but also ancient literature and culture. Actually, it is absolutely impossible to understand ancient intellectual practices if one makes the mistake of considering play and seriousness as contradictory. Nothing could be further from the truth. And this persistent double mind game is not only Greek. The term 'to play on words', although often brought to mind in such cases, is usually incorrect when naming the intellectual exercise, both philosophical and literary, and imaginative and thoughtful, in which the Ancients indulged. The Platonic Cratylus dialogue is an illustration of this: as D. Sedley reminds us, not a single ancient commentator considers Socrates' Cratylean' exposition to be a parody and all recognize the value and legitimacy of this path of questioning—even if the path is unsure.

Romani draws our attention to the philosophical potential of etymological research in his case study of the Tgxvrt in the Cratylus, both as an etymologized word and as a clue to considering the method (i.e. techne) of name-giving. Introduced as 'one of the things that appear to be serious', TExvri is compositionally analyzed as originating from the roots of and hence the meaning 'possession of intelligence' or 'holding on to intelligence' (Crat. 414b6—c8). Despite their exaggerated belief in flux and transience, the early name-givers implicitly acknowledged the importance of methodological stability in order for their own procedures to enjoy the status of techne. They also suggest that etymology is an activity that needs to be subordinate to the oversight of philosophy.

The two main options concerning the origin of words are carried by the protagonists and antagonists of the Platonic dialogue: Cratylus, the proponent of a natural and reasoned origin of words, on the one hand, and Hermogenes, the holder of a conventional, even arbitrary, origin, on the other. M. Chriti demonstrates that the neoplatonists Ammonius, Simplicius or Philopon, in a movement of 'harmonization' and philosophical ecumenism, aim at reconciling the position partly defended by Socrates

of a 'ruler of names' and that of Aristotle, who states that words are created and established by an agreement between men: eventually names are considered as existing both 'by nature' (Oueu) and 'by convention' The author also shows the role that, according to these philosophers, ety mological reflection can play in the constitution of controlled neologisms, providing a methodological tool for the creation of words.

This game, despite the great freedom in connecting words, and the absence of a methodological approach (as in modern scientific protocols of linguistic investigation) nevertheless has its rules. As has been said, it is based on the postulate of consistency in a language, conceived as a synchronic system in which words communicate and are mutually shaped. The idea itself assumes reasoned and motivated naming by (early) men—a 'correctness' of names quite opposite to the arbitrary nature of the sign of modern doctrine. Words must meet two requirements in order to be potential kin and etymologically related: they must manifest semantic proximity (i.e. compatibility and a form of convergence of meanings) and graphic or phonetic proximity (i.e. similar material composition). In practice, etymologists took more liberties with the latter, mainly due to two phenomena, promoted as 'corruption principles' by Latin grammarians: wear and tear due to time, and poetic make-up introduced for aesthetic reasons. These two factors can play in any direction, with no regular evolutionary process, and poets can be blamed for all kinds of cosmetic arrangements. Moving letters within a word (metathesis), addition or subtraction are also common accidents which, in the eyes of etymologists, do not need any particular justification and allow all kinds of tinkering necessary to make one word appear as the root of another.

The simultaneous and cooperating plurality of etymons

Another essential feature of ancient practice is the admitted existence of the plurality of etymons for each word. This is not a flexibility betraying the reluctance of authors to define the origin of a word, but a set principle stating that every word in a language always potentially (and often explicitly) has several etymons. Modern linguists are totally deaf to such a conception and this undoubtedly constitutes the major difference between ancient and modern etymology. The Greek genetic model of the construction (i.e. derivation) of words is that of artificial synthesis, not natural procreation: each word is a graphic-semantic compromise, the result of modeling during which the creator of names sought to incorporate the maximum number of semantic facets of the word, which investigators can, like Socrates in Cratylus, seek to detect. The large number of etymons constitutes confirmation of the accuracy of this research and not a weakness thereof: the more explanations there are, the more reasons the ancients had for naming this or that as they did; in other words, the more etymological explanations authors can provide, the more motivated the sign is both on morphological and semantical levels.

Our difficulty in envisaging this idea reveals the extent of the gap separating the two notions and uses (modern and ancient) of the word 'etymology'. It is based on both theoretical foundations and ideological blockages. Modern linguistics, born in Prussia at the end of the 18th century (with figures such as Humboldt), considered etymological investigation as a kind of genealogical reconstruction, developed in a patriarchal society and culture: a man has only one father (and only one mother); similarly—or therefore—words have a sole origin. The monogenesis of names is a dogma which, admittedly, does not precisely correspond to the two-parent generation model, but the 'family' terminology of 19th century linguists regarding etymological relationships shows the importance of this model: "Jedem Worte kommt nur eine Etymologie zu, so wie jedes lebende Wesen nur eine Mutter hat"

(Muller, Ninth lesson on the science of language, 1869, 2.380) and "each word can have only one etymology, just as each living being can have only one mother" (ibid. 2.139).

Conversely, the peaceful multiplicity of etymological options, the first application of which is known to have been divine onomastics, can be considered typical of a culture in which polytheism was not a theological principle but the religious aspect of a more general mode of thought, both competitive and plural. Greek pluralism (so cruel in Plato's heart) is thus translated in etymological practice by the idea that the candidates for the 'truth of the name' are in cooperation rather than competition. In matters of name, as in matters of religious etiology or myth, i.e. in matters of archaeology, origins are obscure and interpretations can add up without weakening each other. The plural or 'ecumenical' formula of ancient etymology is nevertheless consistent with the analysis rendered by certain modern linguists of the dynamics of semantic motivation. As Dalbera (2006, 24) writes, "sign motivation does not only occur once and for all in the creation of a lexical unity; at any moment the need for reason can manifest itself, not only in new signs but also in lieu of demotivated signs that have become arbitrary." The motive that presided over the creation of a sign can in fact "be considered in several different ways, without there necessarily being a hierarchy among them (the best interpretation) or, above all, exclusivity (the true interpretation). There would be lexical room for competing interpretations" (Ibid. 137).

Linguistic consciousness and unconsciousness

The unbiased study of this linguistic process encourages researchers to renounce to the Manichean dualism of 'true' and 'false' etymologies (Kabakova 1992), taking into account that 'the etymologies of the etymologists' are sometimes no better than those of the people. Actually, we are more and more often invited not to treat them as "a kind of comic interlude on the stage of linguistics", since "popular etymology has conditioned [...] at all times, the life of language, being only a manifestation, albeit sometimes outrageous, of the associative processes that, alone, makes the acquisition of a language, its handling and its development possible" (Orr 1954, 141). So-called popular etymologies are not only folk and metalinguistic witnesses, but actors in semantic and linguistic evolution in general. In the case of so-called common expressions (which also largely caught the attention of ancient authors under the name napotpia) linguists or essayists face both the impossibility of opting in favor of one single explanation and the fruitfulness of an approach that admits to the effective complicity and cooperation of several co-existing genealogical options.

Beyond the explicit recourse to etymological exegesis, it appears that this sensitivity to the affinity of words with each other—which is the object of the present volume—is constantly expressed through onomastic associations, sometimes with subtle and sometimes with implicit words, and in all scientific or literary texts. Implicitness may be suggested by the context (epigrammatic form, enigmas, symposia...) or a network of assonances or alliterations.

It is not essential to prove that Gregory of Nyssa (In Canticum canticorum, Or. 15, 6.242 Langerbeck), for example, consciously wanted to reinforce his exegesis of a poem from the Song of Songs when he provided successively over four lines, as an echo to (gazelle), (renown), (judgment), (vision) (discernment) and (heart), a relay of his symbolic interpretation. It is sufficient to agree that in these echoes a significant and effective phonetic-semantic association is visible. This opaque or uncertain form of etymology, whether it is the true intention of the author or the suspicion of the reader, expresses the diffusion, painted within the text, of this formal attention to the links between words.

The rules of ancient etymologizing

It is important, however, to stress that everything in Greek etymology is not wild fantasy and that the discipline obeys rules and principles which, although they may not be correct from a modern linguistic point of view, have nevertheless some roots in the Greek language.

The most bewildering characteristic of Greek etymologies is that they can be multiple. We find often in the works of philosophers or grammarians that word X "may come from Y, or from Z." In modern etymological reconstruction, such a formulation means that the etymology of X is not certain and that two etymologies have been proposed, but that only one of them is the correct one. That is, if X comes from Y, it does not come from Z, and conversely. But for Greek philosophers and scholars, Y and Z were not exclusive of each other and both etymologies could be correct (see above for the philosophical justification of that conception).

Context and etymology

One important reason for those multiple etymologies is that, whereas modern etymology aims at accounting for a word as an abstract entity, ancient Greek etymology is fundamentally contextual and aims at accounting for a word in all the contexts in which it can be used. That is, it incorporates by necessity semantic features which are not the word's but are provided by the context, so that the `perimeter' of a given word varies according to the context in which it is used. This variation is what multiple etymologies try to capture. As a god can have several epicleses, local, functional, mythological, each used in a different context (remember that etymology in Greek started with theonyms), so a word can have several etymologies, each accounting for a different contextual use. This is particularly obvious when it comes to the explanation of Homeric words, when the etymology of a word is drawn from one specific context, as illustrated by C. Le Feuvre in her article. Even though the syntagmatic association between the word and the alleged etymon in the context is obviously contingent, Greek scholars nevertheless use this association as a proof of a semantic and formal relationship between both. Then, such an etymology, born in one precise philological context, is considered valid in itself independent of context. Greek scholars, as well as philosophers, very often back a proposed etymology by quoting Homer, Hesiod, Pindar, Aeschylus or other literary giants, not only because of the authority of those poets, but because this provides the context justifying the etymology. Thus, for a given word there are as many potential etymologies as there are different contexts of use.

This is sometimes explicit: "word X comes from Y when it means A, comes from Z when it means B," A and B being two different contextual uses. As an example, here is what the Scholia in Batrachomyomachiam 81 say about Ups:

`Bodily frame' has two meanings: it designates the living body and the dead one. When it is the living body, its etymology is 'to bind', because it is that which is bound with the soul. But when it is the dead body, its etymology is 'to tame', as it has been tamed.'

Here X is, Y is), Z is, both Y and Z having at least two phonemes in common with X. The semantic features 'dead' or 'alive' do not belong to X; they are inferred from the context: but in a given context, X is either 'dead' or 'alive', which are of course very different things, hence two etymologies referring to two distinct states of X in different contexts. Most of the time, however, this remains implicit, either because it was so from the start, or because those etymologies have been transmitted by sources which have omitted part of the necessary informations. C. Le Feuvre, through two case studies on etymology

in the Homeric scholia, argues for the necessity of first restoring the missing information in order to understand how Greek etymologists worked and to be able to evaluate their explanations in the system to which they belong.

Needless to say, contextual etymology leads to strange results from our modern point of view, but this point was central to Greek thinking about words. Does that mean that taking context into account is irrelevant? No, and modern etymology uses context, too, looking especially for phraseological collocations. Therefore in principle the Greeks were not wrong to pay attention to context; the problem is that they selected in the available contexts elements which were not relevant, for lack of valid criteria.

Phonetic manipulations

Another striking feature of ancient Greek etymology is its recourse to numerous phonetic manipulations, such as adding a consonant, deleting a vowel, modifying the order of phonemes, changing a consonant into another one and so on. That was reputedly characteristic of the Stoics, but in fact this is systematic: all Greek authors dealing with etymology indulge in this type of manipulation, including Plato in the Cratylus. Provided there is a semantic affinity and a formal (vague) similarity, phonetic manipulations can derive anything from anything. Those manipulations seem to be completely random and arbitrary. They are in most philosophers because the latter do not take the pain to explain how that works. But Greek grammarians, in particular the Alexandrian school, sought to justify those changes through analogy, that is, by giving other examples of the same phenomenon through which they demonstrated (in their opinion) that the change was regular. This is not always explicit in what has survived of their works, but this enterprise was systematic (Lallot 2012, 228). And most of the time, the involved manipulations have their roots in real linguistic phenomena found in Greek: when an etymology relies on the transformation of a voiced plosive into a voiceless one (OM, it can appeal to the many examples of aspirate dissimilation like. When an etymology relies on the change of a short vowel into a long one or conversely, it can appeal to the many cases like in which the long and short vowels alternate. When an etymology relies on the change of an [e] into [o], it can appeal to the many cases of apophonic alternation of the type Atro/Ithoyosos. When an etymology relies on the addition of a consonant, it can appeal to the countless forms derived through suffixation, which as a matter of fact adds a consonant, as in in (combined with the quantity alternation of the preceding case), or at the beginning of a word in. When an etymology relies on metathesis, it also goes back to the observation of real cases of metathesis in Greek. That is, all that stems from a linguistic observation which in itself is correct, and shows a rather good understanding of the morphological relationships uniting words belonging to a same root (to put it in modern terms), on the whole (see Sluiter 2015, 914-915). But, because the Greeks had no notion of historical phonetics, this correct observation was wrongly extrapolated to cases for which it was not justified.

Defiance of etymology in antiquity

The absence of rules guiding extrapolation is the cause of this seeming arbitrariness of the manipulations required between the etymon and the actual word. This was already considered with great suspicion by many learned Greek in antiquity. N. Rousseau in her article shows how Galen in the 2nd c. CE rejected that kind of practice and considered etymology as practiced by his contemporaries useless and unable to tell anything worthwhile about the meaning of words. However, Galen himself uses etymology in a

restricted sense, namely for derivation. When he acknowledges that has its etymology in he underlines the derivational relationship between the two words, which is of course correct, and although he considers that this is a correct etymology, he nevertheless argues from this example that etymology is useless for understanding the meaning of words, since in medical terminology refers to the cold and humid humor, whereas its etymology should have connected it to the hot and dry one—and in ordinary language it does mean 'burning'. Galen thereby affirms that the etymological search, even in the narrow sense restricted to derivation, cannot do anything against usage and that what matters is usage. We have here a rare example of an explicit critical evaluation of contemporary scholarship.

This example taken by Galen could be used to illustrate the principle of enantiosemy, developed by D. Petit in his article. Enantiosemy refers to the practice of etymologizing a noun through a word which has an opposite meaning—another bewildering conception for us. It was in favour above all in Rome, and several works of Stoicist inspiration show examples of it. The most famous instance is lucus a non lucendo "the 'wood' is named from the fact that there is no light." D. Petit examines the origin, development and continuation of this principle down to the 19th c. We could add 'cold humor' from the fact that it does not burn," although enantiosemy is never explicitly invoked in the case of the medical use of. Enantiosemy relies on the fact that the word and its alleged etymon share one semantic feature at least, and that polarity undergoes an inversion in the process of derivation—from positive, it becomes negative. There are few instances in Greek authors before the imperial era. Enantiosemy probably has its roots in antiphrasis and euphemism, familiar rhetorical tropes extended to etymological derivation: in that case again, a well-known phenomenon is extrapolated from a domain in which it is justified, rhetorics, to a domain in which it is not, etymology. This principle should not be taken as proof of a lack of rigor, but as the result of an erroneous application of a correct linguistic observation.

To sum up, although not much in ancient Greek etymology is correct from our modern point of view, its principles are far from fanciful. They rest on a correct observation of linguistic facts. And, correct or not, those fantastic etymologies give us precious insights on the way the Greeks used to think about language in general and their own language in particular.

Conclusion

In ancient times practicing etymology was therefore freely exercised and consisted in searching for a family resemblance between words. This family resemblance could be deceptive, as was the resemblance between Adenoid Hynkel and the Jewish barber in Charlie Chaplin's Dictator, but is nonetheless significant, otherwise we would not see it. We are sensitive to family resemblances between words and, as speakers or readers, we build on these similarities in many ways. Etymology as a living practice links contemporary words together, like communication vessels. It thus assumes that flight and light, world and word, well and well are no strangers to each other. When phonetic proximity and semantic compatibility exist, words are irresistibly attracted to each other in the mind. Thus, objective etymology mimics or elucidates pairings that the mind finds more or less vague: it does not arbitrarily invent correspondences but expresses the existence of privileged relationships, of variable distances between words in the mind. Language is thought by people and slips and improvised pairings are eruptions of these neighboring words in the brain. They signal not only psychical ambivalences but also relationships between the deep meaning that words hold in a language.

Today, etymological intuition is often regarded as a form of magical thinking, an interpretative delusion that ignores the rules that modern science has forged to give these relationships between words the status of true history. Today a clandestine (or 'parallel') inclination, valid only to betray oneself, etymologizing is, in fact, a largely unconscious, tonic activity of living the language. The studies gathered here on ancient situations and etymologizations can provide an opportunity both to reconsider the formal constraints of the discipline that claims official control over etymological practices and to become more aware of the reality and fruitfulness, in the life of the mind and the creation, of this often discreet but profound and multiple etymologizing practice. <>

THE IDEA OF THE LABYRINTH FROM CLASSICAL ANTIQUITY THROUGH THE MIDDLE AGES by Penelope Reed Doob [Cornell University Press, 9780801423932]

Ancient and medieval labyrinths embody paradox, according to Penelope Reed Doob. Their structure allows a double perspective—the baffling, fragmented prospect confronting the maze-treader within, and the comprehensive vision available to those without. Mazes simultaneously assert order and chaos, artistry and confusion, articulated clarity and bewildering complexity, perfected pattern and hesitant process. In this handsomely illustrated book, Doob reconstructs from a variety of literary and visual sources the idea of the labyrinth from the classical period through the Middle Ages.

Doob first examines several complementary traditions of the maze topos, showing how ancient historical and geographical writings generate metaphors in which the labyrinth signifies admirable complexity, while poetic texts tend to suggest that the labyrinth is a sign of moral duplicity. She then describes two common models of the labyrinth and explores their formal implications: the unicursal model, with no false turnings, found almost universally in the visual arts; and the multicursal model, with blind alleys and dead ends, characteristic of literary texts. This paradigmatic clash between the labyrinths of art and of literature becomes a key to the metaphorical potential of the maze, as Doob's examination of a vast array of materials from the classical period through the Middle Ages suggests. She concludes with linked readings of four "labyrinths of words": Virgil's *Aeneid*, Boethius' *Consolation of Philosophy*, Dante's *Divine Comedy*, and Chaucer's *House of Fame*, each of which plays with and transforms received ideas of the labyrinth as well as reflecting and responding to aspects of the texts that influenced it.

Doob not only provides fresh theoretical and historical perspectives on the labyrinth tradition, but also portrays a complex medieval aesthetic that helps us to approach structurally elaborate early works. Readers in such fields as Classical literature, Medieval Studies, Renaissance Studies, comparative literature, literary theory, art history, and intellectual history will welcome this wide-ranging and illuminating book.

Review

An admirably argued, massively informed, and often brilliant book. It will be a widely useful source, and will lead to important new approaches to a whole range of texts and artworks. Doob includes superb new readings of Virgil, Boethius, Dante, and Chaucer. -- Christopher Baswell, Barnard College

CONTENTS

Charting the Maze

Ancient and medieval labyrinths or mazes (the words have different etymologies but mean the same thing) are characteristically double. They are full of ambiguity, their circuitous design prescribes a constant doubling back, and they fall into two distinct but related structural categories. They presume a double perspective: maze-treaders, whose vision ahead and behind is severely constricted and fragmented, suffer confusion, whereas maze-viewers who see the pattern whole, from above or in a diagram, are dazzled by its complex artistry. What you see depends on where you stand, and thus, at one and the same time, labyrinths are single (there is one physical structure) and double: they simultaneously incorporate order and disorder, clarity and confusion, unity and multiplicity, artistry and chaos. They may be perceived as path (a linear but circuitous passage to a goal) or as pattern (a complete symmetrical design). They are dynamic from a maze-walker's perspective and static from a privileged onlooker's point of view. Their paths are linear, but-since many ancient and medieval labyrinths are round-their pattern may be circular, cyclical; they describe both the linearity and the architecture of space and time. They may be inextricable (if no one can find the exit) or impenetrable (if no one can find the center). Our perception of labyrinths is thus intrinsically unstable: change your perspective and the labyrinth seems to change. As images, then, labyrinths are convertible and relative: what you see and feel and understand one moment can shift completely the next like a reversible figure, an optical illusion. Thus mazes encode the very principle of doubleness, contrariety, paradox, concordia discors, as Wyatt knew.

Accordingly, the aims of this book are dual: to reconstruct the idea of the labyrinth in the western Middle Ages by extrapolation from a wide variety of sources, both literary and visual, and to see how that idea informs an array of important literary texts. I use the word idea to mean the general governing concept of the labyrinth as a visual or verbal sign, its ruling principles, the theoretical set of characteristics abstracted from and manifested in the specific labyrinths of art or literature. The idea of the labyrinth thus encompasses both formal principles (e.g., circuitousness, complexity) and habitual, culturally shared and transmitted significances of labyrinths (e.g., artistry, imprisonment). Unlike a Platonic idea, the kind of idea I'm talking about is not "true," universal, or immutable; like other human ideas, the idea of the labyrinth is subject to temporal change, the most marked change occurring in postmedieval times, when the presence of false turnings and repeated choice became the labyrinth's dominant characteristic. But because there is considerable constancy in the idea of the labyrinth over many centuries, including those spanned by this book, I speak of an idea (albeit one with permissible variations), not of many ideas. Since it allows for certain variations, this idea is not monolithic, a fixed and perfect template; rather, it includes a small repertory of attributes and associations among which a mazemaker can select, emphasizing these as opposed to those to shape the precise significance of this

particular maze, which will in turn be interpreted by readers or viewers in accordance with their familiarity with the received idea of the labyrinth.

The word idea is also appropriate because I am interested not only in "real" labyrinths-mazes one can see and touch, things that are labeled labyrinths-but also in metaphorical labyrinths and in the very concept of the labyrinth. Thus I am also concerned with the labyrinthine: with identifying certain features closely associated with labyrinths (for instance, enforced circuitousness; disorientation; the idea of planned chaos; the bivium or critical choice between two paths; inextricability; intricacy; complexity), and with examining how constellations of these features operate in things, metaphors, and texts that function like labyrinths even though they may not be identified as such. In this context, I have coined the term "labyrinthicity," by which I mean the condition of possessing significant features habitually associated with labyrinths.

I speak of reconstructing the medieval idea of the labyrinth because I want to avoid imposing modern definitions and canons of interpretation on medieval mazes. The modern idea of a labyrinth is curiously limited. It holds that mazes must contain many points of choice between two or more paths (they are multicursal, to use a word that will recur throughout this study) with dead ends leading nowhere, and that they are intended to confuse and frustrate. This idea is not foreign to the Middle Ages: many literary texts assume a multicursal model, and some see confusion as the maze's primary function where others present bewilderment as merely a byproduct of brilliantly complex structure. But the modern concept of the maze excludes virtually all medieval labyrinths in the visual arts, which show a single winding path leading inevitably to the center and then back out again (they are thus unicursal). The medieval idea of the labyrinth allows both patterns, so modern readers must discard their mental image of the maze if they are to approach medieval examples and see what is actually there. Previous studies of medieval labyrinths have been seriously handicapped by their failure to appreciate, let alone to examine carefully, the implications of the coexistence of these radically different paradigms of the maze. Similarly, most modern studies of labyrinths manifest an interest in determining anthropological origins or archetypal significance. This search for the Or-labyrinth may tell us something about twentieth-century ways of thinking about signs in general and the labyrinth in particular, and it can provide cross-cultural insights and suggestive speculation about the maze's prehistory, but it tells us next to nothing about how medieval people saw and used the sign and hence has no place in my discussion. Instead, I want to recover what medieval people actually thought about mazes, what their "horizon of expectations" might have been when they heard the word laborintus or saw a maze in a cathedral nave, what they meant by the sign in their own works; I want to describe an appropriate code for deciphering medieval visual or literary works involving literal or metaphorical labyrinths, to define the "literary competence" required to appreciate labyrinth references and intertextualities. The kinds of questions I want to answer are these: What was the documentable medieval reception and development of the form, concept, and meaning of the labyrinth, as witnessed by the broadest possible range of texts and visual images from both official and unofficial cultures? What were characteristic and atypical medieval ways of seeing the labyrinth? How did the idea of the labyrinth, both literary and visual, generate metaphor, and what are the consequent metaphorical uses of the sign? How does the idea of the labyrinth function as a heuristic tool for understanding labyrinthine literary texts that may or may not explicitly identify themselves as labyrinths? This general focus on the medieval, the metaphorical, and the literary distinguishes my work from most recent studies of labyrinths.

Readers familiar with W. H. Matthews's seminal Mazes and Labyrinths, Paolo Santarcangeli's Livre des labyrinthes, and Hermann Kern's Labirinti may wonder why another book is necessary. First, these previous studies concentrate on the visual arts, not on literature, and certainly not on labyrinthine texts. Second, they treat the labyrinth from prehistory to the present, and the medieval idea of the labyrinth merits far more attention than they have given it. Third, despite their visual orientation, they give little or no attention to the formal implications of the two medieval paradigms of the maze and the tensions between literary and visual traditions. Fourth, my work deals more with metaphorical labyrinths than with real ones.

The best way to suggest the scope, rationale, and methods of this book is through a brief overview of its contents. Part One lays the groundwork for the study of medieval labyrinths by examining several facets of the classical and early Christian background. Focusing on the written witness, Chapter 1 identifies, analyzes, and compares two major classical traditions associated with different kinds of literature and well-known to the Middle Ages-the historical-geographical, quasi-factual description of four ancient labyrinths as real buildings, discussed by Pliny the Elder, Strabo, and others, and the purely literary tradition established by Virgil and Ovid, the classical poets who most influenced medieval thought. Here I explore characteristically labyrinthine dualities-artistry vs. chaos, order vs. confusion, admirable complexity vs. moral duplicity-in these traditions and texts; I discuss the physical facts and narrative implications of the labyrinth and its associated myth; and I show how the written tradition presupposes the multicursal model of the maze, transmitting that model to the Middle Ages.

Chapter 2 focuses on the surprising conflict between written tradition and the visual arts, which endorse not the multicursal model but rather the unicursal model that persists in art throughout the Middle Ages. It is almost impossible to overestimate how remarkable this paradigmatic incompatibility is: as an analogy, imagine that literary descriptions of circles defined them as having four sides joined by right angles, whereas visual illustrations showed the figure we recognize as a circle. Other studies of the labyrinth at best mention the extraordinary discrepancy between medieval unicursal and modern multicursal visual models. But I will argue that it is precisely the peaceful coexistence of ancient and medieval literary multicursal models and visual unicursal models that is the key to understanding what medieval people meant by the word laborintus. Analysis of the two paradigms, then, constitutes the substance of Chapter 2. First I examine the formal implications of each model, showing how its characteristic features imply metaphorical potential; for instance, the presence of true and false paths in the multicursal maze may suggest the importance of correct moral or intellectual choice within a confusing world, whereas the single circuitous passage of the unicursal type argues that persistence in the difficult path prescribed by Godor in the devious path designed by the devil, or in the philosopher's complex argument-leads ineluctably to the appropriate destination, be it heaven, hell, or knowledge. Since the single word labyrintus denotes both unicursal and multicursal models, and since the name and the visual image often appear together, classical and medieval people must have assumed that the paradigms, so contradictory from our point of view, shared enough common features to comprise a single category; therefore I deduce the classical-medieval definition of this category, laborintus, by identifying the two models' most important shared characteristics. The formal features that both models share broadly outline the general idea or the essence of the labyrinth; they reveal the most important criteria for labyrinthicity and shape the major aspects of the maze's metaphorical potential. Formal features specific to one model or the other fill in the picture and allow considerable flexibility in individual instances: medieval authors can pick the model that best suits the meta phor in mind, or

(occasionally) they can select features from both models, or (very rarely) they can describe a transformation of one model into the other.

Chapter 3 shows how three shared formal characteristics generate a taxonomy of labyrinth metaphors: because of certain physical attributes, the labyrinth may be a sign of complex artistry, of impenetrability or inextricability, and of difficult intellectual, epistemological, and verbal process. These categories are illustrated and developed by a wide range of classical and early Christian texts, most of them known in the Middle Ages. 7 In a general sense, then, Chapter 3 is a case history in how properties of structural models generate, or at least support, literary metaphor; more particularly, the chapter documents the specific metaphorical heritage of the maze on which medieval writers and artists could, and did, draw in creating their own labyrinthine works and metaphors.

Part One thus describes the literary, conceptual, and metaphorical backgrounds of the medieval idea of the labyrinth. Part Two tackles that idea directly. A brief introduction, Chapter 4, considers Latin etymology and vernacular terms for mazes and condenses the various ambiguities of labor intus and domus daedali into three general categories of meaning roughly corresponding to those outlined in Chapter 3: artistry, morality, and difficult process. Each of these categories is then explored. Chapter 5 examines the witness of the medieval visual arts (architecture, gardens, turf and stone mazes, cathedral labyrinths, mazes in manuscripts) to see how it informs written texts by exemplifying, developing, and popularizing certain aspects of the medieval idea of the labyrinth; in return, the literary tradition casts light on some puzzling aspects of visual labyrinths, including the hotly debated function of cathedral mazes. The visual arts are the major medieval locus of the classical and early Christian concept of the labyrinth as magnificent artistry, whether human or divine; they also provide evidence for a purely secular view of labyrinths in a culture that moralized most things, including mazes, and give some insight into the mazes of popular and aristocratic cultures. Thus the interaction of literature and art enhances our understanding of each and enriches our perception of the medieval idea of the labyrinth.

Chapter 5 stresses Daedalian artistry, the visual arts, and the labyrinth in bono; Chapter 6 turns to morality, literature, and the deceitful, nearly inextricable mazes of the world and sin. Most of the texts considered here draw as heavily on the story of the Cretan labyrinth as on the ambiguous building itself, and that narrative context tends to equate the structural windings or errores of the maze with moral error. Three sets of texts are considered. First, several elaborate fourteenth-century mythographical readings of the Cretan legend illustrate the rich and comprehensive metaphorical potential of labyrinthine characters, plot, and structure within the allegorical tradition. Next, fairly casual references to the labyrinth in selected nonmythographical texts document the maze's commonplace metaphorical associations as background for more substantial discussion and fuller appreciation of particularly innovative works. The chapter concludes with four unrelated texts that draw more creatively on the plot and cast of the Cretan legend: the story of Gardinus in the Gesta Romanorum, Boccaccio's Corbaccio, the anonymous Assembly of Ladies, and the Queste del Saint Graal. Each text reflects the medieval idea of the labyrinth and presents the world as a perilous maze in which one learns how to function only with great difficulty, and in each the idea of labyrinth serves as a revealing interpretive tool.

Chapter 7 concludes Part Two with the most interesting group of metaphorical mazes: intellectual and textual labyrinths. Here the maze becomes a model for the complex processes of creating and receiving texts as well as for the object of these activities, the text itself as a work of elaborate art. The chapter addresses the question of a labyrinthine aesthetic and shows how labyrinthine qualities are privileged in

literary theory and practice even though the term "labyrinth" is most commonly applied pejoratively to failed art, art that is too complex for its intended audience and purpose.

Part Three, "Labyrinths of Words," consists of four essays in practical criticism. Here I apply concepts developed in Parts One and Two to labyrinthine readings of four interrelated literary texts: Virgil's Aeneid, Boethius's Consolation of Philosophy, Dante's Divine Comedy, and Chaucer's House of Fame. Each of these texts plays with received ideas of the labyrinth, its plot, its characters; and each text reflects not only the idea of the labyrinth in its own age but also labyrinthine aspects of the texts that precede it in this remarkable series. Boethius uses and corrects Virgil's idea of the labyrinth; Dante uses and corrects Virgil and Boethius; and Chaucer makes extraordinarily innovative use of all three masters. These four works constitute a complex study in labyrinthine intertextuality and an appropriate conclusion to my explorations of the idea of the labyrinth. Thus these chapters illuminate the texts they discuss and serve as models for readings of other labyrinthine literature.

Obviously my methodology is eclectic. By nature and training a literary historian with some interest in modern theory, I share Paul Zumthor's insistence on the need to respect the historicity of a text "and, simultaneously, to redefine, adapt, and sometimes reject modern critical concepts, so as to render them appropriate in seizing this historicity." At the same time, I share many medievalists' conviction that a good deal of modern thought has medieval ancestry. Thus I take a somewhat semiotic approach in considering the labyrinth as a sign with important formal attributes, but I don't see this as ahistorical or anachronistic: medieval philosophers were interested in sign theory and believed that the meaning of any conventional sign (signum ad placitum) derived not only from traditional usage but also from qualities inherent in the sign-its etymology, if the sign is a word ; its natural attributes, if the sign is a thing-that make it an appropriate symbol of the thing signified. Thus, for Isidore of Seville, amicus (friend) is derived from animi custos (guardian of the spirit), and the triangle, its three angles united in one geometrical figure, is an appropriate sign for the Trinity. Since the labyrinth is both a word and a thing, its etymologies and physical structure help delineate its significance.

Similarly, reader response and reception theories of literature inform my interest in the reception of the labyrinth in the Middle Ages, my speculations on the labyrinth as process, and my assumption that neither the sign's meaning nor its significance in medieval texts is ever strictly determinate. But once again such concerns are not alien to medieval thought: rhetoricians and preachers were acutely sensitive to reader (or listener) response, and the labyrinth topos figures in such ruminations. Augustine discusses the polysemous nature of signs, and the validity of biblical interpretations never intended by the author, as long as these novel interpretations accord with the prevailing code, "the truth taught in other passages of the Holy Scriptures." Ambiguity is as central to medieval hermeneutic practice as it is to the labyrinth itself. Deconstructionist ideas are also illuminating: the concept of aporia (the "unpassable path," self-contradiction, paradox) sheds light on the labyrinth's embodiment of paradox, its simultaneous affirmation of antinomies: order/ chaos, imprisonment/liberation, linearity/circularity, clarity/complexity, stability/instability. The view that what one sees in a text, however perverse by traditional critical standards, is worth writing about has encouraged me to be mildly speculative in discussing what a text expresses even if that expression may be remote from the writer's probable intention. But what medieval exegete ever acted differently?

ILLUSTRATION OF THE CRETAN LABYRINTH. THE INSCRIPTION READS, "CUM MINOTHAURO PUGNAT THESEUS LABORINTO." LIBELLUM DE SEPTEM MIRACULIS MUNDI, SAINT EMMERAM, REGENSBURG, GERMANY, LATE TWELFTH CENTURY. MUNICH, BAYERISCHE STAATSBIBLIOTHEK MS. CLM. 14731, FOL 82A

In some ways my discussion of the medieval idea of the labyrinth may even illuminate some contentious issues in contemporary theory. For instance, since the labyrinth is a model simultaneously for artistic intention (the architect's plan), the integrity of a text (the labyrinth as artifact), and the experience of the reader (the well- or ill-informed choices of the maze-treader within the parameters set by the builder), it suggests some possible ways of dealing with the often conflicting claims of authorial intention versus reception in critical discourse.

Naturally, this study has limitations. It is not-nor does it aim to be-a catalogue of literary labyrinths comparable to Kern's catalogue of mazes in the visual arts; but I am reasonably sure that I have covered all categories of labyrinthine metaphor as well as a representative selection of classical and medieval works in which the idea of the labyrinth plays a major part. Much as I would have liked to locate certain ways of seeing mazes on the vast map of intellectual history by linking this interpretation with Platonists and that with Aristotelians, say, I have been unable to do so: there seem to be no systematic linkages between labyrinthine metaphors and particular schools of thought, although in a very gradual temporal change the word labyrinth, though not the visual image or the idea, acquired predominately moral and pejorative connotations, as we shall see.

Another unavoidable limitation is suggested by Hans Robert Jauss's comment that "modern scholarship still does not sufficiently differentiate between various levels of reception." For Jauss, high-level reception is the "dialogue of great authors," which creates truly innovative (and quite unpredictable) readings-Pascal reading Montaigne, for instance. Part Three of this book grapples with high-level readings in the labyrinthine tradition and by its very nature is not susceptible to "proof," if proof is ever possible in literary criticism. We know how commentators like Servius and pseudo-Bernard Silvester read the Aeneid, and we know how Benvenuto da Imola and Guido of Pisa read Dante's reading of the Aeneid in the Divine Comedy, but neither kind of evidence tells us how Dante read Virgil and his labyrinths. Middle-level reception involves "institutionalized reading," interpretations of texts and visual images by skilled readers whose comments reflect competence but not the idiosyncrasies of genius and result in "traditionalized and authorized meaning." Much of the material presented in Chapters 3 through 7 reflects middle-level reception and development of the idea of the labyrinth: commentaries on and uses of real and metaphorical labyrinths by men literate in Latin, schooled in the trivium (grammar, rhetoric, and dialectic), familiar with such standard curriculum authors as Virgil and Ovid and their commentators, and trained to read and interpret in predictable ways. Here I have drawn on as many kinds of primary written and visual sources as possible: letters, commentaries, poetry, historical and geographical treatises, theology, biblical exegesis, encyclopedias, arts of preaching and rhetoric, sermons, formularies, philosophical works, manuscript illuminations, and so on-material that defined and transmitted official institutional culture. The idea of the labyrinth that evolves in the first two parts of this book, then, is primarily the idea shaped and accepted in middle-level readings, for this is the idea that can most easily be reconstructed and documented. At the lowest level is "pre-reflective" reading, the personal responses of a relatively inexperienced reader encountering a work for the first time. There is little classical or medieval evidence for low-level reading of the maze for the simple reason that the medieval equivalents of modern low-level "readers" were illiterate and their responses to the labyrinth went unrecorded. We may detect traces of low-level readings in the names of turf-mazes or labyrinthine stone circles, or in preaching manuals and sermon collections whose content might have been transmitted to unlettered parishioners. But what is transmitted is not necessarily what is received, so we can only guess at low-level reception of the labyrinth in the Middle Ages. Thus much of this book recreates a middle-level horizon of expectations regarding labyrinths, and its conclusions about the medieval idea of the labyrinth are neither comprehensive nor a handy interpretive template to be applied mechanically to all medieval uses of the image.

There is yet another limitation to be acknowledged. I began studying medieval labyrinths almost twenty years ago while lecturing on Chaucer's House of Fame as a labyrinthine poem, and though I have worked on the topic ever since, I have certainly not read everything published or in manuscript that might be

relevant. Moreover, I am not a classicist or a specialist in Italian and French literature, and I have not read all the secondary material on the Aeneid or the Divine Comedy or the Queste del Saint Graal, to name but three works I treat at some length. Rather than refrain from discussing obviously pertinent texts, I have forged ahead in the hope that by looking at old material with fresh eyes, much-appreciated guidance from willing experts, and a different perspective-the view from the labyrinth-! can suggest new threads to follow through these textual mazes. I acknowledge these problems with regret but also with a lively awareness that treaders of multicursal labyrinths inevitably leave some paths untraced and forget what they learned in others. I sometimes think it is a miracle that I have extricated myself from this endless labyrinth of contraries at all: nineteenth-century discussions of church mazes are dotted with references to one M. Bonnin, who had collected more than two hundred maze designs that he intended to publish as soon as he had completed the accompanying text. So far as I can tell, nothing ever appeared in print, and the cautionary figure of M. Bonnin stalks my nightmares.

The Cretan Labyrinth Myth

Outraged by the death of his son Androgeos in Athens, King Minos of Crete besieged that Greek city. Meanwhile, his wayward wife Pasiphae fell passionately in love with a handsome bull. To satisfy her lust, she enlisted the help of the Athenian Daedalus, master inventor of antiquity, who built her a wooden cow covered with hides. Pasiphae climbed into the cow, mated with the bull, and conceived the Minotaur, a monster with the body of a man and the head of a bull. When Minos returned triumphantly to Crete, he was shamed by this visible proof of his wife's lechery, and he bade Daedalus construct the confusing and inextricable labyrinth in which to emprison and conceal the Minotaur. So bewildering were the maze's paths that even Daedalus could scarcely find his way back to the entrance.

Every nine years (or, some say, every year), Minos fed the Minotaur with Athenian youths sent as tribute in atonement for the death of Androgeos. At the time of the third tribute, one of the fatal lots fell to Theseus, King Aegeus's son, who, with his companions, was brought to Crete. But Ariadne, Minos's daughter, fell in love with the young prince and determined to save him from labyrinth and Minotaur alike. To this end-and, some say, on the advice of the crafty Daedalus-she gave Theseus a clue of thread, which he tied to the entrance of the labyrinth and unwound as he followed the twisting paths to the center. There, some say, he took Ariadne's second gift, a ball of pitch, and threw it into the Minotaur's gaping mouth. Choking on the ball and unable to attack the man who should have been his prey, the Minotaur fell victim to Theseus's sword (or, in other accounts, his club). The young Athenian rewound the clue of thread, retraced his steps, and emerged safely from the hitherto inextricable labyrinth. Taking Ariadne and her young sister Phaedra with him, Theseus set sail for Naxos, where he abandoned Ariadne. Moved by her plight, the god Dionysus consoled her, transforming her crown into a constellation. Theseus and his companions sailed on to Delos, where they performed a labyrinthine dance in celebration of their escape from Crete. But Theseus's triumphant homecoming to Athens turned to tragedy. He had promised his father Aegeus that if by some miracle he escaped the labyrinth, he would replace the black sails on his ship with white ones. Having already forgotten Ariadne, Theseus was equally forgetful of his promise to his father: the black sails remained aloft, and the distraught Aegeus hurled himself into the sea.

ILLUSTRATION OF THE CRETAN LEGEND WITH THREE-DIMENSIONAL LABYRINTH. ITALIAN COPPERPLATE, CA. 1460, ATTRIBUTED TO MASO FINIGUERRA. LONDON, BRITISH LIBRARY

Meanwhile Daedalus, inventor of the labyrinth, was himself made prisoner. Some say that Minos cast him and his son Icarus into the labyrinth as punishment for assisting Pasiphae or for having helped Ariadne save Theseus; others claim that Minos refused to let so ingenious an inventor return home to Athens. Whatever the truth may be, Daedalus made wings so he and Icarus might escape the maze by flight. Daedalus warned his son to take a middle course-the sun would melt the wax that held the feathers in

place, the waves would drench them. But Icarus ignored his father's advice, soared sunward, and plummeted into the sea.

As Daedalus mourned, he was taunted by a partridge who had once been his own nephew, Talos (or Perdix). This precocious lad had been apprenticed to his uncle, but when the child proved his brilliance by inventing the saw and the compass at the tender age of twelve, Daedalus grew jealous, threw him off the Acropolis, and fled to Crete. Athena, pitying the child, turned him into a partridge, a bird that still shuns heights because it remembers Talos's terrible fall.

After the death of Icarus, Daedalus flew to Italian Cumae, where he built a temple to Apollo, sculpting on its doors the story of the Cretan labyrinth. Some say that Daedalus then flew to Sicily, where he was welcomed by King Cocalus. Still seeking vengeance, Minos offered a reward to anyone who could thread a tightly spiraled shell. Daedalus, as crafty as ever, drilled a tiny hole in one end, inserted an ant with a thread attached to its body, induced it to enter by smearing honey on the shell's mouth, and thus traced the windings of the shell. Sure that no one but Daedalus could have accomplished such a task, Minos came to claim him, but the Sicilians, reluctant to give Daedalus up, murdered Minos. <>

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