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Some qualified reviewers offer their own brief evaluation of the book. Otherwise, most of our content represents the authors'-editors' own words as a preview to their approach to the subject, their style and point-of-view. <>

SPINOZA, LIFE AND LEGACY by Jonathan I. Israel [Oxford University Press, ISBN: 9780198857488]

A biography of the boldest and most unsettling of the early modern philosophers, Spinoza, which examines the man's life, relationships, writings, and career, while also forcing us to rethink how we previously understood Spinoza's reception in his own time and in the years following his death.

The boldest and most unsettling of the major early modern philosophers, Spinoza, had a much greater, if often concealed, impact on the international intellectual scene and on the early Enlightenment than philosophers, historians, and political theorists have conventionally tended to recognize. Europe-wide efforts to prevent the reading public and university students learning about Spinoza, the man and his work, in the years immediately after his death in 1677, dominated much of his early reception owing to the revolutionary implications of his thought for philosophy, religion, practical ethics and lifestyle, Bible criticism, and political theory. Nevertheless, contrary to what has sometimes been maintained, his general impact was immediate, very widespread, and profound. One of the main objectives of the book is to show how early and how deeply Leibniz, Bayle, Arnauld, Henry More, Anne Conway, Richard Baxter, Robert Boyle, Henry Oldenburg, Pierre-Daniel Huet, Richard Simon, and Nicholas Steno, among many others, were affected by and led to wrestle with his principal ideas.

There have been surprisingly few biographies of Spinoza, given his fundamental importance in intellectual history and history of philosophy, Bible criticism, and political thought. Jonathan I. Israel has written a biography which provides more detail and context about Spinoza's life, family, writings, circle of friends, highly unusual career and networking, and early reception than its predecessors. Weaving the circumstances of his life and thought into a detailed biography has also led to several notable instances of nuancing or revising our notions of how to interpret certain of his assertions and philosophical claims, and how to understand the complex international reaction to his work during his life-time and in the years immediately following his death.

- Presents a significant new interpretation of Spinoza's life, thought, and early reception

- Offers a more detailed coverage of its subject than previous biographies, enabling the author to make a broader and more accurate assessment of Spinoza's role in the early Enlightenment

- ⊕ Significantly alters our picture of the early Enlightenment in Europe, including in our understanding of the origins of modern democratic political theory, toleration, and secularism

- ⊕ Includes use of historical sources that have never been used before

Review

"Monumental... a brilliant biography...Jonathan Israel has more than done justice to this ultimately elusive genius" -- Daniel Johnson, The Critic

No account of Spinoza's life and legacy can have much value unless it rests on an exhaustive analysis of his works and correspondence. But this in turn inevitably involves delving into the wider debates and polemics of his age, personages and texts he praised and (more often) against whom he aimed his critical barbs as well as friends and sparring partners with whom he debated during his life. Equally, there cannot be a comprehensive biography of Spinoza not enmeshed in analysis of the deep-seated religious and political tensions and conflicts of the Dutch Golden Age as well as the central issues debated by its philosophers, scientists, religious leaders, and statesmen. All considered, a great deal of preliminary research and publication of other documents and surviving material is requisite before it is at all feasible to attempt a comprehensive, documents-based biography that, hopefully, adds to the earlier picture that Steven Nadler, in particular, has given us. There is thus good reason to emphasize here the crucial role of the marked revival of interest, and surge of new research, in all aspects of Spinoza's life and writings that followed in the wake of Nadler's biography

which appeared in 1999 in making possible a more detailed account of Spinoza's contribution to the history of philosophy, the Enlightenment and of his age.

"Given Spinoza's continuing relevance and pervasive influence," commented Frederick Beiser, in 1999, in response to Nadler's Spinoza: A Life which he reviewed together with another less significant biography, Margaret Gullan-Whur's Within Reason, both published in 1999, "it is surprising to find that there have been so few biographies of him."' It is indeed "surprising," and a phenomenon not easily explained, but certainly one factor, until recently, was the relative inaccessibility and where published, elusiveness, of much of what solid documentary material was available. In 2018, the Cambridge University Press brought out the revised edition of Nadler's masterful biography which reflects many though not all the recent finds relating to Spinoza's life. Nadler's biography and mine present a different picture in some regards though not in others, and while I have tried to fill in more of the historical and cultural context of Spinoza's life and early impact, I have remained conscious throughout of my enduring debt to Steve, my continuing debate with him, and the formidable and lasting value of his achievement.

As Nadler mentions in his preface to the second edition of his biography, the completion of Edwin Curley's landmark two-volume English edition of Spinoza's writings with the appearance of the second volume in 2016 not only provides a fresh store of valuable notes and commentary on the writings but enables one to refer the reader to a single complete, consistent, and mostly reliable English rendering of Spinoza's texts and letters. Curley's edition of Spinoza's Collected Works (2 vols., Princeton 1985 and 2016) the reader will find frequently referred to throughout. However, the best way of rendering into English Spinoza's meaning from the original Latin or Dutch still often remains elusive or debatable and there are numerous points throughout this biography where, after careful consideration, I have opted to render some of Spinoza's phrases and expressions rather differently from Curley and a great many slightly differently. The reader's attention is drawn to this point. Rather than quoting Curley's, or another translator's rendering exactly, my policy throughout has been to refer back to the original Latin and compare the various renderings, frequently arriving at wording that diverges, sometimes significantly, from the wording in the sources quoted. Where I have preferred to avoid Curley's understanding of the Latin, I have indicated this by referring to the Akkerman Dutch rendering or Maxime Rovere's excellent recent French translation.

Where this divergence seems significant I have indicated this either by referring directly to Carl Gebhardt's classic four-volume Latin edition of Spinoza's Opera (Heidelberg, 1925) or by referring to

the extremely exacting scholarly bilingual Latin-French PUF editions of the texts by the team that produced the Traite Theologico-Politique (1999), Fokke Akkerman, Jacqueline Lagrée, and Pierre-Francois Moreau, the Traite Politique (2005), Omero Proietti and Charles Ramond, the Premiers Écrits (2009), Filippo Mignini, M. Beyssade, and J. Ganault, and the Ethique (2020), Akkerman, Moreau, and Piet Steenbakkers. Since much of Spinoza's correspondence was in Dutch, as also is the earliest surviving version of Spinoza's Short Treatise on God, Man and his Well-Being, some of my translations of Spinoza's remarks and expressions have relied on the modern Dutch editions of Spinoza's letters by Akkerman, H. G. Hubbeling, and A. G. Westerbrink, of 1992 and of the early writings by Akkerman, Hubbeling, Mignini, M. J. Petry, and N. and G. van Suchtelen of 1982. However, though guided or influenced by these scholars, all the many English renderings in this volume wherever they do noticeably diverge from Curley's wording, are my own.

Steve Nadler has himself painstakingly continued adding to the research he originally did for his 1999 biography, and also since the appearance of the revised edition, and for the opportunities I have had to exchange information and views with him since (as well as before) 2018, I feel much additional gratitude....

If one could measure the stature of a thinker by how many refutations of his work appeared in the three decades following his death, it would be a shrewd bet that Spinoza would win the prize.' No other thinker or writer of early modern times attracted so much hostility and recrimination. Although a few other front-rank miscreants of the world ran him close for being universally reviled and vilified in his own time, Philip II of Spain and Hobbes for example, no other personage of ha came even close to being so decried, denounced and condemned in weighty texts of exhaustive length, over so long a span of time, in Latin, Dutch, French, English, German, Spanish, Portuguese, Hebrew, and other languages. A curious reception indeed for someone who preached continually against prejudice, envy, and hatred and showed no desire whatever to gain coveted positions, honours, property, wealth, or power.

Born in Amsterdam, in November 1632, Spinoza lived a relatively short life, dying nine months short of his forty-fifth birthday, in February 1677. For an ever curious, inquiring scholar of his aspirations and standing, he travelled remarkably little. Always anxious not to waste time, Spinoza was not one for frequent lew6.67 -urely chats, jollification, or, as far as one can tell, for romance. He mostly eschewed quarrels, rarely sought publicity, and in the end had to abandon his efforts to get his masterpiece of pure phosophy, The Ethics (1662677), published during hifetime. He .67 -pent so much of hime buried

There are many reasons why a comprehensive, detailed biography of Spinoza is desirable. It is not simply because he figures among the dozen or so foremost Western philosophers since classical times or was prominent in the general history of intellectual culture, political thought, and Bible criticism as well as philosophy properly speaking, though those reasons alone suffice to justify any aspiring biographer devoting years of research to the task. A more detailed picture, made possible by the extensive and impressive new research of recent decades, is needed also for broader historical reasons. For despite the unparalleled hostility Spinoza's philosophy provoked in his own time, there was also from the first fervent and highly influential enthusiasm for his views albeit until the 1780s exclusively in furtively secret, clandestine circles. Despite the high-pitched overwhelmingly negative reaction which only subsided to a more subdued level, noted a leading observer and critic of the early Enlightenment era, Jean le Clerc (1657-1736), from around 1725, certain strands of Spinoza's philosophy powerfully promoting a wide range of key modern values diffused steadily if slowly and with difficulty, contributing in highly original fashion to laying the groundwork of present-day liberal democratic modernity. Chief among these key features of his thought were his stress on individual autonomy, separation of the moral sphere from organized religion, unrestricted religious toleration, full freedom of thought and expression, press freedom, and a conception of government's responsibilities to society uncompromisingly insisting on the inherent superiority of the democratic republic over other forms of state, whether monarchy, aristocracy, oligarchic republic, or theocracy.

A comprehensive account of Spinoza's life also contributes to a broader understanding of early modern Europe, a clearer perception of how it was that despite the tide of fierce hostility surrounding his every move, he nevertheless mustered a remarkable amount of hidden, clandestine support. Measured in terms of what established philosophers in universities and academies then and later recognized as major new contributions to philosophy, Descartes, Locke, and Leibniz were undoubtedly the three most important philosophers of early modern times down to the high Enlightenment era, far outstripping Spinoza. Measured in terms of lasting long-term subversive impact on the foundations of early modern thought, religion, and political theory, it was undoubtedly Spinoza, far outstripping all of these, who exerted the greatest impact. This occurred first in Holland, then England, Germany, and France, and finally other lands, to such an extent that Spinoza must be considered the first founder of a major secular philosophical sect since classical times, since the rise of Stoicism, Neoplatonism, and Epicureanism, in a way that Machiavelli, Hobbes, and Locke ultimately could never rival, a movement that consciously set out to reform and, in effect, remake, that is to say revolutionize humanity and our world, helping drive the tendency historians now term "Radical Enlightenment."

Although, owing to the implications, many Enlightenment scholars today remain reluctant to admit the fact, a vast amount of evidence proves incontrovertibly that Spinoza was among the most important figures shaping not just the early Enlightenment, but the entire Western Enlightenment

down to the nineteenth century. He was not just a major influence on, but a decades-long central obsession of, Leibniz, Bayle, Le Clerc, Toland, Diderot, Voltaire, Lessing, Mendelssohn, Kant, Goethe, Herder, Fichte, Schelling, and many a lesser figure. But this unique role and status was due not just to his innate philosophical talents but, to a great extent, to his life story and activities combining and distilling in I highly original fashion a uniquely broad convergence (and clashing) of religious traditions, heretical sects, rival political cultures, languages, and scientific and philosophical approaches reflecting the fact that seventeenth-century Amsterdam and the whole urban core of Holland was at that time strikingly and challengingly more religiously, culturally, and linguistically diverse than Paris, Rome, Venice, London, Berlin, or Madrid, or indeed anywhere else on earth.

No doubt a modern Englishman, Frenchman, or German would immediately assume that the Spanish Jewish Baroque poet and chronicler, Miguel Levi de Barrios (1635-1701), was absurdly exaggerating when remarking, in 1684, that not only was Europe in the seventeenth century the most dominant part of the world, but that Europe's commercially most resplendent emporium, the "famous city of Amsterdam," was also Europe's greatest marvel in terms of cultural diversity eclipsing all the rest as the "Babel and Athens of different languages," publishing, art, cultivation of the "new philosophy" (Cartesianism), and new kinds of humanist study. This truth is also hard for modern historians to grasp. But during the seventeenth century, Paris, London, Berlin, Venice, Madrid, and all the era's other great capitals were all religiously, linguistically, and culturally less pluriform, less multicultural, and less global than Amsterdam. On top of that, given that Descartes and Bayle as well as Spinoza spent most of their intellectually creative lives in Holland, the Netherlands until 1700 was also unquestionably the world's then philosophical centre.

The daunting task of writing a comprehensive, detailed biography of a man for whom philosophical striving was everything becomes more daunting still when we consider how limited were Spinoza's correspondence and circle of long-term personal contacts. If other great philosophers of the age were eager for extensive networking, Spinoza was not. He practically never seems to have initiated a correspondence with someone he did not know. Leibniz, a titan of the pan-European "republic of letters," may have been altogether exceptional, leaving well over 20,000 letters. But Locke left around 3,650 and Bayle's letters, note the editors of the now complete published Bayle correspondence, total around 1,740.3 Even Descartes, who left far fewer, only around 800 letters, bequeathed approximately nine times as many as Spinoza from whom we have a mere forty-eight letters with another forty addressed to him, totalling just eighty-eight in all.

Yet, within the limitations imposed by a short life, poor health (at any rate by his early forties), and static existence, Spinoza led a quite extraordinary life. From a certain stage, deteriorating health and a gradually encroaching, at the time incurable, lung disease increasingly impeded his activities. Yet, despite his restricted circumstances and studied reclusiveness, his life can hardly be called uneventful.

Whatever else a biographer says about him, Spinoza's life was no quiet, leisurely stroll to the grave past rows of scholarly volumes. Rather it provoked an unprecedented international uproar. That Spinoza's philosophy constitutes a re-evaluation of all values was abundantly obvious to contemporaries as it is to us today. In his Ethics Spinoza analyses the working of the human passions and, thrusting aside all religious or theological underpinning for our moral order, lays down the principle that what "we call good, or evil, is what is useful or harmful to preserving our being in the sense of what increases or diminishes our power of acting," a principle determined strictly by "reason" that in Spinoza is both individual and collective, bearing on how one leads one's own life and on society as a whole. This principle, which he declares man's sole true moral basis, was no recipe for personal or group selfishness. Rather, as he presents it, it stands in constant tension with, almost outright opposition to, our instinctive nature and personal impulses, feelings and judgements about what we desire, or do not desire. For these are, for the most part, not based on rational calculation but impulse and "appetite," or rather whatever we individually momentarily imagine will bring us "happiness" or "sadness," which much of time, according to Spinoza, is barely considered, highly imaginative, or seriously deluded. Man is irreversibly part of nature and cannot act otherwise than in accordance with his nature but doing so in the best and wisest way is an arduous, often painful, learning process in which everyone needs all the help educators, more experienced family, neighbours, and others, and good laws, as well as willingness to learn, can proffer.

Spinoza defines "good" as "what we certainly know to be useful to us," and "bad" as what we surely perceive prevents us from acquiring some "good." "Virtue" Spinoza defines in a way that at first seems rather strange. But we soon come to see that he uses the term logically within his framework, presenting it as man's "very essence" in the sense of being man's power to bring about things, good rather than bad, in accordance with his specific nature. But although his ethical schema is based on a metaphysical relativity of "good" and "bad," his moral doctrine clearly produces naturalistic social and political certainties and absolutes within the human context. His principles contradicted all existing religions and codes of conduct. What in effect Spinoza presented to the world was what the Dutch Calvinist preacher, the younger Frans Burman (1671-1719), denounced as a general overturning of all then accepted "grounds of truth and certainty, denying there is any God distinct from Nature and abolishing all natural obligation to obey His commandments and true morality."' Spinoza's morality amounted to a new outlook on life, a new concept of what human happiness is, and undeniably stood in every way opposed to every Christian principle, belief, and tradition as taught by the churches (albeit not to Christianity as reinterpreted by him), as well as all revealed religion of whatever kind, every hierarchical social order, all custom, tradition, and received morality. For any theologian, political leader, editor, or teacher of his time it was wholly impossible to openly endorse his views, and even being suspected of adopting them in a concealed, esoteric, and partial fashion carried serious risk.

Spinoza was a philosopher who set out to reform philosophy, religion, politics, and society's understanding of human happiness. It was, and is, natural enough to pour scorn on such a project. Spinoza was a "fanatic" a leading French savant and convener of scientists in Paris, Melchisédec Thévenot (c.1620-92) sarcastically remarked in 1674, "qui veut réformer le monde [who wants to reform the world]," an impossible, even insane ambition.6 But the most staggering fact about Spinoza's life is that, against all the odds, gradually, unseen and clandestinely, he eventually partly succeeded. Although the real furore Spinoza universally provoked began only in 1670, during the last six or seven years of his life, more locally Spinoza met with fierce opposition on all sides from a much earlier stage. Such was its cogency that, behind the scenes, his philosophy attracted from the outset, gaining ground with each passing decade, a small fringe of intellectually inclined types ready to risk being shunned to embrace his philosophy in tiny clandestine groups. For the immense army of opposing academics, theologians, statesmen, law-makers, magistrates, schoolmasters, and pastors of his own country and neighbouring lands sworn to crush his system and coterie, his movement proved, both in his own day and for two or three centuries after, exasperatingly difficult to attack, persecute, and crush, partly due to its furtive way of organizing and diffusing its ideas and partly because Spinoza's system of ideas was so rigorously and deftly worked out that it proved highly resistant to being rebutted on purely rational and evidential grounds.

Spinoza by no means fits in the same category as Descartes, Hobbes, Locke, Leibniz, Bayle, or Rousseau. These were all towering thinkers; but all of these lost their direct relevance to modern life within a few decades, or at any rate half a century, after their deaths, subsequently remaining meaningful mostly to scholars and those interested in the history and development of Western thought. But this is not the case with Spinoza. Spinoza's relevance not only persisted but in much of the world has tended to increase and is today in many countries greater than ever, most strikingly in Latin America, North America, and the Far East. By no means all scholars today rejoice in this fact. But even those most unsympathetic to this only recently fully emerging historical reality—Spinoza's long veiled but unparalleled centrality and historical impact during the Enlightenment era—find it impossible, much to their exasperation, to deny the facts. "Of all seventeenth-century philosophers," notes Frederick Beiser, a leading expert on the history of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century German thought, in 1999, "Spinoza has come closest to the mentality of the modern age."' By the late eighteenth and the nineteenth century, Spinoza's status as a unique re-evaluator of all values began to assume a positive, and for some, such as Goethe, Heine, Shelley, and George Eliot, even heroic glow. It did also, at least during his middle period, for that other great modern re-evaluator of all values and prophet of "modernity"—Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900). Nietzsche, while diverging from Spinoza in several significant ways, to an extent also avowedly echoed his predecessor.'

Among the salient features of this debate about Spinoza's historical and current role is disagreement about his political thought, one of the most important dimensions of his philosophy. Until Spinoza's

time there had never been any prominent thinker in the West or East who prioritized the democratic republic over all other forms of state. "Doubts have been expressed as to whether Spinoza was really a democrat," observed the eminent Dutch historian E. H. Kossmann, in 1960, "but the text of his work gives no reason for doubt." Whatever other philosophers ancient, medieval, or early modern concluded about reality and politics, Spinoza's "intellectual convictions led him," as Kossmann put it, to conclude that "democracy was the original and, so long as it was designed properly, the best form of government."' (Spinoza was all too aware that it is prone not to be designed properly.) Many scholars oppose Kossmann's view. For many, it is extremely difficult to concede that the first powerful and influential expression of modern democratic thought in no way derived from or found inspiration in, the Anglo-American world. Again, a fact extremely exasperating for many scholars (who until a few decades ago, preferred to omit Spinoza from the canon of major modern political thinkers entirely), but established in recent decades as undeniable historical reality.

Considerable distaste arises too from Spinoza's obvious scorn for whatever is commonly and popularly accepted. Spinoza was not the kind of revolutionary who sought to stir up the common people and provoke violent dissension or mass revolt. For the opinions of "the multitude," for the accepted view of things, not just of ordinary people but nearly all people at every level including kings, princes, statesmen, churchmen, academics, preachers, and aristocrats, Spinoza showed astoundingly scant deference or respect. But while inclined to think practically all humans in his own time lacked a realistic understanding of the universe they inhabited, he solemnly vowed to regard humanity's collective ignorance and proneness to superstition, as he viewed it, as a universal natural blindness, a reality humanity cannot easily escape, a formidable burden afflicting everyone collectively rather than something merely deserving contempt.

Even Machiavelli and Hobbes, then, massive though their impact was, could not rival the sheer scope or intensity of blanket negative reaction that Spinoza incurred. In the Netherlands, exclaimed the Franker professor and preacher Johannes Regius (1656-1738), in 1713, the world of godlessness, atheism, and was dominated intellectually not by Machiavelli, nor Hobbes or Bayle,

despite the impact of these thinkers, but specifically the figure of Spinoza!' The same could be said for early Enlightenment France and Germany, and even, startlingly, once one gets past the early 1680s, for England, the major European land where Spinoza's modern reputation has always counted for least. Certainly, by Spinoza's time, Machiavelli had long been regarded throughout Europe as a highly impious and immoral influence, but one could hardly cite him as an outright, systematic denier of Revelation or the divine status and character of Sciptature. Hobbes, no less than Spinoza, was everywhere deemed an "atheist" and often seen as no less dangerous, malevolent, and anti-Scripturalist than Spinoza.

Among those who had made it their business to "disparage the Holy Scriptures, and revealed religion," commented Richard Kidder (1633-1703), bishop of Bath and Wells, in 1694, "three writers have denied Moses wrote the Pentateuch: Hobbes, in his Leviathan, the author of the Praeadamitae [La Peyrere] and Spinoza." Neither Hobbes nor anyone else, however, so comprehensively subverted confidence and belief that the Scriptures are divine revelation and are the true foundation of mankind's moral code or did so by employing such a rigorous system of Bible exegesis and historical argument. No one else went so far in severing theology from philosophy, wholly secularizing ethics, rejecting the very possibility of miracles and revelation and denying supernaturalia of every kind, all credence in spirits, demons, devils, angels, ghosts, magic, alchemy, divinely inspired prophecy, and sorcery.

Furthermore, some of the greatest minds of post-1700 modern humanity including Lessing, Herder, Goethe, Shelley, George Eliot, Heine, Nietzsche, Freud, and Einstein considered Spinoza's philosophy the most inspiring guide in their personal lives. For them, this was sometimes less a question of persuasive argument than Spinoza's rare ability to uplift, enlighten, and refine the most inquiring and poetic leanings, assisting individuals place their own existence on a higher, more meaningful level. If Freud had a notoriously low opinion of philosophy and philosophers in general, "I readily admit my dependence on Spinoza's doctrine," he wrote: "throughout my long life I sustained an extraordinarily high regard for the person as well as the thought achievement [Denkleistung] of the great philosopher Spinoza."" Einstein, we know, read Spinoza's greatest work, the Ethics, several times, commencing well before securing his first paid job, at the age of twenty-three, at the patent office in Bern, Switzerland, in 1902: "I think [Spinoza's] Ethics," he wrote to his cousin Else, his future wife, thirteen years later, in September 1915, "will have a permanent effect on me."13 Einstein's life-long devotion to strict determinism, universal causality, and the unity of the universe in its determined causality, including in the subatomic sphere of particles and their supposedly uncertain movements, closely chimed at a fundamental level with a philosophy which insists, as Spinoza expresses it in the Ethics, Part One, "that in nature there is nothing contingent, but all things are determined from the necessity of the divine nature to exist and to act in a certain way." In particular, Einstein's insistence on the universal character and unity, the Einheitlichkeit, of the universe fitted with Spinoza's determinism, universalism, and general approach, something alien to all medieval philosophy, even Maimonides who, in other respects evinces significant affinities with parts of Spinoza's system. Einstein's drive to establish the principles of the universe driven by a pervasive Verallgemeinerungsbedurfenis, or need to universalize, remained an overarching constant throughout his life-long striving to renew the basis of modern physics. Throughout his triumphant years developing relativity theory and subsequent unsuccessful final years of his scientific efforts at the Institute for Advanced Study, Einstein endeavoured to uncover, prove, and explain the oneness of the laws of physics at all levels in the shape of his "unified field theory."'

The drive to generalize and unify our vision of reality infused not only Einstein's scientific efforts but also his social ideals and view of politics which rested on deep, emotional aversion to all forms of fascism and chauvinistic nationalism. Characteristically, he insisted on calling himself a "European" rather than a "German." Equally, the drive to unify shaped his distinctive view of religion and the relationship of science to religion. Is not the essence of what is best in all the great religions better than anyone religion? Is it not better to view Moses, Jesus, and Buddha as equally valid prophets than to insist on one? Like Spinoza, Einstein was convinced there is such a thing as "true religion," but that this true religion has little to do with what most people understand by "religion."' Consisting of an ethical core, basically justice and charity, it is infused with a sense of wonder and awe at the unimaginable grandeur and unity of the universe.

When anxiety first arose among the public, in 1929, as to whether or not the man acknowledged as the world's greatest scientist of the age might be an "atheist," Rabbi Herbert S. Goldstein famously sent Einstein an urgent telegram: "Do you believe in God? Stop. Answer paid, fifty words. Stop." Often sparing with words, Einstein needed only thirty for his reply: "I believe in Spinoza's God, who gals Himself in the law-governed harmony of the world, not in a God who concerns Himself with the fate and doings of mankind."' "We followers of Spinoza," he added, in a private letter, a few months later, "see our God in the wonderful order and lawfulness of all that exists and in its Beseeltheit [inspired animation], as it reveals itself in man and animal."' Einstein believed not only that this "cosmic religious feeling" of awe was the strongest and noblest motive driving scientific research in modern times but also that humanity generally is slowly but gradually moving towards what he envisaged as this new higher conception of religion. As mankind's awe before the unity and coherence of the universe grows together with the impulse to renew human society on the basis of justice and charity, it would give birth to a new universal "true religion" stripped of all superstition, dogma, intolerance, hatred, and bigotry that will ultimately replace all the scriptures, priests, rabbis, gurus, cardinals, and mullahs of the world with the collected and integrated findings of philosophers and scientists.

Spinoza's family settled in Amsterdam having emerged from a clandestine crypto-Judaism in the Iberian peninsula locked in constant and irresolvable combat with Spanish and Portuguese royal absolutism, the Catholic Church, and especially the Inquisition, the ultimate symbol of oppression, persecution, theological narrowness, and extreme dogmatic intolerance in Spinoza's day, the constant ominous shadow over his own forebears in Portugal. The Inquisition was a powerful institution that for well over three centuries imprisoned, tortured, and executed literally thousands of martyrs. This dark Iberian context was a crucial factor in Spinoza's background, early life, and formation and likewise an essential dimension for understanding his thought generally. The contrast between Spinoza's Ibero-Jewish background and the Dutch social context in which he lived fed his passionate yet cautious involvement in the political scene of his day, his tenacious defence of certain encouraging features of his immediate milieu. No matter how wretched and oppressive the

circumstances of men living under brutal and relentless tyranny, a much better human context is conceivable and achievable. He remained acutely aware throughout his life that he and those around him were less at risk in their activities and persons in the Dutch Republic than anywhere else at the time. Publishing their views may have been forbidden, teaching them to students impermissible, openly debating their views with others inadvisable. Yet, despite these barriers, he and his circle enjoyed "the rare happiness of living in a republic where every person's liberty to judge for himself is respected, everyone is permitted to worship God according to his own mind, and nothing is thought dearer or sweeter than freedom." This passage is undoubtedly tinged with sarcasm. But while he is here criticizing the limitations and incompleteness of seventeenth-century Dutch freedom, he was nevertheless also expressing a deeply felt positive emotion. Indeed, Spinoza never ceased to place a high value on the Dutch Republic during its Golden Age. However imperfect, it offered a greater degree of religious liberty and freedom of conscience and thought than any other society at the time, including Britain prior to the Glorious Revolution of 1688. Indeed, the England of Cromwell and Charles II figured among the specific targets of his political criticism, even if substantially less so than Philip II's Spain and Louis XIV's France.

There is an important sense in which the Dutch Republic was, as one historian called it, the first "modern society" and this is doubtless why its greatest thinker was, in Beiser's sense, the "first modern philosopher." But while he valued it, Spinoza remained acutely aware of the limitations of Dutch freedom in his day, of its precariousness and instability, the constant threat to the religious liberty and political freedom he enjoyed there, emanating from what he considered the oppressive role of the clergy and angry resentment of the monarchically-inclined Orangist political faction among the Dutch public and regents. But most basic of all as a threat to liberty and personal fulfilment, he maintains, was the ignorance, intolerance, theological dogmatism, the uncomprehending notions and all-encompassing "superstition" of the great mass of society (kings, princes, aristocrats, and academics included).

Spinoza's distinctive interpretation of what human "superstition" is was directly linked to his own family's long and complex encounter with the Inquisition. To Spinoza's mind "superstition" and false belief form the most powerful, pervasive, and dangerous force in human life, in politics, religion, and education, and are by no means the outcome merely of ignorance. Rather, as with the Spanish and Portuguese Inquisition, its most obnoxious fruit, "superstition" for Spinoza is credulity forged into politically empowered oppressive dogma, laws, and institutionalized practice. He envisaged mankind's greatest foe as a product of our inability to understand the nature of things powered by universal desperation laced with our unending expectation that a good life can after all be salvaged from the wretchedness and misery engulfing most of humanity, albeit without most men having the slightest idea how. For Spinoza believes that it is by manipulating humanity's rudderless fear and hope that the cunningly self-seeking are able to sway the masses into applauding and embracing not

just the crassest notions but also despotic, exploitative control, forging their own servitude. In Spinoza's theologico-politico-philosophical system, much the most formidable pillar of despotism defined as government by elite groups and their vested interests opposing the "common good" and the interest of the majority, the basis of all systems preying on the majority in the interest of the few, whether headed by several tyrants or a single despot, is always the artful exploiting and building on the universal foundation of credulity and "superstition." Ignorance, misinformation, and superstition rule humanity.

The myriad rulers, religious heads, and oligarchs whose power, glory, and wealth are built on "superstition" have a problem, though, in that "superstition" left to itself tends to be unstable. The vast mass of the world's wretched, fearful, and desperate, as Spinoza understood things, can readily be made to embrace nonsense and believe total lies, as has been shown time and again. That part is easy. But because men are wretched without understanding why, they tend to rush headlong from one hoped-for cure for their distress to the next. Consequently, contends Spinoza, to stabilize the control, profits, and advantages "superstition" affords masters, despots, and exploiters, great energy and resources are invested in formulating and buttressing particular forms of superstition to solidify and render durable by introducing impressive ceremonies and elaborating an intricate, fabricated theology lessening the need for direct coercive force. By developing castes of priests and theologians to further elaborate religious dogma and adorning their teaching with grandiose art and architecture, music, rituals and processions, "holy" dogmas can be made stable, alluring, impressive, and durable.' What any given religious teacher or theologian believes or does not believe about God and His commandments makes little difference in Spinoza's schema: coercively imposed religious authority designed to keep the "common people" in thrall to particular beliefs and doctrines, penalizing, segregating, or executing those who dissent, is by definition devoid of truth value and can never rise above "pagan superstition" because its social purpose is to promote hateful "servitude.""

Christianity is not of itself something negative in Spinoza's eyes. True Christianity, he insisted, is a religion of "love, joy, peace, moderation and good will to all men" and thus immensely valuable. Unfortunately, organized Christianity's most striking feature in his day, in Spinoza's view, was largely the opposite, consisting chiefly of the "extraordinary animosity" of the different confessions endlessly battling each other and fiercely suppressing dissenters, Orthodox against Catholic, Catholic against Protestant, Calvinist versus Lutheran, Trinitarian against Anti-Trinitarian, confessions "giving daily expression to the bitterest mutual hatred." Each revealed religion claims to be the true one. But the only difference a careful observer can discern between Catholics, Protestants, Muslims, and Jews, suggests Spinoza, is the distinctive dress and customs, and particular places of worship they attend, "otherwise their lives are identical in each case."' The reason for this "deplorable situation," this sea of hatred and implacable and unending war of creed against creed, according to Spinoza, is quite simple: Christianity, after Christ's death and immediately after the Apostles, was perverted from its proper

course into "superstition" and ecclesiastical hierarchies enabling theologians, irrespective of which creed they professed, to hold sway over the common people, while giving birth to the warring ancient churches of the Near East, Africa, and Europe. The Church Fathers, held Spinoza, proved avid chiefly to control, polemicize, secure their own church's "lucrative positions," and be "considered great dignitaries."' In Spinoza's thought," true religion" and the actuality of our world's churches are two completely different things usually in outright opposition to each other.

Morality and "true religion," then, including true "Christianity," were understood by Spinoza as something entirely separate from what churchmen and most people call "religion," though he himself, like Einstein later, was perfectly willing to acknowledge a core of "true religion" in every faith to the extent that it does actually promote the higher moral values. "True religion," he argues, boils down to an ethical core. Few have ever expressly agreed with Spinoza's estimate of the value of his ethical and political ideas to humanity at large. However, those who have include some of the most creative and exceptional. The English novelist George Eliot, on reading Spinoza in the early 1840s, was immediately captivated by his recipe for enabling men to escape the "shackles of superstition." She set to work to translate two of Spinoza's major works from Latin into English, a large part of the Tractatus Theologico-Politicus of 1670 over a prolonged period (1843-9) and then the Ethics, in 1854-6.

George Eliot adopted Spinoza as her particular philosophical moral guide, but eventually felt frustrated by the difficulty of effectively rendering Spinoza's core ideas meaningfully to a wide audience. From her first full-scale novel, Adam Bede (1859), onwards, she set out to transcend what she saw as the restricted usefulness of straightforward translation with fictional dramatizing. In her first novel, her main character, Adam, like Silas Marner (1861) in her third, remains trapped in a whirl of damaging emotions and false notions only mitigated as he painstakingly learns to understand, evaluate, and take responsibility for the true nature of his emotional difficulties and personal predicament. In her late novel, Daniel Deronda (1876) Eliot illustrates how the life of a person (Gwendolen) devoted to pure selfishness eventually shrivels but can ultimately be elevated and reinvigorated by a more experienced person who has learnt to find happiness in helping others lift themselves from misery. For both Spinoza and Eliot, correcting our ideas is not just a philosophical procedure helping the individual clarify her or his thoughts, but the means to redeem individuals individually and collectively and reform society and institutions. The remedy afforded by true liberating understanding, in Spinoza and Eliot, is indispensable both for individuals and the well-being of groups and society as a whole, and the basis for the fundamental principles of the state.' In Middlemarch, with admirable skill, Eliot conveys a sense of how every person's "life impinges on many others," how the individual's life is entwined with that of the community, and how every community's established prejudices and false judgements threaten the well-being of, and pose a challenge of responsibility to, every individual."

Lack of religious affiliation, observes Beiser, and his variegated and rich cultural background "makes Spinoza the perfect symbol of the modern alienated intellectual, the prime example of the alienated thinker who was at home everywhere and nowhere. Is it any wonder that the Dutch, Portuguese, Spanish, Christians, and Jews all claim him? It is a tribute to Spinoza - and part of the fascination of the man - that all are both right and wrong."" Writing a comprehensive biography of Spinoza therefore presents an unusual set of challenges. In the first place a whole catalogue of dramatically different religious and philosophical traditions converged and to a degree fused in Spinoza and in his life's project in highly exceptional fashion.' In Spinoza, medieval Islamic-Jewish philosophy, early modern Marrano clandestine intellectual and religious subversion, Cartesianism, Spanish scholasticism, Jesuit pedagogy, the experimental philosophy of Bacon and Boyle, Radical Reformation Christian Socinianism and irenicism, and early modern Neo-Epicurean libertinage erudit were all powerfully merged.

Besides this unusual medley of influences it is essential to convey some sense of how and why certain features of his thought but not others proved uncommonly inspirational to some of the world's most exalted minds. Fortunately, Spinoza's own powerful sense of purpose in life, rigorous writing style and conciseness, make it relatively easy to impart awareness of the impressive coherence interconnecting all his major and minor texts, linking his life-story to his philosophy and interventions in Dutch politics and religion, and also how the different religious and other traditions converging in his life related to his attitudes, activities, and legacy. To convey an initial glimpse of Spinoza's ultimate legacy one need only point to his greatest philosophical work, the Ethics. A person can be "free" as an individual in the most vital respects, he contends here, even under a tyrannical, oppressive regime. Equally, in a democracy a person can easily live a thoroughly wretched, miserable, and unworthy life effectively as "a slave" of others or of one's own emotions. But the optimal context for advancing individual "reason" and virtue alongside and to some extent together with collective freedom and wellbeing, the context most conducive to both, constitutes what he was the first great thinker to project as the "democratic republic."

The centrality of the political dimension in Spinoza's general philosophy and ethics is indeed a key feature of his thought. Because happiness and pleasure form the foundations of the "good" relative to other things, and pain and sorrow the "bad," Spinoza's system has, as a direct consequence, that "whatever is conducive to man's social organization, or causes men to live in harmony, is advantageous, while those things that introduce discord into the state are bad" (Ethics, Part IV, Proposition 40). Hence, it is owing as much to its effects on oneself, as on others, insists Spinoza, that "hatred can never be good" (Ethics, Part IV, Proposition 45). Defining "hatred" as "hatred towards men," Spinoza holds that all hatred foments desire to destroy, subjugate, or humiliate those we loathe while every emotion allied to hatred, like envy, anger, contempt, and thirst for revenge, is debasing and "bad" in relation to reason and man's own individual being. Equally, where the rule of law prevails

"in a state unjust," that is nearly all societies, the oppression, resentment, and negative consequences generated simultaneously fill he who hates with base emotion while harming those who are hated. Correcting men's thinking and improving our forms of government matters greatly, therefore, to everyone without exception from the wisest to the most ignorant. For, as things stand, not only do people commonly believe things that are completely untrue but passionately commit themselves to false ideas in organized blocs, often in fanatical fashion, causing immense damage to their immediate milieu, themselves, and everyone else.

In the work of combating universal ignorance and superstition, and seeking to build a better society, all peoples and nations, in Spinoza's view, are equal. It was a fundamental axiom of his thought that mankind is universally identical in its basic nature, and universally blinkered in much the same way, even while particular societies and qualities of life remain sharply differentiated, depending on the type and quality of political constitutions, institutions, and laws prevailing.' Thus, for example the "Jews today have absolutely nothing that they can assign to themselves but not to other peoples."" War, fanaticism, intolerance, and misplaced dogmatism are the central curses and obstructions in everyone's life, as in that of Spinoza's own life and experience. Removing false notions and prejudices from people's minds not only helps in making individual lives happier, more satisfactory, and more their own responsibility but assists also in reducing strife, war and quarrels and promoting social harmony.

In Spinoza's philosophy, the same freedom and better life acquired for the individual by ridding one's mind of false or, as Spinoza termed them, "inadequate" ideas, our striving toward the "blessedness [zaligheid]" that is the highest state that humans can attain, is also the recipe for achieving a better and more satisfactory form of society and politics. "Whatever conduces to the universal fellowship of men," goes one of Spinoza's more renowned maxims (Ethics IV, Prop. 40), "that is to say, whatever causes men to live in harmony with one another, is profitable and, on the contrary, whatever brings discord is evil." In her (for long unpublished) manuscript translation, George Eliot especially prized this dimension of Spinoza, rendering this maxim: "Those things which cherish human society, or which cause men to live together in concern, are useful; and, on the contrary, those things are evil which occasion discord in the community."'

Men can agree and dwell in harmony, Spinoza teaches in Part V of his Ethics, only insofar as they restrain their individual passions and organize their community under the guidance of "reason." Unfortunately, men rarely do so as most concern themselves only with their own personal advantage, causing strife and collisions at every turn. Nevertheless, crucially for the fate of mankind, it is also true that it is "when each man most seeks his own advantage for himself, that men are most useful to one another." This, of course, is the essence of trade, and providing commercial and other services, which had long been the sphere of activity of Spinoza's forebears not just in Portugal but from the 1590s also

in France and the Spanish Netherlands as well as North Africa. It was equally the essence of political negotiation and even arguably theology and academic life as well as of the vast web of behind-the-scenes dialogue and negotiation between the warring Lutherans, Calvinists, Anglicans, Catholics, Mennonites, Quakers, fringe Christian Millenarians, and Jews, confessions all especially numerous in the Holland of his day. But at the same time, this usefulness of all to everyone is the principal reason why Spinoza judges the democratic republic, seeking the optimal set of conditions for each person to develop their own individual lives as they wish, to be inherently superior to every other form of regime.' This insight of Spinoza's, that all theology, religious debate, and politics, like commerce and family relations, is about power seeking, manipulation, jockeying for position and advantage, provides the rationale behind his distinctive doctrine that the force of reason, however imperfect, is always a collective as much as individual phenomenon and one not necessarily, or even usually, understood by those who directly experience and benefit from this collective reason. Every particular desire or emotion can be either good or bad depending on circumstances except for one solitary major exception: by Part IV, Proposition 61 of the Ethics, "a desire that arises from reason cannot be excessive."" Never was there a more unbending rationalist.

If mankind's religious status ever reaches the stage where "the piety or impiety of each person's faith should be judged by their works alone," everyone will then understand, as they miserably failed to do for the most part when he lived, that the unique result, wherever everyone is truly free "to obey God in a spirit of sincerity and freedom," is that "only justice and charity [are] esteemed by everyone."' Throughout his most productive years as a thinker and writer Spinoza was widely denounced as an "atheist," and enemy of public and private morality, a great corrupter of mankind, charges he angrily rejected. Spinoza himself always insisted, as he reiterates at both the beginning and close of his Tractatus Theologico-Politicus that he wrote in all sincerity taking "great pains to ensure above all that everything I write entirely accords with the laws of my country, with piety, and with morality."" He did not accept that he was an "atheist," indeed angrily disavowed any such designation. But among the foremost consequences of his underlying approach to philosophy, religion, ethics, science, and political thought is his concluding that there is no such thing as divinely-sanctioned or justified "religious authority." Coercive regulation of belief on the basis of dogma or church decree is always "superstition" from whatever source it derives and whatever it preaches. Only civil government and its laws possess the right to rule over men and even these only outside the sphere of individual conscience, thought, and belief. For Spinoza, no religious authority exists or ever could exist.

No aspect of Spinoza's Tractatus Theologico-Politicus of 1670 (henceforth the TTP), his second most important work, matters more than his insistence that he had written it for the benefit of all, to combat what he considered mistaken ideas and false theological notions prevalent in the society in which he lived, and especially to fight "superstition" and denial of freedom of thought. However, he then importantly qualifies this pronouncement by adding that he had not written it for direct

consumption by "the multitude" or the great majority of readers, since he considers it impossible to challenge the prevailing "superstition" and ignorance shaping the world in which men live head on. Rather, his highly subversive treatise should be read, he recommended, only by that small band of "philosophical readers" capable of thinking independently, rationally, and critically. Broadly speaking, the same goals and provisos characterize his most important work, the Ethics. For the kind of philosopher he aspired to be, and turn others into, great caution was requisite—even in the relatively free Dutch Republic of the Golden Age. Both wholly uneducated minds, he explains, and those possessing some education but conventionally shaped and devoid of real philosophical and critical apparatus, are not just powerfully driven and torn by fear and hope, but inherently dangerous to any vocal dissident. For "most people are quite ready to believe anything," as he puts it on the first page of the TTP, and in their ignorance all too ready to assault and crush whoever opposes their cherished prejudices."

Yet how can one possibly "reform the world," one might object, if like medieval Islamic thinkers, Maimonides, and Spinoza, or Toland, Voltaire, d'Holbach, and Condorcet later, one believes "the ignorant" do in fact overwhelmingly outnumber "the wise," if the great majority of mankind possess no intellectual grasp of the human condition or morality and politics at all, and when, as Spinoza says, "every man judges what is good according to his own way of thinking"?' Here his vision diverges markedly from that of the great medieval Jewish thinker Maimonides, who adhered to a similar (originally Platonic) dichotomy dividing all mankind into the philosophically-inclined versus the ignorant multitude comprising everyone else." Spinoza's answer is that wherever an increasingly free interplay of views and interests is permitted, each individual's needs within society will collectively spur and steer society, guided by the balancing and offsetting of conflicting interests, in the right direction. True though it is that men are continually a great nuisance to each other, and the greatest cause of mankind's distress and disasters, yet, paradoxically, "from the society of our fellow men," we nevertheless derive "many more advantages than disadvantages."" On this ground he believed, "reason" can advance if and wherever freedom of thought, debate, and to publish prevail—a colossal "if" he ceaselessly reiterates.

It is indeed a striking feature of Spinoza's philosophy, and indication of its intensely political character, that it remains unnecessary for most, or even more than a handful, to perceive the truth intellectually. To live in accord with reason understanding the basic principles of morality, science, and politics is reserved for very few. But all can benefit from the advance of "reason" because the pressure of social needs and fear of insecurity automatically creates a framework of social tendencies, a context of laws and customs, enshrining to a greater or lesser degree (depending on the character and quality of the state) morality's authentic principles. Any law, Spinoza maintained (whether or not altogether convincingly), no matter how vigorously enforced must become discredited and progressively weakened where its negative consequences for the whole are manifest, and its inherent

morality brought into doubt, helped by the few possessing wisdom pronouncing it damaging, divisive, irrational, and absurd. Even if only the freest, most rational individuals, understand religion, politics, and morality and can exhort the need to negate damaging common notions of doctrine, revelation, miracles, martyrdom, heroism, magic and faith fomenting strife and fanaticism, and that damage society, the whole body exudes an inherent but fragile automatic tendency and impulse to move in the right direction wherever this is not blocked by organized, doctrinally-sanctioned error, myth, and tyranny mobilizing "superstition" to forcibly underpin oppression. The understanding of the wise and free can provide the needed intellectual steering mechanism, justifying and reinforcing the operations of law and custom, and guiding society as a whole to better things, as long as public affairs of every kind remain open to free discussion and unrestricted rational criticism with respect to their social and moral consequences.

The political arena and the falsely "religious" and theologically tainted ethical sphere, for Spinoza, interact on every level and affect, usually adversely, the quality of life and happiness of the individual, even the most rational, in fundamental ways. This is because, Spinoza explains in the Part IV of his principal work of philosophy, "a man who is guided by reason is more free in a state where he lives according to a common decision, than in solitude where he obeys only himself.' The free individual's own freedom and virtue, in other words, are enhanced where he aligns with what Spinoza terms "the common advantage" working both for others and himself. From the argument of Part IV of the Ethics we see clearly that throughout Spinoza's system the political is always directly linked to the ethical— so that nothing is worse in studying Spinoza's philosophy than the (unfortunately) common practice of detaching and considering the Ethics separately from the TTP and the unfinished Tractatus Politicus [TP]. For just as the collective in Spinoza always stands in indirect and complex relation to the individual, collective reason seeking the "common advantage" is a force for the advancement and benefit of society no less in Part IV and Part V of the Ethics than in Spinoza's strictly political writings.

This "common advantage" benefits everyone, the aware free man no less than the vast majority, the "superstitious," scantily educated humans unable, according to Spinoza, to grasp the reality of things, those who live by passions and emotion spiced by misguided religious notions, rather than by reason. Still, even where "reason" registers some gains, the ignorance of the vast majority always represents a continuing threat to the well-being of society as a whole and to everyone in it. Spinoza's philosophy and moral teaching, then, as presented in the Ethics, are in no way inconsistent, or out of balance (as is sometimes suggested), with Spinoza's democratic republican political theory or life-long unrelenting attack on the sway and pretensions of ecclesiastics whether Catholic, Protestant, Muslim, or Jewish, all of whose pretensions, such was his ambition, he resolutely set out to demolish utterly in the interest of truth, science, and society. <>

Future Law A new series that analyses how law and ethics influence and regulate technology in the context of cultural and global development Arts and popular culture play a complex role in mediating between law and technology. They can express the enthusiasm or unease a society feels about technological development, shaping demand for legislative intervention. They give us the creative space to think about how societies governed by new laws may look. And they can explain complex technological or legal issues to the layperson. At the same time, they can distort legal and technological constraints, mislead the public through misguided expectations and create demand for unnecessary legislative intervention.

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by Andelka M. Phillips [Future Law, Edinburgh University Press, ISBN 9781474422598]

Examines the direct-to-consumer genetic testing industry's controversial use of 'wrap' contracts

This book examines the rise of the direct-to-consumer genetic testing industry (DTC) and its use of 'wrap' contracts. It uses the example of DTC to show the challenges that disruptive technologies pose for societies and for regulation. It also uses the wrap contracts of DTC companies to explore broader issues with online contracting.

Uses the example of DTC genetic testing companies using wrap contracts as their dominant means of governance to show the challenges that disruptive technologies pose for societies and for regulation

- Reviews 71 wrap contracts used by DTC companies providing health testing

- Explores broader issues with online contracting

- Sets an agenda for improving regulation and the online contracting environment

This book provides an introduction to the world of personal genomics and examines the rise of the direct-to-consumer genetic testing industry (DTC) and its use of 'wrap' contracts. It explores the different types of tests available and the issues that this industry raises for law and society.

- Considering ordering a genetic test online?
- Did you stop to read the fine print?
- Most of us never consider the contracts we enter into online. We click 'Agree' and move on – not necessarily realising the implications of that click, and others.

This book provides an introduction to the world of personal genomics (also known as direct-to-consumer genetic testing or DTC). It examines the rise of the DTC genetic testing industry and its use of electronic 'wrap' (typically clickwrap and browsewrap) contracts. It explores the different types of tests available, with the issues that this industry raises for law and society. It concludes with a call for improved regulation of the industry.

Key Features

- Uses the example of the DTC industry's reliance on wrap contracts as its dominant means of governance to highlight the challenges that disruptive technologies pose for societies and regulation
- Provides an overview of the different types of tests available and explores the issues raised by each type of test – including discussion of consumer protection and privacy issues in this context
- Provides a summary and review of 71 wrap contracts used by DTC companies that provide tests for health purposes
- Suggests that a number of terms commonly included are challengeable on the basis of unfairness
- Explores broader issues with online contracting and consumer behaviour
- Sets an agenda for improving regulation and the online contracting environment

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Direct-to-Consumer Genetic Testing and Regulating Disruptive Technology

We are all made up of DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid). We all have our own unique genetic code. When any one of us gives up a physical sample for the purpose of a genetic test, that code becomes decipherable. Through genetic testing, information that is contained in our bodies is encapsulated in digital form. This genetic data has the potential to be stored indefinitely and it can serve not only as a unique identifier for you, but also to identify family members. The shared nature of genetic data also means that data collected for one purpose can be used for a variety of secondary purposes, including criminal investigations and tracing family members.

Our DNA is part of each of us as individuals and we might assume that we own it in the same way that many of us might assume we own our bodies. Yet in many places the law does not actually provide for property rights in samples of DNA, once they are

extracted from us or in our own bodies. While we might often feel that we in some sense own our bodies and their parts, this is not the case for the most part at present. For example, in the United States of America, tissue samples such as skin and saliva that we leave behind us are often treated as abandoned and can be used by law enforcement in criminal investigations.2 This has been exemplified by the recent involvement of the geneology database GEDmatch in the investigation of the Golden State Killer case, which will be discussed in Chapter 4.

While we often will not have property rights in our own DNA or our bodies, our rights in genetic data are protected in various jurisdictions in different ways, but significantly genetic data is included within the definition of personal data in the European Union's (EU) General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). This means that entities that collect and process genetic data should be complying with the provisions of the GDPR. One of the most significant requirements of the GDPR in this context is the standard of consent required. Consent as specified in Article 4 of the GDPR must be 'freely given, specific, informed and unambiguous indication of the data subject's wishes by which he or she, by a statement or by a clear affirmative action, signifies agreement to the processing of personal data relating to him or her'.

While the GDPR is EU law, it is having a significant influence on privacy and data protection law worldwide, with many countries outside the EU seeking to reform their laws, so that they are still able to do business with the EU, where it involves personal data. This includes: Brazil; Japan; New Zealand; and Singapore.

Many of us access new types of service online and in particular there are many new and emerging technologies, which are directed at the consumer market. This means that other areas of law also have a role to play in governing industries and in protecting consumer rights. Most significant here for present purposes are consumer protection and contract law. In the UK and EU there are a number of Directives that protect consumer rights and also provide for fairness in consumer contracts. The most significant in this context are the Directive on Consumer Rights and the Unfair Contract Terms Directive (although the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive also has relevance).

We are also living in an age when our lives are increasingly becoming digital and many services we engage with do collect, store, share and sell data about us. This is the era of Big Data, dataveillance, self-tracking and connectivity. Dataveillance is 'the systematic use of personal data systems in the investigation or monitoring of the actions or communications of one or more persons'. Dataveillance occurs in many different contexts and a wide range of businesses use dataveillance in some form. The Internet of Things (IoT), which essentially involves equipping an ever-increasing array of everyday objects with sensors and Internet connectivity is rapidly expanding the variety of entities engaging in dataveillance. IoT is estimated to grow significantly in the coming years. Many online services make money through advertising and the European Commission's European Data Market study found that 'the overall value of the data economy grew from the €247 billion in 2013 to almost reaching €300 billion in 2016' and it estimates that 'by 2020, the EU data economy is expected to increase to €739 billion'. This data-driven age is also an age increasingly of data breaches. Symantec's 2017 Threat Report estimated that over the previous eight years, 'more than seven billion online identities have been stolen in data breaches, which is almost the equivalent of one for every person on the planet'. The last few years have also seen growth in mega-breaches, with 15 occurring in 2016 alone. Yahoo's breach is one of the most prominent and in December of 2016 it was revealed that this breach affected more than 1 billion users. Breaches can now affect almost any kind of organisation and so businesses that offer new types of commercial services that rely on personal data and sensitive data need to have sound and reliable security infrastructure.

So, what is this book about? Are you interested in learning about your genetic origins? Have you recently noticed advertisements for commercial genetic tests? Do you regularly read website terms and conditions or privacy policies? Would knowing the content of a company's online terms and conditions or privacy policy influence your decision to engage with a particular service or product?

Let's be honest. Most of us are active online today, regardless of our interests or profession. Most of us have an email account. Most of us use a particular search engine. Most of us have personal data about us collected and stored somewhere by others we do not know. Most of us will give up some personal data in order to use a free service

and most of us have entered into contractual arrangements with businesses through their website without reading the lengthy terms and conditions, terms of service or privacy policy documents. Although laws such as the Consumer Rights Directive and the GDPR aim to enhance our rights as consumers and data subjects, most of us do not really know what those rights are in full and we do not really know or understand the content of all these documents. Remember: every website you visit has some form of contractual document or policy, whether or not we actually notice it.

What does all this mean? It means that if you are like me, you have entered into contractual relationships without pausing to read the fine print. This book will take you on a journey to explore the content of the terms and conditions of personal genomics – of direct-to-consumer genetic testing (DTC) companies. It will also discuss privacy and data protection issues drawing upon other recent studies.

It should be noted at the outset that DTC contracts are of a specific type. These documents are wrap contracts, which are either framed as clickwrap or browsewrap agreements. These are contractual forms that have evolved from shrink-wrap agreements or licences. Shrink-wrap agreements were originally conceived in order to protect the rights of software developers. Shrink-wrap contracts are included on the packaging of software products and a person normally signals their assent to be bound by these contracts by ripping open the packaging. They are also a form of adhesion contract and may also be viewed as mass consumer standard form contracts (that is, boilerplates). In this book, 'wrap contract' is used in the same manner as in Nancy Kim's leading text Wrap Contracts: Foundations and Ramifications. Accordingly, the term 'wrap contract' is used as:

> a blanket term to refer to a unilaterally imposed set of terms which the drafter purports to be legally binding and which is presented to the non-drafting party in a nontraditional format. Nontraditional in this context means that the contracting form wasn't commonly used prior to 1980 and includes electronic media and offline mediums. The single common characteristic is that the adhering party does not have to use a pen in order to accept the terms.

Both clickwrap and browsewrap are contractual forms common to all types of e-commerce and many DTC contracts strongly resemble the contracts used by Google, iTunes, Twitter and Amazon. Such contracts are normally extremely lengthy. For

instance, a recent article compared the lengths of iTunes' and Amazon's contracts to the length of Macbeth and Hamlet respectively and both contracts are longer than these plays. So now people can choose whether to read wrap contracts or Shakespeare.

This book is based on research which originally began in 2011. This research involved the compilation of a database containing data concerning the DTC industry, including the location of companies, the types of service they offered, screen shots, electronic contracts and privacy policies, where these were publicly available. Several versions of the dataset were publicly released via Zenodo in 2018 and updated versions will be released over the coming years. A significant part of this project involved the review of 71 wrap contracts of DTC companies that provide tests for health purposes. The book also draws upon more recent studies of privacy policies and electronic contracts of DTC companies and other digital services. In conducting this research, screen shots were saved and the content of DTC websites explored. However, it has not been possible to provide an in-depth analysis of DTC marketing claims herein and so reference will be made to other studies that have examined DTC website content and marketing claims.

How many contracts have you entered today? The Norwegian Consumer Council (NCC) in its APPFAIL campaign estimated that on average one smartphone contains approximately 250,000 words of application terms and conditions and privacy policies. Furthermore, if you own five Apple devices, it is likely that you have entered into 'at least 30 contracts, totalling more than 100,000 words'. Most of these documents are lengthy and written in complex legalese which the layperson would struggle to understand. A recent study by Conklin and Hyde investigating the readability of seven insurance policies found that all policies 'required a very high level of education to be understood' with the easiest requiring 14 years of education and the most difficult requiring a PhD-level education.

The Australian consumer group CHOICE carried out a study of e-reader terms and conditions in 2017. They hired an actor to read the terms aloud. For Amazon's Kindle there were at least eight documents in total, which together exceeded 73,000 words – approaching the length of this book. As well as not being easy to read, many wrap contracts used in e-commerce more generally may contain terms that are

challengeable on the grounds of unfairness and they may also include terms that give businesses additional advantages. This practice has been dubbed by Kim as the inclusion of 'crook' provisions. In the last few years there have been a number of experiments centred around including clauses of this type. These range from GameStation's inclusion of an immortal soul clause to the more recent example of Purple's community service clause. In the Purple example, they added the clause for a two-week period. Under the clause 'over 22,000 people agreed to carry out 1,000 hours of community service', which included agreeing to clean public toilets, hug stray animals and paint snails' shells. 'All users were given the chance to flag up the questionable clause in return for a prize, but remarkably only one individual, which is 0.000045% of all Wi-Fi users throughout the whole two weeks, managed to spot it'.

This is not a contract law textbook; it deals with regulation of technology, focusing on the specific example of DTC and the use of electronic wrap contracts in that context. As wrap contracts play a significant role in industry self-regulation in this context, this book does address wrap contracts and comes at this from a critical perspective. It takes a practical rather than theoretical approach, seeking to draw attention to the ways in which we all as consumers and data subjects engage with wrap contracts and privacy policies, and the issues which this raises for our society and the law. In relation to the designed environment of websites, contracts and privacy settings it draws upon the work of Frischmann and Selinger, Obar and Oeldorf-Hirsch, and the Norwegian Consumer Council. Frischmann and Selinger's work (which draws upon Radin's Boilerplate) argues that the architecture of electronic contracts can mean that 'it is completely rational for a user to blindly accept the terms of use'. They suggest that the designed environment of websites encourages people to behave as automatons and this in turn has negative consequences for autonomy and sociality. In its Deceived by Design report the Norwegian Consumer Council identified a number of dark patterns in user-interface design, which they argue nudge users away from privacy-friendly options. This book also draws upon a number of more recent studies of wrap contracts and privacy policies, by Hazel and Slobogin, Laestadius et al., Obar and Oeldorf-Hirsch,40 Elshout et al., and the Norwegian Consumer Council.

Aims of this Book

This book has a number of aims. It provides an overview of the rise of the DTC industry and the challenges and issues that these services raise for the law and society and the regulation of technology. DTC can be viewed as an example of both an emerging technology and disruptive innovation. It is also an example of consumer-centred healthcare services and raises issues similar to those of wearable fitness monitors and other innovations considered as part of the quantified self (or lifelogging) movement. A useful definition of what constitutes the 'quantified self' is 'any individual engaged in the self-tracking of any kind of biological, physical, behavioural or environmental information'. This book uses the DTC industry as an example to allow discussion of broader issues related to technology governance in this context, focusing on wrap contracts and privacy policies. As the DTC industry has largely been unregulated to date, companies have tended to rely on electronic wrap contracts and privacy policies to govern relationships with consumers. A further aim is to highlight problems with current industry practice in relation to both wrap contracts and privacy policies and suggest possible reform.

Chapter 2 provides a brief introduction to the science behind DTC, while Chapter 3 gives an overview of the industry and the types of service it offers. Chapter 4 will then address the privacy, data protection and security issues raised by the DTC industry, drawing upon the more recent study by Hazel and Slobogin of DTC privacy policies and the Norwegian Consumer Council's Deceived by Design and APPFAIL reports. The second part of the book discusses the contracts of DTC companies, drawing upon the review conducted between 2011 and 2016 looking at this primarily from the perspective of consumer protection. The Conclusion suggests some possibilities for improving regulation.

Guidance for Readers

It is hoped that this book will be of interest to a variety of readers. Those with a background in medicine may not need to read Chapter 2, while those with in an interest in contract may find Chapter 5 most relevant to their interests. Those from a

computer science background may find Chapter 4 useful, and finally those with an interest in reform may find Chapter 6 most useful. <>

edited by Siddharth Peter de Souza, Maximilian Spohr [Future Law, Edinburgh University Press, ISBN 9781474473866]

While legal technology may bring efficiency and economy to business, where are the people in this process and what does it mean for their lives?

- Brings together leading judges, academics, practitioners, policy makers and educators from countries including India, Canada, Germany, United Kingdom South Africa and Nigeria

- Includes contributions from Roger Smith, Dory Reiling, Christian Djeffal, George Williams and Odunoluwa Longe

- Offers a dialogue between theory and practice by presenting practical and reflective essays on the nature of changes in the legal sector

- Analyses technological changes taking place in the legal sector, situates where these developments have taken place, who has brought it about and what impact has it had on society

Around four billion people globally are unable to address their everyday legal problems and do not have the security, opportunity or protection to redress their grievances and injustices. Courts and legal institutions can often be out of reach because of costs, distance, or a lack of knowledge of rights and entitlements and judicial institutions may be under-funded leading to poor judicial infrastructure, inadequate staff, and limited resources to meet the needs of those who require such services. This book sets out to embed access to justice into mainstream discussions on the future of law and to explore how this can be addressed in different parts of the legal industry. It examines what changes in technology mean for the end user, whether an ordinary citizen, a client or a student. It looks at the everyday practice of law through a sector wide analysis of law firms, universities, startups and civil society organizations. In doing so, the book provides a roadmap on how to address sector specific access to justice questions and to draw lessons for the future. The book draws on experiences from judges, academics, practitioners, policy makers and educators and presents perspectives from both the Global South and the Global North.

Making Access to Justice Count: Debating the Future of Law

Over 5 billion people do not have meaningful access to the justice delivery system, according to a recent report produced by a network of international development organisations (Pathfinders 2019). The magnitude of the gap is further understood where over 253 million people live in conditions of extreme injustice such as slavery, conflict and statelessness; 1.5 billion have justice problems they cannot solve, and over 4.5 billion people are excluded from protections of the law that provide for socio-economic and political security (Pathfinders 2019). Addressing this justice gap is of critical importance and is central to the imagination of the Sustainable Development Goals, which aspire to build inclusive societies and protect vulnerable populations (United Nations Sustainable Development Goals 2015).

While the justice gap continues to grow, we are also living in an age where the scale of technological innovation has resulted in developments such as document automation, e-discovery, predictive analytics and online dispute resolution increasingly being adopted in the delivery of legal services. The influx of new services that are engineered around improving efficiency, productivity and quality review are influencing changes in the ways of working in the legal sector. These factors are also leading to the development of alternative business models for law firms, new models of legal education, and new expectations and demands from public services.

These new technologies are beginning to deeply impact the ordinary functioning of law and the everyday life of its users. In an age of digital change, it is crucial to understand what these changes mean for the resolution of common legal problems that result in social, economic and cultural challenges for citizens. How do we place people first, and understand their challenges and difficulties and ensure they find a solution for their justice problems?

Debating about the future of law and of the justice sector requires a mapping of the changes to different actors and institutions in the legal sector whether lawyers, judges, firms and most of all, ordinary citizens. While there is much work emerging in terms of trends around 'legal tech', 'artificial intelligence and law' in the commercial law space, there is less scholarly and policy attention on the use of such technologies in terms of its implications for ensuring access to justice and addressing the needs of the ordinary citizen. This book seeks to mainstream discussions on access to justice into discussions on the future of law. In doing so, it seeks to examine what changes in technology mean for the end user, whether an ordinary citizen, a client or a student. In this way, it looks at the everyday practice of law through a sector-wide analysis of law firms, universities, start-ups and civil society organisations. It argues that a lack of access to justice is not a concern limited to civil society organisations alone but requires collaboration and synergies between different actors and institutions in the legal sector.

We propose a three-step approach towards investigating how to build a strategic roadmap for meeting the challenges of the justice gap in the context of dynamic innovation and technological changes. The first is to provide broad insights and trends into what technology changes have been introduced in the private sector, public sector, civil society and in legal education by conducting a mapping exercise to survey the field. The second is to locate what these changes mean for the concerns of a digital divide, for legal empowerment and for access to justice. For example, do these technologies enable individuals to understand procedures better? Does it render justice more cost-effective? Or does it result in less transparency and accountability because technological solutions are more opaque? And the third is to plug the gap by examining how to address sector-specific access to justice questions and learn as we go forward.

By analysing the technological changes taking place in the legal sector, this book seeks to explore where the developments have taken place, the types of actors and institutions driving these developments, and the impact and lessons they have had for the future of law.

In the next section of this chapter, we examine the significance of the scale of change, taking place, how this has been forecasted, and why we are living in particularly

dynamic times. Thereafter, we look at the importance of emphasising these changes on debates around access to justice, and the value of a sector-wide approach. Finally, we examine the key lessons in order to make justice count and provide an outline of the volume.

Mapping sites of Innovation	Embedding access and Empowerment	Plugging the gap

Scheme of chapter

Mapping Sites of Innovation: Examining Trends and Identifying Points of Change

The debate on 'The future of the law' has been around for some time with Richard Susskind, a reference point in almost all related publications, publishing a book under this title as early as 1996 (Susskind 1996). A good ten years later his seminal 2008 publication 'The end of lawyers?' then sparked a euphoric legal tech debate and made a very self-confident profession wonder if it, too, could one day be replaced by intelligent machines (Susskind 2008).

Apart from this, other factors regularly cited for the emergence of 'legal tech' in the past decade include the 2008 global economic downturn that forced legal service providers to become more cost-efficient and the technological development such as the take-up of cloud computing (Goodman 2018: 70). Furthermore, market liberalisation, such as through the UK Legal Services Act 2007 allowed for new business models in the field and fuelled entrepreneurship (Goodman 2018: 67). The Covid-19 pandemic has also seen a accelerated push towards digital transformation with more multidisciplinary perspectives needed to be able to respond to rapidly changing market and client needs (Cohen 2020).

A good decade after the Susskind prophecies, the ever-accelerating development of technology has opened the door to new exciting possibilities. While the legal services industry had been somewhat of a latecomer in adopting new means of technology, the rise of artificial intelligence and machine learning have now given us an idea of what the future of the law might look like. Predictive analytics, today, allows forecasting the outcome of US Supreme Court decisions with over 70 per cent accuracy – far better

than expert legal analysts (Katz, Bommarito, Blackman 2017). Furthermore, it plays an increasing role in predictive policing, tax evasion and tax outcomes, recurrence rates of criminal defendants and even lawsuit financing (Vogl 2018: 57). Intelligent machines can even forecast the enactment of legislation, as demonstrated by Skopos Labs in 2017 (Hutson 2017).

This new technology is increasingly included in the everyday practice of the law. While initially this was with respect to making the job of a (human) lawyer easier through faster and more effective file and knowledge management, billing or other administrative tasks, it has now started to impact the very heart of rendering legal advice (de Souza 2017). Examples include automated contract analysis tools such as eBrevia, Kira, Luminance or Leverton. E-discovery tools such as Relativity, legal expert systems like Neota Logic or prognostic tools like Ravel, LexPredict or IBM Watson (Wenzler 2018: 78). McKinsey has predicted that 35 per cent of a law clerk's job will be rendered redundant while 22 per cent of a lawyers job will be replaced by these technologies (Winick 2017).

With their access to large financial resources, it is the big law firms that are the early adopters of these new technologies (Goodman 2018: 70). Additionally, with the rise of AI-powered programs, the development and training of these intelligent machines becomes more and more important, and many law firms find themselves in a race to also succeed as legal tech investors and developers (Goodman 2018: 72). This competition has now intensified considerably with the big accountancy firms, who have a head start in adopting technology, muscling their way in on the market wherever possible (Derbyshire 2018)....

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These technological developments will change the legal profession. Ultimately, the demand on the labour market will follow, which will not allow for legal education to remain the same. However, as multiple authors in this book find, the legal profession is rather conservative when it comes to adopting change. Legal education is no exemption here as Aviva Rotenberg illustrates in Chapter 15, describing a reluctant profession that needs to be engaged in its own future. Canada, as demonstrated by

Ryerson Law School, offers interesting examples of innovation in legal education. It attempts to train the lawyers of the future, taking into account that graduates today make their way into practice in an ever-widening range of ways (Holloway 2019). Just in April 2019, the Law Society of Ontario unanimously approved Ryerson's application to have its JD programme designated as an Integrated Practice Curriculum (IPC). A broad overview of innovation in legal services and particularly in legal education is offered by the Law School Innovation Index (Legal Services Innovation Index n.d.). Responding to growing criticism over the past years that law schools failed to update their curricula, this prototype index collects and lists schools that drive innovation. Some examples of law schools embracing the future also come from Michigan State University College of Law or the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) which collaborates with Georgetown Law School. Addressing these examples, Ana Paula Camelo and Cláudio Lucena, in Part IV, describe what a roadmap for legal education, on its path to the future, could look like.

In addition to the law firms setting up accelerators, there are also innovation clusters emerging around the world. Singapore, with its Future Law Innovation Programme by the Singapore Academy of Law, is seeking to create a space for legal innovation and collaboration to create solutions for the changing legal services market. The Innovating Justice Accelerator by The Hague Institute for Innovation of Law (HiiL), on the other hand, has been a pioneering programme that supports entrepreneurs particularly from the Global South. Projects span a wide range including family law, criminal law, legal aid and technical project support.

Embedding Access and Empowerment in Technology and Innovation

What we see from this mapping exercise is that the legal sector is at a crucial moment in its history. It seems clear that with technology and innovation, legal institutions are changing. Whether it be law firms who are looking at alternative ways of working by investing and transforming into technology enterprises, legal tech firms boosted by an influx of capital to scale their services or others who are strategically merging; courts, and public institutions like the police who are increasingly using technology for predictive analytics or creating more IT-based infrastructures; civil society

organisations that are helping people diagnose problems and also using technology for spreading legal literacy; and education where law schools are innovating and offering new courses to meet the demands of the market. These institutional changes are at differing levels of speed, scale and with different levels of success. While the previous section has included examples to present a picture of the changes taking place, this section focuses more on asking what it means to the different sectors to embed questions of access to justice and empowerment in their work.

Access to justice is understood as the ability for people to address their everyday legal problems, either through recourse to law, courts or other forums (Cappelletti and Garth 1981; UNDP 2004). The challenges of access to justice can emerge in multiple ways, such as where courts and legal institutions are out of reach of litigants because of costs, distance, or even a lack of knowledge of rights and entitlements. It can also be because many judicial institutions are under-funded and as a result there is poor judicial infrastructure, inadequate staff, and limited resources to meet the needs and demands of litigants who require such services. In many instances, the text of the law itself is riddled with complexities, and that makes it difficult for ordinary litigants to understand and use it effectively.

Plugging the Gap

While thinking in terms of empowerment and access providing an important lens to investigate the potential of technology, in this section, we explore some of the factors that can create an environment that will enhance innovation while also meeting the needs of the justice gap.

As we have demonstrated through the first section of mapping different sites of innovation – what is clear is that the scale and funding of innovation has resulted in the development of particular clusters around the world. While the US is still a pioneer in terms of scale and reach, Singapore and Hong Kong are also emerging as legal tech hubs with active involvement from the State and law societies (Pickup 2018). HiiL in the Netherlands through their work with a Justice Accelerator has focused on innovation from Africa. In particular, they have funded projects that work on matters related to criminal law, employment, legal advice and land-related problems. Each of

these clusters has its own particularities and priorities and comparatively examining their frameworks offers an opportunity to understand the diversity in the contexts within which innovation is taking place. Equally, it is important to recognise the different kinds of expertise that are required in order to foster innovation. While each of these clusters has lawyers who can provide domain expertise, they also require business consultants to examine questions of funding and strategy, they require technologists to build products, and they require communicators who can market and build a user base for these technologies. In this book, we have also brought together a variety of voices to show how it is important to have a diversity of perspectives in order to tackle the complex challenges of access to justice.

Finding Relations Between Sectors: Ideas from the Book

Innovation is impacted by several factors from capital, which allows for experimentation, to regulation and regulatory institutions that create climates for a culture of change, to different kinds of mindsets that allow for risk taking (Cohen 2017; Cohen 2018). As a trans-disciplinary project, this volume brings together leading authors from different parts of the legal sector such as judges, academics, practitioners, policy makers and entrepreneurs from all parts of the world, including countries like Brazil, Nigeria, United Arab Emirates, Germany, Netherlands, Belgium, Italy, India, Canada, United Kingdom, South Africa, and Australia.

By doing so, it seeks to widen the conversation by introducing comparative experiences to understand the manner and implications in which changes are taking place. Adopting a sector-wide approach provides insights into where and how innovation is taking place, who is driving it, and how it is developing. Further by seeking to look at change across different regions and geographies, this book also pluralises the conversation by introducing contextual understandings of innovation.

The design and choices of the sectors also reflect on the impact of technology in the law. For reasons of capital, capacity and competencies, innovation has had a larger impact in the private sector first. With a growing availability of capital and market liberalisation, a vibrant start-up scene is evolving, too. At the same time, though traditionally a bit slower, the public sector follows. It is driven by the promise that

technology holds the key to build cost-effective administrations such as, for example, that it will solve the problem of chronically overburdened courts with technology-driven solutions. As described above, legal aid and the improvement of access to justice is an objective for many law innovators, which makes civil society an important sector to look at. Ultimately, legal education has to adopt technology and to produce tomorrow's lawyers they might have to include multi-disciplinary skills in their curricula.

However, the discussion on the future of the law is still highly fragmented along country borders, jurisdictions and legal systems, just as the law itself. Hence, internationalisation of the debate is highly expedient. The authors in this volume from around the world engage with the different protagonists and stakeholders and attempt to find reasons and meanings for the latest developments. They offer evidence that the drivers of technological change are emerging from beyond the private sector, and it is important to understand how conversations among different stakeholders can help think about questions of access to justice in the age of the future of law.

Accordingly, this volume looks at the private sector first. Leading innovators, entrepreneurs and experts from law firms, legal tech start-ups and the legal aid sector share their view on current changes in the industry, its challenges and opportunities.

Özgür Kahale starts us off, giving an insight to innovation at one of the world's biggest law firms, focusing particularly on the role of pro bono work and how it is evolving with technology. From this, it becomes clear that the sector is at a defining moment and will face considerable change and disruption in the near future. A growing number of indicators foreshadow this development already today, but we are barely scratching the surface of future change, as Suzanna Kalendzhian points out. She further maps out the most relevant technologies that are currently changing the law.

Odunoluwa Longe argues that the abundance of newly evolving possibilities will only allow those lawyers that are innovative and open to change to keep up. Roger Smith, too, takes a closer analytical look and describes how differently innovation drives the for-profit and not-for-profit sector forward. Apart from identifying the key challenges and opportunities, he is convinced that, since technology is transnational, there are

lessons learnt from international comparison, comparative research and global benchmarking.

The second part turns to the public sector with leading academics and practitioners assessing the potential but also the risks and challenges of digitising the law in the public sphere. Automating governmental decision-making, however promising it is, has turned out not to be without risks where applied, as comprehensively illustrated by Monika Zalnieriute, Lyria Bennett Moses and George Williams. A lack of transparency, consistency and predictability of such automated decisions or human bias that translates into such programs, they find, could have a severe impact on the rule of law. All of these factors have to be taken into account if technology is to develop its full potential in this sector. In light of the complexities of the technological revolution of the public sector of the law, Christian Djeffal proposes a sustainable AI development framework to think about the impacts of the use of AI systems at a social, technical and governance level. From practice, Dory Reiling then shares her professional experiences in bringing a court into the digital age, a goal worth pursuing but not easy to achieve. Lastly, Cedric Vanleenhove analyses the potential role of social media in legal proceedings, a technology that might help solve some typical problems of the analog world.

In the third part of the book, we learn about some of the multiple ways that technology influences the law in civil society. Gianluca Sgueo explores the potential of gamification as a tool for digital advocacy. Siddharth Peter de Souza then shows us that we can re-shape legal communication taking into account inter-disciplinary influences of design and visualisation. However, the promise of technology fixing the global access to justice crisis will not come true all too easily. Alistair Alexander and Mira Suleimenova demonstrate how privacy issues play a key role in all levels of the legal tech revolution. They present practical solutions and an artistic approach to engage stakeholders and raise their awareness. Lastly, Astrid Wiik illustrates how potential solutions always need to be based on a firm understanding of how law and technology operate in the specific socio-cultural context of the target community. Hence, she argues, development cooperation needs to directly engage with communities for interventions to be effective and meaningful.

In the final part of the book, we look at legal education. Since fundamental change and disruption in one sector of the law is unlikely to leave the others untouched, we ask the question if the education sector is changing too. One thing seems clear: Law schools and universities have to start producing tomorrow's lawyers today if they want to satisfy future demand on the labour market. As Maeve Lavelle describes, legal education, together with the whole profession seems to be caught up in an identity crisis. Similarly, Aviva Rotenberg observes a reluctance of the profession to engage in its own future and offers concrete strategies of promoting change. Cláudio Lucena and Ana Paula Camelo offer concrete solutions by presenting a roadmap for the future of legal education. They further engage, among many others, in the key question of how much coding skills future lawyers will need. In some cases, however, progress is made with no plan or strategy at all as we learn from Angelo Dube. He tells the story about how technology helped keep up legal education despite university shutdowns in the context of the 2015–2016 FeesMustFall protests in South Africa.

PLATONISM: A CONCISE HISTORY FROM THE EARLY ACADEMY TO LATE ANTIQUITY by Mauro Bonazzi , translated by Sergio Knipe, Foreword by David Sedley [Classical Scholarship in Translation, Cambridge University Press, ISBN 9781009253420]

The first comprehensive account of Platonism from the foundation of Plato's Academy in the fourth century BC to late antiquity.

The task of philosophy, the French philosopher Gilles Deleuze once wrote, is to 'overturn Platonism'. This might be true, if only we could define what Platonism is. In this clear and accessible book Mauro Bonazzi provides the first comprehensive introduction to ancient Platonism. He begins his story with Plato's Academy before moving on to the sceptical turn which occurred during the Hellenistic centuries. He then explains the theologically oriented interpretation of Plato typical of Middle Platonists and concludes with the metaphysical systems of the Neoplatonists. Platonism has often been regarded as no more than a trivial repetition of the same doctrines. This book, however, demonstrates how the attempts of Platonists over the centuries to engage with Plato's thought constitute one of the most philosophically challenging moments in the history of ancient philosophy.

Review

'For roughly 900 years, the history of philosophy was virtually the history of Platonism, including both its opponents and its widely disparate defenders. In a book that is at once comprehensive and concise, lucid, and above all, accurate, Bonazzi has managed to provide a refined overview of that history. This is the book I would recommend to anyone who is looking for a reliable orientation to Platonism.' Lloyd Gerson, University of Toronto

'This concise and stimulating critical discussion of the entire tradition from the Early Academy to the Neoplatonic schools reveals the existence of multiple Platonisms. While they range philosophically from the scepticism of the Hellenistic Academy to the elaborate metaphysics of late Antiquity, Bonazzi shows very successfully how each of these iterations was motivated by the unifying influence of Plato's works.' Myrto Hatzimichali, University of Cambridge

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Readers of this book know, or are about to learn under Mauro Bonazzi's expert guidance, how continuous and yet at the same time how diverse was the ancient philosophical movement known to us as Platonism. How can there have been so many

Platonisms, or, if you prefer, so many competing versions of Plato's philosophy? After all, every published word of Plato, the school's iconic founder, survived and was, as indeed it remains today, open to direct scrutiny? Why wasn't that enough to make Plato's philosophical meaning transparent? In other words, why was Plato not himself the ultimate authority on his own philosophy?

The Platonic corpus is a large, diverse and brilliant collection of writings, nearly all of them purporting to be or to include reports of dialogues. But Plato himself is never named as taking part in these conversations. The figure who is virtually always present, and more often than not asks the questions, is Plato's revered master Socrates. Does this literary figure Socrates, then, tend to speak for Plato? So it has generally, and very plausibly, been thought. Yet across the corpus, Socrates himself varies widely in the opinions he seems to favour — when, at any rate, he favours any, and is not simply interrogating others, perhaps in order to expose their assumptions and test these for mutual coherence.

To pick just one example out of many, is knowledge humanly attainable? Socrates makes few substantive knowledge claims on his own behalf in any Platonic dialogue, and repeatedly refutes others' pretensions to knowledge. Indeed, in the Phaedo, Socrates seems at times to go so far as to treat knowledge as unattainable by the soul until it leaves bodily incarnation behind altogether. Yet this same character Socrates is also the lead speaker of the Republic, where he argues that human happiness depends on the remote but real prospect of living under the governance of highly trained philosophers who possess comprehensive knowledge of the Forms, all the way up to the ultimate explanatory principle, identified as the Form of the Good.

In the course of two-and-a-half millennia, Plato's readers have adopted a variety of strategies for dealing with this kind of problem. Perhaps Socrates does not always speak for Plato, for example. Perhaps when he disavows knowledge he is speaking `ironically', with his own articulated philosophical knowledge lying just below the surface. Perhaps Plato used Socrates only to puncture others' epistemic vanity. Or perhaps Plato's own views changed over the years, and these developments were reflected by philosophical shifts of position in the dialogues.

We may start with this last hypothesis. Today, it is very widely assumed that Plato's writings fall into three main phases, albeit with some works classed as 'transitional' between one phase and the next. The three postulated phases are as follows:

- An 'early' period, in which he was still working out the meaning of Socrates' philosophical legacy;

- a 'middle' period, dominated by the immortality of the soul, and by a dualistic metaphysics of intelligibles and sensibles, or of Forms and their participants; and

- a 'late' period critically readdressing major political and analytic themes, but also including the Timaeus, Plato's one dialogue devoted to physics.

It would indeed be hard for today's readers to set aside the whole of this chronological matrix, which has the additional merit of seeming to correspond to stylistic changes in Plato's writing, with the philosophically earlier dialogues prone to mimic the natural flow of conversation, whereas the philosophically later ones seem like self-conscious literary constructs, often thereby placing much greater demands on the reader.

It is therefore of utmost importance to appreciate that the task of dating Plato's individual works relative to each other, a major priority in modem scholarship, was of little concern to ancient Platonists. Of course, the dialogues must have been written in some order, and the Laws was explicitly recognised to have been the last. Since, however, it was inconceivable to his followers that the 'divine' Plato should ever have been forced to change his mind, developmental assumptions were not invoked to resolve apparent contradictions between earlier and later dialogues.

Was there not a much easier way for Platonists to establish a global interpretation? Surely they simply had to ask Plato! By `they' I mean the many distinguished intellectuals (see Bonazzi's Chapter) who had joined Plato's celebrated Athenian school, the Academy, during the roughly four decades from its foundation to his death in 347 BC. These included not only Aristotle, but also Plato's nephew and chosen successor Speusippus, and the latter's own eventual successor as school-head, Xenocrates. Who, it might be asked, could have been better placed than Plato's own

long-time close associates to preserve for future generations his full philosophical system?

What actually happened, however, fell far short of that. True, a set of 'unwritten doctrines' attributed to Plato circulated after his death (Bonazzi's Chapter 1). But consider how Plato's most iconic doctrine, the theory of Forms, fared in the school. Aristotle, before departing to set up his own rival school in the Lyceum, wrote a refutation of the theory, entitled On Forms. The theory was likewise disputed by both Speusippus and the mathematician and moral philosopher Eudoxus, himself a member of the Academy. Most significant of all, one critique of the theory was written by none other than Plato himself, in the opening part of his Parmenides.

We should infer that the educational agenda of the school in Plato's lifetime was one in which critical independence was strongly encouraged, orthodoxy discouraged. Even the decision to bequeath the school-headship to Speusippus, to all intents and purposes a non-Platonist, may reflect a fear on Plato's part that in future generations reverence for his own authority might lead the Academy into a hagiographic search of the corpus for his own ultimate principles, thereby stifling open-ended philosophical inquiry in a way he had expressly warned against in the Phaedrus (275d—e). At all events, by 339 BC, when Speusippus was in turn succeeded as school-head by Xenocrates, the reconstruction of such a Platonist orthodoxy was already under way. And so it would remain for most of the movement's history, with just one significant exception, recounted by Mauro Bonazzi in Chapter 2.

The difficulty of extracting a full-blooded Platonism from the corpus can be appreciated by asking how we ourselves would fare if, without the benefits of an established reading, order, we were presented with those same scrolls and invited to give a conspectus of their underlying philosophy, paying no attention to the contributions made by literary virtuosity, genre-switching, the interplay of diversely motivated speakers, or (other than in the Letters, which are of disputed authenticity) the author's apparently almost -exceptionless avoidance of any personal presence in the narrative or self-reference in the interplay of arguments.

We certainly would not make much headway if we gave equal weight to all the dialogues, nor if we picked one of them at random, be it Phaedo, Phaedrus, Philebus, or Protagoras, if only because different initial choices might bring in their wake radically differing perspectives on the author's entire philosophical orientation.

This vicious circle could however be plausibly broken by concentrating initially on one specially privileged text, the Timaeus. Today comparatively few students of Plato ever even reach the Timaeus, let alone study it in depth. In antiquity, from Plato's death onwards, this dialogue was on the contrary treated by both Platonists and their opponents as if it were a semi-official manifesto for his system.

Why so? What has come down to us as the Timaeus is evidently the first part of an unfinished trilogy of speeches, in which Timaeus' speech on the creation of the world was evidently the only one of the dialogue's three intended speeches to have been completed by the time of Plato's death. At the end of the preserved text, the speech of Critias breaks off in mid sentence (Critias 121 c). Although various of the Timaeus' innovative ideas (for instance that of the 'receptacle of becoming') are likely to have been already familiar to Plato's close associates through school discussions, the fact that he had still been at work on it when he died may have helped spotlight it for his successors as potentially the most authoritative account of his system. (No similar canonisation could credibly have been proposed regarding his late and not fully revised political-theological masterpiece the Laws.)

When finally published, the Timaeus quickly became the focus of a millennia-long debate, still unresolved today, about the meaning of Timaeus' very first doctrinal assertion: the world, he maintains, 'has come to be' (28b7). Could Plato really have believed that something destined to exist for infinite future time, as the world was agreed to be, might nevertheless have a merely finite past existence, starting from a dateable act of creation? Most Platonists, thinking such a temporal asymmetry incoherent, tried to show that Timaeus' grammatically past-perfect tense, `it has come to be', had been intended by Plato not as a literal truth claim, but in the spirit of an epexegetic creation myth. Most anti-Platonists, including Aristotle, for the same reason insisted on reading it literally.

Why, it might be wondered, did the early Platonists did not simply ask Plato which of the two he meant, and thereby settle the dispute? The question is readily answered, however, if we accept, as suggested above, that it was only as part of Plato's posthumous legacy that the Timaeus came to prominence. By the time this great interpretative schism emerged, Plato was dead.

But the value of Timaeus' speech as an entry route to Plato's philosophy could in any case not, by any stretch of the imagination, be exhausted by disambiguating this single verb. Although the speech's theme is physics, his cosmic creation narrative embodies (from a physical point of view) a whole network of metaphysical, ethical, psychological, epistemological, and even logical theses that had been individually defended in other dialogues, usually by Socrates but on occasion by another main speaker. This constitutes very strong evidence that Plato already had a structured philosophical system, into which paradigmatic Forms, the tripartite soul, the epistemological dualism of intelligibles and sensibles, the immortality of the rational soul, the explanation of false belief, and much else besides, had been integrated.

I have already mentioned Plato's restraint in absenting himself from his own dialogues. Even that remark now needs qualifying, however. The corpus contains many anonymous references which, tantalisingly, could be to Plato. Some of these are predictive, as when in the Charmides 168e-169a Socrates' remarks that we will have to await the arrival of a 'great man' to solve the problem whether there can be a self-moving motion; and when Parmenides (Parmenides 135-b) similarly expects a 'great man' one day to resolve his own criticisms of the theory of Forms. Others have an implicit but clear present reference, notably Republic 4.427c—d and 9.580c, where the dialogue's two major conclusions are celebrated, with each in turn attributed by Socrates to 'the son of Ariston'. Within the economy of the dialogue these are Socrates' two main interlocutors, respectively, Adeimantus and Glaucon. But their half-brother, Plato, was a third 'son of Ariston'. Readers are surely being challenged to notice how, in the double deployment of Plato's patronymic, the Republic conceals within itself its author's indelible signature.

With this in mind, we may return now to the Timaeus, which I have characterised as conveying to its future readers the basic tenets of Plato's proprietary philosophical system. There of all places we might expect to find his authorial fingerprint. And so we do! In the opening lines we learn that, since one of the expected speakers has failed to turn up, Timaeus will be speaking on his behalf. That is to say, the teachings imparted by Timaeus in his speech will be those of the missing person.

Who then is this anonymous absentee? It is Plato. The clue lies in Timaeus' explanation of his absence: 'Some kind of sickness has befallen him, Socrates. For this is a gathering that he would not have missed willingly.' The words are calculated to remind us of the opening pages of the Phaedo, where we learn to our mild surprise that Plato was too ill to attend that most important of all philosophical gatherings, Socrates' final conversation and ensuing execution. The sicknote story may not reveal Plato in a very heroic light, but its very banality allowed the all-important identity-clue to pass almost unnoticed, awaiting eventual rediscovery, much like its counterpart in the Republic.

Did any of Plato's followers or readers in antiquity arrive at this same decipherment? Yes, according to Proclus (who does not himself find it credible) the covert allusion to Plato was pointed out by one Dercyllides — of uncertain date and identity, but in all probability a Middle Platonist. By the Middle Platonist era (Bonazzi chapter 3), the Timaeus was widely believed to be a Pythagorean work, and Timaeus, its presumed author, an authentic Pythagorean. If Dercyllides was the first reader to discover Plato's indelible signature in the Timaeus, he was probably concerned above all to reclaim this dialogue from the Pythagoreans. But if, intentionally or not, he was also making available to future generations Plato's concealed certification of the Timaeus as his own philosophical testament, his is truly a name to celebrate.

It becomes ever clearer that, almost throughout the near-millennium during which ancient Platonism thrived, the Timaeus not only exerted a unique influence on the reception of the Platonic corpus, but in doing so may well have been fulfilling Plato's goals more faithfully than it has done in any modern reconstruction of his philosophy.

Pushing that heretical thought to one side, I shall stand no longer between the reader and Mauro Bonazzi's rich and absorbing monograph. <>

THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF PLATO, SECOND EDITION

edited by Gail Fine [Oxford Handbooks, Oxford University Press, ISBN 9780190639730 (hardback) ISBN 9780197680957 (paperback)]

An exceptional reference work that offers a guide to the major corpus of Plato's thought. The essays are well wrought and under the guiding mind of Fine the disparate essays hold together.

Plato is the best known, and continues to be the most widely studied, of all the ancient Greek philosophers. The updated and original essays in the second edition of The Oxford Handbook of Plato provide in-depth discussions of a variety of topics and dialogues, all serving several functions at once: they survey the current academic landscape; express and develop the authors' own views; and situate those views within a range of alternatives. The result is a useful state-of-the-art reference to the person many consider the most important philosophical thinker in history.

This second edition of _____ differs in two main ways from the first edition. First, six leading scholars of ancient philosophy have contributed entirely new chapters: Hugh Benson on the Apology, Crito, and Euthyphro; James Warren on the Protagoras and Gorgias; Lindsay Judson on the Meno; Luca Castagnoli on the Phaedo; Susan Sauvé Meyer on the Laws; and David Sedley on Plato's theology. The second edition therefore covers both dialogues and topics in more depth than the first edition did. Second, most of the original chapters have been revised and updated, some in small, others in large, ways. The Introduction has been revised to reflect these changes from the first edition. The Bibliography has also been updated.

CONTENTS

This volume falls into four parts. Chapters 2–4 discuss preliminaries to the philosophical study of Plato. Chapters 5–15 discuss individual dialogues. Chapters 16–26 consider central themes in Plato's work. Chapters 27–28 explore Plato's legacy.

A handbook on Plato could be organized in different ways. One might have chapters just on individual dialogues, just on particular topics, or chapters of both sorts. This volume favors the last of these three options. This makes the volume richer and more varied than it would otherwise have been, providing different angles from which to view Plato's multi-textured thought. Each dialogue is an integral whole and should be read as such, with proper attention to and appreciation of its overall structure and the interconnections among its various themes and arguments; one also needs to pay attention to the dialectical and dramatic context. If one focuses just on what is said on

a given topic, abstracting it from its context, one runs the risk of misinterpretation. On the other hand, Plato discusses the same topics in many dialogues. Some dialogues seem to have the same, or similar, views; by considering them together, we can paint a fuller picture of Plato's thought.

For example, the Phaedo, Symposium, Republic, and Phaedrus (all of which are generally classified as middle dialogues) discuss forms (e.g., the form of equal, the form of beauty) in roughly similar ways, though each of these dialogues also says something that adds to what is said in the others. When these discussions are read together, we gain deeper insight into what Plato might have had in mind. Other dialogues sometimes seem to express different views about forms, ones that are sometimes thought to be incompatible with the middle dialogues' view of them. This might be evidence of Plato's development, though whether his views develop and, if they do, how they do so, are matters of controversy. For example, the Parmenides criticizes a theory of forms. Some commentators think it criticizes views about forms to be found in the middle dialogues: views that, according to some commentators, do not reappear after the Parmenides. On another interpretation, the Parmenides deliberately distorts the middle dialogues' views about forms, so that we can see how not to understand them. Others argue that the middle dialogues don't have a fully determinate theory of forms; the Parmenides guards against one way of making their views more determinate. Similar remarks apply, mutatis mutandis, to what the dialogues say about, for example, epistemology, ethics, politics, and the soul.

Though this volume contains chapters on both dialogues and topics, not every dialogue or topic receives its own chapter: doing that would have made an already long volume far too long. However, some dialogues that don't receive their own chapters are considered in the topical chapters. For example, Devereux and Annas discuss the Euthydemus; Kraut discusses the Symposium; Crivelli discusses the Cratylus. Some dialogues both receive their own chapters and are also considered, often from different points of view and with a different focus, in the topical chapters. For example, the Protagoras and Gorgias are discussed not only in Warren's chapter on those two dialogues, but also in Devereux's more general chapter on Socratic ethics and moral psychology. The Meno is discussed not only in Judson's chapter on that dialogue, but

also by Matthews and Taylor. The Phaedo is discussed not only in Castagnoli's chapter on that dialogue, but also by Taylor (epistemology), Harte (metaphysics), and Lorenz (the soul). The Republic is discussed not only in Scott's chapter on that dialogue, but also in many other chapters. Lee's chapter focuses on the Theaetetus; Taylor discusses the Theaetetus in the broader context of Plato's epistemology in general. Brown's chapter is devoted to the Sophist, a dialogue that is also discussed by Crivelli in his more general chapter on Plato's philosophy of language. The Laws is discussed not only in its own chapter, by Meyer, but also by Bobonich (political theory), Kamtekar (education), and Sedley (theology). I hope that the fact that some chapters discuss the same dialogues and issues, sometimes from different points of view, or within different contexts, or by focusing on different parts, will afford the reader a deeper insight into Plato's thought than would be possible in a volume that included chapters only on topics or only on individual dialogues.

In the rest of this introduction, I provide an overview of the dialogues and topics discussed in subsequent chapters.

PRELIMINARIES

In chapter 2, Schofield locates Plato in his place and time. Plato was influenced by earlier philosophers (the Presocratics, or early Greek philosophers), Greek drama, historians and historical events, the medical writers, and more. Schofield discusses some of the philosophical and non-philosophical influences on Plato; he also discusses Plato's life.

In chapter 3, Irwin discusses various features of the Platonic corpus: how the dialogues survived from Plato's time to our own, how the earliest (Academic and Alexandrian) editions of his work came into existence, how and when the dialogues came to be arranged in tetralogies, and the order of the dialogues. According to the standard view, the dialogues may be divided into early (or Socratic), middle, and late dialogues. Though the standard view has been challenged, Irwin defends it. However, as he notes, the relative dates of some dialogues are more controversial than those of others.

Acceptance of the standard view of the chronology of Plato's works is neutral as between "developmentalism" and "unitarianism": to suggest a given order of the

dialogues says nothing about how, if at all, Plato's thought develops. However, on one familiar view, Plato's early dialogues represent the thought of the historical Socrates (as well as Plato's own first thoughts), whereas the middle and late dialogues develop Plato's more independent views. This is so in two ways. First, the middle and late dialogues engage in systematic discussion of issues that the early dialogues do not discuss in detail, such as metaphysics and epistemology. Second, in some cases they defend different views from those to be found in the early dialogues. For example, from the Gorgias and Republic on, Plato countenances non-rational desires, which are not countenanced in earlier dialogues. Or again, the middle dialogues articulate views about forms that are at least not explicit in earlier dialogues. The late dialogues, in turn, are often thought to suggest yet a different view of forms.

In chapter 4, McCabe discusses Plato's various ways of writing. She asks to what extent the pictures in the dialogues (what is said) are affected by their frames (the setting in which something is said). She argues that even if one is primarily concerned with philosophical argument, one can't afford to ignore the frames, for they are actually part of the pictures. Her argument is developed not just in the abstract but also by attention to literary and dramatic details that influence our understanding of particular arguments. She suggests that, while the dialogues are not dogmatic in the sense of claiming to present the final truth, subject to no revision, neither are they merely exploratory in the sense of articulating views to which Plato is not at all committed; nor are they intended to convey a hidden message. However, though McCabe thinks Plato's lack of dogmatism explains some aspects of his ways of writing—such as the puzzling nature of the endings of some of the dialogues, and the tentative way in which Socrates sometimes declares his commitments7—she also argues that it does not fully account for the multifarious forms of the dialogues, for which she provides yet further explanations.

APOLOGY, CRITO, EUTHYPHRO

In chapter 5, Benson discusses the Apology, Crito, and Euthyphro. These three dialogues are generally thought to be among Plato's earliest. They are linked both chronologically and dramatically. In the Euthyphro, Socrates is on his way to trial for impiety and corrupting the young; the Apology describes his trial and conviction; the

Crito describes one of his days in prison after he was convicted.8 (The Phaedo describes his last day and his death. Despite the dramatic continuity, the Phaedo is usually thought to be from Plato's middle period.)

As is well known, Socrates often disclaims knowledge. For example, at Apology 21d he says that "neither of us knows (eidenai) anything fine and good (kalon kagathon).' However, sometimes he claims to have knowledge, including, it seems, knowledge of what's fine and good. For example, at Apology 29b he says: "I know (oida), however, that it is wicked and shameful to do wrong, to disobey one's superior, be he man or god.' Socrates' account of his cognitive condition therefore seems to be inconsistent.

There are alternatives to the view that he is inconsistent: for example, that he is insincere (or ironical) in denying that he has knowledge; that he claims to know in one sense of the term but not in another; that he claims to have one kind of knowledge but to lack another kind of knowledge, in a single sense of the term; that he thinks he knows some things but not others, in a single sense of the term. On one version of the last of these views, he takes himself to know some particular truths, including some moral truths, but thinks he lacks knowledge of what, for example, virtue is: he can't provide satisfactory answers to his characteristic "What is F?" question (the nature of which is discussed below).

As against this, however, it has been argued that Socrates accepts the Priority of Knowledge of a Definition (PKD), according to which one cannot know anything about F unless one knows what F is.10 If he accepts PKD in the Apology, he can't consistently maintain there both that he knows some particular moral truths and also that he doesn't know what virtue is. In chapter 16, however, Matthews argues that Socrates is not committed to PKD in the early dialogues. If Matthews is right (a matter about which there's dispute), Socrates' failure to know what virtue is doesn't imply that he doesn't know any particular moral truths.

Benson and Taylor favor a different view, according to which Socrates recognizes two kinds of knowledge: high- and low-level (Benson), or expert and non-expert (Taylor); Socrates disclaims the first sort of knowledge but takes himself to have some of the second sort of knowledge. But, Benson argues, though this solution allows us to

accommodate many of Socrates' otherwise seemingly contradictory avowals and disavowals, it doesn't clearly accommodate all of them. Be that as it may, and contrary to what is sometimes said, Socrates at least isn't committed to the claim that he knows that he knows nothing, where that amounts to a contradiction. Either he knows, in a low-level way, that he lacks all high-level knowledge; or else he is aware, in a way that falls short of knowing, that he lacks high-level knowledge.

Despite claiming to lack knowledge, Socrates claims to have "human wisdom" (Ap. 20d6-e3). This too has been understood in various ways. On one view, his human wisdom consists in his not thinking he knows something when he doesn't (Ap. 21d2–8; 29a5–b5).

The Euthyphro is a classic "elenctic" dialogue: Socrates cross-examines (elenchein) an interlocutor in an effort to find an answer to a "What is F?" question (in this case, what is the pious, or the holy: to hosion). A satisfactory answer will specify not only necessary and sufficient conditions for something's being F but also the form (eidos, 6d11; idea, 6e1, 4) of F, which is that by which all F things are F; it is the essence of F-ness, what F-ness really is. Various answers are considered and then rejected. For example, at one point justified if they knew that the retained propositions, or beliefs, were true. But given Socrates' denial of knowledge, it seems unlikely that he knows, or thinks he knows, which of them are true. What, then, justifies rejecting a particular proposition, or belief? And how can repeated practice of the method yield knowledge? This is one version of "the problem of the elenchus." It is essentially what Matthews calls the stronger version: how can the elenchus be used to acquire knowledge of what F-ness is, when all it seems capable of doing is to uncover inconsistencies among a given set of propositions, or beliefs?

According to one view, Socrates doesn't use the elenchus to do more than uncover inconsistencies; hence the problem doesn't arise. On another view, he thinks we begin with knowledge of examples of things that are F, and we then use the elenchus to acquire knowledge of what F-ness is. This view assumes that Socrates rejects PKD, allowing us to have some knowledge about F-ness even if we don't know what F-ness is.

On yet another view, even if we lack knowledge at the outset, the elenchus can help us acquire it, if we have and rely on enough relevant true beliefs.

In the Crito, the personified Laws explain why Socrates should not flee from prison, though he is urged to do so by his friend Crito and apparently could easily have done so. On one view, the dialogue urges absolute submission to the Laws. Yet Socrates says that one should never act unjustly (48–9). But surely the Laws could require one to do something unjust? Further, in the Apology, Socrates seems to describe cases where he did disobey a law or, at least, an order. One solution is to say that the Laws present a prima facie case for always obeying them—a case that can in principle be overturned, though in his particular case Socrates doesn't think it should be.

But why does he think this? After all we've seen that he disavows knowledge. He doesn't claim to know what justice is, yet he wants to do the just thing: Is it just for him to flee, or not? He makes the decision to stay, but on what basis, given his lack of knowledge? Benson addresses these questions.

SOCRATIC ETHICS

Socrates takes an answer to the "What is F?" question to be not only of epistemological but also of moral importance. For, in his view, knowledge is necessary for virtue: if one does not know what virtue is, one cannot be a virtuous person. Hence failure to answer the "What is F?" question indicates not just an epistemological but also a moral failing.

Socrates is generally thought to hold that knowledge is not only necessary but also sufficient for virtue. Indeed, he seems to think that virtue just is knowledge—in particular, knowledge of good and bad. This is one of two so-called Socratic paradoxes. The other is that no one does wrong willingly or voluntarily; I discuss it in the following paragraph.

If virtue is good and bad, it seems that anyone who knows what it is good—that is, best overall for oneself—to do will do it (given that the virtuous person acts virtuously). Hence anyone who does what is bad must not have known what it was best to do. Indeed, Socrates holds an even stronger view: not only will anyone who knows that it is best to do x, do x; if one even believes that it is best to do x, one will do it. This is the second Socratic paradox: that no one does wrong willingly or voluntarily. There is, then,

no such thing as akrasia (incontinence or weakness of will): no such thing, that is, as knowing, or believing, that it is better to do x than y, but doing y instead. Yet it is often assumed that there is such a phenomenon. Socrates therefore owes us an explanation of his denial of its possibility. He offers one in the Protagoras, a dialogue discussed by both Warren and Devereux. Before considering it, it will be helpful to lay some groundwork.

Let us say that a rational desire is good-dependent: it is a desire one has because one believes it is in one's best overall interest to pursue a given course of action. What is best for one overall is to be eudaimon, which is conventionally translated into English as "happy." This translation is liable to mislead, since to a modern ear it suggests feeling pleased or content, whereas eudaimonia is doing well (eu prattein). Eudaimonia is a property of a life, not something fleeting; the eudaimon life is the best life possible for a human being, whatever that turns out to be.

Socrates assumes that a rational desire is one that ultimately aim at one's own happiness. Since he thinks that all desires ultimately aim at one's own happiness, he thinks that all desires are rational. Because he takes all desires to be rational, and so to aim at one's own happiness, he—like virtually all Greek moral philosophers—is a eudaimonist. Devereux discusses the eudaimonist framework of the early dialogues, and Annas discusses it as it figures in Plato's dialogues more generally.

Here it is useful to distinguish between rational and psychological eudaimonism. According to rational eudaimonism, happiness provides the only ultimate justifying reason for doing something: it is the ultimate answer to the question, "Why is x worth pursuing?." According to psychological eudaimonism, happiness is the only ultimate explanatory reason for doing something: it is the ultimate answer to the question, "Why did you do x?." The early dialogues assume both sorts of eudaimonism. They assume, that is, not only that it is rational for me to do something only to the extent that it contributes to my happiness but also that whatever I do, I do because I believe it will most contribute to my happiness.

It follows from psychological eudaimonism that no one ever acts against what he believes it is best for him to do. This is sometimes called the prudential version of the

second Socratic paradox. There is also a moral version, according to which no one ever does moral wrong willingly. This version is secured if we add Socrates' beliefs that (1) acting unjustly or immorally is bad for the agent, and (2) we only want what is good for us. It follows from (1) and (2) that if we act unjustly or immorally, we do not want to act that way, and we therefore do so unwillingly or involuntarily (see Gorgias 509e).

Though Socrates takes psychological eudaimonism to be a fundamental fact about us, he doesn't just leave it there. Rather, he argues that akrasia is impossible. Hence, his own alternative (that no one does wrong willingly) is either implied or at least rendered more plausible. In the Protagoras, the argument against akrasia assumes hedonism, the view that the good—that is, happiness—is the same as pleasure (353c–354e); it also assumes that we always choose what we take to be the maximum amount of pleasure. If the good consists in pleasure, and if we always choose what we think will yield the good—which, according to the sort of hedonism at issue here, is the maximum amount of pleasure— then, in choosing y over x, we must believe that y will yield more pleasure than x. But in a case of akrasia, we choose what we take to be less good, though more pleasant. So, in this alleged case of akrasia, we must think x is better than y. But then, given that the good just is pleasure, it's as though we chose y over x, thinking y more pleasant than x, but also thinking x more pleasant than y. This seems to involve inconsistent beliefs: we think both that y is more pleasant than x and that x is more pleasant than y. We can avoid this unpalatable result if we assume that, if we choose y over x, it isn't because of akrasia but because of a mistaken belief about what would yield the most pleasure. The phenomenon that some describe as akrasia therefore really just involves false beliefs (e.g., 358c1–5): there is a purely cognitive failure, not weakness of the will.

The argument against the possibility of akrasia is open to objection. There is also dispute about whether, in the Protagoras, Socrates accepts the hedonism that his argument against akrasia rests on, or whether the argument is purely ad hominem.

We saw above that the moral version of the second Socratic paradox assumes that what is best for one is being morally virtuous. More strongly, Socrates thinks that virtue is sufficient for happiness. This, too, is a highly controversial claim, one Socrates defends

in the Euthydemus, where he argues that x is either a part of, or necessary for, happiness if and only if virtue secures it.

The claim that virtue is sufficient for happiness has been understood in two different ways. On one view, it means that virtue, all by itself, is sufficient for happiness. On another, weaker, view, it means that virtue is sufficient for happiness only given a sufficient (modest) amount of certain other goods, such as health. Annas argues that both views sit side by side throughout the corpus, without ever being clearly distinguished from one another

Suppose, however, that virtue is literally sufficient for happiness. We can then ask whether virtue is sufficient for happiness by being its sole component or by being an infallible means to it. An analogy will illustrate the difference between these two views. Milk, flour, and eggs are parts of, ingredients in, a cake; going to the store to buy these ingredients is an instrumental means of making the cake, but it is not part of the cake.

It is sometimes thought that the fact that Socrates takes virtue to be a craft (technê, also translated as "skill" or "art") supports the instrumental view: just as shoemaking is a craft with the distinct product of shoes, so virtue is a craft with the distinct product of happiness. But it has been argued that not all crafts have distinct products; music and dance have been thought to be counterexamples. If this is right, then the mere fact that Socrates takes virtue to be a craft does not imply that he takes it to be merely an instrumental means to happiness. We need to know what sort of craft he takes it to be: one that has, or lacks, an independent product. Devereux discusses this issue.

If virtue is the sole component of happiness, we have an account of what Socrates takes happiness to consist in. If, however, virtue is merely an instrumental means to happiness, we still lack such an account. If he endorses the hedonism described in the Protagoras, that would provide such an account; but, as we have seen, it is disputed whether he endorses it there. Whether or not he endorses hedonism in the Protagoras, he firmly rejects it by the time of the Gorgias as well as in subsequent dialogues, where he argues that, though some pleasures—the good ones—are part of the happy life, happiness does not consist just in pleasure.

MENO

In chapter 7 Judson discusses the Meno, a dialogue that is often thought to begin a new phase in Plato's thought: the early dialogues are primarily devoted to ethical questions; though the Meno (like most of Plato's dialogues) also discusses such questions, it devotes more attention than earlier dialogues do to questions in epistemology and metaphysics. It also explicitly addresses, and provides an answer to, the problem of the elenchus (discussed in Section 3 of this chapter), an answer that goes beyond anything to be found in earlier dialogues.

The dialogue opens with Meno asking Socrates whether virtue can be taught. It is not entirely clear what Socrates' answer to this question is. For, as Judson explains, later in the dialogue Socrates argues both that virtue is teachable and that it isn't (87c1–96b10), and there's dispute about which of these arguments (or conclusions) he favors.

But, Socrates says at the outset of the dialogue, unless one knows what virtue is, one can't know whether it is teachable or, indeed, anything at all about it (7 1a4–b8). This is an instance of PKD, which we discussed in Section 3 of this chapter, in connection with the early dialogues. Socrates claims not to know what virtue is, yet knowing what it is, is prior to all other knowledge of virtue; hence they spend some time asking what it is. Though Meno initially thinks he knows the answer, it emerges that he doesn't; hence he doesn't know anything at all about virtue. How, then, can he inquire into it? This leads Meno to formulate "Meno's paradox" (80d5–8), which Socrates then reformulates (80e1–5).

Meno is sometimes thought to raise two problems: the problem of inquiry and the problem of discovery.33 The first asks how, if one lacks knowledge, one can begin an inquiry; the second asks how, if one lacks knowledge, one can complete an inquiry. Socrates reformulates Meno's questions into a constructive dilemma: whether one knows or doesn't know, one can't inquire. There's dispute about the precise connection between Meno's questions and Socrates' reformulation. There's also dispute about how Socrates replies to Meno's questions and to his own reformulation of them.

Socrates' reply is in three stages. In the first stage he describes the theory of recollection, according to which we had prenatal knowledge, and what's called learning

is really recollection of that knowledge. When Meno professes not to understand, Socrates says he'll explain. He does so in the second stage. Here he cross-examines a slave about a geometry problem whose answer the slave doesn't know either at the beginning or at the end of their discussion. He begins with a false belief about the answer (though he has some related true beliefs). He eventually acquires a true belief about the answer. Socrates says that the slave still doesn't know the answer (85c2), though he could come to know it if he were questioned further (85c10–d1). In the third stage Socrates reiterates the theory of recollection.

How should we understand Socrates' reply? On one view, favored by Matthews and Taylor, it distinguishes latent innate knowledge from manifest knowledge. We all have the former but lack the latter; inquiry consists in making our latent innate knowledge manifest.

It is clear that the theory of recollection posits prenatal knowledge (knowledge we had before birth), but that doesn't imply that we have innate knowledge (knowledge we have when we are born). For one might lose one's prenatal knowledge on being born, in such a way that one no longer knows and so lacks innate knowledge. And, on one view, Plato thinks we are born without any knowledge. Nonetheless, we eventually acquire true beliefs; and by relying on relevant true beliefs, along with our tendency to favor truths over falsehoods, we are able to acquire knowledge. That's the point of the discussion with the slave, who, as we've seen, eventually acquires a true belief about the answer to a geometry problem, even though he doesn't yet know it (nor does he have other relevant knowledge), though he can come to know it. This is the true-belief response, according to which Plato argues that one doesn't need any prior knowledge (in this life) in order to inquire or discover; having and relying on relevant true beliefs will do.

Judson argues against this view and in favor of the view that what's crucial, and suggested by the passages on recollection, is our ability to recognize the correct answer when we find it. Since recognition implies prior knowledge, we already know in a way; but insofar as inquiry involves articulating the answer (which we can't always do), we don't already know.

The true-belief and recognitional responses are alternative solutions not just to Meno's paradox, but also to the problem of the elenchus, which, as we saw in Section 3, asks (among other things) how we can acquire knowledge when we don't already have it. According to the true-belief response, our reliance on relevant true beliefs, coupled with our tendency to favor truths over falsehoods, enables us to acquire yet further true beliefs that we can eventually convert into knowledge (when, for example, we can interrelate a sufficient number of true beliefs into an explanatory whole). According to the recognitional response, even if we in some sense lack knowledge now, we had it once; when we come upon the right answer, we'll recognize it as such and thereby know it.

However that may be, Plato undoubtedly distinguishes knowledge from true belief: he does so in saying that the slave has true belief but not knowledge. Then, at 97a, he distinguishes someone who knows the way to Larisa from someone who has a mere true belief about it. Hence Plato allows us to have knowledge and beliefs about at least some of the same things: knowledge and belief aren't individuated by their distinct objects. He also countenances empirical knowledge.

How exactly do knowledge and true belief differ? Plato doesn't provide an explicit account of true belief or of belief. But at 98a he says that knowledge is true belief tied down with reasoning about the explanation (aitias logismos). One can know that p is so only if one knows why p is so; all knowledge requires an account of the reason why what one knows is true. There's dispute about whether this is a version of a justified-true-belief account of knowledge. It isn't if, according to such an account, any old justification is sufficient for turning a true belief into knowledge. For Plato thinks knowledge requires, not just any old justification for believing that p is true, but an explanation of why p is true. However, if one takes the justified-true-belief account of knowledge to say that, to know that p, p must be true, one must believe that p is true, and one must have a justification for one's belief that is sufficient for turning it into knowledge, then Plato does have a version of a justified-true-belief account of knowledge.

PHAEDO: SOUL

In chapter 8, Castagnoli discusses the Phaedo, a dialogue that is generally thought to belong to Plato's middle period. The Phaedo is also discussed by Taylor (epistemology), Harte (metaphysics), and Lorenz (the soul). The dialogue describes Socrates' last day and his death. His friends are gathered around him in prison, distressed at the prospect of his imminent death. To reassure them that they need not be distressed (though the end of the dialogue suggests he hasn't fully convinced them), he engages them in discussion of the immortality of the soul. For if, as he believes, the soul is immortal, then he won't die (115). And if he's lived a properly philosophical life, as he has striven to do, it's reasonable to think he will have a good afterlife. Several arguments are considered: the Cyclical Argument (69e6–72e1), the Argument from Recollection (72e3–78b3), the Affinity Argument (78b4–84b8), and the Final Argument (102a10–107b10). Not all of these arguments claim to prove immortality. The Recollection Argument, for example, aims to prove just the preexistence of the soul (76; this contrasts with the Meno, where it is said to prove immortality: 86b). According to the Affinity Argument, the soul is more like everlasting things than it is like sensibles, and so the soul is likely to be immortal; but that doesn't imply that it is immortal. Socrates takes at most the Final Argument to show this, though even here he remains open-minded. Castagnoli and Lorenz discuss some of Socrates' views about the soul in the Phaedo. Castagnoli also discusses Socrates' attitude to arguments and philosophy, arguing that he is more tentative than is sometimes thought.

PHAEDO: FORMS

The other main topic of the Phaedo, apart from the soul, is the theory of forms.42 The Euthyphro and Meno discuss forms, though only briefly. The Phaedo says much more about them, and the dialogue is often thought to describe a new view of them, sometimes called the middle or classical theory of forms. We've seen that in the early dialogues, a satisfactory answer to the "What is F?" question says what it is to be F. The correct answer to the question "What is justice?," for example, says what justice itself—the nature or real essence of justice—is. In the early dialogues, Socrates sometimes calls justice, piety, and so on—the referents of correct answers to "What is F?" questions—forms. The form of piety, for example, is that "by which (hô(i)) all pious

things are pious" (Eu. 6d10–11), something that "is the same in every [pious] action" (5d1).

Since a form is some one thing, the same in all cases, it seems to be a universal, in the Aristotelian sense of being a one over many (De Int. 17a38–b1). Aristotle, however, says, or comes close to saying, that forms are both universals and particulars (see, e.g., Met. 13. 9). In chapter 19, Harte suggests that it is difficult to decide about this, partly because Plato lacks technical terms for "particular" and "universal," and partly because the contrast between universal and particular is not one of his central concerns. For example, he often contrasts forms and sensibles. But this is not the contrast between all universals, on the one hand, and all particulars, on the other. For there are nonsensible particulars, such as god and individual souls. There are also sensible or perceivable universals, such as redness and being 3 inches, which are universals in the sense that they are repeatable, or can be had or shared by many things: there are many red things and many three-inch-long things. Plato's primary concern is not to distinguish universals from particulars but to argue for the existence of a certain sort of nonsensible entity, the forms. This, by itself, doesn't allow us to know whether forms are universals, particulars, or both. In chapter 27, Shields asks why Aristotle nonetheless claims that forms are, or come close to being, both universals and particulars.

Why does Plato posit forms? As Harte and Shields explain, forms have various functional and explanatory roles. Aristotle, for example, says that Plato introduced forms as the (basic) objects of knowledge and definition because he thought that entities in the sensible world are in flux or change, which disqualifies them from being (the basic) items of knowledge and definition. Hence there must be stable objects that can so serve, and these are the forms (Met. 1.6, 13.4, 13.9).

There is dispute about what, if any, sort of flux or change Plato appeals to in arguing that there are forms. Plato takes both the compresence and the succession of opposites to be kinds of flux or change. Compresence obtains when something is both F and not F at the same time: for example, Helen is both beautiful (insofar as she is more beautiful than other women) and ugly (insofar as she is less beautiful than Aphrodite); bright

color is both beautiful (in this painting) and ugly (in that one). The former is compresence in a particular (Helen); the latter is compresence in a property or type (bright color). Succession obtains when something is F at t1, and then ceases to be F, and becomes not-F, at a later time t2. For example, Helen is first short and then becomes taller as she grows older. There are also more radical sorts of succession, as encapsulated in Heraclitus' alleged remark that one can't step into the same river twice (DK B91), the idea being that it changes so rapidly that it doesn't persist over time.

On one view, in the middle dialogues Plato takes the sensible world to undergo the most radical sort of succession of opposites, according to which each sensible is, at every moment, changing in every respect. But it has also been argued that Plato consistently rejects the view that anything, whether sensible or nonsensible, changes in this radical way. Moreover, though sensibles undoubtedly undergo some sorts of succession—if of more orderly sorts—it is not clear that that is what motivates the introduction of forms. Rather, as Harte argues, it is the compresence of opposites, especially in properties or types, that does so. For Plato accepts the oneness condition: he thinks that beauty, for example, is some one thing, the same in all cases. Beauty cannot be identified with any single sensible property; since beauty must be a single, non-disjunctive property, it must be a nonsensible one, and this is the form of beauty.

Though compresence in sensible Fs is a sufficient reason for positing the existence of a form of F, it is not clearly necessary. Plato sometimes seems to suggest that there are forms in any case where perception is inadequate for answering the "What is F?" question, and this might yield a broader range of forms than is licensed by compresence. Be that as it may, forms are, at any rate, unobservable entities. This explains why, in the Phaedo, Plato argues that we can't acquire knowledge (or, at least, some knowledge) if we rely solely on perception. For perception has access only to sensibles; but attention solely to them can't confer knowledge, since knowledge requires a grasp of forms, which aren't perceptible (65–67).

Socrates returns to the importance of forms later in the Phaedo, especially in the passage on aitia (causes or explanations) (95d4–102a9), which begins with a discussion of his earlier views. This part of the passage is sometimes said to be Socrates', or Plato's,

"intellectual autobiography," though how genuinely autobiographical it is remains open to dispute. Socrates says that he used to think one could explain various phenomena in material terms. For example, human beings grow by eating and drinking; one person is taller than another by a head (96c–e). But he eventually decided that such purported explanations are not genuine explanations. He would have liked to find teleological explanations for all phenomena: an explanation of why it's best that each thing comes to be as it does and is at is. But he was unable to find such accounts on a broad scale (97c–99d). Hence he settled on a deuteros plous (99c9–d1), a second sailing, that is, a second way of finding explanations (including teleological ones). This is the "safe aitia," according to which x is F if and only if, and because, it participates in the form of F (if there is one) (99b–101d). For example, something is beautiful if and only if it participates in the form of beauty. Socrates also proposes the "clever" (or "sophisticated") aitia, according to which x is F if G brings F-ness to x. For example, something is cold if snow brings the form of coldness to it (102b–105c). Both aitiai invoke forms, but the clever aitia also makes use of "intermediary" entities such as snow (the physical stuff: not the form of snow).

The view that forms are, or are parts of, (at least some) aitiai, recalls the Meno's claim that knowledge is true belief tied down with an aitias logismos. The Phaedo adds that the relevant aitiai involve forms. Hence knowledge (or, at least knowledge-why, in at least some cases) requires knowledge of forms. It doesn't follow, however, that only forms can be known. Rather, the aitia passage suggests, we know sensibles when we can explain why they are as they are in the light of forms. Just as the Phaedo allows knowledge of sensibles, so it also allows mere belief about forms. Hence it is not committed to the so-called Two Worlds Theory, according to which there is knowledge but not belief about forms, and belief but not knowledge about sensibles.

Forms are sometimes thought to be necessary for the possibility not only of (at least some) knowledge but also of language. On one view, Plato thinks that grasping the meaning of a general term requires grasping a form; it is also sometimes thought that forms are the meanings of general terms. If not every meaningful general term has a corresponding form, then forms are not the meanings of (all) general terms. Nonetheless, they might be central to thought and language in a different way. In

chapter 20, Crivelli asks whether there is a linguistic dimension to the theory of forms. He also considers Plato's views about language more broadly, focusing on the Cratylus and Sophist.

To say that forms are nonsensible properties is to say that they are different from (non-identical to) sensibles. Are they also separate from them? That is, can they exist whether or not sensibles do? Difference and separation are quite different: the latter implies the former but not conversely. For example, I am different from oxygen but couldn't exist without it. Aristotle thinks Plato is committed to separation, and he argues that this is responsible for various difficulties in the theory of forms.

It is sometimes thought that if forms are separate, they cannot exist in sensibles. However, separation implies only that it's possible for forms to exist whether or not any sensibles have them. That doesn't preclude immanence. But how can forms be immanent? Is either the whole, or a part, of the form of F in each sensible particular? In the first part of the Parmenides, Plato considers problems for both options. But, as Peterson explains in chapter 10, the problems arise because he treats immanence in crudely physicalistic terms. Perhaps he means us to infer that, on other interpretations, there is no difficulty in forms being immanent. For example, perhaps forms are in things by being properties of them. Aristotle canvasses a number of ways in which one thing can be in another in Physics 4.3; Cat. 1a24–25; and Met. 5.23.

Plato's metaphysics is not exhausted by his views about forms or by his view that some sensible properties and particu lars suffer compresence, as well as some sorts of succession, of opposites. For example, we've seen that in the Phaedo he sought, but failed to find (at least on a broad scale), teleological explanations. The Republic, however, posits the form of the good as the basic explanatory principle. This reaffirms Plato's commitment to teleology, including natural teleology; but the Republic doesn't supply many details. This gap is filled primarily by the Timaeus, which provides a detailed account of the principles that govern the coming to be of the sensible world; it also describes its nature once it exists. Insofar as Plato thinks the sensible world and its coming into being can be explained, he does not think it completely eludes our grasp,

as it would if it were in the most extreme sort of Heraclitean flux described previously. In chapter 13, Johansen explores these and other aspects of the Timaeus.

REPUBLIC: ETHICS

In chapter 9, Scott discusses the Republic, aspects of which are also discussed in many other chapters. The main ostensible topic of the Republic is the question "What is justice (dikaiosunê)?," but the dialogue also discusses many other topics, including the soul, politics, art, education, knowledge and belief, and forms. These issues are intimately connected. For example, the dialogue argues that the best polis—city or state—should be governed by the best people. The best people are those who are virtuous. Virtue requires knowledge, and one can have moral knowledge only if one knows forms. Only philosophers have this knowledge; hence only they should rule. Plato's political views therefore rely on his views about ethics, which, in turn, rely on his epistemological and metaphysical views. Or again, he argues that justice is the dominant component of happiness (eudaimonia): that is, though it isn't sufficient for happiness, it makes the single greatest contribution to our happiness, outweighing every other combination of goods. What happiness for humans consists in depends on what we are like: on the nature of our souls. So Plato also discusses the nature of the soul. Further, he thinks we can come closer to happiness by improving ourselves in various ways: by acquiring more true beliefs and by training our desires. Here education and the arts play important roles; hence Plato discusses them as well.

We have seen that the early dialogues assume rational eudaimonism: one has reason to do something only insofar as it contributes to one's happiness. One therefore has reason to be just only if that contributes to one's happiness. The early dialogues assume that being just contributes to one's happiness. But the assumption is controversial. For justice seems to be other-regarding, in the sense that my justice seems to benefit you. As Thrasymachus says in Book 1, justice is "another's good" (343c): that is, my being just is good for you but it harms me. What if any reason, then, does a rational eudaimonist have for being just? This is one of the main questions that Plato considers in the Republic. It is his version of the fundamental, and perennially fascinating, question: "Why be moral?"

At the beginning of Republic 2, Glaucon challenges Socrates to show that justice is good not only for its consequences (it is agreed on all hands that it is good in this way) but also in itself, a view that, Glaucon says, is generally denied. To develop this point, he describes a thought-experiment: Gyges had a ring that made him invisible and so enabled him to commit injustice with impunity. Glaucon thinks that if we reflect on Gyges's situation, we will see that everyone would act as Gyges did: we would all behave unjustly if we could get away with it. We practice justice reluctantly, because we lack such a ring.

But what is justice? As ordinarily conceived, it seems to involve both not harming others and also benefiting them. But this is not yet to say exactly what justice is. And Glaucon admits that most people might have an incorrect understanding of what it is; hence he asks Socrates to provide his own account. At the end of Book 4, Socrates suggests that for a person to be just is for her soul to be in a certain sort of psychic harmony, with each part fulfilling its proper function. It has been argued that in explaining what it is for a person to be just this way, Plato commits the fallacy of irrelevance: he was asked to explain why I have reason not to harm, and to benefit, others; instead he explains why I have reason to promote my own psychic harmony. The fallacy of irrelevance alleges that the latter account of justice is too far removed from the ordinary, other-regarding, understanding of it to provide an explanation of why one should be just, as the question was originally intended. Glaucon wanted to know why one should, for example, honor one's commitments and parents and not steal. Socrates explains why one has reason to want one's soul to be well ordered. What is the connection between the original question and Socrates' answer?

Scott canvasses various replies. The basic strategy is to argue that one can achieve and maintain one's psychic harmony only if one doesn't harm, and indeed benefits, others, perhaps only if one benefits them for their own sakes; hence benefiting others turns out to be part of one's good. But there are many different versions of this general strategy. Scott considers both psychological and metaphysical defenses. According to the psychological defense, conventionally unjust behavior is motivated by desires a person who has achieved Platonic justice will lack; for example, someone who has Platonic justice lacks the motives to steal that someone else might have. Hence the Platonically

just person can be relied on to act, at least by and large, as a conventionally just person would. There is therefore a significant overlap between conventional and Platonic justice; the fallacy of irrelevance is therefore avoided. According to the metaphysical defense, the Platonically just person will both understand and love the form of the good; and this, in turn, will lead him to behave, at least by and large, as a conventionally just person would, if for different reasons (because of his love of the form of the good, rather than, for example, out of a fear of being caught). In Scott's view, Plato explicitly relies on the psychological defense. Though he may also intend the metaphysical defense, he does not explicitly offer it; commentators who appeal to it are, in Scott's view, engaged in "rational reconstruction."

In considering how this rational reconstruction would go, it is worthwhile to consider Plato's views on love, which Kraut explores (though not primarily in connection with Plato's reply to Glaucon) in chapter 23. If one loves something, one wants to be surrounded by it. Philosophers—who alone are Platonically, hence truly, just—love goodness; hence they want to be surrounded by goodness. Hence they have reason to benefit others, by making them as good as their natures allow them to be. I return to this sort of consideration later on in this chapter.

Plato's views about love have been criticized. For example, it has been argued that he thinks we do, or at any rate should, love others just for their admirable traits. This might seem to imply that we do not love others as the distinctive individuals they are: we love their admirable traits, not the people who have them. Kraut however, argues that Plato leaves room for loving people as the people they are.

REPUBLIC: DIVISION OF THE SOUL

Plato describes Platonic justice in terms of his division of the soul into three "parts" or "kinds" (435e–4 4 1c): the rational (to logistikon), the spirited (to thumoeides), and the appetitive (to epithumêtikon). A person is just when each of these parts fulfills its proper function, and when they are in the right sort of harmony with one another. In chapter 21, Lorenz discusses Plato's division of the soul and compares it with Plato's view of the soul in the Protagoras, Gorgias, and Phaedo.

On one view, the rational part is all reasoning, the appetitive all desire; on this view, there doesn't seem to be room for the third, spirited, part. On another view, Plato's distinction is between three irreducibly different sorts of desires or motivating factors or, alternatively, between the subjects of those desires. On this view, the rational part of the soul either consists of one's rational desires or is the subject for such desires; these are good-dependent desires (see Section 4 of this chapter). I have a rational desire to drink milk, for example, if I desire to do so because I think that's best for me, all things considered—because, say, I believe that it will promote my health, which I think is good for me. Appetitive desires, by contrast, are good-independent: they do not consider what is best for me overall. I have an appetitive desire to drink milk, for example, if I just feel like drinking it. As this example makes clear, one can have an appetitive and a rational desire for at least some of the same things, if for different reasons. But these desires can also conflict: I might want to drink milk because I think it will contribute to my health, but I might want not to drink it because I don't like its taste.

This way of conceiving of the parts of the soul—as types of desires, or as subjects for types of desires—leaves room for a third part, since the division between good-dependent and good-independent desires is not exhaustive. There are, however, different ways of conceiving of the spirited part. Lorenz, for example, suggests the spirited part involves the desire to distinguish oneself and to be esteemed and respected by others, as well as an awareness of one's social position and of one's merits. This explains the spirited person's sensitivity to slights and insults; it also explains why Plato associates spirit with anger.

In acknowledging the existence of spirited and appetitive desires, Plato rejects the view, often attributed to the early dialogues, that all desires are rational; he therefore rejects psychological (but not rational) eudaimonism. In allowing that appetitive desires can not only conflict with but also overcome rational desires, he acknowledges the possibility of akrasia, again in contrast to the early dialogues.

REPUBLIC: CITY AND SOUL

Just as Plato divides the soul into three parts, so he divides the ideally just polis into three occupationally defined classes: the guardians or rulers, the auxiliaries or military class, and the workers or productive class. And just as he argues that justice for an individual consists in the harmony of the three parts of the individual's soul, with each part fulfilling its proper function, so he argues that justice for a city consists in the proper harmony of its three parts (the three classes), with each part (class) fulfilling its function.

There is dispute about how to interpret Plato's elaborate analogy between justice in a soul and in a city. According to the Whole-Part account, a city is just if and only if all or most of its members are just; but this view leads to considerable difficulties. For example, Plato thinks that even in the ideally just city, most people aren't just; only the guardians are. For they alone know what justice is, and one can be just only if one has this knowledge.

This suggests the Macro-Micro account, according to which there is a structural isomorphism between the justice of a person and a city. For a person to be just is for the parts of her soul to be in a particular sort of harmony, and for each part to fulfill its function. For a city to be just is for its occupationally defined classes to be in structurally the same harmony, and for each of its parts to fulfill its function. On this view, a city can be just even if not all or most of its citizens are just. All that is required is that each class fulfill its proper function, and that the classes stand in the appropriate harmonious relations to one another.

REPUBLIC: KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF

In Republic Book 5, Plato introduces three "waves of paradox," the third and largest of which is that philosophers should rule (473d; cf. 484d). One reason he favors this view is that he thinks the virtuous should rule, but only philosophers have the knowledge needed for virtue. What sort of knowledge do they need to have? And how can Socrates persuade others of this audacious view? Part of his answer involves developing his epistemological—and metaphysical—views further, especially in a difficult argument

at the end of Book 5, and in the famous images of the Sun, Line, and Cave in Books 6 and 7.63 These passages are discussed by Taylor.

At the end of Book 5, Plato claims that knowledge is of what is, whereas belief is of what is and is not. On one interpretation, "is" is predicative (is F, e.g. is blue). On one familiar interpretation, the point is that one can know only entities that are F (and not also not F); these are the forms, which escape compresence. By contrast, beliefs are only about entities that are both F and not F; these are sensibles, which suffer compresence. Hence, one can't know sensibles or have beliefs about forms. This is a version of the Two Worlds Theory, discussed briefly in Section 7 of this chapter in connection with the Phaedo.

On an alternative interpretation, "is" is veridical (is true). The point then is that knowledge is of what is in the sense that it implies truth; whereas belief is of what is and is not in the sense that belief doesn't imply either truth or falsity, since there are both true, and false, beliefs. This says nothing about what objects knowledge and belief can be of or about, and so it doesn't involve commitment to the Two Worlds Theory. It's true that Plato argues that, to have any knowledge (or, at least, to know what, e.g., beauty is), one needs to know forms. But that doesn't imply that one can't also know sensibles or that one can't have mere beliefs about forms.

Even if Republic 5 is not committed to the Two Worlds Theory, Books 6 and 7 might be. However, Socrates introduces the simile of the Sun because, he says, he has belief, but not knowledge, about the form of the good (506c). Hence, contrary to the Two Worlds Theory, he admits beliefs about forms. The simile of the Sun describes, among other things, the crucial role of the form of the good in explaining other phenomena. As Taylor explains, Plato suggests that just as the sun generates and illuminates visible things, so the form of the good explains the existence, nature, and knowability of forms: forms exist, and are as they are, because it is best that things be that way; and we know forms when we understand how and why that's so. Here Plato reasserts the teleology mentioned but despaired of in the Phaedo, though he doesn't explain it in detail. However, Taylor suggests that, for Plato, goodness involves order and proportion,

which is to be understood mathematically. This partly explains the importance Plato places on mathematics in the education of the guardians.

In the Line, Plato describes two kinds of belief and two kinds of knowledge. On one interpretation, each of these cognitive conditions is individuated in terms of a certain sort of object, such that one has the lowest sort of belief, for example, if and only if one looks at shadows. This interpretation is congenial to the Two Worlds Theory. On an alternative interpretation, on which Plato rejects Two Worlds Theory, what cognitive condition one is in is determined not by the objects one considers but by how one reasons about them. More precisely, if, for example, one is restricted to sensibles and doesn't acknowledge the existence of forms, one can have at best belief; whereas, if one countenances forms, one can have knowledge that, however, is not restricted to forms, for one can know sensibles in the light of forms.

In the allegory of the Cave, Plato explains how one can move from the lowest sort of belief to the best sort of knowledge, which requires knowing the form of the good. That's the upward path: one emerges from the cave (the sensible world) that most of us are confined to, into the light of the sun (the form of the good) outside the cave. Plato also describes the downward path, whereby those who have attained the best sort of knowledge return to the cave. After a period of adjustment, they will be able to see the things there better than the prisoners, who have never left the cave, can do. Indeed, unlike the prisoners, they will know sensibles (520c). This counts against the Two Worlds theory, since Socrates countenances knowledge of sensibles.

What is involved in knowing forms? On one view, one grasps isolated individual forms through particular acts of non-propositional acquaintance. On an alternative view, Plato doesn't take knowledge of forms to consist in non-propositional acquaintance. Rather, to know a form is to know what it is, which is propositional knowledge: to know what the form of beauty is, for example, is to know that it is thus and so. Nor does Plato think one can know just a single form all on its own. Rather, he is an epistemological holist in the sense that he thinks that knowing any form requires knowing its place in a broader system, which requires knowing other forms.

REPUBLIC: POLITICAL THEORY

At the end of Section 10 of this chapter, we saw that Plato thinks that, in the best polis, each class will fulfill its proper function. This requires the members of each class to devote themselves to just one type of work; this is mandated by the principle of specialization laid down in Book 2. Those in the productive class will spend their time making shoes, producing food, and so on; the auxiliaries will devote themselves to defending the city from both external and internal enemies; and the guardians will contemplate forms and rule in the light of the knowledge that confers.

In restricting ruling to the guardians, Plato rejects democracy; the guardians are the only ones who have a say in how the city will be run. Hence most people are deprived of political autonomy. Their personal autonomy is also severely limited. For example, someone who is most suited to be in the working class cannot be an auxiliary, even if she wants to be. Both political and personal autonomy are often thought to be important goods; in depriving most members of the city of much of their personal and political autonomy, isn't Plato making them less happy than they could otherwise be? We might also ask, as Glaucon does at 519e, whether, in requiring philosophers, at least temporarily, to forgo contemplation of forms in order to rule, Plato is making them less happy than they could be; for contemplating forms is a greater good than ruling.

In reply to the worry about the happiness of philosophers, Socrates says that he isn't aiming at the happiness of any one class but at the happiness of the whole (420b–421c; 519e–520a). According to Popper, Plato accepts the "organic theory," which involves both a metaphysical and a political component. The metaphysical component says that the state is an entity in its own right, distinct from its parts. The political component involves the view that individual citizens must sacrifice their interests for those of the city.

Scott argues, against Popper, that the city-soul analogy does not imply the metaphysical component. Rather, it implies only that the city and the soul are structurally similar. Though Scott also rejects Popper's version of the political component, he agrees that Plato thinks that the interests of individual citizens are subordinate to the greatest good of the state, which is its unity. On an alternative view,

in saying that he aims at the happiness of the whole, Plato means that he wants each citizen to be as happy as he can be. To say this is not to sacrifice individual happiness to the happiness of a distinct entity, the city; nor is it to give priority to the interests of the city over those of its citizens.

How does Plato defend the view that he aims to make ordinary citizens as happy as possible, given that they have so little personal and political autonomy? And how does he defend the view that guardians are happy, when they are made to abandon the greater good of contemplating forms for the lesser good of ruling?

On one view, Plato argues that the guardians must return to the cave to rule, despite the fact that it is not in their self-interest, because it is good to do so: not good for them, but impersonally good. If this is right, then at this stage Plato abandons rational eudaimonism and does not show, as he undertook to do in Book 2, that it is always in one's interest to be just.

On an alternative view, he retains rational eudaimonism and argues that it is in the guardians' best overall interest to rule. To be sure, contemplating forms is a greater good than ruling. But it doesn't follow that the philosopher who has been trained in the ideal city would be better off, all things considered, if she continued to philosophize (and thereby violated the just requirement that she rule) than if she spent some time ruling (thereby fulfilling a just requirement). Still, one wants to know why the philosopher is better off occasionally engaging in a less good activity than she would be if she more single-mindedly devoted herself to contemplating the forms.

One possibility is that ruling is instrumentally good for philosophers: if they don't rule, the city will be less stable than it would otherwise be, and that would harm them. By way of analogy, if philosophers don't eat, they will die and so could not contemplate the forms; hence even though eating is less good than contemplation, philosophers will spend some time eating, and for their own sakes. Similarly, even if ruling is less good than contemplating, it may be in the philosophers' best interest to spend some time ruling.

One might also argue that ruling is not merely instrumentally good. For example, as we saw previously, given their love of goodness, philosophers want, for their own sakes, to

be surrounded by as much goodness as possible. In ruling, they make others as good as possible, which is in the intrinsic interests of those others. But in benefiting others for their own sakes, the guardians also benefit themselves; achieving the good of others is therefore part of their own happiness.

As to non-guardians, Plato thinks they will come as close to being happy as their natures allow only if they are ruled by the guardians, since only the guardians know what is truly good. In Plato's view, political and personal autonomy are less important to one's happiness than they are sometimes taken to be. Living in a stable, well-ordered city in which one devotes oneself to the task for which one is best suited contributes more to one's happiness than having more autonomy would. We may not agree with Plato's low estimation of the importance of autonomy or with his defense of paternalism. It is nonetheless important to see that he limits personal and political autonomy not in sacrifice to a superorganism or the state but to enable each individual to come as close to being happy as possible.

POLITICAL THEORY

For the ideally just city to come into existence, people's attitudes need to be radically transformed. For example, they need to learn what is most valuable: virtue, not material goods. They also need to learn to value true philosophers who, in turn, need to undergo the proper training so as to allow their natures to flourish. In chapter 25, Kamtekar considers the sort of education this transformation requires. She also considers Plato's views on art, which are intimately connected to his views on education since, for example, attending to certain sorts of art can inhibit proper development by arousing and encouraging inappropriate emotions.

Though Plato seems to think his ideally just city is possible, it certainly isn't actual. We might then wonder what the best city we can hope for is, given people as they actually are. In chapter 24, Christopher Bobonich suggests that different dialogues defend different views. In his view, in the early dialogues Socrates thinks no one has the knowledge that is required for virtue; hence no one is qualified to rule in the way the guardians of the Republic are. Does Plato nonetheless think there should be absolute rulers, albeit less-qualified ones? Or does he think the city should be run in a different

way? Presumably, he thinks the best city we can hope for, taking us more or less as we are, is one run according to his moral principles: for example, that it is better to suffer than to commit injustice; that if one commits injustice, it is better to be punished than to escape punishment; and so on. What would a city look like if it embodied these and other Socratic principles, but taking us more or less as we are? Such a city would need to impose some sanctions, which, in turn, might require a fair amount of coercion. What legitimates such coercion? Would all citizens benefit equally from living in a city founded on Socratic principles? How stable would such a city be? Does political activity, in such a city, compete with developing one's own virtue? Because the ethical views of the early dialogues are so underdeveloped, it is difficult to answer these questions in their case. But, Bobonich suggests, some questions receive fuller—and different—answers, beginning in the Phaedo. Bobonich traces Plato's answers to the various questions just mentioned, from the earliest through the latest dialogues. He also explores Plato's changing views of the nature of the ideally best city. He argues that the early, middle, and late dialogues espouse different ethical, epistemological, and metaphysical views, which, in turn, lead to different views about the best city, both for people as they are and for people who have undergone the transformation needed for a more radical change in society.

For example, according to Bobonich, the early dialogues deny the existence of non-rational desires, whereas later dialogues admit their existence. Hence, according to the early dialogues, one can persuade people to change their lives only by changing their beliefs. By contrast, admitting the existence of non-rational desires opens up the possibility that people can be trained to care about the right things not, or not only, by changing their beliefs but also by training their non-rational desires in such a way that they come to care about the right things, whether or not they can appreciate their true value.

According to Bobonich, Plato's views about the ideally just city, and about the best state for us more or less as we are, change again in the Statesman. For example, it seems to have more demanding qualifications for citizenship, and citizenship has greater ethical significance. In the Republic, the members of all three classes are citizens, though only the philosophers are just; in the Statesman, only just people can

be citizens. However, this would allow non-philosophers to be citizens if they are just, and Bobonich thinks that is Plato's view by the time of the Statesman. This could be so for one of two reasons: either Plato now thinks that non-philosophers have knowledge, or he no longer requires knowledge for virtue.

The Laws has different views again. For example, it revises the Republic's view of the nature of the ideally just city. It also allows, contrary to the Republic, that non-philosophers can be educated so as to have a reasoned grasp of basic ethical and political truths. Hence non-philosophers are fit to rule; accordingly, instead of philosopher rulers, Plato now posits an Assembly open to all citizens.

The Laws also takes up other questions considered in earlier dialogues. For example, as Meyer explains in chapter 15, it considers the various virtues (such as wisdom, justice, moderation, and courage) and asks about the relations among them. Does Plato still believe, as he is often thought to believe in earlier dialogues, that one can have one of these virtues if and only if he has the others? Does he think they are hierarchically arranged and if so, how and on what basis? Another topic taken up in the Laws is theology, a topic that is also of central concern in the Timaeus. Sedley explores this in chapter 26.

PARMENIDES

In chapter 10, Sandra Peterson discusses the Parmenides, which is sometimes thought to criticize the middle dialogues' views about forms. This dialogue falls into two sharply distinct parts. The first part discusses and criticizes a theory of forms. The second part conducts an exercise designed to help one resolve some of the problems broached in the first part.

At the beginning of the dialogue, Socrates says that forms are introduced to solve a puzzle raised by the fact that things are both one and many, like and unlike: Simmias, for example, is one man with many limbs; he is like some things and unlike others. We can understand how this can be so only by grasping that he participates in both the form of one and the form of many, and in the forms of likeness and unlikeness. As in the middle dialogues, compresence in sensibles is explained by reference to forms.

Socrates is also tempted to posit forms of man, fire, and water, yet sensible men, fire, and water do not in any obvious way suffer compresence: Socrates is not both a man and not a man. Perhaps, then, as suggested in Section 7 of this chapter, compresence is sufficient but not necessary for positing forms.

Socrates denies that there are forms of mud, dirt, and hair. One of his reasons is that they are just what we see them to be. Perhaps this supports the suggestion, mentioned in Section 7 of this chapter, that his general concern is with the limits of perception. So far, then, the Parmenides seems to capture at least one central line of thought in the middle dialogues.

The middle dialogues also seem to suggest that forms are Self-Predicative: any form of F is itself F; the form of beauty, for example, is itself beautiful. Self-Predication can seem absurd: how, for example, could the form of large be large? For, one might think, something can be large only if it has a size; yet forms are incorporeal. Self-Predication would indeed be absurd if it required the form of F to be F in the very same way in which sensible particulars are F, such that something can be large, for example, only if it has a size. However, as Peterson explains, Self-Predication can be understood as a much more plausible thesis. Indeed, in her view, if we were to reject it, we would also have to give up many ordinary statements we routinely accept, such as the biblical statement that "charity suffereth long" and encyclopedia statements such as "the tiger is a carnivore." She suggests that there are various accounts of the semantics of Self-Predications on which they are true, including the one Plato accepts; and she shows how some of his arguments (such as the celebrated Third Man Argument (132a-b) and the Greatest Difficulty (133b-134e)) require no more than a version of Self-Predication on which it is true.

Strenuous efforts have been made to argue either that Plato was never committed to Self-Predication or that, even if he was committed to it in the middle dialogues, he abandoned it because of the Parmenides' criticisms. But if Self-Predication is arguably true, it is less clear that we should attempt to extricate Plato from it. If, rightly or wrongly, he remains committed to Self-Predication, he needs a different escape route from some of the arguments leveled in the first part of the Parmenides.

Perhaps the most famous of these arguments is the Third Man Argument. According to it, the, or a, theory of forms is vulnerable to a vicious infinite regress: if there is even one form of F, there are infinitely many of them. This violates Plato's Uniqueness assumption, according to which there is at most one form for any given predicate. The regress goes roughly as follows. Each form is a one over many: that is, whenever many things are F, there is one form in virtue of which they are F. Consider the set of sensible large things. According to the One over Many assumption, there is one form of large— call it the form1 of large—over them. Since forms are Self-Predicative, we may posit a new set of large things, one consisting of the members of the original set, along with the form1 of large. The One over Many assumption tells us that there is one form of large over this set. This can't be the form in the set (= the form1 of large). For, or so the Third Man Argument assumes, nothing is F in virtue of itself: this is the so-called Non-Identity assumption. Hence there must be another form of large—call it the form2 of large— which is the form of large in virtue of which the members of our new set of large things are large. By Self-Predication, the form2 of large is large. We can now posit yet another set of large things, which consists of the members of the previous set along with the form2 of large. By the One over Many assumption, there must be a form of large over this set, which, by Non-Identity, must be non-identical with anything in the set—and so on ad infinitum, and in violation of Uniqueness.

The Third Man Argument validly generates a regress. Hence Plato can avoid the argument only if he is not committed to all its premises. If Self-Predication is arguably true, it is not a likely candidate for rejection. Plato also accepts a one over many assumption, as well as the view that forms are different from, and perhaps separate from, sensibles. But these latter two views are not enough to commit him to either the One over Many assumption or the Non-Identity assumption, that are at work in the Third Man Argument. It is debated whether he is committed to these assumptions for other reasons.

It is sometimes thought that in the difficult second part of the Parmenides, Plato provides clues about how to answer at least some of the puzzles in the first part of the dialogue. But it remains a matter of controversy whether—and if so, how—Plato revises his views about forms either there or in subsequent dialogues. The Theaetetus,

Timaeus, Sophist, and Philebus all either mention entities called forms, or describe entities that seem similar, in at least some ways, to forms as they are described in the middle dialogues. But there is dispute about the precise connection between these entities and the forms countenanced in the middle dialogues.

THEAETETUS

The Theaetetus is Plato's longest systematic discussion of knowledge. In chapter 11, Lee discusses the dialogue as a whole, focusing on two related issues: whether the dialogue espouses the view that epistemology can be done without metaphysics, and what if anything it suggests about the nature and existence of forms. She argues that some of the accounts of knowledge considered in the dialogue are supported with metaphysical theories that are incompatible with the existence of forms; but, since Plato rejects those accounts of knowledge, he is not committed to the metaphysics used to support them. Though this falls short of positing forms, she suggests that Plato hints at requirements for knowledge that we could satisfy by positing forms.

The first and longest part of the dialogue discusses the view that knowledge is perception. That view is linked both to Protagoras's measure doctrine, according to which things are (to one) as they appear to one, and to a Heraclitean flux doctrine. The refutation of Protagoras's measure doctrine is sometimes thought to be a refutation (or an attempted refutation) of relativism, though it is disputed whether Protagoras is a relativist and, if he is, in what sense he is. It is also disputed whether Plato's refutation of a Heraclitean flux doctrine in 181–83 refutes any sort of Heracliteanism that he himself accepts in earlier dialogues, or whether he is just refuting the flux doctrine that is needed to support Theaetetus' suggestion that knowledge is perception (or, more precisely, that suggestion when it is interpreted along Protagorean lines).

In 184–86, Plato presents his final refutation of the claim that knowledge is perception. On one view, which Lee is sympathetic to, he argues that when perception is conceived as being below the propositional and conceptual threshold, it cannot constitute knowledge; indeed, when perception is so conceived, it does not even get as far as belief. This is compatible with allowing—although it does not imply—that perceiving

that something is so (which, in contrast to "pure" perception, involves identifying what one sees as being something or other) can be a case of knowledge.

In the second part of the dialogue, Plato asks whether knowledge is true belief. He eventually argues that it is not, on the ground that the members of a jury might have a true belief about who committed a crime but, not having been eyewitnesses, they do not know who committed it; hence true belief is not sufficient for knowledge. Before directly rejecting the view that knowledge is true belief, he asks about the possibility of false belief. He proposes five explanations; but each of them seems to fail.

It has been argued that Plato's failure to explain false belief stems from his alleged unclarity about being and not being, or about the distinction between naming and stating; according to some commentators, it is only in the Sophist that he attains clarity on these issues and so is able to explain the nature of false statement and belief. Lee suggests, however, that the failure is due instead to the dialectical context. In particular, it is an indirect indictment of the definition of knowledge as true belief. For in order to have a false belief about something, one must succeed in thinking about it, in which case one must have a true belief about it. If knowledge is true belief, it follows that whenever one succeeds in thinking about something, one thereby knows it. But, according to Plato, one cannot both know and not know the same thing. Hence if thinking about something involves knowing it, one cannot also have a false belief about it.

In the third and final part of the dialogue, Plato asks whether knowledge is true belief plus an account (logos). He explores this issue partly in terms of a dream Socrates says he has had, according to which there are basic elements that can be perceived and named but that have no account and so are unknowable. Lee suggests that Plato deliberately leaves open the question of precisely what these elements are because he wants to focus on abstract questions about ontology and language that a more determinate account of the elements might obscure.

On one view, Plato accepts the dream theory's claim that some things can be known without an account. If he accepts it, he rejects the Meno's claim that knowledge is true belief tied down with an aitias logismos, as well as the claim made in the Phaedo (76b)

and Republic (531e, 534b) that knowledge requires a logos. On another view, he believes both that knowledge requires an account and that elements are knowable; and so he rejects the view that they lack accounts.

In order to adjudicate between these and other options, we need to know what an account is. Plato considers three possibilities, but appears to reject all of them. On one view, however, he hints that elements can be seen to have accounts once we realize that accounts need not consist in listing a thing's elements but can also consist in describing something's place in the larger whole of which it is a part. This leads to the sort of holism, or interrelation model of knowledge, that is explicit not only in such late dialogues as the Statesman but also, according to some commentators, in earlier dialogues.

SOPHIST

The ostensible main topic of the Sophist is the definition of a sophist. Seven definitions are considered, but each seems to fail. In exploring the seventh definition, Plato broaches various issues about being and not being. Among the many issues he considers within that broad compass is the nature of predication and correct speaking. The Late-Learners deny that one can predicate one thing of another. It is often thought that Plato can solve their problem only if he distinguishes between the identity and predication senses, or uses, of "is" (e.g., "Cicero is Tully"; "snow is white"). Commentators who share this assumption divide into optimists, who think Plato succeeds in distinguishing identity and predication senses or uses of "is," and pessimists, who think he doesn't. In chapter 12, Brown denies their common assumption, arguing, with the pessimists, that Plato does not distinguish different senses or uses of "is," but resisting their conclusion that he thereby fails to solve the Late-Learners' problem. For in her view, distinguishing different senses or uses of "is" is not necessary for solving their problem. It can be solved by distinguishing between identity and predication statements. Plato does this by considering the "communion of kinds." This allows us to see how, for instance, Change is both the same and not the same. For to say that Change is the same, is to predicate "the same" of it; and to say that Change is not the same, is to say that it is not identical with the kind, Sameness.

Likewise, Change is both different (from other things) and also not different, in that it is not (identical with) the kind, Different.

Another, related issue taken up in the "middle part" (as opposed to the "outer part") of the dialogue is the possibility of false statement (and belief). Showing that kinds mix is part of the solution, but it is not the whole of it. In addition, Plato provides an account of what a statement (logos) is: it involves interweaving a name (onoma) and a verb (rhêma) in such a way that one names something, and then says something about it. Hence Plato distinguishes naming from stating. This, in turn, allows him to explain the nature of both true and false statements: a true statement says of things that are, that they are; a false statement says different things from the things that are. Both a true statement, such as "Theaetetus sits," and a false statement, such as "Theaetetus flies," name Theaetetus and also say something about him; hence both count as statements. But the true statement says, concerning Theaetetus, that things that are, while the false one says different things from the things that are. The precise interpretation of this account of false statement is disputed. Both Brown and Crivelli canvass and criticize a number of options; in the end, they favor different accounts.

PHILEBUS

The main topic of the Philebus is the good human life: Is it pleasure, intelligence, or some combination thereof? In ways that anticipate Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics, Plato argues that the good (i.e., the best) human life—that is, the happy (eudaimon) life—doesn't consist just in pleasure or just in intelligence but in a combination of them; intelligence is the more important component, but some pleasures (the good but not the bad ones) are also part of happiness. In rejecting the view that happiness consists in pleasure, Plato rejects hedonism, as he also does in the earlier Gorgias and Republic. In rejecting the view that happiness consists in intelligence alone, he rejects a purely contemplative view of happiness that, according to some but not others, he favors in the Republic and Symposium.

In chapter 14, Meinwald discusses these issues about the Philebus, placing special emphasis on its treatment of method and metaphysics, an understanding of which is necessary if we are to understand how Plato arrives at his final view of the constituents

of happiness. In doing so, Plato introduces the Promethean Method, which is based on the view that there is both limit (peras) and the unlimited (to apeiron) in things. This method involves dividing subjects into subkinds and knowing how they combine with each other.

In addition to the Promethean Method, Plato also describes a fourfold division of things into limit (peras), the unlimited (to apeiron), what is mixed from them, and the cause of the mixture. Pleasure is put in the category of the unlimited, and mind in the category of cause; this helps explain their place in the good human life.

The method of division, adverted to in the Promethean Method, is also described in other dialogues. But the Philebus is unique in linking it to limit and the unlimited. There are disputes about how to understand these notions. Indeed, it is not even clear that they have the same sense or reference in the Promethean Method and in the fourfold division, though Meinwald argues that they do. In her view, the unlimited is best understood as a blurred condition in which kinds run together with no significant demarcations. For example, below the level of specific vowels there is a continuum of sounds; below the lowest division into kinds of cats, there is indefinite variation in softness, fur, and so on, all at the level of types. On this view, unlimited things (apeira) are not, as is sometimes thought, particulars (this cat and that one) but types considered independently of their division into determinate kinds, which is the realm of limit (peras). Limit involves proportion, which, in turn, involves explaining forms or kinds mathematically. The Philebus is not unique in emphasizing the fundamentally mathematical nature of things. As we've seen, the Republic also does so. The importance of mathematics for understanding reality is also emphasized in the Timaeus.

What are the kinds (eidê) that Plato discusses in the Philebus? Meinwald suggests that they are given by genus-species trees. Here it is worth asking (as one might also do about the "greatest kinds" in the Sophist) how these kinds compare with the forms described in the middle dialogues.

ARISTOTLE'S CRITICISM OF PLATO; PLATONISM

Aristotle was Plato's student, or associate, in the Academy for nearly 20 years, and he is an important source of information about Plato, though there are disputes about his reliability. In chapter 27, Shields explores some of Aristotle's criticisms of Plato, especially his claim that Platonic forms turn out to be both particulars and universals, a claim we mentioned briefly in Section 7 of this chapter. Shields also explores a closely related, but possibly importantly different, claim: that "universals and particulars are practically the same natures" (Met. 1086b10–11). Shields argues that if Aristotle means to argue that forms are both universals and particulars, where these are taken to be exclusive categories of being, his arguments fail; whereas, on some ways of understanding the claim that universals and particulars are practically the same natures, he has a more challenging criticism, one he himself needs to grapple with.

As Shields explains, Aristotle sometimes seems to suggest that the separation of forms makes them particulars. This is a curious claim for Aristotle to make. First, we've seen that to say that the form of F is separate is to say that it can exist whether or not there are any F sensibles. That is to say, they can exist uninstantiated (by sensibles, at any rate). But to say that forms can exist uninstantiated doesn't seem to make them into particulars: Why can't there be uninstantiated universals? Further, as Shields notes, Aristotle himself, in at least some phases of his career, admits universal substances (ousiai), as in the Categories, where the species and genera of individual substances count as secondary substances; yet species and genera are universals, not particulars.

Shields also explores Plato's account of participation in terms of mimeticism (or imitation), asking whether, as Aristotle may believe, it commits Plato to the view that forms are particulars. Shields concludes that it does not do so. For these and other reasons, Shields argues, Aristotle has no easy route to the conclusion that forms are particulars. However, Shields argues, Aristotle also makes the good point that Plato seems to overtax forms, giving them too many roles to play, roles no single sort of entity could obviously play. Shields suggests, for example, that, according to Aristotle, Plato posits forms in order to explain both the knowability and the unity (both synchronic and diachronic) of sensible particulars. Insofar as they explain knowability, they must, in Aristotle's view, be universals; but insofar as they are principles of the synchronic

and diachronic unity of particulars, it seems they must, according to Aristotle, be particulars. Shields suggests that this Aristotelian line of criticism is more promising than one that attempts to argue that forms are, impossibly, both universals and particulars.

More generally, Shields suggests that, though Aristotle does not succeed in delivering a knockout blow to Plato, he raises important criticisms that are well worth considering. In any case, we can understand both Plato's and Aristotle's views better by considering both Aristotle's objections and Plato's resources in the face of them.

Whether or not Plato was the first Platonist, he was certainly not the last. In chapter 28, Brittain describes the fascinating—though difficult and complex, and still relatively unexplored—history of how later Platonists appropriated, or claimed to appropriate, Plato's views. Though "Platonism" is often taken to involve a single, unified body of thought, Brittain shows how heterogeneous the Platonic tradition is. Nonetheless, he identifies three generally shared commitments: (1) to the authoritative status of Plato's work; (2) to the assumption that experience is an inadequate basis for understanding the world and that there are various primary immaterial principles, including forms, souls, and a transcendent god, that do explain it; and (3) to an increasing interest in a range of religious practices and concerns. As Brittain notes, the results of these commitments are likely to strike modern readers as remote from Plato's text, at least at first glance. However, as he also notes, even if we do not share the three commitments just mentioned, we can benefit greatly by reading the work of the philosophers who made them—not just because that work is intrinsically interesting but also because it sheds light on Plato, by providing a range of imaginative solutions to interpretative difficulties that are still with us. Just as exploring Aristotle's criticisms of Plato allows us to gain further insight into both Plato's and Aristotle's views, so comparing Plato's Platonism with later Platonism promises to shed light on both. <>

Essay: *What is Platonism?* by Lloyd P. Gerson abridged from
, July 2005, 43:3 pp 253-276

The Problem

The question posed in the title of this paper is an historical one. I am not, for example, primarily interested in the term 'Platonism' cognition includes content; (3) Hence, as suggested by A7, 1072b22, intellect is determined by the essences which are its objects; (4) The claim that if God knew anything other than himself he would be less perfect is spurious, because thinking is identical with its object. As Kahn puts it, "the Prime Mover is simply the formal-noetic structure of the cosmos as conscious of itself" (Kahn's emphasis). One could dispute all of these points. I only wish to stress that insofar as Aristotle is interpreted as holding that divine thinking has content, he must be seen to be relying on the Platonic principle of hierarchy and of the ontological priority of the intelligible to the sensible.

The aversion to understanding Aristotle's God as thinking about all intelligibles is based largely on A9, not on A7. For it is in A9, and only there, that Aristotle famously claims that God is "thinking thinking about thinking." Many scholars infer from this phrase alone that if God is thinking about "thinking" (vovqs is), that is, thinking about himself, then God cannot be thinking about anything else. Such an inference, of course, is invalid, unless we suppose that that something else could not also be identical with thinking, the explicit object of thinking in Aristotle's conclusion. The justification for holding that this is so, is supposedly found in the argument for the conclusion of which the claim that God is thinking thinking about thinking is a part. The central argument is: as used by modern philosophers to stand for a particular theory under discussion—a theory, which it is typically acknowledged, no one may have actually held. I am rather concerned to understand and articulate on an historical basis the core position of that "school" of thought prominent in antiquity from the time of the "founder" up until at least the middle of the 6th century C.E. Platonism was unquestionably the dominant philosophical position in the ancient world over a period of more than 800 years. Epicureanism is perhaps the sole major exception to the rule that in the ancient world all philosophers took Platonism as the starting-point for speculation, including those who thought their first task was to refute Platonism. Basically, Platonism set the

ancient philosophical agenda. Given this fact, understanding with some precision the nature of Platonism is obviously a desirable thing for the historian of ancient philosophy.

One might suppose that the task of determining the nature of Platonism can be handled in a relatively straightforward and perspicuous manner if one stipulates that Platonism is the view or collection of views held by all those who called themselves Platonists or followers of Plato. Thus, we could take a purely phenomenological approach: Platonism is just whatever anyone in the relevant period identifies as Platonism. A similar approach could be made in determining who is a Platonist. As a strictly historical method, this is not an unreasonable way to proceed. Nevertheless, it has several drawbacks.

First, the fact that philosophers did not self-identify as Platonists until sometime in the 2nd century C.E. means that we would have to exclude from our construction of Platonism, on the basis of a technicality, as it were, the contributions of many philosophers who were quite evidently in some sense followers of Plato and of his philosophy. The list of the philosophers thus excluded would be quite impressive. It includes members of the Old Academy such as Speusippus (c. 410– 339 B.C.E.) and Xenocrates (396/5–314/313 B.C.E.) as well as numerous significant figures of what is anachronistically called Middle Platonism such as Antiochus of Ascalon (c. 130–c. 68 B.C.E.) and Numenius (2nd century C.E.). I single out these philosophers from among many others because the remains of their writings—in some cases extensive and in others exiguous—surely have some role to play in giving an historical answer to my question. In this regard, the skeptical philosophers of the New Academy, Arcesilaus (316/315–241/340 B.C.E.), Carneades (214–129/8 B.C.E.), Clitomachus (187/6–110/09 B.C.E.), and Philo of Larissa (158–84 B.C.E.) are especially interesting. For there is a serious and complex question of whether skepticism does or does not represent an authentic element of Platonism. It would seem to be needlessly scholastic to dismiss the question out of hand just because New Academics did not actually call themselves Platonists.

Second, among self-described Platonists as well as among de facto ones, there were serious and substantial disagreements about various doctrines understood to comprise Platonism. If we move forward to the end of our period, those of undoubtedly Platonic pedigree such as Proclus (412–85 C.E.) and Simplicius (c. 490–560 C.E.) preserve for us extensive doxographies of disputed positions among Platonists across many centuries. These disputes focus on matters small and large. A scholar such as Dörrie, deeply conversant with these disputes, and committed to the phenomological approach, would insist that the recognition of contradictions within Platonism should occasion no unease. For example, according to Dörrie, it belongs to authentic Platonism to argue either that our entire soul is immortal or only that one part of it is; to argue either that Forms are within a divine intellect or that they are not; to argue either that the universe was created literally in time or that it was not; to argue that evil is to be identified with matter or privation or with neither; and so on.

My unease with this approach consists simply in the fact that it is superficial. For among Platonists, the disputes were fundamentally different from disputes between Platonists and members of other schools. In the former, there was, or so I aim to show, commonly agreed upon principles on the basis of which the disputed positions were advanced. In the latter, Platonists argued that their opponents were fundamentally mistaken in principle. It is I believe upon these principles that we should focus in order to understand Platonism.

One of these principles is, of course, that Platonists are adherents of Plato's philosophy. And this in turn raises the large issue of how one is to proceed from "what Plato says" to "what Plato means." The gap between what Plato says or, more accurately, what Plato's characters say, and what Plato's means, is potentially an abyss. It is possible to leap into that abyss and never be heard from again. Most students of ancient philosophy, however, suppose that there are ways to bridge the gap, that is, reasonable assumptions that allow us to draw conclusions (modest or otherwise) about Plato's meaning on the basis of what is said in the dialogues. But to allow that there is a gap at all is to admit that there is a philosophical position or a set of these, whose parts may or may not be consistent, that goes beyond just what the dialogues say. For example, the theory of Forms or a theory of Forms may be constructed from the dialogues, but no account of

Forms that I know of does not attempt at least to generalize from the words of the dialogues or to draw out their implications.

The gap between the paraphrasing of the literal and the construction of the doctrinal is the gap between what Plato wrote and Platonism. I think we must recognize at the outset that Platonists were interested in the former primarily because it was an indispensable means of arriving at the latter. But it was not the only means. It hardly needs emphasizing that from the claims that "Plato believed p" and that "p implies q", we cannot infer that "Plato believed q". Nevertheless, Platonists were eager to be initiated and nurtured in their understanding of Platonism as far as possible by reading Plato.

It was fairly widely believed in antiquity that Plato was not the first Platonist, as we might put it. Aristotle tells us that Plato "followed the Italians (i.e., the Pythagoreans) in most things." Plotinus tells us that Plato was not the first to say the things that in fact we today widely identify as elements of "Platonism," but he said them best. Since Plato was not the first and therefore not the only champion of Platonism, there was generally held to be nothing in principle untoward in arguing that Plato meant what he did not happen to say explicitly. To draw out the implications or the true meaning of what Plato said, in other words, was part of the project of articulating and defending Platonism.

The attempt to expose the inspired meaning of Plato's words was evidently consistent with a refusal to accept Plato's authority without question. For example, Olympiodorus (before 510—after 565 C.E.), in his Commentary on Plato's Gorgias relates the revealing story that his own teacher, Ammonius (before c. 440—after 517 C.E.), rebuked a student who gave as the reason for some doctrine or other that "Plato said it." Ammonius replied that, first of all, that was "not what Plato meant" and second, even if he did, it was not true because Plato said it. Ammonius's first point is as significant as his second: Plato's words cannot always be taken at face value. They must be interpreted. And in their interpretation, they must be defended by argument.

In trying to understand what Platonism is, we must, therefore, recognize that Platonism is, in a sense, bigger than Plato. But we must also recognize that the evidence for Plato's

expression of Platonism was, in several crucial respects, conceived of more broadly than is generally the case today.

The core evidence is, of course, the Platonic corpus. As Diogenes Laertius reports, Thrasyllus (d. 36 C.E.) divided the works of Plato into nine "tetralogies" or groups of four.15 To these he appended a number of works he judged to be spurious. There is considerable controversy today over the question of whether Thrasyllus originated the division into tetralogies.16 There is even greater dispute regarding Thrasyllus's division of authentic and spurious material. From our perspective, what is most important is that the Thrasyllan scheme established the authentic corpus of Platonic writings for Platonists ever after.

The 36 works of the nine tetralogies include 35 dialogues and 13 Epistles that are counted as one work. Not all of these are today universally recognized as genuine. Of the dialogues of doubted authenticity, Alcibiades I is the one that was most important for Platonists because that dialogue was apparently read first in their philosophical "curriculum." Among the Epistles of doubted authenticity, the 2nd and the philosophical portion of the 7th are unquestionably the most significant for Platonists. These were used by them regularly to bolster their interpretations of the dialogues.

In addition to the writings in the corpus, there were Aristotle's reports of Plato's "unwritten teachings." The view that Plato had unwritten teachings and that these differed in any way from what is said in the dialogues is a matter of intense and even bitter controversy. It is not controversial that all self-described Platonists of our period took these reports seriously if not always a face-value. Further, there were Aristotle's interpretations of the doctrines expressed in the dialogues. These were assumed by Platonists to be informed by Aristotle's knowledge of the "unwritten teachings" as well as his intimate contact with Plato over a period of many years. Since they were more concerned with Platonism than with the material contained in the published writings, it was, accordingly, entirely reasonable for them to rely on Aristotle here as it would perhaps not be if their interest were principally historical or scholarly.

The use by Platonists of the Aristotelian material is complicated by the fact that it was generally assumed by them that Aristotle was not an anti-Platonist. More precisely, it

was thought that the philosophy of Aristotle was in "harmony" with the philosophy of Plato. As Simplicius put it, Aristotle was authoritative for the sensible world and Plato for the intelligible world. The differences between them are only apparent and stem from the fact that Plato examines the sensible world on the basis of principles drawn from the intelligible world and Aristotle proceeds in the opposite manner. I shall say some more about the concept of the harmony of Plato and Aristotle in section four, including why it is perhaps not the "crazy" idea Richard Sorabji denounced it as being. For now, I simply note that Platonists saw no impediment to drinking from the font of Aristotelian wisdom in order to understand Platonism better.

The Fundamental Features of Platonism

In this section, I propose to sketch what I take to be the contours of the common ground shared both by all those who self-identified explicitly as Platonists and all those self-identified as proponents of the philosophical position of which Plato was held to be the greatest exponent. I am not exactly sure what it would mean to provide direct evidence for the accuracy of this sketch short of providing expositions of the basic philosophical positions of the above mentioned philosophers. Acccordingly, my sketch may be taken in the first instance as a sort of hypothesis about the essential nature of Platonism. It is thus subject to confirmation or disconfirmation on the basis of analysis of the relevant texts. In the fourth section below I shall how this sketch can actually be used to do some honest work in the history of philosophy.

The feature common to virtually all varieties of Platonism is a commitment to what I would characterize as a top-down metaphysical approach to the entire budget of philosophical problems extant in any particular period. What is most distinctive about Platonism is that it is resolutely and irreducibly top-down rather than bottom-up. A top-down approach to philosophical problems rejects and a bottom-up approach accepts the claim that the most important and puzzling phenomena we encounter in this world can be explained by seeking the simplest elements out of which these are composed.

The top-down approach appeals to irreducible, intelligible principles to account for these phenomena. Among these are human personhood, and the personal attribute of

freedom, cognition, the presence of evil, and the very existence of a universe. The top-down approach holds that answers to questions about these phenomena are never going to be satisfactorily given in terms of, say, elementary physical particles from which things "evolve" or upon which the phenomena "supervene." According to this position, "Platonism" is ur "top-downism" and its authentic opposite is ur "bottom-upism." Varieties of "bottom-upism" are practically coextensive with varieties of materialism. By materialism I mean, basically, the position that holds that the only things that exist in the world are bodies and their attributes, however the latter be construed. All materialists, that is, all anti-Platonists, share the view that, even if attributes are taken to be immaterial in the anodyne sense that they are real and that they are not themselves bodies, they are dependent upon bodies for their existence and explicable entirely in materialistic terms. Thus, for the materialist there are no immaterial or incorporeal entities. Hence, the explanation or account of problematic features of life are obviously not going to be top-down. The explanations must begin and end ultimately with bodies or their parts and the scientific laws governing these.

Here, then, is a brief and very schematic compendium of the features of the "top-downism" that is Platonism.

(1) The universe has a systematic unity. The practice of systematizing Platonism may be compared with the formulation of a theology based upon Scriptures as well as other canonical evidentiary sources. The hypothesis that a true systematic philosophy is possible at all rests upon an assumption of cosmic unity. This is Platonism's most profound legacy from the Pre-Socratics philosophers. These philosophers held that the world is a unity in the sense that its constituents and the laws according to which it operates are really and intelligibly interrelated. Because the world is a unity, a systematic understanding of it is possible. Thus, particular doctrines in metaphysics, epistemology, ethics, and so on are ultimately relatable within the system. More than this, they are inseparable because the principles that enable us to formulate doctrine in one area are identical with those that enable us to formulate doctrine in another. Many scholars have pointed out the unsystematic nature of Platonism understood as consisting of the raw data of the dialogues. This fact is not necessarily inconsistent with the amenability of claims made in the dialogues to systematization.

(2) The systematic unity is an explanatory hierarchy. The Platonic view of the world—the key to the system—is that the universe is to be seen in hierarchical manner. It is to be

understood uncompromisingly from the top-down. The hierarchy is ordered basically according to two criteria. First, the simple precedes the complex and second, the intelligible precedes the sensible. The precedence in both cases is not temporal, but ontological and conceptual. That is, understanding the complex and the sensible depends on understanding the simple and the intelligible because the latter are explanatory of the former. The ultimate explanatory principle in the universe, therefore, must be unqualifiedly simple. For this reason, Platonism is in a sense reductivist, though not in the way that a bottom-up philosophy is. It is conceptually reductivist, not materially reductivist. The simplicity of the first principle is contrasted with the simplicity of elements out of which things are composed according to a bottom-up approach. Whether or to what extent the unqualifiedly simple can also be intelligible or in some sense transcends intelligibility is a deep question within Platonism.

(3) The divine constitutes an irreducible explanatory category. An essential part of the systematic hierarchy is a god adduced first and foremost to explain the order of the sensible world or the world of becoming. Platonism converges on the notion that the divine has complete explanatory "reach." That is, there is nothing that it cannot explain. Thus, ontology and theology are inseparable. The Platonic notion of divinity includes an irremovable personal element, though this is frequently highly attenuated. This attenuation in part follows along the diverse efforts to employ both the intelligible and the simple, as well as the divine, to explain everything else. The residual personhood of the divine agent of transient order is retained in part owing to the fundamental Platonic exhortation to person to "become like god" (see (5) below). Additionally, benevolence and providence are viewed as essential features of the divine, equally in an attenuated sense corresponding to the "depersonalization" of the divine.

(4) The psychological constitutes an irreducible explanatory category. For Platonism, the universe is itself alive and filled with living things. Soul is the principle of life. Life is not viewed as epiphenomenal or supervenient on what is non-living. On the contrary, soul has a unique explanatory role in the systematic hierarchy. Though soul is fundamentally an explanatory principle, individual souls are fitted into the overall hierarchy in a subordinate manner. One of the central issues facing the Platonists was the relation between intellect, intellection, and the intelligibles, on the one hand, and soul on the other. Just as the psychical was thought to be irreducible to the material, so the intelligible was thought to be irreducible to the psychical. All striving by anything capable of striving is to be understood as in a way the reverse of the derivation of the complex from the simple, the sensible from the intelligible. Thus, the intellectual was not an aspect of or derived from the psychic, but prior to that.

(5) Persons belong to the systematic hierarchy and personal happiness consists in achieving a lost position within the hierarchy. All Platonists accepted the view that in some sense the person was the soul and the soul was immortal. Since perhaps the most important feature of the divine was immortality, the goal or TevΛoς of embodied personal existence was viewed as "becoming like god." But obviously one does not have to strive to become what one already is. The task of "becoming like god" is typically situated within the fundamental polarity in the general Greek concept of nature or physis between "what is" and "what ought to be." Thus, normativity is woven into the account of what is objectively real. We are exhorted to become what we really or truly or ideally are. One might say that the first principle of Platonic ethics is that one must "become like god."

(6) The epistemological order is included within the metaphysical order. Modes of cognition are hierarchically gradable according to the hierarchical levels of objective reality. The highest mode of cognition corresponds to the first explanatory principles. All modes of cognition including sense-perception and requiring sense-perception as a condition for their operation are inferior to the highest mode. That persons can be the subject both of the highest mode of cognition and of the lower modes indicates an ambiguity or conflict in personhood between the desires of the embodied human being and those of the ideal disembodied cognitive agent. The conflict is reflected, for example in the differing attractions of the contemplative and the practical.

This rather austere description is primarily intended to accommodate the possibility of the existence of varieties of Platonism. Varieties of Platonism can actually contain contradictory positions on particular issues. For example, Platonists who agree on the priority of the intelligible to the sensible or, more accurately, imperfectly intelligible, can disagree on what the parts of the intelligible universe are and whether or not some of these are reducible to others. To take another example, Platonists who agree that there is a first principle of all can hold contradictory views on its activity, its knowability, its explanatory "reach" etc. One last relatively minor example is that it is not part of the essence of Platonism to be for or against theurgical practices. But it does belong to the essence of Platonism to hold that the goal of human existence is to be somehow reunited with that from which humans are or have been separated. It is for this reason somewhat misleading to characterize Platonism in terms of dualism(s) like mind (soul)/body or even intelligible/sensible. The hierarchical explanatory framework of top-downism is conceptually prior to these dualisms. A type of Platonism might

indeed posit such a dualism. However, more basic is the essential explanatory realism within the hierarchical metaphysical framework.

Here is why the dualistic characterizations of Platonism are derivative. Platonism holds that phenomena in the sensible world can only be explained ultimately by intelligible principles. But these phenomena are themselves not coherently characterizable as non-intelligible; otherwise, there would be nothing to explain. So, the putative dualism of sensible/intelligible disguises rather than reveals the fundamental assumption. Again, the dualism mind (soul)/body is secondary to the Platonic position that embodied human existence has to be understood or explained in terms of intelligible ideals. Thus, embodied persons are images of disembodied ideals. If anything, one insisting on dualism as a property of Platonism would be more accurate to describe this as a dualism of embodied person/disembodied person rather than a dualism of mind (soul)/body. Understanding Platonism as what underlies the varieties of Platonism explains why some things are missing from the above list. First, anything that might be termed "uniquely Socratic" is missing. The ethics of Platonism as Platonists understood it flowed from the combination of the ontology, theology, and psychology as represented largely in what, for better or worse, have come to be known as the middle and late dialogues. The exhortation to "become like god" is embedded in the technical metaphysical and cosmological views of Theaetetus and Timaeus. Accordingly, there was for them nothing uniquely edifying in the so-called Socratic paradoxes, found principally though certainly not exclusively in the so-called early dialogues.

Second, the theory of Forms is not here explicitly mentioned. Partly, this is owing to the assumption that Forms are not ultimate principles in Platonism. In this regard, Platonists took guidance both from a straightforward interpretation of the Form of the Good in Republic and from Aristotle's account of various theories of reduction to first principles within the Academy. What was beyond dispute, however, is that Platonism is firmly committed to the existence of an intelligible, that is, immaterial or incorporeal realm, that is ontologically prior to the sensible realm. Thus, Platonism is a form of explanatory realism, in principle similar to theories that posit neutrinos or the unconscious to explain certain phenomena. The precise status of the contours of the intelligible realm—was a legitimate topic of dispute within the Platonic "community."

Thus, for example, a question such as "what is the range of Forms?" was widely debated. What is most crucial to appreciate in this regard is that all discussion about Forms was carried out on the assumption that Forms are not themselves ultimate ontological principles, both owing to their plurality and internal complexity.

Third, there is no mention of politics, whether this be the ideal state of Republic or the somewhat different views of Statesman and Laws. No doubt, all sorts of extra-philosophical explanations can be adduced to explain the indifference of Platonists between the 3rd and 6th centuries C.E. to political philosophy, including the increasing danger to pagans who engaged in politics. More to the point, however, is that for Platonists, political philosophy was understood to belong to the discussion of 'popular and political virtue' as described by Plato. This was inferior, albeit instrumental, to the virtue that constituted assimilation to the divine. Consequently, the teaching of political philosophy was basically ignored. One might perhaps compare in this regard Martin Luther's pointed assertion that "Christianity has nothing to do with virtue." This typically provocative remark of Luther's expresses the principle that in trying to determine what Platonism (or Christianity) is, we should aim to discover what "all and only" Platonists (or Christians) believe.

One can I think appreciate more fully what is included and what is excluded from the above account of Platonism if one reflects on the systematic unity of its various features. As in Stoicism, in the Platonism of our period everything is connected with everything else. The difference, of course, is that while Stoicism is more or less consistently materialistic, Platonism maintains a non-materialistic and hierarchical explanatory framework. Specific problems relating to the natural world in general, that is, problems about living and non-living physical entities, cognition, language, and morality, are all addressed within this framework. For Platonism, the sensible properties of things or sensibles themselves are never the starting-points for explanations. The sensible world is always understood as explicable by the intelligible world, that is, by that which is ultimately transparent to an intellect. Specifically, it is an image produced by the intelligible world, though versions of Platonism differ on how to characterize these images. There is nothing self-explanatory about an image. Its "real" inner workings are to be sought in that of which it is an image. Because there is an all-

encompassing hierarchy ordered in terms of complexity and intelligibility, the orientation of investigation is thoroughly "vertical" and almost never "horizontal." Thus, there is little room for political philosophy. For political philosophy must start with irreducible political, that is, practical principles. But there cannot be such in Platonism. All principles for Platonism are to be located among that which is relatively simple and intelligible. The concrete and contingent nature of the political militates against the top-down approach.

The systematic unity of Platonism can be seen most clearly in its treatment of all matters of cognition. For Platonism, cognition is to be understood, again, hierarchically, with the highest form of cognition, nous or "intellection" as the paradigm for all inferior forms, including those which involve the sensible world. The representationalist aspect of all the images of this paradigm is a central focus of Platonic interest. In addition, cognition is what most closely identifies souls or persons, with possession of the highest form of cognition constituting the ideal state. Since the highest form of cognition is a non-representational state, one in which the immaterial cognizer is in a sense identified with the objects of cognition, psychology and epistemology are inseparable from the ontological and theological principles. In short, to understand fully a matter relating to language or belief or rational desire is ultimately to relate those embodied phenomena to the simple and intelligible first principles.

Platonism by Negation

I would like now to enrich my sketch of Platonism by suggesting another approach. One might suspect a distorting effect of the anachronistic Neoplatonic "systematization" of Platonism. It must certainly be granted that a "system" is not so much what we find in the dialogues of Plato, at any rate, as what we make of what we find. I have already suggested that Platonism is inevitably and rightly taken to be something more than the sum of the conclusions of arguments in the dialogues. Nevertheless, to narrow the gap between what Plato says and claims about what Plato means, I suggest we consider for a bit the consequences for a philosopher who rejects the positions that are decisively rejected in the dialogues.

Plato has quite a lot to say about his historical predecessors and contemporaries and he is also often quite specific about what in their views he finds unacceptable. I shall try to show that if we look at Platonism as the philosophical position that results from the rejection or negation of these views, we shall be in a better position to see the basis for the Platonic system. Although the construction of a philosophical position by negation may appear obscurantist, it is not entirely out of keeping with the approach endemic to the competing philosophical schools beginning in the Middle Platonic period.

It will be convenient to begin with the argument in Plato's Parmenides whereby Socrates aims to refute Zeno's defense of Parmenidean monism. According to Plato, Zeno argued that

> If things are many, then the same things must be both like and unlike. But this is impossible: for it is not possible for unlike things to be like, nor like things unlike. So, if it is impossible for unlike things to be like or like things unlike, it is also impossible that things should be a plurality. For if there were a plurality, they would have impossible attributes.

Socrates's solution to this problem is basically a theory of Forms. Things can be both like and unlike so long as we recognize the "self-identical." Forms of Likeness and Unlikeness from the attributes of likeness and unlikeness that like and unlike things possess. In other words, a plurality is possible because any two things can be like insofar as they are each one and unlike insofar as each is different from the other. The qualification 'insofar as' indicates that being either like or unlike does not exclusively identify the thing thereby producing a contradiction. The qualification is justified only because there exists in itself a Form of Likeness and Unlikeness and these are non-identical.

The claim made by Socrates is perfectly generalizable and applicable to the explanation of any case of predication whether of contraries such as likeness and unlikeness or not. Plato in effect interprets the Eleatic argument against plurality as extreme nominalism, avoidable only by a theory of Forms. Part of what Platonism is, then, is the rejection of the extreme nominalism that Eleatic monism is. But this still leaves much scope for disagreement about the precise nature of the explanation for the possibility of predication among all those who believe that an explanation is necessary.

In Sophist, Plato confronts Parmenides again, this time within the context of his rejection of four views of "what is real". The first two, pluralists of various sorts tell us what is real, like the hot and cold or wet and dry whereas monists claim that reality is one. The latter two, the so-called giants and gods, actually seek to identify reality in some way. The former claim that "reality"is identical with "body". The latter, whom Plato calls "friends of the Forms," claim that "real reality" belongs only to that which is "always in the same state." Pluralists are dismissed because though they tell us what things are real, they do not define reality. Monists fail to distinguish reality from the one thing they claim to be real.

The response to the giants or materialists is different. It is accepted by the interlocutors that they will admit that the virtues like wisdom or justice that can come to be present in a soul are not themselves bodies. Therefore, they cannot identify reality with being a body. It may be supposed that Plato is here presenting a false dichotomy: if something is not a body it is bodiless. But this ignores the fact that the attributes of bodies, for example, their surfaces, are not bodies, though this does not entail that they are bodiless, in the sense that they are entities that exist separate from bodies. The materialist can benignly insist that to be real is either to be a body or an attribute of a body, where all attributes are dependent on bodies for their existence.

Apart from the obvious but perhaps not fatal point that this position, like that of the pluralists, tells us what is real without telling us what 'real' means, Platonism will want to insist that if 'wise' or 'just' or, indeed, any predicate, is "something" (ti) real, then there must be a separate entity whose name this predicate bears, even if the presence of an instance of that entity's nature is not separate from the subject. Materialism, unlike monism, does not purport to show the impossibility of its contradictory. But if the materialist will concede that it is not possible that only bodies, that is, three-dimensional solids, exist, then they will eventually be forced to agree not only that non-bodily entities exist, but that these are prior in existence.

The refutation of materialism in this passage is like the refutation of monism in Parmenides in insisting on the reality of the complex objects of predicational judgments. And it is reasonable that if Plato held that a rejection of nominalism leads

to a postulation of intelligible principles called Forms, then he also held that the explanation of how predication is possible also entails the rejection of materialism.

The famous definition of reality that the Eleatic Stranger offers the materialists at 247E1-4, namely, that the things that are real are nothing else but the power [duvnami] of acting or being affected," is clearly provisional as the immediate following lines show. That it is also dialectical follows from the fact that its refutation would proceed exactly as does the refutation of the pluralists account of reality. That is, reality is clearly something other than either acting or being affected, though everything that does either is real.

The same definition is also used to defeat the friends of the Forms. For they hold that only Forms are real. But if this is so, then the activity that consists in knowing Forms has no part in the real. Indeed, asks the Stranger, are we to be persuaded that it is true that

> motion, life, soul, and thought are not present in the perfectly real, that it neither lives nor thinks, but stands alone solemn and holy, having no intellect [nous], being immovable?

This rhetorical question is answered in the negative. Motion, life, soul, and thought belong in the perfectly real. Therefore, the perfectly real is not motionless. Hence, we cannot admit that the real is only changeless nor can we, if we wish to include intellect in what is real, admit that the real is only what is changing. For without things that are at rest, there can be no objects for intellect to attain. Therefore, that which is real or the sum of all that is real must include both what is changeless and what is changing.

I wish to make several basic points about this famous and puzzling passage. First, this argument does not claim that Forms change. On the contrary, it insists that there must be unchanging objects if intellect exists. But the argument does not say that these must be Forms, or that they must be Forms as conceived of by their "friends." What Plato is rejecting is the exclusion of the activity of knowing from the realm of the really real. That is, he is rejecting the view that the only things that are real are Forms and therefore, if Forms are known, they are known by something that is not real or less than real.

The problem then becomes discerning what the inclusion of intellect, etc., in the really real amounts to. Why does intellect have to be so included in order for there to be knowledge of Forms? The friends of the Forms object to the claim that knowledge is an activity because this seems to entail that the Forms, by being known, are being affected. But why should this lead the Eleatic Stranger to insist that if knowledge, etc. exists, then it belongs to the really real? Logically, he should only be claiming that if knowledge exists, and if knowledge is an activity, and if the objects of knowledge are thereby acted upon, then change (i.e., being acted upon) belongs to what is really real because it must belong to Forms. But in fact, as we have just seen, he goes on to insist that the objects of knowledge must be changeless.

Why does that which knows Forms have to be as real as they? At least one part of the answer to this question is that intellect must be the same kind of thing as what it knows. This is, in fact, not a new idea. It is exactly what Plato argued in his Phaedo in the so-called Affinity Argument. The soul, or a part of it, must be like the Forms in order for knowledge to occur. But we do in fact have knowledge, as was shown in the Recollection Argument. Therefore, our soul, or a part of it, is, like Forms, an immaterial entity, separate from the sensible world. Thus, the argument that knowledge exists is connected with the rejection of at least one version of the theory of Forms and, indirectly, of materialism. For Plato, the falsity of materialism establishes the identity of the knowable as immaterial. Then, assuming that knowledge is at least possible, the way is open for an argument that it is only possible for a knower who is also immaterial.

There is, perhaps more to it than this. For one might suggest that the immaterial soul and its cognitive life is like changeless Forms insofar as it is immaterial, but unlike then insofar as it is changing or in motion. And it is the latter property that should exclude it from the realm of the really real. But this would, counter to the text, amount to the exclusion of intellect from the really real. It is for this reason that Neoplatonists generally supposed that the necessary inclusion of intellect within the realm of the really real implied the permanent connection of some intellect with Forms and the concomitant characterization of the really real as being other than unqualifiedly changeless.

In addition to Plato's rejection of Eleatic monism, materialism, and at least one version of a theory of Forms, there are many places in the dialogues where he confronts his predecessors, including Anaxagoras in Phaedo, Protagoras in the dialogue that bears his name as well as in Theaetetus along with Heraclitus, and Cratylus in his eponymous dialogue. It seems to me, however, that the core of Platonism negatively defined is the enterprise of drawing out the conclusions of the rejection of nominalism and materialism which are in fact two faces of the same doctrine. By contrast, the rejection of Protagorean relativism or Heraclitean flux theory do not, in themselves, make one a Platonist. Limiting Platonism on the negative side to the rejection of nominalism and materialism admittedly makes Platonism a large tent. But it is not an infinitely large one. Indeed, viewed from a modern perspective, one might suppose that it is a tent too impossibly small to inhabit.

Was Aristotle a Platonist?

Though it may at first seem odd, yet another way of understanding what Platonism is involves our asking the question of whether Aristotle was a Platonist. For a long time, the canonical answer to this question has been: he was at one time and then he was not. That is, Aristotle started out as a Platonist, and then, turning his back on his "roots," became in his maturity resolutely anti-Platonist. This hypothetical trajectory for Aristotle is the sole axis for further hypotheses about Aristotle's development. Developmentalism according to the axis Platonist—anti-Platonist has its modern origin in the writings of the great German scholar Werner Jaeger. This general developmentalist hypothesis has been widely embraced and applied in the major areas of Aristotle's thought—logic, psychology, ethics, and metaphysics. The basic hypothesis is seldom questioned, even when the details are rejected.

It is I think salutary to note that Platonists, for the most part, did not regard Aristotle as an anti-Platonist. Hence, they had no inkling of development away from Platonism. Rather, they held that Aristotle's philosophy was in harmony with Platonism. For example, the indispensable Diogenes Laertius (c. 200 C.E.), tells us that Aristotle was Plato's "most genuine disciple." Beginning perhaps in the 1st century B.C.E., we can already see philosophers claiming the ultimate harmony of Academic and Peripatetic thought. Antiochus of Ascalon is frequently identified as a principal figure in this

regard. A similar view is clearly expressed by Cicero. Later in the 2nd century C.E., we observe the Platonist Alcinous in his influential Handbook of Platonism simply incorporating what we might call Aristotelian elements into his account of authentic Platonism.59 Finally, and most importantly, for a period of about three hundred years, from the middle of the 3rd century C.E. to the middle of the 6th, Aristotelianism and Platonism were widely viewed and written about as being harmonious philosophical systems.

The first concrete indication we possess that Platonists of this period were prepared to argue for the harmony of Aristotle and Plato is contained in a reference in Photius's Bibliography to the Neoplatonist Hierocles' statement that Ammonius of Alexandria, the teacher of Plotinus, attempted to resolve the conflict between the disciples of Plato and Aristotle, showing that they were in fact "of one and the same mind". The second indication of an effort to display harmony is found in the Suda where it is stated that Porphyry, Plotinus's disciple, produced a work in six books titled On Plato and Aristotle Being Adherents of the Same School (mia; th;v ai{rersiv). We know nothing of this work apart from the title and what we can infer from what Porphyry actually says in the extant works. It seems reasonably clear, however, that a work of such length was attempting to provide a substantial argument, one which was evidently in opposition to at least some prevailing views. It is also perhaps the case that Porphyry is questioning the basis for the traditional division of the "schools" of ancient philosophy, as found, for example, in Diogenes Laertius.

The view that the philosophy of Aristotle was in harmony with the philosophy of Plato must be sharply distinguished from the view, held by no one in antiquity, that the philosophy of Aristotle was identical with the philosophy of Plato. For example, in Plato's dialogue Parmenides, Socrates suggests that Zeno's book states the "same position" as Parmenides' differing only in that it focuses on an attack on Parmenides' opponents. Zeno acknowledges this identity. The harmony of Aristotle and Plato was not supposed to be like the identity of the philosophy of Zeno and Parmenides. Again, Eusebius famously tells us that Numenius asked rhetorically, "what is Plato but Moses speaking Attic Greek." No Neoplatonist supposed that Aristotle was just Plato speaking a Peripatetic "dialect."

Aristotle was supposed to be a Platonist because he adhered to the principles contained in the sketch of Platonism in section two above. This, however, did not mean that he agreed with all other Platonists, including Plato himself, about all the doctrines flowing from these principles. In particular, his attitude to what F.M. Cornford once felicitously called "the twin pillars of Platonism" namely, the theory of separate Forms and the immortality of the soul, is highly complex.

Aristotle is obviously a relentless critic of some theories of Forms. So, evidently was Plato, as we saw above. But Aristotle does not, it seems, deny the ontological priority of the intelligible world to the sensible world. Exactly what sort of priority is this? In many passages in Metaphysics, Aristotle argued both for the priority in substance of actuality to potency and even for the priority in substance of the eternal to the transitory. The priority in substance of the eternal to the transitory looks very much like the sort of priority that Aristotle says Plato was interested in. Plato held that if X can exist without Y, but Y cannot exist without X, then X is prior to Y in nature and in substance. This is a perfectly reasonable way to understand the Platonic notion of the priority of the intelligible world in relation to the sensible world.

Granted such priority, it will be objected that for Aristotle this intelligible world is a barren terrain, consisting of nothing but the self-absorbed thinking of the prime unmoved mover. An enormous scholarly literature exists on the question of what the this mover is actually thinking of, with the opinion fairly divided. Charles Kahn provides a concise summary of the basis for the interpretation that the prime unmoved mover is thinking of all that is intelligible. He lists four points against what he terms "the prevailing view," namely, that when God knows himself he knows nothing else: (1) At L7, 1072b25 Aristotle says that "God has always what we have sometimes" which picks up b14–15, "[God's] way of life is the best, a way of life that we enjoy for a little time." If what we sometimes enjoy is contemplation of intelligibles, then God's superior life can hardly be less than cognition of these intelligibles; it must be cognition of all that is intelligible; (2) At L7, 1072b19–21, it is said that "intellect thinks itself according to participation in the intelligible." This is a strong indication of the meaning of the famous phrase in L9, 1074b33–5 that God is "thinking thinking of thinking." It is by thinking of all that is intelligible that God thinks himself, just as we think ourselves

when we think what is intelligible. The difference between God and us is that (a) we are more than the activity of thinking because we are not pure actualities; (b) our thinking is intermittent; and (c) we do not think all that is intelligible at once. But none of these differences contradict the point that God's perfect self-reflexive cognition includes content; (3) Hence, as suggested by A7, 1072b22, intellect is determined by the essences which are its objects; (4) The claim that if God knew anything other than himself he would be less perfect is spurious, because thinking is identical with its object. As Kahn puts it, "the Prime Mover is simply the formal-noetic structure of the cosmos as conscious of itself" (Kahn's emphasis). One could dispute all of these points. I only wish to stress that insofar as Aristotle is interpreted as holding that divine thinking has content, he must be seen to be relying on the Platonic principle of hierarchy and of the ontological priority of the intelligible to the sensible.

The aversion to understanding Aristotle's God as thinking about all intelligibles is based largely on A9, not on A7. For it is in A9, and only there, that Aristotle famously claims that God is "thinking thinking about thinking." Many scholars infer from this phrase alone that if God is thinking about "thinking" (vovqs is), that is, thinking about himself, then God cannot be thinking about anything else. Such an inference, of course, is invalid, unless we suppose that that something else could not also be identical with thinking, the explicit object of thinking in Aristotle's conclusion. The justification for holding that this is so, is supposedly found in the argument for the conclusion of which the claim that God is thinking thinking about thinking is a part. The central argument is:

1)   God is thinking of what is best.

2)   God is best.

3)   Therefore, God is thinking of God's self.

The first premise is directly inferable from the claim in L7 that "thinking is in itself concerned with what is in itself best." The problem addressed in L9 is really with the second premise. This premise was also a claim or, perhaps better, an hypothesis, boldly made in L7. The problem with it is that if God is in essence an intellect that thinks, and not the activity of thinking itself, then God's essence would be a potency in relation to

the activity of thinking. In that case, God would not be the best; he would be a potency in relation to the best, that is, to thinking. So, if God is best and thinking of what is best, God must be thinking, not an intellect that thinks.

The words that follow the conclusion "therefore, God is thinking of himself," namely, "[God is] thinking thinking about thinking" are an explication of the words "therefore he is thinking himself." They do not add a further conclusion. That is, because God's essence is identical with his thinking and not in potency to it, when he thinks he thinks himself. By contrast, another thinker, such as a human being, has an essence that is not identical with thinking. So, when human beings think, they are in essence not identical with what they think. Although they are not in essence identical with what they think, their thinking is in a way identical with what they think, as Aristotle will carefully add at the end of the chapter. So, the crucial difference between God and human beings is not that God thinks of nothing whereas we think of something; rather, it is that God is not in potency to his thinking, while we are. Therefore, God (who is just thinking) is thinking about himself, i.e., thinking. The point of saying that God is "thinking thinking about thinking" is not to drain all content out of God's thinking, but to contrast that thinking with the thinking of things that are not essentially identical with the essence of thinking. The exalted position of the prime unmoved mover is owing to the fact that he is nothing but thinking, not to the alleged fact that there is no content to his thinking.

Of course, it is possible that independently of the point Aristotle is apparently making here, he might also believe that the identity of the activity of thinking with the object of thinking eliminates content from that thinking. But there is no reason to believe that this is so on the grounds that God is thinking thinking about thinking. And in fact there are no other grounds in L9 for believing this.

Platonists more or less assumed that the prime unmoved mover's thinking of all intelligibles is parallel to Plato's Demiurge or eternal Intellect thinking all the Forms.83 There is no space here to make the case for this interpretation. The principal point I wish to emphasize is that this is an interpretation which would be taken much more seriously if scholars recognized Platonism as the set of principles outlined above and if,

on this basis, they were to reconsider the claim that Aristotle either was always or must have become an anti-Platonist.

In regard to the immortality of the soul, what Platonism holds essentially is that personal immortality must be understood in an attenuated sense that excludes the idiosyncratic and focuses on the intellect. This is owing to the fact that the contents of intellection are entirely universal. But intellect, when embodied, is evidently a part of the soul and cannot arise apart from soul. These two points are exactly what Aristotle maintains in De Anima: (1) the intellect alone is immortal and (2) embodied intellection in inseparable from specifically psychical activity, that is, activities of the actual composite substance, such as imagination. Again, my point here is simply that with a clear grasp of what Platonism is we should be less willing to suppose that Aristotle is to be interpreted as an anti-Platonist. Accordingly, notoriously difficult passages such as De Anima book three, chapter five may turn out to be somewhat more yielding to our understanding.

Is Aristotle just a Platonist? Certainly not. But within the above framework, I think we have reason to see, as Neoplatonists did, that Aristotelianism is a variety of Platonism. The crucial mistake is to conclude from Aristotle's unrelenting criticisms of Plato and other Academics and from the orientation of most of the corpus to categorizing and explaining sensible reality that Aristotle is not au fond a Platonist. Even when Aristotle is criticizing Plato, as in, for example, De Anima, he is led, perhaps malgré lui, to draw conclusions based on Platonic assumptions. These assumptions are not so general and benign that anyone can accept them.

CONCLUSION

My main conclusion is that we should understand Platonism historically as consisting in fidelity to the principles of "top-downism." So understanding it, we have a relatively sharp critical tool for deciding who was and who was not a Platonist despite their silence or protestations to the contrary. Unquestionably, the most important figure in this regard is Aristotle. I would not like to end this historical inquiry, however, without suggesting a philosophical moral. The moral is that there are at least some reasons for claiming that a truly anti-Platonic Aristotelianism is not philosophically in the cards, so

to speak. Thus, if one rigorously and honestly seeks to remove the principles of Platonism from a putatively Aristotelian position, what would remain would be incoherent and probably indefensible. Thus, an Aristotelian ontology of the sensible world that excluded the ontological priority of the supersensible is probably unsustainable. And an Aristotelian psychology that did not recognize the priority and irreducibility of intellect to soul would be similarly beyond repair.89 What contemporary exponents of versions of Platonism or Aristotelianism should perhaps conclude from a study of the history is that, rather than standing in opposition to each other, merger, or at least synergy, ought to be the order of the day.

The complete essay with notes may be found at

July 2005, 43:3 pp 253-276

THE PARMENIDEAN ASCENT by Michael Della Rocca [Oxford University Press, ISBN 9780197510940]

For the Parmenidean monist, there are no distinctions whatsoever-indeed, distinctions are unintelligible. In The *Parmenidean Ascent*, Michael Della Rocca aims to revive this controversial approach on rationalist grounds. He not only defends the attribution of such an extreme monism to the pre-Socratic philosopher Parmenides, but also embraces this extreme monism in its own right and expands these monistic results to many of the most crucial areas of philosophy, including being, action, knowledge, meaning, truth, and metaphysical explanation. On Della Rocca's account, there is no differentiated being, no differentiated action, knowledge, or meaning; rather all is being, just as all is action, all is knowledge, all is meaning.

Motivating this argument is a detailed survey of the failure of leading positions (both historical and contemporary) to meet a demand for the explanation of a given phenomenon, together with a powerful, original version of a Bradleyan argument against the reality of relations. The result is a rationalist rejection of all distinctions and a skeptical denial of the intelligibility of ordinary, relational notions of being, action, knowledge, and meaning.

Della Rocca then turns this analysis on the practice of philosophy itself. Followed to its conclusion, Parmenidean monism rejects any distinction between philosophy and the study

of its history. Such a conclusion challenges methods popular in the practice of philosophy today, including especially the method of relying on intuitions and common sense as the basis of philosophical inquiry. The historically-minded and rationalist approach used throughout the book aims to demonstrate the ultimate bankruptcy of the prevailing methodology. It promises-on rationalist grounds-to inspire much soul-searching on the part of philosophers and to challenge the content and the methods of so much philosophy both now and in the past.

- ❖ Defends a form of monism that is much more extreme than versions of monism in current debates
- ❖ Engages with and challenges prominent contemporary and historical theories in a wide range of areas of philosophy
- ❖ Demonstrates the power of a sustained and relentless application of the Principle of Sufficient Reason according to which each thing has an explanation

Reviews

"... literally unbelievable ..." -- Alexander Douglas, *The Philosopher*

"*The Parmenidean Ascent* is an ode to the joy of philosophizing with the Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR). It is a major contribution to rationalist metaphysics and its history. But it also undermines the intellectual complacency that has seeped into analytic philosophy by using the tools familiar to analytic philosophy. It does so by revealing a feature hidden in plain sight: that much of 'core' analytic philosophy today understands itself as in the business of meeting explanatory demands. So it is already in the ambit of the PSR, and there is no place to run." -- Eric Schliesser, University of Amsterdam

"The 'Parmenidean ascent' that Della Rocca spells out is radical and unorthodox. It might even come as a shock to many philosophers who consider Parmenides' extreme monism to be a position that is only of historical interest. Della Rocca defends it from a contemporary point of view, claiming that it is the position we have to embrace if we really subscribe to rationalism. But he is fully aware that most philosophers, especially those working in the analytical tradition, will reject it. But this is exactly what makes this book so fascinating. It does not simply add some details to an ongoing debate, nor does it criticize or amend some parts of a given theory, but radically challenges the foundation of most debates in contemporary philosophy." -- Dominik Perler, Humboldt University

"Michael Della Rocca's work is consistently exciting, engaging, and bold. It is more than that, in fact: it is courageous...I like that even as he is offending me, he is on a genuine mission to shake things up in contemporary philosophy, to unsettle established orthodoxies and to disallow the perpetuation of "normal science," and to do all this, moreover, by bringing the history of philosophy to bear on philosophy in original ways. This is the kind of material that it is fun to disagree with: serious, passionate, and always interesting." -- Justin E.H. Smith, Université Paris Diderot - Paris 7

CONTENTS

I have often thought it ironic that the writings of Parmenides— one of the most famous monists in the history of philosophy— are available to us only in the form of fragments. Would that Parmenidean monism had come down to us in the integral form it presumably originally had, a form that would come closer than fragments do to reflecting the monistic world of which he seems to speak!

Perhaps it is because we have only these fragments that most philosophers do not feel the need to address Parmenides' arguments or his insights explicitly. Some do or did feel this demand— most notably, perhaps, Plato and Aristotle both of whom would have had access to more of Parmenides' written words than we do. Indeed, I would say that Plato and Aristotle were, in different ways, practically haunted by Parmenides'

arguments and vision. Yet these arguments and this vision are now— if they are discussed at all— more or less relegated to the study of the history of philosophy, a pursuit often seen as, effectively, separate from the pursuit of philosophy itself.

However, whether or not philosophers nowadays actively engage with Parmenides, his thought still hovers like a specter rising above and challenging all subsequent philosophy down to the present day, and it calls for a response. This call of Parmenides arises because his monism embodies a powerful and penetrating philosophical insight which is very difficult to resist legitimately, no matter how much we might try to wish it away or to ignore it. My aim is to counteract such unfortunate evasion of Parmenides by revealing the subversive force of an extreme monism of the Parmenidean variety and by doing so in a clearer, more uncompromising way than has, I believe, been attempted for many a year.

Throughout this book, you will see me engage with Parmenides and other historical figures in significant detail. You will also see me engage in deep explorations of contemporary and recent philosophy. This combination of pursuits may lead you to ask whether this is a book on the history of philosophy or in contemporary philosophy. And my playful but serious answer is: "Yes." In other words, I reject the question, and this is precisely because I see the book as supporting a Parmenidean denial of the distinction between philosophy and the study of its history. In chapter 7, I will argue for this denial explicitly, but the book as a whole is meant to exhibit its truth.

I begin my Parmenidean journey in chapter 1 with what I take to be a strong case for a reading of Parmenides as what I (following others) will call a strict monism. Parmenides is, I contend, a strict monist in the sense that he rejects any kind of distinction or multiplicity whatsoever. On my reading, Parmenides affirms simply the reality of being; he does not affirm the reality of any individual being or beings and does not affirm any distinctions within being. Of course, I freely acknowledge that, as Alexander Mourelatos rightly says in his wonderful book on Parmenides, "Given the paucity of text and the bewildering ambiguities in Parmenides' syntax and vocabulary, it would be interpreter's hubris to claim that any single reading of Parmenides' poem forecloses the possibility of others" (The Route of Parmenides, p. xxvi). And, because I

am not a specialist in ancient philosophy, I am all the more willing— and indeed happy— to emphasize that my interpretation is neither definitive nor obligatory. However, I am encouraged by the fact that, although this kind of interpretation has recently come under sustained and powerful attack by Mourelatos and many others, it nonetheless enjoys an illustrious pedigree, including interpretations by G. E. L. Owen, Montgomery Furth, Bertrand Russell, and others, and has recently witnessed a kind of renaissance in the interpretive work of Barbara Sattler, Timothy Clarke, and Michael Wedin.1 It is one of my hopes and aims that my first chapter will contribute to this renaissance, in particular by portraying, with solid textual support, Parmenides' monistic argument as a more thoroughgoing application of a famous rationalist principle than has previously been recognized. The principle I have in mind is the Principle of Sufficient Reason (the PSR), the principle according to which each fact or each thing has an explanation. Others also, as we will see, attribute the PSR to Parmenides, and I am indebted to their work. Where I go beyond them is, perhaps, in seeing the role that the PSR plays in Parmenides' thought as more pervasive and more fundamental.

In advancing this kind of rationalism- infused monism, Parmenides makes what I call the Parmenidean Ascent. Guided by his demand for explanation, he rejects distinctions in general and, in so doing, seeks to capture the reality that we were— by appealing to distinctions— illegitimately trying to capture. In transcending— in making the ascent beyond— distinctions, Parmenides aims to finally see the world aright, as Wittgenstein says in a different but, as I will eventually argue, not entirely dissimilar context. And just as Wittgenstein invokes certain propositions concerning, e.g., logical form, but also transcends them and rejects them as nonsense, so too Parmenides invokes certain distinctions, e.g., between what is and what is not, but also transcends them and rejects them as unthinkable.

My choice of the metaphor of ascent may be seen as alluding to the journey of the youth who narrates Parmenides' poem and who— as recounted in Parmenides' own proem— can be seen as traveling with the daughters of the sun upward to somewhere ethereal (B1.13) and toward the light (B1.10). The trajectory of the youth's journey— up or down or both— is a matter of great dispute in the literature on Parmenides, and I

take no stand on this interpretive issue. I merely want to point out that my metaphor of ascent fits in with a natural reading of Parmenides as well as, of course, a natural reading of Wittgenstein, two of the philosophical inspirations for the journey I will take with you in this book.

This journey— my Parmenidean Ascent— is, like the journey of Parmenides' youth, designed to shed light on, and to wreak havoc throughout, philosophy. In the five chapters immediately following the first, I will undertake to argue for Parmenidean Ascents in a number of central philosophical domains. In many ways, these five chapters are the heart of this book. I begin in chapters 2 and 3 with a Parmenidean Ascent with regard to substance or being itself. All or most philosophers should feel— I will argue— considerable pressure to reject as unintelligible distinctions among or within substances or beings. This rejection can be motivated, as is Parmenides' own rejection of distinctions, by the rationalist principle, the PSR. I will offer an analogously structured argument in chapter 4 for a Parmenidean Ascent with regard to action: there are no individuated actions and no distinctions between actions and such items as reasons or beliefs or desires; rather there is simply action itself. I make similar arguments in chapter 5 with regard to knowledge and in chapter 6 with regard to meaning. In each case, I argue, we have strong reason to make a Parmenidean Ascent with regard to the relevant phenomenon: substance, action, knowledge or meaning.

For each notion, I begin inductively. First, I establish the failure of all or almost all extant theories in the relevant domain to meet a certain explanatory demand that— as all sides seem to agree— structures our understanding of the notion in question. The explanatory demand takes the form: what is it in virtue of which a given substance is a substance? What is it in virtue of which a given action is an action? And similarly natural questions arise with regard to knowledge and meaning. This demand is a seemingly well- placed request for a metaphysical explanation of a certain phenomenon. It is a virtue of the leading theories I discuss that they insist on this demand. I will then conduct a general survey of these leading theories and pinpoint where they fail to meet the explanatory demand that these theories— rightly, it seems— impose on themselves. This widespread and massive failure to meet the relevant explanatory demands indicates— and this is my inductive conclusion— that

there is something systematically and fundamentally wrong with the leading approaches in each of these areas.

To identify the source of the difficulty, I will in each of these cases also argue in a complementary a priori fashion that all theories of the phenomenon in question that make a certain seemingly harmless assumption— viz. the assumption that we are concerned with differentiated cases of the phenomenon— must fail to meet the explanatory demand relevant in this domain. The crux of the a priori argument in each of these cases is a rationalist argument in the spirit of the great British idealist, F. H. Bradley, against the reality of the relevant kind of relation, and hence against the reality of differentiated substance, action, knowledge, or meaning. Though the spirit of my a priori argument is Bradleyan— and indeed Parmenidean— its formulation and inner workings are my own.

The upshot (or one upshot) is that, in order to preserve the key notions of substance, action, etc., we must give up the assumption of differentiation or relations in these areas. We must, in other words, make a Parmenidean Ascent in each of these fields and embrace a kind of monism of substance, of action, of knowledge, and of meaning. For example, if we are to retain the notion of substance or being at all, then, instead of individuated, differentiated substances or beings, we should accept only undifferentiated substance or being that stands in no relations of distinction, either internal or external.

There is simply substance or being. Similarly, there is simply action, there is simply knowledge, there is simply meaning. And, of course, there is no distinction between being, action, knowledge, and meaning.

I will lay out this a priori argument first and in most detail in chapter 3 in the case of substance. There I will defend my Bradleyan juggernaut against many prominent objections and exhibit the Parmenidean Ascent with regard to substance. Chapter 2 will conduct the inductive argument that leading theories of substance fail to meet their own explanatory demand and that there is something systematically amiss in such theories. The inductive arguments concerning action, knowledge, and meaning

occur in chapters 4– 6. The a priori arguments in these cases have the same form as the a priori argument in the case of substance and thus will not require separate chapters.

In the case of action, the Parmenidean Ascent will have shocking and drastic implications for our understanding of free will and also for moral philosophy generally, as I will explain briefly in chapter 4. However, exploring the full impact of the Parmenidean Ascent for matters of moral philosophy will be a project for a future occasion.

In the case of knowledge, the Parmenidean Ascent will lead in chapter 5— despite the pervasiveness of knowledge or the monism of knowledge— to skepticism in the form of a denial that there is knowledge as we ordinarily understand it, and indeed a denial of the coherence of the ordinary concept of knowledge. This will be a denial of the coherence of the claim that there are states of knowledge that are differentiated from each other and from things that are not states of knowledge. I should stress, though, that skeptical implications are not unique to the Parmenidean Ascent with regard to knowledge. In general, the Parmenidean Ascents in this book are skeptical in character: they deny the existence and the coherence of phenomena, including apparent distinctions, to which we are ordinarily committed.

The Parmenidean Ascent with regard to meaning in chapter 6 is especially noteworthy for it is in connection with meaning— perhaps more than in any other area in contemporary and recent philosophy— that philosophers have, perhaps not fully intentionally, advanced arguments that express a form of a Parmenidean Ascent. I have in mind certain arguments in support of a radical holism of meaning in Willard van Orman Quine's "Two Dogmas of Empiricism" (and other writings of Quine's) and in Donald Davidson's "On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme" (and other essays of Davidson's). It is a ray of hope for contemporary philosophy that two of the most consequential arguments in recent philosophy manifest— whether the authors realized this fact or not— a Parmenidean thrust. The Parmenidean Ascent with regard to meaning will also, as we will see, lead to a Parmenidean Ascent with regard to truth: the alleged distinction between a true proposition and the fact that that proposition is

about must, like other distinctions, be transcended. The rejection of this distinction amounts to a rejection of realism.

This abandonment of realism is a theme that I pursue further in chapter 7 in which I also advance, on the basis of the Parmenidean Ascent with regard to meaning, a new way of thinking about the distinction between philosophy and the study of its history. Here I urge a Parmenidean Ascent with regard to this distinction too, and in so doing, I also begin the process of challenging some of the foundations— or what I will call the struts— of analytical philosophy itself, a project that I will continue in the remaining chapters of this book. One of these struts is realism, and all of the struts turn upon or presuppose the notion of relations which I challenge throughout the book.

As if the monistic, distinction- less outcomes in the domains taken up in chapters 2– 7 are not troubling and provocative enough, I take my Parmenidean chariot in perhaps even more paradoxical and skeptical directions in chapter 8 and beyond. Chapter 8 challenges the notion of metaphysical explanation and the related notion of metaphysical grounding that is prevalent in much of contemporary metaphysics. In this case, however, my challenge proceeds differently from the way I conduct my challenges to accepted notions in the earlier chapters. This is because, in the case of metaphysical explanation, the explanatory demand is not as clearly in place as it is with regard to other central notions. Philosophers are only too happy to treat metaphysical explanation and grounding as primitive, to reject the applicability of the question: in virtue of what is this instance of metaphysical explanation an instance of metaphysical explanation? Nonetheless, in this chapter with the help of a nearly universally beloved principle— Ockham's Razor— I will argue that the notion of metaphysical explanation is incoherent and that employing this notion is irrational. Accordingly, appealing to the notion of metaphysical explanation is not legitimate. The argument in chapter 8 is thus a challenge to the whole edifice of metaphysical explanation and grounding that looms over much contemporary and recent metaphysics (not to mention over much historically prominent metaphysics as well).

And here, as I explain in chapter 9, is where the paradoxical character of my view kicks into even higher gear. For with the rejection of the notion of metaphysical explanation

and of the related notion of grounding, we see that there can be no genuine relation of grounding and no genuine metaphysical explanation. However— and this is the paradox— in my earlier arguments I invoke freely and often rely upon the notions of such explanation and of such grounding relations to strike down our ordinary understanding of certain central philosophical notions. In those chapters, I invoke the notion of metaphysical explanation by issuing explanatory demands and asking "in virtue of" questions. There I also praise extant (though misguided) theories of being, knowledge, etc. for their insistence on an explanatory demand, a demand that a given phenomenon be metaphysically explained. But in chapter 8, I reject the very notions of grounding and of metaphysical explanation as incoherent, and so I may seem to undermine my many earlier arguments that are driven by these notions. In the earlier chapters, I deploy these notions with apparent glee in order to mount my arguments against leading accounts of substance, action, knowledge, and meaning. Such accounts fall, I argue in the earlier chapters, because they fail to satisfy the explanatory demand— the demand for a certain kind of metaphysical explanation— that these accounts rightly insist on. But now with the rejection (which I am proposing in chapter 8) of the very notions of grounding and of metaphysical explanation, where do those earlier arguments stand? Indeed, they may seem not to stand at all, but to be instead undermined.

In this light, what are we to do? Can we go back to our original notions of differentiated being, action, etc.? No, because those notions are governed by explanatory demands (and thus by the notion of grounding). These demands, once reinstituted, will eventually lead us again to give up the notions of differentiated substance, etc. But if we then try to defend the undifferentiated notion we get into trouble too, as we are now seeing. We seem, then, to be at another kind of skeptical impasse: there seems to be no way forward for our inquiry.

How then are we to avoid the skeptical, paradoxical instability of self-refutation if we take the explanatory demand seriously, as I do in earlier chapters? We seem to be— just as Parmenides is, as I attempt to show in chapter 1— in a position analogous to Wittgenstein's at the end of his Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. We must recognize that the arguments that have gotten us to this point are illegitimate and also that we

cannot return to our original position from which those arguments have purported to deliver us. What step can be taken, then, as Wittgenstein puts it, to see the world aright?

As Wittgenstein counsels, we must transcend or overcome the problematic propositions on which we have relied; we must, as he puts it, use them as a ladder which we climb and then throw away.5 That is, in my terminology, we must make a Parmenidean Ascent with regard to the explanatory demand itself. The explanations that I appeal to in the earlier chapters are explanations that are, at least potentially, distinct from the thing explained. They purport to be explanations of something in terms of something. Such relational explanations— we can now see— are problematic. We must say, instead, that there are no explanations as differentiated from the things explained or from other explanations and that there are no explanations of anything or in terms of anything, rather there is just explanation, undifferentiated explanation, pure explanation, just as there is pure being, pure action, pure knowing, and pure meaning. Indeed, these phenomena cannot be distinguished from one another, and each is, in effect, explanation itself.

Here on full display is the rationalist character of the Parmenidean view I am espousing in this book: all is simply explanation itself. Reality is not only shot through with intelligibility or explanation, it is simply intelligibility or explanation itself. This theme— all is explanation itself— is one that Parmenides may be articulating in his cryptic pronouncement, "it is the same to think and also to be" (B3). But at the same time that this view is deeply rationalist, it is also deeply skeptical for in portraying reality as pure explanation, being, action, knowledge, and meaning, we are denying the coherence ordinary conceptions of each of these phenomena.

This Parmenidean rationalism— paradoxical and skeptical as it is— certainly seems to be too extreme. Isn't there a way to do justice, as I try to do throughout, to rationalist motivations while at the same time avoiding these Parmenidean precipices, i.e. without taking our chariot so far into uncharted and perhaps unchartable territory? The question here, in effect, is whether there is a way to respect the explanatory demand and to respect the PSR, while limiting the PSR— taming it, as I like to put this point—

in some principled way? This strategy of taming the explanatory demand or taming the PSR has been and is a popular and powerful strategy. We find it in some of the less radical interpreters of Parmenides, as I argue in chapter 1, but one can also find, throughout the history of philosophy, other so- called friends of rationalism who also try to limit the PSR. This is what I call a taming strategy, and it is adopted by philosophers as diverse as Kant and contemporary grounding theorists such as Shamik Dasgupta, Kit Fine, and Jonathan Schaffer, and it is one source of potential resistance to the Parmenidean Ascent. I think that this taming strategy should be taken down, and in chapter 10 I take some steps toward doing precisely that. I will attempt to show that the taming strategy is incoherent. I will proceed in that chapter, as I often do in the book, in dialectical fashion by beginning with a critique of one of Leibniz's apparently failed arguments for a strong, untamed version of the PSR. On the basis of this failure, I develop a new way of showing how the limited versions of the PSR on which Kant and others rely invariably turn into a radical monism and an unrestricted PSR that is incompatible with the essence of the strategy of PSR taming. The upshot of that chapter is that the Kantian response to me and, more generally, the response to me that seeks to tame the PSR do not work and that, if one is going to respect explanatory demands at all, one is inevitably led to the kind of skeptical, rationalist monism that I am led to throughout this book. This dialectical argument generates, as I will explain, a positive argument for the PSR, as long as one is willing— as almost all philosophers are— to grant some appeal to the notion of explanation.

With this argument for the PSR, we are not only in a position to claim that if one accepts certain explanatory demands, then one should make various Parmenidean Ascents and accept monism in various domains, but we are also in a position to argue more directly for those explanatory demands and thus for the PSR and for monism in these domains. The earlier, more conditional claims are substantive and provocative in their own right, but the more direct argument in chapter 10 for explanatory demands and for the PSR and for Parmenidean distinction- less monism is truly Parmenideanism run amok.

I am well aware, of course, that you are not likely to embrace the views— or perhaps, the view— I put forth in this book. I expect the resistance to be strong or— worse—

the dismissal to be total and peremptory. I know this from long, hard, fascinating, and ultimately uplifting experience. I know that it is overwhelmingly likely that you will not like my conclusions. I am resigned to that, and I expect that. A dear colleague in the profession once said to me— after I expressed one of my Parmenidean conclusions— "I don't like that view." I replied, "You're not supposed to." But even if I do not expect agreement, I want you to take my views seriously, I encourage you to engage with my arguments, and most of all I urge you, as I have said in an epigraph to one of my papers,6 not to mistake the fact that you don't like my conclusions for an argument against them. In other words, don't just disagree or dismiss. Show me where I go wrong.

In chapter 11, I will take some further steps toward criticizing and, perhaps, overcoming what I call "The Great Resistance," the inevitable tendency to dismiss my views outright. One source of this tendency to dismiss is the quick way analytical philosophers in particular have of dealing with counterintuitive or implausible views. This high- handedness is a reflection of the method of relying on intuitions— a method that dominates analytical philosophy and forms, as I argue in chapter 7, another one of the struts of analytical philosophy. In chapter 11, I seek to take another step to overcome this resistance to my Parmenidean views by challenging this pervasive method of intuition. My challenge will have two main parts. First, I identify and diagnose several unwelcome features of the method of intuition— its conservatism, its psychologism, and its arbitrary and unprincipled character. Then I will take a different tack and, as I do elsewhere in the book, "go historical" and dig deeper into the early twentieth- century sources of the aversion among analytical philosophers to counterintuitive views. Here, by unmasking one source of this aversion as an ineffectual and, perhaps, question- begging rejection of the PSR, we can see that the method of intuition and indeed much of analytical philosophy itself rests on weak or non- existent grounds. This big reveal may help to overcome some of the opposition or dismissal that will certainly greet the Parmenidean Ascent.

The brief but rich final two chapters embody two modestly proposed, only seemingly different, suggestions for how to proceed in light of my rationalist, Parmenidean Ascent and my rationalist methodological critique of dominant ways of doing philosophy.

An observation for readers of my work on Spinoza: it may seem surprising that in this book I largely refrain from engaging explicitly with Spinoza. I have been tempted to include full- blown discussions of Spinoza in this book because I do think that, in at least one strand of his thinking, Spinoza is drawn to and powerfully articulates a version of the Parmenidean Ascent. But that interpretation is extremely controversial, and it is one that is best entered in separate endeavors devoted to Spinoza. Rest assured, however, Spinoza fans: the spirit of Spinoza does hover over much of my thinking in this book in unmistakable ways.

Finally, a general piece of advice for all readers of this book: if you find yourself asking, "What is Della Rocca (MDR) doing?," then it is a good idea to remind yourself that my arguments are probably more rationalist and more skeptical and more Parmenidean than you may suspect. My chariot always aims to outflank you on the rationalist, skeptical, and Parmenidean extreme. But an even more important piece of advice for reading this book is this: ask not what MDR is doing, but ask what you are doing when you are or seem to be doing philosophy. It is, above all else (if there is anything else), this question that I hope that my book inspires you to pursue even more deeply. <>

FRAMING THE DIALOGUES: HOW TO READ OPENINGS AND CLOSURES IN PLATO edited by Eleni Kaklamanou, Maria Pavlou, and Antonis Tsakmakis. [Series: Brill's Plato studies, Brill, ISBN 9789004443983]

It is well known that scrutiny of Plato's first words begins with Proclus' commentary on the Parmenides. Proclus asks how we, the readers of a Platonic dialogue, could or should treat the prooimia of the dialogues. Proclus supports the view that a reader should first understand the dialogue and then revisit the opening scene, aiming to understand how the philosophical content developed in the main part of the dialogue sheds light on the prelude. It is thanks to Myles Burnyeat that Proclus' approach to the Platonic prooimia became part of the contemporary discussion regarding the nature of Plato's first words.

_____ is a collection of 14 chapters with an Introduction that focuses on the intricate and multifarious ways in which Plato frames his dialogues. Its main aim is to explore both the association between

inner and outer framework and how this relationship contributes to, and sheds light upon, the framed dialogues and their philosophical content. All contributors to the volume advocate the significance of closures and especially openings in Plato, arguing that platonic frames should not be treated merely as 'trimmings' or decorative literary devices but as an integral part of the central philosophical discourse. The volume will prove to be an invaluable companion to all those interested in Plato as well as in classical literature in general.

CONTENTS

Where have you just come from, Socrates? No, don't tell me. PLATO, Protagoras 309a

It is well known that scrutiny of Plato's first words begins with Proclus' commentary on the Parmenides. Proclus asks how we, the readers of a Platonic dialogue, could or should treat the prooimia of the dialogues. Proclus supports the view that a reader should first understand the dialogue and then revisit the opening scene, aiming to understand how the philosophical content developed in the main part of the dialogue sheds light on the prelude.1 It is thanks to Myles Burnyeat that Proclus' approach to the Platonic prooimia became part of the contemporary discussion regarding the nature of Plato's first words. As Burnyeat notes:

> So far from the opening scene telling you how to read the philosophy that follows, it is the philosophy that tells you how to read the opening scene. The opera explains the overture, not vice versa. Only when you know the opera, can you 'read' and really savour the overture. But the philosophical content of a Platonic dialogue, unlike its prologue, is not something you can take in at a glance, or even by one or two careful readings. It may require years of philosophical training, experience, and study – as Proclus would most emphatically agree.

The question 'What is a beginning?' could, or should, be rephrased as follows: 'Is there a beginning at all?', 'What is a beginning of a story?' and 'What is a beginning of a plot?'. We have to ask ourselves whether a piece of written work, such as a Platonic dialogue, actually begins with its very first words; or whether it commences with the beginning of the actual story; or whether its beginning coincides with the beginning of the plot, which is the succession of events that constitutes the narrative.3 The true paradox with beginnings is that there are never true beginnings, as is noted by various authors in this volume, in view of the fact that the participants in a discussion carry their past with them, and the whole context is determined by preceding events or ideas, known to the reader. A beginning is the entrance into a new succession of events; the participants in a discussion bring something new, mark some kind of progress, and move towards an end. Every single beginning signals an ending, and the other way around. Still, an ending is not necessarily a closure. 'Our tale is now done' says Antony Trollope at the beginning of the last chapter of the Warden, and signals the closure of the story. But there are endings that encourage and prompt us to revisit the text and attempt a new reading. Hence, they lead to a 'new' sequence of events in our minds.

In Plato's Theaetetus, the accidental meeting of two friends is marked by chance. Terpsion had been looking for Euclides in the Agora, an 'intentional' meeting has been postponed, as an arbitrary and unexpected factor plays a determining role: the encounter with the dying Theaetetus. The event breaks the circle of everyday life and triggers the discussion. Attention is focused on the present as the point where past and future meet, and is rife with the possibility of a dialogue with both. Euclides recalls an encounter with Socrates a long time ago, and the latter's meeting with the youth who was destined to become a great mathematician. The future signals Theaetetus' death. Dramatically speaking, the Euthyphro follows the Theaetetus, which is part of the set of dialogues that depict the events of Socrates' trial and execution. At the very end of the long discussion on the nature and definition of knowledge, Socrates departs to answer charges at the porch of King Archon. We meet him again, in the Euthyphro, this time outside the King Archon' porch waiting for his turn to be tried, and engaged in a discussion with Euthyphro on the nature of piety.

Queries concerning Plato's philosophical endeavour and literary devices arise almost immediately upon commencing to read a Platonic dialogue. Readers encounter the text and the individual arguments not in isolation, or in abstract, but within a particular context, and through an encounter with a specific person or persons, at a historical time, and in a given place. As Scolnicov says: 'a platonic dialogue is a real drama with developed characters, personality clashes, in most cases with an elaborated setting, even ostensibly dramatic date'. Yet, he argues: 'Plato's dialogues are not just drama engagés just as they are not plain philosophical treatises. Although his dialogues deal with ideas directly, they are explored not 'objectively', but from the points of view of the characters involved in the conversation at each of its stages'.

Scholars acknowledge that the majority of the Platonic dialogues can be divided into two groups regarding their frames: direct and reported dialogues. In the direct dialogues, such as the Euthyphro, the Gorgias and the Laches, we are presented with a conversation between Socrates and an interlocutor (or a succession of interlocutors), without any mediating narrative voice. We, the readers, are in the position of the audience at a live performance: we see Socrates only as a character in the dialogue. In the case of the reported dialogues, the conversation is rendered by a narrator: either

Socrates narrates an account of his actions, or a third party narrates an account of Socrates' actions. For example, in the Charmides, the Lysis and the Republic, Socrates himself is the narrator, while in the Symposium and the Parmenides the narrators were not actually present at the original conversations. Notably, in the Parmenides the story of the encounter of the young Socrates with Parmenides and Zeno was once told by Pythodorus, an eyewitness of the conversation, to Antiphon, and by Antiphon to Cephalus of Clazomenae, who now tells us the story. In these dialogues, the 'faithful' narration of the dramatic action is entrusted to the memory of the tellers. Further, the narrator gives the reader additional information to use when reading the dialogue.

The everyday setting of the dialogues is predominant; accidental meetings are events that break the cycle of everyday life and trigger a discussion, as in the case of the Theaetetus. The dialogic engagement, marked in the opening, does not occur exclusively within the sphere of philosophical discourse (e.g. Parmenides). Rather, the physical and cultural settings and contexts in which the discussion occurs are the settings and contexts of everyday life in Athens.

The Republic begins with Adeimantus' group meeting Socrates and Glaucon on the road between Athens and Piraeus, and their subsequent visit to the house of Cephalus. In the Protagoras, Socrates accidentally meets an anonymous friend and recounts his encounter with the sophists at Callias' house earlier on that day. The inner frame of the dialogue opens with Hippocrates banging loudly at Socrates' door early in the morning and chatting with him while he is still in bed. In the Phaedrus, Socrates walks with Phaedrus outside the city walls, and Plato gives colourful descriptions of the scenery as the two interlocutors take leisurely their stroll.

The contrast between philosophical inquiry and the sophistic method and practice is a recurring theme that runs through a number of Platonic dialogues. Socrates finds himself conversing with a sophist (e.g., Protagoras in the Protagoras, Hippias in the Hippias Major and Hippias Minor, Gorgias in the Gorgias, Thrasymachus in the Republic), or he discusses the views of the sophists, or a particular sophist (Protagoras in the Theaetetus), typically at the request of a third party. Often in the prologues, especially in the early dialogues, Plato portrays the typical, wealthy Athenian youth's

craving for an education that would allow him to make his mark in Athenian civic life, and his belief that the most likely source for such an education was to be found in the sophists.

Plato skillfully draws characters that intermingle and affect each other in ways that exemplify the philosophical themes of the dialogues (e.g. Phaedrus, Hippocrates). The mundane, or not so mundane, concerns, troubles and anxieties of the characters shape the inner content of the dialogues; the Platonic prologues appear to provide the basis for the following investigations by drawing attention to particular problems and aporias without reference to which the discussions that follow can neither be fully understood, nor rendered fruitful. He masterfully knits together delicate wordplay with evocative imagery, literary allusion and poetical references. There is also irony, humour, playfulness and sarcasm. We come across openings with distinctive poetic elements, for example a poetic exchange in the Lysis, or the reference to the palinode in the Phaedrus. These elements often appear in the closing lines of the dialogues too, while several dialogues incorporate an erotic play into the introductory scenes, which runs through the whole of the dialogue.

Open- ended- ness is a feature of most Platonic dialogues; we are always invited to see the conversation as incomplete, to revisit it, and to start philosophising for ourselves. This is more than obvious in the case of the Theaetetus and the Parmenides. The aporiai raised in the closing scenes are many and multifaceted. As Fowler points out: 'A work ... which leaves questions unanswered will be "open" to different interpretations and may leave the reader feeling that where the work stops is not really The End'.

The fourteen chapters of this volume focus on the nature, functions, roles, content, understanding and reception of the Platonic frames. ^here has been no attempt on the part of the editors at unification or an overall thematic approach to the topic. The volume aims to walk hand in hand both with those who are encountering Plato for the first time and desire guidance as they begin the fascinating journey into the Platonic world, and also with those who are reading the dialogues for the second, third, or hundredth time. We believe that all of the essays help to unveil the richness, complexity and multifaceted nature of the Platonic frames, even though a number of

unresolved issues and unexamined dialogues still remain. Nevertheless, we hope that this volume is a useful contribution to the discussion on Plato's frames and that it will serve as a new beginning, stimulating new questions and discussion on the topic.

The volume opens with three chapters that look, each from a different perspective, at the nature of the Platonic frames and the literary devices employed there. In 'Where are You Going and Where Have You Come From? The Problem of Beginnings and Endings in Plato', Stephen Halliwell provides a systematic reading of the Phaedrus and reveals the complexity and multifaced character of the Platonic openings and endings. Halliwell defends the view that the Platonic openings and endings intercede 'between the contingency of life and philosophy's quest for unity of meaning' in ways which are resistant to 'closed' form. By understanding the complex relationship between discursive form and the activity of philosophy, at the end of the day, we, as Plato's readers, are confronted with our own conception of, and relation to philosophy.

In 'Frame and Frame- Breaking in Plato's Dialogues', Margalit Finkelberg focusses on the narratological concept of metalepsis, or framing breaking, 'a narratological concept relating to the literary strategy of transgressing the boundaries between different levels of narrative'. The term metalepsis was coined by Gérard Genette in the fifth chapter of his Discours du récit (1972). Finkelberg examines different cases of it in several dialogues and argues that in the Platonic corpus we mostly come across the so- called 'rhetorical type' of metalepsis, namely the case in which we are transferred to a different narrative level, but the flow of the narrative is resumed without any delay. Hence, metalepsis in the Platonic dialogues overcomes and 'breaks the boundary between the narrative frame and the framed story, leaving the overall fictional edifice intact'. In 'Paradoxical Proems: On the Relationship Between ^^^^^^^^ and ^^^^^^^ in Plato's Dialogues', Carlotta Capuccino argues that far from being merely the fine creations of a great writer, Platonic openings and introductory scenes are much more nuanced and significant. They contain a crafty allusion to the meaning of Plato's dialectical writing and his authorial anonymity. There is a particular group of six dialogues (Protagoras, Euthydemus, Phaedo, Symposium, Parmenides and Theaetetus) with both an outer and an inner frame. This is paradoxical, according to the author, because the outer frame is set in a place and at a time other than the place and time the

actual dialogue took place. Further, it often takes place between different interlocutors, as is the case in the Theaetetus. These skillfully constructed paradoxical proems contain allusions to Plato's view on what is the desirable style for good philosophical writing.

The three subsequent chapters are concerned with the so- called Socratic dialogues. Starting with Charmides, Luc Brisson in 'The prologue of the Charmides', examines one of the most beautiful Platonic prologues, which shows, probably more than any other, the mastery of Plato both as a philosopher and a writer. Brisson delivers a close reading of the prologue (153a- 158e) in order to show that the central theme of the dialogue, 'care of the soul leading to understood as mastery on every level, including sexual' is announced there.

Along the same lines, in 'Elenctic Aporia and Performative Euporia: Literary Form and Philosophical Message', Michael Erler addresses the question of the relation between argument and form in Platonic dialogues, especially in the aporetic dialogues, such as the Euthyphro and Protagoras. He claims that it is not possible to separate Plato the philosopher from Plato the author. An appreciation of both aspects provides us the keys to unlock a Platonic dialogue. The frames, the historical settings, the fictive chronology, the performance of the characters, often provide the signs or information needed for a better understanding of the conversation between Socrates and his interlocutors. Erler argues that a close reading of the endings of the dialogues unfolds Plato's strategy: he offers certain cues to the readers that prove useful to continue the philosophical inquiry. The author suggests that dialogues like the Euthyphro do end, but do not conclude; their endings open up and reveal a variety of perspectives. It is worth reading the aporetic dialogues again and again reconsidering the themes discussed, since aporia plays a positive role in the inquiry.

In 'Leisure, Philosophy and Teaching in the Protagoras', Maria Pavlou revisits and offers a fresh reading of the well- commented upon opening scene of the Protagoras, both the outer and the inner frame, with focus on the notion of 'leisure' and its role in philosophy and teaching. This reading reminds us of the famous digression in the Theaetetus, and the role and significance of leisure in teaching philosophy and in living

a philosophical life. Pavlou argues that although the binary opposition between ^^^^^ and ^^^^^^^ is not explicitly thematised in the Protagoras, it runs through it as an undercurrent, and it is actualised in the figures of Socrates, a practitioner of philosophy, and Protagoras, a sophist. Both the inner and the outer frames, as the author argues, 'provoke reflection and are essential to a better understanding, if not of the philosophical subject of virtue, then of the importance of "slowness" in philosophy'.

Chapter 7 is a contribution on the Republic. Panagiotis Thanassas in 'Justice as ^appiness: Republic and its Proems', a title with specific connotations, opens his discussion with the diametrically different readings of the role of Platonic prologues by M. Burnyeat (1997) and Th. Ebert (2002). In contrast to Burnyeat's well known reading, Ebert argues in favour of the view that no feature of the famous opening scene of the Republic could, or should, be explained by a later passage. Thanassas asserts that both interpretive strategies represent two diametrically opposed misconceptions of the hermeneutic relationship between parts and whole. Hence, in order to understand the multiple and multifaceted beginnings in the Republic, we should consider the relation between a dialogue and its proem as a relationship between whole and part. Following a thorough analysis of the first scene, the first book, and the first part, he concludes that 'the aim of the Republic is not the construction of a political program (albeit utopian) or of an ideal political organisation, its topic, as clearly shown in the proem, is justice in the soul as the harmonisation of our internal contradictions in a way that allows us to achieve the highest good – individual happiness'.

The subsequent two chapters are concerned with Plato's erotic dialogues. Andrea Capra's chapter 'Eros from Plato to comedy. The Lysis and the early reception of Plato's beginnings' is a fascinating journey into the world of Plato's erotic dialogues: Lysis, Phaedrus and the Symposium. The proximity of the dialogues and their great debt to the poetic tradition is noticeably reflected as early as the fourth century b.c. in Alexis' Phaedrus, where the author makes a playful allusion to Plato's homonymous dialogue while, at the same time, we can trace elements and features found in the Symposium. Further, Capra argues that Alexis' Phaedrus draws upon and echoes the beginning of the Lysis. Therefore, it is not unreasonable to claim that it is most likely the first example in the history of the literary reception of Plato's openings.

In 'Eros in the Platonic Frame', Kathryn Morgan examines manifestations of Athenian erotic culture in the beginnings of a series of dialogues, especially the Lysis, Charmides, Symposium and Phaedrus, in order to show that desire is the context of the philosophical inquiry. The opening scenes reflect the multiple role of Socrates as a lover and an object of love, but also as an educator and an intellectual facilitator. Erotic role- playing or flirtation, which we find at the beginnings of these dialogues, allows Socrates to consider and reflect upon 'uncomfortable' truths, and, at the end of the day, flirt with philosophy.

In ' "Were You There Yourself?" The "Dialectics of The Body" in Plato's Phaedo', Zacharoula Petraki offers a new reading of one of the most well- known and discussed frames in the Platonic corpus. She suggests that the opening narrative frame of the Phaedo celebrates the triumph of the eternal philosophical discourse over the particular and perishable human body, and its ending imagines Socrates as overcoming the limitations of bodily form.

In 'The Necessity of Writing: The Introduction of Plato's Theaetetus', Antonis Tsakmakis revisits one of the most discussed Platonic frames, the beginning of the Theaetetus. He draws upon both the outer and inner frames in order to prove the inextricable link between the prologue and the main part of the dialogue. The issue of philosophy and teaching is at the heart of the discussion. Of great significance for the author is the aporetic nature of the dialogue, in contrast to the other dialogues of the same period. The main argument is that the Theaetetus is, rather, concerned with the dialectical method, and the exercise of philosophy than with the philosophical content itself. Plato's interlocutors and audience are part of an education process. As the author says 'the text constructs an ideal reader and an ideal setting for its intended (original) reception. This reader is familiar with Plato's life, work and thought, aware of the requirements of the study of philosophy, and willing to follow this path'.

In 'Chance Encounters and Abrupt Endings: On the Preludes and Closures of Plato's Third Thrasyllan Tetralogy', Spyridon Rangos addresses the question of the unity of the third Thrasyllan tetralogy (Symposium, Phaedrus, Philebus and Parmenides) and attempts to understand the relations between the preludes and the philosophical views

contained in the main parts. Although the four dialogues are, at first sight, very different, the author shows that their openings and endings, if seen only in the light of the main philosophical discussions, narrate and celebrate the story and life of Socrates the philosopher, who, during his entire life, was preoccupied with the same issues 'about the essential gist of ever- changing reality'. This Socrates, Rangos concludes, 'may well have been Plato'.

Along the same lines, David Horan in 'The Introduction of Plato's Parmenides: What Does it introduce and to Whom?' concentrates on the Parmenides and addresses a series of questions on the content, role and significance of the prologue, which is elaborately embedded in the main dialogue. The prologue has a crucial part to play in unveiling the ways in which the reader of the dialogue should engage with the other parts. Two of the main concerns are Plato's intended audience and what he wished to communicate to them. As elsewhere, Parmenides' prologue is another intriguing and fascinating way for Plato to prepare his readers for the exercise and practice of philosophy.

The volume reaches an end (but not a closure) with a chapter that revisits what had first initiated the discussion of Plato's openings: Proclus' hermeneutic attitudes towards prooimia. In 'The Prooimion and the Skopos: Proclus' Commentary of the Alcibiades I', Pauliina Remes focusses on the Neoplatonic attitude towards prooimia with special attention to skopos, as the understanding of a preamble is tied to the interpretation of the overall theme or goal of the dialogue. A skopos governs the totality of the dialogue and not merely a part thereof. Proclus insists on the organic unity of the dialogue, reminiscent of the Platonic Phaedrus (264c). Further, Remes examines Proclus' interpretation of the preamble of the Alcibiades i. Although not the longest or the most interesting of Plato's preambles, the skopos of this dialogue is established in the very first sentences of the commentary: the subject is self- knowledge.

One of the main strands of this volume is the admission that the openings and endings of the dialogues are part of the project that the author and philosopher Plato regards as philosophy. It is our hope that the fourteen essays presented here offer some insight and contribute to the deeper and broader understanding of the nature and role of

Platonic frames, stimulating new discussions and questions on the matter. Let me close this short introduction with a succinct quotation from John Dillon, which encapsulates this approach: 'the platonic dialogue, after all, is designed to advance philosophical positions aporetically and philosophically, not dogmatically. If we derive doctrines from them it is, so to speak, at our own risk'. <>

BRILL'S COMPANION TO THE RECEPTION OF SOCRATES
edited by Christopher Moore [Brill's Companion to Classical Reception, Brill, ISBN 9789004396746]

' , edited by Christopher Moore, provides almost unbroken coverage, across three-dozen studies, of 2450 years of philosophical and literary engagement with Socrates – the singular Athenian intellectual, paradigm of moral discipline, and inspiration for millennia of philosophical, rhetorical, and dramatic composition. Following an Introduction reflecting on the essentially "receptive" nature of Socrates' influence (by contrast to Plato's), chapters address the uptake of Socrates by authors in the Classical, Hellenistic, Roman, Late Antique (including Latin Christian, Syriac, and Arabic), Medieval (including Byzantine), Renaissance, Early Modern, Late Modern, and Twentieth-Century periods. Together they reveal the continuity of Socrates' idiosyncratic, polyvalent, and deep imprint on the history of Western thought, and witness the value of further research in the reception of Socrates.

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Socrates' Writing as Writings about Socrates by Christopher Moore

In Lawrence Sterne's Tristram Shandy (1761), we learn that the narrator's father has written a Life of Socrates. His version has a life-denying protagonist:

> My father, I say, had a way, when things went extremely wrong with him, especially upon the first sally of his impatience,—of wondering why he was begot,—wishing himself dead;— sometimes worse:—And when the provocation ran high, and grief touched his lips with more than ordinary powers—Sir, you scarce could have distinguished him from Socrates himself. Tristram Shandy 3.

Walter Shandy has frequent occasion to quote his epitome of Socrates' 399 BCE defense speech, concerning the charms of death. When Tristram summarizes that epitome, he finds it difficult to restrict himself to Socrates' views: he blends them with Hamlet's ruminations on suicide and then with certain haut-ascetic Brahmanic views from late fourth-century BCE India.

We wonder why the father writes a Life of Socrates: what problem in mid-eighteenth-century leisured England does it show him intending to solve? And what does Sterne mean to do by including this detail in the novel, with the attention to Socrates' purported death-tendency and the ease with which one might conflate his views with exotic and foreign Cynical intellectual practices? Answering these questions would involve looking to the popularity of Lives of Socrates from before the time of Walter Shandy's implied youth. They praised and posited as familiar Socrates' "heroic virtue," "invincible heart," and "incorruptible justice," wondering indeed "whether Athens were more to be honored for the birth of Socrates, or branded with infamy and hatred for the cruel murder of him." Walter Shandy's literary impulse, and that of his compatriots, has not, of course, waned; even popular bookstores stock new biographies of Socrates. And

wordtrade reviews| spotlight

while Socrates' contrary views about life and living represent only one feature of his complex character, they retain their salience.

Similar questions arise for another great novel, Proust's *À la recherche du temps perdu*. In the fourth volume (1922), Dr. Cottard praises and disparages Socrates in a single rant:

> The wise man is of necessity a skeptic ... What do I know? 'Gnothi seauton,' said Socrates. That's very true, excess in anything is a fault. But I'm flabbergasted when I reflect that that was enough for the name of Socrates to have endured until our own day. What is there in that philosophy? Little enough, when all's said and done. When you reflect that Charcot and others have done work a thousand times more remarkable and which at least rests on something, on the suppression of the pupillary reflex as a syndrome of general paralysis, and that they're almost forgotten! When all's said and done, Socrates isn't so extraordinary. They're people who had nothing to do, who spent their whole day walking about chopping logic. It's like Jesus Christ: 'Love one another,' how very pretty.... Still, I acknowledge that Socrates and the others, they're necessary for a superior culture, to get a gift for exposition. I always quote the gnothi seauton to my pupils at the first lecture. Old Bouchard, who found that out, congratulated me.
> Sodome et Gomorrhe, Part 2, Ch. 3, tr. Sturrock

Cottard chafes at Socrates' maxim earning him two-and-a-half millennia of fame, a maxim that mere leisure and disputatiousness could produce, and that yields at best only an indeterminate effect on the soul, whereas the decades of careful researches that yielded medically substantial treatments of the mind and body have no such commonplace currency. But he also recognizes the cultural importance of Socrates' maxim, and has absorbed the norm of its continued dissemination. So then we can ask, again, what's going on in fin-de-siècle France such that Socrates is the best representative of a vague humanism against a rigorous science, one that is reduced to—for Proust, obviously the leading desideratum—self-knowledge? The tight linkage to Jesus' maxim raises its own questions, about a naïve merging of Pagan philosophy and Christian morality from the perspective of a Parisian academic.

Answers to these questions about Sterne and Proust, novelists with strong philosophical bents, require broadly historicist inquiry. This means learning what their compatriots, and especially authors of the books they read in school and thereafter, knew and thought about Socrates. This involves knowing both the sources on Socrates

generally available and the breadth and texture of ideological or intellectual work those sources had been put to. That might be called the objective side of the inquiry—how Socrates came to our authors in their culture. The subjective side of the inquiry amounts to discerning, by the way they put to use the Socrates available to them, something about their own thinking of the world. This includes their insights into latent or forgotten traits of Socrates' character and philosophical principles. But we cannot infer details of their mentality if we do not already understand much about Socrates as he had been and could have been interpreted, argumentatively deployed, and identified with or against.

...

This Introduction began with reference to two novels to show the pervasiveness and vitality of Socratic reception even at a great distance from the Classical era or the scholarship of ancient philosophy. So pervasive, alas, that this Companion could hardly canvass the most significant loci of such reception, especially not in literature and art. To constrain the scope, and to focus on the most fecund instances of such reception, this volume attends mainly to philosophical authors, individuals principally but also some schools and movements. The exceptions are for some non-philosophical authors or groups of authors closely related to philosophy. As it happens, novelists like Sterne and Proust were reading philosophers and the history of philosophy—the young Proust named his literary journal after Plato's Symposium [Le Banquet, 1892–93]—and so this study, with present and future studies like it, under-girds any successful research into the reception of Socrates even in non-philosophical genres.

To articulate what was implied above, the reception of a philosopher means, instead of analyzing the philosopher's views or telling the philosopher's life in some unmediated way, studying other thinkers' analyses of his or her philosophical and biographical meaning. In reception we turn our focus on the receivers rather than the received. Yet if the focus blurs the background it does not block it. Reception studies is motivated by an assumption of transparency: the study of a philosopher requires study of his or her objects of interest. For example, making sense of Nietzsche includes making sense of his study of Socrates, which includes making sense of Socrates. Studying reception

requires looking two directions at once, both at and over the shoulder of one's target of interest.

Philosophical reception—the reception of a philosopher by a philosopher— requires doing philosophy. In the case of Socrates, it takes reconstructing and evaluating the arguments, self-descriptions, and deliberate intimations attributable to him, and reconstructing and evaluating the same found in the later author (e.g., Nietzsche) relevant to understanding and contextualizing that later author's discussion of him. It also requires intellectual and bibliographical history, genre analysis, and acuity about the authors' rhetorical goals. These are not merely the accumulation of trivia. They help us judge whether Socrates and/or his "receiver" are right about the best way to live, or whatever else the local goal of philosophizing might be. And our own reception of Socrates is mediated by our predecessors', so reception studies is a pursuit of self-understanding. The value of philosophical reception might already have a Socratic tinge: it assumes, first, that doing philosophy by ourselves, without help from other philosophers (i.e., in history), is relatively unpromising, and second, that studying a historical figure in philosophy by ourselves, without help from other philosophers, is also relatively unpromising, and so, third, that we might have the best chance to succeed if we follow the best philosophers studying the best philosophers. Of course, this does not devolve work from ourselves; we still have to do the philosophy on and with these two philosophers. By studying, say, Nietzsche on Socrates, we have a chance, at once, to learn more about Nietzsche (by seeing what choices he makes in his limning of Socrates) and more about Socrates (by seeing what Nietzsche sees in him that we might not yet have seen, or appreciated). We want to learn more about Nietzsche and about Socrates just because we think they may be fruitful guides for our own philosophical endeavors.

In reception studies, the "receivers"—the topics of the chapters in this volume—are no longer mere "sources" or "interpretations" from which we glean information or lore about Socrates not known elsewhere or, for the sake of dialectical completeness, populate the field of logically possible or historically actual readings of Socrates. Source-criticism is part of reception studies, but it has a different goal. We are less concerned to distinguish reliable from unreliable channels of precise information, and

thereby to establish the original text or person, which is what Quellenforschung seeks, than to know what a person could believe and know about Socrates and what others similarly situated would for their own part come to believe and know. Historiography of Socratic interpretation is also part of reception studies, but it too has a different goal. How scholars and others have studied and written about Socrates is worth charting, as we seek self-knowledge of our own discipline and its history; but, for the most part, in reception studies we target only certain individual interpretations. To be sure, we cannot divorce reception from historiography, because to judge the selectivity, aptness, and density of some latter-day author's picture of Socrates involves having set a contemporaneous baseline. But, again, the focus differs. In philosophy, reception means doing philosophy with more people. That is, if philosophy amounts to a conversation—one that goes better not when solutions are found but when more mutual and self-understanding is attained, and the methods for such understanding are refined and transferrable to new participants—then reception studies is part of philosophy in its broadening the conversation as widely as possible.

...

Socrates seems to represent a certain limit case for reception studies. Since Socrates wrote nothing, it seems that every study of him must count as a study of his reception. There seems to be no study of Socrates himself. We seem to have no access to his thoughts as he would choose to have articulated them, as we do in the published works, no matter how rhetorically indirect, of Plato or Montaigne or Nietzsche. Not only does this suggest a "pure" reception; it suggests as well an "empty" reception, since, in perhaps every case, authors are receiving not Socrates but other receptions of Socrates; not even the earliest had writings on which to ground his interpretation.

This suggestion is not quite right. It overplays the importance of writing for evincing a person's views. In Plato's Apology, Socrates says that he asks questions, and anyone who wishes to answer them may thereby hear what he has to say (33a7–b4). Might Socrates have manifested his views not in writing but in the way he talked to other people—perhaps even a way of talking that showed the way to writing about Socrates' conversations themselves? The evidence from the Platonic dialogues suggests that a

regular part of Socrates' conversational practice—might we say, his philosophical teaching?—was retelling earlier conversations in which he took part, perhaps leaving it up to his audience to infer why he told them the conversation, or why he said what he did in the conversation itself. Beyond that, might Socrates have "written on the souls" of his associates, such that Plato and Antisthenes and Xenophon— and/or their writings—fairly count as Socrates' articulated expressions of his views? Just as a text is constituted by an author's writing on the page, a person is constituted by a teacher's having conversations with him or her. By writing Socratic conversations, might Plato and the rest have answered his questions, thus allowing us to hear what he has to say? No doubt Plato and Antisthenes and Xenophon are their own people, with their own ideas and goals that condition, limit, bend Socrates' message. But might that not be his message too? Anyway, a person's writing is always conditioned, limited, and bent by his or her cultural context, the language and salient concepts and available contrasts and effective dialectical maneuvers. So, no doubt, Socratic reception is strange. But that is because Socratic philosophy is strange. It is practiced in an unusual medium. Reception can deal with it, because later authors can recognize, theorize, and judge Socrates' unwritten conversations.

This volume aims to be a resource for doing philosophy with Socrates. A resource, not the resource. This project began in the desire to have effectively an encyclopedia of Socrates in the history of philosophy. Practical considerations limited it to a single volume of long research articles. I solicited chapters on philosophers or groups of thinkers from people whom I believed would bring a new perspective or on topics on which there were no readily accessible resources. But I had to restrict in some ways. I implicitly depended on readers filling in gaps with chapters from a recent Brill volume, for which I was co-editor, Socrates and the Socratic Dialogue (2018). That volume combined source-criticism with reception studies; but in any event only up to Plotinus. Recent collections edited by Michael Trapp (2007, 2 vol.) and by Sara Ahbel-Rappe and Rachana Kamtekar (2006) fill in further gaps, for example on Socrates in Sextus Empiricus, Jewish thought, Voltaire, phenomenology, and psychoanalysis.

,   provides just one instrument in the study of Socrates. The recent nine-volume Loeb Classical Library collection of the

fragments of the Early Greek Philosophers (Laks and Most 2016, 8.293–411) includes testimonia about Socrates in volume 8, among the Sophists, relying almost exclusively on the writings of Aristophanes, Plato, and Xenophon (though with a smattering of Aristotle and Cicero). From that material the editors settle on about a dozen traits: a primary (or exclusive) interest in ethics; the search for definition; irony, a habit of non-answering, and self-ascription of ignorance; conscious conversational norms; epagôgê ("induction"); refutation; the concern to know and care for oneself; the equation of virtue and knowledge; curiosity about the teachability of virtue; belief in the unity of virtue; assertion of involuntariness of evildoing and the impossibility of akrasia ("incontinence"); an absolute prohibition on doing injustice; and a subtle political skepticism. Three recent Socratica volumes collect ongoing research, from a range of disciplinary approaches, into the Socratic period and movement. The Bloomsbury Companion to Socrates (Bussanich and Smith 2012) assembles various guides to recent analytic scholarship on philosophical issues related to Socrates. Another recent companion, from Cambridge University Press (Morrison 2011), tries to balance the goals of the two previously mentioned volumes, in tight compass. The present volume aims, in contrast with these others, to provide something like an uninterrupted account of mostly philosophical reception of Socrates across 2450 years. Neither comprehensive nor exhaustive, of course, but a taste of the intellectual approaches to Socrates and Socratic material from most of the centuries past.

Many good philosophers were written about while they were alive; but for the earliest philosophers, we generally lack evidence of contemporary commentary. Thankfully, Socrates lived in an era whose works became extremely popular to quote in ensuing centuries. From the Late-Antique biographer of philosophy, Diogenes Laertius, we know that Ion of Chios, a fifth-century BCE belletrist and playwright, noted Socrates' travel to Samos with Archelaus, who was probably an erstwhile teacher of his. Diogenes Laertius also has sources who attribute to a shoemaker named Simon sketches or memoranda of conversations he or his clients had with Socrates (2.122–4). As with most literature from the fifth century, we lack the slightest fragment of Simon's; but the possibility that he did write is guaranteed by the proliferation of written Socratic conversations in the decades around Socrates' execution and, more forcefully, by the

number of plays, produced at large-scale Athenian festivals from the 420s, that featured or at least mentioned Socrates. Uncertainty remains about the source of Socrates' popularity: perhaps it was his unusual and famous valor in war; perhaps his connections with Pericles' circle, Critias and his family, or Alcibiades put him on the celebrity pages; perhaps he simply had a major intellectual profile, approaching that of Damon, Anaxagoras, and Protagoras; or perhaps he really did haunt the marketplace, hassling those most reputed for wisdom. Whichever it was, Socrates seems to have gotten his fellow Athenians talking, and writing.

Actually, many stories have Socrates talking to tragic dramatists. Early Greek anecdotes recall Socrates' influence on Euripides, an influence noted as early as their contemporary Aristophanes. Plato's Symposium depicts a close connection with Agathon. Their work, as well as that of Sophocles and the Aeschylean author of Prometheus Bound, seems to exhibit idiosyncratic views of erôs, and certainly all those who knew Socrates personally attributed to him a prominent set of reflections about erôs. Jacques Bromberg ("Greek Tragedy and the Socratic Tradition") reviews the evidence and conjectures several likely instances of tragic reception of Socrates, deploying not a better insight into the historical characteristics of Socrates but a more thorough sense of the character-traits attributed to "Socrates," for example shoelessness and an un-Sophistic poverty. In the process, this volume-opening chapter outlines the basic problems of Socratic reception, drawing instructive parallels to the Homeric problem, where already an author has been posited as explanation for a variety of textual and performance effects. For Bromberg, we should feel comfortable looking for Socrates in fifth-century intellectual culture, both informed by and informing it, and we should seek to revisit the extant tragic plays and fragments thinking about those by whom they are influenced or to whose influence they are responding. The chapter prompts two more general questions about the magnitude of Socrates' influence on contemporary Athenian (intellectual) culture. First, were even the first-generation Socratics— Plato, Xenophon, Antisthenes, etc.—taking up an "idea" of Socrates assembled since the 420s on the dramatic stage and in conversations thereafter, such that even for them we cannot really resolve who was "more true to Socrates himself"? Second, could the import of Socrates' influence on his contemporaries have matched

that of the tragedians—whose influence Aristophanes' Frogs asserts, in the process vaunting Socrates' too—or of the city leadership's closest intellectual advisors—e.g., Damon, Anaxagoras, Protagoras—such that the study of Athens could be, in however an indeterminate form, a study of the cultural reception of Socrates?

Indeed, we do learn something about Athens and Socrates from the fact that the former accused, convicted, and executed the latter for undue influence on the young; we would learn even more were it true that Athens soon expressed remorse for its decision, perhaps enough to condemn Meletus and exile Anytus (DL 2.43), but not so soon as to convince some of Socrates' friends (Plato included) not to flee to Euclides' place in Megara (DL 3.6, 2.106). But the best early locations for "political" reception are the early fourth-century politically active prose authors: Polycrates, Lysias, Isocrates, and the author of the "Against Alcibiades" attributed to Andocides (conjectured to be Aeschines of Sphettus, a student of Socrates'). All might be considered orators or rhetoricians, and each wrote about Socrates for a speech-hungry audience. Exactly what that audience may have been, David J. Murphy ("Socrates in Early Fourth-Century Rhetoric") sets out to determine, starting with the observation that their Socrates appears in "fictive" show-addresses rather than in politically exigent deliberative or forensic work. In other words, early extant oratory uses Socrates less as an available example in public debate than as a topos of controversy in protreptic or marketing pieces—these authors sought students, and they understood that they could display their wares by (fictionally) re-litigating Socratic events. Socrates the man, as well as reactions to his supposed associates Critias and Alcibiades, and his execution at the hands of the democracy, must have proved sufficiently salient or pertinent in pedagogical contexts. This might mean that Socratism ranged wider and had a felt effect further than what we now consider "philosophy"; the lore of Socrates' rhetorical excellence, and the general value of virtue-teaching, allows it. Murphy's chapter yields several more important historical results; here I will mention just a few, leaving the exciting conclusions about Lysias and Aeschines for the reader to discover. Murphy reconstructs Polycrates' work as a paradoxological advertisement meant to lure students away from Socratic teachers, and redates it to the mid-380s. This sheds new light on Xenophon's defenses of Socrates, which have long been understood as

reactions to, among others, Polycrates. Isocrates' Busiris also responds to Polycrates' Against Socrates; Isocrates does not rave about that speech, though he hardly raves about Socrates' supporters either, especially Antisthenes and those lauding the "unity of virtue" thesis. We see more approval of Socratism later in Isocrates' career, perhaps with a softening marketplace for instruction: Isocrates appears to model the Antidosis (c. 353 BCE), probably the instigation for Aristotle's own Protrepticus ("Exhortation to Philosophy"), on a Socratic apologia; and the Panathenaicus (c. 342–339) closes with a mock-dialogue of the Socratic variety. In any event, Socrates seems to have an amazing connection with literary production, and the genre of fiction in particular, at this early stage.

We do not know when Plato started writing dialogues, or in what order. Historically many scholars have thought he wrote while Socrates still lived, and that he was trying to direct the course of history. Almost nobody now accepts that view, though for most dialogues not because they have counter-evidence; the thought seems simply to be that the execution and the hothouse atmosphere in Megara to which Plato, Euclides, Terpsion, and other friends repaired after the execution inspired and facilitated dialogue writing. Yet David Sider has shown that nothing prevents our believing that Plato wrote while Socrates was alive; Julius Tomin has written cleverly about Plato's dialogues as fifth-century documents; and the existence of much else written about Socrates while he was still alive, and the claims about a Simon the Shoemaker, and Aristotle's observation that Socratic dialogue began long before Plato, make it even plausible that people were writing Socratic dialogues during Socrates' life. The issue is a remarkably important one for reception studies, because it both governs what "access" Plato had, and "access" to what, when he wrote his earliest dialogues, and changes the social context against which to infer Plato's purposes for writing. Still, the evidence allows only that almost any starting date is possible. A more reliable approach to Platonic reception of Socrates takes an achronological avenue. That means looking for continuity across the dialogues. Sandra Peterson ("Plato's Reception of Socrates: One Aspect") focuses on a striking continuity: Plato presents Socrates as a person preoccupied by conversation. This for Plato constitutes both the legacy of Socrates and, almost independently from that, the practice that Plato and his readers ought to seek to

understand, if we mean to take Socrates as a model for or insight into the successful life. What then, according to Plato, does Socrates in conversation do? His self- and other-examining questions uncover life-guiding convictions, and then he draws inferences from those convictions, for example that some interlocutor has contradictory views, or does not do what he takes the good man to do (and what he therefore thinks he ought to do). He does this to persuade people to care for virtue or, more simply, to take as their preeminent concern the avoidance of wrongdoing. A familiar enough idea, but Peterson's view, as an overall interpretation of Plato's writerly project, contrasts with those that say, for example, that Plato foregrounds or cares most about Socrates' paradoxes, or his radical individualism, or his authoritative teacherly presence, or (eventually) Socrates' generic necessity in (as some people think) dialogues without a Socratic sensibility (such as the Philebus or Statesman), even if we can nestle those elements into the larger view.

A consequence of the losses of other first-generation Socratics' writings is that we cannot tell how distinctive Plato's interpretation of Socrates and Socratic conversation really is. The dominance of Plato's dialogues surely results as much from the details of his Socrates interpretation as other considerations, institutional and creative: his family relations and his founding of the successful Academy, his having Aristotle and others as long-term students, his world-historical prose style and philosophical novelty and insight. For his Socratic reception itself, we have, practically speaking, two imperfect comparison cases. The first is Antisthenes, whose extant fragments number fewer than two hundred; the second is Xenophon, all of whose many Socratic and non-Socratic writings exist to this day but who falls somewhat outside the Athenian intellectual tradition of the other Socratics. While fragments of other authors prove informative, they simply do not present even a blurry picture.

Establishing the basic outlook of the "oldest" of Socratics, Antisthenes of Athens, is hard enough, but we cannot forego assessing the ancient claim that Antisthenes was the true representative of Socrates' teachings. Menahem Luz ("Antisthenes' Portrayal of Socrates") accepts that Antisthenes knew Socrates from an earlier age, more continuously, and more intimately than Plato or Xenophon. But he seems also to have come to Socrates from a rhetoric background, perhaps as a student of Gorgias', and in

general we have no reason to assume that length of exposure equates with purity or immediacy of reception. In any event, we can perhaps draw two key conclusions about Antisthenes' reception of Socrates. First, he treats as Socrates' core traits his "inner strength" (to karterikon), which may be sufficient for virtue, and his wealth of spirit. Socrates serves as a wise counselor, Luz shows, but presumably his confidence in the advice he gives comes from his experience with his own indomitable soul, not from elenctic testing, life-long conversation, practices of self-knowledge, or the other socio-rational-linguistic exercises depicted by Plato. Second, Antisthenes' episodic works seem to feature Socrates not as a uniquely sufficient ethical ideal but as one among others, such as Heracles. Consistent with this is the fact that Antisthenes includes himself or his own views in his works, aiming for clear teaching, on the belief that moral knowledge can be attained and transferred to others, perhaps thanks to paradigms and analogies. This suggests that we do not know whether Antisthenes spoke to what we now think of as Socratic ignorance, perhaps instead focusing on his judgment and discipline of desire; and that even if he did, we have no reason to believe that Antisthenes adopted such epistemic humility for himself. (In favor of this view is the ease with which most commentators on Plato— Aristotle being only the earliest of them—have believed that even Plato did not accept Socratic epistemic humility!) Indeed, while Antisthenes vaunted one Socratic conversational technique, brachulogia ("brief speech"), Luz argues that he seems to have doubted the Platonic elaboration as virtually endless back-and-forth exchanges, taking it instead to mean simple but persuasive explanations. The Antisthenean evidence forces stark questions about the Platonic perspective, making us wonder how much of the conversational optimism and epistemic pessimism counts as Plato's interpretation rather than the historical personality both he and Antisthenes are interpreting.

Xenophon takes a middle course: sometimes depicting or describing Socrates' mode of critical examination, and nearly always presenting Socrates as engaged in one-on-one conversation (even if, for the sake of literary efficiency, eliding the interlocutors' responses, and, for the sake of literary variety, setting Socrates in a range of conversation types), he invariably portrays Socrates as a person who can and does give positive and determinate advice. But this hardly proves that Plato and Antisthenes

stylized in opposite directions; Xenophon cannot be treated as a relatively unbiased source for the way Socrates really was, as his status as historian, without a philosophical school for which he had to drum up interest, might suggest. As David Johnson ("Xenophon's Socrates and the Socratic Xenophon") emphasizes, while Xenophon knew Socrates, he also read a lot of Socratic literature and took it upon himself to respond to it; he missed the last two (momentous) years of Socrates' life (of which we know only about the last days, but which Plato and Antisthenes surely knew in horrifying detail); and Xenophon was developing his own literary persona throughout his non-Socratic writings (as Antisthenes also did), such that his Socratic and non-Socratic ideas appear to have merged into one. This does not mean that Xenophon's Socrates tells us exclusively about Xenophon, though it does reveal much about his conception of leadership, civic education, and literary purpose. Johnson argues that Xenophon places himself as narrator in all his Socratic writings, even those at which he could not have been present, to indicate that he in fact (though perhaps elsewhere) had direct access to Socrates and was not wholly derivative of and dependent on other Socratic writers. This implies something about Xenophon's sense of status and the range of those he graded as competitors; but, more importantly, it shows that he purports to provide a more complete view than other authors were providing. He may accept the validity of aspects of the Platonic and Antisthenic portrayal but, at the same time, assert that both underplayed the breadth of Socrates' way of being. This may well be animated by Xenophon's own self-defense as a worldly and literarily adventurous person, as his many non-Socratic writings show, rather than a school-bound and rigorous philosopher, a self-defense not unrelated to Isocrates'— and Xenophon may have lived as un-Socratic a life as Isocrates did. Johnson concludes that we should see in Xenophon something quite modern, the sifting between literary and historical claims and evidence about Socrates with the intention not of getting factually correct what Socrates said but making sense of the underlying reality. Seeing his Socratic and non-Socratic work this way may allow us to see Xenophon's writerly and educational goals that much more clearly: as a fascinating, useful, and brilliant case of Socratic reception.

Greek Philosophy

Second-generation Socratics would have known people who knew Socrates, and they were the audience of all the (now mostly lost) postmortem writings of that first generation of Socratic writers. They would also have been members of groups who discussed, at great length, Socrates the fascinating cultural, political, and philosophical exemplum as one in an increasingly expansive corpus of interesting thinkers, such as Pythagoras, Empedocles, and Antisthenes. They may have also seen themselves as having distance on the assessment of Socrates, since they were not implicated in the toxic affairs of the previous turn of the century, and thus as having more objective ideas about his legacy. For our purposes these men amount to some of Plato's Academic students; the Megarian Bryson of Heraclea; Antisthenes' student Diogenes, soon to be founder of the Cynics; and at least one Peripatetic, Aristoxenus, whose father, Spintharus, may have known Socrates. This volume attends to Aristotle, for the independent interest Aristotle provides and because his Socratic reception (obviously) far exceeds that of any of his contemporaries.

One could ask two main kinds of question about Aristotle's reception of Socrates. First, how has Socrates influenced Aristotle's philosophical outlook? The causal connection, from Socrates to Plato and from Plato to Aristotle, is plain. The dialectical and aporetic elements of Aristotle's program are familiar. The fundamental commitment to eudaimonism is evident, and Aristotle's ethical works can be construed as arguing within the Socratic paradigm.21 But it is just as obvious that Aristotle draws from a vast history of philosophy of which Socrates is only a part, and perhaps—as Aristotle's works themselves make clear—only a small part. The second question develops this observation: how does Aristotle see Socrates in the history of philosophy or, more complicatedly, how does Socrates affect Aristotle's historiography of philosophy? My contribution ("Socrates in Aristotle's History of Philosophy") addresses this question.

I argue that Aristotle has an ambivalent attitude toward Socrates. On the one hand, he sees Socrates as only indirectly or minimally connected to the philosophical discipline he reconstructs, one concerned with advancing in sophia concerning both physical and unchanging principles. Socrates' innovative mode of inquiry, into definitions (and thus formal causes), amounted to a search for universals; and this somehow prompted

Academics to formulate "separable" universals. None of these definitions concerned physical or metaphysical explanation, Aristotle's leading interests; Socrates cared exclusively about ethical virtue. Aristotle finds that Socrates' theses about ethics, principally the equivalence of knowledge and virtue and the related impossibility of incontinence (akrasia), look crazy. And when Aristotle mentions Socrates in other contexts, it is often as rather a cultural phenomenon than prima facie a normative philosopher. On the other hand, Aristotle attributes to Socrates novelty in his concern for sullogizesthai— basically, argument as such, but specifically the articulation of reasons for action—and, more precisely, the introduction of something like both deductive and inductive reasoning into philosophical thought. Aristotle also tends to introduce ethical puzzles by appeal to Socrates' thoughts (as he understands them), as though they are the most important ones to consider. And Socrates is presented as not the sole but the most complex and perhaps substantive influence on Plato, whom Aristotle treats as his most interesting philosophical interlocutor. In brief, Socrates straddles Aristotle's divisions of philosopher and dialectician, and of ethical and methodological thinker, one who has discernible moral and logical views but who also disavows all knowledge and asks only questions. He thus reveals the conceptual strengths and limitations of Aristotle's historiography of philosophy. His reception also shows how far Aristotle is from seeing himself as Socratic in spirit, in particular with respect to Socrates' epistemological modesty and personal and therapeutic approach to inquiry.

A question I ignore in this chapter concerns the way Aristotle's research into and writings about Socrates affect the later reception of Socrates. Cicero's claim that Socrates brought philosophy down from the heavens (Tusc. 5.4.10) appears to have early Peripatetic or Academic provenance. Aristotle does not make so grandiose a claim in extant works, even if his lost On Philosophy could have said something like this; a more likely source might be Heraclides. But Demetrius of Phalerum wrote about Socrates, too, though not in the context of the physics-related doxographies that had the greatest endurance in Antiquity.

Socrates had a largely but not exclusively positive uptake through the Hellenistic schools. Many (eventually) sought their origins in the Socratic movement, but the

disagreements might be more interesting and informative than the proclamations of sympathy and historical connection. This section begins with three chapters that concern—from the edges, as it were—the Academy, the school that might be thought most Socratic. The mainstream of the Academy seems, with Plato's death (or even decades before!), to have turned largely away from Socrates. But this is no damnatio memoriae; at least some Academics or para-Academics wrote vigorously about Socrates. Mark Joyal ("What is Socratic about the Pseudo-Platonica?") studies the Socrates depicted in the "Pseudo-Platonica," the dialogues that may have been written in the Old Academy and were conflated with Plato's genuine writings (or were posthumous developments of Platonic sketches), as well as the dialogues obviously not written by Plato but that survived thanks to their accompanying the authentic and "dubious" works in the often-copied Platonic literary corpus. Despite having been written by many hands over several centuries, Joyal finds important commonalities across the dialogues. Most accounts retain the Platonic flavoring of definitional questioning, professions of ignorance, advocacy of shared inquiry, and simmering eroticism. But they do not discuss the loaded concepts of Forms and Recollection, and they treat Socrates as, by and large, a wise advisor, one who avoids digression and who has a tendency for didactic monologues. Do we see here a regression toward the mean, a gradual deradicalizing of (Plato's) Socrates? At any rate, this study shows an evolution both in what people found most promising about Socrates and in what people found worthwhile to preserve from the genuine Platonic writings.

Just as most Academics took themselves to have moved beyond Socrates, having acquired epistemic grounds unknown to him, with at most a lingering appreciation for his pedagogical insights and moral integrity, Epicureans seem to have had at best qualified appreciation for Socrates as a valuable force in the history of philosophy. It has long been believed that Epicurus and Socrates presented to Antiquity opposed ideal types of the philosopher, and that Epicurus and Epicureans disdained Socrates. The texture of this disapprobation, its mellowing over the centuries, and the meaning of Epicurean reception of Socrates for our understanding of Epicurean philosophy have not, however, been carefully studied. F. Javier Campos-Daroca ("Epicurus and the Epicureans on Socrates and the Socratics") addresses this limitation by canvassing

every Epicurean reference to Socrates, much of it fragmentary and recently published; with this evidence base, he traces the evolution in Epicurean thinking about Socrates. Epicurus (341–270 BCE) started teaching in Athens in the last decade of the fourth century, a period during which, for various reasons, combatting Socrates' philosophical views was not a primary concern. He took aim instead at Socrates as a model of pedagogical association, railing against his irony, his sympotic chattering, and his comportment. Indeed, though Epicurus engaged with the works of Socrates' students, he seems not to have thought much of Socrates as a philosopher—in this we might constructively compare Aristotle. Then there is information about three of Epicurus' immediate students, all hailing from Lampsacus. Metrodorus (331–277 BCE) took issue with Plato's depiction of Socrates in the Euthyphro. Idomeneus (c. 325–270 BCE), author of On the Socratics, reports on both Socrates' rhetorical excellence and intra-Socratic tensions, which are to be contrasted with the peacefulness of the Garden. The mightiest abuse comes from Colotes (c. 320 to after 268 BCE), which, however, seems minimally informative, since he had it in for everyone, accusing all philosophers except his mentor of positing guidelines that would make living life in obedience to them impossible. He treats Socrates, as Epicurus did, as ironic and pretentious, even if he had ulterior motives in doing so, grinding his ax against Arcesilaus' Skeptical Academy; but his doing so shows that these early Epicureans saw Socrates' irony as his most or only salient quality. Two centuries later we have Philodemus (110–35 BCE), who again finds Socrates wanting: his eirôneia is that of the devious alazôn, and by being so tendentious he does not even lead conversations well. For all that, however, Campos-Daroca shows that Philodemus moderates that view. And, two further centuries on, Maximus of Tyre (c. 115–195 CE) gives Socrates' erotic stories an Epicurean twist. Naturally there remain deep questions about Socrates' hedonism, commitment to a philosophical system, and interest in physics, each of which if present would align him more closely with Epicureans. But the purported differences between Socrates and Epicureanism make the latter's reception of the former especially fruitful.

This section contains two chapters about a much more Socrates-sympathetic system, Stoicism, and its two best-preserved expounders. Brian Earl Johnson ("The Syncretic Socrates of Epictetus") shows, with exhaustive attention to Socrates in Epictetus (55–

135 CE), the way Socrates served as a Stoic role-model on a par with Diogenes of Sinope and Zeno of Citium. Epictetus, who drew from a range of sources, wanted to create a consistent account. His result: Socrates is practically a saint, uses elenchus for healing, and advises without teaching— and in sum, fits into Epictetus' framework for legitimate kinds of philosophical discourse—but lacks the irony, puzzle-wizardry, and edge we find in Plato. Without those inimitable traits, what could Epictetus see as so great about Socrates? Well, in brief, whatever Xenophon, on whose Memorabilia Epictetus drew copiously, saw as great. He may simply have ignored Plato's aporetic dialogues as just so many one-off refutations of pompous interlocutors, as interpreters even into the nineteenth and twentieth centuries have. And he judged Socrates to have committed a Stoic suicide, and to have prioritized Stoic knowledge of one's prohairesis ("volition") in his repeated appropriation of the Delphic "know yourself."

John Sellars ("Socratic Themes in the Meditations of Marcus Aurelius") studies both the dozen-odd references to Socrates in the Meditations and the shape of the Meditations itself, and concludes that Marcus Aurelius (121–180 C E) probably saw his work as a Socratic project. Relying on Plato, Epictetus, and the scraps of ideas circulating in his intellectual culture (as his letters with Fronto reveal), Aurelius distills the Socratic attitude as one concerned with self-cultivation, self-control, and the supremacy of virtue. These are the three goals he adopts for himself. For both Aurelius and Socrates, the highest good is understanding, which is the seat of the virtues; the impulses should be subordinated to them through a process of intense self-discipline. The importance of this finding is that the two men otherwise have seemed strictly different: the earlier is someone who spent his life in public conversation; the later is an emperor and general who was a solitary journal-writer. What is especially interesting is that Aurelius uses Socrates rather than an early Stoic (which orthodoxy might recommend) as his model.

Plutarch, generally categorized as a Middle Platonist, knows a vast range of (extant and lost) work on Socrates, which he quotes or alludes to through his oeuvre, not least significantly in his De genio Socratis. As with much ancient biography, he focuses rather on Socrates' life and death than on his thought— believing that on the facts concerning a person's experience supervene a moral significance—but he does not entirely ignore the latter (though when he does cite a Socratic idea it often sounds

cliché or banal). In short, for Plutarch, "Socrates was a 'champion of the truth,' 'divinely inspired towards virtue,' free from humbug and reliant on sober reason and a steadfast judgment." But Socrates did not just stand as an independent model of the successfully ethical life. According to Plutarch, Socrates expanded philosophy to include political action and leadership; the politician as educator has its premier exemplar in Socrates. Plutarch's most famous achievements are his Parallel Lives, comparisons of Greek and Roman statesmen who present or undermine putative moral exemplars for their present audiences. Mark Beck ("Plutarch's Primary Use of the Socratic Paradigm in the Lives") shows that Socrates plays a powerful role in these comparisons. In many cases, Roman exempla fail morally to count as exempla when compared with Socrates. Beck's chapter presents Plutarch's complex goals in his Parallel Lives, for example in the Lives of Cato the Elder, Cato the Younger, and Phocion, and details differences the image of Socrates makes in them. Plutarch brings Socrates into then-current debates in an urgent rather than abstract or antiquarian way.

At the far end of the Academy is Damascius (c. 460–after 540 CE), the last ancient Platonist. Damascius differs from other (previous) Platonists who, so Damian Caluori ("Socratic Methods in Damascius") argues, cared rather less than he did for Socrates: where they wanted dogma, Damascius seemed glad to study and learn from Socrates' dialectical, maieutic, and erotic approaches. While his available literary genres, the philosophical commentary and the treatise, prevented him from "erotically" regulating his readers' desires in the way that Socratic conversation or written dialogue might, he endeavored to adopt other Socratic traits, including the revelation of aporiai in his readers and the deployment of written elenchus and maieusis. Damascius does not differ absolutely from his predecessors; Proclus, Olympiodorus, and Hermias also vaunted Socrates as a model for rationality and knowledge, a knowledge that they took as practical, an art, useful for education. But he works to integrate a Socratic methodology into a (Neo-)Platonic system that might otherwise seem too arid or self-confident for the earthy Socratism of its founder.

Roman Writers

Already with the Stoics we have begun studying Roman reception of Socrates, albeit a reception strongly influenced by a Greek philosophical tradition. In the next section of

the volume, we have four chapters on Roman para-philosophical authors, writers deeply influenced by Athenian schools but not themselves woven into any specific tradition or program. At this point Socrates, bound to no school, becomes representative of Greekness and a certain distinctive, even for some a pungent and sensuous, unconventional way of life.

The most philosophical of the authors discussed here is Cicero (106–43 BCE), who makes frequent reference to Socrates throughout his rhetorical and philosophical works (though, notably, not in popular speeches or letters). Cicero accepts contemporary Stoic and Academic views of Socrates, that he is the father of philosophy and a deeply wise person. But the interpretative challenge for Cicero, according to Sean McConnell ("Cicero and Socrates"), is Socrates' anti-rhetoric stance. Roman society, and Cicero's livelihood, depended on eloquent and persuasive speech; it simply cannot reject it as tantamount to deception and self-deception. Cicero solves the problem in two directions. He adds rhetoric to the list of philosophically acceptable activities, thereby innovating and making Roman philosophy to that extent un-Socratic. But by emphasizing Socrates' own radical innovation of philosophy, making Greek philosophy concerned with ethics and politics, he preserves his importance for Roman philosophy, which, being practical, is concerned with little else.

Socrates' irony Cicero recognizes as a conversational virtue rather than a tool necessary for philosophy, and his constant elenchus Cicero recognizes as a salutary method of skepticism, diffidence about putting forward views of one's own, rather than a weapon to refute and devoice others. The crown of Cicero's Roman reception of Socrates involves the praise of Socrates' stands against tyranny and his fearlessness toward death.

Cedric Littlewood ("Socrates in Roman Satire") writes about Horace (65–27 BCE), Persius (34–62 CE), Juvenal (c. 55–127 CE), and Apuleius (125–170 CE). Satire lampoons high or foreign learning, as it takes Greek-originating philosophy to be. But it also aims at moral correction, as philosophy does. So it provides an incisive if mixed account of Socrates. Socrates' intimate friendships seem very Greek to a Roman audience, and Apuleius plays up Socrates' occult aspects. But Socrates also deals with the bodily and

appetitive sides of life with which comedy and satire deal so closely, and which for many people give satire a more realistic, accessible, and thus promising educative effect. Thus Socrates provides satire both a convenient and hilarious butt of its jokes and a predecessor for its moral efforts.

The rhetorical theorist Quintilian (c. 35–100 CE), who writes frequently about Socrates, shares Socrates' cauterizing irony, as Curtis Dozier (" The Rhetoric of Socrates in Quintilian's Institutio Oratio") advances in this chapter. Dozier observes that Quintilian's claims about Socrates are false, but so obviously false as to require an explanation other than "He's mistaken." Dozier's solution: Quintilian adopts a sort of Socratic irony. More precisely, Quintilian wants his readers to observe the devious power of rhetoric in his own texts, and so he misappropriates the authority-bolstering Socrates. He does this in particular by the dubious inclusion of Socrates in inductive arguments from examples, the very argumentative technique for which Socrates was famous. Checking Quintilian's attitude toward his sources of Socrates, Dozier shows that he judges the first-generation Socrates to have written rhetorically about their teacher, and that he therefore wants his readers to exercise cautious skepticism about them, too. Dozier's rereading of Quintilian might be judged both radical and exemplary of the reception model, fresh insight into an author earned by studying his uptake of someone seemingly so distinct but in the end markedly similar.

This section concludes with a chapter on second-century Rome, focusing on Aulus Gellius (c. 125–before 192 CE), an urbane polymath fond of philosophy but who nevertheless did not identify himself as a philosopher. He was also fond of Socrates, citing him in his extant work, Attic Nights, more times than anybody but his teacher Favorinus, Plato, or Aristotle. Leofranc Holford-Strevens ("Socrates in Aulus Gellius") finds that this work contains otherwise unattested anecdotes about Socrates. These, and the better-known ones he uses, focus on Socrates' patience and self-discipline, and the moral benefit in his tutelage: both Socrates and Gellius champion everyday morality. Gellius does not discuss Socrates' daimonion sign, and unlike his friend Fronto, he stays mum about the art of love. The chapter concludes with a comparison to the Socratic reception by some of Gellius' contemporaries: Fronto (c. 100–170 CE), Aelius Aristides (117–181 CE), Apuleius (125–170 CE), and Galen (130–210 CE).

Late Antiquity and the Medieval Period

This volume's first half has studied pagan authors. We now turn to Socrates' reception by several individual and groups of Christian or Christian-influenced authors (with one exception).32 He comes to be compared with Jesus— characterologically, doctrinally, and in his final moments—but the status of his piety and his belief in (a single) God come under close scrutiny. He stands for a peculiar strain of pagan philosophy, but is also assimilated to a trans-historical wisdom tradition.

This section begins with the earliest Latin-writing Christian theological author, Tertullian (c. 155–240 CE), and thus the first to write about Socrates— and so, as might be expected, among the most influential authors on later Christian writers.33 But he also stands out, by contrast with, for example, Justin Martyr (c. 100–165 CE) and with many later Christians, for his scorn toward Socrates. Tertullian believes, for example, that Socrates' epistemic confidence, grounded in sheer reason rather than revealed scripture, could only have been a sham, and that his daimonion sign, in second- and third-century thinking the manifestation of an evil demon, implies unpurified idolatry. But Tertullian does show some sympathy for the Greek, and whether there's any principled reason for doing so is the subject of Juraj Franek's chapter (" The Reception of Socrates in Tertullian"). The answer is basically "no": Tertullian uses Socrates merely as exemplar for his various apologetic purposes. (This does reveal the enduring power of the Socratic icon wherever Classical education remains.) For instance, Tertullian approves, as he sees it, of Socrates' rejection of the Athenians' gods, since they are not the Christian God, whatever Socrates' reasons for doing what looks like such a rejection.

The people whose reception of Socrates we have studied to this point have shared the one thing with which they differ most markedly from Socrates— they are all writers, whether creators of verse or prose, assertions or drama, fictions or memoirs or treatises. They have something to say, they come up with it, whatever their reliance on historical evidence or oral lore, and they put it into print. The chapter by Susan Prince ("Socrates in Stobaeus: Assembling a Philosopher") addresses someone who also has something to say, and puts it into print, but writes virtually nothing in his own name. Scholarship now knows John of Stobi (from the capital of the Roman province in the present-day

Republic of Macedonia) mostly as the laconic "Stob." cited for his Anthology, a morally edifying commonplace book in four volumes, 206 chapters, and 10,000 passages, excerpting from a huge library of (now mostly lost) Greek literature. It includes more than twelve dozen sayings or discussions attributed to Socrates—that is, even beyond its numerous passages quoted from Plato and Xenophon. If many of these sayings have limited value as historical evidence for Socrates' actual views, they present an at least hazy sense of the things people in the centuries following Socrates' life thought he stood for, and, in particular, of the ethically worthwhile things deserving of attribution to a sage.

All this, however, does not represent Stobaeus' reception of Socrates— how Stobaeus understood Socrates, and what we learn about Stobaeus' philosophical views via studying his use of Socrates—so much as it represents the lore extant in the fifth century CE. What Prince attends to is his placement of Socratic material in his volume. For, despite the claim in the previous paragraph, the Anthology is no mere commonplace book; it has a finely wrought architecture, with headings and subheadings (e.g., "On Virtue"; "On Discipline"), and, so Prince shows, careful (if sometimes opaque) organization of passages within each subheading. Stobaeus thus says what he means through his placement of passages (e.g., Socrates') throughout chapters (e.g., at the opening or close) throughout the structure of his book (e.g., in the ethical sections). Inferring Stobaeus' views through a sort of reverse-engineering of the distribution of Socratic sayings proves a difficult and subtle process. But Prince shows, convincingly, that Stobaeus understands Socrates "as a skeptic in the fields of physics and logic, an earnest ethicist who is more interested in general than particular questions and most interested in topics connected with the virtues of intelligence and self-control, a moderate but not extreme social critic, and a political citizen." There are good reasons to take Stobaeus as himself particularly sympathetic with these positions.

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self-control, a moderate but not extreme social critic, and a political citizen." There are good reasons to take Stobaeus as himself particularly sympathetic with these positions.

We now turn to a series of interpretative communities that partially constitute the international story of Late-Antique reception. We begin with Ute Pietrushka's "Syriac Reception of Socrates." Syriac, the Aramaic language of the Middle East, and after Latin and Greek the most important early Christian language, began absorbing Greek literature beginning in the fourth century. By the sixth century, it had accumulated a corpus of medical texts, especially Galen, and philosophy, mainly Aristotle' Organon and then Porphyry and Plotinus. Interestingly, no genuine Plato texts got translated, only pseudo-Platonica. This does not mean that Syriac intellectuals knew nothing else of Plato; they must simply have read certain of the dialogues in Greek and decided not to translate them. And they apparently digested and translated the many and still-inadequately-understood Greek gnomologia, collections of sayings and anecdotes attributed to wise persons of the past. Many such sayings were attributed to Socrates, who, as Pietrushka shows, was the model of a wise ascetic, an exemplar of the philosophical life, and an exemplar of the philosophical death. Syriac authors (or unknown Greek sources) were creative, too, inventing a Socratic dialogue on the soul, and stylizing his asceticism as (a culturally acceptable) misogyny. The Syriac Socratic material reveals, therefore, both the most resonant aspect of Socrates—what it means to practice a certain social minimalism—and what the Christians could find acceptable about the Greek tradition. Its philosophical importance, since the gnomological material was really too heterogeneous to ground a theoretical system, is primarily its being one of several conduits of Greek philosophy into Arabic.

That reception is the topic of Elvira Wakelnig's chapter ("Socrates in the Arabic Tradition: An Esteemed Monotheist with Moist Blue Eyes"). Wakelnig argues that translation of Greek/Syriac gnomologia, alongside the more comprehensive and rigorous translation of most of Greek philosophy, science, and medicine, was to build confidence in readers that the Greek writers were morally sound people. Beyond that, Wakelnig shows the remarkably flexible usage to which Arabic intellectuals put Socrates, describing his appearance, granting him and then analyzing his detailed monotheistic theological views, and ascribing literary authorship to him.36

Historically contiguous with and bibliographically dependent on the Arabic authors about Socrates were the Medieval Christian writers. Nadia Bray ("Socrates, 'Princeps Stoicorum,' in Albert the Great's Middle Ages") tracks and coordinates all such references to Socrates. She shows that only in the eleventh century did thinkers come to have more than minimal knowledge, and that by the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, many thinkers approved of Socrates. But some did not: they conflated his views with the Stoics', and distinguished those from (normative) Aristotelianism. The Stoics, they believed, erred in idolizing human reason. Bray traces this conflation back to Albert the Great (c. 1200– 1280), the first commentator on the complete (extant) works of Aristotle. He fixated on a doctrine inferred from (his indirect knowledge of) Plato's Meno, that Socrates equated knowledge and virtue, and thought knowledge came from recollection. He understood this to be a Stoic, and non-Christian, view.

Michele Trizio ("Socrates in Byzantium") writes about the Byzantine thinkers contemporary with Bray's Western Medieval brethren. They could rely on better resources through their entire history, if they also tended to follow the interpretative lines of Patristic and Neoplatonist forebears. This chapter reviews some of the most interesting deployments of Socratica. Some authors, including Theodore Metochites, showed a renewed interest in Socratic irony and the Socratic problem; in the antagonism and mutual reliance of philosophy and rhetoric; and in Socrates' skepticism and declarations of ignorance. Some, such as Barlaam of Calabria, even used Socrates' trial as a model for their own persecutions for heterodoxy, and began re-valuing Socratic method as a route to knowledge.

Early Modern Europe

We arrive now at, so to speak, the modern world. James Hankins has traced the history of Socratic reception in the Renaissance.37 Little was known of Plato in Italy and Europe before 1400. This began to change with the humanist Coluccio Salutati (1331–1406), who wanted to know about Socrates' bringing philosophy down from the heavens, presaging the de-Scholasticizing civic philosophy favored by the end of the fourteenth century. So he encouraged his mentee Leonardo Bruni (c. 1370–1441) to translate Socratic dialogues, eventually Plato's Phaedo, Crito, Apology, Gorgias, part of the Symposium, and Xenophon's Apology. In 1431, Ambrogio Traversari (1386–1439)

translated Book Two of Diogenes Laertius' Lives of the Eminent Philosophers, which addresses the Presocratic philosophers, Socrates, and the first-generation Socratics. Then around 1440, relying on better sources than any previous Christian Latin author, Giannozzo Manetti wrote Vita Socratis, the first biography of Socrates since Antiquity. This assemblage of material presents Socrates as, according to Hankins (in "Manetti's Socrates and the Socrateses of Antiquity"), "an authority for and exemplum of the humanist cultural project," the proper philosopher to oppose to "school philosophy." He ignores nearly all the "Socratic doctrines" except the Jesus-approved "suffering is better than committing injustice"; Socrates' emphasis on self-reliant reason evidently does not easily square with Humanistic reliance on authoritative books and on Christian grace. But the biography must confront some aspects of Socrates' life that are difficult for a Christian to appreciate. So, unlike Tertullian, Manetti interprets the daimonion sign as witness to Socrates' good guardian angel; Socrates' wisdom as a natural disposition, not a false confidence in light of his ignorance of Scripture; and Socrates' enkrateia as Christian patience and his professions of ignorance as a sign of humility and the commendable work of taking down pretended experts. This redemptive biography had an unexpected cultural impact, thanks to its inclusion as an appendix to the era's most popular edition of Plutarch's Lives, one that stayed in print for almost the next century. But it was not the only Renaissance Socrates, Hankins argues. Relative to Manetti's Xenophontic Socrates, an "eloquent model citizen," Ficino's is a Neoplatonic holy man. His proclamations of ignorance are understood in terms of negative theology and divine infusion of wisdom. He came to be seen as a Jesus Christ avant la lettre—thanks, in part, to some strategic Bowdlerizing.

After the Renaissance, the most important recipient of Socrates is Montaigne (1533–1592). It is no surprise that Montaigne admired and wrote extensively about Socrates: each presents his life as one dedicated to continuous self-examination and striving for self-knowledge, practices dependent at once on a shared doubt about the transparency to himself of his desires, beliefs, and expertises and on an omnivorous curiosity about those who might have something to teach him. But this similarity puts into relief a manifest difference: Montaigne examined himself through writing, albeit in response to voluble authors through the centuries, whereas Socrates wrote nothing, though his

interrogative and protreptic conversations would become literary fodder for untold authorial followers. Moreover, Montaigne was consciously writing an autobiography, putting himself forward as somebody worth reading about, whereas Socrates seems to have established himself as a figure for study only indirectly, as a person who, all-too-memorably, put a mirror up to others, so that they might reflect on themselves. A leading task for the Montaignian reception of Socrates has thus been to understand what Montaigne took himself to be doing—writing his life by essaying his views and compositing those of others—while having the beliefs and sentiments about Socrates, evidently a powerful inspiration but not a model to which he hewed closely, that he reveals himself to have. More simply, what is it that Montaigne esteems about Socrates, and how does Montaigne justify going his own route, diarizing at home rather than disambiguating his neighbors' views in town? More philosophically, what distinguishes the two attitudes toward self-knowledge, and how do Montaigne's writings about Socrates help us make sense of and then evaluate them? Finally, the ethical dimension: Socratic self-knowledge aims at becoming a more just person; but at what goods, if any, does Montaigne's autobiographical effort aim, for himself and for his reader? Important recent investigations into Montaigne's thinking about Socrates have focused on the problem of exemplarity and authenticity: how can one follow the lead of an individual, without either failing oneself to become individual (because one is simply copying another person, which the object of one's emulation by hypothesis did not do) or failing to follow that individual (because one has a merely idealized vision of him, knowing only his doctrines but not his character and lived life)? This problem requires, eventually, recourse to more fundamental questions, such as the nature of (moral) exemplars, the meaning of (ethically pertinent) authenticity, and the invulnerability of character to external or even internal influence. But, more immediately, it requires a finer-grained appreciation for Montaigne's judgment of Socrates, which is colored by his sources for Socrates, his autobiographical goals, and his moral expectations. Alison Calhoun ("Writing Montaigne's Socrates with Diogenes Laertius and Plutarch") provides this. She argues that Montaigne relies not just on Xenophon and Plato for his information about Socrates but also, to a remarkable extent, Diogenes Laertius, the Late-Antique author of the Lives of the Eminent Philosophers. But this is not just for anecdotes otherwise not known from those two classical authors—of which Diogenes

certainly has many. It is for an attitude toward telling ancient lives. Diogenes famously combines doctrinal reports with various life events, life events which do not always cohere readily with the norms espoused by the various philosophers. There is also contradiction and uncertainty. Calhoun explains the well-known variability in Montaigne's uptake of Socrates as of a piece with this Laertian tendency, appreciating whatever evidence he can find even if that requires foregoing the integrity of the whole or the preservation of the ideal. This "patchwork" approach has at least two advantages. First, allowing that it may also posit impossibilities, it gives air to the actual messiness and out-of-character actions of even the most celebrated human life. Virtue manifests not just in heroic deeds but in recuperation and recovery. Second, it stymies attempts to take any biographied philosopher as worthy of direct emulation. Their seeming excellences may be negated by something else, or may not be excellences at all, just lucky traits given the idiosyncratic circumstances. Montaigne amplifies this second advantage by taking a line from Plutarch, giving studiously complex comparisons between people, which can recast an ideal type as simply a local success, one from which it would be silly to generalize much.

Theological philosophers in the eighteenth century appealed frequently and robustly to Socrates as they addressed the central question of the day, one that has proved crucial in our passage to a modern secular age: what can reason say about religion, and by extension, about the fundamental issues of human happiness and meaning? We have already seen Socrates' status as a religious expert or innovator appreciated or debated in our chapters on Tertullian, the Arabic Socrates, and the Renaissance period. He gets put to related use in the English-speaking eighteenth century. Long appreciated as an exemplar of virtue and as a martyr of enlightened reason—Hume, for example, admired his rigorous skepticism—Felicity P. Loughlin ("Socrates and Religious Debate in the Scottish Enlightenment") unravels another poignant strand in the reception of Socrates in Scottish Enlightenment thought. Philosophers and theologians, prizing him as among history's most astute minds, and recognizing his wont to talk about god, the soul, death and immortality, and human purpose—indeed, they acknowledged in him a sort of Christianity avant la lettre—cited his very failure to reason successfully about religion as proof that nobody could reason successfully about religion. Socrates served

for them as the best negative case against natural religion and in favor of revealed religion, even if Socrates never explicitly takes a stand against natural religion (and may even seem to appreciate arguments from design or intuition).

The Nineteenth Century

Hayden W. Ausland ("Socrates in the Early Nineteenth Century, Become Young and Beautiful") locates the key moment in modern Socratic scholarship with the 1818 "Über den Werth des Sokrates als Philosophen" ("On the Value of Socrates as a Philosopher") of Friedrich Schleiermacher (1768–1834). This chapter recovers, in tight detail, the German and Dutch precursors to that essay in the last quarter of the eighteenth century, a time which saw considerable new translation activity, including the first complete German translation of the Platonic dialogues since 1602, and German scholarship in the thirty subsequent years, until K.F. Hermann's "Die historischen Elemente des platonischen Staatsideals" of 1849. Before this period, reconstructions of Socrates were eclectic, and then they became mostly of the Xenophontic wise-advisor type we have seen recur throughout this volume. Schleiermacher, giving a chronological ordering to Plato's dialogues, drew from Plato's account, and strove to replace eclecticism with a scientific research method. Christian Brandis (1790–1867) added Aristotle's testimony to the mix, thereby emphasizing the ethical dimension nowadays assumed the one obvious thing about Socrates. Then scholars took cognizance of Aristophanes' Clouds, which led, with some Hegelian infusions, to the view that Socrates stood for subjective rationality against convention and tradition. The program of Eduard Zeller (1814–1908) contributed to the distinction between Socrates and Plato (for more details of which see Raymond's paper, below). The moral of this story, according to Ausland (and recapitulated by Wolfsdorf, below), is that late twentieth-century understanding of Socrates recapitulates or develops early nineteenth-century views, and so our present views ought not to be assumed to be natural or inevitable.

Samuel Frederick ("Astonished Thought: Friedrich Schlegel's Appropriation of Socratic Irony") tells the story of a great exponent of German Romanticism, the once-student of Classical philology, scholarly collaborator of Schleiermacher's, and probable instructor of Hegel: Friedrich Schlegel. Schlegel argued for Socrates' continued relevance to

philosophy, as the representation of a life in self-aware pursuit of an unattainable "absolute" knowledge. This is Socrates' celebrated Schlegelian irony: a striving after the infinite—fundamental reality or unconditioned explanation—in full appreciation of one's finitude. We see this in Socrates' humble refusal to systematize while also refusing the lesser glories of a reductive or naturalizing empiricism. Schlegel's is at once an epistemological Socrates, one admittedly less sanguine than Hegel's about the accessibility of knowledge, and a practical one, whose dialogical and self-aware way of life provides a concrete model for then-contemporary thought.

The most impressive philosophical response to Socrates during the period of Ausland's chapter is found in Hegel (1770–1831). For Hegel, Brady Bowman argues ("Hegel on Socrates and the Historical Advent of Moral Self-Consciousness"), Socrates is a tragic figure, whose moral and intellectual self-reliance butted up against the embedded cultural norms of Athens, which its agents could not simply abandon. The chapter shows the extent of similarities between Socrates and the Sophists (especially Protagoras), and Hegel's sincere and elaborate criticism of Socrates, that Socrates could not show how normative ideals are to be followed in concrete historical situations. This is a consequence of Socrates' purely negative, critical, or aporetic way of life, which is the way of life he shares with the tradition-criticizing Sophists. In a word, he lacks an account of the good. Thus Hegel criticizes Socrates for the same failure for which he criticizes Kant. Yet Hegel also grants Socrates world-historical importance as the icon of "moral individuality as such."

As this volume has been showing, for a majority of the history of his reception, Socrates' elenctic mission, his argumentative knack for undermining proffered definitions, and the resulting improved self-constitution brought about by sharper appreciation of one's beliefs and desires—the attitude toward the philosophical life, his tool of prosecuting it, and the consequence of adopting these that strike contemporary readers as most salient about him—did not figure centrally in people's thinking about him. Indeed, we rarely see it after Plato and the Platonic dialogues until the early nineteenth century in German scholarship. Even the Scottish Enlightenment authors, as we have noted, appreciated him rather for his supreme thoughtfulness, his advocacy of reason, and his wholehearted faith in the divine. But we do see it in English-language philosophy at the

same time as the German-language philosophy discussed above, not surprisingly given shared corpora of contemporary thought and, perhaps, related economic and political conditions. Quite interestingly, we see it most vividly in the work of philosophers who are not practitioners of ancient philology but who are deeply committed to its value nevertheless: the Utilitarians James Mill, George Grote, and John Stuart Mill. As Antis Loizides ("The Mills") presents it, Socrates was their hero, but in a precisely delineated way. They focused on Socrates' personal elenctic method, his attempts to improve his interlocutors' connections between statement, belief, and justification. His examination of views sought not merely the purgation of the false ones but the constitution of agency, helping a person act on the basis of good or at least more fully understood reasons. Beyond the benefit to private or epistemic liberation, Socrates' practice had capacious social benefits, militating against prejudice, bias, and obscurity. Loizides provides, in addition to this account of a salutary Socratic practice, connected to nineteenth-century studies of logic and inductive method, important bio-historical observations about James Mill's substantive influence on his son's views.

David Schur's and Lori Yamato's study of Kierkegaard (1813–1855) ("Kierkegaard's Socratic Way of Writing") shows how he, by contrast, so appreciates Socrates' ironic assertions of ignorance as to replicate them in his own fashion, even as he advocates total commitment to a way of life. Schur and Yamato focus on the paradoxical fact that Kierkegaard's Socratism involves not foregoing writing but writing a lot. Kierkegaard realized that Socrates forewent writing to avoid making authoritative pronouncements; rather than foregoing writing, however, Kierkegaard sought to undermine authoritative pronouncements in another way—through complex practices of pseudonymity, framing, humor, and genre-bending. Thus a noisy writer can still embrace "the silence of the philosopher," and we get a post-Platonic, post-Montaignean lesson in the way that a philosopher might "produce" work but still follow the Socratic knowledge of ignorance. This chapter raises deep Socratic questions about the nature of "authorship" in its relation to self-knowledge and epistemic authority.

Such questions of writing and authority, combined with those of research and the limits of rationality, arise again in Christopher C. Raymond's study, "Nietzsche's Revaluation of Socrates." Friedrich Nietzsche (1844–1900) has long been treated as

having an ambivalent, "love-hate" attitude toward Socrates. But Raymond argues against this psychologizing attempt to redeem, for Socrates-lovers, Nietzsche's critical statements about the Greek. He studies Nietzsche's early and late discussions of Socrates instead for the information it provides for Nietzsche's overall philological-philosophical project. Setting the details of his early iconoclastic lecture on Socrates into the Zeller-dominated worldview of Classicists—a progressivist account that had Socrates advancing the cause of Wissenschaft ("research") that Plato and Aristotle brought into further perfection—we see that Nietzsche used Socrates, more than anything, as a figure to critique what he saw as the narrow-minded Wissenschaft of his own discipline. Raymond explains that the very evidentiary wobbliness of Nietzsche's Socratic reception, full of tendentious, unsubstantiated, and false assertions about the ancient world, fits his critical-rhetorical program, sacrificing philological scrupulosity for philosophical free creativity. That early lecture presents a Socrates not dissimilar to, though less far-reaching in his effects than, the Socrates in The Birth of Tragedy. And the Socrates in Nietzsche's late works, contrary to common conception, plays almost the same role as he always did, even if some details and emphases have changed.

The Twentieth Century

The final section of this volume contains five chapters on twentieth-century figures. Oskari Kuusela ("Wittgenstein's Reception of Socrates") argues that whereas Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889–1951) is taken as believing—and in fact believed, into the 1930s—that the Socratic quest for definition was mistaken, assuming conceptual unity without demonstrating it, he stopped asserting that later on. He reconsidered his views, recognizing that Socratic definitional inquiry has a range of methodological values, ones he himself could accept. This is important because, as both a critic of philosophy and a novel practitioner of it, it is helpful to see Wittgenstein's awareness of potential parallels with another critic/innovator of philosophy.

Dolores Amat ("Leo Strauss' Socrates and the Possibility of Philosophy in Our Time") shows the way Leo Strauss (1899–1973) studied Socrates as a political philosopher, perhaps the political philosopher who can still help us. And we do need help standing up against modern positivism, Strauss argues, as it slouches toward nihilism and so-called value-neutrality. Studying the ancients, in general, rejuvenates the moral and

political imagination. This chapter engages in a salutary conversation with the chapter on Nietzsche: Strauss judged Nietzsche as too pessimistic about the opportunities reason can provide for improving political life, having given incomplete reflection on the solutions offered by the ancients—in short, he was too Aristophanic, too worried about Socrates' undermining of social certainties. But Strauss also judged Platonic optimism perhaps too sanguine in its belief that reason can defend itself on its own terms. A truer Socrates, between Aristophanes and Plato, seems to have kept open the hard questions that resound even today.

Len Lawlor's chapter on Michel Foucault ("'Sacrifice a Cock to Asclepius': The Reception of Socrates in Foucault's Final Writings") describes the way Socrates becomes a key player in his last five years of work. Foucault (1926– 1984) sees Socrates, which he studied primarily through Plato's Apology, Laches, and Alcibiades, as of fundamental historical importance, but in a way distinct from Hegel and Nietzsche before him: for Foucault, Socrates shifts the focus within philosophy from self-care to self-knowledge, and from parrhêsia ("frank speech") as political to parrhêsia as self-constituting. His self-testing practices address Foucault's thinking about the ways subjects speak truth about themselves. And Socrates' self-care addresses Foucault's juxtaposition of corporal and discursive practices.

Karel Thein ("Socratic Voices in Derrida's Writings") takes up Jacques Derrida's (1930– 2004) critique of the history of Western philosophy's adoration of reasoning without curiosity about its limits. Platonism is a prime target; Socrates becomes partial recipient of that assault. In the process, Socrates' unconventional relationship to writing and speaking arises. Questions about the relationship between Socratic practice (self-knowledge, truthfulness, irony) and Platonic metaphysics (stable forms of things knowable only in abstraction from experience) arise, in particular why Plato puts his own views (to the extent he does) in Socrates' voice. Derrida asks how diffident we can be concerning the grounds of self-knowledge, the priority of definition, and so forth, and queries philosophy's reluctance to inquire after its own limits.

The Socratic interpretation now best known in the English-speaking world was influenced by analytic philosophy, and was popularized by Gregory Vlastos (1907–1991).

As narrated by David Conan Wolfsdorf ("Socrates, Vlastos, and Analytic Philosophy"), it was a surprising turn of events that analytic philosophy came to have any ethical or historical interest, prerequisites for any interest in Socrates. After all, it was originally allied with non-cognitivism and expressivism, and sought to find arguments to analyze with a clarity that allows criticism and transparent advance, and such arguments are more readily found in contemporary scholarship than in ancient texts. Only with new commitments that allowed for rigorous ethical reflection, and the appreciation that cogent meta-ethical, moral epistemological, and relevant metaphysical ideas arose in ancient texts could Socrates be an object for analytic investigation. And he could be, Wolfsdorf clarifies, only if one could find a Socrates with arguments. Suitable arguments, fortunately, are found in Plato, and for various reasons in a set of dialogues that came to be called "early" or, somewhat circularly, "Socratic." (There is usually ambivalence or unconcern about whether Plato's ("early") Socrates is the historical Socrates, since there is a belief that Plato's ("early") Socrates is at least a coherent and non-Platonic philosopher.) Vlastos popularized the "developmentalist" thought that this (Platonic) "Socrates" lacks an interest in "Platonic" Forms and the related epistemological or metaphysical apparatus. Vlastos also helped attribute to Socrates a more-or-less Aristotelian set of ethical "paradoxes" that could be philosophically provocative, for example, his stances on weakness of will, desire for the good, and the nature of virtue and ethical knowledge. It did not hurt that Vlastos could read Socrates (as many of his predecessors did) as a model of utter rationality, the "analytic" quest after the argument at all costs, leaving aside the mystical, religious, rhetorical, and commonsensical elements equally commonly found throughout the history of Socratic reception.

This view culminated a century-and-a-half tradition of modern scholarship. The importance of Gregory Vlastos cannot be overestimated, for beyond his high-impact journal articles and books, he advised the dissertations or led the seminars of dozens of highly-placed scholars of ancient philosophy, and organized discipline-wide meetings and consulted on the creation of Ancient Philosophy graduate programs. Recent interest in the exact nature of Socratic irony, elenchus, and the disavowal of knowledge can be referred to his commitment to those questions. But unfamiliarity with the long

history of Socratic reception, and thus over-subscription to Vlastos' program for Socratic studies, might also be referred to him. It is hoped that this study of Vlastos, and to Socratic reception from the previous 2400 years, can re-open the innumerable questions that study of Socrates allows. <>

by Gary M. Gurtler [The Catholic University of America Press, 9780813234519]

This book argues that Plotinus was a careful and skillful writer who constructed his treatises with a coherent structure and a consistent theme. The book shows how Plotinus used various literary techniques to convey his ideas and to overcome the limitations of language. Some of these techniques are:

- The use of questions and answers to guide the reader and to anticipate objections.
- The use of analogies and examples to illustrate abstract concepts and to appeal to the imagination.
- The use of paradoxes and aporias to challenge the reader and to show the limits of rational discourse.
- The use of metaphors and similes to express the ineffable and to create vivid images.
- The use of repetition and variation to emphasize key points and to show different perspectives.

The book also provides a new and nuanced interpretation of some of the key passages in Plotinus' works, based on a close reading of the context and the argument. The book also explores Plotinus' use of imagery, especially the metaphors of light and warmth, to illustrate the relation between soul and body. The book shows that Plotinus did not use these images in a contradictory way, but rather to complement each other and to overcome the limitations of each. The book also challenges some common interpretations of Plotinus' doctrine of the impassibility of the soul, which states that the soul is not affected by anything in the physical world. The book argues that Plotinus did not intend to create a dualism between body and soul, but rather to protect the soul's transcendence and intelligibility from being compromised by its presence in the body.

The book differs from other works on Plotinus in several ways. First, it focuses on each treatise as a whole, rather than on isolated passages or topics. Second, it pays close attention to

Plotinus' style and method of philosophizing, rather than just to his doctrines and arguments. Third, it offers a fresh and nuanced reading of some of the most difficult and controversial passages in Plotinus' works, based on a careful consideration of the textual evidence and the logical flow of the argument. The book also provides the Greek text of the passages discussed, along with a clear and accurate translation. The book will be of interest to scholars and students of ancient philosophy, especially those who want to gain a deeper understanding of Plotinus' style and method of philosophizing.

Review

"Gurtler's approach through these themes and their exploration through carefully selected entire treatises allow him to reveal new connections in Plotinus' thought and fresh insights, both in detail and in a larger vision of the shape of his philosophical program. Makes a very significant contribution as a corrective to many often distorted conventional interpretations of Plotinus."—Andrew Smith, University College Dublin

"The most striking and distinctive feature of the book is Gurtler's method. He neither focuses on the treatises, principally in *Ennead* IV, that are expressly devoted to the subject of soul, nor constructs a synthetic account based on a synoptic approach to the *Enneads*. Instead, he addresses selected treatises in their chronological order, providing close, sequential readings with special attention to key passages in their particular contexts and careful dissection of Plotinus' metaphors and images. In this way he brings to light recurring themes and fundamental principles of Plotinus' thought in a variety of different applications."—Eric D. Perl, Loyola Marymount University

"   is a brilliant and eminently readable contribution to the study of Plotinian Psychology. An exceptionally lucid guide and an insightful interpreter of this notoriously difficult material, Gurtler aptly navigates Plotinus's elaborate philosophical system. Soul in Plotinus represents a metaphysical reality extending well beyond the level of the individual self and rooted in the highest levels of reality. Accordingly, Gurtler's book not only makes contributions to philosophical psychology but offers a clear and compelling reading of Plotinus' overall metaphysics. Gurtler vividly brings out what is most characteristic of Plotinian thought while convincingly arguing that it puts forward viable philosophical positions. This volume will be useful and accessible for both advanced scholars and for students and students of Plotinus."—Daniel Regnier, St. Thomas More College, University of

Saskatchewan

"Gurtler's decades-long encounter with Plotinus has resulted in a very thoughtful book from a rather unusual perspective."—*Thomist*

From the Alien to the Alone

Readers of Plotinus are familiar with the phrase "from the alone to the Alone," which describes the soul's ascent to and union with the One. My title attends to that first alone, of the soul's movement to itself, the precondition for its movement toward the One. The soul must first move from its initial forgetfulness of itself, its ignorance, and its perilous moral status to recover its identity in an initial ascent at once intellectual and moral. The soul begins as isolated in the body, deriving its knowledge from the senses that it activates within the body. Its first move is to recognize those sensations that awaken its inner nature and lead it from its isolation in the body to a union with other souls human, astral, and cosmic. Plotinus uses "being alone" to describe the soul's discovery of its own nature and its deep connection with other souls. Human souls are together in bodies and move to construct a community of diverse endeavors that seek to engage their common need in a world that appears at once welcoming and supportive but also on occasion threatening and hostile. The powers of the soul to know thus help to forge various forms of knowledge, revealing the reach of the soul to the cosmos as a whole and its identification with the world soul. The soul's initial ignorance, however, reveals an ambiguity peculiar to the human soul, with the moral

dilemma of using its knowledge and action to recapture its unity with other souls, or furthering its isolation by sinking more deeply into the grasp of the corporeal division of the sensible cosmos. This captures the human situation that Plotinus seeks to understand as he builds on the work of previous philosophers, Plato and Aristotle most especially, to give an account of who we are and where we seek to go.

I emphasize this because not a few presentations of Plotinus's thought start from different vantage points that obscure or misunderstand what he is doing. Students often complain of being lost in his treatises without some external key that ostensibly can be used to make sense of them in easy schematic form. Scholars have indulged them with a variety of such keys that are designed to accommodate Plotinus to modern philosophy and its method. On the side of method, there is a desire to present Plotinus's "system" in a neat and comprehensive way. This inevitably starts with the One and shows how Plotinus deduces everything from it: intellect, soul, and the sensible cosmos. The difficulty is that rarely does Plotinus begin a treatise with a consideration of the One. Invariably he begins with some puzzle about human experience and develops his thought to account for it. His method, in other words, is not deductive, so this deductive key actually leaves out what for Plotinus is central, the human soul in its puzzling relation to the sensible cosmos and the higher levels of reality needed to make sense of its experience. This systematic key distorts because it looks at Plotinus's thought from the outside, presenting an abstract, theoretical schema that does not correspond to Plotinus's more empirically engaged method, nor to the kind of dynamic system that would be consistent with it.

Another key attempts to find Plotinus as a precursor of current philosophical assumptions. In his treatment of the soul, for example, scholars frequently turn to presumed parallels to Descartes's subject. This is especially the case in dealing with Plotinus's emphasis on the nature of the soul and its relation to the body and the sensible world. The difficulty is that Cartesian assumptions split mind and body into two independent substances, with the need to overcome the gap between them to explain the interaction of sensing and knowing. For Plotinus, however, soul and body are not two independent substances, but rather body is a manifestation of soul, albeit not just the human soul, at a lower level. This means that the soul is independent of the

body, but not the reverse. Plotinus's problem is showing how the soul can be the source of activities in the body without losing its independence, a much different problem from the Cartesian need to overcome the gap between the two.'

Helpful keys can actually be found in the works of Plotinus, but need to be made explicit. From this study of a selection of early treatises, three major assumptions are pervasive: the first envisions the cosmos as a single living thing, working from Timaeus 30d-31a; the second uses the highest genera of Sophist 254d-255e as the means for structuring each level of reality within itself and in relation both to its source and to what comes from it; and the third uses the principle of two acts, implicit in the simile of the sun in Republic VI, 508a-509c (among other places), to introduce a causality different from Aristotle's. Plotinus does in fact use Aristotle's theory of change in terms of act and potency and the four causes, but transforms them rather thoroughly to fit his more Platonic approach. He will also reinterpret Aristotle's notion of genus and species to function outside the realm of logic. These assumptions emerged in the course of studying the treatises included here, but it will be of great help to the reader to have them in mind from the start, for understanding both these treatises and Plotinus's writings in general. These assumptions also go against the grain of some contemporary interpretations of Plotinus and the assumptions in modern philosophy upon which such interpretations depend. These interpretations keep Plotinus's own assumptions occluded, so explaining them clearly becomes an important task in gaining access to his highly consistent account of human experience and the account of the world that serves as its foundation.

A Single Living Thing

The most basic assumption that forms the background on which Plotinus develops his thought is the nature of the sensible cosmos, our world of experience, as a single living thing. This he shares with most of the Greek philosophical tradition, Plato and Aristotle as well as the Stoics. It is also quite opposed to the reigning assumption of modern philosophy, which tends to see the world as discontinuous, spatially and temporally, with the mind given the task of providing any unity. While philosophers such as Kant deal specifically with the tension between assuming that bodies are discontinuous or continuous in providing an adequate physics, the tendency in philosophy has been to

assume discontinuity. Plotinus, however, is one of the most articulate in making the counter assumption of cosmic continuity explicit on several different levels. He begins with Plato's Timaeus 30d3-31a1, which describes the All as a single living thing that surrounds all the living things within it. As living, the unity of the whole cosmos implies a single source, the cosmic soul that enlivens and unifies the sensible cosmos as indeed one living thing. This is perhaps the feature that strikes the modern reader as strangest, as the view of the cosmos as a vast and empty space, with life a rare and insignificant exception, seems more natural. Plotinus is not, however, content to take the unity of the cosmos as simply given by this cosmic soul. He also reconfigures Aristotle's matter and Plato's receptacle to provide unity from the point of view of the material cause. In this instance, he insists that prime matter does not function as the principle of individuation, as Aristotle takes it, but rather teases out its nature as the common substrate of all bodies, providing the cosmos with its unity as a single body, whether alive or not.

The treatises examined here show how this idea of a single living thing is assumed and also explained. The early treatise On Beauty (1.6 [1]) is a short text where the unity of the cosmos operates as an assumption, with the soul initially captivated by the beauty of nature which casts a spell that keeps the soul in a forgetful and alienated state. This beauty resides in the unity of the cosmos as presented to the senses and is able to keep the soul from identifying with its own internal unity that brings it first toward the cosmic soul and then to intellect and the One.

The treatise On the Good and the One (VI.9 [9]) refers to the demiurge of the Timaeus as the source of the unity of the sensible cosmos and all the beings within it. Unity here comes to the fore as from the soul; it cannot be identified with body, as body is essentially divisible into parts. Unity is beyond what has parts, with its origin in the simplicity of forms and souls as incorporeal sources that make bodies a "this" and "one" at the same time. In VI.9 [9].9, he also introduces the image of the dance, a favorite for expressing both the unity and individuality among souls, illustrated in the kinds of unity that the soul experiences in its ascent, as described by Plato in his Symposium and elsewhere. The treatise On the Three Primary Hypostases (V.1[10]) makes the distinction between world soul and hypostasis soul explicit. The human soul is defined

as of like form with the world soul, which Plotinus takes as the ground for its ascent to the three hypostases (soul, intellect, and the One). Where previous treatises related soul to the sensible cosmos, V.1 [10] shifts to the soul's own nature as one and as having within it access to the higher hypostases, explaining both its initial state of alienation and its resources for overcoming it.

The treatise On Matter (II.4 [12]) argues in great detail about the nature of matter as the common substrate of the sensible cosmos, the basis on which bodies come to be in relation to one another and form together a single corporeal world. Drawing out the consequences of earlier thinkers, prime matter is itself incorporeal, analyzed explicitly as the principle of possibility for bodies and their interrelation as parts of a single thing. Matter in this sense functions as an a priori condition, not space and time as experienced but the conditions for such space and time and the bodies that occur within them. The treatise On the Presence of Being, One and the Same, Everywhere as a Whole I (VI.4 [22]) presents a complementary analysis of the role of soul in the formation of bodies. While matter remains only a condition of possibility, soul is a cause that remains transcendent to the body, whether a single body or the cosmos as a whole, and yet because of its incorporeal transcendence it is omnipresent to the body. In sum, matter provides for the corporeal continuity of the sensible cosmos, that bodies are related to one another temporally and spatially. The soul as form provides for its unity as a living thing, allowing these bodies to have activities that derive from their natures as enlivened by forms in varying degrees. The unity of soul allows sensible bodies to interact beyond mere corporeal juxtaposition, as living bodies of various kinds with activities richly diverse, from forming composites of great complexity to forming living beings displaying life in its vegetative, sensitive, rational, and intelligible variety.

The Five Highest Genera

To make his vision of the sensible cosmos as a single living thing work, Plotinus needs some structural mechanisms. He finds such a mechanism in the five highest genera of Plato's Sophist: being, rest, motion, sameness, and difference. As in Plato, these genera allow for the forms to be and to relate to one another, as they all share in different ways in these five highest kinds. They function like the axioms and principles of a science in

relation to the forms as theorems.' They allow being, in this case intelligible being, to be one and many and thus overcome the split represented by Parmenides's One and the many of the natural philosophers, neither of which could ground knowledge or the discourse in which it is expressed. These genera accomplish the interweaving of the forms, as described in the Sophist, working through motion and rest, and sameness and difference, to emphasize the fundamentally active nature and individual identity of the forms. In addition to its function as genus paired with sameness, otherness has a further role in generating being and becoming, already present in the Sophist. Plotinus explains this thoroughly, stating that otherness is the distinguishing feature of everything derived from the One, ending with the complete otherness of matter itself, whether described in terms of Aristotle's substrate or Plato's receptacle. Otherness in this sense will be crucial in articulating the principle of two acts.

With the treatise On the Good or the One (VI.9 [9]), Plotinus introduces this use of otherness to distinguish the unity peculiar to the One from the otherness of everything else. He states in VI.9 [9] .6 that the One has no otherness, with the consequence that the One is before motion and thought and so does not have knowledge, which is precisely defined as one thing knowing another. There is then a contrast between the One and intellect, and all the beings within it. Intellect and each of its beings are different from one another, so that thinking is first of the other and each being must move toward knowing the other to come to know itself. The One has no otherness at all. It thus does not have nor need knowledge of itself, as knowledge is defined by Plotinus as knowledge of the other. In addition, the One neither has nor needs knowledge of intellect and the beings within it, as such knowledge would mean it was no longer the One. Intelligible beings and souls, by contrast, are defined by otherness and motion.

In fact, intellect, because it is other than the One and is defined by its dual motion of departing from and returning to the One, knows, or tries to know, the One as the object of its thought. The One, however, cannot be an object of thought, so intellect's attempt to know the One remains incomplete, producing instead the multiplicity of beings. Intellect seeks the One's presence because intellect is other than it, but the One does not seek intellect precisely because the One has no otherness, as Plotinus states in VI.9

[9].8. In describing our knowledge of the One, Plotinus further states that we move beyond being and knowing, so the One is not experienced as other. More is said about this later, especially in VI.5 [2,3] in relation to the One's omnipresence.

In V.1[10].1, Plotinus begins with the primal otherness of the soul as the explanation for its alienation and ignorance, but moves in V.1 [10].4 to a full discussion of the highest kinds from the Sophist, when he turns to examine intellect. First, thinking is defined in terms of otherness and sameness, distinguishing intellect from the total lack of otherness characteristic of the One. This thinking, however, must be traced back to motion and rest as the conditions for thinking: thinking as essentially a motion, and rest for this thinking to remain the same. Otherness is then introduced so that there can be thinker and thought, with these objects of thought needing also to be different from one another. Finally, sameness so that intellect can be one in itself and also common to all thoughts as together one. Plotinus stays close to the Platonic vocabulary, but reveals his own interest not so much in the necessity of these genera for speech, but for the very constitution of the intelligible cosmos. It is interesting that he retains the priority of rest and motion to difference and sameness, which seems slightly out of step with modern philosophy, where logical priority dominates over the ontological.4

In the treatise On Matter, Plotinus explores the relation of otherness and motion to matter, whether of the intelligible or sensible world (II.4 [12].5). He describes these two genera as the shared principle of matter, what makes it possible. In this way, matter can be traced back to that first motion coming from the One, a motion that is also described as otherness. In addition, the matter of the sensible cosmos is in curious ways identified with otherness and yet strongly distinguished from it (11.4 [12].13). Matter is not identified with otherness as a genus, nor with sameness, for matter cannot be qualified in any way or share in these genera even as minimally as bodies.

Finally, at II.4 [12).16, 1-3, matter is identified with that part of otherness opposed to all being, even at the minimal level of the corporeal. It captures just the emptiness and possibility of otherness before it turns back to the forms and becomes bodies. Unlike intelligible matter, it is not being but other than it. This status as other than being, in

turn, does not mean that matter is nothing in the absolute sense, but rather that it draws near to being and by so doing allows for the world of becoming.

The difficulty faced in VI.4 [22] is how intellect and especially soul are related to body. At the core of his analysis is the different relation that body has to the highest genera. These genera define intelligible being, but have a somewhat extrinsic role in relation to the corporeal, due to its divisible and partitive nature. Forms, for instance, have two very different modes of relation to bodies. In VI.4 [22].3, immanent forms are identified with the qualities of bodies. Qualitative forms, accidents in Aristotle's terms, are possessed by the body in piecemeal fashion. The same form can be possessed by different parts of the body, but is numerically different in each part. This means that one part of the body can lose this form while another does not. These forms share the essentially divided nature of the body, with the body providing only an accidental unity that lasts as long as the body stays together.

The soul, however, as form of the body, does not relate to it in this piecemeal fashion but is present to the body as a whole and is cause of the body's unity and activities as living. It is the soul, then, that brings the highest genera to bear in the divided world of bodies, and it does so in a way that contrasts with qualitative forms. First, soul is not possessed by the body, keeping its difference; it is also present as a whole to the whole body and each of its parts, putting sameness into play. Soul remains at rest in the intelligible, and yet exercises activities while in the body, or while the body is in it, as

Plotinus states more precisely. In this way, there is no Cartesian gap to overcome, because the soul is precisely the kind of thing that can be present to a body qualified to receive it. Plotinus understands this interaction in terms of the soul's transcendence of, and immanence in, the body, both of which are applications of the highest genera in the more divisible realm of the corporeal (VI.4 [22]).

The Principle of Two Acts
The principle of two acts is already implicit in Plotinus's understanding of the nature of otherness, as otherness comes from a source on which it depends totally, while the source remains completely independent. Scholars have been aware of this principle for some time, but it is still not given its rightful role in the articulation of Plotinus's

thought.' Part of the reason for this is the strong tendency to take Aristotle's theory of act and potency as the paradigm for understanding any theory of action among ancient philosophers. Act and potency, however, are concerned with explaining change in sensible objects, Aristotle's primary substances. Act and potency thus concern the generation and corruption of living things, where a particular substance produces something like itself, with the same form coming into being and passing away. Form is the active cause, and matter of an appropriate kind is the potential cause. This theory of act and potency also serves as the foundation for Aristotelian hylomorphism, that form and matter are co-principles of sensible substances, the principles that make each thing one. The relation of act and potency in this scheme is horizontal, as it were: the two principles are used to explain the generation and unity of sensible things.

Plotinus is adamantly against this part of Aristotle's project, with a different understanding of substance and the unity at its base. In the principle of two acts, he looks not at change but at the nature of anything, with the first act as the activity that constitutes the thing's nature and the second act as the external image of the thing. The first act is thus identified with the unity inherent in a thing. The second act, as the image of the thing, is necessarily multiple or less unified in relation to the higher, more unified first act. As a consequence, the soul as form of the body is not a co-principle of the sensible substance, nor is it the entelechy of the body, but soul itself is the substance, whole and complete, that unifies the body while remaining separate from it. The reason is already apparent from the discussion of the highest genera: the soul remains transcendent and it is this transcendence which allows it to unify the body and exercise activities in and through it.

This combination of transcendence and unity stands behind the articulation of the theory of two acts and its pervasive importance for understanding Plotinus's project and its internal coherence. This is not about change at the sensible level, but rather about the presence of what is one and whole to something other and less unified. This emphasis on unity also entails simplicity, as the activity inherent in a thing cannot strictly speaking be composed of parts. Plotinus's assimilation of unity and simplicity implies that a source is different from its product, and that any activity can be shared in varying degrees, as a higher principle in relation to its lower manifestations.

implications for higher and more perfect causes, intellect, and the One. This is a causality different from Aristotle's and distinguishes the more absolute unity and independence of the cause from the multiplicity and radical dependence of the things caused.

V.1 [10].2 returns to the distinction between the world soul and the hypostasis soul as an example of a unifying power in relation to the multitude that derives from it and is dependent on it. The context seeks to explain the similarity of the human soul and the world soul, given that both bring unity to the sensible cosmos. With his understanding that the cause of unity needs to be independent, the hypostasis soul is introduced to accomplish this task for souls by establishing a soul that is not among the class of souls being unified but is in fact their higher source of unity. V.1 [10].3 then describes that soul's presence in and relation to intellect, where it curiously functions as intelligible matter. Subsequently intellect itself needs to be traced back to a unity more simple than its own. Plotinus analyzes this in terms of intellect's "seeing," alluding to the simile of the sun in the Republic. This is one of the Platonic texts most associated with Plotinus's principle of two acts. The sun, with fire as its internal activity, is the source of another activity, light, that is dependent on it but which leaves the sun completely unchanged. The emergence of light from the sun also has what Plotinus considers a crucial feature: it does not emerge by plan or design, but as it ought to, given the sun's fiery nature. Finally, the One is described as "beyond being;' just as the Good is described in this section of the Republic.

In his discussion of the virtues in I.2-3 [19-20], Plotinus highlights another crucial feature of the principle of two acts, namely, the nonreciprocal nature of the relation of the higher to the lower. Reciprocal likeness is true of things at the same level of reality, where one thing can be used to explain another. It is the kind of likeness operative in Aristotle's account of act and potency, where things actually dissimilar are brought from being potentially similar to being actually similar. Two languages, for example, that appear initially unintelligible to one another can achieve a mutual intelligibility by means that are not outside their own resources, such as matching words that refer to the same things and show similar grammatical structures. Nonreciprocal likeness, however, cannot be based on some similarity of form, but functions differently, as

Plotinus explains in I.2[19].2. This involves the Platonic relation of instances to their form, as first, the primal cause of these instances or images. When dealing with similar things, Aristotle's theory holds that they are like one another as sharing the same form. In the Platonic scheme, similar things are alike as instances of a common form and so are like the form itself, but the form as the paradigm is not like these instances because it is not itself an instance with them, which would lead to an infinite regress, the accusation against the forms in the Parmenides and in Aristotle's writings.

Plotinus illustrates this in terms of the topic of the treatise, the virtues that the human soul acquires in making its ascent. These virtues are not like their paradigms in the intelligible, which do not need to be acquired (the gods do not acquire but are their virtues), so that the likeness is different, where virtues express the reality of the paradigm in a lesser and weaker way. The central case in this text, at [19].5-6, introduces Plotinus's theory of the two selves; one self is only like its intelligible counterpart while the other is just this higher self. Here we see the principle of two acts at the very center of Plotinus's account of the human soul, and as necessary for understanding its peculiar situation in the sensible world where it continues to have access to the higher levels of reality. The difference in virtues, civic or purifying, turns on the nature of the activity involved. Civic virtues are activities of the lower self and are merely like the virtues of the higher self. These higher, purificatory virtues are activities that indicate the nature of the higher self. While the civic virtues allow the lower self to become like the higher self, when the self reaches a state where there is no impediment to the activity of the higher virtues, the lower self disappears, and the two selves become functionally the same; the soul is then alone.

Plotinus needs to make one more distinction, between the activities of these higher virtues in souls and the corresponding states in the intelligible. Even higher souls have virtues, wisdom for example, as something they receive from the intelligible, but wisdom in the intelligible is not acquired as if from the outside but just is what the intelligible is. All of these distinctions both illustrate and depend on the theory of two acts. A lower act is always inferior to and dependent on the higher; the higher can be relatively first, as in the case of the two selves in relation to the soul, or it can be

essentially higher, as in the case of the soul's relation to the intelligible, which possesses the activity precisely as its own.

In VI.4[22], Plotinus continues this analysis of the relation of soul and intellect to the sensible, but here in terms of transcendent powers that are sources of activities at the sense level. The powers are activities of higher beings that flow out and are present to the sense world, while remaining totally dependent on the higher. He uses some examples drawn from ordinary experience to illustrate his point in V1.4 [22].6-9. The hand, for example, has the power to pick up an object and perhaps even to throw it some distance. The power in the hand is omnipresent in the object, but it is unlike the qualitative attributes in the object which are immanent and possessed by the object in piecemeal fashion. The hand's power is not so possessed or immanent, but it is present to all parts of the object all at once and is present precisely as an activity that comes as an external power independent of the object. To explain the soul's similar presence to and activity in the body, this example needs a slight correction: while the power of the hand is present to the whole object, the hand itself has corporeal limits and is clearly physically external to the object. The soul, as incorporeal, is present not as external to the body but as thoroughly internal, without at the same time losing its complete transcendence and independence from the body. The other images in this section of the text concern light as the second activity of a fiery source, a clear allusion to Plato's discussion of light in the Parmenides and Republic and Plotinus's own clearest expression of the principle of two acts in his discussion of light in N5[29].6-7.7

In the preceding overviews, 111.6 [26] was not cited, but not for want of supporting evidence for these Plotinian assumptions. It does, however, present two intriguing clarifications of the principle of two acts. The first concerns the relation of soul and body particularly in light of the strong independence that earlier treatises gave to the soul. The dilemma Plotinus faces is his constant claim that the soul is impassible, the particular theme of this treatise. If it is impassible, what then is the status of the so-called affections of the soul and, more to the point, what does the soul's purification end up meaning?

Part of the answer comes in III.6 [23].3, where Plotinus argues that what are called affections" are the soul's if they are indeed identifiable as activities, with corresponding changes or alterations located in the body. Such activities include such things as ways of life, desires, and memories. These can be seen as aspects of soul as form, unchanging in themselves but taking on a certain structure in the body as the matter configured by these activities. Thus, one may have a regimen of health that in the soul is an idea or plan but gets translated into a diet on the one hand and physical exercise on the other.

In III.6 [23].4, he tackles the nature of bodily affections, such as fear, to indicate from this perspective the same kind of configuration, soul functioning as the form either configuring or responding to the configuration in the bodily affection. He develops a threefold structure for this, fear as a quasi-understanding in the part of the soul that fears that is derived from a quasi-opinion or quasi-image that in turn derives from the body in its state of agitation. Interestingly, music has a similar structure, the melody as in the soul, the musician who mediates between the melody, as form, and the instrument, whose plucked strings embody the melody in the production of the sound. In all these cases, he is applying the principle of two acts in the precise case of activities of a living thing that can be traced to soul but are expressed through the body.

In III.6 [26]. II-14, there is a curious discussion of the nature of matter in which Plotinus seems to hold that even matter in its peculiar way displays the twofold activity, that activity by which a thing is what it is and that activity that comes from it. In the case of matter, these cannot be seen as activities at all, but are mere shadows of such activities. What matter is as evil and ugly maintains its nature as unalterable, as incapable of receiving the forms that appear in it. If it should receive any form in any way, it would cease to be matter. Nonetheless, though it remains evil, it would still desire the good (II, 32). Thus, matter preserves its escape from being (13, 21) and never becomes being but is only other, ugly in contrast to the beauty of being (16, 24). Matter has a strange and shadowy way of manifesting a resistance to form, and yet a desire for it as well.

In this way, matter illustrates the general principle that the lower always seeks the higher, a mysterious sort of claim that causes Plotinus to wonder:

Since it is impossible that any being whatever, that is in any way, even being outside it, does not participate at all in being—for the nature itself of being is to make beings—but what is not at all being is unmixed with being, the thing becomes a wonder, how not participating it participates and how it has something as if from its nearness, even though by its own nature it is unable, as it were, to adhere. (III.6 [26].14, 18-23)

The principle of two acts is then a versatile tool that Plotinus can employ across the various levels of his system, from the One to matter. It is well adapted to this role, as it is precisely designed to explain how these different levels can interact with one another and yet keep their differences. If one fails to take full notice of it, then much of what Plotinus is doing throughout the Enneads is escaping one's attention.

Alienation

The above principles structure how intelligible being and sensible becoming function in diverse but consistent ways. Alienation emerges in the context of the human soul and its embodiment, and seems to bring about two possible modes, one conforming to the rest of reality and the other strangely at odds with it. To begin, alienation is paired with difference or otherness, one of the highest genera, and is used by Plotinus to understand the peculiar nature of the soul's existence and experience. Alienation is thus a peculiar instantiation of otherness in the human soul. Plotinus develops its meaning in ways that go beyond the Platonism he inherited, and which inaugurate several new ideas in the history of philosophy. It is clear, moreover, that Plotinus is well aware of the innovations he is making.

One major innovation concerns the nature of the One, or God. Otherness, as the defining characteristic of being, is the precise way it is distinct from the One. There is no otherness in the One, as mentioned above. From this comes a new understanding of the nature of God and a new method to articulate it, subsequently denominated as "negative theology." At the other extreme, matter is just otherness, with no admixture of anything else, particularly the complementary categories that define being. Matter is thus formless, nonbeing, the other nature that is absolute evil and source of evil. The intelligible and sensible worlds fall in between, combining the otherness which makes them different from the One with the unity that roots them in the One. This primordial

otherness and unity are the grounds of being and knowing, extending from the perfection of the intelligible to the more limited perfection of the sensible cosmos. Soul is the particular agency that links these two worlds, serving as the midpoint in Plotinus's scheme of things. It is this ontological situation that provides the context in which the particular alienation of the human soul is possible and, furthermore, comprehensible, without the negativity often associated with it.

He uses the two words to describe the nature of the soul's alienation and how this alienation fits into the larger scheme of his system. In addition, he uses, one's own, as their opposite. Alienation stems from the soul's departure from the intelligible world and presence in the sensible world, where the human soul, unlike any other soul, is capable of two opposite kinds of movements. One movement reunites the soul with its own intelligible nature, while the other causes it to sink so deeply into the sensible world that it becomes alienated from itself. Alienation thus indicates the way in which the human soul has activities that are unique: it can act morally or immorally, experience the beautiful or the ugly, and judge truly or falsely. In fact, all the soul's powers and activities are expressions of its alienation as well as the means to overcome '1 his situation is quite problematic, not the least for the dualism of soul and body and the depreciation of the sensible that is often seen as its consequence. More fundamentally, however, it places the human soul in a special category, with functions and activities different from those of other souls in relation to intellect and the One.

This intersection between the inner alienation of the soul and the ontological otherness of matter and being is already present in the earliest treatises. 1.6 [1] focuses on the alienation of the soul that makes the aesthetic distinction between the beautiful and the ugly possible. There is a surprising passage in I.6 [1].7, however, where Plotinus identifies the alien with all that is not the One, including both the sensible and the intelligible worlds. V1.9[9] considers unity and traces it back to the One in such a way that both being and knowing have an otherness totally absent from the One, with difficulties both in experience of and language about the One. V.1 [12] begins with the alienation of the soul as the problem to be discussed and seeks to resolve it with an intricate analysis of the nature of soul, individual, world, and hypostasis.

The two treatises on matter, II.4[12] and III.6 [26], have a central role in elaborating the nature of otherness as the condition of possibility for the sensible cosmos. II.4 [12] focuses particularly on the Aristotelian terminology for the material cause, with the words "matter" and "substrate" carefully defined. 111.6 [26], however, explores the equivalent (for Plotinus!) Platonic language in the Timaeus and Symposium. In examining these dialogues Plotinus pinpoints the precise way in which he sees the matter of the sensible cosmos as evil and ugly, as completely without form. Alienation in the human soul has this character of matter as the condition for moral evil and falsehood, though the alienation is not directly caused by matter, but rather by the human self as embodied. I.2-3 [19-20] explore the nature of the self, examining the virtues, moral and intellectual, that are at the soul's disposal for its ascent to the intelligible and escape from the state of alienation. Finally, VI.4-5 [22-23] describes the different ways that soul moves out from the intelligible and brings its power to the sensible. This emphasizes the positive nature of soul's care of the universe, with the specific role of the human soul in bringing the beauty of the sensible cosmos to fuller expression.

Alienation, then, provides us with Plotinus's attempt to describe the Platonic view that the human soul is somehow not quite where it should be, alienated in some strange way that still preserves its impassibility, and to ground this alienation in a radical reformulation of the first principles of a Platonic ontology. Plotinus's ability to tie together the very loose ends of Plato's philosophy, at times only suggested in the Platonic corpus, comes through with astonishing clarity.

Method

Plotinus's own method is an intriguing mix. He often starts with problems, from disagreements among his philosophical predecessors to puzzles deriving from the consequences of his own position. In this instance, he follows in the aporetic tradition of Plato and Aristotle. He also has a remarkable ability for observing and describing the intricacies of the human situation, giving him an anticipation of phenomenological method. His arguments are crisp and clean and he can draw out the consequences of a position with tenacious exactness. He consciously uses images and analogies with care and facility. It is the presence of all these elements together that gives his writing both

its vibrancy as well as its occasional obscurity, especially for those not attentive to the intertwining of these different modes even within a single treatise.

My own attempt at sensitivity to his various methods, furı her, has dictated the strategy of this work. Plotinus's methods work together to foster a pedagogical goal, gradually unfolding the structure of his philosophy in order to bring his dissenter to a fuller self-understanding and thence to a more adequate knowledge of the soul and reality in all their complexity. This philosophical investigation of a small group of treatises from his earliest period is not a philological commentary on the treatises involved, for which there are now happily some examples, but a commentary centered on a few key ideas and how they function as Plotinus invites us to reflect on our experience.

All translations are my own. Plotinus is one of those figures where translation needs to be done over and over again. Initial translations allow the reader access to his philosophy, but have often been based on imprecise understanding of his thought. Further translations can correct these imprecisions and thus more fully express what he is actually trying to say. I have also attempted not to over-translate the passages and have generally put words not in the Greek text in brackets. This is to facilitate the reader's own comparison of the translation with the original. I have also discovered many passages where I found the current translations wrong or misleading. Usually, a simpler translation proved to be more accurate as well. I have not presented his arguments by taking passages from several places to elaborate a single topic or thesis. Instead, I have developed an understanding of his argument by analyzing each passage within the context of the treatise in which it is found and how it contributes to the overall argument of that treatise. With this as a foundation, I have attempted to develop a cumulative understanding of his philosophical position by seeing how different treatises depend on and amplify one another. <>

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The Enneadic treatise IV 7 (2) constitutes Plotinus' first attempt to reflect systematically on the problem of the immortality of the soul. It is a complex text, in which the exposition of the Plotinian doctrine is preceded by a long doxographic excursus dedicated to the refutation of the ideas of some ancient philosophical schools (Aristotelian, Epicurean, Stoic, Pythagorean). The problems posed by the treatise are addressed in this volume from an interdisciplinary perspective: historians of ancient thought and of Neoplatonism, historians of religions, historians of late antique culture, classical philologists meet in these pages to address, from very different points of view, one of the most stimulating texts left to us by Plotinus.

CONTENTS

Plotinus' treatise IV 7 (2) On the Immortality of the Soul is a peculiar text. Dating back to the philosopher's early teaching and writing activity in Rome, it occupies the second place in the 'chronological' list presented by Porphyry in his Vita Plotini (henceforth, VP).1 Treatise IV 7 (2) is therefore only preceded by the short I 6 (1) On Beauty, thus constituting the first reflection attempted by the thinker from Lycopolis regarding the problem of the immortality of the soul. Plotinus introduces his discussion (always dealt with from the point of view of a Platonic thinker) with a long polemical doxographic section aimed at demonstrating the falsity of the different doctrines proposed, in this regard, by some of antiquity's most influential philosophical schools: Epicurean, Stoic (soul as matter), Pythagorean (soul as harmony), and Peripatetic (soul as entelechy). These theories are then refuted, one after the other, in an excursus occupying a large part of the treatise. Because of the way in which Plotinus puts his argumentative techniques into play, and because of the information it provides on other philosophical systems, this doxographic approach constitutes one of the work's most interesting aspects: it is, however, far from being the only one.

Treatise IV 7 (2) actually places itself at the crossroads of discussions regarding such crucial issues as the textual history of Plotinus' corpus in Late Antiquity; the study of the enneadic manuscript tradition; the evaluation of the role played by the indirect tradition in the history of the transmission of Plotinus' works; and the influence exerted on Plotinus' thought by the Gnostic reflection on Plato. In what follows, we intend to provide a general overview aimed at introducing the reader, in a succinct yet sufficiently detailed way, to some of the most relevant issues at hand. Many others will be taken up by the papers assembled in this volume.

Plotinus IV 7 (2): new perspectives of interdisciplinary research

The journey leading up to the publication of this book was a long one. This volume is the final outcome of a research project, funded by Università degli Studi di Roma Tor

Vergata, that aimed at exploiting the specificities of IV 7 (2) by considering them not only from the perspective of specialists in Plotinus' text, but also (and in a sense mainly) from the particular point of view of scholars who have focused their research interests on different aspects of Greek thought and culture. This was the starting point of a series of Plotinus seminars focusing on IV 7 (2) that we organized between December 2019 and February 2021: our meetings, devoted to reading, translating, and discussing several chapters of our treatise, one after the other, were able to survive – with a few months' interruption – even the Covid-19 pandemic, and it is with great pleasure that we thank all those people who attended them for their willingness to endure long work sessions conducted remotely through Microsoft Teams.

It is equally our pleasure to thank the Istituto Svizzero of Rome for willingly hosting, via Zoom (together with Tor Vergata University), our final International Conference (Plotino, Sull'immortalità dell'anima [Enn. IV 7 (2)]: nuove prospettive di ricerca interdisciplinare, March 12, 2021), after we were twice forced to move and reschedule the event, which was originally planned to be held, with in-person attendance, on June 4, 2020.

The reader will find many of the contributions presented in the context of our seminars and the conference here. Among the friends whose works, due to various reasons and circumstances, could not be included here, we are pleased to at least mention the following: Francesca Alesse, Riccardo Chiaradonna, Marta Cristiani, Nicolas D'Andrès, Jean-Marc Narbonne, and Emidio Spinelli.

This book thus explores a large part of the spectrum of research lines converging on IV 7 (2). Thanks to the participation of some of the best specialists in each one of the disciplines involved (philology, ecdotics, the history of Greek philosophy, the history of religions, the history of Late Antiquity, etc.), the reader will have the opportunity to approach this stimulating Plotinus text through an interdisciplinary perspective that is able to account for the plurality of questions it raises.

Let us now have a closer look at both the structure of this volume and the content of the papers we are presenting:

SECTION I: PHILOLOGICAL ISSUES

DANIELA P. TAORMINA (ROMA, TOR VERGATA): PLOTIN IV 7 (2): LA NUMÉROTATION MARGINALE

Treatise IV 7 (2) is one of the 17 texts by Plotinus for which the manuscript tradition presents, in the text's margins, a Greek numbering for which its significance is, at first sight, unclear. P. Henry suggested that it is a sort of 'note marker' referring to Plotinian words and phrases explained by Porphyry in one of his lost commentaries on the Enneads. On the ground of a new analysis of these marginal annotations, we take up here Henry's hypothesis and suggest that we may see in this numbering a trace of a chapter division of the treatise far from the Ficinian one modern scholars are accustomed to referring to.

LORENZO FERRONI (FIRENZE) : TROIS NOTES TEXTUELLES EN MARGE DE PLOTIN IV 7 (2)

Even though H.-S.'s researches have produced one of the masterpieces of 20th-century philology, from the point of view of an analysis of both the textual and editorial choices, the possibility of critically establishing Plotinus's text on the ground of a fresh examination of old and new data is still appealing. The excellence of this reference edition has often led scholars to maintain a somewhat passive approach to the text published by H.-S.; we believe that, on the contrary, it is still possible to find new solutions to the many textual problems posed by the Enneads. The analysis of three problematic passages of IV 7 (2) precisely aims at showing proof of this.

SECTION II: TREATISE IV 7 (2) IN ITS ENNEADIC CONTEXT

GHEORGHE PASCALÅU (LEUVEN) : DE LA BEAUTE VERS L'UN A TRAVERS L'AME : LA PLACE DU TRAITE IV 7 (2) DANS LA COMPOSITION DES PREMIERS ECRITS DE PLOTIN

Plotinus' second treatise On the Immortality of the Soul (IV 7), though often treated with contempt because of its apparently 'scholastic' character, proves itself on a closer reading to be a peculiarly important station in the development of Plotinian thought. On one hand, the treatise On the Immortality of the Soul revisits certain themes of the first Plotinian writing (I 6 [1] On the Beautiful) and even answers some questions left open in it. On the other, Plotinus' second treatise introduces concepts and arguments of which the immediately succeeding works will expand upon. Thus, the third treatise, On Fate (III 1), resolves the problem of causality by recurring to the notion of "purified

soul," as developed in the previous work. The fifth work, On Intellect, Ideas, and Being (V 9), widens the horizon of philosophical reflection towards a theory of transcendent Intelligence, but insists on the links which assure the communication between this Intelligence and soul. Intellect is conceived as the agent of essential reasons (^^^ot) which structure the soul's substance and determine its demiurgic and 'poetic' activity, an activity described in treatises 1 6 (1) and IV 7 (2). Finally, the ninth treatise, On the Good or the One (VI 9), by which the first period of Plotinus' 'literary' creation is completed, represents in many ways the culmination of certain threads of reflection expounded in the treatises 1 6 (1) and IV 7 (2). The formula of 'self-abstraction,' developed in the works On the Beautiful and On the Immortality of the Soul, is enlarged and reinterpreted in the sense of a transcendence beyond one's Self and not merely towards one's (true) Self, as in the treatises 1 6 (1) and IV 7 (2). The 'cathartic' singularisation of the soul, on which the arguments for its immortality were grounded in the second treatise, now finds a deeper ground in the flight of the solitary one to the solitary One, as theorised in the ninth treatise (VI 9).

CLAUDIA LO CASTO (SALERNO): IL TEMA DEL VERO UOMO IN PLOTINO: IV 7 (2) 1, 22-25 E I 1 (53) 9-10 A CONFRONTO
In IV 7 (2), Plotinus presents his thesis on the existence of a purer part of the soul, the rational part, which would define man in the most authentic sense, "the true man." This idea is intimately connected to the famous doctrine of the non-descended soul formulated by Plotinus for the first time in IV 7 (2) with the aim, as I will try to demonstrate, of detaching the soul from the body to which it is joined at a specific time, that is, during the biological life of the living being. In this contribution I propose to reconstruct Plotinus' view of the authentic essence of man by also using the analysis of some crucial passages of treatise I 1 (53), where Plotinus distinguishes 'man,' understood in his primary, authentic sense (i.e. the soul), from the living being, understood as the union of soul and body.

ELENI PERDIKOURI (ATHENS): THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE SOUL FROM THE BODY AS A NECESSARY CONDITION FOR PERCEPTION IN PLOTINUS (IV 7 [2] 6-7)
In this paper I discuss a central feature of Plotinus' philosophical psychology, which appears at the onset of his writing, in the early treatise On the Immortality of the Soul

IV 7 (2). It is the claim that the complete separateness of soul from body is a necessary condition not only for intellection but also for perception. This claim is accompanied by another essential claim, that the soul is immortal and impassible in its entirety. The separateness of soul from body is first discussed with relation to the unity of the perceiving subject, which is necessary for any perception to occur. Perception presupposes the transmission of the affections from the body so-qualified to the faculty of representation. It is nature, the lower part of the soul, that operates as the transmitting agent. This transmission consists in a kind of translation of bodily sensations into intelligible forms. The process of translation constitutes Plotinus' 'messenger' theory, which implies that the messenger in question, i.e. nature which 'reports' to the perceptive soul, is unaffected by the message that it carries. The necessity for an unaffected 'messenger' entails the unaffectability and thus the uniformity of the whole soul.

MAURICIO PAGOTTO MARSOLA (SÃO PAULO, UNIFESP), WITH THE COLLABORATION OF ANDREA ARAF (ROMA TRE): APPUNTI SU IV 7 (2) 15

In the final chapter of treatise IV 7 (2), Plotinus proposes a final argument, explicitly addressed to those who need sensation to convince themselves of the immortality of the soul. After opposing demonstration to belief (15, 1-3), the philosopher states that the grounds for the latter come from data offered by io-copia (15, 4), a term here closely connected to the theme of divination. It is actually oracles and mantic art that transmit the messages of the souls, including the testimony of their immortality. In the second half of the chapter, the oracular testimony of the souls is presented in two senses: (1) the cultural practices regarding the souls in the worshiping of the dead (15, 4-6) and (2) the souls' beneficial intervention in regard to the living (15, 7-9). The structure of the chapter is simple; still, its reading, after that of the previous 14 chapters, requires a deep change of perspective. Moreover, the terms used by Plotinus are steeped in a long tradition. It is therefore appropriate to note the singularity of this chapter and state that this kind of argument is uncommon in the Enneads.

Section III Philosophical Targets, Cultural Context, and Aspects of Later Fortune

FRANCESCO VERDE (ROMA, SAPIENZA): L'ANIMA COME AGGREGATO DI ELEMENTI IN PLOTINO (IV 7 [2] 3, 1-6) E IL DE ANIMA DI ARISTOTELE (I 4-5)

The main purpose of this paper on Plotinus' treatise On the Immortality of the Soul (IV 7 [2]) is focused on the very beginning of the third chapter (l. 1-6), in which Plotinus criticizes those philosophical traditions which described the soul as a reality composed of elements. Here I would like to suggest the exegetical hypothesis that Plotinus' critique of the conception of the soul as an aggregate of elements – be they of corporeal nature like atoms, or of indivisible magnitudes or amere – could have as an important model of reference chapters 4 and 5 of the first book of De anima, in which Aristotle criticizes Democritus' and Xenocrates' definitions of the soul.

LUCA GILI (MONTRÉAL, UQÀM): FORMS AS WHOLES. PLOTINUS' DIALECTICAL REFUTATION OF THE DOCTRINE OF THE ENTELECHY-SOUL

In this paper, I show that Plotinus adopts a distinctive dialectical approach while discussing the Aristotelian doctrine of the soul as the entelechy of a body potentially possessing life. While Plotinus' theory of the soul has been the object of several studies, the logical structure of his critique of the Aristotelian point of view has not been the object of an in-depth analysis. By fleshing out the structure of the argument proposed by the Neoplatonist philosopher in order to show that the soul is not the form of a body, I will be stressing his skillful adoption of dialectical techniques, according to a broad notion of dialectic that was practiced by Plato in his dialogues and described by Aristotle chiefly in Topics VIII. This type of dialectic does not map onto Plotinus' own characterization of dialectic as a method of ascent to the principles, thereby suggesting that the generic dialogical structure described by M. Marion in recent papers was still the preferred form of argumentation in Plotinus' time, since it was nonchalantly adopted by the Neoplatonist philosopher while debating a competing description of the soul.

FEDERICO MARIA PETRUCCI (TORINO): HIDDEN TARGETS: PLOTINUS' CRITICISM OF THE MIDDLE PLATONISTS IN IV 7 (2)

The aim of this paper is to reveal the implicit criticism against some Middle Platonist philosophical stances in the polemical part of IV 7 (2) (i.e., 2-85), which is usually

regarded as being directed only against Stoic and Peripatetic doctrines and as relying on earlier Platonist material. I want to suggest that Plotinus' polemic is designed to dismantle not only Stoic and Peripatetic views of the soul, but also what he regards as the Middle Platonists' erroneous ways of understanding the soul's nature and immortality.

GIULIA SFAMENI GASPARRO (MESSINA): LA VERITÀ DELL'ESSERE ALLO SPECCHIO DELLA MEMORIA MITICA E CULTUALE: PLOTINO FRA TRADIZIONE ELLENICA E POLEMICA ANTI-GNOSTICA

As the protagonist of a unique human experience stretching across almost the entire 3rd century CE between the two most influential cultural centres of the Empire, Alexandria and Rome, Plotinus stands out as a sort of exceptional 'sounding board' of the many and sometimes conflicting ideological, spiritual, and religious currents spreading through the contemporary historical horizon. In the construction of an original philosophical proposal based on rigorous logical arguments, rooted in the ground of the Hellenic tradition of thought, and with a strong Platonic hue combined with vital contributions issued by both the Aristotelian and Stoic experiences, he is also interested in the religious dimension of the cultural environment to which he belongs, a context he observes in its double nature of both cultic practice and 'sacred narrations' on superhuman powers - the mythoi - that were reflected to a large extent in the voices of poets, starting with the Homeric and Hesiodic poems. The repeated Plotinian appeals to myths and traditional cultic practices, revisited in the light of his own philosophical views, constitute one of the highest celebrations of one's own cultural and religious identity that an exponent of the 3rd century CE hellenismòs could propose – and this while having to face the more numerous and pervasive Christian movement, as well as the shocking proposal by the Gnostics attending his school and radically refuting the Platonic postulate of the visible cosmos as 'the best of the possible worlds' put forward by the 'friends' with whom he established an uninterrupted and passionate debate during the whole of his human and intellectual experience.

CHIARA OMBRETTA TOMMASI (PISA): CENNI SULLA DOTTRINA DELL'ANIMA IMORTALE IN ALCUNI SCRITTI DEL PRIMO CRISTIANESIMO

This paper discusses how the doctrine of an immortal soul was discussed and developed among early Christian thinkers, taking into account the position assumed by the early Apologists, Arnobius, Tertullian and some Gnostic writers, as well as the influence exerted on them by Greek philosophy. Particular attention is given to Arnobius' polemic against the so-called viri novi.

ALEXANDRA MICHALEWSKI (CNRS) : LA QUESTION DE L'IMMORTALITE DE L'AME EN IV 7 (2) 85 : LE CHOIX DES EXTRAITS D'EUSEBE DE CESAREE EN PE XV, 9-11

This article analyses to what extent Eusebius' selection in PE XV 9-11, a passage offering a triptych of Platonic refutations of the Aristotelian doctrine of entelechy, partly obscures the specificity of Plotinus' position. Indeed, if Eusebius reports extensive portions of IV 7 (2), he only quotes from Plotinus' polemical doxography, which ends, with the refutation of Aristotle's entelechy doctrine, in IV 7 (2) 85. Now, unlike Atticus, who focuses on the inconsistency of a definition which makes the soul an immobile entelechy, Plotinus, starting from IV 7 (2) 9, shows that the soul is self-moving because it is an essentially living reality, living and existing of itself – which is the feature of its substantiality. This leads him to address the question of auto-motricity in the context of the soul's ontological situation, which ranks among the intelligible entities. Now, it is precisely this understanding of auto-motricity which is at stake in Porphyry's extract from Against Boethos quoted in PE XV 11. This contribution thus aims to show that, between PE XV 9 and 11, the meaning of the soul's automotricity has changed. But from the perspective of the Eusebian selection, which only aims at stressing the Platonists' unanimity against the Aristotelian doctrine of entelechy, this transformation remains unnoticed. <>

PROCLI DIADOCHI, IN
PLATONIS TIMAEUM COMMENTARIA

BY PROCLUS
EDITED BY GERD VAN RIEL [OXFORD CLASSICAL TEXTS,
OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS, [Procli Diadochi, In Platonis
Timaeum Commentaria, Oxford Classical Texts Oxford University
Press, ISBN 9780192856074]

Oxford Classical Texts, also known as Scriptorum Classicorum Bibliotheca Oxoniensis, provide authoritative, clear, and reliable editions of ancient texts, with apparatus criticus on each page. This five volume work is a new critical text edition of the only surviving ancient commentary on Plato's Timaeus, in which Proclus encompasses seven centuries of philosophical reflection on Plato's cosmology. For many authors belonging to the Platonic tradition, Proclus' commentary is the only extant source. For late Neoplatonic authors such as Proclus, writing commentaries on works by Plato and others was in fact a way to present their own highly original philosophical doctrines. Apart from being an important source text for the historiography of philosophy, this commentary on the Timaeus thus also provides a unique access way to Proclus' own Neoplatonic views on cosmology, theology, physics, and metaphysics.

This new edition is based on a thorough re-examination of the entire manuscript tradition, which has led to a complete understanding of the relation between all extant manuscripts, including the Paris palimpsest BNF Supplément grec 921, belonging to the so-called 'collection philosophique' (9th century). On the basis of digitally enhanced UV photos, the scriptio inferior of this palimpsest (containing parts of books IV and V) was made nearly fully accessible. The study of the manuscript tradition and the apparatus fontium take stock of more than 100 years of study of this circumstantial text. The edition of the text is preceded by a substantial introduction, and followed, for each book, by the edition of the scholia to the text. The final volume also comprises an edition of the remaining fragments of the lost part of the text, including an Arabic fragment, edited by Rüdiger Arnzen.

The Timaeus is a dialogue by Plato that deals with the nature of the cosmos and the human soul. The dialogue takes place after the events of the Republic, where Plato's characters discuss the ideal city and its citizens. In the Timaeus, Timaeus, one of the characters, presents a cosmological theory of how the universe was created by a divine craftsman, who used mathematical principles and geometrical shapes to create a harmonious and orderly world. The dialogue also investigates the nature of the human soul, its parts and functions, its relation to the body, and its fate after death.

The Timaeus has inspired and challenged many thinkers throughout history, who have used its ideas and arguments in various domains such as philosophy, science, and theology. The dialogue's impact can be seen in areas such as metaphysics, epistemology, ethics, and political theory. The Timaeus also played a key role in the development of Neoplatonism, a philosophical school that emerged in the third century CE and combined Plato's teachings with mystical and religious elements.

Neoplatonism is a version of Platonic philosophy that emerged against the background of Hellenistic philosophy and religion. The term does not encapsulate a set of ideas as much as a series of thinkers who shared some common themes, such as the doctrine that all of reality can be derived from a single principle, "the One". Neoplatonism was influenced by other philosophical schools, such as Aristotle's metaphysics, Stoicism's ethics, and Pythagoreanism's mathematics. Neoplatonism also incorporated elements of literature, myth, and religious practice into its system of thought. Neoplatonism had a lasting impact on the subsequent history of Western philosophy and religion, especially on Christian, Jewish, and Islamic thinkers. Proclus' Commentary on Plato's Timaeus Book One is a philosophical work by one of the most prominent Neoplatonist thinkers, Proclus, who wrote it to explain Plato's dialogue on cosmology. This commentary is the only ancient one that survives on Plato's Timaeus, and it covers seven centuries of Platonic philosophy. The books have been edited in Greek and corrected by Gerd Van Riel and published by Oxford University Press in its prestigious Oxford Classical Texts Series. They provide a critical edition of the text with detailed introductions to each book that review the studies on Plato's Timaeus over the last 100 years. It also provides a new examination of the manuscript tradition of the work.

Proclus' Commentaries on the Timæus of Plato is a powerful and innovative work of ancient philosophy that has left a lasting mark on the field of Plato scholarship. Proclus' commentary illustrates how the Neo-Platonic school adopted and refined Plato's notions about the metaphysical, cosmological, theological, and ethical dimensions of reality. Proclus' commentary also provides a unique view on the textual history and transmission of the Timaeus, which was not available to previous commentators.

Proclus' Commentaries on the Timæus of Plato is a comprehensive work that covers a wide range of themes, including:

- The nature of reality, including the distinction between the intelligible and the sensible worlds
- The nature of the soul, including its immortality and its relationship to the body
- The nature of the cosmos, including its creation, structure, and function
- The nature of mathematics, including its relationship to the intelligible world
- The nature of theology, including the nature of the divine and its relationship to the world

Proclus' commentary is particularly notable for its depth and sophistication in its treatment of mathematical and theological topics. He draws on a wide range of sources, including Pythagorean, Platonic, and Neoplatonic philosophy, as well as mathematics, astronomy, and other sciences.

Here are some specific topics that Proclus discusses in his commentary:

- The nature of being and becoming
- The relationship between the One and the Many
- The nature of the Forms
- The nature of the soul and its immortality
- The nature of the cosmos and its creation
- The role of mathematics in the cosmos
- The nature of the divine and its relationship to the world
- The interpretation of Plato's Timaeus line by line

Proclus' Commentary on the Timæus of Plato is a complex and challenging work. A more detailed overview of the topics discussed in Proclus' Commentaries on the Timæus of Plato, keyed to the parts:

Part I:

- The nature of philosophy and its relationship to mathematics and theology,

- The Pythagorean tetraktys

- The Neoplatonic theory of emanation

- The nature of the intelligible world and its relationship to the sensible world

- The Platonic theory of Forms

- The nature of the Forms and their role in the intelligible world

Part II:

- The nature of the soul and its immortality

- The different types of souls (rational, irrational, and vegetal)

- The soul's relationship to the body

- The soul's journey after death

- The nature of the cosmos and its creation

- The role of mathematics in the cosmos

Part III:

- The nature of the divine and its relationship to the world

- The nature of the divine One

- The different orders of gods

- The relationship between the divine and the human

- The interpretation of Plato's Timaeus

Within each part, Proclus discusses a wide range of specific topics. For example, in Part I, he discusses the Pythagorean and Platonic theories of mathematics, as well as the Neoplatonic theory of emanation. In Part II, he discusses the different types of souls,

the soul's relationship to the body, and the soul's journey after death. In Part III, he discusses the nature of the divine One, the different orders of gods, and the relationship between the divine and the human.

Proclus' commentary is also notable for its detailed treatment of Plato's Timaeus. He goes through the dialogue line by line, explaining Plato's text and offering his own interpretations. In doing so, he draws on a wide range of sources, including Pythagorean, Platonic, and Neoplatonic philosophy, as well as mathematics, astronomy, and other sciences.

The first volume deals with what may be seen as the prefatory material of the Timaeus. In it Socrates gives a summary of the political arrangements favoured in the Republic, and Critias tells the story of how news of the defeat of Atlantis by ancient Athens had been brought back to Greece from Egypt by the poet and politician Solon. In the second part Proclus describes the 'creation' of the soul that animates the entire universe. This is not a literal creation, for Proclus argues that Plato means only to convey the eternal dependence of the World Soul upon higher causes. In his exegesis of Plato's text, Proclus addresses a range of issues in Pythagorean harmonic theory, as well as questions about the way in which the World Soul knows both forms and the visible reality that comprises its body. This part of Proclus' Commentary is particularly responsive to the interpretive tradition that precedes it. As a result, this part of the commentary is especially significant for the study of the Platonic tradition from the earliest commentators onwards.

Proclus' commentary on Plato's Timaeus records Proclus' exegesis of Timaeus 27a–31b, in which Plato first discusses preliminary matters that precede his account of the creation of the universe, and then moves to the account of the creation of the universe as a totality. For Proclus this text is a grand opportunity to reflect on the nature of causation as it relates to the physical reality of our cosmos. The commentary deals with many subjects that have been of central interest to philosophers from Plato's time onwards, such as the question whether the cosmos was created in time, and the nature of evil as it relates to physical reality and its ontological imperfection.

Among other parts the fifth presents Proclus' commentary on the Timaeus, dealing with Proclus' account of static and flowing time; we see Proclus situating Plato's account of the motions of the stars and planets in relation to the astronomical theories of his day. The volume includes a substantial introduction, as well as notes that will shed new light on the text.

Proclus' commentary has been a crucial source for Plato scholars from antiquity to modern times, and has enhanced our comprehension and admiration of the Timaeus.

THE RENAISSANCE OF PLOTINUS: THE SOUL AND HUMAN NATURE IN MARSILIO FICINO'S COMMENTARY ON THE ENNEADS by Anna Corrias [Routledge Research in Early Modern History, Routledge, 9781138630895]

Plotinus (204/5–270 C.E.) is a central figure in the history of Western philosophy. However, during the Middle Ages he was almost unknown. None of the treatises constituting his Enneads were translated, and ancient translations were lost. Although scholars had indirect access to his philosophy through the works of Proclus, St. Augustine, and Macrobius, among others, it was not until 1492 with the publication of the first Latin translation of the Enneads by the humanist philosopher Marsilio Ficino (1433–1499) that Plotinus was reborn to the Western world.

Ficino's translation was accompanied by a long commentary in which he examined the close relationship between metaphysics and anthropology that informed Plotinus's philosophy. Focusing on Ficino's interpretation of Plotinus's view of the soul and of human nature, this book excavates a fundamental chapter in the history of Platonic scholarship, one which was to inform later readings of the Enneads up until the nineteenth century. It will appeal to scholars and students interested in the history of Western philosophy, intellectual history, and book history.

CONTENTS

Ficino's Plotinus

This book, as the title suggests, is about Plotinus. Not the Plotinus who is taught in textbooks and university classrooms today, although, in many respects, the five chapters which follow speak also of that Plotinus. He is the Plotinus to whom on many occasions I shall refer to as 'Ficino's Plotinus'. This epithet, I hope, will make the task of describing his historical and philosophical identity easier: he is the Plotinus who emerges from the commentary on the Enneads composed by the fifteenth-century humanist philosopher Marsilio Ficino and published in Florence in 1492. This commentary accompanied Ficino's Latin translation of the Enneads, published in the same year, but which, as we shall see, occupied Ficino from the 1460s.

The epithet 'Ficino's Plotinus', however, expresses a much more intimate and complex relationship than the one implied by Ficino's authorship of the Latin version and interpretation of Plotinus's text. For our Plotinus shares some fundamental philosophical traits with his translator and commentator. Two of these traits – the most prominent ones – have been identified and discussed in previous scholarship, most recently by Stephen Gersh in the two introductory essays that accompany his critical edition and English translation of Ficino's commentary on Enneads III and IV.1 They are: (1) Plotinus's interest in and commitment to the philosophy of some of his successors, i.e. Porphyry, Synesius of Cyrene, Proclus, and, especially, Iamblichus (whom I shall generally refer to as 'post-Plotinian' Platonists hoping that the reader will keep in mind that, for Ficino, they were not 'post-' to anyone, but simply 'Platonists'); (2) Plotinus's adaption of some of his positions to the principles of Christian theology. The third trait, partly discussed by Gersh,2 which I shall articulate further in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3, is our Plotinus's desire to rescue the original Aristotle from the misinterpretations of Alexander of Aphrodisias and Averroes who, in Ficino's view, had disgracefully made Aristotle a 'non-Platonist'. The first two traits need to be further

unpacked in order to avoid hasty conclusions, such as thinking Ficino was deliberately manipulating Plotinus and forcing him into a box where he did not belong – for this is the last thing that Ficino wished to do.

In the first part of this Introduction, I shall discuss what it meant, for Ficino, to give Plotinus – what for us is – a post-Plotinian character and why on many occasions he made Plotinus agree with Christianity. I shall claim that: (1) the reason why Ficino made Plotinus make a wide use of the post-Plotinian philosophers was not to give Plotinus a spurious, borrowed identity; on the contrary, his intention was to make Plotinus's genuine thought as transparent as possible for his readers – for who could explain Plotinus more lucidly and loyally than Plotinus's closest successors?; (2) in many instances, Ficino's Plotinus's espousal of some principles of Christianity cannot be explained by Ficino's belief that Plotinus agreed – or should have agreed – with those principles. Instead, it should be understood in the light of Ficino's constant preoccupation with getting into trouble with the Inquisition. I shall also argue that on no occasion should the post-Plotinian and the Christian dimensions of Ficino's Plotinus affect or transform the theoretical sophistication of Plotinus's line of thought. In Ficino's commentary, Plotinus remains, first and foremost, a rigorous metaphysical philosopher.

Plotinus's relation to the philosophy of his successors was discussed by E. R. Dodds in several works, especially his 'Theurgy and Its Relationship with Neoplatonism', published in 1947, and The Greeks and the Irrational, of 1951. Dodds famously claimed that Plotinus was a highly rational thinker who, in contrast to his philosophical successors, had no interest at all in theurgic rituals aimed at recovering the magical character of nature by enabling a connection between the earthly and the divine worlds. Quoting Wilhelm Kroll, he argued that Plotinus 'raised himself by a strong intellectual and moral effort above the fog-ridden atmosphere which surrounded him'. According to Dodds, the fact that Plotinus agreed to participate in the ritual of evocation of his own daemon in the temple of Isis in Rome was nothing more than school gossip. Even if this event really had taken place, it would not have proved that Plotinus had any interest in the ritual itself, for 'a visit to a séance does not make a man a spiritualist, especially if he went there on someone else's initiative'.5 With Plotinus's

death, Dodds continued, the fog from which he had tried to escape began to close in again, and the later Platonists can be seen, in different respects, as reverting to 'the spineless syncretism from which he had tried to escape'.

Dodds did not mention Ficino. Yet Ficino was the philosopher most responsible for the interpretation of Plotinus he rejected. Indeed, Ficino's Plotinus is not only the author of the Enneads and Plato's most sublime interpreter. He is also a passionate reader of Iamblichus and Proclus; he believes in the efficacy of magic and even devises various ways of dealing with a systematically organised hierarchy of daemons. He inhabits, describes, and philosophically justifies a universe where the soul can – and must – withdraw in solitude and obscurity, preparing its ultimate, earth-renouncing 'escape in solitude to the solitary'. In this same universe, though, the soul can also – and must – penetrate the divine on earth, attuning the rhythm of embodied life to the theophanic activity which characterises the cycles of nature. 'On earth' means in stones, in plants, in animals, in the various daemons bustling about the air, in heavenly influxes, and in people. It is no surprise that such a theurgically-oriented Plotinus inspired the third book of Ficino's De vita libri tres, entitled De vita caelitus comparanda ('On How to Obtain Life from the Heavens') which, Ficino claims, grew out of his commentary on a treatise from Enneads IV, in all probability Enneads IV.3.11.

Surely, there is very little of Dodds's Plotinus in the De vita. Apart from Ficino's account of the operations of the Soul of the World, which plays an undeniably important role in the Enneads, this treatise is mostly grounded in the idea that daemonic and astral influences, as well as material objects used as talismans, could give the fully descended soul access to the divine nowhere else, but on earth. Obtaining this access (and especially obtaining it here), however, had neither speculative nor practical relevance for the Greek Plotinus, since he believed that our highest part, our intellect, never abandons the divine. Hence, Ficino's Enneads closely resembles Iamblichus's De mysteriis, which, according to Dodds, offered 'seductive comfort' to pagan minds,8 but was 'the last resort of the personally desperate, of those whom man and God have alike failed' and the 'refuge of a despairing intelligentsia which already felt la fascination de l'abîme'.

However, in approaching Ficino's Plotinus the main question should not be to what extent he differs from (or resembles) the Plotinus we think of today. It is not whether Ficino was right or wrong to interpret some passages of the Enneads through post-Plotinian lenses, or whether right or wrong are those scholars who read Plotinus following Dodds's 'hyper-rationalistic' hermeneutics. A question of this kind would miss an important point, i.e. the historical and philosophical (or, better said, historically philosophical) significance of Ficino's Plotinus per se. For the history of Western philosophy is not the history of authors who were at some point lost to later reappear in their pristine form – often in the nineteenth century; nor is it the history of philosophers who remained unchanged through time. It is rather the history of the different personae of those philosophers, as Denis Robichaud would have it, as they were crafted by their interpreters and received by their readers.

Plotinus is certainly the sublime rational thinker described by Dodds, one who believed that the unio mystica 'is attained, not by any ritual of evocation or performance of prescribed acts, but by an inward discipline of the mind which involves no compulsive element and has nothing to do with magic'.11 But for two centuries at least, Plotinus was also the 'exalted mind' described by Ficino, the sublime interpreter of Plato who, just like Dodds's Plotinus, understood the unio mystica as an inward flight of intellect to Intellect which, however, had its driving force in the love of God; the 'exalted mind' who believed that we can rejoin the divine in Intellect, but did not rule out that the divine could be accessed on earth through theurgical rituals and daemonic partnership.

Given the undeniable impact of post-Plotinian philosophy on Ficino's reading of the Enneads, we might be tempted to assume that Ficino created a Plotinus devoted to magic, with little of the philosophical rigour that is so characteristic of his thought. Such an assumption would, however, be completely wrong. As I hope this book will make clear, the main activity and interest of Ficino's Plotinus remained philosophy in the strict sense of the term. His rigorous reasoning and complex metaphysics were fully preserved by Ficino; and it was precisely because of Plotinus's ability to describe the world and the soul – and their relationship to each other – in purely philosophical terms that Ficino regarded him as Plato's greatest commentator. We need to keep this in mind in order to make a correct assessment of his interest in Plotinus and also to

rescue Ficino from an interpretative trend which sees him more as a magician or an astrologer than a metaphysical philosopher and humanist. An exploration of the influence of Ficino's Plotinus before the 1580 publication of the editio princeps of the Enneads in the original Greek will certainly contribute to the study of an important chapter in the history of Western philosophy. As Gersh has rightly observed, the only Plotinus known to sixteenth-century luminaries such as Giles of Viterbo, Francesco Giorgi, and Giordano Bruno (but also John Colet, Girolamo Cardano, and Charles de Bovelles) was Ficino's Plotinus. It must also be said that Ficino's Latin version of the Enneads accompanied the Greek text for almost four centuries, i.e. from 1580 until in 1924 Émile Bréhier published a modern edition of the Greek text accompanied by a French translation rather than Ficino's Latin.13 In the early nineteenth century Thomas Taylor rendered many of the Enneads into English. However, throughout the seventeenth century and beyond, Ficino's commentary was widely used as an interpretative tool to read Plotinus, both in Greek and in Latin. Ralph Cudworth and Henry More, for example, often refer to and quote Ficino's commentary although they read and quote Plotinus in Greek. Even though Plotinus went hand in hand with Ficino for so many centuries, while Plotinus is a familiar presence to most scholars working on Ficino, Ficino is just a name to most Plotinian scholars. This is the result of the truncated view – dominant in the field of history of philosophy, but especially in that of classical reception – which tends to ignore centuries of interpretative labours and historical filiation and to treat the presence of classical authors in the modern world as sudden appearances lacking a history of textual and doctrinal transformation. This book, I hope, will challenge this view. By focusing on the identity crafted for him by Ficino, it will show that the Plotinus who traversed the paths of Western philosophy did not austerely abide in the eternal and unchanging nature of his doctrines. In fact, for a period of time which was long enough to leave an undeniable mark in at least two generations of readers, he was deeply conversant with the philosophy of his later interpreters and even, anachronistically as it may seem, spoke through their voices and invoked their daemons. By exploring the post-Plotinian dimension of Ficino's Plotinus (which, I must reiterate, on no occasion overshadowed the philosophical ingenuity and rigour of the Greek Plotinus), I also hope to show that, in the Renaissance, references to the ancient world were understood as an unremitting act of interpretation and re-

invention. Far from being an undisciplined exercise of creation, such acts relied on the painstaking textual analysis and sophisticated translation work of the humanists, of which Ficino's Latin Enneads is a superb example. Even if we decide to disregard the doctrinal transformations undergone by Plotinus in the course of his reception history and focus on his original text instead, we cannot ignore the fact that Friedrich Creuzer and Georg Heinrich Moser, Plotinus's nineteenth-century editors, consulted Ficino's editorial and translation work and that Ficino's Latin version of and commentary on the Enneads accompanied their 1835 critical edition of the Greek Enneads.14 To modern eyes Ficino's Plotinus may appear to have a biform nature: zealously loyal to both the letter and the spirit of the Greek text in the translation and intertextual, yet eclectic, and syncretistic in the commentary. Ficino, however, would have not accepted such a characterisation for his Plotinus. One thing is for sure: if by 'eclecticism' and 'syncretism' we mean a deliberate attempt to reconcile different or opposing philosophical positions, nothing can be said to be more foreign to Ficino's spirit than these two terms.15 For Ficino believed that the Platonism which he was bringing to light was a comprehensive system, a unified whole; as such, it did not need reconciliation. In his view, he sailed as close to land as possible in his account of what was in the Enneads. Indeed, Ficino made great efforts to follow Plotinus's narrative to the very roots of his thought and when he invoked other authors – the late ancient Platonists, medieval philosophers, and even St. Paul – he did so with the intention of making Plotinus's text more accessible and familiar for his readers; he wanted no recess of the Enneads to remain unexplored, no meaning unexcavated. For Ficino 'the translator' and Ficino 'the interpreter' the constant overarching goal was the same: to ensure easy readability and make Plotinus's voice unambiguously clear. In the 'Commentary', the post-Plotinians could provide this clarity with accuracy, elegance, and accessibility, serving the same purpose as a right translation choice would do with Plotinus's most tortured syntax. Let us proceed to the second trait of Ficino's Plotinus, i.e. his being a friend of Christianity. It has long been claimed that Ficino endeavoured to reconcile Platonic metaphysics and Christian theology, which is undoubtedly true. However, in order to appreciate the nature of Ficino's Plotinus, we should investigate whether these endeavours originated (1) in Ficino's authentic belief that in order for Platonism to be philosophically acceptable it should be fine-tuned with some, or all, of

the principles of Christianity; or (2) in his ever-present fear of the possible reactions of the Roman Curia. The chances of success in this investigation are few to none. Indeed, in elaborating what Gersh has defined as 'the concord in discord between Plotinus and Christianity',16 Ficino keeps silent, never drawing attention to his doctrinal interventions. Nonetheless, my feeling is that Ficino held Platonism to have an intrinsic philosophical value regardless of whether or not it agreed with Christian doctrine. I am not claiming that Ficino was entirely unbiased – no translator or interpreter is. But I believe that his interest in voicing Plotinus's authentic philosophy was stronger than his interest in making Plotinus accommodate positions that he recognized as foreign to Plotinus's thought. In other words, his reasons for making Plotinus sometimes speak as a Christian – which Ficino undeniably does – were more political than theoretical. I do not mean that they were entirely political, for I believe that Ficino genuinely held that the Platonists and the Christians agreed on fundamental truths. However, in those cases where they did not agree, Ficino did not believe that they necessarily should. The exception is, of course, when pagan sources advocated positions which were offensive to human nature, such as mortalism and metensomatosis into animal species. We shall see that Ficino harshly rebukes Plotinus for having endorsed the latter position. Transmigration provides a very apt example for my claim, for while Ficino is outraged by metensomatosis into animal bodies, he widely discusses metensomatosis into human bodies, i.e. the soul's so-called 'vehicles' or spiritual envelops, as we shall see in Chapter 3. He even uses this doctrine to back up his own philosophical positions. In the same context, he also discusses the pre-existence of the soul. These discussions are often followed by his usual disclaimers, such as, 'we have explained these things, interpreting rather than approving of them (nos non tam approbantes, quam interpretantes exposuimus)', which are scattered throughout the Commentary. These disclaimers, however, tell us very little about what Ficino really thought of the philosophical value of these doctrines. If he was to write in a religious censorship-free context he would not have let Plotinus freely express transmigration into animal bodies, but, surely, he would have made much fewer acts of disavowal. Indeed, in reading Ficino's Commentary one gets the impression that at times he lets Plotinus talk autonomously and even unconventionally. Returning to metensomatosis into animal bodies, for example, Ficino chastises Plotinus, but does not censure him. This is not, of

course, because deeply inside himself Ficino sympathised with the pagans but because, in my view, he did not see his role as a commentator and his identity as a Christian (and clergyman) as anonymously blending into one another. As I said, it is impossible to ascertain to what extent Ficino was sincerely convinced that Plotinus's thought should be tweaked or altered. Admittedly, the reader of this book will encounter a Plotinus who, in most cases, indisputably obeys the Christian truth. However, it is my hope that the reader will not stop at Ficino's role as a Christianizing interpreter, which would lead to a very shallow and misleading understanding of his hermeneutical approach. Such a view fails to acknowledge one dominant aspect of his intellectual identity which, in my view, should come to the fore in the scholarship on Ficino's commentaries: the fact that he was a classical scholar of supreme skills. One that had been entrusted with the onerous task of providing the first Latin translations of some Greek works ever to be read in Italy. Ficino was aware that the transmission of the wisdom contained in those works depended on his ability to make those works talk to his contemporaries in a way that was both as accessible to fifteenth-century readers and as loyal as possible to the voice of the original authors. He maintains a courteous and non-judgemental relationship with his sources, his interest being first and foremost that of excavating the original truths told by the texts – whether or not they agreed with Christianity. My claim is that Ficino felt the obligation towards his role as a classical scholar as deeply as he felt the commitment to religious orthodoxy, if not more so. The latter does not overshadow the former, even if, as Robichaud has rightly observed, Ficino made great efforts to hide his laborious textual work behind the glow of his philosophical persona. I hope the reader will keep this in mind in order to fully appreciate the complex identities of both Ficino as a commentator and the Plotinus he comments on.

Finally, the third trait of Ficino's Plotinus is his hermeneutical finesse, not only in the interpretation of Plato, but also in that of Aristotle and, in particular, of Aristotle's view of intellect. Indeed, untangling Ficino's use of Plotinus in an Aristotelian context is a central task of this book. It is well known that in De anima III.5 Aristotle unexpectedly introduced what, apparently, is a second, 'productive' intellect – called nous poiêtikos by his successors. His brief and complex remarks on the nature of this intellect left

generations of readers wondering what exactly the nous poiêtikos was and how it related to the intellect as he had described it up to that point. In Ficino's view, no second intellect was ever introduced in III.5 or elsewhere in the De anima. The mind described by Aristotle was one single entity, which acted on two different levels, depending on whether it used reason or intellect. In the latter case, thinking was in act, whether in the former case it was potential to thinking in act. This view emerges neatly from Ficino's commentary on Priscianus Lydus's paraphrase of Theophrastus, published in 1497, a text essential to the understanding of Ficino's engagement with Aristotle's De anima. It is not my intention to expand on Ficino's reception of Theophrastus in this book. However, Ficino's view of De anima is essential to understand why he regarded Plotinus as the one who had seized the words and meanings of that text, revealing the nous poiêtikos's intrinsic Platonic nature. For in describing man's truest self in terms of a hypostasised Intellect, eternally engaged in the contemplation of Being, yet able to be accessed by the individual human intellect, Plotinus, for Ficino, had interpreted Aristotle correctly.20

In praising Plotinus for having deciphered the obscure language of De anima III.5, Ficino compared him, more or less explicitly, to Aristotle's two most famous interpreters – Alexander of Aphrodisias and Averroes. In wrestling with the enigmatic nature of the nous poiêtikos, Alexander identified it with God, drastically separating it from the nous pathêtikos and condemning the latter to sharing the same mortal fate as the body. On the other hand, Averroes – as interpreted by his Latin commentators – hypostasised the nous pathêtikos, placing it outside and above the individual human soul. For him, thinking occurred through episodic contacts between the forms of the imagination in the soul and the external nous pathêtikos – contacts which were put into effect by the nous poiêtikos. In doing so, Averroes placed the final actualisation of the human mind in the union with the external intellect, depriving it, in Ficino's view, of its essential ability for both discursive thinking and intellectual contemplation. In a letter to John of Hungary, Ficino expressed his concern about the powerful position which had been attained by such interpreters of Aristotle and stated clearly that he had

translated and commented on Plotinus in order to bring to light a philosophy which was able to counter these perverted forms of Aristotelianism:

> We, therefore, who have toiled until this time to translate and expound the earlier theologians, are now daily working in the same way on the books of Plotinus. We have been chosen for this work by divine Providence, just as they were for theirs, so that, when this theology emerges into the light, the poets will stop the irreligious inclusion of the rites and mysteries of religion in their stories, and the Aristotelians, I mean all philosophers, will be reminded that it is wrong to consider religion, at least religion in general, as a collection of old wives' tales. For the whole world has been seized by the Aristotelians and divided for the most part into two schools of thought, the Alexandrian and the Averroist. The Alexandrians consider our intellect to be subject to death, while the Averroists maintain that there is only one intellect. They both equally undermine the whole of religion.

He goes on to explain that this philosophical irreligiousness was so widespread and defended by such sharp intellects that merely preaching the faith would not have been sufficient to save Christianity. 'Here much greater power is needed', he says, 'either divine miracles manifesting themselves everywhere, or at least a philosophical religion which one day will persuade the philosophers who are prepared to listen to it with an open mind'. Against Alexander and Averroes, Ficino deploys his Plotinus, fully armed with a solid and unrivalled form of personal intellectualism and immortality.

These three traits of Ficino's Plotinus are tightly interlaced. It is often the case that while wearing his 'post-Plotinian' hat, Plotinus is also concerned with rescuing what, for Ficino, was Aristotle's original view on the soul and with showing the essential harmony of philosophy and religion. This complex identity, I hope, will become clearer by reading the five chapters in this book.

Outline of the Book

The title of this book indicates that my study of Ficino's Plotinus focuses on 'human nature' and the 'soul'. In fact, this was also the focus of Ficino's own study of Plotinus. In reading, translating, and commenting on the Enneads, Ficino was not drawn to the One or the Intellect. Nor was he drawn to the Soul of the World, or to daemons, or to the stars. He was drawn to the human soul. Indeed, it was the harmony of metaphysics and anthropology that Ficino admired most in Plotinus. Plotinus's description of human nature as a complex system of interactions between a discarnate and an

incarnate self and his claim that, of the two, it is the discarnate self that is truly 'human', deeply informed Ficino's thought from the earliest days of his Platonic career.

Chapter 1 looks at the birth of Ficino's Plotinus, showing how Ficino became acquainted with the Enneads and why he regarded Plotinus as Plato's most sublime interpreter. It also provides an introductory discussion of the first two traits discussed above, i.e. Plotinus's closeness to certain central principles of the Christian religion and his acceptance of some philosophical tenets which belong to later forms of Platonism.

The second and third chapters discuss what I have indicated as the third trait of Ficino's Plotinus, that is, his concern with rescuing Aristotle's original view on the soul. As I said above, Ficino thought that his newly discovered Plotinus could perform an invaluable service for philosophy: that he could provide an alternative to the dominant but perverted interpretations of Aristotle's De anima. For Plotinus's position as regards both the soul and the separate intellect, he believed, had the merit of being in harmony with not only Plato but with Aristotle as well.

Chapter 2 shows that Ficino built his criticism of Alexander of Aphrodisias's mortalism on Plotinus's idea of a 'presence without participation'. In fact, for Plotinus, it is not only the intellect that is discarnate, but the soul too. The soul gives life to the body without participating in the nature of the body: it enlivens and forms the body from without. Plotinus believed that the living being (τὸ συναμφότερον) results not from the coming together of the body and the soul, but from the coming together of the body and an image (εἴδωλον) of the soul. I also show that Ficino lingers on Plotinus's use of the verb παρεῖναι, which indicates a presence 'by the side', to stress the difference between being present to the body and being present in the body. In excavating this position, Ficino praises Plotinus for having described a form of hylomorphism in which, contra Alexander, the soul supplied its entelechy to the body without becoming metaphysically involved with the body.

I devote Chapter 3 to Ficino's criticism of Averroes's so-called monopsychism, that is, the view that there is one single intellect for all human beings. I claim that Ficino's insistence on and even obsession with criticising monopsychism betrays an underlying

attraction towards the lofty and ever-acting nature of the nous pathêtikos as described by the Arab commentator. In fact, Averroes is Ficino's bête noire, by whom he is, however, irresistibly charmed. For even though, in Ficino's eyes, the Commentator had 'de-humanised' the intellect by depriving it of all individuality, he had also revealed the undeniable tribute to Plato in Aristotle's De anima III.5. Indeed, monopsychism was attractive philosophically inasmuch as it explained the possibility of the knowledge of universals and ensured that the intellective soul, as demanded by Aristotle, was not mixed with the body.

While Ficino found the separateness of Intellect insidious, yet unsettlingly appealing, he could not admit Averroes's view that the act of understanding occurs in the human mind through occasional contact between the formae imaginativae or phantasmata in the cogitative faculty and the intelligible forms in the material intellect. Averroes, moreover, claimed that the death of an individual brought with it the destruction of the imagination – the essential condition for individual thinking – and that all traces of individuality relapsed thereupon into nothingness, whereas the nous poiêtikos continued to enjoy its eternal thinking of Forms, completely unconcerned with human affairs. This solution, in Ficino's eyes, robbed the individual of his or her inherent capability to understand. Thus, for Ficino, Averroes was guilty of two serious philosophical crimes, one metaphysical and one epistemological. He stood charged of denying both the ontological independence of the intellectual soul from the two intellects, and the self-determination of individual understanding. In Plotinus, by contrast, Ficino saw a rock-solid defence of the metaphysical belonging of the individual intellect to Intellect as a hypostasis. This unity could be broken, so to speak, from a psychological perspective – as we can or cannot be aware that our truest nature is to be intellects. However, the identity of intellect and Intellect is not affected by our awareness (or unawareness) of it. For Plotinus, we are intellectual by nature – whether or not we, as incarnate selves, acknowledge it.

Chapter 4 analyses Ficino's reception of Plotinus's account of the soul's faculties, with a special focus on the imagination. In Ficino's commentary, the bi-dimensional psychology described in the Enneads becomes a multi-level psychology, so to speak. For in addition to Plotinus's distinction between a higher-rational and a lower-

irrational soul, Ficino ascribes to each of the soul's powers – the intellect, reason, the imagination, and the senses – a more perfect and a less perfect level of operation. Hence, the soul, as emerges from his account, is able to use each faculty at two different heights – closer to Intellect or to the body. This view agreed with one of the primary concepts of his philosophy: that the nature of man is such that it mirrors divine things without letting go of mortal ones and is the bond which joins Being and Becoming together, as in one of the most famous images from his Platonic Theology. Of all the Plotinian soul's faculties, Ficino seems to be particularly attracted to the imagination, on account of the imagination's ability to mediate between the higher and the lower soul and to provide the soul with self-awareness. This faculty, Ficino believed, oscillated between conditions of heightened perception, on the one hand, and the vital dispositions which ruled the lower parts of the soul and governed the body, on the other. In this way, it kept the two extremes of human nature connected. Moreover, the imagination was responsible for the soul's perception of the temporal relations between events which characterize embodied life as opposed to the timeless existence of Intellect. Because of its intermediate nature between spirit and matter, the imagination played a key role in the relationship between mind and body and was responsible for the general well-being of the individual. Ficino is very attentive to the psychosomatic dimension of the soul's procession of images, giving detailed descriptions of the ways in which images are responsible for different physiological processes, from falling ill and recovering to being lovesick and conceiving a child.

In Chapter 5, I explore some aspects of Ficino's daemonology and of his view that stars are not causes, but 'signifiers' of what happens on earth. The focus is primarily on Enneads III.4.3 ('On Our Allotted Guardian Daemon') and II.3 ('On Whether the Stars Are Causes'). I concentrate on the philosophical implications of the soul's interactions with entities higher on the ontological scale, whose sophistic nature had important epistemological consequences. I also compare Ficino's fascination with external daemons as masters of illusion with Plotinus's interest in the psychological dimension of the daemon. Plotinus considered one's guardian daemon to be the trace left by the intellect within the soul – a token of divine life. In fact, external daemons were philosophically insignificant for him and the 'daemonic', he believed, was an inner,

luminous region where the soul could, and should, withdraw to reconnect with its divine source. For Ficino, by contrast, the 'daemonic' was a hazy – at times even murky – territory where the influence and action of external daemons were interiorized by the soul. This interiorization often resulted in the soul becoming trapped in the web of appearances rather than becoming emancipated from them. Since Ficino believed that human souls, daemons, and planets were connected by invisible chains extending everywhere, Chapter 5 is also concerned with the role of astral influences in the life of the soul. In his work on providence, Plotinus famously attacked a certain kind of astrology which assumed a causal relation between planetary and earthly events. In his Commentary, Ficino begins with Plotinus's position but takes his discussion well beyond Plotinus, showing a remarkable knowledge of late ancient and medieval astrological literature. Indeed, Ficino's commentary on Enneads II.3 opens up a vibrant new world, one which expands from Saturn to the Moon, from the Alexandria of Ptolemy to Renaissance Florence, into which Plotinus temporarily disappears. In this world, we see the Hellenistic poet Aratus and the Persian astrologer Abû Ma'shar scan the sky, and Porphyry arguing with Iamblichus on whether our guardian daemon is given to us according to one single star or to the general disposition of the heavens. We learn about the planets which hunt the Zodiac and even hear stories from Ficino's everyday life, such as that of two twin sisters, born simultaneously (sine intermissione) under the exact same constellation. However, Ficino says, the two little girls went on to face different, yet equally tragic fates: one died of illness after seven weeks, while the other was suffocated after seven months by an unskilled childminder. Ficino also tells us of two twin brothers born into a family in his neighbourhood – again sine intermissione – who grew up to be very different in their physical constitution, character, and fate (corporibus, ingeniis, casibus diversissimi). Finally, we hear how Ficino, with the help of a midwife, was able to save the life of an infant born under Saturnian influence in the eighth month of gestation.

These stories set the context for Ficino's central claim that celestial bodies have no causal power over earthly events – let alone the mind, its free action, and free will. However, they can act on the psychosomatic composite (at times even perniciously as, for example, on new-born children) and on our emotional persona. This is because

stars, just like daemons, are both outside and inside the soul, in the sense that their influences, like daemonic influences, can be interiorized, that is, transformed into a psychological or psycho-physiological act that takes place within the soul or the soul–body composite. This act of interiorization is made possible by the fluid relations of harmony and attunement which govern the universe. These relations, of which Ficino's Plotinus is the exquisite narrator, bring together the crystalline spheres and the dusty earth, daemons and men, discarnate intellects and incarnate souls. They also explain why stars cannot be causes but sometimes can be signs. Indeed, dancing to the same tune as the other components of the interconnected universe, stars can predict the moves of their fellow dancers and tell their stories in a visible language. However, as Ficino never tires of repeating, stars do not write the stories they tell.

Ficino's entire career as a philosopher was devoted to proving that the ever-changing and free human soul was God's most cherished creature, to which He had given the gift of immortality. It is no surprise, therefore, that the human soul, with its capacity for the most abstract philosophical contemplation and the deepest form of religious devotion, was at the centre of Ficino's revival of the Enneads. His presentation of Plotinus as a supreme interpreter of Plato, a sublime philosopher, and a powerful theurgos, who had a god as his guardian spirit, was the crowning achievement in his lifelong praise of the human soul. For this achievement Ficino had prepared for over twenty-five years, reading, translating, and using the Enneads as a central text to untangle the truest nature of Platonic metaphysics and philosophical anthropology. In fact, I would dare to say that after the late 1460s there is no Ficino without Plotinus. Definitely, his Platonic Theology is as Plotinian as his Commentary on the 'Enneads'. We should henceforth consider Ficino's Plotinus as an illuminating guide to understanding the ingenious and philologically-based dialogue which Ficino had with the Greek Plotinus and the Platonists of late antiquity – however different his Plotinus might be from our current perception of who Plotinus is. <>

HAMLET AND EMOTIONS edited by Paul Megna, Brid Phillips, R. S. White [Palgrave Shakespeare Studies, Palgrave / Macmillan, ISBN 9783030037949]

This volume bears potent testimony, not only to the dense complexity of Hamlet's emotional dynamics, but also to the enduring fascination that audiences, adaptors, and academics have with what may well be Shakespeare's moodiest play. Its chapters explore emotion in Hamlet, as well as the myriad emotions surrounding Hamlet's debts to the medieval past, its relationship to the cultural milieu in which it was produced, its celebrated performance history, and its profound impact beyond the early modern era. Its component chapters are not unified by a single methodological approach. Some deal with a single emotion in Hamlet, while others analyse the emotional trajectory of a single character, and still others focus on a given emotional expression (e.g., sighing or crying). Some bring modern methodologies for studying emotion to bear on Hamlet, others explore how Hamlet anticipates modern discourses on emotion, and still others ask how Hamlet itself can complicate and contribute to our current understanding of emotion.

Review

"Megna, Phillips, and White's volume illuminates Shakespeare's play from a number of angles, offering a wealth of penetrating insights and rewarding both systematic and more intermittent readers." (Erin Sullivan, Renaissance Quarterly, Vol. 73 (2), 2020)

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Prologue to the Omen Coming On by R. S. White

It has often been said facetiously that Hamlet is 'full of quotations' (or even clichés, so familiar do they sound). These are phrases acting as 'sound bytes' so instantly suggestive and memorable that they are ready-made as titles of novels and movies. Some can be grouped around emotive themes which point to genres in the play and conceptual preoccupations. For example, it is a play about crime involving murder, and has produced phrases that have named other murder mysteries, or could in future: 'poison in jest' (3.2.222), 'The Mousetrap' (3.2.225), `that sleep of death' (3.1.68), 'These words like daggers' (3.4.85), 'dead men's fingers' (4.7.143), 'the foul crimes done in my days of nature' (1.5.12), `Prenominate crimes' (2.1.43), 'With all his crimes broad blown, as flush as May' (3.3.81), 'so crimeful and so capital in nature' (4.7.7), and others. We have quotable gothic expressions of murderous intent of the kind used by Mrs. Radcliff as chapter headings in her novels, quotations more attributable to Macbeth than the student of philosophy back from Wittenberg University for his father's funeral:

'Tis now the very witching time of night,

> When churchyards yawn, and hell itself breathes out
> Contagion to this world. Now could I drink hot blood,
> And do such bitter business as the day
> Would quake to look on. (3.2.377-381)

Emotions driving revenge are obviously at the heart of the action: `revenge his foul and most unnatural murder' (1.5.25), 'sweep to my revenge' (1.5.31), 'the croaking raven doth bellow for revenge' (3.2.242), 'o, this is hire and salary, not revenge!' (3.4.79), 'spur my dull revenge!' (4.4.24), 'revenge should have no bounds' (4.7.101), and so on. Similarly, a stench of corruption pervades the atmosphere: 'rank corruption, mining all within/ Infects unseen' (3.4.139), 'shall in the general censure take corruption/ From that particular fault' (Q2 only, 1.4), 'Something is rotten in the state of Denmark' (1.4.67), 'the primrose path of dalliance' (1.3.50), and 'stewed in corruption' (3.4.83). Pricks of conscience too: 'conscience does make cowards of us all' (3.1.85), 'the conscience of the king' (2.2.607), 'to thine own self be true' (1.3.78), 'all my sins remembered' (3.1.92). And, of course, madness, whether feigned or real: 'Though this be madness, yet there is method in't' (2.2.208), 'I am but mad north-north-west' (2.2.380), 'a crafty madness' (3.1.8), 'a document in madness — thoughts and remembrance fitted' (4.5.178), 'antic disposition' (1.5.173), 'a counterfeit presento(6.5(a)-t)-5.690a pk (3fien

historians ploughing the field of history of emotions are becoming less reticent in speaking of 'affective' content in works of fiction and drama, acknowledging as they do that literature is nothing if not emotional in its very nature. There are, for example, vestiges of Elizabethan humours theory as a medical paradigm, as when Hamlet punningly diagnoses Claudius as 'distempered' or 'dis-tempered', his humours thrown out of balance by an excess of yellow bile causing `choler' and requiring 'purgation':

> GUILDENSTERN The king, sir, —
> HAMLET Ay, sir, what of him?
> GUILDENSTERN Is in his retirement marvellous distempered.
> HAMLET With drink, sir?
> GUILDENSTERN No, my lord, rather with choler.
> HAMLET Your wisdom should show itself more richer to signify this to his doctor; for, for me to put him to his purgation would perhaps plunge him into far more choler. (3.2.286-293)

There are also, of course, many emotional areas in the play that go `beyond the humours': grief, love, fear, sympathy, wonder, doubt, anguish, hope, jocularity, and the list goes on. The play begins to seem like a work about emotions, in the context of Elizabethan theories and also in terms of the avalanche of works which over the centuries have come, and continue to come, in the wake of Shakespeare's play. One of the most famous quotations of all, 'hold as 'twere the mirror up to nature' (3.2.22), has paradoxically become a culturally self-fulfilling prophecy of the play's own ontological status, guiding the ubiquitous and influential afterlife of Hamlet, as though in some uncanny way nature is mirroring and following Shakespeare rather than the other way around. With its tantalising mix of familiarity and estrangement, the play has changed not only the way we think, but the ways in which we feel, or at least conceptualise our feelings.

Of the particular emotional states, one thing everybody knows about Hamlet's is that he is melancholy. We know because he tells us:

> [...] The spirit that I have seen
> May be the devil, and the devil bath power
> T'assume a pleasing shape; yea, and perhaps,
> Out of my weakness and my melancholy

> As he is very potent with such spirits —
> Abuses me to damn me. (2.2.600-605)

And because Claudius diagnoses him thus, using as an image a bird incubating its eggs:

> Love? His affections do not that way tend,
> Nor what he spake, though it lacked form a little,
> Was not like madness. There's something in his soul
> O'er which his melancholy sits on brood,
> And I do doubt the hatch and the disclose
> Will be some danger [...] (3.1.165-170)

Ophelia's description reads like a textbook case listing outward signs of love-melancholy through his dishevelled clothes, distracted appearance, and formulaic gestures:

> OPHELIA My lord, as I was sewing in my chamber,
> Lord Hamlet, with his doublet all unbraced,
> No hat upon his head, his stockings fouled,
> Ungartered, and down-gyved to his ankle,
> Pale as his shirt, his knees knocking each other,
> And with a look so piteous in purport
> As if he had been loosed out of hell
> To speak of horrors, he comes before me.
> LORD POLONIUS Mad for thy love?
> OPHELIA My lord, I do not know,
> But truly I do fear it.
> LORD POLONIUS What said he?
> OPHELIA He took me by the wrist and held me hard,
> Then goes he to the length of all his arm,
> And with his other hand thus o'er his brow,
> He falls to such perusal of my face
> As a would draw it. Long stayed he so.
> At last, a little shaking of mine arm,
> And thrice his head thus waving up and down,
> He raised a sigh so piteous and profound
> That it did seem to shatter all his bulk
> And end his being. That done, he lets me go,
> And, with his head over his shoulder turned,

> He seemed to find his way without his eyes,
> For out o' doors he went without their help,
> And, to the last bended their light on me. (2.1.78-101)

Gertrude, in the ornithological image of a bird with new-hatched chicks suggested by her husband, speaks of the apparently fluctuating, manic-depressive swings in her son's emotional behaviour:

> [...] This is mere madness,
> And thus a while the fit will work on him.
> Anon, as patient as the female dove
> When that her golden couplets are disclosed,
> His silence will sit drooping. (5.1.282-284)

But melancholy in Shakespeare's time was not understood quite as tepidly as it is today, as anybody who has waded through the 1400 pages of Robert Burton's The Anatomy of Melancholy (1604) will know. According to the prevailing Galenic, humoral model of physiology and psychology, it was a specific illness with myriad sub-divisions, a pathology so broad and deep in its potential symptom pictures that it encompasses whole areas of what now we call not melancholy but mental or emotional illness—`mere madness' in Gertrude's phrase.5 Erin Sullivan's book Beyond Melancholy: Sadness and Selfhood in Renaissance England is the latest (and arguably best) in a long line of historical studies dealing with the subject, though Hamlet does not feature here in as much detail as Jaques in As You Like It.

In Hamlet's case, all the evidence suggests that the initial cause of his melancholy is understandable grief for his father who died less than two months before the play starts, so recently that the son has not had an opportunity for proper mourning. His grieving is then complicated and worsened by extra circumstances, especially the rapid remarriage of his mother causing an inevitable rift with her, a prompted suspicion that his father was murdered by the old king's brother, Hamlet's uncle, and the disruption of his budding love relationship with Ophelia. But grief is the prior, dislodging element, despite his mother's attempted consolatory thought that every person loses a father at some time, and her reminder that 'all that lives, must die':

> HAMLET Ay, madam, it is common.
> QUEEN GERTRUDE If it be,

> Why seems it so particular with thee?
> HAMLET 'Tis not alone my inky cloak, good mother,
> Nor customary suits of solemn black,
> Nor windy suspiration of forced breath,
> No, nor the fruitful river in the eye,
> Nor the dejected haviour of the visage,
> Together with all forms, moods, shapes of grief
> That can denote me truly. These indeed 'seem',
> For they are actions that a man might play;
> But I have that within which passeth show —

These but the trappings and the suits of woe. (1.2.72, 74-86)

A whole familial spectrum of grief pervades the play from start to finish: a son has lost his father and, it seems, his mother in her role as the

husband of his biological father; a lover loses in love and then her father

dies at the hand of her lover; a brother loses his sister (Laertes' feelings of justified grief and anger are often overlooked in accounts of the play and minimised in performance); and finally a mother loses her son and

two husbands (one posthumously). The play is saturated in grief, though the only actual tears are shed by an actor playing the role of Hecuba. It was this play that Sigmund Freud used tacitly to generate his distinction between 'mourning and melancholia' since here some of the characters lose another, while Hamlet and Ophelia lose themselves in distraction (the word literally meaning 'drawn apart', in these cases from each other and also internally and individually).'

At the same time, however, Hamlet is capable of encompassing emotional opposites, 'The violence of either grief or joy' (3.2.187). If the heart he wears on his sleeve bears 'the trappings and the suits of woe' (1.2.86), yet we have glimpses of the opposite 'within', 'words of so sweet breath composed/ As made the things more rich' (Ophelia, 3.1.100-101), his 'music vows' now 'like sweet bells jangled out of tune' (3.1.1610)—in fact both women in his life, as well as his closest friend Horatio, address him as 'sweet'. This side of his personality is manifested in the quality of 'infinite jest' which he nostalgically recalls learning as a child from Yorick, the official court jester now long dead. His jokes,

sometimes aimed at himself as one of 'we fools of nature' (1.4.35), are most often at the expense of Polonius's pomposity and bureaucratic dim-wittedness (`You are merry, 'my lord', concedes Polonius [3.2.116]) and the 'dressy' courtier Osric, but they reveal a more wryly amused self than we see in any other Shakespearean tragic protagonist, and an emotional resilience at odds with his outward melancholy. It predisposes him to notice such discrepancies in others, in particular the hypocritical, noting sardonically 'That one may smile and smile and be a villain' (1.5.109). The smiling assassin referred to here gives himself away in a

set of images where 'the most heterogeneous ideas [...] are yoked by violence together' (T. S. Eliot's phrase describing metaphysical poetry), so glib and forced that they seem less like the mixed emotions assailing Hamlet as 'a sea of troubles' (3.1.61), and more like two-faced emotional fabrication and witty rhetoric than authentic feelings:

> [...] as 'twere with a defeated joy,
> With one auspicious and one dropping eye,
> With mirth in funeral and with dirge in marriage,
> In equal scale weighing delight and dole,
> [...] (1.2.11-14)

Hamlet's sarcastic observation on the incongruously proximate events seems more to the point, and reveals something of his own emotionally conflicted state, hovering between disgust and bitter amusement in a black joke: 'Thrift, thrift, Horatio! the funeral baked meats/ Did coldly furnish forth the marriage tables' (1.2.179-180).

There are a host of other emotions expressed in Hamlet, such as `affections' in the word's early sense (feelings which are affected by, or caused by encounter with another person or event), unrequited love, `wonder' imitating Aristotle's admiratio as a desired 'affect' of drama generated by pity, grief, and fear: 'What is it you would see? / If aught of woe or wonder, cease your search' (5.2.316-17)' and 'It harrows me with fear and wonder' (1.1.42). Other emotional states are represented in phrases: 'It would have much amaz'd you' (1.2.234), 'He waxes desperate with imagination' (1.4.64), 'I have been so affrighted' (2.1.76), `And I, of ladies most deject and wretched' (3.1.158), 'With tristful visage, as against the doom, / Is thought-sick at the act' (3.4.49-50). Other examples include states which can be described as paradoxical 'mixed emotions': 'Blasted with

Ecstasy', / 'More grief to hide than hate to utter love' (3.1.163), and sometimes written on the face: 'HORATIO A countenance more in sorrow than in anger / HAMLET Pale or red? / HORATIO Nay, very pale' (1.2.229-230). In the meta-theatricality of Hamlet's addresses to the players, he emphasises that emotional states are the stuff of drama and must be awakened if a play is to succeed:

> HAMLET He that plays the King shall be welcome; his majesty shall have tribute of me. The adventurous Knight shall use his foil and target, the Lover shall not sigh gratis, the Humorous Man shall end his part in peace, the Clown shall make those laugh whose lungs are tickled o' th' sear, and the Lady shall say her mind freely, or the blank verse shall halt for't. What players are they?
> ROSENCRANTZ Even those you were wont to take delight in, the tragedians of the city. (2.2.320-330)

It is emotional expressiveness that Hamlet admires in the Player's speech personating Hecuba with palpably wet tears in his eyes. One thinks also of the emotional crescendos built up in scenes, such as the pathos and poignancy of Ophelia's madness, Hamlet's lacerating recriminations directed at his mother, and the howls of grief uttered by both Hamlet and Laertes over her grave. Significantly, the one who shows little emotion is the one who has most feelings to hide is Claudius, and even he is driven to break into startled 'choler' at the player Queen's 'In second husband let me be accurst; / None wed the second but who killed the first', drawing from Hamlet a bitterly muttered 'Wormwood, wormwood' (3.2.170-171), and leading towards the King's abrupt departure from 'The Mousetrap' set up to catch him out.

In offering this brief introduction to some of the diverse affective territory to be covered in this book, I finish with consideration of a word with broad emotional range in early modern English, here given a Shakespearean twist. 'Passion' rings through Hamlet some fourteen times in strong positions and with a revealing consistency. Interestingly, however Shakespeare deploys it in a limited sense and without its primary, early modern meaning. Passions were said to be 'of the soul', internal, driving motivations which compel action. Deep-seated in an individual's mind and located in the soul, passions were generally invoked in religious contexts. The prime reference was back to the 'passions' of Christ, and the narrative of his sufferings during the last days of his life. The linkage to the various senses is through the idea that one must be

overwhelmingly controlled by a single feeling which compels one to face appalling suffering as a mark of martyrdom, which in turn is also a referent for the word 'passion'. However, surprisingly, in this play (which elsewhere is steeped in Christian imagery) Shakespeare uses the word more often in a pre-Christian, classical sense, as a term of rhetoric, 'the passion', used to describe certain literary constructions, set-piece passages expressing strong feelings (OED, 'passion', 2.6d), which are calculated to persuade auditors to share them. The genre of the 'female complaint poem' (such as the possibly Shakespearean poem 'A Lover's Complaint', or for that matter the Player in Hamlet) was a contemporary example of how 'the passion' is used in this sense, without religious reference. Aristotle, obviously in a pagan context before Christ's suffering, includes passion as a function of pathos which he sees as an appeal to an audience's emotions, 'putting the audience into a certain frame of mind', and a means of persuading auditors into sympathising with a suffering subject. In Book 2 of Rhetoric, Aristotle provides a list of emotions which can be raised, including anger and its opposite calm; desire; friendship and its opposite enmity or hatred; fear; shame and shamelessness; kindness and unkindness; pity; indignation; envy; emulation. It would be perfectly possible to trace examples of each in Hamlet. The principal actor in Shakespeare's company, Richard Burbage, was adept at delivering 'passions' in his various roles, and Hamlet was one of his most famous roles. In their book, Shakespeare in Parts Simon Palfrey and Tiffany Sterne quote eye-witness reports, one of which 'talks of Burbage as a man who strips to his shirt and then "Much like mad-Hamlet, thus [at] Passion teares". Another observer, Richard Bancroft, recorded in poetry that Burbage [...] when his part/ He acted, sent his passion to his heart', noting how he switched emotions from love to wrath." This kind of `transitioning' in emotional states, according to Palfrey and Sterne, was especially valued by Elizabethan audiences, and accords with the comments from both Claudius and Gertrude in the passages quoted in this chapter, to Hamlet's sudden changes from violence to extreme docility, as though from one passion to its extreme opposite.

In musical terminology we find the pre-Christian and Christian meanings fused, for example in the title of Bach's St Matthew Passion where the word refers to both a subject and a genre. In Hamlet, 'passion' occurs several times in this aesthetic context,

with special reference to theatrical monologues and used with almost technical precision in the craft of play-making: 'the cue for passion' (1.1.537), 'tear a passion to tatters, to very rags, to split the ears of the groundlings' (3.2.12), `a tow'ring passion' (5.2.81), 'Come, a passionate speech' (2.2.435). We find it in a rare stage direction within the play-within-play's dumbshow indicating what is to be seen, 'makes passionate action' (3.2.125). Despite the word's traditional link with Christ's passion and with the soul, we find passion linked only occasionally and obliquely with religion: 'any passion under heaven' (2.1.106), 'passion in the gods' (2.2.521), and with feelings likened to equally generic spiritual states such as `thought and affliction, passion, hell itself' (4.5.186). We find it also as an overriding, compulsive pressure which we would call an obsessive or even neurotic state in any suffering individual—`passion's slave' (3.2.70) and 'the whirlwind of your passion' (3.2.10) without religious associations and referring to strong emotions stirred in secular contexts. It is also interesting that the other secular 'turn' in the word's fortunes towards meaning strong sexual attraction was initiated by early modern writers, Spenser (`shee grew Full of soft passion [...]' [The Faerie Queene Book III, Canto 5, Verse 30])12 and Shakespeare himself (`passion lends them power' [Romeo and Juliet 2. Chorus. 13]). It might bear further analysis that in Hamlet the playwright chooses primarily to draw attention to the rhetorical and secular meaning of the word.

The play as a whole might conceivably be described as 'Shakespeare's passion', an artistically ordered and framed cry from the heart expressive of profound grief which is not articulated through an authorial voice but realised as a play about inter-generational loss. In 1600, Shakespeare must have been starkly contemplating the imminent death of his seventy-year-old father (it came a year later), and no doubt beginning to realize how much unfinished business would be bequeathed to the next generation, perhaps by way of revenge over his father's enemies; and he must have carried residual grief of losing his son Hamnet, Judith's twin brother, at the mature age of eleven, just four years earlier. Critics have always been intrigued by the similarity of names, especially since we know Hamnet was named after Hamnet Sadler whose first name Shakespeare in his will spelled as 'Hamlet'. Whether or not there had also occurred some blighted love relationship, perhaps of a 'dark lady', is purely conjectural,

but part of a possible emotional maelstrom in the writer's mind which produced this 'dream of passion' (2.2.554) which continues to haunt the world. <>

AN IRONIC APPROACH TO THE ABSOLUTE: SCHLEGEL'S POETIC MYSTICISM by Karolin Mirzakhan [Lexington Books, ISBN: 9781498578912]

_____ , _____ brings Friedrich Schlegel's ironic fragments in dialogue with the Dao De Jing and John Ashbery's Flow Chart to argue that poetic texts offer an intuition of the whole because they resist the reader's desire to comprehend them fully. Karolin Mirzakhan argues that although Schlegel's ironic fragments proclaim their incompleteness in both their form and their content, they are the primary means for facilitating an intuition of the Absolute. Focusing on the techniques by which texts remain open, empty, or ungraspable, Mirzakhan's analysis uncovers the methods that authors use to cultivate the agility of mind necessary for their readers to intuit the Absolute. Mirzakhan develops the term "poetic mysticism" to describe the experience of the Absolute made possible by particular textual moments,examining the Dao De Jing and Flow Chart to provide an original account of the striving to know the Absolute that is non-linear, non-totalizing, and attuned to non-presence. This conversation with ancient and contemporary poetic texts enacts the romantic imperative to join philosophy with poetry and advances a clearer communication of the notion of the Absolute that emerges from Schlegel's romantic philosophy.

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Paradox and Philosophizing Together

I begin our investigation of Friedrich Schlegel's romantic philosophy, and the role of irony therein, with a sojourn into Plato's Meno. In the dialogue, Socrates and Meno discuss the nature of virtue and whether it can be taught or is acquired in some other way. Socrates exhorts Meno––who has given many fine speeches on the matter––to define virtue. Meno initially answers confidently, but, after several failed attempts to satisfy Socrates, he gives up and, in exasperation, accuses Socrates of being a "broad torpedo fish" that has made his mind and tongue numb. Socrates is willing to accept this characterization if Meno agrees that Socrates is also numb. In other words, if Socrates has confused Meno and left him numb, it is only because he is also perplexed as to the nature of virtue. Nonetheless, Socrates tells Meno that he would welcome the opportunity to continue searching together for a definition. At this point in the dialogue, Socrates (and the reader) are presented with a paradox by Meno: How can you search for something if you do not know what it is? And, if, by chance or in some other way, you encountered it, how would you even know that you had? In other words, searching for what we already know is futile, and searching for what we do not know is impossible.

I have chosen to begin this exploration of an ironic approach to the Absolute with a Socratic dialogue for a few reasons. First, Schlegel will inaugurate his transformation of irony in its philosophical homeland and with Socrates. As readers of this Socratic dialogue, our interpretation of the text will hinge on whether we maintain that Socrates' statements are ironic and, if we do, which definition of irony we ascribe to when we make this judgment. Secondly, the conception of the Absolute for Schlegel, which I will expound throughout, struggles against Meno's paradox; in brief, how can we strive to know the Absolute if we do not know what it is that we are searching for? Even if we were to come into contact with it, how would we know that we had? Third, Socrates' invitation to search for the definition of virtue with Meno is an example of Schlegel's concept of symphilosophie, as doing philosophy with the other, or philosophizing together. Indeed, the relationship between a reader and a writer is an ideal space for successfully executing symphilosophie. The writer guided by the goal of symphilosophie is the synthetic writer who designs her reader and brings her forth. The

synthetic writer engages with her reader as still "alive and critical," rather than already fully formed. Because she must create her reader, the synthetic writer faces a delay–– she will not be understood until such a reader exists. Worse yet, her writing may fail to create an audience who understands her. [Indeed, both Socrates and Schlegel were misunderstood by their contemporaries. The theme of misunderstanding will reappear in chapter 2 where I discuss Hegel's sharp criticism of Schlegel. In part, Hegel's critique stems from his need to distinguish the destructive capacity of irony from the high place of comedy (and, in particular, Aristophanes) in his system of the fine arts. Whereas Hegel's exemplar of comedy is Aristophanes, Schlegel's ancient Greek reference point for irony is Socrates; it is not incidental, especially with the difference between the synthetic and analytic writers in mind, that Socrates was sentenced to death by the Athenians, whereas Aristophanes never received more than a slap on the wrist as punishment for the content of his comedies.] In contrast, the analytic writer simply observes the reader as she already is and produces a text that will maximize the appropriate impression upon that reader. As I will elaborate throughout, Schlegel is a synthetic writer whose primary means for enacting symphilosophie is irony. As a synthetic writer, Schlegel leaves room for his reader to affect the text's meaning; however, by saying less and by writing ironically, Schlegel risks being misunderstood by his reader.

EARLY GERMAN ROMANTICISM

Friedrich Schlegel is considered by scholars to be the leading thinker of the early German romantic movement [Frühromantik], as well as a foremost thinker of irony. Frühromantik lasted from approximately 1794 to 1808 in Jena and Berlin. The Athenaeum journal, published from 1798 to1800, was a major venue for the development of romantic philosophy during this period. The Athenaeum emerged out of a close group of friends now referred to as the early German romantics (an anachronism since this group of friends never referred to themselves as "romantics"). This close-knit group of friends that became the contrib utors to the journal included August Wilhelm and Friedrich Schlegel (the initiators of the journal), Caroline Schlegel, Dorothea Veit, Friedrich von Hardenberg (Novalis), Ludwig Tieck, and Friedrich Schleiermacher.

Several characteristics distinguish the early German romantics from their predecessors. First, they emphasize that philosophy is an infinite activity rather than a final product in the form of a completed system (belonging to its creator). The activity of philosophizing does not begin with a self-sufficient first principle upon which it would be possible to build toward a conclusion regarding the nature of reality or the Absolute. For the romantics, philosophizing begins in media res (or "in the midst of things") and progressively works toward a better understanding of the matter at hand. However, as I will argue, particularly through the intervention of Daoism, the ideal of linear progress will be disrupted by the notion of the Absolute that emerges in Schlegel's philosophy, as well as by the non-linear and non-totalizing method of approaching the Absolute offered by the ironic fragments.

Second, the early German romantics not only stress the incompleteness of all systems of human knowing, but they also claim that philosophy itself is incomplete. Philosophy has gotten as far as it can on its own; it must be united with poetry and science. The philosopher, in the romantic model, is a poet-scientist-philosopher. This mixing of disciplines will alter each component: Poetry will become scientific, science will become poetic, and philosophy will become a scientific-poetic endeavor, in both its content and form. Not only are the disciplines joined together, but the philosopher is also not a solitary thinker; in the romantic circle, the activity of philosophizing is a communal effort. Schlegel emphasizes this communal aspect of philosophy to his readers when he writes that the phrase "my philosophy" is as absurd as the utterance "my God," as if God or philosophy could belong to any one person.

Third, in this model for philosophizing that enjoins us to collaborate, the fragment and the dialogue are the privileged forms for philosophical engagement. Philosophy is a dialogue between different thinkers spanning time and place, as well as between the myriad disciplines. As a form, the fragment also highlights the role of dialogue; the term "fragment" already implies separation from a larger whole, or from other fragments. Like the thinkers and disciplines, the fragments are also in conversation with one another.

Finally, the infinite striving that characterizes romantic philosophy is motivated by the desire to know the Absolute. Novalis describes this yearning in his first Pollen fragment when he writes, "We seek the absolute [das Unbedingte] everywhere and only ever find things [nur Dinge]." To rephrase Novalis' concern in terms of Meno's paradox: How can we look for the Absolute (the unconditioned) if all we are ever presented with are things (subject to conditions for their arising)? In this text, I will define the Absolute tentatively as the whole, or that which is unconditioned. I will elaborate this tentative definition in chapter 1; however, an important aspect of the Absolute as the whole, or as oneness, is its non-relationality. As the unconditioned, the Absolute is not connected to a cause (or condition) for its arising. Insofar as the Absolute is the whole, it must contain all relationships within itself and it cannot be in relation to anything else that would limit it. Therefore, if we seek to know the Absolute, as oneness, we abandon oneness as soon as we conceive of ourselves as separate from that which we seek to know. Our usual ways of knowing separate the "I" from what it seeks to know, and therefore forms of poetic expression, such as the literary technique irony, are necessary in order to communicate the whole without cutting it apart by separating the knower from what she seeks to know. If the knower is separate from the whole, then the whole is not truly a oneness, but rather it has already become a twoness (as I will elaborate in chapter 3, on Daoism). Poetic techniques, particularly irony, facilitate the reader's intuition of the whole as whole. Certain poetic techniques allow for an intuition of the Absolute as a unity, without splitting it apart. Ironically, for the romantics, the fragment is the form for the intuition of the whole. Through their form, the fragments proclaim their incompleteness, and in so doing, they leave room for that which necessarily exceeds them.

Throughout this text, the language being used to describe the philosophical striving to know the Absolute will betray the very methods that the writers in question wield; terms such as "closer" or "nearer," which are used to describe a striving "toward" the Absolute, emphasize a linear, rather than a cyclical, model for philosophizing. To say that the Absolute "contains" oppositions turns it into a thing, an imagined container, which is separate from its contents; this expression turns the unthinged into a thing. The romantics do not begin "in media res" because they lack the rigor to seek first

principles, but rather because this beginning point expresses the nature of the Absolute as non-relational. The Absolute includes the poet-knower. As poet John Ashbery puts it, we are in a "gluey embrace"; philosophy's task, through irony, is to reveal that we are already in this embrace.

POETIC MYSTICISM

During the early German romantic period, a new conception of a dynamic Absolute emerges from Schlegel's philosophical fragments. This book will focus on irony as a primary technique for realizing the Absolute in Schlegel's symphilosophical project. I use the term "poetic mysticism" to describe the experience of realizing the Absolute, which can be traced back to particular texts. These texts are mystical in nature; I retain the term "mysticism" to refer to an intuition of the whole that is non-discursive and that has its own temporality––of flashes. I qualify this mysticism as "poetic" insofar as the intuition of the whole is tied to particular texts that initiate it. It is not possible to give a fully rational, systematic account of how this experience is generated because the primary technique employed is irony, and irony can never be fully comprehended and articulated without turning the ironic utterance into an

unironic, direct expression. However, this does not mean that poetic mysticism is entirely indemonstrable. Rather, it is possible to give an account of the techniques used by certain poetic texts to facilitate an encounter with the Absolute in communion with their readers. The techniques that perform romantic striving will themselves be unironi-cally described in the chapters that follow. Moreover, all attempts to capture the work of irony will always be undercut by irony itself; thus, no complete account can ever be given of how precisely irony makes possible an intuition of the whole.

Although I am arguing for a conception of the Absolute that is at odds with dominant interpretations, [In   , Dalia Nassar details the metaphysical and epistemological interpretations of the Absolute that have come to dominate scholarship on the romantics. On one side, Manfred Frank reads the Absolute as merely an epistemological notion, much like the Kantian regulative ideal. On the other side, Frederick Beiser understands the Absolute as a metaphysical idea in line with Spinoza's substance. Nassar's thesis is that these two sides need to be thought

in a notion of the Absolute that unites both the epistemological and metaphysical view in order to provide an account of not only "what" the Absolute is, but also how we gain access to "it." For Nassar, this access is possible through a "special mode of thought" that is "nondiscursive" or "nonconceptual." In other words, on Nassar's reading, Schlegel's position is that we can grasp the Absolute through intellectual intuition, i.e., an intuition that grasps the whole as a whole. Nassar argues that intellectual intuition has the advantage that it does not objectify the Absolute.

by Dalia Nassar (London and Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2013), 5–6, 108.] I preserve this term in my arguments, because it tethers the reader to a central concept for philosophers during the nineteenth century (unlike the term "Dao," which might be more appropriate). As such, I will retain the term "Absolute" as a subterfuge operating throughout this book, as a way of naming that which cannot be named––a necessary deception to aid the reader, a name that points to the limitation of all names.

CHAPTER SUMMARIES

In chapter 1, I examine the development and genesis of irony in order to understand how Schlegelian irony, or irony as the "form of paradox," alters its traditional meanings. I argue that Schlegel's development of irony lays bare aspects of the traditional definitions, which were previously only implicit. I will argue that irony is a primary technique through which the striving to know the Absolute is enacted in Schlegel's romantic philosophy. Irony cultivates the agility of mind needed for the reader to intuit the whole. Here, Meno's paradox re-emerges in a different form: if irony cultivates the appropriate stance in the reader, how will the reader know whether she has arrived at the necessary disposition for intuiting the Absolute?

In chapter 1, I argue that Schlegel transforms the meaning of irony and that irony plays a central role in his romantic philosophy. In the subsequent chapters, I engage this definition of irony in dialogue with three interlocuters: G. W. F. Hegel, John Ashbery, and the ancient Daoist text the Dao De Jing (or Laozi). Each conversation partner will bring to light a different aspect of Schlegel's romantic philosophy, especially as it pertains to the role of irony and to the textual nature of the striving for the Absolute. This book will take seriously the romantic commitment to philosophy as an activity of

synthesis, rather than separation or limitation, by bringing Schlegel's romantic philosophy into conversation with both ancient and contemporary texts. Chapters 3 and 4 are an application of the romantic imperative to join philosophy with poetry. The Dao De Jing and Flow Chart succeed in bringing their reader in contact with the Absolute through poetic mysticism.

Chapter 2 takes up Schlegel's ironic project against the backdrop of G. W. F. Hegel's criticism. Hegel's characterization of irony points to the legitimate dangers of the creative and destructive potential of an unlimited or absolute ego. For Hegel, the ironic genius is the individual who regards only what she creates (and thus is capable of destroying) to be substantial; there is nothing that she considers to be real, independent of her creations. I will respond to Hegel's critique in order to illuminate certain elements of Schlegel's philosophy, particularly his emphasis on self-restraint. Restraint appears in both the form and content of Schlegel's philosophical project. He writes in concise, self-contained fragments, and the content of the fragments repeatedly emphasizes the importance of self-restraint for the writer and knower. Moreover, restraint is not merely self-restraint; the writer is also limited by language, by irony, and by the audience with whom she is in conversation.

Chapter 3 focuses on the site of emptiness or incomprehensibility in Schlegel's fragmentary writings through a comparison with the ancient Chinese text the Dao De Jing. These texts are co-illuminating: Both emphasize the role of that which cannot be known and exceeds the realm of the human, but which is necessary for knowing to happen at all. This chapter deals explicitly with the issue of language that runs throughout the book, such as how attempts to communicate the Absolute inevitably betray what they seek to name. The Dao De Jing offers resources for poetic language that expresses the Absolute without mastering or objectifying it; its presentation of the Dao emphasizes a conception of the Absolute that is dynamic and generative. In order to describe the Dao, the text appeals to metaphors, which underscore the role of emptiness in the utility of natural and artificial objects. Additionally, and crucially, the text performs the emptiness it describes in its many metaphors at the level of its form: It remains mysterious and cryptic through its use of paradox. The Dao De Jing's

emptiness thwarts its reader's typical relationship of mastery toward texts and thereby conveys absoluteness as a dynamic movement.

Chapter 4 is a reflection on John Ashbery's poem Flow Chart. I argue that the poem's movement can be read as ironic in the Schlegelian sense. This book-length poem contains no apparent narrative; its movements resemble waves, which approach and break apart from meaning before the reader. Ashbery is a writer who welcomes contingency and outside influences into his poetry. Because Ashbery introduces the element of chance into his writing process, a text emerges that is not under the complete control of its author, and which cannot be fully grasped by its reader. The text's autonomy––its resistance to definition––enables it to perform absoluteness. <>

SENSING THE SACRED: RECOVERING A MYSTAGOGICAL VISION OF KNOWLEDGE AND SALVATION by Hanna J. Lucas [Veritas, Cascade Books, ISBN 9781666758054]

This book offers a theological vision of learning informed by the mystagogical homilies of Ambrose of Milan, Cyril of Jerusalem, John Chrysostom, and Theodore of Mopsuestia. In dialogue with these four mystagogues, Hanna Lucas walks through the rites and liturgy surrounding baptism and the eucharist in order to establish a theological epistemology that sees knowledge as part of the "capacitation" of our nature for heavenly mysteries and union with God. The sacraments of initiation teach us that even the mundane aspects of knowledge, including the rudiments of matter and sensation, fit into a larger divine gift of capacitation. This book offers a holistic and integrated theory of knowledge that envisions one all-encompassing divine pedagogy that orients toward union with God. This union is experienced fully in the eschaton, but it breaks into time through the sacraments of the church, and it echoes down through the ordinary modes of knowing we encounter in daily life. Mundane knowledge beckons the knower to become capable of a sublime intelligence: to become capable of union with the divine. This integrative, unitive, and eschatologically oriented vision of knowledge stands in stark contrast to modern and postmodern epistemologies. Sensing the Sacred positions mystagogy as a timely remedy for the "incapacitations" that modernity offers us.

Review

"Deeply rooted in patristic mystagogy, Hanna Lucas constructs a theology of learning that guides our faculties to receive God.   wisely counsels a return to an approach that integrates all learning--sensible, rational, and spiritual--into a unified process of capacitation for union with God. Teachers in every discipline, therefore, do well to heed Lucas's salutary appeal for a return to mystery." --Hans Boersma, chair in ascetical theology, Nashotah House Theological Seminary

"I have sitting before me the classic beauty on love and learning by Jean Leclercq,   . This bounty of a book by Hanna Lucas,   walks Leclercq to yet deeper and fuller places, a vision of the mystagogical tradition at the core of salvation knowledge. Lucas has made deep dives and recovered many a priceless pearl--do read and inwardly digest soul nourishment of the highest level." --Ron Dart, associate professor of political science, University of the Fraser Valley

"Hanna Lucas combines deep engagement with Latin, Greek, and Syriac mystagogical texts with a broad, enthusiastic, and constructive theological vision. What she develops in this volume is both a rich retrieval and a bold development of a theology of learning." --Karen Kilby, professor of Catholic theology, University of Durham

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This book offers a bold and exciting thesis concerning human learning and initiation into the Christian mysteries. It invites us into the strange world of the mystagogues of

the fourth century, those bishops who led neophytes into the sacramental life of the church through a liturgical instruction in mystery. Mystagogy is a particular kind of education—a sensuous and gentle healing of the intellect, will, and senses through liturgical rites that render the neophyte capacious and open to the divine life. If sin makes us close-in on ourselves and hide (Gen 3:8), the mystagogical initiation into the Christian life opens the human person to God's presence in the church, the body of Christ gathered and vivified by the Holy Spirit. By grace, the initiate becomes a new creation in receiving anew the gift of life through the second birth of baptism.

The mystagogical texts that are the subject of this book are deeply rooted in Scripture, particularly Christ's healing miracles recounted in the Synoptic Gospels. Ears, eyes, and mouth are opened to hear, see, and proclaim the gospel. The rites initiate a renewed sensitivity to taste and the ancient conviction that touch is the primary sense. Fourth-century Christian mystagogy also reflects the intimacy of life in Christ that is one of the most striking characteristics of St. John's Gospel. In the Fourth Gospel, we learn that the Christian is grafted into the true vine so that the sap of Christ's life becomes, as it were, the sap of our own (John 15:1–7). The Christian is to eat the flesh and drink the blood of Christ (John 6:53–56), for in this is life. The Christian is to have their feet—the lowliest, most burdened, yet a most sensitive part of the body—washed and dried by Christ's tender touch (John 13:1–11). Mystagogical initiation reflects the Synoptic emphasis on healing and opening, and the Johannine emphasis on intimacy with the Word made flesh, through a sensuous liturgical instruction that is at once intellectual, volitional, and corporeal. The healing of the soul and the body, the intellect and will, are begun in mystagogy so that the new Christian becomes whole in Christ. Contrast this with modern Christian initiation, which tends to center on information, life experience, and propositional assent. The life of faith too easily becomes abstract or overly subjective. Fourth-century mystagogical initiation offers a very different mode of pedagogy and catechesis that is deeply scriptural and sacramental.

As Hanna Lucas emphasizes, the world of fourth-century mystagogy is ordered to mystery. Again, this makes mystagogy strange for any modern reader. We moderns see a dialectical relationship between mystery and knowledge. Mystery betokens a deficit in understanding; it is to be overcome by the gradual accumulation and possession of

knowledge. What remains mysterious must be subject to examination by the senses and analysis by an allegedly dispassionate reason. The gathering and interpretation of evidence satiates curiosity, illuminates the understanding, and overcomes the mysterious. What was once mysterious, we now comprehend. Knowledge is our achievement and our possession. Truth, on this account, evacuated of any essential mystery, becomes flat in the sense that it is simply the arrangement of discoverable and discrete facts as if on a dining room table.

Mystagogy offers a very different vision. It understands mystery and knowledge to be mutually ever-present because mystery is truth. Mystery is not negative, but rather a surfeit or depth of intelligibility into which the Christian neophyte is initiated. The emphasis on mystery is not, however, peculiar to fourth-century mystagogy because mystery lies at the heart of ancient Greek and Christian philosophy, as well as patristic and high medieval theology. This perennial tradition is explored in its philosophical guise by Joseph Pieper in a brief essay entitled "Philosophy and the Sense for Mystery." Pieper distinguishes philosophy from the special sciences, which explore aspects of being (the properties of matter or features of the human psyche, for example) rather than being itself. These sciences only pose questions that fall within the compass of their particular modes of enquiry and criteria of knowledge. Those questions should be answerable, at least in principle, and restricted to the positively knowable. The knowledge they generate can be cumulative and possessed. We know, for example, what it would be to comprehend the workings of the immune system according to criteria established by medicine or the behavior of dark matter according to the methods of physics. Insofar as modern analytic philosophy has tried to align itself with the natural sciences, classically in the school of Logical Positivism, it has adopted a similar strategy of establishing closed criteria of truth and intelligibility. According to Pieper, ancient philosophy is different. It enquires after the ultimate origin, nature, and end of beings in their most general and fundamental aspect. It asks, "What is the human person as such?" or, "What truth itself, as distinct from particular truths?"3 The questions of philosophy imply the desire to comprehend the very natures, ultimate origins, and final ends of things. For the philosophers and theologians of antiquity and the Middle Ages, however, we cannot exhaustively and conclusively comprehend the

fundamental essence of anything (not even, according to Aquinas, a gnat) because created being is always unfolding. Such knowledge cannot be "possessed"; it can only be received as an ever-arriving mystery and gift. It is the burden of philosophy that its questions can never be answered fully and finally on their own terms. Philosophy cannot be a "closed system" in the sense that "the essential reality of the world would be adequately reflected in it." The truth of being is its mystery.

According to Pieper, the superiority of a distinctively Christian philosophy does not lie in its ability to give more polished or definitive answers to classical philosophical questions concerning the mystery of being. Rather, the profundity of Christian philosophy lies in its treatment of the world as created. The being of creatures is not self-standing but is the expression of God, who is "self-subsistent being itself," to use Aquinas's formula. This amplifies the sense of mystery at the heart of philosophy because an enquiry into the fundamental origins, nature, and ends of beings is also an enquiry into their relation to an eternal and unfathomable source, namely the simplicity of God. More specifically, the doctrine of creation ex nihilo, which is both a metaphysical claim consequent upon the doctrine of God and an article of faith rooted in Scripture, is the passageway through which philosophical reason is carried into the mystery of revelation. The fundamental truth of created being is that it is gift rather than brute fact. Created being in its totality, finding its absolute source in God, points beyond itself to a divine donor. The gift of creation bears something of God to creatures. Creation therefore bears unfathomable significance and value; it is a mysterium and sacramentum—a pattern of signs that reveal, in the realm of becoming, the light of being. This is not a matter of mere puzzlement, curiosity, or obscurity that must be tolerated or overcome, but of astonishment that gives rise to wonder that there is something rather than nothing. Human enquiry and human living are not a ceaseless chasing after truth or a wandering in the dark with a torch, but a dwelling in the inexhaustible light of the divine that is given in creation. In being inexhaustible, its truth is mystery and its mystery is truth. Mystagogy belongs to this ancient tradition of education in mystery. It is concerned with the gift of God's grace to renew and ignite the Christian neophyte's capacity for that mystery.

Mystagogy therefore belongs to this ancient tradition of philosophy and theology as an initiation into divine mysteries. In being a sensuous and liturgical form of initiation into the Christian life, mystagogy does not contrast the mystery of God with the straightforward intelligibility of creatures. Mystagogical rites open the neophytes not only to the mystery of God, but also to the mystery of their own being and the mystery of creation. The rites utilize created elements and human gestures: oil, water, bread, wine, incense, candles, clothing; touch, embrace, vocal address, prostration, leading by the hand. Elements and gestures become signs and bearers of God's grace. These mysteries of the church that we call sacraments, through which the mystagogues lead and instruct the neophytes, reveal the sacramental mystery of all creation. This sacramental and sensuous pedagogy is consistent with the ancient conviction that human learning is not a matter of comprehending and possessing "truth," but the wonderful capacitation for the unfathomable mystery of God and his creation. Sensing the Sacred is an initiation into an ancient sacramental pedagogy that offers an arresting challenge to our modern sensibilities concerning initiation, learning, and knowledge. It returns us again to a proper sacramental pedagogy.

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> Already is there on you the savor of blessedness, O you who are soon to be enlightened; already are you gathering spiritual flowers, to weave heavenly crowns withal; already hath the fragrance of the Holy Ghost refreshed you; already are you at the entrance-hall of the King's house, may you be brought into it by the King! —Cyril of Jerusalem, Procatechesis.

The mystery of learning

I have offered a reading of the mystagogical catecheses of the fourth century which seeks to articulate and recover a patristic theology of learning. I have argued that the meaning and character of knowledge are ultimately intelligible within their relation to salvation in Christ. I set out to reflect upon learning in terms of the mundane and sacramental movements of humanity toward the knowledge of God that Jesus prayed for: "and this is eternal life, that they may know you the only true God and Jesus Christ whom you have sent" (John 17:3).

I have traced how, in the explicit catechetical journey through the sacraments by which one enters into the knowledge that is eternal life— that is, into the divinizing union

with Christ—the mystagogues also journey, implicitly, through the gracious summons to that knowledge in the order of creation. These two journeys reveal one grace of providence, and one inner logic and end of creaturehood. This one grace and inner logic is the gift of capacitation for union with God. Creation exists to know, or bear, the Creator according to the capacities bestowed to its diverse natures. For humanity, the mystery of learning is our journey toward the knowledge of God that is intimacy with Christ—in mundane echoes and sacramental realities. And it is measured not in an accumulation of data, but in the capacitation of our nature for union with Him. The fullness of the gift of learning is to know Christ with a knowledge that becomes indistinguishable from love, to know by union. I have argued that this entails a "catholicity" whereby even the most ordinary knowing and learning belong in some manner to the grace of salvation and theõsis, to the divine transfiguration of our nature that enables us to participate in divine life.

A theology of learning lies in how one defines the manner in which mundane learning belongs to this higher grace of transformation and capacitation. Throughout this book, I have used the phrase "the mystery of learning." My reading of the mystagogies sought to give an account of the theology of learning that underlies these texts and makes sense of, especially, the physicality of the sacraments and the predilection for analogy in the mystagogues' pedagogies. We can now say that the theology of learning present in the mystagogies is a sacramental theology. Learning is a mystery in that it is a symbol, an image or imitation, of a higher, spiritual reality: the reality of salvation. What we are really discovering is the sacramentality of learning: that is, how the order of learning echoes and participates in that of which it is a sign. We could say that earthly learning comprises the humble, creaturely foothills of knowing Christ.1

This diverges markedly from the vision of learning and knowledge that developed over the course of modernity and informs the prevailing epistemologies we encounter today. A forgetfulness of the patristic confidence in the soteriological entailment of creatureliness in the gift of theõsis is bound up in modernity's sojourn through empiricism and idealism. The result for the heirs of this patrimony is an immanentized vision of learning in which to know is to accumulate information about an inert cosmos, or to foist vestures of value-regimes upon the indifference of alterity. In both

senses, this is to instrumentalize knowledge, making it a tool of conquest or a contrivance in the face of the nihil. This is to woefully miss the truth that learning is about the salvation of our souls—and our bodies.

Salvation: may you be brought in by the King

Before elaborating on the sacramentality of learning, we must revisit the soteriology that the mystagogies profess, as this vision of salvation is that of which learning is a sign. The mystagogues' teachings on the rites of initiation reflect a doctrine of salvation that, while robustly affirming the absolute centrality of Christ's passion and the grace of forgiveness of sins, is profoundly oriented toward the eschatological. The deeper end of the paschal, participatory imitation of Christ in the sacraments is to be transformed by the Holy Spirit through this likeness into a creature who partakes in divine life. That is, the end of the sacraments is to receive and submit to the firstfruits of theõsis.

The eschatological orientation of the mystagogues' teachings, as I have shown, is always paired with a profoundly holistic vision of salvation where this divine union and transformation embraces and touches the whole of our created nature. The physicality of the initiation rites and the analogical pedagogy of the mystagogues encourage an understanding of salvation-divinization as a holistic grace; a capacitation for union with God that excludes no part of our nature in its redeeming, healing, and transfiguring work. I sought to emphasize this all-embracing aspect by orienting my argument around themes of sensation and by focusing on the "capacitation" of human faculties for the divine. The mystagogies dissuade us from a gnostic vision of salvation. Knowing God is an embodied affair; a communion with Christ that touches the entire order of our humanity, and the capacitation of our faculties is part of the salvation of our nature. The ears, the tongue, the eyes, and the whole body are "saved" when they are healed by Christ, sensitized to the divine, and empowered to embrace God.

In chapter 1, I argued that the capacitation of hearing is a consummation of the divine summons that echoes through scripture's narrative and throughout the cosmos. It is an attunement to the divine origin and end of creatureliness. The capacitation of hearing is to have our relational receptivity fulfilled in the hearing of divine speech—like the deaf man whose ears were healed at the voice of Christ saying "Ephphatha," be opened.

I sought to establish the ontological and epistemological depth of the "openness" to God that Christ gives to the baptized. This discussion served as a first component of what chõreotikos theou, capacity for God, means. In chapter 2, I explored how the faculty of speech is drawn into salvation and theõsis when the tongue, as a symbol of our capacity for communication, "discharges its office" of true speech through confession and adoration and exercises the parrhesia of those who belong to God. Capacitated speech echoes God's creative speech when it gives voice to the truth, stating the "actuality of things" regarding our own nature and those of our fellow creatures. Capacitated speech joins and administers a catholic cosmic song of return, both in the liturgy and in our ordinary knowing of creation, and it boldly repudiates the diabolical sundering of signs. In chapter 3, I argued that the power of sight is drawn into theõsis through its capacitation to apprehend the precision (akribeia) of creaturely epiphany, to manifest the eschatological meaning of our nature, and to participate in the claritas, or radiance, of the divine Son. Lastly, in chapter 4 I argued that touch reveals the root and order of all the senses, and, by extension, the root and order of creation, embodiment, and knowledge. We are made for the embrace of God. Touch, read mystagogically, reveals how salvation and theõsis are fundamentally tied to intimacy and union—a union that shapes our being, beautifying and beatifying us, fitting us for heavenly nuptials.

Salvation is properly conceived when this depth and scope are accounted for. The knowledge of God that is eternal life lies in the grace of union pouring down and penetrating every sense and every power of our nature. The "sublime intelligence" Theodore spoke of lies in a divinely empowered, complete human nature receiving God by every faculty in the overflowing gratuitous excess of His self-giving. In this mystagogical vision, salvation is to be united to and filled with God, and theõsis is the divine work making us infinitely capacious toward the divine.

But this is not only a capacity for, it is a capacity like. Chõretikos theou means becoming "capable of God," but it also means becoming divinely capable—acquiring a "capacity" that imitates the capaciousness of God. This is the divine capaciousness in which all of creation derives and has its being; and beneath this lies the absolute capacity of being and love that belongs to the Trinity. Since the capacity for divine

communion belongs perfectly to the divine nature alone, what it means for any faculty or aspect of our nature to be made chõreotikos theou is to be conformed to Christ in whom perfect communion between God and humanity exists, and to be made-capable of participating in this communion of God by the "touch" of the Holy Spirit. And since God, as Creator, "contains" all things, sustained as they are within the one divine will, intelligence, and goodness, our capacity for God through the world is a knowledge that partakes, however modestly, in divine knowledge.

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Earthly learning: "already is there on you
the savor of blessedness"

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The end of knowing God in this way, of becoming chõretikos theou, or "embracing Him with all our power" as Theodore said, echoes through the whole of creation and through our human faculties even in their ordinary operations and rhythms. And thus, earthly learning is a "mystery" insofar as it images the salvific and eschatological knowing of Christ and the gift of being made-capable of that knowledge. Just as the mystagogies dissuade us from a gnostic vision of salvation, so they dissuade us from a gnostic vision of knowledge, including its mundane forms. The theology of learning that is operative throughout the mystagogies envisions earthly knowing as a mundane communion that consummates the prevenient kinship, or "fittingness," between creatures and brings about a theologically informed likeness in the knower and a teleological harmony between the knower and the known oriented toward their common end in God.

I articulated this account of knowledge as communion and change in relation to Aristotle's theory of sensory perception. For Aristotle, sensation, as the rudiment of knowledge, involves the form of the object being "impressed" upon the soul and a likeness of the form being reproduced in the faculty itself. Knowledge in this sense, as an encounter of likeness-making mediated by the senses, is also a consummation of the suitedness and potential of the knower to receive the "change" of learning (Aristotle's "alteration," alloiõsis). The learner is already "combustible," like the sense faculty awaiting the spark of sensation. I argued that a similar notion of knowledge can describe the mystagogical approach to learning, especially in the mystagogues' appeals to natural analogies. Humanity is instructed and formed by our relations with creation,

even in the humblest rhythms of creatureliness. And this mundane education echoes the encounter with divine truth in the sacraments and the change of likeness-making that it brings about. We meet and are "moved" by truth in creation; we are formed and altered by this encounter, but in a way that consummates the prevenient disposition of our nature toward that very change.

What Aristotle understood as "form"—the inner truth doing the "moving" and "changing" in the knower—Christian metaphysics recognizes as analogia entis. The analogical mathethsis of the created order echoes and impresses heavenly truth upon the soul through the faculties of the body and the intellect. Creation is, in one sense, already chõreotikos theou in that creaturely particularities and creaturely relations bear or contain an anticipation of the end of union with God. This is what creation is for and what creation says by varied tones. The intelligibility of creation, and the kinship that underwrites that intelligibility exist because we are destined for divine communion.

Cyril said to the phõtizomenoi, the about-to-be-illumined, "already is there on you the savor of blessedness;" and I read this as an expression of the Christologically oriented pedagogical logic of creation. We come to the liturgy already formed and informed by the pedagogy of nature, the scent of heaven encircling us: we are immersed from birth in a mundane education delivered in the echoes of our end in God that we receive through our intimacy with "cloddish earth."6 The inner truth of creatures—the mathethsis in sackcloth, water, oil, sunrise and sunset, bread and wine—is, in the end, an evangelical instruction, a divine pedagogy and anticipation, a sweet aroma, proceeding from and coming to rest in Christ.

Learning can be called a mystery, a sacrament or, at least, sacramental, because our knowledge of creatures is an analogy of the true knowledge of and union with Christ that is offered in the sacraments; or it can be, in the claritas of grace. Just as our knowing of Christ in the sacraments, by the power of the Holy Spirit, "fits" us for eschatological union and is a true participation in that union even now, so our earthly knowing rehearses in a shadowy, yet participative, way the end of knowing God. In the capacities that already belong to our nature for sensing, feeling, and learning through

the order of creaturehood, we partake of an imitation of the sacramental union; the gift of being transfigured, capacitated by the Holy Spirit to know God, and to know Him by union. I have called creation pedagogical; and now we can say that what "pedagogical" means is something more than merely "instructive." Pedagogy pertains to the ways in which creation and earthly knowledge belong to the reverberations of theõsis; the "change" that fits us for union with the divine.

Our end is to be endlessly capacitated for union with God. Even ordinary knowing participates in a modest way in the knowledge of God and of His Son because all of creation proceeds from and returns to divine intelligence and love. In the everyday and mundane, a shadow of salvific likeness-making and communion is rehearsed. The imprint pressed on our souls as we know creation is the signet of Christ, and our love is awakened in tiny but noble ways in our knowing of creatures. Earthly knowledge echoes our sacramental communion with Christ, and that echo is not merely referential. The subtle education of our longing that we pass through in bodily life and the capacitation for truth that is possible in earthly learning are drawn into God's gracious gathering of His creation. Said another way, we are "already" chõreotikos kosmou because we are called to become chõre^tikos theou. In the liturgy of the church, the sacrament of learning is enveloped into the reality of union.

Mystagogy as curatio

I have sought to express how profoundly positive the mystagogical estimation of earthly knowing really is. The implicit doctrines of creation and salvation that underlie the sacraments, the liturgy, and the mystagogies assume and lean deeply into the creaturely kinship of ontology and the intelligibility that originates in Christ and curves toward the end of union. Mystagogy counts on the fact that those coming to initiation have truly been formed by the "savor of blessedness" that already permeates the mundane. This is a vision for what earthly learning is at its heart, but we still face the incapacitations of sin and of thought. And thus, I argued that the mystagogues' joyous confidence in our true union with Christ, and the extension of that joyous confidence in their understanding of earthly knowing, must be recovered to heal the wounds of modern metaphysics and to re-illuminate the pedagogy of creation that anticipates our end in Christ.

I offered an application of this mystagogical curatio in chapter 5, where I outlined certain malaises of modern thought that cast an anaesthetizing doubt over the earthly foothills of chõreotikos. Modernity's metaphysical flirtations with nihilism via the inheritance of empiricism, nominalism, and idealism have resulted in an impoverished vision of knowledge that has dislodged epistemology from ontology and eschatology, and from its grounding in the grace of salvation. I proposed as a remedial alternative the sacramental vision of learning that mystagogy maintains.

Mystagogy recalls us to the koinonia of creaturehood and to the intelligibility of creation's logos. It affirms the divine empowerment and corroboration of our language when we speak forth confession and adoration. It renews the priestly vocation of the baptized to illuminate the world by apprehending and magnifying the alluring, Christophanic radiance of creation. And it recalls us to the hope of consummation, even in our earthly knowing, because the first fruits of consummation are truly given to the "children of the bridechamber." All of these together restore a vision of the earthly order and of earthly knowledge as the tamieion: the maternal house of rearing that becomes the secret chamber of love and knowledge. Mystagogy leads us to esteem the cosmos and earthly knowing as sites of betrothal; and this liturgical epistemology leads us to say to Christ, "I will take You, and bring You into the house of my We can apply Cyril's warning with regard to all forms of knowledge. All knowing, ordered rightly, runs the blessed risk of God "busying' Himself with our hearts. And the contrary risk of being cast into "outer darkness,' as befell the man who came to take but not partake in the wedding feast, is the fate of all epistemologies that fail to embrace the mysterium—in other words, the nuptiality—of learning. To put on a "becoming" garment, that is, to acquire a fitting epistemology, is not an arbitrary disposition; it is to encounter the world's light as the torches of the bridal train. This is to sense and to know the world through and for the sake of Christ. As Chrysostom says, "He has thrown Himself around us as a garment.' Knowing is truly knowing when it tends toward our nuptial end in Christ. In light of the festal nature of the sacrament we can recover the festal calling of earthly knowledge.

Mystagogy is an education that illuminates the festivity of the sacraments—as Cyril said of his teaching, "it remains therefore to dress for you a board of more perfect

instruction.' I have argued that mystagogy's "table" of perfect instruction also points us to the torches of the bridal train that shine in the trenches of the ordinary and process toward that same wedding feast. The sublime intelligence that mystagogy cultivates is measured in our capacity to feast on this perfect instruction at the table of the cosmos, at the table of the altar, and at the table of the King. And this sublime intelligence is the measure of all intelligence; it is the end of learning, the end of creation itself. And so, a mystagogical theology of learning calls us to embrace the mystery of learning in light of the mysteries of the church: to see knowledge as, in its own way, a banquet of more perfect instruction, an echo of the secret chamber filled with delicacies where the Bridegroom is Teacher. Learning thus belongs to the one grace that draws us and vests us for the wedding feast of the Lamb. <>

EMOTIONS IN PLATO edited by Laura Candiotto, Olivier Renaut [Series: Brill's Plato studies, Brill, ISBN 9789004429437]

Emotions (pathe) such as anger, fear, shame, and envy have long been underestimated in Plato's philosophy. The aim of Emotions in Plato is to provide a consistent account of the role of emotions in Plato's psychology, epistemology, ethics and political theory. The volume focuses on three main issues: taxonomy of emotions, their epistemic status, and their relevance for the ethical and political theory and practice. This volume, which is the first edited volume entirely dedicated to emotions in Plato's philosophy, shows how Plato, in many aspects, was positively interested in these affective states in order to support the rule of reason.

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Why Plato Comes First by Laura Candiotto and Olivier Renaut

Emotions have become an important topic of research in Classics, merging historical, anthropological, literary, and philosophical approaches. The research on the so-called cognitive humanities is very promising nowadays, and the study of emotions in particular is one of the most fascinating topics in the field. Nevertheless, the study of the role of emotions in Plato's philosophy has not received until now the attention it deserves, despite the many books dedicated to emotions in Aristotle's philosophy, for example. [Aristotle is often presented as the first theorist of emotions, esp. in regards with Rh. ii .2–11 where he offers an extended analysis of the emotions used in rhetoric: anger and calm, friendship and hatred, shame and shamelessness, gratitude, fear and confidence, pity, indignation, envy and emulation. Numerous studies have focused on what appears to be rather a regional typology for the sake of rhetoric only, but as a

consequence, Plato is too often presented as only having an "incomplete" theory of emotions. Moreover, it is still under debate the opportunity to ascribe to the ancient conceptualisation of our contemporary notion of "emotion".

This is the first edited volume entirely dedicated to emotions in Plato's philosophy. The aim of Emotions in Plato is to address this topic through a scholarly analysis of the role of the pathe in the dialogues in order to provide a consistent account of it, especially regarding Plato's epistemology, ethics, and political theory.

In this introduction, we will first discuss the contemporary debate on Plato's emotions in the fields of Classics and History of Ancient Greek Philosophy. Then, we will introduce the motivations which push us to promote such research, also highlighting the expected new venues of investigation for the contemporary field of philosophy of emotions. Finally, we will provide a summary of the volume.

What Do We Know about Plato's Emotions?

There is no such thing as a concept of emotion in Plato. The reader of the dialogues would look in vain after a clear-cut definition of what is now to us much a class of psychophysiological event. This difficulty has been, if not resolved, lucidly exposed in studies of emotions in the archaic and classical period. That being said, we find numerous hints in the dialogues which proves that Plato has a particular concern for some states in the agent that are best described with our own notion of "affectivity" or "emotions". The best we could do, or perhaps the most instructive, is to use our broad notion of "emotion" covering the range of affects, sentiments, and feelings, to expose the importance of such states in the philosophical journey of the dialogues. Again, if there is no definition of what an "emotion" is in Plato, nor any full-fledged or consistent typology or theory of it, nevertheless we are left with a certain number of features of emotions that should lead us to reconsider a too sharp distinction between "passions" and more rational states or activities.

To begin with, emotions in Plato are often presented as "passions" or "affections", a genre which encompasses altogether physical affections and also things that a compound or a soul may suffer, from anger to thought. Why would we try, then, to isolate "emotions" among these? A first reason, and a first way of approaching emotions

in Plato, is to consider the "lists" of emotions in the dialogues. They typically include anger, fear, love, hope, envy, regret, and most of the time they come along with pleasure and pain, and desire. The lists are not always the same, and Plato probably does not mean to provide a comprehensive one; the lists often end up with a "and the like", without necessarily hinting towards a natural kind. Indeed, they hardly form an autonomous class. Their relation to other genres of, sensation or perception on the one hand, pleasures and pains on the other, or lastly "motions", depends on the dialogical argument being brought in each dialogue. There is no one typology of the emotions but probably several attempts to sort out emotions depending on the criteria that are used for a precise argument.

What we can assert though, from the proximity of emotions with ^^^^^^^^, is that emotions amount to the sensible realm, are a certain kind of motion, and include the body to a certain extent. Moreover, they are always closely related to pleasure and pain, whether all emotions include a certain amount of mixed pleasure and pain, or are a species of them. Lastly, they are tied with desires which appear to be responsible for the conative element of emotions, even if it is not clear whether emotions and appetites should be put at the same level, or if desire as such is much more like a genre of emotions. Some emotions, if not all, are tied with other faculties in Plato such as memory, anticipation, and opinion, but also seem to require, at some point, a non-verbal representation of the situation that causes them. Some others are more explicitly presented as being specifically connected with "functions" of the soul; anger and shame, perhaps love and philia, are linked with ^^^^^, whereas some pleasures providing joy and satisfaction (or at least an image of it, and even false ones) are connected to the appetitive function of the soul (^^ ^^^^^^^^^^^^); probably, some specific pleasures of the wise man amount to his rational part. Many of the chapters hereafter develop some of these leads to define some emotions in Plato.

But lists are certainly not the sole path to follow for studying the emotions in Plato. Contrasting Plato's dialogues with Aristotle's description here is relevant: in Plato's dialogues, emotions are embodied in characters. Some of Plato's characters graciously or reluctantly try to describe them, so that emotions are, in a way, legitimately parts of the argument. Let's recall Hippothales' love in the Lysis, Callicles' anger, shame and

contempt in the Gorgias, Alcibiades' love and shame altogether at the end of the Symposium, Thrasymachus' violent eagerness to intervene in the course of the argument at the beginning of the Republic; but most of all, the peculiar tragic feeling of Phaedo at the beginning of the eponymous dialogue (Phd. 58e1-59b1), a mix of joy, despair and pity, whose nature does not fully square with better known emotional stage devices, being nonetheless very intense. Plato is not short on descriptions of the very symptoms of these characters overwhelmed with these emotions: blushing, veiling, sweating, the pounding and the heaviness of the heart. What we may call "positive" emotions are not absent either: joy, laughing, hope, pride, gaiety are all embodied in various characters. Socrates himself, even if he embodies in a very peculiar way some of these emotions or feelings (and in particular love, friendship, confidence, spirit, gratitude, serenity), may be the first character with which a philosophical survey of emotions in Plato should start.

How could we define emotions in Plato? This is a vexed question. Precisely because Plato himself does not consider "emotions" as a class, the definition and interpretation of emotions would probably not fit within a unified approach. We can try to recall several paths of interpretations that have been proposed so far.

First, it is impossible not to be aware of the platonic dualist framework within which emotions are sometimes accounted for. Emotions such as fear, anger, envy, love, form a group which is contrasted with rational action and thinking. Together with pleasure and pain, sensation and perception, they are tied with the body and the sensible realm of human existence. They appear to be states in the agents, with which they sometimes struggle to master them, if ever they can. Emotions are irrational bodily drives. Thus, a basic dualist approach would categorize emotions on the side either of the body, or the irrational part or function of the soul. Indeed, this dualistic approach is hard to deny in Plato's dialogues, and this opposition between soul and body on the one hand, and between rational and irrational soul on the other hand, forms a conceptual framework in which we must account for emotions. This is why at first sight, Plato's description of emotions, by contrast with Aristotle's, seems hard to fit with our contemporary presuppositions of emotions being complex mental motives in our lives, presuppositions that are actually scarcely compatible with a strict dualism.

Nevertheless, emotions appear not solely as impediments: they could fit with a rational endeavour, help the action, as an auxiliary, being nicely performed, or even consists of the best behaviour one could expect. If it is true that one may not expect Socrates to be violently angry for example, one can scarcely say that the pleasures and joy of wise men are not good or even rational emotions. This means that a more moderate interpretation of the dualism between rational and irrational states, or even an account which looks at their interwoven functionality, deserve to be pursued for better understanding how to conceptualize the emotions in Plato.

Moreover, dualism should not impair an interesting account of emotions in the dialogues. The cognitive approach that has been currently used by interpreters to account for emotions in the antiquity could still equally apply in a dualist framework. A first approach, then, is to account for distinct degrees of "cognition" in emotions. This has been, as a matter of fact, a widely shared assumption that the "partition" of the soul, whether bipartite or tripartite, leaves room for distinct degrees of cognition depending on the part at stake. Without being fully rational, emotions can, depending on which irrational "part" of the soul is responsible for it, display a certain amount of cognition. It is not the place here to discuss to what extent we should attribute cognitive capacities to different parts of the soul, but it is true that, facing the diversity of emotions related to different parts of the soul, one might be tempted to ascribe different emotions to distinct parts. But then, how could we account for the differences between characters whose emotions have the same name, but not the same content? This is true of love, fear, joy, emulation, wonder, and other desires that we should not deny even (or in some cases certainly not) to the philosopher.

Perhaps a more promising explanation is not to account for emotions within the framework of partition per se, as if the parts were seats of some emotions, but rather to acknowledge that emotions are complex events which require several faculties: bodily affections, perceptions, beliefs and judgement, even rational calculation. The emotion of fear, for example, could be accounted for as a synthesis of diverse mental activities (an anticipation of risk, a judgement that the danger is unpleasant or bad), and bodily symptoms (shudders, pallor, cooling of the heart) in Plato. Feeling an emotion then, could be analytically explained maintaining a basic dualism that opposes body and

soul, rational and irrational, and altogether clarifying how, in some cases, emotions are more or less "rational" or "justified". Of course, if it is so, the platonic account of emotions is not "cognitive" in the strict sense, for it does not assert that emotions are autonomous events in the agent with their cognitive power of their own. Nevertheless, a multi-faceted functional account of emotions could be an interesting path of worthwhile investigation. It is all the more justified that emotions can denote, in Plato, some "states" of appraisal whose rational "quality" differs from character to character, rather than mere psychophysiological events.

So last, without putting too much weight on the question "what are emotions for Plato?", we can approach emotions by the function they perform in the ethical and political life. Indeed, if Plato is ever interested in emotions, it is because they are powerful drives and conative forces that threaten, question or promote a moral or political value. Sociological approaches to emotions have been important tools for better understanding their status in Antiquity. And so in Plato: the role of anger, love, shame, philia, pity, envy is obviously an important matter for the educator and the legislator so that they prove to be a "just" anger (if it is even possible), a "right" love, without denying that they are necessary levers. Again, the notion of has emerged in the platonic studies as being a central feature to educate emotions and to give them a proper value, bearing in mind that their power is ambivalent and possibly dangerous. It may be argued that, at some point, Plato is much more interested in emotions being potentially "moral emotions" or "auxiliaries" than in emotions per se. If emotions form a class in Plato, it is perhaps in their being a desire that may become potentially moral, just, and means for reason to rule over one's life. And maybe that's why the emotions are always embodied in characters: manipulating the emotions, Plato's paideia works for a transformation of the way of living.

We believe that textual evidence and research on the topic show that investigating emotions in Plato deserve our attention. Not only does it merit consideration, but as our title says, "Plato comes first" as a valuable theorist of emotions. Of course the poets and the Presocratics before Plato are of invaluable importance to understand how the Greeks view sentiments, feelings and affective states; and of course it is still possible that Aristotle provided a first step toward a philosophical theory of emotions in his

Rhetoric. However, we think we need to recognise that Plato's insights on emotions are philosophically profound, and his philosophical writing is full of references to the affective dimension of dialogical inquiry and existence. The great Aristotle came after him, and surely inherited parts of Plato's analysis on emotions.

Nurturing the Research on Plato's Emotions

We believe that the study of Plato's emotions can be pursued in different ways. In the previous section, we discussed the main results achieved in the fields of Classics and History of Ancient Greek Philosophy. In this section, we want to highlight the contemporary relevance of this research, discussing Plato's emotions along with the contemporary field of philosophy of emotions. Our persuasion is that this is not only relevant to these fields, for example employing conceptual tools for better highlighting some features of Plato's emotions, but also to the contemporary debate in the philosophy of emotions. In fact, Plato's conceptualisation can provide unexpected insights to the contemporary discussion, for example regarding epistemic emotions or emotional valence.

Although the following list is not exhaustive (and we really hope that new venues of investigation will be pursued in the near future), we now present and discuss some core issues which can be addressed in this manner:

> First. Emotions like anger, fear, hope, envy, jealousy, etc. appear as complex psycho-physiological states in the Platonic corpus, involving pleasure and pain, perception or, even, judgements. The status of these states remains unclear in the Platonic psycho-physiology, especially regarding their embodied dimension and intentional character.

The first issue deals with the notion of emotion, and its relevance for understanding Plato's epistemology. This investigation also challenges the employment of the word/concept of "emotion" for understanding the nature and functionality of Plato's pathe, as we have already mentioned. This is not only a linguistic affair, but it requires to engage with many conceptual issues which are very much discussed nowadays. In our opinion, this issue should first be addressed along with the contemporary taxonomy on emotions. This means to study if the 7r^^^ in Plato are primarily mental states, as for the cognitive theory of emotions (Nussbaum (2001a)), embodied processes and bodily feelings, as for the enactive theory by Clombetti (2011), quasi-perceptions

(Tappolet (2016)) and the embodied appraisal theory (Prinz (2006)), volitional states, as for the Motivational Theory of Emotions (Fridja (1986)), or socially extended processes (Candiotto (2015)(2019b)). It is possible that none of these options is completely good for depicting the ancient characterizations of emotions (Rorty (2004)), or that a mix is required, maybe also contextualised to specific dialogues. But what is important to highlight here is that engaging with this issue would allow to discuss some important topics, such as the relationship among emotions, body, and soul; emotional valence (are Plato's emotions compounds of pleasure and pain?); the emotions' epistemic status (are they rational? How can an irrational state play an epistemic function? Do emotions supervene on individual mental states?); the role of emotions in the epistemic practices (in which contexts – public or private – do emotions play their function? Are they required by the dialogical method of enquiry?).

Second. The Western philosophical tradition has defined emotions through their opposition to reason. This opposition may find its roots in Plato, since some 7r^^^ are called irrational and they seem to obscure the operation of reason and disturb the soul. However, it should not be taken for granted that emotions in Plato are totally devoid of rationality, or that they do not play any important function in epistemology, ethics, and political theory. In fact, they may possess a very specific way of representing their object, as quasi-perceptions or intellectual insights, for example. Or, they may acquire a rational value if profitably associated with what is called a "rational desire", or if regulated by the rational part of the soul, as the famous myth of the Phaedrus may suggest (246a-249d).

Whether the epistemological role of emotions might be understood as a gateway to knowledge, or at least as an adjuvant to the ethical life, is still an open question, not only in the platonic scholarship, but also in the contemporary debate on emotions. In the interdisciplinary research on emotions, neuroscience has proven that the traditional dualism between emotions and reason should be overcome since emotions always play a role in our mental life. However, cognitive scientists and philosophers are working for discovering what are their functions, and if they are beneficial. There are different approaches, from the one that looks at the function of emotions in the theory of evolution (Griffiths & Scarantino (2008)) to the ones that ground it in a

sentimentalist ethics (Slote (2007)), for example. Some of the questions which are discussed in the field are relevant to Plato's scholarship as well. For instance, we can explore the nature of Platonic in relation to reason and the philosophical method, and ask which is – if there is one – their epistemic marker, analysing how do they benefit or hinder the cognitive process of knowledge. These questions are not relevant to Plato's psychology and epistemology only, but also to his ethics. In fact, questioning the rational value of emotions also imply discussing their role in Socratic intellectualism, practical decision making, and rational choice, for example.

Third. The third issue therefore concerns with the moral and political agency, specifically the impact of emotions in judging, evaluating, and acting well or wrong. Some questions which can be asked in this regard are the following: How to define the role of emotions in the acquisition and exercise of virtue? Have emotions an exclusively negative function or, by contrast, are they necessary – and in which sense – for its exercise? Which are – if there are – Plato's moral and political emotions, and how do they work? Of course there are many and different approaches in contemporary moral theory which aim to integrate emotion in the picture, but what is relevant here is that some of them refers directly to Plato, as for example virtue theory (Zagzebski (1996), Chappell (2014)). This field of studies is strictly related to the definition of the good life, wisdom and the philosophical way of living, and it has several implications to educational theory and practice too.

This Volume
This edited volume arises from the selection of the revised papers delivered at the joint workshops in Ancient Theories of Soul and Knowledge we organised at Paris-Nanterre University and Edinburgh University in 2017 and 2018. The workshops were made possible thanks to the generous funding of the Eidyn Research Centre (University of Edinburgh), The Scots Philosophical Society, the Doctoral School ED 139 and the Institut de Recherches Philosophiques (University of Paris-Nanterre) together with the Institut Universitaire de France. We would like to thank the colleagues and the public who attended the workshops, especially Douglas Cairns for his insightful questions and discussion in Edinburgh, and David Konstan for his important contribution to the debate in Paris.

The volume is divided into three parts which discuss the three issues, and related questions, we introduced in the previous section. The first part is thus dedicated to the taxonomy of Plato's emotions, the second to their rational or irrational status and the third to their relevance for the ethical and political theory and practice.

In the first part, we find four papers which centre around the very same notion of emotion in Plato. The first one, "Epistemic wonder and the beginning of the enquiry: Plato's Theaetetus 155d2-4 and its wider significance", co-authored by Laura Candiotto and Vasilis Politis, analyses wonder as a paradigmatic case of epistemic emotion in Plato. Through the study of wonder, this chapter discusses the epistemic significance of emotions in processes of inquiry, thus contextualizing emotions within Plato's philosophical method. Chapter 2, "The feel of the real. Perceptual encounters in Plato's critique of poetry", by Pia Campeggiani, and Chapter 3, "Why do itches itch? Bodily pain in the Socratic theory of motivation", by Freya Möbus, explore the relationship between emotions and the body, especially focusing on pleasure and pain and bodily desires. Chapter 2 employs the perceptual model of cognition for explaining the psychological experience of "transportation" driven by poetry. Chapter 3 explores Plato's Socratic dialogues for understanding pleasure and pain as felt evaluations. "Emotions in context: "risk" as condition for emotion", authored by Stefano Maso, provides a comprehensive understanding of Plato's conceptualisation of emotion as what is triggered by risk. The chapter explores courage and love as case-studies for testing this interpretation.

The second part is composed of five chapters which discuss the irrational or rational status of emotions. Olivier Renaut, in the chapter titled "Emotions and rationality in the Timaeus (Ti. 42a-b, 69c-72e)", provides a psychophysiological interpretation of the emotion as a compound of body and soul and argues that emotions possess a derivative "rationality". Chapters 6 and 7, "On the desire for drink in Plato and the Platonist tradition" by Lidia Palumbo and Anna Motta, and "Plato's seasick steersman: on (not) being overwhelmed by fear in Plato's Laws" by Myrthe Bartels, both deal with the irrational or excessive behaviours brought on by emotions, and the consequent need of their regulation. Chapter 6 discusses the desire for drink and the emotional conflict in the context of Plato's Republic iv; Chapter 7 analyses the characteristics which are

required to a symposiarch and how emotions are ruled out by a more advanced paideia in the context of Plato's Laws. Also Chapter 8, "The dialogue between the emotions in the platonic corpus", by Karine Tordo-Rombaut, discusses the irrational or rational status of emotions in the light of their mastership. The author depicts the dynamic between a first irrational emotion and a second one which regulates it for showing how much Plato's view of emotions leads to the need of self-control. Finally, Chapter 9 focuses on the role of emotions in the dialogical structure of the dialogues. Carla Francalanci in her "Love, speech and charm in the Charmides: reading the dialogue through emotions" directs attention to the rhetorical dimension of the Charmides for analysing the conversion of emotions (mostly love and erotic desire) operated by Socrates' refutation.

The third and last section is dedicated to the ethical and political value of Plato's emotions. This section comprises of 8 chapters, each one dedicated to the analysis of one specific emotion. Chapters 10 and 11 are dedicated to envy, Chapters 12, 13, and 14 to shame (but also erotic desire and fear), Chapter 15 to anger, Chapter 16 to pity, and Chapter 17 to friendship and love. "The Notion in Plato" by Luc Brisson, and "On mild envy as self-deceit. (Philebus 47d-50e)" by Beatriz Bossi investigate the nature and function of envy as a mixed emotion of pleasure and pain in the context of the Philebus. Brisson stresses how and why Plato condemned this emotion and provides a typology of objects and reasons for envy; Bossi focuses on Socrates' appealing to comedy to focus on mild ordinary envy among friends. Both the authors share the view that envy should not have a place in the soul for Plato.

Chapters 12, 13, and 14 are dedicated to the positive role ascribed to shame by Plato in different dialogues. In Plato's Republic", Chiara Militello discusses the famous debate about the role of shame in the tripartite soul in the Republic, also establishing an important reference to Aristotle's Topics for discovering the function played by shame in helping reason. Chapter 13, "Shame and virtue in Plato's Laws: two kinds of fear and the drunken puppet", by Julia Pfefferkorn, discusses the fear of a bad reputation in the context of the education of citizens in Plato's Laws. Pfefferkorn argues that shame can play a beneficial function not only for acquiring virtue, but also for partaking in virtue. Simon Scott, in his "Loving and living well: the importance of shame in Plato's

Phaedrus", examines the role of shame in the regulation of erotic desires. Through a reading of Plato's Phaedrus, in conjunction with the Diotima's speech in the Symposium, the chapter highlights the fundamental role played by shame for living well.

Marta Jimenez, in her "Plato on the role of anger in our intellectual and moral development", argues for a positive role of anger in our moral judgement. She claims that Plato pursued the goal of rechannelling destructive retaliatory anger into a more productive reformative anger. A reformative anger is the one which looks inside for a self-betterment in the context of philosophical conversations, and which cooperates with courage in the good citizen's moral development. Chapter 16, "Platonic pity", authored by Rachana Kamtekar, offers an alternative interpretation of the role of pity in Plato's philosophy. Differently from Woodruff, Nussbaum, and Konstan, the author argues that the virtuous person expresses pity, although for Plato pity is not a virtue. Love and erotic desire are explored by Frisbee Sheffield in her "Love and the city. Eros and philia in Plato's Laws" in the context of fostering bonds of connectedness in the city. This chapter offers an interpretation of eros and philia as civic virtues through an interpretation of Plato's Laws.

The volume ends with an afterword written by David Konstan which magisterially orchestrates a dialogue between Plato and Aristotle on what emotions are. In this way the volume comes back to the beginning, to the motivations which pushed us to undertake a research on emotions in Plato and promote workshops for discussing if Plato came first. Our auspice is that this volume can contribute to this debate. <>

PLATO'S TIMAEUS: PROCEEDINGS OF THE TENTH SYMPOSIUM PLATONICUM PRAGENSE edited by Chad Jorgenson, Filip Karfík, Štêpán Špinka [Brill's Plato Studies Series, Brill, ISBN 9789004436060]

_____ brings together a number of studies from both leading Plato specialists and up-and-coming researchers from across Europe. The contributions cover a wide variety of topics, ranging from the literary form of the work to the ontology of sense perception and the

status of medicine in Timaeus' account. Although informed by a commitment to methodological diversity, the collection as a whole forms an organic unity, opening fresh perspectives on widely read passages, while shedding new light on less frequently discussed topics. The volume thus provides a valuable resource for students and researchers at all levels, whether their interest bears on Timaeus as a whole or on a particular passage.

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The papers collected in this volume were originally presented within the framework of the Tenth Symposium Platonicum Pragense, which was held in Prague from November 12th to 14th, 2015. The symposium brought together Plato scholars from across Europe, representing a variety of traditions and methodological approaches. The aim was to foster a comprehensive discussion of the Timaeus, covering both well-established scholarly problems and less-studied topics and passages.

The arrangement of the individual contributions reflects, so far as possible, the thematic arrangement of the dialogue. Hence, Tanja Ruben opens the volume with "Genos, chora et guerre dans le prologue du Timée," showing how the narrative of the

war against Atlantis anticipates themes from the main cosmogonical narrative, while Lucius Hartmann in "Die grosse Rede des Timaios— ein Beispiel wahrer Rhetorik?" focuses on the status of Timaeus' speech as an example of true rhetoric in the Platonic tradition.

The next four contributions focus on the discussion of the World Soul and astronomy in the first part of the Timaeus. In "Panteles zõion e pantelõs on: vita, anima e movimento intellegibile nel Timeo (e nel Sofista)," Francesco Fronterotta raises the question of the status of the so-called "intelligible animal," upon which the cosmos is modelled, drawing on evidence from the Sophist in order to explain in what sense it can possess life and movement. Luc Brisson's contribution, "How to Make a Soul in the Timaeus," guides the reader step by step through the difficult passage on the creation and structure of the World Soul. Karel Thein shifts the focus to astronomy with his "Planets and Time: A Timaean Puzzle," arguing—against the traditional interpretation— that it is not time, but rather the planets themselves that are the "moving image of eternity." Keeping with this theme, István Bodnár's "The Day, the Month, and the Year: What Plato Expects from Astronomy" reflects on the uses and limitations of astronomy in the Timaeus and the Republic.

From there, the focus shifts to the discussion of the receptacle in the second part of Timaeus' speech. Ondrej Krása's contribution, "Bodies and Space in the Timaeus," tackles the question of how this mysterious "third kind" relates to the more familiar Platonic concept of becoming. In "Does Plato Present a Bundle Theory of Substance in the Timaeus?" George Karamanolis uses contemporary philosophical tools to raise questions about the identity and structure of physical objects in the Timaeus' ontology. Gerd Van Riel closes this section with "Matter Doesn't Matter: On the Status of Bodies in the Timaeus (30a–32b and 53c–61c)," in which he raises the thorny question of whether the Timaean receptacle can be identified with matter and whether this is important.

The final group of articles focuses on the more eclectic third section of the Timaeus. Marwan Rashed examines the intermediary status of mathëmata between being and becoming in the Timaeus in "An Unnoticed Analogy between the Timaeus and the

Laws," arguing that it provides a clear model for understanding the intermediary status of the city of the Laws. Filip Karfik asks "What is Perceptible in Plato's Timaeus?", exploring the relationship between sensible properties and the mathematical structures in which they are grounded. Finally, the volume closes with two papers on Plato's account of illness: Gábor Betegh's "Plato on Illness in the Phaedo, the Republic, and the Timaeus," which provides a comprehensive reassessment of the Platonic conception of illness, and Chad Jorgenson's "Responsibility, Causality, and Will in the Timaeus," which takes up the problem of vice as a form of psychic illness and its consequences for human and divine responsibility. <>

THE DANGEROUS LIFE AND IDEAS OF DIOGENES THE CYNIC by Jean-Manuel Roubineau, translated by Malcolm DeBevoise, edited by Phillip Mitsis [Oxford University Press, 9780197666357]

An engaging look at the founder of one of the most important philosophical schools of ancient Greece.

The ancient philosopher Diogenes--nicknamed "The Dog" and decried by Plato as a "Socrates gone mad"--was widely praised and idealized as much as he was mocked and vilified. A favorite subject of sculptors and painters since the Renaissance, his notoriety is equally due to his infamously eccentric behavior, scorn of conventions, and biting aphorisms, and to the role he played in the creation of the Cynic school, which flourished from the 4th century B.C. to the Christian era. In this book, Jean-Manuel Roubineau paints a new portrait of an atypical philosopher whose life left an indelible mark on the Western collective imagination and whose philosophy courses through various schools of thought well beyond antiquity.

Roubineau sifts through the many legends and apocryphal stories that surround the life of Diogenes. Was he, the son of a banker, a counterfeiter in his hometown of Sinope? Did he really meet Alexander the Great? Was he truly an apologist for incest, patricide, and anthropophagy? And how did he actually die? To answer these questions, Roubineau retraces the known facts of Diogenes' existence.

Beyond the rehashed clichés, this book inspires us to rediscover Diogenes' philosophical legacy--whether it be the challenge to the established order, the detachment from materialism, the choice of a return to nature, or the formulation of a cosmopolitan ideal strongly rooted in the belief that virtue is better revealed in action than in theory.

Review

"Diogenes the Cynic was a radical and a disruptive public intellectual of the best kind, challenging the conventions of his day and forcing people to rethink their values and life choices. In a fast-paced and entertaining narrative, this wide-ranging introduction to the ancient traditions about Diogenes sheds fresh light on the idea of philosophy as a way of life. The vigorous translation from Jean-Manuel Roubineau's original French is complemented by a hard-hitting foreword by classical scholar Phillip Mitsis." -- Brad Inwood, author of *Stoicism: A Very Short Introduction*

"Diogenes the Cynic was an ancient philosopher like no other who, as a consequence, has been mythologized for centuries. In this excellent new book--compact yet comprehensive--Roubineau carefully sifts through all the ancient evidence to separate fact from myth, shedding new light on many familiar stories and anecdotes. At last we can appreciate Diogenes in his historical context, while also gaining a clearer picture of his 'philosophy with no holds barred.' This should be required reading for anyone interested in ancient philosophy." -- John Sellars, author of *The Pocket Epicurean*

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Ancient Greek philosophers tended to put their arguments and beliefs into practice much more earnestly and directly than those who take up the mantle of philosophy these days (usually academic professors)— so much so, in fact, that scholars speak of philosophy in Greek antiquity as a way of life. This way of contrasting old and new is extremely broad- brushed, of course, but one immediately thinks of Socrates incessantly buttonholing his fellow Athenians, challenging their most cherished convictions, and exhorting them to examine their lives since "an unexamined life is not worth living." By the same token, Plato portrays his teacher as preferring execution to a life in which he would be forced to give up his very public and evidently annoying methods of doing philosophy. Yet, although Socrates is often taken to be the preeminent example of a philosopher living and ultimately dying for his philosophy, arguably none of the ancient Greek philosophers lived in accordance with their beliefs in such an unremitting and all- consuming fashion as Diogenes the Cynic. It is reported that Diogenes chided Socrates for indulging in the luxury of wearing sandals, for socializing with the rich and famous, and for keeping a modest amount of inherited family property along with household slaves. Socrates, moreover, spent much of his adult life serving in Athens's imperialistic wars, the justice of which he did not question; indeed, he seems to have displayed a certain degree of patriotic zeal. At the end of his life he disingenuously avowed conventional religious belief and then cheerfully tried to justify his acceptance of a verdict handed down by a jury of his fellow citizens that condemned him to death for his philosophical practices. In

drinking hemlock he obeyed their decision, despite being convinced that they were the ones committing injustice, not he. None of this would pass muster with Diogenes.

Plato, for his part, dismissed Diogenes as a "Socrates gone mad," and it would appear that, even if unfair, this charge nonetheless captures something of the extreme, intransigent, and flamboyantly brazen character of Diogenes's life and thought. Diogenes, on the other hand, considered himself to be eminently sane and virtuous, and thought Plato little more than a Socrates gone soft— an elite, aristocratic windbag with airy- fairy theories and a hypocritical lifestyle to match. Both of these are polemical exaggerations, of course, but whether we view a life such as the one Diogenes led merely as a form of madness or as embodying harsh but necessary truths, we all at some point, consciously or not, must come to terms with our own societies' demands and with making our own choices in the face of the kinds of dilemmas Diogenes's example presents. Should we speak up, even if it is dangerous? Should we lead a life of social conformity even if its demands are psychologically debilitating or have cruel and immoral effects on the lives of others? Do we too often let economic worries and anxieties about social position and status slowly drain our lives of meaning? Do we enjoy exercising power over others, especially in our sexual relationships? These are just a few of the questions that Diogenes's life and thought confront us with in thinking about our own lives— questions that are posed in a particularly thought- provoking and often outrageous manner in the surviving reports of Diogenes's words and deeds.

Jean-Manuel Roubineau's Diogène: L'antisocial is in the grand tradition of French public philosophy. In bringing it before an English-speaking audience, Oxford University Press has enlisted the services of Malcolm DeBevoise, a prize- winning translator whose deep background in ancient philosophy enables him to navigate the famous difficulties in moving between two capriciously different philosophical vocabularies and styles of argument (a word for which, as many Anglo- American philosophers like to point out, there is no straightforward equivalent term in French). Taking to heart the old adage that between England and France the best thing is the English Channel, many publishers just throw up their hands when faced with the prospect of translating French philosophical works.

Be that as it may, I think readers may be reassured that they will soon find Roubineau speaking to them in beguilingly familiar tones, with a certain amount of patented French wit and harmless irony, of course, but also with a refreshing candor about the actual state of our ancient sources. The narrative he pieces together about Diogenes's extraordinary life, as he readily acknowledges, can at best have only a general historical plausibility, but readers are given clearly marked starting points for further exploration. The incidents of Diogenes's career, like the stories attached to other lives that have taken on mythical status, have an emblematic value of their own. Moreover, the themes that Roubineau has chosen to emphasize have served as touchstones for a long line of subsequent thinkers who at times have adopted, at least in their writings, something approaching the intensity and vehemence of Diogenes's positions in attempting to draw aside the curtain dividing our social lives from our innermost natures. Freud and Nietzsche, for instance, both saw Diogenes as a man dedicated to living a thoroughly honest life, someone whose defiance of societal conventions amply illustrates the economies of repression that, for better or worse, support the complex structures of modern civilization.

Diogenes's life offers an especially rich and often amusing perspective on the social mores of his time, all the more since he himself was acquainted with a broad range of social positions, from his early years as the son of a wealthy provincial banker to the later experience of exile and slavery, finally becoming a public figure, playwright, and pedagogue. Roubineau deftly places Diogenes's travels and personal encounters in the context of the wider Mediterranean world of the fourth century BCE, laying special emphasis on his contrarian ideas concerning commerce and wealth, and his conception of the body as a tool for philosophy. The ways that Diogenes put his economic thought into practice, and his scandalous views of sexuality, in particular, have been a source of inspiration for a great many remarkably inventive defamers, partisans, imitators, and analysts through the centuries.

To find one's way through all the underbrush requires a sober and judicious guide. Roubineau is that and more. He argues that Cynic sexuality was actually rather conventional in certain respects, and, to a modern sensibility, retrograde. He often pauses to take a closer look at the purple passages, as it were, of the Cynic tradition,

sometimes debunking traditional sources while taking care to clarify the textual evidence and giving reasons for his own judgments. His book ends appropriately by considering the various ancient accounts of Diogenes's death and their distinctive symbolic resonances. Diogenes wished for himself the kind of death that would have been thought horrific for a Homeric or tragic figure— to be left unburied, without the healing balm of communal rituals, and so never to be properly inscribed in collective memory. As Roubineau notes, antiquity's dangerous dog may have been successful in his first aim, but his place in collective memory is now secure, as scores of paintings and statues attest; his likeness is even to be found on the face of coins issued in the very place from which he had long before been exiled, allegedly for the crime of altering the coinage.

Perhaps Diogenes's most important philosophical influence was on the founders of Stoicism. As Stoicism developed and expanded its following, some aspects of this influence were often viewed with embarrassment, especially among later Stoics. Considering Stoicism's unsuspected resurgence in today's pop culture marketplace, it may be worth pointing out that the teachings of Zeno, Cleanthes, and Chrysippus, the school's original triumvirate, have precious little in common with the vulgar forms of Stoic doctrine now being hawked from all corners of the internet and dispensed at weekend retreats for Wall Street and Silicon Valley warriors who come together to enjoy manly companionship fortified by selective readings from Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius. In order to get to the heart of Stoicism, one must first come to grips with Diogenes, the source of the early Stoics' most potent and provocative doctrines. The rigors of a self- sufficient life lived in accordance with nature— its poverty, disregard of public opinion, and impudent candor— are usually soft- pedaled in popular accounts of Stoicism today. Looking back to Diogenes, we are reminded of what initially made Stoicism so striking, inflammatory, and intellectually powerful.

A common view in antiquity was that Stoicism was "written on the tail of the dog," and it is this Cynic inheritance that gave Stoicism its bite; Stoicism, for its part, provided Cynicism with a more acceptable public face as well as a theological aspect, rooted in the idea of a beneficent Providence. Many scholars have seen the more philosophically palatable elements that Stoics share with Diogenes to have anticipated Kant's

insistence on individual autonomy and will, unflinching moral rectitude in the face of life's choices, and a doctrine of divine mercy. In his unpublished lectures on logic, Kant parsed the question "What is a human being?" into three further ones: "What can I know?," "What should I do?," and "What may I hope?" For the Kantian, this final question ultimately leads to an inquiry into the nature of religion, but Diogenes, unlike the Stoics, who affirmed the operation of divine providence, found theological questions essentially unanswerable and in any case irrelevant to his primary task, which was to determine how one should live in accordance with nature and achieve a life of freedom and self- sufficiency. He showed a similar reticence about claims to knowledge. Diogenes's life offers us instead a series of exemplary moments demonstrating in a visceral way what it actually means to act in the light of an implacable commitment to freedom, rationality, and independence—this in a world driven by greed, lust, and ambition and governed by the social structures that foster these impulses. He would not have been much impressed by two hundred years of academic argumentation in defense of Kantian rationality and autonomy, bolstered by appeal to particular theological and epistemological doctrines.

Many commentators, of course, have found it easy to dismiss Diogenes either as naive and immature or as a blustering show- off craving attention. A disparaging view of philosophers more generally is no doubt coeval with the origins of philosophy itself. Certainly such a view continues to flourish today, especially whenever a professor resorts to abstractions to illuminate the practical problems of life. In the case of Diogenes, to be sure, we are presented with a particularly stark example of ethical obstinacy, since in answering the question of what we should do, his every action seems to have been calculated to call into question even the most mundane of our ordinary pursuits— pursuits that shield and distract us from values that it is easy to give lip service to as we go on living lives he would have regarded as proofs of cowardly self- deception. Parallels with the great Abrahamic religions abound here, of course, except that Diogenes thinks there is no divinity to help or hinder us morally, no original flaw in our nature that can keep us from realizing our true happiness, and certainly no future celestial rewards or punishments to spur us into action now. It is unlikely, of course, that any of the readers of this book will immediately cast away their

possessions, say what they think with no restraint, and live in the streets with the carefree self- sufficiency of their dogs. But as Roubineau weaves his narrative, reviewing the many episodes in Diogenes's life that cannot help but stimulate further reflection, it is hard sometimes not to feel rather more sheepish than blithely dog- like.

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Even bronze is aged by time, but not all the ages, Diogenes, will destroy your fame, since you alone showed mortals the rule of self-sufficiency and the easiest path through life.

Inscribed on the base of the bronze statue erected by the city of Sinope in honor of Diogenes, shortly after his death, these lines were composed by one of his disciples, Philiscus of Aegina. His poem, while it insists on the philosopher's renown in the Greek world of his time, also makes a bold prediction: Diogenes will not be forgotten! More than two millennia later, time has taken it upon itself to confirm the justice of this forecast. Diogenes's memory has in fact not been extinguished. In 2006, the modern Turkish city of Sinop erected a new statue, proclaiming itself, by this gesture, the birthplace of the founder of Cynic philosophy. Diogenes is shown standing on a barrel, holding a lamp, a dog at his side. On the bulge of the barrel there is a second representation of the philosopher, here shown curled up with a book. Still more recently, Greece has issued several commemorative coins bearing the image of Diogenes, who is shown naked, leaning on a staff, with a dog on one side and, on the other, the large ceramic jar he called home for a part of his life.

Exiled from the city of his birth, an outcast, mocked and insulted by his contemporaries, Diogenes has become a tourist attraction and a patrimonial figure, adaptable to any purpose, however unexpected. Almost fifty years ago, in 1975, his name was given to a medical condition: Diogenes syndrome, a behavioral disorder marked by withdrawal from society, poor personal hygiene, domestic uncleanliness, and excessive hoarding of objects of all kinds. And some fifteen years ago, in 2005, Diogenes having long been a symbol of frugality, his name was given to a European Union program aimed at reducing obesity, DIOGENES, an acronym for Diet, Obesity, and Genes.

But this very modern and persistent impulse carries on an older tradition. Diogenes has been a source of inspiration for Western artists since the Renaissance. The highest honors came in the nineteenth century, in particular with two famous paintings by Jean-Léon Gérôme and John William Waterhouse. The first shows Diogenes seated at the opening of his jar, adjusting his lamp under the gaze of four dogs. The second shows him once more seated in his jar, now holding a scroll, with a lamp set down nearby; three elegant young women look down upon him from an adjacent staircase. Some years earlier Honoré Daumier had devoted a series of caricatures to Diogenes, depicting him alone or in the company of the flamboyant Athenian statesman Alcibiades or Alexander the Great. The lithograph published in 1842, where Diogenes appears as a ragman, is accompanied by a brief poem composed by M. de Rambuteau:

What, then, is Diogenes doing with a lamp?

some foppish young men wondered out loud.

I am looking for a man, he said, and with my slow lusterless eye

I do not see one; this did sorely vex them.

There are a number of reasons for Diogenes's abiding place in collective memory, beginning with his shockingly unconventional behavior, the best- known instance of which, incontestably, is his practice of masturbating in public. To this needs to be added his embrace of mendicancy as a livelihood and his occasional habit of living in a large ceramic jar on the edge of the Agora in Athens. Two episodes in particular contributed to the formation of the legend surrounding him: on the one hand, his extraordinary encounter with Alexander the Great and, on the other, the disputed circumstances of his death. But, above all, Diogenes's notoriety is bound up with the role he played in formulating a Cynic philosophy and encouraging its propagation, from the fourth century BCE down through the Christian era. His legacy was considerable, not only in respect of the challenge he posed to established authority but also because of his indifference to material comforts and his commitment to a cosmopolitan conception of citizenship. Diogenes's teaching nourished a great many schools of thought, in antiquity and long afterward.

And yet in spite of his lasting influence on philosophical inquiry, Diogenes has remained the victim of two kinds of mistreatment, the first administered by the ancients, the second by the moderns.

A Misunderstanding

Since antiquity Cynicism has regularly been passed over in the annals of schools of philosophy and Diogenes himself dismissed as a harmless scatterbrain. In the first half of the second century BCE, Hippobotus, compiler of a list of philosophers and author of a treatise on philosophical sects, enumerated nine schools without mentioning Cynicism. Diogenes Laertius, whose biography of Diogenes, composed in the third century CE, is the only one to have come down to us, rightly objected to this omission, emphasizing that "Cynicism is also a school of philosophy, and not, as some say, merely a way of life."

The misunderstanding arose in large part from the fact that Cynicism is more than a body of doctrine; it is a philosophy of action, of ideas put into effect by its adherents. It does not pretend to the status of a philosophical system. It has no grand intellectual ambitions. Its purpose is a purely practical one, animated by a desire to be immediately comprehensible to all people, educated or uneducated. The Cynic therefore cannot be a scholar, detached from what he speculates about; he must be an agent, the exemplar of his own convictions.

In addition to being reproached for a lack of theoretical sophistication, Diogenes and his followers were regularly accused of immorality. Cicero, though he approved of Diogenes's emphasis on free speech and independence of mind in relation to personal life, was by no means the first in a long line of critics who charged that the Cynic philosophy must be rejected in relation to social life, since its advocacy of shamelessness undermined moral sensibility and all that is "upright and honorable."

In the eyes of the ancients, then, by denying the dignity and function of philosophy, Diogenes brought about his own downfall and that of Cynicism as well. The fact that in everyday language the term "cynicism" came to designate, not the school descended from Diogenes, but an attitude based on the rejection of hypocrisy and a mistrust of

social conventions and received ideas, has done a disservice to the philosophical tradition of Cynicism by unjustly restricting the meaning and scope of its ideas.

The demotion of Cynicism in antiquity has been aggravated by its neglect by modern scholarship. When Diogenes has been seriously studied at all, it has been within the confines of a single field, the history of philosophy, and from a single point of view, which sees him as the founder of a philosophical tendency, nothing else. Very few economists, anthropologists, sociologists, or historians have regarded Diogenes as worthy of their interest. And yet philosophy is not the only thing he has to teach us. There is much more.

A Distorting Mirror

Many aspects of Diogenes's life cast light upon the Greek city- states of the fourth century BCE. His peregrinations give us some idea of the place reserved for foreigners in these urban centers, and of the mobility of populations in a Mediterranean world that was much more open and connected than in previous centuries. Moreover, contrary to the familiar idea of fixed hierarchies in ancient society, Diogenes's career testifies to the mutability of social status during this period, he himself having in the course of his life passed through every civic condition, successively citizen, resident foreigner, slave, and, finally, free man.

More generally, by his furious rejection of norms of all types, whether social, economic, or political, Diogenes illuminates their contours. Taken together, his transgressions amount to a negation of the standards of civic life. One thinks of his decision to live by begging, his refusal to marry, his celebration of a spontaneous sexuality, his contempt for property and his insistence on the paramount need for self- sufficiency, his scorn for privilege and wealth, his rejection of customary attachments, and his cosmopolitan outlook.

Diogenes delighted in bluntly pointing out the contradictions, the small- mindedness, in some cases the sheer absurdity of prevailing social conventions. And yet, unavoidably, he was a man of his own time, not always able to escape the hold of popular prejudice. Much more than he would have wished, Diogenes sometimes

resembled the very people he scathingly criticized. In this respect, he interests us as much by what made him like them as by what made him different from them.

The portrait of Diogenes I present here is divided into four chapters. I begin by following Diogenes through the main stages of his life: citizen of Sinope, exile, resident foreigner in Athens and Corinth, slave following his capture by pirates, and his sale in Crete to a rich Corinthian who made him steward of his estate and tutor to his children, then released him. It was as a free man that he lived out the rest of his days.

In the second chapter I consider Diogenes's economic position, the social worlds he frequented, and the relation between his way of life as a mendicant philosopher and his thinking about wealth and poverty, freedom and slavery.

I go on, in the third chapter, to study the idea of the body that Diogenes proposed and incarnated, the Cynic ideals of simplicity and living in accordance with nature, and the appeal to animals as a model for human conduct in relation to diet, sex and marriage, and exercise and health.

I conclude by examining Diogenes's purposes as educator and founder of a school, his desire to transmit his philosophy, and his criticism of traditional philosophical schools (notably his quarrel with Plato), as well as the means he adopted to make his teachings known (foremost among them, speaking one's mind frankly and without fear of giving offense) and the risk of physical harm to which this policy exposed him. Finally, I take up the question of Diogenes's death and what the manner of one's death means for a philosopher. <>

SOUL AND SELF IN VEDIC INDIA by Per-Johan Norelius [Numen Book Series, Brill, ISBN 9789004545991]

How did the Vedic Indians think of life, consciousness, and personhood? How did they envisage man's fate after death? Did some part of the person survive the death of the body and depart for the beyond? Is it possible to speak of a "soul" or "souls" in the context of Vedic tradition? This book sets out to answer these questions in a systematic manner, subjecting the relevant Vedic beliefs to a detailed chronological investigation. Special attention is given to the ways in which the early Indians' answers

to the above problems changed over time, with an early pluralism of soul-like concepts later giving way to the unified "self" of the Upaniṣads.

Conclusion

By drawing on both scholars and practitioners reflecting on debates around the future of law and the changes that are taking place due to technological innovation, this book seeks to embed and mainstream discussions on access to justice into discussions on the future of law. It begins by mapping innovations taking place around the world and identifying the different locations for innovation, next it examines what embedding access and empowerment can mean for a technological innovation and lastly it examines ways to plug the gap through focusing on aspects of diversity, users and scale. In order to do this, it provides an analysis of how questions of access to justice can be addressed in different parts of the legal industry; second, it draws from conversations in both the Global North and Global South, to showcase the diversity in experiences and expertise in addressing technological innovation in the legal sector; and third, offers a dialogue between theory and practice that allows for both practical and reflective essays on the nature of changes in the legal sector.

There is now further impetus among legal tech entrepreneurs to apply legal technologies for the common good, which is evident through the first Law for Good conference in London in October 2019 as a spin-off from Legal Geek. The time is now ripe to fuel and structure the debate on legal tech for access to justice. As innovation is driven by the big law firms and technology is developed and applied by them first – could pro bono work be a space for translating some of the technology into access to justice solutions? Can the public sector and regulators incentivise different players to contribute to the field by encouraging and developing innovation policies? Can legal education which, is gearing up to address the need for new skill sets, also spearhead a responsibility revolution among new lawyers? Or must such change be driven by civic tech enterprises who can act as effective power brokers? We have seen that while technology can help address social challenges, it is important to ensure that to actually achieve something, there is an infrastructure that supports such innovation. This is to ensure that we are not just left with techno-fixes, which do not have a long-term impact. Technology can address barriers to access to justice – however, it needs a

concerted and systematic effort to amplify, structure and translate its impacts to be relevant in different contexts. <>

Souls and Self in Vedic Thought

The time has come to sum up the results of our examination of Vedic conceptions of what has been referred to as the "soul" or "souls." As I argued in the Introduction, this disputed word may, if properly defined, be usefully applied as an analytical category when studying certain kinds of beliefs current across cultures. In the present study it has been used with regard to a plurality of concepts current at various times during the Vedic epoch, all of which concern the more immaterial element in an individual, responsible for such things as life, animacy, perception, thought, and consciousness. Though the Vedic language lacks a common term for all these concepts – except, perhaps, for plural forms of prana, "vital air," as used in Middle and Late Vedic texts – bringing them together under a common category for analytical purposes is a valid enterprise which may yield a deeper insight into Vedic thinking about the nature of personhood, life, and the afterlife.

Older generations of scholars argued that it is possible to identify specific "primitive" or "archaic" types of soul-conception, which they contrasted with especially the Christian concept of the soul, held to be characteristic of a higher stage of civilization and speculative thought. I have argued that the notion of archaic soul-concepts and the use of supposedly universally valid typologies of soul-beliefs are methodologically problematic and best avoided. It is, however, possible, when studying a certain

tradition, to use broad categories like body-soul or shadow-soul to describe aspects of the beliefs studied, as long as it is recognized that these are analytical concepts and not timeless archetypes or Elementargedanken.

Any study of ancient Indian soul-beliefs will have to engage with Ernst Arbman's work and his controversial classification of the evidence. As argued here, his idea of a primitive "dualism of the soul," comprising one or more body-souls and a free-soul or psyche – the former perishable and bound to the body, the latter mobile, capable of making excursions outside the sleeping or unconscious body, and finally deserting it at death – is not applicable to the Vedic situation. Though I have retained his concept of body-souls, a ghostlike psyche-soul of the type described by Arbman is nowhere to be found in the extant sources. Modifying Arbman's rather complex concept of the psyche into that of a "surviving free-soul," however, it is possible to speak of a certain category of "souls" described as outliving the body and leaving for the other world at death.

Even so, a review of Early and Middle Vedic afterlife conceptions shows that, for most of the period covered here, it was not in the form of a special, immortal "soul" that a person was thought to live on after death. The individual was seen as a conglomeration of gross and subtle elements, which were dispersed at death and joined with their respective macrocosmic counterparts. Among the subtle components we find the "vital powers," which in Middle Vedic times form a standardized pentad comprised of speech, breath, mind, sight, and hearing. These may, in Arbmanian terms, be referred to as body-souls. In addition, the early texts speak of asu and ãtman, concepts connected with vitality and animacy. Beginning probably in late Rigvedic times there evolves the idea, promoted by the developing hieratic system of ritual, that a privileged few – the aristocratic, male patrons of sacrifices – could secure for themselves an afterlife in a "world" (loka-) prepared by rites, in which their scattered components would be restored from their cosmic counterparts and joined together in a new form. This form, constituted by the totality of bodily constituents, is denoted in early texts by the word tanü-, "body"; later this is replaced by ãtman-, "body, self." It seems that it was mostly conceived in physical terms, though there is some ambiguity as to whether it was identical with the sacrificer's earthly body or if a kind of metamorphosis took place. Some passages speak of a refined, subtle body, "purified" by the cremation fire

and contrasted with the flawed earthly body. Furthermore, the Brahmanas often speak of the survival of only the vital powers (the "immortal" part of a person), which, it seems, were to form the basis for a new, better body in the hereafter.

As for the fate of persons not eligible to sacrifice, such as women, minors, šūdras, and foreigners, the sources leave us pretty much in the dark, though there is evidence that the sacrificer's wife would follow her husband to the beyond. Scattered references to a gloomy netherworld give us glimpses of what may have been thought to await non-sacrificers, but nowhere is it indicated what it is that survives. It is possible that no settled view existed on this matter. Whatever the case, it is clear that a reconstituted body was a precondition for a functioning afterlife existence; those who were left without body and vital faculties were apparently condemned to an unsubstantial shadow-existence in the hereafter.

I have argued that the conception of the human being which underlies these beliefs can be roughly characterized using the modern anthropological category of the "dividual," i.e., a view of the human being seen not as a self-sufficient unit existing apart from the world at large, but as a composite being whose components participate in the cosmos in various ways. Mauss's concept of "personne" may also be used to characterize especially the Early Vedic view of the human being as defined by social relationships (lineage, marriage, varna membership). These relationships may extend into the afterlife, as seen most clearly in the ancestor cult. However, this view begins to change with the rise of Śrauta ritualism, which brings about an "individualization" of the afterlife, placing the individual sacrificer in his own "world" won by rites, rather than in the faceless crowd of forefathers. The immortality promised by the hieratic ritual also makes redundant the old notion that a man lives on in his male descendants, which may antedate the belief in immortality in heaven.

Still, there is no notion of an individual, surviving soul. A person is seen as a collective of vital powers joined to a body, something that also applies to the postmortal person. Only in the RV and the AV do we come upon tendencies towards concentrating the surviving personality to a single principle, a "surviving free-soul" in the terminology adopted here. This principle is usually asu, though manas may sometimes appear in a

similar role. Looking at the various functions of asu in the Early Veda, however, it comes across as a rather ambiguous concept that may be used in different ways. Meaning, it seems, "existence" (from as-, "to be"), the word may be used for the life or life-force of a living being; as such it sometimes appears in the plural. It may, however, also refer to postmortal existence, a meaning that goes back to Indo-Iranian times. At some point, these different meanings of the word must have fused to form a concept of a surviving soul, an immaterial form in which the dead go to yonder world. This use, however, largely disappears after the AV, and asu is reduced to a rather marginal life-soul which is not even included in the standard group of vital powers. For reasons we can only speculate about, it was more or less excluded from the Šrauta speculations on the afterlife. Though it is possible that the concept was falling into desuetude and that its elevation in the AV and the late RV must be ascribed to a short-lived doctrinal trend, we must also take into account the possibility that the ritual specialists had their own reasons for discarding the idea of a single immortal soul, advancing instead the view that immortality could only be achieved through the joining together, by means of ritual, of the various constituents which together form a person.

As for the second most important Early Vedic soul-concept, manas, it denotes the mind, the conscious principle. It also figures in the role of a free-soul, capable of leaving the body in states of illness, insanity, and unconsciousness; the late RV, the AV, and the Yajurvedic mantras contain spells for retrieving a lost manas. In particular, the Atharvavedic evidence shows that this is how it came to take on the function of surviving free-soul: in a comatose person, the manas was thought to be gone, being on its way to join the ancestors in Yama's world, unless called back in time. There may also have been a notion that the dead would need their consciousness-principle in the hereafter, since asu, the principal surviving soul, was often considered an impersonal force responsible only for vitality. In some instances, manas appears as a kind of appendage to asu; unlike it, it never came to denote the entire surviving personality. Like asu, manas loses much of its importance in Middle Vedic times; though it is included in the pentad of vital faculties, its old free-soul function is rarely heard of.

In the Brahmanas, the responsibility for a person's future immortality falls instead on the pranas or vital breaths. These usually comprise the pentad of vital faculties, of

which prana, the actual breath, is merely one member; it may, however, also refer to the series of (usually five) vital airs that animate the body and are responsible for its various functions, or to the bodily orifices and the organs connected with them. All these groups are described as forms of the one prana, and it is evident that the word in the plural originally referred only to the bodily winds and to the phases of respiration. It was secondarily applied to the vital powers and organs, and the notion of a vital air circulating through the body, manifesting itself in its various functions, gained prominence towards the end of the Brahmana period. Thus, prana becomes more than just respiration: it may refer to the whole collective of vital powers, or to the subtler element in a person, as opposed to the gross physical body. In the Aranyakas and Upanishads a shift takes place: the one prana is increasingly elevated above the other vital powers, whose dependence on the presence of breath in the body is much emphasized. However, in the long run, the trend towards transforming prana into the one immortal soul, e.g., by attributing a conscious nature to it or by turning its cosmic counterpart, the wind, into a supreme power, was not successful, probably because the impersonal nature of breath and its old role as one of the vital powers proved a disadvantage in a time when thinkers increasingly inquired about the transcendental, conscious core in all beings. The immortal element was now variously identified with one or another of the new, Upanishadic soul-concepts, purusa and ãtman, which sometimes compete for supremacy and sometimes are identified with each other.

I have labeled these two as "Late Vedic" or "Upanishadic" soul-concepts, as they are unknown, at least in their "classical" forms, before the end of the Vedic era. While ãtman does appear as a vital force or life-soul in the early texts, it was more or less obsolete by the time of the Brahmanas; whereas any evidence for an early soul-concept called purusa is entirely absent. As I have argued, the origins of the Late Vedic concepts must be sought in ritualistic speculations on the postmortal form of the sacrificer. This form, as mentioned, was called ãtman, and its obtainment is one of the central concerns of Šrauta ritual. In the Agnicayana, it was referred to as purusa, "man, person," identified as a cosmic being of golden aspect, residing in the sun; it was represented by a tiny golden figure under the fire-altar. I have tried to explain the transformation of these concepts into what may be called "souls" against the backdrop of the Late Vedic

trend known as ritual interiorization, whereby the ritual and its elements become assimilated to the human being. Thus, the golden figure of the Agnicayana, placed at the center of a brick-altar which is itself referred to as a "man," is transposed to the cavity of the heart, where it resides as a homunculus. Similarly, the ãtman is brought down from yonder world and transferred to one's own innermost being; the source of immortality, then, already exists within oneself, and there is no longer a need to create a "self" in the other world by means of rites. Reflecting its ritual background, the purusha of the late Brãhmanas and Upanishads is described as man-shaped, golden, and of minute size; the ãtman, being without iconic representation in the ritual, remains more vaguely outlined, being sometimes described as altogether lacking form and positive attributes.

The interiorization of ritual is usually seen as connected in some way with the apparent decline of the sacrificial ideology at the end of the Vedic age. The reasons for this decline are far from evident, and I have made no attempt to solve the issue here, though various theories have been cited. What can be said for certain is that the sacrifice begins to fall out of favor, and that by the time of the early Upanishads, it has become common to elevate knowledge (especially of the soul, however designated) as a more effective means of achieving immortality in the hereafter. Knowledge of the soul begins to usurp the place previously held by the sacrifice; and it may be surmised that positioning themselves as the keepers of this kind of knowledge served as a means for some Brahmins to secure continued patronage in a time when ritual was on the wane. That the wealthy khatriyas, the traditional sponsors of sacrifices, were the intended audience of at least some of the new teachings can be inferred from the fact that many of these teachings are heavily invested with rulership symbolism (the soul lording over the vital powers being likened to a king among his vassals, etc.), and from the promises of worldly power said to accrue to the knower. Royal symbolism of this kind can first be seen in teachings on the prana, but later comes to surround the other Upanishadic soul-concepts as well.

A comparison between Early and Late Vedic soul-conceptions shows that there are significant differences in their functions and in the thought-worlds that underlie them. In the RV and the AV, and in the mantras of the Yajurveda, the various forces

responsible for vitality, animacy, and consciousness are seen as having a precarious existence in the body, being vulnerable to illness and outside influences. This is true not only for the "free-soul," manas; concepts like asu, ãtman, and prã^a/the prã^as are also referred to as deserting a person on the brink of death, and must be called back by means of spells. The impression conveyed by the sources is that Early Vedic speculation on the "souls" in a person were oriented not so much towards the attainment of afterlife immortality as the preservation of the present life. The life of the "dividual" was seen as based on a number of subtle components which maintained an unstable presence in the body; in critical states they might leave it and return to the cosmic elements from which they originated. Extracorporeal excursions by any of the souls are feared as either the symptom or the cause of illness or approaching death. We seldom hear of voluntary or beneficial soul-excursions; there are few indications of anything like a Vedic "shamanism," healing and soul-retrieval being left to the care of a priest who recited spells over the afflicted person. Nor is there any early evidence for a belief in dream-excursions in which a free-soul might leave the sleeping body and roam about. Such ideas are attested only in late texts, especially in the Upanishads, where journeys of this kind are cast in a positive light, as manifestations of the soul's (the purusha's) power.

The conception of the composite person begins to change in the Late Vedic period and is replaced by the idea that a person can ultimately be reduced to an immutable core, something that exists apart from the body and its functions and which outlives them. Isolated precursors of this notion can be found here and there in older literature, in the Atharvaveda and in some Brâhmana-period texts, where principles like prana or manas are sometimes elevated and assigned a divine status. It is, however, only in the Aranyakas and Upanishads, and in the late tenth book of the ŠB, that such ideas become systematized and acquire true significance. The unchanging core, or "soul," is here variously identified as ãtman, purana, or, sometimes, prana. As for the vital powers, they are reduced to mere appendages or manifestations of the soul, which is the true source of sensory perception, cognition, speech, and respiration. This soul has the nature of perception (vijñãna) or consciousness (prajñã); it controls the other vital faculties and absorbs them in deep sleep, unconsciousness, and at the event of death.

These ideas first appear in connection with the breath, whose superiority over the other vital faculties was demonstrated by the fact that it alone remained active in deep sleep, during which it was thought to absorb the other faculties. In the end, however, ideas of a conscious principle (identified as ãtman or purana) underlying all the vital powers would prevail. This type of speculation reaches its apex in the teachings ascribed to Yãjñavalkya, which posit the ãtman as a passive, immutable substratum of the senses and other functions, the "unseen seer," "unheard hearer," etc., which, though conscious, ceases to perceive at death and in states of unconsciousness, when the vital powers disappear and there are no objects to perceive. The true nature of the ãtman is said to be experienced in states of unconsciousness; hence deep sleep is elevated above waking and dreaming as the state closest to liberation. Sometimes this state is described as one of ãnanda, oblivious bliss.

It is possible, though difficult to prove, that "mystical" practices and experiences may have played a role in the development of some of these teachings. Ideas about the oneness of everything, states of contentless consciousness, and merging with the world-ground may all be adduced as indicators of mysticism, though it should be borne in mind that this is a contested concept and that superficial similarities with "mystical" traditions in other cultures do not prove anything. As it is, the earliest evidence for meditative practices, trance, and yoga is found in the Middle Upanishads; the older texts appear to be wholly ignorant of these phenomena. It is, however, possible that some of the authors of the older texts had knowledge of such practices and of altered states of consciousness, even though they may only have heard of them. The speculations about pure consciousness may hint at some knowledge of this kind.

Arbman argued that what can be seen in the Upanishads is a "unification of the soul," a fusion of the old, dual soul-concepts – the free-soul or psyche on the one hand, the body-souls on the other – into a single entity. This theory has been criticized, and I agree with those who hold that there is little evidence for soul-dualism proper at any phase of the Vedic age. Nevertheless, I have argued that the basic idea of a unification of the soul is applicable to the Upanishadic evidence. The various life- or body-souls merge with one or another of the new, all-dominating soul-concepts, which eventually usurp their functions, becoming, in the process, the sole source of life, consciousness,

and perception. Though it may be objected that the Upanishads know of several such "unified" souls, all doctrines reckon with only one eternal core in a person; concepts like ãtman and purana are treated not as separate beings, but are identified, or one soul-concept is said to be a specific form or aspect of the other.

Another major change in Late Vedic conceptions of the person and the world is the dissolution of the old system of macro-microcosmic correspondences, which more or less ceases to play a role in afterlife speculations. The new soul-concepts have no ties to any of the cosmic elements; at death, the soul goes to yonder world, transmigrates, or attains liberation, often characterized as a state in which all distinctions disappear and only pure consciousness remains. The soul is also identified with the world-ground (often denoted as brahman), the substratum of the created cosmos, and liberation is to become one with this substratum, abandoning all individuality. The equation of the individual ãtman with the universal brahman, which later becomes a central tenet in Advaita Vedãnta, can be seen as the final conclusion of the old system of macro-microcosmic correspondences, which have here merged into just two principles.

Not all Upanishadic conceptions pertaining to the soul or self can be traced back to older thought through a linear development. These texts came into being in a fervid intellectual climate in which new ideas and teachings were circulated, elaborated, and criticized. It must also be asked to what extent social developments may have contributed to changes in the old worldview. As indicated, socioeconomic and political factors may have played a decisive role in the shift of focus from the external ritual to the human interior. It is possible that changes in the material culture may have promoted a centering of the individual, which, on the metaphysical plane, might have been expressed through the emerging notion of a unitary soul. There are indications in the sources that traditional ties of kinship were being devalued: the self is described as free from worldly ties; marriage and offspring are no longer prerequisites for attaining immortality, which can be achieved through knowledge of the soul. The seeds of these new ideas, however, can already be seen in Šrauta ritualism with its sacrificer-centered focus, and predate urbanization and other major changes in society. They seem to have begun as an intellectual trend, limited to certain higher strata of society.

Another moot question is to what extent šramanism may have influenced Upanishadic thought. As this is a long-debated issue which cannot be settled here, I have limited my focus to the question of šramanic influence on Late Vedic conceptions of the soul. I have argued that no such influence can be definitely established in the old prose Upanishads, whose conceptions of ãtman, purana, and prana all have roots in Vedic thought. It is primarily in the Middle Upanishads that probable šramanic influences can be inferred, e.g. in the appearance of the jiva,a concept (said to be the ãtman in its embodied, transmigrating form). Bronkhorst's theory of a "Greater Magadha," a specific cultural geographic region from which the world-renouncing movements as well as the ãtman concept would have originated, has been criticized here: a review of the evidence suggests that there was no specific šramanic conception of the soul, but rather a plurality of teachings which propound different views of the soul (usually denoted as jiva, not ãtman) and which tend to attach less importance to the matter than do the Upanishads. The Greater Magadhan conception of a passive, transcendental ãtman reconstructed by Bronkhorst turns out to be based almost entirely on Brahmanical sources. This being said, there is some evidence that Brahmanical renouncers seized on the concept of a "self" that transcends worldly ties and most likely contributed to its diffusion, which might explain early Buddhism's familiarity with an Upanishadic-like ãtman.

Another difficult issue where the question of borrowing inevitably comes up is the origin of rebirth beliefs in ancient India. Again, this is a matter that cannot be solved here, and which will probably never be given a satisfying solution. In my discussion I have focused on the evidence, or lack thereof, of rebirth conceptions or possible "precursors" of such conceptions in the Vedic corpus, and on the relation of rebirth eschatology to Late Vedic concepts of the soul. An examination of the evidence makes it clear that the case for a Vedic origin of the notion is extremely weak; there are no unambiguous instances of belief in rebirth before the end of the Vedic age, when the notion makes its first abrupt appearance in the texts of the Jaiminïyas and in the oldest Upanishads. The "evidence" from earlier texts hinges mostly on spurious readings of isolated passages. A somewhat stronger case can perhaps be built for the theory that the karma doctrine can be traced to Vedic speculations on the efficacy of ritual acts;

but here, too, conclusive evidence is missing. When the doctrine of rebirth does appear, it has been furnished with an "orthodox" framework, apparently meant to give it a respectable appearance, though the absence of antecedents betrays its exogenous origin. Where and when it originated is, as said, an enigma that defies solution; what can be said for sure is that rebirth conceptions did not originate within the Brahmanical tradition, but must have been borrowed from some external source. That the idea of a transmigrating soul was still alien to the authors of the oldest Upanishads can perhaps be seen from the fact that the earliest instances of the rebirth doctrine make no mention of any soul-concept, nor make it clear exactly what it is that is reborn. <>

THE CHESTER BEATTY BIBLICAL PAPYRI AT NINETY: LITERATURE, PAPYROLOGY, ETHICS edited by Garrick Vernon Allen, Usama Ali Mohamed Gad, Kelsie Gayle Rodenbiker, Anthony Philip Royle, and Jill Unkel [Series: Manuscripta Biblica, Walter de Gruyter, ISBN 9783110781014]

Despite the significant work carried out on the text, transmission, materiality, and scribal habits preserved in the Chester Beatty Biblical Papyri since their acquisition by Beatty ninety years ago in 1931, these early copies of Jewish scripture and the New Testament have, for the most part, belonged primarily to textual critics. The goal of this book is to resituate this important collection of manuscripts in broader contexts, examining their significance in conversation with papyrology as a discipline, in the context of other ancient literary traditions preserved on papyri, and in discussion with the intellectual and cultural history of collecting, colonialism, and scholarly rhetoric. The Chester Beatty Biblical Papyri, and other papyrological collection with which they are inextricably bound, remind us of the critical value of examining old manuscripts afresh in their historical, scholarly, and intellectual contexts. These studies are relevant for all scholars who work with manuscripts and ancient texts of any variety.

This book engages the Chester Beatty Biblical Papyri, one of the most important collections of early manuscripts of Jewish scripture and the New Testament, by placing them within larger conversations relating to ancient literature and its interpretation, papyrology, and the ethics of collecting and scholarship. Ninety years after Beatty acquired these manuscripts, their value for scholarship and culture remains largely unexplored.

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Manuscripta Biblica is dedicated to scholarship on manuscripts of the Jewish and Christian Bible. The series is open to all scholarly fields and methods that address any aspect of biblical manuscripts in a broad sense. This includes research on textual and paratextual aspects, the presentation, organization, physical composition, and artistic dimensions of the artifact as well as issues related to production, dissemination, forms of use, and reception.

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Papyrology in its Second Century, and the Chester Beatty by Brian McGing
Decolonizing the Troubled Archive(s) of Papyri and Papyrology by Usama Gad
The Bodmer Papyri and the Chester Beatty by Daniel B. Sharp and Brent Nongbri
An Old Story Retold: The Acquisition of the Chester Beatty Biblical Papyri by Jill Unkel
Reading across the Archives: Mining the Beatty Narrative by Yii-Jan Lin
Papyrology as an Art of Destruction by Jennifer Wright Knust
Scribal "Faithfulness" and the Text-Critical Imaginary by Kelsie G. Rodenbiker
The Threads that Bind: Evidence of the Early Codex Structure in Chester Beatty's Papyri by Kristine Rose-Beers
Beyond Palaeography: Text, Paratext and Dating of Early Christian Papyri by Tommy Wasserman
The Papyri and the Septuagint: Chester Beatty Papyrus 967 and the Greek Texts of the Book of Esther by Kristin De Troyer
The Apocalypse of Elijah in the Context of Coptic Apocrypha by Hugo Lundhaug
Characterising Discipleship in the Fifth Manichaean Psalm of Heracleides: Women's Participation in Late Antique Egypt by Kimberley A. Fowler
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In the introductory volume to the first edition of the Chester Beatty Biblical Papyri, a project funded by Beatty himself, Sir Frederic G. Kenyon concludes with a lengthy note of gratitude to his patron:

> Biblical students will not be slow to congratulate Mr. Chester Beatty on his extraordinary good fortune in acquiring this unique group of manuscripts, and to thank him for making them so fully available for their study. As editor, I can only express my gratitude to him for placing material of such fascinating interest in my hands just at the moment when I was free to undertake it, and my regret for the imperfections of execution which more competent scholars will no doubt discover.

Although this statement is a stereotypical acknowledgement of funding and humility, it reflects a larger perspective that the guild owes collectors a debt of gratitude. This view that Beatty and the other large-scale collectors of that generation are ultimately responsible, for the discovery, acquisition, and publication of the papyri remains largely intact in the popular imagination. Beatty is, after all, the one who purchased the material with his own funds, transported them to Europe, had Hugo Ibscher mount them in glass, brought them to London to be studied by Kenyon, paid for their publication, and eventually brought them to Dublin (along with the rest of his astounding collection) after the Second World War, finally leaving them upon trust for the use and enjoyment of the public to be housed in a museum that bears his name to this day. This is surely no insignificant series of events and, insofar as Beatty could have discharged his fortune in any way he saw fit, we might indeed be thankful that he spent his money on items that are so relevant to our field.

The portrait of Beatty as a lone actor and generous benefactor to Biblical Studies and Papyrology, not to mention the other disciplines and the broader public that continue to profit from access to his sprawling collection,2 is a persistent narrative. By all accounts Beatty was deeply generous, philanthropic, and a patron for research on this collection, a portrait promulgated most notably by his aristocratic friends' and a biography penned by the press officer of his mining company in 1985 that has influenced "official" narratives of Beatty's centrality to the collection for nearly thirty years.' Ninety years after the announcement of the acquisition of the Biblical Papyri in The Times by Kenyon on 19 November 1931, the goal of this book is to take stock of the scholarship on the papyri and the narrative that stands behind the collection in an effort to explore new avenues of research, to emphasise the collaborative nature of Beatty's enterprise and the scholarship that it has enabled, and to point to the many agents, ancient and modern, who made it possible for us to saunter through the glass doors of the Chester Beatty to engage with some of the earliest copies of the New Testament and other works. We do this by combining close study of the papyri in the Beatty collection, especially by scholars who offer new approaches to the material, with an exploration of the popular narrative around Beatty himself that accrues importance and cultural value to these manuscripts. This approach is not to deny the critical value

and cultural importance of the manuscripts that Beatty acquired, nor is it to deny the important text-critical value that these manuscripts have for reconstructing "original" or "initial" texts, but to contextualise the material as it now stands in the broader discourse on Papyrology, to reflect upon the period in which great personal collections like Beatty's were assembled, and to situate our scholarship within the larger historical narratives that dominate the ways we write and think about our work. The careful philological work and the larger stories we tell ourselves about the people and institutions that made these artefacts available to us for study are undoubtedly connected. Philology and ethics are two sides of the same coin.

Exploring the Chester Beatty Biblical Papyri, the Beatty narrative, and the larger papyrological collection side by side is an important undertaking because Beatty's activities and the stories around his collection are far from unique among his contemporaries. They have ongoing relevance for those who work with manuscripts in institutional contexts of many kinds. For example, consider the narrative surrounding another American art enthusiast whose collection is also housed in a museum bearing his name, Charles Lang Freer (1854-1919). Kent Clarke's 2006 biographical sketch of Freer describes him, in idealistic language, as an industrialist who was a "self-made millionaire," and as one who eschewed the "self-interested pursuit of wealth," instead putting his riches to good use to "encourage a sensitivity of 'the beautiful' that would arrest the materialism of the Industrialist Age.'" Freer had broad artistic tastes, including a focus on material from the Far East, worked diligently to institutionalise his collection before his death, and cultivated a deep bench of agents in Egypt and elsewhere to seek out purchases on his behalf.' He even worked with Maurice Nahman, a Cairo dealer known also to Beatty.' Moreover, Freer, like Beatty, paid a reputable scholar handsomely for the publication of his manuscripts' and he later took on the role of patron to scholars and art collectors, all the while overcoming the spectre of a genetic illness.' Freer's story as a self-made, generous, persevering American who pulled himself up by his bootstraps to create a world-renowned collection of manuscripts and objets d'art has striking parallels to Beatty's narrative as described by Wilson and previous generations of curators.' Beatty's collection is indeed unique and enduringly relevant to biblical and other kinds of scholarship, but he is part of a larger tradition of

wealthy American industrialists and capitalists who emerged from the Gilded Age with fortunes to build, money to spend, an aversion for taxes and meddlesome bureaucracy, and a taste for manuscripts and beautiful things. The larger issues that contributors explore in this book, whether they explore the fine textual details of Manichaean psalms, histories of acquisition, or the stories we accept about "great men," are relevant for many (if not all) institutional collections that preserve the most primary sources of our disciplines.

Inextricably bound up in the narratives surrounding Beatty and his collection are the manuscripts themselves, artefacts that, when taken together, offer us chance glimpses at the many cultures, individuals, and communities that produced, used, and transmitted these works. In addition to larger critical questions, the essays that follow work to connect the Chester Beatty Biblical Papyri to the other ancient works preserved on papyrus in the collection and to trends in the broader discipline of Papyrology. For example, Brian McGing walks us through the emerging trends of Papyrology in its second century, highlighting the monumental nature of the editorial task that still remains from the material uncovered over a century ago, pointing to the work involved in the indebtedness of Papyrology to colonialism, and unpacking the historical narratives that remain to be crafted from the documentary material.

Similarly, Usama Gad examines the embeddedness of colonialism and Eurocentrism in Papyrology, arguing that this trend is not something unique to the earliest generations of papyrologists; it is something that continues today when Egypt's glorious past is emphasised to the detriment or ignorance of modern Egypt and its agency in the antiquities trade. We can begin to "decolonize" the archive through detailed historical research that seriously considers the good, the bad, and the ugly of the history of the discipline. Exploring the collection and its materials from this angle highlights the often-invisible role of Egyptians in producing, using, and working to discover the papyri that have become almost entirely the domain of European and North American scholars. This volume works to address this issue by including Arabic titles and author names at the start of each article and an Arabic summary at the end of each piece, prepared by Gad. We also address issues of access by making the book open access, thanks to funding from the Irish Research Council and European Research Council.

Next, the detective work of Daniel B. Sharp and Brent Nongbri complements the broader strokes of McGing and Gad by taking up the call for detailed work in the archives, showcasing the complexity that the ad hoc and unprovenanced collecting of the early twentieth century has wrought on the discipline. Looking at the Bodmer Papyri and Chester Beatty Biblical Papyri in particular, we see that the story of the manuscripts we work with are entangled with the realities of divided collections and opaque, or even intentionally constructed, origin stories. More work in the archives of various collecting institutions is required if we are to better understand the manuscripts and their texts.

Jill Unkel, the Curator of the Western Collection at the Chester Beatty, gets more specific than Sharp and Nongbri, focusing on the acquisition of the Chester Beatty Biblical Papyri in particular. The details of the acquisition remain vague, but Unkel emphasises the collaborative and international endeavour that stands behind the collection of the material, a reality that demonstrates the complex and variegated social ties that lead to a collection like the one we have in Dublin. The collection bears Beatty's name but it is not the fruit of his labour alone. Unkel concludes by arguing for renewed attention to museum archaeology, or "mining the archive," as one route forward for better understanding the origins and contexts of the manuscript we continue to engage.

Getting more specific still, Yii-Jan Lin focuses not on acquisition history, but on Beatty himself, the popular narrative that supported his collecting activities, and the reception of the narrative by later generations. She takes direct aim at the narrative propagated by Wilson (1985) and others, pointing out the deeply one-sided portrayal and its obvious factual inaccuracies about Beat-ty's family and wealth. For Lin, collections like Beatty's are built upon generational exploitative practices and enabled by colonial regimes, a stark contrast to the stories we tell about the collections as exquisite things acquired on a great adventure. She decentres Beatty as a figure and turns our attention to those who had no role in the popular narrative and whose labour enriched Beatty and his family before him, including those who worked in his mines and those who were enslaved by Beatty's ancestors in the Caribbean. These anonymous people too played a role in bringing us the Chester Beatty Biblical Papyri, and her paper begins to

give them a voice in our scholarship on these materials. When we read across archives — historical, scholarly, economic, and popular — we can begin to gain a view of the larger story that stands behind the enduring, simplified narratives.

In a similar vein Jennifer Knust's essay explores Papyrology not as the philanthropic result of wealthy men seeking the purity of beauty and antiquity (like Clarke 2006 describes Freer's activities), but as an "art of destruction." By this she means that the papyri are the souvenirs of destructive practices and attitudes supported by colonialism and capitalism. Just as mining destroys the landscape to extract precious minerals, so too does text collecting leave collateral damage, both in the process of amassing enough wealth to collect manuscripts in the first place (as Lin argues) and also in the communities from which these items are extracted, especially in the political context of the "great powers diplomacy" of the early twentieth century (as Gad points out). Her work, in concert with Gad's perspective, makes us attentive to the ongoing illicit trade of antiquities and helps us to remember that at the other end of a smuggled papyrus there's often an Egyptian child crawling through a narrow mineshaft.

Turning from direct questions around the ethics and complexities of collecting, the remaining articles explore more specifically critical questions relevant to particular literary traditions represented by the Beatty collection. These essays are not disconnected from the metacritical issues that open the volume but are more attuned to larger issues classically relevant to Papyrology. Kelsie Roden-biker, for example, uses the papyri as a way to analyse scholarly language around faithfulness, fidelity, scripture, and scribal activity, especially as it relates to the New Testament. For her, language pertaining to scribal fidelity in the process of copying is used as a cipher for the canonical and textual imaginaries that undergird perceptions of the scriptural in New Testament studies. We ought to view manuscripts like the Chester Beatty Biblical Papyri as unique instances of reception, and as a space where scribes and communities co-mingle to create the New Testament anew.

Taking a more material approach, Kristine Rose-Beers engages the Chester Beatty's papyrological collection to explore the evolution of the book, moving from scroll to single-quire codex to multi-quire codex, with a special focus on binding procedures.

When we explore the papyri from this perspective, we gain a deeper understanding of the relationship between text and material and of the actual reading experiences that these manuscripts would have engendered when they were first made and used.

Tommy Wasserman also pays attention to the scribal aspects of early New Testament papyri and what they reveal about channels of tradition and cultural transfer in the ancient Roman world, particularly the relationship between Jewish and Christian scribal cultures that both used the Greek language. For Wasserman, shared Jewish and Christian scribal practices suggest perhaps an earlier date for some of the more substantial New Testament papyri, pushing back against recent challenges to the early dating of the Chester Beatty Biblical Papyri and other collections."

The New Testament is not the only ancient literary collection preserved on papyri. The Septuagint — the Greek translations of Jewish scriptures, or the Old Testament — are also preserved among the Chester Beatty Biblical Papyri. Kristin De Troyer's essay examines the complicated textual history of the book of Esther, focusing on the variations internal to its Greek traditions. Her careful textual analysis illustrates the text-critical importance of the papyri as early witnesses to these traditions. And although the Biblical Papyri have been privileged for their text critical value, over and against other possible uses, De Troyer shows us that there is still much to uncover and recategorize when it comes to the ancient texts of scriptural works.

The final two articles in the book turn to an area that has until quite recently been overlooked when it comes to thinking about Christian writings preserved on papyrus: Coptic literature. Hugo Lundhaug examines the Apocalypse of Elijah, one manuscript of which is part of the Beatty collection, concluding that, although interest in the work appears to have died off in late antiquity, themes preserved in it appear in much later Coptic apocrypha. Nonetheless, it is an ideal example of what we owe to the papyrological material uncovered in Egypt around the turn of the twentieth century; without the papyri, much early Jewish and Christian literature would be lost. Kimberley A. Fowler's essay also addresses a Coptic tradition, this time focusing on the Manichaean psalms, their presentation of women, and interpretation of female figures in the New Testament Gospels and other ancient Christian literature. Fowler argues

that when we coordinate the literary evidence with the documentary papyri from a location like Kellis, where we know an active Manichaean community existed, we can gain a deeper understanding of the role of women in the community and in early Christianity more broadly. The Coptic papyri should not be overlooked because they can shed important light on genuine instantiations of early Christian literature and practices.

Overall, this book is designed to reassess the critical value of the Chester Beatty Biblical Papyri in relationship to Papyrology more broadly and the stories about this collection ninety years after its existence was made public. The articles that follow do this by acknowledging the inherent connection between acquisition and exhibition and between the consequence for real, mostly anonymous people who enabled the acquisition and our own scholarship by rethinking the critical emphases that have dominated scholarship on the Chester Beatty Biblical Papyri since the 1930s. It is my hope that this publication supports the institutional goals of the Chester Beatty in caring for, researching, sharing, and promoting its collection and in fostering understanding, engagement, and curiosity. The substance of this book shows that there remains much to be curious about and that there is much more to be said about the papyri, not to mention the rest of the collection that extends from cuneiform tablets to Darer prints to deluxe Byzantine gospel manuscripts to snuff boxes and beyond. The Beatty collection and its archives remain fertile ground for researchers from many traditions and disciplines, and I hope that this book encourages new research and interest in the collection.

And while we might decide not to follow Kenyon in thanking Chester Beatty himself, especially since he is no longer our personal patron, we can certainly extend our gratitude to the staff at the museum that bears his name, along with the taxpayers of Ireland and others who fund it, for continuing to conserve, display, and make accessible some of the most remarkable papyrological materials in existence. I am grateful to the Chester Beatty for hosting a conference where these papers were first read in October 2021, especially to Jill Unkel for her logistical work, but also to the technical team, Head of Collections Sinéad McCartan, and Director Fionnuala Croke for their support, participation, and conversation. The conference and part of the

MYSTIC BONFIRES: WALTER HILTON AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF PRACTICAL SPIRITUAL THEOLOGY
Kevin Goodrich, OP, Foreword by Bryan Froehle [Wipf & Stock, ISBN 9781666724851]

For centuries, people have been drawn to the Christian mystics—women and men who have known God in powerful and experiential ways. *Mystic Bonfires* is for students, scholars, and practitioners of ministry, theology, and spiritual formation. It explores theology and theory and shares insights for practice and prayer. Readers will encounter classical concepts about the spiritual life and how to apply these concepts to their ministries in faithful and creative ways. *Mystic Bonfires* includes questions for students in academic and formation settings as well as project ideas for congregations. *Mystic Bonfires* explores the intersection of spiritual theology and practical theology. Walter Hilton, a 14th century English mystic and a contemporary of Julian of Norwich serves as a case study for the intersection of these fields called practical spiritual theology.

Reviews

"A fresh and innovative addition to Hilton scholarship, this will be of particular interest to Christian educators, spiritual directors, and those who know the area in Nottinghamshire, England, where Hilton lived and worked. Bringing the medieval mystical tradition into dialogue with contemporary theology and spirituality, Fr. Kevin's analysis will surely encourage others to explore and to learn from Hilton's writings." —ERICA KIRK, priest vicar, Southwell Minster, Nottinghamshire, England

"In a time of global anxiety, we need spiritual resources and practices as never before. Mystic Bonfires will be immensely valuable in guiding young people especially in the fourteenth-century mystical tradition, which is so practical and attractive in its theology of love. The book offers a unique introduction to the wisdom of Walter Hilton, who unlike many, wrote explicitly for ordinary Christians in their working lives." —ALISON MILBANK, University of Nottingham

"Mystic Bonfires revives Hilton's tradition to work in tandem with a creative and contemporary practical spiritual theology. Its integration of spiritual theology with pastoral theology points a way for pastors, spiritual directors, Christian educators, and church evangelists to recover this living

contemplative tradition at the heart of the church's mission." —JULIA GATTA, The University of the South

"Fr. Goodrich constructs a remarkable bridge between the spirituality of the High Middle Ages and contemporary Christianity. Although well-informed and critical, Mystic Bonfires is not primarily an academic study, although it would be a valuable resource in a variety of settings. . . . Fr. Goodrich presents a lucid and inspiring conversation across centuries of what Hilton would describe as 'reformation in faith and feeling.'" —RICHARD WOODS, OP, Dominican University, emeritus

"The Christian tradition has treasure troves of practical wisdom, embodied spirituality, and moral reflection. Unfortunately, these treasures are obscured to many contemporary people who have become disillusioned by shallow substitutes and church salesmanship. Kevin Goodrich leads readers on a pilgrimage of recovery, discovering along the way a practical and spiritual theology designed for ordinary people. This book is for students, parents, professionals, tradespeople, and pensioners who long for a deeper life with God.' —JASON GABOURY, author of Wait with Me: Meeting God in Loneliness

"Goodrich introduces and ignites a contemporary integration of spirituality, practical theology, and empirical studies, constructing a method for the growing enterprise of practical theology. Individuals and institutions enduring global and local crises can embrace such an approach and set the church, academy, and the most curious of society aflame by renewing and creating a liberative future. . . . This practical spiritual-theological method responds to social, cultural, and ecclesial problems and seeks a prophetic response of justice.' —SONJA B. WILLIAMS, Eden Theological Seminary

"Packed with potential and possibilities, Mystic Bonfires sets forth a unique method for academia, the church, and laity to explore and incorporate mystic prayer practices in our modern context. It serves as a strong reminder of how much might yet be gleaned from early Christian theological pillars and mystics as we seek to integrate the active and contemplative life.' —GAIL BRECHT, Christos Center for Spiritual Formation

CONTENTS

Interest in spirituality has grown dramatically over the past few decades. This has been the case across the various forms of religion, regions of the world, and people in general, from scholars and leaders to ordinary people. As the Church in the global north struggles with profound cultural shifts challenging its growth and even its future, and the Church in the global south continues to grow in vibrancy, the need for careful and creative attention to spirituality and spiritual formation is paramount.

The Church of the global north will require both creativity and continuity in its engagement with past faith and practices if it is to thrive in a post-secular age. It will require retrievals of historical spiritualities and the development of new Christian spiritualities in response to today's challenges. This is a particular challenge for those engaged in lay and ordained ministries, the practice of spiritual direction, and formation work. The Rev. Dr. Kevin Goodrich, O.P., a former doctoral student of mine, is at the forefront of this important interdisciplinary, scholarly, and pastoral work.

I first met Father Kevin when I was the director of the Ph.D. program at St. Thomas University in Miami, Florida. My first impressions were of a contemplative Christian, an Anglican Dominican, possessing a creative spirit that captures the attention of others through a strong personal presence whether in conversation, teaching, or preaching. His creative spirit was quickly evident in his ready combination of prayer, scholarship, and the practice of ministry. These personal gifts, honed through years of study and pastoral ministry in diverse settings, are revealed in this book. Though an Episcopal priest and spiritual director anchored in the Anglican tradition, Father Kevin has been formed in critical ways within Evangelical, Catholic, and Mainline Christian institutions. He has ministered in rural, suburban, and urban settings in Canada and the United States. He has supervised seminarians from varied denominational

backgrounds in field education programs. He has traveled both sides of the Atlantic as an itinerant preacher, preaching at small faithful congregations and lively historic cathedrals. His teaching at Protestant and Catholic universities has enriched his abilities as a translator between Christian traditions and an advocate for what C.S. Lewis called "mere" Christianity. Fr. Kevin's breadth of experience with the Christian tradition is revealed in this book.

Mystic Bonfires: Walter Hilton and the Development of Practical Spiritual Theology will be useful to readers from a variety of Christian traditions. I particularly commend its use as a secondary textbook in advanced undergraduate courses, most especially for graduate courses in practical theology, pastoral theology and leadership, spiritual direction, and Christian formation and education. Practitioners in those fields will also benefit greatly from the book. His work informed my own thinking and will surely broaden that of students and practitioners as they seek to understand their own fields and provide resources for engaging in the work of Christian spirituality. While Rev. Dr. Goodrich's emphasis is on the Western Christian mystical tradition, his method of Practical Spiritual Theology as described in this book holds promise for many contexts.

The Christian mystical tradition has something to say to Christianity globally. This book offers a flexible way for professional scholars to approach the work of retrieval in fresh ways. It empowers ministry practitioners to complete their own projects of investigation into the mystics. Such projects will surely create mystical laboratories in their own ministry settings drawing upon the deep well of wisdom from our foremothers and forefathers in the faith. Goodrich's combination of concerns from practical theology and spiritual theology, promises to enrich each theological discipline and most importantly lead to transforming practice by individuals and institutions.

I am particularly struck by the synthesis of medieval spirituality and contemporary concerns in the concept Goodrich describes as conative mysticism. His work helps us preserve the best of the tradition while commending it to address contemporary challenges.

I remember going to the Episcopal Cathedral in Miami to hear Father Kevin preach for the first time. I took my seat in a pew toward the back. He did not know I was there.

What I did know, however, was that the congregation was highly engaged during his homily. It turned out that this was also the congregation's first time to hear him. It was the early 8 o'clock Sunday Eucharist and the congregation was very quiet until, at the end of the liturgy, the dean of the cathedral assured congregants that Father Kevin would be returning to preach again and be part of the Cathedral's life as a priest-in-residence. The congregation applauded. This was most definitely not par for the course at 8 o'clock Eucharists, yet thoroughly merited by Father Kevin. I add my applause to this book and recommend it to you. May the fire witnessed by generations of mystics give light to your mind and warmth to your heart as you read these pages. — BRYAN T. FROEHLE, PH.D., Professor and Director, Ph.D. in Practical Theology Program

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Spirituality in general and historical figures of the Christian tradition, especially mystics, are of interest to a wide variety of audiences within the academy, church, and society at large. This book is theological in nature. It explores the relationship between spirituality, spiritual theology, and practical theology. Each of these fields has its own methods, methodology, and literature. Each is a formal academic discipline practiced by scholars in the academy. Scholars from other disciplines also study spiritual texts and experiences. For example, scholars of religion, literature, and psychology. These scholars and their work are often enriching resources for theological reflection and pastoral practice. Work in spirituality, spiritual theology, and practical theology is done not only by professional theologians, but by Christian educators, clergy, and spiritual directors. Spirituality, understood in a multiplicity of ways by multitudes of people, is an area of human inquiry and practice engaged by billions of human beings, Christian and non-Christian.

The turn to the spiritual, to meaning making, and to a religious sense of finding a connection to something beyond oneself is one of the distinguishing features of human life. This book explores this connection theologically, from the perspective of the Christian theological tradition, especially as found in the medieval mystical tradition. The fourteenth-century English mystic Walter Hilton serves as a case study for this exploration. Chapters one and two will be helpful to all readers. Seminary and spiritual

direction students will be introduced to fields and ideas that relate to the everyday exercise of their ministries. Graduate and advanced undergraduate students will become familiar with theological approaches to religion and spirituality that may complement or contrast their own methodologies of study. They will also be introduced to a Christian mystic and spiritual writer, Walter Hilton. Lay ministers and Christian educators will not only learn about the formal fields that shape their work but will also find insights into their work.

Chapter three will be of value to scholars as well as students of Christian education and spiritual formation interested in the philosophical dimensions of their work. More broadly, chapter three will be of interest to those practitioners interested in integrating concepts and ideas from past Christian practice with present practice. Chapter four, which highlights the responses of contemporary Christians to a historical mystic, will be of interest to all readers. Those students and others interested in combining theological reflection with empirical research will also find chapter four useful. Chapter five explores the possibilities and pitfalls of practical spiritual theology—the method of theological and spiritual inquiry proposed in this book. The chapter includes suggestions for scholars, practitioners, and communities. Appendix I includes questions for each chapter intended for use in a university course. Appendix II includes a second set of questions and exercises that may be used independently or in conjunction with the first set of questions for students in preparation for various kinds of ministry, including pastoral ministry, Christian education, and spiritual direction. This appendix also includes projects that can be used by scholars and ministry practitioners in small groups, faith communities, and institutions.

Dominican friar and scholar, Jordan Aumann, wrote in the preface to his book, Spiritual Theology, "Consequently, the study of the theology of Christian perfection should proceed scientifically and systematically, although its aim is not to produce scholars but to form holy Christians." The intention of this book is to encourage and sharpen scholarship as well as the spiritual vitality of readers and the people they teach, serve, and love. As Walter Hilton, Julian of Norwich, and many other medieval writers taught, love is both the means and the end of the Christian spiritual life. <>

THE COMPLETE WORKS BY SULPICIUS SEVERUS;
introduction, translation, and notes by Richard J. Goodrich [Series: Ancient Christian Writers, The Newman Press, Paulist Press, ISBN 9780809106202]

Volume 70 in the Ancient Christian Writers series offers the first complete English translation since the late nineteenth century of the works of Sulpicius Severus, an early fifth-century Gallic writer. Although Sulpicius is primarily known for his two works on Saint Martin of Tours (Life of Saint Martin and Dialogues), he also wrote the Chronica, a history of the world in two books that began with the creation of Adam and extended to the ecclesiastical controversies of late-fourth-century Gaul. These three works, plus a small number of extant letters, offer a fascinating glimpse into the emerging Gallic church, the use of historical writing in biography, apologetic, and polemic, and the role played by Roman aristocrats in promoting and shaping the western monastic movement.

Sulpicius Severus (ca. 355-420), a native of Aquitaine, lived in a world that was rapidly changing. It was an age of flux, of upheaval, a time when old certainties were passing away and no one could have predicted what the future held. He was alive when Emperor Valens lost his life and army at Hadrianople (378); he would have been stunned, along with Augustine and Jerome, when Alaric and the Visigoths sacked Rome (410). During his life, there were rumors of Germanic invasions (Sulp.-Sev. Mart. 18) and the Roman empire was beginning to cede control of its western provinces to Germanic

generals; little more than fifty years after his death, the western Roman empire, which had controlled Gaul since the days of Julius Caesar, would cease to exist. Already the seeds of the end had been planted: a parade of usurpers vied for control of Gaul, and rumors of Germans spread mouth to mouth. Modern scholars might argue whether the empire ended with a bang or a whimper, an apocalyptic upheaval or simply a slow reversion to a preexisting state, but for Sulpicius, the end was near and his writings suggest that he knew it.

Sulpicius wrote little about himself: he claimed to be a sinful man, a wicked man, a man unworthy to write about the holy Saint Martin, but these assertions were rather conventional. His successors in Gaul also passed over him. It is not until Gennadius of Marseilles, writing almost a century later, that we learn more about Sulpicius. Gennadius stated that Sulpicius had been a priest who had written books about Saint Martin. As an old man, he had been led astray by the Pelagians. Realizing his error, Sulpicius had taken a vow of silence and stopped writing (Gennad. Vir. 19). While Gennadius does offer a correct list of Sulpicius's works, there is little else in the biography that is useful.

Tantalizing hints of a biography can be assembled by studying the letters of his friend, senator-turned-bishop Paulinus of Nola. Thirteen of Paulinus's letters to Sulpicius survive, and in this exchange, a portrait of the man emerges. The correspondence is one-sided—all of Sulpicius's letters to Paulinus have been lost. The two men enjoyed a close relationship, although Paulinus expressed frequent irritation over Sulpicius's refusal to visit Nola. Although Paulinus came from the superior senatorial class, the similarity in education, secular aspirations, and ultimate Christian goals make Paulinus's letters a reliable source for insights into Sulpicius's life and motivations.

Paulinus noted that Sulpicius was the younger of the two, and so his birth date may be placed in the middle of the fourth century.' Sulpicius was born into an upper-class family: his father owned property,' but there is no evidence to suggest that he came from the senatorial or patrician order.' Gennadius mentioned that he had a sister, but any letters Sulpicius wrote her no longer survive'

Young Gallo-Roman men of good birth who displayed a talent for learning were expected to receive an education in the literary arts. The quality of Sulpicius's writing suggests that he had been an excellent student. Gaul had long been a center for the literary arts; its teachers included the famous Ausonius. Paulinus and Ausonius were friends and correspondents; it is possible that Sulpicius also knew the famous rhetor. The prestige and quality of these schools is obliquely asserted by the character Gallus: "When I think about myself, a Gallic man telling stories among men from Aquitaine, I become afraid that I might offend your sophisticated ears with my uneducated speech" (Sulp.-Sev. Dial. 1.27.2).

Like Jerome and Augustine, Sulpicius joined the young talented men who hoped to win the attention of the imperial court and carve out careers serving the emperors. At some point in his secular career, he met Paulinus, and the bishop would later fondly remember that the two had been friends before Christ had united them as brothers (P.-Nol. Ep. 11.5). Paulinus offered firsthand testimony of Sulpicius's secular achievements: "You were winning greater praise...you were still a prominent player in the theater of the world, the forum" (P.-Nol. Ep. 5.5). Although this claim should be interpreted cautiously—it was offered in the context of the great sacrifice that Sulpicius had made to become an ascetic; the greater the career, the greater the sacrifice— there is no reason to doubt Sulpicius had enjoyed success. It should also be noted that later in his life, Sulpicius appeared to know a significant number of prominent men (see especially Sulp.-Sev. Dial., book III), and this suggests that he moved easily in that circle.

At some point, Sulpicius married. The name of his wife is not recorded, but according to Paulinus, she came from a consular family (P.-Nol. Ep. 5.5). If true, this would attest to Sulpicius's less than humble origins as well as support the claim that his career was flourishing. Sulpicius also acquired a mother-in-law, Bassula, through this marriage. She was well-off and later would provide scribes and an estate to support Sulpicius's literary and ascetic endeavors.

There is nothing to suggest the duration of Sulpicius's marriage. There is no mention of children or signs of a family life. Sulpicius's wife died of unknown causes, and this loss

plunged Sulpicius into an existential crisis. After meeting Martin of Tours, he decided to renounce his secular ambitions and adopt an ascetic lifestyle.

Asceticism was a burgeoning movement in the Roman empire. Although the movement had begun in the East, the success of Athanasius's Life of Antony had also inspired westerners. Augustine records the famous story of two young courtiers in Trier who had read the Life of Antony and been inspired to renounce the world and embrace a life centered on God (Aug. Conf. 8.6.15). Jerome was another example; after failing in his secular career, he spent time in the Syrian desert before returning to Rome to pose as an ascetic master. With all the force of a popular movement, the ascetic ideal swept across the empire, capturing the imagination of aristocratic men.

That is not to say that the movement was welcomed by all. Ascetics could be an alternate source of authority, one that challenged the "legitimate" power of the bishops and the ecclesiastical hierarchy. The monks and virgins, like the martyrs and confessors of a century earlier, emphasized their direct relationship with God, a relationship that could appear to circumvent the church. Personal charisma was often pitted against institutional authority. While Athanasius had demonstrated Antony's respect for, and subordination to, the hierarchical church, this was not true of all ascetics, and many bishops felt threatened by the burgeoning movement. In Alexandria, at the beginning of the fifth century, bishops and monks fought over the orthodoxy of Origen. The monks asserted they had the right to read the great theologian, while the bishops insisted that the monks needed to submit to episcopal authority and stop reading him. Ultimately, the bishops would appeal to the state to back up their authority (Sulp.-Sev. Dial. 1.6-7), forcing the monks to flee into exile.

As this incident suggests, many believed that the monastic movement needed to be under the control of the church, regulated to prevent the idiosyncratic ideas and practices of individual monks from leading them into heresy. During Sulpicius's lifetime, the Spanish ascetic Priscillian dabbled on the extreme edges of the faith and led others to share his unorthodox ideas. Many bishops would come to suspect all ascetics of heresy, and it was easy for the more mainstream ascetics to be lumped in with the less orthodox. When the Emperor Maximus threatened to send men into

Spain to arrest and execute the Priscillianists, Martin agonized over the possibility that good ascetics would also be snared in the dragnet (Sulp.-Sev. Dial. 3.11.5).

Finally, as Jerome's career demonstrated, the secular world often opposed the more extreme elements of the ascetic movement. Many people in Rome viewed the ascetic excesses of Jerome's group of women with concern. When Blesilla, a young patrician girl, starved herself to death through fasting, voices were raised against Jerome: How long should we wait to drive these detestable monks out of Rome? (Hier. Ep. 39.6). The cultured Rutilius Namatianus sniffed disparagingly at those men who abandoned cultured life to rot away on offshore islands (Rut. Nam. Red. 441-450).

Sulpicius's father was not pleased by his son's decision to renounce the world. The plan was probably revealed in 394, as Paulinus congratulates him for this radical step in a letter written in early 395: "For in answer to my prayer...you revealed the increase of your inheritance among the saints. This you did by your wholesome disposal of the burdens of this world, for you have purchased heaven and Christ at the price of brittle worldly goods." Paulinus framed Sulpicius's renunciation in terms of Christ's injunction: "You put your heavenly Father before your earthly one, and following the example of the apostles, you left him on the tossing and uncertain ship of this life. Leaving him with the nets of his possessions, enmeshed in his ancestral inheritance, you followed Christ." Rather tellingly, Paulinus does not state that Sulpicius had severed all familial ties; to the contrary, his decision had won the support of his mother-in-law, Bassula (P.-Nol. Ep. 5.6). She approved of his decision to become an ascetic and offered valuable financial support to replace what he had lost through his break with his father.

Joining an established monastery was the obvious course for a young man renouncing the world. Both Sulpicius and Paulinus had visited Saint Martin; both professed great respect and admiration for the bishop of Tours; neither joined his monastery at Marmoutier. Paulinus moved to Nola, where he used his wealth to build a shrine and monastery in honor of Saint Felix; Sulpicius withdrew to his estate at Primuliacum and began an ascetic experiment there. Two decades later, the ascetic expert John Cassian criticized those Gallic monks who chose to set themselves up as abbots of monasteries

without first serving under experienced men themselves (Cassian Inst. 2.3), but neither Sulpicius nor Paulinus demonstrate any awareness that this might be a problem. In fact, they were simply Christianizing the ancient Roman ideal of otium ruris, a leisured, literary retreat to the country, where, cut off from secular concerns (negotium), a man could engage in philosophy and the camaraderie of like-minded friends.

This lifestyle little resembled the more austere Egyptian practices memorialized in sources such as the Rule of Pachomius. Paulinus built buildings, wrote poetry, and maintained a lively correspondence with the leading secular and theological figures of his day. He wrote of his own life,

> Finally...unbusied by public affairs and far from the din of the marketplace, I enjoyed the leisure of country life and my religious duties, surrounded by pleasant peace in my withdrawn household. Gradually my mind became disengaged from my worldly troubles, adapting itself to the divine commands, so that I strove more easily towards contempt for the world and comradeship with Christ, since my way of life already bordered on this intention.

Sulpicius's ascetic life also took a literary turn as he began to produce the works that make up this volume, along with a number of letters that are now lost. Couriers carried letters back and forth between the foundation at Nola and Primuliacum.

While this renunciation of the world might seem less than spectacular to a modern reader, both Paulinus and Sulpicius did turn their backs on public life and commit themselves to a more serious pursuit of Christianity. Nevertheless, as was true for many educated western ascetics, renunciation did not necessarily mean rejecting wealth and status. In most respects, their lifestyle did not change much after renouncing the world. While a normative pattern for the monastic life had yet to emerge, the lives of the westerners might have seemed a bit odd to the more rustic monks of Egypt. Sulpicius and Paulinus both practiced a Christianized form of otium ruris; rather than turning to philosophy, as Roman gentlemen did, both began to carve out careers as Christian authors.

Literary Career

Most men and women who renounced the world and devoted themselves to the ascetic life were never heard from again. Many thousands flocked to the deserts of Egypt, or later enrolled in the great medieval monasteries of the West. As would be expected,

these people died in obscurity, out of the public eye. They had abandoned the world, and the world abandoned them.

Obscurity, however, had never been a goal of the reputationconscious Roman elite. Nor, despite Cassian's later assertion to the contrary, was there a normative model for monasticism in effect at this time . Certainly some would be tempted to travel east and embrace the forms of ascetic life found there, but it should come as no surprise that aristocrats like Paulinus and Sulpicius would favor a model that harmonized with traditional Roman practices.

Jerome and Rufinus were precedents for Paulinus and Sulpicius. Jerome had served the ecclesiastical hierarchy for a season in Rome, but after having been driven out of the city after the death of Pope Damasus, he had withdrawn to Bethlehem. There, supported by the wealthy Paula, he had devoted himself to his literary career. Rufinus, likewise, was living off of the wealth of the famous Melania the Elder in Jerusalem. Both men established themselves as freelance Christian authors, using their monasticism as a platform and source of authority for their writings.

Jerome was gaining popularity in the West when Sulpicius made his renunciation. His Life of Hilarion was written in 390, and it may have provided a model for Sulpicius's Life of Martin?' The similarities between the two works suggest that Sulpicius had read it, and perhaps the Life of Hilarion was the stimulus that Sulpicius needed to goad him into writing a competing account about Martin. In addition to suggesting a genre for the celebration of Martin's life and accomplishments, the Life of Hilarion also emphasized the miraculous in the life of the saint. Like Martin, Hilarion was a miracle worker, and this might explain why Sulpicius, following Jerome's lead, included the miracle stories that proved so controversial.

Emulation of Jerome and a desire to produce literary works were possible motivators, but it would appear that Sulpicius also had a desire to explain his renunciation of the world, an apologetic motivation that might also have contributed to his literary debut. Paulinus hints at this: "You write that you are taking pains to explain my course and your own" (P.-Nol. Ep. 1.4). This, suggested Paulinus, was a dangerous course: in arguing with his adversaries, he might fail to persuade them, and, in the course of the debate,

might lose confidence in the choice that he had made. In fact, wrote Paulinus, Sulpicius needed to think carefully about his objective in offering an account to these people; was he trying to win the favor of the world? That was not a proper goal for the monk, who should only be worried about pleasing Christ (P.-Nol. Ep. 1.6). Paulinus hinted that Sulpicius had been contemplating a written work that would explain the choice he had made to cultured skeptics. Consequently, his literary debut, the Life of Martin, can also be read as a sophisticated apologia. Written to charm and entertain Roman aristocrats, the Life offered a counterweight to those bishops concerned about the growth of asceticism in the West, while also explaining why men like Paulinus and Sulpicius would choose to renounce the world.

Competition with established authors and an apology for the ascetic lifestyle were important motivators. Nevertheless, the religious imperative should not be discounted. Paulinus developed this idea at length after receiving a copy of the Life:

> Your words, as eloquent as they are chaste, bear witness that you have conquered the law of the members and the outer corrupt man, that you are preparing a pure paste, and that unleavened bread without yeast is being prepared for Christ. You would not have been privileged to tell of Martin if you had not made your mouth worthy of such sacred praise by means of a pure heart. So you are a man blessed before the Lord, since you have recounted, in language as apposite as your love is righteous, the history of this great priest who is most clearly a Confessor of the church. He, too, is blessed as he deserves, for he has merited an historian worthy of his faith and life; he is destined for heavenly glory by his merits, and for fame among men by your writing. And these words of yours are a fleece, helping to cover with a most welcome garment our Lord Jesus, whose limbs they cover with fine adornment, and they deck out with the bloom of your talent. The Lamb will in His turn clothe you with His fleece on the day of retribution, investing your mortal frame with His own immortality."

Paulinus argued that Sulpicius could not have produced such a morally excellent work had not the author perfected his soul by turning it toward Christ. Not only did the Life enhance Martin's reputation among men (an apologetic motif), but it also added to Christ's glory, and in turn, Christ would reward Sulpicius. Sulpicius had signaled the same hope in his introductory paragraphs, writing, "I do not expect a pointless memorial from men, but an eternal reward from God" (Sulp.-Sev. Mart. 1.6). By setting out a profoundly Christian model for others to follow, Sulpicius could hope to reap a reward in the Lord's vineyards.

The Life of Martin

The Life of Martin was Sulpicius's literary debut. Published in the summer of 396, it was not the first life of an ascetic, but it is innovative in being the first in a series about western bishops." The Life of Martin was followed by Paulinus of Milan's Life of Saint Ambrose. In this work, Paulinus credited Sulpicius with providing a model for his work. Athanasius and Jerome had written about desert monks, but "Severus, God's servant eulogized the life of the venerable Martin, bishop of the church at Tours" (Paulin. Vit. Ambr. 1). Paulinus of Milan made a clear distinction between the writings about eastern monks and Sulpicius's account of a western monk-bishop. The Life of Ambrose was followed by Possidius's Life of Augustine. In this work, Possidius noted the great writers before him who had written about those whom the Lord had enabled to live among men and still persevere in the faith (i.e., Martin and Ambrose; Possid. Vit. Aug. pref.). Sulpicius's work provided a model and a precedent for later works devoted to lives and deeds of western bishops.

Sulpicius wrote a complete biography of Martin, from infancy to his own day. The work, he claimed, was based primarily on personal interviews with the bishop. Whereas others might have heard stories about Martin, Sulpicius had firsthand knowledge, acquired from Martin himself. This was an achievement because Martin was notorious for hiding his works out of a concern for modesty (Sulp.-Sev. Mart. 1.7; Sulp.-Sev. Dial. 2.1.1-9). Near the end of the Life, Sulpicius described how he acquired his source material: having heard of Martin, he made a trip to Tours in order to meet him. There he learned about the bishop, partly from Martin himself and partly from questioning those who knew him (Sulp.-Sev. Mart. 25.1). It is difficult to assess how many times Sulpicius met with Martin; Paulinus asserted that Sulpicius traveled to Tours often (P.-Nol. Ep. 17.4), but this claim must be evaluated in its context: Paulinus was accusing Sulpicius of frequently visiting Martin, but having no time to visit him in Nola. Consequently, the frequency of Sulpicius's trips to Tours may have been exaggerated in order to lend more force to Paulinus's complaint.

The Life was never intended to be a step-by-step guide to the ascetic life. A reader who wants to learn how to become a monk will find little help in the book. It does not offer

a schedule for the daily offices of prayer, nor does it give guidelines for fasting. Rather, it holds Martin up as a finished product. He is the goal, the culmination of the ascetic life, an example of what the truly committed could hope to become. Sulpicius wrote "to fully describe the life of that most holy man to serve as an example for others later. This work will spur my readers on to true wisdom, to service in the heavenly army, and divine excellence" (Sulp.-Sev. Mart. 1.6). Martin exemplified what was possible in the Christian life, and Sulpicius hoped to "preserve from obscurity a man who should be imitated" (Sulp.-Sev. Mart. 1.6). There was no good to be derived from reading about Hector fighting or Socrates philosophizing, because their achievements were restricted to the secular age. By establishing Martin as a standard and working to emulate him, a person could make a contribution to the eternal kingdom of God, an everlasting achievement. Consequently, the Life, like Jerome's Life of Hilarion, offers a series of vignettes designed to show Martin in action, living a Christlike life in the world.

There is a qualitative difference between this work and the later treatises of John Cassian. Cassian alluded to this difference when he wrote that he was not going to produce an account of miracles "that offer the reader nothing but astonishment and no instruction in the perfect life" (Cassian Inst. pref.7). Cassian offered a program, guidelines designed to help a person make progress in the ascetic life. Sulpicius and Jerome offered the finished product and wrote very little about how their subjects had acquired their excellence.

The censure of miracle stories in Cassian's Institutes is most certainly a reference to the Life of Saint Martin. One of the work's most distinctive characteristics is its emphasis on the miracles of Martin. Chapters 6 through 24 offer an unending parade of miracles: the resuscitation of the dead, the expulsion of demons, and preaching the gospel to Satan. Cassian's critique does not suggest disbelief in the miraculous—he was quick to assert that he knew of many miracles that had occurred among the Egyptian Desert Fathers (Cassian Inst. pref.7)—but rather he doubted whether stories about miracles contributed anything to the educational process. What was the point of this obsession with the miraculous? How did these stories teach the reader to become a better disciple of Christ?

For Sulpicius, the miracles demonstrated that Martin was a modern apostle, performing the exact deeds that Christ and his disciples had done nearly four hundred years earlier. The miracles located Martin on the Christian spectrum, placing him among the greatest of the Christians: Sulpicius wrote that after he had restored his

evolution. The central thesis is that these stages were translated from the "Hindu" tradition to the "Theosophical" tradition through multifaceted "hybridization processes" in which several Indian members of the Theosophical Society partook. Starting with Annie Besant's early Theosophy, the stages of initiation are traced through Blavatsky's work to Manilal Dvivedi and T. Subba Row, both Indian members of the Theosophical Society, and then on to the Sanâtana Dharma Text Books. In 1898, the English Theosophist Annie Besant and the Indian Theosophist Bhagavan Das together founded the Central Hindu College, Benares, which became the nucleus around which the Benares Hindu University was instituted in 1915. In this context the Sanâtana Dharma Text Books were published. Mühlematter shows that the stages of initiation were the blueprint for Annie Besant's pedagogy, which she implemented in the Central Hindu College in Benares. In doing so, he succeeds in making intelligible how "esoteric" knowledge was transferred to public institutions and how a broader public could be reached as a result.

Oh, East is East, and West is West, and never the twain shall meet. (Rudyard Kipling, The Ballad of East and West, 1889)

The first two lines of Kipling's famous poem states the claim that "East" and "West" are mutually exclusive spheres, both as fixed cultures and as clearly distinguishable geographical spaces, unconnected and each in itself monolithic. However, the poem takes a rather different turn as it continues: "But there is neither East nor West, Border, nor Breed, nor Birth, When two strong men stand face to face, tho' they come from the ends of the earth?"' In the poem, Kamal, a local chieftain in what is today the border region of Pakistan, stands "face to face" with the son of a colonel in the British Army after Kamal steals the colonel's mare. The two figures here embody and illustrate the encounter between "East" and "West." At the end of the poem, the colonel's son regains his father's horse while Kamal, in turn, receives the son's pistol. The British soldier rides back to his fellows accompanied by Kamal's own son, whom Kamal has sent with the British soldier for his protection. The pair swear blood brotherhood to one another and ride off together towards the British fort. When they arrive at their destination, the colonel's son tells the other soldiers that his companion is one of them now. "Last night ye had struck at a Border thief — tonight 'tis a man of the Guides?"

The story of Kamal and the colonel's son provides a vivid image of what will be discussed in this book under the heading of "hybridization." Kamal endangers the British by taking away something that belongs to them. His appropriation of this piece of British identity is so threatening to the British colonel that he sends his own son after Kamal to retrieve what has been stolen. The chase leads deep into Kamal's territory, where he occupies a position of power. In the encounter, both sides are altered: Kamal acquires a British pistol, while the colonel's son rides back with Kamal's own son as a companion. The retrieval of the mare triggers a close interaction in a liminal space in which Kamal occupies a superior position and the life of the colonel's son (the British identity) is potentially endangered. In this liminal space, new relations are established between Kamal, his son, and the son of the colonel. Both sides impart something to the other that has the potential to alter each of them fundamentally. When Kamal's son enters the British fort at the end of their journey, he becomes "one of them," marking the end of the process which is now irreversible.

This image — and one should keep in mind that it remains only an image —illustrates how "exchange" processes between "East" and "West" are understood in the present book. The language of "exchange" is misleading when it comes to thinking about the conceptualization of "hybridization" as a metaprocess (Chapter 4.3), as I do in this book. The "metaprocess of hybridization" is understood as a complex of numerous multifaceted and interlocking processes in which "elements" and "structures" are "transferred, translated, repeated, and de- and recontextualized." In these processes, "original" and "copy" constitute each other by establishing new and altered relations. Being dependent on each other in such a way, it is impossible to distinguish an "original" or a "copy" as existing outside that relationship. Nevertheless, the theoretical approach advanced in this book can still be read as a conceptualization of "exchange" processes between "East" and "West." However, the approach developed here allows for the identification and management of an increased level of complexity and is therefore better suited to the identification of heterogeneity instead of homogeneity. Such an increased level of complexity and heterogeneity is better suited to give a balanced account of the discursive fields analyzed in this book. It is my intention to move away from essentialist and Eurocentric perspectives. This means that notions of "mutually

exclusive spheres, both as fixed cultures and as clearly distinguishable geographical spaces, unconnected and each in itself monolithic" become untenable. It is not to be claimed here that the theory used as a framework here, and an analysis such as I am conducting, can explain "everything," nor can it transcend or even erase power asymmetries. Nevertheless, it adds many new and altered perspectives on a phenomenon that has too long been perceived as purely "Western."

The primary goal of this book is to investigate the "hybridization processes" that arise from the encounters between Indian and Non-Indian Theosophists and Non-Theosophists, and to consider how these processes are reflected in the Sanatana Dharma Text Books, the textbooks of the Central Hindu College (see below). The main subjects of analysis here are the stages of initiation in the grand scheme of Theosophical evolution. These initiatory steps are connected to an idea of evolutionary self-development by means of a set of virtues that are relative to the individual's position on the path of evolution. The central thesis is that these stages were translated from the "Hindu" tradition to the "Theosophical" tradition through multifaceted "hybridization processes" in which several Indian members of the Theosophical Society partook. These processes cannot be understood as following a simple linear genealogy but, rather, need to be seen in terms of metaprocesses of meshing hybridizations in which different positions were negotiated. Starting with Annie Besant's early Theosophy, the stages of initiation will be traced through Blavatsky's work to Manilal Dvivedi and T. Subba Row, both Indian members of the Theosophical Society, and then on to the Sanatana Dharma Text Books.

The Theosophical Society

In 1898, the English Theosophist Annie Besant (1847-1933) and the Indian Theosophist Bhagavan Das (1869-1958) together founded the Central Hindu College, Benares, which became the nucleus around which the Benares Hindu University was instituted in 1915. In this context, three textbooks, two story books, and a monthly magazine were published. These were part of a geographically widespread Theosophical educational system that encompassed hundreds, if not thousands, of schools. The Theosophical Society was undeniably the most important institutional structure to emerge from the

field of occult currents in the 19th century. It was founded by Helena Petrovna Blavatsky (1831-1891), Henry Steel Olcott (1832-1907), and others in 1875 in New York!' Annie Besant joined the Theosophical Society fourteen years later, in 1889. The Society's headquarters moved to Adyar, a suburb of Madras, today Chennai, in 1883 where it still remains. The Theosophical Society opened numerous branches around the world, some of which are still active, especially in Britain, the U.S., India, Australia, and the Philippines. The history of the Theosophical Society is complicated, with a number of schisms leading to the creation of numerous branching divisions. In the following, I will mainly be concerned with Adyar Theosophy and it is to this branch that I refer whenever I use the term "Theosophy." However, this distinction only becomes meaningful after 1895, when the American branch, under William Quan Judge (1851-1896), seceded from Adyar Theosophy. These topics have received little scholarly attention, and, in general, the Theosophical Society in both its historical and its contemporary forms remains severely under-researched.

This book contributes to a profound conceptualization of initiation into higher knowledge in the Theosophical Society and its sociocultural consequences. In doing so, it succeeds in making understandable how "esoteric" knowledge was transferred into public institutions and how a wider public could be reached as a result. In contrast to older research that focused on "Western" Theosophists, I contextualize this central finding in such a way that I am able to sketch a broadly spun field of discourse in which Indian Theosophists were significantly involved in the conception of the "stages of initiation." Thus, the "stages of initiation" cannot simply be described as "Western" or "Eastern," but are to be understood as the result of diverse, interlocking processes of hybridization.

In Chapter 1 of the book, the main topics are introduced, along with an overview of each of the subsequent chapters. Chapter 2 discusses the current state of research, in which a homogenizing and Eurocentric tendency is identified. In Chapter 3, I elaborate the theoretical foundation for my analytical tool by discussing "postcolonialism," "hybridity," and the global history approach. In Chapter 4, the analytical tool itself is developed.

In Chapter 5, a "field of encounters" is presented in which Indian and non-Indian Theosophists and non-Theosophists came into contact with each other. I argue that these encounters initiated numerous "hybridization processes." In Chapter 6, "evolutionism" is discussed. The stages of initiation in the Theosophical Society were embedded in a scheme of evolution in which several discursive fields were connected, including European evolutionism, the reception of that evolutionism in India, and Indian concepts that had the conceptual vocabulary of "evolutionism" retrospectively applied to them.

Chapter 7 discusses a central motif of the Theosophical narrative, the mas-ter/disciple relationships that are a precondition for initiation in the Theosophical Society. These relationships structure the Theosophical dissemination of occult knowledge as well as providing support for claims of authority and securing lines of succession. The "Quickening of Evolution" can be understood as a reaction to the "Master Paradox." This is a crucial context for an understanding of the discursive dynamics within the Theosophical Society.

Chapter 8 draws on this discussion to elaborate on the idea of the "Quickening of Evolution" and on the stages of initiation that formed the core of this concept in Annie Besant's early Theosophy. This early phase extends to the beginning of the 20th century, and I take it that its terminus ante quem is marked by the publication of the Sanâtana Dharma Text Books in 1902 and 1903, to which Besant contributed.

Chapter 9 presents a close reading of Blavatsky's The Voice of the Silence. As a book of initiation, it communicates the idea of the acceleration of evolution that is spurred on by the passing of the individual through stages of initiation. In this respect, Blavatsky's work was pivotal for Annie Besant because it served as her own "book of initiation," the reading of which allegedly led to contact with the Theosophical masters. Chapter 10 discusses the uptake of "Hinduism" in the Theosophical Society, mapping out a discursive field in which Indian members and non-members of the Society were the experts on this topic. It describes the reception of Advaita Vedanta in the Theosophical Society and its equation with "occult" wisdom, and the process by which non-Indian

Theosophists gradually also came to claim expertise on "Hinduism" just as they presented themselves as the expert on the "occult" wisdom.

Chapters 11 and 12 discuss the writings of two eminent Indian-Theosophists, Manilal Dvivedi and T. Subba Row. Dvivedi's work was crucial for the conceptualization of the stages of initiation in the Theosophical Society, which was based on his understanding of raja yoga and Advaita Vedanta. He was not only one of the distinguished experts on "Hinduism" in the Theosophical Society but also a recognized expert within European academia. His work is a paradigmatic example of the connection of numerous discursive fields in the global colonial discursive continuum. Row was the expert on "Hinduism," and on the Bhagavad-Gita in particular, in the Theosophical Society between 1880 and 1890. Chapter 12 documents his ideas on "Hinduism" as theistic bhakti Advaita Vedanta. This approach was closely linked to later developments in the Theosophical Society and to the development of ideas of evolution towards divinity.

Finally, Chapter 13 discusses the Sanatana Dharma Text Books with a special focus on the "Ethical Science" elaborated therein. It illustrates how the stages of initiation were adopted both in and beyond the educational establishments of the Theosophical Society as the foundations for ethical education. <>

METANOIA: THE SHAPE OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE by Brother John OF TAIZE [CASCADE BOOKS, ISBN 9781725297968]

How can one live an authentically Christian life? Although many books and articles delineate the content of the Gospel message, the form or shape of an existence based on faith has not been studied as thoroughly. To use a language correctly, it is not enough to know the vocabulary; one must have a good grasp of its grammar. This book attempts to deepen our knowledge of the grammar of the Christian life starting from the notion of metanoia. Generally translated as "repentance" or "conversion," the word has in fact a much richer significance: it describes a total reorientation and transformation of our being, never accomplished once and for all, through the action of the Spirit of the risen Christ. Metanoia takes us out of our self-centered outlook and our limited and self-interested

actions and brings us into God's today, where we become witnesses to a real Presence, that of the universal Body of Christ.

For centuries now, an uninterrupted flow of books, articles, and sermons has attempted to explain the characteristics of the life led by the disciples of Jesus Christ. Some authors begin by examining the figure of Jesus that we find in the four Gospels, for very early on Christians understood their own existence as an imitatio Christi. Others attempt to take a more systematic tack, basing their investigation on a particular passage such as the Beatitudes (Matt 5:1–11), the entire Sermon on the Mount (Matt 5–7), or the "fruits of the Spirit" listed by Saint Paul (see Gal 5:22). But almost all of these essays, which often contain excellent intuitions for those who wish to lead a life according to the gospel, concentrate mainly on the substance of Christian living. They

attempt to provide an answer to the question: "What are the values or character traits that determine an existence in the steps of Christ?"

This line of research, while valuable in itself, often omits another reflection which is equally essential. This other line of questioning focuses, not on the content of the life of faith, but on its form or shape. Expressed differently, it does not deal with the vocabulary of that life but with its grammar. And just as when we attempt to learn a language, these two dimensions reinforce each other. In order to speak or write a language, we have to know both the meaning of the words and the rules that enable us to assemble them correctly. If we neglect the grammar, even using the right words can lead to misunderstandings.

In these pages, then, I wish to concentrate on what can be called the grammar of the Christian life, essential if the life of believers is to be conformed to that of their Master and mirror a faithful image of it. Otherwise, even the most impressive Christian virtues run the risk of being integrated into a whole that does not awaken us to the breathtaking Newness of God, but merely adds an attractive icing to the cake of a life already well-structured in human terms.

The thesis of this book is that the shape of a life of faith, its basic grammar, can be summed up in a Greek word that we find at the beginning of the Gospel of Jesus Christ—the term metanoia, or more exactly the verb metanoeõ. This notion, however, has to be shorn of many of the extraneous meanings that have adhered to it in the course of centuries and veiled its authentic import. We are perhaps in a position today, more than ever before, of accomplishing this enterprise successfully.

If I may be allowed a personal note here, in writing this work I was all at once struck by the fact that I am carrying forward a topic that has fascinated me from early on. My first publications, written some thirty years ago, were an investigation into the life of faith as a pilgrimage, as a journey in the steps of the pilgrim God. In Jesus, this road enters fully into human history, since it becomes one with a human existence. Other books that followed, on newness or holiness, described the tone or color of this life more than its content. And recently, a long reflection on Holy Saturday as the day that sums up the Christian life in this world attempted to indicate the basic structure of an existence

poised between death and life. In the following pages, then, by taking up this leitmotiv once again, I hope to carry it further and deepen our understanding of the specificity and the uniqueness of being a believer at the heart of a world more and more in search of its identity, in which the old answers increasingly fail to convince. <>

OPENING THE TREASURE OF THE SCRIPTURES: SOME BIBLICAL CRUMBS by Brother Richard of Taizé [Cascade Books, ISBN 9781666754971]

From the inexhaustible treasure which is the Bible, here are a few crumbs. They represent an attempt at serious exegesis and theological reflection as well as a desire to understand not only the Bible, but also our own time and our world. It was the Risen Christ, on the road to Emmaus, who first ""opened the Scriptures"" to his fellow travelers (Luke 24:32). It is as his disciples and in his steps that we can draw from that treasure ""things both new and old"" (see Matt 13:52).

Biblical Books Quoted
Preface
"How Pleasant It Is to Live Together in Unity": Fraternity in the Bible
Does the Holy Spirit Breathe through the Cracks and the Gaps Left by Varying Translations?
Is Mercy Dangerous and Unjust?
The Little Ones in the Gospel According to Matthew
The Precious Pearl
Judas, "One of the Twelve"
Joy as Source of Forgiveness
The Message of the Cross, Source of Fellowship
Protesting for Communion
Contours of the Church According to the Acts of the Apostles
Resourcing and Mission
"Do Not Quench the Spirit!"
Origin of the Texts

From the inexhaustible treasure, which is the Bible, here are a few crumbs. They represent an attempt at serious exegesis and theological reflection as well as a desire to understand not only the Bible, but also our own time and our world. It was the risen Christ, on the road to Emmaus, who first "opened the Scriptures" to his fellow travelers

(Luke 24:32). It is as his disciples and in his steps that we can draw from that treasure "things both new and old" (see Matt 13:52).

Except for the study on fraternity, these texts were first written for other occasions and then revised, translated, or augmented for this publication. The twelve chapters can be read separately, but they also form a whole: not as a systematic presentation, but as a kind of introduction in crumbs to Christian life and thought. The book delves into biblical themes such as fraternity, justice and mercy, joy and forgiveness, perplexity and enthusiasm, the reign of God in the church and in the world—with the hope that the insights obtained bring to light the contours of the faith as a whole. What it proposes is not so much conclusions as suggestions for further reflection. It is incomplete and fragmentary, but it attests to the experience described in Peter's second epistle: as readers patiently study the ancient Scriptures, "the day dawns and the morning star rises" (2 Pet 1:19) in their hearts.

This book grew in the soil of Taizé; it would not have seen the light of day without the mercy of God and the community of my brothers which I requested, according to our custom, on the day of my lifelong commitment. So it should come as no surprise if the breath of biblical inspiration is mixed with a little of the air of Taizé, sometimes imperceptibly and sometimes by explicit references to the life of the community and to the meetings of young people there. <>

THE JOURNALS OF BROTHER ROGER OF TAIZÉ: VOLUME 1: 1941–1968 by Brother Roger of Taizé [Cascade Books, ISBN 9781725297937]

When the definitive history of Christianity in the twentieth century is written, one of the key figures will certainly be that of Roger Schutz-Marsauche (1915–2005), known as Brother Roger, the founder and first prior of the Taizé Community in France. Taizé is familiar to many across the world for its music and contemplative style of worship, and as a place where tens of thousands of young Christians flock each year to spend a time of prayer and reflection. What is less well-known is the underlying reality that makes all this possible: a monastic community of brothers from over twenty-five different countries and different Christian traditions striving to live as a "parable of community," a sign of unity in the midst of divided Christians and a world torn apart.

This first volume of Brother Roger's journals covers the years from his arrival in Taizé during World War II to the turbulent 1960s, when young adults began making their way to the hill of Taizé in their searching. These collected insights, reflections, and accounts of personal encounters and current events offer what is perhaps the best portrait of the founder of Taizé. They bring to light key aspects of the community which continues to attempt to put into practice the vision that inspired him.

Reviews

"I knew Brother Roger personally for a long time, and I had a relationship of warm friendship with him. He had often visited me, and, as I said in Rome, the day of his death I had received a letter from him that went directly to my heart. . . . I think that we should listen to him, listen from within to the ecumenism that he lived out spiritually, and allow ourselves to he led by his witness towards an ecumenism that is truly inward and spiritual." —POPE BENEDICT XVI

"Very few people in a generation manage to change the whole climate of a religious culture; but Brother Roger did just this. . . . He changed the image of Christianity itself for countless young people. . . . His authority was authentically monastic—the authority of a father and elder brother in God who drew his vision from patient waiting on the Lord in prayer, and from the work and study and discernment of a committed community." —ROWAN WILLIAMS, Former Archbishop of Canterbury

"The vision of peace and reconciliation in 'God's today' which guided Brother Roger's commitment and that of the community he founded has been a source of inspiration and spiritual renewal for generations of young people, in Europe and throughout the world. Under his spiritual leadership, the Taizé Community has offered a model of how the praise of God is integrally linked to solidarity with the least fortunate. For many of us, Brother Roger incarnated the hope that the Christian faith can bring to the world." —GENEVIÈVE JACQUES, Former Secretary General, World Council of Churches, Switzerland

"Brother Roger was known throughout the whole world. Man of inspired words, man of prayer, zealous worker in the fields of Christ—his untiring search to establish relationships of peace and love among Christians and his commitment to transmitting the Christian ideal to the youth of Europe earned him universal respect." —ALEXY II (1929–2008), First Patriarch of Moscow and All Russia in the post-Soviet period

"When I came in mission to Estonia after the terrible years of communism, I understood what Brother Roger meant by the 'power of the provisional,' which leaves all the room to God and God alone. I shall ever be grateful to him for that. . . . He was called Roger and his name, everywhere it was pronounced, sang the consoling tenderness and freshness of God for all who were in pain and suffering." —METROPOLITAN STEPHANOS OF TALLIN, Primate of the Orthodox Church of Estonia

"Brother Roger came twice to Dresden for a prayer with young people and he stayed at my home. The Kreuzkirche was filled to overflowing, and other churches too. It was a profound moment of hope for many young people, right in the midst of the era of the German Democratic Republic. His spiritual openness to the will of God and God's commandments also remains unforgettable. . . . What a life in the footsteps of Christ!" —JOHANNES HEMPEL (1929–2020), Lutheran Bishop of Dresden during the time of Communism "Brother Roger was a good friend and brother to our Mother, Mother Teresa; to our late Holy Father, Pope John Paul II; to the young; and to all regardless of religion, race, nationality, or social status. He has left behind thousands of friends on earth and will surely be welcomed by a host of friends in heaven." —SISTER M. NIRMALA (1924–2015), Successor to Mother Teresa as Superior General, Missionaries of Charity, Kolkata, India

"For me, Brother Roger was one of the spiritual pillars of Europe in its movement towards unity." —VACLAV HAVEL (1936–2011), Former President of the Czech Republic

"Following the finest traditions of the faith that sustained him, Brother Roger consecrated his life to the service of peace, dialogue, and reconciliation. He became the untiring advocate of the values of respect, of tolerance, and of solidarity, in particular toward the young. His message of hope and of trust will remain a source of inspiration for all." —KOFI ANNAN (1938–2018), Former Secretary General of the United Nations

For many people in the English-speaking world, the name "Taizé" evokes a kind of short repetitive chant used in the context of a meditative worship service, or perhaps even more the style of prayer in which such chants are employed. Others know Taizé as a place in rural France where tens of thousands of young Christians flock each year to spend a week of prayer and reflection in the context of a community life.

What is not always understood, however, is the underlying reality that makes possible both the worship and the gatherings of young people. A tiny village in eastern France, since 1940 Taizé has been the site of an ecumenical community of brothers rooted in the monastic tradition. Today it is made up of around a hundred brothers, from over 25 different countries and from different Christian traditions, Reformed, Lutheran, Anglican, and Catholic, who commit themselves for life to an existence made up of common prayer, work to earn their living, and hospitality. They strive to live as a "parable of community," a sign of unity in the midst of divided Christians.

The Taizé Community began thanks to one man, known as Brother Roger, born on May 12, 1915 in French-speaking Switzerland. His father, Charles Schutz, was a pastor in the Swiss Reformed Church, and his mother, Amélie Marsauche, came from a family whose roots were in France. The youngest of nine children, seven girls and two boys, Roger felt called to be a writer from an early age. Following his return to the faith after an adolescent religious crisis and a long bout with tuberculosis that brought him close to death, he decided to study theology, more in accordance with his father's wishes than out of a desire to become the pastor of a congregation.

As a young man, Roger was deeply concerned about the growing individualism in society that was leaving its mark on the church as well. In addition, he was convinced that transmitting the message of Jesus Christ by words alone was not enough. Although in Europe everyone by now was familiar with the figure of Jesus and his teaching, this knowledge seemingly no longer had the power to move mountains. What was needed, according to Roger, were concrete signs that would manifest the truth and beauty of the gospel. This led him to examine the age-old tradition of intentional community life in the Christian church and its possible relevance for our time.

When the Second World War broke out and the north of France was occupied by the Nazi armies, Roger felt called to leave neutral Switzerland and settle in France. He wanted to be close to the victims of the war, as well as continuing to reflect on the creation of a community. In August 1940 he found an abandoned house for sale in the small, isolated hamlet of Taizé, in Burgundy, and purchased it. After the war, Taizé became the home of the community which Brother Roger founded and of which he

served as prior until his tragic death on August 16, 2005 at the hand of a demented person, during evening prayer in the church.

Throughout his life, the founder of Taizé was in the habit of jotting down thoughts and reflecting on daily events in notebooks used for that purpose or, especially in his later years, on small bits of paper. These writings helped him to reflect on essential aspects of his existence; they were part of an attempt to forge what he called "the unity of the personality." This unity, however, was never just an individualistic endeavor for him. As a Christian, Brother Roger felt it was essential to discover the salient traits of the age in which he lived, in order to discover how to be present in the contemporary world as a follower of Christ. Moreover, it was often through personal encounters that he was able better to understand his own identity and the society around him.

This book contains the journals of Brother Roger. In some cases they are fragmentary in nature, often because the originals were lost or destroyed. Beginning in 1972, however, Brother Roger began publishing his diaries, interspersed with short meditations. Six volumes saw the light of day, covering the years from 1969 to 1981. These collected insights, reflections and accounts of personal encounters and current events offer what is perhaps the best portrait of the founder of Taizé. Moreover, they bring to light key aspects of the community that continues to attempt to put into practice the vision that inspired him. <>

THE JOURNALS OF BROTHER ROGER OF TAIZÉ: VOLUME II: 1969–1972 by Brother Roger of Taizé [Cascade Books, ISBN 9781666761221]

This is the second volume of the personal journals of Roger Schutz-Marsauche (1915–2005), known as Brother Roger, the founder and first prior of the Taizé Community in France, an ecumenical monastic community that strives to live as a "parable of community" in a divided world. Taizé is known especially for its music and contemplative style of worship, and as a place where tens of thousands of young Christians flock each year to spend a time of prayer and reflection.

This volume covers the years from 1969 to 1972 and is centered on the genesis and first preparations of a "Council of Youth." The project was inspired by the crisis in the Catholic Church in the wake of the

Second Vatican Council, and the slowdown of ecumenism after the glowing hopes kindled in the wake of the Council. It was an attempt to take seriously the aspirations of the younger generation and orient them in a positive direction. Brother Roger also talks in these pages about the ongoing life of the community, his personal spiritual journey, and many important encounters that took place in those eventful years.

This book is the second in a series of volumes presenting the journals of Brother Roger, the founder of the Taizé Community in eastern France, an ecumenical community of brothers rooted in the monastic tradition. Today it numbers over eighty brothers, from over twenty-five different countries and from different Christian traditions, Reformed, Lutheran, Anglican and Catholic, who commit themselves for life to an existence made up of common prayer, work, and hospitality. Each year, tens of thousands of young and not-so-young seekers come to Taizé to spend a week of prayer and reflection in the context of a community life.

Brother Roger was born on May 12, 1915 in French-speaking Switzerland. His father, Charles Schutz, was a pastor in the Swiss Reformed Church, and his mother, Amélie Marsauche, came from a family whose roots were in France. Following his return to the faith after an adolescent religious crisis and a long bout with tuberculosis, he decided to study theology. Convinced that people needed living signs of the gospel to complement the proclamation of the Christian message, he became interested in what today are known as intentional communities.

When the Second World War broke out and the north of France was occupied by the Nazi armies, Roger felt called to leave neutral Switzerland and settle in France. He wanted to be close to the victims of the war, as well as continuing to reflect on the possible creation of a community. In August 1940 he found an abandoned house for

sale in the small, isolated hamlet of Taizé, in Burgundy, and purchased it. After the war, Taizé became the home of the community which Brother Roger founded and of which he served as prior until his tragic death on August 16, 2005 at the hand of a demented person, during evening prayer in the church.

Throughout his life, the founder of Taizé was in the habit of jotting down thoughts and reflecting on daily events in notebooks used for that purpose or on small bits of paper. Beginning in 1972, Brother Roger began publishing his diaries. The entries contained in this volume come from two books, Que ta fête soit sans fin (Festival without End), published in 1971, and Lutte et contemplation (Struggle and Contemplation), published in 1973. Since these texts were selected and sometimes written with a view to publication, they present a more continuous and accessible picture of the personal reflections of the founder of Taizé and the life of the community than the first volume, while still maintaining the freshness of a day-to-day contemplation of persons and events. <>

PLATO'S MORAL REALISM by Lloyd P. Gerson [Cambridge University Press, ISBN 9781009329989]

Demonstrates that Plato's ethics rests upon a metaphysical foundation, the Idea of the Good, the first principle of all.

Plato's moral realism rests on the Idea of the Good, the unhypothetical first principle of all. It is this, as Plato says, that makes just things useful and beneficial. That Plato makes the first principle of all the Idea of the Good sets his approach apart from that of virtually every other philosopher. This fact has been occluded by later Christian Platonists who tried to identify the Good with the God of scripture. But for Plato, theology, though important, is subordinate to metaphysics. For this reason, ethics is independent of theology and attached to metaphysics. This book challenges many contemporary accounts of Plato's ethics that start with the so-called Socratic paradoxes and attempt to construct a psychology of action or moral psychology that makes these paradoxes defensible. Rather, Lloyd Gerson argues that Plato at least never thought that moral realism was defensible outside of a metaphysical framework.

Platonism and Moral Realism

The Metaphysical Foundation of Ethics

Plato tells us in Republic that the Idea of the Good is the "unhypothetical first principle of all." He also says that it is the Good that makes just things and other useful things actually become useful or beneficial. Further, he says that the knowledge of this Good is the means to human happiness and the explanation for everything right and beautiful. Finally, he says that no one can act wisely, either in private or in public, without seeing the Good. It seems reasonable to suggest that an innocent or unbiased perusal of these passages and many others should lead one to conclude that a study of Plato's ethics ought to try to take account of the Idea of the Good. Of course, "good" is a key term used in all accounts of Plato's ethics. But the Idea of the Good is manifestly more than a word or a concept; it is, as Plato says, both the starting-point of everything and the goal at which everything aims. And in calling it "the Idea of the Good," he is saying more than that there is a first principle of all, something too remote or unattainable to bother with when trying to understand how to live or how to interact with other human beings. Rather, in calling the first principle of all "the Idea of the Good," Plato seems clearly to be setting his ethics within a radically original metaphysical framework.

Anyone who finds this claim obvious should be astonished, or at least deeply puzzled, to discover that most contemporary scholarship on Plato's ethics studiously avoids any suggestion that Plato believes that there is a metaphysical foundation for his ethics. This is a charge that is all too easy to substantiate, and I shall do so in the following

pages. But for the moment, I simply want to point out the apparent discordance between the presence of a metaphysical principle found in Republic and named "the Idea of the Good" and an approach to Plato's ethics that eschews or ignores any appeal to metaphysics altogether.

There are at least three possible explanations for this discordance. First, Aristotle presents us with a perspicuous example of how ethics can be detached from metaphysics, namely, the distinction between practical and theoretical science. The principles of the former are distinct from those of the latter, even if the latter science in some sense embraces the former owing to its complete generality. It is no doubt tempting to retroject Aristotle's definitional clarity into an account of Plato's ethics, particularly if Plato's metaphysics is thought to be obscure or bizarrely implausible.

This explanation leads us to the second. How in the world can a superordinate Good, that which is "beyond essence have any relevance whatsoever to the existential dilemmas and urgent real-life problems that we find so marvelously canvassed in, say, Gorgias and Protagoras and, indeed, even in Republic itself? Is it not precisely because the Idea of the Good is not or does not itself have an essence that it is irrelevant to answering the deep personal questions that Socrates and his interlocutors are habitually wrestling with? So, the second explanation for the absence of attention to the Idea of the Good in studies of Plato's ethics is found in the difficulty — many would say impossibility —of integrating the Idea of the Good into an account of Plato's ethics, including or even especially what he has to say about what is good (and bad or evil) in human life and human action.

A third reason for the diffidence of most scholars to Plato's metaphysics when discussing his ethics rests upon an assumption that the core of Plato's ethics is, in fact, Socratic, and that Socratic ethics is rather clearly innocent of all metaphysical doctrine. Unquestionably, the work of Gregory Vlastos has had a major impact in this regard in the latter half of the twentieth century." The followers of Vlastos are divided according to whether they see Plato as adding nothing worthwhile to Socratic ethics and those who see him as adding quite a bit, but nothing of a metaphysical import!' My own view is diametrically opposed to that of Vlastos and others. There is no distinctive Socratic

philosophy in the dialogues and Plato's metaphysics underlies everything he says about ethics even in the so-called early dialogues." In the fourth chapter, I shall present the case for rejecting any meaningful distinction between "Socratic" ethics and Platonic ethics and for maintaining that the identical metaphysical principles underlie both.

My aim in the present work is to try to situate Plato's ethics firmly within the metaphysical framework seemingly demanded by the text. But as I shall also try to show, there are multiple indications in the text that the Idea of the Good is not, as it were, an utterly contentless or merely formal principle of normativity. There is, in fact, quite a lot that can be said about the Good that illuminates and supports the ethical claims made in the dialogues. Indeed, without the integration of the first principle of all into the ethics, the claims that are made in the dialogues are, as I shall argue, plainly unsupportable. That is, they amount to nothing more than rhetoric, prejudice, and pious hope. Plato believes that these claims are supportable because he never considered ethics as autonomous. This is in sharp contrast to most modern scholars, who take these claims to be possibly supportable only if they are autonomous, that is, detached from metaphysics. I shall not here contend that a deracinated Platonic ethics has no attractions. Obviously, what has come to be called by some Plato scholars "prudentialism" is not a crazy position to defend." Old saws like "always keep your promises," "better safe than sorry," "look before you leap," "virtue is its own reward," and "waste not, want not" are old saws for a perfectly understandable reason. They are sound guides to action, especially for those who need practical heuristics. But the prudentialism that generates these saws could never attain to the exceptionless or unconditional universality of ethics as articulated by Plato. For Plato, just as there is a metaphysical basis for the exceptionless universality of mathematics, so, too, is there one for ethics.

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Aristotle made a sharp distinction between the practical sciences and the theoretical sciences, with ethics belonging to the former and metaphysics belonging to the latter. The end of a practical science is action; the end of a theoretical science is truth. Of course, the knowledge sought in theoretical science is not irrelevant to action. Still,

knowledge in metaphysics or mathematics or physics does not belong to the starting points or principles of a science of action. By contrast, for Plato ethics is inseparable from metaphysics because the fundamental principles of ethics are metaphysical principles. The Platonic position, however, is more radical than an insistence on rooting ethics in fundamental truths about the world. Plato agrees with Aristotle that ethics is about action and so about particulars. But all particulars belong to the sensible world and as such they are merely images of eternal reality. So, it is not just the case that ethical claims must be deduced from metaphysical truths, but that nothing about the sensible world, including human action and norms, can be grasped or explained unless the images are accurately represented as such.

Plato's moral realism is both breathtakingly ambitious in its scope and, at the same time, surprisingly modest in its defensible conclusions. To maintain that there is an absolutely simple first principle of all that is both metaphysical and axiological is to be committed to extreme systematic unity. Yet for this very reason, the steps from "the Good is universally one and the same everywhere" to "the Good is manifested here and now in this specific action of mine" are perilous, to say the least. It is not, I think, inapposite to combine an insistence on the reality of the metaphysical-cum-axiological first principle with a relatively high degree of skepticism in regard to the beneficial effects of one's behavior, especially with regard to other people. This claim does not amount to a counsel of inaction. As Socrates would no doubt point out, often to refrain from acting is perforce to act. To be guided by the principle that one's own good cannot be purchased at the expense of another, to reflect continually on whether one's self-love is so "excessive" as to constitute a violation of this principle, and to adhere to the trifold criteria of integrative unity consisting in beauty, truth, and symmetry, seems to describe a robust moral realism without grandiose illusions about one's success at casuistry. The philosopher is, according to Plato, better off than everyone else insofar as he knows or even just believes that the sensible world is only an image of the intelligible world, and that morality is embedded in metaphysics. But he is no miracle worker, since he is embodied and living in the sensible world. His incapacities multiply exponentially the more widely he casts his net in practical affairs.

The principal feature of the sensible world that is relevant to Plato's moral realism is that human beings, though they desire the Good and manifestations of it are, owing to embodiment, destined to act to achieve what appears to them to be good. They do this always with the hope and even expectation that what appears to them to be good is in fact so, though there is no necessity of this. The principal attraction of the acquisition of virtue is that the virtuous person can forge a more reliable connection between what appears to her to be good and what is in fact so.

Plato uses the word "good" in a popular sense and also in a technical sense. According to the popular sense, it is evident to all that there are many human goods, that is, many things or states that human beings typically aim to obtain. According to the technical sense, the superordinate Idea of the Good is the source of the real goodness in anything properly so called. To deny that physical health or pleasure or friendship or thinking or virtue are goods in the popular sense would be to put oneself outside the scope of normal rational discourse, and not in a good way. Nevertheless, we are not truly human beings and the Good we desire is not the goods or aims of human beings. It is always open at any critical juncture in life to question whether one or more of the goods that human beings typically pursue are in fact manifestations of the Good that we all will. It is also open to question whether among the human goods one or another prioritization of these will actually achieve the Good. It is not too much of an exaggeration to say that Plato's moral realism is focused on strategies for bringing popular goods in line with real manifestations of the Good in the technical sense.

The contrast between apparent goods and real goods is not identical to the contrast between human goods and manifestations of the Idea of the Good. For one thing, while apparent goods are in fact really good when we are referring to the appearances of a virtuous person, human goods are always defeasible as manifestations of the Good. As Plato has Socrates say, wisdom turns human goods into manifestations of the Good. A human good such as pleasure does not stop being a human good for a virtuous person to whom it appears that some pleasures are bad.

The distinction between veridical and nonveridical appearance turns up dramatically throughout the dialogues, especially among Socrates' interlocutors who, conceding that

they will the Good, identify their pursuit of manifestations of it in ways that betray their misunderstanding of the imagistic nature of the sensible world. For example, Socrates' multifaceted argument against Callicles to the effect that pleasure is not the Good is not intended to deny that pleasure is good. It is intended to show the mistake in thinking that pleasure is the Good because it is pleasure, and so obviously desirable or a good. The closer one gets to realizing that the way to instantiate the Good is not to identify it with the material out of which instantiations are formed, the closer one gets to a healthy assessment of images of the real and our interaction with them. So, a human good like pleasure may appear veridically or nonveridically to manifest the Good. The former, like the true pleasures in Philebus, are true even though they are images of disembodied cognitive states. The latter, like the false pleasures of anticipation in Philebus, are false, not because they are not pleasures, but because they nonveridically appear to manifest the Good.

The putative metaphysical foundation of moral realism for Plato, the Idea of the Good, is saved from irrelevance by its identification with the One such that integrative unity according to kind is an index of our attainment of the Good. The One is not, as we have repeatedly seen, the number one or a unity. It is a principle of measure and, therefore, a principle of number, which is only one type of measure. It is a principle the manifestations of which are necessarily complex unities. Anything other than the first principle of all is complex. Anything that is complex has a unity of some sort; otherwise, it would not be one complex, but many complexes, which themselves would have to be unities, too. Integrative unity according to kind is the ideal unity for anything. It represents the achievement or fulfillment of the nature or kind that is an endowment. Ideal and nonideal types of integration are precisely gradable according to proximity to the Good that everything seeks. Perfect or absolute integration is not possible for that which is complex. "Union" with the Good is a misconceived idea. Nevertheless, a watershed in the process of achieving integrative unity is separation from the body, which is a permanent source of disunity. Psychical separation involves the identification of the self with the subject of thinking. Physical separation at death presumably leaves the achieved self, whether ideal or not, to its own fate.

Within this framework, it is easy to see the importance of gradations of virtue. There are indefinitely many ways of achieving unity in a life, even if there is only one way of achieving the ideal. Plato's taxonomy of poleis and of individual souls is only the barest sketch of the major possibilities indexed to the tripartite soul. But within that general schema, every personal narrative — especially in retrospect — will present a unique version.

For Plato, the resources of ancient Greek high culture are adequate for bringing about popular or political virtue in individuals and the polis. But it is philosophy, and philosophy alone, that is able to advance integrative unity both in the individual and the state and to the achievement of the ideal. Many misunderstandings of Plato's moral realism, as I have tried to show throughout this book, arise from not taking sufficiently seriously the distinction between the two principal grades of virtue. Popular or political virtue is virtue just as false pleasure is pleasure. But the integrative unity that it achieves is unstable and unreliable. Socrates' ringing declaration in Apology that the unexamined life is not livable for a human being is but a gesture in the direction of the articulated and exhaustive philosophical educational program in Republic. Again in Apology, the valorization of "soul-care" does not rise much above the level of a banal slogan until it is clear that the soul is the self, and that this self has taken on the travails of embodiment and so lost its way. When these truths are clear, philosophy understood as transformative self-discovery comes into its own. At that point, one begins to see that the Good that we all desire is definitely not to be identified with any human good, even when it is manifested in one or another human good. The successful philosopher, who does not mistake the image for the real thing, is able to attain a healthier perspective on these human goods than is one who looks to one or another, or to all, as the locus of the Good. I take it that this is what Plato is getting at when in Book 9 of Republic he makes the astonishing claim that the philosopher will enjoy physical pleasure more than one who is addicted to it.

I have argued that the moral realism exposed in this book does not translate smoothly into a political context. The self-limiting rule never to attempt to achieve the good for oneself at the expense of anyone else is not, I believe, a rule that can legitimate the exercise of political power. It is difficult — for me at any rate — to conceive of any

form of state that does not have recourse to some form of utilitarianism in the imposition of its laws. But Plato's moral realism is unalterably opposed to utilitarianism. I suppose that there have been political regimes that were, broadly speaking, non-utilitarian. But they are one and all totalitarian, wherein not some but all are apt for sacrifice to some ideal or other. Plato himself evidently saw the problem of legitimacy for his ideal and quasi-ideal poleis. I do not think, however, he saw clearly enough that, while my knowledge is a firm basis for my actions, political legitimacy requires more, or from another perspective, less than this. Plato does indeed recognize the need to persuade citizens of a new polis of the desirability of its laws, institutions, and practices. But successful persuasion does not require knowledge, and some are not persuadable, even by those who, ex hypothesi, know.

I conclude with the following comparison from the dialogues and from Plato's central methodological strategy. In Parmenides, Plato sets up a radical dilemma: either nominalism or Platonism. And then he goes further. If you opt for nominalism, then you cannot even say legitimately that there are two things in the world since then each would be one and they would share "oneness" even though they are two. So, the only alternative to the radical and preposterous extreme nominalism that is Eleaticism is Platonism. With regard to Plato's moral realism, there is a similar dilemma: either a moral realism rooted in the superordinate Idea of the Good or there is no basis whatsoever for any universal propositional claims about good or bad, right or wrong. Plato supposed, I imagine, that if you recoil from the latter, sooner or later you will embrace the former. <>

PHILOSOPHY IN THE ISLAMIC WORLD: VOLUME 1: 8TH-10TH CENTURIES Editors: Ulrich Rudolph, Rotraud Hansberger, and Peter Adamson [Series: Handbook of Oriental Studies. Section 1 The Near and Middle East, Volume: 115/1, Brill, ISBN: 9789004323162]

Philosophy in the Islamic World is a comprehensive and unprecedented four-volume reference work devoted to the history of philosophy in the realms of Islam, from its

beginnings in the eighth century AD down to modern times. In the period covered by this first volume (eighth to tenth centuries), philosophy began to blossom thanks to the translation of Greek scientific works into Arabic and the emergence of autochthonous intellectual traditions within Islam. Both major and minor figures of the period are covered, giving details of biography and doctrine, as well as detailed lists and summaries of each author's works. This is the English version of the relevant volume of the Ueberweg, the most authoritative German reference work on the history of philosophy (Philosophie in der Islamischen Welt Band I: 8.–10. Jahrhundert., Basel: Schwabe, 2012).

Stages of the History of Research

When Friedrich Ueberweg wrote the chapter on 'Arabic philosophers of the Middle Ages' for his Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie (Ueberweg 1864 [*4: 49–62]), there was not much for him to go on in terms of previous work done in the field. This applies to primary texts, of which only a few had been printed, let alone translated into

European languages, and to secondary literature alike. Nevertheless the subject matter he was writing about was not new. Shortly before he began his work on the Grundriss, Arabic philosophy, which had not received much scholarly attention up to the middle of the 19th century (Daiber 1999 [*68: xvi–xx]), had begun to attract discussion. The reason was Ernest Renan's epochal work Averroès et l'averroïsme (Renan 1852 [*2]), which for the first time had directed attention to this subject, and at the same time had led to a certain image of philosophy in the Islamic world being spread universally amongst European scholars and interested readers.

Renan's study discussed Ibn Rušd's life and thought as well as the vast influence he exerted on many Jewish thinkers and the Latin Middle Ages. It led Renan to a series of ground-breaking results which not only moved Latin Averroism into the centre of interest, but attracted attention also to its Arabic-Islamic cultural context. Yet he undermined his own project of casting light on the Arabic tradition. His book contained a number of (prejudiced) verdicts which were able to exert all the more influence as they were brilliantly formulated, and pronounced with the apodeictic gesture of the expert. This included his convictions (1) that the Arabs, or rather the Semites in general, had no natural aptitude for philosophy; (2) that their historic 'task' had merely consisted in preserving Greek philosophy and transmitting it to the Latin Middle Ages; and (3) that only 'pure, classical' Greece had been able to create philosophy; this was also why philosophy had never been properly understood or further developed before the advent of the Renaissance, which was closely related to antiquity in spirit; by contrast, the Latin and especially the Arabic authors of the Middle Ages had merely 'imitated' it and passed it on (Renan 1852 [*2: VII– IX]; on all this, but in particular on the second point cf. also Renan 1883 [*5]).

Renan's judgements in many respects corresponded to certain expectations current in his day and age; apart from other ideological entanglements they reflected a certain aspect of the 'orientalism' that loomed large in Europe (not only) in the 19th century. One should furthermore grant that his study, despite arguing in a conventional way, also broached unexpected viewpoints which in fact called Renan's own stance into question. Thus we find buried in his book the proclamation that 'the true philosophical movement' of Islam was to be found in its theological schools (Renan 1852 [*2: 89]; cf.

von Kügelgen 1994 [*59: 102]). Nevertheless Renan limited scholarship even as he was stimulating it. His pointed rhetorical formulations were essential in the establishment of a one-sided perspective on the philosophy of the Islamic world as the f^ijrst paradigm of scholarly engagement with the field. According to him, the achievements of the 'Arabic philosophers' were confined to adopting the Greek heritage and passing it on to Latin Europe, leading naturally to the often-quoted conclusion that 'with Averroes' death in 1198, Arabic philosophy lost its last representative, and the Quran was to triumph over independent thought for at least six centuries' (Renan 1852 [*2: 2]).

The basic elements of this paradigm can be traced in numerous accounts published after the middle of the 19th century. To begin with, this applies to Salomon Munk's Mélanges de philosophie juive et arabe, which appeared only a few years after Averroès et l'averroïsme (Munk 1859 [*3]). Munk went far beyond Renan in his engagement with the subject matter, unlocking extensive new source material, and for the first time sketching detailed portraits of individual Jewish and Islamic authors. Nevertheless he, too, took it for granted that 'the last great philosophers flourished in the 12th century' (Munk 1859 [*3: 333]). Resorting to a thesis he had advanced earlier (Munk 1845 [*1: 512]), he suggested as an explanation that philosophy in the Orient had never managed to recover from the blow dealt to it by the fierce critique of al-Gazãlï (d. 505/1111; on him cf. vol. 2, § 3) (Munk 1859 [*3: 382; cf. 334]).

Ueberweg, who followed Munk's account in many points, arrived at a similar assessment. He, too, had 'Arabic philosophy' ending in the 12th century, again stating the very same reasons: in the East of the Islamic world, its demise was the result of al-Gazãlï's attacks; in the West, it was the outcome of Ibn Rušd's death and the subsequent Spanish Reconquista (Ueberweg 1864 [*4: 58–59]).

The same temporal boundaries can be found in numerous 19th century publications in the field of Islamic Studies, at times explicitly, at others mentioned only in passing. However, and this would prove to be of much greater importance for further developments, we also encounter it in the scholarly literature of the early 20th century – despite being, by then, based on much broader textual foundations. Again the year 1200 is on principle accepted as an endpoint. In the f^ijrst instance, this concerns Tjitze

de Boer's Geschichte der Philosophie im Islam (de Boer 1901 [*6]), which was widely read, in its German original as well as in an English translation (The History of Philosophy in Islam) released only two years later, in 1903. In the second instance, it applies to Max Horten's account of 'Syriac and Arabic philosophy' (Die syrische und arabische Philosophie), which was published in the eleventh edition of Ueberweg's Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie, revised by Bernhard Geyer (Horten 1927 [*11]).

Remarkably, though, it was not just Renan's pointed claim that lived on in these works, but also his doubts concerning it. This emerges in de Boer as well as in Horten: both clearly articulate their misgivings about the very scientif^ijc paradigm they follow. At some point, de Boer comments on it in the following words: 'That Gazali has annihilated philosophy in the East, for all time to come, is an assertion frequently repeated but wholly erroneous, and one which evidences neither historical knowledge nor understanding. Philosophy in the East has since his day numbered its teachers and students by hundreds and by thousands' (de Boer 1901 [*6: 150, Engl. transl. 169]). Horten expressed his doubts in an even more emphatic manner. Before taking up his work on the new edition of the Grundriss, he had published several studies on Islamic authors after al-Gazālï and Ibn Rušd, for instance on Fahr al-Dïn al-Rãzï (d. 607/1210), Na^ïr al-Dïn al-Füsï (d. 672/1274) (Horten 1910 [*7], 1912 [*8]) and Mullã Sadrã (d. 1050/1640) (Horten 1912 [*9], 1913 [*10]). This may have been the reason why he felt compelled to add the following declaration to his contribution to the Grundriss: 'It is a consequence of the tradition of this Grundriss (lit., 'outline'), that from among the vast abundance of philosophies, i.e. world views, only those are included that are dependent on the Greeks, and that became known to the Latin schoolmen – i.e. only the Greek strand, which to the Orient itself was and remained a foreign body, and as an entire system was rejected, even if its individual concepts were put to use as building blocks within originally Oriental systems. This means that the real essence, and the main component of Oriental philosophy is excluded from this account, while only a comparatively minor, marginal strand within this entire complex is given attention [...] Due to prejudice and lack of comprehension, the old Orientalist school had grown used to the phrase: "after al-Gazālï or after Averroes no philosophy can be found in

Islam." They had not the least idea that the true philosophy internal to Islam begins only after 1100!' (Horten 1927 [*11: 298]).

The persuasiveness of Horten's own ideas concerning the history of philosophy is not at issue here; his diffuse concepts and his sweeping comparisons were at any rate repeatedly criticized in scholarly literature (a summary is provided by Daiber 1999 [*68: xxiii–xxv]). What is important in the present context is simply that both he and de Boer early on expressed concerns regarding the prevalent labelling and periodization of philosophy in the Islamic world. Yet the uneasiness manifest in their remarks was to remain without consequence. As mentioned already, neither of the two authors ventured past the magical line apparently drawn by Ibn Rušd's death (if we disregard a brief section on Ibn Haldün [d. 808/1406] in de Boer 1901 [*6: 177–184, Engl. transl. 200–208]). Thus de Boer and Horten contributed to disseminating the paradigm they themselves had called into question, and to its treatment as a 'fait accompli'.

It was, therefore, not easy for alternative approaches to gain recognition. This f^ijrst afffected an interpretative model which had been developed in Egypt since the 1930s. An independent branch of research into the history of philosophy had established itself there, whose most important and influential representative was – alongside A^mad Amïn (d. 1954), Yüsuf Karam (d. 1959) and Ma^müd al-^u^ayrï (d. 1960) – Mu^^afã `Abd al-Rãziq (d. 1947). Following various preparatory studies, he drew up a new conspectus of philosophy within Islamic culture, which he laid out in a widely read study entitled Prolegomena to a History of Islamic Philosophy (Tamhïd li-ta ^rï^ al-falsafa al-islãmiyya) (`Abd al-Rãziq 1944 [*13]).

At the core of this account stood the thesis that the concept of philosophy ought to be understood diffferently in the Islamic world and in Europe: in the Islamic context, it could not be reduced to the tradition that followed Greek role models, but would have to include all forms of reflection that were in any way responsible for laying the foundations of Islamic religion and culture. As a central point in this context, `Abd al-Rãziq considered Islamic law. It had its theoretical foundation in the science of 'principles of law' (u^ül al-f^ijqh), which he regarded as basis of Islamic philosophy, or rather Islamic thought; this is also why in his account of philosophy, the development

of u^ül al-f^ijqh was accorded the largest space by far. Only Islamic theology (^ilm al-kalãm) was able to claim a similarly prominent position in his presentation. To all other traditions, including Greek inspired philosophy (falsafa) and Suf^ijsm (ta^awwuf), `Abd l-Rãziq by contrast assigned subsidiary roles: they might have shaped or passed on certain elements of Islamic philosophical thought, but were never constitutive for its development as such (von Kügelgen 1994 [*59: 103–105], 2008 [*94: 13–14]).

The suggestion to broaden the concept of 'philosophy' in the Islamic context in the direction of 'Islamic thought', or 'pensée islamique' (thus the term later used by Arkoun 1973 [*33] and other authors arguing in a similar vein) constituted a challenge for European scholarship. It contested the identification of 'philosophy' with 'Greek philosophy', which in older scholarship had been taken for granted. Moreover, shortly after ^Abd al-Rãziq's publications, a further concept of (history of Islamic) philosophy emerged, which again vehemently questioned Renan's old paradigm. It did not come from the pen of an Arabic scholar, but from that of a European author, whose perspective was influenced by a strong affinity with Iran.

This was Henry Corbin, who in 1946 became the director of the Département d'iranologie at the Institut franco-iranien in Tehran. In his early work he had concerned himself mainly with Šihãb al-Dïn al-Suhrawardï (d. 587/1191) (Corbin 1939 [*12], 1945 [*14]). Now, in Tehran, he began to research the later Persian thinkers (13th-19th centuries) on this basis. This was f^ijrst reflected in a large number of individual studies, many of which made previously unknown authors and texts accessible for the first time, through editions, translations and introductory commentaries. From the very beginning, however, these publications were based on a new overall concept of 'Islamic philosophy'. This concept was presented to a larger audience when Corbin set out his ideas in two detailed and comprehensive works. One of them is the four-volume work En islam iranien, which follows a thread from the beginnings of the Twelver Shia up to the Persian authors of the 19th century (Corbin 1971–1972 [*31]); the other work is the shorter, but even more influential Histoire de la philosophie islamique, which was published in several stages, beginning in 1964 (Corbin 1964 [*21], 1974 [*34], 1986 [*42]).

Corbin aimed to provide an entirely new interpretation of philosophy and its history within Islamic culture. In his opinion, the early authors (up to Ibn Rušd), who previously had drawn all scholarly attention to themselves, were merely 'philosophes hellénisants', that is, thinkers that had been completely under the spell of the Greek heritage (with the exception of Ibn Sïnã; on this cf. p. 9 below). Real 'Islamic philosophy', by contrast, developed its own, unmistakable character, and began to flourish only in the 12th century. The location of this blossoming is, for Corbin, Iran. The distinguishing mark of 'Islamic philosophy' is supposed to consist in its having linked rational cognition, spiritual experience, gnostic insight, and prophetic knowledge to one another. This had been done particularly impressively and successfully by Mullã Sadrã (d. 1050/1640; on him cf. vol. 3), who accordingly was regarded by Corbin as the pinnacle of Islamic philosophy as a whole, or, as he puts it, of 'theosophy' ('theosophy' here rendering the Arabic term ^ikma ilãhiyya; cf. Landolt 1999 [*70: 486]). Even Mullã Sadrã, however, is but one link in a long tradition of philosophico-mystical speculation and 'Oriental wisdom' for Corbin. He lastly describes it as eternal wisdom (sophia perennis), which supposedly harks back to early Islam and even beyond that, to pre-Islamic Iran, with a correspondingly lengthy list of characteristic features. These features in fact have no real historical connection, but Corbin puts them together on the basis that they form a unified intellectual structure. Amongst other things, they comprise (Twelver) Shiite thought, including the deeper knowledge it attributes to the Imams, al-Suhrawardï's metaphysics of light, which supposedly combined Platonism and old Iranian as well as gnostic wisdom, and the mystical speculations advanced by Ibn ^Arabi (Shayegan 2011 [*108: 116–166. 187–194. 338–365]).

It is Corbin's great merit to have read the history of philosophy against the grain, moving entire epochs that had long since suffered neglect into the centre of attention. He thus opened up new horizons for scholarship, something that has been duly acknowledged by scholars reacting to his writings (Vajda 1964 [*23: 275], Rosenthal 1965 [*24]; for a summary see Landolt 1999 [*70: 484–485. 489–490]). At the same time, however, his outline also posed new problems. First of all, he intentionally applied the concept of 'philosophy' in a rather diffuse manner, distinguishing it neither clearly from

theology, nor from mysticism or spirituality, but understanding it instead in the sense of a higher, spiritual-metaphysical wisdom, whose blurry outlines were supposedly characteristic of 'Islamic philosophy' (Vajda 1964 [*23: 273], Rosenthal 1965 [*24: 504], Wernst 1967 [*26: 355], Adams 1985 [*40: 141–145]). In addition, he explicitly subscribed to the concept of métahistoire, which allowed him to dissociate ideas from their historical context and to interpret them as archetypal phenomena of the soul. Thus he developed a vision of 'Islam' with highly subjective and selective features (Vajda 1964 [*23: 276–278]). Examples include his ahistorical interpretation of the Shia; its pointed prioritization over the Sunna (Adams 1985 [*40: 137–141]); the biased assessment of Sunni Sufism, which he regards as an extension of the Shia or as Proto-Shiism (Adams 1985 [*40: 136], Landolt 1999 [*70: 489]); and – more than anything else – the spiritual elevation of Iran (Adams 1985 [*40: 134–137]). The latter marks Corbin's account as a kind of Orientalism in reverse: whereas Renan and other earlier authors had usually construed a defective 'Orient', inferior and lastly subservient to Europe, in Corbin's works the 'Orient' is hypostasized as an ideal and the true home of the soul (Adams 1985 [*40: 147–148], Landolt 1999 [*70: 485]).

Notwithstanding such objections, Corbin's approach was fascinating, and it is not surprising that he acquired numerous followers. Among the first was Seyyed Hossein Nasr, who had already had a hand in the genesis of the Histoire de la philosophie islamique (Corbin 1964 [*21]), and later on contributed significantly to the promulgation of its aims in the English-speaking world. Nasr studied natural sciences and the history of science in the USA (Boroujerdi 1996 [*61: 120]), which had a pronounced influence on his early works. In them he attempts to interpret Ibn Sïnã, al-Suhrawardï and Ibn ^Arabi as three types of Islamic thinkers that he characterized as 'philosopher-scientist', 'illumination-ist', and 'mystic' (Nasr 1964 [*22]; for a critical review see Wernst 1967 [*26]). In all fundamental questions, however, Nasr acknowledged that he was following Corbin. For him, too, 'Islamic philosophy' is a quest for truth under the guidance of God, uniting rationality, spiritual illumination, and prophetic knowledge in the sense of an 'eternal wisdom' (Nasr 1983 [*39: 59–63], 1995 [*60: 328]; cf. Boroujerdi 1996 [*61: 122–123.125]). This quest for truth supposedly developed first and foremost in Iran, finding its ultimate expression in Mullã Sadrã's

'theosophy' (Nasr 1983 [*39: 66–68. 77–79], 1995 [*60: 331–332], 2006 [*90: 223– 234], 2010 [*100: 156–161]). Thus Nasr stressed time and again that this 'theosophy' preserved a form of wisdom which had been lost in Western thought since the Renaissance – delivering what we need to understand as a decided plea for traditional Islamic metaphysics, and against modern, 'Western' civilization (Nasr 1983 [*39: 80], 2010 [*100: 193–201. 224–225]; cf. Boroujerdi 1996 [*61: 123–124. 128–130]).

Besides the paradigm that was developed by Corbin and disseminated by his students (including Nasr), there also have been other new trends of research since the 1950s. Leo Strauss' theoretical approach, for instance, was based on the assumption that within Islamic culture, philosophers were constantly exposed to suspicion and repression on the part of religious orthodoxy; from this he inferred that they had developed a certain literary strategy (or rather a 'political philosophy') in order to hide their true opinions from hostile readers and thus to avoid possible sanctions (Strauss 1952 [*15]). Several scholars applied this approach to their interpretations of individual texts; but ultimately it was not able to yield a new overall perspective on the history of philosophy. Therefore we can, at this point, dispense with a more detailed account and evaluation of Strauss' arguments (for a critical discussion see Tamer 2001 [*74], Gutas 2002 [*76: 19–24]). Here we are primarily interested in the question as to which general framework – if any – should be used in the study of philosophy in the Islamic world. As we have seen, by the 1950s this question had been given three basic answers. One of them took Arabic philosophy to be a continuation of Greek philosophy, up to Ibn Rušd. The second postulated the concept of an 'Islamic thought' ('pensée islamique') that would encompass law, theology, philosophy (in the narrow sense) and mysticism. The third one, linked to Corbin's name, formulated the idea of an 'Islamic philosophy' that was rooted in perennial Oriental wisdom, that united rational speculation with spirituality and prophetic insight, and had found its completion in 16th and 17th century Iran.

This state of the discussion has been reflected in several surveys published since the 1960s. They are too numerous to be listed and introduced individually (cf. the bibliographical information in Daiber (1999 [*68: xxvi–xxix]; for a detailed account of the development of research during this period see Endress 1989 [*49]). However, a

number of frequently quoted and widely read publications may nevertheless be mentioned briefly here, in order to indicate how they position themselves in the face of the three historiographical models described above.

The two-volume survey A History of Muslim Philosophy edited by M. M. Sharif in 1963 and 1966 [*20] mainly follows the idea of an 'Islamic thought': its aim is to include multiple intellectual traditions within its presentation. For Sharif, these comprise, apart from the 'philosophers' proper, the Quran, the theologians, the Sufis and the political thinkers. Majid Fakhry's A History of Islamic Philosophy (Fakhry 1970 [*28]; cf. also 1997 [*63]), by contrast, distances itself from any integrative historiographical conception. Though containing two brief chapters on Mullã Sadrã, several theologians and Sufis (insofar as they came into immediate contact with philosophical thought) and some more recent intellectual trends (19th and 20th centuries), the focus of Fakhry's work lies entirely on those topics which have traditionally formed the centre of attention, i.e. the string of early philosophers up to and including Ibn Rušd. The short contribution Shlomo Pines wrote for The Cambridge History of Iran (Pines 1970 [*29]) steers a middle course: under the title 'philosophy' he deals with Islamic theology as well as with philosophy up to 1200 (with a brief glance at later authors). ^Abd al-Rahmãn Badawï's two-volume Histoire de la philosophie en islam (Badawï 1972 [*32]) is similar in this respect: its first part introduces the most important theological schools, the second the philosophers up to Ibn Rušd. Michael Marmura's explications concerning 'Islamic philosophy of the Middle Ages' (Die islamische Philosophie des Mittelalters, Marmura 1985 [*41]) again focus only on the well-known philosophical tradition from al-Kindï to Ibn Rušd. Marmura emphasizes, however, that there did exist philosophers after 1200 (basing themselves on the doctrines of the aforementioned authors), and that one ought to separate philosophy from the tradition of 'Islamic religious and theological thought' (Marmura 1985 [*41: 323]). By contrast, the two-volume History of Islamic Philosophy edited by Seyyed Hossein Nasr and Oliver Leaman in the mid-1990s renews the integrative approach, being indebted both to the idea of a 'pensée islamique' (reminiscent of Sharif 1963–1966 [*20]) and to Corbin's conception. The former is evidenced by the extensive chapters on Quran, ^adï^, theology, mysticism, and law (Nasr, Leaman 1996 [*62: I 27–40. 71–89. 105–119; II 947–

959. 979–1000]); the latter by the great weight placed on the topics central to Corbin (Shiism, mysticism, Illuminationism, Iranian tradition), and on the explication of Corbin's hermeneutics (Nasr, Leaman 1996 [*62: I 119–155. 367–663; II 1037–1051. 1149–1156]).

By the time Nasr's and Leaman's work was published, however, scholarship had already taken a new turn. Since the 1980s, several corrections had been made to Corbin's model as well as to the other, older conceptions, eventually ushering in a new paradigm of the historiography of philosophy in the Islamic world. The starting point for this turn was a reappraisal of Ibn Sïnã's thought. Ibn Sïnã held a special place within the debate, insofar as the question how to position his philosophy in historical as well as conceptual terms was a key element in Corbin's scheme. According to his view, Ibn Sïnã performed a remarkable U-turn in the course of his life. It supposedly induced him to distance himself from Aristotelian philosophy, and instead to design a mystical-visionary, 'Oriental philosophy', thus becoming the pioneer for all further significant developments within 'Islamic philosophy' – by which Corbin meant al-Suhrawardï's illuminationism and the 'theosophy' of the later Iranian authors (Corbin 1954 [*16]; cf. Landolt 1999 [*70: 486–487], Shayegan 2011 [*18: 243–259]). These assumptions, however, were met by increasing criticism in the 1980s. As a precise analysis of Ibn Sïnã's œuvre was able to show, it is impossible to diagnose a break with the philosophical heritage. Instead it was demonstrated that Ibn Sïnã mastered the philosophical tradition systematically, and modif^ijed it with new ideas (Gutas 1988 [*48]; cf. Wisnovsky 2003 [*78]), though always – against the assumptions of Corbin and certain medieval authors (e.g. Ibn Hufayl) – holding on to a rational understanding of philosophy that was ultimately based on Aristotle (Gutas 1994 [*58], 2000 [*71]).

These important findings were complemented by a second epochal development in recent scholarship. It consisted in the realization that Ibn Sïnã's very same rational philosophy, with its re-interpretation of the philosophical heritage, was of paramount historical significance, having been studied over centuries by a large number of authors in the Islamic world who had taken it as starting point for their own philosophical reflections. This insight rendered the earlier question, whether Ibn Rušd had found any readers after 1200, obsolete (even though his writings indeed continued to be read for

some time; cf. Endress 2001 [*73: 24. 55]). As it now emerged, engagement with Ibn Rušd was not, after all, the decisive criterion for answering the question whether philosophy continued to exist beyond the 12th century. Instead it was Ibn Sïnã whose writings on logic, metaphysics and physics constituted the focus of interest from this time onwards. This insight was bound to lead to a new paradigm of research. It ties in with Corbin's ideas insofar as it shares his conviction that philosophy continued to prosper in the Islamic world after 1200. At the same time, however, it distances itself from his conceptual approach, as it does not buy into the idea of limiting philosophy from this point forward to mystical-intuitive speculations on metaphysical topics, but conceives of it, even after 1200, as a rationally-based, argumentative science comprising logic, metaphysics and physics as well as ethics.

This new historiographical approach was evident in Gerhard Endress' section on 'philosophy' within the Grundriss der arabischen Philologie ('outline of Arabic philology') (Endress 1992 [*53: 25–61]). It includes chapters on topics like 'the development of philosophy as a discipline' ('Die Entwicklung einer philos-ophischen Disziplin'), 'hermeneutics and logic' ('Hermeneutik und Logik') and 'encyclopedia' ('Enzyklopädie'). Endress' observations do not end with the 12th century, but continue with references to important later authors, up to the 16th or 17th century (Endress 1992 [*53: 36–37. 56–57. 60–61]). The new historiographical paradigm was then presented in an explicitly programmatic fashion by Dimitri Gutas. In a 2002 article, he advocated calling the time from ca. 1000 to 1350 (not, that is, 1200!) the 'golden age of Arabic philosophy', producing at the same time a preliminary outline showing that in Iran, India, and parts of the Ottoman Empire, Ibn Sïnã's works and ideas were likely to have remained influential far into the 18th century (Gutas 2002 [*75]; cf. 2002 [*76: 7]). In parallel to these general surveys, new individual studies conf^ijrmed the continuation of philosophical activity in the 13th century and later. Noteworthy in particular are a number of publications produced by Sabine Schmidtke (2000 [*72]), Gerhard Endress (2006 [*89]), Heidrun Eichner (2007 [*91], 2011 [*102]), Sajjad Rizvi (2009 [*97]), Khaled El-Rouayheb (2010 [*98]), Reza Pourjavady (2011 [*105]), and Firouzeh Saatchian (2011 [*107]). The overwhelming majority of later authors, however, yet remain to be studied. According to careful estimates, not even 10% of the Arabic texts

that were composed between the 13th and the 18th centuries on philosophical topics, and are extant in manuscripts, are available in print (Wisnovsky 2004 [*83: 160]). Hence one may well say that the new historiographical paradigm has opened up unexpected and promising avenues for research, which, however, will need to be refined and realized by many further studies.

A similar situation presents itself with regard to philosophy of the Islamic world during the 19th and 20th centuries. It had long been ignored entirely by scholars and had no impact on the discussions of philosophy's possible demise or continuation after 1200. If individual aspects of these developments were taken up at all, this happened within studies that were dedicated not to the history of philosophy as such, but to the history of ideas and the religio-political developments of the last two centuries (most convincingly in Hourani 1962 [*19]). Initial changes in this respect have, however, already been visible since the 1960s. Chapters that discuss contemporary philosophical thought are found first and foremost in Sharif (1966 [*20: II 1446–1656]), but also in Fakhry (1970 [*28: 333–367]; cf. 1997 [*63: 120–131]). The same applies for the history of philosophy edited by Nasr and Leaman (Nasr, Leaman 1996 [*62: II 1037–1140] though the temporal definition of 'modernity' is not consistent across the individual subsections). A proper branch of research into 19th and 20th century philosophy, though, has only begun to establish itself in the 1990s. In many respects this research is still in its infancy. Nevertheless it has already shown a surprising vitality and yielded important results, as is documented for instance by studies published by Anke von Kügelgen (1994 [*59]), Reza Hajatpour (2002 [*77]), Ursula Günther (2004 [*79]), Geert Hendrich (2004 [*81]), Jan Peter Hartung (2004 [*80], 2009 [*96]) and Sarhan Dhouib (2011 [*101]). In addition, there have been several recent publications that chart the history of philosophy in the Islamic world up to the present day (Rudolph 2004/2013 [*82], Adamson 2015 [*109], 2016 [*110], and El-Rouayheb, Schmidtke 2016 [*111]).

Principles of Presentation

The circumstances outlined above have several consequences for our series of four volumes which now will appear successively within the framework of this series. On the one hand, they concern temporal boundaries. After all that has been said, the

presentation cannot possibly be restricted to only one epoch, and most certainly not to the period before 1200. It must be chosen in such a way as to do justice to the entire development of philosophy in the Islamic world. This does not mean to say that, given the current state of research, compendia that impose temporal limits on themselves are unjustifiable. Two more recent publications in fact prove the opposite: the Storia della fijlosofija nell'Islam medievale (D'Ancona 2005 [*85]), which paints a very broad and detailed picture of philosophy up to 1200 (including the lesser known authors), and the Cambridge Companion to Arabic Philosophy (Adamson, Taylor 2005 [*84]), which focuses mainly on the 'big names' up to 1200, but also contains chapters on Ibn Arabï and Mullã Sadrã as well as systematic accounts of the different sub-disciplines of philosophy (logic, ethics, politics, etc.). For the Grundriss, however, a restriction to certain epochs or thinkers is out of the question, given that it is its conceptual aspiration to impart an overview of the history of philosophy that is as extensive and detailed as possible. Applied to the Islamic world, this means that its presentation of the subject matter will need to stretch from the beginnings of philosophical activity up to the present time. As far as the current state of research allows, it moreover should include authors that are lesser known or that have not yet been dealt with in general surveys at all.

This objective is subject to one caveat, however. As our overview of the history of research has brought to light, in many areas our knowledge is still rather limited. First of all this applies at the level of philosophical topics, of individual texts and their interpretations, where there is a multitude of open questions to be dealt with (such as inadequate knowledge of the extant manuscripts, a lack of [reliable] editions, uncertain attributions to authors, the lack of proper analysis and contextualization of individual works, etc.). Therefore many results of the research presented here will be preliminary, and will require further verif^ijcation on the basis of textual material which is not available as yet. With regard to the period beginning with the 13th century, however, our ignorance also applies at the level of authors, and even of entire authorial traditions. It would even be fair to say that the philosophy of the 13th century and later so far has yet to be situated historically, institutionally, or in the sense of a taxonomy of the sciences. Notwithstanding the by now established consensus regarding its

continued existence, scholars have not yet been able to agree on how it should be described, or how it should be seen in its relation to other intellectual traditions. This is not only due to the still ongoing discussion about Corbin's approach (which recently has been brought into play again by Jambet 2011 [*104: 11–20. 62–114]). Even those scholars who subscribe to the new paradigm of a continuation of rational philosophy as described at the end of the previous section have not yet established a clear, common view on how autonomous this philosophy would have been, or of its place in the wider context. On such questions, we so far only have several divergent hypotheses, awaiting verification (or falsification) on the basis of the textual material. They stretch from the claim that even after the 13th century, large parts of philosophy can be described as 'mainstream Avicennism' (Gutas 2002 [*75: 92–94]), to the assumption that in the long run, philosophy was only able to gain universal acceptance 'at the price of subordinating itself' to other disciplines, to wit, theology (Endress 1992 [*53: 37; cf. 27]), to the thesis that for the period between the 11th and the 19th century, it is in any case not possible to separate philosophy (falsafa) from Islamic theology (kalãm), as they are best understood as 'a single hybrid enterprise' (Wisnovsky 2004 [*83: 154–156]).

Given these circumstances, it is impossible at this point to attempt an overview or even a classification of the various forms and expressions of philosophy that developed in the Islamic world over a period of many centuries. What we are hoping is rather that the four volumes which will be published within the framework of this series will help to increase our knowledge of the subject matter to an extent that will finally allow us to undertake a first description and (historical, institutional, taxonomical, etc.) contextualization of philosophy in its longue durée. One thing to mention briefly at this point, however, is the theoretical approach on which these volumes on Philosophy in the Islamic World are based. It may already have emerged to some extent in our account of the history of research. Nevertheless its essential elements shall be made explicit here.

Two basic assumptions have been decisive for the conception of the series. One of them concerns the fact that philosophical thought may be articulated in various ways, and will change over time. Even the concept of philosophy itself has a history, in the course of which it has time and again been subject to modifications, if not to far-

reaching alterations. For research in European philosophy, this is a commonplace assumption (cf. e.g. the varied points of view charted in Aertsen, Speer 1998 [*65]). Scholars are of course aware of the fact that even Plato and Aristotle understood in different ways, and since then the concept of philosophy has seen numerous further interpretations in Europe. At least since the 19th century, this has led to a plurality of competing notions (Elberfeld 2006 [*87], Schnädelbach 2007 [*93: 12–20]). Insights that are commonplace within the European framework, however, are not always transferred to other contexts. When studying non-European philosophical traditions, the scholarly community rather tends towards setting narrower criteria, and demanding a concept of philosophy that is fixed unequivocally, on the basis of almost ahistorical features. This postulate does not, however, correspond to reality. Varying ideas of philosophy can be observed in other regions too, and most certainly in the Islamic world. In order to prove this, one does not even have to point to the major ruptures associated with the 13th and the 19th century respectively; it suffices to read some of the authors introduced in the present first volume more carefully. For they already display considerable differences: Abü Nasr al-Fãrãbï (§ 8), the 'Iqwãn al-fafã^, i.e. the 'Brethren of Purity' of Basra (§ 9.4.2), Abü l-Hasan al-Ãmirï (§ 5.2.3) and Abü Sulaymãn al-Siistãnï (§ 5.3.4–6) were practicing philosophy at nearly the same time, yet careful scrutiny quickly reveals that they all worked with diffferent concepts of philosophy.

A first basic assumption is therefore the plurality and the internal diversity of the philosophical field. This does not mean that this field lacks unity, or cannot be demarcated from other intellectual traditions. To the contrary, a recognition of this diversity immediately demands that we find a suitably comprehensive definition. Even if philosophy is multifaceted, and even if its concept changes over time, the historian needs to circumscribe the philosophical field as a whole. This brings us to the second leading premise underlying the conception of this series. Like the first, it can be described as a consequence of the history of research: philosophy in the Islamic world is not defined relative to any specific culture. Rather, the same criteria and demarcations used in other areas of the history of philosophy are to be applied here.

This assumption implies a departure from the three older paradigms described above. For neither is philosophy here identified with 'Greek philosophy', as advocated by Renan and many authors after him; nor is there an assumption of a specifically Islamic concept of philosophy, as demanded by adherents of the 'pensée islamique' as well as by Corbin and his successors. Within the framework of this series, philosophy is rather understood as a distinct form of rationality which appears everywhere, or may appear everywhere. If one wanted to define its peculiar characteristics, one could say that it consists in a fundamental reflection on the structures of thought and being (that is, of thought as considered in itself and in respect of its representations), as well as structures of action.

This definition in fact corresponds to contemporary conceptions of philosophy. Even though contemporary philosophy focuses mainly on analysing our thought, or rather the language in which our thoughts are expressed, it also recognizes other problems and paths to knowledge (Stegmüller 1989 [*50: XXXVIII–XLIV]). Moreover, even where it primarily aims at analysing our thought, it never shuts out the fact that our thoughts refer both to what is and what ought to be (Schnädelbach 2007 [*93: 22–25]). In addition, it cannot be denied that for many earlier authors, it was natural to search for the laws of thought as well as for the structures of reality, and of the good. This most certainly applies to large parts of the philosophy of the Islamic world. The definition mentioned here has therefore already been adduced more than once in this context, for instance by Paul Wernst, who as early as 1967, in a critical review of the theoretical approaches of Seyyed Hossein Nasr and Corbin, argued for describing philosophy as 'the quest for the general interrelations of thinking and being, whose results can neither be proven by sense perception, nor rely on postulates of a "higher" (e.g. religious or esoteric) kind as their formal presupposition' (Wernst 1967 [*26: 356]).

Thus def^ijned, philosophy may, as mentioned before, appear in various forms. It may be expressed in technical terminology, allegories, or symbols; it may discuss individual questions or design entire systems; it may be taught in private settings or within institutional frameworks, and in general may be pursued in various scientific contexts. The only important thing is that it is aware of its premises, and that it always gives reasons for the way in which it proceeds. This, however, happens by way of reflecting

on its own procedure, by way of 'thinking about our thoughts' (Schnädelbach 2007 [*93: 22]) – something we can assume to be a constitutive feature of philosophy, in the Islamic world just as anywhere else.

In order to describe the philosophical tradition in the Islamic world specifically, yet another conceptual clarification is needed. It is connected with a question that has been discussed several times in recent scholarship: whether the subject matter under investigation should be termed 'Arabic philosophy', 'Islamic philosophy', 'Arabic-Islamic philosophy', or something else (e.g. Gardet 1959 [*18], Anawati 1967 [*25], Panella 1975 [*35], Wernst 1988 [*47: 321–322], Vollmer 1989 [*51], Brague 1998 [*66], 2006 [*86], Ramón Guerrero 1998 [*67], Jambet 2011 [*104: 53–62]). These discussions have not yielded a consensus, in part because each of the solutions on offer adequately represents some of the aspects of the issue, while suppressing other aspects, or even putting a wrong complexion on them.

The expression 'Arabic philosophy' (Butterworth 1983 [*38], Gutas 2002 [*76], Adamson, Taylor 2005 [*84]) emphasizes the linguistic aspect. This is justif^ijed insofar as most of the texts under investigation were indeed written in Arabic (which has always retained its position as scientif^ijc language of the Islamic world). It furthermore avoids tying the concept of philosophy to any particular religion, thus capturing the fact that philosophical debates were not conducted by Muslims only, but also by Jews, Christians and, it stands to reason, authors of yet other convictions. At the same time, a focus on the Arabic language also presents certain problems. As the philosophical tradition in the Islamic world progressed, its protagonists were increasingly likely to use other languages (Persian, Ottoman, Turkish, Urdu, French, English, etc.) The expression 'Arabic philosophy' therefore also implies a certain conceptual restriction, and it is not surprising that it was frequently used by Renan and other early authors, who regarded the end of philosophy around 1200 as a matter of course (Vollmer 1989 [*51: 881]).

The term 'Islamic philosophy' avoids this problem, as it allows for all sorts of linguistic affiliations, and indicates that Muslims of any provenance and any era were able to practice philosophy. In turn, however, it generates other difficulties, as it ignores the

contributions of Jewish and Christian authors and wrongly suggests that in the Islamic world, the study of philosophy was tied to Islamic religion. Those who had rather avoid such interpretations therefore can only use the term 'Islamic philosophy' in a pragmatic way, where the attribute 'Islamic' is understood as a general imputation which does not refer to a religion but – taken more broadly – to a certain culture or culturally defined geographic area (Daiber 1999 [*69], Rudolph 2004 [*82], Brague 2006 [*86: 178]). A parallel case could for instance be seen in the expression 'Islamic art', which usually subsumes all artistic and architectural artefacts which have been created in Islamic culture.

Such comparisons are not, however, without their own problems. Therefore it has been determined that within the framework of this series, expressions like 'Arabic philosophy' or 'Islamic philosophy' (or a combination of both) will be avoided from the outset. Instead, the series title avails itself of the expression 'philosophy in the Islamic world', ultimately taking up a suggestion by Louis Gardet and Georges C. Anawati, who long time ago were already advocating the use of the expression 'philosophie en terre d'Islam' (Gardet 1959 [*18], Anawati 1959 [*17], 1967 [*25], 1968–1970 [*27], 1987 [*43]). The decision has several conceptual advantages for the project. It allows for the inclusion of philosophical texts in all languages, and independently of the religious affiliation of their authors. Furthermore, it makes it possible to avoid tying philosophy itself to certain religious or cultural conditions. Instead, as described above, it may be understood as an independent reflection on fundamental principles, open to all interested parties. Nevertheless one should be aware of the fact that this appellation, too, has its limitations. This will emerge in particular in the fourth volume of the series, which is concerned with the developments in the 19th and 20th centuries. It will feature, among others, Muslim authors in India or in France, and Marxist authors in Iran or in Turkey. In this context it will become clear in various ways that even the expression 'philosophy in the Islamic world' is no unequivocal term, but always ought to be understood pragmatically, and in relation to its respective context.

Characteristics of the First Volume: Philosophy from the 8th to the 10th Century

Such deliberations largely concern the developments of recent centuries. In the early Islamic era, which forms the topic of the present volume, the situation of philosophy in the Islamic world was very diffferent. As indicated above, we do need to expect various philosophical approaches, manifest on the one hand in the plurality of doctrines and methods which we encounter in the 9th and 10th century, and on the other hand in the fact that philosophy was already being conceptualized in various ways. Nevertheless the philosophical f^ijeld as a whole was still quite consistent. In this era, it may be described as a 'distinct, continuous, and self-contained school tradition' (Endress 1992 [*53: 25]) or as a community with its own epistemic norms. It constituted itself, once the requisite preconditions were in place, in 9th century Iraq, thereafter continuing to spread geographically, gaining increasing influence on the courtly and educated circles of society.

The characteristic features of this school tradition have been outlined several times, and have received an authoritative description by Endress. As he explains in his contribution to the Grundriss der arabischen Philologie (Endress 1987 [*44]), they included a number of features which were characteristic not just for philosophy but for all sciences that were able to hark back to ancient traditions (like arithmetic, geometry, astronomy, medicine, etc.). Among them are the explicit reference to late ancient curricula and Greek models (in philosophy, first and foremost Aristotle), at times supplemented by related points from the Iranian tradition and Indian knowledge; the tremendous interest in translations from the Greek, which usually were produced by Syriac-speaking scholars (often from intermediary Syriac translations); the adoption and further development of certain literary forms and genres of antiquity, as e.g. commentary, treatise, textbook and didactic poem; financial and ideological support through the caliphal and other courts, including their viziers and notables (Endress 1987 [*44: 402–473]); and, finally, the development of an Arabic technical terminology. The latter quickly turned into a precise and malleable instrument, suitable not only for adequately rendering ancient texts, but also for formulating new concepts and theorems (Endress 1992 [*53: 3–23]).

Many of these topics have entered the present volume in one form or another. This in particular applies to the late ancient background (here in § 1), the philosophical tradition of the Syriac Christians (§ 2) and the Graeco-Arabic translation movement (§ 3; cf. also §§ 4.3 and 6.2). They all receive detailed discussion because they were indispensable preconditions for the development of philosophy in the Islamic world. Philosophy itself then comes to the fore, beginning with § 4, which is dedicated to Abü Yüsuf al-Kindï (d. after 247/861), who was the f^ijrst signif^ijcant philosopher (and polymath) of the Arabic language. Then follows, in § 5, a long line of authors (A^mad b. al-ayyib al-Sarasï, Abü Zayd al-Bal^ï, Ibn Farïgün, Abü l-Hasan al-`Ãmirï, Abü ^ayyãn al-Taw^ïdï, Abü Sulaymãn al-Siistãnï, Abü `Alï Miskawayh, and Ibn Hindü) who took over al-Kindï's ideas either entirely or in part, applying them to various scientif^ijc contexts, disseminating them as far as Iran. § 6 introduces Abü Bakr al-Rãzï (d. 313/925), an original thinker whose ideas, however, seem to have been too eccentric to attract a large following. § 7 again discusses a number of authors: the so-called Baghdad Aristotelians of the 10th century, whose studies and commentaries mainly focused on Aristotelian logic (Abü Bišr Mattã b. Yünus, Ya^yã Ibn `Adï, `Ïsã Ibn Zur`a, Ibn al-Ammar, Ibn al-Sami and Abü l-Fara Ibn al-Hayyib). From their circle arose Abü Nasr al-Fãrãbï (d. 339/950–

The philosophy of the 9th and 10th centuries was already perceived as a distinct tradition sustained by its own scholarly community – by its own protagonists as well as by other contemporary observers. This is evident from the specific linguistic expressions used to refer to it: someone who had a share in it was a faylasüf (borrowed from Greek, via Syriac pïlõsõpã) and practiced falsafa (an Arabic derivative of faylasüf). Apart from that, one also spoke of hikma, which al-Fãrãbï understood as the universally valid, demonstrative 'wisdom', and which later was to become the most prevalent name for 'philosophy'. The distinctive position of philosophy can moreover be gleaned from the texts of medieval Arabic historians and historians of science. They separated philosophy from the other disciplines, and described its history, as far as it was known to them, as a continuous journey from its beginnings in Greece up to their own day and age (Rudolph 2011 [*106]). This explains why certain Arabic authors – bio-bibliographers like Ibn al-Nadïm (d. 380/990) or historians of science like ã`id al-Andalusï (d. 462/1070), Ibn al-Qifi (d. 646/ 1248) and Ibn Abï Urabe's (d. 668/1270) – dealt with the lives and works of the philosophers in works or chapters reserved to them exclusively; which, incidentally, also means that these works are repeatedly referred to in this volume as primary sources for information on the individual philosophers.

These circumstances allow even the present-day historian to separate philosophy in the 9th and 10th centuries clearly from other intellectual areas. This first concerns its demarcation from Sufism, i.e. Islamic mysticism. Not many difficulties are attached to this, insofar as it was only at a later date (approximately with Ibn `Arabï [d. 638/1240]) that mysticism began to engage significantly with philosophical questions. However, even if some of its early representatives, like al-Hakïm al-Tirmïi (d. 285/898), already leaned towards conceiving of mysticism as 'wisdom' (Hikma) or as 'theosophy', this 'wisdom' meant something entirely different from anything that could be found in the works of the philosophers (Radtke 1988 [*46: 167–170]).

Matters are much more complicated with regard to Islamic theology, which was called `ilm al-kalãm (speculative science, or science of dialectical disputation) or `ilm uül al-dïn (science of the principles of religion) (van Ess 1991 [*52: I 51–54], Frank 1992 [*54: 9–12]). It naturally converged with philosophy on many more topics, which has induced

several modern scholars, like Pines and Badawï (cf. p. 8 above), to present it as a second, as it were 'inner-Islamic', form of philosophizing (on the various positions scholars have held with regard to this question, cf. von Kügelgen 1994 [*59: 105 n. 245]). Therefore its case needs more detailed discussion, to explain why the Islamic theology of the 8th to 10th centuries has not been included in the present volume.

Prima facie, there are several strong arguments for the inclusion of kalãm. This is connected to the fact that like philosophy, early Islamic theology also developed in an environment that presupposed ancient learning and concepts (Endress 1992 [*53: 25–26]). In addition, one may regard it as a striking characteristic of the first significant theological school – i.e. the Mu`tazila (van Ess 1987 [*45], Gimaret 1992 [*55]) – that it justified the decisive points of its teaching with sophisticated rational deliberations (Frank 1977 [*36: 124–129. 137], Gimaret 1992 [*55: 791]). In this way the Mu`tazilites designed an epistemology that was essentially based on rational arguments (van Ess 1987 [*45: 228], 1997 [*52: IV 660–672]). Similar considerations apply to their ideas concerning the physical structure of the world (Dhanani 1994 [*57], van Ess 1992 [*52: III 67–74. 224–244. 309–369]), which allowed them to present a proof of God's existence 'from the contingency of the world' (van Ess 1992 [*52: III 229–232], 1997 [*52: IV 362–363]). They furthermore designed a rationalist ethics, which declares good and bad to be objective standards that do not depend on God, and from this infers the necessity of human free will (Gimaret 1992 [*55: 792], Kühn 1992 [*56: 607–612]; on details of Mu`tazilite theory of action see Gimaret 1980 [*37: 3–60]). Doubtless these are all philosophically relevant reflections (Frank 1992 [*54: 12–15]). On the basis of the Stoic division of philosophy into logic, physics, and ethics, one could even claim that the Mu`tazilites had produced a complete philosophical system.

There are, however, weighty arguments that can be mounted against their inclusion. To begin with, the rational arguments of the Mu`tazila, however impressive, never formed the only basis of their teachings. They were always accompanied by justif^ijcation with reference to the pronouncements of the revelation. The foundations for this were laid down in Mu`tazilite epistemology: it accepted revelation or religious tradition as an important source of knowledge. This meant that their theological explanations often contained references to the Quran, as emerges clearly in respect of their explications on

human free will, which lend themselves nicely to being divided into rational arguments and arguments based on the Quran (Gimaret 1980 [*37: 241–304. 334–360]). Of course, such a procedure is only to be expected. It would have been much more surprising if Islamic theologians had developed their dogmatics without any reference to the Quran. Nevertheless this has an important implication: theological speculation – even that of the Mu`tazila – was never truly free from presuppositions. It always laid claim to formulating orthodox doctrine, and ultimately conceived of itself as interpretation of God's revealed message to those that believed in Him (Frank 1992 [*54: 21–22. 25–27. 30. 37], Gimaret 1992 [*55: 791]).

This impression is further confirmed by a look at the taxonomy of sciences as it was commonly accepted in the early Islamic era. It indicates very clearly that philosophy and theology were not regarded as related or comparable disciplines, but were assigned to opposite poles within the system. The usual classifications were based on a dichotomy: sciences like philosophy, arithmetic, geometry, astronomy, and medicine, which had an ancient background, were assigned to one side. Depending on the aspect the thinker wanted to emphasize, they were called 'the ancient sciences' (al-ulüm al-qadïma), 'the sciences of the foreigners' (^Al-Alam), or 'the rational sciences' (al-ulüm al-aqliyya). On the other side we find e.g. Arabic grammar, theology, jurisprudence, and Quranic exegesis. Their common characteristic consisted in aiming at understanding revelation, and reflecting its consequences for Islamic society. Therefore they were also called 'the Islamic sciences' (al-ulüm al-islãmiyya) or 'the religious sciences' (ulüm al-šarï^a), or, later, 'the sciences that are based on traditions and conventions' (al-ulüm al-naqliyya al-waiyya) (Endress 1987 [*44: 400–401], 1992 [*53: 50–51]; on classification of the sciences in general see Endress 2006 [*88]). Philosophy and theology were thus strictly separated. One of them was assigned to reason, the other to revelation, or to the linguistic expression of revelation. This separation corresponded to a communis opinio, which was also shared by the philosophers, as can be observed in striking form in al-Fãrãbï, who did take theology quite seriously (Rudolph 2008 [*95]), but insisted that it (including its Mu`tazilite variant) was merely a discipline for Muslim believers, and could not lay claim to universally valid knowledge (Rudolph 2007 [*92]).

In addition, there is a third point, which carries particular weight insofar as it brings the 9th and 10th century theological protagonists themselves into play, i.e. the very scholars who are under discussion here. What emerges in this respect is that they did not even want to be associated with the philosophers. In their eyes, philosophy was not a path towards knowledge, but a collection of dubious and misleading claims which were on a par with the doctrines of heretics, if not infidels. The only possible reaction to philosophy that could be expected from a theologian was its refutation. This was undertaken either in polemical works dedicated specifically to the purpose, or within the framework of systematic theological treatises. In those latter works, the authors did not only broach their own positions, but also the opinions of people who did not share their beliefs. In this context they discussed all dubitable arguments (šubah) advanced by their opponents, be they Muslim heretics or simply infidels – who, apart from dualists, Jews and Christians, usually also included the philosophers (Frank 1977 [*36: 134–135]).

It ought to be added, however, that the sources do present us with a problem in this context: a small number of exceptions and some fragments aside, the theological works of the 9th century are lost to us. With regard to this period, one therefore cannot do much more than pointing out that the extant bibliographical lists of the Islamic theologians repeatedly mention refutations of philosophy, or of Aristotle specifically (van Ess 1993 [*52: V 70 no. 8; 229 no. 8; 285 no. 49]). From the 10th century, by contrast, we do possess numerous theological works, in which an acid criticism of philosophy can be easily detected, for instance in texts by Abū l-Hasan al-Aš`arī (d. 324/935–936) (van Ess 2010 [*99: 460. 474; cf. 456–457]) and by Abū Mansur al-Mãturïdï (d. 333/944), who in turn explicitly mentions Muhammad b. Šabïb, a Mu`tazilite author of the 9th century, as his source (Rudolph 1997 [*64: 227–228; cf. 183–197; Engl. transl. 207; cf. 166–179]). In such cases, the chasm that must have existed between philosophy and theology in the 9th and 10th centuries becomes glaringly obvious. Good reason perhaps to refrain from obliging the theologians of that time to become part of a history of 'philosophy in the Islamic world'.   <>

PHILOSOPHY IN THE ISLAMIC WORLD: VOLUME 2/1: 11TH-12TH CENTURIES: CENTRAL AND EASTERN REGIONS Editors: Ulrich Rudolph and Peter Adamson, Translator: Gwendolin Goldbloom [Series: Handbook of Oriental Studies. Section 1 The Near and Middle East, Brill, ISBN: 9789004471498]

Philosophy in the Islamic World is a comprehensive and unprecedented four-volume reference work devoted to the history of philosophy in the realms of Islam, from its beginnings in the eighth century AD down to modern times. In the period covered by this second volume (eleventh and twelfth centuries). Both major and minor figures of the period are covered, giving details of biography and doctrine, as well as detailed lists and summaries of each author's works. This is the English version of the relevant volume of the Ueberweg, the most authoritative German reference work on the history of philosophy (Philosophie in der Islamischen Welt Band II: 11.–12. Jahrhundert. Zentrale und östliche Gebiete , Basel: Schwabe, 2021).

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New Concepts and New Debates

There are compelling reasons to regard the 5th/11th and 6th/12th centuries as a central period in the history of philosophy in the Islamic world. Not only were the teachings of older authors such as Abū Yūsuf al-Kindī (d. after 247/861) and Abū Naṣr al-Fārābī (d. 339/950) developed further during this time, but, even more importantly, new concepts and new forms of philosophising were discussed. The results of these debates were ground-breaking, as they in turn led to a further formation of philosophical discourse that became established towards 1200 and may be regarded as a consolidation of the results of previous discussions.

The two centuries discussed in the present volume thus occupy a key position in the history of philosophy in the Islamic world. They are situated between the early period (8th–10th cent.), which Richard Walzer (1970 [*11]) once characterised as the 'awakening of Islamic philosophy', and the later period (13th–18th cent.), nowadays usually called the 'post-classical period'. Whether, consequently, the two centuries should be called the 'classical period' of Islamic philosophy, remains doubtful all the same. This term implies normative ideas of rise, classicism, and decline, which were presumed as a matter of course in the past (cf. e.g. Brunschvig, von Grunebaum 1957 [*4]), but have by now been recognised to be problematic. If we do try to characterise the special position of the 5th/11th and 6th/12 centuries, we might consider it – with recourse to conceptual history as developed prominently by the German scholar Reinhart Koselleck (1923–2006) – as the 'saddle period' ('Sattelzeit') of the history of philosophy in the Islamic world. However, this metaphor, too, is not uncontroversial, and we must first clarify in what sense and with which limitations such an attribution might be undertaken in order to be hermeneutically profitable (for a general introduction into the concept and its use in scholarship see the entry by Friedrich Wilhelm Graf 2004 [*49], English version).

It cannot be denied that the term 'saddle period' was originally intended to denote a phenomenon in European intellectual history. It was coined by Koselleck in the course of his work on the encyclopaedia *Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe* to characterise the

revolutionary transformation that occurred in the language of political-social discourse in Europe, and especially in the German language area, between the mid-eighteenth and the mid-nineteenth century Koselleck 1972 [*12: XIII–XXVII]). Used in this sense, the term continues to be employed in the secondary sources, admittedly with some reservations. Certain assumptions that formed part of the foundation on which it was coined – such as the emphasis on breaks as opposed to continuities, or the rather static fixation on the time around 1800 – have been criticised repeatedly, and are embraced only in a modified form in the context of present-day conceptual historical research (on the discussion in detail Motzkin 2005 [*54], Fulda 2016 [*82]).

In addition, the discussion has broadened geographically in the meantime. The term has been applied to other regions of the world for some time now. To Asia, for instance, where societies are also understood to have lived through a 'saddle period' on the threshold to the modern age, in their case dated to the time between 1850 and 1950, or 1860 and 1940 (Schulz-Forberg 2014 [*77]; cf. Pernau 2012 [*73]). This includes the Islamic world, with the result that there have been recent references to an Arab or Near Eastern 'saddle period' between the mid-19th and mid-20th century, too (von Kügelgen 2017 [*90: 22–23]; cf. PIW 4, Introduction, Item 4). While several critical objections have been made (Topal, Wigen 2019 [*36]), current contributions to the debate by Zemmin and Sievert (2021 [*113]) have been able to demonstrate that sound reasons can be adduced for employing the term in this context.

In view of this state of research it may seem confusing if we speak of a 'saddle period' in a chronologically as well as materially different context. However, such a change of perspective might prove to be beneficial, as long as the term is dissociated from its original geographical and chronological context (German language area/transition to the modern age) and reduced to its structural characteristics and its heuristic potential. The fundamental phenomenon Koselleck intended to describe is a revolutionary conceptual and linguistic transformation, not just some kind of change as it happens more often in the course of history (cf. Koselleck, Richter 2011 [*70: 9]). This is precisely what took place during the 5th/11th and 6th/12 centuries in the Islamic world. A revolutionary conceptual and linguistic transformation did indeed occur affecting the field of philosophy and, in its wake, further intellectual fields more profoundly than any

change has done in the centuries before or after this period. To be concrete: The ancient knowledge system, adopted during late antiquity and still valid during the 4th/10th century, was gradually transformed and transposed into a new, 'Islamic' system, which would provide the framework for philosophical discourse and intellectual debate from 1200 onwards. The starting point of this development was Ibn Sīnā, whose metaphysics Robert Wisnovsky (2003 [*48: 15–16]) has interpreted as the culmination as well as the final overcoming of the 'Ammonian Synthesis' (with reference to Ammonios Hermeiou [d. after 517]; regarding him cf. PIW 1 § 1.3). If we interpret 'saddle period' in this sense, several characteristics ascribed to the term on the theoretical level can be identified in the Islamic philosophy of the 5th/11th and 6th/12th centuries: the fundamental nature of the transformation that led from Ibn Sīnā (d. 428/1037) through al-Ġazālī (d. 505/1111) and al-Suhrawardī (d. 587/1191) to Faḫr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. 607/1210); the change in the conceptual framework and the language associated with it; the dynamics of the development which took place in several steps and also, in part, in parallel strata. Among these are, besides the obvious 'progressive' trends, the non-synchronous, repetitive and retarding elements Koselleck emphasised in his later deliberations on the 'saddle period' (cf. Jordheim 2012 [*72: 170–171]); in the case of the Islamic world these might be, for instance, Abū l-Farağ Ibn al-Ṭayyib (d. 435/1043; cf. PIW 1 § 7.6), ʿAbd al-Laṭīf al-Baġdādī (d. 629/1231; cf. § 4.2.5 below), or indeed Ibn Rušd (d. 595/1198; cf. § 3 in Vol. 2-2). And then, finally, there is another aspect to be taken into consideration: The period with regard to which Koselleck coined the phrase was the time when in Germany if not in Europe the most important, and in the long term most influential, philosophers took centre stage, namely Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) and Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770–1831). A similar situation may be observed in the Islamic world of the 5th/11th and 6th/12th centuries, as the authors active during that time (Ibn Sīnā, al-Ġazālī, Ibn Rušd, Faḫr al-Dīn al-Rāzī) would remain authoritative in the teaching of philosophy and intellectual discourse for centuries to come.

There are thus compelling reasons for distinguishing this time from other periods of the history of Islamic philosophy. This applies to the time after 1200, which has long been regarded as a separate period in research (regarding this assessment and the attendant

difficulties cf. PIW 1, Introduction), and it also applies to the early centuries. Scholarship in the past tended to mention the latter in the same breath as the 5th/11th and 6th/12 centuries, which often seemed to suggest that there was a continuous development ('from al-Kindī to Ibn Rušd') and indeed a continuum of intellectual history (emphasised by e.g. Fakhry 1970 [*10: 128]). In fact, however, the two periods presented in this volume and in Volume 1 are separated by a number of noticeable features that imbue each era with its own distinctive character.

A first difference is that, towards the end of the 4th/10th century, philosophical discourse emancipated itself from the work of the Greek-Arabic translators. Until that time it had been customary for philosophers to cultivate close ties with scholars from the translation movement, with the result that their focus on certain branches of philosophy (natural philosophy, metaphysics, logic, etc.) or on individual philosophical texts was influenced by the work of the translators around them. This is true not only of al-Kindī, the most important author of the 3rd/9th century, whose work directly reflects this kind of influence (cf. PIW 1 § 4.3). Similar tendencies may be seen in the work of philosophers of the 4th/10th century, such as Abū Bakr al-Rāzī (ibid. § 6.2) and al-Fārābī (ibid. § 8.2 and § 8.4.1), too. Even a work like the encyclopaedia of the Iḫwān al-Ṣafāʾ, probably composed no earlier than the decade between 360/970 and 370/980, directly reflects the selection and orientation of the Greek sources available in Arabic translation at the time (ibid. § 9.4.2.3).

Soon afterwards, however, the significance of these connections dwindled. We may still encounter a few Greek-(Syriac)-Arabic translators by the end of the 4th/10th century, especially in the context of the ʿAḍudī hospital founded in Baghdad in 372/982. One of these was the Melkite physician Naẓīf b. Yumn al-Rūmī, who translated several medical works as well as parts of Aristotle's *Metaphysics* and was apparently interested in Euclid's *Elements*; another was his colleague Ibrāhīm b. Bakkūš al-ʿAššārī, who was the translator of several works by Theophrastus and the editor of a Syriac version of Aristotle's *Sophistical Refutations*. Activities of this kind, however, increasingly became the exception, and appear to have ceased altogether in the 5th/11th century. At least we hear no more about new translations of ancient texts that influenced philosophical debate (Gutas 1998 [*42: 151–155]).

This is likely to be closely linked to the second difference observable between the two periods, namely the shift in the philosophical paradigm that served as the model and starting point for the philosophical observations of the contemporary actors. Until the beginning of the 5th/11th century, Aristotle was regarded as the definitive authority. His position may not have been exclusive, as some authors preferred other Greek authorities; Abū Bakr al-Rāzī, for instance, responded especially to Plato and Galen, while many Ismāʿīlī thinkers looked to Neo-Platonism. To most philosophers writing in Arabic, however, Aristotle offered an uncontested paradigm that must be understood and interpreted. This was expressed in many eulogies, most explicitly by al-Fārābī who not only accepted the Stagirite's unique position but explained it in the context of cultural history in *On the Emergence of Philosophy* and *The Particles* (PIW 1 § 8.4.1). His opinion would be shared by all other followers of the Baghdad School including Ibn al-Ṭayyib (d. 435/1043). In other regions of the Islamic world, Aristotle was revered as the unsurpassed master for even longer. This is particularly true of Spain, where Ṣāʿid al-Andalusī (d. 462/1070) composed a universal history of the sciences, entitled *Ṭabaqāt al-umam* (*The Generations of Nations*), around the middle of the 5th/11th century. Here he describes in detail the contributions made to the development of the sciences by the various peoples (Indians, Persians, Chaldeans [Babylonians], Greeks, Romans, [late ancient] Egyptians, Arabs, and [Spanish] Jews). In his opinion, it is clear that most outstanding achievements in philosophy, medicine, mathematics, and astronomy are due to the Greeks, and that Aristotle was 'the seal of their philosophers and the chief among their scholars' (*ḫātimat ḥukamāʾihim wa-sayyid ʿulamāʾihim*) (Ṣāʿid, *Ṭabaqāt* [* 2: 24,7]).

As Ṣāʿid al-Andalusī wrote these lines, the eastern part of the Islamic world already witnessed a paradigm shift initiated by Ibn Sīnā's (d. 428/1037) monumental oeuvre. It not only held great fascination for his immediate circle (cf. § 2.1 below) but was met with interest across a much broader range of readers, soon becoming a new point of reference for philosophical discourse. Ibn Sīnā, too, based his deliberations on the *Corpus Aristotelicum*. In fact, his philosophical activity may be described as a continuous debate with Aristotelian tradition (Gutas 2014 [*76]). This links him with his late ancient and Arabic predecessors who also investigated the Aristotelian corpus,

endeavouring to find conceptual bridges for its internal divergences (for instance between the *Categories* and the *Metaphysics*) as well as the differences between Aristotle and Plato, for instance in the context of the image of God or the doctrine of the soul (Wisnovsky 2003 [*48; 15. 43–141]). At the same time, Ibn Sīnā's philosophical project aims far beyond this exegetic concern. He not only wants to understand Aristotle, but to surpass his doctrine and transpose it into a new synthesis. His objective is to combine the insights of philosophy with the contemporary insights of the sciences (medicine, astronomy, etc.) and with certain concerns of Islamic theology (cf. § 1.4.1 below and Wisnovsky 2003 [*48: 16. 145–160. 227–243]). Ultimately, this led to a new paradigm that went beyond the 'Ammonian Synthesis', setting new standards not only within the field of metaphysics (thus already Goichon 1938 [*3] and Verbeke 1983 [*21]), but throughout wide swathes of philosophy. This was accompanied by linguistic transformation. Central terms such as 'being', 'essence', 'necessity', and 'possibility', which had long been established in philosophical terminology, were given new significance by Ibn Sīnā (Wisnovsky 2003 [*48: 145–263]).

The reaction to Ibn Sīnā was correspondingly vehement. He no longer presented philosophy as an 'alien' intellectual heritage, but as a comprehensive science including both the well-established (late) ancient topics and the fundamental concerns of Islamic society of the 5th/11th century, which were integrated into philosophical discourse (examples of this are provided by Gutas in § 4.5 below). This could only fascinate educated Muslims, and would soon lead to a shift of emphasis. Philosophy was no longer a matter for a small coterie of experts, but increasingly moved to the centre of intellectual discussion. Moreover, this was not a momentary development, but an incisive and enduring process which may be called the third and perhaps major difference between this period and the preceding centuries.

The debate surrounding Ibn Sīnā's theories persisted and may be seen as an intensive struggle to find the right path. On one side were scholars who embraced his views or diverged from them only marginally. Their long line begins with his immediate companions al-Ǧūzǧānī (d. after 428/337), al-Maʿṣūmī (d. c. 430/1038–1039), Ibn Zayla (d. c. 440/1048–1049), and Bahmanyār (d. 458/1066–1067?) (for all these, cf. § 2.1 below), leading through Abū l-ʿAbbās al-Lawkarī (d. after 503/1109) (cf. § 2.2) to the

'Avicennians' of the 6th/12th century: ʿUmar al-Ḫayyām (d. 517/1123–1124 or 526/1131–1132), Muḥammad al-Hindī (d. c. 529/1135), al-Īlāqī (d. 536/1141), Ibn Sahlān al-Sāwī (d. after 536/1141) und Maǧdaddīn al-Ǧīlī (d. before 596/1199) (for all these, cf. § 4.1 below) – all of them, in fact, authors working in the eastern or the central part of the Islamic world.

On the other side, we meet several critical voices. The kind of opposition they express differs, documenting a broad range of attitudes to philosophy current at the time. One position was to criticise 'the philosophers' – this usually referred to Ibn Sīnā – from outside, i.e. from the point of view of the religious scholar. The most outstanding instance is al-Ġazālī (d. 505/1111) who found them guilty of two capital errors in his famous polemical text *Tahāfut al-falāsifa* (*The Incoherence of the Philosophers*): the methodological inability to prove their theories in accordance with their own rules of logic, and the fact that their metaphysics and physics were in breach of several of the fundamental assumptions of Islam (cf. § 3 below). Other authors, who also argued theologically, adopted a similar perspective: Ibn al-Malāḥimī (d. 536/1141), who attacked the philosophers in order to defend his own Muʿtazilī beliefs (§ 4.2.1); Ibn Ġaylān al-Balḫī (fl. 580/1184), and Šaraf al-Dīn al-Masʿūdī (d. after 582/1182), who

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A third position aimed at combining philosophy with Sufism. This, too, was promoted by several thinkers in the 6th/12th century, although the ideas of how this aim might be achieved could differ considerably. The argument proposed by Ibn Ṭufayl (d. 581/1185), a Spanish author, was inclusivist. His novel *Ḥayy b. Yaqẓān* (*Alive, Son of Awake*) describes a path of knowledge in which both traditions are joined harmoniously. The introduction to the text states explicitly that one can recognise the truth only by following Ibn Sīnā as well as al-Ġazālī, and by revealing the inner meaning of their respective teachings (cf. § 2 in Vol. 2-2). Šihāb al-Dīn al-Suhrawardī (d. 587/1191), an approximate contemporary of Ibn Ṭufayl's in the east of the Islamic world, also had Sufi leanings. As a result, modern scholars used to characterize him as having combined philosophy with Sufism, and there are still good reasons to do that. Recent scholarship, however, stresses more his philosophical insights. Jari Kaukua e.g. argues in a book which has just appeared that Suhrawardī's corpus offers a rival philosophical system to Ibn Sīnā's, with many technical positions on topics like the essence/existence distinction, the nature of matter, the sufficiency of nominal definitions, etc. (Kaukua 2022 [*114]). Interpreted in that way Suhrawardī's project would be essentially philosophical and share some important features with the project of Abū l-Barakāt.

Still other critics had no intention of modifying Ibn Sīnā's teachings, let alone developing them further. On the contrary: In their view, the changes he had made to the Aristotelian system had weakened philosophy and made it vulnerable to attacks like al-Ġazālī's *Tahāfut*. The only possible reaction to this plight was to restore the original paradigm. Demands of this kind were consequently raised in several locations in the Islamic world. In the West – with great success – by Ibn Rušd (d. 595/1198), who went back to concentrating entirely on commenting on the Aristotelian corpus (cf. § 3 in Vol. 2-2). In the East – with rather less resonance – by ʿAbd al-Laṭīf al-Baġdādī (d. 629/1231), who advised the readers of his *Kitāb al-Naṣīḥatayn* (*Book of Two Pieces of Advice*) to return to Hippocrates in medicine, and to Plato and Aristotle in philosophy (cf. § 4.2.5 below).

And finally, there was Faḫr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. 606/1210). His activity marks the transition from the period discussed in this volume to the subsequent period (13th–18th cent.), as it were. Al-Rāzī, who was an expert in the religious disciplines (theology, jurisprudence,

Quranic exegesis) as well as the writings of Ibn Sīnā, adopted the method of 'carefully considering' (*i'tibār*) from Abū l-Barakāt, applying it not only to philosophy but indeed to all the sciences which he studied systematically (cf. § 6 below). As a result, he, more than his predecessors, created a new field of discourse for the various intellectual traditions. Ibn Sīnā's thought occupied a privileged position therein, as al-Rāzī's detailed and vehement discussion of the content of his last summa, *al-Išārāt wa-l-tanbīhāt* (*Pointers and Reminders*) impressively demonstrates (cf. Shihadeh 2017 [*91]). Al-Rāzī did not reject philosophy but critically scrutinised it in order to combine it constructively with considerations based on theology as well as other religious sciences. How these connections evolved individually and in the long term, however, was decided not by him but by intellectuals of the following generations, who will be the subject of Volume 3 of this series.

Intellectual Contexts

The Growing Resonance of Philosophy

It was not only the philosophical content of Ibn Sīnā's teachings that gave rise to this sort of reaction. Another factor was their ability to establish connections to other disciplines. Indeed, it is remarkable that the reception of his ideas was not limited to the philosophical class but extended to other circles as well, opening new contexts to philosophy that had previously regarded it with reservation or rejection.

Of course, earlier philosophers, too, had observed their intellectual surroundings and reacted to them. We know, for instance, that al-Kindī's teachings displayed a number of points of contact with the Mu'tazilī theology of his time (Walzer 1962 [*6: 176–200], Ivry 1974 [*13: 22], Endress 1991 [*32: 155. 158]). Later representatives of his school such as Abū l-Ḥasan al-'Āmirī (d. 381/992) were also willing to combine philosophy and religious or theological thought (cf. PIW 1 § 5.2.3). Even al-Fārābī was open to this idea. He continued to accuse the Muslim theologians of having achieved only limited access to knowledge and of interpreting the content of the revelation inadequately (Rudolph 2007 [*63: 61–78, esp. 67–68]). This did not, however, stop him from taking the core concerns of Islamic theology seriously and discussing them from the philosophical point of view step by step in his *Mabādi' ārā' ahl al-madīna al-fāḍila* (*The Principles of*

the Opinions of the Inhabitants of the Excellent City) (Rudolph 2008 [*64], 2022 [*115: 17–32]; cf. PIW 1 § 8.3.9).

All these endeavours remained without significant resonance. The philosophical concepts of the 3rd/9th and 4th/10th centuries circulated to a certain degree among authors who were interested in ethics, medicine and the natural sciences, or Ismāʿīlī metaphysical speculations (cf. PIW 1 § 9). They did not reach the mainstream of Islamic scholarship, though, with the result that the sciences described as 'ancient' or 'alien' and the 'religious' disciplines (theology, jurisprudence, Quranic exegesis, Arabic grammar, etc.) generally remained separate during this time. It was only in the 5th/11th century that the distance between them began to erode. A major stimulus came from Ibn Sīnā's doctrine which, as we have mentioned, offered conceptual advances in a variety of fields. This led to philosophical theses and questions, or at least notions, being received in a variety of contexts. In the following, the processes through which this occurred will be demonstrated using a few significant examples. Due to the current state of knowledge, our observations can be preliminary only, as research has so far concentrated almost exclusively on the history of ideas, not inquiring into the intellectual contexts of philosophising until recently, when this aspect has increasingly come to the fore (cf. Adamson 2019 [*98]; Germann, Najafi 2021 [*109], as well as the further volumes scheduled in the series *Philosophy in the Islamic World in Context*).

Logic

Logic provides us with a varied field for observations of this kind. Its status underwent a fundamental change in the 5th/11th century, as it transformed from a science for experts to an instrument employed in many disciplines, and as such was introduced into the general educational curriculum. Previously it had played at best a marginal role in the deliberations of religious scholars. We know that individual theological issues of the early Islamic period, especially the 2nd/8th century, were discussed with recourse to late ancient logical concepts. Among these was, for instance, the question of how indefinite or generally expressed statements in the Quran (such as 'the evildoers are in hell') should be quantified or modalised, a matter of immediate importance not least because the answer to the question directly influenced religious doctrine. Even so,

the discussions presumed at best selective access to Greek logic. It is moreover not clear whether the actors (primarily theologians of the Murǧiʾa and the Muʿtazila) were even aware of this connection. It is entirely possible that their arguments rested not on the text-based study of Aristotelian or Stoic logic, but rather on the reception of oral discourses taking place in several languages since late antiquity (Greek, Syriac, later Arabic) (Schöck 2005 [*57], 2006 [*61: 14–16 and passim]).

This is even more true as Islamic theology (*kalām*) and jurisprudence (*fiqh*) soon evolved their own methods of drawing conclusions and conducting arguments. They were not based in Aristotelian syllogistics, but emphasised conclusions by analogy, which were called 'concluding to the hidden from the manifest' (*qiyās al-ġāʾib ʿalā l-šāhid* or *istidlāl bi-l-šāhid ʿalā l-ġāʾib*) in *kalām*, and, more succinctly, 'analogical argument' (*qiyās*) in *fiqh* (van Ess 1970 [*9], 1976 [*15], 1991–1997 [*34: IV 660–666]). As a consequence of this development, religious scholars and logicians formed rival groups in the 3rd/9th and 4th/10th centuries. *Kalām* scholars did not study Aristotelian logic but refuted it, with examples including the Muʿtazilī Abū l-ʿAbbās al-Nāšiʾ (d. 293/906) and the Shiite Ḥasan ibn Mūsā al-Nawbaḫtī (d. c. 305/917) (El-Rouayheb 2016 [*81: 408]). Or else they endeavoured to undermine the logicians' claims with derision and irony, as did the prominent Muʿtazilī Abū Hāšim al-Ǧubbāʾī (d. 321/933), to whom the sources ascribe the sarcastic question whether the term 'logic' (*manṭiq*), rather than denoting an independent form of knowledge, was not simply derived from the word 'speech/talk' (*nuṭq*) (van Ess 1970 [*9: 21]).

The backdrop of such remarks was the fundamental rivalry between (Greek) logic and (Arabic) grammar. It found its visible expression in several public debates concerned with the scope of application of the two disciplines. One of these was carried out towards the end of the 5th/11th century in Spain, between the philosopher Ibn Bāǧǧa and his opponent Ibn al-Sīd al-Baṭalyawsī (cf. Elamrani-Jamal 1979 [*18] and PIW 2-2 § 2). Much better known, however, is another dispute, conducted in 326/937–938 in Baghdad between the logician and philosopher Abū Bišr Mattā (d. 328/940) and the grammarian and theologian Abū Saʿīd al-Sīrāfī (d. 368/979). In a report by Abū Ḥayyān al-Tawḥīdī (d. 414/1023) (regarding him see PIW 1 § 5.3), grammar emerges victorious. Only grammar, he says, knows the diverse possibilities of expression and meaning that

the Arabic language possesses, and is thus the only authority capable of deciding which statements are true and which false. Aristotelian logic, on the other hand, is not capable of this as, despite its claim to universality, it is subject to the conventions of Greek. Even when it advances as far as rules of seemingly universal application, it has to express them in grammatically correct Arabic (Adamson, Key 2015 [*79: 76–82]; cf. Endress 1986 [*23], Kühn 1986 [*24]).

Many religious scholars of the 4th/10th century were of this opinion, in fact, not just al-Sīrāfī who is celebrated here as the victorious debater. For them, not logic but Arabic grammar was the methodological guiding science enabling them to fulfil the tasks of religious hermeneutics (Quranic exegesis, interpretation of the *šarīʿa*, etc.). The fact that very few authors, such as the jurist Abū Bakr al-Ġaṣṣāṣ (d. 370/980), were willing to travel a separate path and integrate certain elements of logic into their hermeneutics, did not change the overall situation (Shehaby 1975 [*14]).

A change came only in the 5th/11th century. The first indication was given by the Andalusian scholar Ibn Ḥazm (d. 456/1064) who spoke out against the application of traditional conclusions by analogy (*qiyās*) in Islamic law, proposing instead that Aristotelian logic including syllogistics be applied in religious hermeneutics (Chejne 1984 [*22]; cf. Abrahamov 2016 [*80: 266–269]). However, his initiative had no effect as he was a member of the minority Ẓāhirī school, and as such had no influence on Sunni theology and jurisprudence (Hallaq 1997 [*38: 137]). Furthermore, Ibn Ḥazm's knowledge of philosophy was limited to the basic texts of the *Organon* and the older logical tradition (Street 2004 [*50: 561]), while the innovative approaches of Ibn Sīnā's works were unknown in Spain in his time.

Consequently, the true turning point in the development is marked by the activity of al-Ġazālī (d. 505/111). He not only studied Ibn Sīnā's logic texts but also recommended them to all religious scholars, composing several handbooks himself in order to introduce his colleagues to logic. The details of this process are described at § 3 below (§ 3.3.3 and § 3.4.2; cf. also Rudolph 2005 [*56]). It thus suffices to point out here that al-Ġazālī's initiative was particularly successful. He succeeded in integrating logic into the study of the religious sciences as a propaedeutic, ensuring it a place within the

curriculum of the madrasa. The result was a significant rise in logical studies (El-Rouayheb 2019 [*101]; cf. also PIW 3), as well as a turning point in Islamic theology. This was so important that Ibn Ḫaldūn (d. 808/1406), the famous historiographer and historian of science from Tunis, wrote in the *Muqaddima* (*Introduction*) to his *Kitāb al-ʿIbar* (*Book of Examples*) that the history of theology was divided into two phases: the time *before* al-Ġazālī, during which the theologians (Ar. *mutakallimūn*) refused to apply Aristotelian logic, and the time *after* al-Ġazālī, when they – with very few exceptions – accepted logic as a methodological guiding science (Ibn Ḫaldūn, *Muqaddima* [*1: III 41. 113–116; Engl. transl. III 51–52. 143–146]; for an analysis of Ibn Ḫaldūn's view cf. Street 2004 [*50: 556–558]).

Ibn Ḫaldūn was clearly aware of the profound and lasting changes that began in the 6th/12th century. Consequently, he distinguished between the method of 'the earlier ones' (*al-mutaqaddimūn*) and the method of 'the later ones' (*al-mutaʾaḫḫirūn*), which at first sight seems to imply that 'the later ones' superseded their predecessors. Still, we must be wary of evoking false associations with terms of this kind. The pair *al-mutaqaddimūn/al-mutaʾaḫḫirūn* was used by many Arabic authors (not only in philosophy and theology but also in literature), expressing a variety of chronological and material delimitations (Wisnovsky 2014 [*78: 704]). The presumption that the 'later ones' must represent an ascending trend or progress compared to the 'earlier ones' was by no means a universal one. Ibn Ḫaldūn certainly used the phrase with a negative connotation. He accused the 'later' theologians of mixing their science too much with philosophy (which he criticised) (Ibn Ḫaldūn, *Muqaddima* [*1: III 41. 43; Engl. transl. III 52. 54]). This documents that philosophy not only gained influence in the later period, but also had to expect growing resistance.

Theology

The interaction between philosophy and theology was not, however, limited to the methodological level. Within the field of ontology (or natural philosophy) and metaphysics, too, it is possible to discern times of proximity and times of distance between the two disciplines which even display a certain parallelism with the development in logic. Here, too, it is possible to distinguish three phases: an early one

in which the theologians still actively engaged with the ancient heritage of philosophy, science, and education (2nd/8th cent. and long periods of the 3rd/9th cent.); a middle phase during which the two disciplines remained mostly separate and the characteristic system concepts of *kalām* were developed (4th/10th cent. and parts of the 5th/11th cent.); and a late period characterised by continuing reception of Ibn Sīnā's doctrine and a deliberate rapprochement between theology and philosophy (from the late 5th/11th cent.; regarding this arrangement cf. Frank 1978 [*16: 1–7]).

Conceptual standards inherited from late antiquity played a major part during the early phase, as shown by many examples. The line begins with Ǧahm b. Ṣafwān (d. 128/745–746), the first scholar known to us who engaged in systematic theology. In it, he emphasises the absolute transcendence and distinctness of God. For God, according to Ǧahm's famous thesis, generated everything existent that we know, without being 'something' (*šay'*) Himself. Modern scholarship usually traces this position back to Neo-Platonic models. It strongly recalls Neo-Platonic metaphysics, which locates the highest principle of all things 'beyond the existent' (ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας) (Frank 1965 [*7], van Ess 1991–1997 [*34: II 499–500]; cf. Zimmermann 1986 [*26: 135–136]). Alternatively, it has been pointed out that similar considerations are found in Christian debates over the Trinity, particularly with Arius and his followers (Schöck 2016 [88: 56–65. 76]).

Two generations after Ǧahm b. Ṣafwān, we can observe ancient and Islamic thought converging in the works of Ḍirār b. ʿAmr (d. 180/796 or 200/815). While Ḍirār was primarily concerned with Quranic exegesis, central elements of his ontology, such as the idea that created existence does not consist of bodies but of 'bundles of accidents', can be understood only within a late ancient context (regarding his doctrine van Ess 1991–1997 [*34: III 37–42]). Where precisely it should be located in this context, however, is once more difficult to determine. What scholarship has been able to establish so far is limited to vague references to Aristotle, certain similarities with Alexander of Aphrodisias, Porphyry, and John Philoponus, as well as an interesting parallel with the theology of Gregory of Nyssa (van Ess 1991–1997 [*34: III 42–44], Schöck 2016 [*88: 66–75]). Here, too, we must assume broad and diffuse transmission of ideas. In addition, Ḍirār explicitly distanced himself from Aristotle, as a work,

unfortunately lost, entitled *al-Radd ʿalā Arisṭālīs fī l-ǧawāhir wa-l-aʿrāḍ* (*Refutation of Aristotle Regarding Substances and Accidents*) is attributed to him.

The ambivalent relationship with antiquity, comprising adoption and rejection, appears to have been characteristic of early *kalām*. Like Ḍirār b. ʿAmr, other theologians distanced themselves explicitly from the philosophical heritage of the Greeks as well. One of them, the Shiite Hišām b. al-Ḥakam (d. 179/795), wrote a *Refutation of Aristotle Regarding the Concept of God's Unity* (*al-Radd ʿalā Arisṭālīs fī l-tawḥīd*). Another, the Muʿtazilī Bišr b. al-Muʿtamir (d. 210/825), was said to have written a book entitled *Refutation of the Philosophers* (*al-Radd ʿalā l-falāsifa*) (references for all these titles in van Ess 1991–1997 [*34: V 229 no. 8 for Ḍirār b. ʿAmr; V 70 no. 8 for Hišām b. al-Ḥakam; V 285 no. 49 for Bišr b. al-Muʿtamir]). Even so, in parallel with this kind of polemic, the process of reception continued. Al-Naẓẓām (d. before 232/847), one of the most prominent Muʿtazilīs of the 3rd/9th century, developed a doctrine that resonates with those of ancient thinkers, among them Damascius and Sextus Empiricus (Sorabji 1982 [*20]). On the basis of his research into early theology, van Ess consequently reaches the conclusion that 'the Muʿtazilites were not only rooted in the tradition of the Quran but also moved within the framework of those problems that had been delimited by the ideas of late antiquity. [...] For all their fundamental differences, early Muslims were often as close to antiquity in their choice of topics as the Church Fathers. During antiquity, theology had rested on cosmology, and a *mutakallim* like Naẓẓām fitted this image well' (van Ess 1991–1997 [*34: IV 359]).

Things began to change around the turn of the 4th/10th century, opening a new chapter in the relationship between theology and philosophy. The first indications emerged in the Muʿtazila, with new theological concepts harking back to the internal (school) heritage. Al-Ǧubbāʾī (d. 303/915–916) and his son Abū Hāšim b. al-Ǧubbāʾī (d. 321/933) systematised and profiled the teachings of the Basran Muʿtazila, Abū l-Qāsim al-Kaʿbī al-Balḫī (d. 319/931) those of the Baghdad Muʿtazila (Schmidtke 2016 [*86: 159–165]). The Basran branch in particular developed a conceptual framework oriented towards intrinsic motifs of Islamic theology, of Quranic exegesis, and above all of Arabic grammar, dissociating itself to a considerable extent from anything that recalls late ancient thought (Frank 1978 [*16: 4–5. 8–38]).

This trend becomes clearer still when we consider the contemporary developments in Sunni theological thought. While Abū Manṣūr al-Māturīdī (d. 333/944), after whom the Māturīdī school was named, does not reject all the elements of the philosophical heritage (Rudolph 1997 [*40: 213. 272. 335; Engl. transl. 192. 246. 301], Wisnovsky 2003 [*48: 156–158]), he does limit its relevance, accusing Aristotle in his *Kitāb al-Tawḥīd* (*Book on the Belief in the One God*) of having been the head (ṣāḥib) of the materialists and the believers in the eternal duration of the world (Rudolph 1997 [*40: 186–187; Engl. transl. 169–170]). Abū l-Ḥasan al-Ašʿarī (d. 324/935–936), the founder of the largest of the Sunni schools, occupies an even more extreme position. His theological deliberations primarily serve a traditionalist understanding of Islam with the emphasis on God's omnipotence (Gimaret 1990 [*29: 22]). This does not rule out interactions with philosophical concepts, but it does mean that explicit connections with philosophy, and with Aristotle in particular, play no part in his thought (with the exception of being referred to in a heresiographical context; cf. van Ess 2011 [*68: I 460]).

This statement does not imply a judgment of al-Ašʿarī's rationality or the quality of his arguments. On the contrary: His observations are stringent and possessed of impressive coherence, which is why Gimaret (1990 [*29: 23]) considered them to be equal to Ibn Sīnā's teachings at a systematic level. Al-Ašʿarī's objective, however, was a different one. He formulated positions that contradicted the philosophers' ideas, with only a few overlaps (e.g. in the context of essence/existence; cf. Jolivet 1995 [*36: 232–236], Wisnovsky 2003 [*48: 145–153]). In his understanding, autonomous substances and natures are replaced by dependent atoms and accidents; objective ethical norms are superseded by their comprehensive dependency on God's decrees; worldly causation is replaced by the effective power of God alone, a position that would later be called 'occasionalism' (Gimaret 1990 [*29: 43–97. 433–451], Rudolph 2016 [*84: 354–357]). These and other distinctive teachings constituted a dogmatic system that distinguished 'classic' *kalām*, especially of the 4th/10th century, from contemporary philosophy (e.g. that of al-Fārābī), as expressed very clearly by later observers such as the Jewish scholar Mošeh ben Maimon (i.e. Maimonides; d. 601/1204; regarding Maimonides' description of *kalām* doctrines cf. Schwarz 1991–1992 [*33]).

Only during the third phase, i.e. from the 5th/11th century onwards, did theology and philosophy grow noticeably closer. Noteworthy first indications are found in the works of the Muʿtazilī Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī (d. 436/1044). Abū l-Ḥusayn modified the theology of the Basran Muʿtazila, introducing numerous philosophical elements into its ontology and doctrine of God. He did not yet refer to Ibn Sīnā, living in Iran at the same time, but to the Baghdad Aristotelians Ibn al-Samḥ (d. 418/1027) and Ibn al-Ṭayyib (d. 435/1043), under whom he had studied medicine as well as philosophy (Schmidtke 2016 [*86: 169–172]; regarding Ibn al-Samḥ and Ibn al-Ṭayyib cf. PIW 1 § 7.5 and § 7.6).

Ibn Sīnā's influence on Islamic theology unfurled rapidly all the same, especially in the two Sunni schools. Interesting examples are the Māturīdī Abū l-Yusr al-Pazdawī (d. 493/1099–1100) and the Ašʿarī Abū l-Maʿālī al-Ǧuwaynī (d. 478/1085), as Wisnovsky (2004 [*51: 65. 90–95]) was able to document. It is noticeable that al-Ǧuwaynī received the intellectual developments of his time particularly extensively, as his arguments not only display parallels with Ibn Sīnā but also with observations by Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī, especially the re-formulation of the proof of the existence of God (cf. Rudolph 1997 [*41], Madelung 2006 [*59], Thiele 2016 [*89: 235–236]).

A direct path leads from al-Ǧuwaynī to his pupil al-Ġazālī. The latter, as we have seen, attacked Ibn Sīnā in spectacular fashion. At the same time, though, he helped to integrate a number of philosophical ideas into *kalām* (Griffel 2009 [*66: 5–12. 275–286]). By the 6th/12th century, hardly any theological discussion was conducted without reference to Ibn Sīnā. Even scholars who roundly rejected his doctrine, used terms and ideas coined by him (cf. § 4.2 below). Philosophy and theology became increasingly intermeshed, becoming each other's most important intellectual context. This ultimately led to a restructuring of the entire field at the hands of Faḫr al-Dīn al-Rāzī and his successors (Shihadeh 2005 [*58], Eichner 2009 [*65]).

Jurisprudence

Within the field of Islamic law, the development is less clear-cut, as already stated by Ibn Ḥaldūn, the prominent historiographer and historian of science of the 8th/14th century. While, as we have seen, he distinguishes a period *before* al-Ġazālī and a period *after* al-Ġazālī in the case of theology, he does not apply a comparable

periodisation either to the 'science of the principles of the law (*ʿilm uṣūl al-fiqh*) or to applied 'jurisprudence' (*ʿilm al-fiqh*) (Ibn Ḫaldūn, *Muqaddima* [*1: III 1–17. 17–26; Engl. transl. 3–23. 23–34]).

This assessment coincides with the observations of modern scholarship, which has emphasised for some time that Islamic law developed in continuous rather than contrasting steps, with the beginnings of the formulation of theories probably datable to the 2nd/8th century. A decisive part was played by Muḥammad al-Šāfiʿī (d. 204/820) who succeeded in establishing the conceptual boundaries of jurisprudence. According to him there are two *material* sources from which law may be derived, namely the Quran and the Sunna (i.e. the prophetic tradition), and two *methodological* principles that may be applied in this process, namely the consensus of the legal scholars and the independent conclusion by analogy to reach a verdict (summarised by Hallaq 1997 [*38: 21–29]; for detailed research on al-Šāfiʿī cf. Lowry 2007 [*62]).

This division became the basis of all further efforts, and al-Šāfiʿī would later be called the founder of the 'science of the principles of law' with some justification. Faḫr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, who was as versed in *fiqh* as he was in theology and philosophy, went along with this assessment, declaring that al-Šāfiʿī occupied the same historical position in the *uṣūl al-fiqh* as Aristotle did in logic (Hallaq 1993 [*35: 599–600]). This documents the profound esteem al-Rāzī felt for the founder of the Šāfiʿī school of law, but it also shows the clear distinction he made between the disciplines: the methodology and epistemology of *uṣūl al-fiqh* represented a separate intellectual tradition in his view, and one that should be distinguished from the philosophers' syllogistic.

This assessment corresponds to the historical development observable in the centuries following al-Šāfiʿī. While individual scholars such as Abū Bakr al-Ǧaṣṣāṣ (d. 370/980) and Ibn Ḥazm (d. 456/1064), whom we already mentioned above, expressed their interest in Aristotelian logic, the large majority of jurists ignored it. This is also true for the 5th/11th century, during which the science of the *uṣūl al-fiqh* experienced an unprecedented boost, and comprehensive handbooks were written, covering the subject in systematic and theory-oriented fashion, but without any recourse to logic

(Hallaq 1997 [*38: 36–39]; an overview of the extant works of legal literature may be found in Muranyi 1987 [*28: 309–322]).

Whenever there were contacts between philosophy and jurisprudence in the centuries following al-Šāfiʿī, these were usually initiated by the philosophers. In the *Kitāb al-Qiyās al-ṣaġīr* (*A Little Book on the Syllogism*), al-Fārābī analysed the inferences drawn by theologians and jurists (cf. PIW 1 385. 420–421), and commented on the relation between ethics and the law in several works (Bouhafa 2019 [*100]). Ibn Sīnā devoted a detailed discussion to the question of whether our ethical judgements (such as 'good', 'bad', 'justice', 'injustice') have objective ontological foundations or whether they are exclusively based on God's commandments and prohibitions, which tied in with a well-known theological-legal debate (Erlwein 2019 [*102]). Comparable initiatives from the other side, i.e. the legal perspective, remained absent for a long time. We know of no substantive attempts by legal scholars at understanding philosophical theories until well into the 5th/11th century, whether within the fields of ethics, politics, or epistemology.

This only changed once Ibn Sīnā's works began to be received in legal scholarship. Once again it was al-Ġazālī who played a significant part. He advised not only the theologians but also the jurists to study philosophical logic, even introducing his main work on the *uṣūl al-fiqh* with an overview of the basic concepts of logic (cf. the description of the *Mustaṣfā* at § 3.3.3 below). This appeal, however, had no lasting effect in practice, a development to which al-Ġazālī himself contributed by distinguishing between theology and jurisprudence in the application of logic. While he called on the theologians to replace their traditional 'conclusion to the hidden from the manifest' with Aristotelian syllogisms, he merely recommended that jurists 'study' syllogistics. In practice, though, when deliberating and justifying verdicts he considered it advisable to recur to the classical conclusion by analogy (*qiyās*) of Islamic law and not to apply syllogistic procedures (El-Rouayheb 2016 [*81: 412–414], Rudolph 2019 [*105: 74–79]; on al-Ġazālī's demonstration of the validity of conclusions by analogy in detail Opwis 2019 [*104: 100–112]).

The response to al-Ġazālī's promotion of logic among jurists was correspondingly muted. Some scholars followed his invitation and actively championed the study of syllogistics. It seems that no decisive role was played by membership in the various schools of law, as supporters of the study of logic included Šāfiʿīs such as Sayf al-Dīn al-Āmidī (d. 631/1233) (regarding him in detail Endress 2005 [*52]), Ḥanbalīs like Ibn Qudāma (d. 631/1233), and the Mālikī Ibn al-Ḥāǧib (d. 646/1248), whose works would be widely studied later on. Yet this positive view remained a minority one, as most jurists positioned themselves against the use of logic. Some rejected it altogether, while others were satisfied to restrict the application of logic to individual problems and topics of legal theory (cf. Hallaq 1997 [*38: 140–143. 257–258]).

Even so, a certain rapprochement between philosophy and jurisprudence did take place. After all, Ibn Sīnā's teachings on logic contained more than just syllogistic, and offered conceptual tools that could be useful for jurists. One of these was his division of the relations conveyed by linguistic expressions into 'congruence' (*muṭābaqa*), 'inclusion' (*taḍammun*), and 'implication' (*luzūm* or *iltizām*), which was taken up by Faḫr al-Dīn al-Rāzī and other scholars (Kalbarczyk 2018 [*95], 2019 [*103]). It played a certain part in legal thought, but more still in language theory, and will thus be discussed in more detail in the next section.

A further example is Ibn Sīnā's doctrine of the intellect. Mullā Ḫusraw (d. 885/1480–1481), an important Ottoman scholar, found an interesting application for it. He explained the different grades of a human's legal capacity by linking them to the corresponding mental development from 'material intellect' (*ʿaql hayūlānī*) to 'intellect possessing disposition' (*ʿaql bi-l-malaka*) (Rudolph 2019 [*105: 85–88]). We do not yet know whether Mullā Ḫusraw was directly familiar with Ibn Sīnā's works, or whether he drew on a later Avicennan thinker. Such examples may be surprising, but they indicate that there were some points of contact and convergences of interests between philosophy and jurisprudence. We can assume that contacts between the two disciplines grew closer from the 5th/11th century onwards, with Ibn Sīnā's ideas once again acting as a catalyst, although they were probably not the only link with jurisprudence (regarding Ibn Rušd, another interesting case, cf. Bou Akl 2019 [*99] with further references).

Linguistic and Literary Theory

The list of interactions between philosophy and other knowledge traditions could easily be continued. During the centuries following Ibn Sīnā, it kept growing, coming to include even seemingly remote fields such as later Persian poetry (cf. Ayada 2012 [*71]). But it is not our aim here to list all intellectual contexts of philosophising after the 5th/11th century, not least because this topic will be discussed in greater detail in Volume 3 (13th–18th centuries). In the present context it will suffice to emphasise one further remarkable exchange, namely the increasing use of philosophical concepts in Arabic linguistic and literary theory from the 5th/11th century onwards.

This development is, first of all, remarkable because grammar and logic originally formed, as mentioned above, competing explanatory systems. Their rivalry concerned not only the level of syntax and the correct formation of statements, which we have already touched upon. It also involved semantics, which inquires into the meanings of individual signs and sequences of signs, and is thus fundamental to all study of language.

In this respect, the philosophers traditionally followed the theory of signs laid out by Aristotle in the first chapter of *On Interpretation*. According to it, three levels – besides written characters – must be distinguished when analysing linguistic content: (1) the words or sounds (φωναί) we pronounce, (2) the affections of our soul (παθήματα τῆς ψυχῆς) these words denote, i.e. our ideas and thoughts (νοήματα), and (3) the things (πράγματα) represented by these ideas (Aristotle, *De Int.* 1, 16a3–8; on the interpretation of this passage by different Arabic philosophers cf. Eichner 2011 [*67: 205–235]). The Arabic grammarians and linguists preferred a bi-partite model, recurring to a dichotomy that had apparently spread in Arabic tradition early on and evolved independently of Greek heritage. According to this model, a semantic analysis must distinguish only between (1) the linguistic expression (*lafẓ*) or its vocal form, and (2) the meaning (*maʿnā*), i.e. the idea or cognitive content expressed (Heinrichs 1987 [*27: 186], 1998 [*43]).

The two models were not necessarily incompatible. After all, the grammarians could not deny that there is a connection between words and things, which meant that

ultimately their analysis had a comparable structure. The disagreement between the two parties is consequently likely to have been primarily an argument concerning the perspective to be applied in the investigation. The proponents of the bi-partite model took language as their starting point and clearly assumed that usage of language determined thought in a certain way. The proponents of the tri-partite model, on the other hand, took things as their starting point and asked how they are represented in our thoughts and words.

Despite the potential for convergence, the two models thus developed separately, and were even pitted against each other. Philosophers such as Abū Bišr Mattā, al-Fārābī, Yaḥyā Ibn ʿAdī (d. 363/974) and Ibn al-Ṭayyib (d. 435/1043) embraced Aristotelian tripartition, while grammarians, writers, theologians, and legal scholars such as al-Sīrāfī, al-Ǧāḥiẓ (d. 255/868–869) and al-Šāfiʿī upheld the *lafẓ–maʿnā* dichotomy. They all formulated undeniably innovative arguments, but the tenor of their positions remained the same throughout. Representatives of the first group emphasised the primacy, correspondence to reality, and universal validity of the intelligibles (*maʿqūlāt*; νοήματα) as opposed to the particularity and conventionality of linguistic signs. The second group, by contrast, pointed to the way thoughts are tied to language, and to the fact that the connection between thoughts and words is by no means trivial but in fact a complex one (e.g. in the case of polysemy). According to them, we learn this not only from language usage, which plays an important part in legal decisions, but also from ancient Arabic poetry, and, above all, the text of the Quran. Consequently, the primary and only reliable path to truth leads via the understanding of linguistic expressions, i.e. the instruments of language theory such as grammar and lexicography (Adamson, Key 2015 [*79: 76–89]).

The front lines between the two camps only began to shift when Ibn Sīnā intervened in the debate. While he was firmly rooted in Aristotelian tradition himself, and his interest in words and concepts had above all to do with their use in syllogisms, his studies of the issue show that he attributed a rather higher place value to linguistic expression (*lafẓ*) than his philosophical predecessors had done.

Evidence of this is provided by Ibn Sīnā's admission that linguistic expressions must be analysed exactly, because their relation with cognitive content (*ma'ānī*) can vary depending on their usage. This addressed problems such as homonymy and ambiguity or polysemy, which later Avicennans like Nāṣir al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī (d. 672/1274) would investigate in detail. Moreover, Ibn Sina's definition of the remit of logic was narrower than that of his predecessors. In his view, logic should above all be concerned with conclusions, definitions, and descriptions, whereas the subject matter of the *Categories* was not really part of its remit. This allowed the linguistic disciplines such as grammar, literary theory, and lexicography sufficient space in which to strive for semantic clarification (Adamson, Key 2015 [*79: 89–91. 94]).

Ibn Sīnā's discussion of indefinite nouns such as 'human' (with reference to Aristotle, *De Int.* 1, 16a20–21) provide a further instance. He allows a variety of legitimate relations between *alfāẓ* and *ma'ānī*, corresponding to one of the linguists' central concerns. In a concrete instance, the connection between two cognitive contents may be expressed either by a linguistic compound or phrase ('rational, mortal, animate being') or by a single word ('human') (Adamson, Key 2015 [*79: 92–93]).

His most important contribution to language theory, however, was his famous classification of names, most memorably expressed in his last summa *al-Išārāt wa-l-tanbīhāt* (*Pointers and Reminders*), but mentioned in other parts of his oeuvre as well. As indicated above, Ibn Sīnā distinguishes between three types of reference: (1) One form is the *muṭābaqa*, usually translated as 'congruence' and sometimes as 'equivalence'. It describes a complete correspondence between the denotation (*dāll*) and that which it denotes (*madlūl*). Ibn Sīnā adduces the example of the expressions 'triangle' and 'figure with three sides' in the *Išārāt*, but it also applies to other definition-based equations such as 'woman' and 'adult female human'. (2) The second form is 'inclusion' (*taḍammun*), where the two expressions do not coincide, but one includes the other. This applies when a specific name refers to something more general, i.e. 'triangle' to 'figure', 'bird' to 'animal', or 'woman' to 'human', the relation between species and genus being presumed in these instances. (3) The third instance, however, is the most interesting: 'implication' or 'concomitance' (*iltizām*). It is no longer limited by the framework provided by the Aristotelian doctrine of definitions, but deliberately

indicates elements that go beyond it. The range of examples we might give is correspondingly broad. It starts with logical implicatures such as 'ceiling' and 'supporting wall', or 'human' and 'capable of writing', mentioned by Ibn Sīnā in his *Išārāt*. The potential uses of *iltizām*, however, go much further. They include all forms of transferred or figurative expressions like metaphors (e.g. 'lion' and 'courageous human') and metonymies (e.g. 'laurel' and 'glory'), opening the door for linguistic references favoured by literature and especially poetry (Ali 2-1021 [*108: 276–277. 288–105], Street 2021 [*112: 103–108. 124]; cf. Adamson, Key 2015 [*79: 91–92]).

It was only a matter of time until these ideas made their way into the linguistic disciplines, although when and with which author their reception began is still a matter of controversy among scholars, as the evidence avaylable is not unambiguous. One likely possibility is 'Abd al-Qāhir al-Ǧurǧānī (d. 471/1078 or 474/1081), the 'uncontested highpoint of all Arabic literary theory' (Heinrichs 1987 [*27: 184]). He composed *Asrār al-balāġa* (*Secrets of* [*the Art of*] *Eloquence*) (Germ. transl. Ritter 1959 [*5]) and *Dalā'il al-iʿǧāz* (*The Signs of the Inimitability* [*of the Quran*]) (Fr. transl. Rachad 2006 [*60]), two works that would be fundamental for all later discussions of imagery and syntactic-stylistic structures (on his life and work cf. Harb, Key 2018 [*94], Harb 2020 [*107]). These texts are highly original and independent of Aristotle's *Rhetoric* and *Poetics*. Some phrases, however, display parallels with Ibn Sīnā's texts on logic. Whether this justifies the assumption that al-Ǧurǧānī read Ibn Sīnā's works requires further investigation. Older scholarship tended to reject this assumption (above all Abu Deeb 1979 [*17: 258–259. 310–317]), while more recent authors are inclined to accept it (Larkin 1995 [*37: 145–149], Key 2018 [*96: 203. 213–219. 237–243]; cf. Key 2021 [*111: 96]).

Similar caveats are unnecessary in the case of later representatives of linguistic and literary studies, first and foremost Ḥāzim al-Qarṭaġannī (d. 684/1285), who deliberately chose the Aristotelian tradition of poetics and logic as the foundation for his own theory of poetry, explicitly referring to al-Fārābī and Ibn Sīnā (for further information regarding him cf. Heinrichs 1969 [*8]; also Heinrichs 1987 [*27: 185. 190]). However, Ḥāzim takes us into the 7th/13th century, a later phase of studies in linguistic and literary theory, on which we shall focus in Volume 3 rather than here.

Institutional Contexts

Professions

As we have seen, the 5th/11th and 6th/12th centuries saw a change in the intellectual conditions under which philosophising took place. This is also true of the social and institutional contexts, which also underwent perceptible modifications during this time. In order to sketch them, however, we are reliant on preliminary considerations even more than in the intellectual contexts, as these aspects of the history of philosophy in the Islamic world have been barely investigated so far.

To begin with, we can assert that philosophers were not regarded as a separate professional class in the Islamic world, any more than they were in Europe and other parts of the world. This is due to the fact that the understanding of wisdom and scholarship was not defined by a single discipline in 'pre-modern' societies but rather by a broad range of studies and knowledge. Furthermore, philosophical knowledge cannot be applied to a practical field of activity. In the Islamic world, someone who possessed legal knowledge could earn a living as a state-appointed judge (*qāḍī*), or as an independent jurist (*faqīh*) and jurisconsult (*muftī*). Someone who possessed philosophical knowledge had no comparable options, and neither, in fact, did an Islamic theologian (*mutakallim*). In order to make a living and be socially secure, one thus had to seek out some other, more 'respectable' profession.

So it was that the philosophers discussed in Volume 1 and here in Volume 2-1 did indeed have various professions, sometimes one, sometimes several. The fields of activity the sources attribute to them are not dissimilar to the biographies of scholars from late antiquity (cf. PIW 1 § 1.4). However, there is additional evidence suggesting that the range of professional options was broader in the Islamic environment.

The most common case was presumably for a philosopher to make a living as a physician. This corresponded with the image of the physician–philosopher significantly shaped by Galen and prevalent in late antiquity, for instance in Alexandria. Cases include many prominent names in the Islamic context, first and foremost Ibn Sīnā and Abu Bakr al-Rāzī, who was first head of the hospital in Rayy, and then of the hospital in Baghdad (cf. PIW 1 § 6.3). Other examples include Ibrāhīm al-Marwazī, Ibn al-Ḥammār,

Abū l-Farağ Ibn al-Ṭayyib (cf. PIW 1 § 7.1, § 7.4 and § 7.6), Šaraf al-Zamān al-Īlāqī, and Abū l-Barakāt al-Baġdādī (cf. § 4.1.2 and § 4.2.3 below). In the west of the Islamic world, which will be the subject of Volume 2-2, the combination of philosophy and medicine was also common, as witnessed by such names as Abū Bakr b. Ṭufayl and Ibn Rušd as well as his pupil Ibn Ṭumlūs (cf. PIW 2-2 § 2.2, § 3.2 and § 4.2). The close tie between the two subjects is furthermore confirmed by instances limited to the theoretical level – i.e. without a practical aspect. Thus, ʿAbd al-Laṭīf al-Baġdādī, who made a name for himself as a philosopher and vocal critic of Ibn Sīnā, is said to have taught medicine in many places, but not practised as a physician anywhere (cf. § 4.2.7 below).

Another scholarly profile familiar from late antiquity, the mathematician– philosopher or astronomer–philosopher, is also found in Islamic culture. While the list of examples is not as long, it does include names such as Ṯābit b. Qurra, a mathematician and astronomer of the 3rd/9th century from Harran (cf. PIW 1 § 9.2.3), al-Lawkarī, who carried out preliminary astronomical work for a Seljuk calendar reform, ʿUmar al-Ḥayyām, who became famous not only as a mathematician but above all as a poet (cf. § 2.2.2 and § 4.1.1 below), and Nāṣir al-Dīn al-Ṭusī, the eminent mathematician– philosopher of the 7th/13th century (cf. PIW 3). In addition, most of the authors (al-Kindī, al-Fārābī, Ibn Sīnā, Ibn Rušd, and many more) who are presented in these volumes composed one or more works on mathematical and astronomical matters.

A novelty, or at any rate more prevalent than in late antiquity, was the trend for philosophical authors to make a living as jurists. The most striking example is Ibn Rušd who was successful not only in medicine and astronomy but above all in jurisprudence. He composed a fundamental compendium of the law that would find numerous readers, and was employed as chief judge first in Seville and later in Cordoba. Other authors discussed here also worked in the administration of justice. ʿUmar b. Sahlān al-Sāwī was a judge in his hometown Sāwa at the beginning of his career (cf. § 4.1.3.2 below). It was said of Ibn Zayla and al-Maʿṣūmī, two of Ibn Sīnā's companions, that they each worked as an independent jurist (*faqīh*) (§ 2.1.5–6). Even Ibn Sīnā, whose name is not linked to jurisprudence at all in the collective memory, appears to have practised law for a time, as he was officially employed as a jurist during his time in Gurgānğ (§ 1.2.2).

Another novel field of professional activity emerged in the context of the development of the book market. The art of manufacturing paper had been known since the 2nd/8th century in the Islamic world. As a result, texts could be copied and disseminated much more quickly, and book shops and libraries opened to facilitate this process. This in turn provided various professional options for scholars, as the biographical sources document. Thus, we know that Ibn al-Samḥ owned a bookshop near the *Bāb al-Ṭāq* gate in Baghdad (cf. PIW 1 § 7.5). Yaḥyā b. ʿAdī, also resident in Baghdad, made a living as book dealer and copyist (ibid. § 7.2). Miskawayh was a librarian (and secretary) at the Būyid courts in Baghdad and Rayy (ibid. § 5.4.2), and ʿUmar b. Sahlān al-Sāwī worked as a copyist in Nishapur after he had resigned from his position as judge in his hometown (cf. § 4.1.3.2 below).

Besides the professions mentioned so far, other activities are also documented, but only in isolated cases. If a general pattern emerges, it might be that some philosophers earned money by teaching, such as Abū Zayd al-Balḫī at a school in his home city, while Ibrāhīm al-Marwazī and Abū Bišr Mattā gave private lessons in logic (cf. PIW 1 § 5.1.2 and § 7.1). It is not possible to identify any further professions beyond these to which philosophers would have privileged access. On the contrary: in order to be financially secure, some of them adopted entirely non-specific 'respectable' occupations. ʿĪsā b. Zurʿa, for instance, was a merchant by profession, which promptly brought him criticism of his 'mercantile pettiness' from the sharp-tongued writer and scholar Abū Ḥayyān al-Tawḥīdī (ibid. § 7.3).

The image conveyed by the sources is thus multi-faceted. However, it is not enough merely to list the various professions and occupations pursued by philosophical authors. Many of the activities just mentioned were not carried out independently, i.e. as the livelihood of one person only. Their foundation was a connection to a princely court where a scholar could live and earn his living. Consequently, courtly culture must be taken into consideration when describing the societal and institutional framework of philosophising. After all, until well into the 5th/11th century, philosophical, scholarly, and scientific activity took place mainly thanks to the patronage of ruling elites.

Princely Courts

Ibn Sīnā, Ibn Rušd, and many of their colleagues were not simply physicians but personal physicians to princes. Astronomical observations, which required costly equipment and instruments, were not carried out in private but at courts. Courts were also the places where large libraries were assembled. This made them even more attractive to scholars and scientists, as it was possible to consult rare books here – as, for instance, Ibn Sīnā did at the Samanid court in Bukhara (cf. § 1.2.2 below) – or to find employment as a librarian – such as Miskawayh at the Būyid courts in Baghdad and Rayy (cf. PIW 1 § 5.4.2).

Consequently, nearly all the authors mentioned so far were employed at one or more courts for at least some of their lives. Of course, the financial resources of the ruler played a decisive part, as did the specific interest he and his immediate circle took in scientific matters. The list of courts where philosophers were occupied as physicians, astronomers, secretaries, librarians, or tutors, is correspondingly lengthy and includes large, transregional rulerships as well as smaller, local ones. The highest-ranking of these is, of course, the Abbasid caliphs' court in Baghdad, where al-Kindī and his pupil Aḥmad b. al-Ṭayyib al-Saraḫsī were employed as the princes' tutors. It is followed by a long series of more or less important courts and dynasties listed here only with regard to the first centuries and without any claim to completeness: the Ḥamdanids in Aleppo (al-Fārābī), the Ziyārids in Nishapur (Ibn Hindū) and in Ǧurǧān south-east of the Caspian Sea (Ibn Sīnā), the Samanids in Bukhara (Abū l-Ḥasan al-ʿĀmirī, Ibn Sīnā), the Maʾmūnids in Gurgānǧ south of the Aral Sea (Ibn Sīnā), the Būyids in Rayy, Baghdad, and Hamadan (al-ʿĀmirī, Abū Sulaimān al-Siǧistānī, Miskawayh, Ibn Hindū, Ibn Sīnā), the Seljuks in Isfahan, Marv, and other places (al-Lawkarī, al-Ġazālī in the early days of his career, ʿUmar al-Ḫayyām, ʿUmar b. Sahlan al-Sāwī, Abū l-Barakāt al-Baġdādī), the Qarā-Ḫānids in Bukhara and Samarqand (Ibn Ġaylān al-Balḫī, Šaraf al-Dīn al-Masʿūdī), the Ḫwārazm-Šāhs south of the Aral Sea (Faḫr al-Dīn al-Rāzī), the Ġūrids in Afghanistan (Faḫr al-Dīn al-Rāzī), the Ayyubids in Damascus, Aleppo, and Cairo (al-Suhrawardī, ʿAbd al-Laṭīf al-Baġdādī), the Banū Hūd and the Almoravids in Zaragoza (Ibn Bāǧǧa) and the Almohads in Marrakesh (Ibn Ṭufayl, Ibn Rušd, Ibn Ṭumlūs).

In later centuries, too, the princely courts remained places where philosophy and science could develop. We often hear of scholars who followed their calling there, partly in cooperation with other scientists, sometimes in competition, when the favour of the ruling elites wat stake. A notorious instance is the polemical debate between Saʿd al-Dīn al-Taftāzānī (d. 793/1390) and al-Šarīf al-Ǧurǧānī (d. 816/1413) at Timur's residence in Samarqand, which seems to have comprised several consecutive sittings (van Ess 2013 [*74: 37–39], Rudolph 2016 [*85]).

From the mid-5th/11th century onwards, princely courts were no longer the only place offering scholars an institutional environment for their activities. Around this time, another institution began its ascent, one that was to play a defining role in the subsequent history of scholarship. This was the *madrasa*, literally a 'place of study', which may be translated as 'Islamic university' or, better, 'Islamic college' (on the subject in general Pedersen, Makdisi 1986 [*25], Brentjes 2018 [*92: 67–70]; for a brief summary with emphasis on the more recent period cf. Abaza, Kéchéchian 2014 [*75]).

Madrasas

As to their legal status, the madrasas were religious trusts (*waqf*) set up by a private person rather than by the state. The endowment usually comprised a building that served for teaching purposes as well as accommodation for teachers and students; the employment of at least one teacher (*mudarris*) whose task was to teach Islamic law according to the rite which the founder followed; a group of students; possessions to guarantee economic yield (agriculture, trade, etc.) to fund the employment of the teacher as well as grants for the students; and finally further staff to work to generate this yield and to manage the *waqf*, frequently members of the founder's family (Brentjes 2018 [*92: 68–69]). Madrasas with this basic set-up are already documented in Iran in the 4th/10th century. They were usually established for a particular scholar who either acted as the founder himself or was employed by a patron. The remarkable spread of the madrasa began in the mid-5th/11th century, in chronological and probably causal connection with the rise of the Seljuks, who held sway in Iran and Iraq at the time. Numerous dignitaries from their circles came to prominence as founders of colleges, first and foremost the vizier Niẓām al-Mulk (d. 485/1092) who founded a

'Madrasa Niẓāmiyya' in many places (Baghdad, Nishapur, Mosul, Āmul, Marv, Herat, Balḫ, Isfahan, Basra; cf. Brentjes 2018 [*92: 67], Yavari 2018 [*97: 90]), but also Abū Ṣaʿd al-Mustawfī (d. 494/1101), a finance minister in the service of the Seljuks, and other leading personalities at court (Makdisi 1981 [*19: 27–32. 41. 302], 1990 [*30: 24–26. 39–40], van Ess 1990 [*31: 71–73]; regarding criticism of Makdisi's far-reaching theories cf. Yavari 2018 [*97: 91 with n. 123], who provides further references).

The new colleges differed from the institutions dating from only for the Seljuk era in two respects above all. On the one hand, their endowments were usually more extensive, as was their staff (Makdisi 1981 [*19: 188–196], van Ess 1990 [*31: 73], Brentjes 2018 [*92: 71–73]). On the other hand, madrasas were increasingly furnished with their own libraries, presumably in emulation of other institutional models such as the 'House of Kwledge' (*Dār al-ʿilm*) in Baghdad or the institution of the same name in Cairo (Makdisi 1990 [*30: 54–55], Halm 1997 [*39: 71–73]). This combined model was well received and would soon be exported into other regions of the Islamic world. In the 6th/12th century we already encounter it in Anatolia, Syria, Palestine, Egypt, and on the Arabian Peninsula (Mecca), later also in the Maghreb, in Central Asia, and in India (cf. Pedersen, Makdisi 1986 [*25: 1127–1128], Brentjes 2018 [*92: 67]).

In spite of the different perspectives concomitant with this growth, one constant remained: the madrasa's primary task was to educate Islamic jurists. Each college was affiliated with a particular school of law whose doctrine would be championed by the *mudarris* during lessons (later madrasas sometimes taught more than one). The students were taught the 'principles of law' (*uṣūl al-fiqh*) and 'law' itself (*fiqh*) by him, and after approximately four years received a licence to pass on his ideas and writings to others. The certificate documenting this graduation bore the title *iǧāza li-l-tadrīs wa-l-iftāʾ*, i.e. 'permission to teach [jurisprudence] and to issue legal opinions (*fatwā*)' (Makdisi 1981 [*19: 147–148. 270], 1990 [*30: 26–29], van Ess 1990 [*31: 73–74], Brentjes 2018 [*92: 69–70]; regarding the much-debated question of whether the study was based on an individual relation between teacher and pupil or also on institutional components cf. Ragep 2016 [*83: 563–568]).

Confident handling of Islamic law, however, presupposed a broad range of knowledge. One had to be familiar with the Quran, Quranic exegesis, *ḥadīṯ* science, Arabic grammar, legal debate, and Islamic history, above all the Prophet's biography. It is consequently unsurprising that these topics were included in the curriculum from early on (Makdisi 1981 [*19: 80–81], cf. van Ess 1990 [*31: 67] regarding the corresponding curricula in mosques). Disciplines not tied to religious hermeneutics, like mathematics, might also be beneficial for the graduates. In principle, including these in the curriculum was possible. After all, the madrasa was not a university managed by the state but a private institution whose founder was entitled to appoint the staff and determine the orientation of his *waqf.*

The question of whether the non-religious sciences, called 'rational' or 'ancient' disciplines, were indeed incorporated into the course of study is difficult to answer. The very freedom enjoyed by the founder and his descendants makes it impossible for us to make general statements in this context, as the respective documents (foundation deeds, manuscripts, readers' notes etc.) that might illuminate the teaching practice at a particular madrasa would have to be investigated in each separate instance. Studies of this kind would be welcome, but have yet to be undertaken. Even so, we may attempt some preliminary assessments. We know, for instance, that the mathematical sciences were taught at several madrasas from a comparatively early date (Brentjes 2018 [*92: 70. 73. 77–91]; cf. Ragep 2016 [*83: 557–560]). Medicine, too, is likely to have found its way into the colleges as early as the 6th/12th century. It occasionally appears as a subject supplementary to the general curriculum. In some cases, we also learn that physicians donated their houses and libraries, transforming them into a madrasa (Brentjes 2018 [*92: 91–98]; cf. Pedersen, Makdisi 1986 [*25: 1127–1130]).

Philosophy, in comparison, is a particularly complicated case. We have reliable information only for the time to be discussed in Volume 3. These inform us that in later times, philosophical texts were read at the madrasas, above all in Iran (cf. Endress 2001 [*44: 10–56, esp. 12] for the period beginning with the 7th/13th century), but also in the Ottoman Empire (from the 9th/15th century onwards; cf. İhsanoğlu 2001–2002 [*45: II 383–387], 2005 [*53: 274–276] and the detailed information in Özyılmaz 2002 [*47: 21–42. 143–151]) and other regions (North Africa, Central Asia, India). For the

5th/11th and 6th/12th centuries, however, on which our interest is focussed here, the information is sparse. Many documents that might provide information have been either lost or not yet evaluated. Consequently, it is advisable to refer only to a few preliminary observations that may serve as initial spotlights on this period.

One point concerns logic, as alluded to above. It seems to have been taught from an early date at several madrasas. This was linked to the fact that religious scholars such as al-Ġazālī, who taught as a Šāfiʿī *mudarris* at the Niẓāmiyya in Baghdad, advised that theologians and legal scholars should be versed in Aristotelian logic as well (cf. § 3.4.2 below). While this appeal did not remain unchallenged, it did find numerous supporters only a short time after al-Ġazālī, among them Faḫr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, who was presumably the most influential scholar of his generation. As a result, logic instruction became an established part of the curriculum of many colleges, and continued to be taught for centuries (Street 2004 [* 50: 524. 555. 558. 579–582], El-Rouayheb 2019 [*101: 15–16. 29–30]; cf. Brentjes 2018 [*92: 257–260]).

Not so the philosophers' physics and metaphysics. They, too, were met with interest by teachers and students, but in their case the opposition of the religious scholars was stronger, as the example of al-Ġazālī demonstrates (cf. § 3.4.4 below). Even so, it appears to have been possible to study these texts within a college or in its environment. This is true not only for the time after 1200, but also for the two centuries discussed in this volume. Evidence is provided by historical and biographical works reporting that philosophical books on physics and metaphysics were read *sirr^{an}* at some madrasas. The Arabic *sirr^{an}* literally means 'in secret', but in this instance it refers to the fact that the texts were not part of the official lectures but were discussed in private, among individual students. This approach is documented in several sources (Makdisi 1990 [*30: 68], Endress 2001 [*44: 13], İhsanoğlu 2005 [*53: 270. 272]). We can probably presume it for al-Ġazālī as well, as there is sufficient evidence to suggest that he read Ibn Sīnā's works 'in private' with al-Ǧuwaynī when he was his pupil at the Madrasa Niẓāmiyya in Nishapur (Griffel 2009 [*66: 29–30]).

The second piece of evidence is the fact that madrasa libraries included philosophical books. The Niẓāmiyya in Nishapur, for instance, held Ibn Sīnā's writings on physics and

metaphysics, as did some madrasas founded by the Ayyubids in Syria and Egypt (Brentjes 2018 [*92: 70. 72]); similar remarks on other institutions are also found in some sources (Makdisi 1990 [*30: 67–68]). Sometimes circumstances even permit verification of these remarks in a manuscript tradition. In 596–697/1199–1201, a manuscript was copied at the Madrasa Muǧāhidiyya in Marāǧa that survives to this day. It contains philosophical texts by various authors, among them Ibn Sīnā, ʿUmar b. Sahlān al-Sāwī, Šaraf al-Dīn al-Masʿūdī, and Maǧd al-Dīn al-Ǧīlī (regarding them see § 1, § 4.1.2, § 4.1.3, and § 4.2.4 below). The owner of the manuscript is not named in the colophon, but it would seem that it was copied by a pupil of Maǧd al-Dīn al-Ǧīlī's, while the latter was employed as a lecturer at the Madrasa Muǧāhidiyya (cf. the preface to the facsimile edition of the manuscript by Pourjavady 2002 [*18]; for more details cf. § 4.1.2 below).

The last point we must mention in this context is in the nature of a hypothesis. It does not concern the question of whether and to what extent philosophical works were studied at madrasas, but the possibility that this process may in turn have had an effect on the form and content of philosophical discourse. In recent years, Frank Griffel has made several contributions concerning this topic (Griffel 2011 [*69], 2018 [*93: 48–59], 2021 [*110: Part III, chap. 3]). In the chapters on Abū l-Barakāt al-Baġdādī (§ 4.2.3) and Faḫr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (§ 6) below he presents the ideas he developed in the course of his research. They focus on the theory that under the influence of the madrasa, philosophy transformed from a demonstrative to a dialectic form of knowledge. First signs of this transformation may be distinguished around the middle of the 6th/12th century in the work of Abū l-Barakāt, who placed the focus of his philosophical writings on 'careful consideration' (*iʿtibār*). Faḫr al-Dīn al-Rāzī fully implemented the dialectic approach, as he dissected every issue – as was customary in madrasa instruction – into every single aspect and aporia, but in fact often desisted from expressing his own position as, in his view, the deliberation was the major concern. In some contested questions, he was even prepared to allow more than one 'correct' solution (cf. § 4.2.3 and § 6.4.1 below).

It remains to be investigated whether and to what extent these observations concerning al-Rāzī may serve as an explanatory pattern for 'post-classical' philosophy. In this context, it will have to be considered on the one hand that dialectic procedures

had long been among the recognised methods of philosophy (cf. Wisnovsky 2014 [*78: 702–703] as well as § 1.4.5.1 [end] below concerning Aristotle and Ibn Sīnā; Ibn Rušd was of a different mind, regarding the application of dialectic as a rejection of the demonstrative ideal; cf. PIW 2-2, § 3). On the other hand, research in Volumes 1 and 2-1 so far has shown that where philosophy in the Islamic world is concerned, we can usually assume several parallel conceptual and methodological models. This suggests that we may presume a diversity of terms and approaches in philosophy in the later period as well. Even so, recognising that methodological access changed in the 6th/12th century is exceedingly important. It makes us realise that fundamental transformations were taking place during this period, and that the changing institutional context played a certain part in the process. Keeping this in mind and illuminating it in greater detail with regard to the period after 1200 will be one of the central tasks of Volume 3. <>

QUR'ĀN TRANSLATION AS A MODERN PHENOMENON by El-Hussein A.Y. Aly [Series: Texts and Studies on the Qurʾān, Brill, ISBN: 9789004543553]

It is a well-established fact nowadays that modernity impacts Islam, but there has not been much focus on how modernity impacts the Qur'ān, the foundational text of Islam and the verbatim word of God. This book argues that the early Muslim Qur'ān translations into English are attempts to reconcile the Qur'ān with modernity by producing translations that encompass modern concepts and interpretations of the Qur'ān. Are these modern concepts and interpretations valid or they alter the word of God? This is the main question that the book attempts to answer, particularly that these early translations have affected and still affect Qur'ān translation.

Index

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SERIES: THE PRESENCE OF THE PROPHET IN EARLY MODERN AND CONTEMPORARY ISLAM Editors: Stefan Reichmuth and Rachida Chih [Brill Series: Handbook of Oriental Studies. Section 1 The Near and Middle East, Volume: 159, in three parts detailed below]

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In his function as messenger of both divine mercy and wrath and as intercessor on behalf of his community in the present and in an eschatological future, the Prophet of Islam stands out as a necessary intermediary between God's transcendence and the human realm. The belief in Muḥammad's intermediacy engendered a constant tension between the superhuman and human aspects of his person and message, which increased with the growing historical distance from him. The engagement with this tension ushered in the development of prophetology, and in diverse and sometimes contested forms of devotion to the Prophet. These have aimed to revivify his memory

and his tradition, to directly or indirectly identify with him, and to look for encounters with him in blessings, dreams and visions.

The objective of this series is not another historical study of the life of the Prophet and of the origins of Islam. It rather approaches the significance of his image for his community with its diverse group affiliations and identities, in the course of history. What have been the foundations of the Muslims' attachment to the Prophet, and the modalities of his presence within their religious endeavours? What has been the role of his figure and memory in the construction of their identities and expectations?

Academic Research and the Prophet

In its quest of the "Historical Muḥammad", academic research has largely pursued the aim of comprehending and reconstructing his historical personality as closely as possible, in the context of the beginnings of Islam, with all the tools of philological and historical criticism available for an assessment of the extant sources.[1] Since the nineteenth century this has led a considerable number of scholars, including some Muslims, to write full biographies of the Prophet, with tendencies that clearly reflect their own world views and their academic formation in the context of their times. The classification applied by Arthur Jeffery to this literature already in 1926,[2] with its distinction between "pathological lives", "political and economic lives", "advanced criticism", "mythology", "eschatological lives", "apologetic lives", and "mysticism", would seem to have retained its usefulness even today.

The image of the Prophet as it was established in Muslim religious and historical tradition had, despite many critical objections, remained for a long time at the centre of historical reconstruction and dominated both positive and more critical accounts of the "Life of the Prophet". But in recent decades this image has been questioned and overshadowed by other research attempts. These locate the origins of Islam and the emergence and development of the Qurʾān in the context of the multireligious culture of the Middle East in late antiquity, and try to break fresh critical ground in the methodological approach toward these early developments. The resulting revision of the basic framework of both the textual genesis and collection of the Qurʾān, of the history of the early religious community from which Islam finally emerged, and of the

life and role of the Prophet himself, puts great stress on the apocalyptic and eschatological dimensions of the early message. It assumes a redaction process of the Qurʾān which lasted until the end of the seventh century. In this new tableau of the emergence of Islam, the role of the Prophet appears more or less reduced to that of a shadowy military leader of an apocalyptic movement, which took on a specific religious shape only by its interactions with the different religious communities in the conquered regions of the Middle East.

Another approach to the Qurʾān has been followed by Angelika Neuwirth, who remains by and large attached to the chronological framework of its textual development as established in the Islamic scholarly tradition and further developed by Theodor Nöldeke in the nineteenth century. But she also explicitly attempts to disentangle the analysis of the Qurʾān from its connection with the received Prophetic *vita*.[4] Looking at the Qurʾānic text as product of an interaction between the Prophet and his audience, she attempts to reconstruct the emergence of the Islamic community in the mirror of its chief document. The text itself conveys a prophetology which for her can be followed in its development. Its beginning can be read as transcendent addresses to a human individual, and it leads towards the affirmation of universal authority for a messenger who unites and supersedes all the previous channels of divine communication with mankind in his own person and in his script. Despite her strong opposition against "revisionist" assumptions and their chronology, one gains the impression that, in her works on the Qurʾān, too, the Prophet seems to lose his agency and to merge with both text and community ("Gemeinde"). She thus can be found in some vicinity to Fred Donner with his attempt at a reconstruction of an early "Believers' movement" which shaped the beginnings of Islam before and after the the Prophet' death.

A comprehensive exploration of the biography of the Prophet of Islam and of the development of his image in the Arabic biographical and pious literature attached to his person was undertaken by Tilman Nagel (2008, 2010). His works stand in clear opposition to the historical devaluation of the Arabic sources for the life of the Prophet and for the beginnings of Islam in contemporary research, which is strongly criticised by him. According to Nagel a clear difference in character can be observed between the

early *sīra* and *maghāzī* works and the reports about the Prophet enshrined in the *ḥadīth* literature, which to him represents a later stage in the de – historicising of his image. He therefore proceeds to develop his own critical approach to the Arabic source materials and their relation to the Qurʾān. His image of the entanglement of religious and political factors in the life of the Prophet remains highly critical of both his personality and of that of his companions. In this respect Nagel's work can be seen as a continuation from older biographical accounts like those of Sprenger, Buhl, and others. His critique also includes the Muslims' dogmatic and ahistorical attitude to their Prophet as it developed since the Umayyad period, which he sees as still at work in the current political and ideological uses of his image.

The Muslims' pious attachment to their Prophet, on the other hand, has certainly received some attention by Islamicists and anthropologists, especially since the beginnings of the twentieth century. The pioneering overviews of Max Horten (1916, 1917–18) and Tor Andrae (1918) have retained much of their value. They already presented a panorama of early and medieval doctrines, traditions and beliefs concerning the exemplary figure of the Prophet with its strong supernatural touches in learned as well as popular culture within both Sunnī and Shīʿī Islam. This broad perspective was only further developed and augmented in the 1980s by Annemarie Schimmel (1981, 1985) with a close view on Sufi culture and poetry in different languages well into the modern period. Recent works with a more comprehensive approach like Brockopp (2010) and Fitzpatrick and Walker (2014) also take the Muslims' attachment to the Prophet into account. But it has to be stated that this perspective has remained marginal, in Islamology and even more so in the sociology of religions in general, and it was only rarely that scholars attempted to understand the nature of the bonds which have attached the Muslims to their Prophet until the present.

Research on the Muslims' Attachment to the Prophet: Objectives and Approaches

The increased attachment of the Muslims to the Prophet in recent times has certainly reinforced and deepened the existing fractures within Islam, and also the tensions and

conflicts with non – Muslims, which have gained in intensity whenever the Prophet and his image are at stake. Under these circumstances, a major task for further research on the Prophet of Islam and on the continuous presence of his figure among the Muslims seems to lie in an exploration of the rich and varied historical and contemporary patterns of attachment to him, which have contributed to the formation of the Muslim individual and to the development of Islamic culture and politics. The three collective volumes which are presented here, the product of a joint French-German research project, are dedicated to this task. They focus on the early modern as well as the modern period, which are taken here to cover the time spans between 1450–1850 and 1850 to the present, respectively. Taken together, both periods were a time of expansion but also decentring of Islam and of the Muslim world. With view to the *longue durée* of certain doctrines and attitudes connected with the Prophet, it was necessary sometimes to direct our attention also to earlier periods (especially in Volume I).

In addition to the study of the normative dimensions of Islam pursued by philological and juridical research, and of the political history of the Muslim world, the three volumes deal with the social and cultural dynamics of living Islam, with a view to the fact that religious norms and practices themselves, far from being fixed and defined once and for all, are at the heart of social action and in constant flux and adaptation. Masses and elites equally participate in this process of social interaction leading to the construction and redefinition of societal and religious norms. The Muslims' relations to the Prophet have yet to find their place in the history of mentalities and representations, and in the history of the Muslim world in general.

Rather than following the simplistic distinction between "popular Islam" and "scholarly Islam" which has long dominated research on Muslim societies, veneration and piety connected with the Prophet should be seen on a continuum which includes different social and cultural formations, at times producing a "Prophetic culture" of considerable social cohesion, shared between masses and elites. Equally, it would be fruitless to look for a homogenised figure of the Prophet Muḥammad agreed upon by the whole of the Muslim community. His image was often determined by Sufi concepts and activities but also by religious milieus which were in opposition to Sufism.

Our task, then, is rather to account for the plurality of representations of the Prophet, which evolved in the course of Muslim history along with sometimes fierce debates and polemics. This is why we have chosen to gather specialists from different disciplines and methodologies around a threefold thematic focus on *doctrinal and aesthetic representations, power relations*, and *devotional practice and experience.* The interdisciplinary dialogue on these themes will hopefully contribute to a clarification of the Muslims' relation to their Prophet, and of the modalities of his presence among them in the past as well as in the contemporary world.

This presence of the Prophet, described by Tilman Nagel (2008) as "spiritual presence and universal ideological authority", includes eschatological beliefs about him which connect the beginnings of Islam (and for some also the origin of the whole created world) with the present time and the end of days. Eschatology is meant here to include not only future expectations of the end of times, but, in a sense already well established for Christianity, a certain fulfilment unfolding already in the present, sometimes called "realised" or "inaugurated eschatology". Regarded by some as the first created being in the world, as "Muḥammadan Light" or "Muḥammadan Reality", the Prophet is even imagined as encompassing and reflecting the whole cosmos. By implication, he can assume the role of mediator, intercessor and addressee for the inner life of the believer in pious practice and mysticism. These eschatological beliefs, too, confer an important position to the descendants of the Prophet (*al-sāda al-ashrāf*) as reputed trustees of his sacred rank and heritage, and as "living links" to him (Morimoto). An auratic mediation between the historical distance of the Prophet and the presence of his words is evoked by the transmitted Prophetical sayings, which speak to the believer, provide edification and admonition, and demand obedience to his orders along with those of the Qurʾān. They suggest blessing and even victory in this world for those who keep hold of the Prophetic *sunna* ("Vergegenwärtigung heilswichtiger Aussagen") and the moral and legal authority derived from his tradition has obvious political implications. The immediate encounter with the words and deeds of the Prophet can nourish the above-mentioned eschatological beliefs, but it can equally be experienced and maintained in strict distance from them.

A point of departure for our project was the intensification of Prophet-centred patterns of piety in different cultural fields since the fourteenth century, which can be observed in virtually all regions of the Muslim world. This development increased with the emergence of the large Muslim empires of the Ottomans, Safavids and Mughals and of a number of other Muslim regional states. In a period of intense religious and socio-political struggles, eschatological expectations gained in fervour among Muslims, Christians and Jews on both sides of the Mediterranean, in larger parts of the Middle East and in Central and South Asia. Patterns of this piety had already emerged in the preceding centuries, and henceforth the Prophetic model increasingly moved among Muslims into the core of personal and collective efforts to strengthen the individual and to renew and expand Islamic culture and politics.

In general terms, piety can be understood as a personal and often affective commitment and effort to realise certain religious ideas, values and instructions in individual and collective life through a specific way of living. It includes both the living practice itself and its reflection and propagation. The three volumes aim to highlight the Muslim attachment to the Prophet and the attempts at his representation in quite diverse individual and collective ways of living, based on both affective and intellectual bonds, within and beyond the Muslim world. This broad concept of a "Prophetic piety" includes both religious practice and doctrinal and institutional settings. It also extends to literary genres like prayer, praise poetry, juridical and Sufi treatises, to literature and the arts, and also to the political sphere. For all its manifold forms and expressions, attachment to the Prophet can be found mainly in the three key modes of *imitation, identification*, and *interaction*, which may serve as a taxonomy for the categorisation of Prophetic piety.

Throughout history, Muslims have emphasised the salience of *imitating* the Prophet Muḥammad as an "excellent model" (*uswa ḥasana*, Qurʾān 23:21) for personal behaviour as well as for public action, by accepting his message and following his *Sunna*. The focus later shifted to his acceptance as the best of human beings, to the duty to love him and to acquire as many traits as possible of his noble character. The above-mentioned concept of the "Muḥammadan Light" as the first creation (found already with al-Tustarī, d. 283/896) reflected a cosmological turn in the view of the

Prophet which developed among Sunnīs through close exchange with Shīʿī thought. The shift towards a more personal orientation vis-à-vis the Prophet, which found its most articulate expression in the twelfth century with al-Qāḍī ʿIyāḍ (d. 544/1149) and his *Kitāb al-shifāʾ*, was to deepen over the following centuries. It can be observed that even those critics of Sufism who fiercely struggled against Muḥammad's cosmic and super-human idealisation came to share an increasingly "Prophetocentric" worldview with their adversaries. Their strong emphasis on the human character of the Prophet, whose biography and tradition reach a paradigmatic role for nearly all aspects of daily human life, can today be observed among Sufis, Islamists, and in the discourse of the global *daʿwa* alike. With this "Sunnatisation of lifeworlds", imitation of the Prophet has become important in the construction of modern Muslim individual and collective identities worldwide.

Building on this imitation, the Prophet and also his family (*ahl al-bayt*) became central figures of *identification* and pride and a source of authority among Muslim individuals and communities. Whether religious scholars and jurists, Sunnī or Shīʿī religio[...] leaders, Sufis, reformists, and even rulers, they all directly or indirectly identifi[...] heirs of the Prophet and in this way derive legitimacy as his rightful successor[...] as transmitters and trustees of his heritage. This often involved the claim to a [...] a "renewer" (*mujaddid*) of the *Sunna* and of the Muslim community, and also [...] authentic representation of the Prophet himself. The identification with the p[...] the Prophet also remains strong in the secular political movements of the twe[...] century, and even in Muslim accounts of his life which show their – sometime[...] critical – engagement with Orientalist scholarship.

Claimants of Prophetic authority often undergirded their cause through the o[...] and use of Prophetic relics and vestiges (hair, teeth, footprints, mantles, sword[...] banners), ignoring the strong reformist critique against such uses. The bodily [...] visua.9(æ)ꞏꞏis of these items functions as a powerful tool in order to create an a[...] protection and blessing for the owner and the audience through their immedi[...] physical presence. A direct identification with the Prophet, and "living links" t[...] also offered by his descendants (*al-sāda al-ashrāf*), who, as mentioned above, [...] often enjoyed a special social and religious status as bearers of his outward an[...]

perfection, moral purity, and blessing. From the fifteenth to the nineteenth century, the number of claimants to Prophetic descendance and their impact on social and political life increased tremendously across various societal spheres in the Islamic world, henceforward strongly shaping Muslim society and culture as they could enhance Islamic legitimacy through a sanctified genealogical link to the Prophet.

Many Muslim individuals and communities, finally, show a desire for *interaction* and communication with the Prophet in prayers, dreams and visions and also in recitations of his sayings or of poetry in his praise, which seems to have increased during the early modern period. Dreams and visions continue to have a special role in Islam as the only part left of prophecy (*mubashshirāt*), and as a crucial element of personal religious experiences evoking the Prophet's presence (according to widespread theological conviction the Prophet is believed to remain alive in his grave) and even allowing for union with him. Literary reports about such encounters abound throughout history, and they are still searched for, transmitted and discussed today in pious circles of both Sufi and Salafi orientation. Believers secure personal access to relics, vestiges, and historic places connected with his life, surround themselves with calligraphic representations of his names and his reported personal appearance (*ḥilya*), and constantly say the benediction upon him (*al-ṣalāt ʿalā an-nabī*) whenever his name is mentioned. Hope and prayer for his intercession (*shafāʿa*) at Judgement Day and his approachability for calls for help (*tawassul, istighātha*) in everyday life became dominant, though often contested, theological issues. Poems in praise of the Prophet (*madīḥ* or *naʿt*) were since the later middle ages conceived as precious gifts to him, connected with the hope to be rewarded with his intercession for author, performers and audience alike.

The artful recitation of poetry in praise of the Prophet, performed especially on his birthday (*mawlid*), thus became a powerful means of bringing about an encounter with him. The auratic character (on which see above) of the ensemble of discursive and sonic performances can evoke profound sensations, like the feeling of being moved to his tomb in Medina. The aforementioned transmission and recitation of the Prophet's sayings appears to convey a similar auratic impression to Sufis, non-Sufis and anti-Sufis alike; an impression that does not seem to be diminished by its "technological

reproducibility", quite in contrast to what Walter Benjamin would describe for the fate of art in modern society.

Thematic Overview of the Three Volumes of This Series

The first volume of the series focuses on the figure of the Prophet as presented and discussed in Islamic knowledge and doctrine, which was constructed and progressively established in the formative age of Islam, and further re-read and re-appropriated in early modern and modern times. As mentioned above, the reconstruction of these formative doctrinal elements and their impact required a good number of thematic recourses to earlier Islamic times. Doctrinal developments are viewed in this volume in interaction with the different modes of aesthetic representation of the Prophet in literature and the arts. Here, as in the field of doctrine, the focus is on the tension between the divine and human realms, connected in the person and message of the Prophet, and their mediation in different forms of textual and aesthetic representation. The complementary focus joining doctrinal, literary and artistic perspectives has only rarely been attempted until now. It promises to provide fresh insights into the interplay of knowledge and culture in Muslim communities, both in their historical and contemporary dimensions.

The theme of the second volume is the role played by the heritage and model of the Prophet Muḥammad as a successful and divinely guided war leader and statesman, which inspired many Muslim communities of different times and regions in their manifold and often opposing political projects. This included the foundation and running of imamates, sultanates and rural and tribal federations, right down to the modern nation states and to secular political movements. Special attention is given to the descendants of the Prophet and their leading roles in various societal spheres, and their emergence as political leaders and founders of states in different parts of the Muslim world, especially in the early modern period.

The volume equally highlights another important dimension of the Prophetic model. That is his significance for the self-empowerment of Muslim individuals and communities in their resistance against foreign powers, and even against their own governments. Reference to his model and life served to justify an opposition that often

included the elaboration of radical political ideologies and of militant action. It has also frequently come up in communal struggles, and in the attempted founding of Islamic states by militant Islamic movements in recent times. The image of the Prophet thus appears as a mirror of the conflictual forces within contemporary Muslim societies, and of their strained relationships with the non-Muslim world.

The third volume, by interlacing historical and anthropological approaches, explores the different practices of piety and devotion connected with the Prophet, whether as individual activities or as group expression. Its focus is on festivals and celebrations, especially those of the Birthday of the Prophet (*mawlid al-nabī*) in different countries, religious and social milieus. The volume also discusses the debates around these celebrations and other forms of veneration of the Prophet and his descendants, which have gained in vigour over the last century and have created a novel Muslim debate over the ways of thinking of the Prophet and of connecting with him, in contexts which are strikingly different from those of the medieval polemics.

The volume also highlights the impact of the Prophetic model on individual and collective identity formation among Muslims. The focus will be particularly on Western Europe, and on the role of the Prophet for Muslim religiosity in European secular societies. Other forms of Muslim attachment to the Prophet will also be discussed. They include the devotion to his reputed bodily traces and relics, which survives until today in many parts of the Muslim world, the articulation of his presence in reported dreams and visions, and the religious and emotional framework connected with benedictions for him and with poetry and chanting in his praise. <>

The Presence of the Prophet in Early Modern and Contemporary Islam, Volume 1, The Prophet Between Doctrine, Literature and Arts: Historical Legacies and Their Unfolding, Volume: 159/1, Editors: Denis Gril, Stefan Reichmuth, and Dilek Sarmis [Series: Handbook of Oriental Studies. Section 1 The Near and Middle East, Volume: 159/1, Brill, ISBN: 9789004466739]

The three-volume series titled The Presence of the Prophet in Early Modern and Contemporary Islam, is the first attempt to explore the dynamics of the representation of the Prophet Muhammad in the course of Muslim history until the present.

This first collective volume outlines his figure in the early Islamic tradition, and its later transformations until recent times that were shaped by Prophet-centered piety and politics. A variety of case studies offers a unique overview of the interplay of Sunnī amd Shīʿī doctrines with literature and arts in the formation of his image. They trace the integrative and conflictual qualities of a "Prophetic culture", in which the Prophet of Islam continues his presence among the Muslim believers.

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Acknowledgements
Figures and Tables
Notes on Contributors
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Part 1 Images of the Prophet in Qurʾān, Ḥadīth, and Sīra/Maghāzī, and their Cultural Embedding
1 The Prophet in the Qurʾān An Attempt at a Synthesis Author: Denis Gril

2 Dating the Emergence of the Warrior-Prophet in Maghāzī Literature
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4 "There Is Matter for Thought" The Episode of the Night Journey and the Heavenly Ascension
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(m. 1332/1719) D'après le Kitāb al-ibrīz de Aḥmad b. al-Mubārak (m. 1156/1743) Author: Jean-
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Twentieth Century Author: Alexandre Papas

The Muslims' relationship with the Prophet Muḥammad, as reflected in their daily lives, in devotional practice, in scholarly, legal and political activities and in literary and artistic expression, largely derives from a rich doctrinal and cultural heritage that was shaped over the centuries by diverse societal and regional contexts. Approaching this relationship therefore requires taking full account of the plurality of, and sometimes competition between, different representations of the Prophetic figure, and of the changing modalities of Prophetic piety over the course of Islamic history.

The first volume in the series is devoted to the figure of the Prophet as it was established and transformed since the beginnings of Islam, then throughout the Middle Ages and in modern times, up to the turn of the twentieth century. This volume aims to show that doctrinal representations of the Prophet are inseparable from those prevailing in literature, music and the visual arts, and that both doctrinal and aesthetic images of him have existed in a state of constant interaction. Along with the general focus of the French-German project on the Prophet in the mirror of his community in the early modern and modern periods (see the General Introduction above), this volume also discusses earlier doctrinal, spiritual and literary developments that retained their importance in the development of the image of the Prophet and for Muslim piety in later times. The studies largely go back to two conferences held by the project in 2017, with some additional contributions which were specially requested. With its combined attention paid to doctrinal, literary and artistic expressions, the volume will hopefully shed new light on the interactions between the different cultural spheres in Muslim societies, and it will confirm – if need be – the

artificial nature of any division between learned and popular religious orientation and practice.

Without even attempting to be exhaustive, this first volume seeks to underline the diversity of the scholarly, literary and artistic forms of representation of the Prophet in various temporal and cultural contexts and in different parts of the Muslim world, with a clear preponderance of Arabic and Turkic literatures. Some of the contributions concern a specific time and place, while others highlight the maturation of doctrines and the adaptation of topics and genres to novel requirements in a diachronic perspective. The volume thus includes a wide range of representations of the Prophet, from the Qurʾān and the early *maghāzī* literature to literary samples and devotional and calligraphic artefacts of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, combining in-depth case studies with overview articles. By juxtaposing the development of Sufi orientations towards the Prophet with the place given to him, along with ʿAlī b. Abī Ṭālib in Twelver and Ismāʿīlī Shīʿism, and with the very specific views of the Muslim philosophers on prophethood, this book seeks to open up perspectives on the cross-connections between multiple attitudes towards the figure of the Prophet. The literary and artistic expressions of veneration and love for the Prophet which have been gathered here, might likewise offer a promising field for further comparative research on the actualisation of his presence in different cultural, medial and linguistic settings in the course of Muslim history.

The volume's five sections begin with a focus on the representations of the Prophet in Qurʾān, *ḥadīth* and *sīra/maghāzī* literature and their cultural embedding in Muslim societies (Part 1). This is followed by a closer look at the developments leading towards a theology of veneration of the Prophet in Sunnī Islam (Part 2). The images and functions of the Prophet in Shīʿī doctrine and in Islamic philosophy are then presented in a comparative perspective (Part 3). The two concluding sections discuss the poetic exaltation of the Prophet across different Islamic literatures (Part 4), and the strikingly common characteristics of his aesthetic representation in literary, scriptural and pictorial imagery (Part 5).

This structural and thematic approach made it impossible to bring all the contributions into a strictly diachronic arrangement, which would show an undeniable progression and deepening of scholarly and devotional prophetology and an increasing personal attachment to his person. Nevertheless, within each section, a certain chronological order has been observed to illustrate such a development as closely as possible. Along with its thematic perspectives, the book thus documents an observable historical process, albeit one that appears to have been far from continuous. There was no shortage of reactions to manifestations of devotion deemed excessive over the centuries; reactions which, however, have followed their own Prophet-centred agenda and have only belatedly reversed a pious trend that had been largely driven by Sufism over centuries. In many respects such anti-Sufi prophetologies can be seen as belonging to the same trend towards a Prophet-centred piety that they otherwise detested. It is in the second volume, devoted more specifically to the early modern and contemporary periods, that these controversies are more fully discussed.

In general terms, this first volume attempts to reflect some of the early developments of Islamic prophetology and devotion and their fanning out into different fields of doctrinal, literary and artistic expression. With the Qurʾān and the early *maghāzī* literature as points of departure, the underlying historiographical framework first touches the period between the eleventh and thirteenth centuries. It can be considered as formative both for the emergence of a prophetological doctrine encompassing elements of *fiqh, kalām* and Sufism, and for a turn in Sufism itself which attempted to explore and imitate the "inner states" (*aḥwāl*) of the Prophet for its journey towards God. This is also the period when the concept of the "Reality" (*ḥaqīqa*) of the Prophet as a metaphysical and cosmogonic principle gained its strength and maturity. Quite significantly, the celebrations of the Prophet's birthday (*mawlid al-nabī*) were also established during that period, first by the Fatimid rulers of Egypt in the eleventh century and then, in a different way, by Sunnī rulers.[4] Such an interplay between the different Sunnī and Shīʿī doctrinal and devotional traditions also made itself felt in prophetological thought in later times with the adaption of Sunnī theosophical ideas by Shīʿī theologians and philosophers.[5]

The next focus is on the period between the thirteenth and sixteenth centuries, with its flourishing culture of *ḥadīth* transmission and scholarship, its unprecedented abundance of literary expressions of Prophetic praise and devotion, and the emergence and flourishing of pictorial representations of the Prophet.[6] A time which equally saw the transformation of the *Khaṣāʾiṣ al-nabī* literature from a legal to a devotional literary genre.

The last period covered by this volume includes studies related to authors and devotional and artistic developments from the seventeenth to the nineteenth (and in one case twentieth) century, with a focus on the Ottoman realm and on Morocco. Veritable cultures of Prophetic piety can be identified for both Ottoman and Moroccan societies during these times, which are documented here by Sufi writings, by the literary genre of the Ottoman *miʿrāciye*, in the pious and artistic uses of the *ḥilye* (i.e. the description of the Prophet's appearance and character) in Ottoman lands, and in Moroccan calligraphic art. Scholarship on the Biography (*sīra*) of the Prophet can be found taking on an encyclopaedic outlook, reacting, so it seems, to increasing criticism of the Muslim pious traditions and practices. At the same time, devotion to the Prophet seems to have become a remarkable catalyst for both literary and artistic activities in this period.

The rather selective thematic profile of our volume can only provide some explorative perspectives on a general chronological framework for the history of Islamic prophetology and Prophetic piety. Such a framework remains to be fully worked out; for the first Islamic centuries as well as for the early modern and modern periods until the present.

Part 1. Images of the Prophet in Qurʾān, ḥadīth, and sīra/maghāzī, and Their Cultural Embedding

The first part of the book opens with studies on the image of the Prophet as presented in the Qurʾān and in other early foundational texts of Islam and of Islamic historiography, which highlight the tension between the ordinary human nature of the Prophet, and his universal mission and authority over the destiny of mankind. At the same time, it attempts to trace the embedding of this image and the negotiation and

transmission of the Prophetic tradition in Muslim cultural life in different historical contexts.

While the usefulness of the Qurʾān as a source for a historical biography of Muḥammad has been questioned, it nevertheless has much to say about the Prophet, sometimes touching on highly personal matters. Without going into the current controversies about the beginnings of the Qurʾānic text and its early development, we can nevertheless note that the Qurʾān, in its final form as a *textus receptus*, seems to contain, both explicitly and allusively, many of the themes that are discussed in the three volumes of our series. As Denis Gril shows in *The Prophet in the Qurʾān: An attempt at synthesis*, the mentioned tension between the human nature of the Prophet and the superhuman aspects of his mission pervades the whole book. His Lord sometimes treats him severely, reminding him of his powerlessness and of his election. It is because he is a humble servant of God that he has been distinguished to receive the revelation and to be taken away to see "some of Our signs" (Q 17:1) and has become "a beautiful model" (Q 33:21) for his followers. The Qurʾān establishes a certain form of identification between the Prophet and the other prophets, a mirror effect which in the tradition will turn into an outspoken superiority, particularly with regard to the *miʿrāj*. On the other hand, the text very clearly enjoins believers to devote full obedience and profound veneration to the Prophet. It therefore forms the basis for much of what our research seeks to bring out in the writings, practices and experiences of Muslims.

If the Qurʾān emphasises above all the mercy of the Prophet, it nevertheless sometimes also shows him as a leader and combatant in an uninterrupted chain of military expeditions, a role in which he is found in the *sīra* throughout the Medina period. Adrien de Jarmy argues that the emergence and development of the *maghāzī* literature describing the battles of the Prophet and his successors enhanced this representation as a war leader. He observes that this coincided with the transition period between the Umayyad and Abbasid regimes, which saw increased pressure on the borders of the empire (*Dating the Emergence of the Warrior-Prophet Character in the Maghāzī Literature (Second/Eighth – Fourth/Tenth Century)*. In this context of a revived *jihād* against external enemies, the refocusing of the Islamic narrative on the figure of the Prophet as a fighter in defence of his community and a guarantor of its

cohesion, the nascent *maghāzī* and *sīra* literature became part of a general trend that can also be identified in early jurisprudence.

The transmission of Prophetic Traditions remained of major importance for Muslim scholarship and religious life long after the establishment of the canonical collections of *ḥadīth*. The dynamics of this persisting institutional as well as extra-institutional transmission after these collections has remained a rather neglected theme in Islamology. Caterina Bori offers an illustration of this open-ended process in *Ḥadīth culture and Ibn Taymiyya's controversial legacy in fifteenth century Damascus: Ibn Nāṣir al-dīn al-Dimashqī and his al-Radd al-wāfir*. She recalls the whole "culture of *ḥadīth*" that can be observed since the Ayyubid period in Damascus, and that created a community of *ḥadīth* transmitters and scholars who by their *isnād* links strove to remain in a lasting connection with the Prophet. As in the case of Nāṣir al-Dīn al-Dimashqī (d. 842/1438), director at the Madrasa Ashrafiyya, a leading institution for the teaching of *ḥadīth* in Damascus, and his defence of Ibn Taymiyya, this community was also seen as maintaining its attachment even to more controversial members. Nāṣir al-Dīn, contemporary and friend of Ibn Ḥajar al-'Asqalānī (d. 852/1449), resolutely defended the *mawlid* celebrations against Ibn Taymiyya's fierce criticism. At the same time, he could afford to accept the legitimacy of the latter's honorific title of *shaykh al-islām*, for his valuable contributions to the scholarly and devotional activities of this group of *ḥadīth* transmitters. As a basis for personal and collective links to the Prophet, *ḥadīth* could thus play an integrative and conciliatory role within the religious milieu of fifteenth century Damascus.

The *sīra* fulfils a similar but broader function, by telling of the exemplary and incomparable life of the founder of Islam, attempting to satisfy a scholarly as well as a more general readership. It is also a conciliatory role that Catherine Mayeur-Jaouen brings out for the *sīra* written by the Shaykh Nūr al-Dīn al-Ḥalabī (d. 1044/1635) at the beginning of the seventeenth century (*"There is matter for Thought". The episode of the Night Journey and the Celestial Ascension in the* Sīra ḥalabiyya). Tributary of the earlier *sīra*s, in particular those of Ibn Sayyid al-Nās (d. 734/1334) and al-Ṣāliḥī (d. 942/1536), Ḥalabī draws on many other sources. He reworks a rich Mamluk heritage in order to recast it in his own version. The section on the night journey and the heavenly

ascension illustrates how the author, a lawyer, theologian and Sufi, seeks to reconcile the different versions of the story, to give a satisfying explanation to its controversial elements and to bring out its spiritual dimensions. From a certain point of view, "the *Sīra ḥalabiyya* portrays the author as much as the Prophet." But it is no less true that al-Ḥalabī quite successfully responded to the expectations of his audience. The *sīra* and, through it, the Prophetic figure serve as a mirror for the believers; and the superiority of the Prophet, evident in the story of *isrāʾ* and *miʿrāj*, radiates upon his entire community.

Part 2. Towards a Theology of Devotion to the Prophet in Sunnī Islam

The emergence and standardisation of a fully-fledged Islamic prophetology can be regarded as a major theological change in Sunnī Islam, that is attested for the sixth/twelfth century. It went along with a gradual shift from doctrinal to devotional orientation vis-à-vis the image of the Prophet. The history of Sufi teaching and practice already shows this increasing focus on the Prophet and his example since the fourth-fifth/tenth-eleventh centuries, a development that in later times led to the emergence of a Sufi trend that attempted to cultivate an education for a spiritual life in the presence of the Prophet himself.

Ruggero Vimercati-Sanseverino analyses al-Qāḍī ʿIyāḍ's classical book *al-Shifāʾ bi-taʿrīf ḥuqūq al-Musṭafā* and its comprehensive prophetological synthesis (*Theology of veneration of the Prophet Muḥammad: Knowledge and love in the* Shifāʾ *of al-Qāḍī ʿIyāḍ (d. 544/1149)*). The author, Qāḍī of Sabta/Ceuta under the late Almoravids, marshals for this several disciplines: *ḥadīth, sīra, dalāʾil al-nubuwwa*, jurisprudence (*fiqh*) and theology (*kalām*). By demonstrating the high rank of the Prophet and his status as God's elect among the creatures, he reminds the believers that, according to *ḥadīth*, the love of the Prophet is a condition of faith and thus becomes a religious duty. Although only God knows the true value (*qadr*) of His messenger, Qāḍī ʿIyāḍ explains to the Muslims how to find in the Qurʾān and *ḥadīth* sufficient reasons for the veneration and love of the Prophet, by referring to his virtues and his excellent character, to his miracles as well as to his promised intercession at the day of judgement. The *Shifāʾ* thus reinforces the Sunnī idea of a community of believers united in the love of the Prophet

for attaining happiness in both worlds. Unquestionably, the book has contributed greatly to the rise of a prophetic piety whose modes of diffusion and expression are discussed in this volume.

In his *"Special Features of the Prophet"* (Khaṣāʾiṣ nabawiya): *From Jurisprudence to Devotion*, Michele Petrone outlines the evolution of a literary genre that was extracted from the religious source texts. It elaborated and discussed the legal privileges (*khaṣāʾiṣ*) granted to the Prophet to the exclusion of the rest of mankind. This genre was first cultivated in particular by Shāfiʿī jurists interested in a clarification of the legal implications of these *khaṣāʾiṣ*. It later came under the influence of other categories of writings on the Prophet, such as the *Sharaf al-Muṣṭafā* of Khargūshī (d. 406/1015–6) and the *Shifāʾ*, and other writings which emphasised the superiority of the Prophet over the rest of mankind. The three works of Suyūṭī (d. 911/1505) reflect the different stages and indeed a turning point of this shift from the juridical to the devotional domain, finally focusing on the Prophet's centrality in the whole cosmos and on his spiritual role for mankind. The Sufi influence on the genre, also expressed in poetical contributions like those of ʿĀʾisha al-Bāʿūniyya (d. 922/1517), further expanded during the Ottoman period, when it came to provide materials for prayer books like those of Ibn ʿAẓẓūm of Kairouan (d. 959/1552).

Which place does the reference to the Prophet occupy among the early spiritual masters of Islam? Based on the biographical material collected in the *Ḥilyat al-awliyāʾ* of Abū Nuʿaym al-Iṣfahānī (d. 430/1037), Pierre Lory states that, for the early representatives of the movement of renunciation (*zuhd*) in the first two Islamic centuries, the love of God seems to be exclusive, the Qurʾān shows the way to Him, and the *sunna* serves to attain an inner conformity to the teaching of the Prophet. (*Modèle prophétique et modèle de sainteté dans le soufisme ancien: quelques exemples*). Sufism would later deepen the concept of *walāya* and to develop it into a "friendship with God". Lory identifies a hagiographic vision of *walāya* as sainthood and sacred heritage, which includes the Companions of the Prophet, the first ascetics and the early Sufi masters. A turning point is marked by the assimilation of the Sufi tradition of Baghdad to that of Khurāsān, as testified by the *Lumaʿ* of Sarrāj (d. 378/988). Emphasis was now increasingly placed on the imitation (*ittibāʿ*) of the Prophet and the internalised

observance of the prophetic model, including his legal prescripts, his manners (*ādāb*) and virtues (*akhlāq*), his spiritual states (*aḥwāl*), and his insight into the higher realities (*ḥaqāʾiq*). But this did not go as far as in later Sufism, and the early orientation towards the One God Himself was vigorously maintained.

The focus of Sufi instruction on the Prophet gained unprecedented force in the twelfth/eighteenth century in the book of the Fāsī scholar Aḥmad b. al-Mubārak al-Lamaṭī (d. 1156/1743) on the teachings of his illiterate master ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz al-Dabbāgh (d. 1132/1719). This is discussed by Jean-Jacques Thibon (*L'éducation par 'la lumière de la foi du Prophète' selon le shaykh ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz al-Dabbāgh (m. 1132/1719) d'après le* Kitāb al-Ibrīz *de Aḥmad b. al-Mubārak (m. 1156/1743)*). Noting, like Pierre Lory, that there is little reference to the Prophet in ancient and classical Sufism, he also mentions the growing institutional expression of the master-disciple relationship along the model of the Prophet and his companions from the twelfth/thirteenth century onwards. He observes that, in al-Lamaṭī's book, the old centrality of the Sufi master gives way to a direction of the disciple towards a spiritual education leading to the living and transforming presence of the Prophet himself. Spiritual education according to this author and his Sufi master was to be based on the capacity of the disciple to form a direct link to the Prophet. Al-Dabbāgh, the illiterate saint claiming Khaḍir, the itinerant prophet, as his master is quoted with often highly original guidance and advice, and for his own continuing relationship with the Prophet. From this experience he derived a peculiar concept of Sufi training (*tarbiya*), supposed to lead the disciple via the master into the immediate presence of the Prophet, who would then occupy his entire mind and horizon. The influence of this book came to be widely felt in the Muslim world. It testifies to a culmination of Prophet-centred mystical doctrine and piety that can be documented for different parts of the Sunnī world between the seventeenth and the early nineteenth centuries.

Part 3. The Prophet in Shīʿī Doctrine and in Islamic Philosophy

In the first two sections, the figure of the Prophet, in its various aspects, is considered from the point of view of the foundational texts and of some of the disciplines of knowledge that directly spring from their interpretation (such as *fiqh* and *kalām*), and

with respect to his growing centrality in Sunnī devotional life and in Sufi thought and practice. The third section turns to other doctrinal configurations in Twelver Shī'ism, Ismā'īlism, and philosophy, which combined strands of cosmological thought with a salvation history based on reputed hidden knowledge of the Prophet and his descendants (in the case of Shī'ism) or with a general framework of a universal ethical and political order for mankind (in the case of the philosophers).

Whereas in Sunnism a cosmic and esoteric reality of the Prophet took several centuries to be commonly accepted, this dimension appears in Shī'ism from the very beginning as the foundation of the doctrine of the imamate and the *walāya* (to be roughly translated in the Shī'ī context as "friendship" and "trusteeship"), and its necessary connection with prophethood. The founding narrative of Shī'ism closely linked the Prophet to his family and descendants, especially to 'Alī and the Imams as trustees of the hidden meaning of the revelation. For all their historical differences, Twelver Shī'ism and Ismā'īlism continued to share this relational structure of the doctrine of the Imamate.

Philosophy maintained a special position towards the Prophet and towards Islamic knowledge and doctrine as a whole, as it had to adapt its doctrines, which were derived from Greek and Hellenistic sources, to the Islamic tradition. It may be said that the result was a figure of the Prophetic law-giver and ruler that appeared more functional than personal.

If Sunnism, and Sufism in particular, acknowledge a particular closeness of 'Alī b. Abī Ṭālib to the Prophet and accept his excellence in virtue and knowledge, this cannot be compared to his place in Shī'ite doctrine as Muḥammad's closest ally and friend (*walī*) and his designated trustee and inheritor (*waṣī*). His status as "God's Friend" (*walī Allāh*) is made explicit even in the Shī'ite profession of faith, and Shī'ī veneration for 'Alī and his descendants, the imams, came to outweigh the respect paid to the Prophet himself. The way in which the relationship between the Prophet and 'Alī is expressed in Twelver Shī'ism follows to some extent its history and its general intellectual development, as Mathieu Terrier shows in his chapter, *The Prophet Muḥammad in Imami Shī'ism: Between History and Metaphysics*. The life of the Prophet is inextricably

connected with that of ʿAlī and his family and descendants, with whom he shares his primordial and luminous reality, and his central role in a salvation history of suffering. But Shīʿism does not neglect the figure of the Prophet, whose life prefigured the historical fate of ʿAlī, his sons and the other Imams: he predicted their death and died of poison himself. As the founding principle of revelation, he is also connected with them on the metaphysical level, where the imams are regarded as the actualisation of the Prophetic original potentialities. His veneration thus remains inextricably linked to that of the Imams.

Despite its similarity to Imamism, the doctrinal vision of the Ismāʿīlī authors concerning revelation and prophethood, which is described in the overview presented by Daniel de Smet (*The Prophet Muḥammad and his Heir ʿAlī: their historical, metahistorical and cosmological roles in Ismāʿīlī Shīʿism*), appears first and foremost to be shaped by the concept of a sacred and cyclical history. Some of them tended to equate the "Five" (i.e., Muḥammad, ʿAlī, Fāṭima, Ḥasan and Ḥusayn) with cosmic principles structuring the universe. Fāṭimid ideologues, bent on maintaining the hierarchical precedence of the Prophet, regarded his relationship to ʿAlī in analogy to that between male and female, reflecting "pen" (*qalam*) and "table" (*lawḥ*) of the original creation. Later Nizārī authors placed the authority of ʿAlī over that of the Prophet. Their doctrine also found expression in a triad consisting of ʿAlī, Muḥammad and Salmān. ʿAlī's esoteric knowledge represented divine authority for them, and he took clear precedence over Muḥammad, with Salmān serving as the "Proof" (*ḥujja*) of the Imams. Nizārī authors expected a future unveiling of the Imam's quasi-divine reality and finally the abolition of the Law. Among the Ṭayyibites, closer to the Fāṭimid stock, a certain balance was maintained between the Prophet, his Trustee, and the Imams, between their human nature (*nāsūt*) and their veiled reality in the divine sphere of the universal intellect (termed here *lāhūt*).

The concerns of the Muslim philosophers with respect to the Prophet are summarised by Meryem Sebti in her *La dimension éthique et politique de la révélation prophétique chez les falāsifa*. It was not the historical or sacred figure of the Prophet which interested them, but rather the question of what it means in philosophical terms to have among men the bearer of a law of divine origin. Al-Kindī saw the Prophet

Muḥammad as an embodied perfection of intellectual and rhetorical ability, as bringer of a Law that ensured a virtuous life for mankind. Fārābī also considered the ethical and above all the political dimension of the revealed Law. For Avicenna the preservation of the "Virtuous City" depended more explicitly on revelation, and on prophecy as the perfection of the human soul in its theoretical and practical dimensions. The efforts of the philosophers to bring philosophy and religion into harmony found their culmination with Averroes. Perhaps more than his predecessors, he insisted on the need to maintain the teachings of religion for success in this world and for salvation in the other, as well as for the preservation of the community. The Prophet's mission was to bring otherwise unattainable knowledge and laws to mankind. For Averroes and for his philosophical predecessors, the role of the Prophet and of religion itself thus seems to have been above all of a practical, ethical and political nature.

Part 4. The Splendour of Words: Exaltation of the Prophet in Islamic Literatures

The image of the Prophet that was conveyed by the foundational texts of Islam as well as by theology, jurisprudence, Sufism and philosophy, deeply permeated the Muslims' general orientation and beliefs. It shaped sensitivity, heightened hope, nurtured reverence and aroused love for a Prophet who was perceived as close to the believers and to their community at large. The increase in Prophetic piety that can be observed since the sixth-seventh/twelfth-thirteenth centuries is all the more evident in poetry, *belles-lettres* and in the arts, as they affected both intellectual and aesthetic sensibilities. The art of letter writing, long elaborated by the chanceries of the Muslim states, came to be used to address even the Prophet himself. The narrative of the Prophet's Ascension (*miʿrāj*), in turn, particularly inspired poets as well as miniaturists. The stylistic wealth and diversity of the poetry in praise of the Prophet, which was taking root in a multitude of different languages, shows the extent to which he had moved to the centre of poetical imagination and virtuosity. This poetry also became a cherished object of musical performance in the art of *samāʿ*.

The devotional use of the epistolary genre for addressing the Prophet, which enjoyed particular popularity in al-Andalus and in the Maghreb, is described by Nelly Amri in her article on the famous scholar, *adīb* and statesman Lisān al-Dīn b. al-Khaṭīb (*'I have commissioned her to fly to you on the wings of my ardent desire'. Letter to the Prophet written by Lisān al-Dīn b. al-Khaṭīb (d. 776/1375) on behalf of the Naṣrid ruler of Granada*). For the Andalusians and North Africans, letters addressed to the Prophet were a means of expressing their longing for the distant holy cities and their love for the Prophet, and of asking him for his help and intercession, as pilgrims otherwise do during their *ziyāra* to his tomb. Ibn al-Khaṭīb brought this literary genre to perfection in letters written on behalf of a ruler of Granada, whose realm was increasingly threatened by his Christian neighbours. The request for divine assistance through the mediation of the Prophet was ever more urgent. Recalling the Medinese roots of the Naṣrid dynasty (tracing itself back to the Anṣār) also serves to enhance their legitimacy. Apart from this political context, the letter conveys a widely shared "Prophetic culture" centred around the holy cities, the life and mission of the Prophet, his virtues and his primordial reality, his support in this world and his intercession in the other. It also includes a more personal imagination of an interior *ziyāra* as a journey of the heart.

Brigitte Foulon adds a study of three further poems in praise of the Prophet written by Ibn al-Khaṭīb during his stay in Morocco (*Les poèmes d'éloge du Prophète de Lisān al-Dīn Ibn al-Khāṭīb*). She recalls that, after the life of the Prophet, eulogies were rather addressed to members of his Family by poets of Shīʿite tendency. It was not until the sixth/twelfth centuries, particularly in Andalusia, that poems in praise of the Prophet came to be written again. In the following century, the *Burda* of Būṣīrī (d. around 695/1296) marked the blossoming of this literary genre. Its links to the commemoration of the *mawlid* gave rise to a derivative branch of its own, the *mawlidiyyāt*, in which Ibn al-Khaṭīb also distinguished himself, like many poets of his time in Andalusia and Morocco. In the Marinid kingdom, these manifestations of the veneration of the Prophet went along with the growing importance of his descendants, the *ashrāf* or *shurafā'* in the social and political sphere. In these poems the whole art of the panegyrist consists in reorienting the themes of the classic *qaṣīda* towards the

thwarted but sublimated desire to meet the Prophet, finally culminating in his praise and in a plea for his help.

The literature of the stories of the night journey and the celestial ascension of the Prophet, inspired by allusions in the Qurʾān and by the longer narratives attested in *ḥadīth* and *sīra*, constitutes one of the most eloquent testimonies to the cross-cultural veneration of the Prophet.[10] Marc Toutant demonstrates this in his article on the *miʿrāj* in Timurid court literature (*Timurid Accounts of Ascension* (miʿrāj) *in Türkī. One Prophet, Two Models*). The choice of Eastern Turkish, and of the Uyghur alphabet in the case of the first text, illustrates the importance attached by the Timurids to their Genghisid origins. The first text, which is abundantly illustrated, closely renders the traditional story with its first-person narrative, and ends with a vivid description of Paradise and Hell, with obvious moral intentions that tie in with the political program of Shāhrūkh (1405–1447). The five *miʿrājiyya* poems of Mīr ʿAlī Shīr Nawāʾī (1441–1501), court poet and chief adviser of the next Timurid ruler Ḥusayn Bayqara (1469–1501) in Herat, pursue an entirely different line. Inspired by the major Persian poets Sanāʾī (d. 1131) and Niẓāmī Ganjawī (d. early seventh/thirteenth century), the author describes the *miʿrāj* as a mystical journey of love (*safar-i ʿishq*) through the cosmos with its heavens and planets, leading to the vision of God and ending in a "non-place" beyond existence, where all duality has vanished. The dissemination of these two different, but by no means contradictory, types of narrative went far beyond the Timurid court, and both seem to have met the expectations of much wider audiences.

Alexandre Papas tracks the remarkable continuity of the Ottoman *miʿrāciyye* in verse or prose from the fifteenth century until the final period of the Ottoman Empire (Miʿrāciyye: *The Ascension of the Prophet in Ottoman literature from the fifteenth to the twentieth century*). These texts are characterised by a relative simplicity of style, which served their didactic scope. The authors, most of them connected with or influenced by Sufism, presented the *miʿrāj* as a spiritual ascent. Over and again, they return to the questions raised by the Prophet's ascension: did it take place in a dream or awake, in body or in spirit? What was the nature of this encounter and exchange with God? The age-old debates about the reality of the celestial ascension had not been brought to a close and could be re-opened with any new intellectual turn: consequently, the figure

of the Prophet remained a contested heritage. The Ottoman *miʿrācnāme* or *miʿrāciyye,* often including praise (*naʿt*) and descriptions of the Prophet (*ḥilye*), did not cease until

Part 5. The Prophet in the Mirror of Verbal, Scriptural and Pictorial Imagery: Aesthetics and Devotional Uses

Together with its rich poetic imagery, the representation of the Prophet also came to involve visual elements, whether in the form of figurative illustrations enhancing his memory and majesty, of calligraphic compositions evoking his name and description, or in the display of acknowledged relics like his mantle, sandals or footprints which served to conjure his symbolic presence. Such visual displays also involved his assimilation to ritual practices that were accepted as Islamic but, at the same time, included patterns that were clearly inherited from earlier religious traditions. Calligraphy and book art also served to enhance the aesthetic effect of texts dedicated to the memory and glory of the Prophet, and the beauty of letters, words and texts might appear as his own beautiful reality, reflected by the heart and hand of the calligrapher. Textual descriptions, calligraphic compositions and painted images were thus merging in the figure of the Prophet, as visual or textual icons in the service of devotional imagination. This interplay of verbal, pictorial and calligraphic iconography can be found as far back as the thirteenth century, when depictions of the Prophet are first attested. The tendency moves from his naturalist depiction to veiling and to further spiritualisation and abstraction, and finally to a notable preponderance of calligraphic and verbal icons and abstract forms and symbols representing Muḥammad. Devotional aesthetics may endow them with the aura of sacred objects, which radiate their blessing and sacralise their surrounding space as well as their owners and visitors.

The reality and image of the Prophet according to the theologian and poet ʿAbd al-Ghanī al-Nābulusī (*d. 1143/1731*), by Samuela Pagani, leads us to a leading Sufi figure of Ottoman Syria in the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. ʿAbd al-Ghanī al-Nābulusī (d. 1143/1731), representative of the school of Akbarian Sufism and imbued with the mystical poetry of Ibn al-Fāriḍ (d. 632/1235), was a highly prominent Damascene scholar and spiritual master and, at the same time, one of the most productive poets of his time. Both his Sufi teaching and his poetic oeuvre have the luminous "Muḥammadan Reality" (*ḥaqīqa muḥammadiyya*) as their main axis, which can be experienced in dreams or visions in a waking state, linked to the intermediary sphere

between the spiritual and material worlds (*barzakh*), where divine and higher realities take on visible forms. In such visions the Prophet can be perceived in an authentic way, either in his physical appearance as described in *ḥadīth* (the so-called *ḥilya*), or in purely symbolic and imaginary forms. This is where poetry with its rhetorical figures (*badīʿ*) and images comes in to exalt the "Muḥammadan Reality" in the language of love and passion. For Nābulusī, the interior immersion in the presence of the Prophet justifies all forms of devotion and can manifest itself even in Christian imagery, as attested in his own poems. Pagani draws remarkable parallels between his theory of a spiritual and symbolic Muḥammadan imagery and the Christian theology of iconic images, as developed in Arabic already by Abū Qurra (d. 830), bishop of Harran, in an Islamic context. She also refers for this to ʿAbd al-Ghanī's substantial intellectual exchange with one of the leading Christian Orthodox bishops and theologians of his time in the Levant.

Christiane Gruber reconstructs a ritual practice involving glass bottles filled with devotional objects and ornaments, among them a calligraphic description of the Prophet, which survive in the Palace Library at Topkapı and elsewhere and which in some cases can be dated to the early nineteenth century (*The Prophet as a Sacred Spring: Late Ottoman* Hilye *Bottles*). The gilded *ḥilye* panels which were included together with poetic texts represent a highly popular calligraphic icon of the Prophet, based on a famous *ḥadīth* of ʿAlī who describes his appearance and character. In one of the samples, a miniature Qurʾān is included instead. The bottles, whose scrapped gold dust remains were collected and used for curative procedures, can be related to a whole set of practices consisting in impregnating or even absorbing *materia prophetica* in order to benefit from its blessing and its prophylactic and healing effects. In Istanbul, the water used to wash his relics like the footprints of the Prophet and his cloak was equally collected and distributed for such uses. Gruber furthermore draws a parallel to the Christian Orthodox icon bottles and to the veneration of sacred fountains (Greek *hagiasma*, Turkish *ayazma*) in Istanbul itself, in which Muslims also participate. This shows the common anchoring of such practices in local culture. The bottles also prove that devotion to the Prophet touched all classes of society, from the Palace of Topkapı to the popular districts of Istanbul.

Along similar lines, Thomas Heinzelmann analyses three life stories and eulogies of the Prophet that were among the most widely read texts in the Ottoman Empire (*Visualising the Prophet – Rhetorical and graphic aspects of three Ottoman-Turkish poems* (*Süleymān Çelebi's* Vesīlet en-Necāt, *Yazıcıoǧlı's* Risāle-i Muḥammediyye, *and Ḫāḳānī's* Ḥilye). Composed in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, they were widely copied and distributed, consecrated as pious foundations, and read but also viewed to admire their layout and beautiful calligraphy, which was deemed to be worthy of the beauty of the Prophet. Some unique abstract illustrations symbolising the Prophet and his Companions are also attested. The three books were written by authors of diverse backgrounds, all of them, however, representatives of an Ottoman spiritual book culture centred on the figure of the Prophet. The *Risāle-i Muḥammediyye* was the object of particular veneration. The original, kept at the author's mausoleum in Gelibolu (Gallipoli), was constantly copied. One of these copyists, the famous Sufi scholar Ismāʾīl Ḥaqqı (m. 1137/1725), was also keen to reproduce, from the original, the drawing of the "Banner of Praise" (*liwāʾ al-ḥamd*), an eschatological symbol of the Prophet's intercession. The manuscripts show that, over the centuries, such images were touched and kissed, and thus used for a physical contact with the Prophet, which was sought for blessing and salvation, testifying to the use of such abstract images as devotional icons.

As indicated above, calligraphy itself could also serve as a medium for identification with the Prophet and for an immersion in his message. The fusion of mystical experience and calligraphic expressivity is brought out for al-Qandūsī (d. 1278/1861), a Sufi herbalist and calligrapher who lived and died in Fes, by Francesco Chiabotti and Hiba Abid (*The World of al-Qandūsī (d. 1278/1861). Prophetology and Calligraphy in Morocco (first half of the nineteenth century*). Attracted from his Algerian home *zāwiya* to Fes by the presence of its founder, Moulay Idrīs, Qandūsī earned his life as a drug-seller. He remained dedicated to his ecstatic and visionary experience and to his calligraphic activities that uniquely show the impact of his contemplations. His case is also important for his personal reflections on the all-compassing "Muḥammadan Reality", which shaped his personal experience as well as his struggles with the calligraphic form of the letters. His efforts led to the development of a unique and quite spectacular calligraphic style which is now highly appreciated in the Maghreb. Qandūsī

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saw himself in hidden but close contact with the Prophet and even considered the name Muḥammad as the Supreme Name of God. The calligraphic and codicological analysis of his works shows how the design and tracing of the letters, especially for the name Muḥammad, combined the expressive potentials of the Maghribī script with the inventiveness of the visionary, where the wonders of the eye and the devotion to the Prophet would feed off each other.

Concluding Remarks

Reading the studies in this volume will show how much their themes and findings intertwine and converge, despite their different sources, disciplines and historical and regional contexts. The "theology of veneration", elaborated by the Qāḍī ʿIyāḍ, enhanced a reverential attitude of love towards the Prophet, which was interpreted by a great scholar like Ibn al-Khaṭīb with great brilliance as an heir to the long Andalusian tradition of epistolary eloquence and poetic refinement. Much later, the poetry and metaphysics of the Muḥammadan Reality were expressed in a similar language of love passion. The narratives of the *mawlid* and *miʿrāj* transmitted by traditionalists, such as Ibn Nāṣir al-Dīn, and arranged and argued later in the *Sīra ḥalabiyya*, fed into the register of the Moroccan singers, just as they inspired the imagination of Timurid and Ottoman poets. Spiritual fulfilment could be expressed in the *miʿrāj* model (as in the poems of Nawāʾī), in musical performances celebrating the beauty of the Prophet, and in Qandūsī's visionary calligraphy.

As already stated at the beginning, a recurring theme of the volume is the interplay between the human and the divine aspects of the Prophetic Reality. The Qurʾān constantly recalls the human nature (*bashariyya*) of the Prophet while alluding to the pristine light which he embodies, and his closeness to God. It thus sacralises his presence. This double face of the Prophetic person, one immediately perceptible, the other more veiled, is encountered at several levels. Ancient Sufism distinguishes between the external and internal aspects of the *sunna*, complementary but inseparable in the imitation of the Prophet. The distinction between the exterior and the interior (*ẓāhir/bāṭin*) dimensions runs through many contributions. It can be traced as much to these two divine names as to the attitudes toward the Prophet himself, and

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saw himself in hidden but close contact with the Prophet and even considered the name Muḥammad as the Supreme Name of God. The calligraphic and codicological analysis of his works shows how the design and tracing of the letters, especially for the name Muḥammad, combined the expressive potentials of the Maghribī script with the inventiveness of the visionary, where the wonders of the eye and the devotion to the Prophet would feed off each other.

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it might also be reflected in the literary genres and their attunement to their popular or initiated audiences, as in the case of the Timurid *mi'rāj* texts. Personal predilections of the respective authors also played their role here, as in the case of Ibn al-Khaṭīb's letters to the Prophet or of Ḥalabī's *Sīra*. From this point of view, Shī'ism, in its ancient spiritual version, and Ismailism occupy a place apart from but consistent with this foundation of Muslim spirituality: the external and internal faces of reality veil and complement each other. In the case of Shī'ism, Muḥammad as Prophet was largely identified with the exoteric aspects of the revelation, whereas 'Alī b. Abī Ṭālib and the Imams became the guardians of its esoteric dimension. In Sunnī spirituality, mediation passes, if not exclusively, at least mainly through the Prophet. But the role of the Shī'īs as forerunners of pious emotional and ritual practice related to the Prophet, as in the case of the *mawlid* celebrations, still remains a matter for further research.

Esoteric vision cannot be separated from more essential functions of the Prophet, such as his intercession at judgement day for all believers. It may be expressed in terms reserved for an elite but nevertheless concerns the whole community when an Ismā'īlī author like Mu'ayyad al-Dīn al-Shīrāzī compares the relationship between the Prophet and 'Alī to that of a male-female couple and their position vis-à-vis the believers as that of father and mother. The set of stories that have nourished the *Sīra* literature, especially those of the battles and warlike expeditions, aims at uniting the community in the face of the trials that it has to face. The *mi'rāj* narratives highlight the superiority of the Prophet over all his peers and magnify his sublime rank above them. Explicitly or implicitly they also affirm the primacy of the Muḥammadan community over the earlier ones. The evolution of the *khaṣā'iṣ* literature also goes into this direction. In a more subtle way, the author of the *Sīra ḥalabiyya* also intended to unite the community around its Prophet, by discussing and harmonising narrative variants and diversities of interpretation. The Qāḍī 'Iyāḍ, in promoting "the veneration of the value of the Prophet" pursued a comparable goal which, judging by the success of his *Shifā'*, was largely achieved. Strangely enough, this integrative function of the Prophet for the Muslim community is not much reflected in the sources themselves; with the notable exception of the philosophers (*falāsifa*), who show themselves to be strongly interested

in the ethical and political role of the Prophets as lawgivers for the "Virtuous City", and of the Prophet Muḥammad for the Muslim polity.

As indicated above, a major starting point for our collective research was the observation of a general increase of Prophetic piety since the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, which strongly gained in momentum in the early modern period and still persists in different and sometimes diverging forms to this day. This went along with a growing personal and collective focus on the metahistorical reality of the Prophet, which has emerged before in esoteric teaching. In early Sufism up to the eleventh and even the twelfth century, the exclusive love of God blurred the love of the Prophet, which was only later advocated as the major way to God. This trend seems to be undeniable, even if it still requires closer periodisation and contextual embedding. The role of the *Kitāb al-Shifāʾ* as a watershed in this respect becomes clearer now, and its contribution to the emergence of a Prophetic model of spirituality in Sunnī Islam, which coincided with the diffusion of the writings of Ghazālī, in the West as elsewhere, should obviously be re-evaluated.

In the blossoming of a "Prophetic culture" in which scholarly literature, Sufism, poetry, arts and devotional practices were intertwined, the period between the fourteenth and sixteenth centuries was crucial, and it was to have a strong impact on the next centuries. The later Ottoman and Moroccan cases, which are discussed in this volume, show a further intensification of the individual commitment to the Prophet in mystical, literary and artistic activities. The studies suggest that personal identification with the Prophet could sometimes go far. At the same time, an expansion and diversification of the devotional patterns of Prophetic piety can be documented, and its expressions clearly increased in fervour. The tendency towards a symbolic and abstract allusion to the Prophet, which evokes his presence and blessing in pictorial as well as in expressive calligraphic forms, has already been highlighted for Ottoman art since the seventeenth century; it is further confirmed in this volume and can also be extended to Morocco. Even if not discussed here, oral as well as written poetry in praise of the Prophet also greatly increased in a growing number of languages in the early modern period, a process that continues to the present day and which will be further addressed in Volume Three.

This volume does not deal with the reactions and polemics against the Sufi doctrines of the Muḥammadan Reality, and against the devotional practices that went along with them. These criticisms, which have gained in public acceptance and political virulence in the course of the twentieth century, will be further discussed in the other volumes (especially in Volume Two). In the face of Salafī/Wahhābī "elephants in the room" in so many Muslim states and societies, and also in research on contemporary Islam, the studies gathered here will hopefully help the reader to overcome the prevailing backward-looking tunnel vision dominated by a search for Salafī and "reformist" predecessors of the present state of Muslim culture. It should have become clear by now that religious and political trends, even "liberal" or "secular" ones, which crystallised since the late nineteenth century in Muslim social and political life, owed as much to the growth of Prophet-centred pious trends as to the active contributions of both Sufis and their adversaries. The responses of this Prophetic piety to the transformations of the Muslim lifeworlds and polities in early modern and modern times remain a topical and indeed urgent matter for further inquiry. In any case, the interplay between doctrine, literature and arts, that has been the topic of this volume, clearly shows that Muslim individuals and communities all over the world have continued to reflect and define their own identity in the mirror of the Prophet and his established biography, and in the beauty and grandeur of his celestial experience. <>

The Presence of the Prophet in Early Modern and Contemporary Islam, Volume 1, The Prophet Between Doctrine, Literature and Arts: Historical Legacies and Their Unfolding Editors: Denis Gril, Stefan Reichmuth, and Dilek Sarmis [Series: Handbook of Oriental Studies. Section 1 The Near and Middle East, Volume: 159/2; The Presence of the Prophet in Early Modern and Contemporary Islam, Volume: 159/2, Brill, ISBN: 9789004466746]

The three-volume series titled The Presence of the Prophet in Early Modern and Contemporary Islam, is the first attempt to explore the dynamics of the representation of the Prophet Muhammad in the course of Muslim history until the present.

This first collective volume outlines his figure in the early Islamic tradition, and its later transformations until recent times that were shaped by Prophet-centered piety and politics. A variety of case studies offers a unique overview of the interplay of Sunnī amd Shī'ī doctrines with literature and arts in the formation of his image. They trace the integrative and conflictual qualities of a "Prophetic culture", in which the Prophet of Islam continues his presence among the Muslim believers.

Contributors: Hiba Abid, Nelly Amri, Caterina Bori, Francesco Chiabotti, Rachida Chih, Adrien de Jarmy, Daniel De Smet, Mohamed Thami El Harrak, Brigitte Foulon, Denis Gril, Christiane Gruber, Tobias Heinzelmann, David Jordan, Pierre Lory, Catherine Mayeur-Jaouen, Samuela Pagani, Alexandre Papas, Michele Petrone, Stefan Reichmuth, Meryem Sebti, Dilek Sarmis, Matthieu Terrier, Jean-Jacques Thibon, Marc Toutant, Ruggiero Vimercati Sanseverino.

This second volume of the *Presence of the Prophet* series engages with the task to analyse the significance of the figure of the Prophet in the early modern and modern periods for questions of power, authority, and individual and collective self-empowerment. This includes rulers, scholars, and activists who have claimed his material or spiritual heritage as leaders or saviours. The chapters of this volume go back to a workshop in Bochum ("The Prophet and the Modern State" – May 2018) and to a colloquium held in Marrakesh ("The Prophet and His Heritage" – November 2018) where they were presented and discussed for the first time.

The historiographical and chronological framework of the collection starts out with the early modern Muslim empires and regional states in the period between approximately 1450 and 1700, followed by a focus on the age of transformations and revolutionary ruptures of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. It then shifts to the formation of Muslim nation-states and their ideologies since the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and finally to the thoroughgoing changes that Muslim states and societies have faced from the late 1970s onwards until the present.

The beliefs, practices, and ideologies connected with the figure of the Prophet generally followed long-term developments and were not automatically subject to the sometimes rapid changes and upheavals of political history. But they nevertheless have remained sensitive to the transformations in the political sphere, and to the crises of conscience, legitimation, and power that often go along with them. In such times of crisis, which may also involve recognised or self-acclaimed inheritors of the Prophetic legacy, it is particularly difficult to maintain a distinction between the time frame of a religious or intellectual "history of Islam", on the one hand, and that of the political "history of the Muslims", on the other, and to restrict attention only to one side of the historical process.

The thematic set-up of this volume roughly follows a chronological order. It begins (Part 1) with the role of the Prophet in the imperial piety promulgated by the Ottoman court, and on the Prophetic model and its significance for the revolutionary Islamic movements of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, before and during European commercial and military encroachment. Part 2 explores the social and political role of the descendants of the Prophet in different regional and political contexts. The focus, in Part 3, then shifts to the Prophet and his place in the ideologies and political practice of Muslim nation-states since the early twentieth century. Finally, Part 4 discusses patterns of attachment and reference to the Prophet in processes of social and communal mobilisation and empowerment, and even of attempted state-building, in the contemporary Muslim world. The coverage of the different periods and polities could only remain far from exhaustive, but the reader will find contributions on states and countries as distant as Morocco, Albania, Turkey, Egypt, Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India.

Empires and Revolutions

Part 1 highlights a long-term phenomenon of the religious and political sphere which can be traced to the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries and remained effective throughout the early modern period. This was the emergence of the Prophet as protector and model for divinely guided rulers and founders of imamates, sultanates, and empires. Marked by the rise of the three large Muslim empires of the Safavids,

Ottomans, and Mughals, this period saw dramatic developments taking place both in Europe and in the Muslim world along with an upsurge of eschatological expectations. Shared by Muslims and non-Muslims alike, these have even been labelled as a "millenarian conjuncture" as they affected regions as distant as Portugal and India. An intensification of the pious attachment to the person of the Prophet, at individual as well as collective levels, can equally be observed in many regions of the Muslim world during that period. Supported by these widespread messianic sentiments, sultans and emperors set out for conquests of new territories or for the reconquest of areas and cities that had for a long time formed part of Christian kingdoms.

These Muslim conquerors who saw their struggles as following the footsteps of the Prophet of Islam presented themselves as renewers of his community and claimed his worldly and spiritual heritage for themselves. In order to reinforce this attachment to the Prophet and to enhance their political legitimation, they encouraged the public veneration of his person and patronised large celebrations of his nativity. In Chapter 1, Gottfried Hagen argues that this cult, under the auspices of the House of Osman, became part of a specific configuration of Islamic religiosity that was centred on the persona of the Prophet. It was mainly informed by literary and calligraphic media (*sīra*, praise poetry, *ḥilye, mawlid*) and by rituals like the display and honouring of the Prophet's relics, such as his mantle and his banner. These performances highlighted Prophetic charisma and promoted emotional expressivity. They invoked the presence of the Prophet's person and promised to lead to salvation by means of spiritual immersion rather than by imitative orthopraxy (although the two certainly could never be neatly distinguished). Ottoman religious and historical scholarship can also largely be seen as serving this image of the charismatic Saviour-Prophet.

Considerably informing this political patronage, devotional practices related to the person of the Prophet were strongly framed by the Sufi brotherhoods whose geographical and social expansion was at its peak during the early modern period. Sufis followed the conquering armies as protectors and spiritual advisors to the soldiers and sultans. The Sufi shaykh Āq Shams al-Dīn (Akşemsettin), spiritual master of Mehmed II, predicted to the sultan the fall of Constantinople (1453) and pointed out to him the tomb of Abū Ayyūb al-Anṣārī (Eyüp Sultan), companion of the Prophet, in the vicinity

of the Byzantine city; this became the place of the famous sanctuary at the Golden Horn, where the Ottoman sultans would henceforth be girded with the sword of Osman.

The Khalwatiyya brotherhood played an important military as well as cultural role in the Ottoman conquest of the Balkans. Similarly, the Naqshbandiyya of Central Asia extended to northern India and the Deccan in the wake of the rise of the Mughal dynasty. In Iran, the Safavid dynasty itself emerged from a Sufi *ṭarīqa* (pl. *ṭuruq*) whose founders claimed Prophetic descent and later passed to Shī'ism. In the Maghrib, the alliance and interplay of Sufism and Sharīfism gave birth to the great *zāwiya*s, some of which would shape the cultural and political history of this country throughout the early modern period. Particularly, the veneration of the *ashrāf* (sing. *sharīf*) in Morocco was strongly backed by the *ṭuruq* and became institutionalised in the fifteenth century, at the time of a profound weakness of a ruling dynasty facing Christian offensives against the country's ports and cities. As a result, men of God who regarded themselves as invested with the mission of renewing religion rose up to defend the *dār al-islām*. Here, as in the case of the Safavids in Iran, the rise of a new Sharīfian dynasty in the sixteenth century enjoyed strong popular and Sufi support and unfolded in a climate of fervent eschatological expectations.

From North Africa and the Middle East to Central Asia and South Asia, Muslim rulers relied on the patronage of Sufi shaykhs and their brotherhoods for the sake of legitimation and for the establishment of Sunnī Islam in the conquered regions. Along with the erection of mosques, mausoleums, and Sufi centres (*khānqāh*s, *tekke*s, *zāwiya*s), cults of saints of local or translocal significance would frequently develop. Sainthood was often derived from the doctrine of the cosmic reality of the Prophet as a primordial light giving birth to the world, and as an intercessor for his community. He was thought to extend his blessings through the saints, the "Friends of God" (*awliyā' Allāh*), as his spiritual representatives. The Prophetic heritage thus came to be shared in Sufi ideology between Prophetic descent and identification with the Prophet through spiritual realisation of his model; two concepts that remained in a close but tense relationship to each other.

The cult of the Prophet and of the saints did not go uncontested. The old debates and polemics that centred around the doctrine of Muḥammad's mediation and intercession and the religious practices to which they gave rise had been revived since the fourteenth century, particularly in the circle of Ibn Taymiyya (d. 1328) and his followers. They were now resumed with renewed vigour in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries by Birgilī (or Birgivi) Meḥmed Efendī (d. 1573) and his successors, the Kadizadelis, a puritan and anti-Sufi movement which became highly influential in the Ottoman capital as well as in the provinces, especially in Syria. The Kadizadelis engaged in fierce confrontations with their adversaries, and sometimes physically attacked the Sufis and their *tekke*s. They contested many of the theosophical and mystical doctrines and practices of the time and advocated a return to the historical model of the Prophet through a strict application of his *sunna*. Following the long tradition of anti-Sufi writings, they denied the claims of the Sufi shaykhs to charismatic authority and called for respect of the sacred texts alone.

The two further contributions to Part 1, which highlight the significance of the Prophetic model for the revolutionary Islamic movements of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, reflect this tense antagonism between the Sufis and their opponents in religious and political life. Enmity against the Sufi veneration of saints and the Prophet found its most radical and exacerbated expression in the Wahhābī movement in Arabia. Its view of the Prophet and of Islamic history is discussed by Martin Riexinger in Chapter 2 on the summarised biography of the Prophet titled *Mukhtaṣar sīrat al-rasūl* (Short version of the life of the Prophet), written by Muḥammad b. ʿAbd al-Wahhāb (d. 1792). In his narrative, which is largely based on the *Sīra* of Ibn Hishām, all episodes which illustrate the superhuman nature of the Prophet have been left out; he retains only those which describe him as an ordinary human being who was not free from error (as demonstrated by the famous story of the "Satanic Verses"). Imitation of him therefore had to be restricted to clearly normative matters. The author passes over all the miraculous events connected with the foretold coming, gestation, and birth of the Prophet, thus undermining the whole doctrine of the "Muḥammadan Light" as the principle of creation, one that is celebrated in all the *mawlid* narratives which were so popular at his time. Even the most outstanding

event in the traditional accounts of Muḥammad's life, his heavenly ascension (*mi'rāj*), is also dealt with only briefly.

The obvious insistence on Muḥammad as an ordinary human being is supposed to clear him of any veneration that would tarnish the sole worship of God alone (i.e. the *tawḥīd al-ulūhiyya*, the central tenet of Wahhābī ideology). This *sīra* can also be read as an ethical and political programme: it is the Muslims who have now succeeded the prophets in their task to educate and coerce mankind whenever it lapses into idolatry (*shirk*), and to lead it back to the path of God by re-enacting the Prophetic model. Riexinger finally brings out the cyclical and basically pessimistic view of human history underlying Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhāb's *Sīra*. It may be added that it appears difficult not to relate this moral pessimism to the turmoil of the author's lifetime, which had overlapped in his early years with Nādir Shāh's stunning military incursions into the Ottoman and Mughal empires.

The anti-Sufism of the Wahhābī emirate of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries clearly remained an influential though marginal position in its time. In fact, most contemporaneous Islamic reformist and revolutionary movements in the different parts of the Muslim world were strongly shaped by Sufism and by Sufi brotherhoods active in their regions; even if they shared a good deal of their reformist agenda with the Wahhābīs. In Chapter 3, Stefan Reichmuth's comparative overview of these movements highlights the crucial role of their attachment to Prophetic models and proposes to view them as part of a Muslim "Age of Revolutions". They roughly coincided with the revolutionary period in Europe and America but took on their own religious and political dynamics well before being drawn into the confrontation with European – and Chinese – imperial expansion. Reichmuth presents in detail four features, widely shared among them, that illustrate the attachment of these movements to the Prophet. They include a strong reliance on Prophetic *ḥadīth* for their doctrinal positions and their religious practice; an orientation towards Medina and the creation of local memorial landscapes connected with the Prophet and his companions; a programmatic emulation of the Prophet as a source of religious and political mobilisation; and a cultivation of eschatological expectations, including the posing of their leaders as "renewer" (*mujaddid*) or even as the Mahdī. Taken together with their

creativity in developing new models of an Islamic political order for their regions, they add to the profile of a Muslim revolutionary age that would exert a lasting impact on the Muslim world of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

Prophetic Descent and Authority

In Part 2, the political and social role played by the descendants of the Prophet (*sayyid*s, *ashrāf*) in different regions and times is explored by three contributions. Chapter 4, by Jaafar Ben El Haj Soulami, traces out the historical development of the institutionalised body of the Prophetic descendants (*niqābat al-ashrāf*) in the Maghrib. Although the Mālikī scholars of this region were familiar with the legal framework for the *niqāba* as part of the caliphal apparatus, which had been largely shaped by the Shāfiʿī jurist Māwardī (d. 450/1058), the institution did not play any notable role until the Marīnid period, when the status of the *ashrāf* was much enhanced by the sultans. Under the Sharīfian dynasties the apparatus of the *niqāba* was much diversified and brought by some of its most energetic rulers under their close supervision. The legal framework was adapted to the needs of the Sharīfian status groups, and the directories of Sharīfian families were updated several times amid larger efforts initiated by the sultans. The later centuries also saw a rise of genealogical and historical studies among the Moroccan scholars, who thus responded to the increasing significance of the *ashrāf* in the country, and to the need for the protection and control of the membership of this prestigious group, which kept its considerable political potential vis-à-vis the royal court. The account shows in an exemplary way the social and political integration of the *ashrāf* into a Muslim polity of the early modern period that was ruled by a Sharīfian dynasty.

In India, in eighteenth-century Delhi, the famous Sufi and poet Mīr Dard (d. 1785), described by Soraya Khodamoradi in Chapter 5, attempted to conceive of a Sharīfian solution to the divisions and sectarian conflicts between Sunnīs and Shīʿīs, which were regaining strength with the decline and decentralisation of the Mughal Empire. Being of Prophetic descent himself and belonging to circles of the Naqshbandiyya Mujaddidiyya founded by Aḥmad Sirhindī (d. 1622), he claimed a revival of the line of the Shīʿī Imams in the person of his father, the founder of a Sufi *ṭarīqa* of his own,

which he had called "The Pure Muḥammadan Path" (*Ṭarīqa Muḥammadiyya Khāliṣa*). Dard's elaborated concept of the *ṭarīqa* of his father, whose authority was to be founded on both genealogical and spiritual links to the Prophet, was offered by him as a model for the reconciliation of Sunnīs and Shīʿīs under this Sufi umbrella. Dard and his father thus posed as bearers of religious renewal and as unifiers of a Muslim community in the grip of a deep political, moral, and religious crisis. Even if this peculiar branch line of the "Muḥammadan Path" clearly remained a road not taken by others, it illustrates the enduring self-concept of prominent *sayyid*s who were still able to regard themselves as standing above the sectarian divisions in Islam.

The case of the contemporary "Syndicate of the Descendants of the Prophet" (*niqābat al-ashrāf*) in Egypt, studied by Catherine Mayeur-Jaouen in Chapter 6, describes a very old institution whose recent history is anchored in the construction of the Egyptian state under Muḥammad ʿAlī (1805–48). Dissolved after the revolution in 1953, it was re-established in 1991 and became situated together with the headquarters of al-Azhar (*mashyakhat al-azhar*) and the state institution responsible for fatwas (*dār al-iftāʾ*) in a set of three modern buildings in neo-Mamluk style, not far from the old centre of Cairo. Its main activity, the verification of Sharīfian genealogies, relies on the established science of genealogy (*ʿilm al-ansāb*). At the same time, it also reinforces the interconnections and the status of a family-oriented Islam in Egypt, which is still strongly territorialised and closely connected with Sufi families and activities. Its social and religious dimensions locate the *niqāba* outside the bureaucratic and political world to which it belongs at first sight. It is part of an Egyptian Islam that defies globalisation and insists on endangered continuities. It can ultimately be identified as an interpretation of the Prophetic intercession that forms the basis of the very constitution of the *ashrāf* as a privileged group – a claim now disputed by Salafism and ignored by a majority of Egyptians.

Modern Nation-States and Ideologies

Part 3 covers a period of profound political change, ranging from the revolution of the Young Turks, the First World War and the end of the Ottoman caliphate to the birth of

the Turkish Republic and the Soviet Union, to the independence movements after the Second World War and to the birth of new nation-states.

Some Turkish accounts of Muḥammad's life which appeared in the late nineteenth century had already presented him as a reformer who brought about profound social reforms for the society of his time. By this they attempted to legitimise the reforms initiated by the Ottoman state. Still before the revolution of the Young Turks, the historian Ahmed Refik (d. 1937), trained at the military school, had authored a small work on the military campaigns (*ghazawāt*) of the Prophet (published in 1906). Its four chapters are devoted to his four most important battles, which are illustrated with maps and sketches. Miracle stories are either ignored or minimised in this narrative which portrays the Prophet and the companions as embodiments of all the qualities required for a perfect soldier in a modern army.

Representations of the Prophet continued to play an important role in the intellectual debates before and after the First World War. The sacred image of the Prophet that had still prevailed in the nineteenth century gave way under the combined impact of European imperialism and orientalism, to the model of a military and political leader and of a religious and social reformer, which was disseminated by the new printed media and literary genres of the time. Classical accounts of the Prophet were reoriented or rewritten to serve nationalist projects. A famous case was the adaptation of Būṣīrī's famous poem in praise of the Prophet, the "Mantle ode" (*Qaṣīdat al-burda*), by the Egyptian poet Aḥmad Shawqī (d. 1930). His version, titled "The way of the mantle" (*Nahj al-burda*), was written in 1910 in a country facing Ottoman decline and British occupation. This poem restructures the *Burda* "into a forceful and eloquent plea for the restoration of the Islamic Ummah based on 'humanistic' concepts which he locates in the Classical Arab-Islamic past". It became a huge success, especially in its version which was sung by Umm Kulthūm in post-World War II Egypt.

The writing of biographies of the Prophet, which had declined in the nineteenth century, re-emerged in Egypt during the interwar period – but in a complete break with the traditional *sīras*. The aim of these modern biographies was ideological and didactic and was aimed at a broader public. There was no longer any question of miracles or

legends, and Muḥammad is presented in them as an ingenious human being responding to the needs of his time. This reorientation also responded to a political and cultural disenchantment with Europe and found its strongest expression in Muḥammad Ḥusayn Haykal's *Ḥayāt Muḥammad* (1935). He attempted to recall the genius of the Prophet in order to reconcile the eternal truths of Islam with human reason and with the changing practical demands of modern society. This trend continued until the 1960s, when ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Sharqāwī's *Rasūl al-ḥurriya* (The messenger of freedom, published 1962) presented the Prophet as a precursor of Nasserist socialism.

The model of Muḥammad as a social and political reformer was also cultivated by Muslim and even Arab Christian Communists who supported the emerging Soviet Union. In Chapter 7, Renaud Soler follows the career of Bandalī Ṣalībā Jawzī (d. 1942), a Palestinian Orthodox Christian who turned towards Marxism and settled as an academic in Baku, keeping his connections with the Arab Middle East throughout his life and continuing to write in Arabic along with Russian. In his magnum opus, *Min tārīkh al-ḥarakāt al-fikriyya fī l-islām* (On the history of the intellectual movements in Islam, printed in Jerusalem in 1928), he outlines his views on the life of the Prophet for an Arab readership by integrating him into his Marxist scheme of dialectical materialism. Here, the Prophet appears as an authentic Arab reformer who tried to reduce the existing inequalities of wealth and the oppression of women in his society, and who fought against tribalism without perceiving or being able to touch at the roots of social disorder. As such he sees him as a forerunner of a future socialist order for the Arab and Muslim world, which was further foreshadowed by the revolts of Bābak and the Ismāʿīlīs and Qarmaṭians in ʿAbbāsid times.

In the period after the Second World War, the Prophet was instrumentalised by the nation-states which had emerged in the meantime. They presented him as a model and identity founder for their nationalist and pedagogical projects. Even in the most secular of these states a gradual shift towards a strengthening of their Islamic character can be observed since the 1990s, which also touches upon the public status of the figure of the Prophet.

This comes out very clearly in Dilek Sarmis's Chapter 8, on the role of the Prophetic figure in school textbooks and religious education in Turkey. Whereas the figure of the Prophet Muḥammad had been overshadowed by that of Mustafa Kemal, who was associated with the Prophetic role by nationalist intellectuals in the 1920s and 1930s, it has markedly increased in visibility in the pedagogical literature since the 1980s. It can be noted that the earlier doctrinal and historical approach to the Prophet has been superseded by his role as a model for citizenship and human exemplarity for the Turkish state. The moral figure of the Prophet became functional for the solution of questions of identity and social conflicts faced by the individual citizen. As an instrument of educational and social engineering, he remains a common identifier for Turkish citizenship. Paradoxically, the moralisation of a modern republican Prophet has also led to a recognition of public rituals connected with his birth (*mawlid*) and to a revival and institutionalisation of *sīra* studies.

In the case of post-Communist Albania studied by Gianfranco Bria in Chapter 9, the celebration of the Prophetic birthday (*mevlud* in Albanian) was gradually integrated into the cultural framework of a secular Albanian nationalism. Already since the late Ottoman period, *mevlud* literature was firmly established as part of the national literary culture. In the interwar period, *mevlud* celebrations had become an important element of public Islamic piety in a pluralist and confessionalised kingdom, and an emotional and performative medium for Muslim religiosity. The radical socialist secularisation that followed this period virtually wiped out the religious practice of the *mevlud* and its literary memory. The post-socialist era, still dominated by a socialist heritage of secular rationalism, has seen a state-sponsored revival of the *mevlud* as a political expression of identity and patriotic belonging to the Albanian nation.

In Chapter 10, Jamal Malik's study of the position of the Prophet in the legal and constitutional framework and its social reality in Pakistan traces the trajectories of laws related to blasphemy in British India, followed by their translation into the Pakistani constitution and penal law against the backdrop of the discussion on the Islamicity of the fledgling state. In the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, the majority of judgements on this issue have been pronounced against non-Muslims and minorities. The atrocious consequences of the public handling of these laws are exemplified with three cases that

have caught the attention of the national and international media: the assassination of the governor of Punjab in 2011 with the subsequent veneration of his murderer, the lynching of Mashal Khan in early 2017, and the spectacular rise of the religio-political party Tehreek-e Labbaik Ya Rasool Allah in late 2017 and 2018. These cases provide some understanding of the struggles between local factions competing for the scarce resources of patronage and public goods, in which the Prophet becomes a major point of reference.

In Chapter 11, David Jordan investigates the changing representation of the Prophet Muḥammad in the public discourse of the Iraqi Arab Socialist Baʿth Party from 1943 till 2003, which underwent a striking increase of its religious expression during and after the First Gulf War. Focussing on the role of the Prophetic figure in Baʿthist ideology and politics throughout this period, Jordan argues that, in the core, the Baʿth regime remained committed to its secular principles till the end but gradually increased the incorporation of the Prophetic heritage into the official political language. The turn towards the use of Islamic traditions and motifs by an Arab nationalist regime can be explained as a strategic attempt to take advantage and remain in control of the general Islamic and religious resurgence that could be observed throughout the Islamic world and beyond since the late 1960s. This was a political move that fuelled and promoted this resurgence even further.

Mobilisation, Empowerment, and Social Reform

Part 4 is dedicated to attempts to claim the Prophet for efforts at social and political mobilisation and reform. If his figure was desacralized by reformist religious currents and by nationalist leaders and their parties like those in Iraq, Syria, and Egypt, a resacralization of social and political life set in from the 1970s onwards which spread throughout the Muslim world. The course of the Iranian Revolution (from 1979), the war against Russian occupation in Afghanistan (1979–89), and the breakdown of the Soviet Union (1991) formed the backdrop to a multifaceted process of social Islamisation and for the proliferation of Islamic educational, missionary, and political movements. These were led by Islamic scholars, preachers, intellectuals, and students, who have increased their public recognition and their political weight in many Muslim

countries. The Prophet has once more moved to the centre of the efforts of diverse religious actors for social and religious reform and political empowerment, for militant resistance against foreign powers, and for the establishment of an Islamic state in the turmoil of multisided warfare in the Middle East.

The positivist approach to the life and mission of the Prophet already permeated the writings of the early Muslim reformists of the twentieth century. Florian Zemmin (Chapter 12) explores the construction of the Prophet as an ideal religious and social reformer, which was put forward by the Syrian Islamic intellectual Rashīd Riḍā (d. 1935), in his journal *al-Manār* and in his tremendously successful book titled "The Muḥammadan inspiration" (*al-Waḥy al-muḥammadī*, first published 1933). Based on a distinction between a true and universal Islamic religion (*al-islām al-dīnī*) and its actual innerworldly manifestations (*al-islām al-dunyawī*), Riḍā attempts to construct Islam as a programme of comprehensive reform in all social and political fields, aiming at the perfection of humans as individuals and collectivities. His representation of a modern Prophet pursued two aims: on the one hand, the emotionally charged figure of the Prophet mediated the salience and practicability of abstract Islamic principles to a wider audience; on the other hand, he served as a role model and lent authority to Riḍā himself, who poses in his writings as a self-styled reformist. Zemmin shows that the debates about religion and modernity and the pedagogical reconstruction of the figures of the prophets as reformist role models were not unique to Islam but can also be found in the contemporary writings of Jewish and Christian intellectuals and theologians. Riḍā's activist view of the Prophet already foreshadows the concept of an individual moral recovery (*iṣlāḥ fardī*) from contemporary decadence, which would provide the base for a reform of the whole society (*iṣlāḥ jamāʿī*) and for its immunity against imperialist influence, and which was later developed by the Islamist thinker Sayyid Quṭb (d. 1966).

Rachida Chih, in Chapter 13, discusses the writings and activities of Shaykh Abdessalem Yassine ('Abd al-Salām Yāsīn, d. 2012), founder of the so-called Islamist movement "Justice and Spirituality" (*al-ʿadl wa-l-iḥsān*) in Morocco, who claimed for himself the title of "reviver of religion" (*mujaddid al-dīn*), predestined to restore the purity of the faith and renew Islamic law. He identified with this role on the basis of his Sharīfian

and Sufi legacy and set himself the mission of the moral reconstruction of the Muslim mind. This he saw as a preliminary step that would lead to the building of a society defined by Islam. He also founded his own community (*jamāʿa*) as a model for this new society. On the basis of the examination of his major work, *al-Minhāj al-nabawī* (The Prophetic path), Chih analyses Yassine's concept of the Prophetic heritage. Relying on the memoire of a messianic mysticism that has been identifiable in Morocco since the Middle Ages, which he fused with concepts of activist piety borrowed from the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, Yassine established himself with this book in the eyes of his followers as an imam predestined to set in motion a great social transformation. This would restore the Islamic community to its original purity by placing it under the direction of an actualised *sunna* of the Prophet.

Alix Philippon's Chapter 14 offers a social movement approach to the Sufi organisation which has been at the centre of the anti-blasphemy campaigns over the recent years in Pakistan (discussed already by Malik in Chapter 10 from a more legal and constitutional perspective). The example used for this are the Barelwis, a Sufi and theological movement originating from nineteenth-century India, which has most loudly proclaimed its love for the Prophet and has posed as a staunch defender of his honour against any attacks. The author describes the figure of the Prophet Muḥammad as a symbolic reference point and an "empty signifier" (Laclau) for the negotiation and structuring of social conflicts, and for the articulation of political claims for collective action. After participating in several political alliances of Islamic groups, the Barelwi activists finally succeeded in taking the lead in the protest against the publication of the (in)famous *Satanic Verses* written by Salman Rushdie. An organisation called "Preservation of the Honour of the Prophetic Message" (Tahaffuz-e Namoos-e Risalat) was founded by them for this purpose. In later times the Barelwis who always struggled for recognition vis-à-vis the other Islamic organised bodies like the Deobandis and the Jamaʿat al-Islamiyya came to the fore with their calls for a rigorous application of the death penalty for blasphemy. The author describes the background and activities of one of the most active and most successful Barelwi leaders, Pir Afzal Qadri (b. 1953). He is the founder of several religious organisations, and patron of a mass movement, Tehreek-e Labbaik Pakistan (TLP, mentioned above), which has become the main

protagonist of these anti-blasphemy campaigns which managed to exert maximum pressure on the Pakistani government and judiciary. It finally took part with considerable success in the nationwide elections of 2018, by this reasserting the position of the Barelwis in the political landscape of Pakistan.

The different uses of Prophetic images by a wide selection of actors in Afghanistan who were involved in the resistance against the Communist regime in Kabul and the Soviet military invasion between 1978 and 1992 are investigated by Jan-Peter Hartung in Chapter 15. His analysis of rare source materials (mainly in Pashto) shows a considerable variation in the uses of the images of the Prophet that were invoked, depending on the social and educational background of these activists. While urbanised Islamist circles emphasised Muḥammad's role as military commander and statesman, those of rural and tribal origins rather stressed his image as the ideal guide to salvation in the hereafter. A closer look into such images in Pashto poetry, classical and contemporary, suggests that both positions seem to have historical antecedents, which reflect distinct ethical frames that are at play in the Pashtun-dominated borderland between Afghanistan and Pakistan. One that resonates well with the urbanised Islamists stresses the princely virtues as an epitome of Pashtunness, while the other, reflecting the views of more subaltern rural and tribal actors, emphasises egality as the Pashtun social ideal. Islamic ethics, epitomised in the figure of the Prophet, thus articulates in distinct ways with the different social layers of Pashtun society.

The most recent attempt to create an Islamic caliphate built on the Prophetic model was the so-called Islamic State (IS), which was established in northern Iraq and eastern Syria and whose remnants still linger on in scattered groups of fighters in the Syro-Iraqi borderland and in other regions of the Middle East and North and West Africa. In Chapter 16, Christoph Günther, who has analysed the self-expression of the IS (founded 2013) and its predecessors in Iraq after 2003, highlights the role of the Prophet Muḥammad as a major source of self-legitimisation for these and other groups of the Jihādī-Salafī current. He scrutinises several topics and symbols which illustrate the effort of the IS to appropriate the Prophetic aura and presence for its own authority. Via texts and songs (*anāshīd*), and by their highly elaborated propaganda films they

frequently refer, directly or indirectly, to the Prophet or to the nascent Muslim community under his leadership. But Günther also argues that, although IS leaders have fiercely claimed to defend pristine Islam and to follow the most exact interpretation of its sources, they hardly engaged intellectually with the *sunna* itself. The figure of the Prophet has been mainly evoked by them for spectacular actions and for their aesthetics of violence in order to equip their own rule with Prophetic power.

If nothing else, the contributions to this volume may serve to illustrate a Weberian truism about the interplay of economic and political developments with religious and cultural phenomena, which may be conditioned by economic and political processes but may also be relevant for them. This interplay includes pious as well as strategic patterns of identification with the Prophet. Each case has, of course, to be observed and closely assessed in order to clarify its specific constellation of factors. Collective attachment to the Prophet and political strategies pursued by leaders, individuals, and groups seem to reinforce each other in several ways in the described case studies, which expose the contradictions and weaknesses of the respective political and legal systems. The Prophet comes out in them as a larger-than-life symbol of sociopolitical representation and identity (Chapter 9), as the model of an ideal reformer (Chapter 12) or of a civilised citizen (Chapter 8), as ancestor of the leader and supra-confessional integration figure (Chapter 11), with his honour serving as a rallying cry against internal enemies (Chapters 10 and 14). He may also reinforce princely or egalitarian values in urban or rural settings (Chapter 15), offer a model for a future utopian society under an ideal leader (Chapter 13), or enhance the power of a self-acclaimed caliphate (Chapter 16). In many of these exemplary cases, his presence and authority have been evoked with diverse and sometimes quite innovative forms of communication and in novel organisational settings.

Conclusion

The resurgence of Islam which unfolded since the late 1970s has been such that even states that had pursued a policy of secularisation could not fail to refer to religion in order to legitimise their authority. The Prophet, who had been emptied to a large extent of his spiritual dimension in public and political life, was then invoked again as

an eschatological figure. The case study of Iraq (Chapter 11) provides perhaps the most telling example of the radical ideological turn of a secular government towards the revival of the figure of the Prophet as intercessor and saviour since the war against Iran in the 1980s and the humanitarian crisis provoked by the Gulf War in the 1990s, with the president posing as a descendant of the Prophet and accusing Imam Khomeini (himself also a *sayyid*) to be an enemy of Islam.

It appears striking that the actors of the recent Islamic mobilisation movements quite often relate themselves in their identification with the Prophet to the revolutionary Islamic movements of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries in their home regions and beyond, whether to those in Arabia, West Africa, or in South and Central Asia (see Chapter 3). Or they revive older patterns of religious doctrine and expectation along Prophetic or Imamic lines, as in the Islamic Republic of Iran or in the case of Morocco (see Chapter 13). Islamological research has often let itself be taken in by this historical self-identification of Islamist actors, without giving sufficient attention to the contemporary challenges that they have been facing together with their societies, and to the unmistakably modern traits of their movements.

But all of the contemporary Islamic movements certainly fit into a general historical trend that can be observed throughout the early modern and modern period. It consists in the growing importance, from late medieval times onwards, of the figure of the Prophet, in learned religious circles as well as in popular piety. This has been supported and encouraged by the political elites who, from the fifteenth century onwards, made their links with the Prophet a source of legitimation for their own power.

The figure of the Prophet, which throughout history oscillated between human and superhuman dimensions, has been constantly reappropriated under different modes of reference. This can be related to its eschatological quality, which – as argued in the general introduction – not only invites expectations regarding the end of the world but also beliefs in a salvation already unfolding in the present. In imperial times, sultans and emperors displayed their ethical, spiritual, and charismatic links with the Prophet as a source of legitimation and a promise of universal peace and justice (as seen in Chapter 1 for the Ottomans). In the revolutionary movements of the eighteenth and

early nineteenth centuries the Prophet was referred to as the founder of the original and authentic Muslim community, and as a model of action. In the times of the nationalist movements and the struggles for independence, he was presented as an ideal head of state, a reformer of his society, a source of law and social order, and even as a guardian of Muslim identity and culture. Therefore, his presence has not diminished, neither with modernity nor with the processes of secularisation which have unfolded in most Muslim countries. The explorative studies of the diverse political representations of the Prophet, which have been collected in this volume, bring out the impact of both secularisation and sacralisation on the Prophetic model. They reveal a process full of tensions between these two poles, and an interaction of pious attachment and strategic ploys, which has emerged with full vigour in the hardening of Sunnī–Shīʿī relations, and in an increasingly globalised struggle over the control of the image of the Prophet. One can only speculate about the consequences that this political instrumentalisation will have for Prophetic piety itself. <>

The Presence of the Prophet in Early Modern and Contemporary Islam, Volume 3, Prophetic Piety: Individual and Collective Manifestations, Editors: Nelly Amri, Rachida Chih, and Stefan Reichmuth [Series: Handbook of Oriental Studies. Section 1 The Near and Middle East, Volume: 159/3, Brill, ISBN: 9789004522619] Open Access

This third collective volume of the series *The Presence of the Prophet* explores the expressions of piety and devotion to the person of the Prophet and their individual and collective significance in early modern and modern times. The authors provide a rich collection of regional case studies on how the Prophet's presence and aura are individually and collectively evoked in dreams, visions, and prayers, in the performance of poetry in his praise, in the devotion to relics related to him, and in the celebration of his birthday. They also highlight the role of the Prophetic figure in the identity formation of young Muslims and cover the controversies and compromises which nowadays shape the devotional practices centered on the Prophet.

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Malik, Youssef Nouiouar, Luca Patrizi, Thomas Pierret, Stefan Reichmuth, Youssouf T. Sangaré, Besnik Sinani, Fabio Vicini and Ines Weinrich.

This volume on individual and collective forms of Prophetic piety is the third and final part of a series devoted to the presence of the Prophet in early modern and modern Islam. It results from a collaborative endeavour joining researchers from France and Germany. As with its two predecessors, this volume considers the dynamics and forms of the perception, construction, and representation of the Prophetic figure since the early modern period. Key notions in this approach are the production of a presence of the Prophet by Muslim believers, their emulation of his model, and their identification and interaction with him; these combine to serve them as a mirror for understanding their religious beliefs, practices, and affiliations. By examining such processes, we can explore Muslim faith, along with practices and religious attachment relating to the Prophet over different times and in different societies.

Structured according to three main themes, our series follows a roughly diachronic perspective. The first volume discusses the emergence and development of the image of the Prophet as metahistorical reality, and as an intermediary and intercessor between the divine and human spheres. It documents the unfolding of this image in the early modern and modern periods in different fields of knowledge, and in literature and the arts. This prepared the field of investigation for the second guiding theme of our programme, treated in the second volume: the claim of the Prophetic heritage and of Prophetic descent as a way of legitimising both religious authority and political power. This gained in importance after the end of the ʿAbbāsid caliphate in Bagdad (656/1258), especially with the emergence of the large Muslim empires from the fifteenth century onwards. It also continued through the decline and regionalisation of these empires, and into the emergence of new religious movements and states, even before the impact of European imperial expansion. The rise of Muslim nation-states and ideologies in response to European colonial rule in the course of the twentieth

century follows as another major topic. The desacralisation of the image of the Prophet, an idea whose forerunners can be identified as early as the eighteenth century, did not gain decisive influence until that period. The Prophetic life and mission, and the Qurʾān itself, were re-examined in the light of the nationalist and pedagogical causes and projects of modern states, in a process that continues today in many Muslim countries. The second volume also deals with the impact that political and economic transformations in the Muslim world since the late 1970s have exerted on the image of the Prophet, and on its recapture as a medium for self-empowerment by Muslim religious groups and by political activists and radical movements.

This third volume in our series explores different expressions of piety and devotion to the person of the Prophet and their individual and collective significance.[6] Several of its contributions were presented and discussed at a workshop in Paris (May 2019) examining the "Presence and the Eschatological Role of the Prophet". Others came in from other workshops run by the project, or were specially invited. The contributions cover various geographical spaces and combine historical and social-anthropological approaches, within a time range that extends back into the early modern period but largely focuses on contemporary case studies. They explore the moral and emotional economy expressed in pious practices attached to the Prophet, their cognitive and aesthetic structures, and the eschatological beliefs that contribute to the evoking of his presence. The rise of Prophetic devotion – including the Sunnī celebration of his birthday (*mawlid*), starting from the early seventh/thirteenth century – was anchored in doctrines and beliefs that emerged from the second/ eighth century onwards in the literature on the life, mission, and unique qualities of the Prophet (*sīra, shamāʾil, khaṣāʾiṣ nabawiyya*). Prophetic piety was shaped in manifold ways by different historical and cultural settings, and by conjunctures of fear and crisis affecting Muslim societies. Since medieval times, widespread eschatological beliefs attribute a living presence to the Prophet Muḥammad after his death, promising the faithful direct personal access and relations with him. Desire for communication with the Prophet in dreams and visions, and a longing to visit his tomb, are expressed in prayers and poetry. Hope and supplication for his intercession (*shafāʿa*) on the behalf of believers on Judgement Day, and for his mediation (*tawassul*) in this world, became dominant,

though often contested, theological issues. The construction of a Prophetic presence in such individual and collective manifestations of piety and religious experience, and the eschatological dimensions of these manifestations, still need to be clarified. This also holds for the relation of such beliefs to more general trends of socio-cultural individualisation; a relation which is often assumed for similar pious attitudes in the early modern and modern Christian world.

Political and Socio-Cultural Contexts

General political and socio-cultural developments influenced Muslim religious attitudes during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries; they must be taken into account in any assessment of Prophetic piety. One of these is the impact of European imperialism and colonialism, which, since the second half of the nineteenth century, brought the vast majority of the Muslim world under European political, economic, and cultural hegemony, and under outright political domination and control. The establishment and spread of modern "Western" education completely changed the cognitive outlook of the populations of many Muslim societies. The long-standing relationship of Muslims to the person of the Prophet, which the previous two volumes have explored, was profoundly transformed. A whole collective memory and imaginary of the figure of the Prophet, conveyed and updated in writings, rituals, and visual and material culture, all of which contributed to making his active presence tangible, started to disintegrate under the effect of both external and internal factors. This desacralisation of the figure of the Prophet was fully affirmed in the first half of the twentieth century, when engagement with European colonisation and Orientalism dominated debates on the Prophet among Muslim intellectuals. The writing of biographies of the Prophet, which had declined in the nineteenth century, resurfaced in the inter-war period, adopting a style that was a complete break with the traditional *sīra*. In this novel type of narration the Prophet appears as an example of moral virtues and as a social reformer, for nations that sought the causes of colonisation in a decadence of religion and morals, and the solution in an individual moral recovery. This recovery, it was hoped, would bring about the revival of Muslim societies as a whole, and, ultimately, their political liberation; a view that was shared to a large extent by both secular and Islamic political movements. Popular religious

festivals such as the *mawlid*s of the Prophet or of Muslim "friends of God" (*awliyāʾ*) were increasingly criticised as backward and superstitious, and subjected to far-reaching state control. The status and role of the *ʿulamāʾ* were seriously shaken by the new secular framework of most independent Muslim states, and by the nationalist and socialist ideologies that underpinned them.

Since the end of the 1970s, new transformations have been taking place within the Muslim world, this time under the impact of a globalising world economy, a context that has made itself felt, as we shall see, even in current *mawlid* festivities in both Asia and Africa. This coincided with a second major socio-cultural development that has strongly influenced Muslim religious attitudes, including the relationship of Muslims with the Prophet, over the last fifty years. This is the international rise of Salafism – often termed "Wahhābism" – as a consequence of the increasing economic and religious influence of Saudi Arabia in many Sunnī regions and communities. It is only since the 1950s that this and related movements have begun to gain wide popularity as a brand of religiosity in parts of the Muslim world that are farther from these centres; such movements have become important in several Asian and African regions since the 1980s. Salafism has become a major popular challenge for Sufi groups, religious practices, and festivals, leading to communal tensions that often turn violent, which in turn may cause lasting splits within Muslim communities. The jihadist inclinations of Salafī organisations have exacerbated such internal conflicts over the *mawlid* and other religious celebrations in many regions. In the present volume the chapters on religious festivals and their scholarly defence often convey this underlying conflict, which usually reflects other specific local contexts and agendas that can also be identified.

Both the Iranian revolution (11 February 1979) and the siege of the Grand Mosque in Mecca (20 November–4 December 1979) led to a hardening of Saudi religious policies at local and international levels and to their reinforced backing of Salafī doctrines and groups to contain the Iranian activities. Iran on its part extended its support not only to Shīʿites but also to Sunnī *sharīf*s and Sufis in different parts of the Muslim world. Both developments had a significant bearing on local attitudes and celebrations related to the Prophet. This can be seen in Chapter 16, dedicated to a prominent scholar and preacher in contemporary Mali and his call for the veneration of the Prophet and his

family. The return of the *ʿulamāʾ* to social and political significance, which was brought about by the revolution in Iran, also enhanced the standing of Islamic scholars in Sunnī societies. In response to the challenges of Salafī scholars and activists, Muslim governments in the Middle East and the Maghrib have sometimes adopted a resolutely pro-Sufi policy, supporting Sufi brotherhoods, cultural activities, and festivals.

The collapse of the Soviet Union and the rise of its successor states in the 1990s also brought Islam and Muslim religiosity back into public life, from which it had been kept away by widespread suppression under Soviet rule. Local Sufi brotherhoods were activated and revived, and often gained political patronage from the new post-Soviet governments, as in the Caucasus or Central Asia. In the case of Chechnya, this led to a "double Islamisation pressure" (M. Kemper) on the Chechen population, by R. Kadyrov, a pro-Sufi and traditionalist military leader, and his state apparatus, on the one hand, and the militant Salafī underground, on the other.

The "cartoon affair" (2005–6), which can be regarded as a belated sequel to the international quarrels over Salman Rushdie's *Satanic Verses* (since 1989), has revived many of the older European negative preconceptions of Islam and its Prophet. Chapters 8 and 9 look at the way young Muslims in France and Germany have come up with the recent repercussions of this event.

Within a religious climate shaped by these major rifts, Prophetic piety and religious festivals that are connected with it remain a bone of contention in many communal struggles. The earlier desacralising shift of the Prophetic image towards his military and political qualities has kept its significance even among militant religious movements and remains at the centre of present-day struggles to achieve cultural and religious hegemony.

Veneration of the Prophet: Between Controversy and Compromise

The particular position of the Prophet of Islam between God and mankind, which embedded his human person in a sacred and transhistorical reality, shaped the field of Muslim piety in relation to the Prophet for a long time. The balance between the human and divine elements inherent in the person of the Prophet and his *sunna* has continued to be negotiated intensively since the beginning of the twentieth century.

The accusation of *ghuluww* ("exaggeration", "exaggerated veneration") that Salafi jurists and theologians nowadays direct against their opponents (see Chapter 14) is one of the "historical", but still current, expressions of this tension and is aimed at the various forms of devotion to the person of the Prophet. Such controversies often reflect deeper social and political divisions among the actors involved, but they can sometimes be relieved by consensus and compromise among representatives of different Islamic tendencies in which both the scholarly elite and popular groups take part (as shown for Pakistan in Chapter 10). Sufi scholars and their poems in praise of the Prophet were crucial parts of festivities celebrating the Prophet, which have often, over time, lost their exclusively Sufi character. The social consensus on which such festivals were based could last for a long time and could even lead to the emergence of new regional centres of festive tradition (as in the case of Lamu on the East African coast; see Chapter 11). This consensus could also involve the emergence of counter-cultural expressions of dissent and sectarianism, both in Shīʿī and Sunnī contexts.

The presence of the Prophet in the daily life of the members of his community – a living and active presence, with which it is possible to establish a direct and intimate relationship – remains central to the pious practice of the majority of Muslims, but also controversial. Today, this concept is rejected by those for whom the Prophet, once his mission has been accomplished, can do nothing more in this world, interceding for his community only on the Day of Judgement. From this it might seem that a personalised presence of living intensity is thus restricted to the normative textual heritage. The general tension between a "presence culture", built on techniques of emotional and imaginary evocation in religious as well as aesthetic performance, and a "meaning culture" that focuses on textual authority and interpretation, can be observed in such controversies. In short, it is the Prophet's status as a living and accessible mediator through whom God can be invoked (*tawassul*), and whose help believers can always seek (*istighātha*), that lies at the crux of conflicting relationships with the Prophet that divide the Muslim community today.

In this volume individual and collective expressions of Prophetic piety overlap. It starts out with a section on prayer and chant (Part 1) and one on visionary experience and material relics related to the Prophet (Part 2) and their place in the life of Muslim

communities. These are followed by a section on the role of the Prophet and his *sunna* in the identity formation of young Muslims, with samples drawn from contemporary Turkey, France, and Germany (Part 3). Further sections deal with contemporary celebrations of the birthday (*mawlid*) of the Prophet in different regional contexts: the Middle East, Africa, and South Asia (Part 4), and accounts of prominent voices among Islamic scholars and preachers defending the veneration of the Prophet against its radical contemporary critics (Part 5). Here, as in the other volumes, the coverage of the major themes remains far from exhaustive because of constraints of space and time, and the fundamentally exploratory character of our French-German research project.

Part 1: A Living and Accessible Mediator: Prayer and Chant

As already stated above, the Prophet is seen by the majority of Muslims as a mediator and intercessor between believers and God. His status as the final witness of God vis-à-vis the other prophets and their communities, and as intercessor (*shafīʿ*) for all believers in the hereafter, is unanimously accepted. But his role as an active helper for believers, even after his death, has given rise to theological debates that continue to this day to fuel controversies with Salafī currents such as the Wahhābīs (in Arabia and elsewhere) and Ahl-i Ḥadīth (in South Asia), both of which reject the concept of such a role for the Prophet.

The prayer on the Prophet (*al-ṣalāt ʿalā l-nabī, taṣliya*) became the most widespread form of devotion to him. Apart from its accepted status as a divine prescription (Q 33:56), it is regarded as an act of love and a pledge of hope for this world and the next. The *taṣliya* gained an initiatory function and became a path of spiritual realisation towards a direct and immediate relationship with the Prophet (*taʿalluq bi-l-rasūl*) and self-extinction (*fanāʾ*) in him. First established as an intimate and individual pious practice, its shift to a collective ritual, first attested in the ninth/fifteenth century, marks a turning point in the history of the veneration of the Prophet.

Nelly Amri's Chapter 1 attempts to elucidate the question of the oldest assemblies of "prayer on the Prophet" in the Maghrib and to shed light on this passage from an individual to a collective and public practice. She focuses on the *majālis* initiated by

Barakāt b. Aḥmad b. Muḥammad al-ʿArūsī [al-Qusanṭīnī] (d. ca. 897/1492), a Sufi *ʿālim* from Ḥafṣid Ifrīqiya, and his collection of twenty- four prayer sessions on the Prophet, titled *Wasīlat al-mutawassilīn bi-faḍl al-ṣalāt ʿalā sayyid al-mursalīn* (composed in 877/1473). According to their author, these *majālis* were written to be recited on Fridays, providing evidence of one of the earliest assemblies for prayer on the Prophet in the Maghrib. Together with two further *majālis* added by the Algerian shaykh Muḥammad b. ʿAzzūz al-Burjī al-Khalwatī (d. 1233/1818), they continue to be recited in Algeria and Tunisia today. Amri examines first the medieval applications of this collection, its modern and contemporary uses and circulation, and the long career of this book of Prophetic piety. Her second section is devoted to analysis of these *majālis*: it highlights the sentiments of love, veneration, and hope towards the Prophet that are evoked in these poems of prayer and praise, which culminate by imploring him to provide help in this world and intercession in the hereafter. It also casts light on the "ecstatic emotion" with which these are expressed and on the ways in which reciters/listeners become active participants and thus contribute themselves to the actualisation of the Prophet's presence. The straightforward language and musicality of the poems, which greatly eased their memorisation and appropriation, contributed in no small way to the popularity and success of the collection. Its history, particularly since the eighteenth century, brings out the role played by Sufism in the persisting influence of these assemblies, and in the popularisation of a whole Prophetic culture, even beyond its original milieu.

A general overview of the development of the *taṣliya* practice and its Sufi dimensions is provided by Amine Hamidoune in Chapter 2, author of the second major study on this subject after Fritz Meier's pioneering work. He traces this development from its early testimonies in the Qurʾān and *ḥadīth* to the evolution of Sufism, with its initiatory paths that encouraged the veneration of the Prophet, and its festive and devotional elaborations. The role of Sufi masters and their specific collections of prayer formulas is highlighted, along with the controversies that emerged around the *taṣliya* practice. From the tension between the Prophet's human nature (*bashariyya*) and his spiritual and sacred reality (*ḥaqīqa*), the author derives the principle of mediation that was described by certain Sufi masters as a "linkage" (*ṣila*) to the "prayer" (*ṣalāt*) on the

Prophet. This linkage also came to include a collective dimension by placing the individual believer firmly within the Muslim *umma* and its mutual solidarity, grounded in a common relationship with the Messenger of God who intercedes to open the gate of divine mercy (*raḥma*).

How do performances of poetry and chant serve as media for a relation with the Prophet? In Chapter 3, Ines Weinrich analyses the interplay of poetical content, musical form, and interaction between musicians and their audience that is at work in contemporary performances of poetry in praise of Muḥammad. Her corpus is based on songs and other vocal recordings collected during fieldwork in urban Sunnī milieus in Syria and Lebanon (2009–13). Her findings show the special attention given by singers to the Prophet's unique qualities as a beloved (*ḥabīb*) and intercessor. Crucial content is either stressed by musical elaboration, or by frequency of repetition within the songs. Central messages are marked by a high degree of participation and interaction between performers and listeners. The relationship with the Prophet that is evoked by these performances oscillates between the poles of elevation and intimacy. Classical and folk idioms work together to portray Muḥammad as a close companion, friend, and support, and culminate in showing his eschatological role as intercessor for his community on the Day of Judgement. As the mediator between the human and divine spheres, he is characterised in a popular song as a "Doorway to God" (*bāb Allāh*). Experiences of elevation and intimacy, concludes the author, are not evoked by cognitive content alone but equally through the aesthetic experiences and behavioural patterns conveyed by the musical performance. This chapter illustrates the strength of a turn to performativity and to the "production of presence" in literary studies, a focus that has been called for by George Steiner, Jean-Luc Nancy, and especially by the above-cited Hans Ulrich Gumbrecht, whose studies on a "presence culture" link the literary field to historical religious models and, at the same time, to the modern event culture of music and sports.

Part 2: Spirituality and Materiality of the Prophetic Presence

This part discusses other reputed ways of achieving contact with the Prophet, whether through his spiritual presence in dreams and visions, or through the material

immediacy of famous *āthār* ("traces", "imprints") of his body. Both the individual and the collective dimensions of such well-known forms of spiritual contact, and of the pious veneration of his relics, are taken into account. Reverence for the Prophet, and the search for a "physical" and direct contact with him, also extend to the *ahl al-bayt*, his family and descendants, in particular to his daughter Fāṭima – in Shīʿī circles but also among Sunnīs, especially women. A receptacle of the divine word and presence, held as sacred by his Companions while he was alive, the Prophet's body is described by the *sīra* in minute details. Attested from the first centuries of Islam, the veneration of his remains and the transfer of relics have also been inscribed, today as in the past, in the dynamics of the legitimisation of power.

Reported visions of the Prophet in the waking state – which begin much later than his countless appearances in dreams – are documented and analysed by Denis Gril in Chapter 4. Hardly attested before the sixth–seventh/twelfth– thirteenth centuries, they became more commonly attributed to some Sufi masters and saints from the ninth–tenth/fifteenth–sixteenth centuries, as an indication of their accomplished sanctity. Moving back and forth between the early modern and medieval periods, the author investigates accounts of such visions, and their significance for the development of Sufism up to the twentieth century. The rather cautious descriptions of events like these as spiritual, rather than bodily, meetings, which can be found in authors such as Suyūṭī (d. 911/1505) and Shaʿrānī (d. 972/1565), depict the encounters as confirmations of the spiritual state granted in this world to those who live in the intimacy of the Prophetic presence. For some masters, the direct and privileged link to the Prophet that the visions provided made them independent of the initiatory paths to which they were attached. The author reviews the often-discussed relationship between these visions and the *ṭarīqa muḥammadiyya* of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and especially with the famous cases of Aḥmad b. Idrīs (d. 1253/1837) and Aḥmad al-Tijānī (d. 1230/1815). He concludes that such visions seem to be a diffuse phenomenon that cannot always be linked to the foundation of new Sufi *ṭuruq*; instead, the visions appear as a supreme divine grace reserved for the elite among the saints and also have significance for their position within their communities. Gril's study offers a greatly extended corpus along with a general framework for the study of this phenomenon,

which remains of crucial importance for Sufism in the early modern and modern periods.

The role of individual dream visions of the Prophet's daughter Sayyida Fāṭima in the emergence of a local martyr-cult in Tehran is considered in the case study of Sana Chavoshian (Chapter 5). This chapter adds a very welcome female dimension to our collection. Chavoshian discusses a group of "mothers of martyrs", who remained for a long time without information on the whereabouts of the bodies of their sons, who, as soldiers, had been killed in the Iran–Iraq War. They have been keeping alive the memory of the deceased mother of the first martyred soldier from their neighbourhood (herself a descendant of the Prophet, also named Fāṭima), who had often reported her consoling dream visions of the daughter of the Prophet to them. Regular prayer meetings had been held with her during her lifetime. Her visionary trances had reportedly evaporated a scent of roses, interpreted as a token of the presence of Sayyida Fāṭima and her Prophetic aura, which was thus shaped by discursive and non-discursive elements. The aura notion, conceived by Walter Benjamin as an interplay of distance and closeness in the experience of a sacred or aesthetic object, is here extended to cover the visionary messages and their narrations, and the emotional atmosphere surrounding them. As laid out by Chavoshian, this aura also includes the prayer rituals performed in memory of the visionary dreamer at her home, and at the cemetery where the reputedly discovered remains of her son had been finally placed. The dream-images of Sayyida Fāṭima thus open up a space of consoling intermediation between the pious women, their martyred sons, and the divine. By its performative and collective focus, this extended examination of the concept of aura ties in with other recent attempts to enhance the productivity of this notion in the fields of historical and media studies.

Over the centuries, the veneration of the relics of the Prophet Muḥammad perpetuated the physical dimension of the devotion that the Companions had for him, touching his sacred body while he was alive. In his historical and anthropological study of the Prophet's relics in Chapter 6, Luca Patrizi shows that approaching the relics directly, or touching objects that have been in contact with them, or drinking liquids that carry their touch and blessing, for many Muslims means entering the very presence of the

Prophet. After a brief summary of the history of devotion to the relics of the Prophet and its scriptural foundations, the author develops a typology of relics drawn from historiographic sources, and provides an overview of the important collections of relics of the Prophet that exist today in the Muslim world. The sacred geography that was sometimes founded on their presence, the circumstances of their transfer, and their importance for the legitimation of Muslim rulers are also addressed. The chapter discusses the vehement critique of the veneration of relics by Salafī and Wahhābī scholars and groups, which has since the eighteenth century led to fits of iconoclastic destruction in different parts of the Middle East. A contemporary case of the political instrumentalisation of a relic is presented, with Ramzan Kadyrov, the president of Chechnya, and his solemn reception of a drinking bowl reputed to have belonged to the Prophet, which he had exhibited in the new Central Mosque of Grozny. It is easy to find historical parallels to this reception and to the public demonstration of religious emotions by the ruler and his companions. Apart from the pious tears of an otherwise strongly military-minded and avowedly masculine leader, political motives can certainly be identified for this action, which falls in line with his efforts to establish a distinctly Islamic profile for a Muslim state under the full authority of the Russian Federation. In addition to this, Kadyrov's claim to have received a blood transfusion from a prominent Arabian *sharīf* attests to a novel form of bodily absorption of the Prophet's *baraka*. The historical role of Sufism in the preservation and veneration of such relics continues to this day, as Sufi groups have carried them to European countries, the United States, and Australia as part of the global migrations of Muslim communities. The transfer of relics may thus contribute to the consolidation of Muslim identities in different parts of the world.

Part 3: Identity-Building in the Mirror of the Prophet

The imitation of the Prophet's reported exemplary conduct, as crystallised in his *sunna* and in the *adab* that was derived from it, gives structure to the communal ideal as well as to individual behaviour in religious movements that combined their Sufi roots with decidedly reformist aspirations. From the late nineteenth century, and increasingly after the First World War, the attempts of such groups to establish a meaningful Muslim life responded to the challenges posed by Muslim states and their

expanding secular education and culture. The figure of the Prophet also affects religious socialisation and self-discovery within Muslim diaspora communities in the secular societies of Western Europe, shaping both their religious attitudes and their identity formation.

The relevance of the Prophetic *sunna* as a pattern for Muslim civility within the Suffa community, an offshoot of the Turkish Nurculuk movement (Nur Cemaatı), is discussed in Fabio Vicini's Chapter 7. He presents the Nurculuk movement, which draws its adherents from the most active Islamic communities in Turkey and the Turkish diaspora in Europe, along with its founder, the Kurdish scholar-intellectual Said Nursi (1877–1960). In Nursi's *Epistle of Light* (*Risāle-i Nūr*), his magnum opus and the central text which is regularly read by group members, he combined solid religious ethics and cosmology, based on Sufi models, with an equally strong emphasis on the natural sciences. Suffa members organise communities for university students. These maintain a group life based on Nursi's doctrines and educational principles, where compliance with the *sunna* in daily life is profoundly intertwined with standards of behaviour inspired by the tradition of Sufi *adab*. Ideals of brotherhood (*uhuvvet*) and love (*muhabbet*) are also supposed to shape day-to-day interaction within the group. The study discusses the normative writings of Nursi and the author's fieldwork within the group, revealing the efforts they make to achieve a balance between older models of Prophetic piety and the need to adapt them to contemporary life. At the same time it attempts to prepare its student members for a successful professional and public career that is supposed to be guided by religious orientation, service to society, and self-control. The name refers to the famous group of young adherents of the Prophet, who lived in the mosque in Medina; the group cherishes an identity that relates to that model.

Chapters 8 and 9 present the results of exploratory surveys on the role and place of the Prophet in the socialisation and self-construction processes of young Muslims in contemporary France and Germany. The first survey was conducted by Vincent Geisser and Youssef Nouiouar in Marseille and other parts of southern France. Moving beyond culturalist stereotypes, Chapter 8 tends to invalidate the assumption of a timeless "Prophetic model", while underlining the centrality of the Prophet Muḥammad as a

point of reference in the daily life of these young French Muslims. The investigation conveys what the authors describe as a "subjective Prophetic model", which remains under permanent reconstruction. They also note a recurrent discrepancy between the subjects' relatively scanty knowledge about the Prophet and his biography and their emotional attachment to him, which remains very strong. At the same time, the survey sheds interesting light on the self-positioning of these young people in the "cartoon affair", revealing a mixed attitude: they feel deeply hurt by both the public disparagement of the Prophet and the terrorist attacks claiming to vindicate his name and honour. The authors identify an image of the Prophet that mediates between the intimate religiosity and the self-orientation of these young people in the secular environment of their country.

Chapter 9, by Stefan Reichmuth and Hanan Karam, highlights the important role played by Muslim families and their education in the formation of the image of the Prophet. Mosque communities also seem to be deeply connected to this "Family Islam", especially among the Turkish Muslim communities. Here, as in Chapter 8, interview partners stressed a great variety of the Prophet's noble qualities as ethical models for their own personal and professional life, with some differences between male and female attitudes towards him that deserve further attention. As mentioned, the surveys confirm the individualising trends among Muslim youths in both countries that have been discussed in earlier studies; these trends also find their expression in the attitudes of the subjects towards the Prophet. Diversity in this respect was certainly greater in the German case, including some students distancing themselves from their parents' authoritarian religious demands, or moving away from strict religious observance to a "religion of the heart". The Salafi challenge to *mawlid* celebrations (still quite popular in several Muslim milieus) and the increasing importance of Islamic media have made themselves felt in both countries, even among young people who otherwise remain strongly attached to their families. A further point common to the French and German samples was the effort to keep away from public disputes around Islam and the Prophet, even when this brought a certain sense of sadness and isolation. For the authors, the Prophet and his image still have an important role to play in the processes of Muslim socialisation and individualisation in Germany.

Part 4: Celebrating the Prophet: *Mawlid* in Context

Celebrations of the Prophet's birthday (*mawlid/mīlād*) on 12 Rabīʿ al-Awwal, which after the early seventh/thirteenth century became widespread and gained in popularity all through the early modern period, still continue as mass or group events in many parts of the Muslim world, especially in Sufi circles. These celebrations have always been occasions for reciting poems and songs in praise of the Prophet, but they were also connected with many other forms of rejoicing and feasting, producing extra-normal experiences and sometimes even utopian perceptions of time. While the *mawlid* is generally agreed to represent a later "innovation" (*bidʿa*) in religious practice, it had become widely accepted among legal scholars as a valuable addition to pious life (as a "good innovation", *bidʿa ḥasana*). Objections to its character as an innovation, and to the popular customs that had often become attached to it, were expressed by scholars as early as Ibn Taymiyya (d. 728/1328), Tāj al-Dīn al-Fākihānī (d. 731/1331), and Ibn al-Ḥājj (d. 737/1337). But these attitudes remained clearly minoritarian until the end of the nineteenth century. In the case of Ibn Taymiyya, his condemnation of the *mawlid* as *bidʿa* was qualified by an acceptance of its religious merits for sincere believers.

Radical rejection of the *mawlid* was expressed by Muḥammad b. ʿAbd al-Wahhāb (d. 1206/1792) and his followers, who abolished *mawlid* celebrations altogether in their realm after their conquest of Mecca in 1803. The celebrations there were re-established after the Egyptian reconquest of the Ḥijāz, retaining their popularity in the Holy Cities, and far beyond, until the end of the Ottoman period. Clear endorsements of the *mawlid* were put forward by scholars as diverse as Rifāʿa al-Ṭahṭāwī (d. 1873) in Egypt and Aḥmad Zaynī Daḥlān (d. 1886) in Mecca, among others. The Sufi element among its supporters remained strong and even gained in significance in the course of the twentieth century, in the face of increasing attacks by Salafī scholars and groups, and also under the tightening control of modernist states. In the present volume, the various contributions devoted to the *mawlid*, whether in Beirut, Damascus, Mali, Oman, Pakistan, or on the East African coast (Lamu in Kenya), illustrate both its contested character, and its integrative or self-assertive functions. Indeed, the festive aspect attached to these celebrations, which may involve economic, social, or even

political issues that go beyond the strictly religious meanings of this commemoration, does not conceal the tensions accompanying this festival in the different milieux under study, and the active give and take of "accommodations" between groups that may otherwise be in irreducible opposition (Chapters 10 and 11).

Why has the celebration of *mīlād* become such a major topic among the various schools of Islamic thought in South Asia, one that seems to pervade all spheres of life? Jamal Malik traces the history of public *mīlād* ceremonies in South Asia and their significance for national identity-building in Pakistan in Chapter 10. He explores the issue's transformation into a veritable discursive and performative field, at both the communal and the national level, and focuses on the conflation between Prophetic piety and economic enterprise in the neo-liberal framework of a public event-culture in today's Pakistan. After tracing the genealogy of *mīlād* in South Asia from the medieval period until the nineteenth century, the chapter emphasises Muhammad Iqbal's views on the *mīlād*. This well-known poet, who died in 1938, saw such celebrations as the perfect context for reanimating the Prophet as a paradigm for political and moral reform, and for the mobilisation of the *umma*; for him, the *mīlād* was also a powerful tool in the nation-building process. Malik explores the present communal nature of the *mīlād* festival in Pakistan and explains its integrative function in the face of persisting differences of opinion between the major religious groups. Despite frequent fatwa battles between scholars from different camps, most members of the different denominations participate in the *mīlād* celebrations, leaving their mutual resentments aside. Regardless of all the controversy, the event serves to reanimate the figure of the Prophet in the memorial culture of Pakistani society.

A similarly complex event culture of *mawlid* celebrations, now recognised as "World Cultural Heritage", is described by Kai Kresse for Lamu Island on the northern Swahili coast in Kenya in Chapter 11. He highlights the tension between its religious and ceremonial nucleus and its festival character, which unites the whole community and attracts large groups of members of the diaspora who live abroad, as well as many foreigners. At the same time, the religious *mawlid* ceremonies themselves remain strongly contested by rival factions in the religious community. The author combines a description of the religious and wider festivities during the *mawlid* week with an

overview of the controversies between Sufi and Salafi-minded scholars about this religious practice. These controversies are to some extent buried or ignored for the sake of an appearance of local unity during the festival period. The disagreements over the *mawlid* reflect local socio-cultural antagonisms as well as the international connections of the people of Lamu. Kresse traces the impact of the major scholars involved in the introduction of the *mawlid* as well as in the controversies around it. Among these are Ḥabīb Ṣāliḥ b. ʿAlawī Jamal al-Layl (d. 1935) of the *ṭarīqa ʿalawiyya*, the first to introduce the *mawlid* text of ʿAlī al-Ḥabshī (d. 1915), and to organise the *mawlid* as a mass event in the town; ʿAbd Allāh Ṣāliḥ al-Fārisī (d. 1982), Qadi in Mombasa, translator of the Qurʾān into Swahili, and the leading reformist critic of blameable innovations; Muḥammad al-Qāsim al-Mazrūʿī (d. 1982), who criticised the Sharīfian patriciate of the town; and finally ʿAbd Allāh Nāṣir (d. 2022), a popular scholar and preacher from Mombasa who converted to Shīʿism in the 1980s and joined the local Sufis in their defence of the *mawlid*. This emergence of a Sufi–Shīʿī alliance against the "Wahhābī" onslaught has become a novel element in the religious culture of Lamu (as well as in Bamako in Mali, as shown in Chapter 16).

David Jordan's study (Chapter 12) offers insights into a little-known milieu of *mawlid* celebrations among the Ibāḍīs of Oman. He traces the historical emergence of Abū Muslim al-Bahlānī's (1860–1920) text, *al-Nashʾa al-muḥammadiyya*, as the standard *mawlid* for Ibāḍīs in combination with his own observations of present-day *mawlid* performances in Oman. The origins of this text, written by the leading Omani poet of his time, can be related to a wider *mawlid* renaissance in the context of the expansion of Sufi orders in the Gulf region and in East Africa in the late nineteenth century, as we have seen for Lamu. Bahlānī's *mawlid* followed the pattern of the famous and popular *mawlid* of Jaʿfar b. Ḥasan al-Barzanjī (d. 1765). It refers to ideas such as Muḥammad's pre-existing light, God's anthropomorphic attributes, and Muḥammad's intercession and mediatorship, which were popular among Sufis but rather unusual for Ibāḍī scholars. By the late 1980s/early 1990s, an adapted, corrected, and nationalised version of *al-Nashʾa al-muḥammadiyya*, cleared of all these controversial ideas, emerged as the new Ibāḍī standard for official *mawlid* celebrations (organised by the state) in Oman. With its discussion of the role of the *mawlid* as a national institution,

and of further public and private *mawlid* performances, this chapter sheds light on the ambiguities of popular and state Islam in contemporary Oman, and on the porosity of the boundaries between Sunnism and Ibāḍism, on the one hand, and between reformist and Sufi currents, on the other.

Emma Aubin-Boltanski conducted an investigation of a *mawlid* celebration in Beirut in 2019, in the context of acute political and communal tensions (Chapter 13). The celebration here was arranged by the Mashārī'iyyīn, the official organisation of the Aḥbāsh Sufi movement. The movement follows its founder, 'Abd Allāh al-Ḥararī al-Ḥabashī (1910–2008), a Sufi *'ālim* from Harar in Ethiopia who settled in Lebanon, in his resolute defence of traditional Islamic theology and law and of the Sufi *ṭuruq* against Salafi and Wahhābī groups and doctrines. Famous for their proselytising activities in many countries, they defend the *mawlid al-nabawī*, and the religiosity they propose is centred on the figure of the Prophet and the veneration of saints. For some years the Aḥbāsh were alone in Lebanon in their revival of public veneration of the Prophet and in the celebration of his *mawlid* with great pomp and circumstance, with a clear anti-Salafi thrust. The organisation's *mawlid* of 2019, which our author attended, clearly evolved in a much more subdued and guarded way, due to the tense atmosphere prevailing in the country. But she also observed that there were then other groups that had the courage to organise public *mawlid* celebrations, especially in Tripoli, while in Beirut, too, rearrangements of the festival seemed to be going on within the Sunnī landscape. The author relates these modest signs of a "return" of the *mawlid* to the "moral shock" that Dā'ish, the Salafi "Islamic State", has set off among Sunnī Muslims. She also describes the display of a cherished relic of the Prophet's hair (*al-sha'ra al-nabawiyya*), kept within the movement as one of its religious landmarks. The rather modest and private way of taking blessing from this relic for personal prayer requests, which she observed during the festival, strongly contrasts with Luca Patrizi's account of the Chechen case. It illustrates the personal side of the *tabarruk* from relics, which is closer to Sana Chavoshian's description of the mourning women of Tehran.

Part 5: Defending the Veneration of the Prophet: ʿUlamāʾ and Preachers

The increasing polemical attacks on the veneration and commemoration of the Prophet and on the *mawlid*, which grew from older roots and came to pervade many Muslim societies with the rise of Salafī and Wahhābī influence since the 1980s, also led Islamic scholars and preachers to respond in the form of apologetics. Many of them had Sufi roots, and some even attempted to organise their own celebrations of the *mawlid* and of the benedictions of the Prophet and thus to bolster their own positions and popularity.

From the late 1970s until his death in 2004, the Meccan Sufi scholar Muḥammad ʿAlawī al-Mālikī, whose intellectual portrait as a defender of the veneration of the Prophet is laid out by Besnik Sinani, engaged critically with Wahhābī teachings (Chapter 14). He wrote a number of refutations of Wahhābī doctrine, defending the legitimacy of various forms of devotion to the Prophet, including the *mawlid* celebrations, and defining the acceptable limits of his veneration. He also advocated a view of the Prophet as divinely endowed with distinctive features (*khaṣāʾiṣ*) that elevated him above other created beings. In the context of the political and religious challenge that was presented by the Iranian Revolution, Mālikī became the target of a campaign of attacks and denunciations in Saudi Arabia. He was accused by Saudi scholars of being the leading exponent of the Sufi beliefs that they had polemically categorised as "(devotional) extremism" (*ghuluww*). This label placed him in the vicinity of extremist strands of the Shīʿa. The author looks at the Wahhābīs' conceptualisation of *ghuluww*, and at Mālikī's responses to their claims, which amounted to a modern manifestation of the age-old Muslim debate about Prophetology. He defended the classical schools of Sunnī theology, regarded as deviant by the Wahhābīs, and presented textual evidence in support of seeking the intercession of the Prophet, and of thinking of him as being alive, present, and able to interact with the believer. For Sufi scholars like Mālikī, Wahhābī teachings constituted an attempt to desacralise the Prophet and resulted in a community living far away from the divine blessing of the Prophetic presence.

The efforts of Syrian *ʿulamāʾ* to reassert their relevance and legitimacy in the face of growing challenges to their authority were observed by Thomas Pierret during

ethnographical fieldwork conducted in Damascus between 2006 and 2008 (Chapter 15). He took part in a number of religious festivities that were organised by prominent religious scholars. These included customary ceremonies like the *mawlid* along with newly established ones – including prayer assemblies for the Prophet and public readings of *ḥadīth*. The spatial arrangement of the prayer ceremony observed by Pierret presented the *'ulamā'* as the dominant element of an idealised social order in which political representatives of the state were conspicuous by their absence.

Pierret's findings suggest that these rituals were organised to limit the emotional expression of the participants. Silent prayer assemblies for the Prophet, by their extreme sobriety, offered an almost uncontroversial ritual framework that strengthened the personal aura and physical presence of the shaykh. Core Sufi principles were maintained, while any language that might appear problematic was filtered out. The more recent revival of public recitations of *ḥadīth*, which gained momentum in the second half of the previous decade, responded to another dimension of the Salafi challenge, directed against *madhhab*-affiliated *'ulamā'*: the accusation of neglecting the *sunna*. These recitations demonstrated the scholars' authoritative commitment to the study and transmission of Muḥammad's sayings. They posed a direct challenge to the Salafis' "bookish" approach to the *ḥadīth*, as they presented the *'ulamā'* as embodiments of a living *ḥadīth* tradition.

Tracing the development of the *mawlid* in Bamako in contemporary Mali, Youssouf T. Sangaré reviews the career, writings, and sermon cassettes of Chérif Ousmane M. Haïdara, a prominent preacher with a Tijānī background, who managed to turn the traditional *mawlid* celebration of the leading imam families of the city into a popular mass event (Chapter 16). Starting out as a pungent social critic who used his sermons as vehicles for strong criticism of the local Islamic dignitaries and the general corruption prevailing in the country, he gathered a large following and founded a major educational organisation, the Ançar Dine. After he had successfully defended the *mawlid* against its influential Salafi critics in the country, in more recent years he began to preach on the duty of every Muslim to love the Prophet and to venerate his family. He thus further undermined the local authority of the traditional religious leaders and refocused it to a large extent on himself as a descendant of the Prophet,

and as his most authentic voice. The propagation of devotion to the *ahl al-bayt* drew him closer to the Shīʿa. He introduced ʿĀshūrāʾ celebrations mourning al-Ḥusayn, and also the *mawlid* of ʿAlī. An Iranian religious representative in the country took an active part in the ʿĀshūrāʾ event that was organised by the Ançar Dine in 2009. Although still declaring his firm adherence to the Sunnī Mālikī school and defending himself against accusations of Shīʿī inclinations, he increasingly called for the veneration of ʿAlī and the other members of the *ahl al-bayt,* a devotion that, for him, could transcend narrower confessional limits. He also insisted on the rightful position of ʿAlī as heir to the caliphate against Muʿāwiya. Such positions and activities were completely novel for Mali; but Haïdara's occasional nearness to Shīʿī patterns of piety echoes the Sufi–Shīʿī alliance that we have seen in operation in Lamu in East Africa against a powerful local "Wahhābī" current.

Continuity and Change in the Field of Prophetic Piety

The studies gathered in this third volume of the *Presence of the Prophet* series show how hard it can be even to distinguish between continuity and change in the field of Muslim pious practice. Muslim attachment to the Prophet includes beliefs and attitudes that have a long history: some of this *longue-durée* character immediately becomes clear when basic religious texts on the Prophet that go back to the beginnings of Islam or to the first half millennium of Islamic history come up anew in current religious practice and dispute. Their adaptation to different historical and contemporary conditions has continued, up to the present day, to be shaped by the believers and their personal and collective outlook and commitment. At the same time, there have certainly been significant developments within the major textual genres of literature on the Prophet that also have to be identified. Both the selective uses of older texts and the novel literary developments require a kind of binocular observation that must align textual with socio-cultural perspectives, in order to arrive at a fuller picture.

"Meeting" the Prophet is re-immersing oneself in the solitude of a vision, of an "announcement" (*bushrā*), of a gesture in the intimacy of hearts and bodies, of an annihilation "in the spirit of the Prophet". The solitude is broken when the vision is shared, and when it becomes a dramatised collective narrative. The aura of the Prophet

then passes to his community. Often serving to confirm the saintly status of the visionary, a significant number of later visions include a vocation to share prayers transmitted to the visionary by the Prophet himself, and to build his own community on the basis of these prayers. In some cases, this gives such visions and the prayers that spring from them a foundational character that seems to represent a rather novel element in the history of pious literature, and clearly leads beyond the merely individual scope of such visions. It becomes clear that, in any case, oral as well as written accounts of visions, and the literary transmission of such accounts, are closely connected with the history of sainthood in Islam itself.

Questions of performance have played a crucial role in understanding the significance and functions of poetry in praise of the Prophet. As remarked by Ines Weinrich for the famous and still very popular "Mantle Ode" by Būṣīrī (d. ca. 694/1294), "it is not the text, but the performance mode which primarily defines its function". In the poetical field of religious edification, where ethical messages are often transmitted via aesthetic and even entertaining means, contemporary anthropological and musicological observation may help to shed light even on earlier historical samples. Religious poems can be regarded as complex "sensational forms" (Birgit Meyer) combining textual and artistic modes in their mediation of transcendent messages.

Prophetic relics, for their part, are at the crossroads of a very personal emotion generated by physical contact, and of collective fervour. Historical continuity is striking in this field, as is their ongoing circulation. Individual and collective pious attachment can be found in close interaction with the symbolic representation of power in the display of Prophetic vestiges in highly elaborated shrines and chambers. Accounts of celebrations of the birthday of the Prophet from South Asia, East and West Africa, Oman, Syria, and Lebanon reveal the great and continuing religious and socio-cultural significance of these festivities in different parts of the Muslim world. In all of them we observe "*mawlid*s under attack", facing a critique by Salafī-minded scholars and currents of varying intensity that has heated up in recent decades and in some places led to violent clashes between opposing groups. Research on this celebration, which is receding in parts of the Muslim world but remains of obvious importance in others, has to take into account not only its long history (reaching back until the

seventh/thirteenth century at least) but also its transformation into public mass events, national holidays, or "national heritage". The persisting importance of the *mawlid/mīlād* and the emotional framework it provides for negotiating and strengthening contemporary Muslim communal and national identity, shaky and divided as they may be, stands out in the contributions about Pakistan, East Africa, and Oman. Others show the role of the *mawlid/mīlād* in reasserting the position of Muslim scholars and Sufi brotherhoods in contested spaces such as Syria, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, and Mali, and its potential for the generation of Sunnī–Shīʿī and even Ibāḍī–Sunnī convergences and alliances.

Conclusion

The historical and contemporary case studies gathered in this volume illustrate the close interplay of individual and collective expressions that can be found in Muslim piety in relation to the Prophet. This is shown in the development of prayer practices and reports of visions, in the structuring of religious emotion through poetic and musical forms, and through the cult of relics, as well as in the festive culture that developed for *mawlid* celebrations in many different regions. Individual emotional ties to the Prophet continue to feed into communal and national identities to this day, and are in turn strengthened and sustained by them. Religious emotions, whether those of Muslims or of others, have often influenced the moral economy of state-building in colonial as well as postcolonial settings. The collections of prayer formulas such as the prayer on the Prophet (*taṣliya*) and the shift from individual to collective use of them convey a sense of belonging to a community of salvation under the tutelage of the Prophet, which certainly was not without its emotional impact on the individual who was praying (chapter 1).

An interface between individual and collective forms of expression with regard to the Prophet and his image can also be found in the processes of identity-building in the Muslim diaspora in Europe, especially among young Muslims (see examples from France and Germany in Chapters 8 and 9, respectively). Established patterns of religious socialisation within families and mosque communities are complemented here with trends towards individualisation and enhanced subjectivity that respond to

the impact of international religious media, to a plural cultural environment, and to widened options of religious and educational orientation.

The evolution of Muslim subjectivities in response to the different challenges of modernity have increasingly drawn the attention of Islamological and sociological research. These developments frequently occurred alongside the emergence of novel forms of religious congregational life and practice modelled after the Prophetic *sunna,* as in the case of the Sufi-inspired reformed community in Turkey described in Chapter 7. Both "individualising" and "de-individualising" trends in pious life, which often have to be seen as complementing each other, can be found in these case studies. The basic tension between individual and collective pious expressions seems to shape the whole field of manifestations of Prophetic piety in the early modern and contemporary period. <>

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