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Wordtrade Reviews: Consequential Appearing

Contents

Editorial Appraisals:

Some qualified reviewers offer their own brief evaluation of the book. Otherwise, most of our content represents the authors'-editors' own words as a preview to their approach to the subject, their style and point-of-view. <>

Secrets, Lies, and Consequences: A Great Scholar's Hidden Past and his Protégé's Unsolved Murder by Bruce Lincoln [Oxford University Press, ISBN 9780197689103]

The tale of a legendary scholar, an unsolved murder, and the mysterious documents that may connect them

In early 1991, Ioan Culianu was on the precipice of a brilliant academic career. Culianu had fled his native Romania and established himself as a widely admired scholar at just forty-one years of age. He was teaching at the University of Chicago Divinity School where he was seen as the heir apparent to his mentor, Mircea Eliade, a fellow Romanian expatriate and the founding father of the field of religious studies, who had died a few years earlier.

But then Culianu began to receive threatening messages. As his fears grew, he asked a colleague to hold onto some papers for safekeeping. A week later, Culianu was in a Divinity School men's room when someone fired a bullet into the back of his head, killing him instantly. The case was never solved, though the prevailing theory is that Culianu was targeted by the Romanian secret police as a result of critical articles he wrote after the fall of dictator Nicolae Ceausescu.

What was in those mysterious papers? And what connection might they have to Culianu's death? The papers eventually passed into the hands of Bruce Lincoln, and their story is at the heart of this book. The documents were English translations of articles that Eliade had written in the 1930s, some of which voiced Eliade's support for the Iron Guard, Romania's virulently anti-Semitic mystical fascist movement. Culianu had sought to publish some of these articles but encountered fierce resistance from Eliade's widow.

In this book, author Bruce Lincoln explores what the articles reveal about Eliade's past, his subsequent efforts to conceal that past, his complex relations with Culianu, and the possible motives for Culianu's shocking murder.

Review

"[A] tantalizing whodunit... This thrilling saga sheds new light on a decades-old mystery." -- *Publishers Weekly*

"A brilliant scholar of ancient myth discovers that he was surrounded by hidden aspects of his mentor's life and revisits the enigma of a colleague's murder, still unsolved after 30 years. Bruce Lincoln has undertaken a huge intellectual effort to unearth lies of the past and the conspiracies of the present, conspiracies he witnessed without knowing it, and evidence of which he even mistakenly destroyed. This is a detective enterprise, a deep mystery for which he suggests a novel solution, showing that sometimes reality can surpass fiction." -- Moshe Idel, author of *Mircea Eliade, from Magic to Myth*

"Bruce Lincoln's approach to Mircea Eliade's youthful relationship with the radical right-wing, anti-Semitic Iron Guard, to his later attempts to conceal it, and to its consequences, is a model of historical analysis. Lincoln offers a close, in-depth reading of a series of documents from a tragic chapter in European history that throws an unexpected light on a case that has been at the center of a heated debate for decades. A page-turner of a book." -- Carlo Ginzburg, Professor Emeritus, UCLA

"Bruce Lincoln's *Secrets, Lies, and Consequences* provides a unique and microscopic portrait of the intellectual Mircea Eliade's degree of involvement in the Romanian fascist movement of the 1930s. Thus, it brings a very dark period in modern Eastern European history to new light." -- Robert D. Kaplan, author of *In Europe's Shadow: Two Cold Wars and a Thirty-Year Journey Through Romania and Beyond*

"Lincoln offers an artful dissection of the possibilities, conducted with the objectivity of a historian and the subjectivity of someone who was there." -- *Harper's Magazine*

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In May 1991 Ioan Culianu, associate professor of history of religions at the University of Chicago Divinity School, approached a colleague with a request to safeguard some papers. Less than a week later, Culianu was shot to death in the Divinity School men's room. The papers he sought to protect would eventually come into my hands. This is their story.

The act of writing this book has been not just technically difficult, but emotionally fraught. The text that follows is the result of more than a quarter century of what might euphemistically be called incubation, but is more accurately characterized as evasion, repression, and some haunted mix of half-knowledge, anxiety, and sorrow.

The dreams I had while writing it suggest how disturbing I found—and still find this material. In one, I saw myself with a band of ragged milicianos in the Spanish Civil War, under fire and terrified, but determined to halt fascism at any cost. In another, while gardening in my backyard I unearthed a corpse that stirred slowly and revealed itself to be barely alive. "What should I do?" I cried, in a state of panic. "How can I help?" To which the aged, filthy figure replied: "Just leave me alone. Cover me up and let me rest."

From 1971 to 1976, it was my privilege to study under Mircea Eliade and serve as his research assistant. Eliade was the world's foremost historian of religions at the time and remains one of the giants of the field. I cannot say enough good things about the way he treated me. Despite his accomplishments and stature, I found him remarkably approachable, modest, and unassuming. In our dealings, he was unfailingly generous, kind, supportive, and encouraging. What I said of Professor Eliade in my first book (which grew out of the dissertation he directed) remains heartfelt and true: "His insight and genius are available to all in his many books, but his warmth, enthusiasm, and friendship are a particularly treasured memory for me."

There was, however, another side to the lovely man I knew. During the years I studied with him, it came to light that in his younger days he had been involved with Romanian fascism. Those revelations sparked controversy that runs hot to this day.2 For years, I sought to avoid the ugly debates that followed, telling myself (and others, when necessary): "Mr. Eliade was my second father, whom I loved and to whom I am indebted in countless ways. Like all fathers, he was not perfect. Having become aware of his failings, I cannot continue to sing his praises without reservations, but it is hardly my job to denounce him in public. Honesty requires that I acknowledge—and regret—those charges that are true, while rejecting those that are unfounded or exaggerated. Conversely, loyalty does not mean defending the indefensible. Rather than getting

embroiled in polemics, my preference is simply to remember all that I found most admirable in him."

There is also a specific incident that inclined me toward that position. When Professor Eliade agreed to supervise my dissertation, he expressed some sentiments that he recorded in his journal on other occasions. "When I take on new students," he began, in what was clearly a well-rehearsed speech, "I prepare myself for the day they will betray me. I have come to expect that, since it is a necessary step if they are to become creative in their own right." I found this statement confusing at the time. Decades later, I still do. On the surface it is high-minded and generous, granting preemptive absolution for a yet-to-be-committed offense, one that he saw as the inevitable climax of a successful initiatory process. At the same time, it was an incredibly manipulative gambit, to which I responded as was no doubt expected: "Oh no, sir! You have no need to worry. I could never be so ungrateful." And in some sense it worked. Although my own work has changed much since my student days, advancing values and views markedly different from those of my teacher, I have always taken pains not to write anything that might be construed as betrayal.

Several things prompted me to reconsider my position. First was an article I wrote with my daughter, Martha Lincoln, a medical anthropologist whose fieldwork in Vietnam alerted her to a veritable epidemic of ghosts and haunting.4 In our paper, we sought to understand this and other "hauntological" phenomena as a set of beliefs, practices, and experiences that manifest the enduring power of the past in the present, forcefully reminding survivors of their unfulfilled obligations to, ongoing relations with, and ultimate accountability to the dead.

Second, an observation Eliade made in one of his early works caught my attention. It suggested that—his later reticence notwithstanding—Eliade understood full well that even the most shameful and painful secrets must be disclosed. In 1935 he wrote: "That which is hidden, simply by being hidden, becomes dangerous to the individual and the collective. A 'sin' is surely serious, but a 'sin' that is unconfessed and is kept hidden becomes terrible, as the magic forces unleashed by the act of concealment in time

menace the whole community."5 Magic or not, the secrets he struggled to preserve had terrible consequences for those who became aware of them, some of whom sacrificed their careers, their scholarly integrity, perhaps even their lives.

The most immediate stimulus, however, was a serious mistake I made, one involving those papers that loan Culianu (Figure 1.2) had entrusted to a colleague all those years ago: papers that have bearing not only on Eliade's past, but on Culianu's murder.

Ioan Petru Culianu was just forty-one years old when he was killed, on the afternoon of May 21, 1991. He had gained his position at the University of Chicago's Divinity School just three years earlier and was widely seen as Eliade's successor. The crime was shocking and remains unsolved, although multiple theories have been offered, including those that focus on disgruntled students, jealous spouses, drug cartels, Chicago gangs, and occult covens. Most widely accepted is the theory popularized by Ted Anton: that agents of the Romanian secret service (Securitate) killed Culianu in response to critical articles he wrote for the emigre press, which threatened their postcommunist hold on power.6

Those articles drew complaints and threats, and in the week before Culianu's murder, the threats became sufficiently serious that he entrusted the papers to our colleague Mark Krupnick, whom he asked to safeguard them. Shortly before his own death in 2003, Krupnick gave me the manuscripts and explained how he came to have them. He was not sure what to make of the papers themselves, nor did he understand why Ioan entrusted them to his care, since the two men were not particularly close. Perhaps it was a chance result of their offices' proximity. Mark speculated that his own identity as a Jewish scholar whose research centered on Jewish fiction, testimonial, and autobiography, might also have had some relevance.

The papers, it turned out, were English translations of articles Eliade had written in the 1930s, including a good number in which he voiced his support for a movement known under two names that signaled its religious and militant nature: the Legion of the Archangel Michael and the Iron Guard. Although these articles were key pieces of evidence in the debate about Eliade's past, few people had actually read them. In

Communist Romania, surviving copies of the right-wing dailies in which they originally appeared were consigned to the special collections of select libraries, access to which was tightly controlled. Requests to view such material triggered state suspicion, and few were foolhardy enough to take that risk.

The articles contained passages that shed light on the bitterly contested question whether—and to what extent—Eliade shared the Iron Guard's virulent anti-Semitism.

When I received these manuscripts, I was not prepared to deal with them or the serious issues they raised. I gave them a cursory reading and persuaded myself that on the crucial question they were neither damning, nor exculpatory, but sufficiently nuanced, ambiguous, and elusive to admit rival interpretations. Determined to continue my own work and avoid entanglement in the endless, acrimonious debates about Eliade, I put the papers in a manila folder and buried them in my files. There they remained until June 2017, when I retired from teaching. While cleaning out my office—a task I found inconvenient and annoying, and thus undertook hastily—I carelessly let that folder go to the dumpster, along with many others of no great importance. Freudians will say this was hardly an accident, and I am in no position to disagree.

A few days later, realizing the enormity of what I had done, I resolved to do whatever I could to rectify it. Since the papers could not be recovered, I decided that the only responsible course of action was to learn Romanian, locate the original articles, translate and study them myself, and make the results available. As I made this vow, I could hear the voice of my Doktorvater, for Professor Eliade was always urging me to learn new languages. "You could pick up X easily," he would say, "since it's just like Y, which you already know, with some added vocabulary from Z."

Finding the original Romanian articles proved easier than I expected, as they had been collected and republished in 2001, but there was much in their content that I did not initially comprehend.? And so I continued to gather material, translating numerous related texts that helped me understand the context of these old publications: Romania's situation between the two world wars; Eliade's position in the intellectual, cultural, and political life of his country; the role played by Nae Ionescu, his mentor and

patron, and the turbulent group that had Nae and Eliade at its center. Beyond this, I was led to other texts that show how Culianu got drawn into the Eliade controversies, how he became aware of the legionary articles, what he made of them, and what he was planning to do with them at the time of his murder. Most of this was written in Romanian and Italian, with occasional pieces in German and French. As a result, monoglot anglophones have had to rely on the way these materials have been characterized by the few scholars writing in English who had competence in these languages—Culianu, Mac Linscott Ricketts, and Adriana Berger—each of whom interpreted the evidence in ways strongly inflected by a desire to defend or prosecute Eliade.

Wading through this material, I came to believe that my chief responsibility is to make the relevant documents more fully and readily available. It was thus my intention to include translations of the texts Culianu entrusted to Mark Krupnick as an appendix to this book and to make them easily available online. Culianu's own efforts to publish this material had run into determined opposition from Christinel Eliade, who inherited the copyrights from her husband. My efforts were similarly checked by Sorin Alexandrescu, Eliade's nephew and one of two literary executors to the Eliade estate, who similarly refused permission, despite the strong support of his coexecutor, David Brent, for the translations' publication. Fortunately, copyright to all these articles will expire in 2028, at which time I plan to make my translations available in one form or another.

In the following chapters, I thus can do no more than quote from those documents and offer the inferences I have drawn from them, along with the interpretations and hypotheses I consider most likely. My own views are less important, however, than the evidence itself. Experience suggests that what I have to say will not resolve the debate about Eliade, nor identify Culianu's killer. The material is revealing, however, and holds more than a few surprises. <>

A History of Scottish Philosophy Series

A History of Scottish Philosophy is a series of collaborative studies, each volume being devoted to a specific period. Together they provide a comprehensive account of the Scottish philosophical tradition, from the centuries that laid the foundation of the remarkable burst of intellectual fertility known as the Scottish Enlightenment, through the Victorian age and beyond, when it continued to exercise powerful intellectual influence at home and abroad. The books aim to be historically informative, while at the same time serving to renew philosophical interest in the problems with which the Scottish philosophers grappled, and in the solutions they proposed.

Scottish Philosophy in the Seventeenth Century edited by Alexander Broadie [A History of Scottish Philosophy, Oxford University Press, ISBN 9780198769842]

During the seventeenth century Scots produced many high quality philosophical writings, writings that were very much part of a wider European philosophical discourse. Yet today Scottish philosophy of the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries is widely studied, but that of the seventeenth century is only now beginning to receive the attention it deserves. This volume begins by placing the seventeenth-century Scottish philosophy in its political and religious contexts, and then investigates the writings of the philosophers in the areas of logic, metaphysics, politics, ethics, law, and religion. It is demonstrated that in a variety of ways the Scottish Reformation impacted on the teaching of philosophy in the Scottish universities. It is also shown that until the second half of the century--and the arrival of Descartes on the Scottish philosophy curriculum--the Scots were teaching and developing a form of Reformed orthodox scholastic philosophy, a philosophy that shared many features with the scholastic Catholic philosophy of the medieval period. By the early eighteenth century Scotland was well placed to give rise to the spectacular Enlightenment that then followed, and to do so in large measure on the basis of its own well-established intellectual resources. Among the many thinkers discussed are Reformed orthodox, Episcopalian, and

Catholics philosophers including George Robertson, George Middleton, John Boyd, Robert Baron, Mark Duncan, Samuel Rutherford, James Dundas (first Lord Arniston), George Mackenzie, James Dalrymple (Viscount Stair), and William Chalmers.

Reviews

- Considers such topics as logic, metaphysics, politics, ethics, law, and religion in seventeenth century thought
- Offers new perspectives on famous figures; sheds new light on neglected thinkers
- Explores key intellectual and historical developments in the period
- Situates this area of philosophy in its political and religious contexts
- Will be the standard reference point for this period of philosophy

"Scottish Philosophy in the Seventeenth Century makes an outstanding contribution to the understanding of Scottish intellectual and cultural history...In sum, Scottish Philosophy in the Seventeenth Century is a must-read for any student of seventeenth-century Scottish church history." -- Nathan C. J. Hood, Scottish Church History

"This volume is a fascinating and rich voyage into the historical, political, social, and religious context in which philosophers of the eighteenth century developed their ideas and philosophical accounts. With authors coming from fields of study ranging from philosophy, to history, and to law and politics, the book offers a wider and deeper account of the world in which Scottish philosophers evolved than what is usually found in current philosophical works." -- Journal of Scottish Philosophy

"...excellent and authoritative." - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews Online

"As the editors acknowledge, the volume is entering a crowded field... This volume nonetheless breaks new ground." --Journal of the History of Philosophy

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Seventeenth-Century Scottish Philosophy by Alexander Broadie

Philosophy was a major part of Scottish high culture during the seventeenth century. Hundreds of writings by Scottish philosophers have survived from this period and they are proof of a lively culture of philosophical discourse in which the protagonists demonstrate skill in argument, creative philosophical imagination, and extensive knowledge of philosophical debates taking place outwith as well as within Scotland. That Scotland should have a rich philosophical culture in the seventeenth century should come as no surprise, for its universities remained on a philosophical trajectory that had been at the heart of Scotland's university life during the preceding two centur es. Yet today the richly coloured tapestry of seventeenth-century Scottish philosophy is known to hardly anyone, even within the community of professional philosophers.

By the end of the fifteenth century Scotland had three universities, St Andrews (founded c.1411), Glasgow (founded 1451), and King's College, Aberdeen (founded 1495), and by the end of the following century there were two further universities in Scotland, Edinburgh (founded 1583) and Marischal College, Aberdeen, founded in 1593 as a degree-conferring institution distinct from King's College.

During the greater part of these two centuries the practice of Scotland's universities was to employ as teachers or 'regents' men (all the academics were men) who had studied at universities in northern Europe and especially Paris, Europe's greatest university and one which routinely was home to a large number of Scottish students, as well as to Scottish regents and professors. The outcome of this Scottish recruitment practice was that Paris was treated as a model for teaching methods and also for curricula and the books prescribed for study.

Thus, we find that Lawrence of Lindores (1372–1437), the first rector of St Andrews University, had been a student and then a regent at Paris where he commented extensively on Aristotelian texts, before returning to Scotland to take up his post at St Andrews. Many of his writings, including his commentaries on Aristotle's Physics, De anima and De interpretatione, are extant. A similar story may be told regarding Hector Boece (c.1465–c.1536) a native of Dundee, who was a student and then regent at Paris before going to Aberdeen where he was the first Principal of King's College. He likewise left a substantial body of writing, including a formidable work on logic. John Mair (c.1467–1550), the central figure in a prominent circle of Scottish philosophers and theologians at Paris, spent five years as Principal at Glasgow University (1518–1523), returned to Paris, and for the last sixteen years of his life was Provost of St Salvator's College, St Andrews University. A large number of his books on logic and philosophy are extant. Mair's friend William Manderston, who graduated from Glasgow University in 1506, became professor at the College of Sainte Barbe, Paris and was also briefly rector of the university, before returning to Scotland, to St Andrews, where he pursued his academic career. Another member of Mair's circle who should be mentioned here is George Lokert from Ayr, who studied at Paris, graduated in arts and then in theology, and taught in both fields at Paris before returning to Scotland where he was elected

rector of St Andrews University. Subsequently he became dean of Glasgow, while maintaining close relations with the university. All these men helped to impose on the Scottish universities a Parisian way of doing things.

Further into the sixteenth century there are other distinguished scholars such as George Buchanan, the great humanist and teacher of young James VI; Robert Rollock, first Principal of Edinburgh University; and Andrew Melville who sought to focus Scottish university philosophy teaching on the writings of Pierre de la Ramée (Petrus Ramus). There is good reason to conclude from their discourses and from the discourses of many others who studied in and who taught in the Scottish universities, that Scots could be taught in Scotland at as high a level as was available anywhere in Europe.

In recent decades a good deal of light has been shed on dark places of sixteenth-century Scottish philosophy, and there is now a strong basis on which to build. But until very recently there has been no attempt to build a corresponding picture of seventeenth-century Scottish philosophy. This fact prompts questions. Were there no good Scottish philosophers of that century? Was there no ground-breaking work? Did the five Scottish universities come to attach less value to philosophy teaching? Or even abandon it entirely? And to step back in order to have a broader perspective, if no noteworthy philosophical product did appear, what could be the explanation for the blackout following the high-quality philosophy produced during the previous two centuries?

The questions are no less pressing, perhaps more pressing, when coming from the perspective of the eighteenth century, the century of Enlightenment during which Scotland's achievement in philosophy was unsurpassed anywhere in Europe. With boasting rights assured by the presence of Francis Hutcheson, David Hume, Adam Smith, Thomas Reid, Adam Ferguson, Dugald Stewart, and others, it is surely difficult to believe that the tremendous achievements of the eighteenth century owed nothing, or the almost nothing, to the philosophy of Scotland of the previous century. But if its origins did not lie in Scotland they must have lain elsewhere. In line with this thought,

there is no lack of secondary literature that finds, in seventeenth-century philosophers from other countries, for example, France, the Low Countries, and England, the explanation for the sudden rise and peerless achievement of Scottish thinkers during the Age of Enlightenment.

In light of the facts and claims just aired, it is surprising that there has not previously been a significant investigation of philosophy in seventeenth-century Scotland, with a view to explaining the dramatic differences in levels of achievement between the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, as also between the sixteenth and seventeenth. It is no less surprising that there had been no serious attempt to determine whether the facts were truly factual.

Now that the work has started it can be reported that seventeenth-century Scotland succeeded in producing a vibrant philosophical culture rich in achievement, with philosophers responsive to each other, responsive to philosophers of other countries, and responded to, in their turn, by philosophers from furth of Scotland. The universities, vested with responsibilities to their disciplines and to their students, discharged their responsibilities at an impressively high level, as also, it should be said, did the schools that provided the students, already competent in Latin, and therefore able both to understand the lectures and also to participate in disputations. With regard to its philosophical culture, the century between the Age of Reformation and the Age of Enlightenment was demonstrably not a mysteriously dark age. On the contrary, it was an age in which there flourished in abundance the intellectual vigour that one might reasonably have expected given the philosophical achievements of the flanking centuries.

Almost all the literature on Scottish philosophy attends exclusively to the philosophy of the Scottish Enlightenment. This means that in providing a narrative now that embraces philosophical writing antecedent to the Scottish Enlightenment there is likely to be a felt pressure to approach the subject in a teleological spirit, that is, by seeing the earlier century's work in terms of the eighteenth century's and attending to that earlier work on the basis of terms of reference dictated by what came later. Some

ideas that were truly important to seventeenth-century philosophy figure less or hardly at all during the following century, and the perspective of seventeenth-century Scottish philosophers was in substantial measure different from the perspective which predominated in the following century. Two points should be noted at this stage; others will emerge as the book progresses.

First: In 1560 Scotland embraced religious Reform. The country, to speak generally, became Protestant, taking up a stance very much more in line with Calvin than Luther, though Lutheranism was prominent in the earlier part of the religious turbulence in Scotland, as witness the stance of Patrick Hamilton, proto-martyr of the Scottish Reformation. But the most important figure in the Protestant leadership in 1560 was John Knox, who had lived in Geneva and had been hugely influenced by Calvin and other theologians in the Genevan leadership. Knox was the principal person in Scotland among those who guided Scottish Protestantism towards a specific confession of faith and a specific concept of church governance, Presbyterianism. These cataclysmic events were bound to impact on Scotland's universities, for each was deeply imbedded within the Catholic culture of medieval Scotland. Each, St Andrews, Glasgow, and King's College, Aberdeen, was founded by papal bull, and each had come into being with the vital help of a local bishop, Henry Wardlaw at St Andrews, William Turnbull at Glasgow, and William Elphinstone at King's College, Aberdeen. All three universities had the task of protecting and promoting the Catholic faith; they were bulwarks against what the Church perceived to be errors. The Reformation was bound to have a transformational effect on Scotland's universities and on the thinking of those engaged in academic studies whether in the groves of academe or not. In terms of their constitution, the universities had to deal with the question of the changes that should be made to their foundation documents in light of the fact that they would thereafter be protecting and promoting the New Faith, not the Old.

Within this unfolding drama philosophy played a powerful role since philosophy, religion, and theology occupy a large area of common ground, including matters relating to the existence of God, the divine attributes, the concept of creation, the meaning of human life, moral imperatives, and much else. A question arises regarding

the implications that the New Faith might have for the teaching, especially the philosophy teaching in the universities. Thus, as regards the Eucharist, Christ's declaration that 'this (bread) is my body, this (wine) is my blood' was given a very precise philosophical interpretation by the Catholic Church. It was based on the concept of transubstantiation and was expounded in terms of the Aristotelian metaphysics of substance and accident. The exposition involved the invention of the conception of 'real accident', and Scotland's seventeenth-century Reformed Orthodox philosophers were unanimous in declaring that that Pre-Reformation concept was incoherent, a logical contradiction. This contested area was no longer contested in Scotland by the Age of Enlightenment. Philosophy had moved on.

A further philosophical cum theological concept that changed as a result of the Reformation was that of the Fall, humankind's first disobedience, the corruption of Adam and Eve, and their expulsion from the Garden of Eden. The concept of the Fall was crucial for an understanding of philosophical anthropology and humankind's moral status. To speak generally, during the period from the early-seventeenth century to the later-eighteenth century the Fall evolved in Scotland from being understood to be a super-terrifying thing to being understood to be something a good deal less fierce. Among the leaders in this process of reassessment was Francis Hutcheson, whose moral philosophy was based on a much gentler and more agreeable picture of human nature.

The second point I wish to make regarding the different perspectives of the earlier philosophers and the later is that eighteenth-century Scottish philosophers, to a greater extent than their immediate predecessors, were engaged with scepticism, whether by wondering how to take it forward or how to refute it, or by wondering with what to replace it. Hume, more than anyone, set the tone, and the common-sense philosophers, Thomas Reid most famously, sought to answer him. These were major issues in the later century and not in the earlier.

To evaluate the philosophers of the seventeenth century simply on the basis of whether their work was or was not helpful to their Enlightenment successors, and to attend to

their writings only to the extent that they could be hooked onto the later philosophical texts, is to do those earlier philosophers an injustice and therefore a disservice. It is to write a teleological history of philosophy—not a kind pursued in this volume.

Chapters two and three provide detailed contextualisation of the Scottish uni versities within a period of rapid change in both the political and the religious dimensions of the country, and dwelling particularly on the impact of those changes on the philoso phy taught in the universities. The impact of the conflictual relations between Presbyterians and Episcopalians is noted and the success of the Presbyterians in the late 1630s and the 1640s in taking charge of the universities, including those in Aberdeen where the outcome of the take-over was catastrophic for the Episcopalians, one of whom, Robert Baron, was one of the finest philosophers in Scotland. A wealth of information is provided regarding the teachers and the philosophical works presented to their students.

Chapters four and five both concern Scotland's philosophers as citizens in the international Republic of Letters, travelling furth of Scotland to help in the philosophical education of others, and also appropriating philosophical ideas not originally conceived in Scotland, but perceived to be helpful to Scots in their own philosophical explorations. In chapter four, Scotland's relation with the Huguenots, France's Genevan-inspired Protestant community, is centre stage. From the late-sixteenth century until 1685 the Huguenots had academies whose primary task was the preparation of young men for the role of pastors of the French Protestant communities. The Scottish philosophers and theologians were judged by Geneva to be doctrinally sound and were therefore welcome as regents and professors at the academies at Saumur, Montauban, Orthez, Montpellier, and elsewhere (there were a dozen Huguenot academies in France, all told). The Scots provided a philosophy syllabus that was in close harmony with the teaching done at the Scottish universities. It all ended in tears for the Huguenots in 1685 with the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes, and the Huguenots' consequent loss of citizen rights and their departure from France in great numbers to settle in many countries in Europe, including Scotland, in large measure a Calvinist country and therefore one into which the immigrants could the more readily

be as simulated, all the more so in view of the welcome and beneficial influence that the Scots had had in Huguenot population centres in France.

Chapter five also faces outward. It tracks lines of influence by which Scots around 1700 were informed by the work of philosophers elsewhere in Europe, works which in many cases impacted on what was taught at the universities of Scotland. The contributions of Scots to wider philosophical debates is noted, while it is also acknowledged that Scots operated under certain constraints. These included the dearth of printing presses in Scotland, and weaknesses in the system that was in place for the distribution of books, especially books from abroad. There was also the deeper problem of the perceived unacceptability of the teaching and promoting of views that were potentially dangerous to the faith. Nevertheless, despite these various obstacles, Scotland's philosophers did gain access to many or even most of the philosophy books that were causing a stir on the Continent and in England, as witness the Scottish discussions of Hobbes, Descartes, Spinoza, Gassendi, Malebranche, Newton, Locke, Henry More, Johannes Clauberg, Gerard de Vries, Jean LeClerk, and many others. To speak generally, the Scottish philosophers kept abreast of what their Continental colleagues were saying and they were engaged in passing on the new ideas to their students, even if passing them on in such a way as to respect the fact that they, as teachers, had the task of preparing students for a life in the church or in public service.

The Arts Faculty was not the place to teach theology. Theology came later, but the regents in Arts could not teach as if theology were not relevant to the task with which they were charged and that task, as just indicated, included teaching philosophy to young men who would play a part in the ecclesiastical life of the newly Protestant country. The Reformed Church in Scotland therefore needed to have a view on the relation between philosophy and the Reformed faith. Chapter six deals with this question on the basis of the doctrines of Bola fide and Bola Scriptura—'by faith alone' and 'by Scripture alone'. Scripture was seen as a self-sufficient text. Through it and it alone we learn the content of our faith; philosophical reflection could not give us that insight. Of course, there is a need for philosophical reflection but, as is stressed in

chapter six, it is necessary to employ philosophy within its natural limits, which are certainly not the limits of a theology that takes Scripture as its starting point.

As to the nature of the philosophy taught in the Scottish universities, chapter six pays attention to the fact that the philosophy of the first half of the sixteenth century had a scholastic character, in this sense, that it is a version of Aristotle's philosophy, heavily informed by the thinking of the medieval Catholic philosophers, the Schoolmen, and it involved a teaching style of reading of authoritative texts and of conducting disputations on those texts, using theses, objections to the theses, and then a process of weighing the theses and objections in search of an outcome to the disputation that would satisfy reason. Such philosophy was really the only philosophical show in town; it was common to Catholic philosophy and Reformed and had the advantage that it enabled philosophers from different faith communities to talk to each at a high level of mutual understanding. Assuredly Catholics and Reformed thinkers took a different view of what the Eucharist meant, but at least they understood each other very well. The Aristotelian language of substance and accident in terms of which Catholics couched their position was exactly the language that the Reformed also used, even if each side thought the other totally wrong in certain of their doctrines.

The following chapter, seven, on logic, demonstrates that the concept of logic was sufficiently broad in late-sixteenth and in seventeenth-century Scotland to cover grammar, rhetoric, and methodology, as well as the idea of rules governing the relations between premises and conclusion in scientific syllogisms. The regents' logic teaching was also influenced by a wide range of sources, including, in the early part of the period, Aristotle (of course) and Pierre de la Ramée, and, in the later part, Descartes and Francis Bacon, though Aristotle's influence continued to count for something. While Aristotle's influence is shown in the regents' handling of the question of how knowledge should be presented, Descartes and then Francis Bacon are seen as sources of precious insights regarding the logic of scientific discovery, which is the area not of the presentation of knowledge, which is primarily a rhetorical matter, but of the acquisition of knowledge, which is not primarily rhetorical. Behind these concerns there lurk others, of a theological nature, concerning the Fall, a topic that surfaces often

in this volume. The Fall left humankind corrupted in the faculties of the mind, but not so corrupted that self-help was ruled out. The regents saw logic as an instrument by which we could rescue ourselves from some of the terrible consequences of humankind's first disobedience.

Chapter eight expounds the concept of 'judgment', a concept that is at home in logic and is also deployed by seventeenth-century Scottish philosophers in their philosophy of mind. Close attention is paid to the discussion on judgment in the Metaphysica generalis of Robert Baron, where he particularly addresses the idea of judgment as a free act. A notable feature of Baron's treatment of judgment is his contrast between, on the one hand, the logician's concern with judgment as a bearer of truth in inferences in which canons of inference are deployed that ensure that if the judgments serving as premises are true then so also must be the judgment drawn as a conclusion from those premises and, on the other hand, a judgment that is passed by an arbiter, a person agreed upon by two parties in dispute who undertake to accept the judgment he makes as to which party is in the right. The arbiter seeks the right balance in judging the respective merits of the two protagonists. He must be guided by pertinent principles, including the dictates of natural justice, and while his deliberations may be grounded in part on a hunch or a feeling, which he cannot present as a sound intellectual basis for his decision, they must also be grounded, at least in part, on defensible principles.

Baron's rich discussion is further enriched by his thoughts on the location, among the faculties of the mind, of the freedom that is thus exercised by the arbiter, a freedom, Baron notes, that is greater than that of a judge sitting in judgment in a court of law, who is bound by a plethora of laws, regulations, and technical clarifications, that cannot be ignored or transgressed without a failure of due process. In short, the judge pronounces on the question: 'What does the law require in respect of the case now before the court?' This is not a question to which the arbiter has to respond.

The law is also foregrounded in chapter nine, where perhaps the single greatest presentation of Scots law, The Institutions of the Law of Scotland, by James Dalrymple, the first Viscount Stair, is discussed with special reference to legal obligation and its

normativity. Since natural law is God's law, it seems evident that God's will is the ground or origin of our obligation to obey natural law. Positive law is made by humans, and it might seem that obligation to obey it derives from the human will as the obligation to obey natural law derives from the divine will. However, in Stair's account, positive law is at least in part derivable from natural law, and hence God's will is part of the explanation for the normativity of positive law. But there is a further point here, concerning the role of the Fall. Before the Fall humans naturally willed in concurrence with natural law, but after the Fall, the natural law requirement of equity is in a conflictual relation with the corrupted human will. The fallen human agent will often fail to obey the natural demand for equitable behaviour and, for the sake of a quiet, or at least an easier time, will treat some individual equitably at the cost of treating the community in equitably. Such is life.

Following the chapter on the great jurisprudentialist James Dalrymple, Viscount Stair, chapter ten focuses on Stair's in-law, the Scottish judge James Dundas, the first Lord Arniston, whose 313 page manuscript Idea philosophiae moralis (The idea of moral philosophy) has only recently come to light. Written in 1679, the year of Dundas's death, the Latin manuscript, the only philosophical work he is known to have written, fits squarely within the category of Reformed orthodox scholasticism. Dundas begins in an Aristotelian spirit by expounding a concept of moral philosophy that rather closely resembles the concept that emerges from Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics, though Dundas believes Aristotle's exposition to be the poorer for its not including a concept corresponding to that of the Fall. Thereafter the book discusses good and evil, happiness, conscience, and the virtues. Dundas discusses the concept of the will, with special reference to the question whether the will necessarily wills in accordance with the last judgment made in a deliberative process by practical reason, and he emerges from his discussion as a determinist who nevertheless believes that we have free will. Chapter ten of this volume takes due note of the theological dimension of Dundas's narrative on the will.

In chapters nine and ten the fact of the Fall plays a prominent part. In chapter eleven the Fall occupies centre stage, as seventeenth-century Scottish philosophy, particularly

the philosophy of the university regents, is surveyed. It is shown that the concepts of original sin, the Fall and post-lapsarian corruption frame much of seventeenth-century Scottish thinking on moral philosophy and moral psychology. Among the players whom the Scottish philosophers discuss are Descartes, Hobbes, and the Cambridge Platonist Henry More; and the neo-Stoic moral essays of the Scottish judge (yet another philosophically minded judge) George Mackenzie are also in the foreground, as ways are noted in which the rather hard-edged Reformed orthodox views of human nature gradually soften, at least in some writings, as the century progresses.

During the seventeenth century, Scottish Catholics could not flourish in Scottish universities, whose teachers were almost entirely (if not entirely) Presbyterian or Episcopalian, and outside the universities also that same religious configuration is to be found among those who contributed to academic disciplines in Scotland. There were Scottish Catholics making a significant contribution to philosophy during the seventeenth century, but they were not making their contribution from within Scotland itself. Perhaps the most important was William Chalmers (surname in Latin: Camerarius) from the village of Fintray in Aberdeenshire. He left Scotland when aged about twelve or in his early teens, studied at the Scots College in Rome, became a Jesuit, left the Order, became an Oratorian, and in his latter days was a secular priest in St Malo. His greatest work, Selectae disputationes philosophicae (Selected philosophical disputations), published in Paris in 1630, demonstrates the influence of the greatest philosopher of medieval Scotland John Duns Scotus, but the work is nevertheless that of an independently minded thinker. Chapter twelve of this book attends to two discussions in the Disputationes, first, on the concept of happiness and the relation of happiness to the role played in its production by the faculties of intellect and will, and secondly, on the concept of doing evil for evil's sake, a concept that Chalmers believes to be instantiated by the actions of persons of several different sorts, the devil, those who are damned (damnati) and those who are very perverse wayfarers (viatores perversissimi) on their pilgrimage through this life. Chalmers' philosophy was read by his contemporaries in Scotland, including Dundas, and their response to him merits a study of its own.

Chapter thirteen turns to political matters, and especially to the doctrines of perhaps Scotland's pre-eminent political philosopher, Samuel Rutherford, regarding the relation of monarchs to the law and to their subjects. Rutherford, with a wealth of subtle arguments, demonstrates that the monarch should be subordinate to the law— hence the ordering of the terms in the title of his greatest work, Lex Rex—and demonstrates also that the monarch should be subordinate to the subjects, in the sense that the monarch is in post by the will of the people, who have the right not only to elect a monarch but also to depose a monarch who proves to be not up to the job of ruling. The chapter also demonstrates that Rutherford's discussion is to be seen in a broad historical-philo soph ic al frame that includes the Scots Hector Boece, John Knox, George Buchanan, and especially John Mair, as well as Jean Gerson and John Mair's former student Jacques Almain. The political issues here dealt with are linked to theological concerns, particularly the Fall, principally because there were no politics before the Fall. It was only with humankind's first disobedience and the consequent depravity, which included, for the first time in human history, a sense of 'mine'—my property — and feelings of greed, that it became necessary for human beings to think of the principles that inform a well-ordered way to live. Sound political thinking must be grounded in a sound anthropology; and an anthropology based on humanity after the Fall is significantly different from that based on humanity prior to the Fall. Rutherford never loses sight of this thesis.

Indeed, throughout this volume we find religion and theology providing a space within which philosophical activity is carried out, and we must also be aware of the religious and theological dimensions of the places where Scotland's philosophy teachers were working, including the universities all of which had, as a primary task, the preparation of students for a life spent as pastors or ministers, and including also the Huguenot academies whose primary task was the same as that of the Scottish universities. Such facts as these need to be in the open if the aim of the historian of philosophy is, as it should be, not simply to make sense of the writings of past philosophers, but to understand what those writings meant to the philosophers who wrote them. <>

SCOTTISH PHILOSOPHY IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY, VOLUME I: MORALS, POLITICS, ART, RELIGION edited by Aaron Garrett and James A. Harris [A History of Scottish Philosophy, Oxford University Press, 9780199560677

This new history of Scottish philosophy will include two volumes that focus on the Scottish Enlightenment. In this volume a team of leading experts explore the ideas, intellectual context, and influence of Hutcheson, Hume, Smith, Reid, and many other thinkers, frame old issues in fresh ways, and introduce new topics and questions into debates about the philosophy of this remarkable period. The contributors explore the distinctively Scottish context of this philosophical flourishing, and juxtapose the work of canonical philosophers with contemporaries now very seldom read. The outcome is a broadening-out, and a filling-in of the detail, of the picture of the philosophical scene of Scotland in the eighteenth century.

Reviews

- The launch of a new history of Scottish philosophy
- New perspectives on famous figures
- Explores key intellectual and historical developments in the period
- Will be the standard reference point for this period of philosophy

CONTENTS

The philosophy of eighteenth-century Scotland, unlike the philosophy of nineteenth-century Scotland, is by now familiar territory. The past forty or fifty years have seen a determined and concerted effort to look beyond and behind the giant figure of David Hume and to recover the full extent of Scottish philosophical achievement from the time of the Glorious Revolution and the Act of Union to the time of the French Revolution and the European wars that followed it. New editions of the complete works of Hume (Beauchamp, Norton, and Stewart (gen. eds.) 1998–), Francis Hutcheson (Haakonssen (gen. ed.) 2002–), Adam Smith (Campbell and Skinner (gen. eds.) 1976–2001), and Thomas Reid (Haakonssen (gen. ed.) 1995–) have been initiated, and in Smith's case completed. Important works by Gershom Carmichael (1724), George Turnbull (1740, 1742), David Fordyce (1748), Adam Ferguson (1767), Lord Kames (1751, 1762, 1774), and John Millar (1771, 1787) have also been freshly edited, and selections from the works of James Beattie (Harris (ed.) 2004), Dugald Stewart (Mortera (ed.) 2007), and Thomas Brown (Dixon (ed.) 2007) have been published. There has also been what demands to be called an explosion of secondary literature on all aspects of the philosophy of Scotland in the eighteenth century. Some of this literature limits its attention to analysis of the arguments of individual philosophers. Some of it explores intellectual relations between different philosophers. There are edited volumes of essays on the philosophy of the Scottish Enlightenment in general, and on particular themes in Scottish Enlightenment philosophy (cf. Campbell and Skinner (eds.) 1982; Hope (ed.) 1984; Stewart (ed.) 1990; Wood (ed.) 2000). There are Cambridge Companions to Hume (Norton and Taylor (eds.) 2008), Smith (Haakonssen (ed.) 2006), and Reid (Cuneo and van Woudenberg (eds.) 2004) along with a Cambridge Companion to the Scottish Enlightenment (Broadie (ed.) 2003). A major biography of Smith is in its second edition (Ross 2010) and biographical studies of Hume and Reid

are soon to appear by contributors to this collection (James Harris and Paul Wood respectively). There are journals dedicated to Hume and to Smith, and a Journal of Scottish Philosophy that started as Reid Studies and tends to be dominated by work on the eighteenth century. New general histories of Scottish philosophy in the eighteenth century, updating the work of late nineteenth-century historians of philosophy such as James McCosh and Henry Graham, have been published (Rendall 1978; Broadie 2009). There are articles on Scottish philosophy in the eighteenth century in the Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy and the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. There is also, of course, a large amount of work on Scottish figures and themes in studies of eighteenth-century philosophy considered more generally.1

What, then, is this new history of Scottish philosophy in the Enlightenment period meant to achieve? What does it add to the vigorous and sophisticated conversation about Scottish eighteenth-century philosophy that is already going on? Is there a need for another survey of the field? Our answer to such questions begins with the list of contributors to this volume. There are thirteen contributors in all. Only four (Garrett, Graham, Harris, Heydt) work in philosophy departments. The other nine contributors are based in departments of history (Emerson, Macleod, Sebastiani, Suderman, Tolonen, Wood), political science (Berry, Hanley), and English literature (Carey). It is our hope that this has resulted in new perspectives on the philosophy of the Scottish Enlightenment, that old issues have been framed in fresh ways, and that new topics and questions have been introduced into the debates that historians of philosophy are currently having with each other about the philosophy written in eighteenth-century Scotland. A lot in this volume will of course be familiar to experts. New ground is not broken on every page. But when, for example, it comes to the four major philosophical figures who each have their own chapter—Hutcheson, Hume, Smith, and Reid— we believe that this volume looks at well-known philosophical material from new points of view. The focus of these chapters tends to be on the distinctively Scottish context of the philosopher in question, and our hope is that this adds substantially to the understanding of his major texts. In the more thematic chapters, the Scottish context—or rather, a variety of Scottish contexts—is again prominent, but so is the

juxtaposition of canonical philosophers with contemporaries now very seldom read. The outcome is, we believe, a broadening out, and a filling in of the detail, of the picture of the philosophical scene of Scotland in the eighteenth century.

It is a peculiar feature of the history of philosophy that it is written primarily by philosophers. The history of history is written by historians of course but it is a somewhat different case. The history of science is not written by physicists and chemists, the history of literature is (mostly) not written by novelists and poets, the history of economics is (again, mostly) not written by economists. Usually the history of philosophy is the work of those who are philosophers first, and historians second. The result is a kind of history more concerned than is usual in other fields of history with what we might term a usable past. It is often the case that the aim, stated or implied, of an exercise in the history of philosophy is to bring a philosopher of the past into productive conversation with the philosophy of the present. For that to be so much as possible, obviously enough, there needs to be a fundamental continuity in understandings of what philosophy is. Philosophers of the past need to be interpretable as doing more or less the same thing as philosophers do now, as addressing more or less the same questions, using more or less the same methods. And so it is ruled out from the beginning that the philosophy of a particular period in the past might be, in significant respects, different from the philosophy of the present. Yet the fact is that philosophy has in the past been different in important respects from what philosophy is now. This is certainly the case when it comes to the philosophy of the eighteenth century. The literary style used by writers of philosophy, their intended audience, the institutional setting in which they worked—all differed greatly from what is usual among philosophers now. The syllabi taught by university professors, the definitions of philosophy given in dictionaries and encyclopaedias, the way the word ‘philosophy’, and its cognates, is used—all these things provide evidence that the nature of philosophy has changed considerably over the past two hundred years. Historians of philosophy who are philosophers by training are not always attuned to these differences. It seems a possibility, at least, that historians of philosophy from other

disciplines might bring things to the attention of philosophers that they might otherwise miss.

A word is perhaps called for here about our conception of the relation between 'the philosophy of eighteenth-century Scotland' and 'the philosophy of the Scottish Enlightenment'. We believe that these are two ways of talking about the same thing. That is, we do not believe that in the Scottish context it is useful to distinguish between 'Enlightenment' and 'Counter-Enlightenment' philosophy. It is by now generally accepted that it makes no sense to use definitions of the Enlightenment taken from the Paris of the philosophes in an account of what Enlightenment meant in Scotland. If, for example, to be part of the Enlightenment is necessarily to be anti-clerical, then the only Scot who stands a chance of being part of the Enlightenment is Hume. But to exclude Hutcheson, Ferguson, and Reid, and many others besides, from the Scottish Enlightenment just because they were Christians and church ministers would be plainly absurd. Yet nor is it obvious that it is proper to identify the Enlightenment in Scotland with the cause of the 'Moderate' faction in the Church of Scotland, the faction that Hutcheson helped make possible, the faction to which Ferguson actively belonged, and the faction with which Hume, Smith, and Reid sympathized. Those who opposed and criticized the Moderates in the name of 'Orthodoxy' were not all unthinking bigots. Some did so with the intelligence and wit that is characteristic of paradigm cases of the Enlightenment cast of mind—see, for example, John Witherspoon's Ecclesiastical Characteristics; or, The Arcana of Church Policy. James Beattie's attack on Hume in An Essay on the Nature and Immutability of Truth is an unattractive piece of ad hominem intolerance, but his other writings are perfectly representative of the mainstream of eighteenth-century Scottish moral philosophy. Beattie, it is worth remembering, was one of the first to criticize the racism in Hume's description of Africans in the essay 'Of National Character'. No one set of philosophical ideas can safely be identified as characteristic of the Scottish Enlightenment. For present purposes, then, the Scottish Enlightenment is all that happened in Scotland, intellectually speaking, between around 1700 and around 1800. And the philosophy of the Scottish Enlightenment is all that happened, philosophically speaking, in that place at that time.

One way of attempting a general characterization of the philosophy of eighteenth-century Scotland would be by means of a comparison and contrast with the Scottish philosophy of the seventeenth century. In this connection it is tempting, and many have succumbed to the temptation, to suppose that an age of enlightenment must have been preceded by an age of darkness. The Scottish philosophy of the seventeenth century, it is easy and convenient to suppose, was subservient to the theology of the Westminster Confession, with its emphasis upon original sin and the utter corruption of human nature. Even where that is not true, it might further be assumed, Scottish philosophy was 'scholastic', and therefore unresponsive both to the humanism of the Renaissance and the new science of Bacon, Galileo, Boyle, and Newton. Either way, so a familiar story goes, the early eighteenth century saw a dramatic and complete rejection of all that had gone before. This story often has it that Hutcheson, in particular, was instrumental in dragging Scotland out of the shadows and cobwebs of the post-Reformation period into the bright modern world of humane morality, polite manners, and empiricist epistemology. Thus, according to Henry Thomas Buckle in his discussion of the 'Scotch intellect' in The History of Civilization in England [sic], the divines who subscribed to the Westminster Confession were 'libellers of their species'. It was 'the peculiar glory of Hutcheson, that he was the first man in Scotland who publicly combatted these degrading notions'. The appearance of Hutcheson's moral philosophy, according to Buckle, 'forms an epoch in the national literature' (Buckle 1861: II.426; cited in Rendall 1978: 74). It is now clear that this story will not do. Hutcheson did not come from nowhere. He was, after all, educated at Glasgow by men who must have done something to shape his philosophical outlook; and he had to be elected to the moral philosophy chair there by men who were sympathetic to his ideas. It may be that no one in, say, 1690, after decades of violent religious conflict in Scotland, could have predicted Hutcheson and the rest of the Scottish Enlightenment. But that does not mean that there are not intellectual roots of Enlightenment thought to be found in the Scottish philosophy of the seventeenth century. We believe that it is too soon responsibly to offer a hypothesis about what those roots may be. Too little is

known as yet about the philosophical culture of the pre-Enlightenment period in Scotland.

In place, then, of an account of the intellectual origins of eighteenth-century Scottish philosophy, this volume begins with a summary description by Roger Emerson in Chapter 1 both of the kind of country Scotland was around 1700 and of the opportunities, especially the intellectual opportunities, that it afforded its citizens. Emerson sets out the distinctiveness of Scotland and of its institutions, and the consequent impossibility of seeing the Scottish Enlightenment as reducible to an extension of an English Enlightenment. Emerson makes clear that at the turn of the eighteenth century Holland was in important respects a greater influence on Scotland than was the country south of the Tweed. Scots continued to study at Leiden in particular, and the textbooks used in Scottish universities, especially Edinburgh and Glasgow, tended to have a Dutch provenance. Aberdeen and St Andrews were marked more by ideas from Catholic Europe, but 'everywhere educational ideals and texts were mostly continental in origin until about 1730' (p. 23). Holland also had a significant role in shaping the outlook of Scottish lawyers and medics until the middle of the century. The men Emerson is particularly interested in came back from Europe with the ambition, and also the means, to improve their native country. Some Scots, at least, had a perception of themselves as living in a backward society that needed to be 'changed' and that could be changed. The abolition of regenting in the universities and the creation of a professoriate, for example, was inspired by European practice. This was just one of many institutional reforms that paved the way for the philosophical achievements described in this volume. 'The Scottish Enlightenment', Emerson concludes, 'was not principally about politeness or civic humanism'. It was about 'something more basic, the remaking of a society so that it could produce men able to compete in every way in a rapidly changing world' (p. 31).

Daniel Carey's account of the life and work of Francis Hutcheson in Chapter 2 begins by noting that Hutcheson's status in Scotland in the second quarter of the eighteenth century owed as much to the way he succeeded in adapting his ideas to the needs of a complex and changing society as to sheer conceptual insight and argumentative

dexterity. Carey charts Hutcheson's career from its beginnings in Dublin to the attempt to cement his place in British intellectual life that was his posthumously published System of Moral Philosophy. It was at no point the case that Hutcheson's ideas were universally welcomed and acclaimed. Religious conservatives challenged him persistently. They continued to attack him even after he succeeded in getting elected to the Glasgow chair of moral philosophy. At every stage of his career in fact there was controversy, and these controversies have much to tell us about the state of philosophy in Scotland, and in Britain as a whole, in the early Enlightenment period. Carey describes in turn the rationalist critique of Hutcheson's moral sense theory, the criticism levelled at his conception of natural benevolence by those (for instance, the St Andrews professor Archibald Campbell) who remained attached to philosophical egoism, and the complaints of those who, under the influence often of Joseph Butler, believed that Hutcheson's ethics needed to be supplemented by a more substantial account of moral obligation. The third of these lines of argument was especially thoroughly developed in the classrooms of Scottish universities, by for example Fordyce, Smith, Reid, and Dugald Stewart. This shows the extent to which Hutcheson's work constituted one important point of departure for the way moral philosophy was taught in Scotland throughout the century—and further abroad as well, in the dissenting academies of England, and in the colleges in the American colonies, where both his critical treatment of slavery in the System and his powerful articulation of a right of resistance were especially carefully attended to.

In Chapter 3 Aaron Garrett and Colin Heydt move on beyond Hutcheson to essay a general account of the moral philosophy of eighteenth-century Scotland. It would be hard to exaggerate the importance of moral philosophy in Scotland at this time. It occupied the entire final year of the arts syllabus. It was the subject that the first three years of college were preparation for. Those who taught moral philosophy were understood to play a vital role in the formation of the minds and characters of the young men who would go on to become Scotland's politicians, church ministers, lawyers, land owners, and businessmen. Of course 'moral philosophy' comprised more in the eighteenth century than it does now. What we call 'aesthetics' (treated in

Chapter 3), 'philosophy of religion' (treated in Chapter 5), and 'political philosophy' (treated variously in Chapters 7, 8, and 9) were all within the remit of the professor of moral philosophy. Garrett and Heydt focus on moral philosophy construed somewhat more narrowly as having two main parts, one theoretical, the other practical. In their discussion of the theoretical component of ethics, Garrett and Heydt give particular attention to three topics: (i) the Scottish insistence that moral philosophy is an empirical, or 'experimental', science, grounded in what might now be called a phenomenology of the moral life, and intimately connected with the other elements of the 'science of man'; (ii) the project (introduced in Chapter 2) of combining Hutchesonian moral sense theory with a Butlerian faculty of conscience; and (iii) the attempt to combine an empirical and broadly anti-rationalist moral philosophy, a moral philosophy that moreover had a central place for the concept of virtue, with a natural jurisprudence taken from Grotius and, especially, Pufendorf. In the process, Garrett and Heydt give attention, not only to familiar and obviously important philosophers from Hutcheson through Hume and Smith to Reid, but also to relatively neglected figures such as Carmichael, Archibald Campbell, Turnbull, Fordyce, Beattie, and the Ferguson of the Institutes of Moral Philosophy. Those who taught moral philosophy could not leave theoretical questions alone, but they treated practical issues as being plainly more important. They often claimed that while disagreement was rife with respect to theoretical issues, there was little controversy when it came to the nature of the duties of adult human beings. In their summary description of the way Scottish professors instructed their charges as to their duties to God, to themselves, and to others, Garrett and Heydt make it clear that there was, all the same, no lack of dispute as to the proper way of categorizing those duties, and as to how they are to be related to the discourse of rights. In the final section of their chapter, Garrett and Heydt bring into focus the question of how eighteenth-century Scottish philosophers reconciled their interest in duty, and in right, with their equally prominent interests in virtue and utility.

There is a tendency among historians of aesthetics to take it as obvious that the subject attained maturity only with the publication of Kant's Critique of Judgment in 1790, and

to treat what happened before in terms of the degree to which it anticipated Kantian doctrines. In his survey of Scottish work on beauty, taste, rhetoric, and language in Chapter 4, Gordon Graham resists this tendency, pointing out early on in the chapter a number of respects in which Scottish philosophical aesthetics contrasts significantly with the Kantian approach. Scottish writers on these topics saw themselves as contributing to the larger project of a comprehensive 'science of man'. Their method was avowedly empirical and inductive. They often thought historically, in terms of conjectural accounts of the origins and development of literary and artistic phenomena. And they were intensely concerned with the practical, indeed moral, value and importance of aesthetic matters. In all of these respects, there are affinities between the aesthetics and the moral philosophy the Scottish Enlightenment, and there is consequently no effort made by the Scots to distinguish, as Kant sought to, our interest in the right and the good from our interest in the beautiful and the sublime. The bulk of Graham's chapter explores Scottish writing on two questions of enduring philosophical significance: first, whether beauty (and other aesthetic properties) exists independently of being perceived or is in some sense the product of our perceptual responses to the more 'objective' properties of objects; and second, whether there is a 'standard of taste' against which aesthetic judgements can be measured and found to be true or false. Hutcheson and Hume dominate discussion of these issues in the eighteenth-century context, but Graham draws in also arguments made by others, including Alexander Gerard and Reid. He also introduces related controversies concerning the pleasures of tragedy and the nature of artistic genius. In section VII of his chapter Graham turns toward the practical dimension of the question of taste, and to how taste, conceived of broadly enough to encompass both moral and aesthetic pleasures and pains, was to be cultivated and improved. Rhetoric, or 'eloquence', was understood by eighteenth-century Scots to be essential to the project of the refinement of taste. Rhetoric, needless to say, was important more generally in a culture that attached great importance to the weekly sermon of a minister to his congregation. A science of rhetoric led naturally to a science of language, and Graham describes work

on language by Smith, Lord Monboddo, and Hugh Blair in his chapter's concluding section.

One of the things that makes David Hume unusual when considered in his eighteenth-century context is his lack of interest in the practical questions that mattered so much to so many of his Scottish contemporaries. He was not a university professor (and does not seem really to have wanted to be one), nor lawyer, nor a medic, nor, of course, a minister of the Church. He does not appear to have taken much of an interest in the great projects of improvement that engaged the interests, and time and energy, of men like Henry Home of Kames, William Robertson, and the Earl of Ilay. His goal was to be a man of letters, free of practical responsibilities, free of the need of an income from one of the professions, and free of the need to please a patron. As a man of letters, he took himself to be speaking to a pan-British, and increasingly also a pan-European, audience. He identified with an international intellectual community that had no important connections with any one particular country. All of this raises the question of the extent to which he is properly regarded as a Scottish philosopher at all. It is this question that James A. Harris and Mikko Tolonen address in Chapter 5. They begin with A Treatise of Human Nature and argue that there is little, if any, discernible connection between it and either the education Hume received at Edinburgh or what was going on in Scottish letters in the 1720s and '30s. Hume's first book was deeply idiosyncratic, and was doubtless marked to a degree that it is impossible for us to gauge by the time he spent in France between 1734 and 1737. The Essays, Moral and Political of 1741–2, written as they are in imitation of The Spectator and The Craftsman, are much less idiosyncratic, but, again, their author's nationality barely imprints itself upon them. There is more to be said, however, about the relation between Scotland and the Political Discourses. Certainly they engage with the questions that Scots were discussing in Edinburgh and Glasgow in the aftermath of the Jacobite Rebellion of 1745. Indeed, some of the essays published in that collection might well have had their origins in the discussion clubs that flourished in Scotland at this time. When he turned to the writing of narrative history, Hume first took Great Britain as his subject, and so of necessity wrote about Scotland as well as about England. But even after The History of

Great Britain became The History of England, Scotland remained prominent among Hume's historical interests. Harris and Tolonen explore ways in which Hume, like William Robertson, engaged with and subverted the usual tropes of Scottish history writing. And in his writings on religious topics, so Harris and Tolonen argue, Scotland was never far from Hume's mind. Hume repeatedly found himself involved in the struggle between 'Moderate' and 'Orthodox' wings of the Church of Scotland, and this had a significant impact on how he presented his philosophy of religion.

Inevitably, perhaps, Hume is central to Jeffrey M. Suderman's treatment of religion and philosophy in Chapter 6. Suderman does not begin with Hume, however. He begins, rather, with the Calvinist and Presbyterian inheritance that Hume shared with his Scottish contemporaries, an inheritance instilled in each new generation by means of the question and answer of the catechism, and recently consolidated by the religious settlement that followed the Glorious Revolution. In the first instance, Suderman observes, this inheritance was not felt to be threatened by the scientific revolutions of the seventeenth century. On the contrary, there were many Scots who regarded the study of nature and its laws as a welcome addition to the means whereby God and his will might be known, and who, furthermore, took themselves to have answers to the deist's question as to why revelation might be needed in addition to a rational religion of nature. But gradually a gap opened up between the preoccupations of Enlightened Scots and those of traditional Calvinists. Providence began to be conceived of, by men like Hutcheson and Turnbull, in terms of God's benevolence and not simply in terms of his inscrutable omnipotence. Then, with the rise of 'Moderatism' in the 1750s, doctrinal questions came to seem to many less important than the practical question of how the Christian lived his life. The philosophy of religion was not neglected altogether—and Suderman describes how texts like Kames's Essays on the Principles of Morality and Natural Religion gave the 'Orthodox' ammunition for their fight against the new religion of virtue. Hume's contribution was to explore the limitations of human reason in ways that made both sides of this conflict feel uneasy. He shared the scepticism of the Orthodox as to the philosophical defences offered by the Moderates of their optimistic providentialism, but the way he expressed that scepticism made it plain that

he had no sympathy at all with Orthodoxy's credal, and moral, conservatism. Suderman concludes with an account of the 'common sense' reply to Hume's writings on religion, as developed in Aberdeen by George Campbell, Gerard, and Reid. For the Aberdonians, as Suderman puts it, there was no tension at all between Christianity and Enlightenment. Enlightenment, in fact, was 'the fulfilment of the Christian spirit itself' (p. 233).

Chapter 7, on Adam Smith, begins with a brief biography, but focuses principally on two themes central to Smith's corpus taken as a whole: impartiality, and history. The 'impartial spectator' is of course a familiar feature of the moral psychology developed in The Theory of Moral Sentiments, but Aaron Garrett and Ryan Hanley show that the enlargement of sentiments and opinions that the impartial spectator encourages in us is a feature more generally of Smith's version of Enlightenment thought. Thus Smith's contributions to the short-lived first incarnation of The Edinburgh Review can be seen as a plea for the enlargement of the Scottish literary world via a more comprehensive engagement with what was going on in France and the rest of continental Europe. The manner of Smith's engagement with his intellectual predecessors and contemporaries is also a theme of this chapter. Smith may have taken his understanding of philosophical method from Hume, but he sought to broaden—or enlarge—the Humean philosophy by incorporating within it insights from, for example, Butler, Kames, and (perhaps especially) Rousseau. Eclecticism is a key, Garrett and Hanley argue, to understanding Smith's philosophical project. When it comes to history, this chapter is concerned again with integration, in this case with how historical investigation is not merely, so to speak, bolted onto Smith's philosophy like an optional extra, but rather is an essential part of what we would now call Smith's normative project. Garrett and Hanley present Smith as 'a theorist committed to articulating a particular vision of the flourishing society and describing the actions necessary for its practical realization' (p. 253). Smith the historian wants to engage the reader's sympathy and to modify their reactions and judgements, with the aim of, in Smith's own words, 'bettering our practice'. The chapter traces how this conception of history informs Smith's conjectural reconstructions of the development of legal, political, and

economic institutions. The stadial theory of history is deployed by Smith in order to make clear how Europe had deviated from the 'natural' developmental process, the result being a range of economic and political problems that badly needed to be properly addressed.

Christopher J. Berry widens the scope of analysis of the Scottish science of man beyond the case of Smith in Chapter 8, to provide a comprehensive description of what the Scots of the eighteenth century contributed to the understanding of the origins and fundamental structure of human society. Berry begins with the question of method, and with the Scottish rejection of 'individualistic' explanations of social phenomena, such as underlay both the social contract tradition and appeals to the genius of legislators. The Scots sought general causes, but sought also to give such causes specificity by means of a comparative approach that had both a synchronic and a diachronic dimension. Vague appeals to the 'situation' or 'humour' or 'disposition' or 'manners' of peoples did not satisfy them. History and (what we would now call) anthropology provided ways of isolating what is peculiar to a given society, and also ways of distinguishing between what is due to chance and what can be given an informative explanation. Berry notes that the Scots were in general sceptical of the explanatory capacity of 'physical' causes, such as climate or soil. They concerned themselves with 'moral' causes—which, Berry claims, they regarded as operating in a deterministic fashion. And the moral causes they gave most attention to were manners, or habits and customs, understood, in their full particularity, as the primary means whereby individuals are knitted together into societies, and as both the enabler of government and also a limit on what policies governments can hope to implement. The Scots, of course, did not regard manners as fixed and immutable. They subjected the changes of manners to historical investigation, with the four-stage analysis of social change a prominent explanatory tool in the hands of Smith, Millar, Kames, Robertson, and James Dunbar. Berry gives special attention to the Scottish examination of commercial society. Smith is naturally prominent here, but so is Sir James Steuart. Chapter 8 concludes with an acknowledgement of the fact that the Scottish science of society was not, so to speak, science for science's sake. As Garrett and Hanley argue

with respect to Smith in Chapter 7, it was a science with a pronounced normative dimension. The goal was always to distinguish between better and worse 'institutional expressions', to use Berry's phrase, of a universal human nature, and to distinguish progress from the decline and decay that all human institutions are subject to in the end.

Silvia Sebastiani's discussion of the interrelated themes of barbarism and republicanism in Chapter 9 explores the Scottish conception of progress, and the practical question of how the Scots thought progress could be sustained, in more detail. The central issue here, Sebastiani argues, was whether modern commercial societies could escape the fate met with by earlier civilizations—and by Rome in particular. The Scots were deeply divided on this issue. Hume, Smith, and Millar adopted positions that challenged the republican position that had been articulated at the beginning of the century by Andrew Fletcher of Saltoun, and that was powerfully reasserted by Adam Ferguson in his Essay on the History of Civil Society. They attached no importance to a civilian militia, they were relaxed about the spread of a taste for luxury goods, and 'corruption' in general was not something they worried about. They were confident that commerce and liberty went together, whether liberty was understood as the security of person and property or as a country's capacity for self-determination on the international stage. Ferguson was sure of none of this.

In describing this debate, Sebastiani shows that general agreement among Scots as to the methodological questions detailed by Berry in Chapter 8 was not sufficient to produce consensus about the fundamental political questions of the day. In the second half of her chapter, Sebastiani turns to the ways in which the debate between Ferguson and the Scottish apologists for commercial society bore on the question of the place of women in the modern world. There was plainly a strongly gendered aspect to Ferguson's critique of commerce. His worry was that commerce inevitably leads to effeminacy, where effeminacy is construed as softness, weakness, cowardice, and a tendency towards depravity. Hume, Smith, and Millar, by contrast, gave to women a positive, progressive role in societal evolution. The refinement of men's manners that resulted from their increasingly open and frequent exchanges with women was

something to be welcomed. By the same token, however, it mattered to Hume, Smith, and Millar that women knew their place. Their place was the drawing room. That was where they could play their part in the improvement of taste and habit. Too much freedom for women would be dangerous: it would set Britain on a course towards the decadence of Italy and France. The question of true femininity, Sebastiani then shows, went along with the question of true masculinity, a question she explores in the context of the Ossian controversy. James Macpherson's poems spoke to Scots of a world that had almost disappeared. They wanted to believe that they were descendants and kinsmen of Fingal precisely because they were losing touch with values, barbarous but also heroic and chivalrous, that had no place in the society they were making for themselves. Ossian thus exposed the deepest tensions and ambivalences in the Scottish belief in history as progress and improvement.

Chapter 10 sees eighteenth-century Scots looking out beyond the borders of Great Britain. Emma Macleod describes the ways in which they reacted to the greatest political events of the age, the revolutions in America and in France. First, though, she considers the question of whether, and to what extent, eighteenth-century Scottish philosophers might be said to have crafted arguments that justified revolutionary demands for greater participation of more citizens in the business of government. Scotland did not see the development of an avowedly radical theory of natural rights such as was taken up by Joseph Priestley and Richard Price. They remained preoccupied by the problem of social order and how it was best maintained. Hutcheson may have been confident of the right to resist magistrates who exceed the limits placed upon their office, but most of the Scots who came after him were more cautious. This may have been because they were, as Macleod puts it, 'anxious to dissociate themselves from the Jacobite rebellions and to prove themselves good Hanoverians' (p. 370). It came naturally to them to deny that it had been, properly speaking, a revolution that had put the Hanoverians on the British throne. When war broke out in America, therefore, Scots did not rush to defend the right of the thirteen colonies to govern themselves. Ferguson, for example, went into print attacking Price's Observations on the Nature of Civil Liberty. Both Hume and Smith, however, the former in his

correspondence and the latter in The Wealth of Nations, echoed Price's scepticism as to the wisdom of fighting a war to enforce the subservience of the colonies to the British crown. Most of the Scots viewed the American question as a problem of political prudence. The Americans did not have natural right on their side, but there was no point trying to hold on to the colonies through brute force, and there would be significant benefits to having an independent America as a trading partner. By the time of the revolution in France, many of those who had debated the American question were dead. Millar, who attacked the American revolutionaries for their inconsistency in maintaining the institution of slavery, was unusual in his sustained and outspoken defence of what happened in France in 1789 and afterwards. Ferguson, strikingly, was less critical of the French than he had been of the Americans, though mostly because, so he thought, events in France boosted his case for the revival of the military spirit in Britain. Other Scots, such as James Mackintosh, Reid, and Dugald Stewart, followed what Macleod terms 'the common British trajectory of initial enthusiasm for the French Revolution arcing downwards into revulsion as it progressed' (p. 389).

In Chapter 11 Paul Wood uses the career of Thomas Reid to challenge conceptions of the Scottish Enlightenment that take their lead from Hume's version of the 'science of man'. Hume originally planned a five-volume Treatise of Human Nature comprising accounts of 'logic' (in Book One), 'the passions' (in Book Two), 'morals' (in Book Three), and also 'criticism' and 'politics' (in projected but unwritten Books Four and Five). Much work on the Scottish Enlightenment has assumed that it is in these areas of philosophy that eighteenth-century Scots principally distinguished themselves. Wood wants, to use his own words, to 'put the science back into the Scottish Enlightenment's "science of man"' (p. 405). The case of Reid is critical to this project because of the extent to which, in addition to making major contributions to what Hume calls 'logic', and what we might call epistemology, he had a serious interest in both mathematics and the philosophy of nature. Wood describes early eighteenth-century Aberdeen, where Reid studied, worked as a college librarian, and then taught as a regent, as 'a staunchly defended Scottish outpost of Newtonianism' (p. 407). Turnbull, Wood points out, was the first Scottish academic to advocate the use of the methods of natural

philosophy in the study of the human mind. And from the first, Reid's cast of mind was characterized by an interest in the interplay of natural and moral philosophy, as is illustrated by his first published work, 'An Essay on Quantity', a critique of Hutcheson's attempt to introduce mathematical reasoning into moral philosophy, but also a clarification of the fundamental mathematical concept of quantity. Wood traces the origins of what became known as 'the common sense philosophy' in Reid's (and to a lesser extent Gerard's) teaching at Aberdeen in the 1750s and in the discussions of the Aberdeen Philosophical Society from 1758 on. He shows that Euclid, Bacon, and Newton were just as important to the formulation of the common sense approach to the mind and its powers as Cicero and Shaftesbury. The first major fruit of the Aberdonian philosophy was Reid's Inquiry into the Human Mind on the Principles of Common Sense, which Wood portrays as 'a work of religious apologetics grounded on a highly technical and extremely sophisticated and philosophical analysis of the mechanisms of sensory perception' (p. 426). It was the proper character of a genuine science of the mind, and of Newton's methodological legacy in particular, that was at the centre of Reid's dispute with Priestley in the 1770s, after Reid's move to the moral philosophy chair at Glasgow in 1764. This dispute carried over into Reid's attack on philosophical necessitarianism in the Essays on the Active Powers. That book joined the earlier Essays on the Intellectual Powers to constitute a fully comprehensive and systematic account of Reid's anatomy of the human mind such as could be, and soon was, used as a teaching text, both by Reid's successors at Glasgow, and more widely in Scotland, Europe, and the new United States of America.

In the concluding Chapter 12, Paul Wood reflects on the historiographical challenge posed by the subject matter of this volume. There is the contentious question of whether there came into being in the eighteenth century a distinctively 'Scottish' philosophy that merits being gathered together into a 'Scottish school'. There is the aforementioned and equally contentious question of what 'Enlightenment' means in the eighteenth-century Scottish context, along with the related question of when, exactly, the Enlightenment in Scotland can be said to have begun and ended. There is in addition the question of, as Wood puts it, 'what type of history the history of the

Scottish Enlightenment ought to be' (p. 462). Should it be a social history of ideas, or a political history, or a more purely intellectual history, or a history that speaks directly to the concerns of philosophers of the present day? Wood chronicles in some detail the debates that these questions have generated. What matters, Wood suggests, is that readers of the present volume be aware that all writing on the Scottish Enlightenment, whether explicitly or implicitly, assumes answers to these questions. There is, in other words, no such thing as the history of Scottish philosophy in the eighteenth century. As with any area of history, it is always a matter of choice for the historian of the Scottish Enlightenment, how to conceive of the object of study, and what historical method to follow.

Such choices, obviously enough, were made in the planning of this volume. It will be plain to the reader that we are not presenting here a comprehensive account of the philosophy of eighteenth-century Scotland. The emphasis is very much upon themes in the moral and political thought of the period. Scottish work in the areas of philosophy that we now call the philosophy of perception, epistemology, the philosophy of psychology, and the philosophy of science is barely covered at all. In other words, half of the Scottish 'science of man', the half that concerns what Thomas Reid termed 'the intellectual powers of man', is largely missing. Moreover, just as in the eighteenth century considered generally it is hard to draw a clear line dividing philosophy from practical ethics, political theory, and history, so also there is (as Paul Wood reminds us) only an indistinct boundary between philosophy and what we now call science. Philosophy and psychology, in particular, are hard to pull apart in an eighteenth-century context. But so are philosophy and the natural sciences. Joseph Black the chemist and James Hutton the geologist were both regarded as 'philosophers'. These are issues that would need to be explored and explained in a genuinely complete history of the philosophy of the Scottish Enlightenment. As we worked on this volume, we came to the decision that another volume would be needed to cover such matters in appropriate depth. That volume is currently under preparation. <>

Scottish Philosophy in the Eighteenth Century, Volume II: Method, Metaphysics, Mind, Language edited by Aaron Garrett and James A. Harris [A History of Scottish Philosophy, Oxford University Press, ISBN 9780198807940]

This is a companion volume to **Scottish Philosophy in the Eighteenth Century, Volume I**. Where *Volume I* covered Scottish Enlightenment contributions to morals, politics, art, and religion, this second volume covers philosophical method, metaphysics, and the philosophy of mind. It includes a comprehensive account of the teaching of philosophy in Scottish universities in the eighteenth century. Particular attention is given to Scottish achievements in the science of the mind in chapters on perception, the intellectual powers, the active powers, habit and the association of ideas, and language.

David Hume has long been Scotland's most famous philosopher, to the extent of overshadowing all his contemporaries. It was not always so, however, and in the last few decades, philosophers and historians of ideas have come to see Hume once more in the context of debates that occupied a significant number of Scottish Enlightenment figures. Alongside Hume, and partly in response to him, the philosophical and scientific investigations of Francis Hutcheson, Adam Smith, Thomas Reid, Adam Ferguson, George Campbell, Dugald Stewart, and many others, set in train a line of inquiry that was vigorously pursued in Scotland and North America for over two centuries. Moreover, it has come to be better understood that though these Enlightenment philosophers were highly innovative, they drew upon a distinctive intellectual tradition embodied in the ancient Scottish universities, where teaching responsibilities shaped research interests.

Reviews

"The Oxford series *A History of Scottish Philosophy* provides unprecedented coverage and depth on the origins and legacy of the Scottish philosophical tradition. The first volume in this series, *Scottish Philosophy in the Eighteenth Century*, edited by James Harris and Aaron Garrett,

sheds new light on the ways in which Scottish Enlighteners popularised distinctive features of Scottish philosophy." --*Journal of Scottish Philosophy*

- State of the art coverage of central elements of eighteenth-century Scottish philosophy
- Includes the first comprehensive account of the teaching of philosophy in eighteenth-century Scotland
- Offers detailed discussion of the philosophy of mind
- Features chapters on neglected aspects of eighteenth-century Scottish philosophy including language and metaphysics

CONTENTS

When the Edinburgh professor of natural philosophy John Leslie was questioned by the members of a Royal Visitation Commission in October 1826, he remarked that the curriculum at Scottish universities was still what it had been a century before. Then, as now, 'the first year the subject taught was [Greek] grammar; the second the same regent . . . taught Logic; and third Ethics, and the fourth Physics' (Commissioners 1837: I.124). This was indeed much the same list of subjects which Gershom Carmichael at the University of Glasgow had described in an account of his teaching in 1712 (Carmichael 2002 [1712]: 379–89).

The similarities between curricula that were more than a century apart, however, obscure far- reaching changes in the content of the various sub- disciplines that constituted 'philosophy' in this age, and in their relationship with each other. These changes and their consequences for the nature and the teaching of philosophy at Scottish universities are the subject of this chapter. In some cases, these changes prompted calls for a reform of the philosophy course, as some of its previous coherence was lost. Sometimes the changes also gave an impetus to the creation of new professorial chairs and other academic positions, in subjects that did not appear to be adequately covered in the conventional curriculum. But, on the whole, the developments that took place unfolded within the same curricular framework that had been in place from the early eighteenth century onwards.

The period examined in this chapter begins in 1690, when another royal visitation commission was set up in the wake of the so- called 'Glorious Revolution' in order to review teaching at all five Scottish colleges. The members of the 1690 commission did not aim at a fundamental reform of the content of philosophy teaching. They intended, rather, to standardize the philosophy course across all five Scottish institutions, and to create a common curriculum. Different universities were tasked with producing outlines of different parts of the course: Edinburgh was assigned 'pneumatology', the branch of philosophy concerned with immaterial forms of being, including the human soul, angels, demons, and God; St Andrews was given logic and metaphysics; Glasgow ethics; Marischal College in Aberdeen was entrusted with general physics, that is the science of corporeal being in general; and King's College Aberdeen was to develop the curriculum for special physics, meaning the study of particular kinds of corporeal being, such as plants, animals, or minerals (Mijers 2011: 120). Although various documents were drawn up, the project stalled, and was finally abandoned in 1702. The visitation commission was more effective in achieving its other purpose of purging Scottish universities of teachers with Episcopalian, 'popish', and Jacobite sympathies (Hannay 1916)— though even then it was not entirely successful, as is shown by the persistence of Jacobitism at the Aberdeen colleges (see McLaren 2005: 52–3).

The end of the period discussed here is marked by the Royal Visitation Commission of 1826–30. This later commission has been suspected of attempting to align Scottish teaching with practices at Oxford and Cambridge, and of being part of a broader programme of Anglicizing Scottish culture (Davie 2013: 5). The true reason for the review of university teaching, however, is likely to have been not so much English cultural imperialism as a loss of coherence in the existing curriculum in philosophy, or, as it was by then often known, 'the Literary Faculty' (see e.g. Bower 1822: 9).

In part, this loss of coherence seems to have been the result of changes in the way in which teaching was organized. At the beginning of the eighteenth century, all Scottish universities followed the so- called regenting system, in which a single teacher, the 'regent', guided a cohort of students through all parts of the philosophy course, from its beginning until graduation in the fourth year.1 As students were assigned to a particular regent, this made it more likely that they would study all subjects taught by this person, in the order in which he delivered them (Chamberlayne 1708: 542). The regent also depended on the students in his class for his income. In early eighteenth- century Edinburgh, for example, the fee (praemium) paid to the regent appears to have been 'never less than a Guinea' for the entire year (Chamberlayne 1708: 543). The incentive for regents to take every single student through the entire curriculum therefore was strong.

This changed, however, as regenting was abandoned and replaced with a system of specialized professorial chairs, which was mainly modelled on the example of the contemporary Dutch universities (Mijers 2011), though there were also some Scottish precedents for this reform (Raffe 2019). The incumbents of these new chairs each lectured on one particular branch of philosophy, rather than the entire breadth of the discipline. Their income usually derived from the combination of a salary and class fees paid by the students attending their lectures. The transition to the professorial system occurred at different times, depending on the university: at Edinburgh in 1708, at Glasgow in 1727, at St Andrews in 1747, at Marischal College in 1753, and, finally, in 1799, at King's College. As students were no longer guided through a defined curriculum by a single lecturer, fewer of them seem to have followed its structure, or even to have taken

all of the subjects in it. Financially, the lecturer's main interest lay in attracting as many ticket- buying students as possible to his lectures, not in ensuring that these students took any other courses in philosophy, or even that they graduated at the end of four years of study.

The looser structure of the philosophy course is reflected in the steep decline in the numbers of graduates, which was not caused by an overall drop in student numbers, but a sharp reduction in the proportion of those who graduated. Nongraduating students would not need to have studied all of the courses in the standard curriculum, or to have done so in the conventional order. The decline is evident from the printed graduation theses in philosophy, which, at the beginning of the century, usually included a long list of names of all the graduands. A set of Edinburgh Theses Philosophicae in 1698, for example, displayed the names of more than seventy students (Massie 1698). Numbers varied somewhat from year to year, and between universities. An earlier set of theses in 1676 by the St Andrews regent Alexander Grant, for example, had included the names of only thirty graduands (Grant 1676), similar to the number in a 1686 set of Theses Philosophicae produced at Marischal College in Aberdeen (Burnet 1686).

But as the eighteenth century wore on, lists of graduands disappeared from graduation theses altogether. Instead, title pages identified only a single student respondent, who was sometimes also described as the actual author (auctor), of the text.2 Only a handful of these philosophical theses or disputations were printed each year, implying that most students on the philosophy course did not graduate (a conclusion that is borne out, for example, by the University of Edinburgh's record of degrees and laureations).3 The number of graduations seems to have increased again at the beginning of the nineteenth century. But even then, very few undergraduate students appear to have completed a full degree course. It is not surprising then that one of the most famous eighteenth-century alumni of the University of Edinburgh, David Hume, never took a degree. Requirements might be stricter for students who intended to progress to study in law, medicine, or theology, because they might be expected to have been trained in certain areas of philosophy. Students might also be expected to have completed a

particular lecture course before being admitted to another. It is clear, however, that the imperative to follow a defined course of study in philosophy lessened considerably over the course of the century.

It also seems that the different branches of the traditional philosophy curriculum were no longer seen to be as closely connected to each other intellectually as they had been a century earlier (Anderson 2017). For that reason, too, it was no longer considered as important as before to study every part of philosophy. John Leslie, for example, argued that those students who wanted to study medicine should be allowed to pursue an abridged course in 'Literature and Philosophy'. For them, it was enough 'to rest satisfied with a moderate share of classical knowledge, and an acquaintance with the elements of general science, or the more popular and practical branches of Natural Philosophy' (Commissioners 1837: I.154). At the same time, some subjects which had been part of the philosophy curriculum began to require a degree of specialist knowledge that made them too difficult for many of the undergraduate students. Natural philosophy, for ex ample, increasingly demanded a level of mathematical understanding which not all students were capable of. The relationship between a 'lower' faculty of arts or philosophy, and the 'higher' faculties of law, medicine, and theology, was showing signs of giving way, gradually, to a collection of separate and self-contained dis cip lines, in which students specialized from the beginning of their undergraduate degrees.

In this chapter I shall first discuss briefly some general assumptions in eighteenth-century thought about the nature of philosophical knowledge, before turning in the following sections to each of the main branches of the standard curriculum in philosophy. A discussion of changes in the teaching of logic will be followed by an analysis of developments in metaphysics (the science of being) and pneumatics (the science of immaterial being)—two disciplines which were often closely linked to each other, and which were sometimes even treated as interchangeable. The next section will focus on physics and natural philosophy, in particular the increasing importance of an experimental method, and the separation of the single discipline of physics into several more specialized subjects, such as rational mechanics, chemistry, and natural history. In the final section I shall turn to moral philosophy, which of all the branches

of eighteenth- century philosophy is probably the one that has received the most attention, but which has rarely been studied in relation to the other branches of the philosophy course.

A range of views on philosophical questions is to be found among eighteenth-century university teachers. It is possible, however, to identify some broader themes which run throughout the period, and which help in understanding many of the general changes that occurred. In particular, it will be shown that much of the intellectual motivation for changes in the curriculum was founded on a belief in the corruption of philosophy by 'scholasticism'. 'Scholasticism' was a polemical term, not an accurate description of a particular group of thinkers. But it was often used in expressing dissatisfaction with conventional philosophy. In particular, the term 'scholasticism' was used to describe a supposed tendency towards abstruse and futile intellectual 'speculation'. Around 1700, the term 'speculation' had still been, on the whole, a neutral, value- free term. Philosophical sub- disciplines were routinely classified as either 'speculative' or 'practical', without suggesting any judgement on their worth. Over the course of the eighteenth century, however, 'speculation' increasingly acquired negative connotations, and by the end of the century, as we shall see, the main division within philosophy was no longer between its 'speculative' and its 'practical' branches, but between the study of mind and the study of matter.

Philosophy, Certainty, and the Critique of 'Scholasticism'

The 'speculative' branches of philosophy around 1700 were those concerned with the acquisition of knowledge. Their aim was to provide so- called 'scientific' intellectual certainty, based on demonstrative proof. All argument in these speculative disciplines rested on the instruments of a verbal logic which even at the end of the seventeenth century drew on broadly Aristotelian principles and relied on syllogistic forms of reasoning.

Practical disciplines, on the other hand, were concerned with the direction of human actions. They were not believed to be capable of the same standard of demonstrative proof, because they depended on the prudential evaluation of the particular

circumstances of an action and were thus subject to a much greater degree of contingency. The main practical discipline was ethics. Logic, as the instrument for demonstrative reasoning, was also considered a practical discipline by university philosophers around 1700, though Aristotle had not included it in either category, speculative or practical.

The speculative sciences were metaphysics, pneumatology (or pneumatics), and physics. All three of these were, in different ways, sciences of being. Metaphysics was the most abstract. It was usually defined as the science of being as such, or knowledge, as Aristotle had said in his Metaphysics (Aristotle 1026a). The Utrecht professor Gerard de Vries, for example, whose textbook on metaphysics was reprinted in Edinburgh and used in teaching at Scottish universities, described the discipline as the science of being (ens) in general. Being was the most general attribute that could be discussed, because 'in any thing which offers itself to our consideration, be it a substance or an accident, . . . the real predicate of Being is present'. The Edinburgh regent William Law offered a very similar explanation of the nature and purpose of metaphysics in lectures he gave in the academic year 1699–1700: metaphysics, he stated, set out 'the common notions of things, and the terms which occur everywhere in the other sciences and also in everyday speech'. In particular, metaphysics set out 'what being is, what unity is, what truth is, what philosophers mean by essence, existence, causality, possibility etc.'. Hence, Law said, 'it is that the object of metaphysics is said to be [the nature of] Being in general, insofar as it is being. Those attributes [i.e. essence, existence, causality, possibility, etc.] however pertain to all, or at least most entities.'

The two other speculative sciences were concerned with the essential attributes of the two main types of being: physics with those of material bodies, and pneumatics with those of non- corporeal, that is, immaterial, spiritual beings, which were usually thought to include the human soul and even God, at least to the extent that His attributes could be known through natural reason and experience.

These three 'scientific' philosophical disciplines were supposed to be founded on universal, necessary truths. From the late seventeenth century onwards, however, it

was increasingly argued that the very ambition to discover such universal truths was misguided. It reflected an intellectual hubris which was the legacy of ancient Greek philosophers, whose errors were perpetuated by the medieval scholastics. They, as Jean LeClerc argued, had tried to construct intellectual systems in which it was possible to derive everything from a set of universal principles. The result, in the case of natural philosophy for example, was that they had 'indulged too much in conjectures concerning the causes of natural things', so that 'the physical doctrines of most of the Ancients were so stupid, that they either differed from the most inept opinions of the vulgar only by their obscure terms; or if they were put forward more clearly and contained something new, were obviously absurd most of the time'.

LeClerc's works were widely used in teaching at Scottish universities around 1700,9 and it is possible to find views like his in lectures and writings by eighteenth- century Scottish regents and professors. A very similar argument to LeClerc's on ancient physics, for example, was made almost half a century later, by the Edinburgh mathematician and natural philosopher Colin Maclaurin, who died in 1746, having overseen the defences of the city against the approaching Jacobite army. The ancients, he said, 'generally speaking, . . . indulged themselves too much in abstruse fruitless disquisitions concerning the hidden essences of things, and sought after a knowledge that was not suited to the grounds they had to build on' (Maclaurin 1748: 38–9).

The situation deteriorated further when in the Middle Ages 'superstition reigned uncontrouled' and 'liberty of enquiry was proscribed', so that 'a thick cloud seems to have darkened the understandings of men, and to have almost extinguished their natural faculties' (Maclaurin 1748: 40). Philosophers' 'pride and ambition', Maclaurin lamented, had 'led [them] to think it beneath them, to offer anything less to the world than a compleat and finished system of nature; and, in order to obtain this at once, to take the liberty of inventing certain principles and hypotheses, from which they pretend to explain all her mysteries' (Maclaurin 1748: 7). A few years after the posthumous publication of Maclaurin's work, Alexander Gerard at Marischal College in Aberdeen argued in similar fashion that '[t]he chief business of that [scholastic] Philosophy was to express opinions in hard and unintelligible terms; the student

needed a dictionary or nomenclature of the technical words and authorised distinctions' (Gerard 1755: 4).

This intellectual hubris of the scholastics was blamed for the parlous state of philosophy around 1700. Although there could only be one truth, philosophy, it was said, had descended into a cacophony of abstruse quarrels which divided phi lo sophers into innumerable rival intellectual sects, whose controversies were about mere words rather than things. The corruption of philosophy had even tainted its most basic part, namely logic. Gershom Carmichael for example criticized the 'scholastics' in his Glasgow logic dictates from 1697 (Carmichael 2002 [1712]: 293, fn. 1), and as late as 1773 the Glasgow professor James Clow remarked that the scholastics had 'pretended to improve Logic greatly, but their systems are full of Darkness & confusion occasioned by their engaging in frivolous disputes, & using a multiplicity of terms, that are now for the most part, unintelligible to us'. Logic supplied the basic tools of philosophical reasoning.

It followed therefore that the reform of philosophy from the corruptions of the ancient Greeks and the medieval scholastics had to begin with logic.

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Moral Philosophy and Ethics

The development of the teaching of moral philosophy over the course of the eighteenth century reflects many of the same broader changes as are to be found in logic, metaphysics, pneumatics, and physics. In particular, there was in moral philosophy, too, a reaction to the 'scholasticism' that had, supposedly, rendered ethics as useless as all other parts of philosophy. Instead of the empty, abstruse speculation of the scholastics, which, it was believed, had little or no effect on the actual conduct of the male, teenage students who attended universities, it was argued that ethics should be about their practical moral formation, or moral culture. The purpose of ethics thus was to develop sound moral habits, just as logic came to be concerned with developing habits of sound reasoning, rather than providing abstract rules which could be learnt by rote, regardless of actual practice.

Moral Philosophy, the Afterlife, and the Summum Bonum

Lectures on moral philosophy around 1700 often began with a discussion of the summum bonum, the 'highest good', as the foundation of ethics. After dismissing the 'bona corporis', such as health and physical strength, and the 'bona fortunae', such as wealth and honour, the lecturers then invariably conclude that the greatest good for human beings is God. Here another, conventional distinction is regularly made between the greatest good in an 'objective' and in a 'formal' sense. God himself is the greatest good in the 'objective' sense: He is the 'object' that humans should strive towards in their efforts to live an ethical life. In a 'formal' sense, the greatest good of human beings is their 'fruitio Dei', the enjoyment of God as the greatest objective good. That enjoyment is believed to be brought about by the cognitio and the amor of God jointly. Cognitio signified the intellectual understanding of God's being and attributes, which, given the limited and broken intellectual faculties of humankind, especially after Original Sin, was possible only by means of a visio beatifica, a 'beatific vision'. Amor, love, was closely linked to cognitio: a realization of the perfections of God (at least to the extent to which that was possible to postlapsarian human beings) engendered the love towards God also.

The fruitio of God was the foundation of the highest possible felicity. Achieving that felicity in this life and by human efforts alone, however, was impossible. It had to wait until the afterlife and depended on support from divine grace 'regaining and remaking' the corrupted faculties that characterized human nature since the Fall from Grace. The overarching framework of this theory was Platonist as much as Aristotelian, as well as Calvinist. God was the supreme truth. Evil, in this system, was not something actually existing, but the effect of privatio, that is, privation, or the absence of good.47

Although perfect beatitude was impossible in this life, there was a continuity between conduct in this life and the fate of the soul in life after death. As Gershom Carmichael put it in his 1724 'Supplements and Observations' on Pufendorf's influential De Officio Hominis et Civis, which Carmichael used for teaching at the University of Glasgow:

> We are taught by the light of nature as the fruit of acting well, to hope, and indeed to expect, not only felicity in this life in particular (although this is most closely attached to duties enjoined by natural law) but also, in general, some greater happiness or greater alleviations of misery, if not in this, at least in a future life, than evildoers will be able to attain. Furthermore, if any way of obtaining the greatest happiness after this life is left to man, [we are] to conceive of the hope of it as the more probably, the more, in individual actions of life, we render ourselves obedient to the divine law. (Carmichael 2002 [1724]: 30)

Carmichael, like any other Scottish regent or professor at that time, did not suggest that humans could achieve salvation by acting morally in this life. Doing so would have been tantamount to a 'popish' defence of a role for good works in salvation. But it was clear that human conduct in this life was known to affect the fate of the soul in the afterlife. Carmichael admitted that

> [i]t is not very easy to determine from nature how far in this degenerate condition of the human race, any ordering of our actions can contribute to obtaining that beatitude or avoiding an equal misery. But it is clear enough that if any way is left to man to secure the one and avoid the other (and on this matter the kindly dispensation of divine providence toward the human race bids one not simply to despair altogether) each man is able to hope with some prospect of justice that he will obtain it the more he gives evidence of devoted affection toward the Deity in his individual actions. And even the least likelihood of obtaining infinite good or escaping infinite evil ought to have more influence with us than all the considerations opposed to it. (Carmichael 2002 [1724]: 24)

Even to heathens, who were not aware of Christian salvation and therefore could not be striving for it, knowledge of the afterlife was essential for moral phil oso-phy. It was needed, in particular, for a robust and coherent idea of moral obligation in this life, as the Edinburgh regent William Law argued in 1704. Law criticized Samuel Pufendorf for neglecting the importance of the afterlife in his natural law theory (a point on which Pufendorf had also been criticized by Leibniz [Ahnert 2009: 56–7]). Although Pufendorf did not deny the existence of an afterlife for the human soul, he believed that

this truth was not known to humankind on the basis of natural reason, unassisted by revelation, and it could not, therefore, form part of moral philosophy. By contrast, Law, as we have seen, claimed that 'no moral philosophy can be firm, stable, and joined to human nature, unless its foundations are placed not only in the existence and providence of the Deity, but also in the immortality of the soul, and the rewards and punishments of a future life'.49

This did not mean that Law believed moral philosophy to be sufficient to avoid the punishments of the afterlife. Humankind was wholly corrupted by Original Sin and, unless redeemed by faith in Christ, unable to make amends for the many particular sins that followed from the Fall from Grace. The means of salvation, however, were the subject of revealed theology, not moral philosophy, which, as Law put it in one of his lectures 'is founded on natural reason and understanding'.

The importance of philosophical, rational evidence for the immortality of the soul meant that pneumatics or pneumatology was often closely associated with the teaching of moral philosophy. When, for example, regenting was replaced by a system of specialized professorial chairs at the University of Edinburgh, one of the new professorships was in 'Pneumatics and Moral Philosophy', with Law as its first incumbent. But pneumatology not only provided philosophical proof of the natural immortality of the soul. It also covered the main operations of the human mind, namely intellection (or understanding) and volition (or willing). These two were considered essential to analysing the process by which moral choices were made. Moral actions belonged to 'practical' (as opposed to 'speculative') phil osophy, because they issued in action and involved an act of the will, not pure understanding, which was the province of 'speculative' philosophy that concerned only a judgement by the intellect. Of course, moral action had to be informed by the judgements of the intellect, and it was the duty of conscience to determine the conformity of an action with moral principles as they were known to the intellect. Human conscience could of course go astray in a number of ways: it could be erroneous, and the error could be either the agent's fault or not. And it could simply be ignorant of a relevant truth, whether

through the agent's fault or not. The important point was that every moral action rested on a judgement by the intellect which was then converted into action by the will.

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Philosophy, Experiment, and Anti-Scholasticism

As has been shown, the changes within university philosophy over the course of the eighteenth century were complex and driven by several concerns. Some of these concerns were specific to certain parts of philosophy, and did not relate to the discipline as a whole. Yet there was a certain degree of overall coherence to the transformation that took place. In particular, change was often presented as a means of correcting the errors of so- called 'scholastic philosophy'. 'Scholasticism' was a highly polemical term, which was used to articulate and focus objections to conventional philosophical doctrines. Criticism was directed, above all, at scholasticism's supposed tendency towards 'speculative' reasoning, that is, reasoning from principles that were supposed to be universally true. But increasingly the belief that truths of this kind were within the reach of human reason was seen as evidence of an intellectual hubris, typical of the pagan philosophers of classical antiquity and the medieval school- men alike.

The result was growing caution, even scepticism, over the capacity of human reason to arrive at any universal truths. It might be possible to do so in mathematics, but, on the whole, it was believed that truths of mathematics did not supply principles of philosophical argument. Newton's natural philosophy, which was heavily mathematical, was of course praised and celebrated, not just by natural philosophers. Thinkers like George Turnbull expressed their hope that other branches of philosophy might be improved by adopting Newton's method. But the broader importance of Newton's method for philosophy was not, in the main, linked to his use of mathematics. Newton's method was, rather, regarded as a non- dogmatic form of reasoning, which emphasized the cautious, gradual accumulation, by means of 'experiments', of particular matters of fact, and which thereby avoided the intellectual pride of ancient Greeks and medieval scholastics alike.

Whereas philosophy at the beginning of the century was divided into 'speculative' and 'practical' branches, by the end of the century the main distinction appears to have been that between the philosophy of mind and the philosophy of matter. Both mind and matter, or incorporeal and corporeal entities, were believed to be known empirically, not in a 'speculative' fashion. But each of these two types of being was known empirically in different ways. Corporeal beings were objects of sensory perception, while the only incorporeal, spiritual being of which humans had any direct, empirical knowledge was their own mind, of which they were aware by an internal sense, through self- reflection. Thus the nature of the object of philosophical knowledge (mind or matter), rather than the nature of the knowledge itself (speculative or practical) became the basis for the distinction between the main parts of philosophy.

Joined to the rejection of philosophical 'speculation' was a growing emphasis on philosophy as a form of 'culture', in the sense of a programme of gradual, incremental improvement through the formation of sound habits. This 'culture' was not the product of intellectual conviction, which might follow only after the right habits had already been established. It was opposed to the empty and abstruse word- games of 'scholasticism', which, it was argued, aimed primarily at persuading the understanding, but led to nothing but interminable intellectual quarrels. Eventually, of course, a programme of 'culture' was no longer sufficient for the highly technical and specialized knowledge required for disciplines like rational mechanics. 'Culture' began to be limited to the new category of discip known as the 'humanities', thus contributing to the emergence of the 'sciences' as a separate branch of learning.

The changes within philosophy during the eighteenth century did not issue in a radical transformation of the structure of the curriculum by the time the members of the University Commission interviewed professors at the five Scottish universities between 1826 and 1830. Yet it is plausible to say that the tensions and strains within the curriculum, which are evident in the records of the interviews, were a prelude to later, more fundamental changes, in particular the development of disciplinary specialization in the undergraduate curriculum, and the end of the traditional relationship between a 'lower' faculty of arts, and the 'higher' faculties of law, medicine,

and theology. In this respect, the developments at Scottish universities paralleled those at other European universities (Anderson 2004: 103–18). <>

Scottish Philosophy in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries edited by Gordon Graham [A History of Scottish Philosophy, Oxford University Press, ISBN 9780199560684]

This volume covers the history of Scottish philosophy after the Enlightenment period, through the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Leading experts explore the lives and work of major figures including Thomas Brown, William Hamilton, J. F. Ferrier, Alexander Bain, John Macmurray, and George Davie, and address important developments in the period from the Scottish reception of Kant and Hegel to the spread of Scottish philosophy in Europe, America and Australasia, and the relation of Common Sense philosophy and American pragmatism. A concluding chapter investigates the nature and identity of a 'Scottish philosophical tradition'.

Reviews

"This is a remarkable collection of essays. The contributors give ample evidence of the vigour and dynamism of philosophical debate in Scotland during the last two centuries. They also show how much of it was concerned with the impact of German Idealism on the philosophical tradition of the Scottish Enlightenment." -- *The Philosophical Quarterly*

"These essays are of a uniformly high standard; each will repay study for those wishing to familiarize themselves with the leading Scottish philosophers of the period. Representing much fresh research, the volume suggests that figures such as Brown, Ferrier and Bain have been unfairly neglected, perhaps as a result of the greater preoccupation with their eighteenth-century predecessors." --*Journal of the History of Philosophy*

- The launch of a new history of Scottish philosophy
- New perspectives on famous figures
- Explores key intellectual and historical developments in the period
- Will be the standard reference point for this period of philosophy

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Nineteenth and twentieth century Scottish philosophy

In the history of Britain, eighteenth century Scotland stands out as a period of remarkable intellectual energy and fertility. The Scottish Enlightenment, as it came to be known, is widely regarded as a crowning cultural achievement, with philosophy the jewel in the crown. Adam Smith, David Hume, William Robertson, Thomas Reid and Adam Ferguson are just the best known among an astonishing array of innovative thinkers, whose influence in philosophy, economics, history and sociology can still be found at work in the contemporary academy.

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thinkers, whose influence in philosophy, economics, history and sociology can still be found at work in the contemporary academy.

The phenomenon of Scottish intellectual life in the eighteenth century, and the widespread interest that it continues to attract, makes it all the more surprising that this was not, in fact, the period in which Scottish philosophy achieved its highest international profile. That distinction came in the century that followed. It is in the nineteenth century that Scottish philosophy set the academic agenda for philosophical debate in Europe and America, provided texts for college students across Canada and the United States, and produced a steady supply of university teachers, not only for North America, but Australia and New Zealand as well.

Scottish philosophy in the nineteenth century had intellectual luminaries who, in their own day, shone even more brilliantly than many of their eighteenth century predecessors. The posthumously published lectures that Thomas Brown gave at Edinburgh went into dozens of editions and were studied for decades. Sir William Hamilton, Professor of Logic and Metaphysics at Edinburgh, was hailed as possibly the most learned Scot who ever lived, and the greatest metaphysician of his age. James Frederick Ferrier at St Andrews ranked as one of Europe's leading intellectuals. Alexander Bain at Aberdeen laid new and firmer foundations for the emerging science of empirical psychology. Edward Caird at Glasgow inspired a whole new generation of philosophers, who went on to teach philosophy at home and abroad.

Statue of David Hume, Edinburgh, by TwoWings. Public domain via Wikimedia Commons.

Yet, in sharp contrast to Smith, Hume, and so on, these names are now virtually unknown. The things they thought and why they thought them, the books they wrote, the debates they had, the people they influenced, have all fallen far below the intellectual radar of the twenty first century. The only survivor, arguably, is Bain's friend John Stuart Mill, and though the roots of his philosophical work are easily identified as Scottish, this connection generally goes unnoticed.

Why is there this dramatic difference between these two centuries of Scottish philosophy, one heralded far and wide, the other for the most passed over in silence? Just who were these thinkers and why were they so influential? How did they fall into such neglect? Is their work still worth anything? Did they build significantly upon their Enlightenment heritage, or are they properly relegated to the status of footnotes to it? The existence and social role of Scotland's four ancient universities meant that, for a long period, the professors of philosophy and their students constituted a genuine intellectual community. Over many generations they sought to maintain and to enlarge a tradition of philosophical inquiry that aimed to unite research and education, bringing scholarly inquiry of international relevance to bear directly on the formation and enrichment of Scotland's social and cultural life.

This admirable ambition gradually came under pressure, from a number of directions. In Scotland, increasing familiarity with Kant and Hegel began to change the relatively isolated philosophical world of the Scottish Enlightenment, while the development of academic specialization gave new independence to politics, economics and psychology, subjects that philosophy had previously included. In Britain at large, improved communication and the establishment of new universities in England, Ireland and Wales eroded the distinctiveness of the Scottish university system. In America, the Scottish philosophy of common sense morphed into philosophical pragmatism. In the antipodes, Australia and New Zealand began to forge philosophical traditions of their own.

At the turn of the twentieth century and into its opening decades, those raised in the Scottish philosophical tradition acknowledged its passing with a mixture of hindsight,

nostalgia and regret. George Davie's powerful lament, *The Democratic Intellect* published in 1961, may be said to mark its final demise. Yet there is something of importance to be learned from it. The radically altered nature of our institutions of higher education has recently occasioned a flurry of books. Their shared concern is captured by the title of one of the volumes — Stefan Collini's *What are Universities For*? This is a question with renewed, some would say urgent, interest for the contemporary academy. And Scottish philosophy in the nineteenth century still has much to teach us about how to frame it. <>

Two Tales of the Death of God by Stephen LeDrew [Oxford University Press, ISBN 9780190086886]

In the 19th century Friedrich Nietzsche infamously declared that "God is dead." It turns out he was on to something. Across the western world, churches are emptying out and closing their doors, and more and more people are rejecting organized religion.

In the early 2000s a group of intellectuals who collectively came to be known as the "new atheists" capitalized on this fact, capturing the imagination of young skeptics and igniting a movement for secularism by arguing that religion is the source of most of our social ills. They believed that the decline of religious belief could be attributed to the rise of modern science. This was only the most recent incarnation of a story that has been told since the 18th century Enlightenment, which forged a myth of social progress and western cultural supremacy that has lent legitimacy to the projects of imperialism and global capitalism ever since.

The social sciences have another story to tell. It is the story of secularization: a theory that grapples with the astonishing fact of Christianity's fall from its position at the center of western culture. In this version of the story, God was not killed by science, but by a complex set of social and economic changes that have produced greater overall well-being and equality, and by shifting moral values that lead people to view religious ethics as a relic of a bygone era.

Stephen LeDrew argues that only the social sciences can explain religion's fall from grace--and the dangers of its resurgence. A coalition of far-right religious extremists is currently working to dismantle democracy in order to preserve white Christian privilege. The evidence from secularization shows that only by working to achieve greater security and equality for all can we halt a descent into an abyss of nihilistic greed and intolerance.

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Secularization is real. Not only is it becoming clearer that it is happening, but it may be reaching an inflection point where religion loses its dominant cultural status and non-religion becomes the new norm. Ronald Inglehart suggests as much in noting the rapidity of the transformation we have seen in recent decades:

Although secularization normally occurs at the pace of intergenerational population replacement, it can reach a tipping point when the dominant opinion shifts and, swayed by the forces of conformism and social desirability, people start to favor the outlook they once opposed—producing exceptionally rapid cultural change. Younger and better-educated groups in high-income countries have recently reached this threshold.'

The process of secularization, then, has suddenly accelerated. The reasons for this change are complex, and it is difficult to clearly prove any one of them, but there has

definitely been a generational shift away from organized religion. Social and economic conditions that enhance existential security laid the groundwork for this shift, but other important factors have pushed it into a higher gear. These include evolving morals that are at odds with the teachings of many major religious traditions, scandals such as the revelations of widespread sexual abuse by priests and the Catholic Church's attempts to cover it up, and 9/11 and the subsequent War on Terror that pitted Christian and Islamic extremists against each other, which opened many eyes to the dangers of fundamentalist faiths. Perhaps most importantly, the internet and social media facilitated the "coming out" of atheists and religious skeptics everywhere by providing a platform for views that were previously unacceptable or inaccessible in mainstream culture.

If Inglehart is correct—and the evidence suggests that he probably is—then current projections of future religious decline may be too conservative, since they rely on intergenerational replacement and birth rates (i.e., religious people having more children and passing their beliefs on to them). These models don't account for the kind of rapid cultural changes Inglehart describes, which are inherently unpredictable. It is possible that unforeseeable events could instigate a resurgence of religion and a return to the pews, but it is much more likely that we are now in the midst of a radical and lasting cultural transformation by which traditional religious institutions aren't going to disappear entirely (at least not all of them), but their status and authority will continue to evaporate, and their memberships will drastically decline.

Some social scientists object that a rise in "spirituality" has accompanied the decline of religion, which indicates that what we are seeing isn't secularization, but a kind of diversification of beliefs pertaining to our place in the world and where we derive meaning in our lives. In this view, the "nones" have risen roughly in tandem with the "spiritual but not religious" (SBNRs), a group that has captured the attention of scholars in recent years but remains poorly defined. SBNRs typically reject organized religion but hold beliefs and engage in practices that they vaguely define as spiritual in that they relate to how they find meaning in life. They might or might not believe in god(s), and the things they define as spiritual might include yoga and meditation, New Age

and neo-Paganism, various elements of Eastern religion and mysticism, a life spent seeking "wellness," or just being in nature and experiencing a connection to it. The list is virtually limitless, which is the problem with the category. It is impossible to measure with any accuracy something so vaguely defined, particularly in surveys. You can ask people, as in a PEW study that claimed one in four Americans to be SBNR, "Do you think of yourself as a spiritual person, or not?"2 But this tells us absolutely nothing about what "spiritual" means to the respondent, and the information is therefore of limited value. It might indicate a kind of liminal phase between being a believer and being non-religious. It might indicate that the religious impulse (if there is such a thing) will persist even in a post-theistic culture, only channeled into things other than supernatural deities. Or it might be mostly meaningless.

Some scholars believe that the SBNR phenomenon points to a "spiritual revolution" where theistic beliefs and churchgoing are being replaced by a turn "towards a life lived by reference to one's own subjective experiences." That is, rather than looking outward to a formal institution and belief structure, people increasingly are turning inward and thinking about their own experience of the world and what it reveals about nature and their place in it. In this sense, what many people mean when they say they are "spiritual" is that they are ego-centric, focusing not on questions concerning community or group membership, but on understanding (or creating) their own significance in the world and what they personally find meaningful (which can be anything). Steve Bruce argues that this "individuated religion" can't produce the same level of commitment as traditional religion, and therefore is itself a secularizing force.4 That is, the shift to individualized spirituality over collective forms of religious practice and centralized authority over doctrine is a sign of secularization, as people retreat into their own personal beliefs and sources of meaning. This, he believes, is a logical outcome of modernization, liberal capitalism, and belief in the authority of the autonomous individual, which makes collective responses to questions of ultimate significance unlikely. Individual spirituality is inherently aimed at discovering and liberating the authentic self and involves a turn inward and away from organized religious communities. Secularization, then, is irreversible.

While a return to the old faiths may be as unlikely as Bruce suggests, he may be too quick to dismiss the notion of an enduring religious impulse, which can be channeled into an array of belief systems and can bind people together. There are reasons to believe that the social and psychological functions of religion represent a need that must be satisfied somehow, as people adopt new forms of faith and seek new moral communities of the sort previously provided by identification with a church or faith tradition. This process is accelerating as the old ties of faith, nation, and community are severed in an inhuman socioeconomic system that is producing increasing social fragmentation and alienation. The need for meaning, identity, and belonging is as strong now as ever. As traditional religion wanes, new forms are arising to take its place, some involving quasi-supernatural beliefs, some entirely naturalistic. Everything from science to nationalism to yoga to football has been interpreted as a new, modern religion. The rise of new individualistic forms of spirituality, which tempt with promises of transcendence but result in greater anomie, coincides with the breakdown of social bonds under the regime of global capitalism and its culture of nihilism.

The new atheism itself could be interpreted in these terms. More generally, the phenomenon of the absurdly titled "intellectual dark web"—a group of public intellectuals, headlined by Sam Harris and Jordan Peterson, who promote themselves as a vanguard of free speech and open inquiry—is another manifestation of the secularization of religion. This group of celebrity pseudo-rationalists has attracted a following of lost, alienated young people (mostly men) looking for meaning, direction, and a sense of connection to something in a world where traditional values are going out the window and neoliberal ideology is conditioning us to think of ourselves as individuals rather than members of communities or societies. Critics express amazement at the fact that debates between Harris and Peterson (which are not really debates since the two are advancing a similar agenda) can pack arenas, but it shouldn't be so surprising. Not so long ago, churches were packed every Sunday. The congregation has moved to a new venue, and these debates are the new sermons.

Essentially what these people want is religion: a worldview wrapped in sacredness and supported by a community bound by a common morality. But in the disenchanted

world of the twenty-first century, theism and bronze-age myths don't hold up anymore, so we have new secular faiths that reflect the atomistic culture of the late modern age. Rather than going to church and finding meaning in being a member of a congregation—just one piece of something bigger than oneself—people today are more inclined to seek self-actualization in secular faiths and practices. The clearest example is wellness culture, which is both a lifestyle and an individualistic spirituality where the purpose isn't the glorification of God or a community but maximizing one's own personal well-being. The wellness and alternative health phenomenon are religion focused on the individual and crafted in the shadow of neoliberal capitalism. In a secularized form of tithing, you can achieve "wellness" (a new addition to a list that includes Salvation, Nirvana, and Enlightenment) if you have sufficient disposable income to purchase the endless array of products the industry has to offer. For those who are still more group-oriented and inclined to subjection to a higher power, there are political religions and conspiracy theories. QAnon and the Trump phenomenon, and the white nationalism both are attached to, are the pre-eminent examples. Millions of Americans have surrendered their critical faculties in embracing a bizarre post-Christian narrative of a hopelessly corrupt world that will be saved by the most unlikely redeemer. No form of faith is more deserving of the descriptor "blind" than the belief that Donald J. Trump is a selfless hero whose purpose on Earth is to sacrifice himself for the good of humanity.

The cult that Trump established is the clearest possible refutation of the notion that the end of monotheism's reign over our culture will lead to a better world guided by science and liberal values. While Trump's support base is Christian, the motivations of many his supporters are secular: greed, selfishness, bigotry, and xenophobia. At least one major belief held by his followers is perfectly legitimate: the idea that the American government is corrupt and has sold out the working class (though the target of their ire is ethnic minorities and immigrants, the scapegoats for the corporate interests the government actually serves). The incredible irony that they would choose as their champion Donald Trump—a cartoonishly evil embodiment of the culture of corruption and nihilistic greed engendered by capitalism—is a perfect illustration of

the potential for religious impulses in a secularized world to be channeled into equally dangerous ideologies, myths, and false prophets. The decades in which we have seen sudden secularization have also involved accelerating concentration of wealth and an explosive assault on the working and middle classes, a rise in neo-fascist ethnic nationalism, an epidemic of opioid addiction, paralysis on the existential threat of climate change, and a general deterioration of democracy.

Religion may contribute to these problems in various ways, but it clearly isn't the ultimate source of them, so the project of vanquishing religion through scientific enlightenment is fundamentally misguided. There is no sound reason to expect that a world absent of religion must be better than the current one. But there is ample reason to expect that religion won't go away until the massive inequalities produced by our current economy and system of government are dealt with, though it might come in different forms. It may be no coincidence that the ascent of Trumpian political chaos and decline of religiosity have occurred at roughly the same time. One thing religion does—from a sociological point of view, the first and most important thing it does—is bind people together and provide them with a basis for thinking of themselves as part of something greater than themselves, and not only as members of a church, but also members of a society. As more moderate and liberal forms of Christianity have rapidly faded, there has been nothing to replace this socially binding force.

Sociologist Robert Putnam famously made this point in his book Bowling Alone, which charts the decline of participation in civic associations and group activities over the past several decades (religious congregations being a major one), and the corresponding growth of feelings of isolation and depression.5 People feel disconnected from each other, their communities, and their society. This sense of disconnection is to the advantage of global neoliberal capitalism, which works to convince us that any attempt at social engineering is an infringement on individual freedom, and that capitalism itself is a righteous force that has provided us with this freedom. It is also to the advantage of populists like Trump and other far-Right opportunists who have harnessed the rage and alienation of the masses who have been victimized by this fundamentally unjust system. With no sense of connection to society

and believing (correctly) that the system is stacked against them, they place their faith in strongmen who promise to make things better. Outlandish conspiracy theories such as QAnon and the communities that have formed around them are rising to satisfy needs that religion used to satisfy. The world after secularization might be one without God, but that doesn't mean it will be a world without gods.

While secularization may be a reality, then, it would be a mistake to become complacent, as the status quo—defending ideology of scientific atheism would have us do. Just because God is dead doesn't mean all will be well (and there's always the possibility that He might be resurrected). Secularists should not be content with the knowledge that the major monotheistic faiths are in decline. Unless the social and psychological needs it responds to are made obsolete, the religious impulse will be channeled into post-theistic forms of faith that may be just as harmful. The sudden surge of nationalism and far-Right political movements across the Western world are symptoms of alienation and the breakdown in meaning and community that coincides with the destructive force of global capitalism and the fading presence of religion in social life. We need to be vigilant and continue to work toward greater social and economic equality, or we risk giving power back to religious ideas and institutions or enhancing the power of its new secularized alternatives.

One thing that seems clear is that religion's power as a political force isn't about to suddenly end. Secularization today is accompanied by religious and political radicalization. This polarizing effect is a result of the fact that conservative religious groups increasingly see themselves as marginalized in a multicultural liberal society where their traditional cultural dominance is waning (this is especially true in the U.S. but also, to a lesser extent, in other Western countries). Their response is to become both more devout and more politically radical, which is producing a politicization of religion that has made it appear that it is growing stronger and adding Ryan Burge, a professor of political science at Eastern Illinois University, has explained the apparent growth of evangelicals in America (as reported in surveys asking about religious affiliation and identity) as a result of conservatives adopting an evangelical identity due to its association with the Republican Party. Many of those new evangelicals, he argues,

might not really be religious in any meaningful sense, illustrating that "evangelical" is becoming more a political identity than a religious one: "For many Americans, to be a conservative Republican is to be an evangelical Christian, regardless of if they ever attend a Sunday service." Religious moderates (in both the theological and political senses) are being squeezed out as the landscape evolves to a situation where there is a secular majority, and the religious will be a minority but will be highly committed and highly politicized.

This is something like the religious revival that occurred in the 1980s that led Jose Casanova to recant his views on secularization. That wave of deprivatization, bookended by the founding of the Moral Majority and the presidency of George W. Bush, resulted in new power for Christian organizations. That power appeared to falter during the Obama years and its concurrent religious decline, which is now driving another wave of religious groups asserting themselves in the public sphere in even more radical ways. Having taken control of the Supreme Court and overturning Roe v. Wade, the Christian Right is now attempting to take control of government through a strategy of association with Trump (who at the time of writing had just announced his campaign for a second term as president), his acolytes in federal and state legislatures, and their attempt to destroy democracy. But as Burge argues, what is understood as the "Christian" Right isn't exclusively, or even primarily, a Christian movement, but a far-Right one where white nationalists motivated by principles of cultural and ethnic purity join forces with the wealthy people seeking to dismantle public institutions and social welfare and pillage the country for all it is worth, together drawing on the authority of religion to accomplish their goals.

Given these trends, it seems clear that religion isn't in and of itself at the core of the challenges we face today, and there is no good reason to expect that religion's slow fade will necessarily be accompanied by social and moral progress. Murtaza Hussain, a journalist best known for his work for The Intercept, is one of few voices on the Left to recognize the new threats posed by the transition away from the traditional theistic faiths. Like the new atheists, many on the Left see secularization through rose-colored glasses and assume that the demise of Christianity will simply wipe away all the bigotry

and backward morality that came with it. In an essay entitled "How the Death of Faith Will Hurt the Left," Hussain challenges this posited inverse correlation between religious decline and social progress, highlighting that we are entering into the unknown: "The slow-rolling death of religion in American life begs the question, then, what type of new world will emerge from the wreckage of the old?" The answer, he suggests, might not be the enlightened liberal utopia that scientific atheists have prophesied, but rather, "we might end up reviving in new guises the worst aspects of the old religions, including moral censoriousness, judgmentalism, heresy-hunting, and the persecution of those who think differently. Frighteningly enough, these base sentiments would also be unchecked by any countervailing religious imperatives towards mercy or the recognition of human frailty." This is an accurate description not only of the conspiratorial Right, but of the rational Right: libertarian, holding little concern for social welfare, employing abstract scientific reasoning without empathy, and replacing morality with scientific authority (recall Sam Harris's view that science can "determine" moral values—morality would then be whatever a select set of scientific experts tell us is right and wrong).

A result of the dissolution of the moral foundation established by religion, Hussain argues, is that people are "at the mercy of a disorienting permanent moral flux" that new ideologies might rise to take advantage of. This is, in fact, already happening. Moral and political polarization is growing, driven by new ideologies on both Left and Right, as well as the demise of a public sphere in which different perspectives could meet in some kind of meaningful exchange, replaced by the echo chambers and information silos created by social media, which has destroyed public discourse in its pursuit of advertising dollars. Without any absolute moral foundation, anything is possible, and there is little reason to suspect that what follows will be better than what came before. On the contrary, the Right is resurgent, and populists and nationalists are capturing the imagination of alienated people across the full spectrum of society. Leaving their churches behind, the ersatz religions being embraced by many people today are extreme political movements and conspiracy theories. The ideologies and organizations associated with the conspiracy-drenched Right provide what religion

provided for people: an explanation for their suffering and marginalization (whether actual or perceived) and the empowerment provided by a community driven by a common purpose. In the absence of anything else coming along to act as a binding force in social life that can provide a sense of meaning and purpose, the polarization and social fragmentation that we are now seeing may lead to unthinkable outcomes.

The situation has been aggravated by the fact that some ostensible opponents of the far-Right are fueling it by attacking common enemies, most significantly higher education in the social sciences and humanities. We are facing a crisis of reason marked by a populist backlash against the intellectuals who some perceive to be attacking white identity and European cultural heritage. This is most obvious in the manufactured controversy over critical race theory (CRT), which is a direct assault on social-scientific understandings of reality. In an act of modern-day book burning, Florida Governor Ron DeSantis signed into law a prohibition against teaching critical race theory. The furor over CRT is a witch hunt—best exemplified by the blatantly racist questions Republican Senators directed at Supreme Court nominee Ketanji Browne Jackson about the role CRT plays in her thinking, in a scene reminiscent of the McCarthy hearings aimed at weeding out communists—that at root is directed at the social sciences and humanities, and their critical inquiry into systemic social inequalities. This situation has been enabled by pseudo-rationalists and free speech warriors who have become mouthpieces of regressive right-wing ideology, granting a veneer of scientific legitimacy to intolerance and bigotry. They have become pawns in the war on reason. For Richard Dawkins in particular, this is a sad end to what began as an admirable career as an educator and public intellectual. His legacy forever tarnished, he and his fellow new atheists will be remembered as enemies of reason rather than its champions, and as unwitting allies of the Christian.

The entrenchment of white nationalism and the social fragmentation and polarization produced by these culture wars may, in fact, strengthen overall religiosity. Though evidence suggests that secularization in the Western world is real, research also shows that the world overall is becoming more religious. This is primarily due to demographics: people in more modernized, less religious countries have fewer

children, while people in less developed countries who are more religious have more children. As immigration trends continue and the West becomes more culturally and ethnically diverse, there is a critical issue concerning the trend of secularization: if minorities continue to experience disproportionate inequality, and perceptions of racism and cultural bigotry continue, they may defensively retreat into stronger affirmation and identification with the religion of their ethnic group. This is already the case in some respects, as with Muslim women in the West who choose to wear veils as a reaction against white men attempting to control them, or African Americans who rely on their churches for a sense of community and social support, strengthening bonds within that group in the face of feeling excluded or oppressed by a white majority. The general trends of greater equality and higher standards of living that underpin the decline of religion must extend to these minorities and immigrant communities or the process will stall. Only if fully accepted as equal members of society who merit the same respect and rights as everyone else could they be expected to eventually let go of the faiths that provide a source of strength and comfort in a hostile social environment.

The strategy of new atheism and the movement for secularism that coalesced around it, which is based on exclusivity and hostility against anyone holding a differing opinion or different culturally based values, is therefore not only doomed to fail, but counterproductive. Secularization has not advanced due to popular atheists calling religious people stupid—it has done so despite them. The rise of the nones preceded this movement, which was not cause but consequence of the tide of disaffiliation and a generation seeking voices that confirm their worldview. That generation soon realized that new atheists did not, in fact, speak for them or advance a worldview they supported. Many have left behind the secular movement that was briefly so exciting and promising. But the cause is still worthy, and if anything, the Trump era and its emergent fascism—which is justified by appeals to the exceptional status conferred on America by the grace of God—suggest that it is perhaps more important than ever. Religion as an unquestionable source of moral authority is a pillar of a radical far-Right insurgency that threatens the safety and stability of the entire planet. The way to

undermine religion's power is not to say to people that humans and elephants have common ancestors and if you disagree, you're an idiot. Tempering religion's power requires constructing a social environment where its authority can be questioned freely and openly, but more importantly, one that doesn't push people to look to an omnipotent Creator to administer justice because they see no other option. Anti-religious movements that strip away supernaturalism but sub in other "rational" justifications for the current social order are part of the problem, not the solution.

The individualistic secular religions that characterize belief in the twenty-first century are both an effect of the decline of traditional religions and a product of the culture of global capitalism, which encourages personal responsibility rather than looking to society to make your life better. These new spiritualities direct people inward, but according to the theory of religion and secularization outlined in this book, to turn inward is to turn away from the source of our problems. If religion is a response to alienation, oppression, and the fragmentation of social life, then mindfulness or other individualistic practices are no antidote to the spiritual malaise that affects the world today. As Phil Zuckerman has illustrated in his studies of secularity in Scandinavia, the democratic socialism practiced in those countries is a model of how a system that reduces alienation and inequality also undermines the power and appeal of religion.

This book recounts two tales of the death of God, and with them, two different visions of what a world without religion would look like. One is a world in which social bonds have broken down and been replaced with the ethos of neoliberal capitalism, a worldview that fetishizes wealth and assigns individuals the responsibility to scratch and claw their way through a morass of corporate power and neo-fascism. The other is a world that recognizes the common humanity we all share—in other words, a world guided by a humanism that recognizes the equal worth of all people and the responsibility to create an anti-Darwinian society, as opposed to the "humanism" advanced by popular atheists who advocate for socioeconomic doctrines that exacerbate the inequality that religion feeds on, thereby contributing to conditions where the death of the old gods might produce new ones that are even more terrible. Anyone concerned about the influence of religion in public affairs should think

carefully about the motivations of the people promoting these opposing visions and examine the evidence for themselves to discover the path to a world without gods.

THOMAS F. TORRANCE AND EVANGELICAL THEOLOGY: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS edited by Myk Habets, R. Lucas Stamps [Studies in Historical and Systematic Theology, Lexham Academic, ISBN 9781683596936]

Thomas F. Torrance invites evangelicals to think more Christianly

THOMAS F. TORRANCE AND EVANGELICAL THEOLOGY: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS brings Torrance into closer conversation with evangelical theology on a range of key theological topics. List of essays:

- Thomas F. Torrance and the Evangelical Tradition (Thomas A. Noble)
- Torrance, The Tacit Dimension, and The Church Fathers (Jonathan Warren P. (Pagán))
- Torrance and the Doctrine of Scripture (Andrew T. B. McGowan)
- Revelation, Rationalism, and an Evangelical Impasse (Myk Habets)
- Theology and Science in Torrance (W. Ross Hastings)
- A Complexly Relational Account of the Imago Dei in Torrance's Vision of Humanity (Marc Cortez)
- Barth, Torrance, and Evangelicals: Critiquing and Reinvigorating the Idea of a "Personal Relationship with Jesus" (Marty Folsom)
- Torrance and Atonement (Christopher Woznicki)
- Torrance and Christ's Assumption of Fallen Human Nature: Toward Clarification and Closure (Jerome Van Kuiken)

- Torrance, Theosis, and Evangelical Reception (Myk Habets)
- Thinking and Acting in Christ: Torrance on Spiritual Formation (Geordie W. Ziegler)
- 'Seeking Love, Justice and Freedom for All': Using the Work of T.F. and J.B. Torrance to Address Domestic and Family Violence (Jenny Richards)
- Toward a Trinitarian Theology of Work (Peter K. W. McGhee)
- Torrance and Global Evangelicalism: Some Potential Generative Exchanges with Contemporary Indian Evangelical Theology (Stavan Narendra John)

Thomas Forsyth Torrance (1913–2007) was one of the most important theologians of the twentieth century, yet his work remains relatively neglected by evangelicals.

A diverse collection of contributors engage Torrance's pioneering and provocative thought, deriving insights from theological loci such as Scripture, Christology, and atonement, as well as from broader topics like domestic violence and science. These stimulating essays reveal how Torrance can help evangelical theologians articulate richer and deeper theology.

Review

THOMAS F. TORRANCE AND EVANGELICAL THEOLOGY: A CRITICAL EVALUATION is an important addition to the growing secondary literature on T. F. Torrance's theology. The editors and eleven additional scholars craft the definitive critical conversation between Torrance's Trinitarian perspective and evangelical theology across a spectrum of theology topics. Well-researched and written, the book is a must-read for anyone interested in Torrance's theology and evangelical thought. —**Elmer M. Colyer,** professor of systematic theology, University of Dubuque Theological Seminary

Between theological rocks and hard places there is T. F. Torrance, who weaves the early Church Fathers, contemporary theologians, and a reverence for Scripture into a coherent, rigorous, and joyful theology. This is a delightful work in which evangelical scholars discuss T. F. Torrance for the sake of the church in fresh ways, always seeking

application and transformation. This is theology as doxology at its best. —**Julie Canlis,** author of Calvin's Ladder and Theology of the Ordinary

This wide-ranging volume reinforces the view that Torrance is the most important English language theologian of the twentieth century. Central to each chapter in this impressive work are Torrance's evangelical views of Christology, the Trinity, and atonement, and how those doctrines invariably mean good news for all when rightly understood. —**Paul D. Molnar,** professor of systematic theology, St. John's University, New York

Full of complexity, challenge, and the embodied love of God in Christ, these thoughtful, discursive essays are a testament to Torrance and his own desire to bear witness to our Incarnate Lord and to share witness across perspectives, disciplines, and eras. In a day when theological fellowship in unity and difference is hard won, this volume succeeds not by setting up straw men or ideas, wearing down the opposition, or building unstable bridges. Rather, it plates a multicourse feast, harmonizing distinctly acquired theological tastes in new ways that invite some serious chewing and savoring. Enjoy! —**Cherith Fee Nordling,** sessional professor of theology, Regent College

Thomas F. Torrance is arguably one of the most important Anglophone theologians of the twentieth century. His work covers an astonishing range of issues and engages an astounding range of sources and conversation partners (including patristic, Reformation, and modern theology along with modern philosophy and advances in the natural sciences), and it has been formative and foundational for many theologians. His work has, however, been criticized and rejected by some evangelicals, and it has been ignored by many others. This volume offers a set of mature reflections that are appreciative but not uncritical. It will serve both the growing guild of Torrance specialists and the broader evangelical theological community. —**Thomas H. McCall,** Timothy C. and Julie M. Tennent Professor of Theology, Asbury Theological Seminary

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Torrance and Evangelical Theology in Conversation by Myk Habets and R. Lucas Stamps

Thomas Forsyth Torrance (1913-2007) was arguably the most important English language theologian of the twentieth century.' Born in Chengdu, China, to missionary parents, Torrance would become one of the most important figures in the Church of Scotland, publishing voluminously, especially from his longtime professoriate at New College, University of Edinburgh. Torrance's theology represents a creative fusion of theological influences both ancient and modern and both Eastern and Western. Torrance drew upon a wide range of sources from Athanasius to Karl Barth (with whom he completed postgraduate studies at Basel), and from John Calvin to Michael Polanyi. Recent years have witnessed a growing interest in the theology of Torrance but his exposure in the evangelical world remains relatively subdued. This book aims to bring Torrance into closer conversation with evangelical theology on a range of important theological loci. This introduction sets the stage for the discussion by briefly considering the broad theological commitments of both dialogue partners: evangelical theology and Torrance himself.

EVANGELICAL THEOLOGY

As to evangelicalism, many wonder whether the term has outlived its usefulness. In a North American context, "evangelical" is widely seen as apolitical identifier, not a set of theological distinctives. Matters are further complicated—better: enriched! —by the fact that evangelicalism is now a global phenomenon and not limited to the Anglo-American contexts in which it originally developed. As an added complication, one could argue that the term may not even be exclusively Protestant, with some Roman Catholics adopting the descriptor as well. Despite these legitimate qualifications, it is our contention that the term "evangelical" still captures something theologically significant and, therefore, should not be rejected. Evangelicalism has a rich heritage and an enduring power to capture a distinctive theological agenda.

The history of evangelicalism is well-documented, and this is not the place to rehearse every detail. Suffice it to say, evangelicalism's theological roots branch out in several

directions. Its taproot, we might say, is the sixteenth-century Protestant Reformation, but it has been nourished as well by the influence of pietism, Puritanism, the modern missions movement, and especially the Great Awakenings of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The current trajectories of evangelicalism have also been definitively shaped by the so-called neo-evangelical movement in the post-World War II era (led by Carl Henry and Billy Graham, among others) that sought to distance evangelicalism from a more culturally quietistic and adversarial fundamentalism (see chapter 4). The movement has now gone global, with some arguing that the center of gravity is no longer in the West but in the majority world.

It is by now a well-worn path to summarize the theological commitments of evangelicalism along the lines of the famous quadrilateral suggested by evangelical Baptist historian, David Bebbington. Bebbington suggests that four characteristics have especially marked the evangelical movement: "con-versionism, the belief that lives need to be changed; activism, the expression of the gospel in effort; biblicism, a particular regard for the Bible; and what may be called crucicentrism, a stress on the sacrifice of Christ on the cross. Together they form a quadrilateral of priorities that is the basis of Evangelicalism."6 This list of emphases is far from exhaustive, and evangelical theologians and historians may want to supplement it. Still, it remains a helpful rubric, at least as a starting point, for understanding the unique cocktail of doctrines that have shaped the evangelical movement. Evangelicalism takes its name from the evangel—the gospel, the good news. So, we might say that evangelicals are gospel people: those who emphasize the good news of salvation (understood in Protestant terms), the necessity of personal conversion that it demands, and the life of holiness and mission that flow from it. The authors in this volume represent the wide geographical spread of evangelicalism—ranging from New Zealand to India, and Britain to North America—but each is committed to these broad theological parameters. There are diverse views represented here, to be sure. The authors do not agree on every doctrinal point nor even on every disputed issue in the interpretation and appropriation of Torrance's work. But for each there is a general identification with the global evangelical movement as stated.

THE THEOLOGY OF TORRANCE

This volume offers an evangelical engagement with some of the major themes in the theology of Torrance. The book aims not so much to provide a comprehensive introduction to Torrance's thought as to explore some of the promises and perils of his impressive theological project from the perspective of evangelical theology (addressed directly in chapter 1). Most of the standard loci communes (common places) of Christian systematic theology are addressed, as are other important aspects of Torrance's methodology and historiography. This introduction certainly cannot adequately capture the whole of Torrance's rich and multi-layered theological program, but a few distinctive and interrelated themes may highlight the important ways his theology interfaces with evangelicalism. No claim is made that these are the most important or the central motifs in Torrance's theology. Indeed, they are somewhat arbitrarily chosen but are, we believe, representative of Torrance's significance for evangelical engagement. Perhaps these will whet the appetite of the reader to explore more in the chapters that follow. While Torrance obviously did not explicitly work within the categories of Bebbington's quadrilateral, it may be helpful to use this rubric as an organizing principle as we bring our dialogue partners into conversation.

CONVERSIONISM

While critical of forms of holiness and pietistic altar calls and crisis moments of faith, Torrance's theology can be seen to be in sympathy with the evangelical emphasis on conversionism, if by that term is meant, not a focus on technique (Charles Finney et al.) but the need for a personal response to the gospel. In Torrance's hands, conversion is first of all realized by the incarnate Son and only then is it a reality in the life of the believer. Torrance thus emphasizes something called "the vicarious humanity of Christ."

One of the richest themes in Torrance's theology is his understanding of Christ's vicarious humanity and ministry. Christology was a central theme for Torrance's theology. A certain Christocentrism marks all that Torrance touches, from the doctrine of the Trinity to the divinization of humanity in the eschaton (theosis, addressed in

chapter ii). And at the heart of Torrance's Christology is a tight connection between the person and the work of Christ, that is, between the incarnation and atonement. These two are really one doctrine in Torrance's thought. Building on Calvin's emphasis on "the whole course" of Christ's obedience, Torrance stresses that Christ began his work of atonement (that is, reconciliation) from the moment he was conceived in the womb of the Virgin Mary. Humanity is saved not only by Christ's passive obedience (his suffering and death) but also by his active obedience (his whole life of obedience). For Torrance, this means that every step in Christ's journey is vicarious. Torrance ascribes to Christ a vicarious faith, a vicarious obedience, and even a vicarious repentance (not in terms of any personal sin but in terms of his identification with sinners, especially expressed in his baptism). And under all these aspects of Christ's work stands his vicarious humanity itself. Self-consciously building on patristic and Eastern influences, Torrance emphasizes the saving significance of the incarnation (see chapter 9). By taking a concrete human nature into personal union with himself, the eternal Son already effects the reconciliation between God and man. There are universal implications of this doctrine that remain a matter of debate, but the richness of this theme provides fertile ground for evangelical consideration.

ACTIVISM

Dogmatics was not merely a theoretical exercise for Torrance. Rather, dogmatics is the bringing of the human person under the full control of the Triune God in order to be drawn up into worship, out into ministry, and deep into acts of Christian witness. Torrance's Christianity is an active one, which models, in many ways, the evangelical activism Bebbington identified in his historical work. For Torrance, this means the rejection of all invented dualisms that would justify an inactive faith. Torrance calls such dualisms the Latin heresy.

Related to the notion of Christ's vicarious humanity is the critique that Torrance levels against what he calls the "Latin heresy." For Torrance, the Western Christian tradition, especially under Augustine's influence, has held to a gospel of extrinsicism, where Christ's humanity is seen as something external to God's own life and where Christ himself is seen as something external to the humanity that he came to save. In this

understanding, the incarnation is merely a prerequisite to the atonement, rather than constitutive of it. And Christ's work is seen in transactional (especially forensic) rather than participatory terms. Torrance sees in the Greek Fathers a more thorough integration of incarnation and atonement that avoids this so-called heresy. Torrance's historical generalizations are certainly open to critique, but his theological insights on these matters are nonetheless worthy of evangelical consideration. When the Latin heresy is avoided, so too are those theologies that would argue for an activism based upon a works-based righteousness (Pelagianism), or those that argue for an inactive form of quietism. Both fall short of an evangelical theology. The addition of essays on work (chapter 13), justice and domestic violence (chapter 12), and personal relationships (chapters 7 and 11) is ample evidence of this.

CRUCICENTRISM

The emphasis on the cross of Christ is often thought to be missing in Torrance, but that is a mistake. Torrance does bring incarnation and atonement together, but not at the expense of the cross. An important theme in Torrance's theology of atonement is the fallen flesh of Christ. One implication of the Latin heresy, for Torrance, is a tendency in Western theology to deny Christ's participation in our concrete humanity in all of its fallenness and misery. Following Edward Irving and Karl Barth, Torrance maintains that Christ assumed a fallen human nature (though he differs with Irving especially in some important ways). Christ himself is sinless, but he assumes humanity in its fallen state in order to heal it and bend it back to God from within. This is perhaps the most controversial aspect of Torrance's theology from an evangelical perspective, and much ink has been spilled trying to position it biblically, historically, and theologically. One of the leading voices in these debates, Jerome van Kuiken, weighs in on the issue in chapter 10 of this book. The cross is the climax of the work of Christ; it is the most intense moment of the incarnation and is the supreme example of his vicarious ministry. At the cross, Torrance argues, Christ meets and triumphs over sin, evil, and death. This is confirmed in the resurrection and sealed at Pentecost.

BIBLICISM

All his life Torrance held Holy Scripture in high regard as the Word of God. His personal devotional life consisted of reading the Bible daily and reading through the entire Bible annually. Hundreds of sermons by Torrance survive, all displaying what today we might call an expositional style, centered on a single text of Scripture applied to the congregation. Torrance was insistent that the way to hear the voice of God was through Scripture, and he devoted his life to its dogmatic exposition. At times Torrance followed the path of his mentor Karl Barth and found himself off-side with certain evangelical sensitivities regarding the nature of Scripture (see chapter 3); but he was often equally off-side with liberals who thought him too conservative, too biblicist, and too evangelical.

Again, these themes are selective, and while they are not the terms Torrance would likely have chosen, they are representative of key aspects of his thought. Torrance's theology is deeply grounded in Scripture and tradition, but he often synthesizes those source materials in creative and controversial ways, as the essays in this book demonstrate. Rather than preview each of the book's chapters, we invite readers to peruse the table of contents and begin wherever they feel most provoked! However, Thomas Noble's opening biographical essay would be an obvious choice to begin with, since it sketches Torrance's life from the unique perspective of his interaction with evangelicalism. It is our hope and prayer that these essays would send readers back to Torrance's own works, where they will find plenty to challenge and confront but also much to comfort and cheer. To that end, we close with these stirring words of evangelical hope from Torrance himself:

> God loves you so utterly and completely that he has given himself for you in Jesus Christ his beloved Son, and has thereby pledged his very being as God for your salvation. In Jesus Christ God has actualised his unconditional love for you in your human nature in such a once for all way, that he cannot go back upon it without undoing the Incarnation and the Cross and thereby denying himself. Jesus Christ died for you precisely because you are sinful and utterly unworthy of him, and has thereby already made you his own before and apart from your ever

believing in him. He has bound you to himself by his love in a way that he will never let you go, for even if you refuse him and damn yourself in hell, his love will never cease. Therefore, repent and believe in Jesus Christ as your Lord and Saviour. <>

THE NEW TESTAMENT AND THE THEOLOGY OF TRUST: 'THIS RICH TRUST' by Teresa Morgan, [Oxford University Press, ISBN 9780192859587]

This study argues for the recovery of trust as a central theme in Christian theology, and offers the first theology of trust in the New Testament.

'Trust' is the root meaning of Christian 'faith' (pistis, fides), and trusting in God and Christ is still fundamental to Christians. But unlike faith, and other aspects of faith such as belief or hope, trust is little studied. Building on her ground-breaking study Roman Faith and Christian Faith, and drawing on the philosophy and psychology of trust, Teresa Morgan explores the significance of trust, trustworthiness, faithfulness, and entrustedness in New Testament writings.

Trust between God, Christ, and humanity is revealed as a risky, dynamic, forward-looking, life-changing partnership. God entrusts Christ with winning the trust of humanity and bringing humanity to trust in God. God and Christ trust humanity to respond to God's initiative through Christ, and entrust the faithful with diverse forms of work for humanity and for creation. Human understanding of God and Christ is limited, and trust and faithfulness often fail, but imperfect trust is not a deal-breaker.

Morgan develops a new model of atonement, showing how trust enables humanity's release from the power of both sin and suffering. She examines the neglected concept of propositional trust and argues that it plays a key role in faith. This volume offers a compelling vision of Christian trust as soteriological, ethical, and community-forming. Trust is both the means of salvation and an end in itself, because where we trust is where we most fully live.

Review

"THIS is a very powerful and demanding book that is likely to change your thinking profoundly." -- Robin Gill, Church Times

"Extensively documented, beautifully argued, and appropriately cautious,...Recommended. Upper-division undergraduates through faculty." – Choice

"New Testament scholars, theologians, Christian ministers, and trust theorists alike would immensely profit from Morgan's labor." -- Religious Studies Review

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One aim of this study, by reflecting theologically on texts which Roman Faith read historically, is to bring the intersubjectivity of history-writing (and, more generally, of our interactions with the material world) into dialogue with the intersubjectivity of

theology (and, more generally, of our interactions with the metaphysical). How does New Testament writers' understanding of trust in God and Christ relate to ours? If, for these writers, trust stands at the heart of the divine–human relationship, how might we understand the role of trust in atonement, for instance, which no New Testament writer explores at length? If Christians believe that human beings are called to order their lives around trust in God and Christ, what implications might that have for their ethics? Can the call to trust challenge contemporary antipathy or indifference to religion?

Some readers may be thinking at this point that the preceding paragraphs gloss over one respect in which we do tend to assume that history is (logically, if not necessarily diachronically) prior to theology, and to metaphysics in general. A person who takes seriously the challenges that history can pose to our world-view might find his metaphysical assumptions or convictions challenged by his account of the past (for example, his belief in divine justice might be challenged by historical persecutions of Christians), but it is harder to imagine that his view of the past might be challenged by his metaphysical commitments. This assumption has some intuitive appeal, but in fact, I think, it is mistaken. Leaving aside, for instance, the strand of pre-modern historiography which sees the divine as working through human agents and institutions, or the determination of some contemporary conspiracy theories to interpret all information that bears on the theory, however plausibly or implausibly, in support of it, we have noted that all historians bring to their work their assumptions and intuitions about the ways in which people, societies, and the world work. These can be very varied in kind: they might include, for example, that all power tends to corrupt; that social groups generally favour stability over change; that some leaders have mysterious qualities of charisma or luck; or that the market has a mind of its own. Historians' readings of their evidence and arguments about it are constantly informed, and can be challenged, by such broad, abstract ideas, which may be drawn from tradition, the surrounding culture, or personal experience, are often widely shared and unconsciously held, and are effectively metaphysical commitments.

A further way in which history and theology work in parallel and in dialogue, therefore, is by recognizing that both make metaphysical assumptions and claims, bringing those claims into conversation with each other, and letting them challenge one another. Accordingly, another aim of this study is to explore whether theologizing about pistis in New Testament writings offers a vision of the world which offers a conversation partner, or a challenge, to the material or metaphysical landscape of contemporary society.

Outline of Chapters

Chapter 2 begins with God, and with the Pauline corpus, where most of the New Testament's explicit language of God's pistis is found. Paul and his followers take for granted that God is faithful to God's people, keeping God's covenant with Israel and fulfilling God's promises. This faithfulness, among much else, is a reason to trust God when God does what Isaiah calls a 'new thing'. For Paul, God has revealed God's trustworthiness anew in the Christ event, which fulfils all God's promises. Paul recognizes that the Christ event is not how Israel would have expected God to fulfil God's promises, but God is the God who has done radically unexpected things in the past, and Paul affirms that a person can be trustworthy in doing the unexpected. The gospel is an invitation to Israel to renew her trust in God in new circumstances by putting her trust in Jesus Christ. To gentiles, it is an invitation not only to put their trust in the God of Israel and in Christ—a new and relatively untried heavenly being—but to relinquish their other gods.

The trust relationship therefore involves risk for all involved: for God and Christ, who must trust human beings to respond to the Christ event, and for human beings, who must trust that God has taken a new initiative and trust in Christ as God's son. Israel remains beloved by God and entrusted with God's prophecies, and Paul expects all Israel to be saved, but the revealing of God's righteousness and salvation no longer depends on Israel's faithfulness or unfaithfulness, and salvation, for Israel as for the gentiles, depends on putting one's trust in both God and Christ. The trust relationship 'surpasses' (2 Cor. 3.10) the covenant and the law, creating a new and holy community of trust which Paul envisions as living, as in God's kingdom or in a new golden age, with

minimal institutions and laws, by love, peace, and shared hope. Modern readers, however, may recognize, as Paul does not, that Paul's assumption that right-standing with God not only now comes through Christ, but always will, is inconsistent with his own view of God. Humanity cannot rule out that God might choose—or already has chosen—to do another 'new thing', and call human beings into another new and different relationship with God.

Though the trust relationship to which God calls human beings is, in some ways, risky on both sides, the risks are also limited. Paul does not envisage the possibility that God will fail humanity, and, though he recognizes that human beings may fail in trust and faithfulness, he does not think God's demands are beyond what the faithful are capable of fulfilling. The risk God takes on humanity, meanwhile, is an example of therapeutic trust, which trusts someone with something, knowing that they will probably not prove trustworthy at this time (or not fully), but trusting that they will become more trustworthy in the future. This idea challenges the later doctrine that God is omniscient in the sense of having foreknowledge of everything that will happen. It makes good sense, however, if, with some modern commentators, we think of God's omniscience as relational rather than propositional. God deeply knows God's creation, and so can confidently trust that human beings will, ultimately, respond to God's trust. In this vision, however, the faithful cannot rely on God in the sense of relying on God to do what they want or ask for. God can be relied on always and only to be God and to enact God's will.

Paul's focus on righteousness, salvation, and the parousia means that his picture of divine–human trust can look strongly 'three-place', but it also has a 'two-place' aspect. The faithful trust God and Christ not only for eventual salvation, but also as part of the right-standing with God which trust itself makes possible. Two-place trust is a powerful, but open-ended bond, allowing both partners to contemplate a future which human beings cannot predict, which may change them and which they may change in unexpected ways, but towards which they can move with confidence together.

The final section of Chapter 2 shows how a number of New Testament writers draw on a scriptural vision of God as creator which puts care, and the trust intrinsic to it, at the heart of the divine–human relationship. In several passages, the creation of the world is invoked to affirm that Christ, as the one who pre-exists with God and participates in creation, is trustworthy as God is trustworthy, and exists in the same relationship of trust and care with the faithful as does Godself. In this relationship, the faithful are far from passive: as Chapter 7 shows, they have their own role in caring for one another and for creation. The identification of Christ with God the creator is another way in which these writings affirm that, though trusting in Jesus Christ is risky, its risks are limited. These passages also tend to have eschatological connections, affirming that trust in God and Christ will ultimately restore humanity to the divine–human relationship for which it was created. The restoration of this relationship is not only humanity's best hope for itself, but also the best hope of creation as a whole for the relief of its present suffering.

Chapter 3 turns to the newly ascended being, the exalted Christ, and to the idea that people are called to trust in Christ as they trust in God. The call to trust in the exalted Christ may be the earliest form of the call to trust in Christ, but it is striking how strongly and explicitly New Testament writings affirm the continuity of Christ's identity in his earthly life, death, resurrection, and exalted life. Across New Testament writings, a key basis for trust in the exalted Christ is belief in the resurrection. Resurrection belief, however, is complex, involving resurrection experiences (one's own and/or others'), preaching, the interpretation of scripture, and the coherence of all these things with one's existing commitment to the God of Israel or willingness to put one's trust in God. Although, therefore, there is no real doubt that Christ-confessors believe that the resurrection occurred, resurrection pistis also has an aspect of propositional trust. The faithful trust that they can trust their experience and their ability to interpret it, the experience of others, the community's interpretation of scripture, and their past experience of God, and that all these things fit together.

The exalted Christ is unusual among exalted human beings of the early principate in being active in oversight and support of the faithful. He does battle with hostile powers

to save those who trust. For Paul, especially, he mediates between God and the faithful, lays the foundations of communities and welcomes people into them, and directs the travels of apostles. The faithful are often said to be 'in Christ's hands', emphasizing both Christ's authority over them and his care for them. The faithful, for their part, remain faithful to God and Christ, seek to become more faithful, and try to imitate the exalted Christ in living for God until the end time. The ongoing relationship of the exalted Christ with the faithful in the present, turbulent and uncertain time, is another aspect of divine–human trust that mitigates its risk.

Chapter 4 offers a model of atonement centred on Christ's restoration of trust between God and humanity. It begins once more with Paul, who uses pistis language in all the key passages in which he writes about the death of Christ, but, like all models of atonement, it moves beyond the texts in seeking to explicate the role and significance of saving trust. It begins by arguing that sin is everywhere entwined with the suffering which it is liable to cause both the guilty and the innocent: including in the scriptures, in messianic traditions, in stories of Christ as saviour, and in everyday experience. Ideally, a model of atonement should therefore show how the death and resurrection of Christ make possible the release of humanity both from sin and from the suffering caused by sin.

For Paul, especially in Romans, both suffering and sin are closely connected with the failure of trust. All three are very difficult, if not impossible, for human beings to extricate themselves from, even if they long to be free of them. Christ, however, trusts and is trustworthy to God, and trusts and is trustworthy to human beings, who are invited to trust in him. Through this double nexus of trust Christ offers mediation between God and humanity to enable their reconciliation. To recognize that Christ's trust in God is vindicated, however, and that they can trust in both God and Christ, human beings also need the revelation of the resurrection. Since the trust of the faithful in God and Christ is partly trust for the future, and will not be vindicated and fulfilled until the end time when the faithful hope to be saved, trust in the atonement can be seen not only as a discrete act of saving trust, but as a long-term relationship in which

the faithful respond incrementally to the trust of God and Christ and continue, and even grow in it until the parousia.

The idea that Christ mediates between God and humanity through trust does not, in itself, explain why Christ needed to die. This chapter argues that Christ had to allow himself to be arrested, because to try to avoid arrest or execution would have been a failure of trust in God, and not to trust in God would have been to deny the person he was. It draws on Paul's language of dying with Christ and being raised with him, to propose that Christ also allows himself to be crucified as an act of grace, because he understands that human beings must die to the power of sin and suffering in order to be restored to right-standing with God. Using the image of a child who is accompanied by her mother so that she will not get lost on a new and intimidating journey to a longed-for destination, it argues that the exalted Christ accompanies human beings on their death to the power of sin and suffering, so that they experience that death as dying 'with' Christ, and are able to go through it in trust and confidence. In addition, it suggests that Christ's suffering and death change human beings' sense of what is possible for humanity, and so encourage them to put their own trust in God. Drawing on contemporary psychology, and on accounts of the rehabilitation of ex-offenders through initiatives that focus on the creation or restoration of trust, it seeks to show how this model of atonement might work, in practice, to release people from the power of both suffering and sin. In these examples, trust emerges as a powerful tool of restoration, reconciliation, and rehabilitation. Finally, this chapter argues that trust in God and Christ also makes possible propositional trust that one will be saved. It considers why there is little trust language in the gospels' passion narratives, and shows how, in the gospel narratives, Jesus acts as a mediator in his earthly ministry, and how other people can also act, Christ-like, as mediators between the suffering and Jesus himself.

Chapters 5 and 6 turn to Jesus in his earthly life, focusing first on the gospels' portrait of the Jesus in whom people trust, and then on how and why people trust, or fail to trust, in Jesus, and with what consequences. Trust language in all four gospels (which are often, though not always, closer in their portrayal of trust than we often assume) is

nearly always put in the mouth of Jesus. It appears in multiple literary forms and layers of tradition, and is soteriological, Christological, eschatological, charismatic, caring, and kerygmatic. Chapter 5 begins by arguing that, for all four evangelists, signs, miracles, prophecies and teaching, though they are all reliable indicators of Jesus' identity for those who trust, cannot prove who he is, and do not create trust, or not lasting trust. Those who seek signs, moreover, or trust their ability to assess who Jesus is rather than responding to him with trust, are fundamentally apistos. The gospels sometimes invoke the scriptures to testify, for their listeners, to the trustworthiness of Jesus by association with the God of Israel, and to affirm that Jesus cares for God's creation as does Godself, but even the appeal to scripture cannot prove Jesus' trustworthiness. Trust arises from personal encounters with the Jesus who is present or near, sees and is seen, calls and is followed. Jesus' own trust in God is everywhere a model for those who trust in him, and the trust that responds to Jesus brings new or renewed life.

For the final redactor of John, those who have eternal life must recognize and trust in Jesus as Son of God, and only those who have been pre-elected can do so. The synoptic gospels and Acts, in contrast, suggest that, in Jesus' lifetime, no new or special revelation or pre-election should have been needed for people to put their trust in him. Jesus should have been recognizable, to both Jews and gentiles, as a prophet, healer, and exorcist by the power of God, a man of God, and a man through whom God acted, and this should have been sufficient for the beginnings of trust. This, it is suggested, makes better sense of the theme, especially in Mark, that Jesus went unacknowledged by many, than the now widely shared but, in the world of the first century, counterintuitive idea that a divine revelation went unrecognized. Finally, this chapter considers the possibility that the gospels' portrait of Jesus in his earthly life and death also acts, for the faithful, as an image of the exalted Christ. If so, it considers whether, even after Jesus' ascension, trust in him may acceptably be based on a more partial and imperfect understanding of his identity than we sometimes assume.

Chapter 6 turns to those who put their trust in Jesus in his earthly life, and to the paradoxical adequacy of fragile and imperfect human trust. Through an anti-ableist

reading of Jesus' healings and other stories, it argues that no one who encounters Jesus in his earthly life fully or adequately understands who he is. Multiple stories about the disciples, moreover, show that even Jesus' closest followers regularly fail in understanding and trust. There is, though, no sign that, for the gospel writers, the inadequacy of human trust is a deal-breaker at any time before the end. The gospels offer a compassionate vision of human trust, in which any response to Jesus is an acceptable starting-point, bringing human beings into a life-giving relationship with God.

The story of the last night of Jesus' life raises the possibility that even Jesus' trust in God is not unshakeable. This chapter argues that Jesus' trust in God does not waver in Gethsemane, but that his trust in himself to be faithful may. If so, he responds by submitting to God's will, replacing any self-trust with trust and obedience to God. Finally, this chapter considers whether the gospels as narratives seek to foster trust, and reflects on the ways in which the birth narratives highlight the significance of human beings as collaborators in the new divine–human relationship.

Chapter 7 explores the theme of human entrustedness by God and Christ, arguing that there is more language of entrustedness, especially in the Pauline corpus, than has been recognized, and that divine trust in humanity plays a vital role in the divine–human relationship. Paul describes himself as entrusted with the gospel and, more broadly, with stewardship of his communities, and entrusts others with acting on his behalf. Other community members are entrusted with various gifts, while communities as a whole are entrusted with teachings and traditions, with being faithful, and with being examples for one another. Being entrusted is both a gift and an obligation, and is strongly eschatological in focus. In the gospels and Acts, Jesus' followers are entrusted by him with their own mission, while, in parables of the end time, the master's slaves are entrusted with his wealth until his return. These parables envisage the faithful as entrusted with care for the material world and those who live in it until the end time, and with an obligation to help it grow and flourish.

This chapter explores the relationship between trust and the spirit and between entrustedness and power, arguing that trust precedes the reception and gifts of the spirit, and that power also depends on trust. Finally, it offers an outline of an 'ethic of entrustedness', exploring how faithful individuals and communities might understand themselves as entrusted today, and with what implications for their behaviour and relationships.

Chapter 8 turns from relational trust, which is the focus of most of this study, to propositional trust: trust that something is the case. Propositional trust is neglected even in the philosophical literature, and is almost absent from discussions of divine–human trust. It is argued, though, that propositional trust has a role to play both as one of the foundations of divine–human trust, and when people commit themselves and their future to their trust in God and Christ. 'Trusting that' means entrusting oneself, or being willing to entrust oneself, and the future, to a proposition about which one accepts that one is not certain. It is not common in New Testament writings, but we have seen that it is implicit in the process of belief formation. In addition, it occurs in the Johannine corpus where Jesus' followers are invited to trust (i.e. to commit themselves to the proposition) that Jesus is the Son of God. In Paul's letters it occurs where the faithful are called to trust that God will raise the dead, and that they will live with Christ in the eschatological future; in the Pastorals, it occurs where the faithful are invited to trust that the teachings they have inherited are true. In addition, it is implicit wherever we can see God and Christ as acting with therapeutic trust towards humanity.

Though philosophy and theology have not taken much explicit interest in propositional trust, all humanities disciplines (and others) implicitly make use of it in constructing arguments and making claims. Taking the study of history and music as examples, this chapter argues that humanities subjects have in common that they are in dialogue with subjects that 'are not': not beyond doubt, not literally true, not here and how, not univalent, or not material. There is always more than one appropriate, interesting, and constructive way to discuss their subject-matter, and never only one right view of it, not least because the observer's viewpoint is always implicated in her view. When we make arguments about the subjects, we therefore do so knowing that taking a view of them is

necessary (because not taking any view leads to paralysis of thought and action) but risky, and involves making choices about which the only certainty is that they will affect the future. In this intellectual and ethical sequence propositional trust plays both a discursive and protreptic role.

In the context of this study, propositional trust is important when we are considering whether our account of divine–human trust is trustworthy, whether it has the capacity to engage us and illuminate our experience, and whether, on that basis, we are willing to commit ourselves and entrust the future to it. Four test cases are proposed, to see whether propositional trust might, for people in different situations, offer a route to trust in God and Christ, and consider the relationship between propositional trust, fear, doubt, and scepticism. Finally, this chapter reflects on the role of propositional trust in the dialogue between history and theology in the study of the New Testament.

Roman Faith discussed at length the differences between representations of pistis in different writers and books. We have noted that this study, too, aims to outline not a single, systematic account of New Testament trust, but a series of sketches of aspects of divine–human trust. We should not automatically expect these to cohere, both because different writings focus on different facets and instantiations of the divine–human relationship (in God's past, present, and hoped-for actions; in Christ's pre-existence, earthly life, death, resurrection, and exalted life), and because different writers have different perspectives and agenda. It comes as no surprise to find, for instance, that Paul's interest in the relationship between trust, the covenant, and the law is not widely shared, while Chapter 4's model of atonement through trust and dying with Christ is rooted in distinctively Pauline language (though its themes of mediation, shared suffering, and imitation have parallels elsewhere).

That said, some significant coherences do emerge in these writings' vision of divine–human trust. The assumption that God is faithful and trustworthy and can be relied on to enact God's will, which is affirmed strongly in Jewish scripture and tradition, and rather more patchily in polytheistic religiosity, is implicit everywhere. The conviction that Jesus Christ is trustworthy as God is trustworthy is also universally accepted, and

widely linked with the theme of divine care for creation, though it is expressed differently by different writers. Multiple writings envisage the exalted Christ as overseeing and acting for the faithful. Entering a relationship of trust with God and Christ is widely understood as a kind of rebirth: a death to the power of sin and suffering, leading to new life and new relationships under God's rule and in Christ's hands. New Testament writings share with modern psychology a conviction that where you trust is your reality: the place where you are seen and known; the place that matters to you and where you matter.

Trust is widely portrayed as both three-place and two-place: trust for salvation which shares God's hope for the world, and trust that lives for God and shares God's care for the world. Most writers recognize both that trust and faithfulness are important, and that they can be fragile; different books emphasize one more than the other but most, in some form, affirm the adequacy of imperfect human trust. By extension, though usually implicitly, they recognize that the trust God and Christ invest in human beings is risky. Multiple writers, however, by their interest in entrustedness, imply that God's risky trust is therapeutic: rooted in God's deep knowledge of God's creation and confidence that human beings will, ultimately, prove trustworthy. Last, but not least, propositional trust, implicit if not explicit, is widespread in these writings. If, in this life, objective truths elude us, whether about the nature of God, the end time, or the life, death, or resurrection of Christ, nevertheless, we can hope to develop reasoned convictions to which we are prepared to entrust ourselves and the future. Though it would be an exaggeration to claim that there is a New Testament theology of trust, therefore, there are signs that New Testament writings share much of their theological understanding of this most central and characteristic of Christian concepts.

Pistis, in these writings, is never only the attitude and act of saving trust. It is ongoing, sometimes progressive, and involves the faithful in entrustedness and in all kinds of this-worldly action. It is therefore not only soteriological and eschatological but ethical and ecclesial. It enters into partnership with God and Christ: God and Christ entrust human beings with all kinds of work in the present time and care for the world, and human beings accept their trust. Pistis is therefore, anthropologically, a strikingly

optimistic concept. It affirms that most people, or everyone, however imperfect, can trust, persist in trust, be entrusted, and, through trust, come eventually to salvation and eternal life. On this basis, this study will conclude by offering some suggestions as to why trust was so important to early Christ-confessors, and why it matters to Christians today. © Teresa Morgan 2022. DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780192859587.003.0001

When Form Becomes Substance: Power of Gestures, Diagrammatical Intuition and Phenomenology of Space edited by Luciano Boi, Carlos Lobo [Birkhäuser, Springer Nature, ISBN 9783030831240]

This interdisciplinary volume collects contributions from experts in their respective fields with as common theme diagrams.

Diagrams play a fundamental role in the mathematical visualization and philosophical analysis of forms in space. Some of the most interesting and profound recent developments in contemporary sciences, whether in topology, geometry, dynamic systems theory, quantum field theory or string theory, have been made possible by the introduction of new types of diagrams, which, in addition to their essential role in the discovery of new classes of spaces and phenomena, have contributed to enriching and clarifying the meaning of the operations, structures and properties that are at the heart of these spaces and phenomena.

The volume gives a closer look at the scope and the nature of diagrams as constituents of mathematical and physical thought, their function in contemporary artistic work, and appraise, in particular, the actual importance of the diagrams of knots, of braids, of fields, of interaction, of strings in topology and geometry, in quantum physics and in cosmology, but also in theory of perception, in plastic arts and in philosophy.

The editors carefully curated this volume to be an inspiration to students and researchers in philosophy, phenomenology, mathematics and the sciences, as well as artists, musicians and the general interested audience.

CONTENTS

Specialists from various backgrounds, each recognised as references in their field or promising to become so, have been invited in January 2018 to reflect and exchange on a theme that was on the way to becoming a commonplace. This conference was guided by the firm intention of renewing this theme by reactivating all the dimensions that may have been convened in the past, but in scattered order, without avoiding salutary tensions and contradictions.

Such dispersion could not be avoided once again and is, no doubt, due to the nature of the theme itself. One of its poles is the diagrammatic and the other is the question of space as they intervene in the development of human knowledge in its broadest and most encompassing sense. By indexing these elements under the aegis of a questioning that crosses mathematics, physics, biology, philosophy, literature, and art, that of form, we have tried not to drown this heterogeneity under an even broader amphibology, but to turn it towards what resonates as a future or even a promise.

Indeed, diagrams play a fundamental role in the mathematical visualisation and philosophical analysis of forms in space. Some of the most interesting and profound recent developments in contemporary sciences, whether in topology, geometry, dynamic systems theory, quantum field theory, or string theory, have been made

possible by the introduction of new types of diagrams, which, in addition to their essential role in the discovery of new classes of spaces and phenomena, have contributed to enriching and clarifying the meaning of the operations, structures, and properties which are at the heart of these spaces and phenomena. This multiplicity of uses covers a certain polysemy that should also be questioned. Diagrams, which are often related to images, drawings, figures, and models, implement a more imaginative and pictorial thinking of scientific and artistic practice, and combine gesture, invention, and meaning. They show that it is possible to elaborate a theory, a model, abstract or concrete, like a thought in movement, which originates in a space that is itself to be reinvented and unfolds in its own time. Developing a diagrammatic thinking thus amounts to trying to understand the dynamics of transformation and the processes of emergence of new properties and qualities of spaces and phenomena.

This volume wants to examine the importance today of diagrams of knots, links, braids, fields, interactions, strings, etc., in topology and geometry, in quantum physics and cosmology, but also in the theories of perception, in the plastic arts and in philosophy. To this end, we propose to study different cases of mathematical and physical theories in which diagrams play an important role, philosophical and phenomenological approaches to space, time, and perception, as well as artistic practices strongly inspired by diagrammatic thinking.

Topological Visualisation, or How to Apprehend the Invisible

The representation of space in topology require a process of "mathematical visualisation" (of idealisation or imagination), which calls upon a new type of intuition, more conceptual and at the same time more pictorial (diagrammatic), and resolutely distant from immediate sensations and empirical intuition. In topology, the figure, the drawing, the diagram, or the graph (in this context, we attribute to these words the same status) are no longer the image of something, of an external object that the image would be in charge of representing, but are themselves the object that represents a universe of relations and "hidden" properties absent from the image. The "semiotization" of the status of the image is even more developed there than in other sciences and has reached a very fine level.

Topology allows another approach to the study of objects which does not restrict itself to quantitative relations of size and visual aspects, but rather considers the form (i.e. the image of a deformation, either an embedding or an immersion) as a whole, as well as the spectrum of possible variations (continuous or discrete) of its configurations. It has changed profoundly our scientific thought and culture of the image; it is the domain par excellence of images (figures, drawings) in the new and particular sense we have just outlined. It is the most abstract (but, in another sense, the most concrete) part of mathematics, which is defined as the science of transformations of extended objects and more or less abstract spaces by continuous deformation, that is to say, without tearing or gluing. In this field of mathematics, the notions of distance and length no longer play any role, and the concept of homotopy, or more generally of homology proves to be powerful to account for the similarity and intrinsic relations between two objects, two figures, two surfaces, or, more generally, between two abstract spaces. The criterion of similarity by superimposition or by reproduction of sizes, and thus the very notion of visible resemblance, takes all meaning in topology. In no other field of mathematics is the distance from visible reality and the model of figuration as important as it is in topology, where a much subtler concept close to the intrinsic structure of objects plays a fundamental role, namely the qualitative concept (in the topological sense, i.e. where no metric relations intervene) of equivalence or homeomorphism. Thus, in its broad meaning, topology studies the properties of geometrical objects such as manifolds, spaces, knots, and braids that conserve their essential properties when submitted to a certain kind of transformations called homeomorphisms and homotopies.

Feynman Diagrams: A New Way Forward in Theoretical Physics

The Feynman diagrams, and their relationship to knots and links diagrams, are a magnificent example of this point of view, and it is one of the most significant ways of thinking in twentieth century physics. It can be seen as a kind of grammar endowed with the power to create theoretical models and possible interactions between physical but immaterial particles. These theoretical models, symbolised by diagrams generated one after the other thanks to a method of invention, represent a process in the making.

Indeed, it allows us to apprehend the meaning of a physical world (that of fields and subatomic particles) invisible and inaccessible to our perception, first through the dynamic construction of a space with a very large number n of parameters (where n is unknown), then by projecting this space onto a simple two-dimensional surface, but which nevertheless conceals hidden possibilities. A fundamental part of physical thought in the twentieth century is closely linked to the invention of the diagrammatic method, largely due to the genius of the physicist Richard Feynman, to whom we owe (together with Tomonaga, Schwinger, and Dyson) the creation in 1948 of Quantum Electrodynamics (QED). It is a quantum field theory that aims to reconcile electromagnetism with quantum mechanics. The concept of field designates a structure that makes it possible to account for the creation or annihilation of particles at any point "in space". Mathematically, it is an Abelian group with a U(1) gauge group of symmetries. The gauge field that intervenes in the interaction between two charges represented by 1/2 integer spin fields is the electromagnetic field. Physically, this translates into the fact that the charged particles interact through the exchange of photons. Photons, which play a fundamental role in atoms, are like strings that bind electrons to the nucleus. Quantum electrodynamics was the first quantum field theory in which the difficulties in developing a purely quantum formalism allowing the creation and annihilation of particles were satisfactorily resolved, thanks to the so-called renormalisation method, designed to free itself from the infinite undesirable quantities encountered in quantum field theory.

Diagrammatics and Invariants in Knot and Braid Theory

It is a field of research that cuts across several fundamental areas of mathematics, physics, biology, and the philosophy of science. Knots and braids diagrams are among the most fascinating objects of current research at the crossroads of algebraic and geometric topology and quantum field theories. Information about two-dimensional knotted surfaces (i.e. knots that allow for a planar projection) living in the three-dimensional space R3 or in S3 results from a structure called a knot diagram. For the mathematical study of knots, the fundamental question is whether two knots are equivalent. If they are not, then they can be distinguished, usually by means of

numerical, geometrical, or algebraic invariants: one of these invariants is the Jones polynomial. Most of these invariants can be obtained from knots diagrams. If at least two knots are equivalent, then we can define an ambient isotopy that establishes an equivalence relationship between manifolds or subsets of Rn.

In its far-reaching meaning, a knot invariant is a function from the set of all knots to any other set such that the function does not change as the knot is changed (up to isotopy). In other words, a knot invariant always assigns the same value to equivalent knots (although different knots may have the same knot invariant). Standard knot invariants include the fundamental group of the knot complement, numerical knot invariants (such as Vassiliev invariants), polynomial invariants (knot polynomials such as the Alexander polynomial, Jones polynomial, Kauffman polynomial, Homfly-pt polynomial), and crossing, linking, or torsion numbers (i.e. numbers defined in terms of an invariant, and for the torsion number, generated by the finite cyclic covering space of a knot complement). Torsion invariants were introduced by Reidemeister in 1935, and were historically the first non-homotopy invariants for closed three-dimensional Piecewise Linear manifolds.

Starting in the eights the quest for knots' invariants has been one of the most significant lines of research in the field of three-manifold topology. This began with the Jones polynomial invariant for knots in S3, which was used by Witten to show, with Chern–Simons theory, that the 2+1 dimensional quantum Yang– Mills theory is exactly soluble. There are combinatorial definitions of the Jones polynomial, basically skein relations that say how the invariant is related before and after changing a crossing in the diagram of a knot or link. These types of relations led to other combinatorial notions of knot invariants and sometimes to 3-manifold invariants. One of the most powerful seems to be the Khovanov homology of knots in S3. These homology groups should be viewed as a categorification, a kind of enrichment, that is a process consisting in replacing sets point of view by category theory. Like the original Jones polynomial, these invariants are defined starting with a braid presentation of the knot. The invariants of knots and links in S3 obtained from Chern–Simons theory (a topological three-dimensional quantum field theory) can be used to construct three-

manifold invariants. This provides an important tool to study topological properties of three-manifolds.

In the 1990s, it has been uncovered a deep but unexpected relationship between conformal field theories and knot theory. Indeed, quantum field theory can be used to generate new knots polynomials and analytic expressions for them. Knot theory, in turn, is an important tool by which conformal field theories and statistical mechanics can be studied, giving us a topological meaning to quantum groups and to the Yang–Baxter relation.

Philosophical and Scientific Implications

This brings us to the epistemological and philosophical issues. (1) In general, and particularly in the case of knots s and Feynman diagrams in quantum electrodynamics, diagrams have not been used to simply "illustrate" something (objects and events), but rather as symbolic operations or operators of an algebraic and topological nature. Moreover, diagrams make it possible to show and know topological properties of the object, in particular concerning their possible transformations in space and their invariant characteristics. Once known, these topological properties can lead to the discovery of new algebraic invariants of the knot. (2) Diagrams are not limited to offering a picture of the world as it appears to us. A diagram is a powerful symbolic and conceptual construction, a key to reading and rewriting the processes of formation of the "real" world, a kind of open semio-dynamics of his becoming. From this point of view, the diagram translates the form of a way of thinking (of a conceptual strategy) that the physicist geometer is able to give to matter, to the physical world. As a set of plastic qualities of a thought in the process of forming itself as an effective model, as a form, the diagram tends to objectify itself in real processes. Diagrams have three functions at the same time: (a) to elucidate concepts by deploying their articulations within a possible form; (b) to introduce new concepts; (c) to create new properties of the objects that diagrams (graphs, trees) model. (3) Diagrammatic thinking has opened the way to new methods and techniques for visualising objects and phenomena inaccessible to ordinary perception, and also to experiments that can be carried out by even very sophisticated devices. This visualisation has additional explanatory power

compared to other classical methods used in the mathematical and physical sciences. Through the creation of mental images of objects and equations, certain visualisation techniques, especially diagrams, are constituted, of which two levels can be distinguished: the first corresponds to models of real objects as they are imagined and not (directly) observed; the second concerns the elements that form the models themselves, i.e. the graphical, denotative and connotative aspects, which give to "see" what is not visible, by a creation of objects and new articulations of meaning.

Diagrammatics and Category Theory

The theory of knots and interlacing gives us to see the stitching of diagram and calculation, implied in each other as in a Feynman diagram. From this interaction between the image and its interpretation, a dialectical pulsation is created between seeing and enunciating in a series of relationships that the diagram imposes and exposes. Explored by Lacan in the meanders of the Borromean knot, the image of these interlaces serves as a support for thought in order to justify and develop the complicated relationships between the real, the symbolic, and the imaginary, and to locate the place of modes of jouissance and meaning between the wedging points of the "bo-knot". It will therefore be a question of studying the theatre of operations of these diagrammatic entanglements, understanding their relationship to the virtual, and giving an account of their creative intuition. But also, to point out the question of indexing, present both in Châtelet's texts and in those of Charles Sanders Peirce, who liked to say that "algebra is nothing other than a kind of diagram".

It is around the algebraic expression of Jones's polynomial that the connections between the low-dimensional topology, of which the theory of knots and links is a part, and the mathematical theory of the categories of Saunders MacLane and Samuel Eilenberg are born. Developed from the middle of the twentieth century onwards, the latter gave rise to many links between various fields of mathematics. The diagram is one of its founding elements and modes of reasoning. It is at work, for example, in Charles Ehresmann's sketch theory and in the theory of locally free diagrams by René Guitart and Christian Lair. These theories deserve to be reinterpreted within the philosophical framework of Alain Badiou's recent writings as set out in his Logique des

mondes, and of the texts of Gilles Deleuze and Michel Foucault, who saw in Bentham's panoptic a diagram of power, a "political device", organising, according to Deleuze, "a new type of reality". In this confrontation between science and philosophy, notions such as appearance, univocity, duality, and universality will find new dimensions that will extend the reflection on the diagram and the diagrammatic.

A French Singularity in Epistemological Field: Gilles Châtelet

Among the many authors who have devoted all or part of their reflections to this question, Gilles Châtelet is undoubtedly a leading figure to whom this colloquium will pay tribute. Indeed, the mathematical philosopher reminds us that the diagram is distinguished from the figure by the operation that makes it function, by a series of singular points that make it up or that emerge ab initio from its own tensions and its own virtualities. For Châtelet, the diagram is "the gestural unfolding of a space" that pushes calculation through "allusive stratagems" that the philosopher in Les enjeux du mobile never ceases to hunt down in Argand's texts, Maxwell's electromagnetism, and Grassmann's theories. No less suggestive is Châtelet's renewed look at the history of science and the philosophy of science, as well as at the way in which the phenomenology of space should be resourced with scientific practice. It never goes without a parallel, sometimes implicit and sometimes explicit, with the history of art and painting in particular. It is in this perspective that Châtelet's insistence, following Leibniz, on the "manner of the operation" must be understood. Against a purely operative conception of algebraic and geometric (understood as the provision of a figurative by means of a "simple abstraction" from sensitive space), he rightly insists on the fluidification of space in favour of a spatium, understood as the space of virtualities whose constitution "presupposes only a law of coordination of the internal spontaneity of monads".

The resignation that would be the acceptance of a space and a metric already won, attached to the position of a neutral observer, is refused in the name of the requirement of a conquest of space that is a "victory of the 'projective'". Whether it is the conquest of depth in pictorial perspective, the scale of speeds in Oresme's diagrams, Einstein's central intuition of the special relativity that underlies the

understanding of Lorentz's contraction, all the experiences of thought or "intuitions" that preside over these "conquests" (or inventions), whether scientific, artistic, philosophical or simply "existential", proceed from a "decision of horizon", where the style of circumspection and the opening of the "thematic" field is decided; which is not surprising, since the horizon "allows us to venture into the turbulent space where science, art and philosophy come close without confusing science, art and philosophy". This decision or "pact" negotiates between two failures: that of geometrical intuition being frozen in "clichés", and that of units of meaning syntactically submitted to the administration of proof. Such pacts correspond to moments of institution and brackets of the "available", and allow for their rediscovery: "a flagrant example is the 'rediscovery' (in Hamilton's case) of imaginary numbers by the introduction of the plane"; "this new encounter of geometry and algebra (and therefore of the visible and calculable) will impose the work of Hamilton and Riemann (and many others), while having an impact on the very notion of the application of mathematics". Such pacts engage us in the wake of Kant, beyond the "classical pact that geometry and algebra had sealed, by tying the images of the first (the "figures") to the literality of the second (the sequences of formulae and calculations of magnitudes)", in this "underbelow" that transcendental aesthetics left in the shadows, without sending it back to an empirical psychology, be it a psychology of the creative imagination or of the mathematical imagination.

The epistemology suggested by Châtelet is a tracking of these gestures and moments of disaffection with regard to clichés, misleading analogies, as well as the domesticated operative, which has become routine. However, this kind of parenthesis has the opposite side to a full and complete subjective involvement in an experience of thought and intropathy, of Einfühlung. This point is essential because it provides us with the link between this epistemological attitude induced by the explicit promotion of the diagram to the rank of formal object and writing and the aesthetic attitude instituted by explicitly diagrammatic practices in the plastic arts. Châtelet's study is exemplary in this respect with regard to the diagrams of intentionality presented on the occasion of the developments on Grassmann, whose schema and general tendency

need only be retained. The reading of these diagrams is pushed by Châtelet to the level of a choreography, depicting the scene of intersubjectivity, resulting in a profound modification of the (classical) subject/object relationship. Intentionality is in turn disturbed in turn, the subject S being haunted by the object O, haunting or reflecting the impassable abyss between two I's.

Phenomenology of Space (and Time) and Diagrammatic Epistemology

In the wake of these reflections, we are invited to rethink the place and role of a phenomenology of space. By stripping away structures, we discover—underneath the constituted—the trace of these gestures and their rich potential. This is how the diagrams are introduced. It is still through the diagram that one can find and make one's own experiences of radical thought. This is the case with the thought experience of Galileo, the Einstein of General Relativity, or Archimedes. The diagram records and transmits these radical thought experiences. They are a trace of them. In this conception of science, understanding and scientific learning, the diagram plays a decisive role, because diagrammatic communication is based on "intropathy". The appropriation of these experiences therefore presupposes that we find the gesture, the embodied operativity; that we plunge back into the constituent variety of subjective ways of "doing", which appear, after the fact, in the eyes of a normalised science, like a halo or a contingent gangue. But it is first of all constitutive: inventio itself presupposes such a "putting oneself in the place of". What is sought in this way under the diagrams and the techniques of forcing intuition, of provoking an algebraic intuition likely to upset the trivialities of a logically domesticated calculable, are in fact the gestures of constitution and institution. Since the task of phenomenology is to "explicitly renew" these formations of meaning by reactivating them, it must stop naively making use of them to consider them in their formation and in their use. This supposes that, in the description and discourse held on this subject, another form of reading of these "legacies" is practised. This legacy presupposes that they are made available in the form of "writing systems" and a socially constituted and transmitted habitus capable of reading and using what is thus made available. This presupposes the acquisition of new linguistic and graphic "tools" to "describe" the provision itself.

A “transcendental” moment comes to lie at the heart of the institution or the renewal of these practices, each time the hypotheses on which the previous practices were based are awakened and shaken up. And, it is possible to consider as a sample of phenomenology the explicit reflection that accompanies these moments of invention. The attention to the foundations and underpinnings of constructive symbolic activity is phenomenological. Phenomenology digs into the “model cupboard”, into the back-kitchen of science. In its exploration of the deepest constitutive levels of constituent subjectivity, it must strive to “re-seize” and “reactivate” the inaugural “gestures”, which are not only those of a proto-geometer from an antiquity as mythical as it is remote, but also and first and foremost those of each “inventor”. But it is one thing, it will be said, to elucidate the role of the diagrammatic in intellectual activity (categorical synthesis), it is another to use diagrams in the course of this elucidation itself, as Husserl does to study a level of synthesis that is precisely not intellectual, and that intervenes, it seems, in the lowest and most immediate levels of constitution, as is the case with everything that touches on “aesthetic” syntheses: those which are constitutive of our consciousness of space and time.

Towards a “Diagrammatic Critique of Aesthetics”

That this area is also the place of the technicality of reason, that is to say of mathematics and art, is what we should never cease to meditate on; but first and foremost, this deployment takes place through a communicability of gestures, that is to say of hands and manners, “all this talking with hands” “which should perhaps be better called talking with hands” and which should not lead us to conceal the “hands” or the “manners” of speaking, this dimension of the linguistic expression which Kant in the third critique designates as being that of gesture (and gesticulation) always joint, in the spoken word, to word and tone (to articulation and modulation). In the field of the arts, it will therefore be a question of questioning the diagram as a gesture, in the act of writing, photographing, painting, or composing music, but also in its own genesis, in what precedes thought, in the unthought: the diagram as a technical device for indexing, preconceived or not, random or deterministic. In Francis Bacon’s interviews with David Sylvester, the act of painting presupposes that there exists on the canvas a

set of figurative data, more or less virtual, more or less current, constituting an intermediate place where the play of forces can be exercised. According to these forces, new data will appear, disappear, fade, or stand out according to the artist's desire or will. From a chaotic, primitive, structural, or algorithmic primordial form, the artistic diagram will be born in a middle ground, in a pure becoming. Because etymologically, the word diagram in Greek is the deverbal noun of diagraphein, that is to say literally "through the writing", it is posed as a transverse axis to the artist's gesture. The function of a diagram is always to make something explicit, and according to Châtelet, to immobilise "a gesture in order to establish an operation of amplification and intuition". From Kandinsky to Paul Klee, from Pollock to Bacon, or for artists such as Ricardo Basbaum, Waclaw Szpakowski, Daniel Sheets Dye, Mark Lombardi who work on lines, their arrangements and relational networks, or for artists such as Edward Tufte, who works on the notion of Feynman's diagram, the diagram does not have here the same meaning or the same status, or particularly for artists such as Jorge Eduardo Eielson and Robert Morris, who worked on different types of knots and their virtual artistic expressions. We will therefore attempt to analyse the aesthetic outline of the diagram, to problematise its links with the work and the artistic process, to situate diagrammatic creativity as a processual whole, that is to say, in short, we will attempt to sketch out a "diagrammatic critique of aesthetics".

The Order of the Essays

The book is divided into eight parts devoted to various mathematical and philosophical themes. The first part of the book is on "Logic, Forms, and Diagrams". The purpose of the paper of L.H. Kauffman is to explore the idea of a sign, using G. Spencer-Brown's work "Laws of Form" as a pivot, a reference, and a place from which Kauffman makes excursions into simplicity and complexity. Julien Bernhard proposes a thorough inquiry on roles of diagrams in logic. Are they merely pedagogical tools, or are they effectively endowed with a demonstrative force and eventually a heuristic potential, at least in the discovery of inferential forms? The paper of Franck Jedrzejewski is a rigorous tentative of giving an interpretation of knot and link diagrams and invariants in terms of theory of category.

The second part of the book is on “Geometrical Spaces and Topological Knots, Old and New”. The nice paper of Marco Andreatta is an historical presentation of some ideas and concrete constructions of geometrical surfaces. He briefly considers some recent results in higher dimensional algebraic geometric, which can be summarised in few diagrams. He also points out that some of these ideas and diagrams could be directly connected to biology and life sciences. Alessandro Verra shows that geometry undergone revolutionary shifts of paradigm during all the last century. He addresses the issue of the difference between historical and contemporary geography of algebraic geometry, trying to bring some evidence and concrete examples from the experience of a person working in this field. A major attention is payed to the history of classical and modern rationality problems, for some famous examples of algebraic varieties. In its paper, Luciano Boi shows that knot theory has extensive interactions, not only with different branches of mathematics but also with various and fundamental areas of physics. Knots and links are deeply related to the geometry of 3-manifolds and low-dimensional topology, quantum field theory, and fluid mechanics. The paper surveys some current topics in the mathematical theory of knots and some of their more striking ramifications in physics and biology. This article aims at stressing the importance of considering diagrams in the study of topological and geometrical objects and the key role of knot theory for the understanding of the structure of space and space-time.

The third part of the book is on “Diagrams, Graphs, and Representation”. Carlo Petronio explains how planar diagrams, equipped with suited depictions, can be used for describing topological objects of dimension 1, 2, 3, and 4. In that paper, Patrick Popescu-Pampu presents some problems which led to the introduction of special kinds of graphs as tools for studying singular points of algebraic surfaces. He explains how such graphs were first described using words, and how several classification problems made it necessary to draw them, leading to the elaboration of a special kind of calculus with graphs. This non-technical paper is intended to be readable both by mathematicians and philosophers or historians of mathematics.

The fourth part of the book deals with “Diagrams, Physical Forces, and Paths Integrals”. In the paper of Sergio Albeverio, Feynman path integrals are first presented for the case of non-relativistic quantum mechanics, both in physical and mathematical terms. Then the case of scalar relativistic and Euclidean quantum fields is discussed. The methods of (constructive) perturbation theory and renormalisation theory in relation to Feynman path integrals are briefly considered, in particular mentioning the visual help provided by Feynman diagrams. The paper ends with mentioning some open problems and presenting some philosophical remarks and reflections on the description of natural phenomena, in particular those of fundamental physics, in mathematical terms. Jean-Jacques Szczeciniarz paper contains some remarks on Penrose diagrams. He explains what a conformal diagram is by expounding the theoretical and geometrical elements which constitute it: complex geometry in several variables, projective geometry, conformal geometry.

Finally, he briefly presents the cosmological and philosophical significance of the synthesis realised by Roger Penrose.

The theme of the fifth part is “Phenomenology in and of Mathematical Dia grams”. Frédéric Patras paper is a tentative of giving representations of elementary geometric and combinatorial objects, with particular emphasis on the so-called non-crossing set partitions, in a Husserlian perspective. The paper of Arturo Romero first presents the inner relation between the phenomenological concept of intentionality and space in a general mathematical sense. Then briefly characterises the use of the geometrical concept of manifold (Mannigfaltigkeit) in Husserl’s work. Next, he presents some examples of the use of the concept in Husserl’s analyses of space, time, and intersubjectivity, pointing out some difficulties in his endeavour. Finally, he offers some points of coincidence between phenomenology and category theory suggesting that the latter can work as a formal frame for ontology in the former. The thesis of the paper is that intentionality operates in different levels as a morphism, functor, and natural transformation. Carlos Lobo’s paper is a study of the way in which diagrams of time have functioned in Husserlian phenomenology in the most fertile period on the subject, i.e. between the lessons of 1905 and the Manuscripts from 1917-1918. While

doing so, he offers a phenomenological clarification on the role of diagrams in science as well as in phenomenology.

The sixth part is on "Diagrams, Gestures, and Subjectivity". The paper of Hye Young Kim presents a topological analysis of space-time consciousness. The paper attempts to explore a possibility to visualise the structure of time-consciousness in a knot shape. By applying Louis Kauffman's knot-logic, the consistency of subjective consciousness, the plurality of now's, and the necessary relationship between subjective and intersubjective consciousness are represented in topological space. Philippe Roy paper is on gestures, diagrams, and subjectivity. According to the author, the subjectivity can be thought through the new articulations of the dualities "Individual/Society" or "Individual unity/Multiplicity of becoming", rather than by the category of substance. The paper of Filipe Varela presents some grounds to further understand what imagination is, what it does, how it possibly works, and where it may be located in our nervous systems. Such an approach follows the imperative to correlate the precious insights coming from philosophy, with those of the sciences that nowadays study our perceptual and cognitive apparatus from a physiological and bio-chemical perspective. Such correlation is vital to a comprehensive understanding of this elusive thing, imagination. The paper of Fabien Ferri is on the diagrammatic language beyond the phenomenological difference. In other words, following the ideas proposed by Bruno Bachimont, the author discusses the possibility of overcoming the traditional difference between scientific language or knowledge whose main function is to calculate, and phenomenological language or knowledge, which can be expressed by natural language and where "saying stands for having a meaning".

The seventh part is about "Diagrams, from Mathematics to Aesthetics". The paper of Charles Alunni shows how Ars diagrammaticae discusses the significance of the art of diagram and its philosophical implications through the analysis of some examples took from modern and contemporary mathematical physics. Alunni draws on the concepts and operations at work in contemporary mathematics to question the classical philosophical distinctions between image, figure, and diagram. The paper of Jakub Zdebik shows how, despite its abstract and non-figurative character, Gilles Deleuze's

diagram has stimulated a deep methodological renewal in aesthetics of visual arts. Amélie de Beauffort's paper focuses on the idea that drawing allow for a plastic foundation of thought, which is important for creativity and also for living in the world. This viewpoint is motivated by a graphic practice which rests on a plastic morphology of the manipulation of knots and gestures that make and unmake the drawing. Farah Khelil paper deals with the emergence of a reasoning owing to the diagram in its artistic practice and in particular in a recent work entitled Point d'étape. She clarifies the singularity of the diagram with respect to the relation of art with philosophy and its relationship with the reality. She also enquires the painting and its relationship to space.

The eighth part of the book is on "Poetics and Politics of Diagrams". Catherine Paoletti focuses on the tentative by Gilles Châtelet, who stressed that the diagram is at the same time tool, object, and locus of thinking, which give rise to new spatial configurations, therefore to potential movements in space and also to new dynamics in the writing. The paper of Tatiana Roque is on diagrams of the possibility, by establishing a link between the phase space (a mathematical object) and the political subject. The function of the diagram is, as stressed by Deleuze, a goal which introduces new effective possibilities in science, as well in social sciences; in other words, it is an operative concept which can change reality. In its paper, Noëlle Batt, after briefly recalling the evolution of the concept of diagram in the philosophical work of Gilles Deleuze, first present the hypothesis that literary and more particularly poetic writing has a diagrammatic dimension. The hypothesis is sustained by a number of resonances between, on the one hand, the features and morpho-dynamic processes which are prominent in the definition of diagram proposed by different disciplines, and, on the other hand, those which characterise the specific reorganisation of signs and infra-semantic elements of the language which constitute the material of the literary text. <>

THE BORDER BETWEEN SEEING AND THINKING by Ned Block [Oxford University Press, ISBN 9780197622223] Open Access

Philosopher Ned Block argues in this book that there is a "joint in nature" between perception and cognition and that by exploring the nature of that joint, one can solve mysteries of the mind. The first half of the book introduces a methodology for discovering what the fundamental differences are between cognition and perception and then applies that methodology to isolate how perception and cognition differ in format and content. The second half draws consequences for theories of consciousness, using results of the first half to argue against cognitive theories of consciousness that focus on prefrontal cortex. Along the way, Block tackles questions such as: Is perception conceptual and propositional? Is perception iconic or more akin to language in being discursive? What is the difference between the format and content of perception, and do perception and cognition have different formats? Is perception probabilistic, and if so, why are we not normally aware of this probabilistic nature of perception? Are the basic features of mind known as "core cognition" a third category in between perception and cognition? This book explores these questions not by appeals to "intuitions," as is common in philosophy, but to empirical evidence, including experiments in neuroscience and psychology.

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Review

"The great virtue of Block's discussion is its blending of philosophy and science, instigating an exciting empirical agenda to test his claims. Does cognition never adapt? Do all perceptual properties adapt? Do Block's signatures generalize to nonhuman animals, artificial systems, or other senses? Can iconicity account for the full breadth of visual representation? Whatever the answers, Block's approach offers deep insight into two fundamentally different aspects of mind." -- Chaz Firestone and Ian Philips, *Science*

"This is a major work in the philosophy of perception. Its central insight is that many debates in philosophy of perception not only assume a distinction between perception and cognition, but often assume a specific way to draw it. That's why giving a theory of the distinction is such a fertile project, and why the book treats so many of the issues that shape contemporary work in this area - including the nature of consciousness, modularity, cognitive penetrability, and the differences between perception and memory, conceptual and non-conceptual contents, and propositional and non-propositional structures for content. The book invites responses along two dimensions: by engaging Block's theory of what grounds the distinction between perception and cognition, or by engaging what he says about the topics he treats in defending this theory. For this reason, the book has made a big impact." -- Susanna Siegel, Edgar Pierce Professor of Philosophy, Harvard University

"Powerfully-argued, steeped in relevant science, and overflowing with insight, Block's landmark book will shape and stimulate debates about perception and thought for years to come." -- Ian Phillips, Bloomberg Distinguished Professor of Philosophy and Brain Sciences, Johns Hopkins University

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Subject Index

This book is about the border between perception and cognition— what it is and why it is important. I was drawn to this subject because of the realization that the difference between what I called access consciousness (cognitive access to phenomenally conscious states) and what I called phenomenal consciousness (what it is like to experience) was rooted in a difference between perception— whether conscious or unconscious— and cognitive access to perception.

A bit of the material in this book appeared in one of my four Jean Nicod Lectures in Paris in 2014 (though those lectures were on consciousness rather than the perception/cognition border). I am very grateful to Pierre Jacob and Frédérique de Vignemont for their warm hospitality and wonderful intellectual stimulation.

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What is the difference between seeing and thinking? Is the border between seeing and thinking a joint in nature in the sense of a fundamental explanatory difference? Is it a difference of degree? Does thinking affect seeing, or, rather, is seeing "cognitively penetrable"? Are we aware of faces, causation, numerosity, and other "high- level" properties or only of the colors, shapes, and textures that— according to the advocate of high- level perception— are the low- level basis on which we see them? How can we distinguish between low- level and high-level perception, and how can we distinguish between high- level perception and perceptual judgment? Is there evaluative perception or is evaluation a matter of emotion and perceptual judgment? Is perception conceptual and propositional? Is perception iconic or more akin to language in being discursive? Is seeing singular? Which is more fundamental, visual attribution or visual discrimination? Is all seeing seeing- as? What is the difference between the format and content of perception, and do perception and cognition have different formats? Is perception probabilistic and, if so, why are we not normally aware of this probabilistic nature of perception? Does perception require perceptual constancies? Are the basic features of mind known as "core cognition" a third category in between perception and cognition? Are there perceptual categories that are not

concepts? Where does consciousness fit in with regard to the difference between seeing and thinking? What is the best theory of consciousness and does the perception/ cognition border have any relevance to which theories of consciousness are best? These are the questions I will be exploring in this book. I will be exploring them not mainly by appeals to "intuitions," as is common in philosophy of perception, but by appeal to empirical evidence, including experiments in neuroscience and psychology.

I will orient the discussion around the question of a joint in nature between perception and cognition resting on differences in format and kind of representation that have been the subject of a great deal of controversy in recent years. Perception is constitutively nonconceptual, nonpropositional, and iconic, but cognition has none of these properties constitutively.

Claims that perception is iconic, nonconceptual, or nonpropositional have been advocated— and opposed— for many years. Stephen Kosslyn is perhaps the most notable advocate of recent years for the iconicity of both perception and mental imagery, but many others have also advocated such views. Zenon Pylyshyn has been a notable opponent of iconicity for both perception and mental imagery (Pylyshyn, 1973, 2003). Similarly, many have advocated nonconceptual and/ or nonpropositional perception (Burge, 2010a; Carey, 2009, 2011b; Crane, 1988; Evans, 1982; Peacocke, 1986, 1989). And there are many opponents (McDowell, 1994; Strong, 1930; Wittgenstein, 1953).

The intended contribution of this book is not that perception is nonconcep-tual, nonpropositional and iconic, but the elaboration of what that view comes to, engagement with the evidence for and against it; and using this picture of perception to refute widely held theories of consciousness, the global workspace theory and the higher order thought theory, and to argue for a new reason to think there can be phenomenal consciousness without access consciousness. I think I have new evidentially based arguments for other familiar theses. For example, Chapter 6 is devoted to an argument for non- conceptual color perception based on developmental psychology. In the first few chapters, I will be especially concerned with how to

distinguish low- level perception from high- level perception and how to distinguish high- level perception from perceptual judgment.

This book is all about evidence. I aim to avoid pronouncements and intuitions. I will also explore the relation between these claims about format, content, and state to modularity and consciousness, and rebut arguments that misconceive the border between perception and cognition. (The content of a representation is the way it represents the world to be, the way the world has to be for the representation to be accurate. The format of a representation is the structure of its representational vehicle.)

I also aim to avoid cherry- picking evidence. When I know of evidence that goes against my claims, I will introduce it.

To say that perception is constitutively X is to say that it is in the nature of perception to be X. The evidence I will present that perception constitutively has certain properties applies most clearly to actual creatures that perceive rather than possible creatures. The evidence I will be talking about concerns the way actual perceptual mechanisms work. Occasionally I will talk about consequences for robot perception, though I am less certain about those claims.

Although I am arguing for certain constitutive properties of perception, my evidence is almost entirely concerned with vision. I believe the points I am making apply at least to all the spatial senses. There is good reason to include smell in the spatial senses (Smith, 2015). Humans can track odors across grass blindfolded, and their tracking deteriorates if they are deprived of the use of one nostril. Humans can also identify the direction of a smell via stereo- olfaction without moving (Jacobs, Arter, Cook, & Sulloway, 2015).

But I will not be talking about the nonspatial senses except in asides such as this one. I will not be talking about proprioception, the sense of balance, thermoception (the sense of temperature, kinesthesia (the sense of movement), chronoception (the sense of time) or others of the perhaps 21 senses (Durie, 2005).

Although there are many types of perception, a wide variety of them obey the same laws of perception such as Weber's Law (that the discriminability of two stimuli is a

linear function of the ratios of the intensities of the two stimuli) and Stevens's Power Law (that says that perceived intensity is proportional to actual intensity raised to an exponent, where the exponent differs according to stimulus type). Stevens's Power Law has been shown to apply not only to various forms of visual and auditory intensity but also to many other kinds of perception and sensation. A recent textbook chapter lists the exponents for the following kinds of perception: electric shock, warmth on arm, heaviness for lifted weights, pressure on arm, cold on arm, vibration, loudness of white noise, loudness of 1 KHz tone, and brightness of white light (Zwislocki, 2009). In sum, although my evidence is almost entirely from vision, there is a prima facie case to be made that many of our perceptual modalities have similar underlying natures.

One feature of the treatment of these ideas that will emerge in Chapters 4 and 6 is that perceptual and cognitive states can share the same or at least similar contents, nonconceptual and nonpropositional in the case of perception, conceptual and propositional in the case of cognition. So nonconceptual content is not a kind of content. Chapter 6 will use an extended example in terms of color contents.

Jerry Fodor argued for a joint in nature between perception and cognition based on the distinction between modular (perception) and nonmodular (cognition) processing. The modularity thesis says perception is a fast, inflexible, automatic, domain- specific system that is informationally encapsulated from other systems, has a fixed neural architecture, a characteristic ontogenetic pace of development, and processes that are themselves largely opaque to other systems (Fodor, 1983). This book argues that the joint in nature between perception and cognition does not depend on modularity, and more specifically that there is a joint and there also is considerable penetration of perception by cognition. Still, there is something to the idea that perception is modular, with only restricted kinds of cognitive penetration. In Chapter 9, I will critique a recent proposal in the spirit of modularity by E. J. Green, but I am friendly to the general approach.

How do we know that we are perceiving a face as a face— as opposed to perceiving a face as having certain colors, lines, curves, textures, shapes, and the like— all low- level

properties? To answer that question, we need methods of distinguishing high- level from low- level perception.

Something can look blue, look like a face, look expensive, or look like a piano. But are these kinds of looking all perceptual as opposed to judgmental overlays on perception? The perceptual representation of blue is low- level, whereas the perceptual representation of faceness is high- level. Low- level visual representations are products of sensory transduction that are causally involved in the production of other (mid- and high- level) visual representations and include representations of contrast, spatial relations, motion, texture, brightness, and color. (Transduction is conversion of signals received by sense organs into neural impulses.) Another low- level property is spatial frequency (roughly, "stripiness"). Representations at a slightly higher level, sometimes characterized as mid- level, include representations of shapes that indicate corners, junctions, and contours (Long, Konkle, Cohen, & Alvarez, 2016). High-level representations include representations of recognizable objects and objectparts, but also causation and numerosity. Some think that conscious perception is never high-level, for example Alex Byrne, Adam Pautz, and Jesse Prinz (Pautz, 2021; Prinz, 2002; Siegel & Byrne, 2016) and that what happens when it seems that something looks like a face is that we perceive lower- level properties while judging that certain high- level properties apply. Those who advocate high- level perception are often said to advocate rich as opposed to thin perception (Siegel, 2010; Siegel & Byrne, 2016).

Although I will be arguing at length that we do perceptually represent some high- level properties, I agree with the skeptics that it is a mistake to postulate rich content solely on the ground that a perceiver can visually recognize something. For example, I can visually recognize that something is a pipe wrench without seeing it as such.

One view of the rich/ thin debate that is not the one I am endorsing is that the thin view is one in which we perceive low- level properties "directly" and high- level properties "indirectly." This picture, sometimes called the "layering" conception, is that "we see more abstract and worldly things in and by seeing simpler and more primitive

ones" (Lycan, 2014, p. 7). I think we visually attribute faceness, causation, and numerosity directly.

High- level perception is to a large extent causally dependent on low- level perception but not totally dependent on low- level perception. For example, there are direct connections between subcortical structures like the amygdala and the high- level fusiform face area (Herrington, Taylor, Grupe, Curby, & Schultz, 2011). The amygdala is activated by fearful faces by a pathway that skips the low- level perceptual analysis of early visual cortex (McFadyen, Mermillod, Mattingley, Halász, & Garrido, 2017). Further, even to the extent that high- level perception is causally dependent on low-level perception, that doesn't make high- level perception indirect in the sense that high- level percepts are composed of low- level percepts. High- level perception in the sense I am using is just the perceptual attribution of high- level properties.

What is the evidence that we visually represent some high- level properties? I will be addressing this question in more detail later, especially in Chapter 2, but I will give one line of evidence here having to do with visual agnosia (a term due to Freud). My argument will be superficially similar to one given by Tim Bayne (2009), and one reason for introducing the argument in the introductory chapter is that the difference between my argument and Bayne's illustrates a key feature of the methodology of this book.

A nineteenth- century classification system of agnosias due to Lissauer (Shallice & Jackson, 1988) that is still useful distinguishes between apperceptive agnosia, in which subjects have problems with grouping of perceptual elements, and associative agnosia, in which grouping is normal or close to normal but recognition is not. Apperceptive agnosia is now more commonly referred to as "visual form agnosia." (The latter term is used in the second [but not the first] edition of Martha Farah's classic book [Farah, 2004].) Apperceptive agnosics can often see color and texture but cannot see shapes and often have trouble telling whether they are seeing one object or two objects. They have difficulty copying drawings even when they can draw from memory with their eyes closed.

Associative agnosics can often copy drawings well without knowing what they are copying. Associative agnosia is characterized by failure to apply high-level visual properties, even though associative agnosics often have normal recognition through nonvisual sensory modalities and intact low- level vision. For example, an associative agnosic might be unable to visually recognize that something is a dog despite being able to recognize that something is a dog haptically and despite having the concept of a dog. Hans- Lukas Teuber described associative agnosia as "percepts stripped of their meaning" (quoted in Goodale & Milner, 2005, p. 13).

In addition to broad visual associative agnosia there are also specialized associative agnosias such as prosopagnosia, the inability to recognize faces despite intact low- level perception. Color agnosia, a type of associative agnosia, is discussed in Chapters 4 and 6. A recent paper reported an even more specific agnosia, agnosia for the digits '2' through '9.' The patient could recognize '0' and '1' and letters of the alphabet. The patient was an engineering geologist with a degenerative brain disease. Although he could not recognize the eight mentioned digits, he could do mental arithmetic. He came up with a different system of representing the eight digits and set up his computer to use the new numerals on the screen so that he could keep working (Kean, 2020; Schubert et al., 2020).

Apperceptive agnosics don't demonstrate the existence of low- level without high- level perception, since what they lack is a kind of low- level perception involving low- level grouping. However, patients whose perceptual grouping is normal but have associative agnosia have low- level perception without high-level perception. The existence of associative agnosics is an excellent reason to believe that there is high- level perception and high- level perceptual content.

I think this point establishes that there is high- level perceptual content, but it does not show that there is high- level perceptual phenomenology, that is conscious high- level content (cf. Bayne, 2009). But separating the issue of high- level perceptual phenomenology into the question of high- level perceptual content and whether that

content can be conscious allows us to get a grip on the latter question. And this is the point of methodology that I am illustrating here.

It is widely agreed among those who study the neuroscience of consciousness that specific phenomenal contents are based at least in part in the brain circuits that process that kind of content. For example, visual brain area MT+ processes motion perception, both 3D and 2D motion. The evidence is partly correlational— even illusory motion and motion aftereffects involve activation in MT+ (Tootell et al., 1995), but the conclusion is also supported by stimulation to MT+ . Indeed the experience of specific directions of motion is produced by stimulation to distinct subareas of MT+ (Salzman, Murasugi, Britten, & Newsome, 1992).

Although we know that activation in MT+ is part of the neural basis of motion experience, what we don't know is what else has to happen for (conscious) motion experience to occur. Though we don't know, theorists do make claims about what else has to happen. For example, the global workspace theory (to be discussed in detail in Chapters 4 and 13) says that the motion representational contents must be "globally broadcast."

What is global broadcasting? Perception sparks competition among neural "coalitions" in perceptual areas in the back of the head. (See Koch, 2004, for a readable account of neural coalitions and (Dehaene, 2014) for a readable presentation of the global workspace account.) These coalitions involve feedback/ feed- forward loops known as recurrent activations. The recurrent activations in the back of the head trigger "ignition," in which a winning neural coalition in perceptual areas links up with frontal circuits via "workspace neurons" that link the front and back of the head. The result is a systemwide mutually supporting neural coalition that advocates of the global workspace model describe as broadcasting in the global workspace. See Figure 1.2. According to the global workspace theory, representations of motion based in MT+ being globally broadcast is constitutive of perceptual consciousness of motion.

The "global workspace" model of consciousness (Dehaene, 2014) is illustrated in Figure 1.2. The outer ring indicates the sensory surfaces of the body. Circles are neural systems

and lines are links between them. Filled circles are activated systems and thick lines are activated links. Activated neural coalitions compete with one another to trigger recurrent (reverberatory) activity, symbolized by the ovals circling strongly activated networks. Sufficiently activated networks trigger recurrent activity in cognitive areas in the center of the diagram and they in turn feed back to the sensory activations, maintaining the sensory excitation until displaced by a new dominant coalition. Not everyone accepts the global workspace theory as a theory of consciousness (including me), but it does serve to illustrate one kind (again, not the only kind) of competition among sensory activations that in many circumstances is "winner- takes- all," with the losers precluded from consciousness. (As we will see in Chapter 7, there is a revised version of the global workspace theory, the global playground theory, that is arguably superior.)

I have argued that recurrent activations confined to the back of the head can be conscious without triggering central activation. Because of local recurrence and other factors, these are "winners" in a local competition without triggering global workspace activation (Block, 2007a). Strong recurrent activations in the back of the head normally trigger "ignition," in which a winning neural coalition in the back of the head spreads into recurrent activations in frontal areas that in turn feed- back to sensory areas. See Figure 1.2. As Dehaene and colleagues have shown, such locally recurrent activations can be produced reliably with a strong stimulus and strong distraction of attention (Dehaene, Changeux, Nacchache, Sackur, & Sergent, 2006). (Since I am concerned in most chapters of this book with normal perception, I won't say much about my disagreement with the model until we get to the chapter on consciousness. But for the record, I think the global workspace model is a better model of conceptualization than of consciousness.)

Here is the point: What is true for low- level perceptual representations such as the representation of motion is also true for high- level perceptual representations, such as face- representations based in the fusiform face area. When high- level perceptual representations are broadcast in the global workspace they give rise to high- level conscious phenomenology— according to the global workspace theory. So the global

workspace account plus the fact that there is high- level perceptual content leads to the conclusion that there is high- level perceptual phenomenology. (I am assuming that the high- level representations are sometimes broadcast in the global workspace, but that is obvious enough.) So if we assume the global workspace account of consciousness, we can move from the high- level perceptual content shown by the agnosia evidence to high- level perceptual phenomenology.

The first- order recurrent activation account of conscious content is basically a truncated form of the global workspace account: It identifies conscious perception with the recurrent activations in the back of the head without the requirement of broadcasting in the global workspace (Block, 2005b; Lamme, 2003). First- order theories do not say that recurrent activations are by themselves sufficient for consciousness. These activations are only sufficient given background conditions. Those background conditions probably include intact connectivity with subcortical structures. (The cortex is the thin sheet covering the brain, the "gray matter.") This kind of connectivity is disrupted under general anesthesia (Alkire, 2008; Golkowski et al., 2019).

That is, according to the first- order recurrent activation account, the active recurrent loops in perceptual areas plus background conditions are enough for conscious perceptual phenomenology. So long as high- level representations participate in those recurrent loops, conscious high- level content is assured. So if we assume the first-order recurrent activation account of consciousness, we can move from the high- level perceptual content shown by the agnosia evidence to highlevel perceptual phenomenology.

I favor the first- order point of view. If the first- order point of view is right, it may be conscious phenomenology that promotes global broadcasting, something like the reverse of what the global workspace theory of consciousness supposes. ("Something like": First- order phenomenology may be a causal factor in promoting global broadcasting; but according to the global workspace theory, global broadcasting constitutes consciousness rather than being caused by it.)

I believe that the same line of thought will apply to any neuroscientific theory of consciousness. All will have to agree that perceptual representation of motion in MT+ plus something else— e.g., certain relations to other brain activations or to behavior— are the basis of conscious experience of motion. It is difficult to imagine a remotely plausible candidate for the "something else" that applies to lowlevel representations such as activations in MT+ but does not apply to high- level activations such as activations in the fusiform face area. This point is the core of my argument for high-level phenomenology.

Some will reject the application of this idea to high- level phenomenology, but that rejection will have to be based on an independent doctrine that there is no high- level perceptual phenomenology. For example, Jesse Prinz's AIR theory (attended intermediate level representation) holds that conscious perception is a matter of mid-level perceptual representations being modulated by attention in a way that allows for availability to working memory— albeit indirectly, via encoding of high- level representation (Prinz, 2012). (Working memory will be discussed later in this chapter and in Chapters 5 and 6.) My point here is that Prinz's theory fits the mold I have described for low- level contents such as motion contents, and he is only able to avoid the extrapolation to high- level phenomenology by explicit stipulation that only mid-level representations can be conscious.

Representationists (also known as representationalists or intentionalists) among philosophers, such as Alex Byrne and Michael Tye, would also be committed to high-level perceptual phenomenology if they accept my argument that there is high- level perceptual representation (Byrne, 2001; Tye, 2019). Representationists hold that the phenomenology of perception is grounded in or determined by its representational content, so high- level content requires high-level phenomenology. (They require further conditions, e.g., that the high- level representations are poised for a role in thought and report, but there is no reason to suppose that these conditions do not apply to high- level representations.)

In sum, many widely accepted perspectives in both neuroscience and philosophy support the move from the existence of high- level perceptual content to the conclusion that there is high- level perceptual phenomenology.

Adam Pautz has argued that the hypothesis of visually representing clusters of low-level properties is methodologically superior to the hypothesis of representing high-level properties. The low- level account is alleged to be more uniform, applying both to faces and to Byrne's "greebles," invented stimuli that are used to study object perception. And the low- level account is alleged to be more parsimonious since the high- level account postulates an extra layer. However, these arguments can't explain the evidence of the sort just presented from agnosias for specific high- level representation. Further, as mentioned earlier, high- level perception has causal sources that are causally independent of low- level perception so high- level perception cannot be reduced to low- level perception.

Now we can return to the use of associative agnosias in arguing for high- level phenomenology. As I mentioned, Tim Bayne (2009) uses associative agnosia to argue for high- level phenomenology. He notes that associative agnosics have low- level perceptual phenomenology, but that it is "extremely plausible" to suppose that the result of the agnosia is that "the phenomenal character of his visual experience has changed" (p. 391). However, introspective judgments about highlevel phenomenology are hard to agree on, as anyone who has argued with an opponent about them realizes. How sure can anyone be that they have the experience of visually attributing faceness as opposed to visually attributing colors, shapes, and textures?

Further, as Robert Briscoe (2015) points out, those who do not believe in highlevel phenomenology (such as Prinz) will regard this argument as questionbegging. They will think that the associative agnosics have lost recognition of high- level properties without having lost any alleged phenomenology that is specific to high- level properties.

Note however, that my argument is not subject to the problem that Briscoe raises. I have used associative agnosia and its difference from visual form agnosia to argue for

high- level perceptual representation— without assuming anything about phenomenology or consciousness. Then I have added that all the main contenders for scientific accounts of how phenomenology relates to perceptual representation have the consequence that there is high- level perceptual phenomenology.

I think this two- step argument for high- level phenomenology is more convincing than other arguments with the same conclusion (Peacocke, 1983; Siegel, 2010). At least it replaces reliance on intuitions about the phenomenology of experience with appeal to the scientific literature.

I am mentioning this issue in the introductory section of Chapter 1 because it illustrates the utility of the methodology of this book. I am discussing perception without consideration of consciousness or phenomenology, and then, once certain conclusions about perception are "established," I will be arguing— in Chapter 13— that they provide arguments against "cognitive" theories of consciousness such as the global workspace and higher order theories.

More discussion of what the distinction between low- level and high- level comes to in terms of the visual hierarchy will come in the discussion in Chapter 2 and in the section of Chapter 4 on Bayesian inference.

I will be giving further arguments that there is high- level perception, though I do not think we have high- level representation of every observable property— observable in the sense that we can detect its presence perceptually. For example, we can often tell visually whether something is expensive but I doubt that expensiveness is visually represented. My main focus, however, is the difference between seeing something as, for example being a face, and forming a minimal immediate direct perceptual judgment that it is a face, the latter being the most perception- like of cognitive states. (More on this below.) The main issue of this book is what that difference is and why it is explanatorily important. The difference between high- level and low- level perception mainly comes in because it can often be hard to distinguish cognitive representations from high- level perceptual representations.

One feature of the scientific approach to perception that frustrates some readers is that there are observable properties that probably are not represented in perception. I just mentioned the property of expensiveness. Other such properties are being a baseball bat or a CD case. Endre Begby describes Burge's view that probably we don't perceptually represent these properties as "oddly reductive" (Begby, 2011). I think that what seems odd to many people is that we can tell pretty well by looking whether something is a baseball bat and whether it is a CD case. We can even do a visual search for baseball bats and CD cases. The reader should keep in mind that the issue here is whether, when one searches for a baseball bat, one is searching on the basis of low-level properties such as color, shape, and texture or whether a representation of baseball bats functions directly in visual search. This is a real experimental issue in many cases. For example Rufin van Rullen argues on the basis of experimental evidence that when one searches for a face in a scene, one uses representations of low-level properties and does not use a high- level face representation directly in search (VanRullen, 2006).

The cognitive state that is hardest to distinguish from a perception is a minimal immediate, direct perceptual judgment based on that perception. If I am perceiving a face, I often simultaneously judge on the basis of that perception that there is a face. When I speak of immediate perceptual judgment, I am talking about a cognitive state that is noninferentially triggered by perception. A direct perceptual judgment is based solely in the perception with no intermediary, inferential or otherwise. I can have a direct immediate perceptual judgment that the two lines in the Muller- Lyer illusion are unequal even when I know that they are actually equal. Thus in the case of known illusions, we have opposite cognitions. We have a perceptual judgment that the lines are unequal and knowledge that they are equal.

Of course, the content of an immediate perceptual judgment has to do with the way the world presents itself in perception. More specifically, what I mean is a minimal immediate direct perceptual judgment. A minimal perceptual judgment conceptualizes each representational aspect of a perception and no more. Later in this

book I will use "perceptual judgment" to mean minimal immediate direct perceptual judgment, often leaving out everything but the "perceptual judgment."

Given my definition of "perceptual judgment," you may wonder whether there really is a difference between perception and perceptual judgment. This whole book is aimed at showing that there is such a difference and what that difference is. Chapter 2 concerns markers of perception that are not markers of perceptual judgment. And the penultimate section of Chapter 3, "Bias: perception vs. perceptual judgment," gives a simple nontechnical example of how one could get empirical evidence that a mental state is a perceptual judgment rather than a perception. That issue stems from some shootings by police of unarmed Black men in which the police seemed to be saying that they "saw" a gun. This section presents one item of evidence that such reported states were perceptual judgments rather than perceptions. Readers who are especially interested in that issue could read that section now, since it does not presuppose anything in the book that comes before it.

A concept of something in my terminology is a representation that functions to provide a way of thinking of what it is a concept of. Oedipus had at least two concepts— i.e., two ways of thinking of his mother, one we could describe as "Mom," and another when he married her (perhaps Greek analogs of "Jocasta" or "Sweetie"). He then found out that, tragically, the two ways of thinking of her, the two concepts of her, were ways of thinking of the same person. Some uses of the term "concept" link it to discrimination and others to categorization (Connolly, 2011). As we will see in Chapter 6, there is perceptual categorization in the absence of the ability to use a representation in thought and reasoning. In my terminology, these cases exhibit nonconceptual perceptual categorization. The ways of representing that are involved in concepts play a role in propositional thought or reasoning— that is definitional in my use of the term "concept."

What is meant by "cognition"? A prescientific characterization is that it constitutively involves capacities for propositional thought, reasoning, planning, evaluating, and decision- making. (I won't be talking about the conative attitudes [e.g., wanting] or

emotions.) Some insects— for example, the nonsocial wasp— can perceive but are not good candidates for propositional thought. Perceptual judgment (i.e., minimal immediate direct perceptual judgment) can be unconscious and automatic. (I will have little to say about emotions, moods, and other mental states that are neither a matter of just perception nor just cognition.)

My usage of the terms "cognition" and "perception" is consonant with much of the recent literature on perception (Firestone & Scholl, 2016a; Pylyshyn, 1999), but some restrict the term "perception" to what I am calling low- level perception (Linton, 2017) and others use "cognition" to encompass mid- level and high- level perception as both perception and cognition (Cavanagh, 2011). This usage is responsible for the term "visual cognition" to mean mid- and high- level vision. For example, here is how Patrick Cavanagh defines "visual cognition" (Cavanagh, 2011, p. 1538):

A critical component of vision is the creation of visual entities, representations of surfaces and objects that do not change the base data of the visual scene but change which parts we see as belonging together and how they are arrayed in depth. Whether seeing a set of dots as a familiar letter, an arrangement of stars as a connected shape or the space within a contour as a filled volume that may or may not connect with the outside space, the entity that is constructed is unified in our mind even if not in the image. The construction of these entities is the task of visual cognition.

Cavanagh seems to exclude low- level perception with the phrase "base data," and the example of a familiar letter brings in high- level perception.

Consider the Necker cube (pictured in Chapter 2). It can be seen as having a front surface pointing to the lower left or, alternatively, the upper right. These are mid- level differences since they have to do with computation of surface representations. By Cavanagh's definition, the difference counts as cognitive— and also a difference in mid- level vision. This way of talking would preclude a joint in nature between perception and cognition, so I will stick with an anchor for "cognition" in propositional

thought, reasoning, planning, evaluating, and decision- making. (See the section on conceptual engineering later in this chapter for a discussion of principles of clarifying the notions of perception and cognition.)

Conceptions of cognition that link it to thinking and reasoning have been called the conservative approach by Cecilia Heyes (Bayne et al., 2019). Of the conservative view, she says (p. R611) it "has a venerable history in Western thought but it's out of kilter with contemporary scientific practice. It implies that much of the research done by those who identify as cognitive scientists— for example, work on the behaviour of plants, shoals of fish and swarms of bees— has nothing to do with cognition."

Although using the term "cognition" in the "liberal" manner that Heyes prefers may have some advantages and it might identify some kind of a joint in nature, it won't be the joint between seeing and thinking. Individual bees may have some thought, but the swarms of bees and shoals of fish don't and plants don't.

Perhaps the most significant difficulty for the perception/ cognition joint has been "core cognition," systems that appear to constitute a mental kind that is both paradigmatically perceptual and paradigmatically cognitive. The existence of a third category does not in itself impugn a joint. Glasses are normally rigid in the manner of solids but have the amorphous structure of liquids. Glasses do flow, more quickly at some temperatures than others, and they do not have the "shear" properties of solids. Glasses have a level of molecular organization intermediate between that of liquids and that of solids (Curtin, 2007). Indeed, one newly discovered form of glass resembles solids in that the molecules cannot change orientation but resembles liquids in that the molecules can move freely (in the sense of translational motion) in all directions (Roller, Laganapan, Meijer, Fuchs, & Zumbusch, 2021). No one would think that the existence of these intermediate types impugns the important explanatory significance of the division of matter into gas, liquid, and solid.

However, the problem posed by core cognition goes beyond providing a third category. The problem is that perception and cognition each are defined by a set of properties

that have their own explanatory unity and core cognition purports to spoil that unity by combining fundamental features of both perception and cognition.

Two of the most dramatic cases of core cognition are mental representation of causation and approximate numerosity (Carey, 2009; Carey & Spelke, 1994). I will argue in Chapter 12 that in these cases there are perceptual analogs of our cognitive representations of causation and numerosity and that some of the key phenomena can be seen as simply perceptual. Also, some can be seen as cognitive phenomena that utilize perceptual materials, as when we think about something by thinking about what it looks like. In their writings on core cognition, Susan Carey and Elizabeth Spelke have advanced a view of core cognition as combining both perceptual and cognitive features in a single type of representation. I will be arguing for a different view, in which the category of "core cognition" is best thought of as mixing fundamentally different kinds of representations in a single system. In a homogeneous mixture, like air or sugar water, the distinct kinds are not easily discernable. In a heterogeneous mixture, like smoke (gases plus particles) or salad dressing (oil plus vinegar), there are different kinds that are discernable. I am saying that core cognition may be a heterogeneous mixture of perception and cognition.

There are other heterogeneous mixtures of perception and cognition. Here is an example of the use of perceptual materials in cognition: when we use a perceptual simulation involving perceptual representation of a sofa and a doorway to think about whether the sofa will fit through the doorway. It is well established that we use the mental imagery system to do something often described as "mental rotation" in such reasoning, and the mechanisms of mental imagery are substantially (but not completely [Kaski, 2002]) shared with perception (Block, 1983a). Another example: the use of perceptual color representations to consider the question of which green color is darker, that of a Christmas tree or that of a frozen pea. In this case, the reasoner uses two different perceptual concepts of color shades. These perceptual concepts are conceptualized percepts, i.e., percepts that have been incorporated into a conceptual structure. Another type of conceptualized percept would be a descriptive concept with a slot for perceptual materials (Balog, 2009b; Block, 2006; Papineau, 2002).

But why don't these examples and the existence of conceptualized percepts show there is no joint in nature? The answer is that the joint is between perception on the one hand and types of states that may use perceptual materials, but not constitutively, on the other. This argument will be explored in greater detail later in the section Conceptual Engineering (p. 46). I will argue that perception should be restricted to what might be called pure perception, perception that does not occur as part of a judgment or as part of a working memory representation. (Working memory is a mental scratch pad that will be described in detail later, mainly in Chapters 5 and 6.) Pure perception is perception without any cognitive envelope.

Perceptual simulations used in cognition do not have all the properties of perception. I will present evidence in Chapter 2 that a basic kind of competition between perceptual representations that is characteristic of perception does not obtain with perceptual representations in working memory. Further, there is reason to believe that the perceptual representations of colors used in working memory representations do not allow for fine- grained colors, the minimal shades of perception.1 Finally, perceptual simulations used in working memory do not have the phenomenology characteristic of conscious perception.

(Compare hearing a phone number and rehearsing it while you look for your phone.) These three points indicate deep differences between perception and perceptual materials used in working memory.

One consequence of the thesis of this book is that certain kinds of machine "vision" are not really cases of vision or even of perception. This issue will be explored in Chapter 6, where I will discuss a robot whose cameras output propositional representations concerning the properties of pixels in the camera's sensor. If those representations are treated as premises in inferences on the basis of which the robot infers the environmental causes of those stimulations, then the robot would have direct sensory production of thought without perception.

One upshot of the ideas in this book for epistemology is that it is a mistake to think of the way perception justifies perceptual belief in terms of inference from perceptual

contents to belief contents. Another upshot has to do with intentionality. The kind of intentionality involved in perception is different from although perhaps the source of the intentionality of belief (Neander, 2017; Shea, 2018).

Consciousness

As noted earlier, throughout most of this book, I will be concerned with perception rather than conscious perception. The border I am talking about is the border between perception— whether conscious or unconscious— and cognition— whether conscious or unconscious. In part, this focus stems from the perception literature (cf. Teufel & Nanay, 2017). Much of the experimental work on perception and cognition does not address the issue of whether the effects are conscious or unconscious. But in part this focus reflects the view that perception is a natural kind that includes both conscious and unconscious perception (see Block, 2016a; Block & Phillips, 2016; and Phillips, 2015, for both sides on this view). (A similar idea applies to the relation between conscious and unconscious control of behavior (Suhler & Churchland, 2009).)

In endorsing the methodological priority of perception over conscious perception, I am not endorsing a view that perception is metaphysically and explanatorily prior (Miracchi, 2017) to consciousness. There are many conscious states that are not perceptual. Perception and consciousness are overlapping natural kinds, neither of which has priority over the other.

Of course the phenomenology of perception is conscious and is part of . . . perception! Some visual phenomena occur in both conscious and unconscious perception, for example the phenomenon of binocular rivalry to be described in Chapter 2. Also, illusory contours probably are present in unconscious vision, since, as will be described in Chapter 2, they occur in insects, and occur so early in visual processing in primates that they probably partially precede conscious perception. However, other perceptual phenomena may only occur in conscious vision, for example, perceptual pop- out.

In Chapter 6 I will argue for nonconceptual color perception in children. Then in Chapter 13 I will leverage that point to argue that these children have phenomenal-consciousness of color without access- consciousness of color.

Pure perception

Any perception that we notice will inevitably involve conceptualization— as part of the cognitive process of noticing the perception. But there may be creatures whose perceptions are always pure, never involving cognition. Wasps have well- developed visual systems. For example, wasp vision exhibits many of the standard visual constancies. Peter Godfrey- Smith has noted that despite their excellent vision, wasps have short lives with highly stereotyped action patterns and show little or no sign of a cognitive or affective life (Godfrey- Smith, 2017).

This is true of the solitary wasp species, for example the sphex wasp. There are thousands of wasp species, with the social wasps being more sophisticated. One social wasp (the paper wasp) has been shown to be capable of a kind of transitive inference-like behavior (Tibbetts, Agudelo, Pandit, & Riojas, 2019). Bees have been shown to learn matching relations between numerosities of 3, 2, and 1 items and symbols, and also between symbols and numerosities (Howard, Avarguès-Weber, Garcia, Greentree, & Dyer, 2019a). But bees trained on matching symbols to numerosities did not generalize to matching numerosities to symbols. And conversely. Although bees have been shown capable of such kinds of symbolic associations with number, they failed the transitivity test. Tibbetts et al. speculate that sensitivity to transitive relations evolved in the paper wasp because its social structure involves dominance hierarchies among individuals. Bees do not have social ranks of the same sort, and of course solitary wasps have no social ranks. My discussion below concerns solitary wasps, not social wasps.

Jumping spiders have been shown to distinguish between biological and nonbiological motion (De Agrò, Rößler, Kim, & Shamble, 2021). De Agrò et al. used displays of 11 moving dots. If the dots are on human joints, displays look like moving humans to human observers. De Agrò et al. constructed similar displays based on spider joints and presented spiders with those displays as well as displays based on moving geometrical figures and random displays. They found that the spiders looked longer at the nonbiological motion. This difference may reflect high- level perception as shown in humans of biological motion. Alternatively, it could reflect cognition…

Why should philosophers be interested in this book?

Here are some reasons why philosophers should be interested in this book.

1. The relevance to epistemology is significant, given that perception but not perceptually based cognition is often supposed to provide unjustified justifiers. If perception is conceptual, propositional, and discursive, then a compelling view of how perception justifies belief is just that we believe what we see— or hear, feel, etc. But if I am right that perception is none of those things, then a different model of perceptual justification is required. Traditionally, the philosophy of perception has been geared toward illuminating the epistemology of perceptual judgment— what justifies the judgments about the world that we base on perception (Stoljar, 2009). This project has often ignored the science of perception. The presumption of this book is that epistemologists would do well to find out what perception is from the science of perception and to base the epistemology of perception on that scientific answer.

2. If perception is nonconceptual, nonpropositional, and iconic, then certain kinds of robots will not be perceivers. Specifically, if a camera output writes directly into cognitive representations, the robot would have data- driven cognitive states that are not perceptual.

3. The conclusions of this book are relevant to issues concerning the synthetic a priori. I'll give an example from a recent controversy.

4. Most importantly, the conclusions of this book concern the nature of minds.

Paul Boghossian and Timothy Williamson have debated whether there are synthetic a priori truths that are justifiable by intuition, more specifically, justified by intellectual seemings (Boghossian & Williamson, 2020). The kind of intellectual seeming at issue would include, for example, the appreciation of the truth of the proposition that it is morally wrong to inflict pain merely for one's own amusement. Boghossian argues that such intellectual seemings are similar

to perceptual seemings in that they are "predoxastic" in the sense of prior to actual belief and also that these intellectual seemings dispose us to believe. He argues further that the considerations that show that perceptual seemings justify perceptual belief apply also to the claim that intellectual seemings justify intellectual beliefs. Williamson opposes predoxastic seemings in both cases. According to Williamson, we have a visual seeming that the Müller- Lyer lines are the same length, but it is not predoxastic because it is constitutively tied to the "felt visually- based inclination to judge that one line is longer" (pp. 232–233).

Similarly, according to Williamson, an inclination to judge that it is morally wrong to inflict pain for one's own amusement does not present itself to him as based on its seeming true. If asked why he is inclined to judge that p, an appeal to p seeming true "sounds forced and feeble" (p. 233) because the explanans is too close to the explanandum.

In my view, both Boghossian and Williamson are mistaken. Boghossian is mistaken because intellectual seemings are not predoxastic and Williamson is mistaken because perceptual seemings are predoxastic. More specifically:

1. Perception is plausibly nonconceptual and nonpropositional, and so are perceptual seemings, but intellectual seemings have to be conceptual and propositional since the contents cannot be appreciated without thought.
2. Perception is iconic, while cognition, including intellectual seemings, is largely discursive, the exception being map- like representations.
3. Perception is subject to large adaptation effects. If I look at a red square for more than a few seconds, it will look slightly less red, as the perception shifts toward the green end of the red/ green opponent process channel. (See Chapter 2.)

Because of adaptation, perception of ambiguous stimuli results in rivalry, as explained in detail in Chapter 9. If I look at a Necker cube, one face will appear to come toward me. That perception will then weaken due to adaptation, and then the other way of perceiving it will win out and another face will come forward. This can continue indefinitely. An ambiguous figure/ ground display yields comparable oscillations in how we see it because of adaptation. (Again, see Chapter 2.) But there is no comparable oscillation in intellectual seemings. People disagree as to whether XYZ is water or not, but we do not experience oscillating views of the sort we do with perception.

4. Perception is to a large extent architecturally separate from cognition and so to a large extent functions autonomously of the subject's theories. The main exception is for ambiguous stimuli. See Chapters 9– 11. We cannot say the same however of intellectual seemings. They are part of the cognitive system and so not architecturally distinct from it. There is every reason to think that they are highly influenced by the subject's theories. Cognitive penetration of perception is limited, but cognitive penetration of intellectual seemings is likely to be relatively unconstrained.

This last item is by far the most significant of the four points for the Boghossian/ Williamson debate. The epistemic value of intellectual seemings is likely to be greatly reduced compared to the epistemic value of perceptual seemings. Susanna Siegel (2017) argues that the epistemic status of a perceptual seeming is affected by how it is formed. For example, wishful seeing or fearful seeing weaken the epistemic force of the perception. But a similar point applies to intellectual seemings that are influenced by one's theoretical views. To allow intellectual seemings to support conclusions that play a role in producing the intellectual seeming in the first place would be a kind of "double counting" and so the intellectual seeming should be epistemically downgraded.



Fig. 12.1. The ladder of psychonautics.

Roadmap

- Chapter 2 is concerned with markers of the perceptual.
- Chapter 3 is concerned with whether the content of perception is singular, whether perception is attributional, and whether there are two kinds of seeing-

as. It ends with a brief discussion of racially biased perceptual responses by way of illustrating how we can distinguish between perception and perceptual judgment.

- Chapters 4– 7 make the positive case that perception is constitutively iconic, nonconceptual, and nonpropositional. Then Chapter 8 makes the negative case— that arguments to the contrary are mistaken.
- Chapter 6 describes a special kind of perceptual representation, a perceptual category representation. These representations are often conflated with concepts— wrongly, I will argue. This is the central chapter for my argument that perception is nonconceptual and the basis for my new argument for "overflow".
- Chapter 7 discusses evidence from neuroscience that perception is nonconceptual.
- Chapter 8 discusses evidence that is wrongly taken to show that perception is conceptual.
- Chapter 9 describes fundamental machinery of perception that determines direct content- appropriate effects of the content of cognition on the content of perception— i.e., cognitive penetrations (by many common standards). The idea here is that once one sees what the joint between perception and cognition is, we can see that feature- based attention, imagery, and other ubiquitous phenomena involve cognitive penetration. Then I will observe that from what we can tell so far, the mechanisms of cognitive penetration (and the representations produced by these mechanisms) divide into the perceptual and the cognitive; so, there is no reason to believe that interpenetration of perception and cognition show any problem with the joint.
- Chapter 10 discusses top- down effects that have been mistakenly supposed to be effects of cognition on perception.

- Chapter 11 discusses modularity. I will argue against modularity in the sense of Fodor and Pylyshyn, but also that there is substantial truth in the modularity thesis.
- Chapter 12 discusses core cognition, arguing against the view that representations of causation and numerosity form a third category intermediate between perception and cognition.
- Chapter 13 discusses the consequences of the joint for cognitivist and conceptualist theories of consciousness.

This book presents a certain conception of perception, of cognition, and of the difference between them. I give evidence and argument for some but not all of the details. I am hoping that the plausibility and coherence of the picture presented will carry some of the burden of argument. I take it to be generally agreed that cognition is paradigmatically conceptual, propositional, and discursive (noniconic), though I will say a bit more in what follows in contrasting perception with cognition.

As the reader will see, I focus much more on perception than on cognition. The reason for that is that the psychology and neuroscience of perception is vastly better developed than the psychology and neuroscience of cognition. The perceptual systems all have fairly similar tasks— of making the output of sense organs useful to the organism. And phenomena discovered in one sensory modality often appear in others. For example, "change blindness," first discovered in vision, also appears in auditory and haptic perception. By contrast, the aspects of the mind that use conceptual propositional discursive representations are a disparate lot with little uniformity. The best developed of the sciences of cognition are those, as with the psychology of language, that are most like perception. <>

Selfhood and Appearing: the Intertwining by James Mensch [Series: Studies in contemporary phenomenology, Brill, ISBN 9789004375833]

What is the relation between our selfhood and appearing? Our embodiment positions us in the world, situating us as an object among its visible objects. Yet, by opening and shutting our eyes, we can make the visible world appear and disappear--a fact that convinces us that the world is *in* us. Thus, we have to assert with Merleau-Ponty that we are in the world that is in us: the two are intertwined. Author James Mensch employs the insights of Jan Patočka's asubjective phenomenology to understand this double relationship of being-in. In this volume, he shows how this relation constitutes the reality of our selfhood, shaping our social and political interactions as well as the violence that constantly threatens to undermine them.

Review

"In addition to all its other achievements, the fact that *Selfhood and Appearing* invites us to consider the irreducible antagonism between intertwining and the dimension external to it, shows clearly that Mensch's new book truly has an impressive scope." Jakub Kowalewski, *Phenomenological Reviews* 2019.11.12.

CONTENTS

Aristotle wrote that the question that had been asked long ago and continually puzzles us is that of being: "What is being, what is it in its primary sense?" Even more baffling, however, is the question of our being: who or what are we? What do we mean by a "self"? How are we to understand it, both individually and collectively? This question is connected to that of appearing. We are not just a being among beings, but a being to whom beings appear. This position presents its own puzzle. Sitting in a room, we experience it as out there and ourselves as in it. But the room appears and vanishes each time we open and close our eyes. This convinces us that the room is inside our heads, in the perceptual experience located within it. We, thus, face "the puzzle," as William James writes, "of how the one identical room can be in two places. The question is actually that of our being-in-the-world. What exactly is our relation to the

world? Are we in the world or is it in us? This question involves a number of issues. By examining them, we can set the terms of engagement that animate the inquiries that follow.

The Status of Consciousness

The first of these concerns what we mean by consciousness. Given its constant presence, we have to accept it as a fact. The problem is that we have no way of connecting this fact to our scientific view of reality. Thus, there is nothing about the behavior of neurons that distinguishes them from, say, liver cells with regard to consciousness. The metabolic processes of neither point to it. We can, of course, find neural correlates to our sensory experiences. When we see or hear something, patterns of activity occur among our neurons.

But a correlate of consciousness is not consciousness. As the cognitive scientist, Riccardo Manzotti, writes, "When scientists look for AIDS or DIVA, they look for the thing itself, not a mere correlate." In fact, the situation we face with regard to consciousness is similar to those that preceded previous scientific revolutions. With consciousness, we confront a fact that does not fit with our current scientific view of reality. In this, our situation is analogous to that occasioned by Michelson and Morley's discovery of the constant speed of light. The fact that its speed is not additive, that it cannot be increased by the velocity of its source, did not tally with what we understood of reality. In response, Einstein transformed our understanding of space and time. The fact of consciousness is like that of the constant speed of light. It demands that we alter our view of reality to take account of this fact. The question, of course, is what this change might be.

At issue here is not just our ontological conception of reality. It also concerns our own conduct. In Plato's "Phaedo," Socrates gives two explanations for why he sits in prison, talking with his friends while he awaits his execution. The first points to his "bones and sinews," i.e., to the fact that his "bones are rigid and separated at the joints, but the sinews are capable of contraction and relaxation" and have, thus, enabled him to sit in his present position. Similarly, the explanation of his talking with his friends relies on

"sound and air and hearing," understood mechanically. The second explanation is moral. It involves his belief that it is "more right to stay and submit" to the penalty imposed on him rather than attempt to escape. The first explanation gives the material conditions for his action. Socrates admits that without them "I should not be able to do what I think is right." But, while necessary, such conditions are not sufficient. One has to add his "choice of what is best," that is, the fact that his "actions are controlled by mind." This second factor involves the mind's capacity to form intentions and, as such, is teleological. At issue is the rightness of the goal that he seeks to realize. The question that Plato raises, but does not answer, is how these two explanations are to be combined. A mechanical explanation explains the present by speaking of the past conditions that led up to it. A teleological explanation relies on an intended future. It explains action in terms of its goal. The distinction between the two plays itself out in the split between the sciences and the humanities. History, for example, focuses on the intentions of the actors, judging them accordingly. Geology, by contrast, accounts for an event—for example, that of an earthquake—by pointing to the slow accumulation of pressures that occurred before the event. Given that both material-causal and teleological explanations apply to ourselves, what this split signifies is a lack in our self-understanding. We have no clear conception of how our being-in-the-world can sustain these different accounts.

The difficulty can be put in terms of temporalities involved in our selfhood. The temporality of our pragmatic activities is by and large teleological. As such, it begins with the future. Suppose, for example, we want to bake a cake. This cake exists only as an intended future. It affects our present activity, not directly, but rather through determining our regard to our past. We try to remember if we have purchased the requisite materials and, if necessary, set about searching for them. As determined by our goal, our past is here regarded in terms of the resources it offers us for the goal's accomplishment. Similarly, if I wish to run a marathon race, this goal makes me think of how much I have trained in order to set my current training schedule. Again the past, as resulting in my current physical condition, is regarded in terms of resources it offers. It is taken, as it were, as "material" for my project. The same temporality is also at work

in perception. Here, the goal is what we intend to see. The past is regarded as material for this intention. Thus, in moving to get a better look at an object, I regard the object through an accumulating series of views, each of which offers me a different perspective of it. Such views serve as the material for my goal of grasping the object. Putting these past views together, I see the object as showing itself through them. It is not just clearer and more detailed as I approach it, it also appears as something that shows itself through a succession of views. As perspectivally appearing, i.e., as capable of being successively viewed from different sides, it is grasped as a spatial-temporal object.

It goes without saying that my action of walking around the object also involves the temporality of physical action. By this, I mean the temporality where the past, rather than the future, plays the leading role. Such temporality is present in the chemical actions that power my muscle cells and neurons. It is equally present in the rising of the cake I put in the oven. If teleological temporality goes from the future to the present through the past, the temporality of mechanical processes proceeds from the past to the present to the future. Thus, when I play billiards, I assume that my action of hitting a ball with a certain impact will affect the ball it subsequently strikes and cause it eventually to enter into a specific side pocket. Overlaid on this is the teleological temporality of my choosing to try and get it into this pocket. This goal affects how I regard the positions of the balls on the table and, through this, my action of hitting the ball. Both temporalities are involved when I play this game. In fact, all my actions, to the point that they are intentional, embody them. This, however, does tell me how their combination is possible—how, in fact, the temporality that defines me can proceed in two different directions.

The Status of Cognition

Our inability to respond to this points to our failure to integrate the fact of consciousness with our scientific conception of reality—a conception that relies exclusively on physical causality and its associated temporality. This failure also lies behind our difficulties with cognition. Husserl gives voice to these when he asks, “how can we be certain of the correspondence between cognition and the object cognized?

How can knowledge transcend itself and reach its object reliably?" His questions are animated by the split that Descartes introduced between consciousness and the world. The aporia that Descartes leaves us with recalls William James's comment about the room being inside and outside us. For Descartes, the puzzle is that of the correspondence between the two: how can we match the inside with the outside? He writes, "the principal and most common error which can be encountered here consists in judging that the ideas [sensuous perceptions] which are in myself are similar to, or conformable to, things outside myself." Our reaching the object depends, of course, on its reaching us. Given that it physically remains there, we seem to be driven to talk of its likeness reaching us. In Descartes' words, I have to assert "that this alien entity sends to me and imposes upon me its likeness." But, how can we know that the image imposed on us is like the original? Do we have to again traverse the distance between ourselves and the object to compare image and object? If we do, then how can we tell whether this second attempt at transcendence with its resulting image is successful? The verification of this image seems to require a third effort, which requires a fourth for its confirmation, and so on indefinitely. Besides, if we look within ourselves, we never find anything like an image. All we encounter are the electro-chemical processes of our neurons.

At the heart of this difficulty is the distinction between consciousness and the physical reality, which supposedly impresses it with its image or representation. According to Descartes, I can be certain of the representations and experiences that fill my consciousness. The doubt simply concerns their correspondence with reality. Given that this doubt cannot be resolved, we seem to be driven to Kant's taking the external reality as a "thing in itself." This conception arises once we ask what the object is in itself apart from the contributions our consciousness makes to its appearance. Kant's account of such contributions fills his Critique of Pure Reason. For our purposes, it is sufficient to note that once these have been abstracted from, the thing in itself becomes totally unknowable. It escapes all the categories that we use to make sense of appearing. Thus, the Kantian response to Husserl's question—"How can knowledge

transcend itself and reach its object reliably?"—is that it cannot reach the object in itself.

Materialism and Idealism

The history of philosophy presents us with two possible responses to this impasse. The first asserts that science does, in fact, give us access to things in themselves. It does this by distinguishing the primary from the secondary qualities of things. The secondary consist in all the sensuous qualities (the qualia) that fill our conscious experience—the tastes, smells, sounds, colors and tactile qualities through which objects present themselves. These differ according to the state of our embodiment. Not only do they alter depending on whether we are sick or well, they also differ for different species. A bat's embodiment, for example, gives it a different sensuous depiction of reality. To move beyond this relativity, we have to engage in a translation. The secondary qualities of our experience must be restated in terms we can enumerate—such terms being the primary qualities of reality. Thus, the color we experience has to be translated into the frequency and amplitude of the light-waves reaching our eyes; equivalently, sound is to be understood as the frequency and amplitude of the moving pressure ridges in the air that cause our eardrums to vibrate. Molecular counts can be used to translate odors and tastes, while texture can be numbered in terms of differences in the positions of material particles and the elasticity that the particles manifest in their relations. The point of such translation is not the details of the account, which tend to change with the advance of science. It is the insight underlying it, which is that mathematical understanding transcends the particulars of our embodiment. Thus, regardless of the particular body configuration a sentient being might have, if his senses allow him to distinguish objects and if his mind allows him to enumerate them and to mathematically express their relations, this creature will be capable of giving an objective account of them. "Objective" here means independent of his particular embodiment. It is a practical expression of Descartes' mind-body dualism.

An objective account can, according to science, also be given of ourselves. Freud gives a typical expression of this claim when he writes, "our mental apparatus ... is itself a constituent part of the world which we set out to [scientifically] investigate, and it

readily admits of such investigation." This investigation does not just show the details of its anatomical structure, it also examines the structure's functioning. Since the result of such functioning is our grasp of the world, the investigation also shows how the structure affects this grasp. As Freud puts this conclusion: "the task of science is fully covered if we limit it to showing how the world must appear to us in consequence of the particular character of our organization." Once it has accomplished this, science has reached its goal. It has shown how the subjective categories involved in such appearing can be reduced to the physical ones which specify the "particular character" of our "mental apparatus." The problem with this claim is readily apparent. It involves the difficulty we began with, which is that the study of this "apparatus" fails to account for the fact of consciousness. Given that this study occurs through consciousness, we cannot know if consciousness can grasp this apparatus as it is in itself. Lacking such certainty, as Husserl writes, "Thoughts of a biological order intrude." Evolution shows that apparatus has evolved and, with it, our intellect. What prevents us from assuming that the changing structure of this apparatus affects the understanding that allows us to enumerate and grasp mathematical relations? What presents us from asserting that "[e]ven logic alters with the structure of the brain," and, with this, our grasp of mathematical reasoning.

Husserl, having raised such difficulties, gives the alternative response to the impasse that Kant leaves us with. Rather than attempting to derive consciousness from spatial-temporal reality, he asserts that "the whole spatial- temporal world ... is a being that consciousness posits in its experiences ... beyond this, however, it is nothing at all or, more precisely, for this being a notion of a beyond is a contradictory one." As he also puts this, "the existence of nature ... is only as constituting itself in the ordered connections of consciousness." In his idealistic phrase, Husserl thus derives nature—i.e., the spatial-temporal reality that science studies—from consciousness. The existence of a spatial-temporal object, for example, results from its perspectival appearing. It arises in our grasp of its appearances as appearances of some given entity. Here, the Kantian problem of what a thing in itself is apart from consciousness makes no sense. For Husserl, "Genuine epistemology, ... instead of dealing with contradictory

inferences which lead from a supposed immanence to a supposed transcendence—that of some undetermined 'thing-in-itself' which is allegedly unknowable in principle"—simply takes "every sort of being itself (Seiendes selbst), be it real or ideal, ... as a constituted product (Gebilde) of transcendental subjectivity."

Social and Political Implications

Husserl later distanced himself from this extreme form of idealism. As he observes in his late work, The Crisis, it leads to the paradox of our constituting spatial-temporal nature while being part of it. The paradox is that of our twofold being—our possessing "both the being of a subject for the world and the being of an object in the world." If we accept that the world is our "constituted product," we have to ask: "How can human subjectivity, which is a part of the world, constitute the whole world, i.e., constitute it as its intentional product ...?" To assume this, for Husserl, leads to the "absurdity" of having a part of the world constitute the whole of the world and, therefore, itself as a part within this whole. The absurdity appears when we ask: Does this part of the world exist before it constitutes the world and, hence, itself as a part? If the part does not exist before it constitutes, how can it act? If it does already exist as part of the world, doesn't its constitutive activity result in a duplicate of itself and the world?

The difficulty Husserl confronts can be put in terms of the different roles, which human subjectivity is called on to play. As a part of the world, it is the subjectivity of an embodied individual. As such, it submits to the world's material causality. As constitutively responsible for the world, however, such subjectivity stands apart from it. As Husserl expresses this, when taken "as a presupposition for knowledge of the world, ..." the subject, "cannot be and cannot remain presupposed as a worldly being." In fact, as such a presupposition, it "loses that which gives it the value of something real in the naively experienced, pre-given world; it loses its sense of being a soul of an animal organism which exists in a pre-given, spatial-temporal nature." The logic of such remarks is clear. A ground or explanation cannot be grounded by that which it is supposed to ground. As Fichte expresses this, "By virtue of its mere notion, the ground falls outside of what it grounds." It cannot, without circularly, be explained by that

which it is supposed to explain. Given this, how can human subjectivity be both part of the world and stand apart from it?

Husserl attempts to resolve this paradox by appealing to an "absolutely functioning subjectivity ... which objectifies itself in human subjectivity."26 The particulars of this solution need not concern us. At issue are the political and social implications of the distinction that Husserl attempts resolve. On the one side, we have the embodied, worldly subject that is explainable in terms of the material causality that rules the natural world. As such, it is open to our abilities to manipulate such causality—for example, by intervening in its genetic material. On the other side, we have the subject that stands apart from the world, that engages in such manipulation. This is the scientist, who claims to know the world as it is in itself. Such a scientist cannot be the material subject, since its very materiality, i.e., the particularity of its embodiment, relativizes its knowledge. Now, nothing in the material subject limits the ability of the scientist to manipulate it. Such limits are necessarily moral, but the biological and chemical structures examined by science do not provide moral knowledge. The questions of "ought" or "ought not" are not those that can be answered through causal analysis. Thus, the laws of chemistry are the same whether we investigate disease or health, whether we give a drug to cure or cause distress.

The situation is no better when we turn to the scientist, understood as distinct from the world. Separated from its limitations, he also separates himself from the moral framework that presupposes such limitations. Thus, the injunctions to feed the hungry, clothe the naked, offer shelter to the homeless, etc. presuppose our embodied being-in-the-world. If moral justification draws its sense from the human framework—in particular, from our relations to embodied Others with their limitations and needs—then to separate oneself from this is, essentially to leave ethics behind. It is to enter a moral vacuum, where the call to justify our actions is undermined by the absence of justification implicit in occupying a standpoint beyond our embodied humanity. The point of these remarks is not to impugn the ethics of scientists, most of whom are highly moral. It is to indicate the aporia that is implicit in science's abstraction from the human context. Science increasingly gives us the ability to manipulate nature without

limit. What prevents this growing ability to do everything from translating itself into an attitude that stops at nothing? As will be seen in the subsequent chapters, a similar aporia plays itself out in our political life. How can we think a political leader as both a part of society and apart from it?

Ontological Considerations

One way to think about the difficulty of overcoming the split between the subject and the world is in terms of the distinction Kant makes between inner and outer perception. Kant observes that "time cannot be outwardly intuited, any more than space can be intuited as something in us." His point is that external perception provides us only with spatial relations. We cannot, in any sensuous sense, see the past or the future. What is past has vanished and the future has yet to appear. Thus, the world we see is always now. To move beyond this instant and regard the past and the future, we must, then, turn inward and through "inner perception" regard our memories and anticipations. The lesson that Kant draws from this observation is that "if we abstract from our mode of inwardly intuiting ourselves ... then time is nothing." Without inner perception, we would have no perceptual access to it. Similarly, when we do turn inward, measurable space is also nothing. We cannot measure our representations. The chair I regard may be so many feet high, but I cannot put a measuring stick to my perception to determine its size. How large it appears depends on my approach to it. Given this split, we have to say that consciousness consists of temporal relations, while the external world is limited to spatial relations. If we accept this, then we also must admit that consciousness can never be perceptually present in the external world. The spatial relations it is limited to are not capable of exhibiting its temporal reality. Science, which focuses on the measurable aspects of external reality, is therefore bound to dismiss its existence.

What about the fact that most of the equations science employs involve time? Take, for example, the familiar formula, velocity equals distance traveled divided by the time taken to cover this distance. Is not time present in the equation $v = d/t$ as well as countless other mathematical expressions describing our world? The difficulty with this concerns the way science measures time. Incapable of representing time through

outer perception, it translates it into spatial relations—namely, those of the hands on a clock. The case is no different when science relies on the numerical readings of a digital clock. What is captured in both cases is what may be called a snapshot view of reality. In using such measurements, science captures time, not in its reality as a flow, but rather as it appears in the instant of the now. Thus, the formula for velocity yields only results for specific distances and times. One can, of course, plot these on a graph, but then the representation is spatial. The equations the concrete emblem of a general manner of being." What is emblematic is the "reversibility of the seeing and the visible, the touching and the touched." It is this that allows our selfhood to straddle the divide between subject and object, being both immanent and transcendent. The fact that it can be both is supposed to integrate consciousness with the world. It is at the heart of the non-dualistic ontology advanced under the title of flesh.

The problem is that while such reversibility characters my body's relation to itself, it does not characterize the world as such. Yet Merleau-Ponty, in moving from our body to an account of being, is compelled to claim that the body is an "exemplar sensible." This, Dillon remarks, is to take it as "an example of sensibles in general." He adds, "If the body is conceived as flesh, then to take it as exemplary of all sensibles is to conceive of everything sensible as being somehow flesh." The implication is that everything sensible is, like flesh, also sensing. This is also implied by Merleau-Ponty's statement, "When we speak of the flesh of the visible, we do not mean to do anthropology, to describe a world covered over with all our own projections, leaving aside what it can be under the human mask. Rather, we mean that carnal being ... is a prototype of Being, of which our body, the sensible sentient, is a very remarkable variant." Our body exhibits the reversibility between the sentient and the sensed. In its case, the sentient is also sensed. But we cannot say that the visible world, though sensed, is inherently sentient. To say this would be to claim, for example, that the forest that I regard also regards me.

Renaud Barbaras repeats this criticism on a more general level. He writes that the "predetermination of the subject as flesh is absolutely ruinous" when we try "to comprehend how the subject ... can be simultaneously situated on both sides of the world"—i.e., stand before it as a perceiver and within it as perceived. Thus, "there is my

flesh, i.e., my seeing body, and there is the flesh of the world, which precisely corresponds to the inscription of my flesh in the depths of the world ... but it is impossible to comprehend how the same flesh can both be facing the world [as sentient] and be at its heart, how the subject can, in the same sense, belong to the world and make it appear." Here, the appeal to flesh is no help since, as Merleau-Ponty finally recognizes in a note to his manuscript, "the flesh of the world does not sense like my flesh—it is sensible but not sensing." Given this we cannot make the move from our flesh to the flesh of the world considered as a "style of being."

There is, however, another way to conceive the intertwining, one that this book will follow. Merleau-Ponty introduces it when he discusses perceptual faith. Such faith signifies that when I see an object, I believe "my vision terminates in it, that it holds and stops my gaze with its insurmountable density." The object is out there in the world, a world that includes me as one of its visible objects. "Yet," he writes, "as soon as I attend to it, this conviction is just as strongly contested by the very fact that this vision is mine." I believe that my perception "is formed this side of the body." Thus, the very "experience of my flesh ... has taught me that perception ... emerges in the recesses of a body"—my body. Similarly, I put the perception that the other has "behind his body"—that is, in his head. Yet, we both claim that our perception terminates in something out there. In fact, we regard each other and the seeing that we engage in as both being out there among the things. As embodied, we take ourselves as present among them. Thus, each of us has to assert, "I am in the world and the world is in me." This, according to Merleau-Ponty, is our natural, perceptual faith. In his words, "The 'natural' man holds on to both ends of the chain." He lives the paradox, undisturbed by it. He thinks both that he grasps external objects and that their apprehension is within him.

The basic tenet of such belief is that our relation to world is that of a double of being-in. We are inside that which is in us. What is asserted here is more than the fact that our embodiment places us in the world, which we internalize through perception. At issue is the appearing of the world. The world appears through our embodied senses. The body is the place of its disclosure. Thus, when I close my eyes, the visual world disappears. When I open them again, it is present. My eyes provide the venues for its

appearing. Using the word tapisser, to cover, drape, line or wallpaper, Merleau-Ponty generalizes this insight. He asserts, "our flesh lines and even envelops all the visible and tangible things." Thus, we "line" the world with audio qualities through our ears, with tactile qualities through our sensitive skin, and so on. Doing so, our embodied being provides measures "for being, dimensions to which we can refer it." In other words, through our flesh, we can refer to the sensible aspects of being. We can measure it along the axes or dimensions of its sights, sounds, tastes, smells, roughness and smoothness. The world that is present through our embodiment is, however, the very world that our embodiment thrusts us into. This means, Merleau-Ponty writes, "my eyes which see, my hands which touch, can also be seen and touched ... they see and touch the visible, the tangible from within" the visible and tangible world. Similarly the flesh that "lines and even envelops" the things of this world is "nevertheless surrounded" by them. It is within the world it reveals. Thus, for Merleau-Ponty, "because our flesh lines and even envelops all the visible and tangible things with which nevertheless it is surrounded, the world and I are within one another."

This double relation of being-in justifies perceptual faith since it locates seeing beyond the immanent-transcendent divide. It places perception in the transcendent world. This does not mean that it reduces it to the anonymity of non-sentient nature. Understood as an intertwining, the relation of perceiver and perceived is not a reduction of one to the other. Thus, Merleau-Ponty, having asserted that flesh lines the world that surrounds it, adds: "and there is no anteriority of the percipere to the percipi, there is simultaneity or even retardation."63 As with hand touching hand, there is a difference. Both hands are simultaneously mine, but a delay prevents me from taking simultaneously the touching hand as touched. Similarly, the reversibility of the relation of my being in the world and the world being in me involves both simultaneity and retardation. Even though the appearing of the world demands an embodied, worldly perceiver, I cannot simultaneously regard myself as in the world and, yet as having the world in me. A delay always intervenes when I turn inward.

The conception of the intertwining as a double relation of being-in will be discussed in the chapters that follow. For the present, three points should be made regarding it. The

first is that its reversibility does not imply that the world itself is sentient. The fact that the subject is in the world makes a part of the world sentient, but such sentience does not extend to the world as a whole. The second is that the double relation is one of disclosure. Because my flesh lines the world, I serve as the place for its sensuous disclosure. I also serve as a place for its appearing through my embodied "I can." Thus, through my practical projects, I also disclose the pragmatic senses of the objects I encounter. Water, for example, appears as water to drink from or water to wash up with depending on my use of it. As we shall see, we "line" the world in all our activities thus serving, in an extended sense, as a place for the world's appearing. It is, however, equally true that the world serves as the place for our disclosure. The eyes I see with can be examined by an optometrist. Similarly, the activities I engage in, as occurring in the world, can be studied as part of it. As such examples indicate, the intertwining is not to be conceived as a physical placing in. As Merleau-Ponty writes, "We have to reject the age-old assumptions that put the body in the world and the seer in the body, or, conversely, the world and the body in the seer as in a box." My body's lining the world is not a matter of putting the world in the seer "as in a box." What we have to deal with here is rather a "reciprocal insertion and intertwining of one in the other."64 This leads to the third point, which is that this reciprocal insertion or intertwining is an ontological form. It is not a physical insertion of two things in each other, but rather a form determining the reality of the intertwined. Thus, the reality of selfhood is neither that of an observer apart from the world nor that of an inherent component of the world. It is, in fact, composed of the double relation of being in. What this signifies is that the two temporalities that characterize our being-in-the-world have to be taken as intertwined. Each is to be conceived as in the other. Each must also be thought of as disclosive of the other. The same holds of the space and time that Kant separates by distinguishing inner and outer perception. How this could be possible is a subject of the inquiries that form this book.

Patocka

Patocka's attempt to integrate consciousness with the world begins with his stress on the uniqueness of the category of appearing. He writes that appearing or "manifesting

is, in itself, something completely original." This means that "manifesting in itself, in that which makes it manifesting, is not reducible, cannot be converted into anything that manifests itself in manifesting."65 It cannot, in other words, be explained by the beings that appear; it cannot be deduced from them or their properties. This holds both for subjects and objects, taken as appearing entities. In Patocka's words, "showing itself is not any of these things that show themselves, whether it is a psychic or physical object." In fact, any attempt to derive appearing from what appears would be circular since it would necessarily presuppose appearing. As Patocka puts this: "I cannot go back to what appears to explain the appearing of appearing, since the understanding of appearing is presupposed in every thesis I might make about the appearing entity." What this signifies is that, in speaking about appearing as such, our focus is not on what is "given as a being." It is on "the givenness and modes of givenness of a being, which modes themselves cannot be designated as beings."

Appearing, then, cannot be explained in terms of any material, physical process. Equally, appearing cannot be understood in terms of "a subject whose accomplishments are phenomena." Thus, we cannot ontologize the structure of appearing and see it as the structure of a subject. This, for Patocka, was Husserl's error. He writes, in this regard:

> Perhaps the chief source of the misunderstanding of the problem of appearing as such is that we exchange or conflate the structure of appearing with the structure of what appears. To assert that there is a structure of appearing is not to assert that there exists an entity, a this-here, which one can call appearing. Appearing as such is not a being and it cannot be referred to as a being. Because he has somehow a sense of this distinction, but never explicitly draws it out, Husserl, instead of inquiring after the givenness of being—the givenness of some sort of absolute being— searches for an absolutely given being.

The reference, here, is to Husserl's absolute consciousness, the consciousness that posits the world out of the connections of its experiences. In Patocka's eyes, Husserl

subjectivized appearing by taking it as the experiences of a subject. He also ontologized it, since such experiences compose an actual subject's consciousness.

Patocka's position recalls our earlier remarks on materialism and idealism. Both fail to explain the fact of our embodied consciousness and, hence, the claims of such consciousness to apprehend the world. Idealism fails because, while accepting consciousness, it ignores the fact of its embodiment. Realism begins with this embodiment, but cannot show how consciousness arises from it. Patocka's understanding is distinct from this. He distinguishes appearing as such from consciousness. In his view, both materialism and idealism conflate appearing with consciousness and attempt to derive appearing/consciousness from what appears—be this the materiality of nature or the experiences and syntheses of an existing subject. Appearing as such, however, can be derived neither from consciousness nor the realities that appear to it. Considered in itself, it is a "world-structure." It is, according to Patocka, "the basic structure that allows the world to appear and ... makes experiential knowing possible." Prior to both subjects and objects, it informs both. It makes knowing possible because it structures our experiences and the ways we put them together. Because these are informed by the same structure that informs the realties that appear to consciousness, this world-structure serves as "a basis for the objective sciences." It, in fact, is what integrates consciousness with the world.

The crucial element in this solution is Patocka's interpretation of it in terms of motion. He writes that his goal "is a philosophy of a distinct kind, one which takes movement as its basic concept and principle ... What is distinctive about our attempt is our interpretation of movement; we understand it independently of the dichotomy between subject and object," i.e., between "on the one hand, an objective world, complete, self-enclosed, and, on the other hand, a subject perceiving this world." Prior to both is appearing as such; such appearing, however, is to be understood in terms of motion. As Patocka expresses this, "movement ... first makes this or that being apparent, causes it to manifest itself in its own original manner." The moving entity does this through affecting what surrounds it. Thus, an oscillating charged particle sets up an oscillating magnetic field, which sets up an oscillating electric field, which sets up

an oscillating magnetic field, and so on. The result is that the oscillating particle affects its environment through an expanding series of electro-magnetic waves. These waves, encountering a sentient creature with appropriate eyes, also affect its vision. Without this ability through motion to affect what surrounds it, an entity cannot distinguish itself from its environment. But without this, it has no presence either to inanimate or animate beings. In living sentient creatures, this manifests itself as experience. It forms the subjective component of appearing. The objective component is simply the physical presence that the entity has through its action. It is, for example, the depression on the pillow left by an object pressing on it.

For Patocka, the very movement through which an entity affects its environment also causes the entity to be. Its appearing or standing out from its environment has the same root as its existing. In an animate creature, this movement, on the most basic, biological level, is that of its metabolic processes. When they cease, the creature dies. In all beings, be they animate or inanimate, movement is present in the atomic, chemical, and other physical processes that make them be what they are. Everywhere, according to Patocka, "movement is what gives things the being that they are; movement is a fundamental ontological factor." What this signifies is that "movement ... is not itself a reality in the same sense as determinate realities." It is, rather, the realization of such entities—this, regardless of their determinations. As Patocka expresses this, "Movement is what makes a being what it is. Movement unifies, maintains cohesion, synthesizes the being's determinations. The persistence and succession of the determinations of a substrate, etc., are movements."76 The necessity for this doctrine is readily apparent. If appearing as such is prior to entities, the movement behind appearing must equally be prior. In other words, by taking movement as prior to the moving being, Patocka can describe appearing in terms of movement without reducing appearing to the beings that appear, i.e. without explaining it in terms of such beings.

We have here, then, three levels of integrating consciousness with the world. On the first, we conceive of appearing as a world structure, one that informs both subjects and objects. Both the subject, who is conscious of entities, and the entities, which it is aware of, instantiate this structure's formal relations. As for appearing itself, it, like its

structure, is prior to both. Entities, if they are to be sentient, have to adapt themselves to it by possessing the appropriate sense organs. If they do, then appearing will be present as their experience. Similarly, if entities are to appear, they also must be informed by the same structure. On the second level, appearing is understood in terms of motion. The structure of appearing is taken as the structure of movement; the "how" of appearing, i.e., how things show themselves is understood in terms of their motion. Here, the informing of the world by the form of appearing is understood in terms of how motion proceeds. The integration of conscious with the world is a function of the motion of sentient subjects being integrated with the motion of world. On the third level, we no longer think of motion as the motion of entities. It is, rather, understood ontologically as the realization of entities. On this level, the integration of consciousness with the world involves their common actualization. One and the same "ontological motion" is responsible for the actualization of both sides of the subject-object divide. Such actualization is also that of appearing (in the subjective sense) insofar as it involves the realization of subjects as sentient and thus as capable of having particular experiences. This, however, does not mean that appearing in its qualitative aspects can be reduced to the physical motions of a creature's sense organs and neurons. It signifies only its adaption to a particular aspect of appearing as such—an adaption that gives it access to this aspect in its qualitative features.

Barbaras' Alternative

Subsequent chapters will fill out this sketch of Patocka's position. We should, however, mention Barbaras' critique of this account. On the one hand, he takes it as representing a decisive advance over the thought of Merleau-Ponty. In his view, "this approach according to movement ... constitutes the sole satisfactory version of what Merleau-Ponty was trying to think at the end of his life under the title of the intertwining or chiasm. In other words, the mutual enveloping of the subject and the world can only be satisfactorily thought in terms of movement." This is because movement, as opposed to "flesh," is common to animate and inanimate nature. In other words, while it is "impossible to comprehend how the same flesh can both be facing the world [as sentient] and be at its heart," this does not hold for motion. This praise, however, is

combined with his question whether motion can really account for subjectivity, i.e., position it as distinct from the world. Barbaras, as we shall see, has his doubts.

His own alternative to Patocka's position involves a return to the Greek conception of nature as alive, and desire as the fundamental form of life. In advancing this position, Barbaras embraces an "ontological monism." Such monism signifies not just that "the subject is made of the same stuff as the world," but also "that there is a profound ontological continuity between the two." The basis of this community is "the primary-movement [archi-mouvement] ... of appearing," which "consists of a process of individualization by delimitation." In Patocka's terms, it is the movement that makes a being stand out, thereby differentiating the being from its environment. There is, however, a difficulty. While we can trace the subject back to this primary movement, we cannot as an ontological form. But how can we understand the latter as "flesh" without falling into the difficulties we noted? Similarly, we will be inquiring into how we could integrate Merleau-Ponty's intertwining with Patocka's conception of motion without falling into a metaphysical monism. Beyond such questions, there is also the issue of the extent of the intertwining. Can it be understood as a form informing not just our perceptual relations with the world, but also the relations we have with Others? What problems does it solve when we use it to explain our recognition of the Other? What is its role in our social and political relations? Such questions lead, in Part 4, to our relations to the transcendent and to the role the intertwining plays in our spiritual and religious involvements.

In pursuing these issues, our inquiry will exceed what can be directly drawn from Merleau-Ponty and Patocka. In part, this is because neither philosopher left us with a finished account. Due to his death from a stroke at 53, Merleau-Ponty never completed The Visible and the Invisible. As a result, he developed his conception of the intertwining only in a fragmentary manner. Patocka's exposition of appearing as such and its relation to motion was also cut short. Because of his political activities on behalf of human rights, he was subject to a lengthy eleven-hour interrogation, from which he never recovered. The inquiries that follow also exceed these author's positions in their attempt to think them together—i.e., to understand Merleau-Ponty's intertwining in

terms of Patocka's ontological motion. Equally, they go beyond them in their attempt to understand the intertwining, not just as an epistemological and ontological form, but as a political, social, and religious conception. In pursuing this goal, the following chapters are organized as inquiries. Each attempts to achieve clarity on a particular topic, this clarity being required for the inquiries that follow. What binds them together is their ultimate subject, which is ourselves in our being-in-the-world. In attempting to understand this in terms of the intertwining, our goal is to understand the relation between selfhood and appearing. <>

Engaging Thomas Merton: Spirituality, Justice, and Racism by Daniel Horan [Orbis Books, ISBN 9781626985445]

Engaging Thomas Merton is based on contemporary engagements with the work and legacy of Thomas Merton that highlight the enduring relevance of his thought in addressing the pressing concerns of our time.

Reviews

"Brings an encyclopedic knowledge of Merton's corpus into vibrant conversation with many of the best theological and spiritual minds writing today . . . In Horan's very capable hands, the wisdom of Thomas Merton continues to challenge, encourage, and enlighten the way forward in hope." —Christopher Pramuk, author, Sophia: The Hidden Christ of Thomas Merton

"Dan Horan carefully curates Merton's ideas on various issues of contemporary Christian life, including personal identity in a digital age, racial justice, and other aspects of contemporary Christian life that reflect the search for meaning and wholeness. . . . A rich and excellent resource." —Ilia Delio, OSF, Josephine C. Connelly Endowed Chair in Theology, Villanova University

"Daniel Horan offers a kaleidoscope of those Mertonian themes an d issues that continue to plague and enlighten us, made all the more relevant in the contemporary idiom of his own fresh style and insight." —Kathleen Noone Deignan, CND, PhD, founding director, Deignan Institute for Earth and Spirit, Iona University

"Engage Merton! This is what Daniel Horan is inviting readers to do. Demonstrating the cross-generational appeal, timeliness, relevance, and profound challenge of Merton's writings, Horan illuminates intersections of contemplation and prophecy, spirituality and social justice, in essays that are as informative and illuminating as they are readable. Here is a Merton course in a book!" —Christine M. Bochen, past-president, International Thomas Merton Society

"Horan captures Merton's voice of conscience screaming at us to confront the challenges of our time: racial justice in the age of Black Lives Matter, religious tolerance in the midst of religious pluralism, ecological conversion in relation to the poor and the rest of creation. It is a must-read for all people of good will." —Joseph Cheah, author, Anti-Asian Racism

CONTENTS

Thomas Merton has fascinated me for nearly my entire adult life. When asked how I became a Merton scholar, a question that inevitably surfaces when I lecture or teach a course or lead a retreat on Merton, I almost always say that, for me, "Merton is a hobby that grew out of control!" I didn't set out to become an expert in the life and writings, thought and legacy of the American Trappist monk and author. It was not planned, and it still surprises me to this day that I have and continue to spend so much time and energy studying and sharing the wisdom of Merton. Like so many readers who become interested in Merton, I started reading his work for my own spiritual nourishment. As a young man, just out of college—St. Bonaventure University, the same college at which Merton taught English literature for three semesters before entering the Abbey of Gethsemani—I was taken with Merton's own conversion story and spiritual journey as he relayed it in The Seven Storey Mountain and The Sign of Jonas. From there I found

myself reading his early books on prayer, contemplation, and the spiritual life. Books like New Seeds of Contemplation and Thoughts in Solitude became regular companions.

Over time, I came to read more and more of his extensive written corpus, not just the books on prayer but also his journals, letters, poetry, and writings on social issues. It was this last category that became especially captivating for me. Merton, who died in 1968, writes across the decades as if he were alive today, addressing many of the same issues that continue to plague our world in the twenty-first century. With a prophetic sense of accuracy and insight, Merton was able to see the world as it actually is and the world that God is calling us to become with clarity that is only possible from the vantage point of a monk on the margins, a man of faith and prayer at the periphery not only of his contemporary society but also at the periphery of his own monastic life. The more he sought solitude in his hermitage, paradoxically, the keener his sense of social criticism and the more accurate his religious response became.

While I have and continue to remain interested in and inspired by Merton's explicitly spiritual writings, especially those texts from the first two decades of his monastic journey, I have also become increasingly convicted by Merton's writings on social issues and the ongoing relevance and timeliness of his insights. I have written dozens of articles and delivered even more lectures on these themes, especially on Merton's writings on racism, violence, and contemporary Christian living. This book is a collection of some of those essays. In my previous book on Thomas Merton— The Franciscan Heart of Thomas Merton: A New Look at the Spiritual Inspiration of His Life, Thought, and Writing—I laid out a singular, constructive argument, studying the manifold ways the Franciscan spiritual and intellectual tradition informed the Trappist monk's theological vision. The format of this present book is decidedly different, offering instead a collection of both previously published essays and new contributions gathered into one volume. The inspiration for this style comes from Merton's later work itself. Although he was capable of writing monographs and books on a singular theme, Merton was also an accomplished essayist whose most important writings on racial justice, war and violence, and other social issues most often appeared as discrete essays

that were ultimately collected into volumes like Seeds of Destruction (1964), Raids on the Unspeakable (1966), and Faith and Violence: Christian Teaching and Christian Practice (1968). It seems fitting to me that my own engagement with many of Merton's contributions in the areas of social justice take a similar form.

Many of the chapters included in this volume have been previously published in an earlier form. These essays have been revised and expanded, some substantively so. Others are appearing in print for the first time in this book. These were first presented as lectures. But all these essays take as their starting point the continued relevance and insight of Merton for our times. While I have made a concerted effort to rework individual essays so that repetition could be minimized across the chapters, certain themes and details of Merton's life and work inevitably recur, although in such cases it is my hope that a new angle or perspective is added.

The chapters in this book are organized into five sections. The first section focuses on Merton's life and continued relevance, appeal, and significance. It opens with a chapter that originated as a sermon delivered on the fiftieth anniversary of his death preached at Corpus Christi Church in Manhattan, the same church where Merton was baptized in 1938. The second chapter, which first appeared as an article around the same anniversary, considers some of the ways in which Merton continues to remain relevant even fifty years after his death. Chapter 3 takes up this same theme but looks to young adults and explores why Merton offers wisdom and insight for a new generation. The section closes with a short reflection on the role Merton continues to play in bringing people together through his writings and inspiration.

The second section examines some of the ways that Merton's thought and writing provides insight into contemporary Christian life. Chapter 5 focuses on an admittedly counterintuitive theme when one considers the author's social context as a Roman Catholic monk and priest: the spirituality of marriage. The next chapter looks at young adults, specifically members of the Millennial Generation and Generation Z, and presents wisdom from Merton for navigating the spiritual journey in a digital age.

Chapter 7, the last in this section, examines the insights Merton offers to those ordained ministry in the church.

The third section, "Insights about Key Christian Virtues," examines four central themes to the Christian tradition: revelation, holiness, poverty, and love. Chapter 8 offers a study of Merton's theology of revelation with attention focused on the importance of mercy in his reflections. Chapter 9 engages the writings of Pope Francis and Merton on the subject of Christian holiness and the universal call to holiness shared by all the baptized. Chapter 10 likewise engages the writings of Pope Francis and Merton, but this time on the subject of evangelical poverty. The last chapter in this section explores a theme that is ever-present in Merton's writings, but that has not been substantively studied in Merton scholarly circles—love, and what I call "true and false love."

The fourth section turns to Merton's prophetic and prescient writings on racism and racial justice. Chapter 12 looks at how Merton's social analysis anticipated what scholars of racism would later term "interest convergence theory" and at how the Trappist monk recognized the intersection of spirituality and racial justice as essential for Christian responses to injustice. Chapter 13 considers Merton's repeated view that "racism is a white problem." While a growing amount of Merton scholarship has engaged his writings on civil rights and racial justice, very few scholars so far have explored what role Merton's whiteness played in his own perception, insight, and critique. The last chapter in this section considers the at-times-complicated relationship Merton had to two civil rights giants, Martin Luther King, Jr. and Malcolm X, and how his perspective of the latter developed in the 1960s from dismissal to admiration and respect.

The last section of this book contains essays that engage Merton's writing as a resource for thinking through contemporary questions on social justice and ethics. Chapter 15 returns to the contemporary teaching of Pope Francis on care for creation and examines the ways Merton's model of "ecological conversion"—to borrow a phrase from Laudato Si'—might offer us insight in our age of climate catastrophe. Chapter 16 explores four ways that Merton models for us what it means to be a person of dialogue.

Finally, the last chapter of this book engages Merton's thought with the contemporary philosophical and ethical thinking of John Caputo and Stanley Hauerwas to consider how these three thinkers provide us with ways to think about Christian nonviolence in our time. <>

THOMAS MERTON IN CALIFORNIA: THE REDWOODS CONFERENCES AND LETTERS by Thomas Merton OCSO, edited by David Odorisio, Preface by Douglas Christie), Foreword by Kathy DeVico OCSO [Liturgical Press, ISBN 9798400800313]

Previously unpublished material from world-renowned Trappist monk and author, Thomas Merton, featuring the final conference talks given in the United States before his untimely death.

In May and October of 1968, Thomas Merton offered two extended conferences at Our Lady of the Redwoods Abbey, a Cistercian women's community in Northern California. Comprising over twenty-six hours of previously unpublished material, *Thomas Merton in California* covers a variety of topics including ecology and consciousness, yoga and Hinduism, Native American ritual and rites of passage, Sufi spirituality, and inter-religious dialogue, along with extended discussions on prayer and the contemplative life.

The material presented in these talks reveals Merton's wide-ranging intellectual and spiritual pursuits in the final year of his life, and fills a long-standing lacuna around Merton's visits to Redwoods Monastery, forming a necessary bridge to the Asian journey that was to come. Practical and applicable, as well as searching and inspired, *Thomas Merton in California* is essential for Merton readers and scholars, and all those interested in deepening their spiritual lives.

Review

"As one of the . . . participants of the [October] 1968 Redwoods Conferences, I can sum up the atmosphere of those days in one word: electrified—and this in every respect . . . even the most

mundane exchange seemed to be charged with high voltage. *Thomas Merton in California* gives readers the privilege to sense for themselves the formidable creative charge of those encounters as if they were there. What higher praise could there be for this book?"
Br. David Steindl-Rast, OSB, monk, author, co-founder of grateful.org
Published On: 2023-04-11

"What a marvelous, unexpected gift! These series of informal talks to a cherished community of Cistercian women and later to a small group of their invited guests, along with related materials, sparkle and inspire with Thomas Merton's characteristic insight, humor and wisdom. Expertly introduced and edited by David Odorisio, this volume presents Merton at the top of his form and fills a gap we didn't even know existed in the literary record of the final months of his life."
Patrick F. O'Connell, Editor, *Thomas Merton: Selected Essays*
Published On: 2023-08-02

"This is a significant, well-annotated exhibition of the monk's nuanced massage of 1960s consciousness experiments mere months before his death in Thailand. David M. Odorisio, the astute editor of the recent magisterial *Merton & Hinduism*, represents a new wave of scholarly contemplatives who explore Merton's strategic inner work to transcend himself in service and witness to the global communities of those who pray. Odorisio lays out evidence of Merton's having lost his 'self' forward through deeper inner experiences of solitude and community. Merton beacons hope that all divisions of our true and false selves will disappear at last into a universal matrix of love."
Jonathan Montaldo, *Bridges to Contemplative Living with Thomas Merton*
Published On: 2023-08-04

"With fresh, astute editing, Odorisio offers us a powerful entry into Merton's post-Vatican II thinking about human consciousness that reveals Merton's deep sense of play, spiritual honesty, and belief in the 'cosmic community of creatures.' These 1968 Redwood Conferences and letters to Mother Myriam Dardenne, OCSO, that created an 'alleluia experience' for Merton are now, for the first time, available to contemporary readers. Promise yourself a thorough and engaging reading."
Dr. Monica Weis, SSJ, Professor Emerita of English, Nazareth University Published On: 2023-

08-16

"Merton was at his best in informal settings. This newly published material provides examples: two sets of talks to monastics and two collections of letters both in his *ipsissima verba*. Edited with intelligence, warmth, and clear documentation, the book makes some of his last, most important teaching on prayer widely available. It is an important contribution to Merton primary sources."
Bonnie Thurston, author of *Shaped By the End You Live For: Thomas Merton's Monastic Spirituality*
Published On: 2023-08-23

"With *Thomas Merton in California*, expertly edited by David M. Odorisio, we have the mature Merton of 1968 speaking on prayer, spirituality, and interfaith dialogue, along with other areas of concern for him at that time. Merton's previously unavailable talks to the community at Our Lady of the Redwoods from May and October 1968 will appeal to seekers everywhere as he tells the sisters, quite simply yet profoundly, 'The great thing is prayer. Prayer itself . . . if you want a life of prayer, the way to get it is by praying.' These talks, given just days before his departure for Asia and weeks before his untimely death, show Merton's deep rootedness in the monastic tradition and his Catholic faith, while still being open to other faith traditions and becoming, as he tells the sisters, 'as good a Buddhist as I can.'"
Paul M. Pearson, Director, Thomas Merton Center Published On: 2023-08-23

"The young man who thought of himself as a contemplative in Greenwich Village now comes full circle after decades of monastic life to the crucible of contemporary culture and thought in northern California, not only with his dear friends at Redwoods Monastery, but in his jaunts into San Francisco, jazz clubs and Beat bookstores. The conferences contained here are more like conversations that Merton initiates, and you can almost hear the restless Trappist breathless with excitement about the future, particularly his own. To read *Thomas Merton in California* is more like listening in, not only to his dizzyingly wide-ranging erudition but on candid descriptions of his own daily life as a solitary that do well to shatter the romantic illusions of hermit life. A profoundly intimate and fascinating glimpse into one of the greatest minds and most important voices of the twentieth century."
Cyprian Consiglio, OSB Cam, author of *Prayer in the Cave of the Heart* and *Spirit, Soul, Body*

Published On: 2023-08-24

"Here we hear Merton in his own voice—candid, uncensored, heartfelt—as he explores human consciousness through lenses of Christian, Hindu, Sufi, and Zen mysticism. We owe David M. Odorisio a debt of gratitude for his artfully crafted introduction to the landscape and spirit of Redwoods, judiciously edited transcriptions of Merton's talks and letters, and informative yet unobtrusive annotation. This book is a treasure—informative and inspiring! It will touch reader's minds and hearts!"
Christine M. Bochen, Professor Emerita of Religious Studies at Nazareth University, Rochester, New York
Published On: 2023-08-28

"Both nostalgic and poignant, for the first time ever, Odorisio makes available the final conferences given by Merton at Redwoods monastery in the Lost Coast of California just months before his fateful journey East. Odorisio's editing—nuanced and subtle—literally 'holds space' for an uncensored Merton to speak anew with a timeless relevance that is as uncanny as it is prophetic. This volume fills an essential gap on the ruminations of a mature Merton across a breadth of subjects as relevant in 1968 as they are now. The world of Merton scholarship is indebted to Odorisio for bringing these conferences to light. Simply brilliant!"
The Rev. Vincent Pizzuto, University of San Francisco, author of *Contemplating Christ: The Gospels and the Interior Life* Published On: 2023-09-20

"This book, for the first time, makes those conferences available in transcription form. They are easy to read and important to digest, for Merton enthusiasts but also for anyone passionate about interfaith and interspiritual learning and discovery today."
Spirituality and Practice Published On: 2024-01-10

CONTENTS

The material in this book came out of two visits that Thomas Merton made to Our Lady of the Redwoods Abbey in 1968. The first visit was in May when Merton spoke to the

monastic community, having been asked by the abbess, Mother Myriam Dardenne, to give the sisters their annual retreat. The second visit was in October just before Merton was flying to Asia, where he was to give a talk in Bangkok and where his untimely death occurred. The context of this second visit was a gathering of religious women and men who were interested in contemplative prayer, specifically how to deepen in this prayer form.

Why Redwoods? What was the background that preceded these two important encounters at Redwoods Monastery? To answer these questions, we need to return to the foundation of the abbey. Redwoods was founded in stages; three groups each of four sisters came at different times over the course of a year, and by different modes of travel. The first group of four sisters included the founding abbess, Mother Myriam, and three other sisters. Because they were coming from Belgium, a European culture, they wanted to get an experience, even if ever so brief, of monastic life lived in the United States. Thus, on their journey to the West Coast they visited several monasteries.

This first group of four left their monastery of Our Lady of Nazareth on October 9, 1962, just as the Second Vatican Council was beginning. They traveled by boat, taking the Rotterdam from the Netherlands to Ellis Island in New York. They visited Mount Saint Mary's Abbey in Wrentham, Massachusetts, Saint Joseph's Abbey in Spencer, Massachusetts, Holy Cross Abbey in Berryville, Virginia, and finally, Gethsemani Abbey in Kentucky. The visit to Gethsemani was providential. One evening they had supper with a monk named Fr. Louis. At the beginning they were not aware that this monk was "Thomas Merton" Nonetheless, the relation began from this initial encounter. Merton was fascinated by the mysticism of the Low Countries, and this awakened his interest in the new foundation. As their correspondence shows, this meeting over a meal was the beginning of a relationship that grew over time, especially between Mother Myriam and Merton.

By 1968, Gethsemani had a new abbot who allowed Merton to take several outside commitments. Merton accepted the invitation from Mother Myriam to come to Redwoods. The talks that ensued in both May and October were recorded. Reels and

reels of recordings were stored in the archives of Redwoods, untouched until this time. A friend of the monastery had these old reels transferred onto CDs, as well as digitized. In the summer of 2021, another providential encounter occurred, when David o dorisio visited Redwoods. It became immediately clear that David had the expertise, the spiritual depth, and editorial skills and sensitivity to transcribe this material and put it into book form. I have nothing but praise for David and trust in his integrity. He obviously has a deep connection with Merton and his passion has been evident each step of the way.

About the material itself: the literary style does not make for an easy read. What do I mean? The talks are not written out conferences. Merton prepared his talks ahead of time and had voluminous notes; however, the presentation format is dialogical. The participants are encouraged to interrupt and ask their questions or offer their comments during each session. The weakness of this approach is that often a certain depth is missing in the topics that Merton is speaking about. What is clear, however, is that Merton was at home with the community. There is abundant laughter throughout his presentations, and one gets a tangible sense of the relaxed nature of these meetings. Merton's impromptu manner reveals his human side, which brings a balance to his intellectual and theological depth. The relaxed atmosphere also allows Merton to have a sense of freedom, where he could be himself and not worry about having his words critiqued by outside reviewers.

What stands out in his talks was how informed he was of other religions: Sufism, Native American rituals, and Hinduism, especially the various forms of yoga. Merton's interest in other religions was prophetic for Catholicism, and his trip to Asia was the final statement of his openness to other religions. He was in many ways a forerunner of monastic interreligious dialogue. He remained clearly rooted in Christ. His whole theological and anthropological approach came out of this life in

His study of these other religions, including Buddhism, only deepened

his monastic life and left us a source of rich religious and spiritual teaching. Added to this was how the wisdom and theological underpinnings of these other religions served to deepen his own Christianity.

Obviously, Merton scholars will be very interested in this material since it was so close to Merton's death. However, I would encourage those readers who are not scholars to imagine themselves as part of these retreat gatherings, anxious to hear what Merton has to say about contemplative prayer, about how God is manifested in our humanity. The following excerpt from the beginning of his conferences in May surely draws the reader into this interactive gathering of monastic and spiritual seekers. It speaks of the human person's capacity for God (capax Dei), the capacity to embody the life of Christ, the gospel horizon where God's love is the force of healing, transformation, and forgiveness. This stunning statement puts in bas-relief the immediate and end goal of the spiritual life:

The fundamental, deepest thing that man has found is himself, his true self. Which is in God. Because in finding his true self, he finds God. He finds the root; he finds the ground. And that is because man is a very peculiar kind of being. Man is the being in whose consciousness God manifests Himself. In a certain sense, man is delegated by God to be God's consciousness of Himself in a creature. Man has the vocation to be conscious as creature of his Ground in God, and in such an intimate way that when man confesses and witnesses to his rootedness in God, it is God Himself who is confessing and witnessing this.'

The historical period in which Merton offered these words is not so different from the times in which we find ourselves today. May these conferences as a whole offer a hopeful reminder of our common vocation and of the ultimate rootedness of our "Ground in God."

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With the appearance of this collection of Merton's Redwoods talks, we have an opportunity to take an even closer look into this important last chapter of his life and

to gain access, in a way that is quite distinct from the literary form of his journals or from his correspondence during this time, to how his thinking was unfolding in "real time" at a critical juncture of his life. Here in this rich and intimate dialogical space, he was often thinking out loud, testing ideas, pushing himself to understand better what it might mean to strip contemplative thought and practice down to its essentials. He was also clearly enjoying himself.

Readers will certainly notice this sense of enjoyment on almost every page; the word "laughter"—placed in brackets by the editor—appears frequently and is just one indication of how often the proceedings slowed or even halted so that those gathered could catch up with the intended or unintended humor provoked by Merton's often wry or whimsical observations. The talks themselves take up a number of serious subjects—the state of contemporary monastic life; prayer, freedom, and doubt; alienation; mystical consciousness; interreligious dialogue; and social and environmental concerns. But the climate of the talks was open, informal, exploratory, and marked by a deep sense of play. This also means that the discourse is not infrequently free-form and occasionally diffuse, retaining the distinctive, rambling charm of the original conversations but sometimes requiring patience and understanding from the reader. Still, I would suggest that much of the value to be found in these talks, and the thought that emerges from them, is rooted in this playful, open climate of inquiry.

Even so, one might well ask how much there is to be gained from listening in on these conversations among monks, nuns, and others gathered in this monastic space at a specific moment in time in the spring and fall of 1968. Is there anything original or important about the content of the talks themselves? How much can we really learn in the year 2023 from reflections on, say "Modern Consciousness," or "The Origins of Modern Consciousness," rooted in the very specific intellectual and cultural assumptions of the 1960s? Or rather, how much of this material can we reasonably expect will still speak to us in this moment? That is, I think, a fair question, and one that I found myself asking from time to time as I read through this manuscript. Other readers may also find themselves struggling with this. Even so, as my earlier comments

regarding the talk entitled here "Life in Prayer" suggest, many of the questions posed in these conferences remain very much alive for us today. And the honesty and depth with which Merton and his interlocutors engage these questions is both refreshing and encouraging.

Often while reading this work, I found myself captivated, as I have been so many times before in reading Merton's work, by his deeply personal and inimitable style of thinking, by the freedom, openness, and spontaneity that have always characterized his best writing and which are on such vivid display here. One does not have to agree with the particular ideas he presents in this or that conference to appreciate the care and attention and sense of spiritual honesty he brings to his inquiry. These have always been characteristic features of Thomas Merton's best writing and thinking. Here, they are enhanced and deepened by the dialogical character of these conferences; often he is responding to particular questions of those who were present at these gatherings, questions almost always arising from a sense of real existential urgency.

So too with Merton's responses. In this sense, the depth of "spirit" in the exchanges between Merton and his interlocutors often counts for as much as the particular ideas being expressed. Listening in on these exchanges during a historical moment when political and cultural differences (in society and in the church) sometimes make it feel almost impossible for us to communicate with one another openly and in a spirit of genuine dialogue, these conferences help remind us of what is still possible.

More than fifty years on, the Redwoods Monastery community continues to follow the ancient Christian monastic way with depth and integrity. Merton sensed these qualities during the time he spent with the community in 1968 and commented on it often. And this is something about these conferences that is also worth lifting up and appreciating: they are not only of a particular time but also of a specific place. These talks took place not just anywhere, but here in this women's Cistercian monastery, founded in the early 1960s by sisters from Belgium, and which slowly, over time, became inculturated within the redwood forests of Northern California.

It is difficult to miss the spirit of the place in these conferences. It shines through in so many ways—in the distinctive ecological character of the place that so often informs the mood and feeling of the conversation that unfolds here; in the courage and openness of this vibrant community of women who play an essential role in this work of shared inquiry; and in the silence infusing and grounding everything. As readers and seekers, we are invited to listen carefully and attentively—to the silence, to words and thought arising from it, and to the deep currents of Spirit moving through it. Perhaps we can add our own voices to a conversation that is, after all, continuing to unfold among us. <>

Puruṣa: Personhood in Ancient India by Matthew I. Robertson [Oxford University Press, ISBN 9780197693605]

Personhood is central to the worldview of ancient India. Across voluminous texts and diverse traditions, the subject of the *puruṣa*, the Sanskrit term for "person," has been a constant source of insight and innovation. Yet little sustained scholarly attention has been paid to the precise meanings of the *puruṣa* concept or its historical transformations within and across traditions. In Puruṣa: Personhood in Ancient India, Matthew I. Robertson traces the history of Indic thinking about *puruṣas* through an extensive analysis of the major texts and traditions of ancient India.

Through clear explanations of classic Sanskrit texts and the idioms of Indian traditions, Robertson discerns the emergence and development of a sustained, paradigmatic understanding that persons are deeply confluent with the world. Personhood is worldhood. *Puruṣa* argues for the significance of this "worldly" thinking about personhood to Indian traditions and identifies a host of techniques that were developed to "extend" and "expand" persons to ever-greater scopes. Ritualized swellings of sovereigns to match the extent of their realm find complement in ascetic meditations on the intersubjective nature of perceptually delimited person-worlds, which in turn find complement in yogas of sensory restraint, the dietary regimens of Ayurvedic medicine, and the devotional theologies by which persons "share" and "eat" the expansive divinity of God. Whether in the guise of a king, an ascetic, a yogi, a buddha, or a patient in the care of an Ayurvedic physician, fully realized

persons know themselves to be coterminous with the horizons of their world.

Offering new readings of classic works and addressing the fields of religion, politics, philosophy, medicine, and literature, *Puruṣa: Personhood in Ancient India* challenges us to reexamine the goals of ancient Indian religions and yields new insights into the interrelated natures of persons and the worlds in which they live.

Review

"Thinking precisely and clearly about personhood and its relationship to the worldhood is important.' This golden thread runs through the whole of this fascinating book that examines the social, philosophical, and religious understandings of puruṣa through Indian history. From deepest antiquity to the mid-first millennium, Robertson explores the very different evolutions of the central concept of personhood through the great traditions of Indian reflection and belief. This is a nuanced and sophisticated series of reflections on one of the most important and continuous themes in South Asian thought." -- Dominik Wujastyk, Singhmar Chair in Indian Society and Polity, University of Alberta

"This magnificent, groundbreaking study of the ancient Indian category of puruṣa, the Indian 'person,' sweeps us into a world where the dimensions of inner and outer, and body and cosmos, collapse. Also collapsing are several received notions concerning Indian metaphysics." -- David Gordon White, Author of *The Yoga Sutra of Patanjali: A Biography*

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> all ten-hundred of his steeds are yoked. —Brhadaranyaka Upanisad
> This person is the same measure as the world. —Caraka Samhita

Personhood

In the Spring of 2017, the High Court of the state of Uttarakhand issued a decision (since stayed by India's Supreme Court) granting the status of legal personhood to the Ganges and Yamuna rivers.' In effect, the rivers and their surrounding ecologies were granted legal protections and rights to representation in response to harms caused by polluters, especially by corporate entities. The logic undergirding the court's decision was complex, relying on long-standing traditions of English common law, recent declarations regarding the personhood of entities like corporations and trade unions, and prior legal decisions in India that granted legal personhood to murtis-the ritually enlivened "manifestations" of gods and goddesses housed as statues in Hindu temples. It also drew from long-standing religious and cultural traditions, declaring that the rivers are a source of both "spiritual and physical sustenance" for all the peoples of India.

Legal decisions of a similar import, contributing to the progress of the environmental personhood movement, have been reached in New Zealand, Bolivia, Ecuador, and in certain parts of the United States. And yet some measure of uncertainty and discomfort remains regarding these decisions, precisely because they throw the issue of personhood into question. Rivers may be persons in a legal sense, but are they really persons in a way comparable to ourselves? What does this mean for them? For us?

Thinking about personhood is difficult. The trouble arises because personhood—the fact or quality of being a person—refers us to something that is so immediate to our experience, so intimate to our existence, that we often find ourselves at a loss for words. There is a certainty that we are persons, but also a vagueness as to what this means. To say simply that a person is an individual, a self, a body, or a human being doesn't necessarily clarify matters. And yet we are pressed to rise above this persistent obscurity insofar as personhood continually announces itself as a fundamental issue in matters legal, medical, biological, ethical, cultural, sociological, anthropological, philosophical, and theological. As a result, the concept of the person, like the issue of personhood, is at once over- and underdetermined. The veritable glut of arguments about the nature of personhood—scholarly or otherwise—attests to both our keen interest in asserting what it is and our continual need to reassess it.

Scholarly work on the subject of personhood in Indic religious traditions has thus far not been so prolific, largely because the subject of the self has (for good reasons) taken center stage. Personhood is often subsumed by selfhood, but this has arguably distracted scholars from considering the distinctive significance of Indic approaches to personhood in their own right. The neglect is all the more surprising given the fact that Indic sources clearly share an abiding and fundamental concern with the nature of the person and with personhood in general. This is evident in the sustained attention paid to the purusa concept. which is also the surest Sanskrit cognate to the English "person."

The purusa concept accedes to a position of fundamental importance in Brahmanical thought through the famed Purusa Sukta of the Rgveda (RV), the "Song of the Person" (RV 10.90). Here, a primordial, cosmogonic Person—possessed of "a thousand heads, a thousand eyes, and a thousand feet (or shadows)"—produces the multiplicity of existence through his own sacrificial dismemberment. Roughly coeval with this late Rgvedic hymn are two other songs to the person that were recorded in an early layer of the "popular" tradition of the Atharvaveda (AV). There, the purusa is strikingly more human, though he is "possessed" (a + vis) by cosmic and divine forces who have settled into his body "like cows into a cow stall." From this point in history forward, the uses of the purusa concept typically follow this dual designation in referring to either (or

sometimes simultaneously) the mortal (and male) human being or the ultimate cosmic reality. It is in this manner a deeply felt concern in many Indic sources (especially orthodox Brahmanical sources) to determine the nature of the relationship between the mortal human person and the Person as the originary "macranthropic" cosmos.? This in turn signals a fundamental concern with the nature of the relation between the human person and the world in which his existence takes place. In other words, Indian traditions have long argued that to think about personhood is also to think about the world, which, since the time of the Purusa Sukta at least, has been otherwise known simply as the "Person."

Persons, Selves, and Others

This conflation of person and world is closely related to another, deeply significant dimension of Indic thinking about personhood, namely its inherent relation to the notion of Otherness. We see this theme explored most impactfully in a series of scholarly works from the last half century. First, McKim Marriott's highly influential investigation of social transactions in Hindu culture shows the "divisibility of the person," in the sense that his personhood is inseparable from "what goes on between" himself and other actors. Marriott urges us to think of a person as a "dividual" rather than an individual, an open psychophysical being constituted by the transactional give-and-take of "substance codes," especially those determined by one's social status (varna) or position within the four stages of life (asrama). Yet though his insights are most directly involved with issues of caste and the kind of personhood that human social relationships form in South Asian contexts, the same logic, Marriott notes, is found in the medical texts of Ayurveda, where it extends to the total milieu of a person's involvements.9 The person stands not as an isolatable embodied presence but as a network of direct and indirect engagements, thoroughly intersubjective and interactive, not merely human, but rather worldwide.

David G. White writes similarly that the person, "as constructed in South Asian ways of knowing is a highly permeable, open system, bristling with conduits through which it transacts with other bodies, persons or selves." Yogis, in his study, are persons who have achieved a special mastery of these systems and their conduits. They actively

operationalize the intersubjective network of beings within their reach, rendering others into selves and uniting masses of beings, acting as both one and many persons. The conduits that they transit are especially those involved in perception, which in Indic traditions extend outward as sunbeam-like "rays" that touch and give shape to the world. Personhood, in this understanding, is delimited by the contours of perceptual habits, while yogis are those who cultivate a uniquely expansive personhood by directing their rays to things near and far, seen and unseen. They traverse these rays and take up residence in multiple sites. They become thoroughly confluent with the otherness that typically stands as obverse to the body, person, or self, as a result of which the precise "identity of the yogi remains an enigma."

But it must be added that the categories of body, person, and self, though contiguous and overlapping in complex ways, tend to remain distinctive. Frederick Smith, in his seminal investigation of possession phenomena in South Asian traditions, builds on the work of Marcel Mauss and Thomas Csordas to carefully distinguish self from person. The self, he suggests, is "often, though far from always, conceptually sedimented within [the] person." Person and self are thus often mutually constitutive; "self' indicates a metaphysical substrate, whereas "person" indicates the recognizable objectification thereof. "But the person," he continues, is "closer to the world and its vicissitudes than the self, [and thus] is more easily subjected than the self to shifts and modalities of objectification." Speaking to the view that I will develop here, Smith resumes,

> In other words, depending on the immediate and ever-shifting coloring of perception conferred by local context, a person is the sum total and unified representation of all autonomic and conceptual systems operating within an individual.... The individual is systemic, with a collocation and hierarchy of autonomic, ethical, perceptual, and conceptual systems.

The person is thus not a "metaphysical residue," as the self is often conceived, but an entity of continuous variation that, by this characteristic, exceeds the self. It "contains within itself antinomies" that are not merely conceptual, but also practical or even physical, especially in the manner that personhood subsumes the changing world within its contours. To consider personhood in the absence of such extended contexts

and contours is thus to risk losing sight of its (often, though not always evident) distinctiveness from the self and its close relationship to the Otherness of the broader world.

The weight of these insights urges us to be heedful of the uniqueness of Indic thinking about persons, selves, and others, so that we may not fall into the easy habit of thinking of persons as basically the same as bodies, individuals, or selves. The present work aims to further develop the research on Indic personhood and its inherent relation to Otherness through a focused examination of the person concept (purusa) as it develops and transforms across texts spanning the Vedic period and the end of the pre-Classical period (c. 1500 bce-400 ce). From the very start, a prevalent approach to the purusa has been to highlight his characteristic indiscreteness, his inability to be coherently distinguished from Otherness, both spatially and temporally. This is, as I will put it, indicative of a fundamentally expansive or extensional understanding of personhood in ancient India. That is, the openness of the person to Otherness is due to the fact that he—and a person is nearly universally presumed male in these contexts—is "spread" or "stretched outward" in such a manner that he fills the phenomenal totality of his existence. As this idea develops, it becomes apparent that he is fundamentally interwoven with the phenomenal realities of others, that all of these worlds are circumscribed especially by the horizons of perception, and that herein lies a key to one's happiness, health, power, and spiritual fate. Out of this arises a whole series of practices and teachings that are aimed at developing the person's capacity to extend and expand not simply into, but as the world, so that he may master and, in a sense, embody this Otherness that a person is. This person-based understanding of the world and its Otherness runs like a brilliant thread through the tapestry of early India's traditions. The manners in which it appears in thought and practice, which form the central subject of this study, suggest a paradigmatic axiom, personhood = worldhood. By considering personhood in this manner I hope to avoid, or at least productively reframe, the spatial and dualistic tendencies expressed in discourses on selves and others, and to highlight instead a more idiomatic understanding of the category of the person that is expressed in so many of the early sources of Indian traditions.

Body Cosmos

The epigrams provided at the opening of this chapter are representative of the idiomatic modes by which this axiom is expressed. It will therefore be beneficial to pause and consider one of them, taken from the Brhadaranyaka Upanisad's (BAU) "Honey Doctrine" (madhu-vidya), more deeply. According to this doctrine, a purusa is discernible in various constituents of the human body (an adhyatma purusa) which corresponds to a purusa discernible in various constituents of the world-at-large. So, for instance, "this immortal, shining purusa that is in the waters and, with respect to the body, the immortal, shining purusa that is in semen—this is verily he who is this self (atman); this is immortal, this is brahman, this is the whole." Fire corresponds in the same manner with speech, wind with breath, humanity with the human, and so on in a long series corresponding purusa pairs. The significance of these correspondences—their meaning and function as opposed to their bare structure—is forcefully expressed in the final conclusion that, in truth, the purusa is the "fort-dweller (purisaya) in all the forts," who equally and unitarily dwells throughout the diversity of embodied selves in the broader cosmos. Hence, this purusa "is the immortal; it is brahman; it is the Whole;" and it is "this atman here who perceives everything." This the Honey Doctrine otherwise puts in terms derived from an older Vedic model, signaling the Upanisad's understanding of the connection between the Vedic characterization of the god Indra and the purusa concept: "His likeness became every form to reveal the form that is his. By his magic powers Indra travels in many forms; all ten-hundred of his steeds are yoked."

The conceptualization of personhood in Indic traditions frequently meets with this kind of talk that blurs the lines between person, self, and world. It is moreover precisely through the recognition of this person's true nature—here deemed brahman, the Upanisadic absolute whose name signifies, in a most literal sense, the "power of expansion"—that a human expands to the same scope, becoming the world-sized purusa that "perceives everything." As that which is refracted and reflected throughout all sites of manifestation, as the "fort-dweller in all forts," the person is at once subject, object, and the agent that animates and exercises both, the self and its other.

We see the same basic idea expressed in the Purusa Sukta, where the primordial Purusa is both the cosmic sacrifice, its sacrificed victim, and the sacrificer. It is he whose apportionment generates the diversity of the cosmos and he who is recuperated as a cosmic unity through that apportionment; and therefore it is he who "is truly the whole world, what has been and what is yet to be." Likewise, Ayurveda's Caraka Samhita (a treatise that I will argue draws significantly from the Brahmanical conception of the cosmos as an ongoing sacrifice) conceives of person and world, subject and object, according to their simultaneity when it states, "this purusa is the same measure as the world." In such manners, the other-ing of the self and the self-ing of the other is also the world-ing of the person. So conceived, in myriad manners and toward a multitude of conceptions about the goal of religious practice, the uses of the purusa concept tend to paint a picture of reality as an overlapping of interwoven and intersubjective worlds, arising and receding throughout time and space.

This framing of things will aid us in thinking not only about persons, selves, and others but also about bodies as they are represented in Indic discourses. I contend that our attention to bodies in Indic traditions can be contextualized and made more intelligible through the analysis of the person concept and its relation to worldhood.

The sources I will deal with here repeatedly convey that physical bodies are a part of persons, but they should not be mistaken for persons themselves. A body is an open system, transacting with the world. Arno Bohler describes the Indic body as "the local site of world-wide planes inhabiting a body; bodies do never merely exist at a stable, solid place within space and time. Rather they do exist. . . a priori in touch with the environment they are surrounded by." We are called, therefore, to problematize our notions of bodily interiors or exteriors, and to reckon with the deeply felt need in these traditions to transform the openness and immediacy of personhood, to improve its scope and comprehension.

Navigating this need through speech, ritual, or other forms of praxis requires the deployment of methods that circumvent and problematize an everyday understanding of bodies and their relationship to persons. One of the most frequently used rhetorical

strategies, of which many examples will appear throughout these pages, relies on a language of correlations, connections, and correspondences. Such language is typically the basis of assertions that the person is a microcosm, or "little world," which replicates in some fashion or another the macrocosmos. This replication typically takes place within the physical body, fostering the impression that herein rests all that one need know or engage with. Visions of closed-eyed meditators naturally arise, quiescent and peacefully escaping from the drudgery of the world to attain a specifically "inner" kind of enlightenment. The thought of such persons being deeply involved in pursuits like politics, family life, rituals, the pursuit of wealth, or the worldly knowledge of the sciences can seem antithetical as a result. The inner landscape of the little world is, after all, not just a place of escape but also a means of surmounting this world to accede to a wholly other condition that places one above and beyond the regular cosmic order.

This all may work well for some strands of Indic tradition. The dualistic, world-escaping, and isolative systems of Patanjali's Yoga and Isvarakrsna's Samkhya come quickly to mind, both of which posit the purusa as identical to individual consciousness, "eternally cut off from matter and other selves—a pure spirit apparently trapped in the material world." These systems mark the beginnings of what we now think of as "Classical era" forms of Indic thought and practice. But quite obviously there is tension between them and the open and expansive view of persons I sketched above. To be sure, some strands of Indic tradition historically sought escape from the world and so treated personhood as somehow unworldly. But this was not universally or always the case. Indeed, as I will argue here, throughout the roughly two thousand years preceding the Classical era dualisms of Patanjali and Isvarakrsna, it was far more common to find those who sought to take hold of and harness the world in ever greater expanses. Such traditions consistently portray persons as deeply entwined not only with the little, inner world of the body but also, and more fundamentally, with the world in and through which their existence occurs. The language of correlations and correspondences would, therefore, amount to a teaching tool. The form of the lesson is one thing, the object of the lesson quite different.

Accepting this possibility means questioning the persistent reliance on microcosm-oriented readings of correlational language. As others have noted, there is no Sanskrit term meaning "little world." Of Greek origin, the notion of the microcosm has had a long and fluid history, signifying a great many things to a great many people. Though perhaps not always to India. The first verifiably authentic use of the term appears in Aristotle's Physics. There he investigates the origins of motion and activity in the cosmos, reflecting briefly on the microcosm theory, according to which motion arises more or less spontaneously, like a sleeping person waking up. As below, so above. But he finds the theory lacking, precisely because a true microcosm should have the self-sufficiency to animate itself, whereas it is apparent that a person is (a) never really motionless while asleep and (b) in truth animated continuously by a vast network of external forces (culminating in the impulses of a single unmoved mover). This leaves us to wonder just how accepted it was among the Greeks of Aristotle's day to consider the human being a microcosm. Indeed, there is evidence that the medical traditions of Greece, Hippocratic or otherwise, preferred a "macranthropic" view of nature to a microcosmic view of the human body.29 Both Aristotle and early Greek physicians, in other words, encouraged us to understand the human person as part of larger networks of forces and substances, deeply enmeshed in expansive milieus. They echo in this way the early and prevailing Indic understanding of persons as worlds, leaving us to further wonder if perhaps this was actually the more commonly accepted paradigm from the Mediterranean to the Gangetic plane.

Regardless, the West was where the microcosm was destined to reach canonical, paradigmatic stature. In the 3rd century ce, the Neo-Platonic philosopher Plotinus famously sought the same unmoved mover posited by Aristotle centuries prior in order to probe the relationship between the One and the Many. He determined that the One is present in the Many in the guise of the intellect (nous). Consequently, the person is a microcosm of the macrocosmos because it thinks.

Thanks to early Church figures like Saint Augustine (an avowed Neo-Platonist before his conversion), Plotinus's thinking person would significantly shape the contours of Catholic thought. The soul was cast as the rational part of a person, virtually cementing

the intellectualization, internalization, and spiritualization (a dematerialization and disworlding) of the human. So established within theology, the notion of the human microcosm spread through both Catholic and Islamic cultures of higher learning. For centuries, it spread across disciplines, continually morphing, but always asserting the replication of something "out there" within the human person.3° It was famously upheld by Aquinas in the 13th century ce, Nicholas of Cusa in the 15th, Giordano Bruno in the 16th, and many others before, after, and in-between who continued to wrestle with the paradox of the One and the Many and the relative natures of the human, the universe, and God.

During the European Renaissance, sped along by a culture of exploration and experimentation, the microcosm paradigm achieved a kind of universal significance, stretched well beyond its original philosophical and theological roots. "An extensive treatment of this complex of ideas," Robert Zwijnenberg writes, "and its manifestations in intellectual currents such as magic and the occult, philosophy of nature, morals, and ethics would amount to an exhaustive study of Renaissance thought as a whole, to such a degree was this notion the motor of the intellectual life of that period." Men like Paracelsus, a theorist and practitioner of medicine, astrology, and alchemy, turned to the microcosm paradigm in search of a grand unification of knowledge. Medical treatises began to regularly contain sketches of the "Zodiac Man," a kind of astrological map of the human body that guided physicians regarding the proper time to let blood or perform surgery. Isaac Newton., whose Principia effectively completed the scientific revolution begun by Copernicus a century prior, ushered the microcosm paradigm into the new era of science through his interest in the alchemical holy grail, the philosopher's stone. He produced a translation of the Emerald Tablet, a foundational Hermetic text of supposedly Egyptian heritage and dubious antiquity32 that summarized a more extensive alchemical teaching on the "work of the Sun." Its first lines, often cited as a perfect encapsulation of the microcosm theory, read: "Tis true without lying, certain and most true. That which is below is like that which is above and that which is above is like that which is below to do the miracles of one only thing."

The microcosm paradigm was transposed into the field of Indology in the mid-19th century through a complicated set of interactions between medical and esoterically oriented trends of thought. The popularization of perennialistic doctrines through the efforts of groups like Blavatsky and Olcott's Theosophical Society played an especially important role in generalizing the microcosm paradigm to Indic traditions. However, the likely terminus a quo for the use of "microcosm" with specific reference to Indic traditions is to be found in Thomas A. Wise's 1845 ethnomedical study Commentary on the Hindu System of Medicine. Wise believed that "Hindu medicine" was historically distinct and geographically isolated from that of the Greeks, but nevertheless refers to "the body, or microcosm" three times in the course of his analysis. This was essentially du jour. Western medical texts throughout this period were rife with microcosm references of just this sort, though they were soon to become irrelevant and outdated. The West was beginning to move away from the microcosm paradigm and toward the worldviews of modern science and technology, but the same was not to be the case in the bourgeoning field of Indology.

As the discipline of Indology developed, leading up to the present day, the microcosm paradigm came to signify a number of different things—the connections of the Brahmanas; the correlations of the Upanisads; the humoral physiology of the Ayurvedic patient; the cakras, nadis, and so on of the subtle body in the traditions of Yoga and Tantra. For each, the precise boundaries, contents, and significances of the supposed microcosms differ, as do the terminologies that scholars have proposed to indicate them. In spite of these differences, the recurrence of these kinds of correspondences of cosmic ordering have inculcated a sense that the microcosm is "precisely what traditional Brahmanism has been teaching persistently for five thousand years, from the Veda to Ramakrishna and Aurobindo."34 It has empowered scholars to make sweeping comparisons to such diverse notions as the imago Dei, Leonardo DaVinci's "Vitruvian Man," and the Emerald Tablet.

As the exogenous "other" to the West's Christianity, Indic religiosity was thus frequently conceived in terms already familiar to the endogenous "other" that was Western occultism and esotericism. Consequently, the notion of the person and its

relation to the world in Indic sources has been interpreted in a manner that seems more familiar to characteristically Western kinds of thinking than to any one Indic text or tradition. This study will provide multiple opportunities to question our reliance on the microcosm paradigm, to ask the extent to which it might be an artifact of perennialistic biases, to clarify precisely what the idioms of traditions convey, and thereby to elevate their diversity and uniqueness.

The key features of a revised understanding, which I have signaled above, involve the following considerations that are broadly representative of a prevalent trend in the early sources. First, persons are not typically identified with bodies that exist "in" worlds. Rather, persons are worlds, centered on bodies but by no means delimited by them. Jan de Vries's comment on the world concept in Celtic religions is instructive here: "In this concept could thus be united the aspect of the sky and the open space in the forest. Was not such a lighted-clearing [Lichtung] viewed as a little cosmos [kleiner Kosmos], which spread out under the bright sky as a sacred site?"38 A person is always the where that they are, the clearing in which the total horizons of their experience and influence measure out. If we are to persist in calling the person a microcosm, I hope it is with this framing in mind, as it emphasizes how worlds are subjective, phenomenal spaces. The word loka often communicates the world that each person perceives and responds to, a world that is never merely objective. And it is a sustained aim in a great many ancient Indic traditions to manipulate and expand its extent.

Second, though the language of correlations and correspondences between persons, bodies, ritual spaces, divine spheres, or simply the world-at-large is indeed common in the textual record of these traditions, it is a mistake to say that it captures "precisely what traditional Brahmanism has been teaching" from its beginnings up to the present. Instead, such language frequently has a pedagogical function, similar to what Buddhists call an upaya, an "expedient means" by which a lesson is conveyed rather than the object of the lesson itself. Consequently, it "would be a great misunderstanding to misinterpret the macrocosmic picture of the human body drawn in these ancient texts"—as, for instance, drawn in the Honey Doctrine—"merely as a metaphorical description of our corporal being in a poetic language. Rather it is the other way round.

Many of these texts . . try to reveal the macrocosmic dimensions, always already embodied at the local site of a body in order to reveal that bodies ek-sist' as outstanding entities."39 In other words, the language of correlations often aims to transpose the usual identification of bodies with human physical forms to a cosmic scale, to say that the true body is the worldhood of the person.

Related to this is the language of inner and outer. What is described as a practitioner's "inward" turn can, paradoxically, lead to realizations about the way he fills the outward spaces of his dwelling, revealing the "out-there" presence of the person and the mutually constituting presence of self and other. Medieval Tantric mystics explored such experiences by using a correlational language of body and cosmos and inner and outer. But rather than establishing the replicative identity of microcosm and macrocosm, they use the teaching tool of correlational language to induce an experience of a "mobius self," a state of one-sidedness in which the dimensions of inner and outer and body and cosmos collapse.

When we discard the perennializing language of microcosms and embrace the language of persons, a different vision of the prevailing character of personhood in ancient Indic traditions arises. Rather than inspiring a world-denying, inward turn, these sources encourage an outward embrace of the world as a fundamental part of who one is and what one can and should do. Each in their own way presses toward the discovery (in accordance with the contours of their tradition) of the ways that persons exist in a fundamental continuity with the world. The sacrificer, the ascetic, the bhikkhu, and the yogi—each in their own way has actively sought an illimitable reach. The record of this sustained enterprise, surviving in a highly diverse series of theories and practices, delights in the subversion of spatial dichotomies like inward-and-outward and toils over the composition of instructive correlations.

At base, what we must confront here, quite literally in this instance, is a fundamental difference in worldviews. We are recipients of a worldview that has routinely asserted the basic objectivity of the world and its unproblematic separability or isolatability from our own observing subjectivity. The world is the always "out there," and our

presence in it is in a certain sense incidental or additive. In early Indic traditions the world is not typically thought of in this manner. It is instead most often conceived in terms of the immediate, phenomenal, apperceptive, and experiential field of personhood. As Gonda correctly observed half a century ago, the world in Indic thought is first designated by the Sanskrit loka, a term that signifies an open, light-filled space. Connected to the verbal roots *ruc ("to shine") and \ lok ("to perceive"), the term loka captures the "locality" of perceptual horizons. As I noted earlier, many religious practices of early India, at least up to the threshold of Classical era Hinduism, aim to transform these horizons, to expand them beyond all constrictions. It is with this in mind that I will refer to the person as an expansive being, and attempt to demonstrate the myriad ways in which he attempts to augment or extend his expansive capacities, thereby changing the manners in which his personhood and worldhood coincide.

Chapter Summary

The chapters have been organized chronologically and by tradition studied. There is inevitably something misleading about such a division, insofar as it can conceal the many ways in which traditions overlap and interact, forming context and subtext. Traditions are, like the persons here studied, typically expansive, permeable, and have continuously negotiated boundaries. It is my hope that the reader will bear this in mind, understanding that each chapter poses an invitation to think beyond its own limits.

In chapter 2, I examine the earliest textual roots of Indic thinking about personhood in the Vedic period (c. 1500 bce-800 bce) and trace the mythic ancestry of the Purusa in the famous Purusa Sukta. On both counts, we are led to Indra in the Rgveda. Indra prefigures the Purusa as the first world-sized person and the expansively solar sovereign Lord of the world. The story of how Indra became world-sized—involving ritual interactions with Agni and Soma and mighty battles with Vora—is also the RV's blueprint for understanding the natural world. The world is, above all, a light-filled expanse, governed by the daily and yearly "swellings" of the Sun that obliterates constrictive darkness and brings life into its fullness. This basic characterization was transposed, in the youngest layer of the RV's hymns, to the figure called "Purusa," a

solarized world-Person who was "spread out" as the sacrifice in ancient times to become all that exists, "what has been and what is yet to be."

From this point onward, the purusa concept was prominently tied to a thinking about human sacrificial activity and its bearing on sovereign status. In chapter 3, I turn to the uses of purusa in the Brahmanic, those exegetical texts that elaborate on the poetics and ritual actions encoded in the hymns of the Vedic Samhitas. There it is announced that, should the human purusa attain true sovereignty, like Indra or Purusa, he too must "spread" himself out as the sacrifice in order to become the "same measure" as the sacrificial cosmos. A key method for achieving this involves an initiatory brush with death, indeed a ritualized and asceticism-driven identification with Death personified.43 In this we discover the incorporation of originally Atharvan motifs, deriving from both early Atharvan speculations on the purusa and hymns celebrating the solar and sovereign qualities of the brahmacarin. Considering the accepted historical timeline of all these sources, I propose the Atharvan tradition as a formative impetus for all Vedic thinking about the purusa (which disrupts the usual primacy afforded to the Purusa Sukta) and a key inspiration for early Upanisadic personhood as well.

In chapter 4, I turn to the purusa concept in those diverse ascetic traditions of the Upanisads. On one hand, the purusa of the early Upanisads tends to retain its Vedic-era associations with creative and solar sovereignty. In this regard it often stands as readily interchangeable with the Upanisadic absolutes, brahman and atman. However, on the other, the Upanisads further individualize and democratize the purusa, portraying a purusa that is a generically mortal, male human being. I isolate a number of key themes by which several early and middle-era Upanisads attempt to reconcile this double nature of the purusa. These include reflections on the person as an eater, whose digestive powers contain the secrets of the bliss of the cosmic progenitor. The knower of these secrets becomes all food and also its eater. His digestive fire is like that of the Sun—pervasive, expansive, all-consuming. He is both life and death, the motor and the fuel that propels the wheel of samsara ever-onward. He dwells as light in the space of the heart, but in truth this space is a vast void as big as the whole world. By searching in

the heart (or in other privileged places) the person can discover the connection between his mortal and immortal personhood. Later Upanishads know this person as the yogi, whose control of his senses and vital breath bridges the mortal and immortal, yoking the individual to the all, just as a skillful charioteer yokes his horses.

In chapter 5, I examine the relation between person and world in the Buddhist Pali Canon. There the Buddha frequently defines the person in terms of his elemental composition. These elements constitute the whole of the world, are impermanent, subject to change, and therefore must be treated in a spirit of detachment and recognized as "not mine . .. not the self." Importantly, by cultivating a detachment to elementality, the person garners the detached nature of those elements themselves, correcting thereby his mental contact (phassa) with the materiality of the world in a manner that leads toward the final liberation of nibbana. This goal, I argue, is reflected in the use of the kasina practice in the Culasunnata Sutta. At the conclusion of this sutta, the Buddha describes the penultimate (i.e., premortem) "nonvoidness" that persists at the moment of final liberation as an abiding of perceptual "extensions" (ayatanas) that effectively constitutes the identification of the "selfless" person with the perceptual horizons of the world.

In chapter 6, I turn to the purusa concept in the early texts of Ayurveda: the Caraka Samhita (CS) and Susruta Samhita (SuS). These texts contain a theory of personhood that is arguably paradigmatic to the pre-Classical period of Indic religious history, and that draws significantly from both Brahmanic and Buddhist traditions. The person is here considered the "same measure" as the world, especially according to the manner in which his sense powers, called indriyas, engage with it. In the idiom of Ayurveda, this engagement is fundamentally dietary; perceiving is therefore a kind of eating that ultimately indicates the manner in which a person "yokes to," which is to say, "makes use of," the world. Ideally this yoking/use is balanced and harmonious, reflecting the wholesome state in which person and world are "joined" in "sameness" (samayoga). Ayurveda's diagnostic and therapeutic procedures are, I show, a direct reflection of this understanding of the person as fundamentally joined with the world. This is further related to Ayurveda's stated spiritual aims, which describe the liberation of the person

in a monistic yet doctrinally non-specific idiom. Liberation in this idiom hinges on the possibility of developing a "true understanding" (satya buddhi) of the person's intimate relation to the world, a relation which is governed by a logic of identity (samanya). Having attained this understanding, the knowledge arises that "I am the whole world," and therefore that the person is the sovereign author of his own pleasures and pains.

In chapter 7, I examine the purusa concept in the layers of the epic Mahabharata (MBh). I identify a series of distinct approaches to the purusa concept that comprise the relationships between heroic and manly sovereigns, divine personalities, and powerful and self-expansive yogis. In its characteristic fashion, the epic composes a sort of resume of Indic personhood, drawing from the traditions of the past and reframing them in a project of Samkhya-yoga-fication that forward a uniquely complex vision of personhood for the pre-Classical era. Viewed as a whole, the epic's approach to personhood is in key respects similar to what we find in early Ayurveda. The hope for a restoration of the proper relationship between person and world rests here most significantly on the transformation of the sovereign into a person of great power and great restraint. He must remain active in the world to maintain and enforce its balance, but he must also train himself lest he succumb to the threatening forces of bewilderment and delusion. He is, in the ideal, to be the paragon of human actors in the world, and he exemplifies the way out of human misery amid the confounding courses of time.

In Chapter 8, I conclude with a summary of the history of Indic personhood, reflecting especially on the emergence of a pre-Classical paradigm of personhood in Ayurvedic theory and the MBh. Having arrived at this overview, I return to the case of the Ganges and Yamuna rivers. The language of the court's decisions shows that ancient Indic thinking about personhood is still relevant to and operational within contemporary Indic society. The court's arguments for the legal personhood of the rivers and their surrounding ecologies are rooted in the tradition of understanding persons to be open, expansive, relational, and interdependent entities. The court's arguments also make it clear that this understanding is troublingly at odds with the governmental foundations of modern society.

There is a great deal of diversity in ancient India's approach to personhood, and I trust this study will provide many reasons to consider that diversity, its causes and conditions, and its consequences for the development of traditions. Yet in spite of this diversity, I hope that readers will be impressed, as I have, by this unmistakable theme that runs steadily throughout, drawing together person and world. To discover such continuity in spite of the great diversity of these traditions reveals the extent to which it was accepted that to think about the person is also to think about the world. Moreover, it affirms the significance of the present task—of ensuring a proper understanding of Indic ways of thinking about personhood—to all those who seek to understand the ancient Indic world and its traditions. Indeed, if our thinking about the traditions of ancient India habitually begins on a false step, how can we expect to arrive at sure conclusions?

A Final Thought before Commencing

The most widely accepted etymology of the English word "person" refers to the Latin persona, a term originally used to denote the mask worn by a dramatic actor. It

is the apparatus "through" which the actor's voice "sounds," and thus it is that by which others that is, ourselves—recognize the quality and character of the actor. In accordance with this etymology, Western thinking about personhood emphasizes the social dimension, that is, the manner in which the embodied human agent is set in relation to and recognized by other embodied human agents. This setting in relation to humanity inherent in the etymology of the term "person" is noteworthy insofar as it clearly informs the still-prevalent conception of personhood forwarded by Marcel Mauss, who distinguishes the idea of the person as a primarily social designation that is to be set apart from the subjective awareness of the self. But while this captures something of the outward orientation of personhood, it limits this orientation toward other human beings—bodies that appear, move, and speak like us. It cannot therefore afford a view that can respond adequately to the many challenges—legal, medical, etc.—that the question "What constitutes personhood?" raises. The instance of the Ganges and Yamuna rivers is a case in point: Can nonhuman animals or environmental entities be persons if their relation to humans (in terms of agency, for instance) is not

of an equal footing? In other words, can personhood be more than a simple mirroring of our embodied and social selves?

The etymology of purusa, according to some, suggests such a possibility. Derived from the verbal root 4pr, meaning "to fill, to cherish, to grant abundantly, to become complete, to fulfill, to cover completely, to overspread, to surround, to enrich, to spend completely," the term purusa expresses precisely the excessiveness of personhood that the person, framed m terms of a persona, fails to express. That is, if it is true that the persona concept poses limitations based on its insistence on a mirroring-kind of relationality, then a corrective may be discerned in the extravagance of the purusa concept and in the inherent willingness in Indic thinking about personhood to incorporate the full scope of the otherness of the world.

A Pre-Classical Paradigm of Personhood

Over the course of the preceding chapters I traced the historical development of the purusa concept from the Vedic period (c. 1500 bce) through the pre-classical period (c. 400 ce) and identified trends that contributed to a paradigmatic approach to personhood in the pre-Classical era. This paradigm is expressed through several key themes: From the Vedic period (as represented by the Vedic Samhitas and the Brahmans), the key theme is that of a sovereignty coincident with an act of cosmic self-expansion. This in turn relies on a sacrificial view of the cosmos, involving especially the role of the Sun as that which extends throughout the cosmos, along the liquid substratum of Soma, subsuming all beings under its influence and ruling them by its illimitable light. This further shapes visions of sovereign persons, who, by might, rites, or ascetic brushes with death, assert their personhood as an expression of their identity with the broader world and the forces that govern its rhythms.

I treated the sramana period in two stages, first dealing with the Upanisads and second with the suttas of early Buddhism in the Pali Canon. The Upanisads approach the purusa concept from multiple angles, but we noticed trends developing from the self-othering of the cosmic Person. The consequences of this self-othering develop into a digestive model of how things are linked up in the world (by light, prams, etc.), how

they transform (by sacrificial metabolization), and how this perpetuates a panoply of beings in the world (by blissful reproductive recursions). Nascent parameters of yoga seem to come from just this understanding, with the yogi as the person who best understands, identifies with, and acts across these worldly linkages and transformations—a personhood of worldly mastery in every respect. In early Buddhist sources, we saw a virtual disavowal of personhood that nevertheless manifests as a kind of worldly embeddedness. Personhood was there dominated by a consideration of its (impersonal, empty) elementality, establishing it as essentially in continuity with the world-at-large. All of these themes—of fire and expansive sovereignty, of eating, perceiving, and recursive reproduction, of yoga, and of elementality—find degrees of distinctive expression in a pre-Classical period paradigm of personhood.

According to this paradigm, the person is a fundamentally expansive being, not reducible to the physicality of the body but instead identified with the full spatial and temporal extent of his phenomenal, apperceptive experience. Insofar as he is not liberated, the person's expansive capacities are limited to the world of everyday, mortal human experience. The sense of bodily discreteness and difference from the world persists. But if he has in some sense mastered his worldly nature, if he has liberated himself from the bonds of karma and human embodiment, if his perceiving and understanding buddhi has become "true," then his expansive capacities are stretched beyond all normal constraints to a point of coterminality with the entire cosmos or, in theistic traditions, to a coincidence with the self-relational experience of the godhead.'

What this signifies, first and foremost, is that Indic thinking about personhood, from the time of the Vedic Samhitas until roughly the end of the pre-Classical period, has often been an excuse to think about worldhood. Persons and worlds are confluent categories in the texts studied here. Personhood is not linked to the renunciation of the world nearly as much as it is to an effort to encompass it. Consequently, and despite the fact that the texts appearing during these two millennia contain numerous expressions of structural correlations between embodied human beings and the world-at-large, I find it increasingly difficult to see the function and meaning of these correlations as supporting the typical microcosm interpretation. Instead of a logic of mirroring or

replication at smaller scales, the point is more often to radically collapse the difference between person and world, to bring an end to their potential for contrariety, precisely because personhood derives from and is inseparable from worldhood.

The methods and meanings posed by this possible overcoming of difference have shifted over time. And to be sure, there are other approaches to personhood that I have not taken up here. I have instead highlighted the trends that appear as the most prominent and consequential, as suggested by both the linguistic data—that is, by the uses of the purusa concept—and by a careful historical and philosophical reading of the ways in which personhood develops within and across texts and traditions. It is this approach that has led me to theorize the emergence of a culminative, paradigmatic approach to personhood in the pre-Classical period, according to which all objectification of the person, in terms of bodies or the like, is subordinated to a phenomenalistic understanding. The person's world is therein delimited by the horizons of his perception—broadly conceived as his dietary enjoyment of the world in the Ayurvedic idiom—and these in turn are shaped by the force of past events and one's understanding; but such everyday limits are overcome by the discovery of a more fundamental, worldwide basis of one's personhood, sometimes referred to as the person-qua-self, an immanently expansive and intersubjective basis of all possible perceptual realities.

As I have argued, this paradigm is most coherently expressed in the early texts of Ayurveda, especially the CS, with its uniquely cosmopolitan doctrine that combines elements of Vaisesika and Buddhist philosophy with an early, monistic form of Samkhyan cosmology-qua-anthropology and yoga-based (meta)physics. Ayurveda encapsulates the paradigm by the claims that "this person is the same measure as the world"; that "one should know the identity of the distinct parts of the person and the world"; and that "seeing equally the self in the whole world and the whole world in the self, the true understanding arises...Having known, 'I am the whole world,' the ancient wisdom appropriate to liberation is aroused."

Elsewhere, key features of this paradigm are discernible in the MBh, though there the emphasis is skewed toward the Brahmanical program of synthesizing sacrificial and sramana traditions under the heading of a theistic yoga. Moreover, the MBh's approach to personhood is deeply inflected by the social and political crisis felt in Brahmanic culture throughout the pre-Classical period,' a crisis that manifests (in part) as an urgent questioning of the power of Time and Fate and the relative impact of human effort. Across both sources we find sustained emphases on the person's elementality, the connection between this elementality and his perceptual experience of the world, and the means by which he may master these facts of his existence and thereby tap into his inherent capacity for self-expansion to clarify his fundamental identity with the world.

As we look forward to what happened next in Indic thinking about personhood, the arrival of a largely consistent pre-Classical paradigm appears like the cresting of a wave. A fundamental shift loomed just ahead that was to be most famously expressed in the Samkhyakarika of Isvarakrsna and Yoga Sutras of Patanjali. There, the identity of person and world was shattered by the argument that the purusa is, in truth, fundamentally nonidentical (nihsamanya) to the world. No longer the all-inclusive apex of a cosmic hierarchy, the purusa henceforth was reduced to an identification with consciousness alone, which stands orthogonal to the psychical and physical dimensions of prakrti, and the person's spiritual goal became one of complete isolation (kaivalya) therefrom. Simultaneously, and roughly coincident with the reign of Candragupta I in the mid-4th century ce, bhakti catapulted to the fore as the dominant form of religious expression that subsumed both sacrificial and ascetic ideologies and praxes. The class of texts known as the Puranas, containing "ancient" stories of the gods and combining the traditions of sruti and smrti into a novel literary form, likewise rose to prominence.' The systems of Isvarakana and Patanjali afforded the metaphysics that most prominently grounds Puranic cosmology and the worlds of bhakti. As a result, the epicenter of the Hindu religious life effectively shifted to gods whose existence extended beyond the time and space of the worldly frame, while the content of religious life became increasingly focused on developing practices that could bridge the

seeming distance between human and god. In the midst of such massive changes, the major trends in Indic thinking about personhood were flipped on their head.

Persons beyond Microcosms

Thinking precisely and clearly about personhood and its relationship to worldhood is important. And not solely because we want to develop an accurate understanding of the historical realities of India's peoples and traditions. There are larger, exigent matters that such a thinking calls to the fore. Consider, for instance, the impact wrought by microcosm-style thinking on the trajectories of the Western world. The idea that man is a microcosm corresponds to a series of notions that "ground western religious anthropology," including the doctrine of imago Dei, the notion that the human being was created in the image of God. Derived from the claims of Genesis 1:26, the imago Dei doctrine is not simply a basis for comparison; it highlights the distinctively creative nature of humanity, which in turn sets the human apart from all other creatures according to his inherent right—indeed his divinely ordained mandate—to dominate all of nature: "Let us make man in our image, after our likeness, and let them have dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the birds of the air, and over the cattle and over all the Earth, and over every creeping thing that creeps upon the Earth." It is this originary proclamation, according to Thomas Carlson, that "yields in its modern extensions the human project of a domination, both conceptual and practical."' In other words, the human potential for sovereignty rests on the imagistic repetition of the divine in the human. In Christian theological interpretation, from at least the time of Augustine onward, the hallmark of this imagistic framing of the human, and thus the source of its claim to sovereignty, is the linking of mortal human to transcendent God by the quality of rational thought. As the imago of the triune God, man is a "little world" precisely because he, unlike other creatures, possesses the rational faculty of the divine. He is both matter and rational spirit.

It is through the inheritance of this paradigm that Augustine, seeking the true image of God, "commands his mind to pull itself away from the body and to 'know itself' as an immortal mind" that bears no substantive connection to the Earth beyond its mere use toward this realization. Inheriting the same, Descartes famously conceived of the

separation of immaterial mind-soul from material body, which in turn informed Hegel's teleological history that sought to reunite material world and Spirit (Geist) via the dominating transformation of the former, through the exercise of human rationality, into the concrete likeness of the latter. In these and other manners, highly consequential Western thinkers have urged that the supposedly better, divine part of the human being is thrust outside of the world. The world becomes object; the object becomes a matter of exploitation and manipulation. In the rational, divine working of his God-given mind-soul, the person transcends all worldliness. He is himself rationally creative in the image of the creator, and thereby he rightfully exercises his sovereign dominance on the world in the mode of its Lord.

The prevailing trends of the early history of Indic thinking about personhood afford an important contrast and intervention to the idea that mankind's project is one of domination, of overcoming nature because he does not, in his "highest" aspect, necessarily belong to it. For here the person and the world are not so easily distinguished. Instead there is a kind of subordination, a deferral of the merely human to the greater movement of the world by which the divine or the absolute is made manifest. Consider, for instance, that as Arjuna stands before the revelation of God's "all-form" in the BhG, he finds only a deepening lack of comprehension—indeed a sheer terror takes hold—because the highest aspect of the person, the purusottama, loudly proclaims the limits of human rationality. The same terror grips Indra when the turning tides of Time appear in the guise of Mada in the MBh. Likewise, as Aivatthaman gives his life over to Siva, the divine expression of the end of time itself, by the sacrifice of his worldly, elemental body, he deems his act "barely imaginable" by thinking men. In these examples we glimpse an early Indic avowal to human reason's inability to grasp the courses of that which supports the world. Thus, before the purusa was conceived as absolutely distinct from both mind and body, before it became pure, aloof, and isolated consciousness, its hopes for sovereign liberation tended to consist in this kind of submitting rather than in surmounting. More to the point, the sovereignty of this purusa, prior to the "classical" formulation of Samkhya, often rested in subordinating one's own humanly rational impulses to rhythms of the whole world, as

in Ayurveda's program of training the intellect (buddhi) to become true (satya) by recognizing one's identity with the world. Liberation, even in the midst of the crisis of samsara, often did not mean total escape into an indeterminable dwelling beyond. It rather meant a deepened participation. It meant a "bearing of the yoke" of the world, exemplified by the sacrificer's identification with the mortality-transcending cosmic expansiveness of the Sun, by the ascetic's identification with the world via the one that abides in all wombs and possesses a "counterform" to every form, by the physician's program of becoming "appropriate" to the Time that "cooks" and consumes all beings by establishing a wide-ranging and harmonious conjunction with the world—need I go on?

Our present environmental crisis has been precipitated in part by a theological anthropology that subordinates the world to the project of domination by a rational intellect deemed divinely transcendent. This is incongruous with what we examined here, where the intellect, or buddhi, is wholly worldly, and where the inactive transcendence of the absolute (at least in the non-Buddhist sources) remains immanent to and subsumptive of worldly affairs. The narrative that frames the Indic project of liberation as a strictly inward turn fails to fully appreciate this and therefore tends to see the training of the intellect as a program of withdrawal from the world. Consequently, it also fails to see the worldly significance of early Indic personhood as tied to a project that trains the intellect to accord with the sovereign activity of the world or the inactive Absolute (or God) that is immanent to it. Might we not, then, begin to wonder whether our world might be better served by a vision of ourselves as persons whose truest nature resides outward, in the world, rather than inward, in our thoughts? Might we not wish to weigh the meaning of a sovereignty based on a subordination to the world rather than on its domination and exploitation? <>

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