Hierocles the Stoic

Hierocles the Stoic by Ilaria Ramelli, translated by David Konstan (Society of Biblical Literature: Brill) Hierocles, the Stoic philosopher of the early imperial age, is a crucial witness to Middle and Neo-Stoicism, especially with regard to their ethical philosophy. In this volume, all of Hierocles surviving works are translated into English for the first time, with the original Greek and a facing English translation: the Elements of Ethics, preserved on papyrus, along with all fragments and excerpts from the treatise On Duties, collected by Stobaeus in the fifth century C.E. and dealing mainly with social relationships, marriage, household, and family. In addition, Ramelli s introductory essay demonstrates how Hierocles was indebted to the Old Stoa and how he modified its doctrines in accord with Middle Stoicism and further developments in philosophy as well as his personal views. Finally, Ramelli s extensive commentary on Hierocles works clarifies philosophical questions raised by the text and provides rich and updated references to existing scholarship.

Hierocles was a Stoic philosopher in the first half of the second century A.D.-a Neo-Stoic, accordingly—and was often confused, prior to the nineteenth century, with the Alexandrian Neoplatonic philosopher of the same name who lived in the fifth century A.D. and was the author of a commentary on the Carmen aureum (Golden Verses) of Pythagoras and a treatise De providentia (On Providence). Our author, however, belongs rather to the world of Neo-Stoicism or Roman Stoicism, which is closely related to Ancient and Middle Stoicism but also has various characteristics that are specific to it.

It was a study by Praechter that signaled the rediscovery of the Stoic Hierocles and the distinction between him and the homonymous Platonist.2 Shortly afterwards, the discovery of a papyrus containing a treatise by the Stoic Hierocles confirmed Praechter's hypotheses, which were subsequently further buttressed by Hans von Arnim, who edited the papyrus and was the author of an important monograph on Hierocles the Stoic, in addition to his fundamental and well-known collection of the Stoicorum veterum fragments. Von Arnim demonstrated definitively, on the basis of stylistic and structural parallels already in part identified by Praechter, that the Hierocles of the Stobaean extracts was the same Stoic writer whose work was preserved on papyrus and who was without question distinct from the much later Neoplatonist. There were other important contributions by Moricca and Pohlenz as well. Nevertheless, broadly speaking the silence that surrounded Hierocles, interrupted just once in 1933 by an article by Philippson, lasted until the 1970s, when it was finally broken, thanks to an article by Pembroke on oikeiôsis and studies of different aspects of Stoic ethics and psychology by Kerferd, Long, Sandbach, Forschner, Inwood, and Brunschwig, as well as an important article by van der Horst in the Corpus Hellenisticum Novi Testamenti.6 Recently, Badalamenti and Delle Donne have investigated Hierocles in articles, Isnardi Parente in an encyclopedia entry, and Radice in a monograph on Stoic oikeiôsis, as have other scholars interested in this philosophical issue, for example, Engberg-Pedersen and, more sketchily, Morford in a general work on Roman philosophy, Erler in an article, and Reydams-Schils in a volume on the Roman Stoics.' This brief overview indicates the increasing interest in this writer in recent years, which has been capped off by a new edition by Guido Bastianini and Anthony A. Long of his major work preserved on papyrus ("Ierocle: Elementi di Etica," in Corpus dei papiri filosofici greci e latini [Florence: Olschki, 1992], 1.1.2:268-362).

This edition, in turn, has stimulated further critical studies of Hierocles' thought, although, strange to say, up to now there was still no complete English translation of all of Hierocles' writings that have come down to us. Indeed, the present translation of his Elements of Ethics is the first English translation ever (some portions were translated by Anthony A. Long and David N. Sedley, The Hellenistic Philosophers [2 vols.; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987], §§53B, 57C—D). As for his work On Appropriate Acts, there have of course been several previous English translations of the Stobaean excerpts that contain fragments of it. Among the first was that of Thomas Taylor, Political Fragments of Archytas, Charondas, Zaleucus, and Other Ancient Pythagoreans Preserved by Stobaeus, and Also, Ethical Fragments of Hierocles, the Celebrated Commentator on the Golden Pythagorean Verses, Preserved by the Same Author (Chiswick: Whittingham, 1822), 75-115; Taylor naturally believed that this was the work of Hierocles the Platonist. A translation also appeared in the first edition of Kenneth Sylvan Guthrie, Pythagoras: Source Book and Library (2 vols.; Yonkers: Platonist, 1920). It is reprinted in Kenneth Sylvan Guthrie, comp. and trans., The Pythagorean Sourcebook and Library (ed. David R. Fiedler; 2nd ed.; Grand Rapids: Phanes, 1987), 275-86, where it is still wrongly ascribed to Hierocles the Neoplatonist. The most important English translation of the excerpts that has appeared so far is that of Abraham J. Malherbe, Moral Exhortation: A Greco-Roman Sourcebook (LEC 4; Philadelphia: Westminster, 1986).

Both Praechter and von Arnim based their argument for the dating of Hierocles on a passage in Aulus Gellius (Noct. att. 9.5.8), which attributes to Gellius's own teacher, the Platonist Calvenus Taurus, a description of Hierocles as a "virtuous and serious man" (vir sanctus et gravis);8 both scholars maintained that these words prove that Taurus personally attended the lectures of Hierocles, who is frequently cited by Taurus for his criticism of Epicurean hedonism. The only scholar who challenged

this identification was A. Bonhoeffer,9 and although it is accepted by Margherita Isnardi Parente, she herself evinces some doubts about the date: she notes that this same Taurus, in another passage, describes Panaetius in similar terms as "serious and learned"—and surely Taurus never met Panaetius in person. Similarly, Zeller's description of Hierocles as one of Gellius's own teachers does not seem adequately documented." Furthermore, the identification of our Stoic with Hierocles of Hyllarima, in Caria, is bound to remain a mere hypothesis unless further evidence is uncovered; this Hierocles is mentioned by Stephanus of Byzantium as a boxer who later devoted himself to philosophy—not necessarily Stoic philosophy. But it appears, nevertheless, "quite probable that we are dealing with the same Hierocles mentioned by Stobaeus" (Isnardi Parente), who is also, perhaps, the very Hierocles cited as the author of nine papyrus rolls in Papyri Varsovienses 5, a catalogue of books among which there appear• some authored by two Stoic philosophers who may fall between the Old and Middle Stoa, namely, Diogenes of Babylon and either Antipater of Tarsus or Zeno of Tarsus."

The parallels in style and content that can be observed, however, between that part of Hierocles' work that has reached us through the indirect tradition via the Stobaean extracts, and the Discourses of the Neronian-age Stoic Musonius Rufus (edited by his disciple Lucius and also known chiefly thanks to Stobaeus) and the orations of his pupil Dio Chrysostom, composed between the time of Vespasian and of Trajan (that is, between the end of the first and the beginning of the second century A.D.), do seem to have considerable value as evidence." These similarities, which I highlight in the commentary to the Stobaean extracts (where I seek to add some to the number of those already identified), were noted by Praechter, who used them to demonstrate the difference between the Stoic and the Neoplatonic Hierocles. Isnardi has exploited them, in turn, to propose as a chronological framework for our author "some time after Posidonius and in all likelihood around the beginning of the imperial period," with the additional arguments that Hierocles is not mentioned in the Herculanean "Index of Stoics," which includes the Middle Stoics, and that one can point also to parallels with Seneca (as we shall see more clearly in the commentary, where they will be supplemented by parallels with Musonius as well) and to their common dependency on Posidonius. An important terminus ante quem is provided by the dating of the papyrus that contains the principal work by the Stoic Hierocles: von Arnim attributed the handwriting of the papyrus broadly to the first century A.D., Pearson and Stephens to the end of the second, Schubart to the end of the second or the beginning of the third, Seider to the mid-second century, while Bastianini and Long, whose edition I follow, suggest the second half of the second century A.D. Hierocles is without a doubt prior to that period and so may be safely dated prior to 150 A.D.; Bastianini and Long hold that "Hierocles was active, in all likelihood, around the middle of the second century A.D."

Hierocles concerned himself above all with ethics, in conformity with that side of philosophy favored by Roman Stoicism. He was the author of The Elements of Ethics, partially preserved, as I have mentioned, on papyrus (Papyrus Berolinensis 9780) and probably deriving from Hermoupolis in Egypt. Today we have an excellent edition of this work in the Corpus dei papiri filosofici greci e latini, which I adopt for the present translation (incorporating subsequent emendations by the editors). The Elements joins a fair number of extracts in Stobaeus that had been falsely ascribed to Hierocles of Alexandria and that derive, it would seem, from a work On Appropriate Acts; we do not know whether the Stobaean extracts On Marriage and Household Management formed part of On Appropriate Acts as chapters or thematic sections or whether they were rather brief independent treatises.

The Elements of Ethics and the Doctrine of Oikeiôsis

I examine the individual arguments of the Elements of Ethics in detail in the commentary, where I provide an outline of each section as occasion arises. Here I am concerned to highlight the general lines of the treatise" and certain specific aspects of the topic that is central the work, namely, oikeiôsis, "appropriation" or "familiarization?'

In the first place, then, it is useful to provide a general overview of the contents of what survives of this treatise by Hierocles.

1.1-30: The best starting point for the elements of ethics is the "first thing that is one's own" or "is familiar:' of an animal. To determine what this is, one must first of all consider what the beginning of an animal's life is (here Hierocles avails himself of an argument ab origine that was employed by the Stoics in other contexts as well):32 it is birth, when nature (coots), in which plants too have a share, is transformed into soul, which is specific to animals.

1.30-37: Characteristic of animals are sensation or perception and impulse. It is the first of these that will be primarily discussed, since it is essential to understanding the "first thing that is one's own" (or "familiar") of an animal.

1.37-50: The offspring of every animal, immediately upon birth, has perception of itself. There follows the proof of this claim in I.51-VI.24.

I. Animals perceive themselves, as is demonstrated by the fact that:

— they perceive their individual parts (1.51-11.3);

— they perceive their individual means of defense (11.3- 18);

— they perceive their own weaknesses and strengths (11.18-111.19);

— they perceive the threat posed by the abilities of other animals (111.19-52);

2. Animals perceive themselves continuously (111.54-56), as is shown by the fact that:

— their body and soul interact continuously (111.56- IV.53);

— animals perceive themselves even in sleep (1V.53- V.38).

3. Animals perceive themselves from the time when they are mere pups, immediately after birth, as is shown by the fact that:

— the continuous perception of self implies self-perception from the very beginning of life (V.38-43);

— no moment is more plausible as the beginning of self-perception than the beginning of life itself (V.43-52);

— the perception of external things, which begins with birth, implies self-perception (V.52-VI.10);

— self-perception precedes the perception of anything else (VI.10-24).

VI.49-53; VII.48-50: An animal, right from birth, becomes its own or familiar to itself and to its own constitution. Proof of this is the fact that: (1) an animal

seems pleased at the representation that it has of itself (VI.24-49); and (2) animals always seek self-preservation (VI.53- VII.48).

VII.50-VIII.27: The representation is sharpened as the animal develops.

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IX.1-10: Adult animals have four types of oikeiôsis, and among these is their affection for their offspring, which is equal to that for themselves.

XI.14-19: Man is a social animal.

I examine the course of Hierocles' argument analytically and in detail in the commentary. Here it is best to focus on the doctrine that occupies the surviving portion of the Elements, that of oikeiôsis.

The doctrine of oikeiôsis, which has a long history in earlier Stoicism as well as in other philosophical schools and even beyond the confines of philosophy,34 is clearly significant in the construction of Hierocles' treatise: he treats as basic to ethical theory the discussion of "the first thing that is one's own and familiar" (my compound expression for, that is, that which each being senses as primarily its own. Hierocles' discussion takes as its point of departure the very beginning of life in each animal, which, prior to being born, is composed of pneuma; the latter only becomes soul at birth, and is characterized by the properties of sensation (or perception) and impulse. Thanks to sensation, an animal, which while still in gestation is similar to a budding plant and has no more than "nature", can perceive that which is "primarily its own and familiar to itself"

The perception of an animal is directed both toward external things and, simultaneously, toward itself, as Hierocles maintains in a polemic against unnamed opponents, whom I attempt to identify in the commentary. Animals, as Hierocles amply illustrates, are conscious of parts of their own bodies and of the uses to which they can be put; they perceive their own capacities and the weaknesses of others and thus can protect themselves against attack. An animal, moreover, not only perceives itself but does so continuously, and to prove this point Hierocles specifies the nature of the relationship between soul and body—both of which are, according to orthodox Stoicism, material entities—as total mixture and as, that is, a sharing of reactions in such a way that those of the body affect the soul and vice versa. Now, self-perception is not only continuous but, as Hierocles demonstrates with various arguments, also primary, in the sense that even a newborn animal, from the first instant of independent life, begins to perceive itself and to do so even before perceiving external things.

Since this primary self-perception is bound up with a tendency to self-preservation and self-love, it follows that an animal, even when tiny and at the very beginning of its life, has the property of , insofar as it becomes "its own and familiar to itself" and to its own constitution. Nevertheless, the representation or appearance of is not initially clear, due to the excessive density and scant exercise or use of the soul. Hierocles alludes here to a controversy between Chrysippus and Cleanthes that is difficult to define, on account of the fragmentary state of the text—as is the case for the entire final section of the papyrus.

At this point Hierocles mentions the various types of oikeiôsis, namely, that toward oneself, that toward others (the so-called sociable oikeiôsis), and that toward external things. Thus, in accord with the aspect of relations toward others that is specific to sociable oikeiôsis, Hierocles affirms the social nature of human beings, a topic that will be important also in his treatise On Appropriate Acts, where this social nature is subdivided into several classes of interpersonal relations.

Hierocles draws the doctrine of oikeiôsis from the earliest phase of Stoicism, where it is attested explicitly and uncontroversially in the first book of Chrysippus's work or On Ends. For Chrysippus, as Diogenes Laertius confirms, the first instinct of a living being is that of self-preservation, insofar as nature makes it "its own" in relation to itself from birth: thus, the for each individual is its specific or constitution and the (consciousness) or (perception) that it has of it. Plutarch further reports that Chrysippus repeated this theory in every one of his writings on physics and ethics (SVF 3.179:43), and he labels it precisely the theory of Zeno, nevertheless, seems already to have highlighted this doctrine, even if there seems to be no testimony in Greek to his use of the technical term. Cicero, however, in his Prior Academics (Acad. pr. 131 = SVF 1.181) employs the term conciliatio in reference to Zeno and says that he "posited as the highest good living honestly, which derives from 'reconciliation' with nature"; we also know that Cicero in other contexts renders the Greek precisely by conciliatio. Radice has recently shown, with additional arguments that to my mind are convincing, the likelihood that this doctrine was already present in Zeno, adducing above all SVF 1.197 and 198."

Isnardi, moreover, exploits the text of Hierocles himself to confirm that oikeiosis is Zenonian: where Hierocles, in VIII.9-1l, reports a divergence of opinion between Cleanthes and Chrysippus in respect to indefinite representation, she supposes that this difference must be in reference to "the representation that a rational living being has of its relation to itself" and regards this as "a firm piece of evidence that Cleanthes and Chrysippus had already offered distinct intepretations of [becoming one's own and familiar to oneself], to all appearances without substantial disagreement but differing in the way that the process of a gradual coming to consciousness of the phenomenon was represented; and this undoubtedly means that the theory of had already taken shape previously." Thus, it was already present in Zeno.

Thus, Isnardi, like Radice, rejects the supposition that the theory of oikeiôsis cannot be attributed to Zeno, although Nicholas P. White has maintained, on the contrary, that it could not, and Ioppolo is in agreement with this. Ioppolo indeed goes further in denying that even the theory, or "first things [or goods] according to nature," is Zenonian, in her interpretation of Cicero, Fin. 4.16.45, which she claims is heavily dependent on Antiochus of Ascalon. Zeno seems rather, she holds, to have adopted from Polemo the theory of "first goods according to nature," those prima commoda naturae attributed to him by Cicero in Acad. pr. 131 and 138 (= frags. 125-126 Gigante), which he then combined with his own theory of indifferents, which are in turn divisible into those that are "preferable" and those that "are to be rejected" The "first goods in accord with nature" are preferable but are not subject to choice, inasmuch as one does not choose whether one wishes to live or perceive. However, Cicero, in Fin. 4.16.45 (SVF 1.198), reports that Zeno "spoke with Polemo, from whom he accelerate what the first principles of nature were." The context indicates that acceperat is better taken here as "agreeing" or "sharing the opinion:' rather than as "learning:' and that the principia naturae are equivalent to the. Zeno's originality will have consisted, then, in including these latter among the preferred indifferents and in treating them as a particular case of nonelective preferables, as well as in combining the two theories of "first goods according to nature" and universal relationship: he formulated the theory of relationship, appropriation, and familiarity with ourselves as the "first goods according to nature" par excellence and as "the first thing that is our own and familiar." In the subsequent tradition, the "first goods according to nature" and oikeiôsis—a doctrine that went beyond the boundaries of the school to such an extent that the anonymous commentator on the Theaetetus calls it , "very commonly used" or "well known" (VII.20), and that will turn up later in Antiochus of Ascalon and in Cicero, as well as in Arius Didymus and in Seneca—will be indissolubly linked. It is this latter doctrine that serves as the most suitable point of departure in the Elements of Ethics, according to Hierocles, and so he highlights in this work precisely the idea of oikeiôsis.

As Radice notes, the principle or apxi) of Hierocles' Elements of Ethics is not strictly speaking ethical but biological, or rather ethological, in that his observations take as their starting point animal behavior. This seems to agree with Radice's other claim that the theory of oikeiôsis arose in an extraphilosophical, and more precisely medical and biological, context.44 For Hierocles, "an animal, immediately after birth, has perception [alo-VtvETad of itself" (1.38-39). Sensation is given by nature both for the perception of external things and for self-perception (1.44ff.). For animals perceive right from the beginning both their own parts and their use: "winged creatures, on the one hand, are aware of the readiness and aptness of their wings for flying, and, on the other hand, every land animal is aware both that it has its own members and of their use" (1.52). The proof of this is that, "when we wish to see something, we direct our eyes toward the visible object, and not our ears" (1.58). This perception of our own parts and their use provides us, for example, with a knowledge of our own weak and strong points: thus, bulls know which parts of their own bodies can be used as weapons (11.18ff. and 3ff.). Analogously, animals perceive the strength of others, and all of them fear humans, since they are aware of humans' superiority (III.20ff. and 46ff.). In humanity in particular, this knowledge is present from the very beginning, since it derives from the tight bond between soul and body (111.56ff.) that is characteristic of human beings.

Hierocles illustrates as follows the simultaneous presence of the perception of external objects and self-perception: together with the perception of white, we perceive ourselves as "whitened" (or, better, we catch ourselves in the act of perceiving white); together with the perception of sweet, we perceive ourselves as "sweetened"; and with the perception of heat, we perceive ourselves as warmed, and so forth. Thus, together with what is perceived, we pick up ourselves as perceivers: "since an animal invariably perceives something as soon as it is born, and perception of itself is naturally joined to the perception of something else, it is clear that for the origin of the doctrine of oikeiôsis in medical circles. Radice looks especially at biology in Hellenistic medicine, at the concept of assimilation in the Corpus Hippocraticum, and at the theory of nutrition and assimilation in Aristotle, Theophrastus, Praxagoras, and their disciples, and also in Galen. The theory of appropriation or oikeiiisis will, it is argued, have arisen out of these biological ideas concerning assimilation, animals must perceive themselves right from the beginning:' Perception of oneself depends, then, on the perception of external entities; therefore, among other things, small babies are afraid of the dark, since, when they are deprived of visual perception of external objects, they also lose the perception of themselves and fear coming to an end.

Besides, along with the perceiver and the perceived, every pereception implies also the perception of perceiving; in other words, perception includes perception of itself. Hierocles explains this by way of the following syllogism:

Major premise: every basic [or primary: arkhiké] faculty begins with itself;
Minor premise: perception is a basic faculty;
Conclusion: thus, before perceiving anything else, perception must involve perception of itself (VI.20ff.).

On this basis, with one additional step, we get oikeiôsis, since every living creature, for its own subsistence, not only is able but also desires to keep itself alive.46 This is why Hierocles (VI.51-52) concludes that "an animal, when it has received the first perception of itself, immediately becomes its own and familiar to itself and to its constitution." One must, then, make a move from self-awareness to self-preservation, with the intermediary step of sensing as one's own and familiar as both oneself and one's own individual identity, and thus holding oneself and one's individuality dear.

To the perceiver, the perceived, and the perception of perceiving there is thus added self-love, which is characteristic of every creature by nature (VII.4): it is this last that makes survival possible. Self-preservation is the result of oikeiôsis. Bastianini and Long rightly observe that for Hierocles, according to Hierocles, and so he highlights in this work precisely the idea of oikeiôsis.

As Radice notes, the principle or of Hierocles' Elements of Ethics is not strictly speaking ethical but biological, or rather ethological, in that his observations take as their starting point animal behavior. This seems to agree with Radice's other claim that the theory of oikeiôsis arose in an extraphilosophical, and more precisely medical and biological, context. For Hierocles, "an animal, immediately after birth, has perception of itself" (1.38-39). Sensation is given by nature both for the perception of external things and for self-perception (I.44ff.). For animals perceive right from the beginning both their own parts and their use: "winged creatures, on the one hand, are aware of the readiness and aptness of their wings for flying, and, on the other hand, every land animal is aware both that it has its own members and of their use" (1.52). The proof of this is that, "when we wish to see something, we direct our eyes toward the visible object, and not our ears" (1.58). This perception of our own parts and their use provides us, for example, with a knowledge of our own weak and strong points: thus, bulls know which parts of their own bodies can be used as weapons (II.18ff. and 3ff.). Analogously, animals perceive the strength of others, and all of them fear humans, since they are aware of humans' superiority (III.20ff. and 46ff.). In humanity in particular, this knowledge is present from the very beginning, since it derives from the tight bond between soul and body (111.56ff.) that is characteristic of human beings.

Hierocles illustrates as follows the simultaneous presence of the perception of external objects and self-perception: together with the perception of white, we perceive ourselves as "whitened" (or, better, we catch ourselves in the act of perceiving white); together with the perception of sweet, we perceive ourselves as "sweetened"; and with the perception of heat, we perceive ourselves as warmed, and so forth. Thus, together with what is perceived, we pick up ourselves as perceivers: "since an animal invariably perceives something as soon as it is born, and perception of itself is naturally joined to the perception of something else, it is clear that case of exterior objects, as always accompanied by interiorization, thanks to which a sense of satisfaction or danger can be associated with one or another sensation. He does not, however, indicate what determines this connection, unless perhaps he has recourse to a principle by which nature acts in a supporting role, as it were, and works in a person's behalf;52 but if so, it is a thesis that Hierocles does not make explicit.

If, however, we leave aside this matter, which would seem to be a knot still to be untied, Hierocles' contribution to the understanding of oikeiôsis can be evaluated positively, in that he makes clear the complexity of pereception and the deep connection between its inner and outer aspects. Oikeiôsis is an appropriation of oneself that is consequent upon the perception and love of oneself and that is immediately projected outward as well, in the activity of an animal. This element of projection outward is not absent in formulations of the doctrine outside of Hierocles, for example in Cicero and in the Old Stoa.53 If this extroversion did not occur, indeed, with an immediate choice between useful and harmful objects, then oikeiôsis, reduced to amor sui and senses sui, would not influence the behavior of animals. Yet it does influence their behavior, so much so, indeed, that it can even have, for the Stoics, ethical implications, and fundamental ones at that.

Hierocles' treatise is important also because, in investigating self-perception (that is, perception of one's own continuous individuality) and the perception of one's own constitution, in accord with one's stage of development, Hierocles makes it clear that one's constitution or crUoTacrts is a consequence of the structure that connects the parts of the body, whereas consciousness or is our awareness of their existence and use, as Seneca too notes.

Above all, the doctrine of oikeiôsis as presented by Hierocles in the Elements of Ethics is important because, at the end, where he treats the several kinds of oikeiôsis, he touches on the problem of interpersonal relations, a topic he analyzes also in his other work, On Appropriate Acts; in this way, Hierocles' treatment is related to the passage by Porphyry in which oikeiôsis is said to be the source of justice, according to the Stoics: "the followers of Zeno treat oikeiôsis as the principle of justice."56 This is a theory that the anonymous Academic (a Middle Platonist) who wrote the commentary on Plato's Theaetetus opposed (V.24ff.).57 This writer is thoroughly familiar with the idea of oikeiôsis, which is introduced by Socrates and by certain sophists in Plato's dialogues (V11.20-25), but he does not accept it as the basis of justice, since elementary oikeiôsis, which regards the self and is essentially self-preserving in nature, is incomparably more intense that the sociable kind, that is, the kind of oikeiôsis that is not toward oneself but toward the others. Indeed, the idea of an equivalence between these types of oikekisis would be "contrary to what is evident and to the self-perception of a person" (V.34-35: the vocabulary is the same as that of Hierocles; in the commentary it is shown that the classification of kinds of oikeiasis is also similar in both writers).

In truth, the theory of "duties," which is connected with that of oikeiósis directed toward one's neighbor, seems to be characteristic of a certain "softening" of the rigorous, Old Stoic line, which begins to be visible in Middle Stoicism, with its easing of the principle of d7rci0Eta, with which the implications of the doctrine of oikeiôsis seemed to be incompatible. As is well known, Panaetius is regarded as the most important exponent of this Middle Stoic mitigation of Old Stoic ethics. Of course, the idea of duties or xaer)xovra, as distinct from was already present in early Stoicism and is indeed attested to by Zeno, as indicated above; nevertheless, it was chiefly Panaetius who deepened the conception of and connected it with a reevaluation of indifferents (acicpopa), which is one of the most important features of the softening of the Old Stoic approach to ethics.

Moreschini, moreover, has suggested that the Academic Antiochus of Ascalon, who was strongly influenced by Stoic thought, was the one who recognized the incompatibility between oikeielsis and apatheia;59 indeed, Antiochus tempered the doctrine of apatheia and the paradoxes associated with Stoic ethics (Cicero, Acad. pr. 43.133ff.) and at the same time affirmed that virtue, which continues to be the summum bonum as in all Stoicism (Cicero, Fin. 5.9.26), is sufficient for happiness, but not for "perfect happiness," which requires also material goods, as the Peripatetics held (Cicero, Acad. pr. 43.134ff.; Fin. 5.9.24; 5.24.72).60 Hierocles himself seems to participate in this tendency to mitigate the severe ideal of apatheia in such a way as to render it compatible with a sociable (i.e., deontological and rational) oikeiôsis, that is, the kind of oikeiôsis that is not directed toward oneself but toward the others and entails duties or appropriate actions toward them. More particularly, Isnardi has suggested that Hierocles may lie behind a passage in Aulus Gellius's Noctes atticae (12.5.7ff.), in which Gellius's teacher, Taurus, affirms that the principia naturae are self-love and concern for ourselves and our safety, "which the ancients called," and he praises Panaetius for having recognized that one cannot accept the theory of oikeiôsis with all its implications and at the same time maintain the doctrine of apatheia in all its rigor (frag. 111 van Straaten, Panaetii Rhodii Fragmenta). Whether this passage actually derives from Hierocles, as is possible, or not, it seems clear, at all events, that Hierocles adopted the same line as Panaetius in acknowledging that the interpersonal consequences of the theory of sociable, deontological, and rational oikeiôsis, that is, the kind of oikeiôsis that is directed toward others, require an attenuation of the doctrine of apatheia.

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