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Faithfulness and the Purpose of Hebrews: A Social Identity Approach by Matthew J. Marohl (Princeton Theological Monograph Series: Pickwick Publications) Why was Hebrews written? What was the purpose of the text? The discussion of the purpose of Hebrews is traditionally connected to the discussion of the identity and social context of the addressees. In other words, it is often assumed that to answer why Hebrews was written, it must first be established to whom Hebrews was written. Herein lies a problem for modern readers of the text. There is little, if any, consensus regarding the identity of the addressees. And there is little, if any, consensus re­garding the purpose of Hebrews. While most still hold to the ‘traditional view,’ that the addressees were ‘Jewish Christians’ in danger of falling back into ‘Judaism,’ a growing number of interpreters have concluded that nothing can be known regarding the identity of the addressees.
The aim of Faithfulness and the Purpose of Hebrews is to provide answers to these questions by employing that branch of social psychology known as social identity theory.

Matthew J. Marohl, teacher of New Testament at Augustana College, Rock Island, Illinois, begins Faithfulness and the Purpose of Hebrews with a description of the social categorization process, created by Henri Tajfel, to categorize the identity of the addressees of Hebrews. Who were the addressees, were they ‘Jewish’ or ‘Gentile Christians?’ Perhaps they were former Essenes, Samaritans, or Ebionites? What were the various groups of the first-century Mediterranean world? What were the unique characteristics of these groups? Does the text point to any of these unique characteristics? While both the question and the method of inquiry may appear simple, the multiplicity of answers and a commonly voiced frustra­tion point to a deeper, problematic level to this question. Why has it been so difficult to answer the question: Who were the addressees?

Indeed, it has become almost commonplace to refer to the ‘mystery’ of Hebrews, to speak of Hebrews as an ‘enigma.’ It is not only the question of the identity of the addressees that has proven problematic for historical critics, the identity of the au­thor, the date of the text, its literary genre, its place of writing, its destina­tion, the social context in which it was written, its structure, and its very purpose have all been widely debated and difficult to discern. For many, these problems may all be traced to the text's lack of specific historical data. Therefore, while some continue to attempt to answer the question, "Who where the addressees of Hebrews?," others voice frustration at the impossibility of the task.

According to Marohl, frustration is justified. There is an incompatibility of the historical-critical method to the data available in Hebrews. However, this may only be a symptom of a much more signifi­cant problem associated with a traditional historical-critical investigation. The larger issue concerns the categories commonly used by historical critics. The inadequacies of such modern categories include both the use of problematic terminology and problematic con­ceptions of the nature of the various first-century groups. For example, a modern reader might envision the first-century addressees as having been ‘Jewish.’ Further, ‘Judaism’ might be understood to be a ‘religion.’ For some, the ‘religion’ of ‘Judaism’ is understood to have been in direct con­flict or competition with the ‘religion’ of ‘Christianity.’ Attempting to place the addressees into one of the categories with which we are familiar, is, after all, a natural part of our social categorization process. But what categories did the addressees use to simplify and systematize their environment? Faithfulness and the Purpose of Hebrews utilizes social identity theory to identify and interpret the social categories employed by the author and the addressees of Hebrews and to identify and interpret the purpose of the text itself.

In chapter 1, Marohl outlines the historical critical process for examining identity. He presents a description of each of the eight common proposals concerning the identity of the addressees of Hebrews. Finally, he engages in a critical examination of the categorization process of historical criticism. At the end of the chapter, he proposes the problem of understanding the identity of the addressees is not rooted in a lack of information within the text but with an inadequate conceptual framework for understanding identity.

The discussion of the identity of the addressees is inherently connected with the discussion of the purpose of the text. Chapter 2 follows the basic structure of chapter 1. Marohl outlines the historical critical pro­cess for analyzing the purpose of a text. He provides a description of each of the four common proposals concerning the purpose of Hebrews. Finally, he engages in an examination of the historical-critical process for analyzing the purpose of Hebrews. At the end of the second chapter, he proposes that the multiplicity of proposals regarding the purpose of the text reflects the multiplicity of proposals regarding the identity of the addressees.

Since an appropriate conceptual framework for understanding iden­tity is needed in order to move forward in the discussion of the addressees of Hebrews, Marohl offers an overview of social identity theory, the theo­retical framework with which he comes at the problem in a new way. Social identity theory not only offers insight into the social categorization process, but more im­portantly, helps to describe how social groups form and maintain identity. Chapter 3 in Faithfulness and the Purpose of Hebrews describes not only the social categorization process, but also defines social identity, the role of social comparison in identity formation and maintenance, and the function of time within social identity. In addition, and of particular importance to the study of Hebrews, Marohl discusses the nature of outgroups according to social identity theory. He considers, for example, whether an outgroup must be a real group, and whether an ingroup might compare itself to a symbolic outgroup.

In chapter 4, Marohl considers the cultural context of the first-century Mediterranean world, including in the discussion the dynamic of temporal orientation. The chapter's main thesis is that unlike the future temporal orientation of most twenty-first century North Atlantic interpreters, the addressees of Hebrews were likely to have had a present temporal orientation. He proposes that social identity theory integrated with a working model of present temporal orientation serves as an appropriate conceptual framework within which to examine the identity of the addressees of Hebrews.

The first step in reading Hebrews within the framework of social identity theory involves the consideration of whether the addressees understand themselves to be a distinct group, an ‘us’? Rather than rely upon the categories of ‘Jewish Christian’ or ‘Gentile Christian,’ chapter 5 argues that the addressees of Hebrews understood their own identity in terms of faithfulness.

The addressees of Hebrews understood themselves to be ‘the faith­ful.’ Repeatedly, the faithfulness of Jesus is understood through comparison. The faithfulness of Jesus is compared to that of Moses (Heb 3:1-6). Likewise, his faithfulness is compared to that of the ‘great cloud of witnesses’ (Heb 12:1-2). In chapter 6, Marohl employs two relevant areas of social identity theory – the theory of shared life stories and the theory of prototypicality – in order to understand the author's use of comparison and his emphasis on the faithfulness of Jesus.

Throughout Hebrews, the author thoroughly integrates issues of identity, faithfulness, and time. Therefore, to more fully understand social identity in Hebrews, it is necessary to consider the role of time within the text. Specifically, chapter 7 of Faithfulness and the Purpose of Hebrews addresses four questions regarding temporality. First, what was the role of the antecedent in Hebrews? Second, what was the role of the forthcoming? Third, what was the role of foresight? Fourth, is there evidence of imaginary time in Hebrews? In addition, this chapter includes a description of the meaning of the promised ‘rest.’ We find that the addressees are encouraged to "look forward by looking back."

In chapter 8, Marohl broadens the discussion from the identity of the addressees of Hebrews to the purpose of the text. The discussion of the purpose of Hebrews has traditionally been connected to the discussion of the identity and social context of the addressees of Hebrews. If we take seriously the conclusions made in chapters 5-7 regarding the identity of the addressees, it is possible to present a new proposal regarding the purpose of the text. The proposal of chapter 8, based upon the culturally appropriate conceptual framework of social identity theory and present temporal orientation, can serve as a helpful tool for the interpreta­tion of Hebrews.

Marohl's welcome study represents an accomplished application of social identity theory to the text of Hebrews. His methodological attentiveness is mature and responsible, resulting in an articulate analysis that recognises the faithfulness of Jesus to be the theological centre that informs the socio-religious program advocated by the author of Hebrews. – Bruce Longenecker, University of St. Andrews

Henri Tajfel could have had no concept of the far-reaching influence of social identity theory he first developed in the 1970s. In Faithfulness and the Purpose of Hebrews, that theory and a model of present temporal orien­tation provide the conceptual framework within which to understand the identity of the addressees of Hebrews and the purpose of the text. But projects such as this can be informative beyond the boundaries and limitations of both New Testament interpretation and social identity theory.

Faithfulness and the Purpose of Hebrews offers fresh answers to several unresolved questions. The study concludes that the author of Hebrews provides internal constraints that are meant to prevent social mobility. Marohl utilizes social creativity (an aspect of social change) to provide a positive social identity for the addressees.

 

Godly Fear: The Epistle to the Hebrews and Greco-Roman Critiques of Superstition by Patrick Gray (Academia Biblica No. 16: Brill Academic Publishers) To what extent was early Christianity viewed as superstition by its contemporaries? Superstition was the standard category in Greco-Roman antiquity for defaming “debased” religion, and to situate early Christianity in its Mediterranean milieu it is necessary to understand what this label meant to those who used it. Fear is the defining element of superstition according to writers like Plutarch, who regard the emotion as a fundamental human problem. Fear is likewise a recurring motif in the Epistle to the Hebrews, whose author holds up “confidence” as a Christian ideal yet also employs language which evokes fear in the starkest of terms. This work examines the articulation of Christian faith in Hebrews in the context of ancient debates about the propriety of fear.

Contents: Acknowledgements, Note on Texts and Translations
Chapter One: Introduction, The Question: “Superstition” or “Godly Fear”? Self-Definition in the Early Church: Christianity as Superstition; Plutarch and the Epistle to the Hebrews: A Common Milieu; New Testament Studies and the History-of-Religions School; Contextualization, Comparison, and “Parallelomania”
Plutarch and the New Testament; The Greco-Roman Background of Hebrews: The State of the Question
Approach
Chapter Two: Plutarch and Superstition, Introduction,  Terminology, Latin, Greek, Plutarch on Superstition in the Moralia and the Lives: Typical or Atypical? The Role of Fear in Plutarch’s Religious Thought, Hellenistic Analyses of the Emotions, Platonic Antecedents, Aristotle, Stoicism, Epicureanism, Summary; Plutarch on Superstition as Inappropriate Fear, The Question of Authenticity, Plutarch’s Argument: Summary and Analysis, Superstition and the Emotions, Positive and Negative Fear, Fear of Death, Atheism and Superstition Compared: Theological and Practical Aspects, Piety as a Mean, Conclusion
Chapter Three: Freedom from Fear as a Christian Ideal in Hebrews, Introduction, Fear of Death (Heb 2:15), Sources of Fear of Death, Subjective Quality of Fear of Death, Scope: Whom Does Fear of Death Affect? Assessment: Is Fear of Death Morally Culpable? Prescription: How to Be Free From Fear of Death, “Help in Time of Need”: Jesus the Great High Priest, Priesthood as Fraternity: Brotherly Love and “The Order of Melchizedek”, “Confidence” before God: ΠΑΡΡΗΣΙΑ in Hebrews, Confidence as Members of God’s Household (Heb 3:6, Confidence Before the Throne of Grace (Heb 4:16,) Confidence in the Heavenly Sanctuary (Heb 10:19–31), The Clean Conscience (Heb 10:19–25), Apostasy and the Forfeiture of Confidence (Heb 10:26–31), The Reward of Confidence (Heb 10:35), Fearlessness in the Face of Earthly Dangers, Withstanding Persecution, Heb 10:32–39, Heb 11:32–38, Heb 13:6, Defiance of Human Authorities: Moses’ Fearlessness (Heb 11:23–28), Reinterpreting Adversity as God’s Education (Heb 12:5–11), Conclusion
Chapter Four: Reverence and Awe: Fear as an Appropriate Response to God in Hebrews, Introduction, Jesus’ “Godly Fear” (Heb 5:7,) What Does Jesus Pray For and How Is He “Heard”? The Exemplary Function of Jesus’ Submission, Fear as a Concomitant of Revelation and Worship (Heb 12:18–29), Moses’ “Fear and Trembling” at Sinai (Heb 12:21), Worship in the Last Days: “Reverence and Awe” (Heb 12:28–29), Conclusion Chapter Five: Conclusions; Bibliography, Index of Modern Authors, Index of Ancient Authors, Index of Biblical Texts.

Patrick Gray, Ph.D. (2002), Emory University, is Assistant Professor of Religious Studies at Rhodes College in Memphis, Tennessee, USA.

To determine the extent to which the form of Christianity one finds in Hebrews would qualify as superstition in Plutarch’s eyes, one must begin by setting out Plutarch’s construal of what it means to be superstitious. This is the task taken up in chapter two after the scholarly frame of reference within which the topic is to be pursued has been established. A survey of the lexical data in Latin will show the areas of confluence with and divergence from the Greek vocabulary employed by Plutarch to describe superstition. A brief but comprehensive review of the use of cognates of superstition in Greek will reveal the range of traits and dispositions covered by this term used by Plutarch in his treatise. His usage fits relatively comfortably within the tradition of philosophical critique of religion and touches on all the recurring indicators of superstition current in the Hellenistic period. By far the most pervasive in this depiction of the superstitious shared by Plutarch and his contemporaries is the element of fear. Because Plutarch locates the core of superstition in the emotions, his work will be examined in the context of the analyses of the emotions in the philosophical traditions with which he is in dialogue. After this erns on the main schools of thought, attention will turn back to Plutarch and De superstitione. This final section of the chapter summarizes and provides detailed commentary on the essay, with special attention to the way he views ft (especially fear of the gods), how these views cohere with those found elsewhere in his immense corpus, and what basic assumptions compel him to pass such harsh judgment on superstition.

Because fear is the core component of superstition according to Plutarch and other Hellenistic authors, who regard the emotion as a fundamental human problem arising in both sacred and secular contexts, chapters three and four look in detail at the various occurrences of this motif in Hebrews. Chapter three examines passages in Hebrews which advocate freedom from fear as a desirable and attainable ideal for the Christian. Of particular concern to the author is fear of death, a theme of recurring interest to the moral philosophers whose ideas inform Plutarch’s characterization of superstitious fear. The causes of and remedy for fear of death according to Hebrews will be interpreted as an integral component of the author’s christological presentation, as will the way in which he puts forward “confidence”  as the obverse of fear in the believer’s approach to God. Once the nature of this “vertical” relationship between God and the individual is established, those passages will be examined which seek to inculcate a posture of fearlessness on the horizontal plane, that is, in circumstances where earthly circumstances and other humans appear to pose a threat to the well-being and emotional equilibrium of the believer. The nexus of belief, feeling, and action, familiar from Hellenistic analyses of the emotions, also underlies the author’s mode of argument and helps to clarify his views on the place of fear in the life of faith.

Chapter four concentrates primarily on two passages (Heb 5:7; 12:18–29) where apparent manifestations of fear signify a disposition the author regards in a quite positive light, and by that token may make him and his readers susceptible to a charge of superstition. One passage celebrates the “godly fear”  of the human Jesus, while the other speaks approvingly of this same quality of “reverent awe” as a fitting accompaniment of thanksgiving and worship offered to God under the new covenant inaugurated by Jesus’ sacrifice.

A final chapter draws together the key insights of the preceding chapters, returns to the question posed at the outset of the study, and reflects briefly on the complexities involved in formulating an answer.

To sum up, while the various schools of thought informing Plutarch’s critique of superstition argue over points of theory and practice, they agree on a basic level on a number of core issues. On the structure of occurrent emotions, Aristotle and especially the Stoics, who carry on a vigorous intramural debate, go to great lengths to understand what constitutes an emotional response. Virtually every Greek writer, Epicurus included, recognizes the physical component of emotions but locates their root cause in cognitive or mental operations and the substantive beliefs, judgments, and opinions into which these processes crystallize, in stark contrast to reductionistic analyses in the fields of neuropsychology, biochemistry, and psychopharmacology. The shape of a person’s beliefs plays a far greater role in determining emotional disposition than does body temperature or the balance of humors.

Aristotle is the most optimistic about the role of the  in the good life, though he is also wary of their irruption at the wrong time and in the wrong form, and tries accordingly to distinguish, for example, true from counterfeit courage. The Epicureans heartily affirm the pleasant passions, seeking them as the highest good. But because these are usually fleeting and cause pain upon withdrawal, true pleasure consists in knowing one’s human limitations and living calmly within them. Coping with emotions, because they develop out of one’s beliefs about the world, involves education, or re-education in many cases since traditional beliefs are so often mistaken and hence responsible for unhealthy emotions. These must be stripped and replaced with a right view of the world and of the nature of the good, which in turn vary according to the school. For most of these thinkers, their appraisals of fear fit within this general framework. Plato and Aristotle reserve a place in their systems for appropriate forms of fear. They regard fear of shame in a positive light because it promotes civic responsibility. Aristotle also accommodates feelings of fear within his account of virtue. Brave men experience rational fear, though only on momentous occasions. Only when the end is a truly good one does reason demand fearlessness in the face of extraordinary pain or impending doom. The Stoics concur on this point but are more discriminating when it comes to circumstances in which fear is permissible. Virtue is the highest good, therefore vice alone is to be feared with the caveat, and never simple ( is rational “cautiousness.” Their qualifying remarks make plain the fact that, here again, belief as to the good distinguishes disapproved fear from its corresponding approved eupathic disposition.

While each school promulgates a theory of the emotions on the basis of core beliefs about ultimate reality, it is evident that, with the exception of Plato, the emphasis in their accounts is on the practical, ethical aspect. To varying degrees, the emotions are inconvenient because they disrupt the smooth flow of a happy life and are suspicious because they are at odds with a normative conception of virtue. Rational or not, the type of fear these philosophers discuss is an unpleasant feeling that usually signals some deficiency in the cardinal virtue of courage. It may or may not have death or the gods as its object. Little or no specifically religious element attaches to it except in a negative sense. Plutarch takes over this philosophical estimation of fear, makes certain modifications, and applies it to popular religious beliefs and observances in his essay on superstition.

The motif of fear pervades the argument in Hebrews at almost every turn, even when the explicit language is missing. Its place among the author’s chief concerns is further suggested by his coordinated discussions of Christian “confidence” and his editorial decisions in such passages as the retelling of the Moses story in 11:23-28. Sources of fear fall into two broad categories: “natural” fear, which includes the ordinary human desire to avoid physical pain, economic deprivation, humiliation, and the like; and “supernatural” fear, the primary manifestation of which is fear of divine judgment after death. Between these two heuristic categories there is, not surprisingly, some degree of overlap. Fear of death, though primarily concerned with what comes after death in Hebrews, naturally participates in both types. In one form or another, thanatophobia and its effects drive the arguments the author tailors to his audience, who have “not yet” had to withstand persecution to the point of bloodshed (12:4). Fear in Hebrews is itself an undesirable state and usually serves as an indicator either of potential peril or of disordered priorities.

The author’s approach to fear is not like that of the school philosophers who assert that it is a ready indicator of superstitiousness and that the emotion has no rational or legitimate basis. He is closer to the more balanced approach one finds in Aristotle in his analysis of the conditions giving rise to fear and his proposed solutions to the problem it presents. The contours of the letter’s Christology fit especially well within a theological and paraenetic program designed to achieve an ideal of fearlessness. Because of the specific claims about the nature of the Christ event, the theological aspect has profound “practical” implications. No longer does “natural” fear excuse one from moral responsibility for capitulation to human forces seeking to dishonor God. This kind of fear bears an inverse relationship to faith, “without which it is impossible to please God” (11:6).

So in one respect, that is, in its insistence that fear is no longer an appropriate component of human engagement with the divine, Hebrews is in agreement with Plutarch. But the qualifier “no longer” would likely be the stumbling block for a contemporary Greek because it points to what has become known as “the scandal of particularity.” Fearlessness is an achievable goal only because of what has transpired with Christ and not because it was a mistake ever to believe that fear once had any objective grounding. In an imaginary debate, then, one can see Plutarch complaining that Hebrews hasn’t gone far enough in expunging fear and has in fact compounded the problem by granting legitimacy to those beliefs underlying the gravest fears in the first place. And to this Hebrews might respond that fear cannot be so easily explained away, and that Plutarch wants the brand of Protestantism whose credo, in the critical summary of H. Richard Niebuhr, can be reduced to this: “A God without wrath brought men without sin into a kingdom without judgment through the ministrations of a Christ without a cross.” In spite of attempts to dispel his readers’ fears, then, it is hard to imagine his sermon earning the approval of the author of De superstitione.

D. H. Lawrence quotes Heb 10:31 (RSV) verbatim in the opening line of his poem, “The Hands of God,” only to follow it with a second line suggestive of the sometimes ambivalent reactions to the prospect of becoming a child of God in the Letter to the Hebrews: “It is a fearful thing to fall into the hands of the living God/But it is a much more fearful thing to fall out of them.” The poem closes with a cry for salvation from “ungodly knowledge”: “Let me never know myself apart from the living God!” The primary aim of the author of Hebrews is to assist his readers in experiencing “boldness” by showing them how their brother and high priest has neutralized the most pervasive causes of fear—namely, judgment by God and abuse at the hands of humans. But in order to help them learn who they really are in God’s eyes, he must draw on a register of language in some respects expressive, even evocative, of a form of fear. Analyses of this language in Hebrews, however, frequently exaggerate the degree to which it connotes craven terror. The author generally avoids such vocabulary, preferring to use terms which accentuate the individual’s recognition of and submissiveness to the will of God. Jesus models this disposition for his siblings, learning the full meaning of obedience to God from the fearful things he suffered. Some measure of trepidation is not only permissible, it is entirely appropriate when confronted with the auspicious events connected with the new covenant, so long as it does not lead one to seek consolation anywhere other than in the living God.

Despite the author’s insistence upon the once-for-all character of Christ’s sacrifice and the way in which it renders superfluous all apotropaic rites aimed at deflecting God’s wrath, in the final analysis Hebrews leaves intact the basic premise that the divine can in any fashion be a legitimate source of fear. In fact, God alone—not persecution, not material deprivation or physical abuse, not even death—is truly fearful. The idea appears in a more straightforward fashion throughout the OT, as when Isaiah writes, “Do not fear what this people fears, nor be in terror. But the Lord of Hosts, him you shall regard as holy; let him be your fear, and let him be your terror” (Isa 8:12-13).26 According to Hebrews, the believer has to travel through fear, not around it, to come out on the other side. This notion, far from allaying any suspicion on other grounds that Christianity is an example of superstition, effectively confirms it for pagan observers after Plutarch who come into direct contact with Christian thought: it is a decidedly good thing that there is no longer any need to be afraid, but the Christian solution comes at the expense of creating a problem where there should not have been one in the first place.

While Plutarch recognizes the possibility that the deity may feel “that he must no longer help us in the same way, but in a different way,” and rebukes those who “yearn for the riddles, allegories, and metaphors” as preferable to the simpler, more direct oracles of first-century Delphi (Pyth. orac. 407F, 409C-D), there is of course no sure way of knowing how he would have reacted to God’s novel way of speaking and acting through a son (Heb 1:1-2).27 It is one thing to acknowledge a theological principle and quite another to agree upon a specific instance of that principle at work. It is of the essential nature of special revelation that its content or significance is inaccessible to or unanticipated by unaided reason. Accordingly, it is not possible to tell how a person might have responded to the novel claim that only Jesus—his life, death, resurrection, and priestly office in heaven—relativizes the fearfulness of any earthly danger and does away with all need to be afraid of God’s wrath. Like most thinkers in antiquity, the author of Hebrews finds the old to be trustworthy and is cautious about anything new, yet in common with the rest of the NT authors, he cannot bring himself to deny that something new has happened and that it is the work of God. He bends over backwards to show how Jesus, while representing God’s new way of dealing with humanity, nonetheless fits perfectly with the divine plan related under the old covenant. But rather than downplaying it for apologetic purposes, the distinctive solution to the problem of fear in Hebrews actually underscores the scandal of particularity that the Christian message has caused since its very beginning.