Leibniz

The Practice of Reason: Leibniz and his Controversies edited by Marcelo Dascal (John Benjamins Publishing Company) Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646-1716) dedicated much of his life to some of the most central debates of his time. For him, our chance of progress towards the happiness of mankind lies in the capacity to recognize the value of the different perspectives through which humans approach the world. Controversies supply the opportunity to exercise this capacity by approaching the opponent not as an adversary but as someone from whose point of view we can enrich our own viewpoint and improve our knowledge.

This approach inspired the creation of this series. The book – the first in the series devoted to Leibniz – presents his views through actual controversies in which he participated, in several domains. Leibniz’s original ‘theory of controversies’ thus appears not only as what the thinker thinks about how one should use reason in a controversy, but also how he puts in practice the kind of rationality he preaches.

Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz was a philosopher, mathematician, jurist, engineer, theologian, physicist, linguist, logician, political advisor and theorist, historian -in short, a polymath. His aim, in all his endeavors, was one - to contribute to the improvement of humankind. He was also one of the first thinkers to realize that controversies have a crucial role in the growth of knowledge, as well as in progress in all branches of human activity. Much of his intellectual and practical activities consisted in participating in some of the central debates of his time (many of which are still open today). His main concern was not to ensure the victory of his own positions, however persuaded he was of their correctness. He was rather interested in learning from his opponents' views, for he conceived the development of knowledge and the solution of man's problems as a collective enterprise to which every bit of insight, whatever its source, was a precious, irreplaceable contribution. For him, man's chance of progress towards happiness lies in the capacity to recognize the value of the different individual perspectives through which humans approach the world. In controversies we have the opportunity to exercise this capacity by making the necessary effort to view the opponent not as an adversary but as a teacher, from whose point of view one has much to learn and through which one can enrich and improve one's own understanding.

To his friend Placcius, who asked for his critique of a recent manuscript, Leibniz wrote in April 1695: "You should not doubt that I will be an eager and, as far as possible, a studious reader of whatever emanates from you. Nevertheless, criticism requires more work, and it should not be expected from me, for by nature and education I am prepared to look for, in the writings of others, for what contributes to my improvement rather than to the other's failure" (DA 297). It is in this Leibnizian spirit that this series was created and this book - the first in the series especially devoted to his work - is intended to provide further insight into his sui generis dialectic.

Leibniz the controversialist is presented to the reader in this book through a selection of actual controversies in which he took part in different areas of knowledge and action. Of course, the practice of controversy reveals the practitioners' beliefs about the principles that should underlie it, thereby providing a glance into their way of understanding the peculiar features of controversy's rationality. Nevertheless, the possibility of observing the unfolding of actual controversies, the recurring strategies of argumentation used, the aims pursued, and the measure in which they are or are not reached, offers, in addition, a new perspective for understanding and assessing a controversialist's 'theory of controversies'. For it shows not only what a thinker thinks about how one should use reason and other tools in the conduct of a controversy, but also how he actively puts in practice the kind of rationality he preaches. It is mainly, though not only, through this perspective that the book purports to contribute to the understanding of what must be acknowledged as Leibniz's 'dialectic'.

His unquestionable merits as a moderate and constructive polemicist notwithstanding, Leibniz was not a saint when it came to actual disputes, as he was no saint when it came to his other activities. One should not expect all the polemics he was engaged in to unfold in the benevolent spirit he claims to conform to by his nature and education. From a pluralist like him, who declares that "in a simple substance there must be a plurality of affections and relations, even though it has no parts" (Monadology §13; GP 6 608), one should rather expect a variety of 'affections' vis-a-vis controversies. Indeed this is the case, to judge from the sample of Leibnizian controversies gathered in this book. In this respect, the book shows how a thinker is not necessarily bound to a single model and style of debating.

No wonder that the three ideal types identified in the typology of debates, which I have been using for more than a decade in my investigation of controversies found their way into the pages of this book effortlessly and unintentionally. Leibniz's participation in the vis viva controversy and the Leibniz-Huygens exchange on the infinitesimal calculus (Chapters 3 and 2), for example, are close to be good examples of the ideal type I call 'discussion' (generally taken to be the model for scientific debate); where the objective is to determine the truth, the contenders share the assumption that this can be reached by applying a certain decision procedure, and the preferred form of argumentation is logical, mathematical, or experimental proof. The animosity of the Leibniz-Pufendorf relation, reflected in their intellectual and political positions vis-a-vis each other's views (Chapter 10), is typical of the kind of debate I dub 'dispute', in which the aim is victory over the adversary, no shared method of decision of the divergence is available, and stratagems of all sorts are in use. The Sturm-Schelhammer debate is also a quite clear case of dispute, apparent, for instance, in the titles chosen for their writings against each other. Yet Leibniz's conciliatory intervention in this dispute transforms it in fact into a 'controversy' (in my sense of the term). It is exemplary of his way of trying to transform the opposition between apparently contradictory positions into a milder opposition; this method permits to overcome the exclusive tertium non datur dichotomy, unblocking the debate and leading to the creation of an alternative which combines elements of each of the opposed positions in a sort of hybrid theory - a typical example of the contribution of the ideal type 'controversy' to the growth of knowledge (Chapter 6).

Needless to say, actual debates can hardly be pure instances of any categories that are construed as ideal types. Debates are dynamic; they may typify different categories in different phases of their development, and even within the same phase they may display elements of different ideal types. In fact, in several of the Chapters we face debates that cannot be simply assigned to one of the ideal types. For example, the Leibniz-Papin debate, as shown in Chapter 4, is typically a 'dispute' in its public phase and a 'controversy' in its private phase - a similar phenomenon occurring in the Leibniz-Foucher debate (Chapter 8).

Having briefly hinted at the richness of the material contained in each chapter of this book, which deals with relatively unknown Leibnizian controversies, I will leave it to the reader to pursue its exploration on his/her own. We have cared to make this possible by providing abundant quotations that convey not only the content but also the flavor of the arguments, by keeping the originals in French or Latin, as well as by translating them when they are not easily accessible in standard English versions, and by giving the necessary references.

The origins of this book can be traced back to a 1995 project titled "Leibniz the Polemicist". The more recent story of the book begins in 2001, with a colloquium at the Center for the Study of Modern Philosophy (CNRS, Paris), jointly organized by Christian Fremont and myself. The topic was Leibniz's controversies. Only some of the participants in that colloquium have submitted their contributions to the present book, but it is thanks to that indispensable initial impulse that the book has finally materialized. Other authors joined the group and gradually the intended coverage of the variety of controversies in which Leibniz was involved reached the point originally aimed at.

The principle of continuity and the 'paradox' of Leibnizian mathematics by Michel Serfati
Geometrization or mathematization: Christiaan Huygens's critiques of infinitesimal analysis in his correspondence with Leibniz by Fabien Chareix
Leibniz and the vis viva controversy by Idan Shimony
The controversy between Leibniz and Papin: From the public debate to the correspondence by Anne-Lise Rey
Leibniz vs. Stahl: A controversy well beyond medicine and chemistry by Sarah Carvallo
Leibniz's conciliatory approaches in scientific controversies by Marcelo Dascal and Erez Firt
Leibniz vs. Lamy: How does confused perception unite soul and body? by Andreas Blank
Leibniz vs. Foucher: Is there anything wrong with the Système Nouveau? by Marta Mendonça
Quantification of natural and positive laws: How to organize privileges? by Pol Boucher
Leibniz's critique of Pufendorf: A dispute in the eve of the Enlightenment by Detlef airing
Leibniz vs. Jablonski: An intestine struggle on uniting the Protestant camp by Hartmut Rudolph
The golden rule: Aspects of Leibniz's method for religious controversy by Mogens Lærke
Leibniz vs. Bossuet: Which reasons for Irenicism? by Christiane Fremont

Self and Substance in Leibniz by Marc Elliott Bobro (Kluwer Academic Publishers) We are omniscient but confused, says Leibniz. He also says that we live in the best of all possible worlds, yet do not causally interact. So what are we? Leibniz is known for many things, including the ideality of space and time, calculus, plans for a universal language, theodicy, and ecumenism. But he is not known for his ideas on the self and personal identity. This book shows that Leibniz offers an original, internally coherent theory of personal identity, a theory that stands on its own even next to Locke's contemporaneous and more famous version. This book will appeal not only to students of Leibniz's thought but also to philosophers and psychologists interested in methodological problems in understanding or formulating theories of self and personal identity.

Bobro writes an historically nuanced and conceptually rich account of the coherence of Leibniz's thought about self and substance. The nature of how self and substance obtain toward one another however has been rife with ambiguity and controversy. “Is a self for Leibniz identical with a particular substance? Or, do selves merely resemble immaterial substances—a helpful device to get a handle on the mysterious monad? Ultimately, are Leibnizian selves best understood as Lockean unities or histories of consciousness?” Bobro asks. Explications of such questions have been ignored by most commentators, not only Leibniz but the other great rationalist forebears René Descartes and Baruch Spinoza.

Bobro claims that the most complete articulation of Leibniz's theory of self and substance comes in Book II, Chapter 27, of the Nouveaux essais sur l'entendement humain (New Essays on Human Understanding) (completed in 1704, first published in 1765); which is a point-by-point analysis of John Locke's theory of personal identity in An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (second edition, 1694).

Many who have read Leibniz's words on personal identity in the Nouveaux essais assume Leibniz is in basic agreement with Locke. Leibniz is partly to blame for this mistaken impression. Bobro asserts that Leibniz is not in basic agreement with Locke. Leibniz’s style can appear overly conciliatory in the Nouveaux essais and he even sets up a sustained dialogue between himself (as Theophilus) and "Locke" (as Philalethes) “as if they were proceeding from the same definitions, having the same objectives, and working under the same constraints. The passages on personal identity seem no different; consequently, it can be difficult to discern any substantial disagreement between Leibniz and Locke. No doubt Leibniz and Locke do share some of the same objectives and work under some of the same constraints.”

Bobro attempts to reconfigure Leibniz's theory of personal identity as an original, internally coherent, theory of personal identity. Bobro begins by raising the essential question: “You are a person, but are you essentially a person? What exactly does it mean to be a person?” In other words, can one exist (or did one once exist) without being a person? Bobro argues that for Leibniz once a person, always a person. This assumption is not true for Locke. So right from the start we find a significant difference between Leibniz and Locke.

Next Bobro explores Leibniz’s view of the composition of a person by showing that by taking the monad, itself an enduring perceiver, as a base and adding certain psychological attributes such as memory, self-consciousness, and rationality, Leibniz arrives at his conception of person. Many commentators have charged that Leibniz's account of the psychological component of personal identity is inconsistent, and based on a superficial reading of Leibniz's Nouveaux essais such an assumption certainly seems warranted, since he says both that memory is necessary and that it is not. However, Bobro asserts that there is no inconsistency in Leibniz's account of the psychological component of personal identity since Leibniz distinguishes between what is necessary for being a person from what is necessary for being the same person over time.

“Monads—Leibnizian simple substances—are seemingly perfect candidates for persons. For, by all accounts, monads are immaterial, enduring substances distinguished by the content and clarity of their internally-driven and incessantly changing perceptions, yet each existing in preestablished harmony with all the others. Leibniz's monads are really a far cry from anything Locke takes to be a substance. They are certainly not "substrata" or things with "bare substantial existence and duration." Thus, substance in Leibniz's hands is a much more promising candidate as a condition for personal identity than substance in Locke's hands.”

Nevertheless, many critics of Leibniz's mature metaphysics have been uncertain to claim for him the unequivocal assertion that persons are monads at all. They suppose that after reading Locke's Essay, Leibniz was so infatuated with Locke's notion of person as psychologically continuous being, that either Leibniz seizes upon Locke's view without actually giving up his earlier understanding of person and as a consequence holds inconsistent views; or Leibniz in fact discards his person-monad in favor of Locke's view that sameness of substance (that is, monadic identity) is not necessary for personal identity.

Bobro argues that although Locke's theory of personal identity certainly had some important influence on Leibniz, Leibniz never dispose of his view that sameness of substance is necessary for the continued existence of the same person. Leibniz persisted with an immaterialist notion of substance and with an immaterialist explanation of thought. Because thought follows from substance because thought must be caused by a substance. According to Leibniz, the unity of consciousness must necessarily be explained by or caused by a true unity, that is, a simple, indivisible substance. Locke, however, is committed neither to an immaterialist notion of substance nor an immaterialist explanation of thought. At best, Locke holds that a substance is a mere holder of properties, with no distinguishing features of its own, that uniquely individuates it from other substances. According to Locke, identity of substance (material or immaterial) has nothing to do with psychological identity, that is, of psychological properties, character, personality, memories, disposition, and attitudes. Bobro claims that such a difference between Leibniz and Locke cannot be overcome.

Next Bobro examines the monadic conception of substance as “crucial in grounding Leibniz's account of what it takes for a person to be morally responsible for past deeds, that is, morally identical with the perpetrator of those deeds.”. Bobro argues that Leibniz never admitted the possibility of thinking machines as moral agents. Nevertheless, Leibniz does countenance the logical possibility of thinking machines, that is, mere aggregates of matter endowed with mental states.

However there is it appears a serious problem in reconciling Leibniz's views on moral agency with his monadological metaphysics. Leibniz accepts as true both that there is no valid causal interaction among monads or simple substances—they are famously "windowless"—and that moral agents do live and take part in a community. However, for Leibniz, all moral agents are monads. So, how is it that non-interactive monads interact, so to speak? Bobro maintains that, according to Leibniz, monads cannot be part of the general order or connection of things without existing as united with a body, and hence embodiment is required for participation in a community of moral agents. Bobro gives an extended case for the astonishing and thoroughly un-Lockean, and hardly ever held claim that for Leibniz a disembodied monad could not even qualify for moral agency.

These observations of Bobro begin to show that there a major difference between Leibniz's and Locke's theories of personal identity that have been previously overlooked—there is unquestionably more stress on body in Leibniz's theory of personal identity than in Locke's.

Unlike Locke, Leibniz gives explicitly philosophical reasons for an embodied life, both in the present and the hereafter, independent of Christian faith. Whereas Leibniz rejects the idea that we are not essentially a person, he deeply approves of the Henry More's and Anne Conway's anti-Cartesian view that we are always embodied. He does not go so far as More and Conway in saying that spirit and body are merely two aspects of one and the same thing, but he does hold that we each are a particular substance that is always united with a body. In fact, Bobro asserts that for Leibniz we would not even qualify for moral agency unless we are a body. This view looks as if it is quite contrary to Locke's way of thinking. Bobro claims that the issue of embodiment represents a significant divergence between Leibniz's and Locke's theories of self and personal identity. It is a difference that has been missed in previous discussions of the philosophers.

Bobro’s study not only addresses what Leibniz means by person and moral agent, but also in great part what constitutes the logically necessary and sufficient conditions for the continued existence or survival of a person and a moral agent. In the conclusion Bobro explores the question: “Under what conditions does a person secure over time what matters in survival?” Bobro asserts that Leibniz holds first of all that meaningful survival takes for granted sameness of substance. For Leibniz the promise of sameness of substance serves to ground meaningful survival beyond death—as long as continuation of substance entails continuation of memory or, in some other way, guarantees knowledge of what we have been. Meaningful survival for Leibniz presupposes the memory or knowledge of what we have been (contra Spinoza). In other words, we would have no reason to desire a future state of survival if that state of survival did not guarantee the memory or knowledge of our past. Leibniz believes that this shows that Platonic, Spinozistic, and Cartesian promises of immortality cannot rationally console us. Bobro asserts that Leibniz fails to show that such a claim can be generalized to all situations. But Leibniz's direct concern is with immortality and the kinds of immortality God might have bestowed upon his subjects.

There are couple of appendixes. The first sketches some differences between Leibniz and Hume on the question of personal identity. The second tries to draw some contrasts between Leibniz's arguments for his views on self and substance and those Kant famously criticizes in his "Paralogisms of Pure Reason."

This does not attempt to formulate a new theory of personal identity; rather it attempts to describe a past philosopher's theory, the aim, not to give the definitive account of Leibniz's theory of personal identity—of self and substance—but to open his ideas up for future discussion.

The above chapters serve to answer not only what Leibniz means by person and moral agent, but also in great part what constitutes the logically necessary and sufficient conditions for the continued existence or survival of a person and a moral agent. But the sixth and final chapter will address the further (and currently popular) question: Under what conditions does a person secure over time what matters in survival? I will argue in "What Makes My Survival Meaningful?" that Leibniz holds first of all that meaningful survival presupposes sameness of substance. For it seems that for Leibniz the promise of sameness of substance might rationally be of some concern to us. Leibniz believes that the promise of the continuation of substance can and should console us—and thereby serve to ground meaningful survival—as long as continuation of substance entails continuation of memory or, in some other way, guarantees knowledge of what we have been. On the other hand, Locke cannot fathom the idea that a guarantee merely of substantial continuity can ground psychological identity, for again, Locke's account of substance (supposing he has one) is of a bare substratum.

Meaningful survival for Leibniz presupposes the memory or knowledge of what we have been (contra Spinoza). In other words, we would have no reason to desire a future state of survival if that state of survival did not guarantee the memory or knowledge of our past. Leibniz believes that this shows that Platonic, Spinozistic, and Cartesian promises of immortality cannot rationally console us. I will argue, however, that Leibniz fails to show that such a claim can be generalized to all situations. But Leibniz's direct concern is with immortality and the kinds of immortality God might have bestowed upon his subjects.

A couple of appendixes can be found at the end of this book. The first sketches some differences between Leibniz and Hume on the question of personal identity. The second tries to draw some contrasts between Leibniz's arguments for his views on self and substance and those Kant famously criticizes in his "Paralogisms of Pure Reason."

You are a person, but are you essentially a person? What exactly does it mean to be a person?

What are the conditions for remaining the same person over time?
Could something non-human be a person?
What relation do bodies have to persons?
What is rationally desirable in a person's survival?

Now, this book does not constitute an attempt at formulating a new theory of personal identity. It attempts to describe a past philosopher's theory. So what then of the above questions? I maintain that in coming to a good understanding of another's theory of personal identity—even a theory formulated centuries past—we must be able to answer those same questions. Indeed, sometimes I will refer to recent developments in the literature on personal identity to shed light on Leibniz.

I have decided to focus on a single topic. Sure, personal identity inevitably leads to much of the rest of Leibniz' s philosophical system: individuation, force and activity, petites perceptiones, justice, harmony, and theodicy. But I will defer much detail on these issues either to work I have published elsewhere or to work by others. For example, detailed discussion of the problem of individuation will be deferred to a couple of recent books on the topic: McCullough's Leibniz on Individuals and Individuation and Cover and O'Leary-Hawthorne's Substance and Individuation in Leibniz. Certainly more could be said on all these topics. However, the general question—What is Leibniz's theory of personal identity?—is hard enough. And it yields a manageable manuscript. My aim is not to give the definitive account of Leibniz's theory of personal identity—of self and substance—but to provoke further discussion.

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Leibniz

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Review Essays of Academic, Professional & Technical Books in the Humanities & Sciences

Leibniz

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Enlightenment