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Realism and Relativism: Philosophical Issues edited by Ernest Sosa, Enrique Villanueva (Blackwell Publishers) gathers papers by many of the best-known philosophers now at work on issues of realism and relativism across the field of philosophy. The result is representative of the best cutting-edge work in the area. It includes work both on the ontology and epistemology of the normative as well as on more general metaphysical and epistemological issues of relativism and realism.

It is the claim that if the classical realism of Descartes' absolute conception of reality (along with relativism, with which it shares a crucial assumption) was successfully refuted by the argument presented in Section I, then the second and residual form of Cartesian realism presented in Section II cannot claim any advantage over the far more attractive pragmatist realism (more attractive because it promotes a more credible epistemology) presented in Section III. This is because the only reason to think that it might have any advantage over the pragmatist version of realism is that the latter seemed susceptible to a kind of relativism. But since it was precisely the force of the argument of Section I that it not only refuted classical realism but also refuted at the same time the kind of relativism with which it shares a crucial assumption, that advantage is illusory. The pragmatist can appeal to that argument, as we have just done in the present section, to show that no such relativism threatens her, despite her rejection of the residual Cartesian realism of Section II.

It is a pity that Davidson does not see the force of his own argument, presented in Section I, as allowing him the space to occupy a far more plausible epistemology than the residual Cartesian one that he rests with. He is happy to rest with the thought that not all our beliefs can be false, thinking that that is enough to keep the Cartesian sceptic at bay. He therefore aggressively asserts that once we have established that not all our beliefs can be false, we must add that we never know which ones among them are true. Truth, of this kind, is still realist truth of course, if not quite that of the absolute conception of reality. In embracing it, Davidson completely neglects the fact that a quite distinct and just as crippling sceptical Cartesian position is entailed by it, a scepticism which re-mains unhurt by his argument presented in Section I, a scepticism which Moore, Austin, Wittgenstein, and the pragmatists are all resisting, the one which says that we are never given the right to claim that any particular belief amounts to knowledge, even if have the general right to the general claim that we have a great deal of knowledge. But he need not have gone on to assert this residual Cartesian position. If I am right in this last section, his own argument with its combined and integrated force against classical realism and relativism allows him to assert an alternative position, a pragmatism, with no concessions to Cartesian scepticism of any variety, with no concessions—despite appearances—to relativism of any sort, and moreover a position (as was shown in Section III) which may properly also call itself a `realism' because it satisfies basic realist demands, once they are shorn off from extreme and gratuitous Cartesian notions of the sort of independence truth and reality are supposed to have from our position as inquirers.

I have singled out Davidson for the most discussion because it is particularly ironic and frustrating that someone who has provided an argument against relativism which makes no appeal to Cartesian realism of any variety in the course of giving the argument, someone who has provided therefore an argument which helps us see that in opposing relativism we do not have to embrace any realism of a sort that implies an unattractive epistemology, should then have failed to arrive at a much more satisfying realism, a realism that integrates itself with a far more attractive epistemology. But it's not just Davidson—Putnam, Rorty, and all the other philosophers who are opposed to one or other versions of Cartesian epistemology and the realisms they presuppose, should all prize such an integration that pragmatism in this form provides. Yet, as I said earlier, Putnam ties truth to unnecessarily idealized conceptions of war-ranted assertiblity, and Rorty has given up the idea that truth is in any sense a goal of inquiry, seeking to replace it by notions of justification and warranted assertiblity. None of those options seem necessary or attractive, once this pragmatist version of realism comes to light.

 Contributors: Akeel Bílgrami • Michael Devitt • James Dreier • Eli Hirsch • Terry Horgan • Frank Jackson • Philip Pettit • Carol Rovane • Stephen Schiffer • Alan Sidelle • Walter Sinnott-Armstrong • Michael Smith • Galen Strawson • Mark Timmons • Peter van Inwagen • Achille C. Varzi • Stephen Yablo

If the classical realism of Descartes' absolute conception of reality (along with relativism, with which it shares a crucial assumption) can be successfully refuted, then the second and residual form of Cartesian realism cannot claim any advantage over the far more attractive pragmatist realism (more attractive because it promotes a more credible epistemology) This is because the only reason to think that it might have any advantage over the pragmatist version of realism is that the latter seemed susceptible to a kind of relativism. But since it was precisely the force of the argument that it not only refuted classical realism but also refuted at the same time the kind of relativism with which it shares a crucial assumption, that advantage is illusory. The pragmatist can appeal to that argument to show that no such relativism threatens her, despite her rejection of the residual Cartesian realism.

It is a pity that Davidson does not see the force of his own argument as allowing him the space to occupy a far more plausible epistemology than the residual Cartesian one that he rests with. He is happy to rest with the thought that not all our beliefs can be false, thinking that that is enough to keep the Cartesian sceptic at bay. He therefore aggressively asserts that once we have established that not all our beliefs can be false, we must add that we never know which ones among them are true. Truth, of this kind, is still realist truth of course, if not quite that of the absolute conception of reality. In embracing it, Davidson completely neglects the fact that a quite distinct and just as crippling sceptical Cartesian position is entailed by it, a scepticism which re-mains unhurt by his argument, a scepticism which Moore, Austin, Wittgenstein, and the pragmatists are all resisting, the one which says that we are never given the right to claim that any particular belief amounts to knowledge, even if have the general right to the general claim that we have a great deal of knowledge. But he need not have gone on to assert this residual Cartesian position. If the argument with its combined and integrated force against classical realism and relativism allows him to assert an alternative position, a pragmatism, with no concessions to Cartesian scepticism of any variety, with no concessions—despite appearances—to relativism of any sort, and moreover a position which may properly also call itself a `realism' because it satisfies basic realist demands, once they are shorn off from extreme and gratuitous Cartesian notions of the sort of independence truth and reality are supposed to have from our position as inquirers.

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