The Predicament of Postmodern Theology: Radical Orthodoxy or Nihilist Textualism? by Gavin Hyman (Westminster John Knox Press) It may be said that radical orthodoxy and nihilist textualism provide two rad­ically antithetical theological responses to our postmodern predicament. What is particularly striking, however, is that these two responses have largely failed to confront and engage each other. In particular, radical orthodoxy makes serious and challenging criticisms of postmodern nihilism to which the nihilist textualist writers have manifestly failed to respond. Indeed, not only nihilist textualism but also other forms of modern and liberal theology have failed to take up Milbank's gauntlet. Although many theologians have been quick to distance themselves from the radical orthodox enterprise, an extended and thorough critique of the project has yet to appear.

It is the primary aim of this book to disrupt this absence by providing a rigor­ous critique of radical orthodoxy from a postmodern perspective. This perspective has something in common with the nihilist textualism of Cupitt and especially Taylor. It will become clear, however, that the process of "out-narration" is not uni­directional, and that radical orthodoxy itself allows one to perceive many defi­ciencies in the projects of nihilist textualism. In particular, it will be seen that nihilist textualism is, in many respects, insufficiently postmodern. I therefore point toward a third postmodern disposition, a "fictional nihilism" that is neither the radical orthodoxy of John Milbank nor the nihilist textualism of Don Cupitt. A subsidiary, though equally necessary, aim of this book is to provide an analysis of the relationship of these two versions of postmodern theology to each other, to the postmodern condition out of which they both, in different ways, emerge, and to the philosophical epoch of modernity against which they both, in different ways, react. It is only out of such an analysis that a properly informed evaluation can emerge.

In chapter 1, I provide an account of the cultural and philosophical condi­tion of postmodernity, drawing in particular on the work of Fredric Jameson, Perry Anderson, and Jean-Francois Lyotard. I then discuss and summarize the two main theological responses to such a condition, taking Don Cupitt as a paradigm of nihilist textualism and John Milbank as a paradigm of radical orthodoxy. I show that whereas Cupitt is much more willing to embrace this cultural condition, together with its implications for theology, Milbank embraces it only insofar as it allows for the return of theology. Once theology has returned, Milbank then provides a theological critique of the very post-modernism that made his theology possible. Milbank's attitude to post-modernism is therefore much more ambivalent than Cupitt's. I suggest that the differing evaluations of postmodernism on the parts of Cupitt and Milbank cannot be understood apart from their respective evaluations of modernity, a discussion I turn to in chapter 2.

Whereas it is often thought that modernity began somewhere around the six­teenth century, particularly with the philosophy of Rene Descartes, I consider the work of Hans Urs von Balthasar and other, more recent scholars (including those of radical orthodoxy) to show how many aspects of Cartesian philosophy are inconceivable without certain theological innovations in the thirteenth and four­teenth centuries on the part of such theologians as John Duns Scotus. If the logic of Scotist thought was manifested in Descartes's philosophy, then it reached its culmination in the philosophy of Immanuel Kant. I show how this "modernist" philosophical tradition is given contemporary expression in the work of liberal theologians such as John Hick. Furthermore, I show how Cupitt's postmodernism emerged organically and progressively out of a similar liberal theology that he previously espoused. In this way, it can be seen that nihilist textualism essentially stands in a relationship of continuity with modernity, even if it is shown that the logic of modernity must ultimately subvert itself. In contrast, radical orthodoxy is emphatically discontinuous with modernity, insisting that the project of modernity is itself a logical outworking of the fundamentally secular and hence "heretical" moves of Duns Scotus. Insofar as postmodernism is a (continuous) exacerbation of modernity, it, too, is fundamentally secular and heretical, and both modernity and postmodernity must be left behind in favor of theology. But insofar as postmodernism interrogates and criticizes modernity, this aspect may be embraced by Milbank as an ally for his cause. Thus, the respective stances of Cupitt and Milbank toward postmodernism can be understood only in terms of these thinkers' antithetical evaluations of modernity.

In chapter 3, I consider the question of why Cupitt has failed to confront the challenge presented to his work by radical orthodoxy. I argue that he is ultimately unable to address the challenge because his project is located within a realist/ anti-realist framework that is a manifestation of the dualism of modernity. This means that any viewpoint or narrative that lies outside this framework is reduced to nothing or is distorted by being subsumed into a framework it refuses. I show how Cupitt follows the latter strategy, insisting that radical orthodox theologians are "non-realists in disguise." The "otherness" of radical orthodoxy as an-"other" theology is thereby destroyed, and the essence of its viewpoint is severely dis­torted, for Cupitt insists on interpreting radical orthodoxy in terms of a frame-work that radical orthodoxy itself refuses. The result is that Cupitt is unable to identify and confront the true essence of its challenge. I argue, therefore, that if a critique of radical orthodoxy is to be effective, it must move beyond and leave behind the realist/anti-realist framework altogether.

I undertake such a critique in chapter 4, where I again take John Milbank's work as a paradigm of radical orthodox theology. My criticisms here are of two main types. First, I argue that Milbank's absolute conception of the theological metanarrative is itself undesirable in its inevitable effects. I show how it gives rise to a dualistic opposition between theology and nihilism, and that this, in turn, gives rise to a whole series of derivative dualisms. I show how the initial dualism gives rise to a violent warfare between theology and nihilism as well as to violent readings and treatments of of all other, subsidiary narratives. I also suggest that Milbank's metanarrative resists the "mastery" of modernist metanarratives only with difficulty. These characteristics are particularly problematic because much of Milbank's rhetoric depends on his contention that (his) theology is the only metanarrative that can resist dualism, violence, and mastery.

Second, I argue that Milbank's absolute metanarrative is, in any case, inher­ently unstable, and that it repeatedly deconstructs itself from within. I suggest that Milbank can resist mastery only by invoking a fictionalist (or nihilist?) supplement that cannot be derived solely from the theological metanarrative itself. The very existence of such a supplement undermines the status of Milbank's metanarrative as an absolute metanarrative. I demonstrate that in Milbank's project, the Chris­tian (meta)narrative is itself "positioned" by Milbank's own (meta)narrative, which is again distinct from the Christian narrative. Furthermore, when Milbank pro­vides an account of the way in which his (meta)narrative "out-narrates" other (meta)narratives, he thereby invokes a "meta-metanarrative" that converges remarkably with the metanarrative of nihilism he is so concerned to reject. In this way, Milbank's absolute metanarrative appears to deconstruct itself from within, for when every metanarrative is positioned by a higher level of metanarrative, the very concept of metanarrative is itself destabilized. It seems that, in post-modernism, a metanarrative is as impossible as it is unavoidable.

Having criticized radical orthodoxy from a postmodern perspective, I reverse the direction of confrontation in chapter 5. Here, I defend postmodern nihilism from Milbank's virulent attacks and (mis)interpretations. I distinguish between a metaphysical nihilism and a fictional nihilism and argue that Milbank's "out-narration" of nihilism is directed solely at a metaphysical form of nihilism. This form of nihilism espouses a metaphysics of the nothing, the nothing that is. As such, it is, as Milbank claims, a disguised form of positivism and consequently refuses all nihilistic implications. I claim that nihilism is properly accomplished only with a weakening of its own ontological status: when it is recognized that nihilism is no more than a fiction. The fictionalism that nihilism ascribes to everything else must ultimately be ascribed even to itself. Furthermore, I argue that Nietzsche himself would be better interpreted as a fictional nihilist, and that any attempt to read him in a metaphysical fashion does undue violence to texts. I argue that it is precisely such a fictional nihilism that Milbank fails to con front. Insofar as postmodern nihilists are themselves fictional nihilists, the meta physical nihilism that Milbank out-narrates is, in effect, a straw man. In the face of a properly accomplished fictional nihilism, Milbank's criticisms would appeal to subside.

Finally, in chapter 6, I consider what a writing of fictional nihilism might loo like. First, I argue that Cupitt's nihilism is insufficiently fictional. The difficulyhere is that Cupitt espouses what is essentially a modern postmodernism, in which the "other" is repressed. When the "other" is eradicated, everything is present and nothing is hidden. This is the modern utopia of the presence of the present. Without an "other," a "principle of travel," Cupitt's narrative becomes static, stable, and insufficiently reflexive. Cupitt wants to "overcome" reflexivity

rather than embrace it. The result of this is that he appears to lapse into what he himself describes as an "obsolete metaphysics." Mark C. Taylor rectifies Cupitt's neglect in this regard. Constantly aware of the "other" that always returns, Tay­lor is sent on an endless voyage of exile; for the "other" ruptures every system, dislocates every location, and refuses every habitation. Taylor therefore passes over every location and is consequently exiled to the nonplace of nowhere—the desert.

It is my suggestion, however, that such a movement is insufficiently embodied. Refusing and passing over every location, Taylor exiles himself to literally nowhere. I suggest that although we should follow Taylor in his movement of perpetual departure, we should move through locations, traditions, and habitations rather than merely pass over them. I suggest that such a movement is exemplified in the writings of Michel de Certeau. For although de Certeau departs on an "endless

exodus of discourse," he nevertheless moves through the finite, through narratives, particularities, bodies, and locations. Although all discourses must ultimately be left behind in the name of the "other," they can be properly left behind only if they have first been inhabited. I also resist the attempts of some theologians to "domes­ticate" de Certeau's writings in favor of a more orthodox theological reading. For although theology, as a heterological discourse par excellence, is a narrative that de Certeau wants to wander through, his heterological concern for the "other" means that theology itself must also, ultimately, be left behind.

I suggest, therefore, that Michel de Certeau shows us not so much the way forward as the way to "get lost" in our postmodern condition. He narrates an endless exodus of discourse that may serve as a paradigm for a writing of fictional nihilism. His writings exemplify the a/logic of the neither/nor that rejects the either/or of both radical orthodoxy and nihilist textualism. In the conclusion, I point toward a third territory for postmodern theology, in which theology repeat­edly "returns" to haunt the movement of perpetual departure. In this sense, we can never be done with theology. But this return cannot be absolute, and the movement of perpetual departure can no longer be anchored in a theological ori­gin. To be anchored in this way is to return to theology as metanarrative, a return that is as undesirable as it is impossible. Understood in this sense, theology must always also "depart."

Having now completed the prelude or introduction to these particular wan­derings, we must now attempt the impossible: that is, we must now attempt to begin at the beginning.

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