Classic Islam as Politics in Modernity

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Into the Hands of the Soldiers: Freedom and Chaos in Egypt and the Middle East by David D. Kirkpatrick [Viking, 9780735220621]

A candid narrative of how and why the Arab Spring sparked, then failed, and the truth about America's role in that failure and the subsequent military coup that put Sisi in power--from the Middle East correspondent of the New York Times.

In 2011, Egyptians of all sects, ages, and social classes shook off millennia of autocracy, then elected a Muslim Brother as president. The 2013 military coup replaced him with a new strongman, Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, who has cracked down on any dissent or opposition with a degree of ferocity Mubarak never dared. New York Times correspondent David D. Kirkpatrick arrived in Egypt with his family less than six months before the uprising first broke out in 2011, looking for a change from life in Washington, D.C. As revolution and violence engulfed the country, he received an unexpected and immersive education in the Arab world.

For centuries, Egypt has set in motion every major trend in politics and culture across the Middle East, from independence and Arab nationalism to Islamic modernism, political Islam, and the jihadist thought that led to Al Qaeda and ISIS. The Arab Spring revolts of 2011 spread from Cairo, and now Americans understandably look with cynical exasperation at the disastrous Egyptian experiment with democracy. They fail to understand the dynamic of the uprising, the hidden story of its failure, and Washington's part in that tragedy. In this candid narrative, Kirkpatrick lives through Cairo's hopeful days and crushing disappointments

alongside the diverse population of his new city: the liberal yuppies who first gathered in Tahrir Square; the persecuted Coptic Christians standing guard around Muslims at prayer during the protests; and the women of a grassroots feminism movement that tried to seize its moment. Juxtaposing his on-the-ground experience in Cairo with new reporting on the conflicts within the Obama administration, Kirkpatrick traces how authoritarianism was allowed to reclaim Egypt after thirty months of turmoil.

Into the Hands of the Soldiers is a heartbreaking story with a simple message: The failings of decades of autocracy are the reason for the chaos we see today across the Arab world. Because autocracy is the problem, more autocracy is unlikely to provide a durable solution. Egypt, home to one in four Arabs, is always a bellwether. Understanding its recent history is essential to understanding everything taking place across the region today--from the terrorist attacks in the North Sinai and Egypt's new partnership with Israel to the bedlam in Syria and Libya.

Excerpt: Whoever Drinks the Water

Driving east from Tunis may be the best way to take in the miracle of the Nile. The road follows the Mediterranean coast for about seventeen hundred miles. Almost every inch of it is brown twelve months a year—rock and sand baking in the sun. Then you cross an invisible line at the edge of the Nile Valley. Everywhere is an eruption of green. Not even the congestion of Cairo can contain the riot of vegetation.

For millennia, no other territory in the Middle East produced such a bounty. Where the yearly flooding of the Euphrates was violent and destructive, the cycles of the Nile were gentle and predictable. A truism holds that the histories of Egypt and Iraq follow their rivers. Medieval sultans dug a well, known today as the Nile-o-meter, on Rawda Island in Cairo, to measure the water level. The annual rise determined how generous the crops would be that year, and the sultans taxed the peasants accordingly. Farming was that easy. The Nile Valley became the breadbasket of the Arab world. Egyptians swelled with pride in their river.

Whoever drinks the water of the Nile will return again to Egypt, the old saying goes.

Egyptians also like to say that they have been rallying around grand national projects since the Pharaohs built the temples of Thebes. After taking power in 1952, President Gamal Abdel Nasser decided to build a great dam at Aswan, near the Sudanese border, to harness the Nile for hydroelectric power. Abdel Nasser promised a dam "more magnificent and seventeen times greater than the Pyramids."

Secretary of State John Foster Dulles announced in 1955 that the United States and the United Kingdom would provide $70 million in assistance for construction of the dam. But he did not like Abdel Nasser's denunciations of colonialism, or his refusal to ally exclusively with Washington. After seven months, Dulles withdrew the offer. Abdel Nasser turned to Moscow.

The dam became a monument to Stalinist engineering. Its construction displaced one hundred twenty thousand Nubians, the dark-skinned Egyptians indigenous to the area. The lake formed by the dam nearly demolished the breathtaking Pharaonic temples at Abu Simbel; UNESCO saved them by paying Western European contractors to relocate the complex, stone by stone, on drier ground. The finished dam stopped the flow of silt and nutrients that had kept much of the Nile Valley so fertile for centuries. The depletion of the water devastated the farmlands downstream and the fishing around the mouth of the Nile. The slowing of the current led to an explosion in waterborne diseases like schistosomiasis.

To fight the disease, Abdel Nasser's successors launched a massive campaign of inoculations. But government health workers reused unsterilized needles. That set off a hepatitis C epidemic that raged on for decades. About one in five Egyptians was infected with "virus C," as Egyptians called it, in imported English. Barbers spread the disease by reusing blades, so sensible Egyptian men carried their own personal shears to haircuts, and I did as well.

The adage about drinking the Nile water lives on today as black humor. The river is so filthy that your first stop would be a hospital. Yet Egyptian schoolchildren are still taught to celebrate Abdel Nasser's High Dam as an unalloyed triumph. I think of the dam whenever I get a haircut: a parable of centralized planning and unaccountable power.

I had the luck to be an American journalist living in Cairo during the thirty months when Egyptians broke free of the autocracy that ruled them. Their escape set off revolts from Benghazi to Baghdad. But the old authoritarian order had only hidden underground, not shattered. It returned to take revenge. A reinvigorated autocracy did its best to blot out the memory of those thirty months of freedom. Let me tell you the story. <>

Fighting for Peace in Somalia: A History and Analysis of the African Union Mission (AMISOM), 2007-2017 by Paul D. Williams [Oxford University Press, 9780198724544]

Fighting for Peace in Somalia provides the first comprehensive analysis of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), an operation deployed in 2007 to stabilize the country and defend its fledgling government from one of the world's deadliest militant organizations, Harakat al-Shabaab.

The book's two parts provide a history of the mission from its genesis in an earlier, failed regional initiative in 2005 up to mid-2017, as well as an analysis of the mission's six most important challenges, namely, logistics, security sector reform, civilian protection, strategic communications, stabilization, and developing a successful exit strategy. These issues are all central to the broader debates about how to design effective peace operations in Africa and beyond.

AMISOM was remarkable in several respects: it would become the African Union's (AU) largest peace operation by a considerable margin deploying over 22,000 soldiers; it became the longest running mission under AU command and control, outlasting the nearest contender by over seven years; it also became the AU's most expensive operation, at its peak costing approximately US$1 billion per year; and, sadly, AMISOM became the AU's deadliest mission. Although often referred to as a peacekeeping operation, AMISOM's troops were given a range of daunting tasks that went well beyond the realm of peacekeeping, including VIP protection, war-fighting, counterinsurgency, stabilization, and state-

building as well as supporting electoral processes and facilitating humanitarian assistance.

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Excerpt: 'Each morning the lion wakes up and knows that he must run faster than the antelope or he will starve. The antelope wakes up and knows that he must run faster than the lion in order to survive. So whether you are a lion or an antelope, when the morning arrives, you'd better be running.

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This version of a motivational African fable was displayed in the force headquarters of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) in January 2013. Deployed to Mogadishu in March 2007, AMISOM's peacekeepers have been `running' for more than ten years. They were tasked with stabilizing the country that had become the world's paradigmatic example of `state failure', warlordism, and corruption for more than twenty years.' In practical terms, this meant AMISOM's

personnel had to fight for peace in Somalia not just keep it. Their principal opponent was the Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujahideen (hereafter, al-Shabaab/ 'the youth'), an adaptable and deadly organization that tried to destroy the successive sets of Somali authorities that AMISOM was mandated to protect.

The story of AMISOM's struggle in what became the deadliest peace operation in modern history is remarkable in its own right for many reasons that will be discussed in this book. But it is also important because it provides insights into how to address some of the most difficult challenges facing contemporary peace operations in other countries: How, for instance, can a peace operation help stabilize a country without a functional central government or a peace process? How can a peace operation combat a transnational, partly criminal organization that relies on asymmetric and terror tactics but also has deep roots in significant segments of the local population? How can multiple international organizations and states partner effectively to defeat such a foe? How can a peace operation succeed when there is a huge gap.

Principal Arguments in Brief

Throughout the book, I make a number of arguments about AMISOM that are relevant to how we think about success and failure for such a complex mission.

First, AMISOM's relatively long duration and evolution through qualitatively different phases means it is usually unwise to draw blanket conclusions spanning the entire period. AMISOM was never a monolithic mission and as Part I of the book explains in considerable detail, it evolved in significant ways between 2007 and 2017. Indeed, it is probably more appropriate to think of AMISOMs—in the plural. Politically, AMISOM initially straddled three nodes in Mogadishu, Nairobi, and Addis Ababa. These reflected its military component, civilian component, and the AU Commission and some planning elements respectively. Officials operating in these locations did not always agree or even share all the same information. AMISOM's mandated tasks also evolved in significant ways and hence the mission was configured for different priorities at different

times. These ranged from securing a foothold in Mogadishu to expelling al-Shabaab's fighters from the entire city, and then shifting from urban warfare to undertake a range of expansion and stabilization operations across south-central Somalia. AMISOM also evolved in size. By January 2014, AMISOM had increased in size to nearly fourteen times its initial deployed strength, while its authorized strength of 8,000 was nearly tripled by November 2013. Similarly, AMISOM's area of operations expanded from roughly 100 square kilometres to more than 400,000

square kilometres from January 2012. Operationally, AMISOM's command and control structures and concomitant high degree of autonomy exercised by the TCCs in their respective sectors meant that it often functioned as separate missions. And as a multidimensional mission, its military, police, and civilian components did not always function in a coherent and coordinated manner. It is therefore sensible to limit most analytical conclusions to specific time periods or aspects of the mission's mandate.

That said, there were elements of continuity, and it is important to recognize that AMISOM achieved notable aspects of its mandate. At the strategic level, the mission successfully protected two iterations of the TFG and helped secure two electoral processes that produced new Federal Governments in September 2012 and January 2017. It is also reasonable to conclude that without AMISOM, al-Shabaab forces would have overrun the TFG after Ethiopian troops withdrew from Mogadishu in January 2009. Moreover, AMISOM's deployment was a precondition for enabling Ethiopia's withdrawal. The mission also weakened al-Shabaab, certainly from what one astute analyst called its `golden age', during 2009 and 2010.20 But its success pushed al-Shabaab to become more transnational and adopt more asymmetric tactics, which proved difficult for AMISOM to counter.

A third argument explains AMISOM's operational and tactical successes against al-Shabaab, most notably during the battle for Mogadishu in 2010 and 2011. As discussed in Chapter 4, these came about because of shifts in AMISOM's pre-deployment training regimes, the innovative use of

urban warfare tactics including sniper teams, `mouse holes', and breaching operations, and the sheer resilience of AMISOM's rank-and-file troops. Indeed, by late 2011, I submit that AMISOM's overall strategic success in protecting the TFG and weakening al-Shabaab was a direct result of these operational and tactical successes. And as detailed in Chapters 3 and 8, they came despite political and strategic problems in the design of the mission and the AU's weak political leadership, exemplified by successive heads of mission not being based in Somalia during this crucial period.

That decision stemmed from the dire security situation in Mogadishu. But it left AMISOM a military-heavy mission: most of its personnel were soldiers, and the Force Commander in Mogadishu became the principal interlocutor with the Somali authorities and visiting international officials. Later on, and especially after AMISOM expanded its operations across south-central Somalia during 2012 and was required to conduct stabilization operations, the military-heavy nature of the mission led to a mismatch between its capabilities and its mandated tasks. As demonstrated in Chapters 6, 7, and 12, not only were the mission's small police and tiny civilian components overwhelmed by the scope of the tasks, the lack of effective and legitimate Somali forces to fill in the gaps also presented an enormous challenge.

This relates to a fifth argument, namely, the difficulty of aligning the mission's progress on both the military and political tracks simultaneously. In sum, while AMISOM managed at various times to make significant progress on the military track, political progress usually lagged behind. And without genuine political progress on issues like power-sharing between the federal authorities and the regions or national reconciliation, military progress was likely to be unsustainable. During the period of the two TFG administrations, AMISOM's principal strategic challenge was to consistently win the support of the local population when it was mandated to support a political entity that was perceived as illegitimate, corrupt, and ineffective by many of those locals. Once a new Federal Government was established in September 2012, AMISOM's key local partner was considered more legitimate, but it still suffered from chronic levels of

corruption, clan-based rivalries, and very limited capacity to deliver essential services to Somali citizens. As successive reports by the UN Monitoring Group pointed out, there was in essence a misalignment of political interests between AMISOM and key Somali political elites. While AMISOM and its partners engaged in an essentially top-down exercise in state-building that usually prioritized the supply of resources to the central government rather than Somalia's regions, the political elites in the capital saw little incentive to take the tough decisions on power-sharing and reconciliation that would have enabled legitimate and effective state institutions to be built. As the Chairperson of the AU Commission had correctly pointed out shortly before AMISOM's deployment,

The Somalis and their leaders have a central role to play. The issues confronting Somalia are first and foremost of a political and governance nature. A peace support operation is indeed needed to address them, but it cannot substitute a genuine commitment to dialogue and reconciliation among the Somalis, including addressing the grievances of groups that may feel left outside of the emerging political dispensation.

It was Somalis, not foreign peacekeepers, who ultimately held the key to peace in Somalia. AMISOM was therefore caught in a difficult position in large part because no matter what military successes it achieved, sustainable peace in Somalia depended on political progress being made on the fundamental questions of governance. And when issues of governance were concerned, AMISOM, like every other external actor, also became caught up in the dynamics generated by clan/sub-clan politics and a war economy that continued to benefit some well-placed elites. This caused problems on a variety of issues but most notably over the role of Kenyan forces in the establishment of the Interim Jubaland Administration in 2013 (discussed in Chapter 6) and AMISOM's attempts to help build the Somali National Army (discussed in Chapter 9).

As will also become clear in the chapters that follow, throughout its first ten years AMISOM suffered from severe capability gaps across two dimensions. First, the capabilities for AMISOM

authorized by the African Union and United Nations were insufficient to achieve its stated objectives. This was particularly apparent after 2012 when AMISOM was given a relatively small number of troops to stabilize the huge area of south-central Somalia. As discussed in Chapter 5, this was largely because one of the planning assumptions for the mission's 2012 Concept of Operations was that the Somali security forces would be able to field an equivalent number of troops to support AMISOM. This turned out to be a faulty assumption. The second dimension was AMISOM's inability to generate some of the capabilities it was authorized to have. One problem was vacancy rates. Most peace operations suffer from some gaps between their authorized and deployed strength on the ground, but AMISOM was an extreme case: there was no agreed timetable for deploying troops and ultimately it took three and a half years to reach the mission's initial authorized strength of 8,000 troops. Even by March 2017, AMISOM's civilian component was missing one hundred staff out of the 240 approved posts. But numbers were not the only problem. The mission's inability to generate a range of military enablers also presented major challenges. Specialist units such as logistics, heavy transportation, engineering, ISTAR, special forces, medial support, and, crucially, aviation were all in short supply. To take just two examples, AMISOM's early logistics support was so bad that between April 2009 and May 2010, approximately 250 peacekeepers contracted wet beriberi from lack of thiamine/vitamin B1. Over fifty of them were airlifted to hospitals in Kenya and Uganda, and four died. It is also shocking that AMISOM did not acquire its first military helicopter as a mission asset until December 2016, despite being authorized an aviation component of twelve military helicopters in February 2012.

The final argument to flag here relates to the many challenges AMISOM faced when trying to establish a unified system of command and control, admittedly a perennial problem for most multinational forces. When Uganda and Burundi were AMISOM's only TCCs, the mission's command structure was effectively a mini-coalition with Uganda assuming the lead role. But things became

more complicated from 2012 when other countries joined the mission and a multinational Force Headquarters and other international coordination mechanisms were established. Being in essence a war-fighting operation, AMISOM's national contingent commanders in their respective sectors retained a considerable degree of autonomy and did not always coordinate their activities with the Force Commander. As one senior AMISOM official put it, `National officers in AMISOM contingents will talk to their national headquarters before talking to the Force Commander.' Another senior commander summed up the situation by saying that the AMISOM Force Commander had command but no real control of the national contingents, and hence trying to ensure coordination between them was the best that could be achieved in practice. In some ways this was simply a recognition of the realities and national politics of fighting a war by coalition. As one informed analyst put it, the Force Headquarters 'was never designed to exercise command and control over the national contingents. It could only ever provide a coordinating function and facilitate positive interaction between the TCCs. This was war-fighting and troops were always going to respond to their national capitals.' Nevertheless, these command and control arrangements had several Ir important consequences. Most notably, they gave considerable power to the Contingent Commanders and hence the national capitals of the TCCs, and they made coordination across AMISOM's different sectors difficult. This, in turn, provided al-Shabaab with an opportunity to take advantage of the relatively sheltered areas along AMISOM's sector boundaries.

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My analysis of AMISOM has been informed by a wide range of primary and secondary sources, as well as data gathered from more than 200 interviews. Interviews were conducted with relevant experts since 2007 in Djibouti, Ethiopia, France, Germany, Kenya, Uganda, Somalia, the United Kingdom, and the United States, as well as by telephone or email. They included AMISOM personnel and representatives from the mission's main troop- and police-contributing countries, officials (civilian and military) from the AU, UN,

IGAD, and the EU, analysts, journalists, academics, and members of NGOs, as well as Somali officials, intellectuals, journalists, and members of the public. Since many of them were serving officials of governments, international organizations, or NGOs, and as agreed at the time, all communications were conducted on a not-for-attribution basis and hence my interviewees remain anonymous. Where I reference their contributions directly, I have identified them by their most relevant generic affiliation or position.

In addition to communications with these interlocutors, primary sources included a wide range of official documents from the AU, IGAD, UN, EU, and Somali authorities. I also analysed several hundred WikiLeaks cables sent from US embassies and missions, mainly between 2006 and 2010, from AMISOM's troop-contributing countries as well as the AU and relevant EU member states.

During the course of my research, I also acquired several hundred unpublished documents, principally, but not exclusively, from the AU, UN, Somali authorities, and a variety of AMISOM's partners. These include concept of operations documents, rules of engagement, strategic directives, mission directives, operational directives, policy guidelines, annual reports, mission implementation developed internal guidelines and standard operating procedures on a range of relevant issues from civilian protection and SEA to medical policy and risk assessments. Taken together, the limitations of the AMISOM model with regard to political authority, financing, and operational effectiveness suggest it would be unwise to try and replicate for other operations that might need to fight for peace.

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This book has told only the first ten years of AMISOM's story. But the mission continues to pursue its three strategic objectives: to reduce the threat posed by al-Shabaab and other armed opposition groups; to provide security in order to enable the political process, reconciliation, and peacebuilding in Somalia; and to enable the gradual handing over of security responsibilities from AMISOM to the Somali security forces contingent on their abilities. In the foreseeable future, reducing the

threat posed by al-Shabaab will hinge on building capable, legitimate, inclusive, and affordable Somali security forces based on a shared political vision for governance arrangements in the security sector. Moreover, while al-Shabaab remains a transnational insurgency utilizing asymmetric tactics, degrading the group will rely more on policing, law enforcement, and intelligence capabilities than military operations. It will also require widespread popular rejection of al-Shabaab's ideology and propaganda and the active education and participation of local Somalis in countering such extremist organizations." This will probably be the focus of the next chapter in AMISOM's story. <>

Christian Martyrs under Islam: Religious Violence and the Making of the Muslim World by Christian C. Sahner [Princeton University Press, 9780691179100]

How did the medieval Middle East transform from a majority-Christian world to a majority-Muslim world, and what role did violence play in this process? Christian Martyrs under Islam explains how Christians across the early Islamic caliphate slowly converted to the faith of the Arab conquerors and how small groups of individuals rejected this faith through dramatic acts of resistance, including apostasy and blasphemy.

Using previously untapped sources in a range of Middle Eastern languages, Christian Sahner introduces an unknown group of martyrs who were executed at the hands of Muslim officials between the seventh and ninth centuries CE. Found in places as diverse as Syria, Spain, Egypt, and Armenia, they include an alleged descendant of Muhammad who converted to Christianity, high-ranking Christian secretaries of the Muslim state who viciously insulted the Prophet, and the children of mixed marriages between Muslims and Christians. Sahner argues that Christians never experienced systematic persecution under the early caliphs, and indeed, they remained the largest portion of the population in the greater Middle East for centuries after the Arab conquest. Still, episodes of ferocious violence contributed to the spread of Islam within Christian societies, and memories of this bloodshed played a key role in shaping Christian identity in the new Islamic empire.

Christian Martyrs under Islam examines how violence against Christians ended the age of porous religious boundaries and laid the foundations for more antagonistic Muslim-Christian relations in the centuries to come.

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Excerpt: Some readers may open this book seeking answers about the tumult that currently rolls the Middle East. I hope that it is interesting and useful for them. My goal, however, has never been to write a history that connects past and present. Indeed, aside from these brief words of introduction (and a few scattered thoughts in the conclusion), this book does not engage in comparisons between religious violence in the early Islamic era and violence today. Such comparisons are legitimate—as much for the similarities they reveal as the differences. But that is an exercise best left to another writer for another time.

Research on this book started in 2011, just as the movement of popular protest known as the "Arab Spring" was beginning to sweep across the region. In the years since, this moment of optimism has given way to political bedlam and sectarian conflict. Especially notable has been the rise of the Islamic State and its persecution of ancient Christian communities and other minorities in Syria and Iraq. To watch these events unfold has been to hear distant echoes of a medieval world I encountered through my research: mass enslavement,

burdensome taxes, forced conversions, crucifixions, and still worse. Although the Islamic State alleged to revive the traditions of the early caliphate, it was clear that it often misinterpreted, exaggerated, and twisted these to suit its modern agenda. I also observed Christians reviving the practices of their early medieval forebears, venerating the victims of recent religious violence as saints and martyrs.

It is important to acknowledge these symbolic parallels up front. At the same time, this book aspires to tell another story: to provide the first comprehensive history of Christian martyrdom in the formative centuries after the rise of Islam, a phenomenon that is largely unknown to the public as well as many academic specialists. More broadly, it aims to explore how violence configured relations between the early Muslims and their Christian subjects, the role that coercion and bloodshed did or did not play in the initial spread of Islam, and the manner in which Christians came to see themselves as a beleaguered minority in the new Muslim cosmos. These are central questions for the study of early Islam and Middle Eastern Christianity more broadly, yet finding clear answers to them can be surprisingly difficult…

Christian Martyrs under Islam

The early Islamic period is one of the greatest watersheds in human history. In a matter of a few generations, Muslim armies emerged from the Arabian Peninsula and established a caliphate stretching from the Atlantic Ocean to the Punjab. Today, we regard these areas as the heartlands of the "Muslim world." But in the early centuries after the conquests, the situation was radically different. Muslims formed a demographic minority in many areas under their control. In places such as Egypt, Palestine, and Syria, the so-called Muslim world was in fact a majority-Christian world and would remain so for centuries to come.' This book seeks to explain the earliest stages of a longterm process whereby the predominantly Christian Middle East of late antiquity became the predominantly Islamic region of today. In particular, it explores the role of religious violence in the process of de-Christianization, as well as how Christians adopted

the mentality of a minority through memories of violence.

To tell the story, this book investigates a neglected group of Christian martyrs who died at the hands of Muslim officials between the seventh and ninth centuries AD. They were known by their contemporaries as "new martyrs" or neomartyrs" Despite the name, there was nothing new about martyrdom itself. Since the first century, Christians had been celebrating as saints members of their community who died witnessing to their faith.' All but one of Christ's apostles were martyred, and many luminaries of the early church died under violent circumstances, including figures such as Ignatius of Antioch (d. ca. 108), Polycarp of Smyrna (d. ca. 155), and Cyprian of Carthage (d. 258). Martyrdom waned with the conversion of the emperor Constantine to Christianity in the early fourth century. Suddenly, the very state that had once committed itself to persecuting Christians was now committed to defending them. While the pace of martyrdom may have slowed inside the Roman Empire, bloodshed carried on outside Rome's borders. In Sasanian Iraq and Iran, for example, Syriac-speaking Christians who ran afoul of the Zoroastrian authorities were killed and remembered as saints. What is more, although pagan-on-Christian violence declined inside Rome, the acid rivalry among competing Christian sects gave rise to new martyr cults within the "schismatic churches" of the empire. These included Donatist martyrs in North Africa and (West Syrian) Miaphysite martyrs in northern Mesopotamia and the Levant.

With the rise of Islam, Christians once again found themselves living and dying under what many regarded as a hostile, pagan state. This was a jarring experience, especially for those in the former provinces of the Byzantine Empire, where Christianity had enjoyed imperial patronage for more than three hundred years. In a sense, the Arab conquest thrust these Christians back into a pre-Constantinian way of doing things. They embraced resources in their own tradition, in turn, to make sense of their new predicament, and the most powerful of these was martyrdom. In places as diverse as the Iberian Peninsula, Egypt, Syria, Armenia, and Georgia, local churches began to

venerate Christians who had died at the hands of the Umayyad and `Abbasid states. The term new martyr was intended to emphasize a sense of continuity between the sufferings of the present day and those of the golden age before the conversion of Constantine. But unlike the classical martyrs—many of whom were killed for shirking what hagiographers portrayed as a timeless paganism—the new martyrs were executed for reneging on a faith and culture that truly surrounded them and which some had even embraced. Thus, the "outsider"—the Muslim—is as visible and real in the martyrologies of the period as the Christians themselves. These martyrs were a varied group, including monks, soldiers, shopkeepers, village priests, craftsmen, princes, and bishops. They were women and men, young and old, peasants and nobles. Although capital punishment disproportionately affected certain groups, especially the clergy, martyrs hailed from across the social spectrum of the early medieval Middle East.

Seen from this perspective, there were three main types of martyrs in the Umayyad and early `Abbasid periods (for the purposes of this book, defined as ca. AD 660-860, between the first recorded martyrdom after the accession of the Umayyads, which occurred in Damascus, and the last substantial burst of martyrdoms, which occurred in Córdoba). The first and most numerous were Christian converts to Islam who then returned to Christianity. Because apostasy came to be considered a capital offense under Islamic law, they faced execution if found guilty. The second group was made up of Muslims who converted to Christianity without any prior affiliation with their new religion. The third consisted of Christians who slandered the Prophet Muhammad, usually before a high-ranking Muslim official. Along with these, there were smaller numbers of Christians who were executed for refusing forced conversion, who were killed fighting the Arabs in times of war, or who died as a result of random, nonreligious violence.

There are roughly 270 new martyrs from the early Islamic period if we compile all the saints mentioned in hagiography, liturgical calendars, and chronicles. This figure, however, is slightly misleading because it includes many saints who

died within larger groups and therefore are poorly differentiated from one another in the historical record. These include the Sixty Martyrs of Gaza, a group of Byzantine soldiers executed following the Arab conquest of Palestine in the late 630s; the Sixty Martyrs of Jerusalem, a cohort of Byzantine soldiers killed during a pilgrimage to the Holy Land in 724/725; the Twenty Martyrs of Mar Saba, who were massacred during a Bedouin raid on their monastery in 788/797; the Forty-Two Martyrs of Amorion, a company of Byzantine soldiers who were captured in an Arab attack on Anatolia in 838 and executed in Iraq in 845;9 and the forty-eight voluntary martyrs of Cordoba, who were executed for blasphemy and apostasy in the capital of Umayyad al-Andalus between 850 and 859. If we remove these saints from the overall tally, the total number of individual martyrs shrinks to around forty.

Some may question whether we can draw broad conclusions about a topic as vast as "the making of the Muslim world" from such a slender base of evidence. Indeed, we should not underestimate the difficulty of reconstructing an entire period on the basis of the somewhat limited body of sources that survive to the present. The challenge is doubly formidable considering the accumulated debris of legend that surrounds many martyrs and which can make it hard to obtain a clear picture of their life and times. In the pages to come, I will explain why so many saints' lives are historically plausible and therefore why we should treat them as useful sources of information for the whole of early Islamic society. Yet the difficulties must be soberly acknowledged at the outset. Here, it is important to note that history furnishes other examples of how Christians behaved when confronted by the dominion of an alien faith, and these offer helpful comparisons for assessing the early medieval evidence.

We have already met the so-called Persian Martyrs, who were executed by the Sasanians between the fourth and seventh centuries. They present an especially useful comparison with the neomartyrs not only because of their chronological and geographic proximity to each other but also because Christians in both periods reacted to the threat of state violence in similar ways. Indeed,

stories of Zoroastrian converts to Christianity and Christian blasphemers against Zoroastrianism could often be retold with Muslim and Christian characters instead without losing their narrative logic. This is not only the result of their common literary heritage. It is also the result of the somewhat consistent manner in which Christian communities in the premodern Middle East reacted when confronted by a similar array of religious, cultural, and social pressures at the hands of non-Christian sovereigns. In other words, there was often a predetermined script that both martyrs and biographers followed when confronted by state violence.

The parallels are even more striking with the Christian martyrs of the early Ottoman period—also commonly known as "neomartyrs"—who were revered across the Balkans and much of Anatolia. Despite the historical chasm separating the two groups, their biographies are shockingly similar: tales of Christians executed after refusing to convert to Islam or, having already converted, apostatized from Islam and returned to Christianity. The parallels between the two cohorts of saints—which have not been noticed by scholars, but which merit thorough study in their own right—are not merely the result of a common literary heritage. They are also the result of shared demographic realities between the early Islamic caliphate and the early Ottoman Empire, both postconquest societies in which culturally Byzantine Christians found themselves living under Muslim ruling minorities. In these worlds, Christians and Muslims could rub shoulders in remarkably similar ways, living in a state of official competition that was offset by many deep cultural, religious, and linguistic similarities. Perhaps inevitably, these worlds produced similar kinds of violence, which Christians commemorated in similar ways, namely, by writing martyrologies. So, when someone reads the lives of the Umayyad and `Abbasid neomartyrs and asks of these harrowing, sometimes theatrical tales whether they represent pure fiction or contain elements of psychological reality, the parallels to earlier and later generations of apostates and blasphemers should instill some confidence in the plausibility of the evidence. Put simply, the sources report the kinds of information we might expect to

find when Christians existed under non-Christian powers in the premodern Middle East.

The use of capital punishment against Christians was an important feature of early Islamic history, but it was limited in its scope and aimed at two specific goals. The first was to establish the primacy of Islam and the Islamic character of the state at a moment when Muslims were dramatically outnumbered by their non-Muslim subjects. In this world, public executions had a performative function and were designed to instill obedience in the massive and potentially recalcitrant non-Muslim population. The second was to forge boundaries between groups at a time of unprecedented social and religious mixing. Indeed, Muslims and Christians interacted with each other in the most intimate of settings, from workshops and markets to city blocks and even marital beds. Not surprisingly, these interactions gave rise to overlapping practices, including behaviors that blurred the line between Christianity and Islam. To ensure that conversion and assimilation went exclusively in the direction of Islam, Muslim officials executed the most flagrant boundary-crossers, and Christians, in turn, revered some of these as saints.

Thus, contrary to the common impression in popular culture today that Islam won converts principally by the sword, the historical record suggests a more complex picture. Capital punishment—while real and occasionally ferocious—was also a remarkably bureaucratic phenomenon that followed established rules and relied on state institutions. Private, nonstate violence against non-Muslims was not a major feature of the postconquest period, nor was forced conversion. On balance, the Umayyads and `Abbasids were not much interested in persecuting Christians, at least systematically. In fact, the state took a rather laissez-faire attitude toward the governance of dhimmīs (the protected non-Muslim subjects of the Islamic state, also including Jews and Zoroastrians). It allowed them to live as they wished provided they paid the jizya (the poll tax imposed on non-Muslims in commutation for military service) and accepted their subordination as laid down by the law.

By and large, relations between Muslims and Christians in the early period were characterized by a peaceful but begrudging form of coexistence. The two groups—themselves internally diverse— shared the same cities, spoke the same languages, and as time went on, increasingly shared many of the same relatives and friends. Indeed, the firm distinction between the Arab Muslim ruling class and the non-Muslim subject population began to dissolve over time as the ranks of the Muslim community swelled with non-Arab converts. This is not to discount the fact that the Islamic empire was forged in the cauldron of conquest, which, like all wars, imposed suffering and deprivation on native populations, including Christians. It is also not to discount the fact that Muslims and Christians made antagonistic and mutually exclusive claims about the nature of God or that Muslims enjoyed privileged access to political, social, and economic power, which they used to marginalize their competitors. Rather, it is to point out that violent episodes such as martyrdom occurred against a backdrop of what Arabs today call `aysh mushtarak, or a "common way of life," not against a backdrop of constant hostility.

One of the great advantages of the sources is the ability to track the ebb and flow of religious and cultural change in the postconquest Middle East. Through these texts, we can gain a clearer picture of when conversion may have accelerated, where violence against Christians was most intense, and how the Middle East first took on the guise of the Islamic society that we know today. Here, the first fifty years of `Abbasid rule emerge as the single most important period in what this book calls "the making of the Muslim world." It was at this time that Muslims and Christians began interacting with each other as members of a shared, increasingly integrated society, rather than as rulers and subjects in a divided, socially stratified world, as they had done in the immediate wake of the conquests. The traditional distinctions between Muslims and Christians—as Arabs and non-Arabs, soldiers and peasants, city dwellers and villagers— were disappearing in the early `Abbasid period. This was due to the large numbers of non-Muslims converting to Islam, increasing Muslim settlement of the countryside, and practices such as slavery and

intermarriage, which brought conquerors and conquered into ever greater proximity. This muddled world generated new anxieties about social and religious differentiation, which led to higher rates of state violence. These may be seen in the larger number of martyrdom incidents in the `Abbasid period, as well as the impulse of Christian writers to commemorate these incidents in literary form. The martyrologies testify to the creation of a Christian identity in the early medieval Middle East grounded in memories of bloodshed, antagonism toward Islam, and hostility to Christians who switched sides. Thus, this book aspires to provide not just a history of a specific historical and literary phenomenon—martyrdom—but also a history of the wider society that generated violence and texts alike, one that was in the process of becoming "Muslim."

Finally, Christians were not the only victims of state violence in the early Islamic period. Jews, Zoroastrians, and others felt the anger of the Muslim authorities for a similar range of offenses, including apostasy and blasphemy. Yet it is significant that these groups did not respond to the violence by creating martyrs. Indeed, it would be impossible to write a comparable book about the phenomenon of Jewish or Zoroastrian "martyrdom" under Islam. The disparity points to the fact that in this period, at least, "martyrdom" was a uniquely Christian idea and practice. As we have seen, the inclination toward martyrdom had deep roots in Christian antiquity. It drew its most profound inspiration from the figure of Jesus himself, who preached a message of finding strength through weakness and achieving victory through defeat. Such ideals were not nearly as pronounced in late ancient Judaism or Zoroastrianism. For this reason, the book is focused on relations between Muslims and Christians specifically, as opposed to Muslims and non-Muslims more broadly. It makes occasional comparisons with the experiences of Jews and Zoroastrians, but a thorough study of these similarities and differences will have to wait for another time period." Far from marking a rupture with the past, the first two centuries of Islamic history have come to be seen as an extension of late antiquity—if not its triumphant denouement. This is especially true if we regard Muhammad and

the early caliphs as heirs to the Constantinian revolution—especially that distinctive marriage of empire and monotheism that Constantine brought about through his conversion in the fourth century. A by-product of this revolution was the use of state power to promote right belief and purge wrong belief. It is this violent by-product, especially in its Islamic context, that constitutes the subject of the present book.

This book also focuses on the history of Muslim-Christian relations. Despite the many exemplary works on this topic over the years, it is a subject that has traditionally lacked a vigorous engagement with social history. This is particularly true in comparison with the study of medieval Judaism, in which the documents of the Cairo Geniza have helped scholars reconstruct the daily life of Jews in the Middle East with unparalleled richness and humanity. When it comes to Christians, we have a clear picture of what was at stake in intellectual encounters at the top of society—especially in the realm of theological dialogue and debate with Muslims. We also have a clear picture of how Muslims used legal categories to regulate their contact with non-Muslims, especially in the form of the so-called Pact of `Umar (Ar. `and rumar, al-shurūt al-`umarīya). But we do not have the same grasp of what was happening on the ground. This book attempts to begin filling this gap.

Amid this, it is surprising to observe that until now, there has been no book-length study of Christian martyrdom in the early Islamic period. There is also no general account of anti-Christian violence under Islam comparable to the voluminous literature on Christian persecution in the Roman Empire.

This is the first book-length study of Christian martyrdom in the early Islamic period. As such, it seeks to explore a relatively unknown aspect of the broader transition from late antiquity to the Islamic Middle Ages. Historians once argued that the rise of Islam violently disrupted the rhythms of life in the late ancient Near East. Over the past decades, however, a new symphony of literary and archaeological evidence has emerged that has changed the way we see the Despite the novelty of the topic, this book enters a long-running debate about the question of "tolerance" and "intolerance"

in premodern Islam. It is a debate that has gripped academic specialists and the general public alike, and here, it is possible to discern two broad views. At one end of the spectrum lies what I will call the "apologetic thesis," which stresses the essential tolerance of medieval Muslim rulers toward the non-Muslim subject population. It tends to highlight verses in the Qur'an that describe the People of the Book positively (e.g., Q. al-Baqara 2:62 etc.), regarding these as normative for how Muslims and non-Muslims interacted throughout history; it suggests that medieval caliphs granted "freedom of religion" to Christians and Jews; it downplays the legal strictures associated with the dhimmī regime; it celebrates moments of convivencia between Muslims and others, especially in mixed areas such as al-Andalus; and it contrasts the allegedly secure status of non-Muslims in the medieval Middle East with the precarious state of Jews and other minorities in Europe at the same time. At the other end of the spectrum is the "lachrymose thesis," famously championed by the Egyptian Jewish writer Bat Ye'or (née Gisèle Littman). For Bat Ye'or (and her even more strident followers, such as Robert Spencer), non-Muslims were the despised second-class citizens of states committed to their gradual eradication, a view she believed was spelled out in the Qur'an itself (e.g., Q. al-Mā'ida 5:51, al-Tawba 9:29, etc.) and developed with zeal and vigor across the ages. Indeed, her books—which have been influential in popular as well as academic settings—consider the longue durée of Christian and Jewish decline in the Near East from the time of the conquests to the present as a consequence of what she calls "dhimmitude," or the state of living as a subjugated minority.

Needless to say, both of these views have serious flaws. The "apologetic thesis" reads into the Qur'an anachronistic ideas of religious freedom that are borrowed from modern culture. It also whitewashes the sometimes troubled history of interreligious relations in the premodern period in the interest of making medieval Islam seem much more open-minded and liberal than it really was. In the process, it overlooks the manner in which premodern Muslim states did often marginalize non-Muslims, whether by imposing heavy taxes on

them, criminalizing apostasy, barring them from public service, prohibiting the construction of new churches and synagogues, mandating the wearing of humiliating clothing, or enslaving native populations (parallels to which are easy to find in other medieval societies outside the Middle East).

The "lachrymose thesis" goes in the opposite direction by downplaying the abundant evidence of peaceful coexistence in the medieval Middle East. At its most extreme manifestations, it does so in order to discredit Islam in the present by tethering it to a history of supposed intolerance in the past. Perhaps inadvertently, the "lachrymose thesis" commits a second error by stripping non-Muslims of historical agency. Indeed, "dhimmitude" and concepts like it treat non-Muslims as hapless victims of persecution rather than as agents with the capacity for independent action, whether resistance or accommodation.

This book attempts to tread a careful path between these two views. As martyrologies and other medieval sources make clear, Muslim-Christian relations were not always irenic. In fact, they could be extremely tense, occasionally spilling over into violence. When this did take place inside the caliphate, the violence almost always went in one direction: from Muslims to Christians

and not the other way around. On the other hand, social and religious conflict usually took place against a backdrop of peaceful relations between communities. It is for this reason that hagiographers, chroniclers, and other medieval writers recorded bloodshed in the first place: not because it was ordinary but precisely because it was extraordinary.

Organization of the Book

This book is divided into five main sections. Chapter 1, "Converting to Islam and Returning to Christianity," profiles the largest group of new martyrs, those who began life as Christians, became Muslims, and then reverted to Christianity. Among these, there were several subgroups, including Christians who converted to Islam as slaves or prisoners, Christians who converted under disputed or contingent circumstances, and martyrs who were brought up in religiously mixed families. Because of the contingent nature of this process,

conversions could also be undone, leading to sizable numbers of apostates over the course of the seventh, eighth, and ninth centuries.

Chapter 2, "Converting from Islam to Christianity," follows the preceding chapter by exploring a small and neglected group of martyrs who converted from Islam to Christianity. The chapter shows that religious change in the postconquest Middle East did not go in one direction—from the church to the mosque—by highlighting a group of martyrs who moved from the mosque to the church. After surveying the evidence of true apostasy in legal, liturgical, and historical literature, it discusses a convert who is said to have been a member of the Prophet's tribe of Quraysh. It then profiles two Muslim martyrs from the Caucasus and a collection of apostates from Iraq, Iberia, and Egypt. The last section investigates a curious cluster of legends about the conversion of caliphs and other high-ranking Muslims to Christianity. It argues that these expressed contemporary hopes for a second "Constantinian moment," when a new pagan ruler would convert to Christianity and restore the church's standing in the Middle East. These and other texts show how Islamization could be a fragile process, even in a world in which Muslims enjoyed privileged access to political and social power.

Chapter 3, "Blaspheming against Islam," investigates the third major group of martyrs, those who were executed after disparaging the Prophet. It begins with a brief overview of the evolution of antiblasphemy laws in Islam, arguing that prohibitions against blasphemy were very slow to coalesce throughout the classical period. It then examines a number of Christians who were killed for blasphemy in Egypt and the Levant, including Peter of Capitolias, whose exceptionally detailed biography has been largely unstudied until now. The final section examines the abundant evidence for blasphemy in Córdoba, the capital of al-Andalus, where forty-eight Christians were martyred between 850 and 859. It suggests that the Christians most likely to blaspheme were those who were closest to Muslims, including members of religiously mixed families, servants of the Muslim court, and individuals in religiously mixed workplaces. On the basis of this evidence, it

proposes that blasphemy emerged as a specific form of Christian protest against Islamization and Arabization at a time when the number of Muslim religious scholars in al-Andalus was on the rise and debate between members of the two religions was intensifying. This, in turn, sensitized Christians at all levels of society to the differences between the two faiths, thereby encouraging them to disparage Islam ever more effectively.

Chapter 4, "Trying and Killing Christian Martyrs," investigates how the lives of the martyrs represent judicial procedure and criminal punishments. It argues that the state was dependent on private networks of informants—including relatives and friends—to root out apostates and blasphemers. It then shows how state officials could be exceptionally cautious in prosecuting religious criminals but, once they established their guilt, how they could be exceptionally brutal in punishing them. It suggests that the state used specific punishments derived from the Qur'an (esp. Q. al-Māʾida 5:33, the "Hirāba Verse") at an early date, along with other controversial punishments that were hotly debated by Muslim jurists. The most important of these was the burning of corpses. The chapter suggests that the state developed a coherent approach for punishing a wide array of religious dissidents, as evidenced by the striking parallels between the executions of Christian martyrs and Muslim heretics, especially the leaders of Shīʿī and Khariji. revolts. It concludes by arguing that violence was limited in its scope and aimed at two specific goals: securing Muslims' place at the top of the religiously mixed society they ruled and countering a widespread culture of boundary-crossing. Indeed, the need to contain potential unrest and clamp down on perceived lawlessness seems to have underlain much of the state's brutality.

Chapter 5, "Creating Saints and Communities," considers what hagiography meant as a genre of literature in the postconquest period. It investigates the rhetorical goals of these texts, arguing that many were written by monks and priests to discourage conversion to Islam and to condemn Christians who were drawn too closely to Arab culture. It then suggests that the martyrologies

enshrined the views of one side of an intra-Christian debate about the threats of Islamization and Arabization. Developing a thesis first introduced by historians of the Córdoba martyrs, it proposes that hagiographers across the Middle East were advocates of a "rejectionist" tendency that looked warily upon the religion and culture of the conquerors. These "rejectionists," in turn, encouraged Christians to preserve their identity by quarantining themselves from Muslims and, when necessary, by taking public stands against Islam through acts of blasphemy. The views of their ideological opponents, the "accommodationists," do not survive explicitly, though judging from the complaints of the "rejectionists," it seems that they held more permissive attitudes toward Islamization and Arabization and more readily went with the tides of change. Furthermore, it seems that they saw greater benefit in making peace with Muslims than in protesting against them through behaviors like martyrdom. The chapter concludes by imagining how these two orientations—if they ever existed as such—may have mapped onto certain social and confessional categories. These include distinctions between urban and rural communities, secular clergy and monks, and Melkite, West Syrian (Miaphysite), and East Syrian churches. The chapter explains how and why Melkites—the Chalcedonian Christians of the Middle East who remained in communion with Constantinople after the conquests—took to martyrology-writing more enthusiastically than their rivals in other denominations, arguing that this had to do with their fall from grace after hundreds of years of imperial patronage.

The conclusion considers the chronology of the martyrdoms as a way of measuring the pace of Islamization and Arabization in the postconquest period. It suggests that the apparent surge in violence between 750 and 800 may have come about as Muslims and Christians began interacting with each other for the very first time as members of a shared society, rather than as rulers and subjects in a divided world, as they had done for much of the immediate postconquest period. This, in turn, destabilized relations between the two communities, giving rise to new anxieties about social and religious differentiation. The final pages

consider the legacy of the martyrs from the Middle Ages to the present, as well as the role martyrs played in the process of community formation for various emergent sects in the early medieval period, Christian and Muslim alike. Appendix 1 presents information about the neomartyrs contained in Muslim texts, while appendix 2 offers a glossary of key names and concepts. <>

Talaat Pasha: Father of Modern Turkey, Architect of Genocide by Hans-Lukas Kieser [Princeton University Press, 9780691157627]

The first English-language biography of the de facto ruler of the late Ottoman Empire and architect of the Armenian Genocide
Talaat Pasha (1874–1921) led the triumvirate that ruled the late Ottoman Empire during World War I and is arguably the father of modern Turkey. He was also the architect of the Armenian Genocide, which would result in the systematic extermination of more than a million people, and which set the stage for a century that would witness atrocities on a scale never imagined. Here is the first biography in English of the revolutionary figure who not only prepared the way for Atatürk and the founding of the republic in 1923, but who shaped the modern world as well.

In this explosive book, Hans-Lukas Kieser provides a mesmerizing portrait of a man who maintained power through a potent blend of the new Turkish ethno-nationalism, the political Islam of former Sultan Abdulhamid II, and a readiness to employ radical "solutions" and violence. From Talaat's role in the Young Turk Revolution of 1908 to his exile from Turkey and assassination--a sensation in Weimar Germany—Kieser restores the Ottoman drama to the heart of world events. He shows how Talaat wielded far more power than previously realized, making him the de facto ruler of the empire. He brings wartime Istanbul vividly to life as a thriving diplomatic hub, and reveals how Talaat's cataclysmic actions would reverberate across the twentieth century.

In this major work of scholarship, Kieser tells the story of the brilliant and merciless politician who stood at the twilight of empire and the dawn of the age of genocide.

CONTENTS

Excerpt: Who was Mehmed Talaat (1874-1921), and why might we call him a first founder of the Turkish nation-state even before Kemal Atatürk?

The last powerful grand vizier (a sort of prime minister) ruling the Ottoman Empire, Talaat was also a partisan heading the so-called Committee of Union and Progress (CUP), a former underground organization. He acted from within the latter's secretive Central Committee: not top-down but as a living hub, through networks of party, state, and co-opted agents in the provinces of the empire. Architect of the 1915 genocide in synergy with forces in the committee and in the provinces, he also pioneered demographic engineering in Asia Minor with other non-Turkish groups of the empire while simultaneously initiating modernist-nationalist reforms.

He thus became a founding father of a post-Ottoman Turkish nationalist polity Talaat had concentrated power during the Balkan Wars and World War I by operationalizing elements of a new messianic nationalism (Muslim pan-Turkism, also called Turanism), framed by his influential Central Committee friend Ziya Gökalp. Gökalp's nationalism in the 1910s was openly imperial and politically Muslim, in contrast to its later version adopted by the Kemalists and Atatürk, himself a spiritual child of Gökalp.

Talaat was not a late nineteenth-century socialist revolutionary who had started believing in new futures for humanity—failing in his methods, and, in deeper analysis, also vision—but a revolutionist obsessed by empire and nation, the main references of far right-wing thought in twentieth-century Europe. In this spirit, he led the ultimate destruction of the Ottoman social fabric in 1915. Although his imperial goals were thwarted, he had prepared the way for the establishment of unrestricted Turkish sovereignty and a Turkish national home in Asia Minor. This book revises the traditional view of a Young Turk triumvirate throughout the 1910s and the marginalization of Ottoman actors in the history of a larger Europe. It reinstates agency to these actors, reconstructs the Ottoman capital, Istanbul, as a diplomatic hub in the early 1910s, and highlights the lasting magnitude of Talaat's policy. Of the same age and, since 1910, an acquaintance of Winston Churchill, Talaat represented Turkish-Islamic might in a period of bellicose confrontation with the British Empire.

Until now, no scholarly biography of Talaat Pasha has been available, although his legacy is present in powerful patterns of government and political thought, as well as in the name of many streets, schools, and mosques dedicated to him in and outside Turkey.' Talaat Pasha was a quintessential "political animal" of the modern twentieth-century Middle East. In the eyes of his admirers in Turkey today, and throughout the twentieth century, he was a great statesman, skillful revolutionary, and

farsighted founding father, whereas for Ottoman Christians who survived World War I, he was principally the organizer of destruction, dispossession, and extermination. This was also true, in part, for Kurds. Kemal Atatürk "rested on Talaat's shoulders."

Applying an inside perspective of the Ottoman Empire and its capital, Istanbul, this biography reinstates Mehmed Talaat as a major political figure of twentieth-century history who set the course for decades to come. He was the last powerful leader of the Ottoman Empire. He and his fellows cataclysmically revolutionized state and society from within, thus largely disrupting Ottoman tradition in politics and in social life, which was until then multireligious. The most influential ruler in the Middle East of the 1910s, when Asia Minor (Anatolia), Iraq, and Syria (including Lebanon and Palestine) were still part of the Ottoman Empire, Talaat led the first single-party experience of the twentieth century.

He stood at the reins of an endangered state that was formally still ruled by a sultan-caliph ("caliph" is a Muslim ruler deemed to be a successor of Muhammed). Not an aloof, single dictator, and far from being omnipotent, Talaat acted from within a conspiring committee that had established a party regime staunchly committed to saving the state, Islam, and the Turks. He succeeded in managing communication, balancing factions, and, although himself a civilian, getting along well with young officers.

Rejecting the entrenched view of the Young Turk leadership as an ongoing triumvirate, this study assesses it as a temporary constellation of 1913-14. From then on, Talaat was more than a primus inter pares, both in domestic and foreign politics, thus politically superior to Enver Pasha (see ibid.). Confusion regarding this point misses the regime's architecture and the crucial nexuses that led to the Republic of Turkey.'

The CUP, the Young Turk power organization, directed the sultan and made him a representative figure after the Young Turk Revolution of 1908. Guided by Talaat, it established a single-party regime in 1913 while simultaneously starting what it considered to be a national struggle of salvation

for a Turkey freed from foreign influence, from which an explicit narrative of national salvation began. It thus inaugurated the first founding period of a post-Ottoman nation-state marked by modern dictatorial patterns and the sidelining of the sultanate-caliphate, though it maintained an imperial spirit throughout the 1910s in its understanding of sociopolitical hierachies. This is true even for its Kemalist successors, after the sultanate-caliphate was definitively abolished in early 1924.

This study therefore calls the committee's mentality "imperially biased," and a main obstacle for real democracy, although its politics demolished the Ottoman social fabric and thus the empire. In this vein, Talaat became the direct forefather of a post-Ottoman Turkey based on radical nationalism ("Ata-türk" means the "Turks' father or progenitor"). Importantly, Atatürk's predecessor Talaat still embraced the power of political Islam, thus making the return of religious hegemony for Kemalists a constant threat and, in a post-Kemalist era, almost inevitable. Public history and political culture in the Republic of Turkey did not disavow Talaat's legacy but welcomed it officially in the 1940s, after silence during Atatürk's lifetime.

Together with his fellows, Talaat led the Ottoman Empire into World War I and jihad—he understood the whole war as a jihad4—and began to transform Asia Minor into a Turkish national home, that is, a "Turkey for the Turks," as a contemporary slogan read. When World War I was lost and the committee was dissolved, informed Germans rightly argued that Talaat was "too strong, on the whole, to simply disappear" in contrast to other, more ephemeral CUP figures.' Talaat's shadow eventually not only emerged and is imprinted on the founding history of the Turkish nation-state, the present Republic of Turkey, but also lingers in a modern confrontation between East and West, Ottoman-Muslim, and Christian powers and traditions. This contemporary polarization informs an alternative understanding of World War I, centered in Istanbul, seat of the Ottoman sultanate-caliphate, and emphasizes victory against the West at Gallipoli.

The Ottoman capital constitutes a main hub, cause, and factor of war itself, and Talaat was the man who was most identified with, most committed to, and most influential in determining the course of the Ottoman state during the last decade of its existence. He was involved in all critical decision making. He and his circle mirrored the forces around them, the zeitgeist and the contemporary system of powers. Tying Europe to an Ottoman cataclysm already in action, they anticipated and shaped the seminal catastrophe of Greater Europe, or, in the terminology of this book, "larger Europe" of the 1910s (Europe, Russia, and the Ottoman world).

Talaat's era, the so-called second constitutional period of the Ottoman state, keeps on "failing to be historicized," at least in public history, because of unbroken implicit and explicit identifications with actors and positions of that era that remain entrenched in the political culture. Successful efforts at comprehensive historicization are therefore critical in order to acquire a healthy distance and to face new futures in and with Turkey. In the first edition of Talaat's memoirs in 1946, the foreword states that Talaat "was one of a few rare statesmen whom Turkish history produced. Among the Ottoman grand viziers, this great Turkish leader had reached his high position thanks to his patriotism, honesty, intelligence and assiduity.... I bow respectfully before the great presence of the late Talaat Pasha"' To this day, Talaat's memoirs have seen many reeditions in this same spirit, indicating that many—including the Turkish state and polity—still stand under his spell and shadow.

In chapter 1, this book opens amid Talaat's most salient actions in the first year of World War I. This chapter introduces main topics of Talaat's biography, referring in several places to in-depth treatment and documentation that is explored in later chapters. These chapters proceed generally in chronological order, apart from two thematic sections. Discussion of research and historiographical issues permeate the entire narrative and the endnotes.

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After a hundred years, it is high time to understand and conclude: Talaat Pasha and his Young Turk

fellows failed to make a timely, healthy, painful break with the empire and its undefeated, built-in, premodern supremacy. Heading the Ottoman Empire, they not only drew out but fueled agony in the 1910s. Angrily and vengefully, they struggled for empire and the Turkish nation, their main identifications. What they missed was the fight for constitutional rule in a reduced territory that they could have reasonably preserved without resorting to extreme violence. A century later, one might be tempted to shrug off those failures—there were so many in that era!—if it were not for the lasting consequences that command precise and careful revisiting.

Pioneering radical nationalist revolutionism, that is—in this study's terminology—from the Right, Talaat's revolutionist cohort entered a temporary marriage of convenience with Bolsheviks after the end of World War I. It proved paradigmatic for larger Europe in the era of the world wars, though long and wrongly disregarded as peripheral or "oriental." Its unresolved (even if would-be solved) questions survived the global break of World War II and determine—modified—the convulsions of the present Middle East. Now visible for everyone, these old issues take center stage in global politics. Talaat and his cohort left behind wounds that even a century could not heal, and descendants of victims can neither forgive nor forget, because credible recognition—the precondition for such healing—is lacking. The hope voiced after Talaat's death by a close Armenian friend of the early Young Turks in opposition that "Turks aware of the true interests of their country will not count this former minister among their good statesmen" is still unfulfilled.

Although periods of relative prosperity and democratic openings were not absent in the post-Ottoman century, the Young Turk single-party leaders have, all in all, left dangerously divided societies behind them: prone to political violence and quasi-condemned to repeat patterns practiced during the Ottoman cataclysm. Because history remained unclarified and soul-searching was halfhearted—if it ever took place in the post-Ottoman states originating in that cataclysm of the 1910s—political culture failed to emancipate itself from unrepented, manifestly evil patterns. Kemalism

benefited from what CUP extremism had achieved, but thus implicitly identified with it, without facing the built-in evil. Such historical summary related to Talaat is not uplifting, yet it is hopefully instructive: at long last, his legacy can today help us to better understand not only why certain politics went and still go wrong, but also, by excludability, even if after an end to terror, which directions must be taken.

This study has not intended to judge but to explore Talaat and even, under the aspect of eternity, to see him off. As a historian and "expert on the past," I know how to appreciate the worth and virtue of historical valediction. In the 2010s, Turkey has become post-Kemalist. It is at risk of losing not only its post—World War II orientation but also its new, more incisive, fundamental compass from the beginning of the twenty-first century: accession to the European Union and implementation of the EU standards, allowing democratic ideals of the 1908 Ottoman spring to resume. In the aftermath of this recent loss, Turkey is again, and perhaps more than ever, haunted by fatal departures of a hundred years ago. In this sense, Talaat's ghost is living on and has befallen Turkey's Justice and Development Party (AKP), which had started so hopefully in the early 2000s. Personal power, party interests, and ideology prevail over democracy. As an analyst recently noted, this "remains one of Turkey's main problems today. The AKP did not invent this problem, of course, but it has been busy building on it, rather than trying to turn Turkey into a genuinely democratic country that is respected across the world." A combination of power, corruption, and imperially biased national-religious appeal ("neo-Ottomanism") has presently—in the late 2010s—made politics sick again.

In scholarship and public history, Mehmed Talaat Pasha's era, the first founding period of the Turkish nation-state, long remained veiled. Unclarified or mystified, the period's actors, ideologemes, and political practices lent themselves to inconsiderate reuse and reidentification. Against this reality, their life and policy decisions urge consistent historical deconstruction. Besides being a study for erudition, the analysis of Talaat's political biography in this book has intended to serve this hopeful purpose.
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[Waiting for Müteferrika: Glimpses of Ottoman Print Culture](#) by Orlin Sabev [Ottoman and Turkish Studies, Academic Studies Press, 9781618116185]

This book is a study of the first Ottoman/Muslim printer Ibrahim Müteferrika and his printing activity in the first half of the eighteenth century. By reviewing the existing views in narratives dating from the fifteenth through the nineteenth century and modern scholarly works, most of them quite critically discussing the relatively late introduction of Ottoman Turkish/Muslim printing, the book argues that the delay was mainly due to the lack of an appropriate printer who would be capable and eager enough to set a printing house and whom the Ottoman authority could trust. By focusing on Müteferrika's western-formed mindset the book detects the influence of his printing enterprise upon the transition from scribal tradition to print culture.

Excerpt: Waiting for Godot?
"Patience is not an absence of action; rather it is 'timing.'" Fulton J. Sheen

One of the Ottoman eighteenth century's hallmarks was the so-called Tulip Age (1718-30). Historians called it so because of the tulip gardens cultivated in different places of Istanbul. Their refined fragrance replaced the smell of the gunpowder that prevailed during the preceding wars. Besides, in those years there was a place in the then

Ottoman capital where one's nose could sense for the first time another kind of smell: the heavy smell of the oil-based ink, used in the first Ottoman Turkish printing press. Indeed, the Ottomans could sniff such a smell in earlier times because Jewish, Armenian, and Greek-Orthodox printing houses operated during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, but it was during the Tulip Age when the printing technology with movable type was introduced to the Ottomans themselves.

One might suggest that before the seemingly fortuitous introduction of Ottoman printing in the first half of the eighteenth century, the Ottomans had a latent rather than apparent wish for printing. The Müteferrika press was definitely a personal enterprise that succeeded in engaging the needed support of statesmen. It offered to the reading public an alternative technology for the multiplication of texts, which could be applicable when demand existed for books on certain topics or of specific genres. In the course of time, printing proved its advantages in serving nineteenth-century reforms, mass education in particular, providing more copies in a shorter time than manuscript duplication could.

The Ottoman authorities did not initiate but supported such a printing enterprise, which was completely a private and personal undertaking. It was Ibrahim Müteferrika who, enjoying in the beginning the moral and financial support of Said Çelebi, one of the officials to join the 1720-21 Ottoman embassy to France, established the first Ottoman printing press.

Ibrahim Müteferrika became famous both among his contemporaries and in history not as müteferrika—his court service—but as the first Ottoman Muslim printer. His incredibly enormous enthusiasm in printing helped him to overcome some obstacles set by alleged opponents of printing such as scribes, manuscript copyists, and men of religion.

As Müteferrika's probate inventory shows, the books he printed sold slowly and with a bit of difficulty. Omne principium difficile! Logically, the unsold copies of the earlier editions were fewer than the later ones, since they were in the book market for a longer period of time. By examining the numbers of unsold copies against the number of

the initial print run of each of the Müteferrika editions, one is able to determine the degree of popularity that each title enjoyed. Among Müteferrika's bestsellers were the Arabic-Turkish dictionary of Vankulu and Grammaire turque, followed by some titles such as Usfilü'l-hikem ft Nizāmi'l ümem, Füyiizāt i Miknātisiye, and Ahvāl-i Gazavāt der Diyār i Bosna, as well as Tārīh of Naima.

Although the first Ottoman Turkish printing enterprise was relatively successful, it ceased immediately after Müteferrika's death, and revived sporadically just for one edition in the mid-1750s and then only in 1784 continued in a more stable way. That is why the previous scholarship was inclined to claim that the first Ottoman Turkish printing press was a failure rather than a success. Perhaps, the hitherto negative assessments of Müteferrika's printing enterprise were due to the view that the printing innovation was a sweeping revolution that took place in a short period of time.

However, for along time, the pen and press had been in play side by side. Their coexistence was seemingly competitive and even mutually rejecting rather than peaceful and complementary. A good illustration is probably the case of Greek-Orthodox printing. It started in the sixteenth century due to various printing houses outside the borders of the Ottoman Empire, except for one founded by the patriarch Cyril Lukaris (b. 1572, 1620-38) and the monk Nikodimos Metaxas in Istanbul in 1627. However, until well into the nineteenth century the Greek monasteries, schools, and other cultural institutions kept on copying theological books by hand since the locals considered the books, printed in Western Europe, to be corrupted with Catholic interpretation, At the turn of the nineteenth century, the Greek intellectuals shared the attitude that printing was controversial. In 1783, Dimitrios Katartzis (1730-1807) called the Greek calligraphers to "resurrect" and plead for active use of manuscripts, referring to the Ottomans (at that time without a printing house), while others such as Yosipos Misioadakas (d. c. 1800) and Adamantios Korais (1748-1833) advocated for printed books. So, could one daim that Greek print culture proved itself toward the beginning of the

nineteenth century? In other words, the formation of print culture must be considered a long-term process, which could take less or much longer time in different socio-cultural contexts.

As for the transition from scribal to print culture within the Turkish-Muslim segment of Ottoman society, its long print revolution or evolution, if you will, was preceded by a long delay or wait. Printing in Western Europe began in the mid-fifteenth century; non-Muslim Ottoman subjects such as Jews, Armenians, Greeks, Orthodox Slavs, or Arabic- or Syriac-speaking Christians established during the late fifteenth, sixteenth, seventeenth, and early eighteenth centuries their own printing presses to print predominantly religious texts, but the first Ottoman/Muslim printing enterprise was launched only in the third decade of the eighteenth century.

How can we explain such a delay? Sixteenth- and seventeenth-century western travelers hold that the Ottoman reluctance to adopt printing was due to the strong manuscript tradition and the resistance of the Ottoman copyists and calligraphers against it. On the other hand, the first sixteenth-century examples of Arabic texts printed in Europe proved the typesetting technology imperfect rather than applicable because of many orthographical and grammatical errors in the western printed versions of the Qur'an and some classical Arabic texts such as Avicenna's Canon of Medicine, for instance. The imperfectness of these examples was due to the lack of capable punch-cutters of the Arabic characters as well as proficient proofreaders. It seems that the poor layout quality of these editions was the main reason that fewer books sold than expected.

Although some documentary evidence exists confirming that the Ottomans were biased against printing of Islamic religious texts, the allegations that they were negatively inclined toward printing in general seem to be groundless. Rather, they did not feel a crucial need of printing.

It seems that technological difficulties made the world of Islam reluctant to immediately and ultimately adopt printing with movable type, and only personal striving and effort, as in the case of Ibrahim Müteferrika, and not a definite

sociocultural demand, called Ottoman/Muslim printing into being. Probably, printing with movable type was the first European invention that was introduced to the Ottomans completely due to personal aspirations rather than a state initiative.

Ibrahim Müteferrika's printing enterprise became possible because he was a confident admirer of the already developed European print culture and probably well skilled in that art to be keen enough to undertake such a venture on Ottoman soil, where calligraphy was adored, and printing was considered imperfect to fit the specifics of the Arabic alphabet. As a matter of fact, the Ottomans relied upon such agents of change, coming from outside, until well into the nineteenth century. For example, persons of foreign background—like Topçu Urban, who made cannons for the Ottomans during the reign of Sultan Mehmed II (1444-46, 1451-81); Gerçek Davud, who in 1720 established in Istanbul the first Ottoman fire department; Ibrahim Müteferrika, who introduced the printing technology; and Claude Alexandre de Bonneval (1675-1747), who became a convert under the name Humbaraci Ahmed Pasha and trained the Ottoman artillerists—were educated border crossers who became "agents of change" in a state which was inward-looking, except for conquest aspirations. And it was during the Tulip Age (1718-30) when, for the first time, long-term Ottoman embassies were sent to France and Persia. However, permanent Ottoman embassies were established only in 1793.11 Since then the Ottoman state gradually became outward-looking, much more interested in the developments outside its borders, and its own representatives were already in charge to observe these developments and to operate as "agents of change" offering the adoption or adaptation of some of them in the Ottoman milieu. Moreover, not only diplomats but also Ottoman students were sent to Europe, mostly to Paris, to acquire western knowledge in various technologies, including lithography and typesetting, and to apply it on their return to the homeland.

The history of Ottoman Turkish printing differs in important points from the general history of printing. In Europe, print culture emerged as a result of a gradual and long-term process of complementing, alternating, and competing with the

manuscript tradition. In the Ottoman milieu, print culture was in a way implanted or transplanted. The Ottomans of the pre-printing period were certainly not concerned that they were losing time by being reluctant to adopt the printing technology. From their perspective, their time was not lost at all. Probably that is why the Ottomans were waiting too patiently for their printer. And all this began due to Ibrahim Müteferrika whom the Ottomans themselves were not seemingly waiting for so faithfully as Beckett's characters for their Godot. Yet by contrast with Godot, Ibrahim Müteferrika did appear to make the first step in the formation of Ottoman print culture.

Once Müteferrika set the precedent of typography in the first half of the eighteenth century, the idea of printing found its way slowly in the minds first of the Ottoman intellectuals and then of the Ottoman rulers and developed gradually into an established print culture in the second half of the nineteenth century.

If Ibrahim Müteferrika could see all these later developments, he would have been satisfied. As to whether he died a happy or a desperate man, as in Jale Baysal's abovementioned play, we can never be certain. However, the consoling words of the poet Nevres—in Baysal's imagination—are at least full of historical optimism:

"Probably the next [generations] will read [your printed books] ... as well as the generations after them. Did not you pave the way?" <>

[Islam without Europe: Traditions of Reform in Eighteenth-Century Islamic Thought](#) by Ahmad S. Dallal [Islamic Civilization and Muslim Networks, The University of North Carolina Press, 9781469640341]

Replete with a cast of giants in Islamic thought and philosophy, Ahmad S. Dallal's pathbreaking intellectual history of the eighteenth-century Muslim world challenges stale views of this period as one of decline, stagnation, and the engendering of a widespread fundamentalism. Far from being moribund, Dallal argues, the eighteenth century--prior to systematic European encounters--was one of the most fertile eras in Islamic thought.

Across vast Islamic territories, Dallal charts in rich detail not only how intellectuals rethought and reorganized religious knowledge but also the reception and impact of their ideas. From the banks of the Ganges to the shores of the Atlantic, commoners and elites alike embraced the appeals of Muslim thinkers who, while preserving classical styles of learning, advocated for general participation by Muslims in the definition of Islam. Dallal also uncovers the regional origins of most reform projects, showing how ideologies were forged in particular sociopolitical contexts. Reformists' ventures were in large part successful--up until the beginnings of European colonization of the Muslim world. By the nineteenth century, the encounter with Europe changed Islamic discursive culture in significant ways into one that was largely articulated in reaction to the radical challenges of colonialism.

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Excerpt: Reimagining the Eighteenth Century

Sometime around the middle of the nineteenth century, the intellectual world of Muslims began to crumble and the great traditions of the past were forgotten. Contrary to common modern assertions, the recession of these traditions was sudden and unexpected. Throughout the eighteenth century and the early decades of the nineteenth, the Muslim world had witnessed one of the most lively and creative periods in its intellectual history. Echoes of this intellectual activity could still be felt in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, yet nothing in this latter period approximated the

erudition and depth of eighteenth-century thought. In the eighteenth century, enormous energies were devoted to a systematic and comprehensive restructuring of Islamic thought. The erudition of eighteenth-century thinkers and their honed historical consciousness enabled them to mold the past and fully appropriate its legacies. Classical styles of thinking were preserved, despite a great awareness of the need to reorganize religious knowledge and identify those aspects of Islam that were shared by all. From within the framework of classical learning, these thinkers dramatically restructured the intellectual world of Muslims. Diverse Islamic ideologies were forged and employed in Islamic sociopolitical as well as intellectual movements. Eighteenth-century models of Islamic activity ranged from political mobilization under the banner of classical Islamic ideology to the creation of a centralized network of Sufi settlements to purely intellectual reform embodied in new approaches to the study of traditional Islamic disciplines.

From the banks of the Ganges to the shores of the Atlantic, masses and elites alike embraced the relentless appeals of eighteenth-century Muslim thinkers. No other earlier period in Islamic history can boast of intellectual activities as self-consciously transformative and inclusive in their conception. Eighteenth-century thinkers were fully aware of the intellectual and political significance of their undertakings, and they embarked upon them with great self-confidence and optimism. Despite their alarmist tone, eighteenth-century thinkers had great hopes for the future: they asserted the potential superiority of later generations of Muslims over earlier ones and then proceeded to demonstrate this superiority; they articulated and espoused an Islam that transcends the boundaries of the schools of law and eradicates sectarian and legal differences; and they advocated the active participation of all Muslims in the definition of Islam and set out meticulously to chart the practical venues for this participation. From the perspective of the late nineteenth century, the intellectual ventures of the eighteenth century had failed to stand the test of time. Yet, judging by the record of the eighteenth century and its immediate aftermath, and not from later, hazy perceptions of this

century, these ventures were quite successful and influential. The cultural vitality of the eighteenth century was not limited to certain regions but was spread over most of the Muslim world. The distinguished thinkers of this period came from India and Arabia, North Africa and West Africa, as well as Syria and Yemen. The diverse and rich legacies of this period—the vibrant eighteenth-century intellectual activities in the Muslim world that developed independent of European influence—are the subject of this book.

The choice of period and subject matter is justified primarily in light of the scope of this cultural activity and its contrast to cultural activities in the age of colonialism. Chronologically, it is easier to demarcate the end of this period than its beginnings. What I call the eighteenth century extends to the beginnings of the modern period, a period that is marked, above all, by European political, economic, and cultural domination over the Muslim world, and by an Islamic discursive culture largely articulated in reaction to this European challenge. Naturally, therefore, no single date can mark the end of the eighteenth century and the beginning of the modern period, as European penetration and domination took hold at different dates in different places. While, for example, the modern era in Egypt arguably starts in the early nineteenth century, European modernity in sub-Saharan Africa does not commence till after the middle of this century. Moreover, since the extent and significance of European hegemony was not simultaneously appreciated in all parts of the Muslim world, the cultural eighteenth century, defined here in terms of cultural production that was not articulated in response to Europe, sometimes lingered past the colonial takeover. As such, my approach is opposed to the traditional Orientalist view that marks the 1798 French invasion of Egypt as the beginning of the modern history of the Middle East and the Muslim world not just because many social, economic, political, and cultural continuities in large parts of the Muslim world were not affected by this invasion, but primarily because this periodization assumes generalized stagnation and decline in the eighteenth-century Muslim world. This idea of economic and political decline has been largely

discredited in a substantial number of studies, especially by historians of the Ottoman Empire and the Ottoman provinces.' This study will undermine the decline thesis in the cultural sphere.

For the purposes of this study, the beginnings of the period under examination are also defined primarily in cultural terms. As I will demonstrate in the chapters that follow, the eighteenth century was characterized by intensive intellectual activities of great cultural significance. These activities continued traditional patterns of thinking but were nonetheless very original and transformative. Eighteenth-century thought was the creative culmination of traditional Islamic traditions and epistemologies, but it was also the end of these traditions. And despite continuities between eighteenth-century thought and earlier traditional patterns of knowledge production, the intellectual constructs of the eighteenth century were unique and, in the case of hadith and legal theory (arguably two of the most important Islamic traditions), had radical transformative implications that far exceeded the scope and impact of earlier Islamic intellectual activities. The ubiquity in Orientalist historiography of the faulty paradigm of eighteenth-century decline further underscores the need for a different and more accurate understanding of eighteenth-century Islamic culture. The appropriateness of treating the Islamic eighteenth century as a unit is further corroborated by political and economic developments in this century. Already in the seventeenth century and through the eighteenth century, the central governments of the three major empires of the Muslim world— the Ottomans, Safavids, and Moghuls — often referred to as the gunpowder empires, were losing some of their control over their provinces and subjects. Changes in the structures of society and economy in each of these states were also coupled with military vulnerability and loss of territory. These gradual, and in no way irreversible, changes culminated in the eighteenth century in a number of dramatic events that underscore the historical distinctiveness of this period. In 1718, the Ottomans signed a treaty that forced them to surrender parts of the Balkans. Mindful of the weakening of its military position relative to Europe, the Ottoman state attempted to reform its bureaucracy and military by importing some of the practices of its European rivals. Around the same period, an Afghan invasion of Iran ended the Safavid dynasty in 1722 and, in 1739, Nāder Shāh, the new ruler of Iran, sacked Delhi and sealed the fate of an already weakened Moghul dynasty. Of course, the weakening or even demise of these centralized and centralizing states did not plunge the Muslim world into a period of irreversible stagnation. In the Ottoman Empire, for example, autonomous local powers, with vibrant and revived economies, emerged in several provinces including Mount Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Palestine, and Egypt.' While significant research has already established the viability and vitality of several emerging eighteenth-century economies and polities of this period, eighteenth-century culture remains largely unexamined. This book explores the exceptional cultural achievements of the eighteenth century.

While offering general signposts for demarcating the boundaries and characteristics of the eighteenth century, political history does not determine the beginning or end of the eighteenth-century cultural activities that are studied in this book. For similar reasons, I do not limit the geographical scope of inquiry to the regions examined in traditional histories of this period. A political or economic history of the period may legitimately limit its scope to regions that have similar state structures or economic patterns of production and circulation. Studies of the eighteenth century usually focus on the territorial domains of one or more of the three gunpowder empires, or on other parts of the Middle East or the Muslim world with comparable polities and economies. Since the primary focus of this study, however, is on trends of Islamic cultural production that were developed independent of European influence, the inclusion of `Uthmān Ibn Fūdī of West Africa, or Muhammad Bin 'Ali al-Sanūsī of North and sub-Saharan Africa, is justified by the intellectual merits of these reformers and the social significance of the movements they led, even if their base territories fell outside the domains of the recognized powers of the time.

Remembering the past is hardly an innocent or objective act. Modernists all too often collect the

debris of past cultures and labor in order to turn the deposits of nonsocieties into redeeming social realities in the present. This is not the purpose of this book. Rather, the object of this study is the cultural and social import of the intellectual achievements of the premodern period in the Muslim world, which, depending on the region, ends sometime between the beginning and the middle of the nineteenth century. The working hypothesis of this book is that the eighteenth century was a period of intellectual vitality rather than decadence. The focus on decline is deliberately avoided not least because it distills and distorts the view of the eighteenth century through the prism of later events. To avoid the retrospective use of modernist criteria in establishing the intellectual trends of the premodern period, the testimonies of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century sources are used to identify the major thinkers of the time. In the absence of an established canon for the intellectual achievements of this period, it is important to justify why certain works are deemed more significant than others. Once again, my purpose is not to canonize the works of unknown individuals but simply to study the contents of the works of scholars who have already been recognized in traditional scholarship. I used two criteria in selecting eighteenth-century authors and writings. First, the works examined in this book are all from prolific writers who were celebrated by their contemporaries and later generations of Muslims as the leading intellectuals of the century. Some enjoyed only regional recognition, whereas the reputation of others spread widely in the Muslim world. These writers often thought of themselves, and were portrayed in contemporary and later sources, as the mujtahids (independent thinkers) of the time. They contributed to more than one field of study, and, as leaders of political movements or intellectual schools of thought, they had substantial influence and popularity. Their works were widely circulated, often far beyond their own countries, and became the subject of commentaries by later scholars. Although their views did not represent all or even most Muslim intellectual activity, these eighteenth-century reformers were the most celebrated among their contemporaries, and their thought prevailed, already during their own lifetime, as the best

thought of the period. The second factor that informed my choice of themes to examine was my objective of providing a corrective to prevalent assumptions in current scholarly accounts of the history of the eighteenth century. In particular, I focus on the kinds of cultural production that undermine the thesis of Islamic decline as well as the various revisionist attempts to qualify this thesis.

The earliest and most widely accepted scholarly view asserts that the eighteenth century is a century of political and economic decline and of intellectual stagnation. According to this view, an era of political and intellectual revival and reform ensues in the nineteenth century primarily as a result of the growth of European influence in, and the resulting intellectual challenges to, the Muslim world. The reaction or response to Europe became the central criterion for defining Islamic reform, as is clearly stated, for example, in Albert Hourani's introduction to his Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age, 1798¬1939. This approach has privileged one particular kind of intellectual activity, namely, that which responded to the "European challenge" by adapting itself to it. Such, for example, is the disproportionate interest in modern scholarship in the views of the Egyptian historian `Abd al-Rahmān al-Jabarti (1756¬1825), who commented on the French in the aftermath of their occupation of Egypt, or in the thought of the Egyptian writer Rifā`a al-Tahtāwī (1801-73), who, among other things, tried to provide an Islamic rationale for Egyptian nationalism?

Later historians have looked at ways in which traditional sectors of Muslim society did in fact participate in the modernization efforts. Other kinds of intellectual activity, however, were deemed "traditional" and, it would seem, not worthy of study. Today, although many of the writings of eighteenthcentury thinkers have been published, these writings are often presented as exceptional achievements in an age characterized by intellectual stagnation; as such, scholars see the significance of these writings chiefly as laying the foundation for the more substantial reforms of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

Historians who adopt the paradigm of decline almost invariably treat the Wahhabi movement as

the representative trend of the eighteenth century, thus compounding, in my view, the misunderstanding of this century. The Wahhabi movement, which is recognized as the one example of Islamic success in the eighteenth century, is in fact its biggest intellectual exception. Also, Wahhabi thought, though manipulated toward political ends, is extremely apolitical. The limited works of Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhãb focus exclusively on creedal issues, whereas the majority of eighteenth-century thinkers and leaders, in contrast to Wahhabism, were primarily concerned with larger social and political problems, both in theory and in practice.

Although my views on the eighteenth century were articulated before the protracted events unleashed on September 11, 2001, and are in no way a response to them, arguments about the eighteenth century have some relevance to the current debate about the roots of contemporary Islamic radicalism. This relevance, however, is contrary to what has been adduced in most discussions about the so-called Wahhabi brand of Islam that, according to many contemporary commentators, triggered the wave of fundamentalism that culminated in the September n attacks. Many scholars and observers contend that modern fundamentalism is rooted in the legacy of the eighteenth-century as represented in the Wahhabi ideology. In the chapters that follow I demonstrate the inadequacy of the use of Wahhabism as a paradigm for understanding the eighteenth century; moreover, I argue that there is a fundamental rupture between the legacies of the long eighteenth century and those of the twentieth century. As such, eighteenth-century Wahhabism is quite distinct from twentieth-century radicalism, whether Wahhabi or otherwise. Eighteenth-century Wahhabism emerged out of Najd, the desert region of Arabia, as an isolated phenomenon and managed to overrun Mecca and Medina, the cultured cities of the Hejaz, due to declining Ottoman control over this region. This brief expansion of Wahhabi power, however, was reversed through the intervention of the armies of Muhammad Ali, the autonomous Ottoman governor of Egypt. Both politically and ideologically, Wahhabism was checked by local and regional actors and was forced to retreat to Najd, where it

had no strategic regional significance. In addition to being a political exception, Wahhabism was not representative of eighteenth-century intellectual trends. Numerous countertrends emerged in the eighteenth century and, in contrast to Wahhabism, these more influential movements were thwarted only after the encounter with Europe. The twentieth-century reemergence of Wahhabism as a regional power in Arabia resulted largely from a new balance of power in the region marked by both a decline of the Ottomans and a rise of British influence in Arabia, which was favorable to the Wahhabis. Furthermore, the Wahhabi regional influence in the twentieth century was dramatically bolstered by the discovery of oil in Arabia. The sway of contemporary Wahhabism is a function of the legacies of postcolonialism. In fact, European influence not only shaped twentieth-century Wahhabism and allowed it to reemerge despite its limited popular appeal, but it also aborted the rich, non-Wahhabi traditions of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries that had previously managed to contain Wahhabi ideology and provide alternatives to it. Twentieth-century radicalism, therefore, is better explained by reference to modernity than by reference to the eighteenth-century or the Wahhabi movement that represented the exception of this century. Neither Wahhabism nor decline is emblematic of Muslim intellectual life in the eighteenth century.

In recent years, scholars have proposed several critiques of the notion of decline and have attempted to construct alternative accounts of the Islamic eighteenth century.' None of the revisionist approaches to the eighteenth century, however, questions the validity of using Wahhabism as a model for representing eighteenth-century Islamic movements and intellectual activity. Instead, these accounts generally suggest that both nineteenth-century Islamic reform and twentieth-century fundamentalism are rooted in the legacy of the eighteenth century. Such estimations of eighteenth-century thought presuppose that its main value was in laying the foundations of later, socially significant reforms. Revisionist accounts of the eighteenth century have placed much emphasis on a Sufism (Islamic mysticism) void of intellectual or spiritual rigor, and on the so-called socio-moral use

of hadith (the traditions of the Prophet Muhammad), that is, on hadith as the source providing standards of individual and collective codes of conduct " This emphasis has shifted the focus of examination from the intellectual content of eighteenth-century writings on Sufism or hadith to the social uses of these two disciplines. Although a large amount of the writings of eighteenth-century thinkers has been published, revisionist historiography continues to focus on practical and social aspects of eighteenth-century activity in a move that confirms the earlier notion that the intellectual value of eighteenth-century thought is minimal.

The distinction between culture and social reality is implied in studies that argue that a political economy approach to the study of the eighteenth century would undermine traditional Orientalist views and would yield a radically different understanding of this period. While these works convincingly criticize notions of social and economic decline in the eighteenth century, they suffer, in my view, from two related shortcomings. First, in advocating that historians ought to "leave what is still basically the intellectual world of culture history (with its typical concern for the transmission of ideas) for the world of political economy," they posit a problematic dichotomy between the "unreal" ideas and the "real" material forces at work in society. Such a dichotomy seriously underestimates the role of Islamic discursive culture and ideology in society. Second, the invitation to shift the focus of research presumably implies that although there might be cultural stagnation in the eighteenth century, we are likely to reach different conclusions if we focus our attention on political economy. While this is meant as a critique of the Orientalist notion that equates "the high point of `Islamic' creativity" with "Islamic culture," it fails to provide a corrective to the long-standing Orientalist assumption that the eighteenth century is, nevertheless, a low point in Islamic culture. This assumption, it must be added, is central to the crude Orientalist scheme of periodization that not only asserts essentialist distinctions between the Islamic world and the West but also posits a European monopoly over humanistic cultural production since the beginnings of European

awakenings in the eleventh century. Abandoning the study of ideas in the Muslim world when our knowledge of the world of culture or even ideas is so impoverished can only reinforce this flawed paradigm.

Sharing the underlying assumption that eighteenth-century movements are more interesting than eighteenth-century thought, both Orientalist and revisionist accounts presuppose that the eighteenth century did not contribute anything of value at the intellectual level. As such, what is implied in this notion of indigenous revivals is an indigenous but intellectually impoverished eighteenth-century revival. One reason that the older account of eighteenth-century decline still prevails is the many weaknesses of the proposed revisionist explanations. Perhaps the weakest point in all of the alternative accounts is that they have yet to identify the elements of eighteenth-century innovation.

To undermine the thesis of decline, I start by revisiting Wahhabism and its place in the intellectual landscape of the eighteenth century. In the chapters that follow I explore the adequacy of revisionist conceptions of eighteenth-century reform. One such conception that I examine is ijtihād, the exercise of independent legal reasoning, a concept commonly considered as the hallmark of Islamic reform. Muslim intellectuals of the twentieth century as well as modern scholars of Islam have given much attention to the subject of ijtihād. Earlier scholarly accounts of modern Islamic history contend that the "gates of ijtihād" were closed in the classical period and were reopened in the late nineteenth century, as a result of the redeeming encounter with Europe. Revisionist historians, however, cite the proliferation of writings on ijtihād in the eighteenth century and hence move back the starting date of reform to the eighteenth century. Yet, in contrast to the revisionist reference to ijtihād, I argue that works on ijtihād were composed throughout earlier periods and, as far as legal theory is concerned, can hardly be considered exclusively characteristic of eighteenth-century thought. What is new about these discussions, however, is the way ijtihād is deployed within the larger projects of their authors. Furthermore, during

their lifetime, as the mujtahids (independent legal scholars as well as thinkers) of their times, the writers examined in this book were celebrated primarily for their ability to exercise ijtihād.

Several Muslim intellectuals of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries attempted to identify the mujtahids or mujaddids (renewers) of the previous century. The nineteenth-century Indian author SiddiqS Khān al-Qanūjī lists among the mujtahids of the end of the eighteenth and beginning of the nineteenth centuries Shāh Wali Allāh al-Dihlawi and his grandson Muhammad Ismā`īl; Muhammad Ibn Ismā`īl al-San`ānī; Muhammad Ibn 'Ali al-Shawkānī; Sālih Ibn `Umar al-Fulānī; Muhammad Hayāt al-Sindi; Muhammad Fākhir al Ilāh Ābādī; and Muhammad Ibn Nāsir al-Hāzimī 1ß These names appear in many other biographical sources, and all but the last two will be examined in this book. Rashid Ridā, the famous reformer of the early twentieth century, also tried to identify the mujaddids of the past. Ridā repeats many of the same names, but he also provides a general rule for identifying these mujaddids. These, he argues, are individuals who not only combine a solid scholarly reputation and an aura of leadership but also offer ideas that satisfy their time's needs for tajdīd (renewal). This definition of mujaddids would be satisfactory if the records of the eighteenth century indicated what the period's needs for renewal might have been. But in most instances, including that of Ridā himself, twentieth-century writers analyzed and defined these needs retrospectively, and the resulting definitions may better represent the perceived needs for renewal in the writers' eras than any objective assessment of the needs of the eighteenth century. Even if the explanatory value of later accounts of eighteenth-century reform are in question, the convergence of these accounts provides grounds for identifying the key thinkers of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.

This study is a partial reconstruction of the thought-world of the main thinkers of the eighteenth century, and an attempt to assess their intellectual achievements. Because the cultural achievements of the eighteenth century remain largely neglected,

some preliminary descriptive work must be done, and the story needs to be told before we can move to the explanatory level of analysis. This study will survey and compare the works and activities of several major thinkers of the eighteenth century whose ideas, I will argue, comprise distinct intellectual trends of Islamic thought in the premodern period, rather than one general trend as suggested by scholarly literature. These thinkers were the most famous scholars or activists of the period in question. They include Muhammad Ibn Ismā`īl al-Amir al-San`ānī (1688-1769) of Yemen, Shāh Wali Allāh al-Dihlawi of India (1703-62), Muhammad Ibn `Abd al-Wahhāb of Arabia (1703-87), `Uthmān Ibn Fidi of West Africa (1754-1817), Muhammad Ibn `Ali al-Shawkānī (1759-1834) of Yemen, and Muhammad Bin 'Ali al-Sanūsī of North Africa (1787-1859). Modern studies that draw parallels between their respective backgrounds and ideas have consistently lacked an in-depth account or analysis of their thought.

Muhammad Ibn Ismā`īl al-Amir al-San`ānī (1688-1769) was one of the central figures in the tradition of Yemeni reform. He grew up in a Zaydi environment, but early in his life he claimed to have become an independent thinker (mujtahid). For this he came under constant attack by other Zaydis accusing him of trying to undermine their school. In auspicious times, he served as the imam (religious leader) of the great mosque of Sanaa, but during less fortunate times he was imprisoned by the rulers of the city after his enemies accused him of dropping the name of the Zaydi imams (in this context, rulers) from the Friday khutba (sermon). Later, he left his hometown and country and traveled to Mecca and Medina, where he became more steeped in traditional Sunni scholarship, especially in the study of the traditions of the Prophet Muhammad (hadith). However, his independent thinking aroused hostility even there, and eventually he went back to northern Yemen, where he spent the rest of his life in relative shelter from public criticism.

Shāh Wali Allāh al-Dihlawi (1703-62) lived and worked in Delhi. During his lifetime he witnessed the final breakup of the Mughal Empire and the rise in its place of a number of smaller and weaker states.

The invasion by Nādir Shāh in 1739 and the sack of Delhi further weakened the Muslims and left them vulnerable to aggression from India's numerous non-Muslim communities. It is not surprising that Walī Allāh's thought was in some measure a response to his perception of the crisis of the time. Since most scholars have defined it simply in terms of their perceptions of the political situation of Wali Allāh's time, it would be instructive to examine his own understanding of this crisis, an understanding that is the basis of his intellectual project.

Muhammad Ibn `Abd al-Wahhāb was born in the village of `Uyayna in Najd in the year 1703. There is little reliable information on his activities during the first four decades of his life. His longest journey was to Basra, from which he was eventually expelled. In the early 1740s, after the death of his father, he started preaching his doctrine of tawhīd (oneness of God). Five years later he gained the political support of the head of the Sa`ūd family residing in Dar`īya, and together they gradually gained control over different parts of Arabia. Ibn Abd al-Wahhāb reportedly retired after the conquest of Riyadh and devoted the last two decades of his life to worship and meditation `Uthmān Ibn Fūdī was born in Gobir (in northern Nigeria) in the year 1754. His father was a learned man, and Ibn Fadi studied with him and with several renowned scholars of the region. He started his career as a wandering teacher in the 1770s, and through the mid-1790s he instructed people on the proper practice of Islam. By the end of this period he had acquired a wide reputation, and his following had increased considerably. Around the year 1795 the emphasis of his teachings and writings gradually shifted from personal instruction to a broader concern with social and political questions and a jihad, which was declared in 1804 and culminated in 1806 in the establishment of the Sokoto caliphate in present-day northern Nigeria. He died in 1817 in the newly established capital, Sokoto, but the caliphate he built continued to flourish under his successors and to inspire many other movements in West Africa.

Muhammad Ibn Ali al-Shawkānī (1759-1834) was another Yemeni scholar who served as chief judge under three of the imams of Sanaa. He belonged to a long tradition of Zaydism in Yemen that was open to Sunni Islam, not in politics alone but also in serious efforts to rework the doctrines and the laws of the school. In this Zaydi tradition, four major figures stand out as the most distinguished scholars of Yemen after the fifteenth century and had great influence on al-Shawkānī: Muhammad Ibn Ibrāhīm al-Wazir (d. 1436), Al-Hasan al-Jalāl (d. 1673), Sālib Ibn Mandi al-Maqbali (d. 1738), and Muhammad Ibn Ismā`īl al-Amir (d. 1768). Al-Shawkāni witnessed the changes in the international and regional political scene of his time and was directly involved in dealing with the political and intellectual ramifications of these changes. AlShawkāni's work is consistently of a high caliber. He was an erudite, prolific, and original writer who composed more than iso books (many of which are multivolume works). Despite this illustrious intellectual career, there is hardly any mention of al-Shawkāni in studies of the eighteenth century in European languages. The influence of al-Shawkāni's thought extended beyond Yemen and his own lifetime. His professed followers include al-Qanūjī in India and al-Sanūsī in North Africa.

The writings of Muhammad Bin Ali al-Sanūsī represent yet another distinct project of revival. Al-Sanūsī was born in 1787 in Mustaghānim, Algeria. He received his early education in his hometown and later in Fez before he went on pilgrimage to Mecca. There he met and became a loyal disciple of Ahmad Ibn Idrīs al-Fāsi, founder of the Idrīsīya (or Ahmadīya) order. After al-Fāsī's death in 1836, al-Sanūsī founded his first zāwiya (Sufi lodge) on Mount Abū Qubays just outside Mecca, but opposition and pressure from local scholars and politicians forced him to leave. In 1840 he headed back to North Africa. In 1842 he established his first headquarters on Al-Jabal al-Akhdar, halfway between Tripoli and the Egyptian border. From this zāwiya, al-Sanūsī dispatched missionaries to the southern and western parts of Libya, where the presence of Ottoman and French authorities, the strong Sufi orders of North African cities, and the influence of the Azharite scholars were minimal.

Between 1846 and 1853 he went on a second long pilgrimage to Mecca, and soon after his return he moved his headquarters farther south to Jaghbūb, where he spent the final years of his life. Upon his death in 1859, dozens of zāwiyas were already established throughout Libya and elsewhere in Egypt, Algeria, and the Sahara. The spread of the Sanūsīya continued under the leadership of the founder's two sons and was halted only by the expanding French powers.

Later the followers of the order were active in the resistance against the Italian occupation, and the head of the order became the first king of Libya after independence.

These eighteenth-century thinkers, along with others not dealt with here, were famous both within and outside their respective regions and were considered the intellectual ancestors of later generations in these regions. The recognition of these thinkers' intellectual credentials by later historians and Muslims resulted from the success of their influential political movements and innovative intellectual traditions. In India, Shāh Wali Allāh is recognized as the most distinguished Muslim scholar that India ever produced, and mutually opposed schools claim to derive and best represent his true thought. Similarly, in Yemen, nationalists, Zaydis, and Sunnis alike claim al- Shawkāni, who was, already during his own lifetime, counted as one of the leading Muslim scholars of Yemen, Ibn Fūdī is also considered the most central figure in the legacy of Islamic Nigeria and in the Islamist discourse of West Africa, partly as a result of his political success in establishing the Sokoto Caliphate. Generally, all of these thinkers were intellectually assertive even when they were not in positions of power.

The ideas developed by these thinkers were decidedly diverse; however, all of them undertook bold and self-consciously transformative intellectual projects. Furthermore, these intellectual projects were coupled with active social and political engagements, a fact that implies a high level of self-confidence and ambition rather than utopian idealism. This is further confirmed by the high quality and quantity of the works of eighteenth-century thinkers and the dual role they assumed as

both reformers of tradition and teachers responsible for guiding an Islamic community and effecting changes of great consequence. Their confidence was manifest, among other things, in the grand intellectual synthesis of Shāh Wali Allāh, al-San`ānī's bold confrontations with political and intellectual authorities, the successful expansion of Islam into sub-Saharan Africa by al-Sanūsī, the building of a centralized state in West Africa by Ibn Fūdī, and al-Shawkānī's attempt to illustrate, via theoretical analysis and historical documentation, the superiority and hence authority of later generations of Muslims over the Prophet's Companions. Viewed from within their own chronological and spatial boundaries, the undertakings of eighteenth-century thinkers were quite successful. These intellectual and political successes suggest that the reasons for the Islamic nineteenth-century crisis are not exclusively endogenous, and that they are rooted in the stifling effect of the events that took hold of the Muslim world during the colonial period. Subsequently, the political and intellectual scenes throughout the Muslim world were characterized by severe crisis, yet the endside the scope of this book and will not be addressed here. Instead, the book charts the historical and epistemological foundations of the reformative traditions of the eighteenth century.

The scholars examined in this book reflect on the subject of ijtihād; yet, the pamphlets they wrote on the topic, attractive as they may be to modern viewers obsessed by Islamic innovation or decline, were minor works in comparison to their other works. The erudition and originality of eighteenth-century Islamic thought lies more in such disciplines as Qur'ānic exegesis, theory of hadith, and jurisprudence. This rich literature in the core disciplines of the Islamic cultural tradition provides the basis for the present study.

While earlier studies of the eighteenth century did not recognize an Islamic intellectual tradition worthy of study, revisionist historians have focused on social and political developments with only a cursory and formal exploration of culture. One aspect of Islamic culture that has been commonly invoked in revisionist histories of the eighteenth century is so-called neo-Sufism: a kind of Sufism

characterized by the tendency to emphasize a Muhammad-oriented mysticism (involving an association with the figure of the Prophet) and to harmonize Sufism with the formal, legal teachings of Islam The earliest uses of the term neo-Sufism were introduced in matter-of-fact fashion without any attempt to define this usage. It denotes a demysticized Sufism that, in the words of Fazlur Rahman, is "nothing else but the postulates of the orthodox religion." Following Rahman, numerous historians have asserted that this neo-Sufism is central to all premodern reform movements. Various studies characterize neo-Sufism in terms of the rejection of popular Sufi practices, the rejection of the philosophical mysticism of the great Sufi thinker Ibn Arabi, the rejection of the strict Sufi hierarchy (the murshid-murid or teacher-disciple relationship), and the rejection of imitation (taqlid) in legal matters. Furthermore, this neo-Sufism supposedly is characterized by an emphasis on mass organization and initiation into social organizations, union with the Prophet and a Muhammad-oriented mysticism (Tarīqa Muhammadiyya), legitimation through chains of authority (silsilas) going all the way to the Prophet, willingness to take political and military action in defense of Islam, emphasis on hadith, and the right to exercise independent legal reasoning (ijtihād). In short, the term neo-Sufism is used to refer to Sufi movements that make deliberate effort to distance themselves from excessive Sufi practices and to conform to "orthodox" beliefs and practices. As such, eighteenth-century Sufism is often viewed by historians as void of spiritual dimensions, and as merely a mass movement in the service of legalistic Islam.

While this scholarly coinage is not grounded in evidence, several elaborate studies have been written to illustrate the inadequacy of the paradigm that Sufism is both at the social and the intellectual levels. Among the many criticisms leveled against this concept is that Ibn Arabi's influence continued to be pervasive in both high and popular Sufism. These studies also point out that the ascribed anthropocentric tendencies of Muhammad-oriented Sufism (Tariqa Muhammadiyya) were already introduced by Ibn 'Arabi himself in the thirteenth century, and that this

kind of Sufism can be, and in fact most of the time is, a deeply mystical principle that reinforces rather than undermines the spiritual, imaginative dimension of Sufism. Critics of the concept of neo-Sufism have also noted that the rejection of imitation (taqlīd) and of legal schools or madhhabs that is emphasized in Tariqah Muhammadiyya is not replaced by an advocacy of personal legal judgment that would have recourse to reason. Therefore, these critics argue, Muhammad-oriented mysticism does not represent a shift from a notion of authority that stands above individual reason to one that is personal; rather, the alternative is the notion of personal access to God.

Of all the paradigms deployed by the revisionist historians of the eighteenth century, the concept of neo-Sufism has received the most criticism. Critiques of this concept, however, do not account for the whole range of eighteenth-century discourse on Sufism, both by Sufis and critics of the Sufi tradition. Most notably, there were eighteenth-century critics of Sufism who did not replicate the Wahhabi attitude toward it, and who managed instead to produce a nuanced criticism of Sufi thought and practice. Moreover, valid as the critiques of the concept of neo-Sufism are, they do not situate Sufism within the context of the main trends of eighteenth-century intellectual reform. In chapter 3, I offer a more nuanced discussion of aspects of eighteenth-century Sufism.

One of the most central assertions of revisionist historians of the eighteenth century is that of the continuity between the eighteenth century and the nineteenth and twentieth centuries One prominent view argues that eighteenth-century reform and modern fundamentalism are linked by virtue of a shared "fundamentalist mode of Islam" that presumably had its latest formulation in the eighteenth century and continues to unfold in the modern period. Proponents of this thesis maintain that several Islamic "socio-moral" reform movements were active in the eighteenth century, that these movements were not inspired by the encounter with Europe, and that they laid the foundation for an indigenous "fundamentalist" tradition that continues today. Several studies of eighteenth-century Islamic thought have already

been produced with the explicit intention of establishing its connection to later developments in Islamic thought." To be sure, advocates of this view do not deny the effect of the encounter with the Weston modern reform, but they still maintain that the eighteenth century had its autonomous agents of innovation and its own brand of original renovation and renewal, and that this indigenous tradition is partly responsible for modern renewal and fundamentalism. This serious scholarly attempt to trace continuities between eighteenth-century reform and modern fundamentalism is not to be equated with nationalist efforts to construct genealogies that root modern regimes in the past of the nation. Yet despite the important differences between these two approaches, both fail to recognize that the problems that informed the reform ideas of the eighteenth century bear no resemblance whatsoever to those that inspired and drove later reforms. The most noticeable absence from the thought of all the major Muslim intellectuals of the eighteenth century is Europe. Even when some of these thinkers were aware of colonial encroachments on Muslim lands, they did not appreciate the extent of the threat these infringements presented, nor did such events influence their thought: Europe, as a politico-cultural challenge, was completely absent. Of course, the exact opposite is true of later Islamic thought, where the challenge of Europe drives all the famous thinkers of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Their responses to Europe ranged from rejecting Europe in all of its political and intellectual dimensions, to striking a compromise and adopting some European institutions, to embracing these institutions wholeheartedly. In all cases, these were responses or reactions to what became the ever-present reality of European hegemony.

To substantiate the continuity thesis, reference is often made to an informal network of teachers and students in the Haramayn (Mecca and Medina). Advocates of this view further maintain that although there were no formal organizational links between eighteenth-century movements, the ideas of the scholars in this network were preached in various parts of the Muslim world, providing a measure of intellectual coherence and family

resemblance among these movements. Aside from tracing possible links and contacts between the known thinkers of the presumed network of scholars, the only attempt to verify this view is simply to assert that most, if not all, of these movements promoted neo-Sufism and championed hadith scholarship as the means for "socio-moral reconstruction."

This idea of an informal intellectual network has had strong appeal among historians of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries; several students of eighteenth-century Islam have attempted to trace the links between the Haramayn scholars and various regional traditions of the period. When it comes to the specific research methodologies, the primary sources privileged for this kind of analysis are the biographical dictionaries, and even then, the parts of biographical entries primarily examined are the names of teachers and students that a certain eighteenth-century scholar studied with. The most serious drawback of this approach is that the actual content of the thought of various members of the network in question does not figure into the analysis before affinities are posited between these scholars. For example, an examination of the writings of Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhāb, who asserts that Sufis are unbelievers punishable by death, and those of Wall Allāh, who wrote extensively on Sufism, renders the notion of a common intellectual network meaningless.

In opposition to focusing on transregional networks of scholars, I trace the development of regional reform traditions that drew heavily on local learning and canons. The primary concerns of this study are the generation of new traditions and epistemologies, their local adaptations, and the distinct characteristics they acquired at the local levels. However, I make no attempt to provide thorough explanations of the local peculiarities, or to delineate the regionally specific social organization of shared theoretical knowledge in local contexts. In other words, this is not a study of local forms of Islam or of the role of Muslim scholars as cultural brokers. I focus instead on conceptual discussions that, despite their reliance on and awareness of universal, transregional Islamic

traditions, took different forms in different regions 49 Nonetheless, once these new ideas were articulated locally, they triggered other reforms beyond the local level. As such, despite their utility in partially explaining developments in the thought of individual eighteenth-century thinkers, the local sociopolitical contexts of each man's thought have little bearing on intellectual developments in the larger Muslim world, or on the influence of this author outside his particular region of activity. Within any geographical region, particular traditions often emerge over long periods of time and encompass several figures working under radically different social and political conditions. The history of a tradition, therefore, cannot be mechanically reduced to the history of its context; from the perspective of the comparative study of intellectual traditions in the eighteenth century, context is secondary to content.

The various universal visions of eighteenth-century thinkers had their roots in earlier regional traditions. While many peripatetic scholars traveled in that century in pursuit of knowledge, the era's major thinkers either traveled after their ideas matured and their views were articulated or they did not travel at all. They also recognized the peculiarities of their own traditions and set out to transform them by deliberately importing ideas and theories from other regional traditions and schools of thought. It is thus possible to speak of an Indian school of thought and aYemeni one. It is perhaps even possible to claim that groundbreaking intellectual contributions were made within the context of mature and erudite regional traditions, whereas the intellectual contributions of traveling apprentice scholars, important as they were from a social perspective, were derivative. The regional rootedness of the main reform traditions, however, does not imply that their intellectual horizons were limited or parochial. Quite the contrary, regional traditions were revitalized by opening them up to the legacies of other Muslim regions and schools of thought. The regional character of their thought was simply a reflection of the concern of eighteenth-century thinkers with the problems of their societies and their attempts to provide real solutions for these problems. This regional character, however,

did not amount to the formation of national identities. Contrary to many contemporary assertions in both scholarly works and nationalist discourse, the reformers of the eighteenth century were not national heroes, nor were they the precursors of the later ideologues of the nationalist movements.

Perhaps paradoxically, the strong emphasis in eighteenth-century writings on the legitimacy of the present was firmly rooted in tradition and the cultural legacies of the past. The deep import of eighteenth-century rejection of imitation (taqlīd) was that imitation undermines the authority of the present. This focus on the present, however, did not come at the expense of tradition. Although from the perspective of the late nineteenth century the adoption of hybrid, non-Islamic cultural legacies seemed inevitable, in the eighteenth century it was not an option. Thus, radical as they were, the reformative projects of the eighteenth century did not involve a complete break with the past. This is why I use the term traditional to describe these reform projects. The ability of eighteenth-century thinkers to re-form knowledge was facilitated by a critical awareness of the historicity of the received traditions. Through a systematic delineation of multiple past legacies, these thinkers were able to provide fresh readings of these legacies. Established canons were thus opened up to new interpretations, and, through a process of inter-Islamic hybridization, the contours of canonical Islamic knowledge were expanded. Although eighteenth-century thought introduced significant departures from traditional epistemologies, these departures were generated from within the tradition and were not derived from alternative cultural systems.

The focus on the comparative, transregional study of traditions is further justified by the nature of the writings of the period under examination. None of the regional traditions examined in this book was intellectually marginal. To be sure, most modern scholars would contend that the examples studied in this book belong to peripheral traditions and would limit the center to those areas first influenced by Europe, that is, Anatolia, Egypt, and Greater Syria. The definition of an intellectual center on the basis

of exposure to Europe is a later historical creation that was not prevalent in the eighteenth century. Since this assumed center has been the subject of numerous studies, in this book I will explore intellectual developments in other parts of the Muslim world. The regions under examination here were, in their own right, centers of highly original Islamic scholarship and were in no way marginal or peripheral. Quite the contrary, some of the most interesting intellectual activities in the Muslim world took place in these regions. The centrality of innovativeness in these regional traditions was coupled with a great ability to exert influence locally and beyond. My focus, therefore, is on central reformative textual traditions, and not on marginality or a pristine "primitiveness" that preserves unchanged age-old patterns of thinking or behavior. Moreover, textual traditions are socially embedded phenomena and as such are constituent of, and not distinct from, social reality.

The objective of this book, however, is not simply to question the current historians' accounts of the eighteenth century but also to reconstruct the thought-world of this period. The writings produced in the eighteenth century were preoccupied with two themes. The first was the value of the present and its legitimacy. The second was the study of hadith, with an emphasis on the importance of scrutinizing the circumstances of the reports and the biographies of the reporters (`ilm al-rifāl), that is, the process of reporting and the validity of this process. Thus a dialectic relationship between knowledge (the content of reports) and history (the reporters and their conditions) and between content and environment was set up and rigorously tested. There was also an emphasis on understanding the sciences and their precepts and rules in light of the historical conditions under which they were formed, and on the role of intellectual authority and its connection to political authority in generating rigid and elitist interpretations of knowledge. For eighteenth-century writers, the undermining of these rigid interpretations in effect liberates knowledge from the hegemony of political authority through understanding the history of this authority. One expression of the historicity of eighteenth-century thought was the recognition of regional histories (in Yemen and in India, for example). Furthermore, the

emphasis on the role of the free intellectual scholar in contrast to official scholars (fuqahā' al-sultān) underscores the subversive nature of knowledge in the minds of eighteenth-century thinkers.

The Islamic eighteenth century was a period of great intellectual vitality comparable in its scope, intensity, and quality to the cultural activities of the classical period. Intellectuals from virtually all the regions of the Muslim world systematically attempted to scrutinize the epistemological foundations of inherited knowledge and to reformulate the traditional Islamic disciplines of learning. No other fields of study received more scrutiny than the fields of usūl (theoretical principles), in particular usūl al fiqh (literally principles of jurisprudence, or legal theory) and usūl al-hadith (the theory of hadith). Orientalists have for long maintained, without any dissent by the revisionist historians, that the fields of usūl are by definition apologetic; that usūl al fiqh, for example, is an attempt by legal scholars to theorize and hence justify older legal practices, and that political theory is a retrospective attempt to justify existing political orders, and so on. However, in contrast to the perceived conservative nature of these disciplines, the most radical rethinking of traditional Islamic thought, and hence the most original thought of the eighteenth century, was in fact in these same fields of usūl. Chapter s and the conclusion of the book discuss these fields.

Chapters 1, 2, 3, and 4 deal with the historical and epistemological foundations of the various reformative traditions of the eighteenth century and the social and intellectual mechanism employed to introduce these reforms. Against this background, the current historiography of the eighteenth century is assessed. In particular, I revisit both the notions of decline and the alternate view that argues for intellectual conformity and continuity. I also revisit three widely accepted claims commonly used to substantiate these notions. These are the assertions that the thought of Ibn `Abd al-Wahhāb is representative of premodern Islamic thought; that a new kind of puritanical Sufism emerged in this period; and that this period witnessed a resurgent insistence on ijtihād and rejection of taqlīd. Chapter

5 and the conclusion focus on the intellectual content of eighteenth-century reform. In particular, I examine the original contributions of eighteenth-century thinkers in the traditional disciplines of hadith and legal theory, and I demonstrate an originality and radicalism in eighteenth-century Islamic thought that was hardly equaled in any other period of Islamic history. <>

Open to Reason: Muslim Philosophers in Conversation with the Western Tradition by Souleymane Bachir Diagne, translated by Jonathan Adjemian [Religion, Culture, and Public Life, Columbia University Press, 9780231185462]

What does it mean to be a Muslim philosopher, or to philosophize in Islam? In Open to Reason, Souleymane Bachir Diagne traces Muslims' intellectual and spiritual history of examining and questioning beliefs and arguments to show how Islamic philosophy has always engaged critically with texts and ideas both inside and outside its tradition. Through a rich reading of classical and modern Muslim philosophers, Diagne explains the long history of philosophy in the Islamic world and its relevance to crucial issues of our own time.

From classical figures such as Avicenna to the twentieth-century Sufi master and teacher of tolerance Tierno Bokar Salif Tall, Diagne explores how Islamic thinkers have asked and answered such questions as Does religion need philosophy? How can religion coexist with rationalism? What does it mean to interpret a religious narrative philosophically? What does it mean to be human, and what are human beings' responsibilities to nature? Is there such a thing as an "Islamic" state, or should Muslims reinvent political institutions that suit their own times? Diagne shows that philosophizing in Islam in its many forms throughout the centuries has meant a commitment to forward and open thinking. A remarkable history of philosophy in the Islamic world as well as a work of philosophy in its own right, Open to Reason seeks to contribute to the revival of a spirit of pluralism rooted in Muslim intellectual and spiritual traditions.

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Introduction

Excerpt: This book had as its title, literally translated from its original French, How to Philosophize in Islam? The subtitle adopted here, Muslim Philosophers in Conversation with the Western Tradition, describes in a more explicit way its object. It is certainly inscribed in the rich literature on the history of philosophy in the Islamic world. It comes for a great part from my teaching, during many years, of a seminar on that topic and many reference works in the field bear precisely such a title: History of Islamic Philosophy.' But from that history a selection is made here, as certain particular questions are spotlighted along with the authors that can help examine them: How did the encounter between Islam and philosophy happen? Does religion need philosophy? What are the implications of the Arabic language becoming philosophical as it received translations from Greek texts? What does it mean to interpret philosophically a religious narrative? Can the religion coexist with philosophical rationalism? Is mysticism in contradiction with rationalism? What does it mean to be human? What is the responsibility of the human being vis-à-vis nature? Is there such a thing as an "Islamic" State or are Muslims free to invent the political institutions that correspond to the demands of their time and allow them to live in open, democratic societies?

Obviously such questions are not simply about the history of philosophy; they also speak to our present time and converge toward the very project of the chapters that address them: to contribute to the reconstruction, for today, of a critical spirit, of a spirit of movement and pluralism as manifested in the intellectual and spiritual tradition of Islam.

Those questions are posed and examined through the reading of texts by different Muslim

philosophers of the classical period, from the ninth century to the twelfth, but also of the modern period, the nineteenth century and twentieth.

Thus, after an introductory chapter presenting a brief history of the constitution of what became a tradition of philosophy in the Muslim world, the second evokes the figure of theologian and grammarian Aba Sa'id Al-Sīrāfī, who engaged in 922 in a famous intellectual joust with philosopher and logician Aba Bishr Mattā about the universality of Aristotelian logic. Is there such a thing as a grammar of reasoning in general or shouldn't we consider that Aristotle's categories are simply the categories of his own Greek language, every other language, especially Arabic, having its own logic? That debate has often been evoked in different histories of Islamic philosophy. It is of interest to examine the echo it found in the twentieth century in the reflections of Rwandan philosopher Alexis Kagamé (1912-81) or French linguist Émile Benveniste (1902-76), who, in 1956 and 1958 respectively, examined what Aristotle's logical categories owe to Greek grammar and linguistic categories.

Philosopher Abū 'Ali Ibn Sinā (c. 980-1037), also known as Avicenna, is presented here, in chapter 3, through a text attributed to him in which he carries out a systematic translation, into the language of philosophy, of a narrative central to the Muslim imaginary, which is the Ascent of the prophet Muhammad. The text offers a model of what a philosophical reading of a religious text means.

The figure of Aba Hamid al-Ghazāli (1058-1111) is evoked in two chapters of the book (chapter 4 and chapter 10) where he presents two different faces. First he offers the visage of a theologian and a mystic who attacks philosophers, accusing them of being heretics because of excessive rationalism: here Ghazāli speaks on behalf of

what he considers the one sect destined for salvation among all the other interpretations of Islam that existed in the troubled times when he lived. In the conclusion, on the contrary, we see his other face as a modern philosopher and an eloquent and committed advocate for pluralism, not only of Islamic sects, but also of religions more

generally. Nobody expresses better than this Janus of Islam the tension that can exist between closure and an ideal of openness, as it is still at work, today, in the Muslim world.

It was important to evoke, in chapter 5, the figure of the philosopher from Andalusia Aba Bakr Ibn Tufayl (c. 1105-85), whose main work, the philosophical novel Hayy Ibn Yaqzān, can be read as a lesson in ecological philosophy: it demonstrates why the human being, when fully understanding who she is and who she has to become, may think of herself not as "master and possessor" (Descartes) of a nature considered resources to be exploited, but as endowed with the responsibility of acting as its steward and the guarantor of its integrity.

Aba Walīd Ibn Rushd (1126-98), known as Averroes, represents the response to Ghazāli's attacks on philosophers. He embodies faith in reason and in the necessity to interpret the religious text under its light. Chapter 6 is devoted to an example of a rationalist reading of the Quranic text and more generally to his contention that it is religion itself that demands rational interpretation and the development of philosophy.

The demand for the Muslim world to develop again philosophy is central to the works of reformist Islamic thinkers eager to see the world of Islam reanimate and rejuvenate the spirit of openness and inquiry that allows for the critical reappraisal of its own intellectual tradition and the reappropriation of the ethos of modernity. In the chapters 7, 8, and 9, figures of reformist philosophers are presented with the questions they help discuss. Jamal ad-Din al-Afghānī (1838-97), in chapter 7, and Muhammad Abduh (1849-1905), in chapter 8, have thus insisted on the demand that systems of education in Muslim societies undergo a deep reform as the only way out of sclerosis, by making room for a teaching of philosophy that, more than technology, is the true spirit of modernity. Also in chapter 8, Ameer Ali (1849-1928) and Ali Abdel Razek, meditating on the lessons to be drawn, in the present, and for the future, from the history of Islam, call Muslim societies to the responsibility and the task of deriving from the premise that each age requires

responses that are new, appropriate, and creative and needs to pull out of what Muhammad Iqbal (1877-1938) has called the "false respect of the past."

Muhammad Iqbal's thought, to which the next chapter is devoted, is indeed, directly or indirectly, at the heart of this book. His teaching that, because it is the very definition of life to be constant newness, religion cannot be in dogmatic tension against time, becoming, and pluralism is the very inspiration of these reflections on philosophy in the Islamic world.

It was important for me to end the book, in its conclusion, on the figure of a Muslim sage from Mali, Tierno Bokar Salif Tall (c. 1875¬1939), who gives such a concrete, human—so human—face to a philosophy of pluralism, openness, and tolerance. His teaching, in a word, was that God loves all beings, including those some call "infidels." Because His name is Rahmān, the Merciful.

In an issue dated January 28, 2017, the French newspaper Le Monde reported on a rally by philosophy teachers in Morocco against newly revised textbooks in Islamic education. They had been shocked, the article said, to find in a textbook for junior high school students, under the chapter heading "Philosophy and Faith," a definition of philosophy as "a product of human thought contrary to Islam." In fact, that is a quotation from a thirteenth-century figure, an Iraqi religious leader in the study of tradition, Ibn as-Salah ash-Shahrazuri (d. 1245), mainly known for his violent attacks against philosophy. For that reason his name is often associated with that of Ghazāli but, as we have seen, it is unfair to the latter to consider his positions—in the plural, as they varied from one work to another—to be the same as the fulminations against falsafa of ash-Shahrazuri, who went as far as opposing logic, the science of valid reasoning, because he saw in it the Trojan horse of philosophical examination.

The members of the Moroccan Association of Philosophy Teachers organized sit-ins to denounce an attack against freedom of thought, which they also saw as an attack against democracy, and declared that they were appalled to see a resurgence of misology in a modern Muslim country

like Morocco, often associated with the idea of an open, dynamic Islam. In response, the ministry of education made it clear that the textbook was just quoting ash-Shahrazuri as an illustration of one given position on the question of the relationship between philosophy and faith, to be submitted to the students' examination and critical thinking.

At any rate, that crisis about textbooks conveys two main lessons concerning the teaching of philosophy (in particular the history of philosophy) in Muslim countries and everywhere.

The Moroccan teachers, swift to oppose anything that looked like an attack on their discipline in the name of freedom of thought and democracy, are right to refute the notion that Islam as such is in opposition to philosophical thinking. In so doing they are speaking on behalf of the long intellectual and spiritual history of examin¬ing and questioning that also defines Islam and that was constituted during centuries in openness to and conversations with other intellectual traditions and figures: Plato, Aristotle, or Plotinus yesterday, Nietzsche, Bergson, and others today. That such a tradition should be found in textbooks as a heritage to be transmitted to students in Muslim countries is the first lesson to be learned from the Moroccan teachers' protests.

A second lesson to be drawn from them concerns the study of philosophy everywhere. What the intellectual tradition of falsafa manifests is that the history of philosophy as it was constructed mainly in nineteenth-century Europe as quintessentially "Western"—Greek, then Roman, then Christian European, then modern-European—is a misleading simplification. Medieval thought coined the phrase translatio studiorum to express the idea that Greek sciences had been transferred to Rome and from Rome to the Christian Western European world. What Islamic philosophy among other intellectual traditions teaches us is that translatio studiorum is also a trajectory from Athens to Bagdad, to Cordoba, to Fez, to Timbuktu in present-day Mali. Generally speaking, there is no such thing as a unique European philosophical telos, and textbooks on the history of philosophy should reflect the fact that philosophical thought is found in every human culture. So on important notions such as "truth," "reason," "belief," "life," and so on, they should

restore, for the critical thinking of students, the conversations that philosophers from different traditions have entertained.

To this double aspect of the question of textbooks on the history of philosophy and the stakes of it, it was the purpose of this book to contribute.

Islam's Renewal: Reform or Revolt? by Derek Hopwood [St Antony's Series, Palgrave Macmillan, 9783319752013]

The book considers some of the solutions proposed by Muslim activists and thinkers in their attempts to renew (tajdid) their ways of life and thought in accord with the demands of the age in which they lived. The two ways of reacting are studied – the movements led by men of action and inspiration, and the thoughts of quietist scholars who laid greater emphasis on calm continuity. These two streams have often collided and particularly so in the contemporary age of greater violence. Other related problems are also considered: how a non-Muslim should regard the religion of the 'other'; the ways modernization have been dealt with; and the two root causes of Muslim 'rage' today – the invasions of the West and the failure to reach an equitable solution to the problem of Palestine. Building on the author's sixty-year experience researching the history of Islam, Islam's Renewal: Reform or Revolt? will appeal to students and scholars across the fields of Islamic studies, religious history and Middle Eastern politics.

CONTENTS
Excerpt: Islam like most other religions has had to face the problem of living in the world of the time. A religion is founded on a set of core, unshakeable and eternal values, but as a living practised faith it

has often had to adjust itself to the demands of a changing society without in any way compromising its fundamental beliefs. This study attempts to show that Muslims often viewed changes in society of their time as a corruption of original values and proclaimed as a way of controlling decline a return to the pristine society of early Islam. Throughout history men emerged who proclaimed this message of renewal (tajdid) and who often instigated a revolutionary movement in the attempt to achieve their aims. The first part of this study offers a theoretical analysis of the characters of some of these men and their movements and, later, looks at similar movements and men in more recent times.

While violent action appealed (and appeals) to some discontented Muslims, others produced an intellectual response to tajdid and deplored the actions of the revolutionary leaders. The central section of the book considers the conclusions of some of these thinkers as an alternative to revolution.

I write as a non-Muslim, but as someone influenced by my late teacher and colleague, Albert Hourani, who himself wrote movingly about his own sincere attempts to understand and appreciate the religion of the `other' (Chap. 4). I realize that my attempt will not necessarily be viewed with approval by any Muslims who may read it, yet I hope they will be assured of its sincerity.

A Hope for Tolerance
H.A.R. Gibb devoted his lifetime's study of Islam to an attempt to under-stand 'the specific attitude of [Muslims] towards religion'. He came to the conclusion that the history of Islam could be categorized as a series of responses to challenges which came either from inside Islam itself, caused by changes in social or economic conditions, or from other sources. The `ulama' who embodied traditional Muslim orthodoxy lived through these challenges but were not equipped to overcome them by themselves. They could either condemn innovations or disturbances to the even tenor of their lives while continuing to follow their own traditions or they could `adapt' and ally themselves with new situations or states that grew out of political or social change. If a challenge were integrated it would become part of a new

orthodoxy which the `ulama' embraced. Thus Islam lived in its first 1000 years with what Gibb called a 'lack of harmony between the inner life of the community and its political development', until in the last three centuries it had to face the intrusion of European ideas and 'the attempt to transplant new and alien institutions'. After Gibb's writing Islam has had to face the more violent intrusion of the armed might of America and Russia, the spread of technology and the advent of the postmodern era.

In this study I have considered the series of challenges that arose during the course of Islamic history and in particular the men who embodied them. They were inspired by the desire to `purify' Islam where they thought it was corrupted and to create suitable conditions in which the shari'a could be observed. They based their authority on claims of divine and prophetic inspiration. Such men have appeared regularly and have led movements that have often been stained with violence. Resulting deaths have been an inevitable consequence but no deterrent. Violence created by non-Muslims has provoked counterviolence. Ulama' opposed to such reactions have insisted that those pursuing violence (jihadists) have 'misinterpreted Islam into a religion of ... warmongering and criminality'.

The early twenty-first century has seen a catastrophic fall in the standards adopted by those activists seeking to spread their version of Islam. In October 2015 a joint statement issued by the United Nations and the International Committee of the Red Cross complained that `[r]arely before (presumably since World War II) have we witnessed so many people on the move, so much instability, so much suffering. In armed conflicts in Afghanistan, Iraq, Nigeria, Southern Sudan, Syria, Yemen and elsewhere combatants are defying humanity's most fundamental norms. Every day we hear of civilians being killed and wounded in violation of the most basic rules of humanitarian law, and with total impunity'. The Red Cross added that [the use] of starvation, rape and other forms of sexual violence, summary executions, as well as inhuman and degrading treatment of detainees' must stop. 'The world has entered a new era and not a peaceful one with combatants ignoring the most fundamental rules of behaviour in conflicts.' The statement continued: `In the midst of conflict,

there is also hope, immense compassion and solidarity, which make it possible to imagine and work towards a different era.

Many men and women have been distressed by the violence practised in the name of religion and largely in the name of Islam. For them, violence is the antithesis of a religion which preaches that it should be based on love, compassion and a complete acceptance of the freedom of choice—religious pluralism and mutual respect. Pope Francis and President Rouhani of Iran issued a joint statement in 2016 stressing the importance of inter-religious dialogue and 'the responsibilities of religious communities in promoting reconciliation, tolerance and peace'.

The respected religious teacher Abu Hamid al-Ghazali had in earlier times taught that the true Muslim should observe the shari'a with sincerity and with an understanding that the purpose was to establish a right relationship with God. It only had value if it was `performed by minds and souls directed towards the goal of knowing and serving God'.4 A perfunctory adherence to the shari'a was not sufficient. A virtuous Muslim should follow the example of Muhammad in the service of God with the ultimate aim of emptying the soul of everything other than Him. Then the fulfilled Muslim would understand the meaning of the duties commanded by the shari'a. Ghazali, not unlike Christian saints or mystics, described in his writings an ideal way of life, perhaps beyond the reach of ordinary Muslims but put before them as a goal. Later scholars have claimed that al-Ghazali was the mujaddid of his time, born to renew Islamic thought and practice for succeeding generations.

The more recent thinker, the Tunisian religious scholar, Muhammad Talbi, has insisted that `[f]aith is the free choice of the individual which does not conflict with reason. God has given man entire freedom in this'. `There is no meaning to faith if there is no freedom of choice.' His aim has been to renew religious concepts and to keep them alive as valid responses to the problems of the postmodern era. He has advanced a positive Islamic view of people with a freedom of choice who are able to interpret the contemporary world and to fix their position within it for themselves.

Others have also tried to point to a peaceful way forward for the concerned Muslim. Husain Amin, the well-known Egyptian writer of the midtwentieth century, tackled the problem of how the East could adopt the scientific spirit of the West in order to revive Islam and give the world a new spirituality. His son, Husain Ahmad Amin, followed him in an attempt to prescribe correct attitudes for the Muslims of his time, namely a tolerant and non-confrontational mode of behaviour. In his book The Sad Muslim's Guide to Required Behaviour in the 20th Century he asserted that various misconceptions had distorted the real message of Islam and had `hindered Muslims from responding to the changing needs of society'.' He considered that a correct knowledge of Islamic history would show that the shari'a had developed centuries ago but had not been amended to match contemporary conditions. An acceptable modernization of the shari'a would enable believers to `adhere to their Islamic identity and confidently accept change'. Amin's promotion of peaceful progression stands in sharp contrast to the assertions of those postmodern activists who insist on a strict adherence to traditional shari'a with extreme penalties for all transgressions.

A striking example of the kind of tolerance and compassion called for by the Red Cross was given much earlier by the Arab Muslim leader, King Husain of the Hijaz, who was concerned with the problems he felt would be caused by the issuing of the Balfour Declaration. He saw that only tolerance and understanding could bring about a just solution. George Antonius drew attention to an article published by Husain in his Meccan newspaper, al-Qibla, in which he quite remarkably urged the Arabs of Palestine to bear in mind the precepts of the Qur'an and the Bible and exhorted them to welcome the Jews as brethren and to cooperate with them for the common good. Antonius believed that this call by a respected Muslim demonstrated his freedom from religious prejudice and fanaticism.

On the non-Muslim side I want to mention again two historians writing on the Middle East, each of whom had a humanitarian view of its problems, believing that goodwill was necessary to help to solve them. Neither had a perfect solution but both believed

that without compassion and understanding little positive could be achieved. They had seen at firsthand the ways in which Muslims were facing the demands of the contemporary world and their reactions. George Antonius, writing in 1938 when the Arab—Jewish dispute had tumbled into a never-ending history of violence, saw only one solution: 'No lasting solution—he wrote—of the Palestine problem is to be hoped for until the injustice is removed. Violence, whether physical or moral, cannot provide a solution ... [it] defeats its own ends; and such immediate gains as it may score are invariably discounted by the harm which is inseparable from it.

Arnold Toynbee was particularly concerned with what he considered to be the injustices done by the British government to the Arabs of Palestine. He did not offer a solution but as a historian he hoped that his profession might help to promote goodwill. He wrote: `In order to save mankind we have to learn to live together in concord.

Somewhere we might ponder such thoughts of concord comprises the Monreale cathedral in Palermo in Sicily. When the Normans invaded in the eleventh century (i.e. at the time of the Crusades), they found much to admire in the Arab/Islamic heritage of the island. (The Arabs had ruled there for some three centuries.) The Normans from the distant North occupied the island and brought about a meeting of cultures noticeable particularly in architecture. One culture accepted the other in a desire to create something new and unique and, in the words of an observer, the great cathedral of Palermo `captures a magical moment in European and Asian and African history' when a diversity of styles came together in harmony. It is `perhaps the world's most architecturally diverse multi-cultural place of worship'. It represents a moment when the different sides preferred cooperation to strife.

Nearby in the Royal Palace stands that smaller example of a cultural melting pot—the Cappella Palatina, built by the Normans with Arab workmen in a harmonious blend of different styles. It unites Norman architecture, Arab arches and scripts and Byzantine dome and mosaics. The Arab-type muqarnas (ornamental vaulting) are exquisite and

the many paintings are reminiscent of Abbasid art from Baghdad. It was famously visited and described by the French writer Guy de Maupassant. May he have the last word?

The Cappella Palatina, the most beautiful there may be in the world, the most surprising religious jewel dreamed up by human thought and executed by the hands of an artist. ... The colourful and calm beauty, penetrating and irresistible, of this small church is the most absolute chef-d'oeuvre imaginable. ... One can encounter in no other monument the marvellous uniting [of different styles and cultures] which makes this divine masterpiece unique.

The chapel was completed by people from different backgrounds working together. It is perhaps not an example of perfect tolerance but it at least engenders the impression of a harmonious whole which surely creates a feeling of deep serenity and wonder in the observer. <>

Arabic Thought against the Authoritarian Age: Towards an Intellectual History of the Present edited by Jens Hanssen, Max Weiss [Cambridge University Press, 9781107193383]

In the wake of the Arab uprisings, the Middle East descended into a frenzy of political turmoil and unprecedented human tragedy which reinforced regrettable stereotypes about the moribund state of Arab intellectual and cultural life. This volume sheds important light on diverse facets of the post-war Arab world and its vibrant intellectual, literary and political history. Cutting-edge research is presented on such wide-ranging topics as poetry, intellectual history, political philosophy, and religious reform and cultural resilience all across the length and breadth of the Arab world, from Morocco to the Gulf States. This is an important statement of new directions in Middle East studies that challenges conventional thinking and has added relevance to the study of global intellectual history more broadly.

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Excerpt: This is a companion volume to our previous book, Arabic Thought Beyond the Liberal Age: Towards an Intellectual History of the Nanda (Cambridge University Press, 2016). Both books have their origins in a conference we organized at Princeton University in October 2012, "Arabic Thought Beyond the Liberal Age: New Directions in Middle East Intellectual History." We are delighted to reiterate our profound gratitude to the various institutions and individuals that made our original conference the enjoyable success that it was. We are particularly indebted to those sponsors at Princeton who made the conference possible financially: the David A. Gardner '69 Magic Fund, the Council of the Humanities, the Program on International and Regional Studies (PIIRS), and its then-director Mark Beissinger. Patricia Zimmer orchestrated the conference proceedings; Joy Scharfstein graced us with posters and promotional materials; Barb Leavey in the history department gave us timely logistical support.

Arabic Intellectual History between the Postwar and the Postcolonial

> [T]he struggle with tyranny that the Arab revolutions attempted ... is fundamentally an intellectual struggle (sira` ma`rifi), a struggle that desires to return history to its historicity, to engage with the present in its contemporaneity, and to look towards the future as though it were a development accumulated from its pasts.

Each generation must out of relative obscurity discover its mission, fulfill it, or betray it ... We must rid ourselves of the habit, now that we are in the thick of the fight, of minimizing the action of our fathers or of feigning incomprehension when considering their silence and passivity. They fought as well as they could, with the arms they possessed then: and if the echoes of their struggle have not resounded in the international arena, we must realize that the reason for this silence lies less in their lack of heroism than in the fundamentally different international situation of our time.

How might practitioners of modern Arab intellectual history find new ways to dispatch historical narratives predicated upon Eurocentric discourses, practices, and modes of being that have been too simplistically tracked as they were transmitted in some modular fashion to other parts of the world, including the Middle East? Is modern Arab intellectual history consigned to only ever amount to a derivative discourse? To what extent have Arab intellectual engagements with questions of politics, society, and culture been integrated into local, regional, and global discourses? How have these currents been transformed in the crucible of the twentieth century Middle East? What are the key moments of rupture and the abiding trajectories of continuity in the intellectual history development of the postwar Arab Middle East? In what ways might historians find other means for interrogating the relationship between the secular and the religious in the production of intellectual discourses in the modern Middle East?

One plausible challenge to the unsatisfying linear narrative of a singular European modernity that diffused from Europe towards its peripheries in a modular form can be found in the form of global studies, a broad scholarly field that has captivated the humanities and social sciences in recent years. But the present ubiquity of "the global" in scholarly and popular discourse demands an engagement with and problematization of its emergence and ascendancy.3 Samuel Moyn and Andrew Sartori interrogate the stakes and possible futures of a field of intellectual historical inquiry gone global.4 They hail the arrival of this new global intellectual history as potentially "transformative" for the disciplines of history, politics, philosophy, and so on, as "a threshold moment in the possible formation of an intellectual history extending across geographical parameters far larger than usual. At the same time, they are careful to subject "the global" to a painstaking critique, unpacking three levels at which scholars employ the term: "as a meta-analytical category of the historian"; "as a substantive scale of historical process"; and, finally, "as a subjective category used by historical agents.

Any adequate assessment of global intellectual history must be situated within the broader context of the professional historical discipline as well as the political-economic conjuncture within which it operates. Otherwise, the global is prone to (however unwittingly) re-inscribing modes of universal rationality that are oblivious to or unconcerned by historical difference.' Another problem concerns the subtle (and, often, not-so-subtle) iterations of Eurocentrism that accompany this pursuit of a global intellectual history that is distinguished by its interconnectedness if not always its singularity; even if globalization proceeds at multiple scales and in divergent directions, the figure of "Europe" haunts the arrival of "the global." As Frederick Cooper cautions in Global Intellectual History, "The path to an intellectual history that takes in most of the world will lead us to a less-than-global intellectual history."

What are the implications, then, of such a global history that may be always already "less-than-global"? How should scholars of the Middle East and other world-historical regions traditionally set apart from, or even sometimes against, the mainline narrative of world and global history respond to the challenges set forth by these methods and concerns? In this rush to synthesize new narratives of everything — from the most mundane to the most universal — have historians of the global obviated the need for local- or mid-range historical research and scholarly analysis?

Critics of overreaching narratives of global history point to the hubris embedded in the triumphalist claims about the inevitability of globalization and its attendant histories, narrative framing devices, and ideological repertoires.' To put the critical question most simply: must all history now be global? Certainly the answer to this question must be a qualified yet emphatic no. Emphatic in the sense that historical research and analysis will never be able to abandon altogether the local: events, structures, and movements; individual actors, social groups, institutions, and even non-human agents. Qualified, too, though, in the sense that, just as historians can no longer justifiably overlook hitherto marginalized sectors of society such as women, workers, peasants, children, and other subal¬tern groups ever since the emergence of

social history and history from below, historians are no longer free to ignore the insights of those proponents of diasporic or transnational or global histories that rely upon polycentric and multiscalar historical analysis.

Other critical intellectual historians employ a centripetal or "outside-in" approach to globalization in an effort to decenter the West. Historians of the Haitian revolution, for example, identify the birth of the modern world in the Atlantic slave trade and Caribbean slave rebellions. Not only did such events in the colonial periphery inspire radical traditions of thought concerning concepts of self-determination and national unification that would challenge liberal platitudes and leftist mobilization. They also fundamentally transformed and recast European Enlightenment thought in the process. What Mohamad Tavakoli-Targhi has called "genesis amnesia" in the (post)colonial encounter with Western modernity echoes the argument of Timothy Mitchell that modernity ought to be conceived as a product of both the West's dialectic interactions with the non-West and the violent forging of that geo-cultural dualism in the first place.

Edward Said referred to the "voyage in" in order to describe an intellectual journey of empowerment and anti-imperial thought that would continue to shape and reshape European Orientalism as well as other scholarly ventures throughout the postwar period even as events in the Middle East and elsewhere galvanized new European intellectual trends. For example, the French-British-Israeli invasion of Suez in 1956 played some part in catalyzing the New Left in Britain, while the Algerian Revolution (1954-1962) profoundly polarized French intellectuals. In turn, Algerian marks on French thought later migrated across the Atlantic as French political philosophy was reconstituted as "theory" and post-structuralism on U.S. campuses. The student revolts of 1968 in France and West Germany, meanwhile, also had strong connections to Thirdworldist political and intellectual movements. In addition, anti-fascist and anti-totalitarian intellectuals in Europe and North America have often come into conflict with anti-colonial and anti-racist thinkers and activists over the question of uncritical support for Israel.

In his contribution to this volume, literature scholar and translator Hosam Aboul-Ela addresses the legacies of Orientalist scholarship, Eurocentric epistemologies, and colonial intervention in their portrayal of the Middle East and North Africa as a "no theory producing area." For a variety of reasons, the most influential centers — intellectually and institutionally — for the development of "Arab theory" have not been in the Middle East itself. Despite widespread debates over Orientalism that had gone on for decades, if not centuries — in France, Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, and elsewhere — the publication of Edward Said's Orientalism in New York in 1978 was far more impactful in catalyzing a scholarly discussion of the politics of knowledge production vis-à-vis the Middle East and the Islamic world on a global scale.

Fadi Bardawil and Samer Frangie, among others, explore the historically contingent tensions between postcolonial thinkers in the metropole and Marxist intellectuals in the Middle East. At the heart of the "broken conversation" between what are often, unfortunately, apprehended as disparate problem-spaces lies the question of what constitutes an effective critique of global capitalism and Western imperialism as well as enduring Orientalist forms of knowledge production. Various methodological solutions have been proposed and explored, from international political economy, critical race theory, and critical sociology to discourse analysis, hermeneutics, and postcolonial historicism, just to name a few salient approaches. In the war-torn Middle East of the mid- to late twentieth century, the economic and, indeed, existential stakes were high; they urgently demanded a more engaged form of political praxis, which seemed unlikely to emerge out of the turn to ethics and epistemology that informed a good deal of critical theory and other postcolonial approaches. Lebanese Marxist philosopher Mandi `Amil (d. 1987), for example, was assassinated by the very forces of sectarian reaction that he had struggled to critically diagnose and politically overthrow.

Since Said's untimely death in 2003, the academic conversation may have shifted from his preferred mode of secular criticism and contrapuntal reading of empire towards a broad and incisive critique of secularism inspired by the work of Talal Asad (b.

1932) and others. Both of these approaches, in their own ways, push towards the provincializing of Judeo-Christian and Eurocentric conceptions of humanity. All the same, the universal(izing) claims of a Saidian critique of Orientalism as well as an Asadian critique of the secular must be subjected, in turn, to the kind of intellectual-historical inquiry that can offer an account of their epistemology, political economy, and political commitments and biases. The fact that these genealogies are primarily to be found in North American and European academic discourses does not render them suspect or make them inauthentic per se, of course, but it does demand a more critical engagement with their arguments and their ideological underpinnings. If Said and Asad remained, for different reasons, skeptical of de-politicized postcolonialism and reductive materialism, they were both praxis-oriented in their own ways. Whereas Said famously deconstructed "the counterrevolutionary zealotry" of Anglophone Orientalists, Asad casts a dark eye towards the possibility of universal human freedom within the framework of the secular modern, calling into question the ostensible virtues and emancipatory potential of "a liberal democratic, or a revolutionary society."

The arguments gathered together in this volume participate in these important debates — without claiming to arrive at a single consensus conclusion — while also striving to challenge, complicate, and push ahead the field of modern Arab intellectual history. As Omnia El Shakry reminds us, scholars must resist the temptation to view a given "intellectual agenda as epiphenomenal to political developments in the Arab world or read postwar Arab intellectual thought as essentially a political allegory for decolonization." Instead of a predetermined, declensionist metanarrative arc from the Nanda's "awakening" to postcolonial "defeatism," therefore, intellectual historians, political philosophers, and cultural critics ought to place greater attention on "the substance of Arab intellectual thought" in a given historical moment. No doubt, this daunting task of historical reconstruction has been bedeviled, in part, by the opaqueness of state archives around the region — especially as compared to the relative transparency and openness of colonial archives —

which "has often masked the precise nature of the political and social debates that went into the consolidation of regimes in the aftermath of decolonization." Such research obstacles have only proliferated in the aftermath of the Arab uprisings, whether due to chaos and destruction or the increased obstructionism of current regimes, but they also make the pursuit of contemporary Arab intellectual history all the more urgent.

As important as political ideology and philosophical investigation may have been for postwar Arab thought, it is in the literary and cultural fields that writers and artists performed generational consciousness most conspicuously as markers of political distinction. Woven into global economic, political, and cultural transitions, modern Arabic literature shifted from the Nanda-era ideal of artistic autonomy to Sartre-inspired "committed literature" in the mid-fifties.128 Encouraged by this trend, Palestinian literature reemerged in the sixties from under "the cultural siege" of the Israel state. Ghassan Kanafani, whose own early short stories transformed Arab narrative form, coined the term "resistance literature," which in his analysis acquired spatial rather than generational attributes: texts written under occupation and those written in exile.

The expansion of the postwar Arab intellectual field was predicated on a number of factors: state education programs increased literacy, new universities were founded and old ones expanded, cultural associations and trade unions blossomed even as radio, television, and subsequently satellite networks reached into the living rooms of ever more households. But the Cold War made the intellectual field a hostile place for female intellectuals even though joint struggles for national independence had opened up universities, the press, and other professions to an increasing number of women around the Arab world. Many of these figures — from Egyptian Communist student activist turned English literature professor and writer Latifa al-Zayyat (1923-96) to Syrian feminist academic turned Ba`thist regime hack Buthayna Shaaban (b. 1953) — initially became visible through women's rights associations and popular movements even as conservative and radical men would brand them liberal and elitist. Arab women's activism did not always readily fit

into the male-dominated ideological trench wars, and many feminists opted to work for international, regional, and national organizations in which they traded revolutionary activity for improving social and economic conditions in their home countries. While some women played leading roles in the Algerian and Palestinian resistance, others decided to participate only indirectly in party politics as they devoted their energies to Arabic cultural production and academic careers, increasingly in Europe and North America.

The place of Arab intellectuals in public life has been dynamic and, at times, tempestuous. On June 14, 2011, for example, barely three months into the popular uprising against the dictatorial rule of Bashar al-Asad and the Ba`th Party in Syria, the poet 'Ali Said Ahmad Isbir — better know by his nom de plume, Adonis — published an "Open Letter to President Bashar al-Asad" in the Lebanese daily newspaper al-Safir. The "open letter" consisted of ten sections, calling upon the regime at once to respect the rights of protestors and citizens while also encouraging the authorities to do whatever was necessary in order to protect the country. "Neither reason nor reality believes that democracy is going to be achieved in Syria immediately following the fall of the current regime," Adonis wrote. "But, on the other hand, neither reason nor reality believes that the violent security regime in Syria will remain standing. That is the conundrum." Regardless of reason or reality, and to the chagrin of many supporters of democratic transformation, the Syrian regime still stands, however damaged and discredited, even as the country burns and its people die or flee.

In addition to being the author of an influential three-volume study of the dialectical relationship between "tradition" and "modernity" in the history of "Arab civilization," Adonis is a central figure in the development of free verse in the mid-twentieth century Arab world, and considered by many to be the greatest living Arab poet, whose name is regularly batted about in discussions of the Nobel Prize and other international awards. His political interventions have been far more controversia1. Born into an `Alawi family in northwest Syria, his identity has often been used against him, whether among members of the opposition who identify him

as incapable of truly breaking with what is misrepresented all too often as an "`Alawi regime" or among those within the regime itself who see his relative independence as a threat to their control of "national culture." One year after the publication of the open letter it was reported on Facebook that Adonis had been charged by the Syrian regime with "being sectarian and assaulting the Islamic religion."

In his open letter Adonis comes across as a pragmatic, muscular liberal, yet also curiously ambivalent about the matter of political change in Syria. Among the "requirements" Adonis identifies for democratization to succeed in the Arab world is the "complete separation of what is religious from what is political and social and cultural." Adonis reserved his harshest critique for the various groupings that loosely constituted "the Syrian opposition." In an interview with an Austrian magazine in 2012, Adonis accused the opposition of collaborating with Western powers. He has also assailed Islamist movements throughout the Arab world, those that long struggled against authoritarian secular nationalist regimes and more recently managed to take power in places such as Egypt and Tunisia. But there was widespread frustration that the people had been abandoned by one of the Arab world's foremost cultural critics, a potentially valuable ally and even spokesperson in the struggle for freedom in Syria. Here was a high-profile public intellectual diverting the wind from the sails of the nonviolent Syrian opposition, muffling their cries for democratic transformation, and replacing their demands with highfalutin rhetoric about the revitalization of state secularism.

This anecdote conjures the "betrayal of the intellectuals" narrative, the abandonment of the people or popular movements with a substantial social base by elite writers and thinkers who fail to act as organic representatives of the people, who seem to be out of touch with the collective mood. If Adonis catalyzed some controversy by virtue of his public positions towards the Syrian uprising, this was by no means unique to the Arab world. Egyptian novelists and one-time icons of dissent Alaa al-Aswany and Sonallah Ibrahim, for example, shocked young readers and activists alike when they embraced the counter-revolutionary

regime of Abdel Fattah el-Sisi.137 Such acts of betrayal by public intellectuals have driven some to hasty declarations about the death of the intellectual.

Certainly, many activists of 2011 — the nineties generation — grew impatient with the intellectual-as-prophet, and bypassed the established sites and rules of the intellectual field. Nevertheless, they consciously built on the rich tradition they subverted.

There are more pressing matters for most activists, intellectuals, and ordinary people who animated the Arab uprisings than the antics and betrayals of certain prominent figures. Too many have been silenced by states of emergency. As in previous generations, they have been abducted, exiled, imprisoned, and assassinated by the regimes they challenged or, in some cases, helped to bring to power in the first place. Many others find themselves demonized by state media. If it is inaccurate or at least incomplete to characterize the Arab uprisings entirely in terms of a catalogue of defeat and betrayal, it is also much too reductive to explain the role of Arab intellectuals during this period exclusively in terms of powerlessness. The assumed impossibility of an effective political philosopher such as Thomas Paine, a vanguardist of Lenin's stature, or an anti-totalitarian "dissident" à la Václav Havel — three types of intellectuals that the New York Times invoked in an early article on the "Arab Spring" — is not sufficient evidence to conclude that Arab intellectuals are irrelevant historical actors in the contemporary moment.139 The upsurge in political activity and revolutionary fervor — from Tahrir Square in Cairo to Pearl Square in Manama and the Baba `Amr neighborhood in Horns — kindled new kinds of hope in and a renewed sense of possibility for the transformation of the Arab world. The poetic tradition collided with social media; highbrow intellectuals mingled with ordinary people; and ideas both new and old about social justice, political transformation, and cultural flourishing brought together different generations of struggle working along the grain of what Walter Benjamin famous called "the tradition of the oppressed."

Thus many of the nonviolent protesters who repelled Egyptian government forces and took over Tahrir Square in 2011 chanted the Tunisian national anthem as well as verse by the early-twentieth-century poet and anti-colonial icon Abu al-Qasim al-Shabbi (d. 1934). Another bard of the Egyptian revolutionary spirit, colloquial versifier Ahmad Fu'ad Nigm (d. 2013), provided further inspiration, reprising his role as a public intellectual and conscience of the nation who had become a legend for his biting satirical poetry of the rich and powerful and his unwavering support for the poor and downtrodden as well as his storied musical collaboration with legendary oud player and singer Shaykh Imam. Those residual forms of musical expression that had exploded during the 1960s constitute a fount of inspiration for contemporary Egyptian activists. There are many other examples of artistic creativity that overflowed the streets of Damascus, Tunis, and Cairo — to say nothing of the ever-expanding vitality of social and cultural media online — that have yet to be comprehensively examined. Visual artists from Egypt such as Ganzeer (dubbed "the Banksy of Egypt") have achieved international fame and recognition in documenting the Egyptian uprising; film and video production collectives such as Masasit Mati with their hilarious puppet satire and Abou Naddara with their powerful short films continue to skewer the political and humanitarian costs of the Syria conflict; and anonymous taggers are physically remaking the urban landscape of the contemporary Middle East.

With or without identifiable intellectual architects, re-coding can go a long way towards institutionalizing revolutionary culture. Graffiti and flags in revolutionary Cairo featured portraits of Shahenda Maklad, the intrepid feminist peasant and labor organizer. And it was not only icons of the left that surfaced during the exuberant days of the uprisings. In Horns and Aleppo, for example, activists launched a public art campaign using the likenesses of populist as well as bourgeois nationalist heroes such as Ibrahim Hananu (d. 1935), Sultan al-Atrash (d. 1982), and Shukri al-Quwwatli (d. 1967), populist and elite leaders who fought for Syrian national independence during the 1920s and 1930s, drawing an unmistakable line

between the struggle against French colonial rule and the fight to overthrow the Ba`thist regime. Some protestors staged the theater of the oppressed by invoking works of Saadallah Wannous and his most famous line: "we are condemned to hope." When Palestinians set up tent villages throughout the occupied West Bank in January 2013 to resist imminent Israeli settlement construction there, they announced the name of the first tent village on twitter: "#Bab al-Shams." The activists' reference to the celebrated 1998 novel, Gate of the Sun, by Elias Khoury, in which the memory of the loss of Palestine in 1948 is rehearsed in ever-recurrent narrative beginnings, was not lost on the author.

In the Translations section of this volume, we present three pieces originally written in Arabic that have never before appeared in English. Elias Khoury is one of the most prominent Arab intellectuals of his generation. One of the best-known novelists from the Middle East, Khoury's fiction has been translated extensively. One hallmark of his prose is the tendency to write dialogue in colloquial Lebanese dialect. His writing is deeply marked by the experience of and multifarious attempts to come to terms with the Lebanese Civil War. His political and social commentary, by contrast, is less often discussed outside of Arabophone circles even though he was the stalwart editor of the Sunday cultural supplement in the Beirut daily an-Nahar newspaper. Born in the same year as the Nakba, Khoury represents not only one of the foremost Arabic novelists and literary critics of his "generation of ruins," as Halabi puts it, but also "a guardian of collective memory" for whom the writer bore the "responsibility of rescuing his community from forced erasure." To that end, we include a short piece in which Khoury calls for a "Third Nanda."

Khoury was hardly alone in engaging with questions of pluralism, tradition, and liberalization. Indeed, many public intellectuals and cultural critics of his generation, including Egyptian literary critic Mahmud Amin al-Alim (1922-2009); Syrian critic, novelist, and translator Nabil Sulayman (b. 1945); and Palestinian politician and public intellectual `Azmi Bishara (b. 1956) threw themselves into similar and related struggles. But intellectual

historians of the Arab world must also begin to take seriously a new generation of writers, scholars, and public intellectuals claiming space within the Arab intellectual field, clamoring for their rights to voice, representation, and recognition. The second and third translations included in this volume highlight two Syrian intellectuals who have played important roles in the protest against dictatorial rule and the dangers of sectarianism in Syria since the early days of they uprising. The novelist Rosa Yassin Hassan (b. 1974) and former political prisoner Yassin al-Haj Saleh (b. 1961) — often called "the conscience of the Syrian revolution" — may come from slightly different generations — and generational outlook — but they also speak with and to one another in their respective visions for the adequate role of the intellectual in a moment of extreme violence, uncertainty, and dislocation. Al-Haj Saleh, for his part, has expressed a particularly acute sense of betrayal by doctrinaire leftists who have vilified him for his critique of the Asad regime (and its Russian and Iranian allies), which is still (almost surreally) touted as a bastion of anti-imperialist resistance in some Western quarters.

These two short pieces — translated here into English for the first time — are significant historical documents that reflect an early moment in the Syrian struggle for liberty, justice, and dignity. It is precisely in their common project to assess and revitalize the role of the intellectual in the contemporary Middle East — across and despite generational divisions — that we include their perspectives on how to articulate a new language of intellectual engagement in a moment of instability and uncertainty. Indeed, even if this new wave of activism across the Arab world can be understood in relation to the emergence of a "new Nanda," as Tarek El-Ariss helpfully points out, it "needs to be examined and theorized not merely as a repetition of or continuity with a particular cultural project from the nineteenth century, but rather as the adoption of new literary and political practices and techniques from which meaning and subjectivity arise."

It is no coincidence that both al-Haj Saleh and Hasan have written extensively about their experiences of imprisonment in the carceral archipelago of the Ba`thist regime. Their stories are part of a bloody tapestry that threads together Arab public intellectuals and oppositional figures throughout the postwar period. Syrian Communist Riyad al-Turk (b. 1930) spent seventeen years in the prisons of Hafiz al-Asad and his son Bashar, much of it in solitary confinement; al-Turk was hardly alone in this experience, as a multitude of Syrian intellectuals, writers, and political activists share common experiences of harassment, imprisonment, and torture throughout the late twentieth century. Egyptian feminist Nawal el-Saadawi (b. 1931) is distinguished, among her literary and intellectual accomplishments, for having been imprisoned by every Egyptian regime from King Faruq (r. 1936-52) through Gamal Abdel Nasser, Anwar Sadat, and Hosni Mubarak. Mahmoud Darwish (1941-2008) and other poets of the Palestinian resistance served long or intermittent time in Israeli prisons. The eminent Egyptian scholar of Islam and hermeneutics Nasr Hamid Abu Zayd fled into exile after being convicted of apostasy by the Egyptian Court of Cassation. Political assassinations were another important factor structuring the link between postwar and postcolonial intellectual history, one that has tended to escape the notice of intellectual historians. The Arab world also saw its share of intellectuals and political activists fall victim to American, Soviet, French, Israeli, Arab and, especially since the 1980s, Islamist assassins.

Amid the raging regional civil wars, counter-revolutions, and political restorations that consign tens of thousands to prison even as millions of refugees are forced into perilous journeys across the Mediterranean and the Balkans towards an uncertain future in Europe, the work of ideas in the Middle East may seem to be exhausted. While it may be the case that the Arab world is at a difficult and complex impasse, and even if the memories, anxieties, and horizons of possibility within the constellation of Arab uprisings "was made of defeats: socialism, pan-Arabism, Third Worldism, and also Islamic fundamentalism," it remains to be seen whether these setbacks and failures are indicative of "the limits of our epoch." Indeed, for Yassin al-Haj Saleh and Rosa Yassin Hassan as well as intellectuals from all over the

Arab world, surrendering before such conceptual and material limits — from theoretical impasse to fear barrier — has simply not been an option. This book shines light on a widespread, and expanding, testimony to the remarkable resilience of Arab intellectuals, not as apolitical sages or regime toadies but as engaged members of dynamic and endangered societies.

Islam: A Contemporary Philosophical Investigation by Imran Aijaz [Investigating Philosophy of Religion, Routledge, 9781138910218]

Islam as a religion and a way of life guides millions of people around the world and has a significant impact on worldly affairs. To many Muslims, however, a philosophical understanding or assessment of Islamic belief is seen as a feeble and religiously inappropriate attempt to understand matters that are beyond rational comprehension. Islam: A Contemporary Philosophical Investigation explores this issue in detail, by guiding readers through a careful study of the relationship between faith and reason in Islam. In particular, it pays close attention to religious objections to philosophizing about Islam, arguments for and against Islamic belief, and the rationality of Islamic belief in light of contemporary philosophical issues, such as problems of religious diversity, evil and religious doubt.

This text is ideal for upper-level undergraduates and graduate students seeking an objective, philosophical introduction to Islam, a subject of increasing interest in classrooms around the world.

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Preface

Excerpt: In this book, I seek to provide a contemporary philosophical investigation of Islam. While philosophers continue to disagree about the precise definition of `philosophy', few would deny the central role that arguments play in the discipline. Here is how Richard Popkin emphasizes this role in his definition of philosophy:

> Philosophy is the attempt to give an account of what is true and what is important, based on a rational assessment of evidence and arguments rather than myth, tradition, bald assertion, oracular utterances, local custom, or mere prejudice.

As Popkin explains, this understanding of philosophy can be traced back to the Greeks around the 5th century BCE. In conducting a philosophical investigation of Islam, it is this classic conception of philosophy that I will be operating under. In doing so, I will be engaged in an exercise that is part of the branch of philosophy known as the Philosophy of Religion, which David Stewart helpfully defines as follows:

> Philosophy of religion is not a systematic statement of religious beliefs (which would be theology or dogmatics) but a second-order activity focused on the fundamental issues of a given religion. Christians, for example, talk a lot about God, but what is the evidence that God exists? If God's existence can be proved, how does one go about it? And if God exists, how can one account for the presence of evil in the world? Such questions are philosophical in nature, and the philosopher of religion will not be content to let such questions go unexamined. The task of philosophy of religion, at least as it is conceived of in the West, is to submit claims such as those made by religions to a thoroughgoing rational investigation.

It is this 'second-order' aspect of Philosophy of Religion that distinguishes it from some other approaches to religion, such as theology or apologetics, where the truth of religious beliefs (e.g., beliefs about the existence of God, the authority of revelation, etc.) is simply presupposed prior to an inquiry. In philosophically investigating Islam, I am interested in rationally examining the truth of Islamic belief through evidence and argument.

But why philosophically investigate Islam? A variety of answers can be given to this question. Here is one answer that I think is compelling. The Islamic religion offers us an account of reality that is supposed to be very important. This account is based on several theological propositions, such as `Allah exists', `There is no god other than Allah', `Muhammad is Allah's Prophet', etc. Because they believe such theological propositions to be true, Muslims engage in a variety of religious practices that are connected to these beliefs, such as prayer, fasting, pilgrimage to Mecca and so on. To make this point is simply to draw attention to a specifically religious instance of the more general fact that there is a connection between belief and action. Beliefs typically influence the actions that we take; they are, as Frank Ramsey put it using his famous metaphor, "maps by which we steer." If I hold the belief that p, then I will typically employ that belief in my practical reasoning towards any action where whether it is the case that p is relevant and salient. For instance, my belief that I am teaching a class at the university this afternoon will be incorporated into my practical reasoning towards whether I need to visit the university campus today. Virtually all Muslim thinkers accept this point, certainly insofar as it applies to Islamic belief and practice. Indeed, many of them explain Islamic commitment as involving a complete 'way of life'. For instance, the famous Pakistani Muslim thinker Sayyid Abu A'la Maududi succinctly explains the connection between Islamic belief and practice as follows:

> The main characteristic of Islamic ideology is that it does not acknowledge a conflict; not even a slight separation between spiritual life and mundane life. It does not confine itself merely to purifying the spiritual and the moral life of man in the limited sense of the word. Its scope extends to the entire aspects of life.

It is obvious that Islamic practice has a significant impact on worldly affairs. To consider just a few examples, traditional Muslims will typically consume meat that is only halal (Islamically permissible); they will avoid the consumption of pork and alcohol; they will refrain from getting into financial matters where interest is involved; and, they will slaughter millions of animals each year during Eid

al-Adha (The `Festival of Sacrifice'). Many of these Islamic practices are also open to moral evaluation. For instance, several people, including some Muslims, have raised ethical concerns about the mass slaughter of animals for Eid al-Adha. Given the practical and ethical import of Islamic practice and the fact that it can be traced back to Islamic belief, it seems clear that the truth or falsity of such belief is a crucial matter. This is where a philosophical investigation of Islam can play an important role. While it is laudable for any person to show interest in philosophical investigations of Islam, it is especially important for Muslims to take these seriously. After all, Muslims are the ones who are engaged in Islamic practice, which is motivated and animated by Islamic belief, and it is such belief that will be the focus of scrutiny whenever Islam is subjected to a philosophical investigation.

My approach to a philosophical investigation of Islam in this book will proceed as follows. In Chapter 1 (`Can Islam be investigated philosophically?'), I note that what is called `fideism' poses perhaps the most significant obstacle to those who want to offer the results of a philosophical investigation of Islam to the Muslim community. In essence, the view of the fideist emphasizes the acceptance of religious claims 'by faith' over reason. In the first chapter of the book, I provide a brief historical outline of the relationship between faith and reason in Islam. In doing so, I carve out some terms to delineate a number of different perspectives that Muslims have taken on the relationship between faith and reason. Under the rubric of what I call 'anti-rationalistic fideism', the view that revelation precedes reason in determining the truth of religious (Islamic) belief, there are two variants — `traditionalist fideism' and `scholastic fideism'. Both these variants of anti-rationalistic fideism begin with the claims of Islamic revelation as a given, prior to any sort of inquiry into religious matters. The difference between the two lies in the role and scope of reason in discussions about Islam. While the traditionalist fideists only allowed reason to be used minimally, if at all, in religious discussions, the scholastic fideists saw no problem in deploying rational argument in the service of defending Islamic belief. In Chapter 2 (`Classical traditionalist fideism in

Islam'), I evaluate the plausibility of classical traditionalist fideism in Islam by looking at some of the arguments given by one of its most famous representatives — the Palestinian traditionalist Muwaffaq ad-Din b. Qudama (d. 1223). This is followed, in Chapter 3 (`Classical scholastic fideism in Islam'), by a substantive critical assessment of classical scholastic fideism in Islam as found in the works of Abu Hamid al-Ghazali (d. 1111). As I explain in that chapter, it is important to engage with al-Ghazali's arguments regarding philosophical speculation about religious matters, given that he is often heralded by Muslims as the great defender of Islamic orthodoxy who refuted philosophy. In Chapter 4 (`Contemporary fideism in Islam'), I turn my attention to some contemporary trends in Islamic fideistic thought as found in the writings of two fundamentalist Muslim thinkers — Sayyid Abu A'la Maududi (d. 1979) and Sayyid Qutb (d. 1966). These four chapters that focus on an understanding and evaluation of Islamic anti-rationalistic fideism constitute most of this book. In pointing this out to readers, I anticipate two concerns that may be raised. First, one might wonder why I am giving so much attention to fideism in Islam and, second, one might complain that an assessment of Islamic fideism isn't really a philosophical investigation of Islam. Let me reply to these two points in turn.

To the first point, I will simply reemphasize what was said earlier. Although a philosophical investigation of Islam is an important enterprise, many Muslims today are simply resistant to it. This force of this point is typically not appreciated by those who are not part of the Muslim community, but it is well known to contemporary Islamic philosophers. The late Islamic philosopher Fazlur Rahman, for instance, explains why, from his perspective, philosophy is important both in a general sense as well as for religion:

> Philosophy is ... a perennial intellectual need and has to be allowed to flourish both for its own sake and for the sake of other disciplines, since it inculcates a much-needed analytical-critical spirit and generates new ideas that become important intellectual tools for other sciences, not least for religion and

theology. Therefore a people that deprives itself of philosophy necessarily exposes itself to starvation in terms of fresh ideas — in fact, it commits intellectual suicide.

But he also notes that, since medieval times, "philosophy has been a disciplina non grata in the Muslim educational system throughout a large part of the Muslim world." A large part of the Islamic opposition to philosophical investigations of Islam, as I have noted, comes from the Muslim adoption of fideism. A careful and sustained critical examination of Islamic fideism will therefore be invaluable in paving the way for Muslims to take philosophy and philosophical investigations of their faith seriously.

My reply to the second point is that it isn't at all clear an assessment of Islamic fideism does not constitute a philosophical investigation of Islam. As will be seen over the course of the chapters in which I evaluate Islamic fideism, all the Muslim fideists surveyed offer arguments for their views. It is tempting to see their efforts as amounting to philosophizing about Islamic belief, in the way that Al-Kindi (d. 873), the `Philosopher of the Arabs', did in responding to opponents of philosophy:

> [F]or they must say that [the pursuit of philosophy] is either necessary or not necessary. If they say that it is necessary, then its pursuit is necessary for them. If, on the other hand, they say that it is not necessary, it is necessary for them ... to give a demonstration of this ... Pursuit of this acquisition is, therefore, required by their own tongues, and devotion to it is necessary for them.

Some of the fideistic stances examined in this book, such as the one developed by al-Ghazali, are quite sophisticated and can be regarded as the adoption of a philosophical position on the relationship between faith and reason. As Richard Amesbury notes in his helpful survey of the topic, fideism may be seen as "denoting a particular philosophical account of faith's appropriate jurisdiction visa-vis that of reason." Construed as a philosophical position, fideism may be investigated philosophically. Suppose, however, that neither fideism nor a critical assessment of it counts as something philosophical. It would still be the case

that an evaluation of fideism is important for a philosophical investigation of Islam, as mentioned earlier. In this work, I shall simply assume that my critique of Islamic fideism does not amount to a philosophical investigation of Islam, even though I think a case can be made for thinking otherwise.

In Chapter 5 (`Rationalist arguments for Islamic belief), the penultimate chapter of the book, I turn my attention to a philosophical investigation of Islamic belief, having argued against fideistic criticisms of such an endeavor in the previous chapters. Specifically, I consider the force of some standard rationalist arguments that Muslims have given to support the truth of Islamic belief. These are mainly arguments for the existence of God and the Prophethood of Muhammad. I argue that these arguments fail to provide rational support for Islamic belief. In this chapter, I also sketch out an outline of what a successful rationalist vindication of Islamic belief would require. In the final chapter of the book, Chapter 6 (`Religious doubt, Islamic faith and The Skeptical Muslim'), I defend the view that a person who harbors religious doubts about Islamic belief can nevertheless embrace a skeptical kind of faith. In this chapter, I respond to a number of arguments that have been given against the viability of such a position as well as consider how a positive case may be developed for seeing religious doubt as a virtue.

One final remark is in order before we get going with the task at hand. In a general sense, a philosophical investigation of Islam is surely a monumental endeavor. On this interpretation, to philosophically investigate Islam would require a lengthy inquiry into the plausibility of Islamic belief, relying on several important disciplines such as theology, philosophy, history, science and so on. Furthermore, such an immense undertaking could not be done without a collective effort on the part of several individuals. My discussion in this book should be seen as a small and humble contribution to this undertaking; it consists of one person attempting to philosophically think his way through his religious tradition. By no means does my work in this book constitute a comprehensive philosophical assessment of the Islamic religion. Imran Aijaz, Michigan, 2018

Analytic Islamic Philosophy by Anthony Robert Booth [Palgrave Philosophy Today, Palgrave Macmillan, 9781137541567]

This book is an introduction to Islamic Philosophy, beginning with its Medieval inception, right through to its more contemporary incarnations. Using the language and conceptual apparatus of contemporary Anglo-American 'Analytic' philosophy, this book represents a novel and creative attempt to rejuvenate Islamic Philosophy for a modern audience. It adopts a 'rational reconstructive' approach to the history of philosophy by affording maximum hermeneutical priority to the strongest possible interpretation of a philosopher's arguments while also paying attention to the historical context in which they worked. The central canonical figures of Medieval Islamic Philosophy — al-Kindi, al-Farabi, Avicenna, al-Ghazali, Averroes — are presented chronologically along with an introduction to the central themes of Islamic theology and the Greek philosophical tradition they inherited. The book then briefly introduces what the author collectively refers to as the 'Pre-Modern' figures including Suhrawardi, Mulla Sadra, and Ibn Taymiyyah, and presents all of these thinkers, along with their Medieval predecessors, as forerunners to the more modern incarnation of Islamic Philosophy: Political Islam.

Excerpt: One of the great scandals in philosophy from around the beginning of the 20th century has been the perpetuation of the idea that there is a substantial distinction to be made between so-called analytic and continental philosophy—one that goes beyond issues regarding style and sociology. And, even though none of the respective participants in the dispute admits to being able to give the distinction any articulation that does not slip between their fingers, the distinction remains today very real (in the stylistic and sociological sense), wielded by both sides for diverse, abject, anti-philosophical ends (inter alia): the perceived winning of arguments via the appeal to authority; ensuring that one's arguments will not be subject to wide-ranging critical scrutiny; the maintenance of one's image and identity as a member of a particular philosophical club at the expense of others' membership; the perceived entitlement to

ignore (and dismiss without reading) vast tranches of literature as some "non-U" other. In short, I think that the belief in the viability of the distinction is ideological in nature (in the pejorative, Marxist sense that I discuss in Chaps. 7 and 8, and which, in a sense, is the guiding theme of this book). One then ought to ask in the present context: why include the word "analytic" in the title of this book? Am I not further securing the credibility of this ideology (used to maintain the positions of power of individual philosophers belonging to each camp) by so doing? Am I not thus indicating my desire to engage with Islamic philosophy (depending on one's perceived sense of tribal belonging) in terms of the "right" or "wrong" way?

My answer has to do with, first, how I think the pejorative ideology is best eschewed and what I think a more favourable alternative would be. And, second, it has to do with some of my own methodological commitments on how I think that History of Philosophy (a discipline that for me is not simply Intellectual History) should be conducted.

With respect to the first point above, it seems to me that it has become unfortunately de rigueur for a certain camp to use the word "analytic" as a means to insult a body of scholarly work in the History of Philosophy. For instance, one can find in certain discourses the idea that so and so is really an "analytic Nietzschean" or (perhaps most paradoxically, yet most de rigeur of all) an "analytic Heideggerian"—and as such a traitor to "real" history of philosophy, a Trojan horse ultimately dreamt up by the resourceful "analytics". This present book, however, has no disguise. It is explicitly written by someone who has primarily worked on issues and in a style that, sociologically speaking, are considered to belong to the analytic tradition. There can thus be no clever uncovering, unweaving, deconstruction (and attendant summary dismissal) that the book is really something connected to the analytic tradition. And, further, I really want to bring it home to the analytic community (such that it is) how congruent the Islamic philosophical tradition is to theirs, and that it did not deserve the fate imparted on it by the summary dismissal of the "father" of the analytic movement:

Arabic philosophy is not important as original thought. Men like Avicenna and Averroes are essentially commentators. Speaking generally, the views of the more scientific philosophers come from Aristotle and the Neoplatonists in logic and metaphysics, from Galen in medicine, from Greek and Indian sources in mathematics and astronomy, and among mystics religious philosophy has also an admixture of old Persian beliefs. Writers in Arabic showed some originality in mathematics and in chemistry—in the latter case, as an incidental result of alchemical researches. Mohammedan civilization in its great days was admirable in the arts and in many technical ways, but it showed no capacity for independent speculation in theoretical matters. Its importance, which must not be underrated, is as a transmitter. Between ancient and modern European civilization, the dark ages intervened. The Mohammedans and the Byzantines, while lacking the intellectual energy required for innovation, preserved the apparatus of civilization—education, books, and learned leisure. Both stimulated the West when it emerged from barbarism—the Mohammedans chiefly in the thirteenth century, the Byzantines chiefly in the fifteenth. In each case the stimulus produced new thought better than any produced by the transmitters—in the one case scholasticism, in the other the Renaissance (which however had other causes also). (Bertrand Russell — A History of Western Philosophy, p. 396)

The claim that "Mohammedan civilization ... showed no capacity for independent speculation in theoretical matters" is rather striking—particularly given the supressed premises that Analytic philosophy is essentially something that requires a capacity for that kind of speculation, and that Analytic philosophy (in its various historical guises) is the proper ("U") philosophy. For anyone who has read any philosophy in Arabic, it is hard not to resist the temptation to conclude that Lord Russell himself must not have read any of it. And yet, given Russell's stature, it's hard to imagine that his words fell on deaf ears, especially given the historical fact that the study of Islamic philosophy in Western Universities continues to be predominantly

considered at best optional in terms of a good philosophical education. My aim in this book is precisely to show that a distinctive feature of Islamic philosophy was in fact in its making theoretical innovations, and that the innovations it made bear the marks of considerable insight, relevant to the problems facing the world today.

My approach, then, is to treat the historical protagonists of Islamic philosophy as living, breathing figures in conversation with contemporary philosophy. My approach does not belong to what people sometimes call "comparative philosophy". The aim is here to do philosophy with the Islamic philoso-phers—not merely to compare theirs to others. With Oliver Leaman, I share the ambition of bringing Islamic philosophy (as he put it) "out of the Islamic Studies ghetto"—but let me emphasise that the significance of the historical and philological work done in the former should never be underestimated. And I agree with Muhammad Ali Khalidi's claim that treating these figures as items of mere historical interest (items of curious exotica) is a kind of "Orientalism" (a pejorative ideological discourse in the guise of a scientific study of the Islamic World, designed to shore up imperialism and oppression).

In order to facilitate the sort of dialogue I have in mind, I have given maximum hermeneutical priority to the principle of charity—to making the works of historical figures come out as the philosophically best possible versions. I think that the methodological ends of pursuing historical accuracy and the application of the principle of charity in doing History of Philosophy are hard to balance; just as the ends of empirical adequacy and explanatory power are hard for scientists to balance. Ultimately, which end we favour is likely to boil down to value choice: my choice is the principle of charity.

Islam and Reason

To get things off the ground, I will begin this book by introducing some of the fundamentals of the Islamic faith, both historically and in terms of doctrine. In particular, I want to discuss aspects of the religion that lend it to what I will call an "Evidentialist" interpretation (or as some scholars have put it, a "Rationalist" interpretation). In this context I will discuss the first ever state-sponsored (and Evidentialist) theology of Islam—Mu`tazilite theology—and compare it with its later (anti-Evidentialist) rival Ash`ãrite theology, as well as to some of the more traditional, literalist understandings of the faith that one finds in Hanbalite theology and jurisprudence. As we will see, both the Mu`tazilite and Ash`ãrite theological schools were extremely philosophically sophisticated (they are both known as part of Kalãm (rational) theology)—to the point where the boundary between philosophy and theology

become rather blurred. And it was during the period of Mu`tazilite dominance that we see the great Islamic philosophers (the Falasifa) first come into ascendance, often appropriating (but also going beyond) philosophical moves made in Kalãm, and indeed the dialectic they follow often mirroring the fundamental differences between Mu`tazilite and Ash`ãrite views. The central and most fundamental issue was a rather simple one: what is the role of independent reason in Islam? <>

Lives of the Prophets: The Illustrations to Hafiz-i Abru's "Assembly of Chronicles" by Mohamad Reza Ghiasian [Studies in Persian Cultural History, Brill, 978-9004377219]

In Lives of the Prophets Mohamad Reza Ghiasian analyses the images of the two extant illustrated copies of Hafiz-i Abru's Majma? al-tawarikh, which were produced for the Timurid ruler Shahrukh (r. 1405-1447).

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8   Cat. 8: The Prophet Job's Distress
9   Cat. 9: Moses Prevails over Pharaoh
10   Cat. 10: Moses and the Israelites Watch the Egyptians Drown in the Sea
11   Cat. 11: Moses Orders the Israelites to Sacrifice a Cow
12   Cat. 12: Moses and Korah
13   Cat. 13: Moses Striking the Giant `Uj's Ankle
14   Cat. 14: Solomon among Demons, Fairies, Wildlife and Birds
15   Cat. 15: Jesus Brings Back to Life Shem, the Son of Noah
16   Cat. 16: Jonah and the Whale

Excerpt: On one level, this study of the lives of the prophets, as narrated by one of the most productive and influential mediaeval Persian historians, contains much that is familiar and easily accessible to readers belonging to the main monotheistic religions. Stories of Moses and the crossing of the Red Sea, of Jonah and the whale, Abraham's sacrifice of Ishmael, or Joseph and Zulaykha (Potiphar's wife), are sufficiently well known that the chief interest in reading their miracles and deeds again is to see how the Biblical narratives are retold in the Islamic tradition, with the accumulated twists of detail and interpretation that make for their complete appropriation into Muslim scholarship.

It is instructive, also, to see that these 'stories' are woven into a chronicle of ancient history that has prophets and kings sharing the same space; a space and a narrative that later, once the age of the prophets was over (for Muslims, Muhammad was the 'seal of the prophets'), we see being shared by shahs and saints, or latterly, in Iran, the Shi`i imams. The competitive but more or less comfortable accommodation between these two sources of authority – secular and spiritual – is a persistent feature of mediaeval writing and with different degrees of emphasis and intensity continues today. The fact that Hafiz-i Abru's Majma` al-tawarikh is an historical compilation, not a hagiography nor a scriptural exegesis, serves to underline the inextricable place of religion in the history of human society and thought. For a fifteenth-century chronicler such as Hafiz-i Abru, indeed, the main point of writing history was to reveal and underline the Divine plan for human life on earth. As it was, equally, for Hafiz-i Abru's contemporaries in Christian Europe, and the sources on which he relied.

On another level, Mohamad Reza Ghiasian plunges fearlessly into the com¬plex manuscript transmission and codicology of Hafiz-i Abru's oeuvre. It is not enough that Hafiz-i Abru absorbed the work of his predecessors, such as Bal`ami's Persian version of Tabari's History of the Prophets and Kings, Rashid al-Din's Jami` al-tawarikh, Nizam al-Din Shami's Zafarnama and other texts into his

own chronicle. He did so partly by inserting his own text into the incomplete manuscripts of the works of his predecessors, most specifically, in this case, the 'universal history' of Rashid al-Din (d. 1318). While Hafiz-i Abru's imprint on manuscripts of the Jami` al-tawarikh is well known, the precise relationship between the two chronicles still causes confusion, as evidenced by the recent printed edition of the history of the prophets discussed in the book before us now, under the authorship of Rashid al-Din, whereas in fact, it is the work of Hafiz-i Abru.

The confusion arises largely because few scholars have looked in detail at the manuscripts themselves. Dr Ghiasian's painstaking and highly precise codicological analysis of the manuscripts not only allows a better understanding of Hafiz-i Abru's own contributions to rewriting earlier history, but has served to identify the existence of a previously unrecognised contemporary copy of Rashid al-Din's chronicle. Fragments of this were absorbed into Hafiz-i Abru's editorial work on the Jami` al-tawarikh in the Istanbul manuscript (H. 1653) and also into his own complete copy of the Majma` al-tawarikh, which has now been dispersed throughout numerous public and private collections.

The main reason for this dispersal is that the manuscript is heavily illustrated in what has been named Shahrukh's 'historical style' – with rather prosaic and simplistic characteristics, in plain primary colours and lacking the refinement of the artistic production of other fifteenth-century ateliers. This is itself is another reason for the relative neglect of the Hafiz-i Abru manuscripts – not, on the whole, seen as interesting to textual scholars (not the subject of any printed editions) or to art historians. Mistakenly, in both cases. And here again, Dr Ghiasian's close and rigorous approach to both text and image has paid off, in identifying numerous paintings of the dispersed manuscript that were painted over the text before it was dismembered by greedy European dealers in the early twentieth century.

In short, his forensic detective work has resulted in a splendid adornment to this series. It will be an essential resource for historiographers and art historians alike in any effort to understand the

meaning of history, the context of its production and way it was visualised in early fifteenth-century Iran. Charles Melville

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The present study aims to discuss the illustrations to some important historical manuscripts commissioned by the Timurid ruler Shahrukh (r. 1405–1447) in the beginning of the fifteenth century. The bibliophile character of Shahrukh and his patronage of historical, religious, poetical and scientific books in Herat are well known. During Shahrukh's reign, book production was an important device to support dynastic claims, representing one of the most significant portrayals of his tendencies. Among the extant illustrated books produced or refurbished under his patronage eight manuscripts can be identified, of which five are historical, two are poetical, and one is religious in content. All these books constitute a base for this research on a group of paintings existing in two of these manuscripts, which are universal chronicles.

As a staunch "renewer" (mujaddid) of Sunni Islam, Shahrukh commanded his court historiographer, Hafiz-i Abru (d. 1430) to compose a series of historical and historico-geographical works. Hafiz-i Abru was also charged to complete several fragmentary manuscripts of the Jami` al-tawarikh ("Compendium of Chronicles"), which had been produced under the patronage of their author Rashid al-Din Fadl-Allah Hamadani (d. 1318) in the first decade of the fourteenth century.[1] Both the text and the images of the fourteenth-century copies of the Jami` al-tawarikh served as models for the historical works commissioned by Shahrukh. Therefore, this study will examine the relationships between the codices produced in the Ilkhanid and Timurid workshops. The intentions of their patrons and authors are also questions of great interest.

Jami` al-tawarikh is a multi-volume universal history composed by Rashid al-Din, at the request of the Ilkhanid rulers Ghazan Khan (r. 1295–1304) and Uljaytu (r. 1304–17). This work, which is considered to be the "first world history," consists of a history from the time of creation up to the date of its composition. This chronicle was divided into three volumes of unequal length, the last of which is not known to be extant. The first volume is devoted to

the history of the Mongols up to the death of Ghazan Khan in 703/1304. The second volume was divided into two parts, in which the first part on the history of Uljaytu is now missing. The second part of the second volume consists of two sections. The first treats the history of the prophets from Adam up to the advent of Islam and the pre-Islamic rulers. The other deals with Islamic history up to the extinction of the `Abbasid dynasty, a history of Islamic Persian dynasties, and a history of the non-Mongol peoples of Eurasia including Ughuz Turks, Chinese, Jews, Franks and Indians.

Rashid al-Din established an enormous multi-functional complex in the northeastern part of Tabriz at the end of the thirteenth century. This complex, which was called Rab`-i Rashidi ("Rashid's Quarter"), comprised a library and scriptorium, a hospital, a khanqah, a caravansary, a guest house, residential facilities, a congregational mosque, and other facilities. One of the main purposes of this complex was the transcription of Rashid al-Din's own works. According to the endowment deed of the Rab`-i Rashidi, two copies of the Jami` al-tawarikh, one in Persian and the other in Arabic, were to be transcribed yearly.

Four fragmentary manuscripts of the Jami` al-tawarikh produced at the Rab`-i Rashidi survive: one in Arabic and three in Persian. All were in the possession of Shahrukh's library. The Arabic copy consists of two fragments of one manuscript kept in the Khalili Collection in London (MSS 727) and the Edinburgh University Library (Or.MS 20). The three Persian copies are 206 leaves of a manuscript with the inventory number of "Hazine 1653" kept in the Topkapı Sarayı Library; most folios of the manuscript "Hazine 1654" preserved in the same collection; and a hitherto unknown manuscript, which has been divided into two parts and its folios can be found partly in Hazine 1653 and partly in the famous dispersed manuscript of the Majma` al-tawarikh ("Assembly of Chronicles"). All these four manuscripts are fragments of the second part of the second volume of the Jami` al-tawarikh, which covers the events from the time of creation up to the extinction of the `Abbasid dynasty and sections on the history of the non-Mongol peoples of Eurasia.

Since the pre-Islamic part of Hazine 1653 was missing, Hafiz-i Abru replaced the missing part with the first volume of his own Majma` al-tawarikh, which had been composed before. Some years later, similar to the fate of Hazine 1653, a further fourteenth-century fragmentary manuscript of the Jami` al-tawarikh was completed that is currently known as the dispersed manuscript. The contents of these two manuscripts are almost identical and thus their pre-Islamic sections comprise the first volume of Hafiz-i Abru's Majma` al-tawarikh and their other sections consist of Rashid al-Din's Jami` al-tawarikh. These two manuscripts are the only surviving illustrated copies of the Majma` al-tawarikh.

To date, no comprehensive description of the dispersed manuscript and the Timurid part of Hazine 1653 has been published, and even the Ilkhanid part of the latter manuscript has never been studied with the care it deserves. The present research focuses on the paintings added to these two manuscripts in Shahrukh's kitabkhana (i.e. royal library cum artists' workshop) by exemplifying the illustrations to the lives of the prophets from the time of Adam up to the early life of the Prophet Muhammad (before his migration).

Finding the reason why the sections on the stories of the prophets are richly illustrated in the Majma` al-tawarikh is one of the purposes of this inquiry. Moreover, the relationship of these illustrations to earlier paintings of historical texts with similar topics will be surveyed and thus some relevant manuscripts such as Hazine 1654, the Arabic codex and Hafiz-i Abru's Kulliyat-i tarikhi ("Collection of Historical Works" kept in the Topkapı Palace Library with the inventory number "Bağdat 282") will be examined.

This study emerged from more than five years of research in the University of Bamberg and libraries and museums in Europe, Iran and Turkey. It is a result of close examination of original materials in three collections: the Topkapı Sarayı Library in Istanbul (Hazine 1653, Hazine 1654 and Bağdat 282), the David Collection in Copenhagen (dispersed folios of the Majma` al-tawarikh and some other relevant materials) and the Reza Abbasi Museum in Tehran (folios of the dispersed

manuscript). Naturally, it was not possible to visit all the discussed materials, which are in the holdings of approximately fifty private and public collections around the world. Among all these collections, the Topkapı Palace Library was the most important for doing this research, especially for the examination of Hazine 1653. The David Collection and the Reza Abbasi Museum were the most accessible collections for examination of the scattered folios.

Chapter Summary

Chapter 1, which is mostly based on secondary sources, surveys the political, religious and cultural context of the era in which the fourteenth-century manuscripts of Rashid al-Din were refurbished. It also seeks to study Shahrukh's personal traits and his intention in preserving and continuing Rashid al-Din's works. The studies of foreign relations, the legitimation of the sultan's rule, and artistic productions help to contextualize Shahrukh's literary patronage.

Chapter 2, which deals with book production in Shahrukh's workshop, offers a list of some of the known manuscripts imprinted with his library seals and a list of the books produced or refurbished under his patronage. The lists of the books collected or patronized by Shahrukh help us in better understanding of the sultan's literary taste. The chapter surveys all the known surviving illustrated books produced or refurbished in Shahrukh's kitabkhana, except for the two copies of the Majma` al-tawarikh, which are the subject of the next chapter.

Chapter 3 deals with a discussion of Hafiz-i Abru's biography, his known works, the Majma` al-tawarikh and the surviving copies of each volume of this comprehensive work. Then the chapter examines Hafiz-i Abru's stories of the prophets and its relationship with earlier Islamic works titled Qisas al-anbiyaʾ ("Stories of the Prophets").

The next part of the chapter focuses on a detailed description of the two extant illustrated manuscripts of the Majma` al-tawarikh: Hazine 1653 and the dispersed manuscript. It tracks down one of the main aims of this inquiry and answers numerous significant questions concerning the travels of these two complicated manuscripts from the early

fourteenth century to the twentieth century. By examining these codices, a hitherto unknown manuscript of the Jami` al-tawarikh produced at the Rab`-i Rashidi has been discovered and thus this chapter introduces this Rashidi manuscript, which is titled the "Divided Manuscript."

The chapter not only surveys the artistic addition of Shahrukh's kitabkhana to these manuscripts, but also reveals some new aspects of book production in Rashid al-Din's scriptorium. It analyzes the contents of Hazine 1653 and surveys the artistic additions to it in four different periods: Ilkhanid, Timurid, Safavid and Ottoman. The dispersed manuscript is even more complicated than Hazine 1653, because it carries some later addition miniatures, which are supposed to have been added in a period between the middle of the fifteenth century until the year 1926. Therefore, the subchapter on the dispersed manuscript is divided into two parts, and the Shahrukhi paintings and the later additional ones have been examined separately. The last section of the chapter includes a partial reconstruction of the illustration cycle of the dispersed manuscript.

Chapter 4 moves to a discussion of the Shahrukhi illustrations of the dispersed manuscript and Hazine 1653 and analyzes their style. It examines iconographic sources and characteristics of the style, which has been called the "historical style," and offers a hypothesis for the function of these illustrations.

It also analyzes different pictorial elements of this style, and in particular, surveys the two largest groups of subject matter: battlefields and enthronements. Line drawings of the categories of different objects help to distinguish the Shahrukhi style of painting compared with other styles.

The Catalogue examines the images of the prophets in Hazine 1653 and the dispersed manuscript. It consists of twenty episodes, of which five episodes are illustrated in both manuscripts while other stories have been painted in only one of them. Therefore, the catalogue focuses on eleven illustrations from Hazine 1653 and fourteen paintings from the dispersed manuscript. It also deals with a range of comparative materials from other manuscripts and in particular, offers

descriptive information of the relevant parts of the text in manuscripts produced for Rashid al-Din that cannot be found elsewhere.

Note on Appendices, Translation, Transliteration and Dates

Appendix 1 includes an English translation of the illustrated parts of the stories of the prophets from Hafiz-i Abru's Majma` al-tawarikh and the life of the Prophet Muhammad from Rashid al-Din's Jami` al-tawarikh. The translation, which consists of twenty accounts, is only based on the original manuscript Hazine 1653, because all these parts of the manuscript are transcribed by Hafiz-i Abru, and there is no major difference with other copies of the text. Qur'an passages follow the translation by Aminah Assami ("Saheeh International" version of Qur'an translation).

Appendix 2 provides a complete list of all headings and illustrations in Hazine 1653 that is of great importance not only for its assistance in reconstruction of the dispersed manuscript, but also by representing a precise list of the Ilkhanid paintings of the manuscript.

Appendices 3 and 4 offer a list of later additional miniatures to the dispersed manuscript that have hitherto been considered as historical paintings from the time of Shahrukh.

The system of transliteration followed is that of the International Journal of Middle East Studies (IJMES). For the sake of consistency and simplicity, all foreign words are transcribed without diacritics. The illustrations to the dispersed manuscript and Hazine 1653 are termed "Catalogue" and comparative paintings as well as other pictures are identified as "Figures." Names of individuals are followed by the years of their death (d.) or regnal years (r.). Dates are given first according to the Islamic calendar (anno Hegirae) and then the Gregorian one (anno Domini).

In Sum
Shahrukh, who was not the designated successor of Timur, attempted to portray himself as the rightful Islamic successor to the legitimate Ilkhanid rulers. He applied Ghazan Khan's title, padishah-i Islam, as his official appellation and developed the Timurid-Ilkhanid linkage. He was well aware of the

importance of historical books for justifying his rule in history. These manuscripts served as a device to connect the Timurids with the previous Ilkhanid sultanates in Iran. Another objective of these religio-historical codices was to set Shahrukh's rule within the general context of Islamic history.

Shahrukh's Islamizing policies and his adherence to Sunnism of the Hanafite school of jurisprudence resulted in patronage of religious and scientific books rather than lyrical poetry. Production of these codices was an endeavour to implement religious orthodoxy or an invitation for conversion to Islam. Such manuscripts as Jami` al-tawarikh and Majma` al-tawarikh, which deal with both the histories of the Persian kings and Islamic stories of the prophets, were the ideal books for patronage of Shahrukh as padishah-i Islam. The interest of Shahrukh in the themes of the Jami` al-tawarikh caused him to encourage his court historian Hafiz-i Abru to compose an expanded version of Rashid al-Din's enterprise. As a result, Majma` al-tawarikh with considerable Qur'anic citations was composed approximately four times larger than its precedent.

It was in this context that those sections on the histories of the ancient kings of Persia and the stories of the prophets were richly illustrated in the first volume of the Majma` al-tawarikh.1 These illustrations to Islamic hagiographical stories also served as a device for justifying the rule of padishah-i Islam. Such attempts like patronage of religious painting, use of the word khilafat in the coinage, visitation of shrines and summoning of Qur'an reciters to the royal court are manifestations of Shahrukh's Islamizing policies.

Apart from the transcription of Hafiz-i Abru's works, one of the main tasks of Shahrukh's kitabkhana was the preservation and completion of fragmen-tary manuscripts of the Jami` al-tawarikh produced at the Rab`-i Rashidi. In the process of completion of Hazine 1653, Hafiz-i Abru replaced the pre-Islamic section of the manuscript with the first volume of his own Majma` al-tawarikh. He utilized thirty-one leaves from a further Rashidi manuscript. Moreover, he omitted the subsection on the Israelites' history, because the content of this subchapter could be found in the pre-Islamic part of the book. Another possible reason for Hafiz-i

Abru's decision could be the Jewish or non-Islamic nature of this subsection.

Shortly after the accomplishment date of Hazine 1653, Shahrukh's kitabkhana drew on the second, "Divided" Rashidi manuscript, some folios of which had previously been inserted into Hazine 1653, to complete the another Shahrukhi manuscript, which now consists of about 407 folios, including approximately sixty-five Rashidi leaves. It was copied directly from Hazine 1653 and nowadays is widely dispersed.

Completion of these fourteenth-century manuscripts cannot simply be considered as "heritage preservation" or even "acquisition." The ideological and political aspects of refurbishing these books persuade us to call it "appropriation." The case of Hazine 1653, for instance, strongly supports this hypothesis. Although the pre-Islamic part of the Jami` al-tawarikh was probably accessible to Hafiz-i Abru, he replaced it with his own Majma` al-tawarikh, which contains a comprehensive introduction explaining his theories of state and a eulogy of Shahrukh. Moreover, the largest — and perhaps the last — Shahrukhi painting of the manuscript, "A dervish becomes a king in India," bears the typical panegyric inscription of Shahrukh. Thus, it becomes clear that these are attempts to appropriate a historical work from the preceding century with the intention to legitimate Shahrukh's rulership.

Refurbishing these fourteenth-century fragmentary illustrated codices (Hazine 1653, Hazine 1654 and the "Divided manuscript") resulted in the appearance of a certain style of painting in Persia. The formation of this style was strongly based on illustrations existing in these manuscripts. In some cases, the artists were obliged to paint on the framework of vacant space left by scribes of the Rab`-i Rashidi, and in other cases, they had to improve the quality of the earlier illustrations by restoration and overpainting. A further restriction on the Shahrukhi artists was the necessity to coordinate the paintings in Timurid parts of these codices with their Ilkhanid pictures. In such a process, the aesthetics of Ilkhanid painting, whose coloured washes were largely restricted to ochre,

red and blue, were updated by using opaque and vivid pigments.

The major iconographic sources for the "historical style" are the paintings produced for Rashid al-Din, Iskandar Sultan and the Jalayird patrons. Among all the codices that had been transferred to Herat by Shahrukh, the Arabic version of the Jami` al-tawarikh provided the most important model for the Timurid artists in depiction of the episodes and selection of the subject matter.

Designation of a large number of paintings in a single manuscript and the hurriedness of execution indicate that they are useful images, which illustrate certain episodes of a historical book. Compared with the Rashidi paintings, these illustrations appear more minimalistic in their component parts, in such a way that they show the most important elements of the narratives. In general, there is a close correspondence between text and image — one could say that we can see a true visualization of the narrative. As this study has argued, in some cases, for example "Noah's Ark" and "The Birth of the Prophet Muhammad," the Shahrukhi artists were more faithful to the text rather than the prototype, while the Rashidi depictions of these episodes appear to be more faithful to Byzantine models.

In the prophetic illustrations of the Majmaʿ al-tawarikh, we see the demonstration of God's omnipotence materialized in the wonders of the prophets, His protection of them and the punishment of those who would not listen. The prophets as predecessors of Muhammad were sent by God to propagate the true religion and fight against paganism.

Usually the prophets and their closest companions are shown in green and brown robes respectively and with Islamic turbans on their heads. Therefore, they are depicted as Muslim religious figures, green being the colour of Muhammad's family and brown the colour of devoted men of religion, especially mystics. This recalls the pious character of Shahrukh and his numerous visitations to the shrines of Muslim saints.

Considering the Sunni nature of these religio-historical manuscripts, it would be interesting to examine both the text and images related to the

four Sunni caliphs. As shown in Cat. 20, Hafiz-i Abru in transmission of Rashid al-Din's text has omitted a considerable amount of the text on the conversion of `Ali ibn Abi Talib and Zayd ibn Haritha. Instead, he focuses on Abu Bakr's conversion and introduces him as the first Muslim who converted to Islam. Therefore, it can be proposed that it was the patron of the manuscript who ordered this episode in the dispersed copy to be illustrated.

For the images, it should be noted that among all the extant paintings in the "historical style" executed in Shahrukh's kitabkhana, only the first and the fourth caliphs are depicted: Abu Bakr and Imam `Ali. Four paintings show Abu Bakr: "The Prophet Muhammad's migration" (Hazine 1654, fol. 73b, and Hazine 1653, fol. 160b), "The Prophet Muhammad converts Abu Bakr" (Cat. 20) and "The persecution of Bilal al-Habashi" (Hazine 1654, fol. 62a). The last illustration portrays Abu Bakr in discussion with Umayya, who is punishing his black half-naked slave Bilal al-Habashi. Abu Bakr negotiated a deal with Umayya to exchange Bilal with Abu Bakr's slave. Then Abu Bakr emancipated Bilal from slavery and afterwards the latter was appointed as the first muezzin by the Prophet.

Three illustrations depict Imam `Ali: "The battle of Uhud" (Hazine 1654, fol. 81b, and the dispersed manuscript, no. 34) and "The conquest of Khaybar" (the dispersed manuscript, no. 36).

As Robert Hillenbrand has beautifully explained, the nature, the rate and the placement of the illustrations in a manuscript demand comment. It seems that some especial events on the lives of the caliphs have been designated for illustration. I believe that there is a certain emphasis on Abu Bakr among the early Muslims depicted in these manuscripts. The images of Imam `Ali depict him only as a brave warrior among the army of the Prophet. On the other hand, Abu Bakr is illustrated as an intimate companion and a successor of the prophet. In these paintings, Abu Bakr is not shown as a companion among the followers of the Prophet, rather he is introduced as the only intimate companion. In two paintings, he is the sole attendant in the presence of the Prophet (Cat. 20, and Hazine 1654, fol. 73b); in the third case, only

an old woman who fed them in their way to Medina is depicted (Hazine 1653, fol. 160b); and in the last case, Abu Bakr is shown as the one who emancipated the "first muezzin" (Hazine 1654, fol. 62a).

The episode of persecution is also illustrated in the Arabic codex (the Edinburgh fragment, fol. 48b). Both illustrations in Hazine 1654 and the Arabic copy are placed within the same location of the text. The noteworthy fact is that the artists of the Rab`-i Rashidi have depicted a general scene of punishment of five half-naked Muslims by an enthroned king and his servants without the presence of Abu Bakr, because the narrative concerning Abu Bakr's negotiation with Umayya is mentioned later. However, Shahrukh's kitabkhana has preferred to portray Abu Bakr instead of a general scene. This image of Abu Bakr in a green robe once again emphasises his great eminence for the workshop of the Timurid ruler.

Interestingly, all these Shahrukhi paintings show Abu Bakr as a companion and successor rather than a warrior, and this is reminiscent of the image of Shahrukh who did not inherit Timur's military aspiration. Thus, it is tempting to assume that Shahrukh, the patron of these manuscripts, is introduced as the "Abu Bakr of his time" who succeeded the founder of the dynasty. This hypothesis is also reinforced by Shahrukh's usage of the word khilafat in the coinage and architectural inscriptions.7 Finally, I would like to underline that the painting depicting "Abu Bakr's conversion," which is perhaps the simplest composition executed for Shahrukh, can be regarded as the most meaningful one.

Several aspects of the historical paintings produced for Shahrukh can be seen in the art of the subsequent period. Some provincial illustrated manuscripts produced in the middle of the fifteenth century show a similar arrangement of the pictorial space. For instance, the horizontal compositions in a copy of Shahnama of 850/1446 produced for Muhammad ibn Murtaza, a local ruler of Mazandaran, are reminiscent of the paintings produced for Shahrukh. Stronger influences of the historical paintings made for Shahrukh can be found in a copy of Shahnama of 1438 produced in

the Bahmanid Deccan. The manuscript, which is richly illustrated with ninety-three illustrations, is housed in the British Library (Or. 1403). From the middle of the fifteenth century onwards, the interest of the Ilkhanids and Timurids in the works of Rashid al-Din and Hafiz-i Abru was not picked up by the Persian artists. However, the Mughal emperors of India who were descendants of Timur patronized several illustrated copies of the Jami` al-tawarikh and some other historical works.

Although this analysis of the two Majma` al-tawarikh manuscripts reveals many aspects of the historical paintings produced for Shahrukh, more research needs to be done on other books connected to his patronage, especially the Jami` al-tawarikh of the Bibliothèque Nationale and the Cartier Khamsa. Moreover, an infrared examination of the illustrations of the Divided manuscript would be of great importance in answering the question of how the Shahrukhi artists added those paintings to the manuscript. Likewise, with the information provided in Appendix 2, a digital reconstruction of the dispersed manuscript would be necessary to preserve this surviving treasure from the Ilkhanid and Timurid periods. <>

[The Qur'an: A Form-Critical History](#) by Karim Samji [Studies in the History and Culture of the Middle East, De Gruyter, 9783110575453]

Die Studien zur Geschichte und Kultur des Vorderen Orients erscheinen als Supplement der Zeitschrift Der Islam, gegründet 1910 von Carl Heinrich Becker, einem der Väter der modernen Islamwissenschaft. Ganz im Sinne Beckers ist das Ziel der Studien die Erforschung der vergangenen Gesellschaften des Vorderen Orients, ihrer Glaubenssysteme und der zugrundeliegenden sozialen und ökonomischen Verhältnisse, von der Iberischen Halbinsel bis nach Zentralasien, von den ukrainischen Steppen zum Hochland des Jemen.

Über die grundlegende philologische Arbeit an der literarischen Überlieferung hinaus nutzen die Studien die archivalischen, sowie materiellen und archäologischen Überlieferungen als Quelle für die gesamte Bandbreite der historisch arbeitenden Geistes- und Sozialwissenschaften.

Herausgeber sind Stefan Heidemann (Universität Hamburg, federführend), Gottfried Hagen (University of Michigan, USA), Andreas Kaplony (Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München) und Rudi Matthee (University of Delaware, USA).

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The studies on the history and culture of the Middle East appear as a supplement of the Journal of Islam, founded 1910 by Carl Heinrich Becker, one of the fathers of modern Islamic studies. In the spirit of Beckers, the aim of the studies is to research the past societies of the Middle East, their belief systems and the underlying social and economic conditions, from the Iberian Peninsula to Central Asia, from the Ukrainian steppes to the highlands of Yemen.

Beyond the basic philological work on literary tradition, the studies use the archival, as well as material and archaeological traditions as a source for the entire range of historically working humanities and Social sciences.

The editors are Stefan Heidemann (University of Hamburg, lead), Gottfried Hagen (University of Michigan, USA), Andreas Kaplony (Ludwig-Maximilians University of Munich) and Rudi Matthee (University of Delaware, USA).

Contents
Abbreviations

Excerpt: Method

The present monograph examines the constructive application of genre criticism to the corpus coranicum.1 Hermann Gunkel (d. 1932) established the method in response to the problems endemic to psalm criticism and extended its scope to the entire Old Testament corpus.' Before long his students Martin Dibelius (d. 1947) and Rudolf Bultmann (d. 1976) blazed a trail in the study of the New Testament. Particularly pertinent to this discussion of method is Johann Gottfried von Herder (d. 1803), whose formative influence on Gunkel was decisive.

Dibelius positively asserts, "Herder was the pioneer of such movements in the sphere of biblical literature...he intuitively put forward many axioms, which only at a later date were to reach significance for criticism."' In point of fact, Herder set the stage and the tone when he endorsed the view that scripture as literature be treated historically. As a result, the shape of things to come is prefigured in Herder.' Karl Barth (d. 1968) repeatedly stresses without exaggeration, "Without Herder, there is no Schleiermacher, no de Wette...Without Herder, there is no Erlangen school, no history of religion school." Largely through Herder, the history of religion method had deep and manifold roots in the modern classical philology of Friedrich August Wolf (d. 1824), the nascent historical discipline of Leopold von Ranke

(d. 1886),9 the emergent science of religion of Friedrich Max Müller (d. 1900), and the historical-critical method of Julius Wellhausen (d. 1918). For instance, the echo of Herder is heard in August Boeckh (d. 1867), who combined the philological and hermeneutical insights of Wolf and Friedrich Schleiermacher (d. 1834), respectively: "The highest task of genre criticism is to investigate whether content and form...are suitable for the inner aim of a genre...." Gunkel concurs that "aesthetic or literary quality is not merely superficial." In other words, he holds that "aesthetic description can be scholarly."

Turning to the critique of the eponymous Wellhausen school, Gunkel opens with a simple disclaimer: Wellhausen is above reproach. Nonetheless, Gunkel asserts that an inadvertent consequence of higher criticism is the relative disregard for historical aesthetics.' In tandem with Herder, he lays this inopportune development at the doorstep of Enlightenment rationalism. In this respect, Gunkel cites the proclivity of the Wellhausen school towards argumentum ex silentio and the legal dictum quod non est in actis, non est in mundo. Yet again, without fail, he denies Wellhausen's complicity in the matter. However, Gunkel takes to task historical criticism, which is premised exclusively on written rather than mixed transmission. He criticizes the Wellhausen school for its failure to recognize the cataloguing of genres as the primary task of research.' As is so often the case in history, Gunkel's ideas were poorly received, and even met stern resistance. It was none other than Carl Heinrich Becker (d. 1933) who promoted members of the history of religion school, and most prominently, Gunkel. In concert with the "little Göttingen faculty," Gunkel promulgated his con¬ception, in which the history of religion works hand in hand with the history of literature. Henning Reventlow (d. 2010) reflects on Gunkel's place in intellectual history':

> One could say that Gunkel blazed new paths in every field in which he worked, and in many cases methodologically broke new ground. Against a generation that had been represented by Wellhausen, he led scholarship to a completely altered

outlook, especially in Old Testament research.

In sum, James Muilenburg (d. 1974) emphasizes, "the first and most obvious achievement of genre criticism is that it supplied a much-needed corrective to literary and historical criticism." Having laid a basis for discussion, let us now turn to scholarly approaches to the Qur'ān.

Genres of the Qur'an

As Neuwirth specifies, the corpus coranicum eludes familiar categories and resists strict labels. Wansbrough maintains that it is foremost a sermonary; casting a wide net, the sermon functions as the dominant literary form and vehicle in a preaching situation:

To the long and many-faceted process of Gemeindebildung, which culminated in the canon¬ical text of Muslim scripture, the sermon (khutba) must have been central, as the instrument of both transmission and explication of the prophetical logia.

This was already appreciated by Voltaire (d. 1778), whose Essai sur les moeurs et l'esprit des nations insightfully reflects on the literary character of the Qur'an as an assemblage of sermons with elements of vision, revelation, and legislation. Meanwhile, Neuwirth asserts, "Above all, it is not to be understood by the term `sermon' in the precise sense of rhetoric that expresses a truth that has already been announced and attempts to urge that truth upon the listener." Be that as it may, Alfred-Louis de Prémare (d. 2006) reframes the Qur'an as polemic.

However, Richard Ettinghausen (d. 1979) states that polemics proper develop only later. Roest Crollius advances the claim that "there is perhaps no scripture that is so totally a book of prayer as is the Qur'ān." He closes with the assertion that "the Qur'ān itself is prayer." Then again, the pseudonymous Christoph Luxenberg's Die syro-aramäische Lesart des Koran (2000) reconstructs a lectionary. While acknowledging its merits, de Prémare concludes to the con trary that the corpus cannot, and should not, be reduced to this. But in a similar spirit, Günter Luling (d. 2014) detects in the Ur-Koran a hymnal. Neuwirth makes the case that

"the arrangement of the qur'ānic text grosso modo seems to go back to the oral use of the text in the earliest community." She impresses upon the reader "what it was originally conceived to be: a liturgical oration, as a text for recitation." Yet again, neither is the liturgy genre all-inclusive. As evident from the foregoing claims, "the Qur'an may contain some elements of homily along with its many other elements, but it yields just as few examples of these as it yields of the catch-all categories of hymns, narratives, or legislation." As an eclectic archive, the Qur'an also preserves literary genres that fall outside the exclusive limits of sermon, polemic, prayer, and liturgy.

The following chapters demonstrate the application of form criticism to the Qur'ānic corpus. In particular, the illustrative cases consider multiple genres, including prayer, liturgy, wisdom, narrative, and proclamation, along with minor genres.'" Accordingly, chapter two presents a form-critical study of the prayer genre. The ensuing section identifies three productive cultic formulae, namely, rabbanā ("Our Lord"), rabbi ("My Lord"), and allāhumma ("O God"). The section thereafter addresses distinct social settings associated with the respective formulae. These situations, which gravitate toward performance in the subcult, display the full spectrum, from the private to the domestic to the corporate. In light of the main functional class termed contextual prayer, the fourth section distinguishes a number of forms, namely, conversational and single response prayers. This section also explores additional prayer forms, for instance, those deemed penitential, together with complaint, praise, imprecatory, and rhetorical prayers. The third chapter begins by defining the liturgy genre vis-à-vis prayer in the Qur'an. The subsequent section locates four formulae in the corpus. The liturgical formula huwa ("He is...") represents one such case. Moreover, the doxological formula doubles as the formula of liturgical praise. Prior to classifying forms of liturgy, the question of setting is decided on the basis of extant "performative markers."'" Drawing a line between the hymn and litany forms, this chapter treats each in turn. In consideration of dominant motifs, the hymn form is subdivided into

hymns to God, hymns to creation, and hymns to victory.

Furthermore, the twofold litany form comprises litanies of praise and those of lament.

Chapter four considers the genre classified as wisdom literature. The first section identifies eleven sapiential formulae found in the Qur'an. The following section then sheds light on wisdom contexts, particularly the adaptation of tribal ethics to teaching situations, ranging from private to small and large group instruction. Even more significant, in this regard, is literally the presence of dei-ctic formulae in the corpus.'" Thereafter, this chapter delineates no less than ten wisdom forms. These vary between relatively short admonitions and fairly lengthy sermons. Of particular relevance is the fact that the latter are delivered by means of the "conveyance command formula.""" The fifth chapter examines the narrative genre writ large. As it so happens, amthāl al-qur'ān alone account for those forms termed similitudes, parables, paradigms, example stories, and controversy stories. Beyond this, the chapter also surveys narrative blocks of the long saga, that is, episodes, legends, and reports.

Methods: Critical Approaches to Literary Genres

It should go without saying that the Qur'an did not develop in a literary vacuum. In other words, the corpus is embedded within an intertextual matrix that emerged in late antiquity. Late Hellenistic and Arabic literary frames of reference form the coordinate plane and textual world of the Qur'an, wherein biblical dramatis personae, narratives, and themes feature prominently. The late antique milieu has likewise shaped its structure. For instance, "the observation that early Meccan suras are structurally similar to the Psalms (al-zabür), which equally constitute polythematic compositions, has long been made."236 In spite of this, the genre criticism of the Qur'an remains a desideratum. As a codified text, it draws from a multitude of sources. Each literary genre is rooted in its sphere of life. The wide range of genres is indicative of a corresponding range of situations. In terms of procedure, Gunkel states, "Since it concerns literary witnesses, the genres of this type of poetry must be

substantiated." Accordingly, this monograph demonstrates that the corpus coranicum evidences a significant number of literary genres that includes prayer, liturgy, wisdom, narrative, and proclamation. Above all, what is essential is the determined insistence of Gunkel that genre criticism is "the firm ground from which everything else must ascend." Let us bring this introduction to a close and open a new critical chapter in Qur'an scholarship with the single proviso: "To evaluate the work one must participate within its methodological presuppositions and evaluate the final results."

Prayer: Genre, Formulae, Setting, Forms

Given that the Qur'ān "contains various prescriptions and descriptions of prayer and includes a great number of prayers, hymns, and invocations," Böwering deems "this scripture in its entirety a book of prayer." Form criticism produces definite and demonstrable results in terms of identifying, classifying, and contextualizing the forms of qur'ānic prayer. In addition to determining patterned prayers, this illustrative case study has generated a systematic taxonomy, along with corresponding termini technici. This is all the more significant in light of Adolf Deißmann's (d. 1937) weighty words, "One could compose the history of religion as the history of prayer." On this note, let us turn our attention to the liturgical forms in the corpus.

Liturgy: Genre, Formulae, Setting, Forms

The form-critical method has discerned dual forms of the liturgy genre in the corpus coranicum. First and foremost, this chapter laid bare the literary structure of hymns of praise. In particular, after identifying a group of liturgical formulae, it further classified multiple hymn forms according to motifs. In addition, it explored the generative properties of the imperative formula in terms of liturgical setting. Secondly, this chapter substantiated on formal grounds the presence of the litany form. Moreover, it discussed several forms, including the litany of praise and that of lament. In the end, these findings lend substance to Neuwirth's statement regarding "the emergence of an oral canon which was tangible within live recitation and whose Sitz im Leben was the community's service...."

Lastly, Dibelius remarks that "the bounds of the category cannot be always strictly maintained, for the style of a sermon, of a prayer, and of a hymn may touch one another closely." At this point, let us turn to the sermon in the wisdom genre.

Wisdom: Genre, Formulae, Setting, Forms

The present chapter has examined the wisdom genre in the corpus coranicum. In particular, it has identified a broad range of sapiential formulae. For that reason, the speech-forms in wisdom literature comprise an equally expansive repertoire, spanning admonitions and exhortations to lectures and sermons. In addition to locating these pedagogical materials in household ethos and clan wisdom, it has also addressed the appropriation of these traditional forms to meet the growing demands present in multiple teaching situations. Significantly, Laurent Pernot considers sermon and story as aspects of pious performance. Beyond this, the Qur'an exhibits an interplay between wisdom and narrative writ large. Even in the biblical case, "the absence of wisdom forms does not disqualify a narrative text from having significant wisdom elements." Accordingly, let us turn our attention to the narrative genre.

Narrative: Genre, Formulae, Setting, Forms

As Coats explains, "at least form-critically, narrative includes all texts that are determined by narrative style...." Although mathal begins with simple comparison, Hirschfeld holds that it extends to parables, paradigms, and example stories alike. Given its breadth, Horovitz even seems to consider amthãl as exempla. In addition, the corpus coranicum also preserves prophetic narratives that contain allusions to mnemohistorical figures and events. On the other hand, the narrative genre is "distinguished from those kinds of texts that either describe permanent conditions or define attitudes or express commands, prohibitions, admonitions, exhortations, and even laws and prophetic announcements, in which narrative style is also used." Presently, let us turn our attention to the prophetic speech-forms in the proclamation genre.

Proclamation : Genre, Formulae, Setting, Forms

As determined by Greßmann, "the prophetical sayings are usually very simply constructed."91 Accordingly, the proclamation genre evidences a cluster of formulae relating to the messenger situation. Particularly noteworthy is the preponderance of communal announcements that commence with "O you who believe" (yā-ayyuhā lladhīna āmanū). Further analysis confirms the presence of multiple regulatory forms covering a comprehensive set of community rules. As copiously illustrated in the present chapter, these proclamations address not only identity, alterity, and structure, but also even questions pertaining directly to prophetic authority. What is more, these rules equally dictate matters martial and marital, ritual and retributive. That is to say, these prescriptive proclamations in the public sphere shed critical light on "the formation of community."

Conclusion: Genre Classification & Genre History

Cesare Segre (d. 2014) states, "It is not just possible, but absolutely necessary, to orient literary texts historically." That is to say, "formal analysis alone cannot possibly be sufficient in form-critical research." This is but a prelude to history; and if not that, "then our most important witness for sounding out the gradual crystallization of the pre-conquest Islamic Urgemeinde is left unexplored." The present volume on genre criticism investigated the application of form criticism in the identification of genres within the corpus coranicum. "Let us ask once more: can this synchronic taxonomy be interpreted diachronically?" By way of closing, genre history is the key.

Middle Powers in Global Governance: The Rise of Turkey edited by Emel Parlar Dal [Palgrave Macmillan, 9783319723648]

This volume summarizes, synthesizes, updates, and contextualizes Turkey's multiple roles in global governance. As a result of various political, economic, cultural and technological changes occurring in the international system, the need for an effective and appropriate global governance is

unfolding. In such an environment, Turkey's and other rising/middle powers' initiatives appear to be indispensable for rendering the existing global governance mechanisms more functional and effective. The authors contribute to the assessment of changing global governance practices of secondary and/or middle power states with a special focus on Turkey's multiple roles and issue-based global governance policies.

Behind Turkey's reticence in redefining its status at the global level as a middle power or middle-ranked state lay its imperial past and the "grandeur politique" narrative inherited from the Ottoman Empire. Added to this weak conceptual foundation of middle power in Turkish foreign policy identity was the unwillingness of the Turkish political elite to employ the concept at the discursive level as a policy instrument. However, the end of the Cold War created new ground for the Turkish political elite to operationalize the middle power concept as both a new self-perception narrative and a power instrument which fits well with Turkey's post-Cold War era foreign policy orientation and ambitions. On the other hand, while the 2000s were marked by ambivalence in Turkey's middle powership and the vicissitudes of Turkey's middle power thinking, this period offered it a better climate in which to adopt a series of middle power behaviors in its diplomacy at both the regional and global levels. Derived from its gradually upgraded international position as a result of its increasing material capabilities over the last decade, Turkey's newly emerged middle power vision sought to support its international activism by enhancing its institutional power in both formal and informal international organizations and forums. Interested more in the functional aspect of the middle power rather than its ideational aspect, Turkey has also sought in recent years to take advantage of the three areas that may be assigned to a middle power vision in the international realm: its increasing international development cooperation activities, its growing economic influence, and its increasing interest in the G20- and MIKTA-like informal groupings. However, the changing security context of the Middle East in the shadow of the ongoing Syrian civil war and the rise of the ISIS threat in recent years has made it difficult for Turkey to actively operationalize the middle power diplomacy tools such as agenda-setting, niche diplomacy, networking, coalition building, mediation, and

democracy promotion. Turkey's current foreign policy, which has been securitized as a consequence of the ongoing security threats emanating from its Middle Eastern neighborhood and its domestic environment, does not allow it to effectively enact a middle power role to promote democratic governance, internationalism, and human rights either inside or outside the country.

In this background, this book attempts to shed light on how a middle-ranked state such as Turkey has engaged in socially constructing a middle Power identity in recent years using appropriate middle power diplomacy tools despite its weak middle power self-perception and decreasing leverage in regional and global affairs, as well as in its relations with its Western failure by political actors to find a sustainable and coherent post-Cold War geopolitical framework that accommodates a wider distribution of power and authority to non-Western political actors and takes due account of the rise of non-state economic and political actors, as well as civilizational identities, in settings of globalization, transnational terrorism, and more recently, nativism/migration. In his contribution, the author also claims that the quality of radical uncertainty has led most governmental actors of sovereign states to exhibit caution and flexibility in their various efforts to navigate the windy seas of global political life. In his final analysis, Falk concludes that, after some adventurous initiatives early in the twenty-first century, Turkey is no exception as it again pursues arrangements aimed at promoting stability and balance, although in the context of independence rather than through geopolitical depen-dence, alignment, and foreign policy passivity as in the Cold War period.

In "The Southern Dimension in Turkish Foreign Policy", Donelli and Gonzalez focus on how Turkey sees the South-South cooperation and with which foreign policy mechanisms it can contribute to this evolving cooperation among the Global South countries, an untouched theme in Turkish foreign policy literature. The authors claim that after the end of the Cold War, the world witnessed an unprecedented growth of what can be called "South-South" aid, which promotes horizontal cooperation based on the principle of equality, partnership, and mutual interest. Therefore,

considering the rising prominence of the South-South Cooperation (SSC) in the foreign policy agendas of the emerging powers, the authors aim to examine the Turkish agenda for the global South. For the authors, while Turkey is not considered an actor of the Global South, the country has a unique geographical position and geopolitical background. Indeed, Turkey is geographically interlocked between the European and Asian continents, located at the crossroads of the AfroEurasia landmass. In this regard, the authors stress that due to this distinctiveness, Turkey has moved from its traditional "threat assessment approach" toward an "active engagement in regional political systems" in the last decade. Donelli and Gonzalez also argue that specifically, after the Arab upheavals of 2011, Turkey has moved toward what Fuat Keyman calls "moral realism" combining hard power-based military assertiveness and humanitarian norms. As part of this new agenda, Turkey has expanded its diplomatic, economic, and humanitarian networks toward different regions, including sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America, and adopted a multidirectional approach. In the eyes of the authors, these developments reflect a new stance toward the Global South, particularly toward the Least Developed Countries (LDC), after years of disinterest, opening a new window for channeling Turkey's interests in the global political economy. As an overall assessment, the authors underline the fact that the interplay of external and domestic factors has shaped Turkish foreign policy's Southern dimension. The interaction between external dynamics such as the translation of power the emergence of non-Western powers and the consequences of the 2008-2009 financial crisis, and domestic variables such as the dynamism of the Turkish economy and the ideology of the ruling political coalition as status-seeker, are central to a general explanatory framework. For Donelli and Gonzalez, the complex interactions of the abovementioned factors should be addressed by the central research question of their chapter investigating the place of the Global South in the late JDP foreign policy strategy. As a response to this question, the authors conclude that the roots of the Southern dimension should be found in the sizable changes in the distribution of resources in

the global political economy combined with the needs of Turkey's economy and the ideological nature of the JDP government.

In the next chapter, Gürol Baba looks into "Turkey's Multistakeholder Diplomacy: From a Middle-power Angle". According to the author, global diplomacy has undergone serious changes since the 2000s. Not only did the term take on new names, that is, economic, trade, energy, public, health, cyber, coercive, science, corporate, and cultural, but more importantly also took several state and non-state actors on board. The literature refers to this amalgamated diplomatic practice as the multistakeholder model. In this practice, non-state actors are not only consumers of diplomacy but also producers of diplomatic outcomes. Multistakeholder diplomacy is not a complete alternative to the state-to-state, that is, the Westphalian way but is rather complementary. In this practical scheme, state and non-state actors utilize their resources to overcome certain limitations and deal with complicated policy issues/agendas. Although the multistakeholder functioning of diplomacy is fairly obvious in practice, the problem of defining and grouping non-state actors remains. This research accepts transnational civil society together with "for profit" national and multinational corporations as non-state actors. Additionally, in multistakeholder diplomacy, the rules of engagement between state agencies, NGOs, civil society, and industry are still in the process of developing. In the generation of diplomacy, Turkey acts as a "typical" middle power. As a good international citizen, it performs as a go-between for international coalition building and creates regional bridging alignments with similar-minded middle powers or great powers. It also utilizes international organizations to amplify its influence. Via alignments within/outside international organizations, Turkey aims to bridge the gap between various actors relying on moral values and epistemic notions rather than ambition and aggression. Multistakeholder diplomacy is an extra layer to this modus operandi. As an emerging middle power, Turkey has been per-forming multistakeholder diplomacy in four major neighboring regions: the Middle East, Balkans, South Caucasus, and Africa. In short, this chapter

analyzes how multistakeholder diplomacy can be a complementary extra layer or even a booster to middle power diplomacy. Turkey's efforts in the last decade have provided a clear example of what type of complex agendas can be approached with multistakeholder diplomacy when mere "emerging middle power diplomacy" is insufficient. In this sense, the chapter also elaborates the tools Turkey has utilized and which have been more practical and effective than the others.

Institutional Approach

The chapter dealing with the institutional approach to Turkey's middle powermanship belongs to Thomas Weiss, who identifies Turkey as a NATO member and long-time European Union (EU) aspirant and classifies it as a "rising" or "emerging power". For the author, all groupings of developing and industrialized countries should be interrogated and not merely applied and assumed to make analytical sense. In addition to Turkey, Weiss also addresses two other topics: global governance and the United Nations. As underlined by the author, this chapter invites readers to investigate several erroneous narratives: "that the Global South has had little impact on universal normative developments; that it was largely absent from the founding of the United Nations whose values came only from the West; that `rising powers' is a meaningful analytical category; and that `global governance' is a synonym for international organization and law with some non-state actors now in the mix". By locating Turkey in the international order considering North-South relations, global governance, and the UN, Weiss sets the stage for an analysis of Turkey as a middle power. For the author, the Southern agency as a source of global norms also merits a reliable context for analyzing Turkey on the world stage. After presenting the main dynamics behind the North-South relations, the author locates Turkey's position as akin to that of other rising powers. For Weiss, Turkey can be portrayed as belonging to both the North and the South. Extrapolating from the Turkish case, Weiss argues that the portrayal of a country as emerging/middle/rising power depends on the context. Departing from this, Weiss explains how the analysis on global governance

and the UN has neglected the dimension of non-state actors and how new studies need to go beyond the limited analysis of international organizations to understand the role of new actors such as Turkey. In the final analysis, the author concludes that there is a need to conceptualize changes in global governance to understand the durability of the systems and urges scholars to go beyond the ahistorical character of much contemporary social science in order to avoid only nation-/region-specific analyses and to provide longer-term perspectives.

In their chapter entitled "Turkey in the UN Funding System: A Comparative Analysis with the BRIGS Countries (2010-2013)", Emel Parlar Dal and Ali Murat Kursun examine in detail Turkey's financial contribution to the UN system compared to the BRIGS countries in order to reveal the main trends and preferences in Turkey's funding strategies in global governance, particularly in the UN. The authors depart by unpacking the recent transformations in financing the UN system and locate Turkey in this picture by comparing the latter with financing strategies of other rising powers, namely the BRIGS countries. The authors explain the main rationale behind the empirical analysis of their study as the evident correlation between the rising powers' increasing interest in financing global governance and their institutional, diplomatic, and soft power in the international system. To reveal the broader picture, Parlar Dal and Kursun collect funding data of the UN system and adopt a statistical methodology (Global Governance Contribution Index and Voluntary Data Analysis) for comparing the amount of finance channeled by Turkey and the BRIGS to the UN. In their empirical analysis, the authors reveal that Turkey was ranked in the bottom in financing the UN system compared to the BRIGS countries and, in doing so, draw attention to the points that seem alarming for Turkey's funding strategies in the UN architecture. To the authors, the fact that Turkey does not seem to have a comprehensive UN policy also affects its UN funding strategies and renders it into an ambivalent nature preventing the development of a strong and reliable stance in global governance. Moreover, Parlar Dal and Kursun identify certain UN bodies to which Turkey prefers to channel the

majority of its funding. The statistical analysis of the authors reveals that, if Turkey concentrates its funding efforts on agencies such as the UNDP, the AO, the UN, UNESCO, and the WHO, it could better locate itself among the rising powers in the UN funding system. In their final analysis, e authors conclude that there is a need to develop a common understanding between the UN and the rising donors, including Turkey, to channel the latter's efforts in multilateral funding with an eye toward proving functionality, efficiency, systematization, global burden-sharing, predictability, responsiveness, high levels of alignment, technical skills, and policy expertise in global governance. In their chapter entitled "Assessing Turkey's New Global Governance Strategies: The G20 Example", Emel Parlar Dal and Ali Murat Kursun first focus on Turkey as an emerging middle power in the G20 with both potentialities as a bridge-builder between the Global North and the Global South and its limitations in terms of its performance in the group, as well as its increasing domestic and security challenges in recent years preventing it from generating sufficient impact in the international sphere. Departing from this, the authors attempt to conceptualize Turkey first as a status-seeking country and second as a G20 middle power with differing expectations in terms of geopolitics, economics, and foreign policy. Third, they attempt to assess Turkey's performance in the G20 as a middle power state in comparison with other G20 middle powers by making use of G20 compliance data set from 2008 to 2013 and the final compliance reports (from the 2014 to 2016 summits). In the final analysis, the author reaches the following conclusions: first, Turkey's "recent" activism in the G20, especially since 2014 in line with its 2015 presidency road map, goes hand in hand with its status mobility approach to global governance. Turkey's new status politics has the potential to closely accommodate the current multilateral environment's multiple designs in the form of informal insti¬tutions or ad hoc and flexible coalitions. On the other hand, the G20 also fits with Turkey's economic expectations at the highest level while its foreign policy and geopolitical expectations have been met at a respectively lower level. In terms of Turkey's performance in the G20, the author underlines the

fact that Turkey has experienced difficulties in using its potentialities as a middle power and effectively operationalizing its global governance-related capabilities in the fields of mediation, conflict resolution, and institutional design. The authors stress that Turkey's compliance performance falls short of that of the other middle powers in the group, especially the traditional ones. A closer assessment of Turkey's compliance With the priority commitments of the last three summits (2014, 2015, and 2016) showcases a fluctuating trend in Turkey's compliance ranking, from the third lowest in 2014 ahead of Saudi Arabia and South Africa to the fourth lowest in 2015 after Indonesia, South Africa, Japan, and Saudi Arabia and the second lowest with South Africa after Italy in 2016. Parlar Dal and Kursun conclude that, despite its lack of compliance with G20 summit commitments compared to other G20 middle power members, Turkey's bridging status between the North and South provides it a special role as both an institutionally accommodating and challenging actor, which may play a constructive role in strengthening the regional inclusiveness of the G20 and in reforming it institutionally.

In the next chapter entitled "Analyzing the 'T' in MIKTA: Turkey's Changing Middle Power Role in the United Nations", Gonca Oguz Gök and Funda Karadeniz stress that it is agreed upon that today we are living in a transition period from the American-led world order to a post-American hegemonic one. This creates uncertainties about the governance of many issues as well as the emergence of new practices by the states to cope with them. For the authors, informal diplomacy can be regarded as one of the new practices with which middle powers find ways to maneuver to increase their voices in global governance. Given this background, in their chapter Oguz Gök and Karadeniz analyze the emerging middle power role of Turkey and the MIKTA states with specific reference to the "ideational component" of the middle power role, which is classified in the literature as comprised of (1) material (positional), (2) behavioral, and (3) ideational factors. By conducting a comparative discourse analysis of UN General Assembly opening speeches given by MIKTA countries from 2000 to 2017 and

examining their "role definitions" in the UN platform, the chapter seeks to answer the question of whether there exists an evolving "middle power role" adopted by Turkey and the MIKTA countries in the 2000s. Acknowledging Cooper's (1997) assertion that the classification of middle powers as a separate class of countries builds on not only their subjective identification but also the fact that this category of actors actually engages in some kind of middle power behavior, the chapter compares and contrasts Turkey's and the MIKTA states' discourses at the UN platform with their behavior in order to see the degree of parallelism as well as divergences between discourse and practice as action. The authors conclude that the country analyses demonstrate to a large extent the explanatory power of functionalist arguments regarding the emergence of the middle power role among the MIKTA countries. Secondly, they conclude that a reading of Turkish leaders' speeches in the UNGA between 2000 and 2015 showcases that, in terms of the ideational role, Turkish rulers refrained from using the term "middle power" to describe Turkey's status and identity in the international arena. Turkey displayed considerable multilateral willingness as well as concrete diplomatic effort in the UN platform in line with middle power behavior during the 2000s. For the authors, these efforts have not yet easily generated international credibility of a genuine middle power role from its counterparts, given Ankara's some contradictory foreign policy approaches, especially toward the Middle East region, as well as the growing belief that Turkey's democratic credentials display a number of important deficiencies. This regional factor in turn has the potential to affect the realization as well as durability of its middle power role notwithstanding its acceptance from its counterparts. In the final analysis, the authors conclude that the MIKTA initiative offers significant opportunities for Ankara to rebrand Turkey's regional and global status.

Behavioral Approach
Senem Cevik looks into Turkish public diplomacy in her chapter entitled "Narrating Turkey's Story: Efforts in Nation Branding and Public Diplomacy". According to the author, nations manage their reputations and compete for a favorable global

image in order to advance their interests in the international arena. This is because public opinion and perception about nations are critically important for a nation's global standing. As nations struggle to attain a positive reputation and image in the eyes of global audiences, they utilize their resources and best practices. One such resource nations have used in the attempts to communicate their brand has been their benevolence and global values that converge on development communication and public diplomacy. For the author, Turkey is not an exception and has tried to manage its reputation as an emerging country by communicating its national brand. On the other hand, the author reminds the reader that Turkey is a newcomer to public diplomacy and its steady economy, new foreign policy vision, and issues pertaining to its global reputation have been the drivers behind its growing interest in public diplomacy practice. At the same time, Turkey has had ambitions in regard to its global position. Consequently, as Çevik states, Turkey looks to its strengths in humanitarian and development aid to narrate its brand image. Today, Turkey highlights its "donor state" and "benevolent couptry" status. State institutions such as TIKA and AFAD are also practitioners of public diplomacy. These institutions use communication to deliver activities, their development aid strategies share similarities such as the lack of political preconditions and the centrality of bilateralism, even as traditional aid donors in the West offer criticism. In their chapter, the authors focus on the motivations, instruments, and geographical distribution strategies of the development aid policies of China and Turkey. In terms of motivations, the authors underline that the search for diplomatic support in international organizations is the key political motivation which drives both China and Turkey to increase their foreign aid. In addition to political motivations, the two countries have increased their interest in Africa for economic incentives such as China's search for natural resources and mega projects and Turkey's export-oriented approach to Africa and infrastructural investments. Ideologically, both enjoy operating in Africa by wreaking normative pressure of the Western world. In particular, China offers African leaders its own way of development combining capitalism, authoritarianism, and

development. In terms of instruments, while TIKA is the primary organization in Turkey entitled to frame strategies and organize the allocation of aid, in China the Ministry of Commerce, the ministry of Foreign Affairs, China Export Import Bank, and the China Development Bank are involved in the process of development aid policies. This multitude of actors is mostly the result of the intertwinement of China's economic enterprises and aid activities on the continent. Another point underlined by the authors is that unlike China, Turkey's development expenditures and its dimensions can be assessed in accordance with Development Assistance Committee (DAC) standards because of Turkey's OECD membership status. This also makes Turkey's development aid program much more compatible with global development aid standards. The authors conclude that the geographical distribution of aid preferences of China and Turkey differ as the latter's activities are largely focused on eastern Africa (mostly in Somalia) whereas China's engagement focuses on resource-rich countries such as Nigeria and Angola. In terms of ideological orientations, the authors conclude that both China and Turkey use anti-colonial discourse to gain more legitimacy for their expanding aid activities in several countries in the sub-Saharan region. Chinese and Turkish officials often announce that they aim to establish relations based on equality and mutual gains which are also the basis of the South-South cooperation logic. However, their short-term bilateral moves deprive them of having long-term strategies and poses risks for sustainability. This problem is much more notable for Turkey due to its fragile economic growth and domestic disputes.

In the next chapter, "Making Sense of Turkey's Development Aid Policies: The Comparison of Turkish and Indian Development Aid Towards Africa", Hakan Mehmetcik compares Turkish and Indian foreign aid and development assistance policies and practices in Africa to produce theoretically rich and practically applicable inferences for Turkey. A comparison of foreign aid strategies of these two countries is essential to understand what middle powers are doing and what are their strategies and motivations. The Turkey-India comparison is also particularly

important for the evaluation of Turkey's decade-long efforts within aid and development assistance to shed light on some parts of the right and wrong practices of Turkey in this field which is becoming a niche diplomacy area for Turkey. To do so, the chapter deals with three analytical settings: ideological-strategic, geographical-sectoral, and institutional. As a matter of fact, foreign aid has been an instrumental tool for middle powers to extend their influence toward new countries and regions. Countries such as China, India, Brazil, and Turkey have become important actors operating in their own interests in the field using their own methods, including significant changes in the institutional and political frameworks of traditional foreign aid. Compared to India, Turkey's African engagement is relatively new and is largely shaped by business goals and humanitarian aid rather than ideological and strategic imperatives. Turkey's characterization of its African policy as a historical, cultural, and humanitarian responsibility brings it back into the continent as a coordinator, provider of aid, and mentor. These differences on ideological bases can be deducted from the geographical focus of these two countries. One of the important lessons for Turkey from the Indian experience is the right balance between multilateralism and bilateralism in the distribution of foreign aid. Being less multilateral may be a matter of control, effectiveness, and speed, but it should be noted that working with multilateral institutions should be a priority for Turkey to become more organizationally effective and internationally visible in this area. The second important lesson for Turkey is the issue of institutionalization and professionalism in its aid and development assistance programs in order to extend the current success to the long run. Third, increasing the efficiency of stakeholders such as civil society and universities is of great importance in this context. Fourth, Turkey should offer more development assistance in technical fields to diversify its sectoral capacities and influence.

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Middle powers are of course not standalone and idealized actors acting utside of the complex turn of events in the international environment. Today's age of uncertainty adds additional complexities to the expected/ idealized and real roles and responsibilities of middle powers in terms of their motivation-action gap, capability-potential linkage, and interest ideals nexus. The smooth bilateralization of international relations at the expense of multilateralization notwithstanding, the emergence of a security-oriented atmosphere in the international system seems to have hanged the global governance environment of the middle powers ranging from the traditional to the emerging ones. The regional and domestic passes of middle powers now seem to weigh heavily on their international and institutional stances. In the current climate of anxieties and uncertainties of global affairs, all states, from major to middle and from middle to small, seem to have turned more to the domestic realm than the ternational. Despite this, middle-sized states still show significant potentialities, particularly at the functional level, in generating middle power diplomacy in the field of coalition building, conflict resolution, and agenda-setting. However, the global ambivalences around the Trump Administration's "global/integrationist" and "liberal internationalist" outlook seem to have made it difficult for middle powers to manage world politics "from the middle". Given that today the United States gives the appearance of being bilateral rather than multilateral, protectionist rather than neoliberal, communitarian rather than cosmopolitan, and nationalist rather than internationalist; the middle character that allows middle powers to pursue balanced relations with the great and small powers seems to have been damaged compared to the past.

As a new development, the relationship of today's middle-ranked powers, conceptualized as the third wave of middle powers by Andrew Cooper, with the so-called great powers such as the growing clash of interests between middle powers and great powers. The case of Turkey also showcases how a middle power state can push its limits to challenge the great power which has long been its biggest traditional Western ally since the Cold War years.

Another new development regarding the changing nature of middle power diplomacy is the fact that the diplomacy pursued by this new generation has succeeded in adapting to the multipolar

international order more rapidly than has generally been predicted. The increasing number of middle power states with a rising power status in recent years is simple proof of how these emerging middle powers would be receptive to the changes emanating from the multiplex nature of the shifting international order. The expansion of the "emerging group" among the middle powers is also a consequence of the diminishing of the gap between the developed and developing countries in terms of material power. The increasing number of emerging middle powers in recent years has also impacted their ideational contribution to the international system. The emerging middle powers, different from traditional middle powers such as Australia, Canada, and South Korea, seem to have been more skeptical and challenging of the West and the weakening of accommodation of emerging middle powers with major powers might finally end up jeopardizing the North-South relations. On the other hand, this paradoxically may also create new potentialities in the functionality of middle power diplomacy. The rising autonomy and independence of middle power states vis-a-vis the great powers may also lead to reinforcing their role as agenda-setters and initiative-takers in global governance.

It can be claimed that, as a third development characterizing the new generation of middle powers, they seem to have gained more consciousness of the importance of their concrete contribution to global governance organizations in order to increase their international image as responsible stakeholders. Given this, the third wave or new generation of middle powers, traditional or non-traditional, pursue "win-win" and pragmatic global governance policies vis-a-vis international organizations. Indeed, the contemporary middle powers' global governance policies are twofold. On the one hand, they pursue strong institutionalist policies making them more actively engaged in both formal and informal international institutions and this in turn has raised their awareness of their bargaining and reform-seeking capacities vis-a-vis the major powers holding permanent positions in international organizations. On the other hand, they have increasingly turned to regional and domestic policies in recent years. The increasing regional security challenges and domestic constraints, as

seen in Turkey's case in the post-Arab Spring era, make it harder for middle powers to assume larger and constructive international responsibilities in global governance. In this regard, the regional-global gap. <>

[Faith and Politics in Iran, Israel and the Islamic State: Theologies of the Real](#) by Ori Goldberg [Cambridge University Press, 9781107115675]

Religious faith has been gaining in reach and influence throughout global politics over the last three decades, most prominently in the Middle East, and theologies of this nature are based on the understanding that faith in God is to be based, primarily and predominantly, on the realness of God's presence. The West, accustomed to its own discussion on religion and politics emphasising democracy and individual freedoms, has been at a loss to explain and engage these rising religious polities. Through an innovative approach to the role of faith in politics, Faith and Politics in Iran, Israel, and the Islamic State considers political theologies of the real formulated during the twentieth century and proposes that, while religion in the West has been committed to absolutist vision, these theologies have drawn their strength from a commitment to their concrete, divinely infused reality.

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Excerpt: This book straddles the line between essay and reflection. In it I try to frame a phenomenon that is occurring in real time, the rise of political faith in the non-Christian monotheistic world. The turgidity of the previous sentence is, perhaps, my motivation to embark on this quest. There seems to be no way to speak of these new theologies in the Middle East without enforcing a categorical separation between faith and politics. The immediate conceptual framework available is a historical one, appreciating traditions for their stable continuity and not, say, for their non-linear dynamics of ideas. The theologies of the real, motivating so many people in the here and now, appear pale and dilapidated after being curtailed by history and political theory.

I wanted to begin to suggest a different way to consider these emerging theologies. This book begins and ends by taking theologies of the real to mean what they say and to say what they mean. I approach them by reading whole texts, because whole texts are quite often the medium of choice for self-expression by theologians (and believers) of the real. The flow of the text, its moral and devotional duty to participate in the creation of the very world in which its composers and readers live, these make it a unique medium for the articulation of politics. Preserving this virtue of the text, and with it the elusive integrity of these theologies of the real, has been my top priority. The language of this book is often associative and figurative, but only because of the conviction that in the real these theologies celebrate, the associative and the figurative are as concrete at anything.

I do not offer any solutions. I certainly have my thoughts on the problems presented by Islamic State (IS), Iran and Israel to their immediate environment and to the rest of the world. Still, this book was not meant to provide recommendations and action items. My purpose throughout this endeavor is mainly to make these theologies of the real accessible, on their own terms and merits, for meaningful contemplation and (perhaps) conversation. This purpose has led me to forgo

many scholarly privileges, like extensive references to the words of others. I hope my decisions have (my) desired effects on you, my gentle readers.

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Religion is a pesky problem. The "wicked problem" is now a staple of strategic discourse and social science research.' Wikipedia defines it as: "a problem that is difficult or impossible to solve because of incomplete, contradictory, and changing requirements that are often difficult to recognize." Acknowledging the existence of wicked problems, accepting that not all problems could be reduced to a set of resolvable parameters and variables, permanently changed philosophy, social planning, mathematics and various other fields. Religion is not a wicked problem, not least for its appropriation of "wicked" in other contexts. If anything, many see religion as too complete, too stable and not sufficiently contradictory or open to critical inquiry. Religion is a pesky problem because it will not go away.

The West, and with it the international community created in the Western image, have invested significant effort in distancing themselves from religion. A separation of church and state is de rigueur for the modern nation-state. Religion is seen, ideally, as a private pastime. Faith can shape one's outlook but it cannot shape one's social or legal obligations. This barrier is enforced with differing intensities. France considers the state an alternative to the communal coherence and positive values of organized religion, and thus curtails the possibility of religious expression in state-sponsored public space. Consider, for example, the debate in France over the permissibility of wearing a burkini. The British state, with its tradition of civic laissez-faire, allows ritual to enter public space. In October 2016, London's Oxford Street was pedestrianized for a commemorative march on Ashura. The tenth day of the month of Muharram is the most important holiday of the Shi'i Muslim year, being the anniversary of Imam Hussein's death in AD 683 at the hands of superior Sunni forces. In Iran and Iraq, the Ashura march is known for scenes of weeping and self-flagellation. In London, the marchers carried signs denouncing terrorism and proclaiming Islam a religion of peace. Despite the

obvious differences, both the British and the French (and the countries on the spectrum between them) consider religion a potentially positive force if and when it affirms the avowedly non-religious social order already in place.

Still, religion will not go away. In fact, the spectrum of separation I've just described demonstrates the insistent tenacity of religion as a public force. The French, apparently, fear the potential adverse effects of religion so much that they are willing to violate basic tenets of individual freedom in their struggle to keep religion in its place. The British apply the carrot rather than the stick, but the extraordinary measure of restricting the use of public space (Oxford Street) speaks volumes on the desire to hold the line before the advancement of religion. It is indeed seen as "Religion," a somewhat monolithic entity including within it all those who find themselves reserved with regard to the potential for fulfillment offered by the modern, liberal order. Is the non-religious side of the equation as clearly definable?

Christoph Schmidt suggests, in a fascinating introductory article to a Hebrew volume on political theology and Jewish modernity, that the modern liberal order itself is based on a conflation of modernity with the coming of the kingdom of God:

> While the ... Church saw the kingdom of God as a transcendental kingdom, the modern revolutionaries — from Lessing to Friedrich Hegel and from Heinrich Heine to Ernst Bloch — turned it [the kingdom of God] into the purpose of human history, a utopia. In other words, the thinkers of modernity established an "eschatological" theory, directed toward the utopian purpose of history, as the realization of the kingdom of God.

One can consider the interpretative act of modernity in a much more radical light: when modernity removes the kingdom from its heavenly birthplace and wishes to establish it as a real political kingdom, it effectively inherits the apocalyptic tradition of John in the New Testament:

> 1 Then I saw "a new heaven and a new earth," for the first heaven and the first earth had passed away, and there was no longer any sea.

> 2 I saw the Holy City, the new Jerusalem, coming down out of heaven from God, prepared as a bride beautifully dressed for her husband.
> 3 And I heard a loud voice from the throne saying, "Look! God's dwelling place is now among the people, and he will dwell with them. They will be his people, and God himself will be with them and be their God.
> 4 'He will wipe every tear from their eyes. There will be no more death' or mourning or crying or pain, for the old order of things has passed away."

Schmidt frames the debate about the metaphysical heart of modernity as a struggle between eschatology and apocalypse, the peaceful resolution of history against its violent upheaval, both inspired by the growing proximity (perhaps the actual presence) of the kingdom of God. The philosophical discussion he describes in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries took on overt political relevance during the first decades of the twentieth century. Carl Schmitt, a German jurist and political theorist, reintroduced the classical term "Political Theology" into Western political theory in 1922, with a slim, paradigm-shifting eponymous volume. Schmitt suggested that the Western liberal state leans on weak, secularized imitations of theological-political tenets. Schmitt rejected the liberal notion that sovereignty comes from the democratic representation of the state's citizens. Instead, he suggested, sovereignty is the ability to determine the occurrence of an emergency. That is, the sovereign is the one capable of severing the regular run of the mill in favor of extraordinary circumstances. This sovereign has the power to curtail the regularity of institutional order, trivializing the stability of the state before larger, violent and volatile forces. This, Schmitt proposed, is a human approximation of divine authority as it appears in scripture.

Schmitt's notion of "political theology" has, in many ways, defined scholarly approaches to religion in the political sphere. Speaking broadly, the relationship between religion and institutional politics is often seen to include dimensions of deception, impersonation and misdirection. Prodding religion in politics, one may expose

foundational fallacies at the core of the liberal order, describe the ultimate weakness of secularization or consider the spiritual potentialities of a virtual world. The threat of religion described above may seem clearer if religion and the state are understood to support and undermine each other in intricate, surreptitious ways. Religion must then be approached with caution, in scholarship and policy both, so as not to unravel the core of the social fabric. Of course, this understanding refers predominantly to religion as practiced in a "Judeo-Christian" world. In this world, religion and politics are elaborately woven below the surface, at the level of primeval foundations.

But the most urgent religious threats to the modern order are less elaborate. As I suggested earlier, the case of Islam, from the Middle East to the heart of Europe, is often framed dichotomously. Muslims are seen as "objectively" different, possessing different values and a potentially contentious attitude. This may be because Islam is popularly perceived as a total civilization, requiring obedience in every aspect of life.'° It may be related to feelings of disenfranchisement among Muslims in the West, leading to anything from a demand to observe Muslim ritual in public to terrorist attacks. It may have something to do with the brutal displays of violence on the part of organizations like IS and Al-Qaeda. In all three (and other) cases, the role of Islam in the political sphere is considered distinctly, removed from the structures and essence of that political sphere itself. Islam is "religion," encroaching on a "civil" tradition, each bearing very different strategies and values. The project of "political theology" is irrelevant to the issues raised by the Muslim world.

This, of course, is true not just with regard to Islam. Political Judaism also provides an acute challenge to the sensibilities of "political theology."

The establishment of the state of Israel was a revolution and a rupture in Jewish history. The historical evolution of Judaism as a religion had taken place mainly in diasporas, where Jews did not enjoy political sovereignty. Israel necessitated a rethinking of Judaism as a tradition of such sovereignty. Israel's 1967 victory over its Arab neighbors jumpstarted a religious-political

movement that promoted legitimate nation-state interests — borders — using undisguised religious arguments for legitimacy. The settler movement installed the Israeli state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip in fulfillment of God's biblical promise to the patriarch Abraham. The settlers and their unabashed rhetoric (and actions) drew (and still draw) attention from the spiritual components of secular Zionism. Many secular Israelis and outside observers consider the settler version of the Israeli narrative, an unfolding of divine redemption, to be an all-out challenge to Israeli civil society and to the heritage of a less apparently political Judaism.

This simplistic, dichotomous understanding breeds willful ignorance of political theologies arising in Judaism and Islam. Most significantly, a dichotomous understanding depicts these theologies as, at best, two-dimensional and less than real. Such theologies can be reduced to mere derivatives of historical circumstance or spiritual necessity, explained as mere realizations of ulterior forces. This book is an attempt to address these political theologies head-on, respecting their internal complexity and coherence on their own terms. I would like to present these political theologies not as realizations, but as theologies of the real.

I will present three such theologies, from the Islamic Republic of Iran, Israel and the Islamic State (IS). My argument is straightforward. I propose that these theologies share a profound commitment to realness. That is, these theologies emphasize their grounding in the real world, highlighting emergence, uncertainty and complexity as the main components of reality. Where they are seen by many as trite in their binary extremity, I would like to approach and engage them as elaborate, devoted celebrations of the real. I will return most frequently to the political expressions of this realness, particularly the concept of sovereignty as it is understood and practiced in physical and institutional space. The challenge these theologies present to the West is very often to be found in their conceptions of sovereignty and authority.

My method in all three cases will be similar. Following historical and conceptual introductions, I will present, and closely read, a seminal text (or texts) composed within these emerging political

theologies. An English translation of the original texts will be closely followed by my analysis and interpretation. I have two main reasons for this methodological choice. First, texts are the preferred medium of articulation and persuasion in the political traditions of Judaism and Islam. Interpretation and study are prized mechanisms for producing meaning and preserving communal and intellectual memory in these traditions. The experience of closely reading a text will allow us access to the language of these theologies, language understood but also performed and spoken. Access to the experiential dimension of these theologies is, I think, important when attempting to transcend the traditionally limited scope of their analyses by others.

My second reason for choosing texts is my desire to engage with these theologies in as immediate a fashion as I could muster. The relationship between religion and politics, when it comes to Islam and Judaism, is often consigned to the realm of security and strategy. When it is not, the sentiments of faith driving these theologies are condensed into a discourse of historical/social/political context and circumstance. In both cases, those qualified to consider and analyze within both strategy and scholarship are experts. The price of entrance to these expert arenas is high, requiring detailed knowledge and disciplinary training. This emphasis on expertise, particularly the neutrality required for its effective practice, diminishes the immense relevance and vibrancy of these texts (and these theologies) for the lives of ordinary Muslims and Jews. I am not suggesting that the theological discussions in this book are similar to ones regularly held by lay Muslims or Jews. Still, my presentation of texts in their entirety (in close reading) is an attempt to provide my readers with all they need in order to engage with these theologies without the mediation, and often the restriction, of purely expert knowledge.

The cases presented are not similar, and I do not pretend to draw a comprehensive model of a theology of the real. These theologies are evolving, unfolding phenomena, occurring in real time in the here and now. The Israeli case is significantly longer than the Iranian and IS cases, because the Israeli theology of the real was formulated in

oppositional response to powerfully dominant national narratives. I found it necessary to draw the contours of these dominant narratives, also through the reading of seminal texts, in order to situate the theology of the real and shed light on its urgency and power. The Iranian case considers a text written in 1988, in a unique situation of crisis and loss. It is formulated as a theology of mourning and coping, but also of resurgence in the face of adversity. The Islamic State's theology of the real will be the only "organizational" case, not generated by a single person in an affirming or subversive engagement with his environment.

My point, if I may be explicit, is that engagement with these theologies of the real should precede attempts to "resolve" or "handle" them. Engagement requires a suspension, as broad as possible, of biases and prejudices. I do not mean to say that one should approach IS as nonviolent. It is an extreme organization, violent and (pardon the unscientific language) scary. Not dismissing this perfectly understandable fear, I would like to chip at the solid conviction that phenomena like IS, or like Israel and the Islamic Republic of Iran, are simple reactions against the progressive complexity of the non-religious order and are thus easily understandable if not easily resolved. Reading nearly whole texts from beginning to end, I've chosen to provide these theologies with a comprehensiveness that is, almost by its very nature, complex and dynamic. The book rarely provides "answers," because I believe the need to ask proper questions with regard to these theologies is much more urgent. Proper asking can and should, with further application and development, lead to effective answers.

Concluding Repetition

This book was meant as an exercise in engagement. Engagement is a mode of intellectual pursuit suited to my subjects of inquiry: theologies of the real. I refrained as much as possible (and, hopefully, enough) from resolution of the tensions raised. These tensions, I suggested, were the drivers and generators of realness for the theologies we considered. The Islamic State, torn between the certainty of ultimate victory and the ungrateful unfolding of the present; Khomeini, proactive

leader and frustrated believer; Gershon Hacohen, soldier of the state and the architect of mediating space — all could locate and apply their faith to guide them through an emerging, uncertain reality. God, who spoke once and will speak again, remained stubbornly absent from this materializing present. Our protagonists all sought (and seek) means to maintain their own engagement with God, through faith, when God's realness is expressed in divine silence.

In a previous book devoted to revolutionary Shi'i theology in Iran, I suggested that repetition is a key dynamic of that theology. I borrowed the term from the Danish philosopher Soren Kierkegaard, who devoted a minor work to the concept. I would like to revisit Kierkegaard's notion of repetition as something of a conclusion for the journey documented in this book. Kierkegaard's concept has much to say about the engagement practiced in this book.

For Kierkegaard," repetition" is a state of being in the world which stands in contrast to the Greek idea of "recollection." In Kierkegaard's words:

> Repetition and recollection are the same movement, except in opposite directions, for what is recollected has been, is repeated backward, whereas genuine repetition is recollected forward. Repetition, therefore, if it is possible, makes a person happy, whereas recollection makes him unhappy — assuming, of course, that he gives himself time to live and does not promptly at birth find an excuse to sneak out of life again, for example, that he has forgotten something.

As a mode of investigation, recollection begins with a void. Something actually happened once but it will not happen again. Recollecting, our point of origin is this unbridgeable chasm. Because we know something happened — God spoke to a prophet, The Red Sea was parted, we felt sudden happiness doing nothing in particular — we also know that occurrence cannot be repeated. We can only try to recollect, remember how it once was. We are repeating backwards, as Kierkegaard says, but what we are repeating is our inability to be certain in the moment that once was. That inability gathers

momentum and traction, and it becomes the main dynamic with which we approach the world. A person can go an entire lifetime without living, says Kierkegaard, because having forgotten something she might spend her entire life repeating her inability to remember it. Recollection is the opposite of living because it strives for a solid wholeness it can never achieve.

Recollection seems to provide the comfort of linearity, but this is only a superficial impression. Repetition demonstrates this superficiality. Recollecting, one thinks that simply repeating backward steps will lead us to the inevitable point of origin, the one moment that actually occurred. That is the one moment we seek when we recollect. Realizing that we can never experience it again, however, renders our recollection perennially empty. Unlike the in-between time we considered earlier in the book, the present of recollection can never be filled. Repetition is another matter. When we repeat, we do not strive (pretend, more likely) to the perfect accuracy of a single moment. We recollect forward, assuming that the purpose of an occurrence is to galvanize an entire life of action. Memory runs forward in repetition, emanating from the perfection of the moment without wallowing in it. That perfection is a point of origin, not a vision to be actually realized. Kierkegaard continues:

> Recollection's love [Kjcœrlighed], an author has said, is the only happy love. He is perfectly right in that, of course, provided one recollects that initially it makes a person unhappy. Repetition's love is in truth the only happy love. Like recollection's love, it does not have the restlessness of hope, the uneasy adventurousness of discovery, but neither does it have the sadness of recollection — it has the blissful security of the moment. Hope is a new garment, stiff and starched and lustrous, but it has never been tried on, and therefore one does not know how becoming it will be or how it will fit. Recollection is a discarded garment that does not fit, however beautiful it is, for one has outgrown it. Repetition is an indestructible garment that fits closely and tenderly, neither binds nor sags.

The perfection of the moment is not equal to the security of the moment. Security does not lie in the static quality of perfection. Recollection's love seems happy because one can devote oneself to such love forever, doting on the perfect memory that forever remains outside one's grasp. The futility of recollection is the key to its permanence. Repetition accepts the imperviousness of time. What happened has already happened. The moment is secure because it has really occurred, not because there is a possibility of it occurring again in exactly the same way. The realness of the moment, its holism, lies in its completion. Respect for that realness requires forward motion, recollecting forward. Repetition is indestructible because it is the only mode of being that acknowledges the permanence and solidity of other moments, of all moments, without wishing to undo that permanence. Recollection is disrespectful because a person can never fully occupy her present moment, since that moment is always enslaved to a past (or a future). Repetition is the epitome of respect because only when fully occupying the present can one fully appreciate the truth of the past. Hope is a lovely maiden who slips away between one's fingers; recollection is a beautiful old woman with whom one is never satisfied at the moment; repetition is a beloved wife of whom one never wearies, for one becomes weary only of what is new. One never grows weary of the old, and when one has that, one is happy.

Kierkegaard's articulation of happiness provides our excursion, I think, with a suitable denouement. The theologies of the real which we read and considered are happy in the Kierkegaardian sense, and that may be their most downplayed and misunderstood quality. For these theologies, the real is emergence and uncertainty, but also faith. They are secure in what has happened and in what will happen. Khomeini knows that Iran was defeated, just as he knows that the Mandi will come to deliver the Shi'a at the end of days. Gershon Hacohen knows that he must enforce the will of the state in order to ensure its continuity and progress. Doing so, he affirms the faith of his Zionist forefathers and rejects the zero-sum game played by the flawed sovereignties of Ariel Sharon and Rabbi Tzvi Yehuda Kook. The Islamic State knows the initial revelation brought by the prophet Muhammad. It knows the oppression and humiliation of the Muslims, but it also knows the assured triumph of the final battle. For all three, what was and what will be impose an imperative to participate fully in what is.

One is never happy with the new because the new throws one for a loop. Newness becomes its own reward, and once that happens the race for the newer never ends. Novelty becomes the only mark of virtue, detached from tradition but also from emotions. Singlehanded pursuit of the new has no room for happiness because happiness is irrelevant. The theologies of the real we've examined have little use for the exclusively new. The realness of these theologies involves both certainty and unfolding. They must have confidence in a beginning and an end in order to effectively progress through the emanating middle. Realness is the integration of all three ingredients. Happiness is a condition of realness, mixing security, expectation and motion.

Our theologies of the real often seem somber, full of loss and sacrifice and never-ending devotion. They are. Nonetheless, they are also full of life and worldliness, repeating rather than recollecting. In fact, their practitioners would be puzzled at an accusation of fanaticism or a lack of realism. They understand their vision of the real to be the richest, fullest vision possible precisely because they do not forgo the security of any moment. Engaging them meaningfully requires that some relinquishing of recollection. The threat of IS, the spirituality of pragmatic Zionism and the messianic belief of Iranian Shi'a — all three can be approached as problems seeking solutions, two-dimensional entities at the mercy of an analytical intellect. In this book, I have attempted to suggest otherwise. Their challenge is their foundational link of faith and realness. Those wishing to engage them cannot do so without asking how and why they themselves believe in the real. <>

Jihad, Radicalism, and the New Atheism by
Mohammad Hassan Khalil [Cambridge University
Press, 9781108421546]

Is Islam fundamentally violent? For influential New
Atheists such as Sam Harris, Ayaan Hirsi Ali, and
Richard Dawkins, the answer is an emphatic yes,
largely because of the Islamic doctrine of jihad.
According to this view, when al-Qaeda plotted
9/11 or ISIS planned any one of its recent terrorist
attacks, they were acting in accord with Islamic
scripture. Jihad, Radicalism, and the New Atheism
scrutinizes this claim by comparing the conflicting
interpretations of jihad offered by mainstream
Muslim scholars, violent Muslim radicals, and New
Atheists. Mohammad Hassan Khalil considers
contemporary Muslim terrorism to be a grave
problem that we must now confront. He shows,
however, that the explanations offered for this
phenomenon by the New Atheists are highly
problematic, and that their own interpretations of
the role of violence in Islam exceed those of even
radicals such as Osama bin Laden. In showing all of
this, Khalil offers critical insights on a most pressing
issue.

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Introduction

Excerpt: In the midst of a lively televised exchange
between journalist Fareed Zakaria and author Sam
Harris on the topic of jihad, Zakaria declared, "The
problem is you and Osama bin Laden agree ...
after all, you're saying ... his interpretation of Islam
is correct."

"Well," Harris responded, "his interpretation ... this
is the problem. His interpretation of Islam is very
straightforward and honest and you really have to
split hairs and do some interpretive acrobatics in
order to get it ... to look non-canonical."

This exchange took place a little more than thirteen
years after bin Laden and his associates
masterminded the deadliest terrorist operation on
American soil. In the immediate aftermath of the
September 11, 2001, tragedy, the notion that such
violence was representative of the world's second-
largest religion was widespread enough to prompt
then American president George W. Bush to
counter that Islam "is a religion of peace."
Numerous skeptics have since dismissed this claim,
some viewing it as nothing more than a politically
correct token. Among the skeptics are individuals
known as "New Atheists," a label given to popular
figures such as Harris who have produced
influential anti-theistic and anti-religious works in
the years following the September 11 attacks and
who focus much of their attention on "the problem
with Islam.

New Atheists featured in this book tend to portray
the interpretations of Islam promoted by radicals
such as bin Laden as literalistic and especially
faithful to Islamic scripture. The central argument of
this book is twofold: (i) among the most distinctive
features of radicals such as bin Laden are not their
alleged literal readings of the foundational texts
of Islam — in some cases, they go to great lengths
to circumvent such readings — but rather their
aberrant, expansive conceptions of justifiable
combat and retaliation and their particular, often
crude assessments of geopolitical reality; and (z)
on account of the New Atheists' overreliance on a
limited array of sources and their apparent
unfamiliarity with some of the prevailing currents of
Islamic thought, they ultimately privilege anomalous
interpretations of scripture. Yet not only do the
New Atheists' conceptions of armed jihad conflict

with those of the majority of Muslim scholars and laypeople, they even overstep what we find in the discourse of radicals.

JIHAD

Although the term jihad (literally, a "struggle" or "striving") conveys a myriad of meanings in Islamic religious culture, in Islamic law it typically signifies an armed struggle against outsiders, primarily non-Muslims. It is this understanding of jihad that concerns us here. But before examining the Islamic legal dimensions of jihad, we shall first consider how the primary sources of Islamic thought — the Qur'an and early Muslim accounts of the actions and sayings of the Prophet Muhammad and his followers — portray war and peace.

I opened this book by quoting an exchange between Sam Harris and journalist Fareed Zakaria on the topic of jihad. Harris asserted that Osama bin Laden's "interpretation of Islam is very straightforward and honest and you really have to split hairs and do some interpretive acro¬batics in order to get it ... to look non-canonical." But consider some of the "interpretive acrobatics" bin Laden performed in his generally unsuccessful attempt to convince Muslim clerics and Islamists — including many who already held anti-American sentiments — that the September 11 attacks could be justified:

> (1) Recognizing that he was neither a state authority nor a certified scholar, and seeking to enlist "all Muslims" in a war that would employ extreme tactics, bin Laden attempted to demonstrate that his manifestly aggressive attacks were, in fact, part of a defensive jihad. (According to the centuries-old Islamic legal tradition of aggressive jihad, he lacked the requisite authority to launch and manage a war, and his tactics would have been even more difficult to justify.)
> (2) In making the case for a defensive jihad, bin Laden went to great lengths to present the United States as a bona fide threat to Muslims worldwide; he pointed to various American actions and sanctions while oversimplifying and misrepresenting some of the facts on the ground.
> (3) Recognizing the Prophet's explicit prohibition against the killing of

noncombatants, most notably women and children, bin Laden argued that al-Qaeda's tactics against the United States were necessary and served the common good (notwithstanding indications to the contrary). And although the 9/11 attacks were directed mostly at civilians (many busy at work), he asserted that he was not targeting innocents but rather "the symbol" of a threatening enemy and that collateral casualties were therefore acceptable (an assertion widely regarded as disingenuous). For good measure, however, he also attempted to make an obviously modern argument that American adult civilians could be treated as combatants because both the taxes they paid (as required by law) and the decisions made by their government officials (who were neither unanimously elected nor unanimously supported) helped shape America's foreign policy. And, finally, notwithstanding his (superficial) claim that he was not targeting innocents, he endeavored to advance and defend an aberrant, expansive conception of retaliation in order to justify the intentional killing of American noncombatants — a conception not supported and, in at least one case, explicitly rejected by the very scholarly sources he invoked to justify it.

A true literalist he was not. Of course the same could be said about Muslims in general. And yet it is critical to recognize that the attempts of al-Qaeda and ISIS to justify terrorism on Islamic grounds typically require the abandonment of both strict literalism and the historically prevailing interpretations of Islamic thought. The interpretations of such radicals are hardly "straightforward." They are their own thing.

Yet we cannot simply leave it at that. We must ask, What motivated "nineteen post-secondary students" to kill thousands of innocent American civilians and themselves on a tragic Tuesday morning? What inspired the "cricket-loving young men" to kill dozens of Londoners and themselves nearly four years later? How can we explain the many brutal acts of ISIS, which considers itself the world's lone "Islamic state"? And why does it seem like Muslim — not Christian, Hindu, or atheist, but Muslim —

suicide killers are almost always on the news these days?

Beginning with Harris, we have seen how various prominent New Atheist authors explain such phenomena by pointing to Islam — not idiosyncratic interpretations of the religion but the core of the religion itself and downplaying other factors. While the worldwide Muslim scholarly and clerical condemnations of 9/11 show that al-Qaeda "is on the fringes of the jihad tradition," Harris places al-Qaeda, along with ISIS and other radicals, firmly in the center; and Ayaan Hirsi Ali suggests that such radicals are not, in fact, "a lunatic fringe of extremists." As Richard Dawkins sees it, the matter is fairly simple: "Suicide bombers do what they do because they really believe what they were taught in their religious schools: that duty to God exceeds all other priorities, and that martyrdom in his service will be rewarded in the gardens of Paradise."

Now compare such assessments with the more incisive analysis offered by terrorism specialist Jessica Stern, the aforementioned former Harvard colleague of Ali's who studied deradicalization efforts in Saudi Arabia: Stern maintains that terrorists are typically motivated by multiple factors and that "[t]errorist movements often arise in reaction to an injustice, real or imagined, that they feel must be corrected." Furthermore, she writes,

> terrorists who claim to be driven by religious ideology are often ignorant about Islam. Our hosts in Riyadh told us that the vast majority of the deradicalization program's "beneficiaries," as its administrators call participants, had received little formal education and had only a limited understanding of Islam. In the Netherlands and elsewhere in Europe, second- and third-generation Muslim youth are rebelling against the kind of "soft" Islam practiced by their parents and promoted in local mosques. They favor what they think is the "purer" Islam, uncorrupted by Western culture, which is touted on some Web sites and by self=appointed imams from the Middle East who are barely educated themselves. For example, the Netherlands-based

terrorist cell known as the Hofstad Group designed what one police officer described as a "do-it-yourself" version of Islam based on interpretations of takfiri ideology (takfir is the practice of accusing other Muslims of apostasy) culled from the Internet and the teachings of a drug dealer turned cleric.

... Terrorism spreads, in part, through bad ideas. The most dangerous and seductive bad idea spreading around the globe today is a distorted and destructive interpretation of Islam, which asserts that killing innocents is a way to worship God. Part of the solution must come from within Islam and from Islamic scholars, who can refute this ideology with arguments based on theology and ethics. But bad ideas are only part of the problem. Terrorists prey on vulnerable populations — people who feel humiliated and victimized or who find their identities by joining extremist movements. Governments' arsenals against terrorism must include tools to strengthen the resilience of vulnerable populations. These tools should look more like anti-gang programs and public diplomacy than war.

There can be little doubt that religious faith is indeed a critical motivating factor for many Muslim terrorists, from the wealthy bin Laden to any number of middle-class ISIS operatives.' But, as we have seen, their Islam is distinct in important ways from the broader Islamic tradition and is often shaped and guided by particular, often crude readings of the facts on the ground. Even if one insists that the Qur'an itself inspires terrorism, then one would also have to concede that this same scripture —a scripture that existed long before the radicalization of bin Laden, and one not going anywhere — provides an especially potent antidote. There is a reason Muslim scholarly condemnations of terrorist acts regularly invoke statements from the Qur'an and hadith corpus. There is a reason the multifaceted Saudi deradicalization efforts described by Stern — which appear to be at least partially effective — involve an engagement with the Islamic tradition. There is a reason, as noted earlier, when Gallup interviewed Muslims in Indonesia, they found that those who condemned 9/11 — unlike those who defended it — often invoked religion. And all this,

of course, is besides the fact that countless "everyday" Muslims derive from Islamic sources motivation for constructive actions.

The New Atheist authors examined here reserve some of their strongest criticisms of religion for Islam in particular. Yet despite the impressive academic backgrounds that some of them boast (outside Islamic studies), they describe Islam and jihad in ways that are often inaccurate and incomplete. This is at least partly due to their methodologies, as they rely heavily on sources that fail to provide a representative spectrum of views. This might explain why their suggestions for solving the very real problem of Muslim terrorism — from Harris's ignore-or-revise proposal to Ali's "heretical" reformation — are rather unrealistic. They seem to be generally unaware of the nuances of modern Islamic thought and therefore overlook other, potentially more effective avenues for action and reform.

Less than a month before his interview with Fareed Zakaria, Harris had appeared on Real Time with Bill Maher. (This was the October 2014 episode I mentioned earlier.) In the midst of a heated exchange with actor Ben Affleck on the subject of Islam, Harris, having stated that he was "actually well-educated on" the topic, proclaimed, "We have to be able to criticize bad ideas, and Islam is the mother lode of bad ideas." He proceeded to explain his problematic "concentric circles" schema, in which would-be suicide bombers occupy the center of the Muslim community. He added, "We're misled to think that the fundamentalists are the fringe," to which host Bill Maher chimed in, "That's the key point."

The Islam that Harris portrays in his writings does indeed appear to be a "mother lode of bad ideas." But it is an Islam that the vast majority of Muslims, whether scholars or laypeople, would likely not recognize — a "mother lode" of bad analysis. It is even more extreme in some ways than bin Laden's Islam. After all, Harris draws a nearly straight line from the Islamic tradition to 9/11: he erroneously downplays the significance of nonreligious factors when assessing the al-Qaeda leader, asserting that bin Laden's grievances were "purely theological"' and that his "only apparent

concerns [were] the spread of Islam and the sanctity of Muslim holy sites." Bin Laden's Islam, however, was not that simple: his views on jihad were formed through convoluted reasoning and guided by a warped perception of geopolitical reality. (Notwithstanding their differences, the same is generally true for the leadership of ISIS.) As such, Zakaria missed the mark when he told Harris, "The problem is you and Osama bin Laden agree ... after all, you're saying ... his interpretation of Islam is correct.""° Although bin Laden and Harris both envisioned a civilizational clash, Harris's interpretation of Islam is so aberrant that it cannot even be ascribed to the man behind 9/11. <>

[Salafism in Lebanon: Local And Transnational Movements](#) by Zoltan Pall [Cambridge Middle East Studies, Cambridge University Press, 9781108426886]

The past two decades have seen an increasing association between Lebanese Salafism and violence, with less attention being paid to Salafis who focus on peaceful proselytization. In reality, it is these Salafis whose influence has dramatically grown since the eruption of the Syrian conflict that profoundly affected Lebanon as well. Based on extensive fieldwork, Zoltan Pall offers insights into the dynamics of non-violent Lebanese Salafi groups and examines the importance of transnational links in shaping the trajectory of the movement. In particular, he shows how the internal transformation of Salafism in Kuwait, Qatar and Saudi Arabia led to the fragmentation of the Lebanese Salafi community. By analysing Salafism as a network, we see how the movement creates and mobilizes material and symbolic resources, and how it contributes to reshaping the structures of authority within the country's Sunni Muslim community.

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Introduction

Excerpt: During the autumn of 2009, I had a discussion with a few young, long bearded Salafi preachers dressed in robes that did not reach beyond their ankles and a handful of local men in a bakery in the Mina district of the Northern Lebanese city of Tripoli. After the preachers had left, I referred to them as Salafis, representatives of a puritan Sunni Islamic movement that intends to return to the morality and belief of the first Muslims, in front of the locals. The locals expressed astonishment; one of them told me: "Wallahi hol shabab tayyibin-tayyibin, ma 'araft annon Salafiyya! [I swear to God, those guys are very good people, I didn't know they were Salafis]." At the time, the term "Salafism" had negative connotations.

The three preachers were well-known in the neighborhood for their personal piety and for providing religious consultation and conflict mediation to the members of the local communities. No one would ever connect them to any violent acts, and people commonly associated Salafism with violence. In the 1990s and 2000s, Salafist Jihadi groups had gained prominence in the Lebanon by causing a number of violent incidents, such as the Battle of al-Dinniya in 1999 and the Battle of Nahr al-Barid in 2007.

During the first of these battles, the Lebanese army and an armed Salafi group in the mountainous Sir al-Dinniya region near Tripoli clashed on New Year's Eve 1999. Bassam al-Kanj, a veteran Jihadi with combat experience in Afghanistan, set up a training camp to prepare and send fighters to Chechnya. The army's final besiegement of the camp left thirty people dead. The three-months long fighting in Nahr al-Barid Palestinian refugee camp on the outskirts of Tripoli between May and September 2007 led to even more casualties. In the battle between the Fath al-Islam, an al-Qaida-inspired militant organization, and the Lebanese army, around 600 people died and tens of thousands of people were displaced.

Many press reports appeared also on 'Usbat al-Ansar, another Jihadi group that controlled areas in 'Ayn al-Hilwa Palestinian camp near the southern city of Sidon. Since the jurisdiction of the Lebanese authorities does not extend to the Palestinian refugee camps, the group could emerge in the 1990s as one of the most powerful forces of 'Ayn al-Hilwa, and they rivalled the major Palestinian factions such as Fatah and Hamas. In short, due to the prominence of Jihadi Salafism in Lebanon's political events, the label "Salafism" was almost exclusively associated with Jihadi Salafism.

The majority of Salafis who carried out peaceful proselytization did not appear in the Lebanese public sphere that frequently. This is despite the fact that they made up the majority of Lebanese Salafism, constituting ideologically diverse networks with dense linkages to the Arabian Gulf and Europe. As my anecdote demonstrates, people were not aware that some of the preachers were Salafis. Many of the latter also did not use the label very often because of the negative connota¬tion attached to it. Some Salafis argue that Salafis simply follow the original and uncorrupted form of Islam, therefore another label than Muslim is not necessary.

The situation changed radically after the 2010-2011 Arab Uprisings. Although the protest movement that emerged in Lebanon was too modest in scale to bring down the sectarian based regime, the wave of revolutions in the region has nevertheless had a severe sociopolitical impact that contributed to the rise of nonviolent Salafi groups. During my visits in 2011 and 2012, I observed that the movement's activists were increasingly participating in managing the affairs of local communities. In Tripoli's al-Tabbana district, leading Salafi figures established a consultative council (shūra in Arabic) to discuss local issues such as social welfare, the hosting of the constantly increasing numbers of Syrian refugees, and political action to free prisoners who are being held by the Lebanese authorities without trial and accused of "terrorism."

Some prominent Salafi shaykhs, with the leadership of Salim al-Rafi'i and Zakariyya al-Masri, openly challenged the authority of Dar al-Fatwa when they joined and filled leading positions in Hay'at 'Ulama' al-Muslimin (League of Muslim Scholars). The League was created in 2011 and included religious scholars ('ulama') mainly from the Salafi movement and the Lebanese Muslim Brothers (al-Jama'a al-Islamiyya). It claims to represent the majority of the Sunni 'ulama', and issues statements and fatawa (nonbinding legal opinions) relating to many of the most important concerns of the Sunni community. In fact, some analysts regard it as a "counter-Dar al-Fatwa." Both the international and local media have paid significant attention to the Salafi ascendancy in North Lebanon.6 Salafi personalities are frequent guests on Beirut-based TV channels' political programs. While previously perhaps the only publicly known Lebanese Salafi personality was Shaykh Da'i al-Islam al-Shahhal, the head of the oldest Lebanese Salafi organization, Jama'iyyat al-Hidaya wa-l-Ihsan (Guidance and Charity Society - GCS), today many Lebanese know about other leading Salafi figures such as the Tripolitan shaykhs Salim al-Rafi'i, Zakariyya al-Masri and Ra'id Hulayhil.

This book traces the evolution and dynamics of non-Jihadi Salafi groups in Lebanon. Throughout the monograph I use the term Salafi to refer to nonviolent groups unless indicated otherwise. The historical dynamics of Salafism globally have been crucial in shaping the structure of the Lebanese Salafi scene due to its dense transnational linkages, especially to the Arabian Gulf. Therefore, I will provide insights into how both the global split of

Salafism into a politically quietist (which later I call purist) and activist (or in Arabic haraki) faction and the internal transformation of the movement in Kuwait, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia led to the fragmentation of the Lebanese Salafi community. Schisms at the transnational level have led to the emergence of the purist-haraki dichotomy in Lebanon as well. I will also discuss how and why the haraki faction emerged as predominant in the post-Arab Uprisings period. Transnational charities that support Lebanese Salafi groups played imperative roles in these developments. Therefore, I put special emphasis on examining the linkages of the latter, especially the Kuwaiti Jama'iyyat Ihya' al-Turath al-Islami (Society for the Revival of Islamic Heritage — SRIH) and the Qatari Mu'assasat al-Shaykh 'Aid al-Khayriyya (Shaykh 'Aid Charity Foundation — SACF) to the Lebanese Salafi scene.

After taking a closer look at the historical trajectory of Lebanese Salafism, the second focus of this monograph is explaining how these Salafi groups establish their authority, create and mobilize symbolic and material resources, and attract their followers. I will do so by analyzing the movement's internal structure, and explain how Lebanese Salafis constitute collectivities and what their transnational ties look like. Lebanese Salafis have strong local roots and were not planted by the Gulf countries; nevertheless, charities and private donors from Kuwait, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia have been crucial in facilitating the expansion of the movement. Money that Lebanese Salafi shaykhs received from the Gulf enabled them to build religious infrastructure and provide financial assistance to their followers. Scholarships from the Gulf States made it possible for many Lebanese Salafis to pursue their studies at the Islamic University of Medina or other Saudi Islamic higher educational institutions. This is why part of the book examines the structure of Lebanese Salafism not only locally but also in a transnational context.

Defining Salafism

The term "Salafism" is derived from the Arabic expression al-Salaf al-Salih (the righteous ancestors), which refers to the first three generations of Islam, namely the companions of the Prophet Muhammad (sahaba) and the first two generations of their followers. Salafis intend to purify the religion, ridding it of foreign elements and returning to the original form of Islam, the understanding of the Prophet and the sahaba. Salafis are not alone in emulating the pious predecessors; in fact, all Muslims regard the sahaba as their primary example, but there is no consensus as to how the sahaba understood and practiced the religion. Since all Muslims look up to al-Salaf al-Salih, this would not make Salafis different from other groups. Salafis today, however, represent a stream of Islam that promotes a literal understanding of the Qur'an and the Sunna (the prophetic tradition: the collection of sayings, practices, and habits of Muhammad, recorded and transmitted by men from generation to generation). One single saying or practice is a hadith, (pl. ahadith), and according to the Salafis' understanding, it leaves no room for interpretation based on human reasoning ('aql) and opinion (ra'y). Salafis try to imitate the Prophet and his companions not only in their beliefs, but also in their daily practices and habits, such as in their appearance (they grow a long beard and trim their moustache).

While the historical roots of Salafism go back to the first decades of the Abbasid caliphate, and modem Salafis regard Hanbali scholars such as Ibn Taymiyya (1263-1328) and Muhammad bin 'Abd Al-Wahhab (1703-1792) as their predecessors, today's Salafism is a modern movement. Salafism originally had a narrow theological meaning. It was only in the 1920s that the definition of the term shifted to refer to those who promoted Islamic revival on the basis of dealing with legal matters unencumbered by the constraints of the four madhabs. Among them, a group of scholars and thinkers envisioned the unification of the umma (global Muslim community) through the uniformity of religious belief on the basis of the literal interpretation of the scripture.

In the mid-twentieth century, this uniformity of practicing Islam was supposed to create a uniform Muslim identity in order to end colonial rule and achieve sociopolitical reforms in Muslim countries. Yet, in the 1970s, with the independence of most countries in the Muslim world, the focus of Salafism increasingly turned toward doctrinal purity and

framing all aspects of human life in Islamic terms. A number of scholars, among them the Syrian scholar Muhammad Nasir al-Din al-Albani (1914-1999), and the Saudis 'Abd al-'Aziz bin Baz (1910-1999) and Muhammad bin Salih al-'Uthaymin (1925-1991) played a crucial role in turning Salafism into an all-encompassing ideology.

The Core Tenets of Salafism

The basic elements of the 'aqida (creed) are what unite all Salafis. This creed is based on the views of Athari or traditionalist theological school that defines the attributes and nature of God based on the literal interpretation of the scripture. The Salafi creed revolves around tawhid, the unity of God . Of course, this is the core concept of Islam, but unlike, for example, the Ash'ari theological school that is currently dominant among Sunni Muslims, Salafis reject any philosophical interpretation of tawhid. Most contemporary Salafis divide tawhid into three basic components, a distinction that is based on the works of the nineteenth-century reformer Muhammad bin 'Abd al-Wahhab.

The first part is tawhid al-rububiyya (oneness of Lordship). It means that God is the sole creator of the universe; he is omnipotent, and nothing is comparable to him. The second part is tawhid al-uluhiyya (oneness of Godship) or tawhid al-'ibada (oneness of worship). It means that all religious practices must be directed toward God alone and no one else can be attributed with any qualities that belong to God. This is one of the reasons for the Salafis' hostility toward Sufism and the Shi'ites, particularly because of the latter's practice of seeking mediation (tawassul) and aid (istighatha) from saints and the family of the Prophet.

The third part is tawhid al-asma' wa-l-sifat (oneness of the names and attributes). The Qur'an names the attributes of God, such as his hands or his face. These provide the basis for metaphorical explanations and the use of reasoning. For example, while Ash'aris explain the mentioning of God's hands in the Qur'an as the expression of his power, Salafis strictly reject this approach. Since these things are mentioned in the Text, they have to be accepted literally without any further explanation.

Salafis consider the preservation and defense of their understanding of tawhid to be their most important task and fight anything that can lead to polytheism (shirk). Therefore, Salafis fight any innovations (bid'a) that contradict the Qur'an and Sunna, because bid'a can lead to shirk. For example, Salafis consider the celebration of the Prophet's birthday (mawlid) bid'a, because they do not find any proof in the scripture.

What makes contemporary Salafis different from other Muslims who adopted similar creeds, such as the majority of the adherents of the Hanbali madhab (legal school) — or for that matter Muhammad bin 'Abd al-Wahhab, who revived Athari thinking in the eighteenth-century Arabian Peninsula — is the rejection of taqlid, or the exclusive.

As Chapter 1 will explain and the book will show throughout, the issue that divides Salafis most sharply relates to the concept of hukm (ruling) in Islam. The main debate revolves around the relationship of the ruled to the ruler (hakim), and this divides Salafis in both Lebanon and the Gulf into two factions. Following Wiktorowicz, I will call the first faction "purist." The term "purist" is appropriate here, since the main concern of the members of this faction is purifying the minute details of belief and religious practice of Muslims. In order to be able to do so, they need a political order, which grants the necessary stability to carry out the da'wa.

This makes purists proponents of unconditional obedience to the ruler as long as he is not an apostate. In addition, they do not allow open criticism of the ruler, only secret advice (nasiha sirriya). The purists refer to the Text to support their stance. They commonly quote one of the sayings of the Prophet: "Who sees disobedience of God from his amir [ruler] shall hate what this disobedience causes but shall not lift his hands against him.i65 Purists usually cite the example of the first civil war in Islam: "When fitna [civil war] occurred in the time of Caliph 'Uthman, some people asked Usama bin Zayd [one of the companions of the Prophet]: 'Don't you rebuke 'Uthman?' He answered: 'Rebuke him in front of the people? I rebuke him only in private but I do not open the doors of Hell in front of the

people'." Purists use this to explain that even if it is warranted, open criticism can cause the people to rise up against the ruler and undermine order.

This faction's main concern, however, is doctrinal purity. Yet, some of them participate in parliamentary politics. For example, in Kuwait, purists have regularly been elected to the legislature since the 1980s. To them, political participation is necessary to defend the autonomy of the da'wa from its enemies, such as western-oriented liberals and socialists. However, their political aims mainly concern social behavior and the promotion of their understanding of Islam within Kuwait. For instance, partly due to their efforts, in most departments of the University of Kuwait, male and female students have to attend lectures in separate rooms. I call this current "purist-politically oriented." Others, whom I call "purist-rejectionists," reject any political participation, putting forward that in the political arena, Muslims can be affected by those who do not practice religion properly, or even by non-Muslims. Faithful Muslims should only focus on proper daily religious practice. The followers of the Saudi scholar Rabi' al-Madkhali are an example of this group.

Those belonging to the second faction, whom I call harakis (activists), refuse to obey the ruler unconditionally. They approach religion from an all-encompassing (shumuli) viewpoint. They are influenced by Sayyid Qutb's concept of hakimiyya, which considers any government that does not govern according to God's law to be illegitimate. Harakis also think that a ruler can only be legitimate if the ruled voluntarily perform an oath of allegiance (bay's). Therefore, regimes that come to power via military coups or conquest are by definition illegitimate. They defend their stance by referring to the case of the first four caliphs who followed the Prophet, all of whom were accepted by the majority of Muslims. Although there is no clear reference to this in the Text, this process is in accordance with the consensus (ijma') of the Sahaba, the Companions of the Prophet.

Haraki Salafis think that since Islam extends its rulings to every domain of life, politics and the political state of the umma should not be neglected. Therefore, the other important point that makes

harakis different from the purists is that in their discourses, they engage with a wider range of topics As I show later in this book, Lebanese Salafis in general feel negatively about the Shiite Muslims. However, while purists mostly criticize the latter from the viewpoint of doctrines, the harakis extensively discuss the Shi'ites' perceived negative role in Lebanese and regional politics, and place them in the center of conspiracy theories. Furthermore, the repertoire of action of harakis is also wider than that of the purists. They do not refrain from openly criticizing the rulers, and regard demonstrations as legitimate means.

Jihadis, the third faction, are different from harakis in the sense that they believe that removing secular regimes and imposing Islamic legislation could happen only through armed jihad, and that long-range public engagement would not bring results. Yet, haraki networks often overlap with that of the jihadis. I encountered many Salafis who firmly believed in the ultimate necessity of armed jihad to abolish secularist regimes and establish Islamic governance. However, at the same time, they advocated for participation in parliamentary politics as a temporary means of activism until the circumstances become appropriate to successfully wage jihad. While jihadis often form their own distinct groups and organizations, there are cases when it is difficult to distinguish them from other harakis on the ground. During my fieldwork in Lebanon and Kuwait, I met Salafi youths in the networks of haraki shaykhs who expressed jihadi views and rejected political participation. Despite this, they networked with others who were inclined toward haraki thinking. These young people were constantly challenging each other's views. On some occasions, I even observed jihadis changing their views regarding political participation.

These ideological differences influence the shape of transnational networks in which Lebanese Salafis are linked. As I will show in this book, the difference of views about the relationship of Muslims to the ruler fragmented the Kuwaiti Salafis in the mid-1990s. This, in turn, reshaped the Salafi scene in Lebanon due to the dense interconnections of Salafis in these two countries. While overlaps might exist, the transnational networks that I discuss

in this book largely can be characterized as harakis or purists.

What Makes Salafism Appealing?

Anthropologists of Islam highlight that many Muslims in the late twentieth and twenty-first century are attracted to religious movements and trends that provide them guidance in rapidly changing and uncertain circumstances. It means offering a way to constantly engage with the scripture and connect one's actions and feelings directly to it.

Salafism fulfills these needs. Anthropologists have noticed a number of similar reasons why individual believers are attracted to Salafism. These include the Salafis' claim to authenticity, that they perform rituals exactly as the Prophet did by correctly reading the Qur'an and the Sunna. By extensively referring back to the hadith, Salafis leave no gray areas but provide clear instructions to all aspects of human life: not just how to pray, but, for example, how to dress, eat, or interact with society. By clearly defining the terms of what being a good Muslim means (i.e. perfecting oneself according to what is codified in the scripture), Salafism provides a point of reference, discipline, and clear structure for one's life in highly unpredictable socioeconomic conditions or in time of personal crisis.

As explained in Chapters 4 and 7, these observations are true for Lebanon as well. In a context of constant political instability and uncertain economic conditions, many Sunnis, especially young people, are looking for empowerment and moral support, which they often find in Salafism. Yet only looking at the moral dimensions of the movement would not sufficiently explain why the popular appeal of Salafism in Lebanon has been growing since the end of the first decade of the twenty-first century in particular. Therefore, this book closely examines the evolution of Salafism in light of the transformation of Lebanon's sociopolitical context, and the dynamics of its interconnections with the countries of the Arabian Gulf.

Furthermore, analyzing the sociopolitical context is also necessary to explain the power balance within the Salafi movement in Lebanon. As Wagemakers highlights in his analysis on Jordanian Salafism, in the kingdom, those who he calls uietist, who I would identify as a purist faction, gained predominance. Contrary to Jordan, in Lebanon, harakis are dominant. I suggest that the haraki message of going beyond doctrinal purity and addressing issues such as the Sunni—Shi'ite sectarian tensions has become more relevant.

Salafism as a Movement

As the discussion in the previous section shows, Salafis, regardless of factions, share a utopian vision: They are determined to recreate the ideal community of Muslims as, according to their belief, it used to be during the time of the Salaf. In many respects, Salafism resembles what Price et al. call "grounded utopian movements" (GUMs).78 GUMS create strong utopias in order to counter different types of oppression and injustice (real and perceived). In other words, the followers of such a movement create a parallel reality to escape from the conditions present in the surrounding world. "Grounded" here means "that the identities, values, and imaginative dimensions of utopia are culturally focused on real places, embodied by living people, informed by past lifeways, and constructed and maintained through quotidian interactions and valued practices that connect the members of a community.

Similarly to the majority of GUMs (including Rastafari or Zapatistas), Salafism is constituted by networks that are largely informal and decentralized. Interpersonal ties make up the core of these networks, which mostly evolve during common activities such as religious lessons held in the mosques or ad-hoc discussions after prayer. Yet, as I explain later, Salafi interpersonal networks in certain cases overlap with formal institutions, in particular charities that finance various humanitarian and religious projects. A collective identity built on shared worldviews and aesthetics, such as performing religious practices in an ostensibly uncorrupted way, a dress code, and specific ways of verbal communication holds these networks together. This book focusses on the characteristic of Salafism as a movement made chiefly of informal networks.

Salafism differs from the majority of the GUMs that are discussed by Price et al. in one important way: While the main goal of these GUMs is to maintain

an autonomous, alternative lifestyle for their participants, for Salafis it is equally important to convince others to adopt their worldviews and practices. In other words, their end goal is to export their utopian vision to wider society. Therefore, Salafis actively engage in various preaching activities, such as holding religious lessons in mosques. Salafis are very active on the web and maintain thousands of websites and internet forums in order to spread their ideas. Salafi educational institutions, often financed by the wealthy monarchies of the Arabian Gulf, can be found all over the world.

All this shows that transforming society is of central importance in Salafism. In this process, Salafis often challenge other actors that they perceive as endangering the da'wa or who resist the Salafis' attempt to spread their version of Islam. This is particularly obvious in Lebanon, where Salafis contest the legitimacy of Dar al-Fatwa to represent Sunni orthodoxy. In this contestation the Salafis employ their economic abilities, social ties, and mastery of religious knowledge and practices to gain more influence in society. Using Pierre Bourdieu's theory of social reproduction, I will explore and describe how Salafis mobilize finances and build up social networks in order to create and reinforce the public image of exemplary Muslims.

Bourdieu's approach divides society into different but interconnected microcosms called "fields." A field is a configuration of hierarchically arranged positions where agents compete with each other to increase their influence and dominate the field. These positions are defined by the possession of capital, a symbolic resource that enables its possessor to exercise power in a specific field. Within a field, there is a struggle between agents to possess as much capital as possible and thereby achieve a more influential position There are as many kinds of fields as there are types of capital. For example, it is possible to distinguish economic, political, artistic, or religious fields, each of which are governed by their own logic and rules. Institutions, individuals, and networks make up these fields. For example, the religious field can be composed of churches and mosques, state institutions that regulate religious life, religious

centers, religious specialists, and religious movements.

Fields can be overlapping and can influence each other. For example, the religious field can affect the political: The success of Islamic movements might lead to the electoral success of parties with an Islamic orientation, as we could see in several cases in the Middle East, such as the Egyptian elections in 2012.

Beyond field-specific capital, two forms of capital are present and often become a game changer in each field. These are economic and social capital. For example, as this book will show, the acquisition of social capital in the religious field might lead to the increase of economic capital that enables agents of the field to expand their religious infrastructure, and hence reach out for more followers.

The Structure of This Book

The first chapter traces the development of Salafism in the Gulf, which is crucial to any understanding of the dynamics of Lebanese Salafism. The first section explains the roots of the fragmentation of the movement in Saudi Arabia, and goes on to describe its transformation in Kuwait. Kuwaiti Salafism is densely interconnected with its equivalent in Lebanon; the Kuwait-based Salafi charity SRIH is one of its main financial supporters. The last section touches upon the development of the other main sponsor of Lebanese Salafism, the Qatari SACF.

Chapter 2 examines how Salafism evolved into a prominent Islamic movement in Tripoli and its surroundings during the 1990s. It shows the historical transformations of the Sunni religious field, and discusses how these changes contributed to the Salafis' accumulation of religious and economic capital.

Chapter 3 further examines the transformation of the Sunni religious field and explains how Salafism in Lebanon split into purist and haraki factions. The chapter identifies the selective repression by the authorities and the material support provided by SRIH to the purists as the main factors leading to the disintegration of the once relatively unified Salafi movement in the country. It also shows the

dynamics of the purist and haraki factions. This chapter also examines how the Arab Uprisings and the subsequent growth of the popularity of Salafism across the Middle East provided Lebanese haraki Salafis with an opportunity to rise in prominence.

Chapter 4 focuses on the construction of the religious authority of the North Lebanese Salafi shaykhs, and outlines the importance of the religious specialists in the movement. It traces how the different forms of capital translate to authority. This authority enables Salafis to successfully claim orthodoxy in considerable segments of the Northern Lebanese Sunni population. The decline of the influence of Dar al-Fatwa and the fact that other Islamic movements do not claim orthodoxy contributed to the Salafis' success.

Chapter 5 analyzes the structure and functions of Salafi networks at the local level. It examines the social composition of Salafi networks and the modality of the evolution of interpersonal network ties. This chapter sheds light on the construction of a collective identity among Salafis. Looking at activities such as religious lessons held in mosques and private homes, Friday sermons, and ad hoc gatherings it provides insights into how a collective identity among younger believers is created.

Chapter 6 discusses the dynamics of Salafi transnational networking, detailing the ties between North Lebanon and the Gulf. It examines how both the role of informal, interpersonal ties and that played by Salafi charities in the Gulf provide religious, social, and economic capital to the Lebanese Salafis. The last section of the chapter explains how informal links with Europe and the Gulf facilitate the dissemination of the Salafi message. Using two of my case studies from Sweden and the Netherlands, the chapter shows how transnational Salafi networks between Lebanon and Europe function.

The last chapter identifies the significance of "framing" and highlights the process of conversion in the recruitment of passive and active adherents of Salafism. The second half of the chapter examines the appeal of Salafi ideology to young people who feel alienated in North Lebanese society for a variety of socioeconomic and identity-related reasons. These youths become committed followers of Salafism and seek to adopt the movement's rulings after undergoing conversion. Within this context, I will also exemplify how Salafi networking strategies facilitate conversion.

Relatively few scholars have explored the dynamics of Lebanese Salafism in depth. In order to understand that the movement is differentiated and cannot quite be understood using western concepts of organizations, it is necessary to provide a detailed history and analysis. <>

Deadly Clerics: Blocked Ambition and the Paths to Jihad by Richard A. Nielsen [Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics, Cambridge University Press, 9781108404051]

Deadly Clerics explains why some Muslim clerics adopt the ideology of militant jihadism while most do not. The book explores multiple pathways of cleric radicalization and shows that the interplay of academic, religious, and political institutions has influenced the rise of modern jihadism through a mechanism of blocked ambition. As long as clerics' academic ambitions remain attainable, they are unlikely to espouse violent jihad. Clerics who are forced out of academia are more likely to turn to jihad for two reasons: jihadist ideas are attractive to those who see the system as turning against them, and preaching a jihad ideology can help these outsider clerics attract supporters and funds. The book draws on evidence from various sources, including large-scale statistical analysis of texts and network data obtained from the Internet, case studies of clerics' lives, and ethnographic participant observations at sites in Cairo, Egypt.

Excerpt: This is a book about jihadists as academics. It tells stories of scholars experiencing the benefits and constraints of academia, relying on their scholarly networks to get ahead or finding them unequal to the task, of academic success and failure, and the ways that the disappointment of having one's academic ambitions blocked can push some people to embrace violent ideas and urge heinous actions. I do not mean this by way of analogy. Jihadist clerics are not "like" academics, but rather they are academics, although their academic personalities are often overshadowed by the dreadful consequences of their ideas. Writing about networks of scholars in Islamic legal

academia has forced me to repeatedly contemplate my own academic networks and recognize just how fortunate I have been. Without the people thanked here, and many more that I'm sure I have failed to recall, it would not have been possible for me to write this book.

While I was a Mormon missionary in Alaska, I spent many hours at the house of an elderly man named Gene Rutledge who had little interest in religion but was willing to talk to me if I would help him organize his papers — a lifetime of snippets from a career spent in science, including a role in the Manhattan Project. The last time I saw him, in 2004, he told me, "When you write your first book, send me a copy." At the time, I merely smiled politely. It wasn't until years later that I realized he had been right: inevitably I was going to try to write a book. The confidence implicit in his request carried me through some of the self-doubt of writing, for which I am deeply grateful. I looked him up some years ago and found his obituary in a local Anchorage newspaper. I wish I could have written more quickly so that I could have sent this book to him before his passing.

Why Study Jihadism?

"Focusing on jihad is just like an American and not a good idea. If you look at any book of jihad, the definitions are clear." This was the reaction of Said, a student at the al-Azhar mosque, as I described my research. It was only the beginning. "Let me talk for seven minutes," he interjected, and then gave an extended explanation for why my focus on jihad was a mistake. He argued that jihad was purely defensive, was misunderstood by non-Muslims, and that by focusing on it, I was reinforcing violent stereotypes about Islam while ignoring the concerns that matter to scholars at al-Azhar. Said was particularly vocal, but he was not alone. My 2011 notes record that four Azhari students who had invited me back to their flat "ask[ed] why I was so focused on [Yusuf] al-Qaradawi and al-Qaeda, as if these two things aren't important to them and they found the choice strange." Since these conversations occurred, I have had many further opportunities to reflect on the question: why study jihadism?

On a personal level, my suspicion is that I was nudged toward studying jihadism because the

September 11, 2001, attacks happened during a remarkably formative time in my life: the second week of my first year of college. But all researchers have personal experiences that draw them toward the objects of their study. It remains necessary to consider the scientific merit of any proposed topic. In my case, why study jihadism? And what of the ethics of producing yet another addition to an already saturated market of books returning again and again to the question of violence in Islam?

On the question of scientific merit, I find that the reproduction of jihadist ideology by Muslim clerics is an ideal place to study the dynamics of idea adoption among elites. It is a good case because, to a first approximation, jihadists' ideas can be expected to "matter," which allows me to largely bracket that question in favor of other, less tilled ground: how do actors come to adopt certain ideas?

Also, though I wish it were not so, knowledge about jihadism is, and is likely to remain, a vital piece of human understanding about the political world. When possible, I believe that scientists should work on problems that concern society.

Choosing to research violent jihadism bears the risk of perpetuating a form of neo-Orientalism that typifies some Muslim "other" as quintessentially exotic, violent, and irrational. It is difficult to see bias in one's own work so I cannot definitively rule out this possibility. My intention, however, is that my research will challenge orientalist misconceptions about the subjects of my study and present them as complex human beings, rather than abstract, essentialized Others. My findings cut against the tendency to characterize jihadists as inherently irrational or exotic. I show that, far from being innate and irrational, the turn to embrace jihadist ideology is at least partially influenced by rational calculations that clerics make within the constraints of a professional system.

Some readers may be concerned that focusing on violent jihadism improperly elevates its importance within the Muslim faith tradition at the expense of alternative understandings that better represent Islam's core principles. As Orsi describes, "People want to be reassured that the men who flew their

planes into the World Trade Center on September 11, 2001, were not representatives of `real' or `good' Islam."

The assertion that jihadism is not "real" Islam, and therefore should not dominate scholarly attention, comes from an admirable desire not to hold the varied adherents of a diverse global religion culpable for violence perpetrated by a marginal subgroup of co-religionists, and to avoid reinforcing colonial structures of power that legitimize control and domination of Muslim bodies by casting them as intrinsically violent, exotic, or alien. However, subterranean power structures in fields of knowledge are more complex than this anticolonial critique admits because the act of defining jihadists as "bad" or "untrue" Islam is itself a reflection of power. Unless we "excavate our hidden moral and political history ... the distinctions that we make will merely be the reiteration of unacknowledged assumptions, prejudices, and implications in power"

With the implicit power dynamics of defining "true" Islam clearly in view, it is no longer surprising that the subjects of my study, as well as readers, disagree about the role of jihad in Islam. The jihadists argue that violent jihad is an essential part of Islam and represents a "forgotten duty" of all Muslims. Non-jihadists argue that the only important jihad in the modern era is the struggle to purify one's soul. My research attempts not to take a side in the power struggle for the essence of Islam, although I realize my attempt may be quixotic. Instead, I attempt to represent the subjects of my study — jihadists and non-jihadists alike — with enough fidelity that they might recognize themselves in my descriptions.

Plan of the Book

The remainder of this book lays out the arguments and evidence I have introduced in this chapter. The broad arc of the book is this: I introduce Muslim clerics in Chapter z and then explain my theoretical arguments about the pathways clerics take to become jihadists in Chapter 3. In Chapters 4 through 6, I offer empirical evidence to support my claims, primarily by collecting a sample of clerics, determining which ones are jihadists, and then testing whether events in the lives of these clerics

predict which ones will become jihadists. In the final chapter, I summarize my analysis and then discuss how this research might be of use to others: first, by suggesting what lessons policy-makers might draw from the analysis and second, by describing how the theory and methods I use might be profitably deployed and extended by other scholars.

I now describe each of the chapters in more detail. Any argument about the decisions of Muslim clerics requires a clear definition of who is and is not a member of this group. I begin the next chapter by explaining my definition of who counts as a Muslim cleric and clarifying how my definition differs from the definitions other scholars have used. Next, I draw on my own observations as well as primary sources and secondary literature to describe how clerics are trained and what they do. To illustrate clerical training for the reader, I parse the syllabus of a jihadist cleric detailing a ten-year program of study to become a scholar. I then describe some genres of work that clerics produce — websites, academic and popular writing, sermons, and fatwas — in order to analyze what these types of intellectual production reveal about the self-conception of clerics.

With this background information in place, in Chapter 3 I develop my theoretical arguments about why some individuals might become jihadist clerics. I make a distinction between individuals who radicalize first and become clerics later and those who become clerics first and jihadists later. I then explain why existing theories of lay Muslim radicalization apply to the first set but not the second. To understand the radicalization of individuals who become clerics first and jihadists later, I focus on the role of academic career incentives in clerics' choices and how blocked ambition at various stages of academic advancement turns clerics toward jihadist ideology. I argue that clerics with better academic networks usually go on to have traditional academic careers and avoid radicalization, while less networked clerics face tougher academic prospects and are more likely to radicalize. Similarly, clerics who build insider careers and then find themselves abruptly on the outside, often because of government repression, are at particular risk of radicalizing.

After presenting my theory, I turn to collecting data with which to test it. Chapter 4 introduces a representative sample of Sunni Muslim clerics with a substantial online presence, describes how I constructed this sample from Internet sources, and presents summaries of clerics' biographical information. These data are unique because I conducted a comprehensive census of Arabic-speaking Muslim clerics on the Internet to form a sampling frame and then sampled zoo clerics at random for inclusion in a quantitative data set. To my knowledge, this is the first sample of Muslim clerics that is representative of Sunni Muslim clerics online. The benefit of this random sampling is that the patterns I uncover in the data are likely to be present in the broader population and are unlikely to be spurious correlations caused by ad hoc sampling. I describe the biographies I collected for the zoo clerics in my sample and report data coded from these biographies showing trends in the mobility, education, and careers of these clerics. This biographical data forms the first half of the data set I will use to test competing arguments about why some clerics become jihadists.

In Chapter 5, I describe how I determine which of the zoo clerics in my sample are jihadists. Detecting jihadists requires conceptual clarity on jihadist ideology itself. To identify the key features of jihadist ideology that my coding must capture, I couple close reading of important jihadist texts with statistical text analysis of a large jihadist corpus. This analysis shows that almost all of jihadist ideology flows from a particular conception of God's sovereignty, called tawhīd. I explain this concept, show how jihadist conceptions of tawhīd differ from non-jihadist conceptions, and trace the logic by which the jihadist version of tawhīd leads them to excommunicate others, reject contemporary regimes in the Middle East, reject notions of state sovereignty, decry democracy, and justify violence against others, both combatant and noncombatant and Muslim and non-Muslim.

In the remainder of Chapter 5, I collect all of the writings I can find for the zoo clerics in my sample and use these to determine which clerics express jihadist ideology when they write. Because these clerics have produced far more writing than I can

possibly read — almost 150,000 documents total — I develop a statistical text analysis model that distinguishes jihadist writing from non-jihadist writing based on patterns of word use. I apply this method to measure the jihadism of each cleric and then verify the results of the model by comparing them to statements about clerics' ideological positions in their biographies, the scholarly literature, and the opinions of other jihadists. I find that the model provides accurate assessments of the degree to which a cleric's writing expresses jihadist ideology, and has the advantage of being transparent and scalable.

I bring the data developed in Chapters 4 and 5 together in Chapter 6 to show that the educational networks and career paths of clerics strongly predict which clerics will be more jihadist, even when accounting for alternative explanations statistically. I also provide evidence that jihadism may give clerics credibility; I analyze page views of fatwas on a large Salafi website and find that jihadist-leaning fatwas are more popular than non-jihadist fatwas. I next present brief case studies that examine turning points in the lives of several jihadist clerics. These case studies complement the statistical analysis by illustrating the theoretical mechanisms at work and providing a rough estimate of which pathways to becoming a jihadist cleric are most common.

Chapter 7 concludes the book. After reviewing the argument and evidence, I offer some suggestions for what policy-makers might learn from my study. I highlight two suggestions that cut against the grain of current thinking: first, that involvement in Islamic education may not be as likely to radicalize people as some have claimed and second, that the attempts of many governments in the Middle East to pacify and dominate the religious sphere have backfired. I then consider what scholars should take away from this study. I first make the case that blocked ambition should be considered as a candidate cause of political choices by individuals in a number of settings far beyond Islamic legal academia. Next, I suggest that the data sources and methods I employ in this book could open new avenues for the study of Islam and Muslim societies. Although there have been a few forays into quantitative approaches, particularly by those

working on Islamic "digital humanities", the full potential of these research methods has not yet been realized. My advocacy for these new methods does not disparage more traditional methods; in fact I argue that old and new approaches are complementary and hope that together they can offer new insights into the causes of radicalization and other crucial questions of our time. <>

The Oxford Handbook of Polling and Survey Methods by Lonna Rae Atkeson and R. Michael Alvarez [Oxford Handbooks, Oxford University Press, 9780190213299]

The methodologies used to study public opinion are now in flux. The primary polling method of the last half-century, the telephone survey, is rapidly becoming obsolete as a data collection method. At the same time, new methods of contacting potential respondents and obtaining their response are appearing, providing a variety of options for scholars and practitioners. Generally speaking, we are moving from a polling world that was largely interviewer driven over the phone and face-to-face to predominantly interviewer driven self-administered poll environments, New methods of data collection, however, must still deal with fundamental questions to polling methodology and total survey error including sampling, selection bias, non-response error, poststratification weighting, and questionnaire design features.

The Oxford Handbook on Polling and Survey Methods brings together a unique mixture of academics and practitioners, from various backgrounds, academic disciplines, and experiences. In some sense, this is reflective of the interdisciplinary nature of the polling and survey industry: polls and surveys are widely used in academia, government, and the private sector. Designing, implementing, and analyzing high quality, accurate, and cost-effective polls and surveys requires a combination of skills and methodological perspectives. Despite the well-publicized issues that have cropped up in recent political polling, a great deal is known today about how to collect high quality polling and survey data even in complex and difficult environments. Divided into four main sections, the Handbook draws on the

existing research and explores data collection methods. It then addresses data analysis and the methods available for combining polling data with other types of data. The next section covers analytic issues, including the new approaches to studying public opinion (ie social media, the analysis of open-ended questions using text analytic tools, and data imputation). The final section focuses on the presentation of polling results, an area where there is a great deal of innovation.

A comprehensive overview of the topic, this volume highlights current polling trends provides ideas for the development of new and better approaches for measuring, modeling, and visualizing public opinion and social behavior.

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Excerpt: Polling and Survey Methods

In recent years political polling has been in a state of visible crisis. Recent "polling misses" have been well-publicized: the Brexit election, the peace agreement referendum in Colombia, and the U.S. presidential election. In the first example, the Brexit vote in the United Kingdom was a close call that missed its mark, while in Colombia polls regarding a referendum on a peace deal that took more than seven years to produce suggested that 66% of eligible voters supported it. However, when the votes were counted on election day the referendum failed by a very close margin, with 50.2% of voters rejecting it.

In the United States another important miss was the failure of polls conducted in the competitive battleground states to predict a Donald Trump presidential win at nearly any point in the election. A recent report from the American Association of Public Opinion Research (AAPOR) argued that while the national polls in 2016 were quite accurate, the state-by-state polling in important battleground states suffered from methodological issues that appear to account for much of their inaccuracy (AAPOR 2017). Moreover, poll aggregators such as fivethirtyeight.com and the Huffington Post provided odds that Hillary Clinton would win by very safe margins. For example, the final election odds from fivethirtyeight.com gave Clinton a 71% chance of winning the election, the lowest percentage of any poll aggregator, and the Huffington Post gave Clinton a 98% chance of winning the election, the highest of any poll aggregator.

These polling misses are highly consequential. Not only have they provided pundits, media, and the public with misleading information, but by being so seemingly unreliable they may even make people skeptical and distrustful of polling in general. Because of these highly visible "misses," political polling has an image problem, as a recent US. poll finding shows that only 37% of the public trusts public opinion polls a great deal or a good amount.

Election polling is an especially unique industry and academic enterprise because it is one of the few social sciences in which predictions can be validated against outcomes, therefore providing the opportunity to assess issues related to survey error. Although comparing predictions to outcomes provides a sense of when polls are off track, there are many places in the survey design in which errors can be introduced, and thus being attentive to innovation and best practices in all aspects of design is critical for a reliable and valid survey.

Problems with polling usually stem from a variety of factors, including issues with the sampling frame and nonresponse bias. Because of these issues, and because of the many complex designs, which often involve multiple modes, panels, or oversamples, there may be unequal probabilities of respondent selection, variation in response rates across subgroups, or departures from distributions on key demographic or other variables within the data, such as party identification, which may result in a variety of postsurvey adjustment weighting strategies. Indeed, pollsters today do a great deal of postsurvey adjustment weighting to create data sets that are representative of the population under study. While there is certainly a science to weighting data, methodological differences in how data are statistically weighted can lead to different results and different predicted winners.

For example, in an experiment during the 2016 election the same raw data set was given to four different pollsters for postsurvey adjustments; the result was four different election predictions, from Trump up one point to Clinton up four points. Another difficult problem for pollsters in an election environment is identifying likely voters. Yet other problems may have to do with nonresponse bias, which may lead some types of voters to refuse to participate in the poll. Shy respondents may cause problems for a survey if, for example, they are associated with a particular candidate or particular issue position.

In developed countries, changes in survey research over the last fifteen years have been tumultuous. The growth of the Internet, the decline in household use of landlines, and the dramatic increase in cell phone use has made it both easier and more

difficult to conduct surveys. While the "gold standard" for survey research has traditionally been probability based sampling, today many polls and surveys use nonprobability designs, such as opt-in Internet panels for online surveys. Furthermore, surveys that begin with a random sample often have such low response rates (less than 10% is now very common) that the quality and accuracy of inferences drawn from the resulting sample may be problematic.

For general population studies, the increase in Internet surveys has also meant that researchers are relying today more on respondent-driven surveys than on the interviewer-driven designs that dominated the field in previous decades. The prevalence of Internet surveys has also led to a greater number of panel designs and to consideration of unique issues that arise with panel data. Survey researchers are also relying on many more modes and combining them more often.

In the developing world, in-person surveys are still the norm, but technology is allowing the development of innovative new methodologies, such as the use of computer assisted personal interview (CAPI) systems or Global Positioning System (GPS) devices, both of which may improve survey quality and reduce total survey error. But other issues abound in surveys conducted in many developing areas, in particular survey coverage and the representativeness of many survey samples.

In addition, there are many new opportunities in the field and many new data sets. Table o.i presents a list of all the academically collected and freely accessible data sets discussed in this Handbook. The number of readily accessible data sets is impressive and affords researchers the chance to answer new and old questions in different contexts. But using these data sets also presents some challenges, in particular understanding how complex survey designs affect how researchers use them. In addition to the wide range of survey data readily available today, there are also innovations in using surveys to interview experts, social media as public opinion data, poll aggregation, the integration of qualitative methods with survey designs, and the expanded use of survey experiments.

Technological advances in computing and statistics have also provided new and better methods to assess opinion in subnational contexts and have created opportunities for better methods to estimate and use latent constructs. In addition, the art of displaying data has advanced significantly, allowing researchers to use graphics to inform their decision-making process during the survey and modeling process, as well as after the fact in how the data are communicated to consumers.

These changes present new opportunities and challenges and make this Oxford University Press Handbook on Polling and Survey Methods timely. Polls, of course, tend to focus on a single question, and simple analysis of a substantive single question usually relies on simple two-variable crosstabs with demographic variables, whereas surveys focus on the answers to many questions in which a research design is often embedded. The goals of the Handbook are to outline current best practices and highlight the changing nature of the field in the way social scientists conduct surveys and analyze and present survey data. The Handbook considers four broad areas of discovery: survey design, data collection, analysis and presentation, and new frontiers. Following is a discussion of the main contributions and points of interest of each chapter.

Survey Design

The first section of the Handbook focuses on general survey methodology considerations. Because survey methodology is the study of the sources of error in surveys, with the intention of limiting as many of those sources of error as possible to produce an accurate measure or true value of the social or political world, it begins with an essay by Herbert F. Weisberg that explains the total survey error and total survey quality approach. Survey error is the difference between what the actual survey process produces and what should be obtained from it. Total survey error considers both observational and nonobservational errors. Observational error, or what is usually considered measurement error, focuses on survey questions and their relationship to the underlying attribute one is interested in measuring. Measurement error in this context is the difference between the true value and the measured value.

Errors of nonobservation focus on problems in estimating the mean and distribution of a variable from a sample instead of the full population. Although the goal in a survey is always to minimize both observational and nonobservational errors, there are constraints within the survey environment, including costs, timing, and ethics. The total survey quality approach extends the total survey error approach to consider additional criteria, including providing usable and quality data to the researcher.

The next several chapters consider various survey design issues related to the method of data collection. Survey researchers often have to ask: What is the best method to collect the data I need for my research project? Data collection methods come in two basic forms, interviewer-administered surveys or self-administered surveys, but data collection efforts must also consider the nature of the survey and whether it is crosssectional or longitudinal. Panel surveys interview the same respondent over time to track attitudes and behavior, thus measuring individual-level changes in attitudes and behavior, which cross-sectional surveys cannot easily assess. Hillygus and Snell consider the unique challenges and opportunities related to using longitudinal or panel designs, including the tension between continuity across panel waves and innovation, panel attrition, and potential measurement error related to panel conditioning of respondents and seam bias. Both the Atkeson and Adams chapter and the Ansolabehere and Schaffner chapter address issues related to survey mode. The former chapter focuses on the advantages and disadvantages associated with using mixed mode surveys, which have become increasingly popular. Mixed mode surveys are those that involve mixtures of different contact and response modes. They pay particular attention to how the presence or absence of an interviewer influences survey response, especially social desirability, and item nonresponse. Thus, they compare mail/Internet surveys to in-person/telephone surveys across a variety of dimensions and consider best practices. Ansolabehere and Schaffner focus their attention on the quality of surveys that use opt-in online nonprobability survey panels, the Cooperative

Congressional Election Study (CCES), and compare that to traditional probability samples.

Gimpel's chapter considers the geographic distribution of respondents and how context, characterized as a respondent's location, influences attitudes and behavior. Traditional sampling designs, for example, focus on strategies that allow researchers to make inferences about the population, which often limit the geographical space in which respondents are found. This tends to create small sample sizes that have limited utility in helping to understand a primary interest of social scientists, how spatial context influences opinion. Because sometimes social scientists are interested in representing places and people, they need to consider a different sampling design; Gimpel's chapter identifies when and how one can sample for context.

Oberski considers another important aspect of survey design, question wording. While many survey methodology textbooks discuss the "art" of writing questions, Oberski takes a more systematic approach, arguing that by using experiments we can better differentiate good or reliable survey questions from the bad and unreliable. To this end, Saris et al. (2012) over many years built up a large question data set that estimated the reliability and common method variance or quality of those questions, coded characteristics of those questions that related to their quality, and predicted question quality based on a meta-analysis. They then created a free Web-based application that allows researchers to input questions and obtain an estimate of their quality. The bulk of Oberski's chapter focuses on explaining the Survey Quality Predictor (SQP) tool and how researchers can use it to make question design a solid science and less of an art.

Data Collection

The Handbook's next section begins with a discussion of postelection exit polling. Exit polls offer the first look at who is voting, how they are voting, and why they are voting that way; they also offer valuable insights into political behavior, especially vote choice. These types of surveys have been part of our election landscape since 1967, and as new modes of voting have developed,

especially early and mail voting, exit polls have had to be modified to ensure they accurately reflect voters. Salvanto's chapter provides an overview of the history and value of exit polls and much needed information on how exit poll operations are managed.

Many researchers are interested in studying the attitudes and behavior of hard-to-reach populations. These individuals can be hard to reach for many different reasons. For example, some groups of people may be hard to identify (e.g., protestors), or they may be hard to locate, such as the LGBT community, which is a very small group whose members live everywhere, so that finding them in the population can be difficult and expensive. It might be hard to persuade some populations to participate, for example, politicians or their staff or people engaging in socially undesirable or illegal activities. The chapters by Adkihari and Bryant and by Berry, Chouhoud, and Junn both focus on these difficult-to-locate populations. Adkihari and Bryant consider hard-to-reach populations in international or developing contexts, while Berry et al. focus on low-incidence populations in the United States. Adkihari and Bryant build their story around a research design in Nepal that examined citizens who either fled their homes or decided to stay during the Maoist insurgency between 1996 and 2006. To examine important theoretical questions related to internally displaced people (IDP), the study first had to identify displacement patterns so that a sample of both those who decided to stay and those who fled could be drawn. The study also had to solve problems related to difficult terrain, lack of infrastructure, low-education populations, and other factors to develop a strong survey design. Berry, Choudhoun, and Junn, on the other hand, focus their chapter on

the United States and on low-incidence populations, who make up a relatively small proportion of the public that could be characterized as new immigrants, racial or ethnic minorities, religious minorities, or small populations that are relatively dispersed, such as gays or lesbians. They outline a strategy that uses a tailored or targeted approach to capture these hard-to-reach populations. They consider various attributes of these groups, such as

whether the group is geographically concentrated or dispersed or the degree of uniformity among its members, and how these attributes help to make good design decisions related to sampling, making contact and gaining cooperation, and analysis. Both chapters provide best practices, useful advice, and important considerations on successfully interviewing hard-to-reach populations.

Seligson and Moreno's chapter and Benstead's chapter focus on issues related to the developing world. Seligson and Moreno's chapter looks at the introduction of the CAPI systems as a quality control measure in face-to-face surveys in Latin America. They argue that CAPI systems improve the quality of the data collected in-person by eliminating many sources of error and allowing the researcher much more control of the field process. Benstead examines data collection issues in the Arab world, which is an often difficult and sometimes inhospitable environment for survey researchers and for social scientists more generally. Over the past several decades a variety of public opinion surveys from the Middle Eastern and North African regions have been made available to researchers (e.g., the Arab Barometer, Afrobarometer), opening up new opportunities for research in these understudied nations. Many of these nations are more accessible to researchers than they were previously, and Benstead also considers unique challenges researchers face when working in this region, as well as best practices for survey researchers.

The chapter by Perez on the connection between language and opinion rounds out the section on data collection. Given that there are so many public opinion surveys, often asking the same questions in different languages across different cultures, Perez asks what the connection between language and opinion is and how we can isolate its effects. In particular, Perez highlights how cognitive psychology can assist us in building theoretical models that help explain how and when language will influence opinion.

Analysis and Presentation
The next set of essays begins with a chapter by Gill and Homola, who discuss a variety of issues related to statistical inference and hypothesis testing using survey data. They highlight several methodological concerns regarding transparency of data, uncertainty in the process, the margin of error, and significance testing. Levin and Sinclair examine how including or excluding survey weights affects various matching algorithms. They find that weights are important to make accurate causal inferences from complex survey data. Their chapter demonstrates the need to account for characteristics of the sample to make population-based inferences.

The next chapter, by Brace, is interested in the study of subnational public opinion. Accurate and reliable measurement of subnational public opinion is especially valuable when researchers are interested in understanding how context, or the political and social environment, influences opinion, and how opinion influences government outcomes. One of the many problems with looking at these types of questions is that there is very little systematic comparative analysis across states, congressional districts, legislative districts, counties, or cities. Surveys at the subnational level are fairly unique and are conducted by different polling organizations at different times, using different methodologies and question wording. Brace discusses the history of this field and the development of various tools and methods to disaggregate national opinion polls to the subnational level to produce reliable estimates of subnational opinion.

Usually researchers are interested in abstract concepts such as political knowledge, ideology, and polarization. But these are often measured with single variables that possess a large quantity of measurement error. Chris Warshaw discusses the value of latent constructs, the various ways latent constructs have been identified, and new methodologies that are available for testing latent constructs. Proctor's chapter follows with a focus on the application of item response theory to the study of group consciousness. She demonstrates how latent constructs help to clarify the role group consciousness plays in understanding political behavior, using a study of the LGBT community, and how some of the measurement assumptions underlying group consciousness are incorrect.

Next, in their chapter Karp and Vowles examine the challenges and opportunities inherent in comparative cross-national survey research. Comparative cross-sectional research creates opportunities for examining the role differing institutions and cultures play in political behavior. They use the CSES as a vehicle to evaluate cross-cultural equivalence in questionnaire design, survey mode, response rates, and case selection.

Presentation using data visualization is valuable for public opinion researchers and consumers. Good visualization of survey and poll results can help researchers uncover patterns that might be difficult to detect in topline and cross-tabulations and can also help researchers more effectively present their results to survey and poll consumers. Therefore, two chapters are devoted to graphing opinion data. The first, by Makela, Si, and Gelman, argues that graphs are valuable at all stages of the analysis, including the exploration of raw data, weighting, building bivariate and multivariate models, and understanding and communicating those results to others. The second chapter, by Schneider and Jacoby, provides specific guidelines on when a graph and what type of graph would be most useful for displaying and communicating survey data and analytical results from survey models. Both chapters provide many useful examples and excellent ideas for ways to explore and report data.

New Frontiers
The last section of the Handbook explores new frontiers in survey methodology. It begins with an essay by Krupnikov and Findley that outlines the growth in survey experiments and their usefulness. They argue that survey experiments provide a balance between internal and external validity that provides needed leverage on opinion formation. However, this is not without some costs, especially related to the participants chosen, and researchers need to carefully consider their goals when identifying the best test for their theory.

Gimbel and Newsome turn their attention to the consideration of how qualitative data can both improve survey methodology and help to better understand and interpret survey results. They focus on three qualitative tools—focus groups, in-depth interviewing, and cognitive interviewing—and provide best practices for when and how to use these tools. Qualitative research is an important part of many public opinion research projects; Gimbel and Newsome provide a great deal of guidance about how to best conduct this type of opinion research.

Razo considers the important role of context in social research. He argues that the problem with context in social research is that it is often too vague, and that scholars need greater guidance on collecting and analyzing contextual data. Razo's chapter provides insight into how scholars can better collect and use contextual data in their analyses of individual-level opinion and behavior. Next Klašnja et al. discuss using Twitter as a source of public opinion data. They identify three main concerns with using Tweets as opinion, including how to measure it, assessing its representativeness, and how to aggregate it. They consider potential solutions to these problems and outline how social media data might be used to study public opinion and social behavior.

Many research questions involve the use of experts to identify processes, institutions, and local environments or other information that only a knowledgeable informant might have. The chapter by Maestas focuses on the use of expert surveys in providing these bits of valuable information for researchers. It considers survey and questionnaire design issues and aggregation procedures, with a focus on enhancing the validity and reliability of experts' estimates. Finally, the last chapter, by Jackson, focuses on polling aggregation and election forecasting, which is interesting to both academics and applied researchers. Her essay discusses the history of election forecasting and the use of poll aggregation, the technical and statistical demands of poll aggregation and election forecasting, and the controversies surrounding it.

Looking Back, and Looking Ahead
This Handbook has brought together a unique mixture of academics and practitioners from various backgrounds, academic disciplines, and experiences. In one sense, this is reflective of the interdisciplinary nature of polling and survey methodology: polls and surveys are widely used in

academia, government, and the private sector. Designing, implementing, and analyzing high-quality, accurate, and cost-effective polls and surveys require a combination of skills and methodological perspectives. Despite the well-publicized issues that have cropped up in recent political polling, looking back at the significant body of research that has been conducted by the authors in this Handbook, a great deal is known today about how to collect high-quality polling and survey data.

Over the course of the last several decades, the survey and polling industries have experienced rapid change. We care about quality surveys and good survey data because as social scientists we are only as good as the data we produce. Therefore, it is critical to consider best practices, guidelines, and helping researchers assess a variety of factors so that they can make good choices when they collect and analyze data. Equally important is transmitting those results to others in a clear and accessible way. This Handbook goes a long way toward providing a great deal of current information on the state of the field.

There is a bright future for further development of polling and survey methodology. Unlike the situation a few decades ago, today there are many opportunities for innovative research on how to improve polling and survey methodology. Ranging from new tools to test survey design, to innovations in how interviews are conducted (Seligson and Moreno in this Handbook), to the use of social media data to study individual opinion and behavior (Klašnja et al. in this Handbook), technology is changing the nature of survey and polling methodology. We hope that the chapters in this Handbook help researchers and practitioners understand these trends and participate in the development of new and better approaches for measuring, modeling, and visualizing public opinion and social behavior. <>

Confronting the Shadow State: An International Law Perspective on State Organized Crime by Henri Decoeur {Oxford Monographs in International Law, Oxford University Press, 9780198823933]

This book examines the rules and mechanisms of international law relevant to the suppression of state organized crime, and provides a normative justification for developing international legal mechanisms specifically designed to address this phenomenon.

State organized crime refers to the use by senior state officials of the resources of the state to facilitate or participate in organized crime, in pursuit of policy objectives or personal profit. This concept covers diverse forms of government misconduct, including strategic partnerships with drug traffickers, the plundering of a country's resources by kleptocrats, and high-level corruption schemes.

The book identifies the distinctive criminological characteristics of state organized crime, and analyses the applicability, potential, and limits of the norms and mechanisms of international law relevant to the suppression of state organized crime. In particular, it discusses whether the involvement of state organs or agents in organized crime may amount to an internationally wrongful act giving rise to the international responsibility of the state, and highlights a number of practical and normative shortcomings of the legal framework established by relevant crime-suppression conventions.

The book also sketches proposals to develop an international legal framework designed to hold perpetrators of state organized crime accountable. It presents a normative justification for criminalizing and suppressing state organized crime at the international level, proposes draft provisions for an international convention for the suppression of state organized crime, and discusses the potential role of the UN Security Council and of international criminal courts and tribunals, respectively, in holding perpetrators accountable.

Providing the first comprehensive analysis, from the perspective of international law, of a phenomenon so far mainly studied by criminologists, this study would appeal to researchers, social activists, and policy makers alike.

Excerpt: Relatively little attention has been paid to the insidious phenomenon of `state capture', the effective appropriation and systematic exploitation for mostly private gain of the institutions of government and public assets of a state by holders of high office. `Kleptocracy', as the phenomenon is also known, makes a mockery of a people's permanent sovereignty over its natural resources and its right to development, beggaring countless millions worldwide. More disheartening still, perhaps, is the reticence surrounding the diversion of the institutional and material resources of a state by its high officials for organized criminal activities, such as trafficking in drugs, arms, clandestine nuclear material, and human beings, with a view to profit.

This is not to say that nothing has been done, including by means of international law, about the global scandals of public-sector corruption and organized crime. An alloy of self-interest and cosmopolitan civic virtue on the part of certain states and the dogged labours of intergovernmental and non-governmental

organizations have given rise to a raft of sectoral, regional, and universal conventions and specific conventional provisions aimed at preventing, putting a stop to, and punishing corrupt practices on the part of rent-seeking state officials and the private-sector actors who pander to them. For its part, transnational organized crime is the subject not only of a universal convention to which 189 states are presently parties but also of three additional protocols to it.

It is Henri Decceur's thesis, however, that, aside from their practical limitations, these current international legal efforts adequately capture neither the moral essence nor material harm caused by what he terms `state organized crime'. In Confronting the Shadow State: An International Law Perspective on State Organized Crime, Dr Decceur proposes establishing state organized crime as a specific international crime, to be suppressed by combined means of a purpose-dedicated universal convention, action by the United Nations Security Council under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, and prosecution by an international criminal court or tribunal. His principled and pragmatic arguments are thoughtful and imaginative and his background account at times arresting. Many are likely to consider his programme utopian, but the same was routinely said of the abolition of slavery, the outlawry of aggressive war, and the establishment of a permanent international criminal court, all of them eventually achieved, if in practice manifestly imperfectly, via international law. Confronting the Shadow State merits and rewards an open mind.

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A few weeks after the coup that deposed former Guinean President Lansana Conté in December 2008, the state television broadcast the confession of his son and of other senior government officials telling the story of the former regime's involvement in the drug trade. Cocaine shipments from Latin America, loaded on board airplanes carrying the insignia of the Red Cross, were received at Conakry international airport by the presidential guard, transported in truck convoys under the supervision of the head of the intelligence services, and smuggled to Europe in diplomatic pouches. The

drug deals were negotiated in the president's VIP salon at the airport and in the first lady's villa.

This short description of the inner workings of a `narco-state' sheds light on the extent of the involvement of senior state officials in organized criminal activities in certain countries. It reinforces the view that organized crime exercises a 'destabilizing and corrupting influence on fundamental social, economic and political institutions', but challenges the underlying assumption commonly found in the literature that organized criminal groups are autonomous agents competing with, and weakening, the authority of the state. Where state organs themselves directly participate in organized criminal activities, organized crime may become for the state a tool of political, economic, and social control.

It is, then, not exaggerated to speak of `state organized crime'. State organized crime constitutes an advanced form of system criminality where the perpetrators, abusing their authority as officials of the state, use the state's material and human resources to commit or facilitate the commission of crimes for the purpose of profit.

This phenomenon is not a new one. History has shown that sovereigns are sometimes keen to turn to criminal means to generate the revenue needed to pursue their agenda. States facilitated or directly engaged in criminal activities where significant economic interests were at stake. Privateering, for example, generated substantial revenue in addition to weakening the enemy's economy. In some instances, it was hardly distinguishable from unlawful state-sponsored piracy. The correlation be¬tween the exercise of sovereign power and organized crime is most tellingly illustrated by the modern history of opium, starting with the trade in opium by the great colonial empires in the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Despite a ban on opium in China, opium produced in regions under the rule of the British East India Company was smuggled into China by British companies while the United Kingdom government collected tax revenues from the production and sale of opium. When China seized and destroyed illicit opium shipments, the United Kingdom responded with military force, triggering the first Opium War. A

hundred years later, Japan funded its war effort in East Asia by taking over and developing the manufacturing of opium, heroin, and cocaine in Manchukuo and Formosa, and facilitating the smuggling of drugs into China, in spite of Japan's ratification of the International Opium Conventions. Narcotics factories were supervised by the Japanese Finance Ministry, while a special branch of the Japanese army was in charge of regulating the drug trade in occupied territories.

It can be seen from these examples that state organized crime has a far-reaching impact on the international plane. As this book will show, state organized crime poses a concrete threat to international peace and security. In addition to fuelling armed conflicts and funding terrorism, it violates human rights, undermines the rule of law, and adversely affects the economy of developing countries. It is a phenomenon that challenges traditional representations of the mechanics of domestic governance and international relations. Untangling 'the complex and murky relations between criminals and political elites in many parts of the world [can help] explain much not only about local politics, but regional and global trends in world politics as well'. State organized crime is the expression of complex political and economic forces which govern informal structures of power entrenched within the state. Such structures, commonly referred to as a `shadow state', `rhizome state' (État rhizome), or 'deep state', can be observed in different forms in many states in all regions of the world and from across the spectrums of economic development and systems of government. As proceeds of organized crime reach unprecedented levels, illicit capital accumulation and diversion by state officials occur in massive proportions. If not properly addressed, state organized crime will continue to undermine the foundations of the international legal order as well as the potential of many countries to experience a peaceful and sustainable development.

Yet the magnitude of the harm caused internationally by state organized crime is not always manifest, as the involvement of governments in organized criminal activities is often cloaked in secrecy. State organized crime remains a marginal object of interest, in particular for international

legal studies. This book proposes to contribute to an enhanced understanding of the implications of this phenomenon on the international plane, by examining state organized crime from the perspective of public international law. An enquiry into international law's potential for addressing state organized crime is indeed both relevant and necessary. State organized crime involves the primary subject of international law—the state—and impacts other subjects of international law, be it states, corporations, or individuals. State organized crime raises a number of questions from the perspective of different branches of international law, such as the law of state responsibility, the law of treaties, international criminal law, and international security law. On an ethical-normative plane, state organized crime stands at odds with core principles of the international legal order. In an attempt to address these important issues, this book provides an analysis of the rules and mechanisms of international law relevant to the suppression of state organized crime, as well as a normative argument for developing international legal mechanisms specifically designed to address this phenomenon.

As Chambliss pointed out, '[t]he fact that some of the most serious social harms [...] are not defined as crime makes the study of state crime in the global age even more urgent'. The analysis performed in this volume shows that state organized crime remains largely unaddressed and unchecked by international law. Existing international law rules and mechanisms, such as the law of state responsibility or crime-suppression conventions designed to ensure individual criminal responsibility under domestic law for organized crime and corruption, are inadequate for the task of combating state organized crime. With the aim of prompting reflection on the implications of the participation of state organs in organized crime and on international law's potential for addressing this phenomenon, the book intends to provide a normative justification for addressing state organized crime at the international level and for establishing it as an international crime." It also puts forward proposals to develop an international legal framework for the suppression of state organized crime, sketching draft provisions for an international convention for the suppression of state organized crime, and considering the potential role of the UN Security Council and of international criminal courts and tribunals, respectively, in holding perpetrators accountable.

Before proceeding with the argument, the concept of state organized crime should be clearly delineated. Because 'the conceptual, definitional, and methodological issues in the realm of state crime are especially daunting', some terminological clarifications are in order.

Terminology
Using the concept of state organized crime in a piece of legal scholarship comes with challenges. First, it must succeed in convincing international lawyers that a term borrowed from criminology, with conceptual underpinnings specific to that discipline, can be useful for the purposes of legal analysis. Secondly, it must convince criminologists that the concept of 'state-organized crime' commonly known in their field may be altered to reflect particular ontological assumptions about profit-driven state criminality and to fit applicable legal concepts. As will be explained shortly, for the purposes of this book the concept of state organized crime should be read more narrowly than the concept of 'state-organized crime' used in criminology. Attentive readers will have noticed that liberty was taken to remove the hyphen, in order to reflect this distinction.

To begin with, in the term `state organized crime' the word `state' is understood as an organized political structure equipped to carry out governmental and administrative functions and possessing the monopoly over the use of coercive power within a given territory. In that sense, it does not refer to the state as a formal legal entity, as it is understood in public international law, but to the government of the state and more generally to the individuals acting as organs or agents of the state. This choice of terminology is intended to reflect the limits, from the perspective of political sciences, of the legal-formal distinction between 'the state' and the individuals acting on its behalf in circumstances where crimes are committed by state officials in their official capacity. It is not intended, however,

to call into question the validity or pertinence of such distinction in public international law. As a result, the use of the term `state organized crime' does not imply in any way that a state, as an abstract entity and vehicle for identity and responsibility under international law, can commit a crime in the legal-technical sense and face criminal responsibility. The dictum of the Nuremberg International Military Tribunal holds true: `Crimes against international law are committed by men, not by abstract entities'. That is not to say, however, that the criminal conduct of individuals acting as organs or agents of the state may not constitute an internationally wrongful act of the state giving rise to state responsibility under international law.

Secondly, contrary to the term known to criminologists, state organized crime as understood in this volume does not encompass every type of criminal activity involving a state. Rather, state organized crime is a particular form of `organized crime'. While attempts to define the concept of `organized crime' for academic or crime suppression purposes have given birth to widely disparate definitions, most have in common two key elements: a certain degree of organization of the perpetrators, and the existence of a specific financial or economic motive for engaging in criminal conduct. Under international law, the commonly accepted definition of organized crime is to be found in the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime22 (UNCTOC, or Palermo Convention). UNCTOC defines an `organized criminal group' as 'a structured group of three or more persons, existing for a period of time and acting in concert with the aim of committing one or more serious crimes or offences [...] in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit'. Simply put, as a matter of international law the lure of profit is an essential feature of organized crime. Organized criminal groups tend to deploy their efforts in lucrative activities, typically activities of an economic nature (such as illicit trade in prohibited goods, or the providing of illicit services) or related to some form of extortion (such as protection rackets, or corruption). In keeping with this premise, this book is concerned solely and

exclusively with crimes committed or facilitated by state officials for the purpose of profit, such as drug trafficking, illicit exploitation of natural resources, currency counterfeiting, corruption, embezzlement of public funds, and money laundering.

That is not to say that state organized crime may not pursue an agenda that goes beyond the satisfaction of plain material interests. As a matter of law, it is accepted that proceeds of organized crime may be used, for example, to further political objectives. This has two important consequences for the purposes of our analysis. First, all criminal activities involving a financial or other material benefit will fall under the definition of state organized crime, irrespective of whether the final purpose for the perpetrator is to obtain personal profit or to further a political agenda. Secondly and correlatively, this definition excludes conduct that is not at least partly motivated by the perspective of a financial or other material benefit. As a result and as a general rule, crimes that do not entail any form of profit as a constitutive element, including crimes committed purely for political or ideological motives, such as terrorism, and other crimes involving the use of armed violence traditionally considered to be `state crimes' par excellence such as aggression, genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes remain beyond the scope of this study. Exceptionally, however, where it can be established that such crimes were committed for the purpose of obtaining a financial or other material benefit, the latter may fall within the scope of the definition of state organized crime. This caveat is important, as crimes known as `core' international crimes may in some instances be driven by material considerations.

The question of which specific offences may be committed in the form of 'organized crime' and, by extension, of which crimes fall within the definition of state organized crime does not need to receive a definite answer. For the sake of consensus, this volume refers to conduct considered a criminal offence in the eyes of international law,26 in particular conduct that states parties to international crime-suppression conventions are required to criminalize in their domestic law.

Lastly, it is necessary to delineate the circle of perpetrators. State organized crime is different from petty corruption involving low-level civil servants. It commonly involves the highest authorities of the state—individuals entrusted with prominent public functions who have the power to devise and control the implementation of state policies, and who have the authority to harness the resources of the state to further their agenda. This element is what makes state organized crime distinctly `wrong' when compared to regular forms of organized crime and corruption. The definition of state organized crime should accordingly reflect the specific harm and wrongfulness inherent in the involvement of the most powerful officials of the state in organized crime. For the purposes of this study, state organized crime is therefore defined as being committed by 'a public official in a position to shape or influence the actions of a state'. This functional definition is similar to that used to define the perpetrators of the crime of aggression.28 As a result, not any case of organized crime or corruption involving public officials may fall within the definition of state organized crime.

To sum up, for the present purposes state organized crime can be defined as the use, by a public official in a position to shape or influence the actions of a state and acting in concert with a structured group, of the resources of the state to commit or facilitate the commission of acts criminalized in international law, in order to obtain a financial or other material benefit.

Methodology
A few words should be said about the methodology followed in this volume to establish the factual basis necessary to postulate the existence, and analyse the mechanics, of state organized crime. Information related to the criminal conduct of senior state officials is, by nature, sensitive, and therefore not easily accessible and often to be taken with a grain of salt. The criminological analysis of the phenomenon of state organized crime, conducted in Chapter 1, relies on prima facie reliable secondary sources, such as published research in criminology and political sociology; publications of international

organizations, non-governmental organizations, independent think-tanks, or domestic commissions of inquiry; judicial decisions and official records of judicial proceedings; press articles and reports from established newspapers and press agencies; and government documents such as US diplomatic cables released by WikiLeaks.

Outline of the Argument
The argument of the book is advanced in three steps. First, as a preliminary matter, a criminological analysis identifies the distinctive characteristics of state organized crime. Secondly, the book analyses the applicability, potential, and limits of the norms and mechanisms of international law relevant to the suppression of state organized crime. It discusses whether and under which conditions the involvement of state organs or agents in organized crime may amount to an internationally wrongful act giving rise to the international responsibility of the state. Turning to an analysis of mechanisms of individual criminal responsibility, the book also highlights a number of practical and normative shortcomings of the legal framework established by relevant crime-suppression conventions requiring states parties to take action to punish individuals involved in organized crime and corruption. Thirdly, the book sketches proposals to develop an international legal framework designed to hold perpetrators of state organized crime accountable. It presents a normative justification for criminalizing and suppressing state organized crime at the international level, proposes draft provisions for an international convention for the suppression of state organized crime, and discusses the potential role of the UN Security Council and of international criminal courts and tribunals, respectively, in holding perpetrators accountable.

Chapter 1 (Part I) describes the phenomenon of state organized crime. It analyses the context in which state organized crime occurs, highlighting the criminogenic mechanisms at play in `shadow states' and kleptocratic regimes. It discusses the motives underlying the involvement of state officials in organized crime, showing that state organized crime may be committed not only for the perpetrators' personal profit, but also in pursuit of

state policy or broader ideological objectives such as international terrorism. It further identifies the actors involved in state organized crime and the means through which it is perpetrated, stressing that state organized crime is committed by senior state officials abusing their authority and using the material and human resources of the state for criminal purposes. State organized crime is posited as a criminological concept to comprehend diverse forms of government misconduct driven by profit, including partnerships with organized criminal groups, the plundering of a country's resources by kleptocratic rulers, and high-level corruption schemes.

Our enquiry into international law's capacity to address state organized crime (Part II) begins in Chapter 2 with an analysis of issues of state responsibility. This chapter discusses whether and under which conditions the involvement of senior public officials in organized crime may amount to an internationally wrongful act of the state. As a preliminary matter, the chapter opens with general considerations concerning the nature of state responsibility for criminal acts committed by individuals acting as organs or agents of the state. The chapter then analyses the issue of attribution of conduct to a state, showing that the conduct of state officials using the resources of the state to commit or facilitate the commission of organized criminal activities may in many cases be considered attributable to the state. This chapter then discusses whether the participation of the organs or agents of a state in organized crime may constitute a breach of an international obligation of the state. It seeks to determine whether state participation in organized crime is prohibited as such under international law, whether pursuant to the provisions of crime-suppression conventions pertaining to organized crime and corruption, or pursuant to customary international law. To that end, it examines the potential legal implications of state organized crime under general principles of international law and under different branches of international law, examining in turn the obligation to perform treaty obligations in good faith, the obligation of states to prevent acts contrary to the rights of other states within their territory, the obligation not to intervene in the internal affairs of

another state, the obligation not to infringe another state's sovereignty over its natural resources, the obligation not to engage in pillaging in the context of an armed conflict, and the obligation under international human rights law to uphold the protection from slavery, servitude, and forced labour. Finally, this chapter discusses the conditions under which other states may be entitled to invoke the responsibility of a state involved in state organized crime where that state may be considered to have committed an internationally wrongful act. The conclusion reached is that, while state participation in organized crime may in certain cases give rise to the international responsibility of the state, overall primary and secondary rules of international law fail to regulate and attach legal consequences to the involvement of states in organized crime.

In Chapters 3 and 4, the book turns to an analysis of the rules and mechanisms of international criminal law relevant to the criminal responsibility of individuals involved in organized crime and corruption. These chapters identify the practical and normative shortcomings, for the specific purpose of combating state organized crime, of the substantive and procedural law laid out in relevant crime-suppression conventions. This part of the book lays the foundation of the argument for establishing state organized crime as an international crime, expounded in Chapter 5, and for the proposals put forward in subsequent chapters.

Chapter 3 begins by outlining the obligations of states parties to the various international instruments on organized crime and corruption, examining provisions on the criminalization of conduct under domestic law, the establishment of jurisdiction, the obligation to extradite or prosecute suspected offenders, international cooperation in criminal matters, and the confiscation and seizure of proceeds of crime.

Chapter 4 then highlights the limits of applicable crime-suppression conventions in cases of state organized crime, analysing the practical and normative shortcomings of relevant treaty provisions as well as external procedural bars such as the international law of immunities. A number of issues are identified in this chapter. First, the

applicable law is fragmented into different legal regimes implemented unevenly across national jurisdictions. Secondly, the current international crime suppression model is likely to be ineffective in politically sensitive cases because of its reliance on a territorial approach to jurisdiction. Thirdly, certain principles governing extradition proceedings and mutual legal assistance in criminal matters, such as the political offence exception, the discrimination clause, and the `essential interests' clause, can be relied on by suspected offenders or requested states parties to undermine international cooperation and law enforcement. Fourthly, the narrow formulation of the obligation aut dedere aut judicare in the relevant conventions can in certain circumstances allow offenders to escape responsibility. Fifthly, the legal regime established by the relevant instruments remains subject to the international law of jurisdictional immunities, which in certain cases shields state officials from foreign criminal proceedings as well as state property from measures of foreign judicial constraint in confiscation proceedings. Finally, and most importantly, this chapter argues that the existing law does not take into consideration the involvement of state organs and resources in organized crime, and therefore fails to fulfil a crucial expressive function.

In view of the limits of the existing law, Part III of the book sketches the contours of an international legal framework dedicated specifically to the suppression of state organized crime, focusing on mechanisms designed to hold perpetrators responsible.

Chapter 5 makes a theoretical argument for establishing state organized crime as an international crime, whether by means of a treaty or through a decision of the UN Security Council. It opens with general reflections on the function of criminalization to identify guiding principles and to establish a theoretical framework within which to make the argument, discussing the dynamics of international criminalization and identifying grounds underlying the genesis of existing international crimes. It shows that conduct considered by states to be eligible for criminalization as a matter of international law tends to present certain features, suggesting that

international criminalization serves the purpose of protecting specific interests. In light of this theoretical framework, this chapter argues that state organized crime ought to be criminalized because it threatens interests that states deem worthy of protection by way of international criminalization, constituting as it does an abuse of state authority, a threat to international peace and security, a violation of internationally guaranteed human rights, and a subversion of the rule of law and of the proper functioning of interstate cooperation. This chapter also suggests that the positing of state organized crime as an international crime would fulfil an important expressive function.

Chapter 6 then proposes the adoption and discusses the contents of a multilateral treaty by which states parties would undertake to criminalize state organized crime specifically, to adopt provisions in their domestic law to allow for more effective law enforcement, and to refrain from participating in or supporting organized criminal activities. The proposed treaty is designed to remedy certain of the limits of the existing law. First, it would provide an appropriate legal basis for prosecuting and punishing individuals involved in state organized crime. Secondly, it would enhance domestic criminal law enforcement by creating a broad obligation for states parties to establish both territorial and extraterritorial jurisdiction over the proposed crime, and by widening the scope of the obligation aut dedere aut judicare, with a view to pressuring states parties genuinely to initiate proceedings against suspected offenders present in their territory. Thirdly, it would open the door for the international responsibility of a state involved in organized crime. Last but not least, it would fulfil a necessary expressive function.

This volume also explores other means to suppress state organized crime at the international level, as an alternative or a complement to the proposed treaty. Chapter 7 discusses the potential role of the UN Security Council in the suppression of state organized crime. It suggests that in situations involving armed violence or a terrorist threat, state organized crime can be characterized as a threat to the peace, which opens the door for the

adoption by the Security Council of binding measures under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. This chapter proposes that the Security Council require UN member states to establish state organized crime as a criminal offence in their domestic law and to cooperate to bring offenders to justice. It is suggested that a Security Council decision could usefully complement or provide a substitute for a multilateral treaty for the purpose of establishing state organized crime as an international crime. In addition, this chapter proposes that the Security Council require member states to freeze the assets of state officials and entities suspected of being involved in state organized crime. Such sanctions would fulfil prescriptive, expressive, and preventive functions. This chapter argues that the proposed measures can be taken in conformity with the UN Charter and that they would be in line with the contemporary practice of the Security Council.

Lastly, Chapter 8 discusses the potential role of international criminal courts and tribunals in prosecuting individuals suspected of being involved in state organized crime. Operating on the premise that a number of obstacles undermining law enforcement at the domestic level could be overcome by an international criminal court or tribunal, it outlines the potential merits and challenges of prosecuting offenders before such courts or tribunals. It identifies potential advantages common to international criminal courts and tribunals, namely the unavailability of jurisdictional immunities as a procedural bar, the greater likelihood of a genuine investigation, the existence of formal rules to deal with concurrent claims of jurisdiction, the capacity to address complex cases of system criminality, and the expressive potential of international criminal courts and tribunals. It then considers the respective advantages and disadvantages of different institutional mechanisms that could be used or adapted for the prosecution of state organized crime, examining in turn the International Criminal Court (ICC), international ad hoc tribunals, and the future criminal chamber of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights (ACJHR). It reaches the conclusion that, while international criminal courts and tribunals may in some circumstances appear better equipped to deal with cases of state

organized crime than their domestic counterparts, recourse to an international criminal court or tribunal would come with difficulties perhaps even greater than those associated with prosecuting offenders domestically. <>

[Rule Makers, Rule Breakers: How Tight and Loose Cultures Wire Our World](#) by Michele Gelfand [Scribner, 9781501152931]

In [Rule Makers, Rule Breakers](#) celebrated cultural psychologist Michele Gelfand takes us on an epic journey through human cultures, offering a startling new view of the world and ourselves. With a mix of brilliantly conceived studies and surprising on-the-ground discoveries, she shows that much of the diversity in the way we think and act derives from a key difference—how tightly or loosely we adhere to social norms.

Why are clocks in Germany so accurate while those in Brazil are frequently wrong? Why do New Zealand's women have the highest number of sexual partners? Why are "Red" and "Blue" States really so divided? Why was the Daimler-Chrysler merger ill-fated from the start? Why is the driver of a Jaguar more likely to run a red light than the driver of a plumber's van? Why does one spouse prize running a "tight ship" while the other refuses to "sweat the small stuff?"

In search of a common answer, Gelfand has spent two decades conducting research in more than fifty countries. Across all age groups, family variations, social classes, businesses, states and nationalities, she's identified a primal pattern that can trigger cooperation or conflict. Her fascinating conclusion: behavior is highly influenced by the perception of threat.

With an approach that is consistently riveting, [Rule Makers, Rule Breakers](#) thrusts many of the puzzling attitudes and actions we observe into sudden and surprising clarity.

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Excerpt: It's 11:00 p.m. in Berlin. Not a single car is in sight, yet a pedestrian waits patiently at the crosswalk until the light turns green. Meanwhile, four thousand miles away in Boston, at rush hour, commuters flout the "Do Not Cross" sign as they dart in front of cabs. To the south, where it's 8:00 p.m. in São Paulo, locals are frolicking in string bikinis in public parks. Up in Silicon Valley, it's midafternoon and T-shirted employees at Google are playing a game of Ping-Pong. And in Zurich, at the Swiss bank UBS, which for years mandated a forty-four-page dress code, executives burning the midnight oil have barely loosened their ties.

We may tease Germans for being excessively orderly or Brazilians for showing too much skin, but we rarely consider how these differences came about. Far beyond dress codes and pedestrian patterns, people's social differences run deep and broad—from politics to parenting, management to worship, and vocations to vacations. In the past several thousand years humanity has evolved to the point where there now exist 195 countries, and more than seven thousand languages and many thousands of religions. Even within a single nation, such as the United States, there are countless differences in fashion, dialect, morals, and political

orientation—sometimes among those who live in close proximity. The diversity of human behavior is astonishing, especially since 96 percent of the human genome is identical to that of chimpanzees, whose lifestyles, unlike humans, are far more similar across communities.

We rightly celebrate diversity and condemn division, yet we're shockingly ignorant of what underlies both of these things: culture. Culture is a stubborn mystery of our experience and one of the last uncharted frontiers. We've used our big brains to accomplish unbelievable technical feats. We've discovered the laws of gravity, split the atom, wired the Earth, eradicated fatal diseases, mapped the human genome, invented the iPhone, and even trained dogs to ride skateboards. But somehow, despite all of our technical prowess, we've made surprisingly little progress in understanding something equally important: our own cultural differences.

Why are we so divided, despite the fact that we're more technologically connected than ever? Culture is at the heart of our divisions, and we need to know more about it. For years, policy experts and laypeople alike have struggled to find a deep underlying factor to explain our sprawling, complex cultural traits and distinctions. Many times we focus on superficial characteristics that are the "symptoms of culture: We try to explain our cultural divides in terms of geography, thinking that people behave the way they do because they live in blue states or red states, in rural or urban areas, in Western or Eastern nations, in the developing or developed world. We wonder if culture can be explained by differences in religion or our different "civilizations: These distinctions have typically left us with more questions than answers because they miss the deeper basis of our differences—they don't get at the underlying primal template of culture.

A more compelling answer has been hiding in plain sight. Just as simple principles can explain a whole lot in fields such as physics, biology, and mathematics, many cultural differences and divides can be explained through a simple shift in perspective.

Behavior, it turns out, largely depends on whether we live in a tight or loose culture. The side of the divide that a culture exists on reflects the strength of its social norms and the strictness with which it enforces them. All cultures have social norms—rules for acceptable behavior—that we regularly take for granted. As children, we learn hundreds of social norms—for example, to not grab things out of other people's hands; to walk on the right side of the sidewalk (or the left, depending on where you live); to put on clothes each day. We continue to absorb new social norms throughout our lives: what to wear to a funeral; how to behave at a rock concert versus a symphony; and the proper way to perform rituals—from weddings to worship. Social norms are the glue that holds groups together; they give us our identity, and they help us coordinate in unprecedented ways. Yet cultures vary in the strength of their social glue, with profound consequences for our worldviews, our environments, and our brains.

Tight cultures have strong social norms and little tolerance for deviance, while loose cultures have weak social norms and are highly permissive. The former are rule makers; the latter, rule breakers. In the United States, a relatively loose culture, a person can't get far down their street without witnessing a slew of casual norm violations, from littering to jaywalking to dog waste. By contrast, in Singapore, where norm violations are rare, pavements are pristine, and jaywalkers are nowhere to be found. Or consider Brazil, a loose culture, where clocks on city streets all read a different time, and arriving late for business meetings is more the rule than the exception. In fact, if you want to be very sure someone will arrive on time in Brazil, you say "com pontualidade britânica," which means "with British punctuality: Meanwhile, in Japan, a tight country, there's a huge emphasis on punctuality—trains almost never arrive late. On the rare days that delays do occur, some train companies will hand out cards to passengers that they can submit to their bosses to excuse a tardy arrival at work.

For centuries, people assumed there were as many explanations for these cultural permutations and rifts as there were examples of them. But what I'll show in this book is that there is a deep structure that underlies cultural variation. A pivotal discovery is that the strength of a culture's norms isn't random or accidental. It has a hidden logic that makes perfectly good sense.

Intriguingly, the same tight-loose logic that explains differences across nations also explains differences across states, organizations, social classes, and households. Tight-loose differences emerge in boardrooms, classrooms, and bedrooms, around negotiating tables and dinner tables. Seemingly idiosyncratic features of our everyday lives— including how we behave on public transit and at the gym, and the kinds of conflicts we have with our friends, partners, and children—all fundamentally reflect tight-loose differences. Are you a rule maker or a rule breaker? I'll show you some of the reasons why you might lean in either direction.

Beyond our immediate community, tight-loose differences can explain global patterns of conflict, revolution, terrorism, and popu-lism. Around the world, tight-loose operates as a universal fault line, causing cultural cohesion to buckle and rifts to open up. The rifts aren't just blared in headlines; they surface in daily interactions.

Tight-loose not only explains the world around us, but actually can predict the conflicts that will erupt—and suggests ways to avoid them. Tight-loose is the key to anticipating our divides—mild clashes, in the case of a construction worker rolling his eyes at a gold-cuff-linked Wall Streeter, or more lethal ones, such as when those who live by the tenets of a sacred text come in contact with those who dismiss guiding texts altogether. For many, to enter this book will be to enter "The Matrix" and see the world in a completely different way. <>

[The Routledge History of World Peace since 1750](#) edited by Christian Philip Peterson, William M. Knoblauch, and Michael Loadenthal [Routledge Histories, Routledge, 9781138069138]

[The Routledge History of World Peace since 1750](#) examines the varied and multifaceted scholarship surrounding the topic of peace and engages in a fruitful dialogue about the global history of peace since 1750.

Interdisciplinary in nature, the book includes contributions from authors working in fields as diverse as history, philosophy, literature, art, sociology, and Peace Studies. The book crosses the divide between historical inquiry and Peace Studies scholarship, with traditional aspects of peace promotion sitting alongside expansive analyses of peace through other lenses, including specific regional investigations of the Middle East, Africa, Latin America, and other parts of the world. Divided thematically into six parts that are loosely chronological in structure, the book offers a broad overview of peace issues such as peacebuilding, state building, and/or conflict resolution in individual countries or regions, and indicates the unique challenges of achieving peace from a range of perspectives.

Global in scope and supported by regional and temporal case studies, the volume is an essential resource for educators, activists, and policymakers involved in promoting peace and curbing violence as well as students and scholars of Peace Studies, history, and their related fields.

Excerpt: Disciplines in dispute history, peace studies, and the pursuit of peace

During the fall of 2016, one of the editors of this anthology, a historian, dined with two social scientists. Their conversation proceeded pleasantly enough until one of the social scientists asked, provocatively: Why would anyone read works by historians who produced "unsophisticated" narratives that almost always lacked basic quantitative analysis. The historian responded by asking who actually understood the jargon of social scientific articles that more often than not overlooked the complexities of historical causation. "How could anyone take the assumptions like parsimony or the `rational actor' theory seriously," the historian quipped, "when they produce theories that usually collapse under the weight of close historical scrutiny and prove so bad at predicting the future?" "Come on," the social scientists responded, "historians use the inevitable limits of theory building to hide their ignorance of quantitative methods and other kinds of `sophisticated' analysis. Please tell us: What have historians written that will actually help people make this world a better place?"

The posing of such a question would no doubt raise the eyebrows of peace historians such as Lawrence Wittner, Sandi E. Cooper, and Ralph Summy, who have dedicated their lives to producing scholarship designed to help human beings end the scourge of war and reduce the many different forms of violence. These scholars might also point out that, before them, posthumous peace historians such as Merle Curti and Charles Chatfield used their writings to highlight the follies of "realistic" wars and inspire people not to fall victim to "blind patriotism" or unquestioning obedience to authority.' Yet, for all of the stereotypes it contains, the conversation described above does reveal an important reality: There remains a divide between historians who write about peace and the social scientists who work in the discipline of Peace and Conflict Studies (PCS) or Peace Studies (PS).

Instead of seeing this gulf as unbridgeable, the editors of this anthology have compiled a collection of essays designed to produce a fruitful interdisciplinary dialogue about the global history of peace since 1750. Recognizing the inherent interdisciplinary nature of peace research, we have compiled essays from authors in the fields of history, popular culture, philosophy, literature, art, sociology, anthropology, gender studies, and

diplomacy. Crossing the divide between historical inquiry and Peace Studies scholarship, this collection hopes to provide both traditional aspects of peace promotion as well as more expansive analyses of peace through other lenses, including specific regional investigations (the Middle East, Africa, Latin America, etc.) and PS. Loosely chronological in organization, this work's thematic categories promise to help readers and scholars better grasp the unique challenges of achieving peace from different scholarly perspectives.

The interdisciplinary nature of this volume offers a broader view of peace issues than many existing works that largely focus on topics such as peacebuilding, state building, and/or conflict resolution in individual countries or regions. Our approach builds upon previous scholarly analyses of peace promotion in the non-Western world since 1750, to advance the important point that those struggling for peace have often conceived of their efforts in international terms and worked to forge transitional connections with each other. However, because this collection is interdisciplinary in nature, some clarification of definitions is in order—for example, with the use of terms such as "transnational" and "internationalism." Throughout, we adhere to diplomatic historian Akira Iriye's definition of "internationalism" as attempts to reformulate foreign and domestic policies in ways designed to overcome hatred of "the other" in ways that "establish a more interdependent, cooperative, and mutually tolerant international community." The term "transnational," then, refers to the "contacts, exchanges, discourses," and information flows that "cut across or permeate at least two nation-states" at various intensities.

Readers will also encounter the term "civil society" at various points in this volume, a term best understood as "un-coerced association between the individual and the state in which people undertake ... collective action" in pursuit of non-violent goals that are mostly "independent from government and the market." To promote peace, civil society actors strive to protect citizens against governmental violence and hold non-governmental and state actors accountable for their behavior. Besides helping with the delivery of needed services, they also help build "social cohesion" or "social capital" between different societal actors and promote dialogue between citizens of different groups, as well as the state.

However unfamiliar some readers might be with such terms, they should remember that the interdisciplinary nature of this collection promises to play a role in helping historians of peace and PS social scientists find more common ground in their work.' If scholars keep an open mind, they can then draw on these essays to write fuller, richer works on the subject of peace, regardless of discipline. To understand why this is so, the next two sections will explain how PS scholars and historians have typically written about the subject of peace in different ways.

Peace and Conflict Studies or Peace Studies

The academic study of peace—commonly referred to as Peace Studies (PS) or Peace and Conflict Studies (PCS) has made key contributions to a variety of interrelated fields over the last century. While the pursuit of peace has ancient roots and histories, as a discernable aim of scholarship, it dates back to the period following World War I (1914-1918), gaining wider support and interest following the end of World War II (1945). Since 2000, this interest has taken great strides towards institutionalization through the establishment and expansion of curricula, peace studies programs in post-secondary education, academic journals and books, and the rise of academic associations and conferences focused on the promotion of peace.8 What began as a reflective process—one that aimed to understand the geopolitical constitution that led to inter-state armed conflict—has since blossomed into a global interdisciplinary field of scholarship and practice. This collection highlights contemporary schools in this field, investigating the history of peace scholarship from various perspectives and through multiple cases studies. Prior to surveying the contributions contained in this collection, it is beneficial to provide an overview of the salient discourses in the field, broken down into four key areas: 1. understanding violence through a multi-layered and structured analysis, 2. critiquing negative peace while promoting positive peace (both defined below), 3. the promotion of peace

education and research, and, 4. the promotion of non-violence, social change, and the prefiguration of a more peaceful world.

One of the primary contributions of PS in its most fundamental form is the field's focus on developing a nuanced and contextually embedded model for understanding the variety of forms violence takes, from the direct (e.g., war, physical assaults) to the structural (e.g., poverty, racism). In this mariner, conflict is separated from violence as the former is not inherently problematic while the latter is to be avoided. Marie Dugan, in her "Nested Theory of Conflict" asserts this point, writing, "Conflict, as most conflict theorists and resolvers agree, is neither good nor bad but simply an integral part of life, necessary for growth and change (and for deterioration and regression.'" PS has often embraced spaces created by conflict while functioning to mitigate, confront, and transform systems of inequality, marginalization, and coercion that manifest violently. Furthermore, this layered analysis of violence often directly investigates the causes of violent conflict, separating the influences into segments such as the individual, group, state, interstate, and the more generalized ideological, social, and economic.

After disassociating violence from conflict, PS has championed a structural analysis that privileges a multi-layered engagement with the topic. This is not to claim a monopoly on such an approach to the field of PS as many disciplines such as Anthropology, Psychology," and continental philosophy" have utilized complementary methods, even developing textbook-length volumes focused on these matters.' Sometimes this structural, layered analysis has separated violence into its ideological social and economic factors, or differentiated between its deployment and its causes, while others have focused more on the varied actors in a conflict, and the diverse strata they inhabit; examples include "system level," "supra-national," and "regional" or "system," "sub-system," "relational," and "issues-specific" strata. One feature that these interdisciplinary conversations share is a clear separation between the violence which is commonly acknowledged and that which is more clandestine and pervasive. Johan Galtung famously modeled this as distinguishing between

"direct violence," "structural violence," and "cultural violence," while philosophers such as Slavoj Zizek have chosen other labels such as "subjective" versus "objective" or "direct" and "indirect." Throughout the various definitions and models present, PS clearly advances an understanding of violence that is bifurcated between that which "kills slowly [versus] violence that kills quickly ... violence that is anonymous [versus] violence that has an author."

One can also credit PS with the advancement of this scholarship which has become increasingly mainstreamed into political and policy levels. For example, the government of the Canadian province of Newfoundland and Labrador hosts a website that defines "violence and abuse," and while the model put forth does not function on a structural level, it does identify nine "distinct forms of violence and abuse" separated as physical violence, sexual violence, emotional violence, psychological violence, spiritual violence, cultural violence, verbal abuse, financial abuse, and neglect. Not only does the inclusion of cultural violence signal the influence of peace theorists such as Galtung, but the inclusion of non-physical occurrences shows the influence that the academic field has had on actual State practice.

A secondary contribution of PS to the discourse of conflict and violence can be found in the distinction made between "negative peace" and "positive peace." The terminology is rooted (again) in the work of Galtung and emerged from this theorist's above-mentioned distinctions between structural and actualized forms of violence. This notion similarly recalls the realist/Realpolitik notion of peace, located in "whenever war or other direct forms of organized state violence are absent." For Galtung, the goal of simply negating the forms of violence that one can observe such as war, violent crime, interpersonal assault, etc., constitutes a negative form of peace through simply seeking to avoid violence. Instead, Galtung promotes the expansion of peace, and the conditions necessary for the positive advancement of the socio-political order and the spreading of justice. Such a positive peace approach seeks to develop justice within areas commonly ignored in more normative discourses such as environmental justice, economic justice, and social justice. In other words, "positive

peace is when social justice has replaced structural violence."

Such a shift towards positive peace may not inherently avoid conflict as conflict can be separated from violence but nevertheless seeks to utilize such occurrences towards positive, constructive, and even utopian ends. As one PS theorist remarked in 1980, "conflict can be a useful and necessary tool for establishing and maintaining peace ... [as] humans do not avoid violence by reducing conflict." Galtung remarks that in this manner, positive peace can be thought of "as a synonym for all other good things in the world community, particularly cooperation and integration between human groups, with less emphasis on the absence of violence." Within the Galtungian model, the notion of peace is inclusive of both the "internal states of a human being" as well as "the absence of organized collective violence ... between major human groups; particularly nations, but also between classes, racial and ethnic groups."

In contrast, Galtung explains negative peace as the "absence of violence, absence of war" when compared to the positive. This can be understood as the difference between diagnosing and treating disease (i.e., negative peace) and the promotion of health (i.e., positive peace). Such a focus on critiquing negative peace has often come from an analysis of the methods used to address violent, inter and intra-State conflict such as military interventionism, policing, anti-war social movements, international law, arms control and disarmament. Critiquing these negative approaches, Galtung argues that the creation of peace must be pursued through peaceful, cooperative, inclusive, sustainable, prefigurative praxis (defined here as the embodiment of theory, and/or the melding of ideas and practice)—and not through military might and statecraft.33 While these negative pursuits can help to reduce the frequency of war and other forms of violent conflict, they do not serve to develop the conditions for a harmonious society that meets the psychological, social, emotional, spiritual, and material needs of the population. For the wider field, the promotion of positive peace includes the advancement of human rights and dignity, democratic values and participation, reconciliation, and the pursuit of

economic, ecological, and spiritual well-being. PS helps to correct for the largely negative peace approach promoted in complementary fields such as Political Science, International Relations, Security Studies, Economics, and Government. While Galtung is not without his critics, his notion of promoting peace versus preventing violence has gained prominence since its original introduction.

A third key contribution of the PS approach has been the articulation and advancement of peace education, peace research, and PS as a scholarly pursuit both within the Ivory Tower of academia as well as through community programs and pre-collegiate education although this involves exposing students to the history, theory, and practices of violence prevention and response. The field then is far broader than simply relaying on the articulation of personal and interpersonal skills such as dispute resolution and peer mediation. PS as a field of study is inherently interdisciplinary (some would say trans-disciplinary) borrowing frequently from Sociology, Anthropology, Psychology, Communication, Economics, International Studies, Security Studies, International Relations, Political Science, Government, Gender Studies, Law, Philosophy, Ethics and more. This genealogy is both a product of the field's development and an intentional intervention that allows scholars to move beyond the "narrow aspect of human behavior ... that most naturally fits its own methodological approaches and assumption." The field of PS is also multidirectional as some theorists focus on a variety of approaches including history, philosophy, and rhetoric while others take on a more practice-based approach, focusing on alternative dispute resolution, mediation, arbitration, policy negotiation, or post-conflict governing. Within these formulations, the field can function through both normative and analytic frames; seeking to establish both what peace is and what peacemaking looks like (i.e., normative), as well as how one establishes peace, where one observes the causes and effects of non-peace, etc. (i.e., analytic). This multiplicity of approaches, disciplines and perspectives has led some to question whether PS is a discipline though which proponents respond that this is far from the only interdisciplinary area of study with varied methodologies, assumptions and precise subjects.

Scholars are quick to point out that as a knowledge trajectory, "precursors of PS, peace education and peace research go back to ancient times ... [yet] the systematic practice of peace education began in the twentieth century." This increased institutionalization of the field has been led by both educators and students, the latter of which began to organize oncampus clubs following the US Civil War (1861-1865). In its more contemporary forms, many are familiar with programs to counter bullying or gun violence, yet far fewer seem knowledgeable about the systematic investigation of peace as practice and pedagogy. While the prevention of bullying or gun violence is important (negative) peace work, the peace research emphasis has been the advancement of knowledge suited for the building of a better future, not simply a less violent present. In this manner, peace education is a forward thinking, proscriptive approach that seeks to understand not only the factors that can help to reduce violent conflict (i.e., increase negative peace), but also to construct a more justice-centric world beyond the rejection of violence. As practice, peace education, and research can also serve to establish peace as a structure and process that seeks to "institutionalize the values of peace and the presence of social justice, participation and diversity." In this manner, the practice of studying peace can help to disseminate peaceful interactions that lead to peaceful practices, patterns, and finally, peaceful structures.

Finally, Galtung and co-author Charles Webel caution proponents of PS that the advancement of the field will likely encounter more resistance in the future within the ranks of academia. Such a development will probably take place because as PS scholars become more critical of the status quo and encourage both structural and practice-base change, they will inevitably challenge established interests and institutional power structures. As Galtung and Webel note, "other academic disciplines may react [to attacks on the status quo] by trying to marginalize, eliminate, prevent and/or co-opt PS ... claim[ing] that PS is superfluous, since the existing disciplines already allegedly cover what PS teaches." Such a move will likely face (non-violent) resistance from proponents of peace

scholarship as the field struggles to maintain its core values and create new inroads in an international climate with greater precarity, insecurity, and interactivity than ever before.

Non-violence is often portrayed as a manner of living, a way of life, or a philosophical perspective, though a grand contribution of PS is the introduction of pacifism and nonviolence as analytical perspectives, political projects, and methodologies for intervention in diverse contexts from communication to political mobilization. The field has also helped to destabilize the binary portrayal of violence v. non-violence, and instead to offer these labels as values within a wider continuum of action. PS has also helped to challenge the linkage between pacifist non-violence and a religious approach, offering secular, revolutionary, and anti-occupation models for such forms of collective action. This diverse presentation has helped to advance the notion that non-violence is a potent and forceful revolutionary strategy for social change—sometimes called the pragmatic tradition of non-violence—that can maintain its avoidance of violence and coercion. This perspective supports the claim that non-violent action is active (i.e., not passive) and proscriptive, not simply a critique of violent forms. These suggestive positions have taken a variety of forms in terms of practice and approach, including those advocating personal transformation, promoting non-violent communication, encouraging consumer practices, integrating religious approaches, and critiquing normative social practices from the eating of non-human animals to the use of automobiles as a form of mass transportation. At the level of mitigating war and inter-state conflicts, a non-violent approach derived from PS has been used to advocate for civilian-based defense (CBD) including community-level structures and techniques that could be mobilized to resist foreign invasion or occupation, or the rise of authoritarian domestic governments. Other complementary approaches, such as unarmed civilian peacekeeping (UCP) have been used widely in conflict as well as in post-conflict zones to help minimize civilian causalities such as in the conflict in Colombia (between Marxist guerrillas and right-wing paramilitaries), and the

ongoing conflict in the Occupied Palestinian Territories.

PS has also served to increase the acknowledgment and study of such methods that have all too often been historically ignored in the face of more well-known violent modes of politics and social change. This excavation serves a key function of identifying how nonviolent means can be used in the resolution of social, political, and other conflicts. Peace educator and pacifist advocate Colman McCarthy makes this point clear when he argues: "If we do not teach our children peace, someone else will teach them violence." Nearly seventy years before McCarthy's warning, another scholar, Richard Gregg, explored the ways in which forms of mass non-violent action interacted with State-level change. In this manner, Gregg addresses this historical gap, writing:

> There have been many instances of successful use of non-violent resistance in different countries and at different times. As the taste of historians inclines more towards politics and wars, these other events have received but slight attention at their hands, and the records of many of them have been lost.

Gregg's point has been made clearer by recent investigations by scholars and long-term political projects (e.g., Albert Einstein Institute, International Center on Non-violent Conflict) which seek to elevate non-violent forms of political action as viable modes of scholarship, politics, and social movement strategies.

Books on the topic of non-violent social change (i.e., non-violent civil resistance studies) seem to be on the rapid upsurge, and the inclusion of such modes of action within larger discussions of violent social change (e.g., The Arab Spring) is becoming both more accepted and expected. This has included the elevation of discussions of a peace-based praxis that marries the theory and practice of peace with notions of political mobilization, structure, tactics, and rhetoric. This tendency notes that for practitioners of non-violence, there is a crucial interdependence of means and ends as "a goal of peace can only be achieved by the use of nonviolence." Peace practitioners have helped to reframe nonviolence as a proactive not simply reactive—force for change. Famed proponents including Mohandas Gandhi and Martin Luther King Jr. (both featured in chapters of this collection) encouraged forceful yet nonviolent modes of struggle, not only in response to colonialism and systematic racism, but also to set forth a vision of society separated from the ills they sought to confront.

Finally, the strategic use of nonviolence as a guideline for social change has persistently challenged the notion that nonviolence "does not work," implying that violence has a higher rate of success and thus legitimacy. While certainly it is simple to illustrate failed attempts to challenge violence with nonviolence, it is equally simple to demonstrate the vast majority of occurrences when violence failed to meet a community's needs. If the goal is to annihilate one's enemy, destroy their infrastructure, starve their people and destabilize their economy, then violence has a great success rate. However, as PS is prefigurative, utopian, and principally focused on creating positive peace, its practitioners view the track record for violent, militaristic success as quite bleak. This argument represents a key paradigm shift put forth by peace theorists, one that seeks to reimage what constitutes successful conflict. According to a groundbreaking quantitative study by Erica Chenoweth and Maria Stephan, campaigns for social change that employ nonviolent means were nearly twice as likely to succeed as violent campaigns. These nonviolent, civil resistance movements tend to be more diverse and inclusive, and they serve to usher in more justice-centric post-conflict societies and thus prevent cyclical paths towards recurring conflict.

The field of PS has rapidly expanded in the last century, accelerating its pace in the period following World War II. While this often amorphous field has diverse academic footprints, its contributions to notions of structural violence, critiquing negative peace, understanding the role of education and research, and advancing nonviolence as a means of social change should stand out as exemplary. These areas have sought to create borders for the field, but also to critique prominent socio-political paradigms entrenched in the related fields of Political Science, International Relations, and others. Here we can see, for

example, the contributions of PS to critiques of liberal approaches to peace that embrace the importing of democratic structures, market-centric economic reforms, the rule of law, and the development of institutions (see below for more on this topic). A PS approach has been keenly positioned to critique such programs for their lack of local leadership, their Eurocentrism, and their emphases on hierarchical institution building and the creation of entrenched bureaucracies. While not the focus of the preceding discussion, it can be argued that the mainstreaming of PS has also facilitated more mainstreamed critiques of these forms of liberalism and (Western) State-driven conflict interventions.

It is at this juncture—precisely where policy meets critique—that PS is most vibrant. In its rejection of such values, a PS framework seeks to be visionary, prefigurative, and situated in an ethic of justice. This is often through Galtung's identification of structural forms of violence and his rejection of negative forms of peace, and the success of such an approach cannot be overstated. Students of global politics must be keenly aware of the failing record of violent, military approaches to the resolution of conflicts. As cities are leveled, populations decimated, and economies stunted, generals and Presidents claim victory as their enemy is vanquished. However, what is the real victory of ending a military conflict simply to begin a more entrenched conflict of resource scarcity, insecurity, disease, and infrastructure failure?

PS bravely questions the notion of victory while seeking to proscribe a better way. Perhaps the real value of the field is its openness; its methodological, ideological, and strategic plurality and willingness to embrace change. Perhaps the history of PS is best understood as the history of attempts to create a new world in the shell of the old.

Historiography of peace scholarship
The methodologies and publications of social scientists in PS lead us now to the issue of where the writings of historians fit into this field; historians including Charles Howlett and Lawrence Wittner, for example, would place their works firmly within PS.59 In large measure, this identification can be

traced back to the writings of historian Merle Curti and the work of the Peace History Society (PHS). During his long and productive career at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, Curti became "the most important figure to work at channeling scholarship into the quest for world peace" with the publication of works including The American Peace Crusade, 1815-1860 (1929), Bryan and World Peace (1931), and Peace or War: The American Struggle, 1636-1936 (1937).60 When paired with his advising of numerous historians such as Arthur Ekrich, Jr., Curti's scholarship played a crucial role in establishing the history of peace as a legitimate field of study that addresses issues as diverse as causes of war, the contours of peace activism, and the prevention of wars. He also demonstrated the importance of examining "the efforts of conscientious objectors and passive nonresisters," as well as "direction action nonviolence." Instead of confining his work to the myriad of diplomatic initiatives designed to promote peace, Curti used Peace or War to strengthen the idea that historians could not fully explain the failures of peace activism without paying close attention to the social and economic factors that led to wars and other forms of state violence. By making these contributions, Curti did much to legitimate the idea that scholarship could play an important role in helping private citizens and policymakers forge a more humane and peaceful world.

Curti also helped establish the PHS, an organization that came together in 1964 when "nearly fifty historians" attended an "informal meeting" at the annual American Historical Association (AHA) in Philadelphia, PA. Well aware that social scientists had created the Peace Research Institute in Washington, D.C. and Center for Research on Conflict Resolution at the University of Michigan, Curti urged historians not to avoid the subject of peace just so they could maintain their scholarly detachment from the events that they wrote about. "Was it really appropriate to separate ourselves as scholars from ourselves as human beings," he asked the audience, when "scholarly study might help in understanding the problems of war and peace." These sorts of arguments resulted in the creation of a committee that founded the Conference on Peace Research in

History (CPRH), which held its first joint session with the AHA in 1966. CPRH members renamed their organization PHS in 1994.63

The PHS has made important contributions to the study of peace. Committed to "making peace research relevant to scholarly disciplines, policymakers, and their own societies," the PHS has sponsored numerous panels at the annual meetings of the Organization of American Historians (AHA), the American Military Institute, the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations (SHAFR), and the International Peace Research Association (IPRA). Besides sponsoring conferences, the PHS created the Peace History Commission (PHC) and made it a part of the IPRA. The PHC built on the previous efforts of the PHS and worked to create a "worldwide network of peace-oriented historians" by helping Americans attend conferences in countries such as Hungary, South Africa, and Austria.

The PHS has also played an important role in encouraging the production of interdisciplinary peace scholarship, such as The Garland Library of War and Peace. Published between 1972 and 1977, this edited collection of 360 titles consists of works that cover topics such as peace activism, biography, political science, art, and international law. The PHS has also sponsored notable scholarship, such as Harold Josephson's Biographical Dictionary of Modern Peace Leaders (1985), and Charles DeBendetti's Peace and Heroes in Twentieth Century America (1988). Recognizing the growing need to examine peace from a global perspective, PHS helped produce the Peace/Mir anthology in 1994, an edited volume consisting of primary documents related to the subject of peace that US and Soviet academics produced after a series of meetings during the early 1990s.

Perhaps the most important work that the PHS has published is the journal Peace & Change. The PHS (then CPRH) founded Peace & Change in 1972 as an interdisciplinary publication featuring cutting-edge peace scholarship from authors in numerous disciplines. In 1978, this journal "acquired the co-sponsorship of the Consortium of Peace Research, Education, and Development (COPRED)," a group that "had more of a social science orientation" than PHS. COPRED merged with the Peace Studies Association in 2001 to become the Peace and Justice Studies Association (PJSA), an organization that still sponsors Peace & Change as its official journal. Despite its interdisciplinary nature, Peace & Change commonly contains more articles written by historians than scholars from other disciplines, a fact that raises the question: Where does peace history fit into the field of PS? Instead of submitting their articles to this journal, social scientists have more frequently published in the Journal of Conflict Resolution or Journal of Peace Research, two publications that privilege analytical explanations of why conflicts take place. As of 2017, the PJSA is debating whether or not to continue sponsoring Peace & Change as its official journal given the growing historical orientation of the publication.

Seeking peace between disciplines
The growing divide between PS social scientists and peace historians reflects an ongoing debate about how best to define the field of peace history. As the previous sections show, a PS perspective can be critical of historical scholarship for its over-emphasis on wars and conflict—not a surprising trend considering that the field was founded on the study of warfare, but a valid criticism for those who feel such works reinforce a culture of conflict. Conversely, historians might counter that without continued examinations of the historical and structural root causes of conflict, enduring peace cannot be possible. These debates intensified in the 1980s with the "Cultural Turn" in the historical field, which firmly rooted literary criticism into increasingly interdisciplinary historical practices. Here, the term "narrative" deserves special definition: The simulation or illustrating of past events in ways that both advance an argument with evidence and engage the reader. Historians are cognizant that the construction of narratives relies on literary structures borrowed from fiction—and by definition such an approach often relies on the use of conflict a problematic reality for those studying peace, and appropriately this is the focus of Carolyn Dekker's chapter in this collection. A full dissection of narrative tropes lay beyond the scope of this collection; however, the infusion of literary criticism on the field left it languishing in self-

criticism and skepticism, until by the end of the 1990s—works emerged that in effect dealt with the "Cultural Turn" by explaining how historians strove to achieve, as best as possible, objectivity within the narrative form...

Organization of anthology

The process of a developing fruitful interdisciplinary dialogue between PS social scientists and historians writing about peace begins with a section titled "Paradigms of peace." In the introductory chapter, Philosopher Casey Rentmeester examines Western concepts of peace that date back to the Enlightenment. While some critics might see this perspective as Eurocentric (a criticism the editors acknowledge), Rentmeester's focus makes sense because most state-driven methods to promote peace during the nineteenth century were based on European ideas as applied to diplomacy; so, such a philosophical background is essential for understanding modern state-driven peace activism since 1750. Like other scholars, Rentmeester identifies Immanuel Kant as the instrumental thinker whose ideas played an important role in shaping the liberal approaches to promoting peace that shaped the behavior of activists during the "long" nineteenth century, as well as the development of international institutions such as the League of Nations and United Nations.

Next, Charles Howlett and Christian Philip Peterson jointly explore how industrialization and globalization influenced internal efforts to promote peace during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. They devote considerable attention to how private citizens, including women, attempted to use liberal forms of peace promotion (such as international law and the process of arbitration) to promote peace during an era of modernity. They also explain why many peace activists began to place more emphasis on transforming domestic orders in ways that promoted "positive" forms of peace after World War I (1914-1918). Not privileging the efforts of Europeans and Americans alone, Peterson and Howlett pay close attention to the steps that government officials and private citizens in Latin America, Japan, and other parts of the world took to promote peace before the "Great War" began.

In the third chapter, Waqar Zaidi explores the relationship between the ideas of liberal internationalism and pacifism in the promotion of peace. After tracing the origins of liberal internationalism back to theorists such as Adam Smith and Jeremy Bentham, he describes how this line of thought evolved from the beginning of the twentieth century through World War II, especially in Great Britain and the United States. By taking his analysis up to the early twenty-first century, Zaidi makes important arguments about how the waging of the Cold War the economic and ideological conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union in the latter half of the twentieth century contributed to a growing divide between the ideas of liberal internationalism and pacifism. His insights also deserve attention because they help explain why the liberal peace paradigm became such an influential international blueprint for peace after the Cold War ended.

Michael Loadenthal's chapter concludes this section by examining the ways in which the "traditions of the critical left" have influenced how PS scholars have conceived of the "relationship between structure and violence." By taking this approach, Loadenthal raises the important question of whether or not "violent inequality is inherent in the state." In his view, given the ways that the modern state facilitates class oppression and hidden forms of violence, scholars should "begin developing positive-trending solutions" that promote a "just peace," a task that historians can make their own contributions to by elucidating how human beings view the proper peaceful ordering of the world and have experienced government authority.

The authors in Part II, "Icons of Peace," explore the complexities of how now iconic individuals have influenced the global struggle for peace. Anna Hamling begins with an examination of three supremely important figures in the history of world peace: Russian writer Lev Nikolaevicz Tolstoy, Indian nationalist Mahatma Gandhi, and Pakistani preacher of non-violence Abdul Ghaffar Khan. Hamling's comparative treatment shows the complex relationship between religious faith, national self-determination, and (curiously) the use of contemporary media to spread ideas and build movements. Her chapter is nicely complemented by

Irina Gordeeva's in-depth examination of the movement Tolstoy inspired. Drawing on research in Russian archives, Gordeeva shows how the steps that Tolstoyans took to promote peace, which included efforts to forge transnational connections with Western peace groups, so challenged a repressive Bolshevik regime as to incur state-sponsored repression. Clinging to their ideals of non-violence, Tolstoyans experienced a curious tension between their conviction of anti-political self-improvement and the desire to challenge the Soviet government's repression. Kevin Grimm's chapter details the life of perhaps the best-known peace activist in American History: Reverend Martin Luther King Jr. More than just an overview of MLK's life and work, Grimm's analysis "explores the numerous political, religious, intellectual, and philosophical concepts that comprised King's non-violent approach to civic action." Grimm's conclusions will inform and hopefully inspire peace activists interested in the global roots of non-violent activism.

Next, chapters by Simon Hall and Jo Grant each examine icons of peace who have attempted to change the world for the better through the force of ideas. The latter chapter describes Bertrand Russell (1872-1970) and Julian Huxley's (1887-1975) efforts as public intellectuals. As Grant recounts, Russell and Huxley drew on the ideals of liberal inter-nationalism to challenge the militarism of the emerging Cold War, with each defining the term "peace" in ways that undermined the appeal of communist ideology across the globe. Uninterested in offering another treatment of the stereotyped 1960s antiwar protester (longhaired, white, countercultural), Hall instead shows the extent to which the Black Power movement worked to end the conflict in Vietnam. Frequently identifying more closely with the repressed peoples of Vietnam than with white America at home, the major Black Power groups including the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC), the Black Panther Party (BPP), the League of Revolutionary Black Workers," and more all "denounced America's military intervention in Southeast Asia." In tracing their efforts and mindset, Hall reveals the dynamics of identity politics in a diverse antiwar movement.

The final two essays in Part II examine the contributions of one revered icon of peace and perhaps a lesser known one. First, Jusuf Salih's describes the role that Ibrahim Rugova played in the struggle for Kosovo's independence. He offers important insights about what a people can accomplish using peaceful methods when faced with an adversary that can pursue its goals through military force. Then, Sabelo J. Ndlovu-Gatsheni offers a theoretical analysis of the South African peace icon Nelson Mandela, and in particular his philosophy of liberation. Mandela differed from other twentieth-century African nationalists in that he stayed true to his non-violent ethos and embrace of democratic values, a commitment so auspicious that it ushered in a new paradigm of peace, one that did not vilify previous oppressors, but worked to include them in a truly inclusive democratic process.

Part III explores the "Cultural and religious dimensions of peace." Joshua W. Jeffery begins by examining how World War I impacted the Stone-Campbell Movement in the United States. His insights help demonstrate the repression that private citizens often face when they challenge governments in a time of war. He also reminds readers that authors often cannot write about peace activism effectively without dealing with the subject of war. Carolyn Dekker then examines the unique role that literature has played in both conveying peace and in promoting it to readers who have little firsthand familiarity with the ravages of nuclear war or the issues of racial inequality. Her analysis encompasses antinuclear tracts of the early Cold War up to contemporary slam poetry and beyond. In doing so, Dekker exposes an interesting tension between peace as a concept and as a narrative construct: The former requires a lack of conflict, while the latter necessitates conflict for the sake of story. This chapter will leave readers contemplating: With this dichotomy, can peace be successfully written about without the guise of conflict as a backdrop?

Shifting to European peace activism, Benita Blessing investigates the role that postwar film played in constructing the memories and lessons for East Germans. Through a close study of films produced in the rubble of postwar Berlin, Blessing identifies

how antifascist films conveyed "images of bands of children [that] served both to chastise adults for allowing children to become part of the war" as well as "frighten viewers with the aim of forcing them to take notice of young people's war-induced misery." In short, much East German postwar film was not always just entertainment; it could be an attempt to induce positive peace in the hopes of preventing a future conflict.

In the final two chapters of this section, Abel Rios demonstrates the unique ways that Seventh-day Adventists worked to promote peace in the United States during the late nineteenth century, especially their opposition to the Spanish—American War of 1898. He illuminates why Adventists had much more success in protecting their non-combatant status during the US Civil War than in convincing the United States not to fight Spain in 1898. Asif Majid concludes Part III with a treatment of how Egyptians used graffiti during the revolution of 2011 to help topple the longstanding authoritarian ruler Hosni Mubarak. He makes a strong case that the use of graffiti represents an "improvisatory" form of protest that helped a diverse array of Egyptians voice their desire for "economic, political, and social justice." His analysis also reveals the pitfalls of calling the Arab Spring a "Twitter" or "Facebook" revolution because, as Majid makes clear, Egyptians did not see themselves as revolting just to become another Western country. Instead, they carried out a "homegrown" revolution that pursued goals and utilized images that only make sense in the context of Egypt's unique history and culture. In this way, Majid offers an excellent example of hybrid peace scholarship in action.

Part IV examines perhaps the greatest global threat to positive peace in world history: Nuclear war. Dario Fazzi opens this section with a new take on the nuclear freeze campaign. Frequently assessed by historians as a national campaign focused on changing US politics, Fazzi shows the transnational connections made between freeze promoters of numerous antinuclear organizations and their European counterparts. In a similar vein, Kyle Harvey shows an all-too-often unexamined aspect of this movement in the South Pacific. Australian and Micronesian antinuclear activists feared nuclear war, and struggled to reach nuclear

nations of the northern hemisphere, frequently adopting the tactics and rhetoric of the nuclear freeze campaign and its counterparts.

Jay Bergman's examination of the life and efforts of the famed peace activist and Soviet dissident Andrei Sakharov may prove provocative to some. After serving as one of the scientists who helped create the Soviet hydrogen bomb, Sakharov won the Nobel Peace Prize in 1975 for his tireless efforts on behalf of peace, human rights, and arms control. After being exiled to the city of Gorky from 1980 to 1986 for challenging the Soviet military campaign in Afghanistan, Sakharov became a famous figure for his struggle to bring liberal democratic government into the Soviet Union. Throughout, Bergman reinforces the point that Sakharov logically and willfully endorsed the creation of hydrogen bombs, as well as the rational use of war and power to achieve limited political ends. When Sakharov opposed controversial nuclear programs—such as Ronald Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative—it was not in the blind pursuit of a nuclear free world, but in the search for stability. Whether readers view the Sakharov of this chapter as pragmatic or misguided may well depend on their own personal convictions.

Paul Rubinson concludes this section with a look at a less typical kind of activist—the Cold War scientist. Driven in part by guilt at having constructed the bomb, and empowered by their expert knowledge of this new, fascinating, and devastating weapon, Cold War scientists engaged in politics in bold and new ways. Arguably, their activism was a well-intentioned devil's bargain. By leaving behind the laboratory and exposing their views to the press and world leaders, scientists traded away the façade of objectivity for publicity. As Rubinson makes clear, this was especially true in the case of scientists turned activists from organizations such as the Union of Concerned Scientists. Whatever their efficacy, Rubinson's chapter shows that peace activism can take many forms.

Part V focuses specifically on the issue of violence and the nation state. In the first chapter, Patrick Van Inwegen raises important questions about the effectiveness of peaceful and violent protest. Drawing on his deep understanding of Irish history,

he (perhaps controversially) argues that the non-violent methods of protest such as "boycotts, protests, petitions, noncooperation and [the] mobilization of alternative governments" played a more important role in the creation of an independent Ireland in 1922 than violent rebellion against British rule. Moving from Europe to Latin America, Saul Rodriguez documents the efforts to promote peace and build a fairer, more democratic society in Colombia. His analysis hopefully helps readers better understand the importance of building both "positive" and "negative" peace; as he contends, a true peace will continue to elude Colombia so long as illegal and rebel groups remain at war with the state. Colombia may never become a peaceful society until the government and civil society actors carry out a variety of positive reforms that help build a law-abiding state and bring about a fairer distribution of wealth.

Next is an examination of one of "the most brutal and protracted armed conflicts of the twentieth century," the Lebanese Civil War (1975-1990). In this chapter, Magnus Dolerud looks at the conflict in Lebanon. He shows the tensions that can arise within a culturally and religious diverse government and society. A classic example of a "consociational democracy" (a government comprised of numerous and distinct ethnic, religious, and cultural conclaves), Lebanon' fifteen-year civil war was frequently opposed by Lebanese citizens themselves, who did not support a continuation of conflict an analysis that brings into question the ideas behind the liberal paradigm for peace. In their pursuit of negative peace in a society plagued by systematic violence, Lebanese activists pushed for positive peace initiatives to reform the structures that might fuel future conflict.

The next two chapters take divergent looks at one of the most pressing, ongoing violent struggles of the past century: The Arab—Israeli conflict. First, Galia Golan provides a detailed overview of the roots of this conflict, specifically beginning with the late 1960s and the onset of violence. Interestingly, her proposed solution to achieve peace differs from the next chapter by Michael J. Carpenter, who favors guidance not from statesmen or political leaders, but "people power." Carpenter's insights

about how the behavior of Palestinian "elites" has undermined grassroots Palestinian peace activism helps demonstrate some of the inherent limitations of a "top-down" investigation. He also evaluates how well "civil resistance" has promoted peace practices,   an argument that urges scholars to pay close attention to the cultural, political, and historical context in which human beings operate.

The last two chapters of this section explore the subject of peace in Africa and Asia from different perspectives. Tony Tai-Ting Liu offers a historical analysis of why the People's Republic of China (PRC—Communist China) and Taiwan (Republic of China—ROC) have managed to maintain mostly peaceful relations with each other despite Beijing's claim that it exercises sovereignty over the ROC. He argues that the PRC and ROC need to engage in consistent dialogue now more than ever to avert future violent conflicts, given the Democratic Progressive Party's growing emphasis on securing official Taiwanese independence. Arnim Langer and Leila Demarset employ quantitative analysis to explore how violent conflicts in Africa have evolved since the end of the Cold War. The patterns that they elucidate from this analysis once again demonstrate the limitations of the liberal peace paradigm, while their insights about the importance of understanding the history and traditions of a country before promoting peace there emphasize the need for historians and social scientists to collaborate in the task of peace promotion.

The authors in Part VI analyze the transnational and international dimensions of peace from numerous angles. Ke Ren looks at the organization and operations of the International Peace Campaign (IPC) (also known as the Rassemblement universel pour la Paix or RUP) and its China National Committee both during the 1930s and the first years of the Second Sino—Japanese War (1937-1945). After offering important insights about the global dimensions of peace activism during this period, Ren exposes the difficulties involved in building a trans¬national movement for peace, especially in attempts to shape the behavior of governments determined to wage war. From there, Chris Dixon and Jon Piccini's account of protest against the US war in Vietnam provides an example of how authors can effectively balance

national and transnational perspectives when describing international movements for peace. Their contribution also reminds readers that the process of globalization could either help to cohere or divide protest and peace movements long before the era of smart phones and social media.

Pauline Ketelaars and Ione Corbeel provide a sociological perspective to the antiwar protest movement against the Second Iraq War of the early 2000s. This chapter examines the characteristic makeup of two categories of protesters those who protested to prevent the Iraqi invasion, and those who protested for an end to the war once it was underway in a specific control group, the residents of Belgium. The authors expertly utilize a quantitative, social science methodology to question common assumptions about the traits, backgrounds, and influences of contemporary peace activists; in the process, they not only reveal a compelling conclusion, but expose to lay readers the methodology of social science when applied to peace. The following part of this section examines the subject of women and peace from transnational and international perspectives. Joanna Tague recounts how the American Janet Mondlane worked to secure the independence of Mozambique and promote peace after marrying the founder of the Mozambique Liberation Front Eduardo Mondlane. This fascinating story takes readers from the American Midwest to the United Nations and then on to East Africa. Instead of focusing on structural forces or macro issues, she uses Janet's life to highlight the human dimensions of peace activism and the pivotal role individuals can play in the quest for social justice. Resisting the temptation to romanticize Janet's life, Tague documents the difficulties that this woman faced, including her experiences with the waging of war after peaceful efforts to secure Mozambican independence failed.

The next two chapters explore the subject of women and peace from a social science perspective. Judith Oleson provides a brief and direct interpretation of feminist approaches to peacekeeping, all within an internationalist framework. In examining the creation and implementation of United Nations Security Resolution 1325, Oleson shows the deep divisions

between male-dominated methods of peacekeeping, and a much-needed inclusion of feminist perspectives to achieve long-lasting peace. As Oleson demonstrates, UN Resolution 1325 demanded "a gender unit at the Department of Peacekeeping," one requiring that "women and men benefit equally from post-conflict reconstruction activities," and even called for "the specific protection of women and girls from sexual and gender-based violence, including in post-conflict settings like refugee camps."

Oleson's assessment of the results of this resolution, and the success of its implementation, nicely sets up the next contribution by Natalie W. Romeri-Lewis, Sarah F. Brown, and Benjamin T. White. Together, their chapter agrees that women have overwhelmingly been excluded from formal processes of Peace and Security. In their methodology, they utilize data to create new and informative tables and scales that reveal what many might simply expect: That not only are women excluded from a male-dominated peace-building process, but that in examples where their inclusion is valued, peace and non-violence is left unbroken for longer periods of time. This chapter is a fine example for historians of peace, PS scholars, or humanitarian activists unfamiliar with the data-driven approaches of social scientists. Finally, the collection concludes not by looking back, but by looking forward. This final chapter is by Linda Groff, a futurist and PS scholar with an impressive track record. In it Dr. Groff provides an ambitious framework—one that acknowledges, but builds upon the work by Johan Galtung—on how to achieve peace in the modern age. This final chapter is both interesting in its proposals, and thought provoking as a counterpoint to the other various disciplines that have preceded it in this collection.

In conclusion, the editors hope that readers of this collection will take away a diversity of scholarly perspectives as well as regional and temporal case studies on attempts to achieve peace around the world since 1750. The limitations of any such collection are obvious to anyone ambitious enough to undertake it. Knowing full well that the collection has some gaps and limitations, we hope that readers will find it to be a noble first step towards

a more inclusive understanding of what constitutes peace in our time. In a world still beset with poverty, hatred, and violence, historians and social scientists have every reason to work together in ways that produce the intellectually sophisticated, yet readable works that can inform and perhaps even inspire human beings to challenge the violence that they encounter and carry out the most effective peacebuilding missions possible across the globe. We cannot assume that the world will become a more a tolerant and humane place, given the contingency of historical change and the inability of technological advances to stop "civilized" human beings—including those living in Western liberal democratic countries—from inflicting violence on one another. But in the face of this reality, we also refuse to end our efforts to inform ourselves, and others, who are interested in pursuing peace in our time. <>

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