History Employs Worth

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Addicted to Incarceration: Corrections Policy and the Politics of Misinformation in The United States,
In 22 BC a series of political and economic crises buffeted the regime of Augustus, Rome’s first emperor. Augustus had won control of Rome’s Mediterranean empire in 30 BC after nearly two decades of civil conflicts, but his hold on power now seemed like it might be slipping. The emperor had only recently recovered from a severe illness that he himself feared would kill him when a series of other misfortunes beset the imperial capital. Plagues and floods hit Rome late in 23, and both returned in early 22. These natural disasters contributed to a food shortage and to such severe rioting that a mob imprisoned the Roman Senate in the senate house and threatened to burn them alive. Augustus could calm the unrest only when he used his own funds to pay for grain to be delivered to the city. It looked like Augustus’s empire might quickly come apart.

Things did not improve as the year continued. Augustus felt compelled to appear at the trial of a Roman commander who had attacked a Thracian tribe without legal authority, and, at the hearing, the emperor found himself subjected to an aggressive cross-examination by the advocates of the accused. An assassination plot against him was detected and, although the plotters were executed, the jury embarrassed the emperor by not returning a unanimous verdict against them.

Problems worsened after Augustus left the capital to attend to matters in the empire’s eastern provinces. The next year, 21 BC, brought rioting...
about the selection of Roman magistrates, violence that would recur nearly every year until the emperor returned at the end of 19. Rome, whose population of one million people made it the world’s largest city, perpetually sat on the edge of anarchy while its imperial frontiers demanded constant attention. An objective observer might wonder whether one man, even one as skilled as Augustus, could really run so complicated a state. With its seemingly endless problems, Rome’s empire under Augustus might by rights look like a failed political experiment in autocracy. Surely, a citizen of a modern republic might assume, Romans would quickly abandon autocracy and return to the representative republic under which Roman elites had shared power with one another for nearly five hundred years. This is how we, who have lived all of our lives under younger representative democracies, have been trained to think about freedom.’

But the traumas of those years did not, in fact, push Romans back toward the familiar political structures of the republic. Instead, most Romans seem to have craved the power and authority of Augustus even more. In 22 BC, the Roman mob that threatened to burn the senate house also sought to force Augustus to accept the title of dictator although he already possessed supreme power in the empire. The third-century Roman historian Cassius Dio wrote that the electoral violence of 21 BC showed ‘clearly that it was impossible for a democratic government to be maintained’ among Romans. And, when Augustus returned to the city in 19 BC, the same author wrote: ‘There was no similarity between the conduct of the people during his absence, when they quarreled, and when he was present.’ Augustus’s presence alone calmed the chaos of Rome and its empire. But Dio added a caveat. Augustus placated Romans only ‘because they were afraid.’ Order came to chaos only when freedom was exchanged for fear.

Augustus himself explained the transition from republic to empire very differently. Although Romans had long held that political domination by one individual represented the opposite of liberty, Augustus framed his autocratic control of the Roman state as a sort of democratic act. In Augustus’s conception, he had restored liberty (libertas) to Rome by first delivering the Roman world from the senators who had seized power by murdering Julius Caesar and by later eliminating the threat of foreign control posed by Cleopatra and her lover Marc Antony. Liberty, as Augustus and his supporters saw it, meant the freedom from domestic unrest and foreign interference that came only with the security and political stability that Augustus provided. Augustus’s liberty meant that Roman property rights remained valid. It opened economic opportunities to new segments of the Roman population. And it took control of the city and its empire away from an increasingly corrupt senatorial elite whose mismanagement had led to civil war. In the 20s BC, many Romans agreed with Augustus that liberty could not exist if insecurity persisted. They came to believe that freedom from oppression could only exist in a polity controlled by one man.

This book explains why Rome, still one of the longest-lived republics in world history, traded the liberty of political autonomy for the security of autocracy. It is written at a moment when modern readers need to be particularly aware of both the nature of republics and the consequences of their failure. We live in a time of political crisis, when the structures of republics as diverse as the United States, Venezuela, France, and Turkey are threatened. Many of these republics are the constitutional descendants of Rome and, as such, they have inherited both the tremendous structural strengths that allowed the Roman Republic to thrive for so long and some of the same structural weaknesses that led eventually to its demise. This is particularly true of the United States, a nation whose basic constitutional structure was deliberately patterned on the idealized view of the Roman Republic presented by the second-century BC author Polybius. This conscious borrowing from Rome’s model makes it vital for all of us to understand how Rome’s republic worked, what it achieved, and why, after nearly five
centuries, its citizens ultimately turned away from it and toward the autocracy of Augustus.

No republic is eternal. It lives only as long as its citizens want it. And, in both the twenty-first century AD and the first century BC, when a republic fails to work as intended, its citizens are capable of choosing the stability of autocratic rule over the chaos of a broken republic. When freedom leads to disorder and autocracy promises a functional and responsive government, even citizens of an established republic can become willing to set aside longstanding, principled objections to the rule of one man and embrace its practical benefits. Rome offers a lesson about how citizens and leaders of a republic might avoid forcing their fellow citizens to make such a tortured choice.

Rome shows that the basic, most important function of a re-public is to create a political space that is governed by laws, fosters compromise, shares governing responsibility among a group of representatives, and rewards good stewardship. Politics in such a republic should not be a zero-sum game. The politician who wins a political struggle may be honored, but one who loses should not be punished. The Roman Republic did not encourage its leaders to seek complete and total political victory. It was not designed to force one side to accept everything the other wanted. Instead, it offered tools that, like the American filibuster, served to keep the process of political negotiation going until a mutually agreeable compromise was found. This process worked very well in Rome for centuries, but it worked only because most Roman politicians accepted the laws and norms of the Republic. They committed to working out their disputes in the political arena that the republic established rather than through violence in the streets. Republican Rome succeeded in this more than perhaps any other state before or since.

If the early and middle centuries of Rome’s republic show how effective this system could be, the last century of the Roman Republic reveals the tremendous dangers that result when political leaders cynically misuse these consensus-building mechanisms to obstruct a republic’s functions. Like politicians in modern republics, Romans could use vetoes to block votes on laws, they could claim the presence of unfavorable religious conditions to annul votes they disliked, and they could deploy other parliamentary tools to slow down or shut down the political process if it seemed to be moving too quickly toward an outcome they disliked. When used as intended, these tools helped promote negotiations and political compromises by preventing majorities from imposing solutions on minorities. But, in Rome as in our world, politicians could also employ such devices to prevent the Republic from doing what its citizens needed. The widespread misuse of these tools offered the first signs of sickness in Rome’s republic!

Much more serious threats to republics appear when arguments between politicians spill out from the controlled environments of representative assemblies and degenerate into violent confrontations between ordinary people in the streets. Romans had avoided political violence for three centuries before a series of political murders rocked the Republic in the 130s and 120s BC. Once mob violence infected Roman politics, however, the institutions of the Republic quickly lost their ability to control the contexts and content of political disputes. Within a generation of the first political assassination in Rome, politicians had begun to arm their supporters and use the threat of violence to influence the votes of assemblies and the election of magistrates. Within two generations, Rome fell into civil war. And, two generations later, Augustus ruled as Roman emperor. When the Republic lost the ability to regulate the rewards given to political victors and the punishments inflicted on the losers of political conflicts, Roman politics became a zero-sum game in which the winner reaped massive rewards and the losers often paid with their lives.

Above all else, the Roman Republic teaches the citizens of its modern descendants the incredible dangers that come along with condoning political obstruction and courting political violence. Roman history could not more clearly show that, when
citizens look away as their leaders engage in these corrosive behaviors, their republic is in mortal danger. Unpunished political dysfunction prevents consensus and encourages violence. In Rome, it eventually led Romans to trade their Republic for the security of an autocracy. This is how a republic dies.

This book begins in the 280s BC, not long after the written record of Roman history becomes more factual than fanciful. The early chapters show how, in moments of crisis throughout the third century BC, Rome’s republic proved remarkably resilient. The consensus-building tools of the Republic ensured that it survived after the Carthaginian general Hannibal invaded Italy in 218 and that it remained robust throughout the incredible territorial and economic expansion that followed Hannibal’s defeat in 202. The Republic continued to function well as Rome grew into the premier military and political power in the Mediterranean world during the first half of the second century BC. Unlike most other ancient societies, Rome was able to absorb tremendous amounts of territory and generate great economic growth during these years while remaining politically stable.

By the 130s, however, popular anxiety about growing economic inequality began to threaten the Republic’s stability. When politicians working within the framework of the Republic failed to reach a consensus about how to respond to their citizens’ concerns, some of their rivals opportunistically exploited their inaction by pushing for radical policies in ways that breached the boundaries of acceptable political behavior. The quest for consensus that had made Rome’s republic so stable in previous centuries was quickly replaced by a winner-takes-all attitude toward political disputes. Between 137 and 133, senators disavowed a Roman treaty in order to punish particular political opponents, a group of politicians obstructed land reforms aimed to address social and economic inequality, and their opponents resorted to constitutional trickery to get around their obstruction. Then, as 133 drew to a close, Rome saw its first acts of lethal political violence in more than three centuries.

Subsequent chapters show that the political violence that was so shocking in the 130s became increasingly routine as the second century BC drew to a close. The mob violence of those years, however, only set the stage for the violent and destructive civil wars that tore through Roman and Italian societies in the late 90s and most of the 80s BC. The Social War and the Roman civil wars that followed it resulted in tens of thousands of deaths, executions, and confiscations of property. The Republican structures that had once been so robust and resilient failed amid such widespread violence and dysfunction. Although the Republic would be restored before the 70s began, it would never fully recover.

The concluding chapters treat the final decades of the Roman Republic. The Republic remained a source of great pride and enjoyed significant public trust through the 60s, 50s, and even into the 40s BC, but the damage done to it in the first decades of the first century could never be completely repaired. Civil war, widespread political violence, and their enduring economic and political repercussions were now a part of the Roman historical experience. And, as the Republic entered its final civil wars in the 40s, all of these traumas rapidly came back to haunt political life.

This violent political world was the one that Augustus came to control, but this is not how Rome’s republic began. In fact, the Republic was expressly designed to prevent the emergence of a figure like Augustus and to limit the political violence that made someone like him possible. It is with this vibrant, capable, and effective Roman Republic that we begin. 

Kill Caesar! Assassination in the Early Roman Empire by Rose Mary Sheldon [Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 9781538114889]

Exploring the history of internal security under the first Roman dynasty, this groundbreaking book answers the enduring question: If there were 9,000
men guarding the emperor, how were three-quarters of Rome’s leaders assassinated? Rose Mary Sheldon traces the evolution of internal security mechanisms under the Julio-Claudians, evaluating the system that Augustus first developed to protect the imperial family and the stability of his dynasty. Yet in spite of the intensive precautions taken, there were multiple attempts on his life. Like all emperors, Augustus had a number of competing constituencies—the senate, the army, his extended family, the provincials, and the populace of Rome—but were they all equally threatening? Indeed, the biggest threat would come from those closest to the emperor—his family and the aristocracy. Even Roman imperial women were deeply involved in instigating regime change. By the fourth emperor, Caligula, the Praetorian Guards were already participating in assassinations, and the army too was becoming more politicized. Sheldon weighs the accuracy of ancient sources: Does the image of the emperor presented to us represent reality or what the people who killed him wanted us to think? Were Caligula and Nero really crazy, or did senatorial historians portray them that way to justify their murder? Was Claudius really the fool found drooling behind a curtain and made emperor, or was he in on the plot from the beginning? These and other fascinating questions are answered as Sheldon concludes that the repeated problem of “killing Caesar” reflected the empire’s larger dynamics and turmoil.

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Excerpt: From the end of the sixth century BCE until two-thirds of the way through the second century CE, Rome’s political officials seemed virtually immune to assault. How ironic then that the most famous day in the history of the republic is the Ides of March. We know more about that day than any other in Roman history because it was the day Julius Caesar was murdered. After his assassination, killing the chief executive officer became almost routine.

Augustus, always mindful of Caesar’s fate, founded a Roman monarchy far more autocratic than the dictatorship that Brutus, Cassius, Cato, and Cicero had so bitterly opposed and died trying to prevent. He introduced a series of institutions guaranteed to keep the Roman state stable and prevent the forcible removal of its leader. He created a variety of bodyguards—the most prominent being the Praetorian Guard, whose job it was to keep him safe—and he created the urban cohorts and the vigiles, the night watchmen who doubled as a fire brigade, to keep the city of Rome safe. Under Augustus, whose rule began in 27 BCE, there were between seven and eight thousand troops stationed in Rome; the number rose rapidly, reaching about thirty thousand by the end of the century. Yet, with all these guardians, there were continued attempts on the lives of the emperors, many of them successful. Three of the five Julio-Claudians died by assassination.

Why did the Roman security system fail so miserably? More importantly, how did the killing of Roman emperors affect the state and its stability? The great irony is that the root causes of the problem lay within the system that Augustus, the great architect himself, designed.

To take his place; this meant a candidate being proclaimed, approved by the army, and confirmed
by the Senate. If more than one candidate emerged, as happened after the death of Nero in 68 or Commodus in 192—then a civil war would break out.

Family relationships were of utmost importance in this story. The republican aristocracy consisted of a group of families whose names, connections, and family fortunes were passed down along with their tradition of holding offices and serving in the military. Such relationships acquired great political significance that could either support the position of a reigning emperor or destabilize it. Even within the emperor’s own family there were many pretenders to the throne. Sons, daughters, and wives all played a crucial role in the question of succession, along with children from a previous marriage and eventually grandchildren. Sometimes these heirs got impatient or were manipulated by those hoping to marry someone within the emperor’s bloodline or be regent for his minor children. The ultimate reality was that emperors were usually killed by men who were after their job. If the assassin was successful, he or, more likely, the man he was working for, would become the next emperor either to found a new dynasty or just continue the old one. If a change of rulers went smoothly, it could provide a certain continuity in government policies. It gave an air of legitimacy to the successor. Although it was the job of security services to protect an emperor, it was not their job to provide for the transition after a coup. They only had to protect the living emperor. An interregnum put them in a dubious position. It was not impossible for a praetorian prefect or an urban prefect (head of the three cohorts of soldiers who policed the city of Rome) to be carried over to a new regime, but there was never a guarantee. Successive praetorian prefects would find themselves having their loyalty tested as pretenders tried to co-opt them into the plot.

How do we document these conspiracies? As Sir Ronald Syme has written, “Conspiracy alleged, proved, or punished, is an elusive theme.” Detecting a conspiracy to remove an emperor is difficult but not impossible. Because conspiracies involve secret events, many acts will always remain in the shadows. This makes more guessing than usual a necessary hazard. One of the reasons we hear so little about these events is that the sources are frequently biased in favor of a senatorial order. Writers like Cassius Dio, Tacitus, and Suetonius tended to cover up or at least justify conspiracies from their own order. This meant leaving out details that would mark some of their colleagues as guilty. There is also the problem of “spin.” Narratives might have been written by someone who thought the conspirators were defending liberty and had a just cause in overthrowing an unjust or cruel or even insane emperor. They offer us little detail on the course of events and leave much doubt as to whether there was an actual conspiracy or whether the condemned were just denounced by unscrupulous prosecutors who were after their estates. We are not told their motives or their methods. What they cannot cover up, however, is that the serious threats against the emperor did not come from the “people.” There are no firebrands or revolutionaries in this story. The threat came directly from other people who wanted to be emperor in his place.

Even when a historian like Tacitus tried to bring into the open the closed and secret events of Roman history, he did not have all the evidence at his disposal. The secret of what was being planned was usually revealed only after an assassination. The success of an attack, while it was happening, depended on keeping information from leaking out. Ancient historians did not even have access to what little information was available at the time. Added to this is the problem that their writings were not held up to the kind of scrutiny modern historians are expected to display. They could borrow stories out of context or make up stories for effect. Roman historians described events they did not witness, or they used a conspiracy as an explanation in the absence of real information. They traded in gossip and what was being said at
the time. They knew their readers enjoyed conspiracy theories. As Syme has asked, what does the historian do when confronted with fiction as well as deceit?

What makes a conspiracy theory different from a real conspiracy, however, is that real conspiracies, like life, are messy. Things do not go as planned. People are delayed; they show up at the wrong place or at the wrong time. Weapons break, or what is supposed to be a fatal blow misses its target. A conspiracy theory can be spotted immediately because it accounts for all the loose ends, and everything fits neatly. People like such theories because they challenge the authoritative view. It makes people feel "in the know" as opposed to the herd that believes the "official story." Modern historians have sometimes overcorrected in the other direction. Many commentators refuse to believe that anything except a completely successful coup can constitute a real conspiracy. They dismiss many conspiracies as mere gossip in a way that reminds us of the Emperor Domitian's remark that emperors were unhappy because, when they discovered a conspiracy, no one believed them unless they had been killed?

We are left with the problem that little can be taken at face value either in the literary or material record, and this is so much more true when we're dealing with conspiracy. With our truncated sources, piecemeal evidence, and literary constructs, it will never be possible to establish the precise motives or the moves of all the participants in an assassination attempt. All we can do is make an educated guess about who was involved and what their aims were. We must assess cui bono in each case. Who would benefit from the emperor's death? If he were killed, who would be his successor and what would be that person's claim to legitimacy? If we trace what the participants did and what the outcome was, rather than trying to discern what they were thinking or what their motives were, we get a better idea of what was going on. We must pay special attention to where the security services were and what they were doing. We are sometimes left with having to judge whether there was a legitimate threat by how violently the emperor reacted in response.

One aspect of the literature that has changed over the last two decades is our interpretation of the role women played in these conspiracies. Commentators have been reluctant to see women as active participants in political matters. When they do participate, they are seen as demented, power-hungry women with voracious sexual appetites. More recent scholars, both male and female, have been able to peel back the layers of sexual accusation and innuendo to reveal some very real and active political intrigue. Women were key players because they carried the imperial bloodline that originated with Augustus himself and, therefore, could provide a usurper with the opportunity to ally himself with a woman of the palace. Women like Agrippina, however, were much more than passive breeders. They actively plotted to put their male relatives or lovers on the throne. Even nonimperial women could play a role in a conspiracy by carrying information, hiding conspirators, or poisoning those about to testify. Espionage has always been an equal opportunity employer.

This is not the story of the emperors' lives, their personal foibles, their sexual predilections, their physical disabilities, or their moral shortcomings. For that we can always read Suetonius! The personality of the emperor and what was written about him afterward can be more of a hindrance than a help. Yes, there may have been some people who hated him or thought him demented, but that does not mean that he was demented. People will justify their actions after the fact by portraying themselves as aiming at loftier goals like freedom or liberty or justice and portraying their victims as evil.

This is the story of the people whose job it was to protect the emperor. Even bad emperors had the right to be protected. They might find themselves protected by bad people or at least people whose motives were unsavory, but nevertheless they
needed to be protected. Few historians try to see things from the point of view of the delatores, the professional informers who brought intelligence of conspiracies to the emperor's attention in the absence of a public prosecutor. After all, they, too, were senators trying to survive. People tend to focus on their "immoral activities" and have little sympathy for men thriving under a dictatorship. They are perpetually portrayed as unrepentant villains. An imperial politician could embark on a career as a delator out of loyalty to the emperor, out of ambition and the desire for influence at court and political power, or just for personal enrichment. It could be all three.

One has to examine not just the emperor's ability as emperor, but the security problems built into the principate itself. It was the system that created the guards, the informers, the sycophants, and even the assassins. There were fewer and fewer avenues by which a senator could gain influence while the emperor controlled most of the governmental mechanisms. It took a very strong will, a sense of commitment, and a great deal of political skill to survive in that atmosphere, and those who did managed to impress their contemporaries and even occasionally arouse grudging admiration from among their foes. It was a dangerous game to play because, whether hero or informer, one could suffer a precipitous decline. One can only imagine what happened to a delator who found himself turned over to his imperial colleagues after an unsuccessful prosecution. We know what happened when one stood up to an emperor; speaking truth to power is dangerous in any age.

The Julio-Claudians are certainly not great examples of stable leadership. This book will not attempt to exculpate their folly or viciousness, but no matter how eccentric a ruler is, assassinating him is treason. There were different visions of how the principate should be run, but those emperors who attempted to change the pattern often paid for it with their lives. This does not necessarily mean they were lunatics who had to be removed, but it may have seemed that way to the people closest to them at the time. It should come as no surprise that the atmosphere around the court of the Julio-Claudians and the Senate could be dangerous and unpleasant. Neither the senators who dared oppose the emperor nor those who remained quiet could escape being caught in a dilemma. Though both loyalist and informers were "forced to practice every kind of adulation, they, nonetheless, never appeared either servile enough to the authorities, or free enough to us." Using deceit and flattery to get along politically was not restricted to the republic or empire or, for that matter, the ancient world. In the ancient Roman world, as in the world today, sycophancy was a means of survival.

Closeness to the emperors was a double-edged sword. If you were one of his friends or close advisors, you had access to his presence. That presence is what your influence and position relied upon, but it also put you in a position to be the one to kill the emperor or to be approached by someone who wanted to kill him. Nor could these associates rely on the loyalty of the emperor, who had no qualms about repudiating his amici. It might be for personal reasons, jealousy over a woman, dynastic policy, or political factors. Epictetus writes about what it was like to dine with the emperor and worry whether it was your last meal and whether you would lose your head shortly thereafter. Losing the friendship of the emperor was a death warrant. Knowing this, disgraced amici could be driven into a conspiracy to kill the emperor first. <>

The Reception of Cicero in the Early Roman Empire: The Rhetorical Schoolroom and the Creation of a Cultural Legend by Thomas J. Keeline [Cambridge University Press, 9781108426237]

Cicero was one of the most important political, intellectual, and literary figures of the late Roman Republic, rising to the consulship as a ‘new man’ and leading a complex and contradictory life. After his murder in 43 BC, he was indeed remembered for his life and his works - but not for all of them. This book explores Cicero's reception in the early Roman Empire, showing what was remembered and why. It argues that early imperial
politics and Cicero's schoolroom canonization had pervasive effects on his reception, with declamation and the schoolroom mediating and even creating his memory in subsequent generations. The way he was deployed in the schools was foundational to the version of Cicero found in literature and the educated imagination in the early Roman Empire, yielding a man stripped of the complex contradictions of his own lifetime and polarized into a literary and political symbol.

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Excerpt: In the predawn light of October, AD 75, a 13-year-old trudges bleary-eyed through the streets of Rome. Cocks are not yet crowing, but occasional sounds can be heard as the city slowly stirs from slumber. Our youth is excited and nervous: he is on his way to his first day of school under the rhetor's tutelage, the place where he will spend the rest of his teenage years learning the art of oratory.' He is about to make the acquaintance of a man long dead, a man whom neither his parents nor his grandparents knew personally, but who will be of fundamental importance for the next few years of his life: Marcus Tullius Cicero. In the
rhetorical classroom he will spend countless hours reading Cicero's speeches and writing declamations about him or in imitation of him. He will be exposed to a very particular version of this famous figure, with some aspects played up and others played down — sometimes to make him a more exemplary classroom icon, sometimes as a legacy of political decisions made a century ago — and he will have this version thrashed into his head for years. But of course he will not stay a schoolboy forever; he will eventually leave the rhetor's school and embark on the cursus honorum, or a legal career, or a military campaign, or any of the other professional paths open to an upper-class youth of education and ambition. And yet even as an adult, those first impressions and that schoolroom image of Cicero will stick with him. When Roman literary authors talk about Cicero, we see in their texts the same themes and points of emphasis that originally developed in the rhetorical classroom. Education wields an enormous influence on the shaping of history and memory, and even more so in an age before printed books, television, and the Internet. I will show the extent and nature of that influence on the in the early Roman Empire...

Scope and Structure
My study of Cicero's reception begins where his own control over his legacy ended: the moment of his death. The living Cicero's self-fashioning has been extensively studied in recent scholarship,' and while I have derived considerable profit from such discussions, I will not rehash them here. Although I constantly make reference to Cicero's life and works in what follows, my goal is not so much to talk about the "real" Cicero — if indeed any Cicero is not simply someone's (re)construction — as the imperial reception of the man. As a result I start with authors writing after Cicero's death and follow their lead backwards and forwards. The endpoint for my investigation is, roughly speaking, the age of Pliny, Tacitus, and Plutarch, and I have at least some discussion of most authors who wrote between 43 BC and AD 117.25 I have also constantly found it useful to bring in later testimony as important witnesses to an earlier tradition, and so texts as diverse as Cassius Dio's Roman History and undatable pseudo-Ciceronian writings find their place alongside works written squarely in the first century. The reasons for this are made clear when the texts are discussed, as are questions of dating, when relevant.

The book consists of seven chapters followed by a brief epilogue. It is probably a central linking chapter. The first four chapters divided into thematically o parts joined rather than chronologically, focus four chapters, arranged the rhetorical schoolroom and its pervasive influence; the final two chapters are case studies of the reception of Cicero in Tacitus and Pliny, which have Quintilian as their educational fulcrum. The bridge is the fifth chapter, a study of Cicero in Seneca the Younger, which spans the gap both chronologically and thematically between the evidence of Seneca the Elder, Seneca the Younger's father, and Quintilian, Seneca the Younger's reactionary conservative successor. The studies of Seneca, Tacitus, and Pliny, while grounded in the classroom, also move beyond it — just as these three authors were grounded in the tradition of rhetorical education but rose above it. In the first half of the book we see Cicero "flattened" as he is textualized and transformed from a living man into words on a page, but this very textualization also allows for a sort of reinflation by more sophisticated authors as they put to various uses the icon that Cicero has become. In particular we see in the later chapters a debate not just over Cicero the educational figure, but also over Cicero the educational theorist.

In the first chapter I establish how a Ciceronian speech was taught in the early Empire, focusing on Cicero's Pro Milone. By triangulating among three ancient sources (Asconius, Quintilian, and the scholia Bobiensia), I try to reconstruct how the speech would have been taught in the ancient rhetorical classroom. Careful scrutiny of the preoccupations and interests of these teachers reveals what students in the early Empire would have learned about Cicero from their closest surviving link to the man: his speeches. The emphasis in the rhetorical classroom is always on Cicero's supreme skill as a
speaker and his status as exemplary orator; appreciation and imitation of his rhetorical artistry is all-important.

Having discussed how Cicero was read in the ancient classroom, I turn next to the other major activity of the rhetorical school, the practice of writing declamations and rhetorical exercises. In my second, third, and fourth chapters I examine ancient schoolroom declamations about Cicero and declamations written in his persona, including "spurious" pseudo-Ciceronian texts. Certain dominant themes and emphases immediately appear, and they continue to reappear in literary treatments of the man. Chapter 2 further develops the idea of Cicero as the model for eloquence, the factor which ensured his centrality to a school curriculum dedicated to teaching that very quality. I argue that this reputation was not inevitable, but once established proved unshakable and undergirded his entire reception. Cicero becomes identified as the "vox publica," and I consider various ways in which his eloquence was discussed in the schoolroom, including comparisons with Demosthenes and the notion of an oratorical decline since Cicero's day, and show that these discussions have ramifications far outside the classroom walls.

The rhetorical schools contended that Cicero's eloquence led to his death, and that death is the subject of my third chapter. Cicero's death was simply the historical event most significant for his reception, and its details were replayed again and again in declamation. These declamations were themselves first subject to the influence of imperial ideology, then acted as propagators of it, and I show how declamation played a central role in shaping history and memory. What young men learned about Cicero's eloquence at school reappears in their literary writings as adults, whether they are historians like Velleius Paterculus or poets like Juvenal. Indeed, the declamatory version of events even influences Greek writers like Plutarch, Appian, and Cassius Dio.

While Cicero's death was the most salient historical component of his reception, it was not the only one, and in my fourth chapter I discuss the other elements that recur with some frequency in later discussions of the man: his consulship as a nouus homo, his exile, and his activities in the aftermath of Caesar's assassination. I view all of these through the prism of pseudopigraphic texts, that is, texts that are ascribed to Cicero or his contemporaries but that are in fact products of the rhetorical schools. Declamation was naturally dialectic, and these themes give scope for both praising and blaming Cicero. There was, however, no simple dichotomy between a positive and a negative tradition, but rather a wealth of material that could be accommodated by enterprising speakers to the demands of the case at hand. Here too I show how the themes and points of emphasis that developed in the rhetorical classroom are echoed in history and literature. The chapter closes with a brief coda on an underappreciated part of pseudopigraphic technique, the use of intertextual allusions.

In chapter 5 I move away from detailed scrutiny of the ancient rhetorical classroom to broader case studies of how sophisticated literary authors make use of their rhetorical training and rise above it. Seneca the Younger is the son of Seneca the Elder and must have been steeped in the rhetorical tradition that his father preserves, and we do indeed see that version of Cicero in his writings. And yet Seneca engages — and chooses not to engage — with Cicero in wholly new ways. He ignores Cicero's philosophy; he forges his own stylistic path; he knows Cicero's letters but goes his own way in epistolography too, embracing a radical generic experiment; he rejects Cicero's broad educational vision. In his wholesale spurning of Cicero, he sets the stage for the neo-Ciceronian reaction of Quintilian, who was in a sense his successor as an imperial tutor.

Quintilian's classroom is the pivot for chapters 6 and 7, which comprise case studies of Cicero in Pliny the Younger and Tacitus. Pliny was Quintilian's pupil, and Tacitus quite possibly was as well; Pliny and Tacitus were moreover friends and
correspondents. I show first that Quintilian puts forth a simplified program of neo-Ciceronianism: Cicero, he says, was Rome’s best orator, and since his day oratory has gone into a decline. Cicero also provided a guide to eloquence in his rhetorical treatises and courtroom speeches. Thus, Quintilian argues, if contemporary students wish to attain Cicero’s greatness, they must do what the great man prescribes and follow in his educational footsteps. In chapter 6 I demonstrate that Tacitus repudiates these ideals in his Dialogus de oratoribus. He mounts a sophisticated theoretical rebuttal of Quintilian’s neo-Ciceronianism, but he does so in a remarkable fashion, cloaking his rejection in Ciceronian style and language. He thus rejects Cicero by subverting Cicero’s own words. With cleverly destructive inter-textuality, Tacitus actually explodes the entire genre within which he is working; while playing by its rules and conventions, he claims that the game can no longer be played and won. In a masterpiece of Ciceronian eloquence he argues that Ciceronian eloquence is no longer possible; the change in political circumstances from the late Republic to the early Empire has closed that route forever.

In the seventh and final chapter I show how Pliny, by contrast, tries to put Quintilian’s Ciceronian classroom principles into practice in the rough and tumble world of Roman life and letters. He is nevertheless acutely conscious that neither his native talent nor the changed political circumstances allow him to do so successfully. His Epistulae thus show a persistently uneasy anxiety of influence, as he both desires to be compared with his great model and avows that he is not worthy of such an honor. I investigate both Pliny’s explicit mentions of Cicero in the Epistulae and some more subtle Ciceronian echoes and motifs in those letters. I demonstrate that his relationship with Cicero remains an unresolved and unresolvable tension throughout his work.

In an epilogue I draw all these threads together and provide an aperçu on the late antique and early medieval reception of Cicero, which is very different. Throughout the early Empire, Cicero had been little valued as a philosopher, not least because those who wanted to read philosophy could read his Greek sources. With the advent of Christianity and the progressive erosion of Greek in the West, however, his stock as a philosopher began to rise. It became less and less necessary to look to him as a model of a Latinity whose character had fundamentally shifted, and less and less possible to understand of the politics of the situation of a completely alien time, but more and moral elements in his philosophécha. 

When All Else Fails: The Ethics of Resistance to State Injustice by Jason Brennan [Princeton University Press, 9780691181714]

Why you have the right to resist unjust government

The economist Albert O. Hirschman famously argued that citizens of democracies have only three possible responses to injustice or wrongdoing by their governments: we may leave, complain, or comply. But in When All Else Fails, Jason Brennan argues that there is a fourth option. When governments violate our rights, we may resist. We may even have a moral duty to do so.

For centuries, almost everyone has believed that we must allow the government and its representatives to act without interference, no matter how they behave. We may complain, protest, sue, or vote officials out, but we can’t fight back. But Brennan makes the case that we have no duty to allow the state or its agents to commit injustice. We have every right to react with acts of “uncivil disobedience.” We may resist arrest for violation of unjust laws. We may disobey orders, sabotage government property, or reveal classified information. We may deceive ignorant, irrational, or malicious voters. We may even use force in self-defense or to defend others.

The result is a provocative challenge to long-held beliefs about how citizens may respond when government officials behave unjustly or abuse their power.

Contents
Western philosophy did not really begin with Socrates, but nevertheless, we tell our students a founding myth. Socrates was a gadfly. He demonstrated that the supposedly wisest people in Athens could not answer what seemed like simple questions about their areas of expertise. The pious could not explain what piety is; the just could not explain what justice is. He showed how much people took for granted and how little they could justify their basic assumptions.

This kind of behavior can be dangerous. The Athenians sure didn’t like it; they had him executed. But philosophy is not just dangerous for the philosopher.

Philosophy brings our hidden ideas to the surface and exposes unseen contradictions. What we think is obvious is not so obvious on reflection. Philosophical inquiry often shows that our core beliefs are a jumbled mess.

We sometimes make dangerous mistakes when we try to clean up that mess. Some countries today still suffer the legacy of philosophers’ past errors.

But at the same time, we do not make progress without challenging and in many cases changing our moral ideas. In general, people live far better and in far more just societies today than a thousand years ago. I don’t want to give philosophers all or even most of the credit for that. But philosophers deserve some credit. It matters that we now see government agents as servants appointed by the people rather than as lords appointed by the gods.

It matters that we see people everywhere as part of the same moral community rather than holding, as most early people did, that the "barbarians" outside our borders also fall outside our moral concerns. It matters that we recognize that government leaders and civilians are fundamentally morally equal; there is not one set of rights for the high and a different set for the low.

Philosophy often deals with dangerous subjects and questions: Might belief in divine beings be a mistake? When do humans acquire a right to life? Which rights do we have, how strong are those rights, and when, if ever, may governments or others override them? What are the principles governing war? What makes sexual assault, stealing, or killing wrong? What makes something a moral patient—that is, a thing to which obligations are owed? What makes something a moral agent—that is, a thing that possesses moral obligations? What kind of value does human, animal, or plant life have? When, if ever, is violence permitted or justified?

These are difficult questions. They are difficult in part because most of us have conflicting beliefs and intuitions about these questions. Most people’s answers to those questions have implications that they are not prepared to endorse.

For instance, bioethicist Peter Singer asks readers to consider why they believe human beings have rights that, say, cows lack. Most will say something such as, “Well, human beings have free will and cows don’t,” or "People have sufficiently high intelligence to have rights but cows don’t.” Singer then responds by saying if that’s really the explanation, it suggests that we may feel free to
perform medical experiments on or even eat the severely mentally disabled; after all, they lack the special features that you claim imbue people with rights. This of course causes many readers great discomfort. But that kind of discomfort is necessary for us to answer questions about where rights come from and what has them.

This book argues for a rather simple but possibly dangerous idea: you possess the same right of self-defense, and the same right to defend others, against government agents as you do against civilians. The moral principles governing self-defense against civilians and government agents, even agents who act by virtue of their appointed status and within the law, are the same. The main way I will argue for this position is to show that the reasons to think otherwise are unsound.

This book has straightforwardly dangerous implications. If I am right, this means that when a police officer uses excessive force against you or tries to arrest you for a crime that should not be a crime, you may defend yourself. It means that agents working within government may sabotage their colleagues or superiors who act unjustly. It means that you may lie to government agents who would use your information in unjust ways.

We need to be cautious here.

This is a book about self-defense and the defense of others. You engage in self-defense against the bully when you fight back as he pushes you. You defend someone else against the would-be mugger when you stop him as he tries to rob his victim. If, on the other hand, you beat up the bully or mugger a year later when they’re harming no one, you aren’t defending yourself or anyone else. You’re exacting revenge or inflicting private punishment. That’s not what this book is about. Self-defense and vigilante justice are two different things.

In recent years, you may have watched recorded videos of police officers using excessive force against civilians. In some of those cases, yes, I am arguing that bystanders had the right to use violence, even deadly violence, to stop the police from brutalizing or killing those civilians. But if you take it on yourself to attack those police now, after the fact, you are not defending anyone. You’re exacting revenge or inflicting private punishment. That’s not what this book defends.

Further, don’t confuse self-defense with revolution or violent social change. The principles that I discuss in this book concern in what ways we may defend ourselves or others from immediate threats of injustice. But I am not arguing that we should use violence, subterfuge, or deceit to change the form of government, who rules, what the laws are, or how the laws are enforced.

This is a book of philosophy, not a manual for self-defense. I recommend that you be extremely cautious in applying the ideas of this book. First, I might be wrong. I don’t think I am, but I may well be. Second, even if I’m right, in the heat of the moment, it’s often hard to apply moral principles correctly, and you may make mistakes. Third, note that while I am arguing that certain forms of defensive action are permissible, the state is almost certainly not going to agree. In, for example, the Rodney King beating, I think it would have been morally permissible for a bystander to intervene. But any such bystander should know that the police may have reacted violently to such intervention, and whoever intervened may be charged with a crime or even killed. Sometimes what’s morally permissible is also imprudent.

Part of philosophy’s job is to critically examine our most basic assumptions and see if these beliefs withstand scrutiny. Doing so is almost guaranteed to offend.

Sometimes what seemed like merely academic discussions became politically salient. In the latter half of the twentieth century, philosophers debated whether torture was always wrong, or whether it might be permissible or at least excusable to extract information from terrorists in "ticking time bomb” cases. Then the United States declared a “War on Terror,” and suddenly these discussions were no longer academic.
Similarly, back in 1978, philosopher Philippa Foot introduced the "Trolley Problem." Foot asks us, if a runaway train were about to crush five people, but you could pull a switch to direct it onto a track where it will only kill one, should you—assuming you have no other options—pull the switch? Most people say yes. She then asks us to imagine the same scenario, except this time you can stop the train by pushing a fat man onto the track. Is that permissible? Most people say no. The puzzle is what makes the cases different. Trolley-ology—philosophy examining thousands of variations on cases like these—seemed pointless to many, but now, with the self-driving automobiles, the question is practical, not hypothetical. We need to program these cars to make the right decisions when they encounter problems like these.

This book was inspired by real-life events. It concerns real-life situations. But I should be clear that I have no ill will toward government agents in general. I believe we should honor the good that others do and hold them accountable for their wrongs. I say this in the spirit of equality. We are fundamentally on par from a moral point of view. This book is an attempt to understand what it means to take that moral parity seriously.

When All Else Fails: The Morality of Caution
Violence, deception, destruction, and sabotage might not always be last resorts, but they are rarely first resorts. Well-functioning societies create nonviolent means to resolve disputes and disagreements. Decent people try to resolve disagreements through nonviolent means when possible. There are good reasons to minimize violence, not just in general, but even in response to violence from others. Sometimes violence is called for, but it's not something to celebrate.

It's usually better (and sometimes obligatory) that we resolve our disputes and disagreements peacefully. Sometimes the best response to injustice is even to suck it up and live with it, or turn the other cheek. When nonviolent forms of mediation or conflict resolution are available, we should generally use them, and we sometimes should accept incorrectly decided outcomes. People frequently disagree about fundamental principles of justice and what the relevant facts are. Given that problem, often what makes a law good isn't so much that it tracks justice perfectly but rather that it provides a workable compromise everyone can live with.

All this applies to interpersonal conflicts. Suppose you crash your car into mine. Suppose you really owe me $3,000 in damages. But suppose both our insurance companies, plus an impartial mediator, mistakenly yet in good faith settle on $2,700. I should let it go rather than hack your bank account for the other $300.

Similarly, I will accept that these same standards apply to conflicts with the state when it acts badly. The point of this book is not to advocate we burn down the capital or start lynching cops. Instead, it's much more modest: we should feel free to treat the state and its agents the way we treat each other. It's just that once we accept this claim—that political actors do not enjoy special immunity—then resistance becomes a viable fourth option in responding to their misbehavior.

Here I introduce some distinctions to help clarify how we should think about these issues. Consider the difference between what we might call strategic versus principled nonviolence. The doctrine of strategic nonviolence, the one that Martin Luther King Jr. most likely advocated, holds that people who are trying to produce social change should avoid violence because peaceful methods are more likely to succeed. King thought nonviolence was more likely to elicit sympathetic responses from others. For instance, if protesters refuse to fight back when the police attack them, people watching at home might view the protesters as especially noble and would then be likely to support the cause. If the protesters fought back, TV viewers may conclude the protesters are getting what they deserve. Viewers would be more likely to side with the state or police. Moreover, those who defend strategic nonviolence often worry that if citizens
fight back against injustice, the state or its agents will retaliate by committing even greater injustices.

While strategic nonviolence holds that nonviolence "works" better, what we might call principled nonviolence maintains that violence is wrong, period, regardless of how well it "works." Pacifist Anabaptists, for example, refused to fight back against oppression, not because they believed their pacifism would shame their oppressors into change, but because they thought defensive violence was wrong in itself, period. They took Christ's injunction to turn the other cheek to mean that they were required to, well, turn the other cheek.

Again, this book is about using defensive violence, deception, and sabotage to stop individual acts of injustice. I am not much concerned with offering a theory of social change—that is, a theory of how best to change laws, institutions, or prevailing social norms.

That said, when we later examine various objections to defensive violence, deception, and sabotage, or consider the various arguments people might offer in favor of the special immunity thesis, we should be careful to consider whether these assertions invoke strategic or principled concerns. If someone says, "You shouldn't fight back against a cop trying to arrest you for possessing marijuana because then people will lose sympathy for the marijuana decriminalization movement," that person appears to invoke a strategic argument for nonviolence. If the person says, "You shouldn't fight back against a cop trying to arrest you for possessing marijuana because cops have a right to be obeyed," that person invokes a principled objection to resistance.

Here's another important distinction. Consider case A' again:

A'. Minivan Shooter
Ann witnesses a police officer stop a minivan with a female driver and three children in the back. Ann sees that the driver has nothing in her hands and her hands are on the steering wheel. The police officer emerges from his car and starts shooting at the van's windows. Ann has a gun. She fires at the police officer before he shoots any of the children.

Now consider two different objections (among many) people might produce against Ann shooting the police officer:

Moral Authority: While it's wrong for the police officer to shoot at the children, Ann has a duty to obey and defer to the police. Even if she knows for certain that what he's doing is wrong, she must allow him to do it rather than stop him. She may/must instead report him to his superior officer.

Epistemic Uncertainty: It's strange and unusual for police officers to attempt to murder innocent people. Though it seems like that's what the police officer is doing, Ann should give the officer the benefit of the doubt and presume that he has some unknown but good reason to do what he's doing. She should not kill him—at least not until she gathers more information.

These objections raise two different kinds of reasons against Ann shooting the cop.

The first is a principled moral objection, which holds that it's just wrong, period, for Ann to shoot the cop. Ann knows what the cop is doing is wrong, but she has a duty to let him act wrongly. Just as subjects must obey their king even if he issues an unjust command, Ann must defer to the cop.

The second is (or could be interpreted as) another kind of strategic objection. It doesn't say strictly speaking that shooting the officer is wrong. Rather, it's offering advice about how a person in Ann's situation ought to think. It allows that her intervention might indeed be permissible. But it advises Ann to be suspicious and self-critical when she reaches that conclusion. The idea is that it's unusual for someone like Ann to be in a situation where it's right to shoot a law enforcement official. She should be cautious in reaching the judgment that defensive action is called for. She should
presume that the officer has some unknown justification for his behavior.

In chapter 4, we'll explore further worries about epistemic uncertainty and moral caution. I'll agree that actors who are considering lying, cheating, stealing, engaging in sabotage or violence, or using violence should be cautious about what they think they know. Nevertheless, I'll show that all this is compatible with the moral parity thesis.

As we'll see in chapter 2 when we review the commonsense doctrine of defensive action, it is not necessary that the defender eliminate uncertainty in order to be justified in using defensive action. To use defensive violence, one should justifiably believe that doing so is necessary to defend oneself or others. But to be justified doesn't require that one be certain. So, for instance, suppose tonight as I'm sleeping, plainclothes police officers mistakenly invade my house in a no-knock raid. In the heat of the moment, I'm likely to be unsure of whether the invaders are police officers or robbers. It would, I'll argue, be justifiable for me to shoot first and ask questions later. All the potential downsides and risks should fall on the police, and they, not my family and I, should bear all the risks from uncertainty about what's happening.

Things I Don't Assume and That Don't Matter for This Debate
Let's clear up some possible misconceptions up front.

I am not arguing for anarchism. Following the philosopher Gregory Kavka, I understand a government to be the subset of a society that claims a monopoly on the legitimate use of coercion, and has coercive power sufficient (more or less) to maintain that monopoly. Anarchists generally believe that governments are unjust. Or more weakly, they believe nongovernmental mechanisms for protecting rights and property, or maintaining public goods, are all things considered superior to governmental mechanisms. Whether anarchist alternatives to government are feasible is, I think, a far more interesting question than most people realize, but this book takes no stance on these issues.

As I will elaborate at greater length in chapter 3, I can assume (for the sake of argument) that we ought to have governments rather than not, and furthermore, that the governments in question generally are legitimate, and may permissibly create and enforce rules. As I'll show in chapter 3, I could even grant for the sake of argument that governments have permission to create and enforce bad, unjust, or downright evil rules. At no point will I argue for revolution—that is, overthrowing any governments, and replacing them with other forms of government or anarchist alternatives. Nevertheless, even with those assumptions and constraints, the main thesis of this book goes through.

I also do not argue for, and my argument does not assume, libertarianism or classical liberalism. Libertarians and classical liberals are generally skeptical of the state and state authority. They do not view the state or its agents as majestic. They think the slogan "government is simply the name we give to the things we choose to do together" is utterly ridiculous. For that reason, they are statistically more likely than others to accept the conclusions of this book. Yet the argument I make here is compatible with a wide range of background political philosophies, including both left and right anarchism, left liberalism, progressivism, US conservatism, Burkean conservatism, Rawlsianism, and classical liberalism.

This book presumes no particular background moral theory. I will argue on the basis of widely shared intuitions and moral principles, but I will not try to ground these principles on any particular philosophical theory of morality. My reasoning is compatible with various forms of consequentialism, Kantianism, natural law theory, and other moral theories. Of course, not everything I say is compatible with every view. I'll assert later that justice and morality are not merely decided by legal or democratic fiat (except perhaps in narrow
cases), and so my view is incompatible with those that say the opposite.

I’m not being evasive here. Rather, it’s important to recognize what’s at stake in an argument and what isn’t. Most moral theories and theories of justice are highly abstract. Asking what some grand moral theory like Kantianism implies about the right of self-defense is a bit like asking what Albert Einstein’s field equations say about the path of a falling feather. Einstein’s field equations describe the general ordering of space and time. They are highly abstract and devoid of specific empirical information. The equations are consistent with worlds radically different from ours, such as Kurt Gödel’s universe. By themselves, the field equations tell us little about the physics of a falling feather. To understand the falling feather, we use intermediary or midlevel physical laws and models, and the laws and models we’d use are ultimately compatible with Newtonian or relativistic physics.

I think something similar holds true for most—and the most interesting—questions in political philosophy and ethics. To answer these questions, we need to make use of intermediary or midlevel moral principles, but these principles are compatible with a wide range of background moral theories. To answer the questions in this book, we don’t need to take a stance on whether Kantianism is correct, any more than to design a jet engine well, we need to take a stance on whether string theory is correct.

Why It Matters Today
Political philosophy aspires to a kind of timelessness. This book does too. I believe that the basic principles I defend here were true two thousand years ago and will be true two thousand years in the future.

That said, current events give this topic special interest. Every day we see videos of or read stories about police beating unarmed people, burning toddlers, or choking nonviolent criminals to death. US police killed about a thousand people in 2015, and approximately another thousand in 2016.

Unfortunately, there do not seem to be good data on the number of police-caused deaths over time. While it’s clear that the US police are more militarized and aggressive overall now than they were forty years ago, it’s unclear whether they really are more violent or abusive, or whether ubiquitous cell phone cameras and social media just mean that we’re more aware of their behavior.

Right now the US government, at both the federal and local levels, suffers from a crisis of perceived illegitimacy.

President Donald Trump, even more than his far-from-innocent predecessors, seems happy to ignore constitutional constraints.

The US federal government tries hard to exempt itself from due process. It regularly spies on citizens and gives itself permission to assassinate them. It tortures foreigners and launches wave after wave of unjust wars. Democracy seems impotent to fix the problem. Agencies are largely autonomous, and these kinds of activities continue regardless of whom we vote into power.

In a recent CounterPunch article defending the Black Panthers, Thandisizwe Chimurenga asks us to "imagine that, instead of bystanders filming CHP Officer Daniel Andrew mercilessly beating a helpless Marlene Pinnock by the side of the I-10 freeway last August, a handful of those bystanders had trained their weapons on Andrew, demanded he cease and desist, handcuffed him and waited until a commander from the CHP arrived on the scene." This is precisely the kind of problem I have in mind. I doubt handcuffing Andrew would have worked; I suspect the cops would have sent a SWAT team to kill anyone who intervened. Still, I agree with Chimurenga that, if the facts are as he states them, some form of violent intervention would be morally permissible, though probably imprudent.

On YouTube, you can watch police violently beat Noel Aguilar, whom the police claimed had a gun and was resisting arrest. At one point, while two officers crush Aguilar beneath their knees, an
officer draws his pistol and attempts to shoot Aguilar. The officer misses and hits his partner. Both officers then shoot Aguilar multiple times.

In another video, police officer Patrick Feaster pursues Andrew Thomas, who had run a red light. Thomas eventually crashes and flips his car, which ejects and kills his wife. Feaster’s own dash cam video shows Thomas crawling out of his window. Almost as soon as Thomas emerges from the car, his hands clearly free of any weapons, Feaster shoots Thomas in the neck.

People dispute what the facts are. But as I’ll argue in future chapters, in at least some cases like these, it would be justifiable for the onlookers to put down their camera phones and instead forcefully intervene to stop the police from using excessive as well as reckless force, or in some extreme cases, stop the officers from executing their victims.

All this holds true even in reasonably just democratic states. Compared to nondemocratic alternatives, democratic states do a decent job defending civil rights. Their agents tend to behave better than agents who work in other forms of government. Democracies provide legal, peaceful avenues to stop leaders from committing injustices.

That said, there are realistic circumstances in which democratic leaders and agents do deeply unjust things that go far beyond anything that could plausibly be seen as their authoritative scope of power. Consider essayist Alfred Jay Nock’s moral indictment of the United State on the eve of World War II:

In order to keep down the great American sin of self-righteousness, every public presentation ought to draw the deadly parallel with the record of the American State. The German State is persecuting a minority, just as the American State did after 1776; the Italian State breaks into Ethiopia, just as the American State broke into Mexico; the Japanese State kills off the Manchurian tribes in wholesale lots, just as the American State did the Indian tribes; ... the imperialist French State massacres native civilians on their own soil, as the American State did in pursuit of its imperialistic policies in the Pacific, and so on.

Even today, democratic officials often do things that they have no right to do and that we have no duty to let them do. Many times there are no peaceful means to stop them. My thesis is that we may do to them whatever we may do to each other.

Historian and civil rights activist proves how progressive movements can flourish even in conservative times.

Despair and mourning after the election of an antagonistic or polarizing president, such as Donald Trump, is part of the push-pull of American politics. But in this incisive book, historian Mary Frances Berry shows that resistance to presidential administrations has led to positive change and the defeat of outrageous proposals, even in challenging times. Noting that all presidents, including ones considered progressive, sometimes require massive organization to affect policy decisions, Berry cites Indigenous peoples’ protests against the Dakota pipeline during Barack Obama’s administration as a modern example of successful resistance built on earlier actions.

Beginning with Franklin D. Roosevelt, Berry discusses that president’s refusal to prevent race discrimination in the defense industry during World War II and the subsequent March on Washington movement. She analyzes Lyndon Johnson, the war in Vietnam, and the antiwar movement and then examines Ronald Reagan’s two terms, which offer stories of opposition to reactionary policies, such as ignoring the AIDS crisis and retreating on racial progress, to show how resistance can succeed.
The prochoice protests during the George H. W. Bush administration and the opposition to Bill Clinton’s “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” policy, as well as his budget cuts and welfare reform, are also discussed, as are protests against the war in Iraq and the Patriot Act during George W. Bush’s presidency. Throughout these varied examples, Berry underscores that even when resistance doesn’t achieve all the goals of a particular movement, it often plants a seed that comes to fruition later.

Berry also shares experiences from her six decades as an activist in various movements, including protesting the Vietnam War and advocating for the Free South Africa and civil rights movements, which provides an additional layer of insight from someone who was there. And as a result of having served in five presidential administrations, Berry brings an insider’s knowledge of government.

Excerpt: History Lessons
When hundreds of thousands of women, men, and children converged on Washington, DC, on January 21, 2017, the day after the inauguration of Donald Trump as president of the United States, they became part of a long protest tradition in the nation’s capital. The tradition includes Coxey’s Army demanding jobs for the unemployed during the economic crisis of 1894 to the Bonus Army of 1932 demanding payment of World War I pensions due to unemployed veterans. It also extends to the Poor People’s Campaign and encampment on the National Mall in Washington, DC, after the 1968 assassination of Martin Luther King Jr. to the prochoice and antiabortion rallies of the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. Marches and other forms of protest, including street theater, and sharing complaints and organizing on social media have become a way to focus national attention on major social and political issues. And even when protests have resulted in uneven immediate success, they have raised important issues that often reverberated beyond the tactics utilized. However, the ease of communications and organizing protest through social media can obscure the persistence and face-to-face contact necessary for staying organized and achieving policy change.

History teaches us the value of resistance and protest. Women have fought for suffrage since at least 1848. But the 1913 march, marred by efforts to keep black women segregated at the rear, kicked off a series of protests, including hunger strikes, leading finally to the Nineteenth Amendment to the Constitution in 1920, which prohibited the denial of the vote because of sex. The Bonus marches got hustled away by troops led by General Douglas MacArthur, but in 1936, Congress overrode President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s veto and paid the veterans the bonus they had sought nine years earlier.

The despair, mourning, and fear that arise after the election of a president who promises devastation to causes supported by large numbers of people are painful and real. But it is also part
of the push-pull of American politics. This is true whether the cause is gun rights on the one hand and gun control on the other. Trump’s election has generated elation from his supporters and fear and loathing from those who believe that progressive change, whether on immigration, health care, or abortion rights, is at risk. But they should remember that resistance to presidential administrations has led to positive change and defeat of outrageous proposals even in perilous times. It is also worth noting that presidents considered progressive can require massive protest to induce policy decisions; Obama and the Indigenous peoples’ protests against the Dakota Access Pipeline is one modern example of resistance built on earlier actions on specific issues.

It’s crucial to recognize that resistance works even if it does not achieve all the movement’s goals, and that movements are always necessary, because major change will engender resistance, which must be addressed.

In this book, I will examine several examples of resistance during presidential administrations, beginning with President Franklin Roosevelt, who refused to prevent race discrimination in the defense industry in World War II, despite massive unemployment. We will see how people involved in the protest used what they learned in later movements for progressive change.

The second example is Lyndon B. Johnson, another president who is often considered progressive; yet, while he responded to civil rights protests positively, he persisted in continuing the war in Vietnam. The antiwar protest movement was so effective that it influenced his decision not to seek another term. Richard Nixon (1968-1974) responded to the momentum generated by the continuing protests by concluding the war, which also ended the need for a draft.

Ronald Reagan’s two terms offer more recent stories of courageous opposition to reactionary policies, such as ignoring the AIDS crisis and retreating on racial progress, and show how resistance can succeed. The prochoice protests during the George H. W. Bush administration offer another example. There are other instructive stories of partial success and failure, such as opposition to Bill Clinton’s “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” policy and his budget cuts and welfare reform and the protests against the war in Iraq and the Patriot Act during George W. Bush’s presidency. The movement for LGBTQ rights and the Dreamers (undocumented immigrants who came to the United States as small children) and other immigration protests are built on the style and methods of earlier efforts.

I was actively involved in some of these movements. I started as an antiwar protester as a student at the University of Michigan and then became an overseas correspondent, working as a "reporter" for local papers in order to go to Vietnam, where I saw the horrors of the war. My friend Joe Wildberger and I stood outside the White House after the Saturday Night Massacre, on October 20, 1973, yelling, "Resign! Resign!" as others who wanted to protest Nixon joined us. (The so-called massacre refers to Nixon’s purge of the top leadership of the Justice Department to appoint an acting attorney general who would fire the special prosecutor, who was pursuing the release of the president’s secret recordings.) I was later a member of the US Commission on Civil Rights and fired by President Reagan on October 25, 1983, for opposing his anti—civil rights policies. I won a lawsuit against him and continued until I was later appointed by President Clinton as chair of the commission. I was one of three antiapartheid protesters who started the Free South Africa movement in December 1984 and inspired nationwide protests. Two years later, US sanctions against the apartheid regime were enacted by Congress. My experiences confirm historical research—protest is an essential ingredient of politics and can effect change.

While researching the history of the movements described in this book, I have noticed some problems they have in common. Protesters sometimes have difficulty keeping to a simple goal, and complicated messaging inhibits growth. The March on Washington movement wanted FDR to
order jobs for blacks in the defense industry. The Free South Africa movement wanted Congress to pass sanctions to end US business dealings with South Africa to help end apartheid: freedom, yes; apartheid, no. The anti—Vietnam War movement wanted to stop the war and end the draft.

If the goal is to educate the public about an issue, then idealism is its own reward. One example is Occupy Wall Street’s effort in 2011 to elevate the income-inequality issue, while the press kept asking, What are the goals and who are your leaders? The more complicated the initiative, even a legislative one, the harder the work and the longer it takes to achieve success. The Civil Rights Act of 1991, remedying negative Supreme Court employment decisions, was too technical to easily explain on a poster and difficult to pass. It failed in 1990 and had to be restarted. Asking for jobs, while difficult, probably is simpler than obtaining real "freedom" or making "Black Lives Matter," which are both complicated and hard but necessary.

Sometimes failure has reverberations. The confirmation fight over Clarence Thomas’s nomination to the US Supreme Court helped achieve the Civil Rights Act of 1991, which was challenging to pass but vitally needed. Sometimes a movement must try what looks like desperate, last-minute protest to prevail, as when disability rights protesters in wheelchairs propelled the Americans with Disabilities Act across the congressional finish line by abandoning their chairs and crawling up the Capitol steps.

This book also shows that every growing movement uneasily incorporates newcomers who are attracted by some part of the message but don’t agree with or understand the goal, or may feel they have a better idea. Sometimes they get bored and leave, other times they choose to either assimilate or be gently left behind. They may form their own movement. Thinking you’ve failed and becoming exhausted can lead to a radical spin-off, such as the Weathermen, a violent offshoot that arose after the seeming failure of the anti—Vietnam War movement, or the Black Power turn when the gains of the Southern civil rights movement didn’t solve police brutality, economic inequity, and other problems of black people.

Also, the study of these movements shows some jealousy from established organizations that have not solved the problem but resent being what they regard as usurped by other organizations taking up their charge. Movement leaders should know that working with other organizations in coalitions toward overall goals has worked, once the fervor dies down. Figuring out the group dynamics is not always easy. The Free South Africa movement, for example, helped to end apartheid, but South Africa is still beset with economic inequality and corruption. Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) led the fight to end the Vietnam War, but when the organization dissolved, the people and groups it inspired carried on until the war ended. Then, there is the problem of seeking celebrity. Some people will join the movement and present themselves to the press as leaders for selfish reasons, including media coverage and speaker fees. They have to be politely denounced instead of embraced, because they may confuse the message and retard the movement’s objectives. The surveillance problem is closely related, because sometimes celebrity seekers can give misleading information to official agencies that fear the changes proposed and make it appear that movement is engaged in suspicious activity. The Free South Africa movement for the most part avoided this problem by having a small group of people who trusted each other make the day-to-day decisions about tactics and strategy. For complicated goals and longer time periods, exhaustion and other aspects of daily life may make this small-group approach impossible. But some way of keeping decisions close must be developed while not offending coalition members when coalitions are embraced.

Of course, no time period or issue is exactly like what has come before; other factors will have significance. Still, I do believe that history teaches us to resist, and I hope this analysis of several US resistance movements may provide useful information and guidance for our time. <>
Worldmaking after Empire: The Rise and Fall of Self-Determination by Adom Getachew [Princeton University Press, 9780691179155]

Decolonization revolutionized the international order during the twentieth century. Yet standard histories that present the end of colonialism as an inevitable transition from a world of empires to one of nations—a world in which self-determination was synonymous with nation-building—obscure just how radical this change was. Drawing on the political thought of anticolonial intellectuals and statesmen such as Nnamdi Azikiwe, W.E.B Du Bois, George Padmore, Kwame Nkrumah, Eric Williams, Michael Manley, and Julius Nyerere, this important new account of decolonization reveals the full extent of their unprecedented ambition to remake not only nations but the world.

Adom Getachew shows that African, African American, and Caribbean anticolonial nationalists were not solely or even primarily nation-builders. Responding to the experience of racialized sovereign inequality, dramatized by interwar Ethiopia and Liberia, Black Atlantic thinkers and politicians challenged international racial hierarchy and articulated alternative visions of worldmaking. Seeking to create an egalitarian postimperial world, they attempted to transcend legal, political, and economic hierarchies by securing a right to self-determination within the newly founded United Nations, constituting regional federations in Africa and the Caribbean, and creating the New International Economic Order.

Using archival sources from Barbados, Trinidad, Ghana, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom, Worldmaking after Empire recasts the history of decolonization, reconsiders the failure of anticolonial nationalism, and offers a new perspective on debates about today’s international order.

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Excerpt: This book studies the global projects of decolonization black Anglophone anticolonial critics and nationalists spearheaded in the three decades after the end of the Second World War. Drawing on the political thought of Nnamdi Azikiwe, W.E.B. Du Bois, Michael Manley, Kwame Nkrumah, Julius Nyerere, George Padmore, and Eric Williams, I argue that decolonization was a project of reordering the world that sought to create a domination-free and egalitarian international order. Against the standard view of decolonization as a moment of nation-building in which the anticolonial demand for self-determination culminated in the rejection of alien rule and the formation of nation-states, I recast anticolonial nationalism as worldmaking. The central actors of this study reinvented self-determination reaching beyond its association with the nation to insist that the achievement of this ideal required juridical, political, and economic institutions in the international realm that would secure non-dominion. Central to this claim was an expansive account of empire that situated alien rule within international structures of unequal integration and racial hierarchy. On this view, empire was a form of domination that exceeded the bilateral relations of colonizer and colonized. As a result, it required a similarly global anticolonial counterpoint that would undo the hierarchies that facilitated domination.
In three different projects—the institutionalization of a right to self-determination at the United Nations, the formation of regional federations, and the demand for a New International Economic Order—anticolonial nationalists sought to overcome the legal and material manifestations of unequal integration and inaugurate a postimperial world. Attending to these global ambitions of anticolonial nationalism offers opportunities to revisit and rethink the critique of nationalism as parochial and antiuniversal. Rather than foreclosing internationalism, the effort to achieve national independence propelled a rethinking of state sovereignty, inspired a far-reaching reconstitution of the postwar international order, and grounded the twentieth century’s most ambitious vision of global redistribution. In casting anticolonial nationalists as worldmakers rather than solely nation builders, I illustrate that the age of decolonization anticipated and reconfigured our contemporary questions about international political and economic justice.

In the background of this book’s thesis that anticolonial nationalism was a project of worldmaking is the history of European imperialism as itself a world-constituting force that violently inaugurated an unprecedented era of globality. Beginning in 1492, European conquest and colonization coupled with native dispossession and genocide, the forced migration of twelve million African slaves over three centuries, and the circulation of commodities linked the Atlantic world and transformed the conditions of economic and political life in each node of the triangular trade. This first moment of imperial globalization reverberated beyond the Atlantic as European expansion extended to Asia and then Africa, producing new dislocations and transformations. By the height of imperialism at the turn of the twentieth century, Europe’s political and economic entanglements with the rest of the world constituted a novel era of world politics that made it impossible to think domestic politics in isolation from the ever-widening global interactions. The contradictions and tensions between the nineteenth-century rise of the democratic nation-state within Europe as well as in the settler colonies and the scale and scope of imperial expansion were a central preoccupation of European intellectuals who offered a series of ideological and institutional sutures for the divides between nation and empire.

The first antisystemic worldmaking project emerged in this context with the founding of the International Workingmen’s Association in 1864. Both the Communist Manifesto and Karl Marx’s Capital situated the rise of capitalist production and its creation of a world market in imperial expansion. "The dawn of the era of capitalist production," Marx argued, was to be found in "the discovery of gold and silver in America, the extirpation, enslavement and entombment in mines of the indigenous populations of that continent, the beginnings of the conquest and plunder of India, and the conversion of Africa into a preserve for the commercial hunting of blackskins." Through this violent domination, the European bourgeoisie sought to create "a world after its own image" and in turn produced the conditions of its own overcoming. In linking together disparate political parties and trade unions against the growing consolidation of an international system of nation-states, the First International envisioned a global emancipation of labor that would remake the world.

Beginning at the turn of the twentieth century, anticolonialists of the colonized world radicalized this Marxist critique of empire’s political economy. They argued that Europe’s effort to produce "a world after its own image" through imperial expansion was always a chimera that belied colonial dependencies and inequalities. Imperial integration did not create one world but instead entailed racialized differentiation.” After the Bolshevik revolution, and working within and beyond the Third International, interwar anti-imperialists mobilized this critique to envision a reordering of the world that transcended imperial inequality and anticipated anti-imperial and often antistatist futures. Operating through transnational networks, internationalists experimented with political forms
beyond and below the nation-state. They offered visions of a world after empire that ranged from Marcus Garvey’s transnational black nation organized through the Universal Negro Improvement Association to Padmore’s International Trade Union Committee of Negro Workers, an arm of the Third International that fashioned black workers as the vanguard of the struggle against imperialism and capitalism.

The worldmakers in this study traveled the circuits of interwar antiimperial internationalisms. However, they arrived on the political stage at a moment after the fall of the Third International and when the midcentury collapse of empires coincided with the triumph of the nation-state. These conditions set limits on the range of political possibilities for anticolonial worldmaking. However, the emergence of the nation-state as the normative unit of the international order also provided occasion to rethink the conditions in which a system of states might overcome imperial hierarchy and domination. In this context, nationalists argued that in the absence of legal, political, and economic institutions that realized an international principle of nondomination, the domestic politics of postcolonial states were constantly vulnerable to external encroachment and intervention. Worldmaking was thus envisioned as the correlate to nation-building, and self-determination stood at their nexus. In its domestic face, self-determination entailed a democratic politics of postcolonial citizenship through which the postcolonial state secured economic development and redistribution. In its international face, self-determination created the external conditions for this domestic politics by transforming conditions of international hierarchy that facilitated dependence and domination. This book demonstrates that instead of marking the collapse of internationalism and the closure of alternative conceptions of a world after empire, anticolonial nationalism in the age of decolonization continued to confront the legacies of imperial hierarchy with a demand for the radical reconstitution of the international order.

The Worlds of Pan-Africanism
To understand this history of anticolonial worldmaking, we need to grasp the worlds of Pan-Africanism that the central characters of this study inhabited. As Anglophone Black Atlantic intellectuals, Nnamdi Azikiwe, W.E.B. Du Bois, Michael Manley, Kwame Nkrumah, Julius Nyerere, George Padmore, and Eric Williams were interlocutors beginning in the interwar period. While I focus on Anglophone thinkers, it should be noted that interwar black internationalism transcended imperial boundaries and gave rise to political collaboration and intellectual exchange between British and French colonial subjects. In fact, during the 1920 and 1930s, Francophone figures like Aimé Césaire, Paulette Nardal, and Léopold Senghor had spearheaded much of this collaboration, but the suppression of black intellectuals in Paris, which intensified during the German occupation, significantly eroded Francophone internationalist circles. By 1945, London rather than Paris was at the center of black internationalism. Moreover, the postwar project of a transnational French federation, which occupied figures like Césaire and Senghor, created divergent trajectories of decolonization in the Francophone world.

While the Anglophone world emerged as the central site of black internationalism by the end of World War II, anticolonial worldmaking was not limited to the central characters of this book. Broader political formations such as the Bandung Conference and the Non-aligned Movement also advanced the project of constituting a postimperial world order. Organized around the rubrics of Afro-Asian solidarity and the Third World, these formations played a central role in securing a right to self-determination and envisioning a New International Economic Order. But if anticolonial worldmaking captures in this sense a broader set of political solidarities, it took a distinctive trajectory in the Black Atlantic, where imagining a world after empire drew on an anticolonial critique that began from the foundational role of New World slavery in the making of the modern world and traced the
ways its legacies were constitutive of racial hierarchy in the international order.

The global legacies of slavery and emancipation were already central to the framing of the first Pan-African Congress, held in 1900, where W.E.B. Du Bois had famously announced, "The problem of the twentieth century is the problem of the color line." In this formulation, he linked the modes of racial domination in post-emancipation societies that the Jim Crow color line epitomized with the new era of imperial expansion in the late nineteenth century. During the interwar period, a new generation of black internationalists extended Du Bois's critique. Crisscrossing the Atlantic, this cohort of anticolonial nationalists was deeply influenced by their experiences of travel, education abroad, and encounters with fellow colonial subjects. Through literary, institutional, and political circuits, they offered a rethinking of the history of transatlantic slavery, formulated their critique of empire as enslavement, and articulated early conceptions of anticolonial worldmaking.

Capturing the worldliness of his generation's political and intellectual formation, Eric Williams retrospectively wrote that the nationalist party he had founded, the People's National Movement of Trinidad, "is part of the world movement against colonialism ... [that emerged from] the very colonialists who formed part of the university generation of the thirties, who saw the rise of Hitler, the rape of Ethiopia, the trampling of Spanish democracy, and who heard the Oxford Union refuse to fight for King and Country." Born in Trinidad in 1911, Williams had won the island scholarship to study at Oxford University. He received his BA in history in 1935 and completed a dissertation on the economic history of slavery and abolition in 1938. Later published as Capitalism and Slavery, Williams's dissertation was inspired by C.L.R. James, who was his secondary school teacher and had also moved to the United Kingdom, where he wrote and published The Black Jacobins. The seminal history of the Haitian Revolution explicitly linked the nineteenth-century struggle against slavery in the Americas with the impending anti-imperial revolutions in Africa. Together with Du Bois's Black Reconstruction (1935), these texts illuminated the constitutive role of the transatlantic slave trade and slavery in North Atlantic modernity.

Williams moved from Oxford to Howard University in 1939, where he joined the political science faculty. At the "Negro Oxford," he participated in debates about the structuring role of white supremacy in the international order with Ralph Bunche, Alain Locke, Rayford Logan, and Merze Tate. Howard and other black colleges and universities functioned as key nodes in black internationalist networks by supporting the research agendas of scholars like Williams, educating a generation of nationalists, and connecting African and Caribbean students and intellectuals to an African American public sphere. The Nigerian nationalist Nnamdi Azikiwe first enrolled at Howard and took courses with Alain Locke, before completing his degree at Lincoln University in 1930. In his first book, Liberia in World Politics, Azikiwe extended the explorations of international racial hierarchy pioneered at Howard by examining modes of imperialism that exceeded alien rule. When Azikiwe returned to West Africa, he started a number of newspapers in Accra and Lagos that were modeled on African American newspapers and provided a new forum for West African nationalists.

In Accra, Azikiwe met Kwame Nkrumah, at the time a student at the Achimota Teacher's College, and encouraged him to study at Lincoln. Nkrumah followed Azikiwe's path to the United States in 1935, stopping in the United Kingdom to secure a visa. Echoing Williams's reflections on the significance of the 1930s, Nkrumah notes in his autobiography that as he arrived in London, he heard news of Italy's invasion of Ethiopia and describes feeling "as if the whole of London had suddenly declared war on me personally." While he did not know it at the time, the 1935 invasion had been a catalyst for black internationalists in London. George Padmore, who resigned from the Third International in 1933, turned toward an
explicitly Pan-African politics in this period, while C.L.R. James offered a more radical critique of the League of Nations as a racially hierarchical organization. Together, Padmore and James formed the International African Friends of Abyssinia to organize support for Ethiopia, and later the International African Service Bureau with a broader aim of coordinating Pan-Africanism in the United Kingdom. During this period, Padmore wrote How Britain Rules Africa (1936), where he deployed the term "colonial fascism" to describe the British Empire and highlight the limits of European antifascism. The following year, he published Africa and World Peace, which traced the ways in which imperial competition and rivalry were once again leading to world war.

By the mid-1930s, black internationalists had rewritten the history of New World slavery and had honed their critique of unequal integration and international racial hierarchy. But at this moment they remained largely undecided about the institutional forms of a postimperial world. The contours of the worldmaking projects described in this study would take shape only over the next decade. Between 1935 and 1945, Nkrumah was in the United States studying at Lincoln and the University of Pennsylvania. These ten years were some of his richest intellectually and politically. He participated in African student groups, where he sharpened his ideas about African unity; was connected with left-leaning political organizations; encountered the writings of Marcus Garvey, which he described as the most influential texts on his political thinking; and joined local branches of Garvey's Universal Negro Improvement Association. It was in this context that Nkrumah began to articulate a demand for national independence and translated Garvey's black nationalism into a vision of Pan-African federation.

Having moved to the United States to join the Trotskyist Socialist Workers Party in 1938, James met Nkrumah and facilitated his entry into the black internationalist circles in London with an introduction to Padmore. When Nkrumah arrived in London in 1945, they organized the Fifth Pan-African Congress and began a political and intellectual relationship that lasted until Padmore's death in 1959. At the congress and in their publications over the next decade, they developed an account of decolonization in which national self-determination was the first step toward Caribrican union and international federation. After Ghana's independence, they hosted the Conference of Independent African States and All People's African Conference in 1958, the first Pan-African gatherings on the continent. Through these meetings of independent African states and liberation movements, they set the groundwork for Pan-African federation and supported a new generation of anticolonial nationalists.

The 1930s university generation, which included Azikiwe, Nkrumah, Padmore, and Williams, shaped the first phase of anticolonial worldmaking in the age of decolonization. They deployed the new histories of slavery to critique empire as a form of enslavement, institutionalized the right to self-determination at the United Nations, achieved national independence, and worked to realize regional federation in Africa and the Caribbean. A second generation of anticolonial worldmakers represented here by Michael Manley and Julius Nyerere responded to the limits of this first moment and articulated a new project of worldmaking. Born in the 1920s, both Manley and Nyerere were too young to travel the black internationalist circuits of the interwar period, and they came of age when the promises of communist internationalism had dissipated. While they did not share the formative experiences of the 1930s generation, they witnessed and supported the early moments of anticolonial worldmaking. Manley campaigned for Williams's West Indian Federation while a student at the London School of Economics, and Nyerere directly participated in the debates about African union.

When these projects failed, Nyerere and Manley returned to the question of imperialism's hierarchical worldmaking and the distortions it created in postcolonial societies to reimagine a world after empire. At the center of this second
phase of worldmaking was an effort to rethink socialism for these conditions and reestablish economic equality as the central ideal of a post-imperial world. In doing so, Manley and Nyerere, educated at the London School of Economics and the University of Edinburgh respectively, drew on Fabian socialism and, in particular, the writings of Harold Laski. Interlocutors since their days in the United Kingdom, Manley’s and Nyerere’s distinctive socialist projects, coupled with their efforts to institutionalize the New International Economic Order, marked the final and most ambitious phase of anticolonial worldmaking.

Organization of the Book
In excavating the projects of anticolonial worldmaking that constituted central episodes of self-determination’s rise and fall, this book draws on extensive research in African, West Indian, and European archives. The animating motivation of this recovery is to contribute to a history of the present by rethinking decolonization. Narratives that equate decolonization with the transition from empire to nation-state understand postcolonial state formation as one episode in a recurring and generic set of questions about political founding, constitutionalism, and popular sovereignty. These narratives also constitute the implicit historical backdrop for normative theorists concerned with international economic and political justice. In illuminating the multiplicity of political projects that decolonization entailed, this book attends to the specificity of postcolonial sovereignty and seeks to reorient the questions we ask about international justice. It highlights the ways that the experience of colonial domination and international hierarchy gave distinctive shape to debates about sovereignty and state formation and recenters the enduring legacies of European imperialism in our present.

Distilling the main theoretical interventions from the historical excavation and reconstruction central to this book, chapter 1 sketches a political theory of decolonization that rethinks how anticolonial nationalism posed the problem of empire to expand our sense of its aims and trajectories. Drawing on recent histories of international law as well as the political thought of Black Atlantic worldmakers, I reconceive empire as processes of unequal international integration that took an increasingly racialized form in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Confronted with a racialized international order, anticolonial nationalists turned to projects of worldmaking that would secure the conditions of international nondomination. When we examine the worldmaking aspirations of anticolonial nationalism, we can move beyond the preoccupation with nationalism’s illiberalism and parochialism to consider the specificity of the animating questions, aims, and contradictions of anticolonial nationalism. I argue that attention to the specificity of political projects that emerged out of the legacy of imperialism also provides a postcolonial approach to contemporary cosmopolitanism. Drawing on the conceptual and political innovations of anticolonial worldmaking, a postcolonial cosmopolitanism entails a critical diagnosis of the persistence of empire and a normative orientation that retains the anti-imperial aspiration for a domination-free international order.

Chapter 2 examines the institutionalization of empire as unequal integration in the League of Nations. Recasting the Wilsonian moment as a counterrevolutionary episode, I argue that Woodrow Wilson and Jan Smuts excised the revolutionary implications of the Bolshevik right to self-determination and repurposed the principle to preserve racial hierarchy in the new international organization. In this appropriation, which drew on Edmund Burke’s critique of the Jacobins as well as their disavowal of the democratic possibilities entailed in nineteenth-century emancipation, Wilson and Smuts effectively remade self-determination as a racially differentiated principle, which was fully compatible with imperial rule. I chart the implications of their account of self-determination by examining Ethiopia’s and Liberia’s membership in the international organization. The membership of these two African states is often viewed as an example of the first expansion of international
society. However, I argue that rather than protecting their sovereign equality, the inclusion of Ethiopia and Liberia created the conditions of their domination through a burdened and racialized membership where obligations were onerous and rights limited. In setting the stage for the history of anticolonial worldmaking, this chapter establishes the problem of empire as racialized international hierarchy and destabilizes the idea that the universal principle of self-determination had Wilsonian origins.

Chapter 3 moves from the League of Nations to the United Nations, where anticolonial nationalists staged their reinvention of self-determination, transforming a secondary principle included in the United Nation Charter into a human right. Through the political thought of Nnamdi Azikiwe, W.E.B. Du Bois, Kwame Nkrumah, and George Padmore, I illustrate that this reinvention drew on a distinctive account of empire as enslavement. In this expansive critique, anticolonial nationalists began with the arbitrary power and exploitation that structured the relationship of the colonizer and colonized and traced the ways in which this colonial domination reverberated in the international sphere. They framed their answer to this problem of empire as a wholesale transformation of domestic and international politics understood as combined projects of nation-building and worldmaking. The right to self-determination marked the first step of this transformation. Through its guarantees of independence and equality, it secured the formal conditions of international nondomination necessary for the domestic exercise of self-government. The emergence of a right to self-determination is often read as an expansion of an already existing principle in which anticolonial nationalists universalize a Westphalian regime of sovereignty. In contrast to this standard account, I argue that the anticolonial account of self-determination marked a radical break from the Eurocentric model of international society and established nondomination as a central ideal of a postimperial world order. Rather than tether the idea of independent and equal states to the legacy of Westphalia, we should identify this vision of international order with an anti-imperialism that went beyond the demand for the inclusion of new states to imagine an egalitarian world order.

Chapter 4 recovers the largely forgotten projects of regional federation in the West Indies and Africa that anticolonial nationalists pursued alongside their reinvention of self-determination. In returning to the centrality of the federal imaginary to anticolonial nationalists, I demonstrate that alternatives to the nation-state persisted at the height of decolonization. For federalists like Kwame Nkrumah and Eric Williams, freedom from alien rule did not sufficiently guarantee nondomination as powerful states, international organizations, and private actors exploited relations of economic dependence to indirectly secure political compulsion. The postcolonial predicament of de jure independence and de facto dependence, captured in Nkrumah’s thesis of neocolonialism, made domestic self-government vulnerable to external encroachment. I reconstruct how Nkrumah and Williams positioned the United States as a model of postcolonial federation to make the case that regional federations could overcome the postcolonial predicament by creating larger, more diverse domestic markets, organizing collective development plans, ensuring regional redistribution, and providing for regional security. If in the formulation of a right to self-determination nondomination was to be secured by creating juridical defenses against domination, federations secured nondomination by creating new political and economic linkages between postcolonial states, which would gradually erode the relations of dependence and domination that subordinated them in the international sphere. In its federal phase, anticolonial worldmaking envisioned dispersing and delegating sovereignty beyond the nation-state. I trace the ways that this model of regional federation gave way to forms of functional integration that bolstered the nation-state as critics rejected Nkrumah’s and Williams’s proposals for centralized federal states. While short-lived, the federal moment in the Black Atlantic
draws attention to the ways that a critique of international hierarchy and the effort to secure national self-determination prompted far-reaching institutional experimentation that attended to both the political and economic dimensions of international nondomination.

Chapter 5 analyzes the ways that anticolonial nationalists responded to an intensified postcolonial predicament with their most ambitious project of worldmaking—the New International Economic Order (NIEO). After the failure of regional federation, postcolonial states, which were largely producers of raw materials, experienced a significant decline in their terms of trade that threatened economic development and revealed once more the ways the postcolonial nation-building remained vulnerable to external forces. I illustrate that when confronted with the limits of the development economics Nkrumah and Williams had embraced, Michael Manley and Julius Nyerere articulated a new political economy of self-determination by returning to the ways in which unequal economic integration engendered a distorted postcolonial economy and produced a damaging international division of labor.

Analogizing this international division of labor to domestic class politics, they engaged in a distinctive politicization of the global economy that framed postcolonial states as the working class; fashioned Third World solidarity as a form of international class politics; and demanded redistribution on the basis that the global south had in fact produced the wealth of the global north. Drawn from this account of the global economy, the NIEO constituted a welfare world that sought to enhance the bargaining power of postcolonial states, democratize decision-making, and achieve international redistribution. I argue that at the center of this welfare world was a radical recasting of sovereign equality as a demand for an equitable share of the world's wealth. The NIEO envisioned this expansive account of sovereign equality as the economic component of international nondomination. The view that sovereign equality had material implications marked anticolonial nationalists' biggest departure from the postwar international legal order and was quickly rejected and displaced in the neoliberal counterrevolution of the 1970s.

Finally, the epilogue charts the fall of self-determination and illustrates that the collapse of anticolonial worldmaking continues to structure our contemporary moment. Picking up in the immediate aftermath of the NIEO, I locate self-determination's fall in two developments—the increasingly critical orientation of Western (especially American) intellectuals and politicians toward the right to self-determination as well as the diminution of international institutions like the United Nations where anticolonial nationalists had staged their worldmaking. Together the normative erosion of self-determination and marginalization of the UN set the stage for the resurgence of international hierarchy and a newly unrestrained American imperialism. At the same time, the critical resources of anticolonial nationalism appeared to be exhausted as the institutional form of the postcolonial state fell short of its democratic and egalitarian aspirations and anticolonial worldmaking retreated into a minimalist defense of the state. But while we live in the aftermath of self-determination's fall and no longer inhabit the political and ideological contexts that gave shape to the visions of a domination-free international order that anticolonial worldmakers pursued, the task of building a world after empire remains ours as much as it was theirs. <>

**Machiavelliana: The Living Machiavelli in Modern Mythologies** by Michael Jackson, Damian Grace

[Value inquiry Series: Philosophy, Literature, and Politics, Brill-Rodopi, 9789004365513]

In **Machiavelliana** Michael Jackson and Damian Grace offer a comprehensive study of the uses and abuses of Niccolò Machiavelli’s name in society generally and in academic fields distant from his intellectual origins. It assesses the appropriation of Machiavelli in didactic works in management, social psychology, and primatology, scholarly texts in leaderships studies, as well as novels, plays,
commercial enterprises, television dramas, operas, rap music, Mach IV scales, children’s books, and more. The book audits, surveys, examines, and evaluates this Machiavelliana against wider claims about Machiavelli. It explains the origins of Machiavelli’s reputation and the spread of his fame as the foundation for the many uses and misuses of his name. They conclude by redressing the most persistent distortions of Machiavelli.

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Excerpt: While Niccolò Machiavelli’s name is common coin in the popular culture, that currency is foreign to serious scholars in political theory, Renaissance history, or Italian language and culture. Many professors of history, political theory, and Italian language and literature have written on Machiavelli’s life, times, and work without a single mention of the impact he has had beyond the borders of those scholarly domains. In our own experience, even calling attention to this vulgar Machiavelli strikes some of these specialists as frivolous. Be that as it may, Machiavelli’s name appears in a vast other literature that spans both popular culture and distant scholarly fields and that literature has not been cataloged and examined. There are, to be specific, two ‘literatures,’ the first is produced by professional scholars who take Machiavelli as the subject matter in the fields named above and others close to them, and the second deploys his name multifariously. This other, second literature ranges from research into management and primates, to popular books on dating or card playing, to newspaper op-ed essays, and more. Much of this second literature trades on the aura of his name as a brand. Akin to this second literature are all manner of other uses of Machiavelli’s name in games, on restaurants, on playing cards and more. These two literatures co-exist side-by-side, each ignoring the other, the dedicated scholars of Machiavelli’s life, works, and times regarding the vulgar Machiavelli as an imposter, while the exponents of Machiavelli in popular culture see no need to consider the findings of scholars. Yet it is the vulgar Machiavelli that has entered the collective unconscious of much of Western culture, and like many weeds in an otherwise well-kept garden, there it flourishes.

The evidence of Machiavelli’s absorption into the collective unconscious is found in the frequency with which his name is used in newspapers, books, restaurants, and other commercial enterprises that have nothing to do with him. When we realized just how often and how freely his name is used far and wide, the research for this book began.

At the outset we thought it would be a simple matter to compile an inventory of his use and misuses beyond academia in wider society, and we set out to compile a comprehensive catalog. Now, perchance wiser, we have reduced our ambitions from a comprehensive account to one that is substantial, farreaching, detailed, and as complete as we can make it to document these other Machiavellis who constitute the second literature. Yet each passing week brings ever more instances of the use of his name on establishments, products, websites, and books. It is hard to keep up with the profusion of references to Machiavelli, the more so now that direct-publishing, i.e., self-publishing, or print on demand publishing, has become easier: many of the works we have compiled fall into that category. What is it about Machiavelli that drives
people far and wide to use his name, sometimes investing much of themselves and their resources in doing so? Why Machiavelli? That is the master question we pursue in these pages.

Though routinely classified with other political thinkers like Thomas Hobbes or Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Machiavelli has a mystique accorded to none of them. Everyone, it seems, knows about him. Individuals, who maintain a circumspect silence when the names of Plato or Hobbes arise, freely use Machiavelli’s name. This peculiar aspect of Machiavelli’s reputation is the subject of this study. We do not set out to offer an interpretation of Machiavelli’s political theory, though in the last chapter we do try to set right some of the more astonishing assertions, common misapprehensions, and plain mistakes made about the man and his works.

Though our purpose is serious, the tone and temper of our prose lacks—we hope—the lead weights that often manacle scholarly discourse, our discussions necessarily involve aspects of contemporary popular culture and this is reflected in references to contemporary novels and films, and asides that seemed suitable to engage with Machiavelli’s cultural diffusion...

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Although Niccolò Machiavelli died in 1527, he has provided employment to many since his death. While he became persona non grata in his beloved Florence for an important part of his life, today the tourist to the jewel on the Arno finds coffee shops, hotels, chocolates, and more named for him. Though the house he lived in on the southside of the Arno has long since been demolished, creative entrepreneurs will sell the traveller tours of it. He is a commodity in this city of trade and commerce, remaining in death a servant of his city.

Beyond Florence, Machiavelli’s eminence offers a reference point to all Italians and to many things Italian from businesses to schools and street names. At one time the Machiavelli Hotel in Milan featured his portrait in reception, though Milan and Florence were antagonists in Machiavelli’s time. Now his reflected glory shines in Milan. More strangely, similar examples can be found around the globe. His name has recognition value. XBox for example, offers a game called Machiavelli’s Ascent. In its iPhone version this game is a pinball exercise with a jellyfish as the protagonist. What has this jellyfish to do with Niccolò? There is no obvious answer to this question, but in the following chapters we have cataloged many such extraneous, dare we say wacky, uses of Machiavelli’s name. In this book we document the widely divergent and dispersed ways in which Machiavelli has been pressed into service well beyond the pale. The frame of reference has been the English-speaking world, but to confirm that the phenomenon is general we have looked beyond that world to similar uses of his good name made in German, French, Spanish, Russian, Chinese, and other languages. Our purpose is in large part to bring to light the extensive misuse that has been made of his name, reputation, and works, in the hope that specialists in Italian letters, Renaissance history, and political theory will address these erroneous uses directly in order to restore his intellectual and moral heritage. We say restore because we shall argue throughout that his reputation has been soiled, maligned, and damaged by the many uses to which his name has been put.

Niccolò Machiavelli, the Florentine public official and diplomat who championed republican liberty in works that became models of Italian literary style is now less well known than his alter ego, the fabled schemer and author of The Prince. This latter Machiavelli, who has somehow lent his name to a computer-generated jellyfish, is also known as the infamous instructor of tyrants and the enemy of good morals and religion. It is this dark Machiavelli, the simulacrum, who has become notorious, better known outside Italy than his twin, the historic defender of liberty. At the heart of the Machiavel’s reputation is The Prince. From its first appearance in handwritten copies it has been a cause of controversy, so much so that now it is sufficient merely to mention the work to indicate a method of
politics. In the pages that follow, we show how this simulacrum gained presence and permanence in our culture. We survey ground well-trodden by historians but do not give a detailed account of the changing fortunes of Machiavelli’s reputation over the centuries. Our focus is on the fate of The Prince and the reputation of its author, Niccolò Machiavelli, in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. We discuss this fate—or rather, these fates—across a number of domains, to show that the Machiavelli exploited there is a figure of myth, and that The Prince that justifies so much of the myth is misrepresented if, indeed, it is read much at all. We have no wish to judge the intrinsic worth of the domains in any way but we do wish to discourage the trivial and eroding use of Machiavelli’s name in them.

Most of the uses of his name in these domains have little connection to the historical man or the book that brought him notoriety. To learn of Machiavelli through these works, as many people do, is akin to studying the history of Spanish America by watching Zorro on television. Popular culture has appropriated Machiavelli, and he has been represented rather than interpreted; in scholarship, the reverse is true. Frank Ankersmit has argued that interpretation and representation are separated by an unbridgeable gap. Interpretation is an explanation of a representation of reality. Academics have stayed mainly on the interpretative/explanatory side of this gap, looking intently at the whole body of Machiavelli’s works, and less at The Prince in isolation as a source of axioms in political science. Machiavelli’s popular profile is just the opposite. Most uses of his name and most references to The Prince are not interpretative but represent him in terms that amount to historical caricature. At worst, Machiavelli is not represented at all, but is a dead metaphor used to market a product like the XBox. His name can be found in political advice, management practice, sporting failure, personal relationships, retailing, warfare, computer games, and primate ethology. His name sells books, pasta, education, chocolates, and self-help schemes.

Typically, none of these twenty-first century concerns have much if anything to do with the historical Machiavelli and his times, but that is not their point: they use a name of myth and power to brand and sell their wares.

Representations of Machiavelli, no matter how improved by scholarship, will not be the intellectual equivalents of photographs. Such a belief is mistaken. Representation, as Bas van Fraassen points out, is not a hologram of the thing represented. In order to represent some objects recognizably or intelligibly, distortion is necessary. For example, foreshortening in the depiction of a painted figure enables it to be seen in correct proportion from a distance. Close up, the figure will appear distorted. An example of constructive distortion in Machiavelli’s time is anamorphosis, a distorted perspective that may even require a special viewing device to make sense. It was used by Hans Holbein the Younger in his famous picture The Ambassadors. A similar kind of distortion seems to have been at work very early with respect to Machiavelli to show aspects of his character and works to greater effect. Unfortunately, when perspective is lost, as it quickly was in his case, all that remains is the distortion itself. Thus was created the Machiavel, Machiavelli’s distorted twin. Just as we point to the modern distortions of Machiavelli, which have taken on a life of their own, quite detached from the man and what he wrote, so must we acknowledge that his early critics represented him in particular ways. Yet, as van Fraassen has pointed out, misrepresentation is still a form of representation. Machiavelli’s contemporaries and near contemporaries read and represented him in particular contexts. Greater faithfulness to texts and better translations—the equivalents of attempting ever closer resemblances between the thing represented and the representation—cannot make good the neglect of those contexts. The new representations we discuss in later chapters originate with the early readers of Machiavelli. They found in him resources to suit their purposes and, in the process, formed a mythology that has proved exploitable over five centuries. They called
attention to some aspects of his works and suppressed others, but they were not interpreting Machiavelli: they were using him in ways that would present his novelty as an affront to the values and familiar political understandings of their audiences.

Although Machiavelli had enemies in his own time, many of the things that troubled his initial opponents are not those that spur contemporary ones. His instrumental view of religion, for example, is not held against him today as it was 500 years ago, but manipulation is. Machiavelli’s sinister reputation was made surprisingly quickly, and once made, it stuck fast. Yet, this reputation has proved endlessly adaptable. Thanks to his early critics, the man has been identified with his book, and The Prince is still taken to express its author’s own corrupt character. While the foundations for Machiavelli’s modern status lie in early reactions to his works – mainly The Prince but also the Discourses – outside the academy these books are little known or appreciated at first hand today. As John Najemy points out, “‘Machiavellian’ has taken on a life of its own as a universally recognized proper adjective.” Moreover, it retains an expressive force lost by other epithets – such as Platonic, Freudian, and Marxist – which have acquired connotations of quaintness.

The construction of Machiavelli’s myth is without comparison among theorists of political life. Thomas Hobbes’s thinly disguised atheism did not make his name a synonym for heinous crimes. Nor did his recommendation of authoritarian government in the Leviathan (1641) burn his name into public consciousness. Still less did Hobbes sire a cultural stereotype by arguing that government has the right to take the lives of its citizens in the name of its own survival. The same is true of other notable historical figures much closer to Machiavelli, like Thomas More and Jean Bodin. Even Cesare Borgia’s bloody deeds have not made his name a commonplace epithet for evil. If any Borgia is remembered today, it is probably Cesare’s sister, Lucrezia, whose infamy, deserved or not, is periodically revived by lurid filmmakers.

In similar vein, Henry viii and his six wives provide reliable licentious material for novelists and documentary producers who focus on the women and seldom say anything about Henry’s murder of at least 50,000 of his Catholic countrymen and women. Henry’s tactics to free England from the interference of the Church, in part by murdering Catholics, has not tainted his popular image as a larger than life champion of the liberties of Englishmen. His daughter, Mary, on the other hand has become the bloodthirsty crazy Tudor for her murder of about 284 Protestants. Mary had John Foxe’s Book of Martyrs to accuse her; her father had history on his side. Machiavelli was not so fortunate. His early critics began a case against him that became orthodoxy, relying mainly on his most famous book, The Prince. The main contributors to Machiavelli’s myth appear in Chapter 2. In the chapters that follow are those who have used this mythology to transport the Machiavel into the modern era. We will sometimes refer to this distorted image as Machiavel and to the man himself as Machiavelli.

The Prince is a classic. Classic texts acquire their status through interpretation and use, not merely as items placed in a venerated canon. Indeed, a classic belongs to a canon precisely because it remains in use, alive and contemporary, as though the author were sitting across from us in conversation. Classic texts are always to hand, available for citation or use in contexts where they confer authority. This kind of availability in scholarship leads, of course, to anachronism, and that misfortune has fallen upon Machiavelli, not only in politics but also across the diverse areas we discuss below. The sustaining interest in The Prince as a living book has inevitably distorted both it and its author’s reputation.

What have scholars made of this? Many believe The Prince is a prophetic text in calling for a liberator of Italy from foreign domination. Had The Prince been less ‘prophetic,’ historical obscurity might have been its fate. Had it been part of some grand design, like many other books of political theory, there might not have been so much
profitless debate about Machiavelli’s intentions. Instead, writes Najemy, ‘Machiavelli has been assigned ... the status of a prophet whose revelations concerning what is constant in human nature and politics are still and always valid ... because they are believed to have foretold our condition.’ Reputations built on this basis are not discarded lightly. Indeed, many classics have acquired such notoriety that they pass into common usage even without being read: examples from literature at large include The Republic, Utopia, The Communist Manifesto, The Origin of Species, War and Peace, and A Brief History of Time. Popular status can prevail over informed readings. Evidence of this is the way a century of solid scholarship has been unable to redefine Machiavelli’s place in popular culture. Part of the reason for this is due, no doubt, to the absorption of terms like ‘Machiavellian’ into common usage. Whereas some misconceptions are susceptible to correction, others persist because correction is otiose, as in idiomatic usage. The situation has not been helped by the fact that some political scientists and historians have shared the assumptions of popular culture, thus reinforcing common misconceptions. Academics writing in this vein are more likely to model than reprove unsupported allegations of Machiavellianism in common usage.

Among the scores of superb studies of Machiavelli’s life, times and works by historians, and students of Renaissance life and literature, very few notice the Machiavel who roams the highways and byways of popular culture. Hence another purpose here is to demonstrate the degree to which those who claim a special knowledge of him ignore this wider public presence. We started in the most obvious of places with editions of The Prince that have appeared since his name started to be used far and wide, consulting those by Brian Richardson (1979), Daniel Donno (1981), James Atkinson (1985), Harvey Mansfield, Jr (1985), Quentin Skinner and Russell Price (1988), Leo Alvarez (1989), Angelo Codevilla (1997), George Bull (1999), William Connell (2005), Cary Nederman (2007), Rob McMahon (2008), Peter Constantine (2009), Tim Parks (2009) and W.K. Marriott (2011). In not one introduction, foreword, afterword, note or interpretative essay in these twelve current translations and editions of The Prince is there a reference to the popular Machiavelli to alert students to its existence as a cultural token. New editions appear constantly but most are revisions of one or another of those above.

Since Machiavelli is so closely identified with politics, we next surveyed a battery of textbooks on the history of political thought written by some of the greatest exponents of political theory, the source of knowledge about Machiavelli for many students: William Bluhm, Leo Strauss and Joseph Cropsey, John Plamenatz and Robert Wokler, George Sabine and T.L. Thorson, J.S. McClelland, William Ebenstein and Alan Ebenstein, Sheldon Wolin, Bruce Haddock, and Alan Ryan. Though these tomes make many claims about Machiavelli’s continued political importance and relevance to the reader, we found in them not one single reference to Machiavelli’s afterlife in such fields as management, social psychology or primatology, let alone in restaurant names, board games, hotels, children’s books, and the many other places we have found him.

We also examined the specialist encyclopedias on political science and political theory as authoritative sources designed for students and general readers. Such works have an entry on Machiavelli and those we examined made no mention of this large swath he cuts in the culture. These general references might attract a larger and more diverse readership than the specialist ones to which we now turn.

Finally there are the scholarly reference books of political theory, because this a field where Machiavelli is a fixture: the Cambridge History of Political Thought, 1450–1700, the Oxford Handbook of Political Theory, the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, and the Oxford Handbook of the History of Political Philosophy. They, too, are mute on the alternative Machiavelli, with two exceptions. The first is in the introduction to
The Portable Machiavelli where the editors, Peter Bondanella and Mark Musa, note that ‘Machiavelli’s ideas ... have, for instance, inspired a recent bestseller by Antony Jay on business management and corporate politics.’ And they observe also that he has been used to justify ‘an empirical psychological test measure, “Machiavellianism,” and its relationship to interpersonal relations.’ They cite these instances as proof of the continued relevance of Machiavelli to our world. We will have a great deal more to say about these domains of management and personal relations in the pages that follow.

The second voice is a brief reference in the editor’s introduction to the Cambridge Companion to Machiavelli. There Najemy notes that ‘Machiavelli’s relevance to business is claimed in an astonishing number of books.’ Najemy, a renowned historian of Florence and exegete of Machiavelli’s writings, makes no reference to the works in social psychology and primatology. Nor does he advert to restaurants and computer games. Bondanella and Musa mentioned the social psychological scale, which they refer to as ‘ideologically loaded,’ yet they do not deny that it owes its paternity to Machiavelli. They imply that this example of Machiavelli’s relevance is perhaps, undesirable, rather than entirely spurious. Such academic niceties do no service to truth. Najemy also refers to the books that apply Machiavelli’s ideas as ‘purportedly’ demonstrating his relevance. That one word – ‘purportedly’ – is charitable: the psychological instrument that bears Machiavelli’s name owes very little – if anything – to his thought. We note that John Scott’s authoritative commentary passes the second Machiavelli in silence.

It seems then that the second Machiavelli of the popular culture passes unnoticed by the curators of Machiavelli’s testament in specialist fields. The role of scholars is to demythologize the past and to question accepted assumptions. This happens, for example, about the importance of slavery as a cause of the American Civil War, or the effects of individuals like Confederate General James Longstreet at Gettysburg, or Pope Pius xii and the Holocaust. Yet the teleported Machiavelli, an a historical figure whose name has graced social psychology, management studies and popular culture, passes without note or comment from the specialists, some of whom have added to the mythology. Examining only the life and circumstances of Cinquecento Machiavelli, the historical figure, without taking account of his fate in subsequent centuries attempts only half the job of demythologization. The public and popular mythologizing of Machiavelli that goes on continuously outside the halls of academe is largely unnoticed therein.

While there are several Machiavellis, they may be grouped under two headings: the first is the figure of scholarship and history, dissected by the various academic disciplines placed under the headings of Renaissance history, Italian language and literature, and political theory. The other is a Machiavellian spirit, who lives on in other ways that we shall parade through the pages of Chapters 3 through 9 in a carnival of color and oddity. This Machiavelli, ever facing the future, is now a cultural artifact and a commercial product. If an image is useful let us say that Machiavelli is Janus-faced, one Machiavelli looking backward, the preserve of specialists, and an other Machiavel who faces the future in the wider and popular culture. In these pages we bring the two together.

In cataloging the uses that revivify Machiavelli’s animus, we will be using the work of specialists in history, literature, and political theory to show how detached these lay uses of Machiavelli are from the words and deeds of the man himself. In that respect this is a work of rehabilitation, but one that cuts both ways, bringing the animus into scholarly focus even as we criticize its presentation and dissemination in popular culture.

Many students of history and political theory coming across Machiavelli’s name and work look only briefly at text and leave it at that, sometimes relying heavily on the editor’s or translator’s introduction. Thereafter references to him are ritualistic, often made, dare we say it, without
reading the original texts. In short, Machiavelli’s name is often invoked for some simple nostrums in academia as well as in other fields and popular culture. What is less well known is how often his name is applied to other more mercantile and distant professional purposes. This second Machiavell has spawned cottage industries in a number of fields, which, taken together, comprise Vulgar Machiavellianism. Karl Marx once said in exasperation at the way his complex theories of economics were reduced to mechanistic inevitabilities by some zealots whom he termed Vulgar Marxists, that he was not a Marxist. Machiavelli was not a Machiavellian but – to borrow from Marx – there are many Vulgar Machiavellians who have created and recreated the Machiavel whom we trace in these pages. To set the scene we return to the man himself in Chapter 1, ‘Who was Niccolò Machiavelli?’ There we will trace the development of Machiavelli’s reputation as a teacher of evil and the connotations that have accrued around that reputation. Chapter 2, ‘The Hand of Satan,’ will investigate how Machiavelli’s reputation for evil was established by Il Principe, and trace this reputation through many of its turns to its becoming a cultural token of the twentieth century. This reputation is the cornerstone of nearly all that follows for the second Machiavelli.

Chapter 3, ‘Machiavelli in Management: The Enterprise of Sir Antony Jay, Ltd,’ reveals how Machiavelli has become a major figure in one of the most influential intellectual domains of our times, management. This chapter concentrates on the first steps in annexing Machiavelli to this world in Sir Antony Jay’s Management and Machiavelli.

Chapter 4, ‘Theory M,’ continues this examination of the uses and abuses of Machiavelli in the popular literature and those of business, commerce, and management in more detail. The flow of titles in books and articles in this domain that take Machiavelli’s name continues unabated and, although our survey ends in June 2017, will surely continue.

As the doppelgänger Machiavel was being revivified in management, he was also at about the same time lending his spirit to social psychology with the development of a personality construct called Mach, short for Machiavellianism. This was quite a process and it remains a white-hot area of research. A search on the Web of Science in any three-month period will deliver dozens of studies using it from around the world. We consider this field, its range, and implications in Chapter 5, ‘The Science of Machiavellianism,’ referring to the scales used to identify kinds and degrees of Machiavellianism.

Chapter 6, ‘Nicolò of the Apes, or Aping Machiavelli,’ explores the migration of Machiavelli to the study of primates. The Machiavellian personality construct inspired the concept of the Machiavellian Intelligence Hypothesis in primate studies, and that in turn has migrated to the study of other creatures, and even some robots. The distorted Machiavel is active indeed and up to date for the twenty-first century.

Chapter 7, ‘The Perennial Pairing: Machiavelli and Power,’ concerns the way proponents and practitioners of political power are associated, and sometimes associate themselves, with Machiavelli. In this chapter we survey some of the more recent and visible ways in which Machiavelli is conjured into popular discussions of power.

Chapter 8, ‘The Reluctant Leader,’ examines the way in which Machiavelli’s alleged ‘hand of Satan’ figures in leadership studies, a growth industry since the 1990s. Everywhere we look there are people proclaiming themselves leaders; few organizations today are any longer content to have managers; instead they have leaders. Among other things, in this chapter we insist on distinguishing leadership from management. Not everyone is a leader. After all, there have to be some followers and some managers. We examine closely one exposition of leadership lessons ostensibly derived from Machiavelli, and to round out the picture, we also consult some of the academic research on
leadership that refers to Machiavelli to show that it is not immune to Machiavel.

In Chapter 9, ‘Machiavelli Ubiquitous,’ we gather a diffuse number of other references to Machiavelli in the popular culture, from board games to books about insults or poker, fantasy and romance novels, and rap music. The result is a menagerie of references, implications, and the like from plays and music to films and books with incongruous titles, like Tennis by Machiavelli. This is quite an exercise in cat-herding: the patience of the reader might be tested.

Chapter 10, ‘The Second Time is Farce,’ ends the book with an account of Machiavelli in light of the use and abuse he has been put to. The title of this chapter is another derivation from the fecund Karl Marx, who discussing Georg Hegel in The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Napoleon remarked that History repeats itself, the first time as tragedy and the second time as farce. Machiavelli has had one contextomy after another as his words have been cut out of context and, thus shorn, attributed to him without qualification.

Our bibliography sets forth in lengthy detail the many places where Machiavelli has been appropriated. We are confident that there is no other such bibliography of works exploiting Machiavelli. Many mention Machiavelli in the title, while saying little or nothing about him in the text. We hasten to add that ours is not a bibliography of scholarly works by experts in political theory, Italian history, language, and literature. To supply this need, we wish some Hercules would update Silvia Ruffo-Fiore’s magisterial 1990 bibliography.

Let it be understood that we neither wish to confine Machiavelli to the Florence of his day, nor to license his aphorisms for eternity. But we do advocate moderation, caution, and qualification in the embrace of his words, arguments, and examples and their spread far and wide. With Machiavelli it is best to take nothing for granted, to inspect every egg before buying the dozen, as some Italians say. Machiavelli took maxims from ancient Rome with enthusiasm and revised them for his own purposes.

He was a creative thinker. Just as we read the works of Williams Shakespeare and Faulkner to reflect on the human condition and our own experiences of it, so we can read Machiavelli. But as we show in the chapters that follow, many contemporary writers have gone far beyond those reflective purposes, claiming to take Machiavelli’s work as a manual for action and then applying his words to a carnival of domains and topics. This book is not an attempt to confine Machiavelli to the special and rarefied groves of academia, but we do wish to separate the man from the vulgar uses made of his reputation, and in so doing to take him seriously. The popular use made of his name is a disfiguring distortion and, at the very least, it should be recognized for what it is. <>

**Vexy Thing: On Gender and Liberation** by Imani Perry [Duke University Press, 9781478000600]

Even as feminism has become increasingly central to our ideas about institutions, relationships, and everyday life, the term used to diagnose the problem—“patriarchy”—is used so loosely that it has lost its meaning. In Vexy Thing Imani Perry resurrects patriarchy as a target of critique, recentering it to contemporary discussions of feminism through a social and literary analysis of cultural artifacts from the Enlightenment to the present. Drawing on a rich array of sources—from nineteenth-century slavery court cases and historical vignettes to writings by Toni Morrison and Audre Lorde and art by Kara Walker and Wangechi Mutu—Perry shows how the figure of the patriarch emerged as part and parcel of modernity, the nation-state, the Industrial Revolution, and globalization. She also outlines how digital media and technology, neoliberalism, and the security state continue to prop up patriarchy. By exploring the past and present of patriarchy in the world we have inherited and are building for the future, Perry exposes its mechanisms of domination as a necessary precursor to dismantling it.

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**ACKNOWLEDGMENTS**

**INTRODUCTION**
The story of Aphra Behn, known as England’s first woman novelist, is filled with gaps and guesses. Few details are known for certain. There are scattered but intriguing tidbits. She was born in 1640. She appears to have lived in Surinam as a child. She likely was married to a Dutch merchant and then later was single. She served as a spy for King Charles in the Netherlands. In 1668 she found herself in so much debt that she served time in a debtor’s prison. And after that she became a writer, a prolific one. Her first play, The Forc’d Marriage, was produced in 1670 at the Lincoln’s Inn Fields. It was a romantic comedy in which forced betrothals are corrected by true love.

Some eighteen years later, with many other works in between, Behn wrote a story with similar plot points but with African protagonists. Oroonoko is considered a foundational text in the development of the English novel. It remains fascinating and distinctive. I will tell the story of the novel in some detail. Its publication was foundational in Western literature, and it reveals so much about the idea and history of Western patriarchy, and therefore provides an apt beginning to this text. Named for its hero, Oroonoko is the story of two beloved Coromantie (Akan) youth, Oroonoko and Imoinda. They are, in the eyes of the English female narrator, ideal types of each gender, though Black. Of Oroonoko’s form she says, “The whole proportion and air of his face was so nobly and exactly form’d, that bating his colour, there could be nothing in nature more beautiful, agreeable and handsome. There was no one grace wanting, that bears the standard of true beauty.”

His physical form was consistent with his capacity and integrity as a man. “Whoever had heard him speak,” Behn writes, “would have been convinced of their errors, that all ne wit is conned to the white men, especially to those of Christendom; and would have confess’d that Oroonoko was as capable even of reigning well, and of governing as wisely, had as great a soul, as politick maxims, and was as sensible of power, as any prince civiliz’d in the most renowned schools of humanity and learning, or the most illustrious courts.”

Imoinda was a similarly extraordinary character; of her the narrator says, “To describe her truly, one need say only, she was female to the noble male; the beautiful black Venus to our young Mars; as charming in her person as he, and of delicate vertues. I have seen a hundred white men sighing after her, and making a thousand vows at her feet, all in vain, and unsuccessful. And she was indeed too great for any but a prince of her own nation to adore.”

At the beginning of the novel, Oroonoko takes the position of the king’s top general after the death of Imoinda’s father, the previous holder of the position. The two have married but not consummated their relationship. Their union is
disrupted by the king, because he has also fallen in love with Imoinda. He exercises his authority to make her his wife and a member of his harem. But through the assistance of other members of The court, Oroonoko is able to sneak into her bridal chamber, and they have sex. They are immediately discovered, and although Imoinda claims that Oroonoko has raped her (to protect him), she is nevertheless sold as a slave as punishment.

Oroonoko faces the same fate. He is betrayed by an English ship captain with whom he had what seemed to be a gregarious relationship, and to whom Oroonoko had previously sold slaves. This captain was a man below the station of Oroonoko, yet they had previously behaved in a mutually respectful fashion. Behn described him as follows:

This captain . . . was always better receiv’d at court, than most of the traders to those countries were; and especially by Oroonoko, who was more civiliz’d, according to the European mode, than any other had been, and took more delight in the white nations; and, above all, men of parts and wit. To this captain he sold abundance of his slaves; and for the favour and esteem he had for him, made him many presents, and oblig’d him to stay at court as long as possibly he cou’d. Which the captain seem’d to take as a very great honour done him, entertaining the prince every day with globes and maps, and mathematical discourses and instruments; eating, drinking, hunting, and living with him with so much familiarity, that it was not to be doubted but he had gain’d very greatly upon the heart of this gallant young man. And the captain, in return of all these mighty favours, besought the prince to honour his vessel with his presence, some day or other at dinner, before he shou’d set sail: which he condescended to accept, and appointed his day. Once on the ship however, the captain springs on Oroonoko and places him in shackles. He makes a man into a slave. The captain plans to sell Oroonoko once the ship has reached Surinam. In protest, Oroonoko and the other Africans on board refuse to eat, preferring death to captivity. Only with the promise of emancipation at the end of the journey, and an immediate removal of the shackles, does Oroonoko begin to eat again and convince the others to do so, as well. Used to good faith, fair dealing, and respect from other men, he hasn’t yet learned the slave’s wise distrust.

Oroonoko is betrayed once again and sold when the ship reaches Surinam. There he is renamed “Caesar.” It is as though he has under gone a baptism of undoing, given a European name, though not a Christian one. That detail is not troubling to Oroonoko. He finds the Christian trinity to be an absurdity. Though deeply skeptical of European religion, he has yet to learn how profoundly his status has changed in this rebaptism that takes him outside the scope of civil society as he knew it and into the new world order of Blackness in modernity. Oroonoko is cast from aristocrat to slave—the same status as the other Africans—although Behn describes him repeatedly as their superior in form, intelligence, and status. While Oroonoko is cast with the other Africans despite his status, the Europeans are puzzled by the Indians in their midst. They, like Oroonoko, are considered great, beautiful, and power ful, though strange. Accordingly, the Europeans believed the Indians must be conquered, if not enslaved. A map of difference and its relations is unfolding.

By remarkable coincidence, on the plantation where Oroonoko is held he finds Imoinda (whom he was told had been killed rather than enslaved). Although they are enslaved, they marry and live in a tentatively blissful domestic union. Soon Imoinda is pregnant. Their status troubles them both. They sense the fragility of their domesticity from the beginning of Oroonoko’s time on the plantation. But they are deceived by the master’s seeming respect. Before actually meeting Imoinda (now renamed Clemene) on the plantation, and having merely heard about an especially beautiful slave,
Oroonoko asks his master why he hasn't raped the enslaved woman:

I do not wonder (reply'd the prince) that Clemene should refuse slaves, being, as you say, so beautiful; but wonder how she escapes those that can entertain her as you can do: or why, being your slave, you do not oblige her to yield? I confess (said Trefry) when I have, against her will, entertained her with love so long, as to be transported with my passion even above decency, I have been ready to make use of those advantages of strength and force nature has given me: But, oh! she disarms me with that modesty and weeping, so tender and so moving, I retire, and thank my stars she overcame me. The company laugh'd at his civility to a slave, and Caesar only applauded the nobleness of his passion and nature, since that slave might be noble, or, what was better, have true notions of honour and virtue in her. Thus passed they this night, after having received from the slaves all imaginable respect and obedience.

This “civility” of his master, Trefry, in not raping Imoinda is deceptive when it comes to the constitution of their family. Oroonoko, though thrilled to be married and expecting a child, learns how profoundly his social position has transformed in his current life as a slave by virtue of his inability to negotiate for his and his family’s freedom through exchange or contract:

From that happy day Caesar took Clemene for his wife, to the general joy of all people; and there was as much magnificence as the country would afford at the celebration of this wedding: and in a very short time after she conceived with child, which made Caesar even adore her, knowing he was the last of his great race. This new accident made him more impatient of liberty, and he was every day treating with Trefry for his and Clemene’s liberty, and offer’d either gold, or a vast quantity of slaves, which should be paid before they let him go, provided he could have any security that he should go when his ransom was paid.

At each stage, however, the Europeans with whom Oroonoko is dealing breach their words, their promises, and their contracts with him. They can do so because, as an enslaved African, Oroonoko has been forcibly removed from the social contract through which he can be a party to negotiated contracts. He no longer counts as a “Man.” Finally, Oroonoko realizes that their slaveholder has no intention of setting them free and that no negotiation will succeed. They must fight for freedom. So he, Imoinda, and other Africans revolt.

Even then, however, he continues to interact with the Europeans, acting as though he is a legally recognized man. When the Europeans defeat the Africans’ insurrection, Oroonoko and his second in command,

Tuscan, attempt to negotiate the terms of their surrender. Behn writes that Oroonoko was overcome by his wit and reasons, and in consideration of Imoinda: and demanding what he desired, and that it should be ratify’d by their hands in writing, because he had perceived that was the common way of contract between man and man amongst the whites; all this was performed, and Tuscan’s pardon was put in, and they surrender’d to the governor, who walked peaceably down into the plantation with them, after giving order to bury their dead.

But they were no sooner arrived at the place where all the slaves receive their punishments of whipping, but they laid hands on Caesar and Tuscan, faint with heat and toil; and surprising them, bound them to two several stakes, and whipped them in a most deplorable and inhuman manner.

Unlike The Forc’d Marriage, this work has a tragic rather than a comedic ending. After Oroonoko’s defeat and torture (“bleeding and naked as he was, [they] loaded him all over with irons, and then rubb’d his wounds, to compleat their cruelty, with Indian pepper, which had like to have made him raving mad; and, in this condition made him so fast to the ground, that he could not stir”) he intends to
kill Imoinda (seeing himself still as a patriarch who maintains possessive control over her life and death) and himself rather than continue to live as slaves. He succeeds in killing Imoinda but is recaptured before he can complete his suicide. Instead of the noble ending he seeks, a return to life in Africa after death in the Americas, he is drawn and quartered, sliced up like cattle after the slaughter.

Behn’s work provides an instructive and foundational exemplum for this book. Among the remarkable things about this story is that in its moves from glory to abjection and death, patriarchy moves with it, shifting with tragic and horrific circumstances. Behn’s bifurcated tales of fortune and misfortune, The Forc’d Marriage and Oroonoko are, in turn, comedic and tragic. They are twin narratives of the development of modern patriarchy.

Following the formulation offered by Cedric Robinson regarding Western “terms of order” through this and many other stories, events and cases, I am invested in tracing a more detailed architecture of patriarchy than what commonplace understandings in the U.S. offer, something more complex than the binary gender constructs of Western bourgeois domesticity. This book is about the praxis of reading as a feminist and, specifically, as what I am terming a “liberation feminist.” I am inviting readers (of this text and of the world around them) to conceive of feminism not primarily as a set of positions or doctrines but as a critical practice for understanding and working against gendered forms of domination and against the way gender becomes a tool of domination and exploitation. This is a book that asks readers to engage in this critical reading practice with the stories, events, and cases presented.

These stories, events, and cases are deliberately chosen to resist accounts of patriarchy that treat “patriarchies” in each society, culture, or subculture as a parallel set of structures that merely repeat themselves within each group, ethnicity, or nation-state. In other words, this book does not say, “Here’s patriarchy here—and look: It’s also over there!” but instead explores the historical and philosophical relation between the here and the there. This work, moreover, is not about the sexism within sociality (an important topic, just not mine). It focuses on the multiple forms of domination that grew under a structure of patriarchal authority that was globally imposed during the age of empire. I am interested in exploring these multiple iterations of patriarchy as shaped by the logic undergirding them all, one that spread across the globe through modernity and European conquest and capture. Hence, while I identify as an Americanist scholar, I have had to stretch myself beyond the borders of the U.S. nation-state and even beyond this hemisphere to make an argument about what has happened to and across the globe. This book attends to the drawing and quartering, the institutional rape, the men who could not be patriarchs, the people who could be neither patriarch nor lady, the captured and the excluded. It attends to those who stood outside the plantation fence, as well as those who sat on thrones in palaces.

The way I use story and vignette, along with description, theorization, and analysis, is admittedly an “odd” structure, at least according to the conventions of academic writing. But within these portraits of gender and gendering, ones that reveal both rules and exceptions, and states of exception, the complex structure of patriarchy is revealed. The gift of such portraits is also that while I present readings, they invite another layer of reading from the reader, and, potentially, a dialogue.

Let me apply these ideas to the foregoing story and its author: The opacity of Behn’s life is unquestionably a piece of the legacy of patriarchy. Were she a comparably achieved Englishman of her period, we would likely have a fuller record. However, her characters, Oroonoko and Imoinda, who may or may not have been based on real people she encountered in Surinam, lie even further underneath the layers of relation that characterized patriarchy as it took shape in the
modern period and through the rise of industrial capitalism. The account of patriarchy in this book, and aspiration toward its undoing, reads the lives of both the Aphras and the Imoindas, and many others betwixt and between, as a feminist praxis. Ultimately, that labor is rooted in an ethical commitment to undoing gendered domination as a critical goal of feminist politics and thought.

Here is another story, strange and nonfictional: Almost two hundred years later, and many miles away, with substantial changes to political economy, law, and imperial formation, a distinct yet structurally consistent set of events took place. In the winter of 1885, David Dickson died. Dickson was a prominent Georgia planter and slave owner. He grew his wealth on Cherokee land that had been auctioned off to white citizens in 1838, with the use of innovative crop-cultivation techniques executed by his slaves. Dickson left the bulk of his fortune to his daughter Amanda and her children. This included seventeen thousand acres of land in Hancock and Washington counties.

Amanda was beloved by her father and doted on by her grandmother. But this transfer of property was a problem for most of the rest of Dickson’s family. Forty-nine of them contested the will. Amanda was not a legitimate inheritor in their eyes.

Amanda’s mother, Julia, had been raped by Dickson when she was twelve years old. Julia was his slave and his victim. This wasn’t unusual. Sexual violence was an integral part of the slave regime and economy.

Rape was institutionalized. What was unusual was Dickson’s concerted effort to legally recognize Amanda and grant her the status of lady that was disallowed by law and custom for nonwhite women.

Amanda was educated, despite laws against slave literacy, and in 1865, when she was sixteen or seventeen, Dickson arranged for her to be classified as white and to marry her white first cousin Charles Eubanks, a Confederate veteran. Amanda and Charles had two children, but by 1870 she had returned home, and she and her children all took on the patronym Dickson.

We can easily speculate about the difficulties Amanda faced as the slave-born wife of a Confederate war veteran. It may have been terrorizing. And there would hardly be any larger social warmth toward a very wealthy freedwoman who entered public life precisely when the White South was smarting from defeat and suffering from economic disaster and military occupation. Amanda, unbound from her husband, sought further education at the recently established Black college, Atlanta University, between 1876 and 1878. She subsequently married a Black man, Nathan Perry. Ostensibly, she was accepting the social fact of her racial status, or accepting that it would be forced on her. And yet, David Dickson was also successful in ensuring that his daughter would live her remaining days in wealth and comfort, if not in whiteness.

When I first read Oroonoko as a high school student, it struck me as an odd tale because of its respectful and sensitive account of Africans at an Ur-moment in British letters. Now I read Behn’s narrative unmaking of the hero and heroine as one of modernity’s creation myths, a story about the world the slave masters made. When I first read the story of Amanda America Dickson, she struck me as an oddly situated person, possessed of a life on the margins that reveal the contours of the color line. But more recent readings about her, as I have been working and writing on gender, have led me to read her history and attend to its details differently.

Dickson was a patriarch in the modern sense of the world. He built wealth with unfree labor and was a settler on colonized land. He was an agent and perpetrator of the institutionalized rape that was not only a form of intrinsic violence in the legal and social regime of U.S. slavery but also a harrowing form of wealth production. In fact, had Amanda not been treated differently, she likely would have been lucrative. “Likely” mixed-race women were
marketed for sexual exploitation in the slave economy.

But Dickson treated Amanda differently. And the markers of this are the manner in which he tried to give her the features of a white lady, and exercised his power to make a white lady of her. He did so with marriage. And when that failed, she and her progenitors bore his name. And then not only did he grant her property, but he did so through the legal transfer required by inheritance law. Julia and Amanda, mother and daughter, were distinctly, conventionally and unconventionally, situated in the architecture of patriarchy.

The story of Amanda America Dickson demands more than an observation of her oddity. For those of us who wish to use feminist analyses to understand the world, she is more than transcendent; she is caught between mechanisms of gendered forms of domination, which include her racialization as a Black woman and the attempt to remove her from blackness to whiteness. This is the type of story readers of this book will be called to grapple with as part of our understanding of gendering in both the modern and the postmodern world.

The argument in this book is distinctive in another way: It resists doctrine. There are a host of positions that are, in the contemporary moment, proxies for feminism, usually liberal feminism. In truth, I agree with most of them, at least in the present moment. But I have consistently noticed that behind concepts such as “slut shaming,” “street harassment,” “reproductive rights,” and “pay equity,” there is always a complicated architecture of relations of domination, one that often falls out of view in the assertion of the professed position. Occasions for deep interrogation and debate that might lead us to identify the sources of the injustice, violence, and ethical failure differently are lost. That is to say, one might argue that “street harassment” is terrible or (taking a rather standard antifeminist position) that it is not. But in the process of simply taking a pro or con position as a doctrine, it is easy to neglect analyses of public space and the history of gender in the public sphere, over- and under-policing, gender socialization, race and class mythologies as applied to men, women and genderqueer people, the way some people are expected to occupy public instead of private space and therefore potentially experience less protection, and the role of economic precariousness and existing on the “wrong side of the law” as a victim of harassment, to name just a few forces. All of these forces are relevant for understanding the repeated events of sexualized and harassing encounters in a public arena. To my mind, it is essential to seek deep understanding to pursue gender liberation. This requires both the past and the present.

This book is, on the one hand, descriptive and analytical: It moves from modernity to the current complex and vexing historical conjuncture in which we are faced with a relatively new global economic order and technological transformation, as well as trenchant remnants of the old imperial order. However, it is also a theoretical argument advocating the primacy of praxis rather than position. Those of us who seek gender liberation ought to think of feminism as a critical reading practice in which one “reads through these layers” of gendered forms of domination. Gender is complicated and demands careful analysis. But reading through the layers is especially necessary now, because some ideas that we conventionally associate with feminism are increasingly colonized by our marketized public sphere; at the same time, politically powerful neoconservative forces are rolling back the gains of feminist movements. This dynamic requires that I map both the “old” and the “new” orders, as it were, as well as the dizzying complex of forces today.

The book is divided into three sections. The first chapter of the first section, “Seafaring, Sovereignty, and the Self: Of Patriarchy and the Conditions of Modernity,” is a reading backward. Through stories such as the two that begin this introduction, I provide exempla of how we can understand the history of modernity and
globalization in terms of patriarchy as the foundational architecture for gender domination. I locate modern patriarchy at the intersection of three legal formations—personhood, sovereignty, and property—that shaped relations of power in the ages of conquest and the transatlantic slave trade.

In chapter “Producing Personhood: The Rise of Capitalism and the Western Subject,” the structure of patriarchy is further elaborated in light of the industrial and technological revolutions in the nineteenth century, the end of slavery that coincided with the rise of colonialism, the transgression of gender boundaries in metropoles, and the resulting punishments. It includes close readings of landmark legal cases, texts, and public figures. Stories of these people and works reveal the status of the nonperson in this global history as the “opposite” to the patriarch who was defined both by his relationship to those in his immediate environment and the status of public and political recognition in the global landscape dominated by European nations.

Between the first and second section there is an interlude. It picks up the structure of patriarchy at the moment of its most dramatic confrontation: in the mid-twentieth century, when anticolonial, civil rights, feminist, and gay rights movements demanded major transformations in the social order of the dominant empire, the United States. Here I describe the truncated terms of its gains due to how feminist achievement (such as ones for racial justice and postcolonialism) became ensnared by the neoliberal logics that are the subject of concern in the second section.

The chapters in the second section then take the construct of the first section and extend it into our understanding of the present moment—specifically, gender in the postmodern, economically neoliberal world. In this there is both a structural repetition of the con temporary landscape in the form of the chapters, as they move outward from various satellite points. This diffusion in the formal structure of the text is a reflection of the con temporary condition. There is also a slight narrative shift.

Throughout the text I write to readers as “we” as a mode of naming the collective (though virtual) process of writing, reading, and grappling between writer and reader. However, in the second section I begin to work with a conception of “we” that is specifically focused on how we are constituted as neoliberal subjects in the con temporary era.

Chapter 3, “In the Ether: Neoliberalism and Entrepreneurial Woman,” interrogates the problem of neoliberalism for feminist thought, with an exploration of the figure of “entrepreneurial woman” and the ideology of “neoliberal feminism,” as well as the “gender artifacts” that circulate and are adopted as artifactual revisions of the material given and that have “exchange values” as products of both exploited labor and beauty markets.

The fourth chapter, “Simulacra Child: Hypermedia and the Mediated Subject,” explores how hypermedia and the digital age transform how people exist in relation to one another in markets and shape our existence as political subjects. These transformations take place with a simultaneous inheritance of past gender formations and eruptions of the new and resistant gender formations, which all become part of the pastiche of a hypermedia culture.

Chapter 5, “Sticks Broken at the River: The Security State and the Violence of Manhood,” focuses on the logic of the security state as the bluntest force of patriarchy, in terms of the rise of both militarization and the proliferation of guns and carcerality (prisons and detention centers), in light of neoliberal market logics.

The final section follows a second interlude, a meditation on the continued analogical, symbolic, and philosophical usefulness of the trope of the witch, a figure who has troubled five hundred years of structuring patriarchy around rules of relation, recognition, and domination. This meditation is preparation for us to move away
from the argument about the layered architectures of gendering, inherited and new, to suggest practices of insurgency relative to those architectures. It adds to the act of “reading” as a feminist that has animated the preceding chapters an argument for the explicit practices of witnessing, mapping, and transforming relations.

The first of these three chapters, chapter 6, “Unmaking the Territory and Remapping the Landscape,” is an argument for the deliberate practice of mapping relations, populations, and landscapes differently, guided by a principle of ethical relation. Here I use fiction writers as theorists of remapping—specifically, Toni Morrison and Edward P. Jones. Chapter 7, “The Utterance of My Name: Invitation and the Disorder of Desire,” takes up the philosopher Stanley Cavell’s idea of the “passionate utterance” and Audre Lorde’s conception of the erotic to pursue an ethics of feminist engagement that disrupts the performativity of gender theories that have compellingly argued are integral to the creation and the coerciveness of gendering.

Chapter 8, the final chapter, is titled “The Vicar of Liberation.” A play on the ecclesiastical term, it is an argument about the tending of our spirits in the service of an ethics and praxis that might liberate us from commitments to patriarchy and compel us to fight against it. This work of nurturance, I argue, is essential to emancipating ourselves from conceptions of what it means to “count” as a person according to the logics of patriarchy inherited from centuries past and the manner in which they have been extended in the neoliberal, hypermedia, and “security state” era in which we live.

Throughout this book, I use stories and historical vignettes as examples of the structure of patriarchy. These mini-narratives also serve as models of how we read layers of domination at work in a profoundly heterogeneous world. In each branch of the argument at least one exemplum is available, and a reading provided by the author, but the exempla are also set forth as an invitation for alternative readings. In this way, this is a deliberately dialogic work. It is suggestive and exploratory rather than doctrinal or utopic. Art is critical in this project—visual art and literary—for exploring how the artistic imagination is rife with philosophical arguments about ethical social and intimate relations and with the moral imagination of being in right relation with others in the world.

Within the landscape of scholarly writing, this work descends from a substantial body of feminist criticism and gender and race theory. Yet I have tried to write it in such a way that it does not demand that the reader be well versed in the long history of such scholarship, although the citations are an encouragement for readers to follow the intellectual genealogy presented. That said, the arguments set forth are presented not as a debate with previous feminist criticism but, rather, as something influenced by previous work, yet distinct.

The additional usefulness I find in writing in this way is that, given the plethora of meanings attached to the words “feminism” and “patriarchy,” it allows me to take up space to present an extended and partial idea of what I take these terms to mean. The usefulness of that unpacking does not lie primarily in arguing for my type of feminism over that of another. Rather, it allows me to give the reader some historical and political mooring that serves as a tool for critical interrogation, regardless of whether the reader ultimately embraces the concept “liberation feminism.”

Although the last word of the Oroonoko is “imoinda,” it is a ghastly homage. The condition of slavery has led her “lady,” as Behn called her, to kill the “beautiful and constant” wife. This inversion of the patriarchal order of protection that was granted to lieges, a common understanding in the West, is an integral feature of the history of Western patriarchy—one that demands unearthing to pursue its undoing.

Amanda Amer i Dickson died of neurasthenia. It was a disease that today doesn’t clearly fit into classification systems, although it was a popular diagnosis in the nineteenth century. Fatigue, anxiety, fainting, headache, heart palpitations, and
depression were symptoms. Commonly speculated causes for the disease included the growth of economic competition and the speed of city life. We don't know what caused Amanda Dickson's death. But in her we have a record of a life that surely must have been dizzying, anxiety-rendering, and rife with heartache. In that she wasn't alone; she certainly was a part of a staggering majority: those who failed to be and were failed by the patriarchs in their midst. <>

Islamophobia, Race, and Global Politics by Nazia Kazi [Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 9781538110096]

Islamophobia, Race, and Global Politics is a powerful introduction to the scope of Islamophobia in the U.S. Drawing on examples such as the legacy of Barack Obama, the mainstream media's portrayal of Muslims, and the justifications given for some of America's most recent military endeavors, author Nazia Kazi highlights the vast impact of Islamophobia, connecting this to a long history of US racism. Kazi shows how American Islamophobia and racism are at once domestic—occurring within the borders of the United States—and global—a matter of foreign policy and global politics. Using Islamophobia as a unique case study, Kazi asks the reader to consider how war and empire-building relate to racism. The book sheds light on the diverse experiences of American Muslims, especially the varying ways they have experienced Islamophobia, and confronts some of the misguided attempts to tackle this Islamophobia.

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Critical Thinking as Terrorism Prevention
We opened this book by discussing systemic ignorance. Remember, there are no accidents when it comes to our collective, societal lack of awareness. Instead, delicate histories of censorship, privilege, and power shape our worldviews. What happens when a powerful society suffers from geographical, historical, or political illiteracy?

The "Spirit of 9/12"
In the days and weeks following 9/11, the world quickly felt alien to me. People I had known since childhood, those I counted among my good friends and teachers, were just as eager for a war in Afghanistan as they would be a year later for a war in Iraq. I felt the impact of 9/11 in my own life, navigating life as a brown Muslim person. My experience at airports often included a harrowing one at security, followed by a second search at the gate. There, someone would come on the PA and page me, sift through the spiced snacks my mom or aunt had sent along in my luggage, and, in many cases, run their fingers through my hair. A "random" search, it was called.

I also remember with great clarity the voices that spoke earnestly about the role the United States has played in the devastation of so much of the world. Critics of America's actions on the world stage were branded traitors, terrorist sympathizers, or naïve hippies and chided as uninterested in keeping America safe. If you happened to be a critic of the "spirit of 9/12" and a person of color, you were told to "go back to your country." You were labeled ungrateful for the freedoms life in America afforded you. I remember attending one of my first-ever antiwar protests in Chicago in 2003. An angry passerby yanked on my sign and hissed at me, "You know, people are fighting that war so that you have the right to protest here." I'm sure the irony of suggesting that the war in Iraq
had anything to do with my right to protest it isn’t lost on the reader. After all, by now we have seen how the United States has backed plenty of dictatorships in the Arab world and beyond, dictatorships that actually suppress people’s right to protest. (Robert Jensen scrutinizes the assumption that our troops are defending freedom, asking, “Is the conflict in which the troops are fighting actually being fought to defend the freedom of Americans? And, if it were the case that the freedoms of Americans were at risk, is a war the best way to defend them?”)

Many have written eloquently and urgently on the post-9/11 climate. I use books such as How Does It Feel to Be a Problem?, The Terror Factory, and Islamophobia and the Politics of Empire in my undergrad classes. These books help to paint a picture of the post-9/11 landscape, a climate with which many of my college-aged students are unfamiliar. My point in bringing up the “spirit of 9/12” is neither to beat a dead horse nor to reiterate the work that has already been done on the topic. Instead, I discuss 9/11 at length precisely because of its banality. There was something so familiar in the extreme, repressive response that swept America after 9/11. US history is peppered with such moments, moments when an overblown sense of injury dominates the American social imagination. There arises, time and again, a feeling that our suffering is somehow more intense, more tragic, and more deserving of sympathy than others’.

The widespread fear that was a hallmark of the post-9/11 moment had significant political effects. It allowed the public to accept, for instance, that, as President Bush put it, “America was targeted for attack because we’re the brightest beacon for freedom and opportunity in the world.” Bush asked his listeners to accept the longstanding framework that renders the United States the land of the free. But to many, saying “they hate our freedoms” sounded something like the mean girl in high school who thinks the people who don’t like her are “just jealous.” “They hate our freedoms” reflected a body of thought that has drawn a clear line between “us” as the freedom lovers, the rational thinkers, and the modern and “them” as anything blanche to a campaign of fear and revenge against those “Others.”

We have seen how the state itself gave anti-Muslim sentiment fertile soil. Khaled Beydoun speaks of a two-directional (what he calls “dialectical”) relationship between state-sponsored Islamophobia and individuals’ anti-Muslim sentiment. In other words, we cannot understand the Confederate flags waved at Arab Americans in Illinois and Michigan the week after 9/11 without understanding how those flags are connected to actions taken by the state. Individual animus and acts of bigotry against Muslims are direct descendants of the actions of states themselves. Stephen Sheehi reminds us that 9/11 made possible the “justification for stripping the civil liberty of tens of thousands; profiling and illegal detaining of thousands of legal residents; condoning and practicing the torture and kidnapping of suspects; legalizing the spying, surveillance, and entrapment of American citizens; and setting the precedence for the assassination of American citizens.” Such institutional mechanisms are the very foundation of Islamophobic jeers, assaults, and vandalism carried out by ordinary people. During the aftermath of 9/11 anti-Muslim hate crimes increased by 1,600 percent, a level that would once again be reached in the immediate aftermath of the Trump inauguration.
but. Bernard Lewis, writing about the problem of what he calls "Muslim rage," argues that Muslims have anger toward the Western world because of jealousy and resentment. Lewis's work stands alongside a huge corpus of work by Raphael Patai, Samuel Huntington, Ayaan Hirsi Ali, and other influential thinkers and writers who draw a line between the enlightened West and the abject, repressed Muslim world.

A similar binary guided Bush when he said, "You are either with us or with the terrorists." Condemning, criticizing, or even expressing hesitance about the "war on terror" was tantamount to siding with terrorists. There was no room for people to call out the acts of a state that commits crimes no less atrocious than terrorism. This was perhaps nowhere more apparent than university campuses, where professors came under attack. Dissenting professors of Muslim or Arab backgrounds found themselves receiving death threats, being listed online as anti-American, or facing firing and tenure difficulties. (For those unfamiliar, it might be useful to become acquainted with the ordeals faced by professors Nadia Abu el Haj, Joseph Massad, and Sami al-Arian, for starters—information that itself is difficult to locate given the intense online smear campaigns against them).

The mainstream media fell in line, supporting various elements of the war on terror. While people are quick to think of MSNBC as "liberal" and Fox News as "conservative," there exists a remarkable consensus between the two on most matters of how the United States ought to fight terror. Americans consuming media following 9/11 had the "choice" of tuning in to any of a plethora of news channels. In spite of all the channels we have the luxury of tuning in to, it's a challenge to find even one that offers a critique of US imperialism or warfare.

Perhaps war is the only feasible solution for a society so deeply in the grips of fear. Corey Robin tells us that "what has been most effective in silencing dissent is not so much particular acts of repression by the state or civil society ... but the fear those acts arouse.... Fear does the work—or enhances the work—of repression." Robin recalls the story of UCLA library assistant Jonnie Hargis, who was suspended for a week without pay for sending out an email condemning the US's support for Israel and bombing of Iraq. This is nothing new—after all, it was fear of communism that gave the government license to lock up or give loyalty tests to scores of Americans. Without panic and terror, the state could never have pursued its project of targeting Muslims in a sinister, multifaceted way. The surveillance mechanisms that pried into the lives of Muslims, the establishment of an extrajudicial prison at Guantanamo Bay, and the expansion of powers given to the president in "fighting terrorism" were ushered in with relative ease during this age of heightened fear. Thousands of Muslim immigrants were detained without cause, many of them subjected to cruel beatings and forced to eat pork in violation of their religious customs.

We see here a troubling mix of social factors: a crackdown on academic freedom, especially among dissenters; the playing and replaying of the 9/11 footage, intensifying Americans' perception of their country as the ultimate victim; and the public being told by its leaders that criticism of the war on terror was tantamount to terrorism itself. This toxic combination yields a wide-reaching culture of anti-intellectualism, a way of being American that is uninterested in the life of the mind or critical thought. "The United States," Robert Jensen tells us, is a society in which people not only can get by without knowing much about the wider world but are systematically encouraged not to think independently or critically and instead to accept the mythology of the United States as a benevolent, misunderstood giant as it lumbers around the world trying to do good. That means the crisis in which we find ourselves after 9/11 is not only political but intellectual, a problem not just of doing but of knowing.

As Moustafa Bayoumi says, the global war on terror "is a war designed to make us stupid." The
unthinking mind was the raw material that made it possible to round up Muslim immigrants for indefinite detention, swell the military budget, and spread apathy about the devastating drone warfare program. The war on terror could not have been waged without a public that was unwilling to think about the history of US involvement in Afghanistan, the relationship between Iraq and the United States, or the expansion of US military bases around the world. It required a widespread systemic ignorance. It required a population that could more easily be seduced by the fear and panic that the word terrorism summons than by the context, analysis, and contemplation that critical thinking offers. One of the greatest skills critical thinking provides, says Steven Salaita, "is the ability to recognize bullshit." I wonder how a critically thinking America would have responded to all the bullshit they were fed after 9/11.

Our economic system reveals the gutting of critical thought; for instance, the drastic budget cuts facing our schools and colleges and the growing understanding that educational institutions should be run as businesses. When we see charter schools replacing public schools and teachers' unions working without contracts for years, this too is part of the crackdown on intellectual life. When universities rely on cheap contingent labor rather than hiring full-time faculty, this too is part of the suppression of intellectual life. Rather than hiring faculty, universities increasingly bloat their administrative ranks, moving their learning institutions further and further from learning. This often has the same effect, albeit indirectly, as censoring dissenting professors. The result is an educational system aimed not at the life of the mind or social engagement but at creating a population ready to swallow the US empire's legitimizing rationale. A public that has been taught not history but nationalism can accept simplistic explanations about them hating our freedoms, us bringing them the gift of democracy, or our right to indiscriminate retaliation in the aftermath of an attack.

A Different Type of Response
Allow me to state an uncomfortable fact: there will probably be another act of terrorism against Westerners committed by people who call themselves Muslim. The question is, will the people of the United States respond once again as they have in the past? Will they give license to undue war? Will they accept the state's rhetoric and clamor for tighter borders, more profiling of Muslims, and swelling the ranks of Homeland Security and law enforcement?

Empire only has as much power as it is granted by those who live at its heart. Iraq War veteran Mike Prysner reminds us that weapons are harmless without people willing to use them. Those who send us to war do not have to pull a trigger or lob a mortar round; they don't have to fight the war. They merely have to sell us the war. They need a public who is willing to send their soldiers into harm's way, and they need soldiers who are willing to kill and be killed, without question. They can spend millions on a single bomb—but that bomb only becomes a weapon when the ranks in the military are willing to follow the orders to use it. They can send every last soldier anywhere on earth, but there will only be a war if soldiers are willing to fight.

The ruling class—the billionaires who profit from human suffering, who care only about expanding their wealth and controlling the world economy—understand that their power lies only in their ability to convince us that war, oppression, and exploitation is in our interest. They understand that their wealth is dependent on their ability to convince the working class to die to control the market of another country. And convincing us to die and kill is based on their ability to make us think that we are somehow superior.

Prysner's words remind me of those of anti-apartheid activist Steve Biko: "The most powerful weapon in the hands of the oppressor is the mind of the oppressed."

When an Islamist terror attack takes place in the United States, what will those of us who live at the
heart of empire do? Will we support legislation to profile Muslim communities, efforts that are devastating and often ineffective? Will we fork over our tax dollars to a war machine that has already devastated the lives of countless Muslims? Or will we recall our position at the heart of one of the most sprawling empires ever to exist? Will we recognize that the violence of terrorism, though atrocious, is hardly senseless? That, given the histories that have inspired terrorism, this violence almost makes perfect sense?

As we have seen, the United States has used all kinds of tools with the goal of fighting terrorism: psychological profiling to single out those who are increasingly religious, politically active, or perhaps sexually frustrated; spying on communities by documenting what they talk about at coffee shops, places of worship, and bookstores; sending paid informants to lure would-be terrorists with promises of explosives and guns; blackmauling imams to work for intelligence agencies and snitch on "suspicious" behavior in their congregations; constructing a wall along the US-Mexico border to keep unsavory characters out; having passengers remove their shoes at airports and squeeze their toiletries into three-ounce bottles before passing through security; putting people with suspicious names on a no-fly list; bombing into oblivion countries the American public associates with terrorism (whether or not that association is valid); funding social workers and religious leaders to engage their communities in efforts to "counter violent extremism"; creating jobs in Homeland Security and law enforcement to battle the terrorist threat; rounding up Muslim immigrants with no links to terrorism for indefinite detention—the list goes on and on.

But what if we thought of critical thinking as a terrorism prevention tool? What if the political and economic realities of the United States and its historical relationship to countries like Saudi Arabia, Iran, Iraq, and Libya were well understood by the Americans whose tax dollars funded such relationships? What if Americans understood the histories of racism, and the names John Brown and Fred Hampton were as well-known as Abraham Lincoln’s? What would happen in the aftermath of a terrorist attack in an America that hadn’t been stupefied by binaries like "good and evil," "safe and dangerous," or "free and unfree"?

In 2017, when ISIS carried out a gruesome attack on concertgoers in Manchester, England, the world reeled. Nothing could soften the horror of knowing young lives had been so brutally lost. The media was replete in its representations of mourners. When we turned on the news, we saw friends embracing, tears streaming down their faces. We saw flowers piling up at the site of the attack. In that moment, many would have found it "in poor taste" to bring up the children—children just like those in Manchester—whose lives had been lost in a brutal US-backed war in Yemen. It wasn’t the time to point out the suffering of migrant children crossing the treacherous Sonoma Desert, many never making it out alive because the United States has militarized the more "crossable" parts of the border. But imagine that we were capable of a different type of grief, a grief that asks us to make these crucial connections. If we can be reminded not just of the terror wrought on the concertgoers in Manchester but also the terror wrought on Iraqi and Somali children, we might exercise a type of mourning that doesn’t lead to an expansion of an already gargantuan military budget.

What Now?
When students discover the realities of the towering US military budget, the flagrant violations of human rights carried out in the name of America’s empire, or the dubious grounds for its invasions and campaigns of militarism, a question inevitably arises: "Well, what can we even do about this?" When students ask this question—usually from a sense of despair, often more to proclaim hopelessness than to seek an actual route of action—it reveals a great deal. It means the curtain has been pulled back, the daunting fact of American racism and imperialism laid bare. But the question is a troubling one. It reflects how so many of us expect a quick, easily parsed, one-stop-shop
solution for something as complex as our racial world order. No such solution exists.

For those of us who accept the realities of a pernicious white supremacy and a disturbing US imperialism, what we can begin to do is to use the lessons of our past to understand that only a wholesale abolition of racism will lead to justice. We must refuse to compromise or to accept lesser evils, to settle for incremental steps toward racial justice. The critical thinking I'm calling for is one in which we are principled and deliberate in how we eliminate white supremacy. If we are to eradicate it, it will be by pulling it up from its roots, not by pruning its most egregious branches.

In August 2017, the far right held a weekend of "Unite the Right" rallies in Charlottesville, Virginia, in which heavily armed neo-Nazis marched through the streets chanting "Jews will not replace us" and calling young murder victims like Trayvon Martin "savages." When the rallies led to the murder of antiracist protester Heather Heyer, there was a decidedly bipartisan outcry. White nationalists marched through Charlottesville chanting Nazi slogans and calling for ethnonationalism. Even Republicans distanced themselves from Donald Trump's statement that there was violence "on both sides" and roundly condemned such shows of white nationalism. Both presidents Bush issued a joint statement against bigotry. Former California governor Arnold Schwarzenegger papered over his own role as California governor in slashing funding for public education, a measure that heavily impacted people of color. Or consider what it means to be thankful to the CEO of Merck for resigning from Trump's advisory board: pharmaceutical companies are hardly blemish-free for their role in medical racism. (Consider which populations are hit hardest by skyrocketing drug prices.)

The white supremacy that marched through the streets of Charlottesville in 2017 could never have sprouted if not for these seedlings. Yet those who breathe sighs of relief at CEOs' and politicians' condemnations settle for "whatever we can get" in this moment of crisis. Perhaps they feel that any allies are better than none. But this reflects a fundamental shortcoming in our political imagination. All too often, we expect to agitate and protest within the spectrum of acceptable political engagement. We believe that what we ask of a deeply unjust world should fall squarely into the realm of what is "likely." But this approach is backward. If anything, the starting point of our political demands should be the world we want, not the one that we're likely to win. Otherwise, we are bound for a pyrrhic victory, toppling the current instantiation of racist violence only to restore the old one.

As an educator, I know all my efforts to galvanize students to think critically will be for naught if I ask them to remain within the parameters of what is reasonable, what is available, or what is practical.
in how they foresee their world. To borrow from Arundhati Roy, we must take seriously the fundamental paradigm that "another world is possible." If this terrifying political moment is to offer us anything, it is the opportunity to think beyond such confines. Perhaps the silver lining of a barefaced, naked white supremacy is that we imagine a wholesale abolition of the structures that led us here to begin with.

Imagine if we allowed ourselves to ask the most "impractical" of questions: What if prisons and policing weren’t solutions to the things we call "crime"? What would the world look like if the US military budget didn’t tower over those of the several largest world militaries combined? What are ways to prevent terrorism that don’t involve surveillance, racial profiling, detention, or torture? What if wealth weren’t concentrated in increasingly fewer hands? What if debt weren’t part of the American way of life?

Of course, these are questions that already guide the grassroots activists pushing for change across the country, people who dared to imagine the toppling of statues that celebrate a legacy of racism, the end of US wars of aggression, or a basic income for all Americans in order to eliminate poverty. These aspirations are not pie-in-the-sky delusions. They are real, feasible conclusions one arrives at when thinking carefully about how we came to such drastic global inequality.

Such was the demand of Martin Luther King Jr., who proclaimed, "America! You must be born again!" America cannot be reborn if we keep even the faintest skeleton of white supremacy intact. <>

The Cambridge Handbook of Classical Liberal Thought edited by M. Todd Henderson [Cambridge University Press, 9781108416931]

Polls suggest up to twenty percent of Americans describe their beliefs as 'libertarian', but libertarians are often derided as heartless Social Darwinists or naïve idealists. This illuminating handbook brings together scholars from a range of fields (from law to philosophy to politics to economics) and political perspectives (right, left, and center) to consider how classical liberal principles can help us understand and potentially address a variety of pressing social problems including immigration, climate change, the growth of the prison population, and a host of others. Anyone interested in political theory or practical law and politics will find this book an essential resource for understanding this major strand of American politics.

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Excerpt: The 2016 election featured two of the most unpopular major-party candidates in American history, leading many (or, at least, me) to believe that the Libertarian Party had a chance. In a hopeful story in the May 29, 2016, issue of the Washington Times, the author described the Libertarian ticket of two former governors — Gary Johnson (New Mexico) and William Weld (Massachusetts) — as "the strongest presidential ticket in [the Libertarian Party's] history," and claimed that the libertarians were "throwing down the gauntlet" to the two major parties. Johnson and Weld got about 3 percent of the popular vote and won no votes in the Electoral College. Faith Spotted Eagle, a member of the Yankton Sioux Nation, got more electoral votes. Needless to say, the libertarian moment that many believed was at hand in 2016 passed uneventfully. Boy, was I wrong (and disappointed)!

To make matters worse, very little about America today seems consistent with the classical liberal ideal. No current member of the Supreme Court could fairly be described as a classical liberal, nor are many politicians. Moreover, political correctness and calls for government regulation of so-called hate speech are rampant on college campuses. The ever-growing power of the administrative state also belies the claim we live in classically liberal times.

Government and its role in our lives is also bigger than ever. President Trump's proposed 2018 budget requested spending of over $4 trillion. This is more than double the final budget President Clinton submitted in 2000. The federal government has doubled in size in under twenty years! This is obviously a bipartisan phenomenon. The role of government in our lives did not go down because of the Republican wave election of 1994, despite the explicit promise — in the Contract with America — that they would reduce it. Government has grown consistently larger over time, regardless of who is in charge. Those on the political Right in America are at serious risk of becoming Charlie Brown, running up to the football with hope despite repeatedly being duped by the Lucy's we put in office.

Nevertheless, polls suggest about 10 to 20 percent of Americans describe their beliefs as "libertarian," and libertarian ideas have been ascendant in recent years. As of 2017, seven states and the District of Columbia legalized recreational use of marijuana, and nineteen other states permit medicinal use. This trend is consistent with the classical liberal view expressed by nineteenth-century English jurist Baron Bramwell in his broad philosophy of "live and let live." John Stuart Mill put this catch phrase in more philosophical terms, which he called the "harm principle." In his book, "On Liberty," Mill declared the harm principle as the basis for a just society:

The object of this Essay is to assert one very simple principle, as entitled to govern absolutely the dealings of society with the individual in the way of compulsion and control, whether the means used to be physical force in the form of legal penalties, or the moral coercion of public opinion. That principle is, that the sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number, is self-protection. That the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant. He cannot rightfully be compelled to do or forbear because it will be better for him to do so, because it will make him happier, because, in the opinion of others, to do so would be wise, or even right ... The only part of the conduct of anyone, for which he is amenable to society, is that which concerns others.
In the part which merely concerns himself, his independence is, of right, absolute. Over himself, over his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign.

The private use of marijuana could be reasoned to cause others harm through a contorted causal chain, but there is increasing societal consensus that the primary person users may harm is themselves, and that does not justify mobilizing the violence of the state to coerce different choices.

There have been other victories. In Joseph Abbey v. Castille, a federal court considered a Louisiana rule requiring retailers of caskets to be licensed funeral directors. The Benedictine monks at St. Joseph Abbey challenged the constitutionality of the regulations on due process grounds — that is, that the due-process guarantee of the Constitution protects people from government action that is not justified on public (as opposed to private) interest grounds. In essence, the monks argued that the Louisiana Board of Embalmers and Funeral Directors promulgated the rules to serve the interests of funeral directors by insulating them from potential competition. The district court agreed, holding that it was "unconstitutional to require those persons who intend solely to manufacture and sell caskets be subject to the licensing requirements for funeral directors and funeral establishments." The federal court of appeals for Texas, Louisiana, and Mississippi affirmed. While the Fifth Circuit shied away from espousing "a judicial vision of free enterprise," the willingness to put government regulation of economic affairs to scrutiny is a long-standing dream of classical liberal lawyers. In fact, the mission of the Institute for Justice, a libertarian public interest law firm, is to overturn the Slaughterhouse Cases, which held that the Due Process Clause did not restrict the regulatory authority of the states in this way. If the Castille case portends a renewed judicial interest in flyspecking economic regulation, it will add a substantial classical liberal constraint on government, even in the absence of widespread political support in state houses or Congress.

Although for classical liberals this result is clearly second best, it is a reality that they will probably accept. It would be better, of course, if legislatures did not pass statutes impinging on human liberty in the absence of demonstrable social harms (that exceed social benefits). But empowering federal judges to intervene on occasion when they do, provides a check on extensions of unjustified government activity. After all, classical liberal thinkers are not opposed to government regulation per se, but rather more circumspect about the need for additional regulation. Aaron Director, a longtime professor at the University of Chicago said it best: "Laissez faire has never been more than a slogan in defense of the proposition that every extension of state activity should be examined under a presumption of error."

This view is broadly shared on the political right in America, especially in the sometimes fetishization about the structural design of our Republic. In his first dissent as an associate justice of the Supreme Court, Neil Gorsuch put it this way when urging a party to take their case to the legislature, instead of the courts:

To be sure, the demands of bicameralism and presentment are real and the process can be protracted. But the difficulty of making new laws isn't some bug in the constitutional design; it's the point of the design, the better to preserve liberty.

So, what is the future of classical-liberal thought in law and policy? What does classical liberal thought have to say about matters of pressing public concern, ranging from immigration policy to consumer welfare regulation to the growth of the prison system?

This book collects some voices on these issues in the hopes about advancing the conversation. Chapter i sets the stage with an historical overview by the great Ralph Raico, who died in 2016. This essay was influential in the formation of my own views of political philosophy, and it is reprinted here with permission of the Future of
Freedom Foundation. Although not a complete history, its ten-thousand-foot view articulates a compelling narrative of what made the west prosper over the past several centuries. It is unfortunately a history that is lost to most historians.

In Chapter 2, the philosopher Jason Brennan challenges the cartoon version of libertarians — that they only care about liberty, and thus are indifferent to actual human conditions of suffering. Brennan rehabilitates classical liberalism from a bad reputation it earned from the pens of Ayn Rand or Murray Rothbard, who's thick conceptions of liberty admitted a thin conception of human compassion. To make a positive case for classical liberalism, Brennan goes back to its roots, finding in Adam Smith and other early thinkers a commitment to what we call social justice. Brennan makes a welfarist case for liberty.

A central foundation of classical liberalism are well-defined property rights, premised on the right being held by the discoverer or first user. In Chapter 3, economist Art Carden defends this foundational principle against criticisms that delineating property from among communally owned things is selfish. Carden argues that it is not the first-comer who is "lucky" but the latecomer; the first in time does not take from the commons but gives to it by doing the difficult work of identifying potentially valuable property, manipulating it to become valuable, and then bringing it into the market to be exchanged. When the uncertain nature of materials and the impact of work is considered, rules that seem to be about selfishness turn out to be other regarding.

If the subject of Chapter 3 — who owns what? — is at one end of the spectrum of classical liberal ideas, law professor David Bernstein’s topic in Chapter 4 — should libertarians favor antidiscrimination laws? — is at the other. Classical liberals, most prominently Richard Epstein (who we will hear from in Chapter 16), often oppose statutes, such as the Civil Rights Act of 1964, on the grounds that freedom of association is a more important social value, and that left to its own devices competitive markets will reduce discrimination to tolerable levels. The willingness to stand up for this First Amendment right has caused some critics to label libertarians as racists. Bernstein confronts this charge head on in Chapter 4. He points out the asymmetry of this argument, noting that when liberals defend the right of Nazi’s to march, it does not turn them into Nazis. Principles by their nature admit uncomfortable cases. Bernstein goes on to situate the debate about speech and association in the modern context, offering insightful commentary on cases involving the tension between the constitutional rights of individuals doing business and the interests of individuals to be free from harmful discrimination. Whether you are persuaded by Bernstein’s argument, at the very least this chapter should take the sting out of the cry that classical liberals are uncaring racists.

Another area in which classical liberals might appear to be vulnerable to substantive attacks is in the field of environmental policy. Pollution is the classic example of an externality that seems to compel government action as a means of addressing persistent collective action problems. In Chapter 5, law professor Jonathan Adler argues that well-defined property rights can be an effective mechanism for addressing a range of environmental issues, using examples ranging from pollution to fisheries. Although there are challenges to defining property rights in some areas, such as ocean-based fisheries, Adler demonstrates with convincing case studies that it is possible to utilize classical-liberal approaches to address environmental concerns. One of these tough cases that Adler identifies is the topic of global warming, since the earth’s atmosphere represents the biggest commons we can imagine. Yet, Adler argues that libertarian principles and approaches may even be valuable here, issuing in effect a call to arms to classical-liberal scholars to take more seriously environmental issues and the potential welfare gains from attacking them using tools of classical-liberal thinking.
Chapter 6 is a reprint of Leonard Read’s iconic biography of a Mongol pencil assembled, fabricated, and finished by Eberhard Faber Pencil Company. It sounds silly at first, but none other than Milton Friedman called Read’s essay the best illustration of Adam Smith’s invisible hand and of F. A. Hayek’s concept of dispersed, local knowledge. Whenever classical liberals hear claims from politicians or law professors about how a complex process or industry could be managed better by a centralized group of so-called experts, a common retort is: "No one knows how to make a pencil!" This comment doesn’t make a great deal of sense until one reads and appreciates Read’s essay. If something as simple as a pencil is beyond the ken of any individual or even group of highly talented and motivated individuals, the argument goes, how could anyone possibly try to plan the multi-trillion-dollar US health care system. An old (and probably apocryphal) story tells of a Soviet visitor to London who, amazed by the abundance in British supermarkets, asks to meet the person responsible for getting bread into the city. A cheeky response would have been to hand the Russian a copy of "I, Pencil."

Law professor Ilya Somin presents a summary of his forthcoming book on what he calls "foot voting" in Chapter 7. He claims that voting with your feet, whether among political jurisdictions (either within a country or across countries) or among competing firms in commerce is better at achieving political freedom than voting at the ballot box. Somin argues that exit is superior to voice (to use the terminology of Albert Hirschmann) in politics. This result obtains, he claims, across various theories of political freedom, ranging from consent to positive liberty to nondomination accounts. There are a range of historically grounded objections to relying on exit as a means of political accountability, including our experience with invidious exclusion of certain groups and the possibilities of poverty traps limiting exit. Somin does not shy away from these objections, and in doing so demonstrates that libertarian theories are not mere pie-in-the-sky fantasies of Ayn Rand, but can lead to institutional reforms that can help expand political opportunities, while mitigating potentially downsides.

In the next chapter, we move from high theory to the practical details of government administration. In Chapter 8, law professor Michael Rappaport takes us on a grand tour of administrative law, as currently practiced by powerful administrative agencies foreign to the classical liberal tradition. While some classical liberals, such as Richard Epstein, and conservatives, such as Phillip Hamburger, advocate getting rid of the administrative state lock, stock, and barrel, Rappaport takes a much more practical and lawyerly approach to trying to advance the mission of a more classically liberal state. The key ingredient in Rappaport’s approach is the doctrine of separation of powers, which, he argues, advances classical liberalism in several ways: it limits government power, it furthers the rule of law, it increases accountability, and it reduces the pathologies of administrative law, such as capture or political meddling with expertise. While Rappaport admits sympathy to those in the classical liberal tradition who would prefer a world of small government to one with big government, the chapter takes a realistic approach, noting contingent on having a big government (which may be unavoidable, at least in the short run), the classical liberal should strictly prefer one with strong separation of powers to one with weak separation of powers. Rappaport makes his case in a comprehensive treatment of administrative law, covering the key cases, doctrines, and details of administration in a way that is refreshingly pragmatic and in touch with the important of foundational tenets of classical liberalism.

Political theorist Jacob Levy’s contribution — in Chapter 9 — is a bucket of cold water dumped over the head of the classical liberal thinker. Levy, who considers himself a classical liberal, rejects the core principle of that particular faith stretching back to Locke and Jefferson and beyond. For them, as for most of us today, classical liberalism is antipolitical or perhaps prepolitical. Locke’s harm
principle and Jefferson’s social contract set forth in the Declaration of Independence assert that the purpose of the state is to protect rights. Levy calls this limited conception of classical liberalism "absurd" and "an end-run around politics" that he believes has made classical liberal ideas less relevant to actual governing than ideal. Looking out at the state of modern politics, Levy sees strands of illiberalism in society (for example, populism, nationalism) that need to be confronted, and it is insufficient, he argues persuasively, to retreat to the enumerated powers of the Constitution. Levy demands classical liberals reengage with ordinary politics instead of retreating to towers of formulaic principles.

Although, given its emphasis on a minimal state, classical liberalism is often thought of as a species of right-wing politics in the United States, there are numerous places where libertarian policy preferences are more aligned with the left wing of American politics. Classical liberals have historically been abolitionists, feminists, sympathetic to gay rights, against the "war on drugs," and skeptical about mass incarceration, especially the racial composition of prisons. These commitments are evident throughout this book. In Chapter 10, law professor Fernando Tesón provides another example of how far libertarians diverge from current Republican politics, making the classical liberal case for a much more open immigration policy. Tesón rejects claims by those hostile to immigration, grounded in national security, hoary notions of sovereignty, or cultural nativism, as well as those supportive of immigration, grounded in the value of diversity. Instead, Tesón bases his argument on solidly bourgeois notions of economic opportunity and equal dignity. For a classical liberal like Tesón, perhaps no policy is a clearer way to increase social welfare than a liberalization of our immigration policy.

Economist Mario Rizzo provides an assessment of recent criticisms of neoclassical economics in Chapter n. The biggest development in economics over the past few decades has been the surge in "behavioral" economics. While all economics is about behavior of humans, the Nobel-winning work of Daniel Kahneman, Richard Thaler, and others has suggested that prevailing economic models are incomplete insofar as they purport to describe people as "rational" human actors. Since much classical liberal theory and politics is premised on economic models of competitive markets, behavioralism can be thought of as an attack on classical liberals. In fact, it is probably not a coincidence that the rise of behavioralism came after a period of several decades in which neoclassical economic models completely reshaped American law, often in a more classically liberal direction. Mario Rizzo argues that the differences between these competing approaches is insufficiently clear. In a return to first principles, Rizzo attempts to reframe our understanding of economic models by considering in detail what we mean when we say "rational" and "irrational." The classical liberal, progressive, and everyone in between will be challenged to rethink their assumptions about economics.

The foundational precept of classical liberalism is private property. (Bodily autonomy is as well, but few deny its importance today.) In Chapter 12, law professor James Stern defends private property against critics, like Thomas Grey, who argue that it is a construct that merely reflects the regulatory choice of the state. Stern grounds his defense against the property relativists in a consideration of the current law of intellectual property, specifically, copyright and patent law. Stern argues that we do not merely call intellectual property "property," out of convenience or otherwise, but rather that intellectual property’s structures and doctrines are consistent with and shaped by the fundamental features of property, writ large. Moreover, Stern points out, that an attempt to describe intellectual property as merely a means of achieving public ends fails to account for the law and policy in the field.

The term "classical liberal" and "libertarian" are often used synonymously, and, in fact, they are often used that way throughout this book. But in Chapter 13, law professor Gus Hurwitz and law
and economics scholar Geoffrey Manne tease out an important distinction — views about technological change may create a tension between these two strands of thought. Libertarians generally embrace technology, especially modern information technology, as a means of empowering individuals. This can be seen in the fantastical claims about the potential of the Internet to create super-empowered individuals free from government constraint. Of course, governments can also use technology, making this position somewhat naïve. But the schism with classical liberals is along another dimension. Starting from Locke, the classical liberal ideal depends on a strong state capable of enforcing property rights and maintaining a peaceful civil society governed by the rule of law. This includes not just ISIS and China, but muggers on the streets of Chicago and fraudsters peddling get-rich-quick schemes and bogus remedies. Hurwitz and Manne explore the proper role of the state and the ways in which technology may upset the historical alliance between classical liberals and libertarians in this thought-provoking chapter.

As the faculty sponsor of the student chapter of the Federalist Society at the University of Chicago Law School, one of my jobs is to deliver the annual "Introduction to the Federalist Society" remarks during the first week of a new school year. (That I inherited this job from Richard Epstein when he decamped to NYU for the Fall each year, is one of the great honors of my professional life.) In these remarks each year, I make a point of arguing for the cross-party nature of classical liberal ideals. To do this, I frequently cite statistics about incarceration rates in the United States, especially the racial nature of them. In Chapter 4, my progressive colleague at Chicago, Aziz Huq, elaborates on this point, urging classical liberal scholars to do more work on the issue of incarceration. After all, if the goal of a political philosophy is to actually impact policy choices, then coalitions must be built, and this in turn depends on goodwill being earned. Common ground can be found among Left and this strand of the Right in America, but it will require classical liberal thinkers to be more forceful in their rejection of the pro-prison agenda that earns Republicans electoral victories. Huq gives several persuasive arguments for why classical liberal thinkers should be against the carceral state, and why this bargain might be the right one to strike.

The final two chapters present a debate of sorts between law professors Michael Seidman and Richard Epstein. The written chapters are a summary and extension of a passionate debate witnessed by participants at the end of the conference. Seidman, a highly regarded man of the Left, had been a playful interlocutor during the event, but when he rose as the penultimate speaker, he set forth his normative views on the content of classical liberalism, as he understands it. Chapter 15 is an enumeration of seven "problems" that Seidman believes are fatal to classical liberalism as a political philosophy, let alone a recipe for guiding American policy making. In classical Seidman style, the points are sharp. In the final chapter, Epstein, the most prolific and articulate defender of classical liberalism in the legal academy today, if not anywhere, responds in kind. Epstein takes Seidman's arguments seriously, offering a robust defense of classical liberalism to each objection, using legal arguments, philosophy, and empirical judgments based on real-world policy. These two chapters taken together paint a fairly complete picture of the two rival political ideals that are competing for the attention and blessing of the American electorate and of policy makers in Washington and across America. <>

Democracy and Prosperity: Reinventing Capitalism through a Turbulent Century by Torben Iversen and David Soskice [Princeton University Press, 9780691182735]

A groundbreaking new historical analysis of how global capitalism and advanced democracies mutually support each other. It is a widespread view that democracy and the advanced nation-state are in crisis, weakened by globalization and undermined by global
capitalism, in turn explaining rising inequality and mounting populism. This book, written by two of the world’s leading political economists, argues this view is wrong: advanced democracies are resilient, and their enduring historical relationship with capitalism has been mutually beneficial.

For all the chaos and upheaval over the past century—major wars, economic crises, massive social change, and technological revolutions—Torben Iversen and David Soskice show how democratic states continuously reinvent their economies through massive public investment in research and education, by imposing competitive product markets and cooperation in the workplace, and by securing macroeconomic discipline as the preconditions for innovation and the promotion of the advanced sectors of the economy. Critically, this investment has generated vast numbers of well-paying jobs for the middle classes and their children, focusing the aims of aspirational families, and in turn providing electoral support for parties. Gains at the top have also been shared with the middle (though not the bottom) through a large welfare state.

Contrary to the prevailing wisdom on globalization, advanced capitalism is neither footloose nor unconstrained: it thrives under democracy precisely because it cannot subvert it. Populism, inequality, and poverty are indeed great scourges of our time, but these are failures of democracy and must be solved by democracy.

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Excerpt: This book started from our discussions of a paradox.

Yet despite its importance it has been curiously little discussed in the academic literature.

On the one hand, the last century of advanced capitalism in the developed world has been one of deep and conflictual instability: two world wars (as well as Vietnam and Korea), technological revolutions, massive social and economic transformation, the collapse of the white colonial empires, fascism, the rise and then fall of the communist bloc and the Cold War, and two great financial crises with subsequent extended deep recessions.

On the other hand, this same developed world of advanced capitalism in this same last century has been spectacularly successful in any remote historical comparison in massively raising living standards, in widely diffusing education, and in remaining highly egalitarian in comparison to states elsewhere. Equally it has been a century in which democracy—established in all the then industrialized countries by the early 1920s—has remained in place (leave aside the 1935-45 exceptions).

As we see it, the advanced capitalist democracies, for all their instability and social problems not least at present, have been remarkably resilient and effective over this whole period. What we want to understand in the book is what mechanisms have driven that resilience and effectiveness over this long century.

In seeking to understand this resilience we want to propose a theory of advanced capitalist democracy, covering its many different forms. Of course, we make much use of the large body of work on varieties of capitalism. But the goal of the book is to develop an overall framework theory of how advanced capitalism works in the different advanced democracies. With the theory we address the key question of resilience.
This is a central historical question. Moreover, if the mechanisms are understood, they may also shed light on the questions that trouble thoughtful observers today: the rise in inequality, the consequences of globalization, the financial crisis, the growth of populism, the meaning of Brexit and Trump, and so on.

Whatever the analysis of current problems, our understanding of the long term has become reasonably clear from our research over the last decade or so. Very broadly, democracy and advanced capitalism have been symbiotic in the advanced nation-states. Democracies positively reinforce advanced capitalism and well-functioning advanced capitalism reinforces democratic support. In our framework theory advanced capitalism is driven by the advanced democratic nation-state: democracy drives advanced capitalism. And in this process the autonomy of the advanced nation-state has increased even as globalization and mutual dependence have risen.

This is very far from any received view.

The great theorists of advanced capitalism—among them Marx, Schumpeter, Hayek, Polanyi, and Poulantzas—all saw its relation to democracy as deeply problematic, although from very different political vantage points. The same is true of major contemporary commentators, notably leading Marxists including Streeck and Piketty, but also Buchanan, Tullock, and other public choice theorists, on the right of the political spectrum. More generally in the political economy and political science literatures, a very widespread assumption is that the interests of capital and labor are opposed. We have come to a different conclusion.

What, then, are the key elements of the symbiotic relationship? We see three:

1. The role of government is central: The state/government has to ensure that companies operate in a broadly competitive environment; it has to ensure that labor is cooperative, allowing management the right to manage; and to provide an effective system of education, training, and research as technology develops. All these in turn mean that the state is powerful enough to carry through these broad strategies. But what is its incentive to do so? Capitalism left to itself will hardly choose to operate in a competitive environment. We argue next that advanced democracies supply the incentive.

2. Parties to be electable have a reputation for managing advanced capitalism effectively: There is typically a significant proportion of the electorate who would not vote for parties without a reputation for economic competence and concern for the advanced sectors of the economy. A key empirical fact is that advanced capitalism is (relatively) skilled-labor intensive, so that it demands and has demanded a large skilled workforce. Because the cooperation of such a workforce is important, efficiency wages align the interest of skilled labor (and its unions) with the broad success of advanced capitalism. Add to this, aspirational voters concerned that they and/or their children get jobs in these advanced sectors. This does not imply support for a particular party, left or right, but instead that electable parties have a reputation for effective management of advanced economies.

3. Advanced capital is geographically embedded in the advanced nation-state rather than footloose: The third element of our approach rules out "race to the bottom" welfare states and/or imposition of subsistence wages in the advanced sectors, and more generally it also justifies advanced governments making huge investments in education, training, and research, which footloose companies might otherwise carry abroad perhaps with their skilled workforces. The value added of advanced companies is geographically embedded in their skilled workforces, via
skill clusters, social networks, the need for colocation of workforces, and skills co-specific across workers and—given their limited codifiability—the implicit nature of a large proportion of skills. The nature and pattern of industrial organization has changed substantially through the century but the insight of economic geographers that competences are geographically embedded has not. Thus, while advanced companies may be powerful in the marketplace, advanced capitalism has little structural power, and competition makes it politically weak. (As noted above, this is a major difference from the less advanced world, to which Rodrik’s analysis of globalization applies.)

These are the three basic ideas—the central role of the state, the concern by a significant part of the electorate for economically competent government, and the geographical embeddedness of advanced capitalism—which have together generated symbiosis between democracy and capitalism in advanced nation-states over the past century despite many ups and downs.

Are capitalism and democracy still symbiotic in the advanced world today? There may be many problems with advanced capitalism. But electorates turn to populism when they feel let down by established politicians they see as ineffective economic managers. If "good jobs" dry up, then middle-class voters can easily lose faith with politicians whom they see as having failed to deliver. When they do, the audience for anti-establishment populist parties grows. This is the unsurprising consequence of the contemporary prolonged recession (as it was in the 1930s), and of an expansion that creates low-paid employment instead of graduate jobs. The problem is particularly urgent in countries such as the US and the UK with inegalitarian access to quality education, which perpetuates inequality and makes upward mobility harder (a relationship known as the Great Gatsby curve).

We see the division between the new knowledge economy and those low-productivity labor markets as a new socioeconomic cleavage that has crystallized along educational lines and a deepening segregation between successful cities and left-behind communities in small towns and rural areas.

Yet we do not see this cleavage as a fundamental threat to democracy, because it does not undo the basic elements of the symbiotic relationship. Democracy has a built-in mechanism to limit antisystemic sentiments. Parties need to build majority coalitions to govern, and they consequently need to extend opportunities to a majority through education and social policies. The fact that populist values are less pervasive in countries with more equal access to the educational system is a testament to this logic. The capacity of the state to address grievances through the welfare state has also not waned.

Despite the doom and gloom of much contemporary scholarship and commentary, we show how the middle class has been able to retain its share of national income over time, in part because of redistributive tax and transfer systems. When the economy grows, the middle advances. But this does not imply that the bottom benefits. Indeed, the rising educated middle classes may have little interest in redistribution to the poor because they are themselves relatively secure. A general problem in the existing literature is that by talking broadly about redistribution it does not adequately separate the interests of the middle class from the interests of the poor or from those who have lost out in the transition to the knowledge economy. A theme that runs through this book is that when we seek to understand the roots of inequality, we should pay more attention to how democracy works and interacts with economic change.

A related theme is the primacy of politics. The huge transformation from a Fordist to the knowledge economy was set in motion by major policy reforms in the 1980s and 1990s, which were induced by democratic governments responding to an
electorate demanding economic results and reasons to believe in the future. Information and communications technology (ICT) enabled the transition, but nothing about the technology itself ensured that it would succeed the way it did. The forces set in motion by these reforms led to the unprecedented expansion of higher education and empowerment of women, which would have been unimaginable in the 1950s and 1960s. Somehow this huge success story has been forgotten in contemporary debates that tend to cast new technology and "neoliberal" reforms as villains in a gloomy story about decline.

Perhaps some of the tension between our own view and those that dominate the current debate is a matter of historical perspective. In this book—which covers a hundred years of history—we deliberately focus on a longer period of time. In contrast to the pessimism that permeates contemporary debates, from this perspective advanced capitalist democracies have generated massive improvements in prosperity. This has been made possible by the repeated democratic reinvention of capitalism through a turbulent century. We believe it is such reinvention that should be the target of our current debates. <>

Where Economics Went Wrong: Chicago’s Abandonment of Classical Liberalism by David Colander and Craig Freedman [Princeton University Press, 9780691179209]

How modern economics abandoned classical liberalism and lost its way
Milton Friedman once predicted that advances in scientific economics would resolve debates about whether raising the minimum wage is good policy. Decades later, Friedman’s prediction has not come true. In Where Economics Went Wrong, David Colander and Craig Freedman argue that it never will. Why? Because economic policy, when done correctly, is an art and a craft. It is not, and cannot be, a science. The authors explain why classical liberal economists understood this essential difference, why modern economists abandoned it, and why now is the time for the profession to return to its classical liberal roots.

Carefully distinguishing policy from science and theory, classical liberal economists emphasized values and context, treating economic policy analysis as a moral science where a dialogue of sensibilities and judgments allowed for the same scientific basis to arrive at a variety of policy recommendations. Using the University of Chicago—one of the last bastions of classical liberal economics—as a case study, Colander and Freedman examine how both the MIT and Chicago variants of modern economics eschewed classical liberalism in their attempt to make economic policy analysis a science. By examining the way in which the discipline managed to lose its bearings, the authors delve into such issues as the development of welfare economics in relation to economic science, alternative voices within the Chicago School, and exactly how Friedman got it wrong.

Contending that the division between science and prescription needs to be restored, Where Economics Went Wrong makes the case for a more nuanced and self-aware policy analysis by economists.

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2 A Classical Garden of Liberal Economics: Policy versus Abstraction
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7 Roads Not Taken: The Stillborn Virginia School of Economics
8 The Classical Liberal "Argumentation for the Sake of Heaven" Alternative
9 The Art and Craft of Economics: The Classical Liberal Attitude
Excerpt: Our telling of the story started as an article, but the story quickly expanded beyond article length and turned into a book. As we developed it, we decided that the story was about Classical Liberalism and how the economics profession lost its Classical Liberal groundings. Chicago was useful in telling that story because it was the last holdout, a bit like the Alamo, not because Chicago was unique. Long before Chicago abandoned it, the broader economics profession had as well. When the Chicago School coalesced in the 1950s, Classical Liberal methodology as the reigning economic methodology was dead.

The reader will detect a real sense of loss in our telling of the story. In our view, by giving up Classical Liberalism, the economics profession went down the wrong track in its policy analysis. That injured both its scientific theory and its policy analysis. The problem is not that economic scientists attempt to keep values out of their science. That's what good science does. The problem is that they don't sufficiently separate out science from policy analysis. That separation is necessary because the appropriate methodology of policy analysis is quite different from the appropriate methodology of science. Classical liberal methodology solved the problem by placing a firewall between science and policy. Modern economics removed that firewall, and in doing so removed Classical economics' method of keeping a consensus on theory and simultaneously dealing with differing sensibilities and values. Thus, while we agree with both right and left heterodox economists that modern economics has problems, we differ from most of them because they also do not maintain a firewall. Economic science and theory do not and cannot tell us whether the right or the left is correct. Both the right and the left heterodox economists have insights, as do mainstream economists. The problem is that those insights get lost by their joint use of a methodology that doesn't distinguish between science and policy, and thus doesn't direct them to the most useful methods to resolve, or at least to agree to disagree, on inevitable policy differences.

The goal of the book should be clear upon reading. It is to fan some of these embers that remain of the Classical Liberal methodology, and to create an environment in which the Classical Liberal attitude toward methodology can reign once again within the economics profession.

We worked hard to keep the book short, and one of the ways we did that was to put many of our ideas into endnotes. There are a lot of them, and the average reader can skip them without loss of our central points. But they are there for the interested reader to consume. We encourage readers to think of the endnotes as a book within a book, and to explore the tangents they discuss. One strategy might be to read them consecutively after finishing the relevant chapter.

The Sweet Science: Engineering a New Approach to Economic Policy

Economic policy does not follow from economic theory. Instead, policy needs to be drawn from a complicated blend of judgments about ambiguous empirical evidence, normative judgments, and sensibilities that may be framed, but are not determined, by scientific theory. Put another way, economic policy is a blend of engineering and judgment—an "art and craft," not a scientific endeavor that follows from economic theory. Debates about policy are best treated as debates about the art and craft of economics, using a methodology appropriate for an art and craft. Policy debates should not be treated as debates about science, and should not be governed by a methodology more appropriate to science.

Unfortunately, modern economics doesn't treat policy in this way. Instead, it conceives of policy as an applied science, and uses the methodology of science to study policy issues. To some degree, that makes sense. Clearly, one wants evidenced-based, objective analysis of policy. An art and craft methodology uses theory and science whenever it can, meaning to the extent it is appropriate. But
when dealing with the messy issues of policy, an art and craft methodology takes seriously the fact that statistical evidence needs interpretation and that one’s views and analysis are inevitably influenced by one’s normative judgments. An art and craft methodology recognizes that policy is intrinsically entangled and must be dealt with using a methodology designed to guide in such ambiguous, messy, and uncertain situations. To pretend otherwise undermines both the science of economics and economic policy discussions.

Early on, economists struggled with this policy/science divide. Advocates of various policy positions all claimed to have science and theory on their side. They inevitably attacked their opponents for being non-scientific. This struggle led Classical Liberal economists to embrace a methodological tradition that interpreted the science of economics narrowly and created a firewall between scientific pursuits and policy endeavors. This tradition is best found in the policy methodology of Classical Liberals such as John Stuart Mill and his followers. That methodology recognized the messiness of policy compared to the elegance of the theory underlying science.

To deal with that messiness, the policy methodology needed a branch of economics that was free of scientific certainty. One way to handle that problem would be to accept that no part of economics was a science. The second way—the path adopted by Classical Liberals—was to divide economics into different branches—a scientific branch concerned with agreed-upon empirical facts and logical implications of assumptions, in which normative values played as minimal a role as possible, and a policy branch in which values were seen as essential elements of the analysis. The policy branch of economics would use a different methodology than the scientific branch, and its conclusions would not be considered scientific conclusions.

Since our goal in this book is to talk about the methodology appropriate for applied policy, we do not distinguish between the "economics is not a science" and the "economic policy branch of economics is not a science" alternatives. The reason is that our interest is in applied policy, not the science of economics. We interpret the "no economic science" alternative, such as that proposed by some philosophers, for example, Hillary Putnam (2002) or Alexander Rosenberg (Rosenberg 1992), as being included in the Classical "separate branch" alternative. The "no economic science" alternative simply makes the further assumption that the science branch of economics is empty, an assumption we do not accept. But for our purposes these come to the same conclusion since, if there is no part of economics that is a science, then the applied policy branch of economics will not be guided by scientific methodology. If one believes, as Putnam and Rosenberg believe, that no part of economics is a science, it does not change our argument that applied policy should not be thought of as applied science—it strengthens it, since if there is no economic science, our argument—that applied policy economics should not be seen as applied science—becomes tautologically true.

Most classical economists accepted that there was a scientific branch of economics. But they also believed that policy did not follow from scientific theory, and they built that belief into their applied policy methodology. By doing so, Classical Liberalism sought to discourage the conflicting advocates of any policy issue from claiming the authority of scientific justification. Only a powerful firewall between theory and policy could accomplish that. For John Stuart Mill, policy was not based on science, and science did not concern policy. Instead, science was about a search for the truth. In pursuit of that truth, in order to see the scientific truth more clearly, one should ideally harbor no policy considerations whatsoever. Since that was practically impossible, one should attempt to guard, as much as possible, against a tendency to claim too much from science. Policy construction was meant to be about the search for answers to specific policy questions. That search required one to go far beyond the limits imposed by science. The
The Abandonment of Classical Liberal Methodology

In the 1930s, the economics profession began to abandon the policy methodology of Classical Liberalism by removing the firewall between economic science and policy. This book is an exploration of that abandonment and a call for the profession to return to a more Classical Liberal methodology in policy matters. In our consideration of the abandonment of Classical Liberal methodology, we use the University of Chicago as a case study of this largely postwar phenomenon. We focus on Chicago, not because of the political inclinations or ideological leanings that characterized Chicago in this era, nor because Chicago was unique in abandoning this Classical firewall separating scientific theory from policy. Instead, we choose it because the stalwarts of the postwar Chicago School actually imagined themselves to be, and were seen by most economists as being, defenders of Classical Liberalism. In our view, the Chicago School failed to defend what was important in Classical Liberalism, namely its art and craft policy methodology.

The Chicago School was intent instead on maintaining a narrow interpretation of a laissez-faire policy precept. Chicago adopted a viewpoint which insisted that economic science effectively underpinned the conclusion that the market is capable of solving its own problems. Consequently, government policy interventions should be strongly discouraged. There were two problems with this. The first is that, in Classical Liberal thought, no policy precept followed directly from economic science. In this regard, the Chicago School failed to adhere to that Classical Liberal position. The second issue was the failure to recognize that the laissez-faire policy precept of Classical Liberalism was far more ambiguous than its Chicago interpretation. The Classical laissez-faire understanding could be held by economists with a wide disparity of views of government policy, ranging from John Maynard Keynes’s policy activism to Frederick von Hayek’s pro-market policy. Moreover, because it was a policy precept, it could change over time, as the problems faced by society changed, as sensibilities changed, and as government structures in turn changed. It was not for economic scientists to settle this debate about policy since the issues debated were, to a large extent, non-economic.

What we are saying is that at the core of Classical Liberalism was a methodology that required separating out, as much as possible, one’s consideration of scientific research from one’s policy views. One could, and inevitably would, hold ideological and policy views, but, using a Classical Liberal methodology, debates about such matters were best separated from debates about science. As the economics profession progressively abandoned Classical Liberal policy views in a process extending from the 1930s to the 1960s, they simultaneously abandoned the corresponding methodological approach to policy.

The abandonment of these methodological views started with the development and acceptance of what would come to be called welfare economics. Welfare economics provided a formal scientific economic framework for thinking about policy. That framework proved extremely useful in shedding light on many policy questions and incorporating...
insights from economic thinking. The problem of coordinating responses to scarcity could be captured in a mathematical general equilibrium model and applied to a wide variety of situations. The power of this mathematical model was recognized by the profession, and it became central to the teaching of economics. It was subsequently supplemented by empirical work applying the theory, which could be carried out more rigorously due to developments in statistical analysis. These advances led many economists to believe that economics had become engaged in a series of scientific breakthroughs that would rescue economics from what many considered to be the realm of pseudoscience. Instead, the discipline would be invested with the much more welcomed foundation of formal science.

The general equilibrium model framed policy within a mathematical optimal control structure. The model implicitly assumed that a perfectly competitive market would optimally organize economies in most situations, but that government intervention would be needed to correct for market failures, such as externalities. This approach resulted in what was considered a scientifically based policy conclusion implying some need for government intervention if an economy was to run smoothly. The theory proceeded to develop formal marginal conditions that were capable of guiding policy makers. Laissez-faire was correspondingly non-optimal.

This welfare economics policy framework caught on like wildfire. Since the best way to understand the framework was to understand the mathematical structure of the general equilibrium system, adopting this framework changed the way economics was taught. Students were taught more math and statistics and less moral philosophy and institutional insights. With that change in place, the general equilibrium welfare policy framework eliminated the previously acknowledged firewall. What was considered scientific economic theory was connected directly to policy.

The change to a mathematical general equilibrium welfare economics framework occurred throughout the profession. It started slowly, but resistance decreased as new mathematically and statistically trained economists replaced those trained in the broader Classical Liberal discursive tradition. The art of policy was lost, and the craft of policy became synonymous with scientific theory. The policy/science firewall was fundamentally violated by this change.

Classical Liberals objected, arguing that thinking about policy in too rigid a mathematical fashion eliminated all types of issues that were important components of the policy debate. The general equilibrium model wasn’t wrong, but it wasn’t "the" sole economic model that should be employed. It was a model based on assumptions that for some issues was useful, but for others was not. Different assumptions could lead to different results. The problem with the model was that it didn’t appropriately capture many of the debatable issues relevant to policy, and thus inappropriately limited the scope of policy discussion. Those objections were vigorous at first, and then tended to fade away. Economists advancing those arguments were attacked as being old-fashioned and unscientific. They were dismissed as lacking mathematical knowledge and skills. This change in methodology occurred throughout the English-speaking economics profession, but was led by economists at LSE (Hicks and Lerner), Cambridge (Pigou), as well as Harvard and MIT (Samuelson).

The Chicago Response

The incipient Chicago School (George Stigler, Milton Friedman, Aaron Director, and their associated colleagues) objected to the development of this general equilibrium welfare frame as a basis for policy. They saw it as a rejection of Classical precepts guiding both microeconomic and macroeconomic policy. Particular ire was directed at what they viewed as the malignant travesty encapsulated by the developing Keynesian (collective) policy. These Chicago economists insisted that the Keynesian model was a Trojan horse being used to advance statist ideology and collectivist ideas. They chose, however, not to argue in favor of Classical Liberal
methodology. Nor did they reject the implicit contention that policy must follow from mathematically rigorous models. Instead, they responded to this challenge by developing an alternative "scientific" pathway that would lead to the desired laissez-faire policy precept. Specifically, they developed an alternative model demonstrating that the types of government intervention supported by the welfare economic framework, as well as the Keynesian macro framework, were fundamentally flawed theories. In their alternative scientific model, an economy would work best when left to its own devices.

Because of their impressive rhetorical and intuitive marketing skills, the Chicago economists eventually managed to engineer a successful partial counterrevolution against this general equilibrium welfare economics framework. But, in engineering that counterrevolution to save the Classical Liberal policy precept of laissez-faire, they abandoned the most essential part of Classical Liberalism—its methodological foundations. In doing so they, like the advocates of the general equilibrium welfare policy framework, abandoned the Classical Liberal firewall that had previously separated science from policy. Once they accepted that policy necessarily followed from a scientific model, the economic policy debate became inextricably focused on whose science was correct. The bone of contention no longer survived as a debate focused on judgments and sensibilities, which is where Classical Liberal methodology placed it. Serious discussion concerning the subtleties and judgments underlying these differing views became impossible. Each side characterized the other as ideology masquerading as science. These pointed accusations were precisely the type of futile debate that the Classical Liberal firewall had been designed to avoid.

Our concern in this book is not focused on which policy view is correct. Instead, our interest lies in the manner in which the debate about those policy views should be conducted. Should it be primarily a debate about science, formal models, and statistical tests of empirical evidence? Or should it be primarily a debate about sensibilities and judgments that are informed, but not determined, by science? Our argument is that Classical Liberal support for the market was a precept upon which good economists could disagree. It was not a fundamental conclusion based on economic science. Although science and theory can provide some guidance about policy, resolution of such debates is not to be found in theory, but rather in vigorous "argumentation for the sake of heaven," a term that designates a process of cordial argumentation that attempts to seek out the best estimate of truth that is possible. It is not argumentation that focuses primarily on winning policy debates.

Had the fight been about Classical Liberal methodology, not policy, the battle lines would have been drawn quite differently. For example, in terms of policy, the Chicago School vehemently opposed John Maynard Keynes. But in terms of methodology alone, Keynes was an ally of Classical Liberalism. Throughout his career he steadfastly stayed within the Classical Liberal methodological tradition. He questioned mathematical models, econometric models, and tended to use discursive arguments to make his key points. While in terms of specific policies, Frank Knight, a guiding light of Chicago in the 1930s, was often diametrically (and vehemently) opposed to Keynes, methodologically Knight had much more in common with Keynes than he did with either Samuelson or Arrow (or Friedman for that matter). That methodological connection between Keynes and Knight was lost when policy (and ideological) fidelity trumped methodological fidelity as the litmus test for Classical Liberalism. By surrendering Classical Liberal methodology, the economics profession steered the policy debate to its current sterile state. <>

Monopoly Power and Competition: The Italian Marginalist Perspective by Manuela Mosca
[Edward Elgar Publishing, 9781781003701]

This defining and original book explores the history of monopoly power and of its relation to competition, focusing on the innovative contributions
of the Italian Marginalists’ Pareto, Pantaleoni, De Viti de Marco and Barone.

Manuela Mosca analyses their articulate vision of competition, and the structural and strategic entry barriers considered in their works to enrich existing literature on the history of the sources of market power. The book is not limited to the reconstruction of the elaboration of pure theory, it also highlights its policy implications and how this group applied their theories as cutting-edge experiments in analysing the labour market, socialism, the Great War and gender issues, against the background of the political situation of the period.

Monopoly Power and Competition is a vital resource for historians of economic thought, as it explores a relatively untouched area of microeconomics in historical perspective, and reveals the theories surrounding monopoly power and competition. Microeconomists and industrial organisation scholars would similarly benefit from the knowledge of the origins of many microeconomic tools and notions.

Critical Appraisal
Monopoly Power and Competition: The Italian Marginalist Perspective provides the English-language reader a fulsome historical account of the social circumstances that embodies the Italian Marginalists’ Pareto, Pantaleoni, De Viti de Marco and Barone understanding of the implications competition and monopoly in late 19th and early 20th century thought. Too often these thinkers have been isolated from their living cultural context in English appraisals of their work.

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Excerpt: According to modern economics, market power (or monopoly power) is ‘the ability of firms to influence the price of the product or products they sell’. But what’s the history of this idea? How have the economists of the past explained monopoly power? And what role has this concept played in economic interventionism? I first encountered this question many years ago (Mosca 1998) when studying the work of the engineer-economist Jules Dupuit, who had clearly described some of the causes of market power, apart from the institutional ones. It made me wonder where I could find a history of ideas on the sources of monopoly power and, as I will explain in Chapter 1, it turned out that this history coincides with the theory of barriers to entry.

Histories of thought that focus on entry barriers, however, go no further back than Bain (1956), even though models of monopoly and duopoly date back at least to Cournot (1838). Quite apart from the use of models, the question of the sources of market power has existed in economic theory from the very beginning. I myself found a treatise on it in the writings of Dupuit. Anti-monopoly policies, too, go back at least to the end of the nineteenth century: wasn’t it the monopoly power of firms that such policies were designed to counteract? There must therefore have been some historical research focusing on this theme in the great amount of literature dealing with these policies. What emerged, instead, was a gap in the historiography. I was puzzled as to why there were no studies about the history of a category that certainly did not appear out of the blue with Bain in 1956, and I decided it was worthwhile starting to write one. Dealing with the question of monopoly power made it unavoidable to deal also with competition, which is widely studied in the secondary literature. The first aim of this book is therefore to attempt to reconstruct from a historical
perspective the theory of market power and the relationship it has with the theory of competition.

The reason for the choice of four Italian marginalists (Pareto, Pantaleoni, De Viti de Marco and Barone) will be thoroughly explained in the first chapter, while their links and influences will be highlighted in the other chapters. I will argue that these economists should be considered by historiography as a close-knit group constituting Italian marginalism. That is the second aim of this book. I should first clarify why I call these Italian economists 'marginalise and not 'neoclassical'. In fact, all four belong to the era of the construction of the neoclassical paradigm, being part of the generation following that of the first marginalists. Nevertheless, calling them simply neoclassical would be even less effective for placing them in their period with any degree of precision, because the term neoclassical is still used today to classify microeconomists. It would perhaps be more exact to call them founders of the neoclassical paradigm, or early neoclassical economists. But I will call them marginalists, since the word marginalism was coined in order 'to cover the acceptance by economists of both marginal utility and marginal productivity', and, as we know, the latter concept was incorporated into economic theory not by the first generation of marginalists, but by the one we are studying here. In this decision on terminology I also have the support of those who feel the term neoclassical is not at all appropriate to describe the marginalist theory.

Deciding the angle to adopt for a research study on the history of thought is always complex; I followed the criterion of placing importance on what was relevant for the economists examined. I started from a sound basis of history of analysis; that is, from their 'pure economics': the third aim of this book is precisely to expand the existing awareness of how extraordinarily rich and innovative their theoretical contribution was. However, I will not limit my analysis to the reconstruction and interpretation of abstract theories; but will also treat the ideal and political value conveyed by these theories as an integral part of the study, along with the hoped-for effects they were intended to achieve. As we shall see, in the specific case of the four economists at the centre of this research, these external aspects were not only present, but also pervasive and often dominant. The fourth aim of this work is therefore to make an in-depth reconstruction of the historical and political context in which their theories were generated, also focusing on the way they have been applied. This corresponds to my belief that reconstructing exclusively internal history could give the impression that these four economists wrote only for the sake of the advancement of economic analysis: a purely rational reconstruction in fact conceals the motives behind the formulation of the theory, although its normative implications may give some pointers. It is only a well-contextualised approach that enables us to know the aims those theories sought to achieve, and that also provides a key to understanding theoretical passages that are difficult to interpret.

I wrote this book with the impossible desire to be judged by the authors I've dealt with, and with the illusion of hearing them say I've given a faithful reconstruction of their thought. This book is for historians of economic thought, of economic analysis and of economic policy, for industrial economists, microeconomists, economic historians, and historians in general.

Plan of the Book
Chapter 1 sets the research field and explains the motivations. Chapter 2 deals with the theory of competition in the work of the four identified Italian marginalists. Chapter 3 is devoted to their ideas on monopoly power. Chapter 4 examines the application of these theories and ideas to various aspects of reality. Chapter 5 analyses their vision of the state and of economic policies. The last chapter then offers some concluding thoughts on the results that have emerged from our enquiry.

The sources of monopoly power in the history of economic thought
When was the notion of market power defined? And how has it been explained in the history of
In this chapter, we distinguish four different fields of enquiry in which to seek a history of ideas on the causes of market power. The first concerns the history of the formal models of profit maximisation in imperfectly competitive markets; the second, competition policies in a historical perspective; the third, the theory of competition in economic thought; and the fourth, the development of the notion of entry barriers. This chapter is of a historiographical character and places this book within the existing panorama of the secondary literature. Moreover, it has been written in the conviction that in the study of economic thought one cannot restrict oneself to simply narrating a history, one must also have some very good reasons for doing so.

The universal force of competition

Begins by checking whether the hypothesis put forward in Chapter 1, that marginalist ideas co-existed with classical theory in the thought of the economists of this period, can also be applied to the Italians. We will start from the thought of the classical period. We will then examine opinions on method that are important in our economists’ conception of competition. In the central section, we will give a critical re-reading of the Italian marginalists’ writings, interpreting the way they dealt with competition.

As we have already said, competition and monopoly power are antithetical only if competition is perfect. It is therefore necessary to clarify how the question will be divided up between this chapter and the next. In the first part of this chapter we will examine the elaboration of the theory of perfect competition. In this vision, the absence of monopoly power is clear from the very conditions hypothesised in order to ensure the instantaneous convergence to the perfectly competitive equilibrium. In the second part, we will deal with the ‘dynamic’ theory of competition in which monopoly power is temporary, that is: the transition of the economy once equilibrium is disturbed; the path of dynamic adjustment toward equilibrium after the introduction of an innovation; the case of competition without equilibrium, where the process of competition does not terminate in an equilibrium state, and where market power is not incompatible with competition. Under the expression ‘dynamic competition’ we also include stability analysis, innovation-imitation, disequilibrium, strategic behaviour, and selection.’ The latter was debated heavily in those years, for instance in the form of social Darwinism, as we shall see in the rest of the book. After an analysis of static and dynamic efficiency we will draw our conclusions.

Monopoly power: competition is never perfect

At this point in our reconstruction it is easy to grasp the sense of what Barone writes, specifically addressing the case of competition: ‘in the real world we are dealing with provisional equilibria, not with definitive equilibria — we would say dynamic, not static, — competition is never perfect’. It is therefore time to ask ourselves how these four economists dealt with this world of ‘never perfect’ competition. As we have already explained in Chapter 1, this book does not deal with formal models of imperfectly competitive markets. Rather, it analyses the sources of market power examined by the Italian marginalists through an investigation of the kind of non-institutional entry barriers they took into account. After showing how important the issue of monopoly power was felt to be in Italy, and how significant it was also for our economists, we will look at their awareness of the different market structures. We will then examine the structural and strategic barriers to entry discoverable in their works; lastly, we will make some concluding comments.

Monopoly power, competition and reality

After focusing in the previous chapters on our marginalists’ theoretical identity, we will now concentrate on their equally authentic nature as applied economists. As we shall see, this shift from abstract analysis to real-world issues is indispensable if we are properly to grasp the essence of their ideas, including those on pure economics. In this chapter, we will look at some of
the historical events of the age, linking them to the development of our economists’ thought and to their efforts to understand how reality works. We will show that they saw their analysis as serving to explain phenomena also outside the boundaries of the economic realm. We will then see what operative importance they attributed to their theories on competition and monopoly power; and examine some of the practical situations in which they used them. The cases we will analyse here are not only economic, but also social and political. They are: gender issues, the labour market, socialism, and the Great War. We will scrutinise their writings in search of the relationship between theory and applications, following up on these various leads. Firstly, however, we wish to point out that in this chapter we will at times use the notions of competition and monopoly power in a broader sense than in the previous chapters, since here we are also examining issues that are not strictly economic. Finally, let us clarify that we are not dealing here with their vision of the state and economic policy, which will be the subject of Chapter 5.

The concept of the state and economic policy
As we said in the first chapter, our four economists were all very involved in politics. One of the main commitments of their life was the fight against corruption and the harmful connections between industrial groups and politics; to give just one of the many examples, in 1892 Pantaleoni and De Viti de Marco together brought to light a huge banking scandal in which the Italian government was implicated.

After examining in the previous chapter the extent to which their interest in the issue of monopoly power and competition was aroused by the reality of the time, we will now try to understand the extent to which it affected that reality. To do so, we will first study the way these two notions made up the theoretical foundation of their concept of the state; then, on the basis of this conception, we will look at their proposals for economic policy.

The subject under examination will therefore be the state, the role of which in their lifetime underwent a profound change, explained by the four economists with reference to, among other things, the great development of industry, public utilities and means of communication. On this, Barone wrote that ‘in the 19th century especially in the second half’ there was a real increase in public spending due to the ‘great public works, deriving from the application of steam and later of electricity to the means of communication, in the broad sense’. Regarding Italy specifically, economic historians tell us that from 1900 to 1913 there was ‘an intervention of the state against the dominant positions in crucial sectors and markets: telephones, maritime services, insurance, railways’, and that this intervention was carried out by opposing ‘the power of the state, public monopoly’ to private monopolies. Italy’s fin-de-siècle crisis was interpreted by all of them as being a result of its statism and protectionism but, as we shall see, in the subsequent political turmoil, which culminated in the advent of fascism, their positions differed greatly. <>

German Political Thought and the Discourse of Platonism: Finding the Way Out of the Cave by Paul Bishop [Palgrave Macmiian, 9783030045098]

Taking Plato’s allegory of the cave as its starting-point, this book demonstrates how later European thinkers can be read as a reaction and a response to key aspects of this allegory and its discourse of enchainment and liberation. Focusing on key thinkers in the tradition of European (and specifically German) political thought including Kant, Marx, Hegel, Nietzsche, Heidegger, and the Frankfurt School, it relates them back to such foundational figures as Rousseau, Aristotle, and in particular Plato. All these thinkers are considered in relation to key passages from their major works, accompanied by an explanatory commentary which seeks to follow a conceptual and imagistic thread through the labyrinth of these complex, yet fascinating, texts. This book will appeal in particular to scholars of political theory, philosophy, and German language and culture.
Excerpt: While the central theme of this volume may at first sight appear obscure, or even quirky, this book has been written in the conviction that it is neither of these things (however inadequate its treatment in the following pages may be) but in fact of major significance. For we live in a time when the focus on all things German—the enduring successfulness of the German economy, the role of German economic policy in determining the fate of the euro zone, the German response to the refugee crisis—keeps growing by the day. On 25 July 2014 the magazine Newsweek placed on its title cover the following slogan: "Spot a problem. Analyse it. Solve it. Welcome to the German Century," while inside Rose Jacobs wrote a story entitled "On Top of the World: This Could Be the Start of a Century of German Success." In an article published in the Financial Times on 20 June 2015, Simon Kuper argued that "we need German thinking." And on 24 September 2015 Time magazine named Angela Merkel not just "Person of the Year" but also "Chancellor of the Free World." Even those who criticize Germany recognize its importance; witness the cover of the New Statesman of 25 June 2012 which depicted Merkel as a Terminator and described her as "Europe's most dangerous leader." Since the election of President Trump, Merkel has come to be seen—despite domestic political problems—as more important than ever.

At the same time, this significance of the Germans is not something to be taken for granted: as became clear when putting together a book proposal for this title. According to one commissioning editor for a major university press, the subject of German Political Thought was going to be "too niche" for her list. Evidently, I disagree with this conclusion. To borrow a phrase from one of the articles mentioned above, we need to understand German thinking (which does not exclude us from understanding how other people, such as the French, also think...). And a point of entry into the tradition of German Political Thought is one that is by no means foreign to us, for it can be found in the discourse of Platonism.

After all, there has long been a culture of engagement with the discourse of Platonism in the English-speaking world, even if this engagement has, in more recent times, become attenuated. In the middle of the seventeenth century, a group of philosophers and theologians, known as the Cambridge Platonists because of their connections with the University of Cambridge, revived interest in the philosophical discourse of Platonism. Among the Cambridge Platonists were such figures as Ralph Cudworth (1617-1688), the author of a study originally planned in three volumes, entitled The True Intellectual System of the Universe (1678; 3 vols, 1845), and Henry More (1614-1687), the author of (among many other works) a Manual of Ethics (1666), the Divine Dialogues (1668), and a Manual of Metaphysics (1671). Other members of this group of thinkers were Benjamin Whichcote (1609-1683), John Smith (1618-1652), Peter Sterry (1613-1672), Nathaniel Culverwell (1619-1651), John Worthington (1618-1671), as well as Viscountess (Anne) Conway (1631-1679), George Rust (d. 1670), and John Norris (1657-1711).

In the eighteenth century, the London-born scholar Thomas Taylor (1758-1835) undertook an extensive programme of translating Platonic and Neoplatonic works. Taylor composed for himself the
following motto: "No servile scribe am I, nor e'er shall be, / My sire is Mind, whose sons are always free," and his epitaph (again, written by himself) expresses the resilience of attitude with which he went to his grave: "Health, strength, and ease, and manhood's active age, / Freely I gave to Plato's sacred page. / With Truth's pure joys, with Fame my days were crown'd / Tho' Fortune adverse on my labours frown'd." As these lines hint, Taylor's life, personally as professionally, was not an easy one; yet, although he was mocked in his day and excluded from the academic establishment, and although the accuracy of his work has been questioned (but also defended), he proved to be instrumental in cultivating and nurturing an interest in the discourse of Platonism among such British writers as William Blake (1757-1827), Percy Bysshe Shelley (1792-1822), and William Wordsworth (1770-1850), as well as among such American Transcendentalist thinkers as Ralph Waldo Emerson (1803-1882), Amos Bronson Alcott (1799-1888), and G.R.S. Mead (1863-1933), that last of whom was to become the secretary to Helena Blavatsky (1831-1891), the founder of the Theosophical Society. Taylor was, in the phrase (borrowed from Empedocles) that has been applied to him, "an exile from the orb of light," but he helped carry the light of Platonism into the modern world.

Over and above the specific Platonic context of Idealism, the nineteenth century saw the establishment of a philosophical movement known as British Idealism, whose influence lasted into the twentieth century. Among the figures in the first generation of this movement were TH. Green (1836-1882), F.H. Bradley (1846-1924), and Bernard Bosanquet (1848-1923), while a second wave of thinkers including J.M.E. McTaggart (1866-1925), H.H. Joachim (1868-1938), John Henry Muirhead (1855-1940), and RG. Collingwood (1889-1943) carried it forward. Its last exponent was the philosopher Geoffrey Reginald Gilchrist Mure (1893-1979), whose career included serving as Warden of Merton College and as Pro-Vice Chancellor of the University of Oxford.

There is a specifically Scottish (and even Glaswegian) dimension to this revival of interest in Idealism. This dimension is embodied in such figures as Edward Caird (1835-1908), who held the Chair of Moral Philosophy at Glasgow, Alfred Edward Taylor (1869-1945), who held chairs in Moral Philosophy at the University of St. Andrews (1908-1924) and then at the University of Edinburgh (1924-1941), and James Hutchison Stirling (1820-1909), the author of a major work on Hegelian philosophy called The Secret of Hegel (1865), a book whose "rather terse translations of the Logic, with commentary in the style of [Thomas] Carlyle," made it "almost as impenetrable as Hegel himself." So it would be wrong to think of the Idealist tradition as having died away in the course of time and having nothing to say to us today: the work of Terry Pinkard has helped clarify "the legacy of Idealism" for modern philosophy, and a volume co-written by Jeremy Dunham, Iain Hamilton Grant, and Sean Watson argues persuasively for the Idealism as "a rich and untapped resource for contemporary philosophical arguments and concepts."

As this title of James Hutchison Stirling's book—The Secret of Hegel—suggests, British Idealism was more influenced by German Idealism in general and Hegel in particular than it was by the discourse of Platonism. Yet rather than examining the links between German and British Idealism, this study aims to uncover another tradition within German Thought itself—the discourse of Platonism. By this, I do not mean Platonism in the strict sense that it acquired specific German forms (as will be analysed by the contributions to the Brill Companion volume being assembled by Alan Kim), and could thus be described as "German Platonism." Rather, we are using the discourse of Platonism to refer to a leitmotif that can serve as an Ariadne's thread through a complex labyrinth of political-theoretical texts, mainly (although, as we shall see, not entirely exclusively) Written in German.

This book has arisen from a course offered to undergraduate students, and it seeks to offer the
conclusions, arrived at while teaching it, to a wider audience. It does so, out of a sense there we still need to engage with both traditions: with the discourse of Platonism and with the problem of how—in terms of the famous allegory in book 7 of the Republic—we are to find our way out of the cave; and with the tradition of German Political Thought as a whole. The response of my students to this basic proposition has encouraged me to write this book as a summary of what, in our lectures and seminars, we have discovered together.

When going through the course approval process to introduce the course, its aim and outcomes were sent for comment to an external academic consultant. To my surprise, this senior academic suggested that there would be no use to students of business in studying the figures now discussed in this book: among whom are Marx, the Frankfurt School, and Habermas. Can it really be the case that these figures have nothing to say to us? (Now it is true that, outside the arts and humanities seminar room, Marx has largely been regarded as having an ever decreasing explanatory value. Yet in May 2013, the former Greek Finance Minister Yanis Varoufakis, in his address to the 6th Subversive Festival in Zagreb, explained why he believes Marx must "remain central to our analysis of capitalism," even if he insisted "we should remain `erratic' in our Marxism.") Later on, the same academic consultant also queried the use of the term "the good life," apparently without realizing that this term, originally associated with Aristotle, has remained a philosophical constant for centuries—indeed, millennia. Have we, even or precisely at the highest levels of our educational system, become deaf to one of the key ideals of ancient Greek philosophy as well as to the insights of German Political Thought alike?

So while the idea of intellectual continuity has fallen out of fashion in the rush to embrace postmodernism, the notion of a persistence of discourse offers a way in which to reappraise a tradition which brings together some of the most fascinating philosophical and political theoretical texts ever written. How to approach them remains a challenge for the reader in the twenty-first century, coming to them as she or he will with all the distractions of the (social) media—driven (post)modern world. Yet given the importance of Germany for our current time, in a century which—if Newsweek is right—will belong to Germany, then it is not an idle exercise to try and understand the intellectual tradition of political thought that emanates from this country. To understand the Germans, we need to begin with the Greeks—and we shall have to mention the French (or, at least, the Swiss) as well ....

The choice of texts discussed in this volume has been hugely influenced by the selection made by the German philosopher Norbert Hoerster in a collection which became a classic of its kind, an anthology of political philosophical texts extracted from works by Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, Augustine, and Thomas Aquinas; by Machiavelli, Hobbes, and Locke; by Hume, Montesquieu, Rousseau, and Kant; by Hegel, Marx & Engels, and J.S. Mill. Hoerster (b. 1937) taught philosophy of law and social philosophy at the University of Mainz, holding the Chair of Law and Social Philosophy until his retirement in 1998. Although he has become perhaps best known for his controversial views on bioethics and his strong defence of humanism, Hoerster became a name familiar to many German students of philosophy, and in this collection he achieved a powerful pedagogical tool that deserves to be better known in the English-speaking world. <>

The Oxford Handbook of European Legal History edited by Heikki Pihlajamaki, Markus D. Dubber, Mark Godfrey [Oxford Handbooks, Oxford University Press, 9780198785521]

European law, including both civil law and common law, has gone through several major phases of expansion in the world. European legal history thus also is a history of legal transplants and cultural borrowings, which national legal histories as products of nineteenth-century historicism until have recently largely left unconsidered. The Handbook of European Legal History supplies its readers with
an overview of the different phases of European legal history in the light of today’s state-of-the-art research, by offering cutting-edge views on research questions currently emerging in international discussions.

The Oxford Handbook of European Legal History takes a broad approach to its subject matter both nationally and systemically. Unlike traditional European legal histories, which tend to concentrate on "heartlands" of Europe (notably Italy and Germany), the Europe of the Handbook is more versatile and nuanced, taking into consideration the legal developments in Europe’s geographical "fringes", such as Scandinavia and Eastern Europe. The Oxford Handbook of European Legal History covers all major time periods, from the ancient Greek law to the twenty-first century. Contributors include acknowledged leaders in the field as well as rising talents, representing a wide range of legal systems, methodologies, areas of expertise and research agendas.

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Excerpt: The editors started this work with the conviction that the concept of European legal history needed updating. As several of the contributions to this volume show, European legal history is essentially a product of the twentieth century and closely entangled with the political history of the Continent. The iconic manifestations of early European legal history include works such as Paul Koschaker’s Europa und das Römische Recht (1947), Francesco Calasso’s Introduzione al diritto comune (1951), and Franz Wieacker’s Privatrechtsgeschichte der Neuzeit (1952). Their conception of European legal history as the history of the European heartland has come to form the essence of European legal history in course books and standard classroom teaching everywhere.

However, we no longer live in the post-Second World War period, when the still prevalent conception of European legal history emerged. As decades have passed, the limitations of this approach have become clear. The traditional European legal histories, built largely around the concept of ius commune, tend to omit large areas of Europe, such as Scandinavia and eastern Europe, where ius commune exerted less influence. These peripheral areas were absent from the dominant narrative of European legal history. English common law made occasional appearances, but mainly as an exotic contrast to continental law.

Similarly, European law has been the law of geographic Europe only. As the chapters of this Handbook show, ancient Roman law owed much to the Near Eastern legal orders. Later on, from the fifteenth century onwards, the major European legal orders gradually spread to all continents.
Indeed, most of the globalization of law has taken place by way of European legal systems turning global.

Finally, the shift from national legal histories to comparative methods has profoundly affected the way we understand legal transformation at the local, national, regional, European, and global level. Legal historians see legal change in terms of the continuous flow and exchange of influences, which take place within complicated combinations of cultural, political, and social networks.

The present Handbook captures this revised conception of European legal history; it not merely reflects the state of the discipline, but also aims to shape it. The Handbook consists of forty-eight chapters in six parts. Part I starts with an assessment of the world historical significance of European legal history and then takes us through some of the central historiography in the field, from national to European and global approaches. Part II follows with a presentation of ancient and early medieval legal systems; Part III shifts to the Middle Ages. Combining a chronological approach with sufficient geographical and substantial coverage proved challenging. Whereas Parts II and III mostly follow a geographical logic, Part IV considers some of the major fields of law in the early modern period. Part V again takes a geographical approach, but this time from the point of view of the early modern territorial expansion of European law—both inside and outside Europe. Part VI tells the story of the nineteenth-century modernization of European law, and then shifts to the darker legacies of the twentieth century. This Part, and the Handbook, end with a chapter on the law of the European Union.

In the end, whilst this volume aims to update the concept of European legal history, it also reflects a discipline already in the process of updating itself. We may have done no more, and no less, than present some of the multifaceted ways in which European legal history has begun to find its place within global legal history.


When President Barack Obama announced the assassination of Osama bin Laden, many Americans hoped the killing of al-Qaida’s leader would sound the death knell for the organization. Since 9/11, killing and capturing terrorist leaders has been a central element in U.S. counterterrorism strategy. This practice, known as leadership decapitation, is based on the logic that removing key figures will disrupt the organization and contribute to its ultimate failure. Yet many scholars have argued that targeted killings are ineffective or counterproductive, questioning whether taking out a terror network’s leaders causes more problems than it solves.

In Targeting Top Terrorists, Bryan C. Price offers a rich, data-driven examination of leadership decapitation tactics, providing theoretical and empirical explanations of the conditions under which they can be successful. Analyzing hundreds of cases of leadership turnover from over two hundred terrorist groups, Price demonstrates that although the tactic may result in short-term negative side effects, the loss of top leaders significantly reduces terror groups’ life spans. He explains vital questions such as: What factors make some terrorist groups more vulnerable than others? Is it better to kill or capture terrorist leaders? How does leadership decapitation compare to other counterterrorism options? With compelling evidence based on an original dataset along with an in-depth case study of Hamas, Targeting Top Terrorists contributes to scholarship on terrorism and organizational theory and provides insights for policy makers and practitioners on some of the most pressing debates in the field.

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Excerpt: I focus on terrorist groups and their leaders. Terrorist leaders are different from their followers in many ways, and this difference has important implications for the effectiveness of decapitation strategies.

I also introduce the literature on leadership succession and show how it applies to our understanding of terrorist organizations. Finally, I explain why group duration should be an important dependent variable in evaluating counterterrorism policy, and I then present hypotheses to be tested in the next chapter.

I focus on group duration for several reasons. First, I believe it is an important and understudied dependent variable. Although the conventional wisdom in the field suggests that 90 percent of all terrorist groups last less than a year and the remaining 10 percent last less than a decade, few studies have actually used empirical evidence to support such claims. In fact, Rapoport’s untested assertion became the conventional wisdom, when it really should never have been treated as a research finding in the first place. I explain why in chapter 4.

Second, since recent U.S. national security strategies specifically identify disrupting and destroying terrorist groups as a primary goal in U.S. counterterrorism efforts, group duration is important because it has been argued that "terrorism is rarely abandoned as long as the organization using it continues to exist." Although some academics and policymakers promote strategies aimed at taming terrorist groups and rehabilitating them into becoming legitimate organizations by entering the political process, U.S. counterterrorism strategy, while recognizing the need to address the political grievances that contribute to terrorism, unmistakably adopts an offensive focus. The 2006 NSCT explicitly states that "the fight must be taken to the enemy, to keep them on the run." Additionally, the United States has traditionally promoted a tough stance of not negotiating with groups that resort to terrorism. Terrorist groups like Hamas that have entered state politics as legitimate actors have not stopped using terrorism as a tactic, even after winning a majority of parliamentary seats in several elections. If states had to rank-order their most preferred outcome when it comes to terrorist organizations that threaten the security of the state, I believe policymakers would rank destruction of the group over rehabilitating them, as rehabilitation would most likely be a long and uncertain process in almost every case. Third, studying terrorist group duration is important because once groups have conducted terrorist acts, "psychological pressures and organizational politics are likely to encourage the continuation of violence even if it becomes counterproductive in an instrumental sense." Even if a terrorist group remains intact yet renounces terrorism, however, the skills and knowledge it acquired to function clandestinely are well adapted to performing other illicit activities, such as drug trafficking, diamond smuggling, or kidnapping for ransom. The Shining Path’s past activity in the Peruvian drug trade serves as one of several examples of groups using their clandestine experience for purposes other than political terrorism, and it shows why governments often require complete disarmament and demobilization of the group.

I test the hypotheses generated in chapter 3 in the next chapter by using an original data set that includes 207 terrorist organizations and their leaders from 1970 to 2008 and spans sixty-five countries. I discuss in detail how I collected and coded the data and how this data set is different.
from previous data sets. I also explain the difficulties and shortcomings of data collection in this field and present some descriptive statistics of the groups in my data set. After controlling for a number of organization- and state-level factors, I test these hypotheses using a Cox proportional hazards model to determine whether decapitation events increase or decrease the mortality rate of terrorist organizations. I also explain how other factors affect terrorist group duration, such as the type of method chosen for decapitation (killing versus capturing the leader), the frequency of leadership turnover, the roles played by allied and rival groups, and the difference between removing the organization's founder as opposed to successor leaders.

Finally, to better understand the micro-level processes that occur after leadership decapitation in terrorist groups, I conducted an in-depth case study of Hamas from 1987 to the present day. Hamas represents a "least likely" case that shows the scope and limits of my theory. Despite experiencing several decapitation events, Hamas remains an active group today. Although this could plausibly be seen as a favorite case for critics of decapitation strategies, the Hamas case study provides evidence that shows how decapitation affected the group's willingness to sign cease-fires and its ability to conduct terrorist attacks.

I conclude with a chapter that summarizes the main findings and policy recommendations and also suggests where research in counterterrorism should head in the future, including possible extensions to the methods used in this book as well as new ways to exploit the original data set presented here. In the end, the most important takeaway from this analysis is that leadership decapitation is not a panacea for U.S. counterterrorism. Although it will likely always remain an attractive tool for policymakers because it is domestically popular, enjoys bipartisan support, and provides tangible metrics that the government is actually doing something, it is a controversial tool with substantial disadvantages. My intention with this book is not to champion the tactic of leadership decapitation, but to provide policymakers with more nuanced information about what this tactic means to include voluntary resignations, and those who died from natural causes, car accidents, and plane crashes.

If leadership decapitation is, in fact, a symptom of dysfunctional organizations, and not, as I believe, an event that creates the conditions for organizational decline, then we should expect to find no correlation between leadership removal via these other means and organizational decline. To put it another way, if we believe decapitation is somehow correlated with groups that would have ended any way, then we should find no such correlation with groups whose leaders have died in power because of natural causes and unforeseen accidents. After all, if one assumes that dying of natural causes or dying in a car accident or plane crash is a random event that could happen to any terrorist group leader, then there should be no discernible pattern indicating that these types of groups are more likely to end than other groups. However, I found a positive correlation between group death and leaders who die of natural causes and accidents. Although it is impossible to completely rid any study of omitted variable problems, I believe this is compelling evidence that leadership succession is an important variable in causing organizational decline and is independent of other group characteristics.

The second limitation of this book is somewhat related to the one already detailed. How does one differentiate between cases where a state purposefully crafts and executes an operation aimed solely at killing or capturing a terrorist group leader, such as the carefully planned and executed targeted killing campaign waged by Israel against Hamas and Hezbollah or the U.S. mission to kill or capture Osama bin Laden, and cases where killing or capturing the leader may not even be the primary goal of the operation. Therefore, is it fair to attribute organizational decline to operations in which the leader is killed or captured along with
the majority of the group in a large-scale effort in the same way we would in cases where the leader is assassinated by a sniper’s bullet. Unfortunately, because of issues of data availability, this is a difficult problem to solve in decapitation studies. States have incentives to take credit for any operation that kills or captures a group’s leader and act as though leadership decapitation was the focus of their mission, even if it was really the result of blind luck instead of prior planning. If the state’s military or security forces happen to kill or capture the terrorist group leader in an operation, the state will most likely pretend that the operation was designed from the outset with this objective in mind. Therefore, it is difficult to parcel out the operations that are primarily focused on killing or capturing the group’s leader and those intended simply to destroy the group or its capabilities. In the original data set in this study, a majority of the cases where a leader was killed or captured also involved the killing or capture of other group members, but very few involved catastrophic cases where a majority of the group was killed or captured. Although I do not control for these nuances in coding decapitation events, these limitations are important to consider when evaluating this study and one that I hope future researchers can resolve.

The Bloomsbury Handbook of Literary and Cultural Theory is the most comprehensive available survey of the state of theory in the 21st century. With chapters written by the world’s leading scholars in their field, this book explores the latest thinking in traditional schools such as feminist, Marxist, historicist, psychoanalytic, and postcolonial criticism and new areas of research in ecocriticism, biopolitics, affect studies, posthumanism, materialism, and many other fields.

In addition, the book includes a substantial A-to-Z compendium of key words and important thinkers in contemporary theory, making this an essential resource for scholars of literary and cultural theory at all levels.

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Theory in the New Millennium by Jeffrey R. Di Leo

Theory is stronger now than it ever was in the twentieth century. The reason for this is not
necessarily a deepening or intensification of the work of theory in traditional areas such as literary criticism and critique (though arguments may be made here), but rather a widening or broadening of its reach and domain. This book aims to illustrate this by bringing together original contributions from 230 theorists from across the globe.

Through twenty-seven chapters on topics ranging from theory’s engagement with the ancient world (Chapter 1, Early Theory) to a survey of various efforts to challenge some versions of theory (Chapter 27, Antithentry), a vibrant working portrait of theory in the twenty-first century begins to take shape. While the focus in these chapters is to provide insight into many of the major concerns of twenty-first-century theory and theorists, an effort is also made to acknowledge the shape of twentieth-century theory and earlier for context and inspiration. Chapter contributors were encouraged to not just look backward regarding their topic, but to look forward as well and to entertain the possibilities for theory in the new millennium in their area of concern. They were also asked for a listing of key terms and figures related to their chapter topic. These lists were then culled to form the basis for the three hundred and nine term-and-figure entries that comprise the second half of this book.

Consequently, the three hundred-plus terms and figures in Part 2 of this book complement the chapters in Part 1. The two hundred and fifty-eight entries on some of the key terms utilized by theorists in the new millennium, and the fifty-one entries on central figures in twenty-first-century theory provide a finer grained portrait of theory in the new millennium, one that supplements the chapters in Part 1. Most of the term-and-figure entries though are written by a different group of contributors than those who penned the chapters. These briefer entries provide a gallery of micro-pictures of theory in the new millennium to consider alongside the macro-portraits of the chapters. Together the two halves of this book are in effect two separate galleries of theory. Though about equal in length, they present varying ways to portray theory in the new millennium.

By limiting the word counts on the terms and figures in Part 2, contributors were encouraged to write less encyclopedically and more essayistically. Unlike encyclopedia entries that are intended to give the air of “objectivity,” the term-and-figure entries in this book, where appropriate, reveal openly the interests and concerns of their author—whose name and affiliation is clearly noted after each entry. Moreover, it is no coincidence that many of the term-and-figure contributors are themselves authors of work on this term or figure. And rather than hiding this, they were encouraged to foreground it in either the entry itself or the suggestions for further reading. In addition, each of the term-and-figure entries is generously cross-listed with other entries as well as with the chapters to facilitate a dynamic and open-ended vision of Theory in the new millennium. Tracking remis and figures through their network of associations and affiliations allows one to discover not only the breadth of theory today, but also new possibilities for it.

The possibilities for theory in the new millennium are directly connected more than anything else to its disciplinary shape and identity within the academy. After all, unlike, say, novelists who often are not members of the academy, theorists in the new millennium are more often than not members of the academy (though perhaps less by choice than fiscal necessity). Therefore, it is not unreasonable to consider theory as primarily situated in the academic context of disciplinarity and departments. So, what then is its disciplinary context? Is it narrow like philosophy or broad like interdisciplinary studies? Fortunately, for theory it is more like the latter than the former.

Theory in the new millennium is a multi- and interdisciplinary endeavor that operates within and among the humanities (particularly, history, languages, linguistics, the arts, philosophy, and religion, in addition to literature), the social sciences (including anthropology, ethnic and cultural studies,
economics, political science, psychology, and sociology), and many of the professions (e.g., architecture, business, communication, education, environmental studies, journalism, law, museum studies, media studies, military science, public policy, and sport science, among others). In addition to its now somewhat more standard-fare work in these areas, of which prime examples may be found throughout this book, it has also made some substantial inroads into the natural sciences (e.g., biology, physics, the earth sciences, and the space sciences) and the formal sciences (especially mathematics, computer science, and systems science). To be sure, more disciplines from across the academy have integrated theory into their practice than at any other time in history—and, in many ways, theory today is the id of the disciplines and the engine of interdisciplinary studies. This, of course, is good news for theorists and theory at large.

Moreover, the academic community that engages, supports, and uses theory in the twenty-first century is not only much larger in number than it ever was in the twentieth century, for many the presumed "heyday of theory," it is also, in part as a consequence of its multi- and interdisciplinary reach, more diverse with respect to the objects and subjects of its attention. In addition to traditional objects of theoretical engagement such as literary, philosophical, and artistic texts, many others are now becoming commonplace such as new media, the environment, and even the university itself. But theory has also extended the range of subjects of its attention. In addition to more commonplace ones such as narrative, identity, translation, and rhetoric, subjects such as affect, globalization, biopolitics, political economy, and institutions have emerged as major concerns for theory. Many of these new and emerging objects and subjects of theory are discussed in the chapters, and term-and-figure entries in this book. For that matter, this introduction itself deals with one of the major concerns of theory and theorists today, namely, its institutionalization and place within the academy, which is itself a field of theory.

The popularity and strength of theory in the new millennium is directly related to the fearlessness it engenders in individuals and communities to question the precepts and extend the boundaries of individual disciplines as well as to draw the disciplines into dialogue with each other. In addition, theory's willingness to turn its critical powers toward the problems facing society and the world at large—as well as upon itself—proves to be still another point of attraction. This is why there seems to be nary a subject or object that has not been engaged in some way or another by theory today. To be sure, most everything is fair game for theory—even theory itself.

Still, while more academics than ever before use theory today in their critical practices, only a small percentage of them self-affiliate as "theorists." This is a problem for theory because affiliations confer value and identity on individuals, disciplines, and institutions. They also have a formative role in determining the status and self-image of theory. As such, through the lens of affiliation, the theory community itself is a small one that is getting smaller, particularly as the older generation of theorists change tense. Without the influx of a new generation of theorists, theory appears on the brink of demise. But all here is not as it appears. Part of the explanation of this apparent decline is that theory is undergoing a sort of identity crisis. The kind of theory that dominates the new century is very different from the kind of theory presented in the textbooks of the previous one.

Late twentieth-century literary and cultural theory charted its identity and progress through a series of schools and movements designated by "-isms": formalism, structuralism, new criticism, psychoanalytic criticism, post-structuralism, linguistic criticism, Marxism, feminism, cultural materialism, New Historicism, new pragmatism, reader-response criticism, postcolonialism, postmodernism, and so on. The adjectives "new" and "post" added to these "-isms" were major points of discussion and disagreement. Also discussed was whether any of these "-isms" could be reduced to a method or system. Progress and development in theory was
denoted by the "invention" of new "-isms," the appending of these two adjectives to outdated "-isms," and the success of efforts to find a method in the madness of key theorists such as Roland Barthes, Jacques Derrida, and Michel Foucault—and sharing it with others.

For many today, the problem seems to be not the importance, significance, and relevance of theory to subjects of concern and objects of study, but rather the identification of oneself as a "theorist"—a term with closer associations to the critical schools and movements of the twentieth century than the emerging and energetic forms of theory of the twenty-first century. Like the great American thinker, Charles Peirce, who wanted nothing more to do with "pragmatism" after William James popularized it and refused to be called a "pragmatist," preferring instead to be called a "pragmaticist," theorise today seem to be distancing themselves from the general term used to describe their work. However, unlike Peirce who thought James dumbed down pragmatism by popularizing it, many "theorists" in the new millennium are moving in the opposite direction. Namely, they are moving to more populist instantiations of theory by taking on subjects and objects of more general concern and access.

As such, for them, there is some discomfort and inappropriateness in being called or considered a "theorist." In addition, the term "posttheorist," which may seem an appropriate one and may have served some transitional need to describe the emergence of new forms of theory in the 1990s, is today an anachronistic and inaccurate one. Finally, the term "theoretician" à la Peirce is a really ugly one, so it too is probably off the Table as an option. We are left then with a naming problem. To self-identify as a "theorist" today is for many to put oneself in the company of the past, rather than the present. However, there is not a better term to describe the current and copious work that has followed in the footsteps, at least in an historical sense, of the movements and schools of the twentieth century.

Still, the self-affiliation problems of "theorists" do not change the fact that the community in the new millennium that uses and engages the work of theory is larger and more diverse in its interests than ever. Perhaps reluctant theorists today need to do like the pop musician and singer Prince and take up a glyph as their common name, rather than the apparently outdated designation ‘theorist.” Though as this did not last very long for the man from Paisley Park—he gave up on the glyph and returned to his real name there is not much hope that it will solve theorist’s problem’s either (even though it would be cool to do so).

If anything has died in the world of theory in the twenty-first century, then it is the dominance of is "-isms." There was a time in the previous century when affiliation with an "-ism" was the required badge of entry into the theory world. One was not just a "theorist," but a member of a specific subcommunity of theory designated by an "-ism." Just as the world of religion has Catholicism, Judaism, and Buddhism, the world of theory had structuralism, Marxism, and feminism. And the lines of division between them within the theory community were at times no less flexible than those within the religious community. One of the most celebrated of all of the theory communities was "deconstruction’s ‘community,’” which Henry Sussman identifies in Chapter 9 as including "Hélène Cixous, Paul de Man, J. Hillis Miller, Jean-Luc Nancy, Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, Bernard Stiegler, Samuel Weber, Jonathan Culler, Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, Rodolphe Gasché, Carol Jacobs, Werner Hamacher, Catherine Malabou, Avital Ronell, John Sallis, Geoff Bennington, Robert Bernasconi, and Tom Cohen.” Reports Sussman, ‘for all that its convener (Jacques Derrida) looked askance at this term [deconstruction], has held remarkably tight to is inaugural specifications.”

But community "tightness" in theory also had another side. Think about how search committees used to badger job candidates with parochial questions about their theoretical affiliation? To do so today almost seems like a violation of FERPA laws. And woe be to the job candidate who
professed the wrong theoretical affiliation. Or confessed to the right one, but was not in line with
the preferred house of postmodernism or version of feminism? Though the late twentieth century may
have been the heyday of "high" theory, in retrospect, it appears much more provincial and doctrinaire compared to the world of theory in the
new millennium—one that is not only much more pluralistic and amorphous but also less tight and
divisive than the previous one.

Whereas in the past, fault lines between and distinctions within "-isms" often became feuding
points among theorists, the new object- or subject-centered world of theory is a much less divisive
one. Who today is going to argue that the object or subject of your theoretical affection (say, pop
music or affect) is the wrong one? Or that working on "debt" is superior to working on "masculinity"?
Though there is still some bickering about "whose" debt and "which" masculinity is the right, valid, or
ture one, such complaints seem more reactionary than progressive, scholastic than pluralistic—and
ultimately thus less acceptable after the demise of the big house of new-, post-, and original flavor ".-isms." Theoretical attention to objects or subjects
allows for more pluralism and tolerance in the theory world compared to its previous incarnation
as a world of schools, movements, and -isms.
Though, as we will see below, the new object- and subject-centric world of theory has many more
divisions than the theory world of ".-isms," it is also a much less divisive one.

The shift from high theory to low theory lessened the divisiveness among theorists. Twentieth-century
theory invested a lot in its ".-isms," but most all have fallen on hard times in the new millennium—even if
a few new ones have surfaced. For one thing, the theory world of the twentieth century often
appeared as a war of all against all. Macho theorists wielded their -isms against each other
both as a primary way of theoretical life and as a way to achieve power and dominance within the
academy. In doing so, the world of theory came to look more and more like the world of philosophy,
where disputes and disagreements are viewed as

the modus operandi of the field—and professional power is afforded to those who battle their way to
being the last man standing.

No area of theory in the twentieth century attracted, if not also welcomed, dispute more than
the high or grand theory exemplified through the work of figures such as Jacques Lacan, Julia
Kristeva, Hélène Cixous, Jean-François Lyotard, Gilles Deleuze, Michel Foucault, and Jacques
Derrida. These structuralist and post-structuralist thinkers set an impressive high-profile agenda for
theory in the late twentieth century. It was also, though, a very divisive one, that is, one that met
with, if not also encouraged, opposition from many different quarters.

A strong case may be made that post-structuralist responses to social and political events such as Jean
Baudrillard’s to the Gulf War in The Gulf War Did Not Take Place (La Guerre du Golfe n’a pas en
lieu 11991]), and then again to the events of September 11, 2001, in "L’esprit du terrorisme"
(2002) and 'Requiem pour les Twin Towers" (2002)
were some of the straws that broke the camel’s
back of twentieth-century theory—and presaged
the major changes in the temper of theory to come,
which is to say, theory in the new millennium.' I still
remember the negative reactions of students who
were or knew veterans of the Gulf War, and of
those grieving the death and destruction of
September 11, 2001, to these works by
Baudrillard—and of the feeling I had at the time
that high theory responses like Baudrillard’s to
major current events might not be a good thing in
the long run for theory. It is one thing to speculate
on simulation while watching The Matrix, but quite
another to try to present a case to students that the
towers fell on their own while at the same time
being respectful to the names and lives of those
who died in the plane crashes that brought the
towers down.

Vincent Leitch, one the contributors to this book,
notes that the opposition to high theory came "from
not only conservative scholars, but also a broad
array of contending liberal and left theorists,
indicting it (particularly post-structuralism) for philosophical idealism, nominalism, obscurantism, and quietism, charges early made famous by certain Marxists, feminists, critical race theorists, and cultural studies scholars. Work like Baudrillard’s in the wake of the events of September 11, 2001, only added fuel to the fire.

I mention the divisiveness not as a character flaw of high theory (for some it was and still is one of its endearing qualities, especially for those relishing the role of enfant terrible, as Richard G. Smith, for example, describes Baudrillard in his figure entry on him for this book), but rather as a point of differentiation with the world of theory that succeeded it. As we now know, the high or grand theory exemplified by the work of Deleuze, Foucault, and Kristeva was eclipsed in the 1990s by both low theory, which found its form in a multitude of ‘studies,’ and posttheory, ‘a pragmatic approach to theory which leads them to assess various theoretical models on the basis of the socio-cultural and political understanding that these models bring about.’ To be sure, the modus operandi of ‘studies’ and ‘posttheory’ was anything but a divisive one. The aim of the studies and posttheory generation that followed in the wake of the high road of twentieth-century theory was less to put down differing projects, than to vigorously and interdisciplinarily pursue and study the object or subject of its theoretical attention. In fact, differing projects appear to the studies and posttheory generation not as competition, but rather as extensions of a common critical or theoretical spirit signified by their shared use of the term "studies."

Moreover, the succeeding generation of theorists were much less obsessed with how they accomplished the study of the object or subject at hand, than why they were pursuing it. In other words, method took a backseat to things such as public interest, social and political activism, and ethics. It is a trend in theory that continues today, namely, to do theory with an eye toward making the world a better place, rather than avoiding it or trying to deny its existence.

In a way then, theory "after theory" never changed tense, it just changed focus. Since the ascent of high theory (or the even higher, so-called sky-high theory or "theoreticism") and the emergence of various forms of opposition to it, rumors of and statements about the demise of theory have persisted. Even today, closure regarding the issue seems remote. It is often said that "theory is dead”—superseded by a multitude of studies. Gone are theory stalwarts such as deconstruction, Marxism, and feminism. They have been replaced by studies of everything and anything from Barbie dolls and Beyoncé to biopolitics and books. In fact, a significant number of the 258 term entries in this book are themselves "studies" areas including affect, archive, canon, class, critical climate, cyborg, debt, diaspora, disability, ethnicity, gender, genre, globalization, labor, law, materialism, memory, migration, minority, multiculturalism, neoliberalism, object, performativity, pop culture, postcolonial, posthuman, print culture, queer, race, reading, reception, resistance, rights, sexuality, sound, subaltern, subculture, surveillance, translation, trauma, university, whiteness, and many others. This emerging and expanding multitude of literary and cultural theory in the twenty-first century leaves little or no room for the more dominant outline of literary theory and criticism, namely, one which divides it into schools and movements. Designators of the outlines of theory and criticism such as Russian formalism, New Criticism, psychoanalysis, feminism, Marxism, structuralism, post-structuralism, queer theory, New Historicism, and postcolonial theory are strictly a twentieth-century phenomenon. Though these designators were important to the emergence of "theory" in the last quarter of the twentieth century; they have outlived their usefulness for mapping literary and cultural theory in the twenty-first century. The explosion of "studies" in the first quarter of the twenty-first century leaves little opportunity for organizing literary and cultural theory into the older matrix of schools and movements. Or, alternately stated, studies as sub-species of the "twentieth-century" schools and movements make
for a very messy and confusing outline. Hence, why bother? Better to just leave it to the historians of theory to trace the legacies of theory amid the "studies" multitude.

What then to do with "theory," that is, the sum body of the twentieth century’s schools and movements in the wake of the explosion of twenty-first-century "studies"? For me, the answer, as evidenced through the title and organization of this book, is one of enthusiastic embrace, rather than rejection. The heterogeneity of "theory" today is a sign of its strength, rather than an indication of its weakness or failure. The aim of this book is to provide a resource to theory in the new millennium. It does so by offering hundreds of different doors to enter the new millennial world of theory. While some of these doors are recognizable schools or movements in theory such as structuralism, feminism, and Marxism, many of these doors are not—and they are open to nascent worlds of millennial theory.

In short, because there is no other term that adequately captures the "proliferation" of objects and subjects of critical attention today, the designator "theory" needs to continue to be used. This approach to theory in the twenty-first century is the proper one and as a whole represents a powerful, collective response to the so-called death of theory." Nor only is theory not dead—in spite of the recent passing of many of its major progenitors—it is undergoing a "reinvention" of sorts today. To put it bluntly, the death of theory is an illusion—and the future of this illusion, through efforts such as this book, will hopefully be short-lived.

Still, what happens if we replace all of the uses of "studies" in conjunction with the multitude of objects and subjects now associated with it with the term "theory" and make its implicit references explicit? For one thing, doing so would end the charade that all of these "studies" are nor second-generation theory—or dare we say, "new theory"? For transitional purposes, it was important at the end of the twentieth century to designate this work with a term other than theory. But a quarter-century later it just seems silly and is needlessly confusing. Theory is not dead—it just changed its name when its focus and the objects of its attention began to broaden and change. Calling theory "theory," rather than "studies," allows the larger and committed community dedicated to it to regroup and retool their identity in the wake of major changes in the theory world. It is past time that this was done.

Theorists today, much like the "deconstruction community" noted above by Sussman still work in affiliation with communities of shared interest and concern. This notion has at times been expressed by the statement "theorists run in packs," one most commonly associated with Stanley Fish's idea of "interpretive communities." Fish uses the notion of "interpretive communities" to answer the question as to "why will different reader execute the same interpretive strategies when faced with the 'same' text?," particularly as "they don't have to." "Interpretive communities," writes Fish, "are made up of those who share interpretive strategies not for reading (in the conventional sense) but for writing texts, for constituting their properties and assigning their intentions." Borrowing from his idea of "community" in theory, it is here being extended well beyond just "interpretive strategies" for "writing texts"—to all of the ways in which theory bring critics and activists together around shared interests and into networks of concern, that is, engages them with common subjects and objects of theoretical attention.

The notion of communities (or networks) of theorists applies equally to men and women; to students and teachers; to the high priests and low practitioners of theory. It has no sexual preference, requires no specific pedigree, and is blind to race and class. It always already reminds us that in spite of the individuality of our voices and the perceived solitude of scholarly pursuits, there is a form of affiliational collectivity that underlie the work of theory—and its multitude of areas of concern and interest. To argue for the validity of this statement is to argue for theory in the best sense of the term—for its continuing relevance; for its continued
existence. It is an argument that can be made simply by observing the ways in which theory materializes and comes to be. It asks us to see individuals within the academy affiliating, rather than atomizing; as forming both relations with others, and relationships to distinct places or regions of critical exchange.

The most basic forms of affiliation are the groups and organizations we join in the name of theory. One need look no further than the Allied Organization Directory of the Modern Language Association of America (MLA) to catch a sense of their depth and diversity: the American Comparative Literature Association, the American Name Society, the American Psychoanalytic Association, the American Translators Association the Association for Computers and the Humanities, the Association for the Study of Literature and the Environment, the Conference on Christianity and Literature, Feministas Unidas, the GL/Q Caucus for the Modern Languages, the Graduate Student Caucus, the International Society for the Study of Narrative, the Marxist Literary Group, the Modernist Studies Association, the Radical Caucus in English and Modern Languages, the Reception Study Society, the Rhetoric Society of America, the Society for Medieval Feminist Scholarship, and the Society for Critical Exchange.

Each of these organizations have allied with the MLA in an effort to further their theoretical interests. Panels are offered each year at the MLA to forward the theoretical agendas of each organization. While there are many societies and organizations affiliated with specific authors (e.g., Thoreau, Faulkner, and Goethe), languages (e.g., Italian, Portuguese), periods (e.g., eighteenth century, medieval), and areas of teaching (e.g., teachers of German, teachers of technical writing), the presence of distinctly theory-based organizations affiliated with the MLA attests to one of the more important forms of theoretical affiliation. But there are many others aside from professional organizations.

Academic journals, for example, are a form of theoretical affiliation. Communities of theorists gravitate around one or more of them with respect to their specific interests. They write articles and book reviews for them; they peer-review each other’s work; and they serve as editors and advisers CO them; so too are scholarly presses, conference proceedings, blogs, discussion groups, reading groups, colloquia, symposiums, and institutes. Theoretical affiliation has many different venues and far too many are supported by active and passionate communities of scholars to even posit that theory is not alive and well. If one turns to each of the areas of theoretical concern and interest, they will find that each in turn has numerous venues and communities that support, encourage, and facilitate work in the area. Some support multiple areas of concern and interest, while others only support one though their relative inclusivity and exclusivity does not impede their role in or support of theoretical affiliation.

To really kill theory, one would need to shut down all of these venues. To make it sick, start diminishing their overall number. But fortunately, such acts of academic terrorism against theory are not occurring with great frequency. In fact, the opposite seems to be happening. There are more venues now than ever to engage in theory. Some are traditional, such as conferences and journals, but others are new, such as blogs and online discussion groups. These venues multiply as theory expands its reach into new disciplines, subjects, and objects, if not also the commons itself. Not only is the community for theory alive and well, it is continuously growing and expanding in a variety of ways.

Theorists today often affiliate simultaneously with different areas of concern and interest. For example, it is not uncommon to see a theorist committed to critically exploring neoliberalism and one or more other zones of critical inquiry. Debt to university studies, for example, are often paired with neoliberalism to produce more specialized zones of critical exchange like critical debt studies. But so too are many other zones of critical
exchange paired like empire, postcolonial studies, and academic labor studies.

Working in different areas of theoretical interest at the same time albeit with differing intensities is part of the strength of millennial theory. One of the major differences say between twentieth-century theory and twenty-first-century theory is the more exclusive nature of theoretical work in the previous century. If in the twentieth century, psychoanalysis, semiotics, deconstruction, and feminism had any meaning, then it was generated through the common work of a particular area of theory. To be a theorist was to associate strongly with at least one school or movement of criticism or theory. If one self-identified as a working theorist during this period, it would not be unusual, as noted before, to be asked to what school of criticism or theory one belonged. Each school had a more or less distinct identity, and several leaders and master texts. For example, there was no way to affiliate with psychoanalysis without Freud and/or Lacan, no way to be a semiotician without Saussure and/or Peirce. The same, however, cannot be said of those who affiliate with the subjects and objects of the new millennial theoretical multitude. Take, for example, two of the more fruitful and well-known zones in the theoretical multitude today, neoliberalism and disability.

Sure, one can say that in the twenty-first century it is impossible to affiliate with neoliberalism without Milton Friedman, Friedrich von Hayek, and John Maynard Keynes, or that disability without Michael Berube, Lennard Davis, and Tobin Siebers is empty, the scale of affiliation is much different than it was in the twentieth century. To do semiotic theory without Saussure or Peirce was impossible in the twentieth century. However, to do disability studies without Berube or Davis today is not a mortal wound. Though your work may be impoverished without the presence of one of the leaders of your area of concern, it is not immediately invalidated. So too is the case with Milton Friedman, Friedrich von Hayek, and John Maynard Keynes in neoliberal theory.

The ability of theorists to work in different areas of theory at the same time is one the strengths of theory in the new millennium. When such opportunities presented themselves in the 1990s, the nervous reaction to them was to call them "posttheory." The fear was that theorists who worked in several different areas were in some way watering down or destroying the purity of theory. This may have been true in the 1990s when theoretical work was more insular, but in the twenty-first century, not only is it acceptable as a theorist to work in several different areas of theoretical inquiry, it is more the norm than the exception.

So if theory is united through communities or networks of shared interest and concern, then one of the ways to destroy theory is to pull apart or atomize them. John Ellis sensed this when he wrote back in the late 1990s in support of his version of "anti-theory" that "theorists do not run in packs." His proposal was that they are individuals who set out to crack particular theoretical problems by thinking hard about them. Their work is solitary; it is never fashionable and must always be estranged from orthodoxies. It follows that a theory elite can arise only when theory has ceased to function effectively and when the individuals who are a part of it no longer act like theorists. Real theorists thrive on the concept of argument and counterargument that is central to theoretical analysis, but race-class-gender scholars show a marked tendency to avoid facing the substance of the arguments of the critics.

While there are many things with which to take issue in this statement by Ellis, perhaps the most important one is the notion that the work of theorists is "solitary." Nothing is further from the truth.

Though some theoretical communities are smaller than others, a community of one is not a community. Theoretical problems do require hard thinking, and making arguments and counterarguments as a theorist is a common practice, but to pursue problems and arguments outside of a community is like trying to play chess without an opponent. It
may seem like chess, but it isn’t. The same is true with theory.

With a community comes the critical exchange that is necessary for theory to adapt to better meet the needs of the community. Without critical exchange, theoretical communities risk becoming frozen in time or crystalized—that is, they hazard establishing orthodoxies that are impervious to critique and never develop or change. But orthodoxy in itself is not the problem.

Orthodoxies bring communities together. They give them a sense of self-identity and shared-momentum. They put theory in motion. Sometimes they bring it down roads well traveled, whereas other times they do not. It is often the interplay between orthodoxy and community that makes the theoretical journey a productive and progressive one. All of this is not to say that theorists cannot or should not be trailblazers. Original and heterodox theory is not only important for progress in theory, but also for challenging the status quo. Nevertheless, it is only possible against the backdrop of orthodoxies shared by communities. If Ellis’s point is that there are pioneers in theory, then I have no problem with this. If his point though is that theorists must work in a vacuum, which he seems to be saying, then he is wrong. Working in a theoretical community may result in the creation of new directions for theory, but theory that is not the consequence of some type of community life is better left on its own and ignored.

"Fashionable theory" or the "latest big thing in theory" may not be everyone’s preference. But it is also not a bad thing for people to be excited about new directions or trends in theory. Again, "fashionable" or heterodox theory is only intelligible within the context of "unfashionable" or orthodox theory. Moreover, if no one believes in a proposed "theory" and if no community forms around it, isn’t this just solipsism? Or worse yet, narcissism? For Ellis, theory that builds a community around it is "a degraded and corrupt shadow of what theory should be." I strongly disagree.

When theory does not work within a community, it risks irrelevance or worse yet, death. The best way to destroy a theory is for no one to believe in it. Theoretical innovation may begin with the unorthodox work of one individual, but it will end there if it continues to lurk in the shadows of the theory community. Moreover, there is nothing wrong or elite with being the leader of a community of theorists. After all, communities without leadership inevitably fail.

In sum, theory without community is dead theory. Community helps it to survive, thrive, and stay relevant. Theorists without community lapse into esotericism and risk becoming irrelevant. The solitary theorist is nothing to be celebrated. Rather it is something to be mourned. But still, the flourishing and multiplication of subjects and objects of theoretical intrigue in the twenty-first century presents a challenge to creating and sustaining community in theory. If one does not have the relatively limited number of schools and movements around which to build community, but rather have the scotes of objects and subjects such as those listed above and in Part 2 of this book, then creating community around this multitude can be a challenge.

If there is any problem with theory in the new millennium, it is that the multitude of theoretical objects and subjects today leaves theorists with too many choices for theoretical affiliation. There are so many, in fact, that the whole notion of affiliation can become as overwhelming as trying to visualize the whole field of theory today. Let us again take, for example, affiliation with neoliberalism, one of the few -isms still in vogue today.

In twenty-first-century theory, "neoliberalism" has become one of our most visible and productive sites for critical exchange. For many, it implies both a critique of late capitalism and the belief that political economy is something that is worthy of our critical attention. Theorists who affiliate with this subject both explore differing ways to define its terms and defend its territories as well as survey alternative histories and extensions of it.
However, theorists who work on neoliberal theory and who find this subject a valuable point of or nexus for critical inquiry, again, more than likely have interests in one or more other areas of theory as well. Moreover, there may also be other subjects and objects and along with them their communities of inquirers that also fit well with the intetests of neoliberal inquiry. This is one of the exciting features of the brave new world of twenty-first-century theory: namely, the way in which it encourages different communities to network with each other in the shared pursuit of theory. It is also one of the more intimidating features of theory in the new millennium, for it is often unclear where affiliations should begin—and where they should end.

The community activity of theorists involves reading and commenting on each other’s work. It also involves using the theoretical work of others as a launching pad for your own work either positively as a source of critical insight—or negatively as a foil. Sometimes, theorists praise each other. Other times they disagree with each other. Some theoretical communities have recognizable leaders, while others don’t. Regardless, community is essential to the well-being of theory.

Theory today is a community, or, more precisely, a set of communities. They may not go by recognizable names like the feminism, deconstruction, and psychoanalysis of the last century, but theory still is driven by communities of individuals who share common bonds of theoretical pursuit and interest. Like all communities, theoretical ones go through periods of growth and popularity—and periods of decline and unpopularity. Some become fashionable, while others languish in relative obscurity. For example, few today seem to want to live in the structuralist community. Though it was once a thriving and active one, arguments and disagreements within the community led many to move to other communities or to take part in the formation of new ones. And this, of course, is not a bad thing. Just look at what the legacies of structuralism gave to the world of theory, including, most significantly, post-structuralism, the roots of which still branch through much millennial theory.

While community is not unique to theorists, it does not diminish its importance in understanding how theory works, flourishes, and even sometimes fails. Theory today has a large, robust, and strong community, one that anyone who values it needs to support. Without the support of communities, theory risks becoming the solitary and esoteric entity envisioned by Ellis. ‘Working in one or several communities of theorists allows theory to flourish and thrive in the new millennium as it continues the process of refiguring or remapping its purview. The chapters, and term-and-figure entries, in this book energetically demonstrate that theory in the new millennium is not isolated nor dead. Rather, it is supported and strengthened by a global network of scholars committed to not just the survival of theory—but to its continued development and relevancy, particularly in dark times. <>

**Literary Obscenities: U.S. Case Law and Naturalism after Modernism** by Erik M. Bachman. [Refiguring modernism, The Pennsylvania State University Press, 9780271080055]

“Examines U.S. obscenity trials in the early twentieth century and how they framed a wide-ranging debate about the printed word’s power to deprave, offend, and shape behavior”

This comparative historical study explores the broad sociocultural factors at play in the relationships among U.S. obscenity laws and literary modernism and naturalism in the early twentieth century. Putting obscenity case law’s crisis of legitimation and modernism’s crisis of representation into dialogue, Erik Bachman shows how obscenity trials and other attempts to suppress allegedly vulgar writing in the United States affected a wide-ranging debate about the power of the printed word to incite emotion and shape behavior.

Far from seeking simply to transgress cultural norms or sexual boundaries, Bachman argues, proscribed authors such as Wyndham Lewis, Erskine Caldwell,
Lillian Smith, and James T. Farrell refigured the capacity of writing to evoke the obscene so that readers might become aware of the social processes by which they were being turned into mass consumers, voyeurs, and racialized subjects. Through such efforts, these writers participated in debates about the libidinal efficacy of language with a range of contemporaries, from behavioral psychologists and advertising executives to book cover illustrators, magazine publishers, civil rights activists, and judges.

Focusing on case law and the social circumstances informing it, Literary Obscenities provides an alternative conceptual framework for understanding obscenity’s subjugation of human bodies, desires, and identities to abstract social forces. It will appeal especially to scholars of American literature, American studies, and U.S. legal history.

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Excerpt: During the first half of the twentieth century, the ability of writing to make unruly claims on our bodies preoccupied judges, jurists, authors, and critics involved in debates over ongoing revisions to the definition of and tests for legal obscenity in the United States. At the same time that modernist writing was challenging fiction and poetry as they had been created hitherto, state and appellate courts began undermining the grounds on which books could be prosecuted for their corruptive moral influences and salacious bodily appeals. Putting into dialogue obscenity case law’s crisis of legitimation and modernism’s crisis of representation, Literary Obscenities argues that “obscene modernism” helps us to account for the cultural logic of a period in which the meaning, identity, and very existence of obscene writing itself seemed to be evaporating. “Modernism,” it should be noted, does not refer to fundamentally subversive, shocking, or disruptive texts here. Instead, it encompasses a widely dispersed set of discursive practices that are marked by concerns regarding the conditions of possibility for art as such. At the same time that these practices contributed to major formal innovations and to a further widening of aesthetic sensibilities, long-held certainties about legal obscenity began to wither under closer examination, and efforts to explain how books could be judged obscene appeared to become more and more Sisyphean with each passing year. In short, the expansion of what potentially counted as a text worthy of artistic or literary judgments under modernism coincided with the contraction of what could possibly be deemed proscribably obscene in a U.S. court of law. At issue in these obscenity cases was nothing less than the capacity of mute words to get off the page and affect readers in the world in ways that could not be fully controlled, especially in the formation of their civic comportments and social identities. Depending on which precedents a given judge cited from the case law, however, obscene books either posed too much of a threat or no threat at all. Accordingly, proscribed writers such as Wyndham Lewis, Erskine Caldwell, and Lillian Smith responded to contemporary obscenity trials by interrogating the power of words to take on embodied dimensions even as they continued to grapple with the manner in which human interests, capacities, and self-knowledge nevertheless get fostered or distorted by the affecting appeals made by putatively obscene texts.

Furthermore, ambivalence regarding what constituted obscenity in the first place extended to the realm of social relationships affected by it. Obscenity trials and the texts prosecuted in them were perennial news items and topics of debate in this period, as were the evolving standards for
what constituted obscenity, which oftentimes shifted year to year, state to state, and court to court. Just as the definition of obscenity was up for grabs, so too were its broader effects on readers, who were variously depicted in case law at this time as children requiring parental oversight, women in need of male protectors, or adults able to determine what was or was not good for them. However, even those judges who treated readers of obscenity like grown-ups still did not fail to assign them a common social role: that of consumers in a market economy. I contend that all of this was not accidental, as obscenity was a conspicuously contested field through which writers and judges addressed other, even more socially pervasive aspects of writing’s effects. As Literary Obscenities demonstrates, the struggle to account for the libidinal efficacy of writing prominently figured in a number of period disputes, such as those concerning the manipulative use of behaviorist-informed advertising practices, shifts in cultural hierarchies between print and visual materials, and activist strategies for desegregating the Jim Crow South before the 1950s.

Just as lascivious writing carried the weight of some enormously important cultural issues, a survey of the case law on obscene books shows that the more frequent targets of obscenity prosecutions in the early 20th-century United States were not modernist novels but literary naturalist texts such as those of Caldwell, Smith, and James T. Farrell. In this study I understand “literary naturalism” to refer to fiction that, in the words of György Lukács, “describes” life rather than “narrates” it. That is to say, it is fiction in which expansive descriptions are tacitly organized and fixed in place by the findings and methodologies of contemporary sociology, psychology, physiology, criminology, and evolutionary biology rather than by the (realist) impulse to model typical human characters and nascent forms of dynamic social action. Because early naturalist writing tended to rely heavily on these fields of scientific inquiry, many of its initial critics in the United States claimed it was robbing fiction of its own authentically literary forms, functions, and narratives. Moreover, by putatively adopting some form of determinism to present their characters as the objects of the social and natural forces investigated by these same discourses of human knowledge, naturalist texts were widely believed to have reduced men and women to “human insects,” to use Malcolm Cowley’s expression, insofar as they reliably depicted a world in which people were more “done to” than “doing.”

Notable scholarly work of the past few decades, however, has moved our discussions of U.S. literary naturalism beyond warmed-over debates about the two cultures (literary vs. scientific) or about the coherence of determinism as a philosophy and its broader implications as a worldview. The attention devoted to literary naturalism by many notable critics aligned with New Historicism in the 1980s, for instance, shifted our focus to the ways in which U.S. naturalist fiction called into question the autonomy of literature with respect to the institutions and discourses in or alongside which it circulated. As a result, “co-optation” has increasingly replaced “determinism” as a keyword in studies of literary naturalism, and the result has been greater attention paid to complicitous relationships in naturalist works rather than to determinist subsumption pure and simple. In keeping with this, scholars and critics have since developed more nuanced conceptions of how subjectivity, will, and agency become informed (rather than wholly overmastered) by the tremendous social and natural forces set forth by naturalist fiction.

Emblematic here remains Jennifer Fleissner’s work on compulsion, which has broadened our conception of how U.S. literary naturalist texts exemplify their embodied reception in readers by representing worlds in which embodiment as such reliably takes the form of repetition, habit formation, and failure. For Fleissner, subjectivity and agency are not abolished by the routine behaviors encrusted onto the bodies to which they are attached in naturalist fiction, nor are they canceled out by the conspicuous inability of this fiction to offer shapely
narratives of triumph or tragedy. Instead, literary naturalism forces us to situate such subjectivity and such agency ever and always in terms of mundane, nonlinear habits and recurring motions (e.g., those involved with cleaning or lovemaking) that do not eventuate in a sense of mastery or completion so much as they do in bodily experiences of repetition and disappointment that nevertheless constitute the only path available to us in naturalist fiction that can still perhaps lead (beyond the frame of the text itself) to mastery and completion eventually. In short, failure in the present does not foreclose the possibility of different outcomes in the future, though according to Fleissner what distinguishes naturalism from other modes of writing is that it locates this future in our bodies (where self and world interface and become meaningfully entangled), and in women’s bodies in particular.

In many respects, then, what my calling attention to the literary naturalistic qualities of early twentieth-century obscenity in the United States entails is that we reckon more expansively with failure, by which I refer both to the recurrent failure of courts at this time to formulate adequate tests for obscenity and to the ultimate failure of fiction to be deemed proscribably obscene, even though the works by Smith, Caldwell, and Lewis examined here were indeed proscribed in courts of law for their obscenity. I would also note that this preoccupation with failure is already encoded in the title of the first chapter—“Getting Off the Page”—in which the key propositions aimed at by its wordplay are only somewhat felicitously expressed. The salacious implications of the idiomatic “get off” are easily discernible, but they badly need a preposition to make it clear that it is a prospective reader who is sexually gratifying him- or herself on (or by means of) a book rather than the leaves of the book itself that are somehow being sexually satisfied by the reader. Despite the possibility of conjuring forth bizarre visions of readers clumsily jerking off or going down on or otherwise illicitly stimulating a book somehow, someway, I have nevertheless opted to omit the preposition, not simply because “Getting Off on the Page” is a less euphonious title but more importantly because “Getting Off the Page” nevertheless does indeed succinctly express the core preoccupation of this book, which has to do with how obscenity has more or less ceased to be something readily predicable of written texts of fiction in a court of law in the United States. In this less idiomatic sense, then, obscenity in this period ceased to get off the page in the ways expected by courts hitherto (namely, by having untoward effects on the bodies and behaviors of readers in the world) and started to get off the page entirely by leaving books behind and moving on to other media (primarily visual ones), with which it is more credibly associated now than it is with writing as such. While this is an outcome that did not become codified until the end of the Supreme Court’s repeated efforts to work up a suitable set of new standards for obscenity during the second half of the twentieth century, Literary Obscenities locates formative (and, up to now, largely overlooked) sources for this eventual result in the period, cases, and works of fiction examined here.

This approach thus distinguishes itself from significant critical work on law, literature, and obscenity carried out by both literary critics and jurists, for whom quite different concerns and questions have guided much recent scholarship. On the one hand, obscenity has tended to provide many of those working in the New Modernist Studies an opportunity to reassert the subversive potentials of certain modernist texts that were creatively vivified by the tussles their respective writers had with obscenity laws and the various institutions enforcing them. On the other hand, some have used “obscene modernism” to express a deep and abiding skepticism about these transgressive potentials by drawing our attention to the ways in which such writing nonetheless ended up embodying the very sorts of interdictions and proscriptions it nominally sought to flout. For legal scholars, in contrast, questions of principle (Is obscenity even an instance of speech in the first place? Is obscenity law equipped to address the problem of moral harm that would potentially justify the proscription of obscenity if such a thing
were indeed an instance of speech?) and practice (Are obscenity prosecutions a wise use of limited institutional resources? Are the conceptions of art and literature offered in obscenity law really in line with how those two things are actually performed or created today?) have tended to predominate over the more historical and evaluative pursuits of those working in the New Modernist Studies.

The aim of this book is therefore to offer an alternative angle of vision onto early twentieth-century writing and obscenity, one that orients itself more around states of development in the reformulation of legal obscenity in this period than around the retroactive credentialing of literary modernism as either a dependably subversive or regrettably compromised set of innovative texts and compositional practices. Likewise, I am not all that interested in reading law in/as literature or literature in/as law. Instead, my concerns are with assessing the consequences of treating proscribably obscene fiction in the early twentieth century not simply as an object of obscenity case law but more importantly as its respondent, as texts that answer to the conditions and limits placed on literary writing’s efficacy by the disparate accounts and appraisals made by judges themselves in this period. In particular, what this closer attention to case law makes salient about the relationship between writing and obscenity in the United States throughout much of the past century is twofold. First, the proscription of obscenity in this period usefully indexes major shifts in contemporary cultural hierarchies that were then in the midst of slowly but surely prioritizing visual texts over written ones, a point I most fully expound in the chapter on Caldwell. When viewed from afar, the large-scale narrative of U.S. legal obscenity in the twentieth century is decidedly not a story of censorship forces heroically overcome by an elite group of modernist pioneers; instead, the tale forced on us by history is a decidedly more ambivalent one that foregrounds the wholesale neutralization of the claims that books can potentially make on bodies, and it is the U.S. literary naturalist texts of this period (rather than modernist works) that offer us a means of conceptualizing the end of book obscenity not so much as a timely victory over censorship forces but rather as the emergent recognition of the sobering and troubling possibility that reading books can no longer affect us in ways that are worth proscribing. Ever since the Supreme Court’s decision in Miller v. California (1973), after all, it is always okay not to masturbate when we read.

This brings up the second point made apparent by the story of obscene writing in the United States when it is first focalized through case law: when the libidinal potentials of books were indeed being neutralized in U.S. courtrooms in the twentieth century, this tended to be carried out by positing art and literature as autonomous modes of human expressivity, along with the aesthetic conceptions of value typically associated with those two things. Hence, the nearly century-long effort to deproscribe obscene books in this country principally entailed the efforts of liberalizing judges, jurists, writers, publishers, and academics to separate the “literary” from the properly obscene in the eyes of judges, juries, post office employees, police officers, and customs officials. In this view, literary writing could not and cannot be obscene because truly obscene writing was not and is not properly literary, a state of affairs pithily summed up in present-day obscenity statutes exempting prurient and patently offensive books from proscription so long as they possess “serious literary value,” which, since Miller, has been implicitly extended to all fiction. As the first chapter shows, modernist writing and its critical reception provided the immediate occasions for the expansive aesthetic arguments offered in defense of obscene writing in the early twentieth-century United States. As indicated earlier, however, even though such aesthetic considerations now allow previously objectionable books to be disseminated to adult readers without state interference, this does not signify a triumph of enlightened liberal attitudes toward salacious and unruly writerly practices but rather a diminution of writing’s effective power in the field of social representation. Ironically,
liberalization of this sort reflects a judgment over writing that has already fallen “before the law”: the demotion of writing’s capacity to affect our bodies with the sort of unsettling immediacy that various other media—such as television, film, photography, videogames, the internet, and so forth—still seem to possess with all the self-evident force of a publicly lewd man.

Consequently, if books no longer appear to affect us in the eyes of the law in the United States, then that is due in no small part to their successful neutralization on aesthetic grounds provided by modernism and its critical reception. In the twentieth century, obscene books became simply “literature,” which itself raises new terminological issues that raise all sorts of skeptical responses, beginning with the obvious question, “Well, what is literature, and what does it do anyway?” Yet despite brass-tacks questions such as this, the matter remains fairly settled for all that. We live in an age in the United States in which Stein-ese may be the best idiolect with which to convey how writing both expresses and yet holds in check its potential to make unmanageable libidinal or behavioral appeals: “Obscene books should be written and read since obscene books are literature and literature should be written and read because literature is literature and there is a difference between obscenity and literature in the character of their quality to be written and read and literature can be and ought to be written and read while obscenity cannot be read because it cannot be written anymore so it is literature that is different from obscenity anyway, meaning obscene books are not obscenity anymore just literature.”

Alternatively, much like the attempts of various early twentieth-century avant-gardes to intervene violently into and qualitatively transform contemporary life, the abilities of obscene books to do much of anything in the world appear to have become a matter of historical and antiquarian interest—matters for professors and collectors of rare books—but not anything we would want our overstuffed court system to squander its time considering.

Disenchantedly, then, the overmastering imperative in telling the story of legal obscenity, modernism, and the dull persistence of literary naturalism in the early twentieth-century United States is not to make it new, but to make it neutral. Accordingly, in place of the familiar “obscene modernism” story of transgressive modernist writing practices and their wildly successful repurposing of a variety of censorship discourses, I want to put forward instead a highly recursive narrative that looks a lot like Invasion of the Body Snatchers, an ungainly story of textual identities and readerly bodies secretly compromised, evacuated, and replaced from the inside out through shadowy interactions between obscenity case law and early twentieth-century writing that are best described in an uneasy, equivocal middle voice. One day we woke up to find our offensive, foulmouthed, philandering neighbors had become reputable suburban members of the community; books that were once dirty had been reborn as literature. This volume’s response is to elaborate how proscribed salacious writing in this period neither actively neutralized its own capacities to make unmanageable claims on readerly bodies, nor was it expressly deprived of its abilities to make such claims by heteronomous social forces. Instead, this overarching process of failure and cooptation is one in which English-language writing in the twentieth century got itself neutralized of the potential to deprave, corrupt, make prurient appeals, patently offend, or make libidinal claims of any consequence on human bodies. Whether writers and judges were ascribing too much power to the ability of printed words to ineluctably arouse the bodies of readers and incite them to action (as Lewis, Smith’s early writings, and the judges of the Massachusetts Supreme Court certainly did), or whether they were calling into question the ability of written language to do anything of note in an age increasingly suffused with and informed by visual representations instead (as Caldwell and Judge Curtis Bok did), literary obscenity was an occasion for naturalizing obscene literature: proscribable obscene writing in the early twentieth-century United States became something we could both take for granted and eventually
disregard (it had become second nature, as it were, to accept that the obscenity of a book did not make it simply an obscene book) because much of that writing had situated its own unmanageable bodily appeals in terms of existing forms of human knowledge that helped us to articulate them descriptively rather than to reexperience them narratively (it had become second nature by way of literary naturalism). If modernism gives us the means of accounting for how aesthetic and literary exceptions to obscenity got articulated by judges in the early twentieth century, then literary naturalism offers us a way of conceptualizing how proscribed writing of this time got itself neutralized of the ability to act obscenely.

I would further note that two interrelated concerns have informed my selection of the obscenity cases and proscribed works discussed in the chapters that follow. First of all, I have chosen decisions and texts that exemplify the uneven and peculiar history of U.S. obscenity case law in the early twentieth century, a period in which obscenity was primarily a lower court (rather than a Supreme Court) concern. Hence, there is little sense of definite progress in the labile definitions of and tests for obscenity put forward by these lower courts between 1917 and 1950. Instead, judges seemed to be stuck returning to the same issues and precedents with little certain or lasting effect. Even District Judge John M. Woolsey’s famous holistic test for obscenity in United States v. One Book Called “Ulysses” (1933) did not mark an advance in the deproscription of obscene books insofar as the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court had no problem using his standard to find God’s Little Acre (1933) and Strange Fruit (1944) obscene more than a decade later. Thus, it would be wrong to interpret the legal battles surrounding Ulysses (1922) as the end of something. Woolsey’s decision and Augustus Hand’s affirmation of it in the appellate case that took place the following year are instead part of a much longer sequence of trials in which reproscribing and deproscribing tendencies are often hard to distinguish from each other when looked at up close. Consequently, the chapters on the proscribably obscene works of Lewis, Caldwell, and Smith do not organically follow from each other so much as they recursively work through the same legal precedents and deterministic processes over and over as issues connected with behaviorism, voyeurism, and racial identity formation, respectively, come to the fore in each case. In other words, as in a naturalist novel, there is no shapely overarching narrative to be told here, only the variously failed efforts of judges, writers, and jurists to come to terms with the problems named by obscenity as they reappeared in different times, places, and texts.

Second, my choice of cases and literary texts spotlights the belatedness of literary obscenity in the United States at this time. I mean “belated” in two senses. First, it was not the muckraking literary naturalism from the turn of the century that proved to be the primary target of obscenity prosecutions in this period but rather literary naturalism after modernism. With the exception of Dreiser’s An American Tragedy (1925), the literary naturalism being proscribed for obscenity in the years covered by this study was not comprised of the figures (Crane, Norris, London, Cahan) familiar to many of us from the customary surveys of U.S. literature. Instead, the texts that were targeted belong to what I refer to here as literary naturalism “after modernism,” with “after” doing double duty. On the one hand, it serves as an indication of imitative facility: modernist styles, techniques, concerns, and problems were available to be mimicked or “taken after,” either with great gusto, as in the early fiction of Caldwell, or ambivalently, as in the work of Smith. On the other hand, “after” serves as a marker of temporal priority: the event of modernism had already happened by the time Farrell, Caldwell, Smith, and others commenced their careers. This is not to say that modernism was a neatly contained phenomenon that had already run its course by the early 1930s. Much valuable work on periodizing modernism (into its late modernist and, more recently, its metamodernist strands) of course attests to the ways in which it subsequently unfolded and continues to ramify
down to the present. Instead, my point is simply that the proscribably obscene naturalist writers looked at here took up writing after modernism’s horizons of legibility had already been disclosed both to a broader public and to (at least a few) judges. I develop this point at length in the chapter on Lewis, who is the token modernist here and whose legal troubles with obscenity in the 1910s afford us a chance to reflect afresh on how courts of law in the United States dealt with modernism before aesthetic and literary justifications for its jarring formal features and (at times) outré contents became matters of course. I would also underscore for my readers that it is this principle of selection that has justified the otherwise conspicuous exclusion of Dreiser, An American Tragedy, and Commonwealth v. Friede (1930) in this study.

The belatedness of literary obscenity is also a preoccupation here because this period does indeed mark the beginning of the end of proscribably obscene books, if not their end as such. That is to say, despite the lack of clarity and agreement among many state and appellate courts during these decades, efforts like those of the Massachusetts Supreme Court to proscribe obscene books well into the middle of the twentieth century certainly did comprise derrière-garde actions in light of what the U.S. Supreme Court accomplished with its obscenity cases between the late 1950s and the early 1970s. However, the chapters that follow resist the temptation to present the course of obscenity case law at this earlier contested time in a teleological fashion, not least of all because the beginning of the end of legally obscene books was a period marked by too much (rather than too little) obscenity law, as the first chapter shows. Literary Obscenities, then, is partly an effort to excavate and re-present the forgotten detours, byways, and dead ends that obscenity case law took in these critical and contentious years.

In chapter 1, “Getting Off the Page,” I demonstrate how literary criticisms of naturalism illuminate debates around book obscenity in early twentieth-century U.S. case law. On the one hand, judges who wanted to continue to proscribe books for obscenity often resorted to drawing a distinction between works with redeeming “literary” value and those without it. In view of their literary qualities having been disputed since the late nineteenth century, naturalist texts proved to be a prominent target for prescriptive forces. On the other hand, the ways in which literary naturalism was believed to divest characters of agency also relate to a number of legal arguments about how obscene books deprive readers of the willpower to resist their aroused sexual or immoral urges. Objective social forces and subjective compulsions thus hazily overlap in obscene books and literary naturalism, just as they did in the debates occasioned by both, a point I develop through a close reading of James T. Farrell’s Studs Lonigan (1932–35). As obscenity case law unfolded across the century, however, this view of the relationship between readers and salacious texts became more vexed. Instead of taking for granted the obscene efficacy of writing, tests for obscenity today tend to assume that books no longer possess any such force. Much like a character in a naturalist novel, obscene writing over the past century has gotten itself deprived of the capacity to get off the page and transgress in the world, such that novels like Samuel R. Delany’s Through the Valley of the Nest of Spiders (2012) appear on bookstore shelves rather than on court dockets. Literary Obscenities ventures an account of how this naturalistic muting of writing’s libidinal effectiveness took place across different modes of fictional writing (the short story and the novel) and in a variety of publication formats (little magazines, deluxe limited-edition hardcover books, and mass-market trade paperbacks) that circulated among an emblematic range of readers, from small literary coteries to the mass audiences of best seller lists.

Chapter 2, “How to Misbehave as a Behaviorist (if You’re Wyndham Lewis),” reveals that what the New York District Court found so troubling about “Cantleman’s Spring-Mate” in the October 1917 issue of The Little Review was its preoccupation with representing obscenity not as a quality intrinsic to a text but rather as a set of culturally produced
reading habits. Lewis's World War I narrative connects a young British soldier's ludicrously overheated readings of Thomas Hardy's The Trumpet-Major (1880) to his wartime milieu, in which distinctions between man and animal appeared to be breaking down altogether. Comparing Lewis's culture critiques of the 1920s and 1930s to the work of John B. Watson as a behaviorist psychologist and later as a successful advertising executive, I claim that for Lewis the bodily responsiveness of a reader to the printed word indexed a broader social trend whereby consumers everywhere were being reduced to well-oiled stimulus-response mechanisms by the twinned forces of behaviorism and modern advertising. "Obscenity," in his view, was a by-product of cultural training—of a widely inculcated "art of being ruled"—not a primary datum of either "obscene works" or "depraved readers."

"Cantleman's Spring-Mate" therefore demonstrates Lewis's hypothesis through a fictional provocation to which, as it happened, the judiciary proved adversely responsive in the 1910s, though the legal and cultural absorption of modernist writing's practices over the next decade or so would ultimately start to change that.

Chapter 3, "Erskine Caldwell, Smut, and the Paperbacking of Obscenity," examines how the fiction of Erskine Caldwell undermines Lewis's basic assumptions. For Caldwell, obscenity was no longer something writers could take for granted by the 1930s, because books were quite possibly henceforth unable to elicit a bodily response at all. Instead, Caldwell's novels in this decade addressed their doubtful capacity for salaciousness through the calculated, repeated experience of mirthful frustration. Evaluating such an experience in light of Judge Bok's ruling in Commonwealth v. Gordon et al. (1949), which absolved God's Little Acre of obscenity in the state of Pennsylvania, I approach both the novel and legal case as indicative of contemporary shifts in the cultural hierarchies existing between visual media and print texts. According to Bok, God's Little Acre was not obscene because it failed to present its readers with the erotic allurement of a publicly lewd man, the clear and present danger of which he assumed as given. I then go on to consider more closely the roles played by frustration in Caldwell's fiction, particularly in his representations of visuality, by comparing the indeterminacies and gaps in Caldwellian voyeurism to the sorts of frustrating experiences elicited by the illustrated covers of the paperback reprints of his books in the late 1940s. In the concluding section of this chapter, I discuss both of these frustrations—verbal and visual—in connection with the concept of "smut" elaborated by Sigmund Freud in Jokes and Their Relation to the Unconscious (1905). For Freud, when smutty language does not lead to sexual acts, it can become an autonomous pleasure, albeit one thereafter primed to transmute into action with a change in circumstances. Smut, I contend, is a way of conceiving the linkages between erotic allurements, bodily experiences, and the various frustrations intervening between the two in Caldwell's fiction and in writing more generally. Caldwell in turn opens up the possibility that the failure of words to seduce readers may nevertheless constitute a technique of "weak" seduction or salacity beyond the purview of proscriptive judges.

Chapter 4, "Sin, Sex, and Segregation in Lillian Smith's Silent South," returns to the assumptions subtending Lewis's position by showing that for Smith obscenity was indeed an overpowering result of a cultural training that hailed a specific kind of social identity. In particular, I contend that the essays, fiction, and little magazine publications of this civil rights activist in the 1930s and 1940s consistently presented the Jim Crow South as a region organized by obscene words that enacted racial difference through the dangers said to be presented by particular forms of sexual desire. Just as certain body parts were off-limits to Southern youth, so too were certain groups of people, and Smith's work from this period comprises an attempt to account for the ways in which sin, sex, and segregation mutually reproduced and overdetermined the efficacy of the social, cultural,
and political institutions of the region. In fact, in Commonwealth v. Isenstadt (1945) the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court criticized—and in part proscribed—Strange Fruit because of its artful capacity to make such linkages not only known but also overwhelmingly felt by its readers. According to the opinions in Isenstadt, whether panderingly attractive or unduly repellent, words in that novel did in fact move beyond the limits of what language ought to do to people. Far from being the biased observations of a group of robed censors, however, these opposing perspectives on the efficacy of Smith’s language—its ability to push and pull its readers—were shrewdly attentive to the somatic functions her texts almost ceaselessly ascribe to words. In Strange Fruit, in particular, Smith sought to demonstrate how segregation had turned the early twentieth-century South into the nation’s closet, whereby symptomatic inconsistencies and incoherence in a community’s sexual knowledge could act as guarantor for discriminating laws, behaviors, and folkways that trumped any rational appeals a reformer might hope to make to her community.

The work of Lewis, Caldwell, and Smith accordingly typify the response of fiction to the evolving standards for obscenity in this period. From within the unfolding process that eventually delivered writing to its present-day neutral zone, Lewis’s essays and creative writing still assume that mere words on the page can hyperbolically affect readers in the world, though his account of obscene embodiment as something that can be performatively contradicted suggests that bodily sensations can be made to mean something other than what they in fact are: just because a woman in a Thomas Hardy novel gives a character in “Cantleman’s Spring-Mate” an erection does not mean that Lewis would have us understand this character to be aroused by her. What Lewis instead insists upon time and time again is that the body and its reactions to stimuli can be transformed into rhetorical gestures, into ironic expressions emanating from a dubious self barely subsisting just below the surface. The work of Smith provides a surprisingly complementary instance of an author from this period who also subsumes bodily arousal under a broader web of signification, although her focus is on allegory rather than irony. For Smith, obscenity does not so much offend as discriminate against, especially by corporeally marking and enforcing otherwise unstable black-white divides. Ultimately, she responds to this dilemma by subjecting obscene words (and their inexorable efficacy in hailing racialized bodies) to an allegorical philosophy of history in which the problems posed by obscenity become null in the face of the evaporation of racial divisions in a projected future where being a human means acting collectively and cooperatively for the good of all. Between Lewis’s ironic embodiment of obscenity and Smith’s allegorical disembodiment of it, Caldwell’s fiction opens up a parenthesis in which an aroused bodily response to writing need not (indeed, probably will not) occur. Caldwell’s writing alludes time and time again to voyeuristic scenes of salacity but refuses to evoke them visually, leaving his reader-viewers to wait and not see as they stare expectantly through a peephole looking out onto a void space that will not be filled, though it is said to remain engrossing all the same. Unlike the works of Lewis or Smith, Caldwell’s fiction problematizes the medium of obscenity rather than the fact of obscene embodiment itself. In sum, then, whereas Lewis has the bodily response evoked by book obscenity take the form of a performative contradiction, and whereas Smith, following the proscription of Strange Fruit, spends the remainder of her career trying to allegorically efface the obscene human body out of existence altogether, Caldwell cussedly doubts that such obscene efficacy is even possible in the case of books anymore.

Finally, when we consider the history of legal obscenity and writing in the first half of the twentieth century, the story that fitfully emerges is not simply the naturalist one of failure but also the Body Snatchers tale of usurpations, howsoever improbable they may appear at first glance. We therefore come upon a contrarian Wyndham Lewis...
who displaces the renowned James Joyce at the center of The Little Review’s legendarily outsized ordeals with obscenity; a know-nothing Erskine Caldwell, whose Southern legion of minimalist hick voyeurs cudfully dislodges D. H. Lawrence’s secular apostles of the flesh; and a decently indecent Lillian Smith, whose early determinist visions of the Jim Crow South and later evolutionary cosmologies supplant the more expressly tragic subjectivities explored in the proscribed writings of William Faulkner. In short, this book is all about modernism’s tardy cuckoos, the presumptive might-have-beens who never quite managed to make it and thus ended up being left behind in the discard pile among the never-were-s, the preterite of “obscene modernism.” Literary Obscenities is for the scumbags, smut peddlers, and closet cases who populated the literary landscape towered over by the modernist giants we love to study, criticize, and esteem. More often than not, however, this thing called “obscenity” was produced by men and women as unprepossessing and downright disreputable as these bottom dogs.

Excerpt: Packing the Suitcase
This book revisits the art and writing of the European avant-gardes as they thrived, roughly, between 1905 and 1935. Before taking off on this book’s journey through Europe in this period, readers need to know a few things. First, as its subtitle highlights, this book is a portable guide. All books are portable of course, but for an introduction to the European avant-gardes such portability is especially relevant. Transportability is one of the defining features of the avant-gardes after all, whether we think of Futurism or Expressionism, Dadaism, Constructivism or Surrealism, or any other -isms we will encounter in the following pages. Many artists discussed in this book travelled remarkable distances during their careers as avant-gardists. Some of them even deserve to be called globetrotters. Take Filippo Tommaso Marinetti, the most important spokesman of the Italian Futurists. Born in Egypt, he spent most of his youth in Italy and France, but by the 1930s he had traversed almost the entire planet, from Russia to the Americas, always and everywhere trumpeting the feats of Futurism and stimulating others to get involved in the movement.
With such a mobile force of writers and artists came an eminently mobile set of publications and ideas. Cubist poet Pierre Albert-Birot, for example, called his first book of poems Trente et un poèmes de poche (Thirty-one pocket poems, 1917), signalling how important it was to him that these were small poems, easily transportable, which readers in turn could put in their pockets and stroll through like gardens, ‘hands in their pockets’. Or consider the trajectory of Dadaist Tristan Tzara. Born in Romania, where at a young age he had been involved in early or proto-Dadaist activities, Tzara’s travels took him to the north, south and centre of Europe; yet he spent most of his time in the west of the continent. Not only did he help introduce the portable word Dada in Paris, assisting in the launch of Dadaism in France, Tzara also turned his suitcase into a moveable office as he travelled all over the continent, mostly by train. An avid user of the postal system who corresponded in various languages to communicate his views to others, Tzara utilised his case as a writing table but also stuffed it with Dada magazines, manifestos and other publications he zealously distributed among like-minded writers and artists. By the time Tzara bid Dada farewell in the 1920s, the spread and reception of such magazines and other texts had made the movement of Dadaism a pan-European phenomenon with branches all over the continent. This brings us to a second thing about this book that needs pointing out before we take off: this book does not deal with any specific ‘national’ avant-garde; thanks to the mobility of early twentieth-century avant-gardists it looks at the avant-gardes as they figured throughout the whole of Europe. Europe is a continent that in the West has boundaries marked by large bodies of water and the British Isles and to the East by the Urals, Ural River and Caspian Sea. That is an unruly span of ground to cover, but in so doing this book only follows the itinerary of many avant-gardists. Like Marinetti, many European avant-gardists travelled even further. Ukrainian David Burliuk, for example, who is often called the ‘father of Russian Futurism’, set up exhibitions in Japan as well. Restricting its scope mainly to what happened within Europe – with the exception of Chapter 6, which also turns to extra-European avant-gardes in the period – this book is thus to an extent artificial, not in the least because Europe around the turn of the century was of course also a colonial power that stretched far beyond the continent. Yet there are good reasons to stick to this constraint. Practicality is one, for how could this introductory study also contain all the extra-European material while remaining portable? More importantly, restricting the scope to the continent follows from the complexity of the terrain we will cover. Europe today (as then) comes with some seventy-five official languages and at least as many national and local cultures, and avant-gardists came from nearly all these cultures and languages. While this book intends to show that, due to their mobility and their singular forms of art, the avant-gardes were in part able to cross many of these linguistic and cultural hurdles with remarkable ease, it also aims to illustrate just how complex and rich that patchwork of languages and cultures made the European avant-gardes. The richly textured nature of the avant-gardes can be glimpsed by quickly looking at the text boxes that are dispersed throughout this book. These text boxes deal with some of the most important avant-garde movements and each box briefly discusses a number of representative and canonised artists, writers and works. These names and works will always be re-encountered by those who after reading this book decide to enjoy the European avant-gardes in more depth. Importantly, almost always these text boxes present movements in the plural; so, not Surrealism but Surrealisms, not Expressionism but Expressionisms, and so on. When discussing Expressionism, for example, it would be ill-advised to limit our gaze to the German-speaking areas of Europe. Expressionism flourished in other regions and countries too, like Denmark and Poland, Croatia and Flanders, and because these variants of Expressionism emerged in different cultural constellations and at other times, these other Expressionisms also tended to differ from the (in itself multifarious) German Expressionism. It is true that some of the text boxes included in this book, like the one on Vorticism, do not present a movement in the plural. Yet here too it will become apparent that it is impossible to do justice to the movement of Vorticism without also taking into account its many connections with other avant-gardes on the continent. Hence, also to gloss the complexity of the European avant-gardes it is...
useful to restrict ourselves to the continent's boundaries.

Third, readers are to know that this book does not focus on one particular artform, be it painting or film, literature or sculpture, architecture or theatre, performance art, dance or music. Why this should be so is made abundantly clear throughout this book: avant-gardists constantly crossed the divides between the arts which tradition and official academies imposed. As a result, it makes little sense to talk, for example, about avant-garde visual art or literature in isolation. Accordingly, when this book talks about ‘art’ what that really means are all the arts together.

Take the exploits of Francis Picabia. This French-born artist could be considered a painter first and foremost; his first painting was exhibited when he was fifteen years old and he later went on to study the art of painting at various institutes. However, Picabia also edited a famous magazine, 391, which presented his own (and others’) drawings and visual art works alongside his poems and essays. In 1924, another text of his would come to form the basis for a ballet entitled Relâche that was performed for the first time in Paris by the Ballets Suédois with music composed by Erik Satie. During the break of that ballet performance, a short film, Entr’acte, premiered as well, directed by René Clair with the assistance of Picabia, who also appeared in the film itself along with many other avant-gardists. In short, to call Picabia a painter would be a misrepresentation of his many activities as an artist, and more generally would amount to missing a crucial feature of the avant-gardes.

Very often too it makes little sense to talk about individual works as belonging to one artform exclusively. This is made very apparent when we consider avant-garde books. What to think, for example, of Russian El Lissitzky’s Pro dva kvadrata? Combining word and image, this book narrates the adventures of a black and a red square that visit the earth from outer space. To label this book plainly literature or simply to call it a work of visual art would again block from view its complex constitution. This is not to say, however, that when discussing the avant-gardes we should simply dismiss the boundaries between artforms – quite the opposite, as we will see. The avant-gardes often deliberately toyed with these differences, and in the process invented new forms, genres and techniques.

Finally, a word is due about this book’s structure, which is modelled after one of the most portable avant-garde works ever produced: Marcel Duchamp’s Boîte-en-valise (literally, ‘box in a suitcase’, see cover image). From the 1930s onwards, Duchamp made a variety of such boxes or cases, which are basically portable, miniature museums folding open and containing some of his writings as well as small reproductions of certain works, including coloured prints of his paintings and tiny versions of his so-called readymade objects – one of these being his famous 1917 Fountain or urinal. To get to know Duchamp today there is no better place to start than one of his Boîtes-en-valises.

This portable book, similarly, might be read as such a miniature museum. It contains what will hopefully be just the right amount of information to get a good sense of what the European avant-gardes were about and to appreciate avant-garde works in an historically and technically informed way. In the spirit of Duchamp’s Boîtes-en-valises, this book also gives readers the freedom to decide on how to read or use it. Whereas it is quite possible, of course, to read the book front to back, and while this may also be most rewarding, nothing is to keep users from going at it differently. Leafing through the book for the first time, for instance, a reader can feel drawn to one of the artworks reproduced here and decide to start with that specific work. (For details about these works’ materials, dimensions and current location, see the list of illustrations at the start of this book.) The text boxes, moreover, can be easily consulted in isolation, when, for instance, readers quickly need to remind themselves of certain facts. As in other books, the index as well could be the reader’s point of departure. Above all, it is possible to read the different parts of the book, and even the chapters, in a random order.

This book is divided into three larger parts. The first part, ‘Strategies and Tactics’, aims to install a sound sense of the avant-gardes’ artistic approach. What technical and aesthetic innovations did their work introduce? How are we to describe the relation between the various arts in the avant-gardes? How did their work relate to other media at the time?
What aesthetic sensibilities and artistic practices need to be distinguished to properly assess the avant-gardes’ work? And why is that work so important to the history of modern art? The second part, ‘Spaces and Places’, widens the scope and looks at the cultural and political contexts in which the avant-gardes could be found, and at how they related to their surroundings. This part tackles the issue of cultural geography already hinted at, but also looks at the cities in which we would most likely have encountered the avant-gardes, and, even, in what cafés. These contexts and settings are important to highlight for several reasons. For one, they bring out how the avant-gardes also developed a distinctly youthful counterculture of creative exuberance. The third part, ‘Times and Temporalities’, deals with the relationship between the avant-garde and time. The very term ‘avant-garde’ implies a certain temporality: by definition, the avant-garde is ahead of its time. But was it, really? Or is that the wrong question to begin with? Why were the avant-gardes so bent on innovation, rupture, the new? How, similarly, are we to conceive the spread of avant-garde isms or movements throughout Europe, and beyond? Clearly, certain isms emerged in very specific places. Take Surrealism, which first announced itself in 1924 in Paris as a literary movement. When the movement spread to other arts, and to other places, including Great Britain, did that make these other outgrowths mere copies? Last, but not least, we will see that the avant-gardes also had what might be called an obsession with time itself, with trying to capture time as such in their work. Whatever way we look at them, the so-called ‘classic’ or ‘historical’ avant-gardes this book deals with clearly managed to survive their own time. They are ‘historical’ to the extent that they were very much of their own time and in part responded to very concrete historical events and changes. Yet many critics have rightfully argued that the avant-gardes at the same time also fundamentally changed how we think about art in general. For that reason they continue to define our own moment. Given their theoretical and historical importance, the third part of this book also contains a chapter discussing some of the most important theories of the avant-gardes, which in different ways mark the avant-gardes’ lasting significance. Indeed, this is perhaps the last thing readers need to know in advance: be careful, the European avant-gardes’ remarkable energy and untrammelled enthusiasm are contagious.

En route
So how do we best remember the classic or historical European avant-gardes? As a powerful flash of lightning? As a formation once there, now gone? Like the protagonist in Aldo Palazzeschi’s novel Il codice di Perelà (The Codex of Perela, 1977)? A Futurist novel still read in Italian high schools today, this book describes how a man of smoke, Perelà, enters a city, is appointed to write the law, only to be imprisoned and to disappear into thin air again. Or, perhaps, as a formation of young artists who witnessed and responded to one of the most daunting periods in modern European history? Like the main characters in Blaise Cendrars’ La prose du Transsibérien et de la Petite Jehanne de France (Prose of the Trans-Siberian and of Little Jehanne of France, 1973), which tells the story of a sixteen-year-old boy and a girl called Jehanne travelling by train from Moscow to Mongolia through an apocalyptic landscape of war and revolution that is at once mesmerising and frightening? Or as a lasting provocation? As for instance the allegorical Franz Müller in Kurt Schwitters’ short story (with the long title) Franz Müllers Drahtfrühling, Erstes Kapitel: Ursachen und Beginn der grossen glorreichen Revolution in Revon (Franz Müller’s Spring Wire, First Chapter: Causes and Start of the Grand, Glorious Revolution of Revon, 1922). First published in Der Sturm, this absurd narrative recounts how a man, simply by standing still and quiet in the street, unchains a revolution as more and more people gather around him in incomprehension.

Of course, the avant-gardes were all these things and more. The present book was conceived as a portable, Duchampian boîte-en-valise, a miniature museum with multiple points of entry, precisely to illustrate that the avant-gardes are best approached from a variety of angles. To look at them only as a phenomenon in the history of the arts, and an important one at that, as done in the first part of this book, is not quite telling the whole tale. For as shown in the second part of this book, they were also an important counterforce in cultural history more broadly, the lasting impact of which can be felt to this day. As manifested by the third part of this book, the avant-gardes can also be
regarded as questioning conventional views of time and history, as a formation ‘outside of time’ that perhaps continues to speak to and question us. For all these reasons the classic or historical European avant-gardes are best studied from multiple perspectives, with each perspective on them unearthing a new facet that often contradicts another. Indeed, only a dialectic approach, that is one that relates all parts to each other and to the whole, allows us to grasp the avant-gardes. We can read their works for form (or formlessness), we can interpret them as critical interventions in cultural history, we can approach them as comments on the avant-gardes’ own history or as allegorical reflections on the nature of art and time more generally. Yet when we do not do all these things, we always miss part of the avant-gardes’ energetic undertaking. This, indeed, proves the biggest challenge: to contain their untrammelled and radiant energy. For 1935 did not mark the end of the avant-gardes’ energetic enterprise. By that time already their energy had been dispersed on a global scale and after the Second World War it would surge up again with great strength in the so-called neo-avant-gardes, which would require a study like this one simply to do justice to them. Today, the avant-gardes are all around us; first and foremost in the museums, libraries and other cultural venues we frequent. The history of the arts has since taken many turns, yet the avant-gardes’ portable works continue to circulate widely, albeit now very much as part of our cultural heritage, in the canon and in large-scale exhibitions often visited by thousands of people. This book touches upon a mere fraction of works in circulation nowadays. It is only a beginning, a portable atlas to facilitate the further navigation of the avant-gardes’ terrain.
social sciences (education, psychology, sociology, social work, nursing, community development, management, etc.) who are about to embark on or who are already conducting a qualitative research study. This book is for you if

- You are contemplating entering a doctoral program and want to know more about what lies ahead in terms of conducting research and writing a qualitative dissertation.
- You are enrolled in a doctoral program, having difficulty identifying a sound, researchable topic, and hence unable to develop your dissertation proposal.
- You have completed all the course requirements and are about to begin the research but are unsure of how and where to get started.
- You are stuck in some part of the research process and are unable to make progress toward completion of your dissertation.
- You have just about abandoned the idea of ever completing your dissertation for whatever reason.

We have witnessed and experienced many of the frustrations voiced by students confronted with the academic challenge of writing a dissertation. How do I select a suitable topic? How do I narrow and focus an idea? What exactly is a research problem? How do I go about formulating a research purpose? How and in what ways do the research questions relate to the study's overall purpose? How do I conduct a literature review? How do I manage and analyze my data? In response to these and other challenges, we have developed what we call "road maps" for understanding the content of the dissertation and navigating through the iterative, recursive, and often messy dissertation process, from its inception to its ultimate successful completion.

Completing a dissertation is fraught with many challenges, both personal and professional. These challenges often lead to a sense of confusion and feelings of inadequacy, incompetence, and frustration. Overwhelming feelings such as these can often spiral to despondency and apathy. It is at this level that many of the students with whom we spoke find themselves. Faced with life's demands and compounded with the stresses of academic rigor, students often bow out, putting aside their dissertations, sometimes forever.

During most doctoral programs, there is a heavy emphasis on the theoretical concepts that form the basis of research. Having completed all the required research courses, as well as having passed a certification examination, there is an expectation that doctoral students have mastered the various aspects of research design and methodology. However, once students are "out on their own" to complete their dissertations, they are often unclear about appropriate style, content, and/or procedures and are uncertain as to how to proceed. As a result, every university and college has a significant number of what are commonly referred to as all-but-dissertation (ABD) students, those who never manage to complete the dissertation—the culminating product needed to fulfill the requirements to graduate with a doctorate. If you suspect that you might fall into this category, then read on.
requirements as well. Keep in mind, too, that some of the qualitative traditions or genres may require or be open to somewhat different presentational strategies in order to align with the underlying philosophy and/or theory. Although dissertations can vary in form and length, depending on the institution, they do share basic components. All dissertations must have an introduction, a review of the relevant literature, a review of methodology, a presentation of findings, a presentation of analysis and interpretation, and a presentation of conclusions and recommendations. In this book, although we address each of these components comprehensively as separate chapters, we are aware that in some institutions or programs some of these components might be combined in the same chapter. As such, students should adhere to the guidelines set by their own institutions and be mindful of the preferences of their own advisors.

The Purpose of This Book

Completing Your Qualitative Dissertation: A Road Map From Beginning to End fills an important gap in the qualitative research literature by specifically addressing the fast-growing practice of qualitative postgraduate dissertations in colleges and universities throughout the world. Many students struggle to complete qualitative research projects because the research itself is inherently messy. To address this challenge, the authors have distilled decades of experience into a first-of-its-kind, highly practical reference for graduate students. Students often think that the dissertation writing process is simple. We wish we had a simple answer to the question: How to portray the process as doable without neglecting the complexity? This is what this book hopes to achieve!

Logical and systematic thinking is necessary to successfully complete a qualitative dissertation. Completing the dissertation will depend on your ability to successfully master both the content and the process. Aside from offering clear guidelines as to the necessary content, the intent of this book is to shed light on structure and style, thereby making the dissertation process organized and manageable. The purpose of the book is to assist you at whatever stage you find yourself. You might be right at the beginning of the process, unable to select a topic that is interesting and/or researchable. You might already have a topic but are unsure of how to focus it narrowly and articulate a researchable problem. You might have covered a lot of ground already, even having collected and analyzed some of your data, but are feeling stuck, lost, or adrift.

Writing a dissertation is a process, but not one that is neat, linear, or always completely transparent. As a cautionary note, the structure of this book may suggest that you will proceed from one point to the next in a seamless and logical manner. Please remember that there will be much looping back and forth, with many iterations and curves along the way. Such is the way of qualitative research and the way of dissertation development. We trust that you will keep this in mind. The intent is to help you better understand the various elements involved in the qualitative dissertation and be able to address these elements appropriately and effectively, thereby making the process more manageable and doable. Moreover, our hope is that the process is a meaningful one for you. A dissertation is intended to be an academically rigorous process, the completion of which demonstrates that you are qualified to join a research community whose members carry the title "Dr." This is a unique opportunity to choose a topic of your own interest, to learn more about it, and to make a contribution to existing bodies of knowledge in your field. The frustrations and difficulties involved in taking on a project of this magnitude, and the level of commitment required and the sacrifices that you have made to get to this point, are all understandable. It is also understandable how important it is for you to complete your dissertation so that you do not remain ABD forever. Therefore, the goal of this book is that you are able to produce a dissertation, and so we offer this step-by-step guide from inception to completion. Our sincere hope is that this book helps you understand the process, embrace it, and succeed!
The cover illustration of this book abstractly depicts the typical doctoral graduation gown sleeve with three velvet stripes, and doctoral cap—the black velvet tam with the golden tassel. The blue hue represents the color of the graduation gown of Columbia University where both authors obtained their doctorates. (And the orange represents the sun at the end of the long dissertation journey; something to dream of and strive for!) Academic regalia, colloquially known as the "cap and gown" or "graduation robes," are the formal attire worn by degree candidates and holders during various ceremonial occasions. The history of the cap and gown dates back over 800 years to scholars in medieval Europe. Around this time, students and professors began organizing themselves into guilds, and three distinct groups emerged: the apprentices (bachelor of arts), the teachers (master of arts), and the teachers who had completed postgraduate work (doctorate). The style of robes and dress became standardized as a gown with a hood. Today’s cap and gown are based on 14th- and 15th-century styles that were particularly popular with students and teachers at Oxford and Cambridge universities in England. American commencement rituals and graduation dress have been in place since colonial times and were standardized by the intercollegiate code in 1895. Doctoral graduates traditionally wear robes with a velvet stripe that extends down the front panel, as well as three velvet stripes across the sleeves in colors indicating the area of study. In addition, instead of the mortarboard that is characteristic of bachelor’s and master’s degree status, those receiving the doctoral degree traditionally wear a black velvet tam with a small golden tassel. With these images in mind, you have something concrete to aspire to in striving to reach the pinnacle of academic achievement: your doctorate!

How This Book Works

This book offers a series of road maps that are designed to help you steer your way through the various activities that constitute the process of writing a qualitative dissertation. At each juncture of the process, the road maps allow you to clarify your objectives, understand and tackle the task at hand, and check on what you have accomplished before you proceed to the next step.

At the heart of the book is a series of chapters that models the typical progression of a dissertation. Each chapter is illustrated by examples that give the reader an understanding of what the actual write-up would look like. Emphasis throughout the book is on conceptual understanding as it relates to the practical aspects involved in navigating the dissertation process. To begin, we use an actual research problem, which is the problem that confronts you, the reader. You are reading this book because you have not yet managed to complete your dissertation. This same problem is the example that will be addressed as the basis of discussion throughout this book. This problem is referred to insofar as it relates to each step of the dissertation process, and as such, you will see a common thread running throughout each of the chapters. We proceed from articulating the problem statement through developing a research purpose and associated research questions. Based on the research problem, we formulate appropriate data collection methods, analyze and synthesize data, and present conclusions and recommendations. In effect, the problem that is used in this book provides a model for you in conducting and writing up your own dissertation.

As you prepare to navigate the dissertation process, please be aware of three caveats:

- First, the approach throughout is to emphasize conceptual understanding as it relates to the practical aspects involved in navigating the dissertation process. As such, this approach bears some caution as it may be seen as an attempt to reduce the complexity and "messiness" of qualitative research by way of a series of simplified "how-to" offerings. The many tables and checklists that are provided in this book might imply that the process is linear. However, this is certainly not the case! It is difficult for many students to
understand that even a road map is a guideline only, and sometimes routes must be retraced or detours developed in order to avoid or navigate unexpected roadblocks. Although our intent is to demystify the dissertation process, we do not sacrifice intellectual rigor for the sake of simplification. This book is not intended to be a quick fix, nor do we offer an easy recipe for success. In our experience, completing a dissertation is a rigorous and demanding process. It is iterative, unpredictable, and in many respects, recursive. However, with the development of a clearer understanding, sharpened competencies, and a set of resources to guide you, the dissertation is, in fact, doable.

• As a second caveat, the reader is reminded throughout that there are various institutional differences and requirements regarding the structure of a dissertation. Be aware that while most institutions will approach the dissertation in common ways, at the same time there are differences in terms of the organization and presentation, and also distinct differences in terms of what and how qualitative language and terminology are used. Of note is that some universities require a five-chapter dissertation by combining data analysis and interpretation of findings into a single chapter. This book presents information as guidelines that are meant to be flexible per institutional expectations and requirements, and subject to modification depending on your institution, department, and program. As such, this book is meant to be a guide rather than a prescriptive one-fits-all approach.

• A third caveat is that although we do offer a general structure regarding the writing of a dissertation, we do not believe this structure should stifle students’ creativity. Creativity comes into play through your own initiative in how you design your instruments, develop your conceptual frameworks and related coding schemes, present your findings, and analyze, interpret, and synthesize your data. That said, however, qualitative research must not be viewed as an exercise in creative writing when it is, in fact, an exercise in conducting a research project that is integrative and intellectually rigorous. Rigor and structure are necessary and essential in order to account for subjectivity and keep creative speculation in check.

We realize that readers of this book are at different stages of the dissertation process. We suggest that you start off by finding your own entry point and, depending on where you are in the dissertation process, begin at the chapter that is most relevant to you. If you are just starting out on your research study, with no clearly defined topic, you should start reading this book from the beginning. If you are further along in the research process, choose to focus on those chapters that are most relevant to your unfolding experience. We readily acknowledge that researchers never move in a linear fashion. Conducting research and writing a dissertation are not like following a clearly marked path. Rather, this process is iterative and recursive, looping back and forth, with many unanticipated events along the way. This book is intended, through its road maps, to walk you through that process and through the confusion.

Organization of This Book
This book is organized in three parts:
Part I, "Taking Charge of Yourself and Your Work," is the point of entry and constitutes a broad introduction to the complex task of writing a dissertation. Part I offers an overview of the steps involved in thinking about and preparing for the dissertation process. The objective of Part I is fourfold: (a) demystify and clarify the dissertation process while maintaining intellectual rigor and the highest ethical standards; (b) expand students’
understanding and appreciation of both the content and the process pertaining to conducting qualitative research and producing a sound defensible dissertation; (c) demonstrate the skills needed to conduct and write up the study; and (d) recognize, appreciate, and adopt the attitudes that will contribute to the success of the research project.

Part I consists of five chapters:

Chapter 1, "A Complete Dissertation: The Big Picture," provides a cursory glance at the constitution of an entire dissertation by way of a comprehensive outline of all key elements for each section of the dissertation. This chapter is a precursor of what is to come, with each element being more fully developed and explained further along in the book. This chapter also addresses evaluating the quality of a qualitative dissertation, and two extensive rubrics are included toward this end.

Chapter 2, "Gearing Up: There Is Method in the Madness," introduces the mind-set that is required to create the physical and mental "space" necessary to begin the dissertation process in as methodical a manner as possible. The chapter includes a discussion about the strengths and limitations regarding identification and choice of topic, as well as clarification regarding appropriate advisor—student collegial relationships and mutual responsibility. The chapter also begins the process of thinking about organizing, managing, and securing data, as well as developing the skills that are needed for establishing and maintaining a realistic and doable timeline.

Chapter 3, "Choosing a Qualitative Research Approach," discusses the implications of choosing a qualitative research approach based on the study’s problem, purpose, and research questions. The chapter includes an overview of the historical development and current status of the field of qualitative inquiry, illustrates the primary characteristics of qualitative research, and includes an overview of how these characteristics compare and contrast with the characteristics of quantitative and mixed methods approaches. We strive for conceptual understanding of the logic behind choice of research approach including knowledge claims and underlying philosophical principles by clarifying and explaining the most commonly used, current, and cutting-edge qualitative methodologies (genres or traditions), with an emphasis on researcher reflexivity and insights into the critiques of each tradition.

Chapter 4, "Developing Your Proposal," explains the logic and reasoning behind developing a sound and comprehensive research proposal by providing an in-depth understanding of the content of a three-chapter proposal so that students can make direct application to their own research. Included in this chapter is a comprehensive set of guidelines regarding academic writing skills, as well as sections that clarify expectations and issues regarding academic integrity including accidental plagiarism and ways to avoid this offense. The chapter also provides guidelines regarding institutional review board (IRB) application and approval requirements.

Chapter 5, "Achieving Alignment Throughout Your Dissertation," seeks to provide a clear understanding of the concept of alignment in qualitative research, highlights and clarifies the key elements that must be aligned throughout the dissertation, and explains how to ensure and check for alignment throughout the research process. The dissertation should provide clear evidence that you have addressed alignment at every step of the process so that the study is tight in terms of methodological integrity. The chapter begins with a detailed table that serves as an at-a-glance road map and checklist, indicating all the components and elements that should be taken into account vis-à-vis alignment, and for ease of use, includes reference to relevant chapters in this book.

The chapters of Part II, "Content and Process: A Chapter-by-Chapter Road Map," narrow and focus the scope of the discussion, and direct the reader’s attention to the discrete aspects involved in conceptualizing and addressing the research and
writing process. Each of the chapters of Part II provides comprehensive instructions with respect to the content of a specific dissertation chapter, and how to develop that content. Instructions also pertain to understanding the process involved in setting up each dissertation chapter. The "Application" section of each chapter in Part II demonstrates what a completed chapter of a dissertation should look like by way of a consistent research example that is carried throughout all of the chapters. Although the application section of each chapter represents a model or example of application, in a real dissertation, the reader is reminded that the discussion would need to be elaborated as required.

At the outset of Part II, and throughout the chapters that constitute Part II, we are careful to point out that while most institutions will approach the proposal and dissertation in common ways, at the same time there are differences in terms of the organization and presentation, and distinct differences in terms of what and how qualitative language and terminology are used. This book presents information as guidelines that are meant to be flexible per institutional expectations and requirements and are subject to modification depending on your institution, department, and program.

The chapters that make up Part II are organized in such a way as to reflect and describe the actual chapters of a dissertation. Part II consists of six chapters:

Chapter 6, "Introduction to Your Study," explores the foundational elements that are necessary in the first chapter of a dissertation, which is the introduction to the study. This includes how to identify and develop a researchable problem from a broader topic area, formulate a clear and concise problem statement, and align this with the study’s purpose and research questions. Also covered are the additional components of the first chapter of a dissertation, including overview of approach, rationale and significance, researcher assumptions and perspectives, and clarification of terminology used.

Chapter 7, "Developing and Presenting Your Literature Review," provides an understanding of the function, purpose, and structure of a literature review, describes the role of a research-based critical literature review in a dissertation, and outlines the skills related to the various steps involved in conducting and presenting a thorough and systematic review of the literature, including identifying and retrieving relevant and credible material and sources, and analyzing, evaluating, and synthesizing ideas found in the literature. This chapter also addresses the theoretical or conceptual framework as an integral element of the research process and provides detailed explanation regarding how to think about developing this framework and how it functions with regard to analysis of research findings.

Chapter 8, "Presenting Methodology and Research Approach," offers a guide for tackling the dissertation’s methodology chapter. Key components of the methodology chapter are identified, and explanation is provided regarding how each component of the research methodology must be developed and presented. These components include research sample and population, sampling method, information sources, research design, methods and strategies of data collection, methods of analysis, trustworthiness issues, ethical considerations, and limitations and delimitations of the study. This chapter illustrates how all of the combined components form a logical, interconnected sequence and contribute to the overall alignment and methodological integrity of the research study.

Chapter 9, "Analyzing Data and Reporting Findings," demonstrates how to write and present the findings of a research study, illustrating clearly how the findings address the research problem and provide a response to each of the study’s research questions. The challenge of qualitative analysis lies in making sense of large amounts of data—reducing raw data, identifying what is significant,
and constructing a framework for communicating the essence of what the data reveal. This chapter begins with a conceptualization of qualitative data analysis and goes on to identify the specific strategies involved in analyzing qualitative data. Detailed explanations are provided regarding how to organize, reduce, and prepare raw data through coding and categorization; how to formulate clear and precise findings statements based on analysis of the data; and how to report and present findings in a clear, comprehensive, and systematic manner.

Chapter 10, "Analyzing, Interpreting, and Synthesizing Findings,” explains how to analyze and interpret the study’s findings. This chapter demonstrates how to integrate and synthesize the findings with the literature and ways to go about interpreting and presenting the meaning behind those findings, which is the essence of the research. The chapter offers detailed explanation and description of qualitative analysis and the concept of synthesis as an ongoing process, and how to go about presenting a final integrated synthesis. A key focus is on the reflexivity of the researcher in performing analysis and interpreting the findings. It should be mentioned that some universities and programs adopt an approach that combines this chapter and the previous one, resulting in a five-chapter dissertation format. As such, analysis of data, reporting findings, and analyzing and interpreting those findings are sometimes presented in the same chapter.

Chapter 11, the final chapter of Part II, "Drawing Trustworthy Conclusions and Presenting Actionable Recommendations," presents the ways in which to address the last chapter of a dissertation: your study’s conclusions and the recommendations that you provide for practice, policy, and future research. Included is an explanation of what conclusions are as distinct from findings and interpretations, as well as suggestions for thinking about and developing sound conclusions and practical, actionable, and research-based recommendations. Emphasis is placed on the significance of alignment among the study’s findings, interpretations, conclusions, and recommendations. The chapter also offers the researcher an opportunity for a final reflection statement.

Part III, "Nearing Completion," addresses the final stages of the dissertation process by explaining all the activities that need to take place when nearing completion of the dissertation and by providing guidelines regarding how to most effectively engage in these final activities, including preparing for a successful defense. Part III is designed to bring a sense of closure to the dissertation process and to offer some suggestions for moving beyond the dissertation, and consists of two chapters:

Chapter 12, "Some Final Technical Considerations," focuses on the technical considerations involved in the final stages of the dissertation process. Here we offer advice and suggestions around the concept of alignment with regard to an entire dissertation and how to check for this. We also provide instruction and guidelines with regard to crafting an appropriate dissertation title, devising a dissertation abstract that conforms to academic standards, proofreading, editing, and comprehensive assembly of the manuscript. This chapter also includes a comprehensive final checklist for all activities (both conceptual and practical) that addresses in the entire research and writing process.

Chapter 13, "Defense Preparation and Beyond," offers guidelines and suggestions regarding pre-defense preparation, including choosing a committee and they preparing for a successful defense. A comprehensive list of possible defense questions is included. These questions are designed to help students begin to think about and prepare for the event, and they address different aspects of the work—the research process itself, the outcomes of the study, and the study’s conceptual framework. The chapter also offers guidelines and suggestions regarding post-defense preparation, including possible avenues for the presentation and publication of the research. Recommended
resources are provided to assist with publication and presentation of the research.

Defining Features of This Book
Some books on writing a dissertation explain the process in overcomplicated language—the classic textbook scholarly writing style that tends to mystify and overwhelm the reader. Other books on the subject make assumptions that by following a set of instructions the reader will somehow know how to conduct the process and do not take into account the inherent messiness of qualitative research. Still others offer way too many unrelated examples and fail to provide sufficient detail and strong examples of the various elements involved. All these versions are difficult to learn from.

Included in Completing Your Qualitative Dissertation: A Road Map From Beginning to End are a number of useful and reader-friendly features that set this book apart:

The focus throughout is on conceptual understanding as it relates to the practical aspects involved in navigating the dissertation process.

Throughout all of the chapters, we reinforce the importance of maintaining alignment among all elements of the dissertation to ensure methodological congruence and, therefore, maintain high academic standards. While this is emphasized at various points throughout, Chapter 5 is dedicated to this matter, highlighting all necessary key components and providing an expanded and detailed discussion. Chapter checklists in each of the chapters of Part II also now include a separate section to address alignment of research components, making the concept of alignment more prominent throughout.

Because reflection and reflexivity are cornerstones of qualitative research, each chapter of Part II includes a set of reflexive questions to stimulate critical thinking and reflection regarding the potential impact of your methodological choices, and what might be potential inherent researcher biases and assumptions. These questions are designed to serve as prompts for journaling throughout the dissertation process, allowing you to think more critically about what reflexivity looks like at different stages of the research process.

Part II of the book mirrors each of the chapters of an actual dissertation, with a focus on addressing all key required components. The purpose of each chapter is twofold: to provide instruction and to demonstrate application, and so each of these chapters is presented in two sections: Section I provides instructions regarding the specific content of each chapter and how that content is developed. Section II is the application that demonstrates what a written-up chapter would look like based on the content developed. In this way, the chapters of Part II are, in effect, a dissertation in action.

A real researchable problem is illustrated up front and is carried through in the application section of each chapter of Part II to demonstrate the steps involved in the dissertation process. By using a real problem, we model what a real dissertation should look like. Carrying one research problem throughout the chapters also allows the reader to follow the same idea as it threads through all the different sections required in a qualitative dissertation.

The authors acknowledge and reinforce throughout the book that there are often institutional and/or program-related differences in requirements vis-à-vis the dissertation process. Where appropriate, we flag possible instances of differences in the content and structure of the dissertation so that students are aware of these.

Where appropriate, we point out instances where qualitative traditions or genres might differ in application and explain how these differences or distinctions can be addressed.

In the instruction section of each chapter of Part II, road maps in the form of tables, figures, and checklists are provided throughout. These afford at-a-glance overviews at each stage of the research-writing process. These road maps are our own creation and have not been previously published.
Based on the idea of road maps, we emphasize the use of working tools to clarify thinking and organize and present the data. Within each instruction section, we include templates for how to go about creating these tools. In the appendices, we include various completed exemplars to offer the reader some idea of what the finished products might look like.

A quality assessment checklist is provided for each chapter of Part II. This checklist is a supplement to the narrative and serves to review what needs to be accomplished before proceeding to the subsequent chapter. A final comprehensive checklist for the complete dissertation is provided in Part III.

Most of the chapters include a set of annotated resources for referral to additional up-to-date, cutting-edge, and relevant literature and research. In preparing this book, the lead author, Linda Bloomberg, has done extensive research and literature reviews, and shares sources that have been found to be most useful. In many cases, this includes seminal works in the field, but also includes works that are less well known and that are considered worthwhile and relevant. With each edition of this book, these annotations have been updated to reflect currency in the field. This edition’s annotated bibliography includes a total of 68 resources.

A comprehensive checklist of all the activities that constitute the entire dissertation process is provided on the inside of the back cover. This practical tool is intended to help students get started on the process and keep themselves in check with regard to the required activities at every stage along the way.

New to the Fourth Edition: Chapter-by-Chapter Overview
This fourth edition of Completing Your Qualitative Dissertation: A Road Map From Beginning to End follows a similar structure to the successful first edition published in 2008, the second edition (2012), and the third edition (2016), and continues to offer doctoral students comprehensive guidance and accessible and practical tools for navigating each step in the recursive and iterative qualitative dissertation process. While key features that distinguish the book’s unique approach are retained, this fourth edition responds to developments in the field as well as reviewer feedback. Two key elements are new to the fourth edition:

Throughout, there is a greater focus on application to a broader range of qualitative methodologies (traditions or genres). The author’s view of qualitative research is to go beyond prevailing assumptions and norms, make a strong case for nonhegemonic, inclusive ways of thinking and informed action, and thereby intentionally facilitate transformative and equity-oriented possibilities. A critical stance vis-à-vis research is vital at the current historical moment, with dominant powerful and pervasive ideologies and policies working to marginalize and silence individuals and groups who challenge the status quo. Indeed, the title of both the 13th and 14th International Congress of Qualitative Inquiry (2017, 2018) is Qualitative Inquiry in Troubled Times. This fourth edition includes a greater focus on how all qualitative traditions or genres can encompass activist research and social justice inquiry, taking a critical stance toward highlighting and potentially changing social structures and processes that shape individual and collective life. This broader coverage of the critical aspect of inquiry, including both methodologies and methods, is reflected throughout (particularly in Chapters 3, 5, 8, 9, and 10) as well as in the selected annotated bibliographies at the end of each chapter. With the increasing tendency for qualitative researchers to ask themselves what the outcome of their research will be in terms of making some impact on a larger social purpose, the inclusion of a strong activist agenda and how qualitative researchers can approach their research critically is now more apparent among all of the different traditions or genres. This broader coverage addresses the current landscape of qualitative research and allows the book to have wider application for dissertation work within the evolving field of qualitative inquiry.
Considering the researcher as the primary instrument of research, the importance of systematically and methodically addressing social location and positionality, and paying close attention to context and complexity become critical toward achieving rigorous and trustworthy research. Assessing issues of trustworthiness, and in particular credibility, has increasingly become a clear focus in the evaluation of qualitative research studies. One of the most fundamental quality criteria for qualitative research is reflexivity; the practice of situating oneself within the context of the research, showing an awareness of, sensitivity to, and engagement with the cultural and social embeddedness of methods, theories, and research questions, as well as reflecting on and critiquing one’s own assumptions and biases. As such, in the current edition, there is a greater focus throughout on reflexivity, underscoring the importance that as a researcher you are thinking more deeply about the potential impact of all the choices you make regarding your study’s design, including identification, justification, and limitations for all methodological choices, and what might be your biases and assumptions, and why. Critically confronting and engaging with our interpretations, and the biases that shape them, is a key consideration in qualitative research. Addressing this ethical responsibility requires a reflexive approach to research that also includes developing and maintaining a commitment to openness to critical feedback and change. This focus is reflected throughout (particularly in Chapters 3, 5, 8, 9, and 10). In addition, each of the chapters of Part II includes a set of reflexive questions that are designed to tap into any inherent biases and assumptions.

The current edition includes additional and updated materials in each of the chapters of Part I, and presents a new Chapter 5, "Achieving Alignment Throughout Your Dissertation.”

Chapter 1, "A Complete Dissertation: The Big Picture", outlines each content element involved in the dissertation process and includes "reasons," "quality markers," and "frequent errors" for each element. This broad guideline overview is a precursor of what is to come, with each element being more fully explored and developed further along in the book. Chapter 1 includes an updated section for evaluating the quality of a qualitative dissertation, and toward this end, two updated and revised evaluation rubrics are provided.

Chapter 2, "Gearing Up: There Is Method in the Madness," provides additional information and practical tips regarding organizing and managing the research project. Also included is a new section pertaining to data security, emphasizing its importance in light of the advent and pervasiveness of social media and new technologies, including various forms of publicly accessible visual, audio, and virtual materials and data.

Chapter 3, "Choosing a Qualitative Research Approach," is substantially rewritten and reorganized to reflect the history and current landscape of qualitative research, highlighting key trends and ongoing developments in the field. Additional details pertaining to the defining features of qualitative research as a field of inquiry have been incorporated to enhance greater understanding of the nuances involved. This edition includes additional clarification regarding mixed methods research as an intentional research approach in its own right, and how this approach aligns with qualitative research methods. Also new to this edition is an outline of the role of the qualitative researcher, with an added emphasis on criticality and reflexivity. The chapter describes and explains in more detail than previous editions the most commonly used current and cutting-edge qualitative methodologies (traditions or genres), and for comparative purposes, this edition includes particular reference to each of the major genres' philosophical underpinnings, application, methods, and critiques. With the increasing tendency for qualitative researchers to ask themselves what the outcome of their research will be in terms of making some impact on a larger social purpose, the inclusion of a strong activist agenda and how qualitative researchers can approach their research critically is now more apparent among all of the...
different traditions or genres. Discussion around indigenous methodologies and critical arts-based inquiry is new to the section on critical genres. Throughout this chapter is an increased emphasis on reflexivity, the politics of research, representation, positioning and positionalilty, and voice as integral features of a critical, collaborative, and activist stance.

Chapter 4, "Developing Your Proposal," includes updated references to a variety of style manuals used in the social sciences and additional guidelines for academic writing and APA format and style requirements. The current edition's chapter also includes expanded sections that address the dissertation's literature review and methodology chapter requirements and also provides additional details regarding the use of pilot studies and field tests.

An all-new Chapter 5, "Achieving Alignment Throughout Your Dissertation," provides the necessary clarity regarding the importance of methodological integrity and congruence throughout the research and writing process. This new chapter has grown out of work Linda Bloomberg has done in developing workshops and seminars on this topic. In her own work with doctoral students, as well as in discussing this with colleagues at various universities around the world, students' understanding and achieving alignment throughout the qualitative dissertation is very often a stumbling block, and lack of expertise in this area often complicates an already stressful process. Alignment (or lack of alignment) is often a key question or issue at the time of the dissertation defense as well. This chapter provides a clear understanding of the concept of alignment in qualitative research, highlights and clarifies the key elements and concepts to be aligned throughout the dissertation, and explains how to ensure and check for alignment, and therefore methodological integrity, throughout. Table 5.1, "Aligning Key Dissertation Components," serves as an at-a-glance road map and checklist, indicating all the key components and elements that should be taken into account vis-à-vis alignment, and for ease of use, it includes reference to relevant chapters in this book. Numerous new references were added with this chapter. To ensure that alignment is addressed throughout the research and writing process, this concept is revisited throughout all of the book's chapters. In addition, chapter checklists have been updated to address the alignment among research components, making the concept of alignment more prominent.

The chapters of Part II, "Content and Process: A Chapter-by-Chapter Road Map," continue to mirror the chapters of an actual dissertation. Chapters 6 through 8 set up the study and constitute the study's framework. As pointed out in Part I, these three chapters form the research proposal. Chapters 9 through 11 discuss how to analyze and present the data that are collected.

Chapter 6, "Introduction to Your Study," remains largely unchanged except for more detailed discussion around the significance of identifying and developing a viable research problem, articulating a clear and concise purpose statement, and developing strong research questions. As mentioned at the outset, and again in subsequent chapters, the reader is continually reminded that while most institutions will approach the proposal and dissertation in common ways, there are some differences in terms of the organization and presentation of the proposal and dissertation.

In appreciating how doctoral students often struggle with developing a well-synthesized literature review and comprehending the nature and function of a theoretical or conceptual framework, additional discussion in Chapter 7, "Developing and Presenting Your Literature Review," serves to enhance and clarify these integral aspects that have significant implications for the design and analysis of qualitative research. Additional explanation is provided around the nature and function of the conceptual or theoretical framework in a dissertation as well as the subtle differences between these two terms, even though they are often used interchangeably. This edition also includes expanded discussion in a number of
other areas: the role and function of a literature review, the significance of utilizing credible peer-reviewed literature, strategies to organize and manage material, and the use of concept maps to critically analyze literature. The section on literature synthesis has also been expanded, and two new synthesis matrices have been included as workable tools to assist in developing this chapter of the dissertation.

Chapter 8, "Presenting Methodology and Research Approach," includes numerous new additions and some revisions. New to the chapter is a section on Internet and online research as work in the field; triangulation strategies to address trustworthiness; document review and analysis; and ethics (with specific reference to privacy issues, including confidentiality and anonymity). Sections that have been substantially reworked include reflexivity/positionality and a critical stance as this relates to the role of the researcher; data analysis and how this aligns with choice of qualitative methodology (tradition or genre); and trustworthiness issues, including credibility, dependability, confirmability, and transferability.

Chapter 9, "Analyzing Data and Reporting Findings," continues to acknowledge analytic distinctions among traditions and genres, emphasizing how each tradition is sensitive to particular analytic methods and strategies. This edition places a stronger emphasis on addressing alignment and achieving methodological congruence. There is additional discussion regarding issues involved in researcher reflexivity and additional description of key features and practical relevance of data analysis vis-à-vis the various qualitative genres. A new section addresses analysis of text, discourse (talk), and visual data, and new information is provided with reference to dealing with exceptions in the data. The application section has been revised to indicate even more clearly how the study’s findings must directly address the research problem and respond to each of the study’s research questions.

Chapter 10, "Analyzing, Interpreting, and Synthesizing Findings," remains largely unchanged but provides some additional material and references regarding data analysis and representation within the different qualitative genres or traditions, and greater focus on addressing trustworthiness by way of ongoing researcher reflexivity.

Chapter 11, "Drawing Trustworthy Conclusions and Presenting Actionable Recommendations," remains largely unchanged except for additional emphasis placed on the significance of alignment among the study’s findings, interpretations, conclusions, and recommendations.

Some new material has been added to Part III, "Nearing Completion," which focuses on the final stages of the dissertation process, includes two chapters:

Chapter 12, "Some Final Technical Considerations," remains largely unchanged except for additional reference to alignment in the final checklist.

Chapter 13, "Defense Preparation and Beyond," deals with the challenges encountered in pre- and post-defense preparation. The chapter remains largely unchanged except for the addition of new dissertation defense questions, which have been categorized for ease of use and applicability and are now organized to address the research process itself, the outcomes of the study, and the study’s conceptual framework. Regarding post-defense preparation, an expanded section is devoted to a critical overview of online publication opportunities. A new set of annotated resources describes useful texts for approaching the publication and presentation of research.

New organization and structure throughout this fourth edition includes:
Sections where the narrative was too dense have been reorganized, and additional headings and/or subheadings have been included so that the reader can more easily follow the text.
Updated references, citations, and websites throughout that include new and cutting-edge research and practice, as well as attention to new editions of previously cited works.

Each of the chapters in Part II now includes a set of reflexive questions.

Chapter checklists in each of the chapters of Part II now include a separate section to address alignment of research components. This serves to reinforce and make the concept of alignment more focused and prominent.

Inclusion of new and updated annotated resources throughout provides broad coverage of the most commonly used qualitative traditions or genres included in the book. In order to remain relevant and accessible, all outdated annotations were discarded. A total of 30 new and current annotations were added, and 17 were updated to reflect the most current editions.

Additional revisions have been made to existing charts for organizing data and managing the dissertation process. The fourth edition includes a new table that serves as an at-a-glance road map and checklist, indicating all the key components and elements that should be taken into account vis-à-vis alignment, and the use of this table is extended by including references to relevant chapters in this book. Two new synthesis matrices are provided as practical tools that can be used in developing a literature review. In addition, a new table is included that offers an overview of trustworthiness criteria for qualitative research.

Updated and reformulated appendices where necessary. Two extensive rubrics for evaluating the quality of a completed dissertation and literature review were added in the previous edition. These rubrics, referenced in Chapter 1, have been updated in the current edition and will hopefully continue to be highly useful to both professors and doctoral students and also used as a source of critique and scholarly discussion.

**Evaluation: A Systematic Approach Eighth Edition**
by Peter H. Rossi, Mark W Lipsey, Howard E. Freeman [Sage Publications, 9781506307886]

**Evaluation: A Systematic Approach** by Peter H. Rossi, Mark W. Lipsey, and Gary T. Henry, is the best-selling comprehensive introduction to the field of program evaluation, covering the range of evaluation research activities used in appraising the design, implementation, effectiveness, and efficiency of social programs. Evaluation domains are presented in a coherent framework that not only explores each, but recognizes their interrelationships, their role in improving social programs and the outcomes they are designed to affect, and their embeddedness in social and political context.

Relied on as the "gold standard" by professors, students, and practitioners for 40 years, the new Eighth Edition includes a new practical chapter on planning an evaluation, entirely new examples throughout, and a major re-organization of the book’s content to better serve the needs of program evaluation courses.
CHAPTER 4 ASSESSING THE NEED FOR A PROGRAM

The Role of Evaluators in Diagnosing Social Conditions and Service Needs
Defining the Problem to Be Addressed
Specifying the Extent of the Problem: When, Where, and How Big?
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Excerpt: This eighth edition contains some new material and extensive revisions of topics that appeared in previous editions. The amendments include an extended treatment of outcome measurement and monitoring, a better exposition of impact assessment designs, a fuller treatment of some key statistical issues in evaluation research, and a more detailed description of meta-analysis. We believe that these changes bring the volume
more completely in line with the current leading edge of the field.

However, the central theme of providing an introduction to the field of program evaluation has not been changed. We cover the full range of evaluation research activities used in appraising the design, implementation, effectiveness, and efficiency of social programs. Throughout the many revisions of this book, we retain the ambition to communicate the technical knowledge and collective experiences of practicing evaluators to those who might consider evaluation as a calling and to those who need to know what evaluation is all about. Our intended readers are students, practitioners, sponsors of social programs, social commentators, and anyone concerned with how to measure the successes and failures of attempts to improve social conditions.

We believe that reading this book will provide enough knowledge to understand and assess evaluations. However, it is not intended to be a cookbook of procedures for conducting evaluations, although we identify sources in which such procedures are described in detail, including references to advanced literature for the adventurous. Ultimately, nothing teaches how to do evaluations as well as direct experience in designing and running actual evaluations. We urge all those considering entering the field of evaluation research to seek hands-on experience.

In the 1970s when the first edition of this book was published, evaluation was not yet fully established as a way of assessing social programs. It is quite different now. In the 21st century, evaluation research has become solidly incorporated into the routine activities of all levels of government throughout the world, into the operations of nongovernmental organizations, and into the public discussions of social issues. Hardly a week goes by when the media do not report the results of some evaluation. We believe that evaluation research makes an important contribution to the formation and improvement of social policies. Being an evaluator can be an exciting professional role providing opportunities to participate in the advancement of social well-being along with the exercise of technical and interpersonal skills.

We dedicate this edition to the memory of Daniel Patrick Moynihan, who died recently. Over the last half century, Pat Moynihan held an astonishing array of key positions in academia (Harvard), in federal agencies (Assistant Secretary of Labor in the Kennedy and Johnson administrations), as White House staff adviser on urban issues in the Nixon administration, and two terms as a senator representing New York. He published several influential books on social policy and decision making in the federal government. His presence in the Senate measurably raised the intellectual level of Senate deliberations on social policy. In all the positions he held, the improvement of social policy was his central concern. In addition, he was a firm and eloquent advocate of social research and of evaluation research in particular. Pat Moynihan played a critical role in building and supporting federal evaluation activities as well as advancing the social well-being of our society.

Addicted to Incarceration: Corrections Policy and the Politics of Misinformation in The United States, Second Edition by Travis C. Pratt, SAGE Publications, 9781544308050

In Addicted to Incarceration, author Travis C. Pratt uses an evidence-based approach to explore the consequences of what he terms America’s "addiction to incarceration." Highlighting the scope of the issue, the nature of the political discussions surrounding criminal justice policy in general and corrections policy in particular, and the complex social cost of incarceration, this book takes an incisive look at the approach to corrections in the United States.

The Second Edition demonstrates that the United States’ addiction to incarceration has been fueled by American citizens’ opinions about crime and punishment, the effectiveness of incarceration as a means of social control, and perhaps most important, by policies legitimized by faulty
information. Analyzing crime policies as they relate to crime rates and society’s ability to both lower the crime rate and address the role of incarceration in preventing future crime, the book shows students how ineffective the rush to incarcerate has been in the last decade and offers recommendations and insights to navigate this significant problem going forward.

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Excerpt: I once held out hope that a second edition of this book was going to be unnecessary. I wrote the first edition nearly a decade ago, and after it was published in 2009, it seemed like things were getting better with respect to both crime and punishment—at least a little bit. Crime rates (particularly homicides) continued to steadily go down, and the voices claiming that the drop in crime was due to getting tough (more prisons; more police) seemed quieter than those pointing to the intersection of demographic shifts, broader economic changes, and stabilizing drug markets. And 8 years of a progressive presidential administration saw the rise in the popularity of "evidence-based" policymaking, and state prison growth began to level off. We even started letting drug offenders out of prison, and a number of states legalized marijuana—things that were unheard of in 2009. All of this seemed to me like the "addiction to incarceration" might be taking a turn for the better.

And then 2016 happened. The United States elected as its president Donald J. Trump. Now whether you like him or hate him is not necessarily what is important. What is important is how his campaign and time in office have fundamentally changed the nature of the conversations we have about what information is real or not real. When the first edition of Addicted to Incarceration was published, the Internet—at least as we now think of it, where we all have unfettered access to it—was only about 10 years old. And with that "democratization" of information, it became difficult to sift through the sea of information and to separate the good evidence from the bad. That was really the point of the book when I wrote it—to give the reader the "best available evidence" on the nature and consequences of incarceration. That, in and of itself, was challenging enough.

But in this new era of politics, we have now reached a point where it seems as though we are no longer even obligated to get good information. We can instead pick and choose what things we want to believe and then dismiss the rest as "fake news"—a term that has now solidified its place in the American political lexicon. And it turns out that the only evidentiary standard that needs to be met to determine whether something is fake or not is stunningly simple: It's fake if we don't like it. We are now even free to dismiss information as fake just because of where it came from: Did it come from CNN? Fake news. Was it reported in the (failing) New York Times? Fake news. Was it produced by a bunch of overly educated, elitist academics who need safe spaces and trigger warnings? Fake news and snowflakes. This state of affairs is far more troubling than the information overload I was sifting through when Addicted to Incarceration first came out. The risk now is that not only can we not even reach a shared understanding of reality, but also we don't even really need to try to reach one anymore. This is not healthy.

Because the reality of incarceration in this country is still rather troubling. This is the nation we currently live in: one where 2.2 million people are housed in our nation's prisons and jails. Just to put this figure into perspective, this is roughly the same number of people who populate the cities of Las Vegas, St. Louis, and Dallas combined. This group of incarcerated citizens would also be large enough to fill the seats of the nation's largest college football stadium at the University of Michigan 20 times. We live in a nation where if a restaurant is too crowded, a fire marshal can shut it down; but if a prison is too crowded, we either build more
space or we rewrite the definition of what the word "crowded" means.

So here in America we still really like to lock people up. A lot. We have had a deep and abiding affection for doing so, and as a $74 billion dollar a year industry it is safe to say that our addiction to incarceration is still running the show. And the reasons why remain the same: There is faulty information being used about the nature of crime and punishment. Thus, the core purpose of the book remains the same; that is, to expose this misinformation for what it is, and to provide the best available evidence on these issues. This task is arguably more important now than it was 10 years ago.

Accordingly, the central thesis of this book is that the United States has become "addicted to incarceration." This addiction has been fueled by policies legitimized by faulty information about the crime problem in the United States, American citizens’ opinions about crime and punishment, and the efficacy of incarceration as a means of social control. Previous works on incarceration trends have often made the mistake of divorcing punishment policy from the larger social context that generated such policies. This book, on the other hand, takes the wider approach of using trends in incarceration as an example of how the politics of punishment (and the politics of misinformation) have influenced criminal justice policy in recent years.

In doing so, the chapters contained in Part I outline the "scope of the problem" with regard to our current practice of incarceration. The introductory chapter highlights the nature of the political discussions surrounding criminal justice policy in general, and corrections policy in particular, and explicitly discusses the role of misinformation in how the United States has ended up with its current state of incarceration (i.e., how we got to this state of affairs). The second chapter in this section outlines the processes by which political discourse on crime, criminal justice, and punishment has become more and more politicized since the 1960s. In particular, this discussion addresses how control over the nature of punishment "changed hands" away from correctional professionals and toward political entrepreneurs in the late 1960s in the wake of a general movement to bring the issues of crime and its control to the political forefront. It ends with a discussion of the recent rise in "evidence-based" policymaking and how corrections policy has benefitted from this trend, and that there is a risk that those benefits are once again coming under political fire.

The three chapters that comprise Part II—the "Sources and Dimensions of Misinformation"—demonstrate how the policy prescriptions of the last four decades (e.g., mandatory sentences connected to the "war on drugs," three strikes laws) have been based on three different (yet certainly interrelated) forms of misinformation. The first form is misinformation about crime (the topic covered in Chapter 3); specifically, the false notion that increases in the "fear of crime" among Americans simply reflect increases in their actual probability of being the victim of a crime—and in particular, a violent crime. This misconception has been central to policy makers’ public justifications for the continued growth of incarceration as a response to the fears of their voters, particularly in recent years with the growth of immigration and policy makers’ use (or rather misuse) of that issue to whip up even more fear among the public. Misinformation about crime has also come in the form of the misconception that low-level offenders (e.g., drug and property offenders) will inevitably graduate to violent offending if they are not immediately locked up. According to this logic, sentences for even nonserious offenses should be ratcheted up if one assumes that today’s jaywalker is tomorrow’s murderer. On a related note, misinformation about crime has also produced the false assumption that chronic, life-course persistent offending can be accurately predicted using variables that are given the most "weight" in criminal justice processing: the
severity of the offender’s present offense and his or her prior record.

The second source of misinformation examined in Part II has to do with policy makers’ concerns over the desires and attitudes of the American public (the topic of Chapter 4). While political advocates of mass incarceration consistently contend that they are merely being responsive to the demands of their constituents (i.e., they are simply giving the public what it wants), the research presented in Chapter 4 demonstrates that Americans’ views on crime and punishment are far more complex than policy makers generally care to admit. While Americans do harbor fairly punitive “global” opinions about crime and the use of incarceration, a number of studies have demonstrated that when it gets to the “specifics,” Americans also support the philosophy and practice of correctional rehabilitation (even if they still place considerable faith in deterrence and incapacitation approaches). Americans are also quite supportive of early intervention strategies with juveniles and alternatives to incarceration (especially for non-serious drug offenders). The broad point of Chapter 4 is that policy makers have outpaced the desires of the American public to increase the punitiveness of punishment policies.

The third source of misinformation in Part II concerns the effectiveness of incarceration as a crime control strategy (the topic covered in Chapter 5). The specific focus of this chapter is the empirical status of the research that scholars have produced in an effort to uncover whether prison expansion and related policy efforts actually reduce crime. In all, the evidence in favor of “prisons for crime control” is scarce. The reasons behind such weak “incapacitation effects” are also explored in this chapter—in particular, the comparative validity of the “bad implementation” (e.g., “we’re just not tough enough”) versus the “incomplete theory of offender decision making” explanations for why locking up more and more offenders does not seem to do much to the crime rate. The general conclusion reached in Chapter 5 is that prisons, at best, provide little in the way of a crime control return for our public dollar.

The chapters in Part III—“Consequences and Looking Forward”—go on to discuss the various social costs of incarceration. These costs come in the form of how incarceration has replaced other social institutions (e.g., public and mental health care) that were previously charged with the tasks of dealing with public problems; how incarceration (especially the way incarceration is done in the United States) has heightened the risk of personal victimization for inmates and has become a barrier to successful offender reintegration into society; how recent trends in the spatial distribution of the communities from which our primary incarcerated population is drawn have contributed to the further breakdown of inner-city environments and have affected the families and children of incarcerated parents; how incarceration has reinforced and exacerbated existing racial inequalities; how our need to provide additional prison space has resulted in the state’s abdication of punishment to the private sphere and what the profit motive has done (and is continuing to do) to the practice of punishment; and how incarceration affects the children and families of those doing time in prison.

The book ends with the suggestion of a number of strategies to combat our dependence on incarceration. These include emphasizing the practice and philosophy of correctional rehabilitation, developing early intervention strategies with juvenile offenders, and reinvesting in community corrections, as well as strategies that readers can employ to separate good information from bad. The point here is not to be preachy, but rather to offer up evidence-based crime control policy alternatives to incarceration. By shining a spotlight on the misinformation surrounding our current punishment practices, perhaps the work presented here may, at minimum, serve as a catalyst for a more informed public discussion about our reliance on prisons as the primary mechanism for social control.
And to that end, this is not a time to ignore social scientific evidence or to be dismissive of it—particularly with something that affects so many American lives like incarceration does. At a time when respect for reliable information is dwindling, the important thing is to fight back against it with the body of legitimate scientific evidence that we have access to, and to remember that facts and feelings are not the same thing (just because you "feel" like it was a record crowd at inauguration day and that the sun was shining does not magically turn either of those things into facts).

Because in the end, addictions do not go away quietly—they go kicking and screaming, and the tantrum over reducing levels of incarceration seems to have already started. So I will double down on my faith in the notion that good evidence still matters and that ignoring it has consequences. Not all readers will be happy with what they read here. Indeed, those who cling to the idea that we can build our way out of the crime problem will find little in the way of comfort in this book—the evidence is simply stacked way too high against that idea. Accordingly, I urge readers to resist the temptation to dismiss it. You can do better. We all can.

It was a pleasure getting to revisit Addicted to Incarceration. And while the structure and the core message in the book remain the same here in the second edition, there is a lot of new material covered here. Some of the new content entailed updating the statistical information and the research related to each of the key points. The first edition is, after all, nearly a decade old, and a lot of new research has been produced over that time that speaks directly to the points raised in this book. I wanted to make sure that this new work was communicated to readers. Each chapter also now ends with a brief list of key readings along with several discussion questions that should help readers keep their thoughts focused and organized as they read.

There is considerable new substantive content here in the second edition as well. Among this new material is the inclusion of a discussion of the rise of evidence-based crime control and corrections policy (see Chapter 2) and an overview of the revival of the rational/choice deterrence, get-tough philosophy in recent years (see Chapter 5). In addition, Chapter 6 now contains a discussion of the consequences of incarceration for families and children of incarcerated parents, as well as a new section on immigration, crime, and punishment. And last, the final chapter of the book has been completely retooled with respect to recommendations for the future, particularly with respect to tips for readers for how to evaluate the validity and reliability of scientific information in a critical way without being dismissive. I hope that readers are challenged by the book and that they come away from it with an appreciation of the role that science can and should play with respect to correctional policy.


While traditional in its coverage of the major research traditions that have developed over the past 100 years, Organizational Communication is the first textbook in the field that is written from a critical perspective while providing a comprehensive survey of theory and research in organizational communication.

Extensively updated and incorporating relevant current events, the Second Edition familiarizes students with the field of organizational communication—historically, conceptually, and practically—and challenges them to critically reflect on their common sense understandings of work and organizations, preparing them for participation in 21st-century organizational settings. Linking theory with practice, Dennis K. Mumby and new co-author Timothy R. Kuhn skillfully explore the significant role played by organizations and corporations in constructing our identities.

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About the Authors

Excerpt: It’s been quite a while (decades, in fact) since we were students, taking the sort of course you’re in now. And though our memories of those days may be a little fuzzy, we recall never really liking the textbooks we were assigned. They were dry and uninteresting attempts to capture large bodies of theory and research, which reduced the complex scholarly literature into lists that we had to regurgitate on exams. As professors, those frustrations grew only stronger. Although there are several terrific organizational communication textbooks (a few of them written by scholars we deeply respect), finding a textbook that fits with the way we approach this course proved challenging. Specifically, the typical textbook is written as if from nowhere. It’s hard to tell from reading the book if the author has a particular perspective or set of assumptions that he or she brings to the study of the topic. In other words, most textbooks read as though they’re offering an objective, authoritative account of a particular body of knowledge; the author’s voice almost never appears. But the truth is that every theory and every program of research you’ve ever read about in your college career operates according to a set of principles—a perspective, if you like—that shapes the very nature of the knowledge claims made by that research.

Now this does not mean that all research is biased in the sense of simply being the expression of a researcher’s opinions and prejudices; all good research is rigorous and systematic in its exploration of the world around us. Rather, all researchers are trained according to the principles and assumptions of a particular academic community (of which there are many), and academic communities differ in their beliefs about what makes good research. That’s why there are debates in all fields of research. Sometimes those debates are over facts (this or that is or isn’t true), but more often those debates are really about what assumptions and theoretical perspectives provide the most useful and insightful way to study a particular phenomenon.

Certainly, the field of organizational communication is no different. In the 1980s, our field went through paradigm debates in which a lot of time was spent arguing over the "best" perspective from which to study organizations—a debate in which Dennis was a key participant. Fortunately, the result of these debates was a richer and more interesting field of study; some disciplines are not so lucky and end up divided into oppositional camps, sometimes for many decades.

As you can probably see, we’re not going to try to overview, in objective fashion, the many perspectives and stances characterizing the
organizational communication field over its history. Our interpretation of the literature, as well as our selection of which literature to include, is shaped by our shared critical orientation. We describe what that means in Chapter 2, but here we should position ourselves: We should address what brought us to this field and how our experiences shape the critical stance from which this book is written. How we got here matters.

For the past 30 years or so Dennis has been writing about organizations from what can broadly be described as a critical perspective. But he didn’t start out as an organizational communication scholar. In the late 1970s as an undergraduate at Sheffield Hallam University, Dennis pursued a BA in communication studies—the first such degree of its kind in the United Kingdom. There, exposed to the cultural studies perspective that we’ll discuss in Chapter 2, Dennis developed a strong interest in how communication and power work in the context of everyday life. How does communication shape people’s realities, and how do some people or groups have more influence over the shaping of reality than others? As an undergraduate, Dennis had never heard of organizational communication, but when he moved to the United States to pursue a PhD, he discovered that some scholars were beginning to think about how we could study organizations as important sites of power and control that shape societal meanings and human identities in significant ways. Thus, he realized that he could apply his broad-based interest in communication and power to an important social context—the organization. Over 35 years later, he still finds organizations endlessly fascinating as communication contexts for examining how people’s social realities of identities are shaped. Thus, Dennis is less interested in things such as how efficient organizations are (a perspective that some researchers would take) and more interested in how they function as communication phenomena that have a profound—sometimes good, sometimes bad—impact on who we are as people. We spend almost all our time in organizations of one kind or another, and certainly our entire work lives are spent as members of organizations, so it’s extremely important to understand the implications of our organizational society of various kinds for who we are as people.

For Tim, the path was a little different. He traces his early interest in organizational communication to conversations around his family’s dinner table, when his father would regale the family with stories of the workplace that day. As a mid-level manager in charge of juice production for a well-known health products company, he regularly complained about the managers above him, who were inevitably shortsighted and petty. During Tim’s senior year of high school, his father was fired from that job, and the conversations around the dinner table made it clear that Dad’s strong distrust of (and lack of respect for) authority was at the root of his firing. When the same thing happened at two similar positions over the next few years, questions of power and identity in the workplace became fascinating. Around the same time that his father lost his job, his mother resumed her career as a kindergarten teacher (until then, Tim’s mother was a homemaker—an occupation that, sadly, rarely registers as “work”). The amount of effort she devoted to her classroom was astounding. She worked late into the evening, almost every evening, commenting on students’ work, creating lesson plans, and producing materials for the classroom. She earned a fraction of the salary Tim’s father did for work that seemed even more important and didn’t seem to deal with the same shortsighted managers as her husband did, and her passion extended the workday well past when he had finished. A different set of questions about power, identity, and the workplace entered Tim’s mind. He didn’t know it then, but the seeds were planted for understanding organizations, and organizing processes, as shot through with power; he also started wondering about how workers’ (i.e., his parents’) identities were constructed so differently and how those identities produced rather different outcomes. He eventually came around to seeing communication processes as key to establishing (and displaying and modifying) identities,
coordinating with others, negotiating authority, and enacting resistance—and his research has revolved around how communication constitutes the very organizations in which those processes are accomplished.

Overview of the Book
But what does this have to do with writing a textbook? We believe that a textbook should not only adequately reflect the breadth of different perspectives in a field, but it should also adopt its own perspective from which a field is studied. It makes no sense that an author should have to check his or her theoretical perspective at the door when he or she becomes a textbook author—the pretense of neutrality and objectivity we mentioned above. In fact, from a student perspective, reading a textbook that’s explicit about its theoretical orientation makes for a much richer educational experience. It’s hard to engage in an argument with someone when that person refuses to state his or her position; when you know where someone is coming from, you are better able to engage with his or her reasoning, as well as articulate your own perspective. Dialogue is possible!

So it’s important to us that you know up front who you’re dealing with here.

Furthermore, the way we’ve structured this textbook does not mean that it is only about the critical perspective. In some ways it is a "traditional" textbook in its coverage of the major research traditions that have developed in the field over the past 100 years. The difference from other textbooks lies in our use of the critical perspective as the lens through which we examine these traditions. Thus, the critical perspective gives us a particular—and powerful—way of understanding both organizational life and the theories and research programs that have been developed to understand it. So as you are reading this book, keep reminding yourself "These guys are working from the perspective of critical theory—how does that shape the way they think about organizations? What conclusions does it lead them to, and how might other assumptions lead in different directions?" Also ask yourself "When do I agree with Dennis and Tim, and when do I disagree with them? Why do I agree or disagree, where did my own beliefs come from, and what does that tell me about my own view of the world?"

In addition to the critical perspective we adopt in this book, we’re also bringing a particular communication approach. Rather than thinking of this book as exploring theories of organizational communication, you can think of it as developing a communicative mode of explanation that enables us to understand organizations as communicative phenomena. Organizations can (and have) been studied from psychological, sociological, and business perspectives (among others), but to study them from a communication perspective means something distinctive and, we think, unique. From this perspective, communication is not just something that happens "in" organizations; rather, it is the very lifeblood of organizations. Organizations, and organizing practices, are communication. It is what makes organizations meaningful places that connect people together to engage collectively in meaningful activity. The implications of this communication perspective will become clearer as we move through the chapters of the book.

New for the Second Edition
There are a number of innovations in this new edition. Indeed, almost every chapter has been extensively revised to reflect developments in the field of organizational communication and work over the last few years. New to this edition are as follows:

- A new chapter on "Information and Communication Technologies in/at Work." This chapter includes discussions of new developments such as platform capitalism and algorithmic management, mobile communication and the extension of the workplace, and extensive discussion of issues related to knowledge management.
- A new chapter on "Fordism and Organization Communication" that provides a comprehensive critical review.
of early theories of management, including scientific management, bureaucracy, human relations theory, and human resource management.

- A new chapter on “Post-Fordism and Organizational Communication,” including discussions of the rise of the gig economy, neoliberal capitalism, the enterprise self, and immaterial labor.
- A new discussion of organizations and corporate social responsibility (Chapter 13)
- A new discussion of the “new science” of complexity and chaos theory (Chapter 4)
- A chapter on “Branding, Work, and Consumption” that is completely updated from the first edition.

Pedagogical Aids
We’ve also updated the pedagogical aids in this new edition that will assist you in getting to grips with the various and sometimes complex issues that we’ll be addressing. First, each chapter contains at least one Critical Case Study that enables you to apply the issues discussed in that chapter to a real-world situation. Think of these case studies as an effort to demonstrate the fact that there’s nothing as practical as a good theory. Second, each chapter contains a Critical Research box that provides some insight into the material in the chapter by interpreting a key study that exemplifies some topic of the chapter. Finally, each chapter highlights key terms in bold throughout the text and lists the key terms at the end of each chapter, along with definitions in the glossary at the end of the book.

The Critical Perspective of the Book
We’d like to say one last thing about the perspective we adopt in this book. This textbook (and indeed, any textbook) is political in the sense suggested by organizational communication scholars Karen Ashcraft and Brenda Allen:

As they orient students to the field and its defining areas of theory and research, textbooks perform a political function. That is, they advance narratives of collective identity, which invite students to internalize a particular map of central and marginal issues, of legitimate and dubious projects.

As we suggested above, knowledge is far from neutral. The ways authors produce, frame, and claim value for knowledge shapes our understandings of it in particular ways. The map we lay out in this book will, we hope, enable you to negotiate organizational life as more engaged and thoughtful organizational citizens (as both members and critical analysts of organizations of all sorts). As such, we hope this book will better equip you to recognize the subtle and not-so-subtle ways organizations shape human identities—both collective and individual. <>

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